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The politics of memory: Creating self-understandings in postwar Japan

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University of Hawaii, 1992
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY:
CREATING SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS IN POSTWAR JAPAN

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Dissertations, like all texts, are created out of relationships—of ideas, of thoughts, of people. Many people have contributed to this dissertation in ways that are difficult to describe and to articulate, but I feel that much of this creation is due to their individual contributions to my thinking and to my life.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the creation and use of memory in the period called Showa (1926-1989) in the place called Japan. It takes, as its point of departure, an understanding of memory, and particularly social memory, as something which is constructed and, therefore, political.

To the extent that memory is linked to self-understanding, the significance of this study lies in the introduction of a certain kind of relationship between the constitution of memory--one kind of memory to the exclusion of others--and politics. Since much of what we know in the present is shaped by our understandings of the past, and much of our self-understanding comes from the historical events which inform us, the production and control of memory is of some importance. By examining how memory is constructed, what is silenced, who gets to remember, and what is forgotten, this study seeks to arrive at an understanding of the ways in which Japanese people have submitted to and negotiated their sense of memory, of self, and of self-understanding, particularly in postwar Japan.
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PART I
SENSUAL MEMORIES
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: MEMORY IN THE REALM OF THE SENSES

The world is a sensual place. We can easily be taken back to a childhood memory by a whiff or a flash or a taste. A sense may be neutralized temporarily but that only serves to heighten it and the others momentarily denied.

Our understanding and apprehending of the world comes initially through an engagement with the senses, and our senses define the edge of consciousness by constantly testing its boundaries and terrain: we tramp through jungles; we go to carnivals; we dive to depths beyond naked human capability; we listen to loud music; we take drugs; we put our lives at risk to taste or see or feel something new.

What delights the senses varies greatly from one culture to another, and what is found appealing for one culture repels another or leaves it blank. What attracts and what is attractive in one culture may not cross over into another. Tattooing women's faces in Atearoa as an enhancer of beauty is no more strange than western women using perfumes on their bodies or tribal women rubbing dung in their hair. Cultural practices claim their own understandings of sense and sensuality. In Japan, there is a culinary delight called fugu which is a highly poisonous fish unless prepared with exquisite care. The most skillful of chefs leave a little of the poison in the flesh to give a tingle to the tongues of those who partake in the fish to bring them closer to the edge of their mortality. In
fact, there have been many known instances of those who, savoring the mysterious fish, die midmeal. A sensual death, perhaps, but death nonetheless.

What is interesting about the senses is that they not only span culture and distance but they span time as well. Our senses connect us intimately to the past, our pasts and to our memories. They don't merely recall those events and moments from our lives; they metonymically stand for an age, a place, a feeling, an event. They negotiate and assemble events into patterns, lighting on a reasonable remembrance (but not always), making delicate transactions with our pasts.

One of the places memory resides is in the senses. Some of the strongest remembrances we have of events and times of our pasts can be recollected through the smells, sounds, sites, and feelings surrounding our experiences. If we are asked to associate a certain memory with a sense, very few of us would be unable to respond. Likewise, when we are caught off guard, as when a smell wafts into our consciousness, we are caught by our own memories and associations.

Diane Ackerman writes in *A Natural History of the Senses*, "sense inspires memory, and calls us back to a place of its beginning, its point of inspiration."¹ Nothing is more memorable than the smells, tastes, and sights that we remember or which come upon us unexpectedly.

We are immediately brought back to the moment of that memory and are transported via our senses to our experience of that past.

For these reasons, it is compelling to write about memory in the realm of the senses. In ways both metaphorical and real, sensual memories play into an understanding which is shared and which is, at the same time, our own. Our minds as well as our identities rely on our senses for meaning, "making sense" of things we touch, taste, smell, hear, and see. From a phenomenological point of view, we know the world by our senses, by what can be seen and felt. So much of what the world is to us is identified by sensual remembrances with it. Those sensual memories also help to mitigate against a complete erasure of experience by those who might want to claim unilateral remembering. Social memory, the shared sensual experiences of the past, has the same power to return us to times before, and to link our senses with our experiences. However, the attempt to display and recall just one memory of an event is done at the expense of other possible remembrances. Whether or not we protest against the rewriting or appropriation of our experiences of the past, we can hardly deny our own memories of those experiences, particularly if they are linked with our senses. The sight of an atom bomb, the smell of burning flesh, the sounds of air raid sirens are extreme examples of such sense-related memories but the attempts to erase them are extreme as well. To tell someone that such events did not take place is impossible if one's link to those events is in the realm of the senses. It is like asking people to deny themselves and their own experiences.
With this in mind, it is important to take up a study of memory and the attempts to control and create it. How it comes to be that such creation and, I would venture, manipulation of memory is possible, seems critical to any understanding of social history. Showing the circumstances in which this is attempted is also of value and allows us a venue and space to speak of other meanings that this practice has. The importance of such a study lies in the understanding that we are all engaged in unconscious and conscious rewritings and reworkings of the past. For whatever reasons or purposes, the constructing of a past suitable to our presents, is an enterprise in which we all partake. Forgetting and remembering gives us who we are in the world, both individually and in relation with others. Who we are is, at least in part, how we remember. How memories are made and how they are called up relies, in part, on their proximity to the senses, and how the sensual is referred by itself to its own past.

Using Japan as a site of memory, I will explore ways of seeing, listening to, and feeling a part of history and the past, and will be concerned with how that past is made and remade, remembered and forgotten. It is not only in Japan, however, that memory is constructed and forgetting made a social practice. We are all complicit, and no society is innocent of creating selective memories about itself. Like Barthes' claim in writing his valuable Empire of Signs, it is not to search out merely the symbols of a system called Japan but to "search out the very fissure of the symbolic" that we write. Japan affords us a situation of writing, not only
about the place called Japan but about ourselves and our own practices. As Clifford Geertz has shown, a study of another culture is as much a study of our own. We come to see our own cultural practices by observing those of another. Therefore, a study of Japan is a study of the U.S. as well.

The time of exploration in this work is limited necessarily to one historical period--SHOWA--which spans from 1926 to 1989. The choice of that period is critical, for in that time, so much of what informs our present understanding of Japan was created, altered, and changed. More importantly, Showa was a period of great disruption and change for the Japanese themselves and for their self-understandings that have since emerged. How Japanese people made sense of the events in those times and how they now recall them is of great value to study. In imagining the ways in which people respond to and interpret their pasts, we are asked to reveal our own--to interrogate our own understandings of Japan and of ourselves, to self-consciously think about what it is we do in this activity of remembering, and to suspend judgment and conclusion about others who do the same. To look on the past as memory, and memory as a kind of synecdoche for what we call community or society, we are inviting an array of responses which will not always favor what is done in the name of memory. To not treat memory, however, is to add to the vocabulary of silence and to retreat to uninspected versions of the past. For Japan, this silence has had consequences which are being felt at present, and which threaten the future for itself and for its relations with the world. It is not only in Japan that we find
this to be true for we are reaping the same effects for our own silencing efforts. It is not possible here to compare the various cultural enterprises of selective remembering and forgetting; I will leave that for a later work. If we consider Japan as a case study and acknowledge that the practices of engagement with social memory are not unique or peculiar to this one culture, we will gain much more from this study than a mere exposure or condemnation of one culture's practices. We may see that we are reading a story about ourselves as well, remembering that no society is innocent of creating memories about itself, either as a conscious enterprise or as a simple forgetting.

**Imagining Japan**

**Fragrant Memories**

My first memories of Japan are fragrant. It was upon my father's return from the Occupation of Japan with boxes of Satsuma vases, Mikimoto pearls, and other spoils of modern war that I, as a five year old, was given the gift of a porcelain doll, wrapped and wrapped again in beautiful tissue and with an unforgettable fragrance.

I was struck with that fragrance. To say I was intrigued would probably be romanticizing a bit but standing over those tissue wrappings with a mysterious, sensuous fragrance wafting up to my child's nose I was left with a feeling which I could not dispel or forget. The memory of that fragrance was to stay with me for years after and was to be recalled when I was living in Japan in 1966 and a whiff of that same lovely smell would come through the open doors
of shops I passed. When I would enter and inquire about the fragrance, the merchants would look bewildered and could give me no answer. Over the years, the fragrance became a sort of metonymy for me—representing "my" Japan and lingering in my memory—since its impression on me had been so great.

Like my own romance with Japan, writers and others have let fragrances, fragments, and memories come to represent Japan—the whole, the TRUE, the ONLY version of Japan. I found this to be so when, in graduate school in Japanese Studies, I began to note the different Japans that existed in the interpretations and perspectives of my colleagues and professors. I found it intriguing and disturbing, as I wanted my imaginary Japan as much as they wanted theirs. There were debates and dismissals, contending stories and interpretations, and dominating and quiet understandings. After years of struggling with this realization, I found that I had to make a conscious attempt to cling less closely to my own interpretations and to be aware of them as the constructions that they are.

This led me to thinking about constructed narratives and their competitive ways. In going back and forth between Japan and America for the last 25 years, I have been afforded the opportunity to raise some of those narratives from my memory and to see how they look in the light of present-day Japan. Some look very tired, some have held up well, some smell better than others and some literally offend. Memories which have held their own were not always the ones I preferred, and some I struggled against violently. Others I continue to resurrect upon occasion. This struggle, however, is not just my
own. Other writers of things Japanese have troubled over which of the multiple Japans to favor, to study, to interpret. Which narrative is chosen has as much to do with personal preference and choice as anything else. Anyone who is attempting to interpret one's own or another's culture deals with such decisions at some point in her or his writing.

In James Clifford's "On Ethnographic Authority," such problems are illuminated. Clifford highlights the developments in studies of "exotic peoples" in the field of anthropology, from the "participant/observer" model (a la Evans-Pritchard and Margaret Mead) to a more "interpretive" approach (Geertz). The problems that Clifford addresses involve who has the right to speak and how things are spoken. There is a constant struggle over ownership of ideas and interpretations, and the authority to speak them. Any attempt at writing seems to do a violence to someone or something, he writes, or to question authorship and authority.

The attempt to write about memory and, more specifically, about social memory, brings up some of these same problems for the writer as well as for the audience for whom it is intended. What legitimizes the writing, the interpretation, the author? Who is writing, and with what authority? From whom is the writing?

Bakhtin writes that language (and writing) "lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word is half someone else's." There are, he writes, "no neutral words or forms--words and forms
that can belong to no one; language has been completely taken over, shot through with intentions and accents."²

And so it is with this writing. Like any writing, then, this one in the end, will be shot through with my own intentions. I don't pretend otherwise. It will also be made from many voices. It represents speaking subjects who interact in a field of multiple discourses. It writes of culture, of behaviors, beliefs, understandings of people. It is intended to be a heteroglossia, drawing from a multiplicity of social and private voices with their links and interrelationships. As Bakhtin writes, "culture is, concretely an open-ended, creative dialogue of subcultures, of insiders, and outsiders, of diverse factions . . . a carnivalesque arena of diversity."³ It is meant to be inclusive of diverse ideas and voices, to allow for the speaking of different ways.

This work is an interpretation. It is made from those different ways, different readings, different forms of seeing. It is an invention, since any interpretation is also an invention, a creation of culture. It is not an innocent act. It is a text to be read, not a conclusion to be deciphered or defended. Roland Barthes who, in defense of text and of its writing, calls it paradoxical ("beyond the limit of the doxa") and metonymic rather than comprehensive and


³Ibid., p. 265.
conclusive, claims that it is "the activity of associations, contiguities, carryings-over which coincide with a liberation of symbolic energy." It is "multiple, irreducible, coming from a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives ... and nevertheless woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony."\(^4\)

Among the disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives of this text, there are those which will be identified as the main streams that flow in and out of the work. Certain ideas and understandings inform this writing and several theoretical impulses emerge at different points. I will be referencing those along the way.

My rhetorical strategy, straight out, owes a debt to what, in Japan is a genre called the "I-Novel"--a personalized, interpretive style which, without embarrassment, and with great use of anecdotal story-telling, brings the reader into a personal engagement with the subject(s) of discourse by the use of the first person. The evocation involved in this strategy establishes a mood and creates images as well as expands notions of what constitutes theory so that stories and evocation can become theory. This results in a blurring of the "theoretical" and the "empirical" and allows for a telling of the

story through a first-person narrative deployed to make theoretical points.5

This strategy decision arose from contemplation of the following problem: attempts by writers to interpret others' lives and stories leave them open to suspicions of intent and authority. The possibility of dismissal or critique increases, too, with a subject as volatile as memory. If the reader (and the writer) can remember that this is one of many possible stories, chosen carefully but subjectively, it need not trouble the reading. I will heed the warning that Barry Lopez gives via cultural anthropologists.

Whorf, Boas, and others urged people . . . to see human culture as a mechanism for ordering reality. These realities are separate, though they might be simultaneously projected onto the same landscape. And there is no ultimate reality--any culture that would judge the perceptions of another, particularly one outside its own tradition, should proceed cautiously.6

Proceeding cautiously, there is still the problem of otherness and positionality which needs to be addressed.

Claims made by native writers that those not born of the culture cannot fully understand and therefore, cannot represent that culture, call for some recognition and debate. It is true that there are

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5I refer the reader to James Clifford's Writing Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) in which several writers deal with this strategy and its justification. Particularly relevant to this discussion is Stephen Tyler's piece "Post-modern Ethnography: From Document of the Occult to Occult Document." Also Dorinne Kondo's Crafting Selves (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) for a successful and interesting use of this strategy). I owe a lot to her challenges to the discourse and to her critical and engaging style.

6Barry Lopez, Arctic Dreams, p. 275.
cultural messages and understandings that may escape the view of the writer. But, this does not seem to be just a problem of the Other, the colonizer, the non-native, the white, the Westerner. It resides as well in culture with differences in the ways of seeing arising from the frames of reference of the particular writer or speaker.

This can become so disenabling a problem that one cannot write nor speak, either from within or from without. The concern becomes: are there not ways to write, self-consciously or reflexively that do not trouble those about whom the story is being told? Is it only by reporting and restating the views of Japanese writers that we can be allowed to speak, or is it possible for the outside gaze to have worth and to be spoken about? Is this only a problem for the gaijin or foreign observer? Can, for example, the Burakumin (or outcast) speak about what it is to be Japanese? Can the Ainu? Can the farmer in Kyushu or the salaryman in Osaka? How do we struggle with this so that the work is not dismissive or dismissed? How can we talk about a national identity or a self-understanding of any group (even our own) without the problem of offense? How can we speak about without speaking for another? These are questions or concerns that can paralyze or mobilize a writer. By writing first from the "experiential" we are able to insert authority of our own experiences and to draw from them to make our theoretical points. By introducing ourselves into the story in some way, it becomes obvious that that is what we do, make a story.

There is also the concern with audience. For whom is one writing? With what authority can claims be made to the reader? The audiences
to whom this writing is intended are multiple as well, ranging from those "experts" of the subject at hand (e.g., those who live it), to those who claim some privilege in talking about what it is (Japanologists or those who turn their intellectual gaze that way), to those familiar with and engaged in political discourse and writing. The various audiences, too, will be foregrounded at different places in the writing and I will signal those places as best I can. Perhaps by the end, none of this will matter in that the writing is known to be privileging one interpretation—allowing and excluding, valorizing or romanticizing. I think the issue is to make an interesting story, one that respects the subject without glamorizing it, that critiques AND cares, that is aware of the currency or poverty of claims and ideas, and writes anyway.

The Politics of Memory

Much of my impulse to write this has come from my own personal struggle to have a relationship with Japan. From the time of childhood, my interest has resided there. It has not always been a comfortable match, but the attempt to understand how things come to be in that culture has occupied a great deal of my thinking. This struggle to relate led, at one point, to my retreating, to "forgetting" Japan, with the return some years after, to recall, recollect, and mourn. Changes in culture had proceeded without my partnership. I couldn't find home there any longer and nostalgia entered. Like a teenager, I grew angry at it for not being what I had imagined it to be and to reject, unreflectively, what it had imported and ingested
along the way to postmodernity. This was not a complete rejection. Rather, I clung to some unforgotten images, and attempted to adjust to those which had found their ways onto this cultural terrain. My impulse to research Japan, to rewrite my own memory of it (not rejecting my former memory but adding to it) has become an overriding one. In it, I have found a part of myself, revealing of my own memory and constructions.

A political impulse has been involved as well in this writing with an attempt to add to or change the subject of memory by interjecting another way of talking about it, and by asking different questions about it. The attempt is not only to reveal certain structures of power and meaning, but to interpret them as well. The questions of power and knowledge emerge, but how power and knowledge are conceived and held in Japan are also worthy of note.

A larger politics is engendered in the writing as well. It has to do with the question of forgetting and of evasion, on the part of the ruling bodies in Japan. How did it come to be that certain social constructions of reality have prevailed, and how have certain memories come to represent the only telling of past stories?

The question of how Japanese people have come to their own self-understandings is interrogated in light of overarching desires to make one story. How Japanese people have processed events in order to make sense of them to themselves, what things affect their

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7Postmodernity, signaling demise and negativity because hope is no longer a category, locates Japan (perhaps correctly) in a world at the abyss.
collective or individual memories of those events, and what role memory plays in the resultant understanding become points which are addressed. Acknowledging writers who have struggled with some of these issues, I have looked at some of the narratives which offer understanding and questioning of the issues of memory, as well as the attempt to gesture towards those places of silence and lack: for where and what they hide. They speak as well.

The understanding of memory is another impulse for this writing. Memory is understood here as something which is socially constituted and variously represented; as a means of self and national understanding; as personal and shared constructions of reality. The politics entailed in the construction of memory reside in the "hows" of that construction. How does it come to be that selected memories dominate and are naturalized while others disappear or are accorded little sympathy? How are memories and images of the past conveyed and sustained? And, how are memories politically created and made acceptable to the general society? If we agree that our experience of the present depends to a large extent upon our knowledge of the past, then the use of that past and the production of it for use, becomes a valuable subject of study. The images of the past help to legitimate a present social order, and the extent to which the memories of a society converge, the more assumptions and understandings can be shared and the easier it is to manipulate the now. Different sets of memories, quite often in the shape of implicit background narratives, encounter each other and compete for legitimacy, and how
those competing narratives are accommodated or subsumed is also part of this work.

A genealogy of memory from the Era called Showa (1926-1989) provides a way to understand the Japanese present since it was during the initial stages of this historical period that a deliberate pursuit of "modernity" took place, and the construction of one social memory appeared as a conscious enterprise or even as an affair of state. Where and how this construction appears in the social life of the people is of particular interest to me, and a choice of sites, events, texts, and people honored by (and forgotten in) memory has been consciously sought out and made.

There has been little attempt on my part to draw conclusions about the constructions and silencing of memory. It is enough to denaturalize or destabilize current thinking on memory in Japan, and to raise questions about how it came to be that such constructions exist.
CHAPTER II
SITES OF MEMORY

If we were able to live within memory, we would not have needed to consecrate lieux de memoire in its place.

Pierre Nora

In a recent issue of Representations devoted to Memory, Pierre Nora introduces the idea of lieux de memoire--sites of memory--where memories converge, condense, conflict, and define relationships between past, present, and future.¹ In this piece, Nora writes that we create lieux de memoire because we no longer live in a world suffused with memory. He suggests that the interest in sites of memory has occurred at this particular historical moment because we are at a turning point where consciousness of a break with the past is bound up with the sense that memory has been torn, and "torn in such a way as to pose the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical continuity persists. There are lieux de memoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer milieux de memoire, real environments of memory."² Examples of the

¹Nora tells us that the term "sites of memory" owes its origin to Frances Yates' The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), which traces the tradition of mnemotechnia. This classical art of memory which was codified by Cicero and Quintilian, taught orators to remember by associating their topoi with some part of a real or imagined building in which the speech was to be given--the columns, the furniture, etc. The art of memory, then, was founded on an inventory of memory places, loci memoriae.

sites of memory that Nora describes are commemorative events and monuments, ethnographic records, national symbols, literary confessions, and physical locations where monumental memory resides.

Nora ascribes to memory the privilege of the Sacred, and of Remembrance, and frames it against History whose goal, he says, is not to exalt but to annihilate memory. Memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects whereas history binds itself strictly to temporal continuities, to progressions and to relations between things.

Like Nietzsche, Nora finds disturbing the attempts to write history over memories and the attempts to privilege that writing. He laments the loss of memory and its replacement by history, by the historical writing and representation of events, sites, and people. It is memory, he says, that dictates while history writes; history inscribes a border around a domain of memory and in so doing, often revises and replaces memory to serve some pedagogical or political end.

Nora writes about memory as "traces"—much like Freud's memory traces—as fragments which are "sifted and sorted," and frames it against history which he claims is "dictatorial, commanding, unself-conscious." In speaking about memory and history in this way, he creates a rupture between them. He argues that we must work to maintain memory in order to stave off the writers of history who would rob us of it. Each historian, he says, is convinced that his or her

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3Ibid., p. 8.
task consists in establishing a more positive, all-encompassing and explicative memory, and is unsettled when confronted with the historiographical task of tracing alien impulses within history itself and discovers that history is the victim of memories which it sought to master. That is why history has sought to become the self-knowledge of society, and to relegate memory to a purely private phenomenon. The attempt to have memory survive only as a reconstituted object beneath the gaze of critical history is to drain from it its life. That is why many of the institutional sites of lieux de mémoire seem beleaguered and cold—they mark the rituals of a society without ritual. They originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, and pronounce eulogies because such activities no longer occur naturally. Nora suggests, however, that there are places where memory does survive: "True memory has taken refuge in gestures and habits, in skills passed down by unspoken traditions, in the body's inherent self-knowledge, in unstudied reflexes and ingrained memories." He also suggests there still exist sites, sacred and symbolic, that maintain and serve to bring memory back to life. He adds that it is essential that we seek out those places which hold meaning and memory, and relegate those delegated as official sites of memory to the status of monument or memorial. He warns that "the less memory is experienced from the inside the more it exists only through its exterior scaffolding and outward
signs, through official lieux or sites.⁴ The purpose of such official sites is often to allow only one version, one memory, one history. But, he says, lieux de memoire are created by a play of memory and history, by an interaction that results in their reciprocal overdetermination. It is not just that one site is sacred and untouchable and the other tainted by history but that there is a meeting of the two and an appropriation of the one for the other. It is by exploring the interaction between the two that we discover their oppositions: the one is dominant and the other dominated; the official lieux (sites) are usually, Nora says, "spectacular, triumphant, imposing and, generally, imposed--either by a national authority or by an established interest, but always from above," whereas the other, more personal, consist of "places of refuge, sanctuaries of spontaneous devotion and silent pilgrimage, where one finds the living heart of memory."⁵ It is by looking to those places that have been consecrated as "sacred" by the political order, and those to which people are personally called to search for memory, that we can illustrate the idea that sites of memory hold the possibility of being both sacred and politically profane.

In Japan, the distinctions between the sacred places of memory and the official lieux de memoire are no more clear than they are anywhere else. That which is held to be personal and that which is imposed has become so blurred that there is a necessity to rediscover

⁴Ibid., p. 13.

⁵Ibid., p. 23.
and reassert what is considered sacred before all memory is lost and all that is left are official sites of memory. It is by exploring how those places in the landscape that have been designated as sacred and those that are constituted as *lieux de mémoire* have come to be that we can begin to distinguish their difference. It is by seeing how those which have been officially sanctioned have come to overtake many of those which are alive in the people's memory, and by identifying those which maintain their sacred stature that we might understand better the *lieu* and the *mileux* of memory in Japan.

**Japan: Sacred Places/Symbolic Landscapes**

A Lakota woman named Elaine Jahner wrote that what lies at the heart of the religion of hunting peoples is the notion that a spiritual landscape exists within the physical landscape. To put it another way, occasionally one sees something fleeting in the land, a moment when line, color, and movement intensify and something sacred is revealed, leading one to believe that there is another realm of reality corresponding to the physical one but different.⁶

Not only for hunting peoples is the physical and the sacred contained in one space. For the Japanese as well, places in the landscape symbolize a relationship with the sacred, the religious. The fleeting moment when the sacred is viewed or revealed expresses the sentiment of the Japanese in their understanding of and relationship to the world.

Allan Grapard notes that throughout most of their history, the Japanese have had a mythic conception of their land and have expressed this in a number of diverse ways. One way in which this vision has found expression has been through the "establishment of a sacred geography." This geography and its sacralization of space is a complex, syncretic activity which is related to the Japanese conception of time and the relationship between the sacred and the profane, and has seen development over the historical moments of Japan's long history.

Grapard describes three categories of sacred space in Japan: the "sacred site" which is a well-structured, clearly defined space seen as the residence of a divine spirit (kami); the "sacred area" which emerged in the course of the interaction of Shinto and Buddhism, and which is a more extensive geographical area than the sacred site, usually consisting of the territory covered by a pilgrim during a religious pilgrimage; and the "sacred nation" which includes all of Japan from both a physical and a political point of view, and which could be expanded to include the universe itself.

The notion of Japan as a sacred land may be traced back to the earliest chronicles in the Kojiki (A.D. 712) and became important in the Kamakura Period (thirteenth century) when Japan faced the threat of Mongol Invasion. It was during this period that the term shinkoku ("divine nation") came into being. This term and all that


8Ibid., p. 196.
it connotes was used politically many times during Japan's history and has significance which we will come back to later.

Fujitani Takashi reminds us that "all nations have their 'sacred places': national cemeteries, monuments to commemorate significant events in the official national history, palaces and other official residences of royalty and heads of State, shrines to the gods of the national religion, and public statuary celebrating national heroes." 9 Although these are "sacred places" of a different sort, they represent what has taken the place of the religious or the symbolic in most societies. The link to the religious life of the people is tenuous in these sites, and the national or the military is foregrounded. In Japan, as well, this has taken place but it is out of a spiritual tradition that such sacred sites first emerged.

It is the spiritual tradition of Shinto, from which the Japanese notion of "sacred site" springs. Shinto or "The Way of the Gods" is based on the belief that there are spirits or deities residing in the land, and the topographic is mapped as a sacred text.

There is no "bible" associated with Shinto, but rather a kind of almanac which indicates the sacred sites of the gods and spirits. 10

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10 Byron Earhart in Religion in the Japanese Experience, Sources and Interpretations (Encino, Calif.: Dickenson, 1974), tells us that regarding kami, in addition to the general sense of sacred ... the specific meanings of kami should be noted. They are: spirits and deities of nature; the spirits of ancestors (especially great ancestors, including emperors, heroes, wise men and saints); superior
The Yengishiki ("The Foundations of Shinto in the Yengi Period") describes how a place comes to be denoted as sacred in Shinto, and highlights the processes for sanctifying the designated site. The sacred place or seichi is determined in many different ways: By going to places where mythological events were supposed to have taken place and consecrating them as sacred; by locating spots designated in a dream or vision and sanctifying them; by being near the tomb of an Emperor or a venerated person; by proximity to an element in nature (by the sea, at the peak of a mountain); by geomancy or divination. Certain places call forth the kami spirit (mitama), and others are determined to have a need for a kami. Those places that call forth the spirit are already felt to contain that sacred essence, and it can be felt upon arrival at that spot. In those places where it is felt there is a "need" for such a spirit to be, a ceremony is performed to call upon a spirit to reside there (ji-chin-sai).

Memory is imbedded in these sites, and histories crafted around these places. These sites are always visible and take on special focus at times of religious ceremony. Some of the ceremonies are

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human beings in actual human society, such as living emperors, high government officials, feudal lords, etc.; the government itself; that which is above in space or superior in location or rank; 'the upper times' i.e., antiquity; God; the hair on the human scalp; paper" (p. 12).


12 Ibid., pp. 338-358.
of a magical nature which make possible the suspension of current
time and the creation of new life, in the spot. This suspension of
time will show itself to be of importance when we discuss how time
is understood and how the sacred is manipulated and used. The sacred
site is untouched by human activity and, hence, is seen as a space
whose nature is Other (not belonging to common categories of experience
within the profane). 13

National ceremonies derive much of their ability to influence
and evoke national sentiments by utilizing the symbolic power which
inheres in these places. Political leaders attempt to fashion a
ritual topography for the performance of national ceremonies, thus
transforming the symbolic landscape into a national one. For example,
Tokyo, Kyoto, and Ise became a major constellation of sacred sites
during Japan's long history and continue to exist as such in some
people's minds. It is worth looking at this constellation to under­
stand better the relationship between sacred places and appropriation
of them for politics.

The Constellation of Ise, Kyoto, and Tokyo

Ise is the resting place of Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess and the
site to which the emperor goes in time of great celebration or great
unrest. At the beginning of the war, Hirohito travelled to Ise to
ask the blessings of the ancestors and of Amaterasu, and it was to
Ise as well that he travelled at the end of the war to apologize for
Japan's failure to win the war. The Imperial entourage makes an

13 Ibid., p. 200.
annual pilgrimage to Ise as well as other progressions during the year, and these processions have continued since the Heian Period. They were made much of during the beginning of the Meiji Era and became part of the master plan of nation-building. Ise became the "most official" shrine and local shrines were subsumed by and indebted to it. Local matsuri or festivals often became mediums through which the masses participated in national ceremonies centered at Ise. Matsuri became significant in creating and redirecting attention to national events rather than regional ones, and local folk beliefs and festivals became co-mingled with official ideology with Ise as the sacred center.

Kyoto, on the other hand, was and still continues to be in some ways, the symbolic center in the constellation. As the teito or "Imperial Capital" from the Heian Period (seventh-eleventh centuries) up until the 1880s, Kyoto embodied tradition and enjoyed courtly stature long after the Imperial court had physically moved to Tokyo. It was held in such high esteem that even after Tokyo had been designated as the ritual and administrative center in the 1880s, the Imperial House Law of 1883 stipulated that the imperial rites of accession must continue to be and must always be conducted in Kyoto. The 1990 accession rites of Akihito were the first to break with that law.

14 These progressions were referred to as junko. There is much written about the processions and procedures surrounding such junko and the role they played in sanctifying space and focusing attention on the imperial family. See Takashi Fujitani, Japan's Modern National Ceremonies: A Historical Ethnography 1868-1912 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
The Meiji leaders understood the symbolic significance of Kyoto and began to remove the Imperial body periodically to Tokyo, a mute city with little ritual and even less sacred significance. In the Imperial Edict of 1868, the emphasis was put upon the need for the Emperor's presence at both of the two cities in order to unify the nation. Therefore, Emperor Meiji was strongly encouraged to embark on what came to be called the "Six Great Imperial Tours" (Roku Dai Junko). This was seen as a juncture between the Sacred order and the people. The Emperor worshipped at what were designated the sacred places in the national landscape, beginning in Kyoto and ending in Tokyo.\footnote{Ibid., p. 13.} He met with local political leaders in those places as well as conferred medals and awards upon loyal citizens and government supporters. Such progresses served to diffuse the symbols and emblems of nation, as well, which were to become the common elements in the idiom of public rituals: The hinomaru (the Rising Sun Flag), the kiku mon (the Chrysanthemum Crest), and the hinomaru chochin (the imperial lantern). Through the glitter and pomp of these processions, the Emperor was in Geertz's terms shown to be the center of symbolic societal significance, and he began as Geertz has put it "to take symbolic possession of the realm."\footnote{Clifford Geertz, "Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power," in \textit{Local Knowledge} (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1983), p. 125.} His own real significance, however, was questionable and the progresses stopped when the
governing elites had finally prepared Tokyo to become the symbolic and ritual center of the nation, and when they decided that they needed the Imperial body in residence strictly in Tokyo in order to sanctify and legitimate that Center. Kyoto then became merely the representation of the Imperial family's and the nation's past as Tokyo became the center of modern state rituals. The governing elite used Kyoto only when there was a need for the regime's legitimacy, and conferred upon Tokyo the title of the Modern Center. To give it symbolic weight, and to justify having the Emperor headquartered there, a magnificent palace was built and conferred with the title of Imperial Palace (Kyujo) in 1889. Thus, Tokyo became another sacred center in the symbolic topography of Japan. The constellation then could be seen as: Ise, representing the nation's link to a mythical past; Kyoto, the historical past; and Tokyo, its possibilities of the future.

How places came to be determined as sacred and symbolic in the Japanese mind, then, reveals more than a religious impulse. It has much to do with the creating and sanctifying of particular sites for purposes of politics. It also relates to what constitutes special places in the social memory. Annual rituals surrounding certain sites as well as the continuous pilgrimages to them reveal their continued place in the symbolic landscape of Japan and their place in memory. By returning again and again to the same sites, designed as special or sacred, the people were reinforced with the idea that these places did, in fact, embody a certain spirit.
It is in this last instance that certain locations have been used in an explicitly political way to justify and sanctify political acts and locations. Of these, there are some which continue to exert an influence on the people by conflating the political and the sacred. Yasukuni Shrine, for example, is one of the most potent of these.

**Yasukuni, Uyoku, and the Valorizing of Memories**

Originally designated as a resting place of the war dead, Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has become one of the most controversial sites of memory and politics. The original name of the shrine was Sho-kon-sha (long o in sho), from sho, "to summon," kon "spirit," and sha "god-house." It was a house of the gods into which the spirits of the dead were summoned to take up residence, or into which they were called by mystic spell in appropriate ceremonies. The shrine was built in 1869, a year after the symbolic center of Japan was shifted from Kyoto to Tokyo. Up until that time, the war dead were enshrined in Kyoto, and the idea of deification was not prevalent. After 1869, those who gave their lives in "holy wars" were "deified" and enshrined at Yasukuni.

