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North-South Korean reunification policies (1988–1991), options, and models

Lee, Hun Kyung, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii, 1992

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NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN REUNIFICATION
POLICIES (1988-1991), OPTIONS, AND MODELS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE
MAY 1992

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is first of all deeply grateful to the members of my doctoral committee: Dr. Richard Chadwick, Dr. Douglas Bwy, Dr. Carolyn Stephenson, Dr. Farideh Farhi, and Dr. Choe Yong-Ho, all of whom provided valuable support and aid in this project and my academic work in political science for the past few years. I also would like to thank Dr. Fred Riggs and Dr. Everett Kleinjans for their comments and advice on my dissertation. In particular, I wish to acknowledge with deepest appreciation Dr. Chadwick who has encouraged me and given me assistance and advice during throughout my doctoral program.

I am also thankful to numerous individuals and institutions in Korea and the United States who provided me with information and data on unification, and gave me assistance in polishing and refining this manuscript. Especially, I would like to offer my thanks to the staff of the National Unification Board; Prof. Denny Freese of Hawaii Pacific University; Mr. Park Hee Joo, Vice President of Tetra Pak Korea Ltd.; my friends, Craig Mulling and Chang Mi Kyung.

A special thanks is extended to my lovely wife, Kim Mi Eon, who has encouraged and supported me with her whole heart; to my parents, as well as my father-in-law and mother-in-law who through their prayers, gave me the long-term support I
needed to successfully complete my studies; to my lovely boy, Richard Lee, who simply acts cute and smiles all the time.

Thanks to all of whose assistance allowed me to complete this project. Without their support, patience, and love, this dissertation may not have been possible. To each and everyone, named and unnamed, I am thankful.
This dissertation is concerned with how to achieve peaceful unification of Korea. The thesis begins with a traditional use of integration and political realist theories to interpret past and current alternatives to North-South Korean relations in much the same way integration theory has been used to evaluate possibilities for western Europe. Components of various integration theories (federalism, pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism) are employed, none of which fully apply to the case of divided Korea, but all of which provide a theoretical contribution and framework for Korean unification.

This study analyzes the contemporary and contradictory unification strategies of the two rival Koreas during the years of 1988-1991. Unification policies and models of South Korea are explained in terms of the functionalist approach, and those of North Korea with the federalist one. Neo-functionalism and pluralism are used to create an alternative to these two contradictory strategies and a solution to the dilemmas they create.

Based on the review of integration and realist theory, a tentative construction and interpretation of alternative futures for North and South Korea is undertaken. An evaluation of the reconstructed and interpreted alternatives is done in terms of support for or opposition to them found in
contemporary empirical data from Korean public opinion surveys, Korean leaders' policies, and major powers' policies.

Using data for 1988-1991, I found that policies most accepted by the public were the "low politics" related to Korean unification, specifically, policies related to humanitarian, cultural, and economic concerns. Most public rejection was aimed at "high politics" focusing on military and security matters which are perceived as alternatives opposed to the "low politics" options.

A problem emerged: integration theories did not yield a complete or coherent perspective. Both the theoretical evaluation and the data suggested only conflicting perspectives in public opinion and policy alternatives. A Korean "problematique" emerged which required a new approach transcending and encompassing both theory and contemporary policy perspectives.

My solution was to reconstruct integration and political realist theories via Maslow's basic needs theory. Upon analysis, each theory turned out to focus principally on a different basic need, so the theories were shown to be complementary rather than contradictory. Each works on a problem peripheral to or unexamined by the other. So the policy problem became one of fitting together the components of a solution rather than of selecting among incomplete and ultimately unsatisfactory solutions.
The integration via Maslow required a methodology by which to contain a new, more comprehensive perspective than any one of the integration or realist theories. A number of complementary perspectives are employed for this purpose. First, Gueztkow's Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) theory and Coplin's "PRINCE" models are employed to logically reconstruct the unification problem. Deutsch's "pluralistic security community" concept is also used. These three frameworks encompass all of Maslow's basic needs, and through those needs, the problems raised by each of the integration and political realist theories are addressed. The policy choices thus arrived at form a complex multi-valued or "multi-criteria" problematique or problem-complex.

The final integration of this complex of alternatives and decision criteria is achieved through Thomas Saaty's "analytic hierarchy process" technique, which forms the basis for the normative conclusion of the thesis, namely, that integration can proceed first by adopting either the functionalist or neo-functionalist policy recommendations, depending on the acceptability of each to the Korean governments (thus meeting "survival" or basic needs in Maslow's sense). This should be followed by the establishment of pluralistic security community to win public support ("affiliation needs" in Maslow's sense). Third, federalist policies should be initiated to promote political unification (meeting "self-esteem" needs in Maslow's sense). "Balance of power"
and "neutralization" theory are modeled as a "federalist" solution for political unification. Finally, democratic and Confucian philosophy are employed to inspire national unification (meeting "self-actualization" needs in Maslow's sense).
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is concerned with how to achieve peaceful unification of Korea. Unification of Korea is defined here as the merging of the two divided entities into one nation-state under one government and one legal system which has supreme power for administration, legislation, and jurisdiction under one economy and one political system. Korea is still divided by a mutual "devil mirror image" and is in a state of war under the present international security regime. This conflict situation is by no means helpful to inter-Korean development and unification, because it implies a zero-sum logic in which unification harms one side in equal proportion to helping the other. This dissertation does not accept zero-sum logic, but instead seeks a resolution to the conflict in conformity with non-zero sum logic in which all participants in the conflict can in reality live and prosper together without losing their authority.

Even today, deep hatred with mutual fear and misgiving between the two Korean peoples is deeply ingrained. Ideological and systemic differences have also been the cause of heightened hostility and high tension. The 155-mile long Demilitarized Zone between North and South is one of the most heavily fortified and dangerous spots in the world, with the largest and most powerful armed forces in the world having 1,500,000 armed combat personnel behind concrete bunkers and
barbed wire diametrically facing each other. It became a symbol of the Cold War as did the Berlin Wall for Europe along with armed confrontations and sporadic incidents.

The national division, the Korean War, and the resultant inter-Korean conflicts originated in complicated circumstances entangled both internally and externally. The division, war, and subsequent conflicts have compounded the prior problems by creating deep changes in the land and pushing the two Koreas to go their separate ways. No doubt these changes have misdirected the lives of all the Korean people in all related areas. Politically, the regimes of the two Republics, taking advantage of the emphasis on the security issue, have brought about extreme totalitarianism in the North and authoritarianism in South, to the frustration and alienation of Korea's poor. A sense of oppression arising from the conflict between them has also produced a high level of tension between the people and the ideology-led culture of Korea's elites on both sides of the DMZ. Ideologically, they have lived under two totally different ideologies--"Western-style democracy" in the South and "Communism" in the North--for over four decades, and as a result have become incompatible with each other.

Socially and culturally, the societies of the two divided Koreas have also become much more estranged from each other than they used to be. The cultural homogeneity of the Korean people, which Koreans had managed to keep through several thousand years of history, has been severely eroded. It is in
these circumstances that integration theory was turned to as a body of literature out of which might emerge a strategy for at least reversing the disintegration of Korea and hopefully suggesting strategies for its reunification.

Economically, the Korean division is perpetually at the root of bitter troubles, and the high level of tensions overwhelmingly hinders national development. The divided condition has made the two Koreas more dependent upon the major allies, always shaping their policies with a view towards obtaining financial and technological aid for economic development. It has also either hampered or postponed national development because both Koreas have allotted a large portion of their GNP to the upkeep and fortification of their military forces. The economy of the North has been in stagnation especially as a result of its exorbitant military spending. All of these chronic problems in socio-cultural, economic, and military areas, as well as those created by the existence of different types of political systems and ideologies growing out of the national tragedy of division, call for settlement.

The starting point of the dissertation (Part I) is an account of the major dynamics of integration. It consists first of a literature review and analysis of integration theories after setting an historical context for application to the case of a divided Korea. Chapter 1 deals with the nature of integration—human efforts for integration, the
definition of integration, and integrative factors. Chapter 2 mostly discusses integration patterns, paradigms, models, and community-building from Nye, Galtung, Etzioni, and Deutsch. In Chapters 3 and 4, conceptual frameworks of the predominant integration theories will be analyzed, and applied to Korea.

All of them provide reasonable theoretical and logical rationales for unification processes, and hold out the expectation of increased total benefits to participants in integration. The theories of two functionalist schools are evaluated in terms of their ability gradually to enhance inter-Korean relations in non-political areas. The pluralist paradigm focuses on peace and security enhancing processes, calling for increased communication and transactions in the Korean peninsula. The federalist design, by contrast, points to structure rather than process, to the establishment of common institutions such as a common parliamentary system, a common judicial system, and a common defense system. Each theoretical approach has its own implications for the sort of tactics which are viewed to be proper in providing practical methods for seeking Korean integration.

Part II reviews current unification policies in connection with the major integration theories and the two conflicting governments' ideas, formulae or models for unification. Chapter 5 explores the pattern of relations between North and South Korea. Before the two entities
inaugurated a new era in 1988, North Korea had been more active on the issue of unification, using the political slogan, "unification is imperative," while South Korea acted under the slogan of "peace first, unification later." In the aftermath of the successful 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, South Korea appeared as a major national actor in the international arena, while North Korea sulked in isolated Pyongyang. Thus Seoul got the initiative on unification. In harmony with the international political tide, North Korea began to revise its unification policy and to show a seemingly warmer attitude to South Korea and the Western countries. Since 1991, North Korea has been led by South Korea's outstanding economic achievements and considerable national (or political) self-confidence, and by South Korea's move from a peripheral to a central position in the international community. South Korea confidently led the crucial pursuit of a more responsible security partnership with the United States. It also led the development of positive economic and diplomatic links with the Soviet Union and most of the European Communist countries, and established business-like relations with China (Seoul's notable "Northern Policy").

The Seoul government has insisted in principle on gradual non-political and functionalist approaches to reunification, while North Korea has been adhering to a federal plan espousing confederalism for the foundation of a common government. The discrepancies between these unification
schemes has created a dilemma which is still under discussion today. Two other integration theories--pluralism and neo-functionalism--are occasionally suggested as alternative strategies to resolve this dilemma, but require development by academics exploring integration, hence are also explored here.

Chapter 6 lays out the unification formulas and models of the two Koreas since 1988. This attempt may be the first of its kind. Basically, the unification strategies of the two Koreas have progressed with two different models. One is the South Korean 1988 model of "the Korean Commonwealth" (KC), and the other, the North Korean 1991 model of the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" (DCRK). In a strict sense, the KC is a process model which is based on functionalist basis, and values highly unification process which pursues an easy issue such as exchange and cooperation at a lower level. The DCRK is a structure (or a higher level of integration) model, espousing federalist scheme whose emphasis is on political solution, at first, and progress of economic, cultural, and social exchanges, second. The KC (one nation, two systems) model is not only different from the DCRK (one nation-two autonomous regions) but also from the German model (formerly, one nation, two states) and that of Vietnam (two regimes, one state).

Regarding source materials for Part II, a voluminous literature on integration has provided the conceptual raw material to be applied to the reintegration of Korea. Books,
journals, magazines published in North and South Korea and the
U.S., and major newspapers (from South Korea, North Korea, the
U.S., Hong Kong, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, France,
West Germany) have been extensively collected and used for the
investigation and evaluation of unification policies and
models for the integration of the two Koreas.

As far as official unification policies of South Korea
are concerned, sources of primary importance in this
dissertation are written government publications and documents
from the National Unification Board, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Culture and
Information, and the Korea Overseas Information Service.
Furthermore, not only articles and monographs from government
supported research centers and some universities, and major
newspapers' reports, but also speeches, reports, and writings
of President Roh Tae Woo are very helpful and worthwhile to
understand unification policies.

From North Korea, speeches, reports, and writings of
President Kim Il Sung, are also valuable sources of
information. Other useful North Korean source materials
contain various official publications and reports of the
Korean Workers Party (KWP) and particularly selected articles
and editorials of the organ of the Central Committee, Rodong
Shinmun (Labor News), and the monthly journal of the KWP, The
Pyongyang Times, Kulloja (the Worker).
As mentioned earlier the period of time covered by this dissertation is 1988-1991. On the whole, focusing on this time period avoids the bygone issues of Korean unification which a number of researchers have in the past promulgated both internally and externally. The international order has changed to one of multi-polarization, and has begun a global trend towards detente with rapprochement of U.S.-Russia and Sino-Russia relations. Immediately after Seoul successfully hosted the 1988 Olympics with a spirit of "harmony and progress," the internal and external milieu around the peninsula changed remarkably, inaugurating a new era by favoring revision of the status quo. More than anything else, a predominant catalyst for transformation arose in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and his intrepid twin policies of perestroika (reactionary reform) and glasnost (openness).

Part III discusses empirical data on public opinion related to integration. Our concern will be concentrated on reviewing public opinion and options, and the public participation in the integration process. It will be contended that peaceful unification can be successfully achieved only through democratic processes, in both Koreas, in order that both benefit from the results of unification. South Koreans began to participate in the process through public discussions via mass media; North Koreans have not had a similar opportunity for public debate. It is obvious that
the current Seoul government, at minimum, listens to people's opinions in its determination of public policy with respect to unification issues. To the contrary, reliable North Korean sources of information suggest opinions and actions toward unification are very restricted by the Pyongyang leadership. Some explain this by noting that North Koreans have been educated under Communist rule and indoctrination, tightly controlled by the government and the Worker's Party. Freedom of speech on unification has been strictly controlled. Given this situation, therefore, their expressed opinions on unification is always equal to their government's views. It is indeed impossible to predict or to gauge their true opinion on unification.

Chapter 7 reviews public opinion surveys on matters of unification from 1988 to 1991 including both pro- and anti-government options and alternative paths to integration. All the major South Korean newspapers are used (Dong-A Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, Jungang Ilbo, Seoul Shinmun, and Hangyurae Shinmun), government organs (from National Unification Board and Ministry of Culture and Information), Seoul National University, and various private research institutes (from Hankook Gallup Research, Media Research, Suktap Labor Research, Dongsuh Research, and Hyundae Research). Most were random samples of South Korean public opinion in the tradition of Gallup and Roper polls in the USA.
Unfortunately, equivalent North Korean data simply does not exist, so one is obliged to do what one can with the reported views of North Korean leaders on the subject. Of course, there is anecdotal material from North Korean refugees, but it was decided to discount such information since it is highly suspect. In my experience, TV and newspaper accounts from such refugees appear to be uniformly against North Korean policies.

Chapter 7 concludes that public opinion is consisted with and hence likely to be supportive of those theories of integration which see economic interdependence as promoting political unification. In particular economic unification is conceived in both public opinion and the integration literature as a pre-stage to "political" unification. Similarly, political, social, and cultural unification processes are conceived of as a precursor to "national" unification. (In this context, "political" refers to the high politics of integrating the two states' governments into one structure, and "national" refers to the low politics of integrating cultural, social and economic relations among the peoples of the two Koreas.)

Chapter 8 discusses minority views based on public opinion surveys, chiefly concerning politico-military solutions through arms reduction and neutralization of Korea. Whatever the views and ways, all of them deserve attention.
In Part IV, the final objective is to build a Korean unification model. The unification strategies of the North and South are not working practically towards unification. Independent of whether one's design and approach is good, the other views it as bad, and vice versa, but also because both sides' decision-makers have used the dialogue for political advantage for office-holding. It is, in fact, a cold war situation, and the two regime actors directly involved perceive themselves to be in a zero-sum game. More recently, the decision-makers on both sides argued that: we (South Korea) do not want the Vietnamese unification solution—"unification by war"; we (North Korea) do not desire the German unification settlement—"unification by way of one's absorption into the other." For Pyongyang, the decision-makers firmly believe that South Korea is trying to subordinate North Korea by imperialistic means in both political and economic contexts with the help of the U.S. and Japan.

The North Koreans aspire to conserve the way of life presently in the northern half of the peninsula, and are ready and willing to fight to keep their country. Further, Pyongyang will by no means accept reunification by absorption, both economically and politically, for it would be self-evident that it is not reunification with equality; the resulting unified political authority would effectively be under the absolute control of bureaucracies of South Korea.
In a more reasonable way, reunification could be achieved by a more equitable, "coexistence" position. But, in the current circumstances of the two Koreas, we cannot expect that such a path toward unification would be likely, due to the serious economic and military inequality of the North and South.

South Koreans long for a non-Communist unified Korea; North Koreans, that it be Communist. The former, to keep their present way of life, without hesitation would fight to prevent unification led by the Communists. Thus their yearning to retain a non-Communist society in the country is as strong as either to avoid war or to attain unification. In short, each Korea will not accept unification by the other's terms or a war. Because of this logic, the model focuses on peaceful means for unifying a nation.

In Chapter 9, a model is constructed using a normative approach, namely Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs structure--i.e., survival, security, affiliation, self-esteem, and self-actualization. The model is then used for interpreting theories of integration and political realism.

Maslow's thought gives us an opportunity to model Korean reunification step-by-step, with a clear sense of priorities based on human needs satisfaction. Even if unification of a nation ultimately requires a high degree of political skill and sophisticated strategies by the national actors involved in the process, it cannot be achieved successfully without full consideration of basic human needs.
Within Maslow's framework, the remaining chapters (10, 11, 12, 13) of the volume focus upon how unification can be attained. The most significant effort of Chapter 10 lies in an Inter-Korean Simulation (IKS) based on Harold Guetzkow's Inter-Nation Simulation model as a projection device, i.e., for "contingent forecasting." Both long-term and short-term futures are explored with the expectation that "real" political decision-makers can play influential roles in solving human basic needs--specifically, satisfying needs for improving consumption standards, national security, and political stability.

In Chapter 11, under the assumption that both Koreas' survival and security needs are fully satisfied, the IKS model is designed represent a "pluralistic security community" (PSC) as elaborated by Karl Deutsch and his followers, and as such is an alternative to the "two Koreas models," that is, "the Korean Commonwealth" (KC) and the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" (DCRK) as interim models of the ultimate reunification. Thus the IKS is intended to represent an effective mechanism for peace and security through affiliation following Maslow of the two Koreas.

Chapter 12 is a decision-making simulation game of achieving national unity, using the PRINCE ("Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute," programmed by William Coplin and others) format. It also lays the groundwork for construction of a model of political unification based in part on balance of
power doctrine, which is intimately related to federalist strategy. In that Korean unification actually includes both intra- and international matters, its achievement necessarily demands a process involving decision-makers in all the powers concerned with the Korean affairs. The ultimate goal in the IKS model is the establishment of a federation of Korea. Similar to a four power simulation game, wherein the powers concerned do not break the balance of power system or status quo in the peninsula, the idea of neutralization of Korea prior to a federation is designed into the model.

Chapter 13 is concerned with a multicriteria decision making approach for Korean unification in which various factors are arranged in a hierarchic structure, breaking down a complex problem into its component parts, using Thomas Saaty's "analytic hierarchy processing" (AHP) technique.

The Korean situation combines both internal and international politics; in both, real world circumstances have not actually been working toward solving the Korean question. Internationally, the two Koreas have diametrically opposed each other ever since their division occurred with the participation of their central decision-makers under the political slogan, ironically, of "unification is the supreme national task." The issue of reunification has, in fact, been dealt with as "the highest political purpose" in order for decision-makers in both parts of the peninsula to assure themselves of continuous office-holding. Actually, more than
anyone else, the full achievement of reunification is the dream of 11 million ordinary people living separated in North and South Korea for two generations.

In the IKS unification approach, in its theory and in its practice, the methods used would be both deductive and inductive. In the IKS's operation, we bring a set of hypotheses and assumptions from the various theoretical perspectives of integration and realist thought to decision making simulation for Korean unification.

A number of complementary perspectives are employed for the normative conclusion of the thesis. First, Guetzkow's INS is applied for the first two factors aimed at the two Koreas' survival and security, and provides the national conditions for Korean unification. For the third factor affiliation, Deutsch's design for a PSC offers us a theoretical and practical alternative to the two Koreas' 10-20 years intermediate models of reunification. For the fourth, following Deutsch, based on mutual self-esteem, the two political units can be consolidated into one single but larger international unit. Coplin's PRINCE model is employed to logically reconstruct the unification problem along Deutsch's lines, to suggest a decision-making process for Korean unification. Saaty's AHP technique provides a process for organizing an overall plan and a strategy synthesizing all of the outcomes from preferences expressed by people. Therefore, Guetzkow's, Deutsch's, Coplin's, and Saaty's frameworks are
used to represent Maslow's basic needs and through these needs each of the problems addressed by each of the integration and political realist theories. Finally, democratic and Confucian philosophy are employed to inspire national unification, meeting Maslow's 5th needs, "self-actualization."
PART I

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION TO POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The primary concern of this part is about how integration takes place, with the restructuring of the international political system and the establishment of new political forms from a system of sovereign nations. Integration is an activity which occurs at the international or regional level among national units whose attempt is at perceiving how and why integration would be successful\facilitated, or be failing\obstructed. On the contrary, Haas, Deutsch, Etzioni, and others claim that integration happens at a transnational level with the expectation of relations and transactions across national borders and of the role of a variety of non-state actors--individuals, elites and interest groups.

In Chapter 1, defining the term, variables, and various type of integrations are the introductory attention. First of all, different writers on integration were confusing in defining the term integration. Following the definition in his (or her) terms, there are those who have been interested in integration process and have devoted and engaged in finding other phenomena associated with international movements, and in deciding integrative independent variables that can appear to affect integration. Such variables have been mostly tested by the European experience. It thus has led to the doubting of a number of the elemental propositions of international integration theory in applying it into other regions.

In conjunction with the conceived various levels of integration definition, our ensuing attention in Chapter 2
will be greatly attached to delineating what are the integration paradigm, model, and community-building of some outstanding integration theorists. These have also different variables and conditions.

In the following two chapters, much attention is also given to describing and analyzing the classic approaches—federalism, pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism—to integration. Each of them expresses a view that political integration has been directed to a great extent in some way either directly by political decisions, or indirectly by changes in social and economic conditions and relations. This is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theoretical Approaches to Integration

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Based on integrative process, Chapter 3 is designed to illustrate federalism and pluralism, and Chapter 4, two leading theories of gradualist integration among states—functionalism and neo-functionalism. Over time, all with the
exception of functionalism have been developed for the attainment of "positive peace" which implies the integration of nation-states at regional or global level in a non-violent sense with political and economic determinism.

With special attention on and wish for the Korean integration, the efforts will concentrate upon reviewing the overall theoretical contribution to integration, which has been remarkably developed by the European process toward peace and integration since men suffered from bitter experience in two world wars.
CHAPTER 1
NATURE OF INTEGRATION

I. HUMAN EFFORTS FOR INTEGRATION

At what level, the primary schemes of integration theories orient mostly toward peace-building and stability in a modern history. Earlier human attempts for integration can be found in the propositions of consolidation, empire-building, and federation. But, the men's efforts for the attainment of institutionalized peace or integration have been initiated after devastation by two internecine world wars. Furthermore and more precisely, the depending upon the means of war (or use of force), the appeal to diplomacy, and even the constitution of various international organizations, i.e., the United Nations, were being doubted as workable and substantial mechanisms for continually keeping hard-earned peace. Their efforts for peace-building and -keeping have continued to avoid conflict and war between states through associative (bringing them together cooperatively) rather than dissociative (keeping them apart through balance of power/terror, deterrence) structures. Hence some of the theories about integration, though the theoretical approach of integration and peace is certainly different to the degree of the level of focus, have appeared for the attainment of a positive peace (bringing people and nations together in a peaceful
means) as an alternative solution to the maintenance of a
negative peace (preventing or avoiding wars of belligerence).

In more recent years, the human efforts for integration
have been focused upon finding solutions of the political and
economic problems still existing in the world. A number of
scholars including economists, functionalists, and neo-
functionalists talk about economic integration. Kitamura
remarks that "regional economic integration implies a
broadening of the regional market and a reduction in the
country's or the region's dependence on trade with the outside
world at least in relative terms, that is, as compared with
the situation likely to prevail in the absence of integra-
tion." Bela Balassa also insists on the economic integration
under the assumption that it would remove intra-regional trade
barriers as well as various forms of discrimination between
economic units of national states. The five forms of Balassa,
which economic integration may take are: a free trade area,
a customs union, a common market, an economic union and a
total economic integration.

On this point, integration is conceived as "the creation
of the most desirable structure of international economy,
removing artificial hindrances to the optimal operation, and
introducing deliberately all desirable elements of coor-
dination and unification." As a rule, economists and
functionalists tend to view integration and the processes, in
formal and structural concepts like the progression from a
free trade area to an economic union. At some point, especially to the neo-functionalists, the principal consideration of this theme is political integration, which internal or international actors have unequivocal political motivations for achieving integration.

It is also worth while to explore the links between political and economic integration. In the conceptual view, the economic integration refers to the integration of intra-regional economic systems for economic objectives. The motives of the actors are not directly toward the political, and even they do not wish a ramification (or spillover) effect into political areas. Louis McCall, however, has another view that "economic integration contains political involvement for the actors." Likewise Michael Dolan maintains that "economic integration is a result of political decisions to integrate." It is my belief, in sharing a neo-functionalist view, that economic integration involves political implication in a sense that the actors would utilize first economic measures to reach political ends, for one thing, the recent German unification. In fact, the dichotomy between political and economic integration is not given weight in a sense that any form of integration within an area needs political determination of the component units.

Most of the studies of regional integration have focused upon the area of the Western Europe or the North Atlantic, in which the principal incentive, from the start, was directed
toward the attainment of the negative peace. However, the works of the different geographical zones—less industrialized areas (or the Third World)—have a different emphasis and often found the existing theoretical notions of finite use outside the European context. The chief incentive in those countries has been centered upon the achievement of economic rather than political integration. They largely desire for joining together the markets of these countries for the economic benefits. In theory, the contention for economic integration seems to be reasonable; but in practice, the outcomes of integration efforts in the region have been intermixed, both politically and economically.

II. WHAT IS INTEGRATION? DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM

In defining the term of integration, in the first place, there should be a distinction between the terms of political unification and political integration. In the most general sense, the term, "unification" simply implies the linking of divided territory and/or population by means of political acts of will. The term, "integration" relates to free-will and nonviolent creation of a new political system by transforming the several political units into a single territorial unit and by the establishment of a national identity with same administrative, socio-economic, and political system through conscious political determination. The term, "integration" more than "unification," thus covers a vast range of human
relationships and attitudes—the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality; the integration of political units into a common territorial framework with a government which can exercise authority; the integration of the rulers, and the ruled; the integration of the citizen into a common political process; and, finally, the integration of individuals into organizations for purposive activities. Another term, national integration or nation-building implies "a comprehensive process in which a society achieves social integration, cultural consolidation, and political unification." In general, there is a common agreement on the notion of unification, but not found in that of integration. Different scholars define integration differently. For the students of integration engaged in inquiring into Mitrany's works, their attention defining the term "integration" is different to the degree of the level of focus. And some of them make attempt at defining it by applying system theory to integration. It is viewed within framework of system with the expectation of the growth of interdependence and interaction among the separate political units at international level.

Leon Lindberg defines political integration as evolution of a collective decision-making system. Placing great importance on the creating of interdependence in an international system, Joseph Nye simply defines integration as "peace by
pieces" on a functionalist basis, and more precise definition which is nearly identical with that of the dictionary is, in most general terms, "making whole out of part." It is broadly accepted as representing a universal description of integration. Robert Keohane agrees on this view. Additionally, Ernst Haas highly espousing integration as a process envisages of integration as "referring exclusively to a process that links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future concrete system." Of crucial importance here is that the modern inter-nation state weighs a continuity of the growth of interaction and interdependence through their active participation in international organizations or other institutions.

However, as the definition of the term "integration" itself within the framework of international system contains different meanings by which scholars have talked past each other, the common usage of the term "integration" is confusing over and over. In the next, some of the definitions will be represented by the degree of level of focus.

Integration as a terminal condition or a process

Some writers have no consensus and have still intricacy in defining the term integration, for its conceptualization has been defined differently in terms of the degree to which they interpret and understand. There are, presumably, various degrees or levels of integration (as a condition) or various
stages of integration (as a process). Others, as adding a third definition, consider it as the combination of the two.

In general, integration as a terminal condition is said to be the keeping of state of being after unification—the "condition of being integrated." In particular, Amitai Etzioni regards the high level of integration as an end, not the means of reaching the end. He plainly distinguishes between political unification and political integration; the former is seen as a process, and the latter as a condition after the former is completely achieved. The end-product (political integration) is conceived that a community would be successfully formed not simply when it possesses self-sufficient integrative mechanism, but also when the maintenance of its being is constant.

Etzioni does not see that increasing or strengthening the ties among the member states which constitute a system at a level beyond the nation-state conduct to the formation of a political community. Here a political community is a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may "delegate" some of this control to member-units); (b) it has a center of a decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; and (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens. He continues: "A political
community is thus a state, an administrative-economic unit, and a focal point of identification."

Such a view of integration as a condition has been criticized because it permits only a general discussion of the environmental factors influencing integration, and that it fails to provide us with the tools needed to make a clear distinction between the situation prior to integration and the situation prevailing during the process, thus obscuring the role of social change. Integration as a process is thus developed by analyzing preconditions conducive and favorable to integration. Ever since David Mitrany pictured integration as a process by which political communities become integrated through his famous doctrine of ramification, the efforts have been concentrated on finding the major activities that are best/beneficial or worst/obstructive for integration.

Likewise, Karl Deutsch in Political Community and the North Atlantic Area views integration as a condition as a result of a process. His view on integration leads to Jacob and Teune's definition in which integration is both a process and a terminal condition. Dominant to Deutsch's conclusion mostly refers to the condition for the formation of "sense of community" and "security community" (either amalgamated or pluralistic) to be viewed integration state (or conflict resolution), and integration is actually realized "when the states concerned cease to prepare for war against each other." To some degree Deutsch's belief is associated with
Etzioni's account in that it is integrated when a political community has efficacious control over the use of the means of violence.

Ernst Haas' principal work of the political dynamics in the development of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1958 definitely conceives of political integration not as a condition but as a process for the creation of political communities, defining it as "whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones." 16 Central to Haas' point is the movement of loyalties which includes both demands and support of the separate political units to a new center.

In his later work (1961), Haas restated the integrative process, by saying, "A variety of constitutional and structural factors are compatible with this notion (of political community); political community exists when there is likelihood of internal peaceful change in a setting of contending groups with mutually antagonistic aims." 17 In the phrase, the notion of "political community" is added to be defined as the terminal condition. He might be considered as Deutsch's minimal, pluralistic type of integration in
considerably being both allowable and essential parts of a proper definition.

From this, the being of political community is indicated simply by the prevalence of peaceful conflict-resolution among participating units. Jacob and Teune seem to encourage this point, saying "political integration generally implies a relationship of community among people within the same political entity." That is, "they are held together by mutual ties of one kind or another which give the group a feeling of identity and self-awareness." They also state that "the essence of the integration relationship is seen as collective action to promote mutual interests."

Remaining with the Haas's process definition, Leon Lindberg in his work on the European Community also defines integration as the process (1) whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic politics independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center. To arrange this dual definition more bluntly, political integration is a part of a broader process of international integration in which "larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence," and in which there is "joint participation in regularized, ongoing decision-
making," as a result, or as part of "the evolution over time of a collective decision-making system among nations."[^22]

In contemplating and criticizing a general contemporary theory of integration, Johan Galtung is, first, confusing the conceptualization of integration defined by above scholars. He reaches another conclusion that integration is a process with the creation of new actors. To borrow Galtung's words,

Integration is the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated. Conversely, disintegration is the process whereby one actor splits into two or more actors. When the process is completed, the actor is said to be disintegrated.[^23]

Although not speaking of loyalties, Galtung sees that it is integrated when a set of actors of political units convert their loyalties to a new actor of a single unit. He further states, "Only when the new actor is so firmly integrated that the images formed by self and others coincide is the integration process completed."[^24] Integration is thus a process in which a great importance is attached to both the constituent actors of previous units and their environment.

In the 1970s some writers thought about integration at the international level, being concerned with in particular, the political structure and institutionalization of the political process among two or more states. Johan K. De Vree's definition of integration is worthy of remark: "... process of the formation and development of institutions through which certain values are authoritatively allocated for
a certain group of political actors or units." Furthermore, Caporaso and Pelowski understand that integration consists of the development of "new structures and functions at a new system level which is more comprehensive (either geographically or functionally) than previously." From that point of view, central to Vree is institutionalization, whereas Caporaso and Pelowski put emphasis upon the creation of a new political structure. The point of the other is more concerned with a growing sense of interrelatedness between, or among, political or economic structures.

III. INTEGRATIVE FACTORS (COMPONENTS OF DYNAMIC MODELS)

Here the things to be dealt with are how and why political integration is facilitated, or obstructed. In this context, at the very outset, there are differences in approach to conceptualization of the dependent variable—integration. While Jacob and Teune tend to regard transaction as an independent variable, and integration as a dependent one in enumerating and explaining integrative variables, Cobb and Elder see interaction as a dependent variable. In their model for the study of inter-nation interaction and international collaboration, research and analysis are used to make every effort to evaluate interaction variables which may reflect the integrative process whether good (or positive) or bad (or negative). For positive integrative process, some scholars have engaged in finding other phenomena associated with it and
then integrative preconditions or factors that can appear to influence to integration. In the abstract it would seem possible to distinguish between factors and preconditions—the former relate to movement in a certain direction, the latter make movement possible in the first place. 27

Etzioni set forth six integrative conditions; and Nye and Deutsch also suggest seven variables respectively. Their variables (not all) are similar with those of Jacob and Teune in many aspects. As integration is viewed as a process in describing integration in this study, used here are Jacob and Teune's ten integrative factors that can affect integration.

1. **Geographical Proximity**

Territorial contiguity is very often referred to be as a crucial factor facilitating regional integration. The hypothesis is that the more nations geographically proximate, the more they will probably interact with each other; and the closer communities are to each other, the higher the possibility of integration. Obviously, the environment of countries connected by a common boundary makes it frequent and easy for transportation and communications, and it exerts a favorable influence on the progress of more profound configuration of interaction leading to integration.

Ironically, although many give particular emphasis to the importance of geographical proximity to regional integration, Jacob and Teune tend to downgrade this transaction variable in a sense that the direct influence of territorial contiguity
may be negligible on account of the development of modern technology, i.e., rapid transportation and mass communication, noting continuous affective and transactional ties between countries in British Commonwealth. The consequential hypothesis is that geographical proximity does not significantly influence the relative intercourse between two nations; the more geographically remote two nations the more they will tend to interact with each other. 28 By contrast, George Liska 29 and Arnold Wolfers 30 reach another conclusion that geographical distance may play a better function in the relations of nations.

Curiously, two different assumptions attributed to geographical proximity have been the subject of relatively little empirical research. Typically, one or two certain cases are presented either to support or refute the general hypothesis that proximity meaningfully influences inter-nation intercourse. But it is our general assumption that contiguity is a cardinal factor in the development of international regionalism.

2. Homogeneity

Homogeneity as one of the background factors is viewed as a set of unit properties. The hypothesis is that social homogeneity will contribute strongly to the feasibility of political integration and, conversely, that communities whose members are very different from one another will have a very hard time achieving or maintaining political integration. 31
That is, the more people are similar, the higher the possibility of integration. Cultural similarity is also frequently cited as a significant constituent in the development of good-natured cooperative attachment between nations. Cobb and Elder's theoretical proposition has strategic implications: "...the greater the homogeneity in background, the greater the frequency of interaction." It means that the more homogeneous the community, the easier the job of integration will be. Furthermore, Guetzkow phrases the hypothesis, "The greater the similarity of language, customs and ideology among nations, the more easily will their members collaborate with one another." To the contrary, Etzioni sees that heterogeneity of the member units does not necessarily hamper national unity. "The less homogeneous a group, whether it is a small group, a community, or a nation, the less likely it is to be highly integrated... there are reports of instances in which this relationship between homogeneity and integration did not hold," he stated. In other words, homogeneity is neither a prerequisite to unification nor a sufficient condition, though it might very well affect the probability that a union will evolve... homogeneity is not a mere "given" or a cause, but must also be viewed as a property that is itself affected by unification; it is a consequence rather than a cause.

As an indicator of homogeneity of an integrative factor, the well-established concept of "social and cultural distance"
in relation to that of similarity is taken in measuring attitudes and values. Similarity in people's implicit feeling of social and cultural distance toward one another and toward individuals and groups outside their community is used as testimony of a feeling of homogeneity. It is hypothesized that if the more people are wide apart on the social and cultural distance scale within the community, the more political cohesion and integration among them would be hard to achieve.

3. **Transactions**

The integrative factor of transaction has been frequently and extensively treated by various integration theorists, especially, Deutsch, Puchala, Haas, Jacob, Teune, Cobb, Elder, and others. Here the transaction variable is referred briefly to as an integration factor, and transaction, more specifically and detailed, would be delineated in the pluralist approach to integration.

In the modern world, we cannot image the integration without depending on transactions. It seems to be generally true that the higher transactional exchanges between people in a community, the higher the promotion of cohesion and the chance of integration. On the basis of this hypothesis, researches have focused upon three predominant kinds of interaction: communications--the interchange of messages (mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, etc.); trade--the movement (or exchange) of goods and services; and mobility--the
movement of persons (a type of transaction that may be assessed also by frequency of personal contacts). A rate of transaction is measured by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them.

4. **Mutual Knowledge (Cognitive Proximity)**

The aforementioned three integrative variables—proximity, homogeneity, and transactions—depend to some extent upon a presumption that they will bring on greater mutual closeness and perception to be conducive to a community link. Suppose people are unaware of each other and don't know what a good deal between them is, it seems unlikely that they will enter into social or political partnership with a sense of relief. The hypothesis arising is that "mutual knowledge or understanding among people and groups of people is essential to their functioning together effectively as a political community." Put another way, when individuals of the community feel the cognitive proximity, they may cooperate with each other, and it, after all, may have a good influence on the achievement of integration. In its measurement, the most useful indicators concerning cognitive proximity such as attitudes and images are extensively used to ascertain what people think they know about one another rather than what they actually do know.

5. **Functional Interest**

Integration would be considered as dependent upon the degree and process to the real interests of people. This
stems from the presumption of the functional basis of integration in Western Europe. To some extent of expectation of benefits and rewards, people will enter into inter-community agreement or association to integration. In international relations, illustrations of the influence of functional interest as an integrative factor are the alignment of nations in a war for national survival and now, in view of the development of the technology of mass annihilation, the strong pressures for international disarmament agreements for survival.\textsuperscript{37}

These functional interests, however, may not provide a firm and lasting basis for integration in some cases. For example, in those countries which are faced with a military threat from a common enemy, they tend to be militarily interdependent and to cooperate with each other through military alliance or defense agreement for mutual defense based on functional interests, but once the threat of a war has disappeared, their functional interests also fade, and rather they may find another solution to improve the mutual functional interests. People's devotion and concern to the specific functional interests also change as conditions change in the realm of time and space.

6. \textit{Communal "Character" or Social "Motive"}

Research concerning communal character (or social motive) is a new main approach in analyzing integrative factor. The communal character is generally measured by the distributions
of attitudes, values, and patterns of the motivational behavior. At this, David McClelland, explicitly describes the differences among societies in the amalgam of three principal motivational sets: an affiliation motive, an achievement motive, and a power motive. From a standpoint of motivation, individuals may be motivated by their obtaining cultural inheritance and by learning a set of behavioral dispositions in a society. This motivational behavior may affect integration. Thus the hypothesis is that "if it is established that a community can acquire a collective motivational pattern that strongly influences its behavior on economic enterprise, it may be possible that it will have acquired traits which dispose it toward cohesiveness and integration or, on the other hand, toward anarchy within or belligerence without." This is no more than hypothesis on social motive to economic development, but it may be developed in combination of the other propositions to political integration.

7. Structural Frame

In the contemporary world, the system of decision-making or the power structure within the community certainly affect cohesion and political integration. If the community is pluralistic, rather than monolithic, if it is organized hierarchically or provides equality in decision-making, if it is socially stratified or mobile, if its political authority is centralized or dispersed--is the society more or less
likely to be internally integrated and more or less disposed to be closely linked to other communities?"^{40}

During the long period while study of political and social structure has gone forward, there has not been adequate explanation to ascertain how structural differences in different political systems influence community cohesion and political integration. In general, there are two notable propositions on political structure which can lead to community cohesion and integration. First, from the democratic perspective in which consensus (or consent) is essential to the flowering of a dynamic political community, the proposition is that a democratic political structure allows a large amount of public participation in decision making, even on the decision to integration, but in an authoritarian or totalitarian political system, aggregate frustrations of the alienated may cause to happen violence which impedes integration.

From the experience of developing countries, the above proposition is to be turned about. To some extent this other proposition seems likely to adopt the side of the tenet of the authoritarian system of government to integration. "A structure of highly concentrated political authority, with strict limitations on general participation, particularly on the voicing of dissent, is almost a requisite of national community organization under conditions of threat and social
But one of these propositions has not been yet systematically demonstrated to be germane to integration.

8. **Sovereignty-Dependency Status**

The community's highest concern on political integration is on its acquisition of a state of "sovereignty." From the classic concept on sovereignty, all members of the community are subject to a supreme political authority; and the community as a political entity is independent of control by anyone else. It refers to total internal political cohesion and complete external autonomy. However, in the light of the reality of the international politics, it is not easy to get absolute sovereignty except for some powerful and rich nations.

From that point of view, the hypothesis which has emerged is that in the international relations, when sovereignty is highly threatened, nations have a tendency to oppose any political action toward integration. In nature, it is difficult to achieve political integration between nations which have a full sovereignty, and relatively easy if between the nations that hold limited sovereignty externally. But this is not demonstrated by a systematic and comprehensive test, either. Deutsch and his collaborators have a skeptical view on this through their observation of integrative process in North Atlantic area.

In reality, a number of new countries in Asia and Africa since the WWII depend politically and economically upon the
powerful nation, and so it cannot be said that the former nations possess a relatively high degree of political and economy autonomy. From the standpoints of neo-colonialism and dependency situation, many are intensely limited in what they can do by the authority of others, which is often referred to that countries are dependent rather than independent. This explains sovereign-dependency status.

9. **Governmental Effectiveness**

The integrative factor of governmental effectiveness should be explained in relation to the functional variable. Indeed it makes functional interests between the parties in integrative process, and then brings forth their loyalties to a new government. In observing a very attentive correlation between the cohesion of a political community and the governmental effectiveness, a larger unified unit of community suffices demands and wishes (or reward and benefit). Based on this, the hypothesis is that "governmental effectiveness is necessary to retain the loyalty of the members of the community, and such loyalty is necessary to maintain internal integration in the community," and that "governmental ineffectiveness, on the other hand, will engender pressures for new, different, or external forms of integration."42

10. **Previous Integrative Experience**

The variable of previous integrative experience as a integrative factor is originally mentioned by Haas in the study of European integration. This is simply hypothesized
rather than other variables that integration may occur more easily if there have been previous integrative experiences. But this proposition is not yet empirically tested. Like other values—functional interest and governmental effectiveness, it seems to be more likely when integrative experience is contributing to reward and benefit for the citizens of the community. Otherwise, it rather leads to disintegration.

According to Bruce Russett's view, "...no one of these is a sufficient condition for successful integration, and research has not yet established with certainty whether any are necessary conditions." But each factor works differently according to different national situations. That is, in the realm of the different countries, some factors are sufficient or necessary conditions and others are not; some are positive preconditions and the others negative.
CHAPTER 2
INTEGRATION PARADIGM, MODEL, AND COMMUNITY-BUILDING

There are various types of integration, such as economic, social, and policy integration as well as various levels of integration as well. For one thing, at the time of the creation of the European Common Market integration meant political unification, economic unification, economic and political cooperation, and more free trade to various groups of people. In this chapter, a full characterization of the integration paradigm, model, and community-building of especially Nye, Galtung, Etzioni, and Deutsch is fairly valuable for understanding integrative image in relation to the definition of integration.

I. JOSEPH NYE'S INTEGRATION PATTERN

Joseph Nye in *Peace in Parts* divides or categorizes integration pattern into economic integration (formation of a transnational economy), social integration (formation of a transnational society), and political integration (formation of a transnational political system).

A. Economic Integration

The predominant claim to economic integration was mostly depicted on the basis of Bela Balassa's strategy to apply it to regional integration. In a most general sense, economic integration is rated as not merely a process but also a state
of affairs, placing more importance on particularly the abolition (or absence) of various forms and rules of discrimination between, or among, economic units of different states. The same economists equate integration with the pursuit of certain economic policies designed to achieve equitable distribution of welfare benefits; but the process of adopting such policies also constitutes integration. ³

At the level of analysis, in compliance with Balassa's scheme, Nye categorizes the various forms in which economic integration would be developed by the process of five sections--free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union, and total economic integration. In nature, where it is aimed at sweeping away from Europe protectionism and economic nationalism with their resulting high production costs, high costs of living and economic stagnation, a different approach was required, a wide attack in more than one dimension as it were; it must have the depth of integration and the wide scope of a freeing of trade. ⁴ The best example of this is the successful operation of the European Economic Community (EEC). In Haas' view, economic unification (common markets) has the highest spill-over value, and hence is apparently the best take-off base. ⁵

B. Social Integration

Another form of regional integration of Nye in agreement with Deutsch's pluralistic device is social integration which entails the continuation of communication and transaction
across national frontiers. The higher such increasing phenomena in the degree of communication and transaction reaches the apogee, the greater the likelihood of social integration. At this the resulting web of relationships among non-state units is a transnational society.

Mutually supporting inputs into a social system tend to be associated with growth of structure, expansion of functions, development equilibrium—in short, a process summed up as "integration." Therefore, in essence, social integration comprises incessant interpersonal communication, contact, and exchange. In its process, a large amount of nongovernmental transaction such as mail, telephone calls, migration, visits, and what not, play a significant role in their effect on integration.

C. Political Integration

Although Nye categorizes integration pattern into three, indeed the first two ingredients are substantiated as a necessary and sufficient condition or a component to obtain political integration. Of the three types of integration, the achievement of political integration is by far more difficult rather than the others on the ground of the belief that economic and social integration do not lead automatically to political integration. From Nye's conclusion, political integration would be achieved by dint of the following salient types of political integration—(1) at least some rudimentary institutional structure, (2) interdependence in policy
formation, and (3) a sense of mutual identity and obligation.\textsuperscript{7} These aspects are in conformity with the accomplishment of institutional integration, policy integration, attitudinal integration, and security community in order to make parts into a whole.

II. JOHAN GALTUNG'S INTEGRATION MODELS

In Johan Galtung's scheme, three following integration categories are sketched, and then are divided into six different models designed to establish conditions for integration.

A. Value Integration

In the first place, integration may be viewed as value integration. In this category, Galtung provides for two models. An egalitarian model implies integration values with the elemental thoughts that actors have coinciding interests, and that "there are no (or only a few) states of the world so that high value for one actor excludes high value for the other."\textsuperscript{8} Differently, the hierarchical model suggests the integration of values in which impasses and conflicts in decision-making to integration can be settled by selecting the value highest in the hierarchy. This intimates that the actor with higher rank predominates over the actor with lower rank.

B. Actor Integration

As a second integration category, integration as actor integration also consists of two models. The similarity model
clings to the principle of which integration is viewed as a process of expanding similarity between actors in rank, demographic composition, and economic or political structure. The interdependence model starts with the concept that integration depends to a larger degree upon a process by which cultural, political, and economic interdependence between actors is increased.

C. Integration as Exchange between Parts and Whole

The third and final category, integration as exchange between parts and whole also suggests two models. The loyalty model expects an input such as acts of allegiance or the allocation of resources from parts to whole. The allocation model, on the other hand, features an output that a nation provides a sense of identity to individuals, safeguards protection from danger and enemies, or furnishes economic gains from a whole to parts. From that point of view, loyalty and allocation models overtly picture a positive feedback of relations of each other. In today's world, a community has a center of decision-making that can affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community and form the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens.9

In connection with those integration models, Galtung suggests three ways of integration:

**Territorial integration:** joining together nations by the principle of vicinity, because they are located close together. This is usually referred to as regionalism.
**Organizational or vertical integration**: joining together nations by the principle of division of labor into an interdependent system. This is usually referred to as (neo-) colonialism.

**Associational or horizontal integration**: joining together nations by the principle of affinity, because they have some kind of similarity. This is usually referred to as functionalism, and leads to an international, governmental organization, and IGO.¹⁰

The notion of territorial integration is parallel with that of "political unification," in that both imply the unifying territories and linking of the component units through political acts of will. The other two sorts of integration are actually distinguishable from territorial integration. The organizational or vertical integration calls for the absolute political and economical dominance worked out by one major center over relatively weak and poor several others. In the modern states, vertical and horizontal models are inclined to expand more rapidly than territorial integration. But in considering the humanism and equality, the integration in a vertical sense is not very well advocated as a way of integration. Under the supposition that there are no supreme actors or nations in the world, the associational or horizontal model is highly recommended for integration based on the equal level.

### III. AMITAI ETZIONI'S PARADIGM FOR POLITICAL UNIFICATION

From the analysis of integrating power at the international level, Amitai Etzioni conceives of the world as a "small set of subglobal systems." Then unification on a
global scale is achieved by a dialectical process. Its process includes three stages. In the first stage, the subcommunities comprising heterogeneous and conflicting units are built, and then component units should be ready to form a political community. In the second stage, the subcommunities furnish the "middle tier" for a "multitier consensus formation structure." In the third stage, it is completed only when a political community comes into tangibility bonding and replacing the subcommunities. Etzioni thinks a small set of regional units are crucial to the model building and the comparative analysis of unification efforts.

In the beginning of Etzioni's study on political unification, he brings forth four major questions: Under what conditions is it initiated? What forces direct its development? What path does it take? And what is the state of the system affected by the process once it is terminated? The tendency in asking such questions is to seek after the breakthrough of a unification process. Being mindful of those questions deeply, Etzioni's paradigm for the work of political integration with his effort on the supposition of a dialectical process to international integration has been to develop a four-stage model of integration as follows.

A. The Pre-unification State

In the first part, the pre-unification state refers to the creation of certain conditions which exist before or
during an initial process of unification. It is basically
determined by three kinds of properties: unit, environment,
and system. Two of them, unit and system properties, are
identical with Cobb and Elder's specific background variables
on mutual behavioral relevance to patterns of interaction
between nations.

The property of the unit is explained by individual and
analytical properties: that which is associated with what
level (or levels) of unit-integration is most conducive to the
beginning and progress of unification; and this attempts to
examine the degree of heterogeneity in ethnic origin, cultural
tradition, language, and religion, to integration. Environ­
ment property encompasses ecological factors, such as the
physical environment in which the union is initiated and by
which it is surrounded; and social factors, the properties of
nonmember units that affect unification. System property
is a factor which affects a process of interdependence among
the participants in a union. In this, both the preunification
level of integration and its scope postulate that "the
integration of a system is increased, a process that ends to
be accompanied by expansion of the scope of the system in
terms of the sectors that are controlled on a system rather a
unit level."14

B. The Unification Process, i.e., Integration Power

The second category, the unification process means what
kinds of integrating power are applied in the effective
initiating of unification process. The following threefold classification seems to be satisfactory: integrating power, we suggest, is either coercive (for example, military forces), or utilitarian (for example, economic sanctions), or identitive (i.e., propaganda). The classification is exhaustive; each concrete power is either one of the three or is composed of their various combinations.

C. The Unification Process, i.e., Integrated Sectors

The third phase of the unification process includes two phenomena: take-off and expansion of the scope (the range of agenda items) as essential analytical instruments. Take-off signifies inauguration of a process, and its phenomenon occurs when member units accumulate enough impetus to unify themselves without resort to the support of nonmember units. Another factor accounting in part for take-off is secondary priming; that is, unification in one sector tends to trigger unification in others. The expansion of the union's scope is much concerned with the formation of a stable union. The highest extent of stability can be obtained "when integration on all three dimensions (monopoly of violence, center of decision-making, and focus for identification) is high."

D. The Termination State

As a final stage of the unification process, the "termination" state provides a fruitful base for the classification of unions, not only because it provides a relatively fixed frame of reference (unlike the fluid state of
the unions in other phases) but also because differences in termination states seem to correlate significantly with variables examined so far.  

**IV. KARL DEUTSCH'S SECURITY-COMMUNITIES ("AMALGAMATED" AND "PLURALISTIC")**

Karl Deutsch's inquiry on integration specifically in North Atlantic area for war-free zone mainly pay, first of all, much attention on the formation of a sense of community in which states should solve their problems and conflicts without depending upon large-scale violence. Integration is, then, achieved by successful attainment of a security community. The terms used in relation to integration could be clarified by a chain of definitions relevant to the notion for a fuller comprehension of our findings:

A **SECURITY-COMMUNITY** is a group of people which has become integrated.

By **INTEGRATION** we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population.

By **SENSE OF COMMUNITY** we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of "peaceful change."

By **PEACEFUL CHANGE** we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

In Deutsch's recent efforts with respect to integration, integration does not necessarily mean only the merging of
different people and governments into a single unit. The key point and the political intention are concerning the attainment of peace and security among political units, regions, and populations within a community. Peace, or integration, will be enhanced, not by the elimination of states, but by their development. That is, integration is parallel with the building of a security community by non-violence means. Hence such a security community would be best considered as an extraordinary type of political community pursuing durable peace. To speak properly, in a security community with the generation of a plural society based on a stable sense of community among individuals as well as nations within certain territories, the participants of that community will not fight each other physically, and will further resolve their clashes in some other peaceful way. Deutsch postulates that as the whole world is integrated as a security community, warfare would be automatically eliminated among members. It is surely believed that such a security community will be conducive to the world peace and security, especially to the players in a dangerous political game, and the nations in conflict or competition.

In a study of political community and the North Atlantic area, Deutsch and his followers then distinguished two different kinds of security-communities between "amalgamated" and "pluralistic."
By **AMALGAMATION** we mean the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation. This common government may be unitary or federal. The United States today is an example of the amalgamated type. It became a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several formerly independent units. It has one supreme decision-making center.

The **PLURALISTIC** security-community, on the other hand, retains the legal independence of separate governments. The combined territory of the United States and Canada is an example of the pluralistic type. Its two separate governmental units form a security-community without being merged. It has two supreme decision-making centers. Where amalgamation occurs without integration, of course a security-community does not exist.\(^2^4\)

These two, therefore, indicate respectively "either the presence or the absence of any real central decision-making institutions or delegations of national autonomy."\(^2^5\) With the operation of such communities, the participants are willing delightedly to communicate, cooperate, and transact hand in hand, and problems existing between them are to be solved without recourse to large-scale physical force. Any political community, be it amalgamated or pluralistic, was eventually **SUCCESSFUL** if it became a security-community--that is, if it achieved integration--and that it was **UNSUCCESSFUL** if it ended eventually in secession or civil war.\(^2^6\)

From the observation and analysis of some of the past European integration of amalgamated political communities, Deutsch and his collaborators comparing 16 shorter-run situations\(^2^7\) concluded that such political communities as the Norwegian-Swedish union in the 1890s, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Anglo-Irish Union in 1918 were disintegrated.
Some of the provisional explanations arise respecting conditions to disintegration: (1) the effect of excessive military commitments; (2) a substantial increase in political participation on the part of a previously passive group; (3) the growth of ethnic or linguistic differentiation; (4) any prolonged economic decline or stagnation; (5) relative closure of the established political elites; (6) the excessive delay in social, economic, or political reforms; and (7) any major failure of a formerly privileged state, group, or region to adjust to its loss of dominance. These disintegrative conditions are likely to hinder, demolish, or at least imperil an ASC.

Much of the North Atlantic work is also conducive to delineation and comparison of each form of a PSC. The PSC symbolizes relatively a weaker or incomplete form of integration than the ASC to the extent of coalescence. The PSC thus seems to provide a "pathway" or a "half-way house" to the ASC and complete unification. There were 13 considerable PSCs in North Atlantic area: United States-Canada since somewhere between 1819 and 1871; United States-Britain since perhaps 1871 or perhaps the end of the century; United States-Mexico since the 1930's; Norway-Sweden since 1907; Sweden-Denmark and Denmark-Norway since some time in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century; Austria-Germany between 1876 and 1932; Britain-Netherlands; Britain-Belgium and Belgium-Netherlands since 1928, if not earlier; and Britain-Norway, Britain-
Denmark, and eventually Britain-Sweden since 1910 or earlier. Only the case of Austria-Germany failed because of the Nazi Germany's coercive amalgamation of Austria which was consummated in 1938. However, the remains have been very successful and have lasted constantly up to the present. Whatever small or larger states, strong or weak powers in those PSCs, they have been existing together with cooperation and communication, and have not been attacked by the counterpart.

Those integration pattern, paradigm, model, and community-building are, both directly and indirectly, associated with integration theories such as federalism, pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism. Although there may be several other modes to classify integration theories, this categorization seems to be the most generally prevalent. Our efforts in the next chapter will be to portray those integration theories, respectively. In nature, the four schools of integration have different approaches in determining solution of the constantly maintaining peace or avoiding wars between, or among, nation-states, and of even coalescing national units without resort to the use of force.
CHAPTER 3

INTEGRATION THEORIES (FEDERALISM AND PLURALISM)

I. FEDERALISM

As the oldest and best-known legacy of integrating nations at the national level, federalism provides the theoretical framework and assumption, not because it is itself an ideal, but because it is a constitutional instrument whereby other ideals might be procured. Federalism can be viewed either as providing a political solution, a way of managing different interests within a single political framework; or it can be viewed as an administrative convenience, a method of governing a homogeneous society within which there is a high degree of consensus. Federalism still has many of the merits originally claimed for it as the right form of government for peoples of multi-national states who wish to be united without being too united. It is also said that a federal union with weak government is better than no political union at all.

From the federalist perspective, war is taken to be the unavoidable offspring of a system. Hence, from the beginning, the federal idea for defense and security of Europe has been developed as an alternative to the rough application of military overthrow or empire-building by a powerful nation which has strong lust for conquest. It holds to the belief that the independent units enter a federation with the
voluntary nature of the act for, in particular, national security, or collective defense objective. The creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC) proposed by Rene Pleven (1950) and Paul-Henri Spaak (1952) was the typical example of the federal thought. The federalist idea shares with the realist thought in international politics.

This is well-explained by the Hobbes' world of "the war of all against all"—that is, human nature is immoral, belligerent and wolfish in and for itself, so their natural viciousness would be a continuously-at-war status with one another and no one could be safe within the being of confrontation in human society. In the inter-, and intra-state system, nation-state would be largely in two risky situation: domestically it tends toward the concentration of power; internationally, it promotes instability and conflict. And, because the classic mechanisms of international adjustment have proven impermanent or unreliable for maintaining peace and security, real institutional limitations must be placed on the autonomy of states—however difficult this may be. In consequence, the only way to solve this problem (and to attain eternal peace) is, to the modern federalists, to form a supranational state.

To be precise, the heart of federalism is that formerly sovereign states go into building of a new transnational regional society which has sufficient political and military
authority through compact. The development of the compact theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and others indicated the first step in extending the federalist strategy.\(^6\) Subsequently, Montesquieu and Madison were seeking to transform the thought into the political principle and procedure. Among them, Hobbes was a principal contributor to the advancement of the federal view that the creation of a common supranational government plays an effective role for preventing (or avoiding) wars and violence, or for obtaining eternal peace and stability in a human society. Likewise, John Stuart Mill,\(^7\) Immanuel Kant,\(^8\) and more recently, Amitai Etzioni,\(^9\) although not federalist, share the federalist idea.

Of crucial importance to federalism is the creation of a common supranational state (or a form of political association) with transfer of previous sovereignty of constituent units by political determination with specific legal and political traits. Therefore, federalism is the "big bang" theory of regional integration in that it identifies the transfer of legal sovereignty from the member states to the communal institutions as the primary mechanism of regional integration.\(^10\)

A new legal authority imperatively entails on the formation of a common political system and institutions among member units to regulate the function of a government. In its device, the legislative, juridical, and administrative powers would be divided equally between a federation and unit
governments, but the latter should delegate a number of their sovereign prerogatives, functions, and powers to a supreme political authority. The latter lose their sovereignties, but retain their individual personality and internal autonomy.

The notion "federal" is quite alike that of "confederal" in a sense of the loose linking together of territorial units with the aim of the military, political, or economic advantage. In conceptual terms, there is little to distinguish between "federal" and "confederal, or between "federation" and "confederation" (or "confederacy"). The features of federalism are illuminated by Paul Taylor distinguishing it from a confederacy in four principal aspects: first, the constitutional immunity of the federation against dissolution by the secession of its constituent region; second the existence in the system of an independent sphere of central authority; third, the exclusive control by the general government of foreign relations and defence; and, fourth, the possibility of the amendment of the federal constitution without the consent of all the constituent regions.11 In the realm of a federation, the people would belong as citizens to both general and regional governments; but in a confederation, they are citizens belonging only to the regional governments. Deutsch further continues:

If a country is too large and diverse to accept a unitary government, and if it needs more effective power and performance than a confederacy can produce, then federal union seems to be the most effective form of government so far discovered. If people in the various states are
not ready politically, socially, culturally, or economically to accept a federal union, then a confederation may be the best that can be organized and made to work for the time being, and it may prepare the way for federation at a later stage.\textsuperscript{12}

Each of such words implies a covenant or treaty between sovereign states. One outstanding example of federation in this form would be found in the confederacies of ancient Greece. The others were the Swiss Confederation before 1848, the United Provinces of the Netherlands 1579-1795, the United States of America before 1787 and the German Empire 1871-1918.\textsuperscript{13}

There is a common view of "federalism" on the transfer of sovereignty of the member states to a new center. But there still exist some different versions of federalism. Some writers define federalism in the levels of focus and tend to see it to the degree of comprehension. In particular, K. C. Wheare has developed the term of "dual federalism." The basic assumption is that the dual sovereignties--general and regional--should exist side by side, and each is co-ordinate and virtually independent of each other in its own sphere.\textsuperscript{14}

Within a federal system\textsuperscript{15} neither does legally or politically gain supremacy over the other. The federal state\textsuperscript{16} and component units can act directly toward the people. Each should be limited to its own sphere of action as regulated by a well-defined constitutional boundary of powers. The classic examples of such federations viewed as "dual federalism" are the United States prototype of 1787 and the later Swiss,
Canadian, and Austrian federations, although there are some significant variation among these. Some of them are truly federal, but if its character should not be entirely "federal" in full measure, it is nothing but "quasi-federal."\(^{17}\)

More recently, a new concept of "co-operative federalism"\(^{18}\) has been developed by the successful operation of American, Canadian, and Australian federations. The expansion of nationwide commercial enterprises, the increase of an interdependent economy, and the growth of national sentiment brought about the rapid creation of these federations. Under the pressures of economic crises and of war, the interstate co-operation and at least partial financial dependence of the regional governments upon the general government extended. Thus the favor of co-operative federalism has come from the increasingly inadequate monetary assets and natural resources of the levels of governments. The trend to "co-operative federalism" can be fully illustrated by J. A. Corry:

It has arisen because several separate governments share a divided responsibility for regulating a single economic and social structure. It is most unlikely that any constitution could be devised which would enable each to perform its specific functions adequately without impinging seriously on the others. So their activities are inevitably mingled and co-operative arrangements must be worked out. In the result, formal powers are not co-terminus with operating responsibilities; the two levels of government as well as the several state and provincial governments interpenetrate one another in many places and ways. Under the heat and pressure generated by social and economic change in the twentieth century, the distinct strata of the older federalism have begun to melt and flow into one another.\(^{19}\)
Although in practice both the theories of "dual federalism" and "co-operative federalism" are derived from the same basic idea, they appear to specify contrasting positions. The major distinction between them is that in a federation, the former views the general and regional governments as equal rivals, on one hand; the latter, as equal partners, on the other hand. Although they differ from each other, they share a common idea that the two or more sets of governments should co-ordinate in a sense that neither is legally or politically subordinate to the other. In view of the modern world which is characterized by political and economic interdependence and administrative co-operation within their allotted realms, the idea of co-operative federalism has, in varying degree, prevailed rather than that of the dual federalism in the study of theory about federalism.

In addition, some modern scholars in conformity with a "process model" of federalism used to support the federal activist rather than the federal classicist. For example, Henri Brumans states the "dynamic potential of federalism":

20 Reginald Lang conceives of federalism "not as a destination, but a method of traveling."21 Carl Friedrich's full phrasing illustrates it well: "...federalism should be seen as the process of federalizing a political community, either though the differentiation of a hitherto unitary state or through a process of integration where separate political organizations (not necessarily territorial states) come to make joint
decisions."\textsuperscript{22} Mitrany and Haas agree on it, in newly defining federation as a "process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for doing various things jointly; and any and all of such actions fall into a general federalizing process."\textsuperscript{23} In this sense, federalism seems to mean basically 'association,' 'co-sociation,' 'reciprocity,' 'mutuality,' and to be contrasted with 'rule,' 'empire,' 'dominance,' 'monarchy.'\textsuperscript{24} This is considered as a "neo-federalist\textsuperscript{25} idea which is not viewed as the end-product, but as process of federating regions.

We reviewed briefly the tradition and definition of federalism. Next we will turn, attaching to the modern federal definitions based on the concept of dual and cooperative federalism, to characterize some of the basic properties of federalism.

1. **Division of Powers between the Center and the Regional Governments**

In a federation, the center government reserves power to uphold "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the federal system, the rights of member states in their relations with one another," and to keep "the government's member states in their proper place."\textsuperscript{26} Both governments perform their functions through their officials and laws within their proper spheres of authority.\textsuperscript{27} The federal principle (of the division of powers) is provided in the constitution in such a way
that the division of powers is now an important constitutional matter; powers of the central government or constituent units cannot be increased or diminished unilaterally by one of them without constitutional amendment, in the process of which both of them are entitled to participate; and there is a certain constitutional mechanism by which to resolve jurisdictional conflicts between them (for example, judicial review or national referendum as possibly in Switzerland).28

In the initial stages of the evolution of a federal system on power distribution, the center unit frequently deals with exterior matters, while the regional units interior ones. In the international relations, although component units of a federal state may make up a limited treaty under the federal constitution, the national authority can be represented by only the center government. If the political powers of the member states are limited and the remnant is left to the center government, it is not to be considered as federal.

On the division of power, a federal system is usefully distinguished from both a unitary on one hand and from a confederal system on the other hand. In a unitary system, the governing power and supreme authority are vested in a supra-government which, in turn, delegates its authority to the constituent units. Conversely, the political power (or absolute supremacy) in a confederal form of government is distributed to the regional units, and in turn, the local units delegate their authorized power to the central organ.
The essential and distinguishing feature of a federal system is that political power is divided between two sets of governments on the basis of co-ordinate levels of sovereignty within a single state with their respective jurisdiction, and each unit is legally or politically independent from the other within its own sphere of activities. The governing power of defense and foreign policy is endowed to the center unit in the unitary and the federal system and to regional units in the confederal one.

Additionally, A. W. MacMahon points out such following substance on the distribution of powers between various entities (the federal, the national, and local authorities) as: (1) a distribution of powers between central and local governments, not subject to legislative change; (2) substantial rather than trivial local powers; (3) contact between the central government and individual citizens; (4) some freedom for the member-states as to their own internal organization; and (5) legal equality of the member-states. The Federalist Papers also draw similar conclusion that a "constitutional distribution of powers between the central establishment and the members of the system was the only essential requirement for a federal system,"

A. H. Birch considers a federal system of government as "one in which there is a division of powers between one general and several regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinate with the others, and each of
which acts directly on the people through its own administrative agencies.\textsuperscript{31} This amends Wheare's major essential of independence of levels of governments in dual federalism. A key point in this context is that the relations between a general and unit governments in a federal system are viewed not by independence but by interdependence. In the contemporary situation for most of the federal states and their people, whatever their political and economic philosophy, none of the units are subordinate to the other, but rather are coordinate in their powers within their own spheres. Therefore, the modern federalists are inclined to seek after decentralization rather than centralization within the sphere of political activities in a federal structure.

In reality, the distribution of powers between levels of governments in a federation is not equal. One of the typical features in the history of federations is a common feeling of some poorer states that they are not sharing adequately the benefits of union. The federalist approach for the poorer states in the modern period thus tends to cling to the principle of interdependence between the center and regional governments rather than independence.

2. **Highly Political**

The federalist "all or nothing" approach advocates highly political traits in unifying nations and people in an international system. Unlike two groups of functionalists who believe that economic and technological development rather
than any other factors work for cooperative solutions to social and economic problems, and thus would root out the material causes of war, the federalists as political determinists resolutely repudiate such a roundabout functionalist approach. This is summarized neatly in the slogan: "The worst way to cross a chasm is in little steps." This insinuates that the efforts to unify political units into a federal union within the sphere of a system have to deal directly with the nucleus to the affair.

