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Elections, electoral behavior, and political parties in Korea, 1981-1992: A logit approach to ecological analysis and inference

Kim, Hyun-woo, Ph.D.

University of Hawaii, 1992

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ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR, AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN
KOREA, 1981- 1992: A LOGIT APPROACH TO ECOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS AND INFERENCE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

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By

Hyun-woo Kim

Dissertation Committee:

Dae Soo Suh, Chairman
Richard W. Chadwick
Yasumasa Kuroda
Soren Risbjerg Thomsen
Yong-ho Ch'oe
Dedicated to my parents.
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This dissertation used the McCune-Reischauer romanization system to translate Korean words into English. The exceptions are: Syngman Rhee (Sung-man Yi); Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hi); Chun Doo Hwan (Chon Tu-hwan); Roh Tae Woo (No T'ae-u); and Seoul (Soul).
ABSTRACT

This study investigates important concepts of party politics such as party loyalty and voter mobility using official election statistics and the logit method for ecological analysis and inference. Party loyalty and voter mobility in the four National Assembly elections in the 1980s and 1992 are investigated. The consequences of the low level of party loyalty to the major parties, the fragile party system and frequent amendment of the electoral systems are examined.

Components of Korean political culture are understood as the basic framework in the analysis. The consequences of low party loyalty and nonvoters' electoral behavior are also examined.

The major findings in this study are the low level of party loyalty and the existence of a volatile electorate in the 1980s. Party loyalty for the DJP was low in 1985 (54.7 percent) and dropped even further in 1988 (41.7 percent). The DJP did not have a large group of loyal supporters in the 1980s although it was able to consistently obtain about one third of the valid votes cast in these elections.

The electorate is not to be blamed for their volatile electoral behavior. Their low party loyalty and volatility resulted from the insufficient and inadequate function and performance of the party leaders and their parties. Changes in the electoral system and party structure have led to the emergence of strong regionalism, insufficient performances of parties, and the low level of voter loyalty.

This low party loyalty, in turn, became one of the major causal factors for the mergers of political parties in 1990 and 1991. These mergers of
parties differ from those of the 1950s and 60s in terms of their motives and patterns. The uncertainty management approach replaced the traditional and power approaches in explaining the merger phenomenon. In other words, the political leaders felt the necessity of uncertainty management after the 1988 National Assembly elections because of unsatisfactory election results. Merger politics are the current form of Korean politics.

Besides the level of low party loyalty and fragile electoral behavior, one of the major findings is that components of political culture regulated the electoral dynamics in Korea in the 1980s and the early 1990s. It is concluded that the political culture regulation theory was examined and supported in this study.

The voter mobility tables for the 1988 and 1992 National Assembly elections show that the merger of three parties in 1990 strengthened the 1988 ruling party voters' loyalty to the ruling DLP in 1992. It has increased from 41.7 percent in 1988 to 55.9 percent in 1992.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Hypotheses

This dissertation is concerned with Korean elections, the electoral system, electoral behavior, and political parties during the period from 1981 through 1992. This study covers the four National Assembly elections in 1981, 1985, 1988, and 1992. These elections are the major subject of this study. This study covers that period because the electoral data became more reliable and accurate in that period. As Korean society has become more stable than ever, the importance of periodic elections and their results have begun to be reconsidered by students of electoral behavior. More importantly, changing electoral dynamics have been modifying the shape of Korean politics, as this study shall argue later. This study analyses periodic and fair electoral competition, voters' participation in elections, and political leaders' careful consideration in regard to the frequent amendment of election laws and party format. This study inquires into the scientific study of elections and electoral behavior.

Under the authoritarian political culture of Korea, voters' rights have often been ignored by political leaders. As Key argues, however, the voters should be considered as the "principal organ of governance." In that sense, elections, the electorate, and their electoral behavior must be considered important in understanding the dynamics of politics.

The major thesis in this study is concerned with the low level of party loyalty and the disloyal attitude of the voters between the period of 1981 and 1992. Another related thesis deals with how electoral and political
dynamics are regulated. This study suggests the political culture as the regulating factor that influences both voters’ and political leaders’ behavior. The major concept in this study is 'party loyalty.' Elections and electoral behavior will be analyzed by interpreting the voter mobility tables computed by a specific technique called the logit method for ecological inference. The method was developed by Soren Risbjerg Thomsen in 1987 and has been tested and evaluated positively in terms of validity and reliability. It has been tested to estimate the voter mobility in elections in many democracies including Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Germany. This is the first time this method has been used to analyze the Korean elections and electoral behavior. The method is adopted in this study because of its scientific nature and validity. More importantly, the program (ECOL, version 3) has been redesigned by the developer to analyze the Korean electoral data because some parties did not field candidates in all districts.

This method was devised to track the voters' electoral behavior in elections. By computing election statistics and interpreting voter mobility tables, it is possible to find some important features of Korean electoral behavior. These results give important clues in understanding political events in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, these electoral and political patterns shown in this study may cast certain implications for future elections. Admitting the volatile nature of Korean politics, this study is cautious in predicting future elections and electoral behavior.

This study attempts to test the following assumptions and hypotheses in regard to the Korean electoral behavior and party behavior: (1) Observers of Korean elections agree on the fact that the ruling parties tended to consistently win about one-third of all valid votes in elections during the
1980s. The direct interpretation of this implies a high level of party loyalty from ruling party voters. (2) The level of party loyalty is a reflection of party performance and the institutional setting including the electoral system. Frequent amendment of election laws and changes in party format might have contributed to the formation of low party loyalty. The hypothesis here is that low party loyalty to the major parties is to be explained at least in part by the frequent amendment of election rules and changes of party format. (3) Components of Korean political culture, e.g., regionalism, personalism, etc., are considered important in understanding the Korean electoral dynamics. These components deny, at least for the time being, the generalization of Korean electoral behavior using dominant theories and hypotheses. Korean electoral behavior should be understood within its own settings and traditions until the indigenous components of political culture lose their extraordinary influence on electoral dynamics. The hypothesis is that components of political culture are positively associated with the partisan support. (4) Party merger is one of the options for survival. Party merger between the ruling Democratic Justice Party (hereafter DJP) and two opposition parties in 1990 is different from that of previous decades in the ways parties combined and their motives for merger. The hypothesis is that party merger is to be explained at least in part by low party loyalty. This hypothesis will also be tested in the coming elections.

Structure

This study consists of nine chapters and a bibliography. Chapter 2 attempts to establish a conceptual framework for explaining electoral
dynamics in Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s. There are several theories and hypotheses to explain the electoral behavior, i.e., modernization (urbanization) theory, political culture theory, decline of community hypothesis, party identification hypothesis, and rational choice hypothesis. Among them, the political culture theory has been chosen in this study as a framework for understanding the electoral dynamics in Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Chapter 3 will survey definitions, functions, and roles of political parties. It will not go too deeply into the theories of political parties. Rather, it will examine the options for survival of political parties in a politically and economically developing society. It is assumed that the backgrounds and formation of the political parties, frequent amendment of electoral system, characters of major political leaders, and surrounding circumstances of the political parties have brought about a certain amount of voter dissatisfaction with the political parties.

Chapter 4 deals with elections, electoral systems, and electoral behavior. This chapter will focus on the meaning of elections, changes in the electoral system by the political leaders and parties, electoral achievements by parties, the determinants of Korean electoral behavior, and their consequences.

Chapters 5 to 9 will examine the consequences of the Korean electoral behavior and patterns. Chapter 5 will show the major findings of this study. Also, the method for this study will be introduced together with other similar methods for comparison. Specifically, Thomsen's logit method for ecological inference (1987) will be introduced. The rest of the chapter traces the party loyalty and voter mobility of the Korean electorate in the
1980s and early 1990s. By interpreting the voter mobility tables presented in this chapter, it is possible to arrive at a better understanding of and to derive important implications as regards the Korean electorate's pattern of electoral behavior.

Chapter 6 will examine nonvoters and nonvoting. Most studies of political behavior concentrate on positive aspects of the political process such as voter participation and mobilization. The subjects of nonvoters and nonvoting have been neglected by many students of Korean political behavior. This study will ask some questions in regard to nonvoting and nonvoters: "Who are the nonvoters? Why do they not vote? How can nonvoting be prevented? What are the consequences of nonvoting? How did nonvoters behave in the following elections? Compared to other democracies, Korean voter turnout is not considered low. It averaged 79.6 percent for the three general elections in the 1980s. However, the turnout rate has been gradually declining in recent elections. Nonvoting, as an important electoral behavior, will be discussed.

Chapter 7 focuses on the merger of Korean political parties during the period studied. This study contends that the merger between the ruling DJP and the two major opposition parties (the Reunification Democratic Party and the New Democratic Republican Party) was a consequence of the low level of loyalty of the Korean electorate to the major parties and of the unsuccessful performance of major political parties in recent National Assembly elections. The argument here is that low party loyalty or the decline of voter loyalty to the major parties may cause the merger of parties.

Chapter 8 will focus on the election results and voter mobility between the 13th and 14th National Assembly elections of 1988 and 1992. Since
the 1992 National Assembly elections were the first national elections after the merger of three parties in 1990, they will reveal an interesting pattern of electoral behavior of the Korean electorate. The impact and voters' judgment of the merger will be explored. This chapter also compares the level of party loyalty to the Japanese and Korean major parties. Finally this chapter examines the proportion district level invalid votes at the district level as well as at the city and province levels. The city and province levels of invalid votes are not surprising but the district level invalid votes often become a question. Chapter 9 provides this study's conclusions. The Korean pattern of electoral behavior will be summarized. The methodological, theoretical, and empirical significances will be concluded.

**Background for the Study**

A number of studies of Korean elections and electoral behavior have been written and have contributed to understanding Korean politics. This study will examine the Korean voters' electoral behavior using a different method and perspective. The difference in methods and perspective in approaching Korean electoral behavior will be shown in Chapter 5.

The major subject of this study is party loyalty. Citing Rose and McAllister's question: "If voters are loyal, what are they loyal to?" Voters are loyal to their own favorite party, and the high degree of party loyalty in many democratic societies suggests the level of popularity of their parties. The level of party loyalty has rarely been examined by the students of political science in Korea.

It is well known to Korean voters that Korea's ruling parties have been winning about one-third of the valid votes in elections in the 1980s. For
example, the DJP gained 35.6 percent of support in 1981, 35.2 percent in 1985, 36.6 percent in 1987, and 34.0 percent in 1988. It seems that the DJP was successful in at least in keeping their supporters loyal, election by election. However, this is not certain because of the changing alignment of political parties, frequent changes in the electoral system, and more importantly the political leaders' authoritative decisions and governmental intervention in elections in the past decades. This study empirically tests these vague assumptions.

This study will interpret the election statistics by estimating individual electoral behavior. The election statistics are the most obvious and objective data in analyzing the performances of each political party and the electoral behavior of the electorate. Sometimes, however, it is necessary to know more about the electorate's behavior than that which appears in the election statistics. For example, how many voters that voted for Party A supported the same party in the following election? How many of them changed their mind and voted for other parties? Because of the political sensitivity of these kinds of questions, it is not easy to get accurate answers from survey research in developing democracies nor even in advanced democracies.

Can the level of party loyalty and voter mobility be estimated using official election statistics? This simple but curious question has been raised by many social scientists, including historians, who do not have the survey results of past elections. The methods of 'ecological inference' have been introduced and tested in several democracies to answer this question. The frequent use of the 'ecological inference' method, however, was cautioned against by American sociologist W. S. Robinson in 1950.
overcome the 'ecological fallacy' have been made by scholars who are not completely discouraged by Robinson's warning. A method of 'ecological regression' was one of the replies given by the scholars. Unfortunately, however, the debate over the validity and reliability of this method still continue.

Another reply has come from Western Europe. Soren Risbjerg Thomsen refutes Robinson's claim about the existence of 'ecological fallacy' by pointing out the inadequate technique Robinson used. Thomsen suggests a new technique to compute voter mobility using election statistics.6 His method is called the logit method for ecological inference, and it has been tested in many democracies since 1987. The logit method for ecological inference tries to avoid the so-called ecological fallacy. This method is applicable to Korean politics even if political parties change their names or even disappear from time to time because the method was made to fit to the multiparty system as well as a two-party system. The ecological estimates using the logit method were made by the personal computer program ECOL, Version 3 (Thomsen, 1991). This version is specially designed to handle electoral areas with missing values which are quite frequent in the Korean electoral data. This effort made the method applicable to the Korean data.

The theory behind the logit method for ecological inference is Rasch's latent structure theory. The main point of the theory is that there exist a number of unknown or latent factors between voting behavior at Election No. 1 and voting behavior at Election No. 2. Berglund (1987) explains: "... the electoral behavior is seen as a function of the voters' position on a number of latent dimensions on both levels of analysis and not as a product
of their previous voting behavior or their socioeconomic status as in the case of ecological regression with respect to transition propensities or party preferences."

**Definitions and Descriptions of Concepts**

**Ecological fallacy ...** The specification of units of analysis is important in the study of electoral behavior. The macro interpretation of aggregate data (e.g., collectivities) often misleads the individual level electoral behavior. For example, the ruling DJP received about one-third of valid votes in the elections in the 1980s. This can be interpreted as the high level of party loyalty to the DJP (the most of voters who voted for the DJP tend to support the same party again in the next election). This kind of interpretation without investigating the individual level behavior is labeled as ecological fallacy.

**Logit Method of Ecological Inference ...** Equating the individual level fourfold correlation with the ecological logit Pearson correlations (logit Pearson correlation means the Pearson correlation between logit-transformed Px and Py).

\[
\text{Logit} = \log \left( \frac{\text{Pct.}}{100 - \text{Pct.}} \right)
\]

Here, \( \text{Pct.} = \frac{\text{Number for Party}}{\text{Total Voters}} \times 100 \)

**Party Loyalty ...** Party loyalty is defined as a voter's close psychological association in at least three consecutive elections to a specific political party.

**Personalism ...** The term personalism is used in this study to describe the charismatic nature of political leaders from different regions. Opposition party leaders in the 1980s and early 1990s
demonstrated a charismatic influence on their followers and supporters. In this sense, personalism can be defined as the manifestation of patron-client relationships between political leaders and followers.

Political Culture ... There are several definitions of political culture. In this study, it is defined as the direction of political style and the mode of political life, be it latent or manifest. In this study the use of the term "political culture" is limited and applied to the political phenomenon in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Political Party ... Political party is defined as an organization that power-motivated people establish, manage, and utilize the resources of in order to recruit the political elites (legislators or officials) and eventually gain control of the legislature. This definition of a political party may not imply the general principles of representative democracy or general expectations about political parties. The reason for this is that Korean political parties in the past were "top-down" parties and not "bottom-up" parties.

Regionalism ... Political scientists and sociologists are not in consensus in regard to the origins of regionalism in Korea. In this study, regionalism is considered as one of the important components of political culture that affected the electoral dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s. Jae On Kim and B. C. Koh defined the term as "the voter's affective identification with and support for candidates with roots in their respective regions."8

Party Merger ... Party merger in this study indicates the merger of parties since the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. More strictly, it indicates the merger of parties that hold seats in the National Assembly. Party merger between parties that do not hold any National Assembly seats may also be called merger. The focus of this study, however, will be the merger between the parties that hold National Assembly seats.

Data

The data for this study are derived from the official election statistics published by the Central Election Management Committee (hereafter CEMC) in the 1980s and early 1992. Four National Assembly elections were held
in 1981, 1985, 1988, and 1992, and the CEMC provided all the information on the candidates, elections, election results, and more importantly the aggregate data from the national level to the t'ong (the lowest administrative unit in Korea) level. These election statistics are the basic source for the computer analysis in this study: Che sibilt'ae kukhoeuiwon son'go sanghwang; Che sibidae kukhoeuiwon son'go ch'ongnam; Che sibsamdae kukhoeuiwon son'go ch'ongnam; and Che sibsadae kukhoeuiwon ch'ongson'go. Also Che sibsadae kukhoeuiwon son'go charyojip published by the Chosun Ilbo. The computation procedure of raw data for ecological inference using ECOL program, version 3 is listed in Appendix A.

Besides the computer analysis, a number of books, articles, monthly magazines, weekly magazines, and newspapers were used in this study. These materials are listed in the bibliography. Some survey research reports are cited in this study to support the conclusions and to make a comparison between the survey research tradition and the ecological research tradition. This study will take a critical stand on both research traditions but gives preference to the ecological research tradition.

Limitations

There are some limitations with this study. The first is that it lacks proper survey results (nationwide) to compare with the research results. There is only partial and limited survey data on Korean voter mobility and party loyalty. The forerunners in the field of electoral ecology have tried to compare their research results with survey results to examine the validity and reliability of their methods of ecological inference. Although survey techniques often give different results, when two or more survey research
organizations investigate the same topic at the same period of time, it is believed that this is the most reliable way of discovering the people's wishes and will. Two possible reasons for not using survey results here are that: (1) there were almost no nationwide survey polls on voter mobility in Korea, at least to the author's knowledge; and (2) the Korean voters are shy about expressing honest opinions in regard to their party support at the polls because of a long-lasting authoritarian political atmosphere which has prevented them from expressing outspoken opinions and attitudes.

The second limitation is that the arguments in this study are made without reference to the world political system. When the Yushin System was introduced by the Park Chung Hee regime in October 1972, some scholars tried to link Korea's domestic political dynamics with the world political dynamics. The global political climate still influences the Korean politics. This means it is possible to link Korean political dynamics, e.g., the merger of three parties in 1990, with the challenging global order. However, this study does not link any foreign influence with domestic political dynamics. Despite the limitations, this study can still contribute to the study of Korean electoral behavior.
Notes for Chapter 1


CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Efforts are made by students of electoral behavior to describe voters' electoral behavior and find repeating patterns. As a result, a number of theories and hypotheses of electoral behavior have been produced and are being tested in many democracies. Of the many theories of electoral behavior, four theories (models) are covered in this chapter. These theoretical frameworks are from sociology, psychology, and economics. After reviewing these theories this study will provide an alternative framework to describe the Korean electoral behavior.

The Socio-Economic Status (SES) Model

What does election mean to the general voters? What is it that voters express at the time of voting? Since 1940, a number of theories of voting have been produced by scholars of electoral behavior. In the early days of election studies, Lazarsfeld et al. found that a voter's socioeconomic status (SES) is closely related with electoral behavior. In The People's Choice, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues focused on the short-term factors that have an influence on voting choice to analyze the 1940 presidential election in the U. S. They found a strong relationship between voters' social characteristics and their electoral behavior. The researchers combined the voter's religion, place of residence, and occupation (education, income, and class) and created the Index of Political Predisposition (IPP) to refer to the voter's partisanship. This approach is often called 'social determinism.'

In European societies, it is said that waves of social reforms, e. g., national revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the development of
welfare states, constructed the current social cleavage structure. These changes and developments have created conflicts among social forces such as those between central elites versus local elites and the church, between the urban sector versus rural sector, between commerce versus agriculture, between management and labor, and between the public and private sectors. Class has been one of the most important cleavages after the Industrial Revolution and has been used as one of the predictors for election forecasting for a long time in European countries and the U. S.

Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee’s work Voting (1954) was an example of a comprehensive sociological model of electoral behavior. As Wattenberg comments, they traced the "roots of stability rather than the forces of changes from election to election."  

In the view of scholars who advocate this model, a high SES increases the turnout rate. It is assumed that level of education, for example, is closely related with the level of participation because highly educated people who know more about politics and social issues participate more than less educated voters. Campbell, Gurin, and Miller further collected nationwide survey data and published a book, The Voter Decides in 1954. They admit the oversimplification of voter profiles using sociological categories.

According to Rose and McAllister’s observation, the British Labour Party was established on the assumption of "group voting" because it receives its support from group organizations, e. g., trade unions as well as individual party members. Class is the primary predictor in most studies of voting in Britain. The trend, however, has been changing. Recent voting studies in
Britain report the existence of 'deviant voters' and the decline of consciousness of party identification based on socioeconomic status. In the U. S., it is frequently observed that Protestants from rural areas and with high socioeconomic status tend to vote for the Republican party. The SES model, however, does not explain why these Protestants vote more Republican than the Catholics do.

According to Giddens, class society is "not simply a society in which there happen to be classes, but one in which class relationships provide the key to the explication of the social structure in general." In this sense, the Korean society is not considered as 'class society.' Hagen Koo, however, argues that the Korean society is moving towards becoming a class society.

Given the relatively weak class consciousness of the Korean society, the application of the SES model to the Korean case is a little difficult. The SES model faces difficulty when the phenomenon of regionalism or personalism prevails. The emergence of strong regionalism in certain periods of time needs another conceptual framework to explain it.

The Social-Psychological Model

This model, which was suggested by the scholars at the Michigan Survey Research Center, has often been called the Michigan Model. This model is an elaboration of previous research on electoral behavior. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) emphasized three psychological aspects- the person's attachment to a party, the person's orientation toward the issues, and the person's orientation toward the candidates. Party identification is the core of this model. Party
identification was considered the most important variable explaining political behavior in the 1950s and 1960s. The advocates of this model argue that party identification is an important long-term factor affecting the vote. Issues and candidates are short-term factors specific to the election and subject to influence by party identification. Party identification is formed through experiences and circumstances from one's early life. This is called the socialization process. A voter makes last-minute decisions on voting day, at the point of the "funnel of causality", based on lifetime learning (funnel theory).9

Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes's work The American Voter (1960) was an analysis based on their 1952 national survey using the social and psychological approach.10 In this model, voters make their decisions based on short-term issues and candidates' personalities. This model better illustrates the relationship between voters' electoral behavior and party choice than the SES model.

W. H. Flanigan and Nancy H. Zingale advocate the importance and influence of party identification on political opinions and electoral behavior. They defined the term party identification as "the sense of attachment or belonging that an individual feels for a political party."11 This model and the concept of party identification have dominated the study of electoral behavior for more than two decades.

Once a person is nominated by their party's leadership or nomination process, he or she starts a campaign to receive enough support to win the election. Election campaigns "tend to reinforce people's preexisting preferences or activate people who may have been thinking about supporting the candidate into actually doing so."12 The way to campaign
has been to focus on the party leadership and party itself. As party identification declined in the 1970s, a "new style in election campaigns" has emerged. The 'new style' campaign focuses on the candidate rather than the party.\textsuperscript{13}

American voters' affiliation with their major political parties has been declining since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{14} The political party's role in guiding voters' choices of candidates has declined, while the role of narrowly defined single issues has risen.\textsuperscript{15} In Britain, Crewe, Sarlvik, and Alt (1977) have observed the declining of the strength of party identification in British elections.

Under the stable two-party system in the U. S., the formation of strong partisan groups can be imagined. However, a group of scholars is challenging the concept of party identification and its application in the study of electoral behavior. For those scholars the concept of party identification may be an elusive one in terms of evaluation and measurement. Martin P. Wattenberg takes a critical stance toward both \textit{Voting} and \textit{The American Voter} because these studies did not take 'performance assessments' into consideration seriously.\textsuperscript{16} Admitting the controversies on the measurement and concept of party identification, Niemi and Weisberg still emphasize the utility of the model.\textsuperscript{17}

Morris P. Fiorina's model of retrospective voting (1981) is a kind of revision of this social-psychological model because Fiorina labelled the role of party images in party choice as "retrospective voting." Unlike the rational choice model that assumes voters are intelligent and spend much time in collecting information, the retrospective voting model attributes voters' judgments to the government's past performance and expected future performance. In Fiorina's model, voters make judgments on the
government’s past performance (results), and this evaluation of past performance becomes an indicator for future performance. Voters need not know about the process of decision making or about policy means. In this sense, retrospective voting is more realistic and easier than rational choice voting.

**The Modernization (Urbanization) Model**

The relationship between modernization and political participation has been a time-honored research topic since the “Chicago school.” Socioeconomic modernization has increased the number and quality of mass media and the voters' educational level. Changes in socioeconomic level may have increased the voters' consciousness toward voting and politics. The modernization model was initially advanced by Lester Milbrath, Karl Deutsch, and Daniel Lerner. The gist of Milbrath’s center-periphery theory is that urban residents have more opportunities to be involved in politics than rural residents because of their exposure to urban political affairs and information from news media. In Deutsch’s view, urban residents' awareness of politics and their political self-interest increase their political participation. Lerner argues that urbanization increases political participation and reinforces the influence of education and mass media on election turnout. This model was tested by a number of scholars in Korea (Yun Ch'on-ju, 1961, 1981; Han-Shik Park, 1971; Kim and Koh, 1972; Kenneth Kunil Ahn, 1975; Chong Lim Kim, 1980b; Tuk-kyu Chong, 1975, 1983; Kim Kwang-ung, 1985). According to this model, turnout rate in rural areas is supposed to be lower than that of urban cities. In Yun Ch'on-ju’s words, the high turnout rate in Korean rural areas is due to the
"conformity voting phenomenon." The logic here is that, if not for the conformity voting phenomenon, the urbanization model is applicable to the Korean case.

This model, however, was criticized by a group of scholars. For example, Alex Inkeles, G. B. Powell, Kenneth Prewitt, and Norman Nie argue that urbanization and political participation do not demonstrate a significant level of correlation.

Chae Jin Lee and other scholars who take different points of view from the modernization model explain the low turnout in urban areas as a socio-psychological phenomenon caused by rapid urbanization (the disruptive effects of over-urbanization). Scholars who do not agree with the modernization model use the "decline-of-community" hypothesis. This hypothesis emphasizes the negative aspects of urbanization: the isolation of individuals, deepening of the gap between traditional and modern social organizations, and increase of political cynicism. Hong Nack Kim and Sunki Choe explain the low turnout in urban areas using the decline-of-community model: "... the low-voting rate among the urban-metropolitan voters can be attributed to the weakening of pressure for conformity to community norms in voting as well as ineffective community social networks in mobilizing voters."

**The Rational Choice Model**

The rational choice model provides more concrete conclusions in economics than in politics. In the political scene, the estimation and calculation of costs and benefits are not easy jobs for ordinary voters, nor even for those who have are politically knowledgable.
this model argue that electoral behavior is not predetermined by the social groupings or psychological orientations of voters because voters are capable of collecting and judging the information about elections and political situations.

The assumption of this model is that individual voters will choose action A when A's benefits over costs compare favorably with B's benefits over costs. The other assumption is that collective action will occur when individual voters feel the positive incentives or negative sanctions in regard to their behavior.\textsuperscript{27} Roger W. Benjamin utilizes the rational choice model in explaining the negative relationship between electoral participation and 'modernization measures' in Korean elections and concludes that those who have political information will not participate in an election if the costs of voting outweigh the benefits expected.\textsuperscript{28}

This model ignores the aspect of the socioeconomic status of individual voters. Voters decide on the basis of some expected benefits whether or not to vote and for which candidates to vote. According to this model, voters vote only if they perceive benefits from voting greater than the cost of voting. In the usual formulation, voters vote for the candidate or party who holds the attitudes and opinions closest to theirs on specific issues.\textsuperscript{29} This is ideological voting because when the cost of voting, e.g., information collection cost, is painful, voters' ideological orientations tend to be reflected in their voting attitudes. It assumes that political parties contest to maximize the vote-getting function along a dimension of choice.\textsuperscript{30} For the calculating voters, this scale of ideology can be used in order to avoid the costs in collecting the information. In Britain, it is conceived as a left-right
dimension using a left-right scale. Voters' choices depend on what they believe in rather than what their feedbacks are.

A major contribution of this approach is that it provides a more explicit, precise theoretical basis for voting decisions and for their analysis than do other approaches. Anthony Downs (1957) began this tradition when he suggested the concept of the cost of voting (including transportation, the cost of gathering information). Using the Downsian model of voter choice (left-right dimension) in Britain, it is argued that "changes in election outcomes are normally expected to be voter-led."32

It is reasonable to think that voters are rational and they vote based on their evaluation on the policy issues and calculation of voting costs. In reality, however, voters do not necessarily behave rationally. According to surveys conducted by Flanigan and Zingale, a considerable proportion of voters are "not concerned with issues as such in a campaign, but vote according to their party loyalty or a candidate's personality."33

The core of Downs's theory is that voters make rational decisions. However, rational electorate's behavior at the time of voting depends on each individual's circumstances and interests. It cannot be explained by group behavior. The results of group behavior may be effected by the results of the irrational behavior of individual voters, however, a measurement problem exists at the individual level of behavior.

The competing theories mentioned above have persuasively helped analyze electoral behavior in many cases and at certain times. However, none of the above theories solely explain Korean electoral behavior and its dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s.
An Alternative Framework: Political Culture

It is a main assumption of this part of study that a new model or theory is necessary in explaining Korean electoral dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s. Theories and hypotheses produced in advanced democracies are probably applicable to Korean electoral behavior, but the appearance of certain strong cultural traits, such as regionalism and personalism, in Korean elections hinders the arbitrary application of these theories and hypotheses. In this sense, more appropriate theoretical paradigms should be found within Korean society.

The concept of political culture was first introduced by Gabriel Almond in 1956. Almond stated that "every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the political culture." Later, Almond and Verba defined the political culture as "the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation." Orientation here includes cognitive orientation, affective orientation, and evaluational orientation.

Kim Un-t'ai argued that Korean political culture exhibits a mixture of three types of political culture (parochial, subject, and participant) suggested by Almond and Verba. Kim argued that it is necessary to grasp the traditional characteristic and historical context as well as behavioral analysis in tracing political culture.

Almond and Verba's typology for political culture, however, does not provide substantial help in understanding the Korean political culture and political behavior. As Dennis Kavanagh claims, these are only ideological types of political culture. Han Pae-ho also points out that Almond and
Verba’s framework provides only a conceptual framework to analyze political culture. Kim Son-jong argues that the political culture consists of complex and diverse orientations. Application of these broad types of political culture to a society’s political culture may result in the vague classifications or descriptions of phenomena.

Dogan and Pleassy state that political culture "refers to the set of political beliefs, feelings, and values that prevail in a nation at a given time. Because it filters perceptions, determines attitudes, and influences modalities of participation, culture is a major component of the political game."

According to Beer, values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes are the major components of political culture. Each of these components can be classified into conceptions of authority and conceptions of purpose. Almond and Powell describe the political culture and subcultures:

In studying any political system, one needs to know its underlying propensities, as well as its actual performances over a given period of time. We call these propensities (the psychological dimension of the political system) the political culture. It consists of the attitudes, beliefs, values, and skills that are current in a population. But regional or ethnic groups or social classes that make up the population of a political system may have special propensities or tendencies. We call these special propensities subculture.

Political culture is one of the portions of a broader social culture. Political culture does not manifest in all aspects of a society. However, it is assumed that it does contribute in interpreting the political dynamics of the society.

Political orientation, according to Kavanagh, means a certain behavioral tendency and appears as a response to political stimulation. This orientation
is determined by elements such as tradition, historical experience, motive, norm, feeling, and symbol.\textsuperscript{47}

The concept 'political culture' is general and broad as shown above.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, only some components of Korean political culture which appeared or manifested in the 1980s and early 1990s will be cited in this study. The components of Korean political culture such as regionalism, personalism, and authoritarianism are useful in explaining Korean political dynamics in the 1980s and the early 1990s. Political culture is an alternative conceptual framework in interpreting a society's political orientation and characters.\textsuperscript{49} The only problem with this conceptual framework lies in the different meanings, categories, and scope of the term "political culture."

In this study, political culture is defined as the direction of political fashion and the mode of political life, be it latent or manifest. Political culture, then, is concerned with both the institutional conduct and the political behavior of the masses (political subculture).

The concept of 'political culture' is frequently used in the literature of comparative politics.\textsuperscript{50} Richardson notes that the "political culture approach has emerged out of both a normative interest in the political proclivities of ordinary people and the strong enthusiasm in recent years for empirical research into political behavior."\textsuperscript{51} However, conceptions of it differ from one society to another, and from one cultural area to another. Even within a society, the shape or tendency of political culture differs from time to time.
Korean Political Culture

The concept of 'political culture' was first introduced into Korea in 1959. Since than, extensive research on Korean political culture has been conducted by scholars. Yi Chi-hun surveyed the basic elements of Korean political culture by analyzing 22 scholars' research reports on Korean political culture. He found that there are 39 elements of Korean political culture suggested by the above 22 scholars. According to the frequency table made by Yi, authoritarianism (f = 14) is the most frequently listed element. Sense of community (f = 8) and factionalism (f = 8) are listed in the second place. Bureaucratism (f = 6), democratic attitudes (f = 6), and high political consciousness (f = 6) also occur often. Yi Chi-hun indicates authoritarianism as the core element of Korean political culture.

Some scholars, Ch'ang-gyu Ch'oe, Han Shik Park, and Kalton, point out the dualistic nature of Korean political culture. They see the dualistic nature between authoritarianism and egalitarianism in the Korean political culture and argue that this nature makes the transition from political authoritarianism to democracy easier.

Bun-woong Kim argues that the political culture of the Korean elites during the Rhee Administration, the Democratic Administration, and the Park Administration was authoritarian, centralization-oriented, and elitist, the bureaucracy showing only minor changes between the administrations.

Yi Yong-ho suggests six characteristics of Korean political culture. Koreans are compliant towards authoritarianism or authoritarian decision-making; lack a sense of political competence; believe the "positive government"; make political choices based on personal relationships; show a low level of mutual trust; and Korean political culture is in a rapid
Kim Un-t'ae suggests three major characteristics of Korean political culture: the principle of "hwa" (conformity, harmony, or unity) and a tradition of humanism; national integrity and integration; national subjectivity and independent spirit. The major features of Korean political culture suggested by Kim are largely derived from its historical context. The idea here is that the Korean people's mode of life and national consciousness have continued from ancient times to modern times as the above-mentioned components of political culture were established through their own cumulative experiences with neighboring countries and by racial, geographical, social, and climate circumstances.

Gregory Henderson also approached the Korean political culture based on its historical and organizational perspectives. He considered the value of centralization as the most important component that affected the formation of Korean political culture:

In Korea, as suggested earlier, the imposition of a continuous high degree of centralism on a homogeneous society has resulted in a vortex, a powerful, upward-sucking force active throughout the culture.

Lucian W. Pye points out the fact that most Asian countries tend to put more values on loyalty to the collective than the Western countries. Pye's general observation on the traits of Asian political culture supports Henderson's argument on the high level of centralism in Korean society.

Han Pae-ho and O Su-yong approached the Korean political culture, using a nationwide, multistage, stratified probability sample survey, with seven dimensions (obedience, personalism, formalism, trust, equality, tolerance, and individual rights) and found that these seven value dimensions are closely related to each other. They argue that Korean
political culture is not authoritarian. Rather, it is mobile and complex and it cannot be explained with a one-dimensional orientation. Han and O refute the taking of the features of authoritarian value orientation from the traditional Korean family and politics.

A number of theories have been applied to explain the Korean political behavior including electoral behavior. Many of them have failed, and some of them are still in debate. There is no one omnipotent theory that can explain electoral behavior cross-culturally. One of the major reasons for difficulties in applying general theories to Korean politics lies in the features of Korean political situations and social structure. Korean politics is not considered stable because Western-originated political institutions and systems are not yet firmly rooted. The repeated political upheavals since 1945 have contributed to the instability of Korean politics. Nam Young Lee’s (1985) indication of weak political infrastructure in Korea is closely related with rapid political changes, legitimacy problems, and low levels of political consciousness.

The purpose here is to introduce some elements of Korean political culture that are closely related with electoral dynamics: regionalism, personalism, personal ties, and the authoritarian way of decision making. These elements may belong to elements suggested by the 22 scholars mentioned earlier. This study will use these specific elements of the political culture to support its argument. Given the broad and general formulations of political culture, this study will use the term 'political culture' in a very restricted sense.
The Political Culture Regulation Theory

The term 'theory' initially came from the meaning of observation. The first step of making a theory is observing facts carefully and suggesting explanations about them. There are very many happenings and phenomena in the world, but if we pay attention to these happenings and phenomena it is possible to detect certain rules and repeating patterns. Abraham Kaplan wrote that theory "stands for the symbolic dimension of experience, as opposed to the apprehension of brute fact." Since the original meaning of theory is not acting but observing, theory-making often means not learning from experiences but thinking about what to learn.

The concept of 'political culture' contains two aspects: traditional aspects (hardly changeable) and modern aspects (changeable by certain political crises). In that sense, Korean political culture in the 1970s, for example, may have a different shape and pattern compared to that of the 1980s. Political culture explains an important portion of political behavior. In many cases, the concept of 'political culture' has been understood as static. It can be argued that political culture is both static (e.g., close personal relationships) and dynamic (e.g., influence from abroad, sudden change of social and political systems, manifestation of regionalism, the formation of personalism). The emergence of strong regionalism and personalism explains an important part of electoral dynamics. Thus, it is assumed that some components of political culture such as regionalism, personalism, personal ties (with regional, academic, and kinship relationships), and the authoritarian way of decision-making style of political leaders will help in explaining the rapid changes in party support, non-voting, and merger movements.
There are two ways of regulating the Korean political culture. A group of scholars use the term 'traditional belief system' in analyzing it while the others advocate the term 'modern values, attitudes, and behavioral patterns.' This study, however, is not concerned with the distinction of these approaches because it will take some components of both traditional and modern political cultures in Korea. The contention here is that the elements of political culture derived from both historical and behavioral research are intertwined with each other.

This study takes the recent merger among the DJP, the Reunification Democratic Party (hereafter RDP), and the New Democratic Republican Party (hereafter NDRP) as a "new" phenomenon in the Korean political culture. This is new because there were always clear reasons and demands for merger between opposition parties from public opinion in the past. The merger among the DJP, RDP, and NDRP in 1990 was made by an authoritarian decision-making process and with no input or demands from the party members and the general public. The same can be said of to the merger of opposition parties in 1991. Its motives differ from that of opposition party mergers in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.

One possible theory here is that the way and style of political decisions and voters' electoral groupings may be more strongly regulated by political culture under the weak political infrastructure (The Political Culture Regulation Theory). This theory might explain the past political dynamics and voters' electoral groupings in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The Political Culture Regulation Theory will be examined in this study. This theory needs modification because the notion of political culture is flexible and changes from time to time.
Notes for Chapter 2


5. Ibid., 34.


10. Ibid., 77.


15. Ibid., ch. 10.


25. Kil Sung-hum et al., *Han'guk son'goron* (Korean Elections), 85.


28. Ibid., 27.


31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.


35. Ibid., 396.


37. Ibid., 15.

38. Kim Un-t'ae, Chongch'ihak wollon (The Principles of Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1980), 251.

39. Ibid., 248.


41. Han Pae-ho, Han'guk ui chongch'i (Korean Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa: 1984), 51-52.

42. Kim Son-jong, "Son'go munhwa wa chongch'i ch'amyo," in Kim Kwang-ung, ed., Han'guk son'goron (Election Politics of Korea) (Seoul: Nanam, 1990), 94.


47. Ibid., 11.


52. Yi Chi-hun, "Han'guk chongch'i munhwa ui kibon yoin," *Han'guk chongch'ilhak hoebo* 16 (December 1982): 98.

53. Ibid., 103.


56. Yi Yong-ho, "Chongch'i sahoehwa kwajong," (Political socialization process) in Kim Un-t'ae et al., Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1988), 202.

57. Kim Un-t'ae, "Traditional characteristics of Korean political culture," in Kim Un-t'ae et al., Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1988), 160-178.


60. Han Pae-ho and O Su-yong, Han'guk chongch'i munhwa (Korean Political Culture) (Seoul: Pommunsan, 1987), 306-307.

61. Ibid.


63. Kim Kwang-ung, Sahoekwahak yon'gu pangbomnon (Research Methods in Social Science) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1984), 103.