The name of the shrine was changed to Yasukuni, "Shrine for Establishing Peace in the Empire" in the Meiji Era and became the


18 All wars became designated as holy after this time since they were fought under the supreme command of, and in the name of, a divine emperor.
symbolic head shrine for all such deaths in the name of the empire. Ties between the shrine and the imperial family have always been close, with periodic visits by the emperor and with designated dates (April 15 and October 22) for services in honor of the war dead. People hold their own memorial services there as well and revere the shrine as a sacred site.

A professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo lost his position in 1938 after it was discovered that he had questioned the ethical issues connected with the deification of the war dead at Yasukuni. His questioning had been voiced eighteen years earlier and went unnoticed until the times necessitated surveillance of impudence and treason. It was then that his statements reignited the ire and concern of the ruling bodies. It was then, eighteen years later, that he was dismissed from his job.

In more recent times, the same issue of deifying those who gave their lives in the name of the Imperial Order and the silencing of those who would speak blasphemies against them, has raised concerns among some that a reversal or return to such symbolic uses of power in the creation of social meaning is dangerous and could signal a reconstituting of military energy.

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19 Yoshino Sakuzo, professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo, wrote an article entitled "Jinja Suhai to Dotoku teki Ig1" ("The Ethical Significance of Worship at the Shrines") for the Chuo Koron journal in December 1920. This article was resurrected by the Teikoku Shimpo newspaper in September 1938, eighteen years later, and the professor was subsequently accused of insulting the Emperor, the national structure, and the sacred spirits who had died for a holy cause. He was dismissed from the University and blacklisted by the press and the government. He never regained his stature nor position.
The pilgrimages of Prime Minister Nakasone and other government officials to Yasukuni Shrine as part of state ceremony have added to the criticism and fear that such displays constitute reverence for the warrior and homage to war. The valorizing of the war dead and their memories, although possibly construed as a reasonable extension of ancestor worship, presents a wide variety of problems.

Before and during the War the shrine was used by the military to actually promote patriotic and nationalistic sentiments by their ceremoniously going to the shrine before going off to combat. It was felt that the spirits of the ancestors enshrined there would guide them into battle, and anyone not attending such services before battle was severely reprimanded or punished. The provincial shrines to the war dead were enlisted in recruiting people to attend the ongoing ceremonies and in financially supporting the head shrine at Yasukuni.

After the war, the government was compelled by the Occupation authorities to terminate all support for Yasukuni Shrine, and it was converted into a private religious organization. In the mid-1950s the Liberal Democratic Party, the Bereaved Families Association (Nihon Izokukai), and other conservative groups launched a movement to provide government support for the shrine. Every year since 1969, a bill for support has been submitted to the Diet but intense opposition to it has come from the Socialist and Communist parties, Buddhist organizations, peace groups, Christian activists, and

\[^{20}\text{Ibid.}\]
prominent intellectuals. The fears and memories bound up with this shrine are still far too real to allow for such support.21

The uyoku or right-wing activists in Japan have made Yasukuni a sacred center, and as guardians of the shrine, they attack those who would deface or protest at the shrine. Incidents of such attacks abound in the press, particularly around the April and October events. More than protection of the physical space, the uyoku function as keepers of the memories at Yasukuni, and it is not unusual to find one of its members dressed in World War II uniform standing in the shrine grounds, at attention, as if awaiting the return of Tojo or one of the other military officers collectively enshrined there in 1969. One is captured by these images when visiting Yasukuni, and it is more than reminiscences about the war that one feels when wandering about the site. It is the valorization of the memories, and their use by the right wing in a way which is both disturbing and fascinating. The search for "place," a place in the post-war society, comes to rest with Yasukuni. In the meaning project of post-war Japan, the veterans of the Pacific War (many of whom are part of the uyoku) have little place. They belong to a past that most Japanese would just as soon forget or erase, and they are the living reminders of the impossibility of doing that. Their memories are not honored, nor, for that matter are they. What they did for the love of the emperor is now seen by many as fanatic at worst or at

least complicitous with a military gone mad. Most Japanese put up with their ravings for they do not always stop at mere heckling but have opted for retribution and violent attacks. Most Japanese citizens do not honor the uyoku or the past that holds them. This does not mean that the Japanese populace are willing to explore that past in a critical way. On the contrary, there is a will to forget and to erase that past and the loudspeakers of those vets will not let them.

During the illness of Hirohito, the uyoku's usual loudspeaker declamations fell silent, and the groups were seen praying fervently at Yasukuni and at various shrines around the country for the recovery of the emperor's health. At the same time, they attacked the government and the Imperial Household Agency for forcing the aged monarch to go on with his official duties, which they claimed ruined his health. When leftists voiced criticism of the imperial institution at this time, rightists responded with violence. In one instance, seven members of a right-wing group assaulted a Japan Communist Party headquarters in Ehime Prefecture, and in another incident, a local branch office of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper was broken into and a smoke bomb thrown in as a protest against the newspaper's report that the emperor was suffering from cancer. This last incident appears rather strange but in Japan, cancer is never announced as a cause of illness. The cancer patient is never told if she or he has cancer.

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So, for the media to publicly break this taboo in the case of the emperor was a very significant act. Even the Imperial Household Authority, who had kept the real nature of the emperor's illness secret, protested to the Asahi after the report appeared. This protest refers, too, to the keeping of one particular image of the emperor intact and alive. The announcement of the nature of his illness somehow implicated him in mortal acts and made his sacredness a bit harder to believe.

In another incident involving the Right Wing in April 1988, Okuno Seisuke, director of the National Land Ministry, attended the shrine's spring festival, where he commented, in reference to China's objections to visits by Japanese Cabinet members to the shrine: "Forty-three years have passed (since the end of the war), and yet, the Japanese people are still being twisted around the finger of Deng Xiaoping. It is very sad." His remark drew such strong reactions from the Chinese and Korean mass media that there were protests in the streets of those two countries. They declared that Okuno was among the governing officials who were still trying to deny Japan's responsibility for its aggression on the continent before and during the Pacific War. Okuno responded that the war was not one of "Japanese aggression" and that the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident had been "accidental." This caused such an uproar in both China and Korea that on May 13 Okuno was forced to step down from his Cabinet post.

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23 Takagi, p. 8.

24 Ibid.
The uyoku welcomed and supported Okuno's remarks as honest and courageous and held rallies to demonstrate their agreement with him. Their protests increased with Okuno's resignation and with Prime Minister Takeshita's decision not to visit the shrine on August 15th of that year.

The violence and terrorism of the uyoku is not new, however, and is in fact, a distinguishing feature. These men have been associated with assassinations of government ministers, opposition party officials and anyone else they have deemed "unpatriotic." In 1987, a young man entered a branch office of the Asahi Shimbun in Osaka, fired a shotgun into the office staffroom, killing one reporter and injuring several others. A group claiming responsibility for the shootings sent Tokyo news agencies a statement declaring that the Asahi was attacked for being unpatriotic and unsupportive of the emperor. In another terrorist attack, a young rightist stabbed a member of the Socialist Party and when sent to the juvenile detention center, he hung himself, leaving the slogan "Long Live the Emperor" scribbled on his cell wall. All of these actions were carried out in the name of aikoku (lit. "love of country") which allows for only one version of patriotism and one form of love. It also includes one kind of reverence for the emperor, a kind which allows for no dissent.

The emergence of a new, younger right-wing force in Japan has added another dimension to the right wing's role as upholders of the emperor system and those wishing for a return to traditional values. The younger nationalists, calling themselves minzoku-ha dantai or
"nationalist groups" to distinguish themselves from the old guard, have done such things as rallying for the dismantling of the Yalta-Potsdam system. Their rationale is that if Japanese people are ever to regain real autonomy, it would be necessary to do away with the post-World War II international order dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union (as set up under the Yalta agreement concluded in February 1945 by Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill). With the recent changes in the USSR, their fervor has subsided. They continue to rail against the anti-emperor, anti-nationalistic ideas that became entrenched in Japan during the Occupation as a result of the Potsdam Declaration (issued in Potsdam in July 1945 by the U.S., Britain, and China). They are opposed to the postwar Constitution, the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, and generally, to those they perceive as Establishment (politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders). Unlike the Old Right, they do not look nostalgically to the prewar militaristic period but toward an older traditional rendering of Japan. Splits in the ranks of the uyoku with these younger rightists responding in ways even more radical than their elders, have caused concern among many that the right-wing base may be widening and becoming more diverse and will not be limited to those who had their living memories in the war and who will soon disappear. It is unlikely that right wing groups will disappear in the foreseeable future, or that their reverence for and protection of the emperor and the past will cease. As long as Yasukuni stands, the memories inhered within will remain and call attention to themselves in the national imagination. Yasukuni will remain a sacred
site for right-wing protectors of the Empire, young and old, and will continue to draw controversy and criticism to it and to those who find within it symbolic significance.

In addition to Yasukuni Shrine, there are two other sites which call attention to themselves in the imagination and memory of the Japanese people as well. These are, of course, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These two sites, perhaps more than any others in the landscape of Japan, signify Japan in the postwar era. The meaning of these symbolic spaces, however, is subject to great yearning and debate. The place of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the social memory is not yet settled, and their significance as yet undecided. There are, however, gestures towards meaning and ways of thinking about these particular sites of memory for the Japanese that would be of interest to us here.

One way to talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki is in terms of atonement. For whom it is atonement and why atonement can be a possible reading is worthy of some detailed discussion.

**Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Politics of Atonement**

Higaisha/kagaisha--victim/aggressor--are two terms which plague the memories of many in postwar Japan. Where to locate themselves vis-à-vis World War II--as victim or as aggressor--seems to be one of the most compelling issues in Japanese people's minds currently. Debates about the two positions have raged through the Japanese landscape since the end of the war, and there still seems no end to the arguments and questions about the war and the Japanese "place" in it. This is especially true when there are the sites of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as reminders of the difficulty to decide.
In the Japanese way of thinking, though, the idea of "victim and aggressor" is also not as clear as it might be in English. If we look at the work of Dorinne Kondo, for example, and her discussion of the Japanese Self as relational, or at Takeo Doi's conception of Amae or "dependence" as the basic structure of Japanese interactions, we can see the difficulty in creating such tight boundaries around these terms. The relation between the two terms is more fluid in this way of thinking, and this fluidity is expressed in such common sayings as "If you are robbed, it is one-half your responsibility" or "Even the robber has a 30% justifiable reason for robbing you." Such expressions indicate the intertwining of self and other in interactions among the Japanese. This way of thinking also adds to the difficulty for Japanese people in locating themselves as either "victim" or "aggressor." In a sense, they are both in this conception, and this makes the decision about where to locate the self difficult. In these two sites, however, it appears that the desire to distinguish is at play. Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be seen as being represented, remembered, and used politically, in a very distinct way.

When entering the Peace Parks of each of these memorials, one is struck with a feeling of remorse, not only as an American and

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25 I would submit that the term "interdependence" is a better translation of the term Amae than "dependence" because the relationships of power and need shift according to the situation. For a full discussion of this way of thinking, see Dorinne Kondo, Crafting Selves (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), and Takeo Doi, Amae no Kozo (Tokyo: Kodansha Intl., 1986).
therefore, somehow implicated in the events, but also as a world citizen witnessing something rather unreal and unassociated with our lives. There seems to arise the same feeling in the Japanese as well.

In Japanese writings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki there is a wealth of information about the devastating effects and ramifications of the atomic bomb but there hardly exists in those writings any attempt to discern how the sites have come to have meaning in the national self-understanding of Japan, and how they have been appropriated for political use. Also, they do not touch on how or why the bombings occurred. This aspect is left virtually untouched. In its own way, Hiroshima (and Nagasaki to a lesser degree) has become a constructed "sacred site."

One way in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be seen as "sacred" (in this case, as sites which are used in a subversive way), is to see them as "sites of atonement" for the Japanese. How this is so, or how they can be read this way is revealed in several different ways: through the annual "peace ceremony" conducted by government officials; by the annual "peace declaration" prepared by the Mayor's office in Hiroshima and distributed throughout the country; through the creation of a "peace museum" which highlights the devastation of the atomic bombings without a word about or reflection upon the events leading up to that disaster; and by continued reference to both Hiroshima and Nagasaki when Japan is confronted by foreign others about wartime atrocities. By remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki only as sites of devastating disaster, and by not reflecting on what may have led up to the bombing, the Japanese government has been able
to utilize the sites and the events to deflect criticism of contemporary practices and to evade questions of guilt and responsibility of wartime activities. The absence of such reflection, however, reveals something anyway. If the representation of the Japanese as higaisha or "victim" is maintained, what preceded the bombs can be more easily atoned for. The constant reminder of "what happened to the Japanese" at Hiroshima and Nagasaki mitigates against any discussion of what brought about that horrific event, and prohibits even raising the issue in the reading of the site. If, however, the kagaisha image dominates, the one which reminds the Japanese that they participated in the Rape of Nanking, the March of Bataan, or other atrocities of the Pacific War, then that past becomes hard to ignore. The national will to amnesia is supported fully at the Hiroshima/Nagasaki sites, representing the Japanese only as the suffering descendants of the victims of an atrocious act.

The annual "Peace Ceremony" held on August 7th at Hiroshima and August 9th at Nagasaki contribute greatly to the higaisha or victim imaging. Having been invited to attend the event in 1988 by the Mayor of Hiroshima, I was given the opportunity to witness firsthand how the emptiness of the official ritual overtook the potential for real contemplation and remorse. Arriving at the "Peace Park" at 6:00 a.m. I was overwhelmed by the numbers and variety of people from all over the world, sitting in meditation, walking through the park with banners calling for the end to nuclear arms, the end to war, the end to Japanese imperialism and so on. There were American Indians, and Tibetan monks, and young and old people displaying a number of
different attitudes and expressions around the event of Hiroshima and the site of its memory. At 7:55 a.m. the official ceremony began and we were ushered to the foreign "dignitary" section up in front, right next to the government "dignitaries." I wondered where the hibakusha, the survivors, were since it was they who should be honored more than any of us who were designated as "honorable." Their absence was striking as was the absence of any reflection or display of genuine emotion about the ceremony and its reason for being. Others have commented on the emptiness of the "official remembrance" and it is all too easy to dismiss it by saying that most government events of this sort are empty of meaning. There is something compelling here that calls for more exploration and questioning. The fact that this event takes place with as many foreign dignitaries participating as Japanese themselves, and that an annual peace declaration is produced, translated and distributed world-wide, and that no hibakusha are central in the ceremonies, leads one to ask: for what and for whom does this event occur? The possibility that such an event allows for atonement for the Japanese looms ever larger when one realizes that there is no space in all of this for any discussion of why the bomb was dropped, and no tolerance for questioning the intent of the ceremonial events. Protesters at the periphery of the park are quickly silenced by the police who lurk everywhere, awaiting the possible protests. Anti-war groups, anti-emperor groups, and any others unrecognized by the authorities as having a legitimate voice are diverted onto the side streets and are not allowed to enter the heart of the park, particularly while the
official ceremonies are taking place. Instead, scores of schoolgirls with postcards reading wishes for world peace and questionnaires asking how we foreigners feel about war and weapons, freely run the park, assigned by their teachers to speak to foreign visitors on these matters. One comes away from it all feeling rather empty, as if there should have been more and realizing that the emptiness is purposeful. The visitors generate their own sadness from within, stoked by displays--graphic and horrendous--in the museum which stands prominently in the park, a two-storey structure that houses shadows, and skin, and children's paintings of their own sufferings, but with no explanation as to why the event took place and what went before. The will to forget is great in an environment such as Hiroshima, packed as it is with emotional weight of its past. However, in recent discussions between Japan and her neighbors (especially China and Korea), the collective will to amnesia has not been able to be sustained. Demands for acknowledgments of and apologies for Japan's past aggressions have worked against the national forgetting which is a disease that Japan has yet to cure.

In a recent anthology of short stories on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, edited by novelist Oe Kenzaburo, such an acknowledgment is clearly made. Oe writes that efforts have been made and challenges continue to be faced by a wide range of citizens' groups on how to comprehend the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and how to get Japanese people to accept responsibility for their happening. He says: "Citizens' movements and literary treatments of A-bomb damage and suffering have not all focused solely on the 'victim' approach to interpreting the
bombings. The 'second-generation survivors' (children of those directly affected) were the first to acknowledge clearly that Japan and the Japanese were aggressors in the Pacific War that brought on the atomic bombings, and, before that, in Japan's war on China. Oe notes that these survivors and their various organizations have actively sought to make this stance public by introducing resolutions to the legislatures of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to the National Diet, and to embrace the concerns of various non-Japanese persons, particularly the large numbers of Koreans who were in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 and also suffered atomic death, injury, and damage. He notes that the movement has expanded to join Pacific-area peoples in protests against nuclear contamination of the Pacific Ocean by aggressor nations, including Japan (for nuclear waste dumping). Naomi Shohno, in her accounts of the atomic survivors entitled The Legacy of Hiroshima claims that the movement of survivors and their supporters numbers about 700,000 people in Japan. While this number does not represent the majority of the Japanese population, it also does not suggest that the entire nation is sleeping or is unwilling to remember. It suggests that such a movement is attempting to make it impossible for others in Japanese


27 Ibid., p. 11.

society to forget. Even if there is a will to forgetting in that country, both external and internal forces are working to make sure that such collective amnesia cannot persist.

In *Atomic Aftermath*, a collection of stories about Hiroshima and Nagasaki as sites of memory, the overriding theme is one of remembrance. The way of remembering, however, is one which invites critique of the governing forces of wartime Japan. Each story has an implied or explicit criticism of the forced silencing of the Japanese populace during the war period, and of the lack of voice of the imperial monarch both during the war and after. Many of the stories display a reverence for traditional things but each is acutely aware of the manipulation of some of those traditions in the war.

Aside from these movements and this anthology of writings which openly question the responsibility of the Japanese in the war, there are few records which do not still desire to see Japan as the eternal victim in the post-atomic world. By perpetuating this stance, even those who would critique the militarists allow for these two sites to be cast in the light of the sacred and for the Japanese governing bodies to use them, perversely, for atonement.

Edward Casey in *Remembrance*, a phenomenological study of memory and place, makes a distinction between "place" and "site" that is helpful in the discussion of atonement as a possible reading of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Casey refers to the "memorability" of a place, the quality that endears one to a specific, unique location. It is in these places that the divine is remembered, experienced,
and placed in imagination. It is in these places, too, that the imagination apprehends the sacred and considers it in memory.29

Casey also describes the "verticality" inherent in the structure of such places. In his thinking, in such places there is a vertical connection between worlds, the connection and striving of spirit.30 In the Japanese context, in Shinto ritual, the kami or sacred essence is invited to "come down and take up residence temporarily in the sacred place," after which it descends to yami, the world of shadow.31 Hiroshima and Nagasaki are devoid of that sense of spirit or of the divine. The structures are not spiritual, they are museums of past horrors. In Casey's analysis, Hiroshima and Nagasaki are "sites." He draws a sharp distinction between place and site, noting that "site lacks the particularities, the specific characteristics of place that disclose the latter's power, its place in dream and memory. Think of the difference," suggests Casey, "between being in a landscape and becoming sensuously attuned to it, versus gazing at it on a map. Site is like the map, a 'modification' of place, in the sense of lacking spirit, power, and memorability."32 Hiroshima and Nagasaki do not lack memorability; however, it is a memorability which is manufactured, and has become a useful site for deflecting attention

29 Ibid., p. 90.


31 Ibid., p. 89.

32 Ibid.
and responsibility for what preceded and led up to the need for those sites. Casey observes that: "Sites modify places by leveling them down, razing them, or making them into something which lacks a connection to the divine." The annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the atomic bombs was aided by the construction of concrete structures, which creates them as part of a "psychic topography" of memory. Structures such as the Peace Museum of Hiroshima or the Memorial Mound of Nagasaki or the "A-Bomb Dome" in the "Peace Park" (the partially destroyed remains of an industrial exhibition hall left as a monument to the destruction of Hiroshima) are all examples of the erasure of memory and the creation of "sites of memory" for political use. These structures intentionally remind the viewer of devastation, both through the eerie mood of the half-corroded steel scaffolds of the dome, sending us immediately back to the day of the bombing, and through the display of human skin and hair and teeth that forces us to feel "real" memory of the bomb. These things do not allow for analysis of what led up to the bombing. They do not ask: "what happened here that caused this?" These sites have a sense of "placelessness," partially because of the cities themselves having been leveled in the destruction, but more importantly, because of their artificiality, their creation as "sites of memory." The intent is to bring people there to feel the destructiveness of nuclear bombs, and to deflect the questioning and criticism that also inhere in those places. This is not to say that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are only sites,

33Ibid.
manipulated by those in power, but to suggest that that reading is also possible and is one which is not usually offered for consideration.

In a return to the original discussion at the beginning of the chapter, the distinction between history and memory aligns with the distinction between "place" and "site." In Pierre Nora's treatment of history, one gets the feeling that history is a legitimation not only by and of the past but of the future as well. If history has become the "self-knowledge of society" as Nora suggests, and has replaced or transformed the tradition of memory and relegated it to a purely private phenomenon, then the society could not conceive of places to "anchor its memory." History can be seen, then, in Nora's terms as: "the controlled exercise and creation of a 'true memory,' and the reconstitution of a past without lacunae or faults." Nora laments that memory has been wholly absorbed by history's meticulous reconstitution. History's vocation is to record; it delegates to the archive the responsibility of remembering. It is what Liebnitz calls "paper memory"--"an autonomous institution of museums, libraries, depositories, centers of documentation, and databanks." This has resulted in what Nora calls the "veneration of the trace." As traditional memory disappears or is overtaken by history, we feel obliged to collect remains, testimonies, documents, images, speeches, and any visible signs of what has been, to "furnish

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34 Nora, p. 8
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 13.
some proof to who knows what tribunal of history."\(^{37}\) The archive has become the deliberate and calculated secretion of lost memory, adding to life "a secondary or prosthetic-memory" and producing the clearest expression of the terrorism of history. History has created the need for private memories and has resulted in the preoccupation of the individual psychology of remembering and a completely new economy of the identity of the self, the mechanics of memory, and the relevance of the past.\(^{38}\) Nora reminds us that the less memory is experienced collectively, and remembering is left to historians, the more it will require individuals to undertake to become themselves "memory-individuals." This will have the effect of creating a "will to remember," rather than allowing the personal to fade in favor of the historical "memory." Nora finally suggests that there is an unconscious organization of collective memory that it is our responsibility to bring to consciousness, and to not allow history to "become our replaceable imagination."

To return finally to Barry Lopez and to his poetics of memory, and to the relationship of memory and place, we are left with:

Over time, small bits of knowledge about a place accumulate in the form of stories. These are remembered in the community; even what is unusual does not become lost and therefore irrelevant. These narratives comprise ... an intricate, long-term view of a particular landscape. And the stories are corroborated, even as they are being refined upon by members of the community traveling between what is truly known and what is only imagined or suspected. Outside the place this complex

\(^{37}\) Nora, p. 14. \(^{38}\) Ibid., p. 15.
but easily shared "reality" is hard to get across without reducing it to generalities, to misleading or imprecise abstraction. The perceptions of a people wash over the land like a flood, leaving ideas hung up in the brush, like pieces of damp paper to be collected and deciphered. No one can tell the whole story.39

I might hasten to add that those least likely to tell the whole story, and who portend to, are those who write history over memory. There is a need for other memories of the site to become part of collective story, rather than the one privileged by history, and to "brush history against the grain" to reveal something different or new.

In an attempt to retrieve those memories and perceptions and to access private memories, perhaps we need to have another way of seeing, another location of people's own experiences, to recover lost memories and to allow for the recalling of past events that have contributed to self-understanding of the Japanese people.

One of the sites which, surprisingly, reveals memory and meaning for the Japanese, is the Pearl Harbor Memorial in Honolulu, Hawaii. How this works as a site of memory, and how it contributes to self-understanding among some Japanese people is worthy of our discussion next.

CHAPTER III
ANOTHER WAY OF SEEING: PEARL HARBOR AS MEMORY

Just before my father passed away, he came to visit me in Honolulu. Before he came, he called to tell me that the one thing he wanted to do while visiting here was to go out to Pearl Harbor. I had been living in Hawaii for about ten years and had yet to visit the war memorial at Pearl Harbor but my father, having been a Navy Commander and very intimately involved in World War II, wanted very much to go out there and view it.

When he arrived, the first thing we did was to arrange for the tour. We set out for the National Park Service site, perused the exhibits, saw the film, and rode on a navy boat out to the wreckage of the U.S.S. Arizona, one of the ships sunk during the December 7, 1941 attack. When the boat approached the memorial, I noticed three young Japanese women carrying bouquets of flowers and looking very visibly upset or moved. I became completely taken over by them, wondering how they were feeling, what this all meant to them. I was also slightly surprised and impressed that they were there at all.

When we walked onto the ship, these young women took their flowers, found the "altar" on board and went to lay their flowers there. A man behind us, about my father's age, remarked quite loudly that "we don't need any Japs here." I felt my neck and ears redden and I wondered why he had needed to say that. I was only surprised for a minute, however. When I thought about it I remembered that
many in America hold personal memories, sadness and anger about the event of Pearl Harbor, and that this is a symbolic site of remembrance for them. But what was it for those young Japanese women? Had they lost someone there as well? Was it remorse that brought them there, or was it out of a feeling of responsibility for a national act of long ago? I could not answer it for myself and it left a distinct memory in me.

This incident came back to me in thinking about Pearl Harbor as a site of memory for Japanese people and I decided to interview Japanese visitors who tour the Arizona Memorial. I saw it as an opportunity to explore some important questions, particularly about what it means to people who come to visit it everyday from Japan. As things happen, I chanced to meet the curator of the Arizona Memorial Museum at Pearl Harbor, and told him of my interest in the site. He invited me out to the Arizona Memorial to tour the museum. The museum houses a collection which is quite detailed and comprehensive, including a Japanese version of the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

I inquired about the possibility of interviewing Japanese visitors to the memorial. I explained that I wanted to elicit their comments and feelings about the event and the site, and since it was the 50th year "anniversary" of the event, the Park Service saw it as an appropriate and important thing to have done.

The Interviews

I began the interviewing of Japanese tourists to the Arizona Memorial in January of 1991. Using a "Terkelian" approach (a la Studs Terkel), I set out to hear the stories of visitors, talking both to
those who had their living memories embedded in Pearl Harbor and to those who were and are the recipients of the historical telling of the event. At a later date, I began including the stories of American visitors as well as I saw the opportunity for some comparative analysis and because of the wealth of stories that I was receiving from those Americans--vets, survivors, and others--just by my being out there. I use these interviews in order to illustrate some points regarding memory and its making, and not to create a statistical account of those visitors. I can make no claims to have selected a representative sample and the results do not constitute a statistically valid or reliable population.

I began the interviewing with a set number of questions which had to be approved by the U.S. Department of the Interior in Washington, DC for I was interviewing on federal property. Certain questions were removed, unallowed to be asked. Among the questions rejected were those which asked about comparisons of the Pearl Harbor memorial and those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was felt that such questions were sensitive and would best be avoided. I asked the same core questions of everyone I interviewed and then allowed for personal embellishment or for the conversation to take its own lead. Many of the stories that appear here resulted from one or another of those initial questions, as remembrances sparked by the asking.

My interviewees occupied a range of ages and occupations as well as geographical locations. For many of the interviewees, this was the first time they had visited the site and for some, it was the first return since that infamous day.
Some of the parameters of the interviews included: an attempt to locate those visitors who had made a conscious effort to come to the site, by hiring a car rather than being part of a tour; a decision to contact as wide a range of people as possible, including those of various age groups as well as attempting to include as many women as men; a plan to get as many diversities in the sample as possible including the various hometowns of the respondents as well as educational achievements and occupations. I also tried to include as many people as possible who would have had their own memories of the event and the historical moment.

In terms of the interviewing method, itself, I tried a variety of ways of conducting the interviews, after discovering that some things worked better than others. For example: I carried out the interviews orally and then attempted to record the results after I had completed the interaction; I later created a one-page written form that I asked people to fill out and then spoke to them casually after they had completed the form; I would explain to them my intent in carrying out these interviews, including the topic of my dissertation and then I would ask my questions. I would also sometimes tell them my own views on the memorial, on my own government's attempts to rewrite history (in the case of the Japanese interviews) and my feelings that no society is innocent of creating memories about itself. I did this to put them at ease since many of them had been warned not to visit the memorial in 1991 because of the sensitivity of the 50th anniversary. I did this also to deter them from offering me only tatemae, expected responses, to my questioning.
The fact that I am able to speak and understand the Japanese language was essential in my being considered "more legitimate" by the Japanese respondents. In addition, I was required to wear a National Park Service uniform since I was being sponsored by the Department of the Interior and I was on their site. This had, I believe, two effects: One was that it allowed me to approach the visitors with some "legitimacy" and they would be more apt to respond to the idea of being interviewed. The other was that it separated me from them and made me suspect and Other. The "authority" of the uniform inscribed on my body a kind of message which didn't let the visitors ignore my presence nor comfortably refuse to respond. I had very ambivalent feelings about this aspect of the interviewing since I felt there was an invasive quality to the uniform and by extension, its wearer, that I had to overcome. I did, on occasion, carry out interviews without my uniform in order to ascertain differences in their response, and I did note some distinct differences in those responding. Some were more hesitant to engage with me, not knowing who I was or what I represented. Others were more relaxed and willing to talk with me and to more freely express their emotions on the subject. There definitely was some observable difference between my being an official or a normal Other. There were instances where people did not want to participate in the interview when I wore no uniform and, on the other hand, there were times when my wearing "civilian" clothing made the interaction easier.

I did several other things in order to observe how people responded (this is primarily in the Japanese interviewing case) which
are worth mentioning. I engaged two Japanese friends of mine, a middle-aged man from Wakayama, and a middle-aged woman from Kyoto. These two friends carried out interviews independently of me, using the same questions as I did. We did this in order to learn if there were differences in responses from the people interviewed. There were some which will be noted as the stories are told. Generally, the Japanese man (true to stereotypic assumptions) was able to generate more **honne** (inner feelings), particularly from the Japanese men whom he interviewed. The Japanese woman was able to elicit very interesting comments and stories from the women she talked with. This is not to discredit my own interviews but to add other dimensions to the interviewing process as they became obvious to me. And, they did make a difference, in some instances, in how much people were able to speak to their own experiences and feelings.

In the case of the American people interviewed, my uniform had some effects as well, some of them disturbing and uncomfortable for me. An assumption of patriotic zeal led some of the American respondents to engage in "Japan bashing" and denigrating that became difficult for me. In other cases, there was a real contemplation about war and its evil ways, regardless of who the victim or aggressor was. There were times when I felt a spirit of compassion coming from the American respondents but there were other times when I was ashamed of my own culture with its "kick butt" mentality that won't allow in others what we excuse in ourselves.

While I am aware of the limitations of my methodologies in this project, I believe that the responses of the people who were
interviewed shed considerable light on not only the event of Pearl Harbor but on the construction of memories of the event and its makers. I nearly always came away from the interviews with two feelings: a renewed sense of sadness about the possibilities of human destructiveness, and a feeling of shared understanding and compassion for suffering incurred during war.

I interviewed approximately 280 people over a nine-month period, half of those being Japanese citizens and the other half being Americans. They ranged in age from their early twenties to late seventies with a few in their eighties. They represented both urban and rural areas and, in the Japanese case, I was able to talk with people from all four of the main islands of Japan. Although I made an effort to have a gender balance, more men ended up being interviewed than women. There were some identifiable characteristics of the various groupings, particularly in the category of Age, although they are not statistically generalizable. People's stories differed greatly within the loose categorizations and there were some surprising similarities among groupings such as in Japanese men and American men of the same generations (60-70 year age group, particularly). Although this is probably not unusual I found it fascinating in light of the cultural distinctiveness of the two groups. War, in a perverse way, creates a shared moment for those who participate in it, and results in memories which hold in all of the participants' hearts.

What were some of the memories and meanings that I discovered from all of these interviews? What were some of the questions asked and what did they provoke in the people asked? What were the
surprising answers that I got? And how does this relate to the politics of memory and remembrance?

The memories and meanings that emerged were quite compelling. For some, it was the worst day of their lives and it had taken them fifty years to confront it and to come and see the site; for others, it is a line out of history, a paragraph in their readers which tells them nothing of the causes or effects; for others, it is a site which provides an opportunity to critique their government and their culture by extension, calling the event "hidei" ("horrendous") and sugoi ("ghastly" or "heinous"). For many, it is a place of curiosity, like some foreign dream, out of a Hollywood film. A 1989 Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper survey in Tokyo asked what the words "Pearl Harbor" meant to Japanese people, and revealed the two most prevalent responses were "Honeymoon Spot" and "Golf Tours." The range of understanding, emotions and response about Pearl Harbor, then, is extreme and extremely interesting.

The questions that I asked were basically the following:

1. What was the reason that you came to Pearl Harbor today?
2. What meaning does Pearl Harbor have to you?
3. What did you learn concerning Pearl Harbor when you were a child?
4. What kinds of things did/do you see in the newspapers and media about Pearl Harbor?
5. How do you feel (What do you think) about the Arizona Memorial?
6. Concerning the site and its exhibits, what are your impressions?

