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China seeks democracy: An inquiry into models of democracy and their role in China's future

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University of Hawaii, 1992
CHINA SEEKS DEMOCRACY: AN INQUIRY INTO
MODELS OF DEMOCRACY AND
THEIR ROLE IN CHINA'S FUTURE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 1992

BY

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I would like to thank all the members of my dissertation committee. Without their critical comments and constructive advice this dissertation could not have been accomplished.

My first debt is to Professor Manfred Henningsen, as the Chairman of my committee, whose encouragement and help gave me the confidence that I needed. His suggestions on studying the model of social democracy (also suggested by Professor Deane Neubauer) has made my research on democracy more complete.

My second debt is to Professor Deane Neubauer. His guidance helped me to study the tensions between liberty and equality, the relation between capitalism and democracy, and thus made it possible for me to reach a realistic understanding of liberal democracy. Especially, the basic framework of this dissertation was recommended by Professor Deane Neubauer. Very special thanks are due to him.

I am also grateful to Professor Peter Manicas. I benefited greatly from his wide knowledge of democracy, and especially, by his suggestion to study the theory of freedom.

My former committee member Professor Farideh Farhi helped me to search the inextricable relationship between socialism and democracy. Her advice has provided me an
opportunity to learn the recent Left analysis on this question. Her help also deserves my thanks.

As an outside department committee member, Professor Chung-ying Cheng benefited me by his extensive knowledge of Chinese philosophy. His impact on me may be found in this perspective. My thanks are due to him, too.

I am also grateful to Professor Belinda Aquino. When Professor Farhi was not able to sit on my committee, she agreed to serve as a committee member and gave me some valuable suggestions to improve my dissertation.

Nevertheless, despite all the advice and suggestions received from my committee members in my research and writing, I should be the only responsible one for this dissertation’s shortcomings.

In addition, I am grateful to the Asian-Pacific Scholarship which I received for my first two years study at the University of Hawaii. I am also indebted to my sister Xi Li Wang’s financial and spiritual support during my studies in the United States.

Finally, I feel deeply regretful as well as grateful to my wife and children. In order to complete my studies I had to leave them alone in a distant country for six years without fulfilling my duties as a husband and father. Without their patience and sacrifice this dissertation could never have been completed.
This dissertation searches for a theory of democracy for China through a comparative study of three models: socialist democracy, liberal democracy, and social democracy. It first inquires into their political, socio-economic and philosophical basis in general, followed by discussions of their problems in the real world. In particular, it studies Chinese socialist democracy and the programs of the Chinese pro-democracy movement.

It concludes that all three models of democracy have some problems. Socialist democracy is undemocratic due to its lack of a democratic power structure. Its egalitarianism dismisses the principle of liberty; and the centrally planned economy decreases the productivity of social wealth. In liberal democracy, the unlimited power of private property undermines the principles of equality and liberty. Although social democracy is usually regarded as a successful middle way to achieve a balance between liberty and equality, it is challenged by the criticisms from both the Right and the Left. In this sense, there is no existing model of democracy that China can simply follow.

Based on this premise, this dissertation discusses some basic principles of democracy that would be appropriate for China’s future. It suggests that a democratic government should be established under the principle of separation of
powers. This perspective defines the democratic method as a mechanism of checks and balances of powers in time and space which is embodied in the institutions of separation of powers, multi-party system and periodic elections. At the same time, this system is logically connected with the principles of liberty and equality. Only a combination of the democratic structure of government and the principles of liberty and equality within the political, social and economic realms can make a social system democratic. If China wants to achieve democracy these basic principles of democracy should be considered as references.
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In early 1989, millions of people in China went to the streets to call for democracy and freedom. From April 15 to June 4, thousands of students gathered on Tian An Men Square (The Square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace) to demonstrate peacefully for political reform. They carried out a hunger strike despite of the martial law issued by the government. However, the Chinese people were not as fortunate as the people in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Chinese communist army finally marched into the Square to crack down on the biggest civil disobedience movement for democracy ever held and the Chinese people's dream of democracy once again was smashed with machine guns and tanks by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Nevertheless, the crackdown of the 1989 pro-democracy movement did not mean the end of the search for democracy by the Chinese people. There is little chance that the present system in China will survive. On the one hand, the victory of democracy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has greatly encouraged the Chinese people to promote political, social and economic liberalization in China. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as a ruling party for more than forty years, has lost its legitimacy, or in Chinese terminology, the "Mandate of Heaven." The CCP
cannot continue to rule by its old manner in the changed world. Furthermore, the Chinese people are not the same as they were forty years ago. The Statue of the Goddess of Democracy, once set up by the students in the center of Tian An Men Square, has symbolically indicated the changing consciousness of the democratic idea among the Chinese people. The principles of Peace, Reason and Nonviolence are reflected in their understanding of the meaning of democracy and they are not willing to live as they used to.

However, a question has been raised after this movement: whether the students, or in general, the Chinese people, understand what democracy is? Some commentators even put the blame for the absence of any theoretical perspective of democracy on the leaders. Generally speaking, these criticisms are correct. The students may have some common sense of what democracy means, but they lack a comprehensive knowledge of democratic theories. To seek some appropriate principles of democracy within China’s perspective thus becomes a task for the Chinese democrats. From this background, the author, as a Chinese student majored in political science, takes it as his task to inquire into different models of democracy and their role for China’s future.

This dissertation will study the general theories of socialist democracy, liberal democracy, and social democracy, and follow this with a critical discussion of the
flaws of these three models. In particular, it will discuss socialist democracy in China and the programs of some organizations of the pro-democracy movement. Based on these discussions, the last chapter will propose some basic principles of democracy that should be considered for China's democratization.

The second chapter consists of general research on three models of democracy: socialist democracy, liberal democracy, and social democracy. The first part of this chapter deals with socialist democracy, including its common features, the theoretical explanation of its democratic nature based on Marxism-Leninism, and its economic basis. The main argument in the chapter is that socialist democracy emphasizes who the ruler is but ignores how to rule in a democratic manner. Following this orientation, Leninist theories of class consciousness, a vanguard party, leadership and the state made socialist democracy equivalent to the proletarian dictatorship. The establishment of the one-party state was logically undemocratic in nature. In addition, Marx's original idea of democracy as a reunification of the state and civil society, which is different from Lenin's approach, will be discussed.

The second part of Chapter II discusses the theories of liberal democracy. The main philosophy of liberal democracy is that it expresses the liberal concept of human nature. The principle of free choice is based on the assumption that
every human being is a rational agent who is the best judge of his/her own interests. The model of liberal democracy materializes its political philosophy in the institutions of free elections and the separation of powers. In addition, it also discusses how liberal democracy has been shaped by capitalism in a historical perspective.

A brief discussion of some differences between socialist democracy and liberal democracy is based on their varying understandings of human nature and the relationship between the state and civil society. These divergences lead to their different forms in practice, such as a one-party system vs. a multi-party system, the indoctrination by official ideology vs. freedom of speech, the planned economy vs. a free market economy, etc.

The model of social democracy will be discussed in the third part of this chapter, which points out that social democracy originated in the theories of the Second International. The characteristics of social democracy can be summarized as "consensual democracy" combined with socialist ideas of "universalism" and "equality." The Swedish approach of "functional socialism" has been discussed particularly as a "Middle Way" to achieve democratic socialism between capitalism and state socialism. What makes social democracy a more desirable alternative is its attempt to seek social and economic democracy as well as political democracy.
Chapter III discusses the problems with socialist democracy, the flaws of liberal democracy, and the criticisms of social democracy. It holds that the socialist approach of abolishing private ownership of the means of production just creates a new privileged ruling class. Under this system, the distribution of social wealth is no longer dependent on one’s productive activity but on one’s political power, thus it fails to motivate production. It fails to equalize the distribution of social wealth on the one hand, and leads to economic stagnation on the other hand. It also worsens social tension by generating power struggle and corruption.

The analysis of the flaws of liberal democracy is based on the inconsistency between its ideology and reality. It argues that capitalism has created social inequality and threatened the existence of political liberty. Additionally, liberal democracy cannot avoid the "iron law of oligarchy" in its policy-making procedure. Schumpeter’s interpretation of democracy as the "rule of politicians" becomes the realistic reading of liberal democracy in the Western nations.

The criticisms of social democracy come from both the Right and the Left. The criticism of the Right is that the welfare state disturbs the mechanism of the free market economy while the Left criticizes the fact that the welfare state does not deal with the root of the illness of
capitalism. Following Macpherson's theory of the concept of property, it also carries out a critical analysis of "functional socialism." It holds that "functional socialism" is a "quasi-market economy," not a "mixed economy" or "market socialism." It is just a reflection of a changed concept of capitalist property as a right to revenue rather than a right to things.

Chapter IV particularly studies the democratic theories regarding liberty and equality. It discusses the tensions between liberty and equality within the political and economic realms. It also discusses how the debates of positive freedom and negative freedom are related to liberal democracy and socialist democracy in their practices.

Chapter V will focus on the debate of socialist democracy in China's context. First, it studies how Deng Xiaoping, the highest authority of the CCP defends socialist democracy by relating to the "Four Cardinal Principles" (to uphold the socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought). Under this guiding thought, the political reform program carried out by the CCP fails to satisfy the people's demand for democracy.

This chapter will also review how the pro-democracy movement criticized socialist democracy in China during the periods of the "Hundred Flowers Movement" and the "Democracy Wall Movement." The main argument focuses on the
dictatorship of the proletariat as the dictatorship of the "privileged stratum" or "bureaucrat-monopoly-privileged class." Some thinkers of the "democracy Wall Movement" demanded workers' democracy within a genuine Marxist framework. Some critiques of the dictatorship of the proletariat are correlated to the theories of political pluralism.

Furthermore, this chapter will discuss the programs held by the Chinese pro-democracy movements. Particular attention will be paid to the programs of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy, the Federation for Democratic China and the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party. These programs reflect their demands for a multi-party system, free elections, separation of powers, rule of law and human rights. They also promote the establishment of private enterprises and a market economy.

Chapter VI searches for the basic principles of democracy which are appropriate for China, and explains what the institutional manifestations of these principles would be. It holds that a democratic political system means a government which is established under the principles of separation of powers, a multi-party competition and periodic elections. At the same time, this system is logically connected with the principles of liberty and equality. The construction of the government can be regarded as the empirical aspect of democracy and the principles of liberty
and equality can be regarded as the normative aspect of democracy.

Based on this assumption, this chapter first inquires into the mechanisms of democracy in an empirical perspective. Referring to Schumpeter's theory of "Equilibrium Democracy," it defines "democratic method" as a mechanism of checks and balances of powers in time and space. In this paradigm of democracy, periodical elections, the separation of powers and a multi-party system (including interest groups) represent three of the main elements of the mechanism of democracy.

This chapter, in particular, compares the Chinese traditional political theory of the "Mandate of Heaven" with the modern democratic principle of the "People's Sovereignty." According to the "Mandate of Heaven," Heaven checks the ruler by people's ears and eyes. If the people are not satisfied, the ruler will lose his mandate from Heaven. In this sense, the people are actually sovereign.

However, this understanding lacks a mechanism to remove the ruler by peaceful means. The only way for the people to carry out the "Tao of Heaven" is to overthrow the tyranny by violent revolution. This shortcoming can be overcome by the institution of periodic elections. This "election-instead of-revolution" function of modern democracy is the most significant experience which the Chinese people should learn from Western politics.
Considering the application of the principle of separation of powers to the different forms of government, this chapter discusses some differences between a presidential system and a parliamentary system. Since the workability and efficiency of the American style separation of powers have been seriously challenged, this chapter suggests a transformation from a socialist parliamentary system to a liberal democratic parliamentary system for China's future. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that Robert Dahl's theory of polyarchy and democratic process should also be applied to establish a democratic representative government.

Chapter VI also discusses the importance of political freedom and civil rights. It maintains that the revival of a free civil society may guarantee freedom for the Chinese people. At the same time, a desirable economic system based on the principle of equality should also be established. A desirable economic system is one which can provide the conditions for productive efficiency and distributive equality, and it also should be compatible with political democracy. It holds that China should adopt an economic system in which public ownership and private ownership, market mechanism and state intervention in the productive perspective coexist; and attention is paid to both individual interests and social interests in the distributive perspective.
The author of this dissertation hopes that his understanding of the basic principles of democracy and their institutional applications may provide some valuable references for China's democratization in the near future.
Socialist Democracy

The Common Features of Socialist Democracy

Socialist democracy is the social system established by the communist parties under the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is also referred to as the "people's democracy." The regimes under this title are characterized by one-party domination politically and state ownership economically. The communists call this system socialism because they regard it as a transition period between capitalism and communism. During this period the state still exists. The nature of the state should take the form in the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat (in Chinese terms, it is also called people's democratic dictatorship). With the arrival of the period of communism, the government would be replaced by the administration of things and the direction of production, thus the state (either democratic or undemocratic) would wither away.

The states of socialist democracy, as Robert Furtak indicates, share some common features in the political sphere:

1. The permanent domination of state and society by one and the same party, or in fact by a small, self-co-opting elite. The aforesaid allocations of power, therefore, are practically irrelevant, because the only real power rests with the Marxist-Leninist
party, whatever stage of development the country might consider itself to have reached.

(2) The acceptance of only one system of values, based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and, in China, partially, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). It forms the binding ideology for social education and integration, and constitutes one, though not the sole, source for motivating and explaining political decisions.

(3) Consequently, there is a lack of autonomous political or social sub-systems—except, to a limited extent, in Poland and Yugoslavia—because the entire political process and all media of communication are in the hands of the Marxist-Leninist party.

(4) The organization of the state—again, except for Yugoslavia—is based on the principle of democratic centralism. This principle is supplemented by that of dual subordination, whereby the administrative organ at any level of government is responsible and accountable to the administrative organ at the next higher level. This implies that the decision-making and administrative structure is strongly centralistic and hierarchical. (Furtak, 1986:6)

Obviously, the regimes under socialist democracy with these features are different from Western societies. Especially, it may be difficult for some people to understand how a regime can claim itself to be dictatorial as well as democratic at the same time.

Theoretical Explanations of Socialist Democracy as Genuine Democracy: Who Is the Ruler?

To perceive the theoretical explanation of Socialist Democracy by the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat
as a genuine democracy, a study of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state should be helpful. Francis J. Kase has noted this key point in his book *People’s Democracy*:

This pleonastic term must be interpreted against the background of the Marxist theory of the state. In the Marxian doctrine of the state, the parliamentary democracy of the Western type is not a democracy, but rather a dictatorship of the ruling minority, the bourgeoisie. The name of "People’s Democracy" is intended to distinguish the Marxian democracy from its bourgeois predecessor, and to describe a "true" democracy, liberated from the rule of special interests, in which the people are the real rulers, a "Democracy of the People." (Kase, 1968:11)

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the state holds that the state is an instrument of class oppression. Lenin maintained: "According to Marx, the state is an organ of class domination, an organ of oppression of one class by another" (Lenin, 1932:8). Since democracy is a form of the state, somehow it is synonymous to dictatorship. Capitalist democracy is the dictatorship by the bourgeoisie whereas Socialist Democracy is the dictatorship by the proletariat. In other words, the former is the rule by a minority while the latter is the rule by the majority. Lenin thus described the nature of capitalist democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat in his *State and Revolution*:

In capitalist society, we have a democracy that is curtailed, poor, false; a democracy only for the rich, for the minority. The dictatorship of the proletariat, the period of transition to communism, will for the first time, produce a democracy for the people, for the majority, side by side with
the necessary suppression of the minority--the exploiters. (Lenin, 1932:74)

Since the main principle of democracy is majority rule, Socialist Democracy is therefore the genuine democracy. However, this kind of interpretation of democracy might be challenged to be problematical in two respects. First, the argument emphasizes who is the ruler and ignores how to rule in a democratic manner. Second, it lacks a constitutional instrument to guarantee the people as ruler. These two problems are related to each other. If there is no way to guarantee the people to be ruler, a tyranny can use the people’s name to rule in an undemocratic manner; on the other hand, if the country is ruled in an undemocratic manner, how can the common people rule?

Norberto Bobbio has noted these problems within Marxist political theory:

Marxism has neglected discussion of the political means for the attainment of dubious political ends, and ignored the question of how power is exercised by concentrating on who holds it. As a result various strategies for seizing power, and the preparation of the proletariat for this task, have dominated Marxist political practice, while analysis of the forms of government which will succeed this event are dismissed as "bourgeois." Most damagingly, the ground on which the new era was to be ushered in, far from uniting socialism and democracy, in a higher synthesis, seem in many respects to be deeply inimical to democratic procedures. (Bobbio, 1987:9)

Because the Marxist-Leninists usually emphasize the question of who is the ruler, not how to rule, they
disparage the institutions of parliament, multi-party system, the separation of powers, free elections, etc. They claim that these institutions are deceitful tricks which the bourgeois plays to fool the people.

**Socialist Democracy Based on Leninist Theories of Class Consciousness, Vanguard Party, and Leadership**

The Marxist-Leninists deeply commit themselves to power struggle by ignoring how to exercise power in a democratic manner. After they establish their regime, they still manage the power of the state in a revolutionary and military style. The style based on Leninist theories of class, party and leadership unavoidably resulted in establishing a regime in the nature of autocracy.

Lenin maintained that political class consciousness can only be brought to the working class from the outside. In his book *What Is To Be Done*, Lenin argued that "class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle." Within the economic struggle, the workers could only acquire spontaneously "trade union consciousness" (Bottomore, 1983:361). It was the party's function to develop social democratic consciousness among them. Bottomore pointed out that "as the organizational instrument for transmitting class consciousness to the empirical working class, Lenin conceives a 'new type of party' the
cadre party of professional revolutionaries" (Bottomore, 1983:80). It means that only the communist party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, can enlighten the proletariat from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself." Lenin took this as the justification for the establishment of party dictatorship: "The party absorbs the vanguard of the proletariat and this vanguard exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Lenin, Vol. 32, 1974:pp.20f). Lenin declared in his address to the First Congress of Workers in Education and Socialist Culture:

When we are reproached with having established a dictatorship of one party . . . we say 'yes, it is a dictatorship of one party! That is what we stand for and we will not shift from that position, because it is the Party that has won, in the course of decades, the position of vanguard of the entire industrial proletariat.' (Lenin, Vol. 29, 1974:535)

Further studies of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat will make it clear that not only the justification of the one party's monopoly of power but also the organizational principle of the party causes a regime under Socialist Democracy to be dictatorial. Lenin initiated a concept of "Democratic Centralism" in 1905 as the organizational principle of the Communist party. This principle requires the hierarchical subordination of the lower party bodies to the higher. The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party has claimed it clearly:

The organizational principle of the party is democratic-centralism. The whole party must
observe unified discipline: The individual is subordinate to the organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is subordinate to the higher level, and the entire Party is subordinate to the Central Committee. (Shanghai Communist Party Committee, 1976:170)

In this statement the only missing link is that the Central Committee must be subordinate to a single leader at the highest level. Actually, as the initiator of this principle, Lenin did not hesitate to recognize it as a natural consequence of democratic centralism. He held that:

There is absolutely no contradiction in principle between Soviet democracy and the wielding of dictatorial power by single individuals... How can strict unity of will be ensured? By the subordination of the will of thousands to the will of one. (Lenin, Vol. 27, 1974:pp.268f)

Although the principle of democratic centralism claims that the people's opinions are the fundamental resources for policy-making, the vanguard party does not trust the people. As a matter of fact, the people should be educated and enlightened by the vanguard and its great leaders. Only the party and its leaders hold the truth of what is good for the people. This is why a Department of Propaganda is set up in socialist countries. Freedom of speech and dissident opinion are not tolerated, because these are considered as harmful in terms of confusing people's thoughts. Open debate on public policy is not necessary, either in the People's Congress or in the mass media. The real task for the people is to carry out the policies made by the central
committee of the party. The party’s will is equal to the people’s will. Therefore, under the system of socialist democracy, as Barry Holden pointed out:

The will of the people is expressed by a single party and is executed by the government under the close guidance of the party. Limitation of the government is not necessary, and would indeed be regarded as undemocratic since it would constitute a limitation on the implementation of the will of the people. (Holden, 1974:35)

Macpherson named the state under one party a "vanguard state." His penetrating analysis of its nature may give us a clearer understanding of Socialist Democracy:

Can a vanguard state properly be called a democratic state? If democracy is taken in its narrow sense as meaning simply of choosing and authorizing governments, then a vanguard state cannot be called democratic. A vanguard state may be a state for the people but it is not a government by the people, or even by the choice of the people. A vanguard state cannot in principle be a democratic state in the narrow sense, since the whole reason for vanguard rule is that the majority of the people are said to be too debased, too impregnated with the ethics and values of the old inhuman society, to be trusted with immediate power. (Macpherson, 1976:20)

The Economic Basis of Socialist Democracy

To regard Socialist Democracy as a genuine democracy is also explained by its economic system. Marxists insist that the economic system is the foundation of the political system. In his "Preface to a Critique of Political Economy," Marx claimed:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual process in general. (Marx, 1977:389)

In the Marxist view, the demand of democracy is first a demand for the democratization of economic power, because a real democratic superstructure cannot be based on an undemocratic economic structure. Marxists proclaim Liberal Democracy a sham democracy because it is identical with capitalism and leaves economic power in the control of the minority.

