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Democratic transition in South Korea, 1985–1988: The eclectic approach

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University of Hawaii, 1992
Democratic Transition in South Korea, 1985-1988:
The Eclectic Approach

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ABSTRACT

South Korea has made significant strides toward political development during the second half of the 1980's after protracted political conflicts between the repressive authoritarian regimes and the persistent opposition forces.

This dissertation seeks to explore the experience of dramatic Korean democratization from 1985 to 1988 under the general theoretical framework of democratic transition.

Two theoretical frameworks were used: the genetic (or agency-oriented) theories that emphasize the strategic choice of political actors who initiated the democratization movement and the structural determination theories that emphasize the structural conditions that facilitate the democratization process. Two types of theories have merits and relevances in explaining particular facets or stages of democratic transition. Structural determination theories are useful in understanding the preconditions of democratic transition and providing broad boundaries of opportunities and constraints. On the other hand, genetic theories have strength in explaining the concrete forms, dynamics, and timing. In explaining the recent Korean experience of democratic transition, this study adopts the eclectic approach combining these two theories on democratization.

Hence, the basic premise underlying this study is that the democratic transition in Korea comes from the interplay
or internal tensions within an authoritarian regime and popular pressures from below, which were generated by the maturity of structural environment, such as socioeconomic development, the change of political culture, favorable international factors, and the timely occurrence of the unexpected events. Among them, the socioeconomic development was the most important factor that increased demands and pressures for democracy, animated by the resurrection of civil society, such as the eruption of enormous autonomous organizations of students, workers, intellectuals, and church activists.

Facing strong challenges, the government hardliners initially tried to repress the opposition forces through imposition of increased physical forces, but, in the process, they committed serious blunders, which provoked the moral indignation of the people against the regime. As the internal political demonstrations and the international concern for the democracy in Korea were increased, the government was pressured into finally accepting the opposition demands for democratization. Through the June 29th Declaration and transition elections, the Sixth Republic was born and the process of evolution toward democracy began.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

I. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

For the past four decades Korea has been ruled by strong authoritarian regimes. Despite remarkable economic progress, Korea has experienced vicious political cycles from short periods of constitutional government to long periods of authoritarian regime by military coups. Hence, crises in political participation, authority, and legitimacy have been characteristic of Korean political history (Ahn, 1987, p. 20; Park, 1988, p. 7).

In order to achieve democracy in Korea, opposition forces formed the strong democratization movement against the authoritarian government. The resulting protracted and inconclusive political conflict between the repressive rulers and the insubordinate populace made the South Korea political system unstable and unpredictable. Unexpected political violence has been the turning point for the various governments of Korea (Lee, 1991, p. 1). Governmental collapse has resulted from either popular uprising (e.g., the April 19 Revolution in 1960) or military coup d'états (e.g., the May 16 coup in 1961 and the May 17 coup in 1980). Democratization has, therefore, remained the "unwritten chapter" in the Korean success story (Plunk, 1991, p. 105).
Nonetheless, Korea has made significant strides toward political development during the second half of the 1980's. This transition to democracy\(^3\) in South Korea basically resulted from the people's determination to demand democracy commensurate with the country's remarkable socioeconomic development. The people relentlessly struggled against the authoritarian Fifth Republic. In response, the government initiated dramatic concessions and a number of reform measures.

While Korea has been the most politically turbulent country among East Asia's Four NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries\(^4\)), it has been the first country to successfully transfer political power in a "democratic way" (Lee, 1988, p. 2). Although the "fundamentals" of the political system are still in a state of flux, the government has been popularly constituted after being fiercely contest between the ruling and opposition forces. Additionally, the unprecedented opportunities for citizens to participate freely in politics have encouraged the exchange of dissenting opinions (Cotton, 1989, p. 244).

Why has democracy, for so long an orphan in this country, suddenly begun to find a home? (Seligson, 1987, p. 168). How has the process developed? What factors contributed to it? This dissertation explores the Korean democratization experience from 1985 to 1988 under the theoretical framework of democratic transition.
The most salient issue in South Korean politics, since the founding of its First Republic in 1948, has been democratization, the long awaited goal of South Koreans. The ideal of democracy\(^5\) was seldom denied publicly by South Korean leaders, even if their administrations drastically deviated from the basic tenets of democracy (Kim, 1988, p. 44). However, except for convenient lip service and excuses for lengthy delays, no real progress for democratization was made until the dramatic June 29th Declaration in 1987.

The democratic experience in the latter part of the Fifth Republic is of cinematic propositions. The regime ruthlessly had repressed the activated civil society\(^6\) resulting in escalating confrontations. Suddenly the regime made abrupt concessions which allowed the peaceful transfer of power from the authoritarian leader to the democratically elected leader.

In this study, the democratization movement of South Korea during the period from the February 12 parliamentary election of 1985 to the April 26 parliamentary election in 1988 is analyzed. In terms of democratization, this period is absolutely the most critical, due to the number of the dramatic incidents and conclusive actions toward a democratic transition by the authoritarian regime. These "breathtaking and fast-moving events" (Kihl, 1988, p. 7) occurring during this time need detailed discussion and analysis to acquire proper historical perspective, and
facilitating understandings of the significance of the political change.

Close analysis of the democratization process of Korea yields apparent differences between the political characteristics of first half of the Fifth Republic and those of the second half. The democratization movement that began to be salient from 1985 climaxed in 1987. In other words, the political drama that dissolved a deep-seated authoritarian regime and led to democratization originated in the 12th parliamentary election on February 12, 1985. It came to a stunning conclusion in the transition period around the 13th parliamentary election of April 26, 1988, when the transition elections (presidential election and parliamentary election) were completed, and political power was peacefully transferred from Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae-woo.

In light of these political developments, the internal Korean political experience from 1985 to 1988 is completely different from the past attempts. Previously, despite two golden opportunities for democratization in 1960 and in 1980, Korea failed to achieve democratic transition. After these efforts failed, strong authoritarian regimes were established. No progress was made toward democracy in spite of equally strong challenges by opposition forces against the repressive measures of the authoritarian regimes. The
democratic transition since 1985 is unprecedented and unique to Korea.

Hence, it is worthwhile to analyze the democratization experience of Korea under the latter part of the Fifth republic. Such a study improves our general theoretical understanding of democratization. In light of my personal observation as a civil servant and through further study, I would like to contribute to a broader historical understanding and theoretical explanation of the democratization process in Korea.

The main focus of this study is centered on those who initiated the democratization movement, how the movement developed, what kind of strategies employed, and how movement developed over time, which are the main arguments of genetic theory. The study also examines why, and under what conditions South Korea has achieved a democratic transition without the usual accompanying revolutionary disturbances, which are crucial points of the structural determination theory. While in theoretical debates, these two schools of thought are competing paradigms, this work argues that they are both compatible and complementary. Indeed there is virtue to combining them. This study, therefore, adopt the eclectic approach of merging two independent theories on democratization: the genetic theory and structural determination theory. By using the structural determination theory, I scrutinize the
socioeconomic conditions and political situations which impacted on the actors' decisions. Using genetic theory, I examine the perceptions, the strategies, and tactics of the political actors

II. THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE STUDY

This study is an attempt to explore the conditions and causes of democratic transitions, the processes by which the transitions occurred, the strategies of the supporters and opponents of democracy in South Korea.

The key issues are to determine what factors contributed to democratization during the period from 1985 to 1988; what roles the popular movements in the civil society played; what the distinguishing features (e.g., actors, ideologies, goals, organizations, strategies and tactics) of the movements were, and how they influenced the political process which led to the regime change.

In relation with Korean democratization experience, how has the balance between the forces demanding democratization and the forces keeping authoritarian regime changed? Why was democratization achievable only just before and after 1987? Why has Korea failed to achieve it before? How did the ruling forces perceive the opposition's democratization movement? How did the opposition forces perceive the reaction of the ruling forces towards their democratization movement?
In this study, a historical structural approach is employed as a research method. The dynamics of conflict, which is the process of interaction between the government and various opposition groups, are explained under socio-political structures governing the political games in the context of changing history. In other words, this approach underscores the importance of interactions between the structural conditions of society and the choices of political actors (Lee, 1990, p. 125; Kim, 1985, pp. i-ii).

It is assumed that social structures are the accumulated products of man's collective behavior. Social structures are continuously transformed by social movements. Even through structural forces, individual and group perceptions, sentiments, and actions are sometimes influenced by events that are not necessarily obvious to the actors. Therefore, not just the structural conditioning of social life but also the historical transformation of structures by conflict, social movements, and class struggle is emphasized (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979, p. x; Eckstein, 1989, p. 4). According to Cardoso & Faletto,

In spite of structural determination there is room for alternatives. Their actualization will depend on the perception of new ways of turning a historical corner through 'a passion for the possible' (1979, p. xi).

The history of a society is shaped by the interactions of various political actors in response to the structural
environment. In the same context, to suitably explain the democratic experiences of Korea, we must first consider the roles of the political actors. Political actors have different alternatives when responding to the crises created by historical conditions achieved through the interactions of domestic and international factors (Kim, 1985, pp. 39-40; Lim, 1985, p. 6).

This study is a single case study of the democratization experience in Korea from 1985 to 1988. According to Smelser, the single case study proves useful in generating assumptions and refining existing observations, even though it suffers from limitations in generalization and in establishing causal relationships among mechanisms and outcomes (1976, p. 199; Kim, 1985, p. 42).

This study is not a description of the historical facts of the regime change from the authoritarian to democratic regime in Korea. Instead, it is an analytical approach to the democratization experience in Korea. This study is based on first hand observations, review of pertinent literature on the general theory of democratization, study of Korean politics, and various other related writings.

Specific validation comes from a set of unstructured personal interviews (Choi, 1989, p. 27) from ruling groups (government officials, party bureaucrats, and National Assemblymen) and from opposition groups (opposition politicians, party bureaucrats, Chaeya Insa) which played
an important role in the democratization of Korea, as well as other individuals who closely observed the democratic transition in Korea. Personal interviews provided thought provoking insight and excellent background information on the transition to democracy in South Korea. The interview questions focused on perceptions, strategies, and actual activities of leading actors who actively participated in the process of democratization.

III. OVERVIEW

This study examines the following subjects:

In Chapter II, the democratization theories explaining the structural conditions as well as political actors who facilitated the democratic transition and caused the disintegration of the authoritarian regimes are analyzed. Throughout this theoretical study, an alternative analytical model to suitably explain the Korean experience is formulated.

In Chapter III, Korean politics since the foundation of the Republic of Korea in 1948 in terms of protest movements against the authoritarian regimes are analyzed. In particular, the main focus of the analysis is centered on the emerging process of the Fifth Republic and its ruling mechanisms.

In Chapter IV, the actual process of democratization in Korea from 1985 to 1988, considering the perceptions and
strategies between the ruling forces and the opposition forces are analytically described.

Within Chapter V and Chapter VI, through each theoretical perspective the actual process of democratization is explained. By this process, we can find the weakness of each theory that cannot fully and satisfactorily explain the entire democratization scenario in Korea. Hence, the democratization theory is reformulated by analyzing the contributing factors that engendered the popular movement to democratization and led to the democratic transition in the structural determination theory. In addition, the perceptions, strategies, and tactics of leading groups that actively participated in the democratization of Korea are discussed. Here, public opinion favoring democratization and the dynamic interactions of politically involved agencies, such as the military, entrepreneurs, religious groups, the middle class, laborers, farmers, and students are systematically traced. Especially, the dynamic relationships among the pro-democratization public opinion, the democratization movement of the opposition forces, and the democratization measures of the government are explored.

In Chapter VII, the concluding remarks of the democratization experience in Korea are presented.

I have used the McCune-Reischauer Romanization System to transliterate Korean Words, except for familiar place names
such as Seoul; and for the proper person names such as
Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-Hwan, Roh Tae-woo,
Kim Young-sam, and Kim Dae-jung.
Notes

1. In the past four decades, South Korea has experienced martial law 11 times, and 9 constitutional revisions. Revisions accompanied the violent change of the constitutional order and authoritarian control by extraconstitutional measures, such as the April 19th student Revolution in 1960, the May 16th military coup d'etat in 1961, the advent of the Yushin system in 1972, the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, and the December 12th, and May 17th military coup d'etat in 1980.

2. To broaden the understanding of this research subject, it is necessary to clearly define the meanings of democracy. The essential characteristics of democracy constitute the principal criteria that define the starting point of transitions (Either, 1990, p. 5). According to Whitehead, the social meaning of traditional democracy involves constitutional government, rule of law, a competitive electoral system, rights of association, and separation of power (1986, p. 50). Diamond (1989) defines democracy as a system of institutionalized competition for power and argues that the essential parts of it are political participation, competition, and civil and political liberties. Additionally, Robert Lane states that democratic politics embraces standard elements: competitive elections, legitimate opposition, a relatively free (officially uncensored) press, and protection of minority rights (1986, p. 383).

Here competition and institutional safeguards that permit full play are essential to democracy because competition discourages monopolistic control of power by a single leader or an institution, generates leadership responsiveness, and enlarges opportunities for popular participation. Therefore, all one needs in order to define democracy is "one single distillate: an open and orderly political competition" (Kim, 1988, p. 46).

Therefore, authoritarianism, whatever its specific forms, always constitutes a negation of pluralism, multipartisanism, and the rules permitting effective recognition of the principle of citizenship (Either, 1990, p. 5), which are the process as well as consequences of an open and orderly political competition.

3. Transition to democracy or democratic transition as a form of "regime change" designates an interim between an authoritarian and a democratic regime. There is the generally accepted conceptualization of the democratic
transition process as involving three stages: liberalization, democratization, and consolidation (Lee, 1990, pp. 1-2).

According to O'Donnell and Schmitter, liberalization is the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties (1986, p. 7).

On one hand, the liberalization on the individual level means a guarantee of habeas corpus, sanctity of private home, the right to be defended in fair trial according to preestablished laws, and freedom of movement, speech, and petition. On the other hand, the liberalization in the group level means to guarantee freedom from punishment for expressions of collective dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens (p. 7).

Democratization also refers to the process whereby the rules of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgment, or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities) or extended to cover issues of citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, partisan organizations, interest associations, productive enterprises, educational institutions) (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 8).

In other words, democratization requires open competition for the right to win control of the government, and this requires abiding by the results of free elections, determine who governs. Therefore, democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept: liberalization refers fundamentally to civil society whereas democratization involves civil society, but it refers fundamentally to political society (Stepan, 1988, p. 6).

In the same context, the consolidation of democracy means guaranteeing the necessary conditions for the regime's regular functioning, its autonomy, and its reproduction (Maravall and Santamaria, 1986, p. 89), or stable development of democracies (Gillespie, 1989, p. 93), or habituation and routinization of democracy (Im, 1990, p. 75). It requires the institutionalization of the regime's norms and structures, the extension of its legitimacy and the removal of the obstacles that, in its initial phases, made its establishment difficult.

According to Gillespie, stable democracies are characterized by their ability to process conflict successfully. This analysis therefore focuses on three crucial axes of political conflict: civil-military
relations; government-opposition relations; and the relations between the state, labor and capital (1989, p. 93).

4. South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have successfully achieved economic development under authoritarian regimes, and they are called the "four little dragons" in the East Asia.

5. Concerning democratization of Korea, the important question that should be clearly defined is the type of system Korea is transiting toward. Past authoritarian regimes tried to disguise the nondemocratic characteristics of their political regimes by calling "Korean style democracy" (e.g., Yushin system). According to the differences of the political interests and ideologies of political actors, the definition and content of the Korea's future political system will be different.

   Perfect democratic nation is nonexistent in practice, but the advanced Western countries have a comparatively higher level of democracy than any politically underdeveloped country. Therefore, the ordinary Korean citizen wants to construct a state keeping traditional democratic principles (e.g., competition, participation, civil and political rights), which means the Korean need to enjoy the level of democracy found in the advanced Western countries.

6. Civil society means the arena that "where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, religious groupings and intellectual currents) and civil organizations from all classes (such as lawyers, journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests." Unlike civil society, political society means the ways in which "the polity specifically arranges itself for political constitution to gain control over public power and the state apparatus." (Stepan, 1988, pp. 4-5).

7. Chaeya Insa is defined as those who actively initiated anti-government movements away from the formal political institutions, such as political parties or parliament. They are mainly comprised of religious leaders, former pressmen, literary men, and former student movement activists. In the process of democratization struggle, many Chaeya Insa came into being and played an important role in the democratization in Korea because of their strenuous struggle experiences and high morality compared to the illegitimate authoritarian government.
8. From July 15, 1991 to August 13, 1991, I interviewed seventeen leading politicians and journalists who played an important role in and closely watched Korea's democratization from 1985 to 1988 (e.g., seven persons in the ruling forces, six persons in the opposition forces, and four persons in the press).
CHAPTER II. THE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

The basic theoretical orientation of this study comes from careful analysis of existing theories of democratization. Previous research activity in this field is especially relevant to the present study, including recent studies on the reasons for the emergence of democratic regimes from authoritarian regimes, and the process of democratic transition.

Although there are many theories on the emergence of democratic regimes from authoritarian regimes, they can be roughly categorized into two: a macro-oriented or structure determination theory, and a micro-oriented or genetic theory (Rustow, 1970; Pridham, 1984, pp. 16-27; Mainwaring, 1989, p. 29). In fact, the most "profound, generic, seminal, recurrent, and enduring" theoretical struggle in modern social science is that of structural determination theory versus the genetic theory. Is democratic transition irresistibly determined by structural forces in society, or is it the product of human action, intention, craft and choice? (Diamond, 1989a, p. 1).

In order to formulate the suitable alternative theoretical framework on the democratic transition in South Korea, these two theories are thoroughly analyzed.
I. STRUCTURE DETERMINATION THEORY

A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Concerning these theoretical questions, the structural determination theory tends to emphasize objective conditions that facilitate or obstruct the democratic transition (Huntington, 1984, p. 196). Structural determination proponents neglect the short-term dynamic political development, and view political transformations as predetermined, and seek to discover the "patterns of determination by inductive generalizations" (Przeworski, 1986, p. 47; Pridham, 1990, p. 12).

Structuralists argue the social, economic, and cultural framework of society, with international environments, lay down a "contending perimeter within which political choices have to be made and solutions sought" (Pridham, 1990, p. 12).

In other words, the decisions made by various political figures "respond to and are conditioned by socioeconomic structures and political institutions" (Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 271) already present, or in existence in people's memories. The existing structures can be decisive in that they may either restrict or enhance the options or strategic scopes available to the different political actors attempting to construct one or another type of democracy (Roxborough, 1983, p. 360). These studies demonstrate
democracy is typically a consequence of "historically-created structures" such as economic development, transformations of class structure, increased education, and the like (Przeworski, 1986, p. 47). According to Dahl, conditions that increase the chances of public competition and polyarchy are broken down in the following ways: historical sequences, the degree of concentration in the socioeconomic order, level of socioeconomic development, inequality, subcultural cleavages, foreign control, and the beliefs of political activities (1971, p. 32).

Representative theories following this approach are the wealth theory of democracy, the political culture theory, the social structure theory, and international situation theory. Such studies need to consider changes in internal political economic situations, social structure and cultural norms that help create and nurture new groups in civil society as well as in favorable international political situations facilitating democratization of a specific countries in a certain time. These groups demand and respond to democratization in their societies, and shape their links to the state and other institutions (Levine, 1988, pp. 388-9). The structural determination theory stresses the socioeconomic, cultural, and social structural requisites of democracy. This theory was the dominant trend in political science in the 1950’s and 1960’s.
B. THE WEALTH THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Modernization theorists argue democracy is the result of progress, which is defined as the economic and social development that comes from industrialization.

Lipset claims greater economic affluence in a country is a favorable condition for democracy, and that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (1981, p. 31).

Samuel P. Huntington (1984), P. Cutright (1963), Lerner (1958), and G. Winham (1970) agree with Lipset's argument, which makes strong and positive correlations between the measures of a country's socioeconomic development and its level of democratic performance. According to these assumptions, democratization might be, more or less, an autonomous and inevitable consequence of socioeconomic development. It is logically assumed that to encourage democratization, the best strategies would be to raise the level of socioeconomic development (Kim, 1988, p. 48; Vanhanen, 1988, p. 2).

How does economic development promote democratization? Actually, sheer wealth itself may not have been a crucial factor in accelerating the democratic transition of undemocratic countries.

First of all, economic development facilitates the progress of urbanization, the growth of literacy, and the
diffusion of mass media. These elevate the political consciousness and political participation of the people. In addition, higher standards of life facilitates the formation of a middle class, increasing social diversity, and elevating the civil consciousness of the people (Lerner, 1958; Momayezi, 1988, p. 114; Diamond, 1989b, p. 34; Karl, 1990, p. 3; Manning, 1990, pp. 49-50). According to Diamond,

Socioeconomic development tends to loosen or sever traditional ties of deference and obedience to authority. New interests are generated, new consciousness is kindled, and new political and organizational capacities are acquired at the individual and group level (1989b, p. 34).

Urbanization affects the democratic political development primarily by increasing educational levels, which increase mass communications, such as newspaper, television, radio (McCrone and Cnudde, 1967, p. 78). The expansion of literacy accompanying the enlargement of education and mass communications heightens public awareness of political issues, which encourages popular demand for participation. The better educated populace is also able to discern government propaganda from fact easier than an illiterate or poorly educated citizenry, and are thus more capable of resisting the influence of such government practices (Park, 1989, p. 155; Krause and Cheng, 1991, p. 3).
Advances in communications, exposure to major media events, frequent contact with foreigners, and travel to other countries play an important role in disseminating or spreading political information and knowledge across a country as well as among nations (Cutright, 1963, pp. 253-264; McCrone and Cnudde, 1967, p. 74; Yang, 1989, p. 297). The information revolution calls for decentralization and a diffusion of power throughout the society, which is incompatible with a centralized authoritarian rule, thereby increasing the threat to authority (Pye, 1990, p. 9; Diniz, 1986, p. 64). Moreover, heightened political awareness contributes to the forming and upgrading of democratic consciousness, such as trust, competence, and bargaining and accommodation.

Economic development increases the capacity of a society to satisfy aspirations, reduces social frustrations and tensions, and tends to thwart consequent political instability (Huntington, 1984). In addition, expending resources to compensate losers breeds political compromise (Cheng, 1989, p. 2; Krause and Cheng, 1991, p. 14).

Generally, the poor are too concerned with the struggle for daily survival to worry about affairs of state. The poor are usually far less educated, and they are generally ignorant of the subtleties of politics and governmental policies. As a result, the poor become the prey of demagogues, who place excessive demands on the political
system by seeking a fundamental redistribution of their society's wealth. Hence, countries which are more socially, politically, and economically advanced produce a more sophisticated and participatory populace, less burdened by political conflict (Solarz, 1985, pp. 140-141).

Second, greater economic development leads to an active civil society and a pluralistic social order (Chang, 1990, p. 390). The emergence of a middle class and the growth of a technically educated population create relatively autonomous, organized, and politically conscious groups, who firmly articulate demands for opening the existing political system towards democracy. The state faces serious challenges from these social forces. If government fails to meet increasing demands for political development, a growing portion of the politically involved population becomes alienated, and denies the system their allegiance, commitment and corporate knowledge.

These social and economic ingredients are essential for sustained economic development and political stability. Heightened political consciousness of the masses and the emergence of autonomous intermediary groups reduces political mobilization. Under these circumstances, the people's propensity to accept passively the actions of their ruler is decreased, and chances for reform of undemocratic practices and institutions are dramatically increased.
As a result, economic development itself creates the conditions of a pluralistic social order, which demands a competitive political system.\(^2\)

Dahl explains it in the following ways:

The monopoly over socioeconomic sanctions enjoyed by the hegemonic leaders is therefore undermined by the very success of their economy: the more they succeed in transforming the economy the more they are threatened with political failure (1971, p. 78).

The authoritarian regime that predominantly depends on repressive violence faces enormous limitations and must pay heavy costs to preserve that regime (Dahl, 1971, p. 79; Pye, 1990, p. 9).

Third, socioeconomic development involving significant industrialization leads to a new, much more diverse, complex, and interrelated economy, which becomes increasingly more difficult for authoritarian regimes to control while encouraging the growth of opposing factions (Huntington, 1990; Cheng, 1989b, p. 2).

Indeed, the economy itself becomes so complex that centralized political and economic control can only suffocate it. The government role in a complicated economy must be set up in terms of decentralization and autonomy of decision-making in each sector. This is necessary to
effectively manage a highly developed industrialized economy and complex society. The "intellectualization of work" requires a high level of devotion, initiative and responsibility on the part of individuals and groups. Hence power is shared and rule must be based on consent (Huntington, 1984, pp. 193-218; Genov, 1991, p. 332).

Fourth, economic development makes government able to achieve a more equal income distribution among social groups, leading to the emergence of the middle class (Dahl, 1971, p. 74; Huntington, 1991, pp. 65-67). Increased income, greater economic security, and widespread higher education comes from economic development. This development largely influences the form of "class struggle." Those in the lower income strata are able to develop a longer time perspective and more complex and gradualist view of politics, making the lower classes less receptive to extremist views. Democracy is less likely to emerge and evolve in societies where an impoverished mass confronts a small wealthy elite who control the means of production and distribution³ (Lipset, 1981, p. 50; Huntington, 1991, pp. 65-67; Pourgerami, 1991, p. 9).

Here, what is most important in the wealth theory of democracy is that the middle class plays a crucial role in the democratic transition (Cheng, 1989b, p. 1; Huntington, 1991, pp. 65-67; Krause and Cheng, 1991, p. 13). Along with economic development, the importance of a middle class as
the prime mover of the democratization movement has grown. Historically, however, middle classes had supported the emergence of the authoritarian regimes to defend their political and economic interests against challenges from the highly politicized and mobilized popular sectors (e.g., labor organizations, peasant organizations) in Latin America in the earlier phases. Nonetheless, the middle class gradually demanded democratization of their societies. They were equipped with "legal expertise and the abilities for information diffusion, issue definition, and social mobilization for political reform" (Cheng, 1989b, p. 3; Krause and Cheng, 1991, p. 13; Huntington, 1991, pp. 65-67).

Fifth, economic development required and promoted the opening of societies to foreign trade, investment, technology, tourism, and communications. Involvement of a country in world economy created alternate nongovernmental sources of wealth and influence, and introduced the society to the impact of the democratic ideas prevailing in the industrialized world. Development and liberalizing foreign influences become unavoidable. In fact, the desire to become recognized as a member of the group of developed countries becomes a compelling factor for further democratic change in Korea. Unlike the Korean case, China wanted to open its economy to the world in order to facilitate economic growth while maintaining a closed political system. However, China continues to face inevitable

Although the empirical testing of the wealth theory of democracy coincides with reality, the particularly strong positive correlation is between the most extreme levels, from the top to the bottom. In the middle, there are numerous instances which refute the theory's basic premise⁵ (Manning, 1990, p. 56).

In order to unplug the bottleneck of this theory, some scholars assume there is a particular level of economic development required for a democratic breakthrough. Huntington terms it "transition zone" (1991, pp. 60-61) while Neubauer uses "development threshold" (1967, p. 1007). There are thresholds below or above at which the chances for competitive politics or polyarchy are not significant. There appears to be a lower threshold of economic development beneath which stable democratic rule is unlikely to emerge. There exists an upper threshold, above which the chances of democracy are so high that any further increases in per capita GNP cannot affect the outcome in any significant way⁶ (Neubauer, 1967, p. 1007; Dahl, 1971, pp. 67-68; Huntington, 1984, pp. 201-202; Seligson, 1987, p. 7; Diamond, 1989b, p. 5; Yen, 1990, pp. 43-44).

However, what is predictable for these countries in the transition zone is not the advent of democracy but rather
the demise of previously existing forms (Huntington, 1991, p. 59). If economic growth occurs without economic crisis, democracy evolves slowly, as it did in nineteenth-century Europe. If economic crisis occurs without achievement of transition zone wealth, the authoritarian regimes may fall, but their replacement with long-lived democratic regimes is highly problematic. The combination of substantial levels of economic development and short-term economic crisis or failure has been the economic formula most favorable to the democratic transition (Huntington, 1991, p. 72).

In spite of influential arguments, the wealth theory of democracy has been criticized by many scholars.

First, this theory doesn't sufficiently explain two types of exceptions: countries that have experienced economic development but not democratic development, and countries that witnessed a democratic breakthrough without prior economic development (Oh, 1989, p. 41; Manning, 1990, p. 52). We can find the examples of the former in Latin America and East Asia (e.g., Singapore).

O'Donnell's theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism (1973) is the strongest argument against the wealth theory of democracy. According to O'Donnell, social and economic development in contemporary South America is more likely to lead to authoritarian regimes than democracy by producing unusual strains in a society. O'Donnell argues there is an "elective affinity" between higher levels of

Conversely, there are some examples showing democratic countries without economic development. India, Jamaica, and Costa Rica are the model countries with longstanding democracies but without real economic growth rates. In the midst of slow growth and economic turbulence, many Latin American countries and Portugal from 1970’s to 1980’s have experienced a democratic breakthrough without prior economic development (Manning, 1990; Rothstein, 1991, p. 53).

Second, successful economic development may well strengthen the positions of authoritarian regimes instead of fostering democracy. By improving the economy, an authoritarian regime may succeed in co-opting or containing the democratic movement for a greater influence in politics. This action may well extend the life of an existing authoritarian regime. Economic development thus contributes to consolidating authoritarian regime from which democracy becomes excluded (Cheng, 1989a, p. 472; Lummis, 1991, p. 34).

Third, this theory is limited in that it is unable to predict or analyze the advent of democracy. In other words, this theory still does not answer the question of why it happened at a particular time. In this sense, the theory is
not enough for us to comprehend the dynamics of the transition process. In the same context, the wealth theorists of democracy are not preoccupied with the genesis of a democratic regime, but rather how a preexistent democracy can best preserve or enhance its health and stability. It is too static to view a complex phenomenon of regime change (Chin, 1988, p. 49; Chung, 1989, p. 26; Arvanitopoulos, 1989, p. 5).

Fourth, this theory cannot suitably explain the variances in the political result of the economic change. In reality, regimes experiencing similar kind of economic crises may not suffer the same fate. Some authoritarian regimes disintegrate while other regimes throve and maintain power. How is this dichotomous paradox explained? As long as the discussion remains rooted in the socioeconomic level, there is no accurate way accounting for the disparate outcome in regime transformations, whether resulting in maintenance or breakdown (Chin, 1988, p. 48).

Any uniform explanation for democratization is not feasible because of the multitudinous factors involved in establishing and sustaining democracy. Perhaps the wealth theory of democracy overemphasizes political outcomes of economic changes while underestimating other factors, such as social, cultural, and psychological factors of political behavior, all of which play an independent role in

Despite some weakness and deviant cases in explaining the democratic transition from authoritarian regimes, many scholars conclude that socioeconomic development leads to more democratic systems. However, as proved, socioeconomic development, while a crucial contributing factor, is not the only consideration for democratic development (Linz, 1973, pp. 258-259; Vanhanen, 1989, p. 99; Arat, 1991, p. 53).

C. THE POLITICAL CULTURE THEORY

Although it is necessary to be cautious when drawing any deterministic linkage between political culture and democratization, the importance of cultural patterns for democratic development is widely recognized. It can be safely argued that differences in the political cultures of various countries account for many of the differences in the nature of their political systems (Dahl, 1971, p. 166; Pridham, 1984, p. 12; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1987, p. 9; Dahl, 1990, p. 3; Huntington, 1991, p. 68).

Democratic development is not simply a matter of mere institutional changes. In order to sustain successful democracy, the political culture also needs to be changed concurrently with institutional changes. Although many third world countries have adopted democracy as ruling political institutions, many of these countries fail to
enjoy the democracy they seek. It is argued that their failure to achieve democracy results from the existence of an undemocratic political culture.

The empirical literature on democracy has been overly preoccupied with specifying the cultural or psychological traits that are likely to facilitate or hinder the genesis and maintenance of democracy. Otherwise, the literature has been preoccupied with the task of identifying the kinds of people who reveal or possess such cultural or psychological traits (Shin, Chey, and Kim, 1989, p. 219; Arat, 1991, p. 41).

The Civic Culture (1989) of Almond and Verba is a representative case. They derive three classifications of the dimensions of "orientations" or "internalized aspects" of political culture from Parsons and Shils: cognitive orientations, affective orientations, and evaluational orientations. Here, cognitive orientations refer to "knowledge and belief about the political system," affective orientation refer to "feeling about the political system," and evaluational orientations to judgments and opinions that involve a "combination of value standards---with information and feelings" (1989, pp. 66-67).

These political orientations contribute to understanding people's knowledge and comprehension of politics. They demonstrate political ability and competence, and attitudes toward governmental authority and its value at a certain
time in a given state. There are three ideal types of political culture based on Almond and Verba's survey of five nations' political orientations towards political systems, input, output, and self. These ideals, parochial (traditional), subject (transitional), and participant (modern), have evolved through gradual political development and by fusion of older attitudes with newer ones (MacDonald, 1991, p. 8).

In the parochial culture, people does not possess clear opinions or consciousness about their political system or the role of political support and opposition in the policy-making of the government's policies. They also lack the in-depth knowledge and understanding about the role of the self as a political actor. As for subject culture, although people understand the political system and government's policies comparatively well, they still lack understanding of the input factors and the role of self as a political actor.

In contrast to the previous two types of political culture, participant culture presents a model of the "good citizen" who is well informed about public affairs and is actively involved in various aspects of the political process. He maintains strong allegiance to the existing political system, tolerates varying political views, and is a firm believer of democratic rule. The participant culture is called "civic culture." The informed, involved,
rational; and active citizen is more frequently found in the successful than in the unsuccessful democracies (Han and O, 1987, pp. 23-25; Almond and Verba, 1989; Chung, 1990, p. 7; MacDonald, 1991, p. 8).

Does this civic culture sufficiently guarantee the success of the democratic government? Almond and Verba affirm that this rationality-activist model of democratic citizenship is only one component of the civic culture. This element alone cannot logically sustain a stable democratic government. Only when combined with a high degree of mutual trust among members of society, a willingness to tolerate diversity, a tradition of accommodation or compromise, and less deference to authority and competence, can be achieved a viable, stable democracy (Huntington, 1984, p. 209; Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 16; Karl, 1990, p. 3; Manning, 1990, p. 115; Arat, 1991, p. 68; MacDonald, 1991, p. 80).

In short, to sustain a successful democracy, political culture must foster political participation, discussion, and awareness on the part of the citizenry. Political activity and partisanship, however, must be tempered by certain moderating orientations: tolerance for opposing political beliefs and a willingness to compromise. Moreover, the presence of social-cultural norms which allow leaders and individual citizens to freely and pragmatically bargain and compromise is essential to democracy. The lack of a
bargaining mechanism in culture makes political cleavages rigid, and often leads to an irreconcilable polarization.

In addition, leaders and citizens must have a strong and dedicated commitment to preserving the democratic structure. The vitality of democracy rests on people and leaders who are consistent in their democratic beliefs and attitudes (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1987, p. 9; Shin, Chey, and Kim, 1989, p. 223). Commitment to democracy stems from a consistently organized democratic belief system. Those who have such a belief system are more likely to be active in the political process than those who does not (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 36).

The following five conditions proposed by Schumpeter for the success of the "democratic method" also are in the same context: 1) skilled professional politicians in bargaining, coalition making, electoral campaigning, and the like are needed; 2) the scope of government should be in some measure limited; 3) bureaucratic professionalism should be strong and confident enough to instruct the politicians; 4) the electors in the countryside must respect the political division of labor. The opposition must resist the temptation to upset or embarrass the government when the opportunities are presented; and 5) tolerance of differing opinions should be permitted (1942, pp. 289-296; Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 21).
It is assumed that this sort of civic culture necessarily rests on a widely differentiated and articulated social structure with relatively autonomous social classes, occupational sectors, and ethnic, religious, or regional groups (Karl, 1990, p. 3).

