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The state and industrial labor: Bureaucratic-authoritarianism and corporatism in Korea's Fifth Republic

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University of Hawaii, 1990
THE STATE AND INDUSTRIAL LABOR:
BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPORATISM
IN KOREA'S FIFTH REPUBLIC

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AUGUST 1990

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Finally, I want to express my deepest gratitude to my wife, Yoon Bang-soon, for her steadfast assistance and moral support during the completion of this project. During this long and arduous process, she was always there when I needed her. I hope I can someday return the favor.
ABSTRACT

Analysis of the policy process can demonstrate the important role played by the state in political and economic development. In the case of contemporary South Korea, the state has developed along authoritarian lines into an institution possessing substantial power to intervene in the civil affairs of the country. In addition, it possesses substantial relative autonomy from control by socio-economic classes or groups rooted in society. The power and autonomy of the contemporary Korean state inverts the notion of state-society relationships embedded in both the orthodox Liberal-Pluralist and Marxist models of politics.

It is hypothesized here that the model of politics in contemporary Korea may be best characterized as Bureaucratic-Authoritarian. An authoritarian leadership has sought to carry out a socio-economic revolution from above to modernize the country, as well as, provide the material basis for the promotion of national security. This has led successive Korean regimes to develop a public policy system and process consistent with the model of State-Corporatism.

A case study of regime policy toward industrial labor during the Korean Fifth Republic (1980-1988) was undertaken to test this hypothesis. The method of investigation included review of primary and secondary source materials, as well as, a one-year field research project. The research
relied most heavily upon qualitative information obtained through personal interviews of Korean government officials, union officers, labor activists, scholars, labor-management affairs researchers, and rank-and-file workers.

The analysis of the data confirmed the hypothesis that state-corporatist conditions and practices best characterized the industrial labor policy process in Korea's Fifth Republic. Due to regime policy, industrial labor has been isolated and subordinated in Korean society--rendered an object rather than a subject of politics.

This has been to their political and economic detriment. During the Fifth Republic, the Chun regime effectively used policy instruments based upon both inducements and constraints to coopt and manipulate the institutions of interest articulation for industrial workers. This state-corporatist system was efficient at repression in the pursuit of regime stability and economic growth-first strategies, but not at providing enduring solutions for industrial labor's social, economic, and political problems.
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AAFLI</td>
<td>Asian-American Free Labor Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMG</td>
<td>American Military Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSP</td>
<td>Agency for National Security Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CADC</td>
<td>Constitutional Amendment Deliberation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>Democratic Justice Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>Democratic Korea Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea, (North Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>Democratic Republican Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Defense Security Command, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPB</td>
<td>Economic Planning Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>FKI</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKTU</td>
<td>Federation of Korean Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td><em>Jeunes Ouvriers Catholiques</em>: Young Catholic Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFAC</td>
<td>Korean Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFBA</td>
<td>Korean Federation of Bar Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCCI</td>
<td>Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>KCIA</td>
<td>Korean Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDI</td>
<td>Korea Development Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Korea Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEA</td>
<td>Korea Employers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEA</td>
<td>Korea Employers Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFPA</td>
<td>Korean Federation of Bar Associations</td>
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<td>KFPA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFPA</td>
<td>Korean Federation of Bar Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIAC</td>
<td>Korea Institute of Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNK</td>
<td>Korea National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNTWU</td>
<td>Korean National Textile Workers' Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCNS</td>
<td>Legislative Council for National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTA</td>
<td>Korea Traders Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, ROK</td>
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<td>MC</td>
<td>Ministry of Construction, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCI</td>
<td>Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ROK</td>
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<td>MCSC</td>
<td>Military and Civilian Standing Committee, SCNSM</td>
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<td>MHSA</td>
<td>Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, ROK</td>
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<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance, ROK</td>
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<td>MOL</td>
<td>Ministry of Labor, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKD</td>
<td>New Korea Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OLA</td>
<td>Office of Labor Affairs, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea, (South Korea)</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>State Council, ROK</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCNSM</td>
<td>Special Committee for National Security Measures</td>
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<td>UIM</td>
<td>Urban Industrial Mission</td>
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Chapter I

Introduction

The goal of this dissertation is to provide insight into the political economy of contemporary South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea). In particular, it is a study of state policy toward industrial labor and industrial labor unions in Korea during the period of the Fifth Republic (1980-1988). As such, it may contribute toward the development of a model of public policy processes that lends itself to comparative cross-national and cross-cultural analyses. In so doing, it is necessary to ask fundamental questions about the structure and dynamic of the Korean political process: the ecology or environment within which policy is made, implemented, and experienced. Concomitantly, it is necessary to inquire into the nature and role of the Korean state, the composition of influential constituencies and their relationships to the state and one another, as well as the process of policy-making and the substance of labor policies produced.

The paucity of material on the Korean policy process has led me toward the construction of a viable model of the structure, process, substance, and consequence of public policy in Korea's Fifth Republic. The challenge has been to weave the relatively ample empirical material into a coherent tapestry of the political economy of modern Korea.
This dissertation will focus on state policies toward industrial labor during the Fifth Republic as a case study having important implications for other policy sectors and constituencies in contemporary Korea. What we learn from it may help us to better understand the nature of political and economic life in this newly industrializing East Asian country. It may also, eventually, contribute to a general theory of comparative policy analysis in countries struggling with the political and economic problems embedded in delayed dependent development.

A basic controversy in the study of Korean affairs concerns the evaluation of national development during the last three decades. This controversy stems from two apparently divergent interpretive evaluations of the performance of economic and social development policies fostered and implemented by the Korean state since the early 1960s. One perspective, seemingly the most widely accepted, posits that Korea's spectacular economic growth and industrial diversification constitute a "political economy of success" worthy of emulation by other developing countries. Hofheinz and Calder argue that Korea is one of the "Little Dragons" or "Little Japans" of East Asia (the others being Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) which possess cultural and organizational attributes giving them a decided "edge" over other developing countries in terms of both national and international economic performance.
Indeed, this edge constitutes a challenge to the continued domination of the international economy by advanced industrial powers such as the United States, the EEC, and Japan. The implication is that Korea has been spectacularly successful not just in comparison to other developing countries, but in relation to the advanced industrial countries as well.

This generally laudatory evaluation of Korea's developmental performance is advanced in the multi-volume study of Korean modernization jointly conducted by Harvard University's Institute for International Development and the Korea Development Institute. The extensive statistical compilation of aggregate data concerning social and economic performance indicators certainly implies success. Between 1960 and 1978, the period dominated by Park Chung-hee, Korea led all Asian nations in average GNP growth with a rate of 9.9% per annum (compared to Japan's 6%, Singapore's 6%, Taiwan's 6.2%, and Hong Kong's 9%). In the early years of the Fifth Republic, the period between 1979 and 1986, GNP growth slipped (due to negative 1980 growth) but, still, averaged a strong 6.55%, and the country finished 1987 with a spectacular annual rate of 12.2%. GNP per capita rose from $87 in 1962 to $2,826 in 1987. Manufacturing accounted for 16.2% of GNP in 1962, but by 1987 it accounted for 30.3%. The dollar value of manufactured exports rose from $15.31 million in 1962 to $47.3 billion in 1987 with
over 94% of exports being manufactured products accounting for just over 40% of total GDP.

Such quantitative evidence of successful modernization is further bolstered by the observation of qualitative changes such as the new skyscraper silhouettes of Korea's major cities, the extensive super-highway system, new steel, automobile, and shipbuilding facilities, the availability of luxury consumer items in stores, and Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Summer Olympic games. Growing trade friction with the United States in the late 1980s also lends the success perspective much credibility and persuasive power.

