INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
The developmental Fijian state and the politics of development discourse

O'Sullivan, Mary M. Y. Low, Ph.D.

University of Hawaii, 1992

Copyright ©1992 by O'Sullivan, Mary M. Y. Low. All rights reserved.
THE DEVELOPMENTAL FIJIAN STATE AND THE POLITICS
OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
DECEMBER 1992

By
Mary M. Y. Low O'Sullivan

Dissertation Committee:
Farideh Farhi, Chairperson
Kathy E. Ferguson
Robert B. Stauffer
Harry Friedman
Alvin Y. So
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this dissertation is the result of years of study and work. Many people and organizations have assisted me in one way or another. I wish to express my appreciation for their assistance. However, there are a few without whose assistance the completion of this project would not have been possible.

I would like to express my gratitude to the East-West Center for supporting my studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and funding my fieldwork and research in Fiji.

In Fiji, I wish to thank the Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific for a visiting attachment during my fieldwork. I would also like to thank the Fiji Sugar Corporation for facilitating my research. Many thanks also go to the Central Planning Office for giving me access to their library. In Seaqaqa, Vanua Levu, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the people who assisted me. In particular, I am grateful to the Fijian sugar cane farmers for accepting me into their homes and sharing their knowledge and experience of development.

The Political Science Department of the University of Hawaii provided me with an intellectually stimulating
and supportive environment for much professional and intellectual growth throughout my graduate studies program. The seminars, class discussions, and colloquia provided the inspiration and intellectual sustenance. I am especially indebted to my committee: Professors Farideh Farhi (Chair), Kathy Ferguson, Bob Stauffer, Harry Friedman, and Alvin So, for their suggestions and encouragement. I am particularly indebted to Kathy Ferguson for giving me access to a pre-publication copy of a chapter of her forthcoming book.

I would also like to acknowledge my friends, colleagues and family who encouraged me by giving me the benefit of their interest and sharing the trying moments. I also wish to thank Freda Hellinger for her assistance in preparing the final presentation of this dissertation.

Finally, I owe much to my husband Patrick, who assisted me at every stage of this endeavor, and my daughter Siobhan, for their patience and understanding and for providing a constant source of support and encouragement.
ABSTRACT

Development is more than about changing a nation-state's position in the international division of labor of the world-economy. Development involves people and affects their way of life. To analyze the process of development also means to study the nature of social change. This dissertation brings into the forefront of development theorizing the question of human agency and intervention in the social transformations brought about by development.

This dissertation analyzes the experience of development of a group of indigenous Fijian farmers participating in state-initiated capitalist agricultural development in Seqaqa, Fiji. The development discourse on the indigenous Fijians has always problematized them as subjects of development while defining the Fijians as objects to be developed. In this study development is problematized as a set of relations of power with possibilities of resistance on the part of the subjects of development. The voices of the Fijian subjects as historic actors who are engaged in activities named development are an integral part of this dissertation.

Several threads are interwoven into this dissertation which builds on the theories of others who have done work
on human agency, subjectivity, and identity; development and the administration of development; the nation-state and development; the relations between the state and ethnicity; and the interrelatedness of power, knowledge, language, and truth. However, the thoughts and ideas in the text have emerged out of the fieldwork and research. The methods used in this analysis include interpretation and genealogy.

The process of development shapes modern subjectivities through the disciplining of bodies and the reworking of one's sense of the self. But there are also points of resistance on the part of the subjects of development implicated in the networks of power relations occasioned by development. In thinking of development in this way one can appreciate the diversity of local responses to the expansion of the world-system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................... iv
ABSTRACT ........................................ vi
LIST OF TABLES .................................. xii

CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION ...................... 1
Statement of the Project ....................... 1
Theoretical Framework ......................... 4
Methodology .................................... 18
Structure of the Dissertation .................. 22
Notes to Chapter I ............................ 27

CHAPTER II THE PROCESSES OF NATION-STATE
FORMATION IN FIJI: AN HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS ................................. 31
Introduction ................................... 31
The Nature of the Modern Nation-State .... 32
The Dependent Peripheral State ............... 40
The Dependent Fijian Nation-State .......... 45
Introduction ................................... 45
Pre-colonial Fiji ............................. 46
British Colonialism and "Indirect Rule" ..... 53
Capitalist Development and the
Emergence of a Plural Society .......... 62
Political Independence, the
Postcolonial State and
Development ................................. 67
Notes to Chapter II ........................... 73

CHAPTER III THE NATURE OF "THE FIJIAN PROBLEM"
IN FIJI'S DEVELOPMENT PROCESS ....... 81
Introduction ................................... 81
The British Colonial State's
Creation of a Neotraditional
Fijian Social Order ......................... 89
Fijian Social Units and Land-
ownership System ......................... 92
Village Communalism: the
Colonial Definition of the
Fijian Way of Life ......................... 95
**CHAPTER IV**

**THE DEVELOPMENT SETTING: THE STATE, CAPITAL AND SOCIETY IN FIJI**

- Introduction ........................................... 122
- The State, Capital, and Society .................... 122
- The State, Economic Development, Capitalist Hegemony, and Resistance: Society in Colonial Fiji ............. 134
- Political Structures, Institutions, and the Political Process: The Problem of Nation-Building Within the Context of Capitalist Development, Class Formation and Ethnic Divisions ......................... 151
- The Fijian State's Development Strategies: Internal and External Actors in Fiji's Development Process ............. 170
- Notes to Chapter IV ................................. 184

**CHAPTER V**

**THE ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEAQAQA SUGAR CANE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS**

- Introduction ........................................... 194
- Rural Development Strategies and Participation ........... 195
- Production-Centered Development ................... 195
- People-Centered Development ........................ 200
- Seaqaqa: Background ............................... 206
- Seaqaqa: Whose Development? ....................... 209
- The Meaning of Participation in Development .............. 225
- Notes to Chapter V .................................... 231
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER VI</th>
<th>THE ROLE AND POWER OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE</th>
<th>235</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Participation and Control in the Development Discourse</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The International Dimension</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Development is Put into Discourse</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development Discourse: Its Production and Control</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The National or Local Dimension of the Development Discourse</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Development Discourse of Fiji</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Development Theory which Informs and Supports the Dominant Development Discourse of Fiji</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Nation-State and Development</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Impact of the Development Discourse of Fiji on the People</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterdiscourses and Resistance</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter VI</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER VII</th>
<th>THE NATURE OF FIJIAN PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT</th>
<th>291</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Seaqaga Sugar Cane Development Project: Who Benefits? Whose Costs? The Objective Consequences</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Fijian Response to Development: The Subjective Dimension</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Fijian Farmers' Definition of the Goals and Objectives of Development with Specific Reference to the SSCDP</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fijian Notions of Subjectivity and Identity and Capitalist Development</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Limits of State Intervention</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resistance and Appropriation in the SSCDP</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiated and Multiple Subjectivities</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter VII</td>
<td>330</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER VIII</th>
<th>CONCLUSION</th>
<th>335</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Notes to Chapter VIII</td>
<td>345</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDICES .................................................. 346

Appendix A. Interview Schedule for Fijian Sugar Cane Farmers at Seaqaqa .......... 346

Appendix B. Fieldwork Analysis ............... 351

Appendix C. Sugar Cane Production Tables for Seaqaqa .......................... 382

Appendix D. The Fijian Administration .... 385

Appendix E. The Fijian Legislature .......... 389

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. 391
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Seagaqa District Cane Production Comparison by Race and Number of Growers</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Seagaqa District Cane Production Comparison by Race and Number of Tonnes Produced</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Fiji Development Bank Clients Sugar Cane Production, Comparison by Race</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Project

The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze an instance of the lived experience of development of a group of indigenous Fijians who are currently "participating" in the development process on the basis of the Fijian state's expressed policy of increasing indigenous Fijian involvement in capitalist development in Fiji. The dissertation draws mainly on material gathered from fieldwork done in Fiji between March and September, 1991.

The concern here is not only to try to understand how capitalist development is effected but also to problematize development as a set of relations of power with possibilities of resistance on the part of those affected. Thus an attempt is also made to focus the analysis on the interpretations of a group of indigenous Fijians of their experience in a state-initiated development project in addition to discussing the Fijian state's and other external elements' objectives of promoting development in Fiji.

The relations between the Fijian state and the indigenous Fijians and development, and the state's relations with the international lending agencies or agents
of capitalist development such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and direct private foreign investment are examined. This is done by analyzing how development has become interconnected to state-building in Fiji through an historical analysis of the state formation process and the struggles of the major groups for the control of the state. The question of how the Fijian state has attempted to naturalize development in the face of the problems and inequalities that development has generated between the social groups along class, ethnic and gender lines, for example, is discussed. On the connection between the Fijian state and international bureaucracies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which have as their target capitalist development of the "world" as a totality, their practices and requirements of the Fijian state for eligibility for their assistance and resources are also examined.

An attempt is also made to problematize development by questioning its beginnings and the purposes of established development practices, including the knowledge and discourse which comprise part of the conditions of existence of these activities named development. Hence the definition of development practices is not limited to just those actions and activities carried out within government bureaucracies and institutions with the stated
objectives of promoting development in Fiji. The term development practices also refers to the knowledge and discourse which allow these activities to be reproduced by legitimizing or naturalizing those actions and activities called development. They include the various discourses produced and reproduced in the academy, in books, journals, school curricula, and the mass media. Included in this dissertation, therefore, is a discussion of the relevance of the academic development debate to the Fijian context.

In summary, the goal of this dissertation is to open up spaces of political analysis and engagement which shift the locus of knowledge and power from the developers, that is, the state and the international agencies of development, to the local people who are taking part in the development project as actors, and in doing this to call attention to the unbalanced power relations that the development enterprise silences. On the other hand, as Kathy Ferguson cautions in her discussion on problematizing development:

This perspective does not assume that local practices are always completely virtuous, lacking in their own patriarchal or class (or other) biases. But it does assume that moral and political priority in making decisions about development should reside with those whose lives are most directly affected by those decisions, and it embraces the self-empowerment of the local people as its goals.
Theoretical Framework

As I attempt to construct a non-essentialist framework of analysis\(^2\) for this dissertation, I draw upon theoretical insights from several areas and people's work: critical development theory and the current debate concerning the development metaphor, state theory—specifically debates on the dependent peripheral state, Giddens's concept of "a duality of structure," feminist perspectives on the constitution of modern subjectivity, and Foucault's work on the subject and power, language and knowledge and their interrelations. However, this section sets out the broad outlines of the basis upon which the dissertation focuses its analysis of the complex and difficult processes brought about by the deployment of development.

The organizing thread of this analysis of the Fijian state's specific policy on increasing the number of indigenous Fijians participating in the national development project is that of viewing the actions and activities which currently constitute what is called "development" as a set of relations of power. Thus the deployment of development is presented as political and contestable. Foucault's non-essentialist approach to the analysis of power is particularly applicable in that it provides a way of making sense of the material gathered during fieldwork with indigenous Fijians on their lived experience of development.
Foucault's analysis of power does not postulate a general theory of power as an entity which has a particular form. According to Foucault,

Power in the substantive sense, 'le pouvoir, doesn't exist . . . . The idea that there is either located at--or emanating from--a given point something which is a 'power' . . . fails to account for a considerable number of phenomena. In reality power means relations, a more-or-less organized, hierarchical, coordinated cluster of relations. 3

Foucault's concern with "how power is exercised," "by what means," and "its effects" rather than "what power is," and "where it comes from," allows for an analysis of relations of power in their specific forms by making it possible to include a range of social phenomena within an analytic of power relations.

Since Foucault is concerned with the way power is exercised, his conception of power and the possibility of resistance and struggle is useful for understanding specific situations or contexts. Foucault's definition of the nature of power directs attention to the productive as well as the repressive aspects of power. Power also produces our social reality as Foucault tells us.

The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. . . . Power exists only when it is put into action, . . . . 4 . . . what defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions; an action
upon an action, on existing actions, or on those which may arise in the present or the future . . . .

Thus relations of power are rooted in the social body or co-extensive with social networks. Power is exercised in a multiplicity of forms. In other words, "relations of power are interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality)." Foucault therefore directs attention to how relations of power are implicated in the way our bodies and identities and subjectivities are formed.

Foucault's work on "the subject and power" is relevant in that he illustrates how our self-apprehensions are produced in direct and concrete ways. One of the purposes of Foucault's project was an analysis of "the forms, modalities, practices and 'techniques of self' through which 'the individual is constituted and becomes conscious of himself [herself] as a subject'." The body is viewed as the central component of the way relations of power come into being. Through genealogical analysis Foucault shows how the body has become an object of knowledge and also a target for the exercise of power. Thus Foucault politicizes the issues of individuality and subjectivity by doing a history of the terms and categories by which our identities have been formed, that is, how we have been constituted as subjects in both senses:
Subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to [our] identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.9

Foucault illustrates how we can question the ways we have been "really and materially" constituted as subjects by analyzing how disciplinary techniques of power or the disciplines constitute us as individuals whereby "certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals."10 Foucault therefore dislodges "the liberal conception of individuals as unconstrained, creative essences," and also attempts to link "the social, economic and political, on the one hand, and the personal and psychological on the other."11

The disciplinary technique of power which became prominent in the eighteenth century and expanded rapidly in the nineteenth century began to include as its target not just individual bodies but collectivities or whole groups of people and is summarized by Foucault in the term population. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault states that

One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a "population," with
its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation.\textsuperscript{12}

The disciplinary technique of power produces our modern subjectivities in three ways: (1) hierarchical observation, (2) normalizing judgment, and (3) the examination.\textsuperscript{13} In attempting a conceptualization of the Fijian state's policy of increasing the number of indigenous Fijians participating in the development process as a specific site of the exercise of power, the most relevant of the three forms of disciplinary power is that of the instrument of normalizing judgment. Foucault argues that one of the most significant aspects of disciplinary power is the punishment of nonconformity in which the exercise of the normalizing process is to correct the deviant.

For example,

The workshop, the school, the army were subject to a whole micro-penalty of time (lateness, absences, interruptions of tasks), of activity (inattention, negligence, lack of zeal), of behaviour (impoliteness, disobedience), of speech (idle chatter, insolence), of the body ('incorrect' attitudes, irregular gestures, lack of cleanliness), of sexuality (impurity, indency).\textsuperscript{14}

However, Foucault points out that disciplinary power works not only through punishment but also by gratification in its rewards and praise for good conduct and practices. Hence one of the effects of this punishment-gratification
process is training and correction and thus distributing, ranking and grading those who are subject to it. Therefore, the purpose of punishment in disciplinary power is not expiation or repression but normalization, which together with surveillance or hierarchical observation constitute one of the most important means by which power is exercised.

According to Foucault, disciplinary power "has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment." Disciplinary power not only permits the extraction of wealth and commodities but also time and labor from bodies. Foucault's concern with analyzing the material techniques of power which came into existence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in European societies provides a way for an attempt to look beyond the juridical-political theory of sovereign power with its location in the state apparatuses to how power is effectively exercised.

The emergence and exercise of disciplinary power has been intimately connected with the proliferation of specific apparatuses of knowledge and the formation of the human sciences. Foucault conceptualizes the intricate relationship between power and knowledge:

- power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); . . .
- power and knowledge directly imply one another; . . . there is no power relation
without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.\textsuperscript{17}

By focusing his analysis on how different techniques of power work, Foucault draws attention to their concurrence with the emergence of specific forms of knowledge which have as their objective the body or bodies. The methods of accumulating knowledge include "observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research."\textsuperscript{18} One form of information or knowledge which has become pervasive and significant has been the "science of the state" or statistics which creates knowledge about the state in terms of its elements and dimensions particularly with regard to its population.

Arturo Escobar has attempted an analysis of development as a set of relations of power which brought into being a whole discourse on the so-called Third World countries and the conditions of existence of their populations. According to Escobar, the deployment of development has allowed relations of power in which the western states exert control and dominate the new states within the new context of the collapse of the colonial systems after World War II. As Escobar points out, "It was in the name of modernization and development that an entire productive apparatus took charge of the management of the life of the 'new' nations."\textsuperscript{19} And likewise the leaders of these
new nation-states—Nehru, Nkrumah, Nassar, Sukarno, all of whom were in search of a raison d'état—also accepted as the purpose of the state the mobilization of the population and the countries' resources to modernize and develop.  

Although Foucault does not center his analysis of power on the state, his work on the relations of power does contain some relevant insights on how the modern state is constituted. Foucault argues:

To pose the problem in terms of the State means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say in terms of law. If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the State apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive: the Army as a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc. I don't want to say that the State isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State . . . because the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the State can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.

However, Foucault's work does illustrate some important aspects of the forms of power relations promoted by the modern state. Foucault directs our attention to the relationship between pastoral power and government. By doing detailed analyses of contemporary forms of human existence and relations of power and knowledge, Foucault discerned a transformation in the methods of exercising
power from that of the predominance of sovereignty-law-repression to power techniques that are more diffused and economical and which "rule individuals and populations in a continuous and permanent way."  

From the sixteenth century onwards the political structure called the state has been increasing its power over human life in both individualizing and totalizing forms, in that the state does not only look after the interests of the totality or of a class or group of its citizens, it has also been interested in each and every individual within its control. As Foucault points out, the state is "a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns."  

This has been made possible through the state's adaptation of the old power technique of pastoral power which has its origins in Christian institutions. 

Pastoral power is an individualizing form of power. It is derived from Christianity and its metaphors of the shepherd and the flock. Pastoral power focused on individual salvation in the next world. It was a form of power which was concerned with the individual's entire life as well as that of the life of the community. Its exercise involved knowledge of people's minds. The modern state has appropriated a form of pastoral power in assuming
the function of looking after the health and well-being of its individual subjects in terms of provision of adequate shelter, wealth, and security. But as Foucault argues "the relationship between political power (exercised over legal subjects) and pastoral power (exercised over live individuals) has been problematic . . . and in modern societies has become particularly prominent in the form of the 'welfare state problem'." 24

Foucault's insights on government are relevant. He points out that qualitative change in the techniques of power during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulting in disciplinary power directed at the optimization of the economic utility and political docility of the human body was also accompanied by a change in government techniques. The model of wise government of the family for the common welfare of all was superseded by the emergence of the process "through which the science of government, the recentering of the theme of economy on a different plane from that of the family, . . . and the problem of population are all linked to one another." 25 Thus, the purpose of government became that of administering the life of the state's population and this involved "inserting people or inducing them to insert themselves into systems of categories and procedures of self-description through which they became governable." 26 The expressed aim of the administration of the life of the
population was presented as that of improving the health and vitality of the people and increasing their wealth. Statistical forms of representation of aspects of the state's population in terms of regularities in death rates, age profiles, and illness, for example, comprise one of the principal components of the new techniques of government.

Foucault's approach to the modern state is that of analyzing the techniques by which power is exercised over individuals and populations. It is relevant to an understanding of the state's role in promoting development for as Foucault argues the exercise of power over life was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic process.27

Although Foucault shows us that power is exercised in multiple forms, he acknowledges the importance of the modern state by stating that in contemporary societies the state is not simply one of the forms or specific situations of the exercise of power—even if it is the most important—but that in a certain way all other forms of power relations must refer to it. But this is not because they are derived from it; it is rather because power relations have come more and more under state control (although this state control has not taken the same form in pedagogical, judicial, economic, or family systems).28
Foucault's formulation of the relations of power in terms of a multiplicity of forms and coterminous with social networks has been criticized for its lack of a foundation and a specific form of resistance. However, since Foucault conceptualizes power to be relational and endemic in the social body rather than as the capacity of some agent exerting its will or interest over and against the will or interest of another and power is therefore something that can be acquired, seized, or shared, Foucault argues that

where there is power, there is resistance, points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. 29

Thus resistance is not limited to a foundational binary division such as that between a ruling and a ruled class for "confrontations in the form of massive binary divisions constitute merely a temporary and exceptional state of accumulation of the multiplicity of cleavages and resistances arising from the plurality of power relations in the social body." 30

In short, resistance takes a multiplicity of forms. Foucault expands his position on power and resistance by arguing that power is something that operates through us and not just added to our relationships with others. A relation of power is not just a relationship between individual or collective agents or one of violence versus consent, but rather a relationship of power comprises
a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. 31

Furthermore, Foucault argues,

. . . a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the other" (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible interventions may open up.32

The Fijian state's policy of increasing indigenous Fijian "participation" in development is analyzed in terms of a particular site of power relations. Foucault's insights on the techniques of modern relations of power such as how the individual subject is constituted by the disciplines which individualize and normalize people are relevant in delineating the processes required for "successful participation" in development by indigenous Fijians involved in the state-initiated Seagaqa Sugar Cane Development Project (SSCDP). Development projects initiated and organized by the state and supported by global agents of capitalist development, constitute sets of relations of power which not only change material relations but also one's sense of the self and its
relationship with the social units of which it is a member such as the family and the clan. Thus, the dissertation also attempts to analyze the changing sense of subjectivity brought about by capitalist development experiences of a group of indigenous Fijians. Foucault's formulation of the multiple forms of relations of power and resistance is pertinent to an attempt to understand not only how capitalist development is effected generally but also the nature of its encounter with specific Third World societies.

The meanings and implications that the expansion of capitalist agricultural development has for Fijian village society are examined. However, it is not possible to present a single coherent indigenous Fijian point of view of the effects of capitalist development on all Fijians. The writer had contact with only a small group of Fijians within limited space and time. Therefore, what is attempted in this dissertation comprises only a partial picture of how development is experienced by a section of Fijian rural society.

To conclude this section of the chapter, as Aihwa Ong in her study of capitalist discipline in Malay society illustrates:

The introduction of industrial capitalist discipline into Malay society involves both resistance and assent to change in work patterns, consumption, group identity, self-consciousness, and ultimately, a greater
synchronization of local life with the rhythm of advanced capitalist societies. Ong shows in her work on capitalist development in Malaysia how the process engenders new relations of power in, for instance, the disciplining of bodies and subjectivities experienced by Malay women working in factories. Relations of dominance are normalized by the discourse of development as progress. In summary, the development process is problematized or politicized through a conceptualization of the development process as generating power-knowledge relations. The way some Fijians involved in rural capitalist development understand and interpret their experiences of development is discussed within this paradigm.

Methodology

This dissertation is informed by a perspective which partially draws insights from Anthony Giddens's work while it also borrows insights from Michel Foucault's analysis of power and the subject and power and relationships.

According to Giddens, "social structures are both the medium and the effect of human action. As such, they do not exist apart from the activities they govern and human agents' conception of these activities, but they are also a material condition of these activities." Therefore, social structures are viewed in some sense as real, yet they do not exist apart from human activity so
they are not seen to be universal or unchanging. Such a perspective is neatly summarized by Roy Bhaskar:

The conception I am proposing is that people, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously reproduce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their activities of production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family or work to sustain the capitalist system. Yet it is nevertheless the unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary condition for, their activity. 35

People as social actors are historically situated under conditions which are not of their own choosing. Human agency is embedded in the social network in that we do not so much "produce" society as we reproduce it and in the process transform it. The indigenous Fijian farmers who were interviewed at the SSCDP experience development in terms of their historical and cultural contexts. Their historical and cultural or social structures provide the resources for, as well as the limits to, their actions and options.

The methods of inquiry that this dissertation engages in include historical analysis, interpretation, and genealogy. An interpretivist mode is employed in that the objects of inquiry have already been defined, that is, the social situation being analyzed has been and continues to be ontologically constituted by the meanings and interpretations of its participants. 36 Hence, it is subject-centered to a certain extent as it privileges and
foregrounds the self-understandings of a group of indigenous Fijians taking part in development. Their intersubjective meanings are constitutive of the activities and practices of their social and political experiences. On the other hand, as Ferguson points out, "there is always more to the self than the existing self-understanding makes available. Interpretation always has to balance the ability of power to distort the worldview of the powerless with the ability of the oppressed to comprehend and transcend their confinement." Thus, this dissertation is an interpretation of a pre-interpreted social world. It is more than an attempt to repeat the commonsense knowledge of the participants, but rather it is the researcher's interpretation of what is happening and offers its own logic or economy that may not coincide with that of the subjects of the development project. Historical analyses of the structures and processes discerned provide the context for this specific site of relations of power being analyzed.

The genealogical approach addresses the questions of how knowledge, truth, and meaning are constituted. Genealogical analysis aims to dislodge or denaturalize the categories that are taken as natural, and thus reflect on the meaning endowing processes imposed on people. The genealogical approach provides a way to problematize "development" in terms of the power relations involved
in the constitutions of subjects and objects in the
development practices, and allows one to represent the
type of subjectivities required of the indigenous Fijians
in order to "participate successfully" in the development
project that is being studied. And as Ferguson argues,
"the genealogical project allows us to recognize the
political claims of those marginalized by the prevailing
categories."  

The genealogical methods of inquiry share with the
interpretivist view that language comprises a practice.
But genealogy discards the truth-value basis of statements
in communication and views language as a discourse which
imposes a form of order in our lived world. Michael
Shapiro directs us to Foucault's alternative approach to
discourse "that provides a politicized alternative to the
traditional preoccupation with the truth-value of individual
statements and discursive formations as a whole."  

To analyze a discursive formation is to weigh
the "value" of statements, a value that is
not defined by their truth, that is not
gauged by a secret content but which
characterizes their place, their capacity
for circulation and exchange, their possibility
of transformation, not only in the
economy of discourse, but more generally in
the administration of scarce resources.

Statements are viewed to be political resources.
They reproduce existing structures of authority, power,
and resource control. The prevailing discourse which
constitutes the "political" in terms of sovereignty and
rights does not lead us to view the constitution of our modern subjectivities, identities, and objects by the processes of "development" as political.

As Foucault has attempted to show, discourse is more than just a mode of communication for

... in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse.41

The genealogical strategies of inquiry provide a way of understanding the interpretations of "development" that have been given by the indigenous Fijians who were interviewed. Rather than interpreting their responses to "development" as a form of false consciousness, where people are seen to have been deceived into believing what their real interests are, a more useful view is that their interpretations are part of their negotiations within the workings of power relations. Moreover, genealogy allows for an attempt to illustrate how "development" has been and continues to be supported by powerful "rational" discourses which naturalize it and neutralize its effects on people.

Structure of the Dissertation

Having discussed the underlying themes and organizing thread of this dissertation, Chapter II begins to
contextualize the analysis of the Fijian state's policy of increasing the number of indigenous Fijians in development. Drawing on insights provided by state theory, specifically the historical-structural dependency approach of Cardoso and Faletto, Chapter II traces the emergence of the modern Fijian state under British colonialism to the present. In addition, how the effects of the British colonial policy of "indirect rule," the introduction of capitalist production and the changing social relations required, together with the discursive and non-discursive practices generated by the colonial officials and (until very recently) mainly western scholars on the "native Fijian" came to constitute the "Fijian" as both subject and object of colonial and present state policies of development will be discussed.

Chapter III expands on the theme of the construction of the "native Fijian" as an object to be developed while at the same time the Fijian subject is constituted as "the problem" in the development process initiated by the state. This involves doing a historical analysis of the Fijian Administration and analyzing its role in constituting Fijian society at the bureaucratic level. In short, this chapter delineates the neotraditional pattern of social and political relations in village life as Fijians become integrated into the nation-state and capitalist development.
Chapter IV draws upon critical development theory and state theory, and by anchoring the analysis within the Fiji context examines the relevance of the academic development debate to an understanding of specific sites of development. This chapter attempts to problematize "development" as a set of relations of power in terms of an analysis of past class and ethnic conflicts consequent upon the state's deployment of particular strategies of development. How the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—"the institutionally-situated promoters of capitalist development . . . ensconced in the power centers of the development industry"—currently reproduce within the Fijian state sites of power relations and control through their activities of lending finance and imposing stringent requirements is examined. Thus this chapter also attempts to discuss how the post-independent Fijian state has responded to the imperatives required by the World Bank and IMF and simultaneously maintained order among its variedly-constituted population for the expansion of capitalist production.

Chapter V focuses on how a specific state-initiated project, SSCDP, has been organized and administered. Through an analysis of relevant and accessible government documents and written records, an attempt is made to examine critically the purposes of this project. The concept of "participation" required by this project is
problematized in terms of relations of power and control of persons and their resources by the state or state-sponsored bureaucracies.

Chapter VI attempts to problematize the natural and neutral "faces" of development by an analysis of the discourses which constitute and legitimize it. The discourses of development include the policies of development planners, the manuals for project planning, the state's development plans, documents produced by the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank (ADB) "experts," the speeches of politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats, the school curricula and the mass media. It then places the problematization of the "native Fijian" within this discourse and how the Fijians have been positioned in these dominant discourses.

Chapter VII is an analysis of the objective and subjective consequences of participation in development for a group of Fijian farmers interviewed at the SSCDP. Insights from the feminist critique of the construction and constitution of the western self as a predominantly male project are called upon to analyze how the state's policy of increasing Fijian participation in development requires and promotes certain notions of subjectivity and agency which may not be compatible with the long-term reproduction of indigenous Fijian social structures and cultural practices. Much of the analysis in this chapter
is based on the interpretations and answers of some of the Fijian farmers participating in the SSCDP.

Chapter VIII concludes this dissertation and attempts a reflection on its relevance as a political analysis and engagement.
Notes to Chapter I


2 Gary Wickham, "Power and Power Analysis: Beyond Foucault?" Economy and Society, Vol. 12, No. 4, Nov., 1983, p. 468. Wickham points out that a non-essentialist analysis is one which does not try to understand its object in terms of a single all-important essence such as the economy, the state, or the individual. Social phenomena are analyzed in terms of their specific conditions of existence, that is, a specific set of relations, and their effects with regard to other social relations and practices.


5 Ibid., p. 220.


8 Ibid., p. 75.

9 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 212.


11 Gary Wickham, p. 474.


16. Ibid., p. 104.

17. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 27.


22. Barry Smart, p. 126.


25. Michel Foucault as quoted by Barry Smart, p. 129.


32. Ibid.


35. Ibid., as quoted by Jeffrey Isaac, p. 68.

36. Interpretation views language as more than an instrument which people use to represent the world. The interpretivist mode of inquiry holds that language is an activity through which we constitute the world we live in, although it is not something we have completely at our disposal. However, social life is made possible by the web of intersubjective meanings which are lodged within language.


38. Ibid., p. 25.


41 Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures: Lecture Two," p. 93.

CHAPTER II
THE PROCESSES OF NATION-STATE FORMATION IN FIJI:
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction
The first part of this chapter is a discussion of current theorizing on the modern nation-state and, specifically, the dependent peripheral state at a relatively high level of abstraction. This chapter then shifts to an historical analysis of the formation of the nation-state in Fiji. In this way the underlying assumptions upon which the analysis is based are clear.

Theorizing about the modern nation-state has been mainly based on the experience of the western advanced capitalist countries due to its first emergence in the West and its later appearance in the other parts of the world. However, there are a variety of theories of the state both in the mainstream and Marxist traditions. There is no universal theory of the modern nation-state although there are some universalistic principles which distinguish the modern state from its predecessors such as the relationship between the state and capitalist society. But it is evident in the theorizing that there is the need to take into account the specific socio-political
institutions and configurations in different states and also their historical experiences both internally and externally.

One of the distinguishing features of the Third World is its peripherality arising out of its physical subordination to western European powers during colonialism so that its economies became subordinated to the dominant western industrialized economies. During colonization, European values and cultural patterns were superimposed on Third World societies but they did not completely destroy the traditional patterns of social organization.

The Third World, on the whole, has failed to repeat the western European trajectory to capitalist development. Hence, the debate about Third World societies in terms of whether they will become like the West continues and the nature of the state has been discussed within this context.

The Nature of the Modern Nation-State

The "nation-state," and "nationalism," are intimately connected to the rise of capitalism. Both Giddens and Foucault, in their studies of the emergence of the modern state in Europe, have identified the close structural relationships between the nation-state and capitalism in the transformations they brought to people's ways of living. Capitalism and the modern nation-state are the two principal forces which have shaped modernity.
According to Giddens, the rise of the bourgeoisie as a class was closely linked to the gradual transformation of the European absolutist state into the modern nation-state. It was by taking control of the already constituted state institutions that the emergent bourgeois class is able to advance its economic goals. Giddens's definitions of "class-divided societies," and "class societies," are helpful in attempting to understand the significance of the socioeconomic and political changes wrought by the emergence of the nation-state and capitalism.

In class-divided societies the extraction of surplus production is normally backed in a direct way by the threat or the use of force. Class division rests less on control of allocative than of authoritative resources, usually backed by the potential or actual use of violence . . . . In class-divided societies the economic power involved in class relations is rarely either achieved or sustained by solely economic means.

On the other hand, in class societies such as capitalism, the dominant class is able to dominate because it has control over the disposal of economic resources through the institution of private property and as a consequence of the constitution of the capitalist labor contract. Thus, the dominant class dominates by virtue of its control over allocative resources.

This circumstance is the result of the transformations Marx describes, of labor into wage-labor, and property into capital, each being transformable into the other via their "double existence" as commodities.
Giddens then goes on to point out that as a result of these transformations:

The extraction of surplus value in capitalist economies is founded upon the economic constraint deriving from the dependence of the propertyless wage-laborer upon those who have access to capital.5

A distinguishing characteristic of capitalism as a class society is the primacy of the "economic," and its "insulation" from the "political" while at the same time exploitation and domination intrude into the center of the labor process.

The close connection between capitalism and the nation-state then is less obvious than in class-divided societies where class power is derived mainly from exercising state power. Thus the access to authoritative resources was the means of controlling economic resources. But as Giddens argues, the state in capitalist society is much more intrusive and comprehensive in its administration or "management" of the subjects within its territorial jurisdiction.

The nation-state, which exists in a complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal and external violence.6

With the extrusion of violence from the labor contract the problem for capitalism was how to secure the compliance
and discipline of labor solely by economic means, and the problem for the nation-state became the internal pacification of its people. In his analysis of modern social life, Giddens makes an association between power and locales or the physical setting of social interaction. In Giddens's view, certain locales form "power containers" in that they permit a concentration of both allocative and authoritative resources. In other words, locales circumscribe arenas for the exercising of administrative power. Thus Giddens points out that "the modern state, as nation-state, becomes in many respects the pre-eminent form of power container, as a territorially bounded (although internally highly regionalized) administrative unity."7

Giddens then proceeds to show the importance of surveillance as a medium of exercising power, and together with the changed nature of military power due to the industrialization of war, contributed to the whole process of the ascendance of the nation-state as the most significant modern-day power container. Surveillance which is the "control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some groups by others" is an important part of the generation of the material wealth or allocative resources of any group. In addition, "information storage is central to the role of 'authoritative resources' in the structuring of social systems."8 State power is
generated through "reflexively monitored system reproduction, involving the regularized gathering, storage, and control of information applied to administrative ends." 

On the other hand, Giddens also recognizes the decisive influence of capitalism in this process of internal pacification through industrial capitalism's infrastructural transformations such as the availability of cheap printed materials. Furthermore, the nature of the modern workplace requires the establishment of locales where regularized observation of activities is carried out in an attempt to control them, thus connecting industrial capitalism as a mode of economic enterprise to the nation-state as the main administrative unit.

However, Foucault's work does not focus on the issue of the state as such but on "the techniques, the practices, which give a concrete form to this new political rationality and to this new kind of relationship between the social entity and the individual." 

Foucault turns our attention to the techniques of power which discipline the body and normalize behavior by determining the conduct of people and submitting them to certain ends or domination. In short, Foucault focuses on how the subject is objectivized to allow for the administering of the life of the populations. Thus, in Foucault's discussion of the state, his central question is:
Which kind of political techniques, which technology of government, has been put to work and used and developed in the general framework of the reason of State in order to make the individual a significant element of the State?11

By analyzing the emergence of the police forces in France and Germany as a specific institution of governance from the end of the sixteenth century, Foucault shows us "the specific techniques by which a government in the framework of the state was able to govern people as individuals significantly useful for the world."12 He analyzes this new technology of government in its three major forms: as utopia, as a practice or rules for some real institution, and as an academic discipline. The utopian view of the role of the police in the new political rationality of the nation-state is concerned with "men's coexistence in a territory, their relationships to property, what they produce, what is exchanged in the market, and so on. It also considers how they live, the diseases and accidents which befall them. In a word, what the police see to is a live, active, and productive man."13

Foucault then examined the administrative practices of the French state by analyzing the major police regulations for French society. According to Foucault, these regulations covered every aspect of people's living including the moral quality of life, the preservation of life, to the conveniences of life. The regulations also
dealt with trade, factories, workers, the poor, and public order.

Finally, the "police" has also become an academic discipline. The role of the police in society is studied and taught in the academy as something positive for "the police govern not by the law but by a specific, a permanent, and a positive intervention in the behavior of individuals." Thus the state does not only have a negative role fighting against its internal enemies through the law and its external enemies by its army, the French state from the eighteenth century onwards also assumed the task of taking care of its people as a population. For the nation-state "wields its power over living beings as living beings, and its politics, therefore, has to be a biopolitics."\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, the modern state is a "nation-state" according to Giddens in the sense that it is "the unification of an administrative apparatus over precisely specified territorial bounds (in a complex of other nation-states)."\textsuperscript{15} And the close relationship between the emergence of the nation-state and capitalism is that "such a unification of administration is only possible once the old city-countryside relation has been shattered by the commodification of production that has overcome the 'segmental' regionalisation of time-space in class-divided society."\textsuperscript{16}
Hence, the association of European nationalism with the nation-state is one particular interpretation of "theorists of industrial society" or "modernization theory," which associates nationalistic sentiments with the liberal-democratic state of "political citizenship." Giddens's definition of nationalism is that of "the existence of symbols and beliefs which were either propagated by elite groups, or held by many of the members of regional, ethnic or linguistic categories of a population, and which imply a communality between them." On the other hand, nationalism or the European experiences of "imagined communities" were closely linked to "the convergent rise of capitalism and of the nation-state." And in certain instances, nationalistic sentiments have coincided with citizenship of a particular nation-state. Moreover, through the effects of European colonialism or imperialism a series of modular experiences in the military, political and educational spheres facilitated the emergence of national consciousness or nationalism in the colonies. It cannot be denied that nationalism as a movement became a significant and powerful means for oppressed peoples in the colonies fighting for political independence from their colonial masters. But again it is necessary to take into account the biographical variety and historical trajectories of the political development of nation-states, specifically those of the Third World.
To summarize, as Giddens posits:

The European state system both supplied some of the conditions for the emergence of capitalism as a distinct type of productive system, as a "mode of production," and the interconnections between capitalism and the state system provided the means of securing a growing European domination over the rest of the world from the sixteenth century onwards.20

The Dependent Peripheral State

The formation of the modern Third World nation-state has been largely determined by the difference in the way that it was established from the western experience. As the heading of this section suggests, there are the characteristics of "dependent" and "peripheral" which define their relationship of subordination to the western societies which colonized and subjugated them politically and economically. The discussion of the emergence of the nation-state in the Third World must take into consideration the colonial experience. The previous section of this chapter attempted to point out that capitalism as a form of society is distinctively western in character and the distinctiveness of the capitalist state is inextricably bound with the rise of capitalism. The rise of the modern nation-state in the Third World has been and continues to be influenced by the existence of forms of dependent capitalism which was first fostered by the colonial powers during the era of colonialism.
Again theorizing about the emergence of the nation-state in the Third World has been dominated by western experience and ideas (until they were later challenged by dependency and world system perspectives), with no consideration of the historical context of colonialism. Much of this type of theorizing is contained in what is known as the modernization school. The underlying assumption of these modernization theories was that the Third World countries will "progress" along the path mapped out and experienced by the western countries to material advancement and democracy. This was the discourse that legitimated and supported the new world order that was being put into place after the Second World War and the fall of the colonial empires. Moreover, in the functionalism of the 1960s the nation-state was presented as the switchboard for transmitting different social demands and there was an ethnocentric tendency to regard the western nation-state as the single evolutionary model of state-building. The modernization theorists led people to believe that the capitalist economic development that occurred in the west would also occur in the former colonies, and this would automatically create the modern capitalist nation-state modelled after the British type of parliamentary democracy or the presidential type of democracy of the United States.
But as Hamza Alavi attempts to show, the "western" and "third world colonial" experiences of the formation of the nation-state differed greatly. Discourse on the nature of the modern nation-state in the Third World must take into account the specific experiences of those societies within the context of their historical subordination economically and politically to western colonial powers. The state and society were controlled forcefully by a western imperialist power. And according to Alavi, the colonial state was "equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and with governmental mechanisms that enable[d] it, through routine operations to subordinate the native social classes."22

As has been pointed out earlier, it has been the dependency and world system approaches which have attempted to be contextually specific in their theories of the capitalist state and society in the Third World situation. Thus recent theorizing about the nation-state in the Third World has been greatly influenced by Marxian discourses of capitalist development in those societies. Two dependency theorists, Frank and Amin posit that

The state in the Third World economies is an essential instrument for the administration of the dependent role of these economies in the international division of labor and the capitalist world process of capital accumulation.23
The capitalist state in the Third World is closely connected to dependent capitalism which is largely determined by capitalism at the center. The dynamics of the capital accumulation process is viewed as the local expression of an autonomous process of accumulation in the center.

Wallerstein's world systems approach views capitalist development in the Third World as part of the emergence of a world-economy which he describes in terms of three parts: the center, the semi-periphery and the periphery. As a consequence of a lengthy history of extensive western exploitation and domination, the production processes in those societies have been transformed largely to serve the purposes of capital accumulation in the center, a process called "peripheralization." As long as states remain part of the capitalist world-economy, they continue to produce for this world market on the basis of the same principles as any other capitalist producer. Therefore, the explanation of the activities of nation-states must take into account the structural role each state occupies in the world-economy at any historical moment.

The historical-structural dependency approach of Cardoso and Faletto is more applicable here in that it takes into consideration particular historical conditions. According to Cardoso and Faletto, the emergence and expansion of capitalism in different countries at different
times resulted in different histories or consequences, which were due in part to how different sectors of the local classes and social groups reacted or responded to foreign intrusion and interventions. Cardoso and Faletto place the formation and expansion of the dependent nation-state in the context of continuous local class and other social struggles for its control. Thus, Cardoso and Faletto's historical-structure approach to the analysis of peripheral societies "emphasizes not just the structural conditioning of social life, but also the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggle," and there are different histories as a consequence of the different historical instances "at which sectors of local classes allied or clashed with foreign interests, organized different forms of state, sustained distinct ideologies, or tried to implement various policies or defined alternative strategies to cope with imperialist challenges."25

However, many of the characteristics of the capitalist state in the advanced western countries may also be manifest in the dependent state with the exception that the industrial base has not been developed and is, therefore, dependent on the economic conditions set by the world capitalist system. On the other hand, there is a variety of possible forms of the dependent state as the history of each country, its class structure and domination set
the context of the interaction between local and external forces such as those set by changes in either the world-economy or the international nation-state system. Cardoso and Faletto's work therefore provides the framework to move from the general to the particular.

The Dependent Fijian Nation-State

Introduction

The historical analysis of the emergence of the modern nation-state in Fiji and its concomitant incorporation into the capitalist world-economy is based on the written works of historians (mostly Europeans). However, an attempt is made to interpret the material critically and to problematize the versions of reality presented by these histories by using the genealogical method of inquiry to point to those versions that have been silenced.

The nation-state of Fiji consists of a group of about 320 islands situated in the mid-South Pacific between 15 degrees and 22 degrees south latitude and 177 degrees west and 175 degrees east longitude, a distance of 1,770 to 2,414 kilometers south of the Equator. Approximately 100 of the islands are permanently inhabited. The total land area is approximately 18,376 square kilometers with the largest island of Viti Levu making up 10,429 square kilometers, and the second largest island of Vanua Levu occupying an area of approximately 5,556 square kilometers of the remaining land area.
Pre-colonial Fiji

The first European to sight the Fiji Islands was the Dutch navigator, Abel Tasman, when he sailed through the north-east of the group in 1645. In 1774, Captain Cook sighted Vatoa, an island in the southern Lau group to the east. The main islands, however, were sighted in 1789 by William Bligh when he and his men were set adrift by the mutineers of the Bounty, sailed into the Fiji group from Tonga en route to Timor. But the impact of European contact began to be felt only from the early 1800s onwards when Europeans came in substantial numbers in search for sandalwood.

Western or European accounts of the island societies at the time of contact tend to look for the structure of those societies in terms of a western type of centralized polity in order to make sense of what they saw. Fiji, like New Zealand and Samoa, was a society where political centralization did not occur during the early contact with the west. On the other hand, it seems that Fijian society was to some extent hierarchically organized with a small chiefly elite attempting to extend political control over the bulk of the people and they were therefore engaged in intertribal warfare. But the situation was extremely fluid in the sense that membership of the various groups which were relatively politically autonomous was subject to change due to warfare and a switching of allegiance.
There were high-ranking chiefly families whose position was due to their claim to be descendants of the major founding fathers. However, high birth alone did not establish a claim to effective political leadership. The elders in the groups who decided on succession matters also took into account the candidate’s ability. Chiefs in Fiji had ritual authority which was expressed in “rigid formality” and elaborate ceremony “in the performance of kava or yagona ceremonies.”²⁷ It was through the chiefs’ exercise of this authority that they were able to exact tributes in the form of food and services from their subjects and exercise dominion over their activities. Fijian society then was a certain type of class-divided society in that the extraction of the surplus or tribute was backed by the chief’s potential or actual use of force over his people. Yet the legitimate basis for the chief’s authority over his people was that of a reciprocal relationship to take care of the welfare of the members of the group. Social life was based on the principle of reciprocity; when one gave away things there was the expectation of receiving something in return.²⁸

The main units of Fijian socio-political organization were patrilineal descent groups of which various segments were localized in villages. A descent group (whose name derives from and whose members trace descent from a common male) is called a yavusa (clan) which consists of several
matagali (subclans) each of which is made up of a number of i-tokatoka (extended families). In terms of territorial organization the basic unit is the village. However, members of the same yavusa may reside in different villages. Several villages formed a single territorial unit called the vanua. Therefore, members of the same yavusa may belong to different vanua but the ties between the members would be expressed in terms of kinship obligations.

The governing ideology of how political power was exercised was based on kinship. And in each group there was constituted an office of "chief."

The office confers upon the incumbent a definite right, subject to conditions, to make decisions on all matters affecting the group as a group.²⁹

Furthermore, in order to exercise authority effectively a chief must be able to satisfy requests from his people for material assistance. This is the way the chief gained prestige, superiority, loyalty, and continued support from his subjects.³⁰

Fijian society at the time of western contact at round about the beginning of the nineteenth century (1800s) was politically organized into seven vanua: Lakeba in Lau; Cakaudrove, Macuata, and Bua in Vanua Levu; Bau, Rewa and Verata in south-east Viti Levu. The high chiefs of these vanua were eager to create larger territorial units of
control called *matanitu* in order to gain greater political supremacy.