Now, the question is how to democratize economic power, i.e., how to transfer economic power into the people's hands. Actually, this consideration includes the distribution and production of economic activities. The socialist policy for equal distribution of social wealth is to transfer private ownership to public ownership and thus avoid the exploitation of the workers by private capital; the consideration for rational production is to transform the market economy into a demand economy or a centrally planned economy; thus industrial democracy would become possible.
According to Marxist theory, the crucial point of the difference between capitalism and socialism lies in their different orientation toward production. In capitalism economic activities are aimed at profit and in socialism such activities focus on use. This causes the regulation of the two economic systems to be handled differently. John Strachey analyzes their difference:

Under capitalism the necessary regulation of the productive system is carried on unconsciously, independently of men's wills. Its regulatory principle asserts itself like a blind force of nature, leaving destruction and suffering in its wake. Things, not men, are in the saddle ... Under a planned economic system, on the other hand, men, working in association, tackle the job of consciously controlling, to suit themselves, their own productive system. The successful achievement of this control will mark a decisive step forward in human history. (Strachey, 1936:70)

The socialists hold that the capitalist market based on the rule of profit-making always leads to economic chaos, not to mention that it creates social inequality. On the other side, the socialist economy based on the principle of equal distribution of rewards for use, rational planning, and management would provide a solid foundation for a true democratic society.

**Marx's Original Idea of True Democracy: Reunification of the State and Civil Society**

Furthermore, if we study why Socialist Democracy always bases itself on a state-controlled economy, we may find its
root in Marx's original understanding of true democracy as the reunification of state and civil society, though, it is in the wrong direction in practice.

Like Hegel, Marx recognized the separation of civil and political life as the character of modern society distinguishing it from feudalism. However, he disagreed with Hegel's contention that the contradiction between state and civil society could be resolved in the form of the modern society. Namely, while the state established the universalization of political life by abolishing the distinctions based on birth, education, and occupation, it still allowed individuals to struggle for private interests particularly in civil society. Therefore, in "On Jewish Question," Marx argued: "the political annulment of private property does not mean the abolition of private property; on the contrary, it even presupposes it" (Marx, 1975:219). In this sense, Colletti, in his "Introduction to Marx's Early Writings," argued that in Marx's view the French Revolution established "juridical and political equality only upon the basis of a new and deeper inequality" (Marx, 1975:34). The contradiction between the democratic representative state and civil society thus replaces the classic contradiction between the public commonwealth and slavedom. The modern society based on the division of state and civil society failed to realize true democracy, which should be a true unity of the particular and universal.
In Marx's point of view, true democracy is an end of politics based upon the reunification of civil and political society. In the form of true democracy the state will wither away and the whole society will finally become an organization for "administration of things." In *Marxist Theory and Democratic Politics*, Christopher Pierson interpreted what Marx meant by true democracy:

Marx anticipated that a whole series of classical political problems—the role of the state, the need of representation and/or delegation, the constraints of the ruling by the ruled—would be overcome. Increasingly, under "True Democracy," the age-old government of men, the circumstances of political rule, would be seen to yield to a Saint-Simonian 'administration of things,' in which society could be organized according to purely technocratic, (neutral and non-controversial) imperative. (Pierson, 1986:16)

For Marx, if Communism is an ideal form of true democracy, the Paris Commune is a model of "the political form of social emancipation, of the liberation of labor from the usurpation (slaveholding) of the monopolists of the means of labor" (Marx, in Mclellan, 1977:556). The Commune was an appropriate form for the dictatorship of the proletariat by combining the executive and legislative; the members were elected from among the ordinary working men for short terms of office and subject to recall and revocation. Their services were paid at workmen's wages. According to Pierson, the meaning of the experiences of the Paris Commune to Marx is:
Though not, in itself, the realization of socialism, the Commune was to be the 'concrete form' through which transition might be realized, through which the reunification of political and civil society might be secured and the existence of specific and separate political institutions overcome. It was, above all, to be 'the political form of the social emancipation.' (Pierson, 1986:23)

Theoretically speaking, for Marx, the dictatorship of the proletariat meant a more expansive and democratic form of government for the working class. It must be in the sense of workers' democracy in general. It is a form of democratic government for the period of revolutionary transformation between capitalist and communist society. During this period, the ready-made state must be smashed, not strengthened. However, in Lenin's practice, the dictatorship of the proletariat or socialist democracy took the form of a centralized state with one party dictatorship. Ironically, the function of the state became stronger rather than withering away. In this sense, the Leninist state socialism is practically against Marx's original idea of socialist democracy. In Marx's theory, the reunification of state and civil society means that the state withers away. People are emancipated from the coercive state and become their own master of social life. Perhaps, this is why he called "socialism" "communism." But in Leninist practice, the reunification of state and civil society becomes a process of the withering away of civil society in the sense of "statism." Therefore, contemporary "state socialism" is
antithetical to Marx’s original concept of "socialism," though it is rooted in his idea of reunification of state and civil society.

**Liberal Democracy**

**A Combination of Liberty and Equality: the Principle of Free Choice**

Modern Western-style democracy is labeled Liberal Democracy, which combines the concept of liberalism and democracy. The relationship between these two concepts was explained by Giovanni Sartori as follows:

> The basic relation between liberalism and democracy is generally rendered from Tocqueville to de Rugiero, Kelsen, and Raymond Aron as a relation between liberty and equality. Thus, in order to isolate liberalism from democracy we say that liberalism calls for liberty and democracy for equality. Conversely, in order to unite them we say that it is the task of liberal-democratic systems to combine liberty with equality. (Sartori, 1987:383)

Historically speaking, the liberal state was first established based on a market society for free competition. After the development of the market economy and the emergence of a strong working class, the demands of equal political power through the universal franchise and civil rights for all became the tasks of democratization. The development from liberalism to liberal-democracy was a process of fulfillment of the principle of free choice which recognized each individual’s equal right to make decisions.
According to Macpherson, the claims of democracy would never have been recognized in the present liberal-democracies if those countries did not get a solid basis of liberalism first. He thus described this process:

The liberal democracies that we know were liberal first and democratic later . . . Before democracy came in the Western world there came the society and the politics of choice, the society and politics of competition, the society and politics of the market. This was the liberal society and state. It will be obvious that I am using liberal here in a very broad sense. I use it in what I take to be its essential sense, to mean that both the society as a whole and the system of government were organized on a principle of freedom of choice. In society as a whole, that is in all those relations between individuals other than the political relation of governors and governed, the principle of free choice was acknowledged. The principle was even insisted upon—for it was sometimes truer in theory than in practice. Individuals were free to choose their religion, their pattern of life, their marriage partners, their occupations. They were free to make the best arrangements, the best bargain they could, in everything that affected their living. (Macpherson, 1976:6)

Actually, liberal democracy is the expansion of free market economy, from which the principle of free choice has been applied to politics and everything in social life. In this sense, the principle of free choice should be considered as the essence of liberal democracy.

Liberal Political Theory and Human Nature

Then why free choice? Underlying the principle of free choice is the philosophy of human nature constructed by
According to Alison M. Jaggar, liberal political theory is grounded on the conception of human beings as essentially rational agents. First, liberals believe that what is especially valuable about human beings is a particular mental capacity, the capacity for rationality. Second, the liberal conception of rationality is conceived as the property of individuals rather than of groups. Third, the liberal conception of rationality is assumed to be a capacity that is possessed in approximately equal measure by all persons. Based on these assumptions, Jaggar held that:

The liberal conception of human nature sets the terms of liberal political theory. It constitutes the ground of the basic moral and political values of liberalism, it poses the fundamental problems of liberal political philosophy and it prescribes the method that liberals use for resolving those problems. The fundamental moral values of liberalism are predicated on the assumption that all individuals have an equal potentiality for reason. This assumption is the basis of liberalism's central moral belief, the intrinsic and ultimate value of the human individual. (Jaggar, 1983:33)

According to Jaggar, because different liberal theorists interpret reason differently, their belief in the value of the human individual is expressed in various terms. Those who emphasize the moral aspect of reason stress the value of individual autonomy. In other words, they value reliance on individual judgment, on uncoerced and unindoctrinated rather than established authority in determining matters of truth and morality. Those who
emphasize the instrumental aspect of reason stress the value of individual self-fulfillment and the importance of each individual being able to pursue her or his own self-interest as they define it.

However, Jaggar argued, whether autonomy or self-fulfillment is the primary emphasis, liberals' belief in the ultimate value of the individual defines "political egalitarianism":

If all individuals have intrinsic and ultimate value, then their dignity must be reflected in political institutions that do not subordinate any individual to the will or judgment of another. (Jaggar, 1983:33)

Given these values, liberal ideology promotes each individual's maximum freedom from interference by others, especially by the government. This characteristic is the basic difference between liberal democracy and socialist democracy, which shall be discussed later.

The Model of Liberal Democracy: Individualist and Pluralist; Free Elections and the Separation of Powers

To actualize the fundamental values of liberalism in the political system, liberal democracy regards the individuals or groups who have the same interests as the basic unit of the political system. Barry Holden described the model of liberal democracy as individualist and pluralist:

The liberal-democratic model rests on a view of society and political system that is
individualist or pluralist. The conception is not the community as a corporate entity, rather, all that is seen to exist is a collection of autonomous individuals or groups. (Holden, 1974:35)

Holden maintained that autonomy of the individuals or groups implies protection from government interference. According to this theory, the government has to act in accordance with the wishes of the people, which simply consists of all the individuals or groups. This can only be done by allowing free expression of views and genuine choices at elections, because an individual’s views and decisions can only properly emerge if he or she can at some point make uninfluenced statements and choices. Thus Holden argued:

Any divining by others of their ‘best interests’ or clarification of their ‘real will’ is ruled out unless it is subject to the check of actual choice on the part of those alleged to have the interest or will. (Holden, 1974:35)

Therefore, under the liberal political system free elections are the lifeline to protect individuals’ or groups’ interests, and thus become a part of the definition of liberal democracy. Holden emphasized this importance, saying:

The making of free choices is seen, then as a logically necessary condition of democracy. And it is this that leads to the emphasis laid by Western democrats on free elections. Free elections are held to involve both unrestricted voting choice and unrestricted expression of opinion. As we saw previously, the notion of free elections and/or the institutional prerequisites for
their existence is quite frequently built into the very definitions of democracy given by liberal-democrats. (Holden, 1974:36)

Another important aspect of the notion of liberal democracy is the idea of limitation on the scope of government. Governmental control of the people should be limited in order to preserve and protect individual autonomy. Furthermore, as the liberal notion of the limited state involves protection of the individual in many spheres from state interference, many principles and devices have been carried out to achieve such protection. Holden pointed out that some of the most notable have been the separation of powers, the principles and practices of 'the rule of law,' written constitutions and bills of rights; rights to free speech and assembly are usually regarded among the requirements for free elections.

In the theoretical approach, liberal democracy is grounded on a liberal philosophy of human nature on which individualism and pluralism are based. In order to protect individuals' or groups' interests and preserve areas of autonomy for them, the government should be limited and its powers should be separated. The main vehicle to carry out the principle of free choice in the political marketplace is the institution of free elections.
Liberal Democracy and Capitalism

As mentioned before, liberal democracy is the companion of capitalism. A study of the interaction between liberal democracy and capitalism would be helpful for us to understand how capitalism shapes the possibilities for liberal democracy.

Many students used to discuss democracy in its abstract sense. They paid little attention to the interaction between economics and political arrangements. This mistake comes right from the starting point of the liberal framework. For liberalism, social life is divided into the "public" and "private." Consequently, the "state" deals with the public section, meaning politics; and the "civil society" deals with the private section. Since economics is categorized as private, especially identified with private property, it is not subject to public accountability. Furthermore, democracy is understood in this view as the form of government in its narrow sense. Therefore, discussions about democracy are always conducted in the abstract by the liberal approach. As a matter of fact, this approach misses the link of the interaction between economics and politics and always leaves the understanding of the particular political institutions in the abstract meaning.

Liberal democracy and capitalism share a common genesis and development. In order to understand the interaction
between democracy and capitalism, and how capitalism shapes the possibilities of liberal democracy in some particular way, a review of the origins of the liberal state guided by an understanding of laissez-faire capitalism and how modern liberal democracy was shaped by corporate capitalism would be helpful. By doing so, we may see the interaction between, and dynamic of, capitalism and democracy.

According to Peter Manicas, the period from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth century may be seen as a period of evolution from a "customary" or "status" society to a "possessive market society" and in this process emerges the division of the public and private sphere. He interpreted this process as follows:

Customary society had a directly 'political' character in the sense that very many elements of everyday life: work, worship, play, exchange, marriage, and the administration of justice were controlled by the 'natural' ruling hierarchy of the lord and priest, a hierarchy itself subject to the pervasive body of well-established custom. Accordingly, there is little in the way of significant distinction between what is 'private' and what is 'public.' And there is not yet the distinction which modern thinkers will make between 'political society' and 'civil society.' (Manicas, 1974:92)

Manicas maintained that with the emergence of the liberal state it was important for liberals to redefine the boundary between public and private. This redefinition meant a new sense of "liberty" and new roles for the institution of government. However, under the actual
historical circumstance the realm of the private was understood in specifically historical terms: "the realm of the private, of liberty and of the rights of man, was concretely conceived as indissolubly connected with the institutions of private property" (Manicas, 1974:91). Actually, this specific redefinition of private and public has become the cornerstone of capitalism as well as liberal democracy.

Liberalism as a political and economic theory was developed during the transition from feudal-monarchical society to capitalist-democratic society. Ronald Glassman has given us a remarkable description of how liberalism—both its ideas and its institutions—emerged during this historical period. In his book *Democracy and Equality*, Glassman argued that liberalism was born in the nations where the commercial class was successful in its revolt against the monarchy and its feudal allies. Therefore, liberalism became the creed of the bourgeois to shape democracy in particular ways. Glassman claimed:

Liberalism is the credo of the trade-capitalist commercial class of the city and countryside. It then transcended its origins and became the theory of representative-democracy for all the world and for all time. However, the historical and structural context in which it emerged set the agenda for liberalism as a political and economic theory.

The kingly-bureaucratic state was a despotic state ruling through traditional legitimacy; therefore the trade-capitalists (city merchants and landed gentry) developed the
idea of the limitation of the power of the state. To counteract the idea of traditional authority, wherein each 'estate' had its ascribed and immutable position, the idea of the 'state of nature' and the 'social contract' were created. Through these latter, humans entered society anew, as equal individuals, with inalienable rights, guaranteed by law (rather than feudal tradition). Further, the attempt to control economic activity by the monarchy and its bureaucracy generated the counter-idea of laissez faire—that government should keep its hands out of business transactions, and that private enterprise was superior in efficiency, creativity, and energy to governmental monopolistic control. Finally, against the claim that the king and his court functionaries had the legitimacy to rule, the idea of representative government was put forth. (Glassman, 1989:165-66)

Accordingly, Glassman argued that where liberalism triumphed the representatives became lawmakers. And parliament became the central political institution of the limited-power state. It is quite clear that the development of laissez-faire capitalism shaped almost all of the ideas and institutions of democracy in its early period.

Glassman further maintained that the positive heritage of liberalism should also be recognized:

Liberalism, in its Enlightenment form, has become the theory of legal democracy for the modern world, accompanying the institutions it supports. A passion for limited government, and political freedom, for economic freedom, for lawful political procedures, and political rights are liberalism's great gift to the world. (Glassman, 1989:165)

However, we must note that when liberalism transcends its democratic ideas of liberty and equality and
correspondent institutions into the universal forms for the whole society, it conceals the real and initiative interest of the private property of a specific class underlying these forms. Thus these particular forms in turn limit the possibilities of democracy. Especially, its distinction between the 'private' and 'public' becomes problematic, and even becomes the origins of the limitation of liberal democracy.

Peter Manicas pointed out this crucial issue in The Death of the State:

The liberal revolutions did mark an enormous human achievement. They did liberate persons from customary coercion and they did advance the idea of freedom. Nevertheless, as these revolutions issued in institutional arrangements which embedded the near identification of the realm of the private with private property, the new arrangements left persons easy prey for more impersonal, but by no means less extensive, forms of private and institutional coercion. Not only has the liberal failed to see or to take seriously that immense power over individuals and the social environment which is furnished by the prevailing institutions of private property, but as well, he has rationalized the use of government to protect and safeguard that power. Accordingly, the idea of freedom advanced by liberals remains an abstraction. As Dewey observed forty years ago: 'The notion that men are equally free to act if only the same legal arrangement apply equally to all--irrespective of differences in education, in command of capital, and the control of the social environment which is furnished by the institution of property--is a pure absurdity, as facts have demonstrated.' (Manicas, 1974:92)
As laissez-faire liberalism developed to corporate liberalism the dilemmas within the liberal distinction between private and public have manifested themselves more clearly. Theodore Lowi, in his book The End of Liberalism, maintained that modern administration presented two basic dilemmas to capitalist ideology:

First, the predominance of administration proves that conscious control rather than mechanistic, automatic, self-control is the predominant fact about modern conduct. Second, it proves that even the remaining self-regulation mechanism, still a substantial factor, have shifted in very large part from market competition to group competition—{}from self-regulation through economics to self-regulation through politics. (Lowi, 1976:29)

As a matter of fact, the private power of the capitalist corporation is no longer "private." In their book Democracy and Capitalism Bowles and Gintis challenge the liberal private-public partition as arbitrary in this way:

Liberal theory's arbitrarily asymmetric treatment of state and economy stems, we believe, from the untenable notion that the capitalist economy is a private sphere—in other words, that its operation does not involve the socially consequential exercise of power. Most liberals go on to argue that the economy, perhaps with suitable state regulation, should remain private. This, however, is beside the point, for if our argument is correct, the capitalist economy is not now a private sphere, and the basic issue concerns its proper organization as a public sphere. (Bowles and Gintis, 1986:67)

Although the situation is very clear that "the modern corporation wields economic and social power of the highest
consequence for the condition of our polity" (Chayes, 1959:28), some liberals still insist on the private-public partition and believe that only capitalism can provide democracy. New Right thinkers such as Hayek, Friedman and Nozick argued that only under the free market can people be free. Friedman shares the same argument with Hayek that there exists a correlative relationship between capitalism and democracy. The argument goes like this:

By removing the organization of economic activities from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement. (Friedman, 1962:15)

According to Friedman, the separation of the economic sphere from the political sphere not only protects people from despotism, but also provides people with a free market mechanism. He argues:

The wider the range of activities covered by the market, the fewer are the issues on which explicitly political decisions are required and hence on which it is necessary to achieve agreement. In turn, the fewer the issues on which agreement is necessary, the greater is the likelihood of getting agreement while maintaining a free society. (Friedman, 1962:24)

In Hayek's point of view, politics, as a governmental decision-making system, will always be a radically imperfect system of choice when compared to the market. Therefore state intervention should be kept to a minimum, to the operation of an "ultra-liberal" state (Hayek, 1976:172).
Nozick also presents a number of arguments concerning the "minimal state" or the "framework for Utopia." Under Nozick's framework, only individuals can judge what they want. The less the state interferes in their lives the better for them. The "minimal state" is inconsistent with "planning in detail" or "forcing some to aid others." It is beyond the state's legitimate bounds to promote equality. Utopia is a framework where people are "at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community" (Nozick, 1975:333).

Contrary to the New Right thinkers, many political scientists of various schools no longer think that the markets are free under corporate capitalism. Under this system individuals are not able to realize their freedom on an equal basis. David Held argues that liberalism generally, and the New Right in particular, projected an image of the market as a 'powerless' mechanism of coordination and neglected the distorting nature of economic power in relation to democracy:

The idea that modern society approximates, or could progressively approximate, a world where producers and consumers meet on an equal basis seems, to say the least, hopelessly unrealistic when massive asymmetries of power and resources are (as both neo-pluralists and neo-Marxists recognize) not only systematically reproduced by the market economy but also supported and buttressed by liberal democratic governments themselves. The resulting 'bias' in the political agenda
appears to be recognized by nearly all schools of contemporary democratic theory other than the New Right. (Held, 1987:252)

Why do liberals neglect the reality that markets are no longer "private" and "free"? After all, underlying their universalized liberalism are the interests of corporate capitalism. Philip Green initiated a very profound criticism of the theory of the New Right, or as he called it, New Individualism, in his book The Pursuit of Inequality.

According to Green, the question of "public" versus "private" arises in the economic sphere only when ownership of productive property is defined in such a way that there are adverse interests created by the definition, namely, someone owns productive property and the other does not. Green asserts that since capitalism is the system in which ownership is the purview of a few, "the whole purpose of the free-market approach to politics is rather to argue that the "majority should not interfere with the few" (Green, 1981:224). He criticizes the theory of the "minimal state":

The minimal state, then, cannot deliver what most people mean by 'liberty.' Moreover, the 'liberty' it does promise is betrayed and destroyed at the very moment of its inception: the moment at which, under the guise of liberating individuals, the corporate concentration of capital is liberated (or unleashed) instead. (Green, 1981:222)

Green's criticism clearly illustrates that the principle of liberty is distorted under capitalism. As a
matter of fact, the interaction between capitalism and democracy is the key point for people to understand the characteristics of liberal democracy in the real world.

Some Differences Between Socialist Democracy and Liberal Democracy

As has been discussed so far, liberal democracy and socialist democracy are based on quite different theoretical approaches. Mainly, there are two fundamental differences between these two models. The first divergence lies in their different understanding of the relationship between public and private spheres, or in other words, between state and civil society. Liberal democrats tend to divide these two spheres while socialist democrats want to reunite them. The second divergence comes from their different interpretation of rationality or human nature. Those theoretical divergences lead to their different policies in practice.

In the general decision-making process, liberals believe that an individual can make the best choice for his/her interests, whereas socialists believe that only the vanguard party armed by Marxist ideology can make good decisions for the people. Marxists deny abstract human nature and rationality. In the Marxian point of view, the "proletariat in itself" as well as common people are—as Macpherson points out—"too debased, too impregnated with
the ethics and values of the old inhuman society." People are not trusted to make decisions by themselves; only the vanguard party knows the truth of history and reality and therefore can make the best decision for the people.