An antipodal conclusion has been arrived at by analysts emphasizing different criteria of evaluative importance. This group's interpretive orientation rests upon concerns for equity as well as growth, political as well as economic rights, and social liberalization as well as social stability. From this perspective, Korean society appears locked in an endemic condition of crisis due to imbalances and inequities inherent in the authoritarian regime's adopted model and strategy of national development. McCormack and Gittings argue that the Korean people have been sacrificed on the altar of GNP growth by a socio-political elite which puts accumulation of surplus capital and maintenance of regime stability ahead of economic equity and political freedoms. Breidenstein and Wideman define the continued existence of poverty and increased
exploitation as products of the particular development path Korea has pursued. The implications are that not only has the Korean experience been seriously flawed in delivering goods and services in an equitable manner to the majority of the Korean people, but that the model's internal contradictions are sowing the seeds of social dissatisfaction and political instability. This negative evaluation of the Korean experience is similar to that posited in a wider body of literature focusing on the opprobrious political and economic consequences of rapid industrialization, productivity growth and sectoral transformation in developing countries in Asia and Latin America.

This latter perspective has a two-fold effect upon the focus of the research. First, it turns away from strictly economic criteria as important indicators and includes those which are overtly social and political. Raising the emphasis on political and social outcomes renders evaluation of the Korean development experience more problematic and controversial. Second, this approach holds within itself a critique of over-reliance on quantitative data and statistical methods, to the exclusion of more qualitative measures, in the evaluation process. Too great a reliance upon aggregate econometric indicators may lead to a myopic conclusion--an inherently biased one in favor of the status quo--concerning the human consequences of Korea's
development experience.

Studies which rely entirely upon statistical data for their evaluative power omit important facets and relationships which enrich our understanding of the development process. What, for example, is the meaning which Koreans attach to political and economic changes in their society? Is the process of change viewed as legitimate and proper? To what extent has the performance of public policy lived up to its promise and prediction? The addressing of such questions is intimately related to the truthfulness and validity of any evaluation of the performance of the Korean model of development.

Factors which deserve our attention include the militarization of Korean society, the growth in size and power of the state security agencies, the maintenance of weak and subordinate judicial and legislative branches of government, the denigration of dissent and its assiduous suppression, and the subordination and manipulation of social groups by the state. Those who argue the failure of the development model pursued in Korea can point to convincing qualitative evidence of systemic crisis in that the country has experienced six different constitutions, one unresolved civil war, two military coups d'etat, several periods of martial law, one assassinated head of state, and one urban massacre since 1948. Such phenomena receive scant attention in most econometric studies of Korean development,
but they are undeniably part and parcel of the same experience. They are also the factors that ought to matter most to students of political economy.

Indeed, recent studies have come to focus on internal and external structural and institutional factors promoting and/or inhibiting the process of regime transition and movements toward political liberalization and democracy in developing societies in the Third World. While much remains to be done in this area, it is clear that a concern for and awareness of the human costs of individual, national development experiences increasingly motivates social science research on the Third World.

Regardless of the pro or con perspective on Korea's development, it would seem that the role of labor--industrial workers and their unions--would be of central concern and thus well researched and analyzed. The Korean development strategy rests upon export-led industrialization, and industrial workers have been the key comparative advantage asset in the pursuit of national development goals. Their contributions and experiences would seem to be of central importance in fully understanding the political and economic consequences of the Korean model of development. Yet, their experience and contribution remains largely ignored. For example, as of 1989 the Harvard/KDI series on the economic and social modernization of Korea had ten volumes, but none
concentrated on industrial labor, an omission which strikes many reviewers as odd.

One way of resolving the controversy concerning the success or failure of the Korean model of development as well as to illuminate the role and impact of the industrial labor movement is to analyze state policies which affect workers and their organizations. Such a study will also clarify the role of the state, the structure of state-society relations, and the role and function of interest groups in the contemporary Korean political system. In short, it will be a study of the political economy of industrial labor policy in modern Korea.

The Approach

The resurgence of the political economy approach in the social sciences over the course of the last decade has been remarkable. It may be attributed in great part to a growing recognition that the American academy's rather arbitrary division of politics and economics into separate fields of study debilitates rather than facilitates an adequate apprehension of the richness and complexity of human society. It may also be perceived as a reaction against the dominant liberal-pluralist paradigm which has preoccupied American political scientists in the post-WW II era. The political economy approach effectively expands and enriches the purview of the researcher. Adopting such an approach effectively politicizes social phenomena that may
have previously been ignored or overlooked.

Harpham and Stone note that the most distinguishing characteristic of the political economy approach is that it "centers on an analysis of the interface that evolves over time between the economic process and political institutions." They go on to state that

Accompanying and informing this interest in the interface between economic processes and political institutions, political economy embraces a holistic approach to the study of particular social, political, and economic problems. Political economists reject the idea that an effective understanding of society, politics, or economics can be reached by investigating their properties in isolation from one another.

Students of political economy should thus seek to integrate the understanding of ideology, the economy, social stratification, and the state into a coherent whole to study particular problems in terms of this whole.

From the perspective of the study of national development, Wilber and Jameson posit that political economists "are more concerned with the nature of the process by which economic growth is achieved" than just the achieving of growth itself. Martin Staniland argues that there are several kinds of political economy theory and the criterion for categorizing such theory is whether or not it claims to depict a systematic relationship between economic and political processes. He posits that this relationship may be conceived in different ways--as a causal relationship between one process and another ("deterministic" theory), as
a relationship of reciprocity ("interactive" theory), or as a behavioral continuity ("public choice" theory). What is significant here is the approach's claim to empirical explanation.

The political economy model adopted here is that which emphasizes interaction and conceives politics and economics as functionally distinguishable but involved in exchange and reciprocal influence in the social world. To again quote Staniland, such an interactive conceptualization has merit in that it satisfies "the intellectual urge to be comprehensive and to develop abstractions of social reality that capture as much as possible the complication and ambiguity of the world as it is (or as intellectuals find it)."

To this extent, political economy expresses a continuing effort to make a highly complex reality intelligible and represents a hope that, by being made intelligible, that reality can be made more manageable and qualitatively better. Political economy analysis therefore holds promise for theorists as well as for those who make and experience specific public policies.

It is, therefore, my intention to explicate the Korean state's policies toward industrial labor as arising from a political economy context and, in so doing, address concerns as to how these policies could be bettered. This interest in betterment, of course, entails a normative evaluation of
the substance and impact of the specific policies under investigation. Anderson notes that

[t]here is then, a normative element at the very heart of any effort to develop a systematic, comparative study of public policy. A policy is more than a state action or activity. It is a conscious contrivance reflecting human purposiveness, and it is in some sense a moral act. A distinction is made somewhere, between things that are good for the public and things that are bad. If policy analysis represents, as many think it does, a rather fundamental reconceptualization of political science, then the logic of evaluation (the normative element which underlies policy) is a matter of very great interest both in theory construction and empirical research.20

This normative evaluation is dual-faceted in that the researcher must take into account the normative disposition in which the policymakers themselves operate as well as make explicit his/her own value perspective. More will be said about this later in this section.