7. How do you feel about the 50th Anniversary?

**Results of the Interviews**

One of the first things that surprised me in the interviews was that the Japanese visitors continue to come to the Pearl Harbor Memorial in spite of warnings issued by tour companies and the media about the sensitivity of Americans regarding the bombing of December 7, 1941. In 1991 there had been a conscious campaign among tour operators and journalists to highlight the anniversary events and times at Pearl Harbor and to indicate when visits to the site would be dangerous. Nonetheless, Japanese visitors continue to come to the Arizona Memorial site. In fact, according to the Monthly Visitors Report produced by the National Park Service, more Japanese tourists have visited the Pearl Harbor site every month of 1991 than for the corresponding months of 1990. Even with the Gulf War reducing overall visitation figures, the numbers reflected a higher number of visits. When I inquired about this, the Japanese interviewees would respond variously: some would relate the fact that this is the one and only time in their lives that they would be in Hawaii, and that they felt they must come to see the site; some felt that it is important to come to respect the dead and the grieving survivors; some said that the event had little to do with them personally but that they wished to express their country's sorrow; some would personally apologize and reiterate the familiar "it is because of
America that Japan enjoys such material wealth now" and that they wished to convey those feelings. Some would admit that Pearl Harbor was just part of their packaged tour and that it held little interest for them. There were times that tour operators out at the site in the early morning would admit that they were waiting for the Bishop Museum or other tourist sites to open and had brought the tour out to the memorial to "kill time." The tourist discourse accounts for many of the visits, as Pearl Harbor is one of those places "to see." Reflection about what it means does not enter into the thinking of much of those visitors. It is just part of the "Hawaii circuit" of things to do. This surprising fact illuminates what, for many, Pearl Harbor "means."

For some younger Japanese tourists, in their thirties and under, Pearl Harbor is a site of critique. They would speak critically of their government and business leaders and I would hear the oft-spoken phrase "makete, yokatta! ("We lost and it was a good thing!"). This statement, to me, reveals a critique not only of present-day practices and leadership but also of that which led to a near-fanatical madness in wartime Japan. Madness came in various ways, from believing too much what the military and media said, these young people say, to having to remain silent because of fear of retribution or death. Madness kept itself shut in for a long time, and only lately have people been able to say what, for so long, was unspeakable. The death of Hirohito, of course, unleashed dormant critique and anger as well
as some unbridled outbursts that have led to arrests and some injury.\footnote{I refer here to the shooting of Mayor Motoshima of Nagasaki which is detailed in another place in this writing, and to other attacks by right-wing groups. I would also like to include the responses to the shooting of the mayor and to other acts of violence which one could see daily in the Japanese press and on the nightly news.}

For some others, a resolve not to be silent any longer has led them to come to Pearl Harbor and to be willing to voice their feelings and critique.

For some it is a sense of place that brings them there. If they were alive during the war, it has real tangible, sensual memory. For some, it is an actual "sight of memory." For others, it is the desire to make peace with their own pasts, with the past of Japan that is being so vigorously debated inside and outside of Japan, and a desire to actually look upon the site of one of the most important wartime events. There are common responses that I received. Nostalgia for a time and for their own places in it, a chance to think and to reflect upon the bombing, the war, and on war and peace in general are motivations that are given. For some, it is for omoide, for remembrance or momento, to say they "have been there" that they come. For others it is to witness a site of Japan's militaristic past, a reminder of a past which has no place in the meaning project of present-day Japan. Those who so vehemently exploited Japan's people for the idea of Empire or for their own military motives, or for the supposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity are not forgotten figures.
from that past, but neither are they valorized nor made heroes. There is little identification with them, and even less recognition of them as part of what constitutes Nihonjin today. What it means to be Japanese in postwar Japan does not include, to any large extent, that element of military madness that guided Japan into defeat some fifty years ago. The right-wing uyoku who wish for a return to the Imperial ways are generally scoffed at when they parade through the major cities of Japan in painted vans, covered with slogans and the rising sun, blaring out messianic messages over loudspeakers, calling for a return to an Emperor-centered, militarily-motivated Japan. They are considered more nuisance than anything else. But they are a force to be contended with for they don't always stop at blasting out warnings to the people on the streets. They have engaged in acts of violence, the most recent being the shooting of the mayor of Nagasaki, and they see no wrong in carrying out terroristic activities in the name of the Empire. Their longing for that past is a nostalgia without meaning in Japan today. The disjuncture of the war, the fracture with the past, has its manifestations in many different corners of that culture. The sense of self and of the nation which was so badly broken by the events of the war, has rendered many in Japan fearful of the lack. Most Japanese do not know who they are anymore, and for a culture which depends so much on continuity and constructs of an essential Japanese self, this is quite disturbing. To quote a Japanese friend of mine who said, "In Japan, life comes
with instructions,\textsuperscript{2} for the Japanese the loss of the plans, the understandings of designs and structures which identified them as Japanese is quite profound. For many of the older Japanese, particularly, this loss is acute. They could not pass on many of the things that made them. Immediately after the war, they were told they could not. They could not study their history, they had to give up artifacts (swords, Imperial regalia, and any other things which could be identified as having links with that past). Even the myth of origin was deposed, disposed of on January 1, 1946, when the Emperor spoke for the first time in public history, to announce his disclaimer of divine descendancy. What did the Japanese do with that information? Where did they go?

Some have said they retreated, retreated into an exercise of \textit{uchi/soto} where they could make Other those figures of the past.\textsuperscript{3}

To create the wartime military as "outside" (\textit{soto}) of public space,

\textsuperscript{2}Rodwic Fukino in a conversation on February 14, 1991.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Uchi/soto} literally means "inside" and "outside" and refers to social distance or closeness. Those who are closest to you are considered \textit{uchi} and include, for example, family members, company co-workers, college classmates or club members, or any other membership linkage that distinguishes one from Others. Dorinne Kondo describes them in the following way: "\textit{Uchi} and \textit{soto} are contextually defined. They are not fixed kinship-based entities. They depend to a large extent on the 'other' against which they are set, and there can be room for individual play and choice. . . . That is, making those choices is constitutive of different kinds of relationships and different degrees of intimacy and distance, inside and outside. But of course, the range of choices is highly restricted, constituted in advance, and so constructed as to permit a certain amount of play and perhaps subversion and change at the margins" (Kondo, \textit{Crafting Selves}, p. 152).
and outside of relational importance, postwar Japanese could more easily dismiss or erase those wartime leaders and feel no identification with them. If those heroes of the past were to remain uchi--"inside" public space and social relations, then they would remain connected and inexorably linked with postwar Japan. They would have been one and the same "Japanese" and this would have proven difficult for the reconstruction of self and nation that was necessary after the war. To make the wartime leaders and military "outside" meant that the postwar Japanese could begin anew from "within" to define themselves and their nation. While it is difficult to conceptualize this distinction, it is probably a little more understandable if one thinks of the "homogeneity" of the Japanese being relieved by the construction of social distance and closeness through this notion of "inside" and "outside." There is a view in Japan that sees the nation as a whole as "inside" but there is also the contention that there are subgroups within that "inside" that oppose and are distinguished from that "harmonious one." There is flexibility in the boundaries of this paradigm and that offers the possibility of maintaining social integrity and order. The distinction between "in-group" and "out-group" is not peculiar to Japan, however, and Max Weber's famous distinction between Binnenmoral and Aussemnoral is one such example of its existence elsewhere. In the U.S., the distinction has been widely known since W. G. Summer published Folkways in 1907. In the case of Japan, however, the boundaries of "inside" and "outside" shift according to the situation, making one group "uchi" (inside) at one time and then "soto" (outside) at another.
Militarists attempted to appropriate this conceptualization to create the idea of nation, and then later to expand it beyond Japan's national borders. The desire to absorb neighboring Asian countries led to the use of the inside/outside distinction (Asia vs the West) and resulted in the establishing of Manchukuo and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The idea of uchi/soto, then, helps to explain how so many Japanese visitors to Pearl Harbor were able to say "kankei nai" ("it has no relationship to me") when I asked them about the bombing and its effects. Even if they were alive on December 7, 1941, "kankei nai" is still possible through the distinction made between themselves (as uchi) and the military decision-makers of the Pearl Harbor event as soto. For a nation that prides itself on its unific voice, this distinction may be hard to believe. Yet, it is there and serves as a mechanism for distinction and for social distancing. It is a protection from being swallowed into the national "we."

Individuals can see themselves as separate from the whole of nation in the uchi/soto construction. Perhaps it aided them in their postwar struggle to survive and to find a way to live with themselves and their memories.

Other people have suggested that another term, tatemae, explains what happened to the Japanese during and after the war and in their

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relationship to their national past. The ability to "accept" and to appear to have accepted a change even so extreme as the Emperor's divine loss derives from the social practice of tatamae. Tatamae includes saying and doing things which others expect, and does not always reflect the sayer's own intent or feeling. Tatamae is used all the time in social interactions and is considered a matter of social grace. It is understood and accepted as a social practice. Everyone in Japan, from the Emperor on down, engages in tatamae. Some have felt that the Emperor's disclaimer on January 1, 1946, was itself tatamae, an expected response to a request of those in power, and not, in fact, his own desired response. Tatamae is a social distancer as well as a way of maintaining social order. People are expected to respond in formalized patterns (called kata), without letting their own feelings enter into the conversation. They achieve a supposed harmony in the public domain by formulaic expression and stance, and this formula for success in Japan also helps in the maintenance of the social order. So, whatever the deep feelings are for Japanese people regarding the Pearl Harbor event or the entire Pacific War, common parlance would indicate a unific voice and feeling on the subject. It is difficult to penetrate to the heart of feelings about the War but when one is able, the resulting stories are more than just revealing. They are moving and intense, locked away for some time and powerful upon expression. It is to some of these expressions that I would now like to turn.

In the course of collecting stories from Pearl Harbor visitors, some particularly profound feelings were expressed as well as
amazingly detailed recounts of the event and people's participation in it. One is struck with the vividness and immediacy with which some of the respondents recalled their wartime experiences, and insights tumble out of the whirls of the conversations that we carried on. For some, it was a coming of age, a loss of innocence, not only for themselves but for Japan and perhaps the world as a whole. Not that things prior to World War II were idyllic and pure, but World War II brought the "exotic" face to face with the "familiar." The Other was too unreal to be human, in the minds of some, making it easier to kill them and not be so concerned about their deaths. This thinking was aided by a propaganda campaign led by the government that imaged the enemy Other as demon or animal (badger or ass), and allowed for their extinction to more easily take place.

For many Japanese people, it was the first interaction with westerners in their entire lives, and so the propaganda fed to them was palatable. They could picture Roosevelt with fangs or Churchill with a tail and imagine that when confronted with the enemy. For some, it was something quite different that caused them to take life. It was a sense of kinship that drove them to kill, a desire to protect and be protected by their fellows, and not so much out of patriotism or bravery or duty to their country. As in any man's war, seeing a buddy killed before you or hearing of the enemy threatening your family creates a desire for revenge. For many of the men I interviewed and met at the 50th Anniversary events, this was precisely the case. Hearing from their officers that American troops were invading the
homeland, they were moved to fight to their deaths to protect that which was sacred to them.

Whatever the reason for killing, one thing is certain. The war changed the world as well as these individual soldiers. Neither Japan nor the United States was the same after that war. For the Japanese, there was a definite fissure left in the terrain, of a physical as well as a psychological sort. For many, this fissure is obvious in the stories recounted and in the faces of their tellers. It is evident in the ways that the events of the war, and in this case, Pearl Harbor, are remembered and retold. For some, there is a desire to forget and to let the memories be put to rest. For others, the telling gives them rest. There are many who have rewritten the memories to their liking, and there are some who choose to let their memories dictate their present way of thinking. For most, it is those memories measured against the officially constructed ones of the event of Pearl Harbor that would be fascinating to explore.

I would like to relate five of the stories I received from the interviews carried out to speak more closely to the issue of memory, and in this case, memories of the event of Pearl Harbor. These stories are illustrative of the range of feelings and ambivalences that I observed in the course of my nine month interviewing project, and are born out of Japanese and American people's desire to remember and forget the event of December 7, 1941. The constructing of meaning out of such an event is obvious at all turns and reflects both the interviewees' own sensual memories of the event and the memories provided them by the institutional renderings of the past.
The first story is that of a 63-year-old man from Gumma who had been the manager of a U.S. army exchange in Tokyo during the U.S. Occupation. At the time of the bombing of Pearl Harbor, he was a teenager in school and remembers having to recite the Imperial Rescript in school which asked for the allegiance of all Japanese people to the Emperor and talked about the blood link of all Japanese to the Imperial ancestors. He could still recite it in full when I met him. After the War, he secured a job in the military exchange of the U.S. Occupational forces and through his hard work and perseverance, became the manager of the shop. He worked every day with American military personnel and every night, after work, would drink and talk with those same folks. One night, he recalls, they had been drinking pretty heavily, and he found himself relaxed enough to ask the soldiers a question. He wondered "why did your government have to drop the second bomb?" He remembers the silence of that moment and then being lifted up by one of the soldiers and thrown down and beaten very badly. When I expressed shock and sadness about this occurrence, he calmly responded: shoganai ("It couldn't be helped"). His feeling was that "there are bad men in America just like there are bad men in Japan, and there are good people in America as well as good people in Japan." He explained that he understood that these soldiers were just feeling their patriotism and that they had to feel okay about what had gone on in the war, just as Japanese people had to justify what they did, following their orders from above. No blame. He then went on to tell me that he has come several times to Pearl Harbor because it brings him back to feelings of
comraderie with American soldiers and a kind of familiarity with the military of the U.S. In an odd way, his nostalgia for a time out of his own past is intimately involved with the soldiers of the Occupation, and the memory of the story told above was profound but only part of a larger personal story of that time in occupied Japan.

In contrast to that personal remembering, a second story involves a young couple, 25 years and 24, from Wakayama, a city two hours south of Kyoto. Their telling is not of nostalgic remembering but of caustic critique of a government and military that they do not like. With a wry smile, the honeymoon husband tells me "makete, yokatta" meaning "it is good that Japan lost the war." When I press him to tell me why, he talks of the stories of his father, now dead, who silently opposed the war and wrote his feelings in a book. He tells me that his father had kept a personal diary all of his life, and that his diary from the war was confiscated by the military and he was reprimanded for writing it. His angst and his fear of the fighting and deaths went unrelieved in his inability to write them. He told his son that many of the soldiers were writing their feelings and that the military took all of their writings and they were punished. But the writers did not forget and after the war, scores of "diaries" and memoirs appeared both publicly and in private collections. Women, too, wrote diaries in the war, and one such collection of these writings was published by a Buddhist nun who heard these stories told by anguished women in her temple in Kyoto. After trying for a number of years to find a publisher in Japan to print these works, she took it upon herself to have the stories bound and
published at her own expense. Then she distributed the ten-volume set to major libraries all over the country, so that these memories will not be forgotten and lost.

The young man and his wife recalled the suffering of the soldier-father and reiterated "makete, yokatta," "good that we lost." When I asked them if they felt like elaborating, the woman answered that they felt that the government and the military had gone mad with their own power and were sacrificing the people for those ends. By losing, that power was deflated and the madness subsided. I asked them if there was any way for their feelings to be heard or if those feelings were shared by other young people in Japan. After a long silence, the husband explained that "Yes, many of my friends feel angry and want to do something, but what can they do?" Sound familiar? The young woman added, "In Japan, you have no chance to object if you want to have a good life." After living there for several years, I understood what she was saying. It isn't out of any lack of feelings that the voices of discontent are not heard. There is still such a lack of social mobility that if one were to protest publicly, one might embarrass one's company and that could constitute grounds for dismissal. That dismissal would follow that person and employment would become difficult. "Deru kugi ga utareru," a well-known expression in Japanese, meaning "the nail which stands up gets hammered down" indicates the well-known reaction to protest and "standing out" in Japan. The young woman's words, then, were not surprising at all. Reticence is considered a cultural characteristic for Japanese people, and it may well be, but there is also a history
of forced silence that makes voicing a little more difficult there. The calls to protest have historically resulted in disaster (the "Ni Ni Roku" Incident, the 1960 Ampo Protests, the 1967 Anti-War Protests, the 1970 Ampo Incidents, etc.) and so people are reluctant to speak. The repercussions are far greater than they appear to be in the U.S. and the benefits of silence greater still. One can slide through, live quietly and be indulged without great fear of being fired, left, rejected. It is not out of lack of imagination that most Japanese people do not speak; rather, it is a lack of cultural "escapes" that quiet them. There is no place to run, no place to hide. There are few margins wide enough to encase protests or protesters. And very few Japanese can escape to other cultural terrain, although it is happening more and more that Japanese young people choose to reside outside of Japan. More often, however, silence becomes the answer, and soon, even the question and questioning disappear.

Another way of handling any discomfort or protest of the war in Japan seems to be through an elevation of "facticity" over emotion. The next story surrounds what I think is such a case. Lt. Commander Yoshioka, a Japanese pilot who flew over Pearl Harbor during the 1941 attack and was videotaped after his visit to the Arizona in summer of 1991, spoke in a lively way of the event. Not with a sense of pride, not with any visible emotion over the event, but with an interest in detail, in getting the facts straight. The interviewers, both experts on the Pearl Harbor attack, listened intently as Commander Yoshioka detailed, graphically, how the ships were arrayed, how the torpedoes were lined up, etc. It was fascinating to view
this unpretentious little old man speak of his military past. There was no getting around the fact that he had been carrying out orders in 1941 and was giving his best recollection of them now. Never having served in the military nor having been forced to fight in a war, I don't quite understand how such attention to detail can take the place of or override the emotional impact of the event. There was nothing sinister about the man nor did he seem any more callous than any other veteran I have ever met. The attention to facts was, however, unnerving, especially in light of the fact that the interview was being held at the Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor. How can be account for this? How can be explain it away? Do we need to explain it away or do we need to understand it as a way of dealing with a traumatic event so that one can go on living with one's self? Perhaps it is a way of suppressing analysis, of avoiding the terror of the act. Frederic Jameson, in The Origins of a Style, speaks about the possibility of "objectivizing" an event through relating to the material "details" in language where the event itself "becomes merely necessary and not sufficient." Maybe it is none of these things at all. Attempts to psychologize or to "culturize" in a case like this can lead one into deep water, and although I'm a good swimmer, I will not venture there.

The fourth story was told to me by an American man who was with the 35th Infantry Division stationed in Hilo in 1941. He had come to Honolulu on December 6th to get an extension on his furlough and had spent the night at Schofield Barracks. He was eating breakfast at Schofield when he felt the first bomb. He thought it was regular
manuevers and that one of the planes had crashed--into his barracks. He asked someone sitting near him what it was and the man shouted, "See those red dots on the wings--It's Japs." He said everyone scrambled and somehow he remained alive. He was later shipped out to Guadalcanal and spent much of his time during the war there. Many years later, he was reading in the Guadalcanal Newsletter about the desire of a Japanese group to collect the bones of Japanese MIAs from Guadalcanal. He responded to their request for help since he knew the area well and between 1982 and 1984 uncovered 517 sets of bones out of 526 Japanese we had killed there. This man and some of his commanding officers and comrades spent two and a half years looking for the remains of men they had killed forty years before.

Later, Mr. Sakamoto, the man who had been the main force behind the search, took a trip to California to personally thank the men who helped to retrieve the remains for the Japanese. He brought gifts and letters of thanks from the families of the deceased. He said that he still wanted to find the missing nine men and felt that the bodies were located under a recreation center built near the site of the battle. He was able soon after to convince the Japanese government to have the building relocated and found the nine bodies and three American bodies which they sent to the American government.

Again, Sakamoto San came to California to personally thank the men who helped him and to bring more gifts and letters of appreciation. The man with whom I spoke at the Arizona Memorial said to me, "I wondered: why couldn't we have been friends in '41? Here's this
decent man and I don't have anything against him and yet he was my enemy."

At a military convention in 1988, this same American man decided to put up a notice on the convention bulletin board, asking vets if they had any Japanese battle flags because he remembered that Sakamoto San had had an interest in them. The man received six such flags which he sent on to Japan. He received letters and thanks from the families to whom Sakamoto San had given these. The two men remained friends and correspondents, recounting their time on Guadalcanal, bemoaning the fact that war had once made them or their countries enemies, and happy that that is no longer the case.

The fifth story surrounds the bosun's mate from the U.S.S. Arizona and his feelings about the war, the Japanese, and his experiences. After the war, during the Occupation, he was stationed at Yokusuka Naval Station and happened to meet a man who was running a laundry outside the gates of the naval base. This was not just a laundry but a sort of social service center for the people in the neighborhood. The sailors from the base would bring in clothes and other items and give them to the laundry which had a room in the back where the clothes would be taken apart and made into shirts and pants for the neighborhood children since there was so little to be had in Japan at that time.

The bosun's mate would collect what are called "saves," things left on the ships when they would return to port, and take them to "Mike" the laundry owner for his use and distribution to the neighborhood people. This went on for the two years that the bosun's mate
was stationed in Yokusuka, with Mike wanting to give something back to Dave, the bosun's mate, for the kindesses that he was shown. Dave kept on refusing the gesture since he knew how little Mike had of his own, and the bosun's mate felt that his "saves" were just his way of helping.

Finally, two days before Dave was to ship out, Mike presented him with a gift and asked him to please accept it. Dave opened the box and in it was a small gold diver's helmet. Mike had chosen this gift because Dave had been a diver earlier in the service and Mike had known this. Dave had seen such charms in the Navy Exchange and knew that they were not too expensive and so felt that he could accept it from Mike. The next day, Dave brought one more bag of "saves" to the laundry and because Mike was not in, he spoke to one of the young women who worked there. She asked how he liked the gift that Mike's parents had given him, and he answered confusedly that he had not gotten a gift from Mike's parents. The woman looked embarrassed and when Dave pushed her, she said, "Mike's parents had their wedding rings melted down to make the gold diving helmet for you." Dave told me he went home and told his wife and they both cried and cried.

The act of generosity is not unusual in Japan or in the U.S. but for both the men it had a powerful symbolism. Memory for both of a war just passed, of hatred and death and pain and loss did not overcome the humanity of either, the care of the present, of the suffering and the hurt. This story has to be told, to be remembered, for its poignancy and for balance. Balance between the "Japan bashing" and the "Japan apologizing" that has been going on of late. Mike the
Laundryman and Dave the Bosun's Mate represent more than just their own humanity; they summon up the call of humanity itself, in its best forms. Remembering that, perhaps we can find balance in the images of "Japanese" as untrustworthy or of U.S. military as monsters. Perhaps we might distinguish the powerful from the powerless in both cultures. And perhaps, we can focus upon where the power of memory lies and its will to act.
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The top half of page 78 with the poem entitled SOUNDS OF SILENCE

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Silence--Do not confuse it with absence. It speaks, in its own way--powerfully, swiftly, silently and sometimes overwhelmingly--as it did in the recent shooting of the Mayor of Nagasaki.

Nagasaki. The name evokes feelings, memories, images--of Puccini's famous opera, of the black ships of Commodore Perry, of atomic bombs. More recently, the Mayor of that city provoked images and sounds of other kinds--of issues surrounding the imperial body and its import in the life-world of Japan. The Mayor's nearly fatal speech acts focused on the place of the Emperor and his role and

responsibility in the Second World War. In addition, his words implicated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, along with the right wing uyoku and its desire for silence, and talked to the need to open up spaces for conversation about these things. By his own speaking, the mayor succeeded in expanding the imagination about what Nagasaki means, particularly in the political landscape of Japan, and challenged the silence that deafens Nagasaki.

In Nagasaki, where war memories are longest lived next to Hiroshima, and where suffering in the name of the nation and the emperor is most profound, talk about these things might be most reasonable to expect. However, there has been a reluctance to speak, to offer up for public debate those memories which appear to demand silence. Why there continues to be reticence in Nagasaki may have to do with an imposed form of thought control, a legislated silence which persists at the expense of those things which need articulation. Nagasaki is a place in a shadow—the shadow of Hiroshima, the first site of devastation and nuclear discourse—and it has remained a city as silent as a mute child, suffering from the disease of voicelessness.

Nagasaki represents one of the most symbolic sites of memory for the Japanese, and the Mayor's questioning of the officially constructed memories angered the Liberal Democratic Party officials and gave rise to retribution in the form of the shooting on that January morning in 1990.

The Liberal Democratic Party, created in 1954 by the Allied Command's ingenious gerrymandering which resulted in rural, rice-growing areas being able to command politics from their fields, is
invested in painting a landscape of the past which keeps the Emperor "residing in the clouds" between the Sun and her botanical children, and as silent as the clouds of his abode. Hirohito, posthumously known as "Emperor Showa," was created as a particular kind of Emperor, and the retaining and maintenance of that image has great currency even in Japan today. That is why, as I sat in Kyoto on the morning of January 18th, watching snow flurries, and heard the news that the Mayor of Nagasaki had been shot and was believed to be near death, I began to reflect on speech and silence and all that goes with them.

Mayor Motoshima, Mayor of Nagasaki, had questioned the "kind" of emperor Hirohito had become and the act of creating him as such. For his questionings, Motoshima received what many Japanese have called his "just rewards." On January 18, 1989, just outside City Hall, the mayor was shot in the heart by right-wing fanatics, voicing, in their own ways, their heartfelt feelings. Their fierce desire to silence the Mayor and to protect the Imperial name resulted in something quite unlike anything that any of them could have imagined. Instead of silence, the shooting produced speech, the exact opposite of what it was intending. Voices were awakened and language entered politics. People wrote letters to the mayor and called his office to express their feelings about his act of speaking. Some spoke in response to a self-imposed silence that they were no longer able to keep mute while some asked for further quiet. But there was speech. There was language. There was response and reflection which opened up spaces which had been empty or vacated for a very long time.
The mayor didn't die. In fact, he was energized by the attempt to take his life and his voice. He acted not as a hero, he quipped, but as a human being who decided to speak out on his own behalf and in the belief that his voice represented others, and he chose language as a weapon to stop the war of silence that has raged in Japan for so long. What had been possible for so long—the imposed and the self-silencing—was challenged, and that challenge was met in a variety of voices. The mayor received, unsolicited, in three months, over 7,300 letters from common folks—citizens—who applauded his speaking out or condemned him for his audacity to voice what could not be voiced. After receiving several hundred of the letters, the mayor decided to create a public display of some of these writings. NHK, the National Broadcasting Corporation, entered into the conversation by taking some of the letters and seeking out their authors for further talk and interview. What emerged both out of the letter writing campaign and the interviews was something troubling and profound. People all over Japan, older people and young, entered into a conversation about their own pasts, their own willingness to remain silent in times which called for voice, and about a Japan that is just now beginning to speak its memories and to review its past. The shooting of the Mayor of Nagasaki was not just a convenient moment for that dialogue to begin to take place. It was a significant event that triggered thought and reflection in the minds of at least 7,300 people. What was it that responded to the attempt to silence the Mayor? And, how was it that so many took up pen and opened up space for talking about a subject that had for so long been taboo?
"The Politics of Censorship in Showa Japan"

This was not the first time that speech about the emperor had occurred, nor was it the first time that such speaking provoked response. It was, however, one of the first by a public official since the end of the war. In addition, it was the first time such an utterance came from someone who is internationally respected as a spokesperson for peace in a city that knew the destructiveness of the bomb. For these reasons, his words had great symbolic currency both in and outside of Japan.

Before the Second World War, and during other moments of conflict, there were instances of voicing opposition to the Emperor, with responses nearly as disastrous as what occurred in Nagasaki. In the following poem, for example, a woman pleads with her brother not to go to war. The poem, entitled "Brother, Please Do Not Die," was written by Yosano Akiko, a poet from the turn of the century, who asks her brother why he should go into battle when the Emperor stays at home and decides the fate of young Japanese men. She implores her brother to reconsider his blind faith to the Emperor and asks him to consider his own life.

For this poetic plea, the poet received the harsh punishment of temporary exile and blacklisting, and found it increasingly more difficult to publish poetry in Japan during the rest of her life. The war was the Russo-Japanese War, and the poet, Yosano Akiko was, in fact, writing this poem for her own brother.²

²This story has been told in several histories of Japanese literature including Edward Putzar's Japanese Literature, p. 183, and Jay Rubin, Injurious to Public Morals, p. 56.
銅賞
大賞
パッド・マスターズ
右は全国かきぞめ競書大会に出品され頭書の成績を貰りましたのでこれを賞します。
This story exemplifies a situation which was not unique to that historical moment in Japan nor to the literary medium. It merely illustrates and highlights a response to criticism that has pervaded the history of the Japanese people, and one which was accentuated and sometimes exaggerated in the period of the war.

Although the idea of exile seems somewhat extreme in the case of Yosano Akiko, censorship of varying degrees was present and felt from post-Restoration on. The term "censorship," a term widely used and variously understood, necessitates some interpretation. The understanding which informs this writing is one which sees censorship as the imposition by those in power of a set of practices which aim to privilege certain discourses and to silence others. What would be silenced or privileged would be those things that would either threaten those in positions of power or would perpetuate and serve the power holders' claims. With this understanding in mind, we will explore the politics of censorship with a particular emphasis on Showa (1926-1989). But, in order to do this, we will have to look at the historical forces which helped to shape Showa understandings.

Japan and the Modern Age: The Administration of Silence

Lawrence Beer tells us that no words existed in pre-modern Japanese for the western-understood concepts of "rights" and "civil liberties," and that the word for "human rights" (jinken) first

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3Meiji Period--1868 to 1912; Russo-Japanese War--1904 to 1905.
became part of the Japanese discourse on government in the mid-nineteenth century, at the beginning of the modern Japanese State.\footnote{Lawrence Beer, \textit{Freedom of Expression in Japan}, p. 45.}

Most scholars agree that the Modern State began in Japan during the mid-nineteenth century, when Japan began her deliberate pursuit of "civilization" and a wholesale emulation of the West. At that time, ideology appeared as a conscious enterprise, and a perpetual civic concern. Japanese leaders expressed concerns over the ability of institutions alone to secure the nation, and felt that the people must also be "influenced" (kyoka) and their hearts and minds made one.\footnote{Carol Gluck, \textit{Japan's Modern Myths}, p. 3.}

This inclination, however, existed prior to the Meiji Restoration, with roots in the feudal establishment of Tokugawa Japan. In this period, also referred to as the Edo period (1600-1868) and dominated by the Tokugawa Family as the center of the ruling Shogunate, censorship became established as a function of the governing forces. The focus of censorship at that time was in four areas including: Christianity; writings that were critical of the Shogun (Tokugawa Teyasu) or his family; criticism of the shogunal government and its official ideology (Neo-Confucianism); and explicit sexual materials. Christianity was banned in 1613 as being detrimental to the nation, and any written materials proselytizing of the Christian faith were confiscated and forbidden. The Shogun (Tokugawa Ieyasu) was declared a deity (kami) after his death in 1616, and therefore, it became a
crime to criticize or desecrate him or any members of his family. Following this line of thinking, criticism of the form of government established by the Shogunate was also deemed a crime. Lastly, sexual materials were banned and, as we will see, continued to be banned until well after the war. The reasoning surrounding this ban had to do with the Japanese desire to be respected by the West and to be seen as "civilized." This took on so much importance that, contrary to their own feelings and understanding of the "naturalness" of the body, they restricted the publication and importation of explicit sexual materials.

In addition to those four major areas, publications of the following were prohibited: Books on Buddhism, Shintoism, other philosophies, medicine and poetry. During the period of the Kansei Reforms (1787-1793), political writings also became highly restricted and this carried over into the Meiji Period, where the foci shifted, but the policies of restriction continued and, in fact, increased.

In the Meiji Restoration, with the emphasis changing from the shogun to the emperor as the seat of authority and the focus for protection, many prohibitions became institutionalized and infused with a sense of "national spirit and self-understanding."

In the beginning of 1869, not even one year after the abolition of feudal rule, government bureaucrats were sent into the countryside to "enlighten" the people about the new imperial state. This new "civic education" or kyoka sought to gain "a universal sentiment" and to persuade the population "to yield as the grasses before the
The yielding process took great time and effort, although there were already "predispositions" within Japanese culture that allowed for penetration of state-ordered ideas into the internal ethos of the people. Maruyama Masao, one of Japan's leading political thinkers, suggests that in opposition to a generally accepted understanding of the modern European State as ein neutraler Staat (where the State adopts a neutral position on internal values such as what truth and justice are), the Japanese State from the Restoration on, strove consistently to base its control on internal values rather than on authority deriving from external laws. Maruyama suggests that there was no real ecclesiastical force to assert the supremacy of any "internal" world over the new unitary power which was, after the Restoration, concentrated in the institution of the Emperor.

Prior to the Restoration (1868), the country was under the dual rule of the Emperor (Tenno), who was the spiritual sovereign, and the Shogun, who held actual political power. After the Restoration, unity was achieved by removing all authority from the Shogun and from other representatives of feudal control, and by concentrating it in the person of the Tenno. This process will be discussed in detail in a later chapter in this work. Briefly, in this process, which is described as the "unification of administration and laws" or "the

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6Ibid.


8Ibid.
unification of sources of dispensation and deprivation," (seirei no
kiitsu, or seikei itto), power and prestige were brought together
in the institution of the Emperor. Reverence for the Emperor, one
of the cardinal virtues of Japanese culture, of course, preceded this
institutionalization, and only helped to cement the tennosei ideorogii
(the ideology of the emperor system) in this period.

One of the first ways in which the Japanese State sought to
declare itself a moral entity with the right to determine values (but
in the name of the emperor) was by creating a document referred to
as the Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyoiku Chokugo) which was
issued in 1890, just before the summoning of the First Imperial Diet.
In this statement was an enunciation of traditional moral principles,
stressing the virtues of filial piety and obedience, and emphasizing
the need for loyalty and self-sacrifice in the service of the
Emperor. This Rescript was read regularly aloud and with great
ceremony in the schools and colleges. It served to impress on the
people that the State had the right to exercise authority and control
over their internal behaviors (thoughts, beliefs, values) as well
as over their external actions. The emperor was constantly represented
in the Rescript as the supreme authority, and as the embodiment of
absolute values. He was described as the "eternal culmination of
the True, The good, and the Beautiful throughout all ages and in all
places."

