FAMILIAR STRANGERS AFOOT IN TAIWAN: THE COMPETING SOCIAL IMAGINARIES OF EAST ASIAN TOURISTS

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation, focusing on intra-Asia tourism practices and tourism encounters in Taiwan, proposes a new transnational, multi-sited ethnographic approach for the examination of several crucial issues concerning social imaginaries, modernities, post-Cold War ideologies, and cultural identities in East Asia. The term “familiar strangers” refers to intra-East Asia tourists—mainly Japanese, and PRC Chinese—visiting Taiwan. These visitors often possess certain preconceptions concerning their destinations prior to departure—preconceptions shaped by a shared contentious history and highly subjective narrations of this history. In this dissertation I intend to explore which “social imaginaries” inform and shape tourism practices if touristic discourses and tourist reactions are assumed to be mutually influential. What dominant image of Taiwan is represented through tourism, specifically with regard to its historical relationships with Japan and China? By examining intra-Asia tourism through this triangular relationship, I illustrate (1) how Taiwan’s past(s), its “Chineseness” and popular culture, are represented at particular tourism sites, and evoke different responses in Japanese and mainland Chinese tourists, (2) how these tourists use Taiwan as a reference point to re-position themselves within East Asia, and (3) how Taiwanese travel agencies and relevant businesses have reinvented and commercialized “Chineseness,” “Japaneseness,” and “Taiwaneseness” to maximize their profits. In order to map the terrain of the destination culture of Taiwan as a dynamic cultural formation, I conducted a transnational and multi-sited fieldwork in Taipei, Tokyo, Osaka, Shanghai and Beijing from August 2009 to May 2011, which allows me to participate in Taiwan’s tourism industry from the perspective of a tour guide, tourist, and researcher. This dissertation represents
an attempt to understand how fluid and yet competing conceptions of “Chineseness,”
“Japaneseness,” and “Taiwaneseness” and the social imaginaries behind them have figured in
Taiwan’s tourism discourse, which has focused on different tourist populations at different
periods of time.

Keywords: Taiwan, Intra-Asia Tourism, Familiar Stranger, Social Imaginaries, Chineseness,
Residual Culture.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: FAMILIAR STRANGERS AFOOT IN TAIWAN:

Introduction

The recent increase in intra-Asia tourism reflects the regional economic developments that have taken place over the past few decades. The touristic practices that have emerged in East Asia embody historical complexes impacted by colonialism, war memories, and Cold War ideologies. In particular, the tourism industry in contemporary Taiwan encapsulates the triangular relationship linking Taiwan, Japan, and China that has taken shape as a product of historical forces. I focus on the interactions and reciprocal perceptions shared by these East Asian “familiar strangers”, a phrase I use to refer to intra-Asia tourists who share certain historical and cultural knowledge about their destinations in East Asia. Their encounters thus raise intriguing questions concerning mutual (mis)understandings that originate in a shared East Asian historical and cultural familiarity. When touring destinations situated within the triangle, they are “familiar strangers,” driven by mutually shaped imaginaries, and often embedded in a web of meanings which shape individual perceptions.

The concept of “familiar strangers” has been previously used in analyses of Rom or Romani
(Gypsy) life in America (Sway 1988) and subsequently with Chinese Muslims within China (Lipman 1988) to refer to groups of people whose presence is common in mainstream society yet aspects of their lives remain distant to the majority. Lipman’s usage of the term “familiar strangers” in reference to Chinese Muslims inspired this study of Taiwan’s “destination culture,” which has long targeted East Asian tourists. This term is doubly applicable to this project, for not only are the Taiwanese familiar strangers to East Asian tourists, but the tourists themselves are familiar strangers to the Taiwanese – familiar because of a shared history and culture, strange because of the different social imaginaries and historical narratives that inform their touristic quests. In contrast to Lipman’s focus on “a frontier very distant to the core areas of Chinese culture and very strange to most Chinese” (1988: 5), I choose to concentrate on the two-way construction of each other with the “familiar strangeness” of both the host and guest culture. The two-way construction of the guest and host culture is represented through their pre-conceptualized imaginations of Taiwan and Taiwan’s promotions of its Chineseness.

Among the familiar strangers in intra-Asia tourism, the Japanese have long been the dominant players in postwar Taiwanese tourism. Yearly statistical data provided by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau reveal a rapid increase in the total number of foreign tourists, and also indicates the successful accommodation of Japanese tourists’ demands. In spite of a major development in promotional strategy which has emphasized Taiwan’s “Chineseness” to attract visitors from
the PRC—necessarily watering down the preexisting single-minded appeal to Japanese
travelers—it seems that the number of Japanese tourists has not decreased.3  According to
yearly statistics, Japanese have consistently comprised one third of the visiting population, from
around 0.826 million out of 2.41 million international tourists in 1999 to 1.17 million out of
3.72 million in 2007, with these figures increasing to 1.09 million out of 3.85 million in 2008
(See Appendix 1).  Although the total number of Japanese tourists (1.08 million) was surpassed
in 2010 by the Chinese, with 1.63 million visitors, Japanese tourists still constitute the mainstay
of Taiwan’s tourism income (Appendix 1). These numbers reflect the stability of Japanese
tourism in Taiwan over the past decade, during which the former colonizers have provided the
cornerstone of their former colony’s tourism industry. It is perhaps not too much to say that
the Taiwanese have successfully catered to Japanese imaginaries of Taiwan, with highly
lucrative results. Prior to the adoption of separate promotional strategies targeting Hong Kong
and South-East Asian tourists, Taiwan’s touristic approaches could be divided into those
targeting Japan and those targeting all other nations.4

The policy shift initiated by the Ma Ying-Jeou (馬英九) administration in June 2008, which
was accompanied by lifting restrictions imposed upon “lźuè” (陸客), the visitors from the
“Chinese mainland,”5 represented a movement away from the past trend of catering to
Japanese tourists in favor of welcoming Chinese tourists, thus seemingly shifting the
long-standing power dynamic operating within the triangle. While the influx of PRC tourists was expected to invigorate Taiwan’s economy, the Taiwan fantasy in the PRC once again became a hot issue in the mass media. A speech given by PRC President Wen Jiabao (温家宝) reflects the imaginary of Taiwan prevailing in the minds of many mainlanders: "Taiwan is the treasure island of China, and is a place I always look forward to visiting. Although I am 67 years old, if it is possible, I would like to go to Taiwan. Even if I am too old to walk, I will crawl." (Xie 2009). This speech not only evoked in Chinese imaginations lingering images of China’s Baodao (“treasure island” or “precious island”), lost in 1896 and later controlled by Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT, but also invoked the tight historical solidarity between China and Taiwan. There were other consequences of the policy shift as well. Due to the limited availability of tourism resources and worries about potential unpleasant encounters at sites between the Japanese and Chinese tourists, the Taiwan Tourism Bureau has been releasing daily and weekly online reports called the Luke Baogao (“daily/weekly Chinese tourist report”), essentially a “weather report” indicating the number of Chinese visitors at a given Taiwanese destination, so that travel agencies can adjust their tour schedules in advance.
When tourists seek something more than superficial differences or similarities, or when destinations fail to invent a version of their culture which appeals to tourists, tourism discourse unavoidably has to face challenges and position itself to respond both to internal and external pressures. Taiwan must somehow mediate the anxiety arising from ambiguous representations of local ethnicity for touristic purposes and the clear-cut cultural identity struggle shaping politics. In the case of Taiwan, the tourism industry is heavily impacted by the interconnected issues of economic growth, cultural identity struggles and the tensions inherent in the formation of East Asian modernities (Sun 2000; Takeuchi 2005; Wang 2002; Zhang 2001). The processes of modernization and westernization in East Asia have historically been fraught with tension and anxiety (Chen 1998; Gluck 1993; Harootunian 2000; Morris-Suzuki 1998). Moreover Taiwan,
in its current state of Neo-liberal transition, seems not only to be losing its state power but also to be anxiously and repeatedly struggling to respond to Post-Cold War ideology. In these circumstances, Taiwan’s tourism may serve as an appropriate medium for us to rethink the role that the state plays in defining its national as well as its destination culture for familiar strangers, in the anthropological vein suggested by Sharma and Gupta that emphasizes “the culture” performed by the state\textsuperscript{10} (Sharma and Gupta 2006: 10). The statehood of Taiwan has been complicated by its political reality and tourist transformations and is thus constantly brought into question.\textsuperscript{11}

While Taiwan’s statehood is frequently challenged both internationally and domestically, neither Nye’s concept of “soft power” (2004a) nor Dinnie’s “nation branding” (2008) seem perfectly applicable to Taiwan’s tourism and its promotions, which are heavily influenced by its marginal position in East Asia and international politics. The Taiwan state instead seems to employ a relatively passive and ambivalent attitude to branding itself and to rely heavily on repetitive negotiations of its ethnicity. Apart from concerns about Taiwan’s statehood, an anthropological standpoint helps to isolate these transformations of the Taiwanese state by exploring “public culture representation and performance of statehood” (Sharma and Gupta:18). An anthropological perspective also enables this research to further investigate this postwar transition through tourism culture as well as policy changes. The earlier discourses produced in
and for the contemporary tourist industry show a desire on the part of the Taiwanese to establish their cultural and national identities on a firm footing. And yet in the later discourses found in promotions, Taiwan commonly utilizes strategies to retain ambiguity in ethnicity and cultural identity. Finally, this approach may provide a convincing explanation for Taiwan as an imagined and desired destination for its familiar strangers. Within the hierarchy of East Asian modernities (Ariyama 2001; Weisenfeld 2000), visitors from both Japan and the PRC betray an eagerness to position themselves in relation to Taiwan.  

Tourism impacts almost every aspect of daily life in modern society. As Tan Chee-Beng (2001) notes,

The anthropological study of tourism has become not only a study of tourism but also of almost all issues relevant to anthropology including cultural change, development, ethnicity, globalization, localization, migration, modernity, and representation. The postmodernist influence on anthropology has made the study of tourism even more relevant, especially with regard to the now fashionable interest in borderzones, diasporas, hybridity, and authenticity. [2001:1-2]

My research thus focuses on a number of questions concerning the touristic practices of these familiar strangers. If touristic discourses and tourist reactions are assumed to be mutually influential, which “social imaginaries” inform and shape tourism practices? What dominant image of Taiwan is represented through tourism, specifically with regard to the historical relationships with Japan and China?

By examining intra-Asia tourism through this triangular relationship, I will attempt to
illustrate: (1) how the tourism representations of Taiwan’s past(s), its memories and histories of particular sites, offered by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau and the tourism industry, are responding to the long term constructed social imaginations of the Japanese and Chinese tourists; (2) how these tourists use Taiwan as a reference point to re-position themselves within East Asia; and lastly, (3) how the process of commercialization of tourism emphasizes its familiarity/commerciality, rather than its exoticness for East Asian tourists. This project also represents an attempt to understand how fluid conceptions of “Chineseness,” “Japaneseness,” and “Taiwaneseness” have figured in Taiwan’s tourism discourse, which has focused on different tourist populations at different periods of time.14

Literature Review

In the case of intra-Asia tourism, the preconceptions held by guests and hosts seem to dispel the notion that tourists are eternally in search of difference, or the exotic. From my dissertation emerges a more complicated picture of tourism which reveals how some tourists are driven by the search for similarity and difference. The impact of this search for similarity and difference on touristic discourse cannot be overestimated. My research on intra-Asia tourism, transnational social imaginaries, and cultural identities in the making focuses on familiar strangers as a paradigm for the understanding of such dynamics within tourism practices.

Rethinking Intra-Asia
The ever-increasing concern with the processes of globalization and unbalanced or unilateral cultural flows of popular culture\textsuperscript{15} has led scholars (Appadurai 2000; Ching 2000; Iwabuchi 2002a) to once again turn their attentions to regionalist thinking or, alternatively, to re-center popular culture phenomena within a framework of global capitalism. Within the regional and inter-Asian context (Chen 1998; Sun 2000; Wang 2002; Wang 2004), I will closely examine the triangular relationship in East Asia as it is revealed by the three “-ness” locutions, “Chineseness,” “Japaneseness,” and “Taiwaneseness,” used in the sphere of Taiwanese tourism.

It has been argued that the concept of Asia exists not merely as an ideological foil to the West, but also as an intellectual frame for self-conceptualization, operative in the minds of many “Asians” (Chen 1998; Sun 2000; Takeuchi 2005; Wang 2002). The distinction of being “Asian” was accepted by many inhabitants of the region and impacted perceptions of cultural similarity, and simultaneously generated a shared sense of living within a “geographical” and “historical” Asia. Proponents of this theory argue its usefulness in understanding interactions within Asia and intra-Asian activities. In the age of global capitalism, a refocus on region may offer a useful analytical tool for the understanding of localized dynamics—one must not necessarily whole-heartedly embrace the notion of decentered globalization. I want to emphasize the importance of locating this concern and interpreting cultural activities within a geographical concept of East Asia, while analyzing issues involving the “familiar strangers” and relevant
historical complexes (Chen 1998; Ching 2000; Hamashita 1997; Sun 2000). The terms “Intra-Asia” and “Inter-Asia” help to elucidate multiple bilateral relationships and the various cultural activities taking place within the region. 

**Transnational Social Imaginaries**

Within the intra-Asia context, an interactive, transnational framework is necessary for an understanding of how Taiwan’s transforming tourism embodies the historical constructed Japanese and Chinese imaginaries about Taiwan as well as the Taiwanese struggle for identity. This framework also helps us to understand how the struggle for Taiwanese cultural identity has been woven into the historical and East Asian context. In this dissertation I apply Charles Taylor’s concept of social imaginaries (Taylor 2004) to the intra-Asia context in an attempt to shed light on the transnational and triangular relationships operating within the East Asian historical complex.

There is no clear-cut means of understanding how social imaginaries function—they must be interpreted within individual contexts. However, an examination of the processes of modernization in East Asia reveals the degree to which the Western gaze and shared imaginaries have been internalized in the region. Where Asian modernization and modernity are concerned, the question of whether modernity is a particularly Western phenomenon is often raised (Shin and Robison 1999; Liao 2002). If it is not, then how do we make sense of the distinction
between the premodernized past and the modernized present in East Asia? The equation between Westernization and modernization in East Asia seems to suggest a historical discontinuity in East Asia. This sense of discontinuity is often attributed to Western influence and thus ignores residual cultural elements persisting across temporal periods. The claim that modernization is exclusively “Western” denies the existence of residual cultural elements that may have facilitated its processes and reduces modernization to a Western imposition.\textsuperscript{18}

Scholars of “alternative modernity” argue against this perspective, which effectually annihilates certain elements of premodern society. The cultural theorist Raymond Williams’ concept of “the residual” (1977) is helpful in locating the East Asian modernization process in a historical perspective—in this reading the old has never been fully erased, but rather continues to be present in a distorted or obfuscated form. The concept of “the residual” also illustrates how imagination functions and is passed down from one generation to the next. Williams’ triple concepts of “the dominant, residual, and emergent” are thus useful for the examination of social and cultural changes occurring in a society that values stability and balance. The residual is particularly useful in refuting discourse arguing for the discontinuity of East Asian modernization. Regardless of whether “post” implies “going beyond” or “marking rupture,” Williams’ interactive concept of cultural transformation may provide an alternative model for the understanding of cultural change without asserting historical continuity or discontinuity.\textsuperscript{19}
This transformative concept of culture can also be applied to the understanding of how social imaginaries evolve.

As I have argued, an overemphasis on ruptures in East Asia has led scholars to focus on discontinuity and ignore the transformation and persistence of memories in societies. Complete eradication of historical memories of tumultuous periods—such as those of Japan’s 1945 defeat, China’s Civil War and Cultural Revolution, the end of colonization in Taiwan and Korea, and the Cold War—is impossible. Attempts to submerge or obliterate undesired memories have failed, as have subsequent attempts to disguise the continuation of American political and cultural influence in this region. In this respect it is important to point out how heavily Cold war ideology influenced East Asian modernity. Inter-Asia scholars have discussed the “immanence of Americaness,” or American dominance as it is rendered invisible in East Asia culture (Sakai 1997, Chen 1998; Yoshimi 2002). As these scholars argue, this Cold war ideology has been integrated into a larger unconscious nation-state discourse. I explain how the residual continues to operate in contemporary societies and thus shapes tourist imaginations about East Asia and Taiwan below. Before examining individual contexts, I apply the dual lenses of Charles Taylor’s social imaginaries and Kuan-Hsing Chen’s cultural imagination (1994) to an examination of mutual imaginations in the triangle and the role of ethnicity, particularly “Chineseness” and its interplay with “Taiwaneseness” and
“Japaneseness,” as it is understood by hosts and tourists.

Charles Taylor asserts that “the social imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather, it is what enables, through making sense of, the practice of a society” (2004: 2). Moving beyond Habermas’ influential concept of the “public sphere” (Calhoun 1992; Fraser 1992; Taylor 2004), Taylor provides a less Western and elite-centric perspective and therefore includes diverse participants in the formation of imaginaries within a society. However, Taylor focused his discussion upon a single society, and consequently is less successful in grasping the social imaginaries tied to globalization. In contrast to Appadurai’s concept of “ethnoscape,” Taylor’s analysis is limited to the social imaginaries active within a single society, and is thus not applied to the formation of transnational social imaginaries. The essence of Taylor’s argument is that within any given society there coexist several social imaginaries seeking to achieve balance. We might say that Taylor’s social imaginaries are about self understanding and lack the mutual (external) influence present in Chen Kuan-Hsin’s concept of “cultural imagination.”

Cultural imagination in East Asia is shared and multi-directional. This dynamic requires us to rethink interactions in East Asia within this triangular frame. With regard to the unbalanced cultural imaginations produced in postcolonial Asia, Kuan-Hsin Chen critiqued the unequal relationships between the former colonizer and the colonized as expressed through
constant production and reproduction of cultural imagination. (Chen 1994, 1996) Focusing on the bilateral relationships between Japan and Taiwan and China and Taiwan, Chen argued that cultural imaginations are mutually influential, and frequently reflexive. Japan, for example, has over the years used Taiwan as a reference point for the confirmation of its own position in the East Asian hierarchy, and so do Taiwan and China when they are located in an East Asian context. Chen’s focus on bilateral relationships creates a need for the analysis of dynamics within East Asia, and I attempt to address this need by considering multiple bilateral relationships within a transnational framework.

Applying Appadurai’s concept of “ethnoscape” to the issue of Taiwanese ethnicity, I contend that Taiwan’s current struggle for a national and cultural identity is not only internal, but external as well, informed by and informing the multiple bilateral relationships within the triangle and the multiple collective imaginations shared amongst Taiwan, China and Japan. This process of ethnicity imagination is often reflected and contextualized in the formation of collective identity and memory. Kushner (2007) argues that the politics of memory function in China, Korea and Taiwan on the issue of Japan’s history textbook controversy—these three nations utilize Japan to foster nationalism, and the manipulation of collective memories suggests multiple, interactive bilateral relationships. My focus on transnational and triangular dynamics
does not mean that social imaginaries only reach equilibrium at the transnational level. Contrary to Appadurai’s overemphasized claim of de-territorization, national boundaries, as many of his contemporaries argue, are still powerful determinants. Within national boundaries and through media intervention, multiple social imaginaries become possible and emerge and merge into a relatively homogenous narrative entailing common understandings of selves and others.

A Touristic Bridge: Japan and China

I next examine the imaginaries of Japan and China about Taiwan, both individually and interactively, and illustrate how these imaginations continue to drive tourism practices in contemporary Taiwan. Japan’s perception of Taiwan has evolved radically since the end of the colonial period, and Taiwan now offers a nostalgic site in which to recover a lost past. China, on the other hand, has discursively constructed the “loss” of Taiwan since the late Qing dynasty, and the sense of loss persists to this day.

The “postwar” designation has often been used to refer to the radical transformation of modern Japan. However, Japanese nostalgia seems to reveal anxiety about imperfectly occluded memories of the prewar past. Japan’s meteoric modernization process, dating from the Meiji period, has led Japanese in the postwar eras to deny their recent past and suggest a ruptured
history (Gluck 1985; Takeuchi 2005). As Oguma Eiji rightly points out (Oguma 1998), the forced abandonment of former Japanese colonies has led to a more complex definition of being Japanese, and accordingly the way that Japanese view others has altered. This is not to say that in the wake of defeat the Japanese have discarded old perceptions and ways of life and adopted those imposed by the American Occupation authorities. For example, the Japanese idea of “Nanyō,” or the Southern Seas, continues to persist in Japan as a locus of postwar Japanese nostalgia (Chen 2007; Kawamura 1993; Oda 1993; Yamashita 1997). Their imaginaries of Nanyō still influence their daily lives, including their tourism practices in Taiwan and other Southeast Asian and Pacific countries. Scholars of tourism and popular culture have found that the established cultural hierarchy persists in postwar Japan. Iwabuchi’s study of Japan’s popular culture Asian fever (2002b) and Graburn’s research (1995) on overseas tourism in Asia point to a “residual” imaginary, which takes the form of nostalgia and serves to mediate the pre- and postwar periods and clarify Japan’s postwar order.

In China, different ruptures have been marked. In particular, the post-socialist era is characterized by a radical turn to capitalism or socialist capitalism. The “post-socialist” designation is equally problematic, due to the indiscriminate use of the term to refer to the diverse contexts of Russia, Vietnam, and China (Zhang 2001). Ethnographic data on social memory in China resists the zero-sum game of socialism or capitalism, and indicates that the
Chinese have indeed incorporated past experience into the “new” mentality. Previous research on Chinese social memory, such as Mueggler’s work on “the haunted ghost” of State and Rubie Watson’s theory of “secret history” (Mueggler 2001; Watson 1994), show how the oppressed formed alternative memories to cope with unspoken suffering endured during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The past is still present in contemporary daily life, though perhaps in a different form—that which “the residual” takes with respect to “the dominant” and “the emergent.” In this sense, emphasis on “discontinuity” becomes minor.

What is more essential to my ethnography is how the transformation has been carried on and what remains and continues. I consider Judith Farquhar’s approach (2002), which focuses on China’s everyday life through daily representations, essential to grasping the historical moments of transformation. To argue along a similar line to Farquhar, ideology, such as Maoism, still manifests in later life experiences of the Chinese people, which itself echoes Williams’ concept of the “residual” in a transforming society. And ideology is embodied in cultural and social experiences. I found this concept useful to challenging the homogeneity of transformation, illustrating the gradual, uneven, and incomplete nature of transformation by analyzing a society in transition. Accordingly, conceptions of Taiwan persisting since the Qing dynasty (Chen 2007; Teng 2004) were intensified by Nationalist and PRC propaganda, and continue to shape Chinese imaginative desires for the lost baodao, as is evident in the words of Wen Jia-bao mentioned.
above. As I will present in later chapters, the famous Taiwanese landscapes of Mt. Ali and Sun-Moon Lake have been constructed strategically in PRC textbooks and the mass media, with little basis in reality, to conjure nostalgia in the “motherland” and relocate lost, beautiful Taiwan as part and parcel of the national suffering caused primarily by the Japanese.

**Cultural Tourism**

Using the metaphor “familiar strangers” to refer to intra-Asia tourists, I address the dynamics operating within the intra-Asia context in the age of late-modernity. I do not wish to propose a dichotomy of Western and other touristic styles (MacCannell 1989), but I do feel it necessary to distinguish intra-Asia tourism from the Western mode that MacCannell suggests. Rather than an East/West distinction, I find it more productive to contextualize each tourism format socially, historically and regionally. The reason that I would like to specify intra-Asia tourism is to question the long-existing utilization of cultural codes of the exotic and the strange and look at how cultural familiarity is also utilized in tourism discourse. Edensor and Urry argued that the touristic pursuit of the “exotic or strange” is firmly located in the Western imaginary of tourism (Edensor 1998:13; Urry 2002), but I contend that this assumption is less useful to an examination of the tourism practices of intra-Asia tourists. Rather than
wholeheartedly pursuing “Otherness,” the “familiar strangers” of intra-Asia search for
difference in the familiar. Within intra-Asia tourism, their historical familiarity is established
on the shared cultural basis of Confucianism as well as East Asian modernization, and
embedded in the historical and regional context, which includes Japan’s colonial past and the
threat posed by modern China. Moreover, due to the familiarity shared by these East Asian
familiar strangers, their tourist expectations distinguish themselves from tourists from areas
outside of Asia.

Herzfeld’s research on Greek construction of national culture illustrated how scholars and
members of the elite established cultural continuity through a consistent Greek mythology
(Herzfeld 1982). Herzfeld’s work, however, ignored the plebeian masses, and was less
concerned with external pressure, which I consider crucial to understanding intra-Asia tourism.
In contrast to the Greek situation, Taiwan, in order to meet demands from each side, must
maintain its hybridity or develop new promotional strategies, such as those celebrating colorful
indigenous cultures that meet the tourist demand for difference and satisfy the quest for cultural
identity. As discussed above, “Chineseness,” “Taiwaneseness,” and ambiguous
“Japaneseness” have been intertwined in daily Taiwanese life. Postmodern phenomena such as
hybrid cultures, shifting identities, ambiguous “-ness” descriptors and diasporas have blurred
cultural and ethnic boundaries (Appadurai 1991, 1996; Bhabha 1995; Chow 1994, 1998; Chun 1996; Hall 1990). The issue of ethnicity is critical if one is to understand the strategies and the historical background underlying the national tourism promotion project. Despite being problematized and criticized for ambiguities of shifting ethnicity, this interplay within an “ethnoscape” helps illustrate the various images that touristic representation intends to convey at various times, and reveals the desires motivating tourists immersed in a context of mutually influencing social imaginaries (Appadurai 2000). Thus, in the context of intra-Asia tourism, these three “-ness” constructions help to posit, at least theoretically, cultural similarity and difference—and it is these seemingly arbitrary similarities and differences that the intra-Asia tourists look for and identify with.

Previous studies of cultural tourism (MacCannell 1989; Urry 2002) have paid relatively little attention to the subject of tourist choice of specific destination, and have largely neglected non-Western modernities. Scholars of tourism found alternative discourses operating in tourism of Japan (Ivy 1995; Morris-Suzuki 1998; Oda 1993; Robertson 1991) and China (Nyíri 2006; Smith 2001; Tan 2001). These two nations did not quite follow the Western model: the former wedded the Western sense of recreation with an emphasis on the “Japanese kokoro” (or Japanese heart) and romanticized its one-time colonies, while the latter has developed its own
method of incorporating both development and cultural preservation in tourism discourse. In an effort to address these gaps, I would like to focus on the interactions of tourists with social imaginaries (Appadurai 2000; Taylor 2004) in a transnational East Asian (intra-Asia) context, with an eye to alternative modernities and the agency of tourists. Social imaginaries refer to common understandings about life held by members of a society, and are mobile and malleable. These interactions have expanded Taiwan’s locality from place to space, and have been defined by transnational social imaginaries and structured by the triangular relationships existing between Taiwan, Japan and China. 27

Is it possible to talk generally about tourists, especially package tour participants, without addressing class, gender, race and other useful analytical tools? Perhaps previous research in media or cultural studies can shed some light on the subject. Much like a television audience, package tour participants are often considered cultural dopes without agency, while backpackers, in possession of information obtained from the mass media, Internet forums and publications like Lonely Planet, are thought to be in control of their destiny (and destination). 28 If we consider tourists an audience, Hall’s “en/decoding” model (1980) offers an excellent opportunity for the examination of official representations embodied in destinations. The agency of audiences/tourists allows them to develop varying and nuanced interpretation contents, though we must not forget that these interpretations are still limited to the social imaginaries
dictated by cultural backgrounds. Travel destinations are quite personal choices, and knowledge of destinations is largely constituted of “mediascapes” as well as social imaginaries—tourists have access to and are exposed to a wealth of information about their destinations. In this respect, we might do better to consider tourists relatively autonomous.

Despite what is perhaps an overemphasis on the agency of audience, Fiske considered divergent textual readings to indicate the presence of resistance, and we might apply this logic to the touristic situation—if one regards sites and their interpretations as being potential fields of resistance, package tour participants must be seen in a quite different light. Tourism practices do not entirely define destinations, but in the case of the East Asian familiar strangers, tourism alters mutual imaginations.

Instead of merely considering the host’s ethnicity as it is represented in tourism spots, Valene Smith has argued for the significance of the “ethnicity of the guest” (2001). On the basis of Smith’s insights, I consider the ethnicity of both the tourists and the toured within an intra-Asian context, in which I see the concept of ethnicity as shaped through interactions. In the case of Taiwan, tourism must simultaneously cater to domestic, PRC, Japanese, and other tourists, and thus must be understood as interactive and dynamic. Perceptions, impacted by ethnicity, take shape in the minds of both tourists and the toured and are reflected with varying degrees of subtlety in Taiwan’s tourism discourse. The interactive
nature of the experience must be appreciated if one is to understand both the nostalgic quest undertaken by Japanese tourists as well as the process of distinguishing between “Chinese” and “Japanese” elements in Taiwan engaged in by tourists from the mainland. The sphere of tourism, then, helps to reveal the complicated and distinct character of Taiwanese modernity.

**Ethnographic/historical background**

Previous studies of tourism in Taiwan have tended to focus on economic development. Historical research on colonial tourism (Lu 2005, Soyama 2003, Su 2006) demonstrated the imbalance between colonizer and the colonized but did not go so far as to examine post-World War II contexts. Anthropological research on tourism has examined how tourism impacts indigenous communities and is mostly community-based. This type of analysis fails to distinguish between international and domestic tourists, for non-indigenous tourists are jumbled into the same category (Graburn 2002). Generally speaking, previous studies of tourism in Taiwan lack a comprehensive historical understanding and macro perspective suitable for analysis of interactions between tourists and destinations.

As mentioned above, when national identity is contested and cultural identity ambiguous, tensions between history and memory in relation to identity struggles appear and impact tourism discourse. Following Benjamin’s concept of the “moment of danger,” June Yip examined how memory shapes Taiwan’s historical imagination, asserting that “the very act of memory, of
actively constructing and creatively retelling the past—can be a critical tool for empowering oneself to deal with the crisis of the present moment” (2004: 129). The ambiguity of Taiwanese identity is such that memory, history, and cultural identity are contested at Taiwan’s tourist sites.

Eschewing Herzfeld’s focus (1982) on the role of the nation-state and the elite in the construction of cultural identity, I agree with Ruby Watson on the impossibility of full control. The state’s control over memory and time, as Watson points out, is never total. This is particularly true in the case of Taiwan, where competition between the two political parties for control over collective memory has resulted in the failure to produce a unified narrative, thus encouraging more resistance in the form of private history. 31 The question of how touristic sites convey and narrate collective memory is intriguing—the politics of memory are played out in sites and places that carry significant historical meanings. The representation of these sites in Taiwan records challenges to “Chineseness” as well as ideological efforts to create “Taiwaneseness.” The Palace Museum illustrates how “Chineseness” has been transformed over the past several decades, while the Memorial Hall as well as other sites relevant to the Chiang family bear witness to Chiang’s authoritarianism in Taiwan and the recent controversy produced by yet another rechristening. 32 Both sites embody the ongoing process of (re)constructing Taiwan’s memory and history, as I explain in the following paragraphs.
Palace Museum

The museum, once regarded as a place for antique objects, has become a significant tourist destination, for museums are required to fund themselves by engaging in cultural business—tourism provides a convenient way and thus initiates transformation of museums. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett observes that “[a]s the tourism industry moves from a product-driven approach to one that is market-led—and from creating an experience based on seeing to one based on doing—it positions museums in the rearguard of the industry……. Today, they are defined more than ever by their relationship to visitors” (1998: 137-8). Museums not only satisfy the desires of tourists to witness the past, but also provide discourses concerning the past and thus assume a primary role in cultural and heritage tourism. With this in mind, an oversimplified equation of tourism with the populace and museums with the elite, as premised in Notar’s analysis, fails to grasp the nuances of the transformative role played by museums in the tourism industry. Although Notar (2006: 7) ignored the evolving role of museums today, his analysis is quite useful as a reminder of the dominant focus on elite consumption in the anthropology of tourism. For scholars of museums and tourism, Notar suggests, it is necessary to turn from history, art-house films, and museums and to examine other popular cultural products, and calls for attentions to postcards, theme parks, and children’s books. In this respect, as with other popular tourism destinations, museums offer multiple meanings for the
Museums are not merely buildings for the exhibition of objects; we must seriously consider the objects within and surrounding museums, including items for sale in museum stores as well as the exhibited. The Palace Museum is a significant site of contested “Chineseness.” In Taiwan it is widely believed that the Palace Museum preserves the true spirit of Chinese culture, and that all significant national treasures were transported to Taiwan during the KMT’s retreat from the mainland, while the Palace Museum in Beijing has been emptied and therefore symbolizes the “empty Chineseness” of PRC Chinese. Debates over the necessity of “Taiwanizing” (or indigenizing) the Palace Museum and ongoing plans to establish a new “Taiwanese” branch have put this site of “Chineseness” in great danger. The Palace Museum, therefore, serves as an excellent site to observe how “Chineseness” is represented and perceived by tourists, especially the familiar strangers within the intra-Asia context.

Sites Concerning the Chiang Kai-Shek Family

In addition to museums, memorials and other destinations of historical significance also serve to attract touristic attention. Given Chiang Kai-Shek’s role (蔣介石) in the Nationalist history, it is not difficult to understand why his memorial as well as his temporary residences attract millions of tourists annually, mostly from the neighboring countries of Japan, Korea, and China. These sites convey different meanings to different individuals; tourists unfamiliar with Chiang’s deeds go to view honor guard performances, while many Japanese and PRC tourists,
with their radically different perceptions of Chiang Kai-Shek, go for historical reasons. For the Taiwanese, the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall and other sites have recorded the history of the social and democratic movements since the 1980s. On the basis of my previous fieldwork conducted at CKSMH, different populations and generations developed their identities at least partially in relation to the CKSMH, and the site also offers an excellent opportunity to observe the Kuomintang’s (KMT) “authentic Chineseness,” which has somewhat declined and is gradually being replaced by diverse discourses. In the meantime, stories of historical figures relevant to the Chiang’s family, such as Chiang-Soong May-Ling (蔣宋美齡), Chiang Ching-Guo (蔣經國) and his political opponent Zhang Xue-Liang (張學良) have constituted great attractions for the East Asian tourists.

**Research Design**

In order to analyze Taiwan’s current tourism without sustaining the binary between tourist and guest, I focus on representations of tourism. Representations, as Notar (2006) suggests, can help the researcher of tourism gain a holistic understanding of tourism spots—“by examining different representations of place, the material after-effects of these representations, and contestations over the uses and meanings of place, we can learn much about the ways in which different groups of people experience socioeconomic change” (4). For the methodological analysis of these representations, I combine participant observation with tours and on-site,
semi-structured interviews, surveys, media study and archival research.

Since tourists are always on the move, the gathering of evidence to substantiate my claims concerning East Asia is thus a crucial part of this project. Where concepts of transnational social imaginaries are concerned, one might inquire what ethnographic data can be obtained to support my triangular structure of East Asia. To resolve this issue, my project is divided into two components: first, transnational and multi-sited fieldwork, and second, a comparative approach. Through a combination of the two, I expect to come to an understanding of locality as it is defined by different tourism participants, including tourists, tourism operators, tourism bureaus, and the mass media. My research also focuses on mobility and the multiple bilateral relationships operating in East Asia, rather than focusing primarily on the traditionally accepted bilateral. Put simply, a transnational and multi-sited fieldwork will allow me to collect tourist impressions and adumbrate the social imaginaries that lie hidden; comparative studies of PRC and Japanese tourists are necessary for an understanding of the multiple bilateral relationships. In order to map the terrain of tourism in Taiwan as dynamic cultural formation, I have conducted a two-year fieldwork in the four cities of Osaka, Tokyo, Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei as my major bases from August 2009 to May 2011. This project represents a new approach to Taiwanese tourism through the lens of multiple bilateral relationships. My fieldwork has focused on the touristic imaginations of these familiar strangers as expressed
through their impressions of Taiwan, with special attention being given to the question of how ethnicity (Chineseness, Japanese, and Taiwaneseness) transformed and is perceived and played out in touristic discourses.

**Methodology**

My transnational fieldwork in Osaka, Tokyo, Beijing, and Shanghai, concerning travel agencies engaging in Japan-Taiwan and China-Taiwan tourism, facilitated my exploration of intra-Asia tourism practices from a holistic perspective. Having established basic tourist industry connections, I began the second half of my fieldwork by participating in the national training and certification to become one of Taiwan’s foreign language tour guides, and by joining package tours. In my ethnography, my primary fieldwork sites were scheduled package tours conducted at the Palace Museum along with other destinations associated with KMT and the Chiang Kai-Shek family, such as Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall, Mt. Ali and Sun Moon Lake, in which I was a participant-observer. I consider the museum and other Taiwanese historical locales to be the most iconic Taiwanese tourism spots, and representative of the Taiwanese tourist experience as a whole; and, as an added incentive, museums and other sites of historical significance often propagate relatively explicit and significant historical meanings (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998). For both the Japanese and PRC tourists, whether packaged tour participants or backpackers, these places are recommended by the Taiwanese Tourism Bureau
and thus listed in most guide books as must-see attractions.