There was a large number of small settlements or village communities which seldom exceeded 2,000 people. These communities were basically self-sufficient and contact with outsiders was minimal. However, there are accounts that some bartering took place between coastal and inland communities. Persons within these communities had definite roles to play within the indigenous social, political and economic systems. There were the chiefs or "turaga," who were assisted by the "sauturaga." There were people who had the role of "matanivanua," whose main duty was to conduct the customary ceremonies on behalf of the chief and community. Construction work such as the building of large sea-going canoes, housebuilding, the making of wooden utensils, war clubs and spears, was done by skilled craftsmen called "mataisau." Although Fijians did not engage in deep-sea fishing, they obtained many kinds of seafood among the coral reefs for consumption by the community.

Sustained European contact which began with the sandalwood trade from 1804 to 1810 and the bêche-de-mer trade from the 1820s to the 1850s had enduring socio-economic and political consequences because these trades involved Fijian labor. Thus, Fijians came to be engaged in exchange relations through the medium of merchant
capital. The transactions between the European traders and Fijian chiefs were often conducted under force and fraud which resulted in violent conflict and loss of life on both sides.\textsuperscript{31} Politically those Fijian chiefs who were able to take advantage of superior European fire power (muskets) and other western technology (iron tools) in local political processes gained greater influence over other vanua. By the 1850s, the high chief of the vanua of Bau, called Cakobau, seemed to be in a position of political supremacy over most of the group. With the consent of his European allies, Cakobau proclaimed himself the \textit{Tui Viti} or King of Fiji. However, he was never formally installed by Fijian ceremonies because such a concept was a western rather than an indigenous development. Moreover, Cakobau did not effectively exercise political control over other parts of Fiji and "he was not even nominally recognized beyond the area in which he was strong enough to compel obedience."\textsuperscript{32} In addition, Tongan influence in eastern Fiji was well established and threatened Cakobau's claim to supremacy. However, the outcome of the rivalry between Cakobau and the Tongan chief, Ma'afu, was to be affected by the presence of a growing number of European settlers and the actions of their metropolitan governments.\textsuperscript{33}

By the 1850s western influence in Fiji seemed well established with the presence of European beachcombers,
traders, settlers and missionaries. In the 1860s greater numbers of European settlers arrived and set up plantations, involving Fiji and the Fijians more directly with European economic expansion and politics. These European settlers demanded land and labor for their plantations. This brought them into conflict with the Fijians who resisted their demands. Before the introduction of the Indian indentured system, labor on the plantations was mainly secured by recruiting other Pacific Islanders. For the first ten years, cotton was a profitable crop for European enterprise. But by the 1870s sugar replaced cotton as the main crop. Capitalist development under the control of European settlers mainly from Britain began in the production of cotton, copra, maize and sugar, and in the extraction of resources such as gold mining.

Several attempts were made by prominent European settlers with the collaboration of the Fijian chiefs, mainly Cakobau and Ma'afu, to form governments in order to provide the conditions and needs of capitalist production such as the securing of land titles and a regular and reliable labor supply under a system of law and order. Although some attempts at forming governments lasted longer than others, these were attempts by a European minority to exert control over Fijians who refused to submit without resistance. The European settlers numbered about 1 to every 200 Fijians. Further, these
attempts at government did not have adequate finance, and an adequate police force and army. None of these attempts to set up government extended their control over the entire group of islands.

But European settlement and its accompanying capitalist economic development took its toll on the indigenous Fijians, who in thirteen years experienced a decline of 30,000 in their membership from approximately 200,000 in 1860 to 170,000 in 1873 as a consequence of the introduction of new diseases and the violence involved in the Europeans' forceful acquisition of their land and labor. 37

As the attempts at forming governments failed to provide the conditions for capitalist development and exploitation of Fiji's resources, the British settlers began to look to their mother country, Britain, to take control of the situation in Fiji. Cakobau, who claimed to be the paramount chief of Fiji, had made several offers to cede Fiji to Britain. Cakobau was held responsible for paying a large American debt incurred by his purchase of an American ship and claims by Americans living in Fiji for compensation for property looted or burned by Fijians. Moreover, Cakobau was anxious about the growing power of the Tongan chief, Ma'afu, in eastern Fiji. Cakobau laid down two conditions in his offers of the cession of Fiji to Britain. They included that he should be allowed to
retain his position of "Tui Viti," or King of Fiji, and that Britain should pay the American debt. Britain's concern with the uncontrolled colonization of Fiji by its nationals eventually led it to formalize the situation by accepting the Fijian chiefs' unconditional offer of cession of Fiji to Britain. 38

British Colonialism and "Indirect Rule"

British annexation of Fiji on October 10, 1874, involved a measure of financial responsibility. Thus, rather than a decision for economic reasons, it was mainly one for political control over the uncontrolled colonization of Fiji and other parts of the South Pacific by British nationals. However, it seemed that enough was at stake for the British government's decision to annex Fiji, as suggested by the Colonial Secretary for the Colonies who told the House of Lords in July 1874 that England had a mission to colonize and "protect" this part of the world as it was a place where there were "English settlers in such numbers, English capital [was] so largely embarked, and English interests [were] so much involved in the peace of the Islands." 39

However, it was the protection ideology that came to dominate the discourse on the relationship between the colonial master and the colonized Fijian subjects. The protection ideology was appropriated by the high chiefs
who ceded Fiji to Britain to encode a recognition by the colonial power of the paramountcy of Fijian interests. It is a stance which continues to privilege their position by providing the political basis for their dominance in Fiji's national political processes to date. However, the protection ideology has served to legitimize and neutralize the processes whereby the colonial power was able to subjugate, control and administer the life of both the European settlers and indigenous Fijians and simultaneously prevent any discourse of resistance against the power asymmetries involved in the relations between colonizer and colonized. Moreover, the protection myth of "preserving the Fijian way of life" hid the great deal of cultural colonialism where anything that British colonial officers found "unpalatable," such as sleeping arrangements in Fijian houses, was regulated. A Fijian house usually accommodated a large extended family (and still does). The colonial officials made great efforts to regulate that there should be a house for each married couple. Foucault's insights on government discussed in Chapter I are used to analyze how the Fijian subject and social processes were objectivized and reified in order to render various aspects of that society visible and understandable, thus making it possible to administer the Fijians effectively and efficiently through the technique of "indirect rule."
The perception of the great extent of lawlessness and disorder that has been documented as characterizing the situation in Fiji before Cession led the Secretary of State for the Colonies to advocate "a Crown Colony of a rather severe type" as the suitable form of government for Fiji. The state bureaucracy that was set up was a two-pronged strategy in the sense that there were to be national state institutions (such as the offices of Colonial Secretary, Receiver-General's Office, the Departments of Audit, Survey, Post, Lands, Immigration, Medical Services, Judicial Services, Police and Gaols) and a separate "native administration" for governing indigenous Fijians. The British Government appointed the Governor to the colony who, in turn, made all appointments within the colony and made the laws of the country and saw that they were carried out.

Order and discipline were imposed by the first resident Governor of Fiji, Sir Arthur Gordon (1875-1880), on the relations between Europeans and Fijians. The first instance of resistance to colonial rule came from Fijians living in the interior of Viti Levu (known as the mountain tribes or "kai colo"). The colonial state took this opportunity to use physical force to silence resistance and exert its control and authority. With the support of Fijian chiefs from other parts of Fiji and with reinforcements sent from India to boost both the police
and the armed forces, the colonial state's monopoly of the use of forces was established and the "rebellion" was suppressed with its leaders executed. 43

The Native Affairs Ordinance of 1876 formally established a native system of administration for the Fijians. The whole country was divided into twelve provinces, each of which was put in the charge of a provincial chief called "Roko." The provinces were further subdivided into districts ("tikina") where district chiefs called "Buli" were put in charge. At the village level (the smallest unit) a village chief was in charge and known as the "Turaga-ni-koro." All the chiefs were appointed to their positions by the Governor, and, therefore, they had to swear allegiance to him and were responsible for their actions to the Governor, and no longer to their people. As Legge points out:

However much Gordon might seek to emphasize the character of his native chiefs and councils as the traditional authorities of native society rather than as officials of a newly established Government, they held their positions in the last analysis at the pleasure of the Government. 44

Chiefs had to be "acceptable" to the Governor to be appointed to their positions for the "efficient execution" of government of the Fijians. 45 Thus the Governor assumed the right to discipline, punish and dismiss them. In addition, each level of the Fijian administrative system was placed under the general supervision of a British
official. In this way a hierarchical or pyramidal chain of authority was created.

On the part of the chiefs, concern was expressed over the erosion of their authority over their people as they no longer had any resort to the use of force to command obedience. Therefore, there was the need for the Governor and the colonial state to confer "real" authority on the chiefs so that they could still command respect and obedience from their people even though they may be seen as agents of colonialism. In allowing for the "native" character of existing authorities to be "preserved" as a link in the chain of authority of the colonial government, one of the most oppressive features of the "native" aspects of chiefly office--the obligation of the chief's subjects to render the chief personal service or "lala" in Fijian--was retained.46

The use of the term "indirect rule" or "native administration" gives the impression of government of a subject people through their own authorities. On the other hand, one may look at how the use of "indirect rule" as a technique for exercising power was practiced by the colonial state by analyzing the way a whole discourse about the Fijian subject and Fijian society came to be produced whereby the colonial officers presented themselves as knowing more about the Fijians than the Fijians who were under their control.47
The discourse was generated within western social science, specifically, the emergent discipline of anthropology. The discourse was based on the unilinear evolutionary theories of the development of societies. It was declared that Fijian society and culture was at the stage of development of society which manifested "the first elements of society emerging from barbarism." At the time of European contact, Fijian society was imagined to fit what was called the 'Middle Period of Barbarism,' a stage of development of society when lands were still owned by communal units and were inalienable. Thus, western social science via the discipline of anthropology declared that Fijian society was not feudal but "primitive."

The task set was to write about "traditional primitive" Fijian society imagined in its "purest" form. This provided the basis for that society to be governed by a series of rigidly observed laws which it was the duty of white colonial officers to become familiar with in order to increase their understanding of and authority over the Fijians under their control. It was imperative to "preserve ancient Fijian traditions" against the destructive impact of the west. Any change must be sought with great caution, and must be planned on the basis of careful study of the institutions concerned. Such a discourse
depoliticized the Fijian colonial experience and supported the operation of power and authority of the colonial state.

An institution called the Native Regulation Board was set up with the expressed aim of codifying Fijian custom. In effect, it was a mechanism for regulating every aspect of the life of the Fijian population. As Peter France points out, there were "few matters contained in these regulations which pertain to Fijian custom. They deal with the councils, the courts, marriage and divorce, planting of gardens and the prevention of fire, theft, adultery, evil speaking, and the registration of births and deaths."52

The life of the Fijian population became strictly regulated and controlled with their movements to and from villages restricted not because it was claimed Fijian society could only be "civilized" through the village community system but rather it was an effective means of exercising power over the colonized. In this way, the Fijians may be inserted into the productive apparatus of the state as docile members of the newly created nation-state of Fiji.

The power of the state was extended to cover all aspects of life in the village through the processes of the formation of laws and law enforcement by the police and courts to punish resistance or deviation from the norm set by the colonial power.53 The "rokos" and the "bulis"
or government-sponsored chiefs were instructed to record and report on all matters on a monthly basis to their supervisors. Government attention focused specifically on those villages that were involved in the early resistance movement against the colonial government. Furthermore, the practice of the Fijian institution of "solevu" or ceremonial exchanges and presentations of gifts between villagers was disallowed as such gatherings of people were considered dangerous to law and order. Fijian society was thus reconstituted by the colonial state as chiefly rule and communal labor. The individualization and totalization processes of nation-state formation were put in place under "Vakapiritania" or Pax Britannica where the reciprocal relationship between chief and people was gradually undermined.

However, a more disastrous effect of early colonial rule on Fijian society was the rapid decrease of the population to 114,748 in 1881, almost half of the population estimated at early contact. The decline in population continued until 1921 to 84,475. But this "decrease in the native population" provided a basis for the generation of further colonial discourse and the production of knowledge about Fijian society in the collection of statistics on births, deaths, and marriages by the "rokos" and "bulis." The cause of the decline of the Fijian population was viewed not to be the result of
the introduction of new diseases, but in the Fijian's behavior and customs. Thus the discourse speculated that there was a connection between Fijian temperament and mortality:

Mental Apathy, Laziness and Improvidence of the people arise from their climate, their diet, and their communal institutions.\textsuperscript{56}

Such a discourse provided the basis for the institution of a program of sanitation of the village to allow for further administrative intervention in order to control and "manage" the life of the Fijians.\textsuperscript{57} But these state interventions to subordinate Fijians to state control and authority did not totally contain the potential for indigenous disorder and resistance, a more detailed analysis of which is the subject matter of Chapter IV.

On the other hand, this course of action concerning the neotraditional Fijian way which restricted European employment of Fijian labor and prevented the alienation of Fijian-owned land was repeatedly challenged by both the European settlers and colonial service officers including several governors. During the administration of Governor Everard Im Thurn (1904-1910), land sales were permitted. But this change was short-lived as Gordon, who still had a great deal of power in the colonial office, saw to it that his policy was upheld. Furthermore, there was no great demand for Fijian labor as long as there was a reliable supply of Indian labor. Moreover, the planters
and sugar companies had access to enough land to meet the demands of the low level of development due to capital shortage and transport difficulties arising from Fiji's isolation from large markets.

Capitalist Development and the Emergence of a Plural Society

The colonial administration had within the first few years firmly imposed political control over the colony, creating the stability needed to attract overseas investment. Although Britain had been willing to finance the first years of the colonial administration in Fiji, it was a requirement that the colony be self-funding as soon as possible. Stringent measures were put into effect by the British Treasury which stipulated that the Fijian colony was only entitled to those services which it could pay for.58

Therefore, the colonial administration was under pressure to seek rapid economic development of the country. Between 1875 and 1880 there had been only limited economic development of Fiji's resources through European enterprise. The colonial government, therefore, set out to establish further conditions to encourage private enterprise to raise revenue to pay its expenses. The government set up a Lands Commission to examine all land claims made by the settlers and issued certificates of title to those
whose claims were granted. Approximately about a half of all the land claims made were granted as the inalienability of Fijian land did not apply to those alienated before Cession. The land that was alienated comprised most of the best land in the country.\textsuperscript{59}

However, to develop Fiji's economy in a way so as to raise sufficient revenue for the colonial state required the attraction of large-scale overseas investment. The cotton boom of the 1860s was short-lived as it ended in 1870. Sugar became one of the new crops that was seen to be commercially feasible to grow for export. But there was the need to attract large capital to provide the mills, plantation equipment, roads and power supplies. The government was only able to attract large-scale overseas investment by its willingness to give concessions as Fiji was relatively unknown to British overseas investors, and it was isolated in distance from the major commodity markets.\textsuperscript{60} In order to induce large-scale new capital to Fiji the government was willing not to follow strictly the land policy of inalienability of Fijian lands.\textsuperscript{61} In 1880, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Australia (CSR) decided to invest in Fiji, encouraged by government's inducements to do so.\textsuperscript{62} As it turned out, government assistance to CSR was forthcoming by ensuring that its investments in Fiji would be profitable.\textsuperscript{63} It was through
the full scale development of the sugar industry that Fiji's link to the world-economy became firmly forged.

Gordon solved the requirement of a regular, dependable and inexpensive labor force for the sugar plantations by drawing upon his previous experience with the importation of Indian indentured laborers in his governorships of Mauritius and Trinidad. A similar proposal to the Colonial Office for the development of plantation agriculture in Fiji was accepted, and by 1879 the first Indian indentured laborers arrived in Fiji. When the system ended in 1916, there were 60,553 immigrants who chose to settle in Fiji.64

Fijian participation in capitalist development was controlled and limited by the colonial government. The colonial government set up a system of native tax payments in kind, which required Fijians to contribute to the financial resources of the colonial state by producing cash crops communally in their villages for their tax payments. Each province was assessed an amount of tax to be paid in kind. "Each province was then required to produce quantities of these commodities sufficient, when sold at the price which had been fixed by public tender, to realize the sum at which the province had been assessed."65 Any crops that were produced in excess of the assessed tax for that year could then be sold in the general market and the proceeds were kept by the province. Such a system provided the material basis for the effective
exercise of the chiefs' authority over their people. Since
the chiefs needed their people, especially able-bodied
men to work the gardens in the villages to produce the
cash crops for the government, they exerted strict control
over their people's movements.

The discourse which this system of taxation gave rise
to in order to legitimize and gain the Fijians' support
for it was problematic. First, the colonial government
pointed out that not only Europeans but the Fijians them-
selves must also contribute to the expenses of the colonial
state. However, the way the Fijians could participate
in limited capitalist enterprise must be within the
protection theme as is illustrated by these statements:

The problem was to make the native the
cultivar of his own soil, but on a more
extensive basis than had been the case
formerly. Such a goal required compulsion,
since the existing pattern of life did not
include production for export. Taxation in
kind was intended to provide that element of
compulsion. 66

The colonial discourse presented the argument that Fijian
society should not be exposed to the sudden disruptions
of capitalism and that change should be planned and
cautiously sought. Therefore, it was necessary to preserve
as far as possible the essential characteristics of Fijian
society, although one may argue that the changes wrought
by western contact and colonialism were already wide-
ranging, and as if change in another society could be
"managed" by another more powerful and "benevolent" state. On the other hand, the native taxation system had the effect of stemming the availability of native labor for the planters. The European settlers, therefore, attacked the system as forced labor on government gardens or plantations.

Thus in the formation of the Fijian nation-state under British colonialism, an ethnic division of labor was imposed and enforced. Using the "divide-and-rule" technique of controlling the Fijians and the Indians, the colonial administration fostered the emergence of a plural society. 67 European capital remained relatively unchallenged for at least the first three decades of colonial administration and until later by Indian capital. 68 The Fijians continued to be involved in the economy mainly as subsistence farmers, in addition to producing cash crops for the government tax.

When the Indian indentured system of labor ended in 1916, the CSR company which had gained dominance in the sugar industry was faced with rising wage rates as a result of a shortage of labor. Resistance from Indian laborers and cane-growers against the company's attempts to keep wages low led the company to decide to divide its plantations into ten acre farms and lease them to Indian tenant farmers who then produced cane for the company.
By 1939, nearly all the cane produced for the mills was by small Indian tenant farmers. According to Michael Moynagh, when the colonial administration decided that sugar should be grown as the single export crop, it expected the Fijians to take up cane cultivation as a popular tax crop grown under government supervision. However, by 1914, Fijian contribution to cane production was negligible. Some reasons for this response may include the compulsory nature of the involvement required, and large areas of the best land in Fiji were already occupied by European settlers and farmed as plantations. Thirdly, most Fijians still enjoyed to a great degree the relative "subsistence affluence" of village life.

Political Independence, the Postcolonial State and Development

At the time of Fiji's political independence in 1970, the British left a relatively well-established civilian and military bureaucracy, an economy which was dependent on one major export commodity, sugar, and a complex political and socio-economic situation. Unlike other Third World countries where political independence followed the demands of nationalist movements, Fiji was more or less given independence by the British government. However, this does not imply that there was no resistance to colonial rule on the part of the colonized Fijians and
Indians during the ninety-six years of British colonialism. But as already indicated, these struggles will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The creation of the nation-state and its relationship to capitalist development in Fiji is closely linked to how power and authority were exercised by the colonial state on the colonized. Whereas in the western capitalist states, the indigenous bourgeoisie played central roles in the creation of the nation-state and capitalist society, the situation in colonial Fiji, for instance, was quite different. The modern nation-state of Fiji was established by the colonial power in conjunction with the collaboration of Fijian chiefs and foreign, western capital. At the time of political independence, therefore, a three-tier society was created whereby the Europeans and Chinese managed the large foreign-owned corporations and banks in Fiji, the Indians owned and operated most of the medium-to small-scale enterprises which included most of the commercial farming, while the Fijians owned most of the land (about 83 percent but the islands are mountainous), and were still very much involved in the non-monetary though relatively affluent subsistence sector. This situation has not changed much two decades later.

The British also left Fiji with a "constitutive system," that is, an electoral system, an elected assembly, and a party system, based on a modified form
of British parliamentary democracy. The communal franchise, a British legacy introduced first to allow European settlers to be represented in the colonial government in 1904 was extended for the Indians in 1929 and the Fijians in 1963. This system of representation and voting which institutionalized the ethnic divisions politically within the electoral system was adopted for independent Fiji. For seventeen years after political independence (1970-1987), before the military coup of May 14, 1987, the communal distribution of political representation ensured that a governing majority could not result from the representatives of one major ethnic group operating solely on a communal basis. Thus the political influence of the General Electors (Europeans, Part-Europeans, Chinese) was raised far above their numerical significance (a legacy of the Europeans' dominance during the colonial era) corresponding more to their economic position in the country.

A Fijian-dominated political party, led mainly by chiefs, governed Fiji from 1970 to 1987. This political situation, which allowed the ethnic group that constituted fewer than half the population to dominate the ruling party, was made possible by the support that the General Electors usually gave to the chiefs. In this way, the dynamics of ethnicity became intricately interwoven into the formation of the nation-state in Fiji. It allowed
for some semblance of political stability for seventeen years.

Fiji's position in the international division of labor of the world-economy is based on a center-periphery pattern. This has basically involved the production of the principal agricultural commodity, sugar, for export initially to Australia but today is mostly sold under special arrangements to Britain, Canada, the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand and China, with the remainder sold in the world market. Tourism, copra and gold-mining have also been important foreign exchange earners. On the other hand, in order to maintain what is called the modern sector of Fiji's economy, Fiji has had to import all its manufactured goods and other products of heavy industry from the advanced capitalist states, including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and the United States; products whose prices follow a pattern of steady increases. This situation has been described by dependency theory as that of unequal exchange, where Fiji, a member of the periphery of the world-economy, has become heavily dependent on and dominated by foreign capital so as to be able to generate economic growth.

The Fijian state has, therefore, actively encouraged national production for export in order to create foreign exchange for the purchase of manufactured products and other services needed for the modern economy. Not unlike
other capitalist states in the twentieth century, the Fijian state is directly involved in the processes of generating economic growth through creating and maintaining industrial sectors, promoting agricultural export commodity production, and even actively engaging in the financing and ownership of the means of production.  

The elite who received political power from the British government not only accepted the political arrangements put in place by the colonial administration, it also unequivocally accepted the modernization paradigm of capitalist development initiated by the colonial administration's discourse and policies on development. After all, it may be argued, the modernization paradigm does provide a convenient "raison d'etat" especially for an ethnically divided plural polity such as Fiji. It provided a means to give legitimacy to the state's assumed role in mobilizing the whole population to increase national production in order to become "developed."

Leaving aside the external dynamics of the world-economy, internally, such a task of "development" for the Fijian state has been far from unproblematic. For the Fijian political elite, who wish to retain control of the Fijian state, the internal ethnic division of labor presents a serious limitation in terms of their continued commitment to capitalist development and simultaneous maintenance of their dominant position within the
nation-state. For this means the maintenance and reproduction of a separate Fijian identity and the creation of a situation which also denies the economically powerful ethnic Indian population an opportunity to challenge Fijian political dominance.

Moreover, the economically weak position of the Fijians was recognized by the colonial administration, specifically towards the end of the 1950s when Britain began to prepare the country for political independence. Various schemes were initiated by the colonial government's Land Development Authority to resettle individual Fijians as commercial farmers.

The discourse generated in order to constitute the indigenous Fijian as the object and subject of state and capitalist policies of development within the bureaucratic construction and regulation of Fijian life in Fiji is the subject matter of the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter II


2 Ibid., p. 112.


5 Ibid., p. 112.

6 Ibid., p. 190.


8 Ibid., p. 2.

9 Ibid., p. 178.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 154.

13 Ibid., pp. 155-156.

14 Ibid., pp. 159-160.

15 Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, p. 190.
16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., pp. 190-191.


22 Ibid., p. 147.


24 Ibid., pp. 192-198. Carnoy's treatment of Cardoso and Faletto's work is extensive and covers a whole range of issues related to the formation and role of the dependent peripheral state.


26 Asesela Ravuvu, *The Facade of Democracy: Fijian Struggles for Political Control 1830-1987* (Suva, Fiji: Reader Publishing House, 1991), "Preface." Ravuvu points out that Fijian culture is basically oral in that indigenous Fijians seldom engage in writing or recording their experiences. Rather, their feelings and experiences are usually discussed orally in face-to-face situations with other members of the community. Thus, most written records of the colonial experience are those by Europeans in their numerous roles as colonial administrators, missionaries, novelists or social scientists.

28. Laura Thompson, "The Relations of Men, Animals, and Plants in an Island Community (Fiji)," in *Polynesia*, ed. Alan Howard (Scranton and London: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 13-26. Thompson discusses the institution of "solevu," an inter-village ceremonial exchange of gifts between two participating villages. According to Thompson, the institution of "solevu" was "an efficient and self-regulatory 'mechanism' to stimulate production of food and craft articles and to expand the system of distribution of each island to include a group of both limestone and volcanic islands whose complementary resources form a natural trade area." See pp. 20-21.


32. Ibid., p. 12.

33. American, British and French warships administered "naval justice" on behalf of their aggrieved nationals. There were already "official" representatives stationed in Fiji such as the United States commercial agent (1846) and a British consul (1858). See Kerry Howe, *Where the Waves Fall*, p. 273.

34. The Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society extended its operations to Fiji by way of Tonga in 1835, and because of an agreement given by Cakobau to Ma'afu for assistance in the Battle of Kaba that all Fijians would be converted, after the victory of Kaba, thousands of Fijians were required to convert to Methodism following their chief, Cakobau. See J. D. Legge, p. 10 and Kerry Howe, pp. 226-273.
This situation arose from a shortage of cotton on the world market due to the American Civil War. But by 1870, the market for Island cotton had contracted.

Asesela Ravuvu, pp. 3-11. Also Ahmed Ali, Fiji: From Colony to Independence 1874-1970 (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1977, pp. 2-5. And A. C. Reid, "The Chiefdom of Lau," The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. XVII, No. 3, July to No. 4 October, 1983, pp. 183-197. The Tongan Chief, Ma'afu, was quite skillful and successful in setting up a constitutional form of government with an efficient bureaucracy and an assembly of Lauan chiefs with himself as President in the area he controlled by engaging European advice and assistance when he needed them.

J. D. Legge, pp. 2-3.

Ibid., "Part One: Britain and Fiji 1858-1874."
See Asesela Ravuvu, pp. 15-16. According to Ravuvu, the chiefs accepted the advice of their European (British) advisers to cede Fiji to Britain unconditionally as they were promised that their land and their people would be "protected." See also William David McIntyre, "The Annexation of Fiji, 1874," in The Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, for details on why Britain accepted the offer of Cession in 1874.


This will become apparent in the later chapters of this dissertation.


J. D. Legge, pp. 214-217.

Ibid., pp. 214-216.

Ibid., p. 217. Also Asesela Ravuvu, p. 19.
Laura Thompson. Not all Fijian chiefs were favored by the colonial administration if they did not toe the line. Thus, the local village chief who held an office in the Fijian Administration may not also be the villager island chief but an appointed officer of the new government system.

J. D. Legge, pp. 220-222. "Lala" comprised the performance by a chief's people of services such as contributions in kind like food, and labor for public occasions such as the "solevu" when Fijians from two villages exchange goods, or labor required for building a canoe for the chief; all of which served to enhance the dignity and respect of their chief.


Ibid., pp. 117-118. In 1869, a Lewis Morgan conducted a study on the kinship system in Fiji, and Lorimer Fison, an anthropologist from the University of Melbourne, Australia, began to correspond with Morgan. Fison thus became convinced of "the total inerrancy of unilinear evolutionary theories." Fison's assessment of the situation in Fiji with regard to the communal ownership and inalienability of land in Fiji as an immemorial custom was a decisive influence on the Colonial Administration's policy, specifically, Gordon, the first resident Governor of Fiji. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.

Ibid., p. 124.

Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid., p. 126.

Ibid., p. 109.

For an excellent analysis of the exercise of state power in early Fiji see Nicholas Thomas, "Sanitation and
Ma'afu, the Tongan chief, spoke about how evil in the previous age had its origins in the chiefs and the chiefs were able to deal with these evils as the people feared and obeyed their chiefs. In short, Ma'afu was lamenting the chiefs' loss of control over their people. The old society had been fundamentally changed by British colonialism. People were "free" to follow their own wishes. See J. D. Legge, p. 224.

55 Ibid., p. 3. In 1875, a measles epidemic killed about one quarter of the Fijian people.

56 Nicholas Thomas, p. 156.

57 Ibid.

58 J. D. Legge, pp. 270-278.

59 Ibid., p. 1970 and p. 194. The claims put forward for ownership amounted to approximately 854,000 acres of the top quality land in the country. A total of 414,615 acres were granted to the settlers.

60 Michael Moynagh, Brown or White? A History of the Fiji Sugar Industry 1873-1973 (Canberra, Australia: The Australian National University, 1981), p. 25. According to Moynagh, there were better investment opportunities in the nearby Australian colonies where land was more readily available.

61 J. D. Legge, p. 194. Ordinance XXI of 1880 enforced the law of inalienability of Fijian lands.

62 Moynagh, pp. 24-25. The government promised to sell CSR 1,000 acres of land at £2 per acre as well as not to levy export duties on sugar, and that sugar would be the sole successful plantation crop for the colony.

63 Ibid., p. 21.

64 Ibid. The Indian indentured labor system was subject to abuse and has been described as "a new system of slavery."
A plural society is defined as two or more distinct social orders living side by side within the boundaries of a nation-state without any or little co-mingling socially or culturally.

Many of the Indian indentured laborers chose to remain in Fiji. They took up planting sugar cane for the CSR or engaged in small businesses or trades or became professionals such as doctors, lawyers and teachers, or joined the public service bureaucracy. In addition, their numbers were augmented by a steady number of free settlers from India.

E. K. Fisk, The Political Economy of Independent Fiji (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1970), pp. 33-48. The Fijians and Indians are the two major ethnic groups. In 1946, the Indians outnumbered the Fijians by 46 percent to 45 percent, respectively, while the rest of the population consisted of Europeans, Chinese, and other Pacific Islanders. By 1976, the Indians comprised 50 percent of the total population of Fiji while the Fijians dropped behind to 44 percent. See R. S. Milne, Politics in Ethnically Bipolar States (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), p. 61.


Fiji had a bicameral parliamentary system of government before the May 14, 1987, military coup. There was a nominated Senate and an elected House of Representatives. Members of the Executive or government were also members of the House of Representatives. The Governor-General (who represented the Queen of England as Head of State of Fiji) appointed the Prime Minister or Head of Government. The Prime Minister then chose his Ministers.
of the Cabinet who were appointed to their offices by the Governor-General. The Ministers of the Cabinet were directly responsible to Parliament. Elections to the House of Representatives were held every five years.

The House of Representatives consisted of 52 elected members allocated on an ethnic basis: 22 Indian members, 22 Fijian members and 8 General Elector members (Europeans, Chinese and Part-Europeans). Voting was carried out according to two methods. The first was basically ethnic groups voting communally with 12 Indian members elected by Indians only, 12 Fijian members by Fijian voters only and 3 General members by General Electors (Europeans, Chinese and Part-Europeans) only. The second method was called cross-voting where all ethnic groups voted for 10 Indian members, 10 Fijian members and 5 General members. Such an electoral system encouraged politicians to appeal to their voters in terms of ethnic issues.

74 The bulk of Fiji's sugar is now sold to Britain under an agreement with the European Economic Community as part of the arrangements included in the Lomé Convention. The Lomé Convention was set up in 1975 to continue the special trade and aid relationships between the former European colonies and the former colonial powers.

75 The government of Fiji acquired ownership of the sugar mills from CSR in 1973.
CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF "THE FIJIAN PROBLEM"
IN FIJI'S DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Introduction

This chapter begins to examine the questions of human agency and subjectivity in the modern Fijian state's development process or the promotion of capitalist economic growth. The main assumption is that human actors in the development process are conscious players who have some control over what is happening in their lives. Hence, how the indigenous Fijians who are taking part in the Seagaqa Sugar Cane Development Project think of themselves in terms of subjectivity and agency will affect their definition of what participation in this development project means. On the other hand, the forces of modernity, capitalism and the emergence of the nation-state, have affected the ways people think of themselves in terms of identity and subjectivity. Both capitalism and the nation-state have contributed to the processes of transformation and re-organization of human life around the concept of people as bounded individuals. In many Third World nation-states those processes were effected by the experience of colonialism. The European colonizers assumed the
prerogative of defining, characterizing and categorizing the people they colonized.

This chapter, therefore, looks at how the category of people called "indigenous Fijians" came to be constituted first by the colonial state and later the post-colonial state as modern individuals. The constitution of the modern individual within capitalist society and the modern nation-state has been dominated by western male notions of subjectivity. It is a constitution of the self as "contained within one's skin," or "the individual self," who as knower, agent and subject stands over and against an "objective" world.

This separately and singularly defined unity of the modern person coincides with capitalist society's institutional and structural separation of the economic and political. This separation is intimately connected with the capitalist state's legal function. The capitalist state facilitates capitalist activity by providing a uniform set of standards or a rationalized code of civil law which defines and regulates the exercise of private property rights. The state's legal function involves both "the definition of rights over subjects," and "the constitution of individuals as bearers of private rights capable of engaging in market transactions." Thus precapitalist norms of reciprocity based on noncapitalist social relations and activities are supposed to be
superseded by the naturalization of "the rights" and the law. Furthermore, the capitalist state's monopoly of the institutionalized means of violence secures the exercise of private property rights.

When the capitalist state assumes a democratic form (as a result of people's struggles) some form of constitution is put in place to regulate the state's exercise of coercive power. In addition, the constitution provides individual subjects with legal guarantees of recourse to the courts in the event of the state's excessive use of coercive power. But just as in private law, individuals are disposed as equal bearers of private rights, public law classifies individuals as equal and free subjects or citizens of the state. In other words, the capitalist state's ideological role is to represent the political sphere as a realm of human equality, or the common good or the national community. Liberal political theory has emphasized this relationship between the state and the individual in concepts such as liberty, equality, fraternity and the idea of one man one vote.\(^4\)

Poulantzas's concept of the "isolation effect" is relevant in this discussion. As Poulantzas points out, people's identities in capitalist society are constituted by private and public law solely as individuals, never as members of particular social groups based on class, ethnicity, gender and religion, for example. Thus people
are represented as individuals shorn of their social associations and attributes.

According to Jeffrey Isaac:

The isolation effect, as Poulantzas discusses it, involves three specific processes: (1) the isolation of individuals through private law, as bearers of legal rights; (2) the isolation of individuals through public law, as formally equal subjects/citizens; and (3) the "reconstitution" or "representation" of the unity of individuals so isolated.5

This is a specifically western male-dominated articulation of the modern individual or subject. Kathy Ferguson, in her work, traces an exemplary male articulation of a modern western subjectivity and identity which is unified, whole, independent, autonomous, and self-sufficient, to Hegel's exposition of the relation of lord and bondsman or master and slave in The Phenomenology of the Mind.6 Hegel's discussion of the relation of lord and bondsman constitutes the modern western male subject as "an isolated individual locked into a variety of combative stances, seeking dominance in relationships, mastery over nature, and absorption of difference."7 This hegemonic western male subject has been challenged by contemporary feminism's thematizations of other possibilities of subjectivity and identity.

Ferguson discusses three thematizations of subjectivity in feminist theory--praxis feminism, cosmic feminism, and linguistic feminism. These thematizations are important
here in that they open up spaces to allow other kinds of subjectivity and possibilities of being to be included and articulated.

Praxis feminism problematizes the Hegelian representation of the subject as a separate autonomous individual whose relations with other people are characteristically ones of domination and conflict. Instead, praxis feminism draws on women's experiences in what they do in their daily activities as daughters, workers, and mothers in the processes of production and reproduction of society, to articulate an alternative type of subjectivity. Women in the performance of their roles as caregivers are engaged in responding to the concrete needs of others such as men and children. In privileging the female as speaking subject, praxis feminism's thematization of subjectivity and identity emphasizes intersubjective connections between persons. In place of separation and conflict in one's self-other relations, there is affirmation of interconnectedness with other people as constitutive of their subjectivities and identities.

However, in articulating such an alternative model of subjectivity, praxis feminists have tended to universalize and absorb difference in their theorizing. This is because "praxis feminism strives to articulate a coherent women's experience that can pose as an alternative to existing coherences." Praxis feminism represents men
and women as separate and coherent groups differentiated by stable boundaries. In doing this, praxis feminists omit other social divisions such as class, ethnicity or race, and religion. Such divisions are also constitutive of modern subjectivities and identities. Finally, "an exclusive focus on the intersubjective, on the ways that women and men experience their relations to others and the world, can be a way of sidestepping a coming to terms with the prediscursive, or nondiscursive, . . ."  

Cosmic feminism, on the other hand, focuses on the prediscursive or nondiscursive aspects of being, emphasizing the spiritual or natural dimension of women's subjectivity in order to subvert the Hegelian subject's imperative urge to dominate and exploit nature. Rather than locating the modern subject as outside and on top of nature, cosmic feminism draws on women's activities and consciousness to blur the boundaries between the human and nature, the human and supernatural. "Cosmic feminism offers an alternative vision of subjectivity stressing the self-in-place with relation to a larger natural or spiritual order of things."  

This feminist perspective of the modern subject is counterpoint to capitalist society's injunction to exploit nature for the purposes of economic development or growth. However, the spread of capitalism to all parts of the world and the superimposition of a powerful androcentric
worldview upon most peoples has affected the meanings given to the realm of the prediscursive. Moreover, the increasing hegemony of the discourse of western political economy and its accompanying projection of an ostensibly universal rational individual has deeply affected the knowledge, sentiments and understandings of subjectivity and identity in many societies today. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that "premodern notions of identity reside within their times and places, are given substance by their multiple rootedness in a geography, a history, an emotional and practical landscape of daily life."¹¹

Linguistic feminism presents the third thematization of subjectivity which upsets the Hegelian subject's belief in self-reflection and language in discovering the self, and the erasure of difference through the incorporation of otherness as a means of expanding the self. Linguistic feminism engages genealogical strategies such as the deconstruction of unities and the problematization of naturalized relations and boundaries to draw our attention to the power of discourse or discursive structures in our apprehension of reality.

The appropriation of poststructuralist thought by linguistic feminism is used to elucidate how women's subjectivity and intersubjectivity are also the outcome of dominant discourses and institutions in one's society.
Furthermore, the fixity of the juridico-legal discourse and the subject it constitutes is called into question by linguistic feminism's critique of the hierarchy and authority that is embodied in language. Thus linguistic feminism's project is to contest the prevalence of the speaking subject through highlighting the semiotics and play of language (where ambiguities allow for other possible meanings to emerge) over the symbolic functions of language in representation and definition. Difference is proffered over the tyranny of oneness and uniformity of phallogocentrism and capitalist hegemony in the discursive structures.

Linguistic feminism's politics consist of "inciting the discrepancies and silences within the already-said . . . [to help] us to see, within the language events that make us what we are, the possibilities for being otherwise." But linguistic feminism also has its weakness. It has concentrated on emphasizing difference in the abstract and, therefore, needs to connect its theorizing to the concrete kinds of difference which affect people's daily lives.

To conclude, contemporary feminism's problematization of the modern self as a predominantly western male-dominated articulation, together with Marxian perspectives on the relations of the law, the state and the individual provide the necessary theoretical insights for an
examination of how indigenous Fijian notions of subjectivity have been and are constituted. How do Fijian forms of subjectivity and identity intersect and interact with the dominant western male notions of subjectivity required by capitalist development? But first the chapter begins with the colonial state's constitution of the Fijian as that of the administered individual with its implications for facilitating the growth of capitalism and the establishment of the modern nation-state.

Attempts by the colonial and postcolonial state to define the "indigenous Fijian" as a modern individual to be developed are far from unproblematic. (We will discuss this situation in Chapter VII.) But first, we will look at how the colonial state attempted to delineate the Fijian people's relationship to it by constituting the Fijian identity and subject. This was done through imposing on the Fijians a theory of traditional Fijian society. How have Fijians interacted within this colonial construction of their society?

**The British Colonial State's Creation of a Neotraditional Fijian Social Order**

British colonialism in Fiji not only created and formalized new relations of production and exchange but also imposed its construction of native Fijian society in relation to subsistence agriculture, ownership of land
and interactions with other groups living in the country. Written records by Europeans at the time of early contact point to the diversity and differences in customs and social structures among the people inhabiting the Fiji islands.\(^{13}\) With formal colonization by the British, a gradual process of homogenization and normalization of Fijian society and culture began. Fijians were seen as an undifferentiated mass of people who, defined in relation to their colonial masters, were inferior or like children. Hence, it was the prerogative of the colonial power, through its colonial administrators, to identify for these "natives" their "real interests."

As discussed in Chapter II, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of Fijians, a decline which began in the early contact period and continued until 1921 from 200,000 to 85,000, as a result of introduced diseases and the violence of contact.\(^{14}\) The cause of this decline in population was attributed to the Fijian's behavior and customs.\(^{15}\) This assumption supported a wider debate at that time concerning the eventual decline and extinction of native races when they came into contact with western civilization. Such a belief underlay the policies of Fiji's colonial governors.

Thus, the colonial discourse constituted for the colonial administration the "native problem" and ways to deal with it. The native Fijian was constituted as a
problem in terms of being "uncivilized," "unenlightened," and "living in apathy." In Basil Thomson's *The Fijians: A Study of the Decay of Custom*, Fijians were represented, like natives everywhere, as emerging from a stage of savagery to the growth of civilization. The Fijians were in a stage of transition from the physical struggles of intertribal warfare to the "moral struggle of modern competition." Thomson characterizes the Fijians as lacking restraint and routine and acting mostly on impulse. "The Fijian eats when he is hungry, or when the sight of cooked food whets his appetite; he bathes only when he would cool his body; he sleeps when he is disinclined to work or when darkness has made work impossible; regular hours for all these functions are quite unknown to him."

The task which the colonial governors or British patriarchs set for the colonial state was to devise ways to normalize and discipline the Fijians into habits conducive to economic progress and in line with the ideals of British society. Thus, the first resident Governor of Fiji, Arthur Gordon, claimed intimate knowledge of how "primitive cultures" worked and, therefore, he understood well how Fijian society functioned. Gordon asserted that his central concern for the new colony was how to save the Fijian race. At that time, the Fijian race was considered to be undergoing a "fatal time of transition" to western civilization. Gordon and subsequent British
governors adopted the belief that "salvation of this squalid decaying society was for Fijians to become more like 'the sturdy yeomen' of England . . . [who were characterized as] hardworking, individually self-sufficient, thrifty farmers and artisans, loyal to their social superiors and devoted to their families in the privacy of picturesque, clean little cottages--with separate bedrooms." How did the British colonial governors set out to put this into practice on the people they administered, the Fijians?

**Fijian Social Units and Landownership System**

The colonial administration sought to impose its order on the perceived chaos and disorder they encountered in the colony by first theorizing and putting into practice a neotraditional order to govern and save the Fijian race. A model of Fijian society was put into effect by the Fijian Administration. Fijian social structure was characterized as a simple agnatic descent structure which had a hierarchy of units. (See also Chapter II, page 47.) Patriarchal authority and privilege was recognized by the British colonial administrators and they codified it. Thus, this social structure outlined below became the official and accepted form of Fijian society. The largest and most inclusive social unit is the "vanua" or tribe. The "vanua" is made up of "yavusa" which comprises the direct agnatic descendants of a single "kalou-vu" or ancestor god. The
sons of the "yavusa" in turn formed other smaller social units called "mataqali." The sons of the "mataqali" further subdivided themselves into "i tokatoka." Below is a diagram of the official and now widely accepted definition of Fijian social structure.

```
  Vanua
     /\    (Tribe)
    /   \
  Yavusa  Yavusa
        /\           (Clan)
       /   \
  Mataqali Mataqali Mataqali
       /\           (Sub-clan/lineage)
      /   \
  i-tokatoka i-tokatoka i-tokatoka (Sub-lineage/ extended family)
```

This was first codified by a British colonial administrative officer, G. V. Maxwell, in 1912, during the final stages of the administration's attempts to settle the ownership of communally-owned land once and for all. The Native Lands Ordinance of 1880 had confirmed the "mataqali" as the legal owner of native land.

Fijians were expected to know the name of each level of the social units they were members of and how their clan came to be occupying the lands they claimed. This was one of the requirements for any Fijian who wished to lay claim to land. Under the Native Lands Commission all communally-owned lands had to be registered under their rightful owners. As Peter France points out:
At last the obscurities of Fijian traditional society seemed to have been dispelled; the administration of the colony, ever eager for symmetry and apprehensive of anomaly, gladly incorporated Maxwell's analysis into the orthodox Fijian way of life. The social units were defined in an easily comprehensible way and their relationships with each other were set out with such clarity that it was possible, after the completion of the Commission's work in an area, to identify the social status of any one of the Fijian occupants immediately by consulting the Commission's lists.\textsuperscript{18}

The Native Lands Commission set out to record all "mataqali" boundaries for all the 83 percent Fijian-owned land in the country. From then on every person who claimed Fijian descent had to be registered under his/her "mataqali" and "yavusa" in the register of native landowners called the "Vola ni Kawa Bula," and became entitled to communally-owned native land.

Although initially, Fijians disliked the finality of codification in matters that they wanted flexibility, they knew that the Commission's inquisition into each and every Fijian's social position could not be ignored.

Fijians met in their groups when they heard that the Commission was about to deal with their lands and agreed on an account of land rights based on the official Fijian social structure, fitting all the local inhabitants into their appropriate social units.\textsuperscript{19} On the other hand, other than getting legally registered as a landowner, for the majority of Fijians, knowing exactly the name of the
"mataqali" and "yavusa" that they are members of, impacts very little on their daily lives in the village. At the national political level, however, this classification of Fijians into their social units has been "lauded and defended as being at the very foundation of Fijian social order. Leading Fijian politicians are publicly committed to its preservation inviolate against mounting pressure for change from an Indian population which now exceeds that of the Fijians in numbers and economic strength." 20 The Council of Chiefs which is the highest legislative body of the Fijian Administration has always taken the position that this system of Fijian landownership and tenure be strictly maintained.

**Village Communalism: The Colonial Definition of the Fijian Way of Life**

As discussed in Chapter II, Fijians were required to live in their villages (and a lot of them did and many still do today). However, under the colonial state and specifically, the Fijian Administration, Fijian movement into and out of the village was strictly regulated. An official communal system which was also described as "traditional" was put into effect by the Fijian political bureaucracy. Under this communal system all aspects of Fijian social and economic life in the village came under the control and surveillance of the state. Thus, for example, in theory, not even the holding of a dance in
the village was allowed without the permission of the Fijian Administration. In this manner, the behavior and daily activities of Fijians in the villages were minutely regulated by "programs of work" drawn up by the Fijian Administration, which were strictly enforced.