In the social realm, socialist democracy ignores the individual's liberty and pays no respect to human rights or civil rights; whereas liberal democracy emphasizes free choice in an individual's life. Therefore, in socialist countries the people are forced to be indoctrinated by official ideology and are organized in a strict discipline. The government interferes or even controls every sphere of the people's lives. The whole society is pushed by an arbitrary will towards a Utopian ideal. The people have to sacrifice their personal interests for the extreme goal of communism. In a liberal society, social progress is based on the individual's understanding of the real world and tries to improve it gradually.

In the political realm, socialist democracy holds that only the vanguard party represents the general will of the people. No political challenges are allowed in the forms of opposite parties or organizations; thus a single-party system is logically established to maintain the authoritarian regime. However, in a liberal democracy, divergence of interests is recognized under the idea of political pluralism by which individuals and groups can seek their own interests. The pursuit of self-interest is not
seen as being against the general will but as a part of its fulfillment. Thus in liberal states, a multi-party system and pressure groups are allowed.

In the economic realm, socialist democracy regards private ownership of property as the root of social inequality, thus it establishes public ownership. Under liberal democracy, the liberal values of autonomy and self-fulfillment have often been linked with the right to private property, thus private property has always been protected. Furthermore, socialist democracy always relies on a planned economy because socialists think that only the governmental plan can be designed rationally while the free market economy based on the individual’s self-interest and irrational competition just leads to chaos and economic crisis.

Therefore, most of the differences between liberal democracy and socialist democracy can be well recognized based on their different opinion of the relationship between state and civil society, and their view of human rationality.

Social Democracy

Social Democracy: The Scandinavian Model

Social democracy is an approach of democratic socialism. The regimes established in the Scandinavian area can be regarded as typical examples of this model.
Geographically, Scandinavia encompasses three constitutional monarchies: Denmark, Norway, Sweden; the newer republics of Finland and Iceland, and also includes two of Denmark’s North Atlantic dominions (self-governing territories) of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:4). The social democratic model of democracy in Scandinavia is known as Scandinavian Democracy or Nordic Democracy. The democratic systems in the five countries and the three self-governing island-regions have important characteristics in common which are more similar to each other than to other democratic countries or regions outside that area (Friis, 1981:2).

The Scandinavian model has attracted international interest for years as a successful "Middle Way" to achieve democracy between state socialism as in the former Soviet Union and liberal democracy as in America. Neil Elder pointed out:

the 'Middle Way,' in its original formulation in the 1930s, was asserted to lie between Fascism and Communism. The meaning has now shifted: it is now taken to lie between capitalism and socialism. (Elder, 1988:9)

Actually, the significant meaning of Scandinavian democracy lies in the fact that it has not only realized democracy in the political realm but also extended the principle of democracy into social and economic realms. The author of Nordic Democracy maintained:
Democracy, as we look upon it in Scandinavia, is not only a form of government but also comprises social and economic democracy as well as the democratic principles underlying justice, education, and culture, etc. This broadened concept of democracy is held common by these five nations, not only in the sense that it has put its stamp on society in all Nordic countries but also in that it as a form of government is not solely the vehicle for an elite but is based on the support of the people as a whole. (Friis, 1981:vii)

Neil Elder identifies Scandinavian democracy as "consensual democracy" under the general principles of liberal democracy. He argues that all liberal democratic states must be consensual democracies in some degree. He asserts:

Rules of thumb for evaluation can be extracted by reference to three dimensions: first, the framework for rules and regulations for the resolution of political conflict; next, the nature of the conflicts arising within that framework; and finally, the manner in which the resolution of those conflicts is attempted. (Elder, 1988:9)

With respect to these three dimensions, a liberal democratic state is considered to be characterized in the following three respects:

1) a liberal democratic state is characterized by a low level of opposition to the framework of rules and regulation of political conflict within that state;

2) a liberal democratic state is characterized by a low level of conflict about the actual exercise of power within that state;

3) a liberal democratic state is characterized by a high degree of concert in
the gestation of public policy. (Elder, 1988:10-11)

Through analysis of Scandinavian democracy in these three dimensions, Elder concludes that it is a "consensus system" in the sense of liberal democracy.

For Robert Eriksen, the core of the Scandinavian model lies in broad public participation in various areas of economic and social life. Its purpose is to promote economic efficiency and the ability of society to master its problems. Especially, it seeks to enrich and equalize the living conditions of individuals and families. And all policies are set up to achieve those goals, e.g., free education for all in public educational institutions; free or inexpensive health care on the same basis; child allowance for all families with children rather than income-tested aid for poor mothers; universal old-age pensions, including pension rights for housewives and others who have not been in gainful employment; general housing policies rather than 'public housing.' Eriksen asserts that the principles of the Scandinavian welfare state are based on the idea of universalism and equality:

In social policy, the cornerstone of the model is universalism. The Scandinavian countries have--at least on paper--set out to develop a welfare state that includes the entire population... The goal is a set of egalitarian institutions which not only give the poor access to the minimum standard of income and social services but also bring those who would otherwise have been poor closer to the general standard of their society, decrease the need of the well-to-do
to develop exclusive services and bring about some overall redistribution of income and other resources. (Eriksen, 1987:vii)

Based on the principles of universalism and equality, he maintains that the transfers and services are regarded as a right for all rather than a charity for the needy. On this basis, the Scandinavian countries have developed their comprehensive policies of the modern welfare state. Although their achievements remain controversial for both socialists and liberals, the fact that they have succeeded in avoiding the worst situations such as economic inequality under capitalism and political dictatorship under state socialism is impressive.

Theoretical Basis for the Successful Road of Social Democracy

Theoretically speaking, the road of social democracy is following the strategy developed by the Second International. There are two basic and different approaches to achieve socialism and democracy, i.e., the road of Leninism-Stalinism and the road of the Second International. The former adopted a revolutionary way whereas the latter preferred a parliamentary road.

Lenin held a very strong negative attitude towards parliamentary democracy. According to Lenin, under this system the workers are only "formally" equal and free. They are not able to do more than vote every few years for a
choice of masters. In his book *State and Revolution*, Lenin thus argued:

"A working, not a parliamentary body"—this hits the vital spot of present-day parliamentarians and the parliamentary Social-Democratic "lap-dogs"! Take any parliamentary countries, from America to Switzerland, from France to England, Norway and so forth—the actual work of the "state" there is done behind the scenes and is carried out by the departments, the offices and staffs. Parliament itself is given up to talk for the special purpose of fooling the "common people." (Lenin, 1932:40)

In Lenin’s point of view, the way to achieve real democracy is not through the parliamentary system but to overthrow it. He said "we can and must think of democracy without parliamentarism" (Lenin, 1932:41).

Nevertheless, the main theorists of the Second International held that the socialist transformation of society could be achieved through a parliamentary majority of the labor party. Kautsky argued in his book *The Class Struggle*:

Sooner or later in every capitalist country the participation of the working class in politics must lead to the formation of an independent party, a labor party. And, once formed, such a party must have for its purpose the conquest of the government in the interests of the class which it represents. (Kautsky, 1971:189)

The working class must engage in parliamentary struggle. This struggle should be directed both towards an increase in the power of the parliament in the state and towards the increase in their own influence within
parliament. When the working class can influence government activity, parliament "ceases to be a mere tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie" (Kautsky, 1971:188).

Bernstein also favored the parliamentary road to achieve democracy in his book *Evolutionary Socialism*. He made a clear distinction between the revolutionary and the democratic roads to political power. He considered parliamentary struggle and constitutional legislation to be "best adapted to positive social-political work" (Bernstein, 1961:218). Bernstein argued that "the formation of political and social organs of the democracy is the indispensable preliminary condition to the realization of socialism" (Bernstein, 1961:163).

According to Bernstein, in the long run universal suffrage could ensure the subjection of the state to popular control:

The right to vote in a democracy makes its members virtually partners in the community, and this virtual partnership must in the end lead to real partnership. With the working class underdeveloped in numbers and culture the general right to vote may long appear as the right to choose 'the butcher;' with the growing number and knowledge of the workers it is changed, however, into the implement by which to transform the representatives of the people from masters into real servants of the people. (Bernstein, 1961:144)

Based on these considerations, Kautsky and Bernstein disagreed with Lenin's theory and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Kautsky argued that the method of dictatorship could not lead to socialism. The
working class could and must gain power by democratic means. Modern socialism means not merely the social organization of production but also democratic organization of society as well. Socialism without democracy is unthinkable. Democracy means majority rule as well as civil liberties and the protection of minorities. Therefore, the method of dictatorship is based on fundamental errors, which will actually destroy the possibility of achieving socialism and democracy.

The theories of the Second International and the German Social Democratic Party strongly influenced socialists in the Scandinavian countries in their approach towards socialism. Along with the socialist ideology of the Second International the Social Democratic Parties in the Scandinavian countries focused their work on the introduction of universal suffrage and cabinet responsibility to parliament. In the early 1900s they succeeded in the struggle for controlling the parliament.

As Einhorn and Logue maintained, the Social Democratic Parties in the Scandinavian countries achieved their multidimensional democracy through three stages:

The first, political democracy—the supremacy of a parliament elected by universal suffrage—was achieved in the first two decades of this century, late by Anglo-American standards... With the foundations of political democracy in place, constructing social democracy, with its goals of equality and social solidarity, took center stage from the 1930s to 1960s. Bitterly contested at first, social reforms
finally received strong consensus support in
the postwar period. They helped to shape a
better and more democratic society as well
as a structure that could withstand social,
political and economic stresses. Finally,
economic democracy, in which the
organization of the production and
distribution of goods and services become
accountable to democratic principles, became
the focus of reform in the 1970s. (Einhorn
and Logue, 1989:33)

The Scandinavian experiences indicate that political
democracy should be first achieved, then comes social
democracy and economic democracy. This is contrary to some
people's belief that socio-economic democracy should be
reached before political democracy. The Scandinavian
experiment may offer an alternative strategy in their
efforts at democratization.

Functional Socialism

As mentioned before, the Scandinavian model is regarded
as an alternative to achieve socialism. Its socialism is
different from the state socialism in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. The latter realizes the
nationalization of the means of production and a planned
economy while the former adopts a mixed market economy which
is described as "functional socialism." The Scandinavian
socialist movement has maintained that private ownership of
the means of production and a market economy are not totally
in conflict with socialism. The goals of socialism may be
achieved in a more sophisticated way than by socializing all
the means of production. The functional socialist policy does not completely socialize ownership of the means of production but indirectly socializes a number of the functions which an unregulated owner can exert. In this way they have tried to resolve the conflicts between the desires of private owners and the demands of society at large. Gunnar Adler-Karlsson thus maintained:

We have not had a total socialization of ownership, but instead a selective socialization of some of the most important functions inside the totality of functions where we call ownership. We have limited the rights of the owners of the means of production to use their goods in an unsocial way. As the means of production are of greatly varying importance in different economic sectors, economically and politically, there has, however, been a considerable difference of what we will call 'functional socialization' in the different sectors of the economy. (Adler-Karssen, 1970:16)

Accordingly, by doing so the power in the economic field can be retained and the temptation to abuse a concentrated power can be checked. These goals can be achieved without attacking private property. Michael Harrington had some comments on this kind of "functional socialization":

The Swedish socialists saw their ideas within an explicitly socialist framework. In the twenties, when it became clear that there was no political basis for wholesale and rapid socialization, they developed the notion of 'functional socialization' to explain what they were doing. Capitalist property, they argued, was not a 'thing' to be seized by the state but a bundle of functions—deciding on what technology to
produce in what way at what wages at what price, and so on. And it would be possible to carry out a policy of 'functional socialization,' of asserting public (but not necessarily state) control over one or another of those functions without attacking private property as such. (Harrington, 1989:101)

Harrington held that these gradualistic measures were conceptualized as part of a socialist strategy for structural changes that were politically possible.

Whether the Scandinavian countries are socialistic in nature is controversial. For Einhorn and Logue, it is the "most widespread misconception" to think that they are socialistic. In Sweden the proportion of industry belonging to the state is smaller than in France, Britain or Italy. They hold that the "Scandinavian welfare states are based on capitalistic market economies" (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:10).

However, for Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, the Swedish middle way of economy is the approach of "functional socialism." They "have maintained the goals of socialism, but chosen the means to realize them in a more sophisticated way than by socializing all the means of production" (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:12). First, they have tried to harmonize the conflicts in the free market; secondly, they have functionally socialized the means of production.

According to Adler-Karlsson, one important characteristic of the Swedish middle way system is the pragmatic attitude to conflicts between the free market economy and state interference in the market. Capitalists
believe that free competition leads to a basically harmonious solution to the economic problem of the society. On the other hand, the communists say that there is no harmony whatsoever in the free market system and there is an unbridgeable conflict between capitalists and the proletariat. The Swedish socialists realize that there is a conflict between the capitalist class and the working class. But they think that this conflict is not total. There is also some harmony in the free market society. This harmony lies in the overriding interest of the growth of the economy for the whole society:

In order to get the economy to grow it is necessary to have good stability in the society. It is necessary to create an atmosphere of belief and trust in the future; and of willingness to work, to save, and to invest, in order that an individual may see his efforts achieve flowering and lasting result. This cannot voluntarily be done without a certain cooperation between the workers and the owners of the means of production. If there is success in reaching that economic growth, then all the other economic conflicts in society are much easier to solve. When the capitalist gets greater profits he is more willing to divide them with his workers, and when the workers constantly see that their living conditions are improving, their willingness to continue in peaceful cooperation in the society is greatly increased. (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:12)

Adler-Karlsson asserts that this attitude makes both parts more willing to cooperate. Because they realized that the most important economic task was to make the national cake grow bigger and bigger. "The cake will often crumble
or be destroyed in the fight, and because of this everyone loses" (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:12).

Furthermore, Adler-Karlsson illustrates what is meant in functional socialism for Sweden to deal with the goal of socialization of the means of production. The fundamental definition of a capitalist or socialist system lies in the private or public ownership of the means of production. In the capitalist system ownership of the means of production has always been in private hands; whereas in the communist system the means of the production are owned by the state. From a legal point of view ownership means that the owner can do any thing he wants to with the owned objects within legal boundaries. However, Swedish functional socialism is based on an old legal theory of ownership which has been developed by the Swedish socialist Osten Unden. Adler-Karlsson points out:

What Osten Unden did--in the legal tradition of Roman Law--was to stress that the concept of ownership is not an indivisible concept, but, quite the contrary, a concept embodying different ownership functions, which can easily be separated from each other. Ownership, O, so to speak, does not simply equal ownership, but equals functions a, b, c, etc., or, expressed in still another way, \[ O = a + b + c \ldots + n \]. The logic of this way of reasoning is that it is not necessary to undertake wholesale socialization in society in order to achieve the socialist goals. It may be sufficient, or even economically better, only to socialize some of the functions of ownership, for instance a and b but not c. (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:14)
For example, as Adler-Karlsson explained, an owner of a house with unlimited ownership can do anything he wants to. He can choose to live in the house himself, to rent it, to tear down and rebuild it, sell it, or he can deposit the money of his income from the house in any bank, he can even send the money abroad where he can get better profits. By the way of functional socialism, it is not necessary to completely socialize ownership of houses, but indirectly socialize a number of the functions. In Sweden the rents of houses are partially controlled by the state; the owner cannot tear down and rebuild his house as he pleases; he cannot use the profits from the ownership of that house in an unregulated way and he must pay a fair amount of taxes to the state. The taxes are used for education and health services. In this way the Swedish have successfully resolved the conflicts between the desire of the private owners and the demands of society at large. Adler-Karlsson maintains: "This way of socialization may, indeed, be the very essence of the Western mixed economies" (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:15).

It seems that the Swedish middle way of a mixed economy sounds economically effective and politically possible. It is an experiment to achieve socialist goals under a market economy. The experience of the Scandinavian model may give some lessons to the countries who used to deny the compatibility of the mechanism of market economy with
socialist goals. In this sense, the Scandinavian democracy can be regarded as "Socialism's Showcase" for democratic socialism.

Considering the democracy of the Scandinavian model, as Einhorn argued, political democracy in Scandinavia did not lead only to political liberty. The role of the state changed from that of defender of the prerogatives and property of the few to that of an instrument for democratizing society and the economy, thus the welfare state became an integral part of Scandinavian democracy (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:135). Its multi-party system and parliamentary democracy are equivalent to the liberal political system in the West and its functional socialism with the social welfare policy ensures social equality at some degree. The Scandinavian model has provided a stimulating experience to achieve both democracy and the goals of socialism.
Chapter III
THE FLAWS OF THE THREE MODELS OF DEMOCRACY

Problems within Socialist Democracy

The socialists hold that the most important way to achieve real democracy is to democratize the economic power of the society. Otherwise, liberty and equality are nothing but abstract principles. The way to achieve these ends is to socialize the means of production and introduce a planned economy. But the realities so far have shown that this policy not only fails to democratize economic power, but also worsens the situation by its unexpected side-effects. Generally speaking, there are three negative consequences of this experiment.

First, public ownership does not place economic power into the people’s hands, but creates a new privileged ruling class. Economic power has turned out to be centralized and bureaucratized rather than democratized.

Second, public ownership of the means of production destroys the motivation of productivity by turning off the incentive for profit, thus causing economic stagnation and social poverty.

Third, public ownership makes distribution of social wealth political. The distribution of wealth is no longer dependent on one’s productive activity but dependent on how
much political power one holds. In other words, wealth is identical with power.

Under socialist democracy, public ownership does not mean the people can really control the means of production. As Larry Wortzel argues in his *Class in China*:

Legal title, guaranteed by state law, ensures that an individual or group of individuals (including the entire populace of a socialist or communist state) own property or specific means of production. Ownership, however, does not mean control. It does not necessarily translate into decision-making power over the property. One must examine the control exercised over the property or means of production to understand the concept of economic ownership. Those persons who have the power to dispose of commodities obtained from production, to regulate the work process and its result, and to assign the means of production for use are "economic owners". Regardless of whether workers or peasants have legal title to an enterprise, control of the enterprise is exercised through the senior cadres of its party committee. (Wortzel, 1987:71)

In socialist countries, the people do not have functional ownership but titular ownership of the means of production. They are really alienated from social production. They can neither participate in the decision-making, nor can they say anything about the distribution of the results.

The problem of distribution, in particular, is related to both the second and third negative consequences mentioned above. It is the determining root of social inequality, economic stagnation, and corruption in socialist
countries. Concerning social inequality, the workers suffer it in two respects. On the one hand, there is inequality between ordinary workers and the privileged cadres. Ordinary workers gain low salaries while the cadres gain higher salaries plus privileges, such as accessing the closed shop system, administrative allocation of housing, favoritism, etc. On the other hand, there is inequality among the workers themselves in the sense that they receive equal salaries regardless of their capacity for production. No matter how hard or skillfully one works, he/she receives the same salary. This feeling of unfair income has resulted in workers' sabotage, which is the reason for economic stagnation from the workers' side.

Likewise, economic stagnation is also caused on the cadres' side. Although the communist cadres work as directors or managers of the enterprises, they receive their salaries and privileged treatment from the government. Their benefits do not depend on the amount of products their enterprises produce; consequently they do not care about the economic outputs of their enterprises. The way to possess more economic benefits is to seize more political power. This politicization of the distribution of wealth causes economic stagnation on the one hand, and encourages corruption on the other hand.

The main purpose of economic activity is to produce social wealth. Man's motivation and creation are needed to
achieve this goal. However, the socialist economic system characterized by public ownership just removes these two elements, and at the same time causes inequality, corruption and low productivity. Socialist democracy has failed to achieve not only political democracy but also economic democracy.

The Flaws of Liberal Democracy in the Western Nations

A society under liberal democracy has usually been seen as a free and democratic society. Notwithstanding, there exist some inconsistencies between theory and reality. The failure of liberal democracy to realize genuine democracy has provoked many critiques. Creel Froman says: "The disparity between what the democratic ideology says and what actually occurs is likely to produce frustration and cynicism in the general population" (Froman, 1984:196). A few of these problems are expounded below.

First, a problem comes right from the foundation of liberal democracy--its market economy or capitalist economy. As mentioned above, the capitalist system of ownership and control of firms created social inequality and thus threatened the extent of political liberty. Robert Dahl argues:

Ownership and control contribute to the creation of great differences among citizens in wealth, incomes, status, skills, information, control over information and propaganda, access to political leaders, and, on the average, predictable life
chances, not only for mature adults but also for the unborn, infants, and children. After all due qualifications have been made, differences like these help in turn to generate significant inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities for participating as political equals in governing the state. (Dahl, 1985:55)

Dahl continues to argue that modern "corporate capitalism," which gains "liberty to accumulate unlimited economic resources and to organize economic activity into hierarchically governed enterprises," tends to "produce inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring severe violation of political equality and hence of the democratic process" (Dahl, 1985:60).

According to David Held, because of the gigantic power of corporate capitalism, the government is forced to take business interests as the primary priority in its policy-making:

The system of private investment, private property etc., creates objective exigencies that must be met if economic growth and stable development are to be sustained. If these arrangements are threatened, economic chaos quickly ensues and the legitimacy of governments can be undermined. In order to remain in power in a liberal democratic electoral system, governments must, in other words, take action to secure the profitability and prosperity of the private sector; they are dependent upon the process of capital accumulation which they have for their own sake to maintain. (Held, 1987:202)

Under this system, Lindblom asserts: "A major function of government, therefore, is to see to it that businessmen
perform their tasks" (Lindblom, 1977:123). Otherwise, the government will lose its foundation to rule.

Creel Froman has provided a vivid depiction of the "corporate political system" in the United States in his book *The Two American Political Systems*. According to Froman's research, in the United States business ownership and control of economic assets are highly concentrated. About 40 percent of the nation's wealth consists of business assets. Corporations, comprising 15 percent of all business establishments, account for 88 percent of all sales. Approximately 200 giant corporations (0.0014% of all business establishments) control over 50 percent of all business assets (Froman, 1984:192). Control over such a large proportion of business wealth by a relatively few corporations organized into oligopolies results in enormous political power as well as economic power.