9 Sadao Araki, The Spirit of Soldiers in the Emperor's Land,
p. 78.
Even before the Education Rescript was issued, however, there existed a document that established and legitimized the new centralized, monarchical, bureaucratized nation-state. This was the Charter Oath of 1868 which declared that the affairs of state would be administered, "uniting the sentiments of high and low." In actuality, this Charter Oath (Gokajo no Goseimon) was primarily directed at the feudal aristocracy and a small number of "uncommonly risen commoners."10 Also, even though it had been touted as the first "civil rights document," the Charter Oath merely insisted on duties and Order and allowed restrictions to be legitimized by those in power.11 Restraints began to be legalized right after this proclamation appeared, beginning with the Verbal Abuse Law (Bagen Ritsu) of 1868, and the Public Ordinance (Shuppan Jorei) of 1869.

Following an uprising of citizens in the form of the People's Rights Movements in the early 1870s, more restrictions were imposed and the government ordered more laws specifically focused on limiting the freedom of speech: the Defamation Law (Zambo Ritsu) of 1875, the Press Law (Shimbunshi Jorei) of 1875, the Criminal Code (Kyu Keiho) of 1880, and various censorship laws on manuscripts and secret publications were passed.12 In fact, the government passed laws and ordinances of this sort at a wholesale rate of 336 in the first ten months of 1890, just before the Diet opened for the first time.13

10 Gluck, p. 25.
11 Beer, p. 47.
12 Ibid., p. 48.
13 Gluck, p. 25.
The creation of institutions of restraint also began and flourished in this period, culminating in the notorious Home Ministry, whose responsibility was "the maintenance of Public Order." This Ministry, established in 1873, gained enormous power through the use of suppressive legislation as a means to control what they saw as "dangers to the State." The Ministry used the Emperor as a means for confronting social issues and for social control. As Carol Gluck states, "the Ministry attempted to meet a social threat with an increased dose of imperial ideology."\(^{14}\) Besides invoking the emperor's moral influence, the Ministry constantly reminded the populace of the debt of gratitude that they owed the emperor for his benevolence. In this way, they increasingly controlled political thought regarding the Emperor. They also succeeded in depoliticizing the people by increased surveillance (under their control) and by indoctrination that began in elementary school (particularly about the myth of the Emperor). The rhetoric employed by the Ministry regarding the emperor was of a religious nature, invoking him as "savior and benevolent god."\(^{15}\)

The Constitution of 1890, too, speaks of the rights of the Japanese people as "gifts from an absolutist but benevolent superior to his filial subjects," and regards the relationship of the people to the emperor to be of tantamount importance and of a religious nature.\(^{16}\)

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 91.

\(^{15}\)Ibid. \(^{16}\)Beer, p. 53.
The "deification" of the Emperor entered into language through the word kokutai, meaning something close to "national essence," and referring to the unique quality of the Japanese polity. The distinguishing elements of kokutai are: rule by an unbroken imperial line, and the notion of the state as a family in which the relationship between the emperor and his subjects is like that of a father and his children.\(^{17}\) However, this idea entails much more. The fact that, to the Japanese, Japan is the "Land of the Gods" and that the Emperor has divine origins from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu (and as a consequence of their birth, all Japanese people do as well), indicates an even more unique self-understanding and relationship with the imperial order. This also points to the reason why there were so few Japanese who vigorously asserted their rights and freedoms, especially the freedom of expression.\(^{18}\) It became common parlance, as well, that patriotism (aikoku) and citizenship (kokumin) necessitated not only a sound sense of nation, but a sound understanding of the role and importance of the Emperor and his imperial children in the creation of that nation. This also allows us to better understand the overwhelming adherence to silence and "self-censorship" that has intrigued Westerners and angered some of the more vocal Japanese critics (e.g., Maruyama, Ienaga, Kawasaki).

This understanding, too, helps to explain the fervent repression of a particular political movement, and that of the Socialists, during

\(^{17}\)Kodansha International Encyclopedia of Japan, p. 263.

\(^{18}\)Beer, p. 46.
the Meiji Period. Anything that threatened the sanctity of the Emperor system was removed from public view and from public thought. In fact, in 1910, all socialist-related material was banned retroactively so that those things not previously removed would now be censored and destroyed. In 1911, socialism literally went underground following the High Treason Incident, and did not re-emerge until 1918.

*Taisho*

In the period that followed Meiji (Taisho--1912 to 1926), the government became even more heavy-handed in its attempts to prevent the spread of socialist and democratic ideas, and to promote even more strongly the belief in the divinity of the imperial line. They became more restrictive in their publication policies and even began to include films in their censorship laws in 1925. But 1925 has more significance for censorship than that, for it was in that year that the Peace Preservation Law (*Chian Iji Ho*) was established. Originally intended as a repressive measure against socialism and the Korean independence movement, it came to embody much more. It expanded to include religious groups and intellectuals; it provided for the death penalty; it created an "ideological persecution system" (*shiso kenji*); and a Special Higher Police Force (*Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu*) who dealt primarily with "ideological offenses." With this Peace Preservation Law, we begin to see the intensification of efforts at suasion and influence that characterized the ideology of the 1930s. Here, too, 

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*19* Ibid.
we see the idea of kokutai ("National Essence") becoming more sacred, with the "altering of the kokutai" included as a crime against the state. This was directed primarily against the Communists and carried a meaning similar to that of "un-American" in the United States. But, this element of the Law had repercussions of such great magnitude that they could be felt much later in other situations such as the famous Minobe Case of 1935.

Minobe Case

In this case, Minobe Tatsukichi, a member of the House of Peers, described the emperor as an "organ" of the state and subject, therefore, to constitutional limitations. Minobe was consequently accused of lese majeste and was forced to resign his seat in the House. Graham Healey has suggested that Minobe's "organ theory" was not an attack on the kokutai but merely a modern interpretation of it. Nevertheless, the case and the subsequent use of the law, indicates the shift to a place where the ideological motive became the standard employed to measure crime. It also signalled the entry of the police and justice system into a new area of "thought control." It eventually became integrated and systematized into what came to be known as the "Peace Preservation Law System." It resulted in the production of tracts like the Kokutai no Hongi of 1937 which was a

20Kodansha, p. 263.
21Richard Mitchell, Censorship in Imperial Japan, p. 198.
22Ibid., p. 196.
manual of patriotic education issued by the Ministry of Education. This manual was an attempt to clarify kokutai and to serve as an ethics guide, while in actuality, it was part of an intensive propaganda effort directed at school children. It glorified service to the state and strongly opposed liberalism and individualism.

Out of this Peace Preservation Law System grew the mentality that called for confession, conversion, re-education and rehabilitation. Unlike other systems of thought control, the Peace Preservation Law System did not have to resort to terror to gain the desired end of conversion and compliance. They were able to discover a solution to the thought control problem which resonated with traditional values and which was, therefore, very effective. That solution was TENKO, a key to understanding modern Japan, Japanese thought control, and to memory and therefore, a term we will come back to and discuss in some depth.

The reverberations from the 1925 Peace Preservation Law and the system it generated could be felt all the way up to the present. Once initiated, systematic censorship remained, and a policy of thorough control was enacted.

**Showa**

In the early Showa years (1926-1936), Japanese imperialistic activities were increasing, necessitating (in the minds of the rulers) further suppression of political movements. Books, newspapers, and magazines were controlled and several were banned. The theme of the "Emperor as Sacred" continued with this as grounds for censorship,
along with any documents which espoused revolutionary ideas, advocating the independence of any of Japan's colonies, criticizing the Diet or the military. Criticism of foreign heads of state was also prohibited because such acts could create obstacles in diplomatic relations.23

With the entry into the War Period (1937-1945), censorship increased even more, and was incorporated into what was swiftly becoming an enormously extensive thought control system. Penalties were stiffened (such as publishers found violating the Peace Preservation Law being thereafter forbidden from publishing). Publishing freedom was eliminated in 1941 with the revision of the National Mobilization Law (Kokka Sodoin Ho), and after the war with the U.S. began, newspapers and journals were heavily restricted. Numerous works of social thought and history were banned as well as certain No plays and kabuki dramas that might mention opposition to state structures. Foreign writers such as Baudelaire, Andre Gide, and Somerset Maugham were banned, mostly because of their mention of the Chinese resistance to the Japanese during the 1930s.

After the war, during the Occupation (1945-1952), the system of "peace preservation" was abolished and new controls were introduced by SCAP, primarily under the Occupation Press Code. Only the control of obscenity remained with the Japanese. In fact, obscenity and censorship of sexual materials was one of the only continuous elements of censorship in Japan's history of control (another being anything
which threatened the State and the Imperial Order). What is so interesting about the focus on obscenity is that sexuality as a whole was affected in order to appear "civilized" to the Western world. Shame surrounding the body was an imposition from the West much like the incision made upon the Hawaiians by the missionaries. It differs only in that there was no direct contact or control in Japan that enforced the ban except in the imaginations of the Japanese.

Other things suffered from attention at this time by the censors of SCAP. All mail, telephone and telegraph communications were censored, and the newspapers were constantly reviewed. The new code for publishing proscribed articles that threatened public peace, contained unconstructive criticism of the Occupation, reported animosity toward the Occupation troops or described their movements. Language became an important focus, particularly wartime vocabulary, and expressions such as hakko ichiu ("the four corners of the world under one roof") and eirei ("the spirits of fallen war heroes") were banned.

In 1947, the Home Ministry was dissolved, effectively ending its "reign of suasion," and in 1952, the Press Code was lifted when the Occupation ended.

In 1947, the Subversive Activities Prevention Law (Hakai Katsudo Boshi Ho) was passed and the Public Security Investigation Agency (Koan Chosa Cho) began its operation, thus signifying a continuation of some of the ideas of the earlier repressive organizations and policies. However, since the 1947 Constitution of Japan guaranteed the freedom of speech and prohibited censorship, less overt control
was exhibited. To be sure, cases of censorship still existed, with the Ienaga Saburo Case being one of the most important examples, but generally, the controlling influences were more subtle. This case involved a professor from Tokyo University whose history textbook was not approved by the Ministry of Education because of its controversial treatment of the war period, especially with its revealing of atrocities committed by the Japanese in Asia. This case will be dealt with in another chapter in some detail but suffice it to say here that this case exemplifies the ongoing process of silencing that continues to take place in Japan.

Another more subtle way of administering silence in Showa had to do with the process of conversion or tenko. The term tenko, along with the term senko (or underground activities), became linked in the processes of thought control in the Showa Period, and were examples of the subtle ways in which people were made mute.

A more detailed discussion of tenko and senko may further illuminate the shadow of censorship which still holds and which has not yet come completely into light.

Tenko

Tenko, popularly defined as "a conversion which occurs under the pressure of state power," has an interesting history. Tsurumi contends that tenko was a thought that arose in the Japanese "civilizing process." With the opening up of Japan and the ending of the feudal rule of the Tokugawa Shogun, there developed a

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consciousness that the country must work together to keep Japan from being colonized by the West. An aristocracy developed, and power became concentrated in the hands of a few. As the hands held tighter and tighter, measures like tenko were introduced. Although this is not the usual interpretation given in Japan, it is interesting.

Patricia Steinhoff says that "the word tenko has been applied at various times to everything from the Meiji intellectuals' rediscovery of Japanese culture to the post-war student activists' acceptance of a job with Mitsubishi." The term tenko refers to the act of renouncing ideological commitment under pressure.

Tsurumi tells us that tenko has two aspects: compulsion exercised by the state; and the response chosen by the individual or group (tenkosha). The original use of the word, he says, came from Yamakawa Hitoshi, a socialist who wrote an article in 1922 entitled "The Change of Direction of the Proletarian Movement." In this article, Yamakawa suggested that the radical elements should turn their attention to the masses and not towards the Party. He spoke of hokotenkan (reform) which refers to the grasping of a pattern of one's thinking and then using it to think about society of the day and its needs. The term "tenko" is said to derive from that word (hokotenkan). The word "tenko" later came to mean "the act of

25 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

understanding one's own thought processes and giving them a new
direction in accordance with one's ideological belief."\(^27\)

Tsurumi suggests that the first "actualization" of the concept
came about through the Association of New Men. This Association,
begun in 1918 by three law students at Tokyo University, under the
tutelage of Yoshino Sakuzo, had as its guiding principles:

1. We will cooperate with and seek to accelerate the new
tide which is moving toward the liberation of Man,
which is the prevailing tendency of world culture;

2. We will join the movement for the rational
reconstruction of contemporary Japan.

The members of the Association gradually went beyond Yoshino's
moderate democratic principles, and affiliated themselves with the
socialist parties and labor unions. Some of the members later became
members of the Communist Party. One of those, Sano Manabu, who was
the chair of the Japanese Communist Party, decided to defect from
the Party in 1933 and "attempt to develop socialism in his own country
with proper respect for the Emperor and for the cultural values he
represented." In his statement of resignation, he used the term
\textit{tenko} for his defection. As a result, many others defected (converted)
and \textit{tenko} became the catchword of the day. It became fashionable
to students, and was then appropriated by the Thought Police. They
used it initially in their investigations under the Maintenance of

\(^{27}\)Tsurumi, p. 11.
Public Order Act of 1928, and subsequently whenever they found it useful.

Oyako Donburi

Both Tsurumi and Steinhoff tell us that the Thought Police devised techniques for persuading radicals to change their views, including the most famous one: oyako donburi. The police station master would bring a radical prisoner into his room, buy him a bowl of oyako donburi (chicken and eggs on rice) and begin the "suasion" session. The word "oyako" means, literally, "parent child" (oya = parent; ko = child) and, because of cultural understandings of that relationship, this dish would have the effect of conjuring up relations of on and giri. The police would say nothing about ideology, but only calmly convey the message, "your mother is worried about you." The importance of that statement is probably lost on most westerners but for the Japanese, it creates an overwhelming sense of sadness and shame. In no time, the conversion takes place, and the oyako donburi has served its purpose.

Tenko became so important and so pervasive that many avoided involvement in popular (and unpopular) movements because of the possibility of having to face the tenko process. Senko, its accompanying position, refers to "underground activities" and indicates the activities prior to or in place of tenko. Although little work has been done on this phenomenon, the existence of underground groups such as the Red Army, indicates its importance. Senko and tenko have been seen as important elements in the Anpo struggles of 1960 and 1970. Anpo or the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States
and Japan has been the site for struggle and conversion since the War. Factions have developed around the abrogation of or continuation of the treaty and, more importantly, around the relationships between the United States and Japan. For these factions, tenko has important implications, and is utilized in the struggle continuously, both by the leaders of the movements, as a self-conscious reminder of the importance of the struggle, and by the disciplinary forces as a most effective means of suasion and thought control.

Relationship Between Censorship and Politics of Memory

The history and impact of censorship on Japanese thinking has great import for the study of memory in Japan. As Foucault has suggested, "memory is the social and historical construction of events," and it is, therefore, important that we understand and recognize how that social constitution takes place. In Japan, the traces left are so obvious and institutionalized that we have little difficulty moving from censorship to memory, from an understanding of how people were silenced and how they were made to remember and forget. Thought control was a mechanism which created social amnesia, and allowed for a forgetting of a past too unbearable to recall. Japanese people maintained their own memories but never spoke them for fear of their conflicting with the official versions of the past. Attempts to address those conflicts have resulted in silencing, exile, and in some extreme cases, incarceration and death. The fear of memory, memory which fights official history, hovers above the Japanese social psyche and keeps most Japanese people in dissonance with their
own pasts. A large number of suicides after the war were eventually attributed to those people's inability to reconcile their own experiences of that period with the official versions of that past. For many, the memories are privatized and internal. They do not get the calling or the telling that they might need. The silence of the past, called up only in official histories, speaks quite loudly of the politics of memory and the constructing of meaning in present-day Japan. That is why the writing of the 7,300 letters to the Mayor of Nagasaki is such an important act. People were willing to speak, to write, to express their own feelings, recall their own memories, and to stop being silent. The will to remember and reveal that remembering is a sign of some change in Japan. The letters range from approval of the mayor's speaking to condemnation for his voicing that which shouldn't be voiced. Some resistance to speaking still persists but the willingness to write of that resistance is a significant act. The scope of responses and some of the actual texts of those letters are given in Appendix A of this work. They reflect not only the braking of silence but the fact that there can no longer appear to be only one version of the past.

The reliance on one version, one taste of the past, is slowly losing its palatability and is being opened up to scrutiny. In the following chapter another way of speaking about this opening up of spaces is offered. Taste, phenomenologically as well as metaphorically represents another one of those places in which the politics of memory and its resultant self-understandings reside. Taste is a powerful sense that recalls the past and reveals how memories are made.
CHAPTER V
TASTES OF WAR AND OTHER UNPALATABLE MEMORIES

In the middle of May, the double cherry blossoms begin their flowering in Kyoto. My friend, Nagai-san, and I had gone to the place considered most perfect for viewing them and had packed the appropriate supplies for hanami: several onigiri—rice covered with seaweed and a plum inside; tsukemono—various vegetables delectably pickled in brine; fruit, and sake—rice wine—produced in the south of Kyoto.

As we walked along the path under the flowering trees, Nagai-san pointed out a large root that she said was edible. I walked over to retrieve it for our picnic and she implored me not to take it as she could not stomach its sight. It had been, she said, one of the main things she had to eat during the war and she could not even bear to look at it now. "What else," I inquired, "did you eat at that time?" And being a close friend, she didn't mind the impertinence of my question. She began: "Rice gruel, very little rice and a lot of gruel, potatoes, and pumpkins." She began to detail the lack of food and how families would cook their small amount of rice together, 

1Hanami literally means "looking at flowers" or flower-viewing. However, the event of looking is much more significant. It is an occasion for poetry, pondering, and a lot of drinking. There are songs devoted to the viewing of cherries as well as books of poetry and verse. People prepare for days, take time off from work (with the blessing of their superiors, usually), dress in special clothing, bring special foods, excellent quality sake, and search for the most favorable spot to view the flowers.
making a milky-white porridge, thinned almost into water. She said that her family had been lucky and that many went without even that. I began to think about these remembrances and how unpalatable the war must have literally been and how indelible the memories of that culinary past must be.

Many people are reminded of war through their memories of food. What deprivations, what extremes people went to and were forced into, and what people ate during times of war are easily recollected and have profound impact on people's memories. Wartime memories of privation are among the most vivid and yet, the improbable analogy of war and eating is not usually accorded serious treatment or thought. How we remember and are brought back to the events of war is often in terms of the carnal and the culinary. Food becomes a signifier of the ravishings of war and makes swallowing that past quite difficult.

In Studs Terkel's "The Good War," one Japanese woman recalls how scarce food was during the war:

"Food was very scarce. My younger brother began to look like one of those starving Indian children: skinny, toothpick legs, and large, distended stomach. When the war ended, there was inflation and confusion. The only people who had food were farmers. Nothing was available in the stores in Kanazawa. Food meant potatoes and rice, nothing else. The farmers would not accept money because it was regarded as worthless. So my mother started exchanging her beautiful silk kimonos for third-grade rice and a few potatoes.

In the Fall of 1945, American soldiers showed up. . . . It took some time for the food to arrive. Until then, we were always hungry. When the white rice came, it was bartered like gold. When the Americans gave us dark bread, we couldn't swallow it; most of us
had only known white bread. We had no sugar, no sweets for a long time. One day Cuban sugar arrived—that's what we called the brown crystals. We made puffed caramels. Oh, it was like heaven."2

How vividly, forty-five years later, these things are remembered. The memory of food eaten or not eaten, as well as its symbolic worth is astounding. This is not particular to the Japanese nor is it particular to moments of war but with war, its importance increases and lingers like the smells of something delicious cooking off in the distance.

In another of the Terkel accounts, a Japanese man who had been a college student during the war and who was sent to the countryside to farm, reveals that same acute feeling:

We knew we were losing the war. First we lost Guadalcanal and then we lost Saipan. The government was saying we weren't losing the islands, we were just retreating strategically. We didn't believe them. They were hiding the bad news. We didn't know that the Imperial Japanese Fleet had by this time been ninety percent destroyed. We thought it was still intact, hiding somewhere. There were some diehards, hoping, lying to themselves, but most of us were having great doubts.

At first it was hush-hush. Nobody dared express his doubts. We all knew that life was getting more and more miserable. We didn't have enough to eat. We didn't even have any rice. Without rice, life means nothing. (Laughs). We were eating all sorts of junk, like seaweed, the kind we would never touch. We were eating awful fish we had never heard of. (Laughs) Everybody was getting very thin and losing much weight.3


3Ibid., p. 201.
And then, after the war:

When the Occupation forces came they began distributing American food to the Japanese people. Everything was rationed, and we stood in line. We sometimes received American potatoes and we couldn't believe how huge they were. (Laughs). Japanese potatoes are much, much smaller. These were two, three times as large. The canned goods may not have been great by American standards, but to us everything tasted great. 4

Such reflections are not uncommon, revealing as it were, the tastes of war. To some, those are the most memorable moments, to some the most painful.

Food has import everywhere not only in war and not only as sustenance for the body but as an important signifier of the religious, the familial, the social. Levi-Strauss found that some tribes of people designate food as "good to think" or "bad to think." We talk of some dishes as "brain food" and others as sensuous or aphrodisiac. Food has an intimate relationship with creation, fertility, sex. Food is created by the sex of plants or animals, and we find it sensual. It is used in ritual, as reward, for seduction. In times of little food, its importance mushrooms. It is those hungry moments nearest our death that glisten in our memories. Recalling hunger is almost a physical sensation, so close it is to the source of our being. Food and its meanings have great impact upon us and consume much of our waking thoughts. Its place in war is even more acute.

In Ooka Shohei's novel Fires on the Plains, such emphasis on the culinary is evident. The first scene of the novel opens with

an interaction between a Private Tamura and his commanding officer in Leyte Island of Luzon, Philippines, during the Pacific War. In this grueling scene, Tamura who, ironically, has "consumption" has returned to his company after being rejected for care at the field hospital nearby. He is reprimanded by his squad leader for not having fought to stay in the hospital and is told that the squad has no food to spare for him because he is no longer able to "pull his weight" and help the squad. Food is the overwhelming issue in this scene and throughout the entire work. The squad leader orders Tamura to return to the hospital, saying:

"Look here, Private Tamura, almost all our men are out foraging for food. Don't you understand? We're fighting for our lives! We've no place for anyone who can't pull his own weight. You've damned well got to go back to that hospital. If they won't let you in, just plant yourself by the front door and wait till they do! They'll take care of you in the end. And if they still refuse, then--well, you'd better put your handgrenade to good use and make an end to it all. At least you'll be carrying out your final duty to your country."

Tamura resigns himself to the situation and his place in it. He answers:

"Yes, sir, I understand perfectly. I am to report back to the hospital. And if I am not admitted, I am to kill myself."

We are then told by Tamura:

Normally the squad leader would have objected to the suggestion of individual judgement implied in the words "I understand perfectly," a terse repetition of orders being considered adequate; this time he chose to overlook the peccadillo.

We then hear the squad leader's response:

"That's right. And look here, Private Tamura. Try to cheer up! Remember--it's all for the Fatherland."
To the very end I expect you to act like a true soldier of the Emperor."

"Yes, sir, I will." 5

Private Tamura's interaction with the squad leader dramatizes the main theme of the work--food--the lack of, the need for, the desperate ends one will go to for--and its symbolic capital as well. The novel introduces an analogic dimension of food--as critique of war and nation--and provides us with a graphic detailing of the meanings of food. It is a story of struggle not just for personal survival from starvation but for a survival of Japanese spirit and human feeling. It is also a work of memory, for it is written from a mental ward six years after the war, after a long period of amnesia about escape, surrender and survival. It is a story that exemplifies the struggle of many in Japan to remember and forget the Pacific War and its miseries.

As the story progresses, we find Private Tamura spending time among the other hospital "rejects"--Japanese imperial soldiers barred from entrance to the hospital because they have no more currency, as killers or patients, due to a lack of rations--and Tamura experiences an overwhelming display of feelings and relations among these comrades. As they huddle some distance from the hospital, marking time by the meals served within, and exchanging critiques of war, of Japan, of the Emperor, some relationships of care are also

established. These too, surround food more often than not. The more disabled or ill are aided by those less sick; some who are hoarding food are goaded for not sharing and are cast out; some make deals with their portions, while others plan how to scavenge or steal more food.

After an attack by American fighter planes, the "group" scatters, and the story follows Tamura pillaging, foraging, and scrounging his way to a seaport where he might escape to Japan. Throughout Tamura's journey, we are constantly brought back to food and its overwhelming presence and absence. However, there is more to the food than just its consumption in this story. Ooka uses food to display many other things--critique of the war through the mouths of the "starving" soldiers (not to be taken too seriously because of their delirium); critique of the military and its unfair treatment (only the officers have food in the story); critique of the country, as when Tamura is finally cast out by his company with six potatoes and he ponders:

As I put the potatoes into my haversack, my hands were trembling. Six small potatoes--to this extent and no further was my country prepared to guarantee my survival: the country to which I belonged and to which I was offering my life. There was a terrifying mathematical exactness about this number six.6

Food becomes a signifier for struggle. It represents possibility, not only of physical sustenance but of Tamura's struggle for humanity as well. Food becomes an overriding concern when the enemy is sighted and when fellow soldiers approach. Tamura kills two Filipino farmers

6Ibid., p. 10.
for their food, and is plagued by this savagery throughout the rest of the story. Later, when he contemplates hiding the cache of salt taken from those dead Filipinos as he is rescued by a unit of Japanese soldiers, he determines that he needs the companionship as much as he desires the salt. He decides to share the salt in exchange for safer passage to the coast and for being allowed to join the wayward unit on their own quest for escape and survival. Food becomes Tamura's bargaining tool, his weapon, with which his life is measured. When his supply begins to dwindle, he panics, not only for the possibility of starving but because it is his currency, his worth to the company he keeps. As he struggles to live, his vision becomes acute. Not only is he able to literally see possibilities of food in the landscape he has come to know well, but in addition he is able to see the ravagings of war in a new light. Critique of war deeds done and legitimized as sacred through the Emperor's name appears as the story moves closer to the end and Tamura's "escape." His allegiance to a Japan that asks him to die willingly "for the Empire" becomes questionable and Tamura interrogates himself about meaning and duty. He wonders about the reasons for dying in a foreign land and for a little understood cause. He calls on the Emperor to explain what it is that Japanese soldiers are dying for. In his delirium, more and more clarity comes to him. He surveys the landscape and upon seeing the remains of enemy soldiers and Japanese alike, cries:

"Here are the feet and hands of Japanese soldiers, dead on a foreign battlefield. For what did they die? For what did they lose those limbs on these plains? Wars may be advantageous to the small group of men who direct them, and I therefore leave them aside; what baffles
me is all the other men and women who seem anxious to be deluded by these leaders. Perhaps they will not understand until they have gone through experiences like those I have had in the Philippine mountains. But even then, will they?"7

He laments the misunderstandings and gives in to the notion of everything as chance. He reminds himself that:

"Before I entered the war, my life was founded on individual necessity and desire. Yet after I had once been exposed on the battlefield to the arbitrariness of authority, it all turned to chance. My return to Japan was based on chance, and my present existence, being the result of my repatriation, is likewise based on chance."8

Chance becomes his explanation for everything from escape to his not having been eaten by his fellows or by the enemy Other. He comforts himself by remembering that he did not engage directly in the cannibalism that he saw all around him and eschews those who did. He recalls a dream in which he sees dead people approaching him through the grasses in a field:

"The dead people are laughing. If this is indeed celestial laughter, how awesome a thing it is!

At this moment a painful joy enters my body from above. Like a long nail, it slowly pierces my skull and reaches to the base of my brain.

Suddenly I understand. I know now they they are laughing. It is because I have not eaten them. I have killed them, to be sure, but I have not eaten them. I killed them because of war, the Emperor, chance—forces outside myself; but it was assuredly because of

7 This appears in the retrospective "Madman's Diary" written in an insane asylum after the war. Ooka, Fires on the Plain, p. 201.

my own will that I did not eat them. This is why in their company I can now gaze at that dark sun in this country of the dead."9

His saving grace in the end is the fact that he did not literally consume his comrades or the enemy either. Since much of the book concerns itself with graphic detailing of cutting up bodies for food, surviving by consuming that which is usually inedible, and distorting the already-perverse nature of war, Tamura's revelation relieves and saves him. Undoubtedly, he is driven mad by his remembrances of bodies with buttocks cut out for their sumptuousness as a meal, but he is also redeemed, in his own mind, for not having partaken in the feast. The ravagings of war are displayed through these bodies and what men will do out of "hunger," and for nation, and although Tamura understands that he has in fact been a cannibal of sorts just by his participating in the war, he finds his comfort in the fact that, in the end, his humanity was saved by his not having eaten his fellow men.

The ending of the story is a stunning indictment of Japan's ruling wartime elite and the men of the military who led the Japanese people into a defeating disaster. "How little we know," Tamura cries, condemning both the Japanese military for their silence about how Japan was faring in the war, and the more general lack of wisdom exhibited in war. His recollections and reflections of memories too unpalatable to recall until he is institutionalized and drugged, exaggerate the hideous appetite for killing, for war, and for nation.

How memories of traumatic moments, especially in war, come to be forgotten or hidden, is a theme continuously returned to in Tamura's diary, and he searches hopelessly for some place to let those memories rest. They rest in his body, he tells us, and there is no erasure possible until that body no longer lives. His "madness" allows him to voice his condemnation of war, of nationalism, and of the Emperor. He speaks to the lack of humanity that emerges in the time of war and of what it says of the appetites and lack in man.

In another place, a similar deficiency and appetite is exhibited and displayed. Perhaps the most extreme example of the dietary lack of World War II for the Japanese appears in the film "The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On" (Yuki Yukite Shingun). This semi-documentary, five years in the making, took the life of the protagonist's wife and left two others badly injured. It portrays the almost-obsessive hunger for truth by an aging soldier named Okazaki Kenzo. The story is an astounding one, not only for its outcome but for the energy and vitality this 68-year-old man exhibits in his undying quest for meaning. He seeks to tear away the years, trample the taboos of speaking out about the war, and to hold up the skeletons of Imperial Japan for all to see.

Okazaki, himself, had been one of about thirty survivors from the 36th Engineering Corps, a regiment of over a thousand which was all but annihilated in the vicious fighting and treacherous conditions of New Guinea at the end of the war. When the war ended, Okazaki, who saw out its ending in a P.O.W. camp, returned to Japan to discover how the people there had been systematically brainwashed; how the
nobility of the Emperor's War had been a shabby pretence; how millions had died in the name of quasi-religious mumbo-jumbo. The shock of the truth turned him into an anarchist, dedicated to exposing Hirohito and eradicating corruption of all sorts in Japan. In January of 1969, he attempted to attack Hirohito while the Emperor was greeting New Year's well-wishers by firing on him with four pachinko balls in a slingshot. As he fired off each ball, he screamed the names of comrades killed in the war. He did a year in prison for the attack. He did ten years after that for murdering a notorious yakuza who was engaging in crooked real estate schemes which victimized many elderly people.

When we meet Okazaki in the film he is obsessed by his major life crusade: to find out how and why two privates in his unit in New Guinea were executed three weeks after the war ended in 1945. We travel with him across Japan, tracking down nine officers from that unit, who he interrogates for their involvement in the executions of these young men. The soldiers are old men, some frail, some invalid, living in their countryside homes, who are visibly disturbed on camera by Okazaki's unexpected and unwelcome visits.

Okazaki grills these men about their roles in the executions and asks: Were you in the firing squad? What were the charges and the crimes? Who gave the orders to kill the privates? The old soldiers lie. Some claim they cannot remember whether they shot the two young men or not--such a long time ago you know--or some say that they weren't there at the time of the killing at all. Okazaki pieces the stories of the nine officers together and quickly spots the lies
and discrepancies. In one scene, he cannot contain his rage and jumps on one of the officers, punching him and yelling at him to tell the truth. We witness him wrestling with the old man and watch as the police are called in. Director Hara Kazuo who doubles as cameraman, catches all of this on film until forced to stop by the police officers.

Okazaki, the protagonist, establishes by the end of the film that the 36th Independent Engineering Corps had been reduced to cannibalism, eating their own comrades because of dire conditions suffered at the time. It gets pointed out, however, that the New Guinean natives were considered "black meat" and therefore, inferior and not palatable to the Japanese soldiers. Okazaki discovers that "white pig" was consumed by the officers and we later learn that "white pig" was American and allied soldiers. Okazaki finally determines that the two Japanese privates, lowest on the military "pecking order," had been sacrificed because of a lack of supplies to the troops, and that, in the confessions of one of the officers he interrogates, it was felt "there was nothing else that could be done." Okazaki goes to the house of the commanding officer, Captain Koshimizu, and after detailing the execution as he has heard it, asks him whether he gave the orders for the killings. Koshimizu tells him that he had merely passed the orders on from a superior and that he wasn't even present at the execution.

Unconvinced, Okazaki continues his investigations and finds a man who confesses to having been in the firing squad. Sitting at a kotatsu with this man, a former corporal, Okazaki reconstructs the
execution, using tangerines to represent the five men in the squad, all of whom he can now name, and the two victims, Privates Yoshizawa and Nomura. He then picks up a tangerine to represent Captain Koshimizu. "Was he standing here at the back?" he queries. "No," says the man and places the tangerine just next to the firing squad. "He was here. When the squad fired, the men didn't die right away, so Captain Koshimizu finished them off with his own gun. One shot each."