Indeed in the course of the workings of integration at national level, federalists have a tendency to heavily fasten to the political components of power and bargaining. The compelling of the situation is assumed or asserted rather than analyzed, but whether and how the necessary integration actually occurs is held to depend primarily on the will, ability and relative power of the elites involved in bringing it about. In this sense, William Riker sees federalism as "a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies."

As providing a political solution, a federation by way of the creation of supranational authority is possible when all component units satisfactorily agree with one another in all bargaining and compromises. The constituent units will join willingly in the integration process not that they are obliged to, but that they want to. From the European experience, the
federal pattern in U.S., Canada, and Switzerland, emerges the thought that perhaps a federal approach where bargains are made between top leaders and eventually compromise solutions and institutions are reached, which will enable minimum sacrifice of institutional integrity for the states in the federation, thus making possible unification with diversity.\textsuperscript{35} That is, integrative process mostly rests on the political determination and arrangement, capability and relative power of the system's elites as the primary forces of promoting the level of integration. For instance, for any number of reasons the time becomes ripe for change; a constituent assembly of national governments or popular representatives is formed; bargains are struck at the top, against a backdrop of rising popular sentiment; and eventually a new set of common institutions emerges which embodies the powers of which the states have agreed to divest themselves.\textsuperscript{36} Emphasized here are both the gradual centralization of regional identity and the creation of the strong central institutions for a high degree of political integration, which might affect the development of other types of integration.

3. **Legalistic to Institution Building and Constitutional Settlement**

Essentially, federalism is a legalistic rather than a behavioral theory of regional integration. This provides a rationale of federalism—the necessity of building
institutions and the constitutional revolution, first, and political loyalties of citizens of the member-states, next.

Conceivably the oldest sense of the federal state represents the loose linking together by compact of previously independent units for certain military and economic purposes, or for overcoming international disorder. To the contrary, in a modern fashion of federalism, the legalistic approach to regional integration is derived from two leading intellectual traditions, one concerned with institutional designs for pacifying the relations among states, and the other related to the actual practice of federal government. 37

The federalists are more concerned with the consequence of politics in the dynamic mechanism of integration through the establishment and process of, particularly, institution. Political institutions characteristically reflect the deeper societal structure of the communities in which they operate. 38 In two institutions, the supreme constitution is essential if government is to be federal; the written constitution is essential if federal government is to work well. 39

Emphasized in this is the principal consequence of political institutions by certain treaties and legal arrangement among the constituents rather than the behaviors of individuals (or elites) and certain groups and parties. To the federal classicists, the stronger the institutional forms in political behavior which include a strong political
determination, the stronger the integration process powers established.

W. S. Livingston, however, comes to another conclusion that federalism is a function not of political constitutions or institutions, but of societies. He claims:

The essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, not in the shadings of legal and constitutional terminology, but in the forces--economic, social, political, cultural--that have made the outward forms of federalism necessary.... The essence of federalism lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected. 40

Livingston adds that a federal society may have its diversities as well expressed by a unitary constitution which is worked in a federal manner as by a federal constitution which is worked in a federal manner as by a federal constitution which is worked in a unitary manner. 41 In reality, it is, nevertheless, now obvious that the causal relation between a federal society and its constitutions (or institutions) is not static but one of persistent interplay. R. L. Watts illustrates: "The pressures within a society may force expression in its political institutions; but these institutions, once created, may themselves shape the pattern of society by determining the channels in which these social pressures will." 42
Essentially, there are some conditions for construction of a federation. The minimal preconditions for federation are cognitive proximity and functional interest. Some integrative factors introduced in Chapter 1 are also momentous to cause a federal state to flourish. For instance, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, oneness of race, religious unity or commonness of nationality would contribute to the possibility of forming a federal order.\(^43\)

Even though not sufficient and necessary conditions, Wheare's prerequisites are very helpful to work successfully a federal government and to link the peoples within the sphere of federalism. He lists a half-dozen factors to be likely to favor integration: (1) a sense of military insecurity and of the consequent need for common defence; (2) a desire to be independent of foreign powers, and a realization that only through union could independence be secured; (3) a hope of economic advantage from union; (4) some political association of the communities concerned prior to their federal union either in a loose confederation, as with the American states and the Swiss cantons, or as parts of the same Empire, as with the Canadian and Austrian colonies; (5) geographical neighborhood; and (6) similarity of political institutions.\(^44\) H. W. Springer divides into two classes the set of Wheare's factors: the first three which may be called "inducements," the residue that may be called "predisposing conditions".\(^45\) All these
factors operated in the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia.

Reviewing Wheare's analysis of the conditions, Birch adds some more factors which are likely essential prerequisites or conditions for the construction of peculiar federal structure of governance or of political union. They are: (1) representative institutions; (2) economy in the staffing of some public services; (3) the hope of achieving greater influence in international affairs. Both Wheare and Birch put more emphasis on economic benefits in both general and regional units to successfully operate a federation. Indeed it is not easy to prosper a federation in the absence of economic cooperation and interdependence between levels of governments, and without giving economic benefit to the component units.

It cannot be said that all conditions aforementioned are absolutely necessary in working a federation. However, in practice, when some of the existing conditions are fully satisfied, a federation is able to run without harsh difficulties. Although an amalgamated security-community is established such as a federation or an empire, Deutsch holds that disintegration or the breakdown of an existing political community may become true whenever the entity is recurrently and highly vulnerable. For instance, four of the eight post-war federations listed below--Indonesia, Pakistan, West Indies, and Central Africa--were short-lived by reason of some of the conditions missed in federations. In a modern
world, owing to so many prerequisites needed to operate a federal state, merely a few nations are adopting the federal form of government.

In the meantime, many federalists have been united in accenting the primacy of politics in European integration in reflection that accord would be reached by tackling head to head the consequential aspects and troublesome problems before everything. The federalist thought largely exerts a positive influence upon the process of European integration in line with the belief of "federalism through cooperation (or collaboration) and interdependence" in a variety of ways.

During or immediately after WWII, the federalist approach produced a good result on the political and economic reconstruction in Europe. As striking examples, federalist aspirations and access directed to, and ultimately created, some of institutions in Europe—the Council of Europe, the Anglo-American Federal Union, the French Committee for European Federation, and the Italian Movimento Federalista Europeo—which were political organizations on the federal basis. Together with the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Switzerland, those countries—Pakistan, Indonesia, Central Africa, the West Indies, Nigeria, Malaya, India, and Malaysia—adopted federalism as a form of government right after WWII. And many countries—Brazil, the Argentine, Venezuela, Libya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Yugoslavia, the Mali Federation, Western Germany, and the Republic of Cameroon—have adopted
constitutions which, though if not conforming to the federal definition, have been characterized slightly themselves as federalists, and have embraced a factor of the "federal spirit," as Friedrich termed it.

On the whole, federalist schemes have been greatly attracted to end-product rather than the process of integrating nations. In its approach, the primacy of political determination to integration, and definite primacy of constitutional settlement as well as the main value of institutions and institution building are highlighted. However, its plan in integrating nation-states cannot be viewed as a superlative framework for the reason that it can hardly surmount the forces of nationalism and ideology among the member units concerned. Along with the shortcomings of federalist design, "...events since 1954 in Europe and since 1960 in Africa have effectively contradicted these federalists' descriptions, explanations, and predictions," and "...this approach, in its pure form, is probably discredited." And the EDC was declined in 1954 and the EPC filed away. In the result, the efforts of integrationalists for uniting Europe began to be concerned with the theories of pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism.

II. PLURALISM

The integrative efforts to the promotion of peace and security in international politics have been done among some
scholars. Among them, Karl Deutsch is a leading pioneer to this approach. From the beginning, his first and foremost concern was about developing peaceful relations among nations. He does not relate peace definitely to other predominant values such as justice and freedom, but it is believed that peace can be achieved when human beings unquestionably eliminate war. Accordingly, what is all-important for integration is the assured procurement of international peace and national security and peaceful settlement in conflict. The integrative process is also facilitated through further contact, cooperation, transactions, and communications rather than a certain kind of a formal institutional change. In many respects, the pluralist approach certainly differentiates from other major integration theories of which predominant foci are on how successfully to create a new political union.

With the emphasis upon preserving peace and security in international relations, Deutsch's primary concern is about the stable formation of a political community. The term, a "political community" is a collection of political actors whose interdependence is sufficient to make a substantial difference to the outcome of some of each other's relevant decisions. Within such a community the constituent states can act independently by their own will. But whether political units, groups, or states are in cooperation, or competition or conflict, they are surely involved in a political community and act as members of it. To pluralists
then, the integrated community is a system of 'independent' states which, while not governed by any supranational authority, is characterized by such a high intensity of communication and interaction between its members that war is quite inconceivable to them as a method of conflict resolution.50

A. Pluralist Images for International Peace and Security

In essence, the pluralist approach directs toward establishment of the amalgamated security-community (ASC) as an ultimate goal with the successful operation of the pluralistic security-community (PSC) between the member states. The strong attainment of international peace and national security is an all-important requirement of both ASC and PSC. Following out this logic the pluralist image of international relations provides for some basic characteristics, as follows.

1. Retention of the National Identity

In nature, the pluralist paradigm provides the basic idea that it is surely possible without reducing or abolishing the sovereignty and legal independence of the constituents in international system. While preserving national identity, "...the growth of a community of states is possibly influenced not only by the perceptions and actions of policy makers in each state, but also by the sharing of political and socio-cultural values among states."51 Clearly, to the pluralists,
integration is the establishment of a community of states among component units. It is entirely different from the functionalist state-model.

On this point, this is a quite different attribute from either federalism or functionalism. The pluralists have the belief that such an abandonment of legal sovereignty and independence of member states and institutional transformation for the creation of a supranational state as visualized by federalists as well as a minimum maintenance of national sovereignty highlighted by functionalist scheme is not actually realistic in international relations. The pluralist form of a community toward integration does not compromise the essential sovereign power of states. That is, it is fairly favorable to the perseverance of the nation-state system as a political form.

2. **Low Politics may be Equally or more Important than High Politics**

The salient feature of the pluralist concern on certain theme issues seems to embrace two different politics—low and high politics—in the international relations. The pluralists agrees on the low politics which underscores transactions in social and cultural provisions or welfare issues of lesser attention to a statesman, on one hand; and the high politics, dealing of all things with national defense, security (particularly the strategic interests of states), and diplomacy on the other hand. However, pluralism is sharply
distinguished from the functionalist paradigm which pursues an indirect tactic to political integration, working through essentially the economic and technical sectors. It is also distinguished from the federalist image which places stress upon political rather than socio-economic affairs and upon the means of the achievement of integration.

As for the security issue, Pentland sharing the pluralist thought contends that "the struggle for power and the conflict of diverse national interests being unchanging ingredients of international politics, the maintenance of peace and security requires, on all sides, the seasoned diplomat's skill in blending his instinct for national advantage with his desire for the pacific settlement of disputes." That is, the pluralists' efforts in agreement of the realist scheme are primarily related to the attainment of peace and security in international relations.

Even though pluralists share national security concerns in common with the realist school of thought on the struggle for (or use of) power among states, the pluralists reject, on the whole, the notion that the agenda of world politics is monopolized nothing but by political, military-security and strategic issues. Being mindful of the consequence of insights from the political and realist paradigm in international relations, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book of *Power and Interdependence* provide for the pluralist perspective: interdependence and integration. An ideal type
of complex interdependence contrary to the realist image is represented by the appearance of three principal propensities in international politics: (1) multiple channels connecting societies, (2) absence of hierarchy among issues, (3) minor role of military force.54

In reality, the pluralist approach in international system combines thoroughly the political and socio-economic areas. Socio-economic and welfare issues as low politics can frequently have a direct positive attitude on the military security of certain political regimes or units as high politics, and vice versa. As a prominent example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established for the purpose of securing Western Europe from the military intimidation of the Soviet bloc, but later has been advanced by mutual cooperation and transaction in socio-economic areas among the member nations. For the reason that this is so, in general, the pluralists used to rebuff the high versus low politics dichotomy prevailing by most realists.

3. Both State and Non-state Actors are Important Entities in International Relations

In the pluralist approach to integration and even to maintenance of international regimes in the context of the socio-economic realm, nongovernmental actors operating across national frontiers are mostly considered as the unit of analysis in international system. Such pluralists' view since two major modern wars in history have considerably reflected
to the development of communication and cooperation, transactions, and interdependence of transnational non-state actors such as multinational corporations, terrorist groups, international banks, and other international organizations such as the U.N., NATO, EEC, and the Organization of African Unity. The pluralist idea of international relations thus provides for greater complication than the comparatively simpler image of state actors (or national units) as unitary actors interacting with one another, and so assumes that non-state actors are also important entities in world politics.

Another prominent assumption of the pluralist scheme pursuant to the dynamic political and systematic foreign policy decision-making process in political determination to integration is that the state is not a unitary and rational actor in international relations. Mostly decision-makers' capability directly affect and lead the integrative process in the context of the actions, reactions, and interactions of states. As Richard Snyder and his associates noted the focus of a state as a major decision-maker in world politics, "state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state." He was also favorable to the systematic reflection of a multitude of non-state components between and among states—for instance, family ties, migration, trade flow, cultural and social exchange, shared values, mass media—that seems likely to exert an influence on the determination of policy makers. Those actors also included such as elites,
bureaucracies, interest groups, and individuals (or public opinion) who attempt to draft or influence decision-making process.

The focus of behavior of non-state actors to the pluralist image includes the supposition that competition, conflict, coalition building, and compromise between units are the balderdash of politics. Therefore, the transactional activities of state and non-state actors working at cross-purposes within and across national borders is equally important. It is quite contrasted to the realist thought of the state as unitary actor.

B. High Intensity of Communications and Transactions

Central to the pluralist strategy toward the creation of a community of states as an integration rather than other predominant integration theories is on the broadening and intensifying of communications and transactions. Amidst Deutsch's 12 conditions for both PSC and ASC, the pluralists particularly uphold such conditions for the process of integration as (1) unbroken social communication links, (2) geographic and social mobility of persons, (3) a wide range of mutual transactions. The accent on the incessant junctions of social communications and transactions across national frontiers is another striking high point of the pluralism which would be surely distinguished from other predominant integrative approaches.
Deutsch from his empirical inquiry of the 13 American colonies concluded that the flowering of communal understanding in such regions definitely came from the communication systems of people and societies. He further contended that "a community consists of people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and services." That is, communications have brought peoples into making themselves familiar with each other, and thereby made them even closer both between and within national borders. Deutsch, then, emphasizes social learning for the high intensity of communications between state units.

The pluralists conceive that communications are a good initiative to foster transactions or links among a given set of nation-states that establish systems. Their relationships are generally established and maintained through communication. In Norbert Wiener's view, "...communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together and to act together." Deutsch also finds that "all successful security communities have a multiplicity of communications performing a variety of common functions and purpose."

On this point, Deutsch's communication approach is greatly concerned with principles of cybernetics whose major concern is with transactions between countries that "involves some communication of information and a transfer of people, goods or services," and with changes in public behavior.
within societies. Indeed, "regional integration is a multidimensional phenomenon, much more complex than initially imagined," and hence, to the pluralists, their approach by communication and transaction is very proper and effective to integration.

Furthermore, the dynamic of this process is border-crossing transactions which give indications of the importance of international contacts, communications, and exchanges, which may change attitudes and interests toward greater community with other nations, in political, economic, social, and cultural realms, since "transaction flows first establish mutual relevance of actors" and "the one thing which is unlikely to accompany a high level of transactions is continued tension and conflict." In a sense, Michael Sullivan remarks that this process:

...suggests that as communication increases between units, the complexities inherent in such activity increase, and that to handle these complexities the units formalize their interactions, one result of which is greater collaboration. From mutual cooperation might flow actual formal institutions to further simplify relationships or to make decisions for the units involved as one unit. Once that stage has been reached, integration of previously separate units into one becomes more likely.

This intimates that as the volume of commodities and services expand across national borders, chances of collaboration and the assimilation of peoples are great. Otherwise, such chances are slim, and so lead to disintegration.
The pluralists start with the general hypothesis that a high rate of the various types of transactional exchange within an area engender a high probability of international collaboration which will ultimately lead to integration, and "cohesiveness among individuals can be measured, and is probably promoted, by the extent of mutual relationship or interaction among them." Another finding of this is that intra-national transactions increased more rapidly than international transactions in an integrating system. It may be that it leads to integration on the regional basis, not international.

Moreover, the researches and analyses on the transaction flow with sharing the pluralist belief help understanding several assumptions for the procedures of social integration as follows:

1. The higher the transaction levels between two groups, the more salient each becomes to the other, however, salience may be positive or negative.
2. The higher the levels of mutually indulging transactions, the higher the positive salience; the higher the levels of mutually depriving transactions, the higher the negative salience.
3. The higher the positive salience, the higher the probability for cooperation and integration; the higher the negative salience, the higher the probability for disintegration and conflict.

The conclusion reached is that the most important societal predictors of mutual relevance are associated with "a general development syndrome in the international system," a finding
that they viewed as "generally consistent with the functionalist theory of international relations."69

As centering on the flow of social transactions among a group of states as the most proper indicator, it procures measurements of the level of transactions that are viewed as objective. In this sense, Deutsch asserts that no one index is suitable by itself. "All ranges of transaction, and the characteristics of any one range, have full meaning only in the context of the ensemble of at least several other major ranges that characterize the transaction flows between the participating populations as a whole,"70 he said. In a measurement, an ensemble of indices is indeed required.

In addition, in examining the flow of transaction in the North Atlantic area, Cobb and Elder undertook an empirical analysis of 1176 pairings of 49 states in a global sample together with 210 pairings of 15 states in the region. In an effort to measure by empirical analysis, a large number of transactional variables such as trade figures, mail flows, telecommunications, tourism, student exchange, etc., are used as the most portentous integrative indicators in determining how people collaborate with one another. Their findings are: "There is a positive correlation among the various indicators of mutual relevance in both systems. They are higher correlations among exchanges of communications and goods (trade, mail, telegraph) than among exchanges of people (tourism, student exchange)."71
This was debatable. One study found that "when measures such as communication or trade flows are used, there is no way to be sure that the increase or decrease in interaction is the result of integrative policies." Cantori and Spiegel argue that the pluralists, "have never been able to set out a causal theory, so it has never been clear whether the transactions are cause or effect of integration." Since it is not entirely clear, either theoretically or empirically, exactly what causes, accelerates, or reverses transaction flows, there is some risk in using transaction analysis predictively in integration studies.

Donald Puchala, presenting his view of "community formation in progress" in Europe of the Six between 1938 and 1963, believes that "'community formation' and 'regional integration' are neither semantically synonymous, conceptually congruent, nor empirically inseparable." He reaches a conclusion that transaction flows do not cause regional integration.

However, the transaction approach did contribute to an understanding of developing regions, as to why there was an absence, or low level of intra-regional transactions, and how that lack of transactions affected potential integrative or cooperative attempts among such states. Transaction flow analysis may be a good deal to the process of affiliation or social assimilation or affiliation between states.
Pluralists associate deepening patterns of mutual dependence among actors with changing transaction rates.\textsuperscript{78} For Richard Chadwick, in this context, being integrated represents one end of a continuum, as he points out combinations of (1) relatively high volumes of transactions, (2) relatively greater interrelatedness or covariance, and (3) relatively high reward or positive affect stemming from those transactions.\textsuperscript{79} Here, "integrative processes" belong to the "cybernetic processes."\textsuperscript{80} In brief, transactional integration is achieved by a higher level of interaction among different entities on a variety of indicators and with the assurance of reward within the international system. Contact between residents of the suburbs and residents of the city in certain areas is assumed to increase positive salience [i.e., the same way our People to People programs with the communist nations are assumed to increase mutual understanding] if there is mutual reward.\textsuperscript{81} On the other hand, if there is a low level of rewards, and as seen as game theory, what is bad for the one comes to be good for the other, a high level of transactional exchange is likely to bring about conflict. Thus a high level of transactions produces negative salience.
CHAPTER 4
INTEGRATION THEORIES (FUNCTIONALISM AND NEO-FUNCTIONALISM)

I. FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism has saliently attracted the theoretical attention soon after two major world wars in the modern history. With the discontentment of the experience of the League of Nations, functionalism had arisen as an alternative to insurmountable schemes for regional or global federations. The leading exponent of functionalism is unquestionably David Mitrany whose study focuses on avoiding war, and eventually preserving world peace by declining the realistic tenet on power politics in international relations. The basic characteristic of functionalism is the piecemeal (or incremental) approach and trans-border cooperation in the functional context, not via either radical or revolutionary strategy, to the goal of integration. Mitrany says in this context: "Our aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for co-operation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition."1

The functionalists express views that a number of nations are beyond their capability either to keep peace or to better the social and economic well-being of their citizens; the nations are increasingly interdependent on one another rather than independent in the economic and technological senses;
nation-state systems also have insufficient structure to obtain peaceful relations between member states. They also deem that global society within the international system comprising sovereign is divided into units based on territory rather than on its function to be expected to solve problems. Thus functionalism focuses upon the establishment of a world political community of states and a transnational web of international organizations to solve such problems at supranational level.

To the functionalists, all worldwide cooperation among nation-states should be strongly connected with the primacy of the interests of governments. The specialization of production and the growth of exchanges of goods and people across state boundaries at the world level, not merely facilitate people demand for the satisfaction of their survival needs, but need also mutual cooperation for interests, thereby integrating various national units. From this perspective, functionalists seem likely to espouse the concept of positive-sum game which all the participants could enjoy sharing benefits together by the mutual interactions, repudiating the thought of a zero-sum game that if one side wins, the other necessarily loses.

It is notable to recall functionalism in its historical context in the development of political, social, and economic structures. The free trade policy as an aftermath of industrialization in Western Europe in the 19th century expedited
to eradicate all barriers to commercial interchange. In turn, three themes were mostly highlighted in functionalism in the first half of the 20th century: the first theme is that of economic development; the second is that of the growth of concern with the state's role in the provision of welfare for the individual; the third is the growing uncertainty about the role of traditional democratic institutions in the modern state.²

In human efforts to solve an increasing number of problems, functionalism would be more likely to describe it as one of throwing increasing numbers of rope bridges across the chasm rather than trying to put a superhighway in place immediately.³ Mitrany's effort for a stable global peace, bridging the chasms separating states, and solving a multitude of problems that had resulted from world disorder in a human society, has proceeded by the growing economic and social interdependence and exchanges of all peoples and goods as well as a number of trans-border activities and cooperation in functional fields played peacefully across national boundaries. He further features that world peace and order could best be improved when international activities are to be organized to fulfill such human basic needs as food, shelter, security, transportation, health and welfare necessities, scientific and cultural activities, trade, and even production in a functional sense. It would create strong peaceful relations (or ties) between nation-states, based on either
enlightened self-interest or a common interest, and eventually lead to world peace and integration at international level. This is what Mitrany calls "A Working Peace System." In this connection Mitrany states:

... not a peace that would keep the nations quietly apart but a peace that would bring them actively together, not the old static and strategic view but a social view of peace. One might say that we must put our faith not in a protected peace but in a working peace; it would be nothing more or less than the idea and aspiration of social security taken in its widest range.

Every activity organized in that way would be a layer of peaceful life, and a sufficient addition of them would create increasingly side strata of peace—not the forbidding peace of an alliance, but one that would suffuse the world with a fertile mingling of common endeavor and achievement.

Mitrany's emphasis on the peace keeping is explained relevant to the establishment of economic integration. For example, the increased economic interactions and interdependence beyond nation-states will bring about the political integration in the long run, and if so, peaceful relations among member states are maintained. His insight produced a good effect on the achievement of the functional forms of international integration. Based on his induction in international relations, the contents of the functional theory to international integration will be enumerated and analyzed in detail.
A. Theoretical Components of Functionalism

The theoretical components of functionalism to world peace and integration are above all in pursuit of the "liberal-democratic tradition" which is "firmly rooted in nineteenth century rationalism and radicalism with its background of growing material prosperity and the eradication of social evils." Its position does not necessarily obstruct cooperation among different states which have different political ideologies and systems.

Liberalism being effectively reflected on outlining the functionalist framework generally pursues both traditions of the utopian thought (or idealism) and of the utilitarian strain. The former based on the ethical standard depicts that "man is by nature good, rational, and devoted to the common weal," so that politics can be made to conform to the fulfillment of the human basic needs and welfare. In this point, functionalist approach toward resolving problems of human welfare is "an assertion and defense of the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and the elimination of war ...."

The utilitarian tradition (and Benthamite) not only embraced the management of natural resources and technological innovations, but also included a broad commitment to humanitarian and moral improvement. From this perspective, men make efforts to pursue their benefit at maximum through
cooperation with one another every time necessary for their material welfare in the real world. In the course of seeking self-interest, human beings might also encourage the international interactions and the creation of world peace and order, and hence member-states might give up the use of force in international relations in order to gratify the aspirations of their people without risking the security of their citizens. It, however, differ from functionalism in a sense of accentuating the advantages of competition over self-interest rather than the essential of service.

Although Mitrany's identification is with the liberal rather than social inclination in the advancement of social welfare, functionalism also shares with the ideological outlook of "Guild Socialism" (traces of Marxism) in the context that interstate conflict is caused by social inequality. To functionalists, unlike the realists, social conflict is not deemed instinctive and unavoidable if and when there is a material affluence of economic resources. Once the inequalities are removed by means of international Functional programs bypassing the state, the creative energies of man will be harnessed to banning war. 11 The functionalists believe that, provided the government cannot consummate such a goal for its own people, it makes it quite difficult to enter into a worldwide system of cooperation with other countries.
B. Separability Propositions

First of all, the functionalists postulate separability propositions of the work of the experts from that of politicians. From the realist perspective, "... disharmonies and conflict will prevail in a society in which authority is exercised by politicians rather than technicians, by parliaments rather than voluntary groups." "Power, instead of the common good, power then determined policy, and irrational behavior follows." By contrast, the functionalists disdain the role of political elites for world peace, but rather demand for highly trained specialists to solve many problems facing today's world at the international level. They believe that it is possible for a central government to delegate its superlative authority to technical experts in functional fields. To be precise, the non-political problems in relatively non-controversial, humanitarian, economic, social, technological areas are bound to be assigned to highly nonpolitical trained experts, technicians and administrators as opposed to politicians from various countries for resolution. In Mitrany's own words, "... functional arrangements have the patent virtue of technical self-determination".

As a second proposition, the functionalists set forth the separability of power from welfare. Both are thought of as representing types of human and state aims; great insistence is placed upon the distinction, and a great many programmatic
It is the functionalists' belief that dedication to the welfare orientation would be acquired by leaving the task of international integration to specialists or voluntary groups. For example, a number of experts of certain state bureaucracies most willingly work for the good of the attainment of a welfare need which is more likely to be the useful integrative method. Therefore, the functionalist proposition is rephrased to read: "International integration is advanced most rapidly by a dedication to welfare, through measures elaborated by experts aware of the political implications of their task and representative of homogeneous and symmetrical social aggregates, public or private."15

Additionally, Haas set forth two more separability propositions. One is the separability of various governmental tasks into discrete elements, even if only temporarily, i.e., complete separation of military-defense (power-oriented) tasks from economic-abundance (welfare-oriented) tasks, in addition to isolating various kinds of welfare tasks.16 The other is, equally important, that "separation occurs between the loyalties imputed to the political actor."17 Since actors can be loyal to several agencies simultaneously, a gradual transfer of loyalties to international organizations performing most of the crucial functions is likely.18 A conclusion is the creation of personal political loyalties coming from the contentment of the completion of important
functions performed by an agency of government, and the change of functions may generate shifts in loyalty.

The separability propositions of functionalism are not, in brief, the policy description of what the organizations are but the policy directive of the path these organizations should follow to achieve a status of supranational integration. From the observation of four separability propositions, if the question of "separability-priority," as Inis Claude denotes, appears in integrative processes, the separability propositions set apart the political from functional processes, and thereafter will certainly give priority to functional processes.

C. The Creation of Transnational Web of Economic and Social Organizations to International Integration

In contrast to the federalist goal of the establishment of supranational government, functionalist efforts lie in the creation of the number of functional international organizations (IOs)—"...formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members insecurity, economic, social, or related fields." The objectives of these organizations were and are oriented primarily toward the attainment of economic interest, concentrating upon development, industrialization, and the improvement of economic relations across national frontiers.
with advances in international transportation and communication technology. By such functional organizations, people are "binding together [of] those interests which are common, where they are common."\textsuperscript{22}

Such organizations would highly facilitate the development of cooperation in the functional context on the basis of overall coordinations at global level, the governmental agencies involved less using or relying upon their sovereign powers of the political units as a means of solving problems facing the modern world and of integration of independent and interdependent states. Functionalists thus assume that through the proliferation of international organizations on the functional level with successful accomplishment of a number of the welfare responsibilities formerly retained to the state, conflict and wars between the nation-states will disappear, so the emphasis on high politics will be obsolete. Good feeling between them and a warless global community will have arisen. For example, for functionalists, the good performance of substantive functional activities by virtue of international organizations--i.e., the International Labor Office (ILO) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)--which have undertaken a particular task or function would not merely bring nations closer together but also make a common interest at the international level.

Furthermore, institutions in international organizations based on function which is dictated by the interaction between
the demands of technology and welfare, not by idealism or philosophy, may be proper for improving human welfare and needs and for solving such basic social and economic problems in the modern ages. In a functionalist view, the process of the function of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs or NGOs) could be developed not by territorial or political lines of organization, but by the nature and the degree of the problems which they have to solve.

There would be as many international organizations as needs, and they would be formed on a universal rather than a regional basis in their participation. Functionalists favor the creation of INGOs for "the development of an informed international opinion in certain fields," and see them as essential supports for the IGOs that they wanted to see created without any governmental pressure in bringing them together. For example, a functional union allows its all nations to work together without depending on a supreme political body or political union.

Nevertheless, it has been observed that the most successful functional tactics were regional and even bilateral in their process of ECSC, Eurovision, WHO smallpox eradication programme. Mitrany points out in this sense, "...the functional approach emphasizes the common index of need. Very many such needs cut across national boundaries, not a few are universal, and an effective beginning for building up an
international community of interest could be made by setting up joint agencies for dealing with these common needs."^{26}

Functionalists pin their hopes for rational organizational action on the technical and non-controversial character of international welfare activity.^{27} They desire that according to "learning process," the citizens to engage in international cooperation to utilize technological developments will gradually transfer their loyalties to the international organizations to improve material conditions of life and social needs. More precisely, when citizens involved share economic benefits together as a result of the successful operation in the economic sector, political loyalties^{28} of the relevant as entangling in a transnational ramifying web of economic and social organizations will be gradually transferred to new supranational institutions. This would eventually bring about distribution of loyalties (or incremental alteration) from one organ to another or other agencies by the spillover effect. "Nationalism thus loses its sting."^{29}

More recently, Mark Imber resurrects Mitranian functionalism as regards international organizations, and brings it forth in five parts as follows:\^{30}

(1) Functionalism proposes that it is possible to identify responsibilities of national government in the field of welfare and technical administration that can be more efficiently organized through inter-governmental co-operation.

(2) Functionalism proposes the foundation of inter-governmental organizations, each mandated to undertake
the specific and limited responsibilities assigned to it by the express instruction of the member governments. Provision will be made for consultative status for non-governmental organizations and for parliamentary representatives of the member states. The mandate will also bestow upon each organization limited powers of executive discretion in respect of technical administration.

(3) The authority of the organization will be extended by the member states consenting to be bound by such rules and operating procedures as may be adopted by the organization in furtherance of its mandate.

(4) Functionalism proposes that each international organization be endowed with enforceable sanctions by which means those member states which act in breach of the rules and procedures of the organization may be penalized. These sanctions will take the form of debarring the state from the benefits of membership.

(5) Functionalism proposes that the successful implementation of each organization's mandate will create positive incentives for each member state to refrain from threat or use of force in the conduct of relations with other member states.

The first two propositions feature the essential of the functional cooperation and inter-governmental cooperation; the third intimates the working position of functionalism; the fourth stresses the authority of intergovernmental organizations among member-states; the fifth mentions the rationale of furthering the development of peaceful relations among nations. Those five propositions on international organizations would reconsider Mitrani's functionalism and furnish the theoretical framework and knowledge of functionalism for further research.

Mitrani's functional approach to international organization widely affected European integration. By turn, our efforts lie in studying what the characteristics of organizations in the functional level have in their operation.
1. A Web of Interdependence

Of particular importance closely associated with the functional image of international system is the regard of interdependence between sovereign states through the expanding net of international organization. In the international realm, as power and balance of power are to realists and as dependency in world capitalist context is to many globalists, so is interdependence to many functionalists (including neo-functionalists). Some denotation of interdependence in relation to integration is depicted by which it is not closely associated with teleological or process-directed theory. Interdependence would "overlay political divisions with spreading web of international activities, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated."

Often rhetorical use of "interdependence" positively connotes egalitarian thought of which it is taken to be a feature of bilateral advantageous relationships. With coordinate various activities between member states, international institutions would appear to be very effective and beneficial. The general assumption of the functionalist is that the more the degree of interdependence, the higher dependence on such institutions.

The interdependence in economic, social, cultural, and other related fields as trade flow, finance, goods, people, tourism, migration, environmental pollution, transfer of
technology, and so on across international boundaries, to the functionalists, would be explicitly conducive at least to the maintaining good relations among the interdependent units. When such type of interdependence exists, military force may have less utility in conflict resolution. Hence it is clear that while the realist view includes a billiard ball model as a power model clashing with one another and little attention to the interactions of sovereign, independent units, the functionalist one has a latticework or cobweb image which would represent a much more intricate system in the contemporary geographical relationships and political boundaries. Such a functionalist image provides for and encourages the high level of interactions of interdependent sovereign units across national borders, and thereby would be conducive to the achievement of integration.

In Deutsch's and others' examination of the relations between interdependence and interactions, the conclusion was reached that the level of interdependence among nations, especially trade, at the international level, has been declining in much of the 20th century than in the 19th century. Trade, as a percentage of GNP, has declined. In some cases, according to Viotti and Kauppi, an interdependent relationship may have such negative consequences that both parties would be quite happy to cease contact with one another entirely, forgoing any benefits that such contact may bring. From the realist perspective, interdependence
between chasm separating states can lead to conflict and cooperation. In Kenneth Waltz's words, "Closer interdependence means closeness of contact and raises the prospect of at least occasional conflict. The fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones have been fought within areas populated by highly similar people whose affairs had become quite closely knit together."[36]

However, the functionalists are strongly against the realist view on that. Rather, they believe that increasing economic and technological interdependence calling necessarily for forming transnational structures will extend cooperation and intensify catalysts to prevent a war in advance, and eventually lead to creating functional international organizations to integration in the international system. Therefore, the functionalists are mindful to use the multiple channels in linking societies, including interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations with a view to promoting interdependence.

2. **Primacy of Nonpolitical Factors**

Both the approach and the "functional sector" of international activities have come to be associated either with those areas customarily designated "social," "humanitarian," or "economic," in accordance with their substance, or with the labels "technical," "non-controversial," or "non-political," in reference to the procedure by which problems in these areas are ostensibly defined and their solutions found and
That is, the functional way is "to shift the emphasis from political issues which divide to those social issues in which the interest of the peoples is plainly akin and collective...." To the functionalists, the intricacy of governmental systems has augmented greatly the vitally technical, anti-political tasks encountering governments. Depoliticization and a technical treatment of issues are thus regarded as the most rapid way in the solution of problems--i.e., specific purpose IGOs and INGOs would work out and collaborate to settle existing problems. Simply put, the functional approach is not favorable to political determinism to international integration. Rather, functionalists generally postulate that specific purpose institutions should be performed by specialists guided by the non-political way, the way of "technical self-determination" in functional areas rather than political elites or diplomats who deal best with particulars of sovereignty and national prestige.

In particular, Mitrany and Myrdal tend to see that war is generally caused by social and economic maladjustments, and social and economic welfare are the preconditions of world peace. In this sense, functionalism avoids situations of conflict to concentrate upon "common needs that are evident" and upon "making frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them." Emphasized most is that a web of international activities and agencies is organized for the
achievement of human needs through trans-border functional cooperation and collaboration, but not through essentially political choices. And such cooperation would be best done in such non-controversial, non-political, social, economic, technical fields as transportation and telecommunications, public health, postal services, river control, and so forth for the common good and interest, a better life, and even world peace. The successful cooperative experience attained in one functional domain is eventually able to transfer the other one and to bring nations closer together. Hence international community would build in terms of the contentment of common needs shared by the components which have diverse nationalism and ideologies.

3. Decentralization

As an another feature, closely clinging to the anti-political component to the functional process, functionalism is inclined to follow decentralization. To functionalists, decentralization is by far superior to centralization as a pragmatic way by allowing functional process to be successful. Mitrany advocates it, saying that:

...it is the central view of the functional approach that such an (overall political) authority is not essential for our greatest and real immediate needs. The several functions could be organized through the agreement, given specially in each case, of the national governments chiefly interests, with the grant of the requisite powers and resources; whereas it is clear...that they could not allow such organizations simply to be prescribed by some universal authority, even if it existed. For an authority which had the title to do so would in effect be hardly less than a world government; and such a strong central
organism might develop a tendency to take unto itself rather more authority than that originally allotted to it....

In decision-making process, it is, however, more accurately difficult to manifest that decentralization is surely superior to centralization. On this point, Robert McLaren argues that decentralization does lead to such benefits as speed in making decisions close to the scene of the action, reliance on the technical expertise produced by that function, enhancement of morale and motivation amongst the involved decision makers, but, centralization of decision-making also has advantages: co-ordination to ensure that all decisions are consistent with each other, continuity with past decisions, and accountability through focusing the decision making prerogative in one person or plenary.

4. Automatic Spillover Effect

Functionalists speculate that nations with successful collaboration in one particular technical area or functional realm will be tempted to engage in further cooperation in other related fields. For example, integration in one sector of an economy provokes integration of another, and economic integration then spreads into other fields and culminates in a submerging of the governments involved in a larger community.... This process is what Mitrany termed as "ramification," and Haas as "spillover." It, if defined, is "the process whereby members of an integration scheme attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to
collaboration in another related sector (expanding the scope of the mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of mutual commitment) or both.\textsuperscript{46} Haas places a greater emphasis on the inevitability of spillover in the integrative process.

For effectual spillover effect functionalists underscore a learning process as an automatic consequence. In Haas' own words, "When actors realize that their interest would best be achieved by adopting new approaches, and if these approaches involve commitment to larger organization then and only then does 'Learning' contribute to integration."\textsuperscript{47} Learning is on the basis of the self-interest perceptions shown by the actors. The corollary of learning is that "integrative lessons learned in one functional context will be applied in other contexts, eventually encroaching upon and supplanting politics."\textsuperscript{48} This suggests that men will learn cooperation by acting hand-in-hand by avoiding both controversial and political matters, and thereby they will also learn how to augment such cooperation and to ameliorate their relations across national boundaries.

5. \textbf{Minimal Attack on Sovereignty (or Nation-State)}

The functionalist scheme is totally different from the federalist aim of creating a larger sovereign state. From the historical experiences and observations of integrative
process, functionalists (especially, Mitrany) see that unexpected changes in sovereignty are likely, not by conquest or revolution, but by a piecemeal shift of sovereignty in accordance with social essential and political evolution. That is, political integration should not be conceived of as an instantaneous and whole surrender of the existing sovereignty and nation-state system. In their view, sovereignty should be transcended and made irrelevant by institutionalizing cooperation for each part of the intricate web of social and economic activities that is a "functioning reality." On the face of it the functional design seems to strike the being of the nation state system which may be considered as a major barrier to integration; however, in fact, the real life of nation-state system would lead to the furtherance of international unity toward human welfare in the long run.

This is in particular so as regards perception of the tenancy of sovereignty in the functionalist approach to international integration. Envisioning that sovereignty cannot be constructively transferred by formula, but via a function, Mitrany claims, "...a slice of sovereign is transferred from the old authority to the new, and the accumulation of such partial transfers over time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority." He adds "...'sharing of sovereignty' rather than surrender--on particular issues, governments would 'poor' their sovereign authority insofar as
Structurally, the minimal result might be something like a pluralistic community of states whose sovereign power is reduced and controlled by international functional linkages. In Stanley Hoffmann's view, "The most effective attack on sovereignty is not a fronted one—it is one which slowly but clearly deprives sovereignty of its substance, and consequently of its prestige."

In conformity with the pluralist view, Karl Deutsch is skeptical about the functionalist approach to the development of international organizations because of his belief that "all these organizations are limited mainly to the exchange of views and of knowledge, the making of studies, the drafting of recommendations, and the rendering of technical assistance to governments requesting it." Further, these agencies are beyond strength to tax their citizens as well as to sanction violations. As Volker Rittberger claims, their governing authorities are mostly made up of intelligentsia and bureaucracies delegated by governments who represent their governments to the international organization. However, neither do they have desire to weaken their own power over their national societies by permitting the serious promotion of any competing international loyalties by which their own domestic power could be weakened, nor can they symbolize
the will of this organization to their components with effect, as national legislators can and do from time to time.

Functionalism as has been discussed in this section is not yet a scientific theory of integration. According to Groom, "...while functionalism is largely inexplicit and untestable, it is never the less an extraordinarily seductive mode of thought which has not been effaced by the passage of time." The logic and dynamics of functionalism were co-opted by European federalists whose concern was with the possible arrangements for a federal United States of Europe. In effect, functionalism is both a description and a prescription as a strategy for constructing world peace. It is, however, already widely accepted as quite close to contemporary theorizing in the arena of regional integration.

In reality, there are some problems in processing functional integration at the international level. For example, many of the problems with which they deal will be closely interrelated; powers and competencies will intersect and clash; and measures taken in one field will have consequences in others. The substantial process of integration in Europe by means of the operation of various international organizations and activities, is not bound up with nonpolitical in almost all respects as the assumption of functionalists. Given this context, it is paradoxical to keep an overt separation between "political" and technical." Furthermore, Mitrany's expectation of functional organizations
of international political relations—the likelihood that functional activities once started, might also expand cooperation and provoke contrary forces—is far from reality. Indeed it is quite difficult to suppose a global society which is led only by a network of autonomous functional agencies. Even worse, all constituent units cannot share equally the obvious benefits of functional activities.

There are also some difficulties of broader application of functionalism as a means of international integration. When its efforts have been applied to such less industrialized areas with economies that are less complex as Latin America (the Latin American Free Trade Area), East Africa (the East African community), and Central America (the Central American Common Market), functionalism did not work well in those regions. Some scholars give a reasonable answer to this question. In Nye's view, there is no "similarity of integration processes in Europe and less developed areas (and thus upon the adequacy of our European-oriented theoretical models) by pointing to important differences in infrastructure, political group structure, interdependence of social sectors, national consciousness, and ideology."^{60} Haas further contends, "integration proceeds fastest when it constitutes a response to socio-economic demands coming from an industrial and urban environment; the factors conducive to regional integration include a pluralist social structure, economic development, and a low level of ideological
politics. But these ingredients are not generally found in less developed areas. And further, spillover from one technical economic task to another has seldom occurred in the region. Even when spillover does occur, the typical integrating organization in the developing countries lacks the necessary administrative and bureaucratic talent to take advantage of the situation.

Its application of functionalism in the region of Europe has also undergone the slow development of European integration due to being at variance with the reality to its process. Functionalism thus needs to reexamine and modify. In the most general sense, its approach is still in impasse in integrative proceeding.

Both the aforementioned weak points and limited application arising from the problems in the process of functional activities to bridge or integrate the chasms between states used to stimulate the birth of the theory of neo-functionalism as a new direction of a theory of integration, will be discussed and analyzed in the second part of the chapter, to show how to move the process from the narrowly technical to the broadly political, from low politics to high politics.

II. NEO-FUNCTIONALISM

In the neo-functionalist scheme integration is the process, as political community is the terminal condition. Although an emulous "pan-European" federalist strategy for the
construction of political community had been espoused in the late 1940s and early 1950s to European integration, any practical federal institutions had not been established. By turn, the attempt to European integration had proceeded through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) offered by Robert Schuman in 1950. As appreciating the limits of economic determinism to integration through the operation of ECSC, integration theorists such as Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter, Leon Lindberg, Joseph Nye, and others, have made an attempt to restate and revise functionalist logic as providing the theoretical breakthrough to European integration with the emergence a new set of views of "neo-functionalism."

The neo-functionalist school of thought based on the European experience appeared as an alternative between federalism and functionalism, and was aimed at the creation of European community to set forward integration in political and economic determinism. Even though the neo-functionalism is derived from the academic offspring of functionalism, in reality, it has traits of both functionalism and federalism. Nye explains it: "Basically, the neo-functionalists were federalists in functionalist clothing, pursuing federal ends through what appeared to be functionalist means."63

Neo-functionalism starts, in theory and practice, differently from other predominant integration theories. The neo-functionalists incline to regard the establishment of a
supranational state as the goal of integration as federalists do, but they are generally more concerned with the process rather with the goal. As contrasted with the older functionalists, neo-functionalists used to intentionally choose the politically momentous areas with the intention of expediting the process of incremental decision-making to integration. They also aspire to establish the international organization to further and accomplish the ultimate political integration.

With the basic neo-functionalist representation mentioned briefly above, the characteristics and assumptions of neo-functional paradigm would be recapitulated, comparing with theory of functionalism.

1. Political Relevancy to Technical, Noncontroversial, and Economic and Welfare Matters

As concerns Mitrany's inadequate explication to the power component, neo-functionalists repudiate the functionalist proposition that "power is separate from welfare." In a sense, Haas put forth, "Men thought in terms of realizing the welfare state, of trimming world commitments and an independent foreign policy to the economic and the fiscal demands of domestic welfare." Though the notion "power" is defined and used on the realist basis, power here may be pictured as a "convenient term for describing violence-laden means used for the realization of welfare aims." According
to an effective learning process, power-oriented national maneuvers would direct toward welfare-oriented activities.

Furthermore, neo-functionalists doubt about functional proposition as respects distinction between "technical" and "political" affairs to integration. This separability proposition--"technical" just indicates what works in functional spheres, and so "political" sectors cannot be appropriate for operation to integration--seems likely to be an unrealistic conclusion. In the rational mode, according to Haas, "...experts increasingly agree on the management of knowledge for action; politicians accept their consensus as they make it part of their striving to attain more ambitious goals." "The combination implies an acceptance of synoptic planning as the appropriate administrative technique." 66

In retrospect, the functional approach to integration from the European experience has been surely practical with the cooperation in economic, social, and technical fields among different states, but indeed would be difficult to accomplish its eventual goals with no application of the political process. The neo-functionalists predict that cooperation in socio-economic sectors and the political process and determination can smoothly co-exist, and make pragmatic progress together toward regional integration.

In the modern democratic industrial society, there would be no longer a political determinism, which is not directed toward the improvement of economics, welfare, education, or
monetary policy. The so-called Eurocrats including intellectuals, especially in the United States, reached the conclusion that although the functionalist strategy directed highly to facilitate the growth of the international cooperation and interdependence, the political integration would proceed by virtue of both economic and technical self-determination and political means. From the example of the ecumenical European Community tactic, "...the scheme was devised and elaborated by technical elites and presented to the public only after compromises had been worked out among political leaders." It should be apparent that the strategy was being effectively carried out by the material function of both political, economic, and technical elites.

Viewed as decisive to integration is the "gradual politicization of the actors' purposes which were initially considered 'technical' or 'noncontroversial,'..." Haas sees that the actors should be gradually politicized with a view of the spectrum of procedures fashioned to bring into political integration so as to respond to the earliest economic and technical approaches. In contrast to Mitrany, Haas does not espouse that economic and technical cooperation bypasses politics, but he does propose that the requirements of mechanical functionalism lead to new forms of political action. Thus, the scholars, specifically Haas and Claude, believe that neo-functionalism is more realistic and practical.
than the functionalism as concerns the possibility of entire separation between welfare and politics.

2. **Superiority of Economic than Political Determinism**

The federal activists understand that "the politicization of actors' aims and the increased controversiality of decisions are seen as vital elements in an expansive process of integration."\(^{69}\) However, to neo-functionalists, the integrative processes can be illustrated both by the expanding functional needs beyond nation-states and by the interacting of such political forces as interest groups, political parties, governments, and international organizations. As Haas observes, "...the history of the European unity movement suggests that the relationship between politics and economics remains somewhat elusive."\(^{70}\) And so, it seems to absolutely need a political determinism in the European social and economic structure.

At what level of concern in integration process, indeed does neo-functionalism have closer affinity to functionalism than to federalism? From the neo-functionalist perspective, it is to believe "the permanent superiority of step-by-step economic decisions over crucial political choices."\(^{71}\) Drawing a distinction between low politics dealing with the socio-economic or welfare issues and the high politics matters of security, diplomacy, strategy and national ideologies, the neo-functionalists give first priority to the formal context
in its integrative process, and the latter's approach, to second stage of integration.

Haas supports this: "...the development of European supranationality was said to connote 'the victory of economics over politics,' thus signaling the demise of the ethnocentric nationalism that preferred guns to butter, passion to reason, and excited demands to statistical bargaining." This also suggests to circumspectly select a sector that is politically both important and relevant, but neither is it designed by technocrats, nor does it call instantaneous commitment to federal institutions. In nature, neo-functionalism is prone to appraise political components as subordinate to economic or technical ones, so high politics of states are generally dealt with as less momentous than low politics. In brief, neo-functionalists value highly the economic self-interest rather than political commitment.

3. **No Automatic Process of Spillover**

The neo-functionalists are largely to decline the thought of what Haas terms, "the built-in autonomy of functional context," or to believe spillover--"the expansive logic of sector integration" leads to "automatic politicization." Nye asserts that integration is far from automatic; sometimes spillover occurs but sometimes not, as external actors may foster or obstruct integration. It implies that there is no automatic process of spillover from the economic, technical, and non-controversial matters of cooperation that
do not automatically lead to other non-technical or politically sensitive areas.

A neo-functionalist view on the spillover process is summarized by Paul Taylor: "Spillover was the process whereby successful integration in an area of lesser salience would lead to a series of further integrative measures in linked areas so that the process would become increasingly involved with issues of greater political importance." This spillover occurs by a setting of the socio-economic and technological interdependence and interdependence in more politically salient issue-areas in international relations. Then, integration (or the eventual emergence of a global community) can be attained through the highest extent of magisterial decision-making, which "in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth."

While spillover of integration takes place, the ensuing constructive improvement in non-political areas is envisioned to spread into other spheres, for example, common defense or even common government, and thereby national policies are adjusted in all related fields. Then, the applications of policies—"Machiavellian or Bismarckian or Gaullist"—are carried on to splash into the heart of politics. This refers to the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union and finally to a political union among states as automatic.
A similar conclusion comes from Haas in his later work on the Western European integration in 1960. He began to doubt the automatism of the spillover effect from the lessons of European regional organizations, with his belief that "lessons about integrative processes associated with one phase do not generally carry over into the next because the specific policy context."78 Then, he restates as regards "learning process"-learning of integrative lessons. Learning processes, again, can be thought of as resulting from the availability of new types of knowledge; or the uninformed recognition of new objectives may trigger "learning" which deliberately seeks new knowledge.79 Such a concept can be labeled "extra-regional echoing"--i.e., whole or partial copying of a regional group's integrative behavior by outside regional groups or states, especially behavior which is innovative.80 Through learning process, spillover will occur only "if actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perception, desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation."81

Spillover itself is perhaps only one of various active social procedures implicated in either integrating or disintegrating or stagnant systems. Will the economic integration be sure to automatically precipitate political integration among nations? The study of Haas and Schmitter on unity in Latin America presents that "under modern conditions the relationship between economic and political union had best be treated as a continuum."82 Put so generally, the process
of economic integration does not automatically lead to political unity. For example, "...given all these conditions, ...the progression from a politically inspired common market to an economic union, and finally to a political union among states is automatic."^83

Within the sphere of spillover process in international system, Schmitter pointed out that the spillover notion on theoretical and operational basis should be revised, refined, and restated in a typology of actor strategies. In the process of regional integration, he understands actor integration strategies as dependent variables, and independent variable as "crisis-induced cycles of decision" by national actors rather than the authority-legitimacy bond. These cycles are the result of regional or external problems and pressures which cause members to re-think their position on the scope and level of integration within the region.^84 A number of results are conceivable with spillover effect:

(1) Spillover, i.e., to increase only the scope and level of his commitment concomitantly;
(2) Spill-around, i.e., to increase only the scope while holding the level of authority constant or within the zone of indifference;
(3) Buildup, i.e., to agree to increase the decisional autonomy or capacity of joint institutions but deny them entrance into new issue areas;
(4) Retrench, i.e., to increase the level of joint deliberation but withdraw the institutions from certain areas;
(5) Muddle-about, i.e., to let the regional bureaucrats debate, suggest, and expostulate on a wider variety of issues but decrease their actual capacity to allocate values;
(6) Spill-back, i.e., to retreat on both dimensions, possibly returning to the status quo ante initiation;
Encapsulate, i.e., to respond to crisis by marginal modifications within the zone of indifference.

Schmitter prefers to apply the concept of "spill-around" rather than use that of "spillover" in characterizing the augmentation of autonomous undertaking at regional coordination in the given functional context. Likewise, Lindberg and Scheingold provide for five alternatives "process models", of which only one, "forward linkage," resembles the old notion of spillover. Other alternatives are "output failure" (or failure of spillover), "equilibrium", "spill-back" (a retraction of the scope or level of integration) and "system transformation," a qualitatively different process in which the original commitments are transcended through an "entirely new constitutive bargaining process".

4. Incremental or Collective Decision-Making Process

Neo-functionalists believe that political and economic integration cannot occur in the absence of the decision-makers' inspired will of the component nations. With the expectation of spillover process, they largely rely on the primacy of the incremental or collective decision-making both of which are more constructive in achieving political integration. The focal point of this is that the conviction and determination of influential state decision-makers will, both certainly and directly, affect the success or failure of regional integration.
As a way of integrative process from neo-functionalist perspective, incremental decision-making is "a routine for collectively coping with problems in such a manner as to let new decisions emerge piecemeal from inadequately made prior decisions." Incrementalism is a strategy of the second-best: if we always had a consensus for dramatic change, and if we always had perfect knowledge of all the variables which ought to go into a decision, we could dispense with incremental modes. Therefore, incremental decision-making pattern, as a form of political behavior, is more practical in triggering integrative process than the construction of elaborate and grand designs. This is given a circumstantial description by Haas, as follows. First, decision-makers, governmental bureaucrats and political elitists engage in decision-making, calling for "more and more interbureaucratic contact and consultations, meeting the new problems which grow out of the earlier compromises." Second, the activities of individuals and certain groups launch to organize across national frontiers so as to directly affect policy decisions against the monopoly of national governments, and then they lead to "spill over into the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse." Third, a multitude of economic and social activities exert an influence upon the supranational jurisdiction. Etzioni calls this approach "a modern democratic method of decision-making."
Furthermore, the advent or establishment over time of collective decision-making processes is also important to political integration. The leading exponents of this are Lindberg and Scheingold. They develop an ordinal scale of decision-making, ranging from a low level, where all decisions are made individually by member states to a high level, where all choices are made collectively.\textsuperscript{92} They consider that regional integration comes from the authority-legitimacy bond and the capability of communal institutions to develop this bond in terms of decision-making process rather than from what Haas and Schmitter used, crisis-induced decision cycles.

Lindberg is concerned with a behavioral approach in collective decision-making process, applying David Easton's systems analysis to the inquiry of European integration. Its emphasis is not geographical nor institutional, but behavioral; politics, as a pattern of behavior, is a crucial ingredient of any social system. Although both Haas and Lindberg feature the function enacted by the bureaucratic elites and interest groups of the nations in the decision making process, Lindberg's notion is less deterministic, and much more "actor-oriented," than Haas's one from neo-functionalism idea.

5. \textbf{Gradual Transfer of Sovereignty (or Nation-State System) to the Supranational Authority}

Neo-functionalism also directly challenges the functional thought of the minimum maintenance of sovereignty and the
continual existence of nation-state system. In its scheme, sovereignty (or nation-state system) should be gradually transferred to the central institutional structures. By delegating decision-making power (or authority) and the affairs of the primacy of politics to the common institutions, decision-makers would also foresee its greater roles to further political integration. Slowly such an integrative process erodes the national sovereignty of the member states to a certain form of political union. Nye's description in this context is interesting: "...neo-functionalism is a strategy for attacking the castle of national sovereignty by stealth, with interest groups as mercenaries and technocrats as agents within the walls to open the gates quietly." In this connection, it shares some of the federalist idea with respect to attack on political sovereignty. It is preferred to be viewed as "federal-functionalists."  

6. Development of International Political Institutions

Neo-functionalists place a greater emphasis on the development of international political institutions, which are relatively superior to the governments of the member-states for the stage of integration with the successful operation in technical economic areas, as part of the process of regional integration. Viewed in this light, neo-functionalism is more likely to be directly in opposition to the functionalism in a strict sense that its tactic stresses the creation of strong central institutions as a high degree of political
integration. It seems to comply with the federalist idea, but strictly speaking, it is at a lower threshold than the federalists.

Neo-functionalists also believe that once important tasks are given to a supranational body, the interdependence of economic processes will produce pressure for the granting of further supranational powers involving regulation and adjustment in order to meet successfully the tasks required by the initial shift of powers.\textsuperscript{95} It should, however, come about only if and when a governmental agency and/or international organizations can successfully fulfill functions of important tasks for economic benefits and welfare by the functional activities that the individuals and organized groups of component units--particularly in industry and agriculture--give most willingly broader authority to a new powerful supranational body regardless of the longing of the individual actors. In the meantime, "...support and loyalty, previously exchanged with national authorities in return for interest satisfaction, are transferred to community institutions."\textsuperscript{96} If the citizens involved should get the economic interest or benefit, their political loyalties are expected to shift to the new supranational entity. If this process works successfully, political integration will occur; a supranational authority hence will supersede the nation-states.

In essence, two functionalist schools of thought look upon processes as more important than goals, and as economic,
social and technical conditions as consequential for integration. In addition, they share common ideas in certain points: (1) Both stress welfare. (2) Both tend to downgrade the role of symbols and identity and to emphasize utilitarian factors in community formation. (3) Both tend to rely on pluralistic societies in which individuals and groups are free to shift their activities and loyalties. (4) Both tend to emphasize the role of the technocrat, though the neo-functionalist technocrat is politically "savvy" and is expected to have close links with the centers of power. 97

However, neo-functionalism is quite distinguished from functionalism in the study of international political integration in some aspects. The pure functionalists are in favor of an interdependence of technology, science, economics; but, neo-functionalists, of a political interdependence in international systems in which national systems are permitted to perform their individual functions arising at a national level, including the authoritative allocation of values in a society. While functionalists focus upon economic determinism and technological changes, neo-functionalist analytical attention is directed to the effects of political factors such as elites, interest groups, political parties, government and international organizations.

Furthermore and perhaps more crucially, as far as the international organizations concerned, the two schools are different from each other to the process of integration. At
the levels of integration, neo-functionalists comply with the pure functionalist proposition that integration across national borders could be accomplished by first creating international organizations, in which they fulfill the economic, social and technical tasks and functions. In their approach to integration, the influence of international interaction in such organizations is a gradual incremental process of institutional development beyond the nation-states. However, in contrast to the traditional functionalists, the important concern of the neo-functionalists is the effective functioning of the international organizations dealing with more controversial subjects which are politically more momentous including those for the contentment of human basic needs and welfare.

Neo-functionalists in their deliberate design of institutions that would lead to further integration include not only the functionalist sense of the transfer of "'lessons of benefits' of technical self-determination from one field to another, but through what has been called l'engrenage, or 'the expansive logic of sector integration'."\textsuperscript{98} For example, as a process mechanism to achieve the integration of social security, transportation policies, and even ultimate integration, the Schuman plan set spurs to the creation of the ECSC, in which six European states--France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg--signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The treaty was, by nature, a customs
union in coal and steel, with further arrangements for abolishing all discriminatory activities between producers and users within the domain of free common markets. Jean Monnet believed that such action was essential to eliminate distortions in coal and steel prices.99

As an opening department for the federation of Europe, the ECSC was an instantaneous success at that time.100 As the economic benefits of the participant units were adequately great, negotiations for European integration were started by 1955 and culminated in the Treaty of Rome, signed by the same six states in 1957. It provided for step-by-step progress of a Common Market and, less successfully, cooperation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy. The treaty provided for phased reduction of tariffs, a common external tariff, a common agricultural support system, harmonization of many regulations, and coordination of economic policy.101 In consequence, two new organizations, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), were established. At last, these organizations, along with the ECSC, constitute what is known as the European Community (EC) which has executive, legislative, and judicial institutions. From 1986 on the expansion of the EC from 6 member states to 12 was completed, via 9 members from 1973 (United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland), 10 from 1981 (Greece) to 12 in 1986 (Spain and Portugal).102
From such European experiences and development, the following notions of integration based on the idea of neo-functionalism are proper to reveal: (1) integration as political unification; (2) integration as economic unification; (3) integration as economic and political cooperation; (4) integration as free trade. Meanwhile, the integrative processes in Europe have been developed by the order of (4) → (3). As a further process for (2), the single market should be completed in 1993.
Theories of integration originate both economic and political perspectives. Economic theories feature either the gains for market economies or developmental gains for developing countries. To them, economic cooperation is thus viewed as a basis for regional integration. Even though it may be said that total economic integration is difficult because it basically necessitates the concordance of monetary and fiscal policies and demands supranational body decisions which could link the component economic units, the conscious endeavor through the growth of economic interdependence and interaction beyond nation-states should be constant for a take-off, a process, and even a final goal. As an on-going example, the member countries of the EC agreed on economic integration in 1993. It will ultimately be very helpful in acquiring the desired result of political integration.

In discussing theories of integration, from the start, there has been a systematic dispute over whether integration is a process or a terminal condition. To the degree of defining integration, the constructions of a theoretical framework or the integration pattern, paradigm, model, and community-building developed by some scholars have different explanations and approaches to integration. Two functionalist schools view that international or regional integration is a process, but each new piece of research would provide a
dissimilar explication of that process. Federalism is divided on this question between federal activists and classicists. The former generally agree on process model. Even to the pluralists (including students of transaction and communication pattern), their opinions on this point are different.

Etzioni asserts integration as an end, not the means of attaining the end. For him, the subcommunities enter into a political community which has effective control over the use of the means of violence. Similarly, Deutsch expresses the view that integration is a terminal condition as a result of a process of integration. Integration is, then, causally related to the successful attainment of a security community.

By contrast, Mitrany, Nye, Haas, and Lindberg consider integration as a process. Mitrany's view perceives that political communities become integrated across national frontiers through the ramification. Nye speaks of integration as forming parts into a whole or creating interdependence. In a much broader sense, Haas deals with it as a process for building political communities. Lindberg puts emphasis upon decision-making process to integration. Galtung has another conclusion that integration is a process with the creation of new actors. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated. And Jacob and Teune view integration both as a process and a terminal condition.

In my judgement, integration is composed of attributes of interaction processes among groups, or nation-states in a
process to reach the end of unification. More specifically, the relationships of autonomous political units very often change in time and space at the international level. Integration is, therefore, a set of processes that is associated with all units seeking after their own interests, and willingly moving to become parts of a single large unit on which they can depend with certainty, and for which they give up their independence and autonomy. In integration processes, furthermore, no one or two factors can be said to be responsible for the success or failure of an integration design. In reviewing Jacob and Teune's 10 integrative guidelines or preconditions for political integration, it was concluded that they would be useful to evaluate the likelihood of regional integration in Korea.

Broadly speaking, federalism, pluralism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism are different and distinct from each other in their strategy, process, and goal toward integration. Federalists essentially cling to a process model of political determinism; end-product is the creation of a supranational state. On the contrary, in the process of integration, the functionalist approach directly clashes with federalist political determinism, seeing it as an "all or nothing" approach for "revolutionary" changes. The functionalists focus on the elimination of political factors by expanding international functional activity across national frontiers, and seek to find piecemeal (or incremental) solutions and to
make efforts by small steps producing a structural evolution in the socio-economic environment. They hope for transnational cooperation in the settlement of common existing problems. Their approach also implies a process by which economic and technical cooperation spills over into the political sphere and a federalist process.

Both functionalists and neo-functionalists set more importance on technical, non-controversial, and economic and welfare matters, and spillover processes among relevant groups. But, unlike functionalists, neo-functionalists are concerned with political processes and political interdependence for regional integration, deny the dichotomy of high and low politics, and to a high degree, stress the political nature of integration.

To comprehend peaceful integration, two notions deserve attention: one is the notion of sovereignty of the state, and the other, the absence of coercion in the interaction process. This signifies generally that the sovereignty of component units will be either preserved with a privileges of the state (functionalism and pluralism) or eroded in terms of the transfer of loyalty of the member units to a single central unit (federalism).

On binding two or more sovereign states into one, in particular, the pluralists with neo-functionalists embrace the federalists' belief that integration needs a political solution and political institutions for the precipitation of
integration. Unlike federalists, the neo-functionalists do not conceive of international integration as a legalistic process even when they predict the consequence of international institutions behavior as essential actors in the process.

The pluralists, like neo-functionalists, are mainly concerned with the process of integration by which "the ties between states are strengthened--ultimately in some form of political and institutional unification." But, unlike neo-functionalists and federalists, they are not attracted to the growth of international institutions or bureaucracies, which may take place for "the channeling of widening ranges of political transactions through these new institutional networks." Instead, the pluralists put a greater emphasis on transactions in bringing nation-states closer together into "security communities." Unlike their approaches, the functionalists' basic dogma places greatest stress on the principle of letting functional access rise to a maximum to obtain the interdependence carried through such items as exchanges, postal services, industrial contracts, etc. across national boundaries. Thus functionalism would serve to weaken and eliminate the consequences of national boundaries.

Both functionalism and neo-functionalism conceive of the function of international organizations as to further integration. But only pluralism diminishes international organizations. The federalists' concern is with the formation
of governments rather than of international organizations, but attempt to take advantage of intergovernmental organizations for expanding the territorial size of states with transfer of sovereignty of member-states.

Even though there are several similarities and dissimilarities mentioned above, Nye, reviewing integration theories, diagrams three predominant integration scheme. They are:³

Federalism: High $P_1$ (B + J) necessary for $P_2$-

Functionalism: High $P_2$ makes $P_1$ and $P_3$ irrelevant for $P_4$

Neo-Functionalism: High $P_2$ and intermediate level of $P_1$ will lead to higher $P_3$, possibly higher $P_1$ and $P_4$

$P_1$ = institutional integration
$B$ = bureaucratic, and $J$ = jurisdictional
$P_2$ = policy integration
$P_3$ = attitudinal integration
$P_4$ = security-community

The ideas of integration theories (except for the federalists) are similar in that the integrative process is "the gradual adjustment of instrumentally motivated actors to relatively small changes in mutual interactions."⁴ On this point, Haas argues that "all agree that what matters most is a utilitarian calculus on the part of actors, and not a dramatic or passionate commitment to a new order."⁵

Indeed integration does not come from simple motivations, but appears as a consequence of the policy decisions of national actors seeking to reach the goal. But integrative processes are also possible in which international or regional cooperation, transactions, and interdependence are sought
simply for mutual benefits. They may simply be caused by "widespread expectations of joint rewards for the participating units, through strong economic ties or gains envisaged for the future." A similar view comes from Haas: "...successful integration is attained when the subjective criterion of certain elite expectations is met; if the expectations of key elites in the region converge toward demands for peaceful change and other benefits thought to be obtainable only through the union, integration is under way." In sum, from whatever theoretical approach, if there are expectations of mutual benefits and rewards in integrative processes or as a result of integration, nations will try to integrate. And vice versa when expectations are negative the outcome tends towards disintegration. To be more precise, if people believe they will get a substantial and satisfactory reward or benefit as a necessary consequence of their efforts, the probability of integration is relatively high. On the contrary, if they postulate that their exertion will not turn out to be advantageous and may even thwart any likelihood of their acquiring the benefit they pursue, the influence of functional interest as an integrative factor will not constructively work for integration. Therefore, success or failure of integration is dependent on the degree of the satisfaction of individuals, groups, or nations with gains and rewards.
NOTES--PART I

CHAPTER 1


9. On system as interdependence, Rapoport views system, "A whole which functions as a whole by virtue of the interdependence of its parts is called a system, and the method which aims at discovering how this is brought about in the widest variety of systems has been called general systems theory" (Anatol Rapoport, "Foreword," in Modern Systems Research for the Behavioral Scientists, ed. Walter Buckley [Chicago:
Aldine, 1968], xvii). At this, one of the leading realists, Kaplan refers to system as "changes in the action of one (or more) unit(s) affect actions in one (or more) other units, and that these latter changes in turn have repercussions on the unit or units in which or from which the change was initiated" (Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957], 4). Dependent on the variety of system related, there are several types of interdependence in the human societies, as a typical example, economic, social, political, and military interdependence to influence to integration.


19. Ibid., 5.


27. Morgan, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics*, 221. From the two different definitions (a condition or a process), he thinks if integration is a condition, for one thing, a flow of people across national frontiers may be conceived of as a precondition; to the contrary, if a process, this movement of people is a factor either to further or to hinder it.