Policy analysis is a potentially productive approach in studying political economy in that policies serve as important indicators of state-society relations, national goals and strategies of implementation, and the relative distribution of power in society. If we accept Dawson and Robinson's argument that public policy "is the major dependent variable that political science seeks to explain," then how are we to define public policy? Several scholars have offered varying suggestions in this regard. Smith has defined public policy as "bundles of government decisions based on issues" and for him the study of public policy concentrates upon the flow of issues that result in
government decisions in favor of some form of action. The concentration on issues and formal decisions is restrictive, however, as pointed out by Feldman:

Regulation is policy, and inaction is policy. Declarations of policy may not be policy at all, and implementation, regarded as a "phase" of policy in rational analysis, may be policy itself. That is, to the extent that governments can control, what they choose not to control is as worthy of policy consideration as what they do control. Government's refusal to build housing is a housing policy. And the way governments exercise control, the way something is done is also policy.23

From Feldman's observation we may infer that "public policy" ought to be conceptualized as incorporating an extremely broad set of state actions and inactions. We are also led to infer that there are numerous phases and levels of analysis in the development of policy. In addition, there is the notion of social control implicit in the attempts of the state to regulate social conditions for specific constituencies via action or inaction. And finally, it is emphasized that the way a policy is arrived at and implemented is as worthy of attention as is that policy's consequences.

Another rationale for broadening the conceptualization of policy is offered by Rose who notes that "the impact of a government program can be very different from the intentions stated by the policymakers, for the desires of the governors are not automatically realized by the programs that they introduce." There is considerable friction between intention and outcome as the policy encounters the
real world. For this reason Rose proposes that

\[\text{public policy is best conceived in terms of process, rather than in terms of policymaking. A policymaking framework is narrow; it concentrates attention upon the decision-making stage of the policy process and perhaps the steps leading up to the government decision as well. The choice of a particular program to realize a government's goal is the half-way point rather than the end of the policy process. If citizens are to feel the impact of a politician's decision, much else must be done... (such) steps are in a lengthy, complex and often recursive series of political interactions between those within and those outside government.}\]

Policy becomes, if we follow Rose's line of argument, a
dynamic and recursive or interactive process. This
characteristic of interaction has much in common with the
focus on reciprocal relationships inherent in Staniland's
second model of political economy mentioned earlier.
Policy, it seems, may be considered as a more or less
organic social process/activity linking its initiators and
recipients. Policy has consequences as a social process for
those who make it as well as those at whom it is explicitly
directed.

Lowi contributes to the discussion of policy analysis
by urging an understanding of the policy process that
includes the values and attitudes which bound and structure
that process as well as the kinds of consequences resulting
from attempts to carry out policy. In other words, we
want to understand what sorts of considerations go into the
making of the policy as well as what differences that
exercise in public choice made. It stands to reason that
policymakers as well as analysts do not live in a vacuum and therefore their material and intellectual environments inform the policy process to a significant degree. Feldman states that "a theoretical perspective at the heart of the system chosen for study—a perspective which derives from the rationale of the system selection and which acknowledges ideology—should guide the comparison." Thus, very careful attention must be paid to what Wildavsky refers to as the cultural context of preference formation—with culture characterized by boundedness and prescription. From this standpoint, policy is a focus of the study but can be best understood only when the ideological and systemic structures informing the process are included in the analysis.

Meehan notes that "at the most fundamental level, knowledge is organized experience and the search for knowledge is a search for patterns of organization. The organization is always created and not discovered." Meehan argues against positivist obsessions with rigid objectivism and the constitution of social science as the pursuit and compilation of data which is to be thought of as self-interpreting or self-evident in meaning. In this regard he joins others such as Rabinow and Sullivan in questioning the value and appropriateness of a social science in which "enormous attention (is) given to strategies for demonstrating some context in which concepts
will be free from cultural variation: stable, self-evident, unequivocally clear in their meanings, like the well-defined concepts of mathematics and physics." They go on to argue that such a positivist approach has resulted in a "fascination with the development of reductionist models and quantification techniques whose foundational concepts could be thought of as securely based in logical self-evidence of one form or another." The method of science ought to be viewed as different from the technology of science; behavioral concentrations and quantification techniques have utility but they are certainly not the only valid approaches to scientific inquiry. In fact, it may be argued that they are limiting and therefore guilty of actually truncating understanding.

To a degree this research project will reflect the tension in comparative politics between the claims of analytic and experiential knowledge. The former implies that the political order can be described from the vantage point of the detached observer. The analytic model of the political system is to an extent an abstraction from and simplification of reality. The critical attributes or variables of the given model may or may not be acknowledged by the political actor himself and they need not correspond to the rules or institutions of the system. Anderson notes that what is necessary is that the variables predict the performance of the actors in that system and "that they be
cognitively comprehensible—that they 'explain'."

This research project is informed by the analytic model of state corporatism and the specific historical experience and context of contemporary Korean political economy. This approach has been chosen in line with Anderson's assertion that

[w]e postulate a relationship between system and policy because institutions and the pattern of power in a society determine the socialization and recruitment of policy-makers, because they define the resources that are available for public purposes, and because policy-makers are presumed to respond to demands generated in the system. And all of this is true at a very general level. However, beyond a certain point, the question is not what demands exist and what resources are provided, but what policy-makers make of them. The characteristics and potential of the nation, the institutions through which he will work, and the patterns of demands and supports become the "givens" of the problem he must resolve. And how he will perceive the problem, how he will deploy the powers and resources of the state to meet it, is not a question causality but of contrivance.33

Here, the interesting questions of policy analysis become those of problem solving, how those engaged in the policy process define and respond to problems, as well as just how successful those responses turn out to be. Such an approach facilitates appreciation of the relationships existing between various social constructs, such as the state, political and economic institutions, and ideology; and the human inhabitants of such environments or cultures.

The approach suggested here underscores the importance of paradigmatic framework to the analysis. To Kuhn, the term "paradigm" suggested that "some accepted examples of
actual scientific practice--examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together--provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." These organizing conceptual frameworks or models may hegemonically serve for an indefinite period of time "to define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding generations of practitioners." A number of social scientists have noted the potentially debilitating and problematic nature of such paradigmatic thinking as it may serve to predetermine the analysis and evaluation of comparative political research to a great degree.

Hirschmann, for example, has delineated the dangers of overdetermination due to slavish adherence to paradigmatic parameters and prescriptions on the part of researchers, but even he notes that "with respect to actual socioeconomic analysis, I am of course not unaware that without models, paradigms, ideal types, and similar abstractions we cannot even start to think." Bodenheimer's seminal critique of North American perspectives of Latin American development as imbued with a particular and pervasive bias rooted in a "paradigm-surrogate" speaks to this point. Bodenheimer reasoned that the "paradigm-surrogate" was a strikingly pervasive consensus on fundamentals, whose core is liberal democratic theory as modified by the particular conditions of 20th century America. This consensus is all the less frequently recognized or challenged precisely because it is generally taken for granted.
While recent developments in American political science may have reduced the hegemonic dominance of Liberal-Pluralism as the discipline's paradigm or paradigm-surrogate, it is unclear whether this portends the demise of an overarching social science paradigm per se, or simply the replacement of one such body of ideas possessing intellectual coherence with another. Addressing this particular question is essentially beyond the scope of this study, but awareness of the implications of paradigmatic thought is not. An important initial step is to make explicit the political economy implications of three diverse and competing conceptual models; Liberal-Pluralism, Marxism and neo-Marxian variants, and Corporatism.