In particular, religion is closely related with the democratization of certain nations because the culture is usually based on the religion. Huntington argues that Hinduism made a contribution to sustaining democracy in India; while Catholicism⁹ was ambivalent toward the democratic transition, and Protestantism facilitated the democratization (1984, pp. 207-208).

Solarz explains it as follows:

The bedrock of political pluralism is a set of values associated with the Judeo-Christian tradition in general and with enlightenment liberalism in particular. Among the norms in this Western package are individualism, freedom, respect for human dignity, and tolerance of views of others (1985, p. 114).

A culture that lacks these factors cannot sustain democratic institutions. However, Islam lacks a strong receptivity for democratic institutions and behaviors. Moreover, Confucianism and Buddhism are conducive to authoritarian rule (Manning, 1990, pp. 111-112).

Hence, the failure of democracy in Asia and African countries can be attributed to the "soil of philosophical traditions antithetical to liberalism" (Solarz, 1985, p.
According to an empirical study, democratic preferences and commitments would be strongest among upholders of an individualist culture whose social ideal is self-regulation. Such preferences and commitments would be weakest among the upholders of a hierarchical culture in which orders come down and obedience flows up\(^{10}\) (Almond and Verba, 1989, p. 222).

In addition, the countries of South America also have been so heavily influenced by traditional Hispanic culture that cannot quite match up the requirements of pluralism to the realities of Catholic culture\(^{11}\) (Manning, 1990, p. 113; Solarz, 1985, p. 144).

A nation's value system, certainly, is continuously changing to meet the varying needs of its citizens. A multitude of factors can be involved in the transformation of political culture. Among them, socioeconomic change often becomes a major cause of changes in political values. Acceleration of urbanization, a surge in the growth of income and education, increasing media exposure, and an enlarging youthful generation cause people to subscribe to modern values. These values include an increase in a sense of efficacy, less deference to authority, and a higher frequency of sociopolitical participation. Moreover, politically competent citizens also show a willingness to resort to "extra-legal or unorthodox methods" beyond those associated with conventional political participation in
order to enlarge the narrow political arena of the established regimes (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 403; Lee, 1989, pp. 5-74). Education and media exposure powerfully relate to civic competence and participation by stimulating political awareness.

There are two views on urbanization: the modernization model, and the decline-of-community model. The former posits that urbanization tends to increase the level of literacy, and higher literacy rates in turn, increase media awareness. Increased media exposure then leads to higher levels of mass participation in politics (Lerner, 1958, pp. 43-75; Deutsh, 1961, pp. 493-515). Conversely, the latter predicts more political activities in rural rather than in urban regions. In the small town it is easier for ordinary people to know the "ropes of politics" and "whom to contact." Hence, politicians are more responsive to the needs of the people. In larger communities, however, attention becomes more diffused because of political complexity.

Although voting, campaigning and communal activities tend to support the decline-of-community model, "psychological involvement in politics" supports the modernization model (Verba and Nie, 1972, pp. 230-231; Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978, pp. 269-285; Auh and Hahn, 1988, p. 49). Generally speaking, the younger generation is more politically aware and more inclined to get involved in
political actions than their elders. Since they enjoy a higher standard of living and are better educated, they have higher expectations of the political system (Lee, 1989, p. 30).

Lee Ae-Rie summarizes the related arguments:

People who are young, highly educated, and reside in urban areas tend to be more interested in politics, less supportive of the political system, less satisfied with government performance, more cynical towards society, and more willing to involve themselves in protest activities than people who are old, less educated, and living in rural areas (1989, p. 209).

Even though the cultural determinants theory contributes to enciphering the reasons for the democratic development, it is risky to regard culture as the major factor explaining variations in political structures. The relationship between political culture and structure must be treated as a "two-way street" (Arat, 1991, p. 69), where structural elements are used consciously to create or reinforce specific values and norms.

D. SOCIAL STRUCTURE THEORY

The main argument of the social structure theory can be subdivided into two theories. One theory is concerned with identifying particular groups or specific types of pluralistic structure as playing a decisive role in making democracy possible or more likely (Manning, 1990, p. 81).
The other is concerned with specific elite structures establishing and sustaining democracy (Higley and Burton, 1989, pp. 17-22).

Whether there is a social force having an autonomous social base or not is closely connected with political development. In other words, a widely differentiated and articulated social structure has relatively autonomous social classes, regional, occupational, ethnic and religious groups. These groups function to limit state power as a countervailing power. They function as the most effective means of sustaining and facilitating democratic development (Huntington, 1984, p. 197; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1987, pp. 10-12; Manning, 1990, p. 82; Chong, 1988, p. 351). In contrast, without autonomous social forces standing against the state power, it is difficult for a regime to avoid the rule of a centralized and repressive state power such as an absolute monarchy, an oriental despotism, or an authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship (Huntington, 1984, p. 197).

The specific groups most likely to play crucial roles in political development are the anti-state autocracy under feudalism, the bourgeoisie, labor organization, and religious institutions (Manning, 1990, pp. 93-94). After analyzing the relationship between social structure and democratic development in traditional societies, some scholars argue that societies with a highly developed feudal
system have a better chance of evolving into democracies than those lacking such social pluralism. Most particularly, an aristocracy in a highly developed feudalist society plays an important role in limiting the state power in order to protect its own interests against the state. Scholars maintain that the success of democracy in the Western countries, in contrast to the failure of democracy in the Russia and China, results from the existence of such a traditional pluralistic social order.

However, this theory does not suitably explain the differences between democratic success in North America (which is generally supposed to come from the absence of feudalism) and democratic failure in Latin America (which is generally assumed to result from the existence of feudalism). In addition, emphasizing the nature of the traditional society leading to democracy, the theory argues predetermination that some societies are destined to become democratic and others are not (Huntington, 1984, pp. 197-198; Manning, 1990, pp. 83-84).

It is also argued that an autonomous bourgeoisie plays the most significant role in a democratic development. The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) by Barrington Moore is the most seminal research arguing for the role of bourgeoisie in developing democracy. Through the historical case studies of eight countries - England, France, the United States, China, Germany, Russia, Japan and
India, he suggests three distinct paths to political modernity. Each path is characterized by specific conditions: "Bourgeois revolution" resulting in Western parliamentary democracies (England, France, the U.S.A.); "Revolution from above" became fascist dictatorships (Germany, Japan); and "Peasant Revolution" evolved into communist dictatorships (China, USSR). The reactions the landed upper classes and the peasants to the challenges of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in determining these paths (Moore, 1966, p. xvii; Skocpol, 1973, p. 5; Rueschemeyer, 1991, p. 19).

More emphasizes the importance of the role of commercial agrarians as an independent economic base. The agrarians "oppose the king and royal attempts to preserve the older order" and broaden the democratic arena in the society. Examples of this are the gentry in the English civil war, the rich peasants in the French Revolution, and the commercial farmers in the American civil war (1966, pp. 16-107; Skocpol, 1973, p. 5). The landed aristocracy must convert itself into a commercial-oriented bourgeoisie in order to assume the same responsibilities. Additionally, a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an important role in the growth of parliamentary democracy.

Social developments including the enbourgeoization of the rural upper classes, the growth of autonomous town dwellers, and their alliance against the royal power made a
great contribution to the development of parliamentary democracy.

The bourgeois impulse was very strong at an early stage of modernization of the "bourgeoisie revolution" countries (e.g., France, England, and the United States). The fascist dictatorship countries (e.g., Germany and Japan) came from a coalition between a medium strength bourgeois and a dominant landed aristocracy. Peasant revolution countries (e.g., Russia and China) developed when a strong landed elite and a weak bourgeoisie were constrained by a powerful agrarian state. In Moore's phrase, "no bourgeoisie, no democracy" (Moore, 1966, p. 418; Skocpol, 1973, p. 6; Manning, 1990, p. 88; Paige, 1990, p. 39).

Huntington argues several countries have no democratic transition despite favorable economic variables resulting from economic development but not commensurate with the growth of the bourgeoisie. The predominant role of the state or of multinational corporations in the economic development of these countries relatively weakens the positions of the bourgeoisie. Whether or not a country has an autonomous, indigenous bourgeoisie likely depends on its size. Countries with small internal markets are generally unable to sustain such a class, while large countries easily support (Huntington, 1984, p. 198; Manning, 1990, pp. 91-92).
Labor movements also play a significant role in democratic transitions in both Western European countries and the United States. Although many people are cynical about the roles of the "co-opted and docile trade unions" for the state, the established labor unions represent permanent interests that are often "antithetical to governmental strategies of capital accumulation" (Sklar, 1987, p. 700).

The organized networks of labour unions frequently provide an underlying support system for demonstrations, protests, and strikes, which directly disrupt the economy. Because the labor unions enjoy a widespread base, and posses the ability interfere with the economy, they are the most threatening opponents of the authoritarian regimes (Valenzuela, 1989, pp. 446-447). Authoritarian regimes are trying to control the labor unions by using all possible means. Valenzuela presents justifications for governmental control:

All processes of redemocratization include a sharp increase in labor movement activation through strikes and demonstrations usually in conjunction with a broader upsurge of mobilization by a wide variety of groups (1989, p. 445).

This "resurrection of civil society," in O'Donnell and Schmitter's terminology, often coincides with the crisis phases of authoritarian rule. Periods of crisis of authoritarianism or liberalization lead to "increased rank-
and file activation and participation in unions, a widespread restructuring of labor organizations, and the reestablishment or recomposition of union links to parties" (Valenzuela, 1989, p. 449).

The immediate demands of labor unions may exceed "the capacity of the economy or the willingness of employers and state economic policy-makers to provide a satisfactory response." Thus, widespread demonstrations and strikes provide sufficient pretext for backlash by hardliners that may retain or regain important positions of state power. It is necessary to follow "the favorable sequence of mobilization followed by restraint" (Valenzuela, 1989, pp. 450-452). The labor unions play a critical role in democratic transition in the Southern Cone Latin American Countries, Poland, Peru, Costa Rica, and India (Huntington, 1984, p. 205; Sklar, 1987, pp. 700-702; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1988, p. 237, p. 239).

The influence of a dominant religious groups may foster democracy, because religious groups contain superior moral legitimacy. They are "less explicitly politically self-interested" than other institutions which seek rewards and resources from the state, making them less malleable by governments and other social institutions (Diamond, Linz, Lipset, 1987, p. 12). There are numerous examples of the role of religious groups in democratic transition. In the Philippines, the Catholic Church was an important source of
the revolutionary thought, particularly, the People's Power Movement in February 1986 against the dictatorial Marcos regime. Similar roles have been played by the Catholic church or protestant denominations in many Latin American Countries, as well as in South Korea.

Contrary to social structure theories above that identify with autonomous organizations or groups playing an important role in the democratization process, elite structure theorists argue that certain elite structures play a decisive role in determining the character of political regimes. Here, "structure" means "the amalgam of attitudes, values, and interpersonal relations among factions making up the elite" (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 296).

There are three types of elite structures: "disunified," "ideologically unified," and "consensually unified" (Burton Higley, 1987, p. 296; Chong, 1988, pp. 359-362).

First, in the disunified elite structures, members of the elite distrust each other and try to avoid interaction. There is seldom cooperation or political negotiation for the common interests. They mobilize every possible means, including violence, to achieve their aims because there is no consensus on the rules of game. Each sect perceives its internal solidarity as very important and negotiation with another sect as becoming a renegade or surrendering (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 296; Chong, 1988, p. 359).
Second, in the ideologically unified elite structure, the elite is monolithically organized and ideologically homogeneous. The elite faction publicly professes the identical ideology, and all members of the elite group are belong to the same party or movement. Political power tends to be centralized, and the circulation of the elite is very slow. Although open competition and conflict are not recognized, on the whole, the competition among the elites changes to veiled enmity (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 296; Chong, 1988, p. 360).

Third, in the consensually unified elite structure, based on different ideologies, the elite is pluralistically organized, and the members compete with each other to hold political power. However, the elite structure is an instrumental one because the political game is played in accordance with the established rules of a game based on mutual consent. The elite have an extensive web of interpersonal relationships which encompass all factions and provide satisfactory access to key decision makers. They frequently meet with each other to coordinate or solve their dissensions. The recruitment of the elite is open and continuously circulated through the diverse paths of recruitment. The elite structures of U.S.A. and West European countries are consistent with this category (Higley and Moore, 1981, pp. 581-597; Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 296; Chong, 1988, p. 360).
The political system under the disunified elite structures is extremely unstable, and the abnormal transfer of power by the military coup d'état or popular uprising is common. Under the ideologically unified structure, the political system is relatively stable because there are no substantial challenging powers or criticisms against the government, simply because it is not permitted in this society. Under the consensually unified structure, the political system is stable, and the power is peacefully and regularly transferred through elections (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 297; Chong, 1988, p. 361).

Democratic transition is identified as a change of the elite structure from a disunified structure or ideologically unified structure to a consensually unified elite structure. Higley and Burton argue that in order to achieve a consensually unified elite it is necessary for the warring national elite factions to deliberately reconcile themselves to the system and abandon their distinct ideological orientations or reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their basic disagreements. They term the concept "elite settlements" (Higley and Burton, 1987, p. 295). Their concept seems to have much affinity with O'Donnell and Schmitter's elite pacts (1986, pp. 196-220).

Why do disunified elites enter into settlements? Burton and Higley maintain that there are two reasons: the recent elite experience of costly, but also essentially
inconclusive, conflict; and the occurrence of a major crisis provoking elite action (1989, p. 298). The degree to which the consensual unification of a national elite produces a fully democratic regime depends on many "facilitative" conditions, such as the context of regional conflicts, the existence of external threats, and the extent of economic prosperity or other facilitative conditions (1987, p. 297). Elite settlements create patterns of open but peaceful competition based on the norm of restrained partisanship and transform unstable political regimes into stable regimes (Burton and Higley, 1987, p. 295; Diamond, 1989b, p. 13; Huntington, 1984, p. 212).

The central weak point of Burton and Higley's theory is that it does not provide any mechanism of sustaining or reproducing the consensual unity of national elites after unity is achieved, especially through the efforts to renegotiate the original bargain to incorporate new groups into the polity and the "rubric of consensus" (Diamond, 1989b, p. 11, pp. 14-15).

E. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Some scholars and policy makers conceive external influences as another set of preconditions of democracy. The main issue of this perspective concerning the environment beyond or outside a country's borders is the extent to which certain external factors might play a
role in determining a country's prospects for democratization and how the external factors alter the adaptability of governmental elites, nongovernmental elites, or broader segments of the population toward regime transitions (Karl, 1990, p. 4; Manning, 1990, p. 94; Starr, 1991, p. 378). This theory's main theoretical point deals with the so-called "diffusion effects" or "demonstration effects" of the spread of democracy based on linkage and interdependence.

Although it is argued that, compared to internal factors, external factors play a secondary role in democratic transition, to the extent that external influences are primary, democratization is the result of diffusion rather than development. The actions of foreign countries may drastically alter options available to a regime. Ties of interdependence affect perceptions of incentive structures and the costs and benefits of governmental change based on the sensitivity and vulnerability to outside forces (Dahl, 1971, p. 190; Huntington, 1984, p. 205; Whitehead, 1986, p. 4; Starr, 1991, p. 378). What makes international factors influential in the change of certain countries' political regimes?

Globalization offers the best explanation for political change. Globalization suggests that political, economic, and social activity of human beings is becoming worldwide. There is an intensification to interact within and between
states and societies, and international borders are dissolved by modern communication systems and the information revolution.

The emergence of a global economic system which reaches beyond the control of any single state, the enormous growth in international organizations and regimes, and the intensification of multilateral diplomacy and transgovernmental interactions which can check and limit the scope of even the most powerful state make certain countries vulnerable to the influences of international factors.

It is no longer possible for one country to obstruct its people from receiving information on international situations in the present age of communications explosion. Moreover, in the interconnected international society, it is hard for any country to diverge from the dominant political and social trend in the world. Hence, the international demonstration effect is felt everywhere (Chin, 1988, p. 128; Held, 1991, pp. 202-203; Huntington, 1991, p. 102).

According to Huntington, "successful democratization" in one country forces other countries in a similar situation to encourage democratization because democratization might be a cure for their problems or because the country that has democratized in advance is powerful and/or is viewed as a political and cultural model. Successful democratization in one country serves as an example for groups in other

Demonstration effects are the strongest among countries geographically proximate and culturally similar, and impact of progress did not significantly depend on the existence of economic and social conditions favorable to democracy in the recipient country. As the "snowballing process" continues, that process itself tends to become a substitute for those conditions (Huntington, 1991, pp. 102-105).

Contrary to the natural flow of the demonstration effects, great modern countries have tried to strengthen "friendly political movements" in other countries through various means such as diplomatic, economic, and military instruments. Substantial post-war diffusion of democracy resulted, in large part, from the efforts of the United States to create a world at least amenable to its best interests. Realists and idealists agree the United States would benefit if democracy was worldwide, other democratic governments are more likely to share U.S. foreign policy, strengthen its market economy, easily muster support for its initiatives, and show greater respect for human rights (Samuels and Douglas, 1981, p. 52; Solarz, 1985, p. 139; Manning, 1990, p. 96).

From post-World War II until the early 1970's, the United States did not show any substantial concern about
human rights and democracy in other countries because of the rising cold war competition and the necessity for alliance with even the authoritarian regimes for the confinement of communist forces. However, from 1973, the signal for policy change came from the United States Congress. Congress began hearings on human rights, and passed adamant human rights bills prohibiting aid toward countries that violated human rights. President Carter made human rights a major theme of his foreign policy and 'world agenda' (Huntington, 1991, pp. 91-92).

Although the Reagan administration initially downplayed the human rights problems of authoritarian regimes in Asia and Latin America, it faced increasing pressures from Congress urging more active policies of the administration promoting human rights and democracy in other authoritarian regimes. Since 1973, the U.S. has actively promoted democratic change in both communist and noncommunist dictatorships, symbolized by the creation of National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Particularly, since the year 1986, the direction of the Reagan administration foreign policy changed from an inarticulate quiet policy to a neo-interventionist policy for democratization. Concerning individual countries' desire for democratization, however, the U.S. did not always support other countries' internal politics, even toward democratization. In principle, U.S. urged taciturn and peaceful solutions to political crises...

However, even if support was less than overt, the U.S. government used various means to promote democratization in other countries: (1) various public statements of President and Secretary of State, publications of human rights yearbook by the Department of State, and information inputs through Voice of America (VOA), Radio Liberty, Radio-Free Europe; (2) various economic sanctions, using trade and financial matters as a reward or punishment; (3) diplomatic sanctions; (4) material support for democratic forces; (5) military action, such as the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the invasion of Panama in 1989; and (6) multilateral diplomacy to mobilize opposition by U.N. agencies against notorious human rights violators (Dahl, 1971, pp. 210-211; Huntington, 1991, pp. 91-94).

The European Community (EC) accepted responsibilities for human rights issues, and prospective community membership was incentive for countries to democratize. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) fostered political openings in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by legitimizing the efforts of internal dissidents and foreign governments to liberalize the communist countries. Portugal provided a good example of the important role that the EC and individual European countries played in the struggle with the communists. The West German government
and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) took the initiative in assistance, by donating substantial resources to the Portuguese. In fact, as each party in the West Germany respectively received financial aid from the government for the political foundations, these political institutions have been used as a conduit for assisting in other countries' democratization. The active work of the German political foundations and others buttressed the creation of several centrist parties, fostered competition within the party structure, and kept power from the well-organized totalitarian left (Samuels and Douglas, 1981, p. 64; Arat, 1991, pp. 72-73; Huntington, 1991, pp. 89-91).

The Soviet Union blocked democratic initiatives in Eastern European countries after the Second World War, but it is certain that recent democratic transitions in Eastern European countries have come from the removal of the principal obstacle (e.g., the Brezhnev doctrine\textsuperscript{16}) to democratization (Manning, 1990, p. 347; Huntington, 1991, pp. 86-87).

Leaving the secondary role of international factors,\textsuperscript{17} however, U.S. and other Western countries did not always support democratization in other countries. Their foreign policies were based on their national economic or political interests rather than on some globally applied principles of humanism or democratic ideology. Hence, in spite of lip service to promote democracy in other countries by various
administrations, the United States occasionally supported authoritarian regimes (e.g., the Shah's Iran, the Marcos' Philippines in the 1970's), and helped to overthrow elected governments (e.g., Allende regime in Chile in 1973) (Blasier, 1987, p. 232; Manning, 1990, p. 100; Stephens, 1990, p. 163; Arat, 1991, p. 72).

In short, although there are some negative effects to the democratization in other countries, the international factors may enhance the chances of democratization by raising the perceived costs of maintaining a repressive authoritarian regime, and creating and widening the feasible political spaces to the opposition forces before and during transition, and mobilizing contacts to persuade the need for restraints by the hardliners during transitions. Moreover, the international influence is more pro-democratic when the regional or global trend is toward democracy, and when the powerful external actors make the promotion of democracy a more explicit foreign policy (Diamond, 1989b, p. 42; O'Donnell, 1989, p. 66; Huntington, 1991, p. 86).

F. CRITICISM

The structuralists maintain that this theory does not argue that individual decisions made at particular points in time are merely epiphenomenal or that all observable outcomes can be linked predictably to pre-existing social, economic or political relations (Karl and Schmitter, 1991,
p. 272). However, this theory has been subsequently criticized for being too deterministic to "orient the activities of political actors who could not help believing that the success of democratization might depend on their strategies and those of their opponents rather than being given once and for all by past conditions" (Przeworski, 1991, p. 96).

In addition, this theory was "unappealing" even to those scholar-activists who opposed the genetic theory because it condemned them to "political importance" (Przeworski, 1991, p. 97; Im, 1990, pp. 53-54) and hampered their efforts to account for the uncertainties and reversals possible in any real historical situation (Whitehead, 1986, p. 38; Levine, 1988, p. 384).

Dankwart Rustow contends that the structural determination theorists often jump from the correlation between democracy and other factors to the conclusion that those other factors were responsible for democracy. He argues that they also tend to look for the causes of democracy primarily in economic, social, cultural, and psychological, and seemingly ignore political factors (1970, p. 337).

Although we cannot deny the importance of structural factors in democratization, there are lots of room for political actors to make choices or for "political crafting" that increase or decrease the probability of the persistence
and stability of a regime (Linz, 1986; Vanhanen, 1988, p. 5).

Empirically, the structural conditions commonly considered preconditions for democracy may be better perceived as the outcomes of democracy, rather than as the explanation of democracy’s emergence. Greater economic growth and more equitable income distribution, higher levels of literacy and education, and increases in media exposure are considered products of a stable democratic process rather than as prerequisites of its existence. A "civic political culture" consisting of high levels of mutual trust, willingness to tolerate diversity of opinion, and a propensity for accommodation and compromise. This could be the result of the protracted functioning of democratic institutions that generate appropriate values and beliefs rather than a set of cultural obstacles that initially needs to be overcome (Im, 1990, pp. 53-54; Karl, 1990, p. 5).

The structural determination theory does not adequately explain why countries with comparatively the same socioeconomic structure form vastly different political systems, or why democratic transition does not occur in certain countries despite the changes in objective conditions. Moreover, it still does not satisfy the issue of why the transition transpired at particular times (Chung, 1990, p. 8).
In the past two decades, political scientists generally emphasized the autonomy of political factors, and democracy was conceived as a product of political elites' contingent choices and arrangements (Mainwaring, 1989, p. 29; Karl, 1990, p. 1; Pridham, 1990, p. 12; Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 270).

II. GENETIC THEORY

A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the structural determination theory that emphasizes objective conditions which either facilitate or obstruct the democratic transition, the genetic theory tends to emphasize the strategic choices of political actors embedded in concrete historical situations. The genetic theory more focuses on political variables, such as the political process operating during regime changes, political actors, their interests and strategies, and the transforming power configuration of contending figures (Przeworski, 1986, p. 47; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Chin, 1988, p. 7; Vanhanen, 1988, p. 6; Im, 1989, pp. 8-9).

According to Rustow, the main question of the structural determination theory is how a democracy, assumed already in existence, best preserves or enhances its health and stability. The prime consideration of the genetic theory is how a democracy is inaugurated into a country in the first

Genetic theorists argue that democratization resulted from political processes, not from structural factors, because the outcome of the transition occurring under the same structural conditions may differ depending on the choice of actors. Most democratization studies, even those macro-oriented variety which perceive political change as a derivation of non-political actors, do not completely ignore political variables (Linz, 1987, p. 2; Chin, 1988, p. 22; Manning, 1990, p. 138; Diamond, 1989b, p. 3).

Rustow (1970) argues transitions to democracy do not necessarily require exceptionally favorable circumstances because democracy evolves from a "compromise to terminate or forestall an inconclusive struggle for regime supremacy" and is a "second best" for most concerned persons, involving conscious choice, and calculative leadership (pp. 337-363).

Various political actors with "different followings, preferences, calculations, resources, and time horizons" participate in the successive stages of democratic transition. For example, elite factions and social movements seem to play the key roles in orchestrating the demise of authoritarian rule; political parties are vital during the transition; and business associations, trade unions, and state agencies become the major actors
determining the type of democracy that is eventually consolidated (Karl, 1990, p. 6).

Generally speaking, democratic transition results from the cooperation between power holders and their challengers. The crucial participants in the process are hardliners and softliners in the governing coalition, and maximalists (revolutionary extremists) and minimalists (democratic moderates) in the opposition. The hardliner - softliner schism surfaces when political reform generates "undesirable" results, while the maximalist - moderate division comes into existence upon the first recession or boom of the opposition movement (Karl, 1990, p. 6; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 7; Huntington, 1991, p. 121). Huntington illustrates:

The three crucial interactions in democratization process were those between government and opposition, between reformers and standpatters in the governing coalition, and between moderates and extremists in the opposition (1991, p. 123).

Different combinations of these groups lead to four alternative results (see figure 2-1 below). According to Cheng and Kim, the shift from confrontation to bargaining is the key to democratic breakthrough. The risks of confrontation and loss propel government and opposition to negotiations. Mutual reduction of risk prompts reformers and moderates to cooperate in establishing democracy (Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 8; Huntington, 1991, p. 161). However,
all political calculations and interactions rely on historical contingency and possess potential for high uncertainty (Karl, 1990, p. 6).

Figure 2-1. Combination of the four groups and their results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>government forces</th>
<th>opposition forces</th>
<th>results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>o. softliners</td>
<td>maximalists</td>
<td>return of hardliners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. hardliners</td>
<td>moderates</td>
<td>suppression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. hardliners</td>
<td>maximalists</td>
<td>confrontation and brinkmanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. softliners</td>
<td>moderates</td>
<td>bargaining</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the genetic theory encompasses many strong points in understanding the dramatic dynamics of democratic transition at a certain time, this theory cannot explain the historical and structural changes constraining political options available to the political actors. In other words, this theory is in danger of descending into "excessive voluntarism" if it is not explicitly placed within a framework of structural-historical constraints. In addition, it is too individualistic, and fails to appreciate the collective and interactive dimensions of political change, involving a wide circle of political elites.

B. DEMOCRATIZATION FROM BELOW

Generally speaking, according to the leading groups of democratization, the genetic theory is subdivided into the "democratization from below" and the "democratization from above" (Stephens, 1990, pp. 168-169; Sakamoto, 1991, pp. 120-121).

The democratization from below model or society-led democratization model argues that democratization results from the concerted struggle of the major political actors or "challengers" (Tilly, 1978; Stepan, 1986, p. 65; Robinson, 1988, p. 58; Lee, 1990; Manglapus, 1990, p. xiv).

It is argued that the retreat of authoritarianism, and the resultant democratization can only partly be explained by challenges from an increasingly powerful and well-organized civil society, which involves "a crucial component of mobilization and large numbers of individuals" because authoritarian regimes "seldom relinquish their monopoly on power voluntarily and usually make concessions for the sake of political expediency rather than democratic values."

Therefore, the initial impetus for liberalization may come from the top, but it is often the strength and tenacity of the opposition forces that accelerate the transition
process. Without persistent pressure from the opposition forces, the transition dissipates or is delayed to the points of distortion (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 11; Robinson, 1988, p. 58; Cheng, 1989, p. 474; Chung, 1990, p. 39).

The agendas and power of challengers against the authoritarian state in some cases have determined the course of the regime change. Civil society must be strong enough to generate pressures for such an opening, be prepared to take advantage of the limited political space granted by authoritarian regimes, and push for its enlargement (Robinson, 1988, p. 58; Mainwaring, 1989, p. 5). Therefore, it is necessary to analyze not only the interactions between the state and its challengers in the civil society but also the mobilization process of challengers against authoritarian regimes in the historical-structural context (Lee, 1990, p. 10).

Why do people come together to challenge the existing regime? How do we theoretically explain it?

The full-scale theoretical concerns and studies of the protest movements commenced in the 1960's because of the emergence of urban riots in the United States (Haas, 1992, p. 134). The theories on urban riots cause us to enlarge our understanding of the protest movement for democratization. Theories on mass protest movement can be
subdivided into the collective behavior approach and the resource mobilization theory (Cho, 1986, p. 6).

In spite of differing emphasis and increasingly sophisticated conceptualization, the theorists in the collective behavior tradition tend to emphasize the importance of spontaneous reactions to immediate deprivations. They argue that origins of political protest movements are closely connected with social and psychological process associated with "fashions, panics, riots, and other crowd behavior" (Rochon, 1990, p. 301).

The collective behavior approach can be recategorized into three in the following ways; (1) the psychological theories; (2) the sociological theories; and (3) the deprivation theories.

The psychological theories are chiefly concerned with the personality traits of protest movement participants. One of these is Le Bon's social disorganization theory. Le Bon (1960) contends crowds participate in protest movement by unaccountable impulses little affected by critical judgment, that is, mob behavior and abnormal behavior through the spread of crowd mentality. In the crowd situation, people are more likely to follow whimsical suggestions or agitations by determined activists. Park argues that collective behavior results from the failure of social control (Do, 1989, pp. 17-19; Haas, 1992, p. 138).
Similar remarks about mass movements are well expressed in the mass society theory; a structural version of the irrationalist theory of political conflict. One of the main arguments in this theory is that participants in violent social movements are recruited disproportionately from the ranks of the socially dislocated, who are easy prey for manipulation by the elites (Do, 1989, pp. 18-19). According to Kornhauser (1959), people who participate in mass political behavior as activities for extreme goals lack ties to large social institutions, and are vulnerable to the agitation by such movements (Do, 1989, p. 19). Smelser (1963) contends that people under abnormal amounts of stress mobilize to reconstitute social order under the guise of same generalized belief (Eckstein, 1989, p. 6; Haas, 1992, p. 143).

The psychological theories do not explain the actual development of movements, but instead neglect the situational conditions under which participants may rationally be seeking to restructure. Theories portray collective behavior as an irrational response to a fluctuation. This supposition has triggered criticisms of contemporary protest movement theorists (Cohen, 1985, p. 672; Cho, 1986, p. 9; Do, 1989, p. 20).

Sociological theorists interpret the emergence of protest movements as closely tied to variations in the social structure. Among the sociological theorists the
relative deprivation theory focuses on psychic states of discontent, indignation, or frustration as the main causes of protest movements (Do, 1989, p. 21). Karl Marx conceived the social protests in terms of the class struggle between the haves and the have-nots. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy (1966) interpreted the American riots of the 1960's as the result of the "super exploitation" by the capitalists facing the "falling rate of profit," which was expressed in a form of racism. However, attitudional data shows that reformist ideology prevailed among the rioters, many of whom were more middle class in occupation and in group memberships. These approaches neglect the motivating factors behind the individuals (Cho, 1986, p. 12; Haas, 1992, p. 146).

According to Gurr (1970), discontent and frustration, resulting from relative deprivation, are the major causes of protest movements. Relative deprivation is the gap between what people think they are entitled to and what they are actually receiving (Cho, 1986, p. 14; Do, 1989, p. 23; Haas, 1992, pp. 146-150). John Burton (1979) argues that protest movements result from those who could not satisfy the 'basic human needs' (Haas, 1992, p. 151).

Although it is assumed that the deprivation level of the collective is the average level of individual deprivation, collective behavior simply cannot be deduced from individual assumptions. Consequently, resource mobilization
theory is proposed as an alternative to the psychological approaches and sociological approaches (Cho, 1986, p. 16).

Some aspects of the political movement of the 1960’s and later have not connected with the claims of the collective behavior approach. According to Rochon,

Their extensive organization, growing tactical sophistication, reliance on privileged portions of the population, and use of mainstream channels of communication and fund-raising all argued against the views of movement as spontaneous uprisings against desperate circumstances (1990, p. 301).

Unlike the collective behavior approach, these phenomena can be resolved by the resource mobilization theory. This theory emphasizes individual and institutional resources associated with political opportunities to generate mass movements. Issues of recruitment, internal organization, and the links between movement organizations are the main issues of this theory (Cohen, 1985, pp. 673-674; Cho, 1986, p. 7; Rochon, 1990, p. 302).

Tilly, one of the representative resource mobilization theorists, developed Bently’s "rational choice model" into the resource mobilization theory. He analyzed the relationship between long-term political transformation and collective action by examining a well-known French counterrevolution history (1978; Roy, 1984, p. 485). Tilly defines mobilization as the process of accumulating and controlling resources by an "active participant" in public
life. He argues that collective action is the rational, goal-oriented pursuit of a group's interest. In order to mobilize collective action, "sophisticated organizational forms and modes of communication", such as the construction of group identity, the recognition of shared interests, the creation of solidarity within and between groups (networks) are pursued. In other words, he stresses such "objective variables" as organizations, interests, resources, opportunities, and strategies to explain large-scale mobilization (Tilly, 1978; Roy, 1984, p. 486; Tilly, 1985, p. 729; Cohen, 1985, p. 674; Haas, 1992, p. 152-153).

Political protest may be grounded in the desire of politically excluded groups to be incorporated into the body politic. Conflict is most likely to occur when the balance of economic, military, and organizational resources among groups shifts. The occurrence of collective action is determined by the existence of sufficient opportunity, such as the position and reaction of governments, crisis situations, national and international contexts, etc. Opportunity is the power to repress and make political action costly or to tolerate the activities of groups in conflict (Tilly, 1978; Eckstein, 1989, p. 27; Do, 1989, p. 27).

Tilly's theory remains a matter for lively discussion among scholars, even if this study provides valuable
information about the strategies and potential outcomes of political conflict and social movements.

First, the resource mobilization theory does not make the clear distinction between protest movements and established political channels such as parties and interest groups, because they conceive the movements as an extension of conventional political activity (Rochon, 1990, p. 303).

Second, this theory cannot provide any clear answers to solve free rider problems because many people enjoy benefits at other people's expense of other people (Cohen, 1985, p. 677).

Third, this theory does not allocate enough consideration to the psychological aspects and international factors of political conflict in developing countries.

Fourth, it is largely based on a logical model, characterized by excessive rationality and ignoring nonrational elements limits its applicability to various types of developing countries (Do, 1989, pp. 31-32).

Lastly, this theory neglects state's action and socioeconomic changes, which can severely affecting the process of political conflict between powerholders and challengers (Lee, 1990, p. 11).

Consideration of the actual relationship between democratization and protest movements, based on the theoretical explanations of mass protest movements is crucial to facilitating understanding.
In order to achieve a stable democratic development, a society must obtain voluntary, independent intermediary groups in civil society. These groups constitute an "alternative channel" for articulating interests and presenting demands to the government. They serve as "training grounds" in a democracy, stimulating participation in the larger political system and enhancing "citizen commitment to democracy." They also check the "releentless tendency of the state to centralize" (Levine, 1988, p. 388; Diamond, 1990, p. 234).