31. Jacob and Teune, "The Integrative Process," 18. Continuously they enumerate ten different elements that have been used as tests of homogeneity: wealth or income, education, status or class, religion, race, language, ethnic identification, attitudes (a catch-all of different types of dispositional factors such as perceptions, fears, aspirations, loyalties), values, and "character" (which in the sense of social or communal character is taken to be a composite of traits held to distinguish a particular group). Ibid., 18-19.

32. Cobb and Elder, International Community, 9. Their study shows that (1) politically homogeneous units show slightly higher interaction levels; (2) cultural homogeneity is more highly associated with interaction than political homogeneity, but it is still a moderate relationship; (3) as the homogeneity of socio-economic development increases and as the average level of socio-economic development increases, the greater their interaction increases.


34. Etzioni, Political Unification, 19.

35. Ibid., 23.

36. Jacob and Teune, "The Integrative Process," 27. They believe that all three integrative factors—proximity, homogeneity, and transactions—are related respectively to get greater mutual acquaintance and then to promote a community association.
37. Ibid., 30.


40. Ibid., 35.

41. Ibid., 36.

42. Jacob and Teune contend that "Governmental effectiveness can be measured uniformly both by objective indices (such as physical survival or increases in gross national product) and by subjective indices (such as feelings of well-being and belief in an ameliorative future)." Ibid., 43.

43. Russett summarizes some salient variables and conditions as substantial and conceivably decisive for political integration at the national level: (1) a degree of cultural similarity or at least compatibility for the major politically relevant values; (2) economic interdependence; (3) the existence of formal institutions with substantial "spill-over" or consensus-building effects; and (4) geographical contiguity. Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), 10.

CHAPTER 2


2. Many integration theorists have used the definition and categories elaborated by Balassa. For the characterization of economic integration, see Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961); Bela Balassa, "Toward a Theory of Economic Integration," in Latin American Economic Integration, ed. Miguel Wionczek (New York: Praeger, 1966).


5. Haas, "International Integration": 374-78.


13. Ibid., 27.

14. Ibid., 34.

15. Ibid., 37-39.


18. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 52, on "derived-growth sectors."

19. Etzioni, Political Unification, 56.

20. Ibid., 60.

21. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5. See also Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level:


6. In the earliest fashion of federalism, the idea was theological, portraying the correlation between God and man as one: both were bonded to each other to make them jointly responsible for the world's welfare. In the Middle Ages, it was embodied by the course of uniting Greece against Macedonia after the Peloponesian War. Since then, neither Plato nor Aristotle, nor many political theorists developed a concept of
federalism. Strictly speaking, the view was being secularized in the late 17th and 18th centuries. Of particular importance was that the good society should exist based on coordinative rather than subordinative relationships, stressing the need of partnership between the components with tantamount rights to legitimacy.

7. Mill's contention that "the creation of federal governments would have peaceful effects because they would be unable to wage any but defensive wars" is highly affected by Hobbes's delineation of the birth of Leviathan in the twentieth century. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Oxford: Blackwell, 1948), 305.

8. According to Kant's view, the essence of the integration is the formation of international federation, not national federalism. His idea of a world organization of states following Cosmopolitan or world laws among a group of previously sovereign states has fairly reflected the federalist thinking. See Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History," "Theory and Practice," and "Eternal Peace," in The Philosophy of Kant, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Modern Library, 1949).

9. In recent time, Etzioni, agrees on the classic federalist view. He adds, "the most compelling appeal of regionalism is that the rise of regional communities may provide a stepping stone on the way from a world of a hundred-odd states to a world of a stable and just peace. Such an achievement seems to acquire the establishment of a world political community." Etzioni, Political Unification, x-xi. See also his The Active Society, 564-75.


11. Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, op. cit., 270. Similarly, Deutsch also describes a federal union of states in comparison with confederations. They are: (1) a federal government is from a usually stronger than its constituent governments with regard to organization, personnel, budget, and jurisdiction; (2) a federal government can act directly on individuals in all matters within the scope of the national government, whereas a confederal government can only act through its constituent government; (3) in a federal union, no secession of constituent states is permitted, whereas in a confederacy, such secession is possible; and (4) the laws of a federal union usually prevail over those of the states, whereas the laws of a confederacy become valid in a state only when they are endorsed by it or when they are not vetoed their application within it. Karl W. Deutsch, Politics and Government, 3d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980), 189.
12. Ibid.


15. Friedrich defines federal system as a "union of groups, united by one or more common objectives, but retaining their distinctive group character for other purposes." Carl J. Friedrich, "New Tendencies in Federal Theory and Practice" (Paper presented to the Sixth World Congress of IPSA, Geneva, September, 1964), 2.

16. The term "federalism" is to be used in a broad sense that includes both the spectrum of federal union and that of the federal state. "Federal union" is viewed as the spectrum between interstate and intrastate relations, and "federal state" as the spectrum between federal union and the unitary state. Murray Forsyth, Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981), 7.

17. Wheare uses the word "quasi-federal" placing a greater emphasis on co-ordinate and independent between the central and unit governments within its own sphere. For further explanation, see Federal Government (1947), Chap 1 & 2; Carnell, "Political Implications of Federalism in New States," in Federalism and Economic Growth, 21.


19. Ibid., 121-22.


36. Pentland, "Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration," in Functionalism, 12.

37. Ibid.


39. Within the federal sphere, the constitution, whether it be written or unwritten, or partly written and partly unwritten, must be supreme if a government is federal. For example, the constitutions of the United States, the British North America Act, 1867, and the Commonwealth of Australia, 1900 expresses the essential supremacy of a constitution in a federal government. See Wheare, Federal Government, 55-60.


43. For examples, the prerequisites of common language and common race were surely conducive to form the political union in the United States, in Italy, in Germany, and in Australia. According to Wheare, in Federal Government (1947), 39, common nationality operated strongly in Italy and in Germany, and also federal unions successfully have been working in Canada and Switzerland albeit these differences of language and race—French and English in Canada; German, French, Italian and Romansch in Switzerland, of religion as between Catholic and Protestant, and of nationality. Working of these federal unions in such countries, community of language, race, region and nationality helped the German-Swiss cantons to work together, and the French-Swiss similarly. In the same way this community brought the English-speaking provinces of Canada together. It clearly shows, nevertheless, that the stronger these forces of language, race, religion and
nationality, the easier it is to smoothly produce a desire for union.

44. Ibid., Chap 3. Wheare again points to six factors which were important in the classical federations. These are: (1) A previous existence of the federating states as distinct colonies or states with distinct governments of their own. (2) A divergence of economic interest between the federating states leading to the desire of the states to remain independent for certain economic purposes. (3) Geographical obstacles to effective unitary government, i.e., large areas and poor communications. (4) Differences of race, religion, language or nationality. (5) Dissimilarity of social institutions. (6) Force of imitation, i.e., the prior existence of a federal constitution to serve as a model.


47. For the conditions which seem likely to make for its disintegration, see Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 244. For a full description of conditions to make for disintegration, see Deutsch et al., Political Community, 59-64.


49. Deutsch explains the meanings of community and political community separately to make fully understandable the term security community. "Community" is "simply a relevant degree of interdependence, and hence an objective fact, regardless of whether the governments or populations involved are aware of it or not." Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 200. And political community is regarded as "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance." in Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5.

50. Dae Chung, Toward a Pluralistic Security Community, 73.

51. Ibid., 48.

52. Ibid., 37.


56. For the successful establishment and preservation of an amalgamated security-community, 12 economic, social, and psychological background conditions are found to be indispensable within and among the participating units. Nine essential conditions for the success of the ASC are basically required: (1) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; (5) superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units; (6) unbroken links of social communication, both geographically between territories and sociologically between different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and (9) a multiplicity of ranges of communication and transaction. And three other conditions may be necessary: (10) a compensation of flows of communications and transactions; (11) a not too infrequent interchange of group roles; and, (12) considerable mutual predictability of behavior. Because of the number of background conditions of the ASC required, it is indeed harder to realize. Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 46-58.


70. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, 59. Lieber further contends that "if a number of these point in the same direction, for example, by signaling an increasing propensity toward mutual attention between France and England, we may then say with some assuredness that underlying social factors are shifting in such a way as to create favorable opportunities for integration" (Robert J. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics* [Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1972], 52).

71. Such indicators were examined for the 14 North Atlantic countries over the 1952 to 1964 period and for 49 countries from the global sample for 1955. Cobb and Elder, *International Community*, 134.


74. Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration": 762.

75. Ibid.: 753.

76. Ibid.: 762.


78. Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975), 12.


80. Ibid., 89.

81. Toscano, "Transaction Flow Analysis in Metropolitan Areas, in *The Integration of Political Communities*, 101-102.

CHAPTER 4


attainment of peace does not comprise a direct attack on problems of war and security, functionalists generally see his description as a realistic mode for working peace.

5. Ibid. (1943), 76-77.
6. Ibid. (1966), 70.
8. Ibid., 8. The functionalist view on human nature is entirely different from the realist theory--man is evil, immoral, power-seeking.
11. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 20.
12. Ibid., 9.
13. Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration," in Functionalism, 68. Mitranean functionalism postulates that only technical experts can solve today's world's problems. However, scientific research expresses a different view that the functionalist access to the world's problems does not lie in the realm of the natural sciences. For more discussion on the subject, see Robert I. McLaren, "Mitranean Functionalism: Possible or Impossible?," Review of International Studies 11, no. 2 (April 1985): 143-44.
15. Ibid., 49.
16. Ibid., 21.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 21, 49-50.

Mitrany defines international organizations as "executive agencies with autonomous tasks and powers" (A Working Peace System [1966], 125). He restated it in detail: "...institutions called into being by agreement between several or more Governments, in order to benefit mutually by continuous co-operative action along specific lines, or by the continuous regulation of certain international activities" (Ibid. [1975], 101). Pentland observes, "...functionalism draws on the organic, socio-economic reformist ethos represented by British Fabianism and on ideas about the reconstruction of international society found in the writings of continental thinkers such as St. Simon. But the major source of functionalist thought has been in the experience of men who created, worked in, or observed the numerous international organizations that began to emerge in the late nineteenth century" (Pentland, "Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration," in Functionalism, 16).


23. Mitrany's thought is different from contemporary functionalist theory in some respects, more precisely, in his emphasis upon functional organizations that are global rather than regional in their membership. For a comparison of Mitrany and Haas, see Andrew Wilson Green, "Mitrany Reread with the Help of Haas and Sewell," Journal of Common Market Studies 8, no. 1 (September, 1969): 50-69. The approach of Haas and his followers is termed "neo-functionalism," but the label of functionalism will be retained here.


27. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 93.

28. From the functionalist perspective, political loyalties move to a new organ not merely through the accomplishment of significant function by governmental agencies and international organizations, but through operation of international interactions in a possible functional area.

30. Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany":105-106, 119. In criticizing Mitrany's functionalism or a new species of functionalism, McLaren articulates the five propositions hardly advance our knowledge of functionalism. See McLaren, "Mitranian Functionalism":139.

31. Mitrany, A Working Peace System (1966), 18. Young uses the notion "interdependence" to comply with "the extent to which events occurring in any given part or within any given component unit of a world system affect (either physically or perceptually) events taking place in each of the other parts or component units of the system" (Oran R. Young, "Interdependence in World Politics," International Journal 24, no. 4 [Autumn 1969]: 726-50). Keohane and Nye similarly define it as the situations in international systems represented by "reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries" (Power and Interdependence, 8).

32. Haas provides for the latticework metaphor in "The Study of Regional Integration":634-35.


35. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York: Macmillan; London: Collier Macmillan, 1987), 365. Even though interdependence is based on the principle of egalitarianism and bilateral benefit, it may be conceived of asymmetrical as one nation depends upon another in a larger degree than exercised vice versa. Such asymmetrical relations are universal and salient between the developed and less-developed countries in today's world.


37. To give examples of the 19th century origin, increased specialization of production in technical fields of activity, extensive trade of goods, exchanges of people among those who have different ideologies and nationalities, and even various communication flows across national boundaries resulted in establishing international organizations--i.e., the International Telegraph Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union
(1874), the International Telecommunications Organization (1875), the International Office of Weights and Measures (1875). These institutions are beside the points to international peace and order, but in line with the functionalist theory they may function towards the goal—integration of people and nations at regional or global level.


41. Ibid., 62.

42. Ibid. (1946), 45.


44. Ibid., 10.

45. Morgan, *Theories and Approaches to International Politics*, 228.

46. The word "spillover" (ramification of Mitrany's term) is initially developed by Haas in the uniting of Europe, in which he used it with a view to linking the socio-economic variables featuring the traditional functionalist scheme with the political variables.


48. Ibid.


56. Unlike members of a national legislature, the bureaucracies, even though they arrive at a consensus, cannot vote a decision. They are, simply speaking, one-way representatives of the government. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations*, 209.


59. Vree, *Political Integration*, 45. Even such a supranational organization as the ECSC has been to a significant extent influenced by political affairs. For example, the structures and functions of the ECSC have been more responsive to political than to economic imperatives.


61. Haas, "International Integration": 104-05. He further adds that "intensity of integration is positively correlated with industrialization and economic diversification" (Ibid., 117).


63. Nye, *Peace in Parts*, 51. For these predictions toward certain federalist means and ends, the neo-functionalists are variously designated as "federal-functionalists," "radical-functionalists," or "federalists in functional clothing." The neo-functionalists are also named "functional-federalists,"
"evolutionary-federalists," or "reformed federalists," or "pragmatic-federalists," in view of their closer affinity to functionalism. In the European case, for instance, such policy-makers as Walter Hallstein, Jean Monnet and Henri Spaak, who worked for the United States of Europe through the ECSC and EEC, were often called "functional-federalists" for their deployment of functionalist rather than federalist tactics. See Pentland, "Functionalism and Theories of International Political Integration," in Functionalism, 17.

64. Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America," Journal of Common Market Studies 5, no. 4 (June 1967): 322 (hereafter cited as "The Uniting of Europe and Latin America").

65. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 47.


69. Ibid., 707, 710.

70. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and Latin America":315.

71. Ibid.:327.


75. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 10.

77. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and Latin America":327.

78. Haas, "International Integration":376.


81. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 48.

82. Haas and Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration":261.

83. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and Latin America":327.


85. Ibid.:846.


88. Ibid.

89. Haas, "International Integration":372.

90. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (1968), xxxiii.


92. Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity, 68-69. Their intention was generally to take gauge of the progress of the integrative process in Europe.

93. Nye, Peace in Parts, 54.

94. For example, some of the notion of "evolutionary federalists" as denoted "federal functionalists" or "gradual federalists" came later to be distilled (mostly by Americans--
notably Haas) and known as neo-functionalism. Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, 182.

95. Lieber, *Theory and World Politics*, 44.


98. Ibid., 51.


100. Iron and steel production swiftly increased, while prices merely slowly. Even coal, in a generally declining market, did better than could have been anticipated. Employment expanded overall, and assistance for the structurally unemployed was made available. It proved, as well, that the member state in ECSC could work together, even though it must be noted that most authority over these industries still, in fact, resided in national hands. Much better, the industries themselves were integral to the waging of war, so centering control in a multinational authority would make future war between France and Germany very difficult or impossible. For more details, see Philip E. Jacob, Alexine L. Atherton, and Arthur M. Wallenstein, *The Dynamics of International Organization*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), 433-52.


CONCLUDING REMARKS


5. Ibid.


PART II

COMPARISON OF UNIFICATION POLICIES AND MODELS OF

This part will delineate and evaluate the comparatively very recent unification policies and models of North and South Korea. The time period entirely ranges from 1988 to 1991. Though understanding of the unification pattern of two Koreas needs its overall description since national division, it is here our concern that the time parameter of this will match with the emerging international environment from confrontation to detente.

In the past, it may be true that North Korea had an initiative in a great measure to unification affairs, and South Korea responded on it as proposing dissenting views or formulae. But its phenomenon is actually reversed of late. The current Seoul government has taken up a positive and progressive attitude and an initiative on the matter of national unification after 1988 Seoul Olympic Games. It was caused by the way in which South Korea marched in accordance with the new international environment, whereas Pyongyang regime did not join in this process at the outset, being far dispirited than before.

The different unification strategies and formulae start with different logic. The South Koreans, undergoing an experience of a miserable internecine war, typically hold the logic of peace rather than that of unification. On the contrary, the logic of North Korea strongly suggests unification, first, even if by force. Whatever its goal in this context, it is ironical that both regimes continually
increase military powers either to defend its own country or
to win a potential war in Korea, while they all claim, at
least, outwardly to desire for peaceful unification.

For the reason of national security concern, Seoul's
gradual and incrementalist approach has been developed with
adopting realism. Lee Young Ho indicates this at length:

In a way, realism has been South Korea's Achilles' heel
as far as unification policy is concerned. From the
standpoint of what can be realistically achieved between
North and South Korea, a gradualist and incrementalist
approach is well justified. Given the mutual distrust
and vast differences in political and social system
between the two, the most that can be realistically
expected are quite rightly small steps. But by taking
such a realistic position South Korea has exposed itself
to the unjustified but seemingly plausible accusation
that it was less than seriously motivated for
unification.'

While unification policies of North Korea\(^2\) have changed
in harmony with the domestic and international circumstances,
those of South Korea,\(^3\) mainly by its leadership change. It
is because North Korean monolithic communist regime has not
been yet changed in its modern history, while South Korean
regimes have been experienced leadership changes since the
Republic of Korea was born in 1948 with the blessing of the
world organization.\(^4\) In essence, the central decision-makers
of two sides find the unification issue a useful political
tool for propaganda and for continually maintaining office-
holding. Furthermore, each Korea's diplomatic offensive
toward the other has a bearing on its ecumenical tactic toward
unification in its own terms.
In proposals and negotiating behavior pattern, Seoul still places the higher priority on an incrementalist and step-by-step approach with non-political issues as economic, socio-cultural, and humanitarian affairs being deliberated primarily to the reunification issue. By contrast, Pyongyang values highly the politico-military solution and requires some of preconditions for its implementation, even not abandoning the revolutionary maneuver of unification by force (or communization of South Korea).

From the strategies which are diametrically contrasted to each other, the most recent unification models (or formulae) of the two Koreas will be also delineated. The present top-leaders of Seoul and Pyongyang with their political acts of will have developed different unification models, respectively, as an interim stage of the complete unification. One is Pyongyang's "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" based on the federalist design, and the other, Seoul's "Korean Commonwealth." The latter is a new scheme for the way of unification, and the former's is not new but a revised form. The important point of the former is to seek to solve Korean problems through a coalition government by federalist approach as founding a confederation between North and South with dramatic political and military actions first. That of the latter is to establish commonwealth by functionalist paradigm. Two models all include the idea of mutual transactions and contact between North and South Korea. Such interactions are
expected as a transient stage and for easing the high tension within the pluralist framework.

Even today, the unification approaches of the two Republics are indeed uncompromising, inflexible, and unrealistic simply to accept mutually, the leaders of both parts taking irreconcilable methods to the reunification question. Therefore, understanding of unification tactics of the two sides, and diagnosing the differences and problems, and finding problem-solving are crucial for an ecumenical comprehension of Korean political behavior. For this, throughout the whole of the part, our effort lies in describing contemporary unification policies and models of the two Koreas: Chapter 6 focuses on the former, and Chapter 7 on the latter.
CHAPTER 5
UNIFICATION POLICIES OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

I. UNIFICATION POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER ROH TAE WOO WITH EMPHASIS ON THE "LOW LEVEL" (NON-POLITICAL) PROCESSES

The South Korean alternative theoretical approach to reunification under the Sixth Republic which was newly born in February 1988 favors functionalist thought—a gradual and incremental approach—by putting more emphasis on the non-political matters out of a growing number of problems to be settled. Put so generally, the top priority of the government is to promote humanitarian, economic, social, and cultural exchanges for gradually solving relatively easier problems with the expectation of the "spillover" effect as part of efforts to improve inter-Korean relations, before they tackle the more serious questions in political and military fields. To dispel South-North distrust and restore mutual confidence, it will be necessary to vigorously promote multifaceted exchanges and cooperation, at the same time building institutional safeguards for such activities.¹

Scholars advocating such an approach contend that policies are not taken by a central force in the stated pursuit of collective virtue, but rather on the basis of a "give-and-take" principle involving varied participants in national affairs.² This expects the effect of the increase of a function by an increase in the independent variable,
pursuing the pragmatic and flexible settlement. Then it is considered such more complicated and sensitive ones as political and military issues and the establishment of the common government. So inter-Korean relations will be improved by going forward from exchanges in relatively non-sensitive to more intricate and sensitive realm.

As Johan Galtung points out, "South Korea evidently sees national unification as a process with many stages in between, not a jump from two political entities to one," the solution of Korean problem, given conflicting situation of two Koreas, cannot be easily solved at once such political mechanisms as negotiation or determination. From the long perspective, South Korea seeks after a need for efficient progress which can generate a substantial basis for recovering mutual trust and creating an environment that North and South will be able to freely tackle and talk about settlement to the unsolvable political items.

In essence, Seoul government efforts to unification have been proceeding by the theoretical contribution of neo-functionalism or pluralism rather than functionalism. Except for the special emphasis on multifaceted exchanges in non-political areas, as a political and military solution, Seoul suggested the following items: (1) conclusion of non-aggression accord; (2) renunciation of unification way by the use of all other forms of violence to communize the capitalist South; (3) non-intervention of revolutionary war and military
provocation; (4) to disarm "to achieve an equilibrium." (4) non-intervention in the internal affairs of each other; (5) to gain U.N. membership as a temporary measure till eventual unification; and (6) to enhance frequent transaction and communication.

Seoul throughout continually proposed a "basic agreement" for improving relations that included confidence-building measures such as ceasing mutual "slander and vilification" and not making any attempt to sabotage or overthrow each other, and resolving their differences and disputes through dialogue and negotiations between responsible authorities. For the effective military confidence and non-aggression, the following are put forward: the two Koreas should be to notify each other of the movement of military units and military maneuvering; to exchange visits and information between military personnel; to immediately establish a hot line between defense ministers of the two Koreas; and to demilitarize the DMZ and remove offensive weapons there.

For moving toward peace, President Roh Tae Woo also offered a unilateral declaration of renouncing the use of force even before a mutual non-aggression accord between them⁶, stating that ROK will never use force first against the North. He further proposed a three-stage plan⁵ of replacing with a peace treaty the "fragile armistice," of associating the two nations by functional scheme, and of driving North Korea to abandon the development of nuclear weapons for better
creation of a framework for mutual cooperation, trust, and unification. In the proposal, he repeated to hold direct talks with President Kim without any conditions for political and military solution. "We discuss sincerely and resolve all the problems raised by either or both sides with regard to disarmament, arms control and other military matters," Roh said.

Central to Seoul's democratic process toward unification is based on the principle of "National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification." In order for the Sixth Republic to better inter-Korean relationships and to establish a milieu which can contribute to eternal peace on the peninsula as terminating the past antagonistic relations with the North, President Roh made the special declaration on July 7, 1988 which incarnates the most momentous policy for national self-esteem, unification, and prosperity. It basically contains the following six-point "policy on reunification":

1. Exchange of visits by a broad spectrum of the people of North and South Korea and free visits to both parts of the Korean peninsula by Koreans residing overseas;
2. Exchanges of correspondence and visits between members of dispersed families;
3. Open trade between North and South Korea as internal trade within the national community;
4. Support trade (not for military goods) between North Korea and countries friendly to South Korea;
5. Giving up the competitive and confrontational diplomatic war between the North and South while ensuring that the North can make a positive contribution to the international community; and
6. Cooperation with Pyongyang in its efforts to improve ties with the United States and Japan and, in parallel, seeking improved ties with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries."
In his bold proposal to North Korea, President Roh did not ask any conditions to realize policies in improving links with the North. He also featured that inter-Korean relations would be developed in terms of special provisional relation between two current authoritative governments within a single national community. However, although President Roh's offer had more practical significance than previous proposals, the exchanges did not take place due to the uncooperative attitude of North Korea. In the proposal, the first three principles talk about policy toward North Korea and the remnant about the northern policy. Because the emphasis of the one would be again treated in the proposal of "Grand Inter-Korean Exchange," here the other would be mentioned first.

In an effort to put a new policy into effect, at the very outset, the government immediately stopped the slanderous anti-North Korean broadcasts including personal attacks on Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il. President Roh also stated that South Korea would provide support to North Korea in international diplomatic areas to bring the other out of its regional and international isolation. This conforms domestically to Seoul's relative confidence over Pyongyang in ecumenical strength, in particular in economic means, and derived from the unremitting isolation of economic stagnation in the North; to internationally, the newly established detente among the superpowers. Furthermore, President Roh
proposed summit talks\textsuperscript{9} between North and South Korea to proceed their halted dialogue immediately.

Under the umbrella of the milieu of accommodation engendered by the newly emerging detente in U.S.-Soviet and Sino-Soviet relations, and the 24th Seoul Olympics\textsuperscript{10} in September 1988, South Korea has made a breakthrough in opening new relations with the socialist countries through "Nordpolitic" (Northern policy).\textsuperscript{11} In nature, Nordpolitic stemmed from West Germany's "Ostpolitik" (Eastern policy)\textsuperscript{12} initiated by Chancellor Willy Brandt with a view to contributing a great deal to reconciliation and bridging of detente and peace between East and West Europe as well as to rapprochement between East and West Germany, as a transitory step or a precondition for the unification of the country.

Basically, the North-diplomacy not only aims at promoting peace and good-neighborliness with traditional allies, but also improving the relations with continental nations--the PRC and the USSR for a first channel of contact, and North Korea for a second channel of contact.\textsuperscript{13} In other words, it set the goal at creating an atmosphere to close Seoul's relations with the Communist countries with economic liberalization policies, widely expanding its diplomatic and economic contacts at the global level, thereby to indirectly drive to open up North Korean society, and to ameliorate inter-Korean relations based on the functional tactic to the conclusive settlement of the Korean question. For its successful
implementation, President Roh pressed the U.S. and other friendly nations to encourage exchanges of non-military goods with North Korea and to "contribute to the progress and opening of North Korea by engaging Pyongyang in expanding relations." At the same time, this new policy aims at exploring new markets for South Korea's growing economic activities abroad while trying to ensure peace and stability on the peninsula with the help of the U.S.

However, taking advantage of Roh's July 7th declaration, Pyongyang invited political, economic, cultural, religious, and students' leaders of South Korea to North Korea. In response to this, some, in particular, dissident Rev. Moon Ik Hwan, Ms. Im Soo Kyung as a college student representative of South Korea, and Father Moon Gyu Hyon illegally visited North Korea via the third countries. As soon as returning to home, they all were put in jail as being charged with infringement of the National Security Law, that is, unauthorized travel to North Korea. According to a new declaration, overseas Koreans are allowed to freely visit to North Korea, and visits of its citizens should be accompanied with specific permission of or conferring with Seoul government. But, with a growing demand for civilian participation in political affairs, the ROK government has to make a choice either to tolerate some unofficial contacts with North Korea, or to reevaluate its posture toward North Korea.
It is very instructive to recall that Pyongyang rejects Seoul's functionalist approach based on the on-going Northern Policy in the beginning. In actuality, Seoul considers that the improvement and expansion of our relations with socialist countries will stimulate North Korea into opening itself up to the outside world and responding positively to our call for reconciliation and cooperation. But both steps illustrated the extent to which the North has become increasingly isolated. Pyongyang believes that Seoul's real purpose is to induce either its corruption or South Korean way to absorb it. According to Suh Dae-Sook, "The northern policy may be a good policy for South Korean diplomacy, but it is unhealthy for inter-Korean relations." It cannot be denied that the Northern policy has increasingly pressured North Korean openness to the outside to the ultimate goal. In the result, it was really North Korea being estranged with her closest allies. It is also true that she has by far isolated herself in the international area, and her economy has become much worse than before. However, as times flow and riding on the worldwide detente mood and propelled by reasons of their internal and external necessities, North Korea slowly began to change from isolation to openness to overcome its domestic economic crisis, and to frequently discuss the unification issues more than before. It just began and is still going well irrespective of political system and ideology.
As a result of Seoul's functionalist approach and the very successful Northern-diplomacy, transactions between North and South in economic, political, cultural, and social fields have been proceeding within the domain of restriction. So far so good. It would be very beneficial to the two Koreas. It is thus expected to expand the volume bigger and bigger for mutual interest. In brief, at all events, the Northern policy based on functionalism has been conducive to making more intimate the North-South relationship than in the past.

Continually, President Roh, in response to North Korean President Kim's July 5th proposal of conditional free travel of approved people in the limited area, echoed a similar proposal, on July 20, 1990. The project named as "Grand Inter-Korean Exchanges of People" allowed all Koreans free, unrestricted and unconditional exchanges, coming and going, and travels between the two halves of the peninsula for five days beginning on August 13 in celebration of the 45th Liberation Day. "The fact that compatriots in the South and North are still unable to visit each other is a shame on us who are a proud people with a rich cultural heritage that has evolved over many millennia," Roh said. Hence "free travel between the South and the North is an indispensable step toward unification," and "Without exchanges, it will not be possible to bridge the gulf of mistrust and hostility and build confidence," he continued.
Although the proposal was scheduled only for the five-day period, it opened the routine of reciprocal visits on and around such national holidays as Ch'usok (The Harvest Moon Festival) and Sulnal (Lunar New Year's Day) and Hanshik (a day in early April set aside for visits to ancestral graves). This plan was followed by the case of Germany in December 1963, in which two Germans celebrated Christmas by opening a passage. It was also encouraged by a new political tide spreading in the world. Roh said, "A tide of openness and reconciliation has torn away the Iron Curtain separating the East and the West and is now shaping a new world in which nations are cooperating with each other regardless of differences in ideology and political system."22

Nevertheless, Pyongyang remarked that "We cannot understand how he wants to realize North-South opening without removing such political barriers as the 'National Security Law' which criminalizes and puts in jail those who visit the North...."23 In effect, Seoul decided to permit transiently a violation of National Security Law of which South Koreans visit North Korea without given government approval during the proposed five-day period. Although Seoul shifted to ease some limitation on visits to the North during that time, unauthorized trips are not yet permissible and violators are incarcerated by long prison terms.

Leading dissident groups like the Coalition for National Democratic Movement (Chonminnyon) and the National Council of
Student Representatives (Chondaehyop) of South Korea revealed their plan to attend the North's pan-national rally with an approval from the government at that time. But, then Unification Minister Hong Sung-Chul indicated, if North Korea accepts President Roh's proposal of unconditional exchanges, that the government would be willing to allow South Koreans to participate in the '90 pan-national rally which Pyongyang planned to hold at Panmunjom around Aug. 15 and to march to Mt. Hallasan in the South from Mt. Paektusan in the North through Panmunjom in an across-the-nation march designed to dramatize aspirations for unification. Seoul also added that we cannot approve the Pyongyang's tactic to open dialogue and allow the participation only with selective groups of people in the South such as radical students, politicians, dissidents, and any others in the rally. For the same reason, Seoul government also did not approve such groups to conduct a unification march for talks with the northern counterpart on June 10, and Aug. 15, 1988 at Panmunjom, the 13th World Youth and Student Festival scheduled for North Korea in early July 1989 and pan-national talk in Berlin on Nov. 20, 1990, and '91 pan-national rally at Panmunjom.

Ho dam, then chairman of Pyongyang's Committee for Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF) had turned down Roh's offer as a "propaganda ploy" to help draw attention away from internal political tumult and to thwart pan-national conference Pyongyang had planned to hold at
Panmunjom around August 15. Regardless of its reaction, however, Seoul decided to widely open the border. In the result, as many as 61,355 of dispersed families of the South submitted application to visit North Korea\textsuperscript{30} for the suggested five days, but it was resolutely rejected by the North. Although not realized, the proposal has a meaning in itself as an announcement of Seoul's conviction to harmonize with Pyongyang.

In Seoul's efforts for the on-going processes of the Nordpolitic, South Korea established formal diplomatic relations with most of Pyongyang's East-bloc allies—Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Soviet Union, and opened trade offices with China, transcending the barriers of differences of ideology, political and social system.

More and more of Pyongyang's friendly allies are affording a "business-as-usual" approach to the matter of Korean problems. While they are attracting South Korean capital, technology, and management, Seoul expects diplomatic advantages for attaining initiative to Korean unification in cooperation or competition with North Korea. They are enticed by South Korea's expertise in labor-intensive industries as well as its knowledge of mid-level technology, which is more applicable to the developing communist countries.\textsuperscript{31} Even though China doesn't have formal diplomatic relations with South Korea, the former is making major business commitments
with the latter. On their business-like relations with Seoul, "It's a pity that some socialist countries are abandoning their principles for a few dollars," said, a member of the Korean Society for relations with Foreign Countries of North Korea.

More particularly, the Pyongyang regime became very angered when Moscow established diplomatic relations with Seoul. Accords of South Korea's Nordpolitik and Soviet's perestroika and glasnost already widely opened the mutual doors in socio-economic areas. Politically, even though the Soviet Union used to avoid making contact with South Korea on the ground of its strong ties with North Korea for the last four decades, both the Soviet and South Korea would have strong and widened relations and established the diplomatic relation as a necessary consequence of the increasing contacts and San Francisco summit as an informal one on June 4, 1990 and Moscow summit as a formal one between Gorbachev and Roh on October 15, in the same year. This was so particularly in accord with regard to the Soviet's will to overcome its domestic economic difficulty and South Korea's endeavor to accomplish its national unity under the expectation of the former's political role and influence to North Korea. On January 22, 1991, South Korea reached agreement with the Soviet Union on a three-year loan package totalling some $3 billion to the USSR. In response to this, Gorbachev responded to do everything within his power to further the
reunification of Korea. At the historic summit in Cheju, South Korea on April 20, 1991, Roh and Gorbachev publicly concluded to establish a cooperation, friendship, and partnership in political, economic for common interests, and, to a less degree, security matters as well. "It is time that the waves of openness and detente reached Northeast Asia, especially the Korean peninsula," Gorbachev and Roh agreed. Gorbachev also endorsed South Korea's campaign to enter into the United Nations. It also increased the international isolation of the North Korean regime of Kim Il Sung, who has relied on the Soviet Union and China for arms and political support since the 1950-53 Korean War.

With the spirit and diplomatic fruition of the Northern Policy and the global detente between East and West, South Korea drove to join in the U.N. together with North Korea. If Pyongyang did not comply with simultaneous or separate admission into the U.N., South Korea alone has a plan to apply for its membership. Seoul has long opposed Pyongyang's plan of entering into the U.N. as a single nation. In this context, then Foreign Minister Choi Ho-Jung said, "The idea of single-seat U.N. membership of the two Koreas is incompatible with the reality of the present inter-Korean relationship, international practices related to U.N. membership, and the qualifications of U.N. membership set out in the charter."

The two divided countries had only observer status at the U.N. with no voting power, but, at last, they entered into the
U.N. as the 160th and 161st member nations at the 46th General Assembly on Sept. 17, 1991. It was possible especially with the acquiescence of two Communist forces in the Security Council on August 9, 1991.

"This step definitely will improve the international standing of both Koreas and will help smooth and improve relations between the two Koreas," then the head of the South Korean observer delegation, Roe Chang Hee, said. "It took the two Germanys 17 years to combine their U.N. seats. I sincerely hope that it will not take as long for the two Korean seats to become one," President Roh added. He also indicates that "entry into the United Nations of both South and North Korea until such time as the peninsula is unified will be conducive to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but of the entire region as well."

In fact, the Seoul government was prudent in order not to look victorious, describing only that the move would furnish an opportunity to secure peace and stability in the Far East. The simultaneous but separate U.N. admission was realized prior to cross-recognition which grants the powers concerned to cross-recognize the two Koreas. It was surely a positive step and a great victory of the Northern Policy led by President Roh as an initial stage for political unification.

In a bid to defuse festering Cold War animosity, and for environmental creation for easing political confrontation and
relieving military tensions between the two Koreas, the prime ministers of North and South Korea began historic rounds of talks in 1990 (in the first session Sept. 4-7 in Seoul,44 the second, Oct. 16-19 in Pyongyang,45 and the third, Dec. 11-12 in Seoul46), and in 1991 (the fourth, Oct. 23-25 in Pyongyang,47 the fifth, Dec. 10-13 in Seoul48). A set of proposals toward North Korea were put forth by Prime Ministers, Kang Young Hoon in the 1st-3rd session, and Chung Won Shik in the 4th-5th session. Common suggestions were to enhance transaction and cooperation in non-political areas and to establish an assured no-war situation in the peninsula.

Even if there appeared to be little prospect of a breakthrough in the talks, an agreement was at last reached during the fifth round of talks that could diminish the possibility of the peninsula war by slightly opening mutual contact and cooperation between the people of two divided halves. The Korean accord highlights are:

(1) Prior notification of troop movements and exercises will be issued, and a hot line for top military leaders will be installed.
(2) Discussion of a peace treaty to replace the armistice which ended the Korean War will begin.
(3) Committee to be formed to discuss nuclear issues.
(4) Ban on terrorism and efforts to overthrow the other's government.
(5) Liaison Offices to be set up in Panmunjom to reunite separated families.
(6) S. Korea is allowed to maintain laws limiting contact with the North.
(7) Travel and correspondence will be promoted.49
Compromise came from the two rival Koreas. "We made history today, record this moment," a North Korean delegate said. Kim Dae Jung, a leader of opposition party, called the pact a step through the "door of peace and reunification." But, to date, the differences on how to reunify Korea remain to be solved. Pyongyang has demanded that a non-aggression declaration be signed before any accords on facilitating various exchanges. To the contrary, Seoul has contended instead that means—i.e., increase cross-border trade and travel, and exchanges of people—to lessen high level tensions should come before a non-aggression declaration. More important, the agreement did not deal with the contentious topic of North Korea's manifest plan to develop nuclear weapons, conceivably the single most significant affair to Seoul and its western allies. Assumed is that Pyongyang's intention of the accords may be symbolic in order to show superficially her efforts for improvement of North-South relations, both internally and externally. Another important point is perhaps to overcome the North's economic crisis which will be explained in her unification approach.

In conclusion, under the circumstances of the changing international environment from confrontation to detente between the powers, and of domestically, the South Koreans becoming more confident of their economic, technological, and military capabilities, their government adopted a new and comprehensive unification policy giving most priority on non-
political affairs. In the unification process, South Koreans have begun a confident initiation in their unification demeanor and are no longer afraid of the ideological offensiveness by North Korea, pursuing dialogue, negotiation, and cooperation with Pyongyang. In nature, this coincides with the principle that which the unification process is more important than the end-product in unification.

The Roh government does no longer, however, regard the counterpart as rival or enemy, but as irrefutable brother of the same bloodline. By allowing South Koreans to approach North Korean reality, the government could at least accommodate the public opinion on the unification issue and make a new unification principle and model in line with democratic procedures. It means the unification policy under the Sixth Republic is much more positive and effective than the precedents and the current Pyongyang regime.

II. UNIFICATION POLICY OF NORTH KOREA UNDER KIM IL SUNG WITH EMPHASIS ON THE "HIGH LEVEL" (POLITICAL) PROCESSES

Since Korea divided into two parts, North Korea's rudimentary attitude to reunification has been based on the principle of "self-determination" of nation and "Juche idea" (also spelt chuch'e), which combines Marxist-Maoism with xenophobic nationalism and a quest for self reliance. For Pyongyang, unification is an internal problem for all the Korean people, so they have both the efficacy and the decision
to bring about national unity by the common exertion. Simply put, unification should be achieved by Koreans themselves without resort to foreign engagement. Inasmuch as the primary intention of this contention depends highly on Korean nationalism, it may be heard to be an attractive appeal. But, indeed its long-term and ultimate strategy of action has aimed at either promoting a class revolution in South Korea, or completely liberating South Koreans from the hands of American imperialists, or communizing/overthrowing the whole Korea by "revolutionary forces" by subversion and infiltration. Even today, it calls for the completion of "anti-imperial national liberation" and "anti-feudal people's democracy" in the task of "revolution in South Korea." According to President Kim:

Unification of the fatherland does not mean the simple reintegration of the divided land and nation but is a pan-national challenge to accomplish an anti-imperial national liberation and a people's democratic revolution all across the country with a revolution in South Korea in mind. A revolution in South Korea is part of a whole-Korea revolution designed to accomplish unification of the fatherland. Unification of the fatherland and a revolution in South Korea are in mutually inseparable relation.

Although its Constitution obviously depicts the peaceful unification on a democratic basis, North Korea has by no means given up its intent of unification by resorting to military measures or revolutionary movement. It is clearly exemplified in the various sources. According to the article 3 of 1972 revised Constitution: "liberation of South" is a
form of class struggle against the imperialist aggressors\textsuperscript{58} and waged by "a revolutionary state power" of North Korea which comprises "all the Korean people" such as "the workers, peasants, soldiers, and working intellectuals."\textsuperscript{59}

Its politico-military behavior toward the South and toward the United States remains unmistakably belligerent.\textsuperscript{60} This does not coincide with the peaceful means of reunification, which North Korea used long for political propaganda and deceitful unification policy. Its propaganda, for example, has successfully convinced northerners that the vast majority of southerners are fighting, almost daily, against Roh and the presence of U.S. troops.\textsuperscript{61}

One of the top items out of Pyongyang's plan to communization of South Korea is, most urgently, to drive American troops out of Korean territory. The North Koreans boast about having no foreign troops on their soil, and they point to the apparent lack of foreign influence over their affairs.\textsuperscript{62} This is also found by President Kim's New Year address of 1988: "Unification of Korea is difficult 'right now' due to the U.S. military occupation of the South," as the fundamental obstacle to fast reunification. In nature, it is also a mixture of fear and hope, of North Korea's own aggressive intentions in the cause of southern liberation and Korean unification and fear of the imperial design and military power and technology of the United States.\textsuperscript{63}
Turning down South Korean President Roh Tae Woo's July 7th Declaration as a way of improving inter-Korean relations in 1988, Pyongyang has been quick and aggressive in its propaganda efforts. Pyongyang also made a proposal of a "Comprehensive Peace Plan" as a new practical counter-proposal of the South or reunification of the Korean peninsula on November 7, 1988. It presented a peace package to guarantee peace for the independent and peaceful reunification of the fatherland. It mainly called for (1) a gradual removal of U.S. forces and nuclear weapons from the peninsula, (2) arms reduction in North and South Korea, demanding a cut in the size of troops of south and north Korea to fewer than 100,000, (3) information and inspection of (1) and (2) and (4) tripartite talks among Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington. All of them were proposed to aim at arms reduction on both sides without the stage of mutual confidence building.

Furthermore, showing little interest on pointblank Seoul's functionalist approach, it proposed particularly the "system of political and military collaboration" between both Koreas to manage all problems pending fatherland unification. It claims simultaneous problem solving in all fields of military, political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian affairs. Most important, it further considers that the priority of politico-military issues paves the way smoothly and perhaps successfully for bargaining between high-ranked
leaders of North and South, to compromise politico-military problems, to plan the establishment of a new government.

In importance of political debate, Pyongyang in line with neo-functionalist propositions holds that political and humanitarian issues cannot be separated. On the other hand, Seoul, following the functionalist separability propositions, claims that it is both possible and desirable to separate political and humanitarian matters—one on exchanges and the other on military and political affairs. And Pyongyang also depreciates the gradual and incrementalist approach to unification due to the belief that it has surely not only contributed to the maintenance of the status quo, but served for the interests of the national dividers. Clearly she regards Seoul's approach to be "a trojan horse to ambush the civil war explanation of Korea's division and unification."67

More to the point of North Korea's way on political and military solution, she continually insists on the conclusion of a peace accord between North and South Korea. In the military area, Pyongyang is obstinate for the substitution of a peace agreement for the armistice agreement set up in the end of Korean War in order to remove military confrontation between the two halves. Although the proposals under the name "peace accord" or "non-aggression accord" are similar to each other in terms, the contents of those are completely incompatible. It is for the reason that, under the circumstances that military threat against each other still
possibly exists, the peace agreement in which Pyongyang demands the withdrawal of American military troops will not be accepted by the Seoul government. But, if mutual confidence and trust for non-aggression in the military sense is restored, it is expected to agree to set up a peace accord between the two Koreas.

After being hard hit by the breakdown of the Berlin Wall, the North Korean leaders are trying hard to push back the waves of change hitting their shores, but they can't. As North Korea has become alienated in international relations more and more, unification policy has changed to be more flexible and less jingoistic. In his speech to the Assembly, Kim Il Sung introduced a new five-point policy to facilitate national unification on May 31, 1990. They are:

(1) Tension on the Korean peninsula must be eased and a peaceful climate for the country's reunification must be created;
(2) The barrier of division must be removed and free travel and a full-scale open-door policy must be instituted between the North and South;
(3) Both sides must develop their foreign relations on the principle of creating an international climate favorable to independent, peaceful reunification of the country;
(4) They must develop the dialogue for national reunification;
(5) A nationwide united front for the country's reunification must be formed.

This policy seems likely to accept the peaceful approach in order to build up mutual trust and cooperation at first glance. But indeed it includes the tactic of unification by force. In contents, Pyongyang demands to accept the three
principles of independence, peace, and national unity which
North and South signed in the July 4th Communiqué in 1972. It
implies considerably something else. According to President
Kim, the principle of independence was meant to drive out the
United States military presence from South Korea; the
principle of peace was meant to halt the modernization of the
South Korean military; and the principle of national unity
transcending ideological differences was meant to strengthen
the South Korean anti-government groups in their effort to
overthrow the South Korean regime.70 Thus peace gestures are
important to Pyongyang in its high-profile effort to depict
South Korea as subservient to the U.S. and as committed to a
policy of economic sellout to foreign capitalists.71 To be
short, its proposal is no more than propaganda in dealing with
unification issues.

Superficially adhering to the importance of item (2)
above, Kim proposed that the societies of the divided halves
of the peninsula be thoroughly opened and free travel be
allowed across national borders on January 1, 199072. A
similar idea was also reemphasized on July 5, announcing
Pyongyang would open the northern section of the truce village
for restricted passage within a small border area for a
limited number of people beginning Aug. 15, 1990. The
proposals were:

(1) Contact and travel between the north and south should be
closely combined with solution of the reunification
question.
(2) The contact and travel between the north and south must be allowed equally, without discrimination, to the political parties, organizations and people from all walks of life with differing ideas, ideologies and political views.

(3) Contact, travel and exchange between the north and south must not be restricted by any legal or social condition.\textsuperscript{73}

Seoul could not accept this proposal because it was designed to induce such anti-governmental circles as the radical and dissident groups of South Korea to attend the pan-national rally which was planned to be held at Panmunjom around Aug. 15. As preconditions, Pyongyang demanded to abolish National Security Law of the South, and to tear down the "concrete wall" along the border between Aug. 1-12, and to release prisoners and to hold the Aug. 15 pan-national rally. As far as the issue of the "wall" is concerned, it is not like the Berlin Wall blocking people's passage. Seoul says the "wall" is actually a series of tank traps designed to prevent another northern invasion.\textsuperscript{74}

With the world changing to a new detente era among the powers, South Korea's new approach to China and the Soviet Union, Gorbachev's and Deng's continued pressure to open North Korea's closed door to the outside, Kim could not help but open its society a little bit to South Korea and restrictedly follow the South Korean incremental approach to meet the needs of new global circumstances. Pyongyang criticizes this that Seoul is seeking to "blow winds of liberalism into Pyongyang"\textsuperscript{75} so as to overthrow the Communist North Korean
government or to achieve unification in terms of the recent German model.

Because of unfavorable international mood to North Korea and the reactions of the neighboring Communist allies press, Pyongyang reluctantly joined a dialogue of North-South prime minister talks in Pyongyang and Seoul. Through the five rounds of talks North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk reiterated its unification policy, with the emphasis that the settlement of political and military problems is most crucial for relaxation of the present political and military tensions between the two Koreas, and promotion of exchanges in functional and humanitarian areas is the second one to tackle by two Koreas, asserting that transactions in non-political areas would automatically flourish after achieving territorial unification.

Unexpectedly, Pyongyang and Seoul reached some accords for non-aggression pact and reconciliation in the fifth round of Premier Talks as described earlier. It was a reluctant and unavoidable choice. North Korea was driven toward the accord by increasing international isolation as one of the last of the hard-line communist states, international pressure to open its nuclear facilities to inspections, and most importantly by pressure on its pocketbook. In particular, economic hardship in North Korea and its increasing diplomatic isolation with the collapse one by one of its communist allies, have prompted greater flexibility by Pyongyang. The North
Korean dictator Kim Il-sung seems to have decided that the collapse of Soviet communism forces him to look to Japan and the West for investments in his flagging economy if he is to compete with prosperous South Korea—and to behave accordingly. That agreement embraces a silent agenda: a bankrupt Communist North seeking economic help (especially from Japan), and a burgeoning South expanding markets. Therefore, for South Korea, these talks are part of the payoff for standing up to North Korea's threats and building a democratic capitalist system that has helped lead Asia's postwar boom.

Furthermore, in Pyongyang's view, the most unsolvable problem on the Korean question is irrefutably the longstanding station of the formidable American armed forces on the Korean territory enough to frustrate and prevent any attempts of the establishment of Communist regime by military conquest in the southern half of Korea. Pyongyang believes that the presence of U.S. forces there is certainly a prime obstacle for inter-Korean dialogue, cooperation, and even reunification based on the principles of independence and peace.

As another reason of anti-dialogue, President Kim put more emphasis on the abolition of U.S. nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

Disarmament and the abolition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction is the most pressing task in ensuring peace. The large stockpile of nuclear weapons now on Earth is a menace to the survival of mankind itself. It is intolerable that the valuable
results of science and technology created by mankind and social wealth be used for the production of the means of aggression and war that threaten man's survival, and not for the well-being and development of humanity....the Korean peninsula should be made a nuclear-free, peace zone.82

It may be true that since a nuclear arsenal can give a country decisive superiority over an opponent lacking such weapons, the possibility that a rival may develop or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons engenders special fears and suspicions.83 But, although President Kim says, "We understand very well that we don't have nuclear weapons. And we are not intending to produce nuclear weapons. We have no capacity to produce nuclear weapons, nor do we have money for that purpose,"84 North Korea has been seeking to find a military solution and to overcome nuclear inferiority through nuclear power program. The motivation of North Korea's accelerating the production of powerful nuclear weapons has been stimulated by the expectation that the Soviet Russia and China will hardly support North Korea in all fields, specially, militarily and economically, and the new changing international environment is not at advantage to her.

Although North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, which obliges any nations to take inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the North has refused to allow international inspection of a nuclear facilities building at Yonbyon, some 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang. The Yonbyon installation
includes several reactors and appears to be able to reprocess spent fuel into weapons-grade material. The reactor is depicted as "very crude in quality...[but] suitable for the production of plutonium." According to the report of *Asiaweek*, reprocessing plants can be used to recover "weapons-grade" plutonium for bombs or "fuel-grade" plutonium and unburned uranium to use in electric power plants. Even though Pyongyang argues that the installation is not designed to produce weaponry, and "it is only for peaceful purposes," there are no power lines emerging from the plant, meaning that it would have no use for electricity generation. Peaceful or not, North Korea's nuclear program is already being used as political leverage. Its policy on nuclear weapons may provide a potentially low-cost solution in the political and military area.

The powers surrounding the peninsula as well as South Korea do not want North Korea to possess nuclear weapons because Pyongyang is out of control from Moscow and Peking in using nuclear weapons, and it obviously threatens the peace and stability in the region of Asia. The nuclear complex in Yonbyon has thus received considerable attention, much of it orchestrated in the U.S. and Japan. Even Moscow, the North's traditional ally, has joined the United States in publicly warning Pyongyang that it had no choice but to yield to international inspection. Tokyo firmly informed Pyongyang again during talks in Peking that, until inspections would be
permitted, it would decline to establish diplomatic relations, or to furnish any of the economic assistance to North Korea.

The most vital liability North Korea faced is to join the full-scope safeguards regulations of IAEA. Negotiations and pressure between Pyongyang and powers concerned have been continued for years, but there were no actual solutions. If it does not fulfill the safeguards of IAEA, Vladlen A. Martynov, a senior official of the Soviet Academy of Science, said "The Soviet Union will stop all kinds of supplies regarding this facility." In this sense, then ROK Defense Minister, Lee Jong-Koo also publicly denoted that her country might be forced to mount an "Entebbe-style" commando raid against a nuclear installation Yonbyon. In response, North Korea denounced this as "virtually a declaration of war."

In late June 1991, Kim Young Nam, Foreign Ministry of North Korea, indicated that "unless inspection on American nuclear-weapons in the South is not realized, North Korea would not get inspection although it signs nuclear safety pact." However, President Bush's epoch-making decision (Sept. 27, 1991) to remove all U.S. land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea as a way of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear weapons program, and the follow-up declaration of President Roh of a nuclear-free country and abandonment of holding and producing nuclear arms in the future, pressured Pyongyang to allow international inspection.
Without such weapons in South Korea, U.S. officials said, the United States could still defend it with long-range nuclear missiles based elsewhere and with bombs aboard B-52's based in Guam. Furthermore, they said, sophisticated conventional weapons like those used in the Persian Gulf war are now sufficient to defend South Korea. However, air-delivered nuclear weapons, which are deployed at a U.S. base of F-16 aircraft in South Korea, were excluded from the Bush announcement. Robert S. Morris of the Natural Resources Defense Council recently estimated that about 40 nuclear artillery shells and 60 nuclear bombs for aircraft delivery remain on South Korean soil. Pyongyang also demanded the elimination of such weapons, and instantly persists in the simultaneous inspection in both the North and the South, or allow international inspection only if the U.S. completely removes all of its nuclear weapons and its troops from the Korean soil. Further demanded is the assurance by document of which the U.S. would not be launching a nuclear attack against North Korea. But, perhaps, they will be retained in South Korea, at least, for the time being under the U.S. nuclear umbrella until North Korea completely gives up its unification policy by military force.

With the Roh's promulgation that his country was now "nuclear-free" (Dec. 18, 1991), Pyongyang indicated it would allow simultaneous international inspection of nuclear facilities in North and South along with the U.S. overt public
and formal demonstration on that, although "the United States has unofficially informed North Korea that U.S. forces have completed their withdrawal of nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea." Washington resolutely rejected this because "the policy of the U.S. government has been neither to confirm nor to deny that it has nuclear warheads in any particular foreign country." 

This strategy of North Korea on atomic arms plan was again changed on December 26, 1991 to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and not to maintain a nuclear reprocessing installation to produce weapons-grade plutonium. This was a surprising and unexpected announcement, but, despite the accord with South Korea, the issue of how and where North Korean facilities are to be inspected has not yet been resolved, and it is not sure that Pyongyang will carry out its pledge to allow access to its nuclear plants. "Paper promises will not keep the peace," Bush said. Pyongyang's new nuclear policy was unavoidable due to continued international pressure and likely compulsory inspection of U.N. Security Council's resolution of February 1992.

Another influential issue on unification policy was Pyongyang's bearing on the admission to the United Nations. On May 24, 1990, President Kim reiterated that Pyongyang and Seoul must join the U.N. only with a single seat, on the basis of the "one place, two delegations" formula. This was repeated and reemphasized by Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It
said, "This stand proceeded from the noble desire and sense of responsibility for preventing the permanent division of the country and achieving its reunification at any cost." Ever since the end of the Korea war in 1953, Pyongyang has stubbornly offered opposition to separate membership in the U.N., maintaining that it would in the long run lead the international community to acknowledge the two Koreas as separate sovereign nations. It is for this reason that Pyongyang conceived of the Seoul's two-Korea policy as anti-unification policy. As a solution, it alleged that two Koreas enter into the U.N. only as a single nation and only under the North's Communist leadership, by sharing a seat in rotation with the South as a symbol of eventual reunification. In recalling Pyongyang's one-Korea policy, it is by far much contradictory that, while ROK had applied for it five times between 1949 and 1975, DPRK alone applied for separate admission into the U.N. so as to join the world organization in 1949 and in 1952.

For more than four decades, Pyongyang entirely depended upon Moscow and Peking to use its permanent seat on the Security Council vetoes to frustrate Seoul's effort for membership of the U.N. separately and independently. However, a closeness and warming of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the two world Communist powers in recent times led to make it clear that they could no longer help North Korea by using their vetoes in the Security Council to Seoul's
application. Its effort at least to delay the Seoul's single entry attempt has been constant, but is beyond ability. When Moscow supported Seoul's position in the summit in Cheju, Korea, Pyongyang began by far to hold on to Peking for its veto. But China also expressed its similar view when its Prime Minister, Li Peng, visited Pyongyang on May 3, 1991. In fact, China gave pressure upon the North to join U.N. membership together with the South by admitting two countries and two systems in order for the North not to absorb into the South as happened in Germany and to continually remain as socialist countries.103

There was no option for Pyongyang to choose, and hence she reluctantly applied for the membership of the world organization on May 27, 1991 in order not to lose her position in the world politics, undercutting her demand to sovereignty over the entire peninsula. "It faces up to the reality there are two countries"104 Kim Young Soon, the secretary of KWP said. According to the North Korean Foreign Ministry, "As the South Korean authorities insist on their unilateral U.N. membership, if we leave this alone, important issues related to the interests of the entire Korean nation would be dealt with in a biased manner on the U.N. rostrum and this would entail grave consequences." "We cannot let it go that way."105 No doubt it was the first manifest sign that Pyongyang's leadership was changing its major policies so as to be relieved of its growing diplomatic isolation. But
strictly, Pyongyang's intention of entry into the UN as a reunified nation is not changed but was "a reluctant choice."

Just as North Korea has been strongly against the dual or separate admission of U.N., it has been stubbornly in opposition of cross-recognition with rhetoric favors of its two major allies, maintaining that it was a stratagem to ultimately perpetuate the status of national division by barricading the road to unification. It cannot put up with the concept of the existence of two governments of Korea in the peninsula in pursuit of "One-Korea Policy," being equal its logic applied for joining membership in the U.N.

As a proper action against the Northern Policy of the South, North Korea has reinforced the "Southern Policy" (or even termed as Western Policy). It has positively propelled to find friends elsewhere in the world so as to escape from international isolation and from persistent stagnation in its economy. In this process, Pyongyang has circumspectly launched to develop amicable relations with particularly, the advanced Western capitalist and Southeast Asian countries regardless of their ideological leanings since late 1988. Two Austrian diplomats from Peking, for example, were invited to Pyongyang in January, and Pyongyang has been forming joint ventures with Belgium, France and Sweden. In recent years, Pyongyang has tended to strengthen contact with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Among them the United
Kingdom has more positive position to the amelioration of the relationship with the North.¹⁰⁷

What Pyongyang really wants is to expand its contact, to improve relations and negotiation with Washington on the Korean matters including unification without engagement of Seoul government as ignoring the political authority of ROK. It is interpreted as North Korea's intention to take initiatives in reunification. However, in October 1988, the United States eased its diplomatic sanctions against the North to intensify President Roh's July 7th Special Declaration of South Korea to ease tension, to be relieved of North Korea's isolation, and to in the long run lead two divided nations to become one peacefully. In an effort to this, Washington has held 11 counselor-level meetings with North Korea in Peking,¹⁰⁸ and had sporadic socio-cultural and academic exchanges with North Korea. Pyongyang also made a conciliatory gesture towards Washington by recent return of the remains of five American soldiers died in the Korean War on May 28, 1990.

North Korea has increasingly sought contacts with Japan without engagement of South Korea,¹⁰⁹ and also is recently seeking to improve relations and to establish normal diplomatic ties with Japan,¹¹⁰ which presently recognizes only South Korea. Tokyo's objective toward North Korea is, of course, economic and political purposes. By the same token, Pyongyang needs Japanese money and investment, which is far
greater than its objections to Team Spirit. Japan has made it clear to Pyongyang that the opening of diplomatic ties, financial aid, and payment—less than the US$5 billion—of "reparations" for colonial rule would be impossible unless the latter should allow international nuclear inspection.

In sum, the most particular continuities in the well-known unification policy of the North during 1988-1991 include generally as follows: (1) the rejection of the logic of incrementalism; (2) the removal of military confrontation between North and South Korea; (3) the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons and the pullout of U.S. military forces in Korean soil; (4) the establishment of Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK) as a theoretical and practical way of reunification; (5) entering two Koreas into the United Nations under one single name, namely DCRK.

Among issues, there has been a slight change since 1990 in (1) into evolving its relation in trade, and socio-cultural fields, and even reluctantly pursuing dialogue with South Korea on some occasions. For example, President Kim has already allowed some openings, including border crossings by around 800 Koreans in authorized sports, cultural, and political exchanges in 1990. Another change is (5) to simultaneous but separate admission into the world organization. Most important, it is hypothesized that all this has been accompanied by a significant modification in Pyongyang's strategic goal: The worthwhile goal of hegemonic
reunification has been scaled down to one of reunification based on parity.112

For inter-Korean dialogue and (4), Pyongyang also suggests some preconditions as follows: (a) the eradication of the current political leadership in South Korea; (b) the obliteration of fascist laws such as the Anti-Communist Law and the National Security Law of South Korea (c) the legalization of all political parties and social organizations including the communist party; (d) the release of political prisoners including communists. Under the conflicting circumstances in the peninsula, such issues will not be easily accepted by the government of South Korea.
CHAPTER 6
UNIFICATION MODELS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
(CONFEDERATION VS. COMMONWEALTH)

I. REVISED DEMOCRATIC CONFEDERAL REPUBLIC OF KORYO OF NORTH KOREA

In reviewing the theory of federalism, as fully described in Chapter 3, the confederation device introduced by President Kim Il Sung deserves attention for the better understanding of the North Korean unification model. Kim seemed to show an interest in some Western unification experiences based on a federal pattern—particularly in the U.S., Canada, and Switzerland—under which regional governments would display peaceful co-existence in non-violent means. His long planned blueprint and idea of confederation is not, however, compatible with that of the above countries, both practically and theoretically, in many respects. Hence, before speaking of its full description, our efforts will be made to, more explicitly, depict and analyze within a theoretical framework.

In general terms, confederation implies a status whereby some preexisting political entities bond together by covenant for, firstly, national security from internal and external invasions, and, secondly, to obtain economic advantages from the confederating states, not merely maintaining their own sovereignty, but forming a common organ or government for strictly restricted purposes, usually foreign matters and
defense. It is an association of various sovereign states, which shares a few common features with the world organization and an EC-like organization.

The basic characteristics accentuated in a confederation are that component (or peripheral) units or states,

(1) maintain their own political sovereignties.
(2) rely upon its own polities.
(3) delegate power to act on matters of common concern and certain agreed-upon common governmental functions to their united government which is never regarded as a fully sovereign state so long as the union continues to exist.
(4) make and operate respective laws and administrative, legislative and political organs within their respective territories.

And that

(5) there are two or more decision centers or governments together with the super-structure, which is only superficial government with limited functions.

Historically, confederations have developed based on the theoretical lineage of federalism. It can be thus said distinctively that confederalism or confederacy is a rectified form of federalism in many respects. In turn, a confederation differs with a federation in a variety of ways. First, in a confederation, the central authority as a state government deals with member states but not with the populations, while in a federation it acts toward both of them. Second, while supragovernment has supremacy over the participating units in the federation, but in the confederation this is not so. Third, confederation states have an international status and can establish diplomatic relations with other sovereign
states. In a federation, provincial governments lack these diplomatic linkages. Fourth, confederal states are equal members of the United Nations and have a right of veto over a determination of the majority in case not only of exercising its own privilege but also obtaining benefits from the economic, political, military, and other areas, while it is neither imaginable nor allowed in a federation. Fifth, confederation is the consequence of an agreement, whereas a federation is based on a written constitution.

Based on the confederal principle, President Kim maintains, "the most realistic and reasonable way to reunify the country independently, peacefully, and on the principle of greater national unity is to bring the north and the south together into a confederal state, leaving the ideas and social systems existing in North and South as they are." He further says: "We will never force our ideas and social system upon South Korea but will subordinate everything to the interests of national union and reunification." It refers to Pyongyang's defensiveness about its own avowedly "superior" socialist system, in face of the highly productive and resourceful South Korea. In brief, the vital character of this scheme is to allow the two different political ideologies and systems to last.

As a way of national unity, President Kim clearly suggested to establish a unified confederal government named "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" (hereafter cited as
DCRK). In the scheme, emphasis was placed upon the necessity for two political units of Korea to embrace and respect each other's existence, and unification norms in political, social, and economic areas. Upon this basis, the DCRK should be neutral and non-aligned state which would not join in any political-military alliance or bloc.

It is here that our major attention is to explain and evaluate the 1991 confederal model. It is virtually a refined and completed scheme of the complementary 1980s designs, and at present, still effective as the only North Korean unification model. The new confederation model shares the idea from the 1980s in the creation of the following institutional mechanisms to deal with general matters of the confederal state, and also takes charge of the regional governments. Suggested was the establishment of: (1) the Supreme National Confederal Assembly (SNCA) as the unified national government, and (2) the Confederal Standing Committee (CSC) as a permanent organ of the assembly. The SNCA would comprise an equal number of representatives from both Koreas and an appropriate number of representatives of overseas nationals. The CSC organized by the SNCA would administer the two Koreas and to discuss and determine all political affairs of the confederal state.

Within the framework of DCRK, the charter indicates the functions of the unified state. They are: (1) to guide the two regional governments; (2) to discuss and decide on
political affairs, national defense problems, foreign affairs and other questions of common concern in the interests of the country and the nation as a whole; (3) to push forward the work of uniform development of the country and the nation; and (4) to realize unity and collaboration between the North and the South in all spheres. In addition, the unified state will neither obliterate the political, social, economic system of self-governing regional units, nor will it dispose of the organisms such as individuals, groups, parties, administrative organizations to frustrate one part from forcing its will on the other.

Under the administration and guidance of the DCRK, the two regional states would seek for a self-reliant policy within the limits in parallel with the principal interests and demands of the fatherland. In this approach, the constituents should make common efforts to narrow the differences in all spheres between the Koreas, to restore the national homogeneity, and to dialogue and cooperate with each other for national unification.

In the proposal, President Kim further set forth "Ten Major Point Policy Lines" which the DCRK would be obliged to do as the unified state of Korea. They are as follows:

(1) the DCRK should adhere to independence in all state activities and follow an independent policy;
(2) the DCRK should effect democracy throughout the country and in all spheres of society and promote great national unity;
(3) the DCRK should bring about economic cooperation and exchange between North and South Korea and ensure the development of an independent national economy;
(4) the DCRK should realize North-South exchange and cooperation in the spheres of science, culture and education and ensure uniform progress in the country's science and technology, national culture and arts, and national education;
(5) the DCRK should reopen the transport and communications between North and South and ensure free utilization of the means of transport and communications in all parts of the country;
(6) the DCRK should ensure a stable livelihood for the entire people, including the workers and peasants and other working masses, and systematically promote their welfare;
(7) the DCRK should remove military confrontation between North and South and form a combined national army to defend the nation against invasion from outside;
(8) the DCRK should defend and protect the national rights and interests of all Koreans overseas;
(9) the DCRK should properly handle the foreign relations established by the North and the South prior to reunification and should coordinate the foreign activities of the two regional governments in a unified way; and
(10) the DCRK should, as a unified state representing the whole nation, develop friendly relations with all countries of the world and pursue a peaceful foreign policy.⁴

Originally, Kim's plan for the creation of the DCRK is derived from previous confederation proposals. In the 1960s Kim Il Sung⁵ set forth that national unification by holding free general elections throughout the entire Korean peninsula on a democratic basis without any foreign interference is the most practical procedure for ultimate unification goal of the fatherland, and went on to purpose that unless the Seoul government should welcome this scheme, North and South Korea should set up the confederal state as a transitional measure.

In the early 1970's Kim reemphasized the formation of the confederal state⁶ by declaring "Five Platforms" which
comprises: (1) dissolution of military confrontations; (2) collaboration and exchanges in many fields; (3) summoning of great national convention; (4) creation of a "Confederal Republic of Koryo" (the word, "Koryo" was a name of an ancient united kingdom); (5) admission into the U.N. under the name of a single country. He said, "It is the most rational way of realizing national unification to establish the North-South confederal state while leaving the existing institutions of North and South intact for the time being...."?

