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Locke in a heathen land: Cultural constructions of politics in the Kingdom of Hawaii, 1825–1845

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LOCKE IN A HEATHEN LAND:
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF POLITICS IN THE
KINGDOM OF HAWAII, 1825 - 1845

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ABSTRACT

The study begins by reassessing a central theoretical question in political anthropology, the polarity between functionalist analysis and cultural relativism. The particular focus is on the concept of politics. More specifically, the study addresses the theoretical problem that arises from the tendency of functional analysis to universalize the concept of politics as a necessary structural property of each society, on the one hand and the conceptual atomism that is created by pure cultural relativism, on the other. An attempt is made to transcend both positions by way of a case study on Hawaiian history.

The case study covers the years from 1825 to 1845 in detail in order to show how the concept of politics was negotiated and socially constructed by using the cultural tools and categories of the various social groups that came in contact with each other during that period of time. A particular emphasis is put on the processes of translation, both linguistic and cultural. It is argued that the functionalist position that stresses human universals was constructed in the everyday interaction between Hawaiians, missionaries, traders, and seamen. It is also argued that the driving force behind the interaction was largely the dynamic relation between the Hawaiian chiefs, on the one hand and between the chiefs and common Hawaiians, on the
other. As the foreigners were drawn into these fluctuations, their interpretations of the Hawaiian society were also set against Hawaiian ideas about foreigners and the foreigners' ideas about themselves and other foreigners.

As to the concept of politics and its relation to human universals, it seems that during the period of the two decades it was only partially universalized in the foreigners' discourse. Hawaiians were still conceptualizing the foreign lands according to their cultural categories, although with a fair touch of biblical images. The concept that universalized across the cultures was that of government. Although it worked its way into the Hawaiian discourse of foreigners in a rather biblical guise, it was precisely the divine narrative that empowered the chiefly complicity in the governmental reorganization in the mid-1840's.
If idealism emphasizes that Being and Reality are only ‘in the consciousness’, this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities. But as long as idealism fails to clarify what this very understanding of Being means ontologically, or how this understanding is possible, or that it belongs to Dasein’s state of Being, the Interpretation of Reality which idealism constructs is an empty one.

Heidegger

Some people would never have fallen in love if they had never heard of love.

La Rochefoucauld
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..............................................................iv

ABSTRACT........................................................................vi

LIST OF TABLES................................................................. x

LIST OF FIGURES............................................................... xi

PART 1: CULTURAL RELATIVISM REVISITED

1. INTRODUCTION..............................................................1
   1.1. Towards a Phenomenology of Political Formalisms...4
   1.2. The Argument............................................................8
   1.3. Basic Concepts: Discursive Approach.........................14
       1.3.1. Politics as a Cultural-Cognitive Object..............14
       1.3.2. The Open Definition of Politics.......................17
       1.3.3. Level of Analysis...........................................20
       1.3.4. Social Dimensions of Discourse.......................23
   1.4. Methodology: Status of Culture, Structure, and Action...31
       1.4.1. Culture Is Structured Action............................31
       1.4.2. Action and Structure: The Subject of the Middle Ground........36
2. THE PROBLEM OF TWO CULTURES.....................................44
   2.1. Power and Politics in Anthropology.........................50
   2.2. Divine King and the Political Theory of Kū: Reflections on Political Language in Hawaiian Anthropology.............................................60
   2.3. From Categorical Relativism to Historical Relativism of Categories......................................................81

PART 2: SOCIAL THEORIES SUBSTANTIALLYZED

3. PURITAN POLITICS......................................................89
   3.1. Liberal Spirit and the Hawaiian Mission...............98
   3.2. Mission, Politics and the Theory of Civilization.................................................................110
       3.2.1. Catholic Perversion of the Law of Nature...124
       3.2.2. The Fear of Partisanship and Revolution....126
   3.3. Almost Modern: A Comparison.............................130
       3.3.1. The Hono Rite.............................................139

4. DISCURSIVE SURFACE: POLITICAL VOCABULARY...............149
   4.1. Sources..........................................................152
   4.2. Hawaiian Images of Politics.................................159
   4.3. Images of Governance..........................................173
   4.4. Discussion......................................................193
PART 3: SOCIAL THEORIES IN HISTORY

5. HAWAIIANS AND FOREIGNERS
   5.1. Foreign Lands
   5.2. The Missionaries
   5.3. The New Alliance

6. CULTURE IN THE MAKING: THE RISE OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
   6.1. Missionary Identity
   6.2. Theocracy and the Foreign Residents
   6.3. Context and Translation
   6.4. The Missing Concept

7. POLITICAL ECONOMY
   7.1. The Missionary Theory of Oppression
   7.2. God of Commerce and Applied Theology
   7.3. Kingship and "Body Politic": The Prevalence of Aupuni
      7.3.1. 'Presencing' Monarchy
      7.3.2. Untranslated Experience

APPENDIX : A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL VOCABULARY OF MAJOR POLYNESIAN LANGUAGES
LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. A Chronology of Hawaiian Word Lists, Vocabularies and Dictionaries ......................... 156

Table A.1. A Comparison of Basic Political Vocabulary of Six Polynesian Languages .................... 446
LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 3.1. Birth Places of the Male Missionaries to Hawaii. Only Ordained Ministers and Licensed Preachers Included.................................................103

Fig. 3.2. Four-year Colleges Attended by the Male Missionaries to Hawaii, 1811-1853; the Educational End Stations of the Male Missionaries to Hawaii, 1819-1858.................................................................104

Fig. 3.3. Kīna‘u and Her "Maids of Honor" Returning from the Foreigners' Church (Seamen’s Chapel) in the mid-1830s; Departure of the Missionaries from New Heaven, Connecticut for the Sandwich Islands, 1822........132

Fig. 5.1. The Dual Organization of the Hawaiian Mission in 1825..............................257
PART 1: CULTURAL RELATIVISM REVISITED
1. INTRODUCTION

Apart from the famous exception of Melville and a few other travelling skeptics, the Hawaiian islands of the nineteenth century were described as rapidly ascending the ladders of civilization. Among the Pacific islands, Hawai‘i was almost universally recognized as the most shining example of the benevolent effects of progress and Christianity. As progress in general was seen to coexist with Christianity, the Boston-based Congregationalist and Presbyterian missionaries usually received the credit for civilizing the Hawaiian heathens and enlightening their dark minds. This praise was, however, sometimes accompanied by disapproving remarks that the missionaries promoted a too austere approach to the earthly joys of life. This criticism aside, the missionaries were credited not only with saving the immortal souls of the Hawaiians, but also with saving their more transient interests of political nature. Mark Twain might have arrived a little too late to witness the historical process, but in 1866, 46 years after the arrival of the first missionaries and 13 years after the closing of the mission, he had this to say:

---

1 I have followed the practice of spelling the name of the whole archipelago without the glottal stop (') to distinguish it from the name of the Hawai‘i island proper. Similarly, I have chosen to use the anglicized adjectival form 'Hawaiian' instead of 'Hawai‘ian'.
The missionaries have clothed them, educated them, broken up the tyrannous authority of their chiefs, and given them freedom and the right to enjoy whatever their hands and brains produce with equal laws for all, and punishment for all alike who transgress them. The contrast is so strong - the benefit conferred upon this people by the missionaries is so prominent, so palpable and so unquestionable, that the frankest compliment I can pay them, and the best, is simply to point to the condition of the Sandwich Islanders of Captain Cook's time, and their condition today. Their work speaks for itself (Twain 1990, 11-12).

This idealized state is also the topic of our historical journey through the Hawaiian cultural landscape of the first half of the nineteenth century. More specifically the journey is about comparisons between cultures and cultural stages, and constructions based on these observations. All this is done in the field of politics in order to specify what kind of a constructed object politics was or became prior to the above remarks by Twain. Naturally, politics and missionaries are not a new focus of historical research (e.g., Sahlins 1992, 101-126; Kame'eleihiwa 1992, 169-198; Gunson 1978, 280-300; Stewens 1968, 8-10, 24-31; Bradley 1968, 168-213; Dodge 1965, 138-146; Tate 1964; 1960; Strauss 1963, 43-82; Koskinen 1953; Wright and Fry 1936), but, to say the least, the field calls for new ways to conceptualize the theme. For one thing, excepting the works of Sahlins and Kame'eleihiwa, the missionary influence in island politics has not been explicitly problematized from the native point of view; and second, still more importantly, I think, the whole concept of politics has been taken too much for granted, as if it
constituted a universal framework for all concerned people, transcending cultural and linguistic boundaries. In this study, my particular interest is to capture the concept of politics in its particular historical contexts and reshape the conventional orientation towards that entity in cultural studies at large. While doing this, I shall emphasize the varying degrees of vagueness that in many cases characterize cultural categories, which may, however, become more focused if the context informs concrete perception by evoking more precise referents for the categories.

To say that we are approaching politics as a cultural construct is to argue, first, that all the power-thirsty cunning and self-interest in politics are more or less functions of culture. But the circumstances in the Hawaiian islands during the period of seemingly rapid changes require a more complex assessment of these cultural functions. The complexity could be stated in a formula: Where cultures communicate politics is not simply an arena for cultural practices but also a target of the same practices. And if this is so, we must come to the conclusion that the notorious 'other' is not just the native culture 'out there' but also us 'in here'. We must, as it is increasingly demanded, anthropologize the West (Rabinow 1986; see also Carrier 1992; Rabinow 1989; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Dumont 1986; Geertz 1983, 147-163; Said 1978; Asad 1973). We should be able to show "how exotic its constitution of
reality has been," how odd and culturally idiosyncratic its scientific epistemology and religious doctrines as well as its economic and political perceptions appear in a culture contact. Thus, politics as a cultural construct is also the creation of politics in a total sense, as a meaningfully communicable concept of a particular kind (such as 'god', 'horse', or 'pandanus tree', perhaps more abstract and elusive, but in any case a concept that must be rendered sensible). The communicative aspect is crucial; without this dimension the whole study would turn into a one-dimensional meditation. For the West in Hawaii, the elements of native culture had to be reformulated and inserted into the political discourse of the West before these elements could have been communicated within the foreign community and back to Europe or America. To some extent this reformulation was also the basis of the foreigners' communication with native Hawaiians. Although documentation is scarce, it seems that the Hawaiians did the same in their observations.

1.1. Towards a Phenomenology of Political Formalisms

The particular theoretical problem of this study is the relativity of the concept of politics at cultural boundaries. On a very general level, the language itself of the social sciences presents the problem. There seems to
be a wide gap between particular experiences of social actors and the accounts of these experiences by social scientists. Throughout the family tree of these sciences the problem has resulted in numerous binary oppositions, which divide opinions and preferences between explaining and understanding social phenomena. This has especially been the case throughout the enterprise of political analysis.

In political anthropology, with which this study has most in common, a central theoretical question has been an adequate definition of politics which would avoid notions so general that they end up being trivially true, on the one hand or so narrow that they run the risk of losing the quality of comparative generalization (Balandier 1970, 22-49). An adequate definition of politics has been hampered by these two polar tendencies, which we could respectively place under the banners of formalism and substantialism.

Using the existing body of literature on the subject as the backdrop for discussion, it is argued that the dichotomy between formal and substantial approaches is rather misplaced (chapter 2). More specifically, by way of a case-study on Hawaiian history (beginning from chapter 3), it is suggested that it is simultaneously possible to gain access to substantial experiences of social actors and still to allow, at the same time, formal notions of politics. The original dichotomy is attenuated here to overcome the tendency of political anthropology to forget its own
history, its greatest theoretical shortcoming. In political anthropology, as well as in the wider paths of life, formal notions of politics are historical, social constructions, which need to be reconstructed by studying their particular substantive social contexts. The failure to do this confines the approach to concepts to measures of adequacy based on the degree of their correspondence to the observed 'reality', thus ignoring the socially embedded nature of the very same concepts. The intent of this study is not to deny the existence of formal concepts, but to emphasize their artifactual nature. In short, formalisms arise from substantial histories, which is all the more true in the contact of two substantially different cultures, such as the Hawaiian and Euro-American.

Given the foregoing, the dilemma into which a culturalist approach to politics will almost inevitably fall is the hermeneutic 'depth' of the situation. On what grounds is the observer able to draw the line between the domains that separate politics into the conceptual spaces of legitimate and illegitimate use? More specifically, how is the observer able to decide theoretically whether there was 'politics' in the Hawaiian culture? This is a paradigmatic problem of cultural comparisons. To place two cultures on the same conceptual terrain is usually to attract charges of ethnocentric formalism. On the other hand, radical substantialism, towards which this study leans more
strongly, has a tendency to atomize cultures and impound them into non-comparable ghettos. Thus, the abovementioned theoretical problem arises: How to overcome this unsatisfactory dichotomy? The course advanced here involves cultural comparison in three methodological steps, first, a substantialist assessment of differences, and second, a social constructivist analysis of the practical activities by which the social actors overcome the sense of strangeness with which they are faced in concrete situations of culture contact. The second step is therefore an analytic attempt to reconstruct historically how people make comparisons possible in their quotidian lives. This would also be the more general starting point for the analysis of representations (for a classic piece of work in this line, see Said 1978), although we intend to go somewhat further. Instead of telling a story about the various ways Hawaiians have been interpreted by the representatives of the West, I propose to tell a story about the concrete ways in which these representations were also implemented and placed in contact with Hawaiian life-ways. Therefore, we shall also look at the social interaction and communication between the key agents – or concept brokers – of the two cultural groups. It is argued that this third phase involves a gradual consolidation of cross-cultural categories, that is, implementation of representations and further construction of new representations. In sum, as far as the possibility
of politics as a meaningful experience as such is concerned, the formal category of politics in cultural comparisons is effected in a substantialist manner in the concrete life of the people under study, not in the minds of academic observers.

From this discursive point of view, the phenomenon of politics is not used in this study as a means to shed light on otherwise unintelligible social relations, but it is, conversely, taken as an historical object to be accounted for in its ability to signify these relations. Thus, the object of this study is to ask what in Hawaii, during the first 70 or so years of contact with the West, counted as being political - first for the Western argonauts and then for the native Hawaiians - and by what means this signification was achieved. Paraphrasing Elias in his study of manners (Elias 1982, 50), the vital point in the process of politicization is the moment from which the consciousness of politics begins to assume a more independent existence from its discursive progenitors.

1.2. The Argument

This study puts forth two major hypotheses or historical arguments. First, that politics as an explicit conceptual space in the nineteenth-century Hawaii is a result of a complex conceptual-practical interplay of social
actors, both Hawaiian and Euro-American. Thus, what makes politics possible is a function of these forces in action. This hypothesis, of course, is indebted to our focus on the experiential level of politics as a meaningful concept. Hence, it is necessary to ask such specific questions as, what does it mean to coin Hawaiian equivalents for English political vocabulary, what is the significance of the social context of translation, including the social positions of the translators, how does the outside world get transposed into the inside world of Hawaiians and the Westerners living amongst them? The methods chosen to pursue these questions come mainly from linguistic and anthropological tool boxes, including some assistance from ethnomethodological inquiry and discourse theory (chapter 1). Given these tools, we are not dealing with a mere change of the boundaries of political experience but with a demarcation of the field for the first time in a certain geographic locus. The role of language and naming must be emphasized, but in such a way as to fuse the purely nominalist tendencies in the myriad details of practical use of language and the social conditions of possibility that surround them (this will be called qualified nominalism). This is done in order to strip the notion of politics from its usual tendency towards automatic universalism (this applies easily to another universalistic concept - economy).
What comes to the social actors, or the engineers of Hawaiian politics, in their every-day activity of subtle cultural comparison is the strongest set of evidence in favor of our assumptions. The resultant comparative formalisms in the field of politics eventually made it possible for them to focus on what they perceived as defects of 'savage politics' and to start molding it in the direction of Western models and conceptions of political order of which the author of *Huckleberry Finn* presumably saw a brief glimpse in 1866. But before this 'change' was made cognitively (and consequently, materially) possible, a pre-change identification of a political sphere in the Hawaiian society had to have taken place (a kind of proto-politics). In view of this, the nineteenth-century Western actors in Hawaii had a long tradition in support of such perceptions. Not only had the journalists of Cook’s third voyage reflected upon the Hawaiians’ politics (e.g., Cook and King 1784, vol. 3, 3, 95-96, 154-155), but the generations of European intellectuals before them had engaged in comparative political speculation, including the late sixteenth-century cosmographers, not to mention the freedom-hungry New England settlers. Besides, these accounts commonly shared an orientation toward political didactics (Greenleaf 1964, 174). In this sense, the rise of politics in any one location is not tied to naturalistic explanations of the levels of organizational complexity, concentration of
power, or intensity of hierarchy. The naturalism of these factors is always indirect, mediated by the observations of concrete historical actors.

This brings us to the second primary question of this study. Did these engineers manufacture politics only for themselves, when, for example, they began to mold the landscape architectonically or when they were making speeches whose central vocabulary carried political human existence only in the English versions? Or, did politics become a shared and translated experience between the cultures and thus a practical comparative formalism? The question is, thus, in what way and to what extent did this 'politics' become distributed in social space? In this work, historical material will be presented that supports the thesis that the native Hawaiian cultural and social structures prevented an outright colonization of the genius of the chiefship, or, to say the least, functioned as conservative buffers, effectively domesticating the foreign notions of politics. In looking at the historical material it seems all the more evident that the efficacy of cultural change, hence political change, in Hawaii was as much a result of the particular patterns of sense-making among the Hawaiians as it was achieved through continuous pressure by foreign warships, missionaries, consuls, merchants, or the extraordinary mortality rate among the natives. Equally, Hawaiian society changed because there was a culturally
sanctioned motive among the Westerners to act as if things were in a process of change.

Perhaps we could say that the reception of these events was peculiarly Hawaiian among the Hawaiians, who had their customary ways of symbolically organizing the acts of foreigners, and, of course, peculiarly Western among the Westerners. As the Hawaiians were traditionally motivated in acquiring foreign habits, so were the Westerners ready to see this as a variation of their own scheme of things, to the effect that the local white establishment commonly held "that the pages of ancient and modern history will be searched in vain to find a case parallel to theirs [Hawaiians'] in the rapidity with which they have progressed from a savage towards a civilized state" (Castle 1841, 86).

It is therefore argued that to understand the social construction of politics in a context that involves two different cultures we must focus on the respective discourses of social organization and change on both sides, and try to find an empirically grounded balance between the two hypotheses, or between change and continuity. In other words, the discourse of politics must be analyzed and specified according to its social coordinates.

In conclusion, the object of this study is to map out the more or less explicitly formulated (i.e., documented) political dimensions of the cultural intercourse between Hawaiians and Westerners, more specifically missionaries -
whose actions launched the political discourse in public - and, to a lesser degree, some other New Englanders and Europeans. The political dimension is not seen merely as an abstracted aspect of all social relations, but here the empirical manifestations of the Puritan-liberal, or Lockean (may it be so termed), political discourse are traced and explicitly placed in the Hawaiian cultural context. In this sense, I think, we have the elements for an outline - and from time to time for a detailed study - of a cultural category we call 'politics', but, again, not as a pure abstraction but as an account, which, by its usual mechanisms of naming and ordering, produces abstractions, such as politics.

It is clear that a study of naming, ordering, or classifying remains rather thin without considering contexts, institutions, and historical circumstances in which these acts take place. Here one must look at both sides of the question, sociology as well as signification, material as well as cognitive elements: the body and mind of politics. In my view, these sides are combined in the act of naming, especially when the act is intended for an audience, which was the case in the contact of Hawaiians and missionaries in particular.
1.3. Basic Concepts: Discursive Approach

1.3.1. Politics as a Cultural-Cognitive Object

We can now turn more closely to the actual theoretical frame of the present work. This study entertains a qualified nominalist pretension approaching politics as a discourse, not merely as a textuality but as a social practice that defines and creates objects of thought, modes of action, and institutional frames. With this understanding of politics, in trying to pin down the elements and ramifications of political discourse in a social environment, it intends to avoid two kinds of determinism. First, the pitfall of what has been called agentive nominalism (Alexander 1989, 56), which would indicate a potentially endless search of particular contexts for particular thoughts and actions, thus also retrospectively neglecting the social mechanisms in the production of the very same contexts²; and second, the difficulties usually associated with structural...

² Alexander's criticism is aimed at the historical studies of Quentin Skinner and his followers, especially at the tendency to intentionalize historical action by situating all action in its specific context and neglecting the role of the "particular system's rules" (Alexander 1989, 56). Skinner's later work, however, contains clear indications of shifting from his previous intentionalism toward semantically laden conceptual history. His analyses of modern political ideas and especially the concept of the modern state stand as landmarks of this change (see Skinner 1978, 1989a,b).
orientations, which pay little or no attention to intentional action and its consequences for structures. Qualified nominalism implies, instead, that the emphasis on social practice at the bottom of every constructed object should transcend not only hermeneutic rummaging in textual meaning bits and a concomitant situationalist naming of things but also rigid and compelling variants of structuralism. It is a project to explain social construction of new things as consolidation of discursive realities, which link the available material organization or cognitive structures on the one hand and individual or collective action on the other. Qualified nominalism, in all its clumsiness as a label, is thus a metaphoric expression for a process-oriented research that takes as its objective the mapping of social novelties. Nominalism, thusly understood, is qualified by structures (material and cognitive) on the one side and by social action on the other.

The ethnographic aspect of this study is meant primarily to facilitate the study of concrete environments, that is, the resistance, or cultural inertia, of the environment in which a discourse is taking shape, for discourse, instead of being an all-powerful monster completely cut off from social actors, usually meets at least some degree of opposition, even after its consolidation. We also need ethnography to account for the
actions of the agents of discourse. What is more, all this can only be demonstrated if the relation of a discourse to its environment is weighed historically.

When the subject matter of this study is concerned, we are more specifically shifting from historical meanings in politics to the historical constitution of political knowledge objects - or cognitive objects, since knowledge is conceptualized here very broadly, namely as a sort of cultural memory which is exposed to new evaluative data. Thus, this study identifies the Hawaiian Islands in the discursive history of these objects, a move that contributes more generally to a history of the idea of politics itself as a central node in the institutional modification of Hawaiian social organization. Hawaii is seen as a chapter in the dissemination of the concept of politics, as an historical example - that by no means stands alone - of the globalizing diffusion of the concept as part of the expansion of Euro-American modernity. To study the phenomenon of modern politics in a context of a culture contact may prove beneficial in at least one significant way. In the setting of a contact the various practices of

3 By modernity I understand a condition specific to the core areas of Western societies at once different from the earlier periods of Western history (roughly pre-1650s) and from other cultures vaguely bundled up as non-Western. It is in this sense of difference that I use the concept of modernity. Thus, modern politics is also by definition something inherently non-Hawaiian, whereas its becoming Hawaiian, or the presence of its elements in Hawaiian context, is another, although related, issue.
politicization are more clearly visible than would be the case were the study conducted within a culture that already sees politics as a commonplace concept (cf. Sahlins 1981, 68). This implies a somewhat dialectic orientation, which has been manifest in the recent historical-anthropological approaches to culture contacts in Oceania (e.g., Kameʻeleihiwa 1992; Linnekin 1990; Borofsky and Howard 1989; Dening 1980, 1988; Kaeppler 1985; Sahlins 1981, 1987, 1991, 1992). As applied, this dialectic produces an ethnography of European ideas and Hawaiian practices - or, as it was, Hawaiian ideas and European practices, thus conceiving the interaction of cultures as two systems (cf. Friedman 1985; Sahlins 1992) and avoiding the fallacy of reducing one or the other to an 'event'. In the course of concrete interaction one cultural system is certainly an event for another system, but we need to know both systems before it is possible to account for the 'eventness' of either. Now, in view of the concept of politics, the assessment of eventness cannot be totally random, but it requires a guide. The task calls for a definition.

1.3.2. The Open Definition of Politics

For the late nineteenth-century French Ambassador to Hawaii, M. G. B. d'Anglade, Hawaiian politics was a matter of a happy surprise: "One of the benefits of civilization
has been the revelation to the natives of the existence of something known as politics" (d'Anglade 1987, 112). In an historiographical sense this direct observation is a primary source of history writing. But this statement can also be treated as an expression of the interpretive grid that controls the discursive production of political practices. The interpretive grid is part of the social and personal framing of the ambassador's perspective (in fact, the frame is the ambassador). Yet, he might have also been a central part of the Hawaiian social scene, hence contributed to the emergence of politics as a social phenomenon. Therefore, his statement or recollection is not just a recorded fact. I do not mean that we should discredit the Honorable Monsieur d'Anglade for his bias, for his bias is constitutive of his and some other peoples' identities and therefore of major interest from the point of view of interpretive social science. What may be biased in Monsieur d'Anglade's observation turns into a meaningful social act in an historical reconstruction.

Bearing this in mind, it appears that the definition of politics is necessarily open if we are to remain within an empirical frame. Therefore, politics is neither a social structure, although it operates on structures, nor a mentality, although it is constitutive of identities. It is rather a form of operative knowledge-practice that integrates social forms and ideational contents and forms
political actors and institutions. Thus, by politics (or the political, which better describes politics as an interpretive practice) I mean a specific quality of relations of people, first, to their surroundings and, second, to themselves. Politics is seen as a product of different ways of interpreting the environment by objectifying it as a specifically knowable unit on the one hand and as a frame for subjective relations of social actors to that environment on the other. The result of this activity is a politically invested relation, which is meaningful precisely as a political relation.

The apparent circularity and permissiveness of this 'definition' is necessary, because politics as an interpretive practice may acquire different contents, which are not themselves the first objects of this study. In sum, by politics I mean a socially and culturally constituted practice, which defines limits for the political action and identity. In this sense politics is a discourse about being and acting in society. The objective, then, is an anthropology of the political form of society.

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4 For a theoretical background of this division and its relation to discursive analysis in general, see Foucault 1986, 3-13; 1989, 133-142; Martin et al. 1988; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 143-183.
1.3.3. Level of Analysis

On the whole, politics can be studied on two levels of inquiry. On the first level we encounter either what I call assumptive or definition-oriented analyses, that is, types of analyses that either rely on some more or less widely shared understanding of the meaning and scope of politics or spend varying amounts of time and space conceptually defining these meanings. This level is mostly shared by two types of concrete analyses, history of political ideas and political sociology (and, of course, political history, if middle a ground is desired). To illustrate this approach I quote the New Zealand historian K. R. Howe: "On the whole, however, the conversion [to Christianity] of the Hawaiian population . . . can ultimately be explained in terms of the political control it offered the Hawaiian monarchy, especially Ka‘ahumanu" (Howe 1988, 173). I take this as an example of an approach that uses the concept of politics as an explanation. In other words, this concept allows one to distinguish and classify political phenomena that have a distinctive dimension of their own as separate from other social dimensions.

On the second level we find the types of analyses that concentrate on social processes that produce meanings of politics. These approaches study the social circumstances that gave rise to the concept of politics as an instrument
of evaluation. For example, we could ask what circumstances resulted in the comments of the missionary George Turner on the social organization in Tana, New Hebrides in the 1840s: "... no political constitution of any value whatsoever ..." (in Howe 1988, 295). This instrument was also in use among the missionaries of Hawaii. When they attempted to organize a mission from Hawaii to the Marquesas in the early years of the 1830s, they encountered a difficulty that was of special interest: for them, a mission was a failure because of "the entire want of civil government of any sort" in those islands (Armstrong, Alexander and Parker to ABCFM, June 4, 1834, MSL). Today's scholars are probably more likely to find political dimensions in all societies, which means that the concept of politics has not lost its importance as an interpretive tool. Quite the contrary, I think.

We can now try to establish a connection between the two levels. It is the assumptions and definitions of the first level, its conceptual basis, that are part of the object of study of the second. It is the social conditioning of political perception that is the issue on the second level. It becomes evident that not even in the political world are words simply essentially conventional, they also become conventional. And it is primarily this becoming that is of interest in the present study, the becoming of the concept, and hence, to recall our
conditional nominalist point, the political itself. This indicates that any history of political ideas or political sociology is possible only after the invention of political space in which these ideas could dwell conceptually. As in any discursive framing of an object, to use the Foucauldian expression, politics did not lie out there waiting in some eternal identity just to be discovered; rather, it was invented as an object of socially relevant knowledge, thus becoming a category of thought that intrudes on concrete reality.

So far we have suspended the question, how to write a history of a category that is at the same time so characteristic of this history itself. I would argue that it is not altogether contradictory to take the concept of politics as an object of inquiry while at the same time indicating the political dimensions of its discursive history in a specific context. It is, I think, exactly the local dimension and the specificity of politics that legitimizes this project as one that omits the politics of the first level (see above). Let us repeat: This is not a study of political theory in any conventional sense. Rather, it attempts to grasp the concept of politics as an empirical phenomenon in both a local and temporal sense. In

5 For a recent study critical of the type of political science that takes the existence of political groups as a common point of departure, "exterior and prior to political practices," see Boltanski 1987.
this sense, the social formation of political discourse in Hawaii is embedded in transformations of identities, social positions and power relations, which would surely make a case for the first level politicization. However, the political nature of this type of analysis should not be conceived as primary statement, but only as a natural corollary of a historical analysis of social forces. If this is casual and just suspends a conceptual problem inherent in the analysis, it is done to facilitate communication by remaining on one level only.

1.3.4. Social Dimensions of Discourse

To continue the themes put forth in the beginning of this chapter, the process that we are about to describe cannot be understood just as a textual property of a discourse; instead of looking at the idea of politics as a collection of texts or as a single text - and the accompanying discursive regularities - it is proposed to focus on the social genesis of these properties and regularities, an approach that would take into account the factors that can be properly called non-discursive (Foucault 1982a, 68; 1991, 54, 58). It is hoped that this move, besides avoiding the intentionalism of pure nominalism, can also steer clear of the idealist tendency inherent in any textualist analysis that moves in a social territory,
namely, the mystery of "regularities which regulate themselves" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982, 84). In view of this, the social becomes the primary locus of interpretative activity, thereby linking social genesis of ideas and modification of the social, as in the literary realm textual production draws on social reality while being, at the same time, an agent of creation. Also, once a discourse has achieved the level of serious thought its original environment has been changed. From this moment on a discourse functions independently of the forces and processes that gave rise to it. It has become a commonplace to which a whole range of other discourses and practices must be proportioned.

If a discourse, as an organization of thought and practice, is being socially constructed in an environment whose fundamental metaphors and types of understanding are alien to those of the dominant agents of the emerging discourse - as was the case of political discourse in Hawaii

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6 The reference to Foucault is not accidental. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982, 75-85, 92-93) have clearly demonstrated, the problematic relation between discursive and non-discursive elements of social life is a major theoretical difficulty in all discursive approaches and more specifically in Foucault's discourse analyses up to The Archaeology of Knowledge. In the present study I have tried to learn from their criticism and attempted an analysis that brings discursive and non-discursive elements closer together, to the extent that sometimes approaches a causal ordering from the latter to the former (while this, of course, is not a universal quality of these elements). At any rate, non-discursivity as practice is preferred to discursivity as self-referential theory.
- in what ways then should we try to make sense of the complex process? To overcome this problem, we should first make an analytic distinction between modes of conceptualizing the world and formation of discourse, in which elements of the former are organized in a particular manner.

Historically speaking, discourse is the positive process through which conceptualizations are created. However, discourse itself has only one dimension, although it can create multidimensional realities for the actors. If, for example, individualism was analyzed as a discourse, the process of its consolidation would, as an analytic object, lack the referential dimension that it may have for social actors, who, living in an individualist universe, can translate their and other's concrete actions into the conceptual frame of individualism. Or, conversely, people who do not share individualist metaphors, may have to develop ways of coping with them. To take an example, discourse about community as a group of individuals receives a rather different significance in a culture that does not conceive of the individual as a self-contained subject, who is inherently separate from the social setting or other individuals, as was the case for Hawaiians who lived as extensions of their chiefs. When these two extremes are put face to face, the meaning of 'community' is subject to negotiation. In the former case, individualism is used
metaphorically to give meaning to action; in the latter it is an object that is encapsulated in order to give it meaning.

This interaction tells us about the accumulation of discursive elements, which form the text in the social body. The separation of formal contents of discourse from its formation or accumulation requires two types of analytic tools. In the narrow, textualist, sense discourse analysis applies to the internal logic of a discourse. On the other hand, the formation of discourse, its different uses and the clashes of its elements with other types of conceptualizations are illuminated by ethnography. In other words, the functioning of non-discursive practices is more easily understood if we apply the ethnographic tools of anthropology.

In stressing the operation of discourse in a non-discursive social environment, it becomes necessary to consider social structures and individual actions which contribute to the emergence of discourse and which are, in turn, molded by discourse. Discourse in this sense is fundamentally a social phenomenon. By combining internal or textual and external or social dimensions of discourse (Hacking 1991, 191) a history of discourse steps out from hermetic textuality and becomes a useful tool of social analysis.
By way of providing some general background for discussion on the social status of discourse, it may well serve, for the reasons of simplicity and briefness, to attribute the split between the self and society to Hegel. The Hegelian self is only a "kind" of self, whose "concrete realization consists solely in cancelling and transcending the natural self" (Hegel 1967, 515). Hence, the being of the self is fundamentally dialectic with culture; it may think of itself as either the original, natural self or as an alienated version of the former - but as soon as it thinks of itself it is forced to leave the protective womb of original unity. This philosophical self becomes a social self by a logical necessity. If this is the condition of modernity, as some writers have suggested, then, following Jeffrey Alexander, "sociological theory deals with modernity" (Alexander 1989, 1) and is contemporaneous with it. The inference is suggestive. The consequences of the Hegelian split are somewhat equal to the possibility of contemporary social theory, which, through Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and many others, has basically been an enterprise to account for the split. On the general level of social theory the present study is a continuation of the tradition that most clearly goes back to this uneasy existence.

To set aside Hegel, the more concrete forefather of this tradition is probably Durkheim’s classic study on aboriginal religion (Durkheim 1915). Although it has been
suggested that Durkheim's sociological position in that study is mainly a reflection of his original social-structural determinism, some recent commentators have found strong evidence in support of a more culturalist approach (Giddens 1979; Law 1986; Alexander 1989; Thompson et al. 1990). All these commentators agree that in Durkheim's later work one can find an attempt to integrate social structures and belief systems into a mutually sustainable whole. This tendency is convincingly lucid in the following lines from Durkheim himself:

[I]t is unquestionable that language, and consequently the system of concepts which it translates, is the product of a collective elaboration. What it expresses is the manner in which society as a whole represents the facts of experience. The ideas which correspond to the diverse elements of language are thus collective representations . . . [Categories] not only come from society, but the things which they express are of a social nature. Not only is it society which has founded them, but their contents are the different aspects of the social being (Durkheim 1915, 434, 440).

This approach is interested not only in the thing-like nature of "social facts" but also in the mechanisms through which social facts become things, how they receive their naturalized forms of existence. This requires a mediation of actors, who, as I urge, construct discursive cohesion between material elements and thought, which are, in their cohesion, constructed realities.

In an interesting way we find Weberian elements in Durkheim. If for Weber, as Aron and Freund clearly state, sociology is a science of "experienced meaning" (Aron 1957,
75), or deals with "the interpretative understanding of subjectively meaningful conduct" (Freund 1968, 95), it is not assumed that these meanings would be simply internal or psychic aspects of behavior, that is, without the social nexus. Weber's own definition of culture may give a misleading impression: "Culture is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance" (Weber 1949, 81). The meaningful segment that Weber calls culture is, however, socially relevant only if it "is meaningfully oriented to the conduct of others" (Freund 1968, 103). The Weberian understanding is, according to Freund, thus deeply rooted in a social understanding of experience: "It is not necessary to be Caesar in order to understand Caesar" (1968, 99).

For social theory in general it seems beneficial to try to facilitate the coming closer of the two classics more fully by closing the Hegelian split as an answer to the obvious reductionist problems of both methodological individualism and holism. In this way, social processes are explained not only from social structures per se; even the two-way, mutually supportive, relation between material structures and cognitive operations is partly transcended, because the structures themselves are to a varying degree not only employed but also generated by discourse when it is formed in the social environment. In other words, this
deployment by discourse is also, in its creative selectivity, productive of new realities. The complexity of these processes will be better understood if we can think of discourse as a coherent way to organize and give expression to material and symbolic structures, while being at the same time a product of the people inhabiting these same structures. Schematically speaking, discourse 'bridges' the material and cognitive dimensions of social structures by creating concrete realities or, to borrow from sociologists of science, "things that hold together" (Desrosières 1991, 195). And when things start holding together "they start becoming true" (Latour 1987, 12). My task is therefore to write a history of discourse as a history of social coding by focusing on processes of solidification in which a variety of material and symbolic elements are combined into a whole, which we call discourse. 7

7 The above discussion draws considerably on a recent and still on-going debate on the possibilities of reconciling subjective and objective sides of social theory. We are reminded, to mention but a few, of Cicourel's attempts to deal with actors and structures by using aggregation and integration as operative tools in moving from structures to actors and back to structures. Callon's and Latour's studies of social translation functions in a similar fashion explaining the processes of single actors generating macro-level authority structures. Both Anthony Giddens, in his theory of structuration, and Pierre Bourdieu, in his work on social actors improvising within their social dispositions, have formed a significant part in bringing the theoretical duality of actors and structures and thought and materiality back together. For these and other relevant works, see, for example, Giddens 1979; Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981; Bourdieu 1984, 1989; Law 1986; Fielding 1988; Alexander 1989; Thompson et al. 1991.
1.4. Methodology: Status of Culture, Structure and Action

1.4.1. Culture Is Structured Action

An essential question concerning a study that focuses on cognitive aspects of social life is the relative position of culture as a totality vis-à-vis social action as contingent phenomenon. Without rehearsing the debate of cultural determinism, I shall only briefly outline the position adopted in the present work. In a classic sense, I have been paying special attention to the word 'social' as an attribute of action. Similarly, in defining culture, I shall rely on the 'open' school, which maintains a working conception that culture is the element in social life that allows different people to communicate and act together without much difficulty (Becker 1982). The logical permutations of various aspects of culture such defined will follow from the premise. Thus, for example, culture may be said to define the areas of disagreement, too, i.e., people can agree on the subjects on which they are not in agreement.

In culture contact, which this study is about, the whole constellation is more complex. Disagreements - or the lack of mutual understanding - may assume primacy over the areas of agreement, or the mutual understandings may arise from mutual but for some reason satisfactory
misunderstandings, like the Hawaiian desire for foreign goods and the Western need to civilize Hawaiians, which formed a mutually reinforcing historical process. This resulted in gradual learning across the cultures and the equally gradual consolidation of some local areas of mutual understanding.

In this process of interaction it may be difficult to decide what status should be given to culture as a received and determining structure. If we take the open school as our point of departure and at the same time focus on two different cultures in contact, it follows that the representatives of these cultures must come into agreement based on their respective abilities to redefine their own cultural categories. In short, they must create a culture, which will adapt to the specific requirements of the situation. Of course, this has not always taken place, of which interethnic hostilities are partly a proof. But generally speaking there have always been some elements of cultural compromise in these encounters - even in violent ones. For example, the conflict in the Balkans is continued largely because the several ethnic groups share a concept of ethnicity, which is then communicated across the intergroup boundaries, thus emphasizing the ethnic value of one's own group in relation to the others.

In a contact situation cultures are always risking their relative integrity (Sahlins 1981, 67-72; 1987, xiv).
For the people who actually perform the contact, it becomes all the more important to be somehow successful in creating a medium with which to approach the other. This requirement inevitably calls for improvisation in which one’s own cultural categories prove to be only loosely structured frames of reference, which may guide the action but not determine it altogether. And since these received categories are loose and not permanently fixed, there is also some genuine creation going on. Not creation out of nothing - no naive artistic freedom - but social creation.

To continue the open metaphor of culture, the mechanisms of creative process are not simply subject to whims of chance, although events producing cultural reaction might be historically contingent. In the present work, for instance, Hawaiians’ conceptions of foreigners were indeed structured; they had ideas about the outside world, but these ideas were qualitatively different prior to the arrival of Cook and his crews in 1778. No Hawaiian of Cook’s generation had ever seen a foreigner, but once they were seen, the already existing cultural categories were rapidly activated and filled with novel observations, which, if we can trust the recorded Hawaiian tradition, were subjected to lively discussion and evaluation (e.g., Kamakau 1992a, 92-96). The resultant idea of a foreigner was changed, not by a radical rupture with the old, but by a reflective sliding together of the new and the old. To use
a bastardized Hegelian metaphor, a contact culture is like a spring, which has always a link to its origin but which never forms a complete loop on any of its levels.

Now, we have some resources to answer a vital question: Where does culture come from? In a sociological sense we can hardly take cultures as god-given, although this sentiment seems to have been the existential ground for a majority of human beings. But instead of disqualifying such ontologies we should approach them in view of understanding their functioning and continuous formation. Here, culture, the paste of human communication, is given an interactional foundation. Culture arises from people living together and learning to respond to each other’s actions without too much trouble.

This theoretical argument, however, is not straightforwardly applicable to all cases of cultural studies. In studies that involve the past we have to allow the limitations that might derive from historical documentation, for example. In this sense, we cannot reliably probe into the Hawaiian past and reconstruct the social processes that generated what we call Hawaiian culture. This task we must give up to speculation. But, the historical past, or the recorded and witnessed as opposed to traditional, contains details of which the stuff of culture is made. The legendary past is naturally not free from fluctuations and unpredictable events, but it is
extremely difficult to assess them in sufficient detail, since the record of oral histories is contemporaneous with the written documents. The analysis of culture and the transformation of its received categories must therefore begin at the contact, which marks the starting point for the recorded history and the qualitative change in the data.

A decapitation must be performed on the cultures of the West, too, not because we would lack detailed information but because we have too much of it. In the Hawaiian case, the traditional past offers some clues according to which we may understand the cultural patterns at contact. The same applies to the West. Of course, these patterns are artificially deprived of their otherwise legitimate historicity, but they are, however, reinserted into history as soon as we have a convenient cultural counterpart to be set against these received patterns. Here begins the action that is behind all cultural patterns, this time acted out perhaps more explicitly and more intensely than in a generally homogeneous monocultural environment. In other words, this is the zero point for the cultures that meet. From then on they start making culture, which we might call, for the sake of convenience, contact culture.
1.4.2. Action and Structure: The Subject of the Middle Ground

The degree of determination of individual or collective action lends itself to the actors' competence of perceiving the contextual elements that constitute the environment of action. Admittedly, competence is a dangerous word, for it suggests incompetence on someone else's part or a uniform hierarchy of competences, which, of course, is culturally speaking not that simple. We are facing a problem quite like the distinction between procedural and substantive rationality in human behavior (Simon 1976). As Simon informs us, the latter alternative, predominantly used in modern economics, assumes the best utility for every action. The model predicts behavior according to utility maximization as the outcome of the best possible choice between constraining external factors in a given situation. This, of course, is the pathway of extreme positions of total culture or no culture at all. Procedural rationality, on the other hand, provides a model that considers behavior as an outcome of two kinds of constraints, external or situation specific and internal or actor-related. In this latter model behavior is rational if the actor uses a reasonable procedure in arriving at a solution in a given situation. The reasonableness of any behavior is therefore judged not as a sum total of all the objective factors that
form the situation but as a function of the specificities of actors. Thus, in a given situation, the utility may be radically different for different actors. The concept of procedural rationality leads us in a more culture specific direction, where the criteria for competent action cannot be reduced to one set of rules. This also indicates that not all actors are equally competent in all situations: actors' competence in social situations varies according to their familiarity with the situation in such a manner that in some situations some people are more apt than others to evaluate the role of determinants that are essential to the situations and also to reflect upon their own position. This quite simply pluralizes culture as a function of changing social dispositions of actors.⁸

But this does not solve the whole problem; it only excludes absolute extremes. Within this frame it is impossible to entertain any notion of a transcendental actor that resides in its own autonomous realm in all possible encounters with the world. But also, it excludes theoretical alternatives that maintain that actors can only hold subject-positions, because this would, in turn, exclude the possibility to account for the action of real people doing real things as something else than mere execution of

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⁸ Social dispositions should not be confused with material conditions or notions of class or social group, since all these entities are being constantly renegotiated and hence redefined in the duration of social process.
preexisting rules; it would leave us with an anonymous 'textuality', which functions as a determining structure. But, in order to conceive a structure we need real actors constructing it in the first place. If a structure provides people with alternatives in a Lévi-Straussian sense, we also need to pay attention to the processes through which these alternatives are generated. This calls for a middle ground notion of actor. Slavoj Žižek has called it "the subject of the work-process" (Žižek 1991, 220).

We can approach this humble subject by way of a synthesis. Its location in a process of becoming seems to imply that the theoretical separation of intentional subject and socially determined subject or transcendental subject and the subject of subject-positions is a false problem, because these two sides are actually present in all social action, hence the word "process." In a process people are not entirely reflective of their situation or completely enslaved by pre-subjective determinants. They are themselves in the making, experiencing flashes of transcendence and again succumbing to a routinized action. It is also for this reason that actor and subject are used in a synonymous sense.

At this point, I would like to recall our definition of discourse: discourse forges cohesion between material world and cognitive elements. Taking this as given, it is evident that the concept of practice is not incompatible with that
of discourse, because practice gets incorporated into discourse, thereby generating bodies of knowledge-practices, which, in-themselves, are not at all stable and once and for all fixed but open to both new discourses and new practices. Just as the empirical, as Sahlins calls practice, cannot be understood "as such but as a culturally relevant significance," practice is also productive of "contingency" (Sahlins 1985, x, xiii), which is again incorporated into the discursive domain (more or less well defined). We can hardly think of practice without meaning.

This becomes acute especially when practice is placed in a context that is new or foreign to it, such as a culture contact. Depending on the situation, it is always possible that the encountered culture does not bind the encounter but to a relatively minor extent, in which case the encounter becomes, by the necessity of the social arrangement, a genuine subject in relation to meanings and structures of the encountered culture (and sometimes, usually through reflection, to his/her own culture). And here cultural determinism makes no big issue, because culture contact as an encounter of two culturally determined systems, unaware of each other's cultural logic, can also produce processes that are relatively independent of both system's categories. The only fertile way to picture an actor-subject that could meet this challenge (we might call it social change) seems
to be the middle ground approach, or "the subject of the work-process," who can and must become historical agent.

This subject positions (Harre and van Langenhove 1991; Davies and Harré 1990) itself in a conjuncture in which it begins to 'acquire' the rules that make the conjuncture conceivable, not only as a projection of old categories but also as reflection and critical thinking. It would seem that this kind of 'positioning' provides a valid model only when the conjuncture involves a radically new situation in which reflection can take place. This is only partially true, since our everyday existence is not a dull stream of repetition after all. There are always countless occasions for novelties, although the experience of drama may not always be that intense. Of course, a culture contact, which this study is about, enhances the drama to the extent that real invention, and not just reflective learning, may occur in the actors' positioning of themselves in the conjuncture. In the latter type of situations, people, in their motivated and intentional action, construct determining structures out of the raw material that the break in their ordinary perception allows; people are, therefore, themselves, in their competent action, the source of determination. In this sense people really make history. They are forced to face radically new situations and therefore to 'double' their competence by being 'twice' the subject, first, in reproducing their own cultural categories, as Sahlins would
have it, and second, in creatively responding to novelties. Through combinations of reproduction and invention new cultural institutions are added in a manner that makes it untenable to separate discourse and practice. Marx said in his thesis on Feuerbach that the reality of any form of thinking that has secluded itself from practice is a scholastic matter. We may add to Marx that also the scholastics have a social universe to dwell in. Thus, the unity of discourse and practice is universal. A notion of subject as a simultaneous creation and creator of discourse is therefore a more fruitful alternative that allows us to take seriously the effects of social structures without falling into a rigid determinism as well as accounting for individual action without being accused of voluntarism.

From the discursive point of view one has to accommodate both the notion of intention and that of discursive structure. Not that the process of social action would naively be equal to a premeditated plan - it would, to recall Marx once more, eliminate all need for social analysis - but that intentional acts get incorporated by intentional acts of others, so that the original acts are no more the property of their initial subjects. They have become structured as a more or less collective reference point, but, nonetheless, on account of real action. Thus, politics can in one sense be taken as a contextualized reference of action, in which case we need to study the
social processes through which events are transformed into politically defined contexts. This connects us to the old question of involuntary consequences of voluntary actions and the formation of social structures (Giddens 1979). In this process, again, the actor is both determining and determined.

Finally, this actor is not unitary. It does not have the same qualities throughout the social scene. Instead, it should be viewed as a relative actor engaging in differential relations with various discourses. To put it more simply, some people become better equipped to partake in certain discourses than others, or, some people become agents of discourse, which brings us to the question of power and its Foucauldian double, knowledge. The question is, then, what type of knowledge supports and constitutes what type of social processes and positions. The task of any socially relevant discourse analysis is to account for the relation of the group of the more 'equipped' actors to their corresponding knowledge-practice and its relation to the society as a whole. However, to liberate actors from extreme subject-positions is not to deny the fact that actors as discursive agents have a structure (Feierman 1990, 34). An analysis of discourse should always try to pinpoint that structure and those actors whose action form the agent.

A summary of the middle ground conception of subject as social actor can be given, in my opinion, only partially,
because to construct an exhaustive list of necessary and sufficient conditions is to exclude all those surprising elements that a particular study in a particular context will indispensably produce. And the middle ground actor is essentially an elastic mover of the particular. Its final character, and the degree of its determination, depends on the empirical material that the student is able to collect; it is up to this material to show whether one actor is more determined in relation to a particular structure than another, or whether the structure is altogether indifferent from the point of view of still another.
2. THE PROBLEM OF TWO CULTURES

If the beginning of fieldwork marked the crisis of armchair anthropology, postmodern anthropology signals the critical juncture of the anthropological representation of fieldwork. It has become increasingly difficult to maintain a position from which the anthropologist could make interventions for the purpose of explaining culture. It is, however, as George Marcus has said, not only the anthropologist, but also the observer, that has changed; the observed has also undergone a mutation (Marcus 1990). The whole process of anthropology seems to have sunk into a network of interpretations in which the anthropological object has multiple authors and in which these voices are or are not given access to the object-image that depends on the literary strategies and narrative plots employed.

Currently, the notions of interpretation and construction are at the heart of the critique of classical anthropology. The words imply a strong anti-empiricist twist, which takes place in the relation between social actors (including anthropologists) and the objects of their action.¹ An anthropology that claims to contribute to this

¹ Much of the critique of anthropological representation in recent years has focused on this relation between the observer and the observed. The ethnographic authority has been questioned as a mechanism that operates on a model of appropriation. This mechanism usually pulls indigenous concepts from their "contexts of discourse to be reinserted in them but according to the dictates of the
interpretive movement must account for the different ways people construct their object worlds and, in so doing, recognize the historical changes in these ways. It is therefore not the static objects of classical anthropology (kinship is a case in point) that are of interest, but their becoming canonized in anthropological discourses or their becoming invested with cultural values by different social

ethnographer’s authoritative analytic scheme" (Marcus 1990, 11-12). Instead, a polyphonic (or at least dialogical) ethnography has been suggested. Whether this is a real solution or just a way to avoid the problem, is open to much debate and falls outside the direct objectives of this study. However, it should be clarified that the approach that has been constructed here does not entertain the claim to "textualist meta-anthropology" (for the concept, see Rabinow 1986, 243). If we had to juxtapose Clifford Geertz and James Clifford, as Rabinow does, the present study leans more strongly to the Geertzian attempt to maintain the anthropological relation between the observer and the observed on the premise that purports to enhance our understanding of human cultures. The meta-anthropological enterprise of textualizing and deconstructing the anthropological project and the ensuing turning inward are treated with caution, since these elements involve a danger, as Rabinow rightly observes, of becoming a hermetic "filing system for others’ texts" (243) reducing the theoretical potential to an endless self-reflection, while the quest for understanding other times and other cultures is being increasingly lost (Linstead 1993). It too often runs the risk of becoming a pathetic and apologetic (and often exhaustively long) narration of an anthropologist constructing and imposing an image of the Other. Not that this mode of reflective writing would be altogether irrelevant or disoriented (because this is how anthropology operates). The criticism here is intended only as a tentative warning against the "flattening" effect of too extensive (and often paradoxically too narrow) self-awareness, not as a categorical rejection. We shall later see that this critique does not necessarily entail a dichotomy between traditional anthropology and textual meta-anthropology. As a result of various social processes the textual practices of inventing the Other have more than once become part of the ‘real’ Other (e.g. Hanson 1989).
actors. This focusing on the interpretations has a bearing on cultural comparisons, too (more so, if it is admitted that comparison is ultimately the only way to approach other cultures). The problem of legitimacy follows: How to formulate a model of comparison that would at least learn from the so-called crisis of classical anthropology?

The history of social construction of cultural objects provides an option. In this chapter the question of comparison is explored more fully paying particular attention to the social-constructivist perspective and politics as a comparative category. I also argue that through the critique of more or less functionalist categories of political anthropology one is able to approach an alternative that can take seriously the critical raids of meta-anthropology while still remaining within the program of constructivist social theory, which, in most variants, takes seriously the possibility of studying real people.

The problem of politics that was outlined in the previous section assumes different degrees of complexity depending on the setting within which it is problematized. It is one thing to compare intrasocial entities and another to engage in intercultural comparisons. It is likely that in the latter type one is faced with greater difficulties than in the former and that the same would be true in historical comparisons. Here we have to confront both dilemmas, historical and cultural distance. The development
of political modernity in Hawaii is therefore at the heart
of the complex issue of comparison in time and symbolic
systems. And even more so, since here politics is not seen
primarily as a formal concept that has abstract institu­
tional correlates in every social reality. In the
following, this comparative problem is outlined in view of
avoiding formal approaches.

In this study, it has not been asked, what are the
manifest political institutions and activities; rather, the
analysis takes as its object the ways of constructing the
objects of knowledge that assume the guise of politics. For
instance, I disagree with R. H. Barnes, who seems to
maintain that politics, together with economics and kinship
among other things, belongs to the group of anthropological
topics that, due to their commonsensical nature, are less
exposed to difficulties of comparison than metaphysical
categories, like experience of time (Barnes 1987, 129). It
is relatively unproblematic for Barnes that politics as an
anthropological object depends on the observer’s everyday
language. Barnes’ position would not arouse my objection,
had I shared with him and many others the operationalizing
approach, in which case the intercultural (or intertemporal)
object of analysis would retain a similar form but assume
different meanings in different contexts. Briefly, as the
outcome of comparisons, we would have a series of different
political structures and meanings, which would nevertheless
be all part of the more abstract and universal category of politics. Ernest Nagel has summed up this theoretical attitude:

... the fact that social processes vary with their institutional settings, and that the specific uniformities found to hold in one culture are not pervasive in all societies, does not preclude the possibility that these specific uniformities are specializations of relational structures invariant for all cultures. For the recognized differences in the ways different societies are organized and in the modes of behavior occurring in them may be the consequences, not of incommensurably dissimilar patterns of social relations in those societies, but simply of differences in the specific values of some set of variables that constitute the elementary components in a structure of connections common to all societies (Nagel 1961, 462).

But when the concept of politics as a cognitive category is itself studied, it becomes difficult to sustain this otherwise quite legitimate (but not unproblematic) comparative strategy. We may again turn to Nagel for an appraisal of the usability of the universal category of politics. For Nagel the category is a survival of high functionalism, which involves an assumption that a political organization is somehow a necessity for a society to endure. The problem with this type of conceptualization is precisely its broadness. When all forms of organized social control are seen as manifestations of political organization and as all human communities possess organized forms of control, it is clear that political organization thus understood cannot be anything else but truism (Nagel 1961, 528).

In Nagel's critique we are still working within a possibility of compromise in form of a better conceptual
definition and logical analysis. Politics is, despite the criticism, still regarded as an explanatory category, which is not, as a category, subjected to empirical analysis. In this form it is permanently faced with the hermeneutic dilemma of the impossibility to translate perfectly from one culture to the other, for it cannot firmly decide the criteria of compromise without losing some of the indigenous meaning: "Anthropologists are torn between diametrically opposed demands: to be true to the intense particularity of their field experience, and to give meaning to that experience by generalizing it to the world at large" (Lewellen 1983, xii).

In order to understand the importance of the different ways in which the category of politics has been used and the processes through which the category has been locally created, one has to alienate oneself not only from the familiarity of the abstract concept of politics as a universal element of every society but one has also to question the seemingly self-evident possibility to possess such a category at all. This may, in the end, require a rejection of the hermeneutic motive of comparison, which depicts the task of interpretation as preservation of meaning. This may be necessary for the simple reason that hermeneutic framing itself creates the issue of impossible cultural comparisons, not the cultures per se (Mattick 1986, 68).
To circumvent both an imperialistic functionalism and a hermeneutic abyss we might try to account for the possibility of comparisons by integrating a history of comparative categories and their concrete effects in the society that is the object of comparison. However, to better understand the problematic nature of the comparative category of politics, let us first examine more carefully its internal structuring and its place in anthropological theory.2

2.1. Power and Politics in Anthropology

... political theory stubbornly persists in identifying itself with a theory of power, that is, mistaking a minor problem for the basic one, which lies in the relation between power and values, or ideology. The moment hierarchy [as a value] is eliminated, subordination has to be explained as a mechanical result of interaction between individuals, and authority degrades itself into power, power into influence, and so on. It is forgotten that this sort of question appears only on a definite ideological basis, namely, individualism ... (Dumont 1977, 10).

The above quote from Dumont summarizes in a concise manner the problem of seeing politics as a formal feature. Politics is supposed to equal an organized functioning of power. This view has penetrated the field of anthropology, too, which is even more deplorable in regard to the primary

2 Here I have concentrated on the more recent developments in political anthropology. For a brief overview of the historical coexistence of political thought and cultural observation before anthropology was established as an independent discipline, see Myres 1916.
task of anthropology as the science of the Other. As can be inferred from Dumont's remarks, pure power is an invention of a society in which the individual as the social atom is highly segregated. In these societies individualism gives rise to political twins of power and legitimacy, peculiar features that have led to an institutionalized form of analytic social criticism (Halévy 1952). In extreme, these societies are constantly waging a war against their own constitution.

Here we have the radical utilitarian (Halévy's Benthamite), the ardent democrat, and the prototype of all revolutionaries, who all belong to a culture that opened up "a space where the activities of thinking and of politics [led] to putting again and again into question not only the given forms of the social institution and of the social representation of the world, but the possible ground for any such forms" (Castoriadis 1987, 43). It is from this perspective that pure power must be understood as a notion that persistently clings to the skirt of the anthropologist. For to claim to free oneself from all constraints of tradition is only a logical root for seeing power only as a pure drive or desire.

A political theorist treats power as a hard-line economist treats production. And this does not apply to hardliners only. To take an example again from Dumont: Schumpeter, in his History of Economic Analysis, paid close
attention to the definition of "economic analysis" but quite simply disregarded the definition of "economic phenomena" (Dumont 1977, 23). It is by way of this lapse of mind that Schumpeter was able to detect signs of economic analysis beyond the emergence of economy as a definite category of scientific knowledge - or, maybe we could say that this enabled him to talk about economy as a reality in the first place. But, as Dumont says, "[i]t should be obvious that there is nothing like an economy out there, unless and until men construct such an object" (24).3

The same applies to pure power as the core of political theory. Power must be understood as an invention, a certain specific investment of meaning rather than a universal utility drive. It would be disastrous, for instance, to

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3 This, of course, is not to say that economic analysis would be profoundly false or not valid as knowledge. As Mattick puts it while criticizing Winchian relativism:

'[W]ar for Winch is not a concept devised to signify a type of social behavior; rather it is the use of this concept which makes the behavior the kind of behavior it is. These are not, however, the only alternatives. True, war cannot be characterized as a kind of 'behavior' but only as a cultural institution. But it does not follow from this that the institution is correctly understood by the natives whose institution it is, nor that actions always correspond to ideologies, so that acts of war always have the character claimed for them by actors (Mattick 1986, 72).

Mattick, however, leaves out one important dimension. War as a conceptual reality is shaped on another front, too, namely, that of science, to which Mattick's latter sentence belongs. One has only to think of the inputs of scientifically based foreign policy decision making.
translate Polynesian mana as power, unless we wanted specifically to transform a cosmic term into an individualist one (which was, in fact, done). This, again, does not strip pure power of its validity as an analytic tool of understanding; it certainly helps explain social relations, but it is not always the best available tool. Some historical landmarks of the discipline can be cited to demonstrate this unfortunate state of things.

Political theory has always been a strange territory for political anthropology as science. From the point of view of this science, political theory is fundamentally committed to speculative dimensions of reality, instead of basing itself on empirical analysis of the same reality. In their classic African Political Systems Fortes and Evans-Pritchard denounced political theory as either engaged in normative prescriptions of the good life or poorly documented evolutionary schemes of the development of political institutions (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940a, 4-5). This has remained the elementary attitude of the majority of political anthropologists. But as Georges Balandier wrote nearly a generation ago, in the first textbook of the discipline, the scientific ambition (he adds the attempt to avoid ethnocentrism),

does not eliminate the initial considerations of any political philosophy. How is politics to be identified and qualified? How is it to be ‘built up’ if it is not an obvious expression of social reality? How are its specific functions to be determined if one admits - as do several anthropologists - that certain primitive
With these words Balandier urges that more attention should be paid to the notion of politics, although he was unable to solve the problem he posed in the beginning of his search. But he is not alone with this dilemma. It has been tackled by almost everyone in the field, and although tentative and workable definitions have been used quite successfully, the sentiment has been one suggested by Morton Fried: "It is a matter of utmost difficulty - probably impossible - to offer universally acceptable solutions" (Fried 1967, 4). Carl Schmitt's 60-year-old laconic statement, "One seldom finds a clear definition of the political" (Schmitt 1976, 20), seems to have retained its acuteness. This has obviously resulted in a practical and happy unconcern, as political theory is concerned, so that the notion itself has more or less been made a function of a variety of particular needs and approaches (Lewellen 1983), instead of forcing one's way to a more fundamental level.

It should be stressed here that it is no solution to universalize politics because power is present in every society. If it is true that political anthropology has consciously or unconsciously postulated that "the true political condition" as opposed to anarchy and tyranny "always evades primitive man" (Clastres 1977, 19), it certainly makes an ethnocentric discipline. But, on the other hand, to emphasize the particularity of the political
aspect of life in some other societies, while at the same
time universalizing the political as the function of the
sociological, as Clastres does, is to remain within the
circle. It is not much different from a simple assertion
that what we have as the primary object of political
anthropology is in fact "the range of political variety" (R.
Cohen 1969, 44). The notion itself is left unaccounted
while accounting for its different uses.

This can be said to be equally true whether we take the
structural-functional or processual or aspect-oriented
culturalist approach to political anthropology. They all
seem to find a common ground." The present form of

Political anthropology as an independent subfield
has, of course, undergone its own period of the critique of
functionalism. While the field has shifted from static
analysis of political systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard
1940b) to that of political processes, mediated mainly by
the works of Leach (1954) and Gluckman (1955), the problem
of functional abstraction of politics has been pushed to the
background. It seems that the more recent criticism of the
older, functionalist notions of politics - attacking the
mode of thinking that basically saw politics as "aspects of
a total social structure" (Radcliffe-Brown 1940, xxii) -
assigns, in its emphasis on dynamics, political meaning to a
greater variety of "aspects" of social life in order to
couple political with something else, something that cannot
be found in the standards of classical political theory.
Paradoxically, even this latter alternative leads to a kind
of functionalism. Although the focus of research is now on
the actual dynamics of political activity and on the acting
subject and his/her manipulative strategies, through the
necessary definition of politics the functionalist problem
is all but eliminated. Either politics has a role in society
through which something of collective nature is achieved as
a process of negotiating power conflicts (Swartz, Turner and
Tuden 1966) or it is incorporated in social life in such a
way that it represents an aspect of all social action, but
not necessarily conceived of by the actors (A. Cohen 1974).
In the former alternative the functionalist core is
political anthropology, as well as the preceding forms, makes a distinction between two sides of social reality, first, the indigenous structures of meaning and experience or motivated action, and second, the sociological explanation of the operation and status of indigenous structures and motivated actions. This is characteristic also of the variety of political anthropology that, instead of abstracting social functions, attempts to penetrate local cultural meanings. In this variety, the tendency to 'distil' the political from indigenous notions as something that is at best a flexible way to realize or modify these notions in practice by the indigenous actors themselves, has resulted in a condition that resembles a contradiction in which ontological preference is given - now in secret - to sociological representation, whereas the experience and the ideas that these actors associate with their practice is separated from the political by an ontological split. The political seems to take the side of the sociological, hence running the risk of what Holy and Stuchlik have rightly called a misunderstanding of the status of the anthropologist's data in relation to the ontological status preserved in the definition of politics, which forms the limits of analysis, no matter how processural the action is within these limits. In the latter, the notion of political aspect as an explanatory factor makes it a close relative of functional analysis.
of the reality he is trying to explain (Holy and Stuchlik 1983).

The experience of the social has been, so to speak, physicalized for one part while humanized for the rest. Instead of thoroughly problematizing such categories as economy or politics, anthropologists, in their more recent emphasis on symbolic dimensions of reality, have expanded the logic of these categories into the domain we can refer to as symbolic. Thus, economy and politics are no more labels of secluded systems of material fulfillment of the functional needs of society, but arenas of symbolic action, or, conversely, the symbolic is a new locus for the political and the economic.

This was already visible in such a landmark work as Leach's study of the Kachin political system (1954). After outlining the two basic modes of structuring the Kachin society, Leach develops an argument according to which the changes in that society depend on the contradictions inherent in the two structures. It is the social reality that does not correspond perfectly to the idealized structures of social order that finally launches the process of change. But then Leach becomes puzzling. He brings in the political as opposed to the ideal. In his own words, "[t]his 'as if' system needs to be distinguished from the categories of political fact" (1954, 281). For Leach, although as a side-product of his study, the ideal as
opposed to the actual equals the ideal as opposed to the
political. This begs for a question. Why, after a detailed
and masterful study of an indigenous cultural system, one
has to resort to a language that shifts the system, with all
its internal dynamics, to a level that cannot be found in
the system itself?

Of course, the question can be deemed to be misplaced
for the single reason that this is how social science
operates. It explains by saying its observations ‘in other
words’. But, nevertheless, social science is possible even
without notions of politics, which in this and many other
cases, without adding substantially to analysis, assumes the
role of sociological formalism that tends to overrun
sociological substantialism. It rather reminds us of the
familiar dream world of ultra-individualist action.

Geertz, writing in a hermeneutic mood, is closer to
capturing the substantialist variant of power, sought after
by Dumont. In his study of the ancient Balinese state,
Geertz criticizes Western political theory for subordinating
the symbolic dimensions of power to those of the
"efficient." According to him political theory treats
symbolic dimensions as "extrinsic" and "more or less
illusional" in relation "to the real business of politics."
But in Bali symbolism and the efficacy of power cannot be
comprehended as separate entities of which the former would
only mystify the functioning of the latter (Geertz 1980,
Any such context as the Balinese culture does not allow the utilitarian power and the adjacent 'legitimation need' to emerge. It is rather "a poetics of power, not a mechanics" (123) that one should try to elaborate, "a structure of thought" as well as "a structure of action" (135) firmly forged together. Agreed. But, quite inevitably, the ontological confusion of sociological and indigenous concepts is not completely avoided. The political assumes the guise of the symbolic.

The above criticism suggests an abandonment of a formalized, that is, individualist-utilitarian, notion of power as the unifying tool of political comparison. And if this formality, which is at the bottom of the notion of Western politics, is rejected as a guiding principle, it follows that the notion of politics also becomes suspect. It would seem that there is no political theory without the category of the political, which is, as said, deeply conditioned by one particular conception of power. Without this formal twist at the outset it would be impossible to translate any non-Western social organization, not to mention the Hawaiian world of divine chiefs, into political language. The symbolic approach is not, as we have seen, a completely satisfactory answer, either.

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5 Hobart (1987) has criticized Geertz for being only partially sensitive to the Balinese culture. According to Hobart the theater metaphor dangerously transplants an idea that is a cultural stranger in Bali.
As this is not merely a theoretical matter in culture contacts, a comparative analysis that takes the study of practices of conceptual translation as one of its primary tasks, becomes all-important. In the history of politics, these conceptions acquire a central analytic position, but any attempt to analyze this history must also understand the cultural logic on the basis of which a political discourse might be constructed.

2.2. Divine King or the Political Theory of Kū: Reflections on Political Language in Hawaiian Anthropology

The cultural logic in Hawaiian society also suggests an interpretation of its own. In the following, however, I will point out some of the difficulties in the several attempts to materialize the particular requirements that the Hawaiian understanding of power puts before the analyst. In doing this I have two major purposes. First, to show that in these works the expression given to Hawaiian politics has been influenced by, if not based on, the Western notions of power - especially the difficult persistence of pure power - and political organizations of the state, which are incompatible with Hawaiian experiences of competition and domination. Second, to prepare to circumscribe the arising hermeneutical dilemma, that is, to pave the way for an approach that instead of deciding whether Hawaiians had
politics or not, studies the empirically identifiable political discourse in Hawaii and the ways in which this discourse encountered Hawaiian culture.