Tourism representations provide an accessible way for us to see how meanings are created and communicated at tourism spots and in tourism discourses. In light of cultural studies and media studies, a constructionist approach by Stuart Hall (1977) leads us to focus on politics of representations concerning how and why things are represented. If we consider “social imaginaries” to be mediators between practices in the real world and the imaginary, it is possible to study tourism through representations. The real question then is methodological: how to elicit meanings from these diverse representations. My methodology thus consists of two components: first, data collection concerning representations, and second, analysis of these representations and of the derived texts. Due to the nature of their occupation, it is extremely difficult to engage in conversation with tourists during the limited time frame of their travels, and what little may be obtained on the run is potentially superficial. Employing a modified approach by participating in package tours and serving as a tour guide in destination cities (Bruner 2005; Gao 2006), I thus have situated myself in a multi-sited ethnographic setting suitable to exploring the mobility of tourists. In addition, I have participated in the national training of foreign language tour guides and volunteered in travel agencies. I also participated in several package tours to Taiwan, including two training tours with veteran tour guides, three Taipei city tours for Japanese tourists, and one Taiwan around island trip. Due to the persistent
political sensitivity that still remains today and the regulation that prohibits non-affiliated
personnel on tour buses of Chinese tourists, I could only supplement my data through
intern-tours, on-site observation and through interviews both with Chinese tourists after their
Taiwan tours and with the Taiwanese tour guides who led these groups.

Representations are an essential part of the tourism industry. As Edensor notes (1998:13),
“symbols, images, signs, phrases and narratives provide the ideas that fuel the commodification
and consumption of tourist sites.” These textual and visual representations “reproduce
discourse of ‘Otherness,’ luxury and escape and also reconfirm notions about travel destinations
by plundering texts and images from each other as well as from older sources.”35 As part of my
ethnography, I analyze the meanings derived from representations in historical and government
documents and mass media texts to see how the mediated social imaginaries, or Appadurai’s
“mediascape,” are related to these representations (1996:35). These representations play a
huge role in the definition of tourism destinations. In an effort to understand “official”
representations through historical records and government documents, I have also analyzed
official statements, policy reports and statistics concerning tourism strategies within the Japan-
Taiwan dynamic and the PRC-Taiwan dynamic.36 In addressing media representation, I also
examine major newspaper articles, television broadcasts, tourism websites and blogs,
travelogues, promotional clips and commercials, and airline magazines, Asia Echo (1976-2008)
This magazine published by Japan Asia Airlines (JAA), *Asia Echo* (1976-2008), which chronologically documented the history of tourism in Taiwan and the evolution of the Japan-Taiwan relationship, has presented a long term communication between Japan and Taiwan and Taiwan’s tourism transformation. These articles, written essentially since Japan established diplomatic relationships with the PRC in 1975, are crucial not only to an understanding of Japan- Taiwan tourism, but also to an understanding of the transformation of tourist imaginations over the past four decades.

Textual materials can be helpful in discerning persisting imaginaries emanating from tourist sites, as with Teng’s discovery of the Qing travel writings on Taiwan (Teng 2004) and Kawamura’s study of “Nanyō,” the southern seas (Kawamura 1993). Therefore, in order to understand the representation of tourism locations, it is necessary to look at how meaning is constructed around the destinations and through tourism discourses. All representations related to the creation or interpretation of meaning shall be carefully examined. Discourse model analysis will be supplemented by textual analysis on collected documentary data, as described above. Furthermore, I find Pierre Macherey’s Marxist approach (1978) to literary theory useful to investigating the unspoken (or the unconsciousness), to disclosing the silence within the texts. By systematically examining both what has been represented and what is missing from written texts and other media, as well as by contextualizing these texts, one may
find the concealed made explicit. By applying the discourse model and delving into the unspoken, meanings can be examined and analyzed through the diverse representations manifest within the relatively unified touristic discourse surrounding particular destinations.

Furthermore, textual analysis of promotional materials will be used to supplement my interviews and participant observations.

**Outline of Chapters**

This dissertation, on the encounters of East Asian familiar strangers in Taiwan within the scope of intra-Asia tourism, is composed of seven chapters. In this chapter, I have presented both a theoretical and historical overview of Taiwan’s tourism transformation and the significant phenomenon of the tours of East Asian “familiar strangers.” Through these packaged tours, one may observe Taiwan’s anxiousness to constantly redefine its ethnicity and respond to the historical complex of East Asia. In chapter 2, I focus on the debates over “Chineseness” and the ideology of “cultural China” in Taiwan. In the second half of that chapter, I discuss “my Taiwan problem” of reconfirming and redefining my identity as simultaneously a Taiwanese, a national licensed tour guide, and a researcher in the field. Following chapter 2, chapter 3 focuses on the great emphasis on professionalization amongst Taiwanese tour guides and the identity negotiation inherent to their presentations of the destination culture of Taiwan. Chapter 4 on Japanese tourists in Taiwan presents the transformation of promotions from a nostalgia- centered
to a “familiarity”-focused aspect. Through tracing the ever-changing promotions of Japan Asia Airways, the Taiwan Association of Tourism and those of the mass media, I argue that the commercialization of ethnicity and historical familiarity are leading to a shift from tours of the *iyarashi* (filthy) to tours of the *shitashi* (familiar) for Japanese tourists. In Chapter 5, by tracing different popular media products prevalent in China, I concentrate on the cultural construction of Chinese historical familiarity and their affinity toward Taiwan. This chapter analyzes the so-called “baodao syndrome” through the 2009 blockbuster *Jianguodaye*, the documentary *Liangan Gugong*, and Chinese guidebooks on Taiwan, to explore China’s re-interpretation of its past associated with Taiwan, which suggests a shared Chineseness between China and Taiwan.

In chapter 6, by examining Taiwan’s popular culture, as well as the theme park *Taiwan Custom Street* and other tour exhibitions of Taiwanese culture in China, I contend that the Chinese mentality has restricted the Taiwanese presentation of its exoticness and do little to distinguish these exhibitions from previous presentations that focus exclusively on its Chineseness. In the second half of the chapter, I find two variations of their imaged Taiwan: first, Taiwan envisioned as an alternative China as an expression of Chinese social dissatisfactions; and second, the creative use of commodification of Taiwan’s Chineseness and the Nationalist figures presented at both destinations and shopping stations in order to simulate their purchase of Taiwan-specific products. The concluding chapter summarizes the social imaginaries functioning behind the
Taiwan tours of both Japanese and Chinese tourists, in which Taiwan serves as host to their respective social imaginaries.
Notes to Chapter 1

1 In 2007, the United Nation World Tourism Organizations (UNWTO) published a series on intra-regional tourism within the Asia and Pacific region, including the seven outbound markets of Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. This publication serves as one of the best indications of the thriving economic situation in Asia (UNTWO 2007).

2 This term is mentioned and used mainly in two books to deal with the various issues concerning certain ethnic minorities within mainstream society. In Sway’s book on Gypsy life in America, Sway uses the Middlemen minority theory to argue for the Gypsies’ resistance to assimilation and strategies to retain its culture and tradition (Sway 1988:1-2). In Lipman’s *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China*, he focuses on the Muslim habitations in Northwest China and explores how the concept of ethnicity and periphery is constructed and transformed in the region. (Lipman 1988:1-22)

3 Certain commentators, however, believe that the open door policy shown to visitors from the PRC somehow discourages Japanese tourists from visiting Taiwan.

4 As I discuss later in this chapter, due to their overwhelming numbers, Japanese tourists greatly influence Taiwanese tourism policy.

5 The Taiwanese government had expected the influx of PRC tourists to invigorate Taiwan’s tourism industry. However, PRC tourists are even outnumbered by Korean tourists, perhaps because the Taiwanese Tourism Bureau invested in a Korean drama filmed at some of Taiwan’s most famous tourism spots. In 2008, of the 329,204 visitors entering from the PRC, only 94,765 were visiting Taiwan for tourism purposes, as compared with 124,216 tourists out of 252,266 Korean visitors.

6 Over the past thirty years, roughly one-third of Taiwan’s tourism revenue has been generated by Japanese tourists.

7 See Xie Yu’s article entitled “Emotional Wen bowled over by beautiful 'treasure island'” (Text translated by China Daily). The original Chinese is even more emotional, emphasizing the historical link between China and Taiwan, which is referred to as “the treasure land of the motherland--China” (zuguo de baodao)
See Taiwan Tourism Bureau’s “daluguanguangtuan remenjingdian renshuyubao” (大陸觀光團熱門景點人數預報). The Tourism Bureau has never confirmed their worries about encounters between Japanese tourists and Chinese tourists at destinations and hotels. In actuality, different tour routes, hotels and restaurants for Japanese and Chinese tourists are arranged in advance by travel agencies. Even within the same travel agency, there are usually two individual teams responsible for these tourists. Except for hot destinations such as the Palace Museum and Taipei 101, this has been largely successful in preventing potential confrontations.

Although its (trans-)formation of cultural identities is intertwined in a more complicated political reality, in the superficial manipulation of opposing ideologies, lines are simply drawn between pro-Japan and pro-China factions and independence and unification advocates. These black-and-white distinctions are often exaggerated during election seasons and used as convenient binaries in the mass media.

“Anthropology brings to the foreground the role of cultural difference in forming and informing states” (Sharma and Gupta 2006:10).

The anthropological approach helps in exploring the “everyday practice of the state and cultural presentation” (Ibid: 5-6).

At the risk of oversimplification, the prevailing relational dynamics may be viewed as a consequence of the colonial past. Japanese come to Taiwan on a nostalgic quest for Japan’s past, while Chinese visitors hope to find a Taiwan distinguishable from mainland China in consequence of colonization by the Japanese. These intentions, conscious or unconscious, only contribute to Taiwanese identity anxieties and impact touristic discourse.

By “social imaginaries” I refer to the concept developed by Charles Taylor, which is concerned with popular conceptions of social life held by a given group of people. I return to this theme below.

I also intend to examine how ethnicity is manipulated in Taiwanese politics. I would suggest that “recycled” perceptions of ethnicity have been utilized in the past decades to attract tourists.

As is the case with Japan’s preeminence in the East Asian context.

Inter-Asia perspectives focusing on regionalism have been contested and often criticized for their attempts to promote Asianism and recenter Asia. For more details on this subject see Rey Chow (1998) and Baogun He (2000). The concept of inter-Asia, however, offers a solid challenge to Cold War ideology and the “Americaness” embedded within East Asia (Yoshimi 2002).
Rather than “inter-Asia” tourism, I prefer to use the term “intra-Asia” tourism. My use of “intra-Asia” incorporates the “inter-Asia” concerns with the historical formation of Asia and “Americaness” within East Asian states. However, I hesitate to fully accept the “inter-Asia” idea of Asianism, which seeks to transcend national boundaries within Asia, for I believe the idea of the nation-state is still powerful in the global age. In addition the elimination of national boundaries seems to me unrealistic. For these reasons I first analyze interactions and the transformations of social imaginaries within national boundaries, and subsequently examine interactions at a larger transnational level.

This view based on dependent history is less persuasive in explaining the phenomenon of the huge economic success of NIEs in 1980s.

Before discussing how social imaginaries constantly refashion themselves and function at a transnational level, I would like to problematize the indiscriminate use of “post-” to signify ruptures. Regardless of differences between pre and post periods, the oftentimes misleading designation “post-” gives a homogenous and static impression of radical transformation or rupture, an impression that is often debatable, as is the case with the term postmodern.

Despite mentioning at the outset that social imaginaries may also be understood in non-western modernities, Taylor primarily focuses his analysis on Western society. (2)

This term seems to imply a cut-and-dry end to socialism, and resonates, I believe, with Francis Fukuyama’s concept of “the end of history.” Rather than focusing on a post-socialist dimension, New Left Chinese scholars instead call attention to how China has strategically reacted to global capitalism (Zhang 2001). Xudong Zhang and other contributors to the edited volume *Wither China* focus on China’s reaction to global capitalism rather than the question of whether or not China is a capitalist society.

Although Farquhar emphasizes the discontinuity that prior “periodization history” has failed to grasp within Chinese society, I tend to see these ruptures as heterogeneity caused by rapid and uneven changes, similar to those which Zhang Xutong considers important phenomena of China’s postmodernity (2008:8-13).

MacCannell’s definition of tourism assumes an equation of West and tourist, Other and host. In this sense, his analysis seems to ignore that the toured, or Other, can also be tourists. Therefore, his analysis seems to founded in the tourism activities of Western societies.

The tortuous historical background of East Asia is reproduced in incessant and sequential debates over issues
such as the Japanese history textbook controversy, the territorial controversy over Diao-yu Island (Senkaku Island),
and Japan’s professed intention to revise its constitution article 9, which forever renounced war as a method of
resolving dispute.

25 For instance, the presence of an “authentic” Chinese culture (authenticity of Chineseness) in Taiwan was
celebrated in touristic promotions to the Japanese, but was challenged by China’s open door policy in the 1980s.
“Taiwaneseness” later absorbed the two poles of Chineseness and Japanese ness in the 1990s.

26 The case of Taiwan’s tourism industry, with its interplay between “Chineseness,” “Japanese ness,” and the more
recently emerging “Taiwaneseness,” offers a potentially fruitful opportunity for studying the use of “-ness”
terminology.

27 Appadurai argued that the “mobility and malleability” of imaginations “work across national lines to produce

28 To a certain extent, the information available to mass tourism and to backpackers is offered by different media
and accordingly each are in control of their own mediascape. In contrast to backpackers, only package tours
participants are offered a relatively well packed and sound discourse about the destinations. This does not mean
backpackers possess full agency in controlling their trips.

29 Megan Morris’s critique of the banality of cultural studies is relevant here. Fiske’s claim is somewhat
overestimated and needs to be reconsidered due to his overemphasis on resistance as well as agency of the audience.
Fiske argues the audience can have full agency, for they can always develop meaning in their own way. He seems
to celebrate resistance and the audience’s agency, though many scholars find this purported totality of agency to be
a stretch.

30 In accordance with Smith’s idea, indigenous tourism in Eastern Taiwan must be understood in its two aspects:
the mainstream discourse dominated by Han Taiwanese, and the internalization of touristic expectations by
indigenous populations, which led to in many cases to a perception of the self as the ethnic other.

31 The oral histories of individual Taiwanese ethnic groups have proven the inefficacy of the state’s efforts to
control the past.

32 In May 2007, the name of the hall was changed from the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall to the Taiwan
Democratic Memorial Hall, only to have the original name restored in September 2008. About the controversy of
renaming and its aftermath, see my other article, CHEN (2010)
Refer to my unpublished papers entitled “In Memory of Whom: Taiwan’s Sorrowful Past or Its National Hero” and “Transcending the Past: A Critical View of Politics of Forgetting in Contemporary Taiwan.”

To a certain extent, both Gao and Bruner ignore the mutual interaction between tourist expectations and tourism discourses. Gao gives little attention to the relationship between tourist and destination. In her works dealing with Japanese tourism to Machuria in the post War era, Gao adopted a methodology involving participation in tour groups. As a Chinese historian, Gao seems more interested in analyzing how the historical sites associated with Manchuguo were represented than in the perceptions and reactions of the tourists. Bruner, as part of his ethnography in Indonesia, worked for travel agencies as a local tour guide. Bruner took an active interest in the education of tourists, and consequently participated in the process of constructing knowledge of sites for tourist consumption. In Bruner’s case and others in which the roles of narrator and observer are conflated the notion of “objectivity” must be carefully considered.

As Edendor puts, “representations are disseminated by souvenirs, travel guides, postcards, photography, guidebooks, travel programmes, and in a host of popular cultural forms including televised and cinematic drama, new bulletins and life style magazines” (Eendor 1998:13).

I benefit from the documents of the Ministries of Transportation, the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, the Interchange Association Japan (IAJ, or Koryū Kyokai), Taiwan Kanko Kyokai (Taiwan Association of Tourism), the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF).

See Katakura Yoshifumi “Taiwan taiken” and Aoki Yuka “Taiwan hitori no kankōkyoku.”

In discourse model analysis, Gee asserts that these models “are theories that people hold, often unconsciously and use to make sense of the world and their experience in it.”

Macherey calls attention to the unspoken meaning hidden in texts, for “they are bound to a specific context which defines the only horizon with respect to which they can be read” (56).
CHAPTER 2
ENCOUNTERS WITH MULTIPLE IDENTITIES:
RECONFIRMING AND REDEFINING RENTONG

The term, “rentong” (認同), a Chinese translation of identity, has been a confusing
term and often given diverse meanings by different scholars. At the 2011 Conference of the
North American Taiwan Studies Association, Lin Man-Houng (林滿紅), economic historian and
former president of the ROC’s Academia Historica (國史館), opened up her keynote speech by
repeating a claim she had made in a personal conversation on Taiwan’s identity with Tu Wei-
Ming, the author of the thought-provoking yet controversial book, Living Tree: the Changing
Meaning of Being Chinese Today. Rentong, she had said, “shall simply be defined as legal
status”. This spare definition represents the emerging concern of Chinese studies scholars with
problematising the indiscriminate use of the term retong (identity), which may contain
contradictory meanings, in contemporary Taiwan, China and other Chinese diaspora locales.
When Chineseness is defined in terms of “ethnicity,” and “Taiwanese” is seen as its opposite,
this term has become increasingly problematic.

In the Chinese usage, cultural identity (文化認同) is frequently presumed inseparable
from national identity (國家認同). Taiwan’s “ethnicity,” oftentimes described as
“Taiwanese” is thus stripped of its complexity and limited to a purely nationalist claim that
denies Taiwan’s “Chineseness.” As scholars who engaged in debates over “Chineseness” in the so-called “Chinese diaspora” have shown, identity is ingrained and thereby inextricable from its context and indelibly associated with its relation to China (Clayton 2010:17-20; Ang 2001; Shin 2003). This Chineseness in Taiwan is never independent from, and has to be interpreted within, the contested reality of Taiwan’s post-colonial, post-Cold War situation. In short the varied identity issues of Taiwan, if not too oversimplified, reflect Taiwan’s imaginings of and relationship with China and change accordingly whenever these imaginings transform.

Insofar as rentong and its concomitant issues cannot be extricated from and thereby understood without its context, it is essential to read through various encounters and then examine how different identities interplay within them. Although this analysis benefits from Dorinne Kondo’s post-structural subjectivity, which signifies the shifting meaning of I/eye, I suggest that the omnipresent “I” may trivialize the proposed ethnography and limit a larger investigation of social imaginations (Knodo1990: 3). Therefore, I chose to focus on significant encounters in the field with the intention of analyzing how multiple identities were interpreted. Each encounter suggests multiple negotiation processes through diverse trajectories and thus offers a lot for researchers to observe, interpret, and negotiate with their own identities. I thus have two aims in this chapter. First, by tracing the transformation of the “Cultural China” ideology, I would like to illustrate the loosening control of KMT’s nationalizing culture project as well as the interactions among discourses of Taiwanese ethnicity. In later chapters, increasing interventions from the marketplace (businesses) will be examined using the case of Taiwan’s tourist businesses. The respective quests of Japanese and Chinese tourists have made Taiwan tourism a prime site to observe diverse and contested plays of ethnicity. In the second half, I intend to analyze my own subjective experience of identities negotiated within specific contexts.
I focus on confrontations and negotiations of the three major identities of which I was constantly aware during my fieldwork: a citizen of Taiwan (the Republic of China), a researcher trained in American universities, and a licensed tour guide in the Taiwan tourism industry. These encounters represent my attempt to reinterpret these identity negotiations in a grander setting.

**Transformation of “Cultural China” Ideology**

I have traced the transformation of discourses of “Chineseness” and the ceaseless debates over Taiwan’s cultural identity since the 1970s, and attempted to understand these discourses throughout the transnational social imaginaries in East Asia. As a departure from previous research focused on bilateral relations in East Asia, I would like to examine how discourses of “Chineseness” in Taiwan have been profoundly intertwined with Taiwan’s contemporary history. Interplays among Taiwan’s “authentic Chineseness,” “inherited Japanese,” and “newly-coined Taiwaneseness” drawn from the diverse social imaginaries of East Asia, have shaped the cultural identity of the Taiwanese. Therefore, I contend that none of these identities can be understood separately from Taiwan’s historical background. Different from the diasporic concept of “Chineseness” that argues for the decentralization of the notion of Chineseness, I intend to historicize the transformation of discourses of ethnicity in Taiwan. Moreover I will attempt to interpret these interplays among the different forms of “Chineseness” against the extreme ends of the spectrum: identification with “cultural China” versus the nativist claim of “Taiwaneseness” (Tu 1994, 1996). Secondly, I will closely examine contemporary issues of “Chineseness” and cultural identity in Taiwan in order to understand how these have been shaped by the transnational social imaginaries of East Asia.

**“Cultural China” and “Chineseness” in Taiwan**
Though the postmodern concept of “rupture” argues for a clear differentiation from the past and emphasizes the nature of the past’s unevenness and discontinuity, I assert that whether the focus is on “discontinuity” or “continuity,” Raymond Williams’ concept of “the residual” continues to apply to Taiwan. Within Taiwan, the concept of residual culture is useful in understanding how Taiwan’s “Chineseness” has been conveyed and transformed in past decades. To understand the debates over cultural identity in contemporary Taiwan, one must be familiar with the gradual marginalization of the “cultural China” discourse proposed in Tu Wei-Ming’s edited volume, *Living Tree: the Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (Tu, 1994). The once prevalent concept of “cultural China,” constructed in the 1980s around the idea of “Chineseness,” has ceded its dominance and assumed a “residual” position in Taiwan. According to Tu’s theory, “cultural China” represents an alternative to “the Chinese culture residing in China” and a decentralizing effort to separate “Chineseness” from a geographical China, thus allowing the people of the Chinese diaspora to assert an authentic “Chineseness” (1994). Tu supports his theory by persuasively arguing that Communist China has destroyed its cultural traditions during the Cultural Revolution. Given Taiwan’s gradually weakening claim to its authentic “Chineseness,” the transformation of the “cultural China” ideology does not appear in Tu’s binary view, which regards Taiwan’s Taiwanese and Chineseness as opposites.  

The transformation of the “cultural China ideology” has not been a homogenous and linear process; rather, it has been an oblique, gradual change of the dominant ideology into the residual. I contend that the “cultural China,” although having slowly yielded to the cultural construction of Taiwanese, still has significant impact on Taiwan’s contemporary social, economic, and political transformation. The ambivalent “Chineseness” as it is presented in these debates is often oversimplified in the same way as is Taiwan’s relationship to the PRC.
Whenever Taiwan, the ROC, encounters the other China, the PRC, these issues erupt in the form of debates over its ethnicity and cultural identity struggles. Japan, too, is drawn into the “Chineseness” question for its role as former colonizer, invader, and Other in nationalist discourse. When considering Taiwan’s ethnicity, the French social scientist Steven Corcuff persuasively argues that both reactions to the outside and its imagination of Chineseness have developed within the framework of Nationalist rule. Corcuff writes: “The ethnicity of Taiwan formed not only in response to ‘foreign’ domination and early nationalist misrule culminating in the February 28 Incident, but also from a specific, exclusively Nationalist imagination of what it meant to be Chinese and a rejection of an authoritarian rule viewed as being imposed from outside” (Corcuff 2002: XV).

Despite frequent challenges by the PRC since Taiwan’s withdrawal from the UN in 1971 and the normalization of relations between the PRC and United States, the fundamental challenges to Taiwan’s “Chineseness” since the late 1980s have been internal (Hsiau 2000; Liao 2000). The identity crisis in Taiwan has largely focused on Taiwan’s “Chineseness,” or “zhongguo xing,” although elements of “Taiwaneseness” and “Japaneseness” have also been involved. Over the past three decades, discourse has often been structured as domestic, binary and oppositional “Chineseness” versus “Taiwaneseness.” This has led to an unfortunate misunderstanding of Taiwanese identity struggles and a zero-sum political game, with no clear assessment of Taiwan’s hybridity, which resulted from the merging of colonizer and colonized cultures, as represented by Homi Bhabha (1995). Before directly delving into the issue of identity struggles, it may be helpful to understand this hybridity by looking at debates between
two camps of scholars and intellectuals over whether Taiwan in the 1990s was in a “postmodern” or “postcolonial” situation.

Of key concern was whether the Taiwan of the 1990s was in a position of “postcoloniality” or “postmodernity, with many scholars debating whether colonialism had truly ended, or whether Taiwan had surpassed modernity and was prepared for postmodernity. Yet the debate was not limited to these questions alone. There were many different voices in the postcolonial camp (Liao 2000; Liu 2006) over the extent to which postcolonial struggles would continue, for “internal colonization still remain[ed] in gender, class, and race (ethnicity)” (Chen 2002). However, as Chen Kuan-Hsin (Ibid.) has argued, it is still too early to argue that Taiwan can be considered a postmodern society on the basis of the immature capitalism that took root in the 1990s. These debates resulted in a break within the postcolonial camp: for some postcolonial intellectuals, the postcolonial missions are more than resistance against colonization by foreign regimes (including Japan, the KMT and American Cold War dominance). Other postcolonial scholars argued that replacing ROC-centered nationalism with a Taiwanese nationalism still constituted oppression by Han Taiwanese, a continuing effort to colonize Taiwan’s diverse ethnic groups internally—for this reason subsequent calls to embrace “Taiwaneseness” have been considered dangerous and chauvinistic (Ibid). These mutual accusations, leveled in the course of “postmodern/postcolonial” debates, were instigated by the journal Chungwai Wenxue (中外文學) but immediately came to the attention of Taiwanese society as a whole, and have been employed as political weapons by the island’s two major political parties, the KMT and the DPP (Chiu 2003; Liao 1992; Liao 2000). Terminology used in the debates was appropriated for later political use, and constituted a major dividing point separating two political parties, which
can be roughly categorized as KMT and DPP advocates, or the advocates in favor of reunification and those in favor of independence. Accordingly, concerns with decolonization or liberation have shifted from issues of Taiwan’s ethnicity to that of cultural identity and the problematic formation of an exclusive national identity. As happened in the postmodern/postcolonial debates amongst intellectuals over Taiwan’s literature and contemporary society of the 1990s, the political charges of China-chauvinism (a China-centered view) and Holo-chauvinism (a Holo Taiwanese-centered view) are now leveled against the opposition. The former claim criticizes “Waisheng” populations, who regard themselves as forced migrants, for their unsettled mentality, while the latter criticizes the “Bensheng,” mainly the Holo (Minnan) dialect speaking population, for attempting to erase the “Waisheng” from Taiwan’s new ethnic map and suppressing other ethnic groups such as the Haka and indigenous Taiwanese. The question, then, moves from that of ethnicity to cultural identity.

The perennial question remains, “Are Taiwanese Chinese?” (Brown 2004). This question in itself raises other issues. Does “Chineseness” matter, and why does this question take on greater significance in Taiwan than in other Chinese diasporic communities? Though identity is in essence evanescent and mercurial, why do the Taiwanese persist in struggling for a static identity? To answer these questions, one must consider ethnicity, and the competing claims for “Chineseness,” “Taiwaneseness,” and “Japaneseness,” historically. Neither an emphasis on “shifting ethnicity” nor on the “hybridity” of ethnicity could provide a persuasive explanation for Taiwan’s ongoing struggles with cultural identity, for Bhabha’s claim of “hybridity” seems to suggest a homogenous appearance of ethnicity, and the diasporic claim of “shifting identity” neglects psychology and the desire to have a fixed identity. The debates over the cultural
identity of overseas Chinese call to mind the scholarly critique on “Chineseness” by Rey Chow, Ien Ang, and Allen Chun (Ang 1998; Chow 1993; Chun 1996). These scholars individually problematize “Chineseness” around Tu Wei-Ming’s concept of “cultural China.” The shared goal of decentralizing “Chineseness,” especially for Chun and Ang, seems to overemphasize the issues of unfixed ethnicity and shifting “Chineseness.” Shih Su-Mei sees as problematic the idea of undifferentiated hybridity and argues that heterogeneity and multiplicity need to be historical and situated (Shih 2007:7).

As evident in current debates concerning Taiwan’s cultural identities, Tu’s concept of "cultural China" is still an influential concept in Taiwan, though functioning in a transformed way. The overt focus on a supposed cultural malleability may disguise the fact that this very malleability is the critical factor in Taiwanese claims to identification with particular moments and identities. Though it is true that identification as Chinese and cultural identification with “Chineseness” is a political position (Zhang 1995:7), we must still examine the motivations behind these “shifts” and this hybridity. I contend that failing to grasp the shifting meanings of “Chineseness” at different periods in the contemporary context is problematic. Chun’s dismissive article on “Chineseness” emerged from his examination of varying “Chineseness” in diverse contexts. Ang embraced an ultimately de-centered attitude toward “Chineseness.” Though applying perfectly to their case studies, neither of their findings can represent the process of shifting “Chineseness”—rather than to reaffirm its shifting nature, the more important point of “shifting Chineseness” is to understand how it has shifted. That is, “Chineseness” can only be situated and contextualized within different contexts, and “Chineseness” thus carries significant and relative meanings, particularly for those wishing to identify their ethnicity. The
relevance of ethnicity to identity allows it to continue to function. Without this relevance “Chineseness” would be nothing but a limiting and useless academic term, as scholars have argued. It is only by contextualizing discussions about “Chineseness” and uncovering the motivations behind claims to Chineseness that we may understand why “Chineseness” is still a critical issue to many Taiwanese today.

Before moving to a discussion of why Tu’s “cultural China” has become an influential concept, invisible but still powerful today, I wish to point out that while Rey Chow’s critique (1993) is an inspired tool for understand the motivation of Tu’s recentralization of “Chineseness,” it is yet insufficient to explain Taiwan’s “inbetweenness” as well as its earlier intention to retain its claim to being part of “authentic China,” in contrast to the other Chinese diaspora. In her critiques, Chow (1993:39-41) asserts that Tu’s “cultural China” seeks to dislocate “Chineseness” from mainland China (PRC) and relocate it in Taiwan, Hong Kong and other Chinese diasporic locations, reflecting Tu’s political beliefs as an anti-communist.8 Focusing on Taiwan (Republic of China)’s exclusive claim over Chineseness, I suggest that if Tu’s “cultural China” model cannot be suited to certain Chinese diasporic locales such as Hong Kong or Macau, it at the very least persuasively explains Taiwan’s official attitude toward “Chineseness” on the basis of the KMT’s Chinese nationalism project imposed in Taiwan. Only in contextualizing Tu’s concept in the late 1980s and early 1990s, one may find that the emergence of “cultural China” was not a coincidence but was created to respond to the challenges from the PRC. Since the 1950s, debates have raged between the two Chinas over who inherited the Chinese legacy (daotong) and who possesses Chinese culture. In another words, which, of the two, is the more representative and authentic China? When the concept of
“cultural China” emerged, its advocates did not attempt to speak to or for the Chinese diaspora but for the “authentic China,” the ROC, in Taiwan, while the population of mainland China experienced the violence of the Cultural Revolution. The goal is to preserve and pass down Chinese tradition. Rejecting this overemphasis on the shifting nature of ethnicity, I am rather concerned with why and out of which context “cultural China” was created. One must not forget that “cultural China” is not a fabrication but a discourse created in response to the crisis of “Chinesness.” Rooted in Neo-Confucianism tradition, Tu’s anti-communist stance explains his advocacy for the concept of “cultural China” as a replacement for PRC “Chineseness.” In other words, by introducing “cultural China,” Tu wished to shake the once-centered “Chineseness” utilizing a stance similar to the diasporic perspective. In this sense, Tu never gave up on “authentic Chineseness” but rather attempted to ease the anxiety of losing control of “Chineseness” to the PRC by intentionally displacing PRC-centered “Chineseness” discursively. This emphasizing and nationalizing of Chineseness in Taiwan thus generated the “cultural China ideology” that has been habituated to and structured Taiwanese minds.

**Embodiment and Transformation of Cultural China**

The issue of “authentic China” finds its parallel in the post-World War II history of Taiwan. Before the 1960s, the National Cultural Association had been established to defend Chinese tradition, in contrast to the PRC’s mass destruction of Chinese tradition and historical relics. Since the normalization of relations between the US and the PRC in the 1970s, the notion of the ROC (Taiwan) as the only and legitimate representative of authentic China has collapsed. Two China(s), the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the ROC (Republic of China), therefore continue to claim authority and compete with one another over Chinese
tradition and legitimacy. Accordingly, Taiwan deployed “cultural China” as a discursive weapon to counter against the PRC’s gradually increasing claims to “Chineseness.” “Authentic Chineseness” was critical to the Kuomintang (KMT) regime as well as to the ROC Taiwan of the 80s and early 90s, representing a continuation of the Chinese tradition in Taiwan. This idea of sustaining true Chinese tradition continues, however, to influence many older and middle-aged Taiwanese, who accepted the KMT’s patriotic education over the past few decades, believing Taiwan to be the “real China,” where “authentic Chineseness” persists and the Chinese tradition continues.12 To Tu and the KMT, it is only through the emancipation of “Chineseness” from the geographical entity of mainland China that the ROC (Taiwan) may assert its exclusive possession of “Chineseness.” Tu’s “cultural China,” if not embraced by other Chinese diaspora, still exists in Taiwan.

After his research trip to Taiwan, the Chinese scholar Hai Ren wrote a paragraph about his perception of Taiwan’s “Chineseness.”

The histories and cultures of aboriginal peoples and the Taiwanese both were constructed and reconstructed within the notion of “Chinese culture.” Taiwan was represented as belonging neither to the aboriginal people nor to the Taiwanese but to the Chinese. This representation has happened worldwide. Euro-Americans, for example, as they could not go to China to study Chinese cultures from 1949 to the late 1970s, studied cultures in Taiwan as Chinese cultures. For them, Taiwanese cultures not only reflected Chinese cultures but were hyper-really Chinese cultures—being made into Chinese cultures. Taiwan’s differences from China have become a signifier for internal diversity or variations within a singular “Chinese” culture. [Hai Ren 1996: 93]

From a US-based Chinese scholar and a “communist bandit” perspective, which he used to mark his subject position and how he has been perceived on sites, Hai Ren summarized the suppressed representations of other ethnicities within Taiwan under the banner of Chineseness to serve specific political purposes.13 Taiwan’s “hyper-really” Chineseness, as he termed Taiwan’s
cultural identity and its representations, has been reorganized and narrated with a tone that emphasizes “authentic Chinese culture” in Taiwan, and accordingly underrepresents other ethnicities.

As discussed above, Taiwan has persistently betrayed an anxiety and desire to replace China as the center of Chinese culture. As analyzed in the article entitled “Taiwan and the Impossibility of Chinese” (1996), Hai Ren sees KMT’s nationalizing Chineseness project as having been gradually undermined and replaced by the nationalizing Taiwanese culture project. This transformation prevents Taiwan from continuing to claim to be the other China. In responding to the Communist China’s Cultural Revolution in 1966, Taiwan initiated the Chinese Culture Restoration Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong 中華文化復興運動) in 1966 through the Association of Chinese Cultural Restoration Movement (Zhonghua wenhua fuxing yundong weiyuanhui 中華文化復興運動總會), later renamed in 1990 as the National Cultural Association (Guojia wenhua zhonghui 國家文化總會) and in 2006 as General Association of Chinese Culture (Zhonghua wenhua zhonghui 中華文化總會), for which Chiang Kai-Shek served as the first president. Although its goals transform along with social and political changes, the major goal was to preserve “Chineseness.” However, this dominant view has been challenged together by anti-authoritarian and other social movements since the 1980s, when Taiwanese populations who experienced the February 28th incident and White Terror resisted the prevailing China discourse and sought an alternative identity for Taiwan (Corcuff 2002; Hsiau 2000).
Despite the concept of “Chineseness” having lost some of its charm for the Taiwanese, Taiwan continues to claim cultural superiority to the PRC. Taiwanese discourse asserts that Taiwan preserves more authentic Chinese culture than the mainland (Dalu) does, though this rhetoric seems to be waning\textsuperscript{16}. The focus on “Chineseness” seems to be giving way to emerging “Taiwaneseness” in dominant cultural discourses since 1990s. However, the Chinese-centered discourse still has strong historical roots and functions as “the residual.” The perception that the PRC irrevocably destroyed its own Chineseness persists in contemporary Taiwan. This belief purports to substantiate the Taiwanese claim of cultural superiority to the PRC. This attitude might be seen as a version of the “primary nationalism” that Yoshino (1992:32-3) has identified as one of two types of nationalism, the upside-down and vice versa -- an early upside-down form of nationalism that later was consumed and diversified into a variety of attitudes toward China\textsuperscript{17}. In general, this cultural China ideology has influenced the Taiwanese so that the population, whether “Bengsheng” (本省, the Han Chinese population residing in Taiwan prior to 1949), or “Waisheng,” (外省, the Chinese population which retreated to Taiwan with the KMT after 1949) widely regard mainland Chinese as latecomers to East Asian modernity\textsuperscript{18}. I will discuss later that how this view shapes tourist representations for Chinese tourists.

To face increasing challenges from the “other” China and consolidate the KMT legitimacy in Taiwan in 1990s, the terms “New Taiwanese” and “New Taiwanese consciousness” were coined by the first Taiwanese (Taiwan-born) president, Lee Teng-Hui (李登輝), in hopes of including collectively the “Waisheng,” the “Bensheng”, and the indigenous
population (Corcuff 2002; Wang 2003; Zhang 1993, 1999). This movement, however, did not successfully achieve its multiculturalist goal, and resulted in a confrontation between the Benshang and Waisheng populations. As Chen points out the movements produced two conflicting ideologies, and caused the very inability to achieve so-called “great conciliation” between the two ethnic groups. These historically rooted attitudes revolving around “Chineseness” remained unresolved and thwarted the notion of “Taiwaneseness.” Divided or not, the discourse does draw a clear line between “Taiwaneseness” and “Chineseness.” The purpose is to eliminate the middle ground and “in-betweeness” in Taiwan, and the two sides accused each other of “tearing up the homogenous ethnicity (shilei zuqun 撕裂族群)” and provoking ethnic confrontation. Such a polarized framework applied to a nationalizing culture project has not only made ethnicity in Taiwan an oversimplified concept, if not a homogenous one, but also abetted the underrepresentation of indigenous populations, already ancillary to the Han majority. Without carefully scrutinizing this transformation, one may overlook the residual Chineseness preexisting in the emerging Taiwaneseness. It would be difficult or even impossible to demarcate Taiwaneseness without transgressing the boundary set for Chineseness. Treating Taiwaneseness as opposed to Chinesness can only derail discussions of Taiwan’s ethnicity into a binary and polarized opposition as misleadingly portrayed in another of Tu’s articles (1996:1132-3), in which Tu sustains an oppositional binary that oversimplifies Taiwan identity as associated exclusively with the Japan complex. And the dynamics and interactions among Taiwan, China, Japan, and the USA are overlooked in such analyses. Just as Raymond Williams sees “the residual” as occupying an essential role in social transformation, what deserves our concentrated
attention here is the how Chineseness has shaped the internal processes of many Taiwanese even while they view China as external to themselves.