Froman argues that this situation leads to the existence of two political systems in the United States: the corporate political system and the individual political system. The corporate political system is well structured to control the general policy-making process in its broad outlines, to control the details of specific policies, and to control the personnel who will be making, interpreting and enforcing the policies. Besides that, this system also controls the ideology and the law-enforcement system. On the other hand, the individual political system, organized
principally around political parties and elections, is incapable of making policies.

Besides the critique of the modern corporate political system in liberal democratic nations, the application of the oligarchical political power argument is another critique which liberal democracy has received from its skeptics. The main spokesmen of this kind of criticism are Pareto, Mosca and Michels. John Plamenatz called them "academic Skeptics" in *Democracy and Illusion*. All three took it for granted that "even in the Western democracies, it is the leaders who really matter politically and not the masses they lead" (Plamenatz, 1973:36). Plamenatz summarized the reason why Pareto, Mosca and Michels came to this conclusion:

One is that business can be done effectively only by a small number of people, so that the larger an organization the smaller the proportion of its members who take an effective part in running it; and the other is that the more complicated the rules of an organization, the greater the opportunities that leaders have of playing the rules to impose their wishes on the rank and file. (Plamenatz, 1973:60)

Following these reasons, Pareto holds that the passive majorities are dominated by the elites. For Mosca, there is always a "political class" or "ruling class" that dominates the majority even where there is a parliamentary system. Like Mosca, Robert Michels, in his book *Political Parties*, developed a concept of what he called "the iron law of oligarchy." According to Michels, society cannot exist without a 'dominant' or 'political' class. And a frequent
partial renewal of the ruling class constitutes the only factor of sufficiently durable efficiency in the history of human development. According to this view, he asserted:

The state cannot be anything other than the organization of a minority. It is the aim of this minority to impose on the rest of society a 'legal order,' which can never be truly representative of the majority. Even when the discontent of the masses culminates in a successful attempt to deprive the bourgeoisie of power . . . always and necessarily there springs from the masses a new organized minority which raises itself to the rank of a governing class. Thus the majority of human beings, in a condition of eternal tutelage, are predestined by tragic necessity to submit to the dominion of a small group and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy. (Michels, 1962:377)

Since every exercise of political power is oligarchical under this iron law, the meanings of people's will, majority rule and people's sovereignty should be reinterpreted for democracy. Perhaps, this is why Schumpeter claims that democracy is the rule of politicians.

For years, liberal democracy not only has been challenged by its problems of polarization of wealth in the economic realm and oligarchical exercise in the political realm, but many social movements have also demonstrated the difficulties that liberal democracy still has to resolve. The problems related to racial, sexual, ecological, cultural, and political difficulties require liberal democracy to further develop its principles of liberty and equality to match up these challenges.
The Criticisms of Social Democracy

Although Social Democracy is seen by some as a successful "middle way" between Socialist Democracy and Liberal Democracy, it is also challenged by criticisms from both the Right and Left. Einhorn and Logue point out:

The Right attacked welfare measures for undermining social morality, undercutting the efficiency of the capitalist system, and being inimical to individual freedom . . . Nevertheless, the Left also offered criticisms of the welfare state. They held that, through transfer payments and social services, the welfare state treated only the symptoms of social ills, not the underlying causes. Moreover, it was unsuccessful in reducing inequality and promoted centralization and bureaucratization that was, for want of a better term, inimical to individual freedom. (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:265)

According to Einhorn and Logue, those criticisms include the moral problems, the inefficiency in market economy, and the persistence of inequality. For moral problems, the welfare state diminished social solidarity by transferring the reciprocal responsibility of each individual for his/her family, neighbors, and workmates to the state. Since the society provides many means of social services in health, education, housing, and old-age insurance, etc., the social fabrics of family and friends become unnecessary for material security. Therefore, the collective means of the welfare state ironically atomize society and encourage individualism. Everyone only has to take care of him/herself and leave others to the state.
Concerning the impacts of the welfare state on the market economy, critiques have emphasized its result in the misallocation of resources and reduction of individual incentives to work. The welfare state reduces the need for personal saving and thus results in a low saving rate. The growth of the public sector drains resources from the investments that ought to create manufacturing jobs into social services, such as building nursery schools. Furthermore, the policy of taxation shapes all economic behavior which disturbs the market mechanism and results in the misallocation of resources. Einhorn and Logue indicate the argument as following:

Paying for the welfare state in Scandinavia requires levels of taxation that are so high that, over time, the tax code has become a primary force in shaping all economic behavior. In practice, that inevitably produces huge and sometimes bizarre misallocation of resources. (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:269)

While the conservatives criticize the welfare state for its inefficiency in the market economy, the Left criticizes the welfare state for the persistence of inequality. They hold that the industries in the Scandinavian countries are still controlled by a few families. They argue that although the welfare state raised the living standard of the worst-off and provided a guarantee of material security for all, "the welfare state had done less to equalize opportunity than had been believed, and far less to equalize result" (Einhorn and Logue, 1989:273).
For the Left, the welfare state treats the symptoms of capitalism, but ignores the causes of its illness. From their point of view, the root of inequality is the private ownership of the means of production. This is the fundamental criticism from the theory of Marxist political economy. For them, any effort to overcome inequality in capitalist society without touching this foundation is naive and meaningless.

Furthermore, the so-called "functional socialism" is not a "market socialism" or "mixed economy." It is still a private enterprise economy. John Freeman clarifies the definitions of "mixed economy" and "private enterprise economy" as follows:

Mixed economies are those in which governments own and operate a substantial number of firms and in which a large number of investment decisions are in public hands. In private enterprise economies, in contrast, most or all firms are owned privately and most investment decisions are in private hands. (Freeman, 1989:ix)

According to these two definitions, the Swedish "functional socialism" is not any kind of "socialism" or "mixed economy," but "private enterprise economy."

Perhaps, in Macpherson's term, "functional socialism," which is based on the concept of property ownership as a bundle of rights not a thing, is "quasi-market society." In his book *Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval*, Macpherson has presented a remarkable analysis of the historical changes from capitalist society to a "quasi-market society"
or a "welfare state" based on changes in the concept of property.

According to Macpherson, in pre-capitalist society, property was generally seen as a right to a revenue rather than as right to specific material things, and was not seen as the material things themselves. The concept of property was changed when modern capitalist society emerged:

That the concept of property which now prevails in Western society is largely an invention of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and is fully appropriate only to an autonomous capitalist market society: this is the concept of property as (a) identical with private property--an individual (or corporate) right to exclude others from the benefit of something; (b) a right in or to material things rather than a right to a revenue (and even, in common usage, as the things themselves rather than the rights); and (c) having as its main function to provide an incentive to labor, as well as (or rather than) being an instrument for the exercise of human capacities. (Macpherson, 1973:122)

However, Macpherson argues that this concept of property has already begun to change. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the concept of property is seen again as a right to a revenue and for most people a right to earn an income. He thus asserts:

The rise of the welfare state has created new forms of property and distributed them widely--all of them being rights to a revenue. The old-age pensioner, the unemployed, and the unemployable, may have as his sole property the right to such a revenue as his condition entitles him to receive from the state. Where in addition the state provides such things as family allowances and various free subsidized
services, almost everyone has some property in such rights to a revenue. (Macpherson, 1973:131)

In Macpherson's opinion, the concept of property as exclusive, alienable, and private rights in things is required by the full market society. In such a society the market is expected to undertake the whole allocation of resources. However, since the rise of the welfare state the market no longer has to do the whole job of allocation. Under this situation, the society has been changed from a market to a quasi-market society:

We have moved from market society to quasi-market society. In all capitalist countries, the society as a whole, or the most influential sections of it, operating through the instrumentality of the welfare state and the welfare state--in any case, the regulatory state--is doing more and more of the work of allocation. Property as exclusive, alienable, 'absolute', individual, or corporate rights in things therefore becomes less necessary. (Macpherson, 1973:134)

In this perspective, "functional socialism" based on the concept of ownership as a bundle of functional rights rather than a thing is just a historical reflection of the changes in the concept of capitalist property. It is not a fulfillment of the political economy of socialism.
Tensions between Liberty and Equality

"Liberty" and "equality" have become the basic values of modern democracy since the French Revolution in 1789. None of the modern ideologies, whether liberalism, socialism, or social democracy, denies these principles. Democracy, in its broad sense, is a way to fulfil both liberty and equality for human beings. However, between these two concepts exists a significant tension, especially, when they are applied to their different practices.

Giovanni Sartori recognized:

It has been seen that for a long time liberty implied 'equality in liberty' and that equality in itself (especially in its distinction-opposition to liberty) obtained little salience. This is no longer the case. Today liberty and equality command separate recognition--and along this path equality may not only implement freedom but also destroy freedom. So we generally say. Still, this is a matter that must be looked into. (Sartori, 1987:357)

The relationship between these two concepts might be observed at two different levels: philosophical and sociological. First, the relationship between liberty and equality at the philosophical level can be seen as follows:

Liberty: freedom of will, freedom of moral autonomy, freedom of self-development, etc.
Equality: every soul is equal before God, everyone is of equal value, and everyone must be treated equally in every respect.

The philosophical approach is concerned with the metaphysical, moral, spiritual, and even religious meaning of these two concepts. At this level, there are not too many tensions between liberty and equality. The relationship between these two concepts may imply "equality in liberty." Everyone's liberty is considered to be of equal value, i.e., everyone should be equally free to realize one's potentiality, desire, and autonomy under equal treatment.

Nevertheless, the relationship between liberty and equality at the sociological level is more complicated. Between them much of the tension exists at this second level. Those tensions may be seen as follows:

Liberty:

(A) political liberty: freedom of speech, press, assembly, participation, etc.

(B) economic liberty: laissez-faire, free market economy, etc.

Equality:

(a) political equality: equal vote, equal access to office, equality before law.

(b) economic equality: equal opportunity to employment, equal outcome, equal social welfare.
From the above, the tension between liberty and equality can be analyzed in this way: LA-Ea; LA-Eb; LB-Ea; LB-Eb; This can be depicted in the following diagram:

(E)quality
\[a: \text{pol} \quad b: \text{econ}\]

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(L)iberty

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Figure 1. Tensions Between Liberty and Equality

LA-Ea indicates the tension between political liberty vs. political equality. Under the liberal democratic system, since the conditions of individuals, interest groups, and political parties vary, political freedom would provide the agencies with more advantages in accessing offices, winning elections, etc. It thus undermines political equality in the sense of rewards.

LA-Eb indicates the tension between political liberty vs. economic equality. Here again, under the liberal democratic system, political liberty would allow the
privileged agencies to dominate the governmental power of policy-making which will benefit their privileged interests and interfere with the equal distribution of social wealth. Therefore, political liberty undermines political and economic equality. Frank Parkin's argument will give us a better understanding of this situation.

A political system which guarantees constitutional rights for groups to organize in defence of their interests is almost bound to favor the privileged at the expense of the disprivileged. The former will always have great organizing capacities and facilities than the latter, such that the competition for rewards between different classes is never an equal contest. This is not merely because the dominant class can more easily be mobilized in defence of its interests, but also because it has access to the all important means of social control, both coercive and normative. Given this fundamental class inequality in the social and economic order, a pluralist or democratic political structure works to the advantage of the dominant class. (Parkin, 1971:79)

LB-Ea indicates the tension between economic liberty and political equality. Under the principle of economic liberty the capitalist system of private ownership and control of firms creates social inequality and thus threatens the extent of political equality.

LB-Eb indicates the tension between economic liberty and economic equality. This is the most obvious and severe tension within the Western liberal democratic system. As mentioned above, the liberal economy allows the capitalist class to accumulate so much wealth that the equal
The distribution of wealth seems impossible within the capitalist system. The polarization of social wealth is inevitable under the Western market economy. Control over large proportions of business wealth by a relatively few corporations must result in enormous economic inequality in the United States.

After all, the liberal political constitution combined with a liberal economic market system largely undermine the political and economic equality in the liberal democratic society. Under a liberal democratic system, the tension between liberty and equality is not easy to overcome.

However, this tension cannot be resolved under socialist democracy either. The practical experience of this approach has demonstrated its failure. Socialist egalitarianism largely violates the principle of liberty with the abuses of constitutional rights, coercion and control of social life. Parkin argues:

Socialist egalitarianism is not readily compatible with a pluralist political order of the classic Western type. Egalitarianism seems to require a political system in which the state is able continually to hold in check those social and occupational groups which, by virtue of their skills or education or personal attributes, might otherwise attempt to stake claims to disproportionate share of society’s rewards. The most effective way of holding such groups in check is by denying them the right to organize politically or in other way to undermine social equality. (Parkin, 1971:80)
Parkin observes that the socialist approach even faces a dilemma within its own humanistic ideals central to the socialist tradition and egalitarianism. Whether it is possible to establish the political conditions for egalitarianism while also guaranteeing human rights to all citizens within a system of socialist legality remains unresolved.

Another approach to resolve this tension is to establish a theory of justice and apply it under the liberal democratic context. However, the theory of justice itself is also controversial. Some attempt to justify inequality by the principle of liberty and some justify more liberty at the expense of equality. It is difficult to gain a generally accepted theory of democratic justice. Roland Pennock has observed that:

Utilitarians seeking the greatest happiness on the whole, or the greatest average happiness, would permit some to suffer for the (greater) benefit of others, thus violating the equality standard and perhaps the libertarian ideal as well. Nozick and Hayek would pursue liberty at the expense of equality. Rawls strives for a happy medium and finds himself attacked by both egalitarians and libertarians, thus demonstrating the absence of consensus on the content of justice even among thinkers who are all professed democrats. (Pennock, 1979:45)

Although these theories are controversial, Rawls's theory of justice has contributed a significant effort to deal with the tension between liberty and equality. His effort is to discover a theory of justice and then to
incorporate it in a constitution. He has developed two basic principles of justice. Rawls's two principles of justice are:

First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (Rawls, 1971:60)

Rawls's first principle is concerned with the principle of political liberty with freedom of social activities and thought. It also includes the right to hold personal property:

the basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrests and seizure as defined by the concept of the law. These liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens of a just society are to have the same basic rights. (Rawls, 1971:61)

Rawls's second principle considers economic justice within the liberal context. He handles this problem in this way:

The second principle applies, in the first approximation, to the distribution of income and wealth and to design of organizations that make use of differences in authority and responsibility, or chains of command. While the distribution of wealth and income need not be equal, it must be to everyone's advantage, and at the same time, positions
of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all. One applies the second principle by holding positions open, and then, subject to this constraint, arranges social and economic inequalities so that everyone benefits. (Rawls, 1971:61)

Rawls believes that it is possible to construct a set of just political constitutions and just arrangement of economic and social institutions, which may operate pure procedural justice. According to Rawls, the law and government can play a significant role in this operation:

Suppose that law and government act effectively to keep market competitive, resources fully employed, property and wealth (especially if private ownership of the means of production is allowed) widely distributed by the appropriate forms of taxation, or whatever, and to guarantee a reasonable social minimum. Assume also that there is fair equality of opportunity underwritten by education for all; and that the other equal liberties are secured. (Rawls, 1971:45)

Basically speaking, the modern welfare state applies these principles of justice, especially in Scandinavian countries. The welfare state is defined by Thoenes as a "form of society characterized by a system of democratic, government-sponsored welfare placed on a new footing and offering a guarantee of collective social care to its citizens, concurrently with the maintenance of a capitalist system of production" (Thoenes, 1976:131). The major purpose of the welfare state is actually to achieve social justice or equality without changing the liberal democratic system. The state involves various services such as
unemployment benefits, old age pensions, medical service, housing, education, and so forth. Surely, these kinds of services may provide for its citizens, especially those who may be disadvantaged by circumstance beyond their control. However, the welfare state is not able to eliminate the inequality of the distribution of wealth through such policies as transfer-payments and progressive taxation. While the Left is not satisfied with the welfare state, the Right contends that "cradle to grave" security tends to stifle the initiative of productive individuals and private enterprise. The tension between liberty and equality still exists in the welfare state.

As two basic values, liberty and equality are pursued by human beings almost with equal enthusiasm. It has been argued by a French Christian Democrat that:

Justice and freedom must be pursued together and with equal vigor. Freedom without justice is artificial, deceptive and hypocritical; it can be used to justify the mechanism of the free market and the servitude of the proletariat; such freedom is, in fact, the antithesis of freedom. Likewise, justice without freedom leads to tyranny and to the totalitarianism of Soviet communism or Fascist corporatism. (Irving, 1973:55)

Nevertheless, no existing social system has succeeded in achieving them at the same time or at the same level. Theoretically speaking, the dilemma between liberty and equality seems inevitable.
The reason why the tension between liberty and equality is inevitable relies on their different characters. The character of liberty is mostly based on a principle of free competition while the character of equality is based on a principle of regulatory distribution. We can draw an analogy for this situation. It is like holding a race in order to see who runs faster, but at the same time commanding them to run at a uniform pace, thus everyone is a winning champion. These two ends cannot be achieved at the same time. Of course, the situations of social, political, and economic realms are more complicated and cannot be interpreted with this simple analogy. However, the inner characteristics of liberty and equality are in contradiction. Free competition is always an antithesis of equal distribution. Their tensions may be manageable at some degree according to some theories, however, the prospect of achieving these two values at the same time or at the same level is not optimistic in the real world.

Negative Freedom and Positive Freedom

There are not only tensions between the conceptions of liberty and equality, but also tensions within the concept of liberty itself. This question has been debated as the tension between "negative freedom" and "positive freedom." Generally speaking, liberals (or capitalists) refer to "negative freedom" and socialists refer to "positive freedom."
freedom." Therefore a further discussion of the theory of freedom may help us to understand the ideological conflict between socialist democracy and liberal democracy in the real world.

In "Two Concepts of Liberty," Isaiah Berlin explained his sense of negative freedom and positive freedom:

"The first of these political senses of freedom or liberty, which I shall call the 'negative' sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'what is the area within which the subject--a person or group of persons--is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other person?' The second, which I shall call the positive sense, is involved in the answer to the question 'what, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or to be, this rather than that.' The two question are clearly different, even though the answers to them may overlap. (Berlin, 1969:121-22)

Simply speaking, the formula of negative freedom is "free from" and positive freedom is "free to." Negative freedom emphasizes being free from interference or constraints while positive freedom emphasizes not only being free from interference but also being able to do what one desires to do, having the means or resources to do what one wants to do. The ideological conflict between socialism and liberalism largely depends on whether it refers to the positive meaning or the negative meaning of freedom.

Liberals usually emphasize negative freedom. For them, being free means not being interfered with by others. Therefore, they believe that the wider the area of non-
interference the wider their freedom. Among them the
disagreement is about how wide the area could or should be.
Different political theorists give different answers to this
question based on different reasons. Liberals like Mill and
Berlin intend to promote maximum freedom under two
conditions: first, that others may share the same degree of
freedom; second, one's freedom cannot hurt the other's
freedom. There should be no other limitations besides these
two.

Furthermore, since men's free action must be limited by
law, some thinkers maintain that there ought to exist a
certain minimum area of personal freedom, which must on no
account be violated. Thus a line must be drawn between the
area of private life and that of public authority.

To reserve an area for the freedom in private life is a
very strong and important argument of the theory of negative
freedom. Even some thinkers of the opposite persuasion
agree with it. Berlin (1969) argued that philosophers with
an optimistic view of human nature and a belief in the
possibility of harmonizing human interests always believed
that social harmony and progress were compatible with
reserving a large area for private life. Neither the state
nor any other authority should be allowed to trespass.

Some conservative or reactionary thinkers also argued
that if men were to be prevented from destroying one another
and making social life a jungle or a wilderness, greater
safeguards must be instituted to keep them in their place. "Both sides agreed that some portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere of social control" (Berlin, 1969:126).

The American founding fathers declared that at least the liberty of religion, opinion, expression, and property must be guaranteed against arbitrary invasion. They insisted on preserving a minimum area of personal freedom that one cannot give up without offending the essence of human nature.

To discuss the concept of negative freedom, it is obvious that we should understand the concept of constraint or limitation. Liberals believe that being unfree in a political sense implies being coerced by other human beings. Coercion is not a term that covers every form of inability. According to Berlin, "coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act" (Berlin, 1969:122). Therefore, one lacks political freedom only if one is prevented from attaining a goal by other human beings. Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political liberty.

However, Joel Feinberg in his Social Philosophy develops broader categories of 'constraints.' He maintains:

I think this way of indicating the distinction between positive and negative freedom will seem plausible only if the idea of a constraint is artificially limited. However, two important distinctions between kinds of constraints, cutting across each
other, can be made, and once these distinctions are recognized, apparent ground for 'two concept' analysis vanishes. The distinctions are those between positive constraints and between internal and external constraints. (Feinberg, 1973:12)

Feinberg holds that those distinctions can cut across one another, creating four categories: (a) internal positive constraints such as headaches, obsessive thoughts, and compulsive desires; (b) internal negative constraints such as ignorance, weakness, and deficiencies in talent or skill; (c) external positive constraints such as barred windows, locked doors, and pointed bayonets; and (d) external negative constraints such as lack of money, lack of transportation, and lack of weapons (Feinberg, 1973:13).

According to Feinberg, if constraints are not restricted to one category then there is no need to speak of two distinct kinds of freedom. He asserts:

A constraint is something--anything--that prevents one from doing something. Therefore, if nothing prevents me from doing X, I am free to do X; conversely, if I am free to do X, then nothing prevents me from doing X. 'freedom to' and 'freedom from' are in this way logically linked, and there can be no special 'positive' freedom to which is not also a freedom from. (Feinberg, 1973:13)

Actually, positive freedom emphasizes the internal and external constraints from the negative side, such as ignorance and lack of money. From the view of negative freedom that kind of unfreedom is a lack of the conditions of freedom, or lack of capacity to realize the freedom that
nobody is prohibiting. However, defender of positive freedom argues that if one is not able to realize freedom then this freedom is meaningless. For example, poor people are free from the constraint of law to buy a Cadillac, but they are not free to buy it because they do not have money.