65. Ibid., 294-95.
CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL PARTIES: FUNCTION, PERFORMANCE, AND OPTIONS FOR SURVIVAL

Political Parties

This chapter will survey the function, role, performance, and options for survival of the political parties. The scope and subject of this chapter are limited to political parties in Korea. The intent is to give some hints and implications about Korean political parties as regards the findings about party loyalty and voter mobility that will be addressed in Chapter 5.

Political parties are important in contemporary democratic societies as well as in socialist states.\(^1\) The term 'political party' has positive connotations because of its representative nature and because of its closeness to people, be it physical or psychological. Newspapers, television, radio, and other media deal with the political events, political parties, and politicians as primary topics in everyday news coverage.

Given the closeness of political parties to the public, it is necessary to review critically the function, role, and performances of Korean political parties to understand the consequences of their actions. The research in this chapter is meant to offer some explanations about the political upheavals and changes in Korean party politics during the 1980s and the early 1990s and to delineate how Korean political parties differ from or are similar to political parties in other countries.

The effectiveness of political parties in Korea is limited because of their narrow ideological perspectives and poor performance.\(^2\) In Europe, political parties and political organizations with various ideologies, creative principles, and critical policy issues, e.g., the Green’s\(^3\) peace and
environmental protection issue, appeal to the electorate and receive support from the people although these parties may receive few votes in elections.

There are several definitions of political parties dependent on different scholars' perspectives (see endnote 1). Essentially, these definitions can be classified into two categories: some emphasize the representativeness of political parties (the high level category) while the majority emphasize the vote-gathering function (the low level category). Among the definitions, Katz illustrates the simple but clear relationship between the party and the elections: "Parties are organizations of holders of, and aspirants to, elective office."4

Korean political parties in the past decades have not been real political parties because of the frequent assemblage and separation of parties, their short lifespans, and irresponsibility. Generally, they are vote-gathering machines and are of the low level category. Giovanni Sartori argues that parties are "vote maximizers" in elections although their policies are not only relevant for the elections.5

If we consider the history of Korean political parties, it is evident that they have only served limited functions and roles. There are several reasons for this failure of political parties in Korea; including lack of experience, lack of capable party leaders, military intervention, the Korean political culture, the executive dominance over the legislature, and opposition party leaders' excessive power ambitions. In regard to the function of Korean political parties, Bae-ho Hahn and Ha-ryong Kim once concluded that political parties are sort of "ephemeral organizations" with limited functions in the political system.6 The number of political parties are even determined by political leaders' preferences. For instance, in 1980, President Chun Doo Hwan
expressed his opinion on a desirable party system in Korea in his interview with the press. He said that "the two-party system in the past brought the extreme confrontation between the ruling party and the major opposition parties. There existed no compromise between them and eventually it led to political instability. Thus, several parties with different policies are expected to come."7

In other words, the multiparty system was advocated by former President Chun Doo Hwan, the founder of the Fifth Republic, to dilute the cohesive power of the opposition at the beginning of the 1980s.8 The formation of the four-party system in 1987 was made possible by the power-motivated party leaders, not by the voters. Thus the multiparty system in the early 1980s and the four-party system in 1987 were considered fragile and unstable because they were based on the prevailing mood of regionalism and the politicians' strong power motives. The number of parties will give very important clues for the analysis of the power relations in a political system (Sartori, 1976). There is, however, no right answer with regard to the number of political parties needed to have a strong democracy.

There are a number of questions that arise in reference to a political party: What is it? How does it come into being? What are its roles and functions? What is the relationship between the political party system and the electoral system? Using these questions, this study will seek to clarify some of the fundamental issues.

As described earlier, Korean political parties in the past were "top-down" and not "bottom-up" parties. In Dahl's words, this is an example of high-risk politics where the authority flows from the top to the people.9
Thus, the people's wishes and opinions were not well reflected in the political system.

As Gunner Sjoblom argues, a party "shall make the authoritative decisions in accordance with its evaluation system." This implies that parties consult with their supporters and people when they evaluate the system. The irrelevant "top-down" system of Korean political parties made the Korean legislators in the National Assembly a rubber stamp for many years.

Political cynicism is prevalent among Korean students and intellectuals. The unsuccessful performance of political parties and politicians are a major reason for this cynicism. This has produced a low commitment to democracy:

The most striking finding was the correlation between the level of formal education and the degree of democratic commitment: the higher the education, the lower the democratic commitment.

Political cynicism can be seen in some countries including advanced democracies. Cynicism is only a partial (regional) phenomenon in some states, e.g., Korea and Japan, but the decline of political parties is a global phenomenon in the political scene. Stephen E. Frantzich argues that "a major source of party decline stemmed from the reduced ability of political parties to control, or even influence, political communications and the election results they spawn." In the United States where the stable two-party system has developed, the voters' deviation from support for specific political parties is no longer a strange phenomenon. The voters have become more independent and self-controlled. In Japan, the younger generations who were born during and since the rapid economic growth period also deviate from affiliating with specific political parties.
In many developing countries, political parties often do not have local organizations, and they can even be formed by "governmental decree." This is the case of some political parties in Korea. In the beginning of the 1980s, major opposition parties such as the Democratic Korea Party and the Korea National Party were encouraged and helped by governmental agencies during their establishment. This kind of opposition party is classified as the "loyal opposition." The external environment surrounding Korean political parties had driven them to a dead end by the late 1980s and had initiated the new environment of the early 1990s as will be shown later.

Function and Role of Political Parties

In the 1950s and 1960s, many scholars indicated the functions and roles of political parties in a modern sense. One said that some of their functions are: (1) to organize the chaotic public will; (2) to educate the private citizen to political responsibilities; (3) to represent the connecting link between government and public opinion; and (4) to select leaders. Another study defined role as: (1) political participation; (2) legitimacy; (3) national integration; and (4) conflict management.

Other views of the function and role of political parties include Epstein's, which argues that "structuring the vote" is the minimum function for the political parties. The fundamental goals of the parties, according to Sjoblom, are: (1) program realization; (2) vote maximization; (3) maximization of parliamentary influence; and (4) party cohesion.

These desirable functions and roles of political parties, except for recruitment and vote-getting functions, were not observed in Korean political parties for a long time. Unfortunately, the function and role of
political parties in general are in decline in many countries, and the trend is often described by scholars as a crisis of political parties (F. Sorauf, 1976; G. Pomper, 1977; Scott and Hrebenar, 1979; Lawson and Merkl, 1988).

Basically, the failure of Korean political parties is related in large part to the lack of "linkages" between the parties and the electorate and the lack of resources of the country. Lawson and Merkl claim that the "linkage" between the electorate and the parties is important and that the formation of this linkage is the very function of political parties.23

In Japan, the individual Diet member plays an important role in forming the linkages between the political party and the electorate using a private supporters' group (Koenkai).24 The necessity of the "linkage" role in representative politics brought the Korean Assemblymen to create the private supporters' group (Huwonhoe).25 The problem that remains with the private supporters' group in Korea is that the ruling party members enjoy plenty of support from the electorate and business while the opposition members lack organizational support. In Japan, the Diet members affiliated with the opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and Japan Communist Party (JCP) almost always do not have their personal supporters' group due to their policy or ideological orientations. The Assemblymen in Korea who are affiliated with the opposition parties find it difficult to receive political funds from businessmen although they may maintain their own personal networks within their electorate.

Political parties in a modern sense were formed to compete in elections. The electoral laws and electoral systems "structure" the competition.26 In that sense, the relationship between political parties and electoral systems is close and inseparable.27 Yun Yong-hi analyzed the role of the Liberal Party
(Chayudang) in the 1950s using the input role and the integration role categories. Findings from Yun's study on the Liberal party's role indicate that the Liberal Party did not promote the people's demands for participation. Rather the Liberal Party was used as a tool in mobilizing the vote. Yun Yong-hi also pointed out that the Liberal Party's decisions became national policy without any other integrating process and adjustments among the parties in the National Assembly. Thus, as Weiner and La Palombara point out, the political environment, i.e., the power relations between the parties and the government, affect the role of political parties and party systems in the electoral dynamics.

In Korea, the People's Party (Minjungdang) raised their voice when Anmyondo residents strongly protested against the nuclear waste disposal facilities construction planned in that area in 1990. On the other hand, the major political parties, including the ruling DJP, the opposition Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), and New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP), failed to clearly address these demonstrations. The major parties' silence on the incident was enough to negate the People's Party and other environmental protection groups' appeals for safety there and elsewhere. As can be seen in the Anmyondo protest case, the major Korean political parties have played a passive role on environmental issues.

The German Greens, Swedish environmentalists, Swiss citizen action groups, Italian Radicals, Japanese Sanrizuka movement, and the Korean Anmyondo protests all address issues that the major parties have failed to treat satisfactorily either in their own programs or in actual practice. When a society has unorganized and uninstitutionalized political and social forces
addressing critical social issues, the society tends to meet the challenges from the people who have fresh and advanced ideas.\textsuperscript{32} 

The role of political parties in a political system, whether in developed or developing countries, may be conceived as that of providing "a comprehensive linkage" between the public and government decision makers.\textsuperscript{33} 

Downs hit the mark in regard to the function and role of political parties and the meaning of elections: "Parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies."\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Character and Attributes of Korean Political Parties}

The political climate in Korea since 1945 has favored a conservative ideology and orientation. Accordingly, almost all the major parties, with the exception of a few minor progressive parties, have been considered conservative in ideology and authoritarian in nature.

The character of the parties in a political system is intimately related to the quality of its democracy - to the structure and functioning of its political institutions, to the nature of the interests represented or unrepresented and to the distribution of influence among them, to the capacity of the system to solve the society's problems, and indeed to the likely longevity of the democratic regime itself. The nature of the party system is among the explanations given frequently for the virtues or defects of a regime.\textsuperscript{35}

The Korean political parties have emerged either as a result of pressure from state power or as a reaction to the regime in power.\textsuperscript{36} This fact regulates the nature and the character of Korean political parties. These externally created political parties lack self-strengthening confidence and
This invites the vicious cycle of denial politics by the new political leaders. Ki-Shik Han describes the role and character of Korean political parties in the past decades: "... if the role of the legislature is handmaiden of the government, the role of the parties is a humble servant of the government administration."\textsuperscript{37}

Under the authoritarian regimes and authoritarian political culture that prevailed in the past decades, especially in the 1970s and 80s, the bureaucrats were accustomed to making and executing administrative orders without consulting the people, as was witnessed in the Anmyondo case. This fashion of authoritative executive dominance is prevalent in Third World countries. Political parties often do not touch sensitive topics such as environmental and strategic issues simply because these are considered as taboo and the parties lack professional knowledge and specialists on these issues.

Political leader-centered party formation and its arbitrary operation have impeded the institutionalization of political parties in Korea. The Handokdang was gone with the death of Kim Ku, the Working People's Party with Yo Un-hyong, the Liberal party with Rhee Syngman, and the Democratic Republican Party with Park Chun-hee.\textsuperscript{38}

Whenever political upheavals occur, the leading forces tend to abolish existing political parties and prohibit political activities of existing political figures. Former presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan are the examples of this phenomenon. Sung-joo Han argues that "the government's occasional banning of existing leaders from active political participation, as happened during the early Park as well as the Chun periods, makes institutionalization of parties extremely difficult."\textsuperscript{39} Thus it may be inevitable
that 'reforms' are carried out by those who were not popularly elected. At the same time, however, it may be a tactic to provide a "catharsis" for the electorate by sacrificing the existing parties.\textsuperscript{40}

The role of Korean political parties in electing the president and all members of the National Assembly was significantly decreased when the Yushin System was adopted.\textsuperscript{41} This was because the new system excluded the political parties from the major political processes. Chang Ul-byong states that: "... under the Yushin System, the political parties have had no influence in selecting the president because he was selected by indirect election by the members of the National Conference for Unification (T'ong'il chuch'e kungmin hoeui)."\textsuperscript{42} Under the Yusin Constitution, the President was empowered to nominate one-third of the members of the National Assembly. The Yushin System came to an end with the assassination of President Park Chung Hee by the Korean CIA Chief Kim Chae-gyu on October 26, 1979.

The subsequent military group that emerged seized all channels of domestic information and controlled the military. The next step in grasping political power was to control the legislature. Dae Sook Suh states what happened to the fragile political party system and the legislature in Korea after President Chun Doo Hwan assumed power:

Chun mobbed swiftly to purify Park's old political system. He ordered 567 political leaders and former party officials who were responsible for political corruption and social unrest to cease political activities for eight years. He banished 232 higher government bureaucrats from government services.\textsuperscript{43}

The structural corruption and social unrests of society are not easily cured by such extreme one-shot prescriptions, as the Park regime used in
the past. The new political groups prove this. Rather such political prescriptions merely appear to give fresh and clean images to the power holders although this effect is doubtful.

Korean political parties seldom touch topics such as environmental issues, human rights, and security issues (including the reunification policy) simply because they lack the professional knowledge and specialists on these issues. In addition to these issues, the political climate, in part, also hinders them from dealing deeply with these issues.

Another factor that limits the capability of political parties in Korea lies in the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political parties. In most countries, be they advanced democracies or developing democracies, the role of the executive is enormous in the process of nation-building and state management. Marn J. Cha observed the increasing dominance and influence of bureaucrats, especially in the Third World countries, and their relationship with democratic decision making. Frequently, the executive intervenes in the territory of the legislative and the judiciary in the developed societies as well as in the developing societies. In the developing societies, the excuse for this overplay by the executive is that "modernizing oligarches" have to rely upon the technologies, professional skills, and organizations of bureaucratic administration.

In the case of Japan, the public bureaucracy was encouraged and raised by the Imperial Government to meet the surge of Western influence and impact in the initial days of the modern Japanese state. Thus the bureaucracy has held a strong position compared to that of the political parties since the beginning of the modern state. As B. C. Koh points out, the status and power of the Japanese bureaucracy were strengthened by
the "constitution and practice alike." On the other hand, it is argued that the earlier post-war Japanese Diet has played a rubber stamp role much as the pre-war Imperial Diet did in the 1930s. Baerwald's observation follows:

In other words, they assert that the parliamentarians are workers on an assembly line powered by the bureaucracy and the products of this are modeled by the bureaucracy in conjunction with business interests which together constitute Japan's ruling elite.

This excuse, in developed societies, can be found in the context of the struggle for power either between the ruling and the opposition parties or between the bureaucracy and the political parties. For example, Martin Shetter cites the Watergate incident as clear evidence for the attempt to appropriate power inside the administration by passing the other institutions including the Congress. Shetter analyzed the relationships between the bureaucracy and political parties. Most developing democracies belong to the category of strong bureaucracy and weak political parties. The Korean case is frequently illustrated as a strong bureaucracy and weak political parties. According to the Shetter's model, the Korean case can be explained by cell III of Figure 3-1 which illustrates an irresponsible party in a state with strong bureaucracy. What is deviant from the exact definition of a bureaucratic state, however, is that Korea has maintained a strong presidency as well as a strong bureaucracy. Thus, political parties are subject to influence from both the president and the bureaucracy through various means and channels which include the administrative order, national projects, and the amendment of electoral system.
Executive dominance is prevalent in Third World countries. The instability of politics, lack of party expertise, and lack of experience in administration are the conditions that contribute to a strong bureaucracy in those countries.

In Korea, the ruling parties and the bureaucracy, from the 1960s through the 1980s, performed well in the economic sector overshadowing the opposition political forces of the country with economic achievements. As Edward Shils states on the nature and the orientation of the bureaucracy in developing societies, "...characteristically, the elite are Western-educated, committed to secular values, and aspire to rapid socioeconomic development." Martin Shefter understood the American New Deal Policy as one of the strategies used to overwhelm opposition political parties by mobilizing mass and popular organizations in national projects.
As far as the political role of the bureaucracy is concerned, it is also considered important for the ruling parties. Yung Chul Han reveals the relationship between the bureaucracy and the ruling party candidates in Korean elections: "One of the most significant aspects of the 1967 general elections was that the police and government officials played a much more active role than party functionaries in campaigning for the DRP candidates." This role of police and government officials during the election periods today, however, is not the same as that of 1960s. It has significantly decreased.

The above attributes and characteristics of Korean political parties probably have a certain influence on the formation of political cynicism, disaffection, and low party loyalty. The levels of institutionalization of Korean political parties are still low. Yong-ho Kim argues that a broadly-based party should emerge in the Korean political domain to help the structural consolidation of political parties.

This study pays attention to the relationship between the political parties and voters. The observations above will aid in an understanding the electoral groupings, voter mobility, party loyalty, and merger of parties in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Korean Political Parties: Performances and Options for Survival

In consideration of the reality of party politics in the past several decades in Korea, there are four possible options for party survival: Name change; amendment of election laws; improved performance; and merger. Although these options do not necessarily guarantee the survival of political
parties, they have been considered to constitute a meaningful way of management in party politics.

Name change: The majority of Koreans are aware of who they are in terms of family history. Each Korean last name has its own origins or myth and a native place from which it originated. Both first and last names are considered important in Korea, and many people visit professional name-makers and fortune tellers to acquire good names and, hence, good fortune. In the business world also, names of companies are considered important because the name or title of a company or organization has a big psychological influence on the people and can confer commercial advantages.55

The politicians who understand the merits of name and image change have used this tactic in Korean party politics. The name change of political parties, however, has differed from that of companies or other organizations because of the party's existing popular attributes and its representativeness of the people's will. Korean political leaders have tended to change the name of the ruling party whenever they assumed political power. For example, President Park Chung Hee established the Democratic Republican Party, and President Chun Doo Hwan formed the DJP. Opposition party leaders have done the same. For example, Kim Yong-sam (Kim Young-sam) and Kim Tae-jung (Kim Dae-jung) separated from the New Korea Democratic Party and established the Reunification Democratic Party and Party for Peace and Democracy respectively.

The name of the political party even became the subject of negotiations between the party leaders. During the beginning of the 1990s, the New Democratic Party's Kim Tae-jung and the Democratic Party's Yi Ki-t'aek
have negotiated about the merger of their two parties. In the process, party name change was discussed and used as one of the negotiation cards for merger. The tactic of party leaders (and leaders in general) arbitrarily creating new parties should be reconsidered so that political parties can develop into more stable institutions.

Election Laws: Besides name changing, another possible way of altering the direction of politics is the amendment of election laws. For example, the at-large proportional representation (PR) system has worked favorably for the ruling parties since the introduction of the system in 1963. It is not unusual that every political system has an electoral system that favors the ruling party. It becomes an issue when it extraordinarily favors the party in power. The basic aim of this at-large PR system is to ensure minority representation in a multiethnic or multilingual Western country. Korea is an ethnically uniform country, and thus the system has been recognized as a functional representational system in Korea.

Douglas W. Rae (1967) analyzed the relationship between the electoral system and the party format and found that the electoral system influences the character and nature of political parties. The configuration of election laws and systems is closely related with the survival of political parties. The amendment of Korean election laws, however, does not always bring the expected effects when the components of Korean political culture, e.g., regionalism and personalism, prevail in the society.

Performance: In When Parties Fail (Lawson and Merkl, 1988), the scholars analyzed the phenomenon of party failure as well as party survival. Lawson and Merkl argue that parties fail to survive when their performance and function do not satisfy voter expectation. In general, parties fail when
they do not take into account the changing attitudes and preferences of the people. In the Korean case, the ruling parties first had to solve the problem of political legitimacy in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. Where there is weak legitimacy, good performance and mass popularity cannot be expected. As many authoritarian regimes in the newly independent countries have done, Korean authoritarian regimes since 1961 have devoted themselves to economic development in order to deal with the problems of legitimacy and better performance.

The founders of the ruling Democratic Republican Party (Minju konghwa dang) concentrated their effort in building a true example of a "modern party." They attempted to use scientific technology and professional skills to integrate the people's will and opinion within national politics. They managed to get more seats in following elections; but, as time went on, they found that their support bases were weak, they were unpopular in many areas, and they were incapable of national management, e. g., the labor-management disputes and the human rights issue. Young Whan Kihl approaches the ruling party's failure in many developing countries in terms of linkage:

"Political parties in many developing countries are not serving as effective linkage mechanisms between citizens and the government in power. One reason for this situation is the ruling elite's use of party organization as an instrument for political mobilization and control of the citizens rather than as a forum of political participation and education."

The ruling parties in the past decades were faced with the structural problems of society and of their own parties. In a strict sense, it is difficult to judge the performance of Korean parties on a scale comparable to Western political parties because Korean political parties are not yet
institutionalized. Structural problems and obstacles prevented the Korean political parties from performing well. Given the conditions of Korean politics, general evaluation of Korean political parties has not been positive due to their lack of self-reform efforts.

**Merger:** In some countries, existing parties collapse because new political parties or organizations emerge. This is why some European democracies establish certain barriers in the legislature to prevent the random formation of political parties.

When the opposition parties become stronger than expected and begin to share the political domain, the ruling party has to do something. The party may merge with opposition parties. The absorption of opposition parties can thus be an option for the survival of the ruling party. Although this tactic has been known the opposition parties' option for struggle and survival for a long time, the ruling DJP in 1990 adopted this tactic to survive. The merger of these parties will be discussed later.

In short, options for the survival of the weak ruling parties include name change, electoral manipulation, merger of parties, and successful political performance as well as electoral competition.

**Conclusion**

Most definitions imply that political parties have to perform well in daily politics as well as in electoral competitions. In other words, political parties should be "cohesive" and "policy-oriented." In principle, as Yves Menv argues, all parties, regardless of whether they are ruling parties or opposition parties, should channel demands from the bottom to the top (input) and decisions from the top to the bottom (output).
Political parties' functions and roles, however, do not accomplish these purposes in general because of the complexities of input and output processes and because of the limited resources and capabilities that each political party holds at the time of decision-making. More importantly, the strong ambitions of the politicians make it more complex. Electoral and party systems are often manipulated by politicians.

In addition to the institutionalization of political parties and organizations, Angelo Panebianco argues that the political successes or failures of political organizations depend to a large extent on the personalities of their leaders and the roles they have assumed.62

Political parties must appeal to the electorate by offering fresh policy issues or by listening to the voice of the voters in order to maintain or obtain office, instead of manipulating the electoral and party system. When the major political parties cannot produce fresh policies, the electorate searches for alternative organizations to make their voices heard (Lawson and Merkl, 1988). The use of surveys and computer techniques and facilities are recommended to assess the voters' opinions and to find new possible support for the party. One of the most critical options, according to Stephen Frantzich, is to maintain "technological superiority" by reading the electorate's opinions in order to formulate policy alternatives.63

The development of the Korean political party system and its political parties was hindered by several factors: random and irresponsible establishment of parties, frequent amendment of election laws, an overly strong and influential bureaucracy, the top leaders' authoritarian style of ruling, the low political consciousness of the masses, and name change. Name change is one of the options for party survival, but it works
negatively for party loyalty. After all, name change can be a temporary tactic for survival but not for the long-term strategy for party survival. In addition to the factors above, it is important to make politicians listen to the people's will when they make decisions in regard to party activities.

In summary, the Korean political parties did not perform well in terms of function and role except for their vote-getting function. The argument here is that the political party leaders' arbitrary behavior in regard to the function, role, and format of political parties has worked against party loyalty in the elections in the 1980s.

Five features of Korean political parties are: Ideologicai narrowness, hurried establishment, inadequate performance, low representativeness, and short life-span. These five features imply the consequences and limit the scope of function and role of the parties.
Notes for Chapter 3


3. Jurg Steiner, *European Democracies* (New York: Longman, 1986), 40. He classifies the Greens as the party on the left-right continuum and party that emphasizes the post-material values.


8. Ibid.


15. Ichiro Miyake, *Seito shii no bunseki* (Analysis of Political Support), (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 1985), 75 (Table 2-4).


25. For the comparative political finance and the Korean huwonhoe system, see Chang Chong-yun, Chongdang ui chongch'i chagum yon'gu (Seoul: Taewon, 1987) and Chongch'i chagum (Political Finance) (Seoul: Omijongsa, 1991).


27. Ibid.


29. Ibid.


31. For the environmental protection policies and policy priorities in Korea, see Sungsoo Kim, The Policy and Politics of Environmental Protection in the Republic of Korea, Ph.D. diss. (University of Texas at Austin, 1989). This study finds that environmental issues have low priority under regimes whose goal is the rapid economic growth.


36. Yi Chong-sik, Han'guk chongch'i sanghwang ui che tanmyon (Phases of Korean Political Situation) (Seoul: Koryowon, 1983), 209.

37. Ki-sik Han, "Development of Parties and Politics in Korea," Korea Journal 14 (September): 86.
38. Yun Hyong-sop, Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1988), 458.

39. Sung-joo Han suggests three more major reasons for the failure of the Korean political party system: (1) a serious imbalance that exists between the bureaucracy (including the military) and political parties that has hampered the development of the latter; (2) parties have not been able to cultivate a stable following among the voters because, in the post-1948 period, there has been no room for ideological deviation from the officially accepted line on virtually all important issues, including unification, national defense, socioeconomic development, and management of wealth; and (3) the many changes of regimes and constitutions that took place, usually through extraordinary measures by governments that came to power by nondemocratic means. See Sung-joo Han, "South Korea: Politics in Transition," in Democracy in Developing Countries-Asia, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 295-296.

40. Yun Hyong-sop, Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics), 458.

41. For the adoption and its consequences of the Yusin system, see Hakkyu Sohn, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea (London: Routledge, 1989).


54. Yong-ho Kim, "Kwonijuui lidosip kwa chongdang chongch'i." (Authoritarian leadership and party politics). In *Han'guk chongch'i kyongjeron*, ed. An Ch'ong-si (Seoul: Pommunsa, 1990), 141. He (1989) also concludes that the DRP was not able to build up a hegemonic party system for: (1) the presence of a relatively strong and autonomous opposition party; (2) the party's lack of internal unity; (3) the party's lack of populist leadership and welfare-oriented policies; (4) and the party's subordination to the administrative bureaucracy.

55. For example, after the Korean airliner was shot down by the Soviet jet fighter on September 1, 1983, the Korean Airlines changed the name to Korean Air.

56. For minority representation in some Western European countries, see Jurg Steiner, *European Democracies* (New York: Longman, 1986), 89-100.


59. Ibid., 75.


63. Frantzich, Political Parties in the Technological Age, 27.
ELECTIONS, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS, AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

Elections are one of the most important parts of the processes that represent the people's will in a democratic system. The diffusion and practice of universal franchise without property qualifications brings about the establishment of political systems based on fair competition and eventually satisfies the electorate's vague demands on the modern democratic system.\(^1\) The realization of universal suffrage, however, has required much effort, time, and sacrifice in many Western countries.

Universal franchise was introduced by the American Military Government in Korea (1945-1948) and adopted for the Korean Republic's first elections in 1948. For Koreans who lacked the experience of struggling to obtain universal franchise, its sudden introduction seemed not much appreciated. Its meaning and consequence in daily political life were misunderstood for a long time.

**Elections and Voting: Meaning and Implications**

It is important to note the definition of democracy since major concepts such as voting, election, party loyalty, and voter mobility will be translated and used within the category of the larger concept of democracy. In a simple but broad sense, democracy means that people choose their political leaders or office holders under free and open elections.\(^2\)

Elections and voting are important elements in democratic theory and practice, as Philip D. Straffin (1980) says, because they can express and also integrate the people's will. Here, voting is the behavior and election is the institution. Thus, the meaning of 'voting' is the same all around the
world because it simply means the act or behavior of casting one's ballot in a box at a certain place determined by the election management authority. 'Election' is the political process and institution for selecting leaders at a certain time and place.

Voting is the physical manifestation of political behavior, but also includes psychological, situational, and political influences on the electorate. There are several explanations about the meaning and implications of voting. The methods of voting and voting systems differ from country to country and even the weight of a single vote differs from district to district. In a constituency that has a bigger population than others, the weight of one vote is less than that of a vote in another constituency that has a smaller population. For example, the number of eligible voters in the Kangso-A district in Seoul was 115,847 while that of the Kuro-A district in Seoul was 238,346 in the 1988 National Assembly elections. When only these two districts are compared, voters in the Kuro-A district are less represented than the voters in the Kangso-A district. This imbalance becomes more serious when it is compared with that of Changhung-gun district (51,770 eligible voters) in Chonnam.

What is clear in regard to the role of elections as an institution is that they bring the winners into the offices and push the losers out. Secret voting is the safest means for replacing political leaders because it does not reveal the individual voter's attitudes to others; but it is still controversial as to whether elections satisfactorily reflect the voters' will. Ginsberg and Stone ask important questions in regard to the meaning and function of elections. The function and role of an election become a problem when unelected officials make important decisions or if a president who promised
certain projects during his election campaign changes his mind after the election.

Taagepera and Shugart suggest general explanations about the role of elections and electoral systems. They argue that both the voters' party preferences and the election laws influence the election results. More importantly, electoral laws in many democratic countries have a different meaning and influence on election results and party format, even under situations where they apply the same kind of electoral system.

For a long time in Korean electoral history, elections served to legitimize the ruling parties and ruling group. Opposition parties and independent observers of the electoral process described many cases of corrupt election practices and structure. In some advanced democracies, it has been argued that elections are becoming more "ritualistic" and, hence, losing their original effectiveness and expectation of results. As Shienbaum argues, however, they are an important means of "legitimizing myth." He also argues that the election as an institution and voting as an act of political behavior have a "tension-relieving and cathartic function."

Michael Avey replaces traditional theories based on psychological aspects and socioeconomic status with a mobilization and demobilization theory in regard to turnout in elections. His point is that the turnout depends upon the politicians' mobilization or demobilization efforts of the masses in the electoral process. This theory is another version of the cost-benefit approach in which mobilization entails benefits. This is ironic in a democracy because, in a democratic system, each citizen is supposed to participate in the electoral process voluntarily and, consequently, no special effort should be needed by the politicians to increase the turnout rate. The
voters have the right and power to control politicians and political parties. Accordingly, they are supposed to use their ballots effectively and wisely. In reality, however, according to Avey, the rate of voter turnout depends upon the politicians' mobilization efforts in many democracies. One problem is that many voters are not familiar with the policy issues that arise during the electoral campaigns. Flanigan and Zingale's observation on the American electorate is probably applicable to the Korean case:

Many voters are not concerned with issues as such in a campaign, but vote according to their party loyalty or a candidate's personality. Their vote has no particular policy significance but reflects a general preference for one candidate.15

The importance of party loyalty or partisanship in the voters' choice has been emphasized by several scholars in America (Fiorina, 1981; Flanigan and Zingale, 1991). For some voters, elections and voting have a tension-relieving, politically cathartic function.16 In Korea in the 1980s, it is not easy to describe in brief what election and voting mean to Koreans because they have experienced or witnessed a number of political upheavals. Under authoritarian regimes, they may be a way of expressing voters' political preferences or social-psychological status.

Elections: Campaign and Actuality

Each society seems to have its own election campaign style, largely determined by its own election laws. However, it might be argued that election style is, to a certain extent, also determined by other factors such as both the politicians' and electorate's experience in election practices, character of the political leadership, political culture, and political interests of the electorate.
In Korea, campaigns during the election period are strictly regulated and observed by the Central Election Management Committee (CEMC). The CEMC suggests guidelines for specific methods and processes for unified campaigns, i.e., joint speech rallies. The campaign period is also limited. For example, a twenty-day campaign period was specified by the National Assembly Election Law for the 1981 National Assembly elections.\(^{17}\) Election campaigns in Korea have also been determined and shaped by the political elites including politicians and high-ranking officials. The meanings and implications of elections, mentioned in the first part of this chapter, and the practice of election laws often do not work effectively in Korea. As far as elections are concerned, both the ruling and opposition parties are not committed to the election laws.\(^{18}\) After the elections, and even during campaign period, it is typical to see newspaper articles describing campaign violations and inter-party disputes. Each party claims that the other parties are violating the election laws, and the illegal activities of both ruling and opposition parties are often observed at election time. Jae-on Kim and B. C. Koh illustrate the more obvious tactics that the ruling parties have taken: coercing rural people, buying votes, sabotaging opposition campaigns, nullifying opposition votes, stuffing ballot boxes, and preventing opposition candidates from running.\(^{19}\)

It is widely believed that both campaign style and the campaign itself influence voter turnout and partisan voting. In consideration of the high rate of "floating" or non-committed voters in Korea, the meaning and effect of the campaign are important.\(^{20}\) Survey research reports show that a number of voters make their decision to vote and choose which candidate to vote for shortly before the election, sometimes even on the day of the election.\(^{21}\)
The first step in an election campaign on the part of the candidates is to
become qualified and nominated by the party leaders. In a representative
political system, candidates must have their party's endorsement to run for
office. Sometimes the party's endorsement directly affects the candidate's
success. In the Honam districts, for example, nomination by Kim Tae-jung
and his party assures success in the elections. The same can be said in the
districts of Pusan where Kim Yong-sam holds a strong support base. The
chances for success are high when the party is popular among the people or
the party leader is charismatic. This implies the existence of keen
competition, even among party members to be endorsed by the party
leadership in the process of nomination. The Korean nomination system for
election is different from that of the primary or caucus system in the
United States. The difference is that candidates for election (National
Assembly elections) are determined by party leaders but not by the local
party members.

The relationship between party strength (or the personal charisma of
political leaders) and success in elections is more important in the single-
member district than in the multi-member district system. The results of the
National Assembly elections in 1988 which used the single-member district
system supported this argument, and at the same time showed that the
Korean case deviates from general expectation because of the effects of
political culture (regionalism and personalism) on election results.

The second step in the campaign process is to mobilize the electorate at
campaign rallies and other campaign locales. The Korean electoral
campaigns can be called "bulk" campaigns. Parties and their candidates try
to mobilize the largest possible number of voters in order to display their
popularity and overwhelm the opposition. Parties often overestimate the number of people who gather at their rallies and stumping places and use these inflated numbers to show the party's popularity. The police, on the other hand, tend to underestimate the number of people gathered at these occasions, especially for the opposition parties. The Central Election Management Committee recently held a forum on the amendment of the presidential election laws and participants suggested the abrogation of outdoor stumping. Instead, they suggested that candidates discuss policy issues through the mass media. The effects of voter mobilization and the claims of inflated numbers of people gathered at rallies during a campaign can influence fragile and floating voters' electoral behavior.

The third step of the election campaign is to maintain the 'straight vote' (Kojongpyo) in each party's strongholds. Each party or candidate has a support base. For some parties, it will be in specific regions, and for other parties it will be with certain classes or specific occupational groups. Be it a region or a class, it is critical for a party to hold its support base in the final stages of the election campaign. The maintenance of 'straight vote' is one of the most important strategies in electoral competitions.

Besides the campaign activities noted above, it is necessary for the candidates to use their personal networks to maximize their support at the polls. Many Korean Assemblymen tend to run again in following elections. What this implies is that these incumbents are more or less confident in that they will be nominated by the party leadership and be reelected by their constituency. Chan Woom Park finds that a candidate's electoral success is closely related with his constituency work including the maintenance of
direct contact with his constituency, e.g., presiding at weddings, sending flowers to funerals, and finding jobs for supporters.25


The 11th National Assembly elections were held on March 25, 1981. Average turnout (out of all eligible voters) rate was 78.4 percent. In this election, Kangwon Province showed the highest turnout (88.0 %) and Ch'ungbuk Province the second highest (86.7 %). Seoul recorded the lowest turnout rate (71.1 %) and Inch'on the second lowest (72.6 %). Kwangju in Chonnam Province also recorded a low turnout rate very close to that of Seoul (72.4 %).

Twelve parties and 106 independents competed in the election. As the results (Table 4-2) show, three parties (DJP, DKP, and KNP) emerged as the major parties and 11 independents (out of 106) won the seats.

The total number of seats was 276 (184 district and 92 at-large seats). The nation was divided into 92 districts, and each district selected two assemblymen. Based on election law, two-thirds (61) of at-large seats were allocated to the party that won the largest number of district seats. The remaining seats (31) were shared by the rest of parties that won at least five seats in district competition.

The DJP won 90 district seats with 35.6 percent of the valid votes and, because of allocation formulas, acquired two-thirds of the at-large seats. For the DJP, 35.6 percent of support (in terms of valid votes) turned into a 54.7 percent share (in terms of seats) in the National Assembly. In Rae's (1967) words, it was a 'manufactured majority.' The second largest party, DKP, received 21.6 percent of the vote which turned into a 29.3 percent
share of the National Assembly. The third party, KNP, received 13.3
percent of the vote and it resulted in 9.1 percent of the legislative seats.27
Election laws, in general, favor the party in power. However, the Korean
situation deviates from the "agreeable advantage" allowed to other
countries' ruling parties. If the at-large PR seats were actually allocated in
proportion to the number of votes instead of the number of district seats,
the DJP might have had difficulties in controlling the legislature.

The 12th National Assembly elections were held on February 12, 1985.
The average turnout rate was 84.6 percent. Compared to the 11th National
Assembly elections (78.4 %), the increased turnout reflected voters'
expectations. In this election, Inch'on and Seoul recorded the lowest
turnout, 80.7 percent and 81.1 percent respectively. This time, Ch'ungbuk
Province recorded the highest turnout (90.4 %) and Kangwon Province
(89.5 %) the next highest.28 These two provinces also showed the highest
turnout in the 1981 National Assembly elections. An observation here is
that, Seoul and Inch'on recorded the lowest turnout rates for both the
elections of 1981 and 1985 while Kangwon and Ch'ungbuk provinces
recorded the highest turnout rates.

Nine parties and 29 independents contested for the 184 district seats.
Compared to the 11th National Assembly elections, the number of parties
decreased from 12 to 9, and the number of independents decreased
noticeably from 106 to 29.29 Out of 29 independents, only 4 successfully
won seats (Table 4-3). The decrease of parties and independents reflected
the emergence of a stronger opposition party and increasing political and
social stability. Four major parties emerged from this election: the
Democratic Justice Party (DJP), the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP),
the Democratic Korea Party (DKP), and the Korea National Party (KNP). Among the four parties, the NKDP emerged as a new 'genuine' opposition party.

The National Assembly still consisted of 276 seats (184 district seats and 92 at-large seats). The formula for the allocation of at-large seats remained the same. In this election, the DJP was the only beneficiary of the electoral system. Besides the benefit from the two-member district system and the at-large PR system, it also had advantages due to the under-representation of large cities, where the DJP had less support.

The DJP captured 7,040,811 votes (35.25%) out of 19,974,643 valid votes and won 87 district seats. The NKDP received 5,843,827 votes (29.26%) and the DKP and the KNP captured 3,930,966 votes (19.68%) and 1,828,744 votes (9.16%) respectively. Two-thirds of the at-large seats (61 seats), based on the allocation formula, went to the DJP.

Compared to the 11th National Assembly election, the DJP lost 3 district seats (from 90 in 1981 to 87 in 1985). The largest opposition party, the DKP, won 57 district and 24 at-large seats in 1981. The largest opposition party, the DKP, won 50 district and 17 at-large seats in 1985. It can be observed that the DJP began to lose popularity among voters while that of the newly emerged NKDP began to increase.