The imposed Fijian communal system stipulated the customs and traditional observances that Fijians were required by law to perform. The Provincial Councils levied rates to be paid by Fijians and imposed fines or imprisonment on any Fijian who failed to carry out these so-called "traditional" obligations. The Tikina (District) Councils drew up the "programs of work." The Fijian Affairs Board Regulations enumerated the following "traditional" obligations:

(a) the making and maintenance of roads;
(b) building and repairing houses;
(c) planting and upkeep of food crops;
(d) supplying Fijian visitors with food (as well as doing personal services for their chiefs--"lala");
(e) . . . transporting of Fijian Administration officials when travelling on official duty . . .
(f) assisting in surveys--of Native Lands Commission or Native Land Trust Board;
(g) conveying of sick persons;
(h) preparing for and taking part in "yaqona" (kava) ceremonies and "meke (Fijian dances) for the entertainment of visitors;
(i) carrying of Fijian Administration letters or messages.22

Furthermore, the colonial state forbade the practice of certain Fijian social practices which emphasized Fijian sociality. This included the custom of "tauvu" where Fijian villages enjoyed and maintained a certain relationship which allowed each other access to one another's crops, livestock and other goods without having to ask formally for permission. The colonial administration issued public warnings to villages which enjoyed this relationship that legal action would be taken against anyone who attempted to exercise "tauvu."23

Another Fijian custom, "kerekere," whereby relatives and friends feel at ease with requesting resources from one another was both discouraged and legislated against in order to stamp it out on a nation-wide basis. "Those who refused to exercise or admit the practice of 'kerekere' wore red ribbons in public declaration of their emancipation, and published their names and villages for all to see in Na Mata [the Fijian newspaper at that time]."24

Fijian Social Reproduction: What Does it Mean to be Indigenous Fijian?

The constitution and reconstitution of Fijian identity and subjectivity--the answers to the questions of "Who is indigenous?" and "Who is a Fijian?" "What does being
a Fijian mean?"—for Fijians have been influenced by the colonial construction of the Fijian within the practices of governance of the Fijian people and western social science and colonial discourses. As alluded to earlier, Fijian leaders, most of whom are chiefs, and academics have sought to maintain and build upon the colonial construction of Fijian society. More obvious reasons for the Fijian elite’s acceptance of the Fijian Administration is that it provides jobs for a number of Fijian career civil servants. In addition, the Fijian Administration is projected by the Fijian-dominated government as a symbol of defense against the presence of other ethnic groups who live in Fiji, and also it would appear paradoxically, against the type of development and development strategies promoted by the postcolonial state. The existence and maintenance of an indigenous political bureaucracy, therefore, continues to keep the Fijians formally separated from other people living in Fiji today.

Instances of Fijians fleeing their provinces in order to escape the burdens of communal work programs and other imposed traditional activities were reported. More sustained and threatening efforts of Fijian resistance to the colonial order and against the communal system will be discussed in Chapter IV. On the other hand, Fijian social organization was, and continues to be, based on kinship cooperation. However, membership of such groups
was and is not rigidly structured and continues to be highly flexible and fluid. Today, many Fijians have left their villages to live permanently in Fiji's towns and cities. But the majority of Fijians remain in their villages in the rural areas.

As is now obvious, the bureaucratic constitution of Fijian identity and subjectivity continues to form an integral part of the socio-political processes of Fijian social reproduction. Moreover, the bureaucratic discursive and non-discursive construction of Fijian identity and subjectivity also involves the allocation of political and economic resources such as enabling the Fijian elite to remain in control of the national government, and Fijian ownership of land.

Fijian ethnicity and identity are also defined in pseudo-kinship terms based upon imagined ties of common ancestry. The Fijian claim to the country as their homeland is expressed in such terms as "taukei," meaning the people who belong to the land. Initially, according to Fijian tradition, the Fijians believed they were autochthonous. They believed that they were created in Fiji and did not migrate there. In the 1890s, however, the legend of the Kaunitoni migration emerged tracing the origins of the Fijians to Africa. The original point of landing of the Fijian people is said to be at Vuda on the
Today this legend occupies an authoritative place in books on Fijian history and custom.

But how do some Fijians living in rural areas in Fiji talk or give an account of their way of life and society? Their interpretations are discussed in terms of the following distinguishing but intertwined ideas: (i) personal characteristics, (ii) the importance of maintaining social relationships, (iii) the principle of reciprocity, (iv) the different uses of cash and other forms of wealth, and (v) the role of ceremony in their social activities.

The majority of Fijian farmers taking part in the Seaqaqa sugar farming project who were asked whether they perceived that there is a "Fijian way of life" answered positively in terms of "Nodai tovo vakavanua," or we have our customs and traditions. In other words, the behavior of a Fijian is characterized by such qualities as "veilomani," meaning caring for each other; "veivukei e na gauna ni leqa," which means helping one another in time of need; "veisolisoli," which means sharing one's resources; "veirokorokovi," or "veidokaidokai," or "veikauwaitaki," which mean respect and consideration for one another. Fijians, especially those who live in the villages, describe village life in terms of "the wide-ranging and supportive character of kin connections, the ethic of
sharing, practices of hospitality, and the ordering of behavior in the village by a range of customs of respect." 27

Maintaining good social relationships and group sociality is emphasized. Thus many apparently economic transactions usually also have social objectives. For Fijians, acts of economic exchange also give expression to existing social relationships rather than as mere exchanges of goods or services. Therefore, the value of the exchange is not merely economic gain. The more important values are the social sentiments which are expressed through the exchange such as the renewal or creation of kinship bonds and the expression of goodwill between the parties involved. This is expressed in the statement, "Bula veimaliwai." Rusiate Nayacakalou, in Tradition and Change in the Fijian Village, gives illustrations of economic exchanges taking place within the social context, which show incongruity in value in the western capitalist economic sense. For example, an exchange of $10.00 worth of yagona (kava) against $100.00 worth of dalo (taro). 28 In order to understand what is happening, one must know the social context of the exchange. 29 An economic transaction takes place as a result of a social relationship which already exists or is to be formed. 30
But this does not mean that Fijians do not engage in purely economic transactions. Rather they distinguish between the two types of exchange and which of the two is perceived to be appropriate depends on the occasion for the exchange. In short, Fijians choose between these two types of exchange. But their decision would be affected by the degree of contact and experience with the western capitalist system which would be greater in the urban centers than in the rural areas.

The central organizing principle of Fijian social and economic behavior and activities is the concept of reciprocity. Fijian farmers working their sugar cane farms at Seaqaga still talked about calling upon the help of their fellow villagers or neighboring Fijian farmers for assistance during busy times without formally having to contract the villagers in terms of paying them a daily wage. The farmer paid the villagers the amount he/she had the resources for or could borrow from the Fiji Development Bank. Sometimes all the villagers might get is just three meals a day. Linked to the principle of reciprocity is the Fijian concept of "kerekere," discussed earlier. Both principles or concepts serve as effective levelling or distributive mechanisms which inhibit the accumulation of great individual private capital and wealth. In addition, these social principles which guide and at times direct interactions among Fijians provide
a form of social welfare or security in that one can depend on one's relatives to see one through any material need. In other words, they make kinship relationships meaningful and valuable for the members. Consequently, they serve to bind Fijians closely to their kindred and create a social bond or solidarity among the group members.

The system of social reproduction which is based on the principle of reciprocity and kinship ties has had to accommodate the introduction of cash into social interactions and transactions. How do Fijians accommodate the introduction of cash into their system of social reproduction for the attainment of socio-cultural objectives? In other words, the Fijian kin-ordered mode of production, however, does not exist in isolation from the capitalist mode. As discussed earlier, many Fijians are now urban dwellers and have to sell their labor power in order to survive. But then even those who live in the villages also produce cash crops for the market. There is also the phenomenon of migrant labor as many Fijian men provide the seasonal labor for sugar cane-harvesting in Seaqaqa, for example. Moreover, the Fijian state, specifically the Fijian-dominated national government, continues to attempt to transform village subsistence-based agriculture into market-oriented production. The full implications of those attempts at rural transformation and hence Fijian
social transformation will become evident in the following chapters.

Fijians use the cash they earn in order to obtain prestige within their own community through making contributions to social and church activities. These activities may take place in the villages or the urban centers. The contributions may be in kind or cash. Further, money can be used to purchase items of ceremonial exchange such as yams, mats, "tabua" (whale's tooth), pigs and groceries such as salt, rice, sugar and tea. The rewards for making these contributions are assessed in terms of the principle of reciprocity and social personality or harmony in one's social relationships with other members of the group. Thus social approbation and sociality are valued more highly over the accumulation of wealth. In other words, wealth is shared and redistributed in order to give expression to existing social relationships. For the Fijian sugar cane farmers at Seqaqa, their cash-earning activities were viewed as providing a means to contribute to social activities or social commitments. Cash and other forms of wealth are, therefore, used to maintain or regain social harmony. On the other hand, Fijians also realize that almost all items for ceremonial exchange may be purchased from the store with cash. Hence, "one's children, who would carry on the prestige of the family, must now be healthy, command
capital, and be well educated.\textsuperscript{33} Earning money in order to pay school fees to send the children to school was one of the main reasons given by Fijian sugar cane farmers for taking up sugar cane farming at Seaqaqa.

Finally, ceremonies are an integral part of Fijian social reproduction. Ceremonies may be divided into life-cycle ceremonies, ceremonies for the Fijian Administration and other political personalities, and ceremonies for the church. Ceremonies of the life cycle include those of birth, marriage and death. With the occasion of a marriage, for example, there are ceremonies to be performed which involve a whole series of presentations of items of exchange between the kin of the bride and bridegroom. These ceremonial exchanges take place over several months. Items of exchange involve those which have social value and meaning such as the "tabua" (whale's tooth), but may also include items of food and cloth. The processes of gathering these items of exchange are distributed over as many people as possible from both kin groups. Hence, a great deal of time and energy is expended by the various members to obtain these items. But again these activities serve as symbols of relationships to be formed or renewed by taking part in the exchanges. Similarly, such large-scale ceremonies are also performed for funerals.

These "formalized" exchanges are part of the social processes through which Fijians symbolize the social bond
which is created, renewed or maintained between new or old members of the kin groups. One of the reasons given by Fijian sugar cane farmers, who were interviewed at Seagaqa for continuing to take part in these ceremonies even though they required a lot of time and resources, include the importance for them of social acceptance in the communities in which they live. Further, they talked about the emphasis on sociality as an important value that they must respond to. Therefore, many Fijian sugar cane farmers contribute to social events and ceremonies in their adopted village of the landowning "mataqali" as well as their own villages in other parts of Fiji. According to these farmers, contributing to these ceremonies by attendance and in kind or cash is part of their being Fijian. If they did not contribute they would be socially castigated. In addition, they said that they valued having good relationships with their relatives and landowners. Moreover, that these ceremonies are social events to be enjoyed rather than merely economic transactions is illustrated in what the items of exchange involve. The items of exchange are of the same type which include "tabua," mats, dalo, kerosene, salt and cloth. The social meaning is expressed in the words and symbols of the formal presentation between the two groups taking part. Thus, "the motivating factor [for the exchange of items] is not economic gain, but the social validation
of the transactions which are expressed in the transfer of actual items of wealth against each other."\textsuperscript{34}

There are also ceremonies which are performed for chiefs, other government dignitaries and foreign visitors, church ministers or priests and pastors. The purposes of these ceremonies are differentiated from those of the life-cycle. One of the symbolic expressions of these ceremonies is that of allegiance and support of the participants present. In a way, these ceremonies may be viewed as reinforcing the status quo and the current forms of hierarchy and authority. The "soli vakavanua" and "soli vakamisinari" are the institutions whereby resources are raised to support village clergymen or chiefs and officers of the Fijian Administration.

To conclude this section, the colonial state attempted to delineate the Fijian people's relationship to the state in order to govern the Fijians effectively. It did this by imposing upon the Fijians a new social system it invented, which is based on the principles of hierarchical authority, over the Fijians' own system of reciprocal exchange between kin groups.\textsuperscript{35} There are thus different or more than one definition or constitution of Fijian identity and subjectivity. There is the official, bureaucratic definition of Fijian, which states:

\begin{quote}
    a person shall be regarded as a Fijian if and shall not be so regarded unless his \textsuperscript{sic} father or any of his \textsuperscript{sic} male progenitors
\end{quote}
in the male line is or was the child of parents both of whom are or were indigenous inhabitants of Fiji and his [sic] name is registered or eligible to be registered in the "Vola ni Kawa Bula" and include persons who are registered or eligible to be registered in the "Vola ni Kawa Bula" by virtue of custom, tradition and practice.36

The social definition of Fijian is one based on the maintenance of one's social relationships with one's kin groups through participation in social ceremonies. There is also "a way of the church," or "vakamisinari." Whether one is a Seventh-Day Adventist, a Catholic, an Anglican, a Methodist, a Jehovah's Witness, a Mormon (Latter Day Saints), is also important. Membership in any one of these Christian denominations defines the limits of, or enhances one's participation in, certain social activities.37 The "official" church has always been Methodist--it being the first to be accepted by Fijian chiefs.

How one integrates these various definitions of Fijian is negotiated. Depending on what circumstances are present, the possibilities for choice may be restricted or wide in scope. As Nayacakalou so aptly pointed out:

"... change actually hinges on the element of choice and decision on the part of particular individuals who are evaluating the possibilities of action open to them and acting according to a more or less rational scheme for securing greatest advantage under the circumstances."38
"The Fijian Problem" in the Development Discourse: An Analysis

In this section the development literature on the specifically "Fijian Problem" in Fiji's national development process is analyzed. The purpose of the analysis is to politicize this development debate. The type of power relations which is, in part, created by the discourse is illustrated. The purpose of this discourse is to attempt to effect the required social transformation on the part of indigenous Fijians to participate "successfully" in capitalist development programs.

How do the discourses of the colonial state and today's postcolonial state on Fijian participation in development implicitly constitute the Fijian as the modern subject to be developed? Both of these discourses begin by problematizing the Fijian subject and calling for changes in Fijian subjectivities in order that Fijians may "succeed" in Fiji's development programs. The assumption is that there is only one type of subjectivity: the modern bounded individual or subject as constituted by the juridico-political discourses of bourgeois law. The insights provided by feminist political theory, specifically the feminist problematization of the modern subject as "the bounded agent of rational self-reflection and autonomous action, [as being] a particularly masculine rather than a universal portrayal of the human,"\textsuperscript{39} are
called upon as a means for opening space for other forms of subjectivities and definitions of personhood. The social definition of Fijian, for example, constitutes a mode of living and knowing which is related to praxis. Feminism's project of constituting subjectivity in terms of intersubjective connections among people. Both emphasize care and responsiveness to people's needs. "Seeing relationships as constitutive of identity, this view stresses persons-in-relations rather than autonomous and isolated selves." 40

As discussed above, the colonial constitution of the native Fijian problem began with the question of how to control and regulate Fijian society. Consequently, a model of Fijian society was imposed through the establishment of a Fijian bureaucracy and a native land tenure system. Embedded within this definition of Fijian is the colonial construction of the Fijian as a modern subject. Hence, the modern Fijian subject can be represented as an object for development. Thus, when individual Fijians opted out of the village to live elsewhere they were described by western and colonial discourses as becoming "independent" and their act of moving as an "individualist form." Fijians moved out of their villages for various reasons. Sometimes the reason may be a personal one or perhaps it may be to escape from the strict routine imposed by the government-controlled work programs. However, this does
not necessarily imply that the Fijian and his family became separated from the village community that they form a part of. They may continue to maintain their sociality by taking part in village ceremonies, for example. But officially and administratively, they constituted a new category of Fijians. The payment of a sum of money for the commutation fee and the Provincial rates, and the requirement of earning an income of over £100 annually were the criteria set by the government for obtaining this status. But this movement to live outside the village was initially closely regulated and controlled. The reason given was that of an official concern that, if left unregulated, it would lead to the breakdown of the village social order.

The academic discourse generated by geographers and anthropologists studying social change in indigenous Fijian society is based on assumptions made about the "independent" Fijian who lives outside the village. "Tu va galala" is a Fijian phrase meaning "outside the village." Both western academics and colonial officials defined the "galala" as a model of the independent Fijian farmer for advancing Fijian economic development and social modernization. Because the bureaucratic requirements for being officially "galala" were strictly enforced and reviewed, any Fijian who went through with this process was regarded as a member of "a distinctive class--individuals who had
the drive and motivation to break the bonds of traditionalism and engage in modern agriculture." The assumption was that it is only in the interests and progress of the Fijian race to adopt this individualistic mode of life. Academic researchers and other researchers commissioned by the colonial government to study Fijian society "were excited by the 'galala' phenomenon, which was gathering pace in the 1960s. The 'galala' farmers represented a symbolic break with communalism, traditionalism and conservatism. Frazer (1973:39) believed that 'galala' had more business acumen, energy, and strength of character than the average villager, and were more productive and better off; . . ." At the same time, the Fijian subject's participation in social ceremonies and maintenance of sociality came to be problematized. In both the academic and colonial discourses, negative metaphors are used to characterize these types of activity such as "the burden of obligations," "traditional troubles: birth, marriage, death," and "obstacles to development." As Cyril Belshaw points out: "The recent authorities are in agreement about the functions of ceremonial in Fijian life and its inhibitory effect upon economic growth." The Burns Commission also advocated doing away with "the burden of Fijian ceremonial" that they reportedly witnessed while doing their research in Fiji. Hence, they stated in their report that they
"would strongly urge that religious, educational and political leaders, should exert their influence to restrain such extravagance, and make their position plain by categorical denunciation, especially of excessive expenditure in connection with marriage ceremonies."\textsuperscript{45}

Even Fijians themselves, particularly those who are educated and have government positions or work as wage earners in the urban centers, accept the above opinions. They agree, to a certain extent, that participation in these social ceremonies contribute to the "poor performance" of Fijians in economic progress and advancement.\textsuperscript{46} But many Fijians also hold the view that "kinship only appears costly when measured with a capitalist yardstick with its impersonal emphasis on profit and loss. As a separate system--divorced from capitalist values--it is a self-sufficient, and thoroughly satisfying human system."\textsuperscript{47}

The majority of the Fijian farmers at Seaqaga who were interviewed said that they still continued to take part in as many social activities as possible in their home as well as their landowning "mataqali's" villages.

However, development planners and advisors of government policy have been more concerned with the promotion of economic growth, and, hence, in how to mobilize Fijian labor and land for capitalist production. Government policies concerning Fijian participation in development are based on the neoclassical developmentalist or
modernization paradigm. The government therefore accepted the premise of "a modernizing process of transition from tribalism to peasantry, in which 'galala' were crucial because they formed 'an incipient class in a new, larger and more stratified society, and their values are distinct from those isolated self-sufficient tribal peoples." 48

Thus, the definition and direction of the colonial government's policies on Fijian participation in development has been determined by the assumption that "economic development for Fijians could be based on the transformation of agriculture and society into a 'galala' peasantry." 49 From the early 1960s, the colonial government then put into practice its decision to encourage the "galala" sector. As a result it set up the Land Development Authority to oversee several schemes to resettle individual Fijians from the villages.

Although Fiji obtained political independence in 1970, the new government continued to adopt the policy of individualization of Fijians for economic development. The Seaqaqa Sugar Cane Development Project is based on the concept of "galala" or the individualistic peasant model. The authorities assumed that it was possible to resettle Fijian villagers as independent farmers or "galala," on new land remote from existing villages to create a Fijian peasantry. These peasants would become market-oriented, innovative, and free from village societal
activities. The assumption is that social transformation of village society follows a linear and evolutionary pattern along a modernization continuum from traditional conservative villages to progressive "galala." However, as this and other studies show, Fijian villagers throughout the country have not responded in great numbers to join the movement in becoming "galala."

But what is the national context of the implementation of such a policy for Fijian economic development? What is the overall structure of the rural political economy of Fiji? What is the overall direction of Fiji's national development policy? How do external forces affect the national development policy-making processes? The answers to these questions are attempted in the next chapter.
Notes to Chapter III


2 Norbert Elias, The History of Manners, Vol. 1. Translated by E. Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1978). In this work, Elias denaturalizes the concept of the "civilized individual" and historicizes and denaturalizes the emergence of western civilization.

Similarly, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. Translated by R. Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980). Foucault's work alerts us to how power and control are exercised by continual and authoritative categorizing, grading, and monitoring of large areas of human behavior into normal and abnormal so that more aspects of the life-world can be regulated and controlled/administered.


5 Jeffrey Isaac, p. 173.

6 Kathy E. Ferguson, "Subject-Centeredness in Feminist Theory," chapter 2 of forthcoming book. Manuscript, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1992. I am indebted to Kathy for giving me access to a prepublication copy of this chapter.

7 Ibid., p. 97.

8 Ibid., p. 44.

9 Ibid., p. 53.

10 Ibid., p. 55.
11 Ibid., p. 70.
12 Ibid., p. 85.


18 Peter France, p. 166.

19 Ibid., pp. 165-175.

20 Ibid., p. 174.

21 Nicholas Thomas, p. 152. See also O.H.K. Spate, The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects, Legislative Council Paper No. 13, 1959, p. 31. For charts of the Fijian Administration, see Appendix D.

22 O.H.K. Spate, p. 22. See also Alan Burns et al., Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji,
118


23 Peter France, p. 155. France points out that in April, 1908, five Fijians from the village of Galoa, Kadavu, were accused before the magistrate's court of having exercised "tauvu" privileges at Galoa, in Bua, by taking two turtles. They were found guilty and fined ten shillings each by the native magistrate at Nabouwalu, Bua. As reported in the Fijian newspaper, Na Mata, May, 1908, p. 74.

24 Ibid. See also O.H.K. Spate, p. 24. It was an offense to "kerekere" money or property above the value of five shillings (50 cents). But as Spate points out, "Legislation on such matters of personal mores is notoriously all but unenforceable anywhere . . ."

25 Peter France, p. 151.

26 Peter France, "The Kaunitoni Migration: Notes on the Genesis of a Fijian Tradition," The Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 1, 1966, pp. 107-112. According to this legend, "The Fijian people are linked by tradition with the vikings of the sunrise. Their ancestors set out, it is said, from a land far to the west, and sailed along the course set by their chief, towards the rising sun. The chief's name was Lutunasobasoba; his canoe was called the Kaunitoni. As they approached the Yasawa islands a great storm arose, scattering the canoes before the wind and driving them onto the western shores of Viti Levu at a place which was given the name 'Vuda' in memory of the event (Vuda = 'our origin'). The brother of Lutunasobasoba, who was called Degei, set out across the island in search of land on which the tribes could settle, and he chose the high mountains to the north-east. Lutunasobasoba was taken there, and a house was built for him, using only the leaves and wood of the pandanus tree, which is called in Fijian "na kau vadra." The settlement prospered, and became known by the name of the chief's house, which was 'Nakauvadra'. Eventually, on the death of Lutunasobasoba, there was a war which resulted in the dispersal of the people all over the islands."

The Fiji Broadcasting Commission presented this legend to its largest audience in 1964. However, France shows that the originality of this legend is questionable.


29 Timothy Macnaught, pp. 69-70.

30 Ibid., p. 21.

31 Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 78. Wolf defines three modes of production: a capitalist mode, a tributary mode, and a kin-ordered mode. In the capitalist mode, the capitalist controls the means of production. The laborers who are compelled to sell their labor power to the capitalists have no independent access to the means of production. The capitalists are driven to act in terms of the maximization of the surplus in order to accumulate the excess as profits. The profit motive is the motivating factor for all labor and production.

In the kin-ordered mode of production, kinship is the organizing principle of committing social labor to the transformation of nature. Here social relations are based on the concepts of filiation, marriage, consanguinity and affinity.

32 Rusiate Nayacakalou, p. 40.

33 Cyril Belshaw, p. 159.

34 Rusiate Nayacakalou, p. 112.

35 Cyril Belshaw, p. 178/

36 Section 156(a) of the Constitution of Fiji, July, 1990, p. 146. The issue of who is an indigenous Fijian has been recently publicly debated in the Fiji Times and the Daily Post--October, 1991 to January, 1992. The issue was raised as a result of a person whose father is non-Fijian but who has a Fijian mother. He has been registered
in his mother's "mataqali" and "yavusa" in the "Vola ni Kawa Bula," the register of native landowners. He has been put forward as a Fijian political candidate running for a Fijian seat in the House of Representatives in the forthcoming 1992 national general elections. However, previously he had won a seat in Parliament on a General Electors' (non-Fijian/Indian/Rotuman) candidacy. Fiji's system of government allocates seats in Parliament on the basis of ethnic groups and voting is on an ethnic basis with Fijians voting for Fijians, Indians for Indians, etc.

37 Nicholas Thomas, "Alejandro Mayta in Fiji: Narratives about Millenarianism, Colonialism, Postcolonial Politics, and Custom," in Clio in Oceania: Towards a Historical Anthropology, ed. Aletta Biersack (Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), pp. 298-299. Thomas gives an example of a Fijian who is a Seventh Day Adventist, not participating in a customary kava-drinking ceremony because his new religion disallows the drinking of alcohol, which is extended to the indigenous narcotic beverage of kava.

38 Rusiate Nayacakalou, p. 131.

39 Kathy Ferguson, "Knowledge, Politics and Persons in Feminist Theory," Mimeo, Political Science Department, University of Hawaii at Manoa, p. 1.

40 Kathy Ferguson, "Subject-Centeredness in Feminist Theory," p. 33.


42 Ibid.

43 O.H.K. Spate, pp. 22 and 25.

44 Cyril Belshaw, p. 126.

45 Alan Burns et al., p. 32, paragraph 706.

46 This is based on various conversations held with Fijians working for government, the University of the South Pacific, etc., and living in urban centers in Fiji.


49 Ibid.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEVELOPMENT SETTING: THE STATE, CAPITAL, AND SOCIETY IN FIJI

Introduction

The main focus of this study is on the interpretations of a group of indigenous Fijian sugar cane farmers of their experience in state-initiated development. However, since the purpose of this analysis is to problematize the processes of economic and social transformation occasioned by capitalist development, it is based on more than a mere repetition of the Fijian farmers' common-sense knowledge. The study therefore draws from critical development theory which moves away from analyses of development in purely economic terms. Rather, critical development theory sets out to emphasize both the economic and social components of capitalist development. When we look at the political aspect of development we come to view the key structures and institutions of economic development as also mechanisms of domination, exploitation and the maintenance of class privilege. Thus our attention is directed to issues of power and control. As Cardoso and Faletto point out:

Capital itself is the economic expression of a social relation; it requires the existence of a set of persons working by wage--selling its labor force--and another group owning machines and money to buy raw material and to pay wages and salaries.1
Furthermore, it is a relation of exploitation and domination which requires a stable social and political order.

Only a small part of the setting, within which the Fijian farmers at Seaqaqa Vanua Levu live, is of their own creation. The task of an outside observer extends to an examination of the other social forces which have shaped the landscape of the Fijian farmers' world. Thus, added to their interpretations of development as human agents, is an analysis of the larger context of capitalist development. Hence, the specific role of the nation-state both colonial and postcolonial in the social processes of development in Fiji is discussed. This chapter, therefore, begins with a review of how other authors have analyzed the relationship of the capitalist state to capitalist development, and specifically, the Third World capitalist state and dependent development. The remainder of the chapter then discusses the specifically Fijian context. In particular, the study looks at the history of the relationship between the political struggles of social classes and groups on the one hand, and the internal and external economic and political structures of exploitation and domination on the other. In other words, the study attempts to examine the contradictions arising from the postcolonial state's policies of pursuing dependent development and also maintaining the interests
of the "nation." Within this context, what have been the conflicts in the relations among social classes and ethnic groups and between those classes and ethnic groups and the Fijian state?

**The State, Capital, and Society**

There have been many attempts to analyze the role of the state in economic development in both the advanced industrialized economies and in those economies of the Third World. It has been within the critical theory debate in state theorizing and development, based on variants of the Marxist tradition which has drawn our attention to the relationship between the state and capital. Much of the debate concerning the relationship between the state and capital revolves around what Kautsky pointed out, that is, in capitalist society, "the ruling class does not rule." In capitalism, the dominant class derives its power from control of the allocative resources or the accumulation process. The state's revenue and survival, as well as everyone else's in capitalist society, are dependent on the accumulation or valorization process. On the other hand, the state in capitalist society does not have direct control of the extraction of surplus value through its control of the means of violence. Rather, the accumulation process is the exclusive domain of privately-owned capital.
There are various instrumentalist theories of the state's relation to capital, which differ in terms of the degree to which the state is viewed as the instrument of the dominant class in capitalist society--the bourgeoisie. In state monopoly capitalism, for example, the state intervenes in the accumulation crisis to serve the monopoly fraction of the capitalist bourgeoisie. In the derivationist or capital logic school, the state's main function is to facilitate the reproduction of capital as a whole. Hence, it is necessary to study the process of capital accumulation in order to understand the functions performed by the state. In short, the state exists to perform the functional needs of the capitalist order.

There are, however, theories of the state which present it as having some autonomy from the bourgeoisie and the accumulation process, with more or less a life of its own. For as Milliband argues, while the state may act on behalf of the ruling class, it does not act at its behest. Marx and Engels differentiated two levels of state autonomy. The first level is described as "normal" when "the State bureaucracy has some autonomy from the bourgeoisie because of the bourgeoisie's inherent dislike of taking charge of the State apparatus and because of the conflicts among individual capitals (requiring an independent bureaucracy that can act as an executor for the capitalist class as a whole)." The second level of
autonomy occurs when the state apparatuses achieve some degree of autonomy as a consequence of the class struggle being "frozen" or suspended due to the inability of any one of the dominant classes to control the state. This is the view of the state that Marx formulated in his analysis of the Bonapartist state in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*.

However, in both situations the state continues to depend on the private capital accumulation process for its own survival and aggrandizement. Thus, although the state is not merely the instrument of the bourgeoisie, its actions take place within the context of the class struggle. Gramsci's, Poulantzas's, and Offe's theories of the state's relation to capital, fall within this paradigm of the autonomous state. The state in capitalism is viewed as "an arena within which class struggles are fought out, but one in which there are influences at work that have a particular character of their own."⁶

A theory which is based on the view that the state is relatively autonomous cannot reduce an analysis of the state to the economic, to the state being merely a reflection or expression of the interests of capital. The bourgeoisie, the dominant class which controls the means of production in capitalist society, may exert influence on state policies in ways that other groups may not be able to. For instance, capitalists can use the
powerful economic tool of the "investment strike." But not all state actions and policies can be explained in terms of the pressure applied by business. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie and propertied classes also depend on the state to maintain social order and stability.

The state in capitalist society is constituted by a set of public institutions such as parliaments, courts, armies, police and administrative bureaucracies, as opposed to the economy which is constituted by a variety of private institutions such as businesses and banks. The purpose of the state is to maintain social order and officials of the state must act in the name of the "general interest," as opposed to the profit-making drive of private enterprises. However, "successful capital accumulation is an essential policy consideration due to the state's dependence on economic prosperity for revenues and stability." But even when the capitalist class occupies a privileged position within the state, the state cannot appear to be a mere instrument of capitalists. This is because the state must also maintain the legitimacy of the social order and fulfill its ideological role.

Fred Block's work on the state also stresses the autonomy of the state actors in policy formulation and implementation. Block widens the actors participating in the state arena to include not only state managers and class actors but other collective actors organized around
race or ethnicity, gender, and religion, for example. In other words, the state is "an arena in which conflicts over basic social and economic interests are fought out." Thus, the state is not just an arena for class struggles but it is also where a broad range of other social and political struggles take place. Block extends the relative autonomy framework with the idea of "a division of labor between those who accumulate capital and those who manage the state apparatus. Those who accumulate capital are conscious of their interests as capitalists, but, in general, they are not conscious of what is necessary to reproduce the social order in changing circumstances. Those who manage the state apparatus, however, are forced to concern themselves to a greater degree with the reproduction of the social order because their continued power rests on the maintenance of political and economic order."

Why then does the state in capitalist society preserve and reproduce capitalist social relations? According to Block, this is the consequence of the structural relationships among the state managers, capitalists and workers. The state managers have a vested interest in facilitating private investment because their own positions in society are dependent on maintaining a healthy level of economic activity. State managers are also concerned with preserving and expanding their own power. Thus, their
goals include protecting the nation-state's position within the international state system, maintaining reasonable levels of economic activity, and building a wide political and social support base.

In summary, Block's formulation of the relationship of the state, capital and society is that "state power is sui generis, not reducible to class power." For Block as well as for Weber, the basis of state power is its successful "monopoly over the means of violence, which is the basis on which the managers of the state apparatus are able to force compliance with their wishes. But the exercise of state power occurs within particular class contexts, which shape and limit the exercise of that power. These class contexts in turn are the products of particular relations of production . . . . each social formation determines the particular ways in which state power will be exercised within that society and social formations will vary in the degree to which the exercise of state power is constrained by class power." 

The state is viewed as an important and potentially autonomous actor in society. As Theda Skocpol argues, the state conceived of as an organization which claims control over a territory and people "may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society." On the other hand, state autonomy is not conceived of as
something which is fixed. "The very structural potentials for autonomous state actions change over time, as the organizations of coercion and administration undergo transformations, both internally and in their relations to societal groups and to representative parts of government." There are, therefore, no theoretical absolutes concerning the fundamental character of the capitalist state, which could be applied to all societies with capitalist relations of production. The characteristics of a particular state are related to the socio-economic and cultural contexts in which the state is embedded and the changing world system.

As Martin Carnoy notes, theories of the state in the Third World comprise part of the ongoing debate concerning the nature of capitalist development in those societies. As discussed in Chapter II, the emergence of the nation-state in colonized societies differed from non-colonized ones. The colonial state's role in the colonized society was basically that of a mechanism of appropriation. Although the colonial state's fundamental interests may have coincided with those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the colonial state also had its own self-interest in expanding its revenue. Thus the colonial state was not merely the political committee of the metropolitan bourgeoisie.
The colonial state developed a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus in order to carry out its routine operations of subordinating the "native" or indigenous social groups and classes in order to execute the surplus appropriation function. A framework of law and other institutions were established under the colonial state for the emergence and expansion of capitalist relations of production in the colony. As Hamza Alavi points out, there was no bourgeois revolution in the colony whereby a local bourgeoisie was able to achieve hegemony over the state. The basis of the colonial state derived from the metropolitan power. For as Carnoy argues, "The repressive forces of the [colonial] State were more developed for internal control, and the State's administrative apparatuses became enlarged as a necessary means of control, a control that is exercised in the metropolitan economy largely at the place of production."14

Therefore, as Alavi argues,

The specific nature of structural alignments created by the colonial relationship and realignments that have developed in the postcolonial situation have rendered the relationship between the state and the social classes [and other groups] more complex.15

Thus the relationship of the postcolonial state to the underlying economic structure on which its survival rests, is complex and historically specific. The capitalist periphery was formed when the non-capitalist
economies became integrated into the world market as a result of the economic expansion of western capitalist economies.

Cardoso and Faletto's insightful analysis of the capitalist state's relationship to capitalist development in Latin America shows how the various societies there experienced different consequences "in spite of having been submitted to the same global dynamic of international capitalism." According to Cardoso and Faletto,

The differences are rooted not only in the diversity of natural resources, nor just in the different periods in which these economies have been incorporated into the international system (although these factors have played some role). Their explanation must also lie in the different moments at which sectors of local classes allied or clashed with foreign interests, organized different forms of state, sustained distinct ideologies, or tried to implement various policies or defined alternative strategies to cope with imperialist challenges in diverse moments of history.

There are different types of capitalist societies and the nature of the role of the state in these societies differ substantially. However, from the beginnings of capitalism, the state has played a major role in facilitating economic activity in the society. But there is a basic difference in the nature of the role of the state in advanced capitalist societies and in those of situations of dependency. As noted above, one of the distinguishing characteristics of peripheralization in the world-economy
is the lack or "the relative absence of an indigenously-
controlled process of production and reproduction of the
means of production," in the modern sector of the economies
of peripheral capitalist societies. 18

In what ways is the postcolonial state involved in
the dynamics of capitalist accumulation? A useful way
to analyze the forms through which the postcolonial state
is bound up in the accumulation process is in terms of
an examination of the social bases of the peripheral state
in its current form of dependent development. As well
as the presence of multinational corporations and the
presence of a relatively weak local bourgeoisie, the state
may generate its own social base by creating a class of
public entrepreneurs or "state bourgeoisie." According
to Cardoso and Faletto, they function as the "'office-
holders of capital'. For they support the accumulation
of capital in state enterprises." 19

The postcolonial state adopts the basic ideology of
"developmentalism." In this way, the state fulfills the
fundamental requirements of promoting and supporting
capitalist development by "both the accumulation of
capital by public enterprises and the placing of all the
national wealth (mineral ore, lands et cetera) at the
disposal of private capital." 20

But as Cardoso and Faletto also posit:

While [the state] serves the interests on
which it bases itself, the state proposes
measures that lend verisimilitude to the "generality of interests" which it must assume to exist (people, equality, nation).  

Although the state is involved in a relationship of class domination, it must also mirror in some way the aspirations of dominated groups by assuming an ideology of acting in the public or general interest. In other words, the post-colonial state expresses the contradiction between "the state as agent of capitalist development and the nation as something that is essentially popular."  

The remainder of this chapter examines the political dynamic of the local society in Fiji in terms of the social struggles in particular economic, social, and political relations, and the attempts of various classes and ethnic groups at finding alternatives. Within this discussion, how the ethnic factor complicates Fiji's political economy is discussed. How the state's development strategies and policies have attempted to respond to the various intersections of class and ethnic interests in Fiji provides the background or landscape of the Seagaqa Sugar Cane Development Project.

**The State, Economic Development, Capitalist Hegemony, and Resistance: Society in Colonial Fiji**

It is obvious that the modern society of Fiji emerged as a result of the economic expansion of European capitalism. Thus, this section attempts to discuss the
following interrelated topics: (i) how the linkage of Fiji's national production system with the world-market economy and its present structures were established; (ii) the historical-structural formation of the modern society that is Fiji; and (iii) the various political-social movements through which the subordinated social classes and groups tried to challenge the dominant interests and exert pressure for change in substituting the unequal structures of domination and exploitation with more egalitarian ones.

Chapter II discussed how the colonial state encouraged economic development in Fiji through the promotion and support of foreign investment in order to generate revenue to sustain the modern administrative structures. As is the case with many ex-colonial societies, the basis of Fiji's early economic development was the production of primary tropical commodities (sugar, tea, coffee, bananas, rubber, copra) for export to meet the demands of the expanding economies of the centers of European capitalism. The specific form of this type of capitalist economic development in the colonies was the plantation or enclave economy. The capital was provided by European investors. But the colonial state was also intimately engaged in its role of facilitating land alienation from the indigenous owners for the plantations, providing a steady supply of cheap, docile labor and establishing a political order
to exert social control over the various classes and groups of people living in the colony.

The history of the economic development of Fiji can be largely covered by an examination of the growth of its sugar industry. Further, the historical development of the sugar industry has contributed significantly to shaping Fiji's modern society. It was mainly the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) of Australia which provided the capital and expertise for the development of the sugar industry in Fiji. The colonial state provided the CSR company with adequate land and Indian immigrant labor. As Michael Moynagh in his indepth study of the development of the sugar industry in Fiji points out, "The size of the Indian population [in Fiji] today, and the resultant competition between Fijians and Indians for political and economic gains, stems largely from the introduction before 1916 of indentured labor to work on sugar plantations and in the mills."  

Initially (1880-1916), sugar cane was grown mainly on plantations owned by European planters, the CSR company, and other millers. Labor intensive methods of cultivation were used. In the 1920s, the sugar industry came largely under the control of CSR, and it was worked by Indian laborers on either CSR's estates or plantations owned by individual planters, some of whom were Indians. Indians who stayed behind after their period of indenture (about
60 percent did) began to lease land either from the Europeans or the Fijians to plant sugar cane themselves.

From 1924 to 1973, CSR became the sole miller of Fiji's cane, which it now bought mainly from a smallholder population of Indian cane growers. To solve the problem of labor shortages resulting from the termination of Indian indentured labor in 1916 and the resultant cancellation of all remaining indentures in 1920, the CSR company adopted a scheme whereby it divided its plantations into small farms of 10 acres and contracted Indian tenants to grow the cane for its mills. As Moynagh notes, "no other sugar industry in the world has virtually all its cane grown by such a large number of small growers—numbering over 16,000 in 1973." Moreover, this situation has resulted in the concentration of the Indian population in the cane growing areas of Fiji, which includes most of the country's arable land, leased to Indian farmers by Fijian landowners.

On the other hand, the indigenous Fijians became involved in the production of copra. The copra industry became a significant, but not predominant, component of Fiji's economy. Fijians either worked as casual laborers for European-owned copra estates, or cut copra in their villages to pay their taxes or to trade for goods in the store. According to Brookfield, "A sort of 'coconut overlay' descended on all the best coastal lands of eastern
and northeastern Fiji within which the estates were the core, and which a web of European and Chinese traders serviced.\textsuperscript{25}

In 1921, the total population of Fiji was recorded as 157,266. Europeans comprised 3,878, part-Europeans 2,781, Chinese 910, Fijians 84,475, and Indians 60,634. The remainder was made up of people from other Pacific Islands.\textsuperscript{26} However, Fiji was a European-dominated order—politically, economically and socially. The Europeans occupied government positions, or they were planters and overseers, missionaries, lawyers, doctors, storekeepers, clerks, shop assistants and artisans.\textsuperscript{27} They enjoyed a much higher standard of living than any other group in the colony. Further, the Europeans held the prestigious positions in the colony's social structure. In particular, both local and expatriate European businessmen and lawyers wielded a great deal of influence in the political and social life of the society.\textsuperscript{28}

The CSR company's dominant role in the sugar industry also gave it a predominant position in the power structure of the colony. By 1920, CSR had invested about three million pounds in Fiji.\textsuperscript{29} The colonial state depended on the revenue from sugar exports to balance its budgets. Sugar generated two-thirds of the colony's export earnings and directly or indirectly made up half of the colony's revenue.\textsuperscript{30} But it was European capital which benefitted
the most from the sugar industry. The cane was processed into raw sugar in Fiji and exported to refineries overseas. Locally, the European planters provided European merchants with an expanding market and stimulated trade. However, Fiji's economy did not gain much in spite of the gains to local Europeans because of the leakage of income abroad through the purchase of imports as well as the repatriation of CSR's profits to Australia. According to Moynagh, "The company's contribution to income growth was . . . limited by its dependence on overseas markets and the location of refining, distilling and other processing facilities outside Fiji." Moreover, the company also forbade any agricultural diversification within the cane growing areas which resulted in the under-utilization of land and labor.

The majority of the Indians did not share in the economic growth generated by the sugar industry. With the existence of the indentured labor system, the European planters and CSR were able to keep wages and costs down. Indian immigrants were forced to live in crowded plantation barracks and were subjected to harsh work discipline by Indian "sirdars." But with the end of the indentured system and the change to smallholder farming, Indian growers drew higher incomes than if they had to continue as wage laborers.
Much of the wealth deriving from the sugar industry for the Fijian community was in the form of rent received from the lease of land to European or Indian planters. However, this wealth came to be concentrated in the hands of the chiefs who claimed 30 percent of the share of the rents in areas where they had authority. Aside from the meagre portion of rent received, Fijian commoners were able to obtain jobs as casual laborers for European planters. But because of the availability of cheap labor through the indentured system for the industry, wages and the price of cane were kept low. Thus, few Fijians were attracted to sugar cane production. In addition, Fijians had to fulfill schedules of work programs directed by the Fijian administration in their villages.

However, during this period, the major structures of Fiji's political economy were established. This involved, initially, plantation agriculture which was replaced by the small farm system worked mostly by Indians but on Fijian-owned land. The consequence of this arrangement is that Fijians and Indians have a conflict of interests over the security of land tenure.

The established colonial order over which the Europeans dominated did not go unchallenged. There were several popular movements among Fijian commoners originating within the first forty years of colonial rule (1874-1914). These social movements tried to challenge
the dominant interests that supported and sustained the power structures of the colonial order. The ordinary Fijian people did not just passively accept the new order imposed on them that oppressed and exploited them (see Chapters II and III).

Two popular movements, called "Tuka" and "Luveniwiwai," provided ways for Fijian commoners to vent their frustrations and discontent with the newly-established colonial order. Both movements offered a means for ordinary Fijians to assert their independence against European dominance and to express their resistance against their subordination under the colonial order. For example, the doctrine of the "Tuka" movement was that the order of the world would be reversed. This meant that the Europeans would become the servants of Fijians and the chiefs would become the servants of the Fijian commoners. With the new order, Fijian chiefs who usually had a reciprocal relationship with their people, no longer had to depend solely on them for support in order to advance. Those chiefs who became officials in the Fijian Administration saw that their interests lay in pleasing the colonial rulers. Thus, there were no channels of communication to express the aspirations and opinions of the ordinary Fijians.

The "Luveniwiwai" movement combined spirit possession and sorcery and was also widespread in Fiji. "Luveniwiwai"
literally means "water baby," or "child of the water."
During the ceremony of "yaqona," or "kava," drinking and chanting, it was believed that spirits could be induced to enter a person's body giving that person special powers. Once persons became possessed they were believed to be capable of performing superhuman deeds. The "luveni wai" associated with particular groups would be able to assist people in times of crisis.

The leaders of these two popular movements were the hereditary priests of the "old" Fijian order who had lost their power and authority due to the wholesale conversion of Fijians to Christianity ordered by their high chiefs. Other minor chiefs who had been excluded from the new hierarchical power structure also joined the movements. These social movements were in effect syncretist attempts to assimilate Christian beliefs and narratives with the Fijian world view and localities. Activities included attendance at secret meetings, the holding of seances, and performing military drills directed by self-appointed sergeants, "rokos," "bulis," and scribes--positions held by chiefs in the Fijian Administration.

