CHARITABLE GIVING AFTER INDULGENCE: FORGIVENESS FOR PAST SINS

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother, Jung-ja Kim, who led me to academics, encouraged me every moment that I struggled, and was a great role model all throughout. I hope you can be proud of me. I also would like to express my gratitude to my family for your support: my sister Sunghee Hwang, my brother-in-law Sunki Lee, my brother Jaewoo Hwang, my father Won Hwang, and my aunt Jung-a Kim for their support. I love you.

Thank you for inspiring me, and having faith in me. I could not have gone through this process without your support.
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ABSTRACT

Charitable Giving After Indulgence: Forgiveness for Past Sins

Previous studies have shown that consumers are more likely to make indulgent choices after making charitable contributions. Indulgent purchases become easier to justify and rationalize when they are linked to charitable contributions, and thus are more likely to occur. This paper further investigates how the virtues of charitable contributions offset the sins of making indulgent choices. The main findings are fourfold. First, people are willing to make greater charitable contributions in money and in time after making more indulgent choices, as compared to non-indulgent choices. I call this the “forgiveness” effect. Giving to charities, in part, offers forgiveness for the sins of a prior indulgence. Furthermore, I demonstrate that people in fact make even greater proportional charitable contributions relative to indulgent spending, when charitable giving follows rather than precedes indulgent choices. That is, the relative magnitude of the forgiveness effect is greater than the previously documented licensing effect. Third, the magnitude of the forgiveness effect is greater to the extent that people use more abstract mental models. And finally, I demonstrate that the forgiveness effect is based on choosing indulgences, not necessarily on spending money or time on indulgences.
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Charitable Giving After Indulgence: Forgiveness for Past Sins

INTRODUCTION

Charitable giving is a $290 billion industry in the United States (Giving USA Foundation 2011), and non-profit organizations (NPO) argue that encouraging charitable contributions is their single most important challenge (West 2004). This research extends the existing literature on the virtues of charitable contributions in offsetting the sins of indulgent purchases, and presents the argument that people are willing to give more to charities after making indulgent purchases as compared to non-indulgent purchases. The association between doing good and indulging may seem intuitive: one would be more likely to splurge as a reward after being virtuous (as studied in previous research), and one would be more likely to be virtuous to make up for previous splurging (as I study here). This is the first research to: (1) measure and document the effect of previous indulgent spending on subsequent charitable donations in both money and time using a combination of experimental and field data, (2) demonstrate that people donate proportionally more to charities relative to their indulgent spending as a means of gaining forgiveness for a past indulgence than for earning the right for a future indulgence, (3) illustrate that the effect of prior indulgence on subsequent charitable giving is magnified when people employ more abstract, high level mental models, and (4) distinguish between purchasing and choosing indulgences and measure the relative effects on subsequent charitable donations.

Research in marketing tends to focus on for-profit organizations, but the basic model of consumers making purchase decisions to maximize gains applies to charitable giving as well. When people give to charities, they also get something back: moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), and the “warm glow” of altruism (Andreoni 1995).
suggest and demonstrate that in addition to general positive feelings and happiness (Harbaugh, Mayr, and Burghart 2007; Thoits and Hewitt 2001), charitable donations also offer “forgiveness” for past sins for those who have made prior indulgent choices. The focus of this research differs from the goals of the existing stream of research that studies charities primarily as an incentive for selling for-profit products. Literature that focuses on charities is surprisingly sparse, and my goal is to augment this relative paucity in the literature.

The limited existing research on charities has looked primarily at the efficacy of different message types. Emotional appeals are relatively more effective (Bagozzi and Moore 1994; Fisher and Ackerman 1998; Fisher, Vandenbosch, and Antia 2008; Small and Verrochi 2009), and highlighting the benefit to others versus self is more effective when people are concerned about self-image (White and Peloza 2009). I complement this literature by examining when to reach out to potential donors: after they indulge; and to a certain extent whom to target: those who indulge.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

Charitable giving and indulgence

The choices people make every day do not stand alone, and prior choices affect subsequent choices either consciously through goals or salient temporal aspects (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Loewenstein and Prelec 1993; Novemsky and Dhar 2005) or unconsciously through enhancing self-concept (Khan and Dhar 2006). In this study, I examine how a prior choice to indulge influences subsequent altruistic behavior. For example, the prior indulgent choice of drinking with his buddies may influence a husband’s choice to bring flowers home for his wife.

Indulgence is relative and subjective. I define “indulgence” as “personal spending for short-term benefit” (Wertenbroch 1998), which combines and subsumes the concepts of hedonic versus utilitarian benefits (Batra and Ahtola 1990; Chitturi, Raghunathan, and Mahajan 2008; Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Hirschman and Holbrook 1982; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982; Okada 2005; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998), luxuries versus necessities (Khan and Dhar 2006; Kivetz and Simonson 2002), vices versus virtues (Sela, Berger, and Liu 2009; Wertenbroch 1998), and wants versus shoulds (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni 1998). Generally I contrast indulgent choices that are hedonic, luxuries, vices, and/or wants, to non-indulgent choices that are utilitarian, necessities, virtues, and/or shoulds.

Most of the existing research that connects virtuous activity to indulgent choices applies to cases where people engage in virtuous activity first, then later are presented with an indulgent choice. People are more likely to make indulgent purchases after making charitable contributions (Kivetz 1999; Kivetz and Simonson 2002; Kivetz and Zheng 2006).
Volunteering in community organizations or merely stating that they intend to volunteer grants people a “license” to indulge in subsequent hedonic consumption by reducing negative self-attribution associated with the purchase of an indulgent item (Khan and Dhar 2006). Because charitable contributions reduce guilt and indulgent purchases increase guilt, bundling the two can effectively compensate for each other. Therefore, promised charitable contributions can be effective purchase incentives when bundled with indulgent items such as hot fudge sundaes, but less so with practical items such as laundry detergent (Strahilevitz and Myers 1998). Surprisingly little attention, however, has been given to people’s choice behavior after they indulge first. Charitable contributions have been studied as a means of boosting more indulgent choices (Khan and Dhar 2006; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998), but in this research I show how indulgent purchases in turn encourage more charitable contributions.

Indulging is a “sin” because by expending resources on something fun and luxurious now, there will be less resources for other things that may yield even greater benefits. Indulgent choice induces guilt and responsibility (Dahl, Honea, and Manchanda 2003; Lascu 1991; Okada 2005; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998; Thaler 1980, 1985), and guilt can significantly increase an individual’s likelihood of engaging in charitable behavior (Baumann, Cialdini, and Kendrick 1981; Cialdini, Darby, and Vincent 1973; Cunningham, Steinberg, and Grev 1980; Freedman, Wallington, and Bless 1967; Izard 1977). Building on existing research that demonstrates how charitable giving entitles donors to future indulgences, I present the argument that the sins of prior indulgences should likewise be forgiven by ex post charitable giving, and predict:

**H1a: People make more charitable contributions following an indulgent**
consumption than when there is no prior indulgent consumption.

**H1b: People make more charitable contributions following an indulgent consumption compared to a non-indulgent consumption.**

I also extend beyond a simple application of guilt-based theories that link indulgences and charitable donations in two principal ways. First, I compare the extent of charitable contributions when they precede indulgent purchases, as shown in the existing literature, to when they follow indulgent purchases in the forgiveness context, which is the focus of this study. Second, I examine how giving to charities affects donors’ perception of the prior indulgence.