The indigenous Hawaiian politics, or what has been perceived as politics in the traditional Hawaiian society by a group of outsiders, has its historical roots in the appearance of competitive chiefly dynamics, which, in turn, is the basis for what I call the political theory of divine kingship, so well described in the works of Sahlins and Valeri. We could also call it the political theory of Kū after the Hawaiian god of male powers, who also represented the activity of usurpation and warfare, which have been judged to have been elementary in the indigenous Hawaiian political culture.6

6 Quite interestingly, in modern interpretation Kū has been explicitly described as the god of politics. The revised edition of Samuel M. Kamakau's Ruling Chiefs of Hawaii (1992a) contains a photograph of a wooden (ʻōhiʻa) image of Kū. The text has a designation "god of war and politics." Compared to the first edition (1961) Kū has acquired the political dimension besides the old function of war god (the first edition has only a picture of a feather image of Kūkāʻilimoku, Kamehameha’s god and one of the manifestations of Kū). This can be a result of a more comprehensive depiction of traditional Hawaiian culture, but even then one should remember that comprehensiveness is an outcome of redirecting scholarly attention, which itself is constrained by strictly speaking extra-scholarly circumstances. It is probably no accident that some of these circumstances - revitalized Hawaiian activism, the fact that one of the editors of the second edition is also a member of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, and the general tendency to see more dynamics and variety in non-Western cultures - come together in the second edition of Kamakau’s work. It is also possible that these circumstances have allowed the editors to see Kamakau’s own writings as expressions of his political identity in the mid-nineteenth-century Hawaii,
The conceptualization of this theory is presented here as an abstract synopsis, which rather lacks much of the dimension of concrete social reality. But, on the other hand, would it be too much to urge that a cosmic existence is a form of real existence, not simply a first cause of everything but a space within which concrete action takes place and against which it is therefore mirrored, the Hawaiian social activity being therefore fundamentally characterized by its relation, as appropriation, to the divine? And now, if we consider carefully the Hawaiian natural understanding, we immediately recognize the difficulty of applying transcultural formalisms as a form of political analysis. Here we also detect some difficulties in the ways in which the chiefly competition is communicated by Sahlins, Valeri and some others.

Let us begin with some fundamentals, namely the Hawaiian cosmological classification of natural objects. It is often said that for a Hawaiian the surrounding nature was a vast collection of divine bodies (*kino lau*, literally "four hundred bodies"), things that according to Hawaiian tradition originated before the people in the realm of the divine (Valeri 1985b, 9-12). The staple food, trees, stones, earth, rats, pigs, dogs, birds, and fish were all part of the divine family of nature. The most famous of the

where drastic changes made Hawaiians a permanent underclass in their own land.
surviving creation chants, Kumulipo', pictures a generative succession of natural beings divided into two realms, divine (pō) and profane (ao). The people only belong to the latter, the former enclosing the rest of the nature. As the chant describes the nature of pō:

O ke Akua ke komo, 'a'oe komo kanaka.
The god enters, man can not enter.
(Beckwith 1990, 59; this line is repeated 43 times during the first seven sections [wā] of the chant).

The place of people as generic beings was therefore of crucial importance. In relation to the divine universe of landscape and celestial phenomena people were categorically profane. The emergence of humanity marked the beginning of the ordinary, the rational and the cultural as opposed to

7 The chant is known to have been dedicated to a sacred child, named Lonoikamakahiki at birth by his mother and renamed Ka'i'imamao by his paternal grandmother when his umbilical cord was cut in a ceremonial consecration following the birth. According to Queen Lili'uokalani, the chant was composed around the year 1700 by a specialist called Keaulumoku, but later analysts agree that it has been reworked several times since its original date of composition to include new generations of chiefs. The significance of any such genealogical and cosmogonic chant is well described by the late Katharine Luomala: "This prayer chant . . . traced the family's divine origin by genealogical pairs through great rulers, heroes, and primary gods back to the first spark of life in the universe. It linked the family with the spiritual representatives of all phenomena, great and small, on the earth, in the sea, in the heavens, in the spirit world, and in the world of living men" (Luomala 1990, xiv). The name of the chant is fitting: 'Beginning in the deep darkness/realm of the divine'.

The chant was first published in a volume of Polynesian mythology by a German anthropologist Adolf Bastian in 1881. Before that date it had existed in a manuscript form in the possession of the Hawaiian royalty. First English translation was provided by Queen Lili'uokalani in 1897. For a detailed discussion, see Beckwith 1990 and Johnson 1981.
the divine "spirit world of gods, which includes all natural forms" (Beckwith 1989, 312; 1990, 48). Thus, wherever a Hawaiian moved he or she encountered innumerable signs of the presence of the divine. No categorical listing of these divine entities exists, and perhaps they were never enumerated to form an exhaustive catalogue that would resemble a biological chart. Perhaps the divine essence of nature simply formed a basis on which natural things were thought of and talked about. They were all embraced by a divine attribute as, for example, coconut, breadfruit and koa and 'ōhi'a trees as well as mountain heights and open seas (moana) were all linked with Kū, one of the four major gods, who represented the male powers of the universe and was associated with such activities as canoe building and warfare. Or, like Lono, the 'fertility god', who was associated with rain clouds, sweet potato and pig (see Valeri 1985b, 15-17 and Kamakau 1991a, 57-59). The Hawaiian classification of natural things therefore followed a logic of divinity, that is, things were grouped together according to their associations with the divine powers of the universe.

From this classificatory logic we may infer a basic mode of Hawaiian existence. The concrete environment being of divine origin, people's arduous duty was to negotiate their mode of being with the divine. People were the paramount appropriators of nature, hence their delicate
status and thoroughgoing ritual existence. Although every Hawaiian participated in this negotiation in daily life (Malo 1991, 81), it was nevertheless not just anyone who could secure nature for the humankind as a whole. A person with the sufficient mana was required. Although there is a great variety of definitions of Polynesian mana (Shore 1989), it is certain that mana was divinely sanctioned; it provided a link to the spirit world through worship and right conduct, main avenues in Hawaii being those of creative and destructive practices of Lono and Kū respectively (Kame‘elelehiwa 1992, 44-49).

The Hawaiian means to demonstrate the factuality of that link was a genealogy extending to pō. Thus, the genealogically closest person to gods, who was also called akua, a god (Malo 1991, 54; Kamakau 1991b, 25), could also defy them, that is, secure the appropriation of nature for humankind. The high chief, as Valeri remarks (1985b, 158-159), was a condition of any social activity and, in fact, the society itself. According to Kamakau the most high-ranking chiefs "could release (wehe) the kapus [tabus] of the gods, hence they were called 'life here on earth,' he ola ma ka honua nei" (Kamakau 1991a, 10).

Schematically, humankind, as represented by the high chief, was really a usurper of divine powers. In Kumulipo the emergence of divinity and humanity are framed in an archetypal competition (Beckwith 1990, 94-106, lines 595-
The god and the first man are from the same source, but through the first child of the woman the man, instead of god whose right it duly was, initiates the senior line that appropriates the land. An analogy of this mythical concentration was witnessed in the marital strategies of the Hawaiian elite, but, as Sahlins remarks, it also served as a model for the so typical process of usurpation: "an iconic realization in the mode of social relations of the appropriation of the bearing earth (= the wife) from the god (= the chief of the senior line) by and for the humankind (= the usurper, the warrior). The problem was that this

8 This is also reflected in the usual ritual practice of worship, the common name of which is ho'omana, that is, "to cause one to have mana, to empower" (Valeri 1985a, 89). Thus, gods' ability to empower men was made dependant on men worshipping gods. It is much telling that when the abolition of the Hawaiian tabu system was at hand in the fall of 1819, the decisive step was first taken by one of the few truly high-ranking chiefs, Keōpūolani, mother of the high chief Liholiho, who now ruled all the islands. Referring to the high chief Kamehameha, who had died in May, Keōpūolani said: "He who guarded the god is dead and it is right that we should eat together freely [eating tabu that separated men and women at meals and forbade women some foods was made a symbolic representative of the whole system of tabus - JM]" (Kamakau 1992a, 224).

Relating to this, the missionary William Ellis, who travelled around the Hawai‘i Island in 1823, tells an interesting story. According to the natives of Kona, Hawai‘i, Kamehameha’s war god Kā‘ili (short for Kūkā‘ilimoku) used to be seen flying about near its temple in the form of a fire ball. Ellis was keen to explain the natural cause of such a phenomenon and after giving the explanation he asked the natives if they did not see the same fire balls although the worship was discontinued and the image destroyed. The answer the natives gave was firmly negative (Ellis 1979, 75).
apparent harmony of act and myth led to struggles without end" (Sahlins 1991, 42).

The possibility of war reached its climax at the death of a high chief, when a new life on earth was to be installed. For any chief of the junior line the new high chief represented an object of usurpation, for he, as a closest link to pō, became a 'god'. By becoming a 'god' the high chief paradoxically jeopardized his divine status by being subject to serious responsibilities as 'god', as a guarantee of the general welfare. The smallest misfortune in his position could lead to rebellion by any one of his closest relatives, who had the same genealogical connection to the divine and who were his virtual doubles (Valeri 1985b, 165-166).

So, it was not always clear who would receive the greatest possible honor of being the life on earth. At least in principle the closest relatives were all potential enemies to each other, for they all possessed the claim to godliness. In this model, warfare through worship of Kū could, and often did, elevate an otherwise junior ranking chief to the paramount status of the first-born. It should, however, be remembered that not just anyone could choose this path; a connection to a chiefly line was needed, and, as was the usual practice, a victorious usurper, to capture the divine mana, sacrificed his prime opponent and married the highest ranking women of the defeated side to secure his
status and the status of his descendants. A recurrent theme in Hawaiian lore is an adopted son who discovers his royal origins and finally usurps the position of his elder brother. It is not merely that this sequence can be read as a metaphoric expression of the humankind appropriating the fertile earth, the point is that the son's high-ranking origin has only been concealed from him. In cases of succession and usurpation the actual relations of different chiefs and their supporters received their coherence from the principle of genealogy, or the transformation of "power into rank" (Valeri 1985b, 157).9

To be the life on earth had also another important implication, namely, the redivision of lands. The new high chief showed his generosity and productivity by redistributing the lands to his followers. In this way he truly was the life on earth and the source of all power. This dividing of lands often bypassed the closest male relatives of the high chief, particularly because they were his genealogical rivals of the first class. It was safer to give land to lesser chiefs and keep the potential 'gods'

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9 The alliances between chiefs and commoners and high chiefs and lesser chiefs were all part of this logic of genealogically mediated mana. The 'utility function' of this system led to constant evaluation of the beneficiality of current commitments, because of the potential chance to enhance one's mana either by usurpation or re-allying. The practice of 'imihaku or the search for the lord was the manifest essence of alliance forming, the result of which was the unstable character of chiefly dynasties, the mana being in perpetual flux, which was partly due to the logic of 'imihaku itself.
without the land resources, which simultaneously deprived them of manpower. Sometimes this led to rebellion. These two functions of the life-giving power of the high chief, abundance of food and dividing of lands, were also the primary motives for his overthrow by the chiefs of the junior line.

If in Hawaii the divinity of the chiefs was depicted within a peculiar logic of competition which, in turn, was a repeated logic of divine structure of the universe itself, the experience of power and utility cannot be understood in the Western terms of an individualist bid for influential position in the social hierarchy. However, the outward activity of Hawaiian chiefs at the time of the first contacts with Europeans and Americans could have been very deceiving, because this practice was developed into a heightened sense of rivalry in which different loyalty lines were under continuous pressure, threatening to break up as new evidence was constantly sought to support the upward movement of a chief. Besides, the foreigners were regularly drawn into the chiefly game as advisors and providers of firearms and ships. This struggle for 'power' cannot, as Sahlins points out, be understood without reference to the cultural stock of codes that inform the social perception and assign intelligible meaning to empirical action.

But regarding the political, the empirical becomes a theoretical problem. If for the Hawaiian high chiefs their
descent was fundamentally undifferentiable - a theory in harmony with the Hawaiian conception of the origin of humankind - then it became increasingly difficult to make a necessary distinction within the chiefly class for the purposes of actual ruling and hierarchy (Geertz's "real business of politics"). Internally humankind was of the same stuff, only nature was separated from people by the division of pō and ao. In fact, a human hierarchy would be incompatible with the cosmological theory of the origin of human beings. It was also a puzzle for the early Hawaiian informants how and why the Hawaiian society was originally hierarchized between aliʻi and makaʻāinana or chiefs and commoners. However, although the question itself was most probably put forth by the early missionaries (the importance of which should not be underestimated), there seems to have been a unanimous opinion in oral histories that the original division was a later invention and of foreign origin, that is, introduced by migrating generations from other parts of Polynesia (see Malo 1991, 4-8, 28, 52-53, 60; Kamakau 1991a, 3; 1991b, 35; 1992b, 229; especially the story of the migrating priest Pā'ao, in Kamakau 1991b, 97-100; also Pogue 1858, 25-26; Remy 1979, 9).

Hence the obvious question for Hawaiians seems to have been: "How to create a satisfactory discontinuity from the political point of view? - or, how is a discontinuity created that corresponds to the lines of force of a
society?" (Valeri 1972, quoted in Sahlin 1991, 42). The contradiction was overcome by the same cosmology, since it also provided the means for distinction in the form of usurpation of god's mana by the first man but now only transposed into relations between the high chief and his relatives.

From these brief fragments one is already able to extract the usage of the notion of politics in the Hawaiian anthropology. If "the political reality appears as a humanized version of heroic legend" (Sahlins 1991, 42), then one must make a theoretical distinction between what is called "political reality" on the one hand and "heroic legend" or the myth on the other. The "lines of force in society" - or the political - thus represent the real, the concrete, and the empirical, whereas the problem of how to create an acceptable form of legitimacy for the real or the political, takes the place of the cultural. But the difficulty in this theoretical distinction is precisely the fact that in modern cultural theory the empirical does not exist in-itself (which Sahlins and Valeri willingly admit). One cannot take the political as representing the empirical, which is then given different interpretations depending on the position of the interpreter, as if the cultural (interpretations) would be a pursuit of the political but now only in disguise. Instead, the existence of the political is guaranteed only as an interpretation. And
furthermore, "the lines of force in society" are themselves products of the cultural.

Briefly, one cannot have pure power struggles, the reality of which would be their utility as empty of meaning and the existence of which would be outside the cultural logic that once made them possible. It is as if the self-interest in the political would be an equivalent to a transcendental need, a will to power. It is too simple to reduce even the Western political to a will to power or, for that matter, to an 'interest'.

In the present case, much of this prevalence of pure power is due to the dual nature of Hawaiian (and some other Polynesian) chieftainships, the active, usurping side of Kū and the passive, productive side of Lono, which could be united in one chief’s rise to paramountcy. This diarchic chieftainship (Goldman 1970, 225; Sahlins 1981; 1992, 61; Valeri 1982, 1985a, 1990) is very much open to political interpretations,10 which use pure power as their measure of the politicality of chiefly struggles as opposed to the more 'religious' or ritual function of the Lono side. The action of lesser chiefs in their realignments and usurping tendencies is considered political par excellence, as the high chief's attempts as the sacred aliʻi nui to maintain a

10 In Western Polynesia, where diarchy is more pronounced, the division of labor between religious chiefs and profane junior chiefs has led to an interpretative standard to identify profane activities with the political.
balanced order is seen to reflect a genuine art of government (see Sahlins 1968, 91).""""Hence we are used to reading about "political rivalry" and "political authority" or "political decision" (Goldman 1970, 212, 227-228), which are of "political importance" in "Hawaiian political structure" (Sahlins 1958, 164). Despite the intelligibility of the foregoing logic, it is not altogether acceptable that the pragmatic aspects of action are invariably, in hierarchical situations, given a political qualification merely because this pragmatism would resemble our politics as the art of the possible. As we have learnt, in these accounts the pragmatic is somewhat equal to the empirical as separate from the cultural. This results in another individualist problem, namely that of camouflaging one’s striving to power. The usual expression of this suspicion is the concept of ideology.

Valeri, for instance, derives the notion of legitimacy from the Hegelian split we referred to in the first chapter. For Valeri the real business of politics was legitimated culturally by invoking a ritual sentiment and the general conditions of reliving it in everyday life, for he, perhaps unintentionally, gives conceptual priority to pure power,

11 In Hawaii, the reorganization of chieftainship after Kamehameha’s conquest in the early 1800s is usually seen in this light, perhaps due to the fact that we have enough historical evidence, that is, written accounts, to reconstruct Kamehameha as a real actor as opposed to the chiefs of Hawaiian oral traditions.
or, he tries to come to terms - a necessity of modern thought that sees social surface only as an appearance of something more fundamental - with Hawaiian cosmic logic and pure power by integrating the two into a dialectic. ¹²

According to Valeri "ritual produces social order by producing conceptual order - sense" (1985b, xi). On the other hand, Valeri argues, this conceptual reproduction of society entails also a "suppression of aspects of reality" (xi), which is expressed as a legitimation problem of "the nobility's rule" (xii). Thus, the ritual process is that of mystifying power, quite like what Malinowski postulated in his theory of myth as a social charter (Malinowski 1936). Valeri, however, is quick to qualify his statement, for the mystifying aspect of ritual cannot be understood without considering the sense through which the power is

¹² This tendency is nothing new in Hawaiian cultural studies. To mention just a few (and to disregard expedition and missionary periods), Handy's popularized "Government and Society" (1933) ends with a celebration of Kamehameha's extraordinary personality and skill as an independent chief, the irony of which is that few pages earlier he had explained in plain language the divine nature of Hawaiian chieftainship (Kamehameha, as the first historically recorded chief who ruled over all the islands provides, of course, a more than adequate object for Western political thinking, which emphasizes individual action independent of all ritual constraints; see Valeri 1985b, 144-145). In her well-informed introduction to Kumulipo chant Martha Beckwith points out "the social and political importance" of genealogical chants, which they owe to their "conventional acceptance" among the Hawaiians (Beckwith 1990, 30 [orig. 1951]). Similarly, 20 years later, Katharine Luomala, in the preface to Beckwith's translation of Kumulipo, maintains that the chiefs in their "political bid for power" were "using ancient cosmogonic beliefs" (Luomala 1990, xviii [orig. 1971], my emphasis).
comprehended. Valeri calls this a "dialectics of sense and mystification" (xii). The only problem of this synthetic approach (we could also call it social analysis) is that it smuggles in the concept of legitimacy in an individualist guise, which informs the standard modern political theory of the West. Valeri's emphasis on the analysis of conceptual conditioning of experience (see 347) is thus undermined by what one could call a functionalist obsession with the latent function of value integration, which is not too far a cry from the analysis of false consciousness. In fact, the function of ritual as cultural and social reproduction is based on a fairly typical sociological understanding, which is, in turn, based on a fairly typical value structure of Western industrial societies (the repressed individual).¹³

The synthesis suggested by Valeri is uneasy, especially when one considers his own conclusion that "the material and the conceptual conditions for the reproduction of society are always given together" (348). In this union, there is no room for the concept of legitimization as suppression of aspects of reality, at least to the extent that the analysis of experience is concerned. As far as Sahlins seems to maintain that "usurpation itself is the principle of legitimacy" (1981, 113), he works against Valeri, for in

¹³ To be fair, Valeri only points to that direction and his analysis is basically concerned with "sense" rather than "the efficacy of Hawaiian religious representations" (Valeri 1985b, xii). Throughout his study he remains loyal to that emphasis.
this reversed order the suspicion of secret motives and analysis of ideology do not surface.

We can see here that the question is not simply that of choosing the right vocabulary. The cultural logic that is captured by words is the key. However, in some cases certain words cannot perform that task. For example, it seems to be – surprisingly even today – a commonplace among neoevolutionary thinkers (and sometimes among their critics) that the direction of change in human societies is from simple to complex, from "foraging group to agrarian state," to quote one recent title (Johnson and Earle 1991). This might well be the case in the majority of societies, providing, of course, that the criteria of complexity and simplicity are relative and relatively local in time and space. But when this developmental line of material and human environment is connected to a scheme of conceptual development – no matter how well disguised in methodological refinement and rejection of normative ideas – one is very close to what Lewis Henry Morgan called the "growth of the idea of government" based on "the history of the human race" which "is one in source, one in experience, and one in progress" (Morgan 1987, 47, xxx; see also Kuper 1988).

To start from the top, Patrick Kirch's (1984, 1985) array of archaeological evidence of precontact Hawaiian society is encapsulated in a narrative that basically agrees with Hocart that the universal history of the state is
"evolution from ritual organization to government" through differentiation, specialization, and centralization (Hocart 1936, 35-36). The same sequence was the metatheoretical basis for Sahlins' early comparative study (1958) and Goldman's culturalist approach to Polynesia (1970).

Accordingly, in the Hawaiian case, the most complex and stratified among precontact Polynesian societies, the idea of the primitive state is expressed most clearly. As Kirch notes, the late precontact Hawaiian society showed a highly stratified class structure, centralized land control, and hierarchical decision making machinery (1984, 258). To perfect the image, for Hommon (1976, 1986), Seaton (1978) and van Bakel (1991) there is enough evidence to call late precontact Hawaiian chiefdoms "primitive states," "early states," or "pristine states". Similarly, in a recent article archaeologist Jane Allen (1991) has referred to these chiefdoms as manifestations of "the pre-contact Hawaiian state." But one might object that criteria, such as autonomous geographic unit, centralized government, specialized hierarchy, and ability to command, all cited by Allen (118), are not necessarily sufficient proof that we are dealing with a state (or that they only reiterate the functionalist truism, criticized by Nagel). And, as a matter of fact, some writers systematically use the concept of chiefdom, instead (Kirch 1984; Earle 1987, 1991).
But the controversy over the right concept, state versus chiefdom, is not central here. It is more relevant to note that the whole discourse of political evolution is based on a formalized version of Western political thinking, which distinguishes a separate political sphere - or state, which is the object of these studies. In our case the formalisms serve as a guarantee of scientific status of the discourse by being constructed as a series of testing of variables within an evolutionary hypothesis. The famous "structural approach" of Claessen (1978) is just that: a catalogue of variables on the basis of which a formalism can be developed. It is true, as Timothy Earle (1987) has rightly noted, that the importance of the choice between chiefdom and state has gradually lost its previous ground and that the major focus is now on the real functioning of early human societies in terms of their structures of power and resource management. 14 This means that archaeological anthropology has followed the general tendency in political anthropology to shift from structures to action.

The dilemma of politics as a concept is not, however, removed by criticizing old, classificatory approaches to political systems. At least in the case of precontact Hawaii the focus on economic activity and cultural basis (religious ideologies) of legitimation of power runs the

14 For an attempt to synthesize the earlier classificatory and the later processual approaches, see Upham 1990.
risk of identifying the political, in the hierarchical con-
tinuum of chiefs and commoners, with self-interested action
as the political constant of human societies, while the
material organization of society still retains priority,
pushing the cultural categories of understanding to a
secondary order and giving them a status of legitimizing
sense-making. It is as if these categories had been
constructed only after the shaping of material relations
between different social groups and their immediate
environments had taken place, so that changes in material
conditions in Hawaii induced, as a necessity, "centralized
solutions" (Johnson and Earle 1987, 238; see also Earle
1991), which needed a cultural or ideological rationale.

Similarly, Johnson and Earle write, if the research
cannot reveal adequate material reasons for a war, it must
have been a result of "political competition" (1987, 232),
the political being a simple rhetorical label for an empty
will to power. In this approach the cultural or ideological
has the privilege of being the storage of meaning; the
material remains the locus of real relations of power, hence
politics, and the cultural is reduced to the role of masking
this 'materiality' of power. But we have good reasons to
question this segregation of social functions. It seems
more fruitful to view the material basis of power and
cultural meanings as inseparable without privileging one
over the other as the real base.
As a consequence, the political as an analytic tool is being put into an ambivalent position. Viewed in this light, does it really increase our understanding of the traditional Hawaiian society? Or, does it rather obscure our attempts by introducing a formalism that does not really exist except in the projections of marginal utilitarians?15

Looking back, the rather casual use of the notion of politics by Goldman, Sahlins, and Valeri and the less culture specific attempts by several archaeologists seem to leave us with a familiar dilemma. How to understand a culture comparatively so that we would not fall within Winchian extreme relativism (Winch 1958) or to construct images that either conceptually violate object cultures or become irrelevant by virtue of universalizing too much? Is there a solution in the culturalist approach represented by Goldman, Sahlins, and Valeri and their casual conceptualization of politics, which puts the emphasis on understanding cultural categories? To my mind, the balance between two extremes just by being casual on a central notion does not satisfy.

15 The reality of self-interested action is, of course, not denied. One can act in a self-interested way and still, for instance, dedicate one's life to charity. The issue is rather to question the idea according to which self-interest as the sole manifestation of the political is taken as autonomous of its cultural setting, thereby creating an image of politics as an empty pursuit of power, which, after all, does not explain anything. It only projects our own culturally conditioned view of power as an evil and politics as power.
2.3. From Categorical Relativism to Historical Relativism of Categories

A question initially posed for this study was concerned with the kind of 'political theory' that can arise from Hawaiian cosmology as juxtaposed to those of Western modernity. In this comparison an assumption was made that the theory must be based on substantial cultural contents and that only after this operation it could be elevated to the level of comparisons. The problem was, however, how to do any comparison, if no formal concept of politics was substantially backed, if there was a fundamental uneasiness between the two (cf. the quote from Balandier above). Should we nevertheless go on with a forced comparison or would it be more elegant to complicate the issue? In the following I shall argue that the formal type of comparison, although it may be implicitly necessary to some extent, hardly makes sense, not to mention the serious theoretical difficulties that accompany it.

Again, the question is particularly difficult when the object of inquiry is the idea of politics itself and the corollary subcategories of governance, power, and participation. First, the formal conception of politics is clear in affirming, as Clastres argues, that the concept describes an important part of the reality of any society (Clastres 1977, 22-26). How is a society run, how is it
governed, what are the relations of power and subordination? The problem with these questions is partly paradoxical. They always yield an answer. They are problematic precisely because of this capacity to provide the interlocutor with an answer. They always assume the a priori possibility of an uninterrupted interlocution. As Clastres shows, there is a dimension of power and hence politics even in that minor South American Indian society, whose collective existence is based on an aversion of subordinate relations, exactly because the animating tension of that society comes from attempts to check hierarchy. And second, whatever is the substance of these forms, the forms always tend to outrun their substances. If a young woman, in the said Indian society, furiously resists her grandfather's sexual desires, it is read into the political abstraction which subjects the woman's culturally defined dislike of incest to a political form of anti-hierarchical acts. For Clastres, these assertions are all derived from his conviction that "it is not a scientific proposition to determine that some cultures lack political power because they show nothing similar to what is found in our culture" (Clastres 1977, 17). Clastres is right insofar as we restrict ourselves to his defence of scientific propositions; but it would be equally unscientific to draw the opposite conclusion.

The example of Clastres is illuminating in an important respect. A good deal of substantialism does not do away
with the problem of relativity, simply because there cannot be political theory without the Western notion of the political. Without this formalism at the outset, it is impossible to communicate any indigenous form of political theory, or, as in our case, to transform the Hawaiian cosmic existence into a political theory of divine kingship, which is understood as being political only on account of the prevalence of a more generally shared political discourse. This is what functionalist anthropology was so apt to elaborate, "the sociological form of chiefly sacredness," which was ill equipped in capturing the "coherent indigenous formulation" of the sacredness of chiefs (Marcus 1989, 182). Another way should be formulated.

A possible way out, although surely open to criticism, is to propose a substantialist critique of formalism which retains a possibility to return to formal level of conceptualization, but which bases this possibility on conceptual developments among the people one is studying. The objective is therefore not to find the best possible compromise for an acceptable comparative formalism (as some substantialists tend to think), but first to outline a picture of a culture as a relatively comprehensive whole, which makes it possible to understand social phenomena without an immediate recourse to formalisms.\footnote{Elements for this alternative may be found in Winch 1958 and 1977 and in the critique of Winchian cultural relativism by Paul Mattick, Jr. (1986).}
Substantialist analysis is also the analytic context in which the study of concrete and local appearance of formalisms takes place. The ultimate goal is, however, not to produce a facsimile of the cultural meanings as they are experienced in a foreign culture (a perfect cultural translation is an impossibility as Winch informs us), but to reconstruct this culture so as to not, while constructing an explanatory model, contradict the indigenous meanings (Mattick 1986, 34, 68-70). This making sense without contradicting the sense-making of the people under study, or explaining while understanding, does not exclude the insiders' experience, it only grasps this experience in terms of explanatory social analysis. But, social analysis is not the same as formal political analysis, which, I argue, may contradict the insider's experience. Allowing this, in the present case, the concept of politics emerges only if it is culturally sanctioned, that is, if it has a culturally more or less specific substance that gives rise to a corresponding abstraction (the concept).

Without the analytic reservation (explanatory model) this critique may result in an extreme form of cultural relativism. This is not necessarily the case, especially when we have reasons - on the basis of substantialist analysis - to presume that some formal categories have been introduced by agents of another culture (that is, the categories are novelties) and that these categories
represent elements alien to the recipient culture. It is then quite legitimate to start with a radical substantialist pretension, and, if the historical reconstruction allows, to take up again the formal categories once they have been introduced and consolidated as cultural objects. Thus (in a quite obscure way, it is admitted) the categories that seem formal are formal only substantially, that is, they receive their formal nature in a culturally specific historical conjunction. As a brief conclusion we could say that the substantialist critique of formal comparisons does not exclude formal categories while succumbing to subjectivism, but it rather helps us understand their historical status and morphology. In this sense, an anthropology of formal categories may contribute to a comparative analysis that not only relativizes our perspectives but helps us bridge the gap between extreme substantialism and blind formalism, since some categories that once belonged to one culture alone now belong to many. In a way, this approach suggests a history of possibilities of comparisons, which is motivated by a desire to understand why we describe things as we do.

The alternative I am suggesting, involves three methodological operations (see chapter 1). First, we shall begin by identifying empirically the Western notion of politics in Hawaii and the elements of Hawaiian culture that were incorporated in that notion. It will also include
comparison of cultural logic of the incorporated Hawaiian elements with the incorporating Western notion or notions. Second, we shall proceed to a description of representations that were intrinsically part of the conceptual incorporation. Third, these substantially based comparisons should also make visible the social processes and actions through which the efficacy of incorporation, i.e., level of practical formality, was achieved. We shall be asking how and to what extent the practical dimension of political representations was made part of the contact culture? This is what I mean by history of comparative categories.

In sum, this indicates moving away from abstract political theories, for behind any abstraction (which includes all the definitions of politics) there is a concrete history open to an anthropology of abstract forms. And if, as Edmund Leach (1985) has suggested, the anthropological concepts are productive of cultural distortion, we need to break them up historically into their constitutive parts. But the question remains, how to execute the dissection while preserving social analysis. To continue social analysis on this level - at once more abstract and more concrete than formal studies of politics - it seems necessary to evaluate the effects of the world upon the cultures that are objects of anthropology without falling back to the subjectivist exegesis of a genuine culture or nativism (Wolf 1990). When nativism is overcome
all representations are social facts and in themselves neither true nor false except when viewed in their particular domains of the true, where they can stand as candidates of truth and falsity (Rabinow 1986, citing Hacking).

The agenda for a 'postmodern' political anthropology is therefore to account for the roles played by political conceptualizations in the social processes during which some indigenous expectations do not coincide with the on-going reality. The method consists in analyzing the various ways people related themselves to the political, how they used the concept and what it meant at the level of social practice. Again, one needs first to identify the political talk, or the discursive surface, and, second, to situate it in the cultural context while taking into consideration the mechanisms that brought about this language and its various consequences. It is not quite accurate to say that in this study the purpose is to explore the various ways in which historical actors, living in a historical context, "created and recreated political discourse" (Feierman 1990, 13), especially because the object of creation and recreation is the concept of politics itself.

This type of historical discourse analysis has a special interest in a social genesis of abstract categories. Although the analysis proceeds from individual acts and events, its real object is a collective being. In the
present study, the concept of politics that appears on the discursive surface of historical documents helps us identify in the Hawaiian society the features that deserve our attention as they drew the attention of the historical agents of political discourse. In this discourse, through cultural translation, those features became political reality, which, as a process, contributed to the emergence of the category of politics as a social force.
PART 2: SOCIAL THEORIES SUBSTANTIALIZED
3. PURITAN POLITICS

Thus in the moral world everything is classified, systematized, foreseen, and decided beforehand; in the political world everything is agitated, disputed, and uncertain.

de Tocqueville

In order to comprehend the cultural structuration process that in Hawaii resulted in practical formalisms in the field of politics, mostly through actions of American missionaries, we need first to develop a cultural frame that offered these foreigners the basic means to represent Hawaiian society in political terms. We shall first follow through some very basic assumptions of Anglo-American political theory, then relate these more closely to the thought patterns and cultural history of the American missionaries and their adherents, and finally set the political world-picture of the missionaries side by side with the Hawaiian ideas of the constitution of human community. In the third part the focus is particularly on the role of mythical thought in the founding of society.

In general, the framing of political representations among foreigners in Hawaii was founded on the natural law premises of liberal theory of the state, including popular sovereignty and freedom of opinion and conscience. Due to some practical limitations in cultural analysis this frame
is here viewed through a rather abstract discussion based largely on principles that were originally presented in the writings of John Locke, the Puritan intellectual of revolutionary England, whose natural law doctrine had been partly preserved by the colonial Puritan community of New England in particular and partly revived in the process of American independence.

Locke is seen both as a concrete embodiment of the moral and political discourse that was disseminated in the higher educational institutions of the early-nineteenth-century New England (Robson 1985; Bingham, c1816) and at the same time as a more metaphoric expression of the shared understanding of organized collective being in America. Thus, if one could name one political theorist who held a paramount place in the American political Pantheon in the early 1800s, and who also represented a whole political tradition, Locke would most probably be an outstanding candidate (this view is unanimously shared by moderates and radicals alike, see e.g., Baradat 1992, 3-7, 24-25; Hinckley and Goldman 1990, 6-10; Laslett 1988, 92; Greenberg 1983, 43-44). Although his democratic ideals and anticipation of the classic separation of powers, his pragmatic approach to the formation of political society, and his moral support for the right to revolution were slow to receive general acceptance in England, even declining in importance (Sabine 1973, 497, 500, 549-550), they sooner became indicators of
the original times of the American nation. This, of course, is not to underestimate other intellectual sources of the American political culture, such as Grotius, Harrington, Montesquieu or Paine, or such lesser-known but still highly influential thinkers as Burlamaqui, Sidney and Hutcheson. Locke was, however, the most important and probably also enjoined the most symbolic prestige among the relevant social and political philosophers.¹

Locke's status was elevated especially in higher education approximately from the 1740s onward (Robson 1985, 17, 66). His works were used both as regular reading in classes and in the preparation of oral and written presentations. Although Locke was a standard already in the early years of the American college, he was not always received directly as a political theorist, but in the collegiate curricula the Lockean political program was much overshadowed by his ethical theory (Robson 1985, 83). Despite the apparent moral emphasis in education, by means of a brief analysis it is suggested that neither Lockean politics or ethics can in any way be understood without considering both. In fact, the political theory of this type was seen more as a part of social and personal ethics

¹ The political writings of Locke were not particularly original even at his own time, although he became canonized as the foremost carrier of the flag of liberty. Especially among the English Levellers there developed similar ideas some half a century before Locke published his Two Treatises of Government (MacIntyre 1973, 153, 158).
than a calculus of national gain, for example. To use Alan Ryan's (1989, 311) suggestion, Lockean political theory was primarily concerned with the justification of a system; although the political consequences of that system were naturally important (see Laslett 1988, 117), they did not dominate the theoretical mood. It is not just accidental that in 1792 Paine was discussing a "government founded on a moral theory, on a system of universal peace, on the indefeasible hereditary Rights of Man" (Paine 1967, 404, emphasis in the original). This, I think, he owed to Locke.

In the next century the ethical (even moralistic) overtone evolved into the cornerstone of what became known as American. When de Tocqueville visited the Union in 1831 - 1832, he was struck by the reality of a functioning democracy, which certainly was a matter of curiosity for an aristocrat living under the newly reformed monarchy of Louis Philippe. Although de Tocqueville associated almost exclusively with the democratic elite of the states of his visit, he was attentive enough to perceive the more general cultural orchestration of American life (more specifically northeastern). We do justice to his analysis by referring to this phenomenon as Puritan politics, not in its old, patriarchal mode of religious austerity (to which de Tocqueville also returns) but in its more recent, liberal yet religious form, which, by drawing the necessary conclusions from Protestant, especially Calvinist,
principles, helped Americans establish a community held together at once by biblical morality and the separation of this moral sphere from what they called civil authority.²

One would be mistaken, however, in identifying this rupture with the Enlightenment idea of civil society of private men become public, in that this latter, continental version was rather a result of reason's self-assertion against a theological order of nature and even natural law; as human-centered it based itself on "the world's lack of consideration of man, on its inhuman order" (Blumenberg 1986, 142). Surely, New England private men of the early nineteenth century became public, but only on account of reducing the political order of community to the natural cum theological order of nature and humanity, more particularly to humankind's natural powers of communality and regard for others; not out of sheer mutuality based on love, but of the common natural quality to understand what is reasonable (cf. Laslett 1988, 111).

This might not sound correct, since the emphasis of reason undoubtedly had an enlightenment origin. True, there was in the post-revolutionary years a period of admiration of France, both its language and rationalistic social philosophy. This movement gave a special boost to

² The final bastion of theocracy was demolished in 1833, a year after de Tocqueville's departure, when church and state were separated in the state of Massachusetts, the stronghold of orthodox Calvinism.
remodelling college curricula throughout the American states, which seriously challenged the old scholastic orthodoxy and its religious overtones. Yet, by the first decade of the nineteenth century the denominational strife between different churches, just a few years after the horrifying reports of the French revolutionary terror had reached the United States, led to a blooming development of colleges. New schools were established practically whenever a group of churchmen could raise enough money for the building and a teacher.

The profound effect of this college-race, backed by the rejuvenating religious revivalism, was a transformation of the received continental Enlightenment. The new books were to stay, but the enlightened empiricism they advocated was coupled with biblical revelation and patriotic telos.\(^3\) In

\(^3\) This development might have been much more complex. The strong position that the new empirical sciences gradually secured beginning in the latter half of the eighteenth century, was at least partly a result of the need to attract more tuition-paying students. Denominational disputes, as much as they strengthened religion inside the college walls, also became quite repellent to the wider population, thus greatly reducing college revenues. Besides, the religion that was smuggled into the empirical sciences was not always a dominant feature at all colleges. Particularly Harvard remained opposed to sectarian motives (Rudolph 1962, 74-75; Schmidt 1957, 55). It is probably no accident that not a single missionary in our target group graduated from Harvard. Instead, the orthodox countermeasure for Harvardian indifference, Andover Theological Seminary, looms large (see fig. 3.2.). Andover was only one of the many theological schools found during the period. The crosspressure from the demand for theological education, mainly caused by revivalism, and from the colleges' need to remain simultaneously open to all walks of life, resulted in the mushrooming of small theological schools and also in the
facilitating the transformation Locke's system of natural law was almost too perfect. The senses, if properly used, would unearth the divine plan whose orders all creatures were bound to obey. Among other things, this feature lent a progressivist character to the Lockean empiricism. All human creatures, excluding Adam and Eve, must learn to use reason and only then is he or she under the law of reason (Two Treatises of Government, II, §§ 56-58). Taking this sense of reasonable mutuality as corresponding to the intents of divine will, which furnished us all with symmetrically oriented reason, every person is capable of education, and by learning can approach the blessings opened by the proper use of reason.

Since the sensibility of this road is found in the Gospel, it is impossible, in the Lockean system, to argue that the defects in human societies, i.e., deviation from natural law and natural rights, could be explained by referring to individuals' intrinsic psychological properties, which were fundamentally derived from the same original source of divine reason. On the contrary, the follies and whims of the human mind, which are perpetuated by custom, as Locke says, are a result of insufficient use of reason due to social circumstances (Two Treatises of

separation of divinity and regular courses. Following the early example of William and Mary, Princeton found its theological seminary in 1812. The same was done at Harvard in 1819 and finally at the conservative Yale in 1822 (Meyer 1957, 132-133).
Government, I, § 58; cf. Dunn 1983, 126). The ingenuity of this logical chain is admirable. In order to perfect and guarantee the reasonableness of one's life, and that of society, one must be educated, for only mature reason may be usefully applied in the creation of political society, the consensual body politic.

Here, to quote de Tocqueville, "religion is the road to knowledge, and the observance of the divine laws leads man to civil freedom" (Tocqueville 1948, 41). Indeed, there was in nature something for every human being to be discovered and learned: the divine - and, we should add, logical hence rational - equality of people in natural society. This equality would irresistibly provoke a dilemma inherent in natural society, namely that each person being the sole executioner of his (and perhaps her) freedom - a quality that Peter Laslett has aptly called "natural political virtue" (Laslett 1988, 108) - it becomes difficult to reconcile this freedom and an organized form of collective existence. The only way out of the dilemma seemed to have been to use the natural freedom and give up part of it to the representatives of the collective, who would use that power to give universally binding laws. In this logic it is clear that establishing a political society would be done in accordance with the very same natural principles, the logical outcome of which was a public authority based on explicit consent of the people bound by this authority.
In the Puritan tradition, civil authority was restricted to resolving conflicts that arose from the condition of natural society, in which everyone had a solemn right to defend his or her natural endowments, Locke's "life, liberty and estate." Hence the religious golden road did not lead from top to bottom, for this would have destroyed the original, god-given freedom. People should learn to discover in themselves their true nature as moral beings. In this sense, an imposed religious dogmatism would have been something abhorrent for the majority of Americans at the time of the Revolution, in many cases including the clergy. Within this frame it is reasonable to allow jurisprudence to guarantee the integrity of the areas of natural and fundamental being (life, liberty, estate), but only at the borders of these areas. In other words, government should have a share in an individual’s liberty only when his or her membership in the civil society (as opposed to natural society) was concerned, when a collective action is deemed necessary in regard to protecting someone’s fundamental rights. Again, original liberty prescribes no right for political authority to interfere in the department of faith. To the extent that a divine plan is at the bottom of this motive, we find the continental Enlightenment modified to the specific purposes of the New World.
While the majority of the thousands of Americans - and Europeans - touching the shores of the Hawaiian islands hardly developed notions resembling even a classificatory political theory respecting a strange culture (at least we have very few traces of that), we have good reasons to focus on the English-speaking population. This applies specifically to Americans, who gradually became the dominant foreign camp not only as permanent residents but also through expanding commercial links between Hawaii and New England ports (Morison 1921; Kuykendall 1989, 82-99, 299-334; Bradley 1968, 214-270).

Unfortunately we have no statistics on the component nationalities of the foreign population until 1853, when the 692 Americans totaled more than all European residents together. The margin being only 86 persons in favor of Americans, it seems that the American physical hegemony at the residential level was achieved relatively late, perhaps in the 1830s or 1840s (Schmitt 1968, 75). Nevertheless, as Harold Bradley has suggested, Americans were by far the most aggressive group of foreigners and thus naturally also the most visible and active in island life (Bradley 1968, 93-94). Besides, sandalwood trade in the 1810s and 1820s and whaling in the next few decades promoted practically an explosion-like influx of American vessels to Hawaiian
waters. The American maritime presence was strong enough to outnumber by ten times the presence of any other nation. For example, in the early years of whaling fleet activity, there was during the seven-year period between 1837 and 1843 an average of 85 arrivals of American whale ships compared to only seven of all others clumped together (The Friend, Dec. 2, 1844, p. 113). With the intensification of whaling the ratio of Americans to other nationalities would only grow in favor of the former. Next year there were 434 American whale ship arrivals as against 57 of other nationalities (The Polynesian, Jan. 4, 1845). Americans also dominated import trade. In 1844, for example, the value of American imports was twice the value of the goods imported from Chile, which held the second place in customs statistics (The Polynesian, Jan. 18, 1845). To this we must add the Congregationalist mission, whose early success placed it in a position that hardly left any doubt in the minds of other foreigners that the god of New England Puritans had chosen the Hawaiian islands to be the laboratory for reliving the legal past based on Mosaic law (for an example of the traders' attitudes, see e.g., Reynolds 1989, 115).

Using the American dominance as a backdrop, it can be fairly said that the sociology of the foreign community in the Hawaiian islands during the first half of the nineteenth century established a strong cultural presence for the
liberal spirit and the more theocentric political ideas of Protestantism, which, as we shall see, did not always evolve in a harmonious way. The two most numerous foreign groups, the English and the Americans, apparently to some extent shared the cultural tools for making political observations. It is difficult, however, in the absence of documentation, to make any definite conclusions on the detailed political differences prevailing between the two national groups (besides the sentiment of anti-monarchy among the Americans), or, for that matter, within each group. From all sources it is clear, however, that a strong national jealousy prevailed, which was more evidently connected to suspicions of imperial designs, unequal treatment of either group, or mercantile competition amidst all uncertainties of the place; but it hardly prevented the two national groups from using approximately the same cultural schemas to base political discourse.

Without being too specific, it serves our purpose here to bring forth the major dividing line that defined the relative social positions of practically all foreigners in Hawaii from 1820 onwards, namely, the Puritan moral code as applied through a system of public power. In New England, patriarchal Puritanism had been on the decline since the first decade of the eighteenth century (Miller 1966; Heyrman 1984), but contention over the proper status of religious legislation continued well into the next century (Ashworth
1987, esp. ch. 5). As Heyrman observes, the rising tide of commerce and secular forms of life resulted in various local responses, and in many cases a threat from outside did not lead directly to a more liberal and individualistic society, but in fact strengthened the traditional Puritan communal life (Heyrman 1984, 407-414). Seen in this light, the religious revivals that swept through New England and other eastern states in the beginning of the nineteenth century can be interpreted as by-products of local resistances to the splintering effects of the worldly spirit of commerce. Not that commerce would have in-itself advantaged Satan, but its effects were certainly tarnished by sin if not controlled by a proper Christian morality, which in this case derived itself from the old Congregational way, so well rooted in the Puritan community. Through revivals the more traditional element expressed its hopes for a reform movement towards a reintegration of moral unity. The missionary enterprise must be seen against this background of cultural reanimation and challenge.  

4 This was the so-called Second Great Awakening, which began approximately in 1800 and lasted three decades. During those years the churches of New England and finally of the whole Union (Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Baptists in particular) underwent a reform. This has been interpreted largely in two ways. Either it has been seen as a reactionary movement towards the old and lost purity or alternatively as a liberal re-reading of antiquated Calvinist doctrines (see McLoughlin 1978). In reviewing the literature, it seems that a balance can be found in the revitalizing effect of the revivals. The radical element succeeded in its demand for a moral reform and forsaking the heavy load of petrified church organizations and musty
The election of the liberal-minded Antifederalist Jefferson to the presidency in 1800 and the defeat of doctrinal orthodoxy at Harvard in 1805 prompted a conservative reaction of which the missionary program was "one symbol of the unity" against worldly dissent (Bradley 1968, 122). The program was organized in 1810 as the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) and based in Boston. From early on the program attracted young, relatively well-educated revivalists from surrounding states to its ranks (figs. 3.1. and 3.2.), and it very soon became a center for a true Christian commonwealth, much in line with its English sister organization, London Missionary Society, which already operated in the Pacific. The difference between the two stemmed mainly from the particular historical situation in New England, which rendered the American enterprise more hardline in character.

liturgic ideas which could not cope with the changing society. On the other hand, the reformist demand for a new moral purity and rectified communal unity might have set the clock back, so to speak. Or perhaps a new clock was gotten. We might do even better in asking for whom the awakening meant a fresh breeze of ideas and for whom it was a great leap to the bygone years. This would, of course, take us back to the division of evangelicals and mercantile men.
Fig. 3.1. Birth Places of the Male Missionaries to Hawaii. Only Ordained Ministers and Licensed Preachers Included.
Fig. 3.2. Four-year Colleges Attended by the Male Missionsaries to Hawaii, 1811-1853 (upper map). Educational End Stations of the Male Missionsaries to Hawaii, 1819-1858 (lower map). Only Ordained Ministers and Licensed Preachers Included.
By New England standards the missionary enterprise was part of the revivalist reaction, which, however, in some other parts of the Western world, would have still been included among the more radical reform movements with its emphasis on inalienable rights of human freedom and equality. Although the evangelical movement was critical of certain social conditions, in its native environment it was not hailed as particularly progressive, and a considerable number of evangelists were drawn towards the reactionary wing of the dominant Democratic-Republican party, and later the Whig party, to defend the national unity (Ashford 1987, 198-200; cf. Miller 1979, 42). This was partly reflected in the educational choices of the future missionaries, who predominantly entered the more conservative colleges of Congregational denomination (fig. 3.2. above, yet Union College, relatively popular among the missionary candidates, had a more liberal aura [Rudolph 1962, 73; Schmidt 1957, 59]).

The factional frontiers were far from fixed, however. Although the relations between liberal Whigs and conservative Democrats are a subject of specialists' debate, suffice it to say that for those individual evangelists who were associated with the revivalist ABCFM, it seems to have been at least a matter of ambiguity whether to embrace wholly the Whig ideology. A case in point is the general acceptance by the missionaries of the separation of church
and state (e.g., Bingham 1849, 278-282). The process of separation lasted the first thirty years of the nineteenth century, during which the majority of the missionaries to Hawaii received their education and underwent their religious conversion. The conservatism of the Congregationalist circles in the heartland of the missionary movement, Connecticut and Massachusetts, was seen in the resistance that the formal disestablishment of the churches met in these states. It was much due to revivals that the Connecticut churches were disestablished in 1818 and that the latecomer Massachusetts followed the suit in 1833. This was not, however, a result of the first, or what McLoughlin has called the "nativist," phase of the awakening (McLoughlin 1978, 108), but of the second, in which a great number of young people, among them many of the future missionaries, set out to reform the old hardline Calvinism. In general, the most intense enlisting of missionaries took place during the second and more liberal phase.\(^5\) In spite

\(^5\) Among the 44 ordained ministers and licensed preachers who participated in the evangelization of Hawaii, there were 25 who graduated from college between the years 1815 and 1830, which coincided almost exactly with the endurance of the second phase of the awakening. In 1831-1835 there were five missionary graduations, and 14 in the years 1836-1853 (data gathered from Missionary Album, 1969). The renewal of Calvinism during the second phase can be seen, for instance, in the instructions that the missionary board gave to the sixth company of missionaries in 1832: "Revolted as the human mind is from God, and corrupted and debased, it is, through God's grace, recoverable" (Bingham 1849, 477). There was no more room, after the Second Great Awakening, for a strict doctrine of predestination, as there was not enough support for a state church, either. The old-time
of the prevailing atmosphere of change and renewal, there was, especially in the colleges, an urge not to exaggerate religious criticism. Spearheading this attempt to contain the spills of extravagance was the President of Yale, Timothy Dwight, who, until his death in 1817, also participated in the missionary movement. After his death, and even earlier, two distinguished clergymen, Lyman Beecher and Nathaniel W. Taylor, took over the Congregationalist counter-measures, but this time smoothly adjusting the containment to the mood of the younger generation by organizing and planning a more rational revival.

In view of the missionary attitudes, the second phase of the revival is likely to make us slightly uncertain about their consistency. This rather contradicting environment left thousands in confusion, a factor that was reflected in some of the missionary attitudes, which were hovering somewhere between the old hardline Calvinism and its liberalized variants. As a rule of thumb, it seems that the younger the missionary the more he denounced the old orthodoxy, thus producing an inevitable tension between the different missionary vintages in the field. Besides, there were the various personal interpretations and preferences. These and other factionalist issues in the vein of theology were, however, largely damped by the evangelical nature of Calvinism was changed, and the mission, both the board and the missionaries, had been conducive to that course of events.
the mission, at least until the Hawaiian revivals in 1837 and 1838 and the organization of independent native churches years later. For these reasons it is more advisable to approach the missionaries collectively as sort of liberal Whigs, who in the good revivalist manner favored a clear separation of church from state government and advocated moral reform by other means, but thereby contradicting the demand for absolute equality as held up by the Democrats, who were easily provoked to view the reforms as an attempt to impose a superior form of morality.

In brief, it was rather the Whigs who took moral reform to the legislature. Besides, although both the evangelicals and the Whigs tried to find a remedy for communal disintegration, the Whigs were ready to use moral laws to promote blooming capitalism without giving much thought to the immortal soul, while the former saw a stronger link between Christian benevolence and a well-oiled commercial economy, which betrayed a rather organic view of society.

On the other side, the Democrats, in their Jeffersonian ultraliberality, could not become very likely partners in the reform, particularly as their tolerance sometimes amounted to sheer religious indifference.

Moreover, the missionaries very heartily subjected worldly affairs to their theocentric framework of thought. Because of this basic orientation it may be fair to say that rather than engaging in political debates of the day, the
future missionaries were by and large interested in sharing the general cultural dimensions that cut across different New England factions. Rather than publicly holding by some particular detail of the debate or developing a political theory of their own, they built their notions of political society on the deeper layer of a democratic culture. For them governments should be created by the consent of people to promote and guarantee the natural rights of "life, liberty and estate." Or, to use the words of the missionary leader of the Hawaiian mission Hiram Bingham:

... our own beloved country whose motto is 'that all men are free and Equal' whose faith was pledged by solemn treaties, and whose early history and revolutionary struggle proved her high abhorrence of oppression and of every unreasonable encroachment of the powerful upon the rights of others (Bingham to Evarts, Sept. 8, 1831, MsL).

In contrast to this rather simplistic political theory held up by the American missionaries, who in due measure represented the true Lockean point of view - liberal-capitalist natural law individualism on top of which was placed the holy trinity of the Protestant god - the Anglo-American mercantile community in Hawaii was discursively united in their emphasis of the liberal spirit without explicit biblical motivations to ground their actions. For the latter there was in general no need for a moral reform - especially for one imposed by authority. If such need ever arose it was for a reform to end all reforms, which, in their view, were great and antiquated obstacles for human
progress, and to their profits. A typical commentary might have followed the theme emphatically used by Stephen Reynolds, a Massachusetts-born trader, who settled on Honolulu in 1823 and was a keen observer of the various conflicts that raged between the mission and the mercantile community.

Mr Bingham told [Captain] Percival he (B) had sent to the Govt of U.S.A. for protection. I wonder if he has sent for lands & Naval forces to force people to Heaven by powder & ball!! Mr Chamberlain [missionary accountant] has gone to visit every part of the Island [O'ahu] in company, or at the head, of two or three Native teachers - to tell them (the people) they must make & subscribe to such laws as the Missionaries shall recommend - and the consequence will be they will all, by Law, go to Heaven - (Reynolds 1989, 140: June 23, 1826).

3.2. Mission, Politics and the Theory of Civilization

For the clerical side there was certainly a road to progress, but it consisted of evoking a communal spirit of hard work and devoted piety, instead of exploding the latent capacities of individualist appropriation in full force, which would have been an antithesis for the Lockean program of reasonable conduct. To observe this theory of civilization through an 'instance of condensation', we must take another look at Locke. It could be said that his attack against Filmer's divine right theory of kings marked a beginning of a new theory of civilization, a theory that
was to become, with a surprising consistency, part and parcel of the educative arsenal of the Hawaiian mission.

Locke's reading of the Old Testament meant at least two things. First, it demonstrated that it was completely unreasonable to base absolute civil power on divine sanctions and biblical evidence. Second, those who could properly apply the faculties of their reasonable minds were also able to perceive clearly that the only natural foundation of civil power rested on the artificial consent of people. This implied a separation of civil and ecclesiastical powers. In retrospect, Locke's own decision to sanctify popular sovereignty led to certain logical problems and in fact only placed Locke and Filmer on the opposite sides in exegesis. Locke succeeded, nevertheless, in making the divine right of kings look like a rather ridiculous piece of theory. In addition, disregarding Locke's fundamental indebtedness to theology and unorthodox exegesis, his premises led almost automatically to the conclusion that under the circumstances the destiny of all human societies was a progressive one, simply because the elaboration of worldly life was left for people to pursue.

The Puritan progress was not, however, a showcase for unlimited will power, but rather deliberate, rationalized and highly conscious choosing in developing and elevating society to a level of redemption, by drawing the right conclusions from individuals' fundamental freedom to govern
themselves. To appreciate this controlled individualism, we must remember that for a Puritan any act or any belief was of value only if it was internally motivated and carefully thought out. Similarly, notwithstanding the eventual climax of history, progress in this world was not independent of human action. It was made conditional on the right choices (Conkin 1976, 13). So it was with civil liberty and political institutions, which might achieve higher forms only in the hands of a virtuous people, who could rationally employ their freedom for a common cause.

This pattern was uniformly shared by the members of the Hawaiian mission. The missionaries' emphasis on Christian virtue connected with political institutions is evident, for instance, in their choices of educational material for the Hawaiian schools. Most likely carried by William Richards a new book on moral philosophy, written by the influential New England university president Francis Wayland, was brought to Honolulu in 1838. The Elements of Moral Science, as it was titled, was an immensely successful book in the United States, a book whose standard edition of 1837 sold at least 75,000 copies and was widely taught at schools. It was also translated into several languages and generally used by American missionaries wherever they operated (Blau 1963, xlii, xlx). The most striking feature overarching the

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6 The date of the book's arrival at Hawaii is only a good guess. The book, first published in May, 1835, might have arrived with the eighth company of missionaries sent by
whole work is the typically Puritan understanding of the moral fiber that is made to penetrate a liberal theory of the state. It is also a nice tribute to the Lockean heritage of the fundamental division of natural and civil society and their divine nature.

For Wayland - as for any other New England social philosopher, who were practically all theologians still in 1837 - political or civil society was always constituted by a people and dissolved by a people. But the theological bent, also visible in the Lockean original, asserted that differing from an ordinary and voluntary association, a civil society is something less than completely voluntary. Since civil society is "an ordinance of God" (because God has made people social and hence subject to the inconveniences of everybody acting the judge in his or her own case according to the natural freedom and equality) "every man is bound to become a member of civil society" (Wayland 1963, 316, emphasis in the original). In civil

ABCFM in December, 1836; or alternatively the mission board might have sent it by any vessel bound to the Hawaiian islands. It is also unclear which edition was used as the basis of the Hawaiian version. The eighth company could have brought only the first edition, to which Wayland, being not satisfied with it, made considerable changes in 1837, the same year the second edition was published and Richards was in the U.S. Since the Hawaiian version was published in 1841, I take it more plausible that the second edition was used. The reasons Wayland was chosen to convey a moral point of view in Hawaii are most probably his exceptionally good reception at American schools and a simple style more commonly found in all sorts of manuals than in treatises of moral philosophy.
society it is essentially salient that its institution is
effected by the God-appointed laws, which, in Wayland's
text, are the rudimentary tenets of political Liberalism.

According to Wayland, the divine appointment of civil
society simply means that God "must forbid whatever would be
inconsistent with its existence." Also, the individuals who
form civil society must refrain from anything contrary to
the continuity of that society. Wayland next outlines a
perfect state of civil society in which all the contracting
members are willing to obey "the law of reciprocity," a
hypothetical condition in which every person's natural
rights - life, liberty and property - are respected equally
by everyone without the interference of a higher authority.
Since this condition has proven historically and empirically
utopian, a civil authority should be formed by a mutual
consent of all to guarantee the inviolability of natural
rights and to act as the supreme magistrate in cases of
violation. To achieve this compromise, every individual
surrenders part of his or her sovereignty and is
reciprocally protected by thusly established civil or
political authority: "The obligations of society are to
protect the individual from infractions of the law of
reciprocity and to redress his wrongs if he have [sic] been
injured" (324). And because all are equals by nature, no
one is allowed to violate the law of reciprocity, which, "if
universally permitted, would destroy society" (318). As a
good liberal, Wayland maintained that in all other respects every individual's life continues as before the establishment of civil society. Thus, the members of civil society are free in person, conscience and property, expect taxation, which is justified only "to meet the necessary expenses of government" (319).

It is perfectly clear that Wayland, Doctor of Divinity, continued the political tradition anchored in Locke's reading of the Old Testament. In harmony with Locke he was also interested in defining the limits of government by developing a theory of contractual enactment of political society, which would be morally and logically binding and acceptable to all of its members. But Wayland also recognized the logical nature of his construct. Civil freedom and stability of political society cannot be sustained merely by a formal agreement or enforcement of laws. The whole idea must be internalized as part of everyday life, otherwise the logic will surely fail in practice. Therefore, in Wayland's system, a whole way of life rests on the degree of virtue prevalent among a people: "There is no self-sustaining power in any form of social organization. The only self-sustaining power is in individual virtue. And the form of a government will always adjust itself to the moral condition of a people" (328).

As if to crown his system Wayland stated that the sufficient amount of civil virtue is best guaranteed by a
proper revelation of natural rights, which are best supported through religion, "in its purest form" (321).
Thus, there was in Wayland's Lockean social theory a causal relation, if not an equation, between Christian godliness and civil liberty, although church and state were strictly separate. As to the latter relation, Wayland concluded that religion cannot be regulated by civil authorities because it is not part of the social compact that forms the civil authority (321); the compact applies only to regulating difficulties that arise from the state of nature. Thus, instead of forcing a doctrinal unity, civil authority should guarantee a free formation of doctrines, providing that they did not threaten the continuity of civil society.
Conversely, a forced religious orthodoxy would therefore only undermine the attempts to promote true virtue by adding to the possibility of revolt and civil war.

We can now elaborate further the Puritan conception of human progress. Although in their thinking humankind was bound to rise from condemnation towards the final redemption, it was not concerned with a simple linear tendency of betterment but rather with a series of cycles, in which the political society either succeeded or failed in realizing its naturally chartered cause. What, then, was the particular element in this theory that pushed the idea of political progress towards the cyclical mode? It may be a little too technical to invest the Lockean notion of human
freedom with the power to generate cyclical thinking, but at least it was in this case elementary.

More concretely, in view of representing Hawaiian society in political terms, it was the idea of human freedom based on natural law that provided the missionaries with the means of evaluating the political conditions of any particular people. It was a very practicable conceptual grid, which had only a few indicators of the state of civilization; in fact, in most cases only the method of establishment of political society was needed. Thus, to observe different people was to employ constantly an evaluative scheme, which gave evidence of either a downward or upward movement of civilization. Wayland, for instance, applied the scheme to the history of England in order to show the advantage of patient suffering and the force of virtuous example as remedies of a defective political system.

And experience has shown that the cause of civil liberty has always gained more by martyrdom than by war; it has rarely happened that during civil war the spirit of true liberty has not declined. Such was the case in the time of Charles I in England. How far the love of liberty had declined in consequence of civil war is evident from the fact that Cromwell succeeded immediately to unlimited power and Charles II returned with acclamation, to inflict upon the nation the most odious and heartless tyranny by which it was ever disgraced. During the suffering for conscience under his reign the spirit of liberty revived, hurled his brother from the throne, and established British freedom upon a firm and, we trust, an immovable
The deep commitment to rationalizing history into simple successive cycles of good and evil is evident from Wayland's recourse to a generalizing treatment of human experience. Writing a decade later and backed by twenty years of cultural comparison, Hiram Bingham expressed the empirically geared theory of universal human mind even more explicitly. In his view "the human mind, the human heart,

The cyclic pattern of evaluation of other nations was carried to Hawaii and more or less systematized by the missionaries. In the first geography book in the Hawaiian language, the missionary authors Samuel Whitney and William Richards evaluated the history of a wide range of countries from a perfect moral point of view. In this much neglected work the most attention was given, not surprisingly though, to the observance of Sabbath, regular prayers and the like. The rise of Catholicism was always a sign of corruption, whereas Protestant ascendancy and expansion of commoner rights carried a hopeful sign. In the case of France, civil wars and revolution were given some more attention. The sins of the Revolution and Napoleon were both recognized and denounced, the former for forsaking the word of God, the latter for autocracy, both leading to excessive bloodshed. The order as represented by Napoleon was, however, treated with some understanding. Among the countries, the history of England was second only to that of the United States, which naturally held the crown of progress and enlightenment on the moral scale (He hoikehonua 1832). This general work was preceded in 1830 by a four-page Hawaiian translation of William IV's address to the English parliament declaring an official revival of the word of God (O ke kaouha maikai 1830). The missionary habit of recounting histories, especially English history, as cycles of good and bad morals and rulers was continued for quite some time. For example, Sereno E. Bishop, son of the missionary Artemas Bishop, used to teach English history at the Lahainaluna Seminary in the late 1860s exactly in the same mould: the objects of evaluation were once again the prevalence of Christian worship, especially Protestant forms, and the status of common people, to which we may add the existence of a written constitution (Sereno Bishop c. 1868).
the human soul, may safely be regarded as essentially the same in all ages and countries" (Bingham 1849, 526). In this line of thinking also human emotions and motives, as appended to the course of political society, are given an equal status independent of the culture that harbors them. Although this idea of a universal and teachable mind opened up the avenues of progress for all people, it also, by emphasizing history as a series of phases during which the degree of freedom would increase or decrease, confined itself to a cyclical world-view. This peculiarly empiricist conception of the human mind allowed only the cyclical return of the same. As Wayland says, the human mind being fundamentally uniform, there could only evolve a desire for freedom or corruption.

Everyone must be convinced, upon reflection, that this is really the course indicated by the highest moral excellence. Passive obedience may arise from servile fear; resistance, from vainglory, ambition, or desire of revolution. Suffering for the sake of right can arise only from a love of justice and a hatred of oppression (338).

Thus, as this bifurcated theory states, everything is subject to an evaluative gaze. Political freedom results from a correct and, most of all, reasonable founding of government. A deviation from the correct path inevitably, as Locke said of the divine right of kings, "cuts up all Government by the Roots" (Two Treatises of Government, I, § 126). It might be repeated here that the correct path to political society was respectively connected, as were human
emotions and morally sound politics, with the developments in natural society, its level of virtue and degree of Revelation. So, when working in the field, the missionaries were able to put forth statements that, while recognizing the mutually enforcing relation between moral truths, religion and civil institutions, inquired about the minimum conditions of salvation. In other words, they had keen interest in the changes that must be effected in natural society to bring out the morally and intellectually rational human nature.

How much civilization and refinement the heathen must possess before they will be given to the Son of God for a possession, we know not, but we know that when any of the children of Adam shall have right views of the character of the Lord Jesus Christ, and exercise an evangelical faith in him, they will be entitled to mansions in heaven. This should be the grand object of all our endeavours (Andrews and Richards to Evarts, Sept. 30, 1828, MsL).

Besides discarding the doctrine of predestination, in the true revivalist spirit, this also confirms the alliance of the empiricist-inspired conception of the human mind and the high standing given to learning and education as the foundation of cultural comparison. The system, in all its pathos and patient understanding of a wretched condition, was indeed quite straight-forward in scaling cultural differences, or deviations from the standards of civilization. This is not to say that such a scale was constructed in any exact measure but only to provide a common metaphor of thought, a tendency to think in terms of
"a scale by which to mark all the grades between their state and that of christian civilization" (Richards 1973, 33).

Scaling was needed, of course, to assess the right dose of teaching and preaching, which were indeed worth the trouble, since the system was furnished with a logic that emphasized the universally shared capacities of the human mind for improvement. But, as human improvement was a comprehensive whole, all this would have been in vain if separated from the proper moral foundation: "Education and civilization, without a firm belief in God’s Word, will accomplish little or nothing for the heathen" (Bingham 1849, 240). Lorrin Andrews, another more significant missionary teacher in Hawaii, went even further in this line of thought. According to him "the human mind needs to be expanded & exercised before it knows what use to make of moral or religious truths . . . Science & literature must expand the mind and religion must sanctify it" (Andrews to Wisner, Nov. 3, 1829, MsL).

In Hawaii, these views were circulated in the English-speaking community particularly with the help of the reformist newspaper The Polynesian, edited by James Jackson Jarves, who, from the very beginning of his editorial career in 1840, became a distinct ideologue of the Lockean point of view:

In proportion therefore as the chiefs of this Archipelago become truly enlightened, in the same ratio may we expect the increase of liberal views, on the
subject of government, and a disposition to regard the rights of all classes of the community.

And, again:

The fundamental principles of the Christian religion [are] the only infallible directory in the formation of laws and administration of justice (Editorial, *The Polynesian*, July 4, 1840, 14, 15).