The cycle of increasing autonomous intermediary organizations and their mobilizations for democracy differ according to transition stages. In the early phases, the opposition forces are comparatively quiescent because of the massive costs of opposing authoritarian rule. Prior to liberalization, the struggles of the opposition forces against the authoritarian regimes exist in the social realms rather than in the proscribed or weakened parties. The initial resistance to authoritarian regime comes from the progressive sectors of the middle classes, such as from bishops and priests, professors, journalists, lawyers, writers, and relatives of political prisoners. Initially, they begin to challenge the government about human rights problems and, later, about democratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Cardoso, 1986-7, pp. 31-32; Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989, p. 496).
The "exemplary" resistances by a few well-known individuals make the authoritarian regime increasingly more vulnerable because these struggles combine with greater social demands. Over time, liberalization enables the opposition forces to mobilize, and a "resurrection of civil society" takes place. With a climate of reduced fear of repression and narrowly guaranteed civil society, "new practices" are indeed forged and "new ideas" have emerged in this path toward democratization. This phase is dominated by the growth of social movements which encompass a broad array of social classes and occupational, professional, civic, and human rights associations. Massive strikes and street demonstrations for voicing the long-repressed political and economic demands take place (Petras, 1986, p. 4; O'Donnell, 1989, pp. 66-67).

Why do they revive? Why does the resurrection of civil society occur at this phase? Generally speaking, people publicly challenge the status quo only because they have limited alternative means to voice their views. In the effort for reform, they consider present conditions unjustifiable and intolerable (Eckstein, 1989, p. xii).

More specifically, the resurrection of civil society in an authoritarian regime occurs because of the following reasons:

First, the incapacity of authoritarian regime to handle the growing economic crises, such as mounting debt,
inflation, balance of payments, and widening economic inequality, becomes a major factor in rousing social movements. Economic disappointment seriously undermines the credibility of an authoritarian regime’s power base.

The economic grievances of groups excluded from the political system (e.g., labors, peasants, the urban poor) tend to be quickly politicized. Ordinary citizens typically first attempt easier, more acceptable remedies (e.g., community self-help, petitions to the government) before turning to more confrontational, higher-risk actions (e.g., protests, strikes, or support for armed resistance (Epstein, 1984, pp. 45-46; Petras, 1986, p. 4; Robinson, 1988, p. 58; Booth, 1991, pp. 48-49).

Second, in contrast to their initial support of the authoritarian regime because of suppression of wage demands by the urban proletariat and insurrection by the rural proletariat, the domestic bourgeoisie and middle class conclude that most dictators have devoted an increasing share of the state budget to military expenditures and enriched themselves by monopolizing private economic power, often at the expense of the domestic bourgeoisie and middle class. The middle class, striving to protect their economic platform, seek to demilitarize the budget and the economy as a way of reducing the high protection costs and of redistributing more desirable economic opportunities to themselves (Schaeffer, 1991, p. 7).
Third, the nationalistic and/or religious discourses that legitimate the resistance to the authoritarian regime and facilitate the formation of opposition coalitions for democracy are formulated. In particular, the somewhat "mythical hope that once democracy is implanted, practically all of the nation's problems will be solved at once" permeates society's thinking due to surging frustrations with the unfavorable political, sociological, economic conditions. This myth further motivates what soon becomes an intense and widespread oppositional mobilization of society (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989, p. 496).

Fourth, from the beginning, the authoritarian regime faces a crisis of political legitimacy. Hence that regime easily becomes the target of opposition and a "common enemy" for groups and classes that may be nursing very different economic and political grievances. Political legitimacy of authoritarian rulers will be severely undermined by the blatantly orchestrated and fraudulent elections in order to justify their continuing power (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989, p. 496).

Another factor turning fragmented grievances into a national revolt involves the regime's response to organization and protest. Popular mobilization and protest movements subside when a regime quickly responds to demands with "ameliorative policies," such as new economic policies aimed at reducing the inequalities of wealth and permitting
the recovery of real wages, the announcement of democratic
development programs, and low or modest levels of force or
repression. However, if the regime does not enact such
compromising policies, repression is commonly escalated by
public security forces, causing an increase in protests and
opposition and eventually leading to a national revolts.
Revolutions seldom transpire in a country where the
government is responsive to the metamorphosing needs of its
people.

Although it is easier for an authoritarian regime to
resort to violence to maintain control over its citizens,
most governments who respond viciously further alienate the
populace, thus defeating the primary objective (Goodwin and
Skocpol, 1989, p. 496). With the addition of conservative
upper and middle classes, the emergence of strong social
movements encompassing the trade unions, slum neighborhoods,
students, and self-employed business leaders will force
the authoritarian regime to choose reform by partial
concessions or face the danger of total loss to reactionary
policies. Negotiations are seen as a substitute for the
street parliaments (Petras, 1986, p. 4). Otherwise, they
could be removed by the revolutionary forces.

The most important elements in the struggles and
negotiations for successful democratization are effective
organization and effective leadership. Impassioned
organization arouses "broad and sustained popular
mobilization" and wise rebellious leadership should discern the appropriate time for struggles and for negotiations. The ultimate success of democratic transition depends on "political entrepreneurship" or on "shrewd political maneuvering" (or political crafting) (Cheng, 1989a, p. 474; Diamond, 1990, p. 238).

C. DEMOCRATIZATION FROM ABOVE

The democratization from above model argues that the powerholders of authoritarian regime initiate the transition to democracy from above. A split between the hardliners and the softliners within the ruling coalition of the authoritarian regime leads to the democratic transition. In particular, the division of the military establishment is crucial to beginning the liberalization process, and in some cases the erosion of governmental and military structures within the regime is far more influential than the civilian pressures for redemocratization (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Roxborough, 1988a, p. 354; Yang, 1989, p. 66; Stephens, 1989, p. 293; Rial, 1991, p. 287).

Why would leaders of an authoritarian regime voluntarily take democratization measures?

First, Legitimacy is the basic factor for the survival of a political regime. However, from the beginning, an authoritarian regime faces a legitimacy crisis, which, if not solved, eventually erodes and discredits the foundation
of the authoritarian regime. In order to appease the opposition or strengthen support for themselves, authoritarian regimes often initiate limited liberalization measures. This narrowed democratic opening is often the catalyst which leads to a division between hardliners and softliners on whether or not further liberalization measures should be encouraged. Frequently, they stake their political futures on criticism. There is also a dissenting view on the degree of the state’s control over the economy and involvement in multinational corporations. "The competing developmental models clash with the need for unity" within the authoritarian regime (Robinson, 1982, pp. 18-31; Rustow, 1990, p. 81).

Some groups (softliners) in the authoritarian regimes believe that democratic procedures and institutions are more effective and efficient under existing conditions, and look forward to strengthening their interests with the introduction of democratic institutions. They view democracy as a "means of prolonging their own rule, achieving international legitimacy, minimizing domestic opposition, and reducing the likelihood of civil violence" (Huntington, 1984, pp. 212-214; Sundhaussen, 1984, pp. 548-549).

Second, regardless of the success or failure of authoritarian regimes, authoritarian rule is supposed to disintegrate. Two boundary limitations inhibit the ability
of authoritarian rulers to substantially legitimize their system, "the upper limit" and "the lower limit." Supposing the regime fails to achieve a minimum level of performance or effectiveness, then the legitimacy crisis is exacerbated. If economic performance is unsuccessful (usually dictators fail to deal effectively with the country's economic problems), and/or if the regime ends in a fiasco in war or in diplomacy (e.g., the defeat of Argentina in the Falkland Islands War, the defeat of Greece in the Cyprus War), there is no justification for the continuance of authoritarian rule (Finer, 1985, pp. 25-26; Park, 1989, p. 8).

If authoritarian regimes do successfully achieve their goals with good performance, authoritarian rulers may not effectively justify the persistence of the system for the pursuit of ambitions already fulfilled. People want a democratic political system commensurate with socioeconomic developments. Greater integration into international markets and the rupture of the ruling coalitions resulting from the growing social and political power of the capitalist class make authoritarian rule irrelevant and counterproductive. Successful socioeconomic developments initiated by authoritarian rulers gradually undermine the foundations of their regimes. They become the victims of their own success (Robinson, 1988, pp. 56-57; Park 1989, p. 9). Hence, they must look for alternative political
systems. Of all political structures, democracy is the most forceful for their society.

Third, pressure toward democratization comes from the military itself. Military leaders realize the political arena is a complex and intricate web of subterfuge. They fear that the worsening political, social, and economic problems of the country may spur social upheaval and revolution, threatening to divide the military structure (Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 226). The military establishment may face divisions of its own: division between the governing groups in the government and non-governing groups in the military, and the division between the security forces and the career soldier's. The non-governing groups in the military may criticize the governing groups in the government for biased policy orientation and resulting failures. They may attempt to win political leadership in the game of leadership succession or through counter-coups. The security forces, created to exercise coercive force over other military personnel and even citizens, may attempt to escape from government leadership control. Arbitrary violence by security forces provoke strong internal repulsion from the opposition forces and incur international criticism of human rights issues (Robinson, 1982, p. 22; Yang, 1989, p. 50).

As a result, continuous involvement by the military in politics leads to "alienation of an organization from the
population, embarrassment, loss of prestige, further politicization, neglect of preparedness, factionalization, and erosion of the army's social standing", which can curtail the ability of the military's primary mission (e.g., defense of the nation against foreign countries) and can undermine its effectiveness as an influential ruling force. The military may choose to protect its long-term corporate interests rather than sacrifice its strength for a partisan regime (Gillespie, 1987, pp. 167-168; Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 226).

The military concludes that to preserve internal order and discipline, and avoid the "opprobrium" which follows accepting responsibility for complex and unsuccessful policies, and to maintain the cohesiveness and professionalism of the military, it becomes necessary for the military to withdraw from political arena (Robinson, 1982, p. 19; Sundhaussen, 1984, p. 549).

How do military dictatorships voluntarily retreat from politics back into foxholes? Except for democratization by the conquerors, the democratic transition in the Third World proceeds according to four stages: (1) decline of fear; (2) amplification of crisis and struggle; (3) conciliatory democratic measures and negotiation; and (4) election and advent of a civilized government (Kaufman, 1986, pp. 92-100).
Authoritarian regimes endeavor to utilize fear as a means of maintaining rule and winning support from the people in the earliest stages of their governance. However, the passage of time weakens the intensity of fear. Under these circumstances, two factors for liberalization emerge: the political and institutional open-door policy by the government, and the resurrection of the civil society and the formation of a democratization alliance by the opposition forces.

Although the concession from above and the democratization pressure from below contribute to securing civil and political rights, sometimes excessive demands from below lead to imposition of stringent measures from the government against the anti-government forces. Regardless of the direction of government policies, the government is reduced to an awkward position. The autonomy policy taken by the authoritarian regime causes the opposition forces to broaden their sphere of activities. They openly criticize the government and demand more progressive policies. In accordance with the diffusion of anti-government movement, the political crisis of the authoritarian regime grows. The ruling elites stand at the crossroads of choice on whether or not to accept the demands of the opposition forces. Usually they advocate tough measures, softened by trends of appeasement in cycles to avoid emerging crises.
In these instances, the attitudes of the middle class play a decisive role in determining the direction of democratization. As time goes on, they vary their stance from supporting to criticizing the government. The Brazilian case after 1974 and the South Korean situation after 1985 are good examples. The brave actions of the middle class facilitated the popular participation in the democratization movement, which becomes an unavoidable trend. The moderate factions in the ruling groups conclude that the authoritarian regime is "expendable and dispensable" (Im, 1989, p. 11; Lee, 1990, p. 3) and negotiate "exit guarantees" for military withdrawal from power. The government, particularly the military, seeks to protect the physical well-being of the regime leaders, as well as their criminal acts, and corporatist interests, such as privileges, budgets, and the size of the armed forces (Sundhaussen, 1984, p. 550; Petras, 1986, p. 7; Weiner, 1987, p. 865). The government assumes that it is possible to legally take the political power again through the election or to withdraw securely away from political revenge of the opposition forces. Since elections are the means to isolate the influence of the radical forces demanding the fundamental change of society, this calculated move is taken.

Maximalists of the opposition forces also postulate in this stage that the continued struggles stir the duros
(hardliners) of the ruling elites to reserve appeasement policy. Then they decide to participate in the election process under the guise of smoothly facilitating democratic transition of the authoritarian regimes. Depending on the validity, honestly, and results of the election, a civilized government may be legally voted into office.

During the negotiations, the military in the ruling forces and the moderates in the opposition forces agree to exclude from the institutional political arena the radicalists within the opposition forces, such as the Marxists, and radical democratic socialists. They foresee that the main concern of the military is naturally inclined to limit radical changes of the society, especially in the political realm. This contradicts with the deeper socioeconomic transformation that the radicals in the opposition forces seek. The moderates on the civilian side also conceive the execution of the election as a realistic alternative or rational compromise that is necessary to replace the military and occupy the highest office. Petras amplifies this situation in the following ways:

The moderates rationalize the advantages secured at the expense of radicals into two ways: the radicals are "self-destructive", bringing upon themselves the problems they encounter; and the growth of moderate strength reflects the populace's distancing itself from the "two extremes" (the military right and the intransigent left) (1986, p. 9).
What is important is that the softliners secure hegemony over the hardliners. From the softliner perspective, to achieve domination, the pressure of opposition forces must exist, but should not be powerful enough to seriously threaten the established regime (Im, 1989, pp. 11-12).

The most alarming problem with this perspective is that it does not solve the perennial question of why, without resolute pressures from below, incumbent authoritarian elites open the regime to outside influences. The second remaining question is how negotiations among the unequal relationship between an authoritarian government and opposition forces culminates in a democratic transition rather than an authoritarian coup. In general, authoritarian powerholders are more likely to acquiesce to democratic transition under strong pressure from the opposition forces (Im, 1989, p. 13) rather than under the spontaneous efforts of the authoritarian leaders to democratizing their repressive political system.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK

Each of these approaches, as previously examined, make a significant contribution to the general understanding of democratic transition from authoritarian regimes. However, each approach contain certain defects. Among the theories on the conditions of democratization, how is the threshold
of affluence which caused the democratization measured? Economic prosperity may be the functional requisite for the maintenance of democracy, but it does not usher democracy into existence (Im, 1989, p. 15). The wealth theory of democracy cannot explain the common situation where deepening industrialization leads to an emergence of strong bureaucratic authoritarianism, as in the cases of Brazil and Argentina. The culture theory disregards the possibility of democratization through the introduction of democratic institutions. In the same context, the social structure provides us with only the social conditions making democratization possible. It is widely accepted that international factors play a secondary role in democratization. Therefore, various structure determination theories can explain only one side of democratization. Structural factors are necessary conditions for democracy, but are in themselves insufficient to initiate democratization.

According to Giner,

The political economy and the structure of a society may remain the best starting points in any macro sociological analysis but if taken alone they failed to explain the success or failure of a political order (1986, p. 29).

Therefore, it is necessary for us to be attentive to the roles of the political actors in a democratization process who raise questions, challenge the authoritarian
regimes and decide the political directions of their countries? According to genetic theory, democratization is the result of the interplay between the innovative efforts of the rulers to maintain their power under new circumstances and the resistance of civic society to the authoritarian regime (Diniz, 1986, p. 65). It is argued that even structural conditions are themselves the consequence of earlier policies and choices of political leaders.

However, structural factors determine the range of options available to decision-makers and may even predispose them to choose a specific option (Diamond, 1989a, p. 16; Karl, 1990, p. 7). In the same context, without the maturity of certain objective conditions that facilitate democratization, constituting the main argument of the structural determination theory, it is probably difficult to establish and consolidate democratization. Even if it does eventuate, the resulting democracies will be of a very fragile condition, easily dismantled by a military coup d'état or by popular uprising.

Hence, in order to fully explain democratic transition, it is necessary to consider both the objective factors of democratization and the role of the political actors. Leadership factors interact with structural conditions in extraordinarily complex ways. Under the given structure of choice, political actors try to maximize their interests.
In the same context, the democratic transition of Korea can be understood as the outcome of strategic choices made by major political actors among alternatives that satisfied structural constraints (Karl, 1986, p. 196; Im, 1987, p. 231; Im, 1990, p. 57).

It is significant to recognize that the theories on democratic transitions are mainly derived from the Latin American and Southern European experiences, and as such the Korean case varies somewhat. Even though Korea is a unique situation, the learned theories provide a very useful framework, and are important implications for our study.

Considering limitations of accepted theories, it is practicably to suggest an alternative theoretical framework, one that consistently explains and is cognizant of the concrete machinations of the democratization of Korea. An eclectic synthesis of the structural determination theory and genetic theory is needed.

Figure 2-2. The flow of democratization

Input ———> Conversion Process ———> Output
democracy

| structural demand ———> strategic choice of political actors between ruling forces and opposition forces ———> democratization |
| conditions support ———> feedback |
Figure 2-2 explains conceptual framework of this study that synthesizes the structural conditions and strategic choices of political actors.

The maturity of structural conditions that facilitates democratization leads to the resurrection of civil society, where opposition forces demand democracy against the authoritarian regime.

The inconclusive tug-of-war between the ruling groups preserving the authoritarian regime and the opposition forces demanding democratization will take place during the conversion process. Under the limited options available to the opposition forces, political actors attempt to maximize their interests. Finally, in order to avoid the catastrophe (e.g., military coup d'état, popular revolution), the softliners in the ruling forces and the moderates in the opposition forces try to make concessions, a derived democratization is final product. This modifies and fuels the fluctuating structural conditions.

This alternative framework is based on the following assumptions: the democratization of Korea comes from dynamic and active interactions among the Korean’s strong demands for democratization, the democratization movement of opposition forces, and the democratization measures of the authoritarian regimes in the structural and situational context.
Public opinions demanding democratization are derived from the maturity of certain objective conditions, such as the rapid socioeconomic development, the change of political culture from a parochial culture (or a submissive culture) to a civic culture (or a participatory one). Also significant are the favorable internal and external political situations (e.g., international tendencies of democratization since the 1970's, the Seoul Olympics, and the weakness of legitimacy), which are the main arguments of the wealth theory of democracy, the political culture theory, and the social structure theory, and the international factors theory of democracy. In this section, public opinions favoring democratization and their diffusion process into civil society since 1985 are discussed.

These strong popular demands for democratization animate the democratization movement of the opposition forces in civil society (e.g., student movements, labor movements, farmers movement) and political society (e.g., New Korea Democratic Party). In this section, perceptions of leading groups in the democratic transition, their strategies and tactics, and struggle methods (e.g., violent or nonviolent methods) are analyzed, closely aligned to the main arguments of the genetic theory. The animated and strenuous democratization movement of the opposition forces based on the strong popular demands for democratization of the people finally forced the Fifth Republic of Korea accept
democratic measures as a last resort. This section also studies the interactions between the active groups in the opposition forces and the ruling groups, and the counterstrategies and the actual actions of the ruling forces in accordance with the changed situations.

Figure 2-3. Conceptual framework of democratization in Korea

Each segment influences others. The democratization of Korea under the Fifth Republic was caused, not by one singular factor, but a combination of timing, atmosphere
and economical political considerations. Figure 2-3 above depicts this writer's conceptual diagram visualizing the relationships among each elements in the labors toward democratization.
Notes

1. Modernization can be defined as a multifaceted process in which a society transforms itself from a "traditional" to a "more diversified, secularized, and industrialized society." In the economic sphere, it occurs in the process of industrialization of society. At the social level, it goes with the process of social mobilization. In the political realm, it refers to political modernization or political development. These three aspects of modernization do not necessarily agree, and the relationship between socioeconomic modernization and political development has long been a focus of debate among students of modernization (Kim, 1985, p. 55).

2. Economic development increases political inclusion strengthening civil society by increasing the size and interaction among politically aware individuals and groups (e.g., middle class, working class). However, the actual strength of the pressures for political inclusion and their political outcomes depend heavily on the agents shaping the political articulation of civil society, such as class structure and patterns of political institutionalization established before and during the expansion of the export economy (Stephens, 1989, p. 288).

3. It is usually assumed among political scientists that extreme inequalities help to produce hegemonic regimes and that non-hegemonic systems of a more egalitarian sort must contain a preponderant middle class, that is, more or less equal and hence avoiding extreme inequalities in status, income, and wealth (Dahl, 1971, p. 81).

4. One of the representative cases is the Tiananmen Square Incident in June 1989 in the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government ruthlessly put down the student democratization movement through bloody military crackdown and cruel persecution.

5. According to Huntington, in 1989 all rich income countries (per capita GNP $ 6,010-21,330) with the exception of three oil exporting countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Arab Emirates) and Singapore were democratic countries. In addition, only India and Sri Lanka among 42 poor countries were democratic countries. Moreover, twenty-three countries among fifty-three middle income countries were democratic countries and twenty-five countries were undemocratic countries while five countries had experienced democratic transition (1991, p. 60).
6. Seligson argues that the lower threshold appears to be around $250 per capita (in 1957 dollars) while Dahl maintains that it is perhaps in the range of about $700 - 800 GNP per capita (in 1957 dollars). In addition, Huntington concludes that the Western European countries became democratic when their gross domestic products were in the $300 - $500 range (in 1960 dollars). According to Huntington's calculation, the income range of these upper middle income countries is about $1,810 to $7,410 (in 1986 dollars).

7. Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, South Korea, and Singapore were perfect examples of economic success without democracy. However, these countries have already experienced or are experiencing democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes. Hence, it is difficult to find the examples against the wealth theory of democracy.

8. Here, political culture is defined as the pattern of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings toward politics current in a nation at given time (Moody, 1988, p. 2; Manning, 1990, p. 109).

9. Karl argues that the so-called 'anti-democratic bias' of Catholicism became increasingly implausible because the Catholic church took an increasingly active role in opposing authoritarian rule, especially in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Panama (1990, p. 4).

10. It is widely known that the most typical characteristic of Confucian culture is an hierarchical social order.

11. According to Manning (1990), there is no truly apt Spanish word for either 'compromise' or 'dissent.'

12. Models of the diffusion process originally came from the study of purely external foreign policy phenomena such as the spread of war. In the same context, the global, regional, and neighborhood changes toward transition to democracy made a decisive contribution to the democratic development of the remaining undemocratic regimes. This is called 'democratic dominoes' (Starr, 1991, p. 358).

13. The rapid development of contemporary science, particularly electronics, leads to communication revolutions, such as shortwave radio, satellite television, computers, and facsimile machines.

14. Spanish democratization was immensely relevant to democratization in Latin America and people's revolution in the Philippines (February 1986) heavily influenced the
democratization movements in Korea. In addition, the democratization in Eastern European countries dramatically symbolized the geographically proximate proposition, demonstration effects and snowballing effects. Although Polish democratization (August, 1989) took ten years before the success of the free labor movement and Catholic church actively initiated the democratization movement. The democratization in Hungary (September, 1989) took ten months, East Germany (October, 1989) ten weeks, Czechoslovakia ten days (November, 1989), and Romania ten hours (December, 1989) (Huntington, 1991, pp. 104-105).

15. The fifteen-session hearings conducted by Representative Donald Fraser's Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements in 1973 are good examples.

16. Facing popular demands for democratization in the Eastern European countries in 1960's, Brezhnev, General Secretary of Soviet Union at that time, declared that the Soviet Union would intervene in the internal affairs of other communist countries in order to defend communist countries.

17. Some scholars argue that any government cannot establish democracy in a foreign country. By definition, that can be achieved only by a nation's own citizenry. Even democratic success in Germany and Japan resulted from a receptive leadership and people (Blasier, 1987, p. 231).

18. According to this theory, contenders participate in the collective action after calculating the costs and benefits of it.

19. Hardliners are the risk-insensitive who want to repress the opposition movements at any price while soft-liners are the risk-averse who compare the costs of repression against the opposition movements and its benefits.
CHAPTER III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF KOREAN POLITICS

I. THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME UNDER THE FIRST REPUBLIC

After thirty-five years of the Japanese colonial rule in 1945, and subsequently three years of U.S. military government, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was born with a democratic constitution. Unlike initial expectations, Syngman Rhee, the first President of Korea, undermined democratic principles and processes in order to perpetuate his own rule. From the beginning, his power sources were composed of conservative elements, such as landowners, ex-colonial bureaucrats and policemen, the ideological and material support of the U.S. government, and Rhee's personal charisma (Kim, 1985, p. 89; Sohn, 1989, p. 15).

Furthermore, his autocratic and arbitrary rules made even his initial supporters break away from his initial ruling coalitions. As he failed to generate sufficient support in the February National Assembly election in 1950, he was doomed to lose the presidential election of 1952, in which he was indirectly elected by members of the National Assembly (Yen, 1990, pp. 137). In order to strengthen his power bases and secure his continued rule, Rhee organized the Liberal Party (LP), revised the
constitution, ruthlessly repressed the political opposition forces, and actively involved himself in political manipulations.

During the Korean war, President Rhee compelled the National Assembly amend the so-called "Excerpt Constitutional Amendment"\(^2\) to change the parliamentary system into the presidential system. President Rhee followed by amending even the constitution to remain in power for life by abolishing the provision limiting the office of the president to two terms. He persistently tried to neutralize the opposition forces using various illegal measures. Rhee easily manipulated public opinion by emphasizing the need for anti-communism and national security (Ahn, 1983, p. 48; Park, 1983, p. 95; Chung, 1989, p. 116).

However, the Rhee regime faced strong challenges from the opposition parties, press, and students. The increasingly authoritarian character of Rhee regime contributed to the growth of public support for the Democratic National Party (DNP) and its successor, the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party was formed to build an anti-Rhee alliance and partially succeeded in getting the vice-presidency in 1956, though not the presidency. Although occasionally opposition politicians indulged in factional struggle among themselves, they united against the dictatorial Syng-man Rhee regime (Park, 1988, p. 5).
Intellectuals and students worked to challenge the autocracy. As Rhee’s regime became increasingly despotic and corrupt, their criticisms grew increasingly acrimonious. In fact, the traditional role of intellectuals and students was conceived as the "final savior of the country from moral and political decadence," built partially from Confucian ethics prevalent throughout Korea (Henderson, 1968).

The opposition forces increased their popularity through demonstrated actions against the Rhee regime. They soon became powerful enough to become a hazard to Syngman Rhee. Facing these strong challenges of the opposition forces, the Syngman Rhee regime blatantly rigged the large-scale election in March 1960. This provoked massive student uprisings denouncing the fraudulent election, and eventually demanding Rhee’s resignation. The American Embassy in Korea issued a statement supporting the "justifiable grievances" of the students. The military refused to suppress the demonstrators. Syng-man Rhee had no choice but to resign on April 26, 1960. The success of popular extra-parliamentary resistance in toppling an authoritarian regime served as an inspiration for later opposition movements, but was also a warning sign for the subsequent governments (Ahn, 1983, pp. 48-49; Han, 1989a, p. 270; Moody, 1988, p. 115; Sohn, 1989, p. 18; Chang, 1990, pp. 101-103).

The collapse of the First Republic resulted from the loss of legitimacy due to autocratic rulership and the
election riggings. It also collapsed from the relentless struggles of students who successfully took advantage of the ruling party's faults.

II. THE FAILED DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT UNDER THE SECOND REPUBLIC

After the resignation of President Rhee, an interim government of Ho Chong immediately formed to manage the transitional period until emergence of a new legitimate government.

The parliamentary form of government was adopted, reflecting the negative impressions toward the presidential form of government under the First Republic. The Democratic Party was predominantly supported in the subsequent parliamentary elections and the Chang Myon government was inaugurated.

However, the new government was swept away by revolutionary enthusiasm for reform. Progressive intellectuals and students demanded fundamental liquidations of the remnants of the Rhee regime. They also impatiently became involved in the unification movement. The lower echelon military officers demanded a purge of the corrupt and incapable generals. Furthermore, economic difficulties, such as higher unemployment and serious poverty needed resolution in a short period of time (Chung, 1990, pp. 116-117).
Unfortunately, the Second Republic was unable to solve these difficult problems. The Chang Myon regime lacked the political leadership to effectively handle the increased pressures and expectations from various sectors of society. Moreover, its "right to rule" was deemed a gift from the students, and unearned (Yen, 1990, p. 141).

Although the students succeeded in toppling the autocratic First Republic, they had no concrete and comprehensive plans for national development. They actively participated in the demonstrations demanding the severe punishment of those who were responsible for the election riggings and causalities that took place in the April 19th Student Revolution, and the direct talks of the North and South Korean student representatives. The Chang regime's initial failure to resolutely punish former officials of the Rhee government alienated many of its supporters, including intellectuals, students, and even members of the Democratic Party.

Later, subsequent punishment against Rhee supporters alienated the conservative Rhee supporters who could have been wooed to the Democratic Party by offering them protection. That undermined the state apparatus (e.g., bureaucrats, police) essential to the maintenance of social order in the face of the challenge from the left (Kim, 1985, p. 92; Han, 1989a, p. 270-271; Sohn, 1989, p. 18).
The relatively liberal political mood after the emergence of the Second Republic gave the left an opportunity to organize and advocate their radical views, without the same pressure they had experienced in the past. According to Han Sung-joo,

They were supported not only by former leftist politicians, but also by many college students and school teachers who felt the need to correct what they considered to be socioeconomic injustice at home, and to achieve national unification, which they believed was being hindered by the presence of foreign powers on Korean territory (1989a, p. 271).

Increasing ideological conflicts and social cleavages between the conservatives (e.g., bureaucrats, militaryman, the bourgeoisie, and the old generation) and the progressive forces developed through extra-institutional channels. Nonetheless, the regime lacked effective institutional channels for conflict resolution (Kim, 1985, p. 930; Han, 1989a, p. 271).

To make matters worse, the ruling Democratic Party was plagued by factionalism. The Shinp’a (new factions) initiated by Prime Minister Chang Myon and the Kup’a (old factions) initiated by President Yun Po-son were indulged in fierce power struggle. Finally old factions of the Democratic Party formed a new opposition party against the Chang regime (Moody, 1988, p. 115; Sohn, 1989, p. 18). Hence, the power base of Chang Myon regime was weakened
by the internal cracks and factional strifes within the ruling Democratic Party.

Although the state was plagued by daily demonstrations, crime waves, and corruptions, there were neither mechanisms nor leadership to effectively manage these problems. The ideal of democracy implemented by the Chang Myon regime quickly became a source of disillusionment for most Koreans. Ordinary people saw the country "falling into chaos."

Public opinion wanted effective government capable of providing stability and development in their society (Kim, 1985, p. 93; Moody, 1988, p. 115).

In spite of factionalism among the top-ranking officers and politicians in the ruling party, the military was the only institution capable of exercising cohesive force. In fact, the military was worried about the social and political instability caused by the unprecedented demonstrations and the strong emergence of radical forces demanding fundamental transformation of Korean society. The mass also began to get sick of unbridled demonstrations of students and irresponsible political strife of politicians. Finally, on May 16, 1961, Major General Park Chung-hee staged a coup d'etat against the nine-month old Chang Myon regime. Thus, the poorly prepared democratic experiment was characterized as a complete failure (Han, 1989a, pp. 270-272).
III. THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC

The military coup d'état initiated by Major General Park Chung-hee was the military’s reaction against acute political, social, economic crises facing Korean society. The people reluctantly accepted military rule as reality; with neither enthusiasm nor opposition (Chung, 1990, pp. 119-120).

Through the so-called "revolutionary pledges," the military junta announced that the military government would actively initiate the construction of a national economy and the elimination of leftist elements. The goals of their policies were to obtain political legitimacy and a national consensus among the people (Chang, 1986, p. 237; So, 1991, p. 79).

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) was established to execute the revolutionary pledges and was empowered to take several emergency measures to strengthen the power base of the new military government: purges and prosecution of leftists, and corrupt politicians and officials were enacted. In addition to these regulatory measures, the military junta proposed an unprecedented five-year economic development plan. In order to effectively promote and secure these goals, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was found under the initiative of
Kim Chong-pil, the second man of the military junta. KCIA exercised greater power than almost any other state apparatus and penetrated into every aspect of Korean life.

After changing his mind several times towards the military government and the restoration of the civilian rule during two years of junta rule, General Park formally returned a civilian government through a comparatively fair presidential election in 1963 (Han, 1989a, p. 273; Sohn, 1989, p. 21; Chung, 1990, p. 132).

In spite of general acceptance of the political order in the 1960's, however, the proposed Korea-Japan normalization provoked a strong opposition from among the students, politicians, the press, and the religious leaders in 1964. The government initially attempted to mollify the opposition forces by postponing the signing of the treaty and reshuffling the cabinet. However, as the protest movement grew in size and intensity, the government sternly reacted by repressing it. The government declared garrison decree and arrested several hundred students. The muster of the opposition forces was strengthened by a large-scale series of demonstrations, such as the demonstration against allegedly unfair National Assembly elections in 1967, and demonstration against the constitutional revision that permitted Park's third-term presidency in 1969 (Chung, 1990, pp. 156-161).
The growing dictatorial tendency of Park's rule in the name of industrialization decreased Park's legitimacy before the Yushin coup d'état. Students, workers, and Christians also keenly recognized the problems of ten years of rapid industrialization (e.g., growing inequality between the haves and the have-nots). The students initiated demonstrations against compulsory military exercise on the campus, and later, in support for a fair election campaigns throughout the presidential election in 1971 (Sohn, 1989, p. 40; Lee, 1990, p. 108).

In addition to economic difficulties, labor disputes rose sharply at that time. Rapid economic development of Korea was based on sacrificing the agricultural sector and on state control over labor unions. On November 13, 1970, a laborer, Chon Tae-il, committed suicide by self-immolation, demanding the improvement of labor conditions. This incident revealed government's indifference to the labor problem, and accordingly increased awareness of the seriousness of labor problems to the students and religious men. Other incidents, such as the Kwangju Industrial Park riot initiated by those evacuated from Seoul seriously undermined the strategy of "legitimacy through effectiveness" of President Park's regime (Sohn, 1989, p. 35).

The remarkable discrepancy between the rapid economic growth and backward political development promoted political
disillusionment among Korean intellectuals, especially judges, professors, and journalists. Their social impact was considerable due to their "moral position in society." Judges protested against government's interference in trial proceedings, professors demanded the autonomy of the university, and the journalists insisted upon freedom of the press. Despite the harsh repressive measures of the Park regime, many of the key dissident activists in the Yushin system and in the Fifth Republic emerged at this time. In some cases, the extra-parliamentary forces (e.g., students, labor workers, church leaders, and some anti-government intellectuals) developed collective actions specifically targeted against the government transgressions (Sohn, 1989, p. 40).

With mounting challenges from the extra-parliamentary forces, in 1971 President Park narrowly escaped defeat in the presidential election. The close margin seriously threatened his dream of life-long tenure in the Office of the President. The abrupt partial pullout of the U.S. army forces stationed in Korea, and the thawing of the relationship between the U.S. and mainland China made President Park determine special extra-constitutional measures for strengthening his power base: the Yushin system (Han, 1989a, p. 274; Sohn, 1989, pp. 33-43; Chung, 1990, p. 161; Lee, 1990, p. 108).
IV. THE HIGHLY AUTHORITARIAN YUSHIN SYSTEM UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

The Yushin system in 1972 emerged as a solution to the unfavorable internal and external crises by creating yet another highly authoritarian regime (Kuk, 1989, p. 115; Chung, 1990, p. 237). President Park dissolved the National Assembly, prohibited political activities, and suspended the functions of the Third Republic constitution through extra-constitutional measures. The important characteristics of the Yushin system born under the martial law allowed the president to be elected by the National Council for Reunification (NCR) with almost absolute power. There were no limits to his terms of office. The president was given control over the executive, the judiciary, and the legislative branches of government. Hence, the power of the legislative and the judiciary systems were severely curtailed, as were the basic rights of the citizens (Han, 1989a, p. 295; Chung, 1990, p. 243).