From Identity to Ideology: Internalizing Cultural China

We must return to the notion of “cultural China” and attempt to explain why this concept remains influential, or at least functional, in contemporary Taiwan. The concept “cultural China” manifested itself in a cultural superiority toward mainland China. Applying Althusser’s famous concept (1989) of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), and introducing Yoshino Kosaku’s framework of primary nationalism to an understanding of KMT patriotic education and propaganda since the 1950s, the “Waisheng” and “Bensheng” populations were both exposed to the same Cold War ideology and developed a repugnance toward communism and communist China as anti-human, in contrast to the capitalist and humane Taiwan. Though now framed differently, this ideology still functions effectively amongst contemporary Taiwanese. Although it may vary in individual cases, to many independence supporters, China is the less developed and culturally inferior Other, while to many unification supporters, China represents the less developed homeland with its decadent “Chineseness.” In terms of East Asian modernization, China is still seen as the late-comer to global capitalism, in spite of its thriving economy. In the minds of both Taiwanese and Japanese, a cultural hierarchy ranking the West/Japan/Taiwan/China persists. As a place of intersection for Taiwanese, Japanese, and mainland Chinese alike, Taiwan’s culture represents a contested field for diverse issues of cultural identity as well as of East Asian modernity.

Anxiety and Desires toward China
“Zhongguo Xue” (China Studies) in Taiwan might still be new and not well developed. After only 15 years of democratization of the country without freedom of thought and of speech, Taiwan’s “national misunderstanding [toward China]” is inevitably ingrained in its national discourses that are used to serve its national goals. By virtue of the long term interactions and profound relations between Taiwan and China, “China Studies” shall be of Taiwan’s great advantage in international competitions, or of Taiwan’s responsibility as a member of international communities. [Wu 2011:i]

This short paragraph appeared in one Taiwan’s best-selling books, entitled “Peinizou zongguo” (陪你走中國 The Heart of China: A Journey of Love from Father to Son). This brief example reveals the mentality prevalent in Taiwanese society. The Taiwanese trend toward and desire for rediscovery of China through the new scope reflected in this book may help us to scrutinize how China is understood, misunderstood and imagined in contemporary Taiwan. Written in the style of a father-son conversation, “Peinizou zhongguo” (陪你走中國) was Wu’s most recent writing project after a trilogy set in Finland, Ireland, and Norway. Wu’s new book reflects the increasing and widespread anxiety of Taiwan, and its great desire to understand China while facing its rise (Wu 2011). This book discloses Taiwan’s anxiety and desires in two ways. First, it understands communist China as Taiwan’s “former enemy” in light of its recent economic development. Second, as a member of the international community, Taiwan cannot be left out of China’s development and shall take the leading role as part of this change. Therefore, it is with these conditions in mind that we attempt to understand the anxiety and desire of the Taiwanese. In such circumstances, transformation and negotiation of identities have to be considered along with the so called “cultural China” ideology and its implication in contemporary Taiwan. In Taiwan, demystification of the Nationalist regime and increasing across-Strait communication have given the young generation ample opportunity to recognize the differences between China and Taiwan. Unlike the elder generation’s knowledge about China,
learned from Taiwan’s earlier textbooks and now only “history” to PRC citizens, “China” is more accessible to Taiwan’s younger generation. And popular media also provide effective ways to imagine the real China, rather than the imagined and lost China. However the clear-cut oppositional binary found in politics, between Taiwanese consciousness and that of a great China, concealed what in reality occurs in Taiwan, namely the residual of “cultural China.” Competing for being the only representative of Chinese culture and later for being the core of Chinese civilization, both Taiwan and China have formed a national discourse concerning “Chineseness.” Although Taiwan has gradually developed its indigenous identities to resist the overarching claim of Chineseness, cultural China is not wiped out but rather inhabits covertly.

Differences are extremely restricted within the political languages between polities, namely the KMT and CCP. In short, the fine line between the Communist Party’s PRC and Kuomintang’s ROC was portrayed as the two Chinas under two polities. Serving the national building projects of each side, differences have to be manipulated and operated within one China ideology. Stevan Harrell in *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan* cogently points out the nature of identity as fluid and multivalent but also argues that the nation-state tends to “hide the history of negotiation behind the narrative of unfolding” (1996: 6) in order to promote nationalism and patriotism. When identity transformation is mentioned, Taiwan’s identity is oftentimes presented as holistic and opposed without further considering “the residual” that exists in between. In addition, cultural identity and national identity are utilized indiscriminately. That being said, regardless of the multi-faceted cultural identities of the Taiwanese, their national identity has been predetermined and divided into the two genres of Taiwan and of China. In Taiwan, the influential cultural China ideology, whether the Taiwanese are aware of it or not, has structured their thoughts and imaginations.
The impact of competition over authentic Chineseness persists today not only in mass media but also the intra-Asian tourism which is the subject of my ethnography, where I found a strong tendency of the Taiwanese to claim cultural superiority over China. Such assertions can frequently be heard at certain Taiwanese destinations, in particular at the Palace Museum and temples; Taiwan is introduced as the guard and preserver of “Chinese tradition.” The remaining cultural China ideology thus distinguishes Taiwan from other Chinese diaspora. Yet, though Taiwan and China still struggle to assert dominance in the binary that exclusively defines the core and periphery of Chinese culture, one may find Taiwan is neither one nor the other, but situated in between. While China is enthusiastically exerting its soft power all over the world, Taiwan has been gradually phased out of the core, the center of Chineseness as once claimed by the Neoconfucism scholars. However, the Taiwanese hardly regard themselves as a Chinese diaspora. This competitive relationship was frequently visible in my fieldwork in East Asia from August 2009 to May 2011—especially when Taiwan is compared to China. In latter paragraphs, I expect to present multiple types of identity negotiation. First, I will reflect upon my interviews and encounters in China from a subjective position. Secondly, from the standpoint of a “half” outsider I will analyze how the tour guides establish the bridge between tourists and the destination. During both types of participant observation I was perpetually anxious and uncertain about how to present my identity. Moreover I found myself perplexed by the cultural China ideology but at the same time took advantage of it in order to avoid the expected embarrassment when being asked about my identity.

**Voyage of Identity Negotiation**
As stated in the beginning, my analysis will focus on the encounters that I had in the field. Given the very complexity of identities in Taiwan, I do not intend to extrapolate single individual encounters which I observed into larger universalisms, given that identities often appear static and single encounters carry too little information to judge the processes of negotiation.

Although this fieldwork was not my first time visiting China, I was not expecting the level of “cultural shock” I experienced, and the concomitant process of constantly reorganizing my identity. Before leaving for China, I felt myself to be informed about and at least minimally exposed to the PRC’s “Chinese culture,” in the form of Chinese media products as well as ethnographies about China, whether from school or daily life. Also as a researcher, based on my previous fieldwork experiences in Taiwan and Japan I was confident of possessing sufficient field skills to conduct the proposed work. It was not until I arrived in Beijing and initiated my fieldwork that I realized the extent of China’s love/hate relationship with Taiwan and Taiwan’s with Dalu (the Chinese mainland). I had never imagined that these mutual imaginations could discourage me as much as they did, and that they would be the greatest obstacles to overcome in the beginning of my research. However, not being evident on the surface of my interviews and interactions, this tension cannot be clearly perceived. In this sense, my ethnographic experience also confirmed my great concerns about the researcher’s subjective position and identity work in the field-- subjective experiences of researchers could shape their perceptions in the field. And more importantly this subjective position says a lot, when working on topics concerning China and Chinese culture, for Taiwanese writers and researchers. They are more or less constantly anxious in dealing with the “cultural China ideology.” This subjective position thus sharply distinguishes these researchers from those from China or Chinese diaspora. While “Chineseness” is discussed in this context, we must not forget to pay special attention to the
author, because the subjective position of the Taiwanese is in fact in between: neither fully recognizing its Chineseness nor capable of shedding it. In particular, the situation becomes more complicated when cultural identity and national identity are treated as the same in some conversations with informants.

My Taiwan Problem

In Aug 2009, I participated in the UH-Peking exchange program to conduct my fieldwork in China. This fieldwork experience was unique not only because this arrangement differed from my previous fieldwork in Japan and Taiwan but also, as we will see, because this upset my presumptions about my interactions with the Chinese, or at least within so-called Chinese culture. Wandering around the campus of Peking University during my first day’s visit, I appreciated the grandeur of this campus where the May Fourth Movement originated, the modernization movement led by Chinese intellectuals in contemporary China. In this mindset I created my own personal imaginary, grouping myself in with those ambitious Chinese intellectuals of the early Nationalist period in early 1920s who played significant roles in this modernization project. Beida’s international office was my first destination, to obtain an authorized school ID that would allow me access to school resources. Two staff members were awaiting me. After a short but warm greeting, I introduced myself as the visiting scholar from Hawaii, in Beijing to do my research on cross-Strait tourism.

The first problem I encountered was the school ID application form. While filling out the form for visiting researchers at Beida, I was asked by the staff to present my passport for photocopying. I took my passport out of my backpack and handed it over to the young staff member. As he picked up my passport, we simultaneously registered his error: my distinctive
green passport, emblazoned in gold letters with “Republic of China” on the first line and “Taiwan” below, is not recognized and thus ineffective in China. The young man should have asked me to present a Taiwan Compatriot Travel Certification (Taibo ID 台胞證). He blushed with embarrassment at this unexpected encounter with the “other China.” The young staff member, I realized, had not known my status and presumably expected a US passport from a researcher arriving from the US. Although I had contacted their supervisor several times beforehand to discuss my visa issues, the young man was apparently not informed that Mr. Chen would be a “Taiwan compatriot.” The senior staff then jumped in and asked for my Taiwan Compatriot Travel Certification, the officially authorized travel documents which allow Taiwanese to travel within Chinese territory.

Figure 2.1 Beida ID that indicates my origin as “Zhongguo Taiwan” (left) and travel document for “Taiwan compatriot.”(right)
Sources: Chien-Yuan CHEN
There were more awkward moments later when I was asked to fill out the columns on my Beida ID, in which ID holders are asked to identify their “origin.” I was quite debating whether I should simply write down “Taiwan” in the blank, as I ordinarily do wherever I travel. Yet considering that “Taiwan” may connote a separatist stance and might have become an obstacle disturbing my research afterward, I decided not to touch the sensitive nerve but leave it blank. The young staff member sensed my discomfort this time and approached me, saying, “Please don’t make things difficult for us, and just fill in ‘Zhongguo Taiwan’ here” (不要為難我了，這裡就填中國台灣). This latter phrase literally means “China’s Taiwan,” and this was my first personal experience with the use of this national possessive in front of “Taiwan.” I realized only later during my fieldwork that the more interviews I conducted, the more I would have to negotiate around this issue of “China’s Taiwan.” The possessive expression reflects a certain ideology that is being internalized by many PRC citizens, which I will further discuss in later chapters. In the case of my ID paperwork, being politically correct and insisting upon the “one China” policy is, at least on the surface, the first reaction and first priority for staff members when encountering the “Taiwanese.”

On the whole, my status as a “Taiwanese compatriot” brought less trouble and inconvenience than I expected. It was sometimes a useful social lubricant in opening up a conversation with strangers. For some people living in northern China, a Taiwanese accent is little different from those who have travelled from the southern provinces. For example, in metropolitan Beijing, with my southern accent, I was merely recognized as a “waideren” (外地人, non-local and non-indigenous) -- an out-of-province traveler from Fujian or
In this regard, I was treated normally and sometimes disinterestedly until someone with an interest in Taiwan, usually through Taiwanese drama or mass media products, noticed the Taiwan-unique phrases that unconsciously rolled off of my tongue. Most of the time, the Chinese affinity toward Taiwan in fact helped me to open up a conversation and thereby facilitated my investigation of their imaginings about Taiwan. My unique placement, however, was a constant reminder of the ambiguous legal status which differed so from others’. My third visit to the office was to request a letter with the head officer’s signature, which is required for the application for visa extension. After exchanging greetings, the senior staff member produced the document in question, a routine form for international scholars and students. But a thought brought the man to an abrupt halt. He had only to press the head officer’s stamp to the form, and I would possess the letter demonstrating my affiliation with Beida. Stamp in hand, the man hesitated, then laid it aside. He decided to make a phone call instead. I later realized the phone call was made to the office of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (港澳台辦公室), which is in charge of Chinese people who affiliate with Beida and hold Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau passports. I, as a Taiwan compatriot, should be assigned to this office, but the American institute where I receive my education categorizes me as international, thus placing me under the supervision of the international office.

Because the two offices ordinarily perform their business separately based on the nationality of students, my appearance in the international office caused a stir. The international office staff was afraid to improperly issue a letter to this Taiwanese, yet the other office was reluctant to intercede in international office business. The slippage between the de facto territory and the claimed territory created this ambivalent position for me. This small anecdote is
emblematic of China’s strong intentions to retain Taiwanese citizens in the imposed category of “us” as Chinese citizens. However, this fixed category erases the possibility of differences between Taiwan and the “China mainland.” In my case, as a non-U.S. citizen who was yet under the supervision of the international office, I upset their common sense understandings about national boundaries.

**Reflections from the Field**

Because of the open structure interviews that I adopted, my informants, out of great curiosity about Taiwan, often asked many questions about what they had seen and experienced during their trips. They also found interesting representations of Taiwan in Taiwan’s trendy dramas that have become popular in the PRC. As a researcher aiming to investigate their social imaginaries, I was extremely cautious not to play an overly active role in directing their interpretations of destinations. However, as a “Taiwan compatriot” in this context, I was expected to go beyond the rapport between the interviewer and interviewee and fulfill a role created by the PRC sense of affinity toward Taiwan. Also, because I was supposed to know Taiwan better than any of them, I was expected to clarify points about which they were curious and to provide persuasive explanation, namely on cultural and national identity of the Taiwanese and differences between China and Taiwan. Whenever I was asked to answer their questions, I had to search my brain to find the “safe” answer among my different identities as researcher of Taiwan studies, as a student under KMT patriotism education, as an ROC Taiwan citizen and so on. In the following interviews, I developed a feasible strategy to present a “Chineseness in common” at the outset and ensure this would not change the nuanced interactions between my informants and me.
In my research on Chinese imagination to Taiwan, most of my informants demonstrated great interest in Taiwan and in my motivations for conducting such a survey. The elder and middle age generations were quite wary of my intentions and provided relatively “safe” and propagandic information about Taiwan. Through conversations, I found that a widespread, stereotypical image of Taiwan has been firmly rooted in many minds. During the interviews, both sides struggled to find the proper vocabulary not to trespass boundaries imposed by political reality. In contrast to the elder Chinese, interviews with the young population, those born after the 1980s in particular, presented diverse ideas about Taiwan. Raised as the post eighties (八零後) and deeply saturated with Taiwanese popular culture, historical familiarity is not their only motivation. Also, as a Taiwanese in the field, I largely benefitted from the claim of shared Chineseness between Taiwan and China, but this assumed cultural familiarity in turn challenged me as an anthropologist in the field.

In some conversations concerning Taiwan tourism, I had to be very careful about my responses due to this presumed mutual imagination. If I was interested in the nuances of their perceptions and conveyed this interest, I was immediately asked to explain how the Taiwanese would react to their statements. They largely enjoyed the different customs and cultural practices of Taiwan, but not all of them were capable of appreciating different cultural identities. Based on my observations, although perceptions may vary, it seems cultural difference between “the mainland” and Taiwan is recognized and is considered greater than the provincial and regional, but is not elevated to the status of “national.” What made this difference was the Chiang’s KMT administration. Under the same Chinese culture umbrella, Taiwan’s previous claim on possessing “authentic Chineseness” has in turn become the most solid evidence of this
inseparable relationship. On such occasions, in order not to offend my informants I had to pay great attention to the fine differences “within” Chinese culture. Therefore, I was always in a state of anxiety over how to present myself. I was constantly troubled by the extent to which I should reveal my identity in the field. Recognizing my ambivalent and tenuous position, particularly in light of my investigations of Chinese imaginings of Taiwan, I began to proclaim my research harmless in advance of the interviews. As stated previously, the cultural China ideology can be merely seen as cultural identity but it can be also interpreted as a mixture of cultural and national identity in terms of Taiwan’s pro-unification identity. The more I interviewed, the more I found myself focused on the thesis that the ROC (Taiwan) preserves the “essential Chineseness,” which also constitutes the main attraction for Chinese tourists. Their interpretation of Taiwan’s Chineseness indeed helps to facilitate conversations about their encounters in Taiwan. I also realized that, after the formal body of the interview, most of my interviewees would inquire about my identity, namely national identity. To prevent my identity from becoming an obstacle to further investigation, I developed an approach which focused on aspects of Taiwan influenced by Chinese culture. When I mentioned the strong influence which the May Fourth Movement has had in Taiwan, this reference sometimes misled my informants into identifying me as a hot-blooded compatriot who dreams of a strong China.

As a Taiwan citizen conducting fieldwork in China, I was often asked about my political leanings and accordingly labeled as “Blue” or “Green” (pro-unification or pro-independence). This produced in me a great anxiousness to imply my accord with the superficial attitude of the Taiwanese government—that the Taiwanese are open for any discussion about the future of unification or independence as long as its serves its long term goals. After conducting a few interviews, it became a burden for me to maintain an innocuous posture; although the process of
creating rapport is equally important and necessary for every researcher in their field, the political realities of my position weighed heavily upon me, requiring serious consideration. At the same time it constantly challenged and sometimes reshaped my identity. I realized my identity as a Republic of China (Taiwan) citizen and my “Chineseness” would constantly make me anxious and reluctant to present my identity-- in a more concrete sense the problem lay in which identities to present, and to what extent to present them. My fieldwork experience in China prompted me to question how the binary and stereotyped thoughts of relations between China and Taiwan have preconfigured both the informants’ thoughts and mine. Their recognition of difference within similarity, reflected through the idea of one China that shares a national history, sentiments, and traditions, in turn reinforces my thoughts of “familiar strangers.”

Previous studies largely indicate that preserving the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is the most popular option among the Taiwanese (Jiang 2006; Rigger 2001), but later research also argues that “preserving the status quo” is in fact a choice after rational calculation of war and economic development and is thus problematic without further distinguishing the diverse motivations behind “the status quo” (Geng, Liu and Chen 2009). This kind of research result often serves to refute polarized identity claims between pro-unification and pro-independence in contemporary Taiwan. However, the excessive emphasis on Taiwan’s preference for maintaining the status quo also has the negative impact of obscuring our understanding of the identity transformations that have recently occurred in Taiwan (Zhang 2010). That is, recent surveys show that more and more people in Taiwan consider themselves “Taiwanese.” In failing to consider the process of identity transformation, the approach that emphasizes the status quo may assert that the preference reflects the simple and fixed basis of Taiwanese identity. And the fixed presence of identity thus leads to hasty claims of the unity of identity formation and overlooks
the negotiation process. Or due to its complexity, scholars are reluctant to give a clear definition and simply claim its heterogeneity. With the consensus that identity is hardly a singular presence, one may benefit from reexamination of “heterogeneity” in order to understand identity transformation and the complexity of multiple presences of identities in Taiwan. As reflected in my ethnographic data, it is often too complicated for the interviewees, even to a researcher such as myself, to sense and clearly tease out their multiple layered identities due to its fluid and malleable nature. In addition, as the interview and conversation goes on, it is almost impossible to constantly clarify one’s contextualized identity. Therefore, paying extra attention to identity transformation and interpretations of contextualized identity has become the first priority in my ethnography.
Notes to Chapter 2

1 I intentionally use “the other China,” ROC, and “Republic of China” interchangeably in contrast to the People’s Republic of China (the PRC and Communist China). “Taiwan” is used in a broader sense to refer to a geographical concept, in order to suggest the different identities that Taiwan and ROC imply respectively.

2 In her talk “Taiwanese Identity for the Next Generation: Where we are, how we got here, and where we are heading,” Lin first suggested that the diverse definitions of identity may obscure our understanding of Taiwan’s legal status; using only its legal status as a measure, the status of the Republic of China becomes clear. It was evident that her main argument was intended to refute the “theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan,” that claims that Taiwan became independent after 1945 Japan’s renouncement of Taiwan as a colony.

3 Tu Wei-Ming later presents this process with an oppositional binary of Chineseness and Taiwaneseness (1996:1115-40).

4 While facing a thriving China, Taiwan’s “cultural China” ideology has transformed into a position-taking. In this sense, what is essential in investigating this residual culture is not the culture itself but to ask how this residuality works, what impact the ideology carries, and who invokes it on the basis of which purposes.

5 Two prominent cases are the recurring protests in East Asia due to the Premier Minister’s controversial visits to Yasukuni Shrine as well as the territory controversy over Senkaku island.

6 Shih correctly argued “heterogeneity as an abstract concept can itself be easily universalized to avoid the hard work of having to sort it through and become instead contained by a benign logic of global multiculturalism. To activate heterogeneity and multiplicity therefore means, above all, being historical and situated, because not all multiplicities are multiple in the same way, and not all heterogeneities are heterogeneous in the same way.” (7)

7 Jingyuan Zhang cited Spivak in Postcolonial Criticism and Cultural Identity to explain the situation in East Asia (1995: 7).

8 While Tu asserts that “authentic Chineseness” can be present outside the PRC, Chow focuses on the shifting nature of Chineseness and suggests a de-centered Chineseness.
In Ang’s “On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West,” she notes “It is important to note the political implication of Tu's project. His position is known to be explicitly neo-confucianist and largely anti-communist, which we need to keep in mind in assessing his critique of 'the center’” (41).

Tu and Ang possessed seemingly similar but in fact contradictory perspectives on “Chineseness.” Despite both Tu and Ang’s concern with “decentering,” “cultural China” is not similar to Ang’s diaspora-centered claim as stated in Can one say no to Chineseness? Tu’s concept aims to decenter the PRC “Chineseness.” Unlike Tu’s “cultural China,” Ang writes, “China can no longer be limited to the more or less fixed area of its official spatial and cultural boundaries nor can it be held up as providing the authentic, authoritative, and uncontested standard for all things Chinese.” Ang continues that for diaspora, “how to determine what is and what is not Chinese has become the necessary preliminary question to ask, and an increasingly urgent one at that. This is, at least, one of the key outcomes of the emergent view from the diaspora.” I contend that Ang is correct, but only from a diasporic and decentered perspective.


The film industry in Hong Kong and Taiwan is an excellent example. By intervening in the Chinese cultural industry, Taiwan attempted to situate itself at the core of Chinese culture. The KMT has invested large sums of money in the Hong Kong film industry since the 50s and also established the Golden Horse Award (Jin-Ma Award), given to films produced in these two places of Chinese film production.

In his paper, Hai Ren raised the issue of his role as a mainlander and a “communist bandit” in the field and how this might influence his observations.

The term “Taiwanese culture,” including the cultures of the Holo, the Hakka and the indigenous population, is often seen differently. Depending on what is referenced, some see the coexistence of multiple cultures in Taiwan, while some criticize Han-Taiwanese domination.


Intriguingly, through my fieldwork, I discovered similar thoughts in turn becoming prevalent among Chinese tourists. I consider this indicative of the efforts of the PRC and their changing attitude toward Taiwan. I will further discuss this in Chapter 5.
These diverse attitudes are more complicated and contested because in Taiwan cultural identity and national identity are not necessarily aligned with each other.

Mass media and textbook representations argued that the Taiwanese experience of modernization would serve as a model for mainland China. Many works of literature from the 1980s on the subject of “returning home” represent this cultural attitude that sees China as lower in the cultural hierarchy.

I do not mean to suggest an oppositional binary between the two. Through the example of two different political positions, my intention is to demonstrate how “cultural China” as a modernity hierarchy is already imposed and influential.

The increasing numbers and influence of China’s Confucius Institutes all over the world is one of the most obvious examples.

Our similar thoughts about the difficulty in narrating “Chineseness” which we encountered in our respective projects concerning contemporary Chinese society or the Chinese nation, an unconsciously assumed notion which underlies many current writings and researches, inspired my colleagues and I to organize a panel entitled “Living Forest.” From the different perspectives of history, political-economy, and anthropology, the participants attempted to examine and problematize the latent “cultural China” which preconfigured the thoughts of the Taiwanese.

Later I was told this campus only accommodates tourist imaginations toward the epochal movement. The real site of the May Fourth Movement is not located on Beida’s current campus. In this sense, I am also a familiar stranger being saturated with romanticization of the history.

The rough translation “foreigner or non-indigenous” also carries connotations of the term “outlander;” however, the term outlander may also imply the core and periphery, which I consider inappropriate to use for Chinese people who simply do not reside in Beijing. However, this term might be useful to describe Taiwan or other remote Chinese territories.

See further discussion of China’s baodao syndrome in chapter 5 and chapter 6, a term I apply to this prevalent complex toward Taiwan.
CHAPTER 3
LEARNING TO BE PROFESSIONAL

The very term “tourism business” suggests the nature of the enterprise. The pursuit of maximum profit helps to explain the concomitant emphasis on the commodification of tourism practices. In stark contrast to business management, social science concerns itself greatly with over-commercialization, particularly in certain tourism sites characterized by natural or historical resources, as the origin of exploitation (Kent 1975:169-98; McLaren 2003:42; Trask 1999:21-23). Thus on the one hand, tourism development to a certain extent brings the issue of exploitation to a head; on the other hand, it produces a dilemma for tour guides who struggle between profit-making and their role as mediator between cultures, especially those who guide packaged tours.

In this chapter, I discuss the occupation of Taiwanese tour guide in two primary ways. First, I examine the contradictory roles of tour guides who are situated within and restricted by the business. Through professionalization they expect to prevent themselves from suffering any crises of professional identity. Second, I will look at my own identity negotiation as both a researcher and tour guide in the business and my participation in tourism business as a whole. One common perception views tour guiding as a process through which to pass on knowledge, and previous research has confirmed this function by recurrent emphasis of its role in social education. But quite a few studies have engaged the incongruity of this role with the goal of profit making in mass tourism. Social expectations for tour guides and their roles in profit-making result in the reconfiguration of their identities and require them to place emphasis on professionalization. I hope not to overgeneralize the profession of tour guides in this chapter, but during my fieldwork on East Asian packaged
tours I witnessed this struggle many times. The mediating role of tour guides has situated these tour guides in an ambivalent position as neither a core member of travel agencies nor as part of the tourist group itself.

Compared to individual travelers, the role of tour guides is vital to the packaged tour participants, because tour guides not only must present a “packaged culture” to the tourists in the span of only a few days, but they also serve as the only medium between the tourists (viewer) and the outside (viewed). It is helpful to possess a concrete sense of how tour guides in Taiwan, Japan and China have been perceived and defined, to better understand the expectations which surround their roles and the struggles these engender. In Taiwan, according to the state’s tourism bureau, tour guides are responsible for: 1) receiving and sending off tourists; 2) taking care of meals and accommodations during the trip; 3) introducing destinations and cultures; 4) handling accidents; and 5) other miscellaneous required duties. In Japan, the license of Tsūyakuannaishi (通訳案内士) is also required, a national certification of candidates’ ability to introduce Japanese culture and heritage. As noted in the Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) website, a qualified tour guide has not only to master a foreign language, but also to be a proficient educator on Japan’s geography and history as well as its industry, economics, politics and cultures. The role of tour guide is tantamount to “lay diplomat.” In China, interpretation skill is also highly valued, with tour guides expected to work toward a higher goal based on the dominant focus of the tour’s subject material. The stringent requirements for becoming a tour guide are stated in detail in a recent announcement (2011) concerning the tour guide exams. In addition to historical, cultural, heritage and other background knowledge, Chinese tour guides are required to pay attention to the current “featured” tourism, Red tourism in particular for the coming 90th anniversary of the CCP. Seeing touring as a communicative
process, tour guide interpretation in China is “also a process of communication which enables visitors to turn tourist products into tourist consumption, or a meaningful and learning experience for the visitor” (Yang and Chen 2009: 225-6).

Professionalism played a large part in my own experience as a tour guide. As a rookie tour guide in the business, the veterans frequently reminded me of the great importance of “being professional” in front of the tourists. At the same time, increasing tensions emerging from my dual roles as researcher and tour guide made me turn to tour guides’ prevalent discourse about “being professional.” I intend to illustrate in the first section of this chapter how the professionalization of tourism, along with the seemingly inevitable commodification, challenges previous assertions about the intermediary role of tour guides. Moreover, this commodification process exacerbates the inner tensions of tour guiding, as guides did not want to be regarded as salespersons while leading a group. Their emerging tension accordingly requires the tour guides to constantly (re)professionalize themselves through different strategies and put great emphasis on their specialty in interpretation.

Interpretation of Destination Cultures

Why do tour guides require and desire themselves to be professionalized? And what significant meaning does professionalization carry for them? In the following paragraphs, I intend to analyze how the inner anxiety that guiding produces is assuaged by professionalization and leads to guides’ heavy emphasis on “professional capability.” Cohen’s inspiring article (1985) on tour guides’ role in contemporary tourism has provided a solid base for further discussion of the transforming role of the tour guide. Cohen argues that the earlier definition of the role of tour guide as the pathfinder and mentor has been transformed, into the mediator between two social environments and the cultural broker.
between two different cultures (Cohen 1985:5-29). Just as the themes of tours may vary, so do varied tours require of tour guides varied expertises and personalities. For example, Ifergan and Cohen (2002), in the article *A New Paradigm in Guiding: The Madrich as a Role Model* on tour guiding in Israel, discusses an alternative discourse for tour guides: as a role model for young overseas Jews participating in tours. Accordingly, tour guides’ role in today’s tourism may need to be analyzed in each context in order to understand the meaning-making processes at work for the tourists (Reisinger and Steiner 2006:481-98). Due to great diversity of customer desires, mass tourism has also developed varied strategies to meet tourist expectations. These varied desires have accordingly led to differentiation of tour guides’ roles based on the goal of their respective tours. Finally, this analysis will devote special attention to the transforming role of tour guides and their identities in light of the development of highly commercialized packaged tours.

The interpretation performed by tour guides, first explored and analyzed by Cohen (1985) as a part of the communicative sphere, has been frequently examined as part of the role of tour guides by scholars of the diversities present in different kind of tourism (Rabotic 2008: 213-215). With a special focus on heritage tourism, Rabotic combines these definitions and describes the interpretative work of tour guide as such: “[I]nterpretation is an act of creativity, similar to art or even a play—like the one found with jugglers, dancers or actors. Every act of artistic creativity takes certain ‘resources’ and their transformation into ‘product’ is a result of integration of intuition, sensitivity, skill and passion” (Rabotic: 215). This comparison of tour guides with jugglers, dancers and actors thus suggests the great difficulty of naming certain characteristics of skilled tour guides.

Not only in heritage tourism but also in other forms of guided tour, namely the guided cultural tourism in the format of the packaged tour, tour guides’ ability to interpret is strictly required and emphasized. The other characteristics of tour guides, however, are not
so clearly delimited—this has perhaps unfairly led to the perception that there are few licensing criteria, that guides lack proper training, and that they are mostly babysitters for tourists’ shopping sprees. Some successful figures are categorized as exceptional and their success is largely attributed to their personalities. While conducting my fieldwork, I found my tour guide colleagues frequently asserted, emphasized, or demonstrated their “expertise” not only in guiding but in their daily conversations. Before having become a nationally licensed guide in 2010, I simply considered their various ways of “being professional” to be performances to convince the tourists. The more I participated in the business the more superficial my original understanding seemed, as I began to perceive the subtle dynamics of the tourism system. I thus failed in the beginning to catch the tensions caused by over-commodification of tourism, in which for example strong connections between tour guides and shopping stations served not only to foster tourists’ distrust, but also to break the consistency of the guide’s role as “translator” of a different culture. The omnipresence of commodified tourism threatens the occupational images of tour guide, and their self-esteem as a professional is frequently challenged and degraded by this lateral shift to “salesperson.”

These challenges certainly generate some identity crises for this occupation and in turn reinforce their quest for “being professional,” the processes of which I will discuss shortly. As we shall see, I argue that the business structure of tourism has a major impact on the occupation of tour guide. Therefore, I would like to illustrate how commercialization has been rooted in Taiwan’s tourism business.

**Behind and Beyond Interpretation: Commodifying Tourism**

The role of tour guide, according to Cohen, is to translate the unfamiliar for the tourists (Cohen:17). However, Cohen’s analysis of tour guides’ roles only suggests one part of the nature of this occupation. As explained previously of East Asian tourists as “familiar strangers,” the key task for tour guides in Taiwan is not only to mediate between two
cultures (guest and host), but also to “translate the familiar” in a new way. Popular destinations are oftentimes already saturated with excessive imaginings, and the first priority of tour guides is therefore to respond to the ideas of the tourists of different nationalities and to make sense of the representation gaps between the imagined and real Taiwan. Among the East Asian tourists, the tourism representations of Taiwan targeting the PRC tourists are extraordinary problematic due to the “long term separation” between Taiwan and China and the intensifying imagination originating from this separation. Because the Japanese have gone through a complicated and commercialized process of creating “familiarity,” as I will argue in a later chapter, Taiwan’s current promotions targeting the Japanese tourist are thus less directly involved in the process of historically and culturally romanticizing the destinations. In contrast to the formation of the Japanese imagination which has evolved along with a high degree of consumerism, imaginations of the PRC Chinese thus represent the great influence of the long term national and cultural discourses of a great Chinese state.

As the Chinese have emerged as global tourists, many stagnant economies have turned to their tourism dollars to provide a boost – whether the locals like this development or not. Fearing being excluded from this global economic trend, Taiwan since 2008 has decided to take an active role in across-Strait economic cooperation. The PRC Chinese tourists thus have become a unique kind of group among the international tourists in Taiwan not only because they are from the “mainland” but also because of their transformative impact on the travel industry in Taiwan. However, Taiwan’s heavy reliance on external sources of tourist revenue, primarily from the Japanese in earlier periods and recently from Chinese travel agencies, has only served to exacerbate the predicament of the struggling Taiwanese tourism industry. To continue to return profit, Taiwan’s receiving agencies (dijieshe, 地接社) must maximize the number of tourist groups and hope to increase their
income through tourism shopping. 8 Tourism shopping has thus become an irreplaceable part of mass tourism. Their reconceived role in “travel business” has become problematic for guides, as they risk damaging their traditional role as mediator (or cultural broker) between two cultures, as described in Cohen’s research. It may simply place tour guides in a position of “broker” that has stripped the essential meaning of guiding. In this way, drawing a harsh distinction between tour guides and salespersons has emerged as the way to professionalize their occupation.

Counterintuitively, rising tour prices have also lead to decreasing profits for Taiwanese agencies and encouraged cost-cutting measures. Low-cost, high-expense tourism has particularly affected Chinese tourists, the “Luke tuan” (陸客團). An increasing concern for both the Taiwanese and Chinese governments is the low quality and relatively high fare of China’s local agencies. Chinese travel agencies have the final say on prices for certain overseas tours. 9 For instance, although the length of tours differs dependant on individual travel budgets, an eight day tour of Taiwan arranged by a Chinese travel agency costs approximately USD $720-960, a much higher rate than a five day tour of Hong Kong at around USD$350-470. Priced as expensively as a trip to Japan, Taiwanese trips on average cost Chinese tour participants more than comparable tours of Thailand or Korean, at about $630. 10 Most of this profit returns to the organizing Chinese agencies, while participating Taiwanese agencies receive little benefit from this high fare and must design budget tours to respond to the demands of the Chinese organizing agencies.

These emerging low-quality tours have, for many Chinese tourists, made trips to Taiwan feel no different in quality from domestic tourism within China. Although Taiwan’s unique attractions still draw PRC tourists, the current business model portends trouble for their long term operations. One popular colloquialism neatly summarizes the mixed feelings
tourists have towards travel to Taiwan: “You would regret never having travelled there; but
you would regret it more to go.” 11 In other words, the constructed imagination of Taiwan as
a destination motivates potential tourists, but tourists are disappointed to discover a place
which is in reality not only unattractive, but worse, too much like home. Another popular
expression vividly summarizes tourists’ feelings about their experiences: “Taiwan: where
you wake earlier than the roosters, run faster than the horses, and eat worse than the pigs.” 12
Therefore, for many Chinese tourists, their trips have resulted in the demystification of
Taiwan as one of the most desired destinations in China.

Maintaining Distinction from the Salesperson

As widely and angrily discussed among tour guides, in spring of 2011 Taiwanese
travel agencies apparently arbitrarily decided to lower guides’ commission percentages on
tourism shopping expenditures.13 Agencies as employer and guides as employee already
existed on unequal terms; this reduction in commission only served to emphasize guides’
lesser status and alienate them. The tour guides immediately protested this change, as they
claimed, in defense of their professional esteem. In their petition, the tour guides stated their
occupation earned not only less respect but less income because travel agencies have taken
away the tips supposedly given to the tour guides for their services in order to balance the
losses from low-cost tour groups, in which they were expected to rely on tourism shopping
to cover extra expenses. This “exploitation,” they asserted, fostered a strong sense of low
achievement and insecurity due to their unstable salary.