The effectiveness of these movements in subverting the status quo was basically in their ability to draw large followings throughout the entire country. This raised the colonial government's anxiety over the possibilities of social disturbances and disorder among the Fijian
population. Moreover, vestiges of these movements continued to reappear in Fiji throughout the rest of Fiji's colonial history. But as one writer put it, the colonial state demonstrated its strength and impressed upon the movements' followers that the forces of the gods of the Fijians were no match for the authority of the King of England. 37

The next popular movement was an attempt at forming an economic cooperative. Its aim was to challenge the dominant structures of economic exploitation within the rural economy of Fiji. The cooperative, named "Viti Kabani" (Fiji Company), was initiated in 1913 and was led by a Fijian commoner, Apolosi R. Nawai. Basically, the idea of Apolosi's scheme appealed to the Fijians' (both chiefs and commoners) desire to partake of a greater share in the economic growth or "progress" of their country. In short, the Fijians wanted a better return from their labor and resources. They, therefore, supported Apolosi's appeal to Fijians to pool their resources in one vast company, do without the European and Chinese middlemen, and take control of the export of their own produce and import of goods. In this way, Fijians could learn the required skills and enjoy the profits of their own labor and land. As a consequence of the failure of the nineteenth century government-run marketing organization, Fijians had to sell their tax produce to European and Chinese traders.
Apolosi's scheme struck at the heart of Fijian discontent that was emerging as they perceived their own economic "backwardness." The "Viti Kabani," at first, drew large numbers of supporters across the country. Fijian banana and copra producers were willing to sell their produce to the company for a lower price in order to get it started. The company was organized on a western model with capital contributions from shareholders. However, without government support, the protests of the European banana interests, its dependence on the established European firms to handle overseas shipping, the jailing and banishment of Apolosi, and the Fijians' lack of experience and skills in enterprise, the company collapsed. Thus ended another attempt by Fijians to change the rural political economy of Fiji to be more favorable to their interests.

On the part of the Indian immigrant laborers, large-scale open protests against the European-dominated order began to occur at the end of the indentured system. As noted above, all remaining indentures were cancelled by January, 1920. Previously, the severe disciplinary system of the plantation enclave, with its attendant regimentation and penal sanctions, kept the majority of Indian laborers compliant. But by 1920, Fiji's Indian immigrants had emerged "from a collection of poor plantation laborers into a diversified, though still primarily agricultural community."
The Indian community was then in a position to openly challenge the largely-assumed relationship between the European and the Indian of sahib and coolie or master and servant by taking economic, occupational and educational initiatives. The sugar industry had been restructured from that of plantations owned by Europeans to small farms worked mainly by Indian growers. Many Indians also set up their own private enterprises, and sent their children to school whenever they could. This generation of Indians became Fiji's first non-white professionals--teachers, medical doctors, lawyers, etc. Other Indians also gradually assumed positions in the new sectors of Fiji's modern economy. In addition, the Indian community was augmented by free immigrants who took up positions in commerce such as storekeepers, artisans and in other sectors such as transport. Therefore, the Indians were now in a position to challenge, more effectively than the Fijians, the local European settlers, CSR, and the colonial government.

In 1920, Indian employees of the government and the CSR company in Suva, Rewa, Navua and Levuka went on strike for higher wages to offset the increased cost of living and for better working conditions. The cost of imported rice and sharps (flour) had increased greatly since the beginning of World War I, but wages had not kept pace.
There were also grievances against European merchants who were profiteering from the shortages.

The colonial government brought an end to the strike and demonstrations by a show of force which engaged the assistance of both European and Fijian constables. Subsequently, the government agreed to reduce the cost of living by subsidizing the sale of imported rice and began to encourage some local production of food. But the colonial government did not agree to increase wages as this would have had a negative and long-term effect on the interests of European planters and employers. Instead, the government relocated the tax burden to CSR and the millers through higher export duties and the excess profits tax.

The CSR company, on the other hand, was determined to limit the rise of labor costs and the price of cane. This resulted in another strike in 1921, which involved Indian laborers and growers against the company. The strike lasted for six months. Finally, CSR announced concessions in the form of cheap provisions, that is, CSR would import the essential supplies and sell them to the laborers at cost. Moreover, there was also a growing rift between Indian laborers and Indian growers who were eager to harvest their cane and get their returns.

The government assisted the ending of the strike by providing security for those who wished to return to work
or harvest their cane. It also relaxed the restricted movement of Fijians from their villages so that CSR could call upon them to replace the Indian laborers. According to Gillion, the Fijians did not accept this arrangement of being exploited by government for the CSR company. Many Fijian laborers also took the opportunity to press for higher wages for themselves. The Fijians were also called upon to join in the government's show of force against the Indian strikers.

In summary, CSR's significance and dominance in Fiji's colonial society is aptly summarized by Gillion in the following paragraph:

In the sugar-growing areas of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu the company was a powerful force in the lives of the Europeans and Indians. It had a reputation for dictatorial methods. 'Company ka raj' said the Indians, and many Europeans, too, believed the CSR was the real ruler of Fiji. It would be more exact to say that it had a predominant position in the power structure of the colony but it shared power with other interests: the well organized, modern colonial administration, which had a special interest in the government of the Fijians; the European planters, especially the copra planters; the European mercantile houses; and the missions, especially the Methodist Mission. Not all matters interested the CSR, but the government gave it a respectful hearing on those that did, because it provided, directly or indirectly, most of the colony's revenue.

Thus during this period the basic framework of Fiji's modern society was established. The 1920 and 1921 strikes by the Indian community were also decidedly anti-European
as well as economic. They were Indian expressions of resentment against European dominance and exploitation. Politically, Indians, like the Fijians, were excluded in the participation of government. Economically, European dominance was manifest in the predominance of CSR in the economy and the lives of the majority of the Indians. Indians were also resentful of their exclusion from non-manual positions in both government and CSR, and being subjected to differential wage rates from their European counterparts. Further, Indians had to set up their own schools to provide an education for their children. Moreover, British culture was upheld as the model for the colonial society.

But the Indian community was now beginning to challenge European dominance in their efforts to improve their standard of living. According to Gillion, "both in 1920 and 1921 the government and the European community generally were worried that the Indian agitators might succeed in turning the Fijians against the established order and so convert the trouble into a general anti-European conflict." These expressions of Indian assertiveness undermined the European assumption that Indians would be content to provide a docile labor force for the immediate profits of European capital.

European settlers, therefore, began to view the Indians rather than the Fijians as a threat to their
interests. The Europeans then attempted to convince the Fijians that European dominance was necessary to protect the Fijians against the Indian threat. Such arguments fell on receptive ears as the Fijians themselves saw their own exclusion from the growth of private capitalist enterprise while the Indians were becoming increasingly successful in commercial agriculture and other sectors of the modern economy.

Most Fijians continued to live in their villages and were occasionally employed on the plantations or the wharves. However, in addition to the chiefs who occupied government positions and enjoyed a steady source of income, there was also an emerging but small Fijian middle class. This group included Fijians who were administrators and teachers in the missions and mission-run schools for Fijian children, and indigenous magistrates, scribes and clerks in government offices.

The Indian community was also far from being homogeneous and united. Although the majority of Indians had the shared experience of indenture, "some had been employed as sirdars over the others, or had been engaged on non-agricultural work as clerks, domestic servants, sugar mill workers or engine drivers. Some had come to the colony as free immigrants, notably Punjabi agriculturalists and Gujarati shopkeepers or artisans. Some had been brought by the government under contract as
interpreters or policemen . . . The indentured laborers themselves were of very diverse background . . ." The CSR company was also instrumental in encouraging the growth of a class of Indian sugar cane growers whose interests were more in line with that of the company as employer, than with their fellow Indians who worked as laborers on CSR's estates. There were also prosperous Indian store-keepers and moneylenders. Therefore, not all Indians had been sympathetic to the strikers in 1920 and 1921. Some apparently well-to-do Indians went ahead and expressed their loyalty to the colonial government.

Within the European business community, there were also conflicts of interests between the CSR company and European merchants in Fiji. The CSR was determined to maximize its profits by keeping wages and the price of cane as low as it could get away with. This meant that there was less money for people to spend on consumer goods. In addition, there was increasing competition from Indians who set up their own stores, and import and export firms.

The other members of Fiji's emerging modern society also included part-Europeans who had Fijian mothers and European fathers. They tended to identify with their European heritage as it was to their advantage to do so. Most succeeded their fathers as planters or joined the professions. They had a lower standard of living than the Europeans but enjoyed a better life than most Fijians
and Indians. They were also given some influence in the affairs of the colony. And the Chinese component, most of whom arrived as free immigrants at the turn of the century, formed a small group of artisans, market gardeners and storekeepers. A good number settled in the Fijian villages throughout the country. Many, therefore, married Fijian women and assimilated into Fijian society. This then is the emergent framework of Fiji's multiracial or ethnically plural society.

Political Structures, Institutions, and the Political Process: The Problem of Nation-Building within the Context of Capitalist Development, Class Formation and Ethnic Divisions

A major challenge facing nation-building in Fiji has been the ethnic division of the two major groups with their different ways of life and values and therefore widely differing perspectives towards the economic life of the society they comprise. How can the nation-state of Fiji reassure everyone of its citizens that they are citizens of equal worth—that regardless of their ethnicity each citizen would be assured an equitable share of the good things in life?

The legacy of the colonial political economy, specifically, the economic, political and social predicaments that capitalist development and colonialism brought
about in Fiji affect the generality of interests which
the state in Fiji must deal with in order to survive.

One of the significant features of colonial society
in Fiji was the limited interaction among the three main
racial or ethnic groups--the Europeans, Fijians and Indians.
As is now evident, the majority of Fijians lived in
regulated villages governed by a separate Fijian
administrative and legal system and mainly engaged in a
subsistence economy. But, as Gillion points out, "there
was in Fiji a vigorous indigenous culture supported by
entrenched land rights and a separate native administration,
and the Fijians were encouraged to preserve a distinct
Fijian identity. In time this would determine the
political position of Indians in Fiji." Most Indian
immigrants had very little, if any, contact with the
Fijians or European settlers, their only outside contact
being with the CSR company's officers.

The economic and social separation of the Fijians
and Indians was heightened by the two communities' differen
ter religions, occupations, and separate school
systems. Later, this differentiation at the local level
was reinforced by the colonial encouragement of separate
political representation and associations at the national
level. It was the colonial government's policy to keep
the Indians from forming an alliance with the Fijians
against the European-dominated order.
In time, the Indian indentured laborers strengthened by free immigrants became a diversified and complex community. Some of its members acquired considerable wealth as landlords, businessmen, and moneylenders. Although the majority of Indians became smallholder sugar cane farmers (they comprise 80 percent of Fiji's cane farmers and 40 percent of the Indian workforce)\textsuperscript{51} many also entered commerce, the professions and the public service. On the other hand, the Fijians owned 83 percent of the land and dominated the army and police forces.\textsuperscript{52}

The emergent Indian community in Fiji had a wider middle-class base than the Fijian community. This middle class provided the base for a number of political leaders of the 1920 and 1921 strikes. In 1919, a group of rich Indian planters had already attempted to form an Indian Cane Growers' Association. In 1920, the Fiji Indian Labor Federation was formed to represent the concerns of Indian wage earners. However, both of these associations were superseded by the formation of the Kisan Sangh or Farmers' Association in late 1937.

The Kisan Sangh's purpose was to mobilize the Indian cane farmers. But in effect its main support came from the better-off cane contractors rather than the poor tenant farmers who were afraid of eviction by the CSR and were, therefore, apathetic. Furthermore, there were both class and cultural dimensions involved as the supporters of the
Kisan Sangh were mainly North Indians who were more prosperous than their fellow South Indians who had arrived at a later date and were poorer. The CSR company eventually accorded the Kisan Sangh recognition as a union. The Kisan Sangh then assumed the role of negotiating contracts for the cane growers and presenting the farmers' grievances to the company. Thus, the Kisan Sangh became an important institution in the life of Fiji's rural Indian community. In addition, the Kisan Sangh provided a political base for Indian politicians aspiring for political leadership at the colony-wide level. But it was not long before a rival organization, the Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh (All Fiji Farmers' Union) was formed in 1941 drawing its support from the South Indian cane farmers.

On the part of the Fijians, it was the Council of Chiefs which assumed the role of representing Fijian aspirations and goals. A prominent Fijian high chief, Ratu Sukuna, successfully convinced the colonial government, in 1944, to continue with the separate Fijian administrative system. This was presented as the appropriate means to ensure that Fijians continue to practice their own way of life based mainly in the villages. The Fijian Administration, through the chiefs, would provide the basis for the articulation of the concerns and interests of the Fijians.
At the same time, there was increasing pressure for equal status with the Europeans for the Indians, and a common franchise, from both India and the Indian community in Fiji. This demand for complete equality of citizenship by Indians in Fiji meant being placed on the same plane as the Europeans with social acceptance, economic equality and political rights. The claim for economic equality particularly related to the holding of land. The Indians also wanted a substantial share in the political power of the colony. Later both these claims came to be extended to the Fijians.

The response of the colonial government to these demands from the Indian community was to agree to guarantee that Indians in Fiji "would in all respects be equal to that of any other class of His Majesty's subjects resident there." The colonial government in Fiji went as far as drafting an ordinance to guarantee the equal status of Indians but it did not enact it. This action was taken to placate the Indian government.

With regard to the land situation in Fiji, the proposed guarantee of equal rights for Indians only meant that they would be allowed to continue to lease land from Fijian landowners who were to determine the duration of tenure. Further, in the 1940s, two major legislative acts were passed to keep the Fijians a separate group and guarantee their ownership of their land. The Native Land
Trust Ordinance of 1940 put the control of the leasing of Fijian lands in the hands of a centrally-controlled bureaucracy—the Native Land Trust Board. The Fijian Affairs Ordinance of 1944 allowed the separate administrative system for Fijians to continue but linked it to the central government.

The Indian demand for political rights was also only partially granted. The demand for a common franchise was rejected by the British government on the basis that the numerical superiority of the Indian community would mean eventual Indian control of the government of Fiji. This would be unacceptable to the minority but dominant European interests. But within the colonial government in Fiji, it resulted in the subsequent declaration by colonial officials of the doctrine of the paramountcy of native Fijian interests.

However, the colonial government allowed some degree of representation for both Fijians and Indians in the central government of the colony. But initially representation was given on a nominated basis and participation was only in an advisory capacity. Thus Indian political leaders continued to push for more meaningful political representation on the basis of a common franchise. Consequently, the Indians were given the franchise in 1929 but on a communal basis. The Indian community was allowed to elect three Indian representatives.
to the Legislative Council. Europeans elected six European members while three Fijian members were nominated by the governor on the recommendation of the Council of Chiefs.

The Indian leadership's persistent and adamant demand for a common franchise had a number of negative repercussions for the Indian community in Fiji as a whole. First, it caused a division within the Indian community itself. The Muslim minority (15 percent of the Indian population), apprehensive of Hindu domination, joined the Europeans and Fijians in opposing the introduction of a common franchise. Second, it resulted in cementing the alliance between Europeans and the Fijian elite--both chiefs and educated Fijians--as neither group wanted to see Indian political domination.56

By 1946, the Indians had outnumbered the Fijians by 46 percent to 45 percent, respectively, of the total population of Fiji. Moreover, the Indians were now firmly embedded in the European-dominated capitalist system of development. In spite of the insecurity of leases, the Indians were firmly established in the sugar industry, comprising the majority of cane growers and workers in the mills. Others had now become dominant in the new sectors of the modern economy such as in transport and construction. Those who had been able to get access to a western education became qualified to enter the public service, though initially as juniors to the colonial
officials. By now Indian merchants, particularly the Gujaratis, were moving in to dominate local commerce and trade and ousted their European counterparts. However, the large European capital concerns retained their dominant position in the economy and society.

The Indians persevered with fighting for further economic gains in the sugar industry in the 1943 strike for higher cane prices. In addition, Indians refused to join the war effort during the Second World War unless they were allowed to serve under the same conditions as the Europeans. They remained in the country and enjoyed some degree of prosperity while the Fijians took up arms and fought together with the Europeans. Later both these actions of the Indians were used to alienate them further from the Europeans and the Fijians. Moreover, after World War II, more Fijians moved out of their villages and had to compete with the Indians for jobs in the public service and the private sector.57

Where there were Fijians and Indians employed in the same type of occupations, they have, on occasion, joined in solidarity to challenge European domination and exploitation. For example, in 1937, both Fijians and Indians jointly protested against higher pay rates for European civil servants in similar positions as those held by them.58 Also during the 1959 oil workers' strike and riots in Suva, both Fijian and Indian workers acted
together to protest against economic exploitation. However, trade unions have also emerged mainly along racial lines due to the history of the different ethnic groups entering and dominating different occupations in the capitalist development of Fiji.59

Fijian dissatisfaction with the establishment resurfaced into a form of open protest in late 1959 and the early 1960s. A cooperative society under the leadership of Apimeleki Ramatau Mataka was formed in 1961. The cooperative movement which involved about 1,000 members in four villages along the southwest coast of Viti Levu adopted the name of "Bula Tale" Communist Party.60 The movement openly challenged the hierarchy of authority established by the Fijian Administration and the Methodist mission. However, its main purpose was to raise the issue of the low standard of living of the Fijians in the villages concerned. Thus it showed up the neglect of the chiefs in the centers of power of the welfare of their people. One of its proposed objectives was to promote economic development among the Fijian villagers.61 The movement did cause some concern among the Fijian elite such as the Fijian Teachers' Association and the Fijian Association which was formed in 1956 with its main purpose as the maintenance of chiefly authority.

During this same period, the colonial government commissioned two studies of the situation in Fiji. The
first was by a geographer from the Australian National University, O.H.K. Spate. His report was presented to the colonial government in 1959. It focused, as stated by its title, on "The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects." The report was specifically critical of the system of Fijian administration in regulating the lives of the Fijians.62

The second study was more wide-ranging and was conducted by a team of three Europeans led by Sir Alan Burns. The "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji," was presented to the colonial government in 1960. It too supported the Spate report's view that the system of Fijian administration was not operating to the benefit of the ordinary Fijians and suggested a number of modifications.63

However, the decolonization process which started after World War II began to affect Fiji in the 1960s. The Afro-Asian resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December, 1960, called for the political independence of all remaining dependent territories. In line with the British policy of withdrawal from all regions east of the Suez, the British Colonial Office introduced constitutional changes in Fiji, first towards self-government and eventually leading to political independence. In 1963, the franchise was extended to
Fijians and women. But communal representation and voting in the electoral system was maintained.

Two main political parties were formed to contest the preparatory elections leading up to political independence. The Federation Party, which later became the National Federation Party (NFP), was formed in 1965 out of the Maha Sangh with its major support base as the Indian cane farmers. Although the Federation Party did try to attract some Fijian membership most of its supporters were Indians.

The Alliance Party of Fiji was formed in 1966 by the Fijian Association, the National Congress or Indian Alliance (comprising most of the supporters of the Kisan Sangh), the General Electors Association (representing Europeans, Part-Europeans and Chinese), and the All-Fiji Muslim Political Front. The Alliance Party was therefore a coalition of constituent ethnic organizations representing the Fijian, European, Indian and Chinese communities in Fiji. But it was a Fijian-dominated Alliance Party as the Fijian Association played the founding role in its formation. As pointed out above, the Fijian Association was dominated by leading Fijian chiefs and was not representative of the "lewe-ni-vanua," or ordinary Fijians. Its leader was a high chief of Lau, Ratu Kamisese Mara, who was Fiji's Prime Minister from independence in 1970 until mid-1992, except for a brief
period in 1987. The small Fijian elite saw that it was necessary to present a united and organized political party, or "controlled participation guided from the top" over a more broadly-based organization emerging from the economic and social needs of the Fijian commoners.66

The Alliance Party was to be a predominantly Fijian political party representing Fijian concerns and interests at the colony-wide level. The Alliance Party stance was based on the Fijian Association's concerns which were expressed in a paper for a senior Colonial Office official. It called for a number of things: that the existing system of landownership be maintained; that there be an ethnic balance between Indians and Fijians in the public service (which was then dominated by Indians); that the powers enjoyed by the Fijian Affairs Board and the Council of Chiefs be retained; that any future Prime Minister of Fiji must be a Fijian; and that there should be an absolute majority of Fijian representation in the national legislature.67

The National Federation Party, on the other hand, continued to push for a common franchise and called for immediate political independence from Britain. The NFP drew the great part of its support from the typical Fiji-Indian who is basically a cane farmer. The major concerns of the Indian cane farmers were access to land, cane prices, debt repayment, the power of the CSR, and the
future of their children. For the Indian farmers, the
NFP was the political party, which if it won political
power, could provide the kind of security of land tenure
they longed for.

The land problem has been Fiji's most sensitive
political issue. Thousands of Indian families earn a
comfortable living as smallholder cane-farmers as tenants
on Fijian-owned land. The Indians are, therefore,
continually dependent on the goodwill of their Fijian
landowners in order to secure extensions of their leases.
Indian tenants were initially limited to 21-year leases
but they were later extended to 30 years. At the end of
these terms, the Fijian landowners may veto further leasing
on the basis that they want to plant the land themselves.
Alternatively, the land may be declared as reserve lands
to be set aside for exclusive Fijian use.68

The decade leading up to political independence (1960-
1970) was a time of anxiety and uncertainty particularly
for the Fijians. There was no "burning desire" on the
part of the Fijians for political independence although
there was some interest in moving toward self-government.69
The Fijians were against immediate independence and a
common franchise--the NFP's two persistent demands.

On the other hand, the NFP president, A. D. Patel,
argued that a common franchise was "the only genuine method
of democratic representation . . . the only way to bring
about political integration and change a multi-ethnic society into one nation.\textsuperscript{70} The Fijians, however, perceived that a common franchise would only provide the legitimate means for Indians to obtain political dominance. There were several factors involved in the Fijians' insecurity. First, the Fijians had become a minority in Fiji's plural society. Second, Fijians were lagging behind non-Fijians in the economic and educational fields. Thus, Fijians would not be in a position to take control of the state apparatuses such as the heads of government departments when the country became independent.\textsuperscript{71} Hence, they foresaw that the control of the state would be in the hands of non-Fijians.

However, the Fijian leadership was aware that British policy was to lead its dependent territories towards self-government and independence in the shortest time possible. Thus, the Fijian leaders insisted that "the control of the country should be returned to Fijians, by force if need be."\textsuperscript{72} A statement by the Fijian Association declared that Fijians were prepared to fight for their rights and recognition as a race in Fiji.\textsuperscript{73} There was growing Fijian resentment and fear at the prospect of ultimate racial subjugation in their homeland upon independence. They, therefore, pushed for safeguards against the above possibility by asking for a special position for the Fijian
people. At the same time, the Indian community demonstrated its solidarity and support for the NFP's policies of immediate independence and a common franchise in the 1968 by-elections. The NFP denounced the Fijian chiefs as oppressors of their people. Such a situation exacerbated the Fijians' anxiety and resentment which erupted into threats of violence and calls for the repatriation of Indians. However, the Fijian chiefs called for restraint, and violence was averted. 74

The Colonial Office and the Fiji government thus adopted a cautious approach when it came to apportioning political power in the country. From 1965 to 1968, there appeared to be irreconcilable differences between the Alliance Party and the National Federation Party representing the views and interests of Fijians and Indians, respectively. But by 1969, relations between the two political parties began to improve. One of the factors leading to the changed situation was the death of the NFP leader, A. D. Patel, in 1969. He was uncompromisingly anti-British and pro-common franchise. His successor, S. M. Koya, although still representing Indian interests, was more inclined to cooperate with the Alliance leadership to find an acceptable position for both parties. 75 Furthermore, the Alliance Party from its position of strength also decided that it was a favorable time to secure independence for Fiji.
The conditions of political independence and the new constitution of the postcolonial state was negotiated by the representatives of the two political parties with the British Government representatives as intermediaries in a Constitutional Conference held between April 20 and May 5, 1970. The negotiations focused on the form of the electoral system. The NFP continued to call for a common franchise while the Alliance Party wanted to continue with the communal system of representation. A compromised set of structures was agreed upon whereby political representation would still be communally distributed on the basis of race. But there would also be a modified form of the common franchise called cross-voting for a certain number of communal seats.

The distribution of political representation ensured that a governing majority could not result from the representatives of either the Fijians or the Indians operating solely on a communal basis. Both the Fijians and the Indians received 22 seats each in a 52-member House of Representatives or legislature. The remaining 8 seats were allocated to the General Electors (Europeans, Part-Europeans and Chinese). Consequently, the Europeans, Part-Europeans and Chinese communities enjoyed a much greater degree of political influence than was warranted by their numbers, a situation which corresponded more to their economic position in the country.
The Fijian-dominated Alliance Party ruled Fiji for the first 17 years of independence. Its political dominance, however, was dependent on continued Fijian and General Elector support. However, this was not the case on two occasions—in the April general elections of 1977 and 1987. The Alliance Party lost both elections because of a shift in the Fijian vote to the Fijian Nationalist Party in 1977 and a shift in the Fijian and General Elector votes in Suva to the NFP-Labor Coalition in 1987. But politicians have continued to mobilize support for their candidacy on the basis of racial concerns. This situation is reinforced and encouraged by the formal political structures and institutions which are based on ethnic divisions.

How then have the state managers attempted to deal with the creation of a national consciousness and the "general interest" of the people within the nation-state of Fiji? As is evident, there is no historical base of a nationalist anti-colonial movement for an official nationalism to build on. And even if there was, the history of African and Asian states have shown the short-lived advantages of nationalist anti-colonial movements in the building of multiracial nation-states after political independence has been gained.

Fiji's Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, leader of the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party, did attempt to present
an ideology of multiracialism under the broader idea of solving conflicts of interests in terms of consensus building called "The Pacific Way." The ideology of multiracialism tried to present to the people of Fiji a way of feeling that there was an "equal" place for the different ethnic groups in Fiji to take part in the capitalist development of the country and yet maintain their distinct ways of living.

However, the problem of the insecurity of land tenure, together with the restricted availability of land due to the increase in population, and the administrative inconveniences in obtaining leases of Fijian land, continued to trouble Indian farmers. The Indian constituency, therefore, continued to take the view that only by obtaining political control could this feeling of insecurity be solved. Thus, they supported the NFP's leaders' persistent demands for a common franchise and substantial political power. In addition, the NFP voiced the Indians' resentment of the Alliance government's policies of responding to Fijian demands for economic and educational privileges such as providing Fijians with jobs in the public service, and scholarships in order to catch up with non-Fijians in the modern sector. The NFP branded such policies as favoritism and racial discrimination. It also criticized the Alliance government for embarking on a systematic policy of staffing the upper echelons of the state bureaucracies with indigenous Fijians.
On the other hand, the more chauvinist Fijian elements accused the Alliance government of selling out the Fijians by giving the Indians concessions such as the passing of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act which offers Indian farmers on native leases greater security of tenure. The Fijian Nationalist Party was formed in 1975. Its leader, Sakiasi Butadroka, called for the immediate repatriation of all persons of Indian descent and absolute Fijian political dominance. Thus, when the Fijian-dominated Alliance Party was defeated in April, 1987, by an Indian-dominated Coalition of the NFP and Labor Party which had an urban and class base, the Fijian-led army decided it would defend the political status of the Fijians by force.

But the leader of the Alliance government did make an attempt to de-emphasize the racial nature of Fiji's national political process in order to create a more stable political order. The idea that communally-based representation in the national legislature would provide this stability only served to entrench the racial divisions in Fiji's society.

In 1980, the Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, put forward a proposal to the leader of the Opposition NFP, Jai Ram Reddy, to form a government of national unity in another attempt at overriding the ethnic divisiveness of Fiji's national political process. According to Ratu Mara, a
government of national unity did not just mean a coalition arrangement between the Alliance Party and the NFP. Rather, his idea of a government of national unity must be based on consensus. One of the most contentious areas where consensus was needed was on how to better distribute the uses of the scarce resources and wealth of Fiji. Thus, the next section of this chapter discusses this issue in light of the development strategies adopted by the Alliance government.

The Fijian State's Development Strategies:

Internal and External Actors

In Fiji's Development Process

The political economy of Fiji at the time of political independence in 1970 had the following major characteristics: (i) ethnic Fijians still owned and effectively controlled 83 percent of the land in the country; (ii) the economy was dependent on foreign capital and an adequate export income for economic growth; (iii) there was a relatively affluent subsistence sector which acted as a "safety net" by absorbing surplus labor and supplementing urban incomes; (iv) the ethnic Indians dominated the localized commercially-oriented sectors of the economy; (v) political power was vested in the coalition of ethnic constituencies through which the ethnically Fijian-dominated Alliance Party ruled the country.
As discussed above, there existed a feeling of insecurity and resentment among Fijians as a result of their economic and educational backwardness in relation to the other ethnic groups who were dominant in the modern sector of Fiji's economy. Although the colonial and post-colonial governments were aware of the situation, no significant or radical steps were taken to change the status quo. Rather, "economic policy objectives stressed national unity, overall real economic growth, job creation, and improved social conditions," within the process of detailed economic planning. There were suggestions for "a full-scale Fijian economic development plan" by the Fijian Advancement Party in 1965. The party was concerned with the Fijian people's "lag in important fields of the colony's progress." It was critical of the colonial government's lack of action in implementing Spate's recommendations dealing with the Fijian Administration and Fijian economic development.

Later, in 1969, on the eve of Fiji's independence, the government outlined a new grassroots plan for rural growth. People in the villages and rural settlements were to be encouraged to take part in planning their own development programs on a self-help basis. This was an integral part of the nation-building process which would create a better life for everyone. But the government did not take any specific measures or set aside any substantial amount of resources to implement this plan.
There was no radical change in the direction of Fiji's economic policies after political independence. The colonial government had established procedures of economic planning in the 1950s. With independence, detailed planning gained greater importance and emphasis. Government planners took the view that planning was critical to the state's management of the economy and promotion of economic growth. Upon independence, Fiji joined the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank. Aid flows replaced colonial budgetary support. Both bilateral and multilateral aid donors required detailed economic planning as a qualification for aid. This requirement provided a means for aid donors to collect the data they needed to justify the aid projects and programs on their own agendas.

The postcolonial government's development strategy has been basically that of expanding Fiji's modern sector. This meant increasing urban-based and cash employment through the growth of manufacturing and the tourist industry. In terms of rural development, the strategy called for freeing up access to land, obtaining greater efficiency from Fijian communally-owned land, encouraging independent farmers, and expanding the range of export commodities from sugar and copra to cocoa, coffee, timber and fish.
The postcolonial or Alliance government has depended on foreign capital to promote economic development in Fiji. Peak foreign investment occurred in Fiji from 1972 to 1974 when the tourist industry began to flourish. By the mid-1980s tourism had become Fiji's second largest foreign exchange earner. However, Fiji's tourist industry is dominated by large foreign-owned hotel chains which have been the main beneficiaries of the tourist boom. The growth of the tourist industry generated some local capitalist development. This occurred in the transport and retailing sectors but has been dominated by Indian enterprises. Indigenous Fijian participation in the tourist industry has been insignificant in the sense that Fijians have only been involved in the provision of cheap labor and services in the hotels, and commercially, in the marginal handicraft trade. However, the growth of the tourist industry in Fiji has only served to integrate Fiji further into the pressures of the world-economy.

The Alliance government has also been optimistic about depending on foreign investment for the capital and the technical and managerial expertise that could be brought into the country in the field of manufacturing. The national development objectives and strategies in manufacturing were basically guided by a policy of import substitution. The government provided protection for light manufacturing industries that produced for the domestic
market through the imposition of import tariffs and quotas for certain consumer items.

However, in 1982, the Economic Development Board spelled out that the government wanted to encourage the growth and expansion of locally-owned enterprises while still welcoming overseas capital investment. To get around this policy, many foreign companies initiated joint ventures with locally-owned enterprises.

But foreign capital and multinational corporations—mainly from Australia and New Zealand—have continued to dominate banking, shipping, mining, forestry, fishing and the export and import sectors of the economy. Their greater access to capital backing and control of the markets have given them the leading edge in these sectors over locally-owned enterprises.

But dependence on multinational corporations to generate economic development in Fiji has been illusive rather than real. Although MNCs assist in the generation of foreign exchange, most of the profits are shifted out of Fiji and channelled to safer investment opportunities in the parent country. According to Taylor, a conservative sum of F$28 million leaves Fiji annually in the form of company transfers.

The Alliance government's policies of encouraging the growth and diversification of locally-owned enterprises have resulted in the emergence of a few "giant" local
companies. With the exception of a Chinese-owned company, the other companies are all owned by Fiji-Indians. All of these enterprises have multi-site locations in Fiji's towns and cities and are owned by individual families. Some of these companies have also become multinational with operations in Australia and other Pacific Island states. These have also been the companies which are well placed to join in partnership with overseas capital in joint ventures. They have a long history (as some of them have been in existence for forty years) of business and borrowing records and thus greater access to capital, as well as the accumulated managerial experience and expertise. With the retreat of foreign capital in certain commercial sectors, locally-owned enterprises have emerged to fill the gap.

Can these local-owned enterprises generate economic development in Fiji? Aside from sugar exports, foreign companies still control much of Fiji's export sector. But, according to Taylor, these foreign companies are more the "peripheral branches [or] regional supply arms of often global corporations set up in Fiji to mop up the market fragments of the South Pacific." Thus, the Alliance government was hopeful that the locally-owned enterprises might begin to assume a role in the production of exports in the economy. However, as noted above, some locally-owned businesses have
preferred to invest their profits overseas in "safer" places such as Australia and New Zealand. Such a move by Fiji-Indian-owned enterprises is indicative of their feelings of insecurity in Fiji and the unstable political climate. The amount of capital that Fiji citizens take or send out of the country amounts to a sum of F$25 million (US$20 million) annually, which compares with the sum taken out by foreign companies operating in Fiji. Another reason for the lack of initiative on the part of locally-owned enterprises to develop exports is due to the difficulties of finding markets for Fiji's manufactured products. In spite of a freer trade access agreement—the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement—SPARTECA—the markets of Australia and New Zealand (two of Fiji's most important trading partners) remain closed to Fiji's manufactured exports.

Therefore, Fiji's economy today continues to be dominated by sugar production. The sugar cane is grown by some 23,000 smallholder farmers, 80 percent of whom are Indians, on 75,000 hectares of land leased from Fijian owners. The sugar industry further provides employment for some 17,000 cane cutters and 3,400 employees of the government-owned Fiji Sugar Corporation. The majority of these employees are Indians.

In 1973, the Alliance government brought CSR's sugar interests and the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) took over
sugar milling and providing the other associated services to the farmers. Following the advice of experts from London, the FSC was set up wholly as a government-owned corporation. This meant it continued to operate on the basis of a private company. Consequently, the historical division of interests between the millers (now FSC instead of CSR) and the growers has continued to trouble the industry.

A further reason for the Fijian-dominated Alliance government's lack of interest in introducing cooperative ownership of the mills was political. The dominance of Indians in the sugar industry as cane growers and mill workers would have meant that Fiji's only national industry, sugar, would benefit mostly one ethnic community in the country. The Alliance government drawing most of its support from the Fijians and, therefore, representing their interests decided to have FSC operate solely as a private company but owned by government. 93

Since 1973, the differences between the cane farmers and the millers have taken the form of a political struggle between the Alliance government-owned FSC and the NFP-dominated cane growers' union. After the military coup of May 14, 1987, Fiji's 18,000 Indian cane farmers showed their opposition by refusing to harvest their cane, putting the Fijian state's potential F$200 million of export receipts at risk. Subsequently, the cane was harvested after a two-month delay.
The growth of the sugar industry in Fiji has been largely influenced by Fiji's fortunate position of having access to protected markets with stabilized and subsidized prices. During the colonial era, Fiji enjoyed preferential tariffs imposed by Britain for imperial sugar. This arrangement was extended for the former colonies upon gaining independence by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA). The CSA was superseded by the Lomé Convention, a preferential trade agreement between the former European colonies and the European Economic Community. Under the Lomé agreement, Fiji continues to sell 60 percent of its sugar to Britain at a stabilized price. In addition, Fiji has also been able to negotiate long-term contracts for the sale of its sugar with New Zealand, the United States, Malaysia, China and Singapore. These arrangements take care of the bulk of Fiji's sugar exports so that only a small proportion must be sold at world market prices. Fiji's sugar cane farmers, therefore, have enjoyed some rise in their standard of living. The gross earnings per farmer for the year 1986 to 1987 was F$7,000.94

Although Fiji is small and isolated, many of its people have enjoyed some long-term growth in average income.95 On the other hand, this has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the cost of living which further disadvantages those not involved in the economic growth of the country--the rural Fijians. Accordingly,
Fiji has the most developed economy in the South Pacific Island region. But, as pointed out earlier, Fiji's relatively high wage economy in comparison with other Third World countries is the result of the ability of a relatively affluent subsistence sector to cushion the effects of capitalist growth by acting as a safety-valve for the indigenous Fijian community. However, with the increase in population, and the government's plans to open up more Fijian land for "efficient" economic production, more Fijians are being pushed to compete with the other ethnic groups for wage employment.

The Alliance government adopted a laissez-faire approach in dealing with the issue of Fijian economic development. Its main strategy was to draw Fijians into the cash economy either through commercial farming or wage employment in the urban sector. The Fijians best able to benefit from government concessions in educational scholarships, soft loans from the Fiji Development Bank to set up commercial enterprises, the setting up of a few Fijian-government sponsored companies, and job hiring and promotional preferences in the public service, have been middle-class Fijians. They already enjoy privileges such as stable and steady employment in government bureaucracies.

The NFP-Labor Coalition government, which took office in April, 1987 (until it was overthrown by the May 14, 1987 military coup), did not propose any radical departures
from the economic development strategies adopted by the former Alliance government. Moreover, most of the measures that the Coalition proposed to introduce would also have benefitted mainly the urban middle-class ethnic Fijians and Indians rather than the rural dwellers in the villages and outlying islands of the country.

The economic and social repercussions of the military coups of 1987 in Fiji have been far-reaching. One of the major consequences of the political disturbances was the near collapse of the modern economy. The subsequent economic crisis took the form of an immediate and considerable flight of capital, total loss of foreign and domestic business confidence, and a dramatic drop in the number of tourist arrivals. Both Fiji's two main foreign exchange earners, tourism and sugar, suffered a drastic downturn in earnings for 1987. The social costs have been manifest in the continued emigration of a great number of Fiji's skilled and talented people. Emigrants have come from all ethnic groups. But the majority have been ethnic Indians. They have moved to more secure and developed destinations such as Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. Consequently, Fiji now suffers from a shortage of medical doctors, teachers, lawyers, accountants, engineers and technicians—all the skilled people needed to run the modern sector.
On the other hand, the outcome of the economic crisis occasioned by political instability has resulted in the complete reorientation of Fiji's development strategies. In mid-1989, the Interim government\(^7\) announced the new economic development strategy of a market-oriented export-led approach. An instance of the new export-oriented strategy in practice is the government's active promotion of a Tax-free Factory Scheme to encourage private investment and restore investor confidence. In addition, in line with advice from the experts of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the government has also proceeded to gradually deregulate the Fiji economy by dismantling its import substitution protective policies, for example. It has also privatized some government-owned services such as telecommunications. Other measures that the government has implemented or is in the process of implementing include the cutting back of government expenditure, deregulation of the labor market and tax reform in order to encourage private sector development. The economy is, therefore, being oriented toward an open export-led development strategy.

The main beneficiaries of these post-coup economic development policies have been basically domestic and foreign capital. For example, most of the locally-owned tax-free enterprises are Fiji-Gujarati-Indian concerns. They are the local entrepreneurs who are taking advantage
of the export-led development strategy. And with their experience and expertise they are best placed to take up joint ventures with foreign investors. However, the foreign investment base is now widened to include not only Australia and New Zealand but South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore and China.

Ethnic Fijians are only involved marginally: in the leasing of their land to make space for the setting up of factories. But indications are that there is a growing number of Fijian women entering the job market in the tax-free factories, specifically in the emergent garment industry. However, a handful of well-placed Fijians have acquired or started enterprises of their own, albeit with substantial help from government in the form of soft loans, in the retailing and transport sectors. Some of the Fijian elite have also acquired positions as directors on the boards of government-owned joint ventures formed on the basis of promoting indigenous Fijian investment.

In conclusion, the export-led open-oriented development strategy of the post-coup government also effectively means that the majority of ethnic Fijians would continue to be left on the periphery of a peripheral economy. Fiji's political instability continues to threaten economic development in the country. For some semblance of the return to political stability, it would mean that Fiji's Indian and other ethnic groups would have to accept
political structures which assure ethnic Fijian political dominance and their continued ownership of land.

In short, the Fijian state's pursuit of the "general interest" and its claim to embody universalistic interests in order to gain legitimacy among its citizens has been difficult to sustain. The Alliance government's ideology of multiracialism seems to have been unworkable within the context of conflicting interests arising historically from colonialism and capitalist development. Furthermore, the state's dependence on foreign capital to generate development, particularly the government's reliance on the World Bank, IMF, and ADB: agencies which insist on the use of their funds for private investments, has restricted both the Alliance and post-coup governments from pursuing policies that would benefit in a concrete way most ethnic Fijians. The Seagaqa Sugar Cane Development Project illustrates the limitations posed by this kind of economic dependency.
Notes to Chapter IV


4 For in-depth discussions of these theories see Martin Carnoy, Chapters 2 and 5.

5 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

6 Anthony Giddens, p. 216.


8 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 25.

9 Fred Block, p. 54.

10 Ibid., p. 84.

11 Ibid.

12 Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich


14 Martin Carnoy, p. 183.


16 Cardoso and Faletto, p. xvii.

17 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., p. 209.

22 Ibid., p. 208.


24 Ibid.


27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 49.
30 Ibid., p. 3.

31 Michael Moynagh, pp. 67 and 120. According to Moynagh, "From 1887 to 1910 CSR's profits (excluding depreciation) totalled 2,171,471 pounds, just over the 2,052,953 pounds, it had invested in the colony by the end of that period. Most of this was remitted overseas. To this, of course, must be added European earnings which were repatriated either as savings or through the purchase of imports; for European consumption consisted mainly of imports--processed food, alcohol, certain luxuries . . . ."

32 Ibid., p. 120.

33 K. L. Gillion, The Fiji Indians. See also by the same author, Fiji's Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962). A. C. Mayer, Indians in Fiji (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 18. According to Mayer, Indian laborers had to work under the task system which involved being given a specific amount of work to be completed each day. If the task was not accomplished the laborer's daily wage was withdrawn. Furthermore, the laborer would also be prosecuted for failure to work under his contract. More often than not, laborers were often overtasked as planters attempted to raise their profits.

34 Michael Moynagh, p. 120.


36 A. J. Chapelle, p. 50; Peter Worsley, p. 20.
William Sutherland, p. 57. The colonial government suppressed and subjugated these movements by banishing and exiling their leaders, and by flogging and sending some of their followers to hard labor.


Ibid., p. 18. Almost all the rice and sharps (flour) consumed by Indians in Fiji was imported from Australia, which itself imported the rice from India, and resold it to Fiji. In 1919, there were prolonged shipping strikes in Australia, and there was a failure of the rice crop in India who then prohibited the export of rice. Australia banned the export of sharps. A legacy of this trend is that Fiji today continues to have a large food import bill.

Ibid., p. 52. The CSR argued that wages paid in Java were lower than those of Fiji, and Java was a main competitor in the sugar market. In addition, the world price of sugar was still falling. Moreover, the company pointed out that the Indian agitation was politically rather than economically motivated. Thus CSR told the colonial government that it would not raise wages. The government, however, was anxious to avoid another costly disturbance. The Governor of the colony, therefore, advised CSR not only to increase wages but to sell food and clothing to the Indian laborers at low prices. The CSR refused to do both things.

Ibid., pp. 52-53.

Ibid., p. 60.

Ibid., p. 42.
Although the 1921 strike was basically a demand for higher wages, it assumed a racial character when Indian laborers for all Europeans as well as the CSR were told to go on strike.

As Gillion puts it, "The two races were markedly different in their customs, motivations, and temperaments. The Indian stereotype of the Fijian was that of an irresponsible, childish, uncivilized fellow or "jungli," while the Fijian learned to avoid the heathen and undersized Indian coolie, brought to Fiji to work as a plantation slave." Intermarriage between the two races has been rare.

See also: Ahmed Ali, "Fiji: Political Change, 1874-1960," in Politics in Fiji, ed. Brij Lal (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 8. According to Ali, "Where the Fijian enjoyed life, was the owner of his land and master of his time, the Indian was a 'coolie' slaving for someone else, subject to the whims of his employer, and engaged in a routine of drudgery."

Gillion quotes a colonial official as giving the reason that because of the adoption of the ideology of the paramountcy of Fijian interests in Fiji, Fijians should be discouraged from forming close ties with the Indians.


55 K. L. Gillion, The Fiji Indians, p. 69. These words echoed a statement made by Lord Salisbury in 1875 as Secretary of State for India, which became known as the "Salisbury Despatch."

56 Ibid., pp. 73-74. The British colonial officials in Fiji sympathized with the local European settlers in Fiji for they were the local representatives of British culture who "provided the social leadership, the capital and the managerial skills that sustained the modern economy and colony's revenues." In addition, the officials argued, Indian political dominance would also threaten Fijian interests. Thus local Europeans who set out to stir up the Fijians against the Indians were not discouraged by the government. Fijians were told that if the common franchise was granted to the Indians, Fijians would lose all their land and their rights. Although this did not cause any violence, the Fijians' growing fear of an Indian threat was exacerbated.

57 The Fijian middle class has been made up mostly of civil servants, teachers, medical officials, clerks and administrative officers in government bureaucracies. On the other hand, the larger Indian middle class has a wider base covering a range of occupations in the civil service, commerce and the professions--lawyers, medical doctors, teachers--as well as in industry.


59 Kevin Hince, Trade Unionism in Fiji in 1990: After Twenty Years of Independence and Two Military Coups (Wellington: Industrial Relations Center, Victoria University of Wellington, 1990). According to Hince, the union divisions between Fijians and Indians have been based on the predominance of each group in certain occupations. Two predominantly Fijian unions are the Seamen's Union and the Fiji Mineworkers Union. The National Farmers Union comprises mainly Indian cane farmers.

The segregated school system for Fijians and Indians also resulted in the formation of the Fijian Teachers Association to represent the interests of Fijian teachers in Fijian schools while the Fiji Teachers Union draws its membership from the Indian school system. However, the two teachers unions have attempted to forge some solidarity with regard to issues which affected teachers generally.

The Fiji Trade Union Congress or the national organization to which all trade unions are affiliated has been dominated by Indian trade union leaders.
Apimeleki was a former clerk in the Medical Department. Although he may have known about communism, the movement had no external influence.


The Fiji Times, November 2 and 9, 1968, p. 5 and p. 3.


Roderic Alley, pp. 32-33.


The Fiji Times, January 22, 1963, p. 3.


Ibid., September 13, 1968.

Ibid., September 17, 1968, p. 3.


Robert Norton, p. 65. The Alliance Party agreed on the ideal of a common roll. However, it argued that under the prevailing conditions of economic, educational, and numerical inequality between the Fijians and Indians, a common franchise would not be accepted by the Fijians. But the Alliance agreed to review the situation at a future date.