Due to the allocation of the at-large seats, the 35.3 percent of popular support (in terms of valid votes) for the DJP became a 53.6 percent share of the National Assembly; the NKDP's 29.3 percent of the vote became 24.3 percent of the legislative seats; and the DKP's proportion of the vote, 19.7 percent, became 12.7 percent of the legislative seats. Likewise, the KNP's 9.2 percent share became 7 percent.
The 13th National Assembly elections were held on April 26, 1988. The average turnout rate was 75.8 percent. Turnout had decreased compared to the previous two National Assembly elections (78.4 % in 1981 and 84.6 % in 1985). Seoul recorded the lowest turnout rate (69.8 %), and Inch'on showed the second lowest (70.1 %). Voters in Kyongbuk Province showed a high interest in the election and recorded the highest turnout rate (83.3 %). As usual, voters in Ch'ungbuk Province showed a high level of participation (83.1 %). Cheju Province recorded a 82.6 percent turnout and Kangwon Province 82.0 percent. It can be noted that voters in Seoul and Inch'on tended to have significantly lower turnout rates during the 1980s (nonvoting will be discussed in Chapter 6). Voters in Kangwon and Ch'ung Provinces showed very positive electoral behavior and high participation with the highest turnout rates throughout the 1980s. Cheju and Kyongbuk provinces also showed high turnout rates in 1981 and 1985.

There were fourteen parties and 111 independents contested in the 1988 elections. The number of parties and independents rapidly increased for this election. It is assumed that the announcement of democratization measures by Roh Tae Woo on June 29, 1987 affected the increase of candidates. The election results show that five parties (four major and one minor) survived and only 9 independents won seats. The four major parties were the DJP, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), the RDP, and the NDRP. Except for the DJP, the other four parties were established in haste in 1987. This is a reality of Korean party and electoral politics. Voters vote for party leaders and candidates but not for political parties and policy issues.
Before the 13th National Assembly elections, a number of political upheavals (political violence and confrontations) between the government and the opposition were observed. On January 14, 1987, the torture death of a college student, Pak Chong-ch’ol, was revealed. The Chun regime and the ruling party were seriously discredited by the people. On April 13, 1987, President Chun closed open discussion on constitutional amendment until after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. Chun’s decision to postpone the constitutional amendment process was made shortly after the breakdown of the NKDP leadership. The NKDP leader Yi Min-u proposed the so-called Yi Min-u Plan in December 1986. It consists of seven points. The DJP leaders considered Yi’s Plan acceptable and supported Yi Min-u to check Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung. The two Kims declared their separation from Yi Min-u’s NKDP. Kim Yong-sam and his followers formed the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) on May 1, 1987.

After Roh’s announcement of June 29, 1987, both ruling and opposition parties agreed on the amendment of election laws. The DJP and the RDP agreed to draft a new constitution. The two parties formed an eight-member panel and started their work on an agreeable constitution for both parties. The importance here is that the constitution was drafted between opposing parties for the first time since 1948. Election-related laws were also changed: the President was to be elected by direct election; the President’s term in office would be a single five-year-term; the President’s power to dissolve the National Assembly was removed; the two-member district system was changed to a single-member district system for the National Assembly elections. It is not the purpose here to introduce all the changes. The immediate concern in this section is the change of
National Assembly district electoral system. In the 1985 National Assembly elections, 184 candidates were elected from 92 district seats under a two-member district system. In the 13th National Assembly elections in 1988, the total number of seats was 299 (224 single-member district seats and 75 at-large seats). The formula for the allocation of at-large seats had changed. The DJP won 87 district seats (out of 224) and was allocated 38 at-large seats (Table 4-4). This time, the party that secured the largest number of district seats was allocated one half of the at-large seats, in this case 38 seats for the DJP. The remaining at-large seats were divided proportionately according to the number of district seats other parties secured.

The DJP lost a legislative majority for the first time in the history of Korean electoral politics. The DJP received 6,675,494 votes (34.0 %), and 41.8 percent of the legislative seats. The PPD received 3,783,279 votes (19.3 %), a 23.4 percent share. On the other hand, the RDP received 4,680,175 votes (23.8 %) and 19.7 percent of the legislative seats. The NDRP received 3,062,506 votes (15.6 %), and a 11.7 percent share. The PPD successfully transformed its voter support into a larger share of National Assembly seats.

The major opposition parties, after the 1988 elections, formed the "cartel of elites" through reconciliation with the ruling party, and ignored progressive opposition forces. After the election, an unstable three-party coalition was formed to control the legislature.
Electons: Special Electons and Turnout

This topic is not directly related to the central arguments of this study, but to a certain extent the results of these special elections influenced the dynamics of party politics.

Five special elections that were held in 1989 (Tonghae-si and Yongdungp'o B districts) and 1990 (Yonggwang-Hamp'yon, Sogu-Kap (Taegu), and Chinch'on-Umsong districts) were examined to investigate the differences in the turnout rate. Special elections, or by-elections, occur when the winners in the national elections do not stay in office until the end of their term because of personal circumstances, e.g., death, health problem, financial problem, scandal, rigged election, and other reasons. In Korea, special elections in recent years were largely due to rigged elections and immoral activities by the candidates. Special elections also reflect the extreme competitiveness of Korean elections.

The first special election under the Sixth Republic was held on April 14, 1989 in Tonghae-si district (see Table 4-6). The reason for this special election was the illegal election campaigns used by former candidates in this district in 1988. Observers of Korean politics paid attention to this special election because it was considered an intermediate evaluation of the Sixth Republic and President Roh Tae Woo. Election fever attacked the political parties and their candidates and a number of disgraceful incidents, e.g., scuffles between opposing party supporters at the campaign locales, happened during the campaign period.39 The withdrawal of the NRDP candidate Yi Hong-sop before the special election became an issue. The NDRP claimed that the RDP bought the NDRP candidate's resignation by giving him money.40 The NDRP candidate Yi Hong-sop admitted that he
received illegal money from RDP members during the campaign. So Sok-jae, the secretary general of the RDP, also admitted his involvement with this case and withdrew from the party. The case was closed with Kim Yong-sam’s apology to the people. In this election, the ruling party candidate Hong Hi-p’yo, formerly an independent candidate and the winner in this district in 1988, won the election again. Table 4-6 shows interesting pattern of candidate support by the voters. Many of the voters who voted in 1988 for Hong Hi-p’yo, as an independent candidate, in 1989 voted for Hong Hi-p’yo, as the ruling party’s candidate, or switched to the RDP’s Yi Kwan-hyong, however, it seems that most Hong’s 1988 voters also voted for him in 1989. The RDP candidate Yi Kwan-hyong received 7,057 votes in 1988 and 12,049 votes (an increase of 4992 votes) in 1989. It seems that Yi Kwan-hyong was able to take most of Yi Hong-sop’s voters for Yi Hong-sop received 5,435 votes in 1988 (Yi Hong-sop did not run in 1989). Due to the geographical and political character of this district, the election results did not surprise observers. The turnout rate dropped from 82.5 percent in 1988 to 79.0 percent in 1989.

On May 26, 1989, the Supreme Court ruled that the Yongdungp’o B district election of 1988 was an invalid election. The reason for this judgment is that all the district’s candidates in the 13th National Assembly elections in 1988 violated the election laws. The candidates violated the laws in these ways: house-to-house canvassing; illegal production and distribution of publicity pamphlets; disturbing campaign rallies and speeches; offering of money, trips, dinners, and other articles). According to election laws for the National Assembly (Article 138), special elections must be held within 90 days after a judgment of invalidity by the court.
The special election in the Yongdungp'o B district (Seoul) was held on August 18, 1989. A comparison of Table 4-7 and Table 4-8 reveals that there was a slightly higher turnout in the special election (69.8%) than in the normal (67.8%) election in the Yongdungp'o B district. Except for the Taerim 2 tong section, all the tongs in the district in the special election showed a higher turnout rate than during the normal election. Voter turnout in the Taerim 2 tong dropped from 83.4 percent to 68.0 percent.

The ruling DJP candidate increased his support from 31,888 votes received in the normal election in 1988 to 45,187 in the special election in 1989. The PPD candidate also increased his votes from 31,337 in 1988 to 35,089 in 1989. The RDP and NDRP candidates lost seriously in this special election. Using a simple calculation, it seems that the voters who supported either the RDP and NDRP in 1988 shifted to the DJP or the PPD in 1989. Also it may be correct to say that many of the 1988 RDP voters shifted to the ruling DJP in the special election.

The special election of the Sogu-Kap district in Taegu was held on April 3, 1990. In 1988, Chong Ho-yong, a colleague of the former president, Chun Doo Hwan was elected as an Assemblyman getting an overwhelming number of votes. Chong received 52,847 out of 97,251 valid votes in the district (see Table 4-10). However, efforts by the Sixth Republic to liquidate the legacy of the Fifth Republic forced Chong Ho-yong to resign his Assemblymanship and move out of politics. Chong was, allegedly, involved with the Kwangju massacre. This resulted in the special election in this district.

Chong Ho-yong registered as an independent candidate for the special election. The ruling Democratic Liberal Party and President Roh were
confounded at Chong’s decision to run. President Roh sent one of his aides to the district to compete with Chong Ho-yong. Under pressure and threats, Chong’s wife attempted suicide and later Chong Ho-yong withdrew his candidacy on March 26, 1990. The ruling party’s candidate Mun Hi-kap (Chief Assistant in Economics to the President before he ran for election to the National Assembly) ran for office and received 41,970 out of 81,411 valid votes in the special election. The DLP and the government’s intervention before the special election forced Chong Ho-yong’s withdrawal. Chong, however, ran for the office again in the same district and defeated the DLP’s Mun Hi-gap in the 1992 National Assembly election (Mun Hi-gap; 26,763 votes; Chong Ho-yong, 50,533 votes; Paek Sung-hong, 16,795 votes; and Kim Hyon-gun, 3,938 votes). Voter turnout in the Sogu-Kap district special election was 63.9 percent, 13.6 percent lower than that of the normal election (77.5%) in 1988 (Table 4-10).

The special election of the Chinch’on-Umsong district in Ch’ungbuk Province was held on April 3, 1990. The voter turnout rate dropped from 85.1 percent in 1988 to 78.2 percent in 1990 (See Table 4-11). In this special election, there was a lot of speculation about who would win the election. It seemed that the ruling party’s (this time the Democratic Liberal Party) candidate had a good chance to win, but an unexpectedly the Democratic Party’s candidate Ho T’ak received 37,441 votes (54.6 %) out of 68,619 valid votes and won. He ran for the office in the 13th National Assembly elections in 1988 as an independent candidate and received only 18,743 votes (24.6 %), failing to take the seat. On the other hand, the ruling party (the DJP in 1988 and the DLP in 1990) lost seriously in the
special election as their number of votes decreased from 34,246 in 1988 to 31,178 in 1990.

The Yonggwang and Hamp’yong district special election in Chonnam Province was held on November 9, 1990. So Kyong-won, a PPD candidate, received overwhelming support in the National Assembly elections in 1988 (64,220 votes out of 85,864 valid votes in the district). So Kyong-won, however, had entered North Korea without reporting his entry to the South Korean government authorities. His disqualification as an Assemblyman resulted in this special election.

Kim Tae-jung, the president of the PPD, picked Vi Su-in, a professor of political science at Yongnam University in Taegu, to run for office as a PPD candidate in the special election. His action was controversial because Vi Su-in was not from Honam; however, he won the election with an absolute majority. Vi Su-in, as Table 4-12 shows, received 55,187 votes (75.4%) out of 73,208 valid votes and exceeded the percentage that So Kyong-won received in 1988 (64,220 votes, 74.8%). Voter turnout dropped from 78.3 percent in 1988 to 73.8 percent for the special election in 1990.

Special elections are considered important because these election results might influence voters' attitudes and feelings towards specific parties in the next elections. For this reason, parties and candidates try their best to win special elections, and high turnout is expected; but from observations of these five special elections, it is safe to say that special elections do not necessarily increase the turnout rate. Yongdungp’o B district in Seoul was the only district that showed an increased turnout.
Electoral Systems: Formation and Changes

The democratic principles, constitutions, and political systems adopted by Korea were imported from Western democracies. The leaders of Korean politics have tried to alter the Western electoral formulas, in part, when they are stalemated. The manipulation of electoral laws in favor of the ruling party and the adoption of imported electoral formulas, e.g., the at-large PR system and the electoral college, produced certain effects on political dynamics during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Frequent amendment of election laws, in this author's opinion, have contributed to the creation of apathy, alienation, and cynicism among the Korean electorate. It is, however, clear that electoral manipulation by the bureaucracy is not unique to Korea.  

There are certain reasons for the establishment of an electoral system in a developing society. For example, the Occupation Authority and the Japanese government initiated extremely strict election rules for post-war Japan (Scalapino and Masumi, 1962). These actions reflected either the existence of corrupt elections or extremely competitive elections in the pre-war Japanese political scene. In 1949, the Western powers pushed West Germany to adopt the winner-take-all system to build a stable two-party system. The winner-take-all system is supposed to give great advantages to the two major parties and disadvantages to the small parties. This system, however, was shown not to represent the diverse political voices in the country. Accordingly, the proportional representation system was adopted to elect half of the lower house members, and the remaining half were elected by the winner-take-all system.
The U. S. Military Government in Korea also initiated universal but very specific election rules and observed the conduct of the first elections in 1948. Constitutions adopted by the Republic of Korea prescribe popular, equal, direct, and secret elections in regard to the National Assembly, presidential, and other elections. As of 1992, there are three types of popular elections in Korea: elections for the members of the National Assembly, elections for President, and elections for the local council. All citizens twenty years of age and over are eligible to vote.

There have been several instances of changes in Korean electoral laws for the selection of presidents and legislators. Violence and abnormal activities have played an important role in the process of amendment of the electoral system. Manipulation of the election laws has become a way to sustain the party in power.

Frequent changes in the electoral system signal unstable politics or the unpopularity of the regime in power. The manipulation of election laws, to a certain extent, may cover the lack of legitimacy or unpopularity of the ruling regimes. The electoral system regulates elections and influences the format of the political party system. Richard S. Katz wrote that:

Electoral law influences party structure because candidates, as individuals attempting to maximize their chances of victory, pattern their behavior in ways determined by those laws.

This is the very reason for the debates and discussions about the structure of the electoral system and laws by the party leaders. As time and conditions allow, they have tried to change the electoral laws in favor of one or both sides in the negotiation process. When a certain election law worked against a party, then that party tried to initiate the amendment of that election law using various excuses.
Classic theories of the electoral system indicate that the single-member district system leads the party system toward the two-party system while the two-member and multi-member district systems work to effect a multiparty system. Although such assumptions and theories make sense and appeal to the general trend, it is still controversial in the Korean case. The format of a political party system depends upon the political leaders' will. For example, President Chun Doo Hwan expressed his wishes for the multiparty system, and in fact, there emerged several parties after Chun's revelation of his opinion in 1980. The multiparty system emerged again in 1987 when several political leaders (Roh Tae Woo, Kim Yong-sam, Kim Tae-jung, and Kim Chong-p'ii) decided to run for the presidency.

In a democracy each individual can take any political action including forming a political party. Therefore, democracy entails "uncertainty" and "instability." The simple reason for this is that the basic principle of democracy is majority rule. In electoral competition, the party that claims more votes wins the election and becomes the major party. In other words, parties need to produce fresh policy alternatives for the national welfare and national interests in order to access political power. Unfortunately, political parties in many newly independent countries and in some advanced democracies often win elections through the manipulation of election laws, e.g., gerrymandering, or allocating a high proportion of PR seats to the largest party, but not through the suggestion of fresh policies to the electorate.

What is still unchanged in the Korean electoral system is the function of one vote, the single nontransferable vote (SNTV). Regardless of the number of parties or candidates, each voter is allowed to cast only one vote at the
polls. Voting age, as an important variable, has not yet changed; although the 1987 Presidential and the 1988 National Assembly elections, the opposition party leaders demanded the adjustment of voting age from 20 to 18 or 19. Voting age in many Western countries is 18.\textsuperscript{53} Voting age should be reconsidered.

**Electoral Systems: Applications and Consequences**

The election laws changed when the effects of regionalism promoted the formation of a four party-system and the opposition parties in 1988 obtained the majority in the legislature. The return to the single-member system in the 1988 National Assembly elections reflected the mutual agreement and calculation of expected benefits between the ruling party and the major opposition party in regard to the electoral laws. The election results, however, disappointed the ruling party and brought more arguments for the further amendment of electoral laws.

Then, what are the implications of the electoral system, and what are its consequences in the political context? Giovanni Sartori describes the electoral system as "the most specific manipulative instrument of politics."\textsuperscript{54} Douglas W. Rae analyzes the relationship between election laws and party systems and argues that political parties are subject to influence by election laws.\textsuperscript{55} Given the fact that ruling parties strongly benefit from the electoral systems in most societies, the issue is over the degree of favorable treatment to the ruling parties. These advantages to the party in power often result from manipulation of electoral law, and include the following: gerrymandering, political party fund-raising regulations, distribution of proportional representation seats, the timing of elections, ballot forms,
location of polling places, the prerequisite for the candidacy, malapportionment, and laws of eligibility for voting and candidacy.\textsuperscript{56}

Sin Myong-sun argues that in Korea "the electoral laws until today have limited and restricted the mass political participation."\textsuperscript{57} It seems that the ruling parties have strongly prompted, if not forced, the electorate in the rural areas and small cities to participate (conformity voting, Yun Ch'\'on-ju, 1961, 1987). They have also discouraged voters in urban areas from voting in elections in the past several decades. There are several means of discouraging urban voters who have relatively higher income and education levels. The urban voters are exposed to frequent, up-dated, and detailed news coverages at their workplace as well as at home. Thus it is natural to imagine that urban voters know more about politics, politicians, and the changes in electoral laws than the rural voters.\textsuperscript{58} The origins of political cynicism derive from that kind of situation in many democracies. In Korea and Japan, for example, the phenomenon of political cynicism has been reported due to the ruling parties' arbitrary access to electoral systems, weak legitimacy (Korea), and money politics (Japan).\textsuperscript{59}

In order to avoid dilution of votes, the established parties often set regulations on the random formation of political parties through certain measures, e.g., the establishment of percentage requirements needed to qualify to receive the proportional representation seats, to check new forces in the legislature. Sweden set up the four percent threshold for entry to the legislature (Lawson, 1988). In Korea, small parties that have failed to obtain more than five district seats are excluded from the allocation of PR seats.

In other cases, the ruling parties favor the adoption of the multiparty-system to divide the votes. The party in power that may have weak
legitimacy or low popularity may favor the adoption of a multiparty-system to split the opposition votes and to secure its own status. It is said that the split of opposition parties indirectly helps the party in power under one-party dominant situations. This argument is applicable to the Korean case. Having a multiparty setting under the one-party dominant situation was the strategy of the Chun Doo Hwan regime.

Two distinctive features of the electoral laws in the Korean Fourth and Fifth Republics were the indirect election of the President by the T'ong'il chuch'e kungmin hoeui (the National Conference for Unification) in the Fourth Republic and the electoral college in the Fifth Republic, and the high proportion of proportional representation seats allotted to the ruling party in the National Assembly.

The at-large proportional representation system was adopted in the Third Republic and changed its nature and role in elections over time. The adoption of the at-large system was not unique to the elections in the 1980s, as mentioned above. However, an important point in understanding the disproportionate nature of the Korean proportional representation system is to understand how the at-large seats were allocated (see Table 4-1). Under the Fifth Republic, the system was reinforced to promote the multiparty system, but at the same time it decreased chances for independents and small minority party candidates to be elected to the National Assembly.

In the 11th and 12th National Assembly elections that were held in 1981 and 1985 respectively, two members were elected in each constituency throughout the nation. There were 92 constituencies, and thus 184 members were elected by single-ballot plurality vote in each
election. According to the election laws at that time, two-thirds of the at-large proportional representation (PR) seats were allocated to the party which obtained the largest number of district seats. This extraordinary favor, no doubt, helped to sustain the existing government and its ruling party, especially because where it's candidates did not receive the largest plurality, they often came in second. Thus the ruling party won seats in a larger number of districts. From a normative perspective, this system of PR seat allocation offset the will of voters. No other Western democracy gives two-thirds of its at-large PR seats to the plurality winner in elections. In many Western democratic countries, especially in some countries who have plural ethnic and cultural groups such as Switzerland and Austria, the proportional representation system and the corporatist decision making system have been adopted because they facilitate various demands from various groups.

Although the nature and purpose may differ from that of the Western PR system, China, a Socialist country with one monopolistic ideology-oriented Communist Party, has an unique allocation system of the seats of the National People's Congress. It makes it a rule to invite the representatives from various sectors such as labor, farmer, military, revolutionary people, intellectuals, patriots, returned Chinese from abroad, women, and the minorities.62

The amended election laws for the 13th National Assembly specify that the most represented party in elections would receive at least 50 percent of the at-large PR seats and the second party and other parties would share the other seats based on the number of district seats they took in elections.
The parties that could not obtain five or more district seats did not receive any PR party list seats in the elections of 1981, 1985, and 1988.

The proportional representation (PR) system does not necessarily produce several parties. Giovanni Sartori's version of Duverger's laws is as follows. The first law of Duverger: "The majority (plurality) single-ballot system tends to party dualism." The second law of Duverger: "The second-ballot (majority) system and proportional representation tend to multipartyism." Duverger claims that "the influence of electoral systems could be compared to a brake or an accelerator." In the Korean National Assembly elections of 1988 which adopted the single-member district system, the two major parties were supposed to come up strong in the elections when Duverger's laws were taken into consideration - the plurality rule brings the two party system. The result was the emergence of four instead of two parties: a ruling party and three major opposition parties. This experience implies that other variables, e.g., regionalism and personalism, might be involved in the electoral process. Regionalism and personalism, as part of the prevailing political culture in Korea in the 1980s, must have contributed in the process of political party realignment during that period.

As Sartori (1986) points out, the adoption of the proportional representation system does not necessarily suit the multiparty format. The reason for this, in part, is that the system allocates the at-large PR seats in proportion to the district seats but not in proportion to a party's share of the total vote in Korea. The Netherlands uses the PR system that allocates the seats in proportion to the total number of votes each party received.
Belgium was the first country that adopted the PR system in 1889, and Sweden adopted the system in 1907. The PR system is supposed to better represent minority opinions and rights in these countries. James Kuklinski argues that the additional seat allocation system favors smaller parties and minority representation.\textsuperscript{67}

The at-large PR system has lost its original purpose and nature in the Korean political scene. The at-large PR system in Korea is being used as a tool for raising political funds for the opposition parties who often appoint wealthy businessmen to legislative seats, and for the employment of the loyal supporters in the case of the ruling parties.\textsuperscript{68} The original aim of the professional representation (Chingnung taep'yoe) was to select professionals from various fields to have effective legislative input.

Maurice Duverger argues that the operation of the PR system increases the influence of political parties over candidates.\textsuperscript{69} His argument can be applied to the Korean case where the candidate nomination process for the National Assembly is fully dependent on the party leadership except for the independents. One prominent feature in the Korean legislative elections of 1981 and 1985 was the ratio of under-representation for the opposition and over-representation of seats for the ruling party.

According to Rein Taagepera, any proportional representation system with two-seat districts works for the smaller parties.\textsuperscript{70} The application of such an election system to other political settings often entails arbitrary adjustments and provides unexpected results. The application of a transformed proportional representation system to the Korean political system has been used to create an unpopular majority party because it
allocates an unusually high proportion of seats to the largest party in electoral representation.

The allocation of the at-large proportional representation seats was not based on the total number of votes each party received but instead was based on the number of district seats each party won. Thus, the RDP, for example, became the second opposition party in the 1988 National Assembly elections despite its winning more votes than the PPD did. The PPD received 3,783,279 votes (19.3%) while the RDP received 4,680,175 votes (23.8%). The PPD, which had a concentrated support base in Honam (the southwest of the country), was able to transform effectively this popular support into National Assembly seats and, hence, became the strongest opposition party. The PPD, ironically, became a beneficiary of the electoral system.

A number of scholars argue that the allocation of the at-large proportional representation seats has not been reasonable. For example, Pak Sung-sik takes a critical stance on the current allocation formula of the at-large PR seats. Pak suggests that the allocation of the at-large PR seats should be based on the number of votes each party has won.

Transplantation of any electoral system or party system to different circumstances often entails significant changes in its nature. When this transformation is made, the original function of the system may be distorted.

**Electoral Behavior: Patterns of Support and Turnout**

Electoral behavior refers to eligible voters' attitudes at the time of elections towards their favorite candidates, political parties, and policy
issues. Reports from Western Europe and the United States show that voters tend to support their chosen political party for a long time unless that party makes radical changes in its policies (party identification). In many cases, voting patterns are expected and can be predicted in these countries. For example, voters' support patterns and partisanship, e.g., the level of party loyalty, can be predicted before election without difficulty in Denmark.

According to the records of past Korean elections, Korean voters have changed their patterns of support towards candidates and political parties. Voter alignment and realignment have been witnessed in both the Korean presidential and legislative elections of the past decades. In the 5th Presidential election of October 15, 1963, ruling party candidate Park Chung Hee received strong support from the voters in the south of Ch'upungnyong while the opposition Yun Po-son was favored by the voters in the north of Ch'upungnyong.

A strong pattern of regional support began to emerge in the 6th Presidential election of May 3, 1967. In that election, the regional support base changed. Candidate Yun Po-son dominated the western area of South Korea, while candidate Park Chung Hee dominated the eastern area.

The 7th Presidential election was held on April 27, 1971, with 79.8 percent turnout. Kim Tae-jung, instead of Yun po-son, emerged as the opposition candidate and trailed Park Chung Hee in the election. Park Chung Hee's strong regional base, Yongnam, played a prominent role in the election. "Regionalism" was a very significant factor because Park captured 1,502,459 more votes than Kim Tae-jung in his Yongnam region while he received only 946,928 more votes than Kim Tae-jung out of the total
number cast (6,342,828 votes for Park Chung Hee and 5,395,900 votes for Kim Tae-jung).78

Faced with tough challenges from both inside and outside Korea, President Park declared martial law throughout South Korea on October 17, 1972. The National Assembly was dissolved, political party activities were prohibited, press censorship was strengthened, and colleges and universities were closed for a long winter vacation. The direct election system for President was ended in 1972 when the Yusin System was established by the Park Chung Hee regime. The newly drafted Yusin Constitution specified indirect election of the President and strengthened the power of the President. President Park stayed in the Presidency until 1979.

The tendency of regionalism, however, appeared again in the Korean political scene after Roh Tae Woo's announcement about democratic measures on June 29, 1987. Chan Wook Park points out that regionalism tended to appear in presidential elections rather than in National Assembly elections until 1971, but then began to appear in National Assembly elections as well. In the 1988 National Assembly elections, for example, the ruling DJP took all the district seats in Taegu. Major opposition leaders such as Kim Yong-sam, Kim Tae-jung, and Kim Chong-p'il also received strong support from their hometowns and home provinces. Kim Yong-sam's RDP won 93.3 percent of district seats in Pusan, Kim Tae-jung's PPD won all the district seats in Kwangju, and Kim Chong-p'il's NDRP took 72.2 percent of districts in Ch'ungnam.79

On the American political scene, realignment means "a major change in the relative strength of the two major parties" or "a substantial change in the support that various social groups give to the political parties."80 In
many Western countries, voter realignment is usually formed by the voters' party identification and party policy based on specific socio-political issues. In this study, the term 'voter realignment' does not necessarily have the same meaning. Voter alignment in Korea is based on personalism and regionalism. In the Korean political scene, "personal loyalty to a leader tends to persist through the formation of a party or its break-up." Sartori observes the existence of personality voting in developing democracies, but it is not a phenomenon unique to those societies.

Regionalism is one of the distinguishing features of the recent Korean presidential elections. In the 1987 Presidential election, for example, four major candidates from four major parties, (Roh Tae Woo from Taegu; Kim Yong-sam from Pusan; Kim Tae-jung from Chonnam; and Kim Chong-p'il from Ch'ungnam), received very strong support from the voters in their own hometowns. The phenomenon of strong regionalism appeared in the 13th National Assembly elections of 1988. Like the previous year's presidential election, the four parties, again, divided the nation into several regions thus forming the basis for a system based on political figures rather than on policies or ideologies. This voter realignment based on regionalism reflects the strong kinship of regional communities as well as antagonistic sentiments between different regions of Korea. On the other hand, however, it excludes the normal principles of party politics. The existence of personalism or regionalism is not the only reason for unstable electoral politics. As already mentioned, frequent changes in electoral laws have impeded the development of sound party politics. The findings here are that voters vote for the candidates but not for the political parties or policy issues. It should be noted here that the popularity of the presidential
candidates (national leaders) was not well reflected in the National Assembly elections in some cases. For example, in 1988 and 1992, the popularity of Kim Chong-p'il (a national leader) seemed to have little influence in electing the candidates from his party in the Chungbu region (the NDRP in 1988 and the DLP in 1992).  

Yun Hyong-sop argues that the voter turnout rate is more likely to be influenced by environmental and situational variables rather than by normal variables in Korea. The environmental and situational variables indicate the changing political situations, attitude of bureaucracy, demonstration, confrontation, and violence. This argument implies a lower level of voter partisanship in the Korean political scene. At the same time, it indicates the reasons for the inapplicability of general theories of electoral behavior to the Korean case.

Flanigan and Zingale summarize the major elements that influence the rate of turnout in the U.S.: 1. Differences in media coverage given the election; 2. Significance attached by voters to the office; 3. Importance of issues raised in the campaign; and 4. Attractiveness of the candidate. Vote buying is a significant problem in Korea and Japan. It is observed that there is virtually no fraud in vote counting in Japan. Vote buying activities are related to providing gifts and opportunities for sight-seeing, for example, for the eligible voters. The fundamental reason for the high cost of campaigning in Japan is because every LDP politician must build and maintain his own political machine (supporters' group). The conservative ruling LDP and its members spend much more money than the opposition party members because, as Scalapino and Masumi (1962) argue, the conservative party voters cast their ballots based on candidates'
personalities while the JSP and the JCP voters vote based on political parties. The existence of such political machines and the interpersonal political network that exists between the Diet members and the electorate explain an important part of turnout and party support.

While the supporters of the two American political parties (the Republican Party and the Democratic Party) can be easily distinguished from each other by specific socioeconomic and demographic variables, this is not the case for Korea. As of 1992, few Korean scholars have argued that Korean patterns of political party support are determined by economic, religious, or other sociological variables. In Korea, the possible predictors of party support are Inmul (personality) and Chiyok (the region where one comes from). Thus it is expected that voters may not deliberate about specific issues or make entirely rational choices.

**Conclusion**

It seems obvious that the electoral system regulates the structure of the party system and influences the electorate's behavior in elections. However, it is important to note that such electoral systems are the byproduct of the political negotiations and the struggle for power. Thus, although electoral systems may change the format of the party system and patterns of electoral behavior, the electoral system is designed by those who struggle to create a ruling majority party and whose goal is to reach important political positions.

Besides the influence of electoral systems on the voters' electoral behavior, it should be noted that some components of political culture, e.g., regionalism, also regulate the electoral dynamics. Ki-shik Han was
concerned about the ineffectiveness of the electoral system in Korea in the 1970s, indicating the intervention and manipulation by government, the political culture, and electoral behavior in the electoral process.\(^{89}\)

The five Korean special elections in 1989 and 1990 show that special elections do not necessarily increase voter turnout when compared with the normal elections in 1988. This is a surprising result when we take into consideration the parties' and their party leaders' enormous campaign efforts.

Discussions are included about the recent elections, electoral systems, and electoral behavior. It seems that Korean voters' electoral behavior is influenced by regional factors as well as other factors, e.g., electoral laws and party performances.

Based on the observations and arguments above, this study takes the same stand as Han-shik Park. He argues that, democratic systems, including electoral and party systems, can be "transplanted" to other societies but electoral behavior cannot easily be transplanted.\(^ {90}\) The changing shape of the electoral system in Korea reflects the ambitions of politicians who insist on staying in power or in established positions. Thus generalizations on the relationship among electoral systems, the party system, and electoral behavior cannot be understood linearly.

As Jurg Steiner (1986) correctly points out about the nature of electoral laws, the electoral system is an "outcome of the political game."\(^ {91}\) However, this does not imply that there has to be frequent manipulation and amendment of the electoral system. It means there should be fair competition in the electoral process.
Together with fragile party systems, the changing electoral system has played a critical role in reducing the people's interest in politics in the past decades (as shown by the low level of party affiliation and preference). The most important features of the current Korean electoral system are popular and equal election based on the national sovereignty; direct Presidential election; the single-member district system for the National Assembly; the at-large proportional representational system; restrictive regulations on election campaigns; and the imbalance in the National Assembly district system (in terms of its size). Elements of this system may be manipulated to favor the ruling party and to discourage many voters from participating.
Table 4-1. The Allocation of National Assembly Seats, 1963-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Number of district seats</th>
<th>Number of PR* seats</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8th</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>(Yujonghoe)**</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PR ... Proportional representation
** Yujonghoe ... The Political Fraternity for Yushin. The members were appointed by the president.
Table 4-2 The 1981 National Assembly Election Results (March 21, 1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prov.</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>DKP</th>
<th>DSP</th>
<th>KNP</th>
<th>CRP</th>
<th>NPP</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ungbuk</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'unghan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonbuk</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonnam</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongbuk</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongnam</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Che sibiltae kukhoe uiwon son'go sanghwang (Seoul: The Central Election Management Committee, 1981), 153.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prov.</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>NKDP</th>
<th>DKP</th>
<th>KNP</th>
<th>NPSP</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Indep.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Inch'on</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ung-buk</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'ung-nam</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Chonbuk</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyong-nam</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-large</td>
<td>92</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
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Source: Che sibidae kukhoe uiwon son'go ch'ongnam (Seoul: The Central Election Management Committee, 1985), 100.
Table 4-4  The 1988 National Assembly Election Results (April 26, 1988)

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<th>NDRP</th>
<th>HDP</th>
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<td>Taegu</td>
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<td>5</td>
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Source: *Che sibsamdae kukhoe uiwon son'go ch'ongnam* (Seoul: The Central Election Management Committee, 1988), 94.
Table 4-5. The 1992 National Assembly Election Results (March 24, 1992)

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<th>Indep.</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>11</td>
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Source: Che sibsadae kukhoe uiwon Ch'ongson'go (Seoul: The Central Election Management Committee, 1992). 3-4.
Table 4-6. The Tonghae-Si Election & Special Election

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<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td>Eligible voters</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>25,688</td>
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<td>Hong Hi-p’yo</td>
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<td>12,049</td>
<td>Yi kwan-hyong</td>
<td>Yi kwan-hyong</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
<td>4,361</td>
<td>2,543</td>
<td>Chi Il-ung</td>
<td>Kim Suk-won</td>
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<td>NDRP</td>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>Yi Hong-sop</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
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<td>Independent</td>
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<td>4,165</td>
<td>Hong Hi-p’yo</td>
<td>Chi Il-ung</td>
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<td>11,977</td>
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<td>Turnout (%)</td>
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Source: Che sibsamdae kukhoe uiwon son’go ch’ongnam (Seoul: CEMC, 1988); Tong-A Ilbo, April 15, 1989. Compiled by the author.

Table 4-7. Yongdungp’o B District Election Statistics in the 13th National Assembly Elections (April 26, 1988).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Tong</th>
<th>Eligible voters</th>
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<th>Turnout</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>PPD</th>
<th>RDP</th>
<th>NDRP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yoido</td>
<td>23,931</td>
<td>14,726</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>5,594</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>5,254</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin’gil 1</td>
<td>19,393</td>
<td>12,954</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>3,812</td>
<td>3,461</td>
<td>3,679</td>
<td>1,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin’gil 4</td>
<td>14,058</td>
<td>9,379</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>2,631</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>2,474</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin’gil 5</td>
<td>16,414</td>
<td>11,166</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>3,298</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin’gil 6</td>
<td>23,213</td>
<td>15,419</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>4,373</td>
<td>4,702</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin’gil 7</td>
<td>11,883</td>
<td>7,795</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>1,154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taerim 1</td>
<td>16,385</td>
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<td>3,335</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>1,585</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taerim 2</td>
<td>18,986</td>
<td>15,679</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>4,198</td>
<td>5,477</td>
<td>3,837</td>
<td>1,948</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taerim 3</td>
<td>18,529</td>
<td>12,149</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>3,164</td>
<td>4,128</td>
<td>3,247</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>110,352</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>31,888</td>
<td>31,337</td>
<td>31,423</td>
<td>14,739</td>
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</table>

Source: Che sibsamdae kukhoe uiwon son’go ch’ongnam (Seoul: CEMC, 1988). Compiled by the author.
Table 4-8. Yongdungp'o B District Special Election Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Eligible Voters</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>PPD</th>
<th>RDP</th>
<th>NDRP</th>
<th>Indep.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Yoido</td>
<td>23,867</td>
<td>15,652</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>8,753</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>471</td>
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<td>Sin'gil 1</td>
<td>19,397</td>
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<td>5,630</td>
<td>3,846</td>
<td>2,297</td>
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<td>69.5</td>
<td>3,497</td>
<td>2,877</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>518</td>
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<td>4,417</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>718</td>
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<tr>
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<td>69.1</td>
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<td>5,504</td>
<td>3,919</td>
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<td>2,425</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>594</td>
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<td>Taerim 1</td>
<td>16,642</td>
<td>11,648</td>
<td>70.0</td>
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<td>3,690</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>670</td>
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<td>20,356</td>
<td>13,832</td>
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<td>2,658</td>
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<td>5,134</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>45,187</td>
<td>35,089</td>
<td>21,945</td>
<td>5,737</td>
<td>8,868</td>
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Source: Han'guk Ilbo, August 20, 1989.

Table 4-9. Yongdungp'o B District Election Returns

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>April 26, 1988</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
<th>August 18, 1989</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
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<td>45,187</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
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<td>28.4</td>
<td>35,089</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>21,945</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14,739</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5,737</td>
<td>4.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8,340</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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* The candidates from the PPD, RDP, and NDRP were the same in both elections. Source: Wolgan Chung-Ang (August 1991), 225.
Table 4-10. The Sogu-Kap District Election & Special Election (Taegu)

| Eligible voters | Votes 1988 | 126,408 | Votes 1990 | 132,364 | Candidate 1988 | DJP | 52,847 | (DLP) | 41,970 | Chong Ho-yong | (DLP) | Mun Higap |
| Total votes     | 97,919     | 84,644  |
| Valid votes     | 97,251     | 81,411  |
| DJP             | 52,847     | (DLP) 41,970 |
| RDP             | 19,242     | 19,242 |
| PPD             | 884        | 884     |
| NDNP            | 22,234     | 22,234 |
| Other           | 2,044      | 2,044 |
| Other (Min jung ui dang) | 5,199 |
| Other (DLP)     | 34,242 |
| Abstain         | 28,489     | 28,489 |
| Turnout (%)     | 77.5       | 77.5    |


Table 4-11. The Chinch'on-Umsong District Election & Special Election

| Eligible voters | Votes 1988 | 91,198  | Votes 1990 | 89,987  | Candidate 1988 | Kim Wan-t'aee | (DLP) Min T'aegu |
| Total votes     | 77,575     | 70,356  |
| Valid votes     | 76,204     | 68,619  |
| DJP             | 34,246     | (DLP) 31,178 |
| RDP             | -----      | -----   |
| PPD             | -----      | -----   |
| NDNP            | 23,215     | -----   |
| Independent     | 18,743     | (DP) 37,441 |
| Abstain         | 13,623     | 19,631  |
| Turnout (%)     | 85.1       | 78.2    |

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<th>Votes 1990</th>
<th>Candidate 1988</th>
<th>Candidate 1990</th>
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<td>16,412</td>
<td>Cho Ki-sang</td>
<td>(DLP) Cho Ki-sang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
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<td>Yi Su-in</td>
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<td>Ch'oe Chu-gyong</td>
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<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstain</td>
<td>24,199</td>
<td>27,347</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (%)</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-13. Voter Turnout

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Turnout (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1948 Constituent National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1950 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1952 Presidential Election</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1954 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1956 Presidential Election</td>
<td>94.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1958 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1960 Presidential Election</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1960 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1963 Presidential Election</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1963 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1967 Presidential Election</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1967 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1971 Presidential Election</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1971 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1973 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1978 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1981 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1981 Electoral College Elections</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1985 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>84.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1987 Presidential Election</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1988 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1991 Local Council Elections (March)</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1991 Local Council Elections (June)</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1992 National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Various publications by the Central Election Management Committee.
Notes for Chapter 4


3. Ezra Shienbaum says that: "Voting is the most important and widespread political activity, and in terms of the impact of the citizenry on governmental performance it may be the single most important act," Beyond the Electoral Connection (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 2. See also Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America: Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 46.