To complete this circular movement of thought, let us consider another reflection by Bingham, namely his evaluation of a leading chief Kalanimitoku (c. 1770-1827): "A competent education would have made him an accomplished statesman" (Bingham 1849, 308). In Bingham's opinion, which I take at least partly as an illustration of a more widely shared position among other missionaries, a person needed to conquer the heights of civilization on two fronts at the same time, one facing godliness, the other leaning towards empirical knowledge of God's creation. Where these fronts met there would the human cycle reach the summit of its trajectory, and a civilized life with all its cultural products and institutions would emerge. 8 Kalanimitoku

8 At times the missionaries depicted the dual front in a hyper-dramatic verbiage of self-aggrandizement, such as the following from the Rev. Sheldon Dibble:

Which would be the sublimest trophy of the grace of God, and the brightest gem in the diadem of Jesus, a soul saved from the midst of intelligence and refinement, or a soul rescued from the depths of heathenism - dug up, as it were, from mire and filth - purified, elevated, refined, and made holy? If [the Archangel] Gabriel then should strive to place the brightest jewel in the crown of Jesus, would he not dive at once down to the depths of heathen degradation, and bring it up from thence? (Dibble 1839, 56).
embraced only the Christian god, hence failing - he died too soon - in fulfilling the other requirement, which would have opened, at least in theory, the road to an enlightened system of politics. Jarves, the editor, was not only a champion of liberal government, but he also engaged in developing a theory of civilization, which, in this instance, gave a very succinct but abstracted expression to Bingham's concrete example. In Jarves' theory natural society and political society were causally linked so that "in proportion as they [the Pacific islanders] become influenced by the new religion, they discontinue their old customs, and the whole government must be revolutionized" (Editorial, The Polynesian, Jan. 2, 1841, 118). This, he argued, will happen by necessity. Thus, in Kalanimōkū's time the missionaries could not have represented the Hawaiian society in any other way than as a heathen nation dominated by a perversion of liberty, since, by the same necessity, the causal chain that would logically allow the collapse of despotism, as the system was called, was not established to a satisfactory degree at all. Therefore, a defect, or an unbalanced combination of faith and knowledge, in the constitution of natural society resulted in an

Beneath the dramatic surface there is a clear distinction made between learnt and educated societies and those that suffer from the absence of both learning and religious truths. Thus, in Hawaii, the missionaries had to work in the two fronts at the same time, unlike the home missions on the more populated areas of New England, for instance.
anomaly in the political constitution of society, i.e., despotism. This produced a state of affairs under which it was extremely difficult to set bounds for the artificial realm that should have defined the natural rights of the people and the rational limits for government. Without the compact "confusion, discord and oppression were the natural results" (Dibble 1909, 382). In brief, the traditional Hawaiian politics rested on an unnatural foundation, out of balance, hence arbitrary.9

3.2.1. Catholic Perversion of the Law of Nature

Correspondingly, on the Euro-American scale, the embodiment of retrogression was the Pope in Rome and

9 In this mode, the missionaries reasoned that a betterment in the political realm would inevitably follow from moral and intellectual growth. Around 1835, the chiefly hierarchy being still in place, they concluded that the improvement in the Hawaiian government was lagging comparatively behind the reform in other areas of life (Anonymous of The Hawaiian Spectator 1839, 346-347; Bishop 1838, 56-57; Dibble 1909, 382; Bingham 1849, 491). The developmental delay, which provided an explanation for the apparent failure in the civilizing process, can easily be seen as an application perfectly in harmony with the logic of their theory of civilization as an integrated system. So well integrated it was that Jarves could ask, regarding the social ideas of the missionaries, whether a more comprehensive body of rules, - embracing so completely in detail the outline of the policy of this government at that time; plans of social, moral, political and religious improvement, connected with the encouragement of not only domestic industry, but the fine-arts and all the branches of education; the reciprocal duties of missionaries, rulers and subjects, and the duties of all alike to God, - could be drawn up (Editorial, The Polynesian, March 1, 1845).
everything he represented. Catholicism was seen as a "politico-religious system," which not only perverted biblical truths but also reduced civil life to an ecclesiastical tyranny, the arbitrary folly of which could not be rationally justified. Interpreted as idolatrous, Catholicism was also seen as being opposed to natural freedom. The Catholic intertwine ment of ecclesiastical and civil powers therefore contradicted the correct process of political society by blurring the borders of artificial civil authority and the naturally endowed liberties. It was no wonder, then, that for the Congregational missionaries Catholicism practically equalled Hawaiian forms of worship and social organization (Bingham 1849, 423). It must be said, however, that the missionaries were to a certain extent committed to religious toleration and certainly to the separation of church and state (Clark to Anderson, March 30, 1833, MsL; Wyllie 1848, 93; Bingham 1849, 278), although their practice was not always easy to understand in this light (e.g., Question addressed to Jules Remy, M-125/AH). It was not so much that they would have given up these principles to defend their privileged position against Catholic encroachment, but that in their eyes the Catholics represented precisely the opposite of these adorned principles, and for that reason were subject to counter-measures and anti-Catholic propaganda.
Bingham, who probably wrote the most penetrating lines on the Catholic question, saw the dividing rift to lie in the institutional arrangement that prevailed between church and state. As Wayland before him, Bingham sanctified the state but underlined the Protestant virtue of making church institutionally, if not ideologically, independent of state:

The ministry of religion and the ministry of the state each has its duties; but each in its own order and place, and both for the glory of the same Master, in accordance with the Divine will ... The state, deriving all its powers from God, both rulers and subjects being bound to do God's will, and its chief magistrate being emphatically God's minister, ought to be, and in an important sense is, a religious institution. It is organized for self-protection, and for securing the enjoyment of certain rights which God grants to men, and the performance of certain duties mutual among men, which God enjoins. Still the state, though in fact a religious institution, incapable of securing its proper ends without recognizing religious obligation, is not a church (Bingham 1849, 278, emphasis in the original; see also Ricord 1844, 59-60; Armstrong to Judd, Apr. 23, 1844, F.O. & Ex.).

3.2.2. The Fear of Partisanship and Revolution

Recalling Wayland's emphasis of patient suffering for the right course as the best means to realize natural freedoms, it is not surprising that although revolution was justified under certain conditions the missionaries and the advocates of their social program were quite firmly opposed to this course of action. For them any sign of partisanship and violent pursuit of particular ends would have been a serious threat against the natural sociability of human
community, and hence also a threat to the morally correct founding of political society.

The Lockean mode of political theory envisioned a harmonious order in which human emotions were channelled towards religious and intimate avenues of expression. Passionate conduct or personal feelings should have no place in the rational business of politics. Again, we find Jarves a particularly poignant commentator, who could, unlike the missionaries, feel relatively free to explicitly state this moral point of view in political language. His approach was systemic and stressed inconspicuous functioning of the system. In the real-world arenas of regulated political conflict he preferred the American Congress and English Parliament, because they, in his view, afforded "the most prominent instances of that free, intellectual and dignified rivalry, accompanied with dispassionate wisdom and mature deliberation." "The French Chambers," he said, would have been such an instance, had the French been able to contain their "restless war-spirit, and love of military glory" (Editorial, The Polynesian, Dec. 14, 1844).

As the ideal political society was formed by a mutual compact of free individuals living in a same natural society, thus composing a body politic, society, natural and political, was also expected to endure as an organic whole. The quality of public sentiment was therefore of special importance. Much in line with the traditional New England
township - now only shifted to the level of a nation - there was no latitude for asocial dissent and stirring up of revolting mood. In Jarves' words, "the government does not require the noise of the demagogue, or the acclamations of the crowd, as a test of a friendly disposition. It sees it in every walk in life . . . " (Editorial, The Polynesian, March 1, 1845).

From this we get further evidence that the so-called missionary party represented a whiggish inclination in the midst of their otherwise critical views of the old-time Calvinism. This position was equally opposed to unlimited government as it was against an unrestrained opposition or a violent revolution. Both ways are defective, especially because they tend to produce irregularity and too much variation in the process (Richards to Anderson, Aug. 7, 1835, MsL). It is not wrong to say that a bit of oppression was better than no conceivable order at all. For example, Hiram Bingham, even after years of field experience, still advocated the image of a society constantly in danger of falling into the state of anarchy.

Strange as it may seem to American freemen, yet it is true that Hawaiians have appreciated the energy, providence, and protection of their hereditary leaders, because, without this, the common people must, from ignorance, imbecility, or ignorance (sic), have been subjected to greater confusion, destitution, and danger (Bingham 1849, 224-225).

Similarly, in proposing a wider reform program in June, 1836, the mission wrote to the board in Boston and solemnly
claimed to favor a moderate course lest the imperfect yet somewhat functioning order would be endangered. The missionaries were to avoid attempting "a radical (or revolutionary) change in the constitution or form of government" (quoted in Bingham 1849, 491, emphasis in the original). Two years later, when the missionaries were ready to officially launch their political reform program, their explicit statement was careful enough to point out the moderate course to be followed. In the annual meeting of 1838, the missionaries agreed on "gradually removing the existing evils of the system - not to revolutionize but to improve" (SIM 1839, 25). Of course, such statements might have been merely a premeditated strategy to attract the interest of the cautious board and to calm the worried and uneasy chiefs, but equally well we can see in them a projection of a social theory, which centered on an idea of restraint of all behavior.  

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10 An often repeated theme in the missionary writings is the Hawaiian way of expressing affection, joy and sorrow. In the eyes of the missionaries this manner of expression, in its unrestrained flow of emotions, disfiguring bodily movements, loud wailing and crying, and, in case of a death of a chief, inflicting of wounds, knocking off teeth and cutting the hair - acts explicitly forbidden in Deuteronomy - was one of the surest signs of barbarism. Of course, in the right context, such as a revivalist Christian prayer meeting, unrestrained emotions were in fact allowed to some extent, even welcomed by some few (see Daws 1961). Also weeping in general was considered not a vice if the person could only combine the tears with the least possible bodily movements (Samuel and Nancy Ruggles, Journal, May 3, 29, 1820; cf. Richards in Stewart 1970, 338-340). Choosing an example at random, the following quote describes a step towards a rational society as assisted by Christian
3.3. Almost Modern: A Comparison

Now, these Lockean clerics from New England Congregationalist circles were sent to a place where inequality was a respected value and hierarchy a way of life (see fig. 3.3.). The Hawaiian hierarchy was not only sociological, it was also a value in somewhat Dumontian sense, a principle of society, whereas hierarchy in New England was markedly a result of the sociology of the place. One cannot easily think of two places on earth that would be culturally so distant. It is almost a paradox that the mission was eventually accepted in Hawaii on the very basis of its theocentric ideas - although the ideas were nothing like those one was to find in the northern angle of principles:

Her [Kaʻahumanu, "the Queen Regent"] reception here [Kailua, Hawaiʻi] by the people was as usual cordial and affectionate, tho unattended with any of those extravagant excesses which formerly ever followed the arrival of any distinguished ruler. On the contrary we assembled by her request and offered to the throne of Grace our thanksgivings and praises for her safe arrival. Formerly, guns would have been fired, wailings of Joy would have rent the air, dances and revelry would have succeeded. Tho not less than ten thousand people assembled here soon after her arrival there was the utmost order and stillness prevalent during the whole time of their stay (Bishop to Evarts, Nov. 30, 1826, MsL).

The early missionary letters and diaries are dotted with similar remarks in which properly contained human emotions are given a constitutive status in laying the foundations of a correct social and political system.
Polynesia. But from the point of view of the Hawaiians this mattered but little.

The above calls for a contrast. But to place the Lockean point of view side by side with the Hawaiian conception of human society also creates a conceptual - and, as I shall also maintain, a practical problem - that not only reminds us of the difficult nature of political comparisons between cultures but that also takes us directly to the heart of this study. More precisely, what practical consequences evolved out of the encounter of the theocentric political ontology of the Congregationalist mission and the
Fig. 3.3 Kina'u and Her "Maids of Honor" Returning from the Foreigners' Church (Seaman's Chapel) in the mid-1830's. Lithograph after Masselot, BM. Source: Sahlins 1992, 109 (upper picture).

Hawaiian version of the constitution of society in which a divine myth was ritually relived? As a preliminary answer to the question we could say that the mutually reinforcing logical relation between natural and political society (as expressed in Lockean social theory and embraced by the missionaries) resulted in a missionary representation of the Hawaiian chiefship that from the Lockean point of view could have been identified as political society in a disfigured and perverted form. The perversion itself was engendered by an unhealthy condition in the Hawaiian version of natural society.

As strange as it may sound, there was, nevertheless, some sort of affinity between the missionary political theory and the Hawaiian version of divine mediation. At least the prominent place the two theories accorded to a non-human agency in the constitution of the human world placed them in a workable relation to each other (the nature of divinity, for example, became a subject of frequent intercultural exchanges). This can be viewed more fully by referring to the logic of the divine, or myth, in these theories as regards their relation to what we call modern human-centered ontologies and to the corresponding approaches to the knowable world they might occasion.

As Lévi-Strauss was so keen to argue, mythical thinking operates through a rather different logic than modern Western thought. As the well-known argument goes, the myth
works from events to structure to conjoin concrete action into structural patterns, whereas the West is characterized by its preoccupation with disjoining events on the basis of a structure (Lévi-Strauss 1966). Although Lévi-Strauss was principally concerned with opposing mythical thought to Western science his thinking may be modified to include also modern political thinking and its emphasis on democratic process and individual action.

Initially (this position will be adjusted later) we could conclude that the fundamental logic of modern politics is in congruence with that of science. Ideally modern political process establishes rules that apply equally to everybody, who are then in a position to act according to their will, abilities and luck, thus producing events that are not necessarily structured back into the same rules.

For the sake of continuity let us again consider Locke, who, in his *Two Treatises of Government*, outlined the basic principles of modern political understanding of social organization. It is curious, and historically and culturally of utmost significance, that people should consciously form a political society, that is, they should establish a separate category of thought for themselves and preserve it as a sign of consent. In this form of political theory, the social bond of a people is made dependent on the act of putting the free will of every individual into a state of moratorium and hence subjecting it to the common
will of the majority, which then, as a form, allows itself to be reformulated on whatever basis and in whatever content. In the present context it is important to realize that this scheme is consciously anti-traditionalist; it only sets the frame of action in which the problem of arbitrariness of power is resolved by a delegation of powers, which leaves the individual determination of one's actions intact as far as it does not contradict the consensual basis of political society. Things are in a political state only when people have this right to establish a mutual consent, which thus frees their other actions in regard to their lives and assets (Two Treatises of Government, II, Ch. 15). Moreover, nothing in the scheme suggests a specific course for society; as long as the political compact remains in force there is no predetermination as to the specific contents of society. In this scheme, to think politically is to render the course of society fundamentally arbitrary, hence radically open to questioning and delegated decision-making - the logic of which produces events on the basis of a structure.

Myth, on the contrary, works events back to the structure, so that, for example, when a dying Hawaiian high chief called his or her closest relatives to hear kauoha, or the last will concerning his or her heir and the division of lands, this and the ensuing events were quickly structured back to genealogical pedigrees and ultimately to the
structure of the universe. It has often been pointed out (e.g., Ellis 1979, 120; Kamakau 1992a, 222; Handy and Pukui 1972, 46; Sahlins 1981, 65; Charlot 1985, 1) that after the death of a high chief all the tabus upon which the normal social order rested were abrogated for anahulu, or the ritual period of ten days, during which "various forms of ritual inversion took place," as in a kind of Saturnalia, until the new high chief restored the tabus and returned the society to the cosmic order of which he was the paramount representation through his divine ancestry.

Seen from a viewpoint of Lockean political theory, the society for Hawaiians existed only through a chief; without a chief society would be abolished. Thus, there was no distinction between natural society and political society, which was a cornerstone in the Lockean version. In the latter, people would always be in a society, as social mode of existence was part of nature's order, whereas in the Hawaiian conception, society needs to be established in a kind of combination of its social and political sides. In this sense, the Hawaiian theory was far closer to Hobbes than Locke, who, unlike his predecessor, envisaged a society bound together by a mutual recognition of its natural right to abolish the political society and to establish a new one should that need ever arise. Hawaiian theory, on the contrary, saw everything as one and therefore collapsing as one. The chief guaranteed the appropriation of nature as
expressed in the mythical origin of human beings (conquest from gods).

It would be an error to dismiss the importance of chiefs simply by making the abrogation of the temple worship and chiefly tabus in 1819 an index of a similar change in the social system. A leading chief of the 1840s, most likely Miriam Kekeuluohi, expressed this idea in a succinct although Christianized form:

O ke ali'i, o ke aupuni a me ka lahuikanaka, hookahi no ia mai ke Akua mai. O ke ola o ke ali'i, o ia ke ola o ke aupuni a me kona lahuikanaka: no laila, e malamaia ke ola o ke ali'i e ke Akua, no kona aupuni a me kona lahuikanaka apau.

The chief, the government and the people have always been one from the time of God [i.e., from creation]. The chief's life is the life of the government and the life of his people: therefore, let the chief's life be preserved by God for his government and all his people (Kekeuluohi, attrib., 1848, my translation).

Schematically, it seems, that as science breaks up entities into new events - which is the opposite of myth - modern politics does the same by liberating individual action by an equalizing edict. It might well be repeated that to say that this was not the way the Hawaiian society was ordered is not to deny the validity of that society as a form of reality. It only suggests that modern politics is, on the level of its fundamental logic, incompatible with mythical thought, even though the modern political process may employ mythical elements and even though it can be appropriated by people accustomed to live a myth.
The above comparison is ideal-typical, and to approach a more balanced view we have to qualify the dichotomy by the peculiarities of the missionary culture. For behind the principle of ignoring the sociology of a society and placing an event-producing structure on top of it, there is a narrative dimension of a biblical type, namely, the story of the original condition of humankind as a collection of free individuals, who cannot, without a consensual basis, organize themselves into hierarchic units. As already indicated, this narrative allows anyone of its adherents to make judgments on any human community, whether the morality of that community stands firmly on the God-given natural foundation (i.e., whether its artifice is naturally founded) or falls short of it, reaching the dimensions of either anarchy or tyranny.

In this sense, the Lockean order of things is mythically based; it may have anti-mythical and rationalistic consequences - events, in Lévi-Strauss' sense - but at root its logic is squarely in line with myth, elections, for example, representing an enactment and realization of the original freedom. It reproduces structures by evaluating and ordering events; it can hardly be said that it would use these event-observations as a basis for pouring meaning out of them, as the modern scientific thinking claims to do according to Lévi-Strauss. It never assumes that there could be a possibility for an
event to be meaningless at the first encounter (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1966, 22). There is, therefore, in the Lockean political theory, a practical dimension of potential myth-breaking. This theory has a capacity to cancel social significations but only at intervals (when the body politic is organized and separated from other social institutions). In other words, this is only a temporary measure. It lasts the rapidly closing moment of equalizing - at least as a norm - all participants of political process and extricating the emerging political pact from all other elements of society, leaving just the expression of consent. After that the narrative foundation takes the scene by morally evaluating the process in terms of a theocentric philosophy of history. In the end, there are always only two possible answers regardless of the combination of events - the achieved organization either corresponds with the moral ideal, or it fails, and perhaps a remedy is in order.

3.3.1. The Hono Rite

To illustrate better the above contrast of a myth and a 'semi-myth' and to bring out the mythical operation of Hawaiian social hierarchy, I have chosen to represent briefly a fundamental ritual, called hono. 11 It at once

11 For a description of this rite I have consulted 'I'i's and Samuel Kamakau's accounts (Ii 1983, 37-38, 43-44; Kamakau 1992b, 142-144). Best available analysis is
describes the founding principles of the traditional Hawaiian society, practiced until the critical year of 1819, and also makes a good contrast to the theory of political society as impersonated by the foreigners in Hawaii, the missionaries in particular.

Hono rite was an important part of the consecration of a luakini temple, the site of human sacrifice and royal privilege. The royal privilege to consecrate luakini through human sacrifice was also a privilege to establish the proper social order and the necessary tabus - or, better, to render the tabus useful for the continuity of society. This was actualized most concretely after a war of conquest. After the decisive battle the victorious chief would tour his dominions, consecrating temples as he went along. More regularly this was done during the makahiki ceremonies at the turn of the year. As studied by Valeri, the performance of the hono rite was itself a mirror image of the universe in creation, now only scaled down to minimal symbolic elements for obvious practical purposes. By recreating an orderly universe it also reproduced the high chief as the living condition of the same order.

The participants in this rite were seated in eight rows before images of gods so that each row began from an image and ended at the sacrificial altar, lele, which was

undoubtedly by Valeri (1985b, 326-327) whom I have followed. He also sites other primary sources describing hono.
surrounded by priests. The high chief and the high priest stood behind the *lele* facing the gods. The people sitting in rows had turned their backs to the images. All sources seem to agree that this rite required great effort on the part of the participants, while they had to hold up their arms and bend down their heads during the long prayers, which, according to 'I'i and Kamakau, lasted a whole hour. After the prayers the participants ate sacrificial pigs particularly reserved for this occasion.

In this rite we are interested in the interpretation of the spatial arrangement of the participants on the one hand and the contents of the prayers on the other. According to Valeri, "the hono rite depicts the final transfer of the divine form into the social relations" (Valeri 1985b, 326). Arranging the participants in rows by god images is a clear sign of the divine ordering of society. But the people in rows are more passive in their roles; though all pray in unison they do not initiate prayers, nor do they face the gods represented by the images. Instead, they face the priests and the high chief, who remain, through sacrifice, the privileged mediators between the visible society and the invisible gods. Besides being an enactment of the separation of gods and humans, this is also a recreation of
the necessary social hierarchy. Hence the indispensability of the chief.\textsuperscript{12}

The prayers of the \textit{hono} rite add an important element to the reconstruction of the Hawaiian theory of society, and to the understanding of the cultural interface that produced the political interpretations of the chiefship. After the first prayers there followed the prayer of the ruling chief, who at the same time grasped the human victim by mouth with an ivory hook:

\begin{quote}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
È Kū è, è Kūnuiākea, & O Kū, O Kūnuiākea, \\
È Lononuiākea, & O Lononuiākea, \\
È Kānenuiākea me Kanaloa, & O Kānenuiākea, and Kanaloa, \\
Eia ka 'ālana, ka mōhai; & Here is a gift [and] a sacrifice; \\
\end{tabular}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
He 'ahu ko'o kea, \\
He palaoa pae, \\
He kipi 'āina, he lawe 'āina. \\
È mōlia aku i kipi owaho me loko, \\
I ke kūnou po'o me ke kuhi lima, \\
A i ka lawe 'āina ho'i. \\
È ola ia'u, i ka pouhane o ke aupuni, \\
A me nā ali'i a pau, \\
I ka hū, i ka maka'āinana, \\
I ke aupuni mai 'ō ā 'ō. \\
'Āmama, ua noa, \\
Lele wale aku lā ho'i.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{12} Valeri does not consider the identity of the participants in the rows and hence the social distribution of ritual knowledge, which would have a profound effect on the generalizability of his interpretation of the \textit{hono} rite in the Hawaiian society at large. Neither do the primary sources identify these people, although it is possible that they were members of the chiefly or priestly households.
In this brief prayer the whole establishment of the traditional Hawaiian society is at stake. The chief, now hooked to the sacrificial victim, channels the divine mana of the gods into society. He becomes the "support" of his government, which in this case is much more than an organization of the functions of ruling, as in the Lockean theory (cf. Kamakau 1992a, 135). Here the chief is in fact creating the society, not merely securing some fundamentals of an already existing social community; the Hawaiian aupuni was therefore not intended for leaving the members of society "exactly in the situation in which they were before the establishment of society" (Wayland 1963, 319). To the contrary, aupuni is the society. And the rebels who threaten to rise against the chief are truly his enemies, but as the chief is the founding principle of society, rebellion has a wider significance for the social organization as a whole.

The importance of the chief's monopolizing the dedication of luakini and the human sacrifice is also clear, for those were the most visible media to the divine and hence the keys to his own position on top of the social hierarchy. Any subordinate chief performing these rites would indeed be considered a rebel, not to mention the common people (Kamakau 1992b, 129).
So important was the chief's person that even in the Christian era the chiefs tended to give orders to God while praying, in close functional resemblance to their facing the god images in the hono rite. According to a missionary descendant the chiefs used the word kauoha ('to order', 'to command') in their prayers, while the common Hawaiians were much more modest and used the word nonoi, 'to ask', 'to petition' (Emerson 1928, 159). This comes not as a surprise if we remember that the chief is, besides the medium, also the natural adversary to gods, and vice versa (see Valeri 1985b, 225-226; Sahlins 1987, 93). The chief's task is to control gods through his sacrificial cult. "Ma ka moku, lele Ku i waho, the land is slain, Ku is fled abroad," says a chant (Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 6, 395).

By appropriating the land through sacrifice the chief became associated with that particular piece of land - or should we say that the land came to bear the identity of the chief (Kepelino 1932, 74; Valeri 1985b, 146). The principle of extension of the chief's person to incorporate physical landscape and people living on the land is well-known. The recorder of native traditions Davida Malo might have had this in mind when he composed a small vignette of a typical aupuni. For Malo aupuni was like a human body, the chief being the head (which was the most sacred part of the natural body), the other chiefs forming the shoulders and chest. The head counsellor, kalaimoku, and the high priest,
kāhuna  nui, were the arms of aupuni, soldiers the right foot, farmers and fishermen the left. The fingers and toes represented the people employed in miscellaneous activities (Malo 1987, 121-122). "Here are the things that belong to the true body of aupuni, all the people from the commoners to the chiefs under the high chief. That is the true body of aupuni, because where there is land without people there is no aupuni" (Malo 1987, 121, my translation; cf. Kepelino 1932, 146).

Thus, in a state of aupuni, people are united through and under a chief, whose identity becomes the identity of the people living under him. This was then repeated throughout the social classes so that each person was known to have an identity of his or her superior. Such a group

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13 In the same vein, but a generation later, Kamakau pictured a united body of chiefs and commoners (Kamakau 1865a). It seems that Kamakau was employing the same body metaphor primarily to criticize the chiefly establishment for its traditionally unacceptable methods of self-aggrandizement, which left a vast open chasm between chiefs and commoners (Malo was also critical at times). However, in doing this, Kamakau framed the three elements, the high chief, subordinate chiefs and commoners, in a state of becoming a united body under the high chief. The product of this unification was called aupuni. Later, in chronicling the passing of the chieftainship to Kamehameha’s son Liholiho, Kamakau again stressed the image of the extended body of a chief:

"When Liholiho became king he gathered about him the young chiefs of every rank and the children also of warriors and many of the commoners and made them members of his household as friends (aikane), favorites (punahele), and foster children (ho’okama), just as the old chiefs had done before him. The kingly crown in those days was represented by the circle of chiefs and commoners who surrounded the king" (Kamakau 1992a, 249).
was designated by adding the word **mā** to the head person's name. Although rejected as an impracticable term, the people of **aupuni** were theoretically the high chief's **mā**. Malo, in fact, implies just that, besides capturing the traditional passivity of a Polynesian chief: "The high chief was like a house. The house merely stands but the wooden fence makes it firm and secure. The high chief is like that, the chiefs under him and the people everywhere are the things that secure him" (Malo 1987, 125, my translation).  

For such a chief, his or her genealogical rank was the ultimate source of a legitimate rule, although a common theme in the native history is usurpation by a low-ranking chief, who, however, by marrying a truly high-ranking woman, secures the traditional legitimacy for his offspring. An upstart chief could thus secure an essential link to the divine ancestors of all people. The best way to prevent a

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14 There is some evidence also from the later contact period that the chief's person remained sacred and subject to great care. Sometime between 1838 and 1842 Kamehameha III's secretary Timothy Ha'ali'ilio wrote to the Governor of O'ahu, Mataio Kekūanaō'a, a troubled letter asking the Governor to send soldiers to guard the king's residence on O'ahu and issuing a list of persons who were allowed to come and go freely without being stopped by the soldiers. Just a few moments earlier a foreigner had come into the house while the king and his closest men were eating. The unobstructed entree of the foreigner caused much alarm and agitation among the Hawaiian nobility. According to Ha'ali'ilio, "ua kokoke mai ka make, death was near." The 'fencing' of the house had failed, which was the reason for Ha'ali'ilio's troubles, as he and Kekūanaō'a were the hosts for the occasion (F.O. & Ex., ND/164; see Greer 1991, 97).
genealogy from diminishing in respect and glory was to couple with the closest relative, i.e., a biological sibling. This ideal of the genealogically purest possible mating between a sister and brother (ni’aupi’o) was represented in the hono rite by coconut fronds plaited with coconut fiber (ni’aupi’o actually means a bent coconut frond conveying an idea of self-generation) (Ii 1983, 38; Kamakau 1992b, 143). The coconut fiber used in the plaiting was called interestingly enough "kuala helehonua o ke aupuni" (Kamakau 1992b, 143). Literally this means 'binding cord for the preparation of aupuni'.

The Hawaiian theory of the constitution of society as it was represented in the hono rite was founded on the principle of genealogical and ritual mediation between the chief and the gods. By establishing aupuni the high chief rendered usable the dangerous tabus and thus gave life and proper shape to society. Indeed, after hono, the participants of the ritual indulged in eating consecrated pork. In this chief-centered theory the Hawaiians were quite one-dimensional, while the Lockeans operated on a two-dimensional model, in which the moral code and social regulations were always already in existence when a government or political society was established. Although

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15 In 'Ī'i's account there were four fronds, while Kamakau gives only two. It seems more likely that the ritual involved four fronds, four being the sacred number. Unlike Kamakau's, 'Ī'i's account is also based on personal experience.
the Lockean founding of government was divinely sanctioned, God was withheld from direct participation in the act itself, as he was absent in concretely establishing other social relations. Myth, therefore, was retained in the Lockean theory only as a kind of master narrative, not as a material embodiment of society. It was also less specific in particulars and its ritual grammar was less complex.

In comparing the above social theories we have already made use of a few Hawaiian concepts, such as aupuni. During the contact period that and many others entered into the foreigner representations of Hawaiian society. That is also the subject of the next chapter.
4. DISCURSIVE SURFACE: POLITICAL VOCABULARY

... there is no question here of a "pie" that may be cut in many ways, but rather that the pie is found in the act of cutting.

Garfinkel

The Lockean point of view, as outlined in the previous chapter, was acted out in several arenas of the culture contact. Besides, in general, it is difficult to separate the political theory from the more mandatory needs of the missionaries to settle in the Hawaiian society and to make themselves understood in the field. At any rate, we shall next single out the political dimension of the cultural translation process and pay special attention to Hawaiian conceptions that were captured by the political discourse carried over by the mission in particular.

For the sake of a systematic presentation cultural translation is located in the compilation of dictionaries and vocabularies of the Hawaiian language. For the most part, this chapter is only descriptive, the historical constitution of the linguistic surface and its analytical assessment being the themes of the following chapters. Before introducing the linguistic corpus, we should, however, note some of the limitations of this type of analysis. Of course, although important, dictionaries are by no means instances in which words appear for the first
time, nor are they final authorities; they are mainly means and avenues of codifying language, that is, they register and regularize the actual use of language, the compiler sometimes engaging in painful compromise-making just to proceed from one entry word to another. Or, as has been the case in Hawaii, and Polynesia in general, dictionaries have also registered sometimes very profound inventions of words and meanings. Chance and the lack of sufficient resources and other practical concerns, like the missionaries' need to concentrate on the translation of basic Christian material, should also be kept in mind, although their varied consequences cannot be but touched upon here.

The limitations apart, dictionaries are useful guides in locating words and meanings as they exist in an objectified culture, or, when they are incomplete, in mapping out the words that are deemed the most important, thereby informing us about the extent and first priorities of linguistic work of the period. Formal translations are important also as cognitive indexes, which, in this case, inform us not merely about the fact that Hawaiian society was represented politically and even codified so, but also give us more substantial information on the selection of terms and the incorporated meanings. Thus, historically speaking, dictionaries and vocabularies represent part of the linguistic surface of intercultural communication, which contains the necessary elements for any type of comparison
between the cultures, which has been the special interest of this study.

To establish some concrete ground for this approach, I first proposed a preliminary linguistic comparison, which would have included, first, a mapping of the concepts of politics in the Polynesian language group, and second, by 'zooming' in detail on our particular case, a check of the earliest Hawaiian language vocabularies and dictionaries in comparison to other early textual material. This was to be done primarily to display the selection processes that resulted in the establishment of standard translations. However, it proved to be too 'heavy' an alternative to include all that material into the main body of the text. For that reason, the comparative material is presented in an appendix (see Appendix A) and only the Hawaiian part is included here. The method used in this search was a simple one: working backwards from later dictionaries and vocabularies until no trace of the word under inspection was found. The reporting is done in a reversed order. In all

1 For the comparison I chose only the major Polynesian languages - Fijian, Tongan, Samoan, Tahitian, Maori and Hawaiian, in order to keep the check simple and manageable. The order of this survey follows the relative linguistic distance of the chosen languages from Fijian to Hawaiian (Elbert 1953). None of the surveys was to be complete as regards the dictionaries and vocabularies used. Also, manuscript sources have been used very sparingly except in the Hawaiian case, in which we can better connect different hand-written word lists and vocabularies with their social contexts. However, historically speaking the printed dictionary material is fairly representative.
cases the word was first looked up in the European language section and after that the corresponding entry in the Hawaiian section was checked. The order of word-check is thus: European language → Hawaiian → European language, wherever this has been applicable (some dictionaries and vocabularies have only Hawaiian entries).

4.1. Sources

The codification of the Hawaiian language was, as elsewhere in Polynesia, initiated by missionaries, only this time American. Before the mission enterprise, which can be said to have begun sometime after 1815, a handful of explorers, starting from Cook’s third voyage, had written down Hawaiian words as they heard them and compiled brief vocabulary lists. For the present purposes these lists offer but little help in delineating the outlines of the history of establishing the intercultural equivalents of political meanings. These lists, which range from 80 to 475 words (Elbert 1954, 6), consist basically of the everyday words stretching from body parts to natural phenomena and words used in the exchange of material goods and other shipping-related vocabulary.

It is more helpful and, I would suggest, closer to the actual sequence of events to concentrate on the translation work of the American missionaries. With the help of a few
native Hawaiians, who were residing at the mission school in Connecticut, the missionaries had already been exposed to the Hawaiian language and culture before they embarked on the voyage to Hawaii in 1819. The printer of this first company of missionaries, Elisha Loomis, was preparing a vocabulary on board their ship, most likely helped by the four young Hawaiians who had received their education at the mission school and learned to speak English. Probably they also had a grammar and vocabulary prepared by another young Hawaiian adventurer, 'ōpūkaha'ia, who, besides this work, is said to have translated the book of Genesis before his death in Connecticut in 1818 (Elbert 1954, 7).

The reason for emphasizing these first missionary efforts to master the Hawaiian language is simple. Unlike the explorers, the missionaries had a special interest in getting inside the Hawaiian society and for that reason they had to seek prolonged face-to-face contacts with Hawaiians. At first, they had to resort to the help of those few Hawaiians who had found their ways, usually as seamen in American merchant ships, to New England and who had some knowledge in the English language. As some of them accompanied the first missionaries to Hawaii, where they were later joined by a few Tahitian converts and the Reverend William Ellis, an English missionary of some years in the Society Islands, the mission got the necessary brokers to inaugurate an organized form of cultural
translation. This, of course, was far from an ideal situation in which the missionaries were expected to be able to perform their work independently and fluently in the native Hawaiian tongue. To even approximate this desired state each missionary had to devote much time to the study of the language. And to facilitate their learning - besides using some of the elementary books of Maori and Tahitian (Ellis 1979, 22; Stewart 1970, 277) - they prepared vocabularies. According to one contemporary witness the progress was relatively slow; in May 1824, more than four years after their arrival and after about five years of intense study, the missionaries in Honolulu could not make themselves properly understood in Hawaiian - at least when giving sermons in the native. Instead, the native assistants took up the task and fared well (Reynolds, 1989, 31).

In order to give an idea of the long process of socio-linguistic codification I shall first present as complete a listing as I have been able to draw of the different vocabularies and dictionaries of the Hawaiian language. In the following I have also included those manuscripts that I know have some time existed but are now apparently lost. The directions of entries in the published works containing
more than 4,000 words and which can be properly called
dictionaries are footnoted.  

I assume that the following list is at least nearly complete in view of the information we have at our disposal today, but this does not by all means exclude the possibility that some works have been unknowingly passed without notice. I have somewhat modified a similar but shorter listing by Elbert (1954).

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2 I assume that the following list is at least nearly complete in view of the information we have at our disposal today, but this does not by all means exclude the possibility that some works have been unknowingly passed without notice. I have somewhat modified a similar but shorter listing by Elbert (1954).
<table>
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<sup>a</sup> Hawaiian-English.

<sup>b</sup> Marquesan-Hawaiian-French and French-Marquesan-Hawaiian.

<sup>c</sup> English-Hawaiian.

<sup>d</sup> Hawaiian-English with an English finding list.

<sup>e</sup> Hawaiian-English and English-Hawaiian.

<sup>f</sup> The following years are only suggestive, reflecting the continuous work by Elbert and Pukui.
The list suggests at least two conclusions. First, a considerable amount of working hours have been devoted to the translation process, not to mention the number of people involved (the acknowledgements in the dictionaries give a slight idea). The dictionaries are thus clearly a collective effort. Second, since the advent of the American missionaries in 1820 the translation process has been in effect monopolized by Americans and the English language, which already had a strong lead in recording Hawaiian words. Culturally, as we have seen, the missionaries were molded by the sturdy Protestant culture of New England, a fact which by all means did not prevent them from practicing cultural translation (that, in fact, was their mission) but which added a taste of labor to their work. Only gradually this taste of labor passed off, and the linguistic ease that emerged instead provided the agents with the intuitive and naturalized base for intercultural communication. The results of that process are visible in the standard dictionary of today. The consequences of cultural translation are, of course, immense and a detailed analysis is practically an impossible task. But, at least, in regard to political vocabulary, the presence of English as the counterpart of Hawaiian in the translation process should alert us to some of the basic tenets of Anglo-American conceptions of social order (see chapter 3).
4.2. Hawaiian Images of Politics

As a dictionary entry the word 'political' appeared first in Lorrin Andrews' dictionary in 1865. The Hawaiian word used by Andrews was kālai'āina (Andrews spelled it without diacritical markers), to which he gave three meanings: First, "to manage or direct the affairs of the land, i.e., the resources," second, "the name of the office of the Minister of Interior," and third, "political economy" (Andrews 1865, 250). In the Western sense, and corresponding to the Hawaiian historical situation of the time, all three meanings were closely connected. The direction of the use of the resources was conceived of as the function of the ministry of interior, which, in turn, relied on the homespun doctrine of political economy.

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3 The word itself appeared first in Andrews' vocabulary of 1836. The entry for the Hawaiian word aiāhulu contains the following explanation: "To pray or poison to death, to procure the death of another by any fraudulent means, or for any political or selfish purposes" (Andrews 1836, 3). The appearance of the word political in this entry does not, however, indicate that the word would have been taken as an explicit object of translation. In the modern Hawaiian dictionary the word aiāhulu has also lost the meaning Andrews was able to decipher. The present day meaning is 'ungodly' or 'wicked', probably based on the more specific meaning 'someone who is careless in observing tabus' (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 9).

4 It should be noted that in Hawaii political economy was explicitly applied, as a branch of knowledge, to reconstruct the ali'i-based contact economy in the late 1830s. The interested missionaries had sincere hopes that by teaching the doctrine to the chiefs the Hawaiian society would be led to acquire, not only a more egalitarian form of government but also commercial capitalism. The latter was
least, these were the functional relations in the nineteenth century. Andrews did not place much emphasis on the word and accordingly excluded it from the English-Hawaiian finding list, which he reluctantly added to his dictionary.\(^5\)

The word itself is a composition of the verb *kalai*, which basically means to carve, hew or cut, and *ʻaina*, land, thought to follow from the former. For this reason 'politics' in the standard missionary translation combined the two meanings of politics of the modern Western tradition, namely the politics of civil society (politics from below) and the politics of government (politics from above). Because of the thoroughgoing hierarchy of the Hawaiian society, the missionaries concentrated in their teachings of political economy on the aliʻi class and correspondingly did not invent a translation that would have made a distinction between the two sides of the Western tradition of politics, as either state (or government) oriented or people oriented activity (see ch. 7).

\(^5\) In fact, Andrews had learnt Hawaiian so well that he took much pride in it and felt the inadequacy of any English translation. The typical missionary despair in facing a 'savage' and 'imperfect' language had been replaced by paternalistic admiration. In the Introduction to his dictionary Andrews remarked that "the Hawaiians possessed a language not only adopted to their former necessities, but capable of being used in introducing the arts of civilized society, and especially of pure morals, of law, and the religion of the Bible" (Andrews 1865, vi; see also Andrews 1864). This attitude was not uncommon among the missionary families. For instance, Rev. Henry H. Parker, a son of a missionary and the principal reviser of Andrews' dictionary, was famed for his outright refusal to preach in English (Elbert 1954, 13). The paternalistic side of this admiration was reflected in the very outspoken manner in which Andrews, for example, tried to establish what he called "the best and purest Hawaiian" he could obtain (Andrews 1865, iv). In practice, this strategy involved concentration on the language of the aliʻi and a few outstanding converts (a language which apparently differed from that of the majority of Hawaiians) and avoidance of terms that would indicate aspects of sexual intercourse and other elements of Hawaiian life that were too much for the agents of civilization.
producing a literal meaning of land carving. Compared to the preceding vocabularies Andrews added the sense of carving out to the verb kālai. According to him, this could also be understood in the sense of dividing out as one's portion. Thus, by expanding the image of carving out, kālai'āina signified the action of dividing out the land in portions. In the revision of Andrews' dictionary Henry H. Parker brought the meaning of kālai closer to what was understood by political economy as a branch of governmental knowledge. Perhaps because Andrews had already defined kālai'āina as a category of land management, Parker thought it best to add similar verbal meanings to the root, kālai. Accordingly, the verbs to direct, to conduct or regulate and to manage were added (Andrews 1922, 251).

Kālai is unquestionably a word with a long indigenous history and it can be found in all major Polynesian languages (Hale 1968, 477). How much the word was manipulated by the early translators, is difficult to say, but it is certain that it acquired new meanings in the process of translation, culminating in Pukui and Elbert's dictionary with an expansion of meaning towards the mental activity of planning and plotting, as, for example, in the expression kālai'ino (to plot evil, concoct mischief, contrive secretly to destroy by witchcraft or treachery, lit. carve evil) and a more modern concept, ke kālai 'ana o ke kuke (tariff policy) (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 121).
Without indulging in a discussion on scientific progress of linguistic research, it is enough to say that the acquisition of new meanings, whether through misunderstandings, manipulation, or accumulation of knowledge, is important as such as a social phenomenon contributing to the changing interface between cultures.

Bearing this in mind, the meaning of *kalai*, as an opening for probing into the Hawaiian culture, seems to have changed by 1865, when Andrews added the meanings to divide and to manage resources. There is no sign of this management dimension in Andrews' vocabulary of 1836, and the same is true regarding the earlier vocabularies. In his vocabulary of synonyms, Samuel Mānaiakalani Kamakau, the only native Hawaiian lexicographer, was equally silent about management, not to mention anything implying political economy. Instead, he listed three synonyms, *kūpā*, *kalakalai*, and *ʻoki*, which are all applied to carving, hewing or cutting (Kamakau, Quotations, n.d.).

This vocabulary has usually been attributed to Andrews and only recently its identity has been seriously questioned. According to Marguerite Ashford (1987) the vocabulary is most likely Kamakau's list of synonyms, which he was appointed to prepare in 1843 by the faculty members of Lahainaluna Seminary (Lahainaluna, Records, Sept. 27, 1843). According to the records of the faculty meetings, Kamakau's vocabulary was intended to be used as a basis for a new Hawaiian-English dictionary (Records, Feb. 11, 1846; this also indicates that the vocabulary was completed or nearly completed by that date). When the Hawaiian Legislature in 1860 decided to finance Andrews' Hawaiian language dictionary, Kamakau's vocabulary had already become an important part of the work.
To set the dictionaries aside, it seems that the word *kalai'aina* was rarely used in the Hawaiian language texts written by native Hawaiians in the nineteenth century. Among the most noted authors only Kamakau appears to have used the word in recording oral history and commenting on contemporary matters. Kamakau left the impression that he associated *kalai'aina* with the valued skills of anyone seeking a high-ranking ali'i who could give the skillful person a place in his household. For example:

O Namaka kekahī kanaka kaulana i ke Au o Kalaniopuu, he kanaka akeakamai - Ua olelo oia, "A loa a kona haku, alaila, hoike oia i kana mau hana akamai oia ho i ke *kalai'aina*, ke kakaolelo, ke kuauhau, ka lonomakaihe, ke kuhikuhi puuone, ka lua, ka lele a me ke kino." Ua ao ia oia i na oihana ike i Kauai, a akamai loa, alaila, hele mai oia i ka imi haku, a o Kalaniopuu no nae kona haku i makemake ai (Kamakau 1867a, my italics).

A mid-twentieth-century translation gives the following text:

Na-maka was one of the noted men of Ka-lani-'opu'u's time. He was a man skilled in politics, oratory, genealogies, spear-throwing, the conformation of the earth's surface, bone-breaking, cliff-leaping, and the interpretation of omens, all accomplishments which he had learned on Kauai. Then he set out to find a haku (lord) to whom he might impart all his learning, and Ka-lani-'opu'u was the haku whom he selected (Kamakau 1992a, 111, my italics).

Two years earlier, in 1865, commenting on the preservation of native Hawaiian traditions, he had used the term in a similar (perhaps identical) sense:

Aka, o ka poe i ao i ka moolelo, a mookuauhau me ka naauao a me ke akamai i kela mea keia mea, ke kakaolelo me ke *kalai'aina*, oia ka poe i kapaia he poe akeakamai io. A ua naauao io lakou e like me Kauakahikahaola a me Kalaikuahulu (Kamakau 1865b, my italics).
But, the people who teach traditions and genealogies with knowledge and skill in various things, like oratory and land matters, those are the people called true scholars. And they are truly enlightened like Kauakahikahaola and Kalaikuahulu (my translation).

But, in general, the native writers, when referring to dividing of lands among chiefs, preferred the words *mahele* (e.g., Elbert 1982, 101, 143, 147; Ii 1869a, 1869d; Kamakau 1867b, 1870), *'oki* (e.g., Pogue 1858, 51), *'oki'oki* (e.g., Ii 1867b; Kahananui 1984, 60; Kamakau 1867b,d, 1868; Pogue 1858, 42), *ka'awale* (e.g., Elbert 1982, 171; Ii 1869c; Malo 1987, 130), or *pu'unaue* (e.g., Ii 1869d), which all carry the implication of cutting and setting aside as a separate portion. On the other hand, emphasizing the management of lands and people, the native writers used terms such as *ho'oponopono* (e.g., Elbert 1982, 173; Ii 1869c; Kahananui 1984, 67; Kamakau 1867e, Malo 1987, 38, 121), *ho'omalu* (e.g., Malo 1987, 43), *mālama* (e.g., Kahananui 1984, 69), *kuapapanui* (e.g., Elbert 1982, 175), or *kālaimoku* (e.g., Malo 1987, 133). Sometimes land was simply given away (*hā'awi*) or figuratively given for adoption (*hānai*). Many times it was conquered (*na'i*), which meant that the land

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7 The Hawaiian word akeakamai means literally to desire wisdom and perhaps is, despite its perfect Hawaiian appearance and construction, a direct translation from the Greek philosophos. At least the word was used by the missionaries to translate natural philosophy and, later, science.

8 Kauakahikahaola and Kālaikuahulu were respected orators and genealogists and close advisors to the high chief Kamehameha.
went (lilo) from one chief to another, or, when land was re-conquered, it reverted (ho'iho'i) to the conquering chief (this also took place at the death of the subordinate landholder). When land was divided it was all fixed and settled (pau ka 'āina i ka 'oki'oki).

It is clear that only kālaimoku implies a close etymological relation with the term kālai'āina. Malo's use of kālaimoku is a sure evidence of its wide applicability. For one thing, it is a term for the person who lends his experience and advice to the high chief in important decisions, like warfare or land apportioning. Second, it is the verb denoting this activity, and third, the name of the general category of the variety of activities belonging to kālaimoku (Malo 1987, 121-133; 1991, 187-204). The early vocabularies do identify kālaimoku, but only as a person. According to Andrews and his missionary colleague Artemas Bishop, kālaimoku was a councillor or a minister of state (Andrews, Vocabulary, n.d.; Bishop 1828). For some reason Andrews omitted the word in his first printed vocabulary (Andrews 1836), but later added it to his dictionary, defining it as "one who is concerned in managing the affairs of the moku, i.e., island [district, sometimes the whole island, JM]" or "one whose advice is valued in managing a people" (Andrews 1865, 250). He then added a quote from Davida Malo's manuscript on Hawaiian history and traditions. In this manuscript, which was probably written about 1840,
Malo gives the following definition: "O ka mea akamai i ke kakaolelo no ke aupuni, he kalaimoku ia" (Malo 1987, 44). When Malo’s manuscript was finally translated and published in 1903, the definition was rendered as "a counselor, skilled in state-craft, was called kalai-moku (kalai to hew; moku, island" (Malo 1991, 59, italics in the original). In his revision of Andrews’ dictionary, Parker translated the same definition as "the person skilled as a counselor for the government is a kalaimoku" (Andrews 1922, 251). Only Pukui and Elbert (1957, 112) were careful enough to add the corresponding verb, to perform such office.

Besides sharing the same root kālai, the both words kālaiʻaina and kālaimoku have as their object a land unit, ʻaina, the general name for land, being less specific than moku. But, notwithstanding Kamakau’s passing insinuations (Kamakau 1865b, 1867a), there appears to be no native Hawaiian source for kālaiʻaina as clearly corresponding to Andrews’ emphasis on management and direction of affairs or resources of the land. Kamakau used the word a quarter of a century after it had been introduced as the translation for political economy by the missionary William Richards, who, for his part, might have encountered the word during his discussions with high-ranking chiefs in Lahaina, Maui (especially Kamehameha’s sacred daughter Nāhiʻenaʻena and Kamehameha’s close adviser Hoapili, who was also at the head of the island of Maui). To draw any definitive conclusions
is risky, for only because missionaries were in the habit of using native constructions in translating foreign concepts. Thus, *kālai‘aina*, although surely a composition of native Hawaiian words, may equally well be a Hawaiian neologism invented by Richards - possibly in cooperation with his Hawaiian informants (although his own attempts to redefine the word would hint to the contrary [see Richards 1839, 18]). Whichever the case, the word is of some major importance for our history, for it mediated the doctrine of political economy into the Hawaiian language and into the organization of the Hawaiian state as of the early-1840s.

As the result of these state-building efforts, there are plenty of sources that use the term in the latter two senses, namely, political economy and the name of the office of the Minister of the Interior (Andrews 1865, 250; see ID/Letter Book 1). As said, in the sense of political economy the word was first used by William Richards, who, in the capacity of an advisor to the Hawaiian chiefs, translated Francis Wayland’s *Element’s of Political Economy* (1837) into Hawaiian and used the book to base his lectures on the same subject to the chiefs in the years 1838 and 1839 (Richards 1942). He entitled the translation *No ke kalaiaina* (Richards 1839). In this sense the word was later used by Kamakau when he chronicled the role of William Richards in the institutional changes that took place soon after he had assumed the position as the advisor of the
chiefs (Kamakau 1869a,b). From 1845 kālai‘aina was used to designate the office of the Minister of the Interior (Kuhina Kalaiaina) and the corresponding duties (‘oihana kālai‘aina).

To be quite specific, Andrews (or Richards) did not translate kālai‘aina as 'political' but political economy, thus particularly referring to the branch of governmental knowledge. By 1887 the translation had become less closely tied to the meaning of political economy. In his English-Hawaiian Dictionary Harvey R. Hitchcock, the son of the missionary by the same name, defined the word 'political' as "pili i ka oihana aupuni" (relating or belonging to the activity of government). The Hawaiian word corresponding to this definition was kālai‘aina. He also translated political economy as kālai‘aina, as if to emphasize the intimate relation of governing and political economy. (Hitchcock 1887, 156). In an earlier English-Hawaiian dictionary, the missionary John S. Emerson defined 'political' in the similar manner ("pili ana i na mea o ke aupuni," relating or belonging to the matters of government) but without giving the word kālai‘aina (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 117).

Still, a hundred years later, in 1945 kālai‘aina was translated as political economy by Judd, Pukui, and Stokes, who added to its ambiguity by rendering it "politics" in the English-Hawaiian section, thus ignoring their emphasis on
political economy in the Hawaiian-English section (Judd, Pukui and Stokes 1945, 147, 251). A few years earlier, in the vocabulary to his elementary book of the Hawaiian language, the same Judd translated ʻkalaiʻaina as "political party, politics" (Judd 1939, 99). The decision to clarify this confusion was finally made by Pukui and Elbert when they, in the 1964 English-Hawaiian dictionary, renamed political economy ʻike ʻkalaiʻaina, ʻike being a term for knowledge and learning (Pukui and Elbert 1964, 117). They did not add the corresponding Hawaiian entry, but nevertheless marked the separation of political economy and politics and political in general, which was, of course, already a common practice among Hawaiian speakers.9

There are two other words that build on ʻkalaiʻaina, but which appeared in a dictionary only very recently, perhaps as a result of more careful reading of Hawaiian language newspapers or official documents. Kalakalaiaupuni as a translation of 'political' was recorded in Pukui and Elbert's dictionary in the 1985 edition (Pukui and Elbert

9 It should not, however, be forgotten that from the beginning of the codification process the hierarchy of Hawaiian society was woven into the translations, which were, after all, supposed to serve some functional purpose in facilitating reform. The emphasis has been on directing the affairs of government, not on party politics or politics 'from below'. This management-orientation was in constant use throughout the nineteenth century. For example, when Princess Kaʻiulani died in 1899, the Hawaiian Political Association (Hui Kalaiaina) sent a condolence to her husband admiring the Princess' educational career in what they called "ike kalaiaina," which was to be used for the benefit of the Hawaiian nation (Ahahui Kalaiaina, c. 1899).
1986, 501). The word has a similar connotation as kalai'aina, but its object is not land in general but aupuni or government (for aupuni, see next section). Kalakalai as a verb signifies carving a little at a time, to whittle. In the Hawaiian-English section kalakalai'ainaupuni was translated as "political activity; to do such" (121). The expression loea kālai'aina as a translation for politician and loea kālai aupuni for statesman also deputed in the 1985 edition (209, 501, 533).10 Loea is a word meaning skillful person or expert. Loea Kalaiaina was the name of a Hawaiian language weekly, which ran about two and a half years from 1897 to 1900 as a mouthpiece for the Hawaiian nationalist Home Rule Party. Political party as 'ao'ao kālai'aina is also a relatively recent codification appearing in Pukui and Elbert's first edition in 1957 (25), although the signification is much older. At the turn of the century the organizers of the Home Rule Party used that phrase to designate themselves as a political party (Home Rula Repubalika, Nov. 2, 1901).

Political expert, kilo aupuni, is another 1957 codification (140). In the pre- and early post-contact period the word kilo was used to name the class of people

10 Pukui and Elbert give another, rarely used translation for statesman, makou, which more properly applied to kalaimoku who had served under three high chiefs. The word probably derives from the name of kukui lamp, which consisted of three strings of kukui nuts (Malo 1991, 61-62).
that studied the signs in different parts of nature to tell future events. It seems that kilo were classified according to the parts of nature in which they were specializing. Kamakau lists experts in sky, stars, clouds, and earth, who were all called kilo (Kamakau 1991a, 8; see also Beckwith 1932, 130). Kilo aupuni does not conform to this logic, since it was not from aupuni that kilo read the signs of the future but from the natural phenomena for the preservation or establishing of aupuni. However, it is possible that because of their function in the high chief's household they were also called kilo aupuni.

Finally, there are the hawaiianized loan words for 'political', namely, politika, polokika and polotika (Pukui and Elbert 1957, 312-313), which have been in use at least from the early years of this century. A writer in Ka Nupepa Kuokoa in 1927 used the phrase "hana politika" in the sense of political affairs or politics (Kalei 1927), which should be added to the three other forms listed by Pukui and Elbert.

The formal history of the word 'politics' somewhat overlaps with that of 'political', but the dates of codification are generally more recent. Kālaiʻāina as a term for 'politics' was first recorded by Judd in 1939 (see above). It was picked up by Pukui and Elbert who used it in the first edition of their dictionary (1957, 112). In 1964 Pukui and Elbert added hana kālaiʻāina to the English-
Hawaiian section of their dictionary (117). The phrase has a literal meaning of political activity, thus politics (equal to hana politika). We might also recall the translation of Kamakau's use of the word kālaiʻāina, which was rendered (presumably by Pukui) as "politics" and published in 1961 (Kamakau 1992, 111). The loan words polokika and polotika were also recorded in the first edition of Pukui and Elbert's dictionary (1957, 313).

Recalling Hitchcock's translations, it appears that kālaiʻāina was still in 1887 used in the sense of political economy or as the adjective political. At least Hitchcock did not use the word to translate 'politics'. Instead, he felt, for some reason, obligated to explain the term by defining it as the knowledge pertaining to the duties or functions of the government ("ka ike e pili ana i ka oihana aupuni") (Hitchcock 1887, 156). Forty years earlier Emerson tackled the same problem and solved it by using a definition instead of a direct translation: "ka oihana o na luna" (the business of the officials) (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 117).

In conclusion, the translation history of the words 'political' and 'politics' speaks in favor of a meaning shift of the word kālaiʻāina from political economy to an understanding that puts the emphasis on modern party politics and the running of the state affairs. This development betrays a movement toward a more extensive application of the word as an expression of the intention to
define a people 'politically'. At the same time the possible indigenous meaning of kālai'āina as the customary institution of land apportioning is increasingly put aside, not only by the Western translators by also by native Hawaiians.

4.3. Images of Governance

Whereas the notions of 'politics' and 'political' have basically been linked to a single word kālai'āina, the translation and codification of the verb 'to govern' and the noun 'government' have been less uniformly focused. The underlying Hawaiian imagery, instead of cutting and slicing, consists of surrounding, shadowing and protecting, residing above, breathing, standing erect, setting in order, eating, and consuming.

The verb 'to govern' was first recorded by Andrews in his 1836 vocabulary. According to Andrews the Hawaiian equivalent was ho'omalu, which he translated as "bless, comfort, make comfortable, to rule over, govern as a chief, to keep in order the affairs of state" (Andrews 1836, 97) - or, ali'i, meaning "to act the chief, to rule over, govern" and "a chief, a king, ruler" (10). Boniface Mosblech also used two words to translate the French verb 'gouverner', namely, ali'i and malu. Malu lacks the causative ho'o- but carries somewhat similar meanings as ho'omalu (for ali'i,
see below). When Emerson and Bishop defined 'government' in 1845, they wrote "na kanawai hoomalu," referring to the body of laws that constitutes the frame of governing, and "ka hoomalu ana i ke aupuni," meaning the sum total of the activity of governing (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 65). They also applied ho'omalu to translate the words 'to rule' (e ho'omalu aupuni) and the noun 'ruler' (he luna ho'omalu) (137). Bishop's Hawaiian Phrase Book translated civil officers as na luna ho'omalu and utilized the same phrase to translate presiding officer (Bishop 1854, 20-21). In his dictionary Andrews sharpened his view on the word ho'omalu and gave the following definition: "To rule over, especially in a peaceful way; to govern quietly; to make peace," and further as an adjective, "making or causing peace between differing parties" (Andrews 1865, 198, my italics). On the other hand, Hitchcock, in his English-Hawaiian dictionary, was very straightforward in translating 'to govern' as "e hoomalu i kanaka" (lit. to cause a shadow over people [Hitchcock 1887, 97]). He also gave ho'omalu as a synonym for 'to rule' (178). In revising Andrews' dictionary Parker added two aspects of ho'omalu, first, "to bring under the care or protection," and second, "to seize and appropriate by process of law" (Andrews 1922, 180).

A similar translation was carried over to the small English-Hawaiian vocabulary, which was published by The Hawaiian Language League in 1936. In this work, however, 'ruler' was translated as mana ho'omalu (Hawaiian Language League 1936, 31).
This seems to be close to the logic of Polynesian tabu and approaching the sense of prohibition with which something was placed for the use of the chiefs only. In a complaint to the Minister of the Interior, Keoni Ana, sometime in the 1840s or 1850s, the maka’āinana of Wai‘oli, Kaua‘i, felt rather indignant about the native konohiki of the place, who had forbidden the use of a certain tree suitable for making shingles. The word that the people used for this type of prohibition was ho‘omalau. The word was also used in government accounts to show, for example, how much cash was extracted by selling ‘prohibited’ (ho‘omalau) fish (IDM, Box 1, Docs. 13 and 20, n.d.). In official use, king Kamehameha III spoke of his malu, which was translated as government, e.g., "malalo o ko‘u malu, subject to my Government" (Proclamation by Kamehameha III, LH/BM).

The present-day translation was confirmed in 1957 by Pukui and Elbert, who basically followed the revised version of Andrews’ dictionary and added some new or previously unrecorded meanings. Of interest are "to keep quiet, still, as during taboo," "to restrict, confine, quarantine," "to suspend, as a license," "to precede, as at a meeting," "probation," "to judge" and "to call to order" (Pukui and Elbert 1957, 315; originally the last two meanings appeared in examples given by Pukui and Elbert).

As we have seen, the word ho‘omalau implies a peaceful state of being, a protection enjoyed by people living under
those in higher position. It also implies a submissive attitude on behalf of the governed. To enjoy the protection and peace one must be willing to accept the restrictions, that is, the mutual harmony between the chiefs and the common people. The falling figurative shadow (malu) of the chief is cool and comfortable like the real shadow on a hot day. William Ellis relates a story of a conquered person who, to avoid being taken captive and sacrificed, could run to the conquering chief and ask for mercy by prostrating on the chief's feet. If the chief spoke to the person, he was to live under malu, or protection, of the chief, usually as a member of the chief's retinue (Ellis 1979, 106). Later, in his notes, Samuel Kamakau identified malu with words such as kia'i (to watch, guard, overlook, a guard, watchman, caretaker), malama12 (to take care of, attend, care for, preserve, etc., care, preservation, support, etc.), maluhia (peace, quiet, security), 'olu'olu (pleasant, happy, nice, etc.), maka (rest, repose, vacation, freedom from pain, at ease, comfort), and haumalu (quiet) (Kamakau, Quotations, n.d.). As ho'omalu has become the standard translation of 'to govern' it has also lost some of its quality as a word implying a state of blessedness and comfort.

12 An Italian visitor of the late 1820s translated the word governor (governatore) as "malama" (Botta 1841, 362). This is certainly a confusion of the title and function of the Hawaiian 'governor', but it carries a valuable indication of the traditional ideal of a reciprocal relationship of caring and loyalty between a chief and his or her people.
Noho as an equivalent of governing is a result of quite recent translation, appearing first in Pukui and Elbert’s English-Hawaiian dictionary (1964, 66). Besides ho’omalu, they gave three alternatives for the verb ‘to govern’, noho aupuni, noho ali’i and noho. In the reverse-order check noho aupuni gets a tripartite translation, to rule, a reign, and a ruler (1957, 248; a ruler was added to the 1985 edition). Noho ali’i has more dimensions. It can mean a throne, reign, chieftainship, tenure as chief, a rule, to reign or act as a chief (1957, 248). Finally, noho, besides its common meanings seat, chair, to live, to reside, or to dwell, can be used to designate to rule or to reign. (Strictly speaking, this meaning is found not until in the 1985 edition.) Pukui and Elbert also noted that in this latter sense the verb noho usually takes a qualifier, for example, noho moku, to rule a district (1986, 268).

Going backwards in time, the verb ‘to govern’ disappears in the dictionary renderings of noho, as well as the phrase noho aupuni, although it was used by Malo in his manuscript (Malo 1987, 39) and translated at the turn of the century as to conduct government (Malo 1991, 54). Instead, noho ali’i seems to have been the favorite of the past compilers. In his vocabulary, Andrews translated it as king’s seat, throne (Andrews 1836, 109). From the late 1820s noho ali’i began to appear in Bible translations to mean a throne or a king’s seat, to be or to continue to act
as a king, or to reign as a king. These meanings, with the Biblical references, were recorded in Andrews' dictionary (1865, 422) and they remained unaltered in the Andrews-Parker edition (Andrews 1922, 464). In 1887 Hitchcock made the exception to use noho aupuni and noho ali’i as equal alternatives in translating 'to rule' (Hitchcock 1887, 178). As can be inferred on the basis of the early translations, the word ali’i, the general epithet of a person in chiefly position, was sometimes used alone to signify governing and ruling (for later usages, see Andrews 1865, 50; Andrews 1922, 52; Pukui and Elbert 1957, 19). The surfacing of ali’i as the first recorded equivalence, together with ho’omalu and malu, of ‘to govern’ is not at all surprising. The word ali’i must have been uppermost in the minds of the missionaries - at times suppressing Jehovah - if they even wished to be allowed to land and stay in Hawaii.

Before going to the more active words we should pause on three words that, as noho, describe the more existential side of governing. Those words are kū, ea, and ka’a maluna. The latter word was first given a meaning "to take the oversight or office" (Andrews 1836, 56) and afterwards intensified to include meanings of exercising an office over others (Andrews 1865, 229), reaching its peak in Pukui and Elbert's dictionary, in which it was translated "to rule others" (1957, 101). Literally, and to emphasize the
existential imagery of the word, *ka'a maluna* means to be situated above.

In the dictionaries there is no reference to the governing or ruling dimension of the words *ku* and *ea* until Pukui and Elbert's first edition in 1957 (34, 155). In their first English-Hawaiian dictionary they list *ku* and *ea* as two possible equivalents for the verb 'to govern' (1964, 131). In the corresponding Hawaiian entries of 1957 *ku* is relatively unambiguous. In addition to the most widely used meanings to stand, to rise, to be upright or erect, Pukui and Elbert give the translation "to rule or reign, as a land" (155). Kamakau uses the word similarly when he says "*ku i ke Aupuni*" (stand at the head of the government) or "*ku i ka moku*" (stand at the head of the district or island) (Kamakau 1867b).

*Ea* was first translated as "a spirit, vital breath, the breath, life" (Andrews 1836, 15). Air, breeze and wind were added later (Andrews 1865, 64-65; Andrews 1922, 77-78). In 1957 two other groups of meanings were added: sovereignty, rule, independence, and to rise, go up, raise, become erect (Pukui and Elbert 1957, 34). At present, sovereignty, rule, and independence are the primary meanings (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 36). It seems that these latter translations of *ea* are based on a re-reading of the official correspondence concerning the short-lived cession of Hawaii by the British naval commander Lord George Paulet in the winter of 1843.
At the time of ceding the islands King Kamehameha III wrote a public declaration using the words "ua haawi au i ke ea o ka aina o kakou," which was translated by Gerrit P. Judd - the official translator who had come to Hawaii as a medical missionary in 1827 - as "I have given away the life of our land (my italics)." In the same declaration Kamehameha III expressed the "hope that the life of the land will be restored when my conduct is justified" (e hoihoi ia mai ana no nae ke ea o ka aina, ke hooonoio mai kaʻu hana ana) (Kamehameha III and Kekauluohi 1843, my italics).

Similarly, informing Kuakini, the head of the Hawaiʻi island, about the cession, his Oʻahu counterpart Governor Kekūanaʻa used the word ea: "Ua haawi iho nei ke Lii au i ke ea o ke aupuni ona ia Beritania Nui" (My chief just gave the ea of his government to the Great Britain [F.O. & Ex., Feb. 27, 1843]). On this occasion the word ea was most likely used figuratively in the traditional spiritual sense, which saw a close link between the life of the chief and the fertility of the land (see below). Moreover, the native choice of the word indicating life seems to have been closely tied to the seriousness of the situation and the presence of death on account of the British warship.

Addressing another chief about the proceedings in Honolulu, Kekūanaʻa made death an explicit point of reference: "Aloha oe e Timoteo Haalilio kuu hoa o na pilikia a pau, a me na make hoi a pau a ka haole" (Greetings to you Timoteo
Ha'alilio my companion in all the troubles and also in all death from the foreigners [F.O. & Ex., March 6, 1843]).

When the cession was over on July 31, 1843, that day was made an annual day of celebration, Lā Ho'iho'i Ea, or Restoration Day as it was called in English. The element of anti-life was removed.

Later twentieth-century readings of ea as independence is particularly intriguing as the idea of independence had been expressed by using the word kū'oko'a (lit. to stand aloof) since at least the late 1830s (Ke Kumu Hawaii, July 4, 1838; Richards 1839, 64; Ka Nonanona, Oct. 3, 1843; The Friend, May 1, 1844; IDL/AH 1, Nov. 5, 1846; Kaimikuokoa 1854). This word was used throughout the nineteenth century (Kamakau 1869a; Baker, c. 1880).

13 By linking death and foreigners with the so-called 'a' possessive, Kekūanaō'a made a distinction between troubles, which, by receiving an 'o' possessive, come and go as nature dictates, whereas death in this case is intentional and relative to illegitimate killing, and clearly at odds with the established order of things.