The ideological platform of the Yushin system were economic development and national security. The government mobilized civil society in the name of Ch'onghwa Tangyol (total solidarity) in order to achieve these aims. The bureaucracy, the military, and the fettered press were significant participants in this system. There were three mobilization networks: the establishment of the Civil
Defense Corps and Student National Defense Corps as a security mobilization network; the execution of the *Saemaul* (new village) movement and *Pansanghoe* (the meeting of neighborhoods in the village) as a social mobilization network; and the promotion of export and heavy chemical industrialization as an economic mobilization network (Sohn, 1989, p. 2; Lee, 1990, pp. 137-163).

President Park used his strengthened power to crack down even harder on his political opposition (e.g., students, religious leaders, labor unionists, and opposition politicians). Numerous dissidents were arrested and imprisoned, and the press was controlled. The Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) extended its networks everywhere, even to Koreans abroad. The representative international incident by KCIA was the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung from Japan. This provoked serious diplomatic problems between Korea and Japan, and prompted anti-government demonstrations by the opposition forces. The mounting political terror led to an increase of governmental human rights abuse (e.g., the torture of opposition members, arrests without warrant) (Lee, 1980, p. 64; Sohn, 1989, p. 51; Ro, 1989, p. 320; Ku, 1989, p. 26; Chung, 1990, p. 253).

Despite comparative political stability by a reign of terror in earlier years of the *Yushin* regime, as times passed, the opposition forces increasingly challenged the
Yushin system -- Particularly through the Yushin constitution revision movement.

Faced with rising protests, the Yushin system responded with a series of emergency decrees. Emergency Decree No. 1 banned any kind of activity denying or opposing the constitution, or proposing or petitioning for revision or repeal of the constitution. In addition, Emergency Decree No. 4, a reaction against rising student demonstrations, banned all student protest movements. The Education Minister was empowered to close any school to which violators of the emergency measures belonged. The most draconian and long-lived was Emergency Decree No. 9. It banned virtually any kind of opposition against the Yushin system. It was prohibited to deny, oppose, distort, or defame the constitution, and to assert, petition, or instigate for revision or repeal of the constitution, and to report any of these activities (Sohn, 1989, p. 89; Chung, 1990, p. 248).

President Park's highly authoritarian rule had generated tremendous opposition to his regime and alienated increasingly larger and more diverse groups. Too much emphasis on the efficiency of the system undermined the sociopolitical cohesion of the Yushin system. Civil society organized itself for more coordinated efforts against the dictatorial control system (Chung, 1990, p. 252; Lee, 1990, pp. 197-198).
The most active group among the opposition forces was the students throughout the Yushin period. Although student movements were comparatively stagnant, the National Federation of Democratic Youths (NFDYs) incident in 1974 was a turning point among the student movements. This incident represented more organized collective actions against the Yushin system than previously. In particular, from the fall semester of 1977, student anti-government demonstrations began to intensify, occurring almost every day on major campuses across the country. Student movements were the main sources of progressive ideals, such as Minjung-oriented ideologies, neocolonialism, and dependency problems of Korean society. Under Presidential Emergency Measures No. 9, these anti-government activities became group-centered or religion-based clandestine actions (Lee, 1990, pp. 203-210; Sohn, 1991, p. 11).

Catholic and Protestant leaders actively participated in various anti-government movements, despite the governmental decrees. Particularly, their participation in constitutional revision movements, human right movements, and labor and peasants movements for social equity filled the institutional vacuum resulting from weakened party politics. Moreover, the Christian Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) played an active role in the development of labor union movements. Catholic and Christian rural organizations helped farmers’ movements. The Catholic Priests’

President Park's ideology of developmentalism was challenged by workers themselves. The labor workers and peasants assimilating radical ideologies from the students and the religious sectors grew increasingly disillusioned with the government-imposed labor control system, poor quality of life, and the Yushin system ideal. However, the repressive political situation and the regime's extreme coercive capacity contained the labor union movements to a very limited level (Ch'oe, 1989, p. 192; Chung, 1990, p. 246; Lee, 1990, p. 237).

In order to collectively cope with regime repression and effectively manage the anti-government movements, various anti-government alliances were formed. Throughout the anti-government movements there existed a loose, but wide, anti-government network among the students, intellectuals, industrial workers, politicians, and religious leaders.

In July 1978, the National Alliance for Democracy (NAD) was formed as the organizational center of the alliance to oppose President Park's authoritarian rule. On March 1979, Kim Dae-jung (former presidential candidate of New
Democratic Party in 1971), Yun Po-son (former President of the Second Republic), and Ham Sok-hon (a prominent social movement activist) founded the National Alliance for Democracy and Unification (NADU) (Sohn, 1989, pp. 143-152; Ch’oe, 1989, pp. 104-105; Ku, 1989, p. 26).

The strengthened opposition movement made it more and more difficult and costly for the Park government to maintain its authoritarian regime. Furthermore, some radical activists among the opposition forces were willing to martyrs themselves for democracy. President Park stood at the crossroads of more repression or political opening. According to Lee Chong-sik,

If he (President Park) applied more pressure on the opposition, more martyrs would have been created, making the situation even more explosive. But if he loosened control, the demand for reforms might have spread, rendering it impossible to contain the demand. The Yushin system had provided for neither a pressure-release valve nor an escape hatch (1980, p. 76).

To make matters worse, the economic downturn which began in late 1978 only heightened the political problems of the Yushin system (Chung, 1990, p. 162). Moreover, the relationship between Korea and the U.S. deteriorated. The issue of the U.S. troop withdrawal, the Pak Tong-son scandal, Carter Administration’s direct intervention against human rights abuses in Korea, and the subsequently awkward and strained relations between the two governments
dominated the last few years of the President Park regime (Sohn, 1989, p. 114).

Moreover, the Tenth National Assembly election held on 12 December, 1978 caused severe damage to the Yushin system. Although the ruling Democratic Republic Party (DRP) won more seats than the main opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), the NDP obtained more votes, capturing 32.8 percent of the votes cast to 31.7 percent for the DRP (Ku, 1989, p. 26; Sohn, 1989, p. 143).

In addition, Kim Young-sam who had demanded strong democratization in Korea, was elected as the president of NDP on 30 May 1979. He incorporated the members of the Unification Democratic Party (UDP) and independent National Assembly into his party and strengthened the alliance between the NDP and extra-institutional opposition forces against the authoritarian Yushin system. Thus, the political situation was almost completely polarized into the two opposing camps; "democratic" versus "dictatorial" (Chung, 1990, p. 235).

The first real climax between the Yushin system and Kim Young-sam's NDP was the Y.H. Trading Company Incident. The forced dispersion by the riot police of the female workers sit-ins occupying the NDP headquarters contributed to the deterioration of the political atmosphere between the ruling bloc and the NDP in the summer of 1979. The regime increased its repression against Kim Young-sam by
nullifying Kim’s party presidency through the judicial
decision on a civil case on September 8, 1979, and
eventually ousted him as an Assemblyman on October 4, 1979.
The Park’s regime used Kim’s interview with *The New York*
Times on September 15, 1979 as evidence of his subordination
to the U.S.\(^{10}\) (Lee, 1990, p. 254).

The repression against Kim Young-sam and the government
intervention in the internal affairs of the NDP provoked
massive student demonstrations supported by civilians in
Pusan and Masan, the stronghold and political hometown of
Kim Young-sam. Despite an emergency in Pusan and its
neighboring areas, violent demonstrations continued for
three consecutive days beginning October 16, 1979 (Chung,

Facing overwhelming opposition, the ruling coalitions
disintegrated into two divergent and conflicting camps on
how to best cope with the political crisis: the hardliners
and softliners. On 26 October, 1979, Kim Chae-gyu, the
Director of KCIA and supporter of moderate reforms of the
Yushin system, assassinated President Park and Chief of
Presidential Guard Corps Ch’a Chi-ch’ol at a dinner in the
course of discussion over the policy direction concerning
Pusan-Masan Incident. Park’s death ended Park’s 18-year
rule and the 7-year old Yushin regime. Since the Yushin
system concentrated all state power in the hands of
President Park (Chung, 1990, p. 257; Lee, 1990, pp. 255-
257), it was impossible to provide an institutional and political framework for an orderly succession of power. In conclusion, the economic success initiated by President Park undermined his authoritarian Yushin system by resurrection of the civil society (Hyun, 1987, p. 69). The resolute actions by opposition forces against the government led to the cracks of the ruling coalitions and the assassination of President Park. President Park became a victim of his own success.

V. THE REEMERGING AUTHORITARIAN FIFTH REPUBLIC

A. THE POLITICS OF THE TRANSITION
IN THE SPRING OF SEOUL

With the demise of the Yushin system (the Fourth Republic) caused by the assassination of the President Park Chung-hee, many Koreans anticipated that democracy would be restored in South Korea. Contrary to this expectation, the power vacuum was filled by the only organized political machine left, the military. Under martial law, the military officially controlled the state apparatus, although formal power was held by the interim civilian government led by Ch’oe Kyu-ha, Prime Minister under Park (Hong, 1988, pp. 1-3; Chung, 1989, pp. 27-28; Im, 1989, p. 131).

The country restored some semblance of peace and order, political forces assumed a wait-and-see stance. It was
obvious there were no decisive political forces during these time of uncertainty. All political forces engaged in internal restructuring (Im, 1989, p. 132).

The military, logically, emerged as the most formidable organized force. They held real power as enforcer of martial law. However, after Park’s assassination, the military divided into two factions. One faction consisted of high-ranking career military officers in the army, and advocated the liberalization of the authoritarian rule and democratization as the second-best option if the corporate interests of the military (e.g., the military prerogatives in promotions and budgets) were protected.

The other faction was comprised of politicized military officers in the security community (e.g., Presidential Guard Corps, the Defense Security Command and the Capital Garrison Division) and young generals initiated by the first generation of the regularly educated graduates of Korean Military Academy, who maintained a high degree of internal cohesiveness. This faction advocated the continuation of authoritarian rule or the installation of a puppet civilian government under the "tutelage of the hardline military officers" as the second best choice (Moody, 1988, p. 129; Im, 1989, pp. 136-138).

There was a subterranean conflict between these two factions concerning the policy orientations of a new government. Although at first the moderate military
officers led by General Chong Sung-hwa, the Commander of the Martial law and the Army Chief of Staff, held formal power, Chun used his position as the Head of the Defense Security Command (DSC) and the Joint Investigation Headquarters (JIH) to increase his influence both within the military and the state (Im, 1989, pp. 138-139; Chung, 1990, p. 342).

On December 12, 1979, General Chun Doo-hwan, the leader of the "new military forces," and the politically ambitious group of young generals arrested the Commander of the Martial Law General Chong Sung-hwa and other senior generals closely connected with General Chong, after a bloody gun battle outside the Ministry of Defense and inside the official residence of the Army Chief of Staff. They accused Chong of complicity in the assassination of President Park. Although the hardliners took control of the military, they needed time to prepare to intervene in the politics of transition. However, the December 12th coup d'etat did not necessarily mean the birth of another military authoritarian regime. There was still an opportunity, however slim, for civilian rule, in accordance with the dynamics of the power game among major political forces (Im, 1989, pp. 140-141; Chung, 1990, p. 47; Chung, 1990, p. 342).

The changed situation precipitated a compromise between political parties on the course of transition through a summit meeting between the president of RDP Kim Chong-pil
and the president of NDP Kim Young-sam. Their prime ambition was restoration of a democratic constitution, and reestablishment of the leading roles of political parties in the transition process.

However, on January 18, 1980, President Ch’oe announced the government should initiate the project of constitutional revision. Conflicts between political parties and the Ch’oe government as the "proxy of the new military forces" resumed. The main difference between the parties’ plan and governmental plan for a new constitution was the structure of the government. The parties’ presidential system included direct, popular election, while the government’s plan was a dual system of government.

Actually, neither the RDP or NDP could influence the political scene in 1980. The RDP faced internal cracks in several organization by the "Chongp’ung" (purification) movement initiated by the young RDP assemblymen, and lost important supporters, such as bureaucrats and monopolistic capitalists. In addition, the NDP could not control the diverse voices of the opposition forces. The division between the Kim Young-sam supporters and Kim Dae-jung supporters undermined the position of the NDP in the politics of the transition. As a result, the transition by negotiations between the two parties became impossible (Im, 1989, p. 146-151).
The activated civil society replaced the political parties which were incapable of securing the democratization of Korea. After Park's death, several liberalization measures loosening the "authoritarian repression" (e.g., removal of the Emergency Measures No. 9, the release of political prisoners and the restoration of their civil rights), led to the resurrection of civil society. Students tried to organize autonomous student representative bodies, and workers attempted to organize autonomous unions. These politically active sentiments spread to other sectors of civil society, and were accepted by religious organizations, academic associations, and the pressman association. Leaders of several autonomous organizations came to realize that the prospects for democratization decreased due to hegemony by the hardline military officers. They felt constrained enough to believe that there was no choice but to develop democratization via popular mobilization.

Popular mobilization assumed two different lines in the Chaeya (extra-institutional opposition forces): the gradual line and the activist line. The former was composed of the moderate factions in the Chaeya. They supported the NDP's strategy of democratic transition through election and controlled popular mobilization to reveal the "conspiracy" of the power establishment to extend an authoritarian regime. The latter was composed of radical factions within
the Chaeya (e.g., former student activists, progressive church leaders, and radical dissident intellectuals) who preferred a "direct appeal" to the people by means of mass rallies and street demonstrations to elite level negotiations under the leadership of the NDP (Im, 1989, pp. 152-159).

The decline of the moderate factions and the rise of radical factions within the ruling forces as well as throughout the opposition forces led to the direct confrontation between the military and the radical factions (e.g., students, Chaeya). Beginning in April 1980, students actively participated in street demonstrations which reached a peak in mid-May, 1980, when tens of thousands students demonstrated fiercely in downtown Seoul.

Although the concurrent mobilization of workers was limited to seeking economic gains and improvement of labor conditions, their widespread mobilizations were sufficient enough to frighten the monopolistic capitalists and the middle class as well as the incumbent government. The number of labor disputes increased dramatically from 105 cases in 1979 to 848 in 1980 (until April 30, 1980). Wildcat strikes, accompanying enormous mass violence (e.g., Sabuk miners' strikes\textsuperscript{13}) also rapidly increased (Im, 1989, pp. 163-168). Amidst the massive popular mobilizations, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung demanded self-restraint from the
students. They also demanded the lifting of the martial law and rapid democratization of the Ch’oe government.

Instead of a favorable response, the government extended the existing state of emergency to encompass the entire country on March 17, 1980. The martial law headquarters stopped all political activities, temporarily closed the universities, arrested major political figures such as Kim Dae-jung and Kim Chong-pil, and put Kim Young-sam under house arrest. The Kwangju uprising took place from May 18, 1980 until May 28, 1980, and was ruthlessly suppressed by the army. That was the end of the short-lived 'Seoul Spring' (Cho, 1989, pp. 95-96; Chung, 1990, p. 343).

Why did Korean society fail to establish democracy in the transitional years of 1979-1980 when the opportunities were evident?

First, despite the death of Park, the power structure of the Yushin system (e.g., the military, the bureaucrats, and other groups that had a vested interest in the status quo) remained intact. Furthermore, with the emergence of the "new military forces", they bought enough time and excuses to regroup themselves, and unite under the military umbrella.

Second, through the December 12th Incident, the military kept enough internal cohesiveness to fend off any challenges against the military. Since the May 16th military coup, the military was politicized, and the top
officers believed they had an "obligation" to involve themselves in South Korea's politics. They saw themselves as "defenders and protectors of society" under constant threat of external invasion and internal subversion. Moreover, because the core members of the military were composed of the four-year class generations of the Korea Military Academy, the new military forces initiating the military coup easily consolidated whole military factions (Han, 1989a, pp. 280-281).

Third, the party politicians, particularly of the opposition, lacked effective leadership and unity. The opposition appeared to miscalculate the power of the ruling bloc associated with authoritarian rule under Park. Hence, they failed to recognize uncertainty in the process of the democratic transition. The students and radical factions of Chaeya's confrontational tactics seemed to produce great fear among remnants of the Yushin system, and convinced the military hardliners that the authoritarian rule needed to be maintained. In fact, the NDP could neither support nor oppose the radical social movements. Moreover, since the NDP was expected to win the forthcoming election, the intra-party conflict between the Kim Young-sam supporters and the Kim Dae-jung supporters became more and more intense. Such a split of the NDP provided the military leaders with an excuse to intervene in politics, but it also eliminated the
ability to effectively cope with the ruling bloc from the opposition party (Han, 1989a, p. 291; Park, 1989, p. 18).

Lastly, the sociopolitical crisis resulting from the street demonstrations of the students and violent strikes of workers stimulated the fears of the middle class, who enjoyed relative material comfort and economic security under the authoritarian rule. Since their economic interests were threatened by the politicization of the popular sector, the middle class became the "accomplice" in the reestablishment of the authoritarian Fifth Republic (Park, 1989, p. 204).

B. THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

After the repression of the Kwangju uprising, no resistance remained to obstruct the military from seizing political power. On May 31, 1980, the 25 member Special Committee for National Security Measures was established to "renovate" the political system. The affairs of state were managed by the 31-member Standing Committee of the Special Committee for National Security Measures headed by General Chun.

On August 27, 1980, General Chun became the new president in accordance with the Yushin constitution and had a new constitution drafted by September 29, 1980. Although the Fifth Republic constitution appeared to be less
dictatorial than the *Yushin* constitution (Im, 1981, p. 181), the president was to be indirectly elected by an electoral college of more than 5,000 and still have power strong enough to disproportionately influence the judiciary and the legislative.

In addition, the military junta took a series of drastic extra-constitutional measures for consolidating power. They purged 8,591 civil servants and state-owned corporation workers, formed 567 political blacklists, and disbanded all existing political parties. They also merged mass media and news agencies, and expelled approximately nine hundred journalists from their positions14 (Kim, 1990, pp. 220-235; Lee, 1990, p. 42). New labor laws strictly regulating the actions of trade unions were adopted, and almost two hundred labor leaders were also purged from the labor movement. Over 40,000 ex-convicts or so-called "disturbing elements" of the society were confined to military training camps in the name of *Samch’ong Kyoyuk* (social purification education) (Yi, 1987, pp. 176-177; Ch’oe, 1989, p. 209; Chung, 1990, p. 178; *Hanguk Ilbo*, August 27, 1991).

After a series of extra-constitutional measures, the military tried to institutionalize power through the establishment of a new party system. The military involved not only the foundation of the ruling Democratic Justice Party but also the loyal or semi-loyal opposition parties: the Democratic Korea Party (DKP) and the Korean Nationalist
party (KNP). The ruling DJP was founded on January 15, 1981. The core members of the DJP were the army officers involved in the December 12th coup and the military junta. In addition, the semi-loyal DKP was founded by the 17 former opposition politicians under the guidance of National Security Planning Agency (NSPA) while the loyal KNP was created by the former ruling RDP politicians under the guidance of the Defense Security Command (DSC). Hence, Koreans "pejoratively called the three parties 'the number one, two, and three army companies'" (Im, 1989, pp. 186-88; Chung, 1990, p. 34; Hanguk Ilbo, April 2, April 30, May 1, 1991).

Table 3-1. The outcome of national assembly election in 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>party contents</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>DKP</th>
<th>KNP</th>
<th>Fringe parties</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.R.</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (% )</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( % )</td>
<td>(54.7)</td>
<td>(29.3)</td>
<td>(9.1)</td>
<td>(2.9)</td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes(%)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the electoral system under the Fifth Republic, four-year term national assemblymen were to be
elected by means of a mixed electoral system of double-member districts (184 seats) and proportional representation (92 seats). In the Eleventh National Assembly Election of March 25, 1981, the ruling DJP won 90 out of 92 districts and got 61 out of 92 seats allotted to the proportional representation (P.R.). The unfair electoral system gave the DJP 54.7 percent of the national assembly seats with only 35 percent of the popular votes (see Table 3-1 above).

On February 25, 1981, President Chun was also indirectly reelected in accordance with the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and on March 3, 1981, he was inaugurated as the 12th President. The political institutionalization was completed for the moment. The Chun regime was basically similar to the Park regime in terms of the excessive dependence on the repressive ruling system (e.g., Police, National Security Planning Agency, Defense Security Command), authoritarian ruling behaviors, and the conservative national ideologies (e.g., developmentalism, national security). The Fifth Republic became more liberal and more inclusive than the Fourth Republic in terms guaranteeing basic human rights and division of power.

The socioeconomic basis of the Chun regime centered on the ruling coalition, an alliance of civilianized military, big business and industrialists, and technocrats in and out of government service. To the extent that the military still remained a dominant institution in politics, however,
the Fifth Republic continued as an authoritarian regime rather than a democratic and populist one (Kihl, 1982, pp. 39-42; Wolgan Choson, December 1989, p. 136).

The ideological platform of the Chun regime was anti-communism and developmentalism. To maintain the sociopolitical stability of the regime and to effectively achieve national goals (e.g., economic development, national security), corporatist control and physical coercion were used as ruling methods (Nam, 1989, p. 277; Kim, 1990, p. 231). The military and intelligence institutions (e.g., police, National Security Planning Agency, and the Defense Security Command) were basic pillars sustaining the regime, and were given preferential treatment for their loyalty.

From the beginning of Chun’s regime, it lacked legitimacy because Chun seized power through military force and his authoritarian personality rather than through democratic election based on the consent of the people. Chun alienated a large segment of the population, while raising questions about the legitimacy of his regime. In addition, his government inherited the hostility and antagonism directed toward the military-authoritarian regime during the Park era (Han, 1989a, p. 283; Nam, 1989, p. 327; Kim, 1989, p. 231). He did nothing to dispel doubts in public sentiment concerning his legitimacy, and Chun’s authority was reflected in incessant political turmoil that had racked the Fifth Republic virtually from its inception.
Notes

1. Although Korea Democratic Party (KDP) is mainly composed of landowning classes that initially supported the emergence of the Rhee government, they broke away from the ruling coalitions of the Rhee government because they were severely alienated from the Rhee government.

2. Excerpt Constitutional Amendment was a product of the negotiation between the ruling party's direct presidential election system and the opposition forces' parliamentary system. The characteristics of this constitutional amendment introduced a parliamentary system into the presidential system. For example, the parliament has the right to dismiss the cabinet members in accordance with the resolution of the parliament.

3. In the July 29 parliamentary election in 1960, the Democratic Party got 175 seats out of 233 in the lower House and 31 seats 55 in the upper body.

4. In the presidential election in 1971, the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) candidate Park Chung-hee gained 0.94 million more votes than the candidate of the New Democratic Party (NDP) Kim Dae-jung. Moreover, in the subsequent parliamentary election, the ruling DRP got 113 seats among 204 (48.8 percent) while the opposition NDP won eighty-nine (44.4 percent), which showed the vast enlargement of support toward NDP by the people.

5. Concerning the reasons for the emergence of the Yushin system, there are two conflicting explanations. One is that the emergence of the Yushin system is closely connected with the necessity for the structural deepening of Korean economy, which is the theoretical perspective of the bureaucratic authoritarian regime. The other is that the establishment of Yushin regime is explained in terms of power considerations: President Park's power-oriented personality, rising political challenges, and the state's predominance over civil society.

Although the Third Republic faced economic difficulties, the government's economic performance was comparatively successful at that time of the emergence of Yushin system. The heavy chemical industrialization of the structural deepening of the Korean economy initiated by Yushin regime is not the cause of its emergence but the result of policy changes accompanying the economic situations. Hence, the political factors played a more important role in the emergence of the Yushin system than the economic factors.
6. Although *Minjung* can be defined in various ways, the main argument of Minjung ideologies is to show affection or concern toward the have-nots in terms of social, economic, and political status, such as labor workers, peasants, and the urban poor.

7. According to Sohn Hak-kyu (1989), an average 44.5 percent of the demonstration participants were people who were connected with the Protestant and Catholic churches.

8. The economic downturn in the late Yushin system resulted from the excessive and overlapping investments on the heavy chemical industries and unfavorable international economic conditions, particularly first and second oil shock.

9. The Y.H. Incident took place on August 9, 1979 when 200 female workers working in Y.H. Trading Company occupied the headquarters of the NDP and demanded reconsideration of the closure decision. Instead of dispersion by persuasion, the Yushin government dispersed the female sit-in strikers by force, and one female worker was killed in the midst of the dispersion by the riot police. While the government arrested some workers and dissident intellectuals, the NDP mounted indefinite sit-ins protesting government crackdown on the main opposition party.

10. Through a *New York Times* interview, Kim Young-sam demanded the constructive intervention of the U.S. in Korean internal politics for the promotion of democratization. The government condemned Kim Young-sam’s behavior as flunkeyism to the U.S.

11. The representative case of an informal organization within the army strengthening internal cohesiveness is *Hanahoe*, which grew up under the proteges of President Park. *Hanahoe* was composed of the persons chosen from every four-year course graduates. This organization made great contribution to the success of the December 12th *coup d'état*, and the members of this organization became the core members of Chun’s regime.

12. The hardline military faction had been called "*sinkunbu*" (new military forces).

13. Demanding wage increases and the resignation of Oyong (company-kept) union leaders, about 2,500 miners seized Sabuk mine town in the Kangwon Provinces for four days and confronted the police.
14. Nine hundred thirty-three journalists (about 10 percent of total journalists) were expelled from their positions in 1980. According to the principle of one newspaper in one province, there were 6 daily newspapers and 2 economic daily newspapers, and 2 English Newspapers in Seoul, 12 daily newspapers in the provinces, 1 news agency, and 2 broadcasting station.
CHAPTER IV. FROM AUTHORITARIAN REGIME TO DEMOCRACY:
THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION, 1985-1988

I. ABERTURA AND RESURRECTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The authoritarian nature of the Fifth Republic was ameliorated by liberalization measures (Abertura), with full knowledge that autonomy and the opening of society was the consensual will of the people. It was necessary for the government to provide an outlet for the repressed social environment for an effective rule. President Chun first deregulated certain restrictions on social sectors imposed by the past regime, such as the lifting of midnight curfew, the autonomy of student uniforms, and liberalization of going abroad (Cumings, 1983, p. 80; Lee, 1985, p. 551).

However, the full-scale political Abertura began with the campus autonomization policy in late 1983. 350 student activists were released from prison, 1,363 expelled students were readmitted, 8 professors expelled for political reasons were reinstated, and police detectives and informers stationed on campuses were withdrawn. On February 25, 1984, the government announced that the ban on political activities of 202 opposition politicians would be lifted.

Why did the Chun regime voluntarily impose liberalization measures? The reasons can be suggested in the following ways:
First, the government was confident in the internal socioeconomic stability and development of the country (Ch’oe, 1989, p. 212; Im, 1989, pp. 206-207; Chung, 1990, pp. 359-360). Economically, after two years of recession, the national economy bounced back to steady, positive growth (6.6% in 1981, 5.4% in 1982, and 11.9% in 1983) from its previous negative growth (-5.2%) in 1980, and the ruling elites were confident in the institutional mechanism of control. According to Im Hyug-baeg,

> The restructuring of ideological apparatuses, "hegemonic" political party system, legal control of mechanisms of press, workers, and students provided the regime safety valves in the case of the resurgent opposition (1989, p. 207).

Second, the government came to realize the "futility and counterproductive" effects of police-state tactics of outright repression of opponents. Although state terror silenced ordinary people, it gave radical elements of the opposition both ammunition and a sense of moral superiority. The tough stance toward campus unrest contributed to the expansion of student demonstrations and the rapid diffusion of radical ideas and activities. The government, therefore, tried to counterbalance radical ideas through realistic effective "ideology education" rather than physical suppression, and attempted to isolate the radical student elements and labor activists from the moderate factions of the opposition forces (Dong, 1987, p. 241; Im,
Third, the government began a series of measures to improve the image of the regime both at home and abroad, and to broaden the "support base of technocrats, businessmen, and the new middle classes" in preparation for the forthcoming election. The government faced increasingly vocal domestic and international pressures for liberalization and democratization, and was sincerely attentions to alleviate antagonism towards the regime. The Papal visit on May 3, 1984 and the U.S. elections were contributing factors which encouraged the government to take Abertura (Ch'oe, 1989, p. 212; Im, 1989, p. 208; Park, 1989, p. 18; Chung, 1990, p. 360).

following the appeasement policies of the government, several newly independent organizations were born into the civil society and the activities of previously existing organizations were strengthened. The Abertura allowed the opposition leaders who disappeared underground because of the government's harsh crackdown, to emerge to reconstruct opposition movements in the civil society.

Under these circumstances, a group of former student activists organized the Minch'ongnyon (the Youth Alliance for Democracy, YAD), the first major organization to institutionalize dissident factions on September 30, 1983. On April 14, 1984, dissident artists, musicians, poets and

Meanwhile, the two national coalition organizations of diverse popular democratic movements were founded, Minminhyop (the People’s Democratic Movement Council, PDMC) formed by the leaders of the youth, labor, farmers, and religious movements in June, 1984, Minju T’ongil Kungmin Hoeui (the National Conference for Democracy and Unification, NCDU) organized by religious and intellectual notables on October 16, 1984: The two national coalition organizations were developed into the Mint’ongnyon (the United People’s Movement for Democracy and Unification, UPMDU), a coalition of twenty-three organizations representing banned unionists, intellectuals, dismissed journalists, church activists, and farmer groups, on March 29, 1985. The group’s leaders tried to construct a grassroots level movement, and initiate the democratization movement through the NKDP and student supporters (Shorrock, 1986, pp. 1205-6).
What deserves notice is the changing of the leaders of the opposition movements. In the 1970’s, the leaders of the opposition movements were only a small group of notables among the intellectual and religious circles. In the 1980’s, opposition movements were led by young former student activists. The labor movement in particular was led primarily by the church (e.g., Urban Industrial Mission) in the 1970’s, but by the 1980’s was under students-turned-workers (Im, 1989, p. 209).

New opposition leaders deplored the low level of political development and the serious economic inequalities remaining in Korea despite the rapid economic development over the past 30 years. Some sections of society became increasingly disaffected with a system that failed to spread the benefits of rapid growth to some large socioeconomic groups, and one which concentrated political power in the hands of a "military oligarchy" (Hamilton and Tanter, 1987, p. 163). The activists wanted to enjoy democracy and social equity commensurate with Korea’s socioeconomic development. As a result, economic success paradoxically generated strong political pressure for political and economic reform from the authoritarian regime, rather than strengthened political legitimacy.

Social movements of the 1980’s showed strong anti-imperialist (particularly anti-U.S.) tendencies and rediscovered values of indigenous Korean culture.
Traditional popular arts, especially T’alch’um (Mask dance), P’ansori (folk opera), and Nongak (peasant folk music) were reinterpreted as a means of exploring counter-hegemonic ideological apparatuses. The social movements activists invented alternative communication networks and introduced magazines, education systems (e.g., night labor school and village activity), and arts. In this way, they made great contributions to the diffusion of the counter-hegemonic ideas into the masses and promoted solidarity among differing social movements (Im, 1989, pp. 220-221).

II. THE 12TH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

By lifting the political ban on dissident politicians, the former ruling party officials and the opposition forces had to prepare for the 12th National Assembly election. There were two conflicting positions concerning the election among the opposition forces: those who urged a boycott of the election and those who urged participation in the election. The former argued election under authoritarian regime was a "mere ritual or pseudo-democratic facade" because it failed to provide any real political alternatives to the masses. Elections, therefore, would not offer opportunities for fundamental power structure. They believed participation in elections, whose result was "predetermined ex ante", would only contribute to legitimizing an unscrupulous regime. They would be part of
the instrument to stabilize and to perpetuate the military dictatorship (Yi, 1987, pp. 180-181; Hong, 1988, p. 147; Im, 1989, p. 226), and they were unwilling to accept that responsibility.

The latter, on the other hand, argued that though an election under authoritarian regime was essentially meaningless, it was difficult for opposition forces to boycott the electoral process as long as the state effectively controlled the mass media. To them, the boycott of the election was conceived as only a declaration. Furthermore, "unsuccessful boycotts" indicated weakness in the opposition forces. The opposition would lose the opportunity to propose a meaningful alternatives. Even a successful boycott would not end the authoritarian regime, but could only hope to further discredit its legitimacy. An election would open public space to mobilize and organize the popular masses for democratization and to expose the dictatorial nature of the regime to the public (Yi, 1987, pp. 180-181; Hong, 1988, p. 177; Im, 1989, p. 226; Huntington, 1991, pp. 188-189).

Those who maintain the boycott of the election finally agreed to participate by agreeing to the necessity for social movements to make use of the electoral space to advance their struggle in the institutional political arena. Hence, they actively participated in helping the opposition party.
The 12 February, 1985 election was significant to the ruling forces as well as opposition forces. For ruling forces, it was the first electoral contest to test popular support of the regime since the emergence of the Fifth Republic. For the opposition, it was an important opportunity to revitalize its power and to display to the populace just how unpopular and fragile the Chun regime really was (Minch’uhyp, 1985, p. 130; Kim, 1986, p. 67; Dong, 1987, p. 242; Chung, 1990, p. 223; West and Baker, 1991, pp. 226-227).

Under these circumstances, the dissident politicians who were released from political ban in 1984, allied themselves with two prominent opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. They organized an autonomous New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) on January 18, 1985, just three weeks before the 12th parliamentary election. The new party’s major planks included the termination of the military rule, the direct popular election of the president, and national unification through the establishment of true democracy (Hanguk Ilbo, December 4, 1984).

As the NKDP lacked time and was unable to organize nationally in time for the election, it depended a great deal on the so-called "opposition-wind," a kind of supporting mood for opposition party by appealing to the anti-government feelings of the people. The NKDP took up issues, such as the legitimacy problems of the Fifth
Republic, democratization of Korea, basic human rights problems, and the living conditions of the workers, farmers, and urban poor. Economic policy suddenly became a key election issue. The opposition party appealed to those disadvantaged by government policies, emphasizing the government’s close alliances with big business, and warned the people of the seriousness of the foreign debt. With vehement attacks against the government, the dissident politicians emphasized autonomy of the NKDP while criticizing dependence on the government of two preexisting political parties (e.g., DKP, KNP) (Yonhap Yearbook, 1986, p. 130; Ahn, 1986-7, p. 36; Haggard and Moon, 1990, p. 231).

Students, labor activists and regional affiliations of democratic movement organizations volunteered to help the NKDP. They actively campaigned for the opposition candidates, as worked as campaign organizers and pamphlet distributors, and also served as very poll-watchers throughout the country (Dong, 1987, pp. 242-243; Cotton, 1989, p. 251; Im, 1989, p. 233; Haggard and Moon, 1990, p. 231).

Contrary to the DJP wanted the 12th National Assembly election to represent a popular mandate for its continued institutionalization. The ruling forces tried to increase the size of the total vote, by increasing what the DJP received in 1981. They were confident in their goals because of financial and organizational resources and
a National Assembly electoral system that was skewed in favor the ruling party. They were confident because the economy was in good condition, and the America and Japanese attitudes towards Korea were favorable (Kim, 1986, p. 68).