This is the pivotal moment in the film. The big lie is exposed. Koshimizu is revealed as the villain but, in Okazaki's words, is merely a "messenger" for the evil Empire. The real villain is the Emperor, himself, and Okazaki shouts, "It is not the soldiers who committed those sins who should be punished, but Emperor Hirohito who was, after all, the Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army."

The film ends with a long gaze into the face of Captain Koshimizu and a quick shot of the Emperor. Then, flashed up on the screen are newspapers whose headlines tell the rest of the story: that Okazaki went to Captain Koshimizu's house with a gun, looking to kill him; that Koshimizu was not at home, and Okazaki, in his rage, decides to shoot Koshimizu's son who is protecting his father and his whereabouts; that the son is seriously wounded and Okazaki is arrested and sentenced to twelve years for attempted murder; and that Okazaki's wife has died of cancer while her husband is serving out his prison sentence.

As unsympathetic a character as Okazaki is in this film, we feel the anxiety and dismay that he feels throughout his search and for
the entirety of the film. And in a way, we can be somewhat more objective about the film because of our ambivalence towards him.

What the film reveals is more than cannibalism and the unpalatable nature of war. It talks of a society gone mad. While *Yuki Yukite Shingun* has been highly praised and widely acclaimed by several critics outside of Japan, many within Japan recreate that madness and express their outrage at Okazaki's actions. They question his methods and also the ethics of the film's director, Hara Kazuo, who filmed the real unstaged acts of violence without intervening. They suspend the horror of what the film is saying and ask for protection of the Imperial name. In post-war Japan, where the outrages of war have been assiduously covered up and the implications have been carefully avoided, such a demonstration as Okazaki's is rare. Instead, things go on as usual or as before. In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke, who had been a leading member in the Tojo cabinet and in charge of the subjugation of Manchuria, became Prime Minister of Japan. Even more recently, the election of Koiichi Miyazaki, who was involved in the famed Recruit Scandal, as Prime Minister, further amplifies this ability to assuage and forget the past. One western journalist has compared this kind of activity to Goebbels or Himmler becoming Chancellor of Germany.\(^\text{10}\)

The fact is that even today in Japanese political circles and in the business world there are many who cultivated Emperor-worship

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\(^\text{10}\) Tom Gill in *Ampo, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review*, vol. 20, no. 3, 1989, p. 28.
and imperialism in the pre-war years, and who cheered as the army set off for New Guinea and the Philippines and other Asian fronts. There are those who participated directly and returned to Japan as future leaders and decision-makers. Their cravings for silence and for digesting the war-past in particular ways have been roasted by Okazaki and his exposé. The Emperor's Naked Army is shown in barest forms: soldiers eating their own bodies or, rather, the bodies they commanded to do the Emperor's bidding. The official line, that Hirohito had no control over the military or the militarists in the Cabinet, is offered and Okazaki rails against this. In fact, the contention that Hirohito finally overruled the Cabinet to bring about the surrender is still widely believed in Japan, and rarely discussed.

One of the major critiques of Okazaki, and of Hara Kazuo's agreement to do this film, surrounds the exposure of the Emperor as villain. The eating of Japanese soldiers becomes foregrounded only momentarily in these critiques and fades quickly into the dark as the critics focus on the need to protect the Imperial name. The fact is that Japan needs its Okazakis. It needs outrageous extremists who obsessively seek for meaning. The calm repose so carefully staged in Japan needs to be unsettled to allow the space for dialogue to begin on the horrors of war and the madness of nationalism. The unwillingness to expose such wartime stories leaves a past that is, as yet, undigested. It also makes the Japanese "unpalatable" to many in the West and in Asia who suffered at the wartime hands of the Japanese militarists. There is a hunger for some reflection to come out of Japan, not just in the apology for things past but for some
willing to attempt to look at their participation in the devastations of war and to increase public knowledge of it.

Ienaga Saburo, noted critic of wartime atrocities, and professor of history at Tokyo University, raises this same issue tirelessly. In his book *The Pacific War*, he catalogues literary attempts to rewrite the War and some of the literary means by which it is remembered, conventionalized, and mythologized. He also exposes the Japanese government's own complicity in censoring unpleasant details of the war, especially in school history books (including textbooks authored by Ienaga himself). In his discussion of censoring the wartime past, Ienaga first looks at the war trials of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and discusses the Japanese criticisms of that body.

The tribunal was criticized in Japan on both moral and legal grounds particularly by the defense attorney Kiyose Ichiro and others. The main objections were that the victors in the tribunal were ignoring their own responsibility for the war and unilaterally blaming only the losers, and that the penalties were based on an ex post facto law, contrary to the legal principle that both crime and punishment should be specified by the law.

Ienaga's response to this is:

If the Japanese people of their own violition had determined legal responsibility for the war, these objections would not have been raised and it should have been possible to reach a clearer judgment. No such attempt was made, however, and the problems of legal responsibility for the war was limited to a moot issue: the legitimacy of the IMTFE's [The International Tribunal on the Far East's judgment]. The basic issue--war responsibility--was obscured in legalistic charges of "victor's justice" and never resolved.11

This issue of responsibility becomes a theme for Ienaga, and almost like Okazaki in The Emperor's Naked Army, he is more than intrigued by it. In his own legal arguments after his textbooks were rejected by the Ministry of Education Review Board, he points to the fact that what was rejected by the ministry textbook reviewers was what they called the "gloomy nature" of his work. They had elaborated on the shortcomings of the manuscript and gave as examples such phrases as "The war was glorified as a 'holy cause,'" or "there were atrocities by Japanese troops," and "it was a reckless war." These reviewers claimed that such phrases were objectionable because "they are excessively critical of Japan's position and actions in World War II and do not give students a proper understanding of this country's position and actions in the war." 

Ienaga contested the decision of the Ministry to reject his textbook in a lawsuit that began in 1963 and which ended finally in 1990 with his losing the last decision. He has noted in numerous publications that the Japanese public must understand that the Ministry of Education's interpretation of the War is not the only one available. But it is the only official version—the one which is taught to students in all history courses from the first grade

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12 Ibid., p. 255.

13 Ibid., p. 256.

14 This case is dealt with in some detail in another chapter of this work. It is such a blatant example of thought control and the politics of memory that it warrants our attention.
through high school. This limiting vision is achieved, Ienaga explains, through textbook approval and other administrative actions. Texts like those of Ienaga and others regarded as "offensive to the children" are banned before they reach the school library shelves. This has the effect of schoolchildren repeating governmental propaganda about the war. In 1962 Murakami Hyoe interviewed teenagers about the Pacific War and discovered that the majority felt "the war was unavoidable" or that the "ABCD encirclement left Japan no choice." Later interviews, such as one conducted by Communications Development Institute in 1989, found just as startling opinions with many lamenting that "Japan was backed into a corner" or that "we would have starved if we had not fought." 

Administrative actions as well have created "skewed vision" among the Japanese young. The most telling "administrative action" is in the university entrance examination (nyugakushiken) where the period of 1931-1945 is absent. Not one question from that period appears on the exam and, consequently, the period is never studied either in the schools or in the juku ("examination cram schools") which nearly every university hopeful in the country attends from 8th through 12th grades. This has resulted in the erasure of that period in the minds of the young. Few Japanese under the age of thirty can

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid., p. 256.

17 "Survey of Teenagers" Communications Development Institute, Kyoto, 1990.
say anything about the Pacific War other than the dates it "began" and the surrender in August, 1945. Not unlike young Americans when questioned about Viet Nam, the war has little currency and less memory for those who didn't somehow "live" it, either viscerally or through textual reconstruction. The actions of the Ministry of Education, in tightly controlling the interpretations of that war, have worked to erase that period from the minds of the young and to destine them to ignorance about its meaning in their contemporary world.

Legalistic arguments and "administrative actions" are not the only areas in which the war has been reinterpreted or erased. Literary reconstructions of the war began to appear with the old wartime style, beginning as early as 1953 with former Colonel Hattori Takushiro's *Dai Tōa Sensō Zenshi* (Complete History of the Greater East Asian War). In this very popular history, Takushiro describes the bravery of Japanese forces as "so gallant that the gods would be moved to tears," and calls for "the establishment of new national defense policies" which Ienaga reads as a "code phrase for rearmament." Takushiro was lauded for this work and it became a best seller throughout Japan. Ienaga suggests that books such as Takushiro's were able to be published at that time because of remarks made by the Minister of Education Okano Seigo to the Diet in February 1953. In response to a question from a Diet member, Okano had said, "I do not wish to pass judgment on the rightness or wrongness of the

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18 Ibid., p. 252.
Greater East Asian War, but the fact that Japan took on so many opponents and fought them for four years . . . proves our superiority." This statement caused a public sensation but also allowed for a space in which favorable evaluations of the war could be recovered and spoken. Less than one year after the occupying forces had left Japan, the valorizing of the war had begun anew. Other works that defended the war began to appear as well. A twelve-volume Hiroku dai Tōa Senshi (A Secret History of the Greater East Asian War), published in late 1953, charged that the accusations against the Japanese for carrying out germ warfare were "utterly false accusations" and that germ warfare had never happened. The text denounces the Chinese for their "plundering mentality" and emphasizes Japanese casualties in China, completely ignoring the destruction wrought by Japanese forces there.

Ienaga notices that all these books revive the term "Greater East Asian War," a term which had been prohibited by the IMTFE and the Occupation forces. He suggests that this is a very subtle semantic and political shift that indicated something that was taking place in Japan at that time. By turning back the linguistic clock, the ghosts of the 1930s and 1940s were made to reappear. Japanese people who read such books in which the expression "Greater East Asian War" appeared were called back to a certain moment, signified by remembered meanings. The meaning of the expression, linguistically

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19 "Kokkai ni hana hiraku bunkyoron" (An Interpretation Blooms in the Diet), Tosho Shimbun, February 21, 1953.
as well as symbolically, worked to regenerate lost hope and illusory images. It allowed for the politics of return, return to Japan's possibility. If the people's minds could be brought back to a moment when Japan was almost in a position to affect its own power, perhaps a revival of the vision could occur. Such illusory thinking persisted in such writings. The serialization of Hayashi Fusao's "Dai Tōa Senso Kotei-Ron" (An Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War) in the Chuo Koron journal in 1963 furthered this hopeful illusion and brought back the apparitions of the past. The linguistic turn of phrase in his work (from "Taiheiyo Senso"—Pacific War—to "Dai tōa Senso"—Greater East Asia War) is significant, as it brings back into social memory a time, which for some, was a time of lost possibilities for Japan and the supposed "greater East Asia co-prosperity." It also signals a reassessment which, in the worlds of Kamikawa Hikomatsu, would relieve "a guilt-ridden nation." Most of the essays that used the term "Greater East Asian War" did so out of nostalgia rather than reason. Ueyama Shumpei, who wrote Dai Tōa Senso no imi (The Meaning of the Greater East Asian War), says that he used the name because he was a member of a Navy suicide unit—"a human torpedo"—and the experience left him with a lingering fondness for the term. Ueyama writes, "I cannot bear the thought that the best years of a whole generation and the lives of my comrades in arms were wasted in a meaningless war" and so this term somehow dignifies and reminds

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20 In Taiheiyo Sensō no Michi (The Road to the Pacific War) in Nihon Gakushiin Kiyo, vol. 23, no. 1, 1963.
people of that glorious historical moment. Such nostalgia is of the same sort that Studs Terkel finds in his book "The Good War," where old soldiers recall personal anecdotes without much reflection on the distastes of war. Ueyama's longing, like those of soldiers elsewhere, elides the realities of war. Veterans who recall, nostalgically, their involvements and commitments in war, often do so in a Kiplingesque way: "a good, hard campaign that brought out the best in courage and dedication in the fighting men." There is little that is offered in terms of opposition or questioning of the activities of war and the pain inflicted in those "good, hard campaigns." Such language sounds like locker room pep talk of a game well played, with little concern for injury or loss of the other "team."

What Ienaga reminds us in The Pacific War is that it was not a game, that untold suffering was inflicted by the Japanese and by all who entered into it and concludes: "The Japanese public only wants to forget the unpleasant experience, but collective amnesia will also erase the costly lessons of the war." Collective amnesia, a phrase that Ienaga was noted for, rang in the ears of only a few, with the desire to forget overriding the need to remember. The costly lessons of the war are now being felt with the Japanese having gained the reputation of selectively remembering and purposely forgetting that unpalatable war. Like Okazaki's struggle to open up the discursive space of that war in The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On, Ienaga and others have continued to question how that war is remembered.

21 Ibid., p. 254. 22 Ibid., p. 256.
The tastes of war, soon to be lost with those who partook now passing away, still, however, remain in the textures of daily life in Japan. Military time is still used in official governmental business, and on the train schedules throughout the country. The war persists in many of the laws repressing sedition and espionage, in the bookstores with sections devoted to the Pacific War, and in the war memorial sites such as Yasukuni Shrine and Hakoguni in Kyushu. And cuisine still commemorates the war, though few know the military origins and usages. Oyako donburi, a favorite among students and others whose economic situation forces them to be frugal, is one of those dishes of wartime origins. This chicken and egg dish, served in a large bowl over a mound of rice, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, is a symbolic meal that was used extensively during the war for the purposes of tenko or "mind conversion." The term "oyako" means "parent and child" and has great significance in Japanese culture. If a person was found to be opposed to the war, he or she would be brought to the offices of the wartime police authorities and sat down in front of this dish. The mere appearance of the meal would conjure up giri, relations of obligation, between the person and his or her parents and that would usually be sufficient to break down the resister (usually in tearful remorse) and bring him or her around to the officially sanctioned stand on the war. There are numerous cases of this simple culinary device being used during the war and after for quelling opposition and bringing resisters into the fold.
This and other tastes of war, especially for those who remember first-hand, remain in the memory with special vividness. The writings, filmic and literary, of the war may turn our stomachs or make us want to forget but they remain the only morsels of that distasteful past. The more these memories are laid out on the table, the less they will be possible to be disguised and served up once again. The lessons of the war, though unsavory, need to find their way into public discourse so that the memories will not just talk of a nation gone mad but will serve some good in present-day behaviors and acts. It is by revealing the institutional practices that are and have been unpalatable that it will become more and more possible for the Japanese people to digest that unsavory past. Other institutional practices as well need to be revealed and digested before the Japanese can move on into any comfortable relationship with the present.

The second part of this work will deal with some of those other institutional practices using the metaphor of text and textual memories.
PART II

TEXTUAL MEMORIES
CHAPTER VI
INTRODUCTION: MEMORY AS TEXT

Thomas Aquinas in his commentaries on Aristotle argued that already in classical antiquity the text was the privileged device by which society conserved its memories of the past and by which men distant in time and space remained "present" to each other. Aquinas pointed to Aristotle's work on memory to show how and where acts of recollection or reminiscence are located. They are, he noted, in the site of mediation: the text. They occur in the pre-linguistic, pre-textual as well but the text is crucial for their iteration.

On the other hand, Socrates warned that writing is the language of the dead and that only through the spoken language is the living knowledge preserved and memory retrieved.

These distinctions regarding memory and text are no longer so useful since what is constituted as "text" has necessarily begun to change. Recent understandings and treatment of the text include much more than the device or account or the "writing of the dead." Text, in fact, has come to mean something quite different. One could simply quote Barthes in saying that analytically we have shifted "From Work to Text." Work is seen as the static holder of knowledge whereas text, in Barthes' understanding, is more concerned with addressing

1Aristotle, De Memoria, 45ibi8.
the full complexity of meaning and its social context. Texts are much more a process than a product, and a process which includes more than just the producer or "author" of a text.

Barthes argues that the "text" is fundamentally to be distinguished from the literary "work" in the following ways:

"The text is not an esthetic product, it is a signifying practice;
it is not a structure, it is a structuration;
it is not an object, it is a work and a game;
it is not a group of closed signs, endowed with a meaning to be rediscovered, it is a volume of traces in displacement."

In this understanding, the text is much more than a literary work. It is a complex network which involves a relationship between the writer, the reader and the observer (critic). It is a tissue, a fabric, "woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages antecedent or contemporary, which cut across it through and through in a vast stereophony." The stereophony that Barthes describes suggests plurality with no one author, code, or discourse claiming privilege. The text is composed of codes, fragments that


\[^4\text{Ibid., p. 160.}]}
invoke different readings but never provide just one, definitive reading. The nature of the text is pluralistic.

Jacques Derrida has also exalted the pluralistic nature of the text. He tries to show, in his analyses of various thinkers, how the text involves a process of writing that is characterized by a "free play of signification understandable more from the inner structure that it exercises than the series of referents that it produces."5 Derrida tries to show that language is not a means for expressing thought as much as it is the locus or being of thought. In accord with this thought, Michael Shapiro points out that Derrida, for example, develops a model of the Freudian subject as memory rather than a person with a consciousness who has a memory.6 Memory, he says, is constructed by Derrida as a series of writings and erasures. A given subject is constituted by selections made "from the systems and process of differences in the play of signification."7 According to this scheme, Derrida sees the development of memory as constituted by fiction, by imaginative discourse (as opposed to the Platonic distinction between reality and imagination).8

Another way of speaking about the Text and memory is that it is not just about things and events, it is about the relations between


7Ibid., p. 9. 8Ibid.
things. It is a space, a social space in which "no language has a hold over any other, where languages circulate."\(^9\) This shift in thinking came about at a time where reproduction rather than authenticity was driving production and the industrial production of signs. In terms of memory, we no longer remembered things, we remembered and continue to remember discourses about things. Memory has come to be represented, and it is the representations that overtake and become our memories. What this means for a study of memory is that texts come to mean and to replace memory. In thinking one is always writing, creating a text, and we are unable to get outside of the production of the world as a form of writing or a text. In recalling, too, a text is being created, one which sifts, deletes, and chooses what and how one remembers. To use the text metaphor, we create a story around memory, and it is that process of creation which is the text.

One last way to speak about text is to understand that any number of media can be construed as "textual." Textualizing is a process which locates power and identifies those who hold it. Film, comics, books can all be looked at as "texts" but the definition can also be expanded to include the metaphorical, as Barthes talks about it. The following chapter on "Scripting the Imperial Body" is one of those instances in which the text is metaphor, in which the ways in which the Japanese emperor has been constituted can be seen as a script, a controlled, concerted creation of a particular kind of being, of a particular kind of memory.

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 164.
CHAPTER VII
SCRIPTING THE IMPERIAL BODY

On February 25, 1989, an article in the Mainichi Daily News noted that the day before, February 24th, had seen the greatest number of video rentals in video history in Japan. February 24, 1989 had been the day of the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, and more Japanese people were apparently watching pornography and Rambo than viewing the historical ritualization of Imperial death.

What does this say of the mythology of reverence for the Emperor? What does it say of the images that represent the Japanese population as wide-eyed followers of a cult that identifies one man as the divine manifestation of the Sun? Obviously, the reverence had surely broken down, if it had ever existed at all. Such claims of mythological reverence ask for scrutiny. They invite questioning of how widely the myths held and whether they still hold in the hearts and minds of the people; they also ask what relationship the mythology has to Japanese people's own and the nation's self-understanding, and most importantly, they question the meanings and uses which the various constructions of the Imperial body have in creating social memory.

How did there come to be one particular image of the Emperor and where did it come to reside in the Japanese cultural terrain? It can be said that the conscious creation of a particular Imperial image began in Meiji (the period of 1868-1912), a historical moment which also marks the beginning of modernity in Japan. Questions that
plague the creation of that Emperor, and which are not often asked, concern how it came to be that there was only one dominant and dominating image of the Emperor, and where and how that imagining came to light in the discourse of the times. Wishing to explore the space that such an image occupied in the various conversations of the Meiji period, and what relevance it has currently, it would be profitable to discuss the "texts" that helped to define and create that image, and to ask how that imaginary Emperor came to be.

The Emperor of the Clouds

Traditional vestments of the Imperial body have always been shrouded in mystery and mythology in Japan. The most resilient of these were in the myths of origin of the Japanese people and the Imperial family's direct descendence from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami. The legend which is first rendered in the Kojiki, the official book of legends produced in 712, tells the story in the following way:

Long, long ago the goddess Izanami and the god Izanagi were floating in the clouds above the world when drops of moisture fell from Izanagi's spear and congealed on the surface of the universe to form an island. The gods descended to have a look and circled the island in opposite directions, and on meeting halfway around, embraced and engaged in lovemaking, producing a number of islands which were Japan. The goddess Izanami was thereafter burned giving birth to fire, and Izanagi went on to beget from himself the three principal deities of the Japanese pantheon--Amaterasu, the sun goddess, from his right eye, Tsuki no kami, the moon goddess from his left eye, and Susanoo, the sword god from his nose. Susanoo came to be known as the Impetuous Male, and this is evidenced in his violating his sister, Amaterasu, who bore him a son. Amaterasu decides to send her offspring to "the Central Land of Reed Plains" (Japan),
and he, in turn, asks her to send his son, Amatsu-hikohiko-no-ninigi no Mikoto. Amaterasu agrees and presents her grandson with three treasures to carry with him to the earth. These treasures were: the curved jewel, the eight-handed mirror, and the sword, Kusanagi, which are still represented as the imperial treasures. Mikoto descends to the earth, and mates with an earth maiden, and out of this union is born a son. From his son, Mikoto's grandson, the first Emperor of Japan, Jimmu, was born.¹

The mythic description of the first ruler and his origins is a story that every schoolchild in Japan can tell. We do not know how it was originally transmitted but it might be assumed that it was, as in most traditional societies, passed on by maternal tellings or by community ritual enactments of the myth. The belief in the divine nature of the emperor is not unique to the Japanese, although it differs significantly from other cultural conceptions. Arthur Hocart suggests that in most societies, the earliest religions contain the belief in the divinity of kings and emperors, that they are the earthly representatives of gods. "We do not know if the worship of gods preceded that of kings. Perhaps there never were any gods without kings, or kings without gods . . . . we only know that when history begins there are kings and they are the representatives of gods."² Hocart suggests that not only did kings belong to the sacred sphere but they were also understood to be gods themselves. What is different about this belief in Japan is that it is not so clear


that the Emperor was considered a god himself but was seen as a kami. Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney argues that a kami is quite a different being from a god, although god-like qualities reside in him. Although "kami" usually refers to deities within the Shinto pantheon, the term came to include all supernatural beings, buddhas, shamans, and deities originating in other belief systems such as Taoism and Confucianism.³

The kami is represented as both human and super-human, and the distinction between the sacred and the profane is blurred. In Japanese cosmology, there are no clear-cut categories between humans and deities, and both deities and humans have dual characters and powers: good and evil, light and dark, constructive and destructive capabilities. The human-deity or hitogami is the most central figure in Shinto and is one who is able to communicate with the gods and to solicit the power of the divine for the benefit of human beings. The hitogami is much like a shaman, and in fact, the emperor has been called arahitogami (the sublime human-deity) or the number one shaman. He was historically represented as a shaman, and his "original" function (goriyaku) was to commune with the divine in order to produce good rice.⁴ Anthropologists say that magicians and shamans cajole, ³There are many studies subsumed under the concept of assimilation in Japan (honji suijaku). See, for example, Alicia Matsunaga's work on the Buddhist Philosophy of Assimilation. ⁴See the work of H. Ozawa, especially "Minshu Shukyo no Shinso" (Deep Structure of Folk Religions) in Nihon Shakaishi (Social History of Japan), pp. 296-332. Also see Ohnuki-Tierney, The Monkey as Mirror: Symbolic Transformations in Japanese History and Ritual, p. 134.
commune with and coerce the gods whereas religious beings supplicate or appease them. In the case of the emperor, his role was and has always been a fluid one, sliding back and forth between human, shaman and deity, between cajoling and appeasing, a kami incarnate. Various governing bodies have used that fluidity to inscribe different meanings upon the imperial body at particular historical moments.

In Meiji (1868-1912), the emperor came to be described as a "true god," a "manifest deity," the living representative of the divine, and his divinity came to be extended to include all Japanese people as descendants of the divine. The people were called his "spiritual children," and the paternal and the divine became one. The metaphor of the family came to be expressive of what constituted "japaneseness" and is important in understanding how the nation was secured and how the people's minds were made one.

From the beginning of Meiji, there was a concerted effort to identify the spiritual link of the kami emperor with the idea of nation in order to unify the people. One way in which this link was to be made was through the issuing of proclamations in the Emperor's name. This ritsuryo or "imperial edict" system was actually created much earlier (around the sixth century) and was revived in Meiji for

\[5\] Ohnuki-Tierney, p. 208.

\[6\] Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths, pp. 142-143.

political use. In this system, the edicts containing the words of the Emperor were said to be the messages of the Gods, handed down to the people through the Emperor's body. Such a system became a spiritual/political synthesis with the sacred emperor residing at its peak. It was instrumental in crafting power in Meiji with the power elite portending a heavenly reign and future bliss for all loyal subjects. They emphasized the fact that the emperor embodied kokutai, the national essence, which was divine and which was their own. By extension, then, they were, themselves made sacred, and were instructed to act accordingly. The creation of ideology with the "manifest deity" in the body of the emperor at its center was an important move. Its significance lay in the ability of its craftsmen to incorporate all Japanese bodies into its making. If they were all, in fact, imbued with the sacred kokutai, they must respond to the divine pronouncements.

Leaders of Meiji such as Ito Hirobumi described the Imperial House and its family as the "axis of the nation" with sovereign power residing there, and warned that "the State would eventually collapse if politics were entrusted only to the reckless ways of the people."\(^8\) Politics and power had to be invested in the royal body, the body imbued with sacred wisdom. In so saying, the place of politics was dignified, sacralized and the emperor's divine sovereignty was made law. The imperial institution was then conceived so that both the emperor and, by extension, his government were made legally,

\(^8\)Gluck, p. 77.
politically, and spiritually sound. This soundness was reinforced in the ways the imperial body was inscribed. What was entailed in that was naming and clothing that body and fashioning an image of him before the public which would secure the "nation." In "naming" the Emperor many significant things occurred, among them that his image replaced his person before the public and he, himself, disappeared. How the naming and disappearance were enacted resulted in what I want to call "meaningful invisibilities."

Name/No Name

The word for "emperor" in Japanese is tenno (天皇), a term assigned in Meiji. It is composed of two characters--"ten" which means "heaven," and "no" which means "the divine one who rules both heaven and earth." The "no" character implies an infusion of the divine within the human. This subtle difference from the original Chinese term ten'o (天王), which means "a human king who receives his power from heaven" is no small thing for Japanese people whose relationship with the visual is quite distinct, especially through their use of the pictographs or ideographs of kanji. The change in the characters came at the time when the divine status of the emperor was necessary for making political ideology divine. If the link between the divine and politics could be made, the hearts and minds of the people could be one/won. By renaming the Emperor, a refiguring of his symbolic body could follow. If he could be transformed from

9Ibid.
"a human king who receives his power" to one who is divine enough that he takes his orders from no one and, in fact, generates those commands, his position in the social order would be changed. Out of the tradition of divine lineage, came the possibility of changing the details of how he would be conceived. Literally and figuratively, the new tenno was born anew, and his position in the cosmos, secured.

The title or name for the emperor--tenno--was not the only signifier of the space occupied by the imperial body that underwent change. His own name disappeared and the name of his epoch became ritualized and used. It was in Meiji that the practice began of taking the name of the era in which the emperor reigned and of the dropping away of his own given name.

The Emperor Has No Name

The Emperor's given name was and still is never spoken in Japan. It is rarely even known by its residents and the emperor is always referred to as Tenno, Tenno Heika, or Tennosama while he is alive. Because the given name of the emperor cannot be articulated, it is lost. He represents, semiotically, a place, a site, a position--a body without a name. Upon death, the body disappears and his given name sinks further into historical oblivion. Today, when a Japanese person is asked the given name of the emperor, she or he will most likely look at the asker blankly. This is most true with older Japanese where the residue of Meiji still sits, like dust on their clothing. It was during the Meiji Period that this practice of silence regarding the Emperor's name began. In times past, the
Emperor had a name which was known, and his reign was given an auspicious title which could be changed if disaster or calamity befell him. When the emperor died, he was always given a new name for he was, from death on, an imperial ancestry (koso). In Meiji, however, the era name became the posthumous name for both the period and the emperor. When the Meiji Emperor died, he took on the name of his designated era (Meiji) and not only was he referred to by that name but the period and the emperor became one. In this way, from the Meiji Period on, the Japanese emperor, while he lived was a person without a name whereas once dead, he became a name without a person.

Further evidence of his being a habeas corpus, a missing body, is the fact that he is the only resident in Japan who does not appear in the Koseki, the Registry of Births. Every person born in Japan must be enrolled in this registry, for it is the major social determinant or mechanism for marriage, employment and university entrance. Only the Emperor does not appear there. The space where the emperor's

10 I want to thank Patricia Steinhoff for alerting me to this practice.

11 There is a long discussion of this phenomenon in Thomas Crump's The Death of An Emperor, pp. 4-7.

12 The Koseki or House Registry dates back to A.D. 645 and was originally called "Register of Clan Names." The Law which demands that every person born in Japan be enrolled in this Registry was enacted in 1898, the 31st year of Meiji. It was called the Koseki Ho, and provided for the registration of all individuals, rather than just clans or families, as the earlier registries had done. For more on this, see Nobushige Hozumi's Ancestor-Worship and Japanese Law (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1973), pp. 114-128.
name would be is occupied by the imperial institution and the history which surrounds it. This situation of naming and of the unnameable, then, results in a symbolic fusing of body and space, of emptying the body into space. Asada Akira addresses this using Nishida Kitaro's notion of "mu no basho" or "site of emptiness." According to Asada, 13

13 Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945) is widely acknowledged as the foremost philosopher of Japan since the time of Meiji. Nishida taught at Kyoto University and inspired the creation of The Kyoto School. The Kyoto School has been described as a way of philosophizing--more of a philosophical ethos than a unified system of thought--somewhat like the German Frankfurt School. The Kyoto School engaged in a deliberate attempt to bring about a synthesis of East and West, and Nishida's contribution to that synthesis was said to be "a system permeated with the spirity of Buddhism and Buddhist meditation by fully employing Western methods of thinking." Nishida employs a dialectic process not of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, but of contradictions and the unity or identity in these contradictions. The source of this dialectical language is to be found in Mahayana Buddhism, and particularly in two ideas which are fundamental to the whole structure. In Jan van Bragt's introduction to Religion and Nothingness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), written by Nishitani Keiji, Nishida's major student and successor in The Kyoto School, these two ideas are given as: "the notion of pratityasamutpada or 'conditioned c-production,' according to which reality is seen as a boundless web of interrelations whose momentary nodes make up the 'things' of experience. It is pure relation without substance. It leaves covetous man with nothing to cling to, nothing to become attached to. But the grasping, clinging subject itself is no more substantial than things, because of a second notion, that of anatman or non-ego, according to which the basic self-affirmation through which man makes himself a permanent center of his world is undercut." This thinking is not a simple negation of reality but an alternative and ultimately positive view of reality that might be termed a "radical empiricism." In the words of Nishida, himself: "In contradistinction to Western culture which considers form as existence and formation as good, the urge to see the form of the formless, and hear the sound of the soundless, lies at the foundation of Buddhist culture." (In A Study of the Good, trans., V. H. Viglielmo [Tokyo: Japanese Government Printing Bureau, 1960], p. 191.)

In Zen Buddhism, in particular, this "form and formlessness" is given special attention. The conjunctive soku or "space" (or "i.e." or "qua"), put between two contradictory concepts as "emptiness-soku-form, form-soku-emptiness," is meant to draw off the total reality of the two poles into itself as their constitutive and
the imperial institution is the ultimate empty space or "place of
nothingness" (mu). This is contrasted with the European kingly place
or nation which is yu or "presence."\textsuperscript{14} Asada relates the fact that,
in the European scene, there is the possibility of conflict between
individuals and the whole in the striving to expand the self in space
whereas "the imperial household as the place of nothingness contains
Japan like an empty cylinder" into which all Japanese will find a
place where the self disappears and all are synthesized into One.\textsuperscript{15}

This synthesis, while perhaps appearing peaceful and harmonious,
allows for manipulation and silencing and in fact, this became a very
conscious enterprise which began in Meiji, and continued into the
postwar era.

\begin{quote}
ontological prior unity. It indicates the only point or "place" at
which the opposites are realized and display their true reality.

Such spatial metaphors as soku are used extensively in
Nishida's work. At every turn we find him referring to the "place"
or "point" at which events occur, to the "field" of being or emptiness,
to the "standpoint" of the subject. He speaks of being as the "place
of emptiness" and the absolute as the "locus of absolute nothingness."
The notion of "locus" was suggested to Nishida by the idea of "topos"
in Plato's Timaeus, although he also refers to Aristotle's notion
of hypokeimenon and Lask's field theory to explain it. Nishida's
"nothingness" or "emptiness" is not a negative or relative nothingness,
but an absolute nothingness that embraces both being and nothingness.
It is a "point" or "place" at which being coincides with nothingness.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14}Asada Akira, "Infantile Capitalism and Japan's Postmodernism:
A Fairy Tale," in The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 87, no. 3, 1988,
pp. 632-633.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 633.
The mu (無) ("emptiness") of the imperial site incorporated, as well, the notion of ma ( masa ) ("sacred space"), the location of "the dust of the kami, the gods."\(^\text{16}\)

In this conception, the kami has no permanent physical body; its body and essence exist as a vacuum, "a place entirely void of matter."\(^\text{17}\) But this "void" does not mean that "nothing is there." Rather, this void is seen as "hollow" because nothing (mu) exists there. This concept of the kami as void (mu, nothing) gives Japanese culture a striking quality, and becomes even more interesting a premise for that civilization when held up next to the European (cultural) adoption of the Aristotelian principle of "abhorrence of the Vacuum." The kami, both empty and sacred, like the nation in its present conception, carries with it the idea of transience.