Stepan contributes much to discussion of the implications of diverse conceptual models by disaggregating their descriptive, normative, and methodological components. He posits that for analytic purposes these components may be separated. That is, in part, models are normative statements about what society should be like. In part they are empirical descriptions of how societies are. In part they are methodological approaches suggesting what aspects of political life are important to study.38

Stepan found that social scientists and/or policy analysts operating from either the Liberal-Pluralist or classical Marxist perspective tend to portray the state as a dependent variable and, concomitantly, to develop research methodologies which systematically draw attention away from
the state as a possible independent variable. This is a conceptualization of state-society relations which has been increasingly questioned, if not contradicted, by a growing body of literature focusing on the experiences of both industrialized and industrializing countries and is particularly inappropriate when applied to the East Asian NICs.

The statist perspective has value in that it focuses on what may be the most important of political economy interests, the sustaining and/or alteration of social relations amongst the members of a given society. In the final analysis, the Korean development model was intended to create a new society, in effect, altering social relationships between members of the national community.

Moore criticizes positivism for ignoring structural distinctions and admonishes us to be concerned with the qualitative impacts political and social changes have on human relationships. To him these changes concern, such differences as those between owning property and producing goods with a few simple tools and one's own hands, and owning no property, working for someone else, and producing goods with complicated machines. To speak in very neutral and abstract terms for a moment, they are changes in the form of social patterns. the distinctions in these forms and patterns do not seem to be reducible to any quantitative differences; they are incommensurable. Yet it is precisely such differences that matter most to human beings. They are the ones where can has produced the most violent conflict, the source of great historical issues.

One implication of Moore's observation is that purely
behavioral approaches may be not only truncating but depoliticizing as well to the extent that they fail to deal with those important qualitative questions concerning political and economic relationships. The elegance achieved via positivist analysis comes at the expense of a more complete (and complex) apprehension of the significance of change or stasis to people. This hardly seems to be the goal toward which political scientists in general and comparativists in particular should be striving. It does not enable our understanding so much as disable it. As Kann puts it:

people are unique in the natural world. They do not behave; they act. Their actions have meaning in the sense that they result from the ever-changing combinations of preconceptions, motives, intentions, and situations. To the extent that we can establish patterns of behavior, we have not yet considered the multiple realities that inform that behavior. And the moment we discover those patterns, we may choose to behave differently, break patterns, or create new ones. Atomic behavior is lawful and predictable; human behavior is ever-changing and creative. Thus, the best we can do is to interpret human changes and creativity; the attempt to establish and test laws of political behavior will necessarily result in distortion.41

An analyst who restricts himself to consideration of only those facts or statistical data made readily available in a closed or highly controlled and politicized environment is critically limited in terms of the sorts of questions his research can address. To return to Barrington Moore, "In any society the dominant groups are the ones with the most to hide about the way society works." To rely solely upon data made available by an authoritarian regime or upon the
prevailing configuration within which the data emerges, as in the case of Korea, is not advisable; especially if the subject to be investigated is charged with political significance.

To do so is to fall into the trap laid by those hoping to control the intellectual discourse on such an issue—and it is precisely this trap into which many of those heralding the merit and success of the Korean model of development have fallen. The data made most available (particularly to non-Korean speakers) is that which makes the experience appear most successful; contradictory data—at least in quantitative form—is much more difficult and costly to come by. However, I would argue that it is this information—in both quantitative and qualitative form—that completes the Korean model or experience and the fact that it is difficult to acquire is not justification for ignoring it.

My own interests have led me to undertake this project for the following reasons. First, most Americans (and not a few Koreans) are ignorant of the role that industrial labor has played in Korea's rapid development. The conditions under which workers and their institutions must operate as well as the political and economic consequences which have accrued as a result of those conditions remain for the most part obscured and underappreciated. My opinion is that this is not accidental. Were the situations in which industrial workers and their unions function rendered more public, the
evaluation of political and economic performance in the past
two decades as well as the achievements of the governing elites would be questioned more than is currently the case. The goal is to fill a lacuna in the literature on Korean development by evaluating the important contributions of industrial labor and, at the same time, to add to the politicization of labor's situation by asking questions concerning the rectitude and effectiveness of the state's manipulation of industrial workers and their institutions. To this extent it is both an intellectual and political act.

Second, as a political scientist I support the assertion of Hoover that "scientific inquiry began as a revolt against dogma established and controlled by dominant political and religious institutions" and that "knowledge is socially powerful only if it is knowledge that can be put to use. Social knowledge, if it is to be useful, must be communicable, valid, and compelling." I see the utility of social or political science as lying in its capacity to liberate, enable, and politicize; it may liberate us from the shackles of ignorance and misperception by facilitating a more complete and honest apprehension of the real world; in so doing it may enable us to find viable and, perhaps, just solutions to social controversies, and it may politicize issues by opening up the discourse surrounding these controversies.

I hope that in its own small way this dissertation will
liberate those who are at all interested in the Korean experience from ignorance of industrial labor's role and circumstance and enable the observer to evaluate the Korean model more critically than before. I also hope that the knowledge generated will contribute to the liberation of Korean workers and their organizations from restrictive and/or inequitable relationships by clarifying and demystifying their predicament. Given these intentions, the research may be perceived as a political act in that it intends to politicize that which has tended to be depoliticized in the prevalent literature on Korean development.

I support the notion of social scientist as "knower" and "doer"; the intellectual as activist as well as commentator. In this important way I essentially agree with Marx's critique that "philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." The Marxian paradigm served to both educate and motivate—to make knowledge an avenue to a normatively better world. I harbor no illusions of following in Marx's footsteps, but I do hope that my project may promote positive change.

During the conduct of field research in Korea during 1980 and 1981 I became aware of the extent to which I myself entered into an intimate relationship with the subjects of the study. For example, many of the people I interviewed...
regarded talking to me as an act of political significance, something of consequence to themselves as well as to the situation of labor in Korea. This was true of workers, union officials, and labor activists as well as for government bureaucrats, foreign embassy personnel, and university faculty members. This politization undoubtedly affected what was made available to me, the emphasis and nuance attached to information, and the genuineness of the other party's responses to questions. It also affected my conduct of the research in terms of explicitness of questions and the veracity attached to responses.

When one engages in research on a politically charged topic in the contemporary Korean context, one is committing a political act. The observer and the observed both become elements of the subject being investigated; they are active parts of the issue or phenomena. In such a context, complete objectivity becomes problematic and the researcher must utilize individual interpretive and analytic abilities in the conduct and evaluation of the project.

To conduct politically significant research in a politically charged ecology is (if one is truly sensitive and observant) a powerful experience. Reactions are often strong in either a positive or negative sense. To deny those reactions—to weed them out of the analysis—is to distort or truncate the experience. The question becomes not how to delete those factors but how to include them in
an educative manner into the analysis and evaluation. To pretend or deny that one has not been touched by the phenomena investigated is not to be objective—it is to be, at least in part, deceptive or dishonest. This would be true even if the motives were of the highest.