The Alliance government implemented the policy that 50 percent of all government scholarships should be reserved for Fijians and the other 50 percent should go to all non-Fijians.

The Labor Party was formed in July, 1985. Its support base was the urban-dominated trade union movement. It proposed to create more jobs, raise wages, implement a fair tax system, provide better and more houses, initiate a comprehensive health scheme and provide free education up to 4th form for all children. See Fiji Sun, March 5, 1987. However, it would seem that the main beneficiaries of these policy reforms would be mainly middle-income ethnic Fijians and Indians in the urban centers.
192


83 The Fiji Times, April 1, 1965.

84 O.H.K. Spate, The Fijian People.


88 Ibid., p. 59. At precoup exchange rate, F$28 million is equivalent to US$30 million; post-coup US$22 million as a result of devaluation of the Fiji dollar.

89 Ibid., p. 70. They include Motibhai and Company, R. B. Patel, Punja and Sons, Tapoo Ltd, G. B. Hari, and Lees Trading.

90 Ibid., p. 68.

91 Ibid., p. 59.

92 Rodney Cole and Helen Hughes, pp. 35-36.

93 See Michael Moynagh, p. 242, for a detailed analysis.

94 Rodney Cole and Helen Hughes, p. 35.
Fiji compares relatively well with other Third World countries with a per capita income of US$1,250 at independence and US$1,710 in 1985, which is three times the per capita incomes of the Philippines and Indonesia.


A civilian government was put in power by the military in December 1987. Its task has been to generate economic recovery and to prepare the country for a return to democratic government. The general election to be held in May 1992 is supposed to put a democratically-elected government back in power.

Mark Sturton and Andrew McGregor, p. 13. Of the 113 new factory products, 74 are in the garment industry.
CHAPTER V
THE ADMINISTRATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SEAQAQA SUGAR CANE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The state in modern society plays an integral part in the processes of production and redistribution. The nature of the state's role in economic development, however, varies according to the limits set by historical conditions, the world-economy and international system and domestic interests and constraints. However, some degree of effective state intervention is assumed to be necessary for successful capitalist development.

The Fijian state has assumed an interventionist role in generating capitalist development and a redistribution of income to Fijians in rural areas. The Fijian state has defined redistribution in terms of increasing Fijian participation in, for example, capitalist agricultural production. The implementation of land resettlement schemes such as the Seaqaga Sugar Cane Development Project (SSCDP) is an attempt by the Alliance government to address the lack of participation of Fijians in Fiji's economic development.
The SSCDP was sponsored by the Fijian state as a "special project" for a limited period of five years (1976 to 1981) with World Bank funding. In 1981, the project was integrated into the national sugar industry administrative framework.

The appropriation of the role of local participation as part of the dominant development paradigm conceals issues of power and control in the administration and implementation of a capitalist economic development project. In order to tease out the type of relations of power and control over the lives and resources of those participating in this state-initiated development project, the study juxtaposes the paradigms of "production-centered" versus "people-centered" development. Accordingly, the meanings given to the concept of "participation" and their consequences for the human actors in terms of production-centered or people-centered development strategies or orientations, differ substantially. There is a great deal of difference in the quality of life of the human agents involved in either of the two strategies of development.

Rural Development Strategies and Participation

Production-Centered Development

The underlying value system of the dominant development paradigm which directs development programs and projects for rural development that the state espouses
is production-centered. The focus of production-centered development is the drawing up of a blueprint of the physical inputs and outputs. Its emphasis is on the search for productive efficiency in the production of material goods, which bureaucrats and politicians believe can be realized through the creation of economies of scale. In other words, capitalist development requires the growth of production of more and more material goods and this process is enhanced by efficiency. Most Third World capitalist states (which includes Fiji) have adopted the production-centered strategy of development, which basically means emulating western technologies, institutions, organizations and values.

The valorization of efficiency, for example, has resulted in the preference for the bureaucratic-style organization as the dominant mode for economic, political and social organization in modern western societies and modernizing Third World societies. The bureaucratic-style organization has facilitated and reinforced the new social relations required by capitalist development such as the separation of owners of the means of production and the producers of goods and services. Moreover, many of the characteristics of bureaucracy facilitate a labor process where the imperative or purpose is the accumulation of capital for the owner of the enterprise.
Max Weber has defined the following ideal-type characteristics of bureaucratic organization: (i) a division of labor with clearly-defined authority relationships and responsibilities; (ii) offices are organized into a hierarchy or chain of command; (iii) managerial officers are selected from those holding technical qualifications determined by education and examination; (iv) rules and regulations govern the conduct of work; (v) impersonality between management and employees; (vi) career-oriented officials receiving fixed salaries; (vii) in the case of government administrators, administrative appointments rather than the election of department heads is preferred.¹

Kathy Ferguson has summarized the bureaucratic-style organization in the form of a pyramidal structure of authority and power.² Bureaucratic organization insists on (i) top-down authority, (ii) a hierarchical division of labor, (iii) the leaders at the top act as commanders, (iv) the emphasis is on specialization and hoarding of skills, (v) the separation of mental and manual labor, (vi) the division of roles and events so that everything is rule-governed, or "rationalized," and (vii) a hierarchical system of rewards.

In the dominant discourse on how societies are organized, and specifically how societies in the Third World should be organized, the bureaucratic, rational model
of organization is presented as the superior way to
organize in order to achieve economic development.
Proponents of the superiority of bureaucracy claim that
a "rational-legal" type of authority is the only way that
the relationship of various administrative units of an
organization can function effectively. This particularly
applies to government agencies and private enterprises
whose goals are efficiency and meeting time deadlines.

As Weber points out, it is the technical advantages
of bureaucratic-style organization which makes it superior
to other forms of organization.

The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism
compares with other organizations exactly as
does the machine with the non-mechanical
modes of production. Precision, speed,
unambiguity, knowledge of the files,
continuity, discretion, unity, strict
subordination, reduction of friction and or
material and personal costs--these are raised
to the optimum point in the strictly
bureaucratic administration . . .

Weber also points out how the very nature of modern
bureaucracy serves easily the requirements of capitalism.

Today, it is primarily the capitalist market
economy which demands that the official
business of the administration be discharged
precisely, unambiguously, continuously, and
with as much speed as possible.

Moreover,

The bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand
with the concentration of the material means
of management in the hands of the master.
Finally, bureaucracy facilitates capitalist social relations by allowing a specific type of subject-object division promoted by the epistemology of capitalism to take place. Thus, government and capitalist development bureaucrats can speak of development as being administered by the "experts of development" to groups of people whom they define as being in need of "development." The people to whom development is administered are treated by the experts of development as objects to be studied in terms of labor inputs or manpower hours. Their activities are placed under surveillance in terms of whether they produce the material goods in the shortest possible time. But they are certainly not the subjects of their own development.

Thus, the local people become constituted as "human resources" to be brought into production of material goods and services. The state's goal is to mobilize the rural populations to produce commodities for export in order to generate foreign exchange and create economic growth. The worth of these rural people is defined in terms of growth in mass production and consumption.

Within the context of the Third World, as Fred Riggs points out, "virtually all the new states that were liberated from imperial rule after World War II inherited a well established and modernized public bureaucracy."
And so, as Weber has cautioned, "once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are hardest to destroy." The production-centered development strategy has as its ideology that efficiency is possible only through bureaucratic-style organization of the development process. This has resulted in allowing the control of the development enterprise to remain in the hands of powerful government and aid agency bureaucrats and local elites.

People-Centered Development

A counter-model of development to the "production-centered" strategy emerged within the experience of capitalist development processes in the rural peoples of Third World countries. Some development administration people working with the grassroots level have attempted to present and legitimate an alternative model called "people-centered" development. The concept of "people-centered" development illustrates the possibilities and alternatives that are disqualified and silenced by the discourses and institutions of the current dominant production-centered paradigm of development. The counter-discourse (more of a reformist approach) generated by some developmentalists working within the dominant bureaucracies of development administration is an incremental step toward challenging the dominance of production-centered
development. Yet, in the absence of any major societal upheaval such as revolutionary changes in the structures of wealth, power and authority, the presentation of a people-centered strategy of development may result in some incremental changes over time in the structures of authority and privilege.

The advocates of a people-centered approach to development talk about "empowering rural communities." What do they mean by "empowerment"? According to some of the authors, empowering rural people "goes beyond ideas of participation in that it implies a transfer of resources to enhance the bargaining position of the [rural people] vis-à-vis other groups in society including state bureaucracies." The direction that a people-centered strategy of development would take implies creating and reinforcing rural people's capabilities to identify opportunities and to raise and control their own resources. Hence, the purpose of development must be changed or modified from exclusive emphasis on the production of material goods to take into consideration the people's mental and physical well-being. In short, the concept of people-centered development advocates the building of self-reliant communities. In other words, it means that the people involved in the development process gain some benefits from, and some control over the development activities which affect their lives. More importantly,
people-centered development also implies some changes in the way power and wealth are distributed in the society concerned.

A people-centered development strategy calls for a transformation of bureaucratic organization or, as David Korten insists, "debureaucratization" of society. As is evident, bureaucracy and the concept of people-centered development are incompatible. In addition, as John Ickis and others point out:

Bureaucracy assumed its distinctive form during the early industrial era and became the preferred organizational model because it responded to the needs of production-centered industrial societies for large-scale mass production of physical goods and standardized services. But so long as Third World development agencies continue to rely on the classic bureaucratic forms such as compartmentalized roles, routinized procedures, and centralized control, they will remain incapable of implementing a people-centered development model.10

If people's well-being becomes the goal of development, then the means of organizing for development are based on the initiative and creativity of the persons or communities concerned. People are allowed or assisted to build up their capabilities to improve their lives or well-being as they define it, and thus retain control of their resources. On the other hand, the concepts associated with people-centered development such as people's well-being, equity, and meaningful participation
are not easily translated into practice. There are many constraints. First, there are the national and international forces pushing for production-centered development. Second, within any modern society, there are many large and solidly-entrenched centrally-directed public and private bureaucracies. Their main purpose is the growth of material production and for private firms, capital accumulation. These defenders of the status quo are in positions of strength materially and ideologically. Moreover, rural communities themselves are hierarchically-structured and inequalitarian in the distribution of wealth and power. Thus, a proponent of people-centered development is already in the midst of a set of dominant activities and discourses called "development" which has different meanings, and depending on whichever meaning is dominant benefits and privileges certain social groups in that society. In short, one is simultaneously inside and outside the ideology of development.

In the processes of renegotiating the meaning of development, the concept of "participation" has become a key word in the development lexicon. The demand for a participatory approach to development originated from grassroots activists involved in the administration of development to rural peoples in different Third World countries and also in some parts of the First World. These people called for a people-centered, bottom-up, endogenous
interpretation of development. They criticized and opposed the top-down techno-economistic and production-centered strategy of development as being detrimental to human welfare. But the dominant development discourse has also appropriated the concept of "participation," as the "new human software." Thus, any political commitment to participation on the part of the mainstream agents of development is two-edged. This is because "participation" is given different meanings by the various protagonists taking part in the development process. For example, as illustrated below and in a later chapter, participation in a development project means different things to the Fijian state bureaucrats and the targeted indigenous Fijian villagers.

Majid Rahnema identifies six reasons for governments of Third World states and conventional development agencies' interest in appropriating the concept of participation. First, the governments of the Third World and the production-centered development agencies acknowledge that "limited and controlled participation" on the part of the people involved is needed for their cooperation and production to occur. Second, politically, participation can serve as a tool to ease tension and resistance generated by government-directed and controlled development policies and strategies. Third, participation can be used to pass on the costs of production-centered
development to the majority of the people in an acceptable manner. Fourth, participation by the people allows foreign "experts" and government bureaucrats to get the necessary knowledge of what is happening in the field and thus allow them to formulate new plans for further development activities. Fifth, "participation is becoming a good fund-raising device," by which Third World recipient governments can obtain funds for development. This is due to the donors' increasing requirement that a "participatory" component be included in the project plan. Sixth, even the private sector has been able to use the concept of participation to push the drive for privatization of development projects. In summary, participatory people-centered development is a very complex and difficult model of development which is not easy to put into practice, particularly, because politicians and conventional development agencies and aid donors are able to coopt and manipulate the concept of participation. And in this way, they refine and reinforce the dominant capitalist economic growth model of development.

Thus, what is the nature of indigenous Fijian participation in the SSCDP as defined by the state? Where and how did the project originate? What were the goals or purposes of the project? Who were involved in defining these goals?
The Fijian state's definition of insufficient participation by indigenous Fijians in the development process is misleading. The Fijian state's definition of Fijian participation in development is skewed toward the growth of material production of commodities for export. This concentration on material production has resulted in an asymmetrical type of participation in terms of the lack of access of the targeted "beneficiaries" to technical knowledge required by this kind of development to be "successful" and in the new systems of distribution of the benefits deriving from production-centered state-directed development.

Seagaqa: Background

The production of sugar in Fiji began to decline from 1969. This became a serious concern for the new government of the newly independent nation-state of Fiji. For, as is now evident, the Fijian economy is a monocultural one depending on sugar as the major export. The government feared that this trend in the decline of sugar output might result in the loss of its guaranteed overseas markets and also jeopardize any future market quotas under the International Sugar Agreement.

Therefore, priorities in government plans for rural development after independence in 1970 were twofold:
(i) The first priority was to strengthen the sugar industry
by further investment in it, in order to increase sugar output; (ii) The second concern of the predominantly Fijian-supported Alliance government was to accelerate the process of transforming indigenous Fijian economic production. Most Fijians living in villages in rural Fiji were (and some still are) at a stage of "subsistence with supplementary cash production" where most needs are met by non-monetary subsistence activities. But there is some supplementary production for cash in order to purchase market goods, pay for certain services and taxes. It was the government's aim to change Fijian economic production from the predominantly subsistence stage to a stage of "cash orientation with supplementary subsistence." At this stage of economic production most of the people's work effort is supposed to be focused on production for cash. However, some basic subsistence needs are also produced at home where it is economical to do so. Finally, the national planners then hoped that eventually these Fijian farmers would move on to the "advanced" stage of complete specialization in the market.\(^{16}\)

The government's strategy of achieving these goals was to embark on a large and expensive land resettlement project. The reason for this plan of action was that there were large areas of "unused" Fijian communally-owned land—land that was not used for the production of of commodities for export. Seqaqa, in western Vanua Levu, was earmarked
by the national planners as a resource frontier region which needed to be integrated into the national economy. Seaqaqa was then one of the largest undeveloped lowland regions of Fiji.

In late 1973, in line with the government's priorities as discussed above, the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) embarked on a major reorganization and expansion of the sugar milling facilities in Labasa, Vanua Levu. Seaqaqa is 40 kilometers, or 25 miles, southwest of the Labasa mill.

Before the land resettlement scheme began in 1974, there were about 50 Fijian and 150 Indian families living in the area now known as Seaqaqa. The Fijian families were basically engaged in subsistence and village-based activities. However, there was some periodic transactions with the cash economy in the sale of surplus root crops and yagona (kava). Money raised from these sales was used to pay school fees and provincial taxes. On the other hand, the Indian families had migrated to the area to take part in a rice production scheme initiated by the colonial government in 1963. They, therefore, had some experience in producing a single commodity for sale in the cash economy.

Finally, government planners at that time were of the view that these large areas of "unused" land could be better utilized for increasing cane production and
raising sugar exports. The soils, however, were not as fertile as in the other cane growing areas of the country. However, local landowners seemed to have been willing to allow a substantial part of their land to be developed under the proposed project.\(^\text{17}\)

**Seaqaqa: Whose Development?**

The administration and implementation of the SSCDP illustrates how the dominant strategy of production-centered development is put into practice. What types of objectives were enunciated by the state and World Bank officials?

The government started the SSCDP in 1974 as part of a larger plan to expand the sugar industry by opening up the largely undeveloped regions at Seaqaqa. However, the planting of cane began in late 1973. The Seaqaqa settlement scheme was viewed by government planners as having the capability of fulfilling the two main aims of the government: (i) First, it was the government's aim to increase sugar production by bringing unused land into the cultivation of cane. It decided on this course of action rather than putting additional resources into raising yields on existing cane farms. The reason for this will be obvious in the second aim. (ii) Through the SSCDP the government hope to induce more Fijian villagers to take up commercial agriculture, specifically, cane farming.
Expansion of production of sugar cane was to be based on the established smallholder system. It would have been more efficient to involve mainly Indians in this expansion of cane production scheme. They had longer experience in commercial agriculture, particularly, sugar cane production. This might have achieved the goal of increased sugar production faster. But the government had to consider the socio-political implications such as the further reduction of the proportional number of Fijians engaged in the cash economy vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups in the country. Furthermore, such a course of action would not be compatible with the Fijian-dominated Alliance government. The government, therefore, decided that there should be equal representation from both major ethnic groups--Fijian and Indian.

Thus, the main goal of the SSCDP in terms of the sugar industry was to increase the production of sugar cane by the production of 200,000 tonnes in Seqaqa by 1980. With regards to Fijian participation in the development project, over half of the 800 farms were to be assigned to Fijian villagers. On the other hand, the SSCDP was one of the first of large state-sponsored projects which involved expensive technology, land development, and the resettlement of 800 families. About 51,891 acres of mostly unfarmed, forest land, flat to undulating in topography,
and owned by Fijian "mataqali" (clans) had to be cleared and cultivated in cane.

The government of Fiji decided to request the World Bank for financial assistance to meet the foreign exchange component of the SSCDP. Therefore, at the beginning of 1975, a World Bank mission arrived in Fiji to assess the feasibility of supporting the project. A "Project Appraisal Document" was prepared by the Bank mission with the help of Fiji government planners. The necessary statistical data was compiled to make a case for the financial gains which would derive from the implementation of the project. Thus, the World Bank decided to make its first major loan to finance commercial agriculture in Fiji by agreeing to provide the foreign exchange component of the project.

The total cost of the project was estimated at F$22.2 million (US$26 million). The foreign exchange component that the World Bank agreed to provide was US$12 million, which comprised 46 percent of the funding of the entire project. As a consequence of the World Bank's agreement to fund the foreign exchange component, there had to be a five-year time limit for the project (as pointed out above).

The project was divided into two parts. The first part consisted of the resettlement of 800 families, and bringing into cane cultivation of some 50,000 acres of
forest land at Seaqaqa. The second component of the project involved the improvement of the drainage of existing sugar cane producing areas near Labasa in order to improve cane yields. My focus in this study is on the nature of indigenous Fijian participation in the resettlement part of the project.

Technically then, as a result of World Bank funding, the SSCDP was given "special project status" for the implementation time of five years, beginning in 1976 and ending in 1981. In 1982, the whole scheme would be integrated into the national sugar industry administrative framework.

Both parts of the project were placed under the control and authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests (MAFF). A principal controlling body was set up called the Central Coordinating Committee (CCC), made up of the top government bureaucrats from all the agencies involved in the implementation of the project. The agencies included: MAFF, FSC, the Fiji Development Bank (FDB), the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB), the Public Works Department (PWD) and the Drainage and Irrigation Division of MAFF. The Central Coordinating Committee's main responsibility was to formulate policy concerning the implementation of the project. The chairman of the CCC was the top executive of MAFF, the Permanent Secretary, who was directly responsible to the Minister of MAFF.
The CCC was based in Suva and it liaised with the World Bank concerning the implementation of the project. The Project Manager, who was locally stationed in Seagaqa and responsible for the day-to-day administration of the project, was appointed by MAFF in line with the requirements and consent of the World Bank.

A monitoring unit was set up in the Economics, Planning and Statistics Division of MAFF. The head of this monitoring unit was the chief economist of MAFF. He reported directly to the Permanent Secretary for MAFF. The task of this monitoring unit was to compile the necessary statistical reports on the physical progress of the project. This was done on a quarterly and half-yearly basis. The monitoring unit was also responsible for doing the financial accounting component.

This then is a brief description of the national administrative structure under which the SSCDP was organized and implemented. The people involved in the decision-making, policy formulation processes were top government executives or bureaucrats. As far as can be gathered from documentary evidence and from fieldwork, there was very little, if any, consultation with the local Fijian villagers. The exception would have been with the leaders of the various landowning "mataqali" whose permission for the development of their land had to be obtained by the government.
At the local level, a Local Coordinating Committee (LCC) was set up by the government. The LCC was based in Labasa and was directly responsible to the Central Coordinating Committee in Suva. The members of the LCC comprised the District Commissioner Northern (Chairman), the District Officer, the "Roko Tui" Macuata, the Labasa Branch Manager of NLTB, the Seagaqa Branch Manager of FDB, a Landowners' ("mataqali") representative, the Divisional Planning Officer Northern, and the Project Manager of Seagaqa. The LCC held meetings in Labasa to decide on selection criteria for choosing would-be settlers. It was also empowered to select the settlers.

Of course, the principal requirement for the selection of the settlers laid down by the government was that half of the 800 farms must be allocated to indigenous Fijians. The remainder could be allocated to Indians and other ethnic groups. Other criteria which were used by the selection committee included: giving priority to farmers who were already living in the area, persons who had been evicted from either native or state-owned land, persons chosen by the landowners themselves, sons of local farmers who had little land to farm on. Preference was also given to persons between the ages of 21 years and 45 years, those who had the technical sugar cane farming knowledge and skills, persons with no other means of earning cash, persons, specifically Fijians, who were willing to move...
away from the village and live on their cane farms, and finally, to Fijians without access to their own "matagali" land. The government was specifically keen to attract Fijians who were living in their villages around the Seagaqa region, who were mainly subsistence farmers, to take part in the project.

The financial costs of the whole project as it was originally estimated in the World Bank Appraisal Report in 1976 was US$26 million. The actual costs amounted to US$30 million when the scheme's special project status was terminated. The agreement laying down the conditions for the World Bank loan of US$12 million was signed in April 1976, and it became effective in July 1976.\(^1^8\) The government, the FDB and the FSC provided the rest of the funding.\(^1^9\) Due to the high costs of putting road and rail infrastructure over rough terrain, plus the high costs of clearing forest land and then preparing it for sugar cane cultivation, the estimated costs came to about US$15,500 per family or household. Most of the Fijian families had not earned more than F$200 a year before the project began.

The prospective settler at Seagaqa had to deal with at least four government bureaucracies: NLTB, FDB, FSC, and MAFF. First, he (as most of the indigenous Fijian settlers who obtained leases were male) must be allocated an allotment of land by the selection committee. An
average farm holding is 20 hectares (50 acres) of which 6 hectares (15 acres) must be suitable for and be planted with sugar cane. Next he must obtain a lease and have the land surveyed by the NLTB. The settlers at Seagaqa are granted 30 year agricultural leases in the first instance with two further renewals of 10 years each. An eviction clause was included in each tenancy agreement to the effect that the project administration had the authority to evict settlers whose sugar cane production was not satisfactory to the implementing authorities of the project.

A subsidiary loan agreement provided the on-lending of US$6 million of the World Bank loan to the FDB to lend to the settlers at Seagaqa for land clearing, farm development and subsistence loans. Most indigenous Fijian villagers needed access to substantial credit facilities such as those provided by the FDB to start up their cane farms. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), MAFF, FDB, and the World Bank agreed to the requirement that loans from the FDB for land clearing and farm development which averaged F$11,000, had to be repaid within a ten year limit. Interest on this loan was at 4.25 percent.

Then in order to produce sugar cane for the FSC, the Seagaqa settler, like other sugar cane farmers in the country, must sign a contract with the FSC. This contract governs the relations between the FSC (as the miller) and
the growers. Some of the most important conditions written into the contract include: (i) The FSC purchases only the contracted quantity of cane from the contracted land area from each farmer. Each farmer is usually given a quota of cane to produce annually. If over a three-year period the farmer fails to produce the contracted cane output, then the cane quote is reduced; (ii) The FSC decides on the price per tonne of cane to be paid to the farmers after it retains 30 percent (to cover operating costs), plus another F$200,000 for FSC research operations from the total proceeds obtained from sugar exports; (iii) The FSC also advances to the grower with no interest, costs of seed cane, fertilizer, and the harvesting and transporting of the cane to the mill. Before the farmer receives any cane proceeds, these advances are recovered at the discretion of the FSC authorities.21

For farmers with loans from the FDB, the net cane proceeds after the FSC deductions are then turned over to the FDB. Initially, the FDB planned to recover its farm development loans by withholding 100 percent or all the net cane proceeds from the settlers for the first three years. Thereafter, the FDB would withhold 75 percent of the cane proceeds until the loan was eventually repaid. This debt repayment system resulted in novice cane farming families, particularly Fijians, receiving practically no cash income from cane production for at least the first
three years. Instead, a subsistence or living allowance loan of between F$400 and F$500 was made available to each farmer annually. These cash allowances were debited against the farmer's farm development account with the FDB. Thus, farm income was totally unrelated to effort, work and labor put into cane production. However, the FAO, under the World Food Program provided some relief to these families by supplying them with food rations on a fortnightly basis beginning in 1977 for the first three years.

As a consequence of farmers' dissatisfaction with the loan repayment system, the FDB introduced some changes. It rescheduled the repayment of farm loans from 10 years to 15 years. A fixed amount was worked out for each farmer according to cane production capacity. A certain amount was then deducted from each cane payment. (Usually there are four cane payments in a fiscal year.) The remainder of the cane proceeds was then made available to the farmer. The median farmer, with a net cane income of F$3000 after FSC deductions, would receive about F$750 from cane production after the first three years of the project. These are very low returns compared to the national average of nearly F$4000 per family.\textsuperscript{22}

Access to funds from the FDB to buy expensive machines such as tractors was given to what the authorities defined as "promising" Fijian farmers. The owner of the tractor,
in addition to working on his farm, was supposed to provide such services as land preparation and the hauling of cane during the harvesting season to the collection depot. Many Fijian farmers also obtained loans from the FDB to purchase working bullocks and other expensive modern farming machines. Interests on these loans were 6.25 percent per annum for the first F$8000 and 10 percent on any excess. The time limit that these loans had to be repaid was four years. Proceeds from tractor services provided by the owner were also paid directly to the FDB except on the rare occasion when cash was paid. The FDB retained one-third of the gross proceeds. The tractor owner recovered the other two-thirds to pay for running costs and other expenses.

Furthermore, the development planners envisaged putting into operation a network of extension service officers. Initially, the MAFF agreed to provide an extension officer for every 100 families. These extension officers would assist the families diversify their economic activities by finding other suitable cash crops to grow in addition to sugar cane. However, this arrangement never really materialized and it terminated in 1978, early in the project. It seems that there was some conflict of interests on the part of the FSC, which wanted the farmers to concentrate on increasing sugar cane production and the proposed goal of agricultural diversification for the
farmers. Thereafter, FSC provided six of its own farm advisors. Each farm advisor was allocated a group of farmers in a particular sector. The responsibility of each farm advisor was to organize the delivery of fertilizers and weedicides to each farmer. In addition, he was to make sure that the farmer grew the right varieties of cane that the FSC recommended for certain types of soil composition. Also, he was supposed to pass on to the farmers under his supervision any new information and techniques developed at the FSC's agricultural experimental station. He also had to assist farmers in solving any problems which arose with cane cultivation.

On the other hand, the field advisor occupies the lowest rank of the hierarchy of field staff in the FSC bureaucracy, and, therefore, has little input in the policy formulation or decision-making process.

Some field training was provided especially for inexperienced Fijian farmers. But, according to the Fijian farmers who were interviewed, the training was minimal and inadequate. It did not appear as a priority in the initial planning documents of the project. One of the training sessions consisted of a five-day residential course dealing with farm record-keeping and budgeting. It was held at the Nasoso Training Center operated by the Methodist Church of Fiji. Further, in 1981, a one-week tractor maintenance course was organized at Seaqaqa by
the International Labor Office in Suva for tractor owners (when Fijian tractor owners with no experience had been operating their machines for a number of years). However, there was no follow-up to this course or any continued assistance provided to those Fijian farmers who owned tractors, particularly with the technical problems that recur in the operation of these machines. After a few years, many abandoned the tractors because they had problems operating them. Yet, they had to continue to pay their loans. In the first place, most of these Fijian tractor owners never had any experience or mechanical training in using such complex machines. Finally, with regard to the technical aspects of cane farming, the problems of harvesting and transporting the cane to the mill were left to individual Fijian farmers to work out. For the majority of these farmers, this was their first experience at cane production. This part of cane production is the most difficult part of the process. And these farmers had no organizational capacity or government assistance to deal with this difficult task.

But when it came to the evaluation part of the project, the project authorities stated that the production objectives had been met very successfully. The first major aim of the SSCDP was to increase sugar cane production by 200,000 tonnes by 1980. This target was reached in 1979, when cane production reached 240,000
In the peak production year of 1982, a total of 316,000 tonnes of cane was produced. Moreover, according to the project authorities, one of the effects of the investment in this project was that it opened up a formerly isolated region for economic development. Consequently, there has emerged a whole community and township heavily dependent economically on sugar production.

In addition, the project authorities also concluded that the social objectives were effectively implemented. By this they meant that 800 families were resettled at Seaqaqa. Half of these families were indigenous Fijians. Moreover, about a third of the 174 farmers who produced over 500 tonnes of cane were Fijians. On the other hand, the "project completion report" is silent on "the considerable reluctance on the part of local Fijian villagers" to take up cane farming. The short time limit imposed by World Bank support for Fiji's first largest and most expensive project, using modern technology, led to hasty decisions by the local authorities to use the disbursed funds before expiration of the project status of the scheme.

As is now obvious, the SSCDP is a typical top-down development approach adopted by the government or public bureaucracies involved in administering the project. There was practically no discussion, no dissemination of
knowledge about what the project involved and no consultation with the local Fijian villagers with the exception of obtaining the permission of the village elders or chiefs to develop their land. They were just expected to respond by agreeing to participate in the project. 32

Thus, the government's strategy of meeting the 50 percent Fijian participatory requirement in this commercial agricultural project was twofold. First, it set up the Native Land Development Corporation as the commercial subsidiary of the Native Land Trust Board. Second, Fijians from the outer islands who faced land scarcity were encouraged to go to Seagaqa to take up cane farming.

In addition, the NLDC was empowered by the authorities to operate a cane estate at Seagaqa comprising 37 out of the 400 farms set aside for Fijians for the benefit of the Fijian people. The Macuata District Council (another Fijian government body) acquired four farms. In this way, the 50 percent allocation of the 800 farms for indigenous Fijians was reached by the end of March, 1976. However, only 42 percent of the farms were run by individual Fijian families. But by 1979, 57.9 percent of the cane farms were leased by Fijians. According to David Evans, "much of this change in ownership ratios can be explained by an increasing resistance from the "mataqalis" [the
landowning units] to allowing their land to be leased to Indians."33

The farms acquired by the NLDC were supposed to form a nucleus estate where inexperienced Fijian village farmers could have the opportunity to learn how to cultivate cane commercially. A second purpose for the NLDC was to take over farms from Fijian smallholders who were not producing the required quota of cane set by the FSC. The NLDC's task was to train these "non-performers" and assist them or find replacement owners from Fijian villagers who were willing to take over the farm and repay any loans owed to the FDB. A third function of the NLDC was to own and operate a certain number of tractors and trucks. They would use these to train Fijians how to maintain and run the machines. The NLDC was also to operate a garage, a service station, and a workshop where Fijians could have the opportunity to learn how to maintain and repair farm equipment such as tractors. Finally, the NLDC was also given the responsibility to develop the new township at Natua, in Seagaqa.

As it turned out, the NLDC, a government-created bureaucracy had little or no experience in commercial smallholder farming. Moreover, it seemed to have had little institutional or organizational support from other agencies involved in the development project. First, it had difficulties in maintaining the cane production level
on its own estate. Therefore, it was impossible for NLDC to perform its other functions such as providing training for inexperienced Fijian village farmers. Furthermore, the NLDC did not seem to have the adequate resources to assist Fijians to take part meaningfully in this commercial agricultural project.

The Meaning of Participation in Development

So far this study has attempted to show how the bureaucratic structure of the various state agencies as well as the World Bank, which were involved in the planning and decision-making processes of the SSCDP, is hierarchically organized in terms of authority and power. This pyramidal structure permits only the top-level bureaucrats and government ministers to formulate policies on the implementation of the project.

The values of the bureaucratic-style of organization with its superior-subordinate division does not allow members of the lower levels of the bureaucracies, who deal with the grassroots day-to-day running of the project, to contribute to the decision-making processes. Yet, these lower-ranking officials played a crucial role in the implementation of the project. They were the ones who were in daily contact with the Fijian farmers and knew their problems and needs. Even today, officials at the lower ranks of government bureaucracies are afraid to rock
the boat. Although they feel they should report the Fijian farmers' need for more assistance and control over their resources, they fear that if they criticize the system, their own positions and promotion prospects would be jeopardized. \textsuperscript{34}

The hierarchical nature of the planning and implementation of the SSCP, specifically, the centralization of the policy formulation and decision-making processes meant there was little or no consideration given to enhancing the local Fijian villagers' institutional and organizational capabilities to take part meaningfully in the project. By indigenous Fijian participation in the SSCDP, government bureaucrats and those of the statutory bodies involved in the project, meant widespread mobilization of Fijian villagers living near the Seaqaqa plateau (and later elsewhere in Fiji) to support and implement the government's policy of increasing sugar production. The plan was to carry this out by inducing Fijian villagers to change their economic production activities from one based mainly on subsistence farming with occasional production for cash to a totally market-oriented type of production. This was basically the meaning given to the concept of participation in this production-centered strategy of the Fijian authorities.

Thus, the project authorities focused all their attention on meeting the production targets set by the
planners. The planners' "blueprint" style of project implementation was put into practice. The belief of the top-level bureaucrats and government ministers was that technical intervention (based on planners' detailed statistical calculations and predictions), and the introduction of western-type technology were sufficient to engineer social change on the part of the Fijian villagers. They hoped that this would motivate the Fijians to take part in commercial agriculture, specifically, sugar cane production, and thus contribute to the economic growth of the state.

In addition, from the outset, the project originated from the state bureaucracies and agencies. With the accelerated time limit required by World Bank funding in such a large capital-intensive project which depended heavily on western technology, any meaningful discussion with the Fijian villagers was not even considered or mentioned by the planners. In short, the welfare of the targeted beneficiaries did not seem important to the authorities.

Hence, the question of the Fijian villagers' understanding of what the project really involved in terms of their access to and control over their resources (such as their time and technical knowledge) was not considered at any stage in the planning, implementation or evaluation of the project. As pointed out above, the SSCDP was
conceived of as a government program to bring into economic production unused indigenous Fijian-owned land, plus the labor of the Fijian villagers. But no attempt was made by the project authorities to discuss and explain to the Fijian villagers what the project was about, and to obtain their felt needs and views about their participation in the project. More so than for the Indian families involved in the project, for the Fijian villagers, participation in the project meant a change in their worldview and social welfare. Rather, the government expected the Fijian villager to simply fit into the existing patterns of development paternalism promoted by the state. Participation of the Fijian villager in the project was defined by the authorities as passive acceptance of, and increasing dependency on state bureaucratically-controlled development such as the SSCDP.

Participation, as defined by government authorities, is simply that the targeted population support government-sponsored production-centered development projects. In effect (as will be shown in Chapter VII), participation by the Fijian villagers in the SSCDP has meant greater government and bureaucratic control over their lives.

Therefore, one of the issues that kept reappearing in the annual reports of the project authorities was that of "non-performance" referring specifically to those Fijian villagers who were not producing the required amount of
cane set by the FSC. However, the major concern of the authorities was how to recover the loans made to these Fijian villagers by the FDB. Although there was a clause included in the tenancy lease concerning the threat of eviction if the person did not produce enough cane, it was very difficult to evict every Fijian who failed to meet the production requirements. On the other hand, it did not occur to the authorities to find out the problems and needs of the non-performing Fijian villagers.  

One of the methods used by the FDB and FSC was to issue eviction notices to these Fijian farmers. Another method was to encourage these farmers to sell their leases to the farms to persons willing to take over the payment of the outstanding loans. Finally, the authorities set up a task force whose purpose was to contact each non-performer. A "rehabilitation and salvage" program was set up by the FDB and FSC. Under this program those affected farmers were encouraged to make new applications for further loans from the FDB to "rehabilitate" their cane farms.  

In this way, more control is exerted over the lives of the village farmers as they become more dependent on further loans. Their resources and time are controlled by these agencies as they appropriate the cane proceeds from the farmers to recover the loans. The authorities present this as the only solution to getting Fijians to
participate in development projects. The consequences are passivity and dependency on government bureaucrats and outsiders on the part of the Fijian villagers, for answers or solutions to their problems arising from participation in production-centered development projects.

Chapter VI will attempt to discuss how the strategy of production-centered development has become connected to nation-state building in Fiji. How do the state managers naturalize this strategy of development and thus neutralize the effects of production-centered development on different social groups? How is production-centered development projected as the desired national goal and, therefore, as being in the "general interest" of all the various ethnic groups to support this kind of development?
Notes to Chapter V


2 Class handout in Kathy Ferguson's Political Science 650: Public Administration Theory, Fall 1989, University of Hawaii, Manoa.

3 Max Weber, p. 31.

4 Ibid., p. 32.

5 Ibid., p. 33.

6 Fred Riggs, "Bureaucratic Links Between Administration and Politics," Occasional Papers in Political Science, Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, Manoa, Vol. 3, No. 3 (January, 1990), p. 16.

7 Max Weber, p. 35.

8 Felipe B. Alfonso, "Empowering Rural Communities," in Beyond Bureaucracy: Strategic Management of Social Development, ed. John Ickis et al. (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1986), Chapter 3. There has emerged within a section of the development administration community within the last three decades a whole discourse on reorienting the development effort from its focus on growth and production to the welfare of the people involved in the development process.


10 Ibid., p. 232.

12 Ibid., p. 201.

13 Ibid., pp. 201-203.


16 David Evans, p. 2.

17 Ibid., p. 16.


19 Ibid. To finance the local costs, the government was to provide US$7.3 million out of annual budget appropriations. The FDB was to provide US$6 million in addition to the US$6 million on-lending of the World Bank funds. FSC was to provide US$0.7 million.

20 Ratu Jone Sovasova, Seagaga Sugar Development Project Completion Report, FSC, Labasa, Fiji: 1984, p. 8. The rate of rental was F$18.53 per hectare (2.471 acres) for 6 hectares (15 acres), and F$1.24 per hectare for the balance of the land for the first five years. After that, the rent was subject to review.

21 David Evans, p. 19.


Much of the Seaqaqa plateau consists of rolling terrain. But the cost of building new roads to the farms for transporting cane to the mill had to be paid for by the farmers themselves. Because of the distance of some of the farms from the main road and then to the mill, farmers had to pay higher transport costs. Furthermore, the soils are poor and more fertilizer is needed to produce a good cane crop. In addition, Seaqaqa, being a new cane production area, did not have the necessary manpower to cut the cane. Each season an average of 2,000 persons are recruited to cut cane. Farmers have to provide housing and food for the cane cutters and their families before they get paid. While the cane cutters are supposed to pay their own way to Seaqaqa, the farmers are required to pay their way back to their homes.

World Bank, Project Completion Report, 1985, p. 5. See also Ratu Jone Sovasova, p. 1.

World Bank, Project Completion Report, p. 5. See also Tim Bayliss-Smith and Patrick Haynes, p. 136, and Ratu Jone Sovasova, p. 12.


World Bank, p. 5.

Ratu Jone Sovasova, p. 1.

World Bank, Project Completion Report, p. i. The final disbursement of funds was to be made by December 31, 1981. But it was extended to December 31, 1983. The final disbursement was made on August 1, 1984. An undisbursed amount of US$256,728.25 was cancelled.

Ratu Jone Sovasova, p. 5.


Personal communication with a field officer at Seaqaqa. The person also gave me a copy of a letter he sent to a government bureaucracy describing the current
plight of many of the indigenous Fijian cane farmers at Seaqaga. Yet, there was a note of hesitancy in that he wanted confidentiality so that his immediate superiors would not know about his action and letter. As a junior officer, he was afraid of being sanctioned for his criticism of the system.

35 Ratu Jone Sovasova, p. 10.
CHAPTER VI
THE ROLE AND POWER OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

Introduction

The apparatus of development is a complex network of both international and national sites of power and control. There is both an international and national or local dimension to the ideology of development. Thus, the first part of the chapter is a discussion of the origins and the international dimension of the ideology of development. The international dimension, however, intervenes and interacts with the national level in Fiji. What is the basis of this ideology of development? How does this discourse naturalize development and depoliticize its effects on different social groups? The answers to these questions will relate specifically to the experience of development in Fiji.

The international and national or local agencies which produce and control the production of the dominant development discourse are intertwined, and they interact. However, for the purposes of analysis in this chapter, the two dimensions are discussed separately to show that there is a hierarchy of power-knowledge between these institutions although it is not always clear or evident.
Participation and Control in the Development Discourse

The International Dimension

In the decade after World War II (1945-1955), the old order of European empires disintegrated when many of their former colonies gained political independence. Wolfgang Sachs, in his essays on the archaeology of the development idea, argues that development as an ideology and world view was propagated by the United States which emerged as the strongest nation after World War II.¹ Thus, the United States assumed the task of reconceptualizing the world and constituting a new world order.

The situations of these newly independent nation-states came to be problematized by the west as "underdeveloped." President Harry Truman in his inauguration speech to Congress in January, 1949, defined the largest part of the world as "underdeveloped areas."² Therefore, the new world view that the west imposed on these new nation states was that they must aspire to one major goal--development. In this way, the framework for a new world order was created to enable the victorious western powers to continue to exercise control over the resources and peoples of the new nation-states. This strategy replaced the old and more visible forms of colonial oppression and exploitation.
According to Arturo Escobar, one of the strategies the west deployed was to create and present to the new Third World states "the idea that westernization (.... along capitalist lines) is a fundamental problem for all societies." This was done in a positive way under the name of development and modernization. Development became synonymous with the evolutionary idea of progress. All non-western societies and cultures came to be viewed as "backward" and needed to be helped on their evolution to modernity through development.

But what did (and does) development really mean? It meant (and still does) basically, the growth of economic production or modern development capitalism. As pointed out in Chapter I, Third World leaders accepted the idea that the purpose of the state was to mobilize the whole country's people and resources to increase its productive output and join in the race to catch up with the west then led by the United States. In other words, these Third World political leaders accepted and internalized the image the west imposed on them as "under-developed." Thus, the principal goal or purpose of the state was (and is still) economic development.

Both Escobar and Sachs point to the emergence of international and national or local centers of power-knowledge as the material conditions of the underdeveloped non-western societies came to be brought into development.
discourse and to be problematized. In this way, the Third World was being (and still is) constituted as under-developed and, therefore, in need of being developed. It is through the discourse of under-development and development that the west constructs and maintains its domination and exploitation over the peoples of the Third World. "This discourse is associated with the whole apparatus of development (from inter-national organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to local-level development agencies) as well as the large number of theories of development produced especially by international organizations and by scholars at North American and European campuses."  

Again as Escobar points out:

... without examining development as discourse we cannot understand the systematic ways in which the Western developed countries have been able to manage and control and, in many ways, even create the Third World politically, economically, sociologically and culturally; and that, although underdevelopment is a very real historical formation, it has given rise to a series of practices (promoted by the discourses of the West) which constitute one of the most powerful mechanisms for insuring domination over the Third World today.  

**How Development is Put into Discourse**

The ideology of development with its Eurocentric philosophies of progress have become the dominant or hegemonic discourse on the processes of capitalist economic development or modernization. This hegemonic discourse,
however, was silent on the materiality of the violent social upheavals that accompanied the capitalist industrialization of the European development experience—a violence which was extended through European colonialism and today through capitalist development to other parts of the world. But how was (and is) the ideology of development put into discourse? How does this discourse assume its hegemonic role in constituting certain practices it calls "development" and simultaneously naturalizes these practices and depoliticizes their effects on the various social groups affected? As Peter Manicas argues, it was the positivism of the social sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which provided the means for rationalizing imperialism or colonialism in the nineteenth century, and modernization or development in the second half of the twentieth century, marked with "scientific neutrality."

Development discourse is a form of practice which embodies relations of power and knowledge. Those who produce the discourse of development are in a privileged position in terms of knowledge and also material resources. They constitute a powerful group and are a different group of persons from those for whom development is mapped out. However, the development discourse has been mainly lodged within positivistic social science with its numerous unquestioned presuppositions hidden in its language of
figures, tables and equations, which serve well the political agenda of the international capitalist development agencies and their experts. Specifically, the discourse assumed the "neutral and scientific" language of positivistic social science. Positivism's fundamentally universalistic trait is its dominant assertion that there is one "true" way of knowing "reality" or materiality--the material conditions of life. Other non-western forms of knowledge came to assume a non-scientific or an "inferior" position in the epistemology of western knowledge. These other forms of knowledge came to be known as intuitive (unscientific), magic, meta-physical, emotional, primitive.

Particularly relevant to the definition of who is "developed" and who is "underdeveloped" is positivistic social science's division of object and subject. The people to whom development is administered are treated by the experts of development as objects to be studied, to be analyzed, but not as subjects of their own development. The language of the "development experts," therefore, is that of a technical type such as the language of development economics, administration, project planning and appraisal. In this way, the materiality of Third World societies and cultures are brought into discourse through the realm of mathematical and "scientific" calculations.

A field of control of knowledge comes into being which values predominantly the technical interpretations
of reality. Escobar refers to this process as "the economization of life," within which context the discipline of economics came to be established as a "positive," "objective," science. This process emerged "during the past two hundred years--[out] of a [basically western European] culture in which a specific economic rationality (based on certain institutions such as money, markets, banks, etc.) became dominant. This process . . . was intimately linked to the development of capitalism; it entailed as necessary prerequisites the establishment of the normative discourse of classical political economy, the adoption of certain principles of government . . . and the introduction of new forms of discipline and control."  

**Development Discourse: Its Production and Control**

The process of the production of development discourse has become institutionalized. Today, a whole network of sites of power and knowledge exists at both the international and national or local levels. At the international level these organizations or institutions include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank, a number of United Nations development agencies, and a host of other lending institutions or organizations of power in the rich advanced industrialized states. In addition, there are also the
research centers and foundations located in the university campuses throughout the wealthy western states.

Historically, it was the IBRD which sent out the first missions (between 1945 and 1958) to investigate the material and life conditions of the newly independent poor nation-states. The purposes of these missions were to gather information or data on all aspects of Third World societies and states—economic, social, and political, at the rural, urban, local, regional, and sectoral levels. From this knowledge or data base, certain material conditions and aspects of life in Third World societies and states became categorized as "problems," or "abnormalities," or "a lack of something," and, therefore, were in need of solutions, treatment or intervention.11

Consequently, there resulted elaborate dossiers on Third World societies and states. Further information gathering, refining and disseminating of this knowledge occurred. Hence, the professionalization of "development" came about with the increase in the number of centers of "development studies" in many of the major universities of the rich western countries or nation-states. Thus, the issue of development came to be conceptualized in economistic-mathematical and technical-scientific language, silencing the political aspects or questions such as who benefits and who bears the brunt of the costs, specifically, the social costs.12 In the new centers of power and
knowledge that focused on development there also emerged a class of "technical development experts." These experts analyzed the problems of the Third World countries, pronounced judgment and provided advice on the types of development strategies and policies for Third World governments, and in general established the nature of the societies of the poor states.