With this distinct difference having been noted, further understandings of kami may also shed some light. The kami does not abide; its nature is to arrive and then to depart, bringing with it kehai, or atmosphere or using scientific parlance, a magnetic field, from which the sacred energy or ch'\i' emanates. Everything in nature is seen to manifest some hidden meaning or symbolism based on the concept of kami. The mountain, for example, is always a sacred mountain

\(^\text{16}\)Catalogue for Ma: Space-Time in Japan, exhibition of the work of artist Arata Isozaki held at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of Design.

\(^\text{17}\)In Ma: Space-Time in Japan, a catalogue for an exhibition held at the Cooper-Hewitt Museum, The Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of Design as part of The Japan Today Festival held in 1989.
because it is a place to which the kami would descend and reside momentarily. How easy it is, then, to extend the idea of the sacred to the land, to the country and to the emperor. The emperor is seen as the manifest kami, and as the manifest kami is said to reside temporarily in ma (sacred spaces). The physical emperor matters less than the sacred space into which he has descended and temporarily resides. This may be why the attachment to the body of the Emperor is so tenuous and the reverence for the Imperial institution is somewhat more concrete.

In Japanese art, aesthetics and religion, the kami descends from heaven, dwells temporarily, and diffuses, disappears, vanishes. Again, the sites where the kami would appear and dwell are ma, and the kami bring to those spaces kehai or "atmosphere of ch'i." All of this is meant to illustrate how the cosmological blended with the imperial in Japan and could easily be used, distorted, and misinterpreted, as it was in Meiji. The myth of the Divine King/Emperor, descending from the clouds, temporarily residing and then disappearing was enacted in political space and became an overriding theme in the construction of the modern nation. The divinity of the emperor and by extension, the divine nature of the Japanese people, was etched in the hearts and minds of the citizens, disallowing conflict or debate.

Eric Voegelin, in his voluminous *Order and History*, suggests that in the civilizations of the "Ancient Orient," symbolists tried to link historical moments with the emergence of order in the cosmos, so that "events would have a meaning that made them worthy of
transmission to posterity." This was accomplished through the act of mythopoesis which, by not breaking the form of the original myth, achieved "a speculation on the origin of being."18 In such a symbolization, which Voegelin names "historiogenesis," parallel histories are absorbed into an imaginary, unilinear history, and everything emanates from mythic beginnings. In Japan, this was the case, with the divine origins of the emperor and the imperial family following one consecutive, continuous line. The story told was a linear one, moving from father to son, and imbued with the sacred ch'i. Every historical event was an enactment of the divine and entailed the acting out of that divinity on earth.

Schoolchildren in Japan came to know the myth of the Divine Emperor and their relationship to him but not so much from hearing the myth of divinity at their mother's knee. Rather, they knew it by a constant retelling of it in the classrooms of their schools. The school system in Meiji was particularly interested in this story having its telling since that system had as its primary mission the implicit obedience to the will of the Emperor and, in reality, to the will of the ruling elite. The Ministry of Education cooperated with those who would be rulers to etch obedience into the hearts of its charges. Thus they instituted the telling of the legend of divine origins in the classrooms, alongside a supposed divine edict called the Imperial Rescript, fabricated in 1890. What was encapsulated

in this rescript was the moral system over which the Emperor would preside. It reinforced the idea of divinity and the responsibilities of the divine subjects. It suggested itself not only as the desire of the emperor but as a spiritual message from the gods. The Ministry of Education (Mombusho) emphasized that the authority of it was imperial rather than legal, and it became the basis of social morality in the schools. Schools competed in elaborating the ceremonial surrounding its reading. Some schools kept the physical document in a lacquer box along with imperial portraits, almost as an icon, an object of worship. Scholarly exegesis appeared soon after its public presentation, explaining and commenting on the rescript, and it later became the center of a cult of the emperor. It links kokutai (national essence) with loyalty and filialty, and makes the emperor the source of a morality that was said to be both indigenous and universal at the same time. It is worth reprinting here and doing a closer reading of it to see what it can further tell us.

**KYOIKU NI KANSURU CHOKUGO**

The Imperial Rescript on Education

Know ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors (waga koso koso) have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly planted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty (chu) and filial piety (ko) have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our

19 Thomas Crump, *The Death of An Emperor*, p. 69.

20 The most interesting discussion of all of this is to be found in Carol Gluck's *Japan's Modern Myths*. 
Empire (kokutai no seika), and herein also lies the source of Our education (kyoiku no engen). Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State (giyuko no hoshi); and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects (churyo no shinmin), but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

The 30th day of the 10th month of the 23rd year of Meiji.21

If we look a little closely at this text, there is a wealth of information in it about the construction of Japanese self, the sacred relationship to the ancestors and the emperor, and about memory. It tells the children who they are, where they came from ("Our imperial ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting . . ."), and how they ought to "be" as well ("be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters . . . pursue learning and cultivate arts"). It guides their behavior and suggests to them their moral duties ("bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all . . . advance public good and promote

21Translated in Gluck, p. 121.
common interests. . . . develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers . . . and should emergencies arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State") and finally, infuses them with the responsibility of maintaining a continuous line from the ancestors through themselves ("render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers"). The signature on the text is that of the Ancestors themselves ("The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching of Our Imperial Ancestors"), instructing the Japanese people to carry on with the teachings ("to be observed alike by their Descendants and subjects") and to create a likemindedness and way of being ("It is our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue"). The creation of subjectivity is achieved through this pronouncement, but reinforces with it a national identity that includes but subsumes the subject. The self is only identifiable by its inclusion in the national, disappearing, it seems, if not constituted as such. The self is relational and its primary relationship is with the nation. This idea was reinforced in the Rescript and became memorized meaning for a generation of young Japanese.

The text was issued as a personal moral utterance of the emperor and not as a law of government. It was, in fact, drafted by elder statesmen and educators who offered many revisions between the months of June and October of 1890, and who had as their main concerns the presentation of the document as a moral pronouncement rather than as an expression of the state. They wanted to avoid all semblence
of a "national doctrine" and to promulgate it as a chokugo, a
transcript of an oral pronouncement by the emperor.22 This was
endorsed and edified in the press which noted that the Rescript con­tained nothing novel and was really nothing more than "the precepts of the imperial ancestors and the tangible expression of national customs and mores."23 The national customs and mores that are referred to are embodied, again, in the term kokutai, variously translated as "national body" or "national essence."

Kokutai is a most pregnant term, containing in it the seeds of ultranationalism, racism, and "uniqueness." It was invoked with increasing frequency throughout Meiji and on into the Showa period until it became a symbolic rebus that, whatever the context, stood unmistakably, for Japan. Kokutai emits its essence in the continuous ancestral tradition of the imperial house, but it is also conceived in a variety of other forms.24 It has been expressed in terms of indigenous customs, imperial continuity, the "blood of the people." It has spatial, historical, and religious dimensions. It is ontological and epistemological, and commands attention at its telling. Fukuzawa Yukichi, one of Japan's greatest educational

22 Gluck, p. 123.

23 Tokyo Assahi Shinbun, 1 Nov. 1890.

philosophers, conceived of it in terms of the social, historical, and geographical attributes that constituted the essence of a nation—what in "Western language they call 'nationality.'"25 Others, however, attributed to it a sacredness, with some patriots calling for Japan "to make manifest our kokutai and to spread knowledge of its sacredness to Japan and to the world."26 Carol Gluck calls it "amuletic" (omamoriteki) borrowing from Tsurumi Shunsuke's definition in his 1946 treatise.27 In this famous article, Professor Tsurumi writes about the magical/mystical nature of the term kokutai and within it the hint of the sacred. This sacred hint is bound up not only with the emperor and kokutai but with an array of elements which are subsumed under the term chi. Chi is emblematic of what it is to be Japanese, and figures as much as kokutai in the construction of Japanese social reality.

Chi: Blood, Land, Father, Mother's Milk and Knowledge

The homonymic play of chi, chi, chichi, chi chi, and chi, while appearing to stretch a topology beyond imagination, actually offers an interesting way to talk about elements of Japanese ontology and the cultural body. For chi (血) or "blood" at first defines "japanese-ness" at the most basic level. More than race, it is a


26Gluck, p. 145.

of Japan springs this pure bloodline, embodied first and foremost by the Emperor and then flowing to the people.

Land, too, acts as metaphor as well for the extension of "the purity of the race" with the attachment to the land being evidenced at every turn. *Chi* (地) or "earth" (land) is key in understanding the cosmological structures of Japan. The sense of "place" is witnessed in the attachment to the land. The sacred sites, the sacred moves or pilgrimages, and the idea of the sacred nation are all wrapped up in the land. The "bones tours" in Japan today is an example of this close relationship to the land. These tours are where relatives of servicemen killed in the Pacific War travel great distances to recover the bones and ashes of the deceased. These are carried out in order to "bring the boys back home." The remains of the dead soldiers are deposited into the ancestor shrines in the homes or in the family cemeteries where they are cared for and prayed upon. In this move, the "coming home" to the land of the ancestors is considered essential for peace within the family and for everlasting harmony with the deceased. By extension, this same idea comes to include peace for the entire nation.

References to the land begin in the myths of origins and carry on into contemporary rationalities for everything from the need to extend outward and "bring the eight corners of the world under one roof" (*hakko ichiu*), an expression which motivated fanatic movement in the Pacific War, to the obsessive reluctance to purchase rice that
was not grown in Japanese soil. The land (chi), through which the relationship to nature finds its place is also significant in the Japanese imaginary landscape. The literary devotion to nature and the claim to "oneness" with it provides another sacred link for the Japanese. The Man'yoshu, a poetic masterpiece of the eighth century abounds with poems about the land. In current symbolic and real currency, the land is made more precious than ever. With real estate in Tokyo being the highest anywhere in the world, and fears of encroachment leading to laws disallowing foreigners to own land in Japan, the significance of land (chi) is evident.

Another chi (地) meaning "knowledge" is also a unifying structure of Japanese culture. The interest in information, "facticity," and knowledge is exceedingly apparent, witnessed in the literacy of the people, the obsession with books, the desire for technologies of knowledge. It is overwhelming to walk into a Japanese bookstore and observe a great number of people engaged in reading, in purchasing books, in listening to learning tapes, in viewing educational videos, and perusing other media of instruction. The desire to acquire or purchase knowledge in Japan is the subject of many cultural studies, both within and outside of Japan. Knowledge

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28Hakko ichiu, bringing the eight corners of the world under one roof, was an expression heard during the Pacific War to rationalize imperialistic moves into Asia and, later, into the Pacific. This "moral imperative" was used to justify the Pacific War by "liberating Asia from American and British imperialism" and guiding those nations into benevolent "co-prosperity." It was felt that the enlightened leadership of Japan could release those suffering from western domination if they were under the one "roof" of Japan.
signifier of otherness and of what it is to really be Japanese. Unity derives from the belief that the emperor's blood and the people's blood are one, of the same "bloodline." There is a whole field of study devoted to "Japanese blood": how it is distinguished from the blood of others, its characteristics, its purity. Everyone in Japan knows his or her blood type and it is not uncommon to be asked "what is your blood type?" (much like the California question of "what is your sign?"). Blood is such an important element in Japan that people spend enormous amounts of money on tonics, baths, lotions, and such to "purify their blood." It is a long-held belief that sake is a blood purifier and is consumed with relish over that idea.

But blood is also a distinguisher—a marker for what constitutes Self and Other. There is a belief which is "borne out" in scientific studies that Japanese people have a special kind of blood, unique antibodies, a shared bloodline; that, what constitutes "being Japanese" is measured by blood. Kinship or family ties (dozoku) are generally determined by blood, consanguinity being a "national characteristic." Blood acts as a barometer of "Japaneseess." Ketto shugi (血統主義) or jun ketsu shugi (純血主義) is the doctrine or principle of "pure blood" and it continues to have validity among many Japanese. In the infamous statement by former Prime Minister Nakasone about the racial heterogeneity of America causing inferiority, the Japanese rendering was "mixed blood" as the problem. Intimations are that in Japan, blood purity accounts for the superior performances in culture. It is as if out of the land
(chi) holds so much symbolic currency in Japan that everything from marriages to employment surround education and I.Q. levels. Although this may not appear unusual, the extremes to which some Japanese go with regard to this are mythic. Stories abound about young ronin.\(^{29}\) those who could not pass the entrance examination to their desired universities, committing suicide, feeling their young lives to be doomed by this failure. Love suicides exist as well over families' refusals of consent based on educational deficiencies of the suitor or his having gone to the "wrong" school. This usually focuses upon young men since education for young women, until recently, was seen as superfluous and educational institutions were "finishing" schools and preparatory academies for marriage. Many Japanese measure Japan's postwar success by the high level of educational achievement and literacy in the country rather than by other measures such as grueling hours of hard work and little individual development. In Japan, knowledge and power are truly mated in the minds of the people and many hold that the accumulation of knowledge is tantamount to success.

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\(^{29}\) Ronin literally means "leaderless man" and refers to the samurai who had no lord and who wandered the countryside searching for a clan or lord. In modern parlance, the term has come to mean one who has failed the nyugakushiken or entrance examination and has to sit out a year before he can take it again. During that year, many students pay large amounts of money to go to juku or "cram schools" in order to improve in those areas that they did poorly on in the exam. Others work for a year and get private tutors. Many just drink and play pachinko and wait for the next exam period. There are television dramas devoted to this phenomenon and manga (comics) abound. Being a ronin is embarrassing, not only to the one who has failed, but to the family, the high school teachers, and any other significant person who has had influence or sway over the young warrior of education.
The infamous "kyoiku mama" or "education mother" (much like the Jewish mother) represents the absorbing nature of Japanese education with the mother doing anything to ensure her child's success in school, including offering sex to her teenage son in order to keep his mind off of girls. Her power is measured in the achievements of her sons, and therefore, there is an overindulgence of the child leading to a clinging passive dependence of the child upon the mother. Amaeru, the verb "to presume upon another's love," to cling, to depend, is the word most often used to describe the mother/son relationship in Japan. In fact, the psychiatrist Doi Takeo says that it is the key to understanding the Japanese personality.

Mothers figure largely in the cosmological and psychological structures of Japan, not only as kyoiku mamas but in a variety of other ways as well. The First Mother, Amaterasu, the Sun Goddess, created Japan and spawned her inhabitants. Susanoo, the Thunder God, screamed for his mother from the underworld while commanding the oceans to do his bidding. Kamikaze pilots were said to have shouted "okaasan" ("Mother") when they were about to meet their deaths in the war more often than "Long Live the Emperor." In fact, the

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30 See Marie Thorsten's work on "Mama-Gon" or "monster mothers" especially in her Master's thesis entitled "Japan's Education Mamas: Martyrs to the Modern Miracle," 1989.


best-selling souvenir at a famous kamikaze museum is a record album entitled "The Suicide Pilot's Mother":

You are the suicide pilot's mother  
So please don't cry  
Laugh as you send us off  
We'll show you how to die  
Mother, oh Mother!33

The reference to the mother and the desire for her to welcome her kamikaze son's death is legendary in Japan.

Mothers figure in literature as well. In the eighth century Man'yoshu, an anthology of poems, the following poem appears.

Oh, that my dear mother  
were a jewel-piece  
That I might place in my hair-knot  
And always wear above me.34

The place of the mother is distinct in Japanese culture, witnessed, again in the Man'yoshu. In one of the poems, there is an expression "tara chi ne no . . ." referring to the "sagging breast of the mother" but also alludes to the "failing nurturance of the land," a lament for the ruins of the landscape that the poet was witnessing. The epithet or makurakotoba (pillow word) encased in the term chi means not only "land" but "the mother's breast and milk" (chi chi) as well.

Chi chi also means "father" in the familiar linguistic form used by most Japanese. When referring to one's own father, it is the correct word to use. With its patriarchal tendencies well noted, Japan cannot escape the importance of the father. From the emperor being described as the "father of the nation" to the company owner

33Ibid., p. 18. 34Ibid.
assuming a "paternal" relationship to his employees, the idea of the father penetrates all aspects of Japanese society. Legally, the rights of property are passed from father to eldest son; the family registry is in the father's family name; the father has the right to determine family members' residence; and the right to approve or disapprove marriages and divorces. These rights were made law under the civil code adopted by the Meiji government in 1898.

There is an interesting parallel here with the position of the emperor, who, in Meiji, became the ultimate father figure in Japan, coming out of his powerless closet. Ian Buruma tells us: "Until Meiji, Japanese emperors had literally been ikons [sic], well hidden from the public view, divine but bereft of real power. Now, suddenly, there he was: sitting on his horse, dressed in full uniform and sporting a bristly moustache, every inch the stern Meiji patriarch. How powerful he really was is open to dispute, but certainly obedience to the father at home and to the emperor as the father of us all, came down to the same thing; one was the logical extension of the other." The ultimate patriarch, the emperor defined the behavior of his inheriting children, and punishment was meted out in his name for those not carrying out his commands. The conception of him as the stern father was to persist throughout Meiji, through images and pronouncements, with little direct contact between this "god-father" and his children.

35Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels, and Outcasts (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 69.

We could carry this metaphor of the father and of \textit{chi} on \textit{ad infinitum} but suffice it to say that \textit{chi} signifies those elements which enjoy symbolic status in the lives of the Japanese people. They all rest in the realm of the sacred or divine, epitomized by the spirit of the emperor. Again, this divine spirit was made legal in a document created in Meiji--the Constitution--and it is this text which helped to concretize most securely the idea of the Imperial body as sacred and divine. And it is to this text that we shall now turn for its part in the constituting of the imperial body and its part in carrying out the "imperial will."

\textbf{The Constitution of the Emperor/The Emperor of the Constitution}

The movement from a feudal form into a constitutional monarchy is the subject of great intellectual debate in Japan since much of what is now considered modern Japan emanates from that period and its constitution. The Meiji Constitution which was formulated during the beginning of its reformation also delineates the role and place of the Emperor in Japanese society. It is perhaps this constructing of the Emperor that is its most salient feature. This document made imperial powers legally implicit for the first time in Japanese history, and more importantly, it constituted the imperial body in such a way as to secure the nation and to keep the moral and sacred aspects of his sovereignty.\textsuperscript{37} In fact, the words "sacred and

\textsuperscript{37}For a deeper discussion of the tug-of-war over interpretations of the emperor's sovereignty, see Carol Gluck's Japan's Modern Myths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 73-101.
inviolable" ("shinsei ni shite okasu bekarazu") appear in Article III of that document. The authority of the emperor was asserted over and against political parties, and he emerged as a constitutional monarch. Carol Gluck says "in 1889 ... Emperor Meiji was raised above politics by the Constitution, which rendered sovereignty but not government within his powers." He was lifted "above the clouds" and became the symbol of national unity, not of a political, but of a spiritual and holy kind. This was enhanced by the sequestering of the imperial body by the "custodians of the throne" after his bestowal of the Constitution, and by conflating politics and religion once again. Kyodoshoku or "national priests" were selected by the government to edify the people and to preach to them on patriotism, worship of national deities, Confucius and Mencius, and reverence for the Emperor. By the late 1800s, more than 100,000 kyodoshoku were dispersed throughout the countryside preaching the centrality of the Emperor and the Gods in national life. The Emperor's sightings were elusive and made of controlled ritual and mystery. People were not permitted to look upon his holy countenance and the roads were swept before his entourage approached. His audiences were screened and usually consisted of prefectural officials and selected members of the local elite. This had the effect of removing both his body and his personality from the constraints of reality. His portrait was painted in 1888 by an Italian artist and from this painting, a photograph was created. This photograph was widely distributed to

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38 Gluck, p. 78.
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schools, consulates, prefectural offices, and ministries, and the photograph, itself, was treated as a sacred object. The imperial body was represented and replaced by the regal portraiture—in full military regalia with medal-covered uniform, sword in hand, and white-plumed cap—unaging and ubiquitous. The imperial body became a work of art, effected as an image or a representation. In addition to its being effected as a representation, there was also a transformation of the Subject. The body of the Emperor had been paraded and put on display in time as well as in space, and then removed and transformed into an ageless icon, the photograph. The contexts in which the Imperial photograph and the imperial body appeared were structured so that separation between the sacred and the real or the profane, collapsed. The distinction disappeared and the Emperor filled what Philip Fisher calls "democratic space," having a public quality. In this act, the Emperor's image became appropriated by the laiety, making it a part of the "second life" of the masses. It also had the effect of the photograph becoming more believable than the lived experience of the emperor and resulted in a kind of disappointment in those who viewed him. The transcendent and immortalized present of the photograph was severed, disrupted by the appearance of the "real" emperor. This is emblematic of the importance of the image and its potential. As David Titus has described it, the imperial image was managed and maintained by the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho), especially through the photograph, and the dignity of the imperial line carried on. 39 The

mystery of the man joined the mystery of the Imperial institution which was used and adapted by the Restoration leaders.  

The Emperor was elevated and made to disappear. Throughout Japan's recorded history, the emperor and his divine ancestors had been exalted and seen as transcendent. It was, therefore, easy for the Meiji elite to extend that imaging and to make the modern monarch a sacred symbol. He became a symbol of the nation as a people, as distinct from the nation as a state. This distinction was important in making the people one and in their seeing their nation and culture as unique. Again, in David Titus's words:

> The new imperial institution (of Meiji), bringing its distinctive character to bear in the building of a new Japan, could be made to symbolize the unity and continuity of Japanese society as it underwent the disruptive effects of extensive modernization. Thus, when the emperor met with government leaders, made a tour of the provinces, presided over an imperial poetry contest, or performed rites at one of the national shinto shrines, he symbolized the unity of the Japanese people, their shared cultural heritage and skills, and their unique religious communality, of which he was high priest. He was Emperor-in-Court acting as Emperor-in-Public, presumably reminding all Japanese that, by virtue of his majesty and mystery, they were a unique and united people.

To ensure the transcendental position of the throne in politics and society, the emperor's guardians worked to make the emperor's person and personal will dissolve. The emperor was soon to be just the representative of the Imperial Will and not representative of himself. It took much of the Meiji Period to settle upon this clothing for

\[40\text{Titus, p. 53.}\]

\[41\text{Ibid.}\]
the Emperor, and such elaborate garb was to remain well into the reign of Hirohito.

The document of Meiji, the Meiji Constitution, helped most to design the wardrobe of the reigning emperor. This document, based on the Prussian Constitution, differs significantly from the European one in terms of its explicit relationship with the cosmic. Article I of the Meiji Constitution states: "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal," and relates how the splendour of the "sacred throne" has been "transmitted through an unbroken line of one and the same dynasty" and has "remained as immutable as that of the heavens and of the earth."\(^{42}\) The words of that unbroken lineage were said to be continuous, passing from the lips of one sacred ruler to the next. The first Article of the Meiji Constitution speaks of the Imperial lineage and the message carried from one royal personage in that line to another through royal edict. The Meiji Constitution became represented as such an edict, transmitting the sacred words of the Emperor to all of the people, the royal "children" of the Empire. The document was accorded the status of a sacred text, and a continuity of the divine from ages past was established. Although this continuity was an illusion, there having been usurpation and struggle between various families over their rights to the divine status, the creation of a different memory, a unified continuous imperial line,

was effected. The document of Meiji did more to bind the thinking of the people into one "harmonious whole" than did any other text. It did so by referring back constantly to divine links and by investing power first and foremost in the body of the Emperor.

The first sixteen articles of the constitution describe the powers of the Emperor including the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial will, the sanctioning and enforcing of laws, the declaring and command of the forces of war, the creating of and dissolving of the Diet, and the ultimate right of supreme command. How these were to be carried out by the imperial leader is more telling than any of the descriptions of his vast sphere of influence and power. Article Seventeen of the constitution introduces the figure of the Regent who was accorded the role of "exercising all powers appertaining to the Emperor in His name."43 The regent, in fact, was responsible for all matters of state and for informing the emperor of actions taken and courses pursued. In his famous Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan, Ito Hirobumi, the chief architect of Meiji constitutionalism, notes that "in the name of the Emperor" actually meant "in the place of the Emperor." That is, the Regent actually issued orders in the place of the Emperor, exercising sovereign powers in His name. Article Seventeen effectively gave power to those who actually ruled Meiji—the Meiji Oligarchy, composed of the Regent and the Genro or elder statesmen. This group of men, headed first by men like Kido Takayoshi and Okubo

Toshimichi, and later by Ito himself, crafted the constitution in such a masterful way as to render the Imperial body impotent and the political parties without voice. These men strengthened their control through legal means and by utilizing absolutist and autocratic tendencies and practices already present in the Japanese body politics. The historical consequences of this style of governance were, of course, to be revealed in the events leading up to the Pacific War and after.

The legacy left by the Meiji Oligarchy for the "constitutionalized" body of the Emperor and for his royal subjects was a monarchy which looked to contain power but didn't; a party system which was weak and divided; and a military that referred to themselves as supreme commanders of the armed forces rather than investing that power in the body of the Emperor. Muted, the emperor was given over to conferring titles and honors, and not to an active role in the making of the modern Japanese state. Emperor Meiji, remembered as a powerful monarch, was in actuality, constitutionally stunted and made to appear tall.

Hirohito inherited these things from Meiji and was figured in much the same manner as Meiji, according to the constitutional document. How the imaging and the constitution affected Hirohito's rule are important in understanding the way in which the Showa Period

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44 This position has been advanced by numerous scholars and most poignantly by George Akita in Foundations of Constitutional Government in Modern Government: 1868-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 2.
developed and how the emperor's body was used. How much the Meiji Constitution contributed to that imaging and how it inevitably failed is of interest to us here.

**Imaging Hirohito**

The December 1990 issue of Bungei Shunju, Japan's leading literary magazine, carried a Monologue delivered by Hirohito during five secret meetings with a small circle of personal advisers. In this Monologue or Dokuhaku, Hirohito describes his futile attempts to impress his personal will upon the military and men in high office before and during the Pacific War, and tells how they had reminded him of the role of constitutional monarch whose voice and will had no place in the decisions of government. For him, the clothing that was fashioned by the Meiji Constitution and which became his personal garb throughout the war, had choked him into a submission as obvious as bound feet. On the two occasions that he defied the constitutional construction of the silent monarch, the results were so disastrous as to nearly silence him permanently. He speaks at length about these crucial events in the monologues. The first instance of speech was the one in which he intervened against the February 26, 1936 rebellion by young army officers, and the second was when he intervened to end the Greater East Asian War in 1945.

The famous February 26, 1936 rebellion, referred to in Japan as the Ni-Ni-Roku Incident, surrounded an attempted coup by young
military officers who envisioned a Showa Restoration. Such a Restoration, they imagined, would return to the center stage of culture the virtues of Bushido, patriotism, filial piety, loyalty, and reverence for the Emperor. These young officers believed that the combined forces of senior statesmen, members of the zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and party politicians had undermined the national polity (kokutai) and had created a critical situation abroad. It was their goal to eliminate such men by direct action.

The rebels occupied the heart of Tokyo on February 26th and after staging a bloodbath of their intended victims, issued a manifesto justifying their actions. They had no concrete plans beyond assassinating the top government officials and court advisers, so the success of their coup actually depended upon whether or not the army leaders would support them. The generals could not agree on the best course of action, and it came down to the Emperor insisting that the insurgents be subdued. Martial law was proclaimed, troops were brought into Tokyo, and after two days, the rebels were forced to surrender. It was the Imperial voice, usually mute, that quashed the rebellion. Although the rebels claimed then and after, at their trials and executions, that what they did was in the name of the Emperor, Hirohito refused to acknowledge them and called them "mutineers." In fact, the Emperor's strong stand during the incident

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so surprised the military and the government that it was said to have jolted them into action.

What followed was a major purge in the military, but with those internal critics eliminated, army leaders became more aggressive in meddling in politics. Political leaders who criticized the military were made powerless, or worse, were assassinated. Civilians, as well as the Emperor himself, became very timid in dealing with the army, having had a taste of what a discontented military was capable of doing. The military was able to influence a veto of all the liberal candidates for cabinet posts, and helped to reinforce the constitutional stipulation of neutrality in the Emperor. This idea was to resurface many times in the course of the war, and was used to keep the Emperor voiceless. In fact, the unifying theme in Hirohito's Monologue is the strong emphasis on constitutional restraints which led, finally, to his own self-silencing.

This restraint emerges clearly in his discussion of Prime Minister Tanaka's downfall in 1929. Hirohito discovered that he had gone too far as a constitutional monarch in virtually dismissing Tanaka as Prime Minister, and this situation made him especially sensitive to the limits of the constitutional position placed on him by the Meiji document.

The fundamental issue in the Tanaka case was that the Prime Minister had refused to make public the investigation of the murder of a Chinese named Chang Tso-lin in 1928. This man had been murdered by Kwantung Army officers and Tanaka wanted to keep the matter quiet. Hirohito found this to be unacceptable and called Tanaka to him and
rebuked him. As a result, Tanaka submitted his resignation and the entire Tanaka cabinet resigned. Hirohito was surprised and was, thereafter, instructed to maintain strict political neutrality. Because of the influence of Minobe Tatsukichi's interpretation of the Emperor as an "organ of the state" whose power, and the political responsibility for exercising it, was delegated to the ministers of the state according to the Meiji Constitution, Hirohito was effectively silenced.

The second incident in which the emperor gave voice to a political situation was his ratifying the final decision for war. In the reflections on this event, Hirohito refers to the Constitution: "As a constitutional monarch in a constitutional political system, I had no choice but to sanction the delusion by the Tojo cabinet to begin the war," and then states more specifically: "If I were to have sanctioned it because I personally liked it, or if I had not sanctioned it because I personally disliked it, I would have been no different from a tyrant." Truly Hirohito had become the Emperor

46 "Showa Tenno no Dokuhaku Hachijikan" in Bungei Shunju, December 1990, pp. 144-145. This Monologue was delivered during five secret meetings with a small group of Hirohito's closest advisers in March and April of 1946. Hirohito speaks very directly about his political role and his "constituted" role in the early years of the Showa Era. These Monologues were transcribed or recorded by Terasaki Hidenari who was his aide and translator, had served in the Japanese Embassy in Washington before the Pacific War. This text was discovered among Terasaki's personal papers by his daughter in 1958, seven years after her father's death, but it was only recently that she realized its historical importance and arranged for its publication. The day the Bungei Shunju appeared on the newsstands with this Monologue in it, every copy was snapped up and I was unable to read it until a month later.
of the Constitution and was, ironically, constituted by it. The Constitution allowed those in power during the war to profess loyalty to the emperor while disallowing his voice and personal will. As Takeda Kiyoko observes, "this kind of ambivalence was a key that enabled the political and military authorities to administer the nation as they pleased, preventing any popular criticism, through the use of the emperor's name."

But it was not only the emperor's name that was used, it was his image as well. The way in which those of power sought to "make the emperor" was through creating images of him, constituting him in a particular way. If they could make his image and his person one, they would be better able to secure the nation in the way they wished. One of the ways in which this was done was through the use of photographs.

The photograph can be seen as a form of ideological scripting, of bodies made to reinforce or oppose the existing order by their posing. Occasionally, the photographer and the photographic subject are unaware of the codes they invoke or the cultural texts to which they refer, but quite often they are consciously involved in that creation. Treating photographs as texts composed of codes or sign-systems allows us, as viewers, to focus on the reading or viewing in a more political way than being absorbed by them into a second-order experience of some kind. Looking at photographs in such light

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intensifies our awareness of the activity required to make such texts mean. The informing ideology is often displayed in the codes, as it is in the photos of Emperor Hirohito, but this sometimes involves a sophisticated game of deciphering the codes to see their ideological bent.

Ideology is rooted in the very concept of imagery. Images seem to speak for themselves by persuading, describing, remembering. The photographic image, itself a kind of remembering, brings us into close contact with the possibility of political imagining and freezing the subject into a particular kind of memory. Roland Barthes calls this the "connoted" aspect of the photograph. He notes:

> Connotation is not necessarily immediately graspable at the level of the message itself but it can already be inferred from certain phenomena which occur at the levels of the production and reception of the message: on the one hand, the professional photograph, for example, is an object that has been worked on, chosen, composed, constructed, treated according to professional, aesthetic or ideological norms which are so many factors of connotation; while on the other, this same photograph is not only perceived, received, it is read, connected more or less consciously by the public that consumes it to a traditional stock of signs. Since every sign supposes a code, it is this code (of connotation) that one should try to establish.48

In attempting to establish the codes of connotation in the photographs taken of Hirohito during his reign, we are struck by certain thematics of embodiment that come to "describe" him during particular historical times. The Showa Era, the time of Hirohito's reign, is often divided

into three obvious periods—prewar, wartime, and postwar. The photographs taken of Hirohito during those particular periods tend to align closely with how they were figured politically and how the emperor came to be represented in them. Culling photos from Japanese newspapers, the medium which most portrayed the Emperor prior to television, we come to see certain images repeatedly displayed.