14 Richards used the word kū'oko'a in his translation of Wayland's textbook of political economy. The specific context is the American war of independence. A literal translation of his wordings would be "and America stood aloof and became a separate government" (a ku okoa o Amerika, a lilo i aupuni kaawale). In this text kū'oko'a was not yet canonized as what it became at the international recognition of Hawaii's independence in 1843. Rather it was used in its more common sense to indicate difference and separation, just like the word ka'awale. We do not see the expression aupuni kū'oko'a, independent government or kingdom, until 1843. Before that date ka'awale was the usual word to denote independence. For instance, in the translation of Woodbridge's geography seven years before the translation of Wayland, Richards and his colleague Samuel Whitney indicated the independent nature of the American
Let us now proceed to words that contain an active imagery of governing, which are ho'oponopono, 'ai, and ho'ohaku. Ho'oponopono was rendered as an equivalent for 'to govern' only by Emerson and Bishop in 1845. However, he also wanted to secure the meaning against possible misinterpretations by adding a Hawaiian definition "e lilo i alii no kekahi poe" (to become a chief for a people) (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 65). In other places ho'oponopono has been translated as to put together, to put in order, or to rectify (Andrews 1836, 50), to rule over, to be superintendent, to put in order, to regulate, to correct what is erroneous (Andrews 1865, 208; Andrews 1922, 197), to put to rights, to put in order or shape, correct, revise, adjust, amend, regulate, arrange, rectify, tidy up, make orderly or neat, administer, superintend, supervise, manage, edit, work carefully or neatly, to make ready, as canoemen preparing to catch a wave (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 341). The foregoing list clearly suggests a wide range of specific meanings for ho'oponopono, but which all seem to point to a one central idea, namely, setting things in order.

Traditionally after a conquest or the death of a chief the lands were divided and redistributed. This business was states by using the clause, "ua noho kaawale," they were ruled independently. The status of the rulers of one state in relation to other states was described as "okoa" (He Hoikehonua 1832, 120). This, apparently, was the old native usage in reference to coexisting chiefdoms and land allotments between the chiefs.
often called ho'oponopono and it included, besides dividing the lands, appointing the right people as chiefs to the subdivisions and overseers to smaller divisions (e.g., Ii 1983, 69-70; 1869d). This also involved more active participation of the chiefs than the idea of ho’omalu might imply.

A still more active connotation is carried by the verb 'ai, the basic meaning of which is food, especially vegetable food and to eat, to destroy, to consume. From early on the translators added the meaning of enjoying the products of the land. From 1836 to 1957 this dimension was expressed in the language of Western economic discourse: e 'ai i ka 'āina, to have the profits of the land (Andrews 1836, 2; Andrews 1865, 23; Andrews 1922, 33). In Fukui and Elbert’s rendition the word ‘profit’ was dropped and replaced by meanings that emphasized reciprocal relations between the chiefs and their people. According to Fukui and Elbert ‘ai can be translated as "to rule or enjoy the privileges and exercise the responsibilities of rule" (1957, 8). In combinations the verb 'ai has similar meanings, as for example, 'ai moku, to rule a district or island; ali'i 'ai moku, ruling chief of a district or island; 'ai 'āina, to own, control and enjoy land (for ali'i 'ai moku, see below). These translations are unquestionably closer to the Hawaiian understanding of the position of their chiefs and seem to correspond to the intentions of the early native
writers (see Stokes 1932). Unlike 'ai, the verb ho'ohaku contains a connotation of illegitimate ruling or domination, a bossy type of lording over.

The translation of the word 'governor' makes a somewhat separate case, although it builds on the common imagery. The early translators used the composition ali'i 'ai moku. According to the vocabulary of the missionary Hiram Bingham, ali'i 'ai moku is "a governor, a chief who takes possession of, or divides a country, or enjoys its profits" (Bingham 1832, 23). Andrews, perhaps willingly in order to keep his vocabulary from expanding, avoided any wordy definitions and satisfied himself with the word governor (Andrews 1836, 10), a rendition he also used in his manuscript (Andrews, Vocabulary, n.d.). In the later years of the 1830s a young newspaperman, S. D. Macintosh, followed Bingham (or someone else with a similar translation) in his manuscript vocabulary (Macintosh, Vocabulary, n.d.). However, by 1845 ali'i 'ai moku had been replaced by kia'aina as the favored translation for 'governor' (Mosblech 1843, 45, 209; Emerson and Bishop 1845, 65; Bishop 1854, 20), thus marking an official break with the traditional past of 'land consuming chiefs'.

15 When the Hawaiian chiefship was restructured to better correspond with the European monarchies in the early 1840s, the use of ali'i 'ai moku appears to have declined, at least in official documents. The head chief of Maui island, Uliumaehehe Hoapili, was among the last to have left a trace of this expression, when he signed the Lahaina harbor regulations in 1838 (Ke Kumu Hawaii, Dec. 19, 1838).
The induced break was not complete. The use of ali‘i 'ai moku was continued beyond 1845, and, correspondingly, the word kia‘aina had been used synonymously at least from 1828 (Bishop 1828; Bingham 1832, 157; Andrews 1836, 68). In his vocabulary, Andrews opted for more words and defined the etymology of the word: "the support of the land, that is, a governor, governor of a state or island, a ruler." In comparison, the word kia‘aina implies a more existential nature of governing, as if a condition of life (not to mention the sexual metaphor inherent in the word kia, pilar, prop, post, pole, etc.), than the words based on the root ‘ai. For example, in the 1865 dictionary 'ai moku is explained quite thoroughly as "a person who holds the rank of a chief over some district or island; one who enjoys the honors and profits of such a post without really owning the land," or "one who enjoys the fruits of the land but pays a part to the owner." To illustrate the managing dimension, Andrews quotes the story of Lā‘ieikawai, the cornerstone of Hawaiian language written fiction: "e pau kona aimoku ana, his authority is ended." Nā ali‘i 'ai moku as "governors" is mentioned only passingly at the end of the same entry (Andrews 1865, 26). Under the entry ali‘i, ali‘i 'ai moku was translated as "the chief over a division, that is, the
For a history of the word mo‘i, see Stokes 1932. In Stokes’ opinion, the word was invented by the foreign advisors to the King Kamehameha – perhaps Gerrit P. Judd – during the reorganization of the Hawaiian government in the early 1840s and gradually replaced the word ali‘i nui as the title for ‘king’. Sahlins assumes a critical view of Stokes (Sahlins 1992, 21). Sahlins’ criticism is based on two rather independent arguments. First that the word mo‘i would fit perfectly in the divine king theory, since according to Malo the central image in the luakini – or the temple for human sacrifice, hence a royal privilege – was called mo‘i (Malo 1991, 165; 1987, 110; Cook and King 1784, 160). This would indicate that during luakini rituals the king and the god were interchangeable. Second, in George Dixon’s Hawaiian vocabulary from 1786-87 the word for king was "myre" (Dixon 1789, 268), an anomaly that no one has been able to explain.

Contra Sahlins we might propose that his first point relies heavily on a structuralist premise, according to which we can derive the meaning of a variety of things from one paradigmatic schema. Secondly, Dixon’s strange spelling can as well be a product of his bad ear. To start with the fact that the English sailors used the letter ‘y’ to indicate the sound [ai], and excluding the initial ‘m’, Dixon’s word for king would be pronounced [airi] or [aire], which resembles the Hawaiian word ari‘i, or ali‘i as it is spelled today. This would conform with other journalists’ translations for king. The fact is, however, that Dixon recorded the word Aree (the modern ali‘i) and rendered it "a chief," making a clear distinction between chief and king. If we include the initial ‘m’, the pronunciation would be [mairi] or perhaps [maire]. This latter case would still be a mystery, for maile is a vine used for garlands on important occasions and associated with Laka, the goddess of hula.

It nevertheless appears strange that Dixon would have used an idiosyncratic spelling for the clear and distinctive sounding mo‘i. At least he was able to record a rather similar word moe (to sleep) without resorting to a complex spelling (Dixon 1789, 269). In addition, mo‘i does not contain the difficult consonants ‘l’ and ‘r’ or ‘k’ and ‘t’; neither does the vowel structure have any difficulties, perhaps excluding the ‘i’, which was often spelled with ‘e’ by English speakers. But in Dixon’s case, his success in spelling moe with ‘e’ would add to the possibility of his spelling mo‘i with ‘i’ and also constructing syllables resembling mo‘i more than his "myre" does. Besides, the anglophone James King of the Cook expedition spelled the word mo‘i as "Maeo," meaning the central temple image (Cook and King 1784, 160). The bad ear hypothesis cannot be
carried over to the revised version of Andrews' dictionary (Andrews 1922, 51) and continued by Judd (1939, 89). In Pukui and Elbert's dictionary the word governor was dropped altogether as a gloss for ali'i 'ai moku (Pukui and Elbert 1957, 19). 17

The essential condition of all the above activity of governing was aupuni, a word that has enjoyed a considerable unanimousness in translations as the gloss for government or kingdom ever since William Ellis in 1825 included it in his brief vocabulary, which was printed as an appendix of his popular Journal of a Tour Around Hawaii. In the first translations the royal side of the coin was prioritized. Ellis rendered aupuni as "kingdom, state of piece, undisturbed state of a nation" (Ellis 1825, 245). In the same year, an English visitor recorded it as "king's reign" (Bloxam 1825). In a manuscript vocabulary, Artemas Bishop, whose earlier vocabulary was the basis for Ellis's appendix, used the word kingdom (Bishop 1828). In Bingham's vocabulary, kingdom was also used (Bingham 1832, 12). In 1836 Andrews summarized this development: "to be in an undisturbed state, to be in a state of peace and quiet, as a

overruled, but this would speak against it.

17 In the only surviving work listing Hawaiian synonyms, that is, Kamakau's Quotations, which was probably compiled during the 1840s, ali'i 'ai moku and ali'i kia'aina were given as being equal in meaning (Kamakau, Quotations, n.d.).
kingdom" and "a kingdom, dominion, jurisdiction of a king" (Andrews 1836, 5-6). This was followed by Mosblech who gave three meanings: kingdom, reign, and to be in peace (1843, 9). ‘Government’ as a translation entered the scene of codification in 1845 by the hand of Emerson. In fact, he used the word aupuni to translate both kingdom and government (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 65, 84). It is worth noting that he also made a clear distinction between the two. Kingdom was translated simply as aupuni (65), but government required more explanations in Hawaiian, because Emerson wanted to give the abstract understanding of the notion (the legal framework of governing and the directing the kingdom’s affairs) without reference to a physical body of people with executive authority: "na kanawai hoomalu" (the governing laws) or "ka hoomalu ana i ke aupuni" (governing the kingdom) (84).

Government and aupuni were finally made equivalents in the 1854 Hawaiian Phrase Book (Bishop 1854, 20), although the actual occurrence might have taken place years earlier. Perhaps reflecting this development, a French visitor Jules Remy translated both government and kingdom by using the same word, aupuni (Remy 1852-1855). Of course, this does not mean that the gloss kingdom would have been replaced; Hawaii was indeed a constitutional monarchy from 1840 to 1893. However, at some point a new epithet for kingdom, aupuni mō‘i, was invented and recorded in Hitchcock’s
English-Hawaiian dictionary in 1887 (122). The expression utilizes the apparent neologism for king, mōʻi (see Stokes 1932), to distinguish aupuni as government (97) from aupuni as kingdom. The fullest account of the word aupuni was given by Andrews in his 1865 dictionary: "A region or country governed by a chief or king. Originally the word did not imply a large country, as there were formerly several aupuni on one island. At present, the word is used to signify a kingdom; the dominion and jurisdiction of a king." Other meanings were: "To be in an undisturbed state, to be in a state of peace and quietness, as a kingdom," "to become a kingdom," and, introducing the word government, "relating to the kingdom or government" (Andrews 1865, 34). The pre-eminence of 'government' became evident at least after the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893. In the revised edition of Andrews' dictionary the sentence "[a]t present, the word is used to signify" does not end with kingdom, as in the 1865 edition, but with "government." In the same vein, Parker added the word republic after the word kingdom in the sentence "to become a kingdom" (Andrews 1922, 73).

The indigenous imagery of aupuni is revealed in the literal translation. The word is a composition of two words, au, meaning "place" or "territory, compounded with other words" and puni, meaning "around," "around on every side" (Andrews 1865, 34; Bingham 1832, 9, 268). In his early vocabulary, Bishop added the meaning "to surround for
protection" (Bishop 1828). Thus, the literal meaning of aupuni would be a safe, surrounded territory. Besides protection, the word puni carries with it connotations of completion and control (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 355), which easily places the origin of the word aupuni in the traditional Hawaiian warfare between chiefdoms and the establishing of aupuni after a settlement of the feud. This is implied by the antonym of aupuni, that is, auhuli, which Bingham and Andrews translate as "to overturn a kingdom" (Bingham 1832, 10; Andrews, Vocabulary, n.d.). The word huli implies a sense of reversing, which, in the case of aupuni, would indicate undoing the protective surrounding and upsetting the peace. Auhuli has also served as the root for the translation of 'revolution' (ka ho'auhuli 'ana).

To conclude this tedious exercise, a continuum of intensity could be established to connect the Hawaiian words expressing dimensions of governing. I have already mentioned that some words have connotations of a more passive existence and others imply more activity. The variations of this kind are best understood against the backdrop of divinity of traditional Hawaiian chiefs, the fact that their existence guaranteed the tilling of the land and the general livelihood, as the land was only appropriated from the gods; or, perhaps better, the land itself belonged to the divine realm, and one needed a person
with a divine ancestry to hold the land. A Hawaiian proverb pictures this relation quite succinctly:

I 'āina no ka 'āina i ke ali'i,
a i waiwai no ka 'āina i ke kanaka.

The land remains the land because of the chiefs, and prosperity comes to the land because of the common people (Pukui 1983, no. 1149).

Pukui gives also the following explanation: "Chiefs are needed to hold the land, and commoners are needed to work the land." Thus, after surrounding the land, that is, after conquering it, usually following a war between close relatives who formed the body of pretenders to the paramount ali'i-ship, the high chief, or the victor (the Hawaiian word for victor, lanakila, was sometimes applied to a chief [Dumont d'Urville 1834, 202-203]), assumed his position at the head of the territory by offering a human sacrifice in the major luakini temple, a deed allowed only to the highest chief of aupuni. If the luakini ritual was successful - sometimes it failed resulting in new hostilities (e.g., Kamakau 1992a, 109) - people "began to have confidence in the stability of the government" (mana'o nui ia e pa'a ke aupuni) (Malo 1991, 176; 1987, 120).

All in all, aupuni is a result of some serious efforts by the prominent ali'i nui to make things firm and stable so that he could dwell (noho) or stand (ku) at the head of the government (aupuni) and provide the life (ea) and protection (malu). The stability was not possible without a proper and satisfactory performance of the division of the lands and
the corresponding nomination of chiefs to these lands (ho'oponopono), chiefs who could then go on with their daily lives of being above the common people (ka'amaluna) and consuming the appropriated land ('ai), sometimes abusing the powers of their high position and overburdening the people (ho'ohaku). Ritually this appropriation was repeated annually by the high chief touring around his lands (aupuni) at the end of the makahiki festival, symbolically reclaiming the land from the 'fertility god', and, in fact, taking his place by accepting offerings. In sum, the continuum of intensity of the words denoting governing is as follows: aupuni, noho, kū, ea, ho'omalu, ka'amaluna, ho'oponopono, 'ai, ho'ohaku.

In the long process of translation the above continuity between the words and the cosmological context is underrepresented, to say the least. And the more we advance in time the more underrepresented it becomes, which is not surprising if we can picture the driving force behind the translations: not only to make sense but to make sense in order to effect a system of equivalences which would also be a field of practical and real relations. A more interesting question, as we shall see in the next few chapters, is the interplay of indigenous and foreign categories, which resulted in a more or less shared understanding of the vocabulary of government.
4.4. Discussion

The above survey of basic Hawaiian vocabulary of politics and government is based on a presumption that gives precedence to communication with a linguistic foundation, that without verbalization there is no culturally communicable experience for the social actors. As used in the present context the word 'linguistic' does not refer to formal processes of reasoning or syntactical rules, but is rather meant to signal cultural indexing and sense-making in view of selecting objects of perception. This does not necessarily consist of purely vocal and well-developed utterances or statements. To proceed from a linguistic study of words to that of naming (or indexing and sense-making) - an act which is rarely fixed or goes without being challenged - entails a social and cultural process in which the practical relationship of the word to its object forms a whole, which transcends any dual polarity between an object and its meaning and therefore transcends the merely linguistic interest in meaning. In naming, there is thus a sort of "ontological complicity" between the object and the socially situated experience expressed by the word.  

18 The expression "ontological complicity" comes from Pierre Bourdieu (1981, 306) by which he indicates a dispositional linkage between a person's way of perceiving the social world (consciousness) and the social world itself, that is, investment in the social world in
Naturally, this socio-linguistic emphasis is partly motivated by the nature of the comparative data, which are throughout textual. However, a material act usually has a symbolic, and thus in the broad sense, linguistic, meaning and context, which cannot be separated from the act itself. Besides this symbolic existence of material acts, we should also remember that not all verbal expressions must be thoroughly premeditated to qualify as verbal expressions; most of our (and others’) communication is, although intentional and motivated, not transparent and self-conscious. Analogously, the rules of a card game (providing that the participants are ‘natives’ of the game) become an object of self-conscious discourse only when someone is found guilty of cheating. In sum, despite the fact that not all communication is strictly speaking formulated in a natural language, I think the use of a "language metaphor" (Brown 1977) is justified.

If, for example, the word *kālai‘aina* was used to designate directing affairs of land, it received quite accordance with previous life experiences, thus producing a perception of the social world that is typical of the interests that, by means of a homology, describe these experiences. Regarding the relation of a word to its object this means a negation of the truth-correspondence theory which is supposed to determine the word from the qualities of the object. It also negates the argument that declares all language arbitrary and insular game which has nothing in common with the outside world. An ontological relation between the word and object depicts a social process of coupling meanings (words) and objects so that they become inseparable but relative and contested, thus replaceable as a unity by virtue of their social nature.
different cultural meanings when the missionary William Richards in 1838 decided to use it to translate and define the term political economy into Hawaiian (see chapter 7.1.). The whole system of *kālaiʻōina* was transposed to another sign-system, and, as it happened, for quite some time the meanings were not the same for the Hawaiians as they were for the Americans. This also means that William Richards was not simply mistaken in using his cultural categories or in manipulating Hawaiian terminology. Instead of highlighting errors, translation is an extremely significant event for quite another reason. It is an act through which the possibility of intercultural communication is framed. It is already important that something has been translated. Within this frame different sign-systems become more or less manifest at the level of their basic assumptions (because they must be spelled out). However, without the frame it would be hard to bring these elements closer to a shared ontological complicity, a system in which the actors may share a project without sharing cultural values. Depending on the social situation one system usually survives the dominated one and therefore, due to various circumstances, is capable of imposing its meanings on the other (but rarely, perhaps never univocally). Thus, it is not surprising that when some of the native Hawaiian commoners founded Hui Kalaiaina in 1888, an opposition group that quite successfully took part in the 1890 elections, it was
also given an English name, Hawaiian Political Association. The modern politics of the West, or in our case the Lockean point of view, was finally carried over as a system to frame Hawaiian aspirations - but this took place after a long and complex intercultural translation process, which also involved some deep structural shifts. The lesson of this ontological understanding of the relation of word and thing is rather simple: there is no extra-social act of naming (remember qualified nominalism) and therefore no extra-social referent that could act as the chief magistrate in the case of the intended meaning.

Perhaps the most salient difficulty behind these comparisons - and at the same time a critique of the above ontology - is, of course, can we be sure that there was not a notion in the Hawaiian or any other Polynesian culture that would have at least resembled the Western idea of politics? Frankly speaking, there is no ultimate certainty in this matter, especially if one wants to remain a proponent of radical cultural relativism. The discussion would end here, however, if that path was chosen. Instead, it is maintained that resemblances between different cultural categories are possible. If this is the case, the issue here is rather - following the historical approach to the analysis of possibilities of comparison, as outlined in the first chapter - to show how the resemblances are socially established. We are interested in showing how they
are made visible and more or less equal in meaning and therefore part of the experiential realm of social actors (ontologization of meaning), who, at the very least, are able to act in relation to the entity or practice that was translated. Therefore, instead of taking sides in a matter of opinion (whether or not there was politics in pre-contact Hawaii) I approach the problem from a viewpoint of social interpretation, which begins its search from material historical traces (texts).

Within this frame, processes of interpretation constitute actions and actions are reflected in the existing patterns of interpretation, indicating that there is no absolutely original culture behind interpretations but that the interpretations themselves are the historically specific culture (hence we are able to transcend, or at least legitimately distance ourselves from the question that misses the social nature of any use of language: Did Hawaiians have politics?). In sum, the political is a tool in cultural translation, or an instrument that is used in arresting otherwise unintelligible flows in an unfamiliar society. By constructing analogies it helps the observer or participant make sense of the chaotic interplay of different interests and motives that seem to zigzag without a reasonable explanation. It helps the observer get some ground for him/herself to re-establish, in a manner of speaking, the foreign society, and, through further
communication with the members of the objectified culture, to prepare the way for mutual re-establishing of that society, materially as well as figuratively.

Recognizing and describing such a comparative system is one thing, but it usually deprives history of efficacy and practice. For example, if we cannot satisfactorily recreate the history of the word kalai'aina, we may, however, evaluate the discursive function of the word and look at its later attributions and overlook its precise origin. Seen from this angle, every attribution, rather than distortion, assumes an important position, since here the "positivities" (Foucault 1982) of every moment of attribution count. In other words, the rather rigid model of the linguistic sign and its polar structure of signifier and signified is replaced by a dynamic conception of signification, which is properly understood only through a diacronic analysis of syncronic systems. Therefore, if we are to believe in Saussure's assertion that in a linguistic system we can find only arbitrary relations of acoustic sounds and concepts (signifiers and signifieds), which have no ontological grounding in the material world of things (Saussure 1966), it remains the task of a social analyst to detect the ways people freeze the play of signifiers and create that ontological grounding. In the act of freezing, the arbitrariness of the system is reduced to contested naturalness. It is contested for the simple reason that
what is correct and natural for one is wrong and perverted for another. In the next chapter we turn to the analysis of qualified nominalism and begin to look at the various ways politics was made a frozen experience of reality in the nineteenth-century Hawaii and how the groundwork for the possibility of political comparisons was effected.
PART 3: SOCIAL THEORIES IN HISTORY
At sunset, on May 6, 1825, a young Scottish botanist James Macrae stood on the deck of a ship of his government and waited for the next morning when he could take his first stroll across the village of Honolulu. He had arrived on board the frigate Blonde together with a high-ranking English expedition led by George Anson, the seventh Lord Byron. The principal task of the mission was to bring home the bodies of the high chief Liholiho and his favorite wife Kamāmalu, who had died of measles during their visit in England. While Lord Byron and his noble associates attended to the figures of protocol and matters of strategic intelligence - as secretly instructed by the Admiralty (Kuykendall 1989, 80-81) - Macrae had in his charge a collection of "useful" plants presented to the Hawaiian chiefs by the Horticultural Society of London. Due to some difficulties Macrae never quite succeeded in planting the seedlings of Enlightenment in the Hawaiian volcanic soil (except grape vines), but at least he managed to witness some other reflections of his native world as practiced by Hawaiians. In the evening before the landing of Lord Byron's delegation Macrae noted the following in his diary: "At 8 o'clock p.m. we were again surprised to hear the gun
from the fort [of Honolulu], as is customary at that hour with the garrisons of other nations" (Macrae 1972, 16).

The fort that awakened Macrae's attention was a peculiar landmark of 47 years of intercourse between the people of Hawaii and the white men from beyond the horizon, which traditionally, in the Hawaiian cosmology, had marked the dividing line of earth and sky, common and sacred. Far from implying any divine status of white men, or haole, as Hawaiians called them, it is remarkable how readily the Hawaiian society embraced Western paraphernalia and engaged in ritual stereotyping of all sorts of customs prevalent among the haole visitors. Naturally, the utility of Western manufactures accounted a great deal for their speedy acceptance. It is often said that the musket (if not the iron hoop) was the emblem of the early years of contact. The new powers of killing from a distance were first

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1 Macrae would have been equally astonished to hear the sentry at the royal powder magazine announcing "All's well" at regular hours during the night (Campbell 1967, 150; for comparison, see also Cox 1957, 36). The signal guns were continued for decades while acquiring more complex significations. In 1844 there was a two-dollar fine "for every seaman seized on shore, after the firing of the second gun from the fort, at half past nine o'clock, P.M." (The Friend, May 1, 1844).

2 An early account of the speed with which the new instruments were spreading among the Hawaiians is from the surgeon of the Resolution, David Samwell. When Samwell recorded his observation in February, 1779, Cook's expedition had spent roughly ten weeks on and off the islands, but according to him the English iron had already come "into universal use," replacing native stone adzes (Samwell 1967, 1186).
demonstrated by the crew of Captain James Cook in 1778 and 1779, but the actual arms trafficking commenced only about a decade later, when commercial ships, first English then American, began to use Hawaii as a convenient stopover between the Northwest coast of America and the China market. When George Vancouver arrived at Hawaii in 1792, he was met with a great disappointment as Hawaiian chiefs realized his reluctance to trade in arms and ammunition, and instead continued the already by Hawaiian standards outmoded 'civilizing' commerce (Vancouver 1984, 449-450, 470). By 1792 the utility of firearms in any battlefield, be it a mountain passage or a channel between two islands, was no doubt well demonstrated in Hawaii. The necessary know-how was delivered along with the arms as the Hawaiian chiefs, tirelessly combatting each other, were at least as tireless in securing the alliance of the passing foreigners. Only four years earlier the art of Western warfare was practically unknown amongst the Hawaiians, yet by Vancouver's time they had become what a visitor called veterans in handling firearms (Menzies in Vancouver 1984, 449).

By the year 1797 the Hawai‘i island chief Kamehameha, the founder of the Kamehameha dynasty, had conquered practically all the islands of the archipelago (the remaining island Kaua‘i was secured by convention in 1810, and finally subdued in the brief war of 1824), thus proving
himself the most successful of the Hawaiian highborn in appropriating the foreign means of destruction (although his military skill should not be underestimated). In 1825 the signalling guns mounted to the coral block walls of the Honolulu fort were the first signs of the power of the dynasty that arriving foreigners could easily distinguish, although the fort itself was more a sign of potential conflict between the island chiefs than a real defense against hostile foreigners.

The origin of the fort was intimately tied to two historical events. First, we have to consider the advancement of conquering chiefs from the Hawai‘i island and the counter-measures taken by the Kaua‘i paramount Kaumuali‘i, who, at the minimum, disliked the idea of succumbing to the rule of the upstart chiefs of Hawai‘i (cf. Kamakau 1992a, 266). Secondly, the fort had its origin in the imperial schemes of certain high-ranking Russian officers. To prevent his dominions from slipping away, Kaumuali‘i joined forces with a Russian agent, an ambitious German national, a certain doctor Georg Anton Scheffer, who in May, 1816, negotiated a commercial treaty between Kaumuali‘i and the Russian American Company, a document that among other things granted half the island of O‘ahu to the Russians (Kuykendall 1989, 57; Bradley 1968, 49-51). O‘ahu being under the control of Kamehameha’s chiefs, Kaumuali‘i gave Scheffer 500 men with whom the doctor sailed to
Honolulu, where the Russian flag was hoisted above a rudimentary fortification built by Scheffer. Kaumuali‘i’s and Scheffer’s grandiose plan, however, was halted by Kamehameha’s men and Scheffer was deported, first to Kaua‘i and then back to Russia after a brief sojourn on O‘ahu. Yet, because of the threat posed by the Russians and the insubordination of Kaumuali‘i, the idea of fort was not discarded along with Scheffer, and the building was finished by the end of the year under the on-site directions of John Young, a trusted Englishman in Kamehameha’s service since 1790. Another Englishman, Captain George Beckley, Kamehameha’s associate as well, was placed at the head of the new defense.  

3 The union of Kaumuali‘i with the Russians was preceded by a union of similar type between the conquering chief Kamehameha and King George of England, mediated by the King’s man Captain George Vancouver in February, 1794 (Vancouver 1794; Vancouver 1984, 1160-1163, 1175, 1181-1183). Just as Kamehameha was given the Union Jack to represent this union (Bell 1929, 82), Kaumuali‘i received the Russian imperial flag to be included in his ritual order (Kuykendall 1989, 57). And in the same manner, Kaumuali‘i placed his island under the protection of Russian emperor. For Kaumuali‘i this was nothing new even on a personal level, for he had tried to ally with the Russians twice before, in 1804 and 1809 (Barratt 1988, 7, 12). Of course, Kamehameha’s alliance with – and submission to – the King of England had more substance in it by the sacrifice and deification of the English navigator Captain James Cook in 1779 by Kamehameha’s uncle Kalani‘ōpu‘u, an event that certainly contributed to Kamehameha’s privileged status in the chiefly circles (for this argument, see Sahlins 1981, 22-28). As suggested by Bradley (1968, 48), Kamehameha was probably facing apparent threat from Russia in 1809 and prompted by the Russian presence he dictated a letter to the King of England, his "brother," reminding him of Vancouver’s promise to send "a man of war, armed with brass guns, and loaded with European articles" (Campbell 1967, 106-107).
The guns - "of all sorts and sizes," totalling forty or so - that welcomed the foreign dignitaries as well as the Hawaiian chiefs whenever they decided to use the Honolulu harbor (which was, not surprisingly, under the direction of a pilot, Captain Alexander Adams, an Englishman) were bought from the American merchants with the money the chiefs received from their sandalwood transactions (later they might also have procured guns in exchange for promises to deliver that precious wood). Another member of Byron's party, Andrew Bloxam, learned that there were six or seven hundred "pieces of artillery" all together in the islands (Bloxam 1925, 34). The problem of inexperience of the natives in gun practice was solved by clearing a drilling field next to the old spear-throwing field in close vicinity of the fort (Ii 1983, 65-66). Again, the chiefs would employ foreigners like Beckley, who, in fact, had imported the practice of saluting ships by gun shots. This practice gave "intense pleasure" to the actual author of the fort and Kamehameha's right hand, Kalanimōkū, or Billy Pitt after the English Prime Minister, a name much preferred by Kalanimōkū

Kamehameha renewed his remainder of the alliance six months later. The remaining documents of this entanglement of Hawaiian and Western rivalries are filed in the Archives of Hawaii (F.O. & Ex., August 1810, April 30, 1812).
Gun salutes bear testimony to the fact that the Hawaiian chiefs were eager to secure not only the available material means and loyalty of the foreigners but also the rituals and customs of European origin. The scene was ready for the proliferation of European costume, furniture, afternoon tea, and military drill, not to mention names of foreign kings, presidents, and prime ministers, which were chosen to adorn the Hawaiian nobility. Thus, for example, we have the U.S. President John Adams and George the King of England directing sandalwood trade or witnessing English marines parading on the beach (Bloxam 1925, 48; Macrae 1972, 52). The names of these famous Europeans and Americans often ended up engraved as tattoos on the arms of some Hawaiians (Cox 1957, 36-37). Lord Byron had even a Hawaiian

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4 The practice of gun salutes was invented long before 1816, when it was first used to honor a foreign ship. Archibald Campbell, who spent thirteen months in Hawaii in 1809-1810, tells about an incident of a birth of a child of a high-ranking chief, an event celebrated with sixteen guns, which were located in front of the house (Campbell says the child was Kamehameha's daughter, probably Nānāulu [Ii 1983, 70]) (Campbell 1967, 154). The same custom seemed to have prevailed until and after the arrival of American missionaries in 1820. The child of Kalanimōkū is said to have died of the great noise produced by several guns outside the maternal house (Kamakau 1992b, 250; Journal of Sybil Bingham, Feb. 22 and 27, 1821). Gun salutes in general were perhaps an introduction by Vancouver, who saluted a few chiefs with four guns in 1792, which naturally pleased the Hawaiian dignitaries (Vancouver 1984, 451, 470). Even earlier the voyagers fired guns to let the Hawaiians know that the ship has been tabued and there was no more trading (Ingraham 1913, 32).
interpreter, a native sea captain called Sir Joseph Banks, styled after the long-time President of the Royal Society and naturalist on Cook's first voyage (Macrae 1972, 53; Bingham 1849, 107). Later, after the acceptance of Christianity, Hawaiians began to adopt Biblical names en masse, occasionally adopting names of the missionaries themselves.

The adoption of foreign ways was made relatively easy by some structural features of maritime life, e.g., the necessity to provision ships, the discovery of sandalwood in the islands, or the presence of deserters and beachcombers of different nationalities. These mediating elements do not explain, however, the intensity with which the chiefs - and other Hawaiians, as well as they could - initiated their dealings with foreigners. The mere presence of foreign elements gives grounds for explanations that rarely exceed the analytic level of curiosity. The answer should rather be sought in cultural ideas and categories, in this case the recurring themes of oral tradition, namely the emphasized difference between foreigners, haole, and native or true people, kanaka maoli, which organized the Hawaiians'Dealings with foreigners.

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5 When Vancouver met the ali'i nui of Kaua'i, Kaumuali'i, in March, 1792, the chief had directed all the members of his household to address him (Kaumuali'i) as King George (probably kini Keoki in Hawaiian) and was much offended if someone used his Hawaiian name (Vancouver 1984, 474).
understanding of their universe (Sahlins 1981, 64-65; Dening 1982, 427).

In the next section I shall outline the fundamental conceptions that Hawaiians most surely entertained in their relation to the growing number of foreigners touching the shores of the islands. Having done this, I shall briefly highlight the particular position of the American missionaries and then return to the year 1825, a year that in many respects was a major turning point for the Hawaiian society in terms of acquiring foreign cultural capital. We shall also meet again Macrae the botanist, this time witnessing a more traditional functioning of Hawaiian chiefly hierarchy.6

5.1. Foreign Lands

If the Honolulu fort and its guns represented the technical cooperation of Hawaiians and haole and the gun salutes were a sign of the willingness to institute haole customs, the gate in the coral block wall separated what can be termed domesticated and dangerous. At the gate, as well as in the Hawaiian society in general, all haole were not

6 In the following I am greatly indebted to Marshall Sahlins' reading of Hawaiian traditions and mythology. I have tried as often as possible to avoid too much overlapping by utilizing historical material not quoted by Sahlins.
equal in terms of admiration, elevation and friendship. Not all haole, especially after Cook’s proven mortality, were treated like ali’i. Among those who stayed, the few got lands and wives, thus becoming ‘native’ (Kamakau 1992a, 251), while others worked their ways the best they could, employing themselves as carpenters, masons, or petty traders, but always at risk of losing the benefits, not always without a good reason, however (Campbell 1967, 87; Gast and Conrad 1973, 248, 281; Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Sept. 23, 1823; Journal of Daniel Chamberlain, June 30, 1820). Some became common farmers on the little spot of land granted by a chief and others, mainly deserters from merchant ships, merely wandered about without being much employed. This white and sometimes industrious middle-

7 A good summary description of the situation in 1818 can be found in the text of the Russian circumnavigator Vasilii M. Golovnin. Besides giving a brief sketch of Hawaii as a stop-over and wintering place for the Northwest Coast traders, he also relates some details on the early residents:
"Such frequent and lengthy visits of foreign ships soon acquainted the Sandwich Islanders with the use of many European objects and even with the customs of civilized nations. This process was accelerated greatly by the strong desire of the present ruler [Kamehameha] to enlighten his people. By his honest and fair dealings with the Europeans [Golovnin’s note specifying that by Europeans he means mostly Americans] and by his kindness to them he attracted many sailors from the trading ships and even some artisans who settled among the Sandwich Islanders and married native island girls. At the time of Vancouver’s visit here (1791-1794) the King [Kamehameha] already had about eleven Europeans in his service, while now there are about 150 of them in the Islands, among whom are ship builders, locksmiths, boiler makers, joiners and many carpenters and blacksmiths. (Golovnin 1974, 28, see also 61; for a
class was, however, functionally, if not symbolically, inside the Hawaiian society and by intermarriages and loyalty ties also socially linked to the domestic order of the island life (Turnbull 1805, II, 81; Bradley 1968, 41, fn. 160). The true foreigners evoked quite different standards of conduct. Thus, for instance, a lieutenant in the Russian navy, Otto von Kotzebue, was denied access to the fort during his visit in November, 1816. Later he found out that no foreigner could enter the fort (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 144; see also Golovnin 1974, 22), which lessens the possibility that Kotzebue could not enter because he represented Russia with which Kamehameha’s chiefs had had troubles just prior to Kotzebue’s landing (Scheffer’s affair). Kotzebue’s "no foreigner" refers at least to those not in service to Kamehameha or his chiefs, namely traders, whalers and visiting captains and officers (probably also to haole workmen hired by the chiefs). On the other hand, in the cultural order, these ‘wild’ foreigners indeed had a place.

In oral traditions as well as in their cosmology, Hawaiians traced the ancestry of a great chief from a great genealogical distance - both in time and place. They could easily count the generations separating the original ancestor and the living chief but cosmic dimensions of the

description of the wandering type, see e.g., Golovnin 1974, 55; Campbell 1967, 119; Cox 1957, 33; Ross 1849, 46-47).
sea and the sky were left unmeasured; or when the memory ceased, these dimensions were translated into cosmic language and stereotyped in the paradigmatic theme of migrations from the distant homeland of Kahiki to the islands of the Hawaiian chain and back. A common variation is a priest bringing a chief from the radiant stock of Kahiki to rule in Hawaii, or, alternatively, a brave Hawaiian chief visiting Kahiki and bringing home a new plant, animal, tool, or ritual object (Malo 1991, 6-7; Kamakau 1991b, 3-5, 90-111; Kepelino 1932, 76-79, 98; Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 5, 590-595; Masse, Carter and Somers 1991, 46-47). Also the gods were said to have

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8 An early historical example is Ka'iana, the nephew of Kalani‘ōpu‘u and a warrior who in 1787 sailed with Captain John Meares to China and the northwest coast of America bringing home muskets several months later. Two years later Captains John Kendrick and Robert Gray took onboard a chief’s son "Atto" (Ka‘u) and another Hawaiian named Kalehua, both of whom then visited America in 1790 (Ingraham 1913, 2, 8, 12). Kalehua, who had returned to Hawaii in May, 1791, acted as an interpreter for Vancouver as Ka‘iana, for some reason, appeared to have lost his knowledge of English (Vancouver 1984, 447, 449-451, 476).

To give even a close approximation of the number of the early post-contact Hawaiian sailors and adventurers is impossible, but evidently dozens, perhaps hundreds, of young Hawaiians, both male and female, took a passage to Kahiki during the 36 years between 1787 and 1823, when some 200 Hawaiians were recorded as absentees, mainly recruited by whalers (Schmitt 1968, 175, 182). Some Hawaiians became minor sensations, like a certain Kānehoa who, before returning to Hawaii in 1817, spent eight years in Russia receiving basic Western education and Russian orthodox baptism (Barratt 1988, 344-345). No systematic effort to teach Hawaiians was attempted, however, before the organization of the Foreign Mission School in Cornwall, Connecticut in 1816. Between 1816 and 1832 the Sandwich Islands Mission educated and brought back to Hawaii 11 native men. The most triumphant of these early voyages took
arrived from Kahiki (Kamakau 1991b, 112-115), which, according to the Hawaiian cosmic geography, was located in heaven, again divided into different regions of Kahiki (Malo 1991, 10; Kamakau 1992a, 5-6). Cook's second lieutenant, James King, recalled that the Hawaiians at Kealakekua Bay indicated that the god of the high chief Kalani'ōpu'u, Kūnuiākea, lived with the Englishmen (King in Beaglehole 1967, 621). This 'national' god was represented in the temples by an image of nearly one meter (King in Beaglehole 1967, 505-506), but he was said to live in the highest heaven and manifest himself in Hawaii through his several forms, like Kūkā'ilimoku, the war god of Kamehameha's line (Kamakau 1991a, 7; 1992b, 211; Beckwith 1989, 363-364). By coincidence, when the Cook expedition first sighted the islands in January, 1778, they were coming from Tahiti, which they communicated to Hawaiians at Kaua'i (Samwell in Beaglehole 1967, 1222). The prevalence of 't' over 'k' in the Kaua'i dialect and the vague distinction in general in the Hawaiian language between 't' and 'k' give us sufficient proof that the Hawaiians of Cook's time knew where the foreigners were coming from. The new era of voyaging began as any Hawaiian relying on the received tradition could have

place in 1823, when high chief Liholiho with some other chiefs and attendants sailed to England hoping to materialize the symbolic alliance between the British crown and Hawaii.
expected; the intercourse with the land of Kahiki had always been extraordinary and pregnant with magnificent events.

The glory associated with Kahiki is clearly seen in the famous chant of Kūali‘i, a legendary O‘ahu chief. The following quotation is from the early part of the chant, where Kūali‘i’s wars of conquest are associated with his ancestral links to Kahiki.9


Invited, Kona meets the eye, Caused to grow under Kumuhonua, Rattling the foundations of Hawai‘iakea. Pointed to the early rays of the sun; Kona meets the eye – Kona appears, Kohala lies behind. Kahiki! For whom is Kahiki? For Kū, indeed. Kahiki the island far across the sea, The land where ‘Olopana lived. Within is the island, without is the sun.

9 In the translation I have followed the Fornander version (Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 4, 374), but occasionally made slight corrections in the otherwise profuse English. A shorter passage of the same part of the Kūali‘i chant is also reproduced by Kamakau (1991b, 115-116). In the Kamakau version the original Hawaiian is slightly different at times, as is the translation, but I do not think it necessary to mix the two versions or to offer alternative wordings. I have, however, followed Kamakau in one respect, namely by spelling Fornander’s Tahiti with the initial ‘K’ to emphasize the difference between the island of Tahiti and the mythical homeland of Kahiki. I have also added the modern diacritical markers to the original Hawaiian.
Approaching the island sun hangs low.
Perhaps you have seen it?
I have seen it.
I have indeed seen Kahiki.

An island of strange speech is Kahiki.
To Kahiki belong the people who ascend
To the backbone of heaven;
And when above they tread,
And look down below.

There are no men in Kahiki;
Kahiki has but one kind of people, the haole.
Like them are gods,
Like me are men;
Men indeed.

Wandering about, and the only one who got there (Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 4, 374-375; Kamakau 1991b, 115-116).

The Hawaiian poetic tradition typically assigns an intentionally built-in hidden meaning (kaona) to a chant. In order to interpret a chant one is advised to find kaona by linking the poetic sentences with typical motives of Hawaiian cosmology and what Sahlins calls heroic chiefly life. In this sense, chants could be treated as historical and social indeces, which contain valuable information on the Hawaiian understanding of the life of their society. It is said that the chant relates to Kūaliʻi’s fame as a conqueror, who is by ancestry connected to the divine land across the ocean. In the excerpt, we have first a description of a voyage nearing its close, the land is appearing in the horizon. There is immediately a play on words as the approaching place is called Kona. Besides a
land section on the south side of the Hawai‘i island (we know it is Hawai‘i because Kohala is mentioned), it also means 'leeward' in general, i.e., the coast that first meets anyone coming from the south, the direction of Kahiki. We also have the names Kumuhonua and Hawai‘i‘iakea, the first being the original ancestor of the old chiefly line of Olōlo (Kamakau 1992a, 446), and the second, following Fornander, a form of the god Lono, who ruled the land under the sea (Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 4, 370, fn. 14 and 374, fn. 10; cf. Kamakau 1991b, 129). Both names refer to original times when the land was born and humans began to dwell upon it. The rattling of this Lono’s foundation (papa, see Beckwith 1989, 24) is probably an allusion to a violent separation of the archipelago from the sea bottom, and, at once, an indication of a conquest of land and freeing it from the tabu of the god. In the Hawaiian cosmogonic logic, human life was thus made possible (cf. Beckwith 1990).

Alternatively, and perhaps even intentionally, this part of the chant may refer to an outright conquest of the land of an autochthonous line, which formed the ancestral foundation (another meaning of papa) of Kūali‘i’s opponents. Thus, Kūali‘i’s line, and hence Kūali‘i himself, is a traditional usurping foreigner-chief (Sahlins 1987, 73-103; cf. Howard 1985), who by sacrificing the vanquished chief and marrying the sacred women of the conquered side establishes himself as the new ruler with a crafted link to
the autochthonous chiefly stock. Kūali‘i’s whole existence is at stake here, and through him the lives of his people. The early rays of the sun also bear witness to the original times of the humankind, since in the shared Polynesian tradition daylight is associated with the appearance of humans in contrast to the darkness of night, which evokes the time of gods and dangerous tabus. The image created by grouping together the arrival of a chief’s canoe, the appearance of land, and the rising sun, on the one hand, and the latent cosmogonic ideas of the arrival of humans in general, on the other, reminds us of the paradigmatic function of chief as the foundation of humankind and the divine condition of life. When all this is addressed to a conquering chief, making him a pillar of life, the constant warring of Hawaiian chiefs seems to have been a reasonable way of life. It was a path towards a more perfect state of society filled with divine mana, which radiates from the chief whose ancestry reaches far back to the original times (Valeri 1985a, 99).\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{10} Thus, Kamehameha’s advancing conquest is compared to passing of night and dawning of day:

'O 'oe ia e Kalani nui Mehameha,
E hea aku ana i ka 'iwa kilou moku la,
E ko-mo!
'A'ole i wehewehena, 'a'ole i waihona kona pō,
O ka hōʻā keia e - .

You, O heavenly chief, Ka-mehameha, great warrior, hero who hooked the islands together, you we greet in welcome: "Come in!"
Dawn has not begun to break, night has not departed,
Then follows the essential reference to Kahiki: "For whom is Kahiki? For Kū, indeed!" Kūali‘i, whose name carries the classic elements of the male powers of the god, is truly a representative of the mana of Kahiki. To him are given the violent yet potentially productive capacities, whose origin lies in the invisible land beyond the horizon. Then the famous character of 'Olopana of Kahiki is cited to continue the association of Kūali‘i with the land of gods", which also brings us forward in the genealogical chain. The next line depicts a space that divides earth and sky. This also has a double meaning, either a realist version describing the sun's path as the traveler approaches the distant land (at this time Kahiki) or a poetic version investing the chief with divinity and identifying him with the sun (cf. Sahlins 1985, 214; 1987, 19, fn. 17) that travels along the firmament above the land, which is categorically common. The following line falls within the same metaphor: seen from Hawaii, Kahiki is the land of sunset, a land seen by the famous chief.

Then follows a description of Kahiki itself, which is said to be a land of strange speech. This may again tell us about a different culture and different people during the torches still burn (Pukui and Korn 1988, 10-11).

It is said that a form of Kū, Kūho‘one‘enu‘u, was represented by the tree brought from Kahiki by Haumea, to whom the tree was given by 'Olopana's daughter Mulei'ula as a reward for her help in delivering Mulei'ula's child (Kamakau 1991b, 6-8).
periods of migration, but it can also be an implication of the ritual and court language, which, as the forms of worship, is supposed to have originated in Kahiki and which was not well understood by common Hawaiians (see Hinds 1968, 127; Botta 1984, 31). It was these proprietors of cryptic language that climbed up to the backbone of heaven, a common epithet for chiefly lineage.\textsuperscript{12} So is the identification of chiefs with high places.

Now, this brilliant abode is said to accommodate no ordinary humans but only haole, who are like gods. This, of course, further affirms the link between divine forces and Kūali‘i. Later, the chant goes on to equal the characteristics of the god Kū and the haole.\textsuperscript{13}

He ulele Kū mai ka lani, Kū moving swiftly from the heavens,

\textsuperscript{12} In fact, this is how Mary Pukui translated the line. See, Kamakau 1991b, 116.

\textsuperscript{13} In the following the word ulele is rendered ‘alele in the Kamakau version, meaning ’messenger’ (another version of ‘elele). Apparently the two versions have been mixed, since the Fornander version gives the translation ‘messenger’ for ulele, which really means "to leap at, get into action, do quickly, do at once; one moving swiftly" (Pukui and Elbert 1986, 368). It is in the latter sense that the word is used in the Kūali‘i chant, which brings the meanings of ‘messenger’ and ‘the one moving swiftly’ fairly close to each other.
And, as we already know, the god Kū and the person Kūaliʻi are at least symbolically interchangeable as Kūaliʻi is an embodiment of the god’s mana and as his own life is the image-turned-real of the legendary function of Kū as a conqueror. Hence the equation in the chant of haole and conqueror. However, a conquest is always, as Sahlins says, a "sublunar creation" of society (Sahlins 1992, 180), hence a productive and, somewhat contradictorily, life-giving enterprise. So, for instance, Kamehameha’s uncle and classificatory father, Kalaniʻōpuʻu, is celebrated in his name chant as,

Ka lālākea, ka manō keʻehiʻale, . . . a white-finned shark riding the crest of the wave,
Ka niuhī moe lawa ’o Kalaniʻōpuʻu, 0 Kalaniʻōpuʻu: a tiger shark resting without fear
ʻO ka hōʻeloʻelo welaʻole ia o ka maka, a rain quenching the sun’s eye-searing glare
ʻO ka umu ia nāna e hahao i ka ‘enaʻena. a grim oven glowing underground (Pukui and Korn 1988, 5-6).

Here, the images of destruction and death are combined with those of containment (resting shark, rain that cools off the heat, glow of the oven). The chief is a shark that cuts up the land and allots the pieces for lower chiefs, who again repeat the process and give life down to the lowest commoner. The chief is a dual character; his is the life and the death, as Hawaiians used to say. In this sense, it is not surprising that the metaphors may be shaded as aspects of chiefly powers, the sun may be warm and gentle
but it can also scorch and ravish. The chief is the man-burning fire breaking forth (he momoku ahi kuni kanaka), the dreadful one (weliwelij) whose tabus would cause death by fire to defilers (M/BM 20; Kamakau 1991a, 10; Malo 1991, 57; ND/139). But the chief whose tabus placed him or her out of the reach of any ordinary mortal - common descriptions are lonely (mehameha), distant (mamao), and heavenly (lani) - could also be - and, in fact, was prescribed to be - a patient (ahonui) and caring (mālama) head of the people, who did not forget the worship of gods (Malo 1987, 39). A useful chief had useful (i.e., contained) tabus.

Schematically, the semiotics of a chief can be represented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Life</th>
<th>Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stillness</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Closeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coolness</td>
<td>Heat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The right hand column is the pole of Kū, the characteristics of a conquering chief. Ideally, the left hand side brings forth the symbolic universe of the post-conquest state, the realm of the fertilizing god Lono, or Kū's transformation from destructive to life-giving form. (Valeri 1985b, esp. 262, 288, 331; Kameʻeleihiwa 1992, 44-
49). It is telling that the first opponents of the conquering chief Kūali‘i in the battle of Waolani on O‘ahu were four high chiefs whose names were derived from the god Lono, the opposite of the god Kū (remember that the birth of the islands in the chant of Kūali‘i was a symbolic conquest from Lononuiākea, the god of the submarine landbase) (Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 4, 408-409). By the same token, just before the victorious battle Kūali‘i’s companion remarked that they were surrounded by "the rain clouds," signs of Lono (412-413; Beckwith 1989, 31) and messengers of growth and comfortable coolness. The place where the battle took place, Waolani, is described in legends as being a site inhabited by spirits and gods, who had built the first temple in Hawaii. Also, the first man, Wākea, was born there and he later built the first human-made temple there — again, an allusion to conquest (Kamakau 1991b, 20, 30, 129; Pukui 1983, nos. 1033, 2113, 2206; Pukui, Elbert, Mookini

14 Traditionally Lono’s possession of the land was only temporary. The myth describes Lono as a late-coming god, who, after a stormy marriage in Hawaii, returns to Kahiki from which he promises to come back again. The story was incorporated — perhaps a post-Cook event — into the new year’s ritual, makahiki, at the end of which Lono was ritually defeated by the high chief and sent back to Kahiki. Lono’s departure marked also the opening of the temples of Kū (Ii 1983, 72; Malo 1991, 150-152; Beckwith 1989, 31-41; Sahlins 1981, 17-28; 1985, 209-214; 1989; Valeri 1985b, 214-215).

15 As an appropriate anecdote it may be added that at the end of the makahiki ritual Lono was addressed as Lononuiākea (K. Kamakau in Fornander 1916-1920, vol. 6, 44-45).
1976, 228). Evoking the appearance of humans on earth once occupied by gods only, what would be a more suitable location for the battle between the powers of Lono and the representative of humankind, Kū? Kūaliʻi's first victory therefore marked at once his being singled out the strongest chief of Oʻahu and an actualization of cosmic drama. Of course, the setting is almost too perfect with the four Lono chiefs, but the historical accuracy is not at stake here. The point is rather how Hawaiians understood and made sense of the conquering chiefs by projecting the whole cosmology on their actions and passing the scheme down to their descendants in the form of the chant.

In this scheme, the origin of the haole lies in Kahiki, the ancestral homeland of all Hawaiians. In the chant of Kūkanaloloa, a god-like hero from Kahiki, he is described as haole and even given the status of kupuna, ancestor, of Hawaiians (Kamakau 1991b, 114-115). Thus, Kahiki, as a place of origin, had a significant symbolic value for Hawaiians, who identified themselves as secularized (noa) descendants of divine (kapu) haole from Kahiki. Also Kūkanaloloa, by marrying a Hawaiian chiefess, did what a foreigner should do: he became domesticated, his tabus useful, and his offspring could trace its origin to Kahiki and ultimately to gods. The drawback was, however, that the

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16 The terms haole and Kahiki were sometimes interchangeable as the Hawaiian words for Irish potato (uala kahiki) and tomato (ʻōhiʻa haole) indicate.
closer to the present one came the more distant was this source and its divine perfection (Sahlins 1981, 13; cf. Valeri 1985a, 99). The appearance of Cook's ships and the dozens of others that followed gave Hawaiians a new possibility to inaugurate a direct mediation with the lands and wonders of Kahiki. It is a whim of history that haole became to mean not only 'foreigner' but also 'white man'. In principle, the category was open to all arriving creatures. In later years of contact a black person, for instance, could be termed haole 'ele'ele, dark foreigner (Kekāuluohi to Kekūnāo‘a, March 13, 1840, IDM/AH).

17 In the christianized Hawaiian tradition, the ancient haole are explicitly described as white men, especially in the accounts embellished by the Catholic faction (Yzendoorn 1927, 1-20). In the Catholic case, there seems to be a strong link between this story, the alleged discovery of Hawaii by the Spanish long before Cook, and the dissemination of Catholic faith in the islands, although the whole cluster is rather a product of genuine cultural reasoning than intentional forgery. The theory itself may have originated in the Protestant side, however (see Ellis 1979, 283-284, 318-320; Loomis, Journal, June 12, 1824). In 1823, the time of Ellis' tour on Hawai'i, the word haole had already acquired its modern meaning 'foreigner/white man'.

A deeper layer behind the hypothesis of Europeans visiting Hawaii prior to Cook may be sought in the vagueness of the term haole itself. Since it appeared as a special category in mythology (the quotidian word for foreigner was malihini, which has more in common with a person's ignorance of local mores than his/her capacity to institute new ones), any arriving people could have added empirical content to the unknown and thus recreating the story with concrete referent, which could be easily agreed upon. Therefore, it is hardly the case that Ellis merely mistook the meaning of haole, for besides that he already had a ready-made historical sequence to be inserted in the Hawaiian lore, the word itself had become the indicator of white man among the Hawaiians themselves.
What was the place for haole then, especially when their lives took on a turn towards remaining in Hawaii? Their status must have been at least vague, if not categorically labelled as a dangerous species. They were extraordinary, and in that capacity also useful in enhancing the mana of those who came in contact with them and especially of those who could contain them in useful employment. But, loaded with this unusual mana, the foreigners were also a constant object of Hawaiian envy and fear. In the early years of contact, it was easy for a wondering sailor with little know-how of Western carpentry and ship-building to settle down in the islands under some chief’s protection. For common Hawaiians, such foreigners hardly represented chiefly qualities. On the contrary, the foreigners were competitors for a people whose major objective in life had traditionally been to find a chief to live under (‘imihaku). The foreigners’ motives were perhaps different but they operated in the same scarce market. For the chiefs the haole arrivals meant perhaps an even greater threat. As Sahlins has attentively noted, the Hawaiian chiefs always appeared at the scene of contact a few days later than the common people (Sahlins 1981, 36). If we take seriously the understandings carried by the traditional lore, foreigners are categorically rival figures. The danger they represented could be minimized by using the available indigenous social mechanism of attachment
(ho'opili) to a chief, which the white men called employment.\(^{18}\)

In time the problem of dangerous foreigners was more or less settled (until the arrival of war-ships in the mid-1820s). The foreigners became deliverers of desirable goods and skills, the Hawaiians provided necessities of food and drink, later sandalwood, and from the very beginning sexual gratification, which was to assume a status of necessity equal to food and drink. In brief, Kahiki was secularized. It became a giant storehouse, but remained, however, a land of wonders where some sailed (the so-called holokahikis, as the Hawaiian sailors were called) and upon returning related more evidence of these wonders. For the chiefs it was more pressing to secure the goods than to worry about conquering foreigners. Not that this traditional wisdom was forgotten; the practice of trade had merely proven that the foreigners in general had no plans of war. Commerce was the order of the day. If, in practical terms, the opening up of Kahiki meant both a source of power and source of threat, a

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\(^{18}\) The Hawaiian perception of haole rivalry was embedded in a still wider understanding of Kahiki as a cultural reserve. Even some of the diseases and healing practices were seen to originate in Kahiki (Ii 1983, 47). Thus, if some brought destruction, others came with blessings. But the Hawaiian interpretation of even the useful foreigners was mediated by the social structure of the chiefdom to the effect that besides the obvious fear of conquest and other destructive foreign elements, also the otherwise beneficial know-how, although fascinating, was seen with jealousy.
successful strategic response would transform the threat into power.  

5.2. The Missionaries

Commerce was still going strong when the threat actualized markedly on account of the arrival of the first American missionaries off the coast of Kona, Hawai‘i, in March, 1820. Just the previous fall, following the death of Kamehameha in May, 1819, his son and follower Liholiho and some other leading chiefs had abandoned their own gods and divine tabus and released the whole society into a continuous state of noa. A rather pleasurable period followed as the normal restrictions did not apply. Whatever was the true reason for the abolition, at least it opened up a more flexible way to deal with the increasing number of foreigners. It found logical support in the Hawaiian tradition as well. A native historian has the following remark:

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19 When the intercourse with foreigners and Hawaiians became a matter of everyday life and Hawaii was firmly linked to the outside world, Kahiki as an expression and category gradually shifted to the background and acquired at once more narrow (Tahiti or any of the southern groups) and clearly legendary (great migrations) meanings. By 1865 the phrase ʻāina ʻē (other lands) had largely replaced Kahiki. For instance, the widow of the King Kamehameha IV, Queen Emma, was said to go to ʻāina ʻē, not to Kahiki, when she set out for her trip to Europe (Ke Au Okoa, May 8, 1865; but see Ke Alaula, Nov. 1866: "He nui na keiki kane i makemake e holo i kahiki" [many young boys wanted to go abroad]).
This custom was not so much of an innovation as might be supposed. In old days the period of mourning at the death of a ruling chief who had been greatly beloved was a time of licence [noa]. The women were allowed to enter the heiau, to eat bananas, coconuts, and pork, and to climb over the sacred places . . . Free eating [‘ainoa] followed the death of the ruling chief [who was in this sense the condition of society - JM]; after the period of mourning was over the new ruler placed the land under a new tabu following old lines. In this case Kamehameha II [Liholiho] merely continued the practice of free eating (Kamakau 1992a, 222).

The so-called "cultural revolution," which still provokes sorry comments from scholars (e.g., Obeyesekere 1992, 157), was in effect a premeditated act very closely tied to the Hawaiian understanding of their gods. To put it briefly, gods were manipulable spiritual objects, whose tabus humans could control through ritual. An illuminating case is Liholiho's arrival at Kailua, Hawai'i, where the tabus were formally abolished. A messenger was sent to inform Liholiho that when he was to arrive at Kailua, the tabu of his god would be neutralized by a ti leaf ritual (ti leaf being a sign that the god had taken the tabu back to him/herself and left humans noa, without the restriction of tabu) (Kamakau 1992a, 225). The newly arrived missionaries noted this in their peculiar way: "though they have abolished their Idols, they have not abandoned their vices" (Thaddeus Journal, June 28, 1820).²⁰ By this manipulative manoeuver - which was

²⁰ As we shall see later, there was a significant crafted continuity between the old indigenous tabu observances and the nineteenth-century Biblical tradition, the old tabus being a sign of godliness and regard for gods, which was seen as a virtue much in line with the virtues of Christian worship. Kamakau, for example, compares those who
yet unpreceded in its magnitude - the chiefs had established themselves as the sole sovereigns on earth. The gods had been defeated for the last time, and thereby also Liholiho's constitutive privilege to human sacrifice on the one hand and the possibility of the human forces to use gods against the ruling chiefs on the other. 21

Now, the missionaries, their souls burning with divine zeal, appeared on the scene, which they interpreted as being a religious vacuum ready to be filled with the spirit of the true god. The mission knelt to a thankful prayer, but their relief was only temporary, for the terrible landscape of atheism appeared before their eyes sooner than they could recover from their joy. Perhaps it was better to be a heathen and worship a deity than to be completely and consciously indifferent. That the Hawaiians were certainly not. It was just that their conception of divinity included various shades, the gods being rather part of their daily

were careless in observing tabus to unbelievers mentioned in the Old Testament. In their own specific ways both were supposed to have been foolish (Kamakau 1992b, 64).

21 In reverence to the ancient wisdom, Kamehameha left the aupuni to his son Liholiho but his war god, Kūkāʻilimoku, to his nephew, Kekuaokalani. The cycle of ruling and usurping was thus built into the inheritance as a structural condition, which Kamehameha's other relatives very well knew. To eliminate the possibility of history repeating itself, the ruling chiefs stripped their gods of divine potency - with well known consequences. In the ensuing war in December, 1819, Kekuaokalani and his followers were defeated (Gast and Conrad 1973, 235-236) and the aupuni left standing without its traditional rival, the younger sibling armed with the government-snatching god.
existence than being pushed outside the direct participation in human life, as was the case with the Protestant mode of Christianity. This was particularly true in the Lockean social theory, which placed God on top of everything as the ultimate source of rationality, while people were left more or less successfully to realize the divinely sanctioned moral duty to uphold the principles of civility. It will be remembered that within this imagery, alienation from the precepts of God was rooted in perversions in the social world. Atheism represented the worst kind of distortion of the God-given reason, as the Puritan reception of the French Revolution would attest. The leader of the mission, Hiram Bingham, found a cause for reflection: "irreligion, heathen amusements, licentiousness and revelry, abounded, and atheism took the throne" - it was "emboldened" (Bingham 1849, 77). The order was shaken, perhaps more than was desirable.

Against the background of this unstable "applied theology" (Dunn 1983) it was perhaps difficult at first for the missionaries to understand that their mission was a potential threat to the existing Hawaiian regime, although they were soon informed of these fears (Thaddeus Journal, Apr. 10, July 17, 1820; Kahananui 1984, 123, 236). Perhaps they were blinded by the Hawaiian holokahikis at the mission school in Cornwall, Connecticut, where these adventurous young men learned the great deeds of the living god Jehova,
who was worshipped in Kahiki (now divided into nations and well-known to these converts). As we already know, in the Hawaiian system, gods, akua, and 'government', aupuni, belonged together - as could be expected in a conquest-oriented society in which people had personal gods. To hold fast to the reigns of aupuni and secure the mana, one was obliged to take good care of one's gods and tabus (Malo 1991, 188-190; Kamakau 1992b, 226; Kahananui 1984, 95). This unity of worship and power was an essential part of the education of the chiefs, hence also of the ruler in 1820 (Kamakau 1992a, 179, 209). Now that the Hawaiian nobility had forsaken their gods and ruled without worshipping them, it was certainly a matter of great alarm if a group of haole from foreign lands would come ashore and begin to disseminate the word of a new god - an act similar to traditional usurping designs. If the priests were already there the chiefs belonging to Jehova would not be far behind (Holman to ABCFM, Nov. 21, 1820, MsL). The first intimation of new tabus - thus a new regime - was the missionaries' refusal to make dresses for the female chiefs on their first Sabbath. The next Sabbath they declined to land their goods, on which they boldly informed Liholiho (Thaddeus Journal, Apr. 2 and 9, 1820). "We assured his majesty, that Jehovah has a tabu, once in seven days, and we were not permitted to remove our effects from the ship during his sacred time" (Bingham 1849, 89, my italics).
In Hawaiian tradition there is a famous story relating to this paradigmatic fear. When Hiram Bingham began to erect the first frame house in the islands in March, 1821, rumors were spread that the missionaries would smuggle in men put in barrels and hide them in the cellar (a new thing in Hawaii but a matter of course in New England). Afterwards these men led by the mission would take the land. The same source relates other similar fears apparently widely held at the time. The idea was rather clear: a prolonged haole presence will eventually lead to a demise of the chiefs, "and when no chief remains the land will belong to the haole" (Anonym. of Lahainaluna, Jan. 30, 1842; HEN I: 223-227; Dibble 1839, 78; see also Journal of Sybil Bingham, Feb. 9, 1821). Sometimes this fear resulted in explicit orders to expel all the foreigners who did not hold land under any of the chiefs. According to a long-time resident, such orders were issued or considered by the chiefs four times between October 30, 1814 and January 16, 1815, twice between August 8 and September 15, 1820, and once on March 10, 1822 and October 9, 1823 (Gast and Conrad 1973, 214-215, 242-243, 262, 283). The mass expulsions never

Besides these explicit orders there were several rumors like the one circulating in March, 1793. According to Vancouver, the Maui paramount Kahekili threatened to kill all white men in his territory (Vancouver 1984, 875). Similarly, Liholiho's cousin and main rival after Kamehameha's death, Kekuaokalani, was rumored to have said he would kill all whites settled in the islands once he had defeated Liholiho (Freycinet 1978, 20). These rumors followed a pattern, which, more than simple fear or inherent
materialized, however, although individual haole troublemakers were forced to leave occasionally. The fear of the haole was not completely reduced even after the formal conversion of most of the population. When the Lahainaluna seminary was established in 1831, some Hawaiians thought it best to be cautious: When the building of the road to Lahainaluna was finished, some people thought the missionaries planned to blow up the whole place killing all the people and then flee with their wives to the ships at the Lahaina harbor and sail away. Or, that they would kill all the people and then send for more Americans (HEN I: 223-227). The immediate comment of the chiefs when they had admitted the mission to stay followed the same logic. They warned against sending for more missionaries (Thaddeus Journal, Apr. 10, 1820). This, as it is known, they had to take back.

Besides the apparent fear of a conquest (Stewart 1970, 161), the chiefs thought the missionaries might risk their relatively stable international relations and blooming commerce. This fear was closely tied to the Hawaiian conceptions of Kahiki and relations of power between the chiefly families. As we already know, the rise of Kamehameha to the chieftainship was mediated by his relation

jealousy, reflected the difference in the chiefs' strategy to appropriate foreign manufactures and know-how; death threats were habitually issued by chiefs who had failed to establish a close mercantile and military alliance with the foreigners.
to Cook and Great Britain in general. He was the chief noted for the ability to maintain warm intercourse with all foreigners and thus secure their support (Sahlins 1992, 37-42). But his prime asset was certainly the union with Great Britain, first inaugurated by the sacrifice of Cook and later confirmed by the so-called cession of the Hawai‘i island to the British crown in 1794 (Vancouver 1984, 1160-1164).

Although Kamehameha’s intention was only to extend Hawaiian custom beyond the horizon and to secure an alliance with the most powerful nation to have sent ships to Hawaii, this deed was generally interpreted among foreigners in terms of international rivalry and Western treaty conventions. In time, other nations began to increase their presence in the islands, which naturally put Kamehameha’s British connection on the spot. He was reminded of the sometimes strenuous relations between some of these nations and their representatives. Kamehameha was persuaded to continue the equal treatment of all nations, even the difficulties with the Russians seemed to fade after Scheffer’s departure. As a sign of his equal policy, Kamehameha accepted a flag in which both English and American insignia were recognized (a combination of the Union Jack and the American stripes). Nevertheless, his British connection remained strong and was transferred to his son Liholiho, who in 1823 went to England to seek help
from King George against rival chiefs, or, as Ka'ahumanu said, "to seek a hakuaina," or a lord from whom Liholiho could hold the land (Bingham 1849, 204). (It was said that Liholiho took some of his father's bones to England to enjoy their mana, and perhaps to hide them from the same rivals, who might have tried to defile the sacred remains [Ellis 1979, 258]). In a way, his trip to England marked an end to the British connection. Not that England would have been forgotten - deified Cook was prayed to by common Hawaiians in remote areas still in 1833 (Lorenzo Lyons to Anderson, Sept. 6, 1833, MsL) - but that there was a turn towards ascension of America through the core group of active ali'i. For one thing Liholiho died while in London, for another a message was brought from King George encouraging the work of the American missionaries. This latter event took place in the summer of 1825, but no such confirmation had been received in 1820, when the first band of missionaries arrived. At that time the Hawaiian elite was very much attached to Great Britain and its ali'i nui, King George, or Kini Keoki (see Manby 1929, 23). The British connection had begun to form during Cook's visit, a singular manifestation of which was the decision of the priest Koa, the constant companion of Cook during the visit, to rename himself "Brittanee" (King in Beaglehole 1967, 525). Thus, from very early on Kahiki began to differentiate into nations, England, France, America, Spain, Russia, etc. This detailed
knowledge received from visitors and settlers was fitted into a cultural scheme, giving the conception of Kahiki more flesh around its bones. I cannot agree with Obeyesekere, for instance, that Cook could not come from Kahiki the mythic land beyond the horizon, simply because it meant "Brittanee" already during the visit (Obeyesekere 1992, 61-62). On the contrary, we must make a distinction between the received mythological concept and the rechecking of it at the contact with foreigners. The rechecking of the concept, more than anything else, brought in detailed information on the concrete places and peoples of Kahiki, a process which naturally changed the concept in the long run, as the Hawaiian geographic awareness approached the more widely shared international standards. Even after this process, at least two decades after the introduction of missionaries, Kahiki remained a synonym for Great Britain (Kahananui 1984, 88; Anonym. of Lahainaluna, Jan. 30, 1842). Besides, in the precontact time, Hawaiians used specific place names of Kahiki to add details to their legends (e.g., Kamakau 1991b, 92-95, 117). Consequently, far from asserting the physical reality of Kahiki, it is sufficient to treat it as a thought-organizing concept, which was used by Hawaiians to make sense of the foreigners.