The National or Local Dimension of the Development Discourse

There was also a proliferation of local or national centers of power-knowledge through the local production of development discourse. In the capitals of the so-called "underdeveloped" states, planning offices assumed a dominant role in the administration of development. The western developed centers of power sent out their professional coaching staff or advisors through their various international banks and development agencies. Thus, local bureaucrats were trained or taught by the development experts to assist in the problem of delineating the nature of all aspects of Third World societies by helping with the collection of data on their societies. These international advisors come from many fields: economics, health, industry, agriculture, national accounts, public administration, and so on. These international capitalist-supported missions worked closely
together with other local experts and advisors (trained in the new development studies centers in the major western universities) to formulate detailed development plans for the whole country. Value was given to a new type of knowledge dealing with economic growth. This knowledge was considered as concrete, quantifiable and, therefore, scientific and objective.

Gradually, a set of relations of power-knowledge was established and systematized among both these international and national elements, institutions and practices. Such a set of relations facilitated the production of a discourse of development which enabled it "to form systematically the objects of which it spoke, to group them and arrange them in certain ways, to give them a unity of their own." This discourse of development is still organized and controlled by the basic system of relations between capital, technology and the World Bank, IMF and other similarly-oriented capitalist development agencies.

As Escobar rightly argues, "development (as a discourse) is a very real historical formation . . . " It is a discourse by which the west constitutes, conceptualizes and controls the Third World societies. Therefore, the discourse of development "has a validity of its own which goes beyond the materiality of 'under-development' itself and in fact profoundly affects it . . . this materiality is not conjured up by an 'objective'
body of knowledge, but . . . it is charted out by the rational discourses of economists, politicians and development experts . . . " Furthermore, the business of the promotion of capitalist development both internationally and nationally continues to flourish in spite of the crisis of the material process of capitalist development in both Third World and First World countries. 16

The Development Discourse of Fiji

The history of national development planning in Fiji dates back to the post-World War II period of the colonial era. 17 These early plans were mainly concerned with public sector capital development budgets or expenditure plans. In order to qualify for financial assistance under the United Kingdom of the Commonwealth Development and Welfare grant scheme, the colony of Fiji had to produce development plans, indicating the sectoral allocations for every five years, for example, in economic services, health and education and communications. There were four five-year development plans covering the years 1949 to 1968. Thus, economic planning is also a colonial legacy which came to assume a significant basis for deciding Fiji's development policies. The colonial government established a Central Planning Office to evaluate and to coordinate "all efforts directed towards the economic and social progress of the country." 18
Planning, therefore, assumed a usefulness or value in terms of it providing the government with systematic procedures or methods for it to appraise and formulate development policies and strategies. Although the government also hoped to raise the people's consciousness on the goal of economic development, planning for development gave the actual process a technical or neutral face. Gradually, the government hoped to link economic development with nation-building. Moreover, central planning was in line with the post-World War II dominant economic international organizations' support, and requirement of governments of Third World states to formulate comprehensive development plans for membership of these organizations in order to qualify for development loans.

Development Plan 5 (DP5, 1966-1970), incorporated the last three years of Development Plan 4 (DP4, 1964-1968), and was Fiji's first (pre-independence) comprehensive development plan. DP5 looked at the development of the economy of the whole country. The plan included projections about the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the growth of investment, exports, foreign trade, the population and unemployment. The main objective for the period of the plan was that of searching for or opening up new fields (such as forestry, marine resources and tourism) to promote growth of the Fiji economy.
Since independence, the Fiji government has produced four comprehensive development plans. Their main purpose has been to provide guidance in establishing a free enterprise economy for Fiji. Development Plan 6 (1971-1975), Fiji's first development plan after gaining independence, is a detailed document which begins with a chapter reviewing Fiji's economic development from 1945 to 1970. The plan deals with the whole economic and social anatomy of the country mapped out by the government's economists and planners. The plan states as its major aim the optimum use of Fiji's physical and human resources in order to promote a successful development process. The second aim is the moderation of income disparities within Fiji's society. This basically means the integration of the rural people and resources within the national economy. "Successful development," then, is associated with the building of a multiracial society, and maintaining economic, social and political stability in Fiji.

Development Plan 7 (1976-1980) provides another comprehensive national development program. The document outlines in detail development objectives and strategies, sectoral plans and implementation techniques. In the "Foreword" to DP7, the Prime Minister of Fiji links development to nation building by focusing on the "national benefits of development," and the government's need for
the people to support its development policies. "The Seventh Plan lays down the basic strategy and offers a road to increased happiness and prosperity. It is up to all of us as citizens of this country not only to work hard for its successful implementation but also to help in providing the right atmosphere for its development." DP7 also drew attention to the redistribution of the benefits of economic development between the different regions of the country and the two major ethnic groups--the Fijians and the Indians. Furthermore, the government announced its strategy of regional planning, that is, the identification of certain rural regions for the establishment of growth centers.

Development Plan 8 (1981-1985) is Fiji's third post-independence five-year development plan. DP8 points out the achievements of political and economic stability of Fiji as a nation. The plan outlines Fiji's national development objectives for a further five years, which would provide the framework for the government's resource allocation and policy formulation process. Although the national development objectives in DP8 are similar to those of DP6 and DP7, two additional national development objectives deserve some comment. The first additional objective is the promotion of greater self-reliance such as the government's encouragement of local food production and the greater use of local raw materials for the
production of goods and services. Thus, the government would increase "community participation in development activities and decision-making." The second national development objective is the government's greater use of the media (the radio and press) and the school system to create a national identity and sense of national unity within Fiji's multiracial or multi-ethnic society.

DP8 consists of two volumes. Although it covers similar ground as the previous two development plans, it also includes a second volume devoted totally to regional planning and projections of growth in population, economic, production and government services. One of the strategies for regional development proposed by the United Nations' Regional Planning Project (1977 UNRPP) was adopted by Fiji's national planners. The strategy is that of the establishment of rural growth centers. The government identified Seagaqa as an area with the potential for economic growth. This strategy of the establishment of rural growth centers has, in the case of Seagaqa, resulted in a former peripheral region of the country being absorbed or integrated into the national economy.

Fiji's fourth (post-independence) comprehensive five-year development plan, Development Plan 9 (1986-1990), once again directed attention to the nation's need "to create a dynamic growth-oriented economy." The emphasis is on increased production and productivity. "In the
context of increased production and productivity we must as a nation become target and results oriented."28 However, DP9 includes a chapter on social and community development which takes into consideration the issues of basic needs and women in development. During the time span of DP9 a new government, the National Federation Party and Labour Party Coalition, was elected to power in April, 1987. A month later, in May 1987, the Fijian-dominated army overthrew the Indian-dominated Coalition government in a military coup.

The Fiji government has also initiated the holding of national economic summits since 1985. It is another way of creating a public forum for the government's development policies and strategies to be put into discourse and legitimized. The invitations extended to, and the attendance by the leaders of different social groups and classes, such as those in the private sector, trade union leaders, and other non-governmental social or community organizations, give the whole process of central development planning some semblance of community participation.

Since the military coups in 1987, there have been two economic summits organized by the Interim government to put forward its newly-adopted directions in development policies and strategies to representatives from various social groups and classes. In line with advice given by
the major capitalist economic institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, the Interim government (1987-1992) decided to re-orient development policies and strategies in order "to accelerate the rate of growth of the Fiji economy in the 1990s." A document as comprehensive in scope as the development plans was prepared by government planners and presented at the 1991 economic summit, entitled, Review of Performance and Prospects of the Fiji Economy. The rationale presented by the government is that Fiji may, as a nation, recover from the economic crisis which followed in the aftermath of the political crisis of 1987. Economic progress and a strong nation continue to be linked: "... we are one nation with a common destiny and, despite the issues which divide us, we stand united and are prepared to work together to fashion policies which will make our nation stronger and accelerate economic progress." 

In summary, the four five-year national development plans discussed above typically begin with a diagnosis and review of the past performance of the Fiji economy. This is followed by a section elaborating national development objectives and strategies; on inflation, balance of payments and other aspects concerning the macro-economic framework; and the targets of growth to be achieved in the five-year time span of each plan. Included also are sectoral plans or programs of investment
for nearly every area of the economic and social life of
the society; and its administration, for example,
agriculture, education, tourism and so on. However, the
people who participate in the actual development process
are aggregated in abstract numbers. For example, the
"total population" which is further subdivided into age
and ethnic groups, projected population growth rates,
employment and unemployment numbers or projected rates
and the economy's manpower needs.

There is some semblance of people's participation
in the development planning process through the two-day
economic summits convened by the government with the
formation of task forces which bring together representa-
tives from government, private, social and community
organizations. In this way, the government has been able
to claim that the development planning process is one of
consultation and interaction between the government and
the various social groups and classes in Fiji, making each
plan "our national development plan."

However, despite the rhetoric on the development
planning process being a consultative one among all the
parties taking part in the development process, the
dominant role is played by the government planners and
other outside development experts. As David Korten aptly
puts it, "... development programming continues to be
dominated by methodologies which take economic output and
the allocation of financial resources--rather than people--as their central focus." 32 The national development plans provide the framework and criteria for the technical expert's selection of specific development projects.

Basically, the organizational model upon which decision making on development planning, policies, strategies, programs and projects in Fiji is based is centrally-directed and hierarchical. The major decisions on development policies and strategies are based on, and supported by, economic analyses and statistical data that only highly trained technical experts can produce. This is evident in all four of Fiji's post-independence comprehensive development plans. Value is given to a new type of knowledge, that is, economic knowledge. This knowledge assumes the quality of being able to predict economic development and growth, and thus regulate economic and political order for a higher complex society.

As noted above, the whole process and the requirement of the production of detailed development plans is linked to the prerequisite set by the major capitalist development credit institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and ADB for Third World state membership in each of them and access to their funds. In addition, these international lending institutions send their own missions (comprising their institution's highly trained technical experts) to Third World member states such as Fiji to gather data on the
current economic (and sometimes social and political) conditions to produce their own dossiers or data bank. This knowledge gathering is basically focused on the state concerned such as Fiji's economy. But the process is constantly redesigned or refined to incorporate changes in the economic conditions of Fiji and its position in relation to the world-economy. Thus, the experts in these institutions design structural adjustments to be imposed on Fiji, for example, to absorb new requirements arising from the contradictions generated by capitalist development within the society as well as the international economic climate.

Since 1987, the World Bank has produced at least two comprehensive documents about the Fiji economy as a whole. The first report entitled Fiji: Challenges for Development (1990) is a comprehensive diagnosis of the whole anatomy of the economy beginning in the 1980s and the macro-economic structural adjustments required for the economy to recover from the economic crisis (see Chapter IV) as a result of the political instability in the aftermath of two military coups in 1987. However, there is a last chapter concerning "human resource development," or the "role of human capital development." The chapter is a summary of another World Bank report entitled Fiji: Performance and Prospects of Education, Training and Health Services (1989). The report contains the recommendations
of a World Bank mission sent to Fiji at the request of the Interim government to "assess the performance and prospects of the health, education and training sectors." The central focus is the question of efficiency of education and training in meeting new labor demands and skills.

A second document entitled Fiji: Incentive Policies for Growth (1991) is also basically a review of the Fiji economy, based on the findings of a mission sent by the World Bank to the country in early 1991. The report makes several recommendations to the Fiji government on future directions to take in developing the economy. For example, there are recommendations on how to create stability in Fiji's sugar industry. But the World Bank mission did not support the Interim government's creation of a public corporation--Fiji National Petroleum Company Limited (FINAPACO)--to establish its fuel importing monopoly.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) also has its own teams of technical experts and economists. The IMF sends missions to Fiji to gather data from government ministries, sectors and statutory bodies on Fiji's economic conditions. For example, a document entitled Fiji: Recent Economic Developments (1989) comprises a review of Fiji's economic performance since 1987, and other familiar economic indicators such as balance of payments, and
monetary policy, as well as economic growth and public finance. These data provide the basis of the criteria used to decide Fiji's credit worthiness when the Fiji government seeks financial loans in capital investment from international financial organizations or foreign investment.

Fiji also became a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) upon independence in 1970. Like the IMF and the World Bank, the ADB sends missions to Third World member states such as Fiji. The ADB's own technical experts gather information and write their reports about Fiji. These reports are typically focused on economic data--Fiji's economic structure, and growth performance, government economic planning for the economy as a whole and for each sector. The Asian Development Bank's lending policy to Fiji is based on the Bank's strategy of emphasizing the predominant role of the private sector in Fiji's long-term economic development objective.

In 1990, the Fiji government sought F$266 million (US$173.85 million) for capital investment in the economy from aid donors and multilateral finance organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and ADB. But in order that an application for a loan be considered by these international finance institutions, certain conditions such as economic structural adjustments implemented through the processes of development project and program planning
are required. Project and program planning is carried out or formulated and controlled by the central government departments of the various economic and social sectors such as agriculture or education respectively. Hence, the entire process of economic development planning, policy and strategy formulation is centrally determined by the government.

The Central Planning Office (CPO), a section of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning plays a crucial role in development policy formulation. A development project is proposed by a government department for a particular sector, for example, manufacturing or education. However, before it gets to be considered by the relevant authorities, the project proposal goes through a screening and selection process conducted by the CPO.

The personnel of the CPO comprises highly trained expatriate or local experts who are conversant with the technical aspects of the project planning process. A technical treatise on the project planning cycle entitled A Guide to Project Planning in Fiji (1983) outlines six stages and the actors involved at each stage for Fiji's context. The first stage is the identification of the development project. The formalized or top-down rather than bottom-up approach is the norm as the development plans guide this process. The CPO and other government agencies are the main actors. The second stage is the
design of the project. This is a technical exercise and is prepared according to the requirements of the financier of the project, for example, the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. This is done by technical experts in the government department. The third stage is that of screening the project proposals. The government agencies involved at this stage include the CPO, the Ministry of Finance and the Public Service Commission (PSC). The criteria used for ranking the projects include: financial or economic viability, manpower implications, net recurrent expenditure implications and accordance with the Fijian state's current development strategies. The fourth stage is that of appraisal of the project. The government agency which proposed the project does the technical appraisal, that is, how the project is to be implemented. The CPO does the market and economic appraisal. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the CPO do the financial appraisal. The PSC does the management appraisal, that is, the skilled personnel needed for the project's implementation. The fifth stage is that of project monitoring. The operational government agency does the physical monitoring. This involves recording and analyzing the progress of the project's implementation. The CPO and the MOF do the financial monitoring which involves recording the disbursement of finance to the project. The sixth stage in the project planning cycle
is that of evaluation. This is done by either local or expatriate experts and involves an indepth technical review of the implementation and "success" of the project. However, the specifics of the project planning cycle is largely determined by the particular aid donor or multilateral financial institution that the Fiji government is requesting assistance from.

In the technical-economistic discourse and procedures of development project planning and the entire process of formulating national development plans, there is negligible consideration or regard for the targeted groups of people who would be affected. As is now evident, government decisions on development policies and strategies are made by top government officials and politicians. These decisions are based on the knowledge provided by technical "development experts" who are invariably far removed from the mass of the people, knowing little of the aspirations and needs of the "targeted beneficiaries." These experts use the aggregate numerical data from the bureau of statistics as social indicators to determine the people's needs.

Development projects are basically selected for their ability to generate and increase economic growth, create employment, and their foreign exchange earning capacity. These projects are then expected by the planners and funding agencies to be implemented by various government
and local subordinate agencies. Predetermined bureaucratic procedures and schedules provide the framework for project implementation.

This analysis of development practices of the Fijian state, aid donors and the major multilateral finance institutions illustrates that both the borrowing government, in this case Fiji, and the capitalist development lending institutions are engaged in the production and reproduction of the dominant development planning practices. After the military coups of 1987, the Fiji government "invited" the IMF, World Bank, ADB, and the Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) to carry out studies of the Fiji economy. According to the principal planning officer (CPO), these international institutions provide the Fiji government a service. "The advice from these international bodies has been used to decide government's policies to put into action. One of the strengths is to have these international agencies to carry out these studies for the Fiji government. They identify the problems and propose the measures."45

In short, planning development is mainly an exercise in attracting or keeping aid donors and meeting the requirements for loans from the IMF, World Bank and ADB. The Fiji government has capitulated to prescriptions for economic structural adjustments meted out by these
capitalist development lending institutions in spite of political protests from local interest groups. For example, World Bank reports have, in the past, been treated with respect by the government as prescriptions for economic development and uplift, even when it has grave reservations about them, often making a show of opposition even as it bites the bullet. In the final analysis, Fiji's experience is an example of the material and intellectual hegemony of the western capitalist system, specifically, the academic hegemony of economics. In other words, this hegemonic position of the rich advanced states, supported by the IMF, the World Bank, ADB and other multilateral capitalist development finance institutions, continues to promote the expansion of private international capital to every part of the world, including Fiji.

The Development Theory which Informs and Supports the Dominant Development Discourse of Fiji

The concept of development has been one of the most powerful of western ideas. Development has become synonymous with the nineteenth century European preoccupation with progress. All change in economic, political and social structures and institutions came to assume "an immanent, unidirectional process of development. The 'later stages' are 'higher' and therefore 'better' than the earlier . .." Central to the meaning of development
is the idea of evolution which implies that development is unidirectional, cumulative, progressive, predetermined, and irreversible. Development has come to be conceptualized as a linear process. This conceptualization is evident in the metatheoretical commitment of the necessity of certain economic and social patterns in both the modernization mainstream development theorists and classical Marxism.

Development came to be defined in terms of the historical rise of the western industrialized European nation-states and the emergence of capitalism, the formation of the bourgeoisie as a dominant class and the industrial revolution. Development as defined provided the basis for western Europeans to compare non-European societies with themselves and their civilization and progress. Furthermore, the basis of traditional thinking on development has been that of extrapolating from experiences which are specific to the western world to non-western societies. As Immanuel Wallerstein points out, the concept of development is one of the principal components of the ideology "both of Western civilization and of world social science."

However, modern development theorizing only dates back to the end of World War II. The first attempts to construct theories on development were done by economists. This being so as a consequence of the dominance of the
ideology of development defined as increasing capitalist economic production or creating economic growth. The development theory which provides the basis of the development discourse on Fiji is predominantly economic and is rooted within the "modernization paradigm." Modernization in this context means both certain characteristics of a development strategy, and a specific historical transitional stage from feudalism to capitalism as experienced by western economic history.49

Walt Rostow's "stages of economic growth" model provides the theoretical framework of the Fijian state's development ideology, policies and strategies. According to Rostow, the history of the western experience of economic growth or development can be described as moving progressively through a number of stages, "linking a state of transition with . . . 'maturity'."50 There are five stages through which all societies must undergo in order to develop. These five stages include: (i) The traditional society in which per capita production is stagnant due to the low level of technological knowledge; (ii) the pre "take-off" stage when the traditional society assumes a new mentality and subsequently there emerges a class of entrepreneurs, all of which results in increased agricultural production and modern infrastructure; (iii) the third stage is "the take-off," which is the beginning of the economic development process, lasting a few decades
and can be identified when "the share of net investment and saving in national income rises from 5 percent to 10 percent or more, resulting in a process of industrialization"; (iv) the road to maturity is the fourth stage when modern technology in certain leading sectors of the economy is disseminated to the whole economy; (v) the fifth stage is reached when the ultimate goal of the creation of "the mass consumption society was arrived at." 51

This model, which has played an important role in economic development theorizing in the late 1950s and the 1960s, continues to provide the basic assumptions of the technical experts directing Fiji's development planning. 52

In short, development experts define a better life in terms of increased mass production and consumption. Therefore, the main criterion for success in development is a rising gross national product and per capital GNP. These are the major indicators of economic development.

Thus, the growth of capitalist economic production is presented by economists and capitalist development experts and their supporting institutions as the universal goal for all societies or nation-states. Private capital accumulation or formation is the principal goal of development. These are the underlying assumptions of the technical experts (both expatriate and local) who determine the formation of development policies and strategies of developing countries like Fiji. Hence development and
growth are synonymous with private capital accumulation or formation.

The problem of underdevelopment is typically characterized as being one of the shortage of capital within the country. The solution, which is advocated by the promoters of capitalist development, is to borrow from the capitalist world's financial institutions. Accordingly, international financial institutions such as the World Bank and ADB support projects which require large amounts of foreign financing. These projects must also utilize western technology and expertise as part of their implementation. In addition, development projects which build up the country's infrastructure, manufacturing and agricultural production for export are favored.

In their attempts to fill the gap between practice and theory, development economists and experts have expanded the concept of capital. Therefore, the concept of capital formation in economic national development planning also includes taking into consideration planning of investment or expenditure for the social sectors. In the development planning parlance, these social sectors are health care and education. More recently, the factors of population, labor force and employment are put into development planning discourse as "human resource development planning." In short, the goal of development posited by the rational theories of development emphasizes
the management of macro-economic variables in order to generate high economic growth rates.

The Nation-State and Development

In the western experience of the emergence of capitalism and capitalist society or modernity, and within the social sciences, the idea of development "has been closely associated with the nation state [and] development theory has so far evinced a national bias, . . ."54 As Hettne points out, the basic assumption was (and continues to be) that development was and is a process that could be controlled and directed centrally by the state. Thus, academic development theory has been concerned mainly with the political debate of the state versus the market.

Basically, development problems were and are still conceptualized as national problems. The pioneers of development theory addressed themselves to the governments of the new nation-states. As Hettne notes, "From the very start development theorists and development economists in particular were addressing governments on the assumption that national development was to be given the highest political priority, . . ."55

As in the west, the state in the Third World (such as Fiji) assumed the role of the manager of an "enterprise" or "industry" called development. Data about the state, especially its economy, became the focus of much economic and social research programs and data collection in the
social sciences. Basically, the development paradigm, which still underlies much of development policy formulation and planning in Fiji, is the modernization imperative. Moreover, "the character of the modern elite [in Fiji] and its close relations to the state made [development] strategies which emphasized the role of state power more attractive than other alternatives."56

The Impact of the Development Discourse of Fiji on the People

The "reality" which the development discourse produced and reproduces in Fiji's comprehensive development plans, in the reviews or reports of the economy, and the various social aspects of its people such as their health and education and project proposals, by both local and foreign development experts, constitute a depoliticized or sanitized and naturalized materiality. The basic life conditions especially the misery of those people negatively affected by and the social costs of capitalist development are not mentioned or are silenced. However, the dominant and hegemonic position of the ideology of capitalist development in Fiji, for example, is basically rooted in Fiji's experience of colonialism. Western forms of power and rationality were implanted in Fiji's context by the introduction of formal schooling. The western-controlled media (press, radio, television) contribute to the
hegemonic development project in exalting capitalist society and industrialization. A better life is defined for the people in terms of mass production and consumption. Is there any resistance to the hegemony of the western world view and values and how is it emerging?

The education system in Fiji is basically an imported and imposed metropolitan model consisting of an introduced restrictive curricula. The standards and examinations of the colonial power's system were adopted. Fiji's early education system reflected the two-tier model of the nineteenth and early twentieth century British system of education. Select schools which provided an academic-type education, and hence access to white-collar employment, restricted admission to the sons and (later) daughters of local European elites. Special boarding schools were built for the children of the Fijian elite. The education of the children of Fijian commoners was left to the initiative of Christian missions, while in the case of those of indentured Indian laborers to their local leaders and committees. The education system in Fiji today has not changed much from this imported model. Basically, such a situation is the consequence of the continuity of the dominance of the capitalist mode of production and its support and promotion by those who control the flow of resources both internally and externally.
Since independence, government bureaucrats and politicians have presented education as a means for achieving development. However, "education for development" means preparing personnel to service the modern sector. In other words, the value of education is that it prepares young people for white-collar employment or wage-earning jobs. On the other hand, those who obtain jobs or careers in the modern sector are relatively well paid. They have access to a western lifestyle which gives them better material well-being and life chances. Parents send their children to school in order that they will get a good job. But in order to get a good job, young people are required to possess the necessary certificates, diplomas and degrees. Students in Fiji are subjected to a series of at least four externally-administered selective examinations, which in the process screen out a great number of young people as they go through the system.

The importance of passing examinations which emphasize passes in mathematics, English and science, means that the curricula in most secondary schools in Fiji are western academic-oriented. A good education means an academic education needed to obtain white-collar employment. In effect, therefore, the education system serves to alienate young people from their own local culture. Furthermore, as the good and better-equipped schools which provide success in passing examinations are urban-based and require
greater financial outlay, only the elite or affluent families (from the rural areas) can afford to send their children to these schools. Thus, the education system in Fiji effectively serves to perpetuate existent economic inequalities.

On the other hand, the government planner and educational administrator are conditioned by the exigencies and requirements of accepting and requesting foreign funds, and the advice and assistance of expatriate development experts. Their main concern is how to synchronize meeting the modern sector's manpower [sic] needs with the allocations of resources to, and the outputs of the education system. In other words, human resource development (in the more recent development lexicon) means planning and matching supply and demand for certain types of skilled personnel needed by the new government policies of development. The purpose of the national education system is to churn out, in as short a time as possible, a predictable number of trained personnel or professionals required for the country's modern economy to function effectively. This kind of educational development policy is enforced through the government awarding scholarships for only specified fields or providing training assistance for certain sections of the economy earmarked for growth, currently, for example, in the garment industry.
The government also does its own public relations exercises concerning its development policies and strategies through the establishment of a public relations office, now the Ministry of Information, located in the capital city of Suva and headquarters of the government. Pamphlets and other publications produced by the government are sent out to school libraries in an attempt to instill impressionistic images on the youth of Fiji concerning the successful development programs and the benefits of modernization. For example, Fiji: Information (July, 1973) is basically a condensed version of what goes into a development plan. Another example is that of a special publication which was produced by the government's department of information to mark Fiji's fifteenth anniversary of political independence. The publication entitled Fiji: Development and Progress 1970-1985 gives an impressive account of what Fiji has been able to achieve as an independent nation. The cover design of an artist's impression of the transformers of the $230 million hydropower scheme at Monasavu, Viti Levu, is meant to capture this "outstanding symbol of Fiji's independent history and progress." The indications of successful modernization such as the physical signs of modern capitalist development include modern housing structures or complexes in the urban centers, airstrips, jetties, the changing countryside as pine crops replace tropical rainforests,
and the power transmission lines alongside the new highway in southeast Viti Levu.

Furthermore, the government also uses the press and government-run radio station to promote and create people's awareness of its development policies. In addition to government's own publicity programs of celebrating Fiji's success of fifteen years of "nationhood and progress" the press has also published supplements which extol Fiji's achievements in the creation of nationhood. Moreover, the press has done supplements on every major development project promoted by the government such as the F$230 million hydro-electric scheme and the multi-million dollar pine industry. Other supplements which laud the benefits of capitalist development to, specifically, indigenous Fijians, include the successful prize-winners of "Start Your Own Business Competition," or "The Best Sugar Cane Farmer of the Year Award."

The press, radio, and (very recently) television are powerful means for the government to dress up its foreign-influenced export-oriented economic development policies and large-scale privatization of government assets, as well as austerity measures imposed by the IMF, and thus attempt to legitimize them and maximize public acceptance. Moreover, the predominance of western, especially bourgeois, values are also impressed on the people through the screening of western controlled and produced films.
and advertisements. These media also elevate the modern conveniences and glamour of lifestyles based on high consumption western industrialized societies.

The indigenous Fijians have also been subjected to exhortations by their fellow Fijians who are government officials or hold positions in modern sector organizations such as the FSC and FDB to change from their Fijian way of life to one more responsive to government's policies of capitalist development. According to a Fijian official of the FSC, Fijian sugar cane farmers in Seagaqa need to change their attitude toward cane farming as another way of practicing the Fijian way of life to one based on a business or commercial orientation.62 The manager of FDB, Seagaqa branch, an indigenous Fijian, enthusiastically described his idea of starting a "rehabilitation program" to train Fijian cane farmers who are not "performing" to "think money."63 In other words, to show them that the FDB wants to "help" them by giving them another loan to redevelop their farms. A similar message to the Fijian cane farmers was echoed by the FDB's managing director, another indigenous Fijian, on his visit to Seagaqa in his speech on the broadening of the FDB's lending policy. Fijian cane farmers would now have access to loans to pay for their social and educational needs.64 This is a classic example of the creation of dependency of a former
relatively self-sufficient class of Fijian subsistence farmers on a new class of bureaucratic administrators. In summary, the mass of the people, specifically, indigenous Fijians are exhorted to adopt western capitalist types of economic and cultural behavior and values. The apparatus of development is constituted through the creation by the dominant social groups of a network of regulatory controls over other groups' resources such as time and labor. In this way, "... people and communities are bound to certain cycles of production certain behaviours and rationalities." 65

Counterdiscourses and Resistance

The hegemony of the dominant discourse of development which has been and continues to be produced by the rational discourses of economists, development experts and politicians has not gone unchallenged. At the international level, many Third World leaders and intellectuals acting as representatives of their people have attempted to appropriate the ideology of development to pursue their national interests. However, they operated within the terms of the same assumptions and goals of the dominant model of development defined basically as growth in production or GNP.

There have also been challenges to the dominant development discourse at the theoretical level. The dependency and underdevelopment school (1960s) and later
the world systems perspective (1974) have challenged the major assumptions of the modernization theorists. The Latin American debate on dependency and underdevelopment arose from the stagnation experienced in the economies of the Latin American countries in the 1960s. These nation-states did not follow the path to material advancement and democracy as predicted by the modernization theorists. Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems perspective points to the Eurocentric basis of the world-system or capitalist world-economy, tracing its origins to sixteenth century Europe. The nature of this capitalist world-economy: specifically its orientation of production towards capital accumulation via profits realized in a world market--means that not all states can "develop" at the same time. Thus, the gap between the rich and the poor countries has widened with the exception of the NICs in East Asia.

The challenges to the dominant development discourse discussed above continue to operate within the purview of a western European political economy perspective. The emergence of the concept of participatory action research (PAR) seemed to promise possibilities of a greater challenge to the dominant development discourse. The possibilities of the counter discourse presented by PAR lie in its potential to subvert the network of centers and local sites of power/knowledge which constitutes and
reproduces the dominant development discourse. "Central to PAR philosophy is the question of popular power, i.e., the investigation of the mechanisms necessary to develop popular counter-power for social transformation and their relation to the production of knowledge." 67

The interrelatedness of power, truth and knowledge of the hegemonic ideology of development is problematized by PAR's philosophy of generating popular power. Popular or local power/knowledge is valorized instead of reproducing the economistic scientific rationalities of the hegemonic development discourse. As Escobar tells us:

PAR projects combine techniques of adult education, social science research and political activism. Some of the methods that have been successfully used in these projects include collective research (between external agents or intellectuals and the popular groups concerned, always taking popular knowledge as the starting point for research and action); the critical reconstruction of local or regional histories . . . . the restoration and use of popular cultures (including the use of people's feelings, imagination and artistic capabilities, activist tendencies, popular language); and the use of novel means of diffusing knowledge (all knowledge being considered the property of the community). 68

There seems to be a fundamental difference between the orientations of the production-centered, conventional dominant development and PAR approaches. In the case of the conventional development model, the national planners and foreign technical experts know and set the development
goals for the people. On the other hand, the PAR approach to development emphasizes a people-oriented, dialogic and participatory process. This method allows the beneficiaries to define their own felt needs, goals and aspirations they want to meet or achieve from taking part in a development project or program.

However, the initiators of or change agents in PAR projects are, like the conventional development strategy, external agents or outsiders. Although Escobar claims that change agents in PAR projects do not replicate the relations of submission and dependence as in the dominant development strategy, this cannot be a generalized quality of PAR. As Majid Rahnema cautions in these questions in spite of the declared sincere intentions of PAR supporters: "Are they (PAR change agents) really embarked on a learning journey into the unknown [when they use dialogue to assist their beneficiaries learn from their own local context], where everything has to be discovered? Or, are they (the PAR change agents) concerned more about finding the most appropriate participatory ways to convince the 'uneducated' of their own educated convictions?"69 In short, participatory activists, like the development experts, are also interveners.

Another counterdiscourse which has emerged to challenge the dominant development paradigm occurs within the feminist movement in the critique of the relations
of gender, development and modernity. The works of women writers such as Ester Boserup, Vandana Shiva, Aihwa Ong, and Maria Mies show that development has yet to better women's lives in their societies. In effect, the deployment of development has promoted the exploitation and further subordination of women. Kathy Ferguson points out, "It has become commonplace to note that development hurts women, that it cuts women off from access to the land, creates more work for women to do, and increases women's dependency on men." While some women writers tend to focus on problematizing how women are treated and affected by development programs and projects, others go further by problematizing development itself.

Within the context of the South Pacific Island states, and Fiji in particular, there is an emergent counter-discourse operating within the scope of the recent questioning of the kind of learning that is worthwhile or the question of learning for what purposes and whom does a certain kind of learning serve. This counter-discourse consists of a number of genres such as poetry, short stories, novels, plays as well as academic essays or books on development and educational systems in the postcolonial states of the region. The cultural hegemony of the western model of development has been questioned in terms of its relevance to, and contradiction with the lifeworld of indigenous Pacific Islanders like
the Fijians. For example, the motivation of working to make a profit contradicts the Fijian value system based on kinship mutual social obligation and identity or affinity with the land ("vanua").

The counterdiscourse attempts to subvert the dominant view that a western-type education provides the panacea for the so-called "Fijian problem" in Fiji's development process. The material conditions of capitalist development does not ensure that every Fijian who aspires to go to school to get a western-type education will obtain white collar or wage employment. Most Fijians continue to be rural or semi-rural dwellers. But the Fijian political elite are more concerned with the production of qualified Fijians to fill the middle- and top-management levels of the work force in both the public and private sectors of the economy. This is the conjunction where ethnicity or race intersects with class formation within the context of capitalist development and Fijian control of the state. Hence the Fijian-dominated government is preoccupied with ensuring that a sufficient number of Fijians must pass examinations as they go through the western-oriented educational system to obtain the necessary qualifications.

On the other hand, Asesela Ravuvu's work entitled Development or Dependence (1988) shows how the processes of modernization and economic development have seriously affected indigenous Fijians' lifeworlds in Nakorosule,
Matainasau, Lutu and Laselou villages in the eastern central part of Viti Levu. Ravuvu argues that as capitalist development intensifies its grip in rural Fiji, the initially self-sufficient and self-reliant Fijian communities have become increasingly affected by and dependent on outside forces. The consequences for these Fijian villagers is loss of control or autonomy over their lives and resources such as their land and timber.

Ravuvu discusses the dilemma of many indigenous Fijians concerning retaining their political dominance while being able to practice "the Fijian way of life" ("na i vakarau ni bula vakaviti"). Yet, indigenous Fijians are simultaneously also admonished by the government to engage "successfully" in capitalist development to gain some hold on their resources. "Fijians," according to Ravuvu, "have long been in a dilemma. Continually advised by their leaders of the importance of maintaining their customs and traditions which insist on communalism, at the same time they have been urged to be involved in commercial enterprises which emphasize individualism. . . ." 75

These counterdiscourses or attempts at challenging the dominant development discourse do not yet have the support of the types of structures and institutions that the capitalist development discourse has. The mainstream development paradigm is supported by institutional
structures such as statism, industrialism and professionalism. On the other hand, the counterdiscourses operate mainly at the ideological level. This is especially evident in the difficulties encountered in articulating justifications for the funding of development projects which do not have as the bottom line, profit making.
Notes to Chapter VI


2 Ibid.


4 Wolfgang Sachs, pp. 4 and 5.

5 Arturo Escobar, p. 383.

6 Ibid., p. 384.


Positivism is a system of philosophy or theory that society can be analyzed in purely objective mechanistic terms. In other words, there is a radical break between empirical observations and non-empirical statements. Social values and normative standards are treated as mere epiphenomena. The positivist persuasion still exists in contemporary social science practice in an implicit rather than explicit assertion.


8 Arturo Escobar, p. 388.

9 Ibid.

10 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created at Bretton Woods in July 1944. The IMF has played the role of an international "lender of the last resort." Third World member countries facing balance of payments deficits may request the Fund for short-term financial
assistance. But this assistance is conditional upon the borrower's agreeing to a stabilization program that the IMF considers as acceptable to its demand-reducing approach to correcting the deficits. Detailed programs of devaluation, deflation and decontrol are imposed and quantitative targets for various macroeconomic variables are required. Compliance is effected by the Fund's method of doling out credit only in installments. The second role which the IMF assumed in the 1970s and 1980s has been that of certifying the ability to service external debt or credit worthiness of the less developed countries (LDCs).

The World Bank was founded in 1944 along with the IMF and began its operations in June 1946. All members of the IMF are eligible to join the World Bank.

The World Bank's main goal or purpose is to provide financial assistance to the poor LDCs to promote capitalist economic development. This is done by encouraging and requiring the borrowing country to welcome and promote private foreign investment. The World Bank carries out its goal through its own team of foreign experts or "development diplomats" going out to work with the local modernized elite of the LDC.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was conceived by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and established in 1966 with its headquarters in Manila. ADB is a regional development bank for countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Its main task or purpose is to assist the Developing Member Countries (DMCs) to promote economic development. However, most ADB financing has been provided for specific projects in agriculture, rural development, infrastructure and energy. Program lending has been based on structural reforms in a particular sector of the borrower's economy.

11Arturo Escobar, pp. 384-387.
12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 386.
14Ibid., p. 389.
15Ibid.
I will list the titles of these sources as I use them in the analysis in the text.


First, I wish to point out that the personnel in control of the Central Planning Office (CPO) then were the development experts from the ex-colonial power, Britain. Even today, the head of the CPO is a development expert from Britain.

DP6 consists of 20 chapters. The first chapter of Part One reviews the economic development of the country from 1945-1970. The second part, which consists of chapters 2 to 6, deals with development objectives and policies, targets for economic development, 1971-1975, the population, employment and manpower, fiscal, monetary and related policies, external trade and balance of payments, and regional, urban and rural development. Part Three, comprising chapters 8 to 19, gives details on sectoral plans and programs for agriculture, forestry, fishing; mining and quarrying; manufacturing and processing, that is, import substitution; building and construction; electricity, water supply and sewerage; transport and communications; commerce; cooperatives; government services for education, for health and welfare which include prisons and urban housing. Part four is on how to implement the plan by using various organizational techniques. Included in each chapter are the projected or relevant statistics and figures dealing with that area. See Government of Fiji, Fiji's Sixth Development Plan 1971-1975, Suva, Fiji: Central Planning Office, Ministry of Finance, 1970.

22 Ibid., p. iii.

23 Ibid.


26 Ibid., p. 16. The United Nations Regional Planning Project identified 60 locations for possibilities of being growth centers.


28 Ibid.

29 Government of Fiji, Review of Performance and Prospects of the Fiji Economy (since 1987), Suva, Fiji: Central Planning Office, 1991, p. ix. As discussed in Chapter IV, measures the government has implemented include the setting up of the Tax Free Factory and Tax Free Zone Scheme; deregulation of the economy through the termination of import licensing and the reduction of tariffs; tax reform, channelling resources from the public sector to promote private sector growth through the privatization of government-owned enterprises into corporations.

30 Ibid.

31 The Fiji Times, May 3, 1991, p. 3. The Prime Minister, Ratu Mara, in his opening address to the National Economic Summit.


34 Ibid., Chapter V.


41 The CPO is made up of five technical units: (i) the Macroeconomic Planning Unit--is mainly concerned with identifying trends in the growth of the economy through economic indicators such as GDP and other aggregate economic and social data; (ii) Manpower planning and population policy unit. This unit is concerned with aggregate data on manpower requirements, human resource development and unemployment; (iii) the Sectoral Planning Unit deals with the evaluation of development project proposals from the various sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, infrastructure, etc.; (iv) the Regional Planning unit deals with development issues relating to the different geographical areas of the country; (v) the Project Planning and Evaluation unit screens and selects project proposals for further consideration--up the hierarchy of the planning process.

The Asian Development Bank has prepared a series of six project planning handbooks to strengthen the project formulation, evaluation and monitoring capabilities of Fiji's key government ministries or departments.


Personal communication, in an interview with a government project planner and evaluator in the CPO, Suva, Fiji, July 26, 1991.

Personal communication in an interview with the Principal Planning Officer, CPO, Suva, Fiji, July 23, 1991.


Ibid., p. 22. See also Alvin So, pp. 29-31.

Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, p. 13.

The Fiji Times, July 5, 1965, p. 2. The Prime Minister of Fiji, Ratu Mara, enunciated Rostow's model as a basis for Fiji's future economic development.

For example, projects in Fiji supported by the World Bank include the building of a road costing F$20 million, a hydro-electric power project costing F$230 million and the Seaqaqa Sugar Cane Development Project costing F$22 million.


Ibid., p. 28.

Ibid., p. 49.

Tom Kaye, "Education and Privilege in the South Pacific," Directions, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 and 2 (Suva, Fiji: Institute of Education, University of the South Pacific, December 1986), pp. 109-117. There were two types of education. The academic-type education, provided by the public and independent schools plus some selected grammar schools, was a prerequisite for a career in the civil service and the professions. The elementary schools provided the children of working and lower middle classes with the basic skills for manual and clerical work. A scholarship system provided for bright children from the lower class to get an academic education in order to obtain white collar jobs.

Ibid. Those young people who have left their villages and communities in order to attend secondary schools in the urban centers, and fail to pass their examinations, experience great difficulty in returning to their homes. They are looked upon or perceive themselves to be "failures." Moreover, they are disabled in effectively participating in the local community because
they have not acquired the culturally sophisticated skills and strategies of their people.


62 Personal communication with a former FSC field superintendent of Seaqaqa 1988-1991, now officer assisting the FSC General Manager (Field Services), August 23, 1991.

63 Personal communication with the manager, FDB, Seaqaqa, June 6, 1991. He told me that he was organizing a program whereby FDB staff at Seaqaqa would go out to the Fijian farmers in the evenings. The FDB staff would join the Fijian farmers around a bowl of yaqona (kava). This would provide an occasion to introduce to the Fijian sugar cane farmers western capitalist concepts of how to manage their time and money. According to the FDB manager at Seaqaqa, the concepts of time and money are new to indigenous Fijians. Since Fijians are used to helping each other, they do not worry about how to save money for the future.

64 Speech given by FDB managing director to about 100 Fijian cane farmers at Seaqaqa, May 15, 1991. See also *The Fiji Times*, May 16, 1991.

65 Escobar, p. 388.

66 Escobar, p. 391. According to Escobar, "PAR grew out of experiences in popular education and grass-roots activism in a number of countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa during the seventies, and it is presently one of the most hopeful lines of research and action in the Third World."

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.


72 Ibid. The outcomes and consequences of development are the result of economic exploitation and domination by one social group over others or another group.

73 Poetry seems to be the most popular genre used to express discontent with the western values which have generated contradictions and conflicting assumptions about what is worth knowing, that is, what type of knowledge is to be privileged. The work of well-known Samoan writer Albert Wendt consists of poems, short stories and novels. Tongan poet Konai Thaman expresses the conflicting beliefs and contradictions created by a western education for the indigenous Pacific Islander. Pio Manoa and Joe Nacola are two Fijian writers, the first a poet and second a playwright, who have articulated the predicament of the indigenous Fijian vis-à-vis western culture and economic development.

74 Aselesa Ravuvu, Development or Dependence: The Pattern of Change in a Fijian Village, Institute of Pacific Studies, Fiji Center (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1988).

75 Ibid., p. 192.
CHAPTER VII
THE NATURE OF FIJIAN PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

The conventional development discourse is silent on how capitalist economic development affects the various social groups who have been "pushed" into participation by the international and national agents of capitalism. Thus this chapter analyzes the consequences of modern capitalist development on Fijian peasant or village society through two perspectives. The first is a political economy view which looks at the "objective" effects or material conditions of development on a group of Fijian farmers involved in the SSCDP. Some of the material effects include the increased production and commodification of goods and services, higher incomes, and greater dependence on market forces and the state bureaucracy.

The second is an attempt at interpreting the "verbal transcript" of some of the Fijian farmers at Seagaqa. However partial this transcript may be, it is important as it provides the outside analyst with a description of the experienced reality of the human actors' engagement in activities which are named as "development." In short, the Fijian farmers' interpretations are constitutive of their experience of development. Therefore, the basis
for analysis here comprises the ideas and feelings which some of the Fijian sugar cane farmers attached to the concept of development. The Fijian word for development is "veivakatorocaketaki." Literally translated into English, the word means the state of being uplifted or moving upwards. The word has a positive connotation. The question to be explored here is how Fijians connect "veivakatorocaketaki" with "na i vakarau ni bula vakaViti," or "the Fijian way of life."

The Seaqaga Sugar Cane Development Project:
Who Benefits? Whose Costs? The Objective Consequences

During May and June, 1991, the writer interviewed 51 Fijian families who were involved in sugar cane farming in Seaqaga. The heads of the families were predominantly male, with the exception of six which had women as heads and as leaseholders. The majority of the farmers interviewed were between the ages of 40 and 60 years. Most of the families had a history of at least 10 years of sugar cane farming at Seaqaga by then. Many took up sugar cane farming during the years when the SSCDP was being implemented (1976-1981).

The Fiji government's policies for the SSCDP were designed mainly for the purposes of facilitating the transition of indigenous Fijians from a subsistence orientation with little participation in the cash economy
to a commercial orientation with some supplementary subsistence production. Thus, the government presented the Fijian farmers with a number of economic incentives to induce them to participate in the SSCDP. These incentives were considered "advantages" for Fijian families who wanted to participate in the SSCDP in comparison with their counterparts in other sugar cane producing areas of Fiji. 4

Of the 51 Fijian sugar cane farming families at Seagaqa, who were interviewed, only 12 said that they were previously involved in some cash crop production. About a quarter said that they had some outside cash employment in government or in the private sector. Most of the families, however, had been self-sufficient in subsistence crops. These families would not have had sufficient funds to bring bush or forest land at Seagaqa into sugar cane production without substantial access to credit facilities.