In the prewar imaging, Hirohito is described as Cosmopolitan Monarch and Divine Shinto Ruler. As Cosmopolitan Monarch, we are treated to several photographs of Hirohito parading in a carriage with King George of England, with King Albert of Belgium, with Crown Prince Edward, and King Fouad of Egypt. Dressed in regal uniform as are the other heads of state, saluting like a brother in some masonic rite, we glimpse the attempt to equalize or to equate the young emperor with European royalty. In the pursuit of international recognition and in their own national storymaking at that time, the media and the governing bodies created the young Hirohito as symbolic head of state and, at the same time, as blue blood royalty. He is seen being escorted to the ruins of Rome, surveying Malta, perusing Paris from the Eiffel Tower, and wandering museums in the company of princes and kings. These images were meant to solidify Japan's international standing in the minds of the Japanese people and to promote Japan's expansionist policies that were unfolding at the time.

The images of Hirohito as Divine Shinto Ruler were also used in a promotional way. These photos surround the young emperor's ascension and coronation and filled the newspapers with a timeless quality of an ethereal being. These were internally focused, with
the desire to promote divinity, and these photos were the first that many would view of such regalia. As Michael Shapiro notes, the photographic genre can lend itself "to a pacification, a reinforcement of the kinds of interpretive codes that lend an aura of naturalness and permanence to the existing structures." This seems to be the case in the Hirohito as Divine Ruler photos in that they work to reinforce the mythological structures of Japanese culture. They refer the viewer back to aeons of divine rule and create a continuity with mythic beginnings. They suggest a lineage, a mystical or magical link, with which the Japanese viewer can identify. Unlike early European photographs showing close-up scenes of kings, aristocrats or church leaders which demystified and humanized them, these photographs worked to script Hirohito as superhuman, as spiritual and divine. A feature of these photographs which contributes to that scripting is their ability to transcend time; they look to have been reproductions of long ago and present an ahistorical reality. The lack of expression on the face of the emperor only adds to and creates that aura. In him, we find remarkable emptiness, not only because he displays no emotion but because stylistically, he appears not to be of this time or space. The costuming certainly contributes to that imagining, not only because of its ancient look, but because it consists of the robes of the shaman. There is an eerie quality to them, like an archaic knowledge that is kept behind palace walls.

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The political rhetoric employed here is also one of cloistering, of the emperor kept aloof and apart, "above the clouds" of everyday existence.

All of this was to change with the war. The Emperor's clothes were changed from shaman to commander, his vehicle from carriage to white horse, and the rhetoric from that of the religious to that of the strategic. All in the emperor's name, the wartime pictures depicted the commander/emperor in control, surveying troops, examining war-damaged cities, and finally, communing and consulting with the gods at Ise Shrine about the fate of Japan's war-torn society. The historical dimension of these wartime photographs, with Hirohito shown as participant, as military commander-in-chief, did much to create meaning about the war for the Japanese. Viewing the emperor in an active way, as having a part in the effort of war, Japanese people were made to comprehend the war differently. His depiction, however, still retains the feeling of fairy tale--of the prince on the white horse, complete with plumage and sword, obviously not for real battle with real bodies, but for creating an image with which the people could die. These wartime images circulated not only in the media but in post offices, police stations, military establishments and schools. People were expected to venerate them and garner strength from them with which to fight.

The ending of the war, represented in the photograph of an imperial pilgrimage to Yasukuni Shrine to apologize to the ancestors who had died in previous battles, is poignant in its presentation. The emperor is photographed in great seriousness, full of duty,
walking steadfastly up to the shrine to apologize. Apologies made to dead Japanese about the failure to win the war would probably not be something that those outside Japan would like to see in photographic or any other form but it probably did something symbolically for the Japanese themselves. The war was cast as holy, for the sake of the emperor and the ancestors, and this symbolic last act perhaps sanctified it. The Emperor calling upon Amaterasu and the attending warriors at the shrine recaptured the collectivity for which the Japanese fought the war, and helped as salve to an open wound.

The arrival soon after this imperial pilgrimage, of General Douglas MacArthur and his occupying forces brings us to one of the most famous early postwar photos. The emperor, dwarfed by a towering MacArthur in the photograph, appears humble yet proud and almost smiling. The giving over of the country to a new imperial body is shown being done with grace, no longer in violence. Thus, the new postwar imaging began--of Hirohito as Humble Pacifist, Gentleman Scientist, and later as Quiet Grandfather. Dressed in grey suit and tie, the emperor was photographed touring the countryside, speaking in factories, kibitzing with children, planting flowers. Surveying the damage to the physical and cultural landscapes, the emperor was used as spiritual aid-giver to an ailing Japanese populace. By being photographed going out among the people, Hirohito was visioned as savior/social worker, ministering to his people. Later photographs began to diminish that aspect in favor of an even more passive one--the marine biologist of the seaside pools and the scientist in his lab. What these two figures represented was a life of peaceful
retreat, framed within a larger passive culture. Memories of the war, at least photographically, disappeared. No visual signs, other than in the people and the landscape itself, were allowed to be shown as the country turned its sights toward building a future.

The emperor began appearing more as a solitary figure, or in family portraiture, with little connection to the political life of the country, other than in such gestures as opening the Diet, and welcoming foreign heads of state. As time passed, the emperor could be seen viewing the cherries, traveling to Ise—the imperial sacred center—and cuddling his grandchildren, like any grandfather might. A neutralizing effect seems to have been sought with the emperor growing more and more silent and with less and less meaning to the new Japan. A trip to America's Disneyland is one of the final public images, capturing the emperor as child, wide-eyed and happy with his lot, dreaming, perhaps, of a "happy ever after" ending to what had been conceived as a turbulent life.

In the memorial albums that appeared after his death, Hirohito is remembered in photographic form as an ethereal god-man, lifted, once again above the clouds to regain an imperial position and aura. The scripting completed, what is left is the story of a space, not a man, which Hirohito as imperial body filled. Even though one can now read his "own" feelings and thoughts in "secret diaries," we are more filled with the image, produced around him, than with any real understanding of or sense of the man. A kind of memory, a socially produced one, will resist even those words in the minds of most people, and will work to keep the imperial space an empty one.
CHAPTER VIII
SHOWA AND THE SOCIAL PRACTICE OF FORGETTING

The struggle of man against power
is the struggle of memory against forgetting.

Upon accepting the 1980 Nobel Prize for literature, Czeslaw Milosz commented that ours is an age marked by a "refusal to remember." He noted that anyone who would publicly lay claim to an independent memory invariably comes into conflict with State-manufactured "truth." Those who would rule work to maintain a monopoly on history and those who would question either that history or its monopoly end up by losing their voices or worse, their lives. Milosz argues in his Captive Mind that we must remember, no matter how hard it is; that to forget or to remain silent is as criminal as creating the space for closing down of memory.

In Japan, the struggle to remember has taken a much more subdued or discreet form. The social practices which inhibit remembering, particularly in Showa, abound and receive reinforcement at all turns. In the media, in the texts of historical imagining, in the classroom teaching, forces are in place which keep people from recalling and remembering their own pasts. Even if remembering is desired, the social practices of forgetting are more powerful and pervasive.

One of the most profound mechanisms for the repressing of memory in Japan is the institutional textbook review board for the Ministry of Education (in Japanese, the Mombusho). The Mombusho, and all its apparatus, is considered one of the most invasive arms of governmental force in Japan.

From the Meiji Period on, the Mombusho exerted more control over the minds of the Japanese people than any other organ of the reigning powers. The Mombusho officials still continue to wield more power and influence than any other ministry of the government, and have more invasive mechanisms than anyone else. The places in which they do their most damage and instill forgetting are the schools and the minds of the Japanese children. The mechanisms for control and induced amnesia are the textbooks and the university entrance examinations (nyugaku shiken) that determine the future of Japanese children both in an economic sense and in a social sense as well. Such control over memory has the effect of destroying and creating individual and national understanding of self and is, therefore, one of the most important to investigate.

The word "to forget" in Japanese is wasureru and the character is comprised of (死亡) which translates as "death" or "loss" or "lack," and (心) which is the symbol for "heart" or "mind." Interpretive license makes it possible to see the derivations in the word "to forget" as a "lack or loss of heart or mind." Since we know that in Japan the captured imagination is a social sickness that allows for such a lack to exist, the linguistic stretch is not too difficult to make.
"To remember" in Japanese is oboeru which is similarly made up of the characters "to memorize" (総), and "opinions" (見), again lending itself to a reading of what gets remembered and how. While this may not really seem significant in the rendering of Japanese processes of forgetting, we must remember that the Japanese language is composed of ideographs which represent ideas as pictures and that these have great influence on the creation of understanding in the Japanese mind. Even the fact that the word for "heart" and "mind" is the same word indicates how these are thought of in Japan and how they affect thinking.

Frederich Nietzsche, in his famous treatise "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life," writes about remembering and forgetting in the following ways. He opens the essay with the fable:

Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is meant by yesterday or today, they leap about, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from morn till night and from day to day, [are] fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure... A human being may well ask [such] an animal: "Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at me?" The animal would like to answer, and say: "The reason is that I always forget what I was going to say"—but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent: so that the human being was left wondering.2

Not totally unlike the bovine beings that Nietzsche describes here, we humans have not only forgotten what it is to remember—and what remembering is—but we have forgotten our own forgetting. So

deep is our oblivion of memory that we are not even aware of how alienated we are from it or how much of it has been torn away from us. Memory has become "self-externalized": projected outside the rememberer herself or himself and onto institutions and machines. Nietzsche suggests one of the motives for amnesia concerning memory: "Even a happy life is possible without remembrance, as the beast shows; but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness." Nietzsche himself advocates the concerted practice of "active forgetfulness"—all the more imperative if his doctrine of eternal return is true. If everything recurs an endless number of times, we would be smarter to avoid remembering anything that has happened even once. To recall what has happened an infinite number of times—including the acts of recollecting—would be a crushing burden. As Milan Kundera has put it:

If every second of our lives recurs an infinite number of times, we are nailed to eternity as Jesus Christ was nailed to the cross. It is a terrifying prospect. In the world of eternal return the weight of unbearable responsibility lies heavily on every move we make. That is why Nietzsche called the idea of eternal return the heaviest of burdens (das schwerste Gewicht).

If eternal return is the heaviest of burdens, then our lives can stand out against it in all their splendid lightness.  

"Splend lightness" is fostered by forgetting, an active forgetting of anything which is intolerably heavy when remembered. In the case

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3 Ibid.

of Japan, perhaps, the heaviness of remembering, particularly remembering the Pacific War, is too much of a burden, and therefore, it is easier to attribute remembering to those in authority. The logic of such forgetting might be: the less responsibility I have for my own remembering, the more I forget—ultimately, the more I can forget my own forgetting. And the more I can forget, the more responsibility I can ascribe to others, those in power, those with responsibility for remembering. If that is the case, the Mombusho has become the repository of memory and forgetting, and has used that power to direct how and what will be recalled and remembered in Japan.

The mechanisms for creating social amnesia and for the social practice of forgetting are best exhibited in school textbooks and the college entrance exams. The practice of textbook revising is well known inside Japan and outside as well, and the erasure of history is legion.

In 1946 the first postwar history textbook talked about the war in the following way: "The Japanese people suffered terribly from the long war. Military leaders suppressed the people, launched a stupid war, and caused this disaster."\(^5\) In a more recent text, which appeared in 1975, this version appeared: "the Pacific War—a war of peculiar savagery which Japan could have avoided if only its armed forces had kept away from politics."\(^6\) The war and its history is

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\(^5\) This was from the much disputed text Kuni no Ayumi, 1946, discussed in Ienaga Saburo's The Pacific War, 1931-1945 (Tokyo: Taiheiyo Senso, 1968), p. 255.

presented in the passive voice, or "victim's history," as the Japanese critics call it. In such textbooks, the copula abounds: the China Incident was caused, Pearl Harbor was bombed, the atomic bomb was dropped. The war appears as a natural catastrophe which "happened" to Japan, as if without the intervention of human agency.\(^7\) Over the years, even the words that described the Japanese actions in the war were revised. For example, in 1982, the Mombusho sought to substitute the benign term "advance" for the more accurate "invasion" of China in the history textbooks.\(^8\) In 1986, the education minister remarked that the Rape of Nanking was no worse than the atrocities committed by other nations. In 1988 another Cabinet official pronounced the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 (which set off the China War and was deliberately provoked by the Japanese army) "an accident" and argued that Japan, far from being an aggressor nation, had waged war only to defend itself against the colonizing white races. He wanted this version instituted as "official" and asked for it to be part of history instruction in the schools. The outcry in Asia prevented this from happening.

At the funeral for Hirohito, the Prime Minister deferred questions of Japan's having been involved in an "aggressive war" during World War II to "later generations of historians," and provoked


\(^8\)Ibid., p. 14.
so much public outrage from the Asian officials attending that he had to apologize in the full glare of the cameras of the global media. His "distortions of history" (as the Asian officials and media referred to his comments) were shown internationally and people began to comment on Japan's national forgetting. Revising one's own history is one thing; revising another country's history is something else altogether. The Rape of Nanking, after all, belongs at least as much to China as to Japan. The routine diplomatic apologies made were unaccepted--such rhetorical rituals no longer suffice--and more and more questions of how Japan remembers and forgets have arisen. Other countries are beginning to scrutinize Japan's renderings and the textbooks that record them.

The most famous case of textbook revision in Japan and the protests against it involve a 25-year struggle for the right to tell another history of the war. The lawsuit which derived from this case ended this year with the Mombusho being exonerated and the voices of protest being (temporarily) silenced. The lawsuit and its repercussions are worth looking at in light of our study of forgetting.

The Ienaga Case

The Ienaga Saburo case is an interesting one in which Ienaga, a well-known author and historian from Tokyo University, brought suit in 1965 and again in 1967 against the state for alleged violations of his constitutional freedom of expression and academic freedoms under the textbook certification system of the Ministry of Education. These suits resulted in two of the most interesting constitutional
cases of modern Japan. The first revolves around Ienaga's high school textbook *Shin Nihonshi (A New History of Japan)*, which he originally wrote in 1953. In April of 1963, Ienaga's revised manuscript of the text was not approved by the Ministry on two grounds: (1) doubtful accuracy; and (2) dubious content selection. This change in understanding is said to have resulted from the comprehensive revision of The Guiding Principles for Instruction of high school textbooks which took place in 1960. Ienaga made the suggested changes and resubmitted the manuscript in September of 1963. He was granted a conditional approval in March of 1964, with suggested or required changes in 290 places.

On June 12, 1965, Ienaga brought a civil suit against the Ministry in Tokyo district court on the grounds that he suffered undue mental distress, that he lost royalties during the certification period (two years), and that his constitutional rights of freedom of thought and expression were violated. He also filed an administrative suit against the Minister of Education on June 23, 1967, asking for reversal of the insistence on changes in the 1966 revision. In July 1970, the district court upheld Ienaga's position on the constitutional questions. Lawrence Beer's treatment of these cases provides a fascinating look not only at thought control but the juridical practices of postwar Japan. Beer points out that the complexity of the cases surrounds not only constitutional questions but legal

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10 Ibid.
issues as well. He notes that the 1970 Decision (The Sugimoto Decision) emphasized the constitutional rights to education as residing with the people, "not in the state or its instrumentalities." This is key in that individual sovereignty was never before privileged in Japanese law. It is also important in that the chain of state-centered policies that ran from Meiji up until this period appeared to be weakened by this decision. However, the 1974 Decision (the Takatsu Decision) issued a ruling in the damage suit, recognizing the state as the repository of the right to educate. However, the court did note that the prewar textbook system was part of a thought control system aimed at controlling textbooks for political purposes, and that ideological conflicts over history lay at the base of the textbook review controversy. This admission did more, Beer contends, to open debate over this kind of review and control than the court decisions themselves. The Takatsu decision was interpreted as a victory for the Ministry, and Ienaga subsequently appealed the case to a Tokyo high court.

In 1975, a high court quashed the Ministry's appeal and, in 1982, the Supreme Court (Nakamura Decision) handed down a mixed decision which was finally decided in January of this year, in favor of the Ministry. What this case points to, in a positive sense, is the ability and mechanisms for dialogue on the issue of thought control. Juxtaposing this with the Meiji repression or the Taisho controls, this is an expression of some movement towards a new kind of freedom in modern Japan. This does not, however, carry us as far as it first
appears. The final loss in the case indicates that the control and repression is still possible and that the Ministry is still as powerful a force in creating forgetting and controlling what is remembered in Japan as it was in the 1930s and 1940s. The Ienaga case is important in that it alerts other historians and writers to the fact that any versions of history not acceptable to the Mombusho will meet with similar fates.

The surprising corollary to all of this is that Ienaga's book has now been printed as a tradebook and is enjoying immense popularity in Japan. People are curious to see what it is that they are not supposed to know, remember, and pass on to the future generations. The Mombusho has been quite deliberate about their attempts to pull the book off the shelves but freedom of publishing acts allow that such a book can be sold. Ienaga is overjoyed at the response and speaks hopefully about its meaning: "Perhaps the Japanese people have awakened from a long sleep, and desire now to know that which was taken away from them. Nevertheless, unless they make an effort to encourage their children to also stay awake, the kind of history they will learn will perpetuate the myths and silences that now exist."11

Ienaga's words resonate with meaning when one looks at the other arena of control over which the Mombusho lords: the nyugakushiken or College Entrance Examination. As previously mentioned, the entrance exam or nyushii, for short, is the single most important event

in the life of the Japanese. While teaching at a Japanese university between 1988 and 1990, I was able to view the entrance examinations of the top ten universities and to verify the claim by those who scrutinize these tests that, in fact, the period of 1931-1945 does not appear anywhere in the exam. What this essentially means is that that historical period is effectively being erased since what is studied in the schools and in the juku ("cram schools") is what constitutes the shared knowledge of the young people in Japan. If it does not appear on the entrance examination, they do not study it. Perhaps this does not appear to be a serious concern since there are other avenues of learning available but, in Japan, with the prevalence of censoring in many different arenas, and the extreme cloistering of school children during their studying years, it is more serious than it first appears. Access to information about the war is not easy to gain and is not so readily available that a young person would have to make a concerted effort to learn about it. With the recent protests lodged against the Japanese government by her Chinese and Korean neighbors (among others), some media time has been given to the period of lost memory. Children are being exposed to some protest of the silencing of the war period within Japan, as well, but the resilience of the structures of authority, most notably the Mombusho, is amazing. This ministry has dominated the discourse of public memory for over fifty years, and their views have had and continue to have an overwhelming effect.

After the protests from China and Korea, some children (and adults) saw the footage of the China War for the first time in
television documentaries, their school textbooks having been visually as well as narratively "reticent" on the subject. One person, born in the early 1960s, noted:

What shocked me the most in all the recent coverage and debate was that Showa was recounted above all as an era of war. And this includes all the people who argued over the war responsibility of the emperor. The discussion focused almost entirely on the relation of the Showa emperor to the beginning of the war and to August 15th; or people saying that "during the war I did such a thing"; or, "on August 15th my whole sense of values collapsed"; or "at that point there was nothing else to be done, so the emperor . . . ."

I tried to think of what I could say about Showa or the emperor . . . . But there is no physiological connection between me and these things. I just felt overwhelmed by how terrible it all was. Remember that song, "The Children Who Don't Know the War"—that's it exactly.12

There is something revealing in this little statement. The line "there was no physiological connection between me and these things" while, at first glance, appears relatively straightforward, actually brings up a very important issue. The idea of "kankei nai" ("it has no relationship to me") is constantly called upon when the need arises to distance oneself from an event, a time, an unpleasant experience in Japan. "Kankei nai" was one of the most prevalent responses I received when I interviewed people about their relationships to the war, regardless of what their ages were. Other distancing mechanisms exist in Japan, as well, and these may account for the ability to "forget" among so many Japanese.

In one of the most important studies on the Japanese mind and the relationship of human extensions to those minds, the psychiatrist Takeo Doi examines two concepts, omote and ura, as representing a way of looking that is unique to the Japanese. Although it is difficult to translate these two terms directly, it is possible to approximate them in English: outside-inside, facade-interior, front-back, recto-verso, public-private. However, none of these correspondences between Japanese and English is precise enough or correct enough to really describe them. For one thing, English makes of these dyadic pairs hierarchical oppositions and, while this same tendency is not totally absent in the Japanese use of the terms, the connectedness between them is also to be found. It is the connectedness of these concepts that holds great importance to the Japanese in their constitution and understanding of self.

Professor Doi constructs what he calls a "two-fold theory of consciousness for the Japanese" where the public/private distinctions break down, where "one cannot consider the outside independently from the inside, the front independently from the back, the face independently from the mind."\(^{13}\) What gives this its depth is also what it indicates about the constitution of self and its relationship to society.

When the Japanese speak of the omote-ura (the "front and back") of things, they are referring to the two sides of things, but even

when these terms are used separately, one term implies the other. To speak of *omote* is to speak of *ura*; to speak of *ura* is to speak of *omote*. *Omote o tateru* is *"put up a front."* *Omote o tsukurou* is *"to keep up appearances."* To the Japanese, the allusion to *ura* is implicit in these expressions.\(^\text{14}\) Similarly, *ura o miru* means *"to keep what is behind"* or to *"see beneath the surface."* *Ura o kaku* is *"to attack from the rear,"* and in each of these examples, the allusion to *omote* is understood. The public is not really distinguished from the private, the inside is not separated from the outside, the front does not exist without the back in the Japanese conception. The dualism breaks down, and for the Western mind this is difficult to grasp.

In classical Japanese, *omote* means *kao* (face), and *ura* means *kokoro* (mind, heart, soul). The expression *omote o ageru* means to *"raise or offer the face,"* and *urayamu* literally means *"to be sick at heart"* or *"envious."* It has thus been suggested that the concept of *omote-ura* is modeled on the relationship of face and mind--that the face expresses the mind, or that *"the mind appears on the face."*\(^\text{15}\) Professor Doi tells us that the face we are talking about here is not merely the face as part of the human body, nor simply the face that is seen. *"It is the face as an object representing a human subject that looks and listens and speaks."*\(^\text{16}\)


\(^\text{16}\) *Ibid.*
This same relationship between these ideas appears in language as well. It is possible to say that some words are **omote**, that they conceal/express and express/conceal the mind (**kokoro**) which is **ura**. To say that words "express the mind" requires no explanation, but how can we explain how words "conceal the mind"? **Omote o tsukurou** or "to save appearances" is one example. It means to put up a good front so that what is concealed will not be discovered.

In this way, words conceal the mind even as they express it, but this act of concealment is by no means limited to deliberate concealment. Everytime we say something, we also conceal, for in the instant we speak, we have chosen not to put into words other possibilities.

The extension of this "front-back" phenomenon into the social sphere appears also in their related expressions **tatemae** and **honne**. **Tatemae** refers to the "public ideal" whereas **honne** stands for the "individual's real motives and opinions." **Tatemae** appears in **omote** while **honne** is concealed in **ura**.

This all makes sense if we remember that Japanese culture is group-oriented. The desires of the individual are subordinated to the demands of the group. The concept of individual rights is not readily understood in Japan as we understand it in the West. Harmony or **wa** is the Japanese way. Outward harmony is preserved by many different conventions. While in the West a person is supposed to have opinions which he or she voices in public, in Japan, opinions, if held at all, are kept to oneself or are carefully blended with those held by others. In private, the Japanese can and do disagree
and express opinions but in public, conflict is minimalized by a veil of politeness and omote. One must play the public game or be excluded from it which, for most Japanese, would mean living death. Public pretense or tatemae is an essential condition for public life. Individual feeling or opinion, honne, under normal circumstances, remains hidden or suppressed. When Japanese people talk about being able to communicate without using words, they mean that they can read each other's honne while engaging in tatemae. This also accounts for how the Japanese "distance" themselves socially and historically. Honne is where truth and memory lie, while tatemae is employed as a covering strategy to maintain "group feeling" and understanding.

Doi relates this analysis to Max Weber's concept of legitimate order for some comparison. He says that when Weber is speaking about "legitimate order" that his meaning is close to what tatemae means, and when Weber speaks of "motives," he is speaking close to what the Japanese call honne. He refers to the quote in Weber's Theory of Social and Economic Organization:

The subjective meaning of a social relationship will be called and "order" only is action is approximately or on the average ordered to some determinate maxims or rules, and further that, in concrete cases, the orientation of action to order involves a wide range of motives.17

What is implied in their similarities is that for Weber, order legitimizes action and that, in so doing, permits the existence of a wide range of motives that are concealed in action. What Doi wants

17 Doi, p. 124.
to claim is that, like *tattemae* and *honne*, the former legitimizes the latter. The difference lies in the fact that in Weber's concept, "legitimate order" and the "wide range of motives" that are at work when individuals orient their actions to it are clearly distinguished and never intersect. With *tattemae/honne*, while they are distinguished as two concepts, they are being used to describe a single thing, with an implicit prior understanding that the two aspects of *tattemae* and *honne* constitute a single reality. They coexist as two contiguous principles. 18

Finally, and this is the main point of this discussion of these terms, the structure constituted by *tattemae* and *honne* fulfills a major role in maintaining psychic balance for the Japanese. Doi explains: "As long as one observes *tattemae*, one can depend on the good will of others. . . . Motives or intentions that cannot be dealt with by *tattemae* are then shut away inside as *honne*. Ambivalence is thereby structured, and in that form, tolerated. This, in essence, creates and protects psychic balance for the Japanese. 19

Having said all that, I turn to the point that if we are to understand the Japanese way of thinking about politics, we must understand their psychic and symbolic structures, and to realize that those structures have relevance and meaning. They impact greatly on remembering and forgetting. *Tattemae/honne* and *omote/ura* allow forgetting, in the social sphere. While individual forgetting is not at question, social forgetting is possible. Japanese people are

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18 Ibid., p. 40. 19 Ibid., p. 45.
able, through this mechanism of "hiding" their own opinions and ideas, to "forget." Unlike Heidegger's Dasein, they have not forgotten their own beings, they have just silenced them. How this affects social understanding and knowledge is that, by not expressing that which is known, it fades and eventually disappears. Witness the situation of the young in Japan who are having their histories created for them by the social practice of selective forgetting. Not only in the area of entrance exams and school textbooks, but in other "texts of instruction" as well can we see this practice having impact. In manga (comics), diaries, films, and other writings of the past this same issue of what is remembered and what gets forgotten is evident. In seemingly innocent media (those which appear innocent), it is easy to discover the covert and sometimes obvious attempts to remember in a certain way and to make forgetting possible.
CHAPTER IX
FILMIC VISIONS, MANGA MADNESS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF THE PAST

On January 21, 1988, the New York Times ran a story on the Japanese editing of the film The Last Emperor. The story stated that prior to the release of the film in Tokyo, the producers of the film in London and the Japanese distributors had met to discuss parts of the film which the Japanese felt were not fit to show in Japan. After the meeting, they had jointly decided to cut scenes which had shown Japanese soldiers gunning down Chinese citizens and dumping their bodies into a pit. The distributors, Shochiku Fuji, had concluded that those scenes must be cut "to avoid unnecessary confusion in the movie theaters." Their spokesperson, Shinji Serata, stated that: "That period [1930s] presents a difficult historical problem in Japan and there are widely differing opinions and judgments about it, particularly about the 'Rape of Nanjing'." Serata went on to say, "It is too difficult for ordinary people who are looking for entertainment at the movies to see such a thing."

In the article, Serata claimed that the London producers had authorized the cuts. Bernardo Bertolucci, the director, however, protested when he heard this and insisted that the original cuts involved an 18-second cut of material on biological warfare. Bertolucci discovered that Fuji had cut much more than was originally agreed to, and learned that they had made the unilateral decision
to do so "because of the fear of reactions from extreme right wing
groups in Japan."

Two weeks later, in an article by Ian Buruma in the *Far Eastern
Economic Review*, it was revealed that the pressure on the distributors
may have come directly from the Japanese government itself. Buruma
contended that the government had pressured Fuji to cut more footage
to avoid a confrontation with right wing forces.

A senior correspondent from the *Asahi Shimbun*, Tetsuya Chikushi,
responded that it would not even matter if the directive had come
from the government or not since, in Japan, there is rampant "voluntary
restriction." Tetsuya said, "So many people worry about something
happening to them (in terms of censorship), even if they don't know
what or why, that the appetite for self-restriction is very strong."1

Whether it was the distributor "self-restricting" or the govern­
ment pressuring them from behind, this episode serves as a good
example of the politics of representation in contemporary Japan.
What is shown and what is silenced, and how things come to have
meaning and articulation talks directly to institutional arrangements
and their role in the creation and control of information and meaning
in Japan today. It also exemplifies the attempts to control public
memory by allowing only certain portions of the historical story to
be told, and then in edited form.

If we look at Japan's history, and particularly at the history
of control and censorship of particular media, we may discover a key

to understanding how information gets to the Japanese public and what gets erased from public view. As Gramsci said, "Disseminating institutions help to construct a shared ideological universe," and by this exploration, we will see how ideology and memory are constituted in Japan. Even just focusing on certain media, we will find a rich repository of information and insights into this subject.

John Berger tells us in *Ways of Seeing* that images make meaning and that seeing comes before words. The visual is how we establish our place in the world and that we "recognize" before we speak. That is why visual media are so influential and why we need to view them with suspicion and care; their power can be unsettling. In the case of Japan, a highly visual culture (witness the pictographic writing system and the importance of visual arts), the visual has been perceived as a primary site for the creation of images, ideology, and text.

Berger tells us that images were first made to conjure up the appearances of something that was absent, and that images usually outlast what they represented.² He notes that no other kind of relic or text from the past can offer such a direct testimony about the world which surrounded people at other times. That is why their impact is so great.

Images involve more than just mental pictures. W. J. T. Mitchell describes images as "pictures, statues, optical illusions, maps,

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diagrams, dreams, hallucinations, spectacles, projections, poems, patterns, memories, and even ideas . . . a far-flung family which has migrated in time and space and undergone profound mutations in the process." The image, he says, is "a site of a special power that must either be contained or exploited." For some, the image is so powerful that it can be seen as "taking power" or "appropriating a voice." Mitchell treats image, in Iconology, his study on the relationship of image and ideology, as text--coded, intentional, and conventional signs--and examines the relationship between this understanding of image and ideology. He refers to Marx's camera obscura as a metaphor for ideology, and shows how the concept of ideology is grounded in the notion of mental entities or "ideas" that provide the materials of thought. These ideas are understood as images—pictorial, graphic signs imprinted or projected on the medium of consciousness—and ideology, then, is seen as a theory of imagery. Barthes' work on images suggests, too, that meanings are produced through the codes at work in representations, and that while meanings might appear to be natural, obvious, immanent, they are in fact produced. This construction of meaning through identifiable processes of signification is at its base, political. Bill Nichols furthers this understanding of the political or ideological dimension of images by saying: "The interplay of codes

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4 Ibid., p. 151. 5 Ibid., p. 164.
constituting the image, like those constituting the self-as-subject, forms an ideological arena and an arena for ideological contestation. He notes that the codes governing a text change as the codes governing society change. All of these works on text and image basically assume the same thing--images are ideological or political and are constructed.

If we turn to the particular images produced in films and look at the making of the text in cinema, this same political dimension can be clearly seen. Annette Kuhn tells us that film is a particularly rich medium for the construction of images but "are circulated between representation, spectator, and social formation." Film is a medium filled with cultural codes that, if unpacked, reveal much about the social constructions of meaning and about the interactions of the spectator, representation, and social formation.

By exploring the film medium of Japan, we may discover how images and meaning are constituted there, and how certain things get represented and others silenced. Analyzing film texts, however, can be quite difficult. It provokes interesting questions, not all of them easily answered. For example, what cultural meanings are drawn on and constructed in Japanese film? How are such meanings worked over, transformed and recirculated as they intersect pre-existing

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forms, discourses, genres, and modes of representation in Japanese
culture? How does the medium of film reflect or conflict with
traditional cultural representations? And, how does film affect the
social memory of the Japanese?

We know that cinema has its own specificity as a mode of
representation, its own genres, and modes of address within which
meanings are produced in particular ways and in particular styles.
It is also quite clear that cinema in different cultural contexts
has an even further specificity and unique mode of representation.

Filmic Images

Early films in Japan were didactic in nature--to learn of other
places, and to reinforce the uniqueness and superiority of Japanese
culture. Japanese film makers created films in the early days which
the director Murata called films of "symbolic photographicism,"
 focusing upon the reproduction of images that reinforced a particular
picture of Japan.

Motion pictures, which were first introduced into Japan in 1896,
were controlled and handled by local police stations much in the same
manner as other traveling entertainment. But even by the early 1900s,
officials became aware that films, even in their silent form, could
be a powerful communicating force, and therefore, one having a
special potential for harm. In 1911, a French film about a gangster
and a detective was shown in Tokyo, and there was an increase in
"social disturbances" involving young men whom the police felt had
been influenced by the film's glorification of crime. Social reaction
to this film and others, spurred the police to institute strict regulations to control the showing of films.

On July 4, 1917, Maruyama Tsurukichi, head of the Public Peace Section of the Metropolitan Police Board, took a first step toward centralizing the supervision of the film industry and enforcing stringent controls on the showing as well as the making of motion pictures. He wrote and issued a document called the Control Regulations for the Motion Picture Amusement Industry (Katsudo Shashin Kogyo Torishimari Kisoku), in which the following were set into motion: theater owners would be required to provide a place in the theater for police officers to view each performance; limits would be placed on the amounts and kinds of advertisements for the film; and the narrators had to be licensed by the Police Board (in those days, a narrator or benshi narrated all films from the side of the stage). The police even went so far as to dictate to the theater owners about how to run other aspects of the theater such as seating, ticket selling, and audience.