The thusly differentiated Kahiki was also ordered hierarchically in such a way as to reserve the highest honors to Great Britain. The British were also the safest
alternative. After extensive visits to Hawaii, Vancouver, for instance, found it safe to conclude that all the foreigners employed by the chiefs were British (Vancouver 1984, 1191-1192). Spain and Russia, on the other hand, were perceived as trouble makers and conquerors - not without good reason but much due to some English and American opinions (e.g., Colnett 1940, 220; Minson 1952, 40; Barratt 1988, 12-14). While Americans came for business (as did most of the early post-Cook Englishmen), the presence of the British Navy left an unparalleled reminder of the powers of that country. For the ritual conscious Hawaiians this naval presence gave a further impetus to regard the British as essentially different from other nationalities. Thus, the presence of the American missionaries was perceived by the Hawaiian ruling ali'i as a possible offense to Great Britain, whose representative George Vancouver had even promised Kamehameha to send English priests to Hawaii (Thaddeus Journal, Apr. 10, 1820; Anonym. of Lahainaluna, Jan. 30, 1842; Bingham 1849, 88; Kamakau 1992a, 246-247).

The whole affair of landing and the four and a half years that followed were burdened with suspicion of the mission’s motives for these interrelated two reasons: preparation for conquest by Americans and endangering the British Connection - both of which were logical extensions of the indigenous precepts for dealing with foreigners.
Hiram Bingham first met Liholiho on April 4, 1820, and immediately explained, with the help of interpreters, the purpose of his mission and asked for a permission to settle in the islands. There was much discussion, and the highest chiefs gathered in Kailua, Hawai‘i, to assess this unexpected turn in their relation to the haole world. A week later the permission was hesitantly granted, but only for a probational year. It seems that in the final argument, the technical know-how of the mission weighted more heavily in the decision to allow the landing than any desire to embrace a new god, especially the chiefs’ readiness to monopolize the teaching of reading skills (Holman to ABCFM, Nov. 21, 1820, MsL; Thaddeus Journal, Apr. 10, July 15, 1820).

In a short time the chiefly advocates of noa, the so-called Ka‘ahumanu mā – as well as Kaumuali‘i, the paramount of the semi-independent island of Kaua‘i – adopted a favorable posture towards the mission. So much so that the leaders of the mission, the Reverends Hiram Bingham and Asa Thurston, could write in their public journal on July 17, 1820: "We want more missionaries and notwithstanding the scruples of the King [Liholiho] with regard to the danger of missionaries, most heartily would we welcome an equal number of additional laborers could they arrive tomorrow" (Thaddeus Journal, my italics). Judging by the mission journal, the three most eager chiefs to receive the missionaries were
Ka'ahumanu's younger brother Kahekili Ke'eaumoku alias Cox, her cousin Hō'eu Kalanimesti alias Billy Pitt and her future husband Kaumuali'i alias King George. The first two were reputed to have exercised close rapport with foreigners already in the time of Vancouver (Vancouver 1984, 841).

Kaumuali'i's foreign contacts were also well-known, although he was more willing to engage foreigners against the Kamehameha regime, thus also against Cox and Pitt. Between May, 1820 and September, 1821 - i.e., until his removal to O'ahu to be married with Ka'ahumanu - Kaumuali'i most graciously supported the missionaries on Kaua'i, Samuel Whitney and Samuel Ruggles, giving them "more than 200 acres of excellent land, two or three fish ponds, and 20 goats." Following the Hawaiian custom, the land was worked by 40 natives now under the missionaries, who themselves held the land directly from Kaumuali'i (Thaddeus Journal, Nov. 13, 1820). In the same manner, the chiefs provided lands and men for the missionaries on other islands, making the priestly foreigners petty chiefs in the Hawaiian style. For Liholiho this must have cost hours of lonely meditation.

5.3. The New Alliance

Although generally well-received by the chiefs - they provided accommodation, food, and occasionally even furniture (Lucia Holman 1986, 26, 28-29, 31-32, 35, 37) -
the missionaries had a much more meager start in their evangelical objective. Successful execution of their work was met by two cultural-structural obstacles; with one of these we are already familiar, namely, the ambivalence embedded in the Hawaiian conception of foreigners. The second was the hierarchic organization of the Hawaiian society, which rendered the mission completely dependent on the goodwill of the chiefs. These two combined produced a situation in which the mission had its basic needs looked after but in which they were not able to extend their teaching outside the chiefly circles. The immediate response from the ruling chief Liholiho exemplified this old model of haole-Hawaiian relations. His desires were directed more towards material means of promoting his interest in the status as the ultimate appropriator of the earth. Excluding the physician Thomas Holman, he thought that in the missionary pack there were too many useless people who could not build ships or otherwise increase his wealth. Palapala - or the system of reading and writing, as Hawaiians had for years called literal communication - was good for nothing (Holman to ABCFM, Nov. 21, 1820, MsL). Nevertheless, Liholiho consented to let the missionaries teach the chiefs and their trusted men, but just for evaluative purposes. Liholiho also secured the best means to get information of the missionary proceedings. In a
typically hierarchic manner he assigned servants and guards to the mission (Lucia Holman 1986, 27).

At the time Liholiho was living in Kailua, Hawai‘i, where he also wanted the Holmans to stay. The Holman couple was joined by the Reverend Asa Thurston and his wife Lucy and the native helpers Hōpū and Kanui. The rest of the band, the Reverend Hiram Bingham and his wife Sybil, Daniel and Jerusha Chamberlain and their five children, Elisha and Maria Loomis, Samuel and Nancy Ruggles, Samuel and Mercy Whitney and two Hawaiians, Humehume and Honoli‘i, headed for Honolulu, where they arrived on April 14, 1820 (Bingham 1849, 91-92). Meanwhile the Thurstons and Holmans in Kailua were directly under Liholiho’s eyes. The Holmans soon found that they were not suited for missionary life, quit the mission in July and within a few months sailed back home. Asa and Lucy Thurston continued with the help of Hōpū and Kanui, although the latter took to the bottle and was excommunicated on July 22 (Thaddeus Journal, July 22, 1820). The first months of the mission in Kailua seem to have been such a series of hardships that the Thurstons eventually joined the others in Honolulu (especially after the loss of Thomas and Lucia Holman and also encouraged by the news that Liholiho planned to move his court to Honolulu). Hōpū, who had met his father and brother and had been given a piece of land by Liholiho, felt obliged to stay with his chief in Kailua. When Liholiho moved to Honolulu in February, 1821,
Hōpū loyally followed with the mission printer Elisha Loomis, who in the previous July had gone to Hawai‘i to instruct Kalanimōkū’s household after this chief’s solicitation (Thaddeus Journal, July 17, 1820; Journal of Daniel Chamberlain, July 19, 1820; Bingham 1849, 99, 104, 125, 132; Gast and Conrad 1973, 246).

The island of Hawai‘i was not left completely without Christian teachers, however, although the mission absented itself from that field for almost two years between 1821 and 1823. There were occasional visits to the ex-Hawai‘i station in October-November, 1822, and in the summer of 1823 (Barrère and Sahlins 1979, 21; Ellis 1979), but the dissemination of the faith was left to the Hawaiian helpers, Hōpū and Honoli‘i, who sailed to Kailua in November, 1822, to work under Kuakini, the chief Liholiho left in charge of the island. Hōpū’s and Honoli‘i’s task was to continue the small select classes begun in 1820. We learn from the visiting English missionary William Ellis that in the spring of 1822 Kuakini had none of the missionary establishment with him (Ellis to Burden, July 9, 1822, MsL). Earlier, likely a year or two before the American missionaries arrived, Kuakini had engaged a Tahitian named Toketa, who had received missionary instruction in his native island, could read and write - also in Hawaiian - and was at least, judging by his journal, on the verge of conversion to
Christianity (Barrère and Sahlins 1979). It was in Kuakini’s court that the celebrated Hawaiian intellectual Davida Malo was first introduced to Christianity and the art of palapala (Piianaia 1987, vii-viii). Besides

23 Although known by the scholars for decades, the essential part played by the native helpers and Tahitians associated with Hawaiian chiefs still waits for an in-depth study (Kuykendall 1989 [1938], 103; Barrère and Sahlins 1979, 23; Barrère 1989, 77; Sahlins 1992, 89, fn 16, 91).

24 To give an idea of the method of combining elements of Christian doctrine and ritual with technical know-how in literacy, let me quote the missionaries’ joint description of a public examination held in Honolulu on January 9, 1823. Note also the presence of the Hawaiian and Tahitian helpers and the organization of schools. All this is shrouded in the naive innocence so typical of the missionary writings in the early 1820s:

On the 9 inst. we had examinations of our schools at this place which now comprize [sic] more than 200 pupils, most of whom appeared in decent order at the chapel, with a good number of spectators - Br. T[thurston]. conducted the examination - which was in our view more flattering than any former one which we had. - Not less than 12 Chiefs & Chiefses [sic] including the favorite queen Kamamalu, & her sister Kinau - the king’s [Liholiho’s] brother Kauikioule [Kauikeaouli] & his sister Nahienaena & Opia [Pi‘ia] one of the wives of the late king [Kamehameha] - with her present husband Laanui, bore an interesting part of the examination; nor was the king’s copy-book with its fair, neat pages, & his communication before alluded to, which was read to the assembly, less interesting. - The assistant teachers, Honorii [Honoli‘i], Auna the Tahitien, James Kahuhi, Kanae & Taumi [Kaomi] appeared at the head of their respective schools and assisted in the examination - The two latter, with Abner Morse read original compositions - The queen recited about half of Watt’s catechism, Kahuhi read with fluency a passage from the Bible, Kapiolani the wife of Naihu [Nāihe] & Tuhio their friends presented their first essays in composition, & Naihu with simplicity handed in a declaration written by his own hand, containing four words - 'Aroha au ia Tehova' - I love the Lord. - Opia exhibited fair hand writing with many others - Honorii gave an address to the pupils, & Br. T. closed the exercises with prayer (Bingham, Thurston, Chamberlain
supporting individuals somewhat versed in the worship of the new god, Kuakini took his own initiative in the propagation of haole culture. In 1823 this tea-drinking gentleman issued orders to observe the Sabbath and built a church of his own much to the surprise of the missionaries who found Kuakini's men at work when they returned from their inspection journey around the island in August (Ellis 1979, 293; Lucy Thurston 1934, 211; see also Kamakau 1992a, 390).

Kuakini's court is an early example of what a few years later developed into a mass scale organization of palapala and pule, or prayer, quite independently of the missionaries. For any Hawaiian chief to be the center from which all activity emanates was equal to a purpose of life, whether it was building a temple (Kamakau 1992a, 155), weeding a taro field (Barrère and Sahlins 1979, 27-28) or organizing schools. Following this principle, which was of course a frequent subject of the missionaries' lamentations over the laziness of the chiefs, Liholiho placed his trusted servants 'I'i and Kahuhu to Thurston's school in Kailua and later to Bingham's in Honolulu. Afterwards, 'I'i and Kahuhu began to teach Liholiho's court. In the same fashion, Liholiho's younger sister Nāhi'ena'ena was at the head of her own school, which was taught by a native Christian Robert Haiā. To integrate her little organization, she had

and Loomis to Evarts, Jan. 11, 1823, MsL).
Haia and one of her companions be married (Bingham 1849, 104, 322, 328-329).

Although we have only scanty information on what went on in Kuakini's court in 1821-1823, we can safely assume these and similar stratagems were in active use, as they were put into operation throughout the chiefly households on every island. On Kaua'i the mission met practically no opposition. The two missionaries, Samuel Ruggles and Samuel Whitney were strongly encouraged to stay by the island paramount Kaumuali'i, whose son Humehume the mission had brought back home after some 17 years of absence (Thaddeus Journal, May 28-29, Nov. 13, 1820; Journal of Samuel and Nancy Ruggles, May 3-June 26, 1820; Damon 1925, 205-207). However, Kaumuali'i also had some misgivings about the motives of the missionaries. According to Nancy Ruggles "Hoomhoome [Humehume] told us that his father had frequently enquired what he thought with respect to our coming to live with him and expressed his apprehensions that we should not come, but purposed to deceive him as other white people had done" (Journal of Samuel and Nancy Ruggles, July 25, 1820). This, of course, was soon effaced as the missionaries moved to Waimea in the leeward side of Kaua'i and took up the teaching of Kaumuali'i's household.

Kaumuali'i was extremely anxious to have foreign teachers about him, but without Liholiho's permission he was unable to establish the tabu day for Jehovah (Damon 1925,
225), which was to wait a few more years. It also seems that Kaumuali‘i was somewhat hesitant in carrying the orders of Jehovah that far, although he very soon after Ruggles’ and Whitney’s arrival ordered his men to build a church "on the ground lately occupied by a celebrated Morai [heiau, a temple]" (Thaddeus Journal, Aug. 23, 1820; Samuel Ruggles to Evarts, Aug. 2, 1820, MsL). This church, first in the islands, was located near Kaumuali‘i’s own houses as tradition prescribes, and it is believed that he seriously planned to take Jehovah as his new god. This speedy process on Kaua‘i was temporarily halted by the removal of Kaumuali‘i to Honolulu in late 1821 to be married to Liholiho’s classificatory mother Ka‘ahumanu. After the incident Honolulu became the center of the mission until 1824, when the developments on Kaua‘i launched the native proselytizing with the full backing of a Polynesian hierarchy. As a prelude to what was to come, Ka‘ahumanu, who had by now learned to read and write, sailed to Kaua‘i in late summer, 1822, and, ordering 800 copies of the new

25 Ka‘ahumanu, one of Kamehameha’s wives, was Liholiho’s makuahine, or a female relative of the parental generation. Her ties to Liholiho were strengthened when she was made his foster mother (makua hānai). There was no real blood tie between the two, but Ka‘ahumanu, who was of a prestigious Maui island lineage, provided Kamehameha a means to enhance the alliance between Maui and Hawai‘i families. After Kamehameha’s death, Ka‘ahumanu dexterously used her position to promote Maui interests, pushing Liholiho, who, through her biological mother Keöpūolani, represented conciliation between the lineages of Hawai‘i and Maui, out of the scene.
spelling book, toured the place and gave orders to set up schools. This technique had always had a certain magic in it, and for a few days Ruggles and Whitney were more than fully employed in satisfying the educational needs of the sudden converts to palapala. And as Bingham recalls, "their former pupils were now demanded as teachers for the beginners" (Bingham 1849, 172).

In Honolulu, after Liholiho's arrival in 1821, the mission was still employed mainly in teaching the chiefs. Apparently Liholiho was assured of the usefulness of palapala, since by 1822 he assumed a more positive stance towards teaching and took up the slate and the sixteen-page spelling book that came out from the mission press in February, 1822. In August 5, Liholiho commenced his studies (Gast and Conrad 1973, 267) and on the 16th he wrote a letter to the high chief of Huahine, one of the Society Islands. In the letter Liholiho assured his Huahinean colleague that he was serving "the God of you and us [kākou]" (quoted in Bingham 1849, 172). This was by no means convincing for the missionaries, who held a quite different notion of divinity than the Hawaiian chiefs, for whom becoming a worshipper of a god was more a rational choice than a christian-like epiphany (see ch. 2.2. fn. 8).

26 There is an apparent connection between this sudden interest in the palapala and the arrival in the spring of 1822 of the Reverend William Ellis and his Tahitian helpers, who soon found their ways in the households of Hawaiian chiefs (see Journal of Sybil Bingham, Aug. 9, 1822).
Not that the chiefs did not believe in their gods, as some of the missionaries thought of the Hawaiian priests, but that the relation to their gods was instrumental rather than contemplative.

Just few months earlier Liholiho had had a talk with William Ellis, according to whom Liholiho liked the new teaching and the new god but could not proceed in establishing Christian tabus because his chiefs were "of a different opinion, and seem, he says, satisfied with the present order of things" (Ellis to Burder, July 9, 1822, MsL). The received wisdom in Hawaiian history appears to disagree with an idea of Liholiho as a hopeful convert to the ordinances of the foreigners' god. Rather, Liholiho was known to have been constantly drunk, a lover of feasts and good times, not really inclined to receive the "humiliating doctrines and self-denying duties" that the mission offered him. Without separating practice from theory, Liholiho’s statement was in fact a paradigmatic expression of his social position. The chief who stands at the head of aupuni should have tabus that will make the ruling acceptable, and if not that, at least relatively endurable. As we know, Hawaii had been without tabus since November, 1819, and, after a brief rebellion by the supporters of the old order, Liholiho’s aupuni was the first to have stood without divine sanctions. It is likely that Liholiho wished to have retained the old tabus, at the very least he was quite
hesitant in abrogating them (Kamakau 1992a, 222-226). The chiefs who eagerly encouraged him to commit this extraordinary breach of tradition were mostly women of his father's household, who also belonged to the group of chiefs that Liholiho mentioned to Ellis as opposing Christianity. Obviously they did not want to return to a tabu state in which their own elevated positions would have been threatened, first by Liholiho himself and second, by those ambitious chiefs who could resort to God's help in their bid for power, just like Liholiho's nephew Kekuaokalani did following the abolition. It was better to let gods rest and continue the rather boozy but relatively secure existence. Liholiho, however, after assuring himself of the peaceful intentions of the missionaries, could have added much to his own prestige by taking Jehova on his side against the arrogant Ka'ahumanu chiefs.

Things were probably more complex than this, however. Towards 1823, after the arrival of Ellis and the Tahitians, the attitude of the chiefs towards Christian teaching gradually grew more approving, while Liholiho showed signs of withdrawal (Bingham 1849, 179). If his previous caution was marked by the traditional chiefly reserve as foreigners were concerned, this new opposition was primarily homespun, yet equally traditional. For whatever tabus there should be, everything must depend on his consent, not Ka'ahumanu's, although she was made - or this is what she claimed - the
co-ruler at the death of Kamehameha in May, 1819. However this may be, Liholiho was still the symbolic center of society, no matter how much a chief without tabus. As for so many things, Hawaiians had a proverb to inculcate the people with the principles of proper order.

O luna, o lalo; o uka, o kai; o ka palaoa pae, no ke ali‘i ia.
Above, below; the upland, the lowland; the whale that washes ashore - all belong to the chief (Pukui 1983, 273, no. 2505).

According to Pukui, this is a condensed expression of what was just said: the chief has a say in everything and all activity of life has a foundation in him. As against this, in effect, Ka‘ahumanu mā was usurping power for their Maui lineage, or, as Sahlins says,

Together, Ka‘ahumanu and Kalaimoku usurped the active domain of Hawaiian sovereignty, leaving Liholiho in the position of ritual or sacerdotal king, in principle the superior and fixed condition of the social order. The dualism was in fact recursively applied, as Ka‘ahumanu stood to Kalaimoku in the same relation of ritual to active ruler: thus war and business fell to Kalaimoku, whereas Ka‘ahumanu was destined to become the great patron of Christianity (Sahlins 1992, 61).

Before the latter could take effect, Liholiho had to be eliminated, so to speak. In the old terms this would have meant war, an undesired alternative for the Maui chiefs of 1823, who wanted to ‘eat’ from all the islands. An early attempt to accomplish something like the usurpation of Liholiho’s symbolic space was Ka‘ahumanu’s order to prohibit drunkenness on August 13, 1822, which coincided with her Kaua‘i tour, Liholiho’s short educational career and the
presence of the Tahitian converts (Gast and Conrad 1973, 268). For a short time it seemed that Liholiho and Kaʻahumanu mā went hand in hand along the road of "improvement" as paved by the mission.

Not that Liholiho would have been sober for any length of time. On the contrary, amidst his studies Liholiho went on with the bottle and merrymaking, much to the disappointment of Kaʻahumanu mā (Bingham 1849, 108; Kaumualii to Hiram and Sybil Bingham, June, 1823, JPL). This attitude is revealing in respect to the ambiguity that characterized the relationships between the highest chiefs. On the one hand, the chiefs were extremely jealous of each other, but on the other, they manifested a deep attachment to their superior Liholiho. At the very top, this ambiguity was played between Kaʻahumanu and Liholiho. It is thus very improbable that Kaʻahumanu would have taken violent actions against her 'son'; he was needed where he was, had he been content with that. Liholiho was soon to discover that the more his 'mother' and 'uncles' took over the rituals of palapala - they already controlled much of the sandalwood business - the more his own authority diminished. In September, 1822, Liholiho, now instructed in the secrets of reading and writing, was quite conscious of the importance that palapala had recently acquired. Indeed, he insisted that none of his subjects should exceed him in learning (Journal of Maria Loomis, Sept. 1, 1822; Bingham 1849, 107).
In a totalizing society, this was the least Liholiho could do, that is, to exert effective control over the new things, a fact that gave a special boost to the social importance of palapala.

In the early weeks of 1823 Liholiho was still taking classes from his teachers, but apparently his mind was not really fixed on the foreign lessons. It may well be that his mind was on his chiefs' mounting activity to appropriate the foreign culture all by themselves without his traditionally vital instrumentality. In May the whole archipelago was turned into a festival to commemorate the death of Kamehameha four years ago. In an eyewitness account, we can see clearly how the gulf between Liholiho and his chiefs had grown wider. In the ceremonial procession the chiefs wore, besides their native valuables, the best silks money could buy, producing a scene so full of luxury that our bystander could not help but proclaim it altogether "splendid". There was also some ritual destruction of fineries. In all this spectacle Liholiho came second. He was becoming poor.

The king and his suite made but a sorry exhibition. They were nearly naked, mounted on horses without saddles, and so much intoxicated as scarce to be able to retain their seats as they scampered from place to place in all the disorder of a troop of bacchanalians (Stewart 1970, 119; see also Jarves 1843, 232).
Not only was he becoming poor, but he also showed signs of turning against foreign customs. 27

When the first missionary reinforcement arrived at Honolulu on April 27, 1823, the Maui chiefs saw an opportunity to harness these messengers from Kahiki to the service of their own ritual economies. At the time the paramount of Maui was Ka'ahumanu's younger brother, Kahekili Ke'eaumoku, or Governor Cox, who held the land under Liholiho's mother Keōpūolani, the most sacred chief alive. Ke'eaumoku was among the first high-ranking chiefs to have supported the mission. Even before the arrival of Ellis and his Tahitians, Ke'eaumoku appeared favorable to palapala and he soon engaged Ellis to share prayers with him (Ellis in Stewart 1970, 275-276; Journal of Sybil Bingham, Aug. 9, 1822). Keōpūolani was even more serious than her active chief Ke'eaumoku. When Keōpūolani moved to Maui in May with about half of the nobility, she also included the newly arrived missionaries, William Richards and Charles Stewart, in the retinue of 1,500 common Hawaiians (Richards and

27 For a more detailed account of this transformation of the traditional role of the paramount chief, see Sahlins 1981, esp. 64-66. Sahlins' argument is basically as follows: As the lower-ranking chiefs took over the appropriation of foreign goods and the control of lands, the traditional connection to the foreign lands (Kahiki) of the high chief was transformed into a defence of what was considered native, that is, the opposite of Western customs and paraphernalia. The encroachment of the Hawaiian nobility upon Liholihō's sovereignty was seen immediately after his succession to the paramountcy in 1819 (Freycinet 1978, 20-21).
Stewart to Evarts, March 6, 1824, MsL). She gave Richards and Stewart good lands and ordered her people to build houses for the missionaries. A little later she had a church built. Towards the end of the summer the now pious Keōpūolani fell ill. Before her death on September 16, 1823, she called Kalanimōkū and the future head of Maui, Ulumaheihei Hoapili, to hear her kauoha and told them to follow Jehovah and take care of her children by Kamehameha, Nāhi'ena'ena and Kauikeaouli. At her deathbed Keōpūolani was baptized and elevated to legendary heights in Hawaiian tradition. Fittingly, Kamakau found just the right words to summarize her lifespan: "Thus the highest tabu chiefess became the first Hawaiian convert" (Kamakau 1992a, 262). We might recall her active role in the abolition of tabus; now she had again put her high rank to appropriate use.

Keōpūolani wanted a Christian burial which was accordingly granted to her. At the time of her death Hoapili personally saw that the most violent expressions of grief were suppressed following the will of Keōpūolani (Kamakau 1992a, 263). Soon after the funeral Liholiho collected his chiefs in Lahaina, Maui, and made known his determination to visit England. After appointing Kauikeaouli his regent and successor in case he would not return, Liholiho set out to prepare for the voyage and left Honolulu harbor with a handful of favorites on November 27, 1823. We have already referred to the likely reasons for
his sudden departure as stemming mainly from his unfavorable situation vis-à-vis his hungry chiefs, who had recently flirted with the foreigners' god, his domain par excellence (Kamakau 1992a, 255-256; Kahananui 1984, 244; Bingham 1849, 204; Ellis to Burder, Nov. 20, 1823, MsL; Bingham to ABCFM, Nov. 21, 1823, MsL). It is said that sometime prior to his voyage Liholiho had attempted to establish the Sabbath and other forms of Christian tabus, but without much success (Dibble 1909, 180; Bingham, 1849, 177). Liholiho's departure ended the attempts to turn him into a passive ruler of the traditional type. It also solved the problem of the mediation of divinity, for the chiefs no longer had to worry about trespassing on Liholiho's privileged area anymore. Kauikeaouli being only ten years of age, Kaʻahumanu, assisted by Kalanimoku, took on the reins for the time being.

Kaʻahumanu's assuming of the mediative role to divinity was declared no sooner than on the 21st of December, less

28 According to the journalist-historian James Jarves a similar edict was declared in February, 1823, and a fine of one dollar - a considerable sum of money in a situation where the chiefs had monopolized the circulation of specie - was imposed for anyone working on the Sabbath (Jarves 1843, 234). It is difficult to say whether Jarves got the date wrong and actually meant the edict given just prior to Liholiho's departure, since the other standard sources seem to be equally vague on exact dates. Nevertheless, the logic of events is clear if not the sequence: The Maui chiefs claimed a share in the area traditionally reserved for the sovereign, who then decided to convert his symbolic link to Great Britain into material support of his reign.
than a month after Liholiho took the voyage to England. On that day she had it publicly announced that from that moment on the Sabbath would be observed in the islands by abstaining from all the work from Saturday evening to Monday morning. Not even a fire could be kindled on the day of rest and prayer (Gast and Conrad 1973, 285; Reynolds 1989, 10; Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Dec. 21, 1823). Unlike Liholiho's attempts, this chiefly edict seemed to have bearing among the people, perhaps due to a better organization of its fulfillment and a wider support by the chiefs, i.e., Ka'ahumanu mā, who had twenty days earlier made a collective decision to improve the treatment of foreigners (Gast and Conrad 1973, 285).

The next two years were decisive for the consolidation of the missionary presence in the Hawaiian social structures. At the time of Liholiho's departure the missionaries, together with their native and Tahitian assistants, were already settled, as teachers (kumu) under their Hawaiian patrons, in four locations on the four major islands (fig. 5.1.), but the knowledge they were prepared to propagate was still restricted to small circles of the chiefly households. As in the other areas of life, the new and prestigious was monopolized by the chiefs, and palapala had already gained much prestige. Equally well, the prestigious soon came to denote the form of social organization, still controlled by the chiefs but properly
distributed throughout the people. On the 13th of April, 1824, the chiefs held a council in Honolulu together with the native teachers and the missionaries to make known their decision to extend the teaching of palapala and the word of God to the common people (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, April 13, 1824; Bingham 1849, 211-212; Dibble 1909, 174).

Then, an event of immense significance took place, an event that compounded Kaʻahumanu chiefs' ascension,
Fig. 5.1. The Dual Organization of the Hawaiian Mission in 1825.

*Stewart withdraw from the field in 1825.*
questions of traditional land rights and the worship of the Christian god. The paramount of Kaua‘i and husband of Ka‘ahumanu, Kaumuali‘i, died on May 26, 1824, leaving his lands as they were under Liholiho, i.e., the chiefs of Kaua‘i would remain on their lands formerly held from Kaumuali‘i. In his kauoha Kaumuali‘i deliberately passed his son Humehe‘ume and ordered his nephew and Humehe‘ume’s cousin, Luanu‘u Kahalai‘a, to assume the chieftainship of the island. This already produced friction among the inheritors by evoking a familiar precondition of war. Since Liholiho had gone to England these orders were carried out by Ka‘ahumanu and Kalanimoku, to whom the land control was temporarily assigned. When Kalanimoku explained the state of affairs to the Kaua‘i chiefs, he was met by much disaffection, and some demanded that Kaumuali‘i’s lands should be all put together and redistributed as was usually the case when the new chief recreates the social order after a period of ritual tumult and upheaval. As a sign of the death of the one who held the land (ka mea nōna ka ‘aina), there certainly were extensive breaches of normal order, "fishponds were robbed, taro pulled, pigs killed, and other lawless acts performed" (Kamakau 1992a, 266). It seemed,

"to take off all restraint. The laws respecting observing the Sabbath as a day of rest from all worldly employment, & many others of a similar nature, were now wholly disregarded . . . No attention was paid to learning, but on the contrary, rioting & drunkenness were kept up . . . " (Journal of Mercy Whitney, March 1, 1825).
The people on Kaua'i expected to have a new holder of the land, for Kaua'i was still thought to be only allied to the ripening Kamehameha dynasty and Kaumuali'i the chief who held the land. And besides, ritual rioting and plunder after a death of a subordinate chief, who merely enjoys the benefits of the land (ali'i 'ai moku), would surely be considered a declaration of war (Kahananui 1984, 145). But Kalanimōkū did not abide the demands of the Kaua'i chiefs and placed Kahalal'ai'a above the lands, not as a land-holding chief but as ali'i 'ai moku, who would hold the land from his superiors in Honolulu.

As several people had expected, the disaffected chiefs allied under Humehume, collected their followers and on August 8, under the leadership of Kia'īmakani and some others, attacked the symbolic center of the windward (i.e., Maui and Hawai'i) rule, the fort at Waimea. A brief battle ensued after which the rebel forces were repelled and chased far up to the mountains. In a few weeks time all the leading rebels were caught or killed by the Ka'ahumanu people led by Kalanimōkū. The aftermath of the Kaua'i rebellion was equally bitter: Out of necessity Ka'ahumanu had to overrule Kaumuali'i's kauoha and strip the chiefs of Kaua'i of their lands and replace them with her own people.

The raids of the rebels were directed also against the institutions of palapala, as the Hawai'i chiefs were easily perceived by Kauaians as usurpers allied to a foreign god.
Bingham thought the foreigners were especially targeted, although there is only sporadic evidence in favor of his opinion. Among the few killed at the fort there were two foreigners, and Samuel Ruggles' mission station was ransacked. There were also reports that the opponents of palapala had attempted to burn the mission church.

Whitney's place survived as it was located away from the rebels' route. At any rate, Kalanimōkū told the missionaries it was better for their safety if they left the island, as they did (Journal of Elisha Loomis, Aug. 9, 1824; Damon 1925, 232; Ellis to LMS, Oct. 26, 1824, MsL; Bingham 1849, 235; Stewart 1970, 312-313).

Before the missionaries left, however, Kalanimōkū, who survived the rebel attack, sent for Whitney and Bingham, the latter of whom was at the time visiting Kaua'i, to offer prayers to Jehovah for having preserved his life (Ellis to LMS, Oct. 26, 1824, MsL; Journal of Elisha Loomis, Aug. 9, 1824; Damon 1925, 231; Bingham 1849, 234). Later, before the decisive battle on the 20th, Hoapili had his Tahitian teacher, Tau'ā, do the same (Kamakau 1992a, 268). After the prayers, as a sign of acceptance of Christian ethics, Kalanimōkū gave strict orders to his men to save the lives of those who gave themselves up peacefully (Journal of Elisha Loomis, Aug. 22, 1824). Before departing Maui a week after the initial attack, the leaders of the reinforcement troops, Hoapili and another high-ranking Hawai'i chief,
Kaikio'ewa, had had a discussion with William Richards about Christian conduct of war and were given the advice not to kill captives (Bingham 1849, 237-238; cf. Kamakau 1991a, 17). It is not certain to what extent these orders were followed, but some of the chiefs certainly boasted of abstaining from even taking captives. And those who were captured were "set to learn the palapala" (Ellis to LMS, Oct. 26, 1824, MsL).

We should further emphasize another interesting detail that once more exemplifies the strength of the native Hawaiian organization and its ability to mobilize the elements of palapala for the cause of the ruling families as if everything would have happened without interference from the outside world. Reflecting the early ordering of palapala in the chiefly households, almost all the native teachers went to Kaua‘i to help Kalanikū (SIM Journal, Aug. 14, 1824; Damon 1925, 232; Stewart 1970, 315). Just to perfect the picture and to signal the total encompassment of the mission by its Hawaiian patrons, Samuel Whitney boarded a ship to Kaua‘i on August 18, "not to fight with carnal weapons, but to hold forth the word of life to those who are going to the field of danger and death" (Damon 1925, 231). To quote Ellis at some length:

Among those who went down from Oahu were most of our teachers and scholars. I gave them every advice in my power before they went and as they were getting under weigh went on board the vessels and exhorted them to avoid all savage cruelty and act as became Christians. Their subsequent behaviour demanded my gratitude to God
and conveyed the most pleasing satisfaction to my mind. They forgot not to assemble together for prayer morning and evening and in the morning on which they marched to the battle. The teachers scholars &c formed the advanced guard on the right. They came in sight of the enemy at daylight [apparently August 20th], and when the three companies into which they were themselves formed had halted, a teacher or chief gave a few words of exhortations to his companions, directing them to put their trust in God and not in their numbers, skill or muskets. Each company then kneeled down and united in prayer to that Being with whom are the issues of life and death. When this was ended they marched steadily on to the charge . . . It was nearly noon before the battles ceased but the prayers of the Christians were heard . . . They did not leave the field of battle till they had offered up their grateful thanks to Him who had covered their head in the day of battle" (Ellis to LMS, Oct. 26, 1824, MsL; see also Bingham 1849, 239).

In the same vein, all around the islands, wherever a chief of some rank was present, the Sabbath was observed, fasts proclaimed, prayers uttered, meeting houses well attended, churches built, and schools established. In a word, the rituals of Jehovah multiplied as did the signs of his power.29 On Kaua‘i the new head of the island,

29 I think one cannot overestimate the immanent influence of the chiefs, for it was certainly not the whole mass of the people that attended to Christian order. As in all times of crisis, the normal course of Hawaiian life was subject to ritual upheavals, and the relatively small party of Jehovah could not enforce the new tabus without being present. Charles Stewart, a little less celebrating in his accounts, says that on Maui "the news of the war at Taui [Kaua‘i], and the absence of the most powerful rulers, have excited in the farmers and common people throughout the district [Lahaina], a more general spirit of drunkenness than at any time since our arrival among them. For the last few days, by far the greater portion of the whole population have been in a state of intoxication; and given up night and day to gambling, riot, and fighting, and every species of revelry" (Stewart 1970, 314-315).
Kaikio‘ewa, began his rule by erecting a temple for Jehovah, i.e., ordered his people to build it. To make the signs materially visible and known at every village — to transform the transcendent God into an immanent experience and part of the social order, so to speak — Ka‘ahumanu, in February, 1825, set out touring all the islands telling people to turn to palapala. The rebellion being over, the new order began to take shape, but not as an entire, or even a partial, replacement of one culture by another. As Greg Dening has pointed out regarding the christianization of the Marquesas, the mission in Hawaii, in want of a wider Christian environment, had to resort to representing and conveying Christian culture in terms of "a series of moral rules" (Dening 1980, 200), which were then integrated and forged into Hawaiian structures of signification and social order by the Hawaiians themselves. Dening's moral rules were grouped under the banner of palapala, which, as a social system, fared better in reproducing native culture than the contact culture in the Marquesas, whose culture was practically wiped out into extinction by the mid-1800s.

To palapala, which began as a small-scale elite instruction of reading and writing, was now added the laws

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30 The chiefs' habitual practice of participating in these proselytizing activities was also a source of irritation for the missionaries, who felt that their own cause was being usurped and compromised. One particular instance was the chiefly monopoly in distributing writing utensils and later, yet to a lesser extent, books (Bingham to Evarts, Oct. 27, 1823, MsL).
of Jehovah, *ke kanawai o Iehova*, which were in fact an improvised choice of bans and positive directives based on the commands of the Decalogue. Thus, Ka'ahumanu gave orders to the district chiefs of Maui forbidding murder, drunkenness, boxing, fighting and theft. She also enforced the observance of the Sabbath and ordered everybody to school once the schools should be established (Stewart 1970, 321). Hoapili, seeing to the fulfillment of the orders, would banish all those who disregarded palapala to the desolate island of Kaho'olawe in close vicinity to Maui (Chamberlain to Anderson, Nov. 14, 1824, MsL). After these events, the missionaries on Kaua'i could, with some astonishment, write to Honolulu exclaiming that they had "never before seen the people give so good attention to the word of life" (quoted in Bingham 1849, 242).

The missionaries were not blind to the effects of the quelling of the Kaua'i rebellion, but they had that much good faith in the instrumentality of the event that they saw in it a means to sow the seeds of true conversion among the rank and file Hawaiians as well as the chiefs. The immediate reaction was colored with optimism and relief:

"I firmly believe the late contest will accelerate the progress of Christianity among the Sandwich Islands" (Ellis to LMS, Oct. 26, 1824, MsL).

"It [Kaua'i rebellion] was the means of directing the minds of the Chiefs to the Lord of hosts, upon whose care they were led to cast themselves, and through whose Spirit, we trust operating on their minds, they were led to ascribe the victory to the interference of his hand" (Chamberlain to Ellis, Nov. 3, 1825, MsL).
"He [Poki] managed his business well and ascribes his protection and success to the power and blessing of Jehovah, to whom he offered a public prayer before he demanded the arms of the opposing parts" (Bingham to Burder, Sept. 13, 1825, MsL).

This optimism was partly spurred by the intensification of schooling as the chiefs sent their people to all parts of the islands to organize more schools, or what Sahlins calls "quasi-ritual centers," the primary purpose of which was to serve as instruments of rule (see Sahlins 1992, 91-93). These schools, Kamakau says, were "conducted like the schools of the hula in old days" with a yearly exhibition of the talents of the scholars (Kamakau 1992a, 270). The usual method of starting a school involved first the permission or order from the chief of the place where the school was to be erected, and second the teacher's application to the missionaries for books, ink, pens and paper or slates (Journal of Elisha Loomis, April 14, 1825). According to missionary estimates, in 1825 there were from 2,000 to 3,000 "scholars" in these schools and a year later the number of learners approached 30,000. At the time of Ka'ahumanu's death the schools comprised nearly 53,000 students or 40 percent of the total native population (Schmitt 1977, 211; Schmitt 1968, 42). Given this, it is no wonder that the mission press churned out volumes in astronomical numbers.

It is certain that the battles on Kaua'i in August, 1824, signified a true field test for the power of Jehovah and to some extent sealed the fate of the mission as an ally
of the Ka'ahumanu regime. There were difficulties along the way, especially after Ka'ahumanu's death in 1832, but the alliance lasted well into the mid-century. However, in the first half of 1825, there was nothing in sight that would shake the alliance. Indeed, the editions of spelling books ran in tens of thousands (Judd, Bell and Murdoch 1978, 6), and, according to Bingham, 16,000 books were distributed through the network of native schools in April alone (Bingham to Evarts, Oct. 18, 1825, MsL). And more was to come.

The event that finally secured the new position of palapala and the word of God was the death of Liholiho and Kamāmalu in London in July, 1824, the news of which arrived at Honolulu on the 8th of March, 1825 (Reynolds 1989, 70). The British government had offered to ship the bodies of Liholiho and Kamāmalu and the surviving company of Hawaiian chiefs and attendants back to Hawaii. When the frigate Blonde arrived at Honolulu on May 6 with the Hawaiian delegation confirming the sad news, Kalanimōkū was quick to see that nothing of the old mourning customs were included in the reception of the ship. Excepting the news from the Hilo station that some of the Hawai‘i chiefs had stopped the schools and turned their backs to palapala (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, May 10, 1825), which had now become the order of society, there were but few signs of the old ways. Kalanimōkū had his men publish orders forbidding drunkenness
and crying, and at times the common Hawaiians were confined to their houses and prevented from seeing the coffins (Reynolds 1989, 79-80). It was said that among the common people these prohibitions were perceived as utterly improper and that many a commoner thought Liholiho "might as well have been buried in England" (Missionary Register 1825, 600, copy in MsL).

The same ritual revolution prevailed during the funeral of Liholiho and Kamāmalu, who had the honor, although not by their own initiative, to inaugurate the new burial custom of the Hawaiian royalty (Keōpūolani was the first, to be sure, but at the time of her death she was not a formal head of the nation). If the mass of commoners was disaffected by all the disregard of tradition, the chiefs were all the more in favor of casting off the old ways, which they already called, reflecting the missionaries' conception of gradual rise from the state of heathenism, the times of darkmindedness or naʻaupō. The funeral ceremony

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31 If this concept reflected the missionary thinking, it was not part of the terminology that the mission invented for conveying their ideas to the Hawaiian audience. It seems that it is of native origin and was adopted by the missionaries. The Hawaiian term pō refers not only to night but also to the times before the arrival of human beings (see ch. 2) and human order, i.e., all that stands for the divine, uncontrollable and dangerous. The human culture, knowledge and skills are the opposite of pō, which was easily turned into the opposite of the enlightenment, or the new human order through the worship - and control - of Jehovah. The concept was Hawaiian but so was the manner in which it reflected the missionary thinking: god + worship = human order = enlightenment.
certainly manifested the ritualist order of palapala, but the climax of Lord Byron's visit was not the funeral but the council of chiefs in which the new order was formally established and Kauikeaouli made the successor of Liholiho. The council was held on June 6 in the presence of the chiefs, two missionaries, Lord Byron, his chaplain, the recently arrived English Consul Richard Charlton and some of the foreign residents.

Two important things were joined in the council: The chiefs under Kauikeaouli and Ka'ahumanu were given rights of inheritance and Jehovah was made the god of Kauikeaouli's aupuni. Prior to the council tradition had recommended that at the death of a subordinate chief the lands reverted back to the paramount chief, who then redistributed them, usually according to the wish of the deceased, but occasionally following some other scheme or direction. But from 1825 the chiefs could pass their lands directly to their descendants.

The break was not without some background. After Kamehameha's conquest there had been an increasing demand from the subordinate chiefs to make the position of their families permanent, as the whole group was now under one ruler (Jarves 1843, 259; Kame'eleihiwa 1992, 86-87). However, total conquest and rights of direct inheritance formed a paradox, because as soon as land was given permanently to any one family, the unified chiefdom began to erode from inside - unless there was a motive to counter-act
that tendency. For the Kaʻahumanu chiefs a unified *aupuni* under one paramount chief and dedicated to one god was such a motive. One of the missionaries may have understood the particulars of the occasion. According to him, all admitted "that the mere youth Kauikeaouli would never have been king had it not been for the influence of the gospel of peace. The king himself, I understand, has often admitted that he owes his kingdom to the controlling power of the true religion" (Dibble 1909, 183). In the Hawaiian tradition, the same was recorded by Kamakau, according to whom "Kaʻahumanu went out to build a new government, a government founded upon God (*aupuni Akua*), and a government of knowledge (*aupuni imi naauao*). And it was knowledge (*naauao*) and God that secured the government of Hawaii" (Kamakau 1988, 38). Due to the structural arrangements of Hawaiian society *palapala* became the proclaimed object of *naʻauao* and the missionaries close companions for the chiefs.

At the council, after Kauikeaouli had been proclaimed king (the title had been in Hawaiian use since the days of Liholiho) and the Kaʻahumanu families established upon the land permanently, Kalanimōkū’s younger brother Poki, the highest-ranking chief who survived the London visit, addressed the chiefs relating the details of his interview with George IV. According to Poki, the king of England had encouraged the Hawaiian chiefs to attend "to the instruction
of the missionaries, for they were sent to enlighten them & do them good - that they came to them not for secular purposes, but by a divine command to teach them the word of God" (Mission joint letter to ABCFM, June 6, 1825, MsL). It is obvious that Poki's message from "Kahiki" had a forceful impact on the chiefs, not simply because the messages from foreign lands would have been received uncritically, but because tradition provided the chiefs with a means to put things into an intelligible perspective. On this particular occasion, Poki's appearance mitigated the more serious skepticism among the chiefs and allowed them to pursue the course of refitting the land with the tabus of Jehovah. Lord Byron, on behalf of his king, secured a promise from the missionaries that they would completely disclaim "all right to interfere with the political and commercial concerns of the nation" (Mission joint letter to ABCFM, June 6, 1825, MsL). In this capacity, separating the worldly affairs from the affairs of the state, Byron could not have failed more profoundly. Just by bringing the news that affirmed the presence of the mission he made his own mission impossible.

For Ka'ahumanu and her closest relatives this made it possible to redouble their efforts in turning the islands into a vast network of schools and churches - and to find a common cause in securing the unification. The man whose experiences opened this chapter, James Macrae, the botanist
of the Byron expedition, was among the first outsiders to witness the effects of Liholiho's trip to England. As he recalls, immediately after the council, which of course had been closed by a public prayer, Ka'ahumanu and her sister Kekuaip'i'a boarded Byron's vessel and sailed to Hilo, where they proclaimed the new order to be established on their personal lands there (Macrae 1972, 54-56; Bingham 1849, 271). Several of the other chiefs did the same - and soon a new Christian nation had sprung up. The universal school edict was proclaimed on June 28, 1825 (Gast and Conrad 1973, 296), and when Ka'ahumanu and Kekuaip'i'a returned from Hilo, they immediately, on July 13, continued their organizing zeal by examining schools in Honolulu. And in the "afternoon Scholars went to the Meeting house" (Reynolds 1989, 99). In August, the chiefs' criers were heard in Honolulu calling people to stop sports and lewdness and to turn to palapala and go to prayer meetings (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Aug. 20, 1825).

At this stage, Christianity was truly an imposed doctrine of tabus and rituals of palapala. As it was, "many of them [common Hawaiians] say that if they do not go [to church], the chiefs will take their lands away, and cast them off from their presence" (Reynolds 1989, 105; also Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 246; Ruggles to Evarts, Sept. 28, 1828, MsL). In the imposition itself there was, however, something that suggested a serious attitude towards the new
tabus, perhaps not a mass conversion but a principle of social life through a chief, a feature that the disillusioned missionaries placed at the root of their failure to effect a more profound change in the "native mind." The schooling was taken very seriously by the common Hawaiians, who were in a habit of memorizing lessons and religious texts and passing them onto their friends and relatives, so that already in the fall of 1825 the missionaries were often surprised to "hear those who came from a distance and had never heard preaching, or obtained a knowledge of the alphabet, repeat whole hymns by heart" (Bishop to Evarts, Oct. 24, 1825, MsL). This, it can be said, the common Hawaiians did in order to make their best in a society dominated by the earthly counterparts of divine powers. Thus, if the Nuer defined all their social relations "in terms of cattle" (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 19), the Hawaiians did the same in terms of the chief. This theory of society was also reflected in the rudiments of political theory that developed out of the inflamed encounter between the mercantile community and the missionaries, the latter of whom were now de facto personal teachers and chaplains of the chiefs.32

32 They were even addressed as "brethren who live together with the chiefs" (nā hoahānau e noho pū ana me nā aliʻi) (Letter of Boas Mahune, Aug. 6, 1838, IDM/AH).
Following the new arrangements, two important texts were published by the mission press in Honolulu, the Hawaiian translation of the Decalogue by Bingham and a collection of letters by the highest ali`i. Both were printed in December in editions of 3,000 copies each (Judd, Bell and Murdoch 1978, 8-9). The idea behind the first was to induce the chiefs to declare the Ten Commandments the new law of the land, or, as the missionaries themselves explained, to give the chiefs a definitive idea of God’s commands, which they then could either accept or reject (in itself a rather strange suggestion, since the basic commands were already a standing fact in the more populous areas). The two texts were closely interrelated in that the letters were written to encourage the people to turn to the new god Jehovah and his son Jesus and to enforce the new tabus, the origin of which was in the Decalogue. The chiefs made it all appear very simple. Hawaiians were to be a new nation that would forsake the old customs and turn to the morally sound Christianity. Good side (‘ao‘ao maika‘i) and bad side (‘ao‘ao hewa) were distinctly marked out, the first being the realm of the new order and the latter that of the old ways. As Kalanimoku put it, "ua haalele i ka naau kahiko; eia wau ma ka naau hou," the old mind [lit. intestines, the
seat of the mind for Hawaiians] is forsaken; I am of the new mind (Kā maono o na ali'i 1825, 3).

By this cognizant act the self-proclaimed proselytes put their own past at a distance. Kalāimōkū, as well as the other chiefs, were perfectly conscious of their choice in favor of Jehovah; all was well organized and premeditated, to such an extent that the cultural distancing, which was required by "the new life," ke ʻōla hou, left the basic structure of their society intact. Kalāimōkū even recalled the decisive events that had led to the acceptance of Christianity:

I mai Keopuolani iaʻu, e malama wau i ke Akua i pono ai koʻu uhane, i noho pu ai maua me ia, i kahi maikai o kakou mahope aku nei o ke aupuni a ke Akua.

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1 At the time, this was really a matter for the highest chiefs, but in the long run Christianity became an important engine for cultural objectification. In the Christian schools and meeting-houses, great but constantly diminishing masses of common Hawaiians were made to abandon their traditional past and adapt to the new forms of life, such as Christian marriage and codes of decency. Christianity also facilitated the rise of a new class of native intellectuals, pious and successful in their studies. As these prominent scholars of the mission schools, quite in line with the missionary theories, regarded the traditional past as the time of loosing sight of the true God, Jehovah, whom their distant ancestors had once known, they at least partially denounced this idolatrous period in their history (Barrère 1969; Dibble 1839, 18-19; 1909, 11-13; Kahananui 1984, 194-195; Kamakau 1991a, 49, 63; 1991b, 118; 1992a, 210; Malo 1991, 62, 73, 237; Pogue 1858, 25-26). It became their Dark Ages, which was first put at a distance but later revived in the form of an ethnographic interest in folklore. The Christian intellectuals were again prominent in collecting traditional material and reconstructing the precontact Hawaiian society, first around 1836, then in the early 1840s, and continuously from the 1860s (HEN: Thrum, 35a, 254, 258; Piianaia 1987; N. Emerson 1991; Thrum 1918).

Keōpūolani said to me that I should serve God so that my soul is correct, so that we two shall live together in the good place of us all after death, the kingdom of God.

Then Keōpūolani died - I pitied her very much. I also liked her dying wish. Then the high chief [Liholiho] went to foreign lands - I lamented for his departure. Then died Kaumuali‘i with his mind in the goodness [of God]. He ordered me to take care of Kaua‘i, its lands and all the people for the high chief. Then I went to Kaua‘i and some made battle. And God took care of us. At that place my mind really dwelt on God (my translation).

Besides this historical consciousness, there also developed a more symbolic discourse in which the temporal kingdom, Kauikeaouli’s aupuni, was made an extension of Jehovah’s aupuni, the kingdom of heaven (not quite unlike Kamehameha’s aupuni, which was dedicated to Kūnuiākea). Accordingly, the Devil’s aupuni received the opposite characteristics, which, had any been detected, were conceived of as illustrations of a devolution of the established regime. Kauikeaouli’s sister, the ten-year-old Nāhi‘ena‘ena expressed this idea in the briefest possible form. She wrote that she had prayed for God that he would make Hawaii a good aupuni and let the Devil have no aupuni at all in Hawaii (“i nele loa o debelo i ke aupuni ole”) (Ka mana o na alii 1825, 7). Although the early evidence is only suggestive, it seems that from the Hawaiian point of
view the old forms of worship were, with the help of the missionaries, associated with the Devil, the enemy of God. In this light, it is easy to understand the strict measures to suppress the old ways (cf. Kepelino 1977, 44). At this time, Kalaninokü, recalling the traditional wisdom of the chiefs who worshiped their gods (Malo 1839, 125; 1991, 190; Kepelino 1932, 140), told the visiting Kotzebue that it was high time to have a god to prevent the people from rebelling against the present rulers (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 251). So total was the reception of the new god that Ka'ahumanu's sister Kekuaiapi'ia had already in December, 1824, reworked history to better correspond with the idea of sudden change. In her interview with Kotzebue, Kekuaiapi'ia did not mention the abolition of the tabus in 1819, but let Kotzebue understand that Christianity had simply replaced the old worship: "In conclusion, the queen [Kekuaiapi'ia] triumphantly made mention of yet another superior side of the new faith: previously, women had been compelled to be satisfied with dog-meat, but now they could regale themselves on pork" (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 252).²

² Kekuaiapi'ia made it very clear that the chiefs were absolutely conscious of their choice and besides in perfect control of situation, for she said that "if we see that the faith in question does not suit our people, we shall exchange it for another" (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 252). Barratt's notes (253) give more sources for similar chiefly responses.
disseminating the foundation of his aupuni. Samuel Ruggles witnessed one of these occasions, this time at Ka'awaloa, Hawai'i:

The king's late visit did much good. His conduct was such as was desirable. On the Sabbath he addressed the congregation with propriety; recommended their strict attention to the instructions of their foreign teachers who he said were their real friends. He also told them not to follow their chiefs [local chiefs who were not church members, JM] for they were "blind, leaders of the blind" but all who persevered and were strong in the good way should be his friends, his brethren, but those who cleave to their old ways were Strangers, they were not his people (Ruggles to Evarts, Sept. 28, 1828, MsL).

We already know the basic function of such tours and chiefly visits. After the collective decision in favor of Christianity the missionaries, who from time to time toured their respective islands without the chiefs, felt the effects of the introduction of the new god. Artemas Bishop, who held the station at Kailua, Hawai'i from 1824 to 1836 (see fig. 5.1.), made a general inspection tour to the more remote areas of Kohala and Hāmākua in the late summer 1828. While staying in the villages he realized the altered situation:

When 5 years ago [1823, see Ellis 1979, 253-254] we visited this place [Kapulena] for the first time, I passed the sabbath at this place with one of my brethren [Joseph Goodrich], we had only a single fowl and a bunch of potatoes presented to us. But now [Aug. 29, 1828] as I sit in my hammock, I count 2 hogs, 12 fowls, ten bundles of potatoes, ten calabashes of poi [water-pounded and fermented taro] and 20 fish, all which were sent in unto me within an hour after my arrival, and all except the fish is cooked (Bishop to Evarts, March 9, 1829, MsL).
It is a possibility that in 1823 there was a shortage of food and for that reason the visitors were received with sparse refreshments. But since Bishop experienced the same contrast wherever he went in 1828, it is more likely that he was now received as Kuakini's priest, who was customarily entitled to a food tribute (for the priestly tribute in 1815, see Whitman 1979, 78-79). The people who organized the tribute were always minor chiefs or headmen of the particular place of visit. In addition, they usually formed the core of the local church when that was formed (Baldwin to Anderson, Aug. 10, 1832, MsL).3

If the chiefs at this point made all look simple and clear-cut, there was, nevertheless, more ambiguity among the

3 It is also of interest that some of the Hawaiian priests were most ready to accept the new worship, and a few engaged in the service of palapala (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Aug. 12, 1827; Journal of Seth L. Andrews, July 4, 1837). The high priest of Kamehameha, Hewahewa, who was in favor of the missionaries and their god, had advised Liholiho to stop the traditional worship in 1819 (Ellis 1979, 80). His behavior can be understood as being typical of a Hawaiian expert in tradition of his kind, for he himself was a descendant of the foreign priest Pā'ao, who had inaugurated the worship of foreign gods in Hawaii. It would be of much interest to know more about the part the priests played in the dissemination of palapala, especially in view of any systematic variation in the orientation of the different types of priests, whether there was a pattern within the priests of Kū, to which Hewahewa belonged, to ally with the forces of Jehovah and whether the Lono priests saw it more attractive to join with the defenders of the Hawaiian gods (cf. Sahlins 1981, 64-66). Also the connection between the nativist party and the Catholic missionaries, who first arrived in 1827, deserves to be studied, particularly as the Catholics were commonly called rebels (he kipi) and disturbers of the people (he haunāele) by the chiefs in power (F.O. & Ex., Nov. 27, 1842).
common Hawaiians. Although the chiefs had already in 1825 taken the traditional corvée labor system outside the acceptable limits by forcing a mass-scale production of sandalwood - and almost equally massive church-building projects⁴ - the society was still largely intact as what comes to the trajectories of commoner life. The common people were still under their chiefs and at least to some extent ready to contribute to the honor and glory of these pillars of society. Despite the real and accumulating misery experienced by the common Hawaiians, the chiefs were as yet objects of commoner aspirations, for any association with a chief and his or her project extended the honor of the project to those who were below and performed the physical work. It was partly this commoner regard for their chiefs, their attempts to place themselves in a favorable position vis-à-vis the chiefs, that would intensify anything that the chiefs chose to promote.

So great was the desire to join the church that men and women flocked in from the country districts neglecting their duties to those at home. A wife would leave her husband or a husband his wife in order to devote himself to the service of God. Such a seeker after membership in the church would come first to Ka‘ahumanu, braving the fear the people had of her because of her blood-red eyes, and would be sent on to another; perhaps at midnight they would be sent on elsewhere and their faith questioned. Finally they were

⁴ When Kalanimōkū, in the late summer, 1825, decided to build a temporary church in Honolulu, he, according to Bingham’s account, "employed about 3,000 men" to perform the work. Bingham, who never grew tired of measuring buildings, said the church covered "an area of 19,440 square feet" (Bingham to Burder, Sept. 13, 1825, MsL).
told that they must see one of the teachers who explained the word of God, for only so could their faith be known. It was these difficulties put in the way of their own simple manner of expressing their faith that made the chiefs and people so devoted to the word of God in the old days (Kamakau 1992a, 272-273, see also Bishop to Anderson, March 9, 1829, MsL).

This does not mean that the commoners were not critical of the chiefs, but that they were critical in a way that can be termed a sort of love-hate relationship. They grumbled behind the backs of the chiefs and resorted to dragging, moonlighting and petty sabotage, but it is also to believed that they wished the chiefs would return to the accepted custom and readjust the balance of burdens and benefits - to resume the caring of the people. In brief, the common people, hoping for the better, continued their reluctant toil for the honor of their chiefs.  

From the missionary point of view, two important historical elements intersected in this new situation, first, the identity of the missionaries themselves, and second, their relation to the foreign mercantile community. In what follows each of the two factors is treated separately as regards their role in the formation of the political discourse in Hawaii.

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5 For a more detailed study of the conditions of the common Hawaiians and the patterns of resistance, see Ralston 1984 and Sahlin 1992, 25-35, 57, 87, 90, 149-163. An interesting contemporary document that gives a summary description of the various ways of commoner tactics is Newbury 1835.
6.1. Missionary Identity

The collective identity of the missionaries was possible only through a contrast they created between themselves, the Hawaiians and the traders and seamen. We are already familiar with the theory of civilization they advocated at the root of their mission. Accordingly, the customs and habits that did not conform to those of the civilized world constituted a descending realm of graded barbarism, which reached from a semi-rational being to a total chaos. The missionaries were also concerned with identifying what they called "the conflicting elements of civilized life" (Andrews and Richards to Evarts, Sept. 30, 1828, MsL), i.e., kinds of behavior that deviated from the course of life prescribed in the Bible, and more generally in the life ways of a New England country parish. And if, in the civilized world, there was a group of people that took little or no heed at all of the biblical backcountry code, seamen ranked high in the list of candidates. All this can be compressed into two words: christian civilization.

The battle against evil was therefore fought on two fields; the Hawaiians should have been saved from their ignorance and false notions of divinity and the law of nature but also from the bad influence of foreigners, who had, in their pride and disregard of their souls, forsaken
God for the gratification of some momentary and earthly pleasures (see ch. 3). Taken together, the two fields formed a great perversion of human society, its constitution and endurance. In order to distinguish themselves in such an environment, the missionaries were encouraged to organize themselves according to the ideal principles typically held up in a 'Lockean' culture. This they did by identifying themselves as a political unit which was established by using divinely sanctioned human freedom. In other words, the missionaries, in becoming a mission, moved from a natural society to an artificial, political society.

In their instructions to the first pack of missionaries the representatives of the mission board stated plainly that "the Kingdom of the Lord Jesus is a Kingdom of order. Missions for the advancement of this kingdom are to be maintained & conducted by a regular, though simple & free polity" (Instructions 1819, my emphasis). A few pages later the text added that "like the members of other Missions, you will find it convenient & necessary to form your selves into a body politic, [illegible] rules & regulations of your own" (my emphasis). This was possible because they represented the correctly - no matter how marginally - understood christian civilization. The other groups - Hawaiians, traders and seamen - were to a varying degree - at least in the eyes of the missionaries - unable to do the same on a similar basis due to their neglect of God. But the mission,
in its constitution, was a microscopic facsimile of the ideal society (see Bingham 1849, 60).

In the situation of 1825 the mission faced the problem of maintaining itself as a free and independent "body politic" and avoiding a total absorption into the chiefly structures. After Ka'ahumanu mā's churchly machinations the missionaries encountered a Hawaiian structure that was as much concerned with the outside civilization as a source of improvement as the missionaries were concerned with improving the state of Hawaiians. The integrity of the missionary identity being at stake, the mission resorted, besides attempting to circumvent the chiefly monopoly of authorizing the distribution of palapala, to an old Congregationalist strategy of controlling the behavior and the seriousness of the faith of the church members. As the above quote from Kamakau already showed, they made it extremely difficult to become a member of the church, and as if to guarantee that the congregation remained a community of free equals, they admitted some common Hawaiians to the church membership before they allowed the same benefit to the chiefs (Bingham 1849, 252-253, 257-268, 277; Bradley 1968, 145). In realist terms, this was only a formality and for many years the strategy simply failed, because the factual operation of the mission was so deeply steeped in the interests of the chiefs. On the other hand, the behavior control was more successful, but even here the
chiefs were the driving force behind the deep sense of guilt and affecting emotions.  

6 Soon after the death of Ka‘ahumanu Kauikeaouli decided to assume full control of the Hawaiian affairs. In doing this, he ritually challenged all the basic codes of pious Christianity supported by Ka‘ahumanu  mā. A particular instance of his challenge was excessive drinking, to which Kauikeaouli encouraged his immediate followers and some other people who were more renowned for their churchgoing than winetasting. In February, 1833, a granddaughter of Kamehameha, Kekau‘ōnohi, had participated in the drinking and as a result "absented herself from meeting on the Sabbath." The missionary investigation that followed is a good testimony of the importance of behavior control, on the one hand and the cooperation of the mission and the Ka‘ahumanu mā in the matters of christian tabus, on the other. Before Hiram Bingham set out to question the culprits, the two prominent chiefs, Kīnaʻu and Kekāuluohi, had suggested that Kekau‘ōnohi confessed her sin personally to Bingham, which she did "with apparent emotion." Another concerned chief, Ka‘ahumanu’s ex-husband, Keali‘iahionui, was also present. After her confession Bingham started the questioning, which Levi Chamberlain recalls as containing the following story:

After she had finished the visit she went with Rebeka to the house of Kamau to eat. While there she was invited to drink spirit, but declined and asked for wine. Wine was brought forward and she and the company drank a bottle. Mr. B[ingham]. asked her why she did not come to meeting in the afternoon. She said she was afraid her breath would be smelled and the people would say she had been drinking. In relating her drinking on the Sabbath she did not seem to think that in that particular she had sinned. Mr. B. was not fully satisfied with her acct. but wanted more evidence. He however advised her to go to the King and acknowledge that she had done wrong, and also to acknowledge her fault to Kinau & Auhea [Kekāuluohi], and moreover told her she ought by all means to go to Maui to see Mr. Richards. She said she wished to go; but the King wished her to stay.  

Yesterday some new light was thrown upon the subject of her drinking by a statement from Kaalahua the wife of Aikanaka. She stated that she saw Kekauonohi at Kamau’s and that she was ona [drunk]. Keliiahonui called to get her to go home but she declined and it was not till dark that he got her to consent to leave the place.
So, in their own mutual business the mission could retain its original covenant of free equals, the "fellow-citizens in Zion," but in their relations with the chiefs and the common Hawaiians the missionaries had been sucked

To day Mr. Bingham has been sifting the stories & getting out the truth. He sent for Rebeka, Alahua & Kekauonohi in order that he might converse with them all together. Kekauonohi refused to come. Dr. Judd however went after her & succeeded in getting her. The investigation proved that what was drunk was called wine; but was in reality either brandy or wine so mingled with brandy as to be very strong. Rebeka called it at the time brandy. It was very evident from the smell & its effects that it was stronger than simple wine. Herein however Kekauonohi had a pretext for calling it wine it being called so by others in the room, the witnesses testifying to Mr. B. that it was so called at the time.

Mr. B. having got at the truth of the story, he advised & urged Kekauonohi to set out immediately for Lahaina. She seemed to be willing to go: but the King wished her to stay having said if she went he should consider her as having haalele'd [forsaken] him. Mr. B. proposed going with her to the King: but she seemed rather inclined to go alone, he however wrote to the King. She went to the Kings house but he was absent and she concluded to go to Lahaina without an interview and embarked on board the Waverly.

Two days later there was a church service during which the subject of drinking was publicly taken up.

The service opened with singing & prayer. An address was made by Mr. Bingham after which and in connexion [sic] with conversation he called upon those who had violated their conscience in any way to state the act by which they had wounded their own souls and done the cause an injury . . . Rebeka who had been guilty of drinking what is supposed to have been brandy mingled with wine on the Sabbath and keeping away from meeting in violation of the day was called upon and she made confession of her sin. Kinimaka who had been guilty of drinking wine with the King and thus countenancing his conduct was called upon to make his statement which he did (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Feb. 21 and 23, 1833).
out of their ideal microcosm. This they expressed in the opposing terms of church and state. The fact that some of the missionaries saw the two as having been fused during the sudden conversion of Hawaiians was explained as a theological necessity. According to Bingham,

the divine will being the foundation of all human authority, it was not difficult to infer, nor unsafe to teach, that no lawgiver, legislator, or magistrate, had a right to contravene the will of Heaven by requiring or licensing that which God forbids in his Word (Bingham 1849, 444). 

If this led to a union of the church and the state, it was perhaps for the good after all. However, among the missionaries, only Sheldon Dibble, who arrived in 1831 at

7 These concepts were more typically used in connection with the chiefs rather than the commoners. The latter were not excluded from these reflections, however, for they were the ultimate objects of the Christian tabus. Also, the Hawaiian custom of attaching oneself to the household of one's superior, to become someone's 'ohua, inhibited the missionaries' attempts to remain an independent group. As it happened, they also became landholders under their respective chiefs, established households and engaged in a number of 'ohua relations (Levi Chamberlain to Baldwin, Aug. 29, 1848, KC/AH 35/28).

8 At times, Bingham was openly in favor of what could be called forced Christianity. In an exchange between him and the American merchant Henry A. Peirce, Bingham noted his conviction that "by persuasion [sic], and the force of public opinion I hope the Sabbath will be sustained" (Bingham to Peirce, March 4, 1833, MsL). Persuasion, of course, referred to the chiefly system. Peirce, evoking the principles of social contract, answered wittily:
Keep down ecclesiastical tyranny (sic). Look at the United States; there the Sabbath is as 'religiously observed' as much or more as in any nation - yet it is done by public opinion solely . . . You must and do know that the force of law will never make men good and virtuous Christians (Peirce to Bingham, March 5, 1833, MsL).
the height of the period of chiefly Christianity, explicitly stated that "such a union did exist to a very considerable extent, notwithstanding the constant endeavors of missionaries to prevent it" (Dibble 1909, 78). Whereas Bingham and some others sought after a theological pretext, Dibble took a more ethnographic path. His explanation, rather than a pretext, was based on the understanding of the constitution of the traditional Hawaiian aupuni, in which Dibble saw an "alliance between the civil power and heathen worship," which was then, according to Dibble, more or less faithfully applied to the reception of Christianity (78).