Therefore, thinkers of positive freedom argue that it is not enough to have only negative freedom. The meaning of positive freedom is more important than negative freedom. They want to answer the question "what or who is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or to be, this rather than that?" If one is his own boss and can control the source by himself, then one is free.

Berlin explained the argument from the point of positive freedom as follows:

The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer--deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realize them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choice.
and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. (Berlin, 1969:131)

To be our own master is a strong desire which can contribute to the motivation of establishment of democracy; although Berlin did not mention it clearly in his article. Peter Manicas points out:

> The positive sense of freedom connects to democracy construed as self-government. Since a person cannot be autarchic ('everybody needs somebody sometime') and we must live with others, we cannot each make our own rules; but we can together make the rules by which we live. (Manicas, 1990:2)

The positive participation of people in political activity and policy-making is the essence of democracy, which obviously originates in the positive sense of freedom. In this sense thinkers of negative freedom will not deny the positive meaning of positive freedom since they are not the opponents of democratic institutions.

However, why are liberals, like Berlin, suspicious of positive freedom? They think that positive freedom may be distorted into unfreedom. There are two ways of determining this distortion or degradation. The first way is through the idealist distinction of "self"; the second way is through rationalism. According to the theory of positive freedom, one may say that "I want to be my own master," "I do not want to be controlled by another person or force," but under what circumstances is he really his own master? Idealists divide "self" into two parts. One is "empirical" or "animal" self and another is an "ideal" or "true" self.
If one is dominated by the empirical self, he is the slave of the untrue self. Only when one is dominated by the true self is he his own master. Then if one is not able to control one's empirical passion and desire or to ignore what the true self is, he needs help from another person or from an outside force. Their help may liberate him from lower desires and passions and assist in realizing the mastery of his true self. Berlin asserts:

The real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual, as a social 'whole' of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and dead and the yet unborn. This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self which, by imposing its collective, or 'organic,' single will upon its recalcitrant 'members,' achieves its own, and therefore their, 'higher' freedom. (Berlin, 1969:132)

This interpretation of true self and freedom can be used by a manipulator to do whatever he wishes to the people. Thinkers who prefer negative freedom always argue that this is what happens in tyrannic society where brainwashing, political indoctrination or even reformation in laborcamps can be justified as a way to raise the people to a "higher" level of freedom. This is the dangerous consequence of the distortion of positive freedom by rationalism. The proponents divide the human psyche into "rational" and "irrational." People with irrational minds should be guided or ruled by those who are rational-minded. By doing so irrational people can be enlightened to truth.
and thus "forced to be free." The paradox of the distortion from positive freedom to despotism makes liberals like Berlin very cautious of it.

In addition to Berlin, John Dewey's theory of freedom is worth considering. In Dewey's theory freedom is treated as freedom as choice, freedom as the power to act and freedom as effective reason. His freedom as choice is similar to negative freedom and his freedom as power to act is similar to positive freedom. In developing the theory, he weaves a philosophy of freedom in which choice, power, and reason are linked together. According to Dewey, "a choice which intelligently manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and this enlargement in turn confers upon our desire greater insight and foresight, and makes choice more intelligent" (Dewey, 1960:261). What makes Dewey's theory of freedom significant is that freedom is treated as a process of development through exercising choice and power to achieve more and higher freedom. For Dewey, freedom is not something already there but something which comes into being. There is an important implication in this idea that freedom consists in conduct. Dewey illustrates this implication as follows:

The orthodox theory of freedom of the will and the classic theory of Liberalism both define freedom on the basis of something antecedently given, something already possessed . . . They both seek for freedom in something already there, given in advance. Our idea compels us on the other hand to seek for freedom in something which
comes to be, in a certain kind of growth; in consequences, rather than in antecedents. We are free not because of what we statically are, but in as far as we are becoming different from what we have been. (Dewey, 1960:280).

From another point of view, Peter Manicas has developed a theory of freedom in a model which divides freedom into "liberal freedom" and "conservative freedom." The former values the freedom to do what one wills while the latter values freedom to do what one ought. Obviously, the liberal idea of freedom includes the freedom to do not only what is good or rational but also what is wrong or foolish. Conservative ideas of freedom tend to justify unfreedom in what one ought not to do. Philosophers such as St. Augustine, Edmund Burke and Emile Durkheim did not take it for granted that freedom is a self-evident primary value.

Conservatives might argue in this way as Peter Manicas indicates:

Given the experience of mankind, how can they (liberals) suppose that the freedom to do what one pleases is any sort of value? What is valuable about it? Does such freedom lead to virtue? Is such freedom even compatible with happiness or justice? Or in fact, does it lead to self-destruction, vice, misery, injustice and social chaos? If so let us be honest about the freedom to do what one wills. Let us not praise it even if we can praise and value freedom which attends a morally informed and rational will. And if goodness, happiness, justice and order are human values, as liberals admit, then let us also admit that no restraints which secure these values is an evil. (Manicas, 1974:197)
Therefore, according to Peter Manicas, for conservatives, that restraint, which is based on wisdom and justice, is itself good. Obviously, liberals like Berlin must be worried that this conservative argument of freedom may be distorted into tyrannical consequences just as the positive freedom may be distorted.

Following the above discussion, what is at issue between the 'capitalist' and 'socialist' defense of freedom is whether freedom should be understood by its negative meaning or positive meaning. This argument turns into the question of whether a market economy or a nationalized and centrally planned economy or, at the very least, a market economy with considerable state intervention will make people free. As has been discussed before, New Right thinkers always argue that only under a free market can people be free. However, socialists see liberty under capitalism in a different way. They allege that pure capitalism does not protect liberty in general, but only those liberties built into private property, an institution which also limits liberty. Therefore, socialists always emphasize the real environmental conditions for individuals to realize their freedom. Socialists even have a different understanding of "the freedom from" in the economic sense as compared to capitalists. Feinberg quoted Granston's argument in his book Social Philosophy:

Conservatives, when they speak of 'economic freedom' usually mean 'the freedom of the
national economy from the control of the state.' Socialists advocating 'economic freedom' refer to 'the freedom of the individual from economic hardship.' (Feinberg, 1973:11)

Actually, conservatives ignore the fact that social and economic structures differentially determine the conditions and possibilities of freedom. Individuals are not equal to obtain freedom within the capitalist system. In order to guarantee freedom in the positive meaning, socialists try to change the social and economic structures that give them some advantage over others, or at least, to carry out welfare state policies to interfere with economic activities, thus to minimize the worst effects of the existing structures.

As discussed above, the theory of freedom has shown us that different schools of thinkers have quite different interpretations of the meaning of freedom. This debate reflects the ideological conflict between capitalist and socialist. Nevertheless, neither liberals nor socialists have succeeded in resolving the problems they face in the theory and practice of freedom as well as the tensions between liberty and equality in the real world.
Chapter V
SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

Deng Xiao Ping's Reading of Chinese-type Socialist Democracy and Its Political Reform Programs

The fundamental theory of socialist democracy held by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is not different from the Leninist interpretation in other socialist countries. Notwithstanding, it has some particular contents in the Chinese context. After his destruction of the Democracy Wall Movement in 1979, Deng Xiao Ping, the chief leader of the CCP, illustrated what he thought of Chinese socialist democracy in his speech "Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles":

We must make a special effort to explain the question of democracy clearly to the people, and to our youth in particular. The socialist road, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought—all these are tied with democracy. What kind of democracy do the Chinese people need today? It can only be socialist democracy, people's democracy, and not bourgeois democracy, individualist democracy. People's democracy is inseparable from dictatorship over the enemy and from centralism based on democracy. We practice democratic centralism, which is the integration of centralism based on democracy with democracy under the guidance of centralism. Democratic centralism is an integral part of the socialist system. Under this system, personal interests must be subordinated to collective ones, the interests of the part to those of the whole, and immediate to long-term interests. In other words, limited interests must be
subordinated to overall interests, and minor interests to major ones. (Deng, 1984:183)

In this speech, Deng read the Chinese-type socialist democracy within his particular framework of the "Four Cardinal Principles" and emphasized democratic centralism. The most important character of this system is that individual interests must be subordinate to the collective ones. Thus he commanded the people to "strictly distinguish" socialist democracy from liberal democracy. He insisted that:

While propagating democracy, we must strictly distinguish between socialist democracy on the one hand and bourgeois, individualist democracy on the other. We must link democracy for the people with dictatorship over the enemy, and with centralism, legality, discipline and leadership by the Communist Party. (Deng, 1984:183)

In Deng's opinion, the Western-type liberal democracy is equivalent to bourgeois and individualist democracy while socialist democracy is analogous to the dictatorship of the proletariat. He said: "We have conducted a lot of propaganda explaining that the dictatorship of the proletariat means socialist democracy for the people" (Deng, 1984:176).

After all, who upholds the "Four Cardinal Principles" and who exercises the dictatorship of the proletariat? The core of Deng's reading of socialist democracy is to maintain the leadership of the CCP. Only the CCP represents the will of the people and works for the people's interests. He
holds that the Chinese people must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party because the survival of the communist movement will be impossible without the political party of the proletariat in general. And particularly, without the leadership of the CCP there will be no new China.

Since the October Revolution it has been clear that without the leadership of a Communist party, the socialist revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction would all be impossible. Lenin said: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is a persistent struggle--bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative--against the forces and traditions of the old society . . . Without an iron party tempered in the struggle, without a party enjoying the confidence of all that is honest in the given class, without a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, it is impossible to conduct such a struggle successfully." This truth enunciated by Lenin remains valid today. In our country, in the 60 years since the May 4th Movement, no political party other than the Communist Party of China has integrated itself with the masses of the working people in the way described by Lenin. Without the Chinese Communist Party there would be no socialist new China. (Deng: 1984:177)

In this paragraph, Deng quoted Lenin’s theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leadership of an iron party to support his argument of the CCP’s leadership in China. He also referred to the CCP’s success in establishing socialist China to prove that only the CCP could save China. He once claimed in a savior’s tone: "Without the Chinese Communist Party, who would organize the socialist economy, politics, military affairs and culture of
Ironically, the Chinese people do not believe this myth any more. During the 1978 Democracy Movement, Deng himself observed that some members of this movement denounced the proletarian dictatorship as the source of all evils and criticized the CCP resolutely and thoroughly. Especially after the June 4th Massacre in 1989, this myth totally broke down. Referring to what happened in Eastern Europe, the Chinese people cynically changed the CCP's slogan of "Only socialism can save China" to "Only China can save socialism."

In order to strengthen socialist democracy and ease the pressure from the people's demand for democracy, the CCP authority carried out a series of political reforms since 1978. The program of socialist democratic reforms can be outlined in four respects.

(1) Separation of party and government:

This policy separates the function of the party and government so as to strengthen the party's leadership and to improve the efficiency of administration. Previously no distinction was made between the party's organization and governmental institution. According to Zheng Hong Qing, most of the defects of China's present political structure are closely related to the confusion of the function of the party and government. Since the nature and functions of the
party and the government are different, they should also have different forms of organization and working methods. The party is a political organization formed by the proletariat voluntarily. It cannot work as a power organ or an executive body of the government. Therefore, the political reform must start with the separation of functions between party and government. After the separation, the functions of the party and government should be thus recognized:

The function of the party is mainly to work out general guiding principles and policies for the party and state, to decide on the policies of important cadres and exercise its general leadership by formulating political principles and pointing out a direction. The function of the state power organs and government executive bodies, however, is to turn the party's line and ideas into the state's will through statutory procedures, be responsible for the implementation and carry out the management. (Zheng, 1987:4-5)

In the above argument, the separation of the party from the government does not mean restricting the party's power in decision-making. The party still "works out general guiding principles and policies for the party and state." This program merely focuses on changing the style of the party's leadership. It suggests that the party's policy should be turned into the will of the state through legal procedures. In fact, even this kind of separation remains vague and controversial. Benedict Stavis noticed:

While theorists urged the separation of the work of party and government, actual
agreement and implementation on this point was not clear. Some conservatives argued that even if there were separation at the lower levels, the party-government combination at top levels had to be retained. (Stavis, 1988:4)

(2) Transfer of power to lower levels:

This reform program focuses on changing functions and reforming working departments of the government, because the overcentralization of power in China is reflected not only in the party’s unified leadership, but also in the government departments that control the economy, politics, and culture of the whole society. The bureaucratic organization has become so huge that:

party and government organizations and institutions have employed eight million people, among whom about two million were administrative cadres. Under the state council there are as many as 70 affiliated departments, of which more than 40 are engaged in economic management and most of them were set up by industries they manage. (Zheng, 1987:6)

Such a bureaucracy not only becomes a heavy financial burden on the state but also hinders the economic reform oriented in the transformation from the planned economy to the market economy.

The main purpose of delegating power to lower levels is to separate the government and enterprises so as to enable enterprises to have real decision-making powers and cease to be accessories of administrative departments. The expected consequence of this transfer of power was described by Zheng Hong Qing:
The government will exercise indirect macro-economic regulation and control, and no longer interfere in the special production and management activities of enterprises, thus gradually bringing about an economic operation mechanism of the state regulating the market, and market guiding enterprises. (Zheng, 1987:6)

(3) Expanding socialist democracy in people’s supervision, social consultation and dialogue:

This program requires the people’s participation and supervision in management, opening up channels for social consultation and social dialogue, and letting the people understand and actively participate in the political life of the state. The form for exercising these functions is to set up a party supervision and inspection department, to make better use of the media including newspaper, radio broadcasts and television, and through letters from and visits by the people. It is expected that through these channels, people can make timely criticism of malpractice, expose bureaucratism and corrupt phenomena, and do their bit to promote democracy and social justice. However, these forms and channels are not independent institutions. Under the control of the authority, only some moderate criticism and prosecution of low level cadres are tolerated. Without freedom of speech and expression, the function of people’s supervision is very limited.

(4) The reform of the election system:

The major reform program of the election system includes the elimination of the life-long tenure of office,
the conduct of regular elections, direct election for the people's representatives at the county level, and margin election ('Margin election' means that the authority will nominate more than one candidate for one position. Previously, only one candidate was nominated.) These measures are aimed at bringing a competitive mechanism into the political realm. In reality, these reforms have been carried out more rhetorically than practically. In the 1980 election campaign, the CCP authorities suppressed dissident workers and students who voluntarily nominated themselves as candidates to challenge those nominated by the authorities. Researching the 1980 election campaign in his book *Chinese Democracy*, Andrew J. Nathan recognized what the reform of the election system really meant.

The election-law revision of 1980 made clear once again the official view of what the limits of Chinese democracy should be. The voters needed to know only which candidate had a good labor history and a commitment to socialism. They could learn who best embodied these qualities at officially sponsored meetings in the few days just before an election. Democracy did not require the hurly-burly of rallies, wall posters, and question-and-answer forms: elections should not be seen as occasions for contests of ideas. (Nathan, 1985:223)

As summarized above, since socialist democratic reform is limited by the "Four Cardinal Principles," all of its programs are superficial and vague. It cannot be a real process of democratization. For example, the program of separation of the party and government does not carry out
the democratic principle of the separation of powers; it still lacks a mechanism of checks and balances of powers. During the political reform debate in 1986 some reformers noticed the importance of this principle and appealed to learn more about it. Wei Hai Bo argued:

Lenin once pointed out, "Socialism cannot win its victory unless it carries out full democracy." To carry on a full democracy, we cannot completely deny bourgeois democracy, which is still effective in today's world. We should actively absorb its rational parts. For example, the principle of "the separation of three powers" is an important measure in preventing the restoration of feudal dictatorships. Undoubtedly the system of separation of power is a method to balance the capitalist forces and safeguard bourgeois rule. But there are some rational factors to check power organs, and to prevent administrative power from expanding viciously. It can be used as a theoretical reference point as we perfect a mechanism for restricting political power in the socialist state. (Wei, in Stavis, 1988:52)

Although they demand this mechanism of Western-type liberal democracy, it is precisely what Deng does not want to accept as a program of Chinese-type socialist democracy. He criticized the idea of separation of powers and held that it is not suitable for China.

When we speak of democracy, we must not mean the implementation of capitalist democracy. We cannot set up such gimmicks as the division of powers between branches of government. I always criticize the Americans and say that they really have three governments. This causes a great deal of trouble. This sort of device is not something our country can use. (Deng, in Stavis, 1988:114)
Deng’s attitude towards the principle of "separation of powers" has signified that the older generation of the CCP is not willing to give up a centralized power structure and to carry out a political reform that can satisfy the people’s demand for democracy.

Critiques of Socialist Democracy from the Pro-democracy Movements in the Late 1970s

The Chinese pro-democracy movements in the late 1970s always focused criticism of socialist democracy on the theory and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the depraved nature of public ownership of the means of production. These criticisms usually came from two sides: one from those who regarded themselves as genuine Marxists and considered the CCP practice a distortion and degeneration of real socialist democracy; the other from those who challenged socialist democracy with the theories of Western-type liberal democracy. During the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement, the noise from the former was louder than the latter. However, with the influence from the West becoming stronger, more people tended to criticize socialist democracy by utilizing the theories of liberal democracy, especially after the 1989 pro-democracy Movement.

Actually, the critique of the proletarian dictatorship emerged as early as in the 1957’s "Hundred Flowers Movement." This movement was a plot by Mao to purge the
potential opposition, because Mao worried that a situation like the "Hungarian Accident" might occur in China if it was not nipped in the bud. First, Mao launched a campaign to "let a hundred schools of thought contend and a hundred flowers bloom" which encouraged people to speak out their dissatisfactions and criticisms of the CCP's authority. He promised that the criticisms of the party's leadership would only be regarded as suggestions and advice to improve the party's work, and no punishment would be imposed on the speakers. After the people spoke out, Mao launched the "Anti-rightist Campaign" to purge the "enemies" of socialism. Mao openly acknowledged that the "Hundred Flowers Movement" was a "preconceived" plan to trap the opposition. He stated:

We determined to carry out the great contending and blooming in order to set free the rightist to serve as opposites, and then to mobilize the laboring people to rise up and argue against them, oppose them, and finally bring them down. (Mao, in Chi, 1986:251)

Nevertheless, this movement really induced the people to "divulge opinions hidden in their hearts which they dared not to express openly" (Chi, 1986:250). This was an early sign of the people's doubt concerning socialism in China.

A wall poster appearing at Tsinghua University showed how the people felt about being deceived and deprived of freedom by the "democracy under the leadership and centralized power of Mao Tse-tung." The author complained:
We Chinese people also have been deceived. Bravely expelling imperialists and the Chiang clique, they have trusted the wrong people. Taking away a knife from a robber and having killed him, we have made the mistake of giving the knife to another robber standing behind us. Now we speak under the threat of this knife when we seek freedom under the promise of hundred flowers and hundred thoughts. This is the style of democracy under the leadership and centralized power of Mao Tse-tung. (Lin, 1980:224)

The author of this wall poster also disclosed how the common people felt powerless under the dictatorship of the proletariat:

I was born and grew up in my native village in a rural area. The past 20 years have given me a chance to see through the imperialists. In the face of an enemy, I am brave enough to sacrifice my life. But in the face of Communist dictatorship, I am very weak and timid, and feel that a single person is so little and poor in strength. I have understood that those protected by us with blood, sweat and our very lives are not the people in general, but a group of bureaucrats who have been riding on the backs of people and ruling arbitrarily and arrogantly. They are a group of Fascists who will use any means to carry out treachery, and ignore the desire of the people both at home and abroad to live in peace. (Lin, 1980:221-222)

He concluded that "the Communists have raped the meanings of such words as 'people' and 'socialism'." At the end of this wall poster, he exclaimed that people should be allowed the freedom to yell "Long Live" (Chairman Mao and Communist Party), as well as the freedom of assembly and association; to allow various political parties to run the government jointly with cabinet ministers appointed by them.
on a rotation basis; to abolish the dictatorship by a single Communist party; to abolish all privileges of communists, etc. (Lin, 1980:225-226).

The price for the naivete of those who believed Mao’s promise and wished to improve the CCP’s work by their loyal suggestions was tragic. About 550,000 people were purged as "rightist" and sent to the countryside or to labor camps to "receive re-education from the proletariat." The iron fist of the proletarian dictatorship easily crashed the poor challenge from the Chinese people and kept them in silence for about twenty years.

The second pro-democracy movement, known as the "Democracy Wall Movement," rose at the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR). During this movement, the theory and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat became the major subject of the political debate once again. Due to the fact that the slogan of "implementing total dictatorship of the proletariat" adopted by the GPCR resulted in disastrous violence, the Chinese people began to re-examine it seriously in the post-Mao period.

Right after the "Lin Biao Incident" in 1974, a long wall poster titled "On Socialist Democracy and the Legal System" emerged on Guang-zhou street and first raised this kind of debate. The main author of this poster was a young worker named Wang Xi Zhe. Wang held that the practice of
proletarian dictatorship in China was not a dictatorship by the proletariat as a whole class, but by "a privileged stratum" or even by one person. He denounced it as a "feudal-fascist dictatorship," a practice equivalent to Stalinism.