Table 4-1. The results of 1985 National Assembly election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes(%)</th>
<th>Number of seats won</th>
<th>Share of seats(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>District  PR  Total</td>
<td>District  Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>87       61   148</td>
<td>47.3    53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKDP</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>50       17   67</td>
<td>27.2    24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>26       9    35</td>
<td>14.1    12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNP</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>15       5    20</td>
<td>8.2     7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6        0    6</td>
<td>3.2     2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>184      92   276</td>
<td>100     100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The ruling DJP, however, failed to achieve its original intentions. The percentage of votes it obtained decreased from 35.6 percent in the 11th National Assembly election to 35.3 percent in the 12th National Assembly election. Moreover, the ruling DJP obtained only 148 seats among 276 despite the support of a biased proportional representative system for ruling party while NKDP obtained 67 seats with 29.3 percent support rate (see Table 4-1 above).
Table 4-2. The election returns of five largest cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Proportion of votes won(%)</th>
<th>Number of seats won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>NKDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inch'on</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation as a whole</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, the ruling DJP lost five seats in the cities. In the major urban cities like Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on, and Kwangju, the votes for the NKDP outnumbered those of the ruling DJP by 12 percent (40.2% vs 28.4%) (see table 4-2 above). The strong showing of the NKDP in the larger cities resulted from the enthusiastic support of the urban middle class and workers in the organized industrial sector. These voters were strongly influenced by social movement organizations in the civil society demanding
the democratization of the authoritarian regime (Im, 1989, p. 235).

The unexpected victory of the NKDP in the 12th National Assembly election had serious political implications. For the ruling forces, rather than improving the regime’s image and legitimacy through an electoral mandate, the election revealed the "repressive nature of the regime and the narrow base of its support" (Im, 1989, p. 238). People chose democratic change rather than conservative stability. As a result, an organized opposition party gradually consolidated popular support for constitutional revision.

Immediately after the election, many DKP and KNP members defected to the NKDP, increasing its 67 seats to 102 seats. This gave the NKDP the right to unilaterally convene the assembly and the power to veto the passage of any proposal for constitutional revision by the ruling party.¹ Unlike the first half of the Fifth Republic that the ruling DJP held easily the political initiatives, the Chun regime faced the democratization pressure from the strongest opposition party initiated by the popular and resolute opposition party leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. In short, the 12th National Assembly election was a reservoir for the democratization movement, or 'the "engine of the democratization"' (Williams, 1985, p. 68; Lee, 1985, p. 553; Cho, 1988, p. 143; Im, 1989, p. 238; West and Baker, 1991, p. 227).
III. TUG-OF-WAR FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION BETWEEN
THE RULING AND OPPOSITION FORCES

A. THE CONSTITUTION REVISION MOVEMENT

After the election, the main focus of the demand of the opposition forces was on constitutional revision: from the indirect presidential election system to the direct popular election system. However, President Chun repeatedly refused to consider this demand. The NKDP was frustrated by the futility of their attempts to compromise. The party concluded that continued seeking of an institutional settlement would be a "political disaster" for the party which therefore might be conceived by the masses as too timid and "too submissive to the Chun’s regime" (Im, 1989, p. 251).

In order to have the Chun regime conform to the people’s desire for democratization, and to get political concessions from the government, the NKDP used extra-parliamentary tactics, such as the ten million signature petition drive for constitutional revision and the opening ceremonies for its national headquarters and local branches for the constitutional revision campaign (Tong-A Yearbook, 1986, p. 48). The NKDP and Chaeya (extra-institutional opposition forces) formed the Mingungnyon (the National Liaison Organization for Democracy, NLOD) in order to coordinate the diverse factions of the opposition forces on democratic
reform. Allied with the Chaeya and student movement groups, the NKDP launched a series of mass rallies in the metropolitan cities, such as Pusan, Kwangju, Taegu and Inch'on, throughout spring of 1986. That focused nationwide attention on the opposition's quest for constitutional revision, and demonstrating grass-roots support for political change.²

In addition to the extra-parliamentary struggles of the NDP and Chaeya against the government, professors and religious leaders also demanded the constitutional revision and autonomy of the universities³. In order to support the constitutional revision campaign of the NKDP, representatives of KNCC and several women's movement groups organized a "Christian Headquarters for the Pan-national Campaign to Boycott the KBS (Korea Broadcasting Station) Viewing and Listening Fees" on February 11, 1986. They denounced the biased reporting of the KBS against the democratization movements. This civil disobedience campaign spread on a massive scale with the combined support of the Catholic Church, the NKDP, and the students (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 8, 1986, p. 23; Chun, 1986, pp. 315–325; Im, 1989, p. 254).

The people's power revolution in the Philippines in February, 1986 seriously influenced the democratization movement of Korea. It demonstrated to the opposition forces the possibility of democratization by the power of people
while causing the ruling forces to fear being overthrown by a people's revolution. After the fall of Marcos, the U.S. government publicly supported peaceful opposition rallies in Korea and recommended that the Chun government compromise with the opposition forces.

Finally, under the mounting pressure from political dissidents and the international influences, the Chun regime was forced to compromise with the opposition forces. On April 30, 1986, President Chun, at a meeting with opposition leaders, retreated from his previous refusal position on the constitutional revision to declare that constitutional revision would be conducted during his term of office based on mutual agreement between the ruling and opposition parties (Kisayon Report, 1986, p. 37; Tong-A Yearbook, 1987, p. 159; Chang, 1987, p. 46; Gohar, 1988, pp. 58-59; Ch'oe, 1989, p. 220).

On June 24, 1986, the Special Constitution Revision Committee, was organized and charged with producing a new draft constitution before the conclusion of the full session of the National Assembly in 1986. However, the committee proceedings made little progress because of fundamental differences in the systems preferred by the government and the opposition parties. The parliamentary system of the ruling government party had little in common with the presidential system of the opposition party (Kim, 1987, p. 656; Kim, 1987, p. 66).
The DJP promoted the parliamentary form by arguing that all advanced democratic industrialized countries except for the U.S. possessed a parliamentary system. It charged that the popular direct presidential system promoted by the opposition had too many weaknesses. For example, the DJP feared intensification of regionalism, political instability, and excessive centralization of executive power. However, their real intentions in proposing the parliamentary system are interpreted as: the DJP enjoyed a decisive edge in their organizational and financial resources, and were better able to take advantage of these resources to perpetuate their majority or at least plurality status to dominate the political system. Moreover, the DJP feared that if they failed to win the presidential election, they could lose all power (Yen, 1990, pp. 335-336; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 24; Plunk, 1991, p. 107).

According to West and Baker,

They foresaw possible loss of the enormous economic power and privilege they had enjoyed for seven years. Moreover, a democratically elected successor would have a strong incentive to investigate the corruption widely believed to have flourished under Chun. Still more ominously, Chun and the other military commanders responsible for the 1980 massacre at Kwangju faced the possibility of being called to account if a truly open political order came into being in 1988 (1991, p. 230).

The DJP lacked commitment to initiate concessions to the opposition forces in the constitutional revision. Even
though opposition forces traditionally were strong supporters of a parliamentary system of government, the DJP began to support a direct popularly elected presidential system. Opposition groups were convinced their potential presidential candidates had charismatic, mass followings. They were confident about their long-standing records of anti-government movement, and believed they had a good chance of getting popularly elected. In addition, the opposition party recognized its disadvantages. It lacked patronage power and had weak grass-roots organization. This made it difficult to gain parliamentary majority. Moreover, the maintenance of such a majority posed problems because of the uncertain nature of intra-party factional alliances. The NKDP would be best served by a direct presidential election system (Kim, 1987, pp. 65-66; Buzo, 1987, pp. 16-17; Gohar, 1988, p. 60).

Other reasons for the deadlock in the political of transition of the constitutional revision issue between the ruling forces and the opposition forces existed.

First, the NKDP was too much indebted to the Chaeya during the process of the 12th National Assembly election. It simply could not ignore the Chaeya's stances toward the constitutional revision. At that time, Chaeya and radical student groups severely criticized the NKDP's policies to make accommodations with the ruling DJP. Furthermore, the
Chaeya demanded the immediate withdrawal of the DJP regime from politics instead of constitutional revision.

Second, the opposition force were confident with their power. Even if they directly confronted the ruling forces, they did not think they could be defeated as in the 1980 calamity.

Third, if the NKDP accepted unilaterally the demands of the ruling forces, it would be accused of selling-out the people's cherished goals of democratization to ruling forces. Opposition forces feared the loss of their support base and the grand failure of the forthcoming elections.

Fourth, the ruling DJP had no autonomous power to independently negotiate with the NKDP, and was unwilling to accept defeat if the DJP failed to win the election. Therefore, if the NKDP took up confrontational strategies, the moderate factions of the ruling forces would ally with the radical factions of the ruling forces. The moderates of the ruling forces feared the loss of their political power. If the NKDP adopted a conciliatory stance toward constitutional reform, the ruling forces preferred the surrender of the NKDP to compromising with the opposition party (Yi, 1986, p. 267; Im, 1990, p. 70).

Under these circumstances, all concerned parties preferred confrontation strategies to negotiation between the ruling and opposition forces despite expected calamity.
B. THE RADICAL OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND THE REPRESSION MEASURES OF THE GOVERNMENT

The hardliners of the ruling groups consisted mainly of some members at the "core of the authoritarian state apparatuses, such as Office of President, NSPA, the army security community, civilian bureaucrats in the state repressive apparatuses and propaganda organizations, and members of the DJP who had close ties to Chun." They objected to concessions to the opposition forces in the game of the constitutional revision, and tried to repress the opposition forces as much as possible. Their final aim was to hand over the presidency to a loyal follower of President Chun in accordance with the existing constitutional rule.

Softliners, however, mainly consisted of civilian party politicians and others in the military faction who competed with the hardliner faction in the succession struggle, who supported dialogue with the moderate opposition party for constitutional revision (Im, 1989, pp. 257-258).

Even though the hardliners temporarily retreated from frontal attacks on opposition forces, they still had enough power to reverse the negotiation phase and sought such opportunities to do so. Finally, the radical actions of the maximalists in the opposition forces provided the hardliners in the ruling forces an excuse to renew the offensive tactics against the opposition forces starting with the May
3rd Inch'on Incident. The moderates opposition forces (e.g., party politicians in the NKDP and its support groups) desired constitutional revision for a directly elected presidential system through negotiations with the ruling forces.

Radical factions of the opposition forces demanded fundamental change in Korean society. They tended to characterize the Korean state as a form of military fascism. They argued that the Korean state was part of the military in conjunction with the bureaucratic state apparatus and monopolistic capitalists. As a result, the state contributed to the interests of the capitalists and the colonial powers using state terror. For the radical elements of the opposition forces, sheer liberalism was no longer a solution to the Korean political and socioeconomic problems. Instead, the choice was between "revolutionary change and defending the existing socioeconomic order, rather than between liberal democracy and dictatorship." In their view, the democratic movement needed to be transferred into an "anti-imperialist" and "anti-fascist" revolution. They accused the U.S. of supporting the Korean authoritarian regime because of U.S. interests of maintaining hegemony in global politics, and particularly in the collective security bloc formed in Northeast Asia (Yi, 1986, p. 259; Sohn, 1991, p. 12).
Radical opposition forces maintained that the structural change in society was directed to destroy the fascist state and then construct a nationalistic and egalitarian society contributing for, and initiated by, the underprivileged and the oppressed (Yi, 1986, p. 259; Sohn, 1991, pp. 12-13).

How were they going to construct this "popularly oriented" and "nationalistic" society? Some factions of the maximalist opposition (e.g., UPMDU, YAD, EYC, democratic labor) agreed with the NKDP on the form of government, but demanded the immediate withdrawal of the military dictatorship from power. This was the precondition for opening the constitutional revision. However, some radical student activists and labor activists (e.g., Mimmint'u group, Sonoryon and Innoryon) were oriented toward violent revolution and the establishment of a Constituent Assembly (CA), and to this end, they committed to draft a Samin constitution to insure anti-military, anti-imperialist, and anti-comprador capitalist nature of the new government (Im, 1989, pp. 261-263).

Radical factions of the opposition forces committed to violence criticized the leaders of the NKDP as "opportunistic" and as de facto "collaborators with the regime." These accusations astonished moderate leaders in the opposition forces and placed them in the "difficult position of wanting to dissociate themselves from the tactics the students were using, while at the same time
wishing to mobilize the students for the massive peaceful demonstrations by which they hoped to bring down the regime" (Huntington, 1991, p. 206).

The previously dormant rifts between the moderate factions and the radical factions began to appear on April 25, 1986, when Kim Dae-jung, a leading figure of the NKDP, publicly denounced the radical student activists. The UPMDU immediately denounced the NKDP's critical stance towards radical students and workers and withdrew from the Mingungnyon (National Liaison Organization for Democracy) (Im, 1989, p. 264).

The internal crack on the opposition forces intensified at the May 3rd Inch'on rally. Instead of the NKDP attempting to "scale down" the rally to celebrate the party's success in drawing concessions from the regime by engaging in open dialogue, the radical factions of the opposition forces tried to use the rally to antagonize a revolutionary popular uprising, thus disrupting NKDP's possible compromises with the ruling forces. Thousands of radical workers and students chanted anti-American, anti-military dictatorship, anti-monopoly capitalist, and anti-NKDP slogans. They engaged in fighting the riot police into the night (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 1986, p. 36; Korea Herald, May 8, 1986; Tong-A Yearbook, 1987, p. 49; Shorrock, 1988, p. 99; Park, 1988, p. 255).
The violent demonstration shocked the nation and caused widespread concern not only among government officials but also among opposition leaders. It provided justification for an increase in governmental repression of excuse to crush the constitutional revision movement. Government leaders tried to use the incident to isolate and destroy the left. It portrayed the incident as part of a plot to establish a leftist government through violent uprising. Eventually, 129 anti-government protesters were arrested in connection with this incident and many leading opposition leaders were forced to go underground (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 1986, p. 36; Hart-Landsberg, 1989, pp. 65-66; Cohen and Baker, 1991, p. 206).

The incident inflicted a severe setback to the moderates of the opposition forces. They had consistently maintained a line of peaceful struggle to gain government concession. Moderates had to "draw a clear line" separating themselves from extremists (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 5, May 15, 1986; Ch’oe, 1989, p. 228).

Moreover, this incident also served as a sobering lesson for radical elements of opposition forces. They realized that, although the masses wanted social change, they did not share the radical forces’ violent methods to gain fundamental changes in society. Furthermore, the masses feared some of the left-wing rhetoric and actions. Hence, the radicals changed the focus of their struggle from
a radical transformation of society to the more accessible issues that could draw sympathy and support at all levels of the Korean society. They promoted the release of political prisoners; an end to torture and tear gas, freedom of the press and of assembly, and strengthening for the working-class, student, farmer, and urban poor organizations.

Radical activists worked closely with the opposition party in advancing the constitutional revision campaign. This strategic change of the radical activists encouraged the middle class to actively participate in the demonstrations in June, 1987 (Shorrock, 1988, pp. 100-101; Hart-Landsberg, 1989, p. 66).

Since the Inch'on incident, the government continued harsh repressions against the radical activists. When student activists from several universities in Seoul occupied the main library of Konkuk University on October 28, 1986, some 8,000 riot police stormed into the library after four day of the siege and arrested 1,525 students. Many students were charged with violating the National Security Law. Opposition lawmaker, Yu Song-hwan, was arrested for publicly questioning the government’s anti-communist policy. The government launched an investigation of 30 popular democratic organizations, conducted a massive police search for 10,000 radical activists on charges of pro-communist activities, and forcefully dissolved 14 radical labor organizations and the UPMDU (and its

The violent tendencies of the ruling power reached an apex. Rumors⁹ that declaration of martial law was imminent spread rapidly throughout Korea. Considering the circumstances, and aware of possible ramifications, Kim Dae-jung announced he would not run for presidency if the government accepted the direct, popularly elected presidential system (Lee, 1990, pp. 246-250).

C. THE DEADLOCK

In order to force the government to accept demands for a direct electoral presidential system, the NKDP tried to hold a mass rally in Seoul on November 29, 1986. They were prevented by a police blockade, and lack of a crowd. The failure opened the dormant cracks among opposition party members, resulting in conflicts, particularly concerning the constitutional revision within NKDP. Some members of the NKDP reconsidered the existing strategy for encouraging the direct electoral presidential system.

On December 24, 1986, Yi Min-u, the president of the NKDP, proposed the so-called "seven-point democratization demand", under which a parliamentary system of government would be accepted if the government instituted democratic reforms. The seven points were, freedom of press and
freedom of speech, with the abrogation of the basic law on the press, guarantee of people's full basic rights, political neutrality of government officials, release of prisoners of conscience and restoration of civil rights; establishment of a two-party system; implementation of local autonomy, and fair election laws (Nahm, 1987, p. 534; Im, 1989, pp. 274-275; Lee, 1990, pp. 258-259).

Although the ruling party and the U.S. immediately welcomed the proposal, the two Kims (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) staunchly rejected it. The internal squabbling within the NKDP concerning Yi's formula and the presumed plan for change of the party president from Yi Min-u to Kim Young-sam did not subside. Finally, on April 8, 1987, the two Kims formed a new opposition party, Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), to remove the obstacles to the democratization movement remaining within the opposition party. Seventy three out of 92 national assemblymen supported the two Kims' leadership (Buzo, 1987, p. 17; Moody, 1988, p. 132; Yonhap Yearbook, 1988, p. 175; Cotton, 1989, pp. 251-252).

The "disappearance of Yi Min-u plan and the emergence of a more intransigent opposition party" provided hardliners in the ruling forces with an excuse to completely suspend the debate on the constitutional revision. On April 13, 1987, in face of the steadily growing popular criticism of his regime because of Park Chong-ch'ol's torture to death,
President Chun announced a declaration to ban further
discussion of the constitutional revision. Discussions
could resume after the 1988 Seoul Olympics and Chun's
successor would be chosen through the existing electoral
college system. This virtually guaranteed victory of the
ruling party's candidate. President Chun and the ruling DJP
defended this measure by arguing badly splintered opposition
was unable to act as a responsible negotiating partner, that
time was running out, and that continuing uncertainty and
instability would jeopardize 'the two national tasks' of a
peaceful change of government and Seoul Olympics (Han, 1989,

Chun's declaration was not a total surprise. On January
12, 1987, President Chun, in his New Year's policy
statement, warned opposition that he would be compelled to
make a "momentous decision" if an agreement was not reached
soon on the issue of constitutional revision. Using the
dissolution of the NKDP, and the formation of the RDP as an
excuse, Chun carried out his threat, hoping to undermine the
new opposition RDP's positions by changing the "political
terms of reference" and "reverting to" the old electoral
college system (Olsen, 1987, p. 845; Gohar, 1988, p. 62;

Chun's declaration darkened prospects for democracy in
Korea, and precipitated wide-spread, angry popular
reactions against the ruling body. Despite the government's
threats of stern measures against the opposition movement, hundreds of Protestant and Roman Catholic ministers, priests and nuns staged hunger strikes, demanding Chun’s resignation, while university professors, artists and literary men, and lawyers issued proclamations condemning Chun’s actions and urging President Chun to accept constitutional revision. Students responded by staging violent anti-government demonstrations showing dissatisfaction and anger. These demonstrations led to further violent clashes with riot police (Nahm, 1987, p. 534; Bridges, 1987, p. 467; Mun, 1987, pp. 318-338; Yen, 1990, p. 336).

The countrywide protest against the April 13th Declaration by President Chun was hardly surprising, especially considering the following points (Buzo, 1987, p. 17; Mun, 1987, p. 318; West and Baker, 1991, p. 148).

First, many Koreans believed that the government’s intransigence was more responsible for negotiation failures than the opposition party was because of Chun’s abrupt unilateral suspension of the talks on constitutional revision.

Second, the declaration dashed the cherished goal of Koreans for democratization. To many South Koreans, this move perpetuated the military authoritarian regime, instead of promoting democracy, which was what the people craved.
Third, the timing of the announcement was poor. Even though ten months before the time of the transfer of the political power might seem insufficient time to amend the constitution, plans still could have been initiated to extend the debate. Furthermore, the announcement was made just before the annual cycle of student demonstration was about to enter its most serious phase. This is one classic example of leadership error that exacerbated the crisis situation (Johnson, 1989, p. 6).

To make matters worse, the government attempted to break up the new party founded by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Thugs were hired to assault participants at the rallies for the formation of the RDP. The harassment of the RDP party platform on legalities, and the unveiling of the cover-up of the torture-death of Pak Chong-ch’ol on May 18, 1987 caused even middle class citizens to take to the streets. It pulled the fragmented opposition together, and put President Chun into a more defensive posture (Economist, May 30, 1987, p. 40; Han, 1989a, p. 286). On May 27, 1987, the National Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC), an alliance of all opposition forces, was formed. Although President Chun tried to appease public anger and frustration by reshuffling the cabinet, it was useless. Despite the repeated demands of the opposition forces for revocation of the April 13th Declaration, the ruling party blithely continued with its own agenda. The ruling forces
established the date of the party convention to nominate Roh as the next presidential candidate on June 10, 1987.

IV. DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION FROM DEADLOCK

A. JUNE UPRISING AND JUNE 29TH DECLARATION

On June 10, 1987, under the guidance of the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution (NCDC), a street demonstration was held denouncing the cover-up of the torture-death of Pak Chong-ch’ol and demanding the revocation of Chun’s April 13th Declaration. Even people unaccustomed to political activity, businessmen, office workers and shoppers, joined in the demonstration, although they had neither a program nor leaders (Economist, June 20, 1987, p. 39; Gohar, 1988, p. 64; Im, 1989, pp. 209-291).

Several factors facilitated mass participation in this uprising: the possibility of continued military rule; moral indignation toward President Chun for reversing his promise on constitutional revision and human rights problems; blatant corruption cases involving Chun’s family and high-ranking officials; the formation of nation-wide anti-government umbrella organizations to effectively control the demonstrations (e.g., NCDC); and the use of the mass appealing catchphrases (e.g., destruction of the military dictatorship, the abolition of the present constitution)
Although some 60,000 riot police were on a maximum alert in Seoul, they were unable to control the demonstrators, and, in some areas, were overwhelmed by the massive crowds. On June 18, 1987, the demonstration in the Pusan became so widespread and violent that the city officials asked the government to declare martial law. The government seriously considered the declaration of the emergency measures on June 19, 1987 but immediately abandoned the plan (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, 1987, p. 9; Cho, 1988, p. 298; Kwon, 1990, p. 406).

The government was at a crossroads. Either military crackdown or wholesale concessions were necessary to appease the opposition forces. Abandonment of martial law meant the government chose concession as an alternative viable strategy. Why did the government not declare the martial law?

First, it was doubtful that martial law would lead to social and political stability. Even if the government successfully oppressed the democratization movement of the opposition by force, results were only achieved through bloodshed and nationwide crisis. Moreover, the ruling forces were haunted by the ghost of the bloody Kwangju Incident, and they were loathe to repeat the incident. Furthermore, the military intervention in politics might led
to derailing the peaceful transfer of power, which was a pledge President Chun attached great importance in obtaining legitimacy for his rule (Buzo, 1987, p. 15; Bridges, 1987, p. 467; West and Baker, 1988, p. 149; Han, 1989a, p. 292; Yi, 1991, p. 372).

Second, the military crackdown would severely hamper the Seoul Olympics, and greatly damage international opinion. The government was afraid of boycott or cancellation of the Seoul Olympics, which Koreans had invested so much time, money, prestige and value. Such a step would seriously disrupt the country's export-based economy, which was performing well (Gohar, 1988, p. 65; Han, 1989a, p. 292).

Third, the armed forces, except for some politically-oriented military men, were, generally speaking, reluctant to follow the hardliner's policy. Unlike the 1960's when the army first intervened in Korean politics, military officers had realized that Korean society had become so sophisticated and pluralistic that the democratization of the society was the inevitable alternative for effective management of society (Bridges, 1987, p. 467; Han, 1989a, p. 292; Cho, 1988, p. 307).

Lastly, the United States government actively persuaded President Chun not to use extreme measures through several means (Ch'oe, 1989, p. 261).
At the peak of the political crisis, on June 29, 1987, Roh Tae-woo, the party's presidential candidate, made dramatic and unexpected announcement that embodied a wholesale acceptance of opposition's demands, and he is credited with effectively ending the "spring of discontent."

Roh's eight point proposal contained the speedy constitution revision, direct presidential election, amnesty for Kim Dae-jung and other political prisoners, maximum promotion and protection of basic rights, freedom of the press, local autonomy and self-governance of universities, guarantee of freedom of political parties, and bold social reforms against corruption and crime (West and Baker, 1991, p. 232).

Whether or not Chun knew or approved of Roh's announcement is uncertain. One group maintains that Roh made the move without the prior blessing of President Chun while the other asserts that President Chun initiated the declaration.

According to the former argument, softliner Roh initiated the move without Chun's knowledge. Roh concluded that hardliner Chun's April 13th Declaration had so enraged the people that governmental concessions were inevitable in order to restore social order. If that was true, Roh thought it was necessary to abandon the vested interests (e.g., presidential election by electoral college system) for democracy. Through his personal sacrifice he hoped to
gain a positive response from the people and be able to use
pronouncement as a political asset in the upcoming
presidential election. Roh essentially gambled his
political career on the favorable public response to his
declaration. Since the positions of the hardliners had been
weakened by the increasing popular resistance, the
softliners were able to take the initiatives leading the
political situation through the negotiations with the
moderates of the opposition forces (e.g., the party
politicians in the NKDP) (Im, 1989, p. 291; Lee and Rhie,
108).

This argument stresses the lonely determination of Roh
Tae-woo for democratic causes at expense of his personal
interests, and it is his official explanation of the
motivation behind the June 29th Declaration.

Alternatively, there are strong arguments that President
Chun proposed the idea of the June 29th Declaration in close
consultation with presidential candidate Roh (e.g., Wolgan
Choson, June, 1989 and Wolgan Chungang, July, 1989). The
persuasive testimony supporting this argument comes from Kim
Song-ik, former Press Secretary to President Chun and
President Roh (Wolgan Choson, January, 1992, pp. 290-396;;
Wolgan Choson, February, 1992, pp. 290-397). Interviews of
many former high-ranking officials and politicians of the
Chun regime confirmed that the June 29th Declaration was made by Roh with the prior blessing of Chun.\textsuperscript{16}

According to this argument, Roh Tae-woo was nominated as the presidential candidate by President Chun, and the military and other forces remained under Chun's tight control. It is not feasible that Roh prepared all the measures "appropriate for the transition" without Chun's prior consent. Roh did not hold either the position nor power necessary to execute the reform measures (Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 231; Wolgan Choson, June, 1989, p. 221; Plunk, 1991, p. 108).

President Chun felt it was necessary for him to correct his error (e.g., April 13th Declaration) because of the irreversible opposition from the people. President Chun chose to dramatically reverse this national crisis by accepting the inevitable direct presidential election system of the opposition forces. President Chun also concluded that the factional divisions of the RDP and two Kims' (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) personal ambition made it impossible for the RDP to close ranks behind a single presidential candidate. Thus, the DJP had a chance of winning the next presidential election even with a direct popular vote. So President Chun and the DJP made concerted efforts to enhance the image of their presidential candidate Roh by dramatizing the whole process of the June 29th Declaration. Thus, by an elaborate public relation scheme\textsuperscript{17}
and by bestowing upon Roh the "sole credit" for the June 29th Declaration and its other succeeding democratic measures, the DJP remained in power and could perpetuate itself (Han, 1989a, p. 293; Kim, 1992, p. 383).

The declaration was secretly prepared by a small study group in the NSPA\textsuperscript{18} since mid-June. It is postulated that a series of talks between President Chun and several leading persons, including the president of the RDP Kim Young-sam and Cardinal Stephen Kim Su-hwan, were deliberate and calculated as due formalities for accepting public opinion about the political situation. Hence, the "Grand Peace March" that took place in Seoul and 30 other cities on June 26, 1987, under the guidance of the NCDC did not substantially alter the direction of the June 29th Declaration.

Even if the June 29 Declaration was the surrender of ruling forces to the demands of the people for democratization, it was not a set of unilateral concessions. Rather it was an indication of President Chun's and presidential candidate Roh's determination to bring the political turmoil under control by abandoning the vested interests (e.g., electoral college system) for maintaining political power. Indeed it was a deftly calculated counterattack from the government side (Okonogi, 1988, p. 30).
Whether presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo initiated the declaration or not, this declaration set a new precedent in government responsiveness and became an epoch-making event among political developments. The seed of modern democracy grew in the womb of the authoritarian regime under Park and Chun and finally blossomed under Roh (Lee, 1987, p. 22; Gohar, 1988, p. 66; Yang, 1989, p. 25; MacDonald, 1991, p. 12).

According to Foster-Carter (1987),

> At a stroke, Roh transformed his image from Chun's clone and crony to a brave harbinger of democracy (pp. 15-16).

The reasons for achieving widespread support resulted from the surprise and unexpectedness of the action by far beyond the people's expectations towards the ruling forces and the inclusiveness of the contents of the declaration (Wolgan Choson, June, 1989, p. 216; Yi, 1991, p. 386).

B. GRAND WORKER STRIKES AND CONSTITUTION REVISION

The first reaction to the June 29th Declaration came from the industrial workers. Hundreds of thousands of workers actively participated in strikes, demanding higher wages, better working conditions, and recognition of autonomous labor unions.

Between July and September, there were over 3,200 strikes or walkouts including factories, mines, and
transportation, which are more than had occurred in the preceding five period. The strikes were extremely violent compared to the previous labor disruptions. Over one million workers participated in strikes or walkouts. During some 3 months, 1,306 new unions were organized and 302,000 new members were added.

Table 4-3. The change of labor unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>content</th>
<th>Before June 29th Declaration</th>
<th>The late October, 1987</th>
<th>comparison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of unions</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>3,925</td>
<td>1,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of members</td>
<td>1,050,600</td>
<td>1,363,000</td>
<td>302,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of organization</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Facing serious disturbances, the government showed more restraint than it had in the past, and in some cases pressured employers to satisfy the demands of workers. It was difficult for the government to repress the laborers after liberalization measures were begun taken (Lee, 1990, p. 61; West and Baker, 1991, p. 233). However, in early September, the government resumed stern measures against the strikers. The government worried about possible coalitions between the rising labor movements and the opposition
forces, particularly among student activists. Hence, President Chun reconsidered mobilizing the military to "clean up" the left-leaning groups before the presidential elections. However, he revoked it because he believed these extraordinary measures could lead to the cancellation of the planned presidential election. President Chun firmly believed that his ruling presidential candidate still had a good chance to be elected as president (Shorrock, 1988, p. 102; West and Baker, 1991, p. 233; Kim, 1992, pp. 301-332).

Many middle class citizens felt uneasy and took a negative attitude toward the labor strikes because of the workers' radical demands and violent actions. Definitions of democratization diverged: the middle class conceived it as political democratization while the workers defined it as an economic democratization. The media's state-wide campaign promoted the perceptions of the middle class. As a result, the popular forces-middle class alliance that made a great contribution to leading to democratic opening in Korea split with the outbreak of the grand labor strikes after the June 29th Declaration (Ch'oe, 1988, p. 232; Koo and Lim, 1990, pp. 17-27).

The RDP did not publicly side with workers and abstained from politicizing workers' strikes for its political advantage. In actuality, the party worried that the strikes might threaten the democratic transition process by providing hardliners with an excuse for military
intervention as in the May 17th military crackdown in 1980. It was necessary for them to conclude negotiations for a constitutional revision with the ruling party as soon as possible. This position was shared by softliners in the ruling forces who were faced the presidential election only a few short months away (Kisayon Report 3, 1987a, p. 10; Anam Yongusil, 1988, p. 67; Im, 1989, pp. 300-301; Ch’oe, 1989, p. 263; Koo and Lim, 1990, p. 34).

After the June 29th Declaration, people’s priorities were centered on the presidential election. Leftist activists, without any real power, retreated to watch the constitution revision and the selection processes of a single presidential candidate from the opposition forces (Hart-Landberg, 1989, p. 67).

In the midst of the labor strikes, the DJP and the RDP constituted a Special Committee for Constitutional Revision and wrote a new constitution based on bipartisan consensus, for the first time in nearly 40 years. In October, 1987, the new constitution was approved by both the National Assembly and by national referendum. The new constitution enlarged the scope of civil rights and strengthened the power of the national assembly, and curtailed presidential constitutional rights such as the use of emergency power and the right to dissolve the national assembly. In addition, freedom of the press, the right of workers to strike, and the principle of habeas corpus were

V. TRANSITION ELECTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SIXTH REPUBLIC

A. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Transition elections were the first national electoral contest which followed the "restoration of political freedoms." The results are an important part of the consolidation of democracy. The outcome of transition elections depends on the nature of the regime transformation, the configuration of class structure which developed during the authoritarian period, and the strength of the semi-opposition before the regime is transformed (Bermeo, 1987, p. 213, p. 228).

The presidential election held on December 16, 1987 was an integral transition election in determining direction and characteristics of Korean democratization. With the ebb of labor strikes, the most pressing popular concern was whether or not the opposition RDP should choose a single candidate in the forthcoming election. In fact, the "strategic calculation" of the ruling forces behind the June 29th Declaration was the split of the opposition candidacy. Without it, Roh would be at a definite disadvantage. For
opposition forces to win the presidential election, they needed to cohesively support a strong single candidate.

However, consolidation behind a single individual was difficult because both Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung possessed a strong electoral support and enjoyed popularity throughout the countries. Kim Young-sam’s electoral base was South Kyongsang province, and he was the preferred choice by predominantly middle class while Kim Dae-jung’s electoral base was in the Cholla province, and he had more support from manual workers and the urban poor (Okonogi, 1988, p. 33; Im, 1989, pp. 308-309).

The marriage of convenience between the two Kims was short lived. When real political power became reachable, each followed his own political agenda. The cooperation dissolved into a struggle for personal power. Even repeated negotiations between two factions for a shared cooperation between the two Kims, and pressures from other opposition forces were not enough to unite them (Yonhap Yearbook, 1987, pp. 176-177).

According to Han Sung-joo, Kim Young-sam claimed he appealed to a broad cross section of increasingly middle-class Koreans. This made him not only very electable, in his view, but also a much more suitable figure, once elected, to unite a politically fractious nation. Kim Dae-jung saw things differently; after exile in the United States and repeated jailing and house arrests in Korea over the years, he had suffered more in the cause of democracy, he claimed. His failure to
run in the presidential election, he warned, could churn up anger and reignite the potentially dangerous regional antagonism that had always belied Korean Politics (1989a, pp. 288-289).

In fact, it was impossible for either one of them to relinquish the candidacy. Both men were intensely ambitious, and both had chance to be elected. Each firmly refused to withdraw from the race while asking the other step down. Both men ran for the presidential office separately (Kisayon Report, 1988a, pp. 21-22).

The split between the two Kims also led to division among other opposition members including students, intellectuals, dissidents, church leaders, and labor leaders. The opposition forces as a whole were divided into a pro-Kim Dae-jung group, the single opposition candidate support group, and an independent popular candidate group (Anam Yongusil, pp. 71-78; Hart-Landsberg, 1989, p. 67; Koo and Lim, 1990, p. 26).

As a result, the one government candidate, Roh Tae-woo, and three opposition candidates, Kim Young-sam (RDP), Kim Dae-jung (PPD), Kim Chong-pil (NDRP), were the competing individuals for presidency. Vigorous campaigning maximized regional and partisan appeal. Each candidate tried to make use of rivalries and animosities between the regions. Localism often took violent forms, which clearly worked to Roh's advantage. The endless violence made the voters anxious about whether the seemingly endless crises would be
resolved after the election. Political stability became more important to voters than reforms for fundamental changes in the society (Okonogi, 1988, p. 36; Han, 1989a, p. 290; Im, 1989, p. 318).

Roh promised political stability and continued economic growth, while the three opposition candidates promised the termination of the military rule. Despite widespread violence and demonstrations, the presidential election was held on December 16, 1987. Roh was elected as president with 36.6 percent of the votes cast. Kim Young-sam was second with 28.0 percent, and Kim Dae-jung came in third with 27.0 percent of the votes.