4. Yi Kap-yun compared the weight of a vote in the urban areas with that of rural areas and found underrepresentation of urban voters. See his "Uinara son'go kwajong ui minjuhwa," (Democratization of the electoral process in Korea), in the Korean Political Science Association, ed., Han'guk chongch'ı ui minjuhwa (Seoul: Pommunsa, 1989), 199.

5. Che sibsamdae kukhoeuiwon son'go ch'ongnam (Electoral Data for the 13th National Assembly Elections) (Seoul: Chung'ang son'go kwallı wiwonhoe, the Central Election Management Committee, 1988), 264, 748.


(1) How can elections matter if most public decisions are made by unelected officials? (2) How can elections matter if candidates for public office are beholden to powerful groups whether because the latter make large campaign contributions or because they command positions of great social and economic influence? (3) How can elections matter if it is not the mass of voters, but rather intensely concerned and organized special interests, who influence the specific policy decisions that public officials make? (4) How can elections matter if the vital decisions of the day are - and should and
must be left to experts, whether military, economic, or scientific, and not to politicians?


10. Ahn, ibid., 57.

11. Shienbaum, Beyond the Electoral Connection, 123.

12. Ibid., 24.

13. Sidney Verba, Norman Nie, and Kim Jae-on, and Wolfinger and Rosenstone have elaborated on the sociopsychological aspects of the SES theory. For the incompatible research results between the voting behavior and the socioeconomic status in the cross-national data, see Michael J. Avey, The Demobilization of American Voters (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 3 - 8.


16. Shienbaum, Beyond the Election Connection, 124.


20. For the strategies of election campaign, see Chu Kwan-jung, Son'go konghak (Seoul: Miraesa, 1972). See also Gerald L. Curtis, Election Campaigning Japanese Style.

21. For example, 77.9 percent of the respondents replied to the pollsters that they did not decide the candidates for the coming local elections. Han'guk Ilbo, June 11, 1991. See also Han'guk Ilbo, March 8, 1992.

22. Each State in the United States holds different nomination rules. There are several ways of nomination in the United States: self-nomination, caucus, national convention, and primary (open primary and closed primary). In States which use the closed primary system, only same party members can participate in the process to select the candidates of that party.


26. Text of Election Laws is in Kil et al., Han'guk son'goron (Korean Elections), (Seoul: Tasan, 1987), 333-420.


29. Ibid., 78.

31. Ibid., 892-893
32. The Central Election Management Committee, Che sibidae kukhoeuiwon son'go ch'ongnam, 96-97.


34. In the election, five parties won the district seats, as shown in Table 4-4. The remaining nine parties were cancelled their registration after the election (the DKP, the KNP, the NPP, the SDP, the Christian Songmin Party, the Third Generation Party, the Han'juui Unification Korea Party, the Uri Justice Party, and the People's party) (Tong-A Ilbo, April 29, 1988).

35. These kinds of political violence and arbitrary decisions made by the Chun regime brought the people especially the middle class to the democratization movement. Ch'oe Chang-jip, "Han'guk ui minjung undong kwa minjjuui," (Minjung Movement and Democracy in Korea), in Han'guk chongch'i i ui minjuhwa, ed. the Korean Political Science Association (Seoul: Pommunsa, 1989), 228-229.

36. (1) Guarantee of the freedom of speech and press, including abrogation of the repressive Basic Press Law; (2) guarantee of the people's basic rights; (3) political neutrality of government officials; (4) releases of political prisoners, giving amnesty and restoration of civil rights, except for radical procommunist elements; (5) establishment of a two-party system; (6) implementation of local autonomy; and (7) fair election laws. Cited from Manwoo Lee, The Odyssey of Korean Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1990), 23-24.

37. Ibid., 41.

38. Yim Hyok-paek, "Han'guk esoui minjuhwa kwajong punsok," (Analysis of democratization process in Korea) in Han'guk chongch'i kyongjeron, ed. An Ch'ong-si (Seoul: Pommuns, 1990), 457.


40. Tong-a Ilbo, April 13, 1989.

41. Tong-a Ilbo, April 14, 1989.
42. *Tong-a Ilbo*, April 15 - 18, 1989. The amount of bribery was almost $200,000. So Sok-jae was jailed for his direct involvement in the case and Kim Young-sam visited Kim Jong-pil for apology. Yi Hong-sop was detained.

43. Hong Hi-p'yoy was not able to keep the popularity in his district. He lost to UNP's Kim Hyo-yong the 1992 National Assembly elections (Hong Hi-p'yoy: 16,117 votes, Kim Hyo-yong: 21,554 votes; Chi Il-ung: 8,230 votes; and Cho Tae-hyong: 662 votes).

44. The Tonghae-si district is located in Kangwon Province which has a relatively small number of population and seats. Kangwon Province is neither the hometown of the strongmen in the Sixth Republic nor the base of the strong opposition parties.


47. Ibid.

48. For the changes of electoral systems in Korea, see Yun Hyong-sop, *Han'guk chongch'iron* (Korean Politics) (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1988), Chapters 9 and 10.

49. Yi Kap-yun, "Urinara son'go kwajong ui minjuhwa," (Democratization of the electoral process in Korea), 197.


52. Rose and McAllister, *The Loyalties of Voters*, 12.

53. Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History* (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991), 509. Voting age in Australia is 18. Austria (19); Belgium (18); Canada (18); Denmark (18); Finland (18); France (18); Germany (18); Greece (18);
Iceland (18); Ireland (18); Israel (18); Italy (18); Japan (20); Luxembourg (18); Malta (18); Netherlands (18); New Zealand (18); Norway (18); Portugal (18); Spain (18); Sweden (18); Switzerland (20); United Kingdom (18); and United States Congress (18).


55. Some scholars (Rae, 1967: 3; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967:37) refute the strong relationship between the electoral system and the political party system. They argue that the electoral system should not be considered as an independent variable that could change the party system.


57. Sin Myong-sun, "Han'guk chongch'i kwajong ui munje was kwaje," in Yun Hyong-sop et al., *Han'guk chongch'i kwajongnon* (The Political Process in Korea) (Seoul: Pommunsa, 1988), 504.

58. For the electoral systems in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s, see Paek Sang-gun, "Reflections on Korean Electoral System." *Han'guk chongch'ihak hoeb* 2 (December 1967): 182-199.


66. Duverger explains this phenomenon from these two factors: (1) the mechanical effects of underrepresenting losing parties and (2) the psychological factor of the electorate who do not waste their votes on losers. For defense of Duverger's laws, see Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later," in Grofman and Lijphart, eds., Electoral Laws and their Political consequences, 69-84.


69. Duverger, Political Parties, 358.


71. A similar case has been found in the elections (1983) for the House of Commons in England. The Labour Party effectively transformed its support to the seats when they received strong support from Labour voter-concentrated districts. The Labour Party received 27.6 percent of support and successfully transformed it to 32.3 percent of seats while the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance transformed 25.4 percent of support only to 3.5 percent of seats. See European Journal of Political Research 12 (September 1984):342 and Steiner, European Democracies, 89-94.


74. This argument is based on the computation of Danish electoral data using the ECOL program, version 3. Data provided by Dr. S. R. Thomsen.


76. C. I. Eugene Kim, admitting the long-lasting enmity between Honam and Yongnam, points out the effect of the failure in the agricultural sector under the Park regime. Both Chonbuk and Chonnam Provinces held a large number of farmers. The farmers' frustration turned into the tendency of regional support. See his "Patterns in the 1967 Korean Elections," *Pacific Affairs* 41, no.1 (Spring 1968): 67.

77. An Pyong-man, "Taet'ongnyong son'go P'yo ui songhyang e nat'an an t'up'yo haengt'ae," 171-173.


81. The origin of personalism goes back to the first president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee. Rhee, with his strong image as an independence fighter and patriot, came back to Korea in 1945 and assumed the presidency in 1948. His personal charisma was well known although it did not reflect very well in elections because of the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953).


85. Yun Hyong-sop, Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics), 417.

86. Flanigan and Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, 12.


91. Steiner, European Democracies, 92.
CHAPTER 5

ELECTORAL DYNAMICS, 1981-1988: METHOD AND ANALYSIS

Party Loyalty

In this part, a new approach to trace voter mobility will be introduced. Voter mobility tables will show the pattern of party support and party loyalty. More importantly, they imply the future development of party politics. For example, when voters show a high level of loyalty to a political party, that party might push forward its policies with confidence. With a low level of loyalty, a party should take action for its future survival, e.g., coalition, merger, changes in policies, changes of party image, etc. In this sense, it can be argued that studies of electoral behavior are important for party survival and development.

A number of observers of Korean politics have suggested that the electoral behavior of the Korean electorate is volatile because of fragile party and electoral systems of the past. However, it is not easy to assess the amount of past volatile electoral behavior, using aggregate data such as official election statistics to analyze electoral behavior. To analyze electoral behavior strictly from the reading of election statistics will often mislead students of political behavior because of the possibility of 'ecological fallacy.' The analysis of political behavior based on survey results also raises questions about the validity and reliability of this method. In some cases, scholars argue that survey results and results from aggregate data should be compared and used to test each other. These efforts would greatly contribute to validating these specific techniques. With these technical considerations, this study approaches the major concepts of party support and voter mobility.
In this study, party identification is similar to but not identical to party loyalty. However, most literature on electoral behavior does not specifically distinguish party identification from party loyalty. In Korea where the history of political parties is short and a number of political upheavals and changes have been experienced in recent decades, this distinction between party identification and party loyalty is necessary, at least in this study. This is because it is commonly believed that there are many factors that prevent strong party identification among Korean voters.

This study uses the term "party loyalty" instead of "party identification." While both party loyalty and party identification reflect a voter's psychological closeness and attitude towards a specific political party; party loyalty implies that voter decisions are consistently based on party considerations. On the other hand, party identification implies that a voter does not necessarily vote for his favorite party at all times. He or she may identify with Party A but not feel a strong obligation to vote for Party A in every election.

In this context, this study will trace the level of party loyalty by looking at voter mobility tables. Tables 5-1 through 5-10 show the ecological estimates of voter mobility between the three National Assembly elections in the 1980s. Table 5-5 (1981-1985) and Table 5-10 (1985-1988) reveal nation-wide voter mobility between major parties. The striking impression from the two tables is that party loyalty is quite low. Even party loyalty for the ruling DJP dropped from 54.7 percent in 1985 to 41.7 percent in 1988. The decline of party loyalty and low stability resulting from voter mobility among the major parties has considerable implications for the future development of Korean politics (as will be discussed in later chapters).
Ecological Inference

For students of electoral behavior, it is interesting to discuss voter mobility between elections. Since the development of computer technology in the 1950s, this subfield in political behavior has become the focal point for scholars interested in partisan support and voter mobility. They study the electorate's mobility using the methods of ecological inference. In a broad sense, electoral ecology is the scientific study of the patterns of relations of members of the electorate to each other and their surroundings. The problem in using ecological inference is the "problem of inferring bivariate or multivariate individual level relations in the absence of data on individuals."^2 Ecological inference has the objective of constructing 'data' on the individual level from data on the aggregate ecological level.^3 Thus, ecological inference answers this sort of question, "How many voters who voted for Party A in 1985, for example, supported the same party in 1988, and how many of them shifted to other parties?" Understanding "voter mobility" will help to explain the voters' support and change of support for the political parties.

More often than not, in historical research, there is a lack of information on past individual electoral behavior. This is why some historians find it necessary to utilize a method like ecological inference.^4 The technique of ecological inference is a byproduct of the growing use of computer technology. Some scholars use it to study individual political behavior through the analysis of aggregate data (election statistics). In part, the technique is a response to the often ambiguous and biased results obtained by surveys (this will be discussed later in this chapter).
Compared to survey data, aggregate data has some important merits: inexpensive, easy-to-get, and fewer measurement problems. Moreover, the aggregate data is more comprehensive than survey data in terms of representing people's electoral behavior.

Given the merits of aggregate data, there remains one prominent and persistent problem in estimating individual political behavior. That is the problem of ecological inference. Robinson (1950) raised the problem of ecological inference and pointed out the existence of 'ecological fallacy' in the use of ecological correlation techniques. Robinson's main argument is that the statistical units of an ecological correlation are groups of persons (such as election districts) not individuals. Therefore one can make errors when inferring from the aggregate data about the cause of individual behavior. David and Chava Nachmias explain the 'ecological fallacy' in a simple way:

Focusing on the relationship between literacy and place of birth in the 1930s, Robinson first compared the geographical regions in the United States. He found that regions with larger percentages of foreign-born people had higher literacy rates than regions with lower percentages of foreign-born persons. These findings were reversed when he subsequently examined the same relationships at the individual level, no matter the region in which people lived: Individuals who were native-born were more literate than persons who were foreign-born. What explains the reversal of the findings? Apparently, marked regional differences in the quality of public education and the tendency of immigrants to initially settle in regions that happened to have better education account for the findings at the regional level of analysis.

A number of scholars have tried to solve the problem of ecological inference (Duncan and Davis, 1953; Goodman, 1959; Shiveley, 1969, 1974, and 1985; Stokes, 1969; Kousser, 1973; Lichtman, 1974; Flanigan and Zingale, 1985; Thomsen, 1987). The problem they faced was how
they could investigate individual level relationships with using the aggregate level data. Robinson's warning about the frequent use of ecological correlation techniques brought controversy and suggestions of alternative methods. Since Robinson's warning on the indiscriminate use of ecological correlation, most social scientists have refrained from using these methods. However, alternative regression techniques have only been supported and used by a small group of scholars. Shiveley points out the possible reasons for the unpopularity of these techniques among scholars:

The lack of interest in ecological regression is probably due to the fact that errors in estimation are likely to turn up either as negative percentages or as percentages which are greater than one hundred. This is disheartening to the researcher, and is difficult to present to his colleagues. Ecological correlations, on the other hand, are comfortably bounded by -1.0 and +1.0 no matter how incorrect the ecological inference is.

Since the negative percentages and the percentages over one hundred are technically possible but logically impossible, some scholars who use the ecological regression method make an adjustment for these impossible estimates on voter mobility. For reasons indicated above, this study takes the logit method for ecological inference instead of ecological regression.

Ecological Regression

Since the introduction of alternative techniques for ecological inference, the advocates of ecological regression techniques have made efforts to yield valid estimates of voter mobility using election results. Leo A. Goodman initiated the technique of ecological regression in 1953 in response to Robinson's warning on the frequent use of ecological inference. Techniques for ecological inference were also suggested by a number of scholars, and applied to various countries (Shiveley, 1969; Kousser, 1973;

Goodman's ecological regression technique is useful for analyzing and tracing voter mobility between two consecutive elections, especially in a two-party system. We may estimate what proportion of people who voted for Party A, for example, in a previous election supported the same party in the next election. Or, how many of them changed their minds and supported other parties. E. Terrence Jones, an advocate of this technique, tested its accuracy by comparing the estimated results with survey results. Jones's study tested the utility of Goodman's ecological regression to study the relationships between individuals' sociological characteristics and their electoral behavior during periods when only aggregate data are available. The number and level of variables influence the estimates under the two-party setting. J. Morgan Kousser provided a more helpful introduction to ecological regression in terms of its theory, mathematical background, and assumptions of the method.

The basic assumption of the regression technique is that "the proportions in the interior cells (the values of the p's and r's) be roughly the same across all the subunits". Here, r stands for the intercept and p stands for the slope + the intercept.

This kind of assumption restricts the applicability of the ecological regression method. Goodman's and Shiveley's techniques limit the practical value of the method because they assume that the bivariate individual level model is properly specified and that bias stems from the grouping process itself. After all, the common assumption for the
Goodman's and Shiveley's techniques is based on the two-party system or two-class system. The assumption of the two-party system or two classes, however, is not reasonable because there exists the third alternative of non-voting.  

It is clear that the regression approach has limited applicability concerning the multiparty system because the number of choices dilutes the accuracy of the estimation. Some scholars found low validity of ecological estimates of voter mobility when multiparty voter mobility was estimated (Stokes, 1969; Hoschka and Schunck, 1975; Flanigan and Zingale, 1985). Ryssevik has critical comments on the regression method:

While promising attempts have been made to estimate two-party voting in two-class societies, the performances of ecological regression models in multi-party and/or multi-class situations are considerably more questionable. Coping with such situations the models frequently produce absurd results. Bearing in mind that even a genuine two-party system offers a third alternative of non-voting, this is indeed a challenge to the "regression approach."  

The regression approach was developed for assessing the two-party vote within the two-class format. In the 1980s the focus of interest has turned from the bivariate relationships to multivariate relationships (Langbein and Zeit, 1980, Stipak and Hensler, 1982; Althauser et al., 1982). A main conclusion of this new focus is that the regression technique is much more "appropriate" than the correlation technique when establishing the relationship between the individual and the ecological levels.  

However, as mentioned above, there are some shortcomings concerning the regression method. Besides the problem of accuracy, the regression method can create unreasonable percentages. As Shiveley pointed out above, the method can produce both negative percentages and percentages
which are greater than one hundred. This is one of the major reasons for its unpopularity among social scientists.

In short, when the number of political parties or social classes involved is greater than two, the weakness of regression analysis lies in the existence of "the problem of mis-specification" and "the problem of multicollinearity."¹⁸

**The Logit Method for Ecological Inference**

The logit method for ecological inference equates the individual level fourfold correlation with the ecological logit Pearson correlations. The logit Pearson correlation means the Pearson correlation between logit-transformed Px and Py. The logit method for ecological inference is an effort to develop a new technique for ecological inference based on the latent structure theory.

Ecological inference means the micro-interpretation of voters' electoral behavior using official aggregate data. It is difficult to ask voters about their electoral behavior of twenty years ago, for example. With the aggregate data published two decades ago, it is possible to trace voters' partisan support and its pattern. Simply stated, the aggregate data can answer the following question: "How many voters who voted for Party A in 1981, for example, voted again for the same party or shifted to another party in 1985?"

The latent structure theory assumes that the "probability of a certain choice is a function of a latent variable associated with each individual."¹⁹
latent factors that explain electoral behavior in the first election as well as electoral behavior in the second election.

Like other similar statistical methods, the logit method for ecological inference has its own assumptions, shortcomings, and advantages. Among the assumptions, the assumption of isomorphism is considered most important. Isomorphism means "the variation between individuals has the same structure as the variation between districts." The assumption of isomorphism means that "the ratio between the within-district individual variance and the between-districts ecological variance is equal to the constant k on all k dimensions in the latent space." It requires "the ratio between individual and ecological variances to be constant for all dimensions of the latent variables" and the constant to be large.

The logit method is applicable to multiparty estimation as well as two-party estimation of individual electoral behavior. The logit method for ecological inference is a return to the correlation method as an alternative to the regression method. The argument for this reversal is that Robinson's analysis and adoption of the analytic tool were faulty. Thomsen (1987) criticizes Robinson's application of the Pearson product-moment correlation on the individual level as well as the aggregate level. The well-known example of covariation between illiteracy and race, put forward by Robinson in 1950, creates a false impression by misuse of the Pearson correlation method. Instead it is suggested that the fourfold correlation is well suited as a measure of association in a fourfold contingency table.

It is assumed here that the method itself also contains some technical and structural problems. Thomsen et al. briefly summarized the methodology:
The ecological estimation of individual behavior is carried out by equating the individual tetrachoric correlation with the ecological logit correlation for all tetrachoric (i.e. four-fold) subsets of the voters' choice...This particular procedure can be regarded as a very simple solution within the framework of a more general logit methodology. The simple solution rests on two assumptions: the assumption of isomorphism between the individual and the ecological factor structure; and the assumption of a very high ratio of individual variance to ecological variance. Both assumptions were chosen not because they seemed to be most realistic but because they are simple and make ecological inference easy.25

The method used in this dissertation is the logit method for ecological inference. The method has been tested in many European countries, especially the Nordic countries, and has been evaluated positively. In comparison with the survey results, the ecologically estimated results were very close.26 While Kim and Thomsen (1991) agree that survey results often show more valid estimates of voter mobility, however, the validity of survey results can also be questioned (to be discussed in the following section).

A number of researchers report conflicting results when comparing ecological estimates with survey results, even in advanced democratic countries. In the Korean case, it is said that Koreans, when they are being interviewed, are very cautious in answering politically sensitive questions, e.g., what party did you vote for last time? What party will you vote for this time? This is further complicated because Korea has experienced authoritarian rule since its founding in 1948. Due to their past experiences and their political culture, Koreans often do not reveal their honest judgments and opinions to pollsters.

An answer to a question does not always reveal the respondent's party preference or support. For politically sensitive people, these kinds of
questions may produce an answer contrary to the respondent’s real political party preference (response bias). In fact, there are studies on voters' misleading replies to pollsters in interviews even in the United States, where voters otherwise honestly express their opinions and ideas. The respondents, who for certain reasons did not vote, tend to answer as though they voted in the previous election. This is the case even in the United States. Robert Bernstein states that:

It is clear that the answers respondents give are not always valid. Those being interviewed have a tendency to say things that will please the interviewer. To some extent this explains why some claim to have voted when they, in fact, did not. Attempts to please the interviewer may also lead citizens to state opinions on issues or candidates that they have not thought much about.27

This study does not deny the general validity of survey results. It contends instead that survey results, in many situations, provide valid results in recording people's opinions. However, given the difficulties in obtaining valid results with the survey research tradition in Korea, the logit method for ecological inference may be used as an alternative to infer the mobility of the electorate. It is important to note that the logit method for ecological inference requires the division of the nation into politically homogeneous regions.28 Korea can be divided into several regions that show different voting patterns in recent national elections. Students of Korean politics agree that strong regionalism exists in Korean electoral politics.29 Regionalism is one of the distinguishing features in the recent elections. Jae On Kim and B. C. Koh define the term as "the voter's affective identification with and support for candidates with roots in their respective regions."30
For this analysis, Korea has been divided into four regions (see Map 5-1 for the location of each city and province): (1) Seoul; (2) the Chungbu region (the middle area of the country excluding Seoul; this includes the city of Inch'on, the provinces of Kyonggi, Kangwon, Ch'ungbuk, and Ch'ungnam); (3) the Honam region (the southeast area of the nation, the city and provinces of Kwangju, Chonbuk, and Chonnam); and (4) the Yongnam region (the southwest area of the nation, the cities and provinces of Pusan, Taegu, Kyongbuk, and Kyongnam). For the convenience of analysis, Cheju Province is included and calculated in the Yongnam region in this research.

The mobility tables based on the four-region format are estimated by the personal computer program ECOL, version 3 (Thomsen, 1991 & 1992). ECOL program is a tool for analyzing election results. ECOL version 3 is designed to study the electoral dynamics from one election to the following election for all parties in many geographical areas. From the database this ECOL program can create different levels of workfiles of data units on a certain regional structure. The ECOL program can make ecological analysis such as listing of units (districts), correlation analysis and factor analysis and ecological inference such as party loyalty, voter mobility, and the flow of votes from the geographical units to the individual level by estimating voter mobility tables. This program has a database module for coding and handling of election results at the two successive elections. The electoral data can be entered or imported for units at certain aggregation levels such as districts or precincts and the program can aggregate these units to higher levels such as provinces and regions.
ECOL program implements the logit methodology for ecological inference. Using this program, it is possible to construct voter mobility tables from one election to the next election. The mobility tables show the flow of votes between all political parties, including "abstain", from the old to the new as percentages of all voters, as row and column percentages, or as net flow of votes between pairs of parties.

This version was specially designed to solve the problem of "missing data" that is frequently observed in the Korean electoral data of the 1980s. Missing data appears in the electoral data because some parties do not run candidates in certain districts. For example, the RDP did not run candidates in most of the districts in Honam, and PPD candidates, in turn, did not run in the Yongnam region, due to their unpopularity in each other's regions. As long as regionalism continues, the problem of missing data will continue.

The validity of the logit method for ecological inference has been positively evaluated in many countries. The following are some comments that have appeared in the professional journals: The logit method is "the most sophisticated" method (Firebaugh, 1988); "mathematically complex" (Margolis, 1988); "shows surprising accuracy" (Ryssevik, 1987); and "the most promising development in ecological data research over the last thirty years (Berglund, 1987).

Validity and Reliability: Survey Data vs. Aggregate Data

In a competitive democratic country, accurately assessing public opinion is essential for both the country's leaders and the political parties. Without access to the people's wishes, political leaders cannot effectively manage the political affairs of the country and maintain their political parties
successfully in a competitive democratic system. That is the very reason for political leaders to survey frequently public opinion in regard to specific policy issues, the government, or the political parties.

The emergence of professional survey research organizations reflects the necessity of knowing the trends of public opinion. Bernstein and Dyer (1984) state the basic problems in survey research: "All survey research has weakness related to getting people to respond to the survey in the first place, and getting them to give valid answers in the second."

The use of the survey technique often invites controversies about its validity and reliability. In many cases social scientists are not sure whether they are measuring what they intend to measure with reliable instruments. Concepts of validity and reliability are stated:

Validity is expressed as the extent to which a test measures what it is supposed to measure (i.e., how well it hits the target).... Reliability is expressed as a correlation coefficient that measures the self-consistency of a test. If any structured method (instrument, test, experiment, etc.) is reliable, the same results should be obtainable time after time.\(^\text{36}\)

As experience accumulates, enormous efforts are being made to reduce the errors and bias in the survey research tradition.\(^\text{37}\)

In Korea, many survey research organizations appeared right before and after the 1987 presidential election to survey public opinion and predict election results. In some cases, those survey results were accurate in representing the people's will and predicting the election results. However, it must be pointed out that such predictions are not always correct and sometimes are misleading.

Morris Rosenberg observes that a number of respondents are not willing to answer how they had voted when they were interviewed by the
pollsters. Moreover, the possible existence of "the spiral of silence"\textsuperscript{39} cautions against the indiscriminate use of survey results in regard to the partisan support items. The existence of people who refuse to be interviewed and the bias in the survey research tradition (including sampling bias and response bias) often become a topic for discussion among scholars in the field.\textsuperscript{40} The rejection rate of interviews increases when the respondents are asked about their own personal matters. Clausen paid attention to the validity of survey findings about sensitive topics:

The validity of the survey findings is expected to vary with the sensitivity of the topic to which the study is addressed. Accordingly, the greatest skepticism will attend the reported results of surveys designed to elicit information on matters of sex, religion, politics, and income. These fall under the rubric of "one's own private business."\textsuperscript{41}

On the Korean scene, it is recommended that another item be added to the list above. It is education. The possession of a Bachelor's or higher degree, in general, is another important social status identifier. Thus, the question of one's educational level may become a sensitive one. Some less sensitive questions are: age, number of children, marital status, occupation, length of time in residence, and so on.\textsuperscript{42}

Survey results can predict the direction of the public opinion and influence an individual's opinion formation. Kwon O-hun, however, points out the limits and unreality of the social survey method: In Korea, (1) the probability of inconsistency between individuals' opinion and their actual behavior is high because of the group-oriented political culture; (2) questions are raised in the selection of sample when the questions are related with particular plan; (3) the way of questioning and the content of the
questionnaire may bring irrelevant results; (4) all collected data are not necessarily worthy to use.43

In this argument, it is correctly pointed out that indiscriminate use of survey data may bring unexpected results and eventually distort the truth. Moreover, in recent survey research reports there is a considerable amount of equivocal responses which means that many of the respondents are not willing to reveal their opinions and attitudes to the pollsters.

With the advance of modernization, the modern communication devices such as telephone, fax, cable, etc., have spread far and wide. As far as the telephone interview is concerned, it has even more potential for error and bias. Respondents' attitudes and replies can be affected even by the voice of the interviewer. Oksenberg et al. (1986) have studied the relationship between the interviewer's voice and the refusal rates in telephone interviews.44 Although there is a controversy about the degree of interviewer effect in the telephone survey, it is safe to say that the telephone survey has its own error and bias.45 Moreover, it is usual to have high rates of equivocal responses and refusals in survey data elsewhere. Faulkenberry and Mason traced the attitudes and political environment of the equivocal respondents. They argue that the "don't know" group differs from the "no opinion" group. These equivocal groups (don't know group and the no opinion group) also differ from the substantive opinion groups who have clear answers, be they positive or negative. Faulkenberry and Mason find that the equivocal respondents are less educated and have lower exposure to the mass media when compared with the respondents who have clear answers (favor or oppose).46
There are some advocates for the use of aggregate data and techniques. While the survey research tradition provides valid estimates on people's opinion and behavior in general, the use of aggregate data sometimes provides more objective, and nation-wide estimates about people's behavior. Moreover, the use of aggregate data has some conveniences, e.g., easy access to the data, lower expenditures, and time-saving.

**Voter Mobility**

In the history of electoral politics since 1948, Seoul and other large cities have supported the strong opposition parties while the rural areas and small cities have supported the ruling parties. This phenomenon has been labeled the 'Yoch'on yado phenomenon' (strong ruling party in rural areas and strong opposition in urban areas) by observers of Korean politics. The ruling parties' strengths in the rural areas are often explained by intervention, pressure, and mobilization by the government in the electoral process. It is described as "mobilized voting" or "conformity voting." With the aid of governmental intervention and other factors, it is recorded that the rural areas show higher voter turnout than larger cities. Contrary to the experiences of other countries and the dominating theories on voter turnout, less educated voters tend to vote more than more educated voters (by more educated voters, here it is designated the voters who have a college or higher education). This is known as "the tojo ch'on'go phenomenon" (low turnout in urban areas and high turnout in rural areas).
Interpreting election results is interesting and exciting. However, the interpretation of 'outside' statistics, i.e., the aggregate nationwide election result, may give us a different perception than that provided by the 'inside' statistics, i.e., the individual-level electoral behavior. For example, it is a fact that Korea's ruling parties have won about one-third of the valid votes in all elections in the 1980s. The ruling DJP attracted 35.6 percent of valid votes in 1981, 35.2 percent in 1985, 36.6 percent in 1987, and 34.0 percent in 1988. When we look at these 'outside' statistics, it is "tempting to jump to the conclusion that the ruling DJP has a permanent core of loyal supporters." Interpretation of 'outside' statistics without examining individual electoral behavior might thus result in a typical "ecological fallacy."

**Voter Mobility, 1981-1985**

It is important to consider voter mobility and party loyalty levels to understand the recent dynamics of Korean electoral politics. For convenience of analysis, the whole country is divided into the four regions mentioned before: Seoul, the Chungbu region, the Honam region, and the Yongnam region.

The voter mobility tables, 5-1 through 5-10, reveal interesting but unexpected voting patterns of the Korean electorate in the 1980s. These are, as far as the ruling party is concerned, unexpected results because the ruling parties in the past have obtained about one-third of the valid votes in elections in the 1980s. Tables 5-1 to 5-5 show ecological estimates of voter mobility between the 1981 and the 1985 National Assembly elections.
Table 5-5 (the nation-wide voter mobility table between 1981 and 1985) shows that 54.7 percent of the 1981 DJP voters voted for the DJP again in 1985. At large, the ruling DJP did not lose its supporters to a specific opposition party except for the NKDP (15.2 %). However, a total of 37.4 percent (10.1 % to the DKP, 7.6 % to the KNP, 15.2 % to the NKDP, and 4.5 % to the Other) of the 1981 DJP voters switched to the opposition parties in 1985. The DKP, the first although weak opposition party, did not retain its 1981 supporters in 1985. Only 27.6 percent of them supported the DKP again in 1985. 33.6 percent of the 1981 DKP voters turned to the newly emerged opposition NKDP. The KNP showed an even poorer performance than the DKP. According to the ecological estimates it retained only 17.8 percent of former KNP voters. The DKP and KNP were the only two major opposition parties who ran in both National Assembly elections in 1981 and 1985. These two parties lost many of their 1981 supporters to either the ruling DJP or the newly emerged opposition NKDP. The results thus implied the failure of these two opposition parties in securing the loyalty of their 1981 voters.

The CRP and the other minor parties also lost their 1981 supporters to either the DJP or the NKDP. The defeat of the 1981 opposition parties provided the opportunity for a party system dominated by the DJP and NKDP. Considering the existence of the inevitable non-voters (Chapter 6 will intensively deal with the non-voting and non-voters), i.e., sick people, shop owners, housewives, etc., the percentage of non-voting by former non-voters is understandable. However, with the exception of continuous non-voters, most of the former non-voters went to the polls to cast their ballots for the opposition parties, especially the NKDP.
The regional voter mobility tables provide a more detailed description of the electorate's voting pattern. Table 5-1 shows that in Seoul the ruling DJP lost a large portion (42.6%) of supporters to the NKDP. The DJP retained only 30.4 percent of 1981 DJP voters. The DKP lost more than half of its supporters to the NKDP. The KNP also lost many of its supporters to the NKDP and kept only 4.6 percent of its supporters. In Seoul, where a quarter of the nation's total population lives, the unpopularity of the old parties is witnessed by the loss of their supporters to the other new parties. Table 5-1 shows that the success of the NKDP, in terms of 'outside' statistics (those collected from published sources), is also supported by 'inside' statistics (which were compiled and analyzed specifically for this study). The NKDP was able to attract the ruling party voters as well as the opposition party voters.

The case is somewhat different in the Chungbu region (see Table 5-2). The ruling DJP retained a 61.9 percent loyalty rate, as only 30.8 percent of its supporters went over to the opposition parties. The big contrast with Seoul was that only 7.3 percent of DJP voters defected to the NKDP in the Chungbu region. The DKP was able to hold 37.9 percent of its supporters and the KNP only 15.4 percent. A large portion of DKP voters (30.1%) went to the NKDP in 1985. Except for the DKP voters and abstainers, the voters who voted for the other opposition parties went to the ruling DJP.

Table 5-3 shows the ecological estimates of how the voters in Honam behaved. Statistically, only a small portion of people in Honam voted for the ruling DJP. However, more than half (55.6%) of the 1981 DJP voters supported the same party in 1985. The CRP voters tended to support the NKDP throughout the nation except in Seoul. The majority (55.0%) of the
1981 CRP voters voted for the NKDP. This implies that the CRP voters had a favorable opinion about the tough opposition party.

In the Yongnam region, the DJP recorded the highest party loyalty (64.3 %) among the four regions in the country (Table 5-4). As in the Chungbu region, the DJP lost only 30.2 percent of its supporters to the opposition parties. The tough opposition NKDP was not able to attract the ruling party voters in this region. The Yongnam region is the birth place of political power in modern Korea. The ruling DJP must have strength in this region. The 1981 DKP voters voted either for the DKP (30.0 %) again or for the NKDP (30.4 %) in 1985. The 1981 KNP voters did not display a clear voting pattern. The 1981 CRP voters and the other minority voters showed similar voting patterns. They voted either for the DJP or the NKDP.

In general, the DJP and the NKDP were the main competitors. Seoul was the most competitive area for the two parties. The multiparty format worked for the ruling party and brought about the decline of 'moderate' opposition parties. The emergence of the NKDP in the 1985 elections signaled the transition from a multiparty system to a two-party system in the near future. The collapse of the 'moderate' opposition parties after the election reflected the electorate's choice and wishes. The newly emerged NKDP was called a 'genuine opposition party' because of its severe verbal attacks and physical protests against the government and the ruling party.

The reason for the failure of other opposition parties in 1985 seems clear when we look at the Figures 5-2 for the DKP and 5-3 for the KNP (numbers shown in the figures stand for cities and provinces). Both figures show that the major opposition parties received random support throughout the country. In other words, the major opposition parties depended upon
local candidates' popularity rather than the party policies or party popularity. Compared to the opposition party support shown in Figures 5-2 and 5-3, the ruling DJP received somewhat stable support in many constituencies (see Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-4 shows the change of support to the DJP in 1988. As in 1985, the ruling DJP managed to maintain its support rate in some constituencies but also showed the effects of lack of loyal supporters and instability in party support. A difference between Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-4 is that the latter shows more scattered numbers (districts in each province) than in the former. The distance from the diagonal line shows the degree of change in support. Although Figure 5-1 shows some isolated numbers on the graph, it is still relatively stable compared to Figure 5-4. The numbers (districts) in Figure 5-1 are tend to fall along the diagonal line relatively more than those in Figure 5-4. This means a drop in support or unstable support for the DJP in 1988.

In Korea, there have been disputes on the existence of the 'loyal opposition' for a long time. In a society that requires the voter to take either the pro-government or anti-government stance, the existence of 'moderate' or 'compromise-seeking' politicians is often disregarded and underestimated by the people. In fact, under authoritarian regimes, the voters tend to prefer either the ruling party or genuine opposition parties but not moderate and compromise-seeking opposition parties.

Mobility tables and figures here reflect the fragile party system and unstable party support of voters.
Voter Mobility, 1985-1988

There had been a number of political, economic, and social changes between the elections of 1985 and 1988. Although these are not all reflected in voter turnout, election results, and voting patterns, it is safe to say that certain events have had a larger impact and influence than others on election results and voting patterns.

In Korea, the voter turnout and election results express complex conditions, situations, and values. With this perspective, it is not sufficient to predict or explain voter turnout and election results using a limited number of socioeconomic and demographic variables. Explanations of voting behavior are also complex and controversial in advanced democracies. Scholars of political behavior disagree about the causes of voting and non-voting.

Table 5-10 shows the nation-wide voter mobility in Korea in 1985-88. Party loyalty in this table is quite low when compared with the voter mobility tables from the Nordic countries.\textsuperscript{50} For example, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SDP) showed 82.8 percent (row percentage) of loyalty between 1924 and 1928, 86.2 percent between 1944 and 1948, and 92.7 percent between 1964 and 1968.\textsuperscript{51} In Denmark, the party loyalty of the Social Democrats and the Centre Democrats were 94.8 percent and 91.7 percent respectively between the two national elections in 1987 and 1988.\textsuperscript{52} In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter LDP) voters showed 78 percent of loyalty in a panel survey conducted in 1983.\textsuperscript{53} Another set of survey results indicate that the LDP maintained 92.6 percent of 'party loyalty' and that of the Japan Socialist Party was 89.4 percent conducted in March 1990.\textsuperscript{54} However, party loyalty is low in some cases
even in the European democracies. In France, for example, the sudden emergence of popular parties led by able leaders may be the reason for the low party loyalty.\textsuperscript{55}

Party loyalty went down in 1988 compared with the elections in 1985 (see Table 5-5). According to the ecological estimates, the DJP supporters' party loyalty went from 54.7 percent in 1985 to 41.7 percent in 1988 (see Table 5-11).