It resurrected all of the darkness and reactionary elements of the middle age in the name of "socialism" and "proletariat." It took Marxism-Leninism and made it religion, and revived the medieval unification of state and church. It took the party and raised it above society and made the leaders of the party supreme dictators who could arbitrarily direct the fate of the people. It put into practice a most barbarous, most cruel, large-scale reign of police state terror to exterminate those true communists and innocent citizens who were loyal to the pursuit of people's democracy. (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:179)

But why cannot the real proletarian dictatorship be realized in China? First, Wang looked at China's industrial economy in the context of a world market system which is dominated by capitalism. Thus China's socialism is founded on the capitalist mode of production under conditions of public ownership. He argued:

Socialism does not refer to just one nation, socialism comprises an entire world system. The material precondition for socialism takes into account not only the highly developed productive forces, but also the world market that had already been created by capitalism, which is "a world exchange on the basis of the interdependency of all mankind" . . . Thus under conditions in which the capitalist mode of production of the world advanced nations is dominant, the nation's production will unavoidably still have some characteristics of capitalist
production . . . But look at socialism from this point of view, it is founded on the capitalist mode of production under conditions of public ownership of the means of production (the nation founded on its foundation is a "capitalist nation without the capitalists"). (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:137)

Meanwhile, concerning the condition of the backward economy in China, "the centralized system of state ownership of the economy is really not a result naturally arising from modern forces of production. It is only a result of administrative coercion." Setting up these premises, Wang claimed that with the low educational levels among workers, scant worker capacity for management, and a division of labor that must replicate capitalism, a Leninist party has to take "direct administrative leadership" in order to monopolize political and economic management on the proletariat's behalf. Wang referred to Lenin's argument that "it was necessary for the advanced stratum of the proletariat to hold temporary control on behalf of the proletariat. No state machinery can solve any important political and organizational problems without the guidance of the party center" (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:152).

Wang asserted that from that time on the communist party had been carrying out direct administrative leadership and its form seemed to be the only form of proletarian leadership in all the socialist countries. Consequently, the communist party's dictatorship thus gradually divorced itself from society's control and became a sort of oppressive force 104
above society. "The dictatorship of the advanced stratum of the proletariat may become a dictatorship of communist bureaucrats" (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:152).

To prevent the party's bureaucratization, Wang suggested a gradual transformation of the party's dictatorship into an organized dictatorship of the entire proletariat, and a transformation of the party's role of direct administrative leadership over the society into one of only political and ideological leadership in the context of self-rule by society as a whole. He favored the model of Yugoslavia's experience of "the self-rule of the workers" and suggested the following three characteristics of their experiment should be considered:

1. Within the economic realm, the workers are in control (worker's management).

2. Within the political realm, the workers have self-rule (worker's self-government).

3. Communists do not exercise direct administrative leadership over society; they only strengthen their leadership over political ideology. (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:144)

Wang believed that by carrying out these principles, it would render the party's relationship with the popular masses closer, and would turn the party into a nuclear force for the unification of all the popular masses. He said, "The self-rule of the worker in the political realm enables the proletarian democracy to become an authentic and direct democracy" (Wang, in Chan, et al., 1985:145).
Another spokesman who criticized the dictatorship of the proletariat was a young worker named Chen Erjin. He was also put into prison for his dissident political opinion. Chen wrote his long article "On Proletarian Democratic Revolution" and published it during the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement.

In his article, Chen called for a proletarian democratic revolution to protect China from the "revisionism" that had occurred in the Soviet Union. He regarded the Soviet Union's system as "revisionism" because in their society public ownership of the means of production was usurped by a new ruling class--the "bureaucrat-monopoly-privileged class"--and turned into a new "collective form of private ownership." The workers remained the nominal owners of the means of production, but were in reality reduced to the status of mere slaves. Thus the primary social conflict became that between privilege and labor based on the division of labor characterized as division of power.

Concerning the situation in China, Chen regarded it as a "crossroads socialist society," which might either move towards full socialism or towards "revisionism." In the case of a crossroads socialist society, the basic contradiction in the mode of production resided in the "incompatibility between, on the one hand, highly organized and politico-economically incorporate social production under public ownership, and on the other, coercive
monopolization of power by the minority" (Chen, in Munro, 1984:87).

Chen argued that although the roots of the distorted power relationship between the party and the people lay within the economic base, it was in the superstructure that the degeneration was primarily centered. He cried out for a proletarian democratic revolution to transfer power from the party minority to the workers as a class, thus carrying out the underlying purpose of converting merely formal-juridical ownership by the latter into true ownership with actual power.

Chen portrayed a blueprint of his "proletarian democratic system" under a "written Marxist constitution," which was supposed to be set up after the proletarian democratic revolution. Under this system "all power to the people" was the principle that would be upheld; a two-party system would be implemented instead of a single-party system, governmental power would be separated between the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches, and the principle of checks and balances would also be adopted to deal with the relation between these branches. Chen held that state sovereignty would rest with the entire working people headed by the proletariat. He claimed:

Under the proletarian-democratic system, the written Marxist constitution would, represent the supreme leadership of the state, a people's-democratic republican system of universal suffrage, whereby every worker would enjoy the right to vote and the
right to stand for election, would constitute the basis of state power as a whole. Under the proletarian-democratic system, state sovereignty would rest with the entire working people headed by the proletariat. Consent and ratification by all workers would have to be sought on any matter concerning the creating of structures of power, the formulation of laws and the appointment and dismissal of bearers of office. (Chen, in Munro, 1984:174)

In Chen’s point of view, since the means of production already had been publicly owned in China, implementing the working people’s sovereignty politically, when the power rightly belonged, both in name and in reality, to the people themselves was the best logical next step.

Chen proposed a two-party system under the supremacy of a written Marxist constitution to overcome the single-party’s hegemony in state authority. He argued that "the single communist party system must be discarded and replaced by a dual communist party system" (Chen, in Munro, 1984:167).

Chen’s proposition was based on his conception of the "two stages of proletarian dictatorship." Chen insisted that the primary task of a proletarian revolution during its initial stage was the capture of state political power and the transformation from private ownership of the means of production to the public. During this stage, the main target of the proletarian revolution was an external one, namely, the old exploiting classes. In this pioneering part of the proletarian dictatorship, "the only agency fitted to
occupy the core position in the struggle during the period from the conquest of power to the consolidation of public ownership, the only agency fit to play the leading role and to exert a monopoly of power is the party organization of the single communist party" (Chen, in Munro, 1984:217).
Nevertheless, when the tasks of the first stage were achieved, the advanced form of the proletarian dictatorship would be adopted for the post-revolutionary state to shift from coercive to consensual means for the exertion of proletarian hegemony. The main enemy of the proletariat was no longer an external but an internal one, a new style exploiting class- the bureaucrat class. The primary task of the proletarian revolution became to abolish that coercive monopolization of power by the minority. Hence, communist-party pluralism would be implemented. The main function of the two-party system would be to provide an institutional safeguard for communist opposition. Chen enthusiastically praised this system and considered it could resolve most difficulties for the proletariat in its post-revolutionary state:

The two party system would provide a rational form for the containment of contrast and struggle. It would supply the requisite condition and platform for the public expression, discussion and test of opinions, views and policies contrary to the ruling party. The written Marxist constitution would, in turn, allow the opinions and policies of the ruling party to be iterated on a correct basis and orientating with those of the party in opposition. The practice of such democracy
and legality would result in falsehood being driven into the open and deprived of all sanctuary. Controversy would be resolved by the people, by the constitution, and by appeal to reason, rather than by restoring to sheer might; controversy would thus become, not a source of error and falsehood, but rather a means of establishing the truth. (Chen, in Munro, 1984:168)

Besides the advantage that the two-party system would provide a rational form for controversy and a way to achieve consensual truth, it also would provide many advantages in political life. Chen listed these advantages as: to legitimate the revolution, remove all traces of the monstrous and shameless conspiratorial intrigues generated by the struggle for power, provide an effective means for supervising the government's exercise of authority and stop those in power abusing that power, facilitate a rapid and smooth correction of mistakes in the political line, and after all, "it would be a most forceful measure in the direction of preventing the governing communist party degenerating into a paternalistic, slave-driving organ controlled by the bureaucrat-monopoly privileged class" (Chen, in Munro, 1984:169).

By referring to Western political theory, Chen based his governmental structure upon a tripartite separation of powers. He considered it a "dictatorship through the separation of powers":

in the term of power-structure the advanced form of proletarian dictatorship must consist in the exact opposite of its previous form. No longer would dictatorship
be exerted by means of an all-encompassing concentration of power subsuming the sovereignty of the legislative, executive and judiciary, through coercive monopoly by the minority. Instead, it would be exerted through the 'separation of powers,' in a tripartite division between legislative, executive and judiciary, so that power would govern power . . . Thus would be safeguarded the democracy and freedom of the working masses. (Chen, in Monro, 1984:224)

Under this principle, Chen recommended setting up systems of people’s conference, presidency and judiciary. People’s Conference was a multi-layered pyramid of representatives, with direct election operation from the grassroots to the county level, and indirect election operating from levels higher than the county to the supreme legislative organ—the National People’s Conference. Chen’s system was supposed to differ from the existing system of the "People’s Congress," which used to ratify the party’s policy and law in rubber-stamp fashion. The relation between the people’s conference and the president is something like the mechanism of checks and balances similar to the American system—the president can veto the law passed by the conference and the conference can override the veto by more than a two-thirds majority. The procedure for the presidential election was also quite similar to American elections—the president is elected by indirect election by an "electoral college " from each province. As for the judiciary system, it is very interesting that "judges would attain office through election" also.
Chen's critique of the existing system of socialist democracy characterized by the dictatorship of the proletariat is profound. His blueprint of the proletarian democratic system is literally a Western-type democracy wrapped up in a protective brand of Marxism. Obviously, this kind of "genuine Marxism" would not be tolerated by the CCP authority.

Unlike those who criticized the existing system of the proletarian dictatorship in China with Marxist language, some members of the pro-democracy movement did it directly by utilizing liberal-democratic terminology. Wei Jing Sheng is an outstanding spokesman of this group. During the pro-democracy movement, he called for democracy as a "Fifth Modernization" in addition to CCP's program of "Four Modernizations." Three days after he issued his article "Democracy or New Dictatorship?," which criticized Deng Xiao Ping's anti-democratic policy, he was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. In early 1989, a petition for his release was signed by a group of famous intellectuals, which was also an early sign of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.

Wei based the foundation of democracy on individualism and human rights. He argued that the difference between totalitarianism and democracy lay in their different forms of society concerning individuals. He criticized the "people's democratic dictatorship" as a means of the autocracy of a Great Helmsman misled by a wrong theory.
This theory taught the people that since men were social beings, social interests should predominate, social interests were common to all people, a centralized management was necessary, thus autocracy was the most ideal form. Wei's argument went:

Since human beings exist in a society, they are all social beings. However, the following factors should be considered: (a) Society is composed of different individuals and, according to natural instincts, each individual exists independently; (b) People's sociality is formed of the common character and common interest of many different individuals. The different social units--individuals--form different societies. Therefore, people's sociality depends on individuality just as human societies necessarily depend on the existence of individuals. (c) Therefore, we conclude that people's individuality enjoys priority over their sociality, although both are important constituents of human nature. (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:57)

Wei believed that the principle of totalitarianism was suppression of individuality whereas the principle of democracy was harmony with individuality. The form of the former is enslavement while the latter is cooperation. He held that "the main difference between totalitarianism and democracy lies in the two different and exactly opposite forms of existence for human individuals as two vastly different living conditions for people" (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:58).  

To develop his argument, Wei returned to the idea of human rights. "Human right is a term used to denote the rights of an individual as a human being" Wei wrote, "he
has the right to live, to live a meaningful life" (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:65). He introduced the idea of freedom into human rights: "Freedom is the right to use one's capabilities to satisfy one's desires" (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:144). Wei maintained that only democracy based on individualism, not "democratic dictatorship," can guarantee human rights and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. He remarked:

Democracy in its primitive sense means letting people be masters of their own affairs. The concept of democracy covers a wide range. Briefly, it means that people have the right to exercise control over all things in human society, including control over economic, political, cultural and social affairs. The desires of the people are not completely identical. If we only emphasize control and neglect the aim of satisfying the desire of the majority, we will end up in the absurd state of "democratic dictatorship." The Marxist theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was developed on the basis of analyzing and magnifying the aspect of control in democracy. When this theory was fully developed, it fundamentally negated the fact that different members of society have the right to satisfy their different desires. In other words, it denied people's right to live as equals. By the time Marxism developed to the Leninist stage of "ruthless suppression of counter-revolutionaries," it fundamentally negated the fact that each man is free to carry out political activities to satisfy his personal desires in life and to fight for survival. . . . This explains why all social systems based on Marxist socialism are without exception undemocratic and even antidemocratic autocracies. (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:144-145)
In light of this fundamental difference between Marxist democracy and "capitalist democracy," Wei stressed the procedural difference in free elections and the free expression of public opinion.

Under Western "capitalist democracy," people can express their will through elections and determine the nation's destiny on the basis of their will. Even though their will may not be entirely correct, people still have the right to make mistakes and to correct them quickly. Therefore, no "bourgeois politicians" would in any way dare to ignore public opinion on any issue; otherwise people can ask them to get out. However, all "proletarian politicians" can, with or without due process of resolution, decide on the use of a big club to force "proletarian masses" into submission. Even though they are entirely worthless, people can only watch them being promoted, enjoying pleasures, and taking concubines. (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:58)

In Wei's opinion, "only a genuine general election can create a government and leaders ready to serve the interests of the electorates" (Wei, in Benton, 1982:49). The CCP's program of the "Four Modernizations" could only modernize a dictatorial state that would not make the people happier. In this program, people were used as instruments to carry out their ambitions. He declared, "We want a modern lifestyle and democracy for the people. Freedom and happiness are our sole objectives in accomplishing modernization. Without this fifth modernization all others are merely another promise" (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:53).

With the severe criticism of the dictatorship of the proletariat, some members of the Democracy Wall Movement
openly appealed to abandon socialist democracy. A wall poster which appeared on May 11, 1979, in Tiantsin, thus demanded:

Cadres at all levels should be produced through free elections, and "socialist democracy" should be abolished. "Socialist democracy" is a slogan without substance; the cadres at various levels cannot say what it means, and it is always in opposition to "Democracy." Since it is just an empty slogan, and what the people want is true democracy, then why modify democracy with the word "socialist"? (Lin, 1980:223)

In this wall poster the author also called to "abandon the four basic principles," to "abandon one-party dictatorship," to "open free enterprise," etc. He explained the reason to do that was: "Of all the countries around the world that have professed a socialist system and carried out a one-party dictatorship over the six decades and more, not a single one has achieved a strong nation and a wealthy people" (Lin, 1980:235).

The Programs of the Current Chinese Pro-democracy Movements

China's Pro-democracy Movements in the Late 1980s

Since the end of the Democracy Wall Movement of 1979, the Chinese democrats have not ceased seeking democracy. From their disappointment with the reform of socialist democracy under the "Four Cardinal Principles," a series of the pro-democracy movements have demanded more liberalization in the political realm as well as in the
economic realm. The most influential movements include the Election Campaign in 1980, the students demonstration in 1986 and the recent pro-democracy movement in 1989.

During the 1980 election campaign for people's delegates, many students and workers who were not nominated by the CCP authority stood up to compete with the candidates who were officially nominated. These voluntary candidates challenged the CCP’s monopoly in elections in order to promote a real free election.

In December 1986, hundreds of thousands of students from more than a hundred college campuses took to the streets throughout China, demonstrating for freedom and democracy. The students looked forward to promoting political reform, which had been begun brewing earlier that year. This movement became silent after Deng Xiao Ping's threat of a bloody suppression. Unfortunately, three years later this threat became a reality as a result of the pro-democracy movement on June 4, 1989.

The 1989 pro-democracy movement was the largest one since the May 4th Movement of 1919. With the raising of the Statue of the Goddess of Democracy on Tian An Men Square, the abstract idea of democracy got a concrete symbol for the Chinese people. The fact that millions of people went out to block the communist army, which had entered Beijing to carry out martial law, signified that the communist regime had lost the "Mandate of Heaven."
All the phenomena of the last ten years in China have shown that the people who seek democracy are not satisfied with the experiments of Chinese socialist democracy. Among the radical spokesmen of the people’s pro-democracy movement was Fang Li Zhi who dedicated himself to liberal democracy and even promoted a wholesale Westernization to modernize China.

What kind of modernization do we want? The truth is every aspect of the Chinese world needs to be modernized. But do we want to be completely Westernized? No new controversy, the question has been asked for more than a century. As for myself, I think that complete Westernization is the only way to modernize. (Fang, in China Spring, Vol. 1, No.2, 1987:12)

Fang’s idea of Westernization means to give up Chinese-type socialism and to liberalize both the political and economic systems in China. Fang’s influence on the 1986 and 1989 students’ demonstration was crucial. Especially, his prestigious position as the Vice-President of the Chinese Science and Technology University strengthened his influence among the students. He was charged as an instigator of the students’ unrest in 1986, which caused him to be expelled from the CCP and removed from his post. He was also accused as the "black hand" of the 1989 Pro-Democracy Movement, thus he was forced to take refuge in the Embassy of the United States of America at Beijing after the June 4th Massacre.
Program of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy

A better way to understand what the Chinese pro-democracy movement seeks is to examine the programs of their organizations. To do this, I choose the programs of the Chinese Alliance for Democracy (CAD), the Federation for Democratic China (FDC), and the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party (CLDP) as exemplary cases.

The Chinese Alliance for Democracy, headed by Dr. Wang Bing Zhang, was organized by the overseas Chinese students in 1982. It was the first overseas Chinese student pro-democracy organization. The main goal of this organization is to promote democracy, rule of law, freedom, human rights and pluralism on the Chinese mainland by nonviolent means. It publishes a monthly magazine—China Spring—to propagandize these ideas. The general program, passed by its Third Congress on January 1, 1988, declared its main tasks. Some main points of this program are:

Under the principle of independence, the CAD is willing to coordinate with all pro-democracy forces to awaken the people to fundamentally change the current dictatorial system and to realize Democracy, Freedom, Rule of Law, Human Rights and Pluralism in China.

The main political and economic programs of the CAD are: to abolish the one-party dictatorship; to realize democratic politics; to protect the ownership of private property; to promote pluralist economy.

The current main task of our work is to promote the pro-democracy movement on the mainland of China. Our short-term goals
are: to suspend the "Four Cardinal Principles" written in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, to release all the arrested dissidents; to allow the press being published by dissent; to open free election for the people's delegates at all levels. (The Chinese Alliance for Democracy, In China Spring, No.3, 1988:15. Translated by author)

Basically, the CAD wants to promote pluralism in both the political and economic realms. In the political realm, it calls for political pluralism by setting up opposition parties as a loyal opposition; as to the economic realm, it calls for economic pluralism by institutionalizing private ownership as a supplement to public ownership.

Primarily, the CAD emphasizes political pluralism and tries to introduce new ideas of the opposition party to China. In an essay entitled "For the Founding of an Opposition Party in China," the editor maintained:

If there is to be an opposition party in mainland China, both the party and the people will need to accept new ideas . . . The first new concept to be introduced is that an opposition party is not an enemy party. An enemy aims to topple and eliminate its opponent, whereas an opposition party tolerates, supervises, checks and balances the ruling party. An opposition party is in fact a "loyal opposition", loyal, like other parties, to the state and to the people . . . The second new concept to be introduced is that open competition in politics is necessary for the establishment of a healthy political metabolism. (China Spring, Vol. 1, No.3, 1987:21)

The CAD's effort to promote pluralism as well as its other programs of freedom of speech and human rights, etc.,
has been influential in China's pro-democracy movement, especially during the years of 1987 and 1989. This organization has been accused by the government as a "black hand" behind these movements. Some of its active members were arrested.

Program of the Federation for Democratic China

The Federation for Democratic China (FDC) was founded on September 22, 1989, in Paris, France. The major leaders of this organization were the participants of the 1989 pro-democracy movement who escaped from China after the June 4th massacre. Yan Jia Qi, the former director of the Political Science Institute, and Wuer Kaixi, the student leader on Tian An Men Square, were elected as its president and vice-president. In the "Declaration of the Founding of the FDC," they claimed that the major goals of the FDC are to protect basic human rights, to maintain social justice, to develop a private economy, and to end the one-party dictatorship. They continue as follows:

The FDC holds that: We must protect the unalienated basic human rights which one obtains with birth. These rights include: the right of self-preservation and self-fulfillment; the right to pursue happiness; the right of the individual's dignity and security. These rights are the foundation of modern civil society and the prerequisite of democratic politics.

All the members of society, regardless of their sex, ethnic background, occupation, and family background are equal, and should share the equal opportunity in fair social
competition. Only the abolition of privilege and the maintenance of social justice can promote the society to develop stably and properly.

Each citizen has the right to obtain and dominate one's own means of labor and the output of one's labor. To deprive the citizen's right of property under the name of the state is the main root of economic stagnation and political despotism in the communist countries. To return social wealth to the people and promote private economy are the only ways to resolve economic difficulties, and thus to modernize China.

In order to end autocracy and realize democracy, we must guarantee the freedom of faith, speech, press, and assembly. The military force must be nationalized. The judiciary department must be independent. The schools should not be politically controlled by the government. Education and academic studies must be independent. At the current time, the conditions for free elections at the levels of local officials and delegates are ready. They should be elected directly by the people. (The FDC, in China Spring, Oct., 1989. Translated by author)

Based on this program, the FDC is firmly promoting democracy for China under a principle of "Peace, Reason, and Nonviolence." As a political scientist, Yan Jia Qi characterized the political agenda for China as follows:

I hope the future Constitution will take these as its fundamental principles: the separation of three powers, federalism for the system of states, de-politicized and nationalized army; to firmly establish the supreme authority of the Constitution; to replace rule of man by rule of law; and finally to terminate the vicious circle of dynasties which has continued for thousands of years. (Yang, in United Press, 1989:520. Translated by author)
Program of the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party

The Chinese Liberal Democratic Party (CLDP) held its first meeting in preparation to found this party in Virginia at the end of 1989; its second meeting was held in Ohio in early March, 1990. In July, 1990, it was established in Ohio. The major members of this party were from the Chinese Democratic Party (CDP), the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), the Association of Chinese Students in the Midwest United States (ACSMUN), the CAD and the FDC, etc. The first chapter of its Constitution claims its "General Program" in eight points:

1. This party is called the Chinese Liberal Democratic Party.

2. This party firmly holds that human beings are born equal, each man has his inalienable rights of life, property and the pursuit of happiness.