Roh Tae-woo’s largest support came from the North Kyongsang province and the upper middle class. Kim Young-sam appealed to voters in the South Kyongsang province and to the white collar voters while Kim Dae-jung received more than 90 percent of the voters from Cholla province and from the underprivileged voters (see Table 4-4 below) (Cho, 1988, pp. 389-407; Okonogi, 1988, p. 37).

The split between Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung was the primary reason for the failure of the opposition to take political power in the 1987 presidential election (Bridges, 1988, pp. 383-384; Gohar, 1988, p. 51; Kihl, 1988, p. 317; Koo and Lim, 1990, p. 26; Kim, 1992, p. 332). It was the worst scenario to the opposition forces demanding rapid democratization of the Korean society.
Table 4-4. The December 1987 presidential election returns by region (% of the total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolis region</th>
<th>% voter turnout</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>RDP</th>
<th>PPD</th>
<th>NDRP</th>
<th>UKP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inch'on</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro %</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ungbuk</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'ungnam</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonbuk</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chonnam</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongbuk</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongnam</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural %</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the scientific management of the election and elaborate preparation of the DJP made great contributions to Roh's victory. Through deft "image-up" strategies, Roh was transformed from the successor of the authoritarian ruler to the incarnation of Korean democratization. The June 29th Declaration made the distinction between Roh and opposition candidates blur in terms of democratization\(^\text{22}\), which gave Roh electoral support from those who otherwise might have been disloyal because of the authoritarian experience under Chun (Park, 1989, p. 108).

Considering the acute disadvantages inflicted by the new government if an opposition candidate won the election, the ruling forces mobilized all possible resources, such as money, mass media, ruling forces organization, to orchestrate Roh's victory (Koo and Lim, 1992).

After the presidential election, even though the two Kims and other radical activists accused the government of election frauds, most people accepted the results of the presidential election. The division of opposition forces, the lack of proof and the comfortable margin of Roh's victory convinced people that Roh's victory was legitimate (Plunk, 1991, p. 109). In spite of a mere 36.6 percent support rate in the election, the direct election of the president contributed to eliminating the legitimacy problem that had haunted President Chun (Shin, 1989, p. 112).
B. THEEmergence of the Sixth Republic and
13th Parliamentary Election

On February 25, 1988, the first peaceful transfer of power in Korean history took place, albeit within the same party. In a nation where peaceful succession is foreign, it set an epochal milestone in the democratic development of Korea. The smooth transition resulting from an open election was regarded by many Koreans as a positive step towards a more civilized nation (Yi, 1988, p. 28; Shin, 1989, p. 111).

The most immediate concern after the emergence of the Sixth Republic was the parliamentary election of April 26, 1988. Before the election, the ruling DJP negotiated the reform of the parliamentary election law with the opposition party. Each parties had different strategies toward the revision of the parliamentary election law. The DJP and PPD favored a single-member, single-district system because continued rivalry between the RDP and PPD would split the anti-government vote in competitive districts, thus allowing DJP candidates to obtain majority victories, and the PPD could exploit a solid regional base in Cholla province. However, the RDP favored the existing double-member district system because that party enjoying unenthusiastic but state-wide support except for Cholla province maintained the party as the largest opposition party.
Finally, the single-member single-district system was adopted. Under the new electoral law, the National Assembly, consisting of 299 seats, received 224 seats elected from single-member districts, and 75 at large seats, which were filled by means of party lists under a proportional system (Park, 1988, pp. 61-62; Im, 1989, pp. 322-324; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 26).

At the inauguration of the election, the ruling DJP easily obtained majority of the seats because of the split in the opposition party and the overwhelming predominance of the ruling party in the election money and organization. However, for the first time in National Assembly election history, the ruling party failed to become a majority in the National Assembly, winning only 125 seats, while Kim Dae-jung’s PPD took 70 seats and became the largest opposition party. Kim Young-sam’s RDP and Kim Chong-pil’s NDRP secured 59 and 35 seats respectively. The remaining 10 seats went to Independents and other small party (Wade and Kang, 1990, p. 46; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 27).

During the 13th Parliamentary election, each party tried to exploit regionalism. Solid and fixed regional cleavage aggravated during the presidential election overwhelmingly influenced the voting behavior of the Korean, especially when compared to other factors, such as social class, occupational specialities, age differences, education levels, and gender lines. Each party monopolized seats
within his native region (see table 4-5 below) (Im, 1989, p. 324).

Table 4-5. The April 1988 National Assembly election returns by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>region</th>
<th>% voter turnout</th>
<th>DJP</th>
<th>PPD</th>
<th>RDP</th>
<th>NDRP</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metropolis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inch’ on</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provinces</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyonggi</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kangwon</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ungbuk</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ungnam</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongbuk</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongnam</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongbuk</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyongnam</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheju</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR seats</td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yo so Yadae (small ruling party, big opposition party) was formed in the National Assembly. The failures of the DJP resulted from the timing of the election, the change from the two-member district system to a single-member district system, and the party's inability to disassociate itself from the former Chun government. Holding the election in April 1988 instead of the originally planned February election allowed opposition parties time to recover from the damages caused by the failure of presidential election. The single-member district system, based on the localism, greatly contributed to the powerful emergence of the PPD and NDRP with strong regional bases. In addition, the well-publicized arrest of Chun Kyong-hwan, former President Chun Doo-hwan's younger brother, and other scandals involving corruption and the abuse of power under former president Chun could not be separated from the DJP. Furthermore, the DJP failed to persuade the voters why a majority of seats were needed in the national assembly (Cho, 1988, p. 453; Park, 1988, p. 69; Kim, 1989, pp. 491-493; Han, 1989b, pp. 30-31).

The electoral results facilitated the democratization of Korea by the formation of strong counter-veiling powers in
the National Assembly. In fact, without the helpful opposition parties, the ruling party could not pass a bill. This contributed to the negotiations and compromises among political parties that were the necessary conditions for democracy.

With the completion of the transition to "formal democracy" through two elections (Im, 1989, p. 328), the Sixth Republic took drastic measures for democracy. They released political prisoners, and revised undemocratic laws and institutions. The Sixth Republic formed special committees in the National Assembly to uncover several misdeeds and wrongdoings that were prevalent in the Fifth Republic, and gradually the ruling party with assistance from opposition parties, liquidated irregular practices left from the Fifth Republic. Although more refinement is needed, Korea is continuing the evolutionary process to consolidate democracy.
Notes

1. For the passage of the constitutional revision in the National Assembly, the approval of two-thirds of the total assemblymen is needed.

2. Large numbers of people participated in the NKDP’s rallies (an estimated total of 500,000 to 700,000).

Table 4-6. Number of participants in the NKDP’s rallies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>No. of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 1986</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 1986</td>
<td>Pusan</td>
<td>30,000 - 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 1986</td>
<td>Kwangju</td>
<td>200,000 - 300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 5, 1986</td>
<td>Taegu</td>
<td>50,000 - 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 1986</td>
<td>Taejun</td>
<td>50,000 - 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 3, 1986</td>
<td>Inch‘on</td>
<td>30,000 - 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1986</td>
<td>Masan</td>
<td>30,000 - 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1986</td>
<td>Chonju</td>
<td>50,000 - 70,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Kisanyon. (1986). *Kae Hon kwa Minjuhwa Undong (Constitutional revision and the democratization)* (Chosa Yongu Ch‘ongso 10). Seoul: Minjungsa, 43.

3. After 28 professors of Korea University announced the statement demanding the constitutional revision on March 28, 1986, 783 professors in 29 universities and colleges participated in statement activities.

4. Radical factions of the opposition forces called themselves "National Democratic Movement forces" and their aim was achieving the popular democratic revolution.

5. EYC is an abbreviation of the Ecumenical Youth Council.

6. Minmint’u (the Struggle Committee for the Nation and Democracy) is the political arm of Chonhangnyon (the
National Federation of Student Associations) formed on April 17, 1985. Major projects of Samint’u were the promotion of labor student solidarity (Nohak Yondae), political struggle against the Chun government in coalition with opposition politicians and social movement forces, and the direct attack on the U.S. whom they believed colluded with the military dictatorship (e.g., occupation of the United States Information Service building).

7. Sonoryon (Seoul Area Labor Movement League) and Innoryon (Inch’on Area Labor Movement League) were mass political organizations formed by fired workers and labor movement activists respectively on August 25, 1985 and on February 18, 1986. These two labor organizations emphasized political struggle rather than economic struggle based on labor unions.

8. The Inch’on rally was organized by the UPMDU, Minch’ongnyon, Innoryon, Sonoryon, Minbullyon (Democratic Buddhist’s Association), Chamint’u and Minmint’u.

9. Throughout interviews of the high ranking staffers of the President Chun, I found that the government had no concrete plan to declare the martial law but tried to threaten the opposition forces by leaking the rumor.

10. According to Kim Song-ik, former Press Secretary to President Chun, President Chun and his core staffers concluded that it was too difficult to revise the constitution by bipartisan consensus or by co-optation of the opposition assemblymen. Hence, from early March, 1987, they prepared the declaration.

11. In a pre-Easter message, Cardinal Stephen Kim Su-hwan lamented "how dreams for a constitutional amendment opening a new era have been dashed---. The people will have no day to dry their tears" (Newsweek, April 27, 1987, p. 9). He also said, at a special mass at Myongdong Cathedral, that "people today lived in a dark society" that was ruled by a despotic government. He called on the people to follow the way of suffering for the truth and justice (Chang, 1987, p. 48; Mun, 1988, pp. 322-323). His statements greatly influenced the opposition movement by inducing the mass participation of the middle class in the June uprising in 1987.

12. Since April 13th Declaration, 1,527 professors, 1,031 artists and literary men, 571 Catholic clergy, and 435 Chaeya Insa participated in the protest movement (Mun, 1987, pp. 318-338).
13. The main actors in the ‘June Uprising’ in 1987 were students and middle class, but we can not disregard the role of the lower classes.

Table 4-7. The sit-ins demonstrators in Myongdong Cathedral

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Urban poor</th>
<th>Citizens</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Source: Ho, C. Y. (December 1988). Minjuhwa ui Homno: Chaeyach’uk ui Munje Usik (The rough road to democratization: The problem consciousness of the opposition forces out of the formal institutions), Minjok Chisong, p. 27.

Table 4-8. The number of those who took in prison in the June 26th peace march

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Office workers</th>
<th>Labours</th>
<th>Shoppers</th>
<th>No job</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


14. Particularly, in Seoul and Pusan, the police were temporarily helpless against the overwhelming mass of demonstrators. The seriousness and violence of the June Uprising were shown in the following statistics announced by the police: The number of demonstrations by the opposition forces (2,145) and the amount of tear gas (351,200 shots) used by the police in order to suppress the demonstrations were more than those number in the year 1986 (e.g., 2,001 demonstrations and 313,204 shots tear gas use) (see Table 4-9 below and Table 6-1 below); 6,305 policemen and 146 civilians were injured in the June Uprising.
Table 4-9. The statistics of the June Uprising

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0. Number of demonstrations</td>
<td>2,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Number of participants</td>
<td>830,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Amount of tear gas use</td>
<td>351,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Injured people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Police</td>
<td>6,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Civilians</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Destruction of property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Car</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Police station</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


15. According to Ko Myong-Sung (former Defense Security Commander), he recommended President Chun not to use the military in the crackdown of the demonstrations (Tong-A Ilbo, June 29, 1991).

16. Among seven persons in the ruling forces who I interviewed in Seoul, from July 1991 to August 1991, three persons clearly maintained that President Chun initiated the June 29th Declaration and the remaining four persons tacitly confirmed that by saying "the ongoing official explanation that the June 29th Declaration was initiated by the Roh might be different from the truth in the future," or "President Chun already had a special alternatives to solve political crisis."

17. President Chun and presidential candidate Roh tried to maximize the effects of the declaration by considering the following points: (1) choosing the suitable timing of announcement (e.g., shortly after the peak time of the political crisis); (2) including the epoch-making contents that can dramatically reverse the crisis situation; and (3) giving the impressions challenging against President Chun’s
authority (e.g., Roh said that he would resign as the party presidential nominee and other official positions if his measures were not accepted by Chun).

18. Pak Ch'ol-on, a Special Advisory to the Director of the National Security Planning Agency at that time, initiated the work. According to his explanation, he received the order to prepare for the June 29th Declaration on June 18, 1987, and the final draft was finished on June 27, 1987. Since that time, the only concern for them was the point of time of announcing the declaration.

19. The government's "hand-off policy" on labor strikes forced capitalists to do face-to-face bargaining with striking workers. Fortunately, the unprecedentedly robust economy could absorb the higher rate of wage hikes of the workers without seriously threatening national economy. According to Foster-Carter (1987, p. 16), the amount of damage caused by strikes was 0.5 billion in exports - just over one percent of the likely annual export total.

20. It is the ninth constitutional revision since the Republic of Korea was established.

21. One of the two Kims would run for president in rotation and the non-candidate would take charge of the party president. If elected, cabinet appointments and the nomination of national assemblymen candidates would be split between the two factions (Im, 1987, p. 309).

22. Roh was dubbed as the incarnation of Korean democratization by the DJP and some mass media.
CHAPTER V. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN KOREA

We have analytically explained how the democratization took place in the second half of the 1980's in the previous chapter. It is important to study why this occurrence happened (Chapter V) and who initiated the process (Chapter VI) from an eclectic perspective of combining the structure determination theory and genetic theory.

I. SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Korea achieved an "economic miracle" since the Third Republic when President Park Chung-hee embarked on his economic development plan. From the 1960's to the 1980's, the growth rates achieved by Korea were among the highest in the world. Between 1962 and 1987 the Korean economy grew at an average rate of 8.9 percent per year, and 1986 and 1987, it grew at 12.6 and 12.3 percent.

The rapid economic development changed Korea from an underdeveloped, low-income country to one of the outstanding Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) with a per capita income of nearly $3,000 in 1987 (Kim, 1985, p. 166; Moore, 1984-1985, p. 577; Chung, 1989, p. 26; Johnson, 1989, p. 7; Bennett, 1991, pp. 119-120; Huntington, 1991, pp. 71-72).

Actually, the economic development has perhaps been emphasized as the most important national goal by the
consecutive governments because the economic performance was
the main means of achieving legitimacy for the new military
regimes. In order to give priority to the economic sector,
the Korean government demobilized social and political
sectors, which produced a "seriously unbalanced society:
economically highly developed, socially moderately
developed, and politically underdeveloped country" (Kuznets,

Table 5-1. Key economic indicators of development in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP (US $ million)</td>
<td>2,315</td>
<td>50,090</td>
<td>60,030</td>
<td>81,073</td>
<td>97,300</td>
<td>118,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP growth rate</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GNP (US $)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,597</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>2,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export (US $ billion)</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (US $ billion)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T'ongsin and Tong-A Ilbosa. Tong-A Yearbook. Seoul: Tong-A Ilbosa for the various years.

As we know, however, that industrialization has
fundamentally changed the "macro social structure" as well
as the "micro personal life and thought patterns" of all
Koreans. With a higher standard of living, people were made
aware of their weak political status and the repressive
nature of the Korean political situation. A growing number of Koreans have refused to accept the traditional notion that political development should await for further economic development, arguing that political development should instead be commensurate with Korea's economic development. In particular, the demand for political liberalization is strongest among the new generation of Koreans who do not have first-hand experience of either the Korean war or Korea's poverty of the 1950's and 1960's. Economic success makes little contribution to the masses' "positive perceptions" of the authoritarian regime, instead it undermines one of the main arguments for supporting authoritarian regime, which avoiding democratization in favor of rapid economic development (Kim, 1987, p. 652; Kang, 1988, p. 219; Park, 1989, pp. 84-85; Chang, 1989, pp. 324-325; Kwon, 1989, p. 10).

With economic development, Korean society became increasingly sophisticated and pluralistic. The centrally dominated social order of the authoritarian regime could not be maintained. Power was diffused. The large conglomerates (Chaebol) which dominate South Korean business become less dependent on the state. Moreover, the autonomous intermediary organizations grew rapidly. Corporatist control of labor was undermined by a vigorous anti-government labor movement of workers, students, and

The accelerated industrialization changed Korean society from an agricultural and rural society to an industrial and urban one. For example, in the mid 1950’s, almost eight of ten people lived in the rural areas, and urban population in 1960 was only 28 percent of the total population. However, as industrialization progressed, the urban population rose to 41 percent in 1970, and 57.2 percent in 1980 (Ahn, 1983, p. 57; Chung, 1990, p. 55).

Table 5-2. Urbanization in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total population (thousand)</th>
<th>Urban population (thousand)</th>
<th>Urban as % of total population</th>
<th>No. of cities over one million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>24,989</td>
<td>6,997</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>31,466</td>
<td>12,953</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>37,436</td>
<td>21,434</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>40,467</td>
<td>26,465</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Urbanization is the locomotive of social change from a traditional society to a modern society. In Korean society, traditional manners, custom, and ways of thinking (e.g., seniority, personal favoritism, and parochialism) wane while
modern value systems are dominating, seen in more individualism, increase in professionalism, and less respect for the aged (Park, 1983, pp. 86-87). Moreover, it is a new and major change that providing economic growth is no longer enough to keep a government in power (Bennett, 1991, p. 133). The development of this modern value system is the current cultural base of democracy in Korea.

Urban voters contrive to cast their votes for the opposition party, thus resulting in "Yoch'on Yado (strong support for the ruling party in the rural areas, strong support for the opposition party in the urban areas)."

According to Dahl (1971),

The development of a political system that allows for opposition, rivalry, or competition between a government and its opponents is an important aspect of democratization (p. 1).

Under the authoritarian regimes, support for the opposition party for the purpose of checking and balancing the undemocratic ruling party and government, even though it is very limited, reflects the urban voter's desire for democracy. The rise of the opposition party was functional in Korea's movement toward democracy. For example, in the 12th parliamentary election in February, 1985, the NKDP's commitment to democratization made those who aspired for more freedom and democracy vote for the NKDP, causing the
NKDP to become the major opposition party (Chung, 1990, pp. 62-65).

In the election, the ruling DJP received around 28.4 percent of the vote in the five metropolitan areas, Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Inch'on, and Kwangju, while the NKDP received 40.2 percent of the vote (Kim and Choe, 1988, pp. 148-155).

After the election, the NKDP’s successful democratization movement against Chun’s regime was supported by the politically sophisticated urban middle class, particularly in the June uprising in 1987.

Table 5-3. Education development in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy rate</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School enrollment (million)</td>
<td>5.33</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of college students (million)</td>
<td>0.13(^a)</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) is the number of 1963.


Along with economic development, in the past four decades, mass education has expanded at a phenomenal rate. As Korea has traditionally emphasized the values of education, successive governments made primary and secondary education free to all people.
More than 77 percent of middle school graduates go on to high school. Thirty-six percent of high school graduates attend universities. College enrollments have already reached 1.2 million. With an astonishing rise to a 98 percent literacy rate, Koreans as a whole are becoming more politically sophisticated (see Table 5-3 above) (Harrison, 1987, p. 160).

Educational authorities in Korea encouraged the political awareness and teach praised democracy, especially the values of representative government and popular sovereignty. Democratization, provided opposition forces with the most valuable political issues and weapons to challenge the authoritarian regimes. The rise in public’s democratic consciousness and attitudes was largely the result of extensive democratic education conducted by the successive Korea government. More educated young people are not only more democratic in their political beliefs but also possess a better organized concept of politics. It is a logical conclusion that students are one of the primary driving forces behind political change in Korea throughout recent history (Yi, 1988, pp. 153-166; Han, 1989a, p. 269; Johnson, 1989, p. 5).

Although there were ups and downs in the development of mass media in accordance with the political situation (as indicated in Table 5-5 below), the number of mass media venues and media diffusion into society continuously
increased due to the development of modern science and technology, "economic affordability," the growth of mass education, and the urbanization of Korea. The traditional respect for the written word and high literacy rate makes Koreans enthusiastic readers of newspapers, magazines, and books. In addition, radio and television reach virtually every citizen in Korea, further contributing to a politically sophisticated voting public (see Table 5-4 above) (Park, 1983, p. 88; MacDonald, 1988, p. 121).

Table 5-4. Mass media development in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Circulation of newspapers</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>6,010</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of television sets</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>7,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(thousand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of telephone (thousand)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,879</td>
<td>4,809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The emergence of the Yushin system, the stifled freedom of the press. After the military takeover in 1980, martial law government carried out hugely extensive massive purge and undertook a revolutionary reorganization of the
mass media to control what the public accessed (see Table 5-5 below).

Table 5-5. The trend of printing media growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>News Papers</th>
<th>News Agency</th>
<th>Weekly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March, 1960 (just before April 19th revolution)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April, 1961 (before May 16th military coup)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1961 (after May 16th military coup</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1979 (before press crackdown)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1980 (after press crackdown)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Fifth Republic also tried to control and dominate the press by interfering with the editorial direction and content, as well as through the legal mechanisms and material rewards (Youm, 1986, pp. 868-882).

Under such repressive circumstances, editors developed a talent for conveying delicate and sensitive messages between the lines and testing the limits of government tolerance (MacDonald, 1988, p. 138). Underground materials provided by anti-government groups were widely read and contributed to the promotion of the anti-government atmosphere.
Moreover, some pressmen publicly unveiled the government's report "guidance" for censorship.

In conclusion, the press as a transmitter of information played an important role in the democratization of Korea, dramatically reporting important sociopolitical incidents, such as Mr. Park's torture-death and the June Incident in 1987, and television was actively employed for the first time covering the 1987 presidential election campaign.

II. THE CHANGE OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Authoritarianism is most frequently cited as a basic characteristic of Korea's political culture. This authoritarian political culture is derived from the legacy of the Confucian culture, the feudalistic role of the Choson dynasty and the oppressive rule of Japanese colonialism. Polarized political attitudes resulted from division of the peninsula, the Korean war, and subsequent anti-communist policy, and the emergence of powerful military and security establishments had negative effects on the formation of the democratic political culture (Ahn, 1988, p. 4; Cotton, 1989, p. 249).

Many scholars of Korean politics ascribed the past failures of democracy to this cultural trait (Lee, 1982, p. 67; Park, 1989, pp. 138-139; Lee, 1991, p. 3).

According to Kim Chong-lim, cultural factors most adverse to democracy are as follows: (1) an inconsistent
commitment to democracy; (2) the norms of political conformity; and (3) the norms of conflict resolution (1988a, pp. 56-57).

In specific, he argues that, although Koreans aspired for democratic rule and maintain high levels of political awareness, the people were inconsistent in their belief system and tended to remain uninvolved "spectators" in the important process of the democratic debates. Koreans were also said to exhibit "political sentimentalism," which obstructed critical and rational judgements about the performance of their political leadership. Moreover, the political culture of Korea that demanded sociopolitical conformity suppressed political competition, the central concept of democracy. Koreans did not permit diversity and severely punished any deviance. Therefore, the pattern of political participation did not derive from participatory activities that were initiated voluntarily from below, but rather political mobilization from above (1988a, pp. 56-57).

Legitimate rules of the game to solve the political conflict were nonexistence. Since Koreans believe that making a compromise was a sign of weakness and betrayal of trust to those who support them, there is no middle ground. Political competition led to "Kukhan Taegyol" (a duel until one's death) or a zero-sum game. To make matters worse, a "winner-take-all" situation makes politics a high-risk

According to Huntington, however,

Even if the culture of a country is at one point an obstacle to democracy, cultures historically are dynamic rather than passive -- -- While maintaining elements of continuity, the prevailing culture in a society may differ significantly from what it was one or two generations previously (1991, p. 311).

In the same context, despite negative legacies of the past political culture, changes in the traditional political culture have taken place in Korea. This is due to rapid socioeconomic development associated with economic development, the expansion of higher education, and the development of mass communications, urbanization, differentiation of the social stratum, and the emergence of the middle class. Mass education in democracy and the increase in media exposure raised the democratic consciousness and participation of the masses. The emergence of an intelligentsia with a strong commitment to democracy is encouraged. Urbanization and the differentiation of social structure leads to a diversity and complexity in society. This undermines the legitimacy of the traditional paternalistic form of authority by forming a countervailing power. Therefore, more open and democratic channels of participation are needed. Otherwise, the level
of dissatisfaction, political frustration, and social conflict continue to rise. Eruption of a social demand for democracy and the political struggle against society as witnessed at this time has been the "reflection of such a backdrop" (Lee, 1982, p. 60; Lee, 1985, p. 83; Ahn, 1988, p. 16; Cotton, 1989, p. 246; Park, 1989, pp. 138-139; Lee, 1991, p. 20; Hart, 1991, pp. 281-304).

In short, the Korean public's consciousness level and belief systems have been significantly altered in favor of a democratic direction. There is evidence of a more participatory political culture in political recognition and political efficacy. Variances exist in accordance with regions, classes generations (Kim, 1990, pp. 141-143).

These kinds of changes are confirmed in empirical research on Korean political culture. In a study on the lower class in the Seoul region in 1970, Yi Hong-gu concluded that even the poorest urban residents had high political interests, positive attitudes towards Korean politics, and believed of the reward system in Korean society (Yi, 1977; Lee, 1982, p. 71). In addition, although farmers have been more subjective or parochial political attitudes than even poor urban residents, voting rates and participation of campaign activity in rural areas is much higher than in small cities or a large metropolitan areas.²

Workers have more or less a participatory political attitude, and are more willing to be active in comparison to
urban poor residents or farmers. The middle class has a higher political interest and participation in politics, and more positive attitudes toward Korean politics, generally, than the lower classes. Particularly, journalists and professors are critical of their socioeconomic and political system. The critical attitudes of the middle class were expressed in the June Democratization Movement in 1987 against Chun government (Lee, 1982, pp. 73-74; Cho, 1988, pp. 136-138; Kim, 1990, p. 141-143).

In terms of generations, younger generations is more democratic and participatory than the older generations, due to a higher sense of political efficacy. By the year 1985, the postwar generation increased to 75 percent of the total population and almost 60 percent of the total voters. Having experienced greater education, wide media exposure, and a high level of urban lifestyle, typical of an industrialized society, the middle class experienced deep disparity between the ideal and the reality of Korean politics. Their perception has brought a high degree of political cynicism and political frustration. The younger generation is more negative towards state authority than the older generation. The youth therefore attempt to realize goals by collective and extra-legal means (Lee, 1985, pp. 52-53; Ahn, 1986-1987, p. 23; Ahn, 1988, pp. 9-15; Oh, 1989, p. 7).
In addition, education heavily influences the development of democratic political culture. It cultivated trust, tolerance, and critical ability essential to the democratic political culture. The more educated an individual, the more democratic his politics (O, 1991, p. 162).

Thus, adult males, urban residents, members of younger generation, the better educated groups, and professional workers tend to have the following political characteristics: 1) they have comparatively higher political knowledge; 2) they have clear political understanding and political efficacy; 3) they are interested in and actively participate in politics; and 4) ideologically, they support democracy (Lee, 1982, pp. 214-215; Chong, 1988, p. 345; Shin and Min; 1989, pp. 38-39).

Historically, Korean political culture, until and immediately following the national independence from the colonial Japan, consisted typically of a combination of the parochial and the subject political culture. However, with the expansion of mass education and mass media, student and intellectuals tended to develop a participatory political culture, evidenced by the April 19th student revolution as an example of the explosion of students participating in politics. With the success of the May 16th military coup, the authoritarian Park’s regime forced the people to accept a subject political culture; traits common to the rural community and the poorest urban residents. The urban
intellectuals and students, on the other hand, maintained their rebellious participatory political culture and actively protested repression against the highly authoritarian Yushin system. In the 1980’s these participatory tendencies were strengthened (Yun, 1989, pp. 34-35; Koo, 1990, pp. 85-86).

Studies on changes in Korean political consciousness from 1974 to 1984 by Yi Nam-yong and the comparative study on the differences in political consciousness between 1978 and 1985 by Kil Sung-hum shows a tremendous growth of political consciousness in the masses.


With socioeconomic development, the society became more differentiated, specialized, and universalized, and the citizens became "more informed, more concerned politically, and more rational" (Chung, 1990, p. 86). These acted as indirect factors facilitating democratic transition of South Korea in the latter part of the Fifth Republic by forming the cultural base of a persistent and unfailing democratization movement.
III. INFLUENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

A. THE INTERNATIONAL TREND OF DEMOCRATIZATION
AND ITS IMPACT ON KOREAN POLITICS

Beginning in the latter part of the 1970's, winds of democratization began to blow in Latin America, and redemocratization became an international trend in the 1980's. Whenever popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes in other countries took place, the Chun government tried to minimize foreign political implications and resist the effects into the internal politics of Korea. Opposition forces, on the other hand, capitalized on these trends and demanded more rapid democratization in Korea.

However, in this "smaller and more open world" because of the media revolution, it was impossible for the Korean government to completely block the spreading "democratic contagion" (Herman and Petras, 1985, p. 84). Images and stories of democratization, or its suppression heightened public awareness and increased opportunities for democratic transition through the "political entrepreneurship" of challengers (Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 22).

According to Cheng and Kim (1991),

The scenes of violent street demonstrations—showing not only the students but the middle class—and the dreadful response of the riot police were broadcasted almost daily on the evening news programs in Korea and the United
States, and reported on the front page of newspapers around the world (p. 25).

Although having only symbolic demonstration effects, the opposition forces were encouraged in their protests against Chun regime. Moreover the international repercussions were stirred up by the Korean democratization movement. Foreign countries, particularly the United States of America, became actively involved in the internal politics of Korea, urging implementation of democratic virus.

The downfall of Marcos in the Philippines in February 1987 through the people's power movement caused the Korean government, as well as opposition forces to recognize the diffusion and demonstration effects. Democratic transition in the Philippines greatly inspired the opposition forces. Major Christian churches in Seoul again voiced opinions on human rights and other political issues. University students returned to the campuses in the spring of 1986 in a volatile mood. The opposition NKDP tried to maximize the people's power through a series of open rallies for constitutional revision. Active and detailed reporting of the Korean news media on the people's power in the Philippines, despite the stringent regulations of the government on the press, made a great contribution in forming the atmosphere of supporting the opposition forces'

However, the Philippines' democratic transition gave the ruling elites a warning sign. Marcos's downfall taught them the instability of an arbitrary rule against the people's will, and frightened the government into more curtailed activities (Chung, 1990, pp. 269-270).

President Chun finally dropped his original insistence that the transfer of power would proceed in 1988 under the old undemocratic rules established at the outset of his administration, and instead, Chun tried to compromise with the opposition (Cotton, 1989, pp. 244-259). Much of the progress was due to the example of Marcos in the Philippines.

B. THE U.S ROLE

Historically, the U.S. has been the most influential foreign power in South Korea since the end of World War II, initially, playing an important role in the emergence of the Republic of Korea. Later, the U.S. actively intervened in Korean affairs as a protector against the North Korean invasion and as an active provider of massive aid for reconstruction of the Korea. In recent years Korea remains a crucial U.S. economic interest as the seventh U.S. largest
largest trading partner. U.S. policy makers have perceived Korea as being vital to the protection of the U.S. security interests in East Asia and 42,000 soldiers are stationed in Korea as defense against North Korea invasion and to maintain strategic interests of the U.S. The United States' first priority toward Korea was placed on security and economic development of Korea but not necessarily on democratization of authoritarian regime (Ha, 1986, pp. 416-423; Council on Foreign Relations and The Asia Society, 1987, p. 22; Gleysteen and Romberg, 1987, p. 1044; Nix, 1988, p. 249; Shorrock, 1988, p. 108; Chung, 1990, p. 266; Cohen and Baker, 1991, p. 171).

The United States, while usually supported successive authoritarian regimes, especially if those regimes were anti-communist and pro-American (Muller, 1985, pp. 445-469), even if the U.S. was critical of the human rights problems of Korea. The reason for this seeming contradictory behavior stems from strategic and geopolitical considerations, and because of the assumption that "economic development would lead to political development" and that the "authoritarians would be better at enforcing the necessary sacrifice for development," (Nam, 1987, pp. 167-168; Pyon, 1987, pp. 359-360; Nix, 1988, p. 249; Chung, 1990, p. 267; Rothstein, 1991, p. 59). The U.S. government, albeit unenthusiastically, supported the Chun regime because there appeared no other alternatives.
The main focus of U.S. diplomacy toward Korea was "quiet diplomacy." U.S. policymakers under the Reagan Administration argued quiet persuasion and secret diplomacy were politically more desirable than open criticism and realistically would moderate the authoritarian Korean government.

Some people that criticized the "quiet policy" maintained that, if the quiet diplomacy had been combined with public diplomacy and other forms of pressure, it could be much more effective. Many perceived a conspicuous "trade off" between protecting U.S. strategic interests by supporting pro-United States authoritarian governments in Korea and promoting human rights. American policymakers concluded that prolonged military rule and continued U.S. support to the authoritarian leader undermined the military interests of the U.S. in Korea or caused incalculable damage to their strategic position in the Far East because support of Chun could lead to anti-Americanism sentiment, and eventually inspire an anti-American regime in the Korean peninsula (Nix, 1988, p. 249; Shorrock, 1988, p. 108; West and Baker, 1988, pp. 176-177; Davydov, 1988, p. 82; Kim, 1989, p. 750; Han, 1988 p. 382; Cohen and Baker, 1991, p. 219).

The U.S. began to change its stance in 1986, when the prospects for democratization between the government and the opposition party turned into a dangerous confrontation.
Subsequently, throughout a series of public commentary and speeches, the U.S. government applied "relatively open diplomacy" favoring human rights and the democratization process in Korea. The U.S. government publicly delivered its own messages, and the U.S. Ambassador to Korea met with opposition leaders for the first time since 1980 (Shaw, 1991, pp. 15-16).

At that time, American diplomatic objectives were expressed as follows: (1) a relaxation of political tensions through compromise between the government and opposition forces; (2) a peaceful transition of South Korean leadership; (3) the construction of a more legitimate pro-U.S. government through fair elections and especially through the avoidance of another military coup; and, (4) progressive civilianization of the Republic of Korea regime (Kisayon, 1986, p. 84; Kim, 1986, p. 45; Gleysteen and Romberg, 1987, p. 1044; Shorrock, 1988, p. 1108; Shaw, 1991, p. 16).

On February 6, 1987, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Gaston Sigur emphasized the importance of "civilianizing" the Korean government. He urged the military to concentrate on its "primary mission" of national defense (Chang, 1987, p. 46; Gripp, 1989, p. 192; Han, 1988, p. 382; Shaw, 1991, p. 16), and the U.S. government reminded the opposition forces in Korea of the self-restraint of extreme action by emphasizing various
side-effects of such behavior; precipitating army intervention in internal politics and the eventual failure of democratization in Korea (Gleysteen and Romberg, 1987, p. 1054; Gripp, 1989, p. 192).


In the latter part of June 1987, when political tensions peaked and risk of military intervention into the anti-government demonstrations surfaced, the U.S. government increased its pressure on President Chun. On June 19, 1987, President Reagan sent a letter to President Chun urging him not to use military force against his opponents, and to resume negotiations with the opposition. He also sent Assistant Secretary Sigur to Seoul to assess the situation and to seek a peaceful solution in the deepening crisis (Newsweek, July 13, 1987, p. 10; Anam Yongusil, 1988, pp. 45-46; Wolgan Choson, December, 1989, pp. 121-126; Huntington, 1991, p. 95).

The U.S. House of Representatives adopted a resolution (H. Con. Res. 141), initially introduced on June 16, 1987, expressing regret over Chun’s decisions to suspend talks with the opposition, and calling for resumption of serious negotiations to facilitate democratic reforms in Korea. A
similar bill (S. Res. 241) was unanimously approved by the U.S. Senate on June 27, 1987. It was the determined reports of U.S. mass media on the Korean political situation that made U.S. policymakers pay more attention to Korea (Kim, 1987, pp. 661-662; Anam Yongusil, 1988, p. 46; Nix, 1988, p. 257; Gripp, 1989, p. 192).