I argue that the structural factors of the tourism business have predetermined the
nature of the occupation of tour guide and thus resulted in their anxiousness to distinguish
themselves from salespersons, whom tour guides consider to be experts in selling products.
My ethnography concerning the process of becoming and being a tour guide may help to
illustrate the negotiation of multiple identities in the tourism business. Before serving as a licensed tour guide in Taiwan, one has to pass a two-phase national examination that includes a written test on basic knowledge of Taiwan’s tourism resources and tourism industry, and an oral examination of foreign language ability. The standardized examination is divided into two types: Chinese language and foreign language. Takers of the former can only lead Chinese-speaking tour groups. The latter test authorizes guides to do both. After the examination, successful candidates are required to undergo a four-week training on Taiwan’s culture, destination introductions and tour operations and regulations. After training is completed, one is recognized as a nationally-authorized tour guide and is able to practice at Taiwan’s tourist destinations. In reality, during most of the year the number of licensed tour guides is far too many for what the job market demands. Yet during the intense peak season, when demand for tour guides sky rockets, the shortage of human resources enables the “rookies” to enter the market regardless of language specialization.

Regular tour guides often mock the seasonal worker: “In the busy season, if you’re breathing, you can lead a tour group.”14 Because of Taiwan’s de-restriction of PRC Chinese tourists in 2008, seasonal demands have become more intense than ever before. But when the off-season comes, these rookies soon lose their temporary jobs. Due to this extreme fluctuation between “on” and “off” seasons, some of my acquaintances have derided their occupation as the “beggar business”— an unstable job that earns them no respect and depends largely on tourists’ tips (小費) and shopping commissions for wages. With the exception of some successful figures, most guides consider their occupation to be a temporary one rather than a career. When a tour guide once introduced me to his colleagues as a guide-in-training who is also a PhD student at Hawaii, their responses were straightforward: “You are not serious about being a tour guide, are you? You will eventually
return to school and have a teaching position in school. And this will be some item to make your resume look great." Others took an economic view, telling me, “The money is very helpful if you simply take this as a part-time job. You can do it in your spare time outside school.” Through these conversations, I noticed the contradiction between their sense of under-achievement and the potential for high profits, which may serve as the major reason for them to professionalize and personalize the occupation. In particular, the “charismatic tour guide” has been widely respected in the tour industry. In contrast to most tour guides who often are assigned tasks by travel agencies, these successful figures possess the autonomy to determine their own schedule.

**Gaining Authority in a “Sandwich” Situation**

Except a few charismatic figures, tour guides generally feel great strain in handling any incidents and responding to tourists’ request during the trips. The heavy emphasis on professionalism is partially due to tour guides’ constant need to “wuzhuangziji” (武裝自己), literally “militarize themselves,” meaning to equip oneself with sufficient professional knowledge and the ability to deal with unexpected situations. During the trip tour guides are seen as the representatives of the travel agencies and thus directly face the complaints of tourists and tour leaders (or tour attendant 領隊). The tour guides describe this as a “sandwich situation,” being a dysfunctional sort of mediator, or glorified buffer, between the tourists and the travel agencies. The tour guides are situated in the intersection of different forces, namely the tourists, the tour leaders, and travel agencies. They also have to deal with other relevant personnel, such as the bus drivers, the staff at destinations, shopping stations, and assigned restaurants to ensure the tour schedule proceeds smoothly. Tour guides are thus in constant struggle with their own identities. Therefore being “professional” and “confident” is the first and most crucial class trait that “the rookies” have to learn.
“Being professional” means, to them, expertise in guiding at tourism destinations and shopping as well as delicacy in taking care of the tour participants. The newcomers were thus asked to control the group and handle unexpected situations. Accordingly the inexperienced tour guides are often taught, “There is only one ‘mi’ (microphone), and you must be the only person with access to it. If the tour leader gets the microphone then you have failed.” The microphone in the bus thus is presented as the symbol of authority for tour guides, an authority which tour guides defend for themselves through competence in leading tours and shopping. More importantly, tour guides were also warned to sustain a good relationship with the tour leaders because they may become potential threats in tourist groups. Usually tour leaders, sent to accompany the tour participants by the organizing tour agencies (Zutuanshe, 組團社) during the trips, are regarded as potential troublemakers, especially for inexperienced tour guides. The authorized roles of tour leaders in a group are to look after tour participants and communicate between the two agencies, the organizing tour agencies and the receiving agencies. Great tensions and sometimes confrontations between tour guides and tour leaders emerge from tour leaders’ authority to request the replacement of “unqualified” tour guides, based on leaders’ own judgments. Therefore, unlike tour guides, tourists often consider tour leaders to be “one of us,” an in-group member who will defend the rights of tourists. Hence, tour guides find themselves in an untenable position and must passively acquiesce to their requests.

Due to the oppositional relationship between tour guides and tour leaders, touring for many guides is nothing but a performance whose first goal is to acquire leadership of the group and exclude external interference from attendants and other tourists. After authority has been established, their expertise can be reinforced through their knowledge about destinations. If they fail in the beginning, they must suffer through tourists’ lack of respect
throughout the rest of the trip, if they are not outright replaced. Therefore, this professional capability is highly regarded and is an essential part of the distinction drawn between tour guides and salespersons. This professionalism also serves them well in negotiations and confrontations during the trip in their capacity as business brokers and cultural educators.

“Sakura”

As stated previously, because of the dominant model of low-cost packaged tours, the tourism business is heavily reliant on commissions from tourist shopping. The most profitable business is the sale of Taiwan’s unique jewelry, antiques and medicine. The storytelling surrounding tourist destinations is largely, if subtly, associated with tourist shopping. In Taiwan, frequent practices of “sakura” in the communicative process have become quite common in packaged tours. The term “sakura” in guides’ jargon, or “product placement” in business management terminology, refers to the technique utilized by tour guides-- by offering background stories about destinations, guides enhance the tourist desire to purchase Taiwan-specific or local products from those destinations, namely jewelry, medicine or tea in Taiwan.

Borrowing sociologist Goffman’s concept of “keying” in symbolic interactionism to describe the process through which tour guides establish staged authenticity for the tourists, Cohen declares “the communicative” the most essential sphere in guided tourism, where “guiding” oftentimes oscillates between “interpretation” and “purely fabrication” (Cohen, 1995: 15). When tourism shopping is involved in the schedules, one may find the tour guides swing from one to the other. To prevent themselves from completely losing credibility among the tourists, tour guides have developed certain strategies to emphasize their expertise and avoid touching upon tourism shopping. Tour guides also benefit from the strong alliance between travel agencies and tourism shopping stations. What they are
required to do is similar to “keying,” or providing a destination constructed between interpretation and fabrication. In so doing, tour guides can avoid embarrassing moments whenever the tourists are taken to shopping stations, by only endeavoring to “interpret” the tourism destinations.

The profits gained from promoting shopping determine guides’ status in the travel agencies, and thus each tour guide has his/her own unique “sakura” which some regard as a professional secret and a personal specialty. One successful strategy is to “sow sakura” in the beginning of tours by interweaving “sakura” with storytelling about the destinations. Targeting middle aged and senior tour participants, sakura manages to skillfully associate their ambiguous understanding of Taiwan with items the tour guides want to promote. Hence half-fabricated tales of “historical authenticity,” or “historical familiarity,” oftentimes in the form of myth or gossip or anecdotes, may come into play. The veteran tour guides usually seem indifferent to promoting shopping once at the actual shops; their shopping promotion has in fact already happened, during their skillful touristic storytelling. That is, they have tied their description of the destination with specific products and through their introduction they have successfully attracted the tour participants’ attention and may have stimulated their desires to purchase the products.

These tour guides thus believe their expertise lays in their depictions of the destination and the culture, which distinguishes them from salespersons. The National Palace Museum is an excellent location for them to utilize this technique, given the countless historical anecdotes and gossip about the invaluable antiques and jewelry worn and appreciated by the Emperor, queen and nobles. The symbolic meaning of jade and jewelry, as a blessing for the wearer, is immediately consumed by the tourists and provides a fantasy for them. Regardless of the tour schedule, these purchasing desires will be gratified inevitably when the tourists are taken to the shopping stations. Upon arrival of the tourists,
the mission of the tour guides has been accomplished and the burden taken over by shopping stations which display various Taiwan-specific artifacts and products to satisfy the tourist imagination. While the role of tour guides is to ensure their sakura are well and subtly placed, the role of shopping stations is to guarantee that the symbolic meanings of the invaluable national treasure in the museum are embodied and purchasable at shopping stations. Yet this cooperation among travel agency, tour guide and shopping station does not constitute the whole story. In a later chapter concerning Chinese tourists in Taiwan, by using a similar example of Chinese tourist shopping, I will illustrate another way in which “Chineseness” has been re-narrated and commodified by mass media, museums, tour guides and tour guide books.

**Negotiations and the Struggle of Identities**

As a researcher in the field and a rookie in the industry, my problem was a different one: just as the conflicting identities “tour guide/salesperson” cause guides internal stress, so too did my dual roles as researcher/tour guide cause me some difficulty. Although I was able to gain a better insider perspective as a tour guide, the tour guide’s role as interpreter in turn restricted my participant observation at destinations. In addition to my attempts to limit being perceived as a “content provider,” (an academic authority) and my circumscribed ability to investigate the tourists’ social imaginings, my role as a guide placed me in a constant struggle between two conflicting identities (researcher and tour guide), mainly based on the context of extreme commercialism in tourism practices in Taiwan’s packaged tours. Therefore, as a researcher in the tourism business, I was constantly aware of the need to sustain the fine line between profit-making and field research. Moreover, I was constantly careful to observe their prior knowledge rather than to create imaginations for the tourists. Presenting myself as an assistant guide and a tourist seemed an ideal way for me to avoid becoming a knowledge and content provider for the tourists when researching their social
and tourism imaginations. Meanwhile I was wary of being deeply involved in the business because of the conflict between profit-making and academic research. I benefited enormously from taking the role of an assistant tour guide, as half-outsider and half-insider, which resolved the tension to a certain degree and allowed my participation as well as ethnographic data collection.

For other tour guides, the conflicts which perplexed them were generally quite different from mine. Being situated within East Asian tourist groups, as tour guides they were often forced to clarify their own identity, as they attempted to explain the Taiwanese culture on display in relation to the tourists themselves. This unavoidably challenged their preexisting identities but also resulted in reconfiguration of their cultural, national and professional identities.

These inconsistencies and reconfigurations were particularly evident to tour guides who had guided PRC Chinese tourists, after decades guiding the Japanese. In practice, tour guides who guide the Japanese tourists and Chinese tourists are usually separate. Because the majority of tourists since the 1970s have been Japanese, the Japanese-language tour guides dominated and led the market for decades until the emerging Chinese tourists appeared in Taiwan. The rising new urban rich from China certainly remind the veteran tour guides of the golden age of the 1980s and 90s, when the industry was flush with Japanese tourists. To some Japanese-language tour guides whom I interviewed, guiding “luke,” the Mainland Chinese tourists, is a unique and somehow unpleasant experience. Due to the great cultural differences between the two tourist populations, some of them have described their disappointing experience as such: “I would never do it again even if someone told me that I might become a millionaire after guiding them. There are many ways to make money but this is not the way for me.” Their distressed attitudes derive mainly from the impassioned attitudes of “luke,” their lack of delicacy in manners, and the dissatisfactory results of their
tourist shopping. As one guide said, “The cultures of Japanese tourists and PRC tourists are significantly different, because I hardly had any problems with the Japanese tourists.”

Although most of the time they referred to the less refined manners of the Chinese tourists, their claims of cultural difference in fact also suggest a dysfunctional mediation as they attempt to switch between two interpretation systems, designed for the Japanese and the Chinese respectively. To return to the concept of “translating between different cultures,” interpretations targeting different guest cultures – although they may have much in common, especially given mass media mediation – still require separate sets of tourism language tailored to meet the tourism expectations of tourists from different societies. Based on these presumed cultural differences between the Japanese and the Chinese and even between the Chinese and Taiwanese, many of them claimed they would rather stay with the Japanese tourists. In such cases their multiple axes of identity, national, cultural and professional, were in constant negotiation; the incongruity that allows no coexistence of different identities thus resulted in their rejection of guiding Chinese groups.

Identity negotiations, however, are oftentimes more subtle and more complex than the simple conflict between two interpretation systems at the national identity level. In certain cases, the identity is unambiguously presented as the national identity that rejects a perceived subordination to China, which some guides choose to exploit. Some tour guides offer submissive greetings, placing themselves in a lower position by calling Chinese tour participants “the leaders from the motherland (gewei zuguolaide lingdao, 各位祖國來的領導)” or “the honorable guests from the Chinese mainland” (laizi neidi de guibin, 來自內地的貴賓), even though the participants are common Chinese citizens. By contrast, some guides are extremely reluctant to employ such greetings because the former defines a hierarchal
relationship that suggests an “inspection trip” of the central government officials and the latter indicates Taiwan’s peripheral position in relation to the Chinese “mainland.”

Other negotiations occur in different levels, as in one training tour in which I participated. This tour may serve as the best example of this complexity. While on our way to Sun-Moon Lake, the most iconic tourism destination in central Taiwan, a couple of tour guides and I visited a shopping station that featured an indigenous nutrition supplement made by the ethnic minority, the Shao. At the entrance, we presented ourselves as guides in training who wished to learn how to cooperate with the shopping stations. The manager of the station decided to give us a presentation that they have designed for other tourist participants. After an unremarkable indigenous dance performance in the hall, we were seated in front of a glass showcase where various “supplement foods” are exhibited. A woman in her early thirties who wore an exotic and, notably, erotic “indigenous costume” that might not be seen elsewhere appeared in the room to introduce their products. Emphasizing health and the fashionable “slow life” movement, she was quite persuasive in combining health trends and traditional herbs in order to sell their unique local supplement. By referring to Chinese or Taiwanese politicians who have regularly taken this supplement and subsequently recovered from severe illness, she successfully induced one of the tour guides to purchase several bottles for his family. Based on her spiel, Madam Chiang Kai-Shek serves as their best advertising spokesperson, as her long-term asthma was purportedly cured by this supplement.¹⁹

What confused us was her intentionally disguised northern accent and some of her vocabulary choices that were neither Han Taiwanese nor of any indigenous population. Out of great curiosity, one of my colleagues interrupted her introduction to ask where she was from. She claimed she was second generation “waisheng,” for her father was a forced migrant from Mainland China and afterward married her mother, an indigenous Shao. The
deeper the conversation went, the more curious that we felt. After becoming more familiar with each other, she revealed that she is a “Mainland Bride,” a term referring to Chinese women who have married Taiwanese husbands. She originated in North Eastern China, but she fabricated an identity to accommodate as many different populations as possible. This “hybridity,” if not regarded as fully fabricated, enables her to avoid her accent being questioned by Chinese tourists and in turn brings them closer through common Chinese ancestry and blood. Later in the trip, one veteran began to complain and immediately a heated conversation erupted over how ethnicity should be exhibited: “Allowing flexibility to play among different roles is acceptable, but this definitely exceeds the necessary level. Yes, we are making money from tourism shopping, but this seems way overboard.” Through the conversation, I sensed “authenticity” was still highly valued among guides and their uneasiness was clear in this encounter with created narratives designed to sell products. The other guide went on to address this “inauthenticity,” saying, “It was hardly distinguishable based on their ethnic costume and dance. They [the Shao people] make no attempt at difference from other indigenous performances.” Being tour guides, they certainly are much more familiar than the tourists with “staged authenticity” as well as the stories invented to “make it real” and appeal to the tourists. However, the experience at the shopping station urged them to rethink representations of Taiwan’s culture and in turn challenged their professional identity and cultural identity.

**Touring in a Quasi-culture**

Unlike the group of female tourists I encountered whom I described earlier, some tourists know about the current international and political situations in Taiwan and would like to experience this historical complex, which they may consider “adventurous” in experiencing the “different.” Only the veterans have developed effective strategies to avoid such inquiries on the political situation; the inexperienced ones, however, could only pretend
naivety or “play dumb” by professing ignorance on the issues. As some Japanese tourists came to Taiwan for the nostalgic past, many Chinese tourists are extremely interested in discovering the other China. For Chinese tourists, the Taiwan effect is extraordinary significant. The history of the once-demonized KMT and Chiang Kai-Shek as well as their “lost tradition” and religion may have shaped their imaginations before departure. If not fully motivated by such fantasies, they are at least excited to witness and gossip about the political reality on the island (daonei, 島內).

For tour guides and travel agencies it is the first priority to avoid making claims about politics or adding personal interpretations. In particular the tourism sites in Taiwan, where representation of the past is in negotiation, which representation of the present can be safely used is a very delicate subject. In reality politics constitute part of Taiwanese daily life. As many Japanese have considered Taiwan to be a country distinct from China, the Japanese chief director of the semi-official Cultural Interchange Association was forced to resign after an unwise public assertion that Taiwan’s status remained unconfirmed following Japan’s 1945 defeat. The chief director’s speech irritated Taiwanese authorities because it undermines the legal status of the ruling party, the KMT’s postwar administration in Taiwan. There was an anecdote making the rounds during my trip as an assistant tour guide of a Japanese tour group which beautifully illustrates Taiwan’s confusing political reality. Through this case, one may grasp the subtlety of geopolitical dynamics in East Asia and how tourism in Taiwan brings these issues tightly together.

Conforming to a Chinese policy, Japan’s official recognition considered Taiwan a province of China, which seems counter to Japanese common understanding that Taiwan is already independent and a separable geographic presence from China. Taiwan’s political confusion is partly a byproduct of this historical factor. One day we toured the so-called
“Taiwan Juzhaigou-Sunlinksea, the Sun-link-sea (杉林溪)” a recently renovated natural forest park in central Taiwan. This comparison with China’s most well-known natural world heritage site seemed to discourage the tour guide from promoting this new destination. He had no choice but to have this destination on the tour schedule, as it was an alternative to the more famous Mt. Ali, which had suffered disastrous damage from a typhoon in the summer of 2010. The tour guide and I were quite surprised by the unexpected positive reaction of the Japanese tourists. In contrast to the over-developed and crowded Mt. Ali, this unexpected encounter with unspoiled nature provided the tourists with a new mysterious destination to discover. Perhaps inspired by the Juzhaigo comparison, a female tourist in her early sixties came to me and inquired whether the Taiwanese government planned to apply as a United Nations World Heritage site for this spectacular destination. The Japanese tourists apparently recognized no political sensitivity in such an application-- Taiwan is a non-recognized member of the United Nations and thus disqualified from applying.

Other tourists who sat around us in the back of the bus were also interested in our discussion and my response due to the fierce competition in world heritage applications among East Asian governments, namely in Japan, China and Korea. As an assistant tour guide, the approved choice would have been to avoid the issue and let the veteran tour guide answer any politically sensitive questions. However, it would have been embarrassing if I left my seat while the bus was heading to the next destination. Partially because I was also very interested to hear their interpretation, I made the decision to give a brief response. My answer of “no” surprised them, and I continued by explaining that, because Taiwan (the Republic of China) is not a UN member, it is incapable of joining the competition. However, I went on to say, “Taiwan has many quasi- world heritages and potential ones, certified by our central government.” I also explained that as Taiwan is a non-member of the UN, the
only way to apply for world heritage certification is to cooperate with other UN members, and concluded with a current example: the recent recognition of Mazu (媽祖), the sea goddess who guards the Taiwan Strait and fishermen, a belief shared by Fujian and Taiwan. This seemed to stimulate discussion among these senior tourists. After a while, one turned to me and said sympathetically, “We Japanese have been heiwa boke, ‘idle with peace,’ for too long. We have been enjoying the peace after the World War and totally forget about the political situation between Japan, China and Taiwan.” I thus wrote the following in my field notes about my deviation from staged authenticity, reflecting from my position as both a tour guide and a researcher: “Her response kept me thinking over and over again whether it is necessary to tell her about political reality, oftentimes ignored by the tourists. In this sense, can the social education component or the communicative function of the tour guide still be functional?”
Notes to Chapter 3

1 See Taiwan Tourism Bureau. Executive Information System, “daoyou lingdhui jingli zege” (導遊領隊經理資格).

2 See Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO). “Tūyakuannaishi shikaku kaiyō” (通訳案内士資格概要).

3 See National Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic of China. “quanguo gaoji daoyouyuan dengji kaoshi dagang” (全国高级导游员等级考试大纲).

4 This part of my field study is inspired by Abbot’s ideas concerning “the system of professions” (1988), taking an overview of the multi-directional development of a profession and how an abstract knowledge of what makes a tour guide has been narrated so as to “legalize and professionalize” the position. Although it is meaningful to examine the process of professionalization of the tour guide in Taiwan, my aim here is to focus on identity negotiation among different identities.

5 My tour guide colleagues-cum-interviewees often compared themselves to one charismatic tour guide and lamented their comparative lack of charm and persuasiveness.

6 See Chen Zhaoyu “zhengdun dijiakuketuan guanguangju jiangji zhongfa” (整頓低價陸客團觀光局將祭重罰) and Chen Rujiao, “Shi Xiuhua daoyou wuzhao 200yuan xingcheng luanshou 200 renminbi baoxue luke tuan luxingshe zao tingye” (導遊無照200 元行程亂收200人民幣 剝削陸客團旅行社遭停業) and Xingshengbao, “luke futaiyou xian tuishao yinyou” (陸客赴臺遊現“退燒”隱憂?)

7 One significant example in Asia is Japan’s changing attitudes toward Chinese tourists. In the film Swallowtail Bufferfly (1996), the Japanese refer to immigrants from Asia as “Yen chasers,” describing a generally negative attitude towards the presence of foreigners. Yet in 2010, because of the yuan that Chinese tourists have brought to Japan, I found that Japanese stores in Osaka have given up using traditional Chinese characters in their signs in favor of simplified Chinese. And in many stores in Shinsaibashi, there are often signs reading “Chinese-speaking shopping guide available.”
Although more detailed research on this turn towards low-fare tours is required, my interviewee, an immigrant from Guangdong and currently working in a travel agency in Honolulu, has indicated his dislike of low-fare tours. He believes this competitive business model was introduced by the Taiwanese and other overseas Chinese beginning in the 1980s. As China thrives and the tourism industry gradually grows, the huge Chinese market supports increasing numbers of travel agencies. Low-cost and budget tourism has become to dominant business model in such a competitive environment. This subsequently became the model Taiwan’s small market adopted to remain competitive. This, my interviewee concluded, was an undesirable outcome.

In most cases, Taiwan is considered non-foreign, but different from the domestic. In a later chapter I will discuss the geographic concept of “zinwai,” literally meaning “going out of bounds” in Chinese.

Price check from China International Travel Services Beijing, based on the rate of 1 dollar to 6.35 rmb.

“buq zhongshenyihan quleyihan zhongshen” (不去終身遺憾，去了遺憾終身).

“qidebijizao, chidebzhucha, paodebimakuai” (起的比雞早，吃的比豬差，跑得比馬快).

The Facebook discussion page “daoyou chuangyeqizhi jiaoliuwang” (導遊創業求職交流網), maintained by veteran tour guides, calls for action to protest this almost unnoticed change. Organized by the page participants, most tour guides who are currently in practice have jointly filed a letter of complaint to the state tourism bureau and arranged for tour guide representatives to negotiate with the government and travel agencies.

This is the very common joke popular among the tour guides and travel agencies. The joke reflects the great difference between “on” and “off” season.

After learning of my background, one of my tour guide friends, who had just retired from a management position in a top 50 Taiwan company and was about to start his second career, told me that his wife has asked him several times not to waste time in doing this. He was quite annoyed by her words: “With your education and experience you deserve a better job than this.”

This term that likens tour guides to military personnel was once used by one veteran tour guide who described the work of tour guides as a “war situation.”

The term “sakura” is Japanese in origin, and refers to certain tricks that distract or mislead the attention of the audience. The term is widely used in Japan to refer to magicians’ bits of misdirection, or to elements of psychological experiments which disguise the original purpose and confuse the subject.
In a later chapter, I will present examples of “sakura” that utilize “historical familiarity” to achieve the goals of tourism shopping. During our trips, we have found that almost every destination has its story about Chiang Kai-Shek and his wife, for they are widely known all over the world. In particular, for the East Asian tourists from Japan or the PRC, Chiang’s KMT and Chiang’s Taiwan carry significant meaning. I will further discuss the use of historical figures in tourism shopping in a later chapter.

Religious practice is discouraged in China; the case of Falunguan (法輪功) is one extreme example of this prohibition.


See Xie Ende, Tang Xiuli and Lin Yizhang “Zhaiteng shiyan youren lixi tairi guanxi xiangjingzhon” (齋藤失言 有人離席 台日關係響警鐘).

See Sun-link-sea official website.
Chapter 4

Escape to A Place of Familiarity:

Transforming Japanese Tourist Imaginations of Taiwan

Introduction

I was quite concerned that the great heritage of Taiwan has been disappearing. However, this heritage is too great to [be eliminated]. It remains alive and well. The familiarity sensed by the Japanese who visited Taiwan is not merely limited to [historical] buildings and foods, but also includes human mindsets and the overall atmosphere. [Kin Mirei 2003:8] ¹

Japan was the first Asian nation to lift restrictions on overseas tourism in 1964. Along with its achievement of the “Income Doubling Project” and the success and auspiciousness gained from hosting the Tokyo Olympics (1964) and Osaka EXPO (1970), both domestic and overseas tourism opened another window for the Japanese to discover the world (Kajiwara 1997:164-178). The increasing numbers of overseas tourists have stimulated wide-spread discussion regarding Japanese overseas tourism as an extension of Japan’s colonialism-influenced search in the postwar decades, namely nostalgic quests to locate lost past(s) through setting foot on former colonial soil in East and South East Asia. Moreover, the Asian historical complex generated from the past and the lingering colonial memories grant both the guest and host a certain degree of cultural and historical familiarity. In other words, the aim of these packaged tourists is not to explore a distinctive exotic culture but rather to limit differences at the destination (Yamashita and Graburn 1997). Japan has
nurtured this form of tourism as a special form of nostalgic longing, a rediscovery of its past through both domestic as well as overseas tourism in its former colonies (Ivy 1995:34-5).²

Among various forms of nostalgia, a “borrowed nostalgia” for Asia is recurrent in postwar Japan, as critically examined by Iwabuchi Koichi (2002b:495); this particularly reflects Japan’s anxiousness to reassert its potentially dubious Asian-ness.³ In the face of its increasingly prosperous neighbors, while Japan’s own post-Bubble economy continues to languish, these constituted memories and past(s) found in Asian Others offer one way for Japanese to make sense of the world. Accordingly the tourism promotions which target the Japanese consumer convey a mixture of both colonialism and the constituted memories of the Japanese people.

The exoticness of the destinations is hardly the determinant, as it is a sense of familiarity that attracts East Asian tourists traveling to neighboring countries. This raises intriguing questions: When and where did this sense of familiarity begin, and from where does it derive? In particular, Taiwan is an intriguing case among these Asian countries due to its complicated relationship with Japan and China. In the previous decades, because the Japanese tourists consistently constituted 40 percent of foreign visitors as well as the highest daily expenditures of visitors in Taiwan, Japanese tourists have had profound authority to impact Taiwan’s tourism industry.⁴ Moreover frequent return visits have made Taiwan almost exclusively adapted to, and eager to incentivize, Japanese tourism.⁵ Some statistics
provided here should clearly demonstrate this impact: among the 4.39 million international visitors, in 2008, 1.2 million, or one quarter of all tourists, departed from Japan. Although since 2009 PRC Chinese tourists (1.5 million) have surpassed the Japanese and taken first place as international tourists, Japanese tourists remain major contributors to the Taiwanese tourist economy. According to the 2009 Taiwan Tourism Bureau Survey, Taiwan’s cuisine, landscape, and hospitality are the main attractions for foreigners choosing to visit Taiwan. However, based on my interviews with Japanese tourists, especially with frequent visitors, what is not measured in these statistics is the compelling “familiarity” that motivates their trips if media representations and promotions are carefully examined. The familiarity is being described and understood as “anshin to shinrei” (安心と信頼, the sense of security and reliability), traits emphasized in earlier tourism promotions of Taiwan.

**Historical Familiarity and Tourism Imagination**

I will use the concept of “historical familiarity” to refer to these mixed imaginaries surrounding tourist destinations that contain a strong, unarticulated sense of a shared past, whether this sense derives from an actual shared past or from reconstituted memories. These phenomena dependent on historical familiarity, shared by both the guest and the host, are especially evident in the cultural tourism of Japanese tourists. This represented familiarity also results from an attitude of mutual affinity and thus necessitates positioning within the context of intertwined Taiwan-Japan relations and the modern history in East Asia. As Lam
Peng-Er interprets this mutual affinity:

Japan and Taiwan have a multifaceted relationship despite the rupture of official ties in 1972. This relationship is underpinned by a shared history, common values, economic ties, strategic alignment, and social networks between their political and business elite. It is also buttressed by mutual warmth, admiration, and appreciation at the societal level. [Lam 2004: 249]

In tourism practices, this familiarity immediately offers a common ground for tourists and host destinations to connect to each other. In particular, this notion of historical and cultural familiarity is frequently reiterated to packaged tour participants, for the tour guides always seek to establish cultural and emotional relationships between destination and tourist.

The transnational participation in Taiwan’s tourism development indicates that tourism policy as well as its representations were not exclusively controlled by the locals (the host) but also intensively associated with external constructions through the social imaginations of the guest. In the following paragraph, I intend to introduce how Japan Asia Airways (JAA 日本亞細亞航空) engages in influencing Taiwan’s tourism development and in constructing familiarity. I would like to present in this chapter how Taiwan’s “ethnicity,” mainly its Chineseness, Japaneseness and Taiwaneseness, has been manipulated and has gone through a process of nationalization, multiplication and commodification since the late 1970s. In a more concrete sense, how did these developments help Taiwan serve as a place of escape for the Japanese and what fantasy has been created and offered for Japanese tourists in the postwar era? Finally, I would like to address the slippage of this assumed historical
familiarity in Japan today, not only between different generations but also for females such as college students and OLs (office ladies). Their already replete tourism imaginations represent both the major transformations of tourism and the commodification of identity and ethnicity for tourists.

**Taiwan as the Destination for Escape**

Scholars of Japan studies and of tourism studies have argued that Japan’s overseas tourism is often a result of their dissatisfactions with daily life. Their desire to escape to another part of Asia, including through immigration and tourism, represent the emerging nostalgic demands of the Japanese. Nelson Graburn (1997:202) specifies two forms of nostalgia: first, the “imperial nostalgia,” coined by Rosaldo (1989), of Western tourists in their search for a disappearing past in a primitive society; second, the nostalgia felt by contemporary Asian workers for lifeways lost to their own modernization. Japanese nostalgia thus constitutes a mixture of the two. The nostalgia represented through Japanese tourism in Asia can be seen as their mourning for the disappearing past while searching for the colonial past at their destination. For instance, Japan’s romanticization of South East Asia is a typical case in contemporary Japan. Along with the nostalgic overtones of Japanese tourism, its colonial implications have been muted by the suppression of memory. Yoneyama names this phenomenon “collective forgetfulness” (1999:4), and Igarashi analyzes this “absent presence of the country’s war memories” (2000:3), a collective
amnesia prevalent in Japanese society which obscures the colonial administrations imposed on former Japanese colonies. As a result, Japanese tourists when traveling to these former colonies can still appreciate the beautiful landscapes and cultural similarity of their destinations yet remain oblivious to or ignorant of the dark side of their shared history.

Building upon this “collective forgetfulness,” in the post-World War II era, through the Japanese quest to locate the past, the nation was forced to abandon any recognition of its colonial implications by utilizing a transforming strategy, moving from promoting nostalgia to promoting an inclusive concept of familiarity. Unlike South Korea’s determination to cut off its colonial bond with Japan, Taiwan, one of the Japanese one–time colonies, has been taking heavy advantage of this historic “solidarity” and thus later created a place of familiarity catering to Japanese tourists. It is noteworthy that an ongoing process of commercialized and customized familiarity has been designed to welcome Japanese tourists.

For instance: in the late 1970s, the increasingly intensive business relationships between Japan and Taiwan along with the appearance of both Japanese karaoke bars in Taipei and sex tourism; in the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan as a destination for family (家族 kazoku) and company tours (社員 shain); and in the late 1990s, relaxing and healing trips (癒し iyashi) for career women.10

The Journey from Iyarashī to Iyashi

Post-war Taiwanese tourism was no doubt established by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau
and Taiwan Kankō Kyokai (台灣觀光協會). However, business-related personnel, the “cultural intermediaries in the marketplace” (1999:8) in Yoshino’s term, also played an irreplaceable role in not only establishing and promoting but also shaping Taiwan’s tourism destinations. Other than the participation of the official tourism organization of Taiwan, Japanese business elites, for instance Japan Asia Airways (JAA) and major tourism agencies, also contributed to the narratives of destination. As a central-level administration, TTB certainly holds the requisite executive power to determine the main themes of Taiwan’s tourism. However, TTB was cautious in re-establishing the sensitive relationship with its former colonizer, particularly as an official organization, and thus lacked flexibility in its promotion strategies. This left the field open for JAA to take a more active position in impacting Taiwan’s tourism development. In this case, Japan Asia Airways and the Taiwan Tourism Bureau dominated tourism narratives of Taiwan. If tourism representation is seen as one of the best forums to scrutinize how ethnicity is formed and consumed, one may observe that Japanese ways of perceiving “ethnic others” often took a significant part in shaping their overseas destinations. The characteristics of ethnic others, perceived and defined by Japanese business elites, later became touristic spotlights, mediated through tourism promotions. Their defined “otherness” was in fact produced and consumed by the Japanese tourists not only during their travels in Taiwan but also through various media such as commercials (CMs), TV shows, guide books and popular travel writings.
What is noteworthy here is the role that “the intermediary” played in Japan-Taiwan communication. By presenting Japanese-ness to the Taiwanese on the one hand, and defining Taiwan’s ethnicity on the other – albeit in a simplified representation of ethnicity – Japan Asia Airways emerged, after Japan broke relations with Taiwan, as one of the primary bridges between Tokyo and Taipei.

Conforming to the People’s Republic of China’s “one China” policy since 1972, JAA was founded as a distinct business from Japan Airways, the national airline, and it became exclusively in charge of regular Taiwan-Japan flights. “We had no choice but to struggle for survival,” a former staff member of Japan Airways said of their initiative to promote Taiwanese tourism, “and the Japan-Taiwan flights were all we had on hand; we are unable to rely exclusively on either [Japanese or Taiwanese flights] but have to rely on the profits brought by both.” In the 1980s, there was a great demand for business travel from Japan to the rest of world. Except for business-related travelers, the JAA rarely benefited from this increase but had to rely on profits from Japan-Taiwan flights due to their business restrictions. This pressure has forced the JAA to engage in the difficult task of selling and promoting Taiwan for the survival of the company. Moreover, JAA was expected by the Japanese government to fill the void after normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations. As a result, JAA, along with the semi-official Japanese organization Koryū Kyōkai (交流協會 Association of Cultural Interchange), invested enormous effort in enhancing friendship
between Japan and Taiwan—such as annual Japanese speech contests and regular mutual visits between Japanese and Taiwanese college students.\textsuperscript{15} During the past three decades, the semi-official status of JAA continued until 2008 when Japan Airlines decided to merge with JAA’s business in Taiwan, which terminated JAA’s mission and placed JAA under the direct control of the Japan Airlines Tokyo headquarters.

Setting aside the tricky political reality that Japan recognizes communist China, Japan and Taiwan have had regular communication over economic, cultural and social demands, which explains why JAA has played a rather unique role in Taiwan, namely in its tourism business. It is thus no great difficulty to understand JAA’s strong influence during the formation of Taiwan’s tourism industry due to its pioneering role in “rediscovering” Taiwan through neither imperial eyes nor male dominated gazes. During an interview, a veteran of the JAA staff recalled the hardship they experienced in the beginning; JAA had expended tremendous effort in promoting Taiwan by utilizing various pop cultural elements.\textsuperscript{16} This may provide an excellent explanation for why the foci of Taiwan tourism promotion seems closely tied to what is prevalent in Japanese mainstream society and heavily utilizes Japanese popular culture elements whenever it goes about reformulating itself. Also, the nostalgic Taiwanese tourism of Japanese tourists may be better understood in terms of the lack of new data used to promote Taiwanese tourism. Pre-established Taiwanese destinations, settled in the colonial period, were reused in the early stage of Taiwan’s tourism
development; and in the concomitant emergence of the nostalgic quest during Japan’s rapid economic development, which urged the Japanese not only to rediscover Japan but to search for their own “lost past” in convenient package tours within neighboring countries.

Creating Familiarity

In the 1980s JAA’s business suffered a setback due to the stigma of Taiwan as a notorious sex tourism destination, primarily associated with Japan’s expansive business network in Asia. JAA also realized it would soon hit a sales ceiling if Taiwan was merely seen as a destination for business trips, and the touristic images of “Iyarashī Taiwan” (a ‘filthy’ or ‘seedy’ impression linked with sex tourism) necessitated refurbishing. The more JAA transformed Taiwan’s touristic imagery, the more it could motivate Japanese tourists to visit it.

On the one hand, we at JAA tried to overthrow the stereotype of business trips for the Japanese “salarim” (サラリーマン white collar salaried men); on the other hand, we wanted to bring in more tourists other than business-associated personnel to Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan was promoted as the destination for family members. In so doing, this would downplay the already stereotyped images of Taiwan as a men’s paradise and would inspire those okusan (奥さん Japanese housewives) to trust their husbands once they realize that Taiwan has a lot to be discovered. They may turn their suspicious attitude into enjoyment of Taiwan with their family members. [Ibid.]