The results of the 1988 National Assembly elections were affected by the introduction of the single-member district system (institutional effect) and the prevailing atmosphere of regionalism caused by party leaders (situational effect). Kim and Thomsen explain the reasons for the low party loyalty recorded in 1988 from two perspectives: the political changes and developments during the period (1985-1988), and the split of the opposition NKDP.\textsuperscript{56}

Table 5-10 shows that a considerable portion of DJP voters voted for the opposition parties (13.6% to the RDP, 10.2% to the PPD, and 14.2% to the NDRP). This change reflects either the increasing credibility of the opposition leaders or the expansion of regionalism between the two elections. The latter seems more appropriate in interpreting the table. Unlike the moderate and weak opposition parties of the 1985 elections, the opposition parties in 1988 had stronger, more distinct regional bases. Because of the declining popularity of the major party leaders and parties, these party leaders tried various means to maintain their political status in order to be able to run for office in the future. The adoption of the single-member district was good news for politicians who did not want to spend their remaining lives 'fishing.' While all the political parties and politicians
sang a song of 'harmony and national developments', in reality, they appealed antagonistically to the electorate, and emphasized their regional background and ties during the campaign. Table 5-10 also reveals that a large portion of DKP voters moved towards the newly emerged opposition parties, the RDP, the PPD, and the NDRP. The NKDP voters' movement shows interesting but expected voting patterns. A large portion of NKDP voters voted for the RDP (26.8 %), PPD (19.8 %), and NDRP (7.8 %). The shift, however, is understandable because both RDP and PPD originated in the NKDP. It is worthy to note the high abstention rate of former NKDP voters (31.4 %). Many NKDP supporters were disappointed with the split of the two opposition leaders. One possible explanation of this behavior is Lazarsfeld's (1944) cross-pressure hypothesis which means that people tend to react with passivity when they face the conflicting forces.

A further indication of the increased volatility of Korean voters is the relatively low proportion of stable nonvoters. Only 35.2 percent of nonvoters in the 1985 election abstained again in 1988. The former nonvoters and former supporters for 'other' parties did not show any clear pattern of electoral behavior in 1988.

Seoul is the region least dominated by personalism and regionalism and is closest to the national average (see Tables 5-1 and 5-6). Apart from the fact that support for the ruling DJP is somewhat lower in Seoul than in the rest of the country, the mobility rates inside Table 5-6 are similar to the national average. Party loyalty for the ruling DJP declined from 30.4 percent in 1985 to 23.0 percent in 1988.

The PPD was relatively successful in attracting DJP voters (24.0 %, see Table 5-6). One unexpected event was the high defection rate of former
DJP voters. They went not to the rival parties, but instead became non-voters (27.6%). The same can be said about the 1985 NKDP voters, KNP voters, and minority voters.

Also in the Chungbu region, party loyalty for the ruling DJP declined in 1988. It was 61.9 percent in 1985 and 51.6 percent in 1988 (see Tables 5-2 and 5-7). The decline of party loyalty and the loss of supporters, especially for the DJP and the RDP, must have caused concern among the party leaders. It is interesting to see that in this region, where neither the RDP nor the PPD had personal affiliations, relatively few NKDP voters voted for these two parties (21.3% and 15.5%), while many abstained (40.7%). The explanation could be that in this region, where no personal ties encouraged voting for either the RDP or the PPD, dissatisfaction with the split of the NKDP was especially high. This could also explain why the Chungbu region had the highest percentage of loyal DJP voters (51.6%).

A final observation about the Chungbu region, which may also be found in other regions, is that former moderate and conservative voters, i.e., the voters for the DKP, the DJP, and the KNP, tended to vote for the party of the region's 'favorite son', in this case the NDRP. The 1985 NKDP voters showed a clear voting pattern by not supporting the ruling DJP (Seoul, 14.7%; Chungbu, 6.4%; Honam, 1.2%; Yongnam, 12.7%). The DKP, KNP, and minority party voters' voting does not show a clear pattern.

Table 5-8 for the Honam region clearly shows the effects of the NKDP split. The region shows the nation's highest defection rates to the region's favorite PPD. In this region, most of the 1981 NKDP voters voted for the PPD (76.8%). In Chungbu, the NKDP voters voted for the RDP (21.3%) and PPD (15.5%) (see Tables 5-7 and 5-8). Kim and Thomsen state that:
Reversing the argument for the Chungbu region, we can say that in Honam, where personal ties encouraged voting for the PPD, dissatisfaction with the split between the RDP and the PPD was not evident. 57

As in the Chungbu region, former moderate and conservative voters from the DKP, the DJP, and the KNP tended to vote for the party of the region's 'favorite son', in this case the PPD.

Table 5-9 shows the strengths of the Yongnam region's favorite parties, the DJP and the RDP. Neither party has dominance in the region. Roh Tae Woo and the ruling DJP gained 32.8 percent of support. Kim Yong-sam and the RDP received 29.3 percent of the voters. Just as happened in Honam, the support for the other parties in this region is quite low. Personal and regional ties - at least to some extent - could overcome dissatisfaction with the split between the RDP and the PPD. 58

The moderate and conservative voters, again, from the DJP, DKP, and KNP tended to vote for the parties of the local 'favorite sons', most for the DJP (44.8 %, 23.2 %, and 54.5 %) but also quite a few for the opposition party RDP (20.6 %, 32.0 %, and 18.3 %).

From the observations above, it is safe to say that the voter volatility in Korean electoral politics is high. Voter volatility is defined as "the level of unpredictability of election outcomes from traditional demographic and political party variables." 59 A high level of voter volatility means a low level of party loyalty.

In the Korean case, volatile voters do not necessarily have low education, low income, or low political interests. 60 Volatile voters are the people who are manipulated by politicians or influenced by situational emotions and regional interests. In Korea, it can be argued that there is no
meaningful correlation between a high level of volatility and low educational or political interest levels.

The frequent emergence and passing of political parties also have influence on the attitudes of voters and their partisan support.

Conclusion

The logit method for ecological inference is an useful method that can be applied to the Korean electoral data because it can be operated even under the multiparty system. The method has been tested in many European democracies with satisfactory results. More importantly, this study adopted the ECOL program, version 3 which was specially designed to handle the Korean electoral data which contains a number of missing data.

It is not asserted that the frequent changes in electoral systems universally favor the ruling parties. In fact, even though the electoral system often favors the party in power, the degree varies from country to country. The concern, as discussed in Chapter 4, is directed to the frequent changes of Korean electoral laws because, whenever the ruling party felt the need to amend these laws, it amended to its advantage. Making matters worse, the ruling as well as the opposition parties have played the game of separation and reassembly of parties in the last decades and even today. This study has focused on electoral politics and party politics mainly in the 1980s.

The findings in this chapter lead to the following general conclusions: Korean voters' loyalty to the major parties has been low, and they are volatile in their electoral behavior. Party loyalty for the ruling DJP was low
in 1985 (54.7 %) and further dropped in 1988 (41.7 %). The decline of party loyalty from 54.7 percent to 41.7 percent is considered meaningful in this study because it happened despite the democratization efforts made by the ruling party. The decline of support to the DJP, in a sense, was inevitable because the ruling party's democratization efforts were a little late.

This suggests that the joining of the ruling party to the merger of three parties in 1990 has certain causes, e. g., the decline of party loyalty and low party loyalty. The ecologically estimated voter mobility tables also show that strong regionalism has appeared in Korean electoral politics between 1985 and 1988 especially in Honam and Yongnam where current political leaders came from.

The argument here, based on the observation of a low level of party stability and party loyalty, is that Korean political parties cannot be compared or evaluated with the Western standards. As previous chapters have shown, Korean political parties are not yet institutionalized and have a relatively short history. If political parties are weak and fragile (low party loyalty), they must have some alternatives to be self-sustaining, e. g., candidate loyalty. Without having strong party loyalties or strong candidate loyalties, a society will be faced with the series of political disorders.

In the beginning of this study, it was hypothesized that the ruling parties in the 1980s maintained a high level of party loyalty because of their winning of roughly one-third of the valid votes in elections. The hypothesis was disproved as the ecologically estimated voter mobility tables show. The ruling parties somehow managed to receive one-third of the valid votes,
but many of the votes were not from loyal supporters. This was the major weakness of the ruling DJP in the 1980s.

In the future, the logit method will be used to compare the validity and reliability of ecologically estimated results and survey results. A new research method for ecological inference is also being developed and in the future it will be compared with the logit method.⁶¹
Table 5-1. Seoul. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1985:</th>
<th>1981:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>DKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.1</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

• Figures in Tables 5-1 through 5-10 are ecologically estimated using ECOL program, version 3. The official election statistics published by the Central Election Management Committee were used to compute the estimation. Data coding examples are listed in Appendix A.

** Interpretation of tables ... The first column of Table 5-1 shows the list of parties that contested in the 1981 elections. The second row provides the list of parties that competed in the 1985 elections. Interpretation of the second column and the third row (30.4) is: 30.4 percent of the voters who voted for the DJP in 1991 supported again in 1985.

Table 5-2. The Chungbu Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Figures in Tables 5-1 through 5-10 are ecologically estimated using ECOL program, version 3. The official election statistics published by the Central Election Management Committee were used to compute the estimation. Data coding examples are listed in Appendix A.
### Table 5-3. The Honam Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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<td></td>
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<td>NKDP</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
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### Table 5-4. The Yongnam Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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<td>KNP</td>
<td>NKDP</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Abstain</td>
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<td>1981:</td>
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Table 5-8. The Honam Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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32.8 29.3 1.1 8.6 7.1 21.2 100.0

Table 5-10. Whole Country. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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25.5 17.9 14.4 11.7 5.5 25.0 100.0
Table 5-11. Survey Results on Voting Intentions of the Electorate: The proportions of intentions to vote for the same political party candidate.

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<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
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</table>

* Survey conducted after the elections of 1987 and 1988.
Map 5-1. South Korea: Cities and Provinces

1. Seoul
2. Pusan
3. Inch'on
4. Taegu
5. Kwangju
6. Kyonggi-do
7. Kangwon-do
8. Ch'ungch'ong buk-do (Ch'ungbuk)
9. Ch'ungch'ong nam-do (Ch'ungnam)
10. Cholla buk-do (Chonbuk)
11. Cholla nam-do (Chonnam)
12. Kyongsang buk-do (Kyongbuk)
13. Kyongsang nam-do (Kyongnam)
14. Cheju-do
Figure 5-1. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DJP 1981-1985.
Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 5-2. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DKP 1981-1985. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 5-3. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, KNP 1981-1985. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 5-4. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DJP 1985-1988. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Notes for Chapter 5


4. For example, see J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1973): 238.


8. Shiveley, ""Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals": 1183-1196. Shiveley illustrates the Duncan-Davis technique and Goodman's regression technique. He encourages further study and more use of the alternatives to ecological correlations.

9. Ibid., 1194.
10. For example, Piergiorgio Corbetta, "Estimating Electoral Flows in Italy from Aggregate Data: A Test of Some Pre-Conditions," and Svante Ersson, "Swedish Communism 1920-1990: An Ecological Analysis." These papers were delivered at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops at the University of Essex, March 22-28, 1991.


14. Goodman, "Some Alternatives to Ecological Correlation,"; Flanigan and Zingale, "Alchemist's Gold: Inferring Individual Relationships from Aggregate Data," *Social Science History* 9, no. 1 (1985): 71-91. Here, \( r \) stands for the intercept and \( p \) stands for the slope + the intercept. Since the values of \( p \) and \( r \) are unknown, it can be estimated by the linear regression equation: \( Y = r + (p - r)X \).

15. Flanagan and Zingale, ibid., 79. Two major reasons for the restriction: "First, it requires that the way the data is aggregated has no impact on the relationship between the two variables of interest, that there is no interaction between group characteristics or contextual factors and the independent variable. The collective experience of social science suggests that there are many in which such an assumption cannot be made. Second, there is virtually no basis for determining whether the assumption is met or not in those circumstances in which a technique to infer individual relationships is most needed, i.e., when no individual data of any kind are available as is the case with a great deal of historical inquiry."


20. Thomsen, Danish Elections 1920-79, 55.

21. Ibid., 54-55.


24. Ibid.


26. Ibid., 81-86.


28. For a technical account, refer to Thomsen's Danish Elections 1920-79: A Logit Approach to Ecological Analysis and Inference.

29. For analyses of regionalism in recent elections, see Han'guk ui son'go chongch'ihak (Electoral Politics of Korea), ed. Kim Kwang-Woong (Seoul: Nanam, 1990). Relevant articles are: Yi Kap-yun, "T'up'yo haengt'ae wa minjuhwa," (pp. 169-174); Pak Chan-uk, "Son'go kwajong kwa taeui chonch'i," (pp. 196-201); Kim Hyong-guk, "Che sibsamdae taet'ongnyong son'go ui t'up'yohaengt'ae e taehan chijonghakchok yon'gu," (pp. 207-232).


32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.


42. Ibid.


52. The Danish electoral data were provided by Soren Risbjerg Thomsen.

54. Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, ed. Gekihen no seiji sentaku (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-sha, 1990), 241. Miyake Ichiro's (1986) and Yomiuri Shimbun's (1990) survey results are different from each other in terms of time interval, covering period, sample size, measuring method, and covering elections.


57. Ibid., 463.

58. Ibid., 463-64.


60. Low education and low income levels do not correlate with low participation in elections. See Kil, Kim, and An, Han'guk son'goron (Korean Elections) (Seoul: Tasan, 1987), 282 (Table 2-12).

61. The Component model for ecological inference is under development by Dr. Andreas J. Kohlsche. A brief outline of the method (Estimation of Voting Migration and Vote Splitting) was delivered at the workshop "Analyzing Voting Behavior using Election Results" at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the ECPR, University of Essex (Colchester), March 22-28, 1991.
CHAPTER 6
NON-VOTING

Studies on Nonvoting

Since the beginning of election processes, nonvoters have existed in all societies that hold elections. Thus, non-voting is neither new nor unique to the current political scene. Since the word 'non-voting' itself implies negative attitudes and feelings, the majority of political scientists have focused on phenomena such as participation, mobilization, voting, demonstration, and protest. Political participation, as many scholars describe, is a core constituent in the concept of democracy. Under a democratic system, however, voting or non-voting depends upon each individual's free will; therefore voters can not be required to go to the polls.

In order to encourage mass political participation, some countries like Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands have set up compulsory voting systems and show about 90 percent or more turnout rate in national elections. Some Swiss cantons have adopted the compulsory voting system. Eligible voters have to go to the polls; otherwise they risk fines or other sanctions. Excluding these exceptions, however, participation in elections generally depends on the individual's attitude, judgment, and values. Regardless, non-voting has become a social concern in some societies.

Non-voting, as an electoral behavior, sends messages to politicians about the current political situation. The messages are interpreted differently by scholars of political behavior. Some interpret non-voting as an expression of satisfaction with the current political system and situation, while others hold that nonvoting expresses dissatisfaction.
Merriam and Gosnell's classic study Non-Voting starts by trying to identify those situations under which eligible voters abstain from voting. \(^3\) Recently, Raymond Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone's work Who Votes? has contributed to understanding the nonvoting phenomenon in the U. S. \(^4\) Non-voting is a problem for scholars who are concerned with representative democratic principles. The problem of non-voting is "a stumbling block on the road to effective democracy." \(^5\) From the viewpoint of democratic principles, voters who have the right to vote should participate in elections to choose elected officials and to maintain or replace the political system. Political participation is highly recommended in democratic systems because the systems are operated under the concept of the majority rule. Lazarsfeld et al. argue that a high rate of non-voting is a critical problem in a democratic society. \(^6\) In their study, they found that the majority (three-fourth) of the non-voters are "deliberate non-voters" who avoid going to the polls. \(^7\) Non-voting reflects a weak connection between the electorate and "social affairs" in general. \(^8\) Will describes non-voting as a passive and an unhealthy form of political consent. \(^9\)

Some scholars (Crozier et al., 1975; Huntington, 1975; Piven and Cloward: 1988) who favor a conflict management perspective refute the arguments above. Piven and Cloward wrote:

Non-voting contributes to the health of a democratic polity, not because the abstainers are necessarily so satisfied, but because mass abstention reduces conflict and provides political leaders with the latitude they require to govern responsibly. \(^10\)

One school of thought approaches the problem of voting and non-voting from the economic point of view. Anthony Downs (1957) argues that voting and non-voting depends upon the "costs." The voters calculate the
cost of voting before they decide on whom to support and whether or not to vote. The norms of democratic principles are not considered at all in this school of thought, however. The forerunners of this school (Downs, 1957; Frey, 1971; Tollison and Willett, 1973; Paldom, 1981; and Brunk, 1984) explained the theoretical background and tested the existence of economic voting. This approach was refuted by Niemi who argues that "voting is relatively costless in the sense of opportunity costs."\(^{11}\)

While not without controversy, this study will focus on some basic points of non-voting suggested in the questions above. Many of the electorate participate in the electoral process despite lower interest or because of a sense of duty. In the Korean political scene, this can be interpreted as "mobilized voting" or "conformity voting."\(^{12}\)

A strong sense of inefficacy and lack of participation naturally brings on feelings of alienation, isolation, and separation from the core of the political system. Thus, loyalty to the political party or system may be diminished to a certain extent.

As mentioned above, some Western democracies control the electoral process by establishing the electoral rules, i.e., compulsory voting system, and urge the eligible voters to go to the polls. In some Asian countries, negative attitudes such as non-voting and political opposition may reflect anti-national activities against the state and the leaders in power. For example, in Japan, nonvoting is considered an undesirable attitude unless the voter is ill or absolutely can not take time away from business matters.\(^{13}\) The strong determinants of Japanese voting behavior are "obligation" and "human feelings."\(^{14}\) While these Confucian norms are not the only factors for high rate of turnout, they may partially explain the high turnout of the
electorate (including those who are not interested in politics but go to the polls during elections).

*Negative and passive forms of political behavior attract little attention from scholars, until they become social issues. Non-voting, in a democratic society, is not a bad thing for the system because democratic principles guarantee the individual freedom of each person. This includes not just the right to vote, but also the right to abstain from voting.*

The turnout rate has gradually decreased in the Korean National Assembly elections. The Constituent National Assembly elections in 1948 recorded 95.5 percent of turnout, 90.7 percent in the 1958 National Assembly elections, 76.1 percent in 1967, 77.1 percent in 1978, 78.4 percent in 1981, 84.6 percent in 1985, and 75.8 percent in 1988 (see Table 4-13 for turnout in other elections). Compared to the other democracies, Korea’s turnout rate is not considered low. Recent Korean local elections, however, recorded the lowest turnout in the history of Korean elections, 55 percent in March 1991 and 58.9 percent in June 1991. The 1992 National Assembly elections recorded a 71.9 percent turnout which is the lowest among the National Assembly elections (see Appendix B for the nonvoting rate in each city and province). Turnout in national elections is gradually declining, and it is expected that local elections will show lower turnout than national elections.

It is possible to trace nonvoters’ electoral behavior in some previous elections. The electoral behavior of nonvoters who did not participate in the 1985 National Assembly elections but voted in the 1988 National Assembly elections will be assessed. By referring to the mobility tables suggested in Chapter 5, the voting behavior of non-voters in the following elections can
be inferred. The mobility of non-voters will show the non-voters' party preference, attitudes, and voting patterns.

In this study, non-voting is treated as a topic because non-voting itself is an important electoral behavior. Students of electoral behavior may have questions like: "Who are the nonvoters? What causes non-voting? Do they abstain all the time? How do the nonvoters behave in the next elections if they are not habitual abstainers? What is the consequence of non-voting? And how can nonvoting be prevented?" The reasons for non-voting will not be understood until these questions are answered.

**Description of Non-Voters**

Who are the nonvoters? If the non-voters do not vote in any elections, it is simple to classify them. However, it is generally believed that voters do not necessarily vote in every election; therefore non-voters do not necessarily abstain from voting in all elections. Nonvoters can be distinguished into two categories: the "habitual non-voter" and the "occasional non-voter." The behavior of the habitual non-voters can be explained by their own character traits while that of occasional non-voters may be explained more by their own situations and circumstances. Habitual non-voters are voluntary non-voters who do not care about political situations and institutions. Occasional non-voters do care about the situations and institutions, to a certain extent.

While the voters stand in long lines waiting to vote, the non-voters may be resting at home, running their businesses, or going fishing. Some non-voters engage in family businesses, the service industry, or sales. This may require them to work on election day, even if it is a holiday. That is why
those people show a low rate of participation. Leon H. Hurwitz suggests a list of reasons for non-voting in America:

Failure to meet residence requirements, inability to secure an absentee ballot, illness, apathy, ignorance, satisfaction with the system to such an extent that any possible alternative is acceptable, dissatisfaction to such an extent that no alternative is acceptable, very little party competition, people on the West Coast know who won the national elections from television reporting of the Eastern returns, a flat tire on the way to the polls.¹⁸

This list illustrates comprehensive reasons for non-voting in America. If we look more closely, non-voting is mostly found among those whose education levels and living standards are quite low.¹⁹ Many American scholars, including Key and Lipset, have emphasized the influence of the education factor in voter turnout.²⁰ Warren E. Miller explains the correlation between the high education level and the high voter turnout in American elections.²¹ Piven and Cloward have used the dichotomy in explaining the voting and non-voting: Voters are better off and better educated, and non-voters are poorer and less well educated.²²

Wolfinger and Rosenstone suggest even more concrete explanations on voter turnout in American elections.²³ They claim that education level is the strongest factor in explaining the voter turnout. The case is similar in Japan. Scholars of Japanese politics found that highly educated voters are more "confident" in participating in the electoral politics than less educated voters.²⁴ However, the existence of political cynicism among students and intellectuals in Japan must also be pointed out.

When we take some demographic variables into account, such as age, sex, and marital status, there will probably be differences. Housewives constitute the largest portion of the non-voters. Women, in general, are
politically apathetic and have limited information on politics.\textsuperscript{25} The age factor is related with the ideological orientation. As people get older, they tend to become more conservative in attitude and ideology. Young people do not have the high turnout rate although they hold high intention for participation in political activities.\textsuperscript{26} Recent studies show the importance of interpersonal relationships and demographic characteristics, e. g., marital status, in voter turnout.\textsuperscript{27} Scholars (Weisberg, 1987; Straits, 1990) conclude that married people vote more than unmarried people.

Who are the non-voters? At this point, this question becomes vague because of the number of non-voting groups and their different characteristics. Nonvoters in the United States are characterized as young, poor, or both.\textsuperscript{28} Shienbaum argues that American voters make a "rational choice" not between political candidates but in deciding on whether to vote.\textsuperscript{29} He also states that the beneficiary of a political system tends to give "symbolic support" by participating in elections while the non-beneficiary of the political system tends not to vote.\textsuperscript{30}

During the Second World War, the American non-voters who were not satisfied with the political system preferred the status quo more than they wanted to become voters.\textsuperscript{31} In the United States, millions of non-voters who did not vote in the previous elections were stimulated by the cold war and by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Hence, they participated in the 1952 elections to show support for the Republican candidates.\textsuperscript{32}

From the foregoing arguments and findings from other countries, it can be assumed that non-voters are less intelligent than voters because they are less educated, low income earners, and limited information holders although they are alert and thinking and will go to the polls in cases of emergency.
These arguments and findings do not match the findings from Korea. In Korea, students of political behavior generally agree on the fact that voting participation is negatively related with the degree of sophistication of political attitudes. Voters are in general very much interested in politics and like to discuss politics and politicians' performances although they are not participating in voting. Yi Kap-yun argues that young and intelligible nonvoters tend to have a high level of political distrust (cynicism) towards the authoritarian regime.

A case study of voters and their attitudes in Chonnam Province, located in the southwest, indicates that Chonnam voters participate in elections although their level of political consciousness is lower than the national average. In other words, the degree of voters' understandings of the political process and their electoral behavior do not coincide, at least in Chonnam Province. Korean non-voters, at large, consist of young people with high education levels (who have high levels of cynicism) and political apathy (lack of knowledge, information, and interests in politics). It seems that these findings in the above research present a partial but general tendency in Korea.

Another survey shows that Koreans have a positive political consciousness toward voting. 75.6 percent of the respondents recognized voting as their own right while 20.1 percent of them consider voting as their duty and 4.3 percent of them replied that they do not have an opinion. The majority of the respondents have positive political consciousness in regard to voting. More specifically, 85.2 percent of those with college or higher level education replied that they consider voting as their right while 46.2 percent of elementary education holders consider voting as a duty.
terms of age, 81.1 percent of the respondents in their 20s replied that they vote voluntarily, but out of a sense of duty. On the other hand, 64.5 percent of the respondents in their 50s or higher answered that they vote voluntarily. A preliminary conclusion here is that young respondents who are more educated have a high level of positive political consciousness compared to those who are less educated and older.38

An interesting finding from the work Kil et al. reveals that, unlike the cases of other democracies, low educated voters, low income voters, and rural voters tend to vote more than highly educated voters, high income voters, and urban voters in Korean elections.39

Causes of Non-Voting

This study introduces nine hypotheses in regard to the phenomenon of non-voting. They are largely based on the findings and experiences of the other democracies with longer histories of electoral politics than that found in Korea.

1. Alienation Hypothesis

Gilmore and Lamb defined political alienation as:

Distrust of government and politicians, a sense of the meaninglessness of electoral politics and political choices, and personal powerlessness to influence or change the course of American political life.40

This is one of the generally accepted ideas among scholars, especially sociologists and political scientists. Gilmore and Lamb believe that non-voters have low education, low political efficacy and low income. The decline of voter turnout (and increase of non-voting) in elections has to do with feelings of alienation.41 Negative attitudes are found among the lower
class people who feel "anomia" and political alienation (McDill and Ridley, 1962). Edgar Litt argues that the origin of cynicism has its roots in the individual's personality as well as in the community. Some scholars blame alienation on industrialization. Passin argues that "the industrialization of Japan created both a working class and its typical discontents. It also created a powerful tradition of working-class alienation from the system."43

C. I. Eugene Kim and his associates argue that "alienation" explains the large portion of nonvoting among highly educated young voters in Korea. Many scholars argue that Koreans tend to have strong feelings of alienation and cynicism, and feel relatively weak political efficacy. Some elements of Korean (political) culture such as "ch'enyom" (abandonment) and "han" (resentment) may help to explain this hypothesis.

2. Urbanization Hypothesis

The turnout rate, as Table 4-13 shows, has been decreasing in Korean elections. Voters in the urban areas, including Seoul, tended not to vote in elections compared to the rural voters. Seoul, as Appendix B shows, recorded the highest nonvoting rate in the country (28.9 % in 1981, 18.9 % in 1985, 30.2 % in 1988, and 30.8 % in 1992). The problem became more serious when the local council elections in 1991 are taken into consideration. Seoul recorded 57.7 percent nonvoting rate in the small-unit local council (Kich'o uihoe) elections in March 1991 and 47.6 percent in the large-unit local council (Kwangyok uihoe) elections in June 1991. Other major special cities also recorded lower turnout rates than those for the entire provinces.
Nonvoting is also increasing in rural areas. The increase of non-voting in the rural areas is due to urbanization.\(^4\) Yun Hyong-sop (1988) attributes the high rate of non-voting in urban areas to the electorate's self-awakening to governmental intervention and rigged elections. Ky-Moon Oum found, contrary to the arguments of modernization theory, that Korean voters prove that the level of participation is lower in the more urbanized and industrialized cities than in the less urbanized areas.\(^4\) Han Shik Park's findings are similar:

1. Turnout rate decreases as the community expands and becomes urbanized;
2. Education and turnout are also inversely related;
3. Farmers are more likely to turn out than urban workers;
4. Some studies point out that white collared persons are likely to turn out more often than blue collared workers, but other studies furnish opposite evidence;
5. Data available for the present study do not support any systematic relation between income and turnout.\(^4\)

Other scholars find the "disruptive effects of over-urbanization" on nonvoting in Korea.\(^5\)

3. Political Apathy Hypothesis

Some people are simply apathetic and do not engage in any political or social activities, including voting. Excluding the characteristic variable, it is difficult to find accurate reasons for non-voting in many cases. If such passive political behavior is not based on one's own characteristics, it can be named as 'political apathy.' People knowledgeable of politics often become apathetic and do not participate in the electoral process. On the other hand, others who know little of politics also become apathetic due to their limited sources of information on which to judge the candidates or policy issues.
Rosenberg takes the view that 'political apathy' is an expression of satisfaction with the current political system or with the performance of the ruling party. Jennings has a closer observation about political apathy:

People with a low level of interest might not have had the opportunity to think things over. They do not invest much time and efforts in formulating their political opinions, and so their resulting political orientations are likely to change frequently.

Jennings's observation seems correct and convincing. Many voters are not interested in political affairs. In some cases they are simply too busy and do not care. If we classify the apathetic non-voters, they can be labeled ordinary and special. The ordinary politically apathetic non-voters fall into the category that Jennings described above. The special ones fall into the category that Palma describes:

Thus, political inactivity is common among people who are cynical and suspicious about politics, who put little trust in politicians, who show feelings of anomie and alienation from the political system, who think of politics as distant and inconsequential for their lives, and who have little confidence in themselves and in their ability to influence political events.

In Korea, Yun Hyong-sop found that the increase of non-voting is closely related to the voters' political indifference and the political indifference is related to the governmental intervention and manipulation of elections. As Tables 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 show, political apathy or political indifference shares an important portion of nonvoting.

4. Calculating Voter Hypothesis

Non-voters exist because eligible voters (calculating voters) calculate the "costs" and "benefits" of voting before the elections. If they think that the voting is not worth the effort, they do not vote. Anthony Downs (1957)
argues that voters are rational. Thus, even nonvoting is a rational behavior. The basis of this hypothesis is the rational choice model initially suggested by Downs (1957). Downs explains voter turnout in terms of "costs" and "benefits." Riker and Ordeshook interpreted "costs" and "benefits" by their own definitions. They expanded on the Downsian model and offered the following:

\[ R = PB - C + D \]

Here, \( R \) is voter benefit from voting; \( P \) is a probability of one vote to control the results; \( B \) is the expected utility difference among parties; \( C \) is the costs for voting; and \( D \) is the long-term benefits of voting. If \( R \) is bigger than zero, then the voter will vote. \( P \) is extremely small because of the huge population in a country. \( C \) is probably small, but it will become a negative number if \( PB \) is extremely small. Eligible voters may consider non-voting is a rational and cost-free alternative.

5. Cross-Pressure Hypothesis

Under the "One Person, One Vote" electoral system, a voter can vote for only one candidate among two (or more) favorable candidates. This subjects many voters to cross-pressures on conflicting issues. Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee found the existence of cross-pressure in their Elmira (located in New York State) study and explained the voting behavior of non-voters and hesitant voters.\(^{55}\) When a voter's party identification is Party A, for example, and the competing candidate from Party B raises important issues, the voter might have conflicting thoughts. As a result, the voter may either abstain from voting or take more time deciding. Lazarsfeld has more:
Many voters subject to cross-pressures tended to belittle the whole affair. They escaped from any real conflict by losing interest in the election. Those with no cross-pressures showed most interest in the election; even one cross-pressure meant a substantial increase in the proportion of voters who felt less interested in the election. In Korea, as Table 5-10 shows, 31.4 percent of the 1985 NKDP voters abstained from voting in the 1988 National Assembly elections. The 1985 NKDP voters were the supporters of a genuine opposition party (NKDP), and they were expected to support the opposition parties in 1988. As Table 5-10 also shows, about a half of the 1985 NKDP voters (26.8 percent of them went to the RDP and 19.8 percent voted for the PPD) came to the polls and supported the major opposition parties. Among the four regions, the Chungbu region shows the highest abstention rate by the former NKDP voters (see Table 5-7, 40.7 percent of the 1985 NKDP voters abstained in 1988). Many of them were disappointed by the split of the two opposition leaders (Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung).

6. Institution Hypothesis

Scholars of American politics often say that non-voting in the United States largely depends upon institutional factors and personality factors (characteristics). Some of the literature on non-voting in the United States suggests that registration laws are an institution that prevent voters from voting. Some factors of eligibility are age, residency, lack of a criminal record or insanity, and voter registration requirements. Requirements vary from country to country (or county to county). Piven and Cloward analyzed and explained the historical and political roots of institutional (legal) barriers that have produced considerable nonvoting by underrepresented people in the United States.
Barriers, either formal or informal, favor the people in power in any society. In some developing nations, transportation means are often controlled by the party in power. Even the polling stations are located only in the pro-government regions.\textsuperscript{60}

Political parties, in Korea, are often understood as incomplete institutions. Byung-Young Ahn wrote that:

Political parties in this country (Korea) have been influenced more by political factors, particularly those relating to the power structure, than by factors relating to the industrialization process... Political parties are not only centralized but also heavily influenced by political power that has not yet been fully institutionalized.\textsuperscript{61}

Nonvoting, in Korea, is understood in the context of inadequate performances and anti-functional status of political parties.

7. Anti-SES Hypothesis

Michael Avey presented a new theoretical perspective in regard to the non-voters. He argues that non-voters are not necessarily low income, poorly educated, and apathetic people. Avey denies the classic arguments based on the socioeconomic status (SES) theory. He states that:

It seems obvious that the major factor affecting nonvoting today is a failure of candidates and parties to interest nonvoters. More indoctrination on civic responsibility is not needed to increase turnout in countries with parties appealing to the disadvantaged. The opposition of those who feel that the political system would be "unstable" with thorough participation is a major obstacle that cannot be ignored.\textsuperscript{62}

Avey takes a critical stand on the overrepresentation of low socioeconomic group among nonvoters.\textsuperscript{63} His basic argument is that the performances of political leaders, political parties, and the political system in general are responsible for low voter turnout.
Avey’s hypothesis is applicable to the Korean case because, as Chapters 3 and 4 of this study have shown, Korean political parties and politicians' performances are not successful; moreover frequent institutional changes and amendments of electoral system probably have disillusioned a number of voters.

8. Demographic Factor Hypothesis

Deth states that many scholars in the field agree that socioeconomic factors are closely related to political interest: education, sex, and age. Before the 1960s, American women were less interested and less involved in politics than men. Rosenberg also argued that: "... certain women express the attitude that political activity would be out of keeping with their social roles." The arguments above were made before the active women's movement in the 1970s, and thus it is expected that this movement has changed women's perceptions on politics to a large extent.

In regard to political participation in Japan, a report shows that men participate more than women. Highly educated people also show a greater interest in political participation. Since 1968, however, the relationship has changed as more women participate in elections than men in Japan. For example, the men's turnout rate was 67.9 percent and the women's was 69.1 percent (in 1969). Since then, the women's turnout rate has exceeded that of the men's in the general elections until 1980. In 1980, it was 73.7 percent for men and 75.4 for women in terms of turnout rate. Other factors influencing participation are summarized by Flanigan and Zingale:

Education is closely related with relative affluence and social status,
people who vote are usually slightly better off in socioeconomic terms than the population as a whole. Another important factor contributing to nonvoting is age. Much of the nonvoting among young people may be attributed to the unsettled circumstances of this age group rather than to simple disinterest in politics, although young people are slightly less interested than older people of similar educational level.70

In the case of Korea, survey results show that young people tend not to vote in Korea. Although they are very much interested in politics and have high political awareness, not many of them participate in elections.71 Men show higher voting intent than women, and less educated people show higher voting intent than educated people in Korea.72

9. Busy-life Hypothesis

This study suggests another hypothesis in regard to non-voting in Korea. When 30.1 percent of the respondents replied to the pollsters that they would not vote in the 1967 election, it was because they were too busy and involved in their daily life (see Table 6-1). This was not surprising to the observers, however more scholars paid attention to the other items such as "in no mood for voting" or "indifference" or "political distrust." This is because "being very busy" does not sound very scholarly as regards political analysis.

People have their own occupations, businesses, and personal activities. It is assumed that everyone is busy, especially those who own their own businesses. Many people engage in business even on election day. Some rest on election day. Others make plans to go on trips.

Tables 6-2 and 6-3 show the reasons for non-voting in the Korean local elections of 1991. The item 'busy-life' is ranked second with 21.4 percent
in Table 6-2 and 22.6 percent in Table 6-3. These percentages are quite considerable and meaningful in explaining non-voting in Korea.

The nine hypotheses are all applicable to the Korean nonvoting and nonvoters because of their overlapping character and nature of each hypothesis. This study, however, put more emphasis on anti-SES hypotheses in explaining the general phenomenon of nonvoting in Korea. This study also advocates the busy-life hypothesis because nonvoting cannot only be explained by such political terms as alienation, cynicism, and issues.

Behavior of Korean Non-Voters

Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes made efforts in explaining the voting behavior by suggesting the concept of the "funnel of causality." They explain that a voter is at the final stage of the "funnel of causality" on election day. The voter's action reflects the crystallization of his learning and values.

The analysis here is based on the voter mobility tables, that appeared in Chapter 5. This study's focus, however, is directed only to the non-voters' mobility between the elections and an interpretation that the fashion and pattern of mobility reveal what happened in the final stage of the "funnel of causality." Most hypotheses of non-voting offer a negative feeling saying that non-voters are disadvantaged, isolated, and passive.

Studies on non-voting in the United States show that non-voting is structural and institutional. Thus, it is assumed that non-voters have certain attitudes and behavioral orientations in their voting or non-voting patterns. It is also assumed that non-voters tend to refrain from voting in elections.
This does not mean that non-voters abstain from voting in all elections but that cleavages exist between voters and non-voters in the United States. In the case of Japan, the existence of the cleavages is not clear because the major reasons for non-voting do not seem to be institutional and structural.

Compared to the other democracies, Korea has experienced frequent social and political upheavals and changes during the last four decades. Moreover, the rapid growth of the economy, in both size and capability, has changed the shape and feature of the society.

In consideration of all the changes and situations in Korea, it may be unreasonable to demand and expect that both the political parties and the electorate remain stable. Socio-political circumstances and situations have prevented voters and political parties from being stable. As Rose and McAllister argue, democracy entails "uncertainty" and "instability." Accepting this theoretical perspective, there is not a serious problem with having unstable voters and political parties in a competitive democratic system. In many cases in Western European countries, the nature of instability of parties and voters is largely based on party policies and performances, e.g., the raising of taxes may cause the regime to lose votes in an election.

The problem in Korea lies in the nature of the instability of voters and political parties. This instability of parties and voters is a deviant case. This study contends that the instability of Korean political parties and voters derives its cause from the strong power-motives of political leaders. Other major factors include the authoritarian political culture and a low level of political consciousness. Thus, the trial-and-error existence of Korean
political parties does not find its cause solely from their policies and orientations.

The strong power motives of political leaders and authoritarianism, helped by "regionalism" or "personalism", have played a critical role in creating and abolishing political parties. Consequently, a number of political parties entered and left the Korean political scene over the last several decades. The low party loyalty discussed in previous chapters is, in part, due to the political leaders' arbitrary methods of accessing power. For example, to run for office, some political leaders will withdraw from a party and form a new party with unreasonable demands.

A large portion of Korean voters are "floating" or uncommitted. These floating voters may vote or abstain during elections. When they vote, their electoral behavior is subject to influence by party loyalty, policy issues, recent situations, feelings, and their personal relationships with the candidates. When they do not vote, their electoral behavior may also influenced by the same variables above.

The low proportion of stable non-voters supports this argument. Stable non-voters who abstained from voting in 1981 and 1985 constituted only 36.5 percent (see Tables 6-4 and 6-5). Due to the changing political climate in Korea, nonvoters' electoral behavior became more volatile between 1985 and 1988. This mobility implies that the Korean non-voters show an amorphous voting pattern.

An interesting pattern derived from Tables 6-4 is that the new opposition party NKDP appealed to the 1981 nonvoters and received general support in all regions of the country (24.1% from nonvoters in Seoul, 27.8% from Chungbu, 30.3% from Honam, and 27.8% from Yongnam). The
1981 nonvoters in Seoul voted less for the ruling DJP (10.1 %) but voted for the DKP (22.3 %) and the NKDP (24.1 %). The KNP was not able to attract the 1981 nonvoters in Seoul due to the emergence of the NKDP. The DJP was not successful in the Chungbu and Yongnam regions in getting support from the 1981 nonvoters.