Having participated, in the sense denoted above, in the politics of industrial labor policy in Korea I cannot claim disinterested objectivity. Rather, I make explicit at the outset my empathy with and passion for the subject of this study and for its theoretical ramifications. However, empathy and passion were tempered by an appreciation of Korean cultural traditions, the national project of modernization and development, and the countries geopolitical situation. Nevertheless, I agree with Kenneth Hoover that

the task of any social science must be to understand why things are the way that they are, as well as how the elements of social life can be reformed to allow for more humane patterns of personal development and expression. The weapons in this struggle for understanding are not only science with its procedures for disciplining inquiry, but also the intuition that life can be better than it is, that a given pattern of behavior may be other than inevitable, that even the smallest transactions of behavior may contain the keys to larger structures of possibility and potential.46

Structure of the Dissertation

In order to explicate the model of politics and policymaking which informs my perception and analysis of the political economy of industrial labor policy in contemporary
South Korea, chapter two will compare and contrast several divergent paradigms of politics; Liberal-Pluralism, Marxism and Neo-Marxian variants, and Corporatism. Special attention will be paid to the nature and structure of state-society relations and the role and functions of interest group or class representation in each system. Emphasis will be placed on the options for social mobilization and control as well as the structuring of interest actualization possible in each paradigmatic model.

Chapter three will be an analysis of the nature and role of the state in modern Korea. It will be argued that the state-form in Korea essentially approximates that of bureaucratic-authoritarianism and that the corporatist model--particularly the state-corporatist variant--is the most appropriate conceptualization of interest articulation viz. the state. The structuring of 20th century state-society relations will be examined and implications for analysis of policy will be explored. Chapter three will also describe and evaluate the changes wrought by rapid, export-led, economic development since the early 1960s. The important role of state and government intervention via policy in that economic transformation will also be analyzed. The participation of important social elite interests and institutions in this political economy context will be made explicit as will the participation of non-elites particularly, industrial labor.
Chapter four will be a specific discussion of the industrial labor policy process of the Fifth Republic; one which exhibited state-corporatist characteristics. The environment, institutions, as well as specific legislation used to structure labor's role and function will be examined.

The consequences of this corporatization for the industrial labor movement and industrial unions in Korea will be explored in chapter five via analysis of statistical data, the results of field interviews, and case studies. These cases were selected to display as clearly as possible the nexus of state and industrial labor interests and the impacts of policy on organized industrial labor and the country as a whole.

Chapter six will conclude the study by recapitulating findings concerning current state policies toward industrial labor in Korea during the Fifth Republic and the political and economic consequences for industrial workers and their organizations. I will also discuss significant occurrences in the post-1987 era and hazard predictions for the future.

While there are real and important achievements attributable to the Korean development model, there are also important and underappreciated consequences of that model for large segments of Korean society. As alluded to earlier, I believe that knowledge should be about a subject and for a purpose, therefore, I hope that this study will prove useful
in expanding understanding and provoking personal action in the future.
End Notes


5. Korea Development Institute, *KDI Quarterly Economic Outlook*, Summer/Fall, 1987, p. 27.


7. Ibid.


15. Ibid., p. 17.


18. Ibid., p. 6.


25. Ibid.


27. Feldman, op. cit., p. 301.


31. Ibid.


33. Ibid., pp. 226-227.


35. Ibid.


42. Moore, op. cit., p. 522.

43. Hoover, op. cit., p. 149.

44. Ibid., p. 7.

45. Karl Marx as quoted in Hoover, op. cit., p. 137.

Chapter II

Alternative Conceptualizations of the State: Implications for Policy Analysis

What an analytic approach to policy most requires is sensitivity to the particularity of diverse national and international contexts and historical experiences which constitute and inform the specific political economic system and processes under investigation. It is argued here that the contemporary Korean state plays a central and ill-understood role in the country's development processes—something particularly true in the case of industrial labor policy.

It follows, therefore, that the task of this chapter is two-fold. The initial task is conceptual, to examine the role of the state implied in the two paradigmatic models most often utilized in contemporary comparative political research, Liberal-Pluralism and classical Marxism. Should the state be viewed as the object of political action or a subject actively engaged in autonomous or semi-autonomous political maneuvering? What may be the ramifications for political understanding and policy analysis embedded in the adoption of either model?

A complementary task is both analytic and empirical in nature. It entails the development and application of an alternative state-centric conceptual framework or model of state-civil society relations, i.e. Corporatism
(specifically, state-corporatism), which may help overcome some of the major conceptual and empirical lacunae that limit the explanatory power of both Liberal-Pluralism and classical Marxism when applied to third world cases. More precisely, it will be argued that in Korea the political system may be better understood and analyzed through the utilization of a model of policy analysis which emphasizes the existence of a relatively autonomous state with a distinct modal pattern of interest organization and representation significantly different from that of either Liberal-Pluralism or Marxism. And, it will be emphasized that there are descriptive, normative, and methodological implications for a policy analysis approach informed by such an alternative model.

Schmitter, Krasner, Linz, and Stepan all argue that a third major conceptual framework of political analysis exists which emphasizes the role of a relatively autonomous Bureaucratic-Authoritarian state in structuring basic political and economic relationships in pursuit of specific national goals or projects. The argument is that a particular modal pattern of interest representation (e.g. State-Corporatism) characterizes such a state-centric model of politics and policy process and, therefore, provides the most useful analytic framework with which to explore the political economy relationships (between state and society as well as between different societal segments) in
contemporary Korea. It will be demonstrated in chapter three that state-labor relations in contemporary Korea, and state-society relations in general, show a tendency toward a corporative ordering of interest politics around non-competing groups, officially sanctioned, closely supervised and often subsidized by the state. To the degree that is so, an initial task becomes the development of a rationale for focus on the state as a crucial actor affecting the policy process.

The Role of the State

One may attempt to address the conceptual problem which confronts analysts of comparative public policy by engaging in what Skocpol refers to as "the paradigmatic reorientation embodied in the phrase 'bringing the state back in'." Skocpol pointed to the dramatic reemergence of the concept of the state in a wide variety of historical and comparative studies produced in the 1970s—studies which represented several diverse academic disciplines and areas of geographic concentration.

While no explicit research agenda or area of common focus motivated these disparate studies and no single theoretical framework united most authors, there exists a common conviction as to the salient importance of the state to each. This has quite important implications for the field of comparative politics and amounts to what Skocpol
has called "an intellectual sea change" that is particularly important "when politics and public policy (are) at issue."

One of the central implications is that the conceptual foundations of both major paradigms of contemporary social science, Liberal-Pluralism and Marxism, more or less slight the focus on the state in favor of focus on society and its constituent components.

Skocpol paraphrased the theoretical import of such state-centric studies in saying:

States, or parts of states, have been identified in these studies as taking weighty, autonomous initiatives—going beyond the demands or interests of social groups—to promote social change, manage economic crises, or develop innovative public policies. The administrative and coercive organizations that form the core of any modern state have been identified as the likely generators of autonomous state initiatives and the varying organizational structures and resources of states have been probed in order to explain why and when states pursue their own strategies and goals. Finally, much interest has centered on the differing abilities of states to realize policy goals and a number of concepts and research strategies have been developed to address this issue through case studies and cross-national comparisons focused on state efforts to implement goals in particular policy areas.

What emerges from this reconceptualization of state-society relationships is the notion that at certain points in time and under certain conditions the state may possess, in Poulantzas' term, "substantial relative autonomy" or independence of action, in terms of composition, developmental agenda, and policy selection and goals, viz. the pressures applied by interest groups, factions, and socio-economic classes constituting civil society.
A corollary implication is that while the state may be relatively autonomous, it may be able to exercise manipulative influence over these interest groups or social classes. The state may be relatively insulated from the pressure and power of groups or classes, but they, inversely, may not be unaffected, indeed they may be very much affected, by the actions of the state. To this extent, a statist perspective or conceptualization inverts the relationship between state and society as it is posited in both the Liberal-Pluralist and Marxist models by viewing the state as a *subject* engaged in political activity and not merely the *object* of the political action of others. Indeed, interest groups and factions, such as organized industrial labor, may become objects of statist manipulation and subordination via policy that is derived for but not of the public.