The 1980 proposal is much refined, and is still relevant for 1991 and beyond as Pyongyang's model to political unification. It is quite different from the previous ones in the following five points: (1) the word, "Democratic" was added to the name of the confederal state; (2) the international character of the state is a non-aligned neutrality; (3) the relationship between the central and the regional governments is distinctly specified; (4) the confederal state is regarded as the final form of the unified state, but not transitory; and (5) there is no statement on unification by a general election. A confederation under which the two regional units coexist—a position rephrased by the North's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland (CPRF), in its shared declaration with dissident South Korean pastor Rev. Moon Ik Hwan during his visit in Pyongyang in late March 1989.
At the recent Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) Conference held in Pyongyang on April 29-May 4, 1991, President Kim distinctly restated the long-standing confederation policy, calling for the unity of the two divided nations under a political system with the name of the DCRK. He asserts that "this conforms with the desire of the Korean nation to develop independently as one reunified nation and meets the requirement of the present era of independence and peace."9

A slight modification within the framework of the 1980s model was represented by some high-ranking government officials from North Korea. It was Han Si Hae, vice chairman of the unification policy committee of the Supreme People's Assembly, that suggests unification by the type of American style of confederation. Continuously, Yoon Ki Bok, chairman of the same committee, revealed a new model in which the governments of Pyongyang and Seoul would exercise sovereignty in diplomatic and military matters impermanently under the loosened confederation system. His idea is to exercise limited sovereignty and to give diplomatic and military powers to autonomous regional government until fully achieving political unification. It is similar with the earlier model of 1980 of giving the powers to the proposed confederation and of organizing a joint army with the local armed forces under the confederal jurisdiction to defend a unified Korea against external invasion.
In recalling the theoretical position of a confederal state recently provided by Pyongyang, we are still confused by its entity. It seems evident that the proposal for DCRK admits de facto entity of two separate sovereign states in Korea, while seeking for unification. Also, although it is depicted as a permanent condition, but, in a most strict sense, is a transitional step.

In its character, the DCRK has both a confederal and a federal character, despite being called a confederal state. It is a confederation in two senses; that each Korea has its own decision-making and institutions and that the SNCA comprises an equal number of representatives from both Koreas. Nevertheless, it resembles a federation in that it rates the CSC and the SNCA as the unitary government of the confederal state.

In the context of governing powers, the DCRK is also ambiguous. In terms of the dynamics of power politics, it is also distinguished from other forms of government in the sense that while the SNCA and the CSC in a unified government have political power (a unitary or a federal feature), the local political units also have their own power to take charge of the populations and groups in a nation (a confederation one). Viewed in this light, it is questioned how to share and divide the powers within the DCRK scheme between SNCA (and CSC) and the provincial parts.
It is reported that Seoul has keenly rejected Pyongyang's proposal for a confederation because it strongly demanded: (1) the elimination of the present political leadership in the South; (2) the repeal of the National Security Law; (3) the repeal of anti-communist confrontation policy; (4) the withdrawal of U.S. armed troops from the Korean territory; and (5) release of political prisoners, including communists. In particular, based on the principle of independence, the DCRK plan was designed "to undercut Seoul's advantages stemming from the United States military presence in the South, Seoul's access to advanced foreign technology and markets, and its extensive connections with multinational corporations." Kang Young Hoon also sees that "when Korean Communists propose a Korean Confederation as an objective of united front from below tactics against South Korea, they openly advocate the destruction of the South Korean government.""11

Furthermore, there are several inappropriate reasons for establishing the DCRK. First, there are no set confederate formulas other than the desire of constituent parts of the confederation for peaceful and constructive dialogue and exchange between them thus lessening tension and reducing unproductive expenditures and efforts resulting from the continuation of extant acrimonious relationships among them. Second, because the two Republics have maintained their own autonomous jurisdictions and socio-economic systems since the time of unfortunate national division, the two
separate governments will be faced by serious obstacles because of the incompatible systems and exacerbated by severe divergence of interests. Thus the DCRK is impractical due to serious heterogeneity between the Koreas.

When looking into the substance of the confederation, its preconditions do not demonstrate confidence in the potential effectiveness of the running DCRK. In examining the comparable historical precedents of confederations, it is worthy of knowing the minimal preconditions for functioning successful confederation. These conditions are: (1) the social orders of the member states of a confederation must be consistent with one another; (2) the solidarity of the foreign policies of the member states must be maintained; (3) the member state must possess "ideological" compatibility. To state the situation accurately, if the social orders of the constituent units are inconsistent with one another, the confederation may be vulnerable, and also not be easy to form it on the ground of a lack of social homogeneity. Besides, unless the foreign policy goals of the participating units should be similar or mutually acceptable, their diplomatic relations with other countries would be in a predicament. The ideological incompatibility might also bring about making the creation of a confederation very difficult, or result in weakening the presence of the confederation.

In the context of the above conditions, the recent historical cases of attempting the formulation of
confederations among independent and autonomous states—i.e., Indian confederation in May 1946,\textsuperscript{14} Jewish-Arabic confederation in November 1947,\textsuperscript{15} and German confederation in January 1963\textsuperscript{16}—fell through. In addition, a confederation is to a greater extent unstable or may be broken up at any time when the above mentioned preconditions are not reached. For instance, Egypt-Syria under the name of "United Arab Republic" in February 1958 and Egypt-South Yemen at the same year created confederations, but went through a bitter experience, ending in the demise of a treaty in September soon thereafter. This certainly shows how difficult it is to effect a harmonizing confederation.

In the case of Korea, the successful creation of the DCRK on the peninsula would be very difficult for the reasons of: (1) a lack of social homogeneity; (2) a lack of social order; (3) a lack of supragovernment capability to participating units; (4) a discrepancy over political and socio-economic system; and (5) bilateral distrust and animosity. Thus it is all but impossible that a pluralist free democratic and a totalitarian communist system peacefully coexist within a confederation without one system dominating the other. To make matters worse, there have not been any significant exchanges and cooperation in all related fields between two sides for several decades. In actuality, confederation cannot be conceivable without conveying multilateral exchanges and contacts. Therefore, Pyongyang's proposal for the creation of
the DCRK with a one-shot political resolution is unrealistic as an interim model or an on-going process for the reunification of Korea.

II. KOREAN COMMONWEALTH OF SOUTH KOREA

As an alternative to North Korea's DCRK, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo promulgated "The Korean National Community Unification Formula" in a major policy speech at the National Assembly on September 11, 1989. Unlike Pyongyang, the Roh administration cannot accept the configuration of "one nation, two governments, two systems" in a unified form of government. Its scheme thus calls for the establishment a single unified state under a unitary system and a single constitution in the international communities, "enabling the people of a single nationality to lead free and affluent lives under a common political, economic, social and cultural system on the same land." It simply symbolizes de facto "one nation, one state, one system" that is "more 'complete' and that will incorporate the ideals of nationalism, democracy, liberty and individual well-being," for it is "the most justifiable and defensible way of reunifying the country." The formula was also drafted based on the principle of "great national unity," that the two Koreas would profoundly have a feeling of a spirit of acceptance, esteem, and reconciliation toward each other, and bearing in mind that they share the same blood and belong to one nation.
In deciding the name of a unified nation, President Roh avoided the term 'Chosun,' 'Koryo' which Pyongyang clung to use the names of unified kingdoms in old ages. Instead Roh preferred to use "Korean (Han in Korean) National Community (hereafter cited as KNC)" which 'Han' means 'one' and 'big'. Furthermore, for completing a popularly-supported unification model, the government had made effort to include the broad opinion of the South Korean people at large. For example, for the most extensive consultation between the government and the people, the government has held 250 seminars and discussion meetings, referred to 426 sets of proposals, commentaries, and analyses, held parliamentary hearings, and conducted a survey of public opinion of 16,800 people from all classes, including Koreans abroad, on ways to improve inter-Korean relations and to achieve unification. In comparing the DCRK, which did not reflect the public opinion at all, the KNC would appear to be an epoch-making design.

Accepting that unification is a process rather than a condition, the definitive intent of the new unification formula is to build Pan-Korean Community (or a common political community) in which all Korean people would share common belief, values, and sentiments, and could link together in a common peaceful living zone to taste both sufficiently and freely human basic needs such as freedom, justice, rights, happiness, and welfare in all areas with the formation of a
unified and democratic republic in the peninsula. In this sense, "While the two parts of Korea are thus building a single social, cultural and an economic single community, they should also create the necessary conditions favorable to political integration, leading eventually to the building of a single nation-state," Roh said.

Its strategy is concentrated upon the process of uniting divided people than upon the establishment of a unified form of government with supreme political authority. As its scheme, the formula's implementation rested on the following three essential steps: (1) North-South dialogue and summit meeting; (2) the creation of Korean Commonwealth as an interim institution; and (3) the creation of a unified democratic republic. Further, its incremental approach stresses arms control, confidence-building measures, and disarmament. The process of community building should involve the creation and expansion of harmonious interactions among qualitatively unique entities. That is, its process, of course, requires the expansion of openness, functional interdependence, and transaction and cooperation between North and South in order to build mutual trust, and even to move towards a common path that will be the basis for integrating them into a single country.

In many aspects, President Roh's new unification formula was based on and referred to by former President Chun Doo Hwan's one "National Reconciliation and Democratic
Unification," announced in 1982. Both the Roh and Chun formulae were based on a gradual and step-by-step approach with two phases—reconciliation and unification which was agreed July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué. Roh's formula reaffirmed Chun's, in pursuing in principles of independence, peace, and democracy, and in the ideals of liberty, human rights, happiness, and welfare. The two formulae also called for general elections in accordance with the new constitution, leading to the creation of a unified government and a unified legislature.

The Roh formula, however, differs from Chun's in delineating the contours of a unified Korea. Roh suggested the transitional institutional arrangements—the foundation of the Korean Commonwealth (hereafter cited as KC)—to link North and South together as an intermediate stage, feeling the difficulty of the instantaneous creation of the KNC for the ultimate establishment of complete unity by reason of heterogeneity and mutual distrust. The KC shall have a bicameral parliament, shall be a democratic republic, and shall gear its policies toward the goals of promoting the welfare of all members of the national community, safeguarding the permanent security of the nation, and maintaining friendly relations with other countries. It was the first time that South Korean President proposed "an interim stage" model since national division.
In character the KC is very similar with the British Commonwealth or the Commonwealth of the Independence States of the Soviet design of 1992, which is a free and voluntary association of nation-states. According to the dictionary, it is defined as "a group of sovereign states and their dependencies associated by their own choice and linked with common objectives and interests." Based on the definition and principle, the KC would be established by dint of common agreement based on democratic mechanism in two Koreas.

The KC was designed based on the principle of a "one nation, two Systems," the two Koreas recognizing each other, retaining fully their respective sovereign rights in international relations, and seeking non-aggression. It would be formed to restore national homogeneity, to surmount salient differences, and eventually to expedite the development of a national community with a one nation, one state system.

Within the sphere of the KC, bilateral relations between the two Koreas will not be between foreign nations any more, but a special inter-Korean relation under a transitional institution arrangement. For example, trade, travel, visits, and what not, in all fields between them will not be regarded as international, but as internal. The KC is, that is, viewed as a "special form of union." National relationship between them in the sphere of the KC is parallel with that among the nations of the European Community or the Nordic Council.
The KC blueprint also requires the institution-building in order to discuss and negotiate unification dilemma and procedures, to improve inter-Korean relations, to accelerate the development of a single national community through broad mutual opening-up, wide-ranging mutual collaboration, cooperation, and transactions between the two divided nations for peaceful co-existence and co-prosperity, regardless of what political systems and ideology, value, and lifestyle are. In its design, the organization of the KC comprises of many executive and administrative councils between the two authoritative states. There will be a Council of Presidents, or chief executives as the highest decision-making organ; a Council of Ministers composed of delegates from the two governments; and a Council of Representatives, including members of the legislatures.

A Council of Ministers will make up nearly ten cabinet ministers from each side, co-chaired by two Prime Ministers. They will discuss and arrange all pending Korean affairs and clinch the implementation of its decisions. Five standing Committees in a Council will be created to treat humanitarian, political, diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, military, and other important matters. The principal agenda of the Council of Ministers in relevant areas are:

(a) In the humanitarian field, the Council of Ministers should solve the issue of reuniting dispersed families, whose members are estimated to total 10 million;

(b) In the political and diplomatic fields, the Council of Ministers should take measures to ease political
confrontation between the South and the North, prevent counterproductive inter-Korean rivalry on the world scene that only wastes national energies, promote the interests of overseas Koreans and otherwise advance national interests jointly;

(c) In the economic, social and cultural fields, the Council should accelerate the opening of South and North Korean societies, promote multi-faceted inter-Korean exchanges, trade and cooperation and jointly foster national culture. The formation of a common economic zone to achieve mutual prosperity would facilitate the development of both the South and the North, thereby enhancing the quality of life for all;

(d) In the military field, measures should be taken to build confidence and control arms with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. Replacing the current armistice agreement with a peace agreement could also be on the Council's agenda.27

The Council of Representatives will be made up about 100 legislators, with equal numbers representing the two Koreas to broadly discuss the political ideals and proposals for unification, to draft the constitution of a unified Korea, to name and form of a unified government, and to clinch its basic intra- and international policies, and to picture timing, methods and procedures for a general election to form a unified legislature. It will also be to provide policy advice and recommendations to the Council of Ministers.

A joint Secretariat, which will be visualized to be located in a Peace Zone within the Demilitarized Zone or other agreed region, will work for support the activities of both the Council of Ministers and the Council of Representatives, and work to realize common concerns, and other administrative affairs. As an interim measure, until North Korea opens its doors, Roh proposed to begin with establishing a new "city of
peace" in a Peace Zone. Within such a city, separated families could freely reunite, and also be the meeting place of people for broad trade and other kinds of exchanges between the two halves.

Although the feature of the KC fundamentally calls for maintaining the special relationship between North and South on a gradual basis rather unifying into either a confederation or a federation, the KC indeed seems to have accommodated an important sign out of DCRK of Pyongyang on unification. It is to constitute the equal members in all the organs. The Seoul government had rejected this for quite long due to the fact the population of the South is two times as large as that of the North. This is a practical concession of Seoul in the establishment of organizations toward a single national community.

The character of the commonwealth would be consociational in the sense that neither side could really force the other side on any major issue, for that would result in breakdown of the Commonwealth. The relaxing military tension and the preservation of eternal peace between the two Koreas are prerequisites in restoring national homogeneity and mutual trust, and in building mutual confidence. Each part must not interfere with a political and military affairs of the other.

North Korea strictly and promptly rejected President Roh's KC model because it was modeled with the intention of perpetuating the two Koreas. Choi Mun Il through commentaries
in *Rodong Shinmun* and *Pyongyang Times* refuted the KC model, commenting that the various organs of the proposed KC are most likely neither to be effective as decision-making bodies, nor to facilitate North-South exchanges and collaboration; that it is quite difficult to reach mutual accords on a constitution, of general elections being conducted, and of a unified parliament and a unified government being established; and that KC set the goal of obliterating communism. Since an obliterating of one system by another is totally unacceptable, Pyongyang argues the establishment of confederation in the peninsula which could accommodate different ideological and political systems.  

In addition, Pyongyang severely censured the KC for not dealing with three essential subjects, i.e., the removal of 1,000 nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops from Korea and the abolishment of the national security law. It argues that no independent solution of the Korean problem is possible as long as U.S. military forces remain on the peninsula, nor can one talk about upholding the principle of great national unity in the unification process without repealing the Seoul government's widespread use of the anti-communist and national security law, which associates North Korea with anti-state activities and as an anti-state organization and severely and brutally punishes those who express sympathy or support for North Korea in the southern area.  

30
Turning to the point, our concern is to scrutinize its feasibility considering the circumstances encompassing the peninsula. The reality today makes it impossible to open a new era of reconciliation and cooperation between North and South and to realize the proposed device without changing attitudes toward each other, due to the following reasons:

(1) As Pyongyang argues, in the establishment of the several organs for unification process, even the representation of both sides of Korea will be equivalently constituted and will discuss on unification issue, they will not likely come to an agreement as each part stubbornly take on principal issues.

(2) South Korea will not convey her unification procedures with the danger of military threat from North Korea. Thus she continually needs the station of American troops in Korea and the efficacy of national security laws;

(3) North Korea will by no means advocate the principle of one political unification system against communism;

(4) North Korea will not agree to a referendum being conducted for a new government because of superiority in population of the South in number, compared to that of the North.

Even though Pyongyang has keenly repudiated the KC model mainly because of (1), and has not changed its real attitude as yet, Seoul has an optimistic belief that as time passes, North Korea will change owing to the rising international mood for reconciliation and cooperation.

There are also some problems as regards the KC in theory and practice. By conceptual terms, the KC indubitably differs from the conventional norms of a commonwealth as based on the international law. As the North-South relationship is conceived of as internal, they should comply with the internal law. But they, in practice, are not following the internal
laws and regulations. It is certainly distinguished from a confederation and a federation in view of international law and international relations.

Another important point is that in the scheme of the KC, each Korea will hold its own political sovereignty with the right to exercise independent diplomatic and military policies, maintaining its own political system and ideology. This is identical with a revised form of DCRK. The great difference is, however, that the KC demands military rights for its own defense (including the deployment of US military power in the Korean soil); on the other hand, the DCRK strongly rejects Roh's device in a military sense. The conceptual difference is that the KC follows the principle of "one nation, two states" similar to an association of states in one nation, while the DCRK is based on that of "one nation, two Systems."

Furthermore, different from the DCRK's scheme to national unity, within the framework of the KC, the two Koreas seek mutual interests in which they can increase contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in all fields—humanitarian, economic, cultural, political, military, and diplomatic in order to build trust. These processes are, to Pyongyang, believed to be possible or accelerated after the establishment of a confederation.

Nevertheless, in actuality, if a single social, cultural and economic community is progressively developed, while
issues pending between the South and the North are resolved one after another, conditions for political integration will ripen. Improved inter-Korean relations and mutual transactions in all related areas will be also to convert their previous belligerent into cooperative and friendly relations, and to have spillover effect into political area. Then, one nation, one state system will be created on the peninsula.

It is commonly said, thus, that the designed KC is not the final fashion of a unified Korea, rather it is regarded as a interim framework for ameliorating inter-Korean relations, and set the goal of creating the KNC as a final form of reunification. That is, the KC is a process model, and the KNC is an end-product one. The former is positive for the unification process, but failed to show how to establish the KNC like the case of DCRK. In the result, being mindful of the shortcomings from the theoretical and practical perspective, the KC should be revised with the description of the road to the goal of a unitary system.
CONCLUDING REMARKS (PART II)

In nature, different from North Korea, South Korea has avoided any form of reunification by using military force that might trigger a full-out war on the Korean peninsula. Rather it has continually advocated peaceful and democratic proposals to resolving the Korean problem. Furthermore, and most importantly, the Seoul government has made an effort to foster its relations with North Korea in terms of a gradual and incremental approach for inter-Korean development and ultimately national unification. Based on such an approach, Seoul has been seeking easy issues (humanitarian, economic, and socio-cultural issues) rather than difficult ones (political and military issues). Later, in partly accepting Pyongyang's request, it used to finding solution in political and military affairs in harmony with North Korea toward reunification on the neo-functionalist basis.

On the part of North Korea, although it slightly began to change its unification policy in order to overcome international isolation and economic difficulty and to respond to Seoul's unification policy, the principle of unification of Pyongyang by force or revolution indeed has not yet changed. Her policy might be heard to pursue peace, but it is, strictly and candidly, a gimmick. If Pyongyang really wants a peaceful unification of Korea, it has to give up the united front strategy, and then make an effort with Seoul with respect to
arms control or reduction, trade, socio-cultural exchanges, and so on.

In fact, Pyongyang has been virtually opposed to inter-Korean transactions in all non-political field, even though, from the theoretical perspective, it would be helpful to reunification. But seldom does President Kim support it because of following several reasons. They are: (a) the North was afraid that its economic and cultural backwardness may be exposed outside through such channels of communication and open contact; (b) the North finally realized that the dialogue did not serve its hidden motive, as it originally intended, to agitate social unrest and chaos in the south in order to create the conditions conductive to its scheme of communizing the south; (c) instead, the dialogue was awakening the dormant consciousness of the North Korean people for unification within their society and this became an important source of its social unrest. More important, the North Koreans have little to gain by further contacts, which could hasten unrest in a country that has been kept under control by strict isolation. In other words, through mutual transactions, one-man, one-party dictatorship, and the North Korean backward society will make it likely to expose its entity to its people, and could resulting a people's revolution against Kim's rigid regime.

In the rapidly changing international order, the dual admission to the United Nations prevented North Korea from
being isolated from the outside world, diplomatically. The opening of economic, social, cultural, and political exchanges in limited areas and five rounds of Premier Talks between North and South Korea (with particular common agreement for non-aggression, transaction, cooperation, and reconciliation in the fifth round of talks) inaugurated a new era of inter-Korean relations. Furthermore, President Roh's declaration of no nuclear weapons in ROK paves the way for nuclear-free-zone on the peninsula, the continued inter-Korean dialogue and a potential summit talk.

But still problems are ahead. Although the talks leading to the dramatic rapprochement accord between the two rival Koreas began to ease high tension, it is safely presumed that it will be difficult to execute such an accord because "there could not be much change because of North Korea's concern about the danger of its system collapsing."

Thus, North Korea will not permit her people the direct and frequent contact and communication with South Koreans on account of fear that her rotten and hard-line Communist society and regime would be known to the general public.

As a further solution in inter-Korean development, it seems evident that a cross-recognition ensured by the four major powers is considered to be the proper way to establish peaceful coexistence until the achievement of Korean unification. The legal acceptance of the legitimacy of the two Koreas will weaken the inclination of each to question the
legitimacy of the other, creating a sounder basis for dialogue and interaction. And it will be sure to facilitate not only the process of socio-economic cooperation, but also the establishment of tension-reduction and detente between them.

In line with different unification policies of two Koreas with different theoretical contribution, both models of the KC and the DCRK consent to the importance of economic, cultural, and social exchanges. Yet two models are not identical with their approaches and processes to reunification. Both as an interim stage, although Pyongyang asserts the proposed confederation is the final form of a unified state, differ from each other in its approach to the complete national unity: the DCRK shares with the federalist mechanism, on one hand; and the KC, with the functionalist one, on the other hand. The former requires a higher level of integration at first, while the latter's strategies pursue an easy issue such as exchange and cooperation at a lower level in integration.

At any rate, if the two Republics consent to any of the KC and the DCRK, or an alternative, it can continually preserve sovereignty without loosing political authority to its citizens. But the problem is that the DCRK calls for end-product, and the KC stresses the process. In terms of the operation of common institutions in which both would take part in by either of transitory form, they engage in dialogue, negotiation, and bargain to the final goal of reunification.


4. As yet each Korea is not ready to legally recognize other's national entity because each deems the regime of the counterpart as illegitimate.

CHAPTER 5


3. Johan Galtung, "Divided Nations as a Process: One State, Two States, and In-Between: The Case of Korea" (Paper presented at the International Conference for the Unification of Korea, held at Kyoto, August 14-17, 1972), 5.


6. This was in an address by President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea at the 43rd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, October 18, 1988. Excerpted from the Foreign Press Division of the Korea Overseas Information Service (hereafter KOIS).


This new foreign policy was stemmed from and succeeded by President Park's declaration on June 23, 1973--that is, a continued dialogue between North and South Korea, a joint participation of the two countries in the United Nations and other international organizations, and an open-door policy to all nations, including the communist countries. NUB, "South-North Joint Communiqué, July 4, 1972, "A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, 45-54. Most parts of the declaration embrace liberal policies toward North Korea as well as other socialist countries. It should be an epoch-making plan that two Koreas work together to upgrade the well-being of the whole Korean people. But it is to some degree infeasible because it was made unconditional regardless of the response from Pyongyang.


9. President Roh on August 15, 1988 proposed to hold a summit with North Korean President Kim at any place as early as possible to substantially discuss any and all issues between two Koreas. It was once again offered in his major policy speech at the National Assembly on October 4 at the same year.

10. The 24th Summer Olympic Games directed "Korea to the world, the world to Korea" by 160 countries attending with approximately 20,000 sports officials and athletes around the world and was successfully held for 16 days from Sept. 17 to Oct. 2, 1988. Its success was depicted as follows: "Holding South Korea's industrial coming-of-age" (David I. Steinberg, South Korea's Economy [New York: Asia Society, August 1988], 1). "Through the Olympics, South Korea could establish itself in the eyes of the world as a modern, sophisticated industrial


12. For detailed explanation on "Ostpolitik," see James H. Wolfe, "West Germany's Ostpolitik," World Affairs 134, no. 3 (Winter 1971): 210-19. Its major points are: (1) Ostpolitik is a realistic policy; for example, Willy Brandt abandoned Adenauer's Hallstein-Doctrine in favor of a realistic dialogue with the East; (2) Ostpolitik is a peaceful policy; for example, Brandt signed a nonaggression pact with Moscow; (3) Ostpolitik is a political experiment towards a "Deutschlands­politik," namely, German policy for reunification. See Youn­Soo Kim, "The Achievement of Detente on the Korean Peninsula and Antagonistic Cooperation between Both Korean Governments," in International Peace and Inter-System Relations in Divided Countries, ed. Se-Jin Kim (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1977), 57. Paper originally delivered at the Second Korean-German Conference, Sept. 23-28, 1976.


14. Roh's statement for Nordpolitik in the first address at the 43rd session of the General Assembly of the United


18. Steven R. Weisman, "As Korean Leaders Meet, North Seems Increasingly Isolated," New York Times, 16 Oct. 1990. Pyongyang also claimed that this was an intrigue to isolate North Korea. Rodong Shinmun, 5 Oct. 1990. Kim Young Nam, North Korean Foreign Minister, in this context, said, "The northern policy is, in essence, designed to isolate our country internationally through the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and socialist countries including the Soviet Union." It was one of six-point memorandum of Kim Young Nam sent to then Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, 19 September 1990. Quoted by Korea Times, 21 Sept. 1990.

19. Dae-Sook Suh, "Changes in North Korea and Inter-Korean Relations," Korea and World Affairs 14, no. 4 (Winter 1990): 622. The original version of this paper was prepared for the Symposium on "Comparative Analysis of German Reunification and the Korean Case," sponsored by the Society, held on November 5, 1990, in Seoul.


21. Commemorative address by President Roh Tae Woo on the 45th National Liberation Day, expressing Seoul's willingness to discuss arms control issues and all other political and military questions with North Korea, Independence Hall, Mokch'on, Chungchongnam-do, Korea, August 15, 1990. Text supplied by the KOIS.


24. The statement of Hong Sung Chul was made to follow up on President Roh's July 20 Proposal for free travel, Seoul, 23 July 1990.
25. Thousands of South Korean university students launched the truce village of Panmunjom on June 10, 1988 to attend meeting with the northern counterpart, shouting "Unite our fatherland," "Drive out the Yankees who divide our fatherland," and "Down with the military dictatorship." It was thwarted and some were arrested by the police. See "Police Thwart Students' March to Panmunjom," Korea Newsreview, 11 June 1988, 8; Washington Post, 21 June 1988.

26. At that time, hundreds of South Korean students tried to conduct a unification march, but it was frustrated by thousands of riot police. "Student march to Panmunjom Thwarted by Police," Korea Newsreview, 20 Aug. 1988, 6.

27. See "Students Can't Attend N.K. Fest," Korea Newsreview, 10 June 1989, 11.

28. Three South Korean dissidents went to meet their counterparts from the North and overseas in West Berlin's City Hall on November 20, 1990 to create a "citizens' coalition" and to discuss reunification by 1995 in spite of government's objection. Chon Gum-Chol, vice chairman of the northern headquarters of the Pan-National Rally, and five overseas Koreans also attended the meeting. See Comments by the Spokesman for the National Unification Board on the "Pan-National Talks" in Berlin, Seoul, November 22, 1990, Foreign Press Division of the KOIS.


30. The Editorial Department, "Bumminjokdaehoi simalgi" (The Period of the Beginning and the End of the Pan-National Rally), Pukhan (September 1990), 48.


32. In this sense, Raymond Seidelman, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies sees that "The joint-venture commitments by Korean firms (via their Hong Kong subsidiaries to bypass China's law prohibiting direct trade with South Korea) are not a one-way street. China is also making a very large commitment to South Korean business." Ibid.


34. "The San Francisco summit talks represent a definite turn in the Soviet Union's policy on Korea toward the recognition of two Koreas on the Korean Peninsula. This change in
Moscow's stance is expected to prompt China to review its traditional pro-north Korea policy" (Kun-Ha Yu, "Sino-Korean Relations Could Blossom after S.F. Summit," Korea Newsreview, 9 June 1990, 7. See also Editorial, International Herald Tribune, 7 June 1990. The summit led to a very consequential breakthrough in which both presidents agreed on the principle of normalized mutual relations.


37. This statement of President Roh Tae Woo and President Mikhail Gorbachev was cited in Source Material, "Summit Talks," Korea and World Affairs 14, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 390.


42. This statement issued by President Roh in welcoming the group participating in the 47th U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Conference held in Seoul, April 1-10, 1991. Quoted from the Information Office, the Embassy of ROK, Washington, D.C., Korea: Update 2, no. 7 (April 15, 1991), 1.

43. "Cross-recognition may not be necessary if the four powers can establish a structure to ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula without recognizing both Koreas." Sang Park, "Northern Diplomacy and Inter-Korea Relations":734.

44. For more sources including the text of both sides' proposals in keynote speeches presented at the first round meeting held in Seoul, September 4-7, 1990 by chief delegates of two Koreas, see Source Material, "The First Round of South-North High-Level Official Talks," Korea and World Affairs 14, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 568-77; "Talks Also Continue on Political Front: First S-N Premiers Talks Held Sept. 4-7," Koreana 4, no. 3 (1990): 75-76; South-North Dialogue in Korea (Seoul: International Cultural Society of Korea, 1990), 27-67.


46. The major issue was concerning nonaggression. For North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk's 10-point declaration on the North-South nonaggression, reconciliation and cooperation in the talks, see Pyongyang Times, 15 Dec. 1990, 4. On the eight-point draft of the South-North nonaggression arrangement proposed by South Korean Premier Kang Young Hoon, see Korea Herald, 13 Dec. 1990. On 10-article draft of a basic agreement for improving South-North relations by Kang, see also KOIS, Continuing the Dialogue: The Third Round of South-North Korean High-Level Talks, Policy Series 90-6 (Seoul: KOIS, December 1990), 11-12. At the meetings they failed to reach any accord, except for meeting again in Pyongyang, February 25-28, 1991.


52. President Kim defines juche as "on the philosophical theory that man is master of everything and decides everything" (Il Sung Kim, On the Juche Idea [Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979], 1), as "holding fast to the principle of solving for oneself all the problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions at home, and mainly by one's own effort" (Il Sung Kim, Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea [New York: International Publishers, 1971], 87). As regards the substance of the leadership principle, the idea of juche in the ideological setting encompasses the idea of jaju (independence) in political work, of jarip (self-support) in economic endeavors, and of jawi (self-defense) in military affairs.


54. Kim Il Sung has conceived of revolutionary forces as both the northern and the southern forces and the international revolutionary forces particularly the fraternal socialist countries led by the Soviet Union and China. See Il Sung Kim, Selected Works, Vol. 4 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), 87-90.
55. NUB, *A Comparison of Unification Policies of South and North Korea* (Seoul: NUB, 1990), 42. Besides the Korean Workers' Party adds, "The south Korean revolution is a revolution for the liberation of the people from the American imperialist and aggressor. It is also a democratic revolution of the people who are against the fascist domain of landlords, comprador capitalists and reactionary government officials, who are the running dogs of the American imperialists" (NUB, *Handbook of North Korea* [Seoul: NUB, 1979], 209).


59. North Korean Constitution, Article 1, 2, 6, and 7.


62. Ibid.


64. Pyongyang's proposal of "Comprehensive Peace Plan" for the reunification of the fatherland, Pyongyang, November 7, 1988. Supplied by *Pyongyang Times*, 12 Nov. 1988, pp. 1, 3, 4. The proposals were outlined in a communique of a joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the DPRK held in Pyongyang on November 7, 1988.

65. For gradual and simultaneous realization of arms reduction in the military size of the two Koreas, President Kim proposed to reduce mutual military to the level of 400,000 strong by the end of 1989, to the level of 250,000 strong by the end of 1990, and to be less than 100,000 strong from 1992. It was restated by Premier Yon in North-South Premier Talks: arms reduction should be done through three stages in three or four years after south and north Korea reach agreements--to a level
of 300,000 during the first stage, to 200,000 during the second and to 100,000 and fewer during the third.

66. Pyongyang proposed tripartite talks involving North and South Korea and the United States (1) to discuss military issues, including arms reduction, (2) to discuss a non-aggression declaration with the ROK, and (3) to discuss a peace treaty replacing the armistice agreement of 1953 with a peace agreement with the United States. It was reiterated by a speech made by North Korean First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-Ju at the 43rd UN General Assembly Plenary Session, New York, October 19, 1988. Pyongyang hopes to preclude the participation of South Korea because the armistice was signed between the U.S. and DPRK at the end of Korean War. Rather, Seoul stresses renunciation of using military power and offensive between the North and the South, and implementation of the armistice agreement.


68. This was said by Noboru Nakaoka, an Asahi Simbun journalist who recently visited Pyongyang. Cited from Jae Hoon Shim, "Pyongyang Paradox," FEER, 29 Nov. 1990, 27.


72. Kim Il Sung's New Year Address for 1990, calling for a meeting of political leaders from North and South Korea to discuss free travel, Pyongyang, January 1, 1990. Excerpted from Pyongyang Times, 1 Jan. 1990, 1,3.


76. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Pyongyang in September 1990 gave more pressure on the North Korea to attend the premier meeting and open its society.

77. The summary of Premier Yon's specific description for solution of the matters of Korean problems are as follows:

1. the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces and the removal of American nuclear weapons on the Korean soil;
2. the establishment of nuclear-free zone;
3. to take a gradual approach covering measures for building mutual confidence to steps guaranteeing peace after achieving the actual reduction of the military size of both Koreas to fewer then 100,000 troops;
4. to establish conclusion of a peace treaty between North Korea and the United States in addition to a nonaggression pact between North and South Korea in order to support measures for easing military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula;
5. as measures of confidence-building, to cease joint military drills and activities involving military personnel of a certain size or larger with U.S. armed forces or in areas near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) against each other;
6. to open a military hot line between high-ranking military officers;
7. to change the DMZ into a peace area, withdrawing all military personnel and arms;
8. to stop further improvement in the quality of military equipment they possess and proposed mutual inspection of each other's side for verification;
9. to secure peace on the peninsula after those disarmament steps, the two sides have military personnel from neutral nations stationed inside the DMZ;

and also demanded:

10. to enter the UN under as a single nation;
11. to release of dissidents in South Korea, including three people jailed 1989 for trying to visit North Korea in violation of South Korean law;
12. to repeal of some national security statutes that regulate and in most cases prohibit contacts with the north.

On a full description of Yon's insistence, see also notes on the 1st-5th rounds Premier Talks.


93. Ibid.


95. Ibid.


99. President Kim's statement was made in his policy speech delivered to the first session of the ninth Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), on May 24, 1990.


101. The application of ROK's admission of the United Nations was rejected by the Soviet Union's veto (at that time, Taiwan was in the Security Council, but not the PRC) in 1949 and 1951. It was not even selected by the Security Council in 1961, 1974, and 1975. For more details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Hankook woekyo 30 nyon, 1948-1978* (30 Years Diplomacy in South Korea, 1948-1978) (Seoul: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978), 203-4.

102. See Ibid., 203.


108. Though the U.S. and North Korea diplomatic contacts were renewed in 1988 after four decades, there has been no meaningful progress in mutual relations. For the North reiterated and censured the joint ROK-US annual military Team Spirit exercise.

109. Following signing of the Japanese-South Korean Normalization Treaty of 1965, Pyongyang's contacts with Tokyo were limited to the bare minimum except for a small amount of barter trade by the reasons of the latter's own internal
politics as well as powerful restraints from Seoul and Washington, but it has remained one of Japan's economic partners.

110. The principle of Tokyo toward Pyongyang has primarily been based on mutual contact in a limited economic field, but not on its recognition of Communist North Korea for the last two decades. More recently, Japan denoted that progress in its normalization with Pyongyang will largely rest upon development in the talks between North and South Korea.


CHAPTER 6


5. North Korea put forward the idea of the "confederal state" for the first time on August 14, 1960, through Kim Il Sung's speech at the mass meeting in celebration of the 15th anniversary of national liberation from Japan. See Rodong Shinmun, 15 Aug. 1960; Il Sung Kim, For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 64-65. In its speech, Kim also proposed "exchanges in culture, science, arts, sports, postal communications; the reduction of the armies of North and South Korea down to 100,000 or less; and a mutual conference at an
earliest possible date at Panmujom or Seoul between the representatives of governments, political parties, social organizations and individual personages" (Ibid, 69-70). Kim again emphasized a need to establish the "North-South confederal state" in his speech on "The Present Task of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," in the Supreme People's Assembly on October 23, 1962, in which he set forth the preconditions—mainly, the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and mutual cooperation and exchanges between the two Koreas.

6. On the 1970 confederation plan, see the North Korean then Foreign Minister Ho Dam's speech at the 5th meeting of the 4th Congress of the Supreme People's Assembly on April 12, 1971 (Rodong Shinmun, 13 April 1971; Kim Il Sung's remarks in a newspaper interview with Mainichi Shimbun reporters on September 17, 1972 (Rodong Shinmun, 19 Sept. 1972).


8. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) conference "was participated in by over 100 delegations and delegates from IPU member nations and other countries and regional and international organizations..." Quoted in Pyongyang Times, 1 May 1991, 1. It was first time that Pyongyang allowed an official visit of Seoul delegates (12 parliamentarians and 13 accompanying staffs), and that they went to Pyongyang by crossing the DMZ via the truce village of Panmunjom since the division of Korea.


14. England made an attempt at designing a Moslem state, a Hindu state and other states from an domain with remarkable religious differences.

15. The United Nations exteriorized a confederation in the Palestine and Israel region.

16. East Germany proposed to West Germany the creation of a confederation for reunification.


20. Kukmin Ilbo, 11 Sept. 1989; Kyunghyang Shinmun, 11 Sept. 1989; Seoul Shinmun, 12 Sept. 1989; Jungang Ilbo, 12 Sept. 1989; Hankook Ilbo, 12 Sept. 1989; Hangyurae Shinmun, 12 Sept. 1989. It is not certain that public opinions were wholly reflected in making the new unification formula. Indeed, it was formed by unification specialists, especially Dr. Lee Hong Koo. He insisted that initiative for unification should not be led by the government or the political leadership but rather by the people at large. The spokesmen of the former Peace and Democratic Party and the former Unification Democratic Party stated their disapproval of this formula on September 11, 1989 because it formed by only government will, and ignored democratic procedure.


24. Former President Chun Doo Hwan called for the formulation of a reunified government: (1) the convening of a consultative conference between North and South to draft a constitution; (2) referenda on the draft constitution in both parts of the peninsula; (3) elections; and (4) the establishment of a reunified government. For the full text of Chun's proposal, see NUB, A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea (1982), 352-56; NUB, Minjokhwahap minju tongilron (On the Formula of the National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification), (Seoul: NUB, 1982); Sang-Woo Rhee, ed., Tongil hankukui mosaek (Search for Unified Korea), (Seoul: Parkyongsa, 1987); Sang-Woo Rhee, ed., Korean Unification: Source Materials with an Introduction, Vol 3 (Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea, 1986), especially 208-13, 214-16.


CONCLUDING REMARKS


3. This was expressed by Dr. Yoo Suk Yol, senior researcher at the pro-government Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; Cited by Tunney, "Pact: North Desperately Seeking to Get Aid," Honolulu Advertiser, 13 Dec. 1991.
PART III
OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES TO KOREAN UNIFICATION
From the information and statistical data gathered through a recent questionnaire, it is evident that not a few in the southern part tend to cling to the functionalist scheme. A variety of exchanges, specifically economic, socio-cultural, humanitarian exchange and cooperation, seem to be the best approaches to the process of unification. As another option, the respondents believe that recovery of homogeneity is also of some urgency in realizing national unification. From the surveys, achievement of democracy is also vital to reunification. Each option based on the public preference is dealt with in Chapter 7.

On the other hand, there are alternatives to public opinion options, such as arms reduction and permanent neutralization of Korea which have long been a part of the North Korean government's thinking. A neutralization design, even if it has not been supported by South Korea's people and government, is offered as one of the options for political unification in accordance with a balance of power logic. This has been put forth by some scholars from both inside and outside Korea as well as the Pyongyang government. A number of college students, laborers, some Korean and foreign scholars, political analysts, and politicians, including the top leaders in non-ruling parties who have engaged in the Korean unification affairs, place the priority on arms reduction. While they claim the gradual withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the Korean territory, the radical students,
the leftists, and others who are anti-governmental in character want its prompt withdrawal and the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the peninsula. Such insistence are described in Chapter 8.
CHAPTER 7
PUBLIC OPINION AND OPTIONS

I. ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRANSACTION

A majority of South Koreans generally give second priority to economic exchanges and cooperation with North Korea for economic integration or the improvement of inter-Korean relations (see Appendix 3.1-7). Is economic integration a necessary and sufficient condition for political integration? If we think of integration as a process, it may be thought to be true. According to a couple of recent examples, German economic integration was went before political integration with voluntary political determinism in 1990; and the member states of the European Community will attain economic integration in 1993 irrespective of the achievement of political integration, maintaining, at minimum, an environment of a security community.

A multitude of scholars from domestic and abroad have also agreed on this scheme. Obviously, this has been an epoch-making suggestion in inter-Korean development, but unfortunately, rejected frequently by Pyongyang decision-makers. In particular, economic non-cooperation (or boycotts) by North Korea—"the refusal to continue or to undertake certain economic relationships, especially the buying, selling, or handling of goods and services"—thwart its economic growth and inter-Korean development. However, in
recent years, the actual progress of economic transactions between North-South Korea has been one of the major developments in their relations. Unlike the past, the two Koreas initiated direct and indirect trade with each other in accordance with the changing international mood. It can be constructed as a positive action that could initiate trade with the North even before an agreement is reached between South and North Korea through economic talks.\(^2\)

In this follow-up, the Seoul government allowed domestic firms to import North Korean commodities in the form of indirect trade. As a front-running company, Daewoo Corp. imported 612 pieces of North Korean art, including Oriental paintings and pottery in 1988-1989.\(^3\) They were sent via Hong Kong to the southern Korean port of Pusan, and it marks the South Korean firm's first trade in commodities with North Korea since Seoul government allowed trade with the North in October, 1988. In addition, North Korean frozen fish has been carried into the ports of South Korea since October 1990,\(^4\) and Hyundai Corp. and two other Korean trading companies imported 12,000 tons of potatoes produced in North Korea to make up for a poor harvest in November and December 1990.\(^5\) Up to October 1990, 45 items of North Korean commodities at the price of $16,898 thousand were exported to South Korea; and such South Korean goods as sports clothes, color TV monitor, and fabrics valued at $284 were sent to North Korea via Japan, Hongkong, Singapore, and Australia.\(^6\) South Korea bought 35,540,000
worth of North Korean products over the last two years and sold the North $162,000 worth of goods.\textsuperscript{7} This marks that during the span of only 4 months North-South indirect trade increased 3.5 times. It was the first time for government authorities of both Koreas to enjoy indirect trade exchanges.

Since March 1991, the two governments of Korea began to enter into a new chapter of direct trade. North Korean craftworks, especially landscape paintings and potteries, at the amounts of $650 thousand were directly exported to South Korea on April 8.\textsuperscript{8} On the basis of a barter system, at the same time, Pyongyang agreed to trade 100,000 tons of cement and coal for South Korean goods.\textsuperscript{9} And 5,000 tons of rice from South Korea and 30,000 tons of coal of North Korea have been shipped and arrived at Nampo port of North Korea and Inchon of South Korea, respectively by way of ships from third countries.\textsuperscript{10} To be sure, this is an internal trade.\textsuperscript{11}

Significant economic cooperation\textsuperscript{12} through interchange of commercial goods between North and South would be certain not merely to produce obvious economic benefits in mutual fashion, but to improve inter-Korean relations. In effect, profits would be reaped from low transportation costs of commercial interchange and business travel due to geographical proximity as well as to tax-free benefits. There is no doubt that economic transactions irrespective of whether they all direct or indirect, barter or not, will (1) incite internal efficiency as well as a source of foreign resources and reach
the point of self-sustaining growth, especially for North Korea; (2) offer common economic interests, prosperity, and welfare to both sides; (3) create an environment for closer ties in non-economic areas; (4) facilitate reducing tension in the peninsula; and thereby (5) contribute to the peaceful unification of Korea.

In totally given different economic systems subjected to the different ideologies, is it possible to trade between the two Koreas? This certainly can be achieved in that it does not need the agreement at the political, ideological, socio-cultural levels. It is also much easier than development in other fields. Continually, a question arises: is it possible to achieve economic integration between capitalist and socialist economic system? Johan Galtung provides, in this question, three possibilities in economic affiliation: all of Korea capitalist, all of Korea socialist, or all of Korea social democrat.13 Logically social democracy is appropriate as a middle ground, but it requires a harmonious economic system. Galtung's view may be correct in consideration of the very recent German economic integration experience. But, it is my belief that economic integration can also be secured through a gradual economic cooperation and interchange in the beginning, and then be attained without breaking each side's economic structure and system. Amitai Etzioni supports this contention, claiming that "countries that differ in the
composition of their economies will integrate more easily than those that have similar economies."[14]

At this point we turn to an examination of the economic systems of the two Koreas to see the probability of further economic transaction and even economic integration of Korea. In contrast with a market economic system, in the socialist economic system, all the means of production, export-import, and distribution and consumption are publicly owned and controlled by the central government. In line with this overall economic pattern, North Korea's economic system[15] corresponds to a "command-type socialism,"[16] giving a greater emphasis on equity and distribution.

In addition, the North Korean socialist system is more concerned with the level of basic needs fulfillment. But in reality, her system completely failed to satisfy such human basic needs due to the policy of independence and spontaneity. To a highest degree governed by the imperatives of Juche (self-reliance) and Jarip (self-sufficiency), North Korea's economic policy appears to espouse an autarky impulse—that is, without depending on the foreign countries or forces of a market economy—to despise "revisionist" tendencies to emphasize material incentives, and hence, to oppose consumerism or "goulash communism."[17] One stated, "We produce only what the people need, so there is no waste or overproduction like in capitalist countries."[18] This refers to boosting the domestic market by use of fully domestic resources to the
greatest possible degree, following the principle of national self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

South Korea's capitalist economy system does not have a pure system of "market-oriented capitalism." Basically it has a feature of "mixed economy," in which the central government intervenes in the market with its supervision on export-import and foreign exchange; there is both publicly and privately owned and operated. To give an example, the major industries such as utilities, steel production, and tobacco manufacturing have been owned and handled by the central government. Thus its economic system is closer to "command" or "guided capitalism," and so is often called "state capitalism." Furthermore, the South Korean development strategy to a great degree integrates with the world capitalist system for capital accumulation through foreign trade, especially in terms of export-oriented industrialization.

In very recent times, South Korea cannot anticipate the high growth rate in economy of the past any more out of the rising protectionist tide and an increasing number of complex trade barriers from the advanced countries. Furthermore, due to its poor natural resources, South Korea can hardly maximize economic growth without the sufficient supply of raw materials needed for economic achievement and thus is dependent on countries which have abundant natural resources.

On the other hand, North Korea is rich in mineral resources; roughly 80% to 90% of all known mineral deposits
are found in the north, with coal (8 billion tons) and iron ore (2 billion tons) in plentiful supply.\textsuperscript{23} Approximately 200 different economically valuable types of minerals have been discovered to exist in the country, the most important of these being (in addition to coal and iron ore) lead, zinc, tungsten, barite, graphite, magnetite, and gold.\textsuperscript{24} Thus more than 80\% of its exports are raw materials, mostly gold or semi-finished products.\textsuperscript{25} However, it would no longer have to resort to the mediation of international trade centres, like Hong Kong and Singapore, in purchasing goods from capitalist markets—thus make imports considerably more expensive.\textsuperscript{26} Because the quality of their exports is poor, they cannot earn the foreign exchange to buy technology.\textsuperscript{27} And North Korea, which often fails to service its estimated foreign debt of $4.5 billion, lacks hard currency to finance its economic development projects, let alone its need for technology.\textsuperscript{28} For these reasons, her economy is in terrible condition to the extent that it is not able to solve her people's food problem by herself.

In considering the difficult economic situation of two Koreas, they recognize a mutual need\textsuperscript{29} for better economic development. On this point, trade is a far more important source of foreign exchange for developing nations than foreign aid or foreign investment and, as such, seems to offer the best route to economic development.\textsuperscript{30}
For mutual economic development of the two Koreas, based on Balassa's scheme for economic integration, the first stage is the establishment of a free-trade zone. Tariffs and border restrictions between them should be completely eliminated, while each country applying to external imports with the lowest external tariffs. Hence inter-Korean trade should be done on the non-tariffs basis to the goods of counterpart. It may be viewed to be the first and all-important step toward economic integration by increasing trade between two sides.

The next stage in integration is the customs union. A customs union also has zero internal tariffs, but consent to apply a common external tariff rates toward the outside, as exemplified by the European Economic Community. This arrangement not only avoids any problem of trade deflection, but, by agreeing to a common external trade policy, implies greater cohesion between North and South.

The next stage toward economic integration of the two Koreas is to establish a common market for the abolishment of all restrictions. A common market also allows free flow of factors of production (labor, technologies, and finance) between them. Within its realm, both direct investment without restriction from one to the other Korea and joint venture projects (including joint development of natural resources and establishment of joint fishery zones) have a greater likelihood of success by covering broader areas of mutual cooperation. It forecasts potential advantages from
removal of barriers, creates new jobs, gains extra non-inflationary growth.

Within the realm of common market, the production of goods of North and South Korea would be complementary in the exploitation of mineral resources and exchanges of technology. That is, there will be a comparative advantages between both as South Korea supplies equipment, technology and capital, and a number of excellent man power resources for industrialization, whereas North Korea offers cheap labor and plenty of natural resources. If the two complementary resources satisfactorily combine, their economies will be improved in quality and quantity. However, it is clearly too difficult to establish or operate a common market "without the harmonization of policies between members can create problems, especially with production, employment, and investment decisions that respond to differential monetary and fiscal policies."³¹

Provided the two Koreas can cooperate to the degree of harmonization of monetary, fiscal, and other social policies (or planning) to trade, and national policies that affect price structures and the allocation of resources, they are also able to constitute an economic union. An economic union thus adds policy integration to foster trade and factor integration, and symbolizes common market of member states to coincide with their economic policies. If such policies are
successfully unified, it can be said that total economic integration which has supranational authority is complete.

In trade, raw materials need to be exchanged for raw materials, capital goods from the North for raw materials from the South and vice versa, and finished products should be traded for finished products.\textsuperscript{32} Exchanges of raw materials, semi-finished or finished goods will not threaten the framework and structure of the economic systems. Inter-Korean trade should proceed with the products that each desires. In this process, both sides will benefit economically by exchange of scarce raw materials, and South Korea's economic superiority should not be revealed to the North Korean people. For example, though raw materials are obtained from South Korea, finished products of North Korea will be marked "made in DPRK."

For the further and successful inter-Korean economic interaction, the participants from North and South must bear in mind some items. First, above anything else, it must be taken place on the non-governmental or non-political rather than governmental or political level, in order to avoid the political factor. Second, due to North Korea's foreign exchange holding, the backward economic structure, low-grade technology, and slow rates of development, one suggestion as a new pattern of cooperation between North and South is commodity exchanges on a barter basis. Third, and similarly, mutual economic exchanges must be done both directly and
indirectly. For this example, trade between East and West Germany\textsuperscript{33} could be performed as the most fruitful case of direct trade between divided countries, and similarly, trade between China and Taiwan\textsuperscript{34} on the indirect basis illustrates the feasibility of trade exchanges between them despite inhospitable relations. It is tacitly known that two Koreas used to conduct indirect trade by way of Hong Kong. In 1990 soon after Seoul Olympic Games, the two Koreas carried on direct trade in a limited items and quantities on the basis of barter. There is a certain potential to put more direct economic transactions, in all feasible areas into practice before long.

Fourth, the two halves trade with products of parallel level in quality rather than those of relatively superior to the other. Similarly and fifth, things of daily necessity would be traded with top priority for better daily life for all Koreans. Sixth, the quantity and content of trade would be taken into account for each side's internal economic condition of demand and supply on an item-by-item basis. Seventh, the finished products by joint venture projects will be marked as "made in Korea," neither as "made in ROK" or "made in DPRK," and then will export to all countries in the world.

Truly such economic plans and approaches would be favorable to breaking down barriers in their relations, and conducive to mutual development as promoting the common
economic affluence and welfare of the peoples of the two Koreas. However, without the construction of infrastructure in Korea, we cannot expect the facilitation of economic transactions between North and South. From the observation of Europe after the end of WWII, it had a strong physical infrastructure for economic development and integration. Yet Korea does not have it. After the Korean War, roads, bridges, railroads were destroyed. Recently only some ports of two halves are used for receiving imports. Hence, the infrastructure—connection of road and railway line for land transport and opening more ports for sea portage, and even airports—should be inevitably equipped for direct economic transactions across the border. Such a frequent utilization of these inexpensive transportation linkages to inter-Korean trade brings greater economic interests and specialization.

For further progress, the two economic units of Korea should have a strong managerial infrastructure which depicts "the human ability within the country to manage and take collective or organizational actions." For economic development is largely dependent on managerial skills. These skills form the basis of the supportive infrastructure that is necessary to lead and direct economic development. It would be consummated only if there exists actual cooperation between the two Koreas "to assure, at minimum, a standard width for tracks"; and "to realize the full potential of managerial infrastructure, much more extensive collaboration
would be needed covering a variety of technical and administrative details.  

In conclusion, the ultimate goal of the two Koreas is indubitably political integration, but the initial or intermediate step is economic. The full economic integration would imply the greatest possible division of labor, the fullest possible mobility of factors, and the least possible discrimination within the grouping, and will benefit the member countries as these will exploit the advantages of the greater efficiency which derives from the increased specialization.

More precisely, in terms of further inter-Korean trade, cooperation, and development, the two countries can overcome economic difficulties by which North Korea can provide South Korea with certain natural resources necessary for the latter's economic growth, whereas the latter can help the former in such domains as foreign exchange, transfer of know-how on industrial techniques, economic planning and the organization of development scheme. Furthermore, they can improve their relationships by helping overcome North Korean economic problems currently encountered; by bringing a comparative economic advantages in terms of labor efficiency; by stimulating mutual economic growth; and hence by minimizing the economic imbalance between them. Conceivably this ultimately leads to economic integration, thereby facilitating the attainment of political integration.
II. SOCIO-CULTURAL TRANSACTION

Socio-cultural transactions between North and South are the most favorable option or first priority to South Koreans for the development and improvement of inter-Korean relations (see Appendix 2.1, 3.1-7). On the level of pre-unification integration, "spillover" effect (or gains) as a result the expansion of inter-Korean economic transactions and inter-dependence can be widely extended to the humanitarian, social, and cultural areas. In Etzioni's view, the exchange acts as solidifier rather than as a prerequisite or initiating factor.40

Such transactions between the two Koreas—especially at the humanitarian level: (1) free visits of dispersed families and relatives; (2) free exchange of letters among them; (3) reunion of family members; and at the socio-cultural level: (4) sports exchanges and competitions; (5) exchanges of artists and performances; (6) academic exchange. These relationships are less problematic since they can be done smoothly irrespective of the agreements over the economics, politics, or ideology. Moreover it may help reduce the politico-military tensions between the two Koreas.

Still the issue of reunion visits among members of separated families is an urgent item in humanitarian terms. In recent times, there has been slow progress on reunion visits in humanitarian realms in other foreign countries.41 However, in the two Koreas, rapid progress has taken place
with expanded inhabitants' contacts. Since the Seoul government promulgated the basic principle of North-South cooperation on June 12, 1989, there have been 352 human round trips and residents' meetings on 25 unification affairs between North and South up to the October 1990.\textsuperscript{42}

At the social level, the discontinued inter-Korean dialogues have been rejuvenated and active discussions on unification have been under way.\textsuperscript{43} Today, positive signs include some visitations to North Korea on business, while more Koreans from the North are taking part in world events elsewhere including Seoul and Pyongyang. The policy of South Koreans' contact with North Koreans under the permission of Seoul government also encouraged interaction in informal, unregulated arenas.

Above all, the foremost turning point in social interactions may be seen through sport competition. Up to the late 1980s, rivalry in sports games and competition were insignificant events in North-South relations. During that time the two Koreas used to participate in a few international sports matches mainly in the Third world countries.\textsuperscript{44} But inter-Korean relations have developed, with a significant turning point occurring when the two Koreas joined and matched together in the 11th Peking Asian Games\textsuperscript{45} in 1990 and the North-South Korean Unification Soccer Matches\textsuperscript{46} in October of the same year. The North and South began to reorient and renew their relationship in terms of soccer games in Seoul and
Pyongyang, which never happened before in the divided peninsula. Subsequently, athletes formed a common team, and participated in the '91 World Table Tennis Championships in April and the 6th World Youth Soccer Match in June. Furthermore, the North-South sport ministers agreed to joining '92 Barcelona Olympic Games under one Korean flag. To be sure, participating in a world event through forming a joint team is quite substantial and meaningful for the further development of inter-Korean relations at the social level.

Looking back at the past experiences of athletic competitions between North and South, it used to be like a zero-sum game with mutual abhorrence in a game and their relations: no matter what may happen, each must strive for victory. However, the two rival Koreas demonstrated a great change in their attitudes, displaying friendship and brotherhood. It was, strictly speaking, a non-zero sum game in competition as working in easing tensions. It helped the two Koreas become closer with each other.

Presently, sports games among countries have been popular and become one of the outstanding ways with which nations compete for individual and national prestige, and also contributing to world peace and cooperation. It can be done irrespective of different ideologies and political, social, cultural, economic system, and whatever. With the competition in sport events, hostile or conflicting countries can vie and serve as a major momentum for dialogue and cooperation. As
good examples, even though there was the sad experience of the Olympic boycotts in Moscow in 1980 and in Los Angeles in 1984 due to political reasons, both the United States and the Soviet Union began to open their interrupted dialogue through Goodwill Games in 1986 and 1990, and the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. To give another example, West and East Germanies have improved their relations in terms of sports competitions, particularly soccer. In applying this to the case of Korea, especially inter-Korean sports matches between athletics of North and South are much more helpful to be closer to their relations. "The fastest way to reunification is through cooperation on sports exchanges,"\(^{49}\) Kim Yu Sun, North Korea's sport minister, said.

Social interactions between North and South Korea cannot stand alone. At the cultural level, epoch-making change has also taken place. There has been the visible development and cooperation in the cultural fields as well. It was the first time that movies of two Koreas were put on screen during the first inter-Korean film festival\(^{50}\) in New York on October 9, 1990, those attending include North and South Korean motion picture people, like producers, directors, movie stars.

Continuously, Pan-national Concerts for Unification were successfully held in Pyongyang, October 18-24 and in Seoul, December 9-10, 1990.\(^{51}\) It was the first time that North-South musicians performed with the endorsement of the two govern-ments' authorization. During this period, some split
families could meet in Seoul. Continually, the joint traditional musical concert was performed in Yanbin, Manchuria as kayagum virtuosos from North and South were joining. Such film festival and musical concerts were first ever attempts at mutual cultural exchanges since the national division. Through such events, artists from the two Koreas embraced the opportunities to come together and to introduce some of their culture.

Those direct and active social and cultural events between North and South were and will be in vanguard of the drive to achieve pan-national reconciliation and harmony, inter-Korean exchanges, and even reunification, reducing mutual suspicion, fear, and hostility. It is also noteworthy that a number of players, performers and delegations of both sides came to cross the border directly via the truce village of Panmunjom, not through any third countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, or China, another breakthrough since American and Soviet militaries occupied and divided Korea in a post-World War II.

Based on the pluralist paradigm, the widespread mutual social and cultural acts between two Koreas are, above everything, conducted to the extent by non-governmental persons and groups, leaving the politico-military aspects for later discussions because the lower level's approach is much easier than that of the higher level under the conflicting situation. Han Seung-Soo says, "The ultimate aim of this
marginal approach is to let different systems converge toward similar ones that will pave the way for national unification with as little disturbances as possible. This scheme fundamentally aims at the sectoral integration between North and South, recalling how Germany and France after WWII with the past history of animosity and rivalry transformed their antagonistic feelings to friendly relations, and have been effectively participating in the ECSC.

The deep and widening inter-Korean transactions and cooperation in such activities will establish an atmosphere of firm relations. It will engender healthy interactions in the social, political, and cultural spheres, and thereby strengthen the stability of the participating states and promote solidarity among them. Furthermore, day-to-day procedures of the inter-Korean pluralist mechanism will not merely slowly recuperate cooperative spirits, but surely intensify behaviors toward a mutual goal of peace and prosperity. If carried out successfully, these contacts will stimulate to create mutual trust and confidence, contributing toward reducing tensions. And then, a process of integration is highly triggered when cultural and social interchanges bring spillover effect to either political or politically sensitive areas of inter-Korean relations. It will, in the long run, hopefully, provide an unwavering stepping-stone to the establishment of a single national community, restoring homogeneity of the two Koreas.
III. DEMOCRATIZATION OF KOREA

Democratization of Korea would be preferred as one of options for the solution of national unity in the minds of Koreans and the most crucial matter to be solved in our society (see Appendix 1.1, 3.8). In general, "democratization" refers to a stage in the creation and maintenance of democracy. What then is democracy? Democracy is not socialism, capitalism, or any other economic system, and much less communism. It, although has been estimated that there may be two hundred definitions of democracy, is simply and universally defined as rule by the many.

The institutions and processes of liberal democracy stipulated in the Constitution of the Sixth Republic are still manipulated or violated by the ruling elites for the maintenance of their power as they were so in the Third Republic. Thus the political system of the Seoul regime(s) has been regarded as "facade-democracy." Its approach to reunification is, however, by far more democratic than its previous regimes and North Korea. For instance, for the broad accommodation of the general public opinion and the actual participation of all classes out of the society on unification issue, policy, and models, President Roh listened to public opinion in completing the new unification model of Korean Commonwealth; and on June 2, 1988, decided to open general materials on North Korea as well as other Communist countries to the public except for some documents which clearly go
against our Constitution.\textsuperscript{59} Such an innovative design and development have widely opened the door for free discussion on political system and ideology, and even unification strategy of North Korea. One of which was to relax the strict censorship on the works relating to socialism and communism. Even Seoul National University is offering a lecture series on Marxism. And the government also has surely permitted the formation of a socialist party in the South. In the result, almost inevitably, South Korean students and many others have the opportunity to access information about North Korea's reality, and socialism and communism.

On the part of North Korea, its political system is monolithic totalitarian,\textsuperscript{60} and pluralism is rebuffed as a degenerate legacy of the bygone days. In reality, the Government controls the totality of life.\textsuperscript{61} And, the entire population seems to live on a stage -- people rehearse their lines so well that it is often impossible to tell when they are speaking from the heart and when from memory.\textsuperscript{62} No news from outside is permitted; radio knobs are fixed so they can be tuned only to Radio Pyongyang.\textsuperscript{63} In the process of political socialization in North Korea, whereas political socialization, by definition, is concerned with the transfer of political values as a whole from the revolutionary elite to the broad masses of the population, North Korea aims at inducing the population into unquestioned obedience to only one leader, Kim Il-sung.\textsuperscript{64} Even worse, the daily channels of
public expression are thoroughly barred or controlled by the
government and the Korean Workers Party in North Korea.

The more democratic domestic politics becomes, the more
the debate on unification becomes a political issue. The
assumption arising in this context is that when two govern-
ments of a divided nation are more democratic and there would
be broad public opinion and participation in the real politics
and unification process, the probability of national unity is
very high. Therefore, the initiative for unification should
not be led by the government or the political leadership but
rather by the people at large, and that the first priority
should be placed on the welfare of the people as the initial
step towards reconciliation.

What then is democratic government? Historically, there
are basic forms of government, as Aristotle long ago
categorized: ruled by wise government by one person--
monarchy, by the few--aristocracy, and by the many--republic;
ruled by unwise government by one person--tyranny, by the few
--oligarchy, and by the many--democracy (mob rule). When the
power of government lies in the light hands of leaders who are
not concerned about the human basic needs, government
invariably works badly.

An old Chinese myth explains why we have to take
democracy or democratic government. Consider the following:

When the country is ruled with a light hand
The people are simple.
When the country is ruled with severity,
The people are cunning.

...67

and

Why are the people starving?
Because the rulers eat up the money in taxes.
Therefore the people are starving.

Why are the people rebellious?
Because the rulers interfere too much.
Therefore they are rebellious.

Why do the people think so little of death?
Because the rulers demand too much of life.
Therefore the people take death lightly.
Having little to live on, one knows better than to value life too much.68

This means if a political leader is good-minded, well-intentioned, and altruistic, he can carefully gather what the popular concerns are. In fact, in North and South Korea, there has been no concrete notion of the government as "servant of the people," though "lip service is paid to such an idea." That is, it is "government high, people low."69 To be a good ruler or a good government is to comply with the will of the people, following the democratic doctrine.

Continually, expecting the ruler follows the will of heaven and seeks to gratify the popular needs, the following explain why the government should be democratic. Richard Chadwick logically hypothesizes:

1. the greater the stress under which people are put, the greater their resistance to authority.
2. the greater resistance to government authority, the more likely escalation into conflict will result in the destruction of natural and social resources.
3. the more disrespect with which people are treated by government, the less respect will people have for government.

4. the less respect people have for government, the more they will resist authority.

5. the more government stresses people, the more likely they are to revolt, not because they will fear death less at the hands of government, but because they value the hope of a better life more.

In a democratic government, the validators would be individuals and interest groups as voters. So the government has to rule the population based on the principle "of the people, by the people, for the people," as Abraham Lincoln long ago claimed. Even today not a few consent that rule by the many, democracy, is the fairest and the best. Democracy as a value in itself, indicates, in this context, that "the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them." Within its system in Korea, it would be an institutional mechanism of conducting people's will and desires for reunification.

To be sure, the fact that the two states are aligned to political, social, economic and ideological principles, policies and practices that are poles apart helps to account for their inability to agree on a plan to reunify their divided nation. Chadwick, in this sense, insinuates democratization of Korea by which "people can express their frustrations, their alienation from government, and their feeling of having been ostracized from decision making processes." It indicates that if the northerners be estranged and alienated by the southerners, or vice versa, it
makes it difficult for each side to affiliate each other. It may be harmful to national unity. The participation of all Korean people in the unification process by the principle of democracy is thus essential. The rapid democratization leads to the rapid emergence of long pent-up popular demands for reunification.

The success of a democratic society depends on feedback relations between the government and the people. By the newly established law, representatives of the people would be born by vote. When they do not work for or do not satisfy the voters, the latter vote for other candidates in the next election. This is the democratic principle and the will of the heaven. Every modern nation, even totalitarian communist regimes, including North Korea, rests virtually upon the electoral system as a mechanism for regime succession. But only in the real democratic political system, the public needs and desires will be transmitted to political leaders via the electoral process, with legitimacy enhanced as the regime respond to such interests. This normal pattern of electoral behavior is consistent with the general understanding that social and economic development will facilitate political democracy. Such a mechanism of democratic election based on majority rule provides the citizens the chance to select the candidates for the deputies--i.e., representatives (legislators) and sometimes heads of government (presidents)--by voting in a community. It would be felt to be a meaningful
factor of "political justice" to have voting rules and procedures which are fair. For example, all population can get the appropriate amount of decision-making power, whether they be rich or poor, live in urban or rural districts, regardless of race, nationality, religion, occupation, age, and so on. This type of justice we propose to call "procedural justice" (this is in line with common usage), since it concerns procedures for selecting national decision-makers who will make the "authoritative allocations of values."76

Because the lips of the chosen represent those of the populace, the former have to try their best to work for fulfillment of the population longings. If people have inalienable, inviolable, natural rights, then such a right should never be overridden by a mere summing up of the net utility, pleasure, or happiness of others.77 This is not found in North Korean political system at all, and a power transition is all but impossible. When the regime continues to fail to meet with the popular aspiration and to prevent the public participation in unification process, there will be no reunification in Korea.

IV. RECOVERY OF HOMOGENEITY

The two Koreas in the modern world have long existed separately with their different ideologies and systems despite a homogeneous genetic heritage. They have already become very different and will continue to become even more different the
longer the separation takes place.\textsuperscript{78} Up to the present, there is no social and cultural homogeneity and national affinity, profoundly different norms and values, and ideological incompatibility between them. Those discrepancies are not original, but have been arisen from their unlike atmosphere, values. It has virtually led to heterogeneity and a disparity in the ways of perception each other's society and also brought about a dissimilarity in their unification policies. It has, after all, failed for the two communities of Korea to promote bilateral dialogue, cooperation, and relations.

Many South Koreans denote the biggest obstacle to unification is heterogeneity between North and South (see Appendix 4.1-6). Thus many view the recovery of homogeneity as urgent for national reunification (see Appendix 2.2). Now that in the relationship between the two Koreas the similarities necessarily required are wholly lacking, and their heterogeneity is much more serious than expected, it cannot foresee two heterogeneous people unite together some of these days. When we can reasonably bridge the gap between them allegedly opposing ideologies, there will be a much better chance for national unification.

In nature, homogeneity of background in race, language, religion, cultural tradition, and their long historical continuity as a unified nation are viewed as positive, but it is negative in value system and living standard.
Considerably, the most realistic step is to enlarge mutual perception and unanimity in an attempt to create political and socio-cultural homogeneity by narrowing the existing ideological differences between North and South Korea, and to strengthen the common relevance and identification.