Table 6-5 shows the nonvoters' mobility between 1985 and 1988. The NDRP as well as the minor parties were not popular among the 1985 nonvoters. The DJP appealed more to the nonvoters compared with previous elections. The DJP became the most attractive party for the 1985 nonvoters (17.3 %). Both the RDP and the PPD also competed with the DJP (16.9 % and 15.5 % respectively). In Yongnam, the DJP obtained 29.5 percent and the RDP gained 25.7 percent of support from the 1981 nonvoters.

The DJP lost 11.6 percent of its supporters in Seoul and only 5.6 percent in Yongnam in 1985 (see Table 6-6). The KNP lost many voters in Seoul in 1985 (22.6 %). This party, however, lost only 9.3 percent in the Chungbu region. The CRP and other parties show a general decline of support throughout the country. Table 6-6 also shows that certain portion of nonvoters (35.5 % in Seoul, 39.2 % in Chungbu, 34.2 % in Honam, and 36.2 % in Yongnam) abstained from voting in 1985.

Table 6-7 reveals how the 1985 party voters abstained in each region in 1988. The DJP showed a serious loss of supporters in Seoul (27.6 %). The DJP lost 11.6 percent of its 1981 supporters in 1985, and in 1988 lost 27.6 percent of the 1985 supporters. This can be interpreted as a decline of party loyalty to the ruling party.
In Honam, only 7.1 percent of 1985 KNP voters abstained while 16.2 percent of them abstained in Yongnam. Many of 1985 NKDP voters abstained from voting in Seoul and Chungbu (32.5 % and 40.7 % respectively). This is probably because of the split of the opposition party leaders. The percentages of 1985 nonvoters who abstained from voting in 1988 was 35.2 percent (36.5 % in 1985). It can be argued that roughly one-third of all nonvoters are stable nonvoters.

After disregarding factors such as regionalism and personalism, Korean nonvoters are volatile and show no clear pattern of behavior. The 1992 National Assembly elections, however, showed a different pattern of electoral behavior of Korean non-voters. As Table 8-5 will show, 47.1 percent of all non-voters who did not vote in 1988 abstained again in 1992. This shows an increase of stable non-voting in Korea. Figures 6-1, 6-2, and 6-3 also show that many non-voters in each district became relatively stable.

Prevention of Non-Voting

Some scholars value a high rate of political participation in elections while others take the opposite position. This study values a high rate of turnout in elections because it better suits democratic political principles.76 Every responsible voter is expected to participate in political activities including voting and to express his or her opinion. This simple logic is the basis of the arguments in this portion of the paper.

The political process often creates odd results in electoral competitions and power struggles. In many cases, keen competition among candidates brings unexpected results and casts doubts on the minority winner's
representativeness as a reflection of the people's will in regards to being the chosen leader. The doubts become more serious when a considerable portion of voters do not vote. Simply stated, non-voting makes election results problematical.

Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn suggest a solution for this problem: approval voting. The basic idea of approval voting is for: "... a voter to vote for, or approve of, as many candidates as he wishes in a multi-candidate race."\(^77\) Just like other voting systems, approval voting has its own advantages and disadvantages.\(^78\) As regards the problem of non-voting caused by cross-pressure, approval voting is recommended in order to reduce non-voting and to increase the representativeness of the winner. In a sense, as Brams and Fishburn claim, the adoption of the approval voting system may help the "realization of democratic principles by redefining what constitutes a democratic choice."\(^79\) The problem with this solution is that it makes election calculation very complex and time-consuming.

Another alternative is the compulsory voting system. There is a group of scholars who insist on adopting the compulsory voting system in order to reduce the number of abstainers and to sustain the electoral system.\(^80\) The effect of compulsory voting legislation was positively tested by scholars in some countries. For example, Galen Irwin reports the impact of compulsory voting legislation on voter turnout in the Netherlands.\(^81\) Since the electoral system provide "public goods", electoral systems must be sustained by all the eligible voters who enjoy the benefits of those.\(^82\) The scholars of this group seem to have a strong sense of civic duty and a participatory attitude where voting is concerned. Thus, according to their view, civic duty should be shared by all the eligible voters who enjoy the benefits of the public
goods that the electoral systems produce. The assessment of fines or other means of sanctions will help in preventing non-voting. Powell describes the situations of some countries that hold the compulsory voting system:

In Australia, Belgium, and Venezuela non-voters are in violation of the law and subject to fines and other penalties for failure to vote unless excused by illness. The potential sanctions in Venezuela are particularly harsh. Italy does not have legally designated compulsory voting, but non-voters are stamped as such on their official work and identification papers. It is widely believed, at least, that such non-voters are subject to discrimination in receiving employment and other benefits.

Powell’s point, however, is that the existence of such sanctions on non-voting does not guarantee the high turnout. It may become a burden for those who do not care about their political system and performances of the parties.

The two suggestions above could have a big impact in increasing voter turnout. Approval voting was suggested and advocated by Brams and Fishburn (1983). Compulsory voting has been adopted by some European countries and advocated by Wertheimer. In an affluent society, the high rate of non-voting may be tolerated because the non-voters can be interpreted as "happy free-riders" of the current political system and situations.

On the other hand, in developing nations and politically unstable societies, a high rate of non-voting may be interpreted as an expression of discontent by the people. A legal and technical solution to the problem of non-voting may bring a high turnout but does not necessarily solve basic political problems.

Lazarsfeld et al. suggest that long-term education of the citizens is a way to prevent non-voting. Besides the institutional arrangements, the
traditional ties between candidates and the electorate are very important in preventing the decline of the voter turnout rate in the Korean and Japanese political culture.

The use of mass media to increase voter turnout is also suggested. Glaser found that television owners and watchers showed a higher voting rate than non-owners and non-watchers and he suggests the effective use of television. It might increase voter turnout because television gives detailed information about the election and candidates to the electorate.

Using Avey's theoretical perspective, the solution to the problem of non-voting lies in improving the performance and conduct of political leaders and political parties. While politicians should not be blamed for being ambitious, the extreme competitiveness of Korean politics has often prevented competent political performance. Thus there will have to be changes in the way Korean politics is conducted if there is to be a change in the non-voting situation.

Conclusion

Nine hypotheses of non-voting have been presented. This study has also introduced findings from the United States, Japan, and Korea. The question "Why do people fail to vote?" is related with the institutional settings of voting. The question "Why do people not vote?" is related to voters private or personal settings and circumstances. These questions have been covered in regard to the phenomenon of non-voting in Korea and elsewhere. These hypotheses may explain why people fail to vote and why they choose to "not vote."
Findings in the United States indicate that some non-voters belong to peripheral groups that often lack political power. It appears difficult to break down the wall between the periphery and the center. In short, the problem of non-voting in the United States is structural and institutional, according to Piven and Cloward's arguments. They conclude that the American political system has worked in favor of the more privileged, e.g., institutional merits for the elites and better offs.

On the other hand, Korea allows a certain amount of space for other factors and explanations of non-voting. While non-voting in the United States is structural and institutional, in Korea it is somewhat emotional and situational and is strongly influenced by inter-personal relationships between the conditions and voters and by regional loyalties and antagonisms. From different hypothetical viewpoints, there are different perspectives and explanations for non-voting. However, it is safe to say that the "busy-life" factor, the "political party" factor (in terms of its performance and role) and the "political apathy" factor are also major factors of non-voting in Korea. This favors the support of multi-variable hypotheses in explaining Korean non-voters' electoral behavior.

This argument matches closely Avey's (1989) new theory of voter turnout in the United States. Political leaders and political parties are responsible for voter turnout. However, other factors such as busy-life factor, political apathy, etc., should not be discarded. Busy people and politically apathetic people do not often get much information, regardless of their interest in politics. Thus, on election day, they tend to abstain from voting or support a party without thoroughly considering its platform or policy. The same can be applied to the case of previous non-voters.
The non-voters' electoral patterns, however, have changed in the 1992 National Assembly elections. The total proportion of nonvoters has increased as well as the percentage of stable non-voters.

In the following chapter, the consequences of the electoral dynamics between the period of 1981 and 1988, including voting, nonvoting, low level of party loyalty, and institutional changes, will be discussed in relation to the mergers of political parties in 1990 and 1991.
Table 6-1. Reasons for Non-Voting

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<tr>
<td>Sickness</td>
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Table 6-2. Reasons for Non-Voting

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* Telephone interview, nation-wide, conducted right after the voting on March 26, 1991.

Table 6-3. Reasons for Non-Voting

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<td>Excessive intervention by parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrupted election</td>
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<td>No adequate candidate</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Results are predicted</td>
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* Nation-wide survey results.
Source: Han'guk Ilbo, June 23, 1991.

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Figure 6-1. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, Abstain 1981-1985. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 6-2. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, Abstain 1985-1988.
Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 6-3. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, Abstain 1988-1992. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Notes for Chapter  6


7. Ibid., 46.


15. Piven and Cloward, *Why Americans Don't Vote*, 5 (Table 1-1). It shows that, as of 1983, Belgium recorded 95 percent of average turnout in national elections, Australia 94 percent (pct.), Austria 92 pct., Sweden 91 pct., Italy 90 pct., Iceland 89 pct., New Zealand 89 pct., Luxembourg 89 pct., West Germany 87 pct., Netherlands 87 pct., France 86 pct., Portugal 84 pct., Denmark 83 pct., Norway 82 pct., Greece 79 pct., Israel 78 pct., United Kingdom 76 pct., Japan 74 pct., Canada 69 pct., Spain 68 pct., Finland 64 pct., Ireland 62 pct., United States 53 pct., and Switzerland 48 pct.


17. Yo-sop Chong, *Son'goron* (Elections), 141-143.


20. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), 476. They argue that the low education level hinders political participation because the flooding information cannot be understood without proper knowledge; Key emphasizes the importance and influence of education in regard to the political activities (*Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 580); Reiter confirms the observations above, reporting that whites who have low-income and low-education tend not to vote since 1960. See Howard L. Reiter, "Why Is Turnout Down?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (Fall 1979): 297-311.


26. An Ch'ong-si and Kim Kyong-dong, "Chongch'i uisik kwa chongch'i ch'amyo," in Han'guk ui chibang chach'i wa chiyok sahoe palchon, ed. Kim Kyong-tong and An Ch'ong-si et al. (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1985), 293.


30. Ibid., 86.


35. Chong Tuk-kyu, "Han'guk chibang'in ui chongch'i uisik kwa t'upyo haengt'ae." Proceedings of the First Joint Conference of the Korean
Political Science Association and the Association of Korean Political Scientists in North America, June 9-12, 1975 (Seoul), 341.

36. Ibid., 347.

37. Kil Sung-hum, *Han'guk son'goron* (Korean Elections), 273 (Table 2-8).

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., 282 (Table 2-12).


41. A group of scholars (Hadley, 1978; Weisberg and Grofman, 1981; Flanigan and Zingale, 1983), however, doubt the linkage between alienation and nonvoting.


63. Ibid., 5.

64. Jan W. van Deth, "Interests in Politics," in Continuities in Political Action, ed. M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), 301.


68. Ibid., 229-251. Detailed explanations on the findings of the community level participation are suggested in the article.


70. Flanigan and Zingale, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, 17.

71. For voters' intention to vote, see Kil Sung-hum, Kim Kwang-ung, and An Pyong-man, Han'guk son'goron (Korean Elections) (Seoul: Tasan, 1987), 281-282.

72. Ibid.

73. Campbell et al., The American Voter, 24.

74. Rose and McAllister, The Loyalties of Voters, 12.

75. Recent studies reveal that the level of political consciousness is gradually going up in Korea. See Pak Tong-so and Kim Kwang-ung, Han'guin ui minju chongch'i uisik (Political consciousness of Koreans) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1987).


78. The advantages are as follows: 1. It gives voters more flexible options; 2. It could increase voter turnout; 3. It would help elect the strongest candidate; 4. It would give minority candidates their proper due; 5. It is relatively insensitive to the number of candidates running; 6. It is superior to preferential voting; 7. It will add legitimacy to the outcome; 8. it is eminently practicable. On the other hand, the disadvantages are as follows: 1. Gradations of preference allowed by voting systems that use voters' rankings of candidates are lost under approval voting; 2. Approval voting could encourage the proliferation of candidates with fuzzy or ambivalent issue positions, thereby giving the electorate no real basis for choice; 3. Approval voting could undermine and perhaps destroy the two-party system; 4. Approval voting could create significant inequities among voters, depending on the number of candidates for whom they vote. For more detailed explanations on these advantages and disadvantages, see Brams and Fishburn, ibid., 3-11. See also Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn, "Approval Voting," *American Political Science Review* 72, no. 3 (September 1978): 831-47.


82. Wertheimer, ibid., 280.

83. Tingsten, *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics*, 205-206. Tingsten, however, does not favor the adoption of a compulsory system while he admits the effects of the system.


86. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, The People's Choice, 46. It may include the amendment of electoral laws, hearings on political participation and maintenance of democratic system, open discussions, and limit the number of elections.


88. Ibid., 78.

89. Piven and Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote, 16.

90. Ibid.
CHAPTER 7

POLITICS OF MERGER

The Merger Phenomenon

The merger of political parties may be an uncommon practice in many countries, especially in the European democracies with parliamentary systems. It is rare even in countries with a presidential system. Although the phenomenon of party merger is not unique to Korean, it is rare. The term 'merger' ('Hapttang' or 'T'onghap') is not unfamiliar to the Korean electorate because there have been a number of mergers since 1945. During the early period of the Korean Republic, political parties merged because of their leaders' ambitions or because of the pressure of public opinion.

This study argues that the motives for the more recent mergers of the early 1990s differ from previous cases. With regard to the party mergers in 1990 and 1991, this chapter will ask the following: "What caused three parties to merge in 1990? What were the motives behind the mergers of 1990 and 1991? Did party leaders consult with their supporters beforehand? How was merger politics tested in the following elections by the voters? Is their any causal relationship between the merger of parties and low party loyalty?"

Mergers are a basic part of Korean politics. The term 'merger' can be defined as the voluntary union of political parties to form a stronger political force. It has a psychological dimension in that party leaders are trying to manage their uncertainties concerning unsatisfactory electoral performances in the past and expected performances in the future.
The merger of Korean political parties has been mainly understood to be a traditional pattern of changing alignment of political parties because of the power motive aspirations of party leaders, however, focusing attention on the recent election results and using concepts such as party loyalty and voter mobility, this study offers another explanation for the merger phenomena in Korean party politics. To do that, the uncertainty management approach will be introduced in this chapter. Although discussion and analysis of party merger have stressed political ambition as a major motivating factor, this study will differentiate the mergers occurring in the early 1990s from those of the past.

Mergers between the ruling DJP and two opposition parties (RDP and NDRP), and between two major opposition parties (NDP and DP) occurred in 1990 and 1991, respectively. There are several possible explanations for this merger phenomenon in the early 1990s. This study attempts to relate this phenomenon with the factors of electoral performance and party loyalty.

The merger of three parties (the DJP, the RDP, and the NDRP) in the beginning of 1990 was a voluntary union of political parties. Some scholars find reasons for the merger in both domestic and international contexts. For example, Jin Pak argues that "the growing anxiety about the country's economic crisis and the impact of the breathtaking democratic convulsions in Eastern Europe, in part, are the reasons for the merger."
The Origins and Background History of Political Party Mergers

Major party mergers of the 1950s and 1960s were selected to show different combinations and motives for party merger, and to contrast these earlier mergers with the mergers that occurred in 1990 and 1991.

A large number of political parties appeared in Korea after independence. The merger of parties at that time was treated as a normal political process in a newly independent country. Thus began Korea's merger politics.

The emergence of political parties and organizations right after the liberation on August 15, 1945 was encouraged by USAMGIK (U.S. Army Military Government in Korea):

The first policy guidance, though formulated as early as September 1945 by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, did not reach the office of General Hodge, commander of the USAFK (U.S. Armed Forces in Korea), until January 12, 1946. Upon his arrival in Korea, General Hodge issued a directive (September 12, 1945) announcing that he would "consult only with organized political groups." This policy of USAMGIK (U.S. Army Military Government in Korea) fostered a situation in which political groups and parties rapidly multiplied.

Kim and Kihl continue:

On September 12, 1945, about 33 political parties heard the speech of General Hodge addressing the Korean people in Seoul's civic auditorium. By October 24, 1945, some 54 political parties had registered with the military government and this number increased to 134 by March of the following year.

Even given this situation, the rapid increase in the number of parties was surprising. The necessity of establishing political parties was recognized by both left wing and right wing political organizations.

Modern Korean political party activities derive their origin from the "Regulation on the Political Parties, No. 55" presented by the U.S. Military
Occupation Authority on November 23, 1946. Unfortunately, the Constitution of Korea, promulgated on July 17, 1948, did not include any regulations on political parties.

To avoid unnecessary confusion, this study will limit its analysis of mergers to only those that have taken place the Republic of Korea. The merger of parties before the establishment of the Republic in 1948 is excluded from this study. Also only political parties with seats in the National Assembly are included. Out of the many mergers that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s are selected which show traditional patterns of party merger. Also in these three cases the major opposition parties coalesced to form a single unified opposition party.

The Democratic Party of Korea (KDP) welcomed Syngman Rhee's return to Korea and supported his access to political power. The KDP, however, was alienated by President Rhee in the process of forming the first cabinet and became an opposition force. The KDP demanded that Rhee share the position of the Prime Minister and more than half the seats in the cabinet with the KDP. The KDP, after its demands were rejected by President Rhee, rallied some opposition forces, reorganized, and changed the party name to the Democratic Nationalist Party (Min'guktang) on February 10, 1949.

The first example of united merger among opposition parties occurred on September 19, 1955. Before the merger of these opposition parties, the ruling Liberal Party was forced to pass a bill to amend the Constitution on March 27, 1954. The Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP), and independents who followed the DNP's line, formed the Hohon tongjihoe (the Comrades Association to Safeguard the Constitution) on November 30,
1954 and made efforts to form a unified opposition party. The Hohon tongjihoe became the core of the merger movement at that time. During the movement, the conflict between the Min'guktang faction and the Minju taedong faction was serious, but the Min'guktang faction took the initiative in the project. The efforts resulted in the merger of the opposition parties and the creation of the Democratic Party (Minjudang) on September 19, 1955.

In 1960, regulations on political parties were included in the Constitution. The Democratic Party became the ruling party by electing 175 legislators in the election of July 29, 1960. However, conflicts between the old and the new factions inside the party propelled the old faction out of the party. The major causes of conflict between the two factions were political ideology and the scope of the merger. The old faction formed the New Democratic Party on October 13, 1960.

After the military coup of May 16, 1961, however, all political party activities were banned until the end of 1962. On May 17, 1961, the military leaders led by Major General Park Chung Hee dissolved the National Assembly and prohibited any political activities. The political party law was enacted on December 31, 1962 to provide a legal and institutional basis for political parties (the Third Republic Constitution, Article 7).

Opposition forces made efforts to form a pan-opposition party, but the old DP faction opposed them. Then, the members of the old NDP, the old Liberal party, a part of old Democratic Party, and the independents established the Democratic Politics Party (Minjongdang) on May 14, 1963. Other ex-Democratic Party members formed the Democratic Party on July 18, 1963. On September 3, 1963, the Liberal Democratic Party was
established. The 'Party of the People' (Kungmin ui dang) was formed on September 6, 1963.

The issue of integration of the parties of the opposition was raised after their defeat in the presidential election on October 15, 1963 and the National Assembly elections on November 26, 1963. In the presidential election, Park Chung Hee obtained 46.6 percent of valid votes (4,702,604 votes) and Yun Bo Sun received 45.1 percent of valid votes (4,546,514 votes). The opposition parties were defeated due to having too many opposing candidates, lack of campaign funds, and lack of organizing capability.\textsuperscript{15} The opposition parties, after defeat in elections in October and November 1963, resumed merger negotiations. The Political Party Law (No. 1643) promulgated on June 12, 1964 specifies the legal formalities of merger of political parties. The 'Party of the People' was absorbed by the Democratic Party on September 17, 1964.\textsuperscript{16} The Liberal Democratic Party, on the other hand, was absorbed by the Democratic Politics Party on November 26, 1964.\textsuperscript{17}

At that time, the DRP and the government were in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan. To oppose these talks between the two governments, the Democratic Politics Party (Minjongdang) and the Democratic Party (Minjudang) merged to create a new opposition party in June 1965.\textsuperscript{18} This is the second example of united merger between opposition parties.

However, the integrated People's Party (Minjungdang) was divided into the hardliners, who insisted on resigning, and the moderates, who insisted on staying in the assembly to fight the bill for the ratification of Korea-Japan
talks which was passed in the Korean National Assembly on August 11, 1965.

Yun Bo Sun and his Minjong faction seceded from the moderate Minju faction who insisted on fighting within the Assembly. Yun and his faction formed the New Korea Party (Sinthandang) on March 30, 1966. At the end of 1966, two opposition parties, the People's Party and the New Korea Party, began to negotiate and merged and changed the party name to the New Democratic Party (Sinmindang) at the joint party convention on February 7, 1967, three months before the Sixth Presidential election in May 1967. This is the third example of united merger between opposition parties.

Major reasons for these party mergers were to unite behind a presidential candidate challenging the incumbent regime or to oppose national policy. Mergers were the result of the pressure from public opinion and the immediate necessity of the two parties.

In 1972, the Yusin System was introduced by the Third Republic, and it hindered the development of political parties. The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979 by Kim Chae-gyu (formerly director of the Korean CIA) was a symbolic manifestation of the deadlocked political situation. At the time of the assassination, the Korean economy and politics seemed to be stagnating: a number of economic indicators had declined, the number of labor-management disputes had increased, and prospects for democratization of politics had not improved.

However, the emergence of a 'new military group' took over the military and, eventually, politics. The 'new military group' formed the Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) and created a
new political system by revising the Constitution as had been done in 1961. The political party established by this new military group was the Democratic Justice Party (DJP). It was established in the early 1980s and followed by the establishment of opposition parties, the Democratic Korea Party and the Korean National Party.

The New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) held their party convention on January 18, 1985. Yi Min-u assumed the party presidency. The core of the party consisted of former New Democratic Party members who had been freed by the removal of a ban on November 30, 1984. The party was supported by Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung. In the 1985 National Assembly elections, the NKDP challenged the ruling DJP by winning 50 (27.2 %) out of 184 district seats. On the other hand, the DJP won 87 district seats (47.3 %) and 61 at-large seats (see Table 4-3 for seat distribution). As they did in 1981 and during the 1985 National Assembly elections, the opposition forces continued to demand the revision of the constitution. Their demands were supported by antigovernment student-worker protests and demonstrations during 1986. What stimulated these protests and demonstrations was the revelation of the sexual abuse of a female student activist by a police investigator in June 1986.

On December 24, 1986, the NKDP president Yi Min-u proposed the so-called "Yi Min-u Proposal." Yi announced that the NKDP would consider the cabinet form of government, proposed by the ruling DJP, if his demands for democratization measures were carried out by the DJP and the government. However, Yi Min-u dropped his seven-point proposal in a joint announcement with Kim Yong-sam saying that a direct presidential election system was the NKDP's unchangeable goal on January 15, 1987.
Even after this joint announcement, controversies about the proposal and party leadership continued.

The Chun regime then enacted a hard-line domestic policy in late 1986 and early 1987. President Chun, on April 13, 1987, announced that debate on constitutional amendment would be postponed until after the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. At the same time, he repeatedly carried his resignation on February 25, 1988. Roh Tae Woo who was hand picked up by President Chun was selected by the 5,000-member electoral college. Government corruption and the cover-up of the torture death of Pak Chong-ch’ol were revealed in May 1987. All these occurrences brought about anti-government protests and demonstrations by students and citizens.

Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung separated from the NKDP and formed the RDP on May 1, 1987. Kim Yong-sam assumed presidency of the party and Kim Tae-jung joined the party on August 8, 1987 as advisor. Kim Tae-jung, later, separated from the RDP and formed the PPD to compete in the presidential election in December 1987.26

Approaches to the Merger of Political Parties

Three approaches are suggested in reviewing the merger phenomena of political parties: the traditional approach, the power motive approach, and the uncertainty management approach.

1. Traditional Approach

Hypothesis 1: Merger of political parties occurs when political parties face pressure from public opinion and among themselves and when the number of parties and political organizations is increasing.
This is a common but conventional approach in explaining past mergers in Korea. The frequent separation and assemblage of political parties inured the public to their merger and split. As seen in Chapters 3 and 5, the existence of fragile, unstable political parties is a crucial variable in explaining the merger phenomenon. Two other important factors in this approach are (1) the low level of political institutionalization, and (2) the lack of long-term experience in practicing democratic principles.

These factors formed and shaped political parties in Korea. Political parties are established by both external and internal forces. It is often difficult for opposition parties to perform their function and role of preventing the government's abuse of power.

Many parties have been irresponsible toward the electorate. The creation and demise of these parties represented a major traditional pattern of party politics in Korea. During this period (1948-1984), both factional and leadership conflicts caused many parties to split but political parties have usually tended to merge.

2. Power Motive Approach

Hypothesis 2: Merger of political parties occurs when party leaders' consider that their political ambitions will be strengthened by merging with other parties.

Considering the motives and desire for power, Aristotle described man as "by nature an animal intended to live in the polis." Thus Aristotle describes man a 'political being.' Political power is often supported by physical force, effective political tactics, strategy, and mobilized supporters. Bertrand Russell defines power as "participation in the making of decision,
where a 'decision' is a policy involving severe sanctions against those who deviate from it."\(^{29}\)

Among human desires, "power and glory" are the most basic ones.\(^{30}\) Thus a number of scholars put power as the basic concept in social sciences (Russell, 1938; McClelland, 1971; Emmet, 1971; Slack, 1981; Hillenbrand, 1949; Friedrich, 1963).

According to Dahl, "collective good," "self-interests," and "unconscious motives" are the reasons for seeking power.\(^{31}\) Friedrich argues that "power is to some extent a possession, and to some extent a relation."\(^{32}\) It is human instinct to seek the power. Russell (1938) argues that those who pursue power can get it. However, as Russell also argues, power must be refined to avoid tragedy in society.

For E. E. Schattschneider, a political party is "first of all an organized attempt to get power."\(^{33}\) For politicians, as the leaders of political parties, it is natural to have strong desires for political power. Without such ambitions, one cannot control and manage either public office or the electorate. Linda L. Fowler and Robert D. McClure argue that "one of the essential conditions for continued control over elected officials is pure political ambition."\(^{34}\)

Slack acknowledges the difficulties of obtaining power through electoral competition because the quest for power by electoral means does not guarantee victory.\(^{35}\) Merger of political parties, then, can be understood as another aspect of the struggle for power.
3. Uncertainty Management Approach

Hypothesis 3: Merger of political parties occurs when party leaders feel the necessity of uncertainty management, especially when they experience low party loyalty, decline of loyalty, and unsuccessful electoral performance.

Rose and McAllister argue that political parties in competitive party systems have to prepare for the possibility of and counter the effects of defeat which can mean a loss of their status and position. From the position of the party leaders, election results are critical to their continued influence. As Roger King argues, democratic elections are one of the mechanisms that legally permit the voters to exercise influence over political parties and candidates.

In Korea, not many observers of politics expected the victory of Roh Tae Woo in the 1987 Presidential election. Both Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung were confident of victory, even with four major candidates competing in the presidential election on December 16, 1987. The man who had the strongest awareness of and motivation for uncertainty management was Kim Yong-sam, who had to deal with the sudden defection of Kim Tae-jung from the RDP.

Roh Tae Woo, after he became president, supported the single-member district system as proposed by the RDP. His party legislators passed an amendment to the National Assembly electoral law in the National Assembly on March 8, 1988. The Thirteenth National Assembly elections were held on April 26, 1988 with unexpected results. This time, the ruling DJP was defeated and startled by the election results (see Table 4-4). Thus the DJP leaders felt the need for uncertainty management. The DJP leaders'
uncertainty over their political situation was soon shared by opposition party leaders, especially by Kim Yong-sam.

In the special elections in the Tonghae-si district in Kangwon Province and the Yongdungp'o B district in Seoul, Kim Yong-sam's RDP candidates lost the elections as explained in Chapter 4. Moreover, survey results revealed that among the four major party supporters, the RDP voters showed a relatively low intent to vote for the RDP again. About 48.8 percent of the RDP supporters surveyed said they would vote for the RDP in the next presidential election and about 52.1 percent of the RDP supporters surveyed would vote for the RDP in the National Assembly elections.\(^{38}\)

The PPD voters showed the highest intent, 70.6 percent for the presidential and 63.2 percent for the National Assembly elections, to vote again for the PPD. The ruling party supporters showed the lowest intention to support their party, 49.6 percent for the Presidential and 45.5 percent for the National Assembly elections.\(^{39}\)

As they are fully utilizing sophisticated computer facilities to learn voters' opinions,\(^{40}\) these survey results probably informed the RDP as well as the ruling party of their low popularity.

**The Merger of Three Parties (Samdang t'onghap)**

The ruling DJP failed to receive broad support from the electorate and lost its legislative majority in the thirteenth general elections held on April 26, 1988. Sung-joo Han argues that change from two-member districts to single-member districts is one of the reasons for the DJP's defeat.\(^{41}\) Han also considers another reason: Before the end of his term, President Chun tried to expand his influence over the nomination process of the DJP
candidates for the 13th National Assembly elections and tried to extend the size and function of the Council of Elder Statesman (consisting of former presidents). Jin Pak argues that: "The main reason for the DJP's electoral setback was the change in the election system. But the cause of the defeat was more than institutional. The DJP's assumption that the continuing opposition fracture would allow it at least a marginal victory proved to be wishful thinking."43

The failure of the DJP and the marginal performance of the three opposition parties have led observers of Korean politics to forecast the possibility of political coalition between the parties.44 Although the PPD became the strongest opposition party in the Assembly, it has recognized the potential limits of its future support base. The lack of majority control by one party has lead to the inconvenience of negotiation in order to make any legislative decisions. This inconvenience felt by the four major parties, especially by the DJP and the RDP, brought about the need to negotiate for political coalition or the merger of parties. One of the more inconvenient cases for the ruling party occurred when President Roh nominated Chung Ki-sung as Supreme Court Chief Justice in August 1988, and the opposition parties united in opposing the nomination.

It is helpful to study possible interactions among parties within a political system when they are operating under conditions of decreased party loyalty or when there are conditions strongly favoring merger. Sjoblom argues that: "If the parties are regarded as homogeneous actors, the possible number of interaction streams is ultimately determined by the number of parties."45 In the case of the four-party system, as shown in Figure 7-1 below, there are several possibilities of interaction among
parties. The weakened DJP and the scared RDP have been, as expected, the core players in this setting.

Figure 7-1. Possible Interactions among Parties (1988-1990)

It would have appeared that the ruling DJP might propose a coalition with the NDRP because the NDRP leaders used to serve in the Democratic Republican Party under the Park government. Kim Chong-p’iIl, Chairman of the NDRP, was Prime Minister and party chairman of the ruling DRP under the Park regime. It could have been assumed that the NDRP leaders still had deep sympathy for the conservative ruling party. This alternative may have looked attractive, but it would not have been necessarily a good choice for the ruling party, if it wanted to liquidate the legacy of its past.

Another alternative might have been a coalition with the PPD or the RDP, the main opposition parties. The PPD may not have been fully satisfied with the four-party system but enjoyed having party status. That party seems to have rejected proposals or at least postponed their response to coalition with the DJP.
The RDP has its support base in Pusan and Kyongnam, and the DJP appeals to voters in Taegu and Kyongbuk. If the DJP could have cooperated with the RDP, it might have looked like a regional tie between Kyongnam and Kyongbuk against Chonbuk and Chonnam, thus a third party would have been needed to join the coalition and avoid this confrontation between the Yongnam and the Honam regions.

On the other hand, the possible partners for the RDP would have been the DJP and the NDRP. Because of the serious rivalry between Kim Tae-jung and Kim Yong-sam, the PPD could not have merged with the RDP. Kim Yong-sam was even willing to link up with the DJP to check Kim Tae-jung and his party.

In June 1989, President Roh Tae Woo suggested a coalition to Kim Yong-sam saying that the current four-party system was not productive. Manwoo Lee indicated President Roh's two critical concerns: "First, who should lead the party after the President steps down? Second, what should be done to end its status as the ruling minority party? The DJP had no choice but to seek alliance with one or more of the opposition parties." President Roh Tae Woo met with three opposition leaders (Kim Tae-jung, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-p'il) at Chong Wa Dae on December 15, 1989. He agreed to 'liquidate' the Fifth Republic questions by the end of the year. The political leaders agreed to urge testimony by the former president, Chun Doo Hwan, and the retirement of Chong Ho-yong and Yi Hisung from political circles. Before the meeting, there were active movements to liquidate the legacy of and questions about the Fifth Republic. The National Assembly formed special committees and held hearings on 44 major cases. Among the issues raised, the Kwangju
uprising, the forced integration and closure of the press and the dismissal of the journalists, and the Ilhae Institute were the most prominent issues.

Former President Chun Doo Hwan testified on December 31, 1989. In his testimony, he denied most of the charges and accusations of wrongdoings during his term. As soon as Chun finished testifying, negotiations among the major parties came to a turning point.

In January 1990, Kim Yong-sam, in response to Roh's suggestion, replied that if the DJP would dissolve itself, then the RDP would also dissolve itself. Kim Yong-sam suggested a merger of the parties. The announcement of the three-party merger (the DJP, the RDP, and the NDRP) was made by President Roh Tae Woo, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-p'il on January 22, 1990. The announcement revealed that the merger process was to be completed by February 1990. This merger brought a large ruling party onto the Korean political scene with a total of 221 seats (127 seats from the DJP, 59 seats from the RDP, and 35 seats from the NDRP).

The integrated Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) was founded on February 9, 1990. It had an absolute majority in the Assembly. The DLP pledged to "strive for democracy, prosperity and national reunification," and the promotion of a "fair distribution of wealth." Thus the merger would contribute to creating a "new political order" in Korea. On the other hand, the PPD's Kim Tae-jung labelled the merger a 'coup d'état.' Jin Pak stated the expected impact of the merger:

The impact of the surprise merger is indeed far-reaching. Domestically, the pace of the "democratization" process is now dominated by the new ruling party with its nearly three-quarters parliamentary majority. Inter-Korea relations are more regulated by the new conservative alliance in South Korea under less influence.
Of the three approaches discussed earlier, the power motive and uncertainty management approaches may be most applicable to this situation. This study places more emphasis on the uncertainty management approach in explaining this merger.

In the 1980s, the major political party leaders survived difficult situations created by the student and civil protests, as well as unsuccessful election performance and the low party loyalty. By the 1990s, the major parties may or may not have known about their supporters' low loyalty to them. It was usual for the parties to conduct either public or secret surveys to know how people thought about their party and to determine their popularity. So, party leaders may have known about the level of party loyalty. But, because of the varied replies and attitudes of the respondents, this information may not have been reliable. Moreover, respondents' replies are not necessarily reflected in the election results.

This recent situation can be understood as the uncertainty management phase. The completion of the mergers (the three parties in 1990 and the opposition parties in 1991) has signaled the start of the power motive-drive phase because the majority of the Koreans now recognize the rivalry between Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung. Both of them are potential presidential candidates for the DLP and the DP, and the ambition will drive them until the end of their competition.

|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|

Figure 7-2. Phases of Political Dynamics
Figure 7-2 shows the phases of political dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the developmental phase, many political parties struggled just to exist. Possibilities for self-reform and further development were spoiled by the split of opposition leaders (Kim Yong-sam and Kim Tae-jung) shortly before the 1987 Presidential election. Their weak performance in the 1987 Presidential and the 1988 National Assembly elections brought about the necessity for uncertainty management for the party leaders of DJP and RDP. The 1990 merger of the three parties (the DJP, the RSP, and the NDRP) reduced the level of uncertainty they had to deal with. In other words, it helped them manage the political uncertainties resulting from the four-party system. The merger of the remaining opposition parties was only to be expected. Party leaders have entered the power drive phase as they strive to build secure positions within their party and strengthen their status in the political system.

The situation after the 1988 elections had the four major parties sharing legislative power without a majority. This and voters' changing opinions have been enough to stimulate the most recent mergers of 1990 and 1991. As indicated in Chapter 5, low party loyalty was a contributing factor.

The 1990 merger of the three political parties can be reviewed from the aspects of voter mobility and party loyalty. The ecologically estimated figures in Tables 5-1 through 5-10 in Chapter 5 indicate that the proportion of loyal supporters of all four political parties is low. Volatile voting behavior and voter's low party loyalty help to explain the merger of 1990, as argued in Chapter 5. The structure in this study is shown in Figure 7-3.
Electoral competition

low party loyalty, frustration, uncertainty

(merged) two-party system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merger of parties</th>
<th>Political change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*corruption</td>
<td>*uncertainty manage-ment</td>
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<td>*illegality</td>
<td>*compro-mise</td>
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<td>*regionalism</td>
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<td>*lack of policy alternatives</td>
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Figure 7-3. Political Change

Figure 7-3 shows how and why party mergers have been effected. It also shows the implications and consequences of merger between the period of 1981 through 1991. In electoral competitions, a number of factors such as corruption, illegality, appeals for regional sentiment, lack of policy alternatives, changing format of party system, and frequent amendment of election laws, worked together and blended in determining voters' decisions for party support. The results are the appearance of low party loyalty, frustration by both party leaders and voters, and the necessity of uncertainty management for party leaders. A merger of parties in 1990 was an alternative to ensure party survival. The follow up merger between the two opposition parties can also be understood as an uncertainty management efforts.
The Merger of Opposition Parties (Yakwon t'onghap)

The practice of effective political opposition is not familiar in most developing societies. Opposition parties in newly independent countries often suffer from intervention by the government in the electoral process; thus 'rigged elections' and 'corrupted elections' have always been major issues in many countries.

In many developing countries, the voices of opposition parties are often intercepted or silenced by the forces in power. Opposition parties often lack policy alternatives, management capabilities, and resources. Panebianco describes the status of opposition parties in general:

The opposition parties cannot rely on state bureaucracy for support, cannot utilize pro dema suia the state and its agencies, and they do not have at their disposal, the abundant financial support that interest groups reserve for parties in government.

In the history of Korean party politics since 1948, only one opposition party has replaced an incumbent regime through electoral competition. That exception was the Democratic Party (Minjudang). The Democratic Party won the 175 seats in the National Assembly elections on July 29, 1960 and became the ruling party. However, the party soon divided into two due to the conflicting issue of leadership. The old faction separated from the Democratic Party and formed the New Democratic Party on October 13, 1960.

The party in power has always maximized the utilization of national organizations and resources to its own benefit. These include the executive branch and police organizations. Under the authoritarian regimes, government officials and the police played an important role in controlling and mobilizing the people. Opposition parties, as in other developing
countries, were subject to suppression by the government. Since the establishment of the government in 1948, Koreans have learned by experience that participating in opposition activities, such as forming and supporting opposition parties, is a hazardous undertaking. Besides structural problems, Korean opposition parties have another problem derived from their cultural norms: "Political opposition had no legitimate place in a society molded by the influence of Confucianism; under the old system it was considered as something inherently immoral and illegitimate."

Moreover, the national leaders' negative attitudes toward political parties in the initial period of party politics also played an important role in shaping party politics in Korea. Evidence shows that Presidents Rhee and Park had negative feelings and attitudes towards political parties.

The history of opposition parties in Korea is the division of and reassembly of parties and party members. The opposition parties have usually had limited resources and capabilities. Accordingly, they have experienced a great deal of trouble, instability, and struggle against those in power. The rivalry between major opposition parties explains an important part of the failure of opposition parties in recent Korean history. However, this rivalry is not the only reason for failure. Lack of policy alternatives (Pak, 1980), internal and external power struggles (Yi, 1987), suppression, a centralized and vertical decision-making structure (Yun, 1987) are also among the possible reasons for the opposition parties' weakness.