3. This party firmly holds that the sovereignty of the state belongs to the people. The people have the right to decide the structural form of government.

4. This party holds that democracy should be realized in China. The principle of checks and balances of powers and multi-party competition should be adopted. The chief officials of administration and the people's representatives should be selected by free election.

5. This party holds that private property should be protected in China. We must develop a free market economy and make our society prosperous.

6. This party holds that the people should enjoy the freedom of thought and speech, freedom of religious faith, freedom of press and assembly. The idea of pluralism should
be promoted. A system of social welfare should be established.

7. This party holds that all ethnic nationals within China's territory are equal. Their native cultures, languages, religions and customs should be treated with due respect.

8. This party holds that military forces should be nationalized and be led by the civil government elected by the people. No political party, individual and local government should have military forces

(Chinese Liberal Democratic Party Preliminary Committee, 1990. Translated by author)

Besides this general program, the CLDP also tried to work out some sub-programs for politics, economy, education, and culture. Its political program makes the following claims:

Political Program:

* Abolishing the "Four Cardinal Principles" and overthrowing the CCP's one-party dictatorship.

* The government should be elected by the people and be organized under the principle of the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers.

* Political parties should be organized freely. A multi-party competition system should be set up.

* To carry out rule of law. All people are equal before the law. No individual and party should enjoy a privileged position beyond the law.

* The judiciary must be absolutely independent. It should not be interfered by politics, the military and political parties. Protecting judges to carry out their duty independently. The Supreme Court should take charge of the interpretation of
the Constitution and protection of its authority.

* Organizations of political parties should withdraw from governmental offices, the military and enterprises.

* In order to protect local autonomy, the limitation of power between the central government and local government should be rationally enacted.

* A civil service system should be established to protect qualified officials and to completely eradicate corruption. (the CLDP Preliminary Committee, 1990. Translated by author)

It is clear, the above political sub-program reflects China’s contemporary political problems as, e.g., centralization of power; the one party’s monopoly in political, economic and military spheres; military interference in politics; and official corruption, etc. The purpose of this program is to address these problems and hope for their resolution. This intention we can also see in its economic sub-program.

Economic Program:

* Ownership of private property should be protected by the Constitution.

* To promote private capital and limit state capital.

* To use financial policies such as a progressive tax to adjust the distribution of social wealth. To reduce unemployment and pay attention to the equal distribution of social wealth.

* To sell state owned enterprises to individuals. To invest the capital obtained from this transfer to public constructions in transportation and education.
* To prohibit officials being engaged in private business with their privileged political power. The competition in the free market should be fair.

* To allow a free commodity circulation.

* To improve the living standard of the peasants. Their ownership of land should be protected in order to realize the principle: "Those who plough own the land."

* The people have rights to choose their occupation and neighborhood. To reduce the difference between city and countryside.

* The workers have rights to organize their independent trade union, and to sign contracts with their employers. To realize labor security. To improve labor conditions. (the CLDP Preliminary Committee, 1990. Translated by author)

The major consideration of this economic program is to set up a free market economy and to protect private ownership of property. It also takes notice of equal distribution of social wealth in order to reduce the side-effects of a private economy. In addition, it is concerned with the actual life and work conditions of the workers and peasants.

Educational and Cultural Program:

* To recognize that education is the foundation of the establishment of a country. To increase the budget for education. To protect equal opportunity for all the people to receive education.

* To guarantee freedom of education and academic study.

* Art and literature should be free for their own sake.
* To protect freedom of speech and press. To promote communication of genuine news. (the CLDP Preliminary Committee, 1990. Translated by author)

This program focuses on promoting the freedom of education, academic discussion, speech, press, communication, art, literature, etc., which are considered as the prerequisites of a free society.

**Ideological Confusion in Contemporary China**

Through the discussions in this chapter, we have seen many ideological conflicts and uncertainties in China today. In order to resolve the economic difficulties the ruling party has carried out certain reforms in the economic sector in the past decade. The government allows the peasants to work for themselves instead of working collectively in the people’s commune. Small private enterprises have been developed in both urban and rural areas. Special economic zones are open to foreign investments. The privatization in the economic sector is impressive under the name of "socialist market economy." Although the government insists that socialism is still the only way that China wants to go, many people think that the government is using capitalism to save socialism.

In the political sector the ruling party remains very conservative. The CCP tries to maintain its one-party monopoly under the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The ideology of the CCP becomes pragmatic
rather than communist. All the policies carried out by the CCP is for its political survival. Deng Xiao Ping asserts: "No matter whether a cat is white or black, a cat that can catch a rat is a good cat."

On the other hand, the pro-democracy movement in the late 1970s focused its criticism on the dictatorship of the proletariat. Some members, such as Wang Xi Zhe and Chen Erjin, hoped to realize a proletarian democratic system based on publicly owned means of production. They wanted to democratize China under the workers' control in both the political and economic sectors within a genuine Marxist framework.

However, the pro-democracy movements in the late 1980s focused their attention on Western-type democracy. They declared that they tried to end the one-party dictatorship and pursued a multi-party system. In order to guarantee a democratic government, free elections should be adopted to select political leaders, and the principle of separation of powers should be implemented in case the powers might be arbitrarily used against the people. In the economic sector, they were in favor of a market economy and private ownership of property. They believed that only a market economy could provide the foundation for people's free choice in other spheres, and bring about a prosperous society. They also wished to protect individual freedom and human rights. Particularly, they promoted freedom of speech.
and assembly and considered these as the foundations of a
democratic society.

Due to their ignorance of the problems within Western
societies, and their disappointment and psychological
reaction to the poor conditions in socialist China, the
members of the pro-democracy movements accepted the Western
ideas of democracy and economy without critical examination.
They believe that a wholesale Westernization is the only way
to bring China into an ideal democratic society. Critically
speaking, there is no absolutely ideal society of democracy
in the real world. And even more skeptically, it is very
questionable whether these Western ideas of democracy can be
realized in a society and culture that lacks the experience
of these issues. Considering that various authoritarian
societies which had imported wholesale Western democratic
forms lapsed quickly back to authoritarian rule, the future
of China's transformation to a democratic society becomes
pessimistic.

What can the Chinese people do for their future? What
is their ideological solution? Obviously, the existing
political system is not a way out for democracy. Some basic
principles of democracy should be introduced into China.
The issue is not the probability of the realization of these
ideas. The issue is that without implementing these basic
ideas a society cannot be regarded as a democratic society.
Who knows what will happen after a large-scale social change
in China? The future is not easy to predict in China just as in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (now called the Commonwealth of Independent States). The important thing we can do is to search for some basic principles of democracy regardless of their ideological color. If the Chinese people want to democratize their society, they should be aware of those principles. It is in this sense that this dissertation continues.
Chapter VI
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY FOR CHINA'S FUTURE

Appropriate Basic Democratic Principles for China

After the discussions of different models of democracy and the debates on democracy by the Chinese ruling party and democratic organizations, the concluding step of this dissertation is to search for some basic principles of democracy which are appropriate for China, and to explain what the institutional manifestations of these principles would be.

As discussed, serious problems exist in both socialist democracy and liberal democracy. Socialist democracy is undemocratic in its practice. Furthermore, its emphasis on equality dismisses the principle of liberty, and the centrally planned economic system decreases the productivity of social wealth. Liberal democracy also is flawed in the real world, particularly, the unlimited power of private property undermines the principles of equality and liberty, economically as well as politically. As a middle way between socialist democracy and liberal democracy, social democracy seems to provide us a model of legal democratic institutions combined with a more rational economic system. Its functional socialism, which utilizes the policies of social welfare such as transfer payments and a progressive taxation policy, deals with the socialization of property in
a rational manner. However, the model of social democracy also faces some serious criticism. Especially, this model is based on historic developments within relatively small and homogeneous countries. It will be difficult for China to follow this model under its concrete conditions that are so different from those countries. All of these situations make the question more complicated for China to simply accept any existing model as its blueprint. Therefore, the Chinese people have to find their own way towards democracy based on the basic principles of democracy for their future.

Generally speaking, a democratic political system means a government which is established under the principles of separation of powers, a multi-party competition, and the periodic elections of officials; at the same time, this system is logically connected with the principles of liberty and equality, e.g., the citizens' rights of free speech and equal opportunity of participation. The construction of government indicates the institutional aspects of democracy; the rights of freedom and equality for the members present the essential values of democracy. The composition of these two parts is an effort to combine the empirical institutions with the normative values of democracy. No matter how different China's conditions are from other countries, it is the direction in which the Chinese Pro-democracy movement should move.
Institutional Mechanism of Political Democracy

Schumpeter, Macpherson and the Theory of "Equilibrium Democracy"

Among those who talk about democracy as a mechanism of political institutions this writer believes that Schumpeter's theory of democracy has provided us with the best understanding. Schumpeter defined the "democratic method" as "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1976:269). Schumpeter's theory of democracy was called by Macpherson "equilibrium democracy" or with a more descriptive name "the pluralist elitist equilibrium model." Macpherson summarized the main stipulations of this model as follows:

The main stipulations of this model are, first, that democracy is simply a mechanism for choosing and authorizing governments, not a kind of society nor a set of moral ends; and second, that the mechanism consists of a competition between two or more self-chosen sets of politicians (elites), arrayed in political parties, for the votes which will entitle them to rule until the next election. The voter's rule is not to decide political issues and then choose representatives who will carry out those decisions: it is rather to choose the men who will do the deciding . . . The citizens' role is simply to choose between sets of politicians periodically at election time. The citizens' ability thus to replace one government by another protects them from tyranny. (Macpherson, 1977:7)
David Held’s reading of Schumpeter’s theory of democracy was quite analogous to Macpherson’s. In his book, *Models of Democracy*, he also argued that democratic life was the struggle between rival politicians for the mandate to rule. The right of citizens was to periodically choose and authorize a government to act on their behalf. We had better avoid confusing the abstract meaning of democracy as a form of life promised by equality and the best conditions for human development with its concrete political operation. He asserted:

Democracy could serve a variety of ends, e.g., the pursuit of social justice. But it was important, Schumpeter argued, not to confuse these ends with democracy itself. What political decisions were taken was an independent question from the proper form of their taking: the conditions of the de facto legitimacy of decision and decision-makers as a result of periodic elections of competing political elites. (Held, 1987:166)

Therefore, in this model, the essence of democracy was to protect the people from the threat of tyranny by the periodic election of competing elites. The argument thus continued:

The essence of democracy was, as the protective theorists of democracy rightly emphasized, the ability of citizens to replace one government by another and hence, to protect themselves from the risk of political decision-makers transforming themselves into an immovable force. As long as governments can be changed, and as long as the electorate has a choice between (at least two) broadly different party platforms, the threat of tyranny can be checked. Democracy is a mechanism which
allows the registration of the broad desires of ordinary people, while leaving actual public policy to the few who are sufficiently experienced and qualified to make it. (Held, 1987:166)

In Schumpeter's interpretation of democracy, there is no moral content in democracy as a vehicle for the improvement of mankind. Democracy is simply a mechanism for political leaders to compete for the people's votes to rule. Since they obtain the mandate to rule by the people's votes, in Chinese terminology, it is a process of "the mandate of the people." In this sense, the principle of the "people's sovereignty" is still meaningful in Schumpeter's model even though the actual decision-making of public policy is left to those who are "sufficiently experienced and qualified to make it."

As an economist, Schumpeter interpreted the mechanism of democracy in the sense of a market mechanism. The "people's sovereignty" was described as "consumers' sovereignty." Macpherson held that in this model, "democracy is simply a market mechanism: the voters are the consumers; the politicians are the entrepreneurs." The political consumers have a choice between the purveyors of the package of political goods. There is also a parallel rationality between these two markets:

In the economic model, entrepreneurs and consumers were assumed to be rational maximizers of their own good, and to be operating in conditions of free competition in which all energies and resources were brought to the market, with the result that
the market produced the optimum distribution of labor and capital and consumer goods. So in the political model, politicians and voters were assumed to be rational maximizers, and to be operating in conditions of free political competition, with the result that the market-like political system produced the optimum distribution of political energies and political goods. The democratic political market produced an optimum equilibrium of inputs and outputs--of the energies and resources people would put into it and the rewards they would get out of it. (Macpherson, 1977:79)

The optimum equilibrium of the political input and output under the political consumers' sovereignty provides one theoretical interpretation for the operation of modern democracy. After all, in this model, consumers have opportunities to influence producers by choosing or refusing their goods. Actually, it is more important that consumers have the right to refuse bad producers and their goods.

It is interesting to note that Vladimi Shlapentokh, a scholar from the Soviet Union, developed a theory of "the evaluation of performance (EP)," which coincides with Schumpeter's theory. Referring to Shlapentokh's theory may also give us a better understanding of the meaning of Schumpeter's theory. He said:

The crucial characteristic of society (as well as any other organization) is the mechanism for evaluating producers' performance, which includes as an important component the rewards, negative or positive, for the performance. It is the organization of the negative rewards--the sanctions for bad performance--which exerts a special impact on the efficiency of producers. (Shlapentokh, 1988:3)
He continued to argue that the best mechanism of EP could be created by a system in which the consumers, not the superior producers passed the final judgment on the work. That kind of system must be based on the principle of democracy. The mechanism of evaluation of performance was not only important for the political system, but also important in the control of human performance in all spheres of social life. He thus maintained:

It turned out that the consumer can get such possibilities only in a society based on the principle of democracy. These principles are important not only for the political system of a society—political freedom, election of government and direct participation in the political decision-making process through voting, referendums, polls—but also for all other spheres of society guaranteeing the ordinary individual the ability to influence, mostly as a consumer, the activity of producers of goods and all sorts of services. In other words, the major merit of democracy from this perspective lies in its capacity to involve the whole population, even if in a very unequal way, in the control of human performance in all spheres of social life. (Shlapentokh, 1988:5)

However, in Shlapentikh’s argument, the functions of the evaluation of performance were highly idealized. As we have observed in earlier chapters, the power of the people or consumers to influence the producers is very limited, either in socialist or capitalist societies. Actually, this mechanism only has symbolic meaning to legitimize the producer’s rule. In Schumpeter’s theory, there is no real people’s will that can be realized as people’s sovereignty
even in a democratic society. Schumpeter claimed his meaning of democracy clearly.

Democracy does not mean and can not mean that people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms "people" and "rule." Democracy means only that people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule. (Schumpeter, 1976:284)

Obviously, this democratic mechanism can only provide the principle of "people’s sovereignty" or "consumers’ sovereignty" with procedural, not substantive, meaning. Nevertheless, despite its limitation, this mechanism provides a way to avoid tyranny in the real world. Without it, the situation becomes worse. The principle of people’s sovereignty would be used as an excuse for tyranny to rule absolutely. Considering it in China’s context, the principle of people’s sovereignty would be equivalent to the doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven used by all tyrannies in China’s long history.

Theories of the "Mandate of Heaven" and "People’s Sovereignty"

The mechanism of democracy in the sense of a means and function by which the people can choose and refuse their rulers through periodic elections is the most significant for China’s democratization in the future. Under the current system of socialist democracy, there is no institutionalized procedure for the Chinese people to replace their political leaders. During the 1989 pro-
democracy demonstration, hundreds of thousands of people went into the streets to appeal to the irremovable "Last Emperor"--Deng Xiao Ping--to resign. Consequently, the people's demonstration, which expressed their will, was condemned by their rulers as a counter-revolutionary rebellion and was violently suppressed. This model of conflict resolution between the ruler and the ruled is still identical with the process under the doctrine of the "Mandate of Heaven."

The doctrine of the Mandate of Heaven was the most important political theory developed by the Chou Dynasty about three thousand years ago. It worked as a legitimate reason for the Chou regime to replace the Shang Dynasty and declared that the replacement took place because of moral corruption. This doctrine can be used either by the rulers to declare their right to rule, or by the opponents who want to take over. As Hok-lam Chan maintained in his book Legitimation in Imperial China:

This mandate, however, was not unconditional nor eternal, for the theory also held that it would be transferred to others should its holders at any time prove incompetent. When that occurred, men could perceive Heaven's displeasure from ominous cosmological signs, natural disasters, and domestic turmoil. In this way, the doctrine of the "Mandate of Heaven" was double-edged; it provided the source of legitimacy and was a powerful instrument of criticism for scholar-officials against their rulers. It has been repeatedly invoked to justify the many changes of dynasties in Chinese history, and the Chinese term for revolution, ko-ming, literally "transferring the mandate," was
According to the theory of the "Mandate of Heaven," a ruler (Son of Heaven) gets his legitimization from Heaven to realize the "Tao of Heaven." The ruler's duty is to carefully maintain social justice, happiness, and harmony. If the ruler fails to fulfill his duty, he will lose the "Mandate of Heaven" and thus be removed. In this model, although the highest censor is Heaven, the evaluation of the ruler's performance comes from the people's judgement.

Liang Chi-chao pointed out the implication of this doctrine:

The purpose and will of heaven is manifested in men. "Heaven sees through what we people see; Heaven hears through what we people hear." "What the people desire Heaven will surely carry out" (Shang Shu) . . . The Son of Heaven is responsible to heaven, but actual authority is exercised over him by the people. (Liang, 1930:150-151)

A typical record of how the theory of "Mandate of Heaven" prevailed in ancient China can be found in The Works of Mencius. A dialogue between Mencius and his student Wan Chang told the story of how the transition of legitimacy from Sage King Yaou to Sage King Shun actually happened under the Mandate of Heaven:

Wan Chang said, "Was it the case that Yaou gave the empire to Shun?" Mencius said, "No. The empire cannot give the empire to another."

"Yes;--but Shun had the empire. Who gave it to him?" "Heaven gave it to him," was the answer.
"'Heaven gave it to him':--did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific injunctions?"

Mencius replied, "No. Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct, and his conduct of affairs." (Mencius, in Legge, 1930:792)

Wan Chang still could not understand how Heaven showed its will by the personal conduct and affairs. Thus Mencius explained:

The empire can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the empire . . . Yaou presented Shun to Heaven, Heaven accepted him; and he exhibited him to the people, the people accepted him. Therefore I say, 'Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.'" (Mencius, in Legge, 1930:792)

Wan Chang further asked what it meant that both Heaven and the people accepted Shun. Mencius replied:

He caused him to preside over the sacrifices, and all the spirits were well pleased with them;--thus Heaven accepted him. He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs were well administered, so that people reposed under him;--thus the people accepted him. Heaven gave the empire to him. The people gave it to him." (Mencius, in Legge, 1930:793)

The continuing dialogue explains why the son of Yaou failed to inherit his father's position, but Shun occupied the emperor's seat according to Heaven's will and the people's choice.

After the death of Yaou, when the three years' mourning was completed, Shun withdrew from the son of Yaou to the South River. The princes of the empire, however, reporting to court, went not to the son of
Yaou, but they went to Shun. Litigants went not to the son of Yaou, but they went to Shun. Singers sang not to the son of Yaou, but they sang Shun. Therefore I said, 'Heaven gave him the empire.' It was after these things that he went to the Middle Kingdom and occupied the emperor's seat. If he had, before these things, taken up his residence in the palace of Yaou, and had applied pressure to the son of Yaou, it would have been an act of usurpation, and not the gift of Heaven.

This sentiment is expressed in the word of The Great Declaration: 'Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear.' (Mencius, in Legge, 1930:795)

In the case of the transition of the Mandate of Heaven from Yaou to Shun, we see the people's consent, and the people as the real censor of the emperor's conduct, thus it is sovereign. In ancient China, since there was no institution of voting, people utilized their mouths and feet to choose their preferred rulers. This is why some scholars hold that the mandate of heaven is actually the mandate of the people. Chung-ying Cheng thus concludes:

In fact, the doctrine of the mandate of heaven (t'ien-ming) in the Shang Shu can be easily interpreted as the mandate of people (min-ming) and hence one can easily argue that for Confucius and Mencius the sovereignty of state rests ultimately with people and the authority of ruler to rule is derived ultimately from people. Mencius did suggest that people have the right to remove a bad ruler, who does not care for the people. (Cheng, 1991:338)

Generally speaking, the essence of the "Mandate of Heaven" is comparable to that of the "People's Sovereignty."

Nevertheless, the former lacks an institutionalized
mechanism to remove a bad ruler as the latter does. In fact, Heaven will not remove the ruler; in many cases it is the people who will overthrow such a ruler by a revolution legitimized by Heaven. The people's rebellion is to carry out the punishment from Heaven upon a bad ruler and thus to transfer the "Mandate of Heaven" onto a new ruler. By this mechanism, both the ruler and the ruled face a life-and-death conflict, because legitimation was always claimed by the winner. James Wang pointed out this cool implication of the doctrine of the "Mandate of Heaven": "an unwritten constitution providing for rebellion as a means of deposing an intolerable imperial ruler--but rebellion was legitimate only if it succeeded" (Wang, 1989:1). For lack of an institutionalized way to remove a bad ruler in peace, the fight between ruler and the ruled is always violent and cruel in the process of changing the "Mandate of Heaven."