Of course, this does not mean that Dibble was not against this perceived union, as he himself said, the missionaries tried to prevent it. But, it is also safe to say that the missionaries (even Dibble) were unanimous in propagating a moral code that had a biblical foundation. The missionaries were obviously fencing a very small pasture for themselves. Bingham might have been more prone to a literal application of the biblical world than the missionaries in general, but the mission, it seems, was rather united in defending christian morality against the interests and recommendations of the other foreigners as well as the old customs of Hawaii. It was "the maxims of men, the policy of human government," to use Bingham’s prose again, that was seen as the encroaching evil surrounding the Hawaiian rulers and pushing them away from "the principles
of the Bible" (Bingham 1849, 444). Therefore, it was not altogether contradictory, disquieting though it was, to sustain the alliance with Ka'ahumanu mā, because through the instrumentality of the chiefs the Hawaiians might have a chance to experience a true rebirth of the heart. For the same reason it was not contrary to the mission to introduce the Ten Commandments as the basis for the new laws.

The disquiet caused by their new status in the Hawaiian hierarchy resulted in attempts to clarify the particular circumstances in which they were so untenably placed. To alleviate their obvious feelings of anxiety and compromise (they had been explicitly instructed to "withhold . . . from all interference and intermeddling with the political affairs and party concerns of the [Hawaiian] nation" [Instructions 1819]) the missionaries first seized upon the Hawaiian principle of land tenure, according to which the chief can take back the granted land "at pleasure." Early on the mission complained about the heavy taxes levied on the land they occupied, so that only "little benefit" could be derived from it (Thaddeus Journal, Nov. 13, 1820, Feb. 17, 1821). True as this probably was, diminution of their rather privileged position was also a practicable way to communicate back to the headquarters in Boston and at once a temporary personal relief for the group of people who were locked between the requirements of their official policy and the necessity to conform to the structural order of Hawaiian
society. Besides, they were also instructed to pay "all proper respect to the powers that be" and to render "to all their dues" (Instructions, 1819).

Again, the "crooked" and "perverted" (Instructions 1819) heathenism provided a crystallized example of a falsely grounded political society, in which, according to their own accounts, the missionaries were insiders who tried to stay aloof as much as practicable. They cautiously guarded against profit-making and felt that it was not so much a matter of direct wire-pulling but that of indirect influence on government through a moral reform of the chiefs and mediated by the word of God. This attitude, not without some real foundation, was a commonplace in the missionary quarters even after the Hawaiians were formally declared a Christian nation.

The influence of the Bible on all classes throughout the islands is most happy. The precepts of the Bible have formed the basis of the laws; and it is believed that more than the laws themselves and the penalties annexed to enforce them, the principles of the Bible have operated to regulate the conduct of a great portion of the people (Levi Chamberlain, Annual Report of the Hawaiian Bible Society, The Friend, May 1, 1844).

The missionary identity was naturally much more than that, but for the present purposes it suffices to concentrate on their own reflections on the status and societal position of the mission. Most importantly, the above attitude, or the rationalization of the role of the missionaries in keeping the church and the state separate,
provided the theoretical foundation for the missionaries' identification of a political system in the Hawaiian society. True, they had, before ever having put their feet on Hawaiian ground, contemplated the chiefly society in monarchical terms as every Western navigator and visitor after Cook. However, the monarchical model could at best be used in creating European equivalents or approximations for the Hawaiian rulers, but not as a viable basis for the collective identity of the missionaries. Neither could it give rise to any widely shared political discourse between the different parts of the foreign community (besides the fact that Kamehameha, Liholiho and Kauikeaouli were all referred to as kings, their wives as queens and Kalanimoku as prime minister, all collectively as government and their dominion as kingdom). Such a discourse did arise but only through a clash between the mission and the other foreigners. And again, church and state were the concepts that organized the discourse.

6.2. Theocracy and the Foreign Residents

Things would have been less complex had only the Hawaiian conceptions of divinity been similar to that of the missionaries and other foreigners. If Hawaiians had difficulties in distinguishing the existence of their aupuni from their god, the foreigners were all the more anxious to
call their attention to such a separation. These two modes of conceiving the institution of an organized society were particularly intricate as the real means to communicate across the cultural groups were certainly underdeveloped in comparison with the cultural profundity of the arguments. At the intersection of the two cultural systems, Hawaiian aupuni and Western theory of government, the missionaries came to a conceptual deadlock. However much nonexistent the political motives of the mission were, they were nonetheless caught into a structure that had inherent elements of the kind that did not allow the mission not to interfere with what the missionary instructions called "political affairs."

Quite independently of the explicit will of the missionaries they were already meddling with politics - as they and the other foreigners had conceptually identified it in the Hawaiian society.

Even though the chiefs in general were not interested in Jehovah as such until sometime in 1823, the mission managed, during the first year of its stay, to shake up the Hawaiian tabuless state of things (noa as opposed to kapu) to alarming extent. The mission schools, which were organized within a few months after the arrival of the mission, became centers of this ritual challenge. Thus, for example, when the few native students declined the order of the chiefs to practice their hula on the Sabbath (Bingham 1849, 129; cf. Gast and Conrad 1973, 248), some of the
foreign residents, who had little sympathy for a Puritan moral code, found an occasion to complain against the mission that the Sabbath interfered with "the affairs of the chiefs" and opposed "the orders or honors of the government" (Thaddeus Journal, Jan. 14, 1821). Hula, in itself, was already a significant manifestation of a native form of life as opposed to haole ways. Not only was the goddess of hula, Laka, retained in the dancing scene (Thaddeus Journal, Feb. 20, 1821) in an apparent defiance of the abolition of traditional worship, but also foreign clothing - otherwise in great demand - was strictly forbidden to the dancers (Bingham 1849, 123). Thus, it seems, that the missionaries happened to strike, completely according to their own cultural logic, at the very center of Hawaiian practices that transformed the traditional symbolic difference between natives and foreigners into concrete life.

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9 As what comes to the expression ka lā kapu, it may be noted that kapu soon became a measurement of time equalling one week, or the passing of one Sabbath. Before the abolition of tabu system in 1819 four tabu days was also a rule in the Hawaiian lunar month. The mission was naturally hesitant to adopt the Hawaiian word kapu and instead introduced the Hebrew-based ka lā Sabati (Ke Kanawai o Iehova 1825), and the Greek loan hebedoma for 'week'. Apparently kapu retained, however, much of its old currency (the use of foreign hebedoma was largely restricted to the small minority of mission-educated convert-intellectuals), since even some of the missionaries were found using it to measure time when dealing with Hawaiians (Richards to Kuakini, IDM/AH, Box 1, Feb. 18, 1840). Besides, the frequent prayer meetings were generally called "kapu meetings" (Lahaina Station Report, 1834, HMCS).
This took place less than ten months after the mission was allowed to land, which is a clear indication of the conflicting position the mission assumed right from the start. The two most prominent instances of these conflicts deserve to be mentioned, namely, church-building and prostitution. In the 1820s, especially after 1825, the main extra-domestic activities of the common Hawaiians consisted of cutting sandalwood for the chiefs and attending schools and church services. It is evident that the combined effect of these activities resulted, even according to their own words (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 245-246), in neglect of cultivation, or at least in a redoubling of the workload of the common people, who had to cultivate their own means of subsistence in addition to attending religious instruction and fulfilling the work obligations they traditionally owed to the chiefs. For the traders, the misery of the Hawaiian commoners was a particular result of using the corvée labor system for building still bigger churches and meeting houses or schools and missionary establishments. These projects were seen by the traders as paradigmatic signs of abuse of ecclesiastical power, which symbolized all the extremities and vanity of a dogmatic religion. This system was considered only a means to prevent the Hawaiians from practicing fair trade and an instrument in producing an atmosphere suitable for "the building of churches instead of paying the Depts [sic]" (Reynolds 1989, 108). As could be
expected, for the missionaries the hard work extracted from the common Hawaiians in the building projects was a laudable effort for the glory of God, and the sandalwooding was the real cause of difficulties. It should be added that for the chiefs, who accumulated a considerable amount of cash and property from the sandalwood trade, the church-building was an important symbolic means to rework their powerbase in cooperation with the new god and priesthood.

Thus, the interpretations of the commoner hardships were adapted to the goals and values of each group irrespective of apparent logical contradictions. So, for example, Bingham denounced the Hawaiian chiefship for its "illiberality" and "arbitrariness" while at the same time procuring materials and manpower for his own massive building enterprises (Bingham 1849, 225; Bingham to Kuakini, F.O. & Ex., 1834). It seems that among the three groups the chiefs were the most consistent in their dealings, because they had an equal interest in both church-building and sandalwooding. Both being collective and oligopolicized, if not monopolized, efforts, the whole active population of a certain area was engaged in either work at any one time. It was customary to let a local konohiki (headman under a chief) assemble the common people, makaʻāinana, of the place and impress on their minds that the particular work was their only employment until the time it was finished. When the first church was built in Kāneʻohe, Oʻahu, in November,
1834, the local konohiki, Amasa, had a prosaic (and perhaps typical) way to make this known: "Aole a kakou hana e ae, ka kakou hana hookahi ko keia" (We do not have any other work, this is our sole work to do) (Amasa 1834, 22; cf. Kepelino 1932, 148).

The same applied to moral legislation, which was implemented quite rigorously and down to the smallest detail. Part of the new moral code was a prohibition against prostitution, which had been practiced for several years by common Hawaiian women. It was this prohibition that finally launched the political discourse in public. The building projects had been a source of irritation and frustration mainly for the traders, who saw in them an effective threat to their livelihood. They certainly conceptualized the situation in political terms, but their discontent never materialized in a scale comparable to the violent outbursts of the seamen during the two years between 1825 and 1827, when the chiefs first experimented with the Decalogue.

First of these conflicts took place in October, 1825. The English whale ship Daniel IV touched the ports of Lahaina and Honolulu, and in both places the crew met with the new regulations concerning the Hawaiian women. The tabu, as it was universally known, forbade the women from going to the ships, a state of affairs that maddened the sailors, who had customarily enjoyed the pleasures of paid
love while staying in these places of rest and relaxation. In Lahaina, several men from the Daniel tried to force their way by attacking the house of William Richards. When the crew could not get what it wanted in Lahaina, due to the interference of the chiefs, the Daniel proceeded to Honolulu, where Hiram Bingham came under the attack (Bingham 1849, 274-277). The second clash was just a few months ahead. In January, 1826, the U.S.S. Dolphin arrived at Honolulu, and in February several crew members with sailors from other ships stormed the houses of Kalanimoku and Bingham, again in order to have women onboard. This time the attacks were more severe, and Kalanimoku's men were ordered to quell the furious sailors. Although the defenders of the tabu easily prevailed in the confrontation, Poki, the head chief of O'ahu and a wavering opponent of the Decalogue, finally allowed the women of Honolulu to continue their usual trade (Bingham 1849, 285-288). In the beginning of April the ban was enforced again and in the summer Ka'ahumanu and Bingham, with a retinue of a couple of hundred people, toured O'ahu propagating God's law (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, April 1, 1826; Bingham 1849, 294-297; Levi Chamberlain to Evarts, July 26, 1826, MsL).

These events made the missionaries very conscious of the suspicions, accusations and hatred that were directed at them from the quarters of other foreigners. The times were critical especially because the network of palapala was
beginning to take shape in massive dimensions as the result of the chiefly tours (Bingham recorded some 25,000 students and at least 400 native teachers in the fall of 1826). Besides, Kuakini's church project in Kailua, Hawai'i, occupied the time and labor of "some thousands" in the summer. When Kuakini's church was dedicated in September, the complex was filled with people, up to 5,000 according to Bingham (1849, 298; cf. Reynolds 1989, 152). In the early part of the year several Hawaiian women were taken from their white lovers and living companions and ordered to get stones for a church as punishment for illicit relations, causing much discussion among the foreign residents on the subject of church and state (Reynolds 1989, 123-124). All this put the mission into an uncomfortable position, particularly as Ka'ahumanu had "publicly declared their determination to follow the precepts of Christianity in the government of the people" (Bingham 1849, 298).

To alleviate the likely protest against themselves, the missionaries, in their annual meeting which they held in connection with the dedication of Kuakini's church, prepared a public declaration in which the principles of noninterference were once again put forth. The declaration began by recalling the Lockean critique of the divine right: "Resolved, that we consider ourselves required by our instructions, as well as by nature of our office as Christian Missionaries, to abstain, like our Divine Master,
from all intermeddling and interference with the political and party concerns of the nation" (SIM 1830, 37). The Divine Master was a great orchestrator of the laws of nature, but he left the reasoning and the establishment of the proper social organization to the mortals. Thus, the mission excluded itself from several areas of life, e.g., the choice of rulers, taxing, dividing of lands, general administration of the islands and "the customs and usages of the country that are not in direct variance with the spirit and precepts of the Gospel" (SIM 1830, 38). In the next paragraph the declaration informed its audience that the mission was, nevertheless, allowed to teach the laws of the Bible "however opposed these prohibitions and requirements may be to the former customs and present practices of the people" (SIM 1830, 38). In the following paragraph the missionaries went even further in qualifying their assumed neutrality, in that they thought it proper to give advice and information to the chiefs if they so requested and use their "influence to discountenance every vice and encourage every virtue" (SIM 1830, 39).

For the mission the declaration did nothing to counteract the suspicions. On the contrary, in chartering the mission to continue its course, the declaration can be seen as a grave strategic error. But more importantly, it was also a product of the collective effort on the side of the missionaries to initiate a rationalized and organized
form of political dialogue in public, although their primary motive was to deny any interference in the political affairs of the chiefs. One could even say that politics as a collectively defined cognitive object was a by-product of this denial, which was deeply rooted in an unavoidable cultural misapprehension.

The missionary declaration was printed in the mission press and circulated among the resident traders and captains of the whaling fleet in the last week of October. The missionaries were anticipating a public hearing, which they were anxious to have in order to prove their point in an undisputed manner. The hearing, which was held in Honolulu on December 8, 1826, was chaired by the Captain Jones of U.S.S. Peacock. Except for the outspoken English Consul, Richard Charlton, the foreign residents and seacaptains turned out to be less eager to criticize the mission in a formal hearing than in their own private meetings. When even Charlton declined to provide any evidence against the mission in writing, as the missionaries demanded, Captain Jones ruled in favor of the missionaries and ended the hearing (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Dec. 8, 1826; Reynolds 1989, 167; Bingham 1849, 301-303).

The whole episode ended quite half-heartedly, yet it had much wider, macroscopic consequences, for it created a social context for political discourse from the cultural elements the concerned individuals brought together. Their
motives might have been disjointed, but these were conceptualized in a uniform manner as a division of labor between the church and the state. At the same time, the Hawaiian society was objectified producing the first comparative formalism in the field of politics. Now there was a socially codified way of seeing church, state and politics in the Hawaiian society, mainly through the changed attitude towards the missionaries, who were earlier, when the chiefs had little regard for the Christian instructions, treated generally "with much politeness" (Journal of Elisha Loomis, Oct. 29, 1825). Again, it may be emphasized that the conceptual unanimity, which was soon reached among the foreigners, including the missionaries, was based on disparate practical reasons to participate in the debate. In other words, politics as a cultural signification was posted in the harbors of Honolulu and Lahaina because the mission wanted explicitly to change the Hawaiian society, and the great majority of the traders and sailors were much less inclined to any such project. Threatened by one group the other constructed its cultural theory of government. 10

10 Long before the arrival of the missionaries the foreign residents and visitors had developed, to safeguard their own importance to the chiefs, a certain reluctance to teach new skills to Hawaiians or in any way to alter the conditions that would have effected their transactions in the islands. Archibald Campbell, who was employed in making sail canvas for Kamehameha’s ships, witnessed the practice sometime in 1810:

Having informed him [Isaac Davis, Kamehameha’s trusted foreigner] that a loom was necessary, he ordered Boyd,
The hostilities culminated in October, 1827, when the English whaler John Palmer fired five cannon balls towards the mission houses in Lahaina and William Richards was called to another public hearing, this time accused of libel. The canons were fired to free the ship’s captain, a certain Clark, who had been detained in the Lahaina fort for not letting ashore the several Hawaiian women, who had broken the tabu against prostitution. The ship’s mate, having gone after his captain, was given orders to open

his principal carpenter, to make one. This, however, Boyd declined, from an illiberal notion held by many of the white people, that the natives should be taught nothing that would render them independent of strangers. He told the king he did not know how to make looms; upon which I undertook to make one myself; although, by so doing, I incurred the displeasure of many of my countrymen. Davis had a native servant called Jack, who worked as a Tailor, and was a very handy fellow. This man showed much anxiety to observe how I proceeded; but his master told me by no means to allow him, as he was so quick he would soon learn to make a loom himself. When I said I had no wish to make it a secret, he replied, that if the natives could weave cloth, and supply themselves, ships would have no encouragement to call at the islands. Another instance of this narrow way of thinking occurred, when a brother of the queen’s, whose name I do not remember, but who was usually called by the white people, John Adams [this was Kuakini], wished me to teach him to read, Davis would not permit me, observing, "they will soon know more than ourselves" (Campbell 1967, 99-100).

As the Hawaiian way to succeed in life was very much tied to one’s ability to attract the attention of a chief and to become one of the chief’s people, it is no wonder that Hawaiians were anxious to learn the foreign skills, which so much fascinated the chiefs. The reluctance to teach the natives these skills was very likely of foreign origin, since customarily the Hawaiian chief did not do any physical work; the chief only gave orders to bring whatever was needed. If foreign merchandise was the desired object, those who could supply the demand naturally had the advantage.
fire. The captain was released on the promise of taking the women ashore, but before he could reach his ship the mate had already discharged the guns. However, the women were not returned and the ship sailed to Honolulu, where the news had broken out that Richards had published an article in The Missionary Herald, portraying Captain John Buckle, the commander of the whaleship Daniel, in a very negative light. In the article Richards had related the particulars of the incidents in October, 1825, involving Buckle's crew - and Buckle himself buying a Hawaiian woman. Buckle and Clark, united with the English Consul, created so much trouble and public excitement that Ka'ahumanu called together all the chiefs to have the skirmish settled. Richards was called to attend the council for an explanation, but again the hearing ended before Richards ever had a chance to confront the captains in public. Ka'ahumanu, after consulting with Davida Malo, made her ruling in favor of Richards and the meeting was closed (Reynolds 1989, 201, 204-209; Dibble 1909, 195-199; Bingham 1849, 313-319; Kamakau 1992a, 281-283).

The discourse of politics was becoming very material, different people uniting to pursue the same cause, public hearings being organized, circulars being printed, petitions drawn up and open violence flaming in the ports. The existence of politics was soon felt among the greater part of foreigners in Honolulu and Lahaina. Political language,
however, was not as manifest as moral language, including religious arguments, ridicule and backbiting. Politics was much more abstract and less tangible in the actual battle than the tabu against prostitution or a revenge of hurt pride. Nevertheless, all these emotional outbursts and practical efforts were translated, or actually channelled - due to the cultural fluency of the participants - into political language. Politics was then placed, in a perfect consensus, on top of the conceptual hierarchy, so that it appeared consistently every time the strained relations between the mission and other foreigners were brought up through organized and public avenues. For instance, when the commander of the U.S.S. Dolphin, Lieutenant John Percival, addressed a public letter to other shipmasters and warned them against allowing too many men to leave ships lest there would be more fighting, he formulated the brutally concrete event in a language that gave the event a universal formula among the foreigners:

The excitement of the seamen towards Mr. Bingham, and from the recent outrage committed by them from the belief that he had interfered with some of the civil regulations of this place, and thereby deprived them of an enjoyment they have always been in the participation of when they visit this island, I have to request you will let but a small portion of your crew come on shore on Sunday; by complying with this request you will aid my wishes in preventing anxiety to the missionary family (quoted in Bingham 1849, 288, my emphasis).

The more fundamental cultural categories, which were shared by the missionaries, traders and sailors alike, allowed these foreigners not only to make sense of each other’s
motives and arguments but also to produce a familiar context in a strange environment, i.e., a political system in which the church and the state were the essential fixed points for the generation of discourse.

Of course, the Hawaiian chiefs were part of the constructed context. Yet, they appeared to be less concerned with the infiltration of a form of worship into their governing practices; their cultural motivation was perhaps different than the missionaries first hoped for, but Christianity and the new tabus were, once again, their conscious, although not unchallenged, choice. The violent outbreaks against the tabus were more likely interpreted as a threat to their authority. As Ka'ahumanu said to Lieutenant Percival, who demanded the women to be set free for prostitution, "it is for us to give directions respecting our women - it is for us to establish tabus - it is for us to bind, to liberate, to impose fines" (quoted in Bingham 1849, 286, original emphasis). Thus, in a traditional way, the foreigners' behavior was taken, quite correctly, indeed, as a threat to aupuni, which was standing because of the tabus. In brief, this resulted in a cultural differentiation of discursive subjects - missionaries, traders, captains, chiefs and common Hawaiians - which caused politics as a cognitive object to be reserved for the foreigners. In the following, we shall see whether, at this point, there developed any political formalisms across the
cultural groups despite the profound differences in the cognitive categories.

6.3. **Context and Translation**

The differentiation of discursive subjects, which was already well developed in 1826, only intensified in the years that followed. As Bradley has observed, the mission was increasingly isolated from other foreigners after the incidents between 1825 and 1827 (Bradley 1968, 171-175), which was perhaps best symbolized in William Richards being escorted to his church by several hundred assigned Hawaiian guards on October 9, 1825 (Journal of Elisha Loomis, Oct. 11, 1825). The immediate result of the isolation was the strengthening of the alliance between the mission and the chiefs, to which we should add, as an amplifying factor, the generally reserved attitude of the chiefs towards the traders, whose occupation was rather disgraceful for the Hawaiians (Vancouver 1984, 854-855; Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 155; Kamakau 1992b, 123; Kepelino 1977, 42). The attachment of the Hawaiians in general to the missionaries seemed also to have deepened as the mission printer Loomis observed:

The change of feelings in the natives towards us since the time of our arrival and first years residence is very remarkable. Then they were exceedingly jealous of us, and not very forward to assist. Now, they have the utmost confidence in us and we have every reason to believe, would think it a great calamity to be deprived
of our instructions. They appear as ready to defend us as their own persons. The guards who now patrol the streets with loaded muskets, amount to several hundred (Journal of Elisha Loomis, Oct. 26, 1825).

While the missionaries, as the result of the reinforced alliance, became more and more involved as interpreters for the chiefs (Judd to Anderson, April 19, 1842, quoted in Judd 1960, 108), they also identified themselves stronger with the objects of their work, i.e., the Hawaiians.

For the development of comparative political formalisms it meant primarily that the conceptual tools of the foreigners' world were translated by using ready-made Hawaiian concepts, little regard being paid to cultural or conceptual differences. The outside world came to be known in concepts entirely Hawaiian. This was, in fact, only a continuation of the pre-missionary practice. The trusted Europeans and Americans, who translated for the chiefs before the missionaries came, were, as everybody else, very much dependent on the chiefs' favors and in any other respect placed in a situation that encouraged them to adapt themselves to Hawaiian conditions of life rather than the reverse (e.g., Campbell 1967, 118-120; Chamisso in Barratt 1988, 175; Cox 1957, 30-35; Freycinet 1978, 19-20; Golovnin 1974, 40, 46-47). Besides technically advising the chiefs, it seems that they did little in formalizing cross-cultural concepts - which would have required more systematic methods. At least we have little or no evidence that would suggest anything beyond mere technical interpreting.
For example, when Don Francisco de Paula Marín, a resident since the mid-1790s, translated Kalanimōkū's account of the acceptance of Christianity for Kotzebue in January, 1825—likely using French—he found it necessary to render aupuni as state (Kalanimōkū's Hawaiian is not given but aupuni is the only probable choice). Kalanimōkū was almost certain that after his death the present aupuni would fall apart, as the chiefs, after Liholiho's departure, were openly considering war. Linking the difficulties in establishing the worship of Jehovah among the common people and the possibility of revolt, he said that "the state, which I have with difficulty held back from ruin, may fall apart after my death" (Kotzebue in Barratt 1988, 189, my emphasis). If this suggested a union of the church and the state, it was a signification between Marín and Kotzebue; for Kalanimōkū the condition of Hawaiian society was still conceptualized through his native aupuni. Thus, a technical interpreting is not a sufficient sign that there evolved a mutual understanding of each other's cultural systems. Here we aim deeper than, say, learning the different modes of saluting, as the Hawaiians surely did without anyone to explain the meaning of these customs: "Encountering Europeans they bow and shake hands according to our customs,
but among themselves they observe their own custom of rubbing noses and holding arms" (Golovnin 1974, 53).11

The culturally subordinate position of the mission became even more evident when the Decalogue and Jehovah were challenged by some high-ranking Hawaiians. We need a bit more narration to make the point. During the two years preceding the publication of the first Puritan laws in December 14, 1827, the younger brother of Kalanimōkū, Poki Kama'ule'ule, had several times opposed the adaptation of biblical laws and openly defied Ka'ahumanu's authority (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Dec. 12, 1825; Journal of Elisha Loomis, Dec. 12, 1825; Levi Chamberlain to Evarts, Feb. 22, 1827, MsL). In March, 1828, when the three laws against killing, theft and adultery were to take effect, Poki, Kauikeaouli and their retinue sailed to Hawai'i, where Poki gave the lands of Hilo to Kauikeaouli for redistribution among his favorites. Poki, who apparently did it to maintain his dignity, as the reception in Hilo had been substandard, drifted into a conflict with Ka'ahumanu over the extent of each other's authority. Poki being the guardian (kahu) of the future ruler Kauikeaouli, he thought he had at least as much to say in the affairs of the islands

11 Also, at a relatively early stage of the regular culture contact, there developed, especially in Honolulu, a specialized sailor jargon, which had some elements from European languages (Botta 1984, 31), but it also remained Hawaiian based until the latter half of the nineteenth century (Roberts 1992).
as did Ka'ahumanu, Kauikeaouli's foster mother. Poki's behavior in Hilo displeased Ka'ahumanu and her closest chiefs, who decided not to include Poki's debts to the foreign traders into the collective debt of all other chiefs, a decision that was a great source of dishonor for Poki. Offended, Poki and his followers got ready to take arms against Ka'ahumanu. The process was halted by a bold but successful mediation effort of Kekūanaō'a, husband of Kīna'u, Kamehameha's daughter by Kaheiheimālie.

Poki gave up his military plans for the time being, and in March 2, 1829, two more laws, one against intoxication, the other prohibiting prostitution, were proclaimed (Reynolds 1989, 255). But early in the next month, it was again rumored that a rebellion against Ka'ahumanu was being planned. Whether Poki was the real culprit is somewhat uncertain; he was spreading a rumor that a conspiracy existed to kill all the white people on O'ahu and to put Kīna'u in Ka'ahumanu's place and make Kīna'u's son by Kekūanaō'a the heir to the paramountcy. A few days earlier Poki had had "a long talk" with Kekūanaō'a and Ka'upena, the wife of Manuia, Poki's close associate, for their "quarreling in his absence." Stephen Reynolds heard that Poki was angry with them, because they had contemplated the killing of white people. At the time Kauikeaouli was in Lahaina and according to Poki would not come to Honolulu until he had received a clearance from him. The clearance
was given and on April 8 Kauikeaouli arrived at Honolulu. Poki met his "son" on board the ship, which was considered quite exceptional and adding to the already tense atmosphere. Reynolds thought "it was the first time, any chief ever visited him on board, before he landed" (Reynolds 1989, 258-259).\(^{12}\)

The next day, Bingham went to meet Poki and Kauikeaouli in Poki's Blond Hotel, where a reconciliatory air prevailed. In the evening, Poki, Kauikeaouli and Ka'ahumanu got together at the Bingham's for a cup of tea and a few psalms. As a result of these meetings Kauikeaouli promised to return to school, which he had been absenting for some time, and Poki "proposed to attend again to instruction." In addition, Poki and Kauikeaouli asked Bingham for 190 books to be distributed to their attendants and, as Bingham recalled, "concurred with Kaahumanu and the people connected with my station in the erection of a church." The new church in Honolulu was dedicated to Jehovah on July 3, 1829, and Kauikeaouli, once again quite spontaneously as in the council of chiefs in June, 1825, dedicated also his aupuni to Jehovah (Bingham 1849, 343-346). As things evolved, in October the chiefs could proclaim with much confidence that all people, foreigners included, should obey the laws that

\(^{12}\) For more details of Poki and his opposition to Ka'ahumanu, see Jarves 1843, 282-283; Bingham 1849, 340-343; Dibble 1909, 204-206; Kamakau 1992a, 284-291; Kuykendall 1989, 123-130; Bradley 1968, 183-184; Kame‘eleihiwa 1992, 85-93; Sahlins 1992, 74-76.
forbade "Murder, Theft, Adultery, Fornication, Retailing Ardent Spirits at houses for selling spirits, Amusements on the Sabbath day, Gambling and betting on the Sabbath day and at all times" (Proclamation, F.O. & Ex., Oct. 7, 1829).

In December, Poki, his pride hurt, went sandalwood-hunting with two ships and never returned. Poki's wife Liliha assumed his vacant position, but she also clashed with Ka'ahumanu over the guardianship of Kauikeaouli. Liliha's rebellion was shortlived and she was dispossessed of her lands and the guardianship in April, 1831. The chiefship of O'ahu was given to Kuakini, who took prompt action to enforce the Christian tabus as he had previously done in parts of the Hawai'i island.

The narrative suggests that the context the foreigners had created for the Hawaiian political system did not operate in the same conceptual frame as the Hawaiian logic. Or, to put it in other words, the motives of Ka'ahumanu in maintaining the integrity of the present aupuni were culturally so strong that the outsiders' discourse of politics and morals was always translated in view of the chiefs' interests. Thus, for instance, when Bingham arbitrated between Poki and Ka'ahumanu in April, 1829, the whole issue seemed to revolve around certain rituals of the native church. The arbitration culminated in the dedication ceremonies of the Honolulu church in the following summer, which all points at the need to secure aupuni. In this
respect, it is only logical that while the foreign community talked politics explicitly, using it in the sense of civil power, the secluded missionaries and the chiefs closed a deal in more cosmic terms. Similarly, when Bingham reasoned with Kauikeaouli about matters of practical government, the usefulness of the tabus were the main point he advocated, not the theory behind the utility. "It is very difficult to govern men who are drunken," he said in Hawaiian and added nothing that would have facilitated the conceptual approachment of Hawaiians and foreigners (Letter of Hiram Bingham to an unknown recipient, 1832, MsL). If he ever did, it was always explained as God's law.

Instead of being a genuine mediator, Bingham accommodated his moral views to the needs of the chiefs, the same views that were interpreted by other foreigners in political terms. As morality, or the tabus, and the chiefs' interests to preserve their aupuni were the unifying factors in the discursive alignment between the mission and the chiefs, the concepts of church and state mediated the intercourse between the mission and the foreign mercantile community. There certainly was not only a physical and social split in the community, it was also discursive and hence conceptual, ultimately materializing itself in words and their cultural significations.

As we have already seen, the missionaries were in a difficult position as regards the tripartite confrontation
of their conceptual tools to recognize politics, the Hawaiian understanding of *aupuni* and the foreigners' accusations. This is not at all surprising if one considers the reception of the Christian god by the chiefs, who, according to an old priest of the old type, lived "in fear of an uprising supporting the idolatrous worship of the old pagan gods" (Duhaut-Cilly 1983, 33), or the servants of the Devil as the Christians would have it. Thus, the Hawaiian powers that be, Kaʻahumanu mā, decidedly chose to advance the worship of their new god with some sweeping measures. For them the new God, Jehovah, was a means to the traditionally desired social stability, which the Hawaiian concepts of *aupuni* and *malu* convey (see ch. 4). Or, as they collectively stated in 1829, "the great thing by which we shall promote peace" ("oia ka mea nui a makou e hoomalu ai"). For that reason all who remained in the islands should have obeyed the laws of God (Proclamation, F.O. & Ex., Oct. 7, 1829).

The missionaries knew the hazards of this kind of authorizing, but were nevertheless conditioned by the Hawaiian language and concepts through which they were communicating the word of God to Hawaiians. Every time they had to refer to God and government in the same sentence, they were - perhaps quite unintentionally - affirming the old Hawaiian structures. A good example is Artemas Bishop,
who in 1835 wrote an exhortatory article to a native Christian paper:

Ina lakou e hoomaikai aku i ke Akua, alaila, ia e hoopomaikai mai ia lakou, a e hoomau hoi i ko lakou aupuni. Aka, i ole, e hiki no ia ia e hookahuli i ko lakou alii ana. No ke Akua mai ka noho ana o na‘lii ma ke ao nei. A o na‘lii malama i ko lakou aupuni ma ke kanawai like me kona kanawai ua malamaia mai lakou e Iehova i pomaikai ai ko lakou noho ana.

If they [the chiefs] will praise God, he will bless them and perpetuate their aupuni. But if not, he can overthrow their rule. The rule of the chiefs in this world is from God. And chiefs who conducted their aupuni according to the laws of God would be preserved by God so that their reign is blessed (A. Bishop 1835, 113, my translation).

Here, the doctrine of christian rulers can still be recognized, but to its features some elements of Hawaiian chiefship have been added. Without a single foreign concept to provoke a sense of difference, the person of a chief is made a direct object of divine mediation, functionally just like in the hono rite (see ch. 3.3.1.). We can conclude with some certainty that from the point of view of the missionaries, the whole interpretative context was prestructured in an unrewarding way. As their actions were passing through the cultural categories of both Hawaiians and foreigners, they were doubly bound up with the requirements of their environment.

The missionaries were in a structured situation in which some key actors (foreign residents, the mission board) had already brought politics to their attention and placed some expectations before them regarding the reality of
politics in the Hawaiian islands. In order for the missionaries to find a relatively comfortable place in this field, they were forced to develop arguments and practical theories on their own mission relative to the demands set by the structured field of discourse (residents and the board) on the one hand and their position in the Hawaiian social order on the other. Their overall position was that of balancing between the hostile merchants, who jealously guarded their customary enjoyments of freeman's life, and Hawaiians, who, after 1825, demanded the services of the mission. For the zealous priests the balancing was frequently overridden by the precepts of their unshaken faith in the divine legitimacy of their mission, with the well-known consequences of conflict.

It might thus be an overstatement to say that the missionaries were cultural mediators in the full sense of the term much beyond their own specialty in the midst of the cross-pressures. In the field of politics, it is better to say that they were themselves at the same time both subjects and objects of cultural translation in the sense of constructing comparative equivalents, because they communicated things to Hawaiians in their own terms and to foreigners in theirs, while themselves learning the most. This continued approximately until 1838, when Richards began to render political economy into Hawaiian terms (see ch. 7.1.).
6.4. The Missing Concept

In early November, 1837, the ship Europe arrived at Honolulu bringing in a few Chileans, who immediately upon landing applied for political asylum in Hawaii. They addressed a letter to the chiefs and expressed their desire in their native Spanish, which was first translated into English and then into Hawaiian. In English the statement began as follows: "We the subscribers, Citizens of the Republic of Chile have the honor to show to you that political difficulties of state have obliged us to flee from our country" (F.O. & Ex., Nov. 2, 1837). The Spanish politicos was of course translated as political, but in the Hawaiian version the concept is completely missing— or no attempt was ever made to invent a simple equivalent or to Hawaiianize the word. Instead, "political difficulties of state" was expressed as "ka pilikia o ka noho ana mamuli o na alii o ka aina," or the trouble of living in accordance with the rulers of the land. Substantially the translation was quite correct, but the conceptual shift in the translation is still worthy of note, particularly since we know that in Honolulu there was a heated debate in which the concept of politics loomed large.

As seen in the fourth chapter, there is no record of formal conceptual codification of politics before the Andrews dictionary of 1865. Yet, politics as a cognitive
object and social practice was recognized in Hawaii from the first contacts (which resulted in an international folklore of absolutism) and was, in the debate just referred to, called back to life soon after the arrival of the missionaries in 1820. However, we should bear in mind the classical hermeneutic dilemma of cultural translation, namely, that politics was represented in two languages, English (or some other major European language) and Hawaiian.

The problem was not merely theoretical; it had also a very concrete practical dimension, as the contextual analysis above indicates. The major difficulty can be attributed to the cultural differences between the Hawaiian society and New England, the former operating in such a hierarchic manner that the identification of politics was necessarily focused on the chiefs. To this the chiefs contributed by practicing a great deal of control in their dealings with foreigners. The concept of politics was thus objectified as 'high politics', which almost automatically reinforced the practical validity of Hawaiian concepts, such as aupuni.

Aupuni is also significant, because it was, along with ali‘i, the first formally translated concept that had some bearing on the rise of the political discourse in 1825. Besides appearing in the early Hawaiian treatises with foreign countries and other business connections, it was
also used in informing Hawaiians about the countries they had to deal with in their daily lives. One of the earliest, if not the first, systematic attempts to present a comparative account of the foreign countries to Hawaiians was the 1832 geography book (see ch. 3.2., fn 7), a central feature of which, following the practice of teaching geography and history together (Anonym. on teaching), was the review of each country's governmental form in historical terms. Generally, the reviews resemble the genre of traditional Hawaiian storytelling, in which the scene is usually divided between the chiefs and the common people. This division forms the dramatic tension also of the geographical comparisons. For example, the French Revolution was covered as follows,

I ka wa kahiko i na'lii wale no ka olelo o ka aina, ka pono a me ka hewa, aole lakou i mamao nui i ka mea e pono ai o kanaka. Noho mai no na kanaka, me ka ae wale aku mahope o ka na'lii. I ke kau i na'lii lokomaikai, pomaikai na kanaka, no ka mea hooluoluia mai lakou; a huli ke aupuni i kekahi poe alii, hoohanohano lakou, a hookaumaha aku i na makaainana, a uluhua iho la na kanaka, kipikipi aku la, aole i malu iki ka aina. Ia manawa, ua hoowahawaha loa ia ka olelo a ke Akua, oia ke kumu o ka hewa. Aole i malamaia ka la sabati, aole pule, aole lohe na kanaka i ka olelo e pono ai, aole i makau i ke Akua, aole i makau i ka make; nolaila, pau loa na kanaka mamuli o ka hewa, pau pu me na'lii, a mokuahana loa ke aupuni. Kipi na kanaka, a pepehi aku la i ke alii nui nona ke aupuni . . .

In the old days, only the nobles (ali'i) had a say in the affairs of the land, they decided what was right and what was wrong. They did not think much of the benefits of the people, who lived only according to the consent of the nobles. During the reign of the kind nobles the people were blessed and prosperous, because they were comforted; until aupuni went to other nobles, who were pompous and burdened the common people, who
grew angry and rebelled. The land was not at all peaceful (maly). At this time, the word of God was treated with contempt, that was the cause of the wrongdoings. The Sabbath was not observed, there was no prayer, the people did not listen to the words so as to be righteous, they were not afraid of God and death; therefore, people died because of their wrongdoings, the nobles died, too, and aupuni was divided into factions. The people rebelled and killed the king (ali‘i nui) who controlled aupuni . . . (He hoikehonua 1832, 49-50, my translation).

In comparison of the style and thematic structure, the following is from Davida Malo’s account of the ancient high chief Waia.

Ma ka olelo mai o ko Hawaii nei poe kahiko, he aupuni hewa loa ko Waia, no kona hele ma ka lealea, haalele no ia i ke kaauha a kona makua, e haipule, e malama pono i ke aupuni, me ka malama i na makaainana, i mea e pono ai ka ae nona . . . Hai aku ko lalo poe, aole no haipule, aoehe ke kahuna ona, aole no na kilo, aole hiki ia ia ke hooponopono aupuni . . . Ua hiki mai kekahi mai ahulau, ma Hawaii nei, he nui loa kanaka i make i ua mai la, he iwakaluakumamaono kanaka i koe aole i make . . .

In the tradition of the old Hawaiians, Waia’s aupuni was full of faults. Because he went after merrymaking, he forsook the charge of his father to pray to gods and take good care of aupuni in view of taking care of the common people, so that his word would be righteous . . . The people under him said that he did not worship gods, he did not have priests or readers of omens, he could not manage aupuni . . . An epidemic arrived at Hawaii and a great many was killed by it. Only twenty-six people survived . . . (Malo 1987, 159-160, my translation).

In the same style, with a liberal touch of enthusiastic patriotism, the history and the political system of the United States were explained. Again, in a remarkable likeness of the two worlds, as they appeared conceptually in the text, only Hawaiian words were used (excluding some proper nouns and the Senate and the House of
representatives, which were retained in a slightly Hawaiianized forms). This is not to say that by using Hawaiian words the missionaries would have been unable to establish the difference that prevailed in the functional principles of the two societies; it is rather to emphasize that all these countries were reduced to a set of comparable units, on an obvious moral scale, and that the comparisons sprang from the Hawaiian universe. In other words, Hawaii was the standard, or the independent variable, of comparison. It may have been that the missionaries intended to rank the United States highest on the scale, which is quite apparent in the text, but the cultural-linguistic circumstances allowed only a compromise, in which the superiority of the democratic America was conveyed as in any evaluative Hawaiian story of a chief’s reign. The next quote will illustrate the compromise. Once more, we concentrate on the use of the word aupuni.

Hooponopono ae la na’lii i ka aina a pono. Penei ka malama ana.
Hookahi no alii nui maluna o na moku a pau; aole nae ia i hanau alii ia. Ma ke koho ana a kanaka i alii ai. E huli no lakou i ke kanaka naauao, a lokomaikai, a noiau ma na mea o ke aupuni, a hoolilo ia ia i alii maluna o ka aina a pau. I eha makahiki o kona alii ana. A pau ia mau makahiki ina aole koho hou aku ia ia, alaila, aole ia i alii hou aku; lilo no ia i kanaka maoli, e like ka manawa mamua.
Aole no ke alii nui wale no ke kanawai o ka aina. Elua poe kanaka alii malalo iho ona. Ua kohoia lakou e kanaka.

The leaders of the nation (ali‘i) straightened up the land in the proper way. This is how they take care of the land.
There is one principal leader (*ali‘i nui*, meaning the President) above all the states (*moku*, traditionally a major land unit); he was not born as a leader (*ali‘i*). He ruled because he was chosen by people. They had become an enlightened and benevolent people and skillful in the affairs of *aupuni*, and he [the President] was made the leader (*ali‘i*) above all the lands. His rule lasts four years. When the four years have passed and if he is not chosen again, he will rule no more; he will become a true commoner (*kanaka maoli*, cf. Campbell 1967, 122), as he was before.

The laws of the land are not in the hands of the principal leader (*ali‘i nui*) alone. Under him there are two groups of leaders (*po’e kanaka ali‘i*). They are chosen by people. (He hoikehonua 1832, 127, my translation).

The geography book of 1832 is all the more important as an instance of cultural translation because it was written first in Hawaiian and only later translated into English for private use, possibly by Lorrin Andrews. For example, in the English translation, *nā kākā‘ōlelo*, or the hereditary advisors of the chiefs were rendered as "political advisers" (ND/AH 193). The context was the French universities, which were, among other things, described as educational centers for "political advisers." Thus, the missionary writers had an obvious context in mind when they wrote the book, yet they were sufficiently satisfied with the expressive power of the Hawaiian language (cf. Andrews 1864), so that, in what they identified as the political realm in Hawaii, they opted for indigenous concepts instead of inventing neologisms or borrowing from English.

Although it is practically impossible to know, for the lack of documentation, to what extent the English concepts
were received by Hawaiians, we can say for sure that by 1832 Hawaiians were well versed in comparing different nations in Hawaiian terms. Ideally, it seems then that only for the missionaries aupuni and government were fused and had cross-culturally formalized meaning. Indeed, the intelligibility and communicability of these ideas, as was the case with the word of God, had to be based first on concepts already known to Hawaiians. For a small group of advanced Hawaiian scholars things were changed in the mid-1840s when the mission experimented for a few years with the teaching of English (cf. Bishop and Emerson 1845) at the Lahainaluna high school. But then again, we do not have detailed information on the teaching or the practical dissemination of the language among the Hawaiians. But we could assume that the knowledge received in English was recirculated in Hawaiian.

In view of the present study, the most important result of this New England reaction was the appearance of political discourse in the island public sphere. By challenging the foreign residents, the missionaries created the political sphere. This small arena was, however, split in two at the time, the one operating in the English language, the other in the Hawaiian, the two debates meeting hardly at all, hence inhibiting the construction of Hawaiian equivalents for the concept of politics. The debates were also socially distinct. The early days of the English debate was very
much a matter between the mission and the foreign residents, the Hawaiian being located between the mission and the chiefs. Later, it evolved into a bilingual arena in which various mediating efforts were extended between the two language groups, although not much is known of this process.

Any comparative formalisms that arose were more or less monocultural, as in the case of aupuni, or sporadic and contingent and developed in social circumstances that hardly presented any systematic manner of approaching cultural differences and their accommodation. A few examples of the latter will suffice. When Lord Russell of the British Navy, in November, 1836, was forcing a treaty between the Hawaiian chiefs and England, he was questioned by Kina’u - who had inherited Ka’ahumanu’s place as the active arm of Kauikeaouli - about the origin of the proposed text of the treaty. Levi Chamberlain recalls Kina’u’s inquiry as follows: "Kinau asked the question whether the Document presented by Lord Russel [sic] was drawn up by Kalaimoku (which upon explanation I found to mean the Prime Minister of Great Britain" (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Nov. 12, 1836). Kalanimōkū, who died in 1827 and whom the foreigners used to call prime minister (Campbell 1967, 122; Bingham to Jackson, Feb 14, 1821, KC/AH) was the likely source of this confusion. At some point, Kalanimōkū, perhaps by some foreigners’ suggestion, took the name Billy (William) Pitt, the English prime minister who died in 1806. For Hawaiians,
there was nothing unusual in taking a new name of whatever
origin, but it also bears testimony to the fact that both
Hawaiians and foreigners had means to view each others'
societies through a common practical instance, in this case
the name Billy Pitt. The Hawaiians knew that there was
in England a high-ranking person, who ran the affairs of the
English aupuni; and the foreigners knew that there was an
equally high-ranking person in Hawaii, who also took care of
the practical affairs of the islands and was the next man
from the high chief or king. As Kalanimoku (or Kalaimoku),
who was also called Billy Pitt, held the office of kalaimoku
(see ch. 4.2.), there developed a practice to call the
foreign prime ministers – those second in rank – by the same
Hawaiian name (kalaimoku).

In this the Hawaiians had an advantage in disadvantage.
They did not have access to the complete contexts of the
foreign cultures, but, in making sense of the contingent
events, the foreign ways were translated into Hawaiian
conceptual schemes. In a similar ad hoc manner, Poki, upon
his return from England in 1825, made sense of the English
order of things. According to Kamakau,

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13 A similar, although much later, case is Kepelino
Keauokalani, another Hawaiian chronicler, who associated
Wākea, the chief who according to tradition first instituted
"image-worship," with Henry VIII. As Wākea was considered in
the christianized Hawaiian tradition the chief who was
responsible for the loss of the true god, he became
"Hawaii’s evil chief." He and Henry VIII "were alike"
(Kepelino 1932, 66).
Boki [Poki] assured the chiefs that of all the information he had gained in England as to how affairs were operated in that famous nation, the things that impressed him most were the great importance given to the word of God as expressed in the cathedrals and churches of London, of which Saint Paul's seemed to him "to my mind the foundation on which was built her fame"; and the fact that those who were educated and learned in letters were the important people of the country, compared to whom the common people were like dust under their feet. The king of England [he said] lived in a way similar to the tabu chiefs of old (Kamakau 1992a, 273).

Besides being a perceptive account, this testimony is also a good example of cultural comparison, which, in the absence of thorough knowledge of the foreign culture, filters off the noise and selects a few themes by projecting central categories of the culture of the subject of comparison. In Poki's case, the categories were the building of temples as connected to creation of aupuni, social hierarchy, and the traditional seclusion and strict court etiquette of the highest chiefs. In a manner of speaking, this could have been the beginning of seeing Hawaii as a monarchy by

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We should, however, guard against placing too much emphasis on the ad hoc nature of these constructs. The chiefs, living at an international stopover for commercial shipping, were, in fact, relatively well-informed about the nature of the foreign lands. For example, William Ellis wrote the following vignette of Liholiho just prior to his voyage to England:

His general knowledge of the world was much greater than could have been expected. I have heard him entertain a party of chiefs for hours together, with accounts of different parts of the earth, describing the extensive lakes, the mountains, and mines of North and South America; the elephants and inhabitants of India; the houses, manufactures, &c. of England, with no small accuracy, considering he had never seen them (Ellis 1979, 324-325).
Hawaiians, as the Hawaiian chiefship came to be seen as belonging to the same category of entities as the courts of England or France (cf. Kepelino 1932, 140).

Of course, the foreigners did the same. Thus, for example, the missionary Lorrin Andrews, who translated Davida Malo’s essay on the Hawaiian depopulation in 1839, characterized Malo "as a politician," who "is considered by the chiefs as rather ultra and is so treated at the present time" (Malo 1839, 121). Andrews was alluding to the less commonly celebrated fact that Malo had incurred the chiefs’ disfavor and had his lands taken away. Andrews’ motive to identify Malo "as a politician" was based on Malo’s position as a non-ali`i adviser for the chiefs. According to Andrews, Malo "was called to advice in the councils of the nation, and from his standing, as he does, between the chiefs and the common people, he may be supposed to be informed as to the things of which he speaks" (121). The reason for the chiefs’ displeasure was Malo’s too aggressive manner of advocating reforms. Andrews wrote that Malo was urging "improvements which the King and chiefs do not yet see to be necessary" (121). An opponent of the mission (perhaps the American Consul John C. Jones) put it in a slightly different way. According to him, Malo was stripped of his possessions because of his "unwaranted [sic] liberties, assumed importance, and dictatorial impudence when near the persons of the chiefs" (Sandwich Island
Mirror, Sept. 15, 1839). But even for this writer Malo was a politician, a mediator of interests, although at variance with the proper code of etiquette in the Hawaiian hierarchy.

On the side of the missionaries and other foreigners, these sporadic events accumulated into a political identity for the Hawaiian society. On both sides, an understanding of each other was created, which validated traditional conceptual tools. Yet, the foreigners being products of a progressivist culture (the missionaries in particular with their divine theory of civilization), they were in the main dissatisfied with what they experienced as Hawaiian politics. As the missionaries were instructed to exclude themselves from political matters, they had to resort to indirect forms of theorizing, in which politics in general was seen as an integral part of civilization, and a certain type of politics as a sign of the progress of civilization. Thus, the Hawaiian society was conceived of in holistic terms and its political existence and survival were made dependent on all other aspects of life, but particularly on the freedom to appropriate what the foreigners called natural resources.
7. POLITICAL ECONOMY

The whole fabric of heathen society, political, domestic, and religious, is based on the most absurd and rotten principles. There must be a tearing up of the very foundation and a building anew of the whole superstructure.

Rev. Sheldon Dibble, in the field 1831 - 1845

The foregoing examples show that in the province of political knowledge the two cultures did approach each other. Yet, the process was not completed, because the comparisons were established in two distinct conceptual systems. A mutual understanding was certainly facilitated by the frequent intercourse, but this did not allow the systems to converge or even to communicate so that a fair amount of cross-cultural learning would have taken place, not to mention the limited social distribution of such knowledge. In other words, while focusing on the interactive scheme of the missionary identity formation and the clash of the mission and the mercantile community, we learnt that the discourse of politics that developed from the conflict was conceptually quite independent in relation to the Hawaiian community, although it was structurally tied to the chiefs' proselytizing efforts. In this chapter we shall focus on the more systematic attempts to facilitate cultural learning, or turning representations into practice,
as they were framed by using political concepts in the 1830s and 1840s.

In tracking down the historical events taking place within the chiefly establishment, there appears to have been a change in the general atmosphere after the death of Ka‘ahumanu on June 5, 1832. Just prior to Ka‘ahumanu’s death it was rumored that she was considering a restructuring of aupuni (Bingham to Evarts, Dec. 30, 1831, HP/HMCS; Bingham to Evarts, Feb. 6, 1832, MsL; Journal of Betsey Lyons, June 5, 1832; see Kamakau 1992a, 306-308), inspired by the advice of General William Miller, later the English Consul in Honolulu, who had had a series of discussions with the missionaries in Honolulu in 1831 (Bingham to an unknown recipient, Dec. 13, 1831, MsL), and who, after Bingham’s solicitation, put his ideas in writing (Miller 1831). Bingham later delivered this "Memorandum" to the chiefs, but its reception is not known.¹

In its general character, Miller’s proposal was typical of the foreign community and the occasional visitors at the time, but to a certain extent he had uncommon sympathy for the mission and managed to carry a peaceful conversation with Bingham.² According to Miller, the chiefs should have

¹ Most likely it was forgotten due to Ka‘ahumanu’s illness and death and the tumultuous succession of Kaukaoua‘oli and Kīna‘u.

² According to Kuykendall, "Beginning with Captain Finch in 1829, there was scarcely one of the foreign naval commanders who visited Hawaii down to 1838 who did not offer
established "some defined form of government," which should have included measures to guarantee the "security for property" (Miller 1831, 1). For him, as well as for other foreigners, the manifest reason for discontent in the foreign community was the "capricious and arbitrary measures of the native rulers" and the "oppressive measures made known by a town crier" (1). It was noted by the foreigners that this was possible, because the land management, or 'ownership', was concentrated in the hands of the highest chief, from whom the other chiefs held their lands and so down to the smallest farmer. In Miller’s words, this was "indeed the root of all evil" (2). As Miller appreciated the philanthropic program of the Hawaiian mission, he also was sympathetic towards the common Hawaiians, whom he thought should have been transformed gradually into petty landowners.

Miller also furnished the chiefs with some concrete measures as to how these ideas could have been implemented. However, here we are more interested in the fundamental social theory that he was applying in his reform proposals. After outlining the major defects of Hawaiian society and

the king and chiefs advice on some subject" (Kuykendall 1989, 158-159). Introduction of private ownership, abrogation of labor dues and standardizing taxation figured practically in every foreign suggestion, but they all - perhaps excluding Miller’s proposal which was aided by Bingham - were wanting in one essential respect. They did not provide a culturally intelligible theory of divinity and history.
suggesting the best remedies for them, Miller turned to theorizing about an ideal society. In a typically Lockean manner, he rehearsed the familiar understanding of the elementary dynamics of society, the contract: "At all events it [allotting of permanent land grants to common Hawaiians] would be the means of creating a middle class of society composed of free men whose fidelity might be depended upon, since it would be to their interest to support the govt that protected them" (3). This was also shared by the mission, when it a few years later undertook a bolder strategy in civilizing Hawaiians.

But on the question of liberty, Miller was much closer to the foreign residents of Honolulu than the mission. Again, the context is relevant. Kuakini's appointment to the head of O'ahu after Liliha's downfall in April, 1831, caused much alarm in the foreign community. Kuakini was known for his rather independent and sweeping measures to enforce Christian tabus, and for a period of two years on O'ahu he quite literally upset the town of Honolulu. "There was quietness and peace in those days," as a missionary historian says (Dibble 1909, 216). Bingham was more concrete: "We can say that the horses rest in Honolulu on the Sabbath" (Bingham to Evarts, Nov. 23, 1831, MsL, orig. emphasis). General Miller happened to arrive just in time to witness the early days of Kuakini's policing, which was also reflected in his proposals.
The late attempts to prevent foreign residents from drinking wine & spirituous liquors at their own table, to close the billiard room and to take away the horses of those who should ride out on a Sunday for innocent recreation, appear to me despotic & vexatious and to emanate rather from sectarian enthusiasm, not to say intolerance, than from justice and sound policy ... it is, I think, to be regretted that their [the missionaries'] evangelical zeal sometimes carries them to extremes by exacting, or by their influence causing to be enacted, certain restrictions on society which I conceive ought to be attributed rather to overrighteous opinions peculiar to their sect than to true religion (Miller 1831, 4-5).

It is likely that Kuakini's measures did not receive an unambiguous blessing of the mission, as the debate on the alleged persecution of Catholics indicates (Bingham, Green and Whitney to Anderson, June 23, 1832; Clark to Anderson, March 30, 1833, both in MsL; F.O. & Ex., Aug. 1840; Jarves 1843, 292). It seems, rather, that the mission had continued to exist in a subservient position in relation to the chiefs, which was not always understood by the foreign residents or visitors like Miller. Neither was this perfectly clear to the missionaries themselves until the native reaction against Christianity after Ka'ahumanu's death. For the mission this reaction had a great disillusioning effect as to the results of their work and the nature of Hawaiian society. It is true, that even before 1832 some individual missionaries had written home

3 The subject of restricting the enjoyments of the mercantile community was more ambiguous. Bingham at least was rather sarcastic to the foreign residents and seacaptains, who signed a petition against the new measures (Bingham to Evarts, Nov. 25, 1831, MsL).
letters filled with pessimism about the future (e.g., Chamberlain to Evarts, July 26, 1826; Chamberlain to Anderson, Feb. 13, 1827; Andrews and Richards to Evarts, Sept. 30, 1828, all in MsL), but the events following the death of Ka‘ahumanu finally forced the mission to reconsider its strategy. It will be argued that the disillusionment contributed to the formation of a missionary theory of Hawaiian despotism, and to a sense of urgency in that the relations of church and state should be finally put on the right footing and the foundations of society corrected. And, paradoxically, in the course of living the theory, the mission assumed a more worldly look.

The issues of despotism, the absence of liberty and industry and - to say it all - the arbitrariness of the Hawaiian society were mostly perceived through the school system, in which all these issues manifested themselves in their indigenous forms. In other words, for the mission the schools were the concrete instances in which the political system became visible and easily objectifiable. However, the perception was generated by a crisis, in which earlier missionary stereotypes were joined by new cultural learning through what can fairly be called alienation.

The process of alienation was not as abrupt as Ka‘ahumanu’s death. Some time before her death, the mission had concluded from their experience of school inspections and teacher evaluations that they were fast running out of
means to both deepen and widen the substance of palapala (Andrews to Anderson, Nov. 3, 1829; Andrews to Anderson, Oct. 1, 1834, both in MsL; General Letter of SIM to ABCFM, July 7, 1836, HP/HMCS). As religious teaching had formed the core of the curriculum, the other areas of knowledge had necessarily received much less attention. Besides, since the word of God was faithfully committed to memory in the native schools throughout the islands, the system had become a daily routine of dull and ritualistic repetition. As far as the Hawaiians were concerned, the schools were firmly established, pa'a loa, and served the intended purpose well enough; but for the missionaries, reviewing the Tahitian experience, this meant the beginning of decadence.

The founding of Lahainaluna high school, or the mission seminary, in 1831 was essentially a result of this fear of an educational standstill (Dibble 1909, 250). Lorrin Andrews, the first principal of the school, had several occasions to reflect on the system of education. Even before Dibble (see Dibble 1909, 216-222), he put in writing the unpleasant suspicion that the schools had primarily served as organizational elements in the Hawaiian aupuni. According to Andrews, the native schools' "existence during these few years past has supplied a vacuum in the civil & religious affairs of this government which to all human appearance nothing else could have filled" (Andrews to Anderson, June 13, 1832, MsL). Further, the schools were
only for the adult population, which the mission board in
Boston found to be "not the most natural method." To this
Andrews could only answer, referring to the chiefly-run
organization of the schools, that "necessity compelled us to
it, or rather the providence of God seemed to say that it
was duty" (Andrews to ABCFM, Nov. 24, 1835, MsL).

This sentiment was not completely new among the
missionaries. They were not blind to the decisive chiefly
impetus, as Levi Chamberlain, the secular agent of the
mission and an instance of realism, observed already in
1825: "If the Chiefs did not favor instruction & religion,
it would be almost impossible to get the attention of the
common people" (Chamberlain to Anderson, Aug. 17, 1825; also
Chamberlain to Anderson, Feb. 13, 1827, both in MsL). As
the missionaries conceptualized the Hawaiian chiefship
against the backdrop of European history and the struggle
between civil rulers and ecclesiastics, the system of
Hawaiian schools and religious instruction received the same
rationalized treatment. Retrospectively, in 1843, Sheldon
Dibble informed his readers that,

it probably would have been utterly impossible, in
those early times, to have restricted the power of the
chiefs to civil matters. They had never known any such
restriction. It has taken the civilized world a long
time to learn the province of civil government, as
distinct from the province of religious obligation. The
chiefs at the Sandwich Islands could not distinguish at
once, and they do not distinguish very clearly even now
(Dibble 1909, 210).
In fact, the missionaries arrived in Hawaii with their minds filled with similar ideas, in which religion was seen "as an engine of government," as Bingham put it (Bingham to Worcester, May 13, 1820, MsL; also Bingham 1849, 77; Ellis 1979, xvii). Not even the most liberal-minded missionary could attribute much value to this heathenish combination. The English missionary, William Ellis, always more sympathetic to Hawaiians than his American colleagues, did conclude from his experience of Hawaii in the early 1820s that the Hawaiians had been "an organized community for many generations." But, again, even in its antiquity, the organization was false and but little advanced "in the art of good government" (Ellis 1979, 309). The Americans, on the other hand, saw no trace of light: "The laws of society . . . are yet to be formed" (SIM to Evarts, Feb. 1, 1822, MsL).

It is clear that in the main the personal experiences of the missionaries only confirmed the stereotypical ideas they held of the political organization of a pagan society. But it seems that as long as the system of schools was holding together, this apparent perversion in the foundation of Hawaiian society did not surface in the missionary discourse but occasionally. But soon after Ka‘ahumanu’s

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4 We have already argued that during the 1820s the missionaries were forced to consider their own position in terms of church and state. However, this was a much more mission-centered discourse and only secondary attention was paid to the Hawaiian system. However, the post-Ka‘ahumanu
death a general theory of Hawaiian political organization was created, which is reflected in the correspondence and journals of the missionaries. Six months after Kaʻahumanu's funeral, Artemas Bishop, realizing that the number of scholars and churchgoers was in decline, wrote to the board that the universal attention of common people to palapala had been greatly aided by "a governmental influence" (Bishop to Anderson, Nov. 5, 1832, MsL). A few days later, the disillusioned Sheldon Dibble told the board about his conviction that the success of the mission had almost completely rested on the shoulders of the chiefs and hierarchic functioning of the Hawaiian society.

Interestingly enough, at the time of writing he was in Hilo, which was Kaʻahumanu's land:

A chief commands, or advises, (if you prefer the term without the meaning) the people obey. If it be to attend church, they attend; to study the word of God in schools, they study it; to purchase books, they purchase them; to become religious, they put on the "form of godliness." - If he neglects to command, they sit in indifference & inactivity. Such has been the condition of this people & such in a great measure it continues to be . . . There can be no doubt that much of the appearance of religion has been & still continues to be of a specious kind; in some cases a mere servile obedience to rulers, in other cases a sycophantic crouching for favor (Dibble to Anderson, Nov. 9, 1932, MsL, orig. emphasis).

discourse was oriented towards Hawaiians, mainly for two reasons. First, after the events of 1827 the mission was quite excluded from the rest of the foreign community, and second, the major threat to palapala came from inside the Hawaiian community.
If Ka‘ahumanu’s death marked a decline of the school system, then Kauikeaouli’s rise to the head of aupuni practically destroyed the whole system, or, as Dibble put it, the system "crumbled at once into ruins" (Dibble 1909, 249). The falling-off from the schools was indeed significant. The data from the Protestant missionary records show a decrease of well over 80 per cent in the school population between December, 1831 and June, 1838. The number of readers dropped from 23,000 to 10,000, or about 56 per cent, between June, 1832 and June 1834 (Schmitt 1977, 211). Similarly, there was a significant downward plunge in church admittance. In 1832, 235 Hawaiians were admitted to the Protestant church. Next year, when Kauikeaouli’s rebellion was full-blown, the number was down to 72. The year 1834 showed an upward curve again with 124 admitted persons (Sahlins 1992, 124).

Kauikeaouli’s heathen rebellion began around January, 1833 and gradually waned towards the end of 1834, although there were occasional bursts of anti-tabu acts through the mid-1830s. His method of restoring the ali‘i-ship to himself as the legitimate heir of Kamehameha consisted primarily of reviving traditional pastimes associated with the closing of temples during makahiki or the new year festival, such as hula and various games and sports, as well as sexual license and free drinking. According to a contemporary historian, violence, plunder and burning of
churches also occurred (Jarves 1843, 300). Kauikeaouli also formally declared void all the previously established Christian laws, except those prohibiting killing and theft and a few days later publicly took the reins of aupuni, yet making christian Kina‘u, who had inherited Ka‘ahumanu’s position, his effective co-ruler, the so-called kuhina nui (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, March 9, 15, 1833; F.O. & Ex., March 14, 1833). Kauikeaouli’s and Kina‘u’s unholy alliance was an effective check of the anti-tabu movement to the extent that it prevented Kauikeaouli from completely dismissing the new ways. It was also a proof of the strength of the Christian party, to which most of the Ka’ahumanu (now Kina‘u) chiefs still belonged.

Among the lesser chiefs and common Hawaiians Kauikeaouli’s rebellion was a welcome event. For, as Sahlins says, "the truly Hawaiian sovereignty was now represented by the suspension of tabu, that is, by outrages against the Protestant restrictions" (Sahlins 1992, 121). Kauikeaouli was leading "the second historic declaration of the abolition of the tabus" (Sahlins 1992, 123), which was a logical inversion of the rise of Ka’ahumanu mā. Just as the departure and death of Liholiho in 1824 had opened the scene for the new tabus, Ka’ahumanu’s death cleared the way for restoring the tabuless state and Kauikeaouli’s honor.

After some serious confrontations between the heathen party and the christian party, Kauikeaouli realized that
Kina'u and her associates were too firm in their cause for him ever to prevail alone at the top. His motives for giving up are not entirely clear, but in the latter part of 1834 he allowed Kina'u and Hoapili to stop the unchristian commotion. There followed some resolute distillery-breaking (Kamakau 1992a, 339-340) and in January next year, as a sign of truce, the island of O'ahu, which had been the primary locus of the rebellion, was given to Kina'u (Journal of Levi Chamberlain, Jan. 5, 1835). It is evident, however, that the school system did not recover until years later, although all the islands were now under Christian chiefs.

The final blow against the enemies of Jehovah came on December 30, 1836, when Kauikeaouli's sister Nāhi'ena'ena died at the age of 21. She had joined her brother in the rebellion by mating with him in the presence of their followers in Honolulu and continued the anti-Christian stance for the remaining years of her life. Moreover, Kauikeaouli's closest favorite, male lover and instigator, Kaomi, died soon after. In Dibble's words, Kauikeaouli "began to reflect and to change in a measure his course of conduct" (Dibble 1909, 254). After that Kauikeaouli moved to Lahaina, away from the temptations of Honolulu.5

5 For particulars of Kauikeaouli's rebellion, see Sahlins 1992, 121-125, which is by far the fullest account. See also Kame'eleihiwa 1992, 157-167 and Kamakau 1992a, 334-340.
7.1. The Missionary Theory of Oppression

The turbulent years, as these were called, involved a number of complex issues, ranging from tabu enforcement and intensified corvée labor to incest and succession. The events of 1832 to 1837 had, however, such a Hawaiian stamp on them that the missionaries could easily, despite the complexity and great number of issues, frame them according to their own progressivist social theory as signs of heathenism and ungodliness or, in milder cases, ignorance and stupidity. But for the missionaries, the essence of these 'disgraceful' events was still the lingering question of social contract, or how to make human society stand distinct from nature without introducing elements that would contravene natural reason. In concrete terms, Lord’s Supper and prayer meetings did not suffice anymore, particularly if the voluntary devotion had only been an illusion. The mission had to pay more attention to the molding of the social atom, the only true element of society, natural or political - the individual.

We have been making great calculation on seeing a nation grow up like a forest, & perfect itself as it grew, with the extraneous aid only of only [sic] a blow here & there to clip some ugly or unprofitable branch. God has of late been showing us that this is not the way; but that instead of trying to convert a nation, we should labour to save the individuals of which that nation is composed. We have had but little to do with individuals except the chiefs, & too much with the people en masse (Emerson to Anderson, Apr. 8, 1835, MsL).
The necessary voluntarism was indeed a hoax. Suddenly there was only a handful of devotees clinging to the mission church, and the masses of people who formerly filled the school rooms and spacious chapels were now hollow bones without the willing so badly needed in forming a society of equals. It has already been suggested that almost certainly for these Hawaiians Kauikeaouli's rebellion was a welcome change in their lives (see Sahlins 1992, 122), an anticipation of better times with more food and less toil and the end of unnatural suppression of all things desirable. In this sense, the mission was, at least partially, conceived of as having placed itself on the side of the Christian chiefs and the increased burdens of the labor system. Paradoxically, had the common people come into a closer contact with the missionaries, they could have

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6 An interesting occurrence of anti-missionary feeling among the common people was reported on Maui during Kauikeaouli's rebellion. According to Lorrin Andrews, a rumor had been circulated that the missionaries were growing rich at the expense of the people - that those who worked for the missionaries ought to be better paid - that the missionaries had more property than the chiefs &c. . . . This manifested itself in several cases of disobedience and a general coldness to me . . . For about three weeks in Oct. [1833] I was obliged to carry up on my own shoulders all the fuel we used for cooking, ironing &c from Lahaina a distance of two miles or pay a price equal to the original cost of the fuel . . . (Andrews to Anderson, oct. 1, 1834, MsL).