Initially, the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) provided credit to new farmers for land clearing, preparation and planting of sugar cane. However, in 1976, the World Bank provided the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) with US$6 million to lend to the settlers and other agencies involved in the SSCDP (see Chapter V). The FDB became the sole financier of farm development costs. Funds were also given to some settlers to buy tractors for land preparation and trucks for transporting sugar cane to the mill in Labasa.
Nearly all the Fijian families who were interviewed (48 out of 51) borrowed F$10,000 or more from the FDB to meet farm development costs. These are substantial debts for most of the families who were self-sufficient in subsistence before the project began. In addition, the recurrent costs for sugar cane farming at Seaqaqa include high fertilizer costs. The low quality of the soil in Seaqaqa requires the application of three times as much fertilizer as in other areas of Fiji.\textsuperscript{5} Transportation costs for sugar cane from Seaqaqa to the mill are also high because of the long distance involved.

Thus, one of the major consequences for the Fijian families participating in the SSCDP has been the compulsion to become heavily indebted to the FDB. To date, half of the families interviewed continue to owe between F$10,000 and F$40,000 in terminal debt. Terminal debt is the level of debt remaining after all payments for the current year's sugar cane activity have been credited to the farmer's account.

Given that the cash earning of most of these Fijian village families ranged between F$50 and F$200 per year prior to participation in the project, these debts are extremely high.\textsuperscript{6} However, the highest single payment that the families received from sugar cane ranged from F$1,000 to F$42,000. Therefore, many of the families have had a rise in income as a result of taking part in the project.
Hence, the great majority of the families in the interviews said they experienced a big difference in cash flow subsequent upon participating in the SSCDP. Thus, they viewed their participation in the project as beneficial.

Other advantages the government presented to the settler families included 30-year leases with further optional periods of 10 years. This provided more secure tenure than similar leases for agricultural land in other parts of Fiji. In addition, the land rent was assessed at a concessional rate for the first five years. The majority of the families interviewed had farms ranging from 20 acres to 50 acres.

Most of the families had between 10 acres and 30 acres of their farms under cane cultivation. Furthermore, half of the families produced between 400 and 600 tonnes of sugar cane annually. Since many of these Fijian families were only marginally involved in the cash economy, that is, not involved in full-time cash earning activities before the project started, these cane production figures point to a change in the type of economic activity for these participants. They have become increasingly active in commodity production for the world market. This constitutes a significant change for Fijian village society which had been self-sufficient in subsistence needs and whose agriculture had been carried out in an organic environment.
The government's emphasis on the concentration of the families' efforts in sugar cane cultivation as a condition for easy access to credit plus the advance of a subsistence loan by the FDB, as well as the food items provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization's World Food Program, have led or encouraged these families to abandon their own production of their basic needs such as food crops. Thus, the hidden costs borne by these families include the loss of self-sufficiency in food production. It has also meant a loss of social autonomy as the families have become increasingly dependent on other social classes such as food retailers, bank officers and state officials. This dependence on other social classes is voiced by the Fijian families in their concern about their relationship with the FDB and FSC officials, their difficulties with hiring trucks to transport their sugar cane to the mill, for example. According to the study by Evans, cash income as a basis for consumption requirements also rose significantly. The families were increasingly becoming more dependent on the cash economy. Moreover, much of the families' productive effort and time is spent on debt reduction as a result of high terminal debts.

However, these families are owners of their means of production in one sense. As smallholder cultivators rather than plantation workers, they continue to enjoy
a degree of independence from other social classes such as owners of the means of production. This was voiced by most of the farmers. When asked about what they thought of their performance in the project, the majority of the Fijian farmers referred to the higher incomes they received and to the fact that they were their own boss.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, the hegemonic ideology of development propagated by the agents of capitalism, therefore, seems to make good on some of its promises of benefits to these participants. Specifically, the benefits include an increase in material production and a raise in income.\textsuperscript{14} In this sense, the families interviewed expressed the view that they too have a stake in the type of development initiated and supported by the Fijian government and exemplified by the SSCDP.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, the material effects of the uneven distribution of the fruits of this development project were also obvious in the different housing conditions of the families who were interviewed. Invariably, those families who had the head or another family member in cash employment other than cultivating sugar cane enjoyed better material welfare. Most were former government employees and were drawing pensions. Others took wage-earning jobs on a part-time basis to supplement farm income.

This situation seems to have some elements of the "straddling model of social reproduction" presented by
Steven Walter Orvis in his study entitled "The Political Economy of Agriculture in Kisii, Kenya: Social Reproduction and Household Response to Development Policy." Orvis postulates that straddling is a process of social reproduction where "successful households include at least one adult man with access to significant off-farm income and a willingness to invest that in household agriculture and education." A process of differentiation seems to be taking place in the sample of Fijian families who were interviewed. It seemed that those families with significant non-agricultural income have done better in the project in terms of increased production and good living conditions. This could be the case in that there is greater access to funds to purchase modern technology to increase productivity.

Moreover, one of the main reasons that many of the Fijian families who were interviewed gave for their initial and also continued participation in the SSCDP was to earn school fees to send their children to school. This is perhaps one of the principal means of ensuring that there would be some level of non-agricultural income from at least one member of the family having outside cash employment in the future.

Thus, development, that is capitalistic economic growth, is an ambiguous process. The power of development
is in the prospects of material gain that it promises. Yet, there are also the risks of the loss of certain values as people become involved in processes of participation in this type of development. Furthermore, participation by the Fijian villagers in such development strategies promoted by the Fijian state serves as a means whereby the state attempts to bring their productive potential under its control. State intervention and rural mobilization of the Fijian villagers to support and implement the government's policy of increased sugar cane production, and Fijian participation in capitalist agricultural development, means the loss of some degree of economic and political independence on the part of Fijian village society. This is because the villagers' material production becomes more closely linked to and dependent on the state and incorporated into the world capitalist economy. This is how the network of new sites of power and control of the apparatus of development expand to include the transformation of Fijian village life.

Participation in development for Fijian villagers means also being subjected to the imposition on them of another network and system of regulatory controls. Its main objective is to bind those villagers and whole communities to certain cycles of production, western capitalist types of economic behavior and cultural rationalities. However, the situation of the Fijian
families at the SSCDP who were interviewed is that they are constitutive of the Fijian peasantry in the making. This seems to be so as these Fijian families satisfy both conditions of the conventional definition of peasants—that is, their autonomy and their dependence. "What makes the peasants different from other social classes is their position as producers with direct access to land, production with the help of family members... but at the same time integration into a larger social economy to which they are forced to make a contribution in one form or another, notably tax or rent." The autonomy of the Fijian families lies in their rights to land and thereby their ability to provide for their basic subsistence from the land and the labor of its members. But they have also become part of the wider market economy in that they are involved in the production of a commodity for sale to the world market. Thus they have become dependent on the state and the World Bank also as a result of the large loans they were enticed to take out to develop their land for cane cultivation. But how do some Fijian village farmers interpret their involvement in this development process?

A Fijian Response to Development: The Subjective Dimension

The state's attempt to extend capitalist relations into Fijian village society involves the subjection of
the villagers to new forms of control and domination. In other words, the process engenders new forms of discipline and normalization in the daily life of the villagers in the interests of capitalist production. How do the Fijian villagers as historical subjects in the development process interact with these new forms of discipline and control? What does greater participation in the market economy mean for them? How have the changing material conditions and relationships brought about by the expansion of capitalist agricultural development affected village societal patterns of work, values, consciousness and identity?

**Some Fijian Farmers' Definition of their Goals and Objectives of Development with Specific Reference to the SSCDP**

Many of the Fijian farmers at the SSCDP who were interviewed are non-village rural Fijians. This means that the families live on their individual homesteads on the sugar cane farms rather than in their villages. The government has encouraged all Fijian families in the project to live on their farms. For example, the Fijian families participating in the SSCDP have had to take out individual leases, in many cases on their own "matagali" or communally-owned land. Legally, this means that other members of the "matagali" (clan) cannot have access to
the use of the same portion of land for 30 years, the
duration of the leases for Fijian "mataqali" land at the
SSCDP.

These requirements for Fijian families involved in
the project to live away from the village and to work
solely in terms of individual interests as "homo
economicus" comprise part of the government's efforts to
encourage capitalist development in rural Fijian society.
As discussed in Chapter III, this is the "galala" model
for indigenous Fijian economic development and social
modernization. Fiji government planners and the inter­
national agents of capitalist economic development are
mainly concerned with what they define as the problem
of how to accelerate the transition of basically
subsistence, non-monetary Fijian village society to a
capitalist one. Thus the government's policies in the
SSCDP have aimed at facilitating the transformation of
the Fijian villager into a capitalist farmer (see
Chapter V).

However, in an interpretive analysis of the "verbal
transcript" of the goals and objectives of some Fijian
farmers taking part in the SSCDP as historical subjects,
a discussion of the relation between culture and history
is relevant here. In general, western social science has
presented "culture" and "history" as binary contrasts in
such oppositions as stability and change, static and
dynamic, system and event. But as Marshall Sahlins points out:

History is culturally ordered, differently so in different societies, according to meaningful schemes of things. The converse is also true: cultural schemes are historically ordered, since to a greater or lesser extent the meanings are revalued as they are practically enacted. The synthesis of these contraries unfolds in the creative action of the historic subjects, the people concerned. For on the one hand, people organize their projects and give significance to their objects from the existing understandings of the cultural order. To that extent, the culture is historically reproduced in action . . . . On the other hand, . . . . as the contingent circumstances of action need not conform to the significance some group might assign them, people are known to creatively reconsider their conventional schemes. And to that extent, the culture is historically altered in action. 19

The Fijian families' experience of participating in capitalist agricultural development in the SSCDP is filtered through the cultural lenses they employ in interpreting and acting upon the state's development policies and strategies. Conversely, specific aspects of Fijian culture are being altered through the Fijian families' participation in capitalist expansion. As Ellen Kay Trimberger puts it, "... the new consciousness that arises out of new experience is shaped by human beings partly through their old consciousness--the cultural standards and values shaped by past experience. People may retain attachments to values and customs even as the
economy is changing. In turn, they may use such cultural attachments to actively intervene in an attempt to alter economic conditions."\textsuperscript{20} As first discussed in Chapter III, the Fijian families interviewed at the SSCDP acknowledged that there is "na i vakarau ni bula vakaViti," or "Vaka i taukei,"--the Fijian way of life.\textsuperscript{21}

The social reproduction of Fijian society continues to be based on the village and the land associated with and owned by the "mataqali." Every Fijian can identify with his or her "mataqali," the land and the village. To date, the village continues to be the center of Fijian social organization and activities. About two-thirds of indigenous Fijians still live in their villages. In any important social event involving an individual member, the entire village becomes involved. As a Fijian writes:

No member of the village will find any difficulty in identifying the particular connection which gives him authority and an obligation to be associated with the particular occasion and will make every effort to contribute to the fund of social valuables demanded by the occasion. Such involvement would be based on descent, common residence, reciprocity, and marriage. Fijians take joy and pride in doing things as a group, and will do their utmost to show their position and relationship in the social system when particular social circumstances call for it.\textsuperscript{22}

What participation in the SSCDP means for the Fijian families who discussed their experiences is interpreted in terms of the village cultural context within which their
experience of development is given meaning. All the families were able to identify their villages of origin without any hesitation. Some lived close to their villages while others even chose to live in the village for certain periods although they also had a house on the farm. Those who lived close to their villages made regular visits to attend any social functions held there. For those whose village of origin was some distance away, such as on another island, the link was maintained by annual visits or by responding to village fund-raising requests. All the families interviewed said that they had close contact with, and contributed to social activities in their village of origin. Moreover, those families who were migrants from another island said they also joined in the social activities of their landowner's village.23

Development was defined by the Fijian families at Seaqaqa as "a rise in the standard of living." This meant better living conditions such as good houses, adequate food, piped water, electricity, telephone services, and other modern amenities and a western education for their children. Basically, a higher standard of living is associated with earning a big cash income.

More than half of the families interviewed stated that one of their goals of participating in the project was to have a good house built in their village as well as on their farm. Thus their participation in the SSCDP
has been viewed by these families as a means of enhancing their ability to meet their social obligations and responsibilities in the village. The more money they earned, the more the Fijian families contributed to social activities in their village.

The purpose of participating in the SSCDP for the Fijian families interviewed, therefore, is one concerned primarily with ensuring the social reproduction of their own household within the context of Fijian village society. As an indigenous Fijian official of the FSC put it, the Fijians' attitude to sugar cane farming is that "it is just a way of life rather than managing it as a business."

However, meeting the needs of the household members means provision not only of the means of subsistence for the present generation but also for the next in the form of land and a modern education. The Fijian families' involvement in the SSCDP is concerned foremost in meeting their socially reproductive goals and needs rather than with production for profit. In other words, their reason for taking part in the project is to meet the needs of the family and the kin group rather than developing the means of production.

The Fijian village organization of the reproduction of the material and social conditions, the circulation of valuables and services is based on what Goran Hyden calls an "economy of affection." Here material
production is not assumed to be the commanding priority. Improved productivity is not valued as an end in itself. "In the economy of affection, economic action is not motivated by individual profit alone, but is embedded in a range of social considerations that allow for redistribution of opportunities and benefits . . . "26

The organization of social activity is based on familial and other communal ties. Affective ties which are formed on the basis of common descent and residence predominate. Thus power relationships in the society are based on the control of the means of reproduction. In Fijian society, for example, social organization and stratification was and continues to be based on its members' relations to the means of social reproduction rather than material production.

The Fijian ideology of descent discussed in Chapters II and III sets out the social units that Fijians belong to, such as the "yavusa," "mataqali," and "i tokatoka," all of which are supposed to be based on patrilineal descent. However, these social groups often have members whose descent may be non-patrilineal.27 But the principle of patrilineal descent was formalized by the colonial government and imposed through a separate Fijian administration (see Chapter III).

As discussed in Chapter II, in Fijian social organization there is constituted an office of chief of each group.
These "turaga ni mataqali," or "turaga ni yavusa," make decisions on behalf of the group on matters affecting its members. "The chief's jurisdiction covers all matters 'vakavanua', and he has the definite right to make decisions on behalf of the group."28

A hierarchy of rank and status relationships for all the members within the group and between groups is constituted on the basis of seniority of descent and age. This hierarchy is socially recognized and re-enacted during ceremonial occasions or during "yagona" or "kava" drinking within the village context. The members of high rank and status in the village community sit "above" or "e cake," and those of low rank sit "below" or "e ra" in seating arrangements during the ceremonies.

What does membership of such a group mean for the everyday life of a Fijian? A Fijian academic, Rusiate Nayacakalou put it this way:

Although an individual member of such a group has some freedom to deal with his own affairs as he likes, there are few contexts in which his group considers them to be entirely his own, because his actions are likely to have implications for his group, which therefore takes a keen interest in the welfare of its members.29

Most of the Fijian families interviewed continued to invest their time and resources in maintaining their position in the kin group and village community. For example, many respondents said that they felt obliged to
share what they earned from sugar cane production with their relatives by taking part in social activities in the village. Thus there is the belief that in the long run the solidarity of kinship and associated ties will pay off through the expansion of one's potential claims on the assistance and resources of one's kin group. An element of reciprocity is structurally induced within the economy of affection.

However, participation in the market economy has resulted in the growth of a degree of individualism. Although the group provides the focus for the social life of Fijian villagers, they must provide for the livelihood of their families or households on an individual basis on communally-owned "mataqali" land. Each individual household must find cash to feed, clothe, shelter and educate its children. Thus, the felt tension between the claims of "na i vakarau ni bula vakaViti," and the new experiences and desires induced by capitalist production (which were alluded to in Chapter III) also includes shifts within the webs of agency and power, subjectivity and identity.

Fijian Notions of Subjectivity and Identity and Capitalist Development

As is now evident, the global historical processes of western European colonialism and capitalist expansion
have played (and continue to do so) a significant role in changing Fijian subjectivities and perceptions of agency. The influence of the Christian missionaries in bringing about change in the lives and subjectivities of the Fijians is profound in that the majority of them are practicing Christians today. The church has become an integral institution of Fijian life. Furthermore, the composition of the modern Fijian state with a significant group of immigrants brought in by the former British colonial power has resulted in the political mobilization of Fijians as a distinctive ethnic group.

Earlier sections of this dissertation discussed the importance of group relationships in constituting Fijian subjectivity and identity. Fijian village society has retained its distinctiveness in terms of its emphasis on the group in which its consciousness is rooted. The notion of consocial personhood, that is, people's subjectivities and identities are formed through their relationships with others, seems to be still predominant among many of the Fijian families interviewed at the SSCDP. They referred to the significance in their lives of experiences such as the sharing of food, land and work. However, this is not to insinuate that Fijians do not have experience of individual subjectivities and identities as well. Rather, it seems that the social self in Fijian society serves as a point of intersection of numerous social relationships
which are reinforced by Fijians in their social activities mostly within the village context.

On the other hand, human social experience is "an ordering of [people] and the objects of their existence according to a scheme of cultural categories which is never the only one possible . . . ."32 The cultural meanings or traditional categories which people engage in concrete contexts are also subjected to practical revaluations and transformations. Nothing guarantees that human beings with their varied social interests and biographies will always employ the existing cultural categories in prescribed ways.

Since the introduction of capitalist relations of production and exchange which was formally imposed by British colonialism, there have been cultural reconstructions of social roles and responsibilities in Fijian society. This has resulted in changing configurations of power relations. The dominant ideology of Fijian social change has worked to give meaning to the discursive practices of everyday life to maintain and reproduce the political economy of Fiji today. This dominant ideology is that "Fijian society, like all others, had to evolve through a universal sequence of stages towards the superior western model of 'monogamous, individualistic, capitalistic, democratic man . . . the culminating product of a natural law of inevitable progress' realized most perfectly to
date by the Anglo-Saxons with their civil liberties
enshrined in the common law and protected by the
franchise." Fijian society and culture has not evolved
according to this ideology of the predetermined progress
of capitalism and modernization.

Local Fijian responses to their encounters with, and
to the colonial and postcolonial government's attempts to
incorporate Fijian village society into the capitalist
mode of production have alternated between acceptance and
resistance. Furthermore, the initial native policies
of the colonial administration worked toward maintaining
a strong rural Fijian corporate culture (see Chapters II
and III). This situation encouraged and gave Fijian
society the capacity to resist or modify the intrusions
of the capitalist economic order which was espoused by
the European, Chinese and Indian communities. On the other
hand, many Fijians have also done well as individual cash
crop growers in instances where a market was assured. These individual Fijians were, of course, categorized as
the "galala," who were assumed to have ceased to be part
of the Fijian village social system.

Thus Fijian villagers have participated of their own
volition in economic development enterprises and projects
in order to generate cash incomes for their families.
Greater economic development as a result of the relative
stability and assured markets in Fiji's sugar industry,
for example, has led to marked changes in the rural areas and villages. Moreover, Fijians who have succeeded in sugar cane production seemed to be better off materially than their counterparts in the village. They enjoyed a higher standard of living in terms of better housing and higher cash income than if they had remained in their villages. They also enjoyed a greater degree of independence of action. This is assumed to allow for greater effort in production. As a result of the demonstration effect of the material well-being of other ethnic groups who are doing well in Fiji's economy, many Fijians have come to view themselves as materially disadvantaged according to western standards of comfort, expertise and power. This is accompanied by the fear that they will be eventually displaced in their own country.

Therefore, the village Fijian's own self-sufficient world with its own reward system has been subjected to change as more and more Fijians experience capitalist agricultural development. For instance, the Fijian families interviewed at Seaqaqa stated that although the frequency of activities of social obligation had not diminished in the village, their being away and living as individual families on their farms gave them the possibility to choose which ones they would contribute to. Also because they were not physically present in the village it was not always possible for the village
elders to contact them in time. It appears, therefore, that movement away from the village lessens the kin group's claim on the non-village rural Fijian's time and resources. Yet the Fijian families interviewed also stated that their taking part in the SSCDP was to enable them to earn enough cash to be able to meet their social obligations in the village. Many also said that when they receive their money from sugar cane payments, the first thing they did with it was to share it with their relatives in social activities. They pointed out that others like the Indians keep their money in the bank. Thus, the respondents stated that non-Fijians do well in this type of development while Fijians lag behind because Fijians have too many social obligations.

The experience of capitalist agricultural development, therefore, generates contradictions in the daily lives and choices of its subjects. In order to be "successful" in the SSCDP or any type of capitalist enterprise or project, Fijian farmers felt that they had to change in terms of their actions and practices. The question of the need to save was raised. How could a Fijian save or accumulate wealth if when he or she has money and a relative arrives from the village asking for assistance, he or she feels obliged to help and care for the relative? On the other hand, the respondents pointed out that it
was part of being Fijian to value the maintenance of a good relationship with one's kin.

Other statements which expressed a changing sense of self-consciousness as a consequence of participation in the capitalist economy included some criticisms concerning the wastage of resources involved in Fijian social activities. It was pointed out that more Fijians would succeed in this type of development if they did not have to commit a great part of their cash earnings to social obligations in the village. However, none of the families interviewed had their social affiliation with their village of origin completely or permanently severed.

Participation in capitalist agricultural production has also produced new meanings in the concepts of work and time, and thus new forms of discipline in the everyday life of the Fijian families interviewed at Seaqaqa. Many respondents stated that as a result of taking part in the project, they have learned how to value and use their time and resources "wisely," that is, in economic terms. As a consequence they earn enough money to send their children to school. In addition, it was easier for them to obtain loans from the FDB, particularly if their production of sugar cane was good.

Success in capitalist development tends to transmute the existing basis of social relations of the participants by reworking their sense of subjectivity and agency. The
social order that Fijian villagers operate in is symbolically constructed and reproduced on the principle of mutual social obligation or structured reciprocity. As discussed above, it gives rise to an economy of affection. Economic relations are generally organized around an existing hierarchically organized structure of social relations based on kinship, seniority of descent and age. Rank or status and prestige are important elements in the social order. Labor is mobilized according to the needs of the social context, specifically based on elements of kinship, and locality of residence. The value of work is social rather than economic. "One works because one is a member of the kinship group or local group. The workers are united not by consideration of reward, but primarily by common loyalties, and common allegiance. They are controlled and directed by the senior members of their group or by their chiefs because of their generalized authority, exercised by virtue of social position; it extends to making decisions about the volume and direction of production." 39

Within such a context, interpersonal relationships are emphasized in the organization of labor and production. Direct economic reward in terms of payment is absent. Furthermore, the employment of labor is not regular in the Fijian economy of affection. "It is mobilized and applied according to the needs of the situation. In times
of great urgency, the hours of work are in effect unlimited. Men [and women] will work while there is energy and incentive, but may leave work if they need to. There is no checking in or checking out time, because the reward is not gauged according to the length of time put in by particular individuals.40

The Fijian social order is symbolically reproduced during ceremonial exchanges which may occur in situations such as a birth, a marriage or a death. Again the nature of the social bond between the parties involved is expressed through the form of exchange of gifts and other social valuables (see Chapter II). The parties involved reconstitute their status or position in the social hierarchy and therefore reproduce the social order. Thus, there is, in the words of the respondents at SSCDP, "etiko nodai tovo," which means we have a social order based on kinship. Fijians often refer to other ethnic groups in the country as people who "have no kinship," meaning they have no order in their communities because everyone is out for oneself.41

On the other hand, capitalist development, of which the Fijian families interviewed are taking part in at Seaqaqa, imposes a radically different social order on their subjects. It is an order in which a market economy is assumed to prevail and a social order predicated on the relations of production which are based on the conflict
between labor and capital. Anthony Giddens has succinctly listed the principal characteristics of capitalist society:

1) "Capitalism" defined as a form of economic system . . . is the primary basis of the production of goods and services upon which the population of that society as a whole depends . . . .

2) The existence of a distinct sphere of "the economy" involves the insulation of the "economic" and the "political" from one another . . . .

3) The insulation of polity and economy presumes institutions of private property in the means of production . . . .

4) The nature of the state, as a mode of "government," is strongly influenced by its institutional alignments with private property and with the insulated economy. The autonomy of the state is conditioned, although never completely "determined," by its reliance upon the accumulation of capital of which its control is to a large extent indirect.42

In capitalist society, the market economy predominates. In other words, material production is presumed to determine all other activities in society. Market relationships are based on impersonal relations between supposedly free and equal private individuals. The purpose of production is the accumulation of individual wealth through the maximization of profit. Decisions about production are taken by individuals owning privately-held capital. All exchange of commodities is conducted in the medium of money. As discussed in Chapter III, the
subjectivities of people are recast as individual owners of property, individual citizens, voters, workers, and consumers.

The Fijian families who were interviewed discussed their interpretation of their experience of the opposition between the two social orders they were operating in, in terms of "na i vakarau ni bula vakaviti," or "the Fijian way of life," versus "na i vakarau ni bula vakailavo se vakavavalagi," or "the way of life according to money," or "the European way of life." Some of their statements illustrated a certain degree of ambivalence regarding their participation in development. For them development certainly fell within "the way of life according to money." Money, undoubtedly, is seen as the source of all kinds of modern convenience such as electricity, piped water, cars, trucks, modern houses, good roads and so on. Hence, in this sense, development is good and is desired.

The social costs for these participants involve their realization that economic success in this type of development requires individual effort and thrift. The need to work is dictated by market relations and repayment of their loans rather than social considerations. The respondents were aware that they were responsible for meeting their loan repayments on an individual basis. At the same time, these Fijian families were not prepared to discard "the Fijian way of life," completely. For in their own terms,
the essence of being Fijian was expressed in the practice of "the Fijian way of life."

The Limits of State Intervention

The Fijian families interviewed at Seagaqa are, however, still embedded in Fijian village society. This is illustrated by their interpretations of their material experiences in terms of the values and expectations of "the Fijian way of life." They continue to view their participation in the development project as strengthening their capability to meet their social obligations in the village. In short, their self-definition continues to be primarily social, in the fulfilling of group responsibilities rather than economic and market production oriented. However, the context within which they live is increasingly being defined by bureaucratic and capitalist relations.

Resistance and Appropriation in the SSCDP

As discussed above, the state's goal of inducing Fijian villagers into capitalist agricultural production has been effective to a certain extent. Prior to joining the SSCDP most of the Fijian families interviewed were basically subsistence producers. Although they had to pay provincial taxes which were introduced and first implemented by the colonial government, the state's regulation and control of their material production was
minimal. As a consequence of participation in the project, the villagers' activities have been subjected to greater bureaucratic regulation and management. Moreover, the easy accessibility of loans for Fijians has raised consumption at the expense of accumulating debt and increasing dependence on the state bureaucracy.  

However, the shifts in land-use patterns and social relations of production in Fijian village society created by the project have had mixed consequences in terms of who its victims and beneficiaries are. Initially, there was considerable reluctance on the part of the local villagers to participate in the project as sugar cane growers. Thus the government attempted to solve this difficulty by recruiting Fijians from other parts of Fiji. But when this happened, the "mataqali," or landowners pressed for greater control in the selection of all Fijian settlers. (The project authorities had only given the landowners the power to select members of their own "mataqali" to the project.) The "mataqali" or landowning unit was successful in gaining the power to allocate a large number of farms to local Fijian villagers rather than to outsiders.

David Evans's study (1980) of the level of commitment to sugar cane farming among settlers (both Fijian and Indian) in the SSCDP provides some useful insights into the limits of state intervention in bringing about change
in the economic production and position of the Fijian villagers. It is important to note that the project authorities judged the performance of the settlers solely in terms of output of sugar cane produced.

According to Evans's study, the Indian settlers on average spent more time on debt-reducing activities than the Fijians. Three quarters of the families in his study who had completed three harvests of sugar cane were Indians. The Indian settlers, however, had significantly lower terminal debt than their Fijian counterparts in the beginning when they joined. Moreover, since Indian families were closer to paying off their debts, they were more likely to receive cash income from the sugar cane they produced. Also the Fijian families were more recent arrivals in Seagaqa than the Indians. Thus Evans attributes the higher terminal debts of the Fijian families to their having to meet the inflationary costs of land clearing and preparation for cane cultivation. Furthermore, the Fijian bank officials were eager to encourage more Fijians to take part and may have given out loans to the villagers more easily, using the "mataqali" land as security.

Fijian families who migrated to the project allocated more time to working on their farms than the local families. In the eyes of the officials, the performance of migrant Fijian settlers was significantly greater and
better than the local Fijians. Fijian families who originally lived in Seaqaqa planted a smaller area of sugar cane and consequently obtained a lower output. But there seemed to have been no significant differences between the two groups in current income earning or terminal debt. Moreover, among the Fijian settlers those who were tractor or truck owners had significantly higher debts. They therefore spent a larger proportion of their time in debt-reducing activities because of the pressure to meet higher loan repayments. Finally, the proportion of labor allocated to the monetary sector was greater than before the settlers joined the project.

Thus, project authorities assumed that once the Fijian village families developed a consumption pattern dependent on a cash income, they would become committed to sugar cane farming as a commercial crop. This assumption could not be applied across the board to all the Fijian families taking part in the project. (See sugar cane production tables in Appendix C.) The responses of those Fijian families who were interviewed by this writer were multiple and varied. For most of the local families the option to withdraw or "exit" out of the project and the demands of the officials and market requirements was still perceived to be viable. For example, in the village of Naravuka, in the beginning of the project (1976) ten families decided to take up sugar cane cultivation to make
use of their "mataqali" land. But at the time the interviews were done (1991), only two families were still cultivating sugar cane, eight had decided to move back to the village system.

With "mataqali" land being a no sales commodity and some of it being reserved specifically for leasing to Fijians only, the attempts by the state to incorporate Fijian village society fully into a capitalist economy cannot be but ineffective. Although some Fijian village families failed to produce an adequate amount of sugar cane as defined by the project authorities, it was virtually impossible to evict anyone. The officials then encouraged these "non-performers" to give up their farms to persons of their own choice. 47

In summary, the Fijian families taking part in the SSCDP are not directly subordinated to the demands of capital. They continue to have control of their means of production and subsistence in the control of their land. They do not have to depend totally on other social classes for their subsistence needs and social reproduction. Thus, the domestic economic base of the Fiji economy continues to be fragmented. The Fijian villagers are mainly engaged in subsistence production with some irregular cash cropping. There is a small but growing number of Fijian petty capitalist farmers, in the SSCDP, for instance. The average annual cane production at Seaqaga has been
at 252,000 tonnes of cane. Fijian production constitutes one third of that figure. (See sugar cane production tables in Appendix C.) In general the petty capitalist farmers who are sensitive to market mechanisms are non-Fijians--the majority being Indians.

**Negotiated and Multiple Subjectivities**

The processes of capitalist development requires a change in human consciousness from one based on Fijian village society to one modelled on western capitalist society. The dominant western knowledge/power systems assume that there is a clear division between the public and private realms as societies progress on their evolutionary map. The public realm is characterized by rational, impersonal behavior and actions. The private realm is the subjective, emotional sphere. Furthermore, western thinking and experience impose this view that in all societies issues of morality should be judged primarily in terms of the individual. The rights of individual citizens are therefore universal. Such a view promises social emancipation for all. Thus primordial groupings, ties and sentiments are presumed to be backward, conservative and traditional--drags on the modernization project.

Contemporary political theory has recast the existence of social groups along a continuum of evolution and progress from those based on loyalties derived from
consanguinity, affinity, religion, ethnicity at the traditional end to those which are functionally-oriented or instrumental such as political parties, trade unions and other types of professional associations. The main purpose of the instrumental or progressive associations is that of interest articulation. It is assumed that all forms of human organization progresses from an ascription to achievement orientation.

Fijian social reproduction of an economy of affection provides for opportunities for action which are not within the control of the power networks and sites of the development enterprise. Hence, continued Fijian affiliations to their kinship groups and their reproduction of the village social system in attempts to cope with the social tensions that arise from capitalist expansion have been labelled as irrational, traditional, and obstacles to development. Much of western social science research and writing has attempted to problematize the Fijian and to redefine Fijian subjectivity and identity. Fijian definitions of personhood, their relationship to the collectivity, to nature and time, and the purpose of work have been problematized in most development-oriented discourse. On the other hand, the development enterprise itself is never questioned.

Contemporary feminist reconstructions of the subjectivities of women have pointed to the gendered nature
of the dominant notions of subjectivity and agency in western capitalist society (see Chapter III). Their projects are relevant in this discussion because they demonstrate that the type of self-consciousness held to be universal in modern society privileges the masculine or male in the allocation of power and other resources. They call our attention to the issue that the values of modern western society and culture are predominantly masculine ways of thinking and knowing and comprise notions of subjectivity required by the promoters of capitalist development. And in what has been presented as the development problematique for all non-western societies, the solution that has been outlined is to embrace the model of modern western patriarchal society.

However, the feminist critique has refuted the eloquently evolutionist narratives of universal progress in terms of social change where all non-western societies will also become modern and western, specifically with regard to the position of women. Such a critique of the western male view of subjectivity and personhood assists in the opening up of spaces for other possibilities of being within societies. Furthermore, linguistic feminism's theorization of power as diversified, both repressive and productive, and operating in areas such as the constitution and reconstitution of subjectivity and identity, also conceptualizes the notion of agency in such terms as well.
Resistance, therefore, can be articulated in a multiplicity of fields and ways. It is not restricted to operation within, or to the transformation of public or state institutions.\footnote{48}

Such analysis by one strand of contemporary feminism, that is, linguistic feminism makes transparent the politics of representation. Linguistic feminism directs our attention to the central role that representation plays in making western capitalist male-dominated society seem natural and inevitable. In capitalist society, the economic principle of efficient production for the purpose of profit maximization and the accumulation of individual wealth is proffered as the central theme of organization of modern society. Thus, this system of thinking refuses to comprehend the (symbolic) exchange relations of some societies whose principal purpose is not the pursuit of wealth but the fostering of community.

The reconstitution of women's subjectivities by praxis and cosmic feminism speaks of the existence of other kinds of subjectivities and identities in addition to the western male-constituted subject and identity. These attempts by feminism to resist the dominance of western male constitutions of subjectivity and identity also indirectly challenge the capitalist social order: an order which is predicated on dominance, conflict and exploitation between the owners of the means of production and those
who have to sell their labor to them. The existence and possibilities of other radically different forms of social organization and institutions can claim some legitimacy in the western world.

In conclusion, the emphasis of western social science in dealing with social change has been to privilege the prescriptive order with its institutional forms over their associated practices—the performative element. The questioning of the dominant system of thinking has raised the issues of self-consciousness and human agency in the transformation of social relations. Thus the Fijian families interviewed at the SSCDP can be said to handle their experiences of capitalist development within a consciousness that continues to be shaped by their cultural milieu in complex and varied ways as they renegotiate their positions in Fijian village society. If their situation is viewed in terms of the performative aspect of culture, we may come to acknowledge and appreciate the diversity of local responses to the expansion of the world system and the persistence of local cultures in changed forms. One may perhaps begin to appreciate that indigenous peoples such as the Fijian families interviewed at Seaqaqa also have the ability to respond creatively to the expansion of capitalist development in order to harness whatever is possible of western European wealth.
Notes to Chapter VII

1 "Pushed" in the sense that the decision to participate in the project of capitalist development has been circumscribed by the context within which the participants have been placed. The context includes the existent power structures plus the new sites of power created by the discursive and non-discursive practices of capitalist expansion. This will become evident in the discussion of how some Fijian cane farmers at Seaqaqa speak about their participation in the development project.


The transcript is only partial due to the limits placed by time and space as well as the subjective interests of the transcriber/observer. Furthermore, not all the human actors' understandings of their lifeworld are consciously reflected upon or raised when they speak or act. Human actors may also provide inconsistent descriptions of their actions. Thus, any interpretive exercise is also supplemented by other known social acts or occurrences. In short, as Scott points out, it is not possible to base one's interpretation on the "complete verbal transcript" of the human agents' experience of development. One is constrained by one's own position in the situation.

3 The interviews were conducted in the Fijian sugar cane farmers' houses on as informal a basis as possible. Many gave generously of their time and some even prepared a full meal for the interviewer and her two assistants. An interview guide dealing with the issues the researcher was concerned to find out about was prepared beforehand. See Appendix A. The guiding questions and statements were translated into standard Fijian, that is, into the Bauan dialect. Most Fijians understand Bauan.

Two or three days before the interview was held, the farmer was asked whether he/she would be willing to be interviewed. Then a date was set for the visit. Both the husband and wife and other adults of the family were asked to be present and to join in the discussions. As it turned out, in the beginning of the interviews, the whole family—about 6 to 8 members including 2 to 3 adults and the children—were present. The duration of the interviews averaged between 2 and 3 hours.
During the introduction, the families were informed of the objectives of the interview and the researcher's own background and interests. All interviewees were assured that the information provided would be used with discretion and that no names would be mentioned.

The researcher had the assistance of two Fijian adults--a man and a woman both in their late thirties--and who were locals who could speak the local dialect, Bauan and English.

These interviews with the Fijian sugar cane farmers in Seaqaqa recorded some personal information such as age, birth place, and experience with commercial farming. Other questions dealt with their perceptions of their current performance, their ideas and sentiments about development, their expectations of their participation in the SSCDP, whether they felt they were benefitting from their participation in the project, the degree of knowledge they had of national economic and political issues, the extent the Fijian farmers practiced Fijian social and cultural activities, and their desire to retain a Fijian identity. See Appendix A.


5 Ibid., p. 27.


7 See Appendix B. Answer to Question No. 17.

8 Ibid., Answer to Question No. 16.

9 David Evans, p. 30.

10 Ibid., p. 31. Farmers were charged F$18.75 per hectare (2.471 acres) annually for 6 hectares (15 acres) and F$1.25 per hectare for the remainder of the land they leased.

11 Appendix B. Answers to Question Nos. 18 and 19.

12 David Evans, p. 116.
Appendix B. Answer (a) to Question No. 17.

Ibid. Answers to Questions 20 and 21.

Ibid. Answers to Questions 20, 22, and 23.


Ibid., p. 25. See in the case of Fijians, John Nation, Customs of Respect: The Traditional Basis of Fijian Communal Politics, Development Studies Center Monograph No. 14 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1978), p. 39. According to Nation, "Education has long been the easiest and most reliable way to break into the cash economy, in particular by becoming a civil servant."


Appendix B. Answer to Question 27.


Appendix B. Answer to Question 22.

Ibid. Answer to Question 32. See also Isireli Lasaqa, p. 36. As Lasaqa points out, the Spate and other reports commissioned by the colonial administration held the view "that social obligations were burdensome and served as a major obstacle to Fijian economic progress."
Despite this view, the support Fijians have for their social responsibilities and associated obligations both in the village and in the town has not weakened. . . . And because such social obligations are part and parcel of the Fijian identity it is most unlikely that they will cease to be part of Fijian life."

25 Goran Hyden, p. 18.

26 Ibid., p. 19.


28 Ibid., p. 31.

29 Ibid.

30 Appendix B. Answer to Question 22 (c). Also answers to Questions 29, 30, and 31. The researcher was told that when the Fijian families were given their rations by the World Food Program to last them for a month, these were also taken to the village and shared with their relatives.

31 Jocelyn Linnekin and Lin Poyer, ed., Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990). See Chapter 4. Persons are defined through "their social placement" as nodes of relationships in institutions such as kinship, adoption, land rights and title systems. This is in contrast to the western concept of a physically bounded genetically determined, self-actuating individual.


34 Ibid., pp. 151-153. The Fijian villagers of Magodro and Qaliyalatina (in northwest Viti Levu) who were subjected to the colonial government's attempts to change Fijian village society to individualistic peasant existence, resisted either by fleeing or just refusing to cooperate.

Appendix B. Answer to Question 33.

Ibid. Answer to Question 22.

Ibid. Answer to Question 29.


Ibid., p. 108.


David B. Evans, p. 115.

Ibid., p. 151.

Ibid. Evans used two indicators of commitment. The first was the total time a family spent in productive activity. The second was the proportion of time it devoted to cane production.

Ibid., pp. 126-158.


CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Development is more than about how to change a country's position in the international division of labor and strengthening the material base of the state as conventional development theory at both the academic and policy levels has represented the process to be. Development involves people in that the process affects their way of life. As subjects of development people's notions of what development means for them must also be considered in development theorizing. This concerns the questions of self-consciousness and human agency in the development enterprise.

Development is, therefore, within the domain of the political. However, development theory, specifically the modernization school, has represented the development process as an apolitical one by constituting development as a national goal--basically an economic one--and which is in the general interest. As pointed out in Chapter VI, economic development theory and its sub-field development economics assumed the status of modern scientific knowledge. In this way, it was possible to silence any questioning or doubt about the state's development project.
The type of social relations capitalist economic development creates involves the ordering of people's lives which favors some group or individual's interests over others. Development comprises the definition and redefinition of the concept of "a society" which was originally conceived of as "a community, nation or broad grouping of people having common traditions, institutions and collective interests." The concept of a society has been redefined in the west under capitalist development. "A society" has now come to denote "individualism," "bourgeois capitalism," and the disintegration of "community." "The only thing which people have in common is 'the government' and, paradoxically, their private interests!" In the market society of the west, the economy is assumed to be disembedded from society and the main concern of economists.

Thus, power and the political realm became delimited:

... the problem of power, accordingly, is the problem of the best form of state; freedom is freedom from interference by the state, except, of course, insofar as the state exists to preserve 'the rules of the game'; ... 3

This dissertation has attempted to problematize the apolitical conceptualization of development by doing a national and historical analysis of the development process in terms of the power/knowledge relations involved. The analysis draws upon insights from Foucault's analysis
of power, language and knowledge and their interrelatedness. In other words, development is defined as more than the activities and projects that are labelled as such by government officials and international development agents. Thus, rather than analyzing the SSCDP and associated activities in terms of whether they have attained their goals and objectives, these goals themselves are questioned or problematized. This involves an analysis of the type of social relations which are required by capitalist development.

Development is basically the continuation of a western project. A project which began with the spread of Christianity to other parts of the world, followed by western trade and commerce and formal colonization. The Enlightenment provided the basis for the project of spreading western civilization to other societies. As Wolfgang Sachs points out:

The Enlightenment's idea of one mankind [sic] suggested that—with history running its course—differences would dissolve into one "civilization". "Development", as the UN Charter in particular exemplifies, closely follows the tradition to conceive "one world" under the influence of this evolutionary bias . . . the "underdeveloped" have taken the place of "savages", . . . A global society endowed with peace does not yet exist, but must first be achieved through the "development" of backward peoples. Whatever is different is seen as a threat which must be neutralized through "development".4
The concept of development with all its positive connotations of progress, advancement and growth "carries a whole host of assumptions about the superiority of western industrial practices." Hence, the control of the development enterprise rests with those who dominate the articulation of meaning and speech practices of development. Issues such as power and control over people's minds and bodies as well as other social and material resources are silenced in the positive meanings attributed to development.

After World War II, in the age of "development," the peoples and societies of the so-called Third World came under the gaze of a material-centered viewpoint or world view. Development discourse problematized non-western European societies as lacking in all the characteristics possessed by western societies such as material wealth, rationality, and modern science, for example. These non-western European societies were described as traditional, conservative and underdeveloped. Thus, there was created by the western development discourse the need for these non-western societies to change from being "traditional" to being "progressive" through espousing the goals of development. Societies which attributed primary importance to the web of relationships with other people, ancestors and gods was assumed by the west to give way to those exemplified by the western model.
In the modern epoch everything is then assumed to focus on the production and distribution of things which are governed by the principles of private ownership of property and profit maximization. Society is viewed primarily as a political economy, in which society itself is defined in terms of its performance in the production and provision of goods. And as Sachs states:

From an economic viewpoint, . . . the nature of man, the function of politics and the character of social reform assume a particular meaning. People are seen as living in a permanent situation of scarcity, since they always have less than they desire; the most noble task of politics is thus to create the conditions for material wealth; and this in turn requires the reorganization of society from a host of locally-based subsistence communities into a nationwide economy.6

On the other hand, capitalist economic development based on the unending accumulation of wealth generates conditions of inequality and misery in the uneven distribution of the material wealth that is accumulated. In this dominant view the economy "overshadows every other reality; the laws of the economy dominate society and not the rules of society the economy."7

This dominant world view of the primacy of the economic within the expansion of capitalism has affected non-western societies through the medium of international and national development experts, planners and strategists. When these people "set their sights on a country, they
do not see a society that has an economy, but a society that is an economy." 8

Although all societies produce, distribute and consume things, it is only in modern capitalist societies that the laws of economic efficiency dictate the production processes and social relations of production. In many other societies land and labor are not viewed as merely factors of production to be optimally combined to produce things in the most efficient way. In short, in these so-called traditional societies, the economy is still embedded within society. As Sachs once more puts it,

In societies that are not built on the compulsion to amass material wealth, economic activity is also not geared to slick, zippy output. Rather, economic activities like choosing an occupation, cultivating the land, or exchanging goods are understood as ways to enact that particular social drama in which the members of the community happen to see themselves as the actors. . . . The "economy" is closely bound up with life and has not been isolated as an autonomous sphere which might stamp its rules and rhythms on the rest of society. 9

The hegemony of the western conceptualization of the world as an economic arena has, of course, affected most non-western societies. However, not all of these societies have become completely dominated by the economy, that is, the market has yet to become the dominant organizing principle in all social activities involving production. On the other hand, all societies today are legally
conceived of as residing within the umbrella or the jurisdiction of the nation-state.

Development theory, both mainstream and critical, has taken the nation-state as the main unit of analysis with the exception of world systems theory which has focused on the capitalist world-economy as a whole. Both strands of development theory have viewed ethnicity as more or less transitory or superficial social phenomena. The issue of the existence of different communities or ethnic groups with their own value or cultural systems and social orders living within the boundaries of these nation-states and how they relate to the development process has not been adequately addressed in the study of development. On the other hand, history continues to show us that ethnicity is a significant mobilizing force in the social dynamics of both developed and developing countries.

This dissertation has attempted to bring into the development debate the important question of ethnicity in the development process with specific reference to Fiji. The relationship between the state and ethnicity is a complex and close one which is historically played out. It clearly affects the development process and vice versa as shifts occur in the patterns of security threats and interest options. In the Fijian experience of capitalist development, class interests as well as social, economic
and political relations have been historically structured along ethnic lines rather than across ethnic boundaries by industry, state institutions and other functional associations. Mass political participation is based on ethnicity resulting in the existence of communally-supported political parties.

Ethnic conflicts are related to the process of capitalist economic development. In the case of Fiji, the ethnic issue comprises an integral part of the state's development strategy with the state intervening directly in the ethnic struggle. The ethnically Fijian-dominated government has intervened directly in the ethnic struggle by redistributing resources to indigenous Fijians in the areas of education, employment, industry, small enterprise and patronage.

Thus, the state is an arena where social conflicts are fought and momentarily resolved. On the other hand, the state is also an organization, specifically, a bureaucracy comprising a social network of people: in the case of Fiji people from both ethnic groups. Like other bureaucracies, the state also has an existence in its own right, an interest of its own.