A "motion picture censorship room" was set up at the Metropolitan Police Department where police actually cut scenes from films. The guidelines for what was to be cut were rather arbitrary but always included: anything that violated the kokutai ("mystical national polity") or the dignity of the imperial family; anything which opposed the "nation's good and beautiful customs"; themes of free love and adultery; anything that stimulated "pornographic thoughts" in the audience, like kissing or bedroom scenes; anything that stimulated people to commit arson, murder, or other crimes.
As the popularity of films grew, officials became more and more concerned about uniformity in censorship, and tightened their controls even more. Foreign films (particularly those of Gloria Swanson and Greta Garbo) were beginning to be seen as dangerous in the mid-1920s because they stimulated the trend of seeing things Western as superior and glorified the West.\(^8\) Other western stars were also viewed as dangerous or suspect because they incited thoughts of democracy in the minds of the Japanese people.

In 1925, censorship of films became the purview of the Japanese Home Ministry, and even greater censorship regulations came to be developed. Some of these included: no uninspected film could be displayed in public; all films had to be licensed by the Home Ministry; no film could violate regulations on public peace and morality; film showings were to be limited to specific geographical areas and times. The Ministry issued a "Censorship Review" (Ken'etsu Jiho) three times a month to all the police departments, in order to keep all parts of the apparatus in contact with each other and with the Ministry censors and, thus, they were able to exert greater control.

The Ministry censors were instructed to focus on the following things in their previews of films: the impact on the audience in relationship to maintaining public peace, anything that might be in defiance of the Constitution, any thought that might damage the social structure or disturb diplomacy. Also they watched with care for

\(^8\)Richard Mitchell, Censorship in Imperial Japan, p. 206.
films portraying crime and violence. As for public morals, films that debased Buddhism or Shintoism, glorified brutality, were grotesque, dealt with pornography or adultery or hurt the image of "the good family" were banned.\textsuperscript{9}

Censors were provided with secret censorship standards and categories for "placing" the films reviewed: "passed" (ken'etsuzumi), "prohibited" (kyohi), and "limited" (seigen). Those which were categorized as "limited" were usually edited, cut, and controlled in terms of who could see them and where they could be shown. Films could be banned in particular places if the film portrayed actual events that had taken place in that area.

One of the films that was cut dramatically during this period was the American film \textit{All Quiet on the Western Front} which was shown in Japan in 1930. It was also a period when militarism was growing and with it, an intensification of efforts at suasion and "influence." This came to characterize the ideology of the 1930s. Many thought that the film \textit{All Quiet} was actually edited because of two scenes: one in which there was an anti-war speech, and another with soldiers talking about the ravages of the War and the uselessness of war in general. Whether this was true or not, it was the case that any film whose theme was counter to the prevailing ideology was banned or edited during this period. Leftist filmmakers and distributors were constantly harassed and, in several instances, forbidden from showing their films, even if they had received a "pass" from the reviewers.

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., p. 207.
To assure its ideological hegemony, the government began to look closely at films to "censor any political tracts on proletarian society that might be embedded in the narrative or story line of the films." They often gave leftist filmmakers weak excuses for why their films could not be shown (such as "fire hazard"). A Japanese proletarian writer noted that "the most direct and often-used weapon of the enemy was the Amusement Control Regulation. They would give you a "pass" on your film and then prevent it from being screened."\(^{10}\)

The Japanese Proletarian Movie League (Nihon Puroretaria Eiga Domei) confronted the Home Ministry on several occasions, and attempted to screen films that had not been submitted for inspection. On several occasions, their film premiers were "raided" and their members arrested and fined.\(^{11}\) This continued throughout the Second World War, and this system of oppression was finally dismantled under the Occupation regime. It is said that freedom of the film industry was, from then on, generally promoted as a matter of policy.\(^{12}\)

In 1949, the Japanese film industry established its own Motion Picture Ethics Code (Eiga rinri kitei), and created a commission to administer the code. This commission or Eirin (acronym for Eiga Rinri Kitei Kanri Iinkai) became the "social instrument for determining what is in accord with prevailing community standards for films and film viewing."\(^{13}\)

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 209.  
\(^{11}\)Ibid.  
\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 345.
Commercial films in Japan since then have been regulated by several groups working together. Eirin, the Eirin Sustaining Committee, the Council on Motion Pictures for Juveniles, and the Theater Owners Association are the major members of this cooperative effort. They are backed by national law and by legal ordinances, and their judgments are abided by. The mainstream film companies are represented on the Eirin Sustaining Committee, and have direct control over what appears on the screen at a movie theater. The Eirin Sustaining Committee is actually composed of four groups: Japanese producers of feature-length films, producers of Japanese short films, Japanese importers and distributors of foreign films, and the Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA).

The Eirin itself consists of up to five members, including the Commissioner and four other members of his choosing. These other members are from the ranks of distinguished scholars, film critics, or other "persons of learning and experience." 14 Briefly, the review procedure consists of the Commissioner asking a Reviewer to review a film submitted, and the Reviewer judges the film on grounds of its compliance with the code. If the reviewer's decision offends the producer, he may ask for a re-review. If the reviewer's decision is accepted, the film is given a seal of approval. Films without the Eirin seal of approval do not get shown in theaters belonging to the Theater Owners Association (Zenkoren). This was made law in

14 Ibid., p. 341.
1957 (Healthy Environment Law or Kankyo eiseiho), prohibiting films without the Eirin seal of approval from being exhibited before general audiences. 15

What is politically interesting about this is that the four major companies, Shochiku, Toei, Toho, and Nikkatsu, either own or are contracturally related to all the major movie houses in Japan. To make the point even clearer, and to show the extent to which the industry is dominated by these companies, not only do they control distribution and exhibition, but nearly all Japanese technicians, writers, and directors are employed by them on a yearly basis. What is most dramatic of all for independent filmmakers and freelancers is that all the best professional equipment in Japan—indeed, most equipment of any kind in the film industry—is owned by these companies, and they do not rent or lend the equipment out.

Trying to make an independent film outside the established commercial system is more difficult in Japan than in any other advanced industrial country. Many of the most famous directors (including Oshima) started with one of the major companies and subsequently turned independent, hoping to gain greater ideological and artistic freedom. The inevitable price was severe material constraint and suspicion from the industry and the viewing audience.

Other filmmakers like Hani Susumu and Teshigahara Hiroshi started out as independent directors but later became attached to a major company (Shochiku). Their films subsequently suffered. The margin

15 Ibid., p. 346.
for maneuver for filmmakers in Japan is so small that many have left
directing or have engaged foreign interests in making their films.
(The best example is, of course, Kurosawa.) The monopoly of the film
industry may be seen as part of a larger political power struggle
that offers "either humiliating subservience to the law of profit,
with only an illusory latitude of expression for all but a very few,
or else the frustrating isolation and material privations of the
independent ghetto."16

The four major film companies, too, dominate what kind of film
or what genre is "suitable" for the public. Yugai or "harmful" films
are still determined to be those which offer intellectual, ideological,
or erotic ideas to the youth which can be potentially dangerous
for the national well-being. This is determined by the Eirin, which,
again, is dominated and controlled by the four major film companies.
It appears that not much has changed since the 1930s except that there
is more sophistication and more subtlety in the methods of surveillance
and control.

There has been an increased popularity in the last few years
of "soft porn" and foreign films in Japan due to the availability
of home video and the growing cost of making (and viewing) films.
To see an old film at the Tokyo Museum of Modern Art Film Centre (to
screen a film) costs 2000 yen (about $15), and first-run movies
generally cost 1500 yen at a regular theater. Therefore, many of
the classic Japanese films are not viewed anymore.

16 Noel Burch, To the Distant Observer, p. 363.
With the increased demand for foreign films in the Japanese market, there has also been an increased role and importance of another bureaucratic arm in the regulation of film: the Custom Bureau System (CBS). The CBS works closely with Eirin, indicating a further monopoly of control and power. But Eirin has met with some problems from other institutions of control. In one court case, Eirin had approved of a film ("Black Snow" or Kuroi Yuki) and then the producer and distributor were subsequently indicted for "public display of an obscene film." The Supreme Court acquitted the accused, and surprised everyone by stating:

In its sixteen years of operation, no picture approved after Eirin review has been charged as an obscene film under the Criminal Code. Thus, if a film passes this review, it is not unreasonable to believe that it is not obscene. 17

The decision was met with outrage and an outcry against the film industry from the National Police Agency, the Educational Film Producers Federation and others. It forced Eirin to become a little more self-conscious and to tighten its internal standards for film regulation. It also forced them to clarify the precise types of portrayals to be restrained, and to make explicit what they were considering Yugai or harmful films. This situation allowed some public critique of the film industry to emerge but the controls and constraints that exist in that industry still persist. Tadao Sato, Japan's leading film historian and critic of the industry and its silencing mechanisms, has noted that there are tremors in society

17 Beer, p. 344.
which are being felt in the industry. These tremors are signs of anger among the common people about the political control of films. Independent filmmakers as well as a sophisticated audience of film viewers are now speaking out for their right to view and their right to make films without the fear of censorship and control. How this will be dealt with is yet to be determined. It is interesting to note, however, that foreign sponsors are now providing large amounts of capital support for the making of films by these Japanese directors. The films that these filmmakers want to make reveal much about why the censors work to deny them access and approval in the Japanese film market. These filmmakers talk of the war, of the silences and images and the portrayals of the past. Sato tells us that the 1930s and 1940s saw the greatest controls on filmmakers but contemporary films which speak to those periods as well receive the censors' scrutiny. Films like The Emperor's Naked Army or Sea and Poison are two of these kinds of films. Their showings were visited by the authorities and were so limited that few in Japan were able to even see them. Both enjoyed one week runs in Tokyo before being banned. Other films of this same genre, like Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence and Barefoot Gen, both collaborative projects with foreign directors working alongside Japanese filmmakers, enjoyed even less time in the Japanese theaters. The images they offer are too confrontive to the institutional authorities and therefore, they are not welcomed or shown. There are still mechanisms for silencing that are in operation in the film world of Japan.
The film is not the only "text" to be censored. Surprisingly, in the world of comics (manga), what can appear and what is unallowed also reveals an imposition of authority and censorship. Why manga are an arena of control is interesting to see.

Manga Madness

Frederik Schodt, the most notable authority on manga and their meaning in Japanese society, tells us that 27 percent of all printed materials in Japan are comics. What constitutes comics or manga are "caricature, cartoon, comic strip, comic book, or animation." 18 The term manga was first coined by the Japanese woodblock-print artist Hokusai in 1814, and it uses the Chinese ideograms 漫 man ("involuntary" or "in spite of oneself") and 画 ga ("picture"). Hokusai was apparently trying to describe something like "whimsical sketches." But it is interesting to note that the first ideogram has a second meaning of "morally corrupt." 19 The earliest example of manga in Japan is the masterpiece from the twelfth century called Chojugiga by the Buddhist priest Toba. The Chojugiga or "Animal Scrolls" was a narrative picture scroll portraying anthropomorphized animals in antics that mocked the Buddhist clergy, the ruling elite, and even the Imperial family. Although well received by the masses, this scroll met with opposition from those who were depicted in it.

19 Ibid.
Scrolls such as the Chojugiga ran wild, with a robust, uninhibited sense of humor, and there were attempts to stop them from being viewed by the public. Although many of the themes of these first cartoons were religious, mocking the stupidity and arrogance of some of the clergy, many were directed to the powerful clans and their own breed of ignorance and conceit. They picture priests and clan leaders lost in gambling, watching cockfights, and playing a type of strip poker. The humor is light and cutting, revealing the underside of that which was held to be sacred or holy.

This same irreverance continued through the centuries in manga style representations, from humorous woodblock prints (ukiyo-e) of the seventeenth century to illustrated humor books of the prewar era. The ukiyo-e or illustrations of the "Floating World" were suggestive of life's uncertainties and the search for sensual pleasures to sweeten one's feeling of hopelessness. Many of the ukiyo-e artists turned to shunga or "spring pictures" which were erotic comics portraying men and women (and other combinations as well) joined in every conceivable position of lovemaking. These uninhibited and humorous examples of Japanese erotic art contrast so greatly to the oppressive, controlled and somber stories which were advanced by the authorities, it is hard to imagine that the two co-existed in the same cultural terrain.

Many of the manga artists at the turn of the century travelled to Europe and to the United States and depicted life in those cultures.

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20 Ibid., p. 33.
in manga form. These representations were not banned and, in fact, were encouraged by the authorities. Often showing ribald, animalistic scenes, these cartoons began to reflect an attitude about foreign Others that was to reach its peak in the 1930s and which was utilized to a great extent during the war. Many of the manga during the 1930s were moralistic, stressing traditional values of loyalty, bravery, and strength for young boys; so much so that in spite of their disarmingly naive style, the degree to which they furthered the cause of militarism is still the subject of scholarly debate. 21

With the fanatic militarists coming into power at that time, the manga artists, like everyone else came under scrutiny. Some of those artists, of course, believed in Japan's avowed goal of liberating Asia from colonialism; others underwent tenko or government conversion to the party line. Many were banned and ostracized, while those who recanted were rewarded with support from the government and the community. The government skillfully exploited cartoonists and created organizations like the New Cartoonists Association of Japan (Shin Nippon Mangaka Kyokai), uniting them under an official policy. They created a monthly magazine called Manga which was the only cartoon magazine to continue publication throughout the war years. The cartoons which appeared in this magazine regularly exhorted the nation to "Annihilate the Satanic Americans and British!" and appeared with caricatures of politicians from those two countries on the covers and throughout the magazines. Cartoons like a fanged, green-faced

\[21\text{Ibid.}, \text{p.} \, 54.\]
Roosevelt with hair standing on end, and an effete pot-bellied Churchill were typical.

Many artists directed their work overseas towards two objectives: persuading the native populations of Asia that the Japanese were liberators and the Allies the Devil in disguise, and sowing dissension in the ranks of Allied troops. These manga were an excellent medium for both goals because they transcended the formidable language barrier, and because they could not be traced to the Japanese in the case of infiltration into the allied ranks or the propaganda leaflets dropped over enemy lines. There were erotic-pornographic cartoons and comic strips which were directed at the American, British, and Australian/New Zealand troops, designed to make the lonely soldier worry about the faithfulness of his girl back home and thereby decrease his fighting efficiency. As Ienaga Saburo has observed in his book The Pacific War, "The flood of such crude officially sanctioned 'information' during the war years turned Japan into an intellectual insane asylum run by the demented." Such comic art as a tool of politics was both a product and a cause of the madness.

After Japan's unconditional surrender in August 1945, surviving cartoonists emerged from rural evacuation or straggled home from all corners of Asia to settle back into the bombed-out cities. Their art began to flourish and although censorship continued in Japan for several years under the Allied Occupation, it still allowed artists more freedom than they had known before. The immediate postwar period

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22 Ibi d., p. 58-59. 23 Ibid., p. 59.
was one of hunger and black markets, of orphans, and limbless veterans. More than anything else, people wanted to forget the war and to rebuild their lives. Manga became the medium of reassurance and humor and for survival of the family, and the main themes were the struggles of the common people making the best of hard times, and of lovable little children. Artists were paid next to nothing but were given considerable freedom in what they created in the manga. Among them was a young medical student named Osamu Tezuka, who has been called the pioneer in the modern comic medium in Japan. In 1947 he created the comic Shintakarajima ("New Treasure Island") which was such a remarkable success that the Tokyo publishing world awoke to the new potential of this medium. He went on to create Atomu Taishi or "Ambassador Atom" which later became "Mighty Atom" and probably the most famous Japanese manga, "Astro Boy." He made the controversial Jungle Taitei ("Jungle Emperor") but its success overrode any attempts to squelch its publication. It deals with the figure of the emperor in the wild, romping with the animals, interacting with nature. The theme was one of freedom and the censors were unable to overshadow what was foremost in the people's imagination.

Another manga that couldn't be stopped by the censors was Hadashi no Gen or "Barefoot Gen," one of the most moving comics ever created. It is the semiautobiographical story of artist Keiji Nakazawa, before, during, and after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Nakazawa was six years old in 1945 and witnessed the spectacle of destruction in Hiroshima firsthand. He lost his father,
brother, and sister in the immediate bombing, and himself survived through sheer luck. With the horror of what he saw etched in his consciousness he grew up to become an artist who determined to convey his experiences to generations that knew little of the war, and nothing about an atomic holocaust. *Barefoot Gen* first began to be serialized in the boys weekly *manga* called *Shonen Jump* in 1973 and has continued in other publications to this day. Drawn not to rehash old arguments of which nation was right or wrong in the war, it is an attack on injustice, militarism, and war itself. There is an implicit critique in this *manga*, told through the eyes of Gen, a second grader in 1945. Gen's family opposes the war and is ostracized and persecuted by neighbors and police. And they are not the only ones to suffer: the story also touches on the plight of the Korean minority in wartime Japan. After Hiroshima is bombed, readers see, through Gen's eyes, a bitter struggle unfold. Not only is the graphic suffering of the victims shown, but the bureaucratic mechanisms and treatment of the victims is recounted. Authorities have tried to subdue Gen and his creator but the popularity of this *manga* persists.24

The question arises about why *manga* are so important in Japan and why they continue to attract everybody from schoolboys to businessmen and housewives. The appeal, Fred Schodt contends, is multilayered. Linguistically, the Japanese are predisposed to more

24 See Appendix B for an excerpt from "Gen Digest" written in 1977.
visual forms of communication owing to their writing system. Calligraphy might be said to fuse drawing and writing with the individual ideogram representing, in its most basic form, a simple picture of a tangible object or an abstract concept, emotion, or action. The earliest ideograms looked much more like what they were meant to represent than they do today. They were, in fact, a kind of cartooning. Over fifty years ago, Sergei Eisenstein, the Russian filmmaker, perceived a link between the ideogram and what he called the inherently "cinematic" nature of much of Japanese culture. The process of combining several "pictographs" to express complex thoughts, he said, was a form of montage that influenced all Japanese arts, and he added that his own studies of ideograms had helped him to understand better the principle of montage on which filmmaking is based.

Comics, however, could not have become such an integral part of Japanese culture if there had not also been a genuine need for them. For children in Japan, like anywhere else, comics are immediately accessible while they are still learning to read. For older children, teenagers, and adults, the reasons are slightly different. Manga are fast to read, more portable than a television set, and provide an important source of relaxation and escape from their extremely highly disciplined lives. It is a silent activity that can be done alone and done anywhere, requiring little space and little interaction with others. It is a mechanism for relief in a

25 Schodt, p. 25.
society so stressed that they have introduced a new word into their vocabulary to accommodate their present situation. The word is karoshi which means "death from overwork." Comics work to allow the workers to sit on the train, during their long commute home, and to immerse themselves in a fantasy world where they can laugh at their own frustrations, seduce beautiful women, machine gun their enemies (or maybe their bosses). They are a boon to the imagination of most Japanese people who have little leisure time to entertain themselves in other ways.

Manga are so widespread and widely read that there is even a Buddhist temple devoted to comic art. Just south of Tokyo in Kawasaki city, the Joryakuji temple (or Mangadera--"Cartoon Temple"--as it is commonly called), sits nestled in an ancient grove of trees. In the main hall of the temple, alongside the usual altar and effigies of the Buddha, are hundreds of cartoons drawn on wooden plaques, scrools, and sliding paper doors. In the garden outside are two boulders inscribed with caricatures of two of Japan's most famous cartoonists, Rakuten Kitazawa and Ippei Okamoto. The temple dates back 200 years, but the cartoon collection was developed and maintained by the present abbot, Shuyu Toki and his wife, Yoshiko. They carry on the normal activities of a Buddhist temple in Japan--religious prayers and funerals--as well as hold special services for the creation, perpetuation, and protection of manga. Above the central altar in the main hall is a plaque on which are written the words:

26Ibid., p. 27.
"The Ideal Priest: Cartoons and the Search for Truth," and this exemplifies the attitude and feeling not only about this temple but about the place of manga in Japanese society as well.

In 1990, over 1.5 billion manga were published in Japan, representing about 10 for every man, woman, and child in the country, or slightly over 27 for each household. With such popularity, and such comic appeal, manga is a powerful medium for creating images and for the construction of self-understanding in Japan. It is also a site for resistance and critique, and although manga have enjoyed relative freedom since the war, restraint and control still hovers above the heads of manga artists and creators.

Another unlikely "text" besides manga that suffered censorship and actual confiscation were the diaries of the soldiers who engaged in the Second World War. In a conversation with an old woman, an ama-san in Kyoto, it was revealed that many diaries were taken from soldiers returning from the field at the end of the war. In fact, there was a restricting order issued early in the war which prohibited the writing of any personal journals either about the experiences of the fighting or about the military treatment and personnel. Many of these diaries were burned before the arrival of the Occupation authorities, but the woman revealed that some of the men mailed their diaries home to their wives and that there remained copies of such texts. She presented me with the diaries of her husband which, upon cursory translation, proved to be masterpieces of repression and fear. The stories told in these diaries about atrocities in occupied lands reinforce the scant reports of such activities that have appeared
recently in the press. They also revealed, at least in this particular case, an ambivalence and distrust of the military leadership during the war. These are not retrospective memorial accounts, but bits and pieces written while on the battlefronts of war. The censoring and confiscation of such texts is not widely known outside of Japan, or for that matter, within Japan itself. Those who participated in that war remember such "tearing away" of their own memories and stories but they have remained relatively silent about this so that those who did not live through that period have little or no knowledge of this.

Personal letters home, too, were often intercepted by military authorities during that time, and while not so unusual in times of war, the wholesale confiscation of such communications reveals the extent to which surveillance was taking place.

Surveillance and thought control were not limited to film or manga or personal diaries in Japan, but these texts represent a way of thinking about information and memory that, some contend, still persists in that society. Censorship and the institutional arrangements necessary for control have existed in Japan since the Edo Period and continue to exist today. What is interesting is what Ian Buruma points out in *Behind the Mask*: there is so little resistance to or protest against either the monopoly or the oppression of thought control that it is hard to believe. There is an expression in Japan: "Deru kui wa utareru," which, loosely translated, means "the nail which sticks up must be hammered down." To stand out, to protest
too much, is to find oneself ostracized, exiled from the rest of society, and to use Clifford Geertz's term, "away." Most Japanese would find this extremely difficult to cope with and, therefore, do not confront authority in almost any instance.

When living with a family in Japan in 1967, I had the opportunity to witness and experience the student protests of the Zengakuren from a close position. My Japanese "brother" was the leader of the Zengakuren at Waseda University and a Marxist. Three years later, when I returned to Japan, he was working for Sumitomo Electric as a salaryman. When I inquired how he could be doing such a thing, he explained to me that there was very little social mobility in Japan and that if he did not conform, he would not survive. When I tell that story to other Japanese people, they immediately understand and concur. It is not, as Ian Buruma contends, that the Japanese are hypocritical or that their beliefs are so dimly felt or so superficially constructed that they can easily let them go. It is more that the social constitution of self is one of self-subsumed-in-group. The orientation is towards conformity and compliance.

This conformity is much more acute than it is in the United States, I believe, both on the individual and on the institutional level. The restrictions placed on film and filmmakers give us some indication that both the processes and understandings of those in control are quite distinct in the United States and Japan. Notions of individualism and constitutional rights are only reflections of the cultural forces that would not allow surveillance and control to
be so blatant in the U.S.--we, in the U.S. prefer the subtlety of our constraints and the illusion of our freedom.
APPENDIX A

JAPANESE REMEMBRANCES OF PEARL HARBOR

(Interviews from Pearl Harbor)

A 65-year-old man from Saitama:

I remember the day the War began. It was December 8, 1941 (Tokyo time). I was a middle school student, with a keen interest in fighter planes and midget subs and anything that had to do with war. I had heard about the Pearl Harbor attack on the radio and felt proud of our navy and fighter pilots, and thought little about what the war meant beyond the machinery and the skill of their users. My brother got drafted and my sister left to work in a munitions factor to support the war effort. I felt left out because of my young age and dreamed of being old enough to be a part of it all.

In school, much of our time was spent learning how to march and to shoot guns, and a great deal of energy was focused on what to do in air raid attacks. We were made to feel more and more patriotic by our history lessons and by patriotic songs.

It wasn't until much later that I came to understand what it all meant and how my boyhood games were of the same sort as the thinking of those men in the midget subs. A disappointment lingers in me even now, today, about those times and about how feeble my understanding of war was.

A 53-year-old woman from Okinawa:

I was only three years old when the attack on Pearl Harbor was made. My memory of it comes much later, maybe three years later when my sister, who was six years older than me, told me about it. We were playing "war nurses" and pretending that our doll was a soldier who we were caring for. I remember being very hungry in those days, eating only potato leaves, pumpkin and rice gruel. My sister would tell me about sweet things that we used to eat before the war but I had no real memory of them. We would take water and put leaves in it for our "patient" and my sister would tell me that she heard that this is what the soldiers had to eat out in the jungles, fighting the war. I didn't even know what a jungle was but I knew it sounded scary. I also knew I wanted this time to be over so that everyone would not be so unhappy and scared.
Yasuhiro and Hiroko Sawada from Asakusa, Tokyo:

He was 9 and I was 7 at the time of Pearl Harbor. We were in elementary school at the time of the attack and the teacher told us that Japan had begun a war with the United States. We all felt sad but we didn't really understand what it all meant. A few years later, it became more personal when our father died and Tokyo began to be firebombed. We went with our mother who volunteered to take children who had been orphaned by the bombs out to the countryside for protection and shelter. I remember feeling very sad for these children and very angry with the Americans for doing this.

May years later, I came to understand Japan's role in this terrible war and I felt confused and angry with the military of Japan and the U.S. for making all of us sacrifice so much.

Hiromi Nagai from Sapporo, Hokkaido:

We were living in the countryside during the war and were not affected so directly by the war except for the extreme lack of food. Immediately after the war, however, when the American soldiers came to Hokkaido, we were directly affected. I was a teenager, as was Isao (her husband), and one day, he was walking down the road when a military jeep came racing around the corner with four or five American soldiers in it. They were going too fast and a little out of control and Isao could not move out of the road fast enough. The jeep ran over his leg and the soldiers stopped, picked him up and drove him to the military base for treatment. The base doctors refused to see him and so the soldiers just dropped him off at a small local dispensary. They did the best they could, I guess, but for years that leg has developed ulcers which Isao (now a doctor) would treat himself. Finally, this year the ulcers turned into gangrene and the doctors made him go into the hospital and they cut off his foot. I think he suffered in silence for so many years because he felt that, somehow we deserved this to happen.

Four Young Men from Tokyo:

We are going to college here in Honolulu for one year and only one of us wanted to really come out to the Memorial. We don't have any personal memories and we really didn't know very much about the bombing of Pearl Harbor. We don't study it in school because it is not on the Entrance Exam for the University. We only know about it from movies and manga (comics).

One of the young men: My grandfather died in Burma during the war and since childhood, I have had an interest in the war and in seeing Pearl Harbor. My family was from Ibaraki and were against the war so when my grandfather died, my family became even angrier. I heard many stories during my childhood about the wartimes and how my
grandmother had to work on neighborhood patrols and how she tried to get the neighbors to protest the war. One day, some police came and told my grandmother that she could not be on neighborhood control anymore and that her ration of food would be cut down because of her activities. This made my grandmother very unhappy but she had three children to feed. My uncle ended up very sick and died at the end of the war. My mother is still bitter about that time but my grandmother will not talk about it at all. No matter how hard I try to get her to talk, she refuses and says nothing.
OH, GEN--LOOK!

WOW, EIKO! WHAT A BEAUTIFUL DAY--THE SKY'S SO 'BLUE!'

EIKO... GEN--BETTER GET READY FOR SCHOOL...

O.K., MAMA.

THAT'S A MIGHTY FINE BATTLESHIP GEN GAVE YOU, SHINJI!

I KNOW!--AND I SURE LOVE GEN!
UNAWARE OF THE HELL THAT WAS APPROACHING IN THE SKY, HIROSHIMA BEGAN THE DAY AS USUAL...

EXCUSE ME, YOUNG MAN...
YES, MA'AM?

IS THE FIRST GRADE CLASS HELD AT THE SCHOOL OR THE TEMPLE?
GEE, I DON'T KNOW... YOU'LL HAVE TO ASK THE TEACHER...

HEY!

IT'S A B-29!
WHEN DID IT GET HERE?

THAT'S STRANGE... THE SIRENS DIDN'T EVEN GO OFF...

THE FUSELAGE IS SHINING IN THE SUN...

ALTITUDE 31,000 FEET-- LET IT GO!

SIGN: "KAMIYAMA NATIONAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOL"
43 SECONDS LATER, 1800 FEET OVER HIROSHIMA, THE ATOMIC BOMB NAMED "LITTLE BOY" EXPLODED WITH A WHITE-HOT LIGHT-- IT WAS AS IF A MILLION FLASH BULBS HAD GONE OFF AT ONCE...

FLASH

WHOAAH!
WE DID IT!
IT'S A SUCCESS!

WOW, WHAT A SHOCK WAVE!
IT'S LIKE BEING IN A TIN CAN THAT'S BEEN HIT WITH A BASEBALL BAT!
LIKE A WIND FROM HELL, THE ATOMIC CLOUD ROARED UP SIX MILES INTO THE SKY OVER HIROSHIMA...

AND IN THE CITY, TIME STOPPED.

UNH-H-H...
WHAT HAPPENED? IT'S PITCH DARK!
...NIGHT ALREADY?

HOW COULD THAT BE? I WAS ON MY WAY TO SCHOOL...

SOMETHING FLASHED AND AFTER THAT I DON'T REMEMBER A THING...

Wow, why'd this wall fall down?
GASP!

IT'S...IT'S THE LADY I WAS JUST TALKING TO -- WHAT'S HAPPENED TO HER SKIN?!

LADY?

SHE'S... SHE'S

DEAD

MA!! MAMAA!

...SOMEONES COMING!

H... HEY! HEY, MISTER! HELP!! THIS LADY'S DEAD!

GASP

GASP
THE PEOPLE LOOK LIKE MONSTERS!
WHAT HAPPENED?

WHERE'S MY HOUSE?!
EVERYTHING'S BEEN KNOCKED FLAT!

PAPA...!
MAMA...!
EIKO...
SHINJI...!
ARGH! WHAT DO YOU WANT? LET GO OF ME!!
SON... SONNY... BRING ME... WATER...

PLEASE... PLEASE... MY THROAT IS BURNING... WATER...

HANG ON, MISTER, JUST HANG ON... I'LL GET SOME...

QUICK... QUICK...
THE HEAT OF THE EXPLOSION LITERALLY MELTED THE SKIN OF ALL WHO WEREN'T SHELTERED FROM THE RAYS... THOSE WEARING DARK CLOTHES WERE BURNED PARTICULARLY BADLY... MOST PEOPLE WERE LEFT NAKED, THEIR CLOTHING RIPPED AWAY BY THE FORCE OF THE BLAST...

WHE-HE-HE

WOW - THAT HORSE IS ON FIRE!
I'LL USE THIS HELMET TO CARRY WATER IN...

HANG ON! I'LL WASH YOUR WOUNDS IN A SECOND!

WHY DID ALL THIS HAPPEN? WHY?
I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND...

THE BLAST STUCK ALL THIS GLASS INTO US!!

MOMMY! I CAN'T SEE!!

HEY, MISTER! I GOT YOU SOME WATER!

M... M... MISTER?

HE... HE'S DEAD!

Oh... NO...

HELP!

THE FIRE'S SPREADING THIS WAY!!

RUN!
PAPA! EIKO! SHINJI!

GEN! THANK GOD YOU'RE SAFE!

GEN! MY LEG HURTS -- IT'S STUCK!

OH, GEN... HELP! I CAN'T EVEN BUDGE THAT ROOF...

DAMN! I'LL GET THEM OUT SOMEHOW...

GEN! IT HURTS! IT HURTS!

HOLD ON, SHINJI... I'LL GET YOU OUT IN A MINUTE!

COME ON, GEN... HURRY! GET ME OUT...

UH...
IT'S NO USE, MAMA... I CAN'T MOVE IT, AND THERE'S NOBODY AROUND TO HELP... WHAT SHOULD WE DO?

I... I DON'T KNOW, GEN... WHAT CAN WE DO?

OHHH... GEN!
GET ME OUT OF HERE!

DAMN THIS ROOF!

UNG... UNnh...

THE FIRE'S COMING THIS WAY!!

DAIKICHI...!
SHINJI...!
EIKO...!
IT'S NO USE ANYMORE...

MAMA!
MAMA!
THE FIRE...

DAMN YOU,
FIRE!
GO AWAY!

GET BACK!
COME ON, MAMA. LET'S GO... COME ON, MAMA...

I'M GOING TO DIE WITH THEM!!

I'M GOING TO DIE WITH EVERYONE ELSE!!

NO! NO!

CRACKLE

WAAAAA! WAAAAA! MAMA! MAMA!

...AS THEY ESCAPE THE FLAMES, GEN'S MOTHER GOES INTO LABOR, AND WITH NO ONE TO HELP THEM, THEY BRING A NEW LIFE INTO THE DYING CITY...
PAPA... EIKO... SHINJI... LOOK!

Hey there, Tomoko! I just brought you into the world all by myself... I'm your big brother, so you'd better listen to me...

WAAAH

Hurry and grow up, so we can play together!!

Papa... Eiko... Shinji... LOOK!

We've got a new little sister! See how healthy she is? She's going to be beautiful when she grows up... she's...

WAAAH

She... she's...

...you... you'll never know her...
-LET ME HOLD HER, GEN... REMEMBER THIS, TOMOKO...!
THIS IS WHAT TOOK YOUR FATHER, BROTHER AND SISTER FROM US...
THIS IS WAR....

WHEN YOU GROW UP, YOU MUST NEVER LET THIS HAPPEN AGAIN!

WARAAH
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