These successful promotion campaigns enabled JAA to transform, if not reverse, the negative erotic images of Taiwanese destinations and thus reconnect the traditional value of family to the company.
The monthly JAA airline magazine, *Asia Echo* (1976-2008), run by a professional team of editors and photographers, witnessed the transformation of Taiwan tourism. That is to say they were present ringside during the process of creating a new familiarity for the Japanese. From the earlier issues, with their superficial introduction of this destination, to later issues on the encounters (deai, 出会い) between Japanese travelers and the local Taiwanese, *Asia Echo* represents a history of how a foreign airline assisted and sometimes filled a void of Taiwanese tourism discourse. It illustrates how this airline, JAA, was capable of serving a supplementary role in bridging Taipei and Tokyo by cooperating with the Association of Cultural Interchange of Japan. Moreover, Taiwan’s cultural identity shift is also discernable in *Asia Echo* Taiwan in its changing content and a new concern with promoting Taiwaneseness. Back issues of *Asia Echo* document an interesting transformation: a shift from promoting exclusively Chinese cuisines to Taiwanese cuisines. It was not until the article entitled “Taiwan Ryōri, Honban no aji” (Taiwanese Cuisine: the Real Taste of Taiwan) was published in 1993 that Taiwan’s cuisine received special attention in their promotions.\(^\text{17}\) In the past the featured Chinese cuisines served in Taiwan’s restaurants constituted a major attraction for Japanese tourists; Taiwanese cuisine was barely acknowledged and merely seen as a sub-category of Fujian dish. In comparison to the former, Taiwan’s local cuisine was seen as mimicry of Fujian cuisine or a fusion of many Chinese dishes.

 Until *xiaolong bao* (小籠包, meat soup dumpling) achieved renown among Japanese
tourists, Taiwan’s local cuisine was often ignored as lacking attraction for foreigners—they came to Taiwan as a destination for high quality Chinese cuisine. According to interviews with JAA staff, the great popularity of this most iconic of Taiwanese foods, *xiaolong bao*, gradually earned its international reputation following JAA’s promotions. This cuisine was discovered by JAA female flight attendants during their short stays in Taipei and gradually became well known among JAA staff. When deciding to bring in some attractions as an alternative to business trips, the JAA staff found their flight attendants’ top-ranked dish might be of interest to the Japanese masses, especially females. After surveying their recommendations and opinions regarding Taiwan’s popular destinations, the JAA then had a blueprint for designing a Japanese-oriented agenda and schedule.

Compared to Taiwan’s varied promotions of “Chineseness” presented in earlier issues of the *Asia Echo*, in tourism promotions of China itself from the same period, Japan tends to focus on China’s spectacular landscapes with a specific interest in Chinese history. *Asia Echo* and *Asahi Ryōkō* advertisements reveal two distinct ways for Japanese tourists to appreciate “Chineseness” as presented by two Chinas, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China. Promotions of Taiwan emphasize the rich representations of Chinese culture in detail on the one hand, and promotions of China use well-worn images of an adventurer-oriented civilization rooted in the ancient river on the other. The sharpening competition over Chineseness pushed Taiwan to concentrate on narrating the cultural variety
and delicacies of the nation, in contrast to China’s effortless appeal to its many ancient heritages. Due to communist China’s imposed restrictions over foreign tourists and a Japanese sense of insecurity when traveling in China, the earlier promotions of Taiwan provided Japanese tourists with an alternative for traveling in a relatively refined and secure Chinese environment. Cooperating with both Japanese and Taiwanese travel agencies, the industry in Taiwan thus became engulfed in narrating ethnicity and selling familiarity. The promotion of Chineseness represented in the Palace Museum, in widespread Chinese cuisine and in daily life can be discerned in JAA’s serial promotions.

These promotions enabled Japanese tourists to imagine and enjoy “Chineseness” by spending a morning in the Palace Museum appreciating the treasures of Chinese civilization or visiting the memorial hall of the former opponent leader, Chiang Kai-Shek, and at night enjoying Peking duck or other dishes from the four major Chinese cuisines. At the same time, though they have been impressed with the richness of Taiwan’s Chinese culture, the historical bonds between Taiwan and Japan situate the Japanese tourists somewhere in Japan’s own past, providing them a combined sense of familiarity and security, which the Japanese tourists could not acquire while touring in China. In this sense, the tour schedule exceeds more than what strictly nostalgic tourism may offer; rather, it offers both newly integrated Chinese elements and nostalgic Taiwan for Japanese tourists. Although having changed over time, current itineraries for the most popular Taipei city tour still reflect a
mixed offering of Chineseness and Taiwaneseness in Taiwan’s tourism.\textsuperscript{22}

Popular culture in East Asia also helps to conflate nostalgia, Japaneseness, Chineseness and Taiwaneseness in Taiwan tourism. In widespread television commercial campaigns throughout Japan, JAA’s use of famous popular icons such as the actor Kaneshiro Takeshi (金城武) and the comedian Shimura Ken (志村健) brought unprecedented success with its campaign “closeness in distance, affinity in culture” (近くて近いね chikakute chikaine) (Lin:113-4).\textsuperscript{23} Emphasizing its geographical and cultural closeness, Taiwan was thus presented as Japan’s closest destination where friendship, delicious food, and landscape constitute the familiar. The combination of the handsome, half-Japanese, half-Taiwanese actor and the master comedian have attracted great attention from Japanese female audiences.\textsuperscript{24} Indeed during my internship in a Japanese tour group in 2010, one female tourist told me that she was sufficiently impressed and thus motivated by the wonderful combination of these celebrities to decide on her first trip to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{25} In another interview with JAA officials, I was told that female-targeted promotions were supported by JAA’s various surveys. In addition to targeting the single Japanese females who possess immeasurable purchasing power, their surveys also suggest that housewives are in charge of choosing destinations for the yearly family vacations.\textsuperscript{26} JAA’s success in promotion strategies not only assuaged the early negative impressions about Taiwan prevalent in Japan but also recreated Taiwan as a female- and family-friendly destination. Followed by a 2006
promotion by the two-woman comedian group Osero, in which the Japanese words “ikitai” (行きたい want to go) and “Taiwan” (たいわん) form the clever portmanteau “Ikitaiwan,” the use of famous Japanese popular icons brought Taiwan into the daily lives of the Japanese audience and thus became an effective approach to promote Taiwan tourism. Images of female figures wandering in the local streets also reinforced the Japanese impression of a place suitable for women to travel. And rediscovered through female eyes, Taiwan is now seen as a wonderful place for gourmet cuisine, foot massage, and “uranai” (fortune telling) (See Appendix B). In the late 1990s, the use of popular icons in tourism promotions became quite common; for example the four-man idol group, F4, along with Taiwan’s trendy drama Liuxinghuayuan (流星花園, Meteor Garden), already popular in East Asia, had unparalleled success in promoting Taiwan (Gao 2003:192-193). The four energetic and handsome male stars of F4 were invited by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, and have become the newest incentives for Japanese women to travel to Taiwan. They have gained great popularity among “pink collar” workers and housewives. As a result, female-oriented images of Taiwan have taken hold in the Japanese mind, namely the minds of “office ladies” (young working women) and middle aged women. I suggest that this indicates the coming of a new phase of Taiwan’s tourism promotions and marks the end of JAA’s domination.

In contrast to the active role taken by JAA prior to its 2008 merger with JAL, Taiwan Kankō Kyōkai (TKK), a semi-official organization of the Taiwan Tourism Bureau in Japan,
had been relatively reluctant to lead the transformation and paid little attention to pop culture
until they witnessed the huge success of JAA in the 1990s. Although sensing the growing
influence of popular culture, TKK focused almost exclusively on the historical and cultural
solidarity between Japan and Taiwan, and have retained a coherent policy of promoting
familiarity. The policy implies a strong sense of nostalgia which juxtaposes Taiwan’s
present and Japan’s past. This dual process remains, although functioning differently for
different populations. In 2009 Kankō Kyōkai published a guidebook through Mainichi
Shinbun on the theme of touring nostalgic Taiwan in an effort to promote Taiwan to the
younger generation as well as to middle-aged and elderly Japanese. Wherever the camera
lens went, a story concerning the Japanese colonial ruling period was presented. Its nostalgic
tone was not always subtle, being clearly presented in its Japanese title “Taiwan nostarujia:
natsukashi nihon no deai tabi” (“Taiwan Nostalgia: Encounters with the Old-Time Japan”).

In its opening remarks, it described this historical complex as such:

Japan, within the 50 years until the 1945 Defeat, brought Japan(esseness) into Taiwan.
After these occurrences (dekiyoto) over the years, [Japan] may have earned both merits
and demerits……The Japanese under 50 years old may possess little knowledge about
Japan’s one-time occupation of Taiwan but may be interested to discover what Japanese
vestiges remain in Taiwan from its long term rule. [2009] 30

As the tourism industry constantly strives to recall the bonds between the host and guest, it is
not surprising that colonial modernity is mentioned in its narration.

During [their] rule over Taiwan, the Japanese government brought foundational
construction such as roads, railways, harbors, dams, and factories to Taiwan. Even today, the Heisei period, there are Japanese who are still dedicated to leaving Taiwan’s current construction project on the map (chizu ni nokoru shikodo) and to the remapping project of discovering contemporary Taiwan (chizu ni okosu shikodo). With huge differences in motivations between them and the Japanese in the past, these Japanese are not driven by ‘Japan’s national policy’ but motivated by their love for Taiwan.31

The romanticization and differentiation of past Japanese motivations seeks to eliminate its colonial implication and to justify Japan’s nostalgic tourism in Taiwan; it in turn also discloses the increasing difficulty of continuing to employ nostalgia in promoting Taiwan.

According to an interview with the director of Taiwan Kankō Kyōkai, a profound relationship between Taiwan and Japan inspired them to plan this special issue on nostalgic Taiwan and this also largely supports his idea that nostalgia is “extremely necessary” for Taiwan’s tourism.32 Giving the example that Taiwan’s modernization was completed on the basis of Japanese colonization, the director pointed out the inseparable and often not intelligible “Japaneseness” thought to preexist in the region which is used in the promotion of Taiwanese culture. Starting from the intertwined historical factors that tie Japan and Taiwan together, the director posed a thought-provoking question: “If the bond were cut off, would the Japanese still be interested in traveling to Taiwan?” (Ibid.). The income from tourism brought by the Japanese in the past has proved this strategy of emphasizing a
discourse of familiarity to be effective. Therefore, nostalgia seems to be an unavoidable yet still useful sentiment in tourism promotion. This approach seems to attest to the difficulty of attempts to decolonize post-war Taiwan, if not the impossibility of such a project, as many critics suggest (Chen 1996:1-53, Lin 2010:111-37).

The wide dissemination of gendered tourism images also helps to present Taiwan as a destination of familiarity that corresponds to current trends in Japanese popular culture. Analyzing the travel writings of Japanese women, Chiu Shwu-Wen’s research on gendered tourism discourses in the images presented of Taiwan criticizes the alliance of the government, mass media, and tourism industry which has created and dominated the gendered images in tourism. In her analysis of the campaign “Nihon no tsukare Taiwan e” (日本の疲れ台湾へ, “Exhausted Japanese, Healing in Taiwan”), Chiu argues that Japanese women have limited choices but to conform to the dominant discourses and perform as passive receivers of the tourism promotion that portrays Taiwan as a destination for hospitality, comfort and submissiveness (Chiu 2006:31-5). On the other hand, at a transnational level, Lin Hsu-Ta focuses on the nostalgia construction project in postcolonial Taiwan and the manipulation of cultural identity and nostalgia in certain destinations in Taiwan (Lin, 111-37). Both Chiu’s and Lin’s analyses look into these image manipulations controlled by the alliance of government/media/industry and powerfully argue for the impossibility of decolonizing Taiwan’s postwar tourism. In this context, Taiwan is still
situated under a tourist gaze that remains colonial and continuously replicates this tourist vision to attract Japanese tourists. What is lacking in Chiu’s and Lin’s analysis is a full appreciation of the capacity of the discourse of familiarity in Taiwan’s tourism representations to resolve the great tensions caused by the historical complex; the representations of a feminized and familiarized Taiwan thus became the main attractions of tourism to Taiwan.

Transformations which occurred afterward show that Taiwanese tourism does not simply correspond to Japanese nostalgia but continues to update itself and to convey diverse fantasies. This great flexibility thus enables the tourism industry to move a step ahead of the transformation of real politics. Taiwan sought balance in its promotions between “Chineseness” and “Japaneseness” during the time that Taiwan was regarded as “the authentic China.” Moreover, in contrast to China’s improvements and massive investments in its tourism industry since the late 1980s, Taiwan cannot do likewise on the same scale but nevertheless works to create more attractions for international tourists. Constructing differences from China to sustain its attractiveness to the Japanese has thus become a major concern of the Taiwan government. Meanwhile, with the rise of Taiwanese cultural identity as well as the pragmatic need to retain its market distinction from the PRC’s Chinese destinations, the emerging focus on promoting Taiwanese characteristics has become quite significant. By absorbing Taiwan’s indigenous (ethnic) and local culture, Taiwan’s tourism
can no longer be called exclusively reliant on nostalgia. Rather, multiple layers of familiarity are at the core of this strategy. Exotic representations of Taiwan’s indigenous (ethnic) culture have been associated with a familiarity that incorporates prewar Japanese fantasies about the indigenous in Taiwan under Japanese rule.33 This changing discourse of familiarity, which started with Japanese Asia Airways, has since been adopted and practiced both by Japanese and Taiwanese travel agencies.34

**Gaps within Promotion Strategies**

It may not be fair to claim that wholesale promotions of nostalgia are outdated, but rather that highly detailed and customized attractions seem quite necessary in recent promotions. The unsatisfactory result of attempts to promote the Taiwanese blockbuster, *Cape No. 7 海角七號* (Wei 2009) in Japan was quite evident.35 Although the film was immediately and extremely popular among Taiwanese audiences and stimulated domestic booms to visit the filming location, Kenting, this film failed to attract as much attention from Japanese audiences as the global award-winning film, *City of Sadness 悲情城市* (Hou 1989), which employed a similar approach to Taiwanese tourism promotion. Focusing on narrating Taiwan’s past and the alluring bonds between Taiwan and Japan, the latter film made Taiwan and the film location, Jiufen, the most desirable Taiwanese destination for Japanese tourists from the 1990s until the 2010s.36 This changing emphasis on familiarity was also accompanied by a differentiation of tourism interests and diversification of tourist
Cooperating with the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, one of the Japan’s major travel agencies, JTB, attempted to utilize a similar strategy to promote its new package for Taiwan tourism. JTB thus held two premier screenings of Cape No. 7 in Tokyo and Osaka in 2010 Spring. However, neither of them achieved their goal of motivating potential tourists to visit Taiwan.

My informant, an employee of the JTB oversea tourism promotion office, commented:

This result surprised us for it was quite different from our expectations. We thought this may bring some new stimulation to the stagnant market of Taiwan tourism. We were invited by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau to experience the model course in southern Taiwan and regarded it as a good start. [2010]

According to another informant at a local agency in Taiwan:

The sale of this particular packaged tour did not go smoothly. Based on previous successful experiences, the staff expected more of the Japanese audiences who attended the screening of the film to purchase the tour on the spot. But the result was hardly satisfactory. Only six couples or so made travel reservations on that day. This was why last month we only had one “Tour of Cape No.7.” [Ibid.]

To the staff, this result may indicate two problems with the fixed representations of Taiwan tourism: first, the emerging demands for a new promotion to replace the previous format of nostalgia; and second, given the young generation’s rejection of packaged tours, the need to find a sustainable business model for Taiwan tourism. My interviews in Japan may partially reflect the challenge that the Taiwanese travel industry is currently facing: the emerging demand to replace the once dominant promotion of nostalgia. The commodification process of familiarity seems to function well in turning nostalgic sentiments into a sense of
familiarity.

What calls extra attention to this transformation are the cleavages that exist amongst Japanese who used to be conceptualized as a homogenous entity. For example, based on interviews with young female college students in Kyoto, Japan in November 2009, I discovered the gap that distinguishes young female students and young “pink collar” ladies (OLs). When invited by an instructor to briefly introduce my research and then to conduct a one hour interview, I was not so aware of the slippage that existed between female college students and OLs at the outset. It was not until I found that Taiwan as a destination held almost no attraction for these college girls, that I adopted a different strategy comparing neighboring countries with Taiwan and asking what “akogare no aru” (憧れのある dreamed and desired) destination would constitute an ideal tourism spot for the young women. During the interviews, I found Europe and America are still first priorities, followed by the tropical paradises of Bali, Guam, and Hawaii. Korea, with its ceaseless promotions of cosmetics and K-pop became the top choice in East Asia. And while Taiwan has gradually lessened its emphasis on its Chineseness, China came in at third place, after Hong Kong, specifically for that Chineseness, represented in slowly diversifying tourist promotions of such attractions as its cuisine and historical relics. Facing a thriving China, Taiwan has not only lost its advantage in attracting Japanese with its Chineseness as it did in previous decades, but also did not rank as one of their key preferences ostensibly due to its lack of exotici
The only girl who expressed an interest in Taiwan had actually been to Taiwan, and she tried to explain to her classmates what attractions the place could offer. With this young woman's opinion voiced and being asked by the instructors again about their willingness to visit Taiwan, other female students began to show an interest. Right after the interview, I had a short conversation with the young woman who had visited Taiwan. She was honest in saying that it was not she who had decided on their Taiwan trip but rather her older sister, an OL in her late twenties. What motivated her sister was the widely promoted image of Taiwan as a healing place of escape, full of delicious cuisine and foot massage, friendly people, and perfectly suited for a weekend trip, all of which seems less attractive to the college aged women. This unexpected result interested both the instructor and me. Attractions that rely heavily on familiarity lack the grand narrative required to bring a comprehensive appeal for all Japanese. This, on the one hand, may be attributable to the success of the customized and differentiated promotions effective and directed towards OLs, but, on the other hand, it indicates that there exists a huge gap amongst young women between 20 and 29 years of age. This deserves more analysis. That is, the presumed homogeneity of social imaginaries often led to overlooking internal group or cohort differences. This also reflects the fact that in most surveys, and tourism surveys in particular, existing categories of gender and age, for example the female aged 20-29, is often coded as a homogenous category. These data seem
to suggest that the major touristic concerns of the OLs are not the disappearing bonds associated with nostalgia but the widely accepted image of Taiwan as an *iyashi* (healing) destination. In addition to this, the indifference of the Japanese youth generation may not only indicate nostalgia’s new ineffectiveness but also a break with the assumed homogeneity of Japanese society.

**Wandering on the Street of the Nostalgic Town: The Case of Jiufen (九份)**

Research on the topic of cultural and historical tourism in the former colonies often leads to debates over whether contemporary tourism is an alternative form of neo-colonialism. Jiufen, a typical historical town in Taiwan that attracts many Japanese, is accordingly one of the main targets of these analyses.

Thanks to Hou’s award-winning film *City of Sadness*, its major filming locale Jiufen
has become one of the most popular destinations in the Taipei suburbs. After reconstruction and revitalization projects, Jiufen has developed into a well-known, must-see destination for both domestic and international tourists. Some Japanese visit Jiufen independently by following the recommended tour itineraries in guidebooks such as Rurubu (るるぶ) or Chikyū no arukikata (地球の歩き方); many participating in packaged tours or in semi-FIT tours (semi-Free Independent Travelers) visit Jiufen by joining the “Jiufen historical tours,” a regular attraction for most Japanese tour groups. Forgotten by the government after having exhausted its gold mine, the site’s buildings and mine retain their original appearance from the Japanese colonial period. Jiufen thus carries more old-time “Japaneseness” than many other cities in Japan: a prewar Japan, difficult to find in rural Japan due to the rapidly changing landscapes of the urbanizing postwar era, yet so tangible in its Asian neighbors. In addition to its nostalgic atmosphere, created and exhibited purposely, this town presents a vivid history of a declining local town as well as its slow life pace. As tourists descend the stone walkway on the hill, the tea houses, occupying an arresting location with a view of the harbor area, offer Chinese cuisine and Chinese green tea to tour participants. When the sun has sunk below the horizon on the sea, red Chinese lanterns are lighted to welcome these visitors. Therefore, a mixture of familiarity and exoticness is sustained to appeal to tourists. Although newly installed food vendors and souvenir shops stand on both sides of the historical street, they do little to alter the nostalgic
qualities of the landscape. As in Jiufen, another internationally famous destination, these modern additions are integrated into the original landscape by selling local artifacts, old-time toys and foods that evoke nostalgia.

The historical town however has changed in terms of its meanings for the tourists. If the site is examined carefully, one may notice that a radical transformation has begun: different emphasis, values, and attractions have been added to this destination. Jiufen, after a few years of promotions relying on City of Sadness, is now targeting the young generation by emphasizing its nightscape as featured in Miyazaki Hayao’s hit animated feature, Spirited Away (sento chihiro no kamikakushi 2001). As a Japanese blogger wrote of this mixed familiarity:

I visited Jiufen, a historical town that is located one-hour driving distance from Taipei. It appeared in the film, City of Sadness, and attracted lots of visiting tourists. Along two sides of its narrow stair walk, the buildings are decorated with red lanterns. The landscape, still retaining the aura of prewar Taiwan, may evoke the nostalgia and memories of certain populations. In fact, this is also the stage of Spirited Away. [Taraberuko chan].

However, the familiar landscapes that appeared in the animation Spirited Away carry almost no geographic significance or resonance to a specifically Taiwanese history or even its past associated with Japan. The Jiufen landscape in Spirited Away is thus perceived by the Japanese tourists as a romanticized old town drawn from Japan’s prewar period. The imaginations of “Shōwa Japan” thus reflect Japanese memories of the earlier life in 1950s and 60s, which has little to do with the war. According to the tour guides of the one-day
Taipei city tour that I joined as a normal tourist, “Recently fewer and fewer tourists are motivated by Hou’s film, but instead, a Miyazaki production seems more interesting and attractive (to the Japanese tourists).” (2010). As one experienced guide said of the A-mei Tea house, “This fabulous locale is the inspiration for the nightscape of the town drawn in Spirited Away. Doesn’t it feel familiar, as if you have seen it somewhere before you ever visited Jiufen?” (Minmin Zemi).

It is not difficult for tourists to switch perspectives from one to the other, from desiring “Shōwa nostalgia,” which highlights the 1950 memories of the Japanese, to feeling recognition of spots which appeared in Spirited Away. Another Japanese blogger expresses this more directly by writing of Jiufen, “This place is saturated with Shōwa nostalgia and at the same time famous for being the stage of the animation, ‘sen to chihiro’” (Regina Blog). The tourists compared the historical town to one Japanese village they have visited before in rural Japan, but in the next minute they contrasted a specific Jiufen store located in Jisan Street (基山街) to the catering house in Spirited Away, the location where the protagonist’s parents ate and later on were cursed, transforming into pigs. What truly excited them was the discovery that the tea house that appeared in City of Sadness is located just across from another tea house that inspired Miyazaki’s archetype illustration of the nightscape in Spirited Away.

The two juxtaposed imaginings of this destination, one oriented towards Japan’s past
and one towards a modern anime, thus demonstrates how a transforming sense of familiarity helps to promote a historical site while still sustaining its nostalgia. As he argues in his analysis of Jiufen as a destination of postcolonial nostalgia, Lin suggests that the mission of decolonization is incomplete and unfulfilled due to the manipulation of cultural identity (Lin 2010: 111-37). His assertion of the “hybridity of multiple identities” (Lin 112) on the site merely describes the current situation in Taiwan but helps little to explain how and why the tourism business could so successfully turn these chaotic representations into profit; or more importantly, how this strategy could later be used to attract the PRC tourist without changing too much of its discourses. Interpreting from the transformation of tourism in an intra-Asia context, I contend that the successful ongoing strategies of promoting familiarity, as in the various discourses about Jiufen and Taiwan as a whole, have created a vacuum of colonial memories and history that allows little room for cultural identities to play.

**Conclusion: Journey from Iyarashī to Iyashi**

In this chapter, I presented a transformation of Taiwanese tourism, targeting Japanese tourists, as the journey from the “iyarashī” to the “iyashi;” in other words, the journey to change perceptions of Taiwan from a “seedy” to a “healing” location. To Japan Asia Airways, the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, and travel agencies, the greatest challenges over the past few decades were focused on how to promote tourism in Taiwan effectively without directly touching upon the sensitive issue of the colonial period. Their concerns, although perhaps
overshadowed in the popular mind by pervasive enmity toward China’s interventions in
Taiwan, are still predominant as the core issue in Taiwan’s tourism promotions. This
transformation constitutes a dual process. First, before presentation of potential tours to
tourists, representations have gone through a simplification process that only connotes
positive historical meanings. The tourists may easily absorb tales and images of the fruitful
modernization brought by Japanese to these destinations without further considering the dark
side of colonialism.47 Due to the purposeful removal of colonial influence and the “self-
censored” interpretations given by the tour guides, Japanese tourists encounter few
difficulties in their positive and passive touristic imaginings. This was observed by Kajiwara,
where Japanese tourists may play indifference or naïve at the sites because of the specific,
obscuring representations made only to Japanese tourists regarding the battlefield of the
Philippines during the Pacific War (Kajiwara 1997). Second, the “Other” has gone through a
strictly selective process which situates Japanese tourists in their version of the past where
there is no room for Taiwan’s colonial history to come into play. By connecting the
contemporary to the past, the industry successfully creates a sense of familiarity that is not
necessarily determined and presented by the tourism location. In short, it can be seen as an
alternative form of Japanese domestic tourism, which largely relies on familiarity.

This pursuit of familiarity in Taiwan tourism is especially obvious in the several
successful old-time railway trips, co-organized by the Taiwan Tourism Bureau and the
Taiwan Railway Bureau, which are designed to create nostalgia and recall childhood memories for both domestic and Japanese tourists as they enjoy a short journey in the trains of an old mountain rail-line, Ping-Xi Line.

When the train passed the tunnel, its steam whistle blew. Some Japanese tourists became quite sentimental after the horn blew and the dust, produced by this coal-burning train, fell down and covered their faces. When the old-fashioned oshibori (wet towels) were provided to the tourists to wipe their tainted faces, I saw their faces were also saturated with tears. They were enjoying these nostalgic experiences. The drama of these old memories made the senior Japanese passengers sentimental, and mentioned later to me [the vice chief director] that this train brought them back to their childhood.

This trip does not necessarily situate Japanese tourists in “the past” associated with colonized Taiwan; instead the railway evokes childhood memories of the Japan of yesteryear, in which Taiwan and its colonial past may appear harmless. Commodified familiarity has replaced and surpassed nostalgia as the most effective promotion tool to attract the Japanese. In other words, the intertwined historical complex among Taiwan, Japan and China has made Taiwan’s cultural tourism turn to the pursuit of familiarity. The capitalized “History,” the official and cultivated tale, remains unchanged, but the storytelling of history, and its associated tourism business and souvenir sales, has been transformed.

The “collective forgetfulness” of younger Japanese generations, articulated by Lisa Yoneyama in her critical examination of memory concerning the Hiroshima atomic bomb, is also discernable in their indifference toward the recent past between Japan and its neighboring country. Their aloofness toward a singular capitalized “History” can be
understood in the context of their participation in Taiwanese tourism. Nostalgia with its implications of the past seems to be a heavy burden with little appeal for young Japanese. The frank reactions of the Japanese college women toward Taiwan as an overseas tourism destination reflect the gradual loss of appeal of promotion strategies that depend on historical familiarity. However, the conspicuous contrast between female college students and the female pink-collar workers, in terms of Taiwan as the destination of healing, suggests a differentiated promotion strategy is adopted to host these familiar strangers of different identities, genders, and importantly, ages. In this process, the abstract but growing concept of familiarity seems to be the most effective strategy to incorporate tourists of diverse interests.

To summarize, the development of Taiwan tourism since WWII, although still in transition, indeed presents an interesting portrait of the journey from the iyarashi (filthy) to the iyashi (healing) and tanoshi (entertaining) by continuously creating elements of shitashi (familiarity).
Notes to Chapter 4

1 Kin Mirei (金美齡), a dissident leader against the KMT administration and a famous political commentator in Japan, once revealed her affinity with Japan in her public conversation with Taiwan’s former president Lee, Teng-hui. See “Utsukushi no shima no miryoku wo katari tukusō! Nihon to ebukaishima dakara ‘natukashiku’ tanoshimeru” in Marugodo isatsu Taiwan wo iku.

2 This nostalgic longing is revealed not only by the “Discovering Japan” campaign conducted by the Japan National Railway, as analyzed by Ivy, but also by the Post War overseas tourism of the Japanese.

3 Through the technological advances of mass media, people are able to appropriate cultural images from other societies and lay claim to “borrowed” memories (Iwabuchi, 2002:549).

4 See Taiwan Tourism Bureau, Annual Report of 2011.

5 Data based on my interview with staff in the Taiwan Tourism Association (June 2010.)

6 See the 2009 tourism statistics from the Taiwan Tourism Bureau as well as their analysis concerning the decade from 2001 to 2010.

7 The case of PRC tourists in Taiwan focuses more on how social imaginings of Taiwan have been created and transformed, which I will discuss in depth below.

8 “Anshin to shinrai” are frequently seen in Japanese promotional flyers for Taiwan tourism; therefore tourism based on this sense of safety and reliability is suitable for women.

9 This refers to the nostalgic longing “for the changed or disappearing lifeways of the “primitive” or the “peasant” people of their colonies and the people of the “Oriental” countries they failed to colonize directly.”

10 According to the 50th year special issue of Taiwian kankō kyokai (2006: 48-57), the Taiwanese travel industry first began on 11/25/1965 to host US military officers associated with the Vietnam War. In the six years until April 1972, there were more than 211,000 US military personnel who spent their vacation in Taiwan. These American tourists helped to found Taiwan’s post war tourism, a major component of which were erotic images of Taiwan. With America’s retreat from Vietnam, the US military waned as the major source of tourism income, to be replaced by Japanese business associates. This perpetuated Taiwan’s image as a male paradise until 1976, when the government and the industry began to promote Taiwan as a paradise for female travelers as well (Yeh 2006).

11 Taiwanese tourism was established under the Japanese colonial administration after the railway system was completed. The original purpose was to allow Japanese citizens to appreciate the modernization projects carried
on in its overseas colony and also allow colonial subjects to experience the modernity that the Japanese brought
to them (see Soyama 2003 and Su 2006).

12 In this sense, tourism is a lens for the tourists to rediscover self and to define others, and this identification
process is completed by the wide use of mass media to produce and promote tourism imaginations.

13 See Chen Zhidong. “ANK yu JAL gengming huiguì riximuongongsi luokfù geng bianli” (ANK 與 JAL 更名
回歸日系母公司，旅客赴日更便利).

14 Interview with former JAA staff in Dec 2009.

15 Many of them were carried out for the purpose of intensifying the informal relationship between Japan and
Taiwan and the JAA expected they would benefit from doing these regular intercommunication activities,
granting more opportunities to do business with the Taiwanese government.

16 “In promoting Taiwan, we had a lot of difficult times dating back to the 1980s in our effort to present Taiwan
as an overseas tourism destination. Taiwan, to be honest, was regarded as having very limited tourism
resources. We strove to catch up to current trends in Japan and introduced the latest ideas in order to link
Taiwan to what is popular in Japan” (Interview with former JAA staff in Spring 2010).

17 See the article “Taiwan Ryôri, Honban no aji” in Asia Echo 1993(213).

18 In a conversation on why the most famous restaurant in Taiwan has become extremely popular among
Japanese, the informant shared this anecdote of how they picked up this food as iconic of Taiwan (Interview
with former JAA staff in Spring 2010).

19 Commercials posted by travel agencies in Gekkan Asahi Ryoko. See Asahi Ryoko 1980(4).

20 In Gekkan Asahi Ryoko, promotions of China, despite also featuring its ancient river civilization, Tang
poetry and story of the Three Kingdoms, emphasis was still placed on the Chinese landscape and China as an
ancient dynasty (Ibid).

21 These destinations still constitute the major part of Taiwanese tourism nowadays, but the tourism industry
has switched its emphasis from its Chineseness to the convenience of traveling in Taiwan; travelers are able to
enjoy these mixed pleasures simultaneously.

22 Taiwaneseness was added for the purpose of distinguishing its attractions from that of China and more ethnic
indigenous elements have been added to enrich the tourism schedule. Even today in a typical Taipei city tour,
the Chineseness of the major attractions is still discernible and yet promoted in a different way.

23 See “Chikakute chikaine niho to taiwan” in Lin Hsu-Ta’s analysis of Japanese nostalgic travels in Taiwan. He
persuasively argues that the catchphrase “chikakute chikaine” implies the closeness between Japan and Taiwan geographically and culturally, the former referencing the shortened travel time and the latter building significantly on the close relationship in colonial history and culture between Japan and Taiwan (Lin 113-4).

24 As Lin asserted in his analysis (Ibid.) I used to interpret the success of this seemingly contradictory combination this way: the young handsome Kaneshiro represents the perfect mixture of the Japanese and Chinese and help to give a fashionable appearance to the tourism of Taiwan, and the “owarai” master Kimura on the other hand implies that Taiwan tourism is a recreational alternative widely enjoyed by the Japanese. However, the JAA staff told me that in the beginning they invited Kaneshiro to be their advertising star. Kaneshiro insisted he would take the job only if they could find Shimura Ken, his idol since childhood, to do the campaign together. JAA was concerned about the negative impression that Shimura might leave with his “shimo neta” (colorful jokes). But it turned out to be an enormous success after the two became iconic of Taiwan tourism, making a positive impression on would-be Japanese travelers.

25 Conversation with one female tourist in her late forties in May 2010.

26 Interview in Spring 2010 with a former JAA staff member who was in charge of promoting Taiwanese tours.

27 Based on flyers I collected in Taiwan and Japan’s travel agencies.

28 See the Chinese official website“Liuxing huayuan.”

29 Use of popular icons in the promotions of Asian tourism became quite common, such as Taiwan’s male idol group “Feilunhai 飛輪海,” the Korean popular drama “On Air,” and others. The great popularity of the Taiwanese male idol group “Feilunhai” helps to motivate young and middle age Japanese women to visit Taiwan for “fandom tours.” The news article describes the ecstatic response of thousands of Japanese female fans when a Taiwanese icon appeared in the Tokyo travel festival. See Cao Yuan. “Yinghuamei mi feilunhai tanhuan dongjing luzhan” (櫻花妹迷飛輪海 鯖瘓東京旅展).


31 Ibid: 44 (My translation).

32 Interview with the chief director of Kankō Kyokai in Feb 2010.

33 Japanese knowledge of Taiwan’s indigenous people is not a postwar construction; rather it can be dated back to the colonial period under Japanese rule and has been closely associated with the Japanese colonial policy that utilized the “savageness” of the colonized to justify the rule of colonizer. The inherited representations thus offer both limited exoticness and familiarity to the postwar Japanese tourist bound for Taiwan.
Decreasing profits made the agencies hesitate to invest time and budgets in discovering and promoting new destinations. After low-fare packaged tours became the ruling mode of tourism, keen competition for market shares discouraged these agencies from creating new content and drove them to sell similar packages. In most cases, the local agencies in Taiwan have been responsible for designing a low-cost itinerary and the Japanese agencies have ensured its appeal to the Japanese. (Interview with local travel agencies in Taiwan in Spring 2010).

This film was quite successful in Hong Kong and South East Asia, areas where many Chinese speaking populations live. And this film further motivated them to visit Taiwan. See the Japanese official website and Chinese website for Cape No. 7.

See the article entitled “中国シフトへの反動か 強まる日本時代へのノスタルジー,” “Reaction to China-leaning policy? The intensifying nostalgia toward the Japan colonial period.” This article suggests that the film became a blockbuster in Taiwan mainly because of the enmity of the Taiwanese youth generation over China’s constant threats to take over Taiwan. This strong reaction has prompted the young generation, already fond of Japanese popular culture, to internalize nostalgia toward Japan’s colonial period.

JTB, founded in 1912 as the Japan Tourist Bureau, changed its name to Nihon Kotsu Kosha Foundation in 1945, and again to JTB Corp. in 1963. Since 1968, it began its overseas tourism business by promoting its brand name “Look JTB”

Interview with a staff member of JTB Kansai who was in charge of overseas tour promotion in Spring 2010.

It was even more interesting when I heard a girl ask her classmate, “Would it be too offensive if I said Taiwan never came to my mind as a tourism destination?”

Her description of Taiwan’s tourism attractions to the young Japanese female are extremely similar to what have been analyzed in Chiu’s article (Chiu 7-40).

Individual travelers and scholars tend to claim great differences between backpackers and packaged tour participants. However, the contents provided by the tour guide books, especially in Japan, often utilize similar storytelling about the destinations.

In most cases, Jiufen is already included in their free one-day city trip, which has been covered in their travel charges.


Interview in May 2010 with a veteran tour guide.
45 See Minmin zemi. “taiwan nosutarujiku kyufun” (台灣 ノスタルジック九份). Similar thoughts can also be seen here; the writer attempted to find out the real landscape represented in Mizaki’s work.

46 See Regina blog. “kyū bun wa shō wa nosutarujiku na kaori ga nogoru eiga ‘sentochihiro’ no budai” (九分は昭和のノスタルジックな香りが残る、映画『千と千尋』の舞台)

47 Storytelling about tourist destinations in Taiwan deserves more attention. For instance, the grand Taiwan President Hall was once used as the Governor’s Residence Hall during the colonial period. However, touring the site with Japanese tourists, most tour guides chose to draw less attention to the colonial past but instead focus on how many positive influences the Japanese left for the Taiwanese. Without delving too deeply into how Taiwan’s agriculture satisfied the demands of imperial Japan, another example is the presentation of Taiwanese admiration for the father of the Jianan plain, Yada Yoichi, whose great contribution was the design and construction of the great Jianan dam to create an agricultural water supply.