The Fijian state's strategy of involving more indigenous Fijians in capitalist economic development has provided it with a legitimate reason for greater intervention in the everyday lives of Fijian villagers in the
peripheral regions of the country. However, as this study has attempted to illustrate, indigenous Fijians handle their experience of capitalist agricultural development as conscious human actors within their cultural context. This is not to claim that there is a single Fijian viewpoint or response that applies to all Fijians participating in economic development in Fiji. There were diverse historically constituted opinions, beliefs and expectations about development given by the Fijian families who were interviewed at Seagaqa. This is a reflection of the subjects' varied experiences in the development process in terms of class, ethnicity, gender and extent of exposure to western capitalist values.

In conclusion, this study has attempted to deal with the question of human agency and intervention in the social transformations brought about by capitalist development. As was discussed in Chapter I, human agency is bounded. People are historically located under conditions not of their own choosing. But on the other hand, as E. P. Thompson has argued, human beings in their "unmastered practice" make their own history and in the process of "eventuation" realize certain historical possibilities. As human actors, the Fijians' complicity in, and transformation of, their own subordination in the power relations created or reinforced by development can only
be understood in terms of the negotiated realities they engage in, within the context of their own culture as well as the structural requirements and social relations imposed by capitalist economic development. The possibilities of resistance lay with the subjects of development: the indigenous Fijians' ability to negotiate their contradictory positions within the messy reality of multiple, and historically fluid subjectivities and identities out of which they live their experience of development.
Notes to Chapter VIII


2. Ibid., pp. 27-32.

3. Ibid., p. 33.


7. Ibid., p. 3.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 5.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR FIJIAN SUGAR CANE FARMERS AT SEAQAQA

VAKADIDIKE VEITALANOA KEI IRA NA DAUTEIDOVU I TAUKEI MAI SEAQAQA

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:
KENA I NAKI:

I. To find out about Fijian farmers' experiences of development (as human agents affected by development), their understanding of the situation, their definitions of development, their values.

Me kunei na nodra kila na dau tei dovu i taukei me baleta na vakasama ni veivakatorocaketaki--na nodra kila na kena yavu, kena i balebale, kei na nodra rai baleta na bula raraba.

How do the Fijian farmers think about their continued involvement in such development projects, the importance of their participation in such projects?

Na cava e nodra nanuma na dau tei dovu i taukei me baleta na nodra cau tiko ki na veivakatorocaketaki, na yaga ni nodra cau tiko e ia sasaga ni veivakatorocaketaki.

II. To find out the level of awareness of Fijian farmers of national issues of development.

Me dikeva nodra kila na dau tei dovu i taukei baleta na veivakasama e so ka umani e na vakasama ni veivakatorocaketaki.

III. To find out the extent Fijian farmers want to keep the Fijian way of life and identity.

Me dikeva na nodra gagadre na dauteidovu i taukei baleta na kena maroroi na bula vakaitaukei.
IV. To find out the types of social activities that Fijian farmers continue to take part in, and the significance of those activities for their survival.

Me dikeva na veimataqali oga vakaveiwekani e so ka ra dau cau kina na dauteidovu i taukei keina kena bibi na oga ogori e na vakadeitaki ni bula vakaitaukei.

PART I: PERSONAL HISTORIES OF HOW FIJIAN SUGAR CANE FARMERS CAME TO BE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SEAQAQA CANE PROJECT

Tukutuku ni nona yaco me okati e dua na dau tei dovu i taukei e na veivakatorocaketaki e Seagaqa.

1. Name:
   Yaca:

2. Birthdate/Age:
   Tikini siga sucu kina/Yabaki:

3. Birthplace:
   Vanua e sucu kina:

4. Where did you live before coming to Seagaqa?
   Ko ni a vakaitikotiko mai vei ni bera nomuni toki mai ki Seagaqa?

5. What were you doing before you came to Seagaqa?
   Na cavu koni a dau qarava se nomuni cakacaka tu e liu?

6. What is the size of the farm?
   E vica na eka na levu ni lisi koni tiko kina?

7. Who owns it?
   O cei e nona?

8. Do you have a sugar cane production contract?
   E tiko beka e dua nomuni konitaraki ni tei dovu?

9. How much sugar cane are you required to produce?
   E vica na tani na nomuni konitaraki?

10. Have you been able to produce the amount of sugar cane contracted?
    Koni tamusuka rawa tiko beka na tani donu ka nomuni konitaraki?
11. **How did you come to know about the Seaqaqa Sugar Cane Project?**
   Koni a rogoca beka vakacava na cakacaka ni tei dovu e Seaqaqa?

12. **What were you told about the project?**
   Na cava koni a bau kila rawa se kainaki taumada vei kemuni baleta na veivakatorocaketaki ogo?

13. **Why did you want to participate in the project?**
   Na cava koni a gadreva kina moni mai vakaitavi kina?

14. **What were your expectations and aspirations when you were first told that you would be a participant in the Seaqaqa Project?**
   Na cava na nomuni lalawa se gagadre moni rawata ni ko ni sa digitaki moni lewe ni sasaga ogo e Seaqaqa?

15. **Do you think your expectations have been fulfilled? How?**
   E sa rawa tiko beka na veika ko ni a lalawataka moni mai rawata?

16. **Do you think that you are benefitting from participation in the Seaqaqa Project?**
   E sa yaga tiko beka vei kemuni na nomuni mai tiko e Seaqaqa?

17. **What do you think about your current performance in the Seaqaqa Project in terms of your own goals and aspirations?**
   E vakacava na nomuni rawa ka ni raici vata kei na i naki taumada ni nomuni gole mai ki Seaqaqa?

18. **Are you happy with the way the Seaqaqa Project has been organised?**
   E sa veiganiti tiko li na veiqaravi e Seaqaqa?

19. **How could the scheme be improved?**
   E na rawa vakacava me uasivi cake na veiqaravi?

20. **What are your reasons for your continued participation in the Seaqaqa Project?**
   Na cava na yavu ni nomuni tomana tiko nomuni vakaitavi e Seaqaqa?
PART II: FARMERS' LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF ISSUES OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

NA I VAKATAGEDEGEDE NI NODRA KILA NA DAUTEITEI NA I BALEBALE NI VEIVAKATOROCAKETAKI

21. Please define your meaning of development or How would you define development? Give a Fijian word for development. Na cava na i balebale ni veivakatorocaketaki? Vakamacalataka vakacava? Dua tale na vosa e rau tautauvata?

22. Describe some issues of national development. Vakamacalataka mada e so na vakasama ka okati e na lalawa ni veivakatorocaketaki raraba.

23. How do you feel about the type of development that has been taking place since independence in 1970? Na cava e nomuni nanuma baleta na veivakatorocaketaki ka sa yaco tiko mai me tekiwai mai na 1970?

24. Are there any aspects of development that you are concerned about, that is, that you are not happy about, and want some change? E tu beka e so na gacagaca ni veivakatorocaketaki ka koni sega soti ni taleitaka, se so na veisau koni gadreva.

25. Describe the type of development that you would like to see take place and that you would participate in. Tukuna mada se mataqali veivakatorocaketaki vakacava koni gadreva?

26. How do you learn about what is happening nationally in the economic and political areas? Na cava na i vurevure se sala ni nomuni kila na veika lelevu e so e na noda vanua?

PART III: FIJIAN SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

BULA VEIMALIWI VAKAITAUKEI

27. Do you think that there is a particular way a Fijian has to act, that is, different from other people living in Fiji, in short, is there a Fijian way of life? Koni nanuma beka ni tiko e dua na i vakarau ni bula se i tovo ni bula e duidui kina na i taukei, se na cava beka na i vakarau ni bula vakaitaukei?
28. Do you think there are essential features of indigenous Fijian society? If yes, please describe some of these features.
Koni nanuma beka ni tu na yavutu e so ka i takele se i vakadei ni bula vakaitaukei? Vakamacalataka.

29. Do you think it is necessary to keep those features? Explain why.
E dodonu beka me'ra maroroi tu na veiyavu oqori? Na cava na yavu ni nomu i sau ni taro?

30. What kinds of Fijian social activities do you contribute to?
Na vei oga vakaitaukei cava soti koni dau vakaitavitaki kemuni kina?

31. Why do you take part in those social activities?
Koni dau cau se vakaitavo vakacava e na vei oga oqori?

32. Do you think there have been any changes in the Fijian social activities since independence?
Koni sa bau raica rawa beka e so na veisau e na bula vakaitaukei me tekivu mai na gauna ni tu vakaikoya ni noda vanua?

33. Do you think you have changed your participation in Fijian social activities since you joined the Seaqaqa scheme? Why?
Koni nanuma beka ni sa veisau na i vakarau ni nomuni vakaitavi e na vei oga vakaitaukei e so mai na gauna koni sa mai tiko kina e Seaqaga? Na cava e vuna?

34. If you were given the choice now, would you leave Seaqaqa? Explain why.
Kevaka e soli vei kemuni na galala koni na bau gadreva beka moni sa biuti Seaqaqa. Na cava e vuna?

35. Are there any other aspects of development that you would like to discuss?
E tu tale beka e so na vakaqama me baleta na veivakatorocaketaki ko ni gadreva moni talanoa kina?
APPENDIX B

FIELDWORK ANALYSIS

The following is an analysis of fieldwork carried out in Seaqaqa on Vanua Levu, Fiji, during May and June, 1991, in the nature of Fijian "participation" in the development process in Fiji.

Objectives of the Study:

1. To find out about some Fijian farmers' experiences of development (as human agents affected by the development policies of the Fijian state), that is, their understanding of the situation, their definitions of development, and their own values. How do Fijian farmers think about their continued involvement in such development activities and the importance of their participation in such activities?

2. To find out the level of awareness of Fijian farmers of national issues of development.

3. To find out the extent Fijian farmers want to keep the Fijian way of life and a Fijian identity.

4. To find out the types of social activities that Fijian farmers continue to take part in, and the significance of those activities for their survival.
PART I: PERSONAL HISTORIES OF HOW SOME FIJIAN FARMERS CAME TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SEAQAQA SUGAR CANE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (SSCDP) AND THEIR CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR PERFORMANCE

1. About 100 persons (comprising 51 households) were interviewed. Most of the Fijian farmers were male although the researcher was able to interview a handful of Fijian women farmers, 6 in all. It has been mainly Fijian males who have obtained leases from the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) and loans from the Fiji Development Bank (FDB), while the women take care of the home and the children. Hence public space is dominated or monopolized by Fijian males in the development process.

2. Age of the Fijian farmers interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71-80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 and under</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About 22 percent of the farmers were between 31 and 40 years old. About 31 percent of the farmers were between 41 and 50 years old. And about 29 percent of the farmers were between 51 and 60 years old. About 60 percent of the farmers were between 41 and 60 years old.

3. Birthplace of Fijian farmers: males and females

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vanua Levu</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lau</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gau</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One each was born in Koro, Suva, Taveuni, Lautoka, Vatukoula, Kadavu and Lomaivuna.

The majority of the farmers who were interviewed were from the island of Vanua Levu, i.e., 56 percent. Thirty-one percent were born in Lau.
4. Place where the Fijian farmers lived before moving to the sugar cane farm in Seaqaqa.

About 65 percent of the Fijian farmers interviewed lived on the island of Vanua Levu before they acquired their sugar cane farms. The remainder lived in different parts of Fiji.

4a. The year they shifted to their farms in Seaqaqa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-1974</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1984</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority, about 56 percent, moved to their farms between 1974 and 1975. Seventy-two percent moved to their farms before 1980. Most of them have been farming sugar cane for some ten years.

5. The type of occupations Fijian farmers had before they came to farm in Seaqaqa.

24 were villagers or subsistence farmers
47% of those interviewed

8 persons had government employment previously
16% were in government employment

2 of those interviewed had been farming commercially, or about 4% had previous commercial farming experience

10 were involved in other government-sponsored development projects, i.e., 19% of those farmers who were interviewed

2 of those interviewed began farming immediately after they left school, i.e., 4% of those interviewed

The remaining 10% or 5 had a range of occupations from freezer hand to being a church pastor.
6. Size of the Farm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm Size</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21-30 acres</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 acres</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 acres</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70 acres</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71-80 acres</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-90 acres</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91-100 acres</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of the farmers, that is, two-thirds had between 30 and 60 acres of land to farm.

6a. Area of the Farm under Sugar Cane

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 or less acres</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20 acres</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30 acres</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40 acres</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50 acres</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 percent or two-thirds of the interviewees had between 11 and 20 acres of their land under sugar cane cultivation.

7. Ownership of the Farm, that is, holding title of the lease

46 of the interviewees had ownership, that is, held their own title to the farm
2 leases belonged to the mother
1 lease to the father
1 lease to the brother
1 lease to the Bible Church of Fiji

8. Have a Contract with the FSC to produce sugar cane

All the interviewees had a contract with the FSC to produce sugar cane, that is, all were eligible to produce sugar cane for sale to the FSC.

9. Amount of sugar cane the Fijian farmer is required to produce
34 said they could produce as much as possible, i.e., 66 percent or two-thirds of the interviewees said they were allowed to produce as much sugar cane as possible for sale to the FSC.

The remainder were given the following quotas of sugar cane to produce.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100–150 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>225 tonnes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300–400 tonnes</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400–500 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600 tonnes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Amount of Sugar Cane Produced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 or less tonnes</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101–200 tonnes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201–300 tonnes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301–400 tonnes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401–500 tonnes</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501–600 tonnes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601–700 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701–800 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801–900 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>901–1000 tonnes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

About a half of the farmers produced between 400 and 600 tonnes of sugar cane. A third produced between 300 and 400 tonnes. 16 percent produced over 600 tonnes of cane. About one-quarter, 24 percent produced 500 or more tonnes of cane. 27 percent produced between 400 and 500 tonnes of cane.

11. How the Fijian Farmer came to know about the Seaqaqa Sugar Cane Development Project

a. 16 interviewees came to know through government officials: NLTB, District Officer, Provincial Official, Agriculture Department, FSC, FDB. This is about 30% of the persons interviewed.

b. 3 heard over the radio.
c. 24 heard through relatives or personal contact with the landowners. This is about 47% of the interviewees.

d. 6 heard through their high chiefs—Ratu Mara and Ratu Penaia.

e. 4 were cane cutters.

f. 2 heard through politicians in Suva.

g. 1 heard through a geography lesson.

12. What the Fijian farmers were told about the Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of information</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Earn a good income or steady source of income. About 47%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fiji's number one income earner is sugar.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The cane development project in Cakaudrove, Bua, and Macuata aims</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to involve more Fijians in development. About 47% of the interviewees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Easy to farm</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Didn't hear much.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Had previous experience.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. Reasons for Participating in the Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons given for participating</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Earn a cash income.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 51% of interviewees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Taking care of relative's farm or utilizing own mataqali land</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. For school fees.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
d. To get cash for church activities 1

e. Support the family
   16% of interviewees 8

f. Take part in the economy of Fiji
   12% of interviewees 6

g. Prove that Fijians can also be
   like Indians 1

h. Raise own standard of living 5

i. An attempt at commercial farming
   or invest in some form of security 2

14. Goals and Expectations of Fijian Farmers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals and Expectations</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Have a better standard of living, e.g., piped water, electricity, telephone service</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A good house in the village</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and a good house on the farm</td>
<td>57% of interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Send children to school</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Keep own mataqali land for children</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Take part in church activities, those of the vanua, assist those in villages</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Have own tractor, truck, boat, chain saw</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Pay off $40,000 loan for buying the farm</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Buy property elsewhere to rent, or to buy a shop, to make a profit</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Expectations that have been Fulfilled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Able to send children to school</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Partly, still needs to build a house</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Has acquired a tractor but has problems</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. No, haven't achieved much</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Yes, has adequate income</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Able to support family</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Able to participate, contribute to Church and other social activities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Have a good house on the farm</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Have a truck or tractor</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Helping relatives or paying off loan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Would like to have farm machines like tractor or a truck</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Does the Fijian Farmer think that he or she is benefitting from taking part in the SSCDP?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Partly, not sending any cane to FSC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. A little</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Yes, benefitting</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Yes, a lot very much</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
17. What Fijian Farmers think about their own Performance in the SSCDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Experiencing a big difference in terms of cash flow, that is, had very little cash in the village, or earned little in previous occupation but now have much more cash and is one's own boss</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82% of interviewees held this view</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Now able to take part in social activities</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Achieving a little gradually</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Doing well</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Are Fijian Farmers happy with the way the SSCDP has been organized?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Initially, not happy with FSC personnel, especially the sirdar who was unfair, and one's cane was not harvested for 3 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Partly happy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. FSC and FDB okay</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Not happy with FSC and FDB officials</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Yes, happy about the way things are</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Not happy with way officials keep people waiting and telling people to return</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Not really, FSC and FDB officials rarely come to visit farmers and get to know their needs and aspirations</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. FDB okay</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
i. Problems relating to FSC such as transport difficulties due to bad roads and unreliability of trucks, also unreliable distribution of fertilizer, problems with quota system and harvesting arrangements 16% of interviewees

j. Not happy with the way things are run 1

19. How Fijian farmers think that this development project could be improved

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. FSC should ensure the reliable distribution of fertilizers to farmers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. FSC and FDB officials should have a good relationship with the farmers</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by knowing the needs and conditions of farmers through frequent visits</td>
<td>73% of interviewees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. FSC should accept more cane than present by increasing quotas for farmers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Speed up the processing of loans</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Need a transport subsidy for carting cane to the mill</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Reasons for Fijian farmers continued participation in the SSCDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. For school fees</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. To support the family</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. To be eligible for loans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. A good source of income</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29% of interviewees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e. To earn cash to buy a truck 2
f. To get money for contributions to church and social functions in village 10
   20% of interviewees

g. Buy property to rent out 2
h. Raise own standard of living 8
   16% of interviewees

i. Fiji's main income earner and government will give assistance 1

j. Sugar cane is easy to grow 2

k. Utilize own mataqali land 1

For data collected for Numbers 21 to 23 only 42 farmers provided information.

21. Debt History of the Fijian Farmers

Beginning or starting-off loan from the Fiji Development Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount (F$)</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31 farmers borrowed between F$10,000 - F$14,000 to start their farms. This is about 74% of the interviewees.
22. Amount of Money still owed to the FDB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount (F$)</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>over 40,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 - 39,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 - 19,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000 - 9,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000 - 4,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less than 1,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Highest Single Payment received from sugar cane production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount (F$)</th>
<th>No. of Farmers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,100 - 7,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,100 - 6,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,100 - 5,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,100 - 4,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,100 - 3,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 - 2,000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 of the interviewees received between F$1,000 and F$3,000 as their highest sugar cane payment. This is about 48% of the interviewees.

13 received between F$3,000 - F$5,000. This is about 31% of the interviewees.

6 received between F$5,000 and F$7,000. This is 14% of the interviewees.

1 received below F$1,000.
PART II: FIJIAN FARMERS' AWARENESS OF ISSUES OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

21. Fijian farmers' perception or definition of development. What development means for the Fijian farmers.

a. Development means a rise in the standard of living, from a lower level to a higher one, which results from having a bigger cash income, e.g., from $2,000 to $4,000. 24 respondents or 45% of the respondents.

b. A higher standard of living means betterment of family living conditions such as having good or adequate housing, piped water, electricity, telephone service, video sets, new church buildings, enough food, having good conditions for relatives when they visit, meeting the needs and wants of wife's and one's own village. 36 respondents or 70% of the respondents.

c. To be able to send the children to school. 24 respondents or 45%.

d. Staying on the sugar cane farm is an improvement from living conditions in the village. 1 respondent.

e. Development means contributing to the well-being of the community. The community includes the church, vanua, and mataqali. Being able to contribute means earning enough income so as to be able to participate in the social activities in the community. Thus contributing to these social activities means having enough money to give, or to buy needed items such as food and mats to contribute. 16 respondents or 31%.

f. "life seems to have improved." 1 respondent.

g. "life has not improved." 1 respondent.

h. As a villager one did not know how to use time—now one has learned to "value" time. 3 respondents.

i. To make use of the land. 2 respondents.
j. Life is now easier than before in that it is now easier to obtain finance by using sugar cane production as a form of security. 1 respondent.

k. Change is being experienced in cash-earning capability, from a villager with little cash income to a cane farmer with a good cash income. 1 respondent.

l. One is free to do what one wants on the farm. 1 respondent.

m. Contribute to national economy. 3 respondents.

n. Development means working hard and getting more aid from the government, and learning how to budget. 1 respondent.

o. Obtained a loan for a tractor and now a lot of the income earned goes to pay for the tractor which is not functioning. Now experiencing difficulties in paying off debt. 2 respondents.

22. Fijian farmers' awareness of some of the issues of national development.

a. The SSCDP is good for the Fijians. 17 respondents or 33%.

b. Indians are doing better than the Fijians economically in raising their incomes because they have more experience in this type of development, e.g., they have been cane farming for a long time as they came here for this purpose and they are keen on this type of development. Furthermore, they already have the machines and other resources. Fijians are not like the Indians. Moreover, Fijians, unlike the Indians have a lot of social activities. 37 respondents or 73%.

c. Fijians live a type of life which has as one of its priorities the principle of sharing one's resources such as time, money and other resources. This principle is practiced in the many social activities and commitments a Fijian must contribute to or participate in. Thus it is
difficult for most young rural Fijians to settle individually on their own farms when they are used to living in villages as they must participate in these social activities and contribute their time and money. For this is the type of life that they have been socialized into and find meaningful. This situation is viewed as constituting a drawback for Fijians who are encouraged to take part in government-sponsored or initiated development programs. But the respondents did not wish to abandon the "Fijian way of life." Some of the Fijian farmers lived close to the villages or even chose to live in the village. Although they had a house on the farm, they did not stay on the farm. They stayed on the farm only when there was work to do or during the harvesting season. Some Fijian cane farmers are not keen on sugar cane farming because they prefer to live in the villages than on the farm. Furthermore, when they leave their farms to live in the village, during the stay in the village they may become involved in the social activities there and find they cannot abandon their social commitments and go back in time to work again on the farm.

26 respondents or 50%.
1 respondent said he still shared his money but more sparingly.
Other ethnic groups were viewed as being able to use their time and resources differently and "wisely."

d. Fijians do not value time, i.e., they have a different concept of time which is called "malua" or meaning being slow.
15 respondents or 29%.

e. Both Fijians and Indians can do well in SSCDP. Those who work hard get more than those who do not.
10 respondents or 20%.

f. There is uneven development. Some benefit more than others.
2 respondents.

g. The sugar cane industry is not controlled by Fijians. This is a political issue, e.g., the harvest boycott threats are mainly from Indian sugar cane farmers. The number of Fijians in sugar cane production is small.
8 respondents.
h. Fijians are laid back and take life easy while other ethnic groups work hard.
   1 respondent.

i. Unless Fijians get help from the government they will continue to be economically backward.
   1 respondent.

k. Fijians are on their own land and if they fail in sugar cane farming, they can always do something else. But this is not the case with other ethnic groups.
   2 respondents.

l. Those who benefit are those who get loans from the bank.
   1 respondent.

m. There is a difference in living standards between FSC officials and farmers. But FSC officials are dependent on the company more than the farmers who can grow their own food.
   10 respondents or 20%.

n. Fijians can do better than Indians. Fijians are physically stronger than the Indians. But when Fijians get income from the SSCDP, they share it amongst their kin in the social activities whereas Indians bank it. This is the main reason why Fijians are not doing well in national economic development.
   1 respondent.

o. Can a Fijian save? If a Fijian has money and a relative arrives and asks for assistance, a Fijian feels obliged to help and show care for the relative by meeting the relative's needs. Maintaining a good relationship is of great importance. On the other hand, "yalo matua" means to keep your resources carefully or save them.
   1 respondent.

p. Fijians can produce just as much sugar cane as the Indians. But Fijians use the cane proceeds differently. Indians save some of the cane proceeds or use them "wisely" but Fijians do not save anything at all. Fijians do not have the concept of saving or accumulating resources such as money.
   2 respondents.
23. Fijian farmers' feelings about the type of development that has been taking place in Fiji since independence in 1970.

a. Good. Support this type of development. 45 respondents or 88%.

b. This type of development benefits some, e.g., those who already have the resources to begin with benefit more than those who have to start from scratch or take out loans from the FDB to start. 5 respondents.

c. Access to loans from the FDB. 1 respondent.

d. There seems to be some change for Fijians in that they are using their time and resources differently and therefore are earning more cash from sugar cane farming. 11 respondents or 22%.

e. Seaqaca is becoming a town and this is good. 2 respondents.

f. More Fijians are becoming involved in commerce. Fijians seem to have a better standard of living now than previously. This is based on one's own experience. There are now more "educated" Fijians. 16 respondents or 30%.

g. Fijian people in rural areas used to live in very poor material conditions. But the SSCDP has provided a means for people to earn cash and thereby improve their material well-being. 6 respondents or 12%.

h. Access to modernization is good and wanted, e.g., roads, town, school, etc. Development is important and helpful for Fijians in that Fijians have access to a lot more material goods. "Levu na ka rawata." 5 respondents or 10%.

i. When Fijians receive proceeds from the cane, they leave the farm and go off to the village. 1 respondent.
j. Development is happening, but there are some drawbacks like the uncertainty of cane payments. 2 respondents.

k. Fijians have not been actively participating in development in Fiji in the sense that they "lack drive, perseverance, or looking to the future." The sugar cane industry is largely run by Indians. Fijians do not worry or think about the future and do not have long-term goals or forward-planning that development advocates. 1 respondent.

24. Aspects of development that Fijian farmers are concerned about, not happy with or want change in.

a. Some Fijians get involved in this type of development and are benefitting from it while many others do not. More Fijians should be involved in cane farming. 3 respondents.

b. Dealing with the FSC. The quota system of harvesting is problematic and needs to be changed. Fijian farmers find this system limits their harvesting as only a certain amount of sugar cane is accepted by the mill each day. Yet, farmers have to feed and house their cane cutters. Furthermore, some cane cutters abandon the sponsoring farmer and work for someone who can let them earn as much as they want. 11 respondents or 22%.

c. Want better roads, clean piped water, electricity, reliable transport for sugar cane to the mill. 6 respondents or 12%.

d. Are benefitting and have no concerns at the moment. 13 respondents or 25%.

e. This type of development has not met the needs of the participants. 2 respondents.

f. The uncertainty concerning the harvesting of sugar cane because of the threats of harvest boycott advocated by Indians, the largest group of cane farmers. This affects the Fijian farmers' ability to pay back loans. 2 respondents.
g. Dealing with the bureaucracy is frustrating. One respondent has a lease of 41 acres from the NLTB and has cultivated 16 acres. But he does not know whether he has all the 41 acres as the land has not been surveyed although he had made numerous requests to the NLTB for it to be surveyed. There have also been rises in the rents from $250 in 1985 to $900 for example. 8 respondents or 16%.

h. The high costs of transporting the cane to the mill for crushing. Would like government to subsidize transport costs or provide trucks to rent at reasonable rates. 17 respondents or 33%.

i. Concern about the high prices for fertilizer, yet the price of cane is the same. 16 respondents or 31%.

j. Officials of the FSC and FDB only come to visit the farmers just before the harvesting begins. Farmers are not treated well, and their needs are not known or ignored. The Fijian sugar cane farmers do not feel they are important participants in the sugar industry. 5 respondents or 10%.

k. The FSC deducts costs of fertilizers and rent from the cane proceeds directly without consultation with the farmers about their needs. Often the farmer receives very little or sometimes nothing after all the deductions are made. 4 respondents or 8%.

l. One respondent is heavily in debt having purchased a tractor but did not know how to look after it.

25. Fijian farmers description of the type of development they would like to take part in.

a. The SSCDP. With cane farming there is a secure market in the sense that government finds the buyers. 41 respondents or 80%.

b. Experiencing difficulties with this type of development but can think of no other option. So is now giving it another try. 1 respondent.
c. Wants to have a taxi or carrier business as well. 2 respondents.

d. Would like to diversify and plant other crops for sale as well as sugar cane. Other crops include vegetables, fruit, pineapple, and rice. Another option is to raise cattle. 7 respondents or 14%.

e. Would like to have a shop. 1 respondent.

f. Would like to buy a boat to fish commercially. 1 respondent.

g. Farmer recognizes the heavy dependence on sugar cane. If cane does not get harvested, then the farmers are in bad shape. 1 respondent.

h. Lower the costs of fertilizers, transport, and interest rates. 1 respondent.

i. Wants more security of tenure for the land being farmed. 1 respondent.

j. Government officials should be more responsive to the farmers' needs. 1 respondent.

26. How Fijian farmers learn about or become aware of national economic and political issues.

a. There is not much political activity or consciousness or political pressure. They support their chiefs. 11 respondents or 22%.

b. The farmers get their news mainly through listening to the radio and reading The Fiji Times and Nai Lalakai. 47 respondents or 92%.

c. Aware of the political issues surrounding the sugar industry. Many parties are involved and a lot of coordination and cooperation is required. 2 respondents.
d. There is a need for more Fijians to become sugar cane farmers.
1 respondent.

e. Through attendance at meetings with Government Ministers, FSC and FDB officials. Being a member of public organizations such as the Seaqaga Township Development Committee, Fijian Cane Farmers Association of Seaqaga.
5 respondents or 10%.

f. Order of priority of concern for the following national political issues:
   i) sugar cane harvest boycott
       36 respondents or 71%.
   ii) Fijian political control of national government: 7 respondents
   iii) Vatukoula goldminers' strike: 2 respondents.

PART III: FIJIAN SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

27. Fijians farmers' perception of whether there is a "Fijian way of life."

   a. Yes, there is a Fijian way of life.
       50 respondents or 98%.

   b. There is a great deal of difference between the way Fijians act and the way other groups act. "e duidui dina."
       13 respondents or 25%.

   c. For Fijians maintaining good relationships with other members of their kin group is important. The principle of "veilomani" or caring for each other is practiced.
       3 respondents.


   a. "e tiko noda i tovo vakavanua" is Fijian for our customs and traditions, which really means that there are certain ways of behaving or acting that distinguish Fijians as a group or that are characteristic of Fijians, e.g., respect for other Fijians' requests for assistance. These features constitute the social bond, i.e., Fijian togetherness as a group is maintained through
the principle of helping and sharing with fellow members. "Veilomani," or caring for one another. "Veivukei," or helping one another, "Veisolisoli," or sharing one's resources. "Veirokorokovi," or "veidokaidokai," showing respect for one another. Fijians share their resources which are accessible to all the relatives, not just the immediate family of wife and children. "Veivukei e na gauna ni leqa" means helping one another in times of need. "Veibereberei" means the obligation to give or reciprocate. "Veikauwaitaki" means consideration for others. "E tiko noda i tovo vakavanua, na loloma, na veilomani" which means Fijians have their own social order based on the above social principles. 44 respondents or 86%.

b. Emphasis on the maintenance of good relationships with other members of the group—"vakabauti," or "veidokai," which stresses respect and thoughtfulness for members of one's kin group. "Bula veimaliwai" maintaining one's relationships with one's relatives, e.g., one may feel at ease to stay with one's relatives. Respect for one's chiefs. 25 respondents or 49%.

c. Fijians have their own language, songs and mekes, rituals and ceremonies for the various life crises of birth, marriage and death. Each member of the group has a certain status or rank in their group for ceremonial occasions according to which they must conduct themselves, e.g., being the "matanivanua" for one's mataqali. Fijians are expected to take part in these ceremonies. These are defined as "noda i tovo vakavanua" or traditional customs. If one is harvesting cane, and there is a death or funeral or a marriage or wedding, there is the obligation to leave the harvesting and attend the ceremony or one feels ostracized by the community in the village. 30 respondents or 59%.

d. "Na i vakarau ni bula vaka i taukei," or "the Fijian way of life," is practiced in the village but not on the farm. 1 respondent.

e. Fijians have their own social structures, i.e., the vanua, mataqali, yavusa. The village is the central unit of social organization. Iowane is
the head of the mataqali and has to respond to requests by the "turaga" of the village in matters concerning the "vanua." One of the respondents is a "matanivanua." If the chief or "turaga" wants something to be done, it is communicated to the head of the mataqali, whose duty it is to tell the rest of the kin group.
8 respondents or 16%.

f. The concept of reciprocity is still called upon as a resource. For example, Fijian farmers continue to ask other villagers to help out on their sugar cane farms but only pay them whenever it is possible. Alternatively, their fellow villagers are given meals but not paid.
4 respondents.

g. "Veirogorogoci" means that Fijians just hear about some activity and they will go and help out or attend without being asked. This is part of the practice of "solesolevaki" which means to work together and cooperate.

29. Fijian farmers' perceptions of whether it is necessary to keep those features of Fijian society they have described above.

a. Yes, these features should be retained.
49 respondents or 96%.

b. Some reasons given include, "vakaديثaka" which means they bind Fijians as a group together.
"Kila i tani kina" or to identify Fijians.
The essence of being Fijian or part of being Fijian.
To let others know who a Fijian is.
Show that Fijians are really Fijians.
Part of this kind of life should be reproduced.
Binds Fijians by creating the social bond.
Part of "the Fijian way of life."
Helps farmer and family to be accepted by other villagers and family.
Binds the farmer and extended family together.
Sees the value of keeping Fijians as a community.
38 respondents or 75%.
c. If a Fijian wants to develop like others such as Europeans, Indians and Chinese, he or she must abandon those features of Fijian society described above. Some Fijians are beginning to do this. 2 respondents.

But some respondents still valued relationships with other relatives more than money and would like children to carry on having these values. 7 respondents or 14%.

d. This is Fijian custom which has been practiced by the forefathers or ancestors. One learned these values or was socialized with them when one was young. For example, one was born into a clan whose role it is to organize social functions or activities for the chief of the group and one is required to continue to perform them to be a member of the clan. 10 respondents or 20%.

e. These features need some adjustment in the modern setting because of the expense involved. But if one does not practice them, one feels bad such as not being able to visit one's relatives. 1 respondent.

f. There is the need to choose which one of those features to keep. Some Fijian values do not go with the type of development promoted by the government, so they should be dropped to leave time for development. But as a Fijian and a member of the clan, one feels obliged to take part in these social functions or one would be accused of neglecting one's duty and of not being Fijian. 1 respondent.

g. Those features should be kept because they are important to the Fijians. 2 respondents.

h. The Indian farmer has a different relationship with the landowner. The Fijian farmer maintains a good relationship with the landowner in order to contribute to the landowner's decision to renew the lease. 1 respondent.

i. Getting rich is not important.
30. Number and kinds of social activities Fijian farmers take part in and contribute to.

a. In own village of origin and also in the landowner's village.
   Marriages, deaths, church or "soli-ni-lotu," "soli-ni-vanua," or "kaci-ni-vanua," chiefly calls.
   All the 51 respondents.

b. i) own village--requires presence if close relatives are involved or if the village is nearby. If far away, one can send one's contribution.
   40 respondents or 78%.
   ii) landowner's village--send one's contribution but be present if it is possible.
   37 respondents or 73%.

c. Nearly every week.
   3 respondents.

   10-20 occasions a year.
   5 respondents.
   Most of the time when social functions take place.
   11 respondents.
   3 or 4 times a year.
   1 respondent.

d. Contributions include food, mats, and money.
   4 respondents.

31. Reasons given by Fijian farmers for taking part in those social activities.

a. "Bula veimaliwai," "Talei taki bula veiwekani" Value maintaining good relationships with one's relatives and landowners.
   24 respondents or 47%.

b. To give example to one's children and grandchildren so they can also learn to take part in these social activities.
   5 respondents or 10%.

c. Since one is making use of the land of the Buavou people to meet one's needs, one feels one should take part in the social activities of Buavou village.
   8 respondents or 16%.
d. Feels obliged to contribute—part of being Fijian. Matters concerning "na lotu" and "vakavanua" are important. 14 respondents or 27%.

e. Reciprocity is valued. Emphasis is on the sharing of resources. Thinking of when one needs one's relatives' help: if one does not take part in their social activities, one does not feel one is free to call on their assistance. Therefore, feels it is one's duty to take part in their social activities. 9 respondents or 18%.

f. When social functions are held in the village, one feels obliged to take part. One has never excused oneself because of work on the farm. 5 respondents or 10%.

g. See value in participation because these activities bind him or her and their kin members together. 4 respondents.

h. Since this respondent has a good source of income from taking part in the SSCDP, she feels she must help her relatives. 1 respondent.

i. Brought up this way, and it is part of one's identity. If one did not participate, one would feel ashamed as one would not be regarded as a Fijian. 2 respondents.

j. Part of the leadership role he has which requires taking part in these social activities. 1 respondent.

k. Part of a way of life. 5 respondents.

32. Fijian farmers' perception of whether there has been any changes in Fijian social activities since Fiji's independence in 1970.

a. There have been a lot of changes, e.g., in the use of time. Now some Fijians have to look after the farm and cannot be present at all the social activities. So there is the need to choose which
social functions to attend and as a result one can attend fewer social activities. 8 respondents or 16%.

b. Fijians now have more income to meet their social commitments. Yes, more Fijians are now earning cash. The more Fijians earn the more they give to those social activities. The money that is earned is shared during these social functions. 23 respondents or 45%.

c. Yes, there has been some change in the type of items to take to contribute to social functions. Before, one had to take a whole "lovo," that is, a meal cooked in an earth oven, now some tapioca is acceptable. 3 respondents.

d. In village life, one was bound to a certain work program or schedule. But now living as individual families on the farm, there are fewer social activities to take part in. 4 respondents.

e. A lot of changes.  
   i) in the villages--now Fijians have better houses. Social activities here remain important and are the fabric of the community. 2 respondents. 
   ii) in the urban centers--these are distant from villages and there are fewer social activities with some modification in participation. 2 respondents.

f. Not much change. Fijians still take part in many social activities. 9 respondents or 18%.

g. Some changes in the obligation to take part in social activities as now it is up to the individual Fijian. But many Fijians continue to take part in all social functions and these respondents would teach their children to take part also. 3 respondents.
h. Fijians are materially better off. NO change in the participation in social activities by those who remain in the village. There are some changes observed in those who have moved from the village and those brought up on the farms. There were in Naravuka village 10 sugar cane farmers initially, now there are only 2 left. The 8 went back to the village and abandoned their farms because of the "demands" of social activities in the village. 3 respondents.

i. There are some changes. Now it is hard to make contributions because of a shortage of cash to buy one's contributions to village social activities as things are expensive. 1 respondent.

j. There have been a lot of changes. Fijians usually respect their chiefs but now not all Fijians do. Prefers that there be some change in the number of Fijian social activities as they involve "a waste of resources." 1 respondent.

k. There is the same number of social activities, only now it is more demanding in that money is also needed to send one's children to school. On the other hand, if the respondent does not take part, it would be easier to develop here. Most of the cash earnings are spent on social functions which seems wasteful and uneconomical. There are contradictions between the Fijian way of life and the type of development that is happening. But again one spends most of one's money and other resources in social activities. However, this is part of the Fijian way of life. 4 respondents.

33. Do the Fijian farmers think that their participation in Fijian social activities has changed since they joined the SSCDP? How and Why?

a. One is able to choose which social activities to contribute to, to attend, although there may be the same number of social activities in the village. One feels at times one does not have to take part in some social activities which one feels are not important. Education for one's children is more important. 21 respondents, or 41%. 
b. In Seagaqa, there is some change but not much. Now one has enough money to give relatives. Before, one did not have enough income so did not participate in some social activities. Now one feels one has enough money and can afford to take part in more social functions. 9 respondents or 18%.

c. Now that he has a source of income he gives more in his contributions to the social activities in the village. There are more social activities to take part in. 1 respondent.

d. Taking part in fewer social activities because of distance from the village than if physically staying in the village or near it. If one is staying in the village one is aware of whatever is happening in the village and, therefore, one feels one must contribute and take part. But on the farm, there is the freedom to choose which social activities to attend such as attending only those of close relatives or of one's own mataqali. There is some change in that only when one is told about social activities, one goes. If one is not told one does not have to go. 14 respondents or 28%.

e. There has been no change. One must take part and attend all the social activities personally in the village. One must still contribute one's labor once a week to cleaning the village. This is because although one has a farm one still lives in the village. 19 respondents or 37%.

f. One does not have to attend all social activities and commit one's time. Now one can only send along one's contribution in kind or cash. 4 respondents or 8%.

g. Depends on affordability. If there are other things which are more important, then send one's contribution or another relative. If one has enough cash, one will attend. 1 respondent.
34. Would the Fijian farmer leave cane farming if given an option? Give reasons.

a. No. It is the main source of cash. There is no land to go back to in one's own village. 45 respondents or 88%.

b. Only if there is some other activity to go to in order to earn money. 4 respondents or 8%.

c. Only if forced by the landowners to leave. 5 respondents or 10%.

d. Own mataqali land is part of the SSCDP. 10 respondents or 20%.

e. Yes, would go back to one's village. 5 respondents.

f. If elected as a representative of his province, he will leave to go to the district where his people are. 1 respondent.

35. Other aspects of development which Fijian farmers showed concern about.

a. Only has experience with the SSCDP. 11 respondents or 22%.

b. Desires a more equitable economic relationship between Fijians and Indians. 1 respondent.

c. Would like to diversify activities on the farm such as planting rice, root crops, vegetables, pineapples, or raising livestock. 14 respondents or 27%.

d. Would like government assistance to diversify activities on the farm. 4 respondents.

e. Government should give more help to Fijian farmers not just money but also machinery. 3 respondents.

f. Would like piped water, electricity and telephone services. 7 respondents or 14%.
g. Would like to run a shop.  
   2 respondents.

h. Would like the government to set up local vocational centers where young Fijians can go and learn the different skills when they need them.  
   1 respondent.

i. Would like the government to assist in organizing a Fijian Cane farmers cooperative store.  
   3 respondents.

j. The Fijian Way of Life. A Fijian sugar cane farmer's wife, Lisa, is a teacher. She does not want her children to continue to practice the Fijian way of life. She wants their children to get a good education and fend for themselves. She thinks that her children are being distracted from their studies because they are living in the village. When there are social activities in the village they do not do their homework and do not want to go to school. Now they are building a house on the farm to be away from the village.

   The car example. A Fijian farmer has a car and has to sell it. A relative such as a brother, sister, cousin, son or daughter wants to buy it, but can only afford to pay a limited sum of money for it. The farmer advertises the car for sale in the local paper and gets offered a better price. Which person would the farmer sell the car to? Give your reasons.

   a. Sell the car to the relative (if they are on good terms).  
      Reasons given: Would still be able to use the car.  
                    To have a good relationship with one's family is more important than having the extra money.  
                    35 respondents or 69%.

   b. Depends on the need for the money.  
      2 respondents.

   c. Sell it to whoever gives the higher price. The relative would expect to get the car for nothing.  
      7 respondents or 14%.

   d. Sell it to whoever arrives first.  
      2 respondents.
## APPENDIX C

SUGAR CANE PRODUCTION TABLES FOR SEAQAQA

Table 1

Seaqaqa District Cane Production
Comparison by Race and Number of Growers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Seaqaqa District Cane Production
Comparison by Race and Number of Tonnes Produced

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indians &amp; Others</td>
<td>136,253</td>
<td>180,094</td>
<td>115,273</td>
<td>182,244</td>
<td>166,035</td>
<td>168,578</td>
<td>155,319</td>
<td>190,520</td>
<td>180,846</td>
<td>218,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijians</td>
<td>114,856</td>
<td>135,944</td>
<td>82,216</td>
<td>110,069</td>
<td>87,178</td>
<td>84,178</td>
<td>69,394</td>
<td>80,115</td>
<td>77,943</td>
<td>82,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>251,109</td>
<td>316,038</td>
<td>197,489</td>
<td>293,313</td>
<td>253,753</td>
<td>252,756</td>
<td>224,713</td>
<td>270,635</td>
<td>258,789</td>
<td>300,880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fiji Sugar Corporation, Seaqaqa, Fiji, 1991
Table 3
Fiji Development Bank Clients
Sugar Cane Production
Comparison by Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fijian</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Tonnes of Sugar Cane Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0 - 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>51 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>101 - 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>151 - 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>201 - 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>251 - 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>301 - 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>351 - 400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>401 - 450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>451 - 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>501 - 550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>551 - 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>601 - 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>More than 650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 315</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FDB and FSC, Seaqaqa, Fiji, 1991
APPENDIX D
THE FIJIAN ADMINISTRATION

Governor

Head

Native Regulation Board

Advise on Native Affairs

Province

Roko

District

Buli

Village

Turaga ni Koro

The Fijian Administration Under the Native Affairs Ordinance, 1876

Source: Kerr and Donnelly, Fiji in the Pacific, 1969
The Fijian Administration Under the Fijian Affairs Ordinance, 1945

Source: Kerr and Donnelly, *Fiji in the Pacific*, 1969
By-passing of the Fijian Administration and the District Administration is made possible through the 1967 re-organization.

Source: Rodney Cole et al., The Fijian Provincial Administration: A Review, 1984

The Relationship Between the Fijian Administrator and the Central Government Departments 1967-1984
Direct communication from village to Central Governments and vice versa at the consent only of the Fijian Administration viz--FAB or Provincial Office

NOTE: The absence of the District Administration from the Review

Source: Rodney Cole et al., The Fijian Provincial Administration: A Review, 1984
APPENDIX E

THE FIJI LEGISLATURE

The Fiji Legislature According to the 1970 Constitution

Parliament

Queen of England (Head of State of Fiji)

Senate (Upper House)
22 nominated members
6 year term

House of Representatives (Lower House)
52 elected members
5 year term

Governor-General (Queen's Local Representative)

House of Representatives Composition

52 ELECTED MEMBERS

FIJIANs 12
INDIANS 12
GENERAL 3
elect
elect
elect

FIJIANs
INDIANS
GENERAL

Communal Rolls

National Roll

Senate Composition

22 NOMINATED MEMBERS

8 nominated by the Council of Chiefs

7 nominated by the Prime Minister

6 nominated by the Leader of the Opposition

1 nominated by the Council of Rotuma
The Fiji Legislature According to the 1990 Constitution

Parliament

President

House of Representatives
70 Elected Members
5 year term

Senate
34 Nominated Members
4 year term

House of Representatives Composition

70 ELECTED MEMBERS

FIJIANs
37

INDIANS
27

ROTUMANS

GENERAL
5

Senate Composition

34 NOMINATED MEMBERS

24 Fijians
Nominated by the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (Council of Chiefs)

1 Rotuman
Nominated by the Rotuma Island Council

9 Nominated by the President
BIBLIOGRAPHY


The Daily Post (Suva, Fiji).


Ferguson, Kathy E. "Subject-Centeredness in Feminist Theory." In forthcoming book.

**Fiji Sun** (Suva, Fiji).

**Fiji Times** (Suva, Fiji).


Islands Business Pacific (Suva, Fiji).


Pacific Islands Monthly (Suva, Fiji).


Raulet, G. "Structuralism and Post-Structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault." Telos, 55 (Spring), 1983.