The appropriate step for recovery of homogeneity may be to create the same ideology. Lasswell and Kaplan define "ideology" as "the political myth functioning to preserve the social structure...". Political ideology as an institution for legitimation, then, will adjust and modify its content of beliefs and values in such a way that the popular demands predominant at the time can most effectively be responded to. Ideology provides a common political belief system for the population. At the most general level, the term "ideology" is a part of the belief system of social groups. Differences in ideologies between the two states on the peninsula refer to differences in the belief systems; thereby national unification would be delayed.

Ideology sameness between two or more diverse ideologies will lead to gain ideological democracy. The concept of "ideological democracy" also provides the logical approach to reduce the ideological difference and heterogeneity between the two Koreas. The question on ideological democracy lies in on how to create socio-culturally homogeneous in different political unit out of two or more definitely, qualitatively different politics. Suggested to acquire the ideological
oneness (or homogeneity) is to introduce and adopt the "Confucianism" of which literati concerned with "defending orthodoxy and banning heterodoxy." 

For the highest moral excellence with the happiest social life, and the ultimate objective for recovery of homogeneity and reunification, a rectification by Confucianism for some time is necessarily demanded in order not only to find the truth and the reality of Korea (especially North Korea), but also to completely recover homogeneity and ideology oneness. It definitely clarifies the distinctions between good and bad, the right and wrong, the logical and the illogical, the just and the unjust, the proper and the improper, the true and the untrue. Thus Confucius teaches the ruler and the ruled on a purely ethical and educative basis. This is important because the ruler governs his citizens on a good, right, logical, just, and proper basis, and carefully listens to the will of people with love and esteem. If the ruler's mind tends in the right direction, the ruled live safely; but if his mind leans in the wrong direction, they may be unsafe. The teaching usually is accompanied by approval and positive reinforcement for proper behavior which is called "good," and disapproval and negative reinforcement for improper behavior which is called "bad." When it is believed that the work of rectification is done, the citizens are educated and enlightened through political and moral teachings.
In terms of rectification of the Confucian tenet, interpersonal relationships can be cultivated following the principle of obedience and loyalty to the ruler, respect to the teacher and parents, love between husband and wife, and friendship between friends can be improved. In this context, a Confucian society which is a hierarchical society that values complementarity and cooperation among its constituent parts is described by Herman Kahn:

In the Confucian hierarchical society, the emphasis is on cooperation among complementary elements, much as in the family (which is in fact the usual paradigm or model in a Confucian culture). The husband and wife work together and cooperate in raising the children; each has different assigned duties and responsibilities, as do the older and younger siblings and the grandparents. There is emphasis on fairness and equity, but it is fairness and equity in the institutional context, not for the individual as an individual.

Confucian order of loyalty and filial piety shook the traditional order based on the patriarchal family system. Rectification should also begin with family. If the parent is kind to the child, and the child is filial to the parent; if the elder brother is fraternal to the younger, and the younger respects the elder; if the husband is just to the wife, and the wife is devoted to the husband, and all keep their proper place in the family, then the family is rectified. If the family is so rectified, the entire state will be rectified. And so, if the family is virtuous and benevolent, the whole state will become virtuous and benevolent. Further, family virtues may be transformed into political virtues. For
instance, filial piety toward parents may be transformed into loyalty to the sovereign. Thus it can be possible for people's loyalty to the old regime to move to the new one. Hence the Confucian cultural mores, with their emphasis upon hierarchy, loyalty, dedication, responsibility, commitment, and group orientation, seem to play a role not only in the political adaption of the respective Korean states and societies but also in the implementation of domestic and foreign legislation.

Following Confucian philosophy which is suggested as an alternative of two different ideologies, especially in human relationship, it is expected that the two Koreas will be in harmony with one another, and is most likely to affect levels of socio-cultural homogeneity, ensuing homogeneity of political ideas, political patterns of its constituents, and social and cultural systems. Thus, rectification by Confucianism is necessary not only to minimize the ideological difference existing between communism and liberal democracy prevailing in North and South, but also to teach the right way of the ruler and the ruled to go in a new community.

Moreover, the principle of benevolent government of Confucius could play a significant role for reunification. Good and ideal government will operate for the benefit of the governed based upon virtue and parental love, and "provide security, continuity, cohesion, and solidarity." But, the longstanding dictatorship to suppress the people are contrary
to the spirit of benevolent government; and so they are opposed by Confucius. Confucianism also points four evils of bad government, namely, cruelty, oppression, injury, and meanness. In this context, North Korea's regime is obviously bad government and enjoys such dictatorship. What is needed in getting a strong government is neither brutal military force nor strict law and severe punishment, but rectification through education and moral influence. Thus, the Confucian principle of the government will show two governments of Korea the rule of virtue and the parental love of the ruler for the ruled. It occurs only in a democratic government.
CHAPTER 8

ALTERNATIVES TO OPTIONS BASED ON PUBLIC OPINION

I. ARMS REDUCTION

The Pyongyang government has long followed the logic of arms reduction as a strategy of politico-military solution for unification. In attempting to solve the military problem, North Korea has suggested arms control approximately four times more than South Korea and has the seemingly demonstrated a positive arms reduction policy for the Korean peninsula. Inasmuch as the North has the larger military force, Seoul considers arms control on the basis of military equilibrium rather than reciprocal arms reduction.

Some Korean people including residents abroad support arms reduction between the two Koreas, although the Seoul government and the majority of its population generally have opposed this because of its own security dilemma (see Appendix 3.2-3). In particular, Lee Yong Hee (professor at Hanyang University), Kwak Tae Hwan (professor of Eastern Kentucky University), radical students in South Korea, and others, strongly support arms reduction, withdrawal of U.S. military troops and removal of nuclear weapons in Korea. In an effort to evaluate such opinions, our concern would be to first describe the arms race between the two rival Koreas, and then to examine the plausibility of arms reduction.
The unfortunate situation of national division, the fratricidal war, and the ensuing inter-Korean conflict have caused increasing mutual fear. While North Korea feels menaced by both the U.S. military forces and nuclear weapons in the southern half, by the viable rehabilitation of Japanese militarism, and by the negative effect of Sino-Russia rivalry, South Korea is in fear of the possible war as a result of North Korean provocation, under the violent and imprudent leadership of Kim Il Sung. The two Koreas are also feeling uneasy as military capabilities of each develop. More powerful and destructive weapons of both Koreas have been deployed forward near the DMZ, an area in which has witnessed intermittent small-scale armed conflicts. It caused arms race between North and South and resulted in creating a great deal of tension, with each side exercising precaution and displaying fear of counterpart's potential offensive.

It is well-known that there are two kinds of arms race; "qualitative" and "quantitative" between the two states in Korea. By "qualitative arms race," Huntington refers to a competition that centers on developing new forms of military force and the discovery of technological breakthroughs, as opposed to a "quantitative arms race" based on competition in the expansion of existing forms of military. As long as the North-South arms race is of the former (qualitative) type, Huntington feels that it "may well be a most desirable form of competition." In contrast, Intriligator and Brito make the
opposite argument, that is, a quantitative arms race is favorable to a qualitative one. By exemplifying the case of the US-USSR arms race, they argue, "The main virtue of the quantitative arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union is that it has protected both sides from technological breakthroughs that occur as a result of the qualitative arms race."\(^5\)

Arms build-up in the two Koreas as a result of their bitter fratricidal war experience is understood as a hazardous intimidation to each's survival and security. Thus they are spending large amounts of money on the military and the arms race. For the DPRK, some 24 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP)\(^6\) as the average cost of military expenditures, has been allocating for its security while approximately 6 to 7 percent of the ROK's GNP on average goes to defense. Up until 1974 the amounts of ROK's arms spending were much lower than that of DPRK, but since around 1975 that of the former began to exceed that of the latter in consequence of her very success in engagement of the world capitalist economy. But, at the present time, in comparing GNP, the amount of 6 or 7 percent of South Korea's GNP is actually larger in numbers of dollars spent than that of North Korea's 24 percent for military expenditures. Further, the average cost of military spending of two Koreas are higher than those of other countries. Such a high portion of military expenditures would
affect the changes in the security and economic policy direction and result in a low economic growth rate.

It is difficult to draw a conclusion from empirical data in comparing to the military capabilities or national power of the two Koreas. Military capability contains tangible components based on the number of armed forces and weapons of the two Korea possessed as well as intangible components, which many tend to depreciate, such as the quantity and quality of human beings by means of size and quality of population, size and quality of military establishment, relative performance of weaponry, industrial capability, morale, quality of government, and leadership in accounting for a country's war-fighting potential.

In relative terms North Korea takes quantitative precedence over South Korea in every section of the 1-million strong military powers in army, navy and air force. It is commonly accepted that North Korea's military capability is quantitatively superior to South Korea's at the rate of 2:1. According to Lee Sang Hoon, a former vice commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command and South Korean defense minister, "the joint combat capabilities of South Korea and U.S. amount to 67.7 percent of North Korea's capabilities, and in 1991, the joint military forces of South Korea and the U.S. would achieve a defensive military capability against North Korea's aggression of 70 percent of North Korea's capability, and that in 1996, they would achieve a deterrent capability of
80 percent of North Korea's capability." And also, North Korea has developed a war-sustaining infrastructure of fuel stocks, ammunition, spare parts, etc., which could support high-intensity combat operations for many weeks, possibly up to three months, without outside aid from the Soviet Union or China. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that the armed forces of North Korea in the qualitative sense is unquestionably superior to those of South Korea. As a matter of fact, an assessment of military forces in North and South Korea shows that neither has the overwhelming military superiority to conquer the other in an all-out struggle if no foreign powers are engaged in a local war.

In addition, according to the 1954 ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty as a collective security system, both the presence of the US military forces and deployment of nuclear weapons in the peninsula were permitted in terms of the concluding phrase of Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty: "The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement." The Agreement on the Status of United States Armed Forces (SOFA) in Korea was also signed on July 9, 1966 as a supplementary accord to the Treaty. The U.S. aim has been, in this context, to strengthen its South Korean ally against the threats and bluster from the North. The U.S.
has always been the assistant or benefactor, and ROK, the helped or the beneficiary.

Currently, about 43,000-strong US military forces are stayed in ROK, of which 29,100 are with the Second Infantry Division of the 8th US Army, 11,200 are with the 7th US Air Force, and 2,300 belong to KATUSA (Korean Augmentation To the US Army). South Korea is the only place in the world where US forces are kept at DEFCON 4 (Defense Readiness Condition Four, one level above normal. For the US decision to discharge its commitment to the security of ROK, the formidable armed powers are still deployed for South Korean security and peace and through annual "Team Spirit" military exercises started in 1976, the combined ROK-US forces practice jointly to improve the military capability for the provision against attack. Seoul and Washington assert that the annual exercises are purely defensive. It is, however, Pyongyang's recent perspective that this exercise is "to launch a first strike attack on the North." This was demonstrated by the two Polish officers to observe the joint military exercise. "Any country conducts a military exercise for defending itself from a possible outside invasion. I think Team Spirit is a good example," they said.

The U.S. military support to the ROK and the U.S. force posture in the region has the following specific security goals: (1) to deter North Korean aggression of defeat it if deterrence fails; (2) to reduce political-military tensions by
encouraging inter-Korean talks and the institution of a confidence-build measures regime; and (3) to change the role of American forces in Korea from a leading to a supporting role, including some force reductions. More importantly, at the regional level, the presence of the U.S. military forces in the peninsula also reinforces the four power balance of power system, maintaining the status quo in the region, and thereby indirectly warning the mainland Asian powers against the commencement of armed clash in the area, while fortifying the bulwark of the US-Japan military security alliance and assuring the protection and security of the sea lanes and air routes in the region.

It is also well-known fact that some few hundred US tactical nuclear weapons have been placed in 19 regions including Kunsan, Osan, Kwangju, Taegu in Korea, even the Washington and Seoul have neither contradicted not authenticated the presence of such weapons. One of the reasons why Washington keeps secretism on nuclear weapons is to give horror and confusion to her enemies through uncertainty. This tactic conforms to Seoul's. According to the words of Chung Ho Yong, the former Defense Minister of ROK, "If we don't have tactical nuclear weapons, DPRK may invade ROK, if we say we do have them, the North may ask the withdrawal of these weapons," and "...for this reason, we neither confirm or deny." However, Bush's and Roh's
recent declaration of removal of all nuclear weapons from the Korean soil demonstrated their existence there.

For South Korea, the presence of nuclear weapons in the peninsula serves as deterrence against North Korean armed attack. Even military experts don't know exactly what kinds and how many nuclear weapons are in the peninsula, but approximately 100-1,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been stationed in the region since the 1960s. Some were deployed so close to the front line between South and North Korea that a congressional committee complained of the danger they might be overrun in an attack. In Kim Il Sung's own words:

Today the greatest danger of nuclear war hovers over the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. imperialists are shipping large numbers of different kinds of nuclear weapons into South Korea, holding noisy nuclear war exercises...there. As a result, South Korea has become the most dangerous hotbed of nuclear war, and our country is in a critical situation where war may break out any minute.

The total capability of massive devastation by using nuclear weapons stored on Korean soil is said to be capable of destroying 1,000 cities the size of Hiroshima. Among them the new B-61 tactical nuclear weapons for aircraft has four options of yield from 100 kilotons to 500 kilotons (the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima was 12 kilotons). However, Roh's declaration on December 19, 1991 on which "there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea" implies that all kinds of US nuclear weapons were already removed from there.
On the other hand, North Korea is also building a nuclear fuel processing plant. According to the U.S. satellite photographs, Yonbyon, 88 miles from the North Korean capital and about 100 miles from the DMZ suggests there are two nuclear reactors, including one still under construction and a second plant that appears designed to extract plutonium, the raw material used for weapons-grade nuclear fuel from spent uranium fuel rods. It is reported that North Korea has some amount of natural uranium.\textsuperscript{25} North Korea, which received four 440MW power-generating reactors from the Soviet Union in 1985, reportedly is striving to build nuclear weapons by constructing nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities.\textsuperscript{26} American and Japanese nuclear experts remark the plutonium output of the plant should be big enough by the mid-1990's to produce a half-dozen simple nuclear devices a year.\textsuperscript{27} Many experts expect that the North could produce nuclear weapons around 1995 by herself.

While Assemblymen--Kim Jung Wi and Kim Jae Tae of the ruling party (Democratic Liberal Party)--insist on the increase of military capability and the continuous possession of the nuclear weapons in the peninsula for national security and deterrence against North Korea, others of the opposition party (New Democratic Party)--Yoo Yun Hak and Jeong Woong--give priority to the establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in the region. South Korean opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, has endorsed American legislators' proposals for the withdrawal of
US ground forces (and, by implication, the pullout of land-based nuclear weapons) believing that such a move could induce North Korea more readily into a genuine detente with the South. Kim Kyung Won, a former ambassador to the United States, some other Korean scholars and intellectuals, and a majority of the radical students and the anti-governmental groups cling to Kim's view. Even the Minjung (People's) Party calls for bilateral disarmament by North and South Korea and the pullout of U.S. forces from the peninsula.

Prof. Kwak Tae Hwan has seldom mentioned about disarmament of the two Koreas, instead insisted on a gradual, partial reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. His argument is based on the international environment. That is, he believes that even though the U.S. combat troops withdraw gradually, North Korea is not likely to easily go to a local war because her major allies, Russia and China will not support her with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, North Korea must rethink its options. Prof. Lee Yong Hee also argues with Kwak in the sense of the changing international security environment. But the big difference between the two is that while Kwak recognizes the North's military superiority over the South, Lee, to the contrary, insists on the South's superiority. Lee argues, "In appraising the military capabilities possessing of the North, she does not have a war capability to carry out a war against the South, the North rather feels a threat of armed attack from the South."
Some of Korean scholars (Prof. Lee Ki Taek, Prof. Lhee Ho Jeh) also still insist on the arms reduction in conformity with Kwak's view.

According to more recent surveys, the South Koreans have the different opinions on the withdrawal of the U.S. military forces from the peninsula: some dissented or consented to it; others wanted a gradual withdrawal (see Appendix 3.5, 9.21-24). It does not mean that the South Korean people are confident with their own security against North Korea's potential invasion. Perhaps it is the result of the growing economic and socio-cultural exchanges and the political dialogue between North and South Korea in 1990.

The culminating "anti-Americanism" is also one of the reasons longing for the withdrawal of US troops. Ronald McLaurin finds the reasons of that at length.

(1) Military tension in the ROK is a function of the U.S. troop presence. In particular, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are a destabilizing factor in northeast Asia rather than a deterrent.
(2) The United States is not a dependable ally of the ROK. There is every reason to believe that the United States will disengage its forces from the ROK sooner or later. If U.S. forces are going to leave, it is preferable that they leave as soon as possible and reduce the political and security costs to the ROK of their presence.
(3) ROK security is prejudiced by the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. Korea should be de-nuclearized irrespective of what happens on other issues concerning U.S. forces in the ROK.
(4) The American military intervenes directly in ROK politics to support a repressive military regime in order to buttress "stability."
Some radical students' idealized vision seems to be identical with North Korea's self-reliant national unification which implies unification should be achieved by Koreans themselves, not by foreign involvement. Their thoughts are based on "nationalism," but are not obviously pro-communist. In brief, Korean nationalism demands reunification of the peninsula and rejects American economic and military pressures. True that "two relationships (the US-ROK and Japan-ROK) embody a series of love-hate bonds. South Korea cannot do without either, and really does not even want to; yet it harbors a degree of frustration about the level of dependency on each that grates on Korean nationalism."36

With the growing anti-Americanism, the policy of reducing military budgets at the global level, and keeping detente in the Pacific area together with Russia, many in the US Congress want force reduction in South Korea. They allege that "the continued easing of East-West tension, mounting pressure to cut the federal budget deficit and the political difficulties of maintaining military bases abroad, have accelerated alls to reduce overseas commitments."37 Thus Washington has a plan to reducing its forces on the peninsula. The United States will withdraw about 7,000 forward-deployed US personnel including 2,000 Air Force support personnel and three of its five air bases in the South would be also closed in phase I (1 to 3 years, or 1992-1995), and continually reduce its military forces from the Korean territory in phase II (3 to 5 years, or
1995-1997), and further reduction but "stabilizing at lower levels as circumstances permit" in phase III (5 to 10 years, or 1997-2002). "People fear that all these pullouts may be premature, especially if North Korea doesn't concede anything in return," Yang Sung Chul says.

Most urgent is, rather, the removal of nuclear weapons in the peninsula. The U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Korea served as a deterrence against North Korean aggression. Since North Korea can have nuclear weapons by the year of 1995, the deterrence effect would be minimized. If so, because, according to the report of the Korea Institute of Energy and Resources (KIER), South Korea have deposits of natural uranium such as U$_3$O$_8$—estimated at 10,000 metric tons,$^{40}$ it will lend an impetus to the production nuclear weapons for its national security. At one time Seoul had planed to develop her own nuclear capability if the United States withdrew its nuclear shield, or if the U.S. nuclear umbrella were withdrawn,$^{41}$ in June 1975. This logic may be applicable for the national security of South Korea in the event of such U.S. actions. Thereby the two Koreas would be in a great danger, simultaneously living within the fear of a nuclear war. If nuclear deterrence failed, and unclear tactical nuclear weapons are to be used on Korean soil by the two sides at the same time, almost all Koreans would die or suffer from radiation effect. It would also devastate its neighbor countries, including Russia, China, and Japan.
Considering the powers' involvement and interests in the Korean peninsula, arms reduction can be advanced with two conceptual frameworks: "voluntary" and "involuntary."\textsuperscript{42} The one is achieved through mutual consultations, decision, and pacts without resorting to outside forces; but the latter is influenced and proceeded mostly through effort of foreign powers. In order for the two Koreas to reach an agreement on military equilibrium or reduction, it should be done both voluntarily and involuntarily. For more effective arms reduction, some of arms reduction techniques which are applicable to both Koreas are to a certain extent suggested: (1) the four powers' guarantee on eternal peace and security of Korea; (2) the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Korean peninsula; (3) mutual force reduction in conformity with military balance equilibrium; (4) reduction of overall military expenditure; and (5) reduction of major powers' military aid to the two Koreas.

In reality, this is the most difficult step for real arms reduction, for it is not easy to decide the standard for reducing each side's military power in evaluation of military power is not an easy thing. This is why each Korea denotes seemingly to evaluate its own military power as low as possible and its opposite side's, high, and further military issues are almost not known to the publics. Although difficult, to realize the voluntary means to reach a conclusion to the likely and substantial concordance on arms
reduction in the Korean peninsula, it should take certain several steps. The primary and first objective is to begin talks about mutual reduction of military capability to ease the high level of tension as a stage for future reunification. In doing so, they can find a solution out of common requests among the proposals which suggested by both parts.

Under the conflicting situation of Korea, the involuntary approach to the issue of arms reduction may be more easily taken than voluntary in the area by two reasons: (1) internally, the growing reciprocal hostility and mistrust between the two Koreas; (2) externally, the extended dependence on the imports of major powers' military technology. Hence arms reduction through involuntary approach is possible when the great powers abandon their commitment to supply weapon systems or put a restraint or halt to providing military technology.

Even difficult, for voluntary military solution, the Military Commission which will be established in early 1992 in agreement of the fifth session of North-South Premier Talk in December 1991 should first and foremost discuss and agree on the issues concerning arms matters. The following five steps are required to put into effect arms reduction for the voluntary means: (1) confidence-building measures; (2) renunciation of increasing military power; (3) proportionate arms reduction; (4) verification; (5) effective sanction against violator, as a way of easing high level tension in the
peninsula and progressing in the inter-Korean talks and negotiation for arms reduction.

In conclusion, the arms race between North and South Korea do not encourage detente or peace in the peninsula, rather accelerate the conditions of growing mutual distrust and fear. It will eventually put them in risky situation, and bring about a slow growth rate in the economy, especially North Korea. It will contribute to neither creating tension reduction, nor achieving national reunification.

In my view, arms reduction would not be the first step in view of the complex security milieu of Korea. It is not easy to facilitate arms reduction in two senses that security policies have been made with a full consideration of enemy's presence across the demilitarized zone, and that the political system itself has functioned under the "unique constraint of semi-war and semi-peace."43 In this situation, the hasty conclusion and expectation of the arms reduction between North and South would create frustrations and anger. What we can consider logically in the strategic vision, which the military superiority of one side will not be permitted to the other, is undoubtedly to maintain military equilibrium of balance between the Koreas first, and arms reduction, second, by bilateral agreement, compromise, or negotiation. Currently, the military balance between them can be maintained by the U.S. military engagement in the peninsula. The immediate U.S. military disengagement would end in military imbalance and a
security vacuum of ROK. Therefore, the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops will be possible when the South Korean military becomes fully modernized and strengthened against a renewed conflict.

II. NEUTRALIZATION OF KOREA

Permanent neutrality of Korea, even though South Korean government and people have been strongly opposed to this device (see Appendix 2.1, 8.21) albeit it has its own advantage, is suggested by some in South Korea and Pyongyang leadership as one of alternatives or options to politico-military solution, and political unification. The idea looks likely to be very seductive in reflecting upon the cold war and the ensuing impasse between powers surrounding Korea. Korea's general geographical location—"a nutcracker between an island-empire and two land-empires"—hints the likelihood of its neutrality to bring about national interests and prosperity and to avoid international involvement in the area.

In effect, perpetual (or permanent) neutrality is the status of institutionalized neutrality for a small, weak state whose strategic-geopolitical location may become a security threat to its neighboring states, if it is not able to maintain its own independence, due to rivalries among the greater powers. Because still some neutralists may deem that "Korea's fate to have her destiny determined by outsiders rather than by indigenous forces," they try to solve the
Korean question through neutralization of Korea with international concurrence. Is it possible or impossible, realistic or unrealistic in the Korean conflicting situation?

For more than two thousand years the fate of Korea has been a function either of the predominance of one nation controlling Korea or of a balance of power between two nations competing for that control. Because of its unique geographical position, the Korean peninsula has been a territory upon which the powers of Northeast Asia have repeatedly converged. In the long history of Korea its unavoidable geopolitical position being located at a major intersection of expansionistic Asian empires has caused repeated international arms conflicts with an entanglement of the powers concerned of which interests have been strongly engrossed in expanding their powers to the region for centuries.

Among them China had been virtually a supreme power in Korea. China's main purpose in the peninsula has been based on its "continentalism" to construct its great empire in Asia as exercising an influence over Korea, both culturally and politically. Due to her limitless enthusiasm in Asia to become hegemonic in the region, Korea was under China's guardianship for a long time whereby its security, sovereign, and originality managed to be sustained. But whenever Chinese regime was too weak to protect independence of Korea, Japan and Russia used to challenge Chinese supremacy in Korea. Japanese challenged Myung regime as encroaching Korea in the
16th and in the 17th century for expansion of her power to the Pacific area. As Russia emerged as an crucial actor in the region, more importantly, two influential international wars had been waged over the absolute dominance of the Korean peninsula—the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Japan's victories in the two wars ensured in her dominance in Asia by making Korea her colony in 1910 up until her surrender in the Pacific War in 1945.

From this perspective, both Russia and China acknowledge Korea's strategic importance as an "ice-free port" and a cultural bridge that passed Confucianism to Japan; the Chinese regarded the Korean peninsula as an invasion route to the Asian land, and as a protective buffer state like "lips and teeth," or as "a hammer ready to strike at the head of China; Russia looked at Korea as another rich prize in its scheme of expansion, and as an enticing base as well as a southward corridor in its search for "warm water; and Japan considered Korea as "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan"; and the United States used Korea, in the past, as a political bargaining chip in her relations with other major power in the region.

Therefore, Korea has been considered, in the geopolitico-strategic terms, as the "Balkans of East Asia" or "a shrimp between the giant whales," which generally viewed as part of a "pass-way" or a "bridge" to expand and strengthen each of the mainland Asian powers to the entire continent and the
Pacific. This kind of expressions over the Korean situation is a warning that "the Koreans should not get sucked into the quarrels of their big neighbors, should not let their land be used as a battleground, and should remain aloof from the conflict (i.e. neutral and independent)."

After WWII with the defeat of Japan, the United States newly appeared as a global power in Asia, which was not based on its geographical reason to preserve its territorial integrity. It permitted the USSR to disarm Japanese troops in the northern half of the Korean peninsula as a reward for entering the war against Japan after she dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. This means that US strategy changed definitely from an invasion of the islands of Japan to the military occupation and disarmament of the Japanese army. After quickly becoming aware of Russian ambitions, the U.S. replaced Japan in the region to successfully fulfill her global objective as protecting Japan and blocking Russian "expansionism" and Chinese "continentalism." Since then, Korea retains its key strategic importance, both to the security of Japan and to the maintenance of stability of Western strength in the general area.

But, unfortunately, the Korean War was initiated by North Korea in 1950 by especially an external reason of both misunderstanding and miscalculation of Washington on the importance of the peninsula and the limitless ambition of the Soviet Union to expand its power. This ended in the perpetual
division of Korea. Since then, Korea has been a battle ground between two rival camps—the US and the USSR. As the emergence of China and Japan as global powers in this region since the early 1960 has led to the formation of the four power structure, Korea became, as Morton Abramowitz properly depicts, "the only place in the world where the four powers come intimately into play." At present, Korea is the spotlight of four major powers: one is the Western power—United States; the others as traditional Asian powers—Russia, China, and Japan. Each except for Japan, has respectively very strong security commitments with ROK and DPRK. In brief, on account of Korea's unique geopolitical and strategic position, Korea as a small and weak nation in Northeast Asia become the locale of an invisible psychological war between the two Koreas with the deepen root of the lasting political and military competition between them.

Therefore, Korea's long history as a scene of international competition in the region draws enough attention of the possibility of neutralizing Korea on the basis of the most well-known "balance of power" dogma in the Pacific area. As a matter of fact, neutrality of Korea can be probable where balance of power is constantly to be kept among powers concerned. It may be working out as a means for maintaining peace and stability and avoiding international clashes between the powers in the region, and for unifying a country. If
failed, however, there will be great potentiality of destroying a nation as entering a war.

Yu Kil Jun and Kim Ok Kyun, progressive thinkers and modernizers during the 1880's, suggested a permanent neutrality of Korea, as a way of protecting and safeguarding Korean independence from neighboring superpowers and national interest. Japanese government also proposed the same idea with a view of blocking Chinese and Russian hegemony in the peninsula. At the same time, the German Vice Consul, Mr. Butler suggested the idea of perpetual neutrality of Korea just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war when hostilities broke out between the Japanese and Chinese armies stationed in Korea fighting for hegemony over Korea. Korean emissaries, dispatched to Japan from 1900 to 1903, when war appeared eminent between Japan and Russia, appealed for a neutralized Korea in order to avoid international war. It was first time that the Korean government seemed to be concerned over the scheme of a neutral Korea. In the 1920s, Dr. Sungman Rhee asserted in the United States that Korea should be permanently neutralized under the guarantee of Great Powers after a certain period of the U.S. trusteeship to rid Korea of Japanese domination.

However, subscribing to Robert L. Rothstein's view on which "neutrality or nonalignment is a dangerous security policy for Small Powers which are exposed to a Great Power threat," the Seoul government has not advocated and
accepted the thought of a neutralized unification of Korea as recalling the North Korean attack in 1950 and the continued warlike activities toward South Korea. To Seoul, the withdrawal of U.S forces in the peninsula as a pre-condition for neutralized unified Korea on which the North has insisted may easily engender a state of security vacuum, bringing about radical activities of the underground communists and even breaking out another Laos-type of civil war in Korea.

As for the matter of military aspect, there are some internal and external problems in achieving neutralization of Korea. First, South Korea developed into a Western-style democracy under the auspices of the United States; North Korea became a Communist satellite. Second, the international system and environment by no means guarantee the existence of the neutralized Korea. For instance, the past neutralized Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Thailand, even though their neutrality was guaranteed by big powers in time of a war, failed to continue. Third, each Korea persists in its own unification way rather than in a compromise settlement. Fourth, in case of a North Korean invasion against the South, the U.S. cannot supply its prompt military aid easily and effectively to Korea due to great distance from Korea. Thus, Seoul cannot accept the idea of neutralized unification of Korea.

Another reason of the Seoul government's rejection on this is that it has not been supported by the public opinion,
as demonstrated in Appendix 2.1. However, the idea presently has a fair number of advocates among politicians, scholars, and other Koreans, internally and externally. Kim Sam Kyu in Japan and Kim Young Chung have advocated unification by neutralization through nation-wide election. According to the theory of Kim Sam Kyu, the solution for the Korean problem should be constructed on the following three democratic principles: Democratic Freedom, Democratic Reconstruction, Democratic Independence. Kim Yong Chung advocates the abolishment of the two existing regimes, withdrawal of foreign troops, reduction in size of the two Korean armed forces to create an impartial atmosphere for the elections. The reformists' movements in favor of the idea were taken in action under the Second Republic of Korea.

Recently, Hwang In Kwan strongly insists on Korean reunification via permanent neutrality based on the rationale of the geopolitical situation of Korea and the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The former chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Kwun Doo Yong, agreed on Hwang's feature and suggested neutralization in the same fashion as Austria or Switzerland. Korean Assemblyman, Chung Sang Koo, followed this, suggesting the three stages of peaceful unification: The first stage is to create peaceful coexistence between North and South; a second stage suggests to establish a confederation; as a final stage, permanent neutralization is needed for unification of Korea. Rev. Moon Ik Hwan
advocates the scheme of permanent neutralization following the first stage of confederation (independence of military and diplomacy) and before the next stage (integration of such activities and maintenance of economic and social system respectively).

In addition, the idea of neutralizing Korea guaranteed by all the great powers has been supported by such influential Americans policy-makers and scholars as Senator William F. Knowland in 1953, Senator Mike Mansfield in 1960, James W. Morely in 1970, Gregory Henderson in 1976. It was Mansfield and Henderson who first presented neutralization of Korea on the Austrian pattern. Also, Krishna Menon, Indian Representative to the UN during the 15th UN General Assembly in November 1960 tried to discuss the possibility of unifying Korea through neutralization.  


Some neutralists hold that the problem of Korean unification would be solved through neutralization by either the Swiss or Austrian pattern. Switzerland was neutralized by
the Vienna Conference in 1815 with the agreement and endorsement of the major related powers seeking hegemony and interests for long in Europe. It could not be obtained within one day, but through a long period of persistent efforts against the powers concerned. From Switzerland Korea can learn about defensive defense and armed neutrality in general, and more particular about positive significance of a small, neutral country in a power field (Switzerland also used to be surrounded by four major powers) as a place where big powers in conflict can meet, have conferences, summit meetings, and what not.  

In the case of Austria, though the Allied Powers' guarantees were crucial to achieve its unification and an complete independence from the world powers (chiefly the Soviet Union), it enacted a statute of a permanent neutral position in 1955 through unilateral proclamation and then appreciated by the powers concerned and other nations, but not initially through formal treaties and agreement. From Austria a unified Korea can learn not only about the process of unification by studying intensely the history of the negotiations that neutralized Austria, but also about what it means, concretely, to be an active trade partner with powers on all sides.  

However, the situation of Korea is different then that of such countries. First of all, Austria and Korea have the following dissimilarity in their circumstance:
(a) The territory of Korea is located in a strategic area bordered by Communist China and Russia.
(b) While Austria might eventually be placed under the protection of NATO, the armed forces of ROK is actually playing one of the most important roles for the defense of the free world in the Far East.
(c) In event of any Communist invasion, the free world can render its immediate help easily and effectively to Austria but, geographically, such help cannot be expected immediately to ROK.72
(d) Even under the occupation of the big four powers, Austria maintained a single government in spite of the four powers' divided rule,73 but DPRK has been under the Communist system and ROK has adopted Western democratic one for the 45 years.

And, furthermore, there are some of the following conditions enabled Switzerland to maintain its neutrality, different from those of Korea.

A. Intrinsic Conditions
1. Public belief in the necessity of neutrality
   (a) spirit for independence and peace.
   (b) ethnical divergency of the Swiss Federation--because of such divergency if Switzerland became involved in war, she would be faced with danger of internal disruption.
2. The measures adopted by Switzerland to realize the above belief:
   (a) ceaseless diplomatic efforts to obtain understanding among foreign nations on the position of Switzerland.
   (b) preparation of defense power.
   (c) precautions to prevent Switzerland from becoming bases for foreign revolutionists.

B. External Conditions
1. Natural geographical location.
2. International necessity--the idea that all foreign nations feel the neutrality of Switzerland more beneficial for their own national securities and economic developments.74

Korea does not have such intrinsic and external conditions except for natural geographical location. While two cooperating parties (the Radical Socialist and the
Catholic Conservative) and an opposition party in Switzerland, the Social Democrat have ceaselessly cooperated with one another concerning diplomatic and defense affairs, Korean parties—Korean Workers' Party in the North and a ruling party, Democratic Liberty Party (DLP) in the South—have constantly demonstrated hostility and distrust regarding the unification policies and models of Korea. Even worse, other non-ruling parties in the South have seldom agreed on DLP's policies on unification.

In nature, the present situation of Korea is not comparable to that of Switzerland and Austria. Rather, that of Korea is similar to that of Laos. Even though Laos reneutralized by the second Geneva Conference in 1962 with a firm international guarantee so as to avoid foreign interference, the coalition government again fell down due to continued mutual confrontation and distrust between leftists, rightists, and moderates. In the conflicting situation of Korea, if Korea should obtain a neutralized unification by dints of either international guarantee or internal agreement, each faction out of Communists and Democrats will try to thwart the other on domestic and foreign affairs. This could to an internal war like Laos.

Nonetheless, I prefer not to totally disregard the Swiss or Austrian type of neutrality as an appropriate for the unification of Korea. It is my belief that it is not a good time to realize such types into Korea. It is perhaps feasible
when two Koreas make progress in mutual communication, contacts, cooperation, and trade whereby the situation may allow such an agreement.

In short, the idea of a neutralized-unified Korea may provide theoretical and practical process in avoiding the powers' competition in the Korean peninsula, and so the two Koreas will be advanced by this scheme as keeping far away from the dynamic and hazardous realm resulting from global rivalries. In considering the current conflicts and rivalry between North and South, it will have a higher likelihood to get effective neutralization of Korea after both sides recover mutual trust and share common interests, maintain peaceful coexistence for a substantive period of time, and reach an agreement on economic and politico-military affairs. It is not suggested as an alternative for the first or intermediate stage, but as that prior to a final stage to unification in order to avoid international conflict in the region.
CONCLUDING REMARKS (PART III)

A number of South Koreans give top priority to a non-political approach in leading the country toward a rational route for reunification. According to very recent public opinion polls on ways to unification, an average of 71% advocate a humanitarian, incremental, and pluralist approach, although these seems to be a declining trend away from this position consistent with the views that the two Koreas continue to grow apart and consequently that internal changes are reducing opportunities for unification (see Appendix 2.1, 3.1-6). The correlation between time and the percent of each sample favoring pluralist integration was $r = -0.891$ and for 4 degrees of freedom, the associated $t$ of 3.88 has a $p < .01$ for 1-tailed.

Although the two Koreas have improved relations in the economic, social, cultural, and even political realms amidst a mood of a new international order, the process has only begun. It should be continued until all Koreans achieve the unification dream. Growing inter-Korean cooperation, trans-action, and even interdependence will eventually contribute to either minimizing or removing the high level tensions in the peninsula. In fact, such approaches are much easier than other attempts such as arms reduction or a political negotiation in the unification process. This will also play
the ultimate role of acting as a political resolution irrespective of ideology and political system.

Furthermore, the half of respondents from the surveys (see Appendix 4.1-6 and 4.71) desired to remove the obstacles that obstruct reunification (i.e., heterogeneity and the difference of thought between North and South Korea). Many also deemed the reasonable way to the unification goal should be based on the democratic process (see Appendix 1.1 and 3.8).

On the contrary, there are a growing number of radical nationalist dissidents--such as radical students, dissidents, anti-governmental groups, possibly opposition politicians as the left, including some intellectuals, scholars, and politicians--over government's initiatives in unification efforts. Some of their requests as a solution for rational national unity contain arms reduction as well as the pullout of U.S. forces and the removal of American nuclear weapons from the Korean soil. In any case it may be true that they have revived the nationalist aspiration for unification and made the entire country engulfed in the hottest debates in what and how to realize national unification. Whatever their opposition direction on government policies, their options are totally contrasted to that of the majority of South Korean civilians.

From the perspective of North Korea, apart from the establishment of confederation which was fully described in the latter section of Chapter 6, arms reduction between North
and South is the most urgent task. North Korea's current
economic condition is terrible beyond description, and thereby
survival of her people is highly threatened. She seeks relief
from them by a drastic cut in military spending. Cuts in
military costs also appears to South Korea as a consequential
issue so as to fulfill the welfare needs of her people. To be
sure, arms reduction would be conducive to turning confronta-
tional relations into conciliatory ones.

Even though the option of neutralization of Korea is
being opposed by the Seoul government for long and is not
popular to its people, in considering unification in
conjunction with security issue, the option provides a
plausible rationale. In reality, the security of each Korea
has been laid in the concern of its major allies for some
time. The four major international actors in the peninsula,
although their policies and ideologies disagree with each
other, will always remain and act as stellar powers in the Far
East and to frequently coexist or compete with each other
acknowledging Korea's geostrategic importance, no matter what
circumstantial changes may occur in the region. Thus the
adoption of neutralization in Korea will be a very effective
political mechanism to avoid international conflict in this
region. Inasmuch as the Korean question has largely been
influenced by the balance of power system of the surrounding
major powers, they are acting toward the balance equilibrium
in the peninsula, not for the Korean unification. Therefore,
all Korean people should realize that unification of Korea will be discussed and achieved by both Korean themselves and the major powers.

In another option, although not suggested in this Part, half of South Korean respondents believe that it is possible or desirable to employ the German way of the absorptive unification to national unity (see Appendix 8.3-4). But, in my judgment, it is very difficult to fully apply the German case to Korea. Their circumstances are different in many respects. First of all, the two Koreans fought each other in a bloody war which had not occurred between two Germanys at all. Therefore, while the two Koreas are diametrically threatened and confronted with each other, both Germanys had steadily shown how unexpectedly an enlarged conflict between competing regimes in a divided nation can come to an end. Seldom has people's uprising or anti-government activity occurred in North Korea, owing to the maintenance of its political stability in virtue of dictatorship and state terrorism against those who challenge its absolute and supreme authority.

In addition, West Germany was ready to absorb East Germany in an economic sense which is not the situation in South Korea. For instance, at the time of destroying the Berlin Wall in the end of 1989, the former's GNP ($1 trillion 2000 hundred million) was 15 times as much as the latter ($819 hundred million); the former's foreign exchange holding amount
($636 hundred million) reached 6 times that of the latter ($99 hundred million); the former's GNP per capita and monthly income were by far exceeded than the latter; the economic growth rate of the former was almost 2 times as large as the latter.¹ More to the point, compared to the two Germanys' economies, at the period of 1989, in GNP, ROK ($2101 hundred million) was 10 times as big as than DPRK ($211 hundred million); GNP per capita of the one ($4968) was 5 times than the other ($987); the one's economic growth rate (6.7 percent) was also higher than the other (2.4 percent).² To be sure, the economic achievement of South Korea is much higher than North Korea in all areas, but the capability of the former to economically absorb the latter is relatively slight in light of German unification procedure. Thus, Seoul fears that trying to unite an increasingly affluent 43 million South Koreans with their 22 million down-in-the-heels neighbors too soon would create far greater strains than those that have been encountered in Germany's unification.³

And further, when the Soviet Union agreed to a neutralized Germany, but rejected a unified Germany to remain continually as a member of NATO, which might supposedly upset the balance, West Germany achieved its goal by the promise to give a huge amount of financial support to the Soviet Union, which was a damaged nation in fighting with Germany in World War II and was the outstanding country to help the East Germany's radical changes, including many of Eastern European
countries in history. Approximately, the East German salvage operation is going to cost anywhere from $470 billion to $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years. In effect, South Korea cannot have sufficient money to rescue North Korea in its economic crisis. In short, reunification by absorption or merging economies of North and South Korea will be very expensive.

Some hard-liners and the military in South Korea desire to achieve its unification by the German unification way in which West Germany absorbed and unified economically and politically to East Germany. It is a way to put more pressure on the North Korean economy to have difficulty enough not to solve survival problem of its people expecting their revolution against its regime. Analytically, such a hard-liners' unification strategy may be listened to feasibly, but this is not conceived of as good for Korean unification. What is a difference between dying from hunger and being killed by shot-gun? Of course, it is not equal. The killing methods (of North Korea's revolutionary way) or the option of absorptive way should not be used toward a national solution.

Even though the options (economic and socio-cultural transaction, establishment of democracy, and the recovery of homogeneity) preferred by South Koreans and those (the creation of confederation, arms reduction, and neutralization) by Pyongyang and some intellectuals and leftists in South Korea are totally different in unification approach, the goal
is one—that is, Korean unification. The priorities of public opinion will be selected and compared by computer calculation in Chapter 13, using Thomas Saaty's "analytic hierarchy process."
CHAPTER 7


3. Daewoo Corporation directly contracted with Kumsangsan International Trade Corp. of North Korea to import the art works. The art products, comprising 84 Oriental paintings, 357 pocks of pottery, 69 wooden art objects and other industrial art works, were shipped from the North Korean port of Nampo on December 20, 1988 and arrived at Pusan port in South Korea on January 3, 1989. The import price of the North Korean art products is known to be $104,000. For more details, Korea Newsreview, 14 Jan. 1989, 13.


6. National Unification Board (hereafter NUB), Nampuk kyoryu hyupryuk pangan yunku (Research on South-North Interchange Cooperation Plan) (Seoul: NUB, 1990), 41-45.

7. "Inter-Korea Trade Rises to $35.6 Mil.," Korea Newsreview, 8 December 1990, 23. It is also said that there was $70,000 thousand of indirect trade between North and South. See Hee Chang Ahn, Jungang Ilbo, 11 April 1991.


11. In a case of export, grant type aid, or long-term loan of over rice 1,000 tons to other country, it must be followed by the law and regulation of Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Thus, Pyongyang agreed to internal trade in order to avoid the FAO's interference.


13. In today's world the economic systems existing can be divided into three rudimentary categories with a few exceptions: capitalist market economy, socialist command economy, and socialist market economy. See Johan Galtung, "The Neutralization Approach to Korean Reunification," in *Korean Reunification*, 16.


16. North Korean socialism is somewhat different from the "market-oriented socialism" evident in some East European countries, in which the market process of supply and demand is controlled by the government, and is, in turn, accommodated by state planning of the economy.

Command type socialism of North Korea tends to operate according to the policy directions and guidelines set up by the party congresses. Moreover, its economic system may well be taken with the emphasis of the equality of distribution, and all economic resources are most of all mobilized and distributed under the thorough control of the Party. There is thus less elastic in accommodating market forces in the command-type socialism practiced in North Korea. On the classification and explanation of command economy and socialist market economy, see Jan Drewnowski, "The Economic Theory of Socialism: A Suggestion for Reconsideration," in Comparative Economic Systems: Models and Cases, ed. Morris Bornstein (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1965).


19. South Korea does not have a pure system of "market capitalism," instead its economic system is closer to "command" or "guided capitalism," which is characterized by extremes in centralization. Because the central government owns and operates key industries such as utilities, steel production, and tobacco manufacturing, South Korea's economy has often been labeled as "state capitalism" or "guide capitalism." For further description of the South Korean economy, see Parvez Hasan, Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1976); Paul W. Kuznets, Economics Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Young Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea, 130-36; Jon Halliday, "The Economies of North and South Korea," in Two Koreas--One
20. A world capitalist system is not merely an economic division of labor across national boundaries. "The division of labor," according to Adam Smith, "is determined by the extent of the market and, as markets expanded in the industrial revolution, the increasing subdivision of activities and complexity of economic and social interdependence led to the creation of a myriad of new organizations, associations, and interest groups in which government, through playing a facilitating role, was not actively engaged as a participant," cited in Edward S. Mason et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980), 34.


21. South Korea is a case of an export-oriented development strategy where the central economic objective is long-term economic growth via industrialization, and the key instrument used is a combination of state and market mechanisms where the state is the leader.

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22. For example, see Hang Yul Rhee, "The New Protectionism and the Korean Trade in the World Political Economy," Korea and World Affairs 9, no. 3 (Fall 1985): 507-17.


24. Ibid.


29. The two Koreas have indeed wanted economic interactions for development. Thus, Pyongyang suggested "Mutual Exchange and Cooperation" in 1980, and in response to this Seoul proposed "20 projects for economic cooperation" of the South in 1981. Agreements on imports and exports of both sides were reached at the inter-Korean economic talks of 1984.


33. The two Germanies concluded the Berlin Agreement in 1951 for the mutual trade advantage and the reduction of enmity. The volume of trade increased rapidly as soon as they signed
the inter-German basic agreement. In 1979, a long-term trade agreement was also signed between the two. Inter-German trade has been controlled in principle following East-West Trade practices.

34. Trade between the two Chinese entities in conflict has been performed indirectly by way of third countries such as Hong Kong, Macao and Japan, where overseas Chinese play a significant role.


36. Ibid.


41. For example, a Korean resident in Japan, Rev. Lee Dae Kyung's North Korean visit (July 27-August 12, 1989), Han Pil Sung and his sister's meeting in Sapporo (March 9-14, 1990), Sohn Young Chong and his wife's meeting and Son Kyung Han and his son's meeting on March 17, 1990 in Tokyo. Besides, 65 dispersed Korean residents in the United States led by Rev. Kim Hyun Hoan arrived at Pyongyang via San Francisco in April 1991 to see their families. See Korea Newsreview, 24 March 1990, 10; Tae Ki Moon, Korea Times Hawaii, 6 April 1991.

42. NUB, Tongil peksuh (The White Paper) (Seoul: NUB, 1990), 193-96.

43. For example, with increasing demands for exchanges, representative of Christians from the two Koreas met each other for the first time in Switzerland in December 1988 and held a missionary conference in Tokyo from July 10-13, 1990. In another sign of approach, efforts were being made to held conferences on unification between scholars of both sides, on
44. Sports events have taken on greater political weight in international relations. However, Pyongyang government did not allow its teams to play a game with Seoul athletes and nor participate any sports contests in Seoul up to 1989. Thus, Pyongyang athletes have been accustomed to competing chiefly with those of other Communist nations, while Seoul's, likewise, with her friendly countries and became more energetic in the sports world and hosted a number of major events.

45. ROK boycotted the Moscow Olympics in 1980 by upholding Carter's policy against Soviet incursion to Afghanistan. DPRK did not take part in the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics and the 1988 Seoul Olympics for the political reasons and in response to Western countries' boycotts of the Moscow Olympics. However, even though North Korea did not join 1986 Seoul Asian Games, the two sports teams joined together and fairly competed with each other in Singapore in 1989 for the preliminary soccer game of the 1990 World cup and Peking Asian game in 1990 without hostility.

46. Soon after the Peking Asian Games, The North-South Korean Unification Soccer Matches was held in the May 1 Stadium in Pyongyang, North Korea on October 11 and in the Chamsil Stadium in Seoul, South Korea on October 23, 1990, and after a game all players were marching around the stadium, hand-in-hand and wearing the sweaty uniforms they had exchanged. Besides, the cheering party of the North Korea welcomed and gave enthusiastically support to the all northern and southern players at the same time, and vice versa, feeling that they are all one people.

47. It was the first time that athletes of the two Koreas joined a world sport event under one flag in the 41st World Table Tennis Championship held in Chiba, Japan. A joint Korean team won the women's team title on April 29, 1991.

48. This was another breakthrough when a unified soccer team participated in the World Youth Soccer Match held in Portugal in June 1991.

49. Korea Newsreview, 29 Sept. 1990, 26. However, no one could guarantee the continued sports exchanges and a single joint team between the two Koreas would exist in the future. For example, although they agreed to participate and vie each other and to make a single joint team in some sports events for the provision of some major international events, soon after friendly soccer game in Seoul, Pyongyang regime did not allow its table-tennis athletes to join the Seoul Table-tennis
Championship Game on November, 1990. It is true, in this sense, that North Korea's turning-point in sports exchanges were slated to show its superficial endeavor to make the warm relationship with South Korea to the world, forced by the Communist changes.

50. Korea Newsreview, 13 Oct. 1990, 26-27. The five-day inter-Korean film event in New York, which put on screen a set of 16 films, eight from Seoul and eight from Pyongyang, in which nine Korean filmmakers and actors and eight North Korean delegates and eight Koreans representing the North American continent and 15 South Korean observers participated the festival.

51. Pyongyang invited 17 South Koreans, including Prof. Hwang Byung-Hi of Ewha Woman's University, to the Pan-national Concert for Unification in a letter September 19, 1990. Over 500 Korean musicians from North, South, and foreign countries took part in this concert. The South Korean musicians mostly played traditional Korean music in human cultural field. For more details, see also Korea Newsreview, 29 Sept. 1990, 30-31; NUB, Tongil peksuh, 196-99; Jeong-In Lee, Korea Times Hawaii, 18 & 20 Oct. 1990. By turn, the northern musical troupe came to Seoul at the invitation of Hwang Byung-ki, chief organizer of the Seoul unification concert. Pyongyang originally intended to send a larger number of musicians, but at Seoul's request to scale down the troupe. 29 North Korean musicians joined the Seoul Unification Traditional Music Concert Dec. 9-10, 1990 at the Seoul Arts Center Concert Hall and National Theater. For Seoul Concert, see also NUB, Tongil peksuh, 199-200; Korea Newsreview, 15 Dec. 1990.

52. Some of separated families met in Seoul on December 1990: Kim Jin-Myung (78) and his younger brother, Kim Hak-Myung (71); Kim Koan-Bo (69) and ex-husband's daughter, Cho Min-Hui (45). NUB, Tongil peksuh, 199-200.


54. North and South Korea can compete and cooperate with each other in sports, folk arts, and other social and cultural events. They can also take part in main international events under a single name representing the whole of Korea, as organizing teams of athletes or artists. In social arenas for interactions, they would make mutual efforts to achieve such their common goals in developing communication for free correspondence, free travel, free transit and free visits between them, and further, exploit the mechanisms of telephone
and telegraphs for mass media to flow throughout the Korean peninsula.


59. Indeed since the Korean War the masses did not have free access to data to judge accurately the factual situation of the North on account of the government's a closed principle to North Korea. Thus most of South Korea's younger generation has been told of the dark-side of North Korea and have been educated by which we are good, and they are bad.

60. Totalitarianism is the political form of leadership by one leader, one party, and one ideology; total mobilization and total control of the population; and total isolation. Hongkoo Lee, "Commentary on South Korean Unification Policy," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 2, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 191-97.

President Kim Il Sung was able to maintain a totalitarian system by either purging or getting rid of all opposition leaders who were connected with China or the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s. On this point, Jung Lee classified monolithic totalitarian system of North Korea into (1) a self-reliant totalitarian system (1960-the present), (2) a personalistic totalitarian system (1970-the present), (3) a hereditary totalitarian system (1980-the present). See Jung Bock Lee, "The Political Systems of South and North Korea and Their Relations," in Korea and Germany, 173-81.

Furthermore, political leadership, the cult of Kim's personality in North Korea may have an effect upon the ideological setting of the Juche idea. "The North Korean political system rests on a mixture of medieval monarchical rule held together by a military culture" (Jae Hoon Shim and Sophie Quinn-Judge, "Endangered Species," FEER, 29 Nov. 1990, 28). See also Sung Chul Yang, "Totalitarianism versus Authoritarianism: The Case of North and South Korean Political Systems," in Changing International Environment and Korean Peninsula, 209-31.

62. Ibid., 46.


64. Chung and Kim, eds., North Korean Communism, 4. Three million members of the Korean Workers Party, occupied one-seventh of the population, and schooled in the philosophy of the Great Leader's infallibility and his juche doctrine, governing every institution of power, ranging from the bureaucracy to the 1-million strong armed forces. As long as they are still in power, change North Korea will be hard to imagine.


67. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, Translated by Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English, (New York: Knopf, 1972), Fifty-eight.

68. Ibid., Seventy-five.


70. Richard W. Chadwick, "Notes toward a Taoist Theory of Revolution: with Applications to Recent Events in China, the Philippines, and Iran" (Paper sponsored by the International Relations Colloquium Series, Political Science Department, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI, September 1, 1989), 4-6.


74. The election of leadership is a preferred alternative to succession on the basis of lineage or force because of the following reasons:

(1) Elections allow citizens to review the qualifications of leaders and candidates;
(2) Elections provide a mechanism to hold public officials accountable;
(3) Elections are important occasions for public discussion of political, economic, and social issues;
(4) Elections are useful procedures in the testing and selection of new leaders;
(5) Finally, elections can help in the formulation of new government policies.

Robert E. Bedeski, "Elections in China: A Comparative Overview," Asian Perspective 2, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1987), 205-6. As a result of voting, an elected leader can earn "legitimacy" in the initial stage, and then the "legitimate" regime would be the power group that has the rights to run internal affairs.


81. The Korean people believed Confucianism which existed as a legacy of Korea for over 500 years, and are still fairly influenced by its doctrine. It is structured according to the well-known five relationships—father-son (or elder brother and younger), husband-wife (or man and woman), teacher-pupil, ruler-subject (or people), and friend-friend. All these relationships are interrelated and, except the last, are vertical. The first two of these are familistic (inward) bond, while the other three are nationalistic (outward) bond. However, the king and subject relationship (loyalty) is conceived of as an extension of the father and son relationship (filial piety). Emphasized always is all men's duty to take part in government, to help the ruler to construct and for maintain a better government.


83. Kleinjans, "Reunification of a Nation": 536.


CHAPTER 8

1. Pyongyang has suggested to Seoul arms control proposal, 205 times with 27 subjects while the latter toward the former, 55 times with 16 subjects during the last 40 years (1945-84). Dae-Sung Song, "Arms Control in the Korean Peninsula," in Search for Causes of International Conflicts and Ways to Their Solutions, ed. The Institute of International Peace Studies (Seoul: Kyung Hee University, 1988), 215-18.


4. Ibid., 381.


11. President Rhee of ROK wanted to construct a mutual defense treaty with the United States before the Korean War, as early as April 1949, when the US military forces was scheduled to be withdrawn. After a war, at the request of Seoul government, Korea and the United States initially signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on October 1, 1953. The resolution of ratification was passed by the U.S. Senate on January 26, 1954, and the treaty began to put into effect on November 17, 1954. It included two principal objectives: (1) to deter any renewal of the North Korean aggression by miscalculation; (2) to give to the government and the people of South Korea formal assurance of the US commitment in the event of external aggression. For more details, see Sung-Joo Han, ed., *U.S.-Korea Security Cooperation: Retrospects and Prospects* (Seoul: Asiatic Research Center, Korea University, 1983), especially pp. 4, 13-15; Yong-Kyun Kim, "The Mutual Defense Treaty and the Collective Defense of the Pacific Area," Ibid., 154-169; Kwang-Il Baek,


20. Chung Ho Yong's words in Sung Woo Koh, Hangyurae Shinmun, 29 Nov. 1988. In 1990, then Foreign Minister Choi Ho-jung equivocated, "It is true that liberal friendly nations of the United States have taken the umbrella of the US nuclear weapons, but it does not mean we have nuclear weapons." Looking back, then US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger publicly stated in June 1975 that the U. S. had tactical nuclear weapons in the peninsula, and those weapons might be used if war occurs. But on July 10, 1977 President Carter neither confirmed nor denied the existence of the nuclear weapons there.

21. According to the Natural Resources Defense Council, "the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea peaked at about 680 in the 1970s and declined to about 150 by 1981, the start of the Ronald Reagan administration" (Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Plans Removal of Korea A-Weapons," Washington Post, 19 Oct. 1991. Arkins and Fieldhouse in May 1985 figure that "there are 151 nuclear weapons in the peninsula: sixty aircraft bombs, forty 8-inch artillery shells, thirty 155mm artillery shells, and twenty one automatic demolition munitions (ADMs, or land mines)" (Arkins and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefield, 120-21, 231. But because a possibility of danger of ADMs automatic fallout is very high, the deployment of ADMs in the US and Europe is banned, and their existence in the peninsula is still in question. According to Gregory Henderson who visited Seoul in July 1988, ADMs are deployed in Korea. In October of the same year, Peter Haize assumed that they have already been withdrawn from DMZ. According to Kim Young Nam, the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK, there are over 1,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds, means of delivery, and even neutron bombs in ROK. See Pyongyang Times, 10 March 1990 and Jungang Ilbo, 23 June 1991. For deployment of US troops and nuclear arms in South Korea, a US nuclear forward base in the eyes of North Korea, see Pyongyang Times, 11 Nov. 1989. It is also known that there are 36 tactical nuclear weapons storehouses, nuclear bombs, and nuclear aircraft in Kunsan Air Base; Kwangju is being served as nuclear bombs' repair centers with nuclear weapons storage; Donduchun and Yuijungbu have nuclear forts. The command of the US 8th Army have already withdrawn
warheads for Honest John surface-to-surface missiles, Nike-Hercules missiles operating either in surface-to-air or surface-to-face models, and other systems. See also Sung Woo Koh, *Hangyurae Shinmun* 1 Dec. 1988.


27. *New York Times*, 16 April 1991; *Chosun Ilbo*, 19 June 1990; *Hankook Ilbo*, 18 June 1990; *Dong-A Ilbo*, 19 June 1990; *Seoul Shinmun*, 22 Nov. 1990. Japanese and American nuclear experts appraises that North Korea would hold nuclear weapons by 1990. But, according to *South China Morning Post* on June 17, 1990, North Korea could produce nuclear weapons within 6 months using its own natural uranium. In this context, South Korean nuclear experts conclude that it may be impossible for North Korean to produce them independently and senses that North Korea does not have adequate technology to separate plutonium from spent uranium 235; and producing nuclear warhead by using uranium 235 is impossible without help of Soviet Union or China; and that it is not easy to use plutonium 239 as concentrating uranium 238. See, for example, *Hankook Ilbo*, 19 June 1990.


29. Tae Kwak, "Military Capabilities of South and North Korea":113-43.

30. Yong Hee Lee, "Nampukhan junjengnungryuk bikyoyonku," (Comparative Study on War Capabilities of South and North Korea) *Sahoiwa Sasang* (Society and Thought) (September 1988).


42. The terms, "voluntary" and "involuntary" on arms control and reduction of the peninsula was used by Lee Ki-Taik. For a similar depiction by Ki Lee, "Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula and the Position of the Four Major Powers": 23-25.

43. Tong Park, "Arms Race between the Two Koreas": 71.

44. Young Jeh Kim, Toward a Unified Korea: History and Alternatives, Ph.D. diss. (University of Tennessee, 1977), 3.


47. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 177.

48. Donald F. Lach and Edmund S. Wehrle, International Politics in East Asia World War II (New York: Praeger, 1975), 72. On a similar view, for example, "Korea was fated by geography to lie at the focal point where the three empires of China, Japan, and Russia met and clashed." John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: The Modern Transformation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 609. On some historical notes of national afflictions and repeated encroachment by the leading neighboring powers due to Korea's unavoidable geographical position, see also Jong-Chun Baek, Probe for Korean Reunification: Conflict and Security, Ph.D. diss. (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980), 2-6.

49. For the perpetual control and domination of Korea, the Chinese regimes—the Han in 108 B.C., the Sui between 608 and 614, and the Tang between 644 and 659, the Kuran in the late 10th and 11th centuries—each attacked Korea. When China lost its power by Mongolia in Asia in 1259, Korea was conquered and dominated by Mongolians for a century. Arising the more puissant Myung Chinese regime, Korea had to be dependent unavoidably upon the power from the period of 1368-1644 from the plausible encroachment of other neighbor countries.

50. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, East Asia, 460-61.


56. *Thus Neutralized Unification is Impossible for Korea* (hereafter cited as *Neutralized Unification is Impossible*) (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, 1965), 11-12.

57. Ibid., 12. Korean Ambassador Cho Byong-sik on August 29, 1900 and Mr. Hyon, Young Woon a Korean Emissary on September 1903 visited Japan to ask its government to take action in persuading the powers to neutralize Korea. It was rejected, however.

58. Ibid., 47.


61. Since 1952, Kim Sam Kyu through the "Korea Review" published by himself and through other Japanese magazines and Kim Yong-chung through the "Voice of Korea, the origin of the "Korean Affairs Institute" and some magazines and newspapers in the United States have voiced their opinions on the neutralization of Korea. See *Neutralized Unification is Impossible*, 14-24. But there is a little difference to fulfill it in a sense that the former only mentions unification by nation-wide free election under terms agreeable to all the condition, whereas the latter, by popular elections under the supervision of a Neutral nations Committee composed of non-belligerent nations.
62. Ibid., 17.

63. Ibid., 24.

64. Those movements were examined well in Sung Joo Han, The Failure of Democracy in South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 178-84.


66. Kwun Doo-Yong presented his idea on neutralization of Korea in a press interview on January 27, 1987. The contents were reprinted in NUB, Jungdang, danche, kaeinui tongilnonui (On Unification Discussion of Parties, Groups, Individuals) (Seoul: NUB, 1989), 41-42.


68. Ik Hwan Moon, "Minjok tongilae koahan kuchejuk Jaean " (The Concrete Suggestion on National Unification), Minjungui Sori 50 (May 7, 1988). The subject was originally laid before the public in Yonsae University, Seoul on April 16, 1988.

69. Neutralized Unification is Impossible, 14. For more details on Krishna Menon's view on neutralization of Korea.


71. Ibid., 15-16.

72. Hankook Ilbo, 2 Nov. 1960; Cited in Neutralization is Impossible, 30.


74. Neutralization is Impossible, 47.
CONCLUDING REMARKS


2. Ibid.


PART IV

MODELING KOREAN UNIFICATION
This part will give all our best energies to modeling Korean unification. "Modeling" refers to theoretical inquiry into an empirical subject that normally proceeds by way of the assertion of general connections and distinctions between events in the real world.\(^1\) It is simply an ordered set of assumptions about a complex system.\(^2\) A model is in the strict sense "a deductive system of axioms and theorems; so fashionable has the term become, however, that it is commonly used simply as a metaphor or an analogy.\(^3\)

Models are, however, developed in contexts which themselves may be modeled. Richard Chadwick's feedback model suggests that "theory" is simply a language used to construct models of the possible, "data" language is used to construct models of the real, and "norms" for models of the desirable. The generic form of each "language" is given by Chadwick as follows (see Table 1). In subsequent chapters, normative models will be designed which are aimed at integrating "models" (in Chadwick's sense) of the desirable, namely the satisfaction of basic human needs following Maslow, with models of what is possible, specifically, integration and realist models of possible paths to unification.

Within Maslow's framework (Chapter 9), the remaining chapters (10, 11, 12, 13) of this volume focus on how unification can be attained. The models in those chapters take a policy-oriented, long-term forecasting approach.
Forecasting...means the attempt to foresee the results of various possible actions: if a certain plan is follow, what will be the consequence? Forecasting is also prescriptively used, i.e. in showing whether or not a given desired future is inconsistent with mechanisms believed to operate in the real world and what actions are required to make the occurrence of that future more likely.4

Table 1. A Feedback Model of Epistemological Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formats:</th>
<th>Hierarchies of Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory if __, then __</td>
<td>Axioms = Theorems = Hypotheses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data if __, __ is, was, will be, is becoming, etc.</td>
<td>Syntax = Semantics = Perception</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chapter 10 presents an Inter-Korean Simulation (IKS) based on Harold Guetzkow's Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) model as a projection device, i.e., for "contingent forecasting." INS gave us a particularly interesting, experimentally accessible, complex inter-group environment for doing studies about which kind of variables had which kind of effects on policy-making and conflict resolution.5

In Chapter 11, the IKS model is used to represent a "pluralistic security community" as an interim model of political unification. Through this approach, peace and security dilemmas are resolved through increased communications and transactions on the peninsula.
Chapter 12 is a decision-making simulation game of achieving national unity, using the PRINCE ("Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute," programmed by William Coplin and others) format. The ultimate goal of this model is the establishment of a federation of Korea, but the idea of an Austrian pattern of neutralization prior to a federation will be designed in a four-power simulation game in a sense that external powers do not break balance of power system or status quo in the peninsula.

The final integration of this complex of alternatives and decision criteria is presented in Chapter 13, and is achieved through Thomas Saaty's "AHP" (analytic hierarchy processing) technique for decision-making analysis, and forms the basis for the normative conclusion of the thesis.
CHAPTER 9
UNIFICATION MODEL (ABRAHAM MASLOW'S FIVE-FOLD HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF HUMAN NEEDS)

In the most general sense, all human beings and human natures yearn to share common basic human needs and universal desires. The hierarchical structure of human needs proposed by Abraham Maslow is perceived that, when man is tangibly and verily satisfied with one level of need, the concern moves to the need of the next level that appears as the primary motivational basis of human behavior. To put it more precisely, the people's lower needs (urgent goals) should be satisfied first, before getting the next higher needs (less urgent goals). See Figure 2. It starts with the needs of survival and physical security; then it seeks after material needs contributing to comfort and well-being; then affiliation (belongingness, love, and social acceptance); following that, self-esteem (respect, dignity); and the whole is lastly achieved with self-actualization (achievement), a sense of full personal development. These five levels can also be grouped into three: self-preservation, community, and self-determination.¹

Maslow never presented his ranking as an absolute hierarchy but instead as a pattern of emphasis.² He stated:

In actual fact, most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the
same time. A more realistic description of the hierarchy would be in terms of decreasing percentages of satisfaction as we go up the hierarchy of prepotency. For instance, if I may assign arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration, it is as if the average citizen is satisfied perhaps 85 percent in his physiological needs, 70 percent in his safety needs, 50 percent in his love needs, 40 percent in his self-esteem needs, and 10 percent in his self-actualization needs. ³

Figure 2. Abraham Maslow's Work on Human Development

Maslow's ascending the stairs for the attainment of human needs is rooted in infant behavior which Erik Erikson developed earlier. A baby's primary needs are survival and safety, free from the trepidation of being killed or from dying as a consequence of indifference; then to adequately get basic material benefits, like food, clothing, shelter, medical services, and so forth. In the following, their needs enthusiastically are to gain love and affection. Craving these needs are common to infants and men.

Subsequently mankind wants to get the satisfaction of human needs and desires such as respect and dignity to himself. The most stable and therefore most healthy self-
estee is based on deserved respect from others rather than on external fame or celebrity and unwarranted adulation. It leads to feelings of self-confidence and effectiveness, of being valuable and essential in the world. As a final and higher stage of social development, the satisfaction of self-actualization is actually demanded for human material needs. The visible rise of those desires depends on some prior fulfillment of the survival, safety, affiliation, and esteem needs, at all times. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one idiosyncratically is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.

Park Han Shik provides some assumptions necessary for the hierarchical structure of the scale of human needs and wants which are basic to full human realization.

Assumption 1: Man behaves in such a way as to conscientiously and constantly pursue the optimum satisfaction of his needs.