Giving to charities is analogous to making deposits to a moral account, as charitable giving is the “purchase of moral satisfaction” (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). On the other hand, indulgent purchases are analogous to spending from a moral account, as indulgent purchases come with a price of guilt (Dahl et al. 2003; Lascu 1991; Okada 2005; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Strahilevitz and Myers 1998; Thaler 1980, 1985). People can save and accumulate a positive balance first and then spend on indulgences, as described in the existing licensing effect literature, or they can spend on indulgences first and then pay the resulting deficit by making deposits later, which is the sequence in the forgiveness effect that I study here.

People tend to be averse to owing money. They tend to prefer to prepay for consumption, especially hedonic consumption, and be paid for work after it is performed (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998). Debt aversion is an especially strong effect with monetary
accounts, because there is actually a time value to money; paying later is more economically beneficial than paying sooner, and receiving money sooner is more economically beneficial than receiving it later. Just as being in financial debt is unpleasant, being in moral debt is also unpleasant. Without any economic factors to mitigate the effect, debt aversion should be even stronger in moral accounts than in monetary accounts.

Debt aversion may be rooted in loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Being in a loss position is relatively more painful than being in a gain position of equal magnitude is enjoyable. Giving to charities moves donors to a moral gain position. Once one has a surplus, one can indulge and spend from that account. Indulging without first building a surplus moves people to a moral loss position. Once one is in deficit, one can pay down the deficit by giving to charities, for example. But the deficit position is more uncomfortable than the surplus position is comfortable, and getting out of an uncomfortable situation requires relatively more altruistic behavior. My second prediction is that people give proportionally more to charities when seeking forgiveness for a past indulgence, than when earning the right for a future indulgence.

**H2: People donate proportionally more to charities relative to their spending on indulgences, when charitable giving follows rather than precedes indulgent choices.**

That is, the amount or magnitude of charitable giving relative to indulgent spending should be greater in the forgiveness effect than in the licensing effect. In this case, the adage that “asking for forgiveness is easier than asking for permission” does not seem to apply.
Existing studies suggest that donors also benefit from giving to charities: they get positive feelings and happiness (Harbaugh et al. 2007; Thoits and Hewitt 2001). Scholars have likened charitable contributions to the purchase of moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), or the “warm glow” of altruism (Andreoni 1995). Building on the existing literature that establishes a link between charitable giving and general good feeling, I propose more specifically that giving to charities allows donors to feel better about their prior indulgences as well. My forgiveness framework proposes that giving to charities is motivated, at least in part, by donors’ desire to reduce guilt for prior indulgences. So after donors give to charities and obtain forgiveness, they should feel less guilt about the prior indulgence and be able to enjoy it more fully going forward.

H3: People feel less guilty about their prior indulgent purchases after making charitable donations than before making charitable donations.

That is, giving to charities also offers the specific benefit of reducing guilt about prior indulgences.

Forgiveness effect and high level thinking

Indulging is a transgression against one’s future self. By giving to charities, that transgression is forgiven by doing good not to the party who was harmed, but instead to another party. Such forgiveness requires high level thinking.

The contrast between high level abstract thinking and low level concrete thinking is the basis for both temporal construal theory (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2010) and action identification theory (Vallacher and Wegner 1989). Past research suggests
that the degree of abstractness in thinking is an individual trait (Vallacher and Wegner 1989), and also varies depending on context. People think more abstractly about events and objects that are temporally distant, and more concretely about events and objects that are in the near future or past (Liberman and Trope 1998; Trope and Liberman 2010). People think about actions that they can perform at the highest level of abstraction, and when they cannot perform the action they engage in low level construal of the action (Vallacher and Wegner 1989). Levels of construal have also been manipulated, to encourage people to think more abstractly or concretely (Tsai and McGill 2011).

I predict that the forgiveness effect should therefore be greater in magnitude when people think more abstractly and at higher levels about the totality of harm and good than when they think more concretely and at lower levels in terms of the harm and good done to each party individually.

**H4: The positive effect of prior indulgent choices on subsequent charitable giving should be greater to the extent that people engage in more high level abstract thinking.**

The magnitude of the forgiveness effect should be greater when people think more abstractly. And by extension, I would similarly expect that giving to charities would help to reduce guilt about prior indulgences to a greater degree, when people think more abstractly.

**H5: The negative effect of charitable giving on guilt about prior indulgent choices should be greater in magnitude to the extent that people engage in more high level abstract thinking.**
Generally, when people think more abstractly versus concretely, the effect of a prior choice on a subsequent choice or feeling should be greater.

My five hypotheses (H1 to H5) are tested in Studies 1 to 4, as summarized in Table 1. In Studies 5 and 6, the implications of the forgiveness effect are further investigated.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Studies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1: Forgiveness effect: people give more to charities following an indulgent consumption…</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5 &amp; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1a: …compared to when there is no prior indulgent consumption.</td>
<td>1, 3, &amp; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1b: …compared to when there is a non-indulgent consumption.</td>
<td>2, 4, &amp; 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Magnitude of forgiveness effect is greater than license effect.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3: Giving to charities reduces guilt about prior indulgence.</td>
<td>3 &amp; 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4: The positive effect of prior indulgent choices on subsequent charitable giving should be greater to the extent that people engage in more high level thinking.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5: The negative effect of charitable giving on guilt about prior indulgent choices should be greater to the extent that people engage in more high level thinking.</td>
<td>4</td>
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STUDY ONE

The purpose of the first study was to demonstrate experimentally the differential effects of forgiveness within the context of the existing literature. The first objective is to test H1: that people are more charitable after indulging. In this study, I do this indirectly. The licensing effect suggests that people spend more on indulgences after donating to charities, than after doing nothing or after doing something else that is not necessarily charitable (Khan and Dhar 2006). It is already established in the literature that indulgent spending and charitable giving are positively associated when the charitable giving happens first and then is followed by indulgent spending, so I use that as the baseline for comparison in Study One. I compare the proportional levels of charitable giving relative to indulgent spending, when people indulge first and subsequently give to charities, versus when people give to charities first and then indulge. This also directly tests H2, which predicts that proportional charitable donations relative to indulgent spending should be greater when the charitable giving follows rather than precedes indulgent choices.

Method

The participants were one hundred and fifty-three undergraduate students at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, who received course credit for participating in the survey. The experiment was conducted as pencil and paper questionnaires in two conditions. Participants were randomly assigned to either the forgiveness treatment or the license treatment. The participants were to imagine that they had received a tax rebate of $400. The hypothetical tax rebate scenario was adopted from Khan and Dhar (2006). In the forgiveness condition, participants were first asked to choose from among three indulgent
alternatives on which to spend $100. The indulgent choices were: “concert or sports activity ticket,” “shopping,” and “others,” in which respondents were asked to write their own favorite personal activity. Then they were asked how much of the remaining $300 they would donate to a charity and to choose among “Hawaii Foodbank (fight hunger and poverty),” “Hawaiian Humane society (help and rescue animals),” and “others,” in which they could write their own choice of charities. In the license condition, participants were first asked to donate $100 to a charity of their choice, and then asked how much of the remaining $300 they would spend on one of the three indulgent alternatives. The participants chose both the indulgent alternative and how much they would spend on this indulgence. Participants in both conditions received the same hypothetical tax rebate, but the sequence of expenditures was reversed. In the forgiveness condition they spent on an indulgence first, then donated to charity. In the license condition they donated to a charity first, then spent on an indulgence. My prediction is that the proportional charity donations relative to indulgent spending will be higher in the forgiveness condition.