Pluralism rests heavily upon the "Bentley-Truman" model of the polity-society best characterized as constituted of multiple and overlapping or cross-cutting, autonomous interest groups which seek to pressure public authority into legitimating, protecting, or maximizing their respective interests. From such a perspective, the state performs the function of either an impartial arbiter--benignly and patiently mediating conflicting interests of diverse constituencies--or of a more or less pliant servant
to the most powerful influences. At one extreme it performs the role of the disinterested referee. At the other it supinely serves as an arena wherein diverse factions struggle for control of public power and policy. In the former scenario it functions to regulate interest group competition in such a way as to promote the general will and public or national interest. In the latter it merely reflects the will of the dominant power constellation regardless of general interests.

Adherents to this individual or group basis of politics tend to conceive of public policy as reflecting the equilibrium attained in a contest between various autonomous interest factions at a given moment; a balance which competing factions are always striving to tip in their individual favor. From this perspective the state merely referees the competition to insure fairness, ratifies the victories scored by the triumphant, and records their demands as statutes, law and policy. All interest groups, labor unions included, are free to organize and press (within the rules of the game) for the maximization of their agendas.

Liberal-Pluralism is a conceptual framework with prescriptive as well as descriptive dimensions. That is, it posits not only that society is best conceived as constituted of competing interest groups, but that this is a good and proper state of affairs. Pluralist thinking tends
to draw adherents by substantiating the traditional liberal democratic ideals of American political culture through demonstrating that individuals freely uniting in group activity can work to achieve goals via input of opinion to an essentially open and benign state authority. The nettlesome problem of factionalism as working against the collective public interest is supposedly nullified by the great plethora of competing groups and the multiple allegiances of constituents which produce a political version of the classical economist's "invisible hand" phenomenon, assuring an optimal equilibrium point on any given policy issue.

Even those critics of the Pluralist model, such as Mills, Bachrach, Dahl, and Lowi, who have contributed much to the erosion of its descriptive power by positing the existence of a "polyarchy" or "power elite" as well as the status quo biases of the model, share with the Pluralists a conception of the state as essentially dependent upon the pressures of well-organized, prominently situated societal forces. The state is viewed as monopolized, dominated, or controlled but not as an autonomous entity advancing its own independently arrived at interests.

Of concern here is the conceptualization of the relationship which exists between state and organized social interests, e.g., the structuring of the interest representation process. Apter notes:
Pluralism extends the Liberal theory of the political marketplace. The notion of individual competition is replaced by a network of organizational competition, influence, accountability, and information in which groups can organize and, by exercising rights, realize interests to affect policy outcomes. The emphasis on transactions and exchanges of influence, information, and accountability has the further effect of converting passionately held political beliefs and values into interests.7

Accordingly, the state's role in the formation, motivation, and direction of interest groups is minimal at best. In addition, the state's role in regulating, mediating, and reconciling diverse and competing interests is minimized, in both the descriptive and prescriptive senses. The assumption is that to assure fairness the state does and should only minimally interfere with the formation and pursuit of group interests. The expectation is that public policy reflects the active and autonomous participation of interest groups rationally and competitively seeking optimal benefits by influencing the public authority. The role of the state is seen as creating and sustaining the conditions for this system of open competition.

The Korean political system has little in common with the Liberal-Pluralist experience and its dynamics. In the 20th century the state has stood above and apart from civil society and has been very much engaged as a subject of political activity, rather than a simple object. The "visible hand" of the Korean state has orchestrated the country's development and modernization and manipulated the
industrial labor movement in the process. Industrial labor has been rendered an object of politics, rather than a subject.

The classical Marxist model also offers an organizing conceptual framework for analyzing the relationship between state and society. However, theories of the state rooted in this alternative perspective differ fundamentally from those of Liberal-Pluralism in that they posit a state which is an active, conscious and official expression of socio-economic class relations, relationships which display the hegemonic domination of one class over another. From this viewpoint it follows that the state is both the product of social relationships of class domination and a key instrument in the shaping of those relationships as well. Absent here is the notion of the state acting as the impartial mediator and in its place the notion that the state serves as the biased instrument of one class's domination over others.

The state functions to close or restrict avenues of access to policy decisions for subordinate classes while fulfilling Lenin's dictum that it acts as the executive committee of the ruling class by insuring its unencumbered access. It follows that policy is not the product of an equilibrium achieved between diverse and competing societal factions but of a severe imbalance in favor of a hegemonic class. "Public" policy will not serve a public or national interest, but the singular interests of the dominant class.
Marxism posits that the proletariat is the true producer of wealth and value and, therefore, a just state would serve proletarian interests by equitably distributing the benefits of growth to the producers. The prescriptive message is that the state should be seized by the working class and utilized in its collective interest as the key instrument of their dictatorship. Just policy is that which emanates from the proletarian state whereas unjust policy assuredly emanates from a state held captive by the exploiting capitalist class.

All of this should not obscure an important fundamental commonality of Liberal-Pluralism and classical Marxism viewing the state as dependent upon or captive of powerful social formations for its motivation and direction. Even in Marx's most explicit discussion of the state, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, he asserts that while the state in France was powerful and capable of substantial independent action, "the state power is not suspended in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small-holding peasants." If not entirely at the behest of at least on the behalf of specific class interests the French state was constrained in its policies.

More recent Neo-Marxist contributions to the literature have expanded upon Marx's original perceptions of the
important role of the state by denoting its capacity for substantial relative autonomy from powerful social formations. Gramsci, Poulantzas, and Djilas have contributed to a rejection of the Leninist view as overly-simplistic; the state should not be regarded as simply the executive committee of the ruling class. They also challenge the very idea of a doctrinaire universal theory of the state and argue instead for specific historical analyses of individual national experiences informed by, but not limited to, an overarching conceptual framework of social class and state-society relations. Focus on the state allowed contemporary neo-Marxist scholars such as Miliband, O'Connor, Wright, and Jessop to investigate developed societies with an eye on explaining increasing state autonomy in the making and implementing of policies affecting economic growth, industrial development, distribution, and class relations.

Yet, as noted by Skocpol, at the theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers on the state have retained deeply embedded society-centered assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of production. Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled out by definitional fiat. Furthermore, neo-Marxist theorists have too often sought to generalize—often in extremely abstract ways—about features or functions shared by all states within a mode of production, a phase of capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world capitalist system. This makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations in state structures and activities across nations and short time periods,
thereby undercutting the usefulness of some neo-Marxist schemes for comparative research.12

The relationship between state and society remains uninverted, and the neo-Marxists share the same normative disposition in favor of proletarian hegemony as do their classical predecessors. The Marxists generically find the idea of state autonomy opprobrious. And this position severely limits classical Marxism's utility in analysis of Korean politics and policy processes.

Of greater utility to study of Korean politics has been research focusing on areas where the state has, essentially, possessed relative autonomy from the point or moment of its inception. In the words of Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol:

Current work, however, increasingly views the state as an actor that, although obviously influenced by the society surrounding it, also shapes social and political processes. There is a recognized need, therefore, to improve conceptualizations of the structures and capacities of states, to explain more adequately how states are formed and reorganized, and to explore in many settings how states affect societies through their interventions—or abstentions—and through their relationships with social groups.13

Now that students of comparative politics are re-emphasizing the centrality of states, the basic—conceptualization of the state—often modified and extended—as offered in the works of Weber and Hintze has received renewed attention. The Weberian notion as developed by Stepan entails consideration of the state from five inter-related perspectives. First, the state must be
thought of as something more than just "the government".