The mission physician on Maui, Alonzo Chapin, made a similar remark in October, 1833, and suggested that the missionaries should give up the lands they held from the chiefs in order to prove the disinterested cause of the mission (Chapin to Anderson, Oct. 6, 1833, MsL).
agreed with the missionary way of thinking that an ordered collectivism and its corollary effect, ritualism, has a tendency to produce falsehoods and lead to oligarchic and unwanted situations. Not that they would have possessed the individualist properties so much valued by the missionaries, had only the chiefs let them decide themselves, but that the pretended godliness, forced congregations and protracted church-building were a burden which should have been replaced by another kind of collectivism, supported by the values of reciprocality between the chiefs and the common people.

It is true, however, that the common Hawaiians found ways of surviving and even taking some advantage of the new collective situation. In an afterthought, Sheldon Dibble found empirical proof for such stratagems, conditioned by the chiefly structures but locally improvised by the common people.

A member of my congregation (Hilo) gave evidence of true conversion, and was admitted to the church. The following week I observed that almost all who came to converse with me used nearly the same language - there seemed to be a stereotype thought for the whole; and on examination I found that it was the substance of the last conversation which the newly-admitted member had with me just previous to her entering the church. She had communicated it to others as a thought of some prevalency [sic], and therefore each adopted it as his own (Dibble 1839, 148).

In the missionary sources common Hawaiians feature usually as anonymous groups or unidentified individuals passing through scenes of history. Accordingly, their lives
and motives are hardly ever presented directly. The missionaries, on the other hand, were ceaseless in explicating their own thoughts and motivations, although never completely detached from the Hawaiian context in which they were operating. In view of the latter, one could say that the understanding of the sociology of the schools and churches guided the missionary perception of what they called a political system. As the whole operation was chief-driven, as its main features revealed intense tabu enforcement and massive and geometrically organized population movements, without the least intelligible suggestion of genuine voluntarism on the part of the common people, the missionaries conceptualized the system as a despotism - a word that was already on James King's lips when he put together the experiences of the Cook expedition (Cook and King 1784, 158).

The hierarchic nature of the Hawaiian society was well-known to the missionaries (e.g., Bishop to Evarts, June 1, 1825; Levi Chamberlain to Evarts, July 26, 1826, both in MsL), but earlier, i.e., from 1825 to 1832, the apparent success of the mission and the somewhat naive trust in the prospects of change directed the missionary attention less to the Hawaiian social organization than to the substance of their own work and the disturbing elements from outside, that is, the mercantile community and sailors. The
heightened sense of hierarchy after 1832 is nicely reflected in a letter, again, from Dibble.

You have frequently been informed of the abject servitude not only of body, but also of mind in which this people are held to their formerly deified & still despotic chiefs; but it is difficult for the subjects of an enlightened & free government to form a just conception of the deep degradation & low vassallage [sic] in which a heathen intellect is held to the will of a despotic chieftain (Dibble to Anderson, Oct. 14, 1833, MsL).

Another missionary, Dwight Baldwin of Waimea, Hawai‘i, wrote to the same effect some weeks before Kauikeaouli’s rebellion had lost most of its edge.

This people have been greatly proven to trust in a round of mere external observances, often perhaps in a mere attendance on public worship, thinking it constituted them servants of God, while the heart was wholly neglected. Our efforts were therefore more directed to break up these false views, which stood in the way of the sinner’s coming Christ (Baldwin to ABCFM, Nov. 3, 1834, MsL).7

The false views were indeed breaking up, as the bubble had burst in the eyes of all concerned parties. The missionaries began to revise their strategy, the common Hawaiians, who had been offered a more attractive alternative, forsook palapala, and the chiefs, although still professed Christians, showed signs of easing their previously insistent demands of school and church attendance (Green to Anderson, Nov. 16, 1836, MsL). Besides, as the

7 Baldwin also recognized the significance of language: Where we attempted to portray the sinner’s guilt, we doubtless failed to give it all that point, which we shd in our own vernacular tongue (Baldwin to ABCFM, Nov. 3, 1834, MsL).
disillusioned missionaries attempted to organize new and independent schools and churches, they were forced to turn to the chiefs for donations, which never really materialized (The Polynesian, Dec. 28, 1844). Therefore, to a significant degree, the mission was to rely on the commoner contributions in their reorganization efforts, which necessarily produced only modest results, as the circulating money was tightly in the chiefly control.

These reforms were clearly heading towards realizing more consciously a system with a considerable Western genius. Yet, the structural features of Hawaiian society made it practically impossible to remove common Hawaiians from their traditional positions in the system of chiefship - or to establish effective and independent local units cut off from the pyramidal hierarchy. There was one issue that surfaced above all others as a result of these difficulties, namely, land and labor. The new focus on Hawaiians as individuals and their structurally conditioned lack of initiative was a direct cause of the taking up of the issues of land and labor by the mission. Lowell Smith, the missionary whom Kina'u in 1834 forced to take a station in 'Ewa, O'ahu, in an apparent move to check unchristian acts, began his missionary career amidst these new concerns. His journal entries from the mid-1830s have traces of personal hopelessness, but they equally well characterize
the problems that were now occupying the minds of the missionaries.

Such is the state of government among the Hawaiians that I almost despair of their ever becoming a working, industrious people, a people to be compared with Americans. When the present offensive form of government shall be done away, and another which shall render to all their due shall be substituted, then we may hope for a reformation in every department of society, and not till then (Journal of Lowell Smith, Aug. 4, 1833).

If the shackles were burst from this oppressed people and they had an opportunity to rise from the dust, degradation and ignorance, I think they would put forth one united, persevering and successful effort (Sept. 17, 1833).

It is very lonely about here these days the labouring part of community all being gone to Moanalua, making salt for the chiefs. They have been absent about three weeks. The taxes of the chiefs are intolerable! 0 that there might be a revolution in the government of these Islands. We can have no schools - but no schools house or meeting house for want of aid. All paa i ka hana no na 'lii [busy with the work for the chiefs] (Oct. 15, 1835).

For the evangelical Lockeans, it was a matter of some importance to become fully aware not only of the functioning of the chiefs’ power but also of the position that it had offered for the mission. The position was surely questionable from the missionary point of view. Thus, the missionaries’ gloom grew as a result of their increased self-understanding of the part played by them in a society that was a reversed image of their own ideal. In Hawaii everything radiated from the chiefs, worship as well as subsistence, which was a strong indicator that individual
freedom was suppressed and the enactment of political society clearly erratic.

This view was only confirmed by the extinction of the sandalwood trade about the time of Ka‘ahumanu’s death (Thrum 1904, 67). As this source of wealth was gradually lost, the insatiable chiefs reorganized the neglected production of staple food for the provisioning of whale ships, but this time with previously unknown intensity and coercion (Sahlins 1992, 108). Thus, it was obvious that the same force that had driven the masses to attend palapala was also preventing them from attaining the level of individuality prescribed by civilization. The collapse of the school system and the simultaneous decline of the sandalwood trade made this defect all the more visible. Another new missionary, Harvey Hitchcock, was quite upset after being two years in the field on the island of Moloka‘i:

As to the political condition of these islands it is in no enviable state. It is true that as it regards those oppressions which their ancient religion imposed on the people the times are now much better, but those coerced upon them by the cupidity of the chiefs are perhaps more intolerable [sic] than ever. The lands are all owned by the high chiefs, and given out by them to the lower ones, and by these distributed to the people who are to cultivate them & whose only freedom is to submit

8 The Hawaiian organization of trade had of course attracted missionary attention much earlier. In a letter to the mission board, Artemas Bishop predicted that "should personal property be guaranteed to the common people as their inviolable right such a spur would be given to industry as has hitherto been unknown" (Bishop to Evarts, June 1, 1825, MsL). But, again, the 1830s differed from the previous years in that the commercial life of Hawaiians became an essential part of the missionary concerns.
unconditionally to the exactions of their landlords or to leave their lands and do worse. Even dilatoriness to pay an enormous demand is sometimes followed by the ejectment of the whole population of the district who when thus ejected have no right to a morcel [sic] of food on the land, and would be treated as thieves [sic] were they to satisfy their hunger out of the fruits of their own labours. There are indeed a few individuals who are honourable exceptions to the above oppressive character. But the fact that these remarks apply to the most of those in authority will give you [end of page, words missing?] to their character as christians without farther comment (Hitchcock, Notebook, Nov. 1, 1834).

It is not very likely that the missionaries merely projected their prejudices and created a distorted or ideological image of the chiefship, either to better serve their own project or out of sheer ignorance and unwillingness to see any value in the Hawaiian way of life. Besides other accounts that give similar details (e.g., Newburgh 1835; he dated his journal only six months after Hitchcock's), there is a more speculative reason not to disqualify missionary material in this respect. By merely describing relations of land ownership and intensified corvée labor, the missionaries were privately engaging in a sort of criticism that would have otherwise seriously compromised their rapport with the chiefs. Furthermore, an analysis of the chiefship's practices provided the missionaries the elementary knowledge they needed in their future attempts to alter it. If a missionary wrote about idleness and poverty as "the only defensive means" the common people had at their disposal to "avoid many heavy exactions which would otherwise be laid on them" (Bishop
1838, 57), we may well assume that besides the voice of the missionary we also hear that of the common Hawaiian.

As we know, the missionaries had conceptualized the chiefship by using typically Lockean tools, church and state. James Jackson, who was well versed in the missionary sentiment, testified to the missionaries' motives to keep the two separate, particularly after the initial success could be seen from the distance created by the immediate post-Ka'ahumanu events. As the aupuni was a totality of centralized order, the chiefs' edicts, no matter how minor (they were never insignificant), also carried a more universal meaning in them than the foreigners were used to think. The same universal dimension was entangled in the

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9 It has been argued that the missionaries exaggerated the divinity of the chiefs by elevating them to the status of real gods. There are two related reasons for this suggestion. First, as the first commandment clearly states, Jehovah is the only god, a transcendental being, who later evolved into a trinity and who was pushed even further away from profane matters by the Reformation. In this light it was naturally a shock for the Calvinist missionaries to see images of gods and high chiefs worshipped as if they were real gods. It is more than likely that the missionaries could not perfectly understand the honors and respect that were paid to the chiefs as their appearance signalled a greatest awe. The missionaries never actually witnessed this, since they arrived after the abolition of the tabu system, but they were well versed in that tradition and also furnished with an evangelical image of the heathen, whose dark mind could have very well produced fancies such as human gods. Second, the missionaries could have exaggerated the chiefly status to embellish their own work, which they saw as a parallel to no less than that of Moses destroying the golden calf. Sociologically this argument seems viable, but only if one essential weakness can be removed. Basically, to question the divine or godly status of the Hawaiian chiefs is to implicitly project a Western idea of transcendental god. The Hawaiian natural universe was quite
moral laws as well as work orders, in soil as well as people. When this became distinctly understood, the mission "was to widen these distinctions [church and state], and enlarge the liberty of the subject" (Jarves 1843, 250). Thus, in this line of thought, a corrupted relation between church and state can amount to a sort of divine dictatorship, which is extremely destructive of all individual liberties and vital preconditions of civilization. And as the most penetrating of all Hawaiian institutions, the corvée labor system, was seen to function on such a basis, it was quite inevitable that the missionary representations of Hawaiian politics took a turn towards economic discourse.

In conclusion, the theory of oppression, through which the Hawaiian aupuni was viewed by the missionaries (and others as well), combined observations (abuses of chiefly power) and social theory (Lockean model). The theory, when communicated and translated, was an important mediating force in the later changes of the chiefship, the perversion of which was seen as the basic hindrance for the advancement different, filled with divinity and personifications of gods. Considering this, it is evident that the argument has been polarized into two incommensurable structures. Instead of supporting either of the poles, I propose a third way, which overcomes the difficulty of polar arguments. To say that the Hawaiian chiefs were divine is not to say that they were gods, nor is it to say that they were not gods. It only claims that they had divine qualities that were associated with gods and had direct connection to the realm of gods. It also indicates that the boundary between humans and gods was fluid and elusive on the level of the highest chiefs.
of civilization, natural society and economic ontology. All the negative qualifiers attached to the chiefship - arbitrariness, oppression and despotism - that gave it a new coherence in the foreigners' thinking, were coexistent with the great disillusionment suffered by the mission, without which the excesses of the chiefship might have received much less attention and without which the Lockean social theory might have remained silent. For the development of political comparisons, it was quite essential that the missionaries realized how closely they had been united with the chiefs. As such a union should be avoided in the future, more attention was paid to the power of the chiefs, terms of ownership and land relations and the overblown labor system. The tenor of this historical process from 1825 through the 1830s was the structural position of the mission, which produced the controversial issue of church and state. The same conceptual separation was used in defining the missionaries' own identity, in their defense against the residents and finally in representing the Hawaiian chiefship. However, it was not merely a private representation, as the images were also involved in real life. Thus, while the preconceptions of the missionaries were being confirmed, they were also forged into a relatively well-structured discourse, which was shared by other foreigners. The existence of a political system in the comparative sense was proven again by reversing the
social process that made politics a collective cognitive object in the 1820s.

7.2. God of Commerce and Applied Theology

Hawaiian despotism, which became a primary concern of the mission after Ka'ahumanu's death, was represented in a language resembling, or actually duplicating, the Lockean interpretation of the birth of human culture. As Locke put it in his Second Treatise,

> Whatsoever then he [man] removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by his labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For his Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others (The Second Treatise of Government, V, 28).

In the Lockean treatment, the beginning of culture as property was also the beginning of laws and government, that is, politics. Thus, the Hawaiian despotism was really a grave mistake of a very old type likened to original sin, now only transposed to political life and the process of converting the state of nature, or natural society, into political society without perverting and endangering the laws of nature. As the chiefs' claims of corvée services were increasing, the nightmarish scene of nature's extinction was revealed to the missionaries in all its
horrors. In Hawaii, there was no private property in the foreigners' sense of the term, hence there was no proper foundation for enacting naturally based political society. The appropriation of nature, or the natural resources, was concentrated in the hands of the chiefs, and as such it represented an incompatible breach of nature, God's law.

So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave Authority so far to appropriate. And the Condition of Humane Life, which requires Labour and Materials to work on, necessarily introduces private Possessions (The Second Treatise of Government, V, 35).

It was not an easy task for a true believer to witness his hosts, on whom his own project fundamentally depended, serving Christian God while grabbing everything of value for themselves (Levi Chamberlain to Anderson, Dec. 11, 1832, MsL). What made it all look even worse was the chiefs' neotraditional habit of accumulating huge quantities of goods, which they occasionally distributed among their favorites, but more often kept behind closed doors. Thus, not even the grabbing showed signs of rational behavior; it was all ruthless exploitation and jealousy, manifested in rotting store houses and the incidental floating piles of Chinese silk in the coastal waters.

As the Hawaiian logic of chiefly consumption was geared to competitive display more than subsistence use, this was only to be expected. But there were more difficulties to come as Hawaii became an object in foreign capitalist plans in the mid-1830s. While the constantly diminishing number
of common people grumbled under their lords, dragging as much as possible, the foreign chiefs were on the rise, more powerful than Kūali‘i or Kamehameha had ever been. The tough competition among the merchants induced several foreigners to turn to agriculture and obtain leases from Kauikeaouli, who was decidedly against the practically permanent commitments. His stance was conservative and consistent with the traditional prerogatives of the paramount chief. In 1834, he had this to say to Kaikio‘ewa, the head of Kaua‘i, who was considering a haole lease: "And if we wish to discharge the foreigners, we can take the land back. Do not give land away permanently (A i manao no kakou e hemo no ia alaila no lawe mai. Mai haawi lilo loa oe i ka aina)" (Kauikeaouli to Kaikio‘ewa, Oct. 24, 1834, M-59/AH).

In 1835, however, the policy was altered and gradually foreigners began to lease tracts of land. The firm that set the future trend, Ladd and Company, had a benevolent if not pious reputation, mostly through Peter Brinsmade, who was a student at Andover Theological Seminary and Yale Divinity School. He also served as the United States commercial agent in Hawaii from 1838 to 1846. With the help of Brinsmade’s known interest in religion and reform, the young owners succeeded in securing missionary support in contracting the lease from Kauikeaouli. Even though the lease was "a special privilege," as Bradley says (Bradley 1968, 239), it was also a positive signal for the
prospective agriculturalists, mostly sugar growers, who had felt the trade slump of the late 1830s and were looking for new ways to prosperity.\footnote{The difficulties that Peter Brinsmade, William Hooper and William Ladd encountered in getting their sugar business started were most certainly noted also by the missionaries, to whom the events at Kōloa must have been another signal of the despotic powers of the chiefly system. In an apparent bid to prevent their white competitors to enrich themselves too much and too fast, the Kaua‘i chiefs imposed several tabus on wild cane, fire wood, water and plantation workers. In addition to this, the new entrepreneurs had to deal with the native habits of work, which quite faithfully repeated the pattern of resistance they were accustomed while working for the chiefs. In 1836, Hooper summarized the difficulties in his diary, not forgetting to mention the higher cause of the plantation:

I have had more annoyance from the chiefs and difficulties with the natives . . . than I ever thought it possible for a white man to bear. Nevertheless, I have succeeded in bringing about a plan, which, if followed up . . . will eventually emancipate the natives from the miserable system of cheap labor, which has ever existed at these islands (quoted in Alexander 1937, 6).

James Jarves, who visited Kōloa in 1837, wrote, while indeed realizing the difficulties, that the native workers were "the envy of the whole island," mainly because of their salaries. He also reported that the paid work created a lucrative alternative to the chiefs’ working days, thus forming a serious threat to the honor of the chiefs. Jarves was moderately excited by what he saw at Kōloa, so that he could even predict the eventual downfall of "the present despotic system of government," as the natives "are becoming to comprehend their own rights and importance in the scale of political economy." As a kind of prelude to the future events, Jarves quoted a native worker: "He [Hooper] has got by his industry, plenty of waiwai, (property;) now if the chiefs do not take it away from him, we will try to accumulate some also" (Jarves 1838, 71-74).}

The declining trade in Hawaii was an overseas reflection of the serious recession of 1837. In Hawaii, whaling fleets had been shrinking almost continuously from

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1833, and the development culminated in 1838, when the tide of recession reached the Hawaiian harbors (The Friend, June 1, 1844; Bradley 1968, 216-220). For the chiefs the recession and the declining whaling industry meant a similar decline in their revenue as the number of visiting ships dropped. We already know from the missionary and other accounts that the ultimate sufferers were the common Hawaiians, who had to labor twice as much to compensate the declining wealth of the chiefs. Generally, the mission was quiet on the intensity of the commoner discontent, yet we have Lowell Smith’s opinion from late 1837 that the people in his parishes, and perhaps elsewhere, were extremely distressed and unwilling to support the system (Smith to Anderson, Nov. 20, 1837, MsL).

The most outspoken Hawaiian critic at the time, Davida Malo, launched the hardest native words (although his essay was published in English) against the chiefs’ growing hunger. In Hawaiian terms, Malo was aiming at the painful spot of the chiefship, the mutual harmony and care, the famous aloha, that ideally should have existed between the chiefs and their people. According to Malo, the taxing and fining chiefs, deeply indebted to the foreign merchants, "seem to have left caring for the people." As a result of the illegitimate use of the chiefship, "some of the people are losing their attachment to the land of their birth" (Malo 1839, 126-127; see Belcher 1970, I, 269-270). For a
Hawaiian, these were serious words. The missionary translator of Malo's essay remarked in a footnote, generally agreeing with Malo, that while the people were diminishing "the wants of the chiefs were increasing; so that besides supporting the chiefs as formerly, the people must now pay the extra expenses which have been incurred, in consequence of a change of habits in the chiefs" (Malo 1839, 126, fn).

The mission thus had two novel enemies. First, there were the hungry chiefs, the patrons of the mission. While in nineteenth-century Europe private property was protected against the people, as Polanyi says (1957, 225), in Hawaii the defense was reversed. Property was to be protected against the rulers, which, again, adding to the missionaries' sense of reliving their own cultural past, reminds us of the situation in England before the revolution. More precisely, private property was to be invented for the common Hawaiians and then protected.

Second, to accomplish anything for the people, they had to be protected against the foreigners, some of whom entertained the possibility of large-scale agricultural production if not an outright colonization. And whenever a warship was in the Hawaiian waters some trouble would ensue, predominantly to the disadvantage of the chiefs, whose methods of business were rarely appreciated by the foreigners.
These structural constraints - commoner discontent and its corollary effect, inefficient labor (see Sahlins 1992, esp. 114, 149), foreign agricultural designs, visits of warships and worldwide recession - formed the context in which the mission operated in the latter half of the 1830s, trying to revive the glory days, but only this time without directly serving the needs of the chiefship. Apparently there was much talk about advising the chiefs, who were losing the support of their own people and being harassed by foreign naval forces. But no systematic effort was made by the missionaries to set the political society on its prescribed course until 1836, when the mission composed a long statement to the Boston board, suggesting various kinds of reforms. The reforms were mainly intended for the encouragement of change in the chiefship as laid down in the tenets of classical political economy and embellished with divine sanctions. In their statement, the missionaries interpreted the structural context of their apparent failure to control their own work as if the issue of land and labor was merely a matter of education.

... But the improvements in the civil policy of the government, and in the science of political economy, have by no means kept pace with the progress of Christianity ... The reception of Gospel by the majority of the royal family did not abrogate their hereditary title to the soil; and though the Bible inculcates justice in rulers, it does not show the modus operandi; - it does nor prescribe the form of government, nor direct the specific methods of administration ... They need competent instruction immediately in the science of government, in order to promote industry, to secure ample means of support, and
to protect the just rights of all . . . The sentiment seems to be of ancient date, that "the sovereign cannot govern chieftains whose lands are not at his control, and that hereditary chiefs cannot easily govern independent landholders under them." This principle is not eradicated by the introduction of the Gospel, and it will probably yield only to the progress of moral and intellectual improvement (SIM 1836a, orig. emphasis).

This was a bold statement as the missionaries were instructed to observe the boundaries of politics and not to cross the borderline. The statement was drawn in July, and in August the mission solicited the approval of the impoverished chiefs to proceed with the scheme. In August, the chiefs dictated their will and approval to William Richards, who had been selected in June to visit the congregational circles at home and present there the views of the mission and to procure the desired teachers (Journal of Reuben Tinker, June 28 and 30, 1836). Among the various artisans the chiefs wished to be sent to Hawaii, was a teacher of land matters ("he kumu ao i na 'ili ma na mea o ka aina") (Hawaiian chiefs 1836, HP/HMCS). 11

11 In the instructions the mission, or more properly Bingham, drafted for Richards, the idea of the close correlation of godliness and political system was confirmed once more:

It being the general conviction of the mission that christian philanthropy requires a great increase of attention in the agriculture, manufactures, commerce, government &c of the Sandwich Islands, & that philanthropists may now may [sic] very properly be invited to engage personally, in the business of cultivating the arts, & improving the political economy of the Islands on the principles of benevolence . . . (SIM 1836b).
Richards left Hawaii in early December and returned some 15 months later without the requested teachers. On June 6, 1837, he had presented the memorial to the mission board in Boston, but without success (Journal of William Richards, June 6, 1837). After that he toured several of the eastern states, but, again, without being able to promote his cause. 12 While Richards was away, the chiefs asked Lorrin Andrews to become their teacher, which he, however, declined after several weeks of meditation and returned to the principalship of Lahainaluna (Journal of Reuben Tinker, June 5, Sept. 18, 1837; Journal of Lowell Smith, Aug. 19, 1837). When Richards returned, it became evident that he would himself assume the position of the teacher for the chiefs. This was first discussed with the chiefs in Kailua, Hawai‘i, in May and confirmed by the delegate meeting of the mission in June. Richards related the details in a long letter to the mission board:

But before the mission can be fully supported by the nation, the chiefs and people must have more instruction on the means of Production. This subject, or rather the general subject of Political Economy is every day increasing in importance, and the time has arrived when the rulers of the nation must have instruction on that subject. There is but one feeling in the mission in relation to it. How to provide that instruction has at length become a desideratum in our minds. The king & chiefs are fully impressed with a

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12 In August, he wrote his missionary colleagues in Hawaii that he found many people interested in "the subject of Political Economy at the Sandwich Islands," but, still, the threshold of leaving was too high for the moment (Richards to the Members of the Sandwich Islands Mission, Aug. 1, 1837, MsL).
sense of the importance of this subject and have said much to us about it. They waited my return with anxiety & when they found their request sent by me to the U.S.A. was not complied with they immediate [sic] requested me to become their teacher, and offered to support me if I would do it. Indeed it was suggested to me by the brethren on my arrival that they were designing to do it. When the request was made, I laid the subject before the brethren and their views were alike. They considered the subject of vast importance and wished to see a man devoted to it, but did not consider it as embraced directly in the objects of the Board. They therefore left me to my own discretion. After considering the subject thoroughly with the king & chiefs, I at length accepted the appointment and now act as "chaplain teacher and Translator" for the king. He has engaged to give me six hundred dollars a year, but I am not to be removed from Lahaina. I continue to preach three times a week, but do not act as the pastor of the church. I consider the king & those directly connected with him, as my special charge. I completed my agreement with the king on the 3rd of July, and immediately commenced translating Wayland's Political Economy, or rather compiling a work on Political Economy of which Wayland's is the basis. I prepare the work in the form of Lectures & spend two hours every day with the king & chiefs in reading these lectures and in conversation on practical subjects naturally introduced by the lectures. They also expect from me free suggestions on every subject connected with government and on their duties as rulers of the nation, and in all important cases I am to be not only translator, but must act as interpreter for the king. These things you will perceive do now, and will continue to occupy all my time except on the sabbath and that limited proportion devoted to preparation for the pulpit. It has been considerably trying to my feelings to turn aside in so great a degree from what is the more common and appropriate business of the missionary. But I am satisfied that the spiritual as well as the temporal good of the nation requires it, or at least require, that some one should be devoted to the business in which I am now engaged. The nation can not long exist without it. The people can not support the gospel without it. There can not be a nation of consistent christians without industry, and for the encouragement of that there must be plans laid . . .

You therefore perceive the reasons why I am pursuing this new course. The king & chiefs fixed their eye on me while I was in America and my brethren to some extent did the same. The prospect of actually effecting something for the good of the nation is at
present flattering. If this course is not successful, we know not what can be done. I have thus particular in order that you may see whether I am violating the principles of the Board or the instructions given to their missionaries (Richards to Anderson, Aug. 1, 1838, HP/HMCS, orig. emphasis; see also Richards 1942).

It is interesting to notice that in this early letter Richards framed his undertakings as being a prelude to independent native churches, as they would be supported from privately owned property of common Hawaiians and not supplied by the chiefly network. In other words, church and state would be finally separated by means of introducing a universal class of landed proprietors. In practice, however, it was difficult to see the difference as far as reforms were articulated in religious language, the only means of communication really available to the missionaries. By that time, also the Christian Hawaiians had learned to connect the liberalizing reforms and the word of God, so that political economy appeared indeed as resting on divine shoulders.

While the chiefs and Richards were holding their conference in Kailua, Toma Hōpū, one of the original native helpers for the missionaries, wrote to Kauikeaouli criticizing the chiefs' oppressive course - just as Malo did a year later - and made it quite clear that God was disapproving the old system of forced labor. With some advice on taxation, the letter was otherwise filled with biblical images of sin and destruction. Amidst the pleas for relaxing the intense demands of work, Hōpū, with a touch
of discreet diplomacy, portrayed a future state in which the chiefs might go without followers, who would rather leave their homes than continue under their chiefs. As God had apparently heard the complaints of the common Hawaiians, there was indeed no time to be wasted, for the wrath of God was strong enough to sink "these islands into the depth of Gehenna" (Hōpū to Kauikeaouli, May 21, 1838, IDM/AH, Box 1). 13

If the chiefs were less concerned with the idea of Hell than the truly converted native intellectuals, they were more likely to be alarmed by their declining popularity and diminishing wealth. Sahlins has proposed that the so-called

13 Malo had, in fact, been the first Hawaiian to complain in public about the chiefs' excesses. In 1837, he wrote a public letter for the native paper Ke Kumu Hawaii, a letter that, unlike his essay of 1839, went untranslated and was thus explicitly directed to a native audience. As a christianized Hawaiian, Malo's frame was derived from the Bible, and although his subject was the arrival of Christianity at Hawaii, the letter contained strong criticism of the chiefs' practices. For example,

Eia kekahi; mai hookaumaha loa i ka hewa maluna o na kanaka Hawaii, a hoomama i ka hewa o kanaka o na aina e mai; a mai hookaumaha i na makaainana, a hoomama i na 'lii, a mai hookaumaha i na ilihune, a hoola i na punahele, aka, eia ka pono, o ke kaumaha like, a me ka mama like, mai na makaainana a na lii, mai na kamaaina, a na malihini.

Here is another thing; do not exclusively burden the Hawaiian people with [your] wrongdoings while easing the load of foreigners; and do not burden the common people while easing the living of the chiefs; and do not burden the poor while saving the favorites. Instead, this is the right way, equal burdens and reliefs to the common people as well as the chiefs, to the long-term residents as well as the newcomers (Malo 1837, 52, my translation).
Great Awakening, the mass-scale religious revival between 1837 and 1839, was not simply a religious event but more precisely a protest movement through which the common people snatched the Christian god from the chiefs (Sahlins 1992, 127-129). It is possible to understand - at least partly and in lack of explicit documentation - the interest in changing the form of chiefship in this particular light of popular resistance. At the very least, the revival coincided with the intensification of labor and plans to alter the chiefly rule. At the height of the revival and fiscal slump, William Richards began his work of crafting political economy, Bible and the Hawaiian traditional practices into a single continuum leading to prosperity and civilization.

14 Dwight Baldwin, the missionary in Lahaina, Maui, gave the following description of the common people's religious interests in August, 1838:

During the week of the meetings, all business was, as if by instinct, suspended. Even the work of preparing food, to which hunger prompts, was not attended to. It was observed that no fires for cooking were kindled in all the place - a change which even positive orders from their chiefs would hardly have effected at any other time. The whole population seemed during this week, to view the time as a Sabbath (quoted in Alexander 1953, 89).

If we consider that also the chiefs' labor dues were disrupted and that the common people generally thought of it as the "time of turning to the pono" (Baldwin in Alexander 1953, 95), we might also get some idea of the common people's understanding of pono as a general epithet for Christianity.
As Locke had done 150 years earlier, Richards began his lecturing by pointing out the fundamentals of human culture.¹⁵ His first difficulty was to make the chiefs understand that they were essentially not different from the common Hawaiians in respect of appropriation of nature. In order to achieve this, Richards outlined what could be termed a political theory of desire. He set out to define—or, as he thought, to redefine—the meaning of wealth (waiwai). For Richards, wealth consisted not merely of those things that were necessary for subsistence but of all things that people desired, providing that they were beneficial to morally sound life (Richards 1839, 18). The next step was to deduce that as wealth requires human agency—as gratification of human desire transforms the pure elements of nature into wealth—it is reasonable to assume that all humans are entitled to equal opportunity to produce wealth for their own use:

Aole nae he waiwai na mea i waiho wale ia . . . A loaa i ko ke kanaka lima, alaila, lilo ia mau mea, i waiwai; aoke waiwai i ka wa e waiho wale ana. I ole e loaa i ka lima, aole e ko ko ke kanaka makemake; aole ia e hooluoluia. A loaa ia ia, alaila, ua ko kona makemake; ua oluolu oia; ua waiwai hoi ia.

Things that merely exist by themselves are not wealth . . . When they are taken by human hand, then they become wealth; they are not wealth during the time they just lie by themselves [i.e., in the state of nature]. If

¹⁵ It is impossible to present the contents of Richards’ lectures in full detail. Here I shall concentrate merely on the major theoretical points as they will help us understand the cultural context of these ideas and their connection to Hawaiian structures of meaning.
they are not taken by human hand, the desire is not fulfilled; it is not satisfied. When the object is obtained, the person's desire is fulfilled; he is satisfied; he is also wealthy (Richards 1839, 19, my translation).

The theoretical myth that Richards used in founding the basics of human existence was again drawn on the Lockean type applied theology. At the time of the creation of people, there were just things that God had made, hence there was no wealth. But as humans multiplied and grew in knowledge, they also began to appropriate nature that God has given to them. Wherever the human hand was found to have united with the God-given resources, there was wealth (35-36). A theory such as this could not function properly if the wealth produced by the great majority of people was reappropriated by the rulers. Thus,

Aole i hoono ho mai ke Akua i na kanaka i poe hana na na’līi, a i mea e waiwai ai na’līi. Ua haawi mai ke Akua i ka oihana ali i i mea e pomaikai ai na kanaka i mea ho i e pono ai ka aina.

God did not create people to work for the chiefs and to enrich the chiefs. God gave the office of the chief as to bless the common people and also to benefit the land (Richards 1839, 64, my translation).

Here, Richards was approaching the language used by the native intellectuals, when they reminded the chiefs of their traditionally expected obligations of reciprocity. It is quite likely that this part was most strongly felt by Richards' high-ranking students, as the means to return to peacefulness and prosperity were spelled out for them in a context that rather formed a link to the long-lost past than
a radical break with it (remember the missionary theory of the origin of idolatry). It is almost too brilliant how Richards made use of legendary figures, such as George Washington (Kanaloaahokana in Hawaiian), whose words, as rendered by Richards, echoed exactly those sentiments that we find in the writings of commoner spokesmen, such as Malo. For example,

Eia ka olelo a Kanaloaahokana. "O ka pono o ke Akua, a me ka pono o ka noho ana, oia wale no na koo e paa ai ka aina me ka pomaikai . . . Mai manao hoi kakou e hiki ke hooponopono i ka noho ana, ke oiaio ole ka malama ana i ke Akua."

Here are the words of Washington. "The righteousness of God and the righteousness of ruling, those are the only supports that will fill the land with blessing . . . Let us not think that it is possible to adjust the ruling if God's will is not faithfully observed" (Richards 1839, 122, my translation).

Although it may appear that Richards was infantilizing Hawaiians by relating obvious facts as if they were not already known - that, for instance, the wealthiest countries were also Christian - this can be supported only by way of an anachronistic reduction. As I have suggested earlier, also Richards, in his lecturing and translating, was largely conditioned by the Hawaiian concepts which had a cultural link, despite the attempts of redefinition, to a larger historical context, which could not be eliminated from the scene of communication. Consider, for example, the following:

Aole hoi e mau ka malu ana, a me ka kuapapanui ana o ka aina, ke malama ole ia ka pono. O ka pono o na 'ili, a me na kanaka, oia wale no ke kumu e paa ai na kanawai,
Protection and peace (malu) and the unified rule will not be endured if the right duties (pono) are not observed. The duties of the chiefs and the duties of the common people are the only source of making the laws and government (aupuni) permanent. The wrongdoings are like the polluted wind and the polluted water which will make people sick. It will also make the government (aupuni) sick. The good wind and the good water will strengthen people. Such is the proper conduct when it is observed. By this the government (aupuni) will be strengthened and will endure (Richards 1839, 123, my translation).

Moreover, infantalizing receded into the background as soon as Richards turned to the heart of the problem, the common people's growing discontent. This he never put directly in writing, in form of a critical attack, yet he brought out the effects of the lack of motivation among the common people.

Ua maopopo ka pili ana o keia olelo i na kanaka o keia aina. Aole hiki i ke kanaka ke hana i loi nui, a maikai, no ka mea, makau oia o lilo, a laweia ka aina, a make hewa ka hana ana.

The pertaining of these words to the people of this land is known. People cannot make big and excellent taro patches, because they are afraid that the produce will go to another and the land will be taken away and the work will be in vain (Richards 1839, 136, my translation).\(^{16}\)

\(^{16}\) In his report to the commander of the United States Exploring Expedition, Charles Wilkes, in 1841, Richards was more direct, perhaps disappointedly, since the reforms were taking root very slowly. According to him,

... even to the present day, it is next to impossible to convince the elder chiefs that authority and
The political economy of this type was, however, not based on the efficacy of the invisible hand or the public benefits of private vices, but, rather, the profit motive was made an

subordinations can be maintained by any other means. An old chief said to me, "If we can not take away their [the common people's] lands, what will they care for us? They will be as rich as we." . . . no landholder considered himself safe in his possessions, and therefore even ridiculed the idea of making extensive improvements (Richards 1973, 23).

More than anything else, this evaluation seems to reflect an altered condition in the chief-commoner relations, as the intensified competition between the chiefs led to intensified relations of production, thus undermining the traditionally respected values of reciprocity and care. These issues were on the table already in 1838 when Richards was conducting his school of political economy (or Kauikeaouli's, to be more precise). Thus,

I keia aina, ua lilo ka poe hoomalu i ka waiwai, i poe lawe i ka waiwai. Aole ikaika na kanaka i ka hana, aole hoi e nui ka waiwai o ka aina . . . Ua manao kekahi alii, ina hoopauia kela hana, alaila, pau ka waiwai nui o na 'llii, a pau ko lakou noho alii ana. No ka naaupo ia manao.

In this land [Hawaii], the governing people (po'e ho'omalu) have become wealthy, a wealth-grabbing people. The [common] people are not diligent at work, and there are not much wealth in the land . . . Some chiefs think that if the present practices are ended the riches of the chiefs are also gone and their ruling is a thing of the past. These thoughts belong to ignorance (Richards 1839, 140, my translation).

To assure the chiefs of the benefits of reform, Richards rehearsed the feudal history of England, to which he likened the traditional land system in Hawaii. In this line of thought, Magna Charta and the abrogation of feudal relations were enough to prove that the source of English wealth was in the land reform, which was itself based on a religious reform. In the final analysis, the word of God was again the guarantee of wealth and longevity of government: Ina aole hooihiki ke alii pela, aole paha loaa ia ia ke aupuni. If the king did not allow [the observance of the word of God], perhaps he might not get the government (aupuni) (Richards 1839, 141, my translation).
extension of a form of worship. And as the profit motive was itself made an intimate part of a lasting *aupuni*, the intelligibility of Richards' narration was more than apparent - to such an extent that we are not risking anything in suggesting that he, as a specialist in the affairs of the foreign lands, was restoring the Hawaiian society to its original and culturally superior condition. This was true both for the chiefs and the missionaries, for they all, in their own separate ways, shared an understanding of human history as a mythical totality, in which there was a beginning, a loss and a recovery. To regain the original human condition as an appropriating animal, nothing less than true godliness was required, as Richards clearly recommended:

Eia ka mea mua e malu ai ka waiwai, o ka manao i ke Akua, a me ka mea i hoikeia mai iloko o ka olelo a ke Akua. Ina manao na 'lii e imi i ka mea e malu ai ka waiwai, a me ka aina, pono ia lakou e imi i ka mea e huli ai na kanaka i ka pono. Ina e huli io na kanaka i ke Akua, alaila, pau koke ke kolohe, a me ka mea e hewa'i, a malu maoli no ka waiwai. Ina ma ka hewa na kanaka a pau, alaila, make hewa na kanawai.

Here is the most important thing that will protect wealth, thinking of God and of those things that are shown in the word of God. If the chiefs are considering the seeking of means to protect wealth and land, they should seek the means to turn the people to the right [pono, meaning the Christian moral code, JM]. If the people will truly turn to God, then, mischievousness and the things that cause harm will be at end and wealth will be really protected. If all the people are in the wrong, then, the laws are in vain (Richards 1839, 137, my translation).

This was the ultimate object of the system of practices Richards called *kālaiʻaina*. In the begin of his lectures
Richards defined the word, referring to "na kakaolelo kahiko," or the old-time counsellors, as "the adjustment of land in order to enrich" (O ka hooponopono ana i na aina, i mea e waivai ai). In turn, land was defined as "various things that will enrich the multitude of people" (O kela mea keia mea e waivai ai na kanaka he nui) (Richards 1839, 18, my translation). In order to produce a logically hermetic system, Richards harnessed kālai‘āina to the service of God and the fulfillment of God’s laws (Richards 1839, 146), so that nothing of what went by the name political economy in the West was in fact directly translated. The modification was extended even to elections and principles of democratic government. As an introduction to the theory of elections, Richards made a reference to one of the laws of God, namely, that knowledge universally precedes wealth (Richards 1839, 157). And as this was true by nature, no one ill versed in palapala should be given say in the matters of government:

O ka poe ike ole i ka palapala, pono e hoole ia lakou, aole a lakou olelo no na mea o ke aupuni. Ma na aina pono, ua koho maoli ia kekahi poe ali'i ku'i, e na kanaka. A o kela poe i kohoia, ia lakou no kekahi olelo no ke aupuni. Ia lakou ka olelo nui no ka auhau ana. Aka, aole e pono ka poe ike ole i ka palapala e koho. O ka poe ike wale no. Ina pela ka hana ana, alaila, e makemake no na kanaka a pau e ike i ka palapala, i loaa ia lakou kekahi olelo no ke aupuni.

As to those who do not know how to read and write it is proper to deny the right to have a say in the affairs of government (aupuni). In the righteous lands some people are genuinely chosen by the people to become crafted chiefs. These chosen people have a say in the affairs of government (aupuni). They can decide on taxing. But, it is not proper for those who do not know how to read and write to choose. It is proper only for
those who know. If this is the method of conducting these affairs, all the people will want to learn in order that they would have a say in the affairs of government (aupuni) (Richards 1839, 162, my translation).”

This was not only an attempt to reason the fundamentals of political society on the model of the contract, but also a secondary circuit – an incentive – to effect the presence of God through acquisition of knowledge as means to prosperity. The same was substantially true in other respects. The principles of ownership, land rent, capital investment, paper money, interest, wages, etc., were first poured into a theological system and then, by way of a detour in the traditional values of chiefship, they were reinserted to the present state of palapala, in which the chiefs were rapidly losing their leading role as the worshippers for the people.

Richards’ school of political economy was by far the most systematic attempt to initiate a cross-cultural project in bringing the conceptual spheres of Hawaiians and foreigners to a common level of understanding. Yet, the leading chiefs’ adoption of the laws of Jehovah and Richards’ own profession as a missionary practically prevented him from diverting too much from the universalizing myth of the values of Kahiki. These values

17 When elections became an established part of the structure of the transformed chiefship in the early 1850s, the word of God and its different interpretations gathered momentum at the polls (e.g., IDM/AH, Box 1, nos. 71, 75).
had years ago encompassed his own idea of the conversion as a return to the good life. It was principally for this reason that the fundamental focus was again on aupuni and its sacred foundations - not on human sacrifice, which belonged to the period of fall from the grace of God, but on the ownership of land and the correctly sanctioned appropriation of nature, which were the last hidden resources of the foreigners' god. We have learnt that even democratic elections were purged from its purified sense of sharing power and made only an accomplice in attaining the intents of God's law. In comparative sense, as we shall see in the next chapter, aupuni - and government - remained the root for the conceptualizations of political discourse that was taking shape as the chiefship was being transformed into a constitutional monarchy of the European type.

7.3. Kingship and "Body Politic": The Prevalence of Aupuni

The constitutional monarchy that sprang up from the discussions at Richards' school - with the help of some of the graduates of Lahainaluna seminary (see Richards 1942, 67, fn. 4; Constitution 1842, 3-4; Kuykendall 1989, 157-159, 167-169; Kamakau 1992a, 370) - also incorporated the biblical idea of the origin of human culture. The first laws of this new type were published in June, 1839, and, in the opening page, the divinely sanctioned method of turning
nature into wealth was well established, in fact, the lawbook itself was titled as "the law of adjusting wealth" (ke kanawai hooponopono waiwai).\(^{18}\) The first page was dedicated to an American-inspired "Declaration of rights," which proclaimed the sacred inviolability of the Lockean elements, life, limb and liberty. More concretely, it was aimed at securing the products of each person's labor - the appropriation of nature - to the laboring person.

Na ke Akua mai no hoi ka oihana alii, a me ka noho alii ana i mea e malu ai; aka, i ka hana ana i na kanawai o ka aina, aole pono e hanaia kekahi kanawai hoomalu alii wale no, a hoomalu ole i na makaainana. Aole hoi e pono ke kau i ke kanawai hoowaiwai i na’lli wale no, a waiwai ole na makaainana; a mahope aku nei, aole loa e kauia kekahi kanawai ku e i keia mau olelo i oleloia maluna, aole hoi e ahuau wale ia, aole e hookauwaia, aole e hoohana wale ia kekahi kanaka ma ke ano ku e i ua mau olelo ia.

The office of the chiefs and ruling for the peace are indeed also from God; but in drafting laws for the land, it is not proper to make laws that will protect the chiefs only and not the common people. It is also improper to enact laws that will enrich the chiefs only and not the common people. After this, there will be no laws that are in opposition to what is said above, no mere taxing, no enslaving, no making people to work contrary to these words (He kumukanawai 1939, 3, my translation).

The concept of kālai‘āina, which was now crafted into the mythical history of its main proponents, was also incorporated into the textual body of the new laws. It was made a duty for the governors (kia‘āina) and konohiki under

\(^{18}\) When Richards translated this law in 1842, these attributes simply disappeared, presenting the foreigners a collection of laws without the keynote that dominated the native discussions.
them to read the new laws to the common people during the
prescribed labor days for the king and the chiefs. It was
particularly emphasized that the landlords should inculcate
the virtues of industry and hard labor in the minds of their
people - with the notable difference that labor was no
longer thought to be arbitrary or oppressive, for there was
a biblical theory behind it.

In adjusting the various things of their (kona) land,
let the people work patiently with their minds turned
to their own bodies, as it is said in the writings of
political economy (kalai‘aina). "The living of the
person who does not work is not at all comfortable. He
will not get the good things if he will not strive for
work. The person will not become enlightened if he will
not strive for learning. There will not be things that
comfort the body and the living, if there is no effort.
If the people intend to become wealthy, it will happen
only if they are diligent in work. That is how the
government (aupuni) was gotten by the chiefs, with
energy and effort." This is what God taught to our
first ancestors. "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt
eat bread." That is the task of the people spoken of in
this law. Consider carefully the meaning of the words
In reality, the lofty words of theory took years to implement. Particularly on the local level the enforcement of law took on improvised forms to serve the customary interests of the konohiki class, the middlemen between the island governors and the common people. It was not unusual that these middlemen grabbed their fair share of the now sacred labor of the local population, occasionally reserving certain trees or fish completely for their own use. In 1846, Harvey Hitchcock reported from Moloka'i that although the law prescribed only one kohohiki for each ahupua'a land

19 The publication of these laws was postponed due to the death of Kina'u on April 4, 1839. The date of publication, June 7, was also the date of proclaiming Kekāuluohi the successor of Kina'u as the effective co-ruler and paramount advocate of Christianity. Her speech, or rather her 'word', on that day was short but highly saturated in the symbolism of aupuni:

You have heard. The land is in my possession [from Kauikeaouli, JM], that mother has gone [Kina'u, Kauikeaouli's adoptive mother, JM]. It is indeed with me. Here is also my thought, according to the word of the deceased, do not tempt my son [Kauikeaouli, JM], and observe the right way of God (F.O. & Ex., June 7, 1839, my translation).

As could be expected, on that occasion Kauikeaouli made no reference to God. However, the third speaker, Christian veteran Hoapili, had only God in his mind, when he recommended God's way "until the end arrives" (F.O. & Ex., June 7, 1839).
section "these head men [konohiki] have enlarged the number to suit their convenience" (Wyllie 1848, 38). Judging by other similar reports, this practice was widespread, leaving the common people still very much subject to the patterns of ruling inherited from the sandalwood trade and intensified agriculture (Wyllie 1848, 41, 67-68, 92; Rowell to Richards, Nov. 16, 1846; Clark to Richards, Aug. 20, 1846, both in MsL; Bond in Damon 1927, 172-174; Kamehameha III and Kekāuluohi to Keaweamahi, Aug. 5, 1839; same to Capt. Mallet, Sept. 4, 1842, both in F.O & Ex.).

However, conceptually these events were encapsulated in the reforms at the top of the chiefship. Kalai'aina as a practice of civilized and rich countries was effectively Hawaiianized to accommodate a form of political thinking meaningfully rooted in the Hawaiian history and its social tensions - enterprising foreigners and displeased commoners, which together amounted to difficulties in maintaining the material standards of chiefly living. The reform of chiefship was thus directed in bringing Hawaii and the foreign lands within a system of thought, whose organizing concept was the Hawaiian aupuni and the laws attached to it.

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20 The constitution of 1840 "succeeded rather in complicating the organization and probably increasing the burdens," because its clear-cut pyramidal logic failed to effectively account for and do away with the more complex local relations of subordination. According to Sahlins, the constitution created an added layer of officials (tax collectors - luna 'auhau) on top of the existing konohiki system (Sahlins 1992, 111).
Locally, the reforms were received, as much as this is known, in terms they were truly intended, as a relaxation of forced labor.

As proof that the present is a state of civil freedom in comparison to former times, I would mention that the common natives, in their religious exhortations and prayers, often speak of the change in this respect with wonder and gratitude. When praying for the enslaved in other lands, they always speak of slavery as having passed away here (Wyllie 1848, 68).

Thus, despite the unsanctioned konohiki practice (or because of it), there seemed to have formed a generally felt sentiment of granted freedom, which certainly was well adapted for reproducing the sense of reciprocity and hierarchy customarily built into the notion of aupuni. Structurally speaking, however, there developed relatively favorable social conditions for a certain type of partisanship among the common Hawaiians, which might have been interpreted by using the usual political language of European origin. This was especially true as the constitution prescribed an elected house of people’s representatives to be established in addition to the council of chiefs. We know (see ch. 4) that such language did not surface until late in the century and that throughout the period of inventing the monarchy, these structural features were interpreted by using the available conceptual tools, which were all derived from the notion of aupuni and its Western equivalent, government. As the final step towards the fully organized constitutional monarchy we shall look at
the interpreting patterns that evolved during this period of state-building and provide means to understand why the political translation work remained within the narrow limits of 'government'.

However, we must first reconsider the notion of political economy as it lends itself to highlighting certain peculiarities of its reception by or, rather, its importation to the chiefly hierarchy. The historical meaning of political economy as a branch of governmental knowledge generally developed through an alteration of interest in the functions of ruling, as "the issue of sovereignty shifted its focus from the legitimacy of leadership to its responsibility for managing the social configuration" (Shapiro 1993, 102). Indeed, it was this management function that was brought to bear on the process of straightening up the practices of Hawaiian aupuni. Yet, the meaning of politics was, unlike in the West, reserved for legitimizing the chiefly rule, thus producing a bastardized combination of contract theory and the politicized view of economy. This anomaly will be better understood if we allow for the fact that William Richards never translated political economy as it was normally known in the West. As the missionary theory of civilization depicted a graded historical trajectory for a heathen society, he first transposed the contemporary Western political economy to an earlier historical phase according
to his own cultural memory. For Richards, this phase corresponded with European feudalism, the closest analogy through which Hawaiian land tenure was normally understood by foreigners. And as European peasantry had been liberated from the feudal yoke and elevated to a position of freemen ready to enter into political contract with one another, the future of Hawaiian society was placed on the same historical track. For the concept of political economy this meant surrendering to the Hawaiian notion of aupuni. This was necessary in emphasizing the change in chief-commoner relations. Thus, although there was much discussion on managing the productive life of society, politics was retained in what made proper management possible, that is, the contract of equals. We might take this as the theoretical reason for the prevalence of the notion of aupuni in the emerging discourse, for in it the theory of contract saw a vehicle of cross-cultural communication.21

21 The practice of viewing social relations as an object of government was indeed built into the foreign-made statute laws of 1845 and 1846, which were intended for establishing the government ministries and the judiciary. For example, the office of the Minister of Public Instruction consisted, among other things, of supervising what were called "parental duties" and "filial duties," which basically meant seeing to the proper execution of Christian moral code at Hawaiian homes (Statute Laws 1846, 198-203). Even though these "duties," when leaving the think tank legislature, remained largely a dead letter, they were certainly an indication of a governmental shift of meaning of individual lives. The most distinct instances of these new governmental dimensions, such as the above "duties," were nevertheless framed as means to promote Christianity among the common people, not explicitly as tools of Western type political economy. There was also a clear emphasis on
7.3.1. 'Presencing' Monarchy

While moving closer to historically tractable acts (as Richards' school survives mainly through the published lectures without much evidence of the social world\textsuperscript{22}), we shall see that in objectifying selected elements or spheres of Hawaiian society as capable of representing politics, the missionaries and other white accomplices worked their way into the chiefship by allowing, intentionally or not, a certain continuity for the Hawaiian conceptualizations - particularly among the common Hawaiians, who evoked the traditional values of chiefly care as their aupuni was assuming a foreign look. For the foreigners, while the enlightening the people and, thus, rendering them better equipped in entering the political society. This theory was, however, much transformed by the common Hawaiians, to whom "the great mass of laws" (na kanawai lehulehu) represented "a real source of oppression and trouble" (he kumu nui keia o ke kaumaha a me ka pilikia) (ND/162) - and, perhaps, a perversion of Christianity. The worship of Christian God and the tenets of christianized kālaiʻāina were understood in a traditionalized sense as benefitting aupuni and the honor of the high chiefs, not as means to accumulate personal wealth without any regard of the collective. Thus, the 52 petitioners from Kona, Hawaiʻi, criticized the chiefs for letting greedy foreigners to settle in the islands: "It is the foreigners who acquire wealth whom we refuse - those people are not true Hawaiians" (LFP/AH, June 25, 1845).

\textsuperscript{22} Apparently there are only two documents left of Hawaiian origin, both of which concern Richards' yearly salary of $600. It appears that Kīnaʻu was responsible was providing the money from her lands on Oʻahu and that there was some reluctance on her part as she thought Richards was engaged only on part-time basis (Kamehameha III to Kīnaʻu, June 27, 1838, F.O. & Ex.; Kanaʻina to Kīnaʻu, 1838, IDM/AH).
Hawaiianess of the chiefship was apparently transformed by applying manifest signs of monarchy and courtly decorum as defined in the diplomatic manuals of the time, thus establishing an easily accessible cultural link between the chiefs and the foreigners, the stereotypes of 'royal politics' came more readily to hand. In general, this had an effect of inhibiting rather than facilitating a profound conceptual change towards a redefinition of *aupuni* and *kālai’āina* as existential concepts expressing social contract and partisan politics.

Among the prominent inventions of the period, besides the complex legal apparatus, was the diplomatic code, which the ex-missionary doctor Gerrit Judd thought would enhance the civilized appearance of the young kingdom (Judd 1960, 131; Kuykendall 1989, 240). Earlier, in March, 1844, Judd had employed an adventurous lawyer, John Ricord, a native of New Jersey, to become the law adviser of the king, or the attorney general in the new government. By June, after consulting Kauikeaouli (or rather informing him), Ricord was ready to present the new diplomatic code (Ricord 1844), essentially modelled after the principles of the Vienna Conference of 1815. This code became "the basis of Court etiquette in the Hawaiian Islands" (Code of Etiquette, F.O & Ex., June 29, 1844). Besides prescribing rank orders, mode of applying for royal audience and the appropriate dress code, the new court etiquette set the Hawaiian standard for
practically everything else that constituted the royal symbolism reminiscent of the European monarchies of the nineteenth century, from the national coat-of-arms to the opening ceremonies of the legislature. To better represent the progression of chiefship from arbitrary despotism to constitutional monarchy, several Hawaiian elements were retained in the new symbols, particularly in the decoration of public occasions. Something of this kind had already been in progress for a number of years, for instance, restricting golden ribbons and the so-called Kamehameha buttons for the use of Kauikeaouli, his chiefs and the foreign consuls in 1839 (KC/AH 22/5). Similarly, several new building projects had been initiated in Honolulu before 1845 (Greer 1977, 5-7), including road construction under the leadership of Kekūanaō‘a, who certainly knew who was the chief in charge. However, the new ceremonial occasions adapted in 1845, especially the opening of the legislature, exposed the novel insignia and royal symbolism to public view, thus evoking new but familiar images among the foreigners - although not always without ambiguity and irony.

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23 Road construction was considered "government work" - hana aupuni - and its execution was not an excuse to disregard other work, as Kekūanaō‘a explained: "Those who carry food for horses are required to do it early - before light, so also those who carry milk, they are to bring it before light and leave it with their customers: then go immediately to the work of the government" (F.O. & EX., Feb. 15, 1841).
and a sense of restoring the glory of aupuni among the chiefs.24

Although the royal pomp did not please but a few foreigners, it could not fail to awaken the beholders to the existence of comparative equivalents - and of politics confined to the notion of 'government'. Although the

24 The air of change was thick in the chiefly circles, as the following quote from the journal of the House of Nobles will show:

Discussion was held and the opinion stated that a seal be made for the Kingdom.
Passed: that the Kingdom have a seal
Passed: that Mr. Richards write out a description of the Kingdom's seal and present it to the legislature.
Passed: that T. Haalilio's [the mission trained secretary for Kauikeaouli, died at sea in December, 1844] seal be given to G.P. Judd.
Passed: that Mr. Richards be in charge of writing a description of the Hawaiian flag.
It is a major task for the legislature to arrange for seals for the main officials of the Kingdom and the seal(s) of the governors.
Passed: a statement that a seal be made for the major finance officials and the governors with the King's new crown made in a badge and then his office inscribed around it. The same to be done for judges.
Passed: New badges for legislators and major government officials shall be the Kamehameha III badge for all connected with the military and other officials, and the King's servants (kanaka, men).
Passed: Dress for the legislature shall be tails and the new badge (Journal of the House of Nobles, May 8, 1845, LFJ/AH).

Judd's report to the legislature for the year 1845, his first year as the minister of finance, indicates that one fifth of all government expenditures was directed towards various construction schemes of monarchical buildings in Honolulu, including the new royal palace and king's summer retreat. Among other construction projects were new rooms for the treasury, a new main road, bridges, prisons etc., but it is not clear whether they were counted to the said fifth (MIR 1845, 4-5, 9-10).
following description of royal audience ridicules the


ceremony in a typical manner of many of the visitors, it


contains a rich collection of signs that formed the semiotic


landscape in which monarchy as a political entity was


conceptualized. The story begins with Robert Wyllie, a


wealthy businessman of Scottish origin, whom Judd had


employed as the secretary of foreign affairs in March, 1845,


walking the guests to the new royal palace:


At the gateway a guard of Kanaka [native] infantry


presented arms, the royal standard was unfurled from


the flag-staff and floated to the breeze. Passing up a


broad, gravelled alley, we ascended a flight of steps


to the piazza, and were again saluted by a double line


of officers, who were supposed to be the black rods in


waiting. Entering the villa, we found ourselves in a


wide hall traversing the centre of the building, with


saloons to the right and left. The King having not


arrived, we had leisure to inspect the reception room.


It was a spacious apartment, with windows on three


sides, having green Venetian blinds opening to the


piazzas, and two doors leading to the hall. It was


handsomely carpeted, and the furniture consisted of a


few plain mahogany chairs, with another of state,


surmounted by a crown. A round table stood in the


centre, supporting alabaster ornaments, volumes of


Wilkes' Exploring Expedition, and a richly-bound Bible


in the native dialect . . . The walls were hung with


portraits of the Lonely One's [Kamehameha's] family -


dingy chiefs and their ladies, smiling intensely, with


round saucer eyes and thick lips - a painting of


Blucher - two of the Kings of Prussia - and facing the


throne, in a gorgeously gilt and carved frame, the King


of the French . . . the approach of majesty was


announced, and we hurried back to the hall.


From the opposite side of the terrace appeared the


regal sortege - brilliant in embroidery, gold lace,


nodding plumes, and swords at their sides. On they


came, two abreast - foremost, the King, with the


Minister of Finance [Judd]; then a brace of


Chamberlains, followed by the high chiefs and officers


of State, and the procession closed by the two young


princes, Alexander and Lot.


In a few moments, his Excellency the Minister of


Foreign Affairs [Wyllie] imparted the august
intelligence of all being prepared for our reception. Forming in line - the Admiral leading, under pilotage of Mr. Wyllie - we entered the saloon, and approached the throne. The King was standing, and the courtiers ranged on either side. Our Admiral backed his topsails, and let go an anchor on the Lonely One's port beam. We were then telegraphed by name - shot ahead - hove-to abrest his Majesty - exchanged signals - filed away, and took position by order of sailing on the starboard bow!

His Excellency the Minister of Finance - who, by the way, was not an ill-looking nobleman - in full Court costume, and a field-marshall's chapeau tucked under his arm, announced to the Admiral that his Majesty would deign to lend a willing ear to any observations upon religion, war, politics, or any other topics most agreeable . . . The King, Premier [Keoni Ana], and Judd, had broad red ribbons thrown baldric fashion over breast and shoulders, of such extreme breadth as to give the idea of the wearers having burst their jugular arteries (Wise 1849, 332-334).

A similar orderedness prevailed in the framing of the kingdom's legislature as of 1845, when Kauikeaouli gave the first of his annual keynote speeches and when the different ministers read their annual reports for the first time. In the legislative building, all the dignitaries were seated in designated places signalling the order of rank, Kauikeaouli's throne occupying the middle of the hall and the nobles, seated to his right in a semi-circle, faced the people's representatives, who took the left side of the throne. Also the foreign representatives and the missionaries had their places, respectively behind the nobles and the people's representatives and facing each other. Directly opposite to the throne were the judges and other government officers (The Polynesian, May 24, 1845).

The king was dressed in a costly and splendid uniform. He came attended by the queen, his cabinet, and
military escort. As he entered the building, the new royal standard, containing the national coat of arms, designed at the herald's office in London, wholly from national emblems, was hoisted for the first time. The brass band, all native musicians, struck up the national anthem; guns from the fort thundered forth twenty-one times. The whole company arose, and the king walked with much dignity to his throne. A prayer was offered by Mr. Richards, chaplain of the court, after which, at the command of the king, all seated themselves. The king then covered his head with his chapeau in a graceful manner and read his speech... I must confess that gratifying reflections filled my mind upon viewing the well-ordered and appropriate ceremonies of the day... Still more gratifying is the reflection that this order has been brought out of disorder and savage barbarism in the short space of twenty years by my countrymen (anonymous traveler in Judd 1960, 132).

The ceremonies such as the opening of the legislature were not in fact completely new in Hawaii, as the missionaries, foreign consuls and naval officers had been conducting funeral processions and official receptions ever since Keōpūolani received a Christian funeral in 1823. What was new was the historical context of the sudden and, true, added splendor. In the early 1840s, the continuing difficulties with foreigners had led the chiefs and Richards to proceed with a plan to gain diplomatic recognition for the Hawaiian government. In July, 1842, Richards and Haʻalilio, the king's secretary, departed for their mission. By April, 1843, they had secured recognition of Hawaiian independence from the governments of England, France, Belgium and the United States. About the same time, in February, the Hawaiian islands were seized by the commander of the English warship Carysfort, Lord George Paulet, who
wanted to settle once and for all the long-standing disputes between the chiefs and the English residents. Paulet's occupation lasted until July the same year, when Rear Admiral Richard Thomas, Paulet's superior, restored the islands to the native chiefship according to the newly recognized independence (for details, see Kuykendall 1989, 185-226). Thomas' restoration and the diplomatic recognition of Hawaiian independence were deeply felt among Hawaiians, who, applying the Bible-based theory of history, had finally suppressed so much of their heathen past that their aupuni could be recognized as an equal partner by those nations whose history had not diverted that much from the God-given path. As a consequence, the evolving political discourse was focused on government, whose constitution, laws and other principles of operation were selected for discursive evaluation.25

25 These public invitations to practice cultural comparisons had been gaining momentum ever since Jarves began his editorial career in the early 1840s. In one of his first calls through the weekly column, Jarves made an inquiry into the basis of cross-cultural comparisons:

We read of religious festivals, of orders of priesthood, the tyranny of the rulers, and other matters of this nature, and yet there are no connecting links to enable us to form any adequate idea of them, by which we could compare these institutions with those of other nations (The Polynesian, Jan. 16, 1841).

Jarves' answer was almost a duplicate of the famous missionary theory of the origins of heathenism. For him, the comparisons should have been based on tracing the common human origin through innovations, in which "the gradual development of human mind, shown in its progress after truth, or its sinking deeper into error" was manifested.
A singular instance of effecting this pattern of thought among the higher ranks of society, took place in the opening session of the legislature of 1845. Abenera Pāki, a member of the upper house, not particularly noted for his Christian behavior, proposed a resolution that,

in the name of all the people of these islands, thanks be expressed by this body to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and the United States, for the readiness with which they severally recognized the Independence of these Islands, thus receiving us into the fraternity of nations.

That these Resolutions be printed in the Hawaiian and English languages, and suspended in a frame in each of the Legislative Chambers (The Polynesian, May 24, 1845).

In Pāki's resolution, the model of social contract of equals is reproduced on an international level, where the actors are no longer individuals but nations with a prescribed level of competence. Here is at least one positive instance of the practical application of the contract theory among the chiefs. Yet, it is important to note that the national actors were indeed governments, not individuals, and that the rapprochement between the Hawaiian chiefship and the

This line of reasoning, of which Jarves was an eloquent spokesman, established Hawaiian chiefship as a developmental stage in the common human history together with such powers as England, France or Germany. "Those who have watched the progress of Hawaiian polity must have been favorably impressed, with the rapid progress which they have of late made, towards a regular and settled form of government" (Jarves in The Polynesian, March 13, 1841). On this progressivest theme the Hawaiian chiefs could not have been more in agreement, for their aupuni, still in the hands of native chiefs, was appropriating the desired properties of the foreign governments, whose power and presence was felt more strongly each day.
Western governments was filtered through the notion of *aupuni*. The same reciprocity principle was repeated by the new attorney general, John Ricord, when he read his tedious report to the legislature the following day. In his report, Ricord made an explicit reference to comparative qualities of the several governments and stressed the duty of the Hawaiian government to render itself intelligible to the foreign governments: "It is not enough that we should understand our [sic] laws; they to [sic] must understand them and witness in them some civilized conformity to their own" (*The Polynesian*, June 14, 1845). The common root that Ricord was displaying before his Hawaiian audience was to be found in the Roman, Jewish and English legal traditions, which were all applications of "the laws of Moses," a thoroughly familiar figure for the Hawaiians. Ricord plainly denied, however, that the Mosaic law would be directly applicable to the government of modern societies. Yet, he had already, merely by alluding to the person of Moses and by giving some modern examples of the application of the Mosaic tradition, lifted the Hawaiian *aupuni* to the conceptual level of Western government. He had also produced a comparative equivalent for himself and those foreigners who shared the conviction that a new monarchical government had just witnessed its political birth. To

26 The political meaning of monarchy apparently caused some problems for Richards, whose duty it was to translate the statute laws of 1845 and 1846 into Hawaiian, as a
this we might add Kauikeaouli's speech (in fact, drafted by Wyllie [F.O. & Ex., May 1845]), in which, as in the old times, it was made quite clear that the Hawaiian *aupuni* was kept through a god. But, also, as the god was the same as the god of the foreign governments, it gave a certain advantage in asserting its power - and not without a good reason: "... the Word of God is the corner stone of our kingdom. Through its influence we have been introduced into the family of the independent nations of the earth" (The Polynesian, May 24, 1845). Although, for Kauikeaouli, a notable shift from the earlier practice of writing the laws first in Hawaiian. In Ricord's preface to the statutes, it was said that "the political principles of this code are not materially different from those sustained by the mildest forms of monarchy" (Statute Laws 1846, 6). Richards' Hawaiian version is as follows: "O na kumu kalaimoku iloko o keia mookanawai, aole i ano e nui keia i ko na Aupuni oluolu nui e ae, na Aupuni alii hanau ho" (Kanawai 1846, 6). To my knowledge this is a rare or perhaps a unique occurrence of the word *kalaimoku* as the translation of the word political. Yet, it is immediately qualified by a compound expression *aupuni alii hanau*, or monarchy (lit. government of born rulers). This appears to have been before the Hawaiian expression for monarchy was established as *aupuni mō'i* according to the new title for the king, *mō'i*. Again, it seems that the political meaning of the new monarchy was mediated through the concept of *aupuni* and the idea of its management, as the word *kalaimoku* implies.

27 While in the United States, Ha'alilio was asked to write something to "a lady's album." Richards apparently took a great deal of interest in Ha'alilio's reflections, for he copied it and translated it for the official journal of the Hawaiian government.

It is with admiration and great joy that I have seen this country, its people, and all they have accomplished for themselves, both for the body and the soul, through energy and intelligence. All these valuable things have really been obtained by piety and a sincere faith in the true God.
proclamation such as this did not mean a personal commitment to the worship of Jehovah beyond mere ceremony, it once again elicited customary patterns of thought.