Results

Seventy-five respondents were in the forgiveness condition and 78 in the license condition. On average, those in the forgiveness condition donated $142.7 to charities after spending $100 on indulgent items, while those in the license condition spent $196.2 on indulgent items after donating $100 to charities. In terms of how much each group gave to charities relative to indulgent spending, participants in the forgiveness condition donated an average of $142.7 to charities for $100 of indulgent spending, while those in the license condition donated an average of only $63.5 for $100 of indulgent spending ($F(1,151) = 37.75,$
This supports my second hypothesis that people give proportionally more to charities after indulging than before indulging.

The balancing theory (Dhar and Simonson 1999; Fishbach and Dhar 2005; Laran 2010; Loewenstein and Prelec 1993; Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2007; Wilcox et al. 2009) may also suggest that people give more to charities after indulging, and also that they indulge more after donating to charities. Dhar and Simonson (1999) show that most consumers prefer balancing between two different goals (e.g., tasty vs. healthy). Once a consumer exercises instead of watching TV – fulfilling a healthy goal – this consumer is more likely to pursue a pleasurable goal by having a tasty dinner. Similarly, according to balancing theory, once people perceive that they have progressed enough to reach their focal goal, this perceived goal progress in turn allows for an opportunity to pursue alternative non-focal goals. For example, once people approach a targeted utilitarian goal, e.g., targeted weight loss, this perceived goal progress frees them to pursue the hedonic goal or indulgence e.g., choosing a chocolate bar over a healthy apple (Fishbach and Dhar 2005). Laran (2010) summarized these shifting preferences between self-control and indulgence (vice vs. virtue or utilitarian vs. hedonic) in terms of temporal distance in the domain of food choices and money spending (saving vs. spending money). However, the balancing theory cannot explain the different levels of charitable contributions between the license and forgiveness conditions, given that only the order of charitable contribution and indulgent choice is reversed.

Study One illustrated the forgiveness effect within the context of the existing literature, and further demonstrated that the forgiveness effect was even stronger than the
established license effect in terms of how much people gave to charities relative to how much they spent on indulgences. One limitation in this analysis of the forgiveness effect is that it did not measure it directly, but only indirectly in comparison to the licensing effect. I compared two conditions, both of which involved one indulgent choice and one charitable donation, and there was no comparison against a non-indulgent choice. Study Two was conducted, in part, to address that issue.
STUDY TWO

In Study Two, I demonstrate the forgiveness effect in a natural setting. I asked shoppers who had made actual purchases how much they would give to a charity. The prediction is that to the extent they spent more on indulgent items, the more they would donate to charities. This serves as a direct test of H1.

Method

I conducted a field survey of one hundred and twenty-five actual shoppers at the Ala Moana Mall shopping center. The study was conducted as a paper and pencil survey, and shoppers participated on a volunteer basis. The survey consisted of three parts.

The first part asked about their actual expenditures at the mall. The questions asked about how much money and time they had spent at the mall that day buying and doing things that are fun and enjoyable. The responses were in dollars and hours respectively, and were measures of indulgent spending in money and indulgent spending in time. The questionnaire also asked about how much money and time they had spent at the mall that day buying and doing things that are practical and functional. These were measures of non-indulgent spending in money and non-indulgent spending in time. Those were the four expenditure questions.

The second part asked about charitable donations. The questionnaire listed four charities: Hawaii Foodbank (fight hunger and poverty), Hawaiian Humane society (help and rescue animals), Environment Hawaii (protect the environment), and Education Advancement Fund International (support education and empower students), and asked participants to
choose one if they were to donate. In addition to the four charities, there was also an “other” choice where they could write in a different charity than those that were listed. The questionnaire then asked how many dollars they would donate to the charity of their choice, and how many hours per month they would volunteer for the charity. The last two were the dependent measures. As donations to charities come in the form of both money and time, I wanted to measure the effect of prior indulgence on people’s subsequent donation of time as well.

The third part asked demographic questions. It took about 10 minutes for participants to complete the surveys, on average.

Results

The 125 shoppers were 56.8% female, averaged 37.3 years in age, with 3.4 members in the household, and 0.9 children. On average, the shoppers had spent at the mall that day: an average of $92.44 on indulgent items (range from $0 to $2,000), 2.4 hours on indulgent items (range from 0 to 12 hours), $67.09 on non-indulgent items (range from $0 to $2,000), and 1.3 hours on non-indulgent items (range from 0 to 20). Hawaii Foodbank (fight hunger and poverty) was the most chosen charity (42 people; 33.6%), while Hawaiian Humane society (help and rescue animals) was the second most chosen charity (29 people; 23.2%). On average, shoppers said they would donate $8,032.30 to charities in money (range from $0 to $1,000,000) and 5 hours a month in time (range from 0 to 40 hours).

Because the distribution of the charitable donations, both in money and in time, deviated significantly from a Gaussian distribution, and was highly skewed to the right (and
to a relatively lesser extent the shoppers’ actual expenditures that day as well), I performed a Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test for analysis. I first did a median split of the dollar expenditure on indulgent items at the mall that day, and compared the charitable dollar contribution between the high indulgent money spending group and the low indulgent money spending group. I compared the 60 people who spent more than the median of $40 on indulgences, to those who spent less than the median. I found that people who spent more money on indulgences responded that they would donate more money to charities compared to those who spent less money on indulgences ($Mdn = $10 vs. $5; p < .05$). People who spent more money on indulgences answered that they would donate more of their time to charities as well ($Mdn = 3$ hours vs. 2 hour; $p < .05$). These results provide support for the forgiveness effect.

I then analyzed the effect of spending time on indulgences. I did a median split of the time expenditure on indulgent items. I compared the 50 people who spent more than the median of 2 hours on indulgences, to those who spent less than the median. I found that those who spent more time on indulgences reported that they would donate more money ($Mdn = $10 vs. $5; p < .05$) as well as time ($Mdn = 3$ hours vs. 0 hour; $p < .05$) to charities. These data again demonstrate the forgiveness effect. Furthermore, they show that indulgent spending in time also encourages greater charitable giving.

I did similar comparisons in charitable donations by expenditures on non-indulgent items as well. In this case, there was no difference between the high spenders and the low spenders. The 56 shoppers who spent more than the median of $20 on non-indulgent items that day at the mall did not donate more to charities compared to those who spent less either
in money ($Mdn = 10 vs. 5; p = .07) or in time ($Mdn = 2 \text{ hours vs. 1 hour; } p = .40)$. And the 37 shoppers who spent more than the median of 1 hour on non-indulgent items did not donate more to charities compared to those who spent less time in either money ($Mdn = 10 \text{ vs. 5; } p = .21$) or in time ($Mdn = 4 \text{ hours vs. 1.5 hours; } p = .07$).