48 In a lecture given by Liu Xilin (劉喜臨), the vice chief director of the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, during the tour leader training in which I participated (2010 January).
CHAPTER 5

IMAGINING BAODAO, IMAGINING “CHINESENESS”

Taiwan is the treasure island of China, and is a place I have always looked forward to visiting. Although I am 67 years old, if it is possible, I would like to go to Taiwan. Even if I am too old to walk, I will crawl. [Wen 2009]

Increasing confidence accompanied by a thriving economy in recent years enabled the government of the PRC to develop multiple and flexible strategies for its “across strait” politics to deal with the issue of Taiwan more practically than before. Realizing the impossibility of controlling Taiwan’s public opinions and the negative ramifications of an overt or forceful pro-reunification agenda, China has attempted to ease the great tension between China and Taiwan by intensifying communication and cooperation, with emphasis on economics and tourism. Therefore, in the name of increasing mutual understanding and in light of their purposeful avoidance of political agreements, tourism has emerged as one of the best options for mutual visits. Mainlanders’ tours of Taiwan particularly serve two mutually-beneficial purposes: first, Taiwan reaps the financial benefits of PRC tourist dollars, invigorating Taiwan’s stagnant economy; second, the PRC government hopes to foster a “Hong Kong effect” in Taiwan by creating an economy dependent on and friendly towards the PRC government. In this sense, what MacCannell cogently argues has become especially true as the Taiwanese tourism industry has begun to host Chinese tourists: “Tourism is not
just an aggregate of merely commercial activities, it is also an ideological framing of history, nature, and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs” (1992:1). Since 2008, frequent mutual visits and cooperation have indicated an improved China-Taiwan relationship. In 2010, Chinese tourists have surpassed Japanese tourists as the most numerous foreign visitors. Meanwhile, the tourism industry has been experiencing a major transformation.³

Benefiting from this policy, the Taiwanese tourism industry has attained striking success since July 2008. With wholehearted support from the Chinese government, Chinese visitors departing for Taiwan have surpassed Japanese tourists with 1.3 million visitors in 2010. Moreover, in June 28 2011, the Taiwanese government’s sanction of individual Chinese travelers (a “free tour” or FIT) in addition to tour groups has been considered not only a great stride in improving across-Strait relations but also of potentially great economic benefit for Taiwan in the coming decades.⁴ Based on Hong Kong’s similar experience with Chinese tourism, some Taiwanese media outlets have predicted an influx of more than 10 million Chinese tourists annually.⁵ In terms of business scale, in 2008 there were initially 13 provinces and 33 authorized travel agencies that received official permission to operate tours of Taiwan, including eleven in Beijing, two in Shanghai, and five in Guangdong.⁶ Two and half years later in December 2011, the amount has grown to 21 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions and 164 travel agencies nationwide.
Although requirements have gradually become less stringent, obtaining a Chinese travel visa to Taiwan requires an annual income which is still considered high. These restrictions however did little to deter PRC tourists who were able to travel to Taiwan, with official recognition, for the first time. Even the high fare, as expensive as an overseas trip to a more “exotic” location, does not appear to discourage PRC citizens from embarking on a Taiwanese tour. “Stepping foot on Taiwanese ground” thus has constituted the most vital part of this experience, irreplaceable by any other overseas tour experience.7

This policy of tourism cooperation seems to presage an unprecedented stage in the China-Taiwan relationship. What does Taiwan’s transforming policy and China’s changing attitude toward Taiwan mean? And what is behind the transformation of tourist attitudes – what motivates Chinese to visit Taiwan? To put it simply, these questions both point to the same answer, the baodao ideology of the Chinese, which helps to construct their imaginations toward Taiwan. Moreover, these questions cannot be answered separately for both are linked to the current, changing social imaginaries of the Chinese. Only through investigation of these changing social imaginaries can one illuminate the whole picture of the tourism transformation in Taiwan and understand the Chinese tourists who tour in Taiwan.

Departing from the strong sentiment and historical familiarity constructed since the Qing’s 1896 cession of Taiwan, this chapter aims to explore the re-interpretation of China’s
contemporary history as well as the CCP-KMT relationship as described in Chinese popular media products. Moreover, through examining changing discourses of “Chineseness,” the CCTV documentary *Liangan Gugong* (兩岸故宮) has built upon the presumed inseparable relationship between China and Taiwan, and has gone further in suggesting a shared Chineseness by emphasizing a history of national treasures transported to Taiwan. In this transformation, the Chinese media possess a strong influence in constructing and disseminating the social imaginary toward Taiwan. Because of the inarguable power of modern televised media, dissemination of meaning and construction of cultural identity accordingly can be traced and understood from media products such as film, documentaries, and television as well as popular writings and travel guidebooks.

Building upon Thompson’s discussion of American soap operas broadcasted in Australia as an effective way to imagine the “absent other,” Barker (1999) asserts that television helps to shape the “provision and the selective construction of social knowledge practice, of social imaginaries through which we perceive the ‘world,’ the lived realities’ of others, and imaginary reconstruct their lives and ours into some intelligible ‘world-of-the–whole’” (Barker, 1999:3). Although Barker focused on television, his notions remain applicable to other kinds of media in understanding how “the other” is imagined. Therefore, through examining popular writings, guidebooks and other mass media products, this chapter will present how the Chinese imaginary of Taiwan is sustained and thus
underlies mainlanders’ Taiwan tourism. My fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai in 2009 and 2010 helps to explore the “baodao ideology,” the emotional ties and various social imaginaries of the Chinese toward Taiwan, which have motivated these tourists to join in Taiwan tours. In this chapter, instead of addressing encounters with these PRC tourists in Taiwan, I intend to focus on what circumstances in China have been created to motivate these PRC citizens. What has created this ideology and fueled the Taiwan craze? I will examine how the PRC imaginings of Taiwan have been constructed through their daily lives and are presented in their tourism.

**Imaginary concerning the “Taiwan of China” and Zuoguo baodao**

China’s Taiwan complex can be dated back to Qing in 1896 when Taiwan was ceded to Japan. In her book *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures 1683-1895*, Emma Teng presents the gradually transforming images of Taiwan during Qing’s imperialism. In the Chinese construction, Taiwan first appeared in Qing maps, illustrations, and travel writings as the “savage island” located “beyond the sea”, the empire’s frontier, and as a “Chinese province, an integral part of the Chinese empire” (3). Through this repetitive cultural construction, Teng argues, Taiwan finally became a symbolic representation of China’s lost territory and a site to host Chinese nationalism. Her notion of imagined geography “refers to not only the physical geography of the island, but to its cultural construction through representation” (Hostetler 2005:492). To argue along similar
lines as Emma Teng about this cultural construction through time, I intend to examine the representations of China’s Taiwan complex and its transforming imaginaries of Taiwan.

After the Qing Empire, neither the PRC nor the ROC wholly dominated the construction of the Chinese imaginaries of Taiwan. Although China’s complex regarding Taiwan has long been intensified by mourning its loss to Japan, China’s imaginary would not have lasted long if Chiang Kai-Shek and the KMT had not participated in the competition for “the authentic Chineseness” that was used to claim its legitimacy. Being treated as “the base of recovering China,” Taiwan under the early KMT administration was nothing more than a vessel to be filled with various imaginaries of “Chineseness” and served as a showcase for its authentic Chinese culture.

As discussed previously, mutual constructions about “the other China” thus occurred in the context of this “Chineseness competition.” Because “Chineseness” is firstly defined as one and unbreakable, ceaseless competitions over Chineseness thus became a zero-sum game for both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While the KMT-led ROC (Taiwan) strived to reinsert Taiwan into its grand Chinese imaginaries by presenting itself as the defender of Chinese civilization, the PRC was thus enabled to continue its narrative about the inseparable relationship between China and Taiwan and the national pathos of this unwilling separation. The metaphor of familial ties, omnipresent in school education and mass media, has thus dominated many Chinese thoughts. In today’s China, the narrative continues to
transform in the search for an alternative interpretation for the Nationalist past and the memories of the Sino-Japan War. Changing attitudes are not only evident in China’s efforts to reinterpret the recent past, but also reflected in their attitudes toward the Chineseness that Taiwan has guarded and preserved. Chineseness now has become sharable and, more importantly, a symbol with which to reunify Taiwan with China.

One may also wonder why the Taiwanese tourism representations that target Chinese tourists lack the diverse ethnicities that are presented to potential Western tourists. On the surface, it seems quite persuasive that China, with its own 56 minority groups, would not find an emphasis on diversity alluring. Though this may be a contributing factor, the primary reason for this lack of representational diversity is Taiwan’s role as the site of Chineseness in the Chinese imaginary, a role which makes any other ethnicities superfluous as a draw. It is the ideology and imaginaries of “baodao” (“treasure island”) that resulted in the homogenous representations of Taiwan’s ethnicity in their wholehearted promotions of Chineseness. The Taiwan represented in the Qing construction was a traditionally Han-dominated territory where the other ethnicities of Taiwan became invisible. The long term constitution of Taiwan as the empire’s baodao still remains true and continues in recent tourism representations of Taiwan which mirror the Qing’s gradual conversion and Sinicization of “the island of ‘inhospitable wilderness’ into an agricultural colony producing lucrative cash crops” (Teng 2004:27).
Re-presenting History

Changing interpretations of the past are not rare in Socialist societies. As Rubie Watson cogently points out, “Under State Socialism the past was read from the present, but because the present changed (leaders, plans, and lines of thinking came and went) the past also had to change” (Watson 1994:1). Similarly, the manipulation of history and collective memories is still discernible in post-socialist society, but as other societies have achieved success in this mission by emphasizing collective amnesia, China has utilized multiple specific approaches to re-narrating the past to satisfy current demands. In China, changing interpretations and reevaluations of the Kuomintang, its former enemy in the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), thus emerged from demands for cooperation among the Chinese to achieve the ultimate goal of unification. History thus has been narrated differently.

China’s recent exertion of soft power in its international relations has been of increasing world-wide concern; this new diplomatic strategy is also evident in the case of its across-Strait communications. In light of this, it is intriguing to examine China’s changing attitudes toward Taiwan and its changing policy in this across-Strait relationship. Popular entertainment may convey the substance of this transforming attitude. In order to resolve tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the “hidden history” of the Nationalists’ contribution in the Anti-Japanese War emerged. During this transition, mass media, popular media in particular, has taken an essential role in creating a friendly atmosphere for the
Kuomintang (KMT), as the CCP began to promote a transformed image of the Nationalist in Chinese history. Presenting the KMT as a respectful opponent in the Civil War, the CCP-led Chinese government thus gives credit to the KMT’s efforts in the anti-Japanese struggle. With the wide reception these dramas and shows received among the Chinese, positive images of the KMT began gradually to be taken for granted by the audience.

These historical transformations and reinterpretations are occurring within a thriving China. Among a number of grand events and popular receptions is the craze which surrounded the 2009 Chinese blockbuster *Jianguodaye (The Founding of a Republic)* (Huang 2009), which focuses on multiple storylines about struggles for Liberation and the foundation of the People’s Republic of China. The film is set mainly against the background of anti-Japanese struggles in the pre-Liberation period and is one of the more renowned Chinese celebrations of its own national birth. Along with many other TV shows on similar themes screened during the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, this film has engaged in re-narrating the contemporary past with a new telling. This film departs from a clichéd relationship between the KMT and the CCP as clearly defined antagonist and hero, to a novel storytelling that presents Chiang Kai-Shek and the KMT leaders as persons unable to resist the overwhelming tide of Liberation. This “main melody movie,” a genre which reiterates the party line or “main melody” and strives for a pedagogical and ideological impact on society, not only brought a record-breaking 4.2
billion dollar box office to Han Sanpin’s China Film Group（中國電影集團）, but also presented a revision of China’s contemporary history to PRC audiences, of conciliation and negotiation between CCP and KMT, a revision which Jianguodaye was not the first to deliver. ¹¹

This changing attitude, which viewed the KMT not as a former enemy but instead as a future partner through reunification, also helped to change the tone of previous Chinese popular historical narrations. During the 60th anniversary of the CCP revolution in 2010, there emerged a fever of re-narration of the modern Chinese history of the Anti-Japanese War. Instead of the previous propaganda dramas that concentrated on state- and party-driven history, numerous TV series produced by Chinese popular media have focused on the personal struggles of common humanity and the bittersweet rounds of their daily lives in this period. The Anti-Japanese War, presented as a shared background, offers these cinematic protagonists – the Chinese farmers, guerrillas, patriots, spies, and intellectuals – a setting in which to act. The popularity of the Minguo (Nationalist) period narratives reached its peak with the September 2009 premiere of the aforementioned blockbuster The Founding of a Republic, starring an enthusiastic cast of the most famous Chinese mainland and Hong Kong actors, to celebrate the 50 year anniversary of the birth of the Chinese Nation in 1949.

Attempts to re-envision the CCP-KMT relationship are visible in the plot of the film, a study of the nuanced and subtle interactions within Chaing-Kai-Shek’s family.¹² By using
father-son interactions and conversations between Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Guo, this movie unmasksthe once demonized KMT figures from China’s early works and humanizes their former opponents. In a scene between father and son set in Nanjing, Chiang Kai-Shek prevents the young and ambitious Chiang Ching-Guo from attempting further reform of the corrupt Shanghai, because Chiang at the time had to rely on the financial support of the Song family, dominant in Shanghai’s underground economy during the Civil War. Chiang Kai-Shek, who has been widely represented as the man behind the rapid descent into corruption, is instead presented in Jiangupdaye as a father sincerely concerned with China’s future and the economic reform that Chiang Ching-Guo believes in: “[A very tough decision]! If it is done, the [KMT] party dies, but if there is no reform, the nation collapses.” Along with the softened images of the Chiang family presented on screen, Chiang and other KMT officers are presented not as traitors to Liberation but as other powerful competitors for the New China. The production of this film and the symbolic meaning it conveys, if not historic events in themselves, at least demonstrate the trajectory of these reinterpretations of history. This film implies that in such a great national crisis, both the patriotic CCP members and the KMT leaders were significant in contemporary Chinese history and both dreamed of a strong and wealthy China; it is the difficulties of political reality that made them choose different paths of national development.
Re-narrating Chineseness at Two Palace Museums

No matter what reasons motivated the transportation of cultural artifacts from the Palace Museum in that year, it has all become history. Taiwan nowadays, like the kite of the Chinese nation, soars into the sky, attracts the eyes of the world, and pulls the heart strings of the Chinese nation. The cultural artifacts remain in the Taiwan Palace Museum, serving as the thread linking the kite, tightly binding the two sides across [the Taiwan Strait] together. [13] [nalixunzhao nafenai 2011]

The re-narration of the connection between the two Palace Museums in Beijing and Taipei present an excellent case study of how Chineseness has been reconstituted and the Chinese national identity is being retold. In resistance to Taiwan’s assertions of independence that threaten unification with China, this discourse of shared Chineseness has
been fore-grounded through repeated emphasis of the Chinese valuables nowadays exhibited in Taipei’s Palace Museum and the epic difficulty of their safe transportation during the Anti-Japanese War. Along with the gradually softening representations of the KMT figures shown in the PRC’s major media, this changing perspective on Chineseness enables the CCP mainstream media to interpret the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War from a different perspective, recognizing the KMT’s contributions in the Anti-Japanese War. This changing attitude thus enables a greater discursive transformation of Chinese identity and a shared Chinese history. The mainlanders’ Taiwan tourism and the cooperation between the two Palace Museums allow the CCP government and its mass media to further describe a shared Chineseness, the Chineseness delivered from the mainland to Taiwan, from the core to the periphery. This exchange avoids the once divisive issue of what is the “authentic China” and emphasizes the continuity of Chineseness. In other words, this nullifies the fight between the CCP and KMT for sole and inseparable Chineseness. Through the example of the two Palace Museums, the narrative suggests that this Chineseness has been well spread from China to Taiwan and is successfully transplanted.

Among various mass media products, the CCTV documentary *Liangan Gugong* (兩岸故宮 2009) is one of the best examples of this transition. This documentary consists of two volumes, *Beijing Gugong* and *Taipei Gugong*, the cover caption of which reads:

Taipei Gugong (the Palace Museum in Taipei) preserves valuable collections of arts and artifacts gathered by the Chinese emperors. It is a showcase of the 5000
thousand year history of the Chinese nation, for China only has one Gugong, the history divided into two, in Beijing and Taipei. They originated from the same source and together present the depth and width of Chinese civilization. [Liangan Gugong 2009]

The first volume of the documentary, *Beijing Gugong*, tells the great history of the Forbidden City and introduces its various collections from late Qing to the Nationalist period then to the post-Liberation period. The other volume, *Taipei Gugong*, a twelve-episode documentary and the sequel to *Beijing Gugong*, introduces the collection exhibited in Taipei to its target PRC audience. In the last episode, the documentary mourns the estrangement of these national treasures, separated by national misfortune into two sites. At the same time, the symbolic mother-son lineage this circumstance affords may help to validate the implied continuity of Chineseness. One audience member’s response to the documentary echoes the national metaphor of China as the motherland and Taiwan as the once lost child:

> Compared to the magnificent nature of the (Beijing) Gugong, the Taipei Gugong gives the impression of delicacy and profound love. It might have originated from the special relation between Taipei Gugong and Beijing Gugong. It is akin to the feeling of missing and anticipation that a mother has through years of longing for her son’s return! Because this (documentary) is narrated in a warm female voice, the effect of this is extraordinarily touching, similar to falling spring rain that moistens the ground.  

[Customer Review from Dangdangwan 2009]

The driving concerns behind these portraits of the two Palace Museums are 1) how to rebuild the connections between China and Taiwan and 2) how to find an alternate way to re-narrate the spread of Chineseness. It is these issues which have preoccupied the mind of the Chinese government. This process of transportation from Beijing to Taipei no longer symbolizes the loss of ancient Chinese heritage, “robbed” by Chiang’s KMT. It instead
represents the continuity of Chineseness, emphasizing the steady determination of the Gugong staff as well as the unwavering desire of the Nationalist government to protect the nation’s most valuable treasures from the Japanese invasion. The happy results of this risky transportation process argue against the CCP’s previous claim that the KMT stole China’s most valuable national treasures, and gives credit to its efforts to preserve Chinese tradition.

The intertwined relationship between the two Palace Museums, one in the Forbidden City in Beijing and the other in Taipei, enables the documentary to re-narrate the deeply rooted connections of Chineseness. Gugong, therefore, serves as one of the best examples of how a productive discourse concerning Chineseness has emerged to tightly tie the PRC and the ROC together. In the episode entitled “Guobao dagianxi” (國寶大遷徙), stories of the so-called “largest-scale migration of a civilization in human history” have moderated the negative connotations of the KMT’s decision to ship the Gugong artifacts to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War. The documentary mourns the tragedies of the Anti-Japanese War and praises the patriotism of the museum staff in Beijing. Because of the courage of the curators who chose to guard the Forbidden City, the Beijing Palace Museum emerged unscathed by the war, retaining its original appearance. They rejected Chiang Kai-Shek’s orders and, risking great danger, stayed to protect the priceless cultural artifacts of Beijing. Yet the documentary draws no distinction between those patriots who stayed behind and those “traitors” who transported some of the treasures to Taiwan, choosing
instead to emphasize the continuity of Chinese civilization and the successful delivery of this reified Chineseness. As in many television shows and movies produced in the past two or three years, the recurring message attributes long distance migration to the nation’s misfortune and underlines the mainstream narrative. Striving to reconnect the “two Chinas,” the documentary uses a persuasive, emotionally-laden tone to portray the continuity of Chinese tradition and shared Chineseness.

The personal suffering of the museum staff has been absorbed into and intertwined with a greater national discourse that is tightly associated with the hardship of the transportation process. Liang Kuanzhong (梁匡忠), son of a museum staff member Liang Tingwei (梁廷煒), and later museum staff himself, oversaw the risky transportation process. Liang has noted sadly, “The artifacts are divided into two and preserved respectively by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the staff who guarded the national treasures never returned [to the mainland] after they left” (Liangan Gugong 2009). This was a painful separation for these museum staff members, who could not return home in the later political turmoil. Zhuang Lin (莊靈), the son of Zhuang Yan (莊嚴), another staff member who aided in the transport, describes his father’s constant thoughts of return:

He thought after a couple years everything would be fine; who could predict that a couple of years would turn into decades? He was staying there [in Taiwan] for these many years, so what else could occupy his mind? To whom could he talk? None of them! Even my grandmother had passed away, and he could not return. [Liangan Gugong 2009]

A subsequent interview with Zhuang from a documentary by the Phoenix Satellite about the
1949 migration describes the estrangement of the museum artifacts in much the same emotional language, paralleling the plight of the staff and the treasures in their care. Zhuang recalls the sadness that followed his father for the rest of his life:

He [Zhuang Lin] thought all the artifacts would eventually return to the Palace Museum in Beijing. However, after the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists, everything changed…….This became his greatest grief even before the end of his life. Until the last moment before he died, he was still preoccupied by the thought of how to ship these national treasures back to the ancient capital [Beijing], but this wish was merely a dream that never came true. [Fenghuang dashiye 1949 daqianxi 2009]

A Sense of “Being There” and Historical Familiarity

Although favorably influenced by Taiwan’s popular culture, historical familiarity still holds the essential position in the Chinese understanding of Taiwan. Recent reinterpretations of history and the concomitant changing attitudes toward Taiwan have made Taiwan a suddenly viable vacation destination. Along with its fashionability, Taiwan is taking advantage of its familiarity, a significant motivator for PRC tourists, to reap substantial profits.

For these Chinese tourists, for whom a constructed “historical familiarity” has effectively shaped their views of Taiwan, they are simultaneously motivated by historical familiarity and their desire to see difference between China and Taiwan. Since regulations over PRC tourists have been removed, the physicality of being in Taiwan has become something crucial to these tourists. Many of my Chinese interviewees declared that “simply touring and experiencing Taiwan itself is fascinating.” Though some have
less-than-extraordinary experiences in Taiwan, most return home full of the wonder of visiting such well-known historic (and symbolically-loaded) locations as the Palace Museum, Sun-Moon Lake and Mount Ali, familiar to Chinese through CCP education and mass media exposure (See Appendix 3). Interestingly, since China began utilizing Gugong as a significant cultural symbol of their shared Chineseness, the Taiwanese tourism industry has developed a new business model centered on Chineseness and historical familiarity, which I will discuss in the next chapter.

The more this cultural longing for Taiwan is cultivated, the stronger becomes the desire of individual Chinese to “set foot on the ground of baodao.” The strength of this desire to merely “be there” makes these tours more akin to a pilgrimage than to standard tourist fare, and accordingly the more common practices of tourism are of less concern. Since Taiwan was transformed from a forbidden destination to a limited access destination in June 2008, some tour participants have adopted a “post-tourist” attitude, appreciating the constructed fantasies presented to them while also enjoying the strong emotion of “being there” at the same time. Others seek the adventure of Taiwan, experiencing the topsy-turviness of another Chinese society that differs from their Socialist one. Both types of tourist have made packaged tours of Taiwan an interesting combination that conflates historical complex, various fantasies and popular cultures. Whatever the approach, “being there” tours indeed share many religious and affective elements in common with what Graburn has called the
“specific rite of passage” (Graburn, 1989: 22). The Taiwan tour, as a pilgrimage to China’s “once-lost territory” and as an adventurous foray into the island under the KMT’s control, makes for a unique experience distinct from other destinations. Just as these trips can create such positive emotions, what tourists are seeking in traveling to Taiwan also reveals their dissatisfactions with what occurs in their own society, a point to which I will return in my discussion of the quest for an alternative Chinese modernity reflected in tourism in Taiwan.

In China, the frequently reinforced desire for “being there” is not only a romanticized one but also a nationalized one. These desires are fostered and fantasies supplemented and reinforced by the government and mass media. The speech given by the PRC Premier, Wen Jiabao, during his official visit to America may best represent the imaginary of Taiwan that prevails in the minds of many Chinese; Taiwan as the baodao has its irreplaceable attraction to the Chinese, seniors in particular. Wen is not the only Chinese who possesses this strong emotion toward Taiwan. In 2009 Taiwan received more than 0.97 million PRC tourists, second to the 1 million Japanese visitors that year by only a small margin. It is noteworthy that 31% of the PRC tourists are “Silvers” (銀髮族), or the elderly, and many share Wen Jiabao’s wish to visit Taiwan before passing away. One news article on these qiansuituan (千歳団) tourists – referring to elderly tour groups whose age in total exceeds one thousand years – writes:

Among mainlander tourists who have long desired to travel in Taiwan, many of the “Silvers,” because of the urgency to go before the end of their lives, as well as the
particular historical complex in which they have lived, wish to travel to Taiwan as soon as they can. ¹⁹ [Wenweibao 2010]

One famous quotation from a 1972 poem by Taiwan’s patriot poet Yu Guan-Chong’s, “The shallow Taiwan Strait brings about the greatest sadness and deepest nostalgia,” is pivotal to understanding the mutual imaginings between Taiwan and China as well as China’s transforming attitude toward Taiwan. Yu’s nostalgic sentiments embedded in his poems have made Yu one of the most famous poets in Chinese societies. And this well-known quotation later was cited by the Chinese Premier, Wen, to convey the essence of the goal of reconciliation and reunification between China and Taiwan (Ibid.). This poem, originally meant as an immigrant exile’s lament for his lost motherland, has taken on new connotations, of China’s increasing desire for Taiwan to come home.

The distinct socio-historical background experienced by Yu and other migrants, forced from China in 1949, fostered the great pathos and nostalgia found in the poems he penned, mourning the loss of home and hometown. In China, Yu’s two widely praised poems Chunlaibandao (春來半島) and Xaingchou (鄉愁) are considered persuasive evidence for Taiwan’s desire to return. Both poems concern Taiwan’s nostalgia for “the Motherland” and have been printed in Chinese junior high school textbooks for decades. In Taiwan, Yu’s use of the metaphor “the Yellow River winding in my blood” (Wuling shaonian 五陵少年) to describe his profound relationship with the motherland China also made him a significant patriotic figure amongst intellectuals as the KMT-led government proclaimed their ambition
to recover China. As with the competition for Chineseness described in the previous chapter, Yu’s poems have been given a dual meaning as both the Taiwanese and Chinese governments simultaneously appeal to familial ties, but from different directions.

In Taiwan, the rapidly changing politico-economic situation has put an end to Yu’s nostalgia. In late 1980s Yu’s unrequited longing found itself suddenly without foundation, as his once-lost homeland opened its doors to Taiwanese compatriots. In an interview with Bai Yansong (白岩松), a Chinese anchor from CCTV, Yu admitted that the changing social background may have eased his strong emotion and thereby resulted in his inability to continue in such a nostalgic writing style because all political obstacles have been removed and he can return home (Bai, 2005: 246-49). After two decades in China, Yu’s poems nowadays find an alternative interpretation apart from nostalgia: as an expression of China’s national trauma, when the World War and the consequent Civil War resulted in innumerable separations of Chinese families. Yu’s poems have become a symbol of the everlasting desire of the Taiwanese for unification.

Having gained broad reception in Chinese textbooks, Yu’s influential poems in China have been widely cited. Guidebooks targeting Chinese readers often begin with this nostalgia. In addressing the strong affection and affinity toward Taiwan, the writing styles of these guidebooks differ greatly from those used for other Chinese tourist destinations. One example of the use of this nostalgic narrative places great emphasis on the mother-son
relationship utilized in Yu’s poem. The guidebook “Taizhilu: shendurenwenyou” (台之旅: 深度人文游), written for PRC tourists, is an excellent example of this change in interpretation and of how thoroughly Yu’s poem penetrates the Chinese imagination of Taiwan. Through his writing the author Qiqiweiyang (七七未央) utilizes nostalgia and fond emotions in describing Taiwan:

The shallow water cannot be portrayed but merely sensed
Exclamations and repressed emotions toward its depth of Culture
All divergences pale in comparison with it.

This island, once adored by all the World, well-known by its romantic name of Formosa, located at the crossroads, at the center of the greatest ocean: this is the island named Taiwan. [Qiqiweiyang 2009:1]

Focusing on its charm and marked geographic significance, the author also emphasizes the dependent bonds of a familial relationship between Taiwan and China:

The people of Taiwan and China who share the same blood, together listening to the sounds and sleeping on the pillow of waves of the Taiwan Strait, could not embrace each other [for their political separation]. There could be only gazing at the other side, separated by the strait, distinguished by roads and mountains. [Ibid.]

Using Yu’s well known mother- wife metaphor to illustrate the Taiwan-China relationship, the author suggests an unwavering familial tie. The author of this text treats Yu as representative of all Taiwanese and thereby transforms all Taiwanese into “the Chinese who left home and married a local wife.” And the appearance of his mother in dreams thus symbolizes his deep desire for reunification. Hence this nostalgia, generated from a quarter century separation, was finally alleviated in 2008 when Chinese tourists finally entered Taiwan. The first encounters between Chinese tourists and the Taiwanese thus symbolized
the reunification of mother and son. It carries a significant meaning for this implied mother-son relationship that in the past only the son could return home to visit his mother; but since 2008 the mother has been able to go to her son, Taiwan.

Unlike many other tourism sites’ strategies to lure tourists with “borrowed nostalgia,” this author appeals directly to the mother-son relationship and the precious feeling of being together as a family. In the closing, the author first introduces the notion of heaven in a religious sense, then crucially suggests that the family values itself even more than heaven. Through this final metaphor, the author seems to suggest a promised land, where home exists around the reunified Chinese family.

Yu said, Taiwan is wife and Mainland is mother. After a quarter of a century, even in the rain [we are] kept distant by numerous mountains and separated by thousands and millions of umbrellas. All is disconnected, only the weather report finds us together.

In the poem and in dreams Yu misses his mother on the Mainland. Only one step away across the shallow water, the half century of intertwined nostalgia that made both mother and son, who could only distantly gaze at each other from two shores, denotes our sorrowful souls.

On the day of July 4th, 2008, when desirous gazes brought long-expected bridges across the great gap; on this day 760 mainland compatriots arrived on the other side of the Strait, bringing with them their parental longings. [The journey enabled] mother and children to tightly embrace each other.

What beauty is able to compete with revealed affections? The most precious blood bonds are among family members. Across the Strait, it gushes in the Yellow and Yan-zi Rivers and abounds with fertile lands and ancient, towering mountains. [It proffers] arresting landscapes flowing with milk. Its name is Mother. Its greatness goes beyond mountains and its broad mind goes beyond the sky and its beauty goes
beyond heaven.

How much more beautiful than heaven is the home that we share.
[Qiqiweiyang 2009: 1]

Departing from similar emotional presentations, another guidebook addresses the shared Chinese ancestry and culture between China and Taiwan. Reinforcing the desire to know more about these Taiwanese “familiar strangers,” the book thus indicates the transformation of China’s attitude toward Taiwan. Shared ancestry and cultural roots in Chinese tradition should make them familiar to each other but political reality has placed China and Taiwan beyond each other’s reach.

In our childhood, we already knew about Taiwan located across the Strait and the beautiful sun-moon lake. Upon growing up, we learned that there live the purest Chinese descendents (中華根脈). There is the other Palace Museum and the other Tsing-hua University. The residents are Chinese who have the same ancestry and share the same culture. They have the same genealogy and blood and feel the same way we feel. Taiwan thus is a place of enormous allure for us, for it is another territory of the Chinese (中華土地) where our brother lives.

However, due to “the shallow sea” which distances us from beautiful and friendly Taiwan, only a few mainland residents are allowed to travel and appreciate the spectacular Taiwanese landscapes, to fully appraise a Chinese culture of the same origin and yet developed in its own special way. Taiwan, due to its unique political circumstances, has become the destination that we feel most familiar with but strange to. We all want to know more about Taiwan but what we know is quite limited. [Lin 2009:1]

Since these Chinese imaginaries toward and the historical familiarity with Taiwan have been constructed for decades, romanticized images of Taiwan along with mediated
fantasies about it have already taken root in many Chinese minds. Examining Qing travel
writings about Taiwan, Emma Teng has pointed out a substantial difference from frontier
tavel writings that aim to convey the firsthand experience of “travelers as explorer and
eyewitness observer;” the Chinese travelers tended to concentrate on their relationship with
the travelers who had been to Taiwan (2004:19). This specific emphasis on the relationship
that connects themselves to these other travelers is still perceptible today in China’s travel
writings when Taiwan is chosen as the destination. Recent Chinese travel writings and
guidebooks about Taiwan have taken further advantage of the historical familiarity and the
nostalgia shared among Yu and other forced migrants from 1949, and have transformed this
into discourses concerning the shared Chineseness between China and Taiwan as well as the
national identity of the Chinese nation. Such focuses in their writing also produce a sense of
historical continuity and subsequent nostalgia, a commonality between both modern
tavelers and the Qing intellectuals who travelled in Taiwan. A feature unique to modern
tours which distinguishes them from travels of the past is that Taiwan as a destination does
not passively wait to be perceived and imagined, but is actively influential in shaping the
Chinese imaginary through popular culture, an issue I will discuss in the next chapter.

**Re-narrating Relationships with the “Baodao”**

In addition to issues surrounding the economic invigoration brought by Chinese tourists,
these Taiwan tours have also generated intriguing discussions on gaps between expectation
and reality at Taiwan’s most renowned destinations, Sun-Moon Lake and Mt. Ali. The endless romanticization of Sun-Moon Lake and Mt. Ali in China over the years has made these two destinations not only the most desired destinations but also the most nostalgic, representing the Taiwan which was the treasure island of China (Zuoguo Baodao 祖國寶島).

Before departing to Taiwan, the tourists have already learned through textbooks and folksongs of its beauty; these high, romanticized expectations in turn disappoint the Chinese tourists.23

_Baodao_ literally means “treasure island” or “the precious island,” a romanticized name for Taiwan. When used within Taiwan, the name _Baodao_ is interchangeable with “Formosa” or the Republic of China (Taiwan.) To the Taiwanese, _baodao_ is the straightforward term frequently utilized to describe the “beautiful island” where the Taiwanese live. However, when the term is translated into foreign languages, “baodao” immediately resonates with Taiwan’s relationship with its neighbors and also to the world. In China, “baodao” frequently appears as the compound noun _zuoguo baodao_, literally meaning “motherland’s precious island.” This diminutive strives to establish connections and define the relationship between Taiwan and China. The connotations of the PRC’s concept of _baodao_ have long been intensified in its official history and education, with great emphasis on the two entities’ inseparable historical bond.

On the other hand, the other name of Taiwan, “Formosa” (from the Portuguese _Ilha_
Formosa, or "beautiful island") is not welcome in China because of “the discriminatory use” of the name by the former colonizers of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{24} The PRC government regards this terminology as a mark of shame symbolizing Taiwan’s colonial past, and thus the use of Formosa may have negative social impacts. In fact, there is more behind this prohibition, because the name Formosa is stringently utilized by Taiwan independence movements and associated with a strong desire to distinguish Taiwan from China. Instead of recognizing China, these uses mostly treat Taiwan as its own homeland. The close relationship between the name Formosa and agitation for the independence of Taiwan has resulted in the PRC government’s antagonism towards its use.

Even though in China’s guidebooks “Formosa” is often used interchangeably with “baodao,” the forcible renaming of Taiwanese brands clearly represents the official attitude of the Chinese government. The intriguing case of one such re-naming demonstrates persuasively how the term of “Formosa” in China has become a sensitive and problematic word. A venerable Taiwanese optical company, founded in 1956, chose Formosa Optical as its translated English name in 1976.\textsuperscript{25} Since they have attempted to establish branches in China, they have encountered substantial difficulty and have had to discard the English translation, widely used in Taiwan, in favor of Baodao Optical for the immense Chinese market.

Re-shelving and Renaming Taiwan
As discussed above, this imbalanced mutual imagination between China and Taiwan also structures the tourism representations and the daily lives of both sides. In China particularly, the exerted imaginaries and symbols are quite evident through examining guidebooks and tourism promotions. In addition to its contents, it is also helpful to examine how these guidebooks have been categorized and shelved in China’s bookstores. Through their categorization, the titles of Chinese guidebook series betray the PRC’s intense concern over Taiwan’s separatist assertions and the international support behind it.

In bookstores located in the Zhongguancun (中關村) area of Beijing, two translated guidebooks that belong to an international tourism series were not shelved with other guidebooks of the same series. The two alone were arranged in the corner for guoneiyou (國內遊: domestic tourism); they are entitled “China Tibet” (中國西藏) and “China Taiwan” (中國台灣) respectively. The use of the possessive form (所有格) in the titles indicates these two destinations and territories are legally owned by China. However, compared to other domestic guidebooks shelved in the domestic tourism corner, such as Beijing and Shanghai, the possessive form is not used and seems redundant.

Moreover, the ruling ideology of the One China policy may force Chinese publishers to adopt alternative strategies to de-internationalize Taiwan. Among the translated guidebooks on Taiwan, it is common to simply add the prefix “China” to its Chinese translated title without changing the content of the guidebook. This renaming of the simplified Chinese title
often occurs in international guidebook series written in English or other foreign languages.

In so doing, the simplified Chinese version of the name “Taiwan” in the National Geographic Traveler series ((2007)2011) and Culture Shock series (1994) both appear as Zhongguo Taiwan (中國台灣) on its cover. The other significant case is the Japanese guidebook series Globe Trotter (地球の歩き方), on which the name also appears as Zhongguo Taiwan, while only 台灣 (Taiwan) appears in its Japanese title. In some guidebook series, the Taiwan guidebook is not translated into simplified Chinese at all, such as in the Lonely Planet series.