Not everything, however, was done under the conceptual aegis of government. A concept that more fully expressed the idea of its constitution soon appeared not only on the pages of The Polynesian, but also in the official government papers and law books. The concept was 'body politic', which we last encountered at the constitutive meeting of the Sandwich Islands Mission in 1819. In the documents of the new monarchy, the concept reappeared in the statutes of 1845 and 1846. In the laws regulating the office of the minister of public instruction, it was felt desirable, as the schools had still a strong denominational connection with the American mission, to explicitly separate church and state. Although the government adopted the Protestant variant as its official form of worship, as opposed to Catholicism ("pule kue i ka pope" - lit., prayer opposed to the Pope), the new law conceptualized government (aupuni) and congregation (ekalesia) as two different entities. In the Hawaiian text, body politic, which was the entity separated

Thus it has appeared to me in my various journeyings, for in all places which I have visited or in which I have dwelt in this country, both among the highest and the lowest classes, I have seen that they worship God. It is on this account, viz., the sincerity with which they worship God, that success attends every work to which they put their hands (The Polynesian, June 14, 1845).
from the congregations in the original English text, was translated simply by using the concept of aupuni, thus giving it a sense of contracted social totality. However, since this body politic was juxtaposed with congregations, which were concretely existing material institutions, we find ourselves again in a situation that creates a conceptual barrier in favor of aupuni as its own kind of totality materialized in the bodies of the chiefs (Statute Laws 1846, 197; Kanawai 1846, 152). Thus, for example, when the premier Keoni Ana spoke of the advantages of the new system of government in early 1846, he - pruning history as Kekuaipia had done for Kotzebue in 1824 - commented on the king's new legal status as being equal with that of the common people: "Now he is one of you. Then he was King and god" (The Polynesian, Feb. 14, 1846). But, still, the cultural center of the reform was the king himself, his lowering down and his granting a constitutional government. This Keoni Ana could not outwit, hardly even wanted to.

The concept of body politic materialized in the political discourse not until after the Declaration of Rights had reestablished the social relations according to the Lockean atomistic model of free-willing individuals and the reorganization of government was put on paper. At least, this was the foreigners' view. But it was not so much the promised commoner participation in government that prompted the haole reactions, but rather the perceived
bustle around the king and the imagined harmony that was being created. There was to be a system: "Politics are now rapidly becoming a system as in other lands," wrote Jarves (The Polynesian, Jan. 3, 1846). The body politic was not to give itself up to fractious partisanship; for it was rather a representation of holistic order, in a manner of aupuni, consisting, however, not of traditional - or traditionalized - care for the people but of rules of conduct, king’s speeches, road construction and suchlike.

7.3.2. Untranslated Experience

Another feature of structural significance must be added. When some of the missionaries left the mission and became attached to the emerging monarchy as advisors and ministers - first Richards in 1838, followed by Judd in 1842 and Andrews in 1845 - the other missionaries, especially in Judd’s case, expressed their relative disapproval of the worldly look assumed by their co-workers in Christ (Journal of Lowell Smith, June 2, 1842; Armstrong to an unknown recipient, June 8, 1844, M-7/AH; Baldwin to Greene, Nov. 8, 1845, HP/HMCS).28 Even Richards, who had usually enjoyed

28 Judd’s attempts to establish the chiefs’ economy on a sound and businesslike basis and "He [Judd] excuses himself for having attended balls - & . . . parties, because he is a politician, & must sustain that character among the men of the world" (Journal of Lowell Smith, Apr. 6, 1844). And, according to Baldwin, "he smokes tobacco through the streets, gives licenses to sell rum, can set up a billiard
the trust and high esteem of his colleagues, was suspected of questionable intents (Richards to Baldwin, June 9, 1845, MsL). The distance that was created in the mid-1840s between the mission and the chiefly powers — thus adding to the earlier post-Ka’ahumanu separation — was not merely one-sided. Motivated by a bid to protect the chiefship, Richards himself maintained some distance from the other missionaries, whom he considered too ready to advocate commoner rights: "It is a fact that there is a number of the Brethren whom I consider quite radicals in politics, & I therefore feel it necessary to act in my sphere somewhat independently [sic]" (Richards to Anderson, Jan. 1, 1842).

While the monarchy became more organized, culminating in the establishment of government ministries and privatization of lands beginning in 1845, the number of laws and regulations multiplied, which all, at the end, rested on the shoulders of perplexed commoners. The missionaries in the field generally felt that the laws were multiplying too fast and that too little attention was paid to lessening the burden of taxes, which were being collected to run the new bureaucratic machine and to pay off the foreign debt the table for the king, & either does or allows other things which they [the missionaries] cannot reconcile with a Christian profession" (Baldwin to Greene, Nov. 8, 1845, HP/HMCS).

29 According to Henry Wise, the "masses of subtle laws" were "equal in magnitude to the huge proportions of a Chinese dictionary" (Wise 1849, 330).
chiefs had accumulated in their business transactions (Kekāuluohi to Kekūanaō‘a, May 4, 1842, F.O. & Ex.). The majority of the missionaries thus taking the side of the common people, it was clear that this kind of criticism resulted in alienating the missionaries in the field from those in the government service. Besides Armstrong (who later changed his mind and joined the government forces by accepting the position of the minister of public instruction), Baldwin and Smith, also Levi Chamberlain, John Emerson and Cochran Forbes expressed their concern over the foreigners in government and it appears that the critical stance was largely shared by all the missionaries in the field (Kuykendall 1989, 256; Baldwin to Greene, Nov. 8, 1845, HP/HMCS).

This split in the mission was further intensified by the so-called petition movement among the common Hawaiians. While the king and his new haole ministers were getting ready for the great opening of the 1845 legislature, the

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30 Chester Smith Lyman recorded a summary of these troubles in May, 1846, which was an exceptionally dry spring on O‘ahu:

The distress among the natives is of course great. To render the matter worse the Govn’t Taxes are required to be paid in gold or silver - but these metals on that Island [O‘ahu] are exceedingly scarce. Mr Richards told me that the whole amt. of money collected fr. that Island was not sufficient to pay the Governor’s [Kekūanaō‘a’s] salary. To procure money the people are obliged to go to some of the larger towns, Hilo or Honolulu, for employment that will yield it - their lands at home are neglected & when once away they seldom return . . . (Journal of Chester Smith Lyman, May 15, 1846).
people all around the islands were holding protracted prayer meetings - much resembling the intense praying during the revival in the late 1830s. The sole purpose of these meetings was to pray "that the Lord wd give them [Hawaiians] black rulers" (Baldwin to Greene, Nov. 8, 1845, HP/HMCS). Eventually, approximately from April that year, these meetings led to drafting petitions to the king and the legislature. Some of the petitions were published in Ka Elele Hawaii and translated in The Friend, which for a while entertained a critical posture towards the new government. The petitions were opposed to mainly three related issues, all part of the government reform, namely, appointing of foreigners to government posts, allowing Hawaiian citizenship to foreigners and selling of land to foreigners. There were also a few other causes of grievance, such as heavy taxation, the too great number of laws and the poverty of the king (e.g., IDM/AH, Apr., Nov., 1845; F.O. & Ex., June 12, Aug., 1845; LFP/AH, June 25, July 2, 1845; ND/162). All these issues were, however, expressions of the common people's fear that the foreigners were on the move to take over the Hawaiian aupuni and turn the Hawaiians into a landless class of wanderers. Some of the petitions were long and elaborate letters signed by hundreds, some times thousands of common Hawaiians. Apparently most were written by the mission educated intellectuals, such as Malo, although his involvement in the actual writing is not
certain. He nevertheless was active in "promoting the movement," as Kuykendall says (1989, 259). All in all, such resistance was unusual and it was taken quite seriously in the government chambers. Kauikeaouli assigned a three-man secret committee, consisting of Ioane 'I'i, Aaron Keli‘iahonui and John Ricord, to investigate the origin of petitions, as it was suspected that either the missionaries or some other foreign residents, notably the U.S. Commissioner Brown, had stirred up the movement.

In the letter of assignment, probably written by Judd, the petition movement itself did not receive nearly as much attention as the possibility of foreign instigation, so that the movement was labelled as "insidious" and

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31 One of the prominent figures in the movement was Z. Kaumaea of Maui. Besides spearheading some of the collective petitions, he drew up at least one individually, advising Kauikeaouli in organizing the five government ministries. Kaumaea's advice consisted of an interesting combination of the Lahainaluna jargon of Christian and educational merits (although his name does not appear in the list of students) and references to traditional Hawaiian virtues of harmonious living. He quite fluently introduced the newly created five government ministries, but in defining their duties, he gave them a considerable coloring of the same ideals we have encountered in the writings of Malo and Höpü. In fact, Kaumaea created an historical continuity between his understanding of the traditional chiefship and the government reform, only this time introducing a commoner point of view. As was the pattern in the other petitions, Kaumaea also put his trust in Kauikeaouli. In order to invigorate the ali‘i-ship, Kaumaea proposed that Kauikeaouli should be placed above the laws, for he was the parent (makua) from which the ministries and hence everything else emanated. In the same manner, Kaumaea also referred kālai‘āina back to its origin in the genealogical knowledge of the chiefs' pedigrees and only after that he would deal with the issues of governing (IDM/AH, Box 2, Nov., 1845).
"insurrectionary," while the foreigners' motives were characterized by an attempt to effect a "political change in our domestic policy." The Hawaiian version of the same letter treated the movement as unlawful and forbidden ("kekahi mau hana malu ana - lit., forbidden doings"). The word political was left untranslated, as the Hawaiian text said "me ka manao e hoohuli i ko' u aupuni ma ke ano o ka hooponopono ana i ka aina" (while thinking to change my aupuni in the manner of adjusting the affairs of the land) (F.O. & Ex., June 12, 1845). But as the possibility of an independent commoner protest was practically ruled out and the word political attached to the foreigners' motives to alter the form of government, it seems that the chiefs and their haole ministers also excluded the common Hawaiians from government-centered political discourse. The secret commission heard several witnesses, including Hawaiian church members and the missionaries Alexander and Baldwin, but for the government theory of the origin of petitions the commission's efforts were of no avail. All they could find out was that the petitions certainly had a religious context, for they were usually written after a church service. Baldwin had also announced a prayer meeting for the good of the government, but had not been present when the petitions were made (Baldwin to Richards, June 9, 1845; Baldwin to Greene, Nov. 8, 1845, HP/HMCS; native testimonies are filed in F.O. & Ex., June 14, 1845). Baldwin had
himself identified the petition meetings as being "political" (Baldwin to Richards, June 9, 1845, HP/HMCS) and made it known to the people (using what expressions is not known), but all this had little or no effect on the conceptual map of the Hawaiian society.

Following the report, there developed among the foreigners in the government a need to put their political identity in writing - or rather assume a political identity - and make it a permanent and binding principle of all the king’s ministers in the new government. The document, whose Hawaiian translation is apparently lost, was entitled "Political Creed and principles as professed individually by the Members of the present Administration of His Majesty Kamehameha III" and dated June 20, 1845. It was drafted by Wyllie, together with Judd and Ricord (Richards is known to have approved these principles). Basically the declaration stated that the foreigners in government service would support monarchy and serve faithfully until the natives were trained well enough to take over the foreigners’ places in the government. More specifically, they outlined once more the progressivist theory of civilization, which did not grant political citizenship for the common Hawaiians. Although Hawaii was thought to be a political nation with diplomatic ties, its people had merely secured an existential precondition to become a political
society also within herself. The fourth and fifth articles of the declaration made this quite clear:

I admit that chiefly owing to the American missionaries, the Natives have made great progress in letters and religion, and that they are capable of being so trained as to be able to conduct the affairs of Government efficiently, but I consider that they are as yet very far from having arrived at that pitch of civilization.

I consider that they [Hawaiians] can only be brought to that pitch, by promoting education, the careful study of proper Books, and the practical training which they may receive by ascending through the different gradations of offices under Foreign Ministers (F.O. & Ex., June 20, 1845).

As an interpretation of commoner resistance, the declaration and its pledges were perfect examples of translating grassroots activity into an abstract language of government by way of constructing a cross-culturally sustainable view of a holistic society, whose organic structures should not be disturbed in their prescribed course of development. This was done mainly by focusing on foreigners as the potential disturbing factor and placing the common Hawaiians within a stereotypical image of a passive peasant. In the eighth article, the haole trio pledged to "discourage all Republican tendencies" and guard against any attempt to place the islands under "dominion of Whites" (F.O. & Ex., June 20, 1845). There was no mention of a threat of this kind originating from the ranks of the common Hawaiians.

While the commoner sentiment was barred from entering the government circles, it was also deemed necessary to prevent any missionary involvement "in the purely political
concerns of the King's Government" (F.O. & Ex., June 20, 1845). As the missionaries in the field were suspected of helping the natives prepare petitions, this can be said to have effectively contributed to preventing a partisan view of politics from being conceptualized. Even more so as the missionaries in the field were in a position to do so.32 Thus, there formed a great divide between the local affairs of land and the state builders in Honolulu. This effectively split the mission; and the gate-keeping machinery - Judd, Wyllie and Ricord, but also Richards - checked any further distribution of interpretive patterns that would have given the commoner resistance an access to comparative discourse of politics.33

32 If not directly, then at least through their proselytizing, which was well understood by the missionaries in government service. They even wished to see more Christian influence among the people, if not a form of liberation theology. In June, 1846, the missionary-turned-judge Lorrin Andrews spoke at the Kawaiahao church in Honolulu stressing the "need of a stronger Gospel influence in respect to the political condition of the nation." According to Andrews, "the nation needs a conscience, or the new laws will be but a dead letter" (Journal of Chester Smith Lyman, June 1, 1846).

33 The government mouthpiece, The Polynesian, joined the exclusion by condemning attempts to interpret politically the commoner prayer meetings, which were held prior to petitionings. The paper strongly opposed "giving a political turn to private and public prayers" (The Polynesian, July 26, 1845). The Polynesian had in fact excluded such possibility even before the petitions began to flood the government offices. In January, 1845, Jarves' column identified the opposition party as consisting of individual foreigners without a unified platform of action. There was to be no "formidable party of subjects [meaning common Hawaiians]" (The Polynesian, Jan. 18, 1845).
In conclusion, the building of monarchy and the development of the comparative political discourse were simultaneous processes, almost symbiotic, for as the reform progressed, certain conceptual and culturally standardized entities became more usable as interpretive patterns. Not that it all would have been *haole* doings. The missionary disintegration was in fact mediated by a Hawaiian disintegration of wider significance. Thus, as the dynamics of Hawaiian society had produced the royal rebellion and Christian revivalism in the 1830s, exposing and releasing some relatively unexpected difficulties for the chiefly rule as well as for the goals of the civilizing mission, the 1840s saw a split of the mission as a result of responding to these difficulties. It seems, however, that it was this split that most effectively aided the conceptual continuity of the political translation work rooted in the chiefly hierarchy. Also, in the short run, the attempt to create a Western type of political society from above failed, since the same means that were used in achieving this goal were working against it. In other words, the system of *kālai‘āina* was applied from top to bottom without attempts to heal the expressed deficiency in the reciprocity between the chiefs and the common people. Regulated working days, uncommon restrictions and taxation in real money were all attempts to create new connections between the chiefs and the commoners, connections that would fall within the
conceptual jurisdiction of Lockean politics. These attempts nevertheless fell short of reviving the traditional meaning of Hawaiian aupuni as the embodiment of malu. Yet, this was probably the only way to effect the reform. As was the case with the early dissemination of palapala, teaching principles of government (aupuni) to the common people before anything was disclosed to the chiefs would have been interpreted as outright rebellion. In time, this failure to reconcile the balance of giving and taking between the chiefs and the common people — and the failure of the economizing white aliʻi never to appreciate such conceptions — were built into the Hawaiian view of life as resentment of the things lost, whether real or imagined, it matters but little.

In the 1860s, Samuel Kamakau, disillusioned of the Protestant ways, turned to Catholicism, which had already assumed an air of original Hawaianness the Protestants in Honolulu could never match, and began to write articles on Hawaiian history for the major Hawaiian language newspapers, occasionally engaging in criticism which brought to light the commoner sentiment so deeply buried beneath the practices and terminology of the monarchy. In May 1869, he was at his gloomiest and although idealizing the past, was able to present a view of Hawaiian life that was predicted in the petitions a quarter of a century earlier:

... in the old days people who lived in out-of-the-way places were heavily burdened by labor performed for
the chiefs, landlords [haku 'āina], and land agents [konohiki]. But although the work was hard, that today is even more so when families are broken up and one must even leave his bones among foreigners. In the old days, the people did not work steadily at hard labor but at several years' interval, because it was easier then to get food from the fishponds, coconut groves, and taro patches. Hogs grew so fat that the eyelids drooped, bananas dropped off at a touch, sugarcane grew so tall that it leaned over, sweet potatoes crowded each hill, dogs fattened, fish cooked with hot stones in the early morning filled the food gourd, and a man could eat until he set the dish aside. This was the generous way of living under a chief who made a good lord; the people were fed and every wish of the chief was gratified. Labor done in the patch of the chief was a rental paid for the use of the land and everyone was benefited thereby. Today the working man labors like a cart-hauling ox that gets a kick in the buttocks. He shivers in the cold and dew-laden wind, or broils in the sun with no rest from his toil. Whether he lives or dies it is all alike. He gets a bit of money for his toil; in the house where he labors there are no blood kin, no parents, no relatives-in-law, just a little corner for himself . . . (Kamakau 1992a, 372).

The laws that were drafted from 1838 to 1846 and beyond, in order to encourage the common people to industry and self-reliance and to realize the social conditions favorable to realizing the political society of free equals, in fact did produce a sentiment of reflective criticism of the workings of aupuni, but it was interpreted as a disturbance of the harmonious order that the chiefs assumed to prevail in the state of aupuni and the haole ministers to prevail in an ordered body politic. It took decades for such disturbances to get integrated into the political conceptions of the Hawaiian monarchy as a pattern of explicit political activity formally and cross-culturally comparable to those of the West. Meanwhile, these
demonstrations were seen as improper acts of resentment, originating from misunderstandings or foreign agitation and not fit to be interpreted as organized form of politics, or falling within "ka oihana o na luna" - the business of the [government] officials, as politics was defined at the time (Emerson and Bishop 1845, 117). This also prevented the concept of kālaiʻāina from becoming the formalized and general equivalent of perceiving politics as a universal phenomenon, which makes itself visible in Hawaii as well in the foreign lands. We may end this discourse by quoting an anonymous poet, whose piece of lyric, missionary as he might have been, crystallizes the sentiment that went untranslated.

E imi i ka waiwai,  Seek wealth,  
E pono ai oukou;  That you may be prosperous;  
Ke dala me ka aina,  Money and land,  
A me ka hale hou.  And a new house.

O ko ke kino keia,  These are material things,  
E huli a loaa,  Seek until you find,  
E malama no hoi,  Take care indeed,  
E aua a hoopaa.  Hold back and secure them.

Ka makamaka ole,  The friendless one,  
Oia ka pomaikai;  Is the prosperous one;  
O lilo wale kona,  Lest his be lost completely,  
Ke no i mai o hai.  When others request.

Heaha la ka hewa,  What indeed is the wrong,  
Ke kapa mai lakou;  When they say;  
He paakiki, he ino,  Hard, evil,  
He pi, he aua no?  Miserly, stingy indeed?

Kokoke lakou ike,  They will soon know,  
Ka make loa ka!  It is death!  
Ka mai, ka hemahema:  Illness, infirmity:  
Popilikia la!  True distress!
O ko Hawaii make,
Mamua o ko hai;
Ka nele i ka waiwai,
Ke hiki mai ka mai.

E nana i ka hana,
(A hana like pu:)
O na haole i mi waiwai,
Na kumu o kakou.

Noloko o ka nui,
Manawalea ai,
I koe ko ke kino,
Ke nui mai ka mai.

Hawaii's demise,
More than anything else;
Is the lack of wealth,
When illness appears.

Observe the actions,
(And work together too:)
The wealth-seeking foreigners,
Are our teachers.

From within the plenty,
You will find beneficence,
The material needs will remain,
When illness is thriving
(Ka Elele Hawaii, Dec. 22, 1848, my translation with Puakea Nogelmayer).
APPENDIX A: A COMPARISON OF POLITICAL VOCABULARY OF MAJOR POLYNESIAN LANGUAGES

The following comparative material contains political vocabulary from five Polynesian languages, Fijian, Tongan, Samoan, Tahitian, and Maori in that order.¹ The Hawaiian material is presented in Chapter 4. In reviewing these vocabularies (part 6 in the appendix), Hawaiian is also included.

1. Fijian

The first Fijian dictionary was compiled by the Wesleyan missionary David Hazlewood and published in 1850. The work, or more precisely its second edition of 1872, remained a standard until 1941, when Arthur Capell's new dictionary was published in Sydney. Between these two major dictionaries we find a small "Practical Dictionary" from 1903. This anonymous book has been attributed to Father Emmanuel Rougier. The latest version of Fijian dictionaries

¹ Fijian is sometimes considered not a Polynesian language. However, in the present context, I have followed less strict categorization for three reasons. First, the general cultural affinity between Fiji and the Central Polynesian Islands is well-established; second, among the Pacific Island languages Fijian is spoken by a considerable number of native speakers; and third, Fijians have had a relatively long history of contacts with the West, indicating a fair amount of cross-cultural communication and influence.
used in this survey is Capell's fourth edition (1973) and
the earliest, Hazlewood's second edition (1872).

The first interesting point to be made on the basis of
lexicographical search is that in these dictionaries one
cannot find a Fijian gloss for the words 'politics' or
'political'. As a matter of fact, there is no English entry
for these words in any of these dictionaries, although, for
the sake of a contrast, the first major ethnographic
description of the Fijians, published in 1858, is pregnant
with English political vocabulary (Williams 1982). The
closest related word that can be found is 'policy', but only
in a highly personalized sense emphasizing one's ability to
act prudently. In Hazlewood's dictionary (1872, 231) the
Fijian equivalent is valomatua, gasegase or vuku. Yalomatua
is rendered as "wise, prudent" (173). Besides having the
meanings "old, cunning, deceitful, cleverly," gasegase can
designate a dwarf or a small person; vuku has the meaning of
"wise" or that of "wisdom" (163). In a reversed-order check
the word 'policy' disappears. Rougier (1903, 56, 109) has
similar renderings except that valomatua does not appear in
the Fijian-English section. In Capell's dictionary the
entry for 'policy' has been dropped altogether, leaving no
trace of polis in the contemporary Fijian dictionaries.

However, the Western political discourse has not
restricted itself to the use of a single root. The
discourse has also embraced several forms of decision-making
and government, hence we should run a check on basic governmental terms. Seen from this angle the Fijian language, and all Polynesian languages as well, appear politically richer. Hazlewood (1872, 220, 79) is unambiguous when he translates 'kingdom' as "matanitu."² There are no other qualifying terms, as there are none in Rougier (1903, 104) who seems to follow Hazlewood. All four editions of Capell's dictionary are identical in their treatment of governmental vocabulary (the references are to the fourth edition). In the English-Fijian section 'kingdom' is still rendered "matanitu" (352), but again, the reversed-order check gives more details of the meaning and the constitution of the word. According to Capell, matanitu is "a political federation of vanua" (140), vanua being a land division under a strong chief and composed of several yavusa, a smaller division, which is still further divided into mataqali. A still smaller unit was called itokatoka. The stability of this hierarchy was frequently subject to alterations and manipulation due to competition on all levels, often transcending blood ties. Also, matanitu could not be formed in all parts of Fiji, and towards the nineteenth century few chiefly federations with matanitu

² Hazlewood gives also the word pule which is almost certainly of Tongan origin and an indicator of Tongan presence in Fiji. He marked the word with an asterisk, and it does not appear in the Fijian-English section.
status grew into dominant but still competing units (Routledge 1985).

In the modern use, that is, after the cession of Fiji to the British crown in 1874, matanitū has become to signify the government of the whole of Fiji, thus being the linguistic solution for the situation in which no single traditional matanitū could maintain its paramount position without risking peace (the colonial Legislative Council was termed Bose Vakamatanitū, or council belonging to government, as contrast to the native Council of Chiefs, Bose Vakatūraga, which was for a long time excluded from colonial government). This is how a British representative in Fiji saw the situation after cession: "Matanitū is now almost solely the term by which the British Colonial Government of Fiji is known and it carries the same mysterious sense of power as did the Sirkar, the designation of our rule in India" (Brewster 1924, 22).³

Following historical transition Capell translates matanitū as "a kingdom", "independent country" or "government" (1973, 140). The word itself is composed of two words and a possessive ni: mata-ni-tū. Literally tū means "that which stands, is permanent" (240), that is,

³ Unsurprisingly, the British rulers wanted to keep the Fijians out of national decision making, but simultaneously undermined the Fijian traditional organization by making the Fijian chiefs salaried officials of local level, a strategy which largely deprived the chiefs from their means to uphold status among their people (Ali 1974).
Capell adds, "government." Among other things mata means source, thus matanitu can be understood as the source of that which is permanent or consolidated.⁴

This reminds us of the typical Polynesian signification of 'government' as not so much the act of governing as the condition of abundance and well-being. Thus, the verb 'to govern' has a different root in Fijian. Hazlewood (1872, 67, 157, 213) uses two verbs: lewa and veitaliataka. Capell (1973, 339) also gives two verbs: lewa (119) and liutaka (122). In Capell's Fijian-English section lewa is translated "command, authority, judgement, rule," or "to command, rule, judge, decide," which is almost identical with Hazlewood's translation. The translation for liutaka takes a slightly different turn: "to precede, command, direct, to be in charge of." Veitaliataka derives from veitalia, which means to do as one pleases or to rule (Rougier has no entry for 'to govern'). These three words have a clear sense of action as the English verb 'to govern' indicates. But there is a third term in Fijian to signify

⁴ Brewster (1923) gives another explanation. According to him matanitu is a composite of two words, mata meaning face and nitu, "the old aboriginal or Melanesian word for a deity" (22). The literal meaning of matanitu would therefore be something like facing the god, which, in Brewster's account, is a reflection of one clan worshipping the same ancestral god: "all clans descended from a common progenitor, adored his spirit and were a matanitu." One should be cautious to accept this explanation at face value, since Brewster is confusing a basic kinship group and matanitu, which was the highest level of Fijian organization and definitely above common descent.
this activity, although the term cannot be found under the English entry 'to govern'. Instead, it is a derivative of tui. By combining the preposition i and the word tui one gets the word tui which means the highest chief or king, as it is usually translated, that is, the head of matanitu (Hazlewood and Rougier give tūraga levu as a synonym meaning great chief or chief whose sway extends over a large area). Tuiya is the corresponding verb, which is translated as "to govern, rule" (241). The qualifying term rule is important, for it emphasizes the existential connotation of the Polynesian 'activity' of government. This feature is clearly embedded in such terms as sautū (peace, plenty, a state of well-being in the country, opposite of famine or war) and sauturaga (secondary chief whose duty is to uphold the laws and customs of the land, a course that guarantees well-being).

The apparent difficulty of giving adequate translations for the word 'government' is manifest in the comparison between Hazlewood's dictionary and the later projects. Interestingly Hazlewood singles out the word lewa to translate 'government' (1872, 213), a word that does not perform the same function in any of the subsequent dictionaries. Similarly, as we noted above, he preferred lewa to translate the English verb 'to govern' and its derivatives, thus forcing the English etymological unity upon Fijian vocabulary - or perhaps he was only sensitive to
the Fijian conceptions not to allow any overlappings between lewa and matanitu (or government and kingdom). But this practice was not continued by the later lexicographers. For example, whereas Hazlewood (1872, 213) still translates governor as "turaga ni lewa" (ruling or governing chief) - as if out of the sheer need to include the word governor in his dictionary - Rougier uses the colonial loan word "kovana" (1903, 36), which is maintained by Capell (1973, 339) who also gives a Fijian descriptive invention, "o koya sa lewa." This means, among other things, that lewa was deprived from its monopoly over the words 'to govern', 'governor' and 'government' by the introduction of kovana and matanitu to this nuclear family of words.

2. Tongan

The lexicographical codification of the Tongan language began relatively early, the first dictionary being compiled by the Wesleyan missionary Stephen Rabone and printed in Tonga in 1845. Rabone's work followed the brief vocabulary printed in Mariner's Tonga Islands in 1817. It took 45 years until the next dictionary saw the light of day. The book was authored by French Catholic missionaries to Tonga in 1890 (Marist Mission 1890). A new English dictionary was published seven years later (Baker 1897), again as a missionary effort. These three dictionaries remained the
only attempts in this field until C. Maxwell Churchward's dictionary came out in 1959 (although E. E. V. Collocott published a brief "Supplementary Tongan Vocabulary" in 1925 in *The Journal of the Polynesian Society*). Churchward's work, despite its age, is still considered the most complete Tongan dictionary. Thomas Schneider's functional dictionary (1977) was a result of a project to fill the linguistic gaps of twenty years of changes in Tonga as is Edgar Tu'inukuafu's simplified dictionary (1992).

The English entry 'political' appears first in Baker's dictionary (1897, 72), in which the Tongan word "fakabuleaga" is given as translation. Unfortunately the word is not listed in the Tongan-English section, nor does the English word 'politics' show in the text. The word "fakabuleaga" is composed of three units: prefix faka-, verb and/or noun pule (which Baker spelled with 'b') and suffix -'anga (without 'n' in Baker's rendition). Pule is the key,

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5 Seen in the light of the present approach, it is not altogether misleading to suggest that more is involved than a mere whim of chance between the appearance of the word 'political' in Baker's Tongan dictionary and Goldman's assertion that "Tonga had evolved its own and more fully political version of dual and bipolar social structures" (Goldman 1970, 280). Baker, during his missionary work in Tonga, had marked the bipolarization of Tongan chieftainship, or what Goldman depicts as "a change from traditional and sacred headship to political overlordship" (1970, 284), thus himself contributing a chapter to the Western tradition of pure power. This applies also to Samoa as we shall see later. It is also interesting to note that Baker became a trusted companion of the first Tongan monarch, Tāufa'āhau, and practically drew up the 1875 constitution. For Baker's activity in Tonga, see Rutherford's excellent history (Rutherford 1971).
of course. According to Churchward (1959, 419) it means "to rule, to be in a position of authority or control." It can also be translated as an adjective or as a noun. In the latter case its English equivalent is "control, authority, government, superintendence" or "one who controls or governs." The prefix faka- denotes among other things likeness, causation, supplying or having; the suffix -anga nominalizes the root. Thus, fakapule'anga could be translated literally as having the quality of ruling or pertaining to ruling and authority. In Churchward's dictionary fakapule'anga (now spelled with the glottal stop ') is translated as "governmental, national, pertaining to the government or to the nation; public; by the government, under the auspices of the government, officially, or nationally" (1959, 96). Churchward also gives the translation of fakapule, indicating the more abstract nature of the nominalized term fakapule'anga. Fakapule is translated as "pertaining to the person or persons in control or authority" (96). The nominalized version without the prefix, that is, pule'anga, is translated as "kingdom, government, state, nation" (420). Also Rabone, Baker and the French missionaries translated pule'anga as government or kingdom, Rabone and Baker adding nation to the list
(Rabone 1845, 34; Baker 1897, 28, 40; Marist Mission 1890, 235, 352).  

Churchward was the first to expand the Tongan political vocabulary (in a dictionary form, of course) to include the words 'politics' and 'politician'. The both words share the same root with another word designating 'political', which again appears first in Churchward's dictionary. The 'root' in this case, although indigenous, is of relatively recent origin, perhaps originating in the events that led to the establishment of the legislative assembly in Tonga after the promulgation of the 1875 constitution. The legislative assembly, or Parliament House, as Churchward puts it, was to be called Fale Alea, which literally means a house of discussion or conference (the meeting of chiefs was previously called fakataha). Using fale alea as root one gets the adjective 'political' by adding the prefix faka- (Churchward 1959, 29, 736). Fakafalealea thus has a literal meaning pertaining to the house of discussion or the Parliament House. Churchward translates it as "parliamentary, legislative, in a parliamentary manner, etc." (29) and again omits the word 'political' in the Tongan-English section. In the same vein, 'politician' is

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6 The Proto-Polynesian word pure means prayer or to pray. It is tempting to see this in connection with chieftainship as a link to the gods. This would imply an inseparable unity of the chiefs' worshipping of their gods and the maintenance of social order and well-being (Williamson 1967, 33).
rendered as "taha 'oku kau ki he Fale Alea" (a person belonging to the Parliament House) and 'politics' as "ngaahi me'a fakafalealea" (things or matters of the legislature) (36). Using the common root the translation for 'political party' is obtained by combining the word fa'ahi, indicating a side, and fakafalealea, the literal translation of which would be a parliamentary side, or more lucidly, a (chosen) side in parliamentary matters.

This all implies a modern, most likely a twentieth-century development in the Tongan monarchy, but the restrictive and narrow meanings of this political vocabulary also betrays a local history of cultural translation, which was meant to serve very specific interests of the Tongan situation (for a brief overview, see Howe 1988, ch. 9). The most modern renditions of 'politics' and 'political' are given by Schneider (1977, 130), who, besides wordy and descriptive definitions, uses anglicized forms "politiki" for politics and "fakapolitikale" for political (he also gives the word fakapule'anga).

The governmental terminology was partly dealt with above, except the verb 'to govern/gouverner' and the noun 'governor/gouverneur' as they appear in the English-Tongan or French-Tongan sections of the dictionaries. The French missionaries distinguished a variety of equivalents for the verb 'gouverner' (Marist Mission 1890, 352), which also retained that meaning in the Tongan-French section. The
terms "faka 'uli" and "'uli" were reserved for a more specific purposes, like those of governing or directing a fortress or a ship (84, 291). "Lea'i" had a special meaning to govern with one's words (174). The liberty-conscious French were also careful to distinguish a rule by one person only ("ta sino i vai" [254]). The two more important verbs were "hau" (and its synonym "haugaholo") and "pule'i," which were both translated as to govern, to rule or to command (131, 235). In the French eyes hau could also be a person, namely a tyrant. Baker was not nearly as attentive as the French missionaries, for he used only one word in translating the action of government. The word was "bule" (1897, 40). In the Tongan-English section Baker, following Rabone, added the qualifying words "to exact," "reign" and "governor" (28). For Baker, as well as for Rabone, pule'i signalled the state of being governed (29). Baker also registered the anglicized term for governor, "kovana," and the native construction "koe bule" (40).

In Churchward's dictionary hau is translated as "champion, victor, or conqueror; sovereign, ruler, monarch"

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7 Rabone was also sensitive to various Tongan derivations of the word pule. The list on page 34 is as follows: "Bulebulegataa, y. To feel a difficulty in speaking or governing to. Bulebulegofua, y. To govern without any difficulty or apprehension . . . Bule-fakamalohi, y. To govern oppressively. Bule-kakaha, y. To govern with overbearing severity . . . Bule-malohi, y. To govern with rigour" (Rabone 1845, 34). These were repeated by Baker (1897, 28), and, as expected, they did not appear in the English-Tongan section.
(1959, 213). It can also be a verb. *Pule'i* is rendered as "to govern, rule over, control, be in charge of, have authority over, superintend" (420). Historically *hau* used to be the so-called secular ruler, who, as the *Tu'i Tonga*, or the divine chief, was too sacred to be active in practical matters, oversaw the regular order of the chiefdom. Mariner's early definition of "how [hau]" clearly implies this dimension: "a king, the supreme chief, not as to rank, but power" (Martin 1981, 436). In contrast to *hau*, Mariner defined *tu'i* ("tooi") as "a chief, or tributary governor of an island, or district" (449). This diarchic division was reflected also in Rabone's dictionary. In his view *hau* was "a conqueror" or "reigning prince" (Rabone 1845, 121), whereas *tu'i* was primarily referred to as "a king" (204). In the more recent development of the Tongan monarchy the title of *Tu'i Tonga* was gradually degraded and formally abolished in 1865 by the king Tāufa'āhau, a development which emphasizes the overall tendency to reduce government to secular matters (the French missionaries, in their dictionary, provided a revealing example, which also relates to the formal religious tolerance, instituted following the show-downs of French gunboat diplomacy in the 1850s: "'Oku 'ikai ke ne pulei ae lotu, il ne gouverne pas la religion" [Marist Mission 1890, 235]). The survival of the term *hau* is thus not accidental as a Tongan gloss for ruler. It is likewise important to note the difference
between the words *hau* and *pule'anga*, the former indicating the more active side of ruling and the latter the more passive existence of authority. And moreover, the words are obviously not etymologically related like the English words 'to govern' and 'government,' which implies a difficulty in differentiating between *hau* and *pule*.

3. **Samoan**

The systematic intercultural codification of Samoan language coincided, as in every Polynesian case, with the missionary needs to distribute Christian texts among the natives and to create a literary people capable of reading, and not merely listening to and repeating, the word of God. The first milestone in this linguistic work was the translation of the New Testament which was printed in 1849. The principal figure in the translation work was missionary George Pratt of the London Missionary Society. His continuous work on the Samoan language finally brought about a dictionary, which appeared in 1862, two years after the whole, revised translation of the Bible had come out from the press. Pratt's dictionary lived through four editions: 1862, 1878, 1893 and 1911. In the year following Pratt's second edition R. P. L. Le Violette published his Samoan-French-English dictionary. The next dictionary project was completed not until 1966, when G. B. Milner's dictionary was
published. Allardice's simplified dictionary from 1985 represents the latest attempt to bring lexicographical work up to date.

Again, we may note the common feature of the Polynesian language area. The codification of political vocabulary as a projection of Western words is of fairly recent origin and abstractly brief in character but enriches - and simultaneously draws away from the political modernity of the West - when one focuses on the native words. In the Samoan case the first English entries for 'politics' and 'political' are found in Milner's dictionary (Milner 1966, 413). 'Politics' (Milner is careful to add the word "village" in parenthesis) is translated as "faigānu'u," which comprises two words, faiga and nu'u. Faiga means basically a method or style of doing something and nu'u is the word for an association of extended families (ʻāiga) or village as it is usually though inaccurately translated. In the Samoan-English section the meaning of faigānu'u is closer to its formative parts. Now without the word 'politics' faigānu'u is simply translated as "village community, village affairs" (Milner 1966, 53), which in reality are usually settled in councils (fono) of chiefs and orators. Another word for 'politics' is faiga fa'alenu'u, which only adds the causative fa'a- and the definite article le to the word nu'u without significantly changing the meaning of faigānu'u. In the same vein, national politics
is rendered as "faiga fa’aleatunu’u," which has the word atunu’u or row or chain of 'villages' as its main component. Another word for national politics is "matā’upu fa’alemālō," which means literally questions belonging to mālō, a word which was traditionally used in reference to an alliance of several nu’u and the authority invested upon the most prestigious and victorious district.

In the dictionaries the word mālō has several meanings. It can be used for guests or visitors but it can also mean "to prevail over an opponent" or to "win a contest." As a noun its meaning can be that of "success" or "victory" but also "prevailing party" or "power in authority," that is, "government" (Milner 1966, 124). The dictionary meanings of mālō have evolved quite significantly since Pratt’s first edition in 1862. Pratt did translate mālō as government but only in the English-Samoan section, the meaning in the Samoan-English section being "the conquering party" or "to be victorious in games or in war" (Pratt 1862, 39, 145). It was only in the subsequent editions that the word government was added to the Samoan-English section - after the unsuccessful and short-lived attempt by the American diplomat cum business man Albert Steinberger to establish a Western-style central government in Šāmoa. Violette had the word in both sections (Violette 1879, 153, 410). It was, however, Milner who recorded mālō as being used in translating the English word 'political' (Milner 1966, 413).
In Milner's rendition 'political' is either fa'alemalō or tau mālō, the both words meaning approximately belonging to or concerning government (mālō).

Milner also added other meanings of mālō, which help us define more closely the translation of 'political'. According to Milner, the meanings "Legislative Assembly," "State" and "republic, kingdom, empire, etc." can also be expressed by mālō (Milner 1966, 124-125), thus indicating a history of broadening the scope of the word. Even more interesting is the fact that Milner retained the words 'politics' and 'political' in his Samoan-English section. Besides being an indication of the belonging to the government, fa'alemalō has the meaning "political".

Matā’upu fa’alemalō is translated unambiguously as either "political questions" or "politics" (Milner 1966, 125). Finally, Allardice gives the loan word polotiki for 'politics' (1985, 170), but now as separate from village politics, which he still translates as faigānu'u.

What we have here is a rather curious line of development, from the alliances of several nu‘u led by a sacred title chief (ali‘i pa‘ia) and acquisition of districts by conquest to the concepts of politics and government. It is significant that mālō as a concept did not, in its traditional context, mean a body of administrators or chosen leaders. The important practical decisions were made collectively in fono, whether the social
unit was nu'u or mālō. Mālō was rather a titular name for the alliance or the term for the authority derived from a conquest or an agreement of alliance under one paramount district. Furthermore, if one district managed by means of war to become mālō in respect to another, it, as a rule, meant humiliation for the latter. The opposite of mālō was indeed vāivai meaning weak, thus indicating a major difference in status. The practical consequences were also severe. The winning side would destroy the land of the conquered side and evict the residences to prevent retaliation (Meleisea 1987, 24).

Thus, mālō as a concept was more than anything associated with the Samoan system of highly graded status and the sacredness of their title chiefs, to whom every Samoan could trace his or her family line, and with the potentialities of conquest and growth through alliances which the status system made possible (tupu as the term for the highest chief of the district means literally to grow or grown; it can either have the more literal meaning of annexing new districts or the symbolic meaning of growth in livelihood made possible by the divine chief). It seems that it was only later, after the forced centralization of Samoan government under the colonial administrations of Germany and the United States, that mālō acquired its modern dictionary meaning and became an acceptable root for the words 'politics' and 'political' in the Western scheme of
stable government (the warfare inherent in the Samoan social system was a continuous source of frustration for the Western agents). We may thus have good reasons to doubt George Turner's travel account on Samoan 'politics' when he gives the following generalized quote apparently describing the typically Samoan friendly attitude toward foreign missionaries, who were witnessing intense rivalry for the highest Samoan chiefly titles: "These missionaries are from a foreign country; they do not understand our Samoan politics . . . " (Turner in Howe 1988, 246, my italics). If this quote was written down verbatim and then translated, it raises the question, what was the Samoan word for 'politics' in the middle of the nineteenth century.

Another peculiarity appears to have taken place half a century later. In the first dictionary of the colonial period, Pratt's fourth edition (1911)\(^8\), there is an interesting qualification of mālō, which tells us something about the interests of the West. Besides translating mālō simply as government Pratt (or the editor, Pratt died in 1894) provided two additional varieties, namely stable government (mālōpōpō) (202) and firm government (mālōtū) (72). Freud would have taken notice of this peculiar

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\(^8\) William E. Branilow, a methodist missionary, compiled a concise comparative vocabulary of Dobuan, Fijian and Samoan languages with English entries in 1904. The scope of the book is too narrow and the explanations provided too brief for it to be considered an adequate dictionary of the languages it attempts to cover.
repetition, since the translations of the two qualifications are almost the same. We could ask why the two Samoan words were included only after the colonial administration was established.

We find still another interesting feature in the governmental vocabulary by juxtaposing the Samoan equivalents of the English noun 'government' and the verb 'to govern'. Unlike the English words government and to govern the Samoan equivalents malo and pule do not share a same root. In Pratt's dictionary pule had the meanings of a command, order, decision or authority and the corresponding verbs (Pratt 1862, 170). These meanings remained unchanged throughout the four editions. Violette added the words "power," "to conspire" and "a conspiracy" (1879, 218). The verb 'to govern' is entirely absent in Pratt's Samoan-English sections and Violette ignored it altogether. Allardice gives the most comprehensive list of meanings: "authority, power, right to decide, decision, ruling, director, principal manager etc., authorize, govern, control, direct, administer" (Allardice 1985, 59). He is the only one to include the verb 'to govern' in a Samoan-English section. He also registers the German colonial invention pulenu'u, or "local government official" or "mayor," as it was first translated (59). Three other derivatives deserve to be noticed in this conjunction. Puletua has the meaning of an opposition party or the party
without a voice in the government (Milner 1966, 192; Allardice 1985, 59). The word does not appear in a dictionary before 1966, but historical records can trace it back at least to the events of 1876, when the deportation of Steinberger from Sāmoa led to a split of mālō and to the establishment of puletua by the supporters of Steinberger. The literal meaning of puletua is 'authority of the back', referring to the country outside the center of the power of the mālō (Meleisea 1987, 37). It is not clear whether the word was specifically invented for this particular incident or whether it is of a more remote origin. At any rate, it testifies to the typically Samoan conception of the fluctuations of status and authority. The other derivative, puleaaoao, which was translated already in Pratt's first edition as "to be supreme" (1862, 170), reduplicates the word ao, which among other things is the general term for the chiefly titles bestowed on a chief by the highest chiefs of a district or a confederation of districts, or alternatively by the special class of orator chiefs (tulāfale). Finally, we have the word valeosi, which was given a translation "govern badly" in Pratt's fourth edition (1911, 72). Again, pule and valeosi are not etymologically related, thus further dispersing the lexicographical project in finding equivalences in political vocabulary.
4. Tahitian

Despite the relatively frequent attempts to produce a Tahitian dictionary, the best efforts to achieve the level of comprehensiveness of the first dictionary by John Davies have been only partially successful. Davies was sent to the Society Islands by the London Missionary Society in 1801 and he spent there in different locations about half a century. However, despite the early presence of missionaries in the islands (the first came in 1794) and the frequent translation of Biblical and other 'civilizing' material into Tahitian, Davies’s dictionary was completed only in 1851 (the latest reprint is from 1991), thus assembling an extraordinary amount of cultural details accumulated during those years. Davies was of course preparing a Tahitian-English dictionary, and by the time of its publication the Society Islands had been nine years a French protectorate. The next Tahitian dictionary was French, compiled by M. G. Cuzent in 1860. The dictionary was only a brief list of vocabulary with concise translations. A more ambitious work was completed by Bishop Tepano Jaussen in 1887. Jaussen’s dictionary soon became the French standard, which underwent several phases of modernization during a century of existence. Besides the first I have used the sixth edition of 1987. For English speakers Davies’s dictionary was the only source for 73 years, that is, until the second

Stimson (1924, 50) was the first to introduce the word 'political' into a Tahitian dictionary. In translating the word "disturber" (perturbateur) he added the qualifying word "political" in parenthesis. The Tahitian equivalent according to Stimson was "'e ta'ata ha'ape'ape'a," meaning a troubling or perplexing person. This was followed by the words "revolutionist" and "rebel," which Stimson translated "'e ta'ata 'orure hau," a construction that was mentioned in this sense already by the missionary William Ellis in 1829 (Ellis 1967, vol. 2, 369). In an earlier instant Stimson also added the word 'political' in parenthesis to specify the meaning of "party," which he translated as "te ho'e pae

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9 Stimson's dictionary was in fact trilingual, presenting words in English, French and Tahitian in that order. It should also be noted that Stimson gathered the words into thematic lessons, so that the lessons 54 and 55 present the basic vocabulary of Western political and juridical institutions.
'au," pae 'au meaning side or division and te ho'e forming an indefinite article (Stimson 1924, 49). This designation of 'political party' was included in Andrews' dictionary (Andrews and Andrews 1944, 109).

Without going any further into Stimson's word lists, which are, as themselves, like manuals of the Western cultural categories, we could stop for a moment at the word hau. Stimson's revolutionist has a literal meaning of a person who stirs up or provokes against peace or established authority (hau). The word hau has several meanings but most importantly it has served as the basis for the modern word 'political' ("no te hau," in Jaussen 1987, no page numbers). In the first Tahitian dictionary hau was translated as "peace, government, reign." It could also mean "more, or beyond" or, in comparing adjectives, "greater, larger, longer, etc." A third meaning was "the dew that falls at night" (Davies 1851, 99). Later more meanings has been attached to it. Swift adds the following: to make peace, to reach an accord, accord, power, state, administration, to exceed, to surpass, exceeding, more (Swift 1939, 171-172). In Andrews' dictionary we can find still others: king, rule, law, order (Andrews and Andrews 1944, 57). Against this backdrop the expression no te hau cannot be translated unambiguously. However, since the majority of the dictionaries seems to give preference to 'government' (or some other word indicating social order) as the most
frequently used translation, we could translate no te hau as 'of or belonging to government'. Hau has also been the root for the translation of other related concepts, like democracy (hau manahune), monarchy (hau ari'i), hereditary government (hau mateata), feudalism (hau matatia), republic (hau repupirita) and anarchy (hau 'ore) (Davies 1851, 99; Jaussen 1887, 49; Cadousteau 1973, 42).

As was evident in the preceding cases the words 'to govern' and 'government' are not etymologically related either in the Tahitian language. The 1987 edition of Jaussen's dictionary gives two words with the meaning 'to govern', namely fa'atere and fa'a'amu (Jaussen 1987, no page numbers). The basic meaning of fa'atere is to steer a boat or to guide or direct (today also used for cars and machines). It can also mean to go on with an oration or

10 The translation 'political' appears only in Jaussen's 1987 edition. The expression no te hau is itself much older and probably dates back well into the pre-European era. In the more recent, post-European context, I have encountered it on the pages of the news bulletin that the French colonial government launched in 1850. Beginning from 1853 there was, in the two-page bulletin, a short column for the government’s announcements. The column was called "Paeau Parau No Te Hau," a literal translation of which is something like the writing section for the government (the irony is that the whole bulletin served that function). Tahitians called the colonial government te Hau Tamaru (shadow government), a phrase which was adopted also by the colonial administrators. The news bulletin itself was dedicated to the benefit of all the lands within the colonial government (te mau fenua i roto i te Hau Tamaru). No te hau was further used to translate 'constitution'. According to Stimson, the Tahitian expression was "ture tumu no te hau" (1924, 51), literally the basic (tumu) law (ture, from Latin) for the government (no te hau).
speech. Beginning from Davies's dictionary fa'aterere has been associated also with acts of direct "national affairs" (Davies 1851, 75). Sometimes the word hau is added after fa'aterere to specify this dimension (Swift 1939, 111). Fa'a'amu is given only by Jaussen, the principal meaning of which is to feed or supply with food. In the Tahitian-French section there is no indication of the French translation of 'gouverner' (Jaussen 1987, no page numbers). On the other hand, fa'aterere has the meaning 'to govern' in both sections in all the dictionaries. In addition, fa'aterere has become the root of some other modern governmental concepts. Cadousteau translates 'wise policy' (une politique sage) as "e fa'aterera'a hau pa'ari," a literal translation of which is skillful or wise conducting of government (Cadousteau 1973, 281). In Swift's rendition a nominalized fa'aterera'a means "administration, management" (Swift 1939, 111). Fa'aterehau has a meaning of cabinet minister (Cadousteau 1973, 42) and cabinet meeting is 'apo'ora'a fa'aterehau (Jaussen 1987, no page numbers).

The concept of hau is more complicated and, judging by Douglas Oliver's monumental work on traditional Tahitian culture, also ambiguous and vaguely documented in original sources (Oliver 1974, 1049-1053). At any rate, one thing is certain. This concept "is not quite so palpable as the innocently straightforward dictionary definition suggests" (1049). From Oliver's rather hesitant interpretations I
would infer one fundamental conclusion, which builds on a semantic continuum between all the standard dictionary definitions: peace-government-reign-greater (one could even consider the dew that falls at night as a symbolic expression of a chief consolidating his hau).

If this continuum is held as the starting point, it is easier to take the second step toward a more complete understanding of hau, namely its inherently cosmological character. For any chief to reign peace was required, for it only allowed the land to bear its fruits, as the speech used in the beginning of truce negotiations suggests: there should be peace "that the land may flourish" (Oliver 1974, 1050). But no land can flourish if the human order is in conflict with the cosmic order. Thus, hau also means the perfect order of the different classes of the people and an orderly mediation between the realms of the gods and the people. This was confirmed by building a new major temple, or marae, for the territory of the tribe when the establishment of hau was at hand. Oliver (1050) sites a Tahitian cosmogonic myth in which the god Ta’aroa gives Venus and Mercury as the eyes for the sky associating Venus with peace (hau) and Mercury with war (tama’i). Besides an indication of cycles of order and disorder, the myth makes a clear connection between the productive and destructive sides of these cycles and the cosmic order of the universe. I do not think it an accident that the tutelar spirit of
medical experts, whose function was to enhance life, was called Hau.

The order of this life-giving side of the universe was, as could be expected, guaranteed by the highest ranking chief, ari'ī nui, who acted as a link to the realm of gods. This chief and his associates were customarily referred to as the supporters or foundations of hau, or "papa o teie nei hau" (Oliver 1974, 1051) and the high chief as the head (upo'o) of his hau (1069). The basic meaning of papa is flat surface or platform, but the usage here refers more likely to a sacred condition of prosperous society. The head was the most sacred part of any person, but especially of ari'ī. The figurative expression "eat the hau" as an indication of the reigning of ari'ī nui and the associated economy of tributes (1068) further suggests an intermediary position of ari'ī nui between the gods and people, thus allowing the people enjoy the products of the land which is ultimately of sacred origin. Although it is uncertain and somewhat speculative I would propose that the indigenous meaning of hau refers to a stable order in which all the forces of the universe are well organized. In this scheme the word fa'aterere would refer to maintaining this order in a prosperous way.

In sum, this would be the entity that was made an equal category for 'political' in the expression "no te hau" (Jaussen 1987, no page numbers). Of course, this particular
translation is very recent (at least it does not appear in a dictionary until 1987) and should not be equalled with any pre-European notion. It is rather an expression that intends to summarize the activity that belongs to the government of this day. 'Government', on the other hand, is a translation that originally identified in the Tahitian society an equivalent of the Western term, but which might not have captured the whole dimension of its indigenous meaning.

Today there also exists a modern loan word translation of 'political' and 'politics', which is poritita (Cadousteau 1973, 281). The word poritita appears only in Cadousteau's dictionary and even there it is excluded from the Tahitian-French section. It is interesting to note that Cadousteau also gives translations to such concepts as 'political man' (ta'ata poritita) and foreign politics (poritita rapae) (Cadousteau 1973, 281). In Jaussen's 1987 edition the modern equivalent for 'politics' (in the sense of policy) is rave'a pa'ari, which has a literal translation of a wise plan or operation.

5. Maori

Among the Polynesian languages Maori was the first to be codified into a dictionary. The author of the pioneering dictionary, Thomas Kendall, came to New Zealand together
with the first company of English missionaries in 1814. Six
difficult years later Kendall, accompanied by a musket-
hungry Maori chief, travelled back to England for his
ordination and to finish the work on Maori grammar and
vocabulary with a Cambridge professor in linguistics (Howe
1988, 216). The work was finished briskly and the
dictionary with a grammar came out from a London press in
1820, the year of Kendall's arrival at England. A year
later he was back in the missionary work in New Zealand.
Although Kendall had an observing eye and a rare quality for
a missionary to expose himself to the Maori culture (Gunson
1978, 213), his own linguistic work was done during a
relatively short period of time, which was heavily marked by
strained relations with the Maori (see Binney 1968), and at
best it can be considered a modest beginning in the
codification of the Maori language. Another missionary,
later the Bishop of Waiapu, William Williams, as a result of
his translation of the New Testament, Catechism and Prayer
Book, made a more informed attempt during the latter part of
the 1830s. A manuscript was finished already in 1838,
although the dictionary was printed not until 1844. This
dictionary, or rather its subsequent editions, became the
standard for decades. In the hands of his son, Bishop
William L. Williams, and grandson, Bishop Herbert W.
Williams, the dictionary was enlarged and corrected several
times (William Williams, Sr. prepared only the first two
editions in 1844 and 1852). The Williams family was responsible for five editions, the third being printed in 1871 and the next two in 1892 and 1917. The sixth and seventh editions were prepared collectively in 1957 and 1971. Unfortunately the English to Maori section, which was developed from second to fourth edition, was dropped when Herbert Williams took over the editorship. Just before the fourth edition of Williams's dictionary was finished, Edward Tregear expanded the scope of the previous linguistic work by compiling a Maori-Polynesian comparative dictionary, which was published in 1891. Tregear's dictionary, which contains a brief English finding list, is still widely used. In 1949 A. H. and A. W. Reed published a concise Maori Dictionary, which had entries in both ways. The most up-to-date work in the field is done by Bruce Biggs, who has recently compiled two dictionaries in the Maori language (1981, 1990), and P. M. Ryan (1989).

In parallel to Fijian there is no Maori translation for the words 'politics' or 'political'. Not even Biggs's The Complete English-Maori Dictionary (1990) has entries for these words, which indicates that we should look for more specific words to grasp the cultural translation process in the conceptual realm of Western politics. The word 'policy' appears in two sources, first in Tregear's comparative dictionary (1891, 509) and later in Biggs's new dictionary (1990, 60, 101). The English finding list in Tregear's
dictionary did not prove helpful in this case (the word was not simply there). Besides, the Maori word denoting policy, *tikanga*, has according to Tregear several other possible translations, for example, rule, plan, method, disposition, custom, reason, meaning, purport, the character or nature of a thing, control, authority and direction. Some other dictionaries emphasize the correctness or the customary or normal manner of the procedure to which *tikanga* refers (Williams 1971, 416-417; Biggs 1990, 137). The word derives from *tika*, which means straight, even, just, correct, right, and is almost universally applied in Polynesia. On the other hand, Biggs identifies a completely different word for 'policy', that is, *kaupapa* (1990, 60). The usual meaning of *kaupapa* is level floor, platform or stage. It can also mean topic or a matter for discussion. The third, and apparently less frequently used, meaning is policy (101). Biggs maintains this definition in both English-Maori and Maori-English sections. In comparison, *tikanga* seems to bear a moral connotation as it refers to a customary procedure, whereas *kaupapa* looks more a casual name for a planned scheme. As a matter of fact, Williams (1971, 107) adds the meanings plan, scheme and proposal. *Kaupapa* has, however, been used in a more restricted context, too. According to Tregear, an altar or sacred platform was called *kaupapa* (1891, 137). Williams does not mention altar but talks about a "medium in communication with spirits" (1971, 107).
Tregear suggests a similar meaning but in a personified sense: "one whom the spirit of an ancestor visits" (1891, 137).

Besides being a general term for customary procedures, tikanga has formed the basis for the translation of the verb 'to govern'. It first appeared in the third edition of William Williams's dictionary in 1871. The Maori translation was whakahaere tikanga (Williams 1871, 16), which literally means to conduct the customary procedures. This is, of course, providing that emphasis is put on the customary side of tikanga, which immediately reverts to what

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11 In Kendall's dictionary (1820) there is an interesting example that puts the verb 'to govern' into a wider perspective. Drawing on the activities of the early years of the nineteenth-century New Zealand, Kendall illustrated the Maori language by translating a highly useful question "Who commands the ship?" as "K'wai ra te rangatira o te kaipuke nei?" (Kendall 1820, 97). In re-translating the Maori sentence back into English one finds that instead of using some Maori equivalent for the verb 'to command' Kendall used the word rangatira, which in the traditional Maori hierarchy was the title of a sort of a petty chief, who usually led a small descent group and could trace his genealogy to an ariki, or high chief. Thus, by asking who is rangatira of the ship, Kendall stressed the status and not the function of the person in the ship's hierarchy. The value of this translation is that it clearly reflects a Maori point of view in a very concrete situation of the contact between the Maori and the West. It is difficult to decide what could be a warranted conclusion in view of the appearance of the verb 'to govern' in Williams' dictionary in 1871. Perhaps Kendall's example reflects very specific conditions of his time, but it is at least suggestive that the verb 'to govern' appears historically speaking relatively late. In 1871, New Zealand had been under the British crown for three decades, although, as it has been argued (Howe 1988, 226-229), Maoris were largely unchanged.
is considered the correct practices of a community. **Whakahaere** is a causative verb meaning to cause to go, carry about, conduct, lead, execute, search for, explore, to go about to examine (Williams 1971, 30; Biggs 1990, 146).

These two words were recorded in Williams’s 1852 edition, but only separately. The translation ‘to govern’ was added to the next edition as a special case of the verb **haere** and its causative form **whakahaere**. Other meanings of **whakahaere tikanga** were to direct and superintend (Williams 1871, 16). This special case was carried over to Herbert Williams’s edition of the Williams dictionary, where it was preserved through all subsequent editions. It is worth observing that not until Reeds’ dictionary of 1949 does the verb ‘to govern’ appear as an independent entry in an English-Maori section (Reed and Reed 1949, 122). Ryan (1989, 112) and Biggs (1990, 42) have continued this practice.

The English word ‘government’ turns up in the last (fourth) edition of Williams’s dictionary in 1892. The Maori word was "kawantanga" (54), a direct loan from English and supplemented with the nominalizing suffix -tanga. Accordingly, ‘governor’ was "kawana" (54). Herbert Williams followed in, as did the Reeds and Ryan, the last of whom uses the diacritical markers (kāwanatanga).

Maori Language seems to be the only major Polynesian language in which the translators and compilers of
dictionaries have been unable to record an indigenous equivalent for the word 'government'. We may only wonder why they were able to translate *whakahaere tikanga* as 'to govern' (but only from 1871) and not to find a corresponding institution. In the Fijian case, in which there too were no equivalents for 'politics' and 'political', both the verb 'to govern' and the noun 'government' were translated (see section 2.1.). It is not unreasonable to assume that in the traditional Maori tribal organization there was an equivalent for the Fijian form of the loose tribal federation (*matanitu*). The federation of Maori tribes was called *waka*, which, however, did not play such a decisive role in their practical lives (Goldman 1970, 45). In the frequent wars the tribe, *iwi*, and the subtribe, *hapū*, were far more significant units. In a way, *waka* never actualized as the lower hierarchy was constantly changing through warfare and inter-group migration. Similarly, in Fiji *matanitu* was an organizational unit that actualized only in few territories. But in Fiji *matanitu* became the translation for 'government', due, perhaps, to the fact that those few Fijian territorial tribes achieved the status of *matanitu*, whereas the Maori tribes were markedly more fluid in their organization. And, finally, it is true that the Western perception of the Maori - especially of those responsible for the codification of the language - was early
on stamped with the horrifying vision of anarchy, as the following missionary assessment shows:

There is in fact no government, no general head over the people, but the whole are under a subdivided and independent chieftainship, which occasions continual jealousies, quarrels, and bloodshed; and nurses that spirit of ferocity and savage cunning, which is inimical to the introduction of all humanising virtue (Christian Missions 1832, 412).

6. Review

In view of these theoretical reflections a few final conclusions on the codification of the Polynesian equivalents of political vocabulary can be presented.

1. The gaps in political reason were filled relatively late in Polynesia. The word 'political' appeared for the first time in a dictionary entry in Hawaii in 1865. Hawaii was followed by Tonga in 1897 and Society Islands in 1924. The word was codified in Sāmoa in 1966. It is completely lacking in Maori and Fijian (as well as many other smaller languages, like Marquesan). It is difficult to suggest adequate explanations for the lack of the words 'political' and 'politics' in some of these languages. In some places the colonial languages English and French gradually replaced or at least reduced the spheres of applicability of the indigenous languages. Thus, for example, in the late nineteenth-century Hawaii we witness an increasing usage of the loan word politika together with the indigenous word
kalai'a'ina as well as an increasing general visibility of
the English language as the medium of education, business,
press and government transactions.

2. In the translations the indigenous political
concepts reveal a rather idiosyncratic history, which
indicates a presence of outsiders as there is a considerable
discontinuity of political vocabulary between the six
Polynesian languages that have been targeted here. Words
describing basic elements of these societies usually display
at least some amount of consistence in etymology and
meaning. But, in comparison (see table 1), they either mark
some subarea of a culture as the privileged locus of
politics and the political or they are loan words (in which
case their meanings are less specific). Besides reflecting
linguistic and cultural differences between Polynesian
chiefdoms, the codification of political vocabulary seems
greatly to reflect the special interests in culture contacts
and the Western perceptions of the political order, namely a
juxtaposition of a centralized and decentralized images of
social order, the latter being an indication of disorder,
hence an apolitical society (Fiji and New Zealand in
particular). In this light, it is not surprising that
Hawaii, Tonga and Tahiti, the most centralized chiefdoms in
the post-contact Polynesia, were the earliest examples in
the development of equivalences in political vocabulary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Govern</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fijian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>matanitā</td>
<td>lewā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongan</td>
<td>fakapule'anga,</td>
<td>ngaahi mea</td>
<td>pule'anga</td>
<td>pule'i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fakafalealea</td>
<td>fakafalealea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>fa'alemālō</td>
<td>fa'alemālō,</td>
<td>mālō</td>
<td>pule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>polotiki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahitian</td>
<td>no te hau,</td>
<td>poritita</td>
<td>hau</td>
<td>fa'atere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>poritita</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>kawanatanga</td>
<td>whakahaere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tikanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>kālai'i'ina,</td>
<td>kālai'i'ina,</td>
<td>aupuni</td>
<td>ho'omalualu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>polikika</td>
<td>polokika</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the above table it is evident that the standard translations of the four basic concepts do not share much in the etymological sense, except the Tongan and Samoan glosses for 'to govern' (pule‘i and pule). Thus, the vertical dimension of the table speaks in favor of an etymological discontinuity between the six languages. Horizontally speaking, that is, within each language, there is significantly more etymological continuity between the words. The peculiar feature, however, is the location of the line of discontinuity in the table. The break in the English language is between 'politics' and 'government', but in the six Polynesian languages we have to move to the right, to the space separating the translations of the words 'government' and 'govern'. Only in Hawaiian there exists a real separation of the words 'political'/'politics' and 'government' corresponding to the break in English. This difference in the location of the etymological break in the table portrays a typically Polynesian conception of power, which differentiates between the source and location of power and its actual use by respectively applying different words. Furthermore, a good translation for the word 'politics' seems to have been the most difficult task. In the cases of Tongan and Samoan, a word for a governing institution was used to derive the translation for 'politics', a decision that produced highly localized renderings (legislature in Tongan and government in Samoan).
In Hawaiian, the word for 'political' was gradually applied also to 'politics'. In Fijian and Maori, the whole word is lacking, and in Tahitian a loan word serves the function (in fact, only in Tonga a native invention has prevailed).

3. What has been abstractly identified as politics by the Western agents without specifying its contents, is much more subtle and differentiated if viewed from the indigenous point of view. The native words describe a complex network of human relations which connect patterns of proper behavior, status, hierarchy and the structures of the universe and the place accorded to humans in it. The political translations have, at least on the superficial level as described in this chapter, established a conceptual space with a system of comparisons that is not merely an imposition of values regarding proper politics but also, and more profoundly, an imposition of the possibility of comparisons on a single cultural continuum, which recognizes differences and similarities as dimensions of same phenomenon.

The description of the existence of this type of comparative system rests on one important premise. Its intention is not to clear all the debris of historical interpretation and distortion in order to somehow save the indigenous layers of cultures from further violence. For one thing, Polynesian cultures are, and they have always been, changing cultures, which make any attempt of salvaging
dubious, and second, a culture in contact with another culture must not be seen as a perverted version of the original; culture is simply culture, whether in contact or not. The details of a contact are, of course, essential fuel for any cultural study focusing on interaction between different people; but the decisions regarding the status of a culture are best to be left for the prophets.
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#### General Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCFM</td>
<td>American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Boston.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AH</td>
<td>Archives of Hawaii, Honolulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>Bishop Museum Archives, Honolulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>The Hawaiian Historical Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL</td>
<td>Hamilton Library, Honolulu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCS</td>
<td>Hawaiian Mission Children's Society Library, Honolulu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIM</td>
<td>Sandwich Islands Mission</td>
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#### Newspapers and Periodicals

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<tr>
<td>Home Rula Repubalika</td>
<td>semi-weekly newspaper</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ka Elele Hawai</td>
<td>semi-monthly paper</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ka Nupepa Kuokoa</td>
<td>weekly newspaper</td>
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<td>semi-monthly paper</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ke Alaula</td>
<td>monthly paper</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ke Au Okaa</td>
<td>weekly newspaper</td>
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<td>Ke Kumu Hawai</td>
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<td>Sandwich Island Mirror and Commercial Gazette</td>
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<td>The Friend</td>
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<td>The Hawaiian Spectator</td>
<td>quarterly paper</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Polynesian</td>
<td>weekly newspaper</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ministerial Reports of the Kingdom

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Report of the Minister of the Interior</td>
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#### Archival Collections

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<td>American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions-Hawaiian Evangelical Association, correspondence, 1820-1920, HMCS.</td>
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<td>AG/AH</td>
<td>Attorney General, Kingdom of Hawaii, AH.</td>
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<td>IDL/AH</td>
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<td>Interior Department, miscellaneous items, Kingdom of Hawaii, AH.</td>
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<td>J/HMCS</td>
<td>The Journal Collection, 1819-1900, HMCS.</td>
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</table>
KC/AH  The Kahn Collection, AH (numbered items).
LFP/AH  Legislative Files, Journals, AH.
LFP/AH  Legislative Files, Petitions, AH.
LH/BM  Letters in Hawaiian, Kapi‘olani-Kalaniana‘ole Collection, BM.
LP/BM  Lahainaluna Papers, BM.
M/BM  Hawaiian Chants Collection, BM.
MsL  Missionary Letters, 1816-1900, HMCS.
M-7/AH  Papers of Richard Armstrong, AH.
M-59/AH  Hawaiian Chiefs, Letters, AH.
M-125/AH  Papers of Jules Remy, AH.
ND  Numbered Documents, Foreign Office and Executive files, Kingdom of Hawaii, AH (no dates).
TW/HMCS  Translation Workbooks Collection, HMCS.

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