After people spend money or time on indulgences, they tend to donate more to charities both in money and time. However, at the 95% level, I do not observe any effect of expenditures on non-indulgent items. This generally supports the prediction of a forgiveness effect, based on consumers’ responses after making actual purchases and expenditures of their time. These findings are logically consistent with the presence of guilt ensuing from indulgent expenditures. I conducted Study Three in part to directly measure the guilt associated with indulgences and charitable donations.
STUDY THREE

The purpose of Study Three was to demonstrate the forgiveness effect in a more controlled experimental setting. In addition to replicating the effects in Study Two, I also wanted to examine how giving to charities influenced people’s feelings about their past indulgence. In Study Three, I also measure guilt about their indulgences both before and after giving to charities to test H3: that people feel less guilty about their prior indulgences after making charitable donations.

Method

Study Three was conducted as a pencil-and-paper survey. One hundred and eleven undergraduate students at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated in exchange for course credit. The cover story was that the researchers were studying people’s preferences for spending money, and the participants were told that there were no right or wrong answers for the survey questions.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: forgiveness, no-spending, and no-charity. In the forgiveness condition, participants were asked to imagine that they had received $400 in a tax rebate. This scenario is similar to the one that Study One used. Furthermore, they were to spend $100 of the rebate on an indulgence, described in the survey as “fun and pleasurable activities,” and were asked to choose among three alternatives: “dinner certificates at a French restaurant,” “theme park tickets,” or “movie passes.” The three indulgent choices were adopted from Strahilevitz and Myers (1998). Next they were asked how much of the remainder of the tax rebate they would donate to a
charity of their choice. Then the survey asked how they felt about the indulgent consumption of $100. They were then asked how guilty they felt about the indulgent purchase. They indicated their responses on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The survey also asked them how happy they were about the indulgent purchase, also on a 7-point scale. The forgiveness condition was the “test” condition, where participants first made an indulgent consumption, then were given a choice to donate to a charity. This is the sequence of consumption that I focus on in this research. In the analysis, I compared the forgiveness condition to two “control” conditions, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task 1</th>
<th>Task 2</th>
<th>Task 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>Indulgent consumption</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-spending</td>
<td>Filler task</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No-charity</td>
<td>Indulgent consumption</td>
<td>Filler task</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to demonstrate the forgiveness effect, that is, the positive effect of a prior indulgence on charitable giving, I compared the forgiveness condition to the no-spending condition. In the no-spending condition, participants completed an unrelated filler task first, which took approximately the same amount of time to complete as the choice task among indulgent alternatives in the forgiveness condition. Then as the second task, they were
presented with the same hypothetical tax rebate scenario as in the forgiveness condition, where they imagined that they had received $400. The survey asked them to indicate how much of the tax rebate they would donate to a charity of their choice. My forgiveness effect hypothesis predicts that people in the forgiveness condition will donate a greater proportion of their remaining rebate to charities than those in the no-spending condition.

In order to analyze how giving to charities affects how people feel about their previous indulgence, I compared the forgiveness condition to the no-charity condition. In the no-charity condition, participants were given the same tax rebate scenario first, and chose among three indulgent alternatives to spend $100. Then, they completed a filler task. After that, they were asked how they felt about the indulgence: how guilty they felt, and how happy they felt about the purchase, both on the same 7-point scale as in the forgiveness condition (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). My prediction is that people will feel less guilty about the indulgent consumption in the forgiveness condition after they have had a chance to be forgiven for their indulgence through their charitable giving, compared to the no-charity condition where people have not had a chance to donate to charities.

Results

Thirty-eight respondents were in the forgiveness condition, 34 in the no-spending condition, and 39 in the no-charity condition. First, I compared the donations to charities in the forgiveness and no-spending conditions by a Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test. In the forgiveness condition, people first spent $100 on an indulgence and had $300 left over to donate to charities. In the no-spending condition, they did not spend any money on an indulgence first, and had all $400 to donate to charities. So I compared the percentage out
of $300 that people in the forgiveness condition donated to charities, to the percentage out of $400 that people in the no-spending condition donated to charities. I found that people donate more money after making an indulgent purchase ($Mdn = 33\%$) than when they do not ($Mdn = 25\%; \ Ws = 1062, \ z = -2.04, \ p < .05, \ r = -.02$). This again provided support for the forgiveness effect.

Then I analyzed how people’s feelings of guilt about their indulgence changed after giving to charities, by comparing how guilty people felt in the forgiveness condition to how guilty they felt in the no-charity condition. Compared to the people in the no-charity condition who did not have a chance to be forgiven by giving to charities, those in the forgiveness condition felt less guilt about the indulgence ($Mdn = 2.7$ vs. $3.3; \ p = .03$). And they were also happier about the indulgence ($Mdn = 3.8$ vs. $4.2; \ p = .02$). This supports my third hypothesis. In addition to the general good feeling that people get from being altruistic, people also get the benefit of feeling better specifically about their previous indulgences by giving to charities.

Study Three showed that people gave a greater percentage of their available money to charities after making an indulgent purchase, compared to when they spent nothing at all. This supports H1a, and is consistent with the predictions of the forgiveness effect. However, an alternative explanation is that after already spending $100, it becomes easier to spend additional money on charities. The tendency to give more to charities could alternatively be due to decreasing sensitivity to marginal spending in general, and not necessarily because of spending on indulgences. I designed Study Four in part to address this alternative explanation.
STUDY FOUR

The forgiveness hypothesis on charitable giving is based on the premise that people give to charities in part to make up for their past transgressions. In indulging, the victim of the transgression is primarily the future self. By giving to a charity, one makes up for a harm done to the future self, by doing good to another separate party. Presumably this would be done more easily when people use more abstract mental models and think about the overall moral deficit and surplus, than when they use more concrete mental models and think about the deficit and surplus in each separate moral account. One objective of Study Four is to test H4: that people tend to donate more to charities following indulgent spending to the extent they engage in more high level thinking.

Method

Study Four was conducted as a pencil-and-paper survey. One hundred and sixty-six undergraduate business students at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated in exchange for course credit. First, I manipulated the levels of construal, using a stimulus designed by Tsai and McGill (2011). In the abstract condition, participants were asked to think about the most important class that they were taking that semester, and write about the benefits of doing well in that class. In the concrete condition, they were asked to think about the most important class that they were taking, and write about a specific study plan of what they would do to do well in that class.

The survey then presented a similar scenario as that employed in Study Three, with one change. In the indulgent condition, people were first given a choice of three indulgent
items on which they could spend $100 out of a $400 tax rebate that they had received. The indulgent choices were: “dinner certificates at a French restaurant,” “electronics or computer peripheral,” and “movie passes.” I introduced the non-indulgent condition in this study, where people were first given a choice of three non-indulgent items on which they would spend $100 out of a $400 tax rebate that they had received. The non-indulgent choices were: “grocery certificates at a local supermarket,” “required textbooks,” and “electronics or computer peripheral.” As electronics and computer peripherals can be either indulgent or non-indulgent depending on the person and context, it was presented as an alternative in both conditions. In both the indulgent and the non-indulgent conditions, the next task was the same. They were asked how much of the remaining $300 they would give to a charity of their choice.

The survey also asked how guilty they felt about spending $100 on a scale of 1 (not at all guilty) to 6 (extremely guilty). In the before condition, I asked the guilt question after the initial $100 expenditure and before they donated to charities. In the after condition, I asked the guilt question after they donated to charities. The study design was 2 construal (abstract, concrete) x 2 spending (indulgent, non-indulgent) x 2 order (before, after) between subjects.