Assumption 2: At any given point in time a society's developmental tasks may be determined as a function of the then-dominant needs of its individual members.

Assumption 3: The legitimacy of government (and politics) lies in its contribution to enhancing people's need-satisfaction.

These assumptions are largely compatible with some distinguished theories of politics. Roland Pennock even more directly points out that "the goal of government and the political system is the provision of political goods to satisfy human needs."
Easton's systems model also intimates that support as the basis of legitimacy is generated as a function of the regime's capability to please people's demands, i.e., the expression of their needs.9 Mitranian functionalism also calls for basic human needs satisfaction. Here legitimacy rests on the degree of people's contentment. In this connection, all nations or all political leaders in the modern world must preferentially satisfy their people's basic needs required for human survival and well-being to secure a substantial and dynamic part in the social and cultural circumstances.

There is no exception in the case of Korea. As yet the two divided regimes considerably have not been concerned with satisfying basic people's needs during that time with the plausible pretext of the magnitude of the national security. Even if Korean reunification is a supreme national goal, the Koreans are little interested in it when starving. Soon after they are full, their concern will turn to the next level of human need. They will want to affiliate with each other and then try out to enhance self-esteem and self-actualization need satisfaction.

Through this chapter within the framework of Maslow's "need-hierarchy" on human development, our attempt is at modeling peaceful Korean reunification, in which it provides a five step approach--survival, security, affiliation, self-esteem, and self-actualization--for the human needs satisfaction. The first two factors direct toward each's
national survival, and describe national conditions for unification; the third, for the process of affiliating the two divided peoples with love and affection; the fourth, toward political unification by establishment of final form of government; the last, toward national unification.

I. SURVIVAL

The survival needs to human beings like other animals in the world are indeed indispensable, and seem to be more a matter of instincts which are to be inherited behavior patterns in human nature, but not to be learned. Because most people value survival so highly, anything that facilitates survival is also valued highly. To the ones who are awfully hungry, no concerns exist except for foods. This phenomenon is common human nature. For example, an infant would cry whenever he is starving; a man also looks for adequate food for his hunger-satisfaction. At the national level, politically a regime was, is, and will be laid in a crisis when its people are in the face of hunger problem--i.e., people's revolution occurred in most of East European countries, and the national entity of the Soviet Union does not exist any more since 1992.

The solution of the survival need is also important before anything else in the case of the formation of a new state or of a new regime in an already existing state. Under unsteady political conditions generated by the crisis of
physical survival, the people naturally seek for political stability of any kind, irrespective of the type of government that can succeed in diminishing life-threatening conditions. Therefore, the political leaders are bound to solve such problems to satisfy the physiological and survival needs for their citizenry.

Emphasis on survival need satisfaction comes from the words of The International Labor Organization in its report on basic needs strategy consisting of two components: (1) certain minimum requirements of a family for private consumption -- adequate food, shelter, and clothing, as well as certain household equipment and furniture; (2) essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public transport and health, educational cultural facilities. When viewed as a "first floor" in minimum needs or food, housing, health, education, and so on, the "second floor" consists of such other basic needs as are defined by each society for its own people, and their satisfaction would primarily be the responsibility of each nation.

Put very generally, once all human beings are free from hunger problems, they absolutely desire for such physical needs as nutrition, fresh air, unpolluted water, housing, health care, education, employment, skills, and other services for human survival, realization, and development. Except for the exigency of those human basic needs, even today, human
survival is also threatened by worsening environmental crisis--continuing drylands degradation, population growth, acid rain, ozone layer damage, cancer, cardio-abuse (tobacco, alcohol, and so on), air and water pollution such as radioactive nuclear waste and chemical contaminants, mass starvation and holocausts. For the solution, an important part of survival is growth and development. In this connection, the goals and aspirations of the human basic needs strategy are summarized:

(1) The purpose of economic and social development is to meet human needs...
(4) The satisfaction of human needs is indeed the whole purpose of growth, trade and investment, development assistance, the world food system, population policy, energy planning, commodity stabilization, ocean management, environment protection, monetary reform, and of arms control.
(5) .... Wide acceptance of responsibility for meeting "human needs" will enable industrial and developing nations to get beyond "dialogue" to a practical start on a new international economic order.

Turning to the point to basic needs emphasis of North and South Korea, poverty resulted from the failure of political and economic policy or the leadership corruption. The masses in the South have been benefitted by the rapid economic growth as a result of a successful economic-led-industrialization under the leadership of President Park Chung Hee since the early 1960s. It is a true fact that most of its people are already free from such survival difficulty, and rather lie in a situation to assist other's survival problems as turning its position from periphery to semi-periphery, and are working to
shift its current position to core not before long. But even though Seoul government says that consumer durables, indicative of high living standards, will be widely supplied among even the rural population and the urban low income classes, distribution (or income) inequality in South Korea is widening by pursuing the philosophy of "growth-first" and "distribution-later" since the embarkation of the outward-looking strategy.

As a result, the high-income earners have a great amount of property to fulfill their life, whereas many from the lower-income families still suffer from food problems and embarrassments like North Korean proletariats. The rich are denounced for attempting to hold what they have already acquired or for getting more income, wealth, and benefits. Their attitude probably arouses grievances and social antagonisms from the poor. When economic inequality is high, (1) the poor are envious, have nothing to lose, and thus resort to force (e.g., political violence) to achieve redistributive demands; (2) the rich are greedy, have everything to lose, and possess the resources necessary to use force (e.g., governmental repression) to avoid giving in to redistributive demands; and (3) the middle class, which respects property rights, is small. In consequence, economic inequality as an independent variable is, at least, a potentially consequential cause of dissent (both the rich
and the poor). It is causing political problems for President Roh Tae Woo.

On the other side, in North Korea, the rises in production and living standards fell far short of South Korea's stellar growth, and in this decade both agriculture and industry have had difficulties. Nevertheless, Li Choi Sin, the vice chairman of the North Korean committee for cultural relations to foreign countries, says, "...everybody has enough to eat, and everybody has an apartment without having to fear that one day he might not be able to pay the rent. In our country, no charge medical attention and free education at schools and universities also come under our understanding of human rights. Everybody is happy in our country." It is not virtually real.

In actual fact, North Korea may be a paradise for a few but certainly not for the many. The life of ones in the northern section have been worse off beyond description after Pyongyang holding the 13th World Youth and Student Festival under the slogan of "For Anti-imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship!" in their isolated country in 1989, spending more than $4 billion on this festival in place of repaying its foreign debt ranging from $5 billion to $8 billion. By now, North Korea, as a well-known fact, is gravely being confronted by chronic economic difficulty, and thereby she perilously encounters survival problems, especially, the food and clothing problems because of the
policy stubbornness of being isolated and closed from the outside to prevent her people from showing the reality and society of other developed reality and society. The economy is currently rated with annual growth at around 2% GNP growth. Faced with the falling price of commodities and the lack of incentives, the North Korean economy must have stagnated continuously despite various efforts to break out of its slump.26

Even though one source of North Korea says, "No one is starving in this country,"27 indeed people live on two meals a day of just rice and kimchi28 dealt out in rations by the factories; one day's ration each week goes to the army.29 According to the observation of diplomats, foreign residents in Pyongyang, and visitors from China, Japan and America, virtually all food is rationed -- meat four or five times a year, two eggs a month, 1.5 pounds of rice a day for an adult male manual laborer.30 There are shortages of meat, fruit and soap.31 But the gap between the standard of living in Pyongyang and the countryside has also widened, as the privileged enjoy more benefits, helped partly by the capital inflow from overseas Koreans.32 Under these circumstances, "One of the most important tasks facing us today is more consumer goods such as oil, meat, eggs, knitwear of various kinds, and textiles should be produced and supplied for production workers to further boost their zeal for production,"33 Rodong Shinmun referred. The wretched life of
North Koreans is actually caused by longstanding North Korean economic policy concentrated on heavy industry for military build-up rather than light industry for better human living standards. It has resulted in that the majority of North Korean people live in a state of poverty and misery with the survival problems.

"About one-third of factories are closed down, and half of the remaining ones are only operating part of the time because of the shortage of energy and raw materials,"34 said a Russian. "Outside Pyongyang, at night it's all dark -- the electricity is cut off."35 However, it finds the resources to build marble-lined subway stations, a 180-foot-high arch of triumph modeled on the one in Paris, and the dam,36 and a 105-story pyramid-shaped steel and concrete shell of the Ryugyong Hotel, on which structural work has been completed but interior work remains to be done37. At this, "It reflects pretty strange priorities,"38 a Western resident of Pyongyang said.

Moscow and Peking do not understand this, either. Thus, Pyongyang has been given pressure on reduction of economic aid from the two major allies. To curb the augmentation of North Korea's indebtedness to Russia and China, Russia notified Pyongyang to reduce the supply of oil; all North Korea's trade with Russia and China will be moved to a hard currency or dollars basis instead of barter; and imports and exports between them have plummeted. Russia deliveries of oil
products, cotton and steel at soft rouble prices would end in January 1991. Provided the price of oil constantly rises, Pyongyang will be sure to have suffered a blow. The two Communist patrons cannot afford adequate economic assistance to the North any longer because of their incessant economic problems at home.

In Hobbes' view, all men are almost tantamount in physical strength and have immeasurable yearning for procuring their survival needs and well-being. There would be no exception in North Korean people. People, North Koreans included, always desire a better way of life. In this sense Yang Sung Chul's metaphorical expression on the behavior pattern of North Korean regime is very instructive: "A lean tiger is a mean tiger, ready to pounce on you for his meal." Pyongyang might try out a hazardous venture in case that Seoul put continuous pressure upon Pyongyang or that the two Asian Communist powers completely terminate economic aid to North Korea. The Seoul government, by the Northern Policy taking advantage of improving relations with socialist countries, has been attempting to find a unification solution in terms of double-sided operations--one is to isolate North Korea internationally and the other is to induce North Korea reluctantly to walk outside. However, as putting firmly the snare on Pyongyang more and more, it may give rise to a "razing game" to, in a flash of lightning, turn people's concern on survival to that on security.
National survival can be either independent or dependent survival.\textsuperscript{42} For independent survival, that is, in order to surmount today's economic crisis and to solve survival problems, even for inter-Korean economic exchange and effective trades with the world capitalist countries, North Korea should be either to change its economic policy and development model, or to undertake substantial economic reform so as to recover its backward economy and to encourage a rapid industrialization. Today, the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular social division of labor we are calling the capitalist world-economy.\textsuperscript{43} As Marshall Goldman argues, "Stalin's growth model eventually became a fetter rather than a facilitator."\textsuperscript{44} In fact, North Korea cannot easily solve survival problems owing to her Stalinist socialist economic policies and system limited to the access to the world capitalist system. In retrospect, the failure of the central planning of North Korea has been resulted from its self-reliance policy which emphasized independence and autarchy and rejects the world division of labor.\textsuperscript{45}

In all cases, self-reliance based on partial or complete isolation is asserted to be economically inferior to participation in a world of free unlimited trade.\textsuperscript{46} No doubt that North Korea's obstinacy on "self-reliance" causes slow economic growth and is a reflective barrier to worthwhile discussions for economic exchanges between North and South. As a consequence, North Korea must gain economic benefits
through the international division of labor, and also open itself up to the Western world for earning foreign currency and acquiring western technology and capital investment for a rise of the populations' living standards and an increase of the production of consumer goods.

Needless to say, the independent is more advisable than the dependent survival, for the latter is only partial survival. However, in considering easily unsolvable North Korean economic conditions, "...even partial survival is preferable to extinction." Therefore, another solution to survival needs and North Korean reconstruction is to cling to the hope that Pyongyang leadership will ask for needed material assistance, foreign capital, and a wide range of technical specialists from the advanced countries including South Korea. Pyongyang's major allies—both Russia and China as providers of much of its economic assistance—can not any longer afford to support North Korea due to their economic difficulties and crisis. What she can expect from foreign help is from Japan at the moment because the latter wants economic transaction with the former at the expense of the diplomatic damage with South Korea. She can also envision economic help and transaction of South Korea. Of course, North Korea is able to take capital and advanced technologies from Japan and South Korea; and also, the latter two can take advantage of the abundant natural resources from the North Korean territories.
If Seoul conceives of her counterpart as compatriots, the most important thing to be urgent right now is unquestionably to enhance to solve the survival problem of North Koreans. When we can believe confidently that the northerners feel free from hunger, then, our effort to reunification would move to security concern.

II. SECURITY

If the physiological needs are relatively well-gratified, there then emerges a new set of needs, which may be categorized roughly as the safety needs (security; stability; dependency; protection; freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, order, law, limits; strength in the protector; and so on).48 Certainly national security is the central concern of all nations, whether sought unilaterally or within an alliance framework. Ultimately the purpose of national security is the maintenance of the security of the nation's population.49 In ecological terms, the nation as a conglomerate of a population has certain basic needs, such as physical resources, security, and cultural maintenance necessary for survival.50 The preservation of security is fundamentally dependent on how surely a country can defend itself from outside "aggression." It is used to justify the maintenance of armies, the development of new weapon systems, and the manufacture of armaments.51 Hence the emphasis upon
"economy," "cooperation," "offensive," "movement," "surprise," and "concentration" as means to the general end.\textsuperscript{52}

Only when security is guaranteed for sure, the constituents in human society can live safely. Security is thus the important chore of the government, both logically and chronologically. The security concern for the preservation of the territorial integrity of a nation-state has appeared urgently as a prior and vital issue for a basic human need as seen in the very recent shocking Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In particular, in a divided country, Korea, in which each side regards the other as its enemy in a semi-war position or conflicting situation, national security is thus a premier attention.

To take the security needs further, it is necessary to study the meaning of security. By its general term, it is defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from internal and external threats.\textsuperscript{53} Karl Deutsch defines it with two different meanings: one meaning of security is that the national independence, the existence of the state, is not in danger; the second one means the security of advantages or privilege.\textsuperscript{54} Carolyn Stephenson sees that there are two basic kinds of security which can be conceptualized as security for and security from: the first includes the assurances of continuity in meeting basic needs of human beings and nations; the second kind of security includes security from crime, from physical abuse, from
attack. She terms the former as "positive security" and the latter as "negative security." To put it another way, the former needs to maintain individual security; the latter, national security.

For a strong sovereign, a war may break out: "If there be no power erected, or not great enough for our own security; man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men." But, the survival way of the strong nations and the relatively small (or weak) nations is not identical with each other in logic and methodology. The mighty states have a capability to pursue and achieve their goals effectively without trepidation over the potential military encroachment from enemies. But, the small powers do not have sufficient power to defend themselves, and so may and will be beaten down by the stronger in case of a war. Thus, they should have shrewd policies adapting to the various changes in international environment in order to secure or maintain their existence and to further independence, and should have also special strategies so as to avoid threats from the Powers due to their limited capabilities. It is for this reason that if and when a small nation is seriously encountered by an external intimidation that is appreciated to be more antagonistic, unjustified, and militarily superior, the emphasis of national security cannot be overstated.

In principle, human efforts towards peace and security in nation-states, especially in weak nations, should focus on the
maintenance of the independence of individual states or the sovereign states by keeping safe its people and nation's territory integrity from outside attack. In other words, nearly as sacrosanct as the territorial integrity of a nation-state, and often closely bound up with it, is the country's claim to exercise of sovereign authority in running its own affairs, free of outside interference.\textsuperscript{59} In this context, national security is identified with the ability to successfully counter the use of coercion by other nations.\textsuperscript{60} In actuality, with the effective accomplishment of negative security, that of the positive security would be successfully materialized as "nations would be enabled to reorder priorities and replace the present emphasis on military insecurity with a stronger commitment to human needs such as housing, health care, alternative energy sources, employment, education and care of the elderly."\textsuperscript{61}

For certain negative security (or national security) of each Korea, after the blood-shared people in a divided nation fought each other with antagonism in the local war for the divergent political and ideological reasons, they have been engrossed in speeding up the arms race with a view to shielding their own nations, or certainly win another Korean War. In Seoul's viewpoint, Pyongyang's purpose in the arms build-up is not for either defense or national security, but rather is for the accomplishment of Communist revolutions by force and the liberation of the South Korean people from the
American imperialistic powers throughout the whole Korean peninsula. So it looks as aggressive in character. By the same token, Pyongyang leaders also believe that South Korea's concentration of increasing military capabilities with the U.S. military powers aims at attacking North Korea. In brief, due to each's psychological fear of the potential invasion by the other, as a matter of fact, both Koreas attach great importance to arms build-up for national security.

In particular, the American withdrawal device immediately reminded all South Koreans of the Truman Administration's depreciation of Korea's strategic magnitude. Thereby from the misjudgment of General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1948-1949, Korea was even omitted from the American defense perimeter in Asia. As I. F. Stone described, "...the North Korean invasion was encouraged politically by Secretary of State Acheson's statement and militarily by the power vacuum--the withdrawal of U.S. forces." As a result, the following year the North Korean Communists suddenly raided the South in the morning of June 1950. From the bitter war experience, what contemporarily the South Koreans tremble at is the complete withdrawal of U.S. military as happened in 1948-1949. Furthermore, North Korea's recurrent fierce and inhuman acts of terrorism and a carefully thought-out plan to attack South Korea by blitzkrieg have threatened the security of South Korea. To give more recent examples, consider the Rangoon bombing in 1983, and blowing up
a South Korean civilian passenger aircraft in the air over the Andaman Sea in 1987 and exploding in Kimpo Airport, Korea in 1988 to thwart Seoul in 1988 from successfully holding Summer Olympic Game. Many are anxious about "accidents leading to war."  

What is more shocking is that since North Korean tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone were discovered three times since 1972, a new tunnel was found big enough for 30,000 armed North Korean soldiers and field artillery in an hour to stealthily and rapidly infiltrate the southern part of Korea on March 3, 1990. Similarly mechanized divisions and commando units have been brought into forward positions along a strip 40–60 km north of the DMZ and more than 100 underground fortresses were built close to the DMZ. According to Lee Sang Hoon, then Defense Minister of South Korea, "North Korea may have constructed 26 tunnels throughout the DMZ in order to provide secret routes for infiltrating troops into the south at the initial stage of war." North Korea has also deployed SA-5 surface-to-air missiles with a range of 300 km there. All these show that DPRK is ready to raid the southern part by blitzkrieg through numerous tunnels and underground fortresses, and to go to a short war for limited purposes without resort to any outside forces' military assistance.

In recalling the estimated 80,000-strong North Korea Special Operations Force and closely affiliated organizations which engage in terrorism, subversion, and intelligence
Kim Il Sung's reign should be revealed as "the most xenophobic, extremist and militarist of all communist states." Such barbarous activities have been aimed mostly at generating milieu enough to scheme any deterioration of internal unsteadiness coming from the far-reaching disorder and riot in the southern half of Korea. Clearly the risk of a renewed conflict in Korea still exists constantly in the peninsula. North Korea appears able to launch an invasion of the South with little advance preparation. Thus Seoul leaders view all Pyongyang's overtures as planned tactics to accomplish her revolutionary ambition in the South.

In reminding us of the past events committed by North Korea, what the South Koreans are most concerned about is the probable burst of another all-out military clash between the two Koreas. South Korea has not yet built its own war capabilities enough to check the North Korean war venture. Given this context, the U.S. military forces due to the long distance of the U.S. from the peninsula should be constantly stationed at least until the military of South Korea is fully modernized and strengthened enough to have deterrent capabilities against a miscalculated North Korea's military adventure. South Korea should hold more self-reliant arms capability and modernizing the military in preparedness of the U.S. military disengagement in the peninsula someday. During this time if deterrence has failed, according to the Mutual Security Commitment, the immediate and direct engagement of
the U.S. military in a war would be strongly required for South Korea's security.

For North Korea, its security is insecure, and very frustrated. North Koreans feel that South Korea has become more unfriendly toward the North Korean Communist regime and militarily modernized and economically much stronger, and the deployment of the joint US-ROK military powers and the annual joint military exercises "Team Spirit" and the holding of nuclear weapons in the peninsula seem to be nearly institutionalized. On this point, Lee Manwoo delineates the nature and extent of insecurity felt by North Koreans.

...the North Korean fear of South Korea is genuine because of their peculiar perception of the so-called fascist regime in Seoul as an unscrupulous, brutal lackey of foreign powers without an ounce of national conscience. That such a "brute" exists only thirty miles away from the DMZ is of serious concern to the North Koreans. They are absolutely convinced that the South Korean regime takes orders from the Pentagon. The North Korean nightmare is that the United States, in collaboration with Japan, may order their lackeys in Seoul to attack the North.72

In addition, as North Koreans have often enjoyed paranoia and dangerous warlike tendencies against ROK and the United States, they surely tremble at revenges. Supposing U.S.-South Korean allied forces or other potential forces should attack North Korea, it would be in security predicament without sufficient military support of Russia and China. More recently, the U.S. direct involvement and the use of formidable war capabilities in Gulf War against Sadam Husein
of Iraq together with the members of the U.N. showed that the U.S. will be directly certain to engage in another war in Korea so as to shield its major ally from a war, and not to lose its privilege and power in the Pacific area.

To date, while one image of North Korea is that of a militant revolutionary exuding confidence and courage, the other image is that of a pitiful, frightened little country which is unsure of its independence.⁷³ In consequence, North Korea will keep two mutual defense treaties respectively with China and the Soviet Union in 1961. According to these pacts of friendship and alliances with them, when North Korea would be attacked by a third party, the two Communist allies would be supposed to support it with military and other assistance and participation for provision against a war.

In the Korean security environment situation, now that each Korea feels such a psychological fear of another War in the peninsula, in the realistic vision, with power being considered as critical in human behavior, to insure securities of two Koreas in competition is essential to the state's survival. For effective accomplishment of negative security of each, military alliances with its major powers are also needed in case of a war. Robert Rothstein supports a small power's dependence on strong powers including alliances in the military sense: "A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid
of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so.\textsuperscript{74}

In effect, the alliances embody the links between security and stability on the peninsula and general security in the region,\textsuperscript{75} and these collective security systems will be conducive to the upkeep of the status quo and balance of power system in the region. The guarantee or satisfaction of security needs through self-reliant military capabilities or alliances of each Korea over the other ultimately bring about the development of the other stage for inter-Korean development and process.

III. AFFILIATION (BELONGINGNESS, LOVE)

Once human beings have fairly well satisfied their survival and security needs, their concern moves to the need for "love," "affection," and "belongingness." It is identical that the baby needs to take the physical expression of touching and fondling. If one looks at a healthy and well-loved and cared-for infant, let us say up to the age of one year and perhaps later, then it is quite impossible to see anything that could be called evil, original sin, sadism, malice, pleasure in hurting, destructiveness, hostility for its own sake or deliberate cruelty.\textsuperscript{76} The human effort for the attainment of such basic needs satisfaction would be a common phenomenon to infants, children as well as adults. In an effort to pursuing such basic needs, a man could be
subjectively possible to affiliate with people (i.e., friends, or sweetheart, or wife, or children, or acquaintances), groups, and society that "may even forget that once, when he was hungry, he sneered at love as unreal or unnecessary or unimportant." 77

Furthermore, man desires to live and to be belonged within a community that protect their life, property and individual freedom, in which they tend to long for both the worthwhile livelihood and the advancement of interpersonal relationship. "For belongingness and by the need to overcome the widespread feelings of alienation, aloneness, strangeness, and loneliness, which have been worsened by our mobility, by the breakdown of traditional groupings, the scattering of families, the generation gap, the steady urbanization and disappearance of village face-to-face ness...." 78 In particular, those who have been separated for long periods of time on the ground of their inescapable involvement in certain events (or a war) against their will are urgently eager to affiliate and join together.

The Korean question has a long lineage and is an enigma which has lasted unsettled in world politics in the division and occupation of the U.S. and the Soviet militaries, and the following-up event, Korean War in 1950-1953. The accumulated mutual confrontation, misgivings, and antagonism between North and South after their fratricidal war makes it more difficult to affiliate them. In contrast with the progress of the
relaxation of tension in Europe, intra-Korean relations still continue to be much more frozen without social acceptance, love and affection, and a high level of tension exists to prevail in an attitude of cold-war showdown between them.

Much worse, the peoples of the two divided halves playing in zero-sum game are as usual in a state of conflict and rivalry in political, military, economic, and socio-cultural realms. Given these circumstances, they with entirely dissimilar systems and ideologies have undergone an experience of the procedure of socialization, both respectively and more differently.

It is a national tragedy that the dispersed families have neither heard from each other for some 45 years, nor known whether their loved ones are still alive, because of Pyongyang's unbending rebuff to grant exchanges of mail and people, telephone communication, reunion of families across the tightly closed border since the end of the war. Until now, the Koreans all commonly feel that they belong to two communities, and are restricted freedoms of family union. In my view, if economic exchanges are restricted at the very beginning, "spillover" effect cannot be expected in social, cultural, and even political realms.

To be sure, the direct and positive social and cultural events between North and South will be in the vanguard of the drive to love each other and to achieve national harmony and reconciliation, reducing mutual suspicion, fear, hostility,
and heterogeneity. As they are fully satisfied with the affiliation of each other, in turn, their salient attention begins to shift to focus on the other level of a human need such as the esteem or respect need.

IV. THE ESTEEM (RESPECT, DIGNITY) NEEDS

Once a man or a society attains a reasonable assurance to secure his physical survival and security needs and to develop a network of social relationships through affiliation, the other component of human needs of self-esteem or self-respect, the esteem of others, would emerge gradually in the minds of the populace. Pride or self-esteem may arise from the qualities of the mind--wit, good-sense, learning, courage, integrity; from those of the body--beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing; from external advantages--country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens horses, dogs, clothes. The notion of both mutual self-esteem and dignity grants participating a political partner's "desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom, for reputation or prestige (defining it as respect or esteem from other people), status, fame and glory, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, dignity, or appreciation."

Some factors are closely connected to the Self-Esteem Principle, as indicated in Table 2.
Table 2. The Self-Esteem Principle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Elements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You Strive for Self-Esteem</td>
<td>Superego</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ego</td>
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In particular, the "self," as Lasswell understood it, was a social emergent constituted through identification, a process through which the "primary ego," namely, the "'me,' the 'I,'" was amplified through the incorporation of "secondary symbols" such as "family," "friends," "nation" and so forth. Rummel infers that one man's esteem may be another's evil. But, in this sense, the part of esteem in inter-Korean relationship will be acquired as the component units respect and recognize each other at an equal level to settle problems in a rational, suitable way. With mutual respect among men and states in Korea, the ideal of human dignity suggests "wide rather than narrow participation in the shaping and sharing of values," leading to democratic process or reunification. Lasswell sees this, "capable of respecting both the self and others"; "perfecting of the democratic character" which appeared as a "partial end" of the "democratic society."
An operative government must listen to this transformation in the level of human popular needs from belongingness and love to esteem and socialization. As the organisms in the unified Korea feel they belong to one community, they can participate in the human affairs with confidence and trust. The part of mutual self-esteem need would be continually applied to the contentment of the organism in a unified form of government. The fundamental task of the new regime is to support the institutions aimed at gratifying people's needs and demands. In order to solve common problems piled up in a new society, particularly the problem of survival and safety in the face of external threat, the new regime will concentrate to work out the institutions to cope with those particular problems.

Once the Koreans generate a network of social affiliation, to the extent that institutionalization of the mechanism can probably lead to the esteem need is procured, the members of the community will be prone to want consequent needs to appear. That is, when the Koreans gratify with the need of esteem through the establishment of a unified nation by tasting political unification, their concern then turns to another level of human need, the achievement of self-actualization (fulfillment).
V. THE NEED FOR SELF-ACTUALIZATION (FULFILLMENT)

Once the people in a society become confident in their capability to satisfy the survival, safety, belongingness and love, and esteem needs, their next attention instantly moves to the new higher level of needs, namely, "satisfaction needs." What the populace want is to realize the Korean dreams or self-fulfillment as they should live with satisfaction in their working. For example, a teacher must teach the students, an athlete must take exercise, an architecture must design the building, and so on. In each involvement, they can have to get peace and satisfaction. Then they yearn for a superior life as comparing their life condition, i.e., "Am I better off now than I was in the past?" and "Am I better off than others?." For the satisfaction of this level, the new authoritative government should cultivate a mechanism to expand resources available and to produce consumer goods necessary as much as possible.

Maslow summarized some phenomena for getting self-actualization. They are:

1. Feelings of belongingness, of being one of a group, of identification with group goals and triumphs, of acceptance, or having a place, at-homeness
2. Feelings of self-actualization, self-fulfillment, self-realization, of more and more complete development and fruition of one's resources and potentialities and consequent feeling of growth, maturity, health, and autonomy
3. Satisfied curiosity, feeling of learning and of knowing more and more
4. Satisfied understanding, more and more philosophical satisfaction; movement toward larger and larger, more and more inclusive and unitary philosophy or religion;
increased perception of connections and relations; awe; value commitment
5. Satisfied beauty need, thrill, sensuous shock, delight, ecstasy, sense of symmetry, rightness, suitability, or perfection
6. Emergence of higher needs
7. Temporary or long-run dependence on and independence of various satisfiers; increasing independence of and disdain for lower needs and lower satisfiers
8. Aversion and appetite feelings
9. Boredom and interest
10. Improvement in values; improvement in taste; better choosing
11. Greater possibility of and greater intensity of pleasant excitement, happiness, joy, delight, contentment, calm, serenity, exultation; richer and more positive emotional life
12. More frequent occurrence of ecstasy, peak experiences, orgasmic emotion, exaltation, and of mystic experience
13. Changes in aspiration level
14. Changes in frustration level
15. Movement toward metamotivation and being-values

In a unified political and economic system of Korea through the institutional and policy integration, there should be some efforts to create attitudinal integration for identification—a sense of common singularity, a sense of common fate, future, and a sense of common responsibility—for the satisfaction of self-actualization needs. The basis lies in that all residents within a unified political system of Korea truly identify themselves as similar brethren who share the same norms, values, belief, languages, and historical view. The common identification and belief will ultimately build a cornerstone for the need satisfaction of self-actualization.

As an essential idea of need satisfaction for self-realization, the unified state should be democratic
government. In terms of the operation of the democracy, as a unified system, the democratic government would take a political system for self-actualization of the populace. Thus the constituents can achieve social justice, express their frustrations, alienation and ostracism from bureaucratic power. In this connection, John Rawls contends that "All social-values—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage."\(^8\)

It is designed to attain social justice that there is a distribution of values that results in acceptable levels of frustration (generated by sustained gaps between people's goals and actual conditions), alienation (generated by gaps between people's goals and the social or other forces which they resist), and ostracism (generated by gaps between people's actual conditions and those desired by others for them, i.e., social pressures to conformity).\(^9\) Roughly the term "democracy" is similar to the concept of a social justice itself. Specially, it is a dimension of distributive justice (which apportions rewards according to some measure of merit or need), not of retributive justice (which distributes punishments according to some measure of demerit).\(^9\)

The unified Korea will attempt to give more freedom, equality, and human right as preconditions for the need satisfaction in order for its people not to estrange from
society and for need satisfaction of self-fulfillment. Although it may be said that "the more liberty, the less equality, and the more equality, the less liberty," the concern is about how to splice the favorite of "equality" based on "common will" and "common good" from the North, and of "liberty" as the absence of restraint and the presence of chance from the South, advocating the democratic principle.

When we can reasonably eradicate the gap of two opposing ideologies, it can be also expected that there will be much better likelihood for need satisfaction of self-fulfillment. Therefore, a most critical issue lies in how a new government remove or minimize ideological differences between the two parts--the acceleration of Juche-ization in the North and a participatory democracy in the South. This implies, that though Korea is politically unified, it cannot be said to achieve national unification which demands more comprehensive processes--economic, social, cultural consolidation, a commonness of primary thoughtfulness, the true homogeneity, unity of the people, people's full satisfaction of self-realization, and what not. In a sense, political unification can be regarded as a superficial unification, whereas national unification, as an actual unification, is the indispensable part of a restored national identity. Adopting the philosophy of Confucianism described in Chapter 7 will probably work for self-actualization, recovery of homogeneity, and national unification.
CHAPTER 10

INTER-KOREAN SIMULATION MODEL FOR SURVIVAL AND SECURITY:
WITH APPLICATION OF INTER-NATION SIMULATION MODEL

Under the basic assumption of action-reaction patterns in the modeling world, simulating methods for survival and national security on the basis on Harold Guetzkow's Inter-Nation Simulation (hereafter cited as INS) inevitably requires inevitably national actors and units. The approach requires first, that modeling political decision-making dynamics implies a "background" of variables which are directly impacted by political decisions and which directly influence those decisions (such as measures of national security, consumption standards, and political stability); and second, that these variables have clear meaning to policy analysts and policy makers. In the Inter-Korean Simulation (hereafter cited as IKS) process for their better living standards and their feelings of national security, some variables with programmed or unprogrammed assumptions and hypotheses are represented through this chapter.

Before entering into the IKS for national survival and security, it is worthwhile to define the term "simulation" in international relations. In general it is defined as "the act or process of pretending; feigning, an assumption or imitation of a particular appearance or form; counterfeit; sham." Guetzkow specifies it as "...an operating representation of
central features of reality...."5 It is commonly used as "let's pretend" condition in the real world and in a given circumstances, or as predicting future situations. In its approach, simulation is characterized by "a complex relationship between one's model and the reality one is trying to study."6

Although it is viewed that simulation is false in that it is not virtually the reality, Paul Smoker insists that "their behavior in the simulated environment will, at least in part, correspond to 'the reality.'"7 In his view, he denotes actual correspondences between "simulation" and "reality."

The "real world" is regarded as given, and the "model world" is regarded as an attempt to demonstrate or show or reveal aspects of reality. ...differences between the two worlds are rectified by changing aspects of reality through social and political action.8

Simulation is quite different from a game theory which attempts to find the optimum way with the predicted tactic for playing a game by means of mathematical manipulation without representation of the real world. A simulation experiment is a game that has been designed not merely for the sake of playing the game, but rather for the purpose of demonstrating a valid truth about actual social processes through the unfolding of an artificially constructed yet dynamic model.9 Thus a simulation method demands necessarily laboratory techniques or nonlaboratory devices with the intention of scrutinizing human behavior. Also in simulation operation,
different from a game theory, it is very important that the actors' roles decide or affect the fate of process to the goal.

**Decision-Makers as Actors**

In the IKS model designed for the solution of human basic needs and wants about what Maslow has already been concerned, who are and will be the major actors? Individuals and groups which directly and indirectly engage in the simulation game within the sphere of the international subsystem of Korea. All participants in the IKS process impersonate the decision-makers as actors along with their resources and capabilities.

Core Unit: Decision-Makers. Those who decide and are responsible for overall national policy concerning intra- and international affairs with responsibility and authority.

In effect, the people's satisfaction on survival and security is largely dependent upon the function of decision-makers' political behaviors and activities in a sphere of a intra-national political game rather than international political processes. However, "irrational" their behavior may sometimes appear, they act in accordance with their perceptions of their environment, their goals, and the prices they perceive they must pay for achieving these goals.¹⁰

1. **Central Decision-maker of North Korea**

North Korean decision-making on unification has been devised and practiced under the leadership of President Kim Il
Sung for the last 45 years. He has taken his office as the supreme and influential leader and the central decision-maker on all intra- and international matters including unification. He is called as "the sun of the nation," "the master of the world," "the iron-willed," "wise and beloved Great Leader" as before. He is now 80 years old, but seems to be in good health. And yet he may retire no later than five years because of his decrepitude. He wants his first son, Kim Jong Il, to become his designate successor out of trepidation of likely downfall and challenge to his political authority and ideology after his death as Stalin suffered. In a given political situation on succession to power, post-Kim Il Sung, within the domain of a vortex of succession crisis, the central decision-maker may be junior Kim. If he should fail in succession, the other dominant (newly rising) groups such as the military or the technocrats will emerge as new central decision-makers. Those groups will create conceivably more moderate changes in unification policy.

2. Central Decision-maker of South Korea

On the part of South Korea, presently President Roh Tae Woo is the central decision-maker in the IKS regarding Korean unification, but will retire in February 1993. Who will be the next president of South Korea as a central decision-maker in its unification process? Expected figures are first, Kim Yong Sam, a representative of the ruling party (Democratic Liberal Party); as his major challenger and cooperator, Kim
Dae Jung of the non-ruling party (Democratic Party), second. Both have worked and struggled together for Korean democracy and against the military government for long, and so they are in character much more democratic than their precedents. For operating IKS, Kim Yong Sam is expected to find the unification solution with cooperation with the major allies pursuing both security and democracy; however, Kim Dae Jung may enter into negotiations with North Korea wanting no external interference. Either of them or others by the democratic election procedure will be the central decision-maker on unification affairs with government authority and legitimacy.

Core Unit: Nations. A group of validated decision-makers.

At least a group of two or more decision-makers acts as the nation. National actors, as human institutions, behave in far more complex ways for different purposes and for a variety of motivations. Implicated to operate as national units are four great international powers (the US, Russia, China, and Japan) including two Koreas that can have effect, directly or indirectly, on a matter of Korea. As all are core units in the decision-making simulation process, they will be allowed numerous chances for interaction. The action of all parties concerned and their decision-making are the actions taken under the authority of the each national unit.

Free Unit: Supraunits. Alliances, trade partnerships, regional and universal international organizations, or other
"supranational groups of nations, developing and operating various structures, with capabilities derived from national units."\(^\text{15}\)

Survival

The INS model gives some idea on decision-making process, being concerned with the basic human needs of the masses—in particular, the need of survival in an ecological and economic framework. Given the predominance of survival need, decision-makers in both Koreas preferentially fulfill their tasks for minimum levels of food production and distribution. When they are impressionable to the survival needs of the public, they will inevitably work best to strengthen national capability enough to gratify consumption needs. In the IKS it is the mainspring for minimum office-holding of decision-makers.

Core Variable: Consumption Standards (CS). The aggregated sum of products produced and used in a country for consumption needs.

In general, the level of consumption standards is rated by the gross national product (GNP). Apparently, the physical size of basic capabilities,\(^\text{16}\) the size of its population, and its level of national income per capita are principal determinants of its economic activity, and reveal the overall capacity to produce all goods and services in the two Koreas. Among them national per capita can be broadly used as a measure and a summary index of the relative economic well-
being of the people in both sides. Today the collective individual incomes of North Korea is, on the average, less than one-fifth of that of South Korea.

Core variable: Minimum Consumption Standards. Minimum consumption standards level provided for the whole population

Programmed Variable: Maximum Consumption Standards (CSmax). The maximum units of consumption which could be allocated by the nation in a given period to consumption standards. CSmax is formalized:

$$CSmax = \text{all Basic capabilities} \times \text{generation rate for CSs}.$$  

Programmed Variable: Validator Satisfaction Respecting Consumption (VScs). The validator satisfactions from the quantity and distribution of goods and services. It is also set up as an equation:

$$VScs \propto CSmax$$

Programmed Assumption: Relation of Validator Satisfaction to Consumption Level.

This includes a set of assumptions:

1. For consumption near minimum consumption standards, validator satisfaction depends on the relation of consumption satisfaction to minimum standards.
2. Once minimum consumption standards have been met, larger increases in consumption are necessary to produce corresponding changes in validator satisfaction.
3. This saturation effect is more prominent for wealthier nations.
The extent of validator satisfaction with respect to consumption standards in South Korea is mostly dependent upon two factors: (1) the average level of national income and (2) the degree of equality in its distribution. Obviously, for any given level of national per capita income, the more unequal the distribution, the lower the validator satisfaction. Similarly, for any given distribution, the lower the average income level, the validator satisfaction will be lower.

However, validator satisfaction in North Korea is totally different from people who are in South Korea. Their satisfaction level is not income or distribution of wealth, but enough food. When her chronic economic problems perhaps cause the rising more and more of public discontent, thereby the validators' satisfaction will be certainly very low.

Core Variable: Military Expenditure. The total costs used for arms building in a nation.

With the experience of a bloody war, the two rival Koreas have been faced diametrically with each other under the dogma of zero-sum game, and have adopted mutually the principle of realism. Under this security environment, they have increasingly spent too much on military expenditures so as to acquire more tremendous and powerful military forces towards achievements either of national unification by force (North Korean way) or of national defence and security (South Korean
way). Both of them are replete with distrust and hostility, so they don't believe each other.

To the South Koreans, they have a keen feeling of an increasing military threat from the northern counterpart with the sporadic small-scale armed conflicts around Demilitarized Zone and incessant terrorist activities against them. This is a main reason why they continually increase military costs per year. In a different level, North Korea's decision-making with respect to heavy military spending is largely affected by a variety of policy variables such as the following: 1) uncertainty about North Korea's own security; 2) political and social changes inside South Korea; 3) North Korea's ability to bear the economic burden; 4) the political situation inside North Korea, and 5) changing values and ideologies on the part of the leadership.19

Unprogrammed Hypothesis. Observing simulation outcomes, the military spending has a relative negative impact on economic development.20

The incessantly high share of military costs of the two Republics has been and continues to be tremendously detrimental and impoverishing their economies. While military spending of North Korea is gobbling up 24% of the country's meagre GNP of US$21 billion,21 that of South Korea reaches 6 to 7% of her GNP. It also makes worse the levels of living standards of the two Koreas. Therefore, economic conversion22 as an option for a strategy for reducing
military costs and for transfer of labor, capital, and other productive resources of the military to the economy can be conceived as an alternative civilian-oriented activity, and a critical positive policy for economic growth and national reconstruction and for making peace.


The IKS through economic exchanges, as suggested in the first part of Chapter 7, is to be enhanced for effective bilateral economic advantages. The economic development of the Koreas can facilitate industries, and thereby consumption standards will be higher than the past. It eventually gives the material affluence to the validators. For operating the IKS, the economic interaction between North and South must be, first and foremost, considered to materialize the following significant factors such as the absence of military belligerence, free trade, and the abolition or control of tariffs and quotas.

When the economic exchanges between them are adequately big in quantities, and are constantly prevailed with being more stable, the interactions will spread through the establishment of a joint institution in the functional context, i.e., Intra-nation organization such as Korean Economic Community.

Free Unit: Intra-Nation Organization. A de jure supraunit recognized and organized between internal units.
In the IKS, intra-nation organizations are needed to control and promote economic exchanges, technological cooperation and capital flows. Within its sphere, the two economic units in the peninsula freely talk, negotiate, and deal with all economic matters related--especially the exchanges of businessmen and technicians, of raw materials, of scientific techniques, and so on, through various institutions. Han Seung-Soo on this point states, "Initially the Central Commission that will work as an organ for the Community may perform minimal functions, receiving and disseminating information on the general economic trends and etc., but its function can be gradually strengthened." Interrelationships and economic interdependence will develop among a greater number of intra-nation organizations themselves.

National Security

Even though the conflicting situation between the two divided national units in the peninsula is illuminated by a multi-dimensional phenomenon encompassing political, diplomatic, economic, and socio-cultural aspects including military confrontation, of great dimensions is the competitive arms construction for one's own national security and deterrence. As for security issues on likely invasion of foe and a "bitter-end" conflict, the questions arising in the IKS are, "Which player will be ruined first?" "Which one will
survive and be counted as the winner?" and "Which is the best betting strategy for avoiding ruin, and hence for survival?" \[24\] Put simply, from the logic of Social Darwinism, in the IKS game only the stronger out of the two conflicting Koreas can survive in a battle, and on the contrary, the defeated is obliged to lose its privilege and priorities it holds.

For this reason, in order to survive in a zero-sum game a major concern of each side is to increase military capabilities enough to protect its own nation against the other's attack. When the validators have a strong feeling on their own national security, their support to the government will probably high. It also makes it possible for the decision-makers to hold their offices incessantly. As a main variable, validator satisfaction on national security considerably reflects the decision-makers' behaviors.

Core Variable: Military Capability (MC). The military strength which can suppress the military attack of the enemy.

The increase of military capability will be very helpful for deterrence or defending against the opponent's attack. It must also support the country's ability to assert itself and protect its interests in the midst of the problems and discord that occur as nations conflict with each other in pursuit of their own respective national interests. \[25\]

Programmed Assumption: Relation of Validator Satisfaction to Level of Military Capability. Validators satisfaction
is directly related, within limits, to the ratio of the force strength of the nation and its allies vis-a-vis the strongest nation or group of nations not allied with it.\textsuperscript{26}

Programmed Variable: Validator Satisfaction Respecting National Security (VSns). The degree to which the population feel secure on their military position in comparison with the opposite nations. This is formalized:

$$VSns = \Delta EMC - EC$$

EC: economic constraint as a fatigue coefficient

This means while the arms level of one side functions as catalyst to strengthen and keep its own existing level of the military, the arms expenditure serves as an economic constraint. Under the conflicting inter-Korean situation, the above equation postulates that increases in military capability for national security are either a positive function of threat element of the opponent's arms level, or a negative function of an economic constraint. This also suggests when a unit arms burden is too great to maintain minimum consumption level, validator satisfaction would be low. This is particularly applicable to North Korea.

Due to the continued North Korea's military threat against South Korea and military inferiority of the latter, the security of the latter is not fully guaranteed, and is to a larger extent destined by the US military engagement. Hence validator satisfaction to security is the main concern to the
decision-makers for continuous office-holding particularly in South Korea.

The behavior patterns of decision-makers in the IKS on national security are based on the following assumptions:

1. Act to increase capability but negotiate rather than fight.
2. Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capability
3. Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor.
4. Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system.
5. Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principle.
6. Permit defeated or constrained national actors who are essential to reenter the system or act to make a previously inessential actor essential. Treat all essential actors as partners.27

Core Variable: War. The use of military capability by certain nation(s) with or without coalition against its (or their) enemy (or enemies) for defense or attack.

Programmed Hypothesis. An unlimited growth of weapons would certainly lead to either deterrence or the outbreak of war.

Programmed hypothesis. The probability of winning a war and of defending a nation from outside offensive greatly rests upon the distribution of military capabilities and the power of coalition.

This hypothesis contains the increase of one's military capabilities would be to deter an opponent's invasion, and to win or prevail in the event of the outbreak of war. Each of
the two Koreas thinks it is desirable to have the margin of military capability vis-a-vis the counterpart; that is, the higher the margin of superiority, the higher the chance of winning a war and the lower the aggression from the enemy. In that the U.S. and three Asian regional powers may employ in the military crisis simulation, the probability of winning a war is greatly dependent upon aggregated force capabilities of coalition. This can be formalized as follows:

\[ p_{WW} = \text{COAmp}(SK + US + JP) > \text{COAmp}(NK + RS + PRC) \text{ or vice versa} \]

\[ p_{WW} \]: probability of winning a war.
\[ \text{COAmp} \]: coalition military powers
\[ SK \]: South Korea; \[ US \]: The United States; \[ JP \]: Japan
\[ NK \]: North Korea; \[ RS \]: Russia; \[ PRC \]: China

From the logic of social Darwinism, either the North or the South will not likely to start a war if it is not going to win. In case one of them opens hostilities against the other, neither of them, unless any external military assistance or resupply should be provided, has the catastrophic military supremacy to subjugate unilaterally the other in a larger-scale war. It is true North Korea is, as a whole, militarily superior to South Korea, but in comparing military capability, military spending, and other intangible elements, the one is quantitatively superior to the other, not qualitatively.

In particular, most of the South Korean people worry about entangling in a war. There are several unprogrammed
hypotheses as regards the likelihood of a war provoked by North Korean leadership and the resultant outcome.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis: The decision-makers of North Korea select a war against South Korea before being faced with their people's revolt coming from the failure of the minimum satisfaction of consumption level.

Provided North Korea is constantly in a position of political and economic impasse by reason of which consumption standards are awfully low, it may hit South Korea by blitzkrieg to give rise to a short war for a limited objective without depending upon foreign assistance as a measure of turning away their concern to the outside.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis. The second peninsula war may be caused by leadership changes in North Korea.

From one perspective, a military crisis will emerge soon after the death of Kim Il Sung. President Kim's decision to enthrone his idiosyncratic son, Kim Jong Il, is almost evident and beyond doubt. By passing power to his son, Kim Il Sung is trying to avert a divisive power struggle that can undermine his rule and, at the same time, to forestall the "de-Kimilsungization" after his death.

The junior Kim is now ready to succeed leadership. His central task after his succession is indisputably to strengthen his father's personality cult. In essence, politics in North Korea today has become a highly personalized family affair built around a personality cult. The North
Korean propaganda agencies have already been engrossed in assuring its people simply that Kim Jong Il is the unique qualified successor.\(^{31}\) Although it is recently informed that his leadership succession is in impasse by the internal opposition and the contemporary North Korean regime is seriously challenged by anti-Kim movements,\(^{32}\) there are not yet any serious problems on currently undergoing power succession. As a critical point, the younger Kim has already cemented his position to formularies the heir to the throne; at KWP 6th session 18th Conference and the Supreme People Conference 9th session 1st Conference in May, 1990, he was ranked in second position in the presidium of the Politburo, first position in the Party Secretariat, and was appointed vice-chairman with Oh Jin Woo and Choe Kwoang in the Military Commission, and his supports are also named in higher positions in KWP, administration.\(^{33}\) On 24 Dec. 1991, he was elected to the top military post at the 19th plenary meeting of the ruling Workers Party Central Committee.\(^{34}\)

In analyzing the Communist memoirs, the probability of the power succession of political leadership to the junior Kim is not sure.\(^{35}\) This succession is unjustifiable either in orthodox Marxism and Leninism or any other lesser isms such as Titoism, Maoism, Castroism and the like, including the so-called renegade socialist thought.\(^{36}\) In the course of the 20th century in Asian Communist systems "...voluntary transfer of supreme power is consistent neither with the communist..."
experience nor with the dynastic tradition of East Asia."^37
For example. Some changes such as the transformation of power
structure and ideology soon after the death of Stalin and Mao
Tse-tung transpired within the Soviet and China Communist
system. As a result, the inevitable power struggle for taking
office in North Korea will be expected post-Kim Il Sung.

Even if the junior Kim takes hold of the government,
certain events against his supremacy will immediately appear.
It is because his continual remaining in office is not yet
certain due to his lack of ability to treat policy pending all
Korean affairs and to confidently control his challengers. As
a measure to solve those problems, it is assumed he would
provoke external adventures to mobilize his masses against
South Korea in pursuit of a sturdy power base in the crisis
simulation.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis: The complete withdrawal of U.S.
military force from the Korean soil may cause another
peninsula war.

North Korea has been unable to launch an attack on South
Korea not because North Korea's military capability is
inferior to South Korea's but because the North Korean
Communists know the U.S. commitment to defend the Republic of
Korea is unquestionable. ^38 There is little doubt that the
stationing of U.S. forces, the ROK-the U.S. Mutual Defense
Treaty, and the U.S. security assistance positively work for
a puissant deterrent to any North Korean venture. And it can
best perform the role of the "stabilizer" and maintain the equilibrium of the four-power system by not permitting changes which would jeopardize stability in the area. Therefore, insofar as U.S. troops continue to be committed to the security of ROK, the probability of a full-out North Korean invasion against ROK is low; however, provided the U.S. forces are suddenly withdrawn from the peninsula with no consideration of the present military disequilibrium between North and South Korea, its possibility is relatively high.

In recent time, the Bush administration has begun to show a sign to change its logic from that the stationing of the U.S. military troops in Korea is indispensable for the peace and security in this region, to that "the U.S. forces in Korea will stay as long as the South Korean people want them to stay." Of course, the number of U.S. military troops will be dislodged someday at the time that the milieu of tension reduction and detente is created between North and South Korea, and that the four major powers guarantee peace and security in the region. But it would not be right time and the right decision to withdraw the U.S. armed troops from South Korea insofar as military confrontation between the two rival Koreas is continued, and North Korea does not abandon the policy of unification of Korea by force.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis. Neither Russia nor China will support or permit the adventurous North Korean military performance against South Korea.
In changing global circumstances, the newly established Sino-Russia, Sino-the U.S., and Russia-the U.S. better relationships will not break up the status quo of the peninsula in order to avoid their direct military conflict in the peninsula. The behavior of such powers toward Korea in addition to the logic of its geopolitical position intimate convincingly that none of them are in favor of the renewal of clashing there. Moscow and Peking view, according to Gary Klintworth, their "...regional strategic interests as best served by encouraging reform in North Korea, helping North Korea relax its hostility to the outside world and discussing tension reduction measures for the Korean peninsula." To put it more bluntly, the regional goals of Russia and the PRC place no emphasis on reunifying the peninsula by force. Since reunification by force could transpire only in terms of a war, the two Asian powers pay little more than lip service to the thought of reunification and in reality give it a much lower priority than stability.

Furthermore, the value to be used and the likelihood they are at risk would be perhaps too great and the rewards too indeterminate or pernicious in the event of a war. Thus Russia is no longer eager--or able--to finance the aggressive extension of communism which is itself a dying ideology. China will not encourage North Korea in any way to wage a large-scale war in order not to demolish the status quo and the order of new detente with Washington and Tokyo. Another
reason is that neither state appears to believe that the Korean peninsula is important enough to risk a war.46

Another reason comes from Russia's and China's current terrible economic condition. Both countries have given an undivided attention to improving economic relation with the Western countries, specifically the U.S. and Japan, being more dependent upon the unremitting flow of foreign funds and capital, advanced scientific and technological know-how. In particular, China's "Four Modernization"--agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military defense--driven under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, and perestroika and glasnost in Russia cannot be successfully pursued without cooperation and economic aid from those developed countries. For this reason, both two countries are in a negative position to North Korea's military adventure in a sense that supporting a high level of military and economic assistance to North Korea is indeed burdensome, and that waging a long-term war evidently requires abundant financial holdings to prevent their modernization processes.

A peninsula war would perhaps bring about negative effects on the relations among the global powers concerned--for example, especially the U.S.-PRC and the U.S.-Russia relations--in a new era. And a war, whichever wins or loses, would eventually push forward Japanese military buildup and attainment of nuclear weapons. The new advent of Japanese
strong military power will probably break down the balance of power in Northeast Asia.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis. If North Korea should provoke a peninsula war in its own terms, she cannot win it without her allies' active military and economic support.

Neither North Korea nor Republic of Korea has the capability to strike at the other on its own; nor does it seem likely that either would undertake a first strike in defiance of the nations supporting them. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, as recalling the American fast reaction to the North Korean raid of 1950 and to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Russia and China do not really want to encounter the U.S. power. They and probably Pyongyang as well would be likely to presume that the U.S. and even Japan would not put up with North Korea's venture--unification by force--with or without external support.

Nonetheless, North Korea would be foolish to risk conflict without strong backing from either China or Russia, backing that is not likely to be forthcoming; yet this does not rule out the possibility that Pyongyang would indeed do something foolish. Suppose North Korea launches a surprise attack against South Korea, the two Communist powers will not provide the substantial and large-scale military assistance to North Korea due to the above economic reason. This is the resultant presumption or conclusion that, though North Korea starts a local war in its own terms, South Korea with the U.S.
formidable military power has enough military and economic
capability to win a war, even a long-term war, thereby North
Korea's security and the existence of its national authority
are certainly in peril.

**Deterrence of War**

In the IKS, the essential fashion of strategic thinking
would be modified from defense to deterrence. Deterrence of
the counterpart's attack is the major concern of the two
Koreas as well as the powers concerned. In conceptual terms,
deterrence is rather a political than military means. It
mainly deals with the prevention of war and not war itself,
and a realization of this simple fact could bring an enormous
change in not only the substance of strategy but also the
procedures and mechanisms for strategic planning. Providing the fundamental purpose of arms building of the two
rival Koreas is deterrence against each other, from the
deterrence tactic, an action-reaction behavior accelerates
arms races between them in a functioning deterrence system.
For South Korea, the deployment of U.S. combat troops in the
forward bases plays a significant role in preventing military
crises. In general, the Koreans considered deterrence
primarily an American function, and defense the major task of
Korean forces.

The analytical instrument used here to describe the
deterrence tactic of both Koreas is rooted in the following
the Richardsonian tradition. The relatively uncomplicated action-reaction process model was initially developed by Lewis Richardson. In operating the IKS, this widely well-known model is based upon three stimuli that affect the changes in the level of arms race and deterrence for the national security of two Koreas.

The basic action-reaction process model is presented in the form of differential equations:\(^5^1\)

\[
\frac{dx}{dt} = ky - ax + g, \quad \frac{dy}{dt} = lx - by + h
\]

x: military expenditures of nation x,
y: military expenditures of nation y,
t: time,
dx/dt: Change in x per unit time, usually a year,
dy/dt: Change in y per unit time,
k, l: positive constants, defense" parameters, often referred to as 'defense' parameter, or 'fear' factors representing reactions to potential enemies' military budgets or attack.
a, b: positive constants often referred to as 'fatigue', or 'economic constraint' parameters, which represent the magnitude of the restraining effect of a unit arms burden.
g, h: similarly, constants often referred to as 'grievance', 'revenge', or 'ambition' factors, delimitating the initial conditions of the arms race.

This formula is again displayed in relation to security behavior in the IKS.

\[
\frac{dsk}{dt} = knk - ask + g, \quad \frac{dnk}{dt} = lsk - bnk + h
\]

As far as interactions are concerned, Richardson implicitly assumed a pattern of mutual sensitivity: if X reacted to Y, Y reacted to X.\(^5^2\) At this, the application of Richardsonian model into the IKS intimates that the two Koreas will engage
in a reaction-type arms race for deterrence to one's own national security.

Free Variable: Alliance. Written treaty explicitly authorized by central decision-makers to provide military aid and/or support to another nation in case of the latter's involvement in military activity. (There is no enforcement of these treaties by the simulation director).

Generally, an alliance is a political instrument through which the dominant member gains political access to the decision-making processes of the lesser members, in return for which the weaker states are guaranteed strategic assistance. Most treaties of alliance contain a fundamental commitment of response in the event of certain military contingencies; such contingencies have been identified either as "aggression" or "armed attack." But, sometimes, alliances may be intended to enhance the security or stability of an ally's government by legitimizing material assistance or military intervention against internal opposition.

In the IKS game, each Korea may conjecture that it is too weak to adequately have a substantial deterrent of its own, and that it would inevitably be dependent upon alliances with major powers, respectively-- i.e., DPRK-PRC and DPRK-Russia, on one hand, and ROK-the US and possible engagement of Japanese military power, on the other hand--which can support it physically for safeguarding its nation.
In operating simulation game for the security environment of the peninsula, the four major powers spontaneously create bipolar, tripolar or multipolar alliances on the balance of power basis at specific times, depending upon the degree to which they feel threats from the opponents. By this pattern, each nation seeks to maximize its own security by seeking to thwart the efforts of another nation or coalition of nations.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, there is comparatively a great chance for restraining the outbreak of a nuclear war, and the adjustment of multipolar power balance and that the present system of international cooperation.\textsuperscript{60}

In actuality, the risk of an all-out war is affected not only by the local balance between the two Koreas, but also by the regional as well as global balance of powers among the concerned Great Powers.\textsuperscript{61} Now that each Korea (especially South Korea) feels uneasy for defense by itself, the alliances respectively are very effective rather than nonaggression pacts or basic relation agreements between parties for deterrence and its own national security.

Programmed Hypothesis. Deterrence for the security of the two Koreas is partly based on a balance of power system in the peninsula, but not on a lopsided military superiority of one side over the other.

\[
\text{SBPP} = \text{MP(SK + US)} \% \text{MP(NK + RS + PRC)} = 1
\]

\textbf{SBPP:} stability of balance of power system in the peninsula
\textbf{MP:} military power
Deterrence or the maintenance of peace and security needs for a balance rather than superiority. Superiority of the one vis-a-vis the other is not a desirable in the balance of power system, and hence the implications of such a superiority lead to negative effect over the deterrence of the other's potential attack in Korea. Viewed in the context, the security of North and South would be steadier when the military strength of each side is closely equal. In the IKS, the greater the balance of military equilibrium between the two conflicting Koreas and the balance of power among the powers concerned in the peninsula, the more peace and security of Korea would be firmly maintained with the deterrence effect, maintaining the status quo.

**Office-Holding**

By definition, the exercise of power in political decision-making situations within a nation depends upon formal or informal office-holding, be it de facto or de jure. The continuous office-holding of the decision-makers in the two divided national units is the primary concern in simulation process. If their retention of office is seriously threatened as a result of unification, they will not attempt at any kind of process for unification. In fact, for the last four decades, the effort of the central decision-makers in the two sides has been made to simulate critical attributes of the process of constantly remaining in office, taking advantage of
the issues of national security and reunification. So office-holding is a leading mainspring of the IKS.

Core Variable: Office-Holding (pOH). The de jure right, as acknowledged by the simulation actors, to decide on all intra- and international affairs.

Core Variable: Validator Satisfaction (VSm). The validators' acceptability of the principal decision-maker's plan to substantiate his retention of office.

In operating simulation, the validator satisfaction should be extracted by adequate popular support and encouragement of elites and interest groups in Korea, in order to set in motion of political decisions. But the validation in North Korea is quite different from that in South Korea owing to different governmental forms and political structures, and so they have different validators at national level. Those validators in the latter's political system would be in a great measure in status of having an influence on the governmental decision-making, and yet it has not transpired in the former's political system. Thus the validators in North Korea are comprised of some oligarchic elite or military junta.

Core Variable: Government Overall Policies (GOP). The government overall policies for human basic needs and wants with the exception of the issue of consumption standards and national security--e.g., the matters of education, pollution, air, suppression, well-being, equality, freedom, justice,
distribution of wealth (or income), in short, issues related to Maslow's "lower" basic needs of community, self esteem and actualization.

Programmed Assumption: Validator's Satisfaction with Respect to Government Overall Policy (VSgop). The degree of the public's satisfaction to such government policies.

In the INS model, only components of consumption standards and security are used for measuring overall validator's satisfaction. In the IKS, government policy which excludes those two issues is added.

Programmed Assumption: Relations of Overall Validation to Component Validations. The continuance of office-holding of decision-makers in the IKS is possible when given adequately the validator's satisfaction with respect to standards of living, national security, and government overall policy. The programmed equation is:

\[ VSm = e(VScs) + g(VSns) + h(VSgop) \]

\( e, g, h: \) positive coefficient

Core Variable: Decision Latitude (DL). The degree to which the probability of decision-makers' retention of office by the changes in validator satisfaction.

The decision latitude Guetzkow used in relation to the degree to validator satisfaction can be unequivocally applied to the cases of different decision latitude in the two Koreas.
In effect, the decision latitude differs according to the political system and structure the two Republics have.

Programmed Assumption: Relation of Validator Satisfaction to Office-Holding. The likelihood of persistent office-holding of the central decision-makers of the Koreas seems to rest upon the degree of satisfaction of validators.

The office-holding of the decision-makers in the two Koreas is possible when they are fully satisfied with the validators with respect to the improvements in the quality of the people's living standards and assurance of national security. It also depends largely upon decision-makers' capability to induce authentication of their office retention in competition with countermoves by an opposition. Guetzkow's programmed assumption is:

\[ p_{OH} = a(b-DL)\times V_{Sm} + c(DL-d)^6 \]

\[ (DL \leq b) \]

But the overall validation of the decision-makers (pOH) of South Korea for a given need satisfaction level (VSm) depends to an extent on the democratic governmental form. When a decision-maker amply pleases a validator, DL is more likely to be high because there is less pressure, and this effect is increased by the democratic form of government. On the contrary, because the central decision-maker is tyrannical (or totalitarian) in North Korea, his office-holding is little affected by validators.
The following equation of probability of office-holding is much more formalized in putting each part of validator satisfaction level and decision latitude.

\[
pOH = a(b-DL)[e(VScs) + g(VSns) + f(VSgop)] + c(DL-d) \\
= abe(VScs) + abg(VSns) + abf(VSgop) - aeDL(VScs) - agDL(VSns) - afDL(VSgop) + cDL - cd
\]

Guetzkow gives arbitrary scales for VSm (VScs and VSns) and DL to manipulate calculation routines in the exploratory runs. The players of the two Koreas in simulation are provided a scale which marks the sensitivity of each side's validators to their decision-making, as follows: (10) = complete decision latitude; (9, 8) = high decision latitude; (7, 6, 5, 4) = moderate decision latitude; (3, 2) = low decision latitude; (1) = no decision latitude.64 Scales for the measurement of VSm are as follows: (10) = maximum satisfaction; (9, 8, 7) = high satisfaction; (6) = moderately high satisfaction; (5) = indifference; (4) moderately low satisfaction (moderate dissatisfaction); (3, 2, 1) = low satisfaction (high dissatisfaction); 0 = minimum satisfaction (maximum dissatisfaction).65 Such scales are also used for VScs, VSns, and even VSGop. The constants given by Guetzkow are: a = 0.01, b= 11 (maximum decision latitude), c = 0.1, d = 1 (minimum decision latitude); and those by the author are: e = 0.333, g = 0.333, and f = 0.333. When given constants are set to the equation for pOH, it will be:
\[ p_{OH} = (0.01)(11)(0.333)(V_{Scs}) + (0.01)(11)(0.333)(V_{Sn}) + \\
(0.01)(11)(0.333)(V_{Sc}) - (0.01)(0.333)(D)(V_{Scs}) - \\
(0.01)(0.333)(D)(V_{Sn}) - (0.01)(0.333)(D)(V_{Sc}) + \\
(0.1)(D) - (0.1)(1) \\
= 0.03663(V_{Scs} + (V_{Sn}) + (V_{Sc})) - \\
0.0033(D)(V_{Scs} - (V_{Sn}) - (V_{Sc})) + 0.1(D) - 0.1 \\
\]

**The Probability of Revolution**

Most Communist countries in Europe as well as the Soviet Russia and China have been struggling and progressing toward either freedom or economic reconstruction or political reform. Ironically, seldom have such events happened in North Korea to date for its rebirth; she remains as a closed society to the Western nations and does not intend to open her door outward to the world in spite of the fact that her people are seriously suffering from the survival problems, particularly, food insufficiency.

In North Korea today, there are no serious challengers against President Kim, and are a few dissents on his overall policy including economic policy there. As before, some believe in Kim as God. Hence even though \( V_{Scs} \) is very low, the level of \( D \) and \( V_{Sc} \) are still high. In consideration of contemporary North Korean reality and situation, arbitrary scales are given: \( V_{Scs} = 3 \) and \( V_{Sc} = 7 \), \( D = 9 \), \( V_{Sn} = 8 \). When the given constants are put in the programmed equation, \( p_{OH} \) is \( 0.92474 \). The calculated result is attained by high decision latitude. At this, Guetzkow's assumption is very appropriate.
Programmed Assumption: Relation of Office-Holding to Decision Latitude. The higher the decision latitude, the less immediately is office-holding subject to validator satisfaction.\textsuperscript{66}

In the case of South Korea, because voters have powers to choose their ruler by election in terms of the democratic procedure, the decision-makers are very sensitive to changes in the overall satisfaction of their validators. Within its national system, many powerful individuals and interest groups within the constituencies of the officeholders reduce the decision latitude of individual decision-makers.\textsuperscript{67} By sharp contrast, in the North Korean governmental form of autocracy, the continuous office-holding of the central decision-makers is not influenced in the slightest by his peoples' response, and so they for certain periods of time have relatively great and wide latitude in their decision.

It is too hasty to visualize Kim's downfall like its former ally Nicolae Ceaucescu of Romania.\textsuperscript{68} The people of North Korea have been experiencing a dictatorial but stable government.\textsuperscript{69} And leadership succession of Kim Jong Il will proceed with no serious difficulty or challenge as long as his father is alive. Yet once Kim Il Sung passes away, as previously hypothesized, the junior Kim will face a serious political challenge from those who are against his succession and from dissidents. If it is real, because of internal chaos and disorder, validator's satisfaction in all areas will be
abated and decision latitude will be moderate. In this predicting situation, DL set at 5; and VScs at 2, VSns at 6, and VSgop at 3, VSns = 6. The attained sum of pOH will be 0.62143 which refers to a moderately high likelihood of office-holding. If a new regime is continually challenged, there will be certainty of losing office as a result of people's low satisfaction on government overall policy and low decision-makers' decision latitude.

Comparatively, in the case of South Korea, when the pictured digits are set at VScs = 7, DL = 7, VSns = 7, VSgop = 5 are applied to the same, pOH will be 0.85707. As a result, when given 1 as certainty of office-holding and 0 as certainty of losing office, the current monolithic totalitarian North Korean regime and the chosen South Korean regime by election could be sure to maintain their office-holding.

Core Variable: The Possibility of Revolution (pRV). The potentiality of people's revolution against the current government.

The widely and commonly accepted view of the cause of revolution is that "misery breeds revolt"; "revolution occurs when a number of severe problems occur together--a royal bankruptcy, a famine, a conflict within the ruling family, a war--the state collapse, opening the floodgates of revolution"; and "revolutions arise when new, radical ideas shake people out of their accustomed lives." In James Davies' view, "...revolutions are most likely to occur when a
prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal.\textsuperscript{71} That is, when validators feel dissatisfaction coming from socio-economic deprivation, they tend to find social expression in revolution. The rhetoric from the American Revolution of 1776 was "All men are created equal"; in the French Revolution of 1789, partisans shouted "liberty, equality, fraternity"; the propaganda of the Russian Revolution of 1917 was "peace, land, bread"; and a wartime slogan of the China's revolutionary interregnum between 1911 and 1949 was "those who have much give much; those who have little give little." With successful revolution, "people actually take a chance on having a new beginning by consciously seeking to break with the past and to establish the basis for a new national community."\textsuperscript{72} The case of Korea is assumed below.