Rather, it is

the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relations between civil society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil society as well. Consolidated modern states should be compared not in terms of whether they structure such relationships, but in terms of the degree to which, and the means through which, they do so.15

An important two-fold question, therefore, is just how pervasive and forceful is the structuring of specific relationships, and just how is this structuring achieved and sustained? To what degree is the Korean industrial labor movement and union organization structured (i.e., to what extent is it economically mobilized and politically demobilized?) in its relations with the state as well as with other important societal groups? How are these relationships achieved and maintained in the Korean context?

Second, the state must be seen as a mechanism of domination and control wherein the laws and bureaucratic procedures of the state reflect the political, social, and political locations of various components of the civil society, but they may also empower the state to shape the influences social groups exert on the state. Stepan noted that a principal task of research is to determine the extent to which any particular state (a) is procedurally neutral and allows an autonomous and competitive process of interest aggregation to present binding demands on the state, (b) is a class instrument in
which the full range of its coercive, administrative, and legal powers is used to dominate some class fractions and protect others, or (c) achieves some degree of autonomy from civil society and thus contributes its own weight to policy outcomes.16

The suggestion is that the policy process and the law (as its manifest output) may serve to display the extent to which the state is autonomous and which specific societal groups or classes are best served by them. How, and under what specific circumstances, may policy and law in the Korean context serve to systematically advantage certain societal interests (e.g., bureaucrats, technocrats, domestic capital, etc.) and disadvantage others (e.g., industrial labor, farmers, students, etc.)? Who is included in the process and to what degree? Who is excluded and to what degree?

The concept of relative autonomy bears clarification here as it is the crux of the statist argument. Trimberger develops the ideas of (1) a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state apparatus; and (2) a dynamically autonomous state bureaucracy. In respect to the former she posits:

A bureaucratic state apparatus, or segment of it, can be said to be relatively autonomous when those who hold high civil and/or military posts satisfy two conditions: (1) they are not recruited from the dominant landed, commercial, or industrial classes; and (2) they do not form close personal and economic ties with these classes after their elevation to high office.17

Relatively autonomous bureaucrats must, therefore, be free of connections and control by both internal and
international class interests. It is only in times of crisis—when existing social, political, and economic order is threatened by external forces and by upheaval from below—that relatively autonomous bureaucrats are likely to make radical changes in the social order. Autonomous bureaucrats enter the class struggle as an independent force, rather than as an instrument of other class forces. The outcome of such radical bureaucratic initiative depends on the international competition between states and also on the domestic class constellation.

Bureaucratic autonomy is most likely to obtain where there is no consolidated landed class or when a landed oligarchy is in economic and political decline and the rising capitalist bourgeoisie is weak and/or dependent on foreign interests. It is my contention, and I will seek to substantiate it in following chapters, that these conditions closely approximate the modern Korean experience and situation.

Third, no state is necessarily monolithic or unitary. Stepan posited that the state is composed of various parts and the degree to which any strategic elite in charge of the state apparatus in fact controls all the component parts of the state varies. To him, "any analysis of an attempt by that elite to use the apparatus of the state to structure society must therefore take into account the composition of the state and the ideological and organizational unity of
the strategic elite." Which groups compose the state elites? Of those included, which are most powerful or dominant? Does power and dominance shift according to policy area? Why?

Fourth, Stepan noted that Weber stressed that continuous administration necessitated by organized domination required that human contact be conditioned to obedience. This raises a question of the nature of the state's claims to obedience as well as whether they are made successfully and at what cost to society. Possible outcomes of elite attempts to install a new pattern of state-society relationships include, Gramscian hegemony wherein statist structures gain at least marginal acceptance, societal quiescence in the face of irresistible force, and failure due to successful societal resistance.

Via what vehicles does the state implement labor policy? How acceptable in both a physical and intellectual sense are these implementation mechanisms and strategies to key social constituencies? Of related importance is the examination of the conditions that are supportive or resistant to the state's installation of structures, and patterns of participation and control, which obtain hegemonic acceptance or acquiescence.

Fifth, Stepan quotes Weber as saying of the modern state that "this system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state...but also to a very
large extent over all the actions taking place in the area of its jurisdiction." This directs attention to the strategies available to a regime which would increase its capacity to control alien actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, and foreign governments.

Hintze's theorizing complements and amplifies this last point by demonstrating that the state is, and always has been, part of a system of competing and interactive states. From this perspective states inevitably stand at the intersection of domestic political economic orders and transnational strategic relations within which they must maneuver for aggrandizement or survival in relation to other states. These relationships may manifest themselves in the form of international communication of models and ideas of public policy, patterns of trade and investment, technology and capital flow, and the international division of labor.

This advances the conceptualization of the state beyond the neo-Marxian preoccupation with economism and toward an inclusion of what may be called "strategic" or national security concerns. In the Korean context, the alliance politics of the East-West struggle clearly color policy concerns and influence the intensity to which and mechanisms through which certain goals are pursued. What emerges from this discussion is a conceptualization of the state as a macrostructure with a dual internal and external nature.
Internally the state supports a particular hierarchical political and economic order through its hegemonic powers of institution-building (e.g. labor-management relations) as well as its monopoly of the forces of organized coercion. Externally, the state projects a nationalist image as the supreme guardian of the national interest and guarantor of national survival in a world of competing interests. However, in a work focusing on contemporary Korea, Burmeister warns of the "reification fallacy" wherein policies adopted in the "national interest" need be recognized, in reality, as affecting important societal groups and interests to different degrees and in different ways. His position owes a great deal to the "developmental state" argument presented by Horowitz who emphasizes that political economy structures—both internal and external—vary across time and condition specific national political and economic policy responses in areas of central importance to national success or survival.

The Developmental State

Alavi's work on the post-colonial state notes that a tradition of substantial relative autonomy has been inherited by many newly independent countries. The interventionist and autonomous characteristics of the colonial state have often been bequeathed to or adopted by the newly emergent nations of the developing world. The
colonial state as an agent or appendage of the imperial country of necessity sat above and apart from the colonized society. In addition, research on "late" or "late-late" industrializing countries, to utilize Hirschman's lexicon, has implied that the political economic imperatives of twentieth-century nation-building have tended to objectively and normatively situate the state at the center of a development process based upon planning and the compression of the modernization process into as short a period of time as possible via the assiduous and dynamic implementation of policy.

Horowitz argues that this developmental state is the prototypical Third World state which has emerged to cope with the twin exigencies of internal economic and political development as well as those of external competition in the international system. Labor policy, therefore, must be viewed as evolving within a complex environmental web of internal and external concerns for policymakers and as part of an overall development policy agenda which includes both economic and strategic factors.

In case studies of Meiji Japan, Ataturk's Turkey, Nasser's Egypt, and Peru after the 1968 military coup, Trimberger stresses the formation via prior career interests and socialization of a coherent official elite with a statist and nationalist ideological orientation. Moreover, she highlights several areas left undeveloped in
Stepan's work such as the role of external threats to
national autonomy as a precipitant of revolution from above
and the relationship of the statist elites to powerful
economic classes. These are important in order to
anticipate the extensiveness of socioeconomic changes a
state may attempt in response to "a crisis situation—when
the existing social, political and economic order is
threatened by external forces and by upheaval from below".29

The applicability of such a perspective to the Korean
case is amply supported by Morrison and Suhrke, and Haggard
and Moon who note the salience of the linkage between
domestic and foreign policy considerations under the aegis
of the modern Korean state as a "survival strategy" made
necessary by great power rivalries, the existence of
mutually hostile regimes on the Korean peninsula, and the
highly competitive international economic environment.