Results

Of the remaining $300 in tax rebates after spending $100, participants indicated that they would donate $115.58 on average to a charity of their choice, ranging from $0 to $300. On average, the level of guilt that people felt about their $100 expenditure was 2.7 ranging from 1 to 6.
In comparing those who spent $100 on indulgences to those who spent $100 on non-indulgent items, I found that the indulgent group gave more to charities compared to the non-indulgent group ($m_{\text{indulgent}} = 131.65$ vs. $m_{\text{non-indulgent}} = 101.98$; $t = 2.53$, $p = .01$), which replicates our findings in Studies One, Two and Three in providing general support for my forgiveness theory. Furthermore, people who spent on indulgences felt more guilt about their purchases compared to those who spent on non-indulgences ($m_{\text{indulgent}} = 3.2$ vs. $m_{\text{non-indulgent}} = 2.4$; $t = 2.76$, $p < .01$), which provides support for the premise of my theory, that indulgence induces guilt.

In the next step, I analyzed how construal level influences the effect of indulgence on the level of charitable giving. My prediction is that when people use more abstract mental models, they are more likely to make more charitable donations following an indulgent purchase. People using more concrete mental models would be less inclined to undo a harm done to one party by doing good to another. I analyzed the data in two steps. See Table 3. First, I analyzed the 86 observations in the before order condition to investigate how (1) indulgent purchase increases guilt, which in turn promotes charitable giving, and (2) this effect is greater when people think more abstractly. Second, I analyzed the 80 observations in the after order condition to investigate how (1) giving to charities mitigates the guilt of prior indulgence, and (2) this effect is also greater when people think more abstractly.
Table 3

Study Four: Sequence of tasks by Order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Task 1</th>
<th>Task 2</th>
<th>Task 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before</td>
<td>Purchase</td>
<td>Guilt about purchase</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After</td>
<td>Purchase</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
<td>Guilt about purchase</td>
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</table>

The first step was to test a mediation effect as shown in Figure 1. My prediction is that guilt about prior indulgence promotes more charitable giving among those people who think more abstractly, compared to those who think more concretely.

*Figure 1.*
When people think abstractly, indulgence induces guilt, which in turn promotes charitable giving.
I conducted two simple path analyses, comparing the 44 observations in the abstract x before group versus the 42 observations in the concrete x before group. Among those who were thinking more abstractly, (1) indulgence had a positive effect on guilt ($\beta = 1.14, p < .05$), and (2) on charitable giving as well ($\beta = 54.05, p = .04$), but (3) the previously significant effect of indulgence on charitable giving becomes not significant ($\beta = 38.87, p = .13$) when guilt ($\beta = 13.36, p < .05$) is also included in the model. This demonstrates the classic mediating effect as propounded by Baron and Kenny (1986), and what Zhao, Lynch and Chen (2010) also call the indirect-only mediation effect. Prior indulgence promotes charitable giving, through increased guilt. In contrast, among those who were thinking more concretely, (1) indulgence had only a marginal positive effect on guilt ($\beta = 0.87, p = .08$), and (2) no effect on charitable giving ($\beta = 3.30, p = .88$). Furthermore, guilt had no effect on charitable giving ($\beta = -2.26, p = .75$). This supports my prediction that the extent to which guilt promotes charitable giving is greater when people think more abstractly. In fact, I did not see the effect in the concrete group in my study. Furthermore, low level thinking appears to diminish the guilt associated with indulgences. Though this is not a specific hypothesis that I articulated, it is consistent with our general prediction that the relationships and causalities among events would be higher when people think in high levels.

In the next step, I analyzed how giving to charities reduces guilt about prior indulgences by comparing the 40 observations in the abstract x after group to the 40 observations in the concrete x after group. I performed a regression of the feeling of guilt about a prior purchase on indulgence, charitable giving, and the interaction between the two. See Figure 2. Among those who were thinking more abstractly, the feeling of guilt about a
prior purchase was greater when the purchase was indulgent rather than non-indulgent ($\beta = 2.09, p < .05$), and more germane to our theory, the main effect of charity was not significant ($\beta = -.007, p = .11$), but giving to charities decreased the feeling of guilt when the prior purchase was indulgent ($\beta = -.02, p = .03$). When people engage in high level thinking, they feel less guilt about their prior indulgent purchases after they give more to charities. In contrast, among those who were thinking more concretely, the level of guilt was not associated with indulgence ($\beta = .129, p = .22$), or how much they gave to charities ($\beta = -.005, p = .48$), or the interaction of the two factors ($\beta = -.003, p = .68$). There was no significant relationship among the factors in this group. This supports my prediction that the extent to which giving to charities diminishes guilt about prior indulgences is greater when people think more abstractly.

Figure 2.
When people think abstractly, charitable giving reduces guilt about prior indulgent consumption.
Abstract versus concrete thinking affects both the extent to which guilt about a prior indulgence promotes charitable giving, and how much giving to charities reduces guilt about a prior indulgence. It also appears to affect the guilt that is associated with indulgence.
STUDY FIVE

The forgiveness theory and the study results thus far suggest that non-profit organizations should more effectively target the “indulgent” segment for donations. Conventional marketing segmentation principles may suggest that non-profit organizations are better off targeting as potential donors, those people who already show interest in performing civic duties, such as participants at a beach clean-up. They are a self-selected group with a behavioral tendency to take action for a cause. However, I demonstrated in Study Two, Three, and Four both in a natural setting and in experimental settings that people are more likely to make charitable contributions following an indulgent consumption, either in time or in money. Therefore, people who engage their resources (time or money) in indulgent activities should be more likely to give to charities than those who do not. For example, charitable donations should actually be greater if solicited at a movie theater than at a beach clean-up. Moviegoers would feel guilty about their indulgence and giving to charities would mitigate the guilt. Basically, the indulgent segment has more to gain from giving to charities, because in addition to the general good feeling that we all get from being altruistic, they also get forgiveness for their past sins.

The purpose of Study Five was to test the forgiveness hypothesis against the segmentation hypothesis. I identified two groups of people in a natural setting: one group engaged in an indulgent activity, and one group engaged in a civic activity. The forgiveness theory predicts that those who engage in indulgent activities will give more to charities compared to those who engage in civic activities, while the segmentation theory would predict that the civic activity group would give more to charities.
Method

I collected field data in two different settings. In one setting, I collected data from people who were going to the movies. This was the “indulgent” condition. In the other setting, I collected data from people who were going to a beach to participate in a cleanup. This was the “civic” condition. I chose going to the movies as the indulgent condition because it fits the definition of “indulgence”: “personal spending for short-term benefit” (Wertenbroch 1998). People go to movies primarily for their own immediate fun and entertainment. I chose the beach cleanup as the civic condition for two reasons. First, it is a discretionary activity, and those who participate do so because it is enjoyable to them, and therefore it has the same positive valence as the movie. Also, beach-cleanups take approximately two hours, and match the duration of typical movies, which are also approximately two hours.

A separate pretest of 34 participants confirmed that “going to the movies” was more indulgent than “participating in a beach cleanup.” On a six-point scale, (1 = “Not at all,” 6 = “Extremely”) going to a movie averaged 4.6, compared to 2.4 for participating in a beach clean-up ($t(33) = -9.5, p < .01$).