Programmed Assumption: Relation of the Possibility of Revolution to Validator Satisfaction. Revolution occurs when people's satisfaction level is below the threshold.

Like the cases of Russian and Chinese Revolution, if the North Korean economy cannot constantly satisfy the masses at the consumption standard, the probability of a social revolution or popular uprisings against existing government is very high. It is well shown that recent accounts of the appearance of wall posters criticizing the government's economic policies mesh with earlier reports of opposition
slogans being painted on a Pyongyang railway station, of scattered industrial strikes, and of incidents of sabotage.

According to the report of Silviu Brucan after his recent visit to North Korea, "...a small group of high-ranking officials in North Korea have begun dissident activities against the leadership of the hard-line Marxist country." He continues that "the object of their activities was not to overthrow Mr. Kim, but to press him toward reunification with South Korea, leading to an opening of the tightly closed society." There is no way to reliably ascertain his account. Yet it may be a true fact that Pyongyang regime is undoubtedly confronted by political crisis coming from economic difficulties. Given such circumstances, Kim has neither any choices nor alternatives except for the economic policy change by opening of the firmly closed society to the outside for the people's survival.

Unprogrammed Hypothesis. Revolution may occur in North Korea when it does not, at least, maintain the minimum consumption standards.

In reality, the two mainland Asian powers are faced with a serious economic crisis in their domestic situation, and more recently, their economies manage to be maintained by the financial aid and economic dependence on the advanced Western capitalist countries. The economic condition of Russia is much worse than China and terrible beyond description. "It had become perfectly clear," according to Politburo member
Alexander Yakovlev, "that the country was in a state of long-lasting and potentially dangerous stagnation." That is, the Soviet Union, even though it undeniably enjoyed the political and security benefits brought by Pyongyang's increased dependence on her for long, gave indication of reducing assistance to North Korea after the latter's prompt and strong support to military coup in Moscow in August 1991.

In James Cotton's view, "Isolation will weaken and discredit Kim Il Sung, with the possible consequence of an internal upheaval leading to the control of the country by a less hardline faction if not to the collapse of the entire communist system." Given the isolation of its society, the minimum consumption standards of North Korea have managed to be maintained because of the economic help of the Soviet Union and China. With limited domestic resources, Pyongyang has remained heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for technology, funds and machinery, and China for food, textiles and other consumer goods. Today North Korea is more dependent upon the Chinese help.

However, Pyongyang can hardly expect such aid as in the past. If either Russia or China reduce economic aid to North Korea, it can still maintain at least minimum consumption standards. But, if both stop such supports some day, revolution will surely occur against the current Pyongyang regime because of failure to meet below minimum consumption levels. Revolutionary efforts would continue "until a
monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a monopoly of power is reestablished."^80

Programmed Assumption: Relation of Office-Holding to Revolution. Political stability is higher when the probability of the revolution is low and the probability of winning election is high. The calculated formula provided by Chadwick is:

\[ p_S = p_{WE} (1 - p_{SR}) \]

\( p_S \): political stability (probability of staying in office)
\( p_{WE} \): probability of winning election
\( p_{SR} \): probability of a successful revolution

Elections are one component of political stability as the feedback are in close connection with political stability. In a more democratic system, because the people's interest is closely related to political stability, "those in power become uneasy in proportion with the voters' increasing expectation" for change, and "irresponsible for carrying out elections"^82 as the voters' expectation of progress abates. Hence political stability with the output function of the nation is maintained when the lower probability of a successful revolution, the higher population satisfaction level, i.e., demands and supports as an input function and probability of winning election, and the higher political stability. On the other hand, in a less democratic system it is in a position of the lower people's satisfaction level and higher probability of a successful revolution. Therefore, decision makers in
political systems that are relatively insensitive (LDs above) to their population's tensions are more prone to losing office through revolution than to electoral processes.\textsuperscript{83} Whatever its political system, once the irresponsibility of those in power causes some frustration on the part of the voters, political stability cannot be expected.\textsuperscript{84}

In conclusion, in South Korea unlike the North, retention of office of central decision-makers is to a larger degree dependent upon validator's satisfaction. Because the populations in both Koreas feel safe to some degree on national security as increasing military capabilities and forming alliances for deterrence and security, their major concern would be, first and foremost, about survival. Political stability of some degree seems to be an essential condition for economic development.\textsuperscript{85} The low level of consumption standards would result in political instability in North Korea. In contrast, political instability would cause economic crisis in South Korea. When both Koreas are faced with both economic and political crises to a larger degree, the probability of occurrence of people's revolution is high. This implies that unless the actual top leader and delegates chosen by the people should be in response to the people's requests, the probability of a successful revolution against the actual government is relatively high (in North Korea), and the leadership change is quite possible by democratic election process (in South Korea).
CHAPTER 11
MODEL TO "PLURALISTIC SECURITY-COMMUNITY" FOR AFFILIATION

Under the proposition that two regimes in the peninsula would successfully satisfy their populations regarding needs of consumption level and national security, their people would begin to become occupied with belongingness and love needs as mentioned in Chapter 9. The scheme of the formation of the "pluralistic security-community" (PSC) which was already termed and elaborated by Karl Deutsch and others may be very attractive to both Koreas as an effective mechanism for affiliation, tension reduction, and peaceful co-existence of the two Koreas at the national level. Therefore, the PSC can be innocuously materialized as a measure of affiliating separated identities and as a stepping-stone stage to build an "amalgamated security community" (ASC). And it would be not antagonistic in theory, but would be more reasonable, realistic, and flexible than other designed models of two Koreas in practice.

The PSC as used in the literature can be identified by two criteria: 1) subjective: a "we-feeling," "sense of community," 2) objective: the absence of preparations for war.¹ In nature, the PSC aims at setting up peace and security in the region by checking and limiting the nature of conflicts and disputes through the peaceful method and the gradual approach toward affiliating or binding the inimical
people within "a sense of community," without imperiling their survival and security. In this context, peace broadly used here means that "absence of direct and structural violence between and within states, realizing survival + well-being + identity + freedom for all; in other words satisfaction of human needs, and in addition, ecological balance."²

The typical example of the PSC is found in the United States-Canadian or Norwegian-Swedish relations. Further, the establishment of European Community (EC) in the post World War II era brought about affiliating people of member states. In particular, West Germany's participation in EC, although it had been esteemed as an antagonistic country to most of EC members through two world wars, served as a major momentum to better its relations with member states (especially France).

This logically insinuates that North and South Korea can form the PSC without exacting loyalties, and with the dependable expectations for non-violent means as a measure of settling conflicts between peoples and between nations, maintaining an optimum balance among freedom, peace, security, and even independence. The growing contacts and manifold forms of interactions based on the PSC scheme will not only minimize the distrust, skepticism, and hostility, but also create the peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas as a long-term strategic dogma. Within its sphere the increasing flow of communication and various transactions will eventually
lead to political integration. These processes are essential as a way of the actualization of the PSC.

The PSC also serves as an "on-going process" towards national unity, and will persist until the two different political systems in the divided political units or governments in the peninsula can be converged, maintaining different ideologies, ideals, and political, economic, social, and cultural system. It grants each other's entity, dealing with each other as a sovereign is equivalent, and can preserve a full legal independence and sovereignty. The participants of the PSC thus have their own independent decision-making rights on especially foreign policy and related areas within their own borders, but make joint-decisions on more limited theme issues from time to time. The independent state has, thus, emerged as a principal national actor or a group in international systems and as a substantial reality in international politics. They will have every incentive to enter the various types of international community, in terms of maintaining a further relationship.

Unlike the ASC, the establishment and maintenance of the PSC basically require the fulfillment of only two or possibly three favorable background conditions to be very necessary and sufficient: (1) compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making; (2) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other's needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without
resort to violence; (3) mutual predictability of behavior among decision-makers of units to be integrated. The remaining nine conditions required in the ASC are considerably beneficial and far less stringent in the PSC, and they also emerged much more "durable as communities." Further, from Cobb and Elder's research, common political values are not necessarily related to the creation of PSC. In the result, comparing with the ASC, the PSC is by far easier to form and to maintain within the international society with different people and political units and can also survive under far less stringent background conditions required. It is thus viewed as a more practical integrative scheme to keep peace and security between North and South Korea.

The integrative models as a transient stage to political unification of both the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK) of North Korea and Korean Commonwealth (KC) of South Korea are compatible with the PSC to a certain extent in a sense of the belief in the persistence of the national sovereignty and independence respectively, and peaceful relations among the constituent units. The fundamental difference among them is that "the pluralists go a step farther and greatly amplify those elements by making them 'explicit' in emphasizing the 'legal independence' (or formally uncompromised sovereignty) and 'peaceful change' among the parts." In other words, with respect to sovereignty, both KC and DCRK use it ambiguously ("implicitly" and
"explicitly"). For example, as the KC signifies "one nation, two systems," and the DCRK "one nation, one state, two governments, and two systems," both do implicitly account for legal independence. On the other hand, the pluralists put most emphasis upon the existence of the nation-state system, and the expectation of peaceful change from an old to a new unit, maintaining the explicit legal sovereignty and independence between units. The PSC if realized in Korea will also explicitly reveal it with "one nation, two states, two governments, and two systems." In its device, like the case of the U.S.-Canada, North-South Korean relations are international in theoretical terms, but dealt with as special relations for the reason that all the Koreans, wherever they come from, are undeniably brothers of the same family.

The distinguished more is that the KC and the DCRK value highly the necessity of institutional mechanisms for unification process at what levels, but the PSC does not. One doubts how internal organizations, institutional mechanism, and all interested parties in the KC and the DCRK can be really workable for mutual satisfaction, national harmony and unity. The answer is, of course, negative. Thus the PSC scheme is more effective than the two others.

Unlike the ASC (and/or a federation), the PSC does not necessarily require the creation of the supranational government and a central institution, either. However, like the KC scheme, the intervention of one side in foreign and
defense policy and purely domestic affairs of the other, although those are to some degree hammered out in the confederal scheme, should not completely be permitted by reason of the specific traits of a divided political system as a whole.

In pursuit of peaceful relations between North and South Korea, their models also have different points on the matter of national security. The KC as more clinging to the concept security rather than peace is made in application of realism to hold especially the military for its defense with recalling the bitter experience of a war as before. On the other hand, the DCRK seemingly sticks to the concept of peace calling upon the complete removal of U.S. nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and arms reduction in the peninsula. Now that the Seoul government does not really believe Pyongyang's intention toward peace, it may be natural that the former will not easily accept the latter's project for peace and reunification.

In the most strict sense, the two models in addition to the PSC all are a confederate form. The proponents of confederal schemes or systems of collective security, according to Charles Pentland, share with the pluralists "the belief in the persistence of national sovereignty not merely as a legal function but as a political, economic, military, technological reality to be accommodated in organizing the
peace. " But, the DCRK, though designed based on a confederal scheme, rather threatens South Korea's security.

For assurance of national security respectively, Seoul wants a sure non-aggression treaty, and Pyongyang, a peace treaty. In view of clinging to the security importance of the two Koreas, the PSC rather than the KC and the DCRK explicitly denotes a very fascinating design in a context of maintaining peace and national security, and is much more attractive for unification process at transitory stage. In general, the PSC notion for the sake of peace and security based on the high politics shares with the realist thought which rejects "dramatic therapeutic approaches to peace and places instead a great premium on the traditional virtues of diplomacy." It focuses on actual or potential conflict between state actors, examining how international stability is attained or maintained, how it breaks down, the utility of force as a means to resolve disputes, and the prevention of the violation of territorial integrity. The important question ranges in how the KC and the DCRK insure peace and security. To speak candidly, all Korean people perhaps want peace rather than unification if the process of unification requires fighting. On this point, the establishment of the PSC deserves attention in a sense that unification should be done in non-violent resolution of conflict.

Under the conflicting circumstances of the peninsula, the way of lessening confrontation is primarily "a future
probability and may eventually come through either gradual change in the character of the actors or through the building of 'a sense of community between them'. There must be bilateral efforts for peaceful settlement of their disputes and renunciation of the military use in running the PSC in a model world. There would be a sure approach of expanding communication and transaction between the entire Koreans to conflict resolution. And also both have to remove a feeling of enemy to each other. Without abandoning the view that North Korea has an "evil" design on South Korea, it assumes that the viewing of the North Korean Communists as incorrigible evil, even if true, is a useless guide to policy since it does not suggest any reasonable course of action.

In order to enhance a spirit of national harmony and affiliation and to find solutions to common problems countlessly piled up one after another, the population of the two halves of the peninsula should communicate, visit, trade, and so on, with each other. In this process, both Seoul and Pyongyang should adopt the antagonistic cooperation toward friendly cooperation. Cooperation demands people who are outgoing in their helpfulness, warm, trustworthy, non-manipulative, non-exploitative, open, approachable, compassionate. Several conditions of antagonistic cooperation are as follows:

(1) Both partners must acknowledge that mutual problems can only be solved with the support of both partners.
(2) Antagonistic cooperation will not solve any mutual problems between the partners, but will benefit each of them individually.

(3) Both partners must know that antagonistic cooperation has limitations. Both must acknowledge the present political situation and mutually cooperate for their benefit. As soon as both partners come to an agreement on antagonistic cooperation, there will be detente, i.e. no war between the partners.\(^\text{12}\)

In the operation in antagonistic cooperation, a security system combines both high operational interdependence and relatively low levels of conflict-related behavior.\(^\text{13}\)

In the process, the role of rational decision-makers in the divided halves of Korea is all-important. They have to exert themselves to direct the present Korean circumstances from conflicting to affiliating or joining together with belongingness and love, achieving satisfaction of the basic human needs and welfare of all people in a whole Korea. Even in different societies, both sides may build friendly and respectable relations, not only seeking after, at least, common interests, but merely creating a firm belief of peaceful coexistence of each other by the pluralistic plan. Coexistence is a continuity of the struggle between the different systems and between the conflicting nations, but "struggle by peaceful means, without resort to war, without interference by one state in the internal affairs of another."\(^\text{14}\) The status of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas will be continued until the time when they are fully assured of peaceful transformation of the two different communities into one single larger community.
As a certain problem would be completely or even partly solved, the decision-makers of Seoul and Pyongyang can turn to other intricate problems to be settled with other proper maneuver by means of a negotiated political arrangement between governments. Some of the conditions for successfully operating the IKS within the PSC scheme toward peaceful Korean reunification would be suggested next.

1. **Maintenance of Peace and Security**

   Most important in the PSC scheme, the decision-makers employed in the simulation, should believe that "other's share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation." Their important task for keeping the balance of power system or status quo in the peninsula is, of course, to maintain durable peace and a sense of mutual security in both Koreas as well as in the powers concerned. The best strategy for this in the region would tend to the security and survival needs of existing communities without thereby reducing the survival chances of the human species; maintain peace and order without abandoning economic well-being, social justice, and cultural values; and further the welfare of the majority, without suppressing the rights of minorities.

With the assumption of which peace and security under the newly established international order, consequences and illustrations of the behavior pattern of decision-makers in a simulation would represent a point of focus on "the increasing unattractiveness of war"—unlikelihood of the military use
or stop planning a war against the counterpart. If central
decision-makers of both Koreas fully realize that a new war
would be detrimental to the continual existence of its
national unit, and want really peace and security in the
region, there should be a common accord and assurance with
respect to complete renunciation of the use of armed forces.
There would two approaches to maintain peace and security in
the Korean peninsula: one is by inter-Korean effort; the
other, by external involvement.

Internally, as the first stage for durable peace and
security, North and South Korea must recognize each other's
government as legitimate bargaining and negotiation
partners with mutual respect and dignity. In this process, it
is suggested that both national units concede and restrict
their own demands, necessities, and objectives, and take
reasonable, satisfactory, and constructive action toward
peace, security, and national unity. This is successfully
acquired when "the policies actually followed by one
government are regarded by its partners as facilitating
realization of their own objectives, as the result of a
process of policy coordina-tion." Further, in terms of
normalization, the chance of a North-South summit meeting will
be high, and in the long run, this will end in providing a
negotiation table on peace, security, and unification.

In turn, mutual full assurance of non-aggression between
the Koreas will be necessarily required for prevention of a
renewed war in the peninsula. That is, "the North and the South as one nation shall not use arms against the other party in any case or infringe upon the other party by force of arms" and "shall settle possible differences and disputes peacefully through dialogue and negotiation." Even though North-South Korea dramatically agreed on a non-aggression pact in the fifth session of Premier Talks in December 1991, it cannot certainly guarantee no-war situation. From the historic perspective, for example, non-aggression treaties between Germany-the Soviet Russia in 1938, and between Japan-Soviet Russia in 1941 broke down as they entered into war against each other. According to former South Korean Premier Kang Yong Hoon, "A nonaggression declaration is nothing but propaganda when South and North Korea don't trust each other."21

In consequence, probably establishing a no-war situation is urgently demanded for territorial integrity by the promise of inviolability and for peace settlement of conflict between the two rival Koreas. Without restoration of mutual trust and confidence building, non-aggression or any other kinds of agreements for peace and security will not feasibly work with the exception of their propaganda advantage, intended political convenience, or other plotting incentive behind.

In the decision-making process in connection with security environment, at least, most effectual five pre-
conditions are demanded to successfully operating the PSC. They are:

1. the presence of acute threat perception;
2. the absence of apparent aggressive intentions from conflicting parties;
3. the absence of excessive military imbalances between the states concerned;
4. mutual recognition of political and territorial integrity;
5. the recognition of two military blocs.\textsuperscript{22}

Externally, the role of the four powers related in the matter of the Korean question would be vitally of importance to keep peace and security of the region. Unless they should consent to accept peace there, the eternal peace of Korea can hardly be guaranteed. Any of them can easily break down the inter-Korean power balance with relatively small military support to one side. In 2+4 power simulation, in this stage, therefore, North and South Korea as well as the major powers should initiate talks and negotiate mainly for tension reduction, peace, and security of the peninsula. The efforts for peace in Europe since 1975 under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) umbrella give a source of inspiration for Koreans and the powers concerned towards peace, security, and cooperation.

When the two Koreas feel trust toward each other and firmly believe in setting up peace and security completely on the peninsula, inter-Korean relations may swiftly enter into the second stage for the PSC in the IKS—e.g., arms reduction between North and South including the gradual withdrawal of
American troops, the establishment of peace treaty. But the full pullout of U.S. forces should be carried out after inter-Korean detente and a substantial peace system are firmly established, and national security of two Koreas is actually endorsed by the powers surrounding the peninsula.

2. **Transaction**

Inter-Korean relations can be facilitated through high mutual relevance (economic and socio-cultural transactions), while North and South are maintaining peace and security. It is conceivable, although there has not been yet noticeable transactions between them since the division of Korea, the increased transaction levels are tangibly willing to reduce the high tension, conflicts and many occasions for quarrels. In terms of high levels of transactions, the inimical countries will spontaneously become close to each other in a non-political field, then create mutual trust. With Deutsch's belief that transaction effects "flow more freely within each level than from one level to the other; and they flow more easily from the higher status and power levels to the lower ones, than they do the other way," the kinds of the flow of transactions between the two Koreas will be probable.

The pluralist approach will be flourishing in ratio to the extent of the high volume of transaction, while relatively low volumes of transactions result in negative effect. Thus, it is postulated when relatively high volumes of transaction prevail between the Koreas, the level of capacities for
interaction patterns is great, the operation of the PSC will be successful. It will eventually bring about the positive effect to reduce the broad economic gap and to create affiliation and cooperation through sports, arts, and other socio-cultural activities.

Over time, Richard Chadwick's political-economic decision-making modeling with respect to integration favoring Deutsch's description of the PSC suggests dynamic transaction processes developing feedback effect to ecosocial input-output model for affiliation. It is passionately projected to the political behavior on decision-making simulation processes which put an emphasis in part on the decision-maker's role and behavior of transaction. Within the PSC framework, a transaction pattern in the socio-economic and political system to a most probable voluntary incremental development of input conditions in favor of affiliation is postulated by Chadwick:

1. the emergence of (a) relatively large volumes of transactions, and (b) covariance among these transactions, creating a condition of interdependence;
2. the development of positive affect (reward) in consequence of these transactions as greater control (political) capability develops in regulating these transactions;
3. the emergence of coordinative social mechanisms which we may refer to as regional organizations or governments, as the case may be, in consequence of the intensified political control of transactions;
4. the emergence of identitive affiliation or community as the relevant populations become accustomed to the organizational structure and its apparently rewarding effects.24
Here as a transaction model, I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch's empirical (inductive) probabilistic transaction models provide likely flows of various transactions between North and South Korea. Their initial equation (\( t_{ij} = 0.0 + T U_i V_j \)), in which \( t_{ij} \) is the expected value of transactions, from nation \( i \) to nation \( j \), \( T \) is the total sum of actual transactions, \( U_i \) is the likelihood of \( i \) giving transactions, whereas \( V_j \) is the likelihood of \( j \) accepting transaction in general.

Then, transaction approaches are fitting and effective for examining some aspects of integration of Korea. The means most habitually used is the Index of Relative Acceptance (RA). The RA is a standardized comparison of the substantial volume and size of transactions among a group of political units to what would be expected, given transactions between the units as well as the outside world. It can be simply set up as an equation: \( RA = \frac{\text{actual} - \text{expected}}{\text{expected}} \). The RA scores may take values from \(-1\) (no actual transactions), to \(0.0\) (transactions as expected), to positive infinity, which marks the degree to that actual transactions exceed envisioned.

In application this to the two national units of the peninsula, if they share fewer transactions than anticipated, scores will be negative value (disintegration occurs) which indicates there is no actual integration. On the contrary, if
higher than anticipated, it will be positive one (integration occurs).

3. Communication

If the different cultural entities within the political system are so profoundly dissimilar that they cannot "communicate" with one another, mutual trust and a sense of collective identity cannot develop. This explains well the case of the current hostile situation of the two Koreas. The question arises about how they are able to affiliate, reduce conflict, or restore mutual trust? Chadwick's assumptions above suggest the need of some stable communication network between the different political entities in the peninsula as a measure of reducing the growing conflict between them. The initiation of communication will be helpful to renew and reorient the transactional relationship between them in the third round stage of simulation in the PSC.

Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together. Deutsch emphasizes it, in which "an attempt has been made within each run to have all the communications between nations, whether oral or written, routed through external decision-makers." If the decision-makers do not organize themselves adequately within their nation, the unit becomes paper-bogged and there are consequent failures in communication. The frequent and improved oral and written communications involving more decision-makers between the two Koreas will be sure to engender mutual
advantage, and to alter their unfriendly relation to be friendly, given the differences in ideologies, political and economic systems. Therefore, increased communication will lead to mutual responsiveness which will at least be converted into a willingness to accept peaceful change in relations. 31

In particular, the various communications including the steady negotiation should deal with humanitarian affairs, before everything. Then, decision-makers would focus on such political issues as South-North versions of election procedures, the structure of an all-Korea government and constitution, legality of South and North Korea, legal foundations for the responsibility of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United nations, dissolution and annulment of treaties, the terms of demilitarization, neutralization, confederation, and "four-power guarantees." 32

Furthermore, as a way to keep firm security environment, implicit and explicit communications between high-level military and political decision-makers of North and South in the simulation are necessary for reducing the high tension, arms control and reduction, and prevention of unexpected renewed war. For this, an effective joint crisis management system involving political and military decision makers from both countries should be established. 33 In the decision-making process, also, the governments of the two Koreas have to cooperate and make a concession in some aspects (or should not persist in any prior conditions), and to confine
rigorously as regards their own demands, aspirations, and goals, and also take reasonable, practical, and positive action within the PSC scheme.

Through the gradual development of communication between the two Koreas, their mutual enmity and misgivings will disappear as acknowledging that they are blood-related. And it will produce a negative "lock-in" effect on further progress of the transactional relationship between the two halves, as earlier precedents of hostility hindered the coordination of cooperative moves. At this stage, Anti-Communist Law and National Security Law in South Korea, and Anti-Democratic Law in North Korea should be simultaneously abrogated for further success of renewed communication and transaction. Truly speaking, a number of college students, anti-government activities and parties, and even some from the ruling party in South Korea believe that national security law to disconnect communication and transaction between North and South should be either changed or abolished for the improvement of bilateral dialogue, reconciliation, and cooperation.

Only if it is actualized in a near future, they will crush the barriers highly blocking meeting of dispersed families, free travel, free transit and visits between them, and cultivate the mechanisms for free correspondence by which telephone, telegraphs and the mass media can again circulate throughout the whole Korea. At this stage, which one might
call a process for political confidence building, exchanges of visits at various levels and dialogues on a broad range of subjects, from culture to politics, must be encouraged. This will undoubtedly lead to advancing the PSC in terms of affiliating them with affection, love, and belongingness. When it can be concluded that this stage is successfully done, both sides will effort to attain the national unity. Needless to say, increasing contact and communication between the two Koreas will produce other forms of cooperation, including the political contacts and negotiation toward political integration.

The formation of the PSC can be possible only when decision-makers of the two Republics of Korea fully satisfy validators with respect to survival and national security needs. When North Korea's consumption level is increasingly improved as a consequence of more direct or indirect economic transaction and interdependence with South Korea and outside world, and when validator's satisfaction on national security are remarkably high, she may agree on transactions and communications with South Korea rather than competition. If North Korea remains poor as usual, in order not that its regime shows its citizenry the actuality of the South Korea (or comparison of two Koreas), it may stop such exchanges. Conversely, if North Korean economy faces a recovery, frequent exchanges will be expected more than before between the
Koreas. This provides a practical means to operate the PSC in Korea.

In the meantime, Deutsch's PSC scheme to integration provides us the theoretical rationale by being broadly applied to solve such needs, and serves as a stepping-stone for future success of peaceful Korean integration. It seems also evident that its approach will be "diminishing the cold war atmosphere that has surrounded Korea," and creating a more stable milieu in the Far East. Within the sphere of the PSC, North and South Korea will cooperate in areas of bargaining and negotiation to resolve the political problems and conflict peacefully. It will also open the way to an increase in transaction and communication on the pluralist basis, thus providing additional channels through which they can learn about each other. Thus inter-Korean relations may swiftly change from antagonistic to friendly, encouraging to provide a security environment in which a state of peaceful coexistence can evolve. Furthermore, the basic compact of coexistence between states, expressed in the exchange of recognition of sovereign jurisdictions, implies a conspiracy of silence entered into by governments about the rights and duties of their respective citizens. As more utilitarian policies in the economic, cultural, and social realm are advanced, a spillover effect into the political arena will arise. When we have a strong conviction that peaceful
solution on all Korean affairs is possible, in turn, our concern will move to political integration.
CHAPTER 12

MODEL TO POLITICAL INTEGRATION:
WITH APPLICATION OF "PRINCE" MODEL

Integration occurs through decision-making. In one approach the decision-makers modify what might be expected based on external and domestic factors; in the second, decision-makers serve as information processors who selectively attend and respond to external and domestic factors; whereas in the third, decision-makers are configured in multiple groups that must bargain and negotiate in both defining and acting on a foreign policy problem.¹ In this connection, Karl Deutsch argues that very often an external event will have only limited effects on domestic affairs²; and James Rosenau talks about the internal influence on the external behavior of states.³

The relations among nations are embodied in the simulation by the postulation of programs of operation which respect to the internal functioning of the several nations constituting the overall inter-nation system.⁴ International systems are not always stable and certain, and some subsystems are not efficient for working with their own logic. In consideration to international system around Korea, the simulation involves internal and external forces that play a significant role on decision-making process to Korean unification, and further, the independent variables--
international and domestic politics--are interconnected and equally affect the achievement of national unity. Within the realm of international subsystem, the decision-making of both internal and external simulation will be envisioned towards Korean reunification.

Some attributes of all directions to national actors--observation and understanding, probability and expectation, alternative and priority--are mused on to the realization to the goal in actor-situation strategy. Moreover, decision structures and processes provide the bases for selecting among the behavioral effects when the explanatory factors generate conflicting predispositions for action. The decision-making simulation to projected action also proceeds within the sphere of situation. At this, PRINCE (Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute), programmed international computer environment model developed by William Coplin, Michael O'Leary, and Stephen L. Mills guides decision-makers' thought and role with respect to a specific decision in a certain situation to the desirable and approachable goal. The PRINCE pictures specification of an issue and salience, and values highly a role of decision-makers and politically significant individuals or groups that are believed to exert some influence over the decision-maker. It adds to actors' power to the solution, and affects in issue-outcome in general political relationship among the actors. That model would be in a larger measure helpful to the approach of political unification of Korea in the
political-economic context through decision-making simulation process after the two Koreas are successfully affiliated with each other in the non-violent means.

Obviously, it differs from Hans Morgenthau's framework based on the realist approach—"struggle for power among powers." The PRINCE focuses on how and why policy outcomes occur, rather than how and why political actors seek to dominate each other. In this model, the issue position is the probability that an actor espouses a position favoring or opposing the outcome; power is thought of as the probability that an actor has capability to bring about its preferences, or priorities; salience is defined as the estimation of the importance of an issue to each actor; affect pictures the general political relationship among the actors. One of the functions of the complete PRINCE model and related research is to provide testable propositions about how actors mutually influence one another's issue position changes, and how changing values over time may be generated for salience and effect.

In that model, each actor is widely engaged in the situation, employing the issue position, power, salience, and affect with time. The following four propositions in social psychological terms to the goal are described:

(1) An actor moves closer to the issue positions held by those other actors which it considers to be positive reference groups, and it moves farther from the issue positions of those actors which it considers to be negative reference groups.
(2) An actor will be more likely to move toward or away from the policy position of another to the extent that the affect felt by the actor toward the other tends toward extreme ranges, that is, when affect is strongly negative or positive.

(3) An actor will be likely to move toward or away from a reference actor the higher of that issue to the reference actor.

(4) The higher the salience of the issue for the actor in question, the more extreme will be its moves toward or away from other reference actors.\textsuperscript{10}

In the concept of the PRINCE model, a major issue would be national unity of Korea. The principal question on the issue here arises from how the two different regimes accept or agree to the issue in relation to the security issue, and how it does not break international subsystem in Northeast Asia region at the crossroad of the four powers' interests. In this sense, the issue position, power, salience, and affect are all involved in the decision-making process to the unification access. In realizing the unification of Korea, who are favoring or opposing it (the issue position); who decide it or have explicitly an influence on it (power); who value it highly (salience); how it affects each actor (affect).

In decision-making process, the simulation would be transpired by the high levels of decision-making or the decision-makers' drastic resolution on reunification. Hence the decision-makers and nations all to be thought of as official and core actors—"constituents," "bargainers," and "associates"—within the international subsystem and the
political-economic system of Korea will negotiate and bargain with respect to the further stage for one Korea.

Peaceful Korean unification as a long-term goal of both North and South Korea is also a global agenda because of the complex relationships and entangling interests of the four major powers--the U.S., Russia, Japan, and China--in the Northeast Asian international subsystem. Therefore, its reunification is a function of intra- and international conflict resolution in which cooperation and accommodation will increase an opportunity for decision-makers of all powers related to solve problems by the non-violent means. On this point, the Korean question can be illustrated to a larger degree by the conflictive interactions and function of internal and external influential powers whose political behaviors have significantly an influence upon achieving Korean reunification. First, government officials (particularly high-level decision-makers) in the two Koreas are core actors. Second, the U.S. and three regional Asian powers as major external core units play, both consciously and unconsciously, and both directly and indirectly, in line with the balance of power in the Pacific area. They will have highly an influence upon the Korean unification within the domain, in order not to change international subsystem in this area.

All participants or national actors involved in the Korean problems will act something like a chain "reaction-
counter reaction" fashion of conduct, for exactly unforeseeable are the counterparts' behaviors. In action to the goal, each national actor engages in a simulation game with the hope and fears, successes and failures, conflicts and compromises. We also perceive need for a viewpoint and a mode of thinking that enables one to abstract and generalize without losing touch with the human achievements, and the human impacts on the habitat in which political problems arise and to which the human future is related. From this perspective, Richard Chadwick delineates, with respect to the decision-makers' roles as political actors to be more helpful to scrutinize decision-makers' behavior, the subsequent three sets of presumptions:

1. the more powerful the actor and the more important the issue to the actor, the more weight will be attached to the actor's opinion;
2. the more powerful the actor is on other issues, and the more important those issues are to the decision-maker, the more weight will be attached to the actor's opinion;
3. the more consistently the actor has supported the decision-maker on issues of importance to the decision-maker, the more support will the decision-maker tend to give to the actor's views; but conversely, the more disagreement on past issues, the more opposition will be given to the actor's views.

In addition, with perception of the Korea's complex situation, the actors' bearing to action to the desirable goal in a certain situation is applied widely based on the following terms:
1. their discrimination and relating of objects, conditions and other actors--various things are perceived or expected in a relational context;
2. the existence, establishment or definition of goals--various things are wanted from the situation;
3. attachment of significance to various courses of action suggested by the situation according to some criteria of estimation.
4. application of "standards of acceptability which 1) narrow the range of perceptions; 2) narrow the range of objects wanted; and 3) narrow the number of alternatives." 

The feature of PRINCE subsumes the disposition of issue, the importance of decision-makers' roles, the estimation of the importance, and the approach and solution of the issue. Now using PRINCE model, we focus on the calculation of issue resolution for adoption of political unification of Korea. In this approach, the integer from -10 to 10 in the issue position is used to symbolize a 10 as support (or certainty), a 0 as neutrality, and a -10 as a strong opposition position (uncertainty) toward a suggested issue and outcome. An actor's power in solution to the goal is estimated by the integer ranging between 0 and 10. If the actor has the capability to approach the goal without any opposition, he is assigned a 10, but if he absolutely lacks it, he gets a 0. The two Koreas as well as all surrounding international actors have powers in the determination and process to the unification of Korea. Like power estimation, each actor's salience (or importance of the issue) is indicated by the integer ranging from 0 to 10 in terms of the percentage of time spent on the issue.
In the domain of intra- and international system, Korea became a test ground for the East-West conflict, and part of the "Rimland" as Nicholas Spykman described that "Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." All national actors involved, both directly and indirectly, in the affairs of the Korean matters, put forth efforts and work hard to minimize resistance and to maximize support or act toward their own advantage, interests, and goal. Therefore, they are bound to take into consideration reactions of the counterpart before making any decision. Conjecturing interaction patterns of the countermove, the decision-makers of the powers concerned including the two Koreas are independently able to choose the optimal tactic or predicted strategies, which they deem best or appropriate in a given situation, evaluating and understanding their capability and national problems placed in, for the sake of a common goal.

Longer run, "integrating the resource-rich North with the industrial South would make Korea a formidable regional power," ending the Cold War and the 45-year intimidation of military conflict in Korea. Besides, with a combined population that rapidly nearing 60 million, with the military power of nearly one and a half million well armed and trained soldiers, and with dynamic economic growth potentials that could threaten to drastically narrow the existing gap with the Japanese, a unified Korea could be a considerable strategic
force in East Asia. However, because of complex conflict interests of powers concerned in the peninsula and its geo-strategic importance, indeed it is not easy to expect unification of Korea when, though the two Koreas agree to it, the external powers are not in favor of it (see Table 3).

Table 3. Illustrative Calculation of Issue Resolution for Adoption of Unification of Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>SAL</th>
<th>RW (P×S/100)</th>
<th>Weighted IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>x3</td>
<td>x8</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>x1</td>
<td>x10</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>x3</td>
<td>x5</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>x3</td>
<td>x6</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x6</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>x1</td>
<td>x6</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1.12</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IP: Issue Position
POW: Power
SAL: Salience
RW: Reference Weight

One of the assumptions concerning the issue is obtained by a French weekly magazine: "...none of South Korea's neighbours would want to see Korea reunited, and particularly that Japan would want to see Korea remain divided." Russia has "nothing to gain from Korean reunification, and China supports North Korea." It is true that they are still interested in "either strategically and militarily or economically and politically in the Korean affairs," not merely enjoying the division of Korea, but pursuing a de facto
"two Koreas" policy. Therefore, policy makers in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo seem unable, and probably unwilling, to generate any momentum toward Korean reunification.\textsuperscript{21}

The core long-term interests of the United States in Korea focus on preserving peace and stability with a minimum of cost and risk to the United States.\textsuperscript{22} The last strategic defense line of the United States in Far East is Japan, not Korea; but she does neither desire a violent unification of Korea under Communist domination, nor will she face with direct military confrontation with Asian Communist countries. It would not support any unification formula which would incur Russia or Chinese wrath and destabilize the power balance on the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{23} The Asian Communist powers share the American view that the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula is beneficial to the Northeast Asian region, and do not hesitate to unify Korea because of the geo-strategical, political, and military reasons.

Tokyo has perhaps the least interest in Korean unification\textsuperscript{24} because not only military conflict in the peninsula will unavoidably and highly jeopardize peace and security of Japan in the 21st century, but the economic and military power of a unified Korea will, also, in nine cases out of ten, threat Japanese national interests. Logically, the "two Koreas" will further enable Japan to keep on controlling one over the other, and aligning them to its absolute economic and political advantages. Hence other
alternatives, such as violent unification of Korea under Communist domination or peaceful unification under a noncommunist regime, are not expected to serve Japan's national interest as well as a divided Korea.25

As far as power concerned in unification process, whether favoring or opposing the issue, the integer is given based on public opinion of South Koreans surveyed on which countries have a strong influence upon Korean unification. It would be displayed in Appendix 8.5. On salience, both Koreas have to deal with the issue of unification of Korea more importantly than external powers. In particular, North Korea used to take advantage of the issue importance for the political propaganda.

What is more manifest is that externally, although indisputable that the existing status quo in Korea is not an alternative for Korean solution, the external powers' Korean policy have been and will have been enjoying maintaining the status quo and balance of power in the peninsula by reducing the probability of another war there rather than unification of Korea. Strictly speaking, reunification is certainly a breakdown of the status quo in the process either a peaceful or a violent method,26 but none of powers will easily be working toward the solution of the Korean problems nor lead to Korean unification. This circumstance makes it more and more difficult to resolve the Korean question.
In the Korean peninsula, more particularly, the powers concerned manage their relations with one another in the interests of international order by (i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence, and (vi) joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium.

What is a valuable and propitious proposal of reunification to please all related nations without breaking up the international order in the region? Because the Korean question is intra- and international problem, the solution may be a neutralization prior to a federation of Korea. In this scheme, the question may arise why Korea should be neutralized. The answer is, as widely well-known, simple: for guaranteeing peace and security of Korea in consideration of Korea's geographical situation; for surviving or avoiding of international conflict in the region; and for bringing about a national unity. However, Korean reunification is doubtful unless the major powers concerned should agree on neutralization of Korea in a sense that it may be still a hostage to geography.
In completing neutralized federation of Korea, the domestic and external political system is a complicatedly interrelated behavioral system comprising the actions and reactions between the two Koreas and among four major powers. In simulation processes toward political integration coming from the intra- and international environments, the action of the decision-makers is in a large measure determined by the following terms:

1. Inaction; delay (expected action does not occur; no substitute)
2. Intensification of action (action is stronger, more intense than expected)
3. Minimization of action (action is weaker, less intense than expected)
4. Redirection of action (action is an option other than expected)
5. Expected action (action is unaltered)

Action can be mostly operated by the behavior (or interaction patterns) of national actors and national decision-making units which "is embedded in an environment composed of three basic systems: an international system, the national economic system, and the national political system" in order to achieve its desirable goal. Simply put, the actors engage in working over the other actors towards the goal.

The merit of neutralized unification is that it offers an outcome in which neither side will lose nor gain at the expense of the other. Historical precedents have made it clear that the neutralization of a state can only be successful if it satisfies the interests of the major powers.
concerned with the state and receives their guarantee and respect.\textsuperscript{32} The unified neutral Korea would be no threat to neighboring superpowers; it would provide rather a buffer zone between the two worlds,\textsuperscript{33} provided its reunification will not be beneficial to one dominant power, nor will it destroy international order and subsystem in this area. Moreover, both the ROK and DPRK might discover genuine common interests in protecting the Korean peninsula from outside incursions.\textsuperscript{34}

At this point, PRINCE models are made again the best use of the decision-making process and action on the national goal of reunification (see Table 4 and 5).

The issue position of a neutral-federation of Korea (the Swiss and Austrian type) would be adopted under the assumption that the two Koreas set up peace and security and solve their conflict by the non-violent means. Therefore the maintenance of a pluralistic security-community in Korea is a sufficient condition to creation of the neutral-federation in Korea.

In looking at Table 4, Seoul is less favorable to the idea of neutralizing Korea than Pyongyang because of security dilemma. In considering geographical condition of the peninsula, ROK's defense is relatively in disadvantage in a sense that "the South Korea's capital, Seoul, which accounts for 30% of the South Korea's population and 50% of its GNP, is only 40 km south of the demilitarized zone\textsuperscript{35} in which the North deploys over 65% of its armed forces and within eight minutes of take-off by North Korean combat aircraft. Even
worse, because ROK's major ally, the United States, is thousands of miles away from Korea, in the time of armed conflict there, the prompt engagement of the U.S. military forces from the U.S. is not envisioned, and so the security of South Korea is probably in danger at that time.

Table 4. Illustrative Calculation of Issue Resolution for Adoption of Neutral-Federation of Korea (Swiss Type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>SAL</th>
<th>RW (P×S/100)</th>
<th>Weighted IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>X3</td>
<td>X6</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>X3</td>
<td>X7</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X6</td>
<td>X4</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X4</td>
<td>X5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X4</td>
<td>X5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>X4</td>
<td>X5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 3.9

On the other hand, the geographical proximity proves that North Korea is in a decisive favorable position because its principal military allies, both Russia and China, neighbor with the northern border of Korea, and thus it enjoys relatively secure lines along with its respectively effective mutual defense treaties with them. It would make it easy to provide their military and other assistance to North Korea in case of a war.

The decision-makers of the Asian regional powers around Korea who may think the issue position--neutralization of Korea--is an alternative solution in solving Korean problem
are still in inaction to the goal. But their minimization of action will be started:

Hypothesis. If the overall strategic balance of power does not break down in the Pacific area, they will not oppose neutralization so as to transfer their concerns to other areas and to avoid international conflicts on the Korean peninsula.

Unlike Germany which is simply too powerful and important to be neutralized without qualitative changes in the nature of international politics, Korea is small enough that its neutralization would not seriously alter or disrupt existing patterns of international politics (or the balance of power).\textsuperscript{36} If permanent neutral status of Korea is realized, each of the two mainland Asian powers can prevent either pro-China or pro-Russia\textsuperscript{37} and satellization of North Korea. Even after the Gulf War such Communist power's worry is transferred to the emerging of the most powerful U.S. power, and hence they in terms of neutralization scheme can curb the latter's expansionism in Northeast Asia.

In a similar vein, the U.S., which is first responsible for the Korean division, can be free from the burden of the Korean problem through neutralization design, and so will also argue in favor of it insofar as the status quo in the region is continued for a firm establishment of peace, guaranteeing security of Korea and Japan. From the Japanese perspective, it will be good in a sense that she can avoid the competition with the neighboring Communist powers, but bad on the rise of
a more powerful unified Korea which has bad feeling to the Japanese resulting from their 36 years of barbarous domination over all Korean people.

Suppose Korea would be neutralized and unified by Swiss type, the processing power and action of the U.S. is much stronger than other nations, for she has a strong influence upon Korea's security with the economic and political purpose. Although somewhat weaker than the U.S. and the remaining powers have ability to realize it: both Russia and China have political and military power, and Japan economic power. In the process, now that this type generally requires the international function and formal agreement than the intra-national, the two Koreas' power would be less influential and action would be weaker, less intense than expected.

With respect to importance of the issue, the concern of the U.S. is a little bit low because it regards Korea as one of the strategically important regions at the global level. But the other three regional powers and North and South Korea strongly and directly involved in the matters of Korea at the regional and local level, and unification of Korea would affect to a greater degree the balance of power system in the region.

Apart from the external powers' efforts to keep the balance of power and status quo in the peninsula, contingencies—recession in USA, future recession in Japan, political instability in Russia and China—will not be
favorable to the issue of Swiss pattern's neutralization of Korea. They will hesitate action for the resolution of the Korean question by this Swiss type. Unlike the case of Switzerland, it cannot expect the international guarantee for permanent neutrality of Korea by the major powers. Hence it is difficult to expect the action to occur to the goal. As an alternative of the Swiss type, the Austrian case may draw much more attention in application to Korea. A plausible reason to justify it would be hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis. The fewer actors or nations involve, their action to the goal of unification of Korea is stronger.

As Selig Harrison points out "a defacto neutralization of the peninsula as an arena of major power conflict without waiting for the conclusion of the formal four-power agreement often advocated,"38 Korean unification should be first worked out by the Koreans themselves in the context of a new regional security framework which is compatible with the two Koreas internally and with the four powers externally.

Hence at a time of which the two Koreas bear fruits in cooperation, transactions, and reconciliation, the Austrian type of neutralization is much easier to establish neutralization in Korea without external involvement in an initial stage than Swiss model. The Austrian type can be potential along with the inter-Korean agreements or treaty, and then the major powers' understanding, unanimity, and compromise will be resultant for permanent Korean peace and
security in the region accepting it as a unified entity. It is thus a very fast way for them to procure a modus operandi as Austria did for avoiding international interference.

In the following, the mechanism of the PRINCE model for issue resolution by a neutral-federation of Korea (Austrian type) indicates strong conviction and plausible probability of Korean reunification (see also Table 5).

Table 5. Illustrative Calculation of Issue Resolution for Adoption of Neutral-Federation of Korea (Austrian Type)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>SAL</th>
<th>RW (PXS/100)</th>
<th>Weighted IP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>x7</td>
<td>x7</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>x5</td>
<td>x9</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x4</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x5</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x5</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>x2</td>
<td>x7</td>
<td>- .14</td>
<td>-.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Austrian neutralization form of unification, North and South Korea enjoy the issue and salience because it can be a much more effective way without interference of the external powers around Korea and is easier to achieve unification through the Swiss way. Moreover, the two Koreas can have much stronger independent power and intensification of action rather than the U.S. and three regional powers to the issue resolution. If they satisfactorily agree on neutralized-federation and intensify action, and thereby unify
by this type, all powers involved, whether like or not, have
to cooperate with one another in order to keep the status quo
and the balance of power in the peninsula.

Somewhat different from the previous case, the power of
the U.S. would be a little bit weaker because the process
first depends on mainly North and South Korea. From the
Japanese perspective, that salience is more significant than
Swiss one in a sense that unification of Korea by Austrian way
may give unforeseen negative security effect to Japan, and so
issue position would be opposed.

In sum, on a -10 to +10 scale, as we see and compare
Tables 3, 4, and 5, the issue position moves from unification
of Korea (1.12) to Swiss type neutralized-federation (3.9), to
Austrian pattern (7.19). On the issue of political unification,
the overall system is likely to stalemate, only slightly
leaning toward the goal. In the international subsystem
surrounding Korea, neutralization of Korea is another solution
to the goal. Perhaps the opportunity of unification by the
Austrian pattern with the declaration of permanent neutralization
of Korea may be reasonable and do intensification of
action prior to the creation of a federation of Korea better
than the Swiss model. Eventually, the international powers
also can attain a settlement in the Korean impasse by
eliminating the dynamic and hazardous global conflict among
them without feeling a trepidation of exterior pressures and
interior machinations.
Through political mechanism of neutral-federation of Korea, the two Koreas can merge into one. It will help to make close their relations as reducing military spending and to promote economic, cultural, and social, and political interchange between them. Thereby two separate states would merge their foreign affairs, military defense, economic systems, and system of jurisprudence and judiciary, reserving some limited power in social matters to and the separate regimes in North and South. Within this form, a nation-building project should contain common basic elements:

(1) The exclusive politico-military control over a certain territory.
(2) The defence of this territory against possible claims from outside.
(3) The creation of material welfare and political legitimacy within this territory.

By this solution of a unified neutral-federation of Korea, all parties concerned are agreeable in accordance with the balance of power dogma and without worrying about who shall dominate over whom or about being afraid of who shall be eaten without the fear of both interior and exterior pressures and peril. It will, in the long run, bring about the major powers' interest by avoiding their rivalries, maintaining international order, seeking the power equilibrium, and removing or reducing their concerns in the region. It will be thus certain to contribute to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
CHAPTER 13

"ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS" TO KOREAN UNIFICATION

To reach a normative conclusion on a strategy for reunification based on the theorists (Maslow, Guetzkow, Deutsch, and Coplin) and taking into account both South Korean public opinion and government unification priorities, Thomas Saaty's "analytic hierarchy process" (AHP) technique for decision-making will now be used. "It allows the decision maker to: 1) design a form that represents a complex problem; 2) measure priorities and choose among alternatives; 3) measure consistency; 4) predict; 5) formulate a cost/benefit analysis; 6) design forward/backward planning; 7) analyze conflict resolution; and 8) develop resource allocation from the cost/benefit analysis."2

Basically the AHP is a method of breaking down a complex, unstructured situation into its component parts; arranging these parts, or variables, into a hierarchic order; assigning numerical values; and synthesizing the judgments to determine which variables have the highest priority and should be acted upon to influence the outcome of the situation.3 That approach makes it possible to synthesize outcomes from preferences expressed by people,4 in a way that is easy to understand by the people themselves.

Figure 3 is arrived through the following steps. The first step is specification of the basic goal, namely Korean
integration through peaceful means, as discussed in the introduction. The second step is specification of the major factors relevant to making choices between or giving emphasis to national policies. Here Maslow's needs hierarchy as applied to the Korean situation was used to specify these factors, as discussed throughout Chapter 9.

With regard to each factor, policy options related to the various integration and realist theories were matched with each of the basic needs according to their substantive content and policy context, as follows (acronyms in Figure 3 are shown in parentheses below).

**Survival** is associated with (1) economic aid to North Korea (ECON AID), and (2) economic exchange with all countries (ECON EXC), especially as a "safety net" for the poor.

**Security** is associated with (1) maintaining alliances of North and South Korean security communities for their respective security (ALIA NSK), (2) continuing presence of U.S. military forces in the peninsula for South Korea's security (PR US SK), and (3) military equilibrium between North and South Korea (ME NSK).

**Affiliation** is associated with (1) social and cultural transactions between North and South Korea (TRANSACT), (2) communication between North and South Korea (COMMUNIC), and (3) to stabilize peace in the peninsula (PEACE).
Figure 3. Approach to the Goal of Korean Integration

GOAL
1.000

SURVIVAL
L 0.513
- ECON AID
L 0.250
- ECON EXC
L 0.750
- ALIA NSK
L 0.669
- PR US SK
L 0.243
- ME NSK
L 0.088

SECURITY
L 0.261
- TRANSACT
L 0.167
- COMMUNIC
L 0.167
- PEACE
L 0.667

AFFILIAT
L 0.129
- ANB NSK
L 0.333
- RESPECT
L 0.333
- REC PSI
L 0.333

SELF-EST
L 0.063
- SOC JUST
L 0.429
- RESTIFIC
L 0.143

SELF-ACT
L 0.033
- DEMOCRAC
L 0.429

AFFILIAT --- affiliation with belongingness and love (Ch. 9, 11; Maslow)
ALIA NSK --- maintaining alliances of North and South Korean security communities for their respective security (Ch. 10; Guetzkow)
ANB NSK --- accommodation, negotiation, and bargaining between North and South Korea (Ch. 12; Coplin)
COMMUNIC --- communication between North and South (Deutsch, and public opinion)
DEMOCRAC --- to rule by the principle of democracy (Chs. 7, 9; Chadwick, and public opinion)
ECON AID --- economic aid to North Korea (Ch. 10; Guetzkow)
ECON EXC --- economic exchange with all countries (Chs. 7, 10; public opinion, ROK government, and Guetzkow)
ME NSK --- military equilibrium between North and South (Ch. 10; Guetzkow)
PEACE --- to stabilize peace in the peninsula (Ch. 11; Deutsch, public opinion, and ROK government)
PR US SK --- continuing presence of U.S. military forces in the peninsula for South Korea's security (Ch. 10; Guetzkow, public opinion, and ROK government)
REC POSI --- recognition of each other's political system and ideology (Ch. 11; public opinion, and DPRK government)
Self-esteem is associated with (1) accommodation, negotiation, and bargaining between North and South Korea (ANB NSK), (2) respect each other as people apart from system (RESPECT), and (3) recognition of each other's political system and ideology (REC PSI).

Self-actualization is associated with (1) social justice (SOC JUST), (2) "rectification for oneness" (RECTIFIC), and (3) to rule by the principle of democracy (DEMOCRAC).

The relative importance of each of the factors above was arrived at through pairwise comparisons based on my impression of public opinion and government policy preferences as discussed in Chapters 5 through 8. The scale used is shown in Table 6, below (from Saaty). The rationale for each judgment is provided below. (In a few cases equal weight was given to two or more policies not because there was reason to believe they were equally significant either politically or
theoretically, but simply because there was no reason to think they were unequal).

**Survival vs. security concerns:** Survival was considered moderately more important than security, first of all, because at least South Korean survey data showed greater concern with the economy than with security issues, and one can assume that North Koreans may feel similarly give the declining state of their economy. Second, by contrast both governments give more emphasis on security. I chose to weight the public concerns for economic well-being more heavily for several reasons: (1) both governments will tend to follow public opinion in the long run due to the changed international situation (detente and decline of Russian pressure); (2) most integration theorists suggest the primacy, as does Maslow, of economic necessity.

**Survival vs. affiliation concerns:** public surveys in South Korea and Deutsch share the view that the pluralistic security community (PSC) approach is very helpful because of its emphasis on building communication and transaction structures for inter-Korean development, thus helping to solve the survival problem as well as maintaining peace and security through improved communications. I thought that solving the survival problem through a "PSC" strategy was strongly more important than an immediate affiliation strategy for the reason that social and cultural communication and transactions
Table 6. Scale for Pairwise Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Equal importance</td>
<td>Two attributes contribute identically to the objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moderate dominance</td>
<td>Experience or judgement slightly favors one attribute over another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Strong dominance</td>
<td>Experience or judgement strongly favors one attribute over another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Demonstrated dominance</td>
<td>An attribute's dominance is demonstrated in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Extreme dominance</td>
<td>The evidence favoring an attribute over another is affirmed to the highest possible order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,4,6,8</td>
<td>Intermediate values</td>
<td>Further subdivision or compromise is needed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A: Intensity of importance on an absolute scale  
B: Definition  
C: Explanation

Do not seem likely to achieve the goal of unification without economic exchanges in the early stages.

**Survival vs. self-esteem concerns:** Public opinion data indicates that South Korean people believe that economic aid to North Korea was necessary for North Korea's survival. President Roh Tae Woo explicitly considered self-esteem in a speech on inter-Korean relations (using the concept as Maslow did) arguing that economic assistance would improve mutual self-esteem. I accepted public opinion in rating survival as very strongly more important than self-esteem because mutual self-esteem cannot be achieved without survival. Economic aid will at least solve food problems in North Korea and help
create mutual respect at a people-to-people level, which is also consistent with President Roh's views.

**Survival vs. self-actualization concerns:** Survival was extremely more important than self-actualization. Chadwick has put an emphasis on achieving democracy and social justice, but I gave top priority to survival because self-fulfillment needs cannot be achieved without solving survival needs.

**Security vs. affiliation concerns:** Security was moderately more important than affiliation. In comparing the current military power of the two Koreas and recalling North Korea's terrorist activities against the South, at present, South Korea's peace and security is more threatened than North Korea's in the sense that a possibility of war started by South Korea is low, but by North Korea is relatively higher as long as jingoistic political leaders are alive in North Korea. The masses and government of South Korea do not anticipate belongingness and love with North Koreans under the present competitive situation. So I agree with public opinion emphasizing security more than affiliation.

**Security vs. self-esteem concerns:** Guetzkow stressed security, and Maslow considered security to be strongly more important than self-esteem. Consistent with their views I considered that security was strongly more important than self-esteem because the two rival governments regard each other as enemies. Mutual respect cannot be expected between
North and South Korea until survival and security needs are met.

**Security vs. self-actualization concerns:** Maslow had a greater concern with security than self-actualization. I agreed with him, and deemed that security was very strongly more important than self-actualization because Koreans do not feel free to do as they wish and will not as long as they do not free from attack.

**Affiliation vs. self-esteem concerns:** The application of Coplin's approach and public opinion data suggested that unification could be achieved when all residents of North and South heartily accommodate, recognize, negotiate, and respect each other. But without widespread communication and transaction between them, they cannot learn to hold each other in mutual esteem. So I followed public opinion and Deutsch, and judged that affiliation was moderately more important than both self- and mutual esteem.

**Affiliation vs. self-actualization concerns:** Affiliation was strongly more important than self-actualization. I followed Deutsch in the "PSC" approach of improving relationships between the totalitarian North and the authoritarian South because regimes do not accept social justice as a greater requirement for government performance than political stability.

**Self-esteem vs. self-actualization concerns:** Self-esteem was moderately more important than self-actualization. The
North Korean government advocated recognition of each other's political system and ideology based on mutual respect for political unification. Kleinjans stressed cultural unification through the marketplace, which would meet people's survival needs, and hence contribute to national unification. I thought the North Korean approach would precede Kleinjans' in the sense that political unification would precede national unification.

So far, only branches or factors (here, Maslow's needs checklist as adapted to the Korean situation) were compared to one another for their relative importance. Turning to Table 7, below, these factors are shown as "level 1" along with the weights that were assigned by the AHP method as a result of the previous pairwise comparisons. "Leaf nodes" (level 3, Table 7) are acting which are compared within each branch or subgoal (level 2, Table 7), to decide which is a relatively preferable strategy with respect to the other, given one of Maslow's values or subgoals (level 1). This is the final and most crucial stage of the "AHP" process wherein priorities are assigned to strategies for implementation. Comparisons of the relative importance of strategies with respect to each subgoal are made pairwise; and as before with values, each judgments is made in as realistically as possible.

Survival level 2: North Korea needs economic transactions with South Korea and other advanced countries but is hesitant due to a possible backlash coming from its opening up. North
Table 7. Sorted Details for Sorted Synthesis of Leaf Nodes with Respect to GOAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL 1</th>
<th>LEVEL 2</th>
<th>LEVEL 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SURVIVAL = 0.513</td>
<td>ECON EXC = 0.385</td>
<td>NSK ECEX = 0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NK EE WC = 0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SK EE CC = 0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ECON AID = 0.128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EA JA NK = 0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EA SK NK = 0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EA RS NK = 0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EA C NK = 0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY = 0.261</td>
<td>ALIA NSK = 0.175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALIA SK = 0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALIA NK = 0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PR US SK = 0.063</td>
<td>PR US GR = 0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PR US AF = 0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ME NSK = 0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NU FR ZO = 0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AB UN FO = 0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARMS RED = 0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WT US FO = 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TR AR PE = 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFILIAT = 0.129</td>
<td>PEACE = 0.086</td>
<td>NU FR ZO = 0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AB UN FO = 0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARMS RED = 0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WT US FO = 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TR AR PE = 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRANSACT = 0.021</td>
<td>SOC TRS = 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CUL TRS = 0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POL TRS = 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMMUNIC = 0.021</td>
<td>AB IELAW = 0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FREE V&amp;C = 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>REU FAMI = 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SM DLNSK = 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ACCOMODA = 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NEG BARG = 0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7--Continued

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{SELF-EST} & = 0.063 \\
& \begin{array}{ccc}
\text{SELF-ACT} & = 0.033 \\
\text{ANB NSK} & = 0.021 & \text{ACCOMODA} & = 0.011 \\
\text{RESPECT} & = 0.021 & \text{NEG BARG} & = 0.011 \\
\text{REC PSI} & = 0.021 & \text{SK RS NK} & = 0.011 \\
\text{REC PS} & = 0.011 & \text{NK RS SK} & = 0.011 \\
\text{REC PI} & = 0.011 & \text{SOJ JUST} & = 0.014 \\
\text{SOC JUST} & = 0.014 & \text{AB FR AL} & = 0.005 \\
\text{FREEDOM} & = 0.005 & \text{EQ NSK} & = 0.004 \\
\text{DEMOCRAC} & = 0.014 & \text{MASS PAR} & = 0.007 \\
\text{EQ R&P} & = 0.007 & \text{RECTIFIC} & = 0.005 \\
\text{RECT CON} & = 0.003 & \text{RECT CHR} & = 0.00095 \\
\text{RECT BUD} & = 0.00095 & \\
\end{array}
\end{align*}
\]

(All acronyms of leaf nodes in Level 3 are fully depicted in Table 8).

Korea cannot solve its survival problems without giving up her self-reliance policy. Thus "economic exchange with all countries" (ECON EXC) is more important than "economic aid to North Korea" (ECON AID).

Survival level 3: (a) "North and South economic exchange" (NSK ECEX) is moderately to strongly more important than both "North Korea's economic exchange with Western countries" (NK EE WC) and "South Korea's economic exchange with Communist countries" (SK EE CC) for the reason that inter-Korean economic transactions give the two Koreas more benefits in
tariffs and transport costs than international trade does; (b) "NK EE WC" is equally as important as "SK EE CC" because it provides the same opportunity for both sides to approach their respective unfriendly nations; (c) "Japan's economic aid to North Korea" (EA JA NK) is strongly more important than "economic aid from Russia and China" (EA RS NK, EA C NK) because Japan is expected to make much larger contributions in the future; and it is moderately more important than "South Korea's economic aid to North Korea" (EA SK NK) because South Korea has both political and economic objective, and so such aid are depended on the political process and outcome; (d) "EA RS NK" is equally as important as "EA C NK" because consumption standards in North Korea could be at least maintained by the help of both Russia and China; (e) "EA SK NK" is moderately more important than "EA RS NK" and "EA C NK" because North Korea cannot expect sufficient economic aid from both Russia and China in the future because of their current economic disaster.

Security level 2: It has also made the two Koreas more reliant on their friendly and powerful nations than in the past, especially both politically and militarily. It is thus likely for both to overcome their military encounter by depending largely upon their allies for their national security. Thus "maintaining alliances of North and South Korean security communities for their respective security" (ALIA NSK) is moderately more important than "continuing
presence of U.S. military forces in the peninsula" (PR US SK); and is very strongly more important than "military equilibrium between North and South Korea" (ME NSK).

**Security Level 3:** "ROK-US alliance" (ALLA SK) is more important than "DPRK-Russia and DPRK-PRC alliances" (ALLA NK) because the United States is thousands of miles away from Korea, whereas Russia and China are neighbor with the northern border of Korea.

**Security Level 2:** "Presence of U.S. military forces in the peninsula" (PR US SK) is moderately more important than "military equilibrium between North and South Korea" (ME NSK) in that the withdrawal of the US military forces break up the military balance between North and South Korea, thereby would increase the risk of North Korea's attack.

**Security Level 3:** "Presence of the US Ground Forces in the peninsula" (PR US GF) is more important than "presence of the US Air Forces (PR US AF) because in the event of war, the US air power from Japan, Guam, and Philippine would swiftly support South Korea.

**Affiliation Level 2:** The war situation limits transactions and communication between North and South Korea. So "to stabilize peace in the peninsula" (PEACE) is moderately to strongly more important than both "social and cultural transactions between North and South Korea" (TRANSACT) and "communication between two Koreas" (COMMUNIC).
Affiliation Level 3: (a) "Establishment of nuclear-free-zone" (NU FR ZO) is moderately more important than "formal abandonment of unification strategy by force" (AB UN FO); is strongly more important than "proportionate arms reduction between North and South Korea" (ARMS RED); and is very strongly more important than both "withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea if peace guarantee" (WT US FO) and "transition from armistice condition to peace" (TR AR PE), because North Korea's development of nuclear weapon accelerates the arms race and threatens neighboring countries (especially South Korea and Japan); (b) North Korea has not given up unification policy by force—to overthrow the South Korean regime through subversion and infiltration and to unify Korea under communism. So "formal abandonment of unification strategy by force" (AB UN FO) is moderately more important than "ARMS RED"; and is strongly more important than both "WT US FO" and "TR AR PE"; (c) "ARMS RED" is moderately more important than both "WT US FO" and "TR AR PE" because a good relationships between North and South may produce mutual arms reduction, but cannot guarantee peace of South Korea; (d) "WT US FO" is equally as important as "TR AR PE" because when South Korea feels peace is at hand, she will agree on the pullout of the US military force and sign a peace agreement.

Affiliation Level 2: "COMMUNIC" is equally as important as "TRANSACT" because once Korean people contact and talk with
each other and begin a process of multi-faceted cooperation, they will extend their transactions to other areas.

Affiliation Level 3: (a) "Abolition of ineffective law against each other" (AB IELAW) is equally to moderately more important than both "free visits and correspondence" (FREE V&C) and "reunion of dispersed families" (REU FAMI) because the former makes possible the latter two; and is moderately more important than "North-South summit and political leaders' dialogue" (SM DLNSK) because the former may produce good results at the summit; (b) "FREE V&C" is equally to moderately more important than "SM DLNSK" because the former would tend to reduce the widening culture gap between the Koreas, although Pyongyang leaders will not promise the former so as not to widely open its society; and it is equally as important as "REU FAMI" because both are the same goal of the separate families; (c) "REU FAMI" is equally to moderately more important than "SM DLNSK" because the former is urgent to these families, but Pyongyang leaders will not allow the former.

Affiliation Level 3: (a) "Social transaction" (SOC TRS) is equally as important as "cultural transaction" (CUL TRS), for both contribute to improve inter-Korean relationships; (b) Both "SOC TRS" and "CUL TRS" are moderately to strongly more important than "political transactions" (POL TRS), for low-level contacts between the two sides will bring about political cooperation and transaction.
Self- and mutual esteem Level 2: When the two Koreas feel a sense of community in Korea for a long time, Deutsch's "PSC" would suggest that political unification can be achieved via political processes. "Accommodation, negotiation, and bargaining between North and South Korea" (ANB NSK) is assured to be equally as important as both "respect for each other as people apart from system" (RESPECT) and "recognition of each other's political system and ideology" (REC PSI).

Self- and mutual esteem Level 3: (a) "Accommodation to each other's proposal" (ACCOMODA) is equally as important as "negotiating and bargaining on unification matters" (NEG BARG) because both are needed for political process to unification; (b) "South Korea's respect to North Korea" (SK RS NK) is equally as important as "North Korea's respect to South Korea" (NK RS SK) because they do not believe each other without mutual respect; (c) "Recognition each other's political system" (REC PS) is equally as important as "recognition of each other's political ideology" (REC PI) because both are important to recognize each other's existence as necessary for negotiation.

Self-actualization Level 2: "Social justice" (SOC JUST) is moderately more important than "rectification for oneness" (RECTIFIC) because when a government rules as its people with justice, the people try to become one; and is equally as important as "to rule by the principle of democracy"
(DEMOCRAC) because both work for reducing people's frustration and alienation.

Self-actualization Level 3: (a) "Abolition of frustration and alienation" (AB FR AL) is equally as important as both "equality of northerners and southerners" (EQ NSK) and "to guarantee freedom of all constituent" (FREEDOM) because all of them are possible in a good society; (b) "EQ NSK" is equally as important as "FREEDOM" because the southerners will seek for more equality and the northerners more freedom.

Self-actualization Level 2: "DEMOCRAC" is moderately more important than "RECTIFIC" because when the people feel that a government is democratic, people tend to follow the government and wish to remain as its constituents and to become one.