Party merger in Korean politics, before 1990 means the merger between opposition parties as there was no necessity for the ruling parties to merge. For the ruling parties, merger was unthinkable before the 1987 and 1988 elections.
Kim Tae-jung and Kim Yong-sam started negotiations to create a united opposition party before the 13th National Assembly elections of April 26, 1988.\textsuperscript{64} They again agreed to form an integrated party on February 23, 1988 despite their long rivalry.\textsuperscript{65} To be sure, their negotiation efforts to field a single candidacy for the 1987 Presidential election failed and ended with the loss of the election. In 1987, Kim Tae-jung delayed the selection of an presidential candidate for the RDP.\textsuperscript{66} On September 3, 1987, the two Kims met and agreed to form a single presidential candidacy.\textsuperscript{67} Beyond their agreement on the single candidacy, the two Kims began their operation for the separate candidacy. The two Kims met together on September 29, 1987 only to fail. They met again on October 20, 1987 and faced each other at a rally, at the Korea University, sponsored by the Council of Youth and Students for Democratic Struggle on October 25, 1987. At this rally, most of the citizens who attended were supporters of Kim Tae-jung, and as a result, Kim Yong-sam was embarrassed.\textsuperscript{68}

On November 9, 1987, Kim Yong-sam was nominated as the RDP's presidential candidate and started his own campaign for the presidency. Kim Tae-jung established the PPD and announced his candidacy for presidency. Kim Tae-jung was nominated as the PPD's presidential candidate on November 12, 1987. Both of them were defeated by the ruling party candidate Roh Tae Woo in this election.

In the 1988 National Assembly elections, Kim Tae-jung's PPD became the leading opposition party. But, the defeats of Kim Yong-sam and his RDP in the 1987, 1988, and special elections brought about their need for uncertainty management. After the 1988 National Assembly elections, the RDP and the PPD agreed to merge by March 5, 1989. In fact, the two
parties held separate conventions and confirmed the merger. However, the merger agreement of the RDP and the PPD was interrupted by violence, and the merger talks between the two never resumed. Some two hundred student activists and PPD members demonstrated and used violence at the hotel where the negotiation talks were being held among the RDP, the PPD, and the Hangyore Democratic Party. 69

There was a special election on August 18, 1989, to elect a legislative representative in the Yongdungp'o B district in Seoul. In that election, the RDP and NDRP candidates finished third and fourth respectively. The district seat went to the DJP (see Table 4-9). This election failure helped spur the merger of the RDP and the NDRP. Both parties feared for their uncertain future.

Given this situation, these two opposition parties (the RDP and the NDRP) abandoned their opposition role and joined the DJP to form a new Democratic Liberal Party (the DLP, Minju chayudang) in February 1990. Unfortunately, the merger of these three parties formalized the division between the Honam and the non-Honam forces. 70 Before the merger of three parties, President Roh and the opposition leader Kim Tae-jung met at Chong Wa Dae on January 11, 1990 to discuss national affairs and party politics. Roh proposed a coalition plan but Kim Tae-jung, allegedly, refused to agree to it. 71

The PPD remained in opposition and claimed to be the only genuine opposition party. Kim Tae-jung and the PPD were still confident of gaining power via the election process. Several months before the local council elections of 1991, Kim Tae-jung said that the results of these elections would decide the next president. 72 Trying to promote a merger between the
PPD and the DP, a small group of opposition law makers called for these two parties to equally share the leadership positions in the proposed integrated party.\textsuperscript{73} The results of the local elections in March and June shocked both Kim Tae-jung's PPD and Yi Ki-t'aek's Democratic Party. In the small-unit local council elections in March 1991, the PPD only won 785 seats (18.2 \%) while the DP won 33 seats (0.8 \%).\textsuperscript{74} In the large-unit local council elections in June 1991, the NDP (formerly PPD) won 165 seats (19.1 \%), and the DP won 21 seats (2.4 \%).\textsuperscript{75}

The defeat of the PPD (later NDP) in the local elections was serious enough to push Kim Tae-jung towards merging with the other opposition parties. The PPD then started merger negotiations to form a pan-opposition force to challenge the huge ruling party. Concerns about regional structure disappeared, to a certain extent, when the PPD and the members of Democratic Party began forming a pan-opposition force in the beginning of 1990. The majority of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) joined the new ruling Democratic Liberal Party in February 1990. Yi, Ki-t'aek of the RDP, who once participated in negotiation talks for merger at Chong Wa Dae, deviated from the ranks of the merger and chose to stay on the opposition side using the party name of the Democratic Party (Minjudang). In a sense, the founders of the Democratic Party from its establishment planned for merger because the party did not select district party organizers in the areas where the PPD had shown its strength.\textsuperscript{76} Both Kim Tae-jung and Yi Ki-t'aek refused to participate in the merger movement with the DJP. In turn, they felt the pressure of public opinion and saw the necessity for their own merger.\textsuperscript{77}
The new Democratic Coalition (Minju yonhap) was integrated with the Democratic Party on February 5, 1991. The tentatively named NDCP (Sin minju yonhap) was also integrated with the PPD on April 9, 1991. The integration process between the PPD and the NDCP involved the PPD changing its name to the NDCP. It then absorbed the members of the NDCP in a joint party convention. Even under the integrated NDCP, however, Kim Tae-jung and the members found the party had basic problems. There were two ways for Kim Tae-jung to reach the presidency. One would be to receive wide-spread, popular support through establishing a democratic broadly-based political party. The other would be to merge with other opposition parties.78

The remaining task for the two parties, Kim Tae-jung's NDCP and Yi Kıt'aek's DP, was to merge. One of the critical conditions suggested by the Democratic Party was the withdrawal of Kim Tae-jung from active politics, in other words his retirement. This was an unacceptable condition for the PPD and Kim Tae-jung. He and his colleagues had fought for democracy and power for several decades. Nevertheless, Kim Tae-jung and the PPD fully recognized that in public opinion the PPD should be dissolved to form a new integrated opposition party.79

During merger negotiations between the PPD and the Democratic Party, Kim Tae-jung made some concessions. Hence, the negotiations were ultimately successful. Kim Tae-jung accepted many of the Democratic Party's demands, e.g., the merger should be a party-to-party merger, leadership positions should be shared equally, and that the party's name should be the Democratic Party.
Figure 7-4 shows the time-frame of the major mergers. The newly merged opposition Democratic party (the DP, Minjudang) officially registered as a political party on September 16, 1991. The Democratic Party selected eight members to form the supreme council. To wipe out the image of a regional party, the Democratic Party distributed the seats of the supreme council to members from all over South Korea: one from Seoul, two from Kyonggi Province, one from Kangwon Province, one from Ch'ungch'ong Province, one from Cholla Province, one from Kyongsang province, and one from Pyongyang (birth place). In its merger declaration statement, the Democratic Party claimed itself to be the scientific party.

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<td>(February 5, 1991)</td>
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<td>PPD</td>
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<td>NDCP (NDP)</td>
<td>(April 9, 1991)</td>
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<td>NDCP (NDP)</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>(September 10, 1991)</td>
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Figure 7-4. Interactions between Opposition Parties

It is interesting to note the emphasis of the importance of scientific methods and professional skills in order to monitor public opinion. It is reminiscent of the former ruling DRP's emphasis on the entry to the
scientific party and the former ruling DJP's utilization of scientific facilities and professionals to monitor voters' shifting opinions and changing values.\textsuperscript{83}

Returning to the focus of the merger itself, it can be understood and explained vis-a-vis the concepts discussed earlier in this study; the parties' past performances, party leaders' efforts to make certain theirs and their parties' political survival. Another important factor to be added in regard to opposition party merger involves the stimuli and encouragement from other political forces:

In spite of the remarkable showing made by the official opposition party in the National Assembly elections in February 1985, the democratization struggle was led by the National Campaign to Win a Democratic Constitution through struggle, in which the opposition New Korea Democratic Party represented only one element among many. Although the NKDP enjoyed substantial influence because of its power to mobilize mass support, technically it still played a subordinate role in the extra-parliamentary coalition.\textsuperscript{84}

In fact, the opposition forces have played a very important role in shaping the format of opposition parties by encouraging and sometimes by threatening opposition leaders who became consumed by the power motives.

The merger between the NDCP and the DP can be understood as a means for Kim Tae-jung and Yi Ki-t'aeak to guarantee their political survival. Currently Kim Tae-jung and Yi Ki-t'aeak are the co-leaders of the integrated opposition DP. Kim Tae-jung, as expected, may run for the presidency in the presidential election of December 1992, and Yi Ki-t'aeak may run for the presidency in the future.
Decisionmakers - The 1990 and 1991 Mergers

Representatives of the three parties (Roh Tae Woo from the DJP, Kim Yong-sam from the RDP, and the Kim Chong-p'il from the NDRP) held a press conference and announced the merger of the three parties they represented. Soon, however, the electorate questioned: "Who made the decision to merge?" Although this merger was not illegal, it was unexpected by the voters. The past experience shows that mergers do not lead to the ability to win power in spite of the people's desire for change and for democratization.

Korean politics faced a new phase in the beginning of 1990. The ruling DJP merged with two opposition parties and formed the DLP which now became the majority party. On the other hand, opposition leaders who criticized the 1990 merger as a "coup d'etat", "immoral", and "secret room politics," have also created in 1991 a product of "immoral" and "secret room politics." The merger of the NDCP and the DP has changed the structure of Korean party system from a multiparty to a two-party system.

The merger between the ruling party and the opposition parties may have been a kind of betrayal of the former oppositions' supporters. Fortunately for the RDP and the NDRP, however, Koreans tend to forget or ignore the reasons for or rationale of political happenings, which soon become accepted as established fact.

A public-opinion poll conducted after the announcement of the merger of the three parties showed that 45.3 percent of the respondents replied that the merger was well done. Another 30.6 percent of them answered the merger was wrong while 24.1 percent of them had no opinion, therefore about 70 percent (45.3% of approval and 24.1% of no opinion
respondents) of them either approved or kept silent about the merger. Despite the high percentage indicating approval or at least acceptance of the merger, it is too early to say that the majority support it. As expected, there were no demonstrations and protests against the opposition party merger in September 1991.

Apart from the positive or negative aspects of the merger, a remaining key issue involved concerns about the voting rights of individual party members and how they are affected by party leaders' decisions for merger without prior consultation with the membership. Thus an individual's vote for Party A, for example, is not a commitment or authorization of the merger activities of Party A's leader.

This tendency to acquiesce to leaders' decisions is the legacy of authoritarian regimes and experiences of the past. Korean political leaders, since 1948, have exercised an authoritarian style of politics. Manwoo Lee has observed the personalities in Korean politics:

Korean politics is dominated by a few powerful political personalities and the Korean political system periodically adjusts itself to the needs of these powerful figures... In the case of Korea, its political institutions, particularly political parties, lack the institutional autonomy and complexity to shape its leaders.86

A typical example of a Korean politician is Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea.87 Henderson describes Syngman Rhee as "Korea's first master manipulator of the atomized mass society."88 Chi-Young Pak states that: "Central to the Korean political system was Syngman Rhee's presidency which was shaped by his personality, a mixture of modernity and traditional. Rhee's presidency was operated by the traditional methods: Rhee's presidency was characterized by its closeness that left little room for consultation or persuasion."89
Both President Park Chung Hee, of the Third and Fourth Republics, and the former president, Chun Doo Hwan, are also men who have ruled dictatorially. Likewise, the opposition leaders have authoritarian political styles. Kihl states that: "both the ruling and opposition parties in Korea tend to follow the line of personal leadership rather than to formulate a set of programs and policies for the party."

In essence, the political parties were formed as means to power by their political leaders. The parties themselves are passive and powerless organizations, subject to manipulation by their leaders at any time. Chang Yun-sik is critical of Korean political parties in regard to their short life span and the political leaders' use of them as tools to gain and maintain political power:

Political parties were designed to meet the leaders' political needs, not the other way around. Personal ties to a leader tend to persist through the formation of a party or its break-up and this gives its leader a high degree of freedom in determining party policies, and augments the tendency for the leader to identify personally with the office. Personalizing the party is a path to political power.

An argument that should be made at this point, however, is that the political leaders' authoritarianism, their electoral performances, and pressure from public opinion are not the only reasons for the mergers in the early 1990s. The political leaders' sense of uncertainty, caused by low party loyalty and declining competitiveness in elections, should be considered an invisible variable involved with the mergers.

Conclusion

While party merger is not a phenomenon unique to Korea, it does assume a particular pattern in Korea, regardless of the reasons and motives
for merger. This study contends that the mergers in the early 1990s were special phenomena in the development of Korean party politics. One of the obstacles to the development of party politics in Korea has been party leaders' short-sighted behavioral patterns, i.e., withdrawal when in stalemate from the party or establishment of a new party with no other justifications.

The power motive approach is the most popular approach and is supported and recognized by many political scientists and journalists in the country. However, in a competitive multiparty system and uncertain political situations, the uncertainty management motive comes before the power motive. As discussed and illustrated in the previous section, the major political parties have not received enough support from the voters to lead the nation. Under a situation of declining party popularity and strength, party leaders, especially Roh Tae Woo and Kim Yong-sam, may have feared and felt the necessity of managing the uncertainty they faced. Merger of parties was the best option to ensure their political survival. When the leaders overcome their own uncertainty, they can move toward political power. The decisionmaking style by the party leaders in regard to merger in 1990, however, was still authoritarian and reflected an authoritarian political culture.

The ruling party's loss of the legislative majority may have led to political coalition, but it would not necessarily have led to merger if the ruling DJP had had its own loyal supporters. There was always reasonable 'myongbun' in the Korean political scene for party merger, except for the 1990 merger of three parties.
When the opposition parties merged, the competition for power intensified among Kim Yong-sam, Kim Tae-jung, and others. On May 19, 1992, Kim Yong-sam was elected as the presidential candidate for the ruling Democratic Liberal party. Kim Tae-jung was also elected as the presidential candidate of the opposition Democratic Party on May 26, 1992. Their long march for political power will end in December 1992.
Notes for Chapter 7

1. Richard Rose and Thomas T. Mackie, "Do Parties Persist or Fail? The Big Trade-off Facing Organizations," in When Parties Fail, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter H. Merkl, 543-546. They show cases of structural change (merger, splits, subjective identification, and disappears) in Western nations. Merger of parties (26 out of 195 cases observed) was only 13 percent in alternative careers of political parties.


4. For the merger of political parties in the early period of independence (1945-46), see Yi Ki-ha, "Chongdang t'onghap undong," (Party merger movement) in Han'guk ui chongdang (Seoul: Han'guk Ilbo Sa, 1987), 96-112.


6. Ibid. See also Yi Ki-ha, "Chongdang t'onghap undong," (Party merger movement), 95. The number of registered political parties exceeded two hundred by November 1, 1945.

7. Yi Ki-ha, ibid., 96.

8. Yun Hyong-sop, "Han'guk chongch'i kwajong," in Han'guk chongch'iron (Korean Politics), ed. Kim Un-tae et al. (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1989), 547.

9. Ibid.

10. Sim Chi-yon, "Posu yadang ui Ppuri, han'mindang ui konggwa," (The origins of conservative opposition party, merits and demerits of the KDP), in Han'guk ui chongdang, 195-199. For a detailed information on the political

11. Han Chong-il, "Yadang uiro ui chongbi, min'guk dang," (The Democratic National Party as an opposition) in *Han'guk ui chongdang*, Yi Kih-a et al., 203; Son Pong-suk, "Yi paksa wa chayudang ui t'okchu," (Dr. Yi and the running alone of the Liberal Party) in *Han'guk ui chongdang*, Yi Kih-a et al, 239-240.


16. Ibid., 137.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 138.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


22. Koon Woo Nam, ibid., 232. Fourteen active service generals and eleven civilians (of whom three were retired generals) were included in the SCNSM. The standing committee of the SCNSM was made up of 30 men (18 military officers and 12 civilian government officials).
23. Yun Hyong-sop, "Han’guk chongch’i kwajong," (Political Process in Korea), in Han’guk chongch’iron, ed. Kim Un-t’ae (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1989), 561.

24. For details of the abuse, see Uridul ui 11al kwon yang, ed. Han’guk kidokyo hyobuihoe inkwon wiwonhoe (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1987).

25. Sindong-A (February 1987): 141. The seven-point demands for democratization made by Yi Min-u: implementation of local autonomy; freedom of press; neutrality of civil servants; establishment of sound two-party system or multiparty system; fair election laws for the National Assembly; release of political detainees; and amnesty and restored civil rights for Kim Tae-jung and others.


36. Rose and McAllister, *The Loyalties of Voters*, 12-13. Here is a good example. The Swedish Socialist Democratic Party, in the general elections held on September 15, 1991, was defeated totally by the conservative parties (*The New York Times*, September 15, 1991). The Swedish Socialist Democratic Party took power in 1931 and has been the major party in the country (there have been other non-Socialist Democratic governments in Sweden since 1931). What this reflects is that the voters are thinking and they are the very key to the survival of political parties. It also shows that party identification or party loyalty does not explain all about the decline and the rise of political parties.


38. Han, Sang-jin, "T'al chiyok chongch'i ui chamjaeryok kwa minju palchon: Haksup iron ui kwanchom eso," in Han'guk ui chiyok chui wa chiyok kaltung (Regionalism and regional conflicts in Korea) (Seoul: Songwonsa, 1990), 367.

39. Ibid.

40. Manwoo Lee, *The Odyssey of Korean Democracy*, 47; Pak Chong-ryol, "Yoron chosa nuga machuonna," (Which survey results were the closest?) in Sindong-A (January 1988), 254-255.


42. Ibid.


46. The pattern and idea of interaction possibilities among parties are adapted from Gunnar Sjoblom's general models that appeared in his book above.
47. Hwang Pyong-t'ae, a Kim Yong-sam aide, revealed the secret story and process of the merger: Kim Yong-sam had his plan for merge with the DJP since April 1989; the NDRP joined the merger process right before the merger. Others argue that Kim Chong-pil already had the idea of party merger in Fall 1989. For Hwang Pyong-t'ae's testimony on the truth of merger of three parties, see Sisa Journal 118 (January 30, 1992): 18-20.

48. For the personal characters, political styles, family backgrounds, and the rival relations between the two Kims, see Yi Kyong-chae, "Kim Tae-jung and Kim Yong-sam," Sindong-A (May 1985): 156-207.

49. Lee, The Odyssey of Korean Democracy, 130.


51. Han'guk Ilbo (February 14, 1990).

52. Korea Newsreview (January 27, 1990): 4. Gist of 5-point Merger Plan: (1) The DJP, the RDP, and the NDRP will be unconditionally merged into a new political party, tentatively named the Democratic Liberal Party. Presidents of the three parties will serve as co-leaders until a national convention; (2) The new party will be a national party open to all moderate, middle-of-the-road democratic forces aimed at national reunification, welfare and justice and promotion of national culture; (3) Registration of the merger will be done by the end of February and a national convention will be held by the end of May; (4) A committee composed of five from each of the three parties will be established to work out details of the merger; (5) The three parties will cooperate with other political forces which do not join in the new party as long as they believe in parliamentary democracy.


57. Jin Pak, "Political Change in South Korea," 1154.


62. See Han Chong-il, "Yadang uiro ui chongbi, min'gukdang," (The Democratic National Party as an Opposition): 228-236. It deals with President Rhee's view on the political party. See also Yun Hyong-sop, "Han'guk chongch'i kwajong", 552-555.

63. For the history and struggle of opposition parties in Korea, see Chi-young Pak, Opposition in Korea - Korean Politics, 1945-1960; Yi Ki-t'aek, Han'guk yadangsa (History of Korean Opposition parties) (Seoul: Paeksan sodang, 1987).

64. Korea Newsreview (February 27, 1988): 11.

65. Ibid.


67. Tong-A Ilbo (September 4, 1987).

68. Lee, The Odyssey, 63.


70. Korea Newsreview (December 30, 1989): 6. Before the meeting with President Roh, Kim Tae-jung expressed his opinion: "I am not saying that present structure (four-party system) is the best. I know that under the presidential system, a two-party format is better. What I want to stress is that the political parties should respect the views of the voters."


76. *Sisa Journal* (September 13, 1990): 24. The PPD had 158 district party organizers (out of 224 legal number of district party) and the DP had 70 district party organizers. The DP did not select any district party organizers in Chonbuk and Chonnam provinces.


79. *Sindong-A* (August 1991): 170-178. Kim Tae-jung, shortly before the merger with the Democratic Party (September 1991), was urged to take one of the two choices: (1) to resign the presidency of the New Democratic Party to form an integrated opposition party in preparation for the coming the 14th National Assembly elections; (2) to stay as the president of the New Democratic Party and enjoy the power and honor of the president of the first opposition party that is based on the support from Honam.

80. The party constitution and party principles of the Democratic Party are as follows: (1) The representative supreme members jointly represent the party as the most responsible persons; (2) The party affairs rely upon the decisions made by the supreme council; (3) The party platform and the basic policies of the party; (4) The direction election of president; (5) The third step toward the national reunification (*Han'guk Ilbo*, September 17, 1991).

81. The council members are: Yi U-jong (the Sinmin faction), Pak Yong-nok (the Sinmin faction), Pak Yong-suk (the Sinmin faction), Ho Kyong-man (the Sinmin faction), Kim Hyon-kyu (the Minju faction), Cho Sun-hyong (the Sinmin faction), Yi Pu-yong (the Minju faction), and Mok Yo-sang (the Minju faction).

82. *Han'guk Ilbo* (September 17, 1991). The gist of the declaration of party merger: (1) To meet the new age, the Democratic Party will stand for the scientific party; (2) To make efforts for the middle class and the lower class as a reformist party; and (3) to become a democratic party by practicing the inner-party democracy.

83. When the military leaders took power in 1961 and established their own Democratic Republican Party (the DRP), they claimed that the DRP
should stand for scientific political party to perform nation-building. Since then, the ruling parties, i.e., the DRP and the DJP, made efforts to recruit professionals and to use scientific facilities and techniques to observe and analyze the attitudes of electorate as mentioned above. In fact, the DJP's presidential candidate Roh Tao Woo utilized the scientific facilities and professionals in the presidential election in 1987.


85. *Han'guk Ilbo* (January 25, 1991). A total of 1,192 people were asked throughout the nation.

86. Manwoo Lee, 128.

87. Han Sung-jo, "Han'guk chongch'i ui kwollyok elitu," (Power elite in Korean politics) in *Han'guk chongch'iron*, ed. Kim Un-t'ae et al. (Seoul: Pak Yong Sa, 1989), 397-402.


90. For the comparison of the characteristics of Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, see Han Sung-jo, "Han'guk chongch'i ui kwollyok elitu," (Power elite in Korean politics), 438-440.

91. Ibid., 462-466. For President Chun's entire life, see Ch'on Kum-song, *Hwanggang eso Pugak kkai: In'gan Chun Doo Hwan* (Seoul: Tong'so, 1981).


93. Young Whan Kihl, "Linkage and Democratic Orientation in South Korea," 82.


95. Myongbun is "a complex and often ambiguous cultural concept, meaning a legitimate basis of social action. For an action to be regarded as

96. They had competed for the presidential candidacy of the major opposition party in 1971. In the national convention, Kim Tae-jung was nominated as the presidential candidate on the second ballot, capturing 450 delegates to 410 votes for Kim Yong-sam.
CHAPTER 8
ELECTORAL DYNAMICS, 1988-1992

Tracing mobility between the two National Assembly elections of 1988 and 1992 will show how the voters responded on the merger of three parties in 1990. If the majority of former DJP, RDP, and NDRP voters voted for the new Democratic Liberal party (DLP) in the 1992 National Assembly elections, then the 1990 merger can be interpreted as successful since the three parties succeeded in maintaining their 'loyal supporters.' If not, the DLP may experience further difficulties in maintaining political viability.

Right before the 1992 National Assembly elections, there were several occurrences that may have affected the election results. First, Yi Chi-mun, an Army lieutenant, revealed that there were campaign violation and pressure to elect the ruling party candidates in military camps. This revelation followed by the open discussion on the problem of absentee voting by the CEMC and political parties. A decision was reached that soldiers vote outside military camps under the supervision of the members of the CEMC for the coming elections. Another happening was that four members of the National Security Planning Agency circulated illegal materials to discredit the opposition party candidate Hong Sa-dok. Public opinion was critical to the correction of these abuses.

Results of the 14th National Assembly Elections

The 14th National Assembly elections were held on March 24, 1992. The average turnout rate was 71.9 percent. Turnout rate had been declining since the 12th National Assembly elections in 1985 (78.4 % in 1981, 84.6 % in 1985, 75.8 % in 1988). Turnout rate in the 1992 National
Assembly elections (71.9 %) was the lowest turnout ever in the history of National Assembly elections in Korea. Similar to the 13th National Assembly elections in 1988, voters in Cheju, Kyongbuk, and Kangwon had the highest turnout rates (78.6 %, 78.4 %, and 78.0 % respectively). Voters in Ch'ungbuk and Ch'ungnam also had high turnout rates (76.0 % each). On the other hand, the six major cities, Seoul, Pusan, Inch'on, Taegu, Kwangju, and Taejon recorded the lowest turnout rates. Taegu had the worst, 66.6 percent. Inch'on, similar to previous elections, had low turnout (67.9 %). Pusan and Seoul recorded 69.1 percent and 69.2 percent respectively. Both Kwangju and Taejon had 70.1 percent turnout. All six major cities' turnout rates were below national average (71.9 %). It seems that the phenomenon of 'tojo ch'ongo' (low turnout in urban areas, high turnout in rural areas) has continued.

Due to the mergers occurring in 1990 and 1991, the number of parties that competed in this election decreased. Six parties and 237 independents competed in the election (see Table 4-5 for the seat allocation in the 14th National Assembly elections in 1992). Out of six parties, only three parties, the DLP, the DP, and UNP were considered as major competitors. As Table 4-5 shows, the NPP won only one district seat, and the People's Party and the Kongmyong Democratic Party failed to win any. The number of independent candidates increased from 111 in 1988 to 237 in 1992. This increase might be the legacy of the merger of parties in 1990 and 1991. Selection of district candidates was based the political influence of different factions within the parties and not on candidates' chances of winning. Those who failed to win party nominations ran as independents, and many of them were successful.
This time the total number of seats was 299 (237 district seats and 62 at-large seats). Based on agreements and compromises between the DLP and the DP, election law had been changed. Thirteen district seats were added while thirteen at-large PR seats were cut. The total number of seats remained the same. The single-member district system also remained the same. The new election law specified that the campaign period should be 17 days. It allowed political parties to have their campaign rallies after the lapse of twenty years. The election results indicated that the DLP won 116 district seats and 33 at-large seats (total of 149 seats).

Unfortunately, there was a fraudulent in ballot counting in the Nowon B district of Seoul. In this district, the DLP's Kim Yong-ch'ae received 40,551 votes and the DP's Yim Ch'ae-jong received 40,515 votes. Yim Ch'ae-jong appealed to the court. His appeal was upheld and ballots were recounted. Fraud had occurred and was confirmed by the CEMC and candidate Yim became the winner in the Nowon B district. The DLP's seats decreased from 116 to 115. On the other hand, the DP's seats increased from 75 to 76.

There were other appeals for recounting. For example, Kim T'ae-ho, a DLP candidate, asked the authorities to recount the ballots in the Ulsan Chung district. The recount was held on June 26, 1992, but found that Kim T'ae-ho received 50,088 votes (he received 50,127 votes on March 24, 1992). The UNP's Ch'a Hwa-jun received 50,111 votes (he received 50,138 votes on March 24, 1992). The UNP's Ch'a was confirmed as the winner in the district. Miscounting ballots became a hot issue in Korea. The Supreme Court has ordered recounting the ballots for four districts.
including Yongdungpo B district (Seoul) and the Masan Happ'o district (Kyongnam) soon.  

The opposition DP won 75 district seats and 22 at-large seats (total of 97 seats). However, the DP added one more district seat due to the election fraud mentioned above. On the other hand, the newly emerged UNP received 3,574,419 votes (17.4%) out of 20,583,812 valid votes. The UNP won 24 district seats and 7 at-large seats (total of 31 seats). Observers of Korean politics point out the emergence of the UNP as one of the major aspects of the election in 1992. According to the allocation formula, at-large seats are allocated to the parties that win more than five district seats or three percent of votes. The party that wins less than five district seats, but has more than three percent can be allocated one at-large seat. The remaining seats are allocated by the proportion of district seats. In this election, the fourth and fifth parties, the New Politic Party and the People's Party, failed to meet the criterion to receive at-large seats. The three major parties, the DLP, the DP, and the UNP, shared 62 at-large seats. The DLP's allocation of 33 at-large seats was based on the following formula:

\[
\text{At-large seats (33)} = \frac{\text{total of at-large seats (62)} \times \text{number of district seats won by the DLP (116)}}{\text{total number of district seats excluding the seats won by independents (216)}}
\]

The ruling DLP, the former DJP, RDP, and NDRP, has still failed to become the legislative majority. It has been the second time that the ruling party has lost the legislative majority in electoral competitions. The DLP won only 49.8 percent of the legislative seats (149 out of 299 seats). This indicates a serious loss of DLP seats and influence in many districts, but the
existence of pro-ruling party independents and their willingness to join the ruling party has encouraged the ruling DLP. When the DJP, RDP, and NDRP merged together, the integrated ruling party DLP controlled 221 out of 299 National Assembly seats. After the 14th National Assembly elections, the ruling DLP controlled only 149 (116 district seats and 33 at-large seats) out of 299 seats.

Moreover, many prominent incumbents were defeated in the election while a number of new candidates won. Voters decided to replace the members of the Assembly. In this sense, the voters' role and attitudes toward the politics should be reconsidered. Voters are now wise enough to replace incapable representatives. However, many of the independent winners were affiliated with the Fifth Republic or had personal problems and thus failed to be nominated by the DLP and the DP. This is another facet of Korean elections. The voters as a mass support clean, fresh, and able politicians, but the voters as individuals support candidates who are famous, who are able to gain power, and who have same origin of birth-place, in many cases.

The argument here is that the 14th National Assembly election results cannot be used directly to forecast the coming Presidential election in December 1992. The reason for this is that voters behave differently at different times of voting based on their perception of the level and importance of the elections. For example, the 1985 National Assembly elections were not relevant to that of the 1987 Presidential election, and the 1987 Presidential election results were not relevant to that of the 1988 National Assembly elections.
An important thing to be added is that opposition forces are now entering the political arena in Korea. Six (Yi Pu-yong, To Chong-gu, Yu Int'ae, Pak Ke-dong, Sin Ke-ryun, and Chang Yong-dal) of those who have been fighting against the authoritarian regimes in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics moved their stage from the outside to inside of the Assembly. This development implies the coming of more stable party politics as opposition forces have begun to recognize the existence of a more legitimized ruling party than the previous ones and more genuine opposition parties.

Another thing is that the Korean opposition parties have tended to emerge shortly before the elections. In 1981, the DKP and the KNP emerged before the election together with the ruling DJP. In 1985, the NKDP appeared as a 'dark horse' shortly before the 1985 National Assembly elections and became the most powerful opposition party winning 5,843,827 votes (29.26 %) with 67 seats (50 district seats and 17 at-large seats). In 1987, the NKDP divided into two shortly before the 1987 Presidential election. Kim Yong-sam formed the Reunification Democratic Party on May 1, 1987, and Kim Tae-jung established the Party for Peace and Democracy on November 12, 1987.

In the 1992 National Assembly elections, there came another newly formed party, the Unification National Party (UNP) led by Chong Chu-yong (Hyundai Group Founder) and Kim Tonggil (formerly a professor). The UNP won 31 seats (24 district seats and 7 at-large seats). The UNP was strongly supported by the members of Hyundai Group in the elections. For example, the UNP candidates won all the three district seats in Ulsan City. The majority of Hyundai's interrelated enterprises are concentrated in the Ulsan
area. Chong Mong-jun, son of Chong Chu-yong, ran for the office in the Ulsan-Tong district and won the seat with a majority of the votes cast (61,263 votes out of 86,114 valid votes). This victory was expected even before the elections because of the nature of the candidate and the city. The UNP candidate in the Ulsan-gun district, however, defeated by the ruling party candidate.

The emergence of new political parties shortly before the elections was observed in the 1980s and early 1990s. This observation implies a limited function and role of Korean political parties. At the same time, it also indicates that Korean electoral behavior is candidate-centered and party support is fragile.

The emergence of new political parties before the elections reflects the voters' distrust of the current regime and politicians. The emergence of new parties before the elections seemed to reflect the desire for "something new". This is one of the reasons for the UNP's successful entry to the legislature.

In general, the 14th National Assembly elections in 1992 were relatively fair except for some conflicts on ballot counting and some government intervention in elections.

**Voter Mobility, 1988-1992**

Korean politics in the 1980s and early 1990s was a period of change and transition. A number of political upheavals and social changes have occurred in that period. Five national elections were held in the midst of the change and transition. The focus here is the two National Assembly elections that were held in 1988 and 1992. The focus of academic
interests in these elections is the mergers of parties in 1990 and 1991 and the voters' judgment about the mergers. Survey results revealed the voters' general satisfaction with the merger of three parties in 1990 as cited in Chapter 7. Two local council elections were held in March 1991 and June 1991, and the merged ruling party (DLP) overwhelmed the opposition parties in the elections. Except for student protests, it seems that voters in general kept silent about the merger between the ruling party (DJP) and two opposition parties in 1990. However, the resulting DLP that held about two-thirds of legislative seats did not perform well in the 14th National Assembly elections in March 1992 and lost its legislative majority. The DLP has overcome this difficulty by pulling in independent winners and other party members. In these elections, the DLP seemed to fail because they only won 116 district seats and 33 at-large seats (49.8%). The DLP was expected to take more seats because controlled 221 out of the 299 seats.

Besides considering the number of votes and seats, there is another way of judging the merger. Tables 8-1 through 8-5 show the ecologically estimated voter mobility between the two elections. Table 8-5 shows nation-wide voter mobility and party loyalty. Party loyalty to the new ruling DLP by the former party (DJP) voters was 55.9 percent in 1992. It is a meaningful increase of partisan support for the ruling party because it was 54.7 percent in 1985 and 41.7 percent in 1988. In this sense, the merger in 1990 was successful in strengthening party loyalty for the former party voters. The DJP's loss of its supporters to other parties does not seem serious. The DJP lost 9.2 percent to the DP, 11.1 percent to the UNP, 1.0 percent to the NPP, and 10.3 percent to the other parties and independents.
Compared to other parties, the DJP had the lowest proportion of nonvoters (12.5 %).

It seems that the 1990 merger was a success for Kim Yong-sam but not for the RDP itself. As Table 8-5 shows, a large proportion of RDP voters abstained in 1992 (29.8 %). Although the DLP won 15 out of 16 district seats in Pusan (Kim Yong-sam's support base), former RDP voters in other areas voted for other opposition parties, e. g., 18.2 percent for the DP and 12.8 percent for the UNP, rather than voting for the DLP to which Kim Yong-sam belongs. Kim Yong-sam has relatively fragile support in the country at least between the two National Assembly elections of 1988 and 1992. Joining the ruling party may have offered him greater potential as a candidate for supreme power.

Many PPD voters are not willing to vote for the DLP (8.8 %). The DP attracted 52.7 percent of PPD voters which is a lower proportion of support than expected. The characteristics of former PPD voters in 1992 are that they either voted for the DP or abstained from voting (29.5 %). The NDRP voters split in the 1992 elections, contributing to the failure of DLP, to a certain extent, in the country, especially in Ch'ungch'ong provinces (Kim Chong-p'иль's support base). The largest proportion of NDRP voters abstained from voting (26.0 %), and only 21.4 percent of them voted for the DLP to which Kim Chong-p'иль belongs. The NDRP lost its voters to other parties (10.4 % to the DP, 21.5 % to the UNP, and 20.7 % to the other parties and independents).

This election recorded the lowest turnout (71.9 %) in the history of National Assembly elections. It can be imagined that a number of previous nonvoters continued to not vote in 1992. In fact, as Table 8-5 shows, 47.1
percent of former nonvoters did not participate in these elections. Figure 8-1 shows a relatively positive relationship, although it has scattered numbers from the diagonal line, between the 1988 DJP voters and the DLP in 1992. Each number in the figure represents the region it belongs to. Number 1 in the figure indicates a district in Seoul, number 2 means a district in Pusan, and number 3 indicates a district in Inch'on.

In Seoul, the ruling DLP maintained 53.2 percent party loyalty (Table 8-1). In the previous elections, the level of party loyalty to the ruling party was 30.4 percent in 1985 and 23.0 percent in 1988. In terms of seats, the ruling party won 10 out of 42 seats in 1988 and 16 out of 44 seats in 1992 under the single-member district system in Seoul. In 1985, the ruling party was able to win 13 out of 28 seats despite its low level of party loyalty (30.4 %) under the two-member district system. The ruling party has benefited by the two-member district system as well as the at-large proportional representation system at that time. Voters chose either the ruling party or parties strongly opposed to the ruling party rather than the moderate opposition parties.

In any case, the DJP voters' support of the new ruling DLP has increased in 1992. Contrary to the general expectation, a considerable portion of former DJP voters went to the DP instead of the UNP or other parties. The newly emerged UNP was not able to attract the conservative ruling party voters. The UNP sent their candidates to 41 out of 44 districts in Seoul. The party has only attracted 3.1 percent of DJP voters (see Table 8-1). On the other hand, the DP was successful in attracting many voters who voted for the DJP (23.0 %).
The 1988 RDP voters were split in 1992. Only 31.6 percent of RDP voters voted for the DLP, and the remaining portion of them voted either for the UNP (28.3 %) or abstained from voting (23.7 %).

The former PPD voters' support for the DP is 47.1 percent. It seems that the consciousness of regionalism has decreased at this time because Kim Tae-jung united with Yi Ki-t'aek from Yongnam. The PPD voters went to the DLP (19.5 %), the UNP (3.2 %), the NPP (0.4 %), and others (4.0 %).

The NDRP suffered large losses to other parties and nonvoting (49.0 %). Only 6.6 percent of former NDRP voters voted for the DLP to which Kim Chong-p'il belongs. In the nomination process for the ruling DLP candidates, Kim Chong-p'il was dissatisfied because many of his faction members were not nominated. The largest portion of NDRP voters did not vote in the elections (41.2 %). The NDRP did not lose its supporters to minor parties, but it lost to the two opposition parties, the DP and the UNP (17.9 percent to the DP and 25.6 percent to the UNP).

The minor party voters tend to abstain from voting. Tables 5-1 through 5-10 support this argument. Tables 8-1 through 8-5 also support this argument. The difference between the tables in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8 is that percentage of non-voters has become more stable in recent elections than in the elections in the early 1980s. All the mobility tables in Chapter 8 show more than 40 percent of abstain rate which is higher than that of Chapter 5.

Table 8-2 shows how the voters in Chungbu region behaved. The former DJP voters demonstrated their changing partisan support. The level of party loyalty is 56.8 percent. The UNP was successful in attracting the
1988 DJP voters (15.5 %). The ruling party voters showed the lowest abstention rate (10.4 %) in the region. The 1988 RDP voters voted for the DP (29.3 %) rather than voting for the DLP (19.7 %). They also decided to abstain from voting (30.2 %) rather than vote for the DLP.