The indulgent group was comprised of 86 movie goers at Ward Stadium Movie Theater. The civic group was comprised of 80 participants in various monthly beach cleanup sites organized by Adopt A Beach Hawaii, the Surfrider Foundation, and Sustainable Coastlines Hawaii. In both groups, respondents were asked to complete short surveys on a volunteer basis.
The survey questions were the same in both settings. The first question asked how much money they planned to donate to charities in the coming year. The second question asked how many hours they planned to volunteer to a charity in the coming month. As donations to charities come in the form of both money and time, the purpose of this question was to measure the effect of indulgence on people’s donation of time as well. As people may donate time to charity events without knowing specifically how many hours would be involved, the survey also asked them how many times they planned to volunteer for a charity in the coming year. These three were the dependent measures, and my hypothesis predicts that they will all be greater among the moviegoers in the indulgent condition, than among the beach participants in the civic condition.

Results

The respondents were 80 beach cleanup participants (mean age = 36.1, 50 % female, average household size = 3.1, average number of children = 0.68) and 86 moviegoers (mean age = 33, 49 % female, average household size = 3.0, average number of children = 0.7).

On average, respondents indicated they would donate $733 and 7.3 hours of time at 11 charity events. By condition, the indulgent moviegoers indicated a higher dollar amount to donate to charities (Mdn = $150), compared to the civic beach participants (Mdn = $25; Ws = 4924, z = -4.20, p < .001, r = -0.03). Because the distribution of the responses deviated significantly from a Gaussian distribution, and was highly skewed to the right, I performed a Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test to compare the distributions of the indulgent versus non-
indulgent groups. This supported my prediction of a forgiveness effect. The indulgent moviegoers also indicated that they planned to donate their time more frequently to charities ($Mdn = 3$) compared to beach participants ($Mdn = 2$; $W_s = 5513$, $z = -2.36$, $p < .05$, $r = -.02$). This also provided support for a forgiveness effect. People tend to donate more money to charities, and donate time more frequently to charities after an indulgent consumption, presumably because in giving to charities they seek forgiveness for their past indulgence. In terms of the number of hours, however, the difference between the indulgent moviegoers ($Mdn_{indulgent} = 3$) and the non-indulgent beach participants ($Mdn_{non-indulgent} = 2$) was only directionally supportive ($W_s = 5481$, $z = -1.42$, $p = .07$, $r = -0.11$).

The difference in charity donations between the two groups is actually a strong effect, considering that a beach clean-up is akin to giving to charities, and therefore the beach participants would be a self-selected segment that would be more likely to donate to charities in general. But mental budgeting (Heath and Soll 1996; Thaler 1980, 1985) may be a competing theory that also predicts greater charitable giving from the moviegoers than the beach participants. If people set aside a certain budget for a “charitable giving” category, the beach participants have already used up a part of their charity budget and have less left to give, while the moviegoers have not necessarily used up any of their charity budget and may have more left to give. I mitigated the mental budgeting effect, in part, by study design. The survey asked how much they planned to give during the year/month to charities in general, so that to the extent the participants in the beach clean-up felt they were already donating to a charity, they would include that day’s activities in their responses. Furthermore, if beach clean-up participants did not include that day’s activities in their
responses, and mental budgeting was the driver for the higher level of charitable giving among the moviegoers compared to the beach participants, the effect should be stronger in time donations than in money donations. Spending two hours for a beach clean-up should have a greater effect on the time budget for other charities than on the monetary budget. But this was indeed not what I found in Study Five. Monetary donations were significantly higher from moviegoers, but there was no statistically significant difference in the donation of time between the two groups, which does not lend support to the alternative mental budgeting explanation.

Study Five demonstrated the forgiveness effect, that people were more likely to give to charities following indulgent consumption. Furthermore, those who have indulged are even more likely to give to charities, than a self-selected segment who has demonstrated a behavioral tendency to spend resources for a cause.
STUDY SIX

Generally, marketing researchers study how consumers choose to purchase, so “choice” and “purchase” are oftentimes used almost interchangeably in the literature. The purpose of Study Six is to distinguish between the two actions. The first five studies demonstrated that consumers give more to charities after spending money and/or time on indulgences. But more specifically, what triggers charitable giving: is it spending on indulgence, or choosing to indulge? Study Six addresses this question. Study Six also employs consequential choice, to complement the experimental designs of Studies One, Three, and Four, which employed hypothetical choice.

Method

Study Six was conducted as an in-class experiment where participants made a consequential choice between a chocolate bar and a non-fat yogurt cup. A pretest confirmed that a chocolate bar was considered more indulgent ($m = 4.29$) than non-fat yogurt ($m = 3.38$; $t(33) = -2.92, p < .01$). Participants in the main study were 71 undergraduate students at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, who received course credit in exchange for their participation.

The sessions started with the experimenter offering two types of snacks: a chocolate bar and a non-fat yogurt cup. Participants were asked to choose between the two snacks, and they received their choice. In the next step, participants were asked how much money and time they would donate to a charity of their choice. Finally, they were asked to write reasons for the charitable contributions to ensure their involvement in the task.
Results

Of 71 participants, 42 (59.2%) chose and received the indulgent chocolate, and 29 (40.8%) chose and received the non-indulgent yogurt. Overall, participants were willing to donate an average of $190.56 to a charity of their choice, ranging from $0 to $5,000. In time, they were willing to volunteer an average of 14.0 hours in a month for a charity of their choice, ranging from 0 to 55 hours a month.

I compared the levels of charitable giving between those who chose and received the indulgent chocolate and those who chose and received the non-indulgent yogurt. Since the participants were given the snacks for free, their consumption of either chocolate or yogurt reflects only choice and not purchase. Because of the asymmetric, non-Gaussian distribution of donations both in dollars and volunteer hours, I performed a non-parametric Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test. People who chose and consumed the indulgent chocolate tended to give more money to a charity of their choice ($Mdn = $100) compared to those who chose and consumed the non-indulgent yogurt ($Mdn = $50, $p = .04$). Also, in time, those who chose and consumed the indulgent chocolate tended to volunteer more of their time ($Mdn = 10$ hours) compared to those who chose and consumed the non-indulgent yogurt ($Mdn = 5$, $p = .07$), though statistically the difference was marginal. The data suggest that indulgent choice and consumption without expenditure likewise increase charitable giving. Even though one commonly chooses to spend money to consume indulgences, it is not the monetary spending on indulgences, per se, that promotes greater charitable donations.
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Existing research has focused primarily on how prior charitable contributions grant the right to subsequent indulgent purchases. In this study, however, I examine the reverse directional relationship: prior indulge in turn encourages more charitable contributions as a means of gaining forgiveness.

My results consistently demonstrate this “forgiveness effect”: when people indulge first, they are more likely to make charitable contributions both in time and money. Second, I demonstrate that people give proportionally more to charities when they indulge first and subsequently obtain forgiveness, than when they get a license first and indulge later. My third finding is that people feel less guilty and happier about their past indulgent purchases after they make charitable contributions. Making an indulgent purchase moves people into a moral deficit position and being morally in debt is as uncomfortable as being financially in debt. But by making charitable contributions, people can repay their moral debt. Fourth, people show a stronger forgiveness effect when they employ more abstract mental models. Finally, indulgent choice (intention) without spending any money still encourages people to donate more to charity.