However, there are two conflicting arguments about the U.S. role in the democratization of Korea. On the one hand, some people argue that the U.S. made a considerable contribution to the peaceful solution of these serious political disturbances because traditionally Americans not only defended Koreans but were also their mentors and big brothers. Koreans fostered an image or perception toward the U.S. that the latter played an important role in Korean politics (Diamond, Lipset, and Linz, 1987, p. 17; Diamond, 1988, p. 63; Han, 1988, pp. 382-383; Chung, 1990, p. 269; Cohen and Baker, 1991, p. 172), regardless of the factual basis.

Other Koreans argue that the U.S. played a minor role in the democratic transition in Korea, and that the degree of influence ascribed to the United States was exaggerated, claiming it was very limited for the U.S. to influence Korean politics (Council on Foreign Relations and The Asian Society, 1987, p. 22; Newsweek, July 13, 1987, p. 10; Lee, 1988, p. 2; Kim, 1988, pp. 85-113; Nix, 1988, p. 259; West

Throughout, even during the occupation period, Americans have been frustrated by the marginal nature of their influence as Koreans have, for the most part, made their own sovereign decisions (p. 1044).

In conclusion, although democratic transition in Korea emerged primarily from the democratization movement by Koreans, U.S. diplomatic pressures and active reporting of the U.S. press on the Korean political situation contributed to enhancing the conciliatory atmosphere between the opposition forces and ruling forces, which promoted the democratic transition rather than a catastrophic confrontation (e.g., martial law or people’s revolution). Unlike general perception, however, the U.S. did not directly involved in the preparation of the June 29th Declaration and in the presidential election (Kim, 1988, pp. 111-112; Kim, 1992. pp. 242-251)

C. THE ROLE OF THE SEOUL OLYMPICS

The Chun government hosted the Seoul Olympics to strengthen social and political mobilization, as well as to improve the international image of Korea. At first, many opposition activists protested against holding the Olympics in Seoul. They feared the Olympics would enhance the
legitimacy of the authoritarian Chun regime, and Chun used these as excuses to crackdown on dissidents in the name of promoting successful Olympic games.

However, the benefits of the successfully hosting Seoul Olympics became an almost universal aspiration for Koreans. The Seoul Olympic became a major source of national pride because it symbolized the international recognition of Koreans' cherished transition from the Third to the First World, similar to what the 1964 Tokyo Olympics did for Japan. Furthermore, the South Koreans conceived the Seoul Olympics as an ideal way to expand their international contacts, particularly with the socialist countries (Gleysteen and Romberg, 1987, p. 1043; Bridges, 1988, p. 382; Moody, 1988, p. 132; Nix, 1988, p. 251; Totten, 1988, pp. 14-15; Cotton, 1989, p. 253; Chung, 1990, p. 271).

Hosting of Seoul Olympics was foremost matter of concern for Chun as well as for the public. When President Chun instructed his press secretary to draft a statement accepting direct election system of the president in late June, 1987, he said to one of his press secretary in the following manner:

Even if the ruling DJP lost the political power, we should successfully host the Seoul Olympics (Kim, 1992, p. 384).

President Chun and his government carefully attempted to avoid damaging the success of the games by adopting a more
conciliatory stance toward the opposition forces. The ruling forces concluded that the continued internal political instability would usher in a "rancorous era of much more widely publicized political bloodletting" instead of enjoying the aura of goodwill the government expected to gain from the Olympics. Furthermore, if the government declared martial law to repress the nationwide demonstrations in June 1987, the International Olympic Committee (I.O.C) would have been forced to shift the games elsewhere, humiliating the nation and discrediting Chun. The boycott of the Seoul Olympics by other nations was one of President Chun's greatest concerns. The government tried to present its "best face" to the world (Olsen, 1987, p. 841; Gray and Warren, 1987, p. 36; Moody, 1988, p. 132; Johnson, 1989, p. 8; Chung, 1990, p. 271).

Opposition forces also realized the importance of the Seoul Olympics, and capitalized on the government's limited position. They correctly presumed that President Chun would not ruin the opportunity to host the games with continued abuses (e.g., martial law), allowing the opposition forces to become bolder in expressing their desire for democratization (Olsen, 1987, p. 841).

The Olympics compelled each side to impose its mandate for an agenda for bargaining to resolve differences in a timely fashion. The Seoul Olympics is a good example of how "non-political issues or events can be utilized and
manipulated to support the democratic transition" (Gray and Warren, 1987, p. 36; Totten, 1988, p. 18; Rustow, 1990, p. 79; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 22).

IV. UNEXPECTED ACCIDENTS

In the opinion of most South Koreans, Chun's takeover through the bloody repression against Kwangju uprising, and unpalatable incidents of corruption involving his family and high-ranking officials made his regime illegitimate. The iron-fisted governance of Chun's regime led to a host of human rights abuse problems, which intensified this negative image and eroded the moral base of the Chun government. Among them, the most well-known, dramatic and devastating blows to Chun's regime were the Miss Kwon sexual interrogation incident of June 1986, and the Pak Chong-ch'ol torture death incident while in police custody in January 1987. They are referred to as the 'Korean Dreyfus Affairs' (Harrison, 1987, pp. 154-175; Dong, 1991, p. 276).

The former took place during the government's harsh repression against the leftist activists after the May 3rd Inch'on Incident. Miss Kwon, a student-turned-labor activist, was arrested for 'falsifying her job application documents' by concealing her education. She was suspected by the police of becoming an industrial worker in order to organize labor unions. She was taken to court, found guilty of lying on her employment application, and sentenced to a
year and a half in prison. However, she disclosed that she was sexually abused by the police interrogator. At first, prosecutors refused to indict the policeman directly involved in the case, and maintained that such an accusation was conjured by radical activists to vilify the public power of the government and neutralize its effectiveness. This incident aroused public outcry against the government. On July 19, 1986, the opposition forces held mass rallies disclosing the whole story of Miss Kwon's sexual torture. Moreover, several women's organizations organized a special committee handling the countermeasures on the Miss Kwon sexual interrogation incidents. Finally, after two appeals and much public protest, Miss Kwon was vindicated, and the policeman was found guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison (West, 1987, p. 69; Tong-A Yearbook, 1987, pp. 156-157; Ogle, 1990, p. 100; Cohen and Baker, 1991, p. 200).

The torture-death was a "political typhoon" that the Chun government could not control as it engulfed the entire political scene of Korea. From October 1986 to the early part of 1987, the authorities conducted sweeping roundups of suspected radical activists. During this campaign, there were numerous human rights abuses. In the middle of the crackdown, an "unexpected bombshell" inflicted serious damages to the Chun's regime when the Pak Chong-ch'ol incident became public on January 14, 1987 (U.S. Department of State, 1988, p. 731; West and Baker, 1991, p. 229).
Pak Chong-ch’ol, a Seoul National University Student, died while he was interrogated by police about the whereabouts of another campus activist. At first, the police announced that he died of shock and tried to "hang the blame on overzealous low-level interrogator." However, an attending physician and press reporters later proved this to be false. The youth’s tragic fate symbolized the seriousness of the human rights abuse in Korea, and public outrage continued to mount. Because Pak was not a student leader and not known as a radical, his torture-death alarmed many Koreans who worried about their own children. Although resignations of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Chief of the National Police followed, it was not sufficient to quell popular outcry and demand for justice (West, 1987, p. 69; West and Baker, 1988, p. 147).

Opposition forces tried to politically make use of the incident by holding a memorial rally in the name of "A Great National Peace March for Abolition of Torture and for Democratization" on February 7 and March 3 respectively. They could hold that because of a police blockade, which only gave the anti-government movement in and outside of party politics cause to a rally around, and greatly contributed to strengthening the position of hardliners within the opposition.

The position of the hardliners in the ruling forces were weakened by this incident. At that time, the ruling party
was trying to attract moderates of the opposition party with a planned amendment of the parliamentary system, and the opposition NKDP was in disarray because Yi Min-u, the president, had agreed to accept the parliamentary system of the ruling DJP if the ruling forces took democratic measures in advance. Pak's torture-death made the solution of the constitutional revision problems through negotiations between the ruling party and opposition party impossible, which was the worst possible outcome for the DJP (West and Baker, 1988, p. 147; Han, 1988, p. 376; Gripp, 1989, p. 195; Im, 1990, p. 70).

To exacerbate the situation, the Chun government was placed in an even more embarrassing position by the announcement of the Ch’onjukyo Chongui Kuhyon Sachetanan (Catholic Priest Association for the Realization of Justice), an organization of Catholic priest. It disclosed the complicity of high-ranking officials in the cover-up of Pak's torture death in May 18, 1987. This revelation decisively damaged the credibility of the government. Pak's death was not merely an individual's tragedy but was instead into a symbol of an absence of Korean political rights.

As a result, the students as well as middle class actively participated in the democratization movements. The government tried to minimize public indignation with a reshuffling of the cabinet, including ousting Prime Minister No Sin-yong and the Director of National Security
Planning Agency, Chang Se-dong, who represented the hardliners in the ruling forces. but the attempt was futile (Buzo, 1987, p. 16; Gohar, 1988, p. 61; Yonhap Yearbook, 1988, pp. 184-185).

In conclusion, these unexpected incidents struck the Chun regime a mortal blow by fostering popular resentment, and became a crucial factor leading to Chun’s about-face on the issue of the direct election of the president. Government handling of the unexpected accidents contributed to changing the course of history.
Notes

1. In Confucian culture, the paternalistic authority, hierarchical social order, and moralistic ways of life are conceived as uncongenial to democracy. In other words, the hierarchical concepts of the Confucian culture tend to preclude extensive participation by the ordinary citizen. Most people do not think of themselves as citizens with rights to exercise and responsibilities to perform. In addition, the moralistic way of life tends to preclude compromise because people must maintain their purity of conscience, and compromise is an essential concept of democracy (Henderson, 1968, p. 365; Cotton, 1989, p. 245; Park, 1989, pp. 138-139; Huntington, 1991, p. 303).

2. Some scholars perceive this phenomenon as the "mobilized participation" by local administration officials and other local notables. However, the raising of farmers' political consciousness by the spread of mass media and the development of autonomous farmers organizations (e.g., Catholic Farmers Association, Christian Farmers Association), has made the mobilized participation in the rural areas difficult.


4. The causes of anti-Americanism, generally speaking, resulted from the perceived U.S. complicity in Kwangju massacre in May 1980, U.S. continued support for the authoritarian Chun's regime, and U.S. pressure on Korea to open the latter's markets to American goods (Kim, 1989, p. 750).

5. In June, 1987, when Chun's regime faced serious political crises caused by nationwide demonstrations, some member countries of I.O.C did doubt the successful hosting of the Seoul Olympics and maintained that they should find other hosting place, such as Paris or Los Angeles. In addition, some high-ranking officials of I.O.C publicly revealed that they were ready to host the games in other places if Korea could not successfully do it.
CHAPTER VI. THE LEADING ACTORS IN THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

I. POPULAR DEMANDS FOR DEMOCRACY

The Fifth Republic government tried to establish a new authoritarian social and political order which excludes both influential opposition politicians and other leaders of civil society. In order to mollify political opposition forces and potential adversaries of the government, state terror and corporatist control mechanisms were used. Political parties were banned. The National Assembly and universities were temporarily closed. The once-free press was fettered, and the labor movement was persecuted.

A strong authoritarian state and a weak civil society formed. Although the Chun regime went unchallenged during the first three years, popular grass-roots groups (e.g., workers, peasants, urban marginals) and former opposition politicians publicly challenged the regime (Hong, 1988, p. 221) with Abertura (liberalization measures) beginning in late 1983.

However, this civil resurrection basically resulted from the popular ardent desire for democratization. The economic success of the consecutive authoritarian regimes and the accompanying rapid social change (e.g., improvement in the security situation, the growth in mass education and mass media) encouraged strong pressures for political and
economic reform of the authoritarian regime rather than to establish political legitimacy. The authoritarian regime was rejected as a viable system for Korea. It failed to spread the benefits of rapid growth all large socioeconomic groups, and instead concentrated political power in the hands of a "military oligarchy" (Council on Foreign Relations and The Asia Society, 1987, p. 1; Hamilton and Tanter, 1987, p. 63; Totten, 1988, p. 3; Gershman, 1989, p. 133).

The Chun regime encountered a legitimacy crisis because of the way it came to power and because of its subsequent behavior. Hence, most people felt that their country had reached a "stage where it should have a government elected by a democratic process without military interference." They hoped that the military would gradually and legitimately retreat to the barracks by way of a presidential election under a new constitution (Council on Foreign Relations and The Asia Society, 1987, p. 9; Okonogi, 1988, p. 28).

The often pathetically intense desire for democracy on the part of the populace came partially from a reaction to the continued efforts by the ruling elites of successive regimes to maintain authoritarian rule. Subsequent attempts by authoritarian leaders to keep themselves in power by an iron fist only intensified the popular demand and yearning
for democracy (Kim, 1991, p. 141). According to Han Sung-joo,

The demand and aspiration for democracy have been so intense and forceful that even the supporters of an authoritarian government have come to admit the inevitability (1989a, p. 267).

Korean desire for democracy was confirmed by several empirical surveys. In a survey conducted by Shin, Chey, and Kim in November 1984, over 86 percent of the college-educated Koreans desired 'an immediate end to military rule for democracy.' Eighty seven percent of the most affluent also wanted to live in democracy. Regardless of socioeconomic status and other personal characteristics, more than three-quarters of the Koreans believed that "democracy would be best for their country." Moreover, nearly three out of five believed that "democracy should and could be set up in Korea immediately" (Kim, 1987, pp. 652-653; Shin, Chey, and Kim, 1987, pp. 15-17).

According to an unpublished survey conducted by Kyonghyang Shinmun (daily newspaper) in 1987, 65.2 percent of those questioned were either "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" with the Chun regime, and only 21.7 percent were "satisfied" (Harrison, 1987, p. 159). Of note was a survey on the middle class conducted by the Social Science Institute of the Seoul National University and Hanguk Ilbo (daily newspaper) in June 9, 1987. Eighty-five point seven
percent of those questioned believed that human rights should be promoted even if economic growth was diminished. One percent gave a positive answer concerning the progress of democracy under the Fifth Republic, while 96 percent agreed to include the right to resist into the new constitution (Hanguk Ilbo, June 9, 1987). The political climate was ripe for democratization, and the inevitable direction of Korea toward it could no longer be delayed.

Public opinion favoring democratization congealed and diffused by an activated civil society beginning in late 1983. Several autonomous organizations in the civil society and the opposition party (e.g., NKDP, RDP) initiated the democratization movement. Despite many obstacles, the press played an important role in organizing public opinion concerning democratization and publicizing it to the whole society (Yi, 1988, p. 114).

The emergence of the Fifth Republic, brought censorship to the Korean press, which was strictly controlled by the government. The most serious restrictions placed on the press were the forced dismissal of over 900 journalists, the closure and merger of various media organs, the establishment of the Basic Press Law, and repressive administrative guidelines for the press reporting. The Basic Press Law placed responsibility on the press for public interest and gave the Minister of Culture and
Information the right to repeal publication of the news media (Won, 1991, pp. 5-6).

The methods of control used by the Chun regime were censorship, financial pressure to the owners of the news media, and co-optation of journalists (Park, 1983, p. 148). In order to take charge of censorship, the Public Relations Policy Bureau in the Ministry of Culture and Information was established in January 1981. This bureau sent the mass media daily "guidelines for the press reports" on "how they should treat a particular story, and even what page it should appear on." Additionally, the contents of television news were also used for propaganda purpose; it was closely monitored and predominantly pro-government. It focused on the president’s daily activities and tried to suppress or curtail reports of anti-government actions of opposition groups. However, even television bias toward the government did not contribute to raising the legitimacy level of the Chun regime (Park, 1989, pp. 163-164).

The government tried to regulate the circulation of information adverse to its interests. The press was restricted in its role as a social watchdog and as a forum for freely channeling public opinion. Dialogue between the people and the government was hampered, and necessary input to the political system was blocked. The populace could not get effective feedback, and governmental policies were

Because the press could not function as a transmitter of public opinion, informal channels began flourished. Rumors and hearsay were widely circulated (Park, 1983, p. 142). Many underground leaflets, books, magazines were published by the anti-government organizations. Former student movement leaders after graduation worked in the publishing circles, publishing many social science books criticizing the political and social situations of Korea.

Since the Abertura in late 1983 and the emergence of a strong opposition party in 1985, the government's daily monitoring of newspapers proved ineffective. Newspapers gradually criticized the government. Even within the narrow margin for reporting, there was some flexibility subtly critical of governmental policy, although criticism against the president or stories explicitly challenging his political legitimacy tended to be suppressed. Hence, "newspapers reporting was not entirely favorable toward the government" (Park, 1989, pp. 163-164).

In order for the press to convey ideas, newspaper editors and reporters intentionally evaded the government guidelines by clever editing or even publicly disregarding government guidelines. In December 1986, the three dissident pressmen who released the guidelines to the public were arrested on charges of violating laws concerning
national security\textsuperscript{2} (Yi, 1988, p. 146; Kwon, 1987, pp. 314-315). Despite the government's control, some monthlies published by the famous Tong-A Ilbo (Daily Newspaper) and Choson Ilbo (Daily Newspaper) (e.g., Sin Tong-A, Wolgan Choson) relayed the activities of democratization movement organizations of the opposition forces, and published articles criticizing Chun regime.

Since the April 13th Declaration, especially, newspapers actively reported the democratization movements of the opposition forces and reached the peak in the June democratization movement in 1987.\textsuperscript{3} Conclusively, competitive and active reporting by the media greatly contributed to diffusing the demonstrations for democratization throughout the entire country (Yi, 1988, p. 146).

II. ACTIVATION OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT GROUPS

A. AN ACTIVATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Democratization may be understood in terms of growth of autonomous and independent civil society from the control of the repressive authoritarian state. The autonomous organizations in the civil society provide a pluralistic infrastructure by creating the base for the control of the state by society. Hence, the growth of democratic political
institutions become the most effective means of exercising that control (Diamond, Lipset, and Linz, 1987, p. 11; Lee, 1990, p. 6). According to Diamond, Lipset, and Linz,

A rich and free associational life may serve as an important source of democratic vitality, leadership, and experience, a training ground for democratic competition and accountability, and a stimulus to participation in the formal political area (1987, p. 11).

However, if the state is too strong and centralized, there is no place for civil society to check the arbitrary power of the powerholders. For the democracy to flourish, it is necessary to maintain a balance between the state and civil society, as well as between the "output" (e.g., bureaucracy) and "input" institutions of the state (e.g., the press and parliament) (Diamond, 1989b, p. 22). This balance occurs when various autonomous organizations in civil society voice their opinions and exercise full autonomy while the power of the state is greatly diffused and checked (Hong, 1988, p. 232).

During transition periods, powerholders try to keep their influence by maintaining the status quo, while various challenges from civil society demand political reform in order to alter the balance of power in their favor. The struggle for power between powerholders and challengers from civil society have in some cases determined the course and outcome of regime change. The struggle of civil society for
democratization may complement the political society's struggle against the authoritarian regime (Lee, 1990a, pp. 9-10).

Democratization movements of Korea between 1985 and 1987 show the 'resurrection of civil society' and popular upsurge of mobilization for democratization. The powerholder groups or the ruling groups were composed of the ruling party, military, bureaucrats, and the business elites, while challengers or opposition groups frequently students, laborers, farmers, religious leaders, and the opposition parties. Acting as a liaison for both sides, the middle class played its common "role of stabilizer" as well as a central force for political change (Chung, 1987, pp. 56-63; Hong, 1988, p. 234; Diamond, 1989a, p. 43).

Leading actors are the military in the powerholder groups, and students acting as challengers. They were mutually hostile veto groups in Korean body politics. The former placed emphasis on national security, anti-communism, and economic growth, while the latter sought radical democratization in various spheres of society and reunification. The strategies and behaviors of the two groups decisively influenced the direction of Korean history.

It is evident that the resurrection of a civil society in Korea resulted from the differentiation of the social structure and the specialization accompanying the
successful industrialization of the prior 30 years. Rapid industrialization of Korea in the 1960's and 1970's brought enormous change in class composition, and the middle and working class grew simultaneously. For example, between 1960 and 1985, manual production workers increased from 34 percent to 51 percent of all wage and salaried workers. The percentage of the white-collar salaried workers rapidly increased from 4.8 percent in 1955 to 17.1 percent in 1985. This represents the rapid growth in numbers of managerial workers in the private sector. These expanding social classes within the urban sector turned away from the authoritarian regime because of economic inequality and authoritarian political reality (Lee, 1988, p. 13; Koo, 1990, p. 5).

As Korean society became more modern and complex, political and social interest groups developed with more complex and sophisticated needs. This is especially evident in conjunction with liberalization measures of Chun regime in the late 1983.

Although the government tried to tightly regulating interest groups by interfering with the running of these groups, such as management, membership, financing, and the articulation of their interests, new demands and interests from the civil society could not be completely ignored: the autonomous functioning of the infrastructure. The Chun regime could, at best, hope to achieve through the
repressive regulations against various interest groups was the "political stability at superficial level with latent instability inside." The blockade of normal channels of interest articulation finally resulted in violent forms of interest articulation (Park, 1983, p. 134).

The most unique characteristic of the 1980’s democratization movement was the support from the diverse groups of citizens. Anger against the authoritarian Fifth Republic was no longer limited to radical students and intellectuals. In 1984-85, various social sectors of civil society organized themselves against the authoritarian Chun regime. New organizations in the already activated sectors expanded their scope to incorporate new members, and each movement organization identified its focus and formed a popular alliance for democracy across the movement sectors (Lee, 1988, p. 13; Lee, 1990a, p. 386), regardless of differences in strategy, tactics, and ideology.

The representative umbrella organizations initiating democratization movements under a common cause were Mint’ongnyon (United People’s Movement for Democracy and Unification, UPMDU) in 1985, Mingungnyon (National Liaison Organization for Democracy) in 1986, and Minju Honbop Chaengch’wi Kungmin Undong Ponbu (National Coalition for Democratic Constitution, NCDC) in 1987.

The networks among the various democratization movement organizations were strengthened by close personal ties among
the leading members, many of whom were former student movement leaders. They shared common experiences throughout their resistances against the successive authoritarian regimes which began in the 1970's.

Many of the student leaders, after graduation or expulsion from the university, continued to actively participate in forming autonomous democratization movement organizations, such as labor organizations, peasant organizations, and other political organizations. Unlike the 1970's, the leaders of the democratization movement of the 1980's were not a few token well-known individuals but the actual representatives of various autonomous bodies (Lee, 1990a, p. 393).

The main issues of these challenging groups was the democratization of Korean politics, and especially, the direct election of the president. Human rights problems, corruption of Chun's family and high ranking officials of the Chun's regime, and economic inequality were secondary issues. More Radical activists in student, religious, and labor movements demanded fundamental changes from a liberal democracy to a socialist state based on social equity. In order to maximize people's participation in democratization movement, however, they moderated their radical slogans to appeal to a more general public.

The basic tactics of the democratization movement organizations were nonviolent resistance combined the
intramural struggles with extramural protests. They distributed statements, published regular bulletins, and offered educational programs for the public as well as participating in hunger strikes. They organized a signature movement for constitutional revision, and a campaign for a public boycott of listening fees for KBS programs (Cho, 1986, p. 185; Lee, 1990a, p. 387).

Table 6-1. Indicators of political crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>contents and protests</th>
<th>riot police</th>
<th>use of tear gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>32,705</td>
<td>2,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39,706</td>
<td>4,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>45,938</td>
<td>8,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,499</td>
<td>43,292</td>
<td>91,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>49,113</td>
<td>204,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,001</td>
<td>53,205</td>
<td>313,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>5,581</td>
<td>58,700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the government’s heavy reliance on physical force prompted violent responses from challenger groups, such as stone throwing and the use of Molotov cocktails in street demonstrations, sit-in strikes occupying main strategic buildings (e.g., government buildings, the Democratic Justice Party building, the U.S. Information Service building), and a few isolate acts of self-immolation (Kang, 1989, p. 203).

The Chun regime continued to face political crises due to the escalating civil strife among the opposition forces. Table 6-1 above demonstrates the intensity of the political crises in the Fifth Republic beginning in 1985. The protest movements in the civil society against the Chun regime increased and peaked in June 1987.

Finally, in light of the escalating popular national resistance, the government made concessions to some of the democratization demands by the opposition forces. However, after the June 29th Declaration, the popular alliances for democracy began to split along blue collar and white collar lines in the laborers' grand strikes from July to September, 1987. Further divisions developed among the social movements and the opposition party forces over the issue of the single presidential candidate representing the opposition forces, leading to defeat in the December 16th presidential election.
B. MIDDLE CLASS

The political characteristics and attitudes of the middle class have been a critical element in the recent transition experience in Korea, and two theories dominate. One view holds that the Korean middle strata has a highly progressive political orientation and thus acted as a democratic force in several important periods of political change, such as during the June Democratization Movement in 1987. Another view argues that the middle strata is basically a conservative force, and condoned by passivity, thereby maintaining the authoritarian regimes, especially in connection with the emergence of the authoritarian Fifth Republic to defend their vested interests (Ch’oe, 1989, p. 101; Koo, 1991, p. 486; Lie, 1991, p. 47).

Although it is difficult to clearly determine the political characteristics of the middle strata, it is certain that the mainstream middle classes are firmly behind the democratization movement led by students, intellectuals, and opposition leaders, before the June 29th Declaration (Koo, 1991, p. 491).

Why has the middle class, with the most to lose and least to gain, actively participated in the risky democratization movements?

First, the middle class keenly felt the contradiction of the authoritarian regime because of their actual experiences
and their enhanced intellectual abilities. The middle class was intimately familiar with conflicts between the ruling forces and opposition forces since 1970’s, and they realized that the abandonment of the liberal democracy led to unbearable social sacrifice and costs. The establishment of democratic government and social democratization were cherished goals. Moreover, the intellectuals, journalists, religious men had organization skills and leadership initiating the democratization movement (Han, 1987, pp. 487-489).

The intellectuals made a crucial contribution by forming the Korean Minjung movement, a version of Korean populism. The Minjung movement provided an "opposition ideology, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and other resources" criticizing the "bourgeois hegemony as well as the ideological artifacts" of the authoritarian regime, such as excessive focus on national security and developmentalism (Koo, 1991, pp. 500-505).

Secondly, under the state-initiated development strategies, each successive Korean government since the 1960’s supported the rise of some Chaebol (big bourgeoisie), whereas smaller capitalists, laborers, farmers were substantially excluded from government patronage. For the aspiring middle classes, government favoritism became a source of political resentment against the authoritarian government. The middle class psychologically and morally

Third, even if the middle class supported the emergence of the authoritarian regime in 1980 in order to maintain their vested interests, they questioned the political legitimacy of the Chun regime due to the unconstitutional way he took power (i.e., military coup d'état). The "escalating and often bloody confrontations" on the streets between the Chun regime and anti-government student activists made many middle class people, who previously were mere political spectators, conclude that continued military rule could lead to only disorder rather than stability. Economic affords provided them an occasion to reconsider the political system. The middle class, particularly the college-educated, white-collar employees, were more "sympathetic to far-reaching political reforms" commensurate with economic development. They are particularly interested in fair political competition, the expansion of political participation, and securing guarantee of basic human rights (Lee, 1988, p. 23; Park, 1989, p. 208; Lie, 1991, p. 47; Koo, 1991; Krause and Cheng, 1991, pp. 15-16).

Finally, the middle class was morally enraged about continued human rights abuses (e.g., the Miss Kwon's sexual interrogation incident and the Pak's torture-death). The
middle class could not condone the government cover-up behavior regarding Pak's torture-death, its abrupt turnaround on the constitutional revision by the April 13th Declaration, and the series of incidents hindering the formation rallies of the opposition RDP through the government's mobilization of thugs. Moral issues surrounding the character and role of the regime in the political development in Korea were the most important factors that motivated the middle class to participate in the democratization movement (Ch'oe, 1989, p. 295; Koo, 1991; Lie, 1991, pp. 46-47).

The middle class's critical attitudes towards Chun's regime were visibly confirmed in the 12th National Assembly election in 1985. In this election, the opposition NKDP dominated urban middle class districts (Han, 1987, p. 488; Koo, 1991, p. 491).

Although they did not actively participate in street demonstrations until the June Democratic Movement in 1987, intellectuals expressed their political goals through nonviolent means, such as the hunger strike and the signature campaign. However, the most dramatic and decisive involvement of the middle class was in June, 1987. A large number of white collar workers joined the students' street demonstration demanding a constitutional revision favoring a direct presidential election. Middle class involvement at such a large scale made Chun's regime realize the
seriousness of the political situation and finally accepted demands of the opposition forces in the June 29th Declaration. Because of the effectiveness of the middle class, the June Democratic Movement was termed a "middle class revolution" by the media (Dong, 1991, p. 275; Huntington, 1991, p. 68; Koo, 1991, p. 491).

After the June 29th Declaration, many white-collar workers employed in the service sector mobilized to organize unions for democracy in the workplaces. Shopkeepers and small manufacturers, however, were unfavorable to the grand labor unrest. Many small business owners were immediately ruined by labor unrest, and they worried that a reversal of democratization might result if the military was forced to intervene.

Middle class' concept of democratization was different from workers' one. The majority of managerial and professional workers and petty bourgeoisie were mainly concerned with political democracy, but a segment of the new middle class was also deeply interested in obtaining social democracy in the workplaces, as well as in other arena of society. However, the working class was mobilized mainly for economic democracy, as evidenced by desire for higher wages, better working conditions, and the right to organize independent unions (Koo, 1991, p. 492). This different definitions on democratization led to different perceptions
on the political situation and different strategies on how to solve the problems they faced.

C. LABOR MOVEMENT

Despite the strong repressive measures taken throughout the 1960's and 1970's, Chon Tae-il's self-immolation aroused a militant unionism which grew rapidly in the 1970's. Unionism drew support from church groups and student activists. More significantly, the Minjung movement of the intellectuals and students gave the laborers a "shelter, organizational networks, and ideological supports." The labor issue became most important as the working class consciousness was raised and the industrial conflict sharpened. Gradually, the grass-roots labor movement and the democratization struggle in the larger society merged, and strengthened each other by cooperation (Hamilton and Tanter, 1987, p. 66; Koo, 1990, p. 10; Koo, 1991, pp. 500-505; Sohn, 1991, p. 14).

After the short-lived vitality of the labor movement in 1980, the Fifth Republic cracked down on the labor movement. The government abolished the newly created independent unions and expelled over one hundred labor union leaders under the "guidelines for purification of labor unions" written by the new military groups. In late 1980, a new set of labor laws was forcibly revised.
The revision seriously undermined three basic union rights, such as the right to organize, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike, by isolating the local unions from the industrial unions, the Federation of Korea Trade Unions (FKTU). The government regulated bargaining and strictly prohibited so-called "third party interventions" in order to exclude the church groups like Urban Industrial Missions (UIM) or students-turned workers (Yu, 1985, p. 32; Chung, 1990, p. 356; Ogle, 1990, pp. 102-103; Lim, 1990, pp. 17-18; Kim, 1990, p. 159).

In order to contain labor, the Fifth Republic used corporatist strategies and market strategies. Although the state permitted the FKTU a monopoly over representation, the state had a legal right to recognize and dissolve labor unions, and intervene in labor disputes through the Labor Committee. Facing the increasing challenges of the strong organized labor unions, the state turned to the market strategy of trying to decentralize the union structure into "enterprise unions." The co-optive inducements to the union leaders and the widespread use of police forces against extra-legal labor activities weakened the labor movements throughout the first part of the Fifth Republic (Choi, 1983, p. 494; Kim, 1984, p. 43; Lee, 1988, pp. 16-18; Im, 1991, p. 6). As a result, union membership was sharply reduced from 1,088,000 in 1979 to 840,000 in 1981.
Workers began recognizing the implications of such restrictive measures, behind dire realities as low wages, long working hours, unsafe working conditions, and poor benefits. Additionally, through increasingly pervasive communication networks and formal education, workers mobilized (Ra, 1991, p. 27).

Despite forceful crackdowns of the state, the labor movement rapidly developed into a political movement. Labor issues were understood to be linked more and more to the political situation. Class struggle involved "more than struggle over economic resources." Class formation necessarily involved the state as a major obstacle in the fight for reform because the state is the most powerful agent in the "production and reproduction of the industrial relations and the dominant ideology" in Korea. The government, lacking legitimacy, justified regulating labor activities as preserving "social order" and "national security," and moreover, aiding the management. This phenomenon occurred partly as a result of the merger of radical students and intellectuals joining the labor movement based on the Minjung movement, and partly because students-turned workers focused on the political struggle outside of the workplace, and to that end, they organized street rallies in accordance with radical students in labor-heavy areas (Lee, 1988, p. 31; Im, 1989, p. 216; Lee, 1990a,
Since late 1983, the government had relatively relaxed its repressive measures on labor activities in the general context of liberalization measures, which encouraged an upsurge in the labor movement. The movement demonstrated a greater organizational capacity and a higher level of political consciousness among workers. The main issue of the worker's strikes was to organize independent unions (so-called Minju Nojo). The unions made a great contribution to mobilizing a broader network of anti-government elements, and workers from nearby factories joined strikes in support of their colleagues, presenting similar demands (e.g., Daewoo Automobile Co. and Daewoo Apparel Co. strikes, and Kuro Industrial Park solidarity struggle in 1985). Violent governmental attacks on the labor movement were countered by a more militant labor movement, which was vital to air workers' grievances (e.g., picketing, striking, and even kidnapping officers of huge manufacturing firms). The labor movement also became more sophisticated in its social analysis and techniques of political mobilization (Chang, 1985, p. 9; Hamilton and Tanter, 1987, p. 67; Hong, 1988, p. 196; Haggard and Moon, 1990, p. 234; Koo and Lim, 1992, pp. 18-19; Ra, 1991, p. 28).

Union leaders who had been forced from their workplace organized Hanguk Nodongja Pokji Hyopuihoe (Council for
Korean Worker’s Welfare) on March 10, 1984, in order to reinstate the ousted laborers and labor unions destroyed by the government. In 1985, the labor activists organized the radical labor organizations, such as the Sonoryon (Seoul Labor Movement Association) and the Innoryon (Inch’on Labor Movement Association) to protest for a fundamental transformation of society (Kisayon, 1986, pp. 59-64).

What is most important is the fact that Korean labor movement leaders embarked earnestly on alliance politics, often teaming with various church affiliated groups (e.g., Tosi Sanop Sonkyohoe), the student movement groups, the so-called Nohak Yondae (labor-student alliance), and the opposition parties. Student movement leaders viewed the labor movement as a requisite element of social transformation and made efforts to further raise worker consciousness. Radical labor movement groups also allied with opposition parties by joining in public rallies and demonstrations initiated by the opposition NKDP (Ra, 1991, pp. 28-29).

After the June 29th Declaration, the grand labor strikes erupted in all sectors of production; the manufacturing, transportation, and the mining industries. Three thousand three hundred twenty-seven strikes occurred from June 29 to September 30. The number is 13 times greater than the number of strikes in the whole year of 1986 (276). One thousand two hundred seventy-eight new unions were organized
after June 29th Declaration, amounting to almost half of the number of existing unions (2,658), but labor still failed to garner unilateral support (Im, 1991, p. 8).