The DP’s support base in Chungbu region seemed weak because only 36.2 percent of PPD voters voted for the DP in 1992. On the other hand, a considerable portion of PPD voters abstained from voting (41.9 %). It is not easy to interpret this high proportion of abstention of the 1988 PPD voters, but it is clear that the DP candidates were not able to attract the PPD voters.

The NDRP voters’ split in Chungbu region was not expected because Kim Chong-p’il has his support base in the region. 46.9 percent of them voted either for minor parties or abstained. Only 25.1 percent of them voted for the DLP.

The DLP and the UNP are the successful parties to appeal to minor party supporters in the region (34.3 % for the DLP and 25.7 % for the UNP). It seems that the non-voters tended to vote for the DP (25.1 %) if not abstain (50.8 %). The Chungbu region recorded the most stable abstention rate among the four regions.

Table 8-3 shows voter mobility in the Honam region. The DJP voters showed a high level of loyalty to the ruling DLP in the region (72.3 %). The ruling party voters recorded 55.6 percent loyalty in 1985 (Table 5-3) and 35.1 percent in 1988 (Table 5-8). The 1988 DJP voters in the region were positive in participating in elections and showed only 4.6 percent nonvoters in 1992.
The 1988 RDP voters voted for the DLP (37.5 %), the DP (11.5 %), the UNP (9.7 %), the NPP (0.5 %), and the minor parties and independents (28.1 %). Neither the DLP nor the DP was successful in attracting the RDP voters in the region. In terms of the absolute number of votes, actual RDP supporters in the region is limited.

PPD voters did not vote much for the ruling party. 1.6 percent of former PPD voters voted for the DLP in 1992. 64.4 percent of 1988 PPD voters voted for the DP to which Kim Tae-jung belongs. A considerable proportion of PPD voters, however, did not go to the polls (27.2 %). This may be an expression of dissatisfaction with the DP leadership or the nomination of the DP candidates in the Honam region.

In terms of the absolute number, there were a small number of NDRP supporters in the Honam region in the 1988 National Assembly elections (44,108 votes), but about a half of them (48.5 %) went to the region's favorite DP. In fact, Kim Chong-p'il himself was dissatisfied by the allocation of the NDRP faction candidates during the nomination process of the DLP. Moreover, the Honam region is a remote area for Kim Chong-p'il, and he neglected the NDRP supporters in the Honam region.

The 1988 minor party voters and independent candidate supporters went to the DLP (32.4 %), the DP (12.3 %), the UNP (8.6 %), the NPP (3.4 %), and the minor parties and independents (15.2 %). About one-third of the 1988 nonvoters were attracted by the DP candidates and voted for them (33.3 %). However, 46.0 percent of them still did not go to the polls.

Table 8-4 shows the voter mobility of the voters in the Yongnam region. The 1988 DJP voters voted for the new ruling party (52.7 %), the DP (2.7 %), the UNP (12.1 %), the NPP (0.6 %), and minor parties and
independents (17.4 %). In the Yongnam region, nine independents were elected, and most of them were the ruling party-affiliated candidates. The independents appealed to the voters because many of them are well known figures to the voters. The candidacy of influential or famous independents prevented the ruling party from keeping a high level of loyalty in the Yongnam region. However, compared to previous elections in 1988 (44.8 %), there was an increase of party loyalty for the ruling DLP who retained 52.7 percent of their previous voters..

The RDP voters seemed not to have liked the merger of three parties in 1990. As observed in the three other regions, the RDP voters' support for the ruling DLP was not considered important. The RDP voters voted for the DLP (34.9 %), the DP (14.9 %), the UNP (4.2 %), the NPP (1.1 %), and minor parties and independents (12.4 %). The independent candidates in the region were more successful than any other opposition parties in this region. Even the 1988 PPD voters voted for the independent candidates and other minor parties (22.2 %). The largest proportion of the 1988 PPD voters, however, chose not to vote (33.6 %).

In general, nonvoters' stability has increased in the 1992 elections (47.1 %). In 1985, 36.5 percent of the 1981 nonvoters abstained, showing volatile electoral behavior. In 1988, 35.2 percent of the 1985 nonvoters did not go to the polls. Compared to the previous elections, nonvoters showed relatively stable electoral behavior in the 1992 National Assembly elections. The increase of stable nonvoting can be interpreted in several ways as discussed in Chapter 6. It may reflect the satisfaction, dissatisfaction, or busy-life of the voters. In the 1992 elections, the turnout rate has decreased while that of stable nonvoters has increased. This can be
interpreted, at least in part, that Korean politics has stabilized to a certain extent.

**Japanese Voter Mobility, 1986-1990**

The following portion of analysis is to compare party loyalty between the Korean and Japanese political parties.\(^{10}\) It is not a general analysis of the Japanese political system and political parties.\(^{11}\)

The assumption here is that Japan will show higher party loyalty than Korea because Japan was the first non-Western country to introduce the parliamentary system in 1890. Japan has experienced peace and prosperity since 1945 while Korea has experienced a number of social and political upheavals including the Korean War (1950-1953). Moreover, Japan's conservative ruling LDP has been ruling the country since 1955.

The 1986 House of Representative (HR) elections were held on July 6, 1986. The election recorded 71.4 percent of turnout. The 1990 HR elections were held on February 18, 1990 and showed 73.3 percent of turnout.\(^{12}\) The ruling LDP won 300 out of 512 total seats in 1986 and 275 out of 512 total seats in 1990.\(^{13}\) Gerald L. Curtis argues that the turnout rate influences the LDP's performance in elections: the higher the turnout rate, the more the LDP votes.\(^{14}\) Hans H. Baerwald also supports this argument.\(^{15}\) This argument, however, is not applicable to the 1990 election results because the LDP was not successful in receiving more votes in 1990 despite the increase of turnout.

The major concern here is the level of 'party loyalty' in the latest Japanese national elections. The party loyalty to the Japanese ruling party between the period of 1986 and 1990 was 76.4 percent (see Table 8-6).
The level of party loyalty is quite similar to the panel survey results (78 percent) conducted in 1983.\textsuperscript{16} It can be said that the LDP has maintained their loyal supporters at least between 1983 and 1990. The problem is that Japan has an electoral system that select a multiple number of representatives in a district. It is difficult to figure out the influence of political party on each voter’s electoral behavior under the electoral system.\textsuperscript{17} For example, the Ishikawa second district in Ishikawa Prefecture selects two representatives and two LDP candidates won the two seats in 1990.\textsuperscript{18} In the Kumamoto second district in Kumamoto Prefecture, it selects five representatives. The results in the 1990 HR election shows that the JSP selected one and the LDP selected four representatives in the district.\textsuperscript{19} Given these difficulties, this study tries to compare the level of party support between Korea and Japan.

Compared to Korean ruling parties in the 1980s and early 1990s, the level of party loyalty to the Japanese ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is higher, but lower than that of European democracies. It seems that the ruling LDP has enjoyed relatively stable party support from the LDP voters. The effect of the Recruit scandal on party support was minimal.\textsuperscript{20} Most of the candidates involved in the scandal, including Yasuhiro Nakasone, Noboru Takeshita, Sosuke Uno, Shintaro Abe, and Kiichi Miyazawa, were reelected in the 1990 HR election. Figure 8-5 shows the electoral dynamics for the ruling LDP between 1986 and 1990.

Table 8-6 reveals that the LDP lost some portion of its 1986 supporters to the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in 1990 (12.3 %). Except for the JSP, the other opposition parties were not able to attract the 1986 LDP voters in 1990. In the 1990 election, the LDP received 46.1 percent of the popular
vote and won 275 seats (286 seats when the independents joined the LDP after the election).  

The JSP, the most powerful opposition party, was not successful in maintaining its 1986 supporters. Party loyalty to the JSP was 59.0 percent. This low party loyalty to the JSP was not expected because the party has been supported by a certain groups and organizations throughout Japan for a long time. The party has clear ideological orientations and policy issues. The party's strict ideological and party principles, however, have hindered attracting more supporters. Despite the ruling LDP members' bribery scandals, the JSP was not able to absorb uncommitted voters and LDP party supporters. The JSP even lost a considerable portion of its former supporters to the LDP (19.2 %) in 1990. The level of party loyalty to the Japan Socialist Party is close to that of the ruling DLP of Korea.

The Clean Government Party (CGP, Komeito) is the only party affiliated with a religious organization, the Soka Gakkai (value-creating academic society).  

The Soka Gakkai is a sect of the Buddhist Nichiren and consists of the believers who are "traditionally nationalistic" in its nature. The CGP reveals its weak partisan support. The party maintained 55.4 percent loyalty from the former CGP voters. About one-fifth (18.8 %) of the former CGP voters abstained from voting in 1990 rather than vote for the CGP or other parties. The other parties including the LDP was not successful in attracting the former CGP voters (4.3 % for the LDP, 8.1 % both for the JSP and JCP, and 3.2 % for the DSP).

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) has had the same as the CGP where a portion of former JCP voters (23.7 %) abstained. The JCP maintained 61.8 percent party loyalty. This party, like the JSP, holds rigid ideological
orientations and party platforms. The political parties that have very definite ideological orientations tend to hold their loyal supporters as was observed in Western European democracies. In Japan, the levels of party loyalty to the JSP and JCP are relatively low at least in these two elections of 1986 and 1990. The Japanese opposition parties are often described as the "perpetual opposition" (Curtis, 1988). The reasons for this perpetual opposition can be understood when the party loyalty to the major opposition parties is referred to. In Japan, the LDP has been stained with money scandals but the major opposition parties have not been able to appeal to the majority of voters. In this context, there is a chance for reformers to form a new political party. In fact, the latest Bungei Shunju and Chuo Koron issues reported on the possibility of the formation of a new party, the Japan New Party.24

The voter mobility table for the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and other minor parties does not show any significance in terms of party loyalty. It looks similar to the scattered voter mobility for the Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and the Korea National Party (KNP) in the 1980s. The Japanese nonvoters, at least between the period of 1986 and 1990, were stable (63.0 %).

This preliminary analysis of the Japanese voter mobility reveals that the level of party loyalty for the major party is relatively high. When the length of political party history and socio-economic conditions are considered, Japanese party loyalty to the major parties can be compared with that of Western European democracies. However, there are some factors that have prevented the rise of party loyalty to the major parties, especially the ruling LDP. The factors that regulate the Japanese party loyalty are the personal
ties between the incumbents (or candidates) and voters, the intermittent revelation of political scandals for the LDP, and the rigid ideological orientations of the JSP and JCP. This implies that political culture is also important in understanding the Japanese electoral behavior. The comparison here also implies the comparability of electoral studies in Asian countries.  

**Invalid Votes: The Mystery**

Korean election statistics between the period of 1981 and 1992 reveal an interesting pattern in regard to the percentages of invalid votes. As Table 8-7 shows, the average percentage of invalid votes in the 1981 National Assembly elections was 1.2 percent. It increased to 1.5 percent in 1985 and 2.1 percent in 1987. In 1988, it decreased to 1.1 percent and 1.3 percent in 1992. The 1987 Presidential election is not the central topic in this study, but its statistics are cited here for the comparison with the four National Assembly elections. When the 1987 invalid votes are excluded, the average invalid percentage of the four National Assembly elections is 1.3 percent.

The proportion of invalid votes in six special cities was relatively lower than that of other provinces. For example, the average percentage of 44 election districts in Seoul is 1.0 percent in 1992. Pusan recorded 1.3 percent of average invalid votes. Taegu showed 1.2 percent of average invalid votes, and Inch'on recorded 1.3 percent. Kwangju recorded 0.9 percent of average invalid votes. The average percentage of invalid votes in these six special cities in 1992 is 1.1 percent while the average percentage
of invalid votes in other provinces is 1.4 percent. The same situation can be seen in the other elections (see Table 8-7).

Based on the figures in Table 8-7, it is safe to say that the normal invalid votes range from a minimum of 0.8 percent to a maximum of 1.9 percent. Operational criterion to indicate an extraordinary level of invalid votes is established at two percent here. In the 1987 Presidential election, the majority of provinces exceeded two percent invalid votes. Both in Ch'ungnam and Chonbuk provinces, the invalid votes exceeded three percent and were considered extraordinary cases. In the four National Assembly elections, only Kwangju in 1981 and Ch'ungnam in 1985 exceeded two percent invalid votes at the province level. At the district level, however, a number of districts show extraordinary levels.

There are several cases that show an unusually high proportion of invalid votes. The first case includes the Tobong-A and Tobong-B districts of Seoul's 6th constituency. Table 8-8 shows that it was 1.5 percent in 1981, 2.7 percent in 1985, and 0.7 percent in 1988 for the Tobong-A district. In Tobong-B, it was 1.1 percent in 1981, 2.6 in 1985, and 0.9 in 1988. In 1985, two opposition party candidates won their seats in the 6th constituency in Seoul. The second case is the Pusan Pukku-B district. It was 0.9 percent in 1988 and 2.8 in 1992. In this district, 5 party candidates contested, and the ruling party candidate won the seat. The third case is the Kwangju 1st constituency (the Tonggu district and Pukku district). In the Tonggu district, it was 4.2 percent in 1981, 1.6 percent in 1985, 0.7 percent in 1988, and 0.9 percent in 1992. This is an extraordinarily high proportion of invalid votes compared to the national average of 1.2 percent in 1981. In the Pukku district, it was 3.3 percent in
1981, 1.5 percent in 1985, 0.8 percent in 1988, and 1.0 percent in 1992. In 1981, 8 party candidates and 3 independents competed, and two candidates (one from the ruling party and one from opposition party) won the seats.

The fourth case is the Wonsong-gun district in Kangwon Province. It was 1.2 percent in 1981, 1.8 percent in 1985, 2.6 percent in 1988, and 1.5 percent in 1992. In 1988, only two candidates ran for the single seat in that district (Hoengsong-gun and Wonsong-gun constitute one district). The opposition party candidate defeated the ruling party candidate in the district.

The fifth case is the Hongsong-gun district in Ch'ungnam Province. It was 1.6 percent in 1981, 2.5 percent in 1985, 1.4 percent in 1988, and 1.7 percent in 1992. In this district, the average percentage of invalid votes has always exceeded the national averages.

The sixth case (Sinan-gun district) shows the most deviant case. It was 1.9 percent in 1981, 2.3 percent in 1985, 7.0 percent in 1988, and 1.9 percent in 1992. In this district, the ruling party candidate and one minor party candidate competed. The ruling party candidate received 9,827 votes, and the opposition party candidate received 34,162 votes in 1988.

The seventh case is the Ponghwa-gun district of Kyongbuk province. It was 0.9 percent in 1981, 1.7 percent in 1985, 1.9 percent in 1988, and 2.7 percent in 1992. In this district, 5 party candidates and 2 independents contested. The ruling party candidate won the seat. The eighth case is the Songju-gun district of Kyongbuk Province. It was 1.0 percent in 1981, 2.0 percent in 1985, 2.1 percent in 1988, and 3.1 percent in 1992. The proportion of invalid votes has increased election by election in this district.
Only two party candidates competed against each other to get the single seat, and the ruling party candidate won the seat.

The last case is the 9th constituency in Kyongnam Province. In Hadong-gun district of the 9th constituency, the record was 3.6 percent of invalid votes in 1981, 1.7 percent in 1985, 1.4 percent in 1988, and 1.5 percent in 1992. In this district, 4 party candidates and 1 independent competed, and the independent candidate overwhelmed the other candidates in 1981.

The mystery here is that why do some districts show extraordinarily high proportions of invalid votes in a particular election.

Conclusion

Although regionalism and personalism are not the only elements of current Korean political culture, they played an important role in the 14th National Assembly elections as well as in the 13th National Assembly elections.

The level of party loyalty to the ruling DLP increased after the merger of three parties in 1990. The 1992 National Assembly elections recorded 55.9 percent nation-wide party loyalty to the DLP. On the other hand, the RDP and the NDRP experienced a serious decrease in party support in the 1992 National Assembly elections, losing their supporters to the other parties. In Pusan, the DLP won 15 out of 16 seats, but the support for the DLP did not come from former RDP voters. As Table 8-4 shows, a large portion of support for the DLP came from former DJP voters in Pusan and Kyongsang Provinces. In this sense, the RDP failed to mobilize former RDP voters to support the DLP to which Kim Yong-sam belongs. The same argument can
be applied to the former NDRP voters. They showed split and scattered electoral behavior in 1992, weakening Kim Chong-p'il in the competition for power. The merger in 1990 was successful in strengthening party loyalty for the former ruling party voters. The merger of three parties in 1990 and merger of two major opposition parties in 1991 have helped in decreasing the tendencies of regionalism and personalism in terms of electoral behavior. For example, the former PPD voters in the Honam region did not necessarily vote for the DP to which Kim Tae-jung belongs.

The Korean voters are emotional in terms of electoral behavior. They do not vote rationally for specific policies.

It is observed that party loyalty to the Japanese LDP is higher than that of the Korean ruling parties. However, the LDP's party loyalty (76.4 % in 1990) is lower than that of Western democracies for several reasons, e. g., length of party existence, political culture, history of democracy, and political circumstances. The ecologically estimated voter mobility table for the Japanese political parties shows that the opposition parties could not maintain their former supporters for certain reasons. One of the possible reasons for this is the lack of (non-legal or private) supporting organizations. Considering the importance of personal ties between the candidate and the individual voter (the patron-client relationship), the lack of supporting organizations like Koenkai may have affected the low party loyalty for the opposition parties. The conservative national tendency also helps in understanding the ideology-oriented political parties' difficulties.

In this chapter, extraordinarily high proportions of invalid votes are reviewed by examining the election statistics. Although the 1987 Presidential election is not the main topic of this study, it is found that this
election recorded the highest invalid vote proportion (2.1 percent) among the five national elections in the 1980s and early 1990s (Table 8-7). When the 1987 invalid votes are excluded, the average invalid percentage (city and province level) of the four National Assembly elections is 1.3 percent. However, when the district level invalid vote is considered, several districts show extraordinarily high proportions of invalid votes. A good example came from the Sinan-gun district of Chonnam Province. The district recorded 7.0 percent of invalid votes in the 1988 National Assembly elections. The two districts in Kwangju in 1981, Tonggu (4.2 %) and Pukku (3.3 %), also recorded a high proportion of invalid votes. The Songju-gun district (3.1%) of Kyongbuk Province in 1992 and the Hadong-gun district (3.6 %) of Kyongnam province can be treated as unusual cases in regard to the invalid votes (Table 8-8).

The major Korean political leaders are now engaged in a drive for power. On May 15, 1992, the Unification National Party held a party convention and selected Chong Chu-yong as the presidential candidate of the party. The ruling DLP held its party convention on May 19, 1992 and selected Kim Yong-sam as the DLP’s presidential candidate. The Democratic Party also held its party convention on May 26, 1992 and selected Kim Tae-jung as the presidential candidate of the party.
Table 8-1. Seoul. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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<td></td>
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<td>DP</td>
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<td>NPP</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12.3</td>
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|        | 23.8  | 25.5   | 13.1   | 2.0    | 4.1    | 31.6   | 100.0  |

Table 8-2. The Chungbu Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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</table>

|        | 26.9  | 18.8   | 14.8   | 1.3    | 9.0    | 29.2   | 100.0  |
### Table 8-3. The Honam Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

<table>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>UNP</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>DJP</td>
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<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>37.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
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<td>28.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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<td>48.5%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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### Table 8-4. The Yongnam Region. Voter Mobility. Row Percent.

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<td>1988:</td>
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<td>12.4%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
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<td>1992:</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
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<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<table>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>CGP</td>
<td>JCP</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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Table 8-7. Invalid Votes in Elections (Province level) (unit: %)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>2.6</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated and compiled by the author using the electoral data published by the Central Election Management Committee (1981, 1985, 1988, and 1992) and by the Chosun Ilbo (the 1987 Presidential election).
Table 8-8. Districts with more than Two Percent of Invalid Votes (unit: %)

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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>(Seoul)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobong-A</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Pusan)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Pukku-B</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Kwangju)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>(Kangwon)</td>
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<td>Hongch' on-gun</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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<td>Hoengsong-gun</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>(Ch'ungnam)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Chonnam)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wanju-gun</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
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<td>(Cheju)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mu'ngun</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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Figure 8-1. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DLP (DJP) 1988-1992. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 8-2. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DLP (RDP) 1988-1992. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 8-3. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DLP (NDRP) 1988-1992. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 8-4. Electoral Dynamics in Korea, DP (PPD) 1988-1992. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Figure 8-5. Electoral Dynamics in Japan, LDP 1986-1990. Percent of All Voters in Each District.
Notes for Chapter 8

1. *Han’guk Ilbo*, May 30, 1992. Some exceptions are admitted for those who physically and situationally are not able to vote outside the camp, e.g., sailors on board.

2. The four agents were detained on March 21, 1992, three days before the general election.

3. *Han’gyore Shinmun*, July 22, 1992


12. The turnout in recent HR elections were 68.0 percent in 1979, 74.6 percent in 1980, 67.9 percent in 1983.
13. In 1986, the New Liberal People's Coalition (Shinjīyu kokuminrengo) joined the LDP with 6 seats.


19. Ibid., 249.


23. Ibid., 148.


26. The electoral data for the 1987 Presidential election relied on the statistics published by a daily newspaper. Unfortunately, it contains some printing errors in the district level statistics. Errors will be corrected later.
27. Chung-Ang Ilbo, May 16, 1992. At the party convention, Chong Churyong was selected as the party's presidential candidate by receiving 1,727 votes out of 1,738. There were 7 opposite votes and 4 nonvotes. Chong was the sole candidate.

28. Chosun Ilbo, May 20, 1992. At the party convention, 6,713 delegates out of 6,882 attended the party convention. Among them, 6,660 delegates participated in voting to select the party's presidential candidate. Kim Yong-sam received 4,418 votes (66%) and Yi Chong-ch'an received 2,214 votes (33%). There were 28 invalid votes and 222 nonvoters. Yi Chong-ch'an did not participate in the convention.

29. At the party convention, Kim Tae-jung won the candidacy by receiving 1,413 votes (60.2%) out of 2,348 votes. Yi Ki-t’aek received 925 votes (39.4%). There were 10 invalid votes. The total number of delegates was 2,426.
CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The major methodological, theoretical, and empirical significance and findings of this study have been suggested in summaries at the conclusions of each chapter.

Chapter 2 provided a theoretical framework for the study of electoral behavior in general and an alternative framework for Korean electoral behavior and political dynamics. The socio-economic model, the social-psychological model, the modernization model, and the rational choice model have contributed extensively to the study of electoral behavior in many countries. However, direct and random application of these theories to the Korean political system have led to odd results because of the nature and situation of Korean society and its developing political institutions. Each theory has its advantages and disadvantages, but each theory covers only a limited period of time and limited area of research. For example, the concept 'party identification' is the core concept of the social-psychological model, but its utility has been declining since the 1970s. More importantly the concept is more applicable to the United States rather than to other societies. Thus new concepts have been introduced by the students of political behavior.

In consideration of the utility and limits of these theories and given the particular situation of Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s, this study has suggested alternative frameworks. Political culture is introduced as an alternative conceptual framework in this study to explain better Korean electoral behavior and political dynamics. The tentative conclusion in this
chapter is that the determinants of Korean electoral dynamics should be derived from Korean society.

Chapter 3 offered some considerations about the function, role, performance, and options for survival of political parties. Definitions of political parties were introduced. Korean political parties are trying to be productive and policy-oriented, but they are still in the process of a struggle for development. In other words, they do not function and perform effectively, except for the vote-getting function. The domination by a few political leaders and the bureaucracy in establishing national policies explains the low status and capability of Korean political parties. Despite the closeness and familiarity with political parties, voters are rarely moved by them. When they vote, they do not vote for the parties because have been too many changes and too many political parties. The voters tend to vote for well-known political figures because, in many cases, the political parties change their names almost before the voters can memorize them.

There are some options for survival for weak parties: coalition, merger, name change, manipulation of election laws, and self-reform. The coalition of political parties, under the presidential system, is almost impossible. When the cabinet is composed of members of several parties, it may weaken the status of the President and bring inconvenience. Self-reform by the political parties is reasonable but difficult because of the political climate. For instance, its military affiliation has reduced the legitimacy of the ruling parties. Unconstructive attitudes and a lack of resources hinder opposition parties. Merger is one way for party leaders and parties to avoid catastrophe. Merger itself, however, has its own weaknesses and pitfalls.
Close observation of Korean political parties offers some significant insights into Korean party politics: First, party leaders do not hold set beliefs or have a philosophy about party politics - party formation, split, and merger are basically dependent on leaders' arbitrary decisions; second, opposition parties have been controlled too much by the regimes in power; third, political parties in the 1980s showed low representation; finally, none of the parties have suggested a future blueprint for national survival and welfare - only blueprints for party survival.

The conclusion is that the structure of the Korean party system is far more regulated by party leaders' desires than by the electoral system or the voters' orientation in regard to party configuration. The parties' electoral performance has largely been based on how to select and nominate the 'yuji' class candidates rather than how to appeal to the electorate with distinct policy issues.

Chapter 4 dealt with elections, electoral systems, and electoral behavior. Together with Chapter 3, this chapter leads to the findings in Chapter 5. The major concern here was the frequent amendment of electoral systems and its consequences. Adoption of certain electoral systems entail side effects from time to time. When the two-member district system was adopted, the ruling party was able to elect its candidates even where unpopular. This system was criticized by the students of electoral laws because it entails the so-called 'tongban tangson', with candidates elected together. Thus under this system, the ruling party's candidates were elected even in the areas of opposition strength.

Later, the electoral system was changed to the single-member district system as a result of negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties.
Then, there came another side effect: reinforced regionalism. Weak legitimacy, the extreme confrontational relationships between parties, and leaders' strong desires for power drove electoral politics to another phase. Political parties and their leaders were caught in their own traps as their losses and the results of the 13th National Assembly elections in April 1988 indicate. The finding here is that the expected effects of changes in electoral systems do not necessarily appear in the results of elections when parties have weak legitimacy or voters are influenced by certain political phenomena - in this study, regionalism and personalism. The conclusion drawn is that the frequent changes in electoral systems resulted in negative effects on the formation of party loyalty.

Chapter 5 reveals the major findings in this study. Party loyalty to the political parties in the 1980s was quite low. Some observers of Korean politics have thought that the ruling parties have been maintaining a large group of supporters. As the election statistics show (see Tables in Chapter 5), the ruling parties in the 1980s obtained about one-third of the valid votes in each election. When students of electoral behavior interpret these 'surface' statistics and describe the individual's electoral behavior, they may encounter the so-called 'ecological fallacy.' To reduce the risk and possibility of 'ecological fallacy', this study adopted the logit method for ecological inference.

The major findings in this chapter, again, are the low party loyalty and the existence of a volatile electorate in Korea in the 1980s and early 1990s. The electorate is not to be blamed for this. Their low level of party loyalty and volatility resulted from party leaders' decisions and behaviors and the political parties' unsuccessful electoral performance. Party loyalty to the
ruling DJP declined from 54.7 percent in 1985 to 41.7 percent in 1988. Together with this decline of party loyalty, the DJP's performance in electoral competitions has declined. What this implies is the coming of different types of strategies for survival, be they productive or nonproductive. The conclusion is that Korean voters showed low party loyalty and volatile electoral behavior between 1981 and 1992.

Chapter 6 discussed non-voting and nonvoters. There has not been extensive research on non-voting and nonvoters in Korea. This study focused on the reasons for nonvoting and former nonvoters' electoral behavior in subsequent elections. It is found that there is a considerable portion of nonvoters who do not vote because of the demands of their daily life and business. Urban voters tend to abstain more from voting than rural residents, as Tables 6-10, 6-11, and 6-13 show. Thus, the busy-life factor, in part, contributes in explaining the reasons for nonvoting.

Besides the busy-life factor, Avey's (1989) new approach to nonvoting also makes sense. Avey argues that voter turnout is dependent upon the political leaders' and political parties' efforts to mobilize the electorate. In Korea, young voters' cynicism regarding efforts to mobilize them explains a part of nonvoting. This chapter suggested a high rate of voter turnout in elections is needed to insure responsible representative politics. Two major institutional methods to prevent non-voting were introduced: compulsory voting and approval voting. However, the existence of a fresh "relationship" between the electorate and the political leaders is desirable. To develop this relationship, politicians will have to be legitimate, moral, and able to serve. Nonvoting is not a serious problem yet in Korea, but in the future it may become an issue. Korean nonvoters are uncommitted.
Chapter 7 focused on the merger of parties, especially in 1990 and 1991. While previous chapters dealt with the political dynamics of the 1980s, this chapter addressed the consequences of the politics in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The changes of the electoral system and party format have led to the emergence of regionalism, ineffective electoral performance, and low party loyalty. The merger between the ruling DJP and two opposition parties (the RDP and the NDRP) in 1990 and the subsequent merger between the two major opposition parties (the NDP and the DP) in 1991 can be regarded as a consequence of the political dynamics in the 1980s. At the same time, however, it can also be regarded as a causal factor for future developments: separation, formation, and new mergers of political parties implying the possibility of future mergers and new political parties.

Furthermore, a reunification of the country might bring about the multiparty format in Korea to represent the interests of the people in terms of policy, ideology, welfare, and interests. This author argues that periodic, fair, and competitive elections may bring instability to the regimes in power but eventually will contribute to the political development of the country.

This study approached and analyzed the merger of parties in 1990 and 1991 from the uncertainty management perspective rather than the power-motive perspective. The conclusion is that the low party loyalty and the decline of party loyalty, in part, contributed to the merger of parties in the early 1990s.

Chapter 8 discussed party loyalty and voter mobility between the 1988 and 1992 National Assembly elections. The 1988 DJP voters' party loyalty to the ruling DLP has significantly increased after the merger of three parties
in 1990. The party loyalty to the ruling DLP is 55.9 percent in 1992. It was 54.7 percent in 1985 and 41.7 percent in 1988. In this sense, the merger in 1990 was successful in strengthening the party loyalty of former party voters. On the other hand, it seems that the joining of the RDP to the DLP was a success for Kim Yong-sam but not for the RDP itself. The majority of the 1988 RDP voters did not support the ruling DLP in 1992. The election results shocked both Kim Chong-p' il and his NDRP because they failed to transform effectively their supporters' votes into electoral victory and they experienced a general decline of support for the NDRP even in Ch' ungch' ong provinces.

This chapter compared Japanese voter mobility with Korean voter mobility and found that the loyalty by the Japanese to the LDP (76.4 %) has been higher than that of Koreans to the DLP (55.9 %) in the early 1990s.

The extraordinarily high proportions of invalid votes are reviewed by examining the election statistics. Although the 1987 Presidential election is not the main topic of this study, it is found that this election recorded the highest proportion of invalid votes among the five national elections in the 1980s and early 1990s. When the 1987 invalid votes are excluded, the average percentage (city and province level) of the four National Assembly elections is 1.3 percent. When the district level is considered, several districts show extraordinarily high proportions of invalid votes. A good example came from the Sinan-gun district of Chonnam Province. This district recorded 7.0 percent invalid votes in the 1988 National Assembly elections. As Table 8-8 shows, the voters in this district do not always make that kind of mistake when they vote.
In general, this study examined and contested about the existence of a large group of loyal supporters to the Korean ruling parties in the 1980s and early 1990s. It can be argued that the ruling parties somehow managed to attract roughly one-third of the votes in elections.

Frequent amendment of electoral rules and changes in party format helped the formation of the low party loyalty of Korean electorate. As tables and figures in Chapters 5 and 8 show, the major parties have received only indifferent random support from the voters and their support to the major parties has been inconsistent.

It is a common observation that indigenous components of political culture are important in understanding electoral dynamics in Korea. This study empirically tested the influence of political culture on electoral dynamics using the logit method for ecological inference.

It was assumed that party merger is one of the options for survival in Korea. The former ruling DJP with its low level of legitimacy was suffered from low popularity and voter loyalty, but their participation in the merger with two major opposition parties in 1990 is considered successful because it strengthened the 1988 DJP voters' party loyalty to the ruling DLP. Moreover, by having Kim Yong-sam as the party's representative, the DLP has strengthened its legitimacy. The DLP lost many seats in the 14th National Assembly elections partly because lack of support by the 1988 RDP voters' and NDRP voters'.

Party loyalty towards the major political parties is low and electoral behavior is much more volatile in Korea than in other stable democracies.
Methodological Significance

A positive aspect for the student of electoral behavior is that election statistics have gradually become more reliable and detailed. Election statistics, which are reliable, detailed, and periodic provided the possibility and the means for researching Korean elections and electoral behavior. In the process of computation and analysis, this study discovered the utility of aggregate data to explain and analyze political dynamics as well as voters' electoral behavior.

This study also discovered the attractiveness of an advanced computation method, the logit method for ecological inference (Thomsen, 1987). What is most attractive is that it was specially designed for the Korean electoral data by the developer of the method and program, Soren Risbjerg Thomsen. The personal computer program ECOL, version 3 (Thomsen, 1991 & 1992) has been used in this study to estimate the voter mobility in the four National Assembly elections in the 1980s and 1992.

This study has emphasized the danger of relying only on 'surface' statistics because of the possible involvement of the so-called ecological fallacy. The technical concern in this study was how a Western method could be applied to Korean electoral data. This concern was met when the program was redesigned by the developer as mentioned above. In the course of analysis, this technical concern has been tested and generally supported. In other words, the ecologically estimated voter mobilities in regional and national levels are generally acceptable in their percentages and shifts (pattern of party support) of voters. It is desired that a comparison of ecologically estimated voter mobilities and survey estimated mobilities be conducted in order to have more meaningful analyses of electoral behavior.
It is also desired that cross-cultural comparisons be made using the same method to contribute to understanding electoral dynamics. This study has shown that scientific methods are applicable to foreign countries which have different cultural and political traditions. This study is only a part of a future project on comparative electoral studies.

**Theoretical Significance**

An important theoretical concern here is that the direction of electoral dynamics might be regulated by a society's own political culture (the Political Culture Regulation Theory). This framework has been used in explaining and analyzing electoral behavior (including nonvoting) and patterns, political party performances, and the merger phenomenon. The assumption about the role of political culture in the Korean political scene has been tested and accepted, at least in part, in this study.

At this point, it can be concluded that party performance, frequent amendment of the electoral system, and changing party alignment are the major factors leading to the low level of party loyalty in the elections in the 1980s. The low party loyalty and the major parties' unsuccessful electoral performances were the contributing factors to the merger of three parties (DJP, RDP, and NDRP) in 1990. All these are understood within the conceptual framework of Korean political culture. This study emphasized the utility of the concept of political culture and a relevant theory called the Political Culture Regulation Theory. It was this study's assumption that one theory cannot cover all the electoral phenomena encountered cross-culturally. The strategy here was to find an alternative model to explain Korean electoral and political dynamics in a given period of time. The
political culture model was used in a very limited way. In the literature review, it is found that most of the students of Korean political culture indicate authoritarianism as one of the important components of Korea political culture. Personalism and regionalism are also important components of current Korean political culture. Without understanding these components of political culture, it would be difficult to understand and analyze Korean politics. Through the scientific method, this study assessed the levels of regionalism, party loyalty, voter mobility, and personalism. The conclusion is that Korean political culture has influenced the electoral dynamics in the 1980s and early 1990s. The political culture regulation theory, then, has tested positively throughout this study.

Another theoretical concern partially tested here is that political parties might merge when they experience a lower level of party loyalty or a decline in party loyalty (the Merger Theory). This does not mean that low party loyalty and a decline in party loyalty always drive political parties to merge but it does imply that they are background factors behind the scenes of a party merger. This theory will be tested further in the next elections.

**Empirical Significance**

The ruling DJP’s vote-getting efforts somehow attracted one-third of the valid votes in elections. The first hypothesis of this study was that the ruling party (DJP) in the 1980s had high level of loyalty because they won consistently about one-third of valid votes. This assumption was not supported because, as the mobility tables in Chapter 5 show, party loyalty to the ruling party in the 1980s was quite low. The DJP showed 54.7 percent loyalty in 1985 but 41.7 percent in 1988. This implies a number of
things. One is that the ruling party was not able to hold their voters' support between elections. Since the 1980s, the low level of party loyalty and its further decline tacitly signaled the coming of "new" political situations of the 1990s.
APPENDIX A

A-1. ECOL Program, Version 3: History*

The previous IBM Personal Computer version of ECOL was written in FORTRAN by Soren Risbjerg Thomsen exclusively with the purpose of giving users the possibility of applying the so-called logit method for ecological inference (Thomsen, 1987). The program was a PC version of a simple batch program for mainframe with an unfriendly user interface.

The present version 3.0 of ECOL was planned in 1988 by Soren Risbjerg Thomsen as a user friendly tool for making ecological inference as well as giving other possibilities for use of election results such as presentation of local party support, election night forecasting, and ecological analysis. It is written in TURBO PASCAL 5.5 with extensive use of the toolboxes from TurboPower, called Turbo Professional and B-BTree Filer.

* Quoted from the manual of the ECOL Program
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* -1 means the missing data.
** Other includes the NKDP, DKP, HDP, other minor parties, and independents.
1-3. ECOL Program, Version 3: Var. file


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<td>Voters Eligible voters</td>
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A-4.  ECOL Program, Version 3: Modifying Record


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* In the Notes section, all information, e.g., personal career, education, occupation, community service, of the candidates who ran for the office in each district can be restored and all information in regard to the election results and performance are restored for the future reference of each candidate of each district.
APPENDIX B


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities &amp; Provinces</th>
<th>Eligible voters</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonvoters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>16,397,845</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>4,511,275</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>5,048,348</td>
<td>3,589,167</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>1,459,181</td>
<td>28.9</td>
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<td>Pusan</td>
<td>1,803,273</td>
<td>1,240,504</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>377,421</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<td>Kyonggi</td>
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<td>76.1</td>
<td>667,568</td>
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<td>Kangwon</td>
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<td>88.0</td>
<td>113,724</td>
<td>12.0</td>
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<td>Ch'ungbuk</td>
<td>788,748</td>
<td>683,514</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>105,234</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ch'ungnam</td>
<td>1,613,381</td>
<td>1,296,344</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>317,037</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<td>Chonbuk</td>
<td>1,237,238</td>
<td>1,001,060</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>236,178</td>
<td>19.1</td>
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<td>Chonnam</td>
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<td>81.0</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
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<td>2,258,089</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>514,147</td>
<td>18.5</td>
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<td>Kyongnam</td>
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<td>1,550,012</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>307,753</td>
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<td>233,956</td>
<td>199,473</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>34,483</td>
<td>14.7</td>
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</table>

Source: Central Election Management Committee, Che Sibiltae kuhhoeuiwon son'gosanghwang (Election Statistics of the 11th National Assembly Elections), 99. Compiled by the author.
### B-2. Voter Turnout in the 1985 National Assembly Elections (February 12, 1985)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cities &amp; Provinces</th>
<th>Eligible voters</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonvoters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1,123,364</td>
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<td>1,752,887</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>302,274</td>
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<td>80.7</td>
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<td>83.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>1,017,454</td>
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<td>89.5</td>
<td>107,170</td>
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<tr>
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<td>751,373</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>79,660</td>
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<td>232,864</td>
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</table>

Source: Central Election Management Committee, Che Sibidae kukhoeiuiwon son'go ch'ongnam (Election Statistics of the 12th National Assembly Elections), 95. Compiled by the author.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cities &amp; Provinces</th>
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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonvoters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td>69.8</td>
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<td>475,135</td>
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<table>
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<th>Cities &amp; Provinces</th>
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<th>Voters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Nonvoters</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>253,937</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>69,201</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Che Sibsadak kukhoeiu won son'go charyojip (Electoral Data of the 14th National Assembly Elections), (Seoul: Chosun Ilbosa, 1992). Compiled by the author.
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