Managerial implications for non-profit organizations

Increasing charitable contributions is a very challenging issue for NPOs (West 2004), and the forgiveness effect has implications for encouraging people to donate more.

The American Heart Association, among other NPOs, raises money by hosting black-tie gala events. One reason for the success of such fundraising events is, of course,
economic. Those who would be interested in attending such gala events and have the means to do so would presumably have more income, and therefore have a greater ability to donate. Additionally, my study suggests that the success of such fundraising can be attributed to the combination of indulgence with charitable donations. NPOs often sponsor charity campaigns in conjunction with other supporting activities such as concerts, meals, and auctions. As my studies suggest that people give more to charities after indulging rather than before, scheduling the supporting indulgent activities before asking for donations rather than after may increase the extent of donation.

In addition, I demonstrated that the forgiveness effect is even stronger when people employ more high level thinking. If the supporting indulgent activities are presented in such a way as to encourage more high level thinking, the extent of donations may be even greater. As people tend to think more abstractly about the desirability versus feasibility of an alternative (Liberman and Trope 1998), supporting indulgent activities should perhaps focus on the main feature, rather than the logistics of the event. For example, an event featuring a great entertainer at a little-known venue in an inconvenient location, rather than a less well-known entertainer at a spectacular venue, may encourage more high level thinking, and in turn yield more charitable donations.

My studies involved intercepting shoppers and consumers and asking for study participants’ responses immediately after a specific actual or hypothetical indulgent consumption. In life, we have all indulged at one point or another. So even in the absence of a specific prior indulgence, there would presumably be some latent level of guilt about indulgences in general. By extension of the forgiveness theory, making past indulgences
more salient should likewise encourage potential donors to make greater charitable donations.

*Implications for (potential) donors and for-profit marketers*

I also found that donors get a “bonus” from giving to charities: in addition to the general good feeling that they get from being altruistic, they feel both less guilty about their indulgent purchase experience and happier about it. I am not suggesting that this should be a selling point for NPOs to suggest to their potential donors, as being too overt about the self-serving motivations for donations may crowd out the altruistic motivations. However, there are implications for potential donors and for-profit marketers. Indulgent donors have more to gain from giving to charities: the sense of being forgiven for their past sins.

For for-profit marketers, especially those with indulgent product offerings such as amusement parks, desserts, and so forth, creating an opportunity – even a small one – for consumers to give to a charity after they indulge, can help manage their purchasing experience to be remembered with less guilt and thus more positively. By making charitable contributions, people feel happier and less guilty about their past indulgent experience. This finding can add to the research stream about retrospective evaluations as well. Retrospective evaluation research generally agrees that certain moments are more salient or influential on the evaluation (Cowley 2008).

*Economic and cultural influences*

After indulging by spending money and/or time, and by choice with or without expenditure, people make greater charitable contributions both in money and time. This research focused on a psychologically based incentive for making charitable donations: guilt
ensuing from indulgence, and the forgiveness of guilt that giving to charities offers to donors. A different type of incentive for making charitable donations, beyond the scope of this paper, is economics based, such as tax incentives. Contrary to my lay prediction that an economic incentive would promote charitable contributions, existing studies empirically show that it does not (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Titmuss 1971). In fact, monetary incentives can crowd out pro-social behavior and decrease rather than promote charitable contributions (Bénabou and Tirole 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Lazear 2000). An interesting direction for future research would be to examine the psychological mechanism by which economic incentives crowd out charitable contributions. We have all indulged at some point in our lives, so even in the “no-spending” condition of this study, and in other previous studies that employ “control” conditions in which there is “no indulgence,” we may have some level of latent and/or non-specific guilt. Whereas charitable giving without economic incentives offers forgiveness and guilt reduction, as I have shown in this research, perhaps the presence of selfish motivations mitigates that effect, which in turn diminishes the benefits of charitable giving, and thus crowds out charitable giving.

I explored guilt as an underlying driving force of the forgiveness effect. As evidence for my explanation of forgiveness, I demonstrated that (1) indulgence creates guilt, which in turn, promotes charitable giving, and (2) guilt diminishes after giving to charities. However one may raise a question about cultural influences, since all of my studies were conducted in the U.S. where Christianity and a puritan cultural background are salient. Therefore cultural influences on the forgiveness effect may need further investigation.
APPENDICES

In this appendix, I provide details of the data collection processes, as well as data descriptions that explain the choice of statistical methods.
APPENDIX 1.

STUDY ONE

Data collection process and description of the data

One hundred and fifty-three undergraduate students from multiple sections of a business class at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated in exchange for course credit over a two-week period. Each respondent took about ten minutes to complete pencil-and-paper questionnaires.

Respondents were randomly assigned to two conditions: “licensing” and “forgiveness.” In the licensing condition, respondents were asked to donate $100 to a charity of their choice and then asked to spend up to $300 on indulgent choices. In the forgiveness condition, respondents were asked to spend $100 on one of the indulgent choices and then to donate up to $300 to a charity of their choice. In order to compare the extent of monetary donation between the two conditions, both conditions were scaled to $100 of indulgent spending. Therefore, the proportion of monetary donation to $100 of indulgent spending for both conditions is a comparable measure (licensing condition = $63.5 of donation given $100 of indulgent spending vs. forgiveness condition = $142.7 of donation given $100 of indulgent spending).
APPENDIX 2.

STUDY TWO

Data collection process

One hundred and twenty-five shoppers at Ala Moana Mall shopping center participated in a voluntary pencil-and-paper survey over seven periods of data collection. Each data collection period took about 2.5 hours and each participant spent about 10 minutes to complete the survey. To show appreciation for participation in the survey, a University of Hawai‘i logo pen was given to each person who completed the survey.

Description of the data and statistical method

The survey measured participants’ charitable donations to their preferred charities, in dollar amounts and in volunteer hours, as dependent variables. Participants’ money and time consumption on “fun & pleasurable activity” as well as “practical & functional activity” were measured as independent variables.

Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test was conducted for both donation dollar amounts and volunteer hours because the distribution of both responses deviated from a Gaussian distribution and skewed to the right, with a pointed shape, as summarized in Table 2.1. Normality tests for both data sets show statistically significant results, which confirms that the data deviated from a normal distribution.
Table 2.1

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<th>Skewness</th>
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<th>Normality test</th>
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The distribution of donation time (DV)

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In addition, the “Figure 2.1 P-P plot for Donation dollars” and “Figure 2.2 P-P plot for Donation time” graphically show that the distribution of both responses deviates from a normal distribution.

Figure 2.1
Figure 2.2

Donation time

Cumulative Distribution of time

Normal(\(\mu=4.644\), \(\sigma=6.779\))
APPENDIX 3.

STUDY THREE

Data collection process

One hundred and eleven undergraduate students in five sections of the BUS312 course at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated in the survey in exchange for course credit. The survey was administered over a one-week period, and each student spent about 15 minutes to complete the pencil-and-paper survey and consent form. Participants were told that the survey was anonymous and confidential and that there were no right or wrong answers for the survey questions.