Table 6-2. The number of labor unions, members, and strike occurrence since 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of unions</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>No. of strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,365</td>
<td>1,010,522</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>1,004,398</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,658</td>
<td>1,035,890</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>1,267,457</td>
<td>3,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Unlike the working class growth that played an important role in the "final breakthrough of democracy" in Western Europe from 1870-1939 (Stephens, 1989, pp. 1064-65), the Korean labor movement was still too weak to set up a politically-oriented movement, or to greatly contribute to the democratization of Korea, although their dedicated struggle against authoritarian regimes enlarged the infrastructure of the Korean democracy.
D. THE FARMERS MOVEMENT

In the development process, the agricultural sector was relatively neglected, and the rural sector has lagged far behind the urban sectors. In order to maintain of the urban workers low wages, the Korean government has regulated and maintained relatively low grain prices except for a few years during the mid 1970's. Farmers were forced to sell their grains at prices substantially below market value (about 85 percent of the market prices). Under the Chun regime, in particular the government suppressed price increases in its buying-price of rice from farmers in order to reduce the deficit in the Grain Management Fund and the Fertilizer Account, while increasing its fertilizer sales-price to the farmers. Farmers were also damaged by massive imports of grain, meat, and other agricultural products (Kim, 1984, P. 843; Moon, 1988, p. 88; Chung, 1990, pp. 356-357; Koo, 1990, p. 7).

This development led to a rapid decrease in the number of farmers and their income, but the number of tenant farmers and absentee landlords increased. This phenomenon was due to the seizure of farm property by large conglomerates and real estate agencies as well as to the growing debt. As of July 1984, the average debt per farm family was 2.3 million won (approximately $3,600). The situation provoked a massive migration to the city (an
average of 600,000 migrants per year since 1960), resulting a proliferation of unskilled laborers in the cities resulted. Only 33 percent of the total population lived in the rural areas in 1980, compared with 64 percent in 1960 (Chang, 1985, p. 18; Harrison, 1987, p. 238).

The state controlled THE politically and economically fragmented rural sector through political exclusion and co-optative economic subordination policies. Rural policies were reduced through a series of state-manipulated mobilization organs established to secure political support for the government party in the elections. The Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives (FAC) was used as an agency for collective sales and credit and for technical guidance. About 70% of FAC's budget relied on borrowing from the state, and the leaders of the cooperatives were closely related to local public officers. Since around 93% of farmers were members of the FAC, the state could mobilize the farmers for political support (Lee, 1988, pp. 13-14; Burmeister, 1991, pp. 9-10).

Farmers are traditionally conservative and relatively passive compared to the other classes. In the process of Korean democratization, however, they were more mobile, more knowledgeable, and had much higher expectations than in the past. They are increasingly articulate about their needs and desires, are often highly critical of government policy, and pockets of farmers have resorted to protests over
certain economic issues. Politically alienated farmers, though not well organized, formed an extensive and a politically explosive source of social unrest (Brandt, 1979, pp. 220-222; Burmeister, 1991, pp. 9-10).

Under this development, democratically-minded farmers concentrated on developing a sustained, organized, collective movement that could fight for their demands. The deteriorating plight of farmers provided fertile ground for political activist groups. At the center of the farmer’s movement are two core groups: the Korean Catholic Farmer’s Association (KCFA) and the General Federation of Korean Christian Farmers’ Association (FKCFA). Many university students also actively participated in the Nonghwal Undong (the farm village activity movement) in order to raise the political consciousness of farmers. The students offered free labor during the farmers’ busy summer months, and worked to strengthen “farmer-student solidarity” through emphatic aid to poor farmers in rural areas. The students desired to politicize the farmers on the biased agricultural policies of the Chun regime as the "root cause" of the farmer’s poverty. Under the guidance of students and religious organizations, farmers called for the democratization of the agricultural co-operatives, the cancellation of farmers’ debts, and guarantees of a return of production costs for agricultural outputs (Moore, 1984-1985, pp. 596-597; Chang, 1985, p. 19; Dong, 1987, p. 250;
Farmers themselves seized the initiative and organized themselves and joined other opposition forces including labor and student organizations. In February 1987, the National Farmers Association (NFA) was established by grassroots activists, and many local chapters were started. The National Farmers Committee (NFC) in the NCDC (National Coalition for Democratic Constitution) and 90 local chapters also organized in July 1987 after the June 29th Declaration. These farmers' autonomous organizations held public hearings on constitutional revision and the democratization of the FAC in August and October, 1987 (Anam Yongusil, 1988, p. 119; Lee, 1990, p. 199-206).

The farmers' movement raised the consciousness of rural workers and broadened the base of the democratization movement. The pattern of political participation in the rural area began to change the "mobilized participation" to an autonomous participation (Brandt, 1979, p. 205; Chang, 1985, p. 23).

E. STUDENT MOVEMENT

Throughout the 40 years since independence from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, students always have played the most important role in spearheading the political opposition movement. Despite difficulties in organizing the opposition
forces against successive authoritarian regimes, they made a great contribution to the collapse of the autocratic Syngman Rhee regime in 1960 and the democratization process in 1987 (Ch’oe, 1989, p. 103; Cheng, 1989b, p. 7; Kim, 1991, p. 27).

However, the students’ perceptions of social reality and the strategies of the struggles against the authoritarian regimes have changed and evolved according to political circumstances.

After the emergence of the Fifth Republic, the government took very repressive measures against student activists. About 1,400 students were arrested and imprisoned on charges of anti-state activities between 1980 and 1983. During this period, the student activists went underground and prepared for a future strategy for democratization based on lessons learned from the failed student movement during the transition period of 1979-1980 (Im, 1989, p. 210).

Future strategy forums debated the course of action, and dictated the student movement activities that took place in December 1980-1981. There were two different positions: Murim versus Hangnim. The former stressed the "accumulation of organized power of a broad anti-regime coalition force" instead of reckless demonstrations. The latter emphasized the continuation of intransigent political struggle against the Chun regime (Im, 1989, pp. 210-211; Kim, 1991, pp. 71-73).
The Murim versus Hangnim debate was followed by Yabi versus Chonmang (critique of night school versus the prospect of student movement) debate. The Yabi group argued that instead of direct action, students should enter the workplace to form a broad solidarity movement with the workers. The Chonmang group, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of anti-regime political struggle as the most advanced means of student movement (Im, 1989, p. 211).

After the Abertura in the late 1983, and for a couple of years, later, there were critical discussions on the characteristics of the Korean society and the role of leadership in social change. The Civil Democratic Revolution (CDR) group perceived the Korean society as a peripheral capitalist society. They argued that in order to achieve democratic revolution, oppressed persons under the military dictatorship, such as workers, farmers, the urban poor, the petty bourgeois, self-employed and national bourgeoisie, need to be united.

The People's Democratic Revolution (PDR) group, on the other hand, perceived Korean society as the state monopoly capitalism. This group argued that the democratic revolution should be carried out by the 'base' popular masses and revolutionary intellectuals, and should exclude the "bourgeois democratic forces" (e.g., the conservative opposition party).
The National Democratic Revolution (NDR), for their part, viewed Korean society as a neocolonial monopoly capitalism lacking the development of indigenous capitalism. They saw the basic contradiction in the Korean society resulting from conflict between Korean popular masses and the military fascists serving the interests of the imperialist power (U.S.) and state monopoly capitalists. For this reason, they tried to court the indigenous national bourgeoisie as a strategic alliance for national democratic revolution (Im, 1989, pp. 212-213).

These debates are indicative of the radical change in student movements, particularly regarding ideological tendencies. They accepted the dependency theory and world-system theory as well as other neo-Marxist theories of the capitalist state theory for use as their ideological weapons (Im, 1989, p. 213; Kim, 1991, p. 147).

The campus autonomy measures of the government in late 1983 provided the student activists "open space" for their activities. They organized most of the official student representatives bodies by May 1984 and took to the streets for the "democratization of the society." In April 17, 1985, Chonhangnyon (the National Federation of Student Associations, NFSA) was established, representing sixty-two universities and colleges in South Korea. Samint’u (the Struggle Committee for the Liberation of the Masses, the Attainment of Democracy, and the Unification of the Nation)
was the political arm of the Chonhangnyon. It initiated various struggles against the government (e.g., labor-student solidarity, the formation of a coalition with opposition politicians and social movement forces, and sit-in demonstrations in the U.S. Cultural Center) (Dong, 1987, p. 244; Im, 1989, pp. 248-249; Hanguk Ilbo, November 8, 1989; Cho, 1989, p. 99).

In 1986, the student movement went through major changes as two radical groups, Chamint’u (Self Reliant Democratization Struggle Committee against the United States and Fascism) and Minmint’u (the National Democratic Struggle Committee against Imperialism and Fascism), emerged. Both groups were basically identical in opposing the Chun regime and the U.S., and in viewing the working class as the "linchpin" of successful revolutionary change of Korean society. The concrete struggle objectives and methods, however, were bipolar. The Chamintu perceived U.S. imperialism as the main enemy, while the Minmint’u vilified the South Korean ruling class. On the question of constitutional revision, the Chamint’u group supported the main opposition RDP and its campaign for a direct presidential election as a means for ending U.S. imperialism in Korea. The Minmint’u group, conversely, regarded the RDP as a "band of conservative opportunists" and advocated Constitutional Assembly (CA) through the formation of a provisional revolutionary government (Far Eastern Economic
Table 6-3. Collective action of the students, 1984-1987

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of on-campus demonstrations</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,743</td>
<td>4,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants of on-campus</td>
<td>517,258</td>
<td>468,375</td>
<td>405,190</td>
<td>1,317,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of off-campus demonstrations</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>3,063&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participants of off-campus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52,182</td>
<td>1,013,543&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demonstrations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* a is the numbers of on-street demonstrations including other citizens in 1986-1987.


The Chamint’u’s position towards constitutional revision appealed to the popular masses resulting from lessons learned by the reckless struggles against Chun’s government, particularly the Inch’on Incident and the Konkuk University Incident of 1986. The active participation of students in the June democratization movement greatly contributed to the
democratic transition in Korea. This group organized the Sodaehyop (Council of Seoul Area University Students Representatives) in May 1987 and Chondaehyop (National Council of the University Students Representatives) in August 1987 in order to carry out more concerted struggles and strengthen solidarity among student movement groups (Kim, 1991, p. 107).

Table 6-4. The number of students committing suicide for anti-government struggles

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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6-5. Students punished by the government, 1985-1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>contents</th>
<th>year</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>reprimand (suspension, expulsion)</td>
<td></td>
<td>408</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charged by Law on the Assembly and demonstration</td>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charged by National Security Law</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, the student movement groups also began to factionalize over the issue of the single presidential candidate of the opposition forces, and divided into three groups. Most Sodaehyop and Chondaehyop followers supported Kim Dae-jung as the single candidate of the opposition party, while the minority in both organizations preferred a single candidate selection. The Minmint’u group, however, supported an independent popular candidate. The Korean democratic transition in 1987 was achieved through the agenda-setting of students (e.g., democratization, economic justice, reunification), their herotic actions, including personal risk and sacrifice, and wise strategic choices (e.g., the formation of the democratization movement alliance with other opposition forces, tactical retreat from radical ideological tendency for fundamental social change to moderate reform positions). Tables 6-3, 6-4 and 6-5 above show the increased challenges against Chun’s regime and the resolute determination of student movement activists. For example, the number of on-campus demonstrations rapidly increased from 1,743 in 1986 to 4,568 in 1987, the number of the students charged by the National Security Law was also increased by 1.6 times (191 in 1986, 306 in 1987) in the same period.
F. THE RELIGIOUS GROUP MOVEMENTS

Since the emergence of the Yushin system, religious circles, particularly among Christianity provided a doctrinal and institutional base for the opposition movement (Lee, 1988, p. 22; Huntington, 1991, p. 74). Religious groups were concerned about human rights, social justice, and the democratization of Korea. The commitment to self-sacrifice and martyrdom induced many people to join in the democratization movement, adding to the momentum of the movement.

In retrospect, the fundamental reasons that the church initiated democratization movement in Korea resulted from their position of moral superiority. Despite severe repression and attractive inducements from the authoritarian regime, the church has been one of the independent institutions co-opted by the regime. Moreover, unlike other types of interest groups that seek rewards and kickbacks from the state, the church has been less politically interested in selfish motives (Diamond, Lipset, and Linz, 1987, p. 12; Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1987, pp. 42-43; Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 219).

Christianization in Korea has been phenomenal. According to the 1980 census, 23.6 percent and 4.3 percent of believers in any religion identified their religion as either Protestant or Roman Catholic respectively.
Christians constitute a more significant social group than this figure stands for, since their religious bodies are more formally and socially organized than other religious bodies, and their political roles have been greatly increased. In other words, Confucian respect for "an orderly system of authority and for a high degree of homogeneity" is yielding to the egalitarian, pluralistic and decidedly Western school of Christian thought. Christians have emphasized their responsibilities and concerns for society in the light of their Christian convictions (Lee, 1988, p. 22; Chung, 1989, p. 34; Park, 1990, p. 34).

Initially, Protestants under the authoritarian Park regime took interests in the human rights problems in terms of humanitarianism. The churches became involved in politics, and many church-based organizations with political concerns were formed. The Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) has been at the forefront of the movement for human rights and democracy. The KNCC not only has organized prayer services for the betterment of human rights but also began to expand its activity by organizing the regional association for human rights mission or the countermeasure committee against torture during the Fifth Republic (Chung, 1989, p. 34; Lee, 1990, p. 314).

Moreover, Christians tried to share with the suffering of the ignored and repressed majority of the population. The church’s renewed concern for the plight of the poor in
society was influenced by the Minjung theology, a Korean version of liberation theology. The Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), founded in 1961, was one of the most important groups (Yu, 1985, p. 27; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 10, 1987, pp. 43-44; Moody, 1988, p. 119; Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 219; Lee, 1990, p. 314).

Since the mid-1970's, Catholic priests' and laymen actively participated in the democratization movement. Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul became a symbolic site for the Korean Catholic as well as political dissidents (Mun, 1986, p. 312-337). Ch'ŏnjukyo Ch'onui Kuhyon Sachetan (The Catholic Priests Association for the Realization of Justice, CPARJ), founded in 1974, initiated the social movements for human rights and democratization of Korea since 1970's. On May 18, 1987, this organization disclosed that Pak Chong-ch'ol's torture-death was schemed by high-ranking police officials, and became the catalyst for the June Democratization movement of 1987. In addition, Hanguk Ch'ŏnjukyo Chongui P'yonghwa Wiwonhoe (Korean Catholic Committee for Justice and Peace) as the organization being directly attached Chukyo Hoeui (the Primate Meeting), founded in 1975, concentrated its efforts on the legal and economic assistance to the political dissidents (Mun, 1986, p. 330).

Since 1985, various laymen's organizations, such as the Catholic Social Movement Council, the Catholic Labor
Missionary Institute, the Catholic Cultural Movement Council, and the Council on the Urban Poor Missionary were established. Among them, the Catholic Social Movement Council was a coalition group of all the Catholic social movement organizations. It initiated the campaign to boycott the KBS (Korea Broadcasting Station) viewing and listening fees and set up watch-dog activities for a fair election. It also organized social movements for the laborers, farmers, and the urban poor (Mun, 1986, pp. 333-334; Kim, 1989, pp. 83-114; Huntington, 1991, p. 84).

By the mid-1980's, the Buddhists, following the Christian example, became involved in dissident activity. Some young Buddhist monks made a declaration demanding the constitutional revision on May 1985, and organized Pulkyo Chongt'o Kuhyon Chongguk Sunggahoe (National Buddhist Monk Organization for Realization of the Promised Land) on June 5, 1986. Their mottos were the autonomy of Buddhism, the democratization of the society, and national reunification. On May 4, 1985 some young Buddhist monks and laymen activists also established Minjung Pulgyo Undong Yonhap (National Council for Popular Buddhist Movement, Minbullyon) whose aims were the construction of the autonomous and democratic Buddhism, the promotion of the independent national, social equity, and the achievement of the autonomous and peaceful reunification. Hence, Minbullyon was actively concerned about labor issues, farmers'
problems, urban poor problems and initiated the May 3rd Inch'on Incident with other anti-government movement organizations (Kim, 1987, pp. 490-505; Lee, 1987, p. 216; Moody, 1988, p. 120).

These religious democratization movement groups played an important role in forming alliances with other dissident organizations, such as labor, student, and intellectuals and actively participated in the sacrificing struggles for democratization of Korea against the authoritarian Chun regime. Especially, religious leaders (213 Catholic, 253 Protestant, and 160 Buddhists) played an important role in forming the NCDC, which initiated the June Democratization Movement (Lee, 1987, p. 142).

III. THE RESPONSES OF RULING FORCES

A. THE MILITARY

The military, the senior partner of the ruling groups, has not only been the most active organization in command of physical forces but has also been actively involved in civilian politics since the May 16th military coup d'état in 1961 (Chung, 1989, p. 31).

Historically, during the First Republic, the Korean military remained excluded politics, primarily because of President Rhee's "skillful manipulation of factional infighting and personal favoritism." In the April 19th
student uprisings against the Rhee regime election fraud, the military refused to fire on demonstrators. Under the Second Republic, even though the military remained in charge of its own affairs, political activism among the military increased. Some field grade officers demanded retirement of their corrupt and politically oriented generals. Finally, discontented colonels under the guidance of Major General Park planned a military coup d'état (Han, 1988, p. 118; Lee and Rhie, 1989, p. 208; Park, 1989, p. 182).

After the military coup in 1961, the military retained its status as ruler until 1963, and then most junta leaders joined the Third Republic's government as high-ranking officers, politicians, diplomats, and so forth after discharge from military service. The military remained the pillar for maintaining Park's power. President Park rewarded his military colleagues and followers through patronage power. He also tightly controlled the military by strengthening the Defense Security Command (DSC), the Capital Garrison Command (CGC), and the Special Forces Command (SFC). Occasionally, these military institutions were used to crackdown on demonstrations or to surveil the civilian opposition forces (Han, 1988, p. 118; Lee and Rhee, 1989, pp. 209-210).

The military was the most powerful political group in the nation and filled the political vacuum after the
assassination of President Park in 1979. At that time, there were strong conflicts in the military between the hardliners who fought for continued involvement in politics, and the softliners who argued for military professionalism. Throughout the December 12th military coup and the Kwangju Incident, the young hardliners seized political power. Once again, the military became the dominant member of ruling coalitions. They took major positions in the government and the ruling DJP (Kim, 1988, pp. 100-101; Lee and Rhie, 1989, pp. 211-213; Chung, 1990, pp. 243-245).

The military was not always happy. President Chun and his military colleagues were annoyed by the bloody repression of the Kwangju uprising (Kim, 1988, p. 106). It was believed that the military had become, the object of popular hatred, an example of repression, rather than love. It was no the protector of the people or democracy, as it was during the April 19th Student Revolution in 1960.

Furthermore, corruption and human rights abuses in the military greatly undermined the image of Korean military professionalism. Koreans felt that prolonging their stay in power might fragment and polarize their forces, and impair their cohesiveness and fighting capacity. Besides, the opposition forces' struggle against the authoritarian Chun's regime became stronger than before, despite harsh repression on the opposition movements (Kim, 1988, p. 106; Lee and Rhie, 1989, pp. 222-224).
Facing increasing opposition, the military’s political attitudes toward democracy could be divided into three groups: a group arguing for returning to the barracks, a group arguing for partial civilianization, and a group arguing for the indefinite continuation of military rule. The average military men, particularly the career soldiers, realized that continued military authoritarian rules could not be applied to the somewhat economically affluent Korean society. They tacitly supported the step-by-step democratization if it safeguarded the future corporate interests of the military. They also concluded that democratization was an irreversible historical demand. In the course of the June Democratization movement, the Chun regime chose a democratic change instead of a military crackdown because of the lingering sentiment of the Kwangju Incident and the strong opposition against top military leadership⁶ declaring martial law. The military thought that it was high-time for them to peacefully withdraw from power if they were guaranteed safety and economic security (Kim, 1988, pp. 107-108; Lee, 1988, p. 326; Lee and Rhie, 1989, pp. 214-228; Cheng and Kim, 1991, p. 34).

After the June 29th Declaration, although the opposition RDP included a clear-cut clause forbidding any kind of military intervention in its new constitution, the military refused to accept such restrictions in new constitutional draft, and indirectly transmitted to the ruling DJP and
opposition RDP their intentions to oppose such a clause. As a result, only the ceremonial clause on the neutrality of military in politics was left in the new constitution. In the midst of constitutional debate, the Army Chief of Staff, General Pak Hi-do, issued a threatening statement to veto Kim Dae-jung by saying that "something unhappy" might happen if Kim Dae-jung ran for president (New York Times, July 18, 1987; Im, 1989, pp. 303-304).

The military, however, was apparently neutral on issues during the 1987 presidential election. The election of former colleague Roh Tae-woo as the president made the military feel secure. Even though some within military expressed slight discontentment, such as the principal of Korea Military Academy Min Pyong-don’s criticism against Roh’s policies and a group of militarymen’s terror on a journalist, the army officers seemed to accept a "diminished institutional role" in the state apparatuses and tried to internalize the principle of civilian supremacy over the military. Opposition parties were extremely careful not to provoke the military because they did not want to give an excuse of military involvement into politics. The parliament allowed the military to reform itself by internal self-rule, not by the surveillance of the legislative (Im, 1989, pp. 332-334), and the military was allowed to maintain corporate interests.
The presence of an autonomous bourgeoisie class is prerequisite of economic development and democracy. In the context of the experience of Western societies, the bourgeoisie class made a great contribution to developing democracy in their societies by regulating royal power and the aristocracy to defend its own interests (Huntington, 1984, p. 204; Arat, 1991, pp. 38-39).

However, the bourgeoisie in most Third World have had no experience in struggling against a privileged aristocracy that held the state authority. Furthermore, the state had developed and given it a privileged position in the economy. Thus the bourgeoisie sometimes preferred to have a conservative authoritarian regime defending their economic interests rather than to undergo economic and political deprivation under the democratic system (Arat, 1991, p. 40).

There are several factors determining the political behaviors of the business elite. According to Conaghan,

The decision of business elites to support or retard the democratization process has much to do with their confidence in their own ability to control the processes, the character of contending groups in society, and the viability of other non-democratic political formulas (1990, p 74).

The entrepreneurs' perception of democratization is usually ambivalent or strategic. Their strategic attitudes
toward democracy is based on calculation of interests, not on internalization of democratic culture or norms. In order for entrepreneurs to support the democratization, the benefit from democratic transition must exceed the cost of the transition. During initial stages, the entrepreneurs display serious discontent with statist control over the economy, which is regarded as their domain (Im, 1989, p. 42; Im, 1991, p. 10).

According to the democratization from above model, the initial democratic transition comes from the split between the techno-bureaucrats and the industrial bourgeoisie. For Poulantzas, the major impetus of democratization in Southern Europe came from the hegemonic instability in the power bloc and intensified struggle between fractions of the bourgeoisie (Poulantzas, 1976; Im, 1989, p. 19).

The capitalist class of Korea, composed of 1.4 percent of the population in 1985, benefitted the most from the state-directed industrialization. In the name of rapid economic development, the state nurtured the capitalist class through various policy measures, such as control of domestic financial capital, the state’s discretionary power over the allocation of foreign capital loans, and direct foreign investment. In addition, the state brutally crushed on labor unrest to continue stable development and promote the entrepreneurial investments (Oh, 1986, p. 65; Lee, 1988,
The business was unable to battle the state, and was forced to comply with bureaucratic demands. Entrepreneurs lacked sufficient political organization and popular trust to govern either openly, directly, or through political parties that would act as their surrogates. Actually, the entrepreneurs formed the "junior partner" of the dominant alliance of the Korean state or "dependable political ally" of the ruling coalition. Moreover, Korean entrepreneurs have not been able to achieve ideological hegemony over the civil society. Unlike the bourgeoisie in the Western society, they were slow in becoming a hegemonic class (Davydov, 1988, p. 82; Park, 1988, p. 240; Kuk, 1989, p. 117; Koo, 1990, pp. 18-20).

The ultimate result of nurturing the capitalist class, however, was an increase in the power of the Chaebol (big business corporation) in the national economy. The Chaebol rapidly grew in size and expanded to several key industrial areas, increasing their economic power vis-a-vis the state and other social groups. The complex differentiation of the economic structure and the growing international competitiveness called for an adjustment of the state's heavy-handed management of the economy. The image of the state as a senior and business as a junior partner was changing (Hamilton and Tanter, 1987, p. 79; Lee, 1988, p. 27;

Under these circumstances, the Fifth Republic decreased its interventionist role in the national economy. The term Mingan Chudo (initiatives by private sectors) became a catchword during the first half of the 1980's. The government privatized the five large commercial banks and eliminated most low interest rate loan incentives and some of its allocative control over bank credits. Chaebols began to enter the high-profit non-bank financial institutions actively, which contributed to undermining the instrumental autonomy of the state (Oh, 1986, p. 66; Lee, 1988, p. 27; Kang, 1988, p. 216; Jung, 1988, p. 74; So, 1991, pp. 134-141).

The business community has also actively lobbied for greater autonomy or private initiatives that would reduce the state's interventionist role in economic activities. The businesses community have desired the state to allow only the necessary minimum economic infrastructure and interference; the marketplace was to be left to the private sector. After the emergence of the Chun regime, individual capitalists resisted the government's attempt to the rationalize and restructure the over-invested Heavy Chemical Industry (HCI) projects. They publicly complained about monetary and credit controls by the government. The weighty influence of Chaebol in the national economy lessened the

The Chaebol, however, wanted the state to protect their privileges from small capitalists as well as workers. In return for protection, the state collected "tribute" in the name of a "quasi-tax" which included donations to the ruling party, the president's personal coffer, and a fund for pro-government initiatives and associations. Chun regime was highly dependent on political funds provided by the Chaebol for the manipulation of domestic political situations and preparation for the election (Steers, Shin, and Ungson, 1989, pp. 42-43; Im, 1989, p. 203; Chung, 1990, p. 23; Chung, 1990, p. 351; Kim, 1991, p. 150; Kearny, 1991, p. 223). According to the report from the Korean Economic Research Institute, the quasi-tax in 1981 was 0.55 percent of the total sales, while corporation tax was 0.70 percent, and Research and Development (R & D) was 0.54 percent (KERI, 1983, p. 12). The powerful Federation of Korean Industry (the association of large company groups in Korea) publicly demanded the rationalization of these hidden taxes (Bennett, 1991, p. 134).

Furthermore, the Chaebol became more strategic by calculating the benefits from the state's protection against
workers and the costs of inefficiency created by state intervention and political levy. Hence, the rift between political and the economic elites might have weakened the support base of the authoritarian Chun regime and, accordingly, the capacity to cope with the pressure for democratization from below (Im, 1989, pp. 204-205).

Moreover, by leading the way to economic growth, the entrepreneurs provided a material foundation for raising aspirations among the people in favor of democratization.

Unlike Brazilian entrepreneurs, who took the anti-authoritarian posture and initiated the democratization movement, Korean entrepreneurs did not positively persuade the governing elite to pursue democratization or even articulate a political project of its own volition. Therefore, their role in political democratization of Korea was, at the very least, passive, if not a negative impact on the democratization movement (Ch’oe, 1989, pp. 217-218; Im, 1989, p. 204; Kim, 1991, pp. 147-148; Przeworski, 1991, p. 68).
Notes

1. When the government asked the editors of the newspapers to curtail demonstration news, the editors collectively allocated demonstration news in a specific section of the newspapers in order to attract people’s attention on the democratization movement.


3. From the April 13th Declaration to late May 1987, six major newspapers in Seoul (Tong-A Ilbo, Choson Ilbo, Hanguk Ilbo, Chungang Ilbo, Kyonghyang Shinmun, Seoul Shinmun) reported 125 demonstration news articles as headline or quasi-headline news (front page news).

4. As shown in the longstanding debates about the political character of the middle classes in Europe and America, there is actually no stable, consistent middle class politics. The unique location of the middle class in the class structure hinders the formation of an autonomous class ideology and politics. In Marxist terms, one foot in the working class and another foot in the capitalist class. The middle class cannot maintain a consistent political ideology but continuously vacillates between the two poles according to shifting political conjunctures.

5. According to Valenzuela (1988), there are two ideal types of labor containment strategies: the corporatist strategy and market strategy. In the former, the state creates a centralized worker organization and controls collective bargaining through this centralized mechanism. In the latter, the state tries to weaken unions as bargaining agents by interfering in market wage settings and by decentralizing collective bargaining as much as possible.

6. According to former Defense Security Commander Ko Myong-sung, the Defense Security Command submitted a report opposing the military crackdown to President Chun during the June Democratization Movement period (Tong-A Ilbo, June 29, 1991).
CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION

In this study, two theoretical frameworks were used. One emphasizes structural conditions while the other the agency (actor). These two types of theories have merits and relevances in explaining particular facets or stages of democratic transition. Structural theories are particularly useful in understanding the preconditions of democratic transition, and provide broad limits (boundaries) of opportunities and constraints. It would be only a fragile democracy to be achieved without the maturity of the structural conditions. On the contrary, agency-orientied, genetic theories have strength in explaining the concrete forms, dynamics, and timing of democratic transition. In other words, these theories are very useful in understanding the process of actualizing the possibilities of the democratic transition into a stable democratic system.

In accounting for the recent Korean experience of democratic transition, this study found these two theories equally useful and relevant. So, structural theories highlight the significance of structural changes brought about by economic development and associated social changes, including urbanization, the rising middle classes, increased education level, and media exposure as well as burgeoning civil society and growing international involvement. These factors resulted in increasing demand and pressure for
pluralism, openness, and competition in politics. But these structural conditions are not sufficient in understanding why it happened in 1987 and why the transition occurred the way it did. Actually, strategic choices, mistakes, and accidents in the process of democratic transition played a crucial role in determining its types and timing.

Hence, this study analyzes the Korean case of democratization in the latter part of the Fifth Republic through the eclectic perspectives by synthetically combining the structural determination theories and the genetic theories. The basic premise underlying this study is that the democratic transition in Korea results from the interplay or internal tension within an authoritarian regime and popular pressure from below generated by the maturity of structural conditions.

After the assassination of President Park in 1979, although the euphoria of democratization swept the country, two military coup d'états (e.g., December 12th Incident and Kwangju Incident) removed the hope for democratization from the people. The Fifth Republic always faced the legitimacy crisis by its coup. From 1980 to 1983, the Chun regime succeeded in achieving outward political stability through strong repressive measures. Beginning in late 1983, the authoritarian regime relaxed its grip on opposition forces because of confidence of in its rule, and because it want to
enlarge their support base before the parliamentary election in 1985.

However, the *abertura* of Chun regime led to the "resurrection of civil society," which erupted into "enormous" autonomous organizations of students, workers, intellectuals, and church activists. These popular democratic organizations played an important role in the unexpected sweeping victory of the independent NKDP in the 12th parliamentary election. Through the elections, people chose the democratic change of the political system rather than choosing authoritarian stability. Based on the people's wishes for democratization, opposition forces that had struggled against the successive authoritarian regimes grew to a sizable counter-powers, capable of threatening even the Chun regime.

The animated opposition forces resolutely challenged the ruling force by demanding democratization. However, the ruling forces, instead of accepting the demands of the opposition forces, tried to repress the opposition forces through increased physical suppression and persuasion efforts, such as the stress on the importance of the peaceful transfer of power and the success of the Seoul Olympics. The opposition NKDP mobilized the popular masses in the street. As the internal political crisis increased, international concern about Korean democracy increased. Especially, the collapse of Marcos regime in the Philippines
through the popular revolution strengthened these feelings. Finally, President Chun permitted the installment of a Special Committee on Constitutional Revision in the National Assembly to discuss the constitutional revision.

However, there was still no progress on constitutional revision because of differences over preferred power structure: government’s parliamentary form of government versus opposition’s presidential form of government. After the May 3rd Inch’on Incident, the government began to suppress the radical activists in order to weaken the popular democratic alliance of the opposition forces.

Facing increased suppression from the government, the opposition NKDP was in disarray. Some members, particularly the party president Yi Min-u, tried to compromise with the ruling party, while other members including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung refused to accept the ruling party’s formula. In order to effectively pursue the constitutional revision movement, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung formed a new opposition, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) in mid-April, 1987. It was impossible to achieve solution through negotiation between the ruling forces and opposition forces concerning constitutional revision. Hardliners in the ruling forces confronted with the maximalists in the opposition forces. The deadlock on the constitutional revision made the political situation of Korea seriously
unstable, like two trains running in opposite directions on the same rail.

Furthermore, the reckless physical suppression of the government led to unexpected accidents, such as Miss Kwon’s sexual torture and Pak Chong-ch’ol’s torture-death, which discredited the public power of the state and degraded the morality of the Chun government. Moreover, President Chun’s April 13th Declaration was an occasion breaking the deadlock.

The opposition forces tried to mobilize all possible resources for the struggles against Chun’s regime and set up the most powerful united front organization (e.g., National Coalition for Democratic Constitution, NCDC) including the opposition NKDP and other social movement organizations in the civil society. In June 1987, the demonstrations for democratization became more massive and broad-based and increasingly involved middle-class people who felt moral indignation against illegitimate and immoral behaviors (e.g., corruption and several human rights abuses) prevalent in Chun’s government.

Standing at the crossroad of military crackdown and wholesale concession to the demands of the opposition forces, the ruling group chose the latter, considering the recommendation of the United States, the possibility of the cancellation of the Seoul Olympics, and the military reluctance to intervene in internal politics. Actually,
"important state sectors of the authoritarian coalition, such as business elites, state bureaucrats, and moderate military officers, became tired of the confrontation with the opposition" and tended to disintegrate (Im, 1989, p. 352; Chung, 1990, p. 38).

The position of softliners was strengthened within the ruling forces. The moderates in the ruling forces and opposition forces reached a compromise in the constitutional revision, and the first direct popular presidential election since 1971 was held on December 16, 1987. The ruling candidate Roh Tae-woo was elected as the new president because of the split of the opposition forces. On February 25, 1988, a peaceful transfer of power was achieved even if Roh was soldier-turned-politician. Korea crossed the first threshold of democratic transition.

In conclusion, the democratic transition of Korea is the product of compromise between the opposition forces that strongly initiated the democratization movement and ruling forces acquiescing to the opposition force demands. However, the prime mover of the Korean democratic transition and its comparatively stable development results from the growth of civil society based on the maturity of structural conditions rather than the concrete strategic choices of the political actors. Hence, we should not overemphasize the importance of the events happened in the latter part of the Fifth Republic. Although there were ups and downs in the
process of democratic transition, the longer pattern of this political change, including the form, the context, and the general direction of democratic reforms, has been more or less determined by the structural conditions. The Korean type of democratic transition suggests a combination of the government-initiated model and popular-initiated model.\(^1\) Therefore, democratization in Korea can be characterized as historical continuity rather than discontinuity or great upheaval. Korea is still in its evolutionary process of achieving democracy, but is very unlikely to retrogress into the authoritarian repression of an illegitimate regime.
Notes

1. Although there are several types of democratization processes, in accordance with the leading groups of democratization, the types of democratic transition can be subdivided as follows: transformation, replacement, and transplacement (see Table 7-1). Replacement occurs when opposition groups take the lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown (e.g., Portugal, Philippines, Greece, and Argentina). On the contrary, transformation occurs when the elites in power take the initiatives in the democratic transition (e.g., Spain and Brazil). However, transplacement results largely from joint action by government and opposition forces (e.g., South Korea) (Huntington, 1991, p. 114).

Table 7-1. Types of democratization processes

<table>
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<th>Huntington</th>
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<td>extrication</td>
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Time

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Notes

1. This study comes from material which was written in English and in Korean. Accordingly, at times a given author may have written in both languages (e.g., Han Sung-joo in English, Han Sung-chu in Korean). Hence, I have added the Korean author's name in square brackets if the romanization of the same Korean author is different in English materials and in Korean materials.