![Figure 5.2 “National Geographic: Zhongguo Taiwan”](amazon.cn)

Departing from the political capital to the metropolitan capital, Shanghai, I found a new category in bookstores. Jinwai (境外), literally meaning “destinations outside the border,” was created to reject the defined binary of “international” (國外) and “domestic” (國內) while at the same time incorporating the Chinese territories of Hong Kong, Macau and
Taiwan. Following this logic, \textit{jinwai} serves to distinguish \textit{neidi} (内地, mainland China) from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (港澳台), which the Chinese are required to have specific visas to enter. In some Chinese international airports, the category \textit{jinwai} appears ambiguously. Except for destinations on the Chinese mainland, all other destinations, including the international, are under the genre of \textit{jinwai}. In some airports, \textit{jinwai} is not seen; direction signs for \textit{guoji} (国际 the international) and \textit{gan au tai} (港澳台 Hong Kong Macau and Taiwan) are juxtaposed instead. With such confusing interchangeability, China can retain the concept of “international” unchanged. This ambiguity also allows Chinese bookstores to shelve books with potentially contentious categorizations without a second thought. However, as Taiwan has become one of most popular destinations in China, booming numbers of guidebooks on Taiwan have eased the tension by enabling the creation of a specific category for Taiwan.
Conclusion

Since July 2008 direct China-Taiwan flights have brought millions of PRC tourists to Taiwan, and Taiwan’s tourism discourses have experienced a nuanced transformation, from nearly exclusive focus on Japanese tourists to the inclusion of a flourishing new market. Focusing on this transformation, this chapter explores Chinese representations and its social imaginings of Taiwan, which have relied on the long term processes of construction of the Chinese nation as well as on a Chineseness shared by both sides of the Taiwan Strait. In the first half of the chapter, I examined the Chinese claim of the inseparable tie between the two Chinas, visible early on in the Taiwanese poet Yu’s famous quotations, and later a pervasive sentiment shared by the Chinese in their mourning over the separation of China and Taiwan.
This nostalgia is also accompanied by China’s currently changing interpretations of the KMT and its revised views of the Nationalist period. The second half of this chapter explores the current reconstruction of “Chineseness” for political purposes, centering on the National Place Museum in Taiwan. As evident in the nostalgic narratives in the CCTV documentary *Liangan gugong* (兩岸故宮), “Chineseness” has been utilized to prove the connection and inseparable relationship between China and Taiwan, which in turn intensifies the historical familiarity of the Chinese tourists. In the last part, my fieldwork suggests that the “baodao ideology” of the Chinese, mediated through different channels, has structured the imagination of the Chinese as well as their Taiwan tours. Through the cultural construction of *baodao*, Taiwan has thus become one of the most desired destinations as host to Chinese nostalgia and imaginations. The simple “being there” of travel to Taiwan is laden with sentiment, and serves as the greatest incentive for Chinese tourists to visit their long lost island.
Since 1996 the Chinese government has tried to impact Taiwan’s presidential elections. Their threatening approach oftentimes has negative consequences for the candidate they endorse. For instance, a volley of missiles fired into the Taiwan Strait in 1996, ostensibly for target practice, were meant to alarm Taiwanese voters into supporting a pro-unification candidate. This approach failed. See Apple Daily Pinglun “zhongguo jieru taiwan xuanju” (中國介入台灣選舉).

“The article describes the agreement from the 2005 April meeting between the CCP’s general secretary, Hu Jintao, and the KMT’s president, Lian Zhan, to put aside different political assertions in favor of the overarching goal of promoting mainland Chinese tourism of Taiwan, to increase mutual communication and economic cooperation but also bring the real benefits for the Taiwanese people.” See Xinhua wan “sanbuwei lianhe fabu dalujuming futai luyou guanlibanfa” (三部委联合发布大陆居民赴台湾旅游管理办法).

See special issue of Wealth Biweekly on “luke ziyouxing: tingjian qian de shengyin” (陸客自由行：聽見錢的聲音).

See Apple Daily. “ziyouxing luke jianjain oxiezhen” (自由行陸客 健檢 拍寫真).

Not everyone in the tourist industry shares this view. For example, in this article, one manager regards the Hong Kong model for hosting Chinese tourists as not reproducible in Taiwan. For instance, see Wang yihong "Liaowencheng: xianggong jingyan bushiyong taiwan" (廖文澄:香港經驗不適用台灣).

See the Executive Information system of the Taiwan Tourism Bureau for more details on "dalu zutuanluxingshe" (大陸組團旅行社).

Intriguingly, their Taiwan experiences somehow in turn help confirm their social status-- an emerging new middle class. In contrast to the search for simply exotic experiences in their other overseas trips, the emerging urban class may expect their “Taiwan experiences” to offer them an experience which surpasses extraordinary--the unprecedented experience and symbolic gesture of stepping onto KMT-ruled territory.

Given regional differences among provinces in China, I will not over-generalize my ethnographic discoveries
but instead regard them as the presentation of different social imaginaries.

9 Recently the CPP has placed as much emphasis on economic cooperation across the Taiwan Strait as they have on a zero-tolerance policy toward Taiwan’s independence in the past. As mentioned previously, the CCP’s official promotion of Taiwan as an inseparable part of China helps generate not only the PRC’s affinity toward the Taiwanese, but also a very emotional reaction toward Taiwan’s independence. In contrast, most Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese alone or both Taiwanese and Chinese. Only a quite limited number regard themselves as Chinese alone. Disregarding other factors, the PRC blames this identity transformation exclusively on the DPP. [See Tianxia 2010 guoqing diaocha (天下雜誌「二○一○國情調查」) and the more detailed analysis in the original report by Liu “Guorenguozu Rentong Qushifenxi” (國人國族認同趨勢分析).]

10 Both the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 nationwide celebration of the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China presented a new image of China and marked its ostensible return to history’s center stage after the suffering of the past several decades. At the same time, increasing concern has been laid on the table regarding widespread penetration of the PRC’s soft power, such as the Chinese government’s massive investment in the worldwide establishment of Confucius institutes and their efforts to promote Chinese culture as one of the most powerful and influential in the world.

11 See the official site of Jianguodaye (2009)

12 See “Chubanwu zhong jiangjiishi xingxiang zhi bian cong chouhua dao rengehua” (出版物中蔣介石形象之變：從醜化到人格化).

13 See Nalixunzhao nafenai . “Taibei gugong shi wenhua jielue haishi wenhua chengzheng?” (台北故宫:是‘文化劫掠’还是‘文化长征?’).

14 The cooperation of the exhibitions in Beijing and Taipei is one significant example of shared Chineseness. The exhibition of “Harmony and Integrity: The Yongzheng Emperor and his Times” is enriched by 37 Beijing’s collection presenting Yongzheng’s life and times. Introduction of “Harmony and Integrity” organized by National Palace Museum, Taiwan..

15 See customer review from Dangdang wan (my translation).

16 The original text is “renlei shishang zuida guimo de wenming qianxi” (人類史上最大規模的文明遷徙).
The episode calls the transportation miraculous, “for in the five years previous, the Gugong staff carried these national treasure in their travels around almost half of China. None of them is missing; this is a miracle remarkable in the world history of cultural artifacts.” (Liangan Gugong 2009)

17 In drawing a distinction between socialist society and other Chinese society, I mean that Taiwan is seen by Chinese tourists in comparison to their current society.

18 “Tourism is……functionally and symbolically equivalent to other institutions that humans use to embellish and add meaning to their lives”; it may be understood either as a regular secular ritual (the annual vacation) that acts as a counterpoint to everyday life and work or as a more specific rite of passage.” (Graburn 1989:17).

19 Wenweibao "youtaidaluoyinpinzhuzhanchangsheng" (遊台大陸客人「銀髮族」佔三成). This news article discusses the demographic composition of Chinese tourists. Thirty percent of the mainland tourists are elderly who have traveled to Taiwan for its historical complex.


21 See Yu’s poem Wuling Shaonian.

22 In 1988, the Chinese government officially sanctioned Taiwanese visitors in the name of visiting relatives in China. See NihaoTaiwan "1987nain liangan kaifang tanqin shimo: Taiwan laobing zhonggui changcheng" (1987年兩岸開放探親始末：台灣老兵重歸長城).

23 Taiwanese music, in the form of folksongs, was popular in China long before modern Taiwanese pop music. These songs have become well known in China and some famous songs [Xiangjiang Xiaolu 鄉間小路 (1984)] Alishan Gunaining 阿里山姑娘 (1985, 1986) Penghuwan 澎湖灣 (1984, 1989)] were regarded as a symbol of Taiwan and accordingly sung in China’s annual Spring Festival Gala (春晚) nationally broadcast by the CCTV.

24 See Huanchiu wan “Taishangdaizhiminqu shi secai shangbiao FORMOSA zaidaluzhuce zouju (台商帶殖民主歧色商标 FORMOSA 在大陆注册遭拒) and Chiu Yanling, "Baodao FORMOSA zhongguo buzunzhuce" (寶島 FORMOSA 中國不准註冊) and Falujiaoyu. “shangbiaojie chexiao jiujian hanyou FORMOSA, fuermosha de
zhuceshangbiao (商标撤销九件含有“FORMOSA”、“福尔摩莎”的注册商标). According to the Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government rejected the registrations of nine Taiwanese companies whose company name included “Formosa.” The Chinese government considered the term “Formosa” degrading, connoting the Portuguese colonization of Taiwan and therefore potentially detrimental to Chinese. The Taiwanese, however, regard this is the violation of the legal rights of Taiwanese companies.

25 See the official site for History of Baodao Yangjin (Baodao Optical).
CHAPTER 6
CRAFTING CHINESENESS, COMMODIFYING TAIWAN

In the past several decades, most mainlanders knew about Taiwan through soundtracks, words, and images, such as “the girls of Mt. Ali” presented in the song “Gaoshanqing,” Lou Dayou’s “Lugang xiaozhen,” and Cai-qin’s “Ludao xiaoyequ.” Along with other familiar street scenes that appeared in popular literature and pop songs, [collective] memories interwoven with personal affections and memories thus have constituted the mainlander’s memory landscape of Taiwan’s culture.¹

From Teresa Teng to Jay Chou, Taiwanese popular songs have been sung for 30 years in China. Not only have the songs comforted generations of Chinese but also have disseminated Taiwanese culture to every corner of the Mainland. It is no wonder that the famous Taiwanese critic, Nanfang Shou, once said, “[Taiwanese] popular songs over the past ten year have accomplished the mission of reunification.” [Ibid.]

If the historical bonds connecting Taiwan and China are considered to be the major driving forces for Chinese tourists to set foot on the ground of baodao, mass media then has occupied a pivotal role in creating and sustaining their social imaginaries. In the previous chapter, I have presented China’s revision of history and its transforming attitudes toward Taiwan, which largely benefit from the constructions of Chinese mass media. In this chapter, I intend to focus on the Taiwan side, including its popular media and its tourism promotions. For a great number of the young generation of the PRC, Taiwan’s mass media have constituted not only a conduit for but also a site to host the fantasies of Chinese popular
culture. Taiwan’s popular culture, namely variety shows, dramas, popular writing and pop songs, has proved very attractive to the younger Chinese generation, and experienced growing fandom and increasing demand for these recreations. If examined from the perspective of soft power or nation-branding, the power of Taiwan’s popular culture in China seems to place Taiwan in a higher position than China within intra-Asian popular culture. That is, Taiwan’s position in intra-Asia pop culture not only defies the constructed bond of the mother-son relationship between China and Taiwan, but even reverses this mother-son relationship through its power to define Chinese popular culture.

Focusing on representations of Taiwan made by the Taiwanese, this chapter also aims to discuss how the Chinese concept of nation, constituted of China and Taiwan, is imagined by the Chinese through both popular culture and repeated tourism practices. For the Taiwanese, retaining flexibility in the face of Chinese national identity constitutes an essential part of their tourism promotions. Using Hong Kong in the context of the global economy as an example, Aihwa Ong’s influential book entitled *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (1999:6) argues that flexible citizenship is shared among the transnational Chinese. Instead of a singular national identity, Ong’s asserts that flexible citizenship thus provides the possibility for individuals to claim multiple identities in a transnational setting, in response to a rapidly changing economy. Quite similar to the
manipulation of identities seen among Hong Kong’s Chinese, Taiwan retains a strategic and opportunistic ambiguity of identities in order to maximize its opportunities in cooperating with China. Taiwan’s multiplicity of identities thus grants it a flexibility in its appearance as it plays host to the nostalgic quest of Chinese tourists; meanwhile recent statistics indicate that more than 80 percent of the Taiwanese identify themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese. Because of this, Chinese tourism of Taiwan has served as one of the best media to explore both 1) the flexible strategy that Taiwan has utilized to respond to the Chinese quest for unification which underlies their tourism practices, and 2) how China’s discourses concerning national identity and nationalism have been transformed and continue to function. Barker’s (1999) definition of national identity is relevant in an understanding of the Chinese construction of the Chinese nation across the Taiwan Strait. The cases presented in the previous chapter echo Barker’s concept of national identity as “a form of imaginative identification with that nation-state as expressed through symbols and discourses, thus nations are not only political formation but systems of cultural representations so that national identity is continually reproduced through discursive action” (Barker 1999:64). Moreover, the cultural aspects of national identity cannot exclusively rely on an abstract emphasis of culture or simply on sentiment; it has to be presented concretely. In his detailed analysis of Japan’s formation of consumer nationalism, Yoshino Kosaku discusses the significant presence of objectified cultural items in forming national identity. Yoshino thus
concludes that national identity “is more likely to be expressed in terms of objectified cultural items such as practice and customs, artifacts and rituals, rather than ethno-national sentiments based on a common cultural ethnos” (3-4). In tourism practices, these objectified cultural items presented at historical places and museums play a pivotal role not only in preserving the past but also in magnifying the national identity of the visitors. In particular, museums are expected to present the nation’s great history in its exhibitions as one of its educational practices. Museums in tourism practices are also expected to provide an effective experience of “being there” for the tourists. Therefore, museums and tourism have an inseparable relationship in which the travel industry depends on museums to provide the background story for their tours and museums rely on the travel industry to bring in more visitors.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Palace Museum in Taipei communicates effectively the symbolic meaning of Chineseness. To Chinese tourists, the meaning implicit in these invaluable Chinese historical artifacts, paintings and other collections is of the essential continuity of the great Chinese civilization; it nonetheless echoes what Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett calls the “alienability of ethnographic objects” (1998:3). In the book *Destination Culture: Tourism, Museums and Heritage*, Kirshenblatt-Gimblett cogently argues that the ethnographic objects exhibited in museums:
...became ethnographic through processes of detachment and contextualization. Whether in that process objects cease to be what they once were, is an open and important question. That question speaks to the relationship of source and destination, to the political economy of display. The answer tests the alienability of what is collected and shown. [Kirshenblatt-Gimblett: 1998:3]

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett goes further to suggest the new meaning of the objects is produced and assigned through reorganizing of the context. “Posited Meaning derives not from the original context of the fragments but from their juxtaposition in a new context” (Ibid). In Chinese tourism of Taiwan, the meanings of cultural objects have been carried further and developed differently. The Palace Museum collection is used creatively by tour guides and the souvenir business: along with renown of the Nationalist figures of Taiwan, the appeal of the Palace Museum in Taipei and its significance in cultural representations has become a selling point for local souvenirs and products.

This chapter will explore the strategies and representations that Taiwan and its tourism industry have used to respond to the social imaginaries and touristic quests of the Chinese. I will argue that Taiwan has employed a limited narrative of Chineseness in its tourism representations. In this sense, “being in Taiwan” constitutes not only the process but the purpose of the Taiwan tour for Chinese tourists. Based on my fieldwork in Beijing, Shanghai, and Taipei, I will first discuss how Taiwan’s popular media have shaped the Chinese imaginary toward Taiwan and their fantasies about an alternative Chinese modernity. And second, I will examine how “Taiwaneseness” is narrated within the framework of
Chineseness using the example of a theme park called *Taiwan Custom Street* (TCS) and other Taiwan exhibitions in China. Third, I will return to the tourism destinations of Taiwan, where a discourse of commodified Chineseness dominates tour schedules. The artifacts of the Palace Museum and anecdotes about Nationalist figures serve as major tourist attractions, as well as the tourism shopping business.

**Popularized Taiwan Images in China**

In addition to the historical complex and ideologies that constantly reinforce Chinese fantasies of Taiwan, Taiwan’s image is also mediated by its own popular media, for instance its widely received variety shows, dramas and pop songs. The wide appreciation of Taiwanese popular culture is hardly a new phenomenon in China, dating back to the late 1970s when songs by the Taiwanese singers Teresa Teng（鄧麗君）, Liu Wenzen（劉文正）and Lou Dayou（羅大佑）and the romantic dramas written and directed by playwright Chunyao（瓊瑤）became classics for the Chinese youth generation.4 Interested in the great popularity of Taiwanese popular culture and its wide positive reception in China, many articles in the Chinese media attribute its success to Taiwan’s performance of Chinese tradition and culture through the medium of pop culture.5 For instance, one article in the *Xinhuawang*（新華網）credits the successful inheritance of Chinese culture, writing “In the arena of Taiwan’s popular culture, Chinese traditional culture is shining and indelible.”6
Dong Wencui, critic and editor for Taiwan News in *The People’s Daily*, *(Renminribao)*, considers Taiwan’s dedication to “legitimacy” to be key to its success, having worked to preserve Chinese tradition and to limit the potential cultural gap created by Japanese colonization, including, he argues, active post-war “de-Japanization” (Ibid). However, this blindness towards the Japanese influence on Taiwanese popular culture is wishful thinking and offers a very limited scope for understanding. Others with a more open mindset on the Japanese influence argue that the use of the Chinese language offers a medium to expose overseas Chinese-speakers to new content. Thus this approach accounts for the rising popularity of Taiwanese popular culture in China. Moreover, during the rise of the middle class in China, Taiwan’s popular cultural products filled in the blanks in China’s own entertainments, and thus provided the Chinese audience with alternatives to earlier, invariably propagandic, works. Offering recreation and creating fandom for China’s young generation, Taiwan thus became the pop culture destination that they desire to visit. Put another way, in addition to these historical imaginaries, Taiwan’s popular media have penetrated PRC citizens’ daily lives and made Taiwan more familiar to the Chinese.

In contrast to the older generation, whose knowledge of Taiwanese singers is often limited to Teresa Deng in the 1980s, the current Chinese youth generation is saturated with various Taiwanese popular culture products. Through television and the internet, the youth
generation has been exposed to various Taiwanese entertainments, such as the popular music of Jay Chou and the female icon group SHE as well as trendy dramas and romances dating back 2001. The great success of the male icon group F4’s leading drama, *Liuxing huayuan* (流星花園) has brought the Taiwan craze not only in China but also to other parts of Asia. Having grown up with these dramas, some of my informants became interested in and familiar with Taiwan in their teens.\(^8\) Familiar with Taiwanese celebrities via Taiwan’s popular culture industry, some admitted that they pay more attention to these foreign figures than to what is being broadcasted on their own CCTV.\(^9\) Therefore, their mindset may differ greatly from that of their grandparents, the senior population who feel such a strong need to visit China’s precious island before passing away. My interview with “D.P.” a senior college student who has travelled to Taiwan with his parents, suggests an alternative to “being there” tourism: fan tourism. The young informant had the impression that Taipei is full of Taiwan’s stars and celebrities. Enthusiastically, D.P. described his spring 2009 trip to Taiwan to me:

> Because Taipei is not a big city, it must be quite easy to meet celebrities, you know. After a whole-day tour of Taipei and checking into the hotel, I took out a guide map that I had printed out from the Internet about where to find celebrities in Taipei. Then I dragged my parents with me into a cab and rushed to Chungxiao E. Road in order to meet famous Taiwanese singers or stars. Because I am a super fan of A.S.O.S, I thought that if I walked up and down Chungxiao E. Road nine times, maybe I would be able to meet them or some other celebrities. [D.P. 2009]

In this conversation, D.P. is referencing the title of a Taiwanese pop song, “The Ninth Time Wandering on Chungxiao E. Rd.” (忠孝東路走九遍) to describe his fervent desire to meet
any Taiwanese celebrities. Although in the end D.P. met no celebrities on the Taipei streets, he observed the slow and graceful urban life of Taipei and concluded, “The tour experience of my family was probably different from those who stayed in the hotel [that night]. They did so simply because the tour guide asked them not to [go out]. They might have missed opportunities to learn more about Taiwan’s daily life.”

In addition to Taiwan’s pop songs and TV shows, Taiwan’s contemporary literature has also been widely received in China. Unlike a previous generation of successful authors, such as Yue Guangzhong, Chunyao and Sanmao, modern authors have been able to gain popularity with Chinese readers via the internet, resulting in their publication in simplified Chinese. In Taiwanese novels and romances considered light reading, their depictions of urban life styles and love stories enable the Chinese youth generation not only to imagine their future lives in the middle class of transforming Chinese society, but also to enrich their imaginaries about Taiwan. One example of such works is Pizi Cai’s (痞子蔡) light novel *Nuannuan* (暖暖 2007), which tells the tale of pure love between a Taiwanese college boy, Lengleng (冷冷), and a girl named Nuannuan (暖暖) in Beijing during the boy’s first visit to China.¹⁰ This novel is not only a medium for young Chinese women to imagine Taiwan but also offers an alternative story of an across-Strait romance that enables the Chinese readers to distance themselves from the homogenous representations found in the
national narrative. One informant, C.C., who is in charge of mutual visit activities in one of Beijing’s colleges, soberly described the risks inherent in such fantasizing:

Romance after all is fabricated, as I have warned students before their trips to Taiwan. They have been saturated with fantasies from Nuannuan about Taiwan and Taiwanese boys. I have met several girls who seek advice for their ‘romantic encounters in Taiwan.’ I told them juli (距離 distance) is always the problem. [C.C. 2009]

C.C.’s use of the word juli is thought-provoking, suggesting three interpretations: first, the geographic distance for a couple in a long distance relationship; second, the distance between reality and imagination about Taiwan; and third, the different customs which have developed over time between Taiwan and China which may result in misunderstanding. C.C. later told the story of one close friend’s tragic experience as a senior in college, having been “so poisoned” by Taiwanese drama. C.C.’s friend met a Taiwanese girl during his three-month stay in Taiwan as an exchange student and they soon fell in love. After a year in a long-distance relationship, his friend decided to propose to the Taiwanese girl. However, they parted in the end because, as C.C. said, “physical distance is not the most difficult part, but rather the lack of common understanding between the two families as between Taiwan and China, which is finally just too difficult to overcome.”

Significantly, these romantic dramas and novels also offer an alternative Chinese life style in the so-called Post-Socialist China period. The Taiwanese lifestyles displayed in
TV dramas and other popular cultural products have become a fantasy template for the Chinese audience. Although real encounters between China and Taiwan inevitably alter the romanticized images of Taiwan, popular portrayals of Taiwanese lifestyles nevertheless provide a potential model for the future lives of the rising Chinese middle class.

**Taiwan: The Alternative Chinese Modernity?**

In the previous paragraphs, I have discussed how historical imaginations and popular imaginations in China have sometimes been at odds, muddling a coherent social imaginary about Taiwan. Putting aside the dominant “One China” ideology, post-socialist China, although taking pains to sustain the official past that treats Taiwan as a lost territory, is permeated by a variety of media which have generated different discourses about the past. Because of the perceived sameness of Taiwanese and Chinese culture, some Chinese consider Taiwan to be a model of alternative Chinese modernity, an ideal of Chinese culture. During my fieldwork on Chinese tourists’ Taiwan tours, I found that not only have alternative past(s) been narrated, but some Chinese are searching for this alternative Chinese modernity. Their imaginations toward and observations of Taiwan in fact are a projection of their dissatisfaction with daily life in China. Taiwan, appearing in their imaginations as *baodao*, has become a site for their fantasies about what lacks in their lives.
In chapter 2, I have discussed how the cultural China ideology has structured the Taiwanese mindset. With a linear concept of development and a cultural hierarchy of Chinese civilization that sees China as a latecomer struggling to catch up with other Chinese societies, Taiwan was eager to present its version of Chineseness to tourists. In its initial tourism design, the intention was for Taiwan (the Republic of China) to present its “refined” Chinese culture to the PRC tourists. Based on its neo-Confucianism tradition and its advanced modernity, Taiwan government strives to identify itself as the ideal of Chinese culture. Placing such emphasis on presenting Chinese culture and tradition may function in certain sites such as the Palace Museum. However, Taiwan’s modernity, visible to Chinese packaged tour participants in its cityscapes, is quaint compared to the sprawling urbanization of metropolitan centers such as Shanghai and Beijing, which have undergone rapid change in the past three decades. Knowing its disadvantage in competing with Chinese urban “hardware,” the Taiwanese government and the travel industry have been forced to concentrate on its “software,” the delicacy of the refined Chinese culture that has been nourished in Taiwan. At least four of my informants described their first Taiwan experience in similar terms:

Taipei is very country-like. After leaving the airport, all I saw were the rice fields and their shaky houses, which appear worse than those in the very rural areas on the mainland. I was so disappointed, feeling like I was stuck somewhere in the countryside. I didn’t feel like I was really in Taipei until getting to the Xin-yi district where Taipei 101 stands. [Gujie 2009]
Many experts and commentators have sought an explanation for such expectation gaps between the real Taiwan and the imagined Taiwan of the Chinese tourists. They have proposed removing the restrictions over individual Chinese travelers, because the more subtle nuances of Chinese civilization in Taiwan are obscured by packaged tours with tight schedules. In so doing, Taiwan’s claim of “cultural delicacy” will hold more appeal for PRC tourists. According to a speech given by the chief director of the Taiwan Tourism Bureau, Lai Se-Zhen (賴瑟珍), the Chinese culture of both Taiwan and China is the key to cooperation in tourism in the Across Strait Tourism Exhibition. As Lai said, “In the development of across-Strait tourism, what distinguishes us from other regions is that our culture incorporates difference within the sameness and similarity among the differences. This part is the most attractive.”

Knowing the difficulty of competing with China’s grandiose landscapes, Lai affirms the primary focus of Taiwan’s tourism, stating that Taiwan’s appeal lies in “its delicate culture and humanity, and affection for its common cultural origins.” Moreover, in re-examining Taiwan’s failure to impress with its modernity, it seems that the Western modernization which Taiwan has in abundance is of less interest to Chinese than its promotions of the cultural delicacy of its Chineseness. It seems the ideal Chinese lifestyle which the Chinese perceive in Taiwan is commonly appreciated amongst Chinese tourists. Imagining that Taiwan has preserved the heart of Chinese tradition since 1949, they demonstrate their envy toward Taiwan’s lifestyle,
delicacy in culture, thoughtful thinking and even democracy. In this sense, some Chinese tourists traveled to Taiwan in a nostalgic search for the lost past of Chinese tradition as well as an alternative Chinese modernity in Taiwan.

The romanticized tourist bubble may burst after the destinations are experienced. However, for those Chinese who regard Taiwan as a model of alternative development for Chinese society, even if not seen as ideal, their desires for difference are invariably met. Taiwan thus constitutes an appropriate site for them to imagine and reflect on their own society—Taiwan as “the other China” that has developed differently since 1949 and has created the “economic miracle” in the 1980s. In contrast to the CCP’s Party-led re-interpretations of the Nationalist past, commoners have developed their own interpretations of history. This continues to shape their tourist imaginations toward Taiwan. Their Taiwan trips thus serve the dual purpose of experiencing both Chiang Kai-Shek’s Taiwan and Chinese society under the KMT’s rule, to imagine the possibilities of another Chinese society. To these PRC tourists driven by their nostalgic search, Chiang’s “other China” in an abstract sense provides unique opportunities for these tourists to experience the path that was not chosen by their Socialist China—a pro-USA capitalist society different from their own. This might offer them the opportunity to experience an alternative life style, a desire which apparently contains significant nostalgic elements.
Treating Taiwan as “the other China” enables the Chinese to impose their varied expectations of an ideal society onto Taiwan. Their dissatisfactions with daily life in their own society have led these Chinese to search for their ideal life in the imagined Taiwan. Their imaginations of Taiwan seem to offer a feasible way to make sense of their present. In this way, Taiwan serves as a nostalgic look at the path they did not travel. One of my informants was J.N., a man in his mid-forties who had never been to Taiwan before. He was enthusiastic about discussing various issues concerning Taiwan with me whenever he noticed me sitting in the corner of his cafeteria writing up my field notes. J.N. asked about the reality of Taiwan and posed many questions about the relationship between China-Taiwan and my views of “the capitalist mode” of Taiwan, which were partially based on his imaginings about capitalism.

My conversations with J.N. urged me to rethink the hidden meanings behind the romanticized imaginations of Taiwan and view it as the alternative Chinese modernity. Once he asked me about Chiang Kai-Shek’s good and bad points in post-1949 Taiwan. I presented a history of the recent past that I considered unbiased to either the Taiwanese or the Chinese. To my surprise, J.N. refuted my summary of Chiang’s rule over Taiwan and my understanding of the takeover period of the 1940s. J.N., defending the Chiang family, kept trying to persuade me that “Chiang indeed has done a great job in boosting Taiwan’s
economy, and successfully built Taiwan into a society of wealth and equality.” As a native of Zejiang province, J.N. apparently had preexisting knowledge about Chiang Kai-Shek and continued to tell me, “I would have migrated to baodao with my parents in 1949, if we could. And then I would not be suffering now, working like this.” As a cafeteria owner in Shanghai, J.N. does not truly suffer from poverty or struggle for a living. Yet J.N. told me that unlike workers in Taiwan, he has to labor extremely hard here to accumulate as much fortune as he can. J.N.’s understanding of Chiang and Taiwan, if examined carefully, in fact is less about the reality of Taiwan and more about his own dissatisfactions. And it suggests his criticism of the social inequality hidden behind the PRC’s rapidly growing economy. J.N. continued with his retrospection, “Many poor young men from the countryside like me had to leave for decent work in metropolises like Shanghai. If I had any choice, I definitely would have taken the opportunity to work in Taiwan. I heard that Taiwan has better opportunities (than Shanghai).” Following up on his thought, I asked J.N. whether he thought of going to Hong Kong and beginning his business there. J.N. gave me an unexpected answer, saying, “I have little interest in working in Hong Kong, for it has too much business and not enough Chinese culture (缺乏中華文化)”. It is evident that Taiwan, this “other China,” provides Chinese like J.N. a space distant from their daily lives onto which their dissatisfactions can be projected and their imaginings attached. In this way, through narrating their imaginations about Taiwan, they have developed their own versions of Chinese modernity.
Branding Taiwan

As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese tourism promotions targeting Japanese tourists have transformed since the country began to host Chinese. The Taiwanese government however is still searching for a proper way to present itself to these familiar strangers from China. The primary challenge for the Taiwanese government and its state tourism authority is deciding to what extent Taiwan can present its “Chineseness” as well as its “Taiwaneseness.” In other words, due to the fantasies the Chinese have projected onto Taiwan, Taiwan is faced with the dilemma of displaying familiar Chineseness while remaining different and exotic. Its extents and limitations may be best illustrated through an examination of a few Taiwan exhibitions in China.

Taiwan Custom Street (台灣老街, TCS) in the greater Shanghai area is a free-admission theme park of Taiwanese society. The TCS is a sub-project of a vacation village operated by a Taiwanese company, which aims to take advantage of the current popularity of Taiwan. In September 2009 news of this construction project and its grand opening caught my attention and motivated my first visit. The news photo of its grand opening immediately attracted my notice, for the staff were wearing the high school uniforms of the most prestigious schools in Taipei. Before visiting the TCS, I wondered how the “staged authenticity” of Taiwan’s past, a hot topic in discussion of East Asian theme
parks generally, would be presented; how the many assorted fantasies concerning Taiwan 
would simultaneously be incorporated; and how much would be lost on Chinese with limited 
exposure to the actual Taiwan.

Upon arrival, I was a little disappointed by its scale yet quite impressed by its ability to 
include so many elements of Taiwan in the limited exhibition space. Also, due to the limited 
space for exhibitions and content, the guides must provide a coherent story to the visitors. 

Compared to other theme parks in China, the relatively small TCS might be better 
categorized as a dynamic exhibition of past and present daily life in Taiwan. Unlike other 
theme parks in East Asia, such as “The Window of the World” in Shengzen, different kinds 
of attractions and “staged authenticity” are designed and presented at TCS, itself filling a 
 supplementary role to the major attraction of Zhouzhuan. The park is intended to provide 
 further amusement for visitors to its larger neighbor, who generally spend only a few hours 
or a half day before departing. With the intriguingly nostalgic landscape of an old-time 
Taiwanese street, the administration company hopes to create a combination package that 
will encourage visitors to stay overnight in their vacation resorts after a full day of touring.

By purposely juxtaposing Taiwan’s past as presented in TCS with the Chinese past as 
preserved in this thousand-year-old historic water village, TCS strives to contrast the past of 
the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Because the TCS in its original design targeted the
Chinese visitors of Zhouzhuan, TCS’s exhibition, in contrast to other theme parks that have been researched by scholars18, constitutes merely half of the whole; the other half is the historical water village that offers nostalgic representations of China’s past. Therefore, TCS’s discourse of the past and its “staged authenticity” is portrayed and supplemented by China’s remote past represented by Zhouzhuan.

Walking through the gate, I was immediately greeted by two young female staff members, one of whom was later my guide. In order to observe the daily operations of TCS, I did not immediately identify myself as a Taiwanese researcher of tourism. Later I was told they thought I must be a tourist from the South because of my accent. Immediately evident was one difference from the news coverage of the park: the staff wore jeans instead of high school uniforms. One female employee, recruited locally, offered me a free tour about Taiwan’s contemporary history and culture and led me to the first exhibition, the battlefield of Kingmen (金門). This site of the last battle between the “Red China” and the “Free China” was once narrated in Taiwan as a victory over “the evil communists.” This story nowadays is portrayed as the starting point for mutual communication and reconciliation. Later I was told by the manager, a young Taiwanese in his early thirties from Taipei, about its design ideas. He described to me his ideas for the exhibition, and how they had originally
been received as “dangerous” to remind the visitors of the last battle in 1958 between the CCP and KMT:

Many mainlanders are extremely interested in the contemporary history of Taiwan. Different interpretations [of Taiwan] from the CCP period of history are especially welcomed. After being separated for decades, many have begun to view Taiwanese history and Taiwanese tours as adventures. Hoping to catch their eyes, I thus risked touching a sensitive nerve and used a vignette of the battle scene on the Bay. Although I was warned by a local government leader in Kunshan City to avoid taking a “dangerous chance with this exhibition,” it later proved effective in opening up conversations about what occurred in Taiwan in the 1960s. [TCS Supervisor 2009]

After the 1958 battlefield was presented, I was led to a house depicting Taiwanese life in the 1960s, filled with timeworn furniture and utensils. Next was a local police station with a holding cell where tourists could take photographs. Next to the police station was a movie theater, named *Taiwan Dasiyuan* (台灣大戲院), which was decorated with a variety of colorful movie posters of foreign and Chinese films of the 1960s and 70s. Lacking real knowledge of life in Taiwan, these tour guides could only memorize the fragments of explanations prewritten by the Taiwanese manager. Standing next to a poster with a slogan that seems quite sarcastic nowadays, “Never forget to rescue the country while entertaining,” (娛樂不忘救國) the guide turned to me and concluded, “The appearance of old-time Taiwan looks quite different from ours.” This borrowed nostalgia toward Taiwan’s past presented on site seems weak and incapable of finding any real emotional weight, in contrast to a representation in the central square where “cute” caricatures of Mao Zedong and Chiang
Kai-Shek hold each other’s hands and smile. This meaningful posture, adopted by the two central symbolic figures of modern Chinese history, located in the central square, indeed functions to deliver a significant message of peace between China and Taiwan. The manager explained the intentional positioning to me, saying, “All these conflicting images [for instance, a battlefield and the image of a pacific handshake] are in fact designed so that viewers become aware of our peaceful situation, and see the humor in the juxtaposition.” This sentiment echoes the sign posted near the battlefield: “The turbulence of the past will gradually be forgotten and memory becomes dim in time. But memories of the past enable self-reflection, and serve as the driving force [to overcome it.]” (Ibid.)

Figure 6.1 The “cute” caricatures of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-Shek
After the brief introduction of the theater, I was then directed to the *Taiwan teshi gaun* (台灣特色館) where images of Taiwan were exhibited, including photographs of the world-famous skyscraper Taipei 101, sunrise on Mt. Ali, scenes of misty Sun-Moon Lake, the clothes of Taiwan’s ethnic minorities, and many other iconic images of Taiwan. Among those, in contrast to Taiwan’s advertisements directed at tourists of other nationalities, TCS’s representation of Taiwan’s minorities seems insufficient and quite homogenous. Although on my second visit I learned that, since May 2011, a minority group dance performance has been added to the program, their representations of minorities simply serve to fulfill Han Chinese fantasies of the “ethnic other.” The TCS performance of ethnic dance offers little to further the Chinese understanding of Taiwan’s minorities. It however echoes a popular imagining among the Chinese people conveyed by the well-known Taiwanese folksong “Gaoshanqing” (高山青). As dances performed in other theme parks in China, these ethnic performances are designed to present only exoticness and difference from the ethnicities of the Han majority. A similar attitude can be seen in Taiwan’s tourist shopping centers, where Taiwanese minority cultures and performances serve as another form of entertainment and as an alternative to the dominant presentations of Chineseness.

Following a linear history, the TCS exhibition proceeds to the 1990s. An imitation of a studio setting for a Taiwanese political talk show, “2100,” is presented to the viewers
because Taiwan’s democracy and political transformations interest many Chinese. The long-lived show, which airs every day at 9pm in Taiwan, is also familiar to Chinese audiences and has become the main channel for them to observe Taiwan’s politics and democracy, because the comments of regular guest speakers are frequently quoted by the CCTV and Phoenix Satellite. And this popular talk show can also be watched in China’s coastal areas if a satellite dish receiver is employed. It is also the enthusiasm of the Chinese audience for Taiwan’s politics that makes Chinese tourists chose to stay in their hotel rooms to watch political talk shows during their trips to Taiwan. Although the TCS staff offered little commentary on the style of the show and studio, one of my Beijing informants, Feng, had quite a bit to say. A college student and a political science major, he is an avid viewer, but was critical of both such shows and Taiwanese politics in general, saying “Politics in Taiwan are no different from soap operas: extremely emotional and sometimes making no sense. Politics should be taken more seriously.” Feng went further, asserting, “Freedom is precious but excessive freedom sometimes brings chaos. In this sense, limited freedom is relatively good.” Similar comments appeared in my other interviews when my informants witnessed demonstrations in Taiwan.