This shortcoming of the "Mandate of Heaven" can only be overcome by adopting the Western democratic mechanism of periodic elections. Theoretically speaking, no tyranny can be removed by peaceful means unless this democratic mechanism is established. The most significant contribution of Western democracy is to provide an institutionalized, non-violent means to change rulers. Democracy has created an "election instead of revolution" function in human political life. This advantage of the mechanism of democracy may sound too common and cheap to the people who
have lived under democracy for many years, but it is so unusual and precious for those who live under an undemocratic society that they are willing to pay with their lives for it. Wei Jing Sheng noticed this valuable meaning of democracy, though his idea of Western democracy was idealized:

What is true democracy? It means the right of the people to choose their own representatives to work according to their will and in their interests. Only this can be called democracy. Furthermore, the people must also have the power to replace their representatives anytime so that these representatives cannot go on deceiving others in the name of the people. This is the kind of democracy enjoyed by people in European and American countries. In accordance with their will, they could run such people as Nixon, de Gaulle, and Tanaka out of office. They can reinstate them if they want, and nobody can interfere with their democratic rights. In China, however, if a person even comments on the already dead Great Helmsman Mao Zedong or the Great Man without peers in history, jail will be ready for him with open door and various unpredictable calamities may befall him. What a vast difference will it be if we compare the socialist system of centralized democracy with the system of capitalist "exploiting class!" (Wei, in Seymour, 1980:52)

In the long Chinese history millions of people have died in rebellions, revolutions, and civil wars merely for the goal of removing one person in the highest leadership role. Unfortunately, in this manner they could only create a cycle of dynastic changes and establish one tyranny after another. They will not get rid of this tragedy unless the mechanism of democracy is established.
Towards a New Definition of the "Democratic Method"

Schumpeter's definition of the "democratic method" highlighted the democratic mechanism of choosing and refusing who would hold power by periodical election, but missed another aspect of the democratic mechanism--how power should be exercised by the power-holder. Under a democratic system, not only the power-holder should be replaceable, but also the power itself should be subject to checks and balances. The principles of the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances" must be regarded as another significant mechanism of democracy. Therefore, it should be included in the definition of the democratic method.

Lord Acton warned: "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Pickles, 1972:22). It seems that the whole meaning of the function of democratic mechanism is to protect power from absolutism. If the periodic election to replace the power-holder is regarded as a manner of the "checks and balances of powers" by time, then the separation of powers of the executive, legislative, and judiciary, and the mechanism of checks and balances of powers between these three branches is the "checks and balances of powers" by space. In addition, the multi-party system (including interest groups), which scatters the power of the state, can also be regarded as a means of "checks and balances of powers" by space.
Power is so dangerous that it must be checked continuously as well as periodically in case it should be monopolized and abused. In other words, it must be checked within a three dimensional network. In this sense, this writer's definition of democratic method can be assumed as: The democratic method is a mechanism of checks and balances of powers in time and space, embodied in the institutions of separation of powers, a multi-party system and periodic elections. This definition can be depicted in the following diagram.

\[
\text{Space} \\
| \\
\text{Separation of the powers of government and state} \\
| \text{Legislative} + \text{Executive} + \text{Judiciary} > \text{Multi-party system} \\
| \\
\text{Time} \\
\text{Periodic elections}
\]

**Figure 2. Definition of the Democratic Method**

This definition of the democratic method is consistent with what Giovanni Sartori said about the characteristics of power under a democratic system as he compared democracy with autocracy.
The difference between democracy and its opposite lies in the fact that in a democracy power is scattered, limited, controlled and exercised in rotation; whereas in an autocracy power is concentrated, uncontrolled, indefinite, and unlimited. (Sartori, In Neubauer and Cundde, 1969:36)

In this definition, the characteristics of power that "the power is scattered, limited, controlled and exercised in rotation" is expressed clearly through three institutions: the separation of powers, multi-party system (including interest groups), and periodic elections. These three institutional elements should be regarded as a criterion to identify whether or not a political system is democratic. The lack of any one of these three elements signifies that the system is not democratic. For example, periodic elections would be meaningless under a single-party state, because only one party dominates non-competitive elections. There is no option for the people to choose. And without periodic elections, a multi-party system would never work, because as long as one party wins elections, it can stay in office forever. The advantage of this definition of the democratic method is that it can provide a concrete criterion for the abstract meaning of democracy, such as the concepts of people's sovereignty or rule by the people. Any regime can declare that it represents the sovereignty of the people or rule by the people, but not every regime can declare that it holds all these three institutions in practice. In light of this definition, one party under one
boss who controls all powers forever in China today is precisely undemocratic, no matter how loud the CCP claims that this party represents the sovereignty of the Chinese people.

**Separation of Powers: Presidential System or Parliamentary System?**

In the above definition of democracy the principle of separation of powers is the most significant characteristic of a democratic government. There is no doubt that it is an effective means to protect the people from tyranny. However, its workability has been challenged by some political scientists, especially in the United States after its long history of practicing this principle. This debate concentrates on whether a presidential or a parliamentary system is the more workable form of a government.

To apply the principle of separation of powers to the structure of government is a question of how to deal with the relationship between three main organs: the legislature, executive, and judiciary. According to the original doctrine of this principle, these three branches of government should be strictly separated. This doctrine was initiated early by Montesquieu and Locke, and further developed in the American constitution. In his *Spirit of Laws*, Montesquieu explained why the three organs of government must be separated.
When the legislative power and executive power are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or the same senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor. (Montesquieu, 1977:202)

In the United States these three functions are given to the Congress (legislative), the President (executive) and the Supreme Court (judicial). Furthermore, the principle of checks and balances allows the three branches of government to limit and interfere with one another in order to prevent the domination of any single branch in important decision-making. Wasserman illustrated this function as follows:

There are numbers of examples of checks and balances in the Constitution. The presidential veto gives the chief executive a primarily legislative power to prevent bills he dislikes from being passed into law by Congress. Congress can check this power by its right to override the veto by a two-third vote. The Senate is given an executive power in its role of confirming presidential nominations for major executive and judicial posts. Further, Congress can refuse to appropriate funds for any executive agency, thereby preventing the agency from carrying out the laws. (Wasserman, 1985:30)

Unlike the American presidential system, the parliamentary system is usually regarded to reject the
principle of the separation of powers. According to some political scientists, in the latter system the legislative and executive powers are combined. Walter Bagehot argued that this form of government could work more simply and easily because of its fusion of the legislative and executive power: "the connecting link is the cabinet. By that new word we mean a committee of the legislative body selected to be the executive body" (Bagehot, in Goldwin and Kaufman, 1986:79). In this sense, they thought that in a parliamentary system there is no strict separation of powers.

However, this argument is misleading to the understanding of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches under a parliamentary system. According to Montesquieu, when the legislative power and executive power are united in the same person or in the same body of magistracy, we say that those two powers are concentrated. As long as there are two persons or two bodies which separately hold these two powers, there is separation of powers. Under a parliamentary system the cabinet is not the same body of the parliament, though it is selected by the latter. The cabinet is certainly not as independent as the executive branch under the presidential system. Nevertheless, there still exist certain functions of checks and balances between the cabinet and parliament, though they are carried out differently.
Furthermore, considering the relationship between those two branches and the judiciary, the principle of separation of powers is very clear. William Gwyn argued that even in a parliamentary system the separation of powers doctrine was partly satisfied. He asserted:

Even if, as some writers contend, there is no separation of legislative and executive power in parliamentary government, there can be and indeed is throughout Western Europe an independent judiciary. In a parliamentary system with independent judiciaries the separation of powers doctrine is at least partly satisfied. Such a government, in Montesquieu's opinion, provides a moderate degree of "political liberty" though not as much as a system in which all three branches of government are independent of one another. (Gwyn, 1986:74)

Whether or not the principle of separation of powers under the presidential system may provide more political liberty, its workability and efficiency have been certainly challenged by many American political scientists. Especially, they think that the fighting between the executive and legislative branches sometimes makes each side frustrated. Wasserman points out this problem.

This elaborated scheme of separation of powers and checks and balances was certainly not designed as the efficient form of government. Rather, it was established 'to control the abuses of government'--to oblige the government to control itself. It set up the structure that historian Richard Hofstadter has called 'a harmonious system of mutual frustration.' (Wasserman, 1985:31)

In 1980, Lloyd Cutler brought the debate on the separation of powers to the public. He said: "The
separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1973, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today" (Cutler, 1986:2). According to Cutler, it is not feasible to "form a government" under the U.S. Constitution in parliamentary terms. Particularly, the U.S. government is unable to "propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing" (Cutler, 1986:1). In a televised American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Public Policy Forum, which addressed issues surrounding the separation of powers, Cutler explained his argument clearly.

My thesis is that today it is impossible for the elected president or the elected majority in either house or both houses of Congress to legislate and execute a balanced program. Given the structure of the presidency and the Congress and the many things that have happened to our party system--the growth of single-interest political groupings, the well-meant reforms of Congress--there is no way the policies adopted can be a balanced set of policies that anyone elected will endorse. The president does not endorse the package that emerges; it is not his program. It is not the program of a legislative majority. It is a program resulting from a series of individual, ad hoc majorities, each pursuing its own policy on each particular issue as it arises. (Cutler, in AEI Forum, 1980:5)

Consequently, Cutler argued, when failure came we had no one to hold accountable. Neither the president or the majority of the Congress could be fairly blamed, because they did not have any particular program of their own. In order to overcome this basic problem of American government
he suggested a series of reform proposals which adopted some institutional arrangement similar to the parliamentary system.

Since the doctrine of the separation of powers originally grew out of a fear of tyranny rather than a design for a more workable governmental structure, its efficiency is truly not satisfied in real political practice. Even in the United States the need to promote efficiency has brought up more and more administrative bureaus and committees which recombine the legislative and executive powers within bureaucratic authority. Nowadays, many Chinese democrats share the same feeling of the fear of tyranny as the founding fathers of the United States did two hundred years ago. In their political programs the principle of separation of powers has been highly emphasized without critical examination. Then what lessons the Chinese democrats can learn from the Americans? First, we are not going to deny the separation of powers as a basic democratic principle, because even in the parliamentary system it is partly satisfied. Second, we cannot simply follow the American model of separation of three powers. Third, we may set up a governmental structure similar to the parliamentary system. The third option should be more convenient for China’s transition from its existing socialist parliamentary system to a new democratic parliamentary system.
Socialist democracy follows the form of the parliamentary system, however, under its unique character of one party dictatorship. The structure of the government is explained by Furtak as follows:

According to the constitutions of the socialist states all state power resides within the representative bodies at each level of the state organization. The executive and judicial branches of government are not part of an institutionalized system of separation of powers but are considered as merely auxiliary functional organs of the representative assemblies which exercise undivided, though only formal, power. That is why the constitutions do not regulate the relationship between the single branch of government in the manner of checks and balances. (Furtak, 1986:13)

Although it seems to be a parliamentary system, the real function of the socialist parliament is different from that of the Western democratic parliamentary system. It is more like a "rubber stamp" to ratify the ruling party’s programs.

Richard Gripp in his The Political System of Communism thus describes the functions of the socialist parliament:

The functions of the legislature in any communist system are both ostensible and real, the main one being to ratify the programs and policies of the regime (as spelled out in detail by the central party and governmental-executive apparatus). The legislature thus performs for the regime a legitimating supporting function. By means of nationwide elections, the legislature’s task is to formally commit the nation’s citizens to the goals, policies, and leadership of the regime. (Gripp, 1973:58)
According to Gripp, besides the main function of the legislature to ratify and legitimate the programs of the communist party, a secondary function is to provide a level of popular representation in the political system for the nation’s citizens.

Since the nature of Chinese socialist democracy is "proletarian dictatorship," in order to transfer a socialist parliamentary system to a democratic parliamentary system this dictatorial nature has to be denied. In other words, non-competitive elections, one party domination, lack of institutional and responsible opposition, illegal dissent, censorship over speech and press, deprivation of civil rights—all of these characteristics have to be dismissed so that a democratic parliamentary system can be established in China.

More specifically, a democratic parliamentary system should be established in accordance with certain institutions of a representative government, which is classified by Robert Dahl as a "polyarchy." There are seven institutions of polyarchy:

1. Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.

2. Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
3. Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the rights to vote in the election of officials.

4. Right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government . . .

5. Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the dander of severe punishment on political matter broadly defined . . .

6. Alternative information. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.

7. Associational autonomy . . . Citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. (Dahl, 1989:221)

According to Dahl, all the institutions of polyarchy are necessary to satisfy the attainment of the democratic process, which includes voting equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion. Dahl’s theory of polyarchy and democratic process adds a substantive meaning to a democratic representative government that is not emphasized by Schumpeter’s approach. In this sense, Dahl’s theory should be considered as a supplement to Schumpeter’s approach to form a democratic parliamentary government in which a fair way of translating votes into representation may be obtained.
Political Freedom and Civil Rights

With the combination of Schumpeter's theory of democratic method and Dahl's theory of polyarchy and democratic process, the writer wishes to further emphasize the importance of political freedom and civil rights in a democratic society. As a matter of fact, the Schumpeterian approach also implies that political freedom and civil rights are the prerequisites of the free competition for the free vote. Martin Edelman argued:

Schumpeter had defined democracy as the "free competition for the free vote." If political leaders are to compete for public support they need the freedom to communicate with the public. Because everyone is formally free to compete for political leadership by campaigning for office, the system requires a significant amount of free speech for individual citizens. Similarly, if the decision of the electorate is to be meaningful, the people cannot be coerced. (Edelman, 1984:63)

According to Edelman, the connection between democracy and freedom is very clear in Schumpeter's definition. The positive advantage of Schumpeter's definition is that: "This defense of democracy was not based upon faith in transcendental values; it relies only on the close logical and functional necessary for personal liberty in a system built around free competition for the free vote" (Edelman, 1984:64). In this sense, how to protect individual liberty and to translate votes into representation in a fair way becomes the most important task for a democratic society.
Individual liberty includes political freedom and various civil rights. As has been mentioned before, under the system of Chinese socialist democracy, those concepts of freedom and civil rights have been dismissed for decades. Recently, with the rise of the pro-democracy movement, the people's demands for freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, legalized political opposition, and the rule of law are the recovery of people's consciousness of freedom and human rights. Especially, those demands have embodied themselves in the return of civil society in China as well as in other socialist states.

Civil society is a form in which the people can maintain some freedom for themselves without the state's intervention. Therefore, many political scientists think that the return of civil society is the prerequisite for democratization happening in the socialist states. A free civil society can provide a guarantee against the totalitarianism of the state.

In the socialist countries the communist party used to penetrate into all the social spheres, all organizations of workers, peasants, students, women, youth, culture, religion, and other professions. The ordinary lives of the people were strictly under state control. Therefore, the struggle for freedom by those people always took the form of seeking for an independent civil society against the state.
According to Manfred Henningsen, the return of civil society in the socialist states indicated the awakening of human agency after the long dark age of the tutelage of the totalitarian state. In his paper "Democracy or the Promise of 'Civil Society,'" Henningsen points out the meaning of the opposition of the dissidents in these countries:

The opposition of the dissidents against the self-selected cadre elites of state socialism was not only motivated by the absence or malfunctioning of an economic system that promises the satisfactory delivery of basic goods and services to society. They rebelled against the dictatorial and oligarchical pattern of politics which had been implemented immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The dissidents of state socialism were engaged in the recovery of politics in its original Greek sense. Through acts of resistance and rebellion against the tutelage of the cadre state they reclaimed the public realm of society, the polis, for human agency. Their vision of politics, however, was guarded against the arrogance of speculative goals. The speculative temptations of either the old radicalism or the new conservatism were looming large. A spiritual commitment to an ethics of common sense seems to temper many of the dissident visionaries. (Henningsen, 1990:5)

To support this mode of reflection, Henningsen refers to Vaclav Havel's speech that his presidential program was to bring spirituality, moral responsibility, humaneness, and humility into politics. For this reason, the transformation from a socialist country to a democratic and liberal one depends on the "return of civil society." The changes happening in Eastern Europe have demonstrated this reality. Henningsen regards the perspective of democratization in the
socialist state as "the promise of civil society" and predicates "civil society as new polis" for the future formation of human society. (Henningsen, 1990:5-25)

Just as Henningsen argued in his paper, the return of civil society in the modern totalitarian regime is not only the result of economic discontent but also of human spiritual needs and common sense. The unwillingness to be treated as children or slaves of the state and the demand for freedom and civil rights are the core motivation of the rebirth of modern civil society under the dictatorial regime.

The pro-democracy movement emerging in China can also be understood in perspective. For years the demands for freedom of speech, freedom of academic research, freedom of press and freedom of assembly have been the main slogans of the Chinese pro-democracy movement. Since the 1978 Democracy-Wall movement unofficial publications and underground organizations struggled to let the society hear different voices. The 1989 Democracy Movement was a large-scale movement of civil disobedience led by the independent organizations of students, intellectuals, and workers. Those organizations earnestly sought a dialogue with the government on an equal footing. The declaration of martial law by the government expressed the serious tension between the state and reborn civil society in contemporary China. In this perspective, China's further democratization largely
depends on the development and growth to maturity of a free civil society. The independent organizations of different social strata should be encouraged in order that the force of political opposition may obtain their broad support from society. With the growth of civil society and the insurance of political freedom, a fair way to translate votes into a democratic representative government will become more attainable.

**Equality and Economic System**

Furthermore, as discussed earlier, political freedom and civil rights alone are not sufficient to resolve the problem of equality. Freedom for those of unequal resources inevitably leads to domination by those with more. To pursue a democratic society for China, an appropriate economic system that aims at a relatively equal distribution of resources should also be concerned. A desirable economic system is one which can provide the condition for productive efficiency and distributive equality, and which is also compatible with political democracy. Socialist democracy tries to realize its principle of equality but lacks productive efficiency and political liberty; whereas liberal democracy provides political liberty but lacks economic equality. Neither is satisfactory as a system to overcome the tension between liberty and equality, positive freedom, and negative freedom.
In this perspective, the economic system of social democracy may be considered as a third alternative for China’s future. China should pursue an economic system in which both public and private ownership coexist, market mechanism and state intervention cooperate, and attention is paid to both individual interests and social interests based on a just distribution.

As seen in Chapter II, Swedish functional socialization is a relatively successful way to resolve the conflict between private interests and the demands of society at large. The Swedish government does not carry out a policy of total socialization of ownership, but regulates a number of the most important functions of private ownership, thus limiting the rights of the owners of the means of production to use their goods in an unsocial manner. The economic reform taking place in China will surely carry out further privatization of property. In order to avoid the polarization of the rich and poor, a policy of functional socialization should be adopted to regulate the distribution of social wealth.

Furthermore, the policy of functional socialization also provides a means for checks and balances of economic power. Adler-Karlsson thus argues:

It enables us to realize that division of power which is so eagerly desired. When ownership is considered as an indivisible concept, only one owner can be imagined. But when ownership is considered as consisting of a number of functions, these
can be divided between different subjects or "partial" owners. When this is done the balance of power in the economic field can be retained, and the temptation to abuse too great a power concentration can be checked. With the help of functional socialism we have avoided big clashes inside the society. We have guided its development in a generally acceptable way for non-doctrine socialists, and at the same time we have been able to maintain the important driving spirit of any economy given by the private entrepreneurs. (Adler-Karlsson, 1970:16)

In China's context, the theory of functional socialization may also provide a theoretical guidance for China's economic reform. In China's ten-year economic reform, no solid theory has been adopted as guidance. The only theory promoted by the reformers is the "primitive stage of socialism." This theory has been used as the legitimate reason for privatization of some sections of the economy. They hold that during this stage private and market economy are still necessary. Nevertheless, it implies that at the advanced stage of socialism no private and market economy are needed. Since China has already reached the stage of holding a highly publicly owned and planned economy, why should it come back from an advanced stage to a primitive stage? This theory is so weak that it gives conservatives a reason to attack the reformers by arguing that they are restoring capitalism in socialist China. If the reformers can use the theory of "functional socialism," it would sound more reasonable to privatize the economy under the model of a mixed economy. There would be
no questions about the contradiction between the primitive stage and the advanced stage. At the time of privatization, the government could interfere with the market through legal regulations such as taxation and monetary policies to achieve productive efficiency and distributive equality. Therefore, the theory of functional socialization is very useful for China's economic reform movement.

Epilogue

As we went through the three models of democracy by discussing their advantages and flaws in political, economic and social aspects, we found that no absolutely ideal form of democracy exists in the real world. However, their role in China's democratization in the future is profound. Especially, the heritage of socialism will exist in China for a long time. The collapse of state socialism around the world signifies neither a final victory of liberal democracy nor an end of searching for the basic values of socialism. Considering the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, Hilary Wainwright argued:

The crisis of socialism is not the result of any exhaustion of the desire for social justice. It is rather the product of the failure of state institutions—the institutions historically associated with socialism—to bring social justice about and bring it about under the rule of the people . . . Socialism has historically associated the goal of social justice with the use of state power by the working class and or its representatives. The viability of these means are at a turning point, not the values
Wainwright is right that the failure of the existing socialist system does not mean the end of the pursuit of equality and social justice. In this sense, socialism is not incompatible with democracy. The problem lies in its historically associated "viability." Actually, socialism and liberalism originally shared the same goals of human emancipation and the values of equality and social justice. The question is how to develop those core values under a new historical situation. In this perspective, besides the heritage of socialism, as Manfred Henningsen argued, the "agency-empowering achievements" of the "liberal-bourgeois revolution" remains important for seeking democracy:

The manifestations of the spirit of democracy around the world indicate how essential the first liberal-bourgeois revolutions have been in empowering human agency. They spelled out the catalogues of human and civil rights essential for any polity based on democratic participation. (Henningsen, 1989:328)

According to Henningsen, those achievements included: "a written constitution, the catalogues of human and civil rights, democratic legitimation of representative government, separation of state and institutional religion, acceptance of political opposition and dissent, an independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances and equality before the law" (Henningsen, 1989:335). Historical experience has shown that those liberal achievements could
be regarded as important aspects of democracy. In addition, democratic socialism embodied in the model of social democracy has also become a positive experience for the Chinese to learn, especially, its economic system.

As the Chinese people seek democracy, they should carefully learn both positive and negative lessons from the existing models of democracy, so that they not repeat their failures. The author hopes that his interpretation of democracy may provide some references for the Chinese people in their process towards democracy in the future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