Self-actualization Level 3: (a) "Mass participation in election, politics, etc." (MASS PAR) is equally as important as "formal equality of rights and privileges" (EQ R&P) because both give the people an opportunity to join a society; (b) "Rectification by Confucianism" (RECT CON) is moderately more important than "rectification by Christianity and Buddhism" (RECT CHR, RECT BUD) because ethical principles of the North and the South based on Confucianism are similar; (c) "RECT CHR" is equally as important as "RECT BUD" because both religions prevail in South Korea, but not in North Korea, and neither will be easily accepted by North Koreans.
Table 8. Priority of Leaf Nodes with Respect to Unification of Korea

OVERALL INCONSISTENCY INDEX = 0.04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaf Node</th>
<th>Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSK ECEX (0.256)</td>
<td>North and South economic exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIA SK (0.098)</td>
<td>ROK-US alliance for ROK security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALIA NK (0.077)</td>
<td>DPRK-Russia and DPRK-PRC alliances for DPRK security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA JA NK (0.072)</td>
<td>Japan's economic aid to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK EE WC (0.064)</td>
<td>North Korea's economic exchange with Western countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK EE CC (0.064)</td>
<td>South Korea's economic exchange with Communist countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU FR ZO (0.056)</td>
<td>establishment of nuclear-free-zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR US GF (0.043)</td>
<td>presence of US Ground Forces in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA SK NK (0.032)</td>
<td>South Korea's economic aid to DPRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB UN FO (0.028)</td>
<td>formal abandonment of unification strategy by force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PR US AF (0.021)</td>
<td>presence of the US Air Forces in South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMS RED (0.013)</td>
<td>proportionate arms reduction between North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCOMODA (0.013)</td>
<td>accommodation to each other's proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEG BARG (0.013)</td>
<td>negotiating and bargaining on unification matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA RS NK (0.012)</td>
<td>Russia's economic aid to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA C NK (0.012)</td>
<td>China's economic aid to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK RS NK (0.011)</td>
<td>South Korea's respect to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK RS SK (0.011)</td>
<td>North Korea's respect to South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC PS (0.011)</td>
<td>recognition of each other's political system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC PI (0.011)</td>
<td>recognition of each other's political ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC TRS (0.010)</td>
<td>social transaction between North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUL TRS (0.010)</td>
<td>cultural transaction between North and South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASS PAR (0.007)</td>
<td>mass participation in election, politics, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQ R&amp;P (0.007)</td>
<td>formal equality of rights and privileges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB IELAW (0.007)</td>
<td>abolition of ineffective law against each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WT US FO (0.006)</td>
<td>withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea if peace guarantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR AR PE (0.006)</td>
<td>transition from armistice condition to peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8--Continued

| AB FR AL (0.005)  | abolition of frustration and alienation |
| FREEDOM (0.005)   | to guarantee freedom of all constituents |
| EQ NSK (0.004)    | equality of northerners and southerners |
| FREE V&C (0.004)  | free visits and correspondence |
| REU FAMI (0.004)  | reunion of dispersed families |
| RECT CON (0.003)  | rectification by Confucianism |
| POL TRS (0.002)   | political transactions |
| SM DLNSK (0.002)  | North-South summit and political leaders' dialogue |
| RECT CHR (0)      | rectification by Christianity |
| RECT BUD (0)      | rectification by Buddhism |

The results in Table 7 are reordered in Table 8, so that it becomes clear what policies should be given greatest emphasis and what least emphasis, according to the considerations presented so far. For example, first priority should be given to "North and South economic exchange," second to "ROK-US alliance for ROK security," third to "DPRK-Russia and DPRK-PRC alliances for DPRK security," for reasons already stated above. These will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

It should be noted that the intermediate factors or subgoals (level 2, Table 7) could be compared for their importance to more than one of Maslow's factors (level 1), as could (in principle) any of the policy options shown in level 3 with respect to any level 2 subgoal. In fact it will be noted that many of the policy options under "affiliation" also appear under security when they clearly had a dual impact. In
a realistic analysis, many such possible comparisons are likely to be overlooked because of numerous factors such as the absence of a systematic methodology such as AHP, simple oversight, or intentionally due to lack of time, personal bias or hidden agendas. However, my own normative conclusion is that (1) the present level of complicating is an improvement over traditional decision-making methods and (2) it exemplifies a process which should be implemented in situations where present negotiating practices contribute to the difficulty of negotiating.
CONCLUDING REMARKS (PART IV)

Up to now, the modeling of peaceful Korean reunification has been based mainly on Maslow's five-step hierarchical structure of human needs: survival, security, belongingness and love, self-esteem, and self-actualization. Each step was applied in a decision-making simulation model of the unification process. The preliminary correlatives are summed up:

Table 9. Adaptation of Maslow's Hierarchical Approach

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maslow</th>
<th>Adaptation to Korean Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>physiological needs</td>
<td>survival of the individual (especially survival of North Korean people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safety, security</td>
<td>the provision of negative security (particularly, security of South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belongingness, love</td>
<td>building &quot;security community&quot; with love, affection, transactions and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-esteem</td>
<td>responsibility for other's security, and building a politically unified nation with esteem or respect, and esteem for the other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-actualization</td>
<td>fulfillment of the above responsibilities as a national goal, as well as individual needs gratification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The value of using Maslow's framework in the contexts of IKS, PSC, PRINCE, and AHP exercises is to develop and evaluate strategies for Korean unification. The recommendations are not only substantive regarding strategy, but also procedural
regarding decision-making processes which transcend cultural and political biases, and can be expected to help overcome many of the misperceptions and incomplete perceptions of the two Koreas and the major powers involved the region. Specifically, the IKS (Inter-Korean Simulation) made possible for each side to "game out" or simulate survival and security issue. The PSC (pluralistic security community) concept provided a goal for affiliation and unification discussions between the Koreas. The PRINCE (Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute) analytic scheme of specifying and evaluating issues and anticipating likely outcomes or pressures for certain outcomes. And the AHP (analytic hierarchy process) provided a process for organizing an overall plan and a strategy synthesizing all of the above results.
NOTES--PART IV


CHAPTER 9


2. Ibid.


5. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 46.

6. Ibid., 46.


23. Anthony Daniels, "Anti-Imperialist Solidarity," Spectator, 22 July 1989. President Kim wished for making "the festival a substitute for the Olympic Games which South Korea hosted last year and use it as a platform to attack the forces of imperialism" (Jasper Becker, "Foreign Invasion will Challenge North Korea," Guardian, 31 March 1989).


25. Urban C. Lehner, "North Koreans Hide Poverty behind Showcase Projects," Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1989. The newspaper explains it in detail: North Korea was said to owe a group of Western banks 1.4 billion West German marks ($725.9 million), and by one Scandinavian estimate it owes Swedish companies 700 million kronor ($108.9 million) and Finnish companies 60 million markkaa ($14.1 million). The other source says, "It owes $700 million to the Soviet Union, $300 million to China, $250 million to Australia and several hundred million dollars more to other Western European nations" (Michael Breen, "Feet Shuffle to Regimental Beat in City of Emptiness," Washington Times, 3 May 1989).


32. Louise do Rosario, "Iron First Relaxes," Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 27 April 1989, 33. It is reported that basic needs in food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and education appeared to be taken care of, but that food for the ordinary person lacked variety and most consumer products are insufficient and costly.

33. The statement of Rodong Shinmun editorial was partly cited by Ralph N. Clough, Embattled Korea: The Rivalry for International Support (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 158. The editorial continued "If all people's consumer goods plants—the grain-processing plants, duckling plants, chicken plants, pig plants, and those of many other daily necessities, food and clothing plants—which we have set up through the arduous struggle of self-reliance are put into full operation, we can solve any problem including that of oil and meat."


35. Ibid.


38. Ibid.


45. Pyongyang worries that the international division of labor may bring forth chauvinist tendencies under which economically powerful states may control small states to frustrate self-reliant and comprehensive development of their economies.


47. Young Lee, "Korean Political Development in Perspective":447.


55. According to Stephenson, "positive security is attained in terms of satisfying such human basic needs as air, water, food, clothing, and shelter needed for human survival, and negative security includes protection from crime, from physical abuse, and defense from attack" (Carolyn M. Stephenson, "Alternative International Security Systems," in Alternative Methods for International Security, 32). Through her book, she asserts that objectively, there is no security, and suggests some alternative methods for international security such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration, world law and organization, and non-violent civilian defense. For more discussions, see also Ibid., 29-34.


57. Maurice A. East defines small powers with four conditions: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP (or other measures of total productive capability, and (4) a low level of military capability, in "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics 25 (July 1973): 557. Robert O. Keohane distinguishes a small power from a great power, and from a middle power, in "Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics," International Organization 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 296.


61. Patricia Mische, "Re-Visioning Nation Security: Toward a Viable World Security System," in Alternative Methods for International Security, 74. He also provides some alternative methods for international security. They are: (1) Education or consciousness-raising; (2) Global structures and mechanisms related to law, adjudication, verification and compliance, based on mutually accepted values and goals; (3) Transitional Strategies or steps to get from here to there. For more details. Ibid., 75-80.

62. Dean G. Acheson, "Crisis in Asia--An Examination of U.S. Policy," The Department of State Bulletin 22, no. 551 (January 23, 1950), 111-16. A similar view comes from recently a specialist at the Cato Institute, declaring that "the Korean


65. The first tunnel was founded on Nov. 15, 1974, the second, on March 19, 1975, the third, on Oct. 17, 1978, and the fourth, on March 3, 1990. According to the UN Command, the North Koreans had dug or were digging as many as ten undiscovered additional tunnels under the DMZ. See, for example, Washington Post, 27 May 1975; Clough, Embattled Korea, 106; Jungang Ilbo, 4 March 1990; "Existence of 4th N.K. Tunnel Confirmed," Korea Newsreview, 10 March 1990.


68. Washington Times, 7 June 1988. The North Korea's acquisition from the Soviet Union of MiG-23 aircraft in 1985, MiG-29 aircraft in 1988, and newer SA-2s, SA-3s, and SA-5a significantly enhances their air defense and intercept capabilities (Louis C. Menetrey, "Statement by US Army Commander, US Forces, Korea, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 1, no. 2 (Winter 1989): 244. The Washington times, quoting Pentagon sources, said the Soviet-made SA-5 surface-to-air missiles with a range of 300km were installed at four sites about 60km north of the DMZ, less than 105km from Seoul.

69. Menetrey, "Statement by US Army Commander...":244.


76. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 122.

77. Ibid., 43.

78. Ibid., 44.


80. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 45.


82. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 45.


87. Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 72-73.


CHAPTER 10

1. Harold Guetzkow is the first person to develop simulation theory, representing a laboratory environment, human subjects, and analyzing programmed and unprogrammed assumptions and hypotheses about decision making process.


14. The flag of the Soviet Union fell to the ground in the end of 1991, so now Russia has become a major core national actor.


16. Basic capability is that the nation's overall capability to produce the industrial sectors—e.g., its primary (agriculture, forestry, and fishing), secondary (mostly manufacturing), and tertiary (commerce, finance, transport, and services). It can be made the best use of pleasing consumption needs and wants. A variety of physical resources endowment (its land, minerals, and other raw materials) and its endowment of human resources (i.e., both numbers of people and their level of skill) are included as basic capabilities for satisfaction of survival needs in the two Koreas. For the
most part, large size of a country's accumulation of basic capabilities tends to be comparatively advantaged than small size, and to be lesser dependent on foreign sources of materials and products.

17. Guetzkow, "The Inter-Nation Simulation," 41. The equation of maximum consumption standards in the programmed variable developed by him. For equation, he provides two core variables. First one is Basic Capability (BC). The second one is Generation Rates. It indicates that "the rates at which basic capabilities allocated to different sectors of the economy generate (with a lag of one period) new basic capability units, for capability units, and consumption satisfaction units." Ibid., 40-41.

18. Ibid., 42.


24. Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 151. He stresses that in a "bitter-end" conflict, human survival in a losing position is in danger, but in a "joint-survival" conflict, neither side can permanently remove of its enemy, examining such war precedents as WWII, the Himalaya War between India and China in 1962, the wars between India and Pakistan in 1964 and 1971, and the cold war between the US and the USSR, 1945-1972. For more analysis, see Ibid., 133.

26. This was given by Guetzkow, "The Inter-Nation Simulation," 43.


28. The Seoul government cannot make a war without the certain concurrence and the ample military assistance from the U.S. in a sense that the whole Korean military forces are under the control of the ROK-U.S. Joint Command of which commander is the US general. Although North Korea is not fully free from the rule of Russia and PRC, either, she has her own decision-making right to go to a war.


32. According to Silviu Brucan, anti-Kim soldiers tried to assassinate North Korean great leader Kim, Il Sung, first, before December, 1986, and second, May, 1987 at around Sinuiju after Kim's visit to Peking. More recently, there are at least six North Korean high-ranked dissidents against Kim and his first son. Junior Kim indicated in Kulloja that there are dangerous figures in KWP organization. This was reported in Chosun Ilbo, Aug. 13, 1990; New York Times, 1 July 1990; Tae-Jin Oh, Chosun Ilbo, 19 June 1990; Jong Il Kim, Kulloja, Oct. 1990.

Similarly, Loengrin Eremenko, head of the Soviet Consular Department in Seoul, said that he believes "an increasing number of north Koreans, including those in the military, are
beginning to disobey Kim Il Sung's leadership" ("N.K. Unlikely to Start Solo Invasion: Eremenko," Korea Newsreview, 22 Sept. 1990, 8).

33. Korea Central Daily of Hawaii, 1 June 1990. Since Kim Jong Il emerged from the shadows to become the publicly acknowledged heir to the throne, at the Sixth Congress of the party in October 1980, he was named to fourth position in the presidium of the Politburo, second position in the Party Secretariat, and third position in the Military Commission, he has fortified his position to heir the throne. At last, he was in a second ranking in KWP and North Korean administration on May, 1990, named publicly "the dear comrade leader." For more details on Kim Jong Il's power succession, see also, Nam-Sik Kim, "North Korea's Power Structure and Foreign Policy: An Analysis of the Sixth Congress of the KWP," The Journal of East Asian Affairs 2, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1982): 125-151; Clough, Embattled Korea, op. cit., 140-48; Sung Chul Yang, "A Study of North Korea's Ruling Elite, 1946-1990 (II)--Based on a Background Analysis of the Members of the Korean Workers's Party Central Committee," Vantage Point 14, no. 5 (May 1991): 2-32; Young Koo Cha and Taeho Kim, "Prospects for Political Change and Leadership Succession in North Korea," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 2, no. 2 (Winter 1991): 231-34.


35. In actuality, Kim Il Sung's desirability of transfer power to his son is daunted from most of all Communist nations in a sense that it generally transgresses the Communist tenet, although Moscow and Peking seemingly agreed to it. In this context, the prospect for heir-designate, even though Junior Kim has almost completed removing the potential antagonistic powers that have downgraded and challenged tacitly his political authority, and argued strongly against his succession, is not certain.


41. Many believe that North Korea may attack South Korea so long as US military forces are completely withdrawn from the Korean soil, recalling the wrong decision-making of the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in 1949, which ended in North Korea's invasion to South Korea with the military help of the Soviet Russia the ambition of which reached the occupation of the whole Korean peninsula to expand its power in the Far East.


50. Ibid., 121.

52. Ibid., 313.

53. There are four general functions of alliances: (1) aggregation of power; (2) interallied control or restraint of allies, (3) promotion of international order; and (4) internal security. See George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 23-26; Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 21-22. Liska continually depicts the principal motives of great powers to enter into alliances: (1) aggregation or addition; (2) diversion; and (3) disguise of power and its exercise, in Ibid., 24-26. According to Suhrke, the great power's motives are: (1) a desire to control the activities of the small state; (2) a desire to deny the small power's territory to an adversary; (3) a wish to support the "legitimacy" of a particular government; and (4) an attempt to impress third parties by maintaining that particular alliance in Astri Suhrke "Gratunity or Tyranny: The Korean Alliances," *World Politics* 25, no. 4 (July 1973): 509. Liska (pp. 27-29), by contrast, argues that the motives of small powers to ally with great powers can be those of security, stability, and status.

54. Guetzkow, "The Inter-Nation Simulation," 56.


58. The Korea-Japan Basic Relations Treaty which, though it is not a defense agreement, encourages mutual cooperation between them, and will evolve bilateral collaboration and perhaps coalition relation in time of war with a view to blocking the expansionism of Communist countries in Northeast Asia.
59. Heinz Eulau and James G. March, "What Political Science is about," in Reading in Contemporary Political Science, ed. The Korean Political Science Association (Seoul: Parkyoungsa, 1974), 29. Take an example, if the Soviet Russia becomes the leading expansionist power in the region, the other global powers--the United States, China, and Japan--will act all together against it to contain its power expansion in the region. This coalition would be conceived of as no more than impermanent; however, provided China becomes the strongest power there in some day, it seems quite likely that the U.S., Japan, and the Soviet Union form an anti-China coalition. This is one of the big powers' paramount maneuver to keep equilibrium or to frustrate even a little likelihood of a war in advance in the area.


61. Sang Rhee, Security and Unification of Korea, 236.


63. This equation was also developed by Guetzkow in INS. See Ibid., 30.

64. Ibid., 31, 33.

65. Ibid., 32.

66. Guetzkow, "The Inter-Nation Simulation," 34.


68. It would be wrong to guess that Kim Il Sung is on the edge of a cliff, and to compare with the ill-fated Nicolae Ceaucescu. In political terms, first, he fought the Japanese military for national liberation in the colonial era; and founded the country with the support of the Soviet Union, creating the army. He also has managed to thwart the Soviets and Chinese from butting into internal affairs and his secretive leadership, and so externally, he has survived by playing two big Communist powers off against each other for a long time. Furthermore, Kim like Sadam Husein of Iraq reinforced his throne through purging or killing his major rivals in the 1950s' and 1960s'. For these reasons, Kim remains as the world's longest-surviving monolithic totalitarian leader firmly controlling the levers of power.


73. The rising tensions and public discontent in North Korea against its government's economic policies have been observed recently by the frequent visitors to North Korea. See *The Economist*, 15 April 1989, 38; *North Korea News*, 30 Oct. 1989, 2.

74. Silviu Brucan is a professor of social science and a former editor and diplomat in the Government of Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of Rumania who was overthrown and executed in December, 1989. He visited on a trip to North Korea sponsored by the Soviet Union of Journalists, in which he found North Korea dissenters such as high-ranking officials and students arguing against Kim Il Sung's policy of political and social isolation. For further discussions on this, see Bill Keller, "Romanian is Advising North Korea Dissenters," *New York Times*, 1 July 1990; Tae-Jin Oh, *Chosun Ilbo*, 19 June 1990.

75. Pyongyang does not want to change its economic policy. Li Myong So, a professor at the Academy of Social science in Pyongyang, adds, "We have our superior economic management system; we don't need to apply what other countries are doing." Louise do Rosario, "Iron First Relaxes," *FEER*, 27 April 1989, 32-33.

77. See, for example, Y. Mikheyev, "The DPRK's Regional Economic Relations," Far Eastern Affairs 2 (1989), 66-75.


79. Gyoo Kahng, "North Korea in the Era of Decaying Communism": 71. It is also reported that "the $150 million to be given North Korea by Beijing under an economic cooperation accord would be used to buy meat, vegetables and other food over the coming five years" ("Rice Shortage in N.K.", Naewoe Economic Daily. Quoted by Korea Newsreview, 9 Feb. 1991, 34).


CHAPTER 11


4. According to Roger W. Cobb and Charles Elder, "Shared political values seem to have little or no influence on any other form of transactional intercourse" (International Community: A Regional and Global Study [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970], 94).


7. Ibid., 36.


18. As a pragmatic path toward further process of the peaceful Korean unification, in the 2 + 3 power simulation, the idea of full-fledged "cross-recognition," in which ROK and DPRK do mutually recognize each other's government; and the United States and Japan accept an actual recognition of DPRK, on one hand; PRC, of ROK, on the other hand. More recently, the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe countries already recognized ROK. In response to Moscow's action, Japan has in mind of recognizing and forming formal diplomatic relation with DPRK for political and economic purposes, if Pyongyang accepts the nuclear safety inspection.

Besides, cross-recognition will not only have various advantages in political processes in decision-making on Korean unification, but will also enhance understanding between the powers concerned and the two Koreas. For one thing, diplomatic missions in Seoul and Pyongyang as well as in Washington, Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking respectively will also make possible direct, frequent conversations between their diplomats, not simply improving understanding of each other's behaviors, attitudes, and policies, but also reducing the scope for miscalculation.


26. Ibid. RA was first used as the measurement indicator of levels of a variety of social transactions within the sphere of Western Europe. Analyzing these transactions, Deutsch and others draw the conclusion that "structural" integration, "the daily mass behavior of its populations and economies," in the European Community augmented in 1954, culminated in 1958, and truly declined in the period of 1958-1963. Karl W. Deutsch et al., France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics (New York: Chas. Schribner's Sons, 1967), 215, 218.


30. Ibid.


33. Taylor et al., Managing Crises, 30.


36. Clough, Embattled Korea, 364.


CHAPTER 12


3. Rosenau depicts the linkages of internal and external influences in detail: "The fused linkage arises out of the possibility that certain outputs and inputs continuously reinforce each other and are thus best viewed as forming a reciprocal relationship. Fused linkage is conceived to be a sequence in which an output fosters an input that in turn fosters an output in such a way that they cannot meaningfully be analyzed separately." James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969), 49.


8. For an explanation of testable propositions in international relations, see Bruce L. Riddle et al., International Relations Education Project: International Relations Theory through PRINCE: A Workbook (Syracuse, New York: International Relations Program Maxwell School, Syracuse University, July 1973).

9. Ibid., 83.

10. Ibid.


19. The French weekly, L'Express, 11 Oct. 1990. This was reported in Hankook Ilbo, 16 Oct. 1990. Translation is from Dae Suh, "Changes in North Korea and Inter-Korean Relations": 623.


28. Ibid., 207, 213-27.


32. Ibid., 69.


37. In particular, on the part of China, from the bitter lesson of Vietnamese communization, she feels uneasy about that a united communized Korea would be pro-Russia. Moscow
also worries a unified Korea to be pro-China as a result of the recent improved relations between China and North Korea. That is, two great powers evenly fear that the trend of a united Korea by either pro-China or pro-Russia perhaps may lead to danger of Russia and China's security.


CHAPTER 13


CHAPTER 14
CONCLUSION

Let us begin this conclusion with a review of the key arguments presented in this thesis. Part I presented the theoretical contribution to political integration. In Chapter 1, political integration was conceptualized as the abolition of separate sovereign power of states without resort to violence or coercive force, by transformation of independent political units into a single territorial unit, and the formation of national identity by deliberate political decisions. But while governments such as North and South Korea may have the desire and authority to initiate integration, they may not necessarily have the economic, cultural, and social accord for realizing political integration. For this they may require mutual interdependence and interactions, cohesiveness, and strong ties with a sense of national unity.

In Chapter 2, Nye, Galtung, Etzioni and Deutsch's theoretical frameworks and approaches on integration were discussed. North, Koch, and Zinnes summarize this literature, enumerating six criteria by which one may measure the potential for integration: very low probability of violence given a conflict situation (similar to Deutsch's "security community"; the frequency of conflicts between any given number of organizations in a given span of time; the number of
compatible policy conditions; the degree of interdependency between given organizations; the number and significance of interlocking communications systems or structures; and the extent to which membership overlaps. ¹

However, non-violent methods in conflict resolution, compatibility of foreign policy, interdependency, and communication and transaction are almost completely absent in inter-Korean relations. As discussed, neither side can create a unified Korea without the authoritative support of the other side. Since national division, each of them has engaged in a typical zero-sum, cut-throat political game. Each side is exclusively concerned with its own external security and plays the game of achieving national unity according to its own rules, to win either by force or absorption. As Yang Sung Chul said, they are like two cars facing each other bumper-to-bumper, each wanting "to continue on down the road but neither able to do so because both refuse to go in any direction but straight ahead, the two Korean states want reunification but without having to compromise to achieve it." ²

In spite of these circumstances, it was generally hypothesized that levels of relative interaction which may lead to integration are promoted by the following factors from Chapter 1: homogeneity of common historical experience; social welfare values and their level of realization; high internal socio-economic development; internal political stability; military and economic power; and bureaucratic or
administrative capabilities. From this point of view, some of the integrative factors hypothesized by Jacob and Teune are present and supportive of Korean integration. There is geographical advantage by nature, and previous integrative experience. The two rival Koreas since 1990 have shared in the economic benefits of trade, a first step in the functional scheme. In contrast, there are negative elements as well. For example, mutual knowledge (cognitive and affective similarities) or understanding between the Koreans is missing because of differences in political socialization processes. Communal character or social motivation and social structure are not positive ingredients. And sovereignty-dependency status is also negative because the two divided regimes are completely independent sovereign states and antagonistic. Governmental ineffectiveness in both Koreas also works for disintegration rather than unification. Unfortunately, interaction (communication, and mobility) across national borders has been almost absent.

Decreasing homogeneity has a negative impact on the struggle for national unity. Religious, ethnic, cultural, and economic divergence since 1945 has contributed to the two Korea's further disintegration, and presumably continues to present obstacles to integration. Integration theories by and large suggest that Korean reunification is becoming increasingly less likely and more difficult due to this increasing divergence. However, this conclusion does not take
into account the problem facing most less developed countries, namely, economic survival to which Maslow gives highest priority. Thus we need theory which focuses less on the religions, cultural, and political factors and more on economic and survival factors such as Mitrany's, Nye's, Haas', and Balassa's (discussion in Chapters 1 and 4).

Expectations in developed and underdeveloped countries are different, and their approach to the goal of integration is also different. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, in many developing and underdeveloped countries, integration is viewed as a means to satisfying their citizens, i.e., for achieving high levels of human needs satisfaction. The expectations of those countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and most in Africa, Latin America, and Central America, are economic. They are much more interested in basic human needs concerns than political concerns, and so economic cooperation between nations in the sense of "association" is much more important. Such cooperation causes mutual benefit to happen through economic interdependence or dependence ensuing from the nature and direction of transactions.

On the other side, expectations of countries in western Europe have been more mixed (see Chapter 4). Their long-term perspective has been concerned with the notion of regional integration not only for the sake of economic, but also political, and even military advantage. To them, economic benefits have been high, and political and military important
but benefits mixed. Some wish that a fully integrated Europe, the United States of Europe, will appear. To the divided country of Korea, while the national goal is nominally political unification, economic gains and social and cultural regeneration are essential and expected to be obtained in the process.

Turning to Part II, a review was presented of North and South Korean policies and unification models. As Korea entered into a new world order in 1988, the Korean question went from global to regional, and from regional to local authority. The initiation of cooperation and development in non-political areas in the spirit of functionalism, and the five rounds of the Premier Talks in Seoul and Pyongyang on a neo-functionalist basis, could be epoch-making breakthroughs in inter-Korean relations (discussed in Chapter 5). The simultaneous U.N. admission in September 1991 could also inaugurate a new era in intra- and international relations. Imperfect as it may be, the separate memberships of the two Koreas in the United Nations is an important interim step on the road to national unification because it contributes to both regimes' self-esteem (interestingly President Roh and Maslow use the same terms here).

In particular, in the fifth round of Premier Talks in 1991, North and South Korea reached common agreements in principle in non-aggression, correspondence of separated families, exchanges in non-political areas, and cooperation in
political and military areas similar to development in relations between the Germanys in the 1950s. This was an epoch-making agreement and process in inter-Korean relations on a neo-functionalist basis as it helped reduce in some measure the frozen relations between them. However, although an agreement was reached in principle for non-aggression and various transactions in the talks, it is not certain that it will be put into practice. Skeptics are quick to point out the fact that the two rival Koreas issued a joint communiqué in July 1972, taking a pledge to terminate belligerence and make a concerted effort for unification by a non-violent means, but failed to achieve real progress and reconciliation. Mutual agreement can guarantee neither non-aggression nor a network of wide-ranging and high level communications and transactions. The agreement specifically excluded listening to radio and watching TV, exchanges of people, reunion of families and relatives, free travel, free visits, etc.

Based on the theories of integration (functionalism by South Korea, federalism by North Korea), the two different unification models as an interim stage were introduced through Chapter 6. The North Korea's "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" (DCRK) as a structure model is said to be designed for peaceful relations, but is bad because it would perhaps get into trouble in terms of South Korea's perception of its security needs. The South Korea's "the Korean Commonwealth" (KC) as a process model, on the other hand, is blamed by the
North Korean leadership as mainly modeled for security, not for unification. This implies not that the two models are not suitable for Korean reunification at all, but that they have not been received well by each of the Korean governments due to their different political systems and ideologies, and the intentions of each as perceived by the other. In short, the differences are more due to bargaining in bad faith than to heartfelt beliefs.

Turning to Part III, detailed discussion of Korean public opinion and leaders' policies and options were presented. Consistent with the public opinion polls and Seoul government, Chapter 7 described economic, and socio-cultural transactions. From their perspective, increased transactions and contacts between the two Koreas (low-level integration) can facilitate the development of political unification (high-level integration). Based on the public opinion surveys, Chapter 7 continued to present two components (democratization of Korea and recovery of homogeneity) for removing the barriers that impede national unification.

Chapter 8 provided for two alternatives (arms reduction and neutralization of Korea) to options based on public opinion. They have been depreciated by South Korea's people and government, but are still conceived as effective ways to achieve political unification by some South Korean scholars, college students, leftists, and Pyongyang leadership.
Under the present security environment, North Korea's unilateral offers for arms reduction and neutralization are neither realistic nor acceptable to South Korea owing to their divergent interests and security problems arising from past hot war and cold war phases in their relations, and owing to the relative military superiority of North Korea. Thus if North Korea really wants arms reduction and the removal of all U.S. military power there, she first will show her strong will and proper deportment toward peace.

Significantly, South Koreans and the Roh government did not themselves support a process similar to the absorptive unification the two Germanys took. In fact, the East German revolution is believed to have paved the way for West Germany to take over its eastern counterpart. Of course, the takeover could not have taken place without the motivation created by West Germany's economic affluence and socio-economic system and its well-developed political democracy. These cannot be found in South Korea's system. Simply put, the West German economic system was certainly superior to that of East Germany whereas South Korea's, though relatively superior to North Korea's by a similar ratio, is at about the same level as East Germany; this also highlights the reasoning behind the high priority given to economic exchange as a major step toward reunification in the next section.

In Part IV, models for Korean unification were designed. Chapter 9 took a normative approach following Maslow. The
greatest concern was to deal with those issues of urgency for the satisfaction of basic human needs in psychological terms. To reach the goal of unification, satisfaction of the lower level of basic human needs (survival and security) is essential; without it, one cannot think about the higher level human needs (affiliation, self-esteem, and self-actualization) associated with unification.

Chapter 10, following Guetzkow, regarded the satisfaction of basic needs as necessary to maintaining office-holding of decision-makers. I hypothesized that when people's overall satisfaction is high, "decision latitude" tends to be high. That is, "decision latitude," or a regime's policy sensitivity to the people's concerns increases as satisfaction increases, i.e., as basic needs are met. Ironically, suitably structured aid from South Korea, Japan, Russia, and China could enable North Korea to maintain her higher decision latitude and office-holding, yet require her to continue to thaw relations with the South, eventually causing a collapse in favor of democracy and a bloodless transition similar to Russia's.

"People's struggles" or revolutions at the end of the 20th century were caused in large measure by the failure of their regimes to solve food problems. This happened in China and most of post-war communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and will be expected in Russia and North Korea when they cannot maintain minimum consumption standards, thus leading to lower decision latitude. Thus the probability of an insurrection in
North Korea is expected to depend upon the degree of "validator satisfaction" with consumption standards, access to outside information, and sensitivity of the regime to people's basic needs.

Pyongyang decision-makers hesitate to open their society to the outside world including South Korea, so as not to expose its real substance to its people. The Pyongyang government sharply limits the information available to its 20 million people: they seem unaware, for example, of recent events in China. They hardly know what happened in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is said that only seven percent of North Korean people, mostly high-ranking officials, know the real detail about South Korea's development and acquire foreign information. Some project that when more than 30 percent of North Korea comprehends such true facts, essential changes can be expected. In the meantime, policies which aim at improving people to people relations (Maslow's higher basic needs) should be pursued at a low level but with little expectation of near term success (cf. Table 7 and 8, Chapter 13).

The establishment of a "PSC" as discussed in Chapter 11 following Deutsch, could be an effective alternative to the confederation model of the North, and to the Korean Commonwealth model of the South (discussed in Chapter 6). The first concern in this model was to stabilize the peace, easing the high level of tension in terms of disengagement or
detente; the second, to cooperate with each other in multilateral inter-Korean exchanges such as mail, family reunion, trade, visits, and so on, commonly seeking to solve their existing problems.

Chapter 12, following Coplin and others, used the PRINCE model (Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute) for actualizing full national unity via the "federalist" solution which was based on "balance of power" and "neutralization" theory. In retrospect, since the turn of century all of Korea's neighboring powers have attached importance to the potential for a whole Korea to expand its power in the Pacific area. But, after its division, all these powers and the USA have evidenced more concern with the security of Korea than with its occupation or rule because of a mutual fear that one of them would extend its power to this zone; thus they have all acted to keep the status quo and the balance of power in this region. In other words, the superpowers will not advocate a reunited Korea if the anticipated consequence is to diminish their sphere of influence in this region. Using PRINCE methodology, a new scheme was explored the "neutralized federation" and was evaluated as a valuable political mechanism in that the two Koreas would be freer to work and cooperate together more effectively for political unification (Tables 4 and 5, Chapter 12).

Returning to integration theories, as will become apparent in succeeding paragraphs below, the integrationist
and realist schools will be shown to vary in their value for policy guidance depending on the relative importance of characteristics of problems facing the Koreas at various stages in their internal and external relations. We will now review how these theories were interrelated in Chapter 13, using Saaty's "AHP" methodology.

Over the years, decision-makers in Seoul and Pyongyang have made incompatible approaches to the reunification issue (discussed in Chapters 5 and 6); they view reunification from perspectives diametrically opposed to each other. Function­alism strongly advocated by the Seoul government and her people have provided for the solution to the problem of survival, starting with such non-political contacts as trade and humanitarian matters. Their basic idea was and is sectoral integration between the two Koreas, beginning with their economies and then progressing toward political integration through "snowball" and "spillover" effects. Its ultimate aim is to let different systems converge towards similar ones that will pave the way for reunification with as little disturbance as possible. Recalling the past history of antagonism and rivalry between France and Germany and how this animosity was kept at bay for the common good by establishing and successfully operating the ECSC, an analogous strategy may work in Korea, for instance, a joint mining venture and refinery.
On the other hand, the decision-makers of Pyongyang have rejected and limited Seoul's functional approach in order not to disclose South Korea's society to North Korea's people. Rather Pyongyang has been supporting a federalist solution to the problem of Korea. Of course, the federal approach is superficially probably the most rapid way to achieve political unification, but, in fact, without any process of substantive, functional integration its achievement is quite impossible short of imposition through victory in war.

With the two different unification strategies (Chapters 5 and 6) and the conflicting perspectives in public opinion and policy alternatives (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8), a Korean "problematique" or problem-complex emerged to be solved. In exploring for a solution, the theory of functional integration implied that practices of dialogue, exchange, and cooperation in various sectors would help to overcome the growing differences between the two Koreas, thus establishing stable and peaceful relations between them. Transactions, for instance, between the two systems in one area are expected not only to help improve our living standards in that area, but also to have "spillover" into other areas as well. Further, sustained inter-Korean cooperation and economic transactions will facilitate further easing tensions in the peninsula and, hopefully, create an atmosphere for closer ties in non-economic areas.
A functionalist approach disregarding political ideology and emphasizing shifts from easy and simple issues to more intricate ones, does not provide a clear path to strengthening political determination for unification. Political integration via functionalism cannot be imagined between states in conflict such as the Koreas. Yet the political realm of the Korean Question is inseparable from its non-political realm. For example, the on-going humanitarian process of Red Cross talks and Premier Talks can be better described as neo-functionalist than functional in approach because they combined political and economic issues.

Neo-functionalism, because it takes into account political ideology and relations appears as an alternative to both functionalism as advocated by South Korea and federalism as advocated by North Korea. From the neo-functionalist perspective, it is assumed that good relations between interdependent units may be intensified in a variety of issue-areas which would support the ultimate goal of integration. This is generally hypothesized as: the greater the level of interdependence, the greater the amount of political interaction leading to integration. It also requires features of "political determination" in North Korea's sense in the integration process.

Through this approach, South Korea works for North Korea and vice versa, by means of broad political, economic, social, and cultural interchange among their government agencies. In
the political area, it is also assumed to improve South Korea's relations with Russia and China, and to open North Korea's new relations with the U.S. and Japan, and to deepen the recognition of North and South Korea by the major powers (See discussion around Deutsch, Chapter 11).

In the economic area, using W. Edwards Deming's perspective, North Korea could be envisioned as a major customer of South Korea, and vice versa. As barriers between them break down, basic needs would be better met because they can improve quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs and provide more jobs. Furthermore, following the neo-functionalist model, inter-Korean economic cooperation would contribute to political unification. First, economic cooperation through exchange of goods as well as technology and managerial know-how would reduce the tension, creating disparity in economic performance and welfare, and either minimize or make obsolete the concept of an economic race. Second, economic cooperation entails mutual personal contact between the two parties. Interlocking the mutual welfare of the two Koreas and mutual contacts in a suitable organizational structure devised to set policies and manage day-to-day operations of inter-Korean economic cooperation, would greatly foster such trust and reinforce positive attitudes toward a common goal and thus contribute toward unification. Through this approach, like the functionalist one, survival problems in both Koreas are at least solved. If
carried out successfully over a sufficiently long time, such cooperation would build confidence, trust, and cooperative spirits which could "spill over" to political or politically sensitive areas of inter-Korean relations.

Assuming the above success, the pluralistic strategy would become important to apply for further widening the range of transactions and communications between the Koreas. By encouraging communication and transaction on the peninsula at this stage, the Koreas can seek peaceful coexistence, and affiliate by feeling close and better about each other through restoring national identity between them. They must make an additional effort together to reduce the mutual distrust and hostility that has existed between them for the last four decades, and to avoid and renounce war or any form of violence. Should both direct or indirect military intimidation by the North against the South be successfully removed, a pluralistic security community (PSC stressed in Chapter 11) would become a transient stage in the ultimate integration of the divided countries. In general to use the form of an hypothesis, the longer the detente between the different political systems, the higher the likelihood of mutual assimilation and transformation to more pacific relations. The two Koreas could then reasonably be expected to shift from a search for peaceful coexistence to a search for co-prosperity, paving the way for recreating socio-cultural homogeneity and for accelerating integration into a
single national community. The reunification will thus involve efforts "to create harmonious relations between two cultural systems."8

The relative economic inferiority of North Korea compared to South Korea makes it even more difficult for communication and transactions on a basis of equality. Each other's attitudes and circumstances need to be appreciated by the other, and mutual consent sought to selected proposals for change. Relations on this basis may develop into subsequent stages of communication and transaction which have hardly ever taken place between North and South.

Assuming that the pluralist strategy successfully built off the previous neo-functionalist policies, the federalist strategy may be applied to reach a higher level of integration, for a stage of political unification that it is harder to achieve and "more risky to aim at than some less integrated and less encompassing form of unification."9 Thus, to realize a federalist solution is far more difficult than actualizing the first and second levels of integration, discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, especially for divided nations which have undergone a war and still feel fearful and unfriendly. The states which joined in the ECSC and EEC, and in search of a European Parliament, had institutional commonalties which do not exist in divided Korea. Further, a federal system may bring about more problems than it solves from time to time, because many acute skirmishes would come
about over the allocation of resources between the different sides and the division of power and responsibilities, especially the control of the armed forces.

Moreover, a federalist unification requires direct and secret negotiations and "once-and-for-all" bargaining based principally on internal Korean political ingredients. The necessary precondition for the successful negotiating or bargaining process is that both sides are willing to consider compromising conflicting interests. It should also be done without either side's interference in the other's internal affairs, in accordance with the principle of mutual self-esteem. Interference delays the negotiation and bargaining process.

We can now see the general pattern linking the integration and realist theories so far discussed. Each of the integration theories explained different strategies and offered a different perspective on Korean unification. My solution to integrating them was to reconstruct integration and political realist theories first via the IKS (Inter-Korean Simulation) for solving survival and security problems of North and South Korea, then the PSC (pluralistic security community) for affiliating the two different peoples, and then the PRINCE (Probe, Interact, Calculate, Execute) for unifying the two different states, but all within Maslow's basic needs theory. Figure 4 summarized how to move from one level to the next level, each based on a corresponding integration or
realist theory in a Maslowian step-by-step design for reunification.

To an extent the present linkages between the Koreas are logical but the present satisfaction of their security needs is based on mutual fear of another war, and has come at an economic cost that now threatens their survival because of U.S.-Russian detente. Thus, the security problem is "solved" at the cost of perpetual fear, and at a price to economic survival that is increasingly intolerable. So Maslow's other human needs components are continually disregarded by this security system, and in fact have been damaged by it in many respects. Security concerns take precedence in policy while the survival dilemma becomes increasingly unstable. In Figure 4, Maslow's order of survival and security needs, in terms of actual satisfaction, has been reversed by major power military support. Both Koreas satisfy, on the whole, security more than other factors. Thus Maslow's needs hierarchy is rearranged as shown for Korean integration: security -> survival -> belongingness and love -> self- and mutual esteem -> self-actualization.

In Chapter 13, the complex, multi-factored and multi-staged process envisioned for Korean unification was given an integrated structure with the help of Saaty's "analytic hierarchy process" (AHP). All processes leading to Korean political unification depend to a large degree upon the
Figure 4. Korean Integration Strategies and Objective within Maslow's Hierarchical Structure of Human Needs

STRATEGIES:

1. Realist Strategy

2. Functionalist or Neo-functionalist Strategy

3. Pluralist Strategy

4. Federalist Strategy

Neutral-federation

Self-actualization (fulfillment)

Pluralistic Security Community

Mutual self-esteem (respect, dignity)

The present situation of two Koreas

Affiliation (belongingness and love)

Two hostile Koreas

Security (negative security)

Survival (physiological needs) (positive security)

OBJECTIVE:

1. Peaceful Co-existence

2. Political Unification

3. National Unification

conscious political decisions of decision-makers not only of the Koreas but also the four major powers concerned. But traditional decision-making methods rely on "habit and instinct" as Richardson would say, both of which presently put
the two Koreas in a deadly struggle. As an aid to self-conscious decision-making, breaking the chains of the past, Saaty's AHP technique enabled us to make effective decisions on complex issues of Korean unification by "simplifying and expediting our natural decision-making process." Based on the methodologies of Guetzkow, Deutsch, and Coplin, realist and integration theories, and both South Korean public opinion polls and the government's published unification priorities, Saaty's decision making process was used to form the basis for the normative conclusion of the dissertation in Chapter 13.

Maslow's basic human needs checklist, shown in Figure 4, was used to order some 37 policies related to North and South Korean international relations, and to crudely evaluate their impact or each of their basic needs in Maslow's sense.

Let us now summarize the strategy in outline form, beginning with security and ending with "self-actualization" strategies. From the realist perspective, security or safety needs should be satisfied first (meeting "negative security" in Maslow's, Guetzkow's, and Stephenson's sense). The policies to solve security problems were as follows. Priorities are shown by numbers to the left of each policy (some of which are tied).

1. ROK-US alliance for ROK security
2. DPRK-Russia and DPRK-PRC alliances for DPRK security
3. establishment of nuclear-free-zone
4. presence of US Ground Forces in South Korea
5. formal abandonment of unification strategy by force
6. presence of US Air Forces in South Korea
7. proportionate arms reduction
8. withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea if peace guarantees
8. transition from armistice condition to peace

Second, integration can proceed by adopting either the functionalist or neo-functionalist policy recommendations, depending on the acceptability to each of the Korean government (meeting "survival" or basic needs in Maslow's and Guetzkow's sense). The emphasis for survival solution were:

1. North and South economic exchange
2. Japan's economic aid to North Korea
3. North Korea's economic exchange with Western countries
4. South Korea's economic exchange with Communist countries
5. South Korea's economic aid to North Korea
6. Russia's economic aid to North Korea
7. China's economic aid to North Korea

Third, pluralist (PSC) policies are promoted to win public support ("affiliation needs" in Maslow's and Deutsch's sense). The suggested for affiliating the northerners and southerners were:

1. establishment of nuclear-free-zone
2. formal abandonment of unification strategy by force
3. proportionate arms reduction
4. accommodation to each other's proposal
5. negotiating and bargaining on unification matters
6. social transactions
7. cultural transactions
8. abolition of ineffective law against each other
9. withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Korea if peace guarantees
10. transition from armistice condition to peace
11. free visits and correspondence
12. reunion of dispersed families
13. political transactions
14. North-South summit and political leaders' dialogue
Next, federalist policies are initiated to promote political unification (meeting "self-esteem" needs in Maslow's and Coplin's sense). The priorities for mutual self-esteem were given as follows:

1. accommodation to each other's proposal
2. negotiating and bargaining on unification matters
3. South Korea's respect to North Korea
4. North Korea's respect to South Korea
5. recognition of each other's political system
6. recognition of each other's political ideology

Finally, efforts to achieve social justice, democracy, and a good society as necessary for real unification are to be made (meeting "self-actualization" in Maslow's and Chadwick's sense). Some policies are suggested for fulfillment needs satisfaction. They were:

1. mass participation in election, politics, etc.
2. formal equality of rights and privileges
3. abolition of frustration and alienation
4. to guarantee freedom of all constituents
5. equality of northerners and southerners
6. rectification by Confucianism
7. rectification by Christianity
8. rectification by Buddhism

Now that we have reviewed the overall strategy, let us turn to a more detailed summary of the top 10 of 37 policies projected to implement this strategy. The top 10 policies below (Table 8, Chapter 13) were regarded as having the highest priority after evaluating their relevance for the basic needs of the two Koreas. As will be noted the principle policies were mainly economic and military concern for
improving "survival" and "safety" rather than other factors related to Korean unification. The priorities (or policy options), using Saaty's AHP, were as follows:

1. North and South Economic exchange
2. ROK-US alliance for ROK security
3. DPRK-Russia and DPRK-PRC alliances for DPRK security
4. Japan's economic aid to North Korea
5. North Korea's economic exchange with Western countries
6. South Korea's economic exchange with Communist countries
7. establishment of nuclear-free-zone
8. presence of US Ground Forces in the peninsula
9. South Korea's economic aid to North Korea
10. formal abandonment of unification strategy by force

The first priority, given the goal of Korean unification, is North and South economic exchange for their survival in the international arena. Economic cooperation and transactions between North and South Korea will provide a solution to the survival dilemma, by both getting mutual benefit in tariff and transport costs, and by taking advantage of investments and transfer of technology from the South, to develop natural resources and manpower from the North. Even though the integrative process of the two Koreas has been proceeding very smoothly recently via the functional mechanism (trade which the ROK has insisted on for a long time as a measure of unification), it has also been limited to functionalism, and even within the functionalist strategy, very constrained. There has been no substantial expansion of economic transactions between them. Inter-Korean development in the longer term should proceed in several stages: the establishment of
a free trade area, a customs union, a common market, and an economic union. Until the North Korean economy recovers to some degree, at the very outset South Korea had better expand indirectly or secretly through economic interchange so as to hide her economic superiority. When this process has ripened, direct transaction could be increased. A gradual step-by-step approach to unification policies and models is a more realistic, conciliatory, and flexible approach from which to start, than a political-military issues approach for needs satisfaction of survival. Thus factors such as establishing a nuclear free zone and removing US troops, while important at later stages, take low priority now relative to stabilizing alliance structures and fostering economic exchange.

A second and third priority is for both Koreas to stabilize their respective alliance structures to avoid another arms race and escalation to possible war. Despite the tension between the two conflicting Koreas, it can be said that in Maslow's sense they can achieve their "security" goals, through their alliances. Maintaining their alliances help a balance of power in the peninsula, thus preventing a war. As long as the antagonistic circumstances continually exists between North and South Korea, both need to maintain alliances with their friendly and powerful nations for their security.

Fourth priority is Japan's economic aid to North Korea. Today the needs for foods grains, daily necessities,
medicines, and housing are very urgently demanded in North Korea for the people's survival. Thus the survival of the Korean people and relief from misery is much more important than anything else enroute towards unification, short of avoiding nuclear war. Economic exchange between North Korea and other countries does not solve North Korea's survival problem at the moment. Hence economic assistance from the advanced countries are necessary for survival solution. Both Russia and China are not in a position to help North Korea because of their economic crisis; and both the U.S., South Korea, and other Western countries hesitate to aid North Korea because there would be no gain, both politically and economically. Economic aid from Japan would be expected because she wants to utilize North Korea's natural resource, and to use "Pyongyang Card" in competition with South Korea in the future.

The fifth priority is North Korea's economic exchange with the Western countries for solving survival problems. North Korea's economy is no longer able to maintain herself as a self-sustaining and insulated system, for she is faced with the serious problem of a slow growth rate caused by the lack of foreign exchange, backward techniques, and the ineffective allocation of investment funds. The only way to find survival solution is to give up the self-reliance policy, and to trade with other countries.
Equal with the above, fifth priority is given to South Korea's economic exchange with communist countries. South Korea cannot expect economic benefit as in the past because of protectionism from the advanced countries. It can find new marketplaces in previously unfriendly countries. The socialist countries aspire to attain Seoul's business know-how and investment capital for their modernization, and Seoul also wants to take political (and economic) advantage for promoting national unity. Eventually fully developed economic transactions between the Koreas through their partners will provide the solution for South Korean survival needs.

Although it is said that South Korean people have been free from the survival dilemma, there are social strata which are low and estranged classes who are still in difficulty in their life especially in the southern provinces. It is my belief that when South Korea solves the survival problem of her poor, she will then be prepared to take the first step toward integration specifically to unify economically with North Korea, thus resolving the latter's survival problems (discussed in Chapter 9).

Seventh, the priority is establishment of nuclear-free-zone. North Korea's holding of nuclear weapons threatens neighboring countries' security, and causes South Korea and Japan to increase military capabilities (creating an arms race in Richardson's sense). Much spending on developing military power in quantity and quality is expected to deepen the
present economic crisis (especially in North Korea). Because of continued international pressure from Russia and China, it is assumed that North Korea will eventually allow international nuclear safeguards and propose new arms reductions for military cuts. These steps will be certain to ease high-level tensions and to allow the U.S. to reduce its forces.

The eighth priority is continuing to station U.S. ground power in the peninsula. As long as South Korean people fear armed conflict from North Korea, the disposition of the U.S. military forces will be continued for security of South Korea, and until South Korea can maintain a military balance and effectively either deter a Northern invasion or succeed via detente and integration as outlined above. Most South Koreans do not want a U.S. withdrawal that would increase the risk of a North Korean attack. A desire for a strong military security relationship with the U.S. prevails in Korean society.

Ninth priority is given to South Korea's economic aid to North Korea. Economic aid from Russia and China to North Korea is diminishing and the problem is expected to assume crisis proportions soon; when it does, the way will be paved for much greater South Korea economic involvement in the North. Thus South Korea should be fully prepared to act with appropriate speed and quiet diplomacy.

Tenth priority is formal abandonment of unification strategy by force. The world has already entered into a new detente era, as the superpowers have given up the Cold War for
maintaining international peace and stability (discussed throughout Part II). But the two divided Koreas are still in the Cold War and indeed in an occasional hot war situation consisting of exchanges of fire now and then, because North Korea has not abandoned its unification policy by force. Thus each side continually maintains its own national security through a visible arms race and military coalitions with their major allies. Unless North Korea should give up its violent unification strategy, there will be no peace despite the substantial changes in inter-Korean relationships which have already taken place.

So far we have reviewed only 10 of the 37 policies discussed in Chapter 13. What follows is a general summary of the remaining 27 policies in a less systematic and more discursive manner.

The economic and military policies above are different from those of public opinion and the present Seoul government, both of which gave top priority to social and cultural transactions and communications. As discussed in Chapter 13, I did not give them as much weight because of the conflict situation between the two Koreas. When security needs are satisfactorily addressed in a realist framework, and functionalist or neo-functionalist policies for survival needs are implemented, transactions and communication between North and South Korea for affiliation become imaginable.
Inter-Korean cooperation and transactions in all related areas, political and social stability, and maintenance of peace and security, are major prerequisites for successfully achieving this long-term policy. Reunification cannot be simply achieved. It requires painstaking reconciliation of the two very different societies. Without transforming these two opposing societies into mutually compatible ones, peaceful unification is not even theoretically conceivable.

Exchange of visits among people, joint activities by private social and cultural institutions in both parts, and allowance of the North Korean population to watch South Korean TV, radio, and so forth, all help recover social and cultural homogeneity between the two Koreas. In this stage, it is envisaged that the security of the two Koreas can be attained in terms of arms reduction as a result of proportionate "build-down" consistent with military equilibrium. Then, their attention will move to well-being following Lasswell, or survival following Maslow, of their people through reducing and redirecting military spending.

Although the policies related to self-esteem were, under the current situation, given low priority by the public and the author, they are necessary for achieving political unification. From the German milestone, Koreans have learned a lesson on how to reduce Cold War tensions and to achieve peaceful unification with different political systems and ideologies. Building mutual confidence through expanded high-
level governmental official contacts and negotiations had also been a critical factor. Thus political confidence should develop between North and South Korea through: (1) the exchange of representatives, (2) dual recognition, and (3) dual representation in foreign relations.

Also, the Koreas can learn from the fact that when Germany came together for its unification, the major powers, in particular, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, did not oppose its reunification, and rather worried about peace and security in Europe. Regardless of whether the international powers are opposed to unification of Korea or not, the Korean question largely depends upon Koreans themselves first, and the major powers second. As a measure of direct problem-solving for the Korean question, summit rather premier talks may propel North-South relations and unification. While the Presidents of both Koreas expressed their wish of holding a summit meeting, they have never agreed on a time despite the fact that East and West Germany did twenty years ago. Even now President Roh is ready and welcome to meet and talk with President Kim about wide-ranging unification problems. Roh repeatedly proposed it without any condition (but also with no hope), and Kim has, as expected, hesitated to accept. If the Koreas fail to agree on unification due to their security dilemma, outside involvement will be needed and probably sought after by them, i.e., "two (North and South Korea)-plus-four (the U.S., Russia, China, and Japan)" talks, a twist on the "four-plus-two" talks in
Germany, to attain "peace and prosperity," but with as much
chance for success as the Mideast peace talks.

Although the priorities for "self-actualization" needs were
given low priority relative to the process of political
unification, they are very important factors for "national"
unification (social and cultural integration). Everett
Kleinjans provides a basic idea for this goal. He sees such
elements--identity, equality, education (to learn to
coop erate, understand each other better, and improve
relationships),12 and Confucianian cultural aspects of
achievement orientation--as all important for national
unification. Similarly, Richard Chadwick, discussing public
opinion, puts emphasis on the achievement of social justice
and democracy as a path towards political stability.13

Kleinjans' and Chadwick's emphases are interrelated. For
instance, both seem to imply that it is possible for the
masses (individual, groups, and organizations) to get to what
they want--universal education, economic benefits, well-being,
participation in politics, freedoms, equality. Similarly,
Park Han Shik believes that "social status, prestige, the
respect of others, 'conspicuous consumption' and political
power or influence"14 are the motivational basis of
individuals' behavior through a democratic form of government.

In a politically unified Korea, suppose the regime
succeeds in attaining the goals related to survival within
some acceptable range of variation; its responsibility for
human actualization and satisfaction in a broad sense moves to the redistribution of such values, rather than the production of more goods, as would have been the case with security. This means that government policies deal primarily with the question, "who gets what, when, why" (following Lasswell), and concentrates on "how to maximize resource expansion (following Deming)." In their solution, Kleinjans emphasizes "market economy"; Meadows and the others hint at "industrialization" as a mechanism for redistribution.

In a democratic system, following David Easton, when the Koreans pay respect, allegiance or loyalty (demands and supports) to the new regime or the new ruler, it is thought of as input from the parts to the whole. The term "output" (policy) is seen as affection and esteem, allocation of resources, and rewards to the people. That is, it is distributed from whole to parts as a nation provides individuals with identity, protection, sense of purpose, etc., and the regional or universal organization serves as a multilateral marketplace for persons, goods, capital, services or information, effectively redistributing these resources where they can best be put to use.

This logic would be applied for both political and national unification. Put another way, there will be a certain likelihood that the more the people are loyal and esteem a government, the more the government will allocate resources and demonstrate love to the people. Therefore,
respect and love, loyalty, and allocation of resources explicitly stand in a relation of positive feedback to each other. Further if the two Koreas' government is good (or democratic) and if it carefully follows the people's will and really take care of its people, and takes seriously democratic processes and principles for national unity, there will be real unification in Korea.
NOTES--CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 14


12. Kleinjans, "Reunification of a Nation": 541.


16. Deming, Quality, Productivity, and Competitive Position or out of the Crisis, op. cit.


APPENDIX 1

PUBLIC POLL: GENERAL VIEW ON UNIFICATION

1.1 What do you think is the most urgent issue, which our society (in South Korea) must solve?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>1990 (A)</th>
<th>1988 (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of democracy</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of law and public order</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realization of economic justice</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price stabilization</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of welfare of society</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification of North and South</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution between regional disputes</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of national defense power</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensification of liberal education on democratic ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1527 (A) N (B) = 3,000

Source: (A) Yisipilsegireul hyanghan kukminuisik Sunghyang Josayunku (Research of People's Projection of the 21st Century) (hereafter Research of SNU) (Seoul: Seoul National University [hereafter SNU], Nov. 1990), p. 35
(B) National Unification Board (hereafter NUB), June 20-July 15, 1988

1.2 What would be some indications that might possibly lead you to believe that unification is achieved between North and South?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though North and South Korea maintain two different systems, when the dispersed families are given right to visit relatively freely, and the interpersonal and material exchanges are possible 34.6% 32.0%
Though North and South Korea maintain two different systems, when military hostility is improved and they acknowledge co-existence in peaceful manner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very much</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little interest</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almost no interest</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500 (1989\1990\1991)

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 5, 19
1.4 Levels of interest of unification indicated by different age groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20's</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30's</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40's</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50's</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 20

1.5 Reunification possible

52.4% (NUB, July 15 1988)
33.1% (Dong-A Ilbo, 1 April 1988)
63.8% (Suktap Labor Research Institute, 2 Aug 1988)
48.7% (Jungang Ilbo, 22 Sept. 1988)
51% (SNU, 12 Dec. 1989)(within 25 years)
46.5% (Dong-A Ilbo, 1 April 1989)
40.6% (Hankook Ilbo, 9 June 1989)
43.8% (Report of NUB & HGRI, Dec. 1989)(within 20 years)
65.1% (MCI, June 1990)(within 20 years)
61.3% (Dong-A Ilbo, 1 August 1990)
43.0% (Jungang Ilbo, 22 Sept. 1990)(within 20 years)
52.9% (Research of SNU, Nov. 1990)(within 10-20 years)
57.5% (Report of NUB, Nov. 1990)(within 20 years)
66.8% (HRI and Seoul Shinmun, 22 Nov. 1990)(within 20 years)
37.1% (Segye Ilbo, 8 Aug. 1991)(within 10 years)
48.5% (Media Research Co., 11 Aug. 1991)(within 10 years)
50.3% (Chosun Ilbo, 14 Aug. 1991)(within 10 years)

MCI: Ministry of Culture and Information
HRI: Hyundae Research Institute

1.6 Should our national policy focus on "unification" rather than "anti-communism"? (Laborers' View)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most definitely</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat disagree</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,278

Source: Suktap Labor Research Institute, July 15-Aug. 2, 1988
PUBLIC POLL: UNIFICATION WAY

### 2.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gradual unification through North-South cultural interaction and cooperation</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a federal government</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free election of North-South Korea</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification through superpowers' intervention</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3,000

Source: NUB, June 20-July 15, 1988

### 2.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recovery of homogeneity</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation of North Korean system</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-communism and democratization in North Korea</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction of the status of division</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconcern</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,537

Source: SNU, Dec. 8-12, 1989
### APPENDIX 3

**PUBLIC POLL: THE TOP-PRIORITY FOR THE REALIZATION FOR REUNIFICATION**

#### 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government's positive unification effort</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concession/unconditional dialogue</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflex of public opinion</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail exchange and meeting of the dispersed families</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian exchanges such as men of religion and students</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians' unselfish dialogue</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-South dialogue</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank report on North-South Korea's reality</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/cultural/sports exchanges</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power/cultivation of national strength</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of the US military forces/abolition of National Security Law</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery of trust</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inducement for North Korea's change</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on unification among political parties</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right anti-Communism education</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of people of all social standings</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No priority</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N = 1500**


#### 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The reunion of the dispersed families/correspondence</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture, arts, and sports exchanges</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic exchange</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders' dialogue of North-South Korea</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms reduction</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N = 2300**

Source: MCI, June 1990
3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free interpersonal exchange</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-South summit meeting</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic transaction</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic and social group transaction</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of American troops</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms control</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation of the National Security Law</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1530

Source: SNU, Research of SNU, Nov. 1990, p. 49

3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Come-and-go between North and South Koreans and cooperation on the multilateral transaction</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition and respect of mutual system</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea's openness and liberalization</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summit meeting</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition of armistice condition to peace</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military confidence building and arms reduction</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admission of the United Nations</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation of office for contact in North and South</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abrogation of the National Security Law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release of visitors to North Korea</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of the American forces/stop Team Spirit exercise</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500 duplicate answer

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 29
### 3.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal and economic transaction</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness and reform of North Korea</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-South summit meeting</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of American troops</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 798

Source: Segye Ilbo, 8 Aug. 1991

### 3.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual concession and North-South Korean dialogue</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come-and-go between North and South Koreans</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reunion of the dispersed families</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of domestic politics and society</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic exchange and assistance to North Korea</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: Chosun Ilbo, 14 Aug. 1991

### 3.7

What is the most important matter which needs to be recognized from North-South accord in interchange and cooperation field?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matter</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mail exchanges and visits of the dispersed families and relatives, and interpersonal exchanges</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges of goods and joint investment, and economic exchanges and cooperation</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation on information (newspaper, radio, TV, publication) exchange</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connection of traffic network of rail and road disconnected between North and South Korea</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 906

Source: HGRI, 13 Dec. 1991
3.8 What is the precondition which South Korea needs to attain for the effective improvement of North-South relationship?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precondition</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic superiority</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of public welfare</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining military superiority</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political democracy</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know well</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1800

Source: Jungang Ilbo, 22 Sept. 1990
APPENDIX 4

PUBLIC POLL: THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE FACTORS TO UNIFICATION

4.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of ideology</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest of U.S., USSR, PRC, Japan</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity of North and South</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust between North and South Korea</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insincerity of North Korean leaders</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insincerity of South Korean leaders</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal political instability of both</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3,000

Source: NUB, June 20-July 15, 1988

4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference of ideology between North and South Korea</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest of leaders</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological difference of the neighboring superpowers</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference of unification strategy</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others/no response</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hankook Ilbo, 9 June 1989
4.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference of ideology between North and South Korea</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea's greed for communization of South Korea</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneity of North and South</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicted interest on international welfare</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2300
Source: MCI, 20 June 1990

4.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heterogeneous political system</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest of the neighboring superpowers</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2020
Source: Dong-A Ilbo, 1 Aug. 1990

4.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological difference of North-South system</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest between North and South Korea</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference of unification policies of North and South Korea</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest of the neighboring superpowers</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of North Korea's will to unify</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of South Korea's will to unify</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust between North and South Koreans</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of the Korean War</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1800
Source: Jungang Ilbo, 21 Sept. 1990
4.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Difference of thought and ideology</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea's rejection of openness and reform</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative position of South Korean government</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 798

Source: Segye Ilbo, 8 Aug. 1991

4.71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Korean leadership</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korean leadership</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. or Japan</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The USSR or the PRC</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 807

Source: Research of SNU, Nov. 1990, p. 48

4.72 South Korean's feeling to the powers concerned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Favorable Image 1990</th>
<th>Favorable Image 1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>11.7% (5.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the U.S.</td>
<td>23.9% (37.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5.4% (13.6%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11.2% (15.9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the USSR</td>
<td>8.2% (4.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2020 (1988\1990)

Source: Dong-A Ilbo, 1 Aug. 1990; in parentheses are the result of the 1988 survey
APPENDIX 5

PUBLIC POLL: UNIFICATION EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

5.11 How much do you think the present South Korean government makes efforts toward unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1988 (A)</th>
<th>(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat Negative</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>71.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negative</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-so</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (A) = 3,000 N (B) = 1,278

Source: (A) NUB, June 20-July 15, 1988
(B) Suktap Labor Research Institute, July 15-Aug. 2, 1988

5.12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great efforts are made</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some efforts are made</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little efforts are made</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No efforts at all</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500 (1989\1990\1991)

Source: Chosun Ilbo, 14 Aug. 1991
NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 8, 24
5.21 North Korea's efforts for unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great efforts made</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some efforts made</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little efforts made</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No efforts at all</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 8, 25

5.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No efforts done</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great efforts done</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: Chosun Ilbo, 14 Aug. 1991
APPENDIX 6

PUBLIC POLL: SOUTH KOREAN UNIFICATION POLICY

6.1 What about the unification policy of South Korea?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feasible</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not feasible</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1800 99.9%

Source: Jungang Ilbo, 22 Sept. 1990

6.2 Will Northern Policy of Seoul influence unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very positively</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat positively</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat negatively</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very negatively</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No effect at all</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 15, 36

6.3 The necessity of the establishment of "South-North Confederation"?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely necessary</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat necessary</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so necessary</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not necessary at all</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no response</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 18, 40
6.4 Plan of across-the nation march and athletic meeting of North and South Korean students (Laborers' view)

- Very salutary: 41.9%
- Salutary: 38.5%

N = 1,278

Source: Suktap Labor Research Institute, July 15-Aug. 2, 1988

6.5. Is the "Grand Inter-Korean Exchange" President Roh Tae Woo proposed helpful to reunification?

- Very helpful: 26.6%
- Somewhat helpful: 47.0%
- Little helpful: 17.7%
- Not helpful at all: 4.7%
- Don't know/no response: 3.9%

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 9, 27

6.6

The government decision on the disapproval of selective groups of people to visit North Korea
- Consent: 43.2%
- Oppose: 42.1%

Acceptance of North Korea's insistence
- Agree: 68.4%
- Oppose: 24.7%

Realization of the "Grand Inter-Korean Exchange"
- Pessimistic: 81.7%
- Optimistic: 7.6%

N = 533

Source: Chosun Ilbo and HGRI, 14 Aug. 1990

6.7 What do you think of National Security Law?

- Should abrogate: 65%
- Should revise: 32%
- I don't know: 3%

N = 234

Source: Hangyurae Shinmun, 24 Aug. 1988
APPENDIX 7
PUBLIC POLL: NORTH KOREA'S OPENNESS

7.1 What is the most effective way to induce North Korea's openness?

Visit to North Korea/substantial relaxation of restriction to contact with North Koreans 43.6%
Induction for openness through China, the USSR, and the neighboring socialist countries 39.9%
Economic assistance to North Korea 32.5%
Entire openness over North Korean newspapers & media 21.2%
Restraint of slander over North Korea 20.4%
Reduction of military exercise/Gradual U.S. forces 19.7%
Encouragement for amity to the US, Japan, and western countries 14.1%
Others 0.4%
Don't know/response 2.6%

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 15, 37

7.21 Do you think it is possible for North Korea's openness and reform to occur while North Korean Great Leader is alive? Or after his death?

Possible while he is alive 21.9%
Possible after his death 64.0%
Fifty-fifty chance 5.0%
Impossible post-Kim 1.1%
Don't know/no response 7.9%

N = 1500

Source: NUB, Public Survey of NUB, Nov. 1990, p. 16, 38
7.22 Notable changes in North Korea will be seen within the next two years?

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>56.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Jugan Chosun* (Weekly Chosun), 23 April 1990
APPENDIX 8
PUBLIC POLL: PROSPECT

8.1 Favorable social system after unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eclecticism of capitalism and socialism</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2300

Source: MCI, 20 June 1990

8.2 Possible form of politics after unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democracy</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-existence of liberal and communist systems</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent neutrality</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevance</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1527

Source: Research of SNU, Nov. 1990, p. 47

8.22 Direction of unification system?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist/socialist system</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democratic system</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed intermediate form system</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No difference on what kind of system</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.3 Is it possible to apply the absorptive unification of Germany to Korean unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possibility</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: HGRI & Seoul Shinmun, 22 Nov. 1990
8.4 Desirable form of unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Unification</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual agreement on unification through negotiation</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absorptive unification of German way</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unification by force</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 500

Source: Media Research Co., 11 Aug. 1991

8.5 Countries which have a strong influence upon unification?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the U.S.</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the USSR</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 500

Source: Media Research Co., 11 Aug. 1991
APPENDIX 9


9.1 Removal of U.S. nuclear weapons (Laborers' view)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitely necessary</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not necessary</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definitely not necessary</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,278

Source: Suktap Labor Research Institute, July 15-Aug 2, 1988

9.21 Withdrawal of U.S. armed troops?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gradual withdrawal</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal now</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuance of station</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 3,000

Source: NUB, June 20-July 15, 1988

9.22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1,278

Source: Suktap Labor Research Institute, July 15-Aug 2, 1988
**9.23**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American Troop Withdrawal?</th>
<th>Opposed 94.07%</th>
<th>Supported 5.93%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea's demand for troop withdrawal is to communize the whole peninsula</td>
<td>83.33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condition for U.S. troop withdrawal will be met in 10 years</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had it not been for U.S. involvement, South Korea would have been communized</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea has the capability to invade South Korea</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1500

Source: HGRI, 30 Aug. 1989

**9.24**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposed to the withdrawal of the U.S. forces as long as North and South Korea stand face to face with each other</th>
<th>35.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should be withdrawn some day as long as North and South Korea stand face to face with each other</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be withdrawn gradually from now on</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be withdrawn right now</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know well</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1800

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Sahoiwa Sasang (Society and Thought) (ROK)
Segye Ilbo (ROK)
Seoul Shinmun (ROK)
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