After touring the studio, I was led to an exhibition of folk religion temples that make offerings to the god of wealth (財神) and to the sea goddess, Mazu (媽祖). The temple’s
presence is apparently intended to offer another unique aspect of Chinese culture that is
retained in the daily lives of the Taiwanese—religious elements that have been gradually
forgotten in China since the Cultural Revolution. In the exhibition, the viewers could in fact
experience the religious practices of Taiwan by lighting candles and praying to the god,
whether they have any religious beliefs or not. The exhibition may offer visitors a similar
experience to touring European cathedrals, in which the religion of visitors is of less concern
than the high cultural value of its architecture and practices. It does not encourage the
religious practices that have been discouraged by the CCP for decades, but offers an
extraordinary experience that is practiced in other Chinese societies outside China. And
more importantly, the nature of the god of wealth appeals to the desires of the emerging
middle class to become rich. Simultaneously, belief in Mazu is a great symbol shared by
both China’s coastal provinces and Taiwan, and emphasizes shared Chinesness and the
inseparable ties.

Similar to many other Taiwan exhibitions held in China, the TCS also encounters great
difficulty in presenting its “Taiwaneseness” to the Chinese. Administrative
“recommendations” from various levels of Chinese government require the exhibition’s
organizers to be flexible in meeting the Chinese imagination of Taiwan. Therefore the
representations of Taiwanese culture and its past at TCS and other exhibitions have become
quite ambiguous. Compared to TCS, where political sensitivity was lower and restrictions more lax because of its location in Southern China, two other exhibitions which I observed in Beijing received more administrative “advice” urging the exhibition staff to pay extra attention to their word choice in descriptions of Taiwan’s landscapes. In these two cases, the concept of a single Chinese nation is essential in the presentations. For instance, the term “national border” became problematic in a tour exhibition at the former CCTV tower, when guides introduced Taiwan’s most famous leisure destination, Kenting, as “south of the national border” (國境之南). The phrase, known to Hong Kong and other overseas Chinese audiences from director Wei Tesheng’s blockbuster Cape No.7, is discouraged by the government, which prefers the phrase “the southern border of Taiwan.” Similar changes also occurred in the introduction of other destinations. For example, “the highest in the nation” had to be changed to “the highest in Taiwan.” In contrast to exhibitions held by non-governmental organizations, the Taiwan-specific product exhibition in Chaoyang Park, organized by the Taipei County government, has purposely avoided controversial representations and merely concentrated on introducing Taiwan’s local products and cuisines. As one booth operator, a Taiwanese businessman in his late forties, told me, “Our major purpose in being here is to do business, not aiming for anything else, so we will focus on promoting our own agricultural products.” This exhibition may succeed in promoting Taiwanese products yet fail to further deliver a comprehensive image of Taiwan. In this case,
such trivial representations of Taiwan do little to motivate more Chinese tourists. According to the booth owner, some Chinese visitors came for some specific food they had tasted in Taiwan during their tours, but some visitors to the exhibition went simply out of curiosity or to get free sample food. In such exhibitions, Chinese social imaginaries play a minor role in promoting Taiwan and its tourism.

If restricted representations of Taiwan reflected the Chinese ideology of a unified Chinese nation, the concept of “branding Taiwan” suggests the strategic ambiguity in representations that present Taiwanese culture along with the commercialized Taiwanese “Chineseness.” Designed based on similar lines of thought, my tour of TCS ended in their souvenir store, the only location where various Taiwan-specific household decorations, foods, tea and Taiwanese products can be purchased in China. In the house the manager offered me high quality tea from Mt. Ali, the most coveted and purchased tea among Chinese tourists. Featuring “Taiwan exclusive products,” the manager shared his thoughts about “branding Taiwan” by selling products that are directly imported from Taiwan and cannot be purchased other than in Taiwan. Based on the attractiveness of Taiwan and of “Made in Taiwan” products to mainlanders, the manager strongly believes in promoting “Taiwan” as a brand:

Taiwan means more to us than the imagination of the Chinese. We desire more than that and we plan to turn our own imaginings into practices. And through the
construction of *Taiwan Custom Street* and the vacation village we expect to establish the brand value of Taiwan, to make Taiwan a famous brand in China. [TCS supervisor 2009]

“Commercialized Chineseness”

In the above, I have discussed how Taiwan tourism exhibitions have emphasized different things to meet the Chinese imaginations. Meanwhile, in contrast to rising concerns about the image of Taiwan that is in constant negotiation with Chinese imaginations, certain Taiwanese businesses have crafted “commercialized Chineseness,” and have made considerable profits from receiving mainland tourists. (I do not mean to suggest that Japanese packaged tours in Taiwan could avoid such a heavy focus on the commercialization of “Chineseness,” but this commercialization is most egregious in those shopping stations designed exclusively to host Chinese tourists.) Rather than focusing on promoting its own unique culture, the Taiwanese souvenir and jewelry business chooses to present Taiwan strategically as the “ancient and lost China.” By promoting this purposely constructed familiarity, they offer more Chineseness to respond to the fantasies of the PRC tourists. This study thus contends that with increasing interactions with China, Taiwan’s tourist industry has taken advantage of the “commercialized Chineseness” in order to boost souvenir sales targeting Chinese visitors.
According to a survey conducted by the Tourism Bureau (cited Wealth Biweekly 2011: 118-9), the most popular Taiwan products among Chinese tourists are (1) pineapple cake, (2) jewelry and diamonds, (3) clothes and accessories, (4) tea from Mt. Ali, and (5) souvenirs from the Palace Museum. In this ranking, the iconic Taiwanese tea is widely regarded by the Chinese as the best gift for their social seniors or supervisors in the workplace who control promotions. The best “hand gifts” (*banshouli 伴手禮*), are considered to be the Taiwanese dessert, pineapple cake, or souvenirs from Palace Museum. These are regarded by Chinese tourists as not only the best gifts for friends and family members who stayed home but also as proof of their Taiwan tour. Since the introduction of Chinese tourists, the sales for both Palace Museum souvenirs and pineapple cake production companies have grown several times over, as tourists buy these items in bulk and in dozens.\(^2\) As for the sale of jewelry, a large portion depends on the sale of Taiwan jade, red coral and artifacts made by local artisans. In the following paragraphs, I will further examine discourses concerning history and Chineseness, which have been utilized for the sale of jewelry and valuable artifacts as well as local products in the tourism business.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Purchased Taiwan Products</th>
<th>Amount (NTD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pineapple cake</td>
<td>$ 9,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jewelry and diamonds</td>
<td>$ 7,672</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1 Most Purchased Taiwan Products (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Clothes and accessories</td>
<td>$3,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Tea</td>
<td>$2,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Souvenirs</td>
<td>$2,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taiwan Tourism Bureau (cited Wealth Biweekly 2011: 118-9)

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Palace Museum in Taipei provides an extraordinary encounter with “the other China” for Chinese tourists. As one of the four greatest museums in the world, the Palace Museum in Taipei has attracted numerous overseas tourists since the 1970s for its collection of over 706,000 items that represent Chinese civilization. The Palace Museum satisfies their desires to view Chinese civilization, and also provides the concrete sense of “being there and stepping on the ground of the other China.” However, for the tourism industry in Taiwan this museum also functions as a trigger for souvenir sales. Due to its heavy emphasis on Chineseness, tourism shopping in Taiwan usually starts from tours in the Palace Museum. In chapter 2, I have examined how “being professional” for inexperienced tour guides is tightly associated with their ability to the introduce Palace Museum well to tourists. According to a veteran tour guide, an ideal schedule for the PRC tourists is to visit the Taipei Palace Museum immediately upon their arrival. This is because the museum collections offer rich materials for tour guides to give a brief but dense view of Chinese civilization and its growth in Taiwan, which also bring China and Taiwan together as the successor of Chinese civilization. *Guogong,* it is suggested
by the veterans, is thus the first and best place to present both a rich knowledge of Chinese heritage and national identity. Moreover, through the process of presenting expertise in guiding the must-see museum collections, the tour guide gains control of the tour group. Furthermore, the Palace Museum is the first and ideal destination to promote products of Chineseness. *Gugong* functions in the packaged tours to simulate the shopping desires of the tourists to buy jewelry and Taiwan-specific artifacts at the shopping stations. *Guogong* then has become the bridge to connect the Museum collections and products at shopping stations. All the tour guide is required to do is to explain the museum collection in detail and refer to the great Chinese history.

![Figure 6.2. Figure of “Jubaopen” exhibited at a shopping station](image-url)
Among various Taiwan-specific souvenirs, high value products such as jade and red coral jewelry and artifacts have also become the most popular souvenirs for Chinese tourists. This example of a skillful introduction to the museum collections, given by a veteran tour guide, reveals the intention of bringing the past “into reality” for the tourists:

Speaking of chances to be wealthy and honored, no Chinese will say no [to this]. Those jade vases (jubaopen 聚寶盆) symbolize the containers used to collect money, as tradition teaches us. In addition, jade is the symbol of wealth and social status in Chinese history…… Red corral products, such as necklaces, bracelets, and chaozhu (朝珠), have in the past been used by royal family members to decorate their robes and official caps. Because of its scarcity it only can be found in very few places in the world; Taiwan happens to be one. These Taiwanese products have traditionally been tribute to the Chinese emperors in Beijing. [Chendao, 2011]

After arrival at the shopping stations, similar speeches will be given by salespersons, this time with an emphasis on sales, to remind tourists of “the happiness and the ‘past’ of Chinese tradition” which is reified and purchasable at these shopping station. In addition, to attract Chinese tourists, some shopping stations that sell jewelry and red corral products have familiar, friendly names such as haixia (海峽, “The Strait”) or liangan (兩岸, “Both Sides of the Strait”); others have hung eye-catching photos at their entrances, of the Qing emperor in court dress wearing his official red corral-adorned cap, or of female members of the royal family wearing red corral necklaces. These pictures immediately remind tourists of
the invaluable cultural objects in the Palace Museum that they likely saw earlier in the morning. And these then become the most persuasive evidence of the connection between the exhibited items and the items for sale at shopping stations.

Figure 6.3 Figure of Chinese emperor and Chiang-Soong May-Ling at a shopping station
Source: CHEN. Chien-Yuan

The “historical familiarity” of the remote past as an effective sales strategy is not used only in the jewelry business; the use of more recent Nationalist historical figures also helps to boost sales in the souvenir business. Mainland tourists’ intense interest in Minguo (the Nationalist period) and “Taiwan as the other China” have created opportunities for Taiwan’s tourism and souvenir business to stimulate their sales of Taiwan-exclusive products. Nationalist historical figures such as the Chiang Kai-Shek family and Young Marshal Peter Xueliang Zhang are of special interest to the PRC tourists. In contrast to the
sympathy garnered by Zhang’s dramatic tale as the youngest Marshal of the Nationalist period and his later misfortune in the Xian Incident (1936), the life story of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, Chiang-Soong May-Ling (1897-2003), generates more envious attentions from tourists. The anecdotes of China’s first lady concern not only her actions in the Anti-Japanese War, but largely her charismatic personality and tales of her personal life. Madame Chiang Kai-Shek is extremely popular partially because of the constructed “historical familiarity,” associated with the KMT, which interests the tourists, and partially because of their powerful desire to see how the Chiang family has made Taiwan differ from the Chinese mainland. Interest in the life stories of the Chiang family reached its peak with the emergence of Nationalist Fever (Minguo ze), accompanying China’s attempts to revise modern history. In this “history” and in the mass media, Chiang-Soong is portrayed as living a “legendary life” of mystery and wealth, leading to a widespread interest in the secrets of the Chiang family. The example of Chiang-Soong demonstrates how the exoticness that attracts Chinese tourists originates in their historical understanding of Taiwan, in which Chiang Kai-Shek’s family holds a crucial position.
Even before the wide use of popular icons to promote Taiwanese tourism, the name of Chiang-Soong May-Ling and other Chiang family members has been used for decades by Taiwan’s tourism industry. The historical significance of Chiang-Soong in contemporary Chinese history is unquestionable, but what made her so key to Taiwan’s tourism business is the “historical familiarity” that connects her stories to East Asian tourists. For not only Chinese but also Japanese tourists, the Chiang family – namely Chiang-Soong May-Ling, Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Guo – have become synonymous with Taiwan. The Chiang family is renowned not only for their travels all over Taiwan after the KMT fled to
Taiwan in 1949, but also through numerous anecdotes which show how close their lives were to that of local Taiwanese as well as their enjoyment of the life and landscapes of *baodao*. Moreover, because Chiang and his wife often chose famous tourists spots for their temporary residences (*xingguan* 行館) while making inspection tours around Taiwan, the histories of many famous sites, including the Caoshan residence (草山行館) at Mt. Yanming and the Hanbilou residence (涵碧樓行館) at Sun-moon Lake (日月潭), are deeply associated with the Chiang family. Therefore, tour guides are able to refer to Taiwanese landscapes as well as local specialty products when speaking of the preferences of Chiang family members. In particular, Chiang-Soong’s outstanding taste and graceful images as the “forever first lady” distinguish her from other Chiang family members, as a person of refined manners raised in an upper class family and recipient of a Western education. Therefore, with her tastes in high culture, her preference for Taiwan’s red coral and jade thus lend legitimacy to these local products sold in shopping stations.

In addition to her preference for red coral jewelry, Chiang-Soong is sometimes described by tour guides as the first lady of ill health. Many stories appear about the local medicines and supplements that Chiang-Soong took to cure her recurring asthma and migraines. Although I heard versions from several tour guides, this comprehensive version of this well-known story was told to me by a salesperson at a shopping station:
As we know, Chiang-Soong had severe asthma and the family doctors, trained in first class Western medical schools, could not find a treatment. When Chiang-Soong accompanied Chiang Kai-Shek by night to visit the Idashao tribe, who live by Sun Moon Lake, Chiang-Soong’s asthma flared up because of the long trip and she was incapable of breathing smoothly. The closest hospital is located a hundred kilometers away, and the doctors could not treat her effectively without the proper equipment. When Chiang-Soong’s symptoms worsened, the local tribesman provided their daily supplement and local medicine to the anxious Chiang Kai-Shek. Although suspicious about the effect of this remedy, Chiang had no other way to cure her beloved wife but had to feed her this local medicine. In moments, her breathing became smooth and clear. After recovering from this asthma attack, Chiang-Soong regularly took the medicine as a daily supplement. This is the secret to why Chiang-Soong lived until her 106th birthday. [Chendao 2010]

Because of the widespread interest in the Chiang family, those things that Chiang-Soong and her family used and ate in their daily lives have become great attractions to the Chinese tourists.

Anecdotes about the Chiang family indeed increase tourist interest in Taiwan-specific products. However, the overuse and exaggeration of Chiang-Soong’s image, along with pervasive historical familiarity with nationalist figures, sometimes goes awry: Tourists begin to question this constructed authenticity. One of the veteran tour guides once commented upon this abuse, complaining:

Some tour guides don’t even spend time researching their destinations, they just make up stories about the Chiang family. Unlike Chiang Kai-Shek and Chiang Ching-Guo whose stories are relatively difficult to make up, Chiang-Soong for some tour guides has simply become the ‘sick beauty.’ While spending her vacations at each of Taiwan’s famous destinations, such as Sun-Moon Lake or Taroko, Chiang-Soong becomes sick for different reasons and the diseases are cured by a local nutritional supplement. [Wudao 2010]
In addition to the abuse of Chiang-Soong’s image, the Chiang family in general are being constructed as “gourmets” in order to promote local food. He continued:

When the tourists are taken to their destinations, they are always being told that this dessert, tropical fruit, or dish was a special favorite of Chiang Kai-Shek or of his family. This certainly boosts the sales of these products, but also cheapens them and makes them not worthy of the attention (Ibid.).

Conclusion

Based on my ethnographic research in Beijing and Taiwan, I found the implicit differences within “Chineseness” that have constituted the main theme of Taiwan’s current tourism discourses targeting Chinese tourists. Taiwan has become the site of multiple imaginaries that represent Taiwan as a nostalgic symbol and an alternative version of Chinese modernity as well as the hub of Chinese popular culture. To the Chinese youth generation, their Taiwan tours and fantasies are thus more complicated than a simple long-term construction of affinity through “history”. Hence, their social imaginaries of Taiwan can be seen as the projection of their affinity formed in the negotiation process between the two forces of revised history and popular media representations. In this negotiation, the Chinese historical imaginaries toward Taiwan have developed in concert with the dissemination of Taiwan-centered popular culture.

As observed at Taiwan Custom Street and the other two exhibitions in Beijing, Taiwan has faced great difficulty in distancing its home culture, with its expected representations of
“Chineseness,” from its guest culture, the Chinese culture of China. Within the restricted narrative framework of Chinese culture there is very little room to narrate its unique culture, namely its “Tawianeseness” and thereby Taiwan must concentrate on conveying the nuanced differences of its Chineseness. Moreover, the regulation passed by China in 2008 only allows Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan by participating in packaged tours; this resulted in the impossibility of Taiwan actually delivering the expected “cultural delicacy” to Chinese tourists. Due to the nature of group tours, which rely on imparting “packaged information” about destinations, tourists have no choice but to be passive receivers unable to discover the destination culture in depth. This failure to convey the unique destination culture in any depth is a source of disappointment for Chinese tourists.

In the second half of this chapter, in contrast to Taiwan’s efforts to fulfill Chinese imaginaries of Taiwan, I have discussed the commercialization process of Chineseness in Taiwan’s tourism. The Palace Museum and the Taiwanese souvenir business have made creative use of Chinese visions of Taiwan’s Chineseness to skillfully link its tourism shopping to the “authentic” representations of Chinese culture in Taiwan. In this commodifying of Chineseness, the Chiang family and other Nationalist figures have been re-interpreted by tour guides to serve the demands of tourism shopping.
Notes to Chapter 6

1 See Nihaotaiwan.com “Huiwang sanshi nain: cong denglijun dao zhoujielun taiwan liuxingwenhua changxiangdalu” (回望30年：从邓丽君到周杰伦 台湾流行文化唱响大陆).

2 Flexible citizenship refers to “cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions” (Ong 1992: 6)

3 See Chu Puqing “taiwanzhikumintiao: youbachengjiu minzhong rentong taiwan shi zuguosuozai” (台灣智庫民調：有八成九民眾認同「台灣」是祖國所在).

4 See Xinhuawan, “Taiwan louxingwenhua dashiji” (台灣流行文化大事记).

5 Xinhua Taiwan Chnnel “Taiwan wenhua chuantong zai liuxing zhong chengji” (台灣文化:傳統在流行中傳承).

6 See “zaitaiwan de liuxingwenhua lingyu zhong zhonghua chuantongwenhua chuchu shanyao zhe buke momie de guanghui” (在台灣的流行文化領域中，中华传统文化处处闪耀着不可磨灭的光辉).

7 See Zhao Wanyi “xiaofei taiwan liuxing” (趙琬仪-消費台灣流行) and “Guanyuta, nijuedui buzhidaode shenceng Taiwan(7)Taiwan de liuxing wenhua” (關於她，你绝对不知道的深层台灣(7)台灣的流行文化).

8 Several of my informants in their early twenties have said that a great motivator for them to visit Taiwan has been their teenage experiences in listening to Taiwan pop music and watching Taiwan’s trendy dramas.

9 In my interviews with Chinese college students, young females usually attested to paying special attention to Taiwan’s popular culture news; males however considered this sort of fandom to be less masculine behavior and expressed their indifference. I later learned many of them are in fact very interested in pop dramas and icons but are too shy to admit to their fandom.

10 The popular writer, Pizi Cai, emerged from such internet writing and first become well known with his urban romance entitled “Diýici de qinmi jiechu” (1998 第一次的亲密接触) since 1998.

11 Interview conducted in fall 2009 with Gujie, a female college student in her early twenties.
12 Jiang, Linyu “jiantizi caidan yinglukeziyouxing? xingxingyuan:duociyiju” (簡體字菜單迎陸客自由行？行政院：多此一舉！).

13 See Nier, “haixia liangan taipeiluzhan dalu daibiaotuan zhenrong kongqian” (海峽兩岸台北旅展大陸代表團陣容空前).

14 See Wang Kejing “ziyouxing de kuanyushen” (自由行的寬與深).

15 See the popular travelogues by Zhao Xing and by Liuxiao. Both of their Taiwan tours have been published.

16 See blog of Taiwan Custom Street.

17 Chen Heng-Guan, “qiannianguzhen zhouzhuang dazao taiwan laojie” (千年古鎮周莊打造台灣老街).


19 “guoqu de fenrao dousuizhu shijian beiyiwangchengwei zhujain danwang de jiyi, huainain shifanxing yeshidongli” 過去的紛擾都隨著時間被遺忘成為逐漸淡忘的記憶，懷念是反省也是動力” (My translation)

20 Zhingyang shangqing wang “qiangshiyiluke zongtongdaxuan yeshi maidian” (搶十一陸客 總統大選也是賣點).

21 Interview conducted in fall 2009 Beijing with Feng, a senior college student.

22 Li Xingtong “bimai fendlisu nianchanzhi biaoshang 250 yiyuan” (必買 鳳梨酥年產值飆上 250 億元).

23 My personal conversation with Chendao, who has been a tour guide for four years.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: THE FAMILIAR STRANGERS IN EAST ASIA

I would start with a conversation from one afternoon’s class on Chinese literature in spring 2009. Having begun with Raymond Williams’ classic “Marxism and Literature,” the classroom was full of Marxist jargon. We moved on to a page on ideology. Perhaps having been in the field of social science for too long, I resisted the impulse to quote from Gramsci or Althusser and to prove my ability to manipulate these well-known concepts. Suddenly a metaphor occurred to me, likening ideology in a society to the sugar that is used in a bakery: “In thinking of a cake, you know that it has been sweetened, but what you don’t know is how much sugar was put in it.” Then I recalled that the classroom is not a cooking class and dropped the idea of the recipe. But later, this metaphor frequently occurred to me during my fieldwork and my writing. Though in class that day I didn’t have much to say, during my two years of fieldwork and the writing process, I perceived more and saw more utility in my metaphor of “sugar in the cake.” It is not only the person who would purchase or eat the cake; the pastry chef himself may have no clear sense of how much sugar is ideal for any given cake. Even with a recipe borrowed from other authorities, the amount of sugar in a cake is always properly “to taste.” “Proper” is then an extremely confusing idea for many
cooking beginners, as for each palate, and for each society, what is thought to be correct varies. The “proper,” however, is not easy for veterans either. For customers, those ordinary people who will taste the cake, how much sweetness they want and how much they can perceive is in doubt. For some bakers, a reputation for sweetness will be enough; the prior experiences of other consumers will set the standard for what constitutes the right amount. In the end, it is those bakeries with the longest line which spark, and satisfy, consumer’s desires for the “proper” taste.

If this metaphor can be aptly applied to the tourism industry and its practices in Taiwan, the Taiwan tour has long been the favorite cake of the Japanese. While hosting new customers from China, the Taiwanese travel industry and tour guides must play the essential role of baker to meet both demands. However, it then faces the challenges of maintaining balance between the taste of the familiar and that of the fresh; a flavor that is extremely familiar to the Japanese somehow has to be adjusted to newcomers, the Chinese tourists. They have known and desired to taste the cake for decades, the only-imagined flavor of Taiwan. This bakery, then, must simultaneously capitalize on its customers’ strong preferences while also facing the challenge of satisfying different customers’ distinct preconceptions of taste. Meeting the sometimes very distinct imaginations of the Japanese and the Chinese is as difficult as baking an ideal cakes for both sides.
In this dissertation, I concentrated on ambiguities that Taiwan intentionally retains, such as ambiguity in presenting its statehood, ambiguity of its colonial and war pasts, ambiguity in presenting its culture(s), which may counter the step-by-step design analyzed in other nation-branding projects. Chapter 1 presented the theoretical concerns of how desired, undesired and shared past(s) bring Taiwan, Japan and China together as a triangle through tourism practices. Given the mobile nature of tourists, aiming to investigate their social imaginaries, I adopted an interdisciplinary methodology of participant-observation as tour guide, tourist and researcher of tourism, as well as analyzing tourism representations, including tourism promotions and images. The second chapter reflected on methodology and “my Taiwan problem,” a term utilized by the PRC government regarding Taiwan as a trouble-maker in international politics; however, the great difficulty inherent in me as a researcher presenting my own identity appeared not only in my fieldwork in China, but also in Japanese tours and among Taiwanese tour guides. My aim has been to conceptualize encounters in the field, to present identities as always confronting and negotiating, by extracting different encounters and analyzing the factors behind each. Such interactions illustrate the meaningful negotiations which appear not only at the national level but also in daily life. Chapter 3 concentrated on the professionalism of tour guides and their intense desire to be perceived as such. Given the nature of the tourism industry and its pursuit of maximum profit, Taiwanese tour guides who lead packaged tours have become anxiousness
to situate themselves as cultural brokers mediating two cultures, in defiance of the fact that the majority of their income is based on commissions from tourism shopping. Uncertainty and underachievement accordingly result in a crisis of professional identity, and their professionalism frequently requires reaffirmation. Additionally, this unequal income distribution system has also led to an intensification of the process of commodifying Chineseness. In the fourth chapter, I presented a transforming process of Taiwan’s tourism promotions concerning the Japanese tourist. By turning the colonial legacy into a narrative of familiarity, the government, travel industry, and airlines smartly avoid recalling the colonial past(s) of Taiwan. This also led to a successful transformation from the male-gaze-dominated Taiwan that started with sex tourism to the female-oriented Taiwan as a “healing” destination. By bringing more Japanese popular cultural elements into this familiarity narrative, Taiwan tourism has promoted Taiwan successfully as an “escape” destination that conflates fantasies toward the prewar past and a desire to escape frantic daily life. This successful strategy also resulted in Taiwan’s ambiguous and fragmental presentation of its “national culture.” In chapter 5, I presented the turn of post-socialist China towards a desire to reinterpret its recent past with the KMT and Taiwan. By analyzing media products such as “main melody” films and the documentary on the two Palace Museums, I argue for China’s transforming imaginations toward Taiwan: from the view of an exclusive Chineseness competed over by two China(s) to the new perception of a
continuous and shared Chineseness between China and Taiwan. Through this transformation and the historical construction of a mother-son relationship between China and Taiwan, the “baodao ideology” of China again asserts Taiwan’s desire to “return home,” and Taiwan’s newly-adopted open door policy for Chinese tourists only offers another opportunity for the metaphor that the Mainland mother could finally see her son in Baodao. In chapter 6 I offered an updated analysis of the historical familiarity sustained by grand narratives of nation and family. Focusing on popular culture influences over the Chinese imagination toward Taiwan, I discovered an alternative to that narrative: that Chinese modernity in Taiwan is created to meet the Chinese desire to search for something different from their own society – a “running away” from their abhorred daily life, in which the imagined Taiwan serves as the other path that they did not choose in 1949. In the second half, I examined diverse efforts to brand Taiwan and the commercialized Chinesness that targets the PRC tourists. Through the case study of Taiwan Custom Street and the tourism practices of Chinese tourists in Taiwan, I argue that certain political and social realities restrict Taiwan from presenting itself concretely and correspondingly prompt the commodifying of Chineseness to meet the Chinese imaginations. By taking advantage of the Nationalist fervor and interest in the Chiang Family among Chinese tourists, the process of commercializing Chineseness helps not only to freeze Taiwan’s past in the divisive Cold War era but also to promote overall economic success through the various products of Chineseness.
Seeing tourism practices, packaged tours in particular, as the projection of social imaginaries, I proposed the concept of East Asian familiar strangers to distinguish a unique category of tourists from others; those who are not simply touring for the exotic, but searching for a familiarity at their destinations which is also subtly different. Through the lens of packaged tours, Taiwan’s cultural tourism allows us not only to explore the historical complex within East Asia but also the incongruent memories about the contemporary past(s) as well as the result of Taiwan’s ceaseless cultural identity struggles. Through my fieldwork in China, Japan, and Taiwan from August 2009 to May 2011, I have explored competing social imaginaries, a concept coined by Charles Taylor, which constitute an essential part of these tourists’ motivation. The post-war triangular relationships of China, Japan and Taiwan have shaped their mutual imaginations. Within intra-Asian tourism, the touristic encounters at destinations in Taiwan not only concern the imaginations between the guest and the host but also involve the third point of the triangle. The imaginations derived from the historical complex have complicated content nowadays because of the dissemination of popular culture. Moreover, within the imbalanced flows between Japan and Taiwan and between Taiwan and China, popular culture has enriched social imaginaries and thus influenced tourists’ destination choices.
The destination culture of Taiwan thus has to be narrated within a certain familiarity for East Asian tourists. Targeting the Japanese, promotions of the search for nostalgia have been developed over decades and have been replaced by an exclusive, absorbing concept of familiarity, which is utilized to remove the link of former colonizer and colonized. For Chinese tourists, the destination culture as well as the meaning carried by destinations is “packaged,” because until June 28 2011, joining a packaged tour was the only way to visit Taiwan. Although the imaginary keeps updating itself through mutual imagination, the Chinese social imagination of baodao thus represents the Chinese cultural and national construction of their “lost territory” and “treasure island.” However, this imagination of Taiwan in turn imposes the frame of Taiwan’s Chineseness, which means Taiwan can only narrate difference within a framework of cultural “sameness.” At the same time, its Chineseness has to be narrated in a more delicate way, a term I may call “familiar strangeness;” its Japaneseness is purposely hidden and the emerging Taiwaneseness is presented as derivative.

In such a context, ethnicity has become a term full of controversies. In this dissertation, I have strived to present a complicated picture of identity negotiations. Even within the discussion of national identity of tour guide/ tourist, one may see deeper interplays of different genders, generations and so on. The Japanese tours of Taiwan that began to thrive
in the 1980s have since presented such multiplicities through their diverse tour options: each
tour schedule design involves not only familiarity but also the experiencing of lifestyles or
other attractions, for example in tea tours, gourmet tours, or “ikemen” tours, featuring
handsome Taiwanese tour guides. In contrast to Japanese packaged tours, the Chinese tours
lack a diversity of choices, being still at an early stage in diversifying its tourism products.
However, my informants’ after-hours fandom tour in Eastern Taipei, as I described in
chapter 6, strongly indicate their fervent desires to find not only a connection between China
and Taiwan, but also the more personal, pop-cultural imaginations of Taiwan.

Let me return to the Han-centered and Chineseness-centered discourses that dominate
Taiwan’s packaged tourism. In packaged tours, the indigenous (ethnic) and local culture is
underrepresented or simply serves as a supplementary exoticness for touristic attractions. For
both tourists from Japan and China, the repetitive cultural and historical (re-)construction of
Taiwan over decades has forced Taiwanese touristic representations to transform in more
subtle ways than before. “Chineseness,” once a source of Taiwan’s desirability for tourists,
has become less exotic in the milieu of its domestic transformation and a thriving China. In
particular, Taiwan appears increasingly banal for tourists in Chinese packages tours, as they
have imagined a Taiwan different from the reality that they encounter. Rather than “staged
authenticity,” what is intriguing about Taiwanese tourism is the “imagined authenticity” that
is constantly in negotiation with exotic representations of the destination. By analyzing this host perspective, Taiwan tourism also offers us a great opportunity to observe Taiwan’s statehood, its “national” culture, and “locality” through the gaps between what tourists expect and the reality they find.

Through exploring the “familiar strangeness” constituted of the triangular relationships of Taiwan, Japan and China, I expect this project on East Asian tourists as familiar strangers can contribute to studies of intra-Asian connections and motility. Moreover, this project represents a new attempt to study intra-East-Asia tourism through transnational and multi-sited ethnography. I hope this project goes beyond previous studies, which merely focused on the bilateral Japan/Taiwan and China/Taiwan relationships. In addition, by situating tourism within a larger regional and global context, namely an intra-Asia context, I explore a mobile concept of “locality” and thus challenge the relatively community-based, indigenous-oriented research in Taiwan’s contemporary anthropology of tourism. This project also challenges problematic distinctions imposed by Cold War ideologies, which sought presumptuously and superficially to divide East Asian area studies along rigid geographical lines into Chinese or Japanese studies. Finally, I hope this project will help ease the tensions associated with cultural identities by revealing the shifting nature of ethnicity, as demonstrated in my research on Taiwan’s cultural tourism.
Notes to Conclusion

1 In Spring 2009; the class was entitled “20th Century Chinese Literary Studies” instructed by Dr. Ming-Bao Yue.
Source: Executive Information System, Taiwan Tourism Bureau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Total foreign visitors</th>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>914,325</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>972,123</td>
<td>2,770,082</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>1,080,153</td>
<td>1,630,735</td>
<td>3,235,477</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,294,758</td>
<td>1,784,185</td>
<td>3,633,856</td>
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</table>
Appendix B: “Lady-go” Tour Designed for Japanese Female Tourists
Source: CHEN Chen-Yuan
<table>
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<tr>
<th>日期</th>
<th>行程</th>
<th>时段</th>
<th>备注</th>
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<tr>
<td>4月09日</td>
<td>厦门 - 金门 - 八方轮 0830/0890 - 台南 - 立荣 B7-936 1250/1345 - 金门</td>
<td></td>
<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>厦门 - 金门 - 八方轮 0830/0890 - 台南 - 立荣 B7-936 1250/1345 - 金门</td>
<td></td>
<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4月10日</td>
<td>金门 - 厦门 - 金门 - 八方轮 0830/0890 - 台南 - 立荣 B7-936 1250/1345 - 金门</td>
<td></td>
<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>第二天</td>
<td>金门 - 厦门 - 金门 - 八方轮 0830/0890 - 台南 - 立荣 B7-936 1250/1345 - 金门</td>
<td></td>
<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
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<tr>
<td>4月11日</td>
<td>金门 - 厦门 - 金门 - 八方轮 0830/0890 - 台南 - 立荣 B7-936 1250/1345 - 金门</td>
<td></td>
<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
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<tr>
<td>第三天</td>
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<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
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<td>第四天</td>
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<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
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<td>4月13日</td>
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<td>第五天</td>
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<tr>
<td>4月14日</td>
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<td>指定时间于厦门东渡码头集合，坐船前往金门，水手水手码头，午餐后乘机前往台南，抵达后游览台南古代的塔【延平郡王庙】，俗称“郑成功庙”。【赤崁楼】是台湾代表性的名胜，文物与建筑历史悠久，明郑及满清时代，具有历史与文化价值。</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

备注：以上行程仅供参考，具体行程、航班、航点以出发前确认为准。
Appendix C. Timeline of Taiwan Tourism Development

1895  Sino-Japanese Shimonoseki Treaty that cedes Taiwan to Japanese Empire

1896  Japan takes over Taiwan

1927  Sino-Japan War erupts

1946  Japan’s defeat

Recovery of Taiwan from Japanese colonization

1949  KMT’s withdraw from Chinese Mainland

Transportation of Palace Museum collection to Taiwan

Martial law regulation in Taiwan

1956  Founding of Taiwan Tourism Association (11.29)

1964  Japan removes restrictions on overseas tourism

Tokyo Olympics

1965  Vietnam War

Founding of Palace Museum in Taipei (Nov.12)

Beginning of overseas vacations of US military personnel (Nov.25)

1966  Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement

Cultural Revolution in China

1967  Publication of “Gekan Taiwankankō” (first authorized Japanese language tourism magazine in Taiwan)

1970  Osaka Expo

Taiwan engages in promoting Chinese culture (ex. Chinese opera designed for tourists)

China begins to host international tourists

1971  Taiwan’s withdraw from United Nations

1973  Breaking-off of relations between Japan and Republic of China (Taiwan)

End of Vietnam War

1974  Taiwan’s official decision to stop regular flight between Taiwan and Japan (continuously operated by other international carriers)
Founding of Japan Chinese Tourism Association (日華觀光協會)

1975 Promotion of “women’s paradise” targeting Japanese tourists
   Amount of Japanese visitors surpasses US visitors for the first time

1976 Re-initiation of regular flight between Japan and Taiwan (China Airline and Japan Asia Airways)

1979 Taiwan’s removal of restrictions on overseas tourism
   Breaking-off of relations between USA and Taiwan

1987 First Taipei International Travel Fair in Taipei
   Abolishment of martial law (解嚴)

1990 Chinese Food Festival (中華美食展) in Taipei

1996 Hong Kong office of Taiwan Tourism Association opens

2002 Doors open to Chinese tourists with business or student visas issued by third party country

2005 Taiwan Tourism Association participates in Chinese travel festival in Kunming, China for the first time
   One million visitors from Japan

2008 Removal of restrictions on Chinese tourists (packaged tour)
   Japan Asia Airways merges with Japan Airline Group

2011 Removal of restrictions on Chinese tourists (FIT)
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Corcuff, Stephane.


Cttv.


Ctrip.


Chu, Puqing.


Dangdang wan.

Dinnie, Keith.

Edensor, Tim.

Eriksen, Thomas.

Falujiaoyu.

Farquar, Judith.

Fraser, Nancy.
Gao, Yuan.


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Yoshino Kosaku.


Yueh, Su-Ying.


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Zhang Xudong.


Zhang Jingyuan, ed.

Zhao Wanyi.


Zhao Xing.


Zhingyang shangqing wang.


Zhonghua wenhua zhonghui.