Description of the data and statistical method

Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions as summarized in Table 3.1: forgiveness, no-spending, and no-charity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>conditions</th>
<th>Task 1</th>
<th>Task 2</th>
<th>Task 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Forgiveness</td>
<td>Indulgent consumption</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
<td>Guilt about indulgence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No-spending</td>
<td>Filler task</td>
<td>Charity donations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. No-charity</td>
<td>Indulgent consumption</td>
<td>Filler task</td>
<td>Guilt about indulgence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents’ monetary donations to their preferred charities were measured as a dependent variable. And respondents’ happy feelings about prior indulgence and guilty feelings about prior indulgence were also measured as dependent variables.
Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test was conducted to compare monetary charitable donations between the forgiveness and the no-spending condition, because the distribution of monetary charitable donations deviated from a normal distribution and skewed to the right, as summarized in Table 3.2. A normality test also shows a statistically significant result: (W(72) = 0.89, P < 0.0001).

Table 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normality test</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer-von Mises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following “Figure 3.1 P-P plot for Donation dollars” also graphically shows that the distribution of donation dollars deviated from a normal distribution.
Respondents’ feelings about prior indulgence were compared between the forgiveness and no-charity conditions by Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test as well, because the distribution of happy feelings and guilty feelings about prior indulgence deviated from a Gaussian distribution: “happy”: (W(77) = 0.87, P < 0.0001) and “guilty”: (W(77) = 0.90, P < 0.0001). Further details of the data distribution are summarized in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The distribution of happy feelings about indulgence (DV)</th>
<th>The distribution of guilty feelings about indulgence (DV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurtosis</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality test</td>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk W 0.87 P &lt; 0.0001</td>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk W 0.90 P &lt; 0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.25 P &lt; 0.0100</td>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.21 P &lt; 0.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.60 P &lt; 0.0050</td>
<td>Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.47 P &lt; 0.0050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anderson-Darling A-Sq 3.46 P &lt; 0.0050</td>
<td>Anderson-Darling A-Sq 2.74 P &lt; 0.0050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following P-P plots, “Figure 3.2 P-P plot for Happy feelings about indulgence” and “Figure 3.3 P-P plot for Guilty feelings about indulgence,” also graphically show that both distributions of responses deviated from a normal distribution.
Figure 3.2

Happy feelings about indulgence

![Cumulative Distribution of Feel](Normal(Mu=5.2353 Sigma=1.5172))

Figure 3.3

Guilty feelings about indulgence

![Cumulative Distribution of Guilt](Normal(Mu=2.9706 Sigma=1.4349))
APPENDIX 4.

STUDY FOUR

Data collection process

One hundred and sixty-six undergraduate students across nine sections of business classes at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated over a two-week period. Each student spent an average of 15 minutes to complete a pencil-and-paper survey as well as a consent form and received course credit in exchange.

Description of the data and statistical method

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of 2 construal (abstract, concrete) x 2 spending (indulgent, non-indulgent) x 2 order (before, after) conditions. Monetary donations to preferred charities and guilt about spending $100 (on either indulgent or non-indulgent choices) were measured as dependent variables. Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test were conducted to compare donations in dollars among 2 indulgent (high, non) x 2 construal (abstract, concrete) conditions, because the distribution of donation in dollars is a non-Gaussian distribution, as summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normality test</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td></td>
<td>W</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer-von Mises</td>
<td></td>
<td>W-Sq</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td></td>
<td>A-Sq</td>
<td>5.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following “Figure 4.1 P-P plot for Donation dollars” also graphically shows that the distribution of responses deviated from a normal distribution.

**Figure 4.1**

![Cumulative Distribution of dollar](attachment:image.png)
APPENDIX 5.

STUDY FIVE

Data collection process

Eighty beach cleanup participants were recruited over five periods of data collection from various beaches around Oahu organized by Adopt A Beach Hawaii, the Surfrider Foundation, and Sustainable Coastlines Hawaii. Each organization is a non-profit organization which performs monthly beach cleanup with voluntary helpers. Each data collection period took about 4.5 hours including helping each organization to set up for a day’s cleanup activity, running the surveys, and cleaning the beach for two hours. Each participant voluntarily participated in the pencil-and-paper survey before a clean-up and took about ten minutes to complete the questionnaires. Participants were thanked and received a University of Hawaii logo pen when they complete the survey.

Eighty-six movie goers participated in the same pencil-and-paper survey at Ward Stadium Movie Theater over five periods of data collection during weekend. Movie goers were recruited in a voluntary basis before they watch a movie and each participant took about ten minutes to complete the survey. To show a gratitude for participation, movie goers also received a University of Hawaii logo pen once they complete the surveys.

Description of the data and statistical method

The survey measured participants’ charitable contributions to their preferred charities, both in dollar amount, volunteer hours, and frequencies. Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test was conducted to measure these dependent variables since the distribution of these variables
deviated from a Gaussian distribution as summarized in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The distribution of donation dollars (DV)</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>59.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality test</td>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer-von Mises</td>
<td>W-Sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>A-Sq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The distribution of frequency of charitable activity (DV)</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>37.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality test</td>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer-von Mises</td>
<td>W-Sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>A-Sq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The distribution of donation time (DV)</th>
<th>Skewness</th>
<th>Kurtosis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skewness</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>36.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normality test</td>
<td>Shapiro-Wilk</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cramer-von Mises</td>
<td>W-Sq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anderson-Darling</td>
<td>A-Sq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following “Figure 5.1 P-P plot for Donation dollars,” “Figure 5.2 P-P plot for Frequency of Charitable activity,” and “Figure 5.3 P-P plot for Donation time” also graphically show that the distribution of responses deviated from a normal distribution.
Figure 5.1.  

Donation dollars

Cumulative Distribution of $y_1$  

Normal($\mu=733.06$ $\sigma=2504.1$)

Figure 5.2

Frequency of charitable activity

Cumulative Distribution of $y_1$  

Normal($\mu=11.028$ $\sigma=35.103$)
Figure 5.3

Donation time

Cumulative Distribution of hour

Normal (μ=7.3165, σ=19.565)
APPENDIX 6.

STUDY SIX

Data collection process

Seventy-one undergraduate business students at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa participated in the survey in exchange for course credit, and each student took about 15 minutes to complete the in-class experiment and consent form. Respondents were told that the researcher had prepared real snacks (chocolate bars and yogurt) as a token of appreciation for their participation, and that they were asked to choose between the two snacks. The chocolate bars were considered the indulgent choice and the yogurt was considered the non-indulgent choice. Once respondents received their choice of snack, they proceeded to answer questions, which were about the two dependent variables: how much money and time they would donate to their choice of a charity.

Description of the data and statistical method

A non-parametric Wilcoxon Scores (Rank Sums) test was conducted to compare charitable contributions between subjects based on their choice of snack, because the distribution of charitable contributions, both in money and in time, is a non-Gaussian distribution, as summarized in Table 6.1. The distribution of charitable contributions both in money and in time skewed to the right with a pointed shape, and a normality test confirmed their deviation from a normal distribution: money (W (71) = 0.26, P < 0.0001), and time (W (71) = 0.77, P < 0.0001).
The following “Figure 6.1 P-P plots for Donation dollars” and “Figure 6.2 P-P plots for Donation time” also graphically show that both distributions of responses deviated from a normal distribution.
Figure 6.2

Donation time

Cumulative Distribution of time

Normal(Mu=13.761 Sigma=13.755)
REFERENCES


Liberman, Nira and Yaacov Trope (1998), "The Role of Feasibility and Desirability