Referring to both North and South Korea, Morrison and
Suhrke note:

The large power environment narrowly delimited their
foreign and military power options, and they were
unable to decisively influence that environment. As
long as the two Koreas were set on a collision course
of mutual, unequivocal hostility, these policy
restraints directly affected the most basic questions
of war, peace and the state's very survival. This
understandably led both Koreas to adopt dual goals of
searching for means of increasing their own freedom of
action (this initially involved domestic as well as
foreign policy) while retaining existing large power
support.31

Haggard and Moon focus on South Korea's participation in the
international economy as justifying if not necessitating the
emergence of a strong state, but admit that the
"consolidation of state power in the name of national
security had the consequence of destroying the political
bases for the articulation of alternative development
strategies. The destruction of political bases for
articulating alternative policies suggests that important
societal groups, such as organized labor and their
representative unions, have been not only repressed but
delegitimated as critics of development policy. It is also
another way of insinuating the emergence and sustenance of
relative autonomy on the part of the Korean state.

A major motivation on the part of the state elites for
increasing and consolidating power at the expense of other
social organizations is to maximize the potential to survive
the dangers posed by foreign and domestic challenges. The
single most important strategy for maximizing survival
potential is the marshalling of political and economic
strength via various forms of social mobilization. For
Migdal, such mobilization is the "channeling of people into
specialized organizational frameworks that enable state
leaders to build stronger armies, collect more taxes, and
complete any number of other complicated tasks." He goes
on to note that social control

is the currency for which social organizations compete.
With high levels of social control, states can mobilize
their populations effectively, gaining tremendous
strength in facing external foes. Internally, state
personnel can gain autonomy from other social groups in
determining their own preferred rules for society; they can build complex, coordinated bureaus to establish these rules; and they can monopolize coercive means in the society to ensure that other groups do not prevent the enforcement of state rules.34

Therefore, the utilization of public policy by statist elites to implement social control strategies is, also, an important concern here. The state apparatus utilizes the mechanisms of public policy in particular ways to mobilize (or de-mobilize, as the case may be) social interests or groups in a hegemonic, if not completely controlled manner, and in pursuit of specific "national" goals or projects.

The statist perspective may be applied to the experiences of late industrializing countries in the twentieth century, particularly those which have attained remarkable levels of GNP growth and sectoral transformation such as the East Asian NICs. Their experiences have stimulated a dramatic reassessment of early assertions in the modernization literature predicting a positive correlation between industrial growth and social diversification on the one hand and the development of democratic political institutions and practices on the other.35

To the contrary, what seems to have typified or characterized "successful" developmentalist states, particularly in East and Southeast Asia is repression and dictatorship, not democracy and representative government.36 To the extent that this has been true, the inability of
Korean industrial unions to translate their numbers and organization into access to power and influence in the policy process may be understood as the consequence of political exclusion rather than inclusion at the hands of the developmentalist state.

**Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism**

Much of the contemporary lexicon of comparative development is derived from studies of various twentieth century Latin American experiences; particularly Argentina and Brazil. As noted by Collier:

Argentina and Brazil were ruled by the military as an institution, rather than exclusively by individual military rulers. In addition, the military appeared to adopt a technocratic, bureaucratic approach to policy making (as opposed to a more "political" approach through which policies were shaped by economic and political demands from different sectors of society, expressed through such channels as elections, legislatures, political parties, and labor unions). This approach to policy making in these regimes has led scholars to join the adjective "bureaucratic" with the term "authoritarian" and to call these systems "bureaucratic-authoritarian." This label has come to be an important addition to typologies of national political regimes.

The taxonomy of authoritarianism has thus been expanded to encompass the emergence of what some refer to as a "new" or "modern" variant of an ancient political regime-type; one that is more pervasive and enduring than the traditional personalist regime of the caudillo or military man on horseback. To O'Donnell, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state is,

1. comprehensive, in the range of activities it
controls or directly manages; (2) dynamic, in its rates of growth compared to those of society as a whole; (3) penetrating, through its subordination of various "private" areas of civil society; (4) repressive, in the extension and efficacy of the coercion it applies; (5) bureaucratic, in the formulation and differentiation of its own structures; and (6) technocratic, in the growing weight of teams of tecnicos expert in the application of "efficientist" techniques of formal rationality. Furthermore, the bureaucratic-authoritarian state is closely linked to international capital...40

The bureaucratic-authoritarian state can therefore be viewed as the archetype of the strong, relatively autonomous, developmentalist, state defined in preceding pages.

O'Donnell linked the emergence of this particular state form to the profundizacion or "deepening" of capitalist industrialization directed toward a high degree of vertical integration and property concentration in industry and the productive structure in general, basically benefitting large organizations, both public and private, national and foreign. There exists a synergistic relationship between the deepening of the national economy as a consequence of strategies aimed at overcoming the problems of late capitalist development within a world capitalist political economy and the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian political structures and processes.

In a work focused directly on the origins and development of the northeast Asian political economy over the last century, Cumings notes

By the mid 1960s both Taiwan and South Korea possessed strong states that bear much comparison to the prewar Japanese model, and to the bureaucratic-authoritarian
states in Latin America. Termed NICs (Newly Industrializing Countries) in much of the literature, the Taiwan and Korean variants deserve a more accurate acronym. I shall call them BAIRs, or Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Industrializing Regimes. These states are ubiquitous in economy and society: penetrating, comprehensive, highly articulated, and relatively autonomous of particular groups and classes. Furthermore, especially in Korea, state power accumulated considerably just as the ROK began a deepening industrialization program in steel, chemicals, ships, and automobiles.41

He thus links the phenomenon of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the Korean context with the developmentalist agenda of deepening industrialization and, in addition, he develops the concept from within the regional political economy framework of modern Northeast Asia. Cardoso, who has contributed much to the literature on bureaucratic-authoritarianism, defines the state as the basic "pact of domination" or coalition of elite groups, classes or class fractions which exercise hegemony over the rest of civil society.42

To Cardoso, the manifestation of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime fronting the developmentalist state is usually a coalition of the armed forces (e.g., the officer corps), civilian bureaucrats, technocratic planners, and big business interests very much linked or tied to foreign political and economic actors. It is not a coalition of equals but, rather, a hierarchical ordering with the military occupying the pinnacle of power. These regimes organize the relations of power in favor of the executive while eliminating or sharply reducing the role of the
legislature and the independence of the judiciary. The efficientist disposition of the military enhances the status of technocrats as planners (especially in the economic field) and the strengthening of the civil bureaucracy as implementers of regime policy while excluding others who might inhibit such efficiency. It is in this way, according to Cardoso, that "the executive depends on the technocratic bureaucracy and on the only real party, the armed forces."

From this perspective, the military, civil bureaucracy, and technocratic planners exercise power over the rest of civil society from bases within the state; they do not exercise power within the state from bases in civil society. This relationship inverts the state-civil society relationship as posited in Liberal-Pluralist and Marxist theories.

**Corporatism**

The way in which group or class interests are articulated with the bureaucratic-authoritarian state/regime is of crucial import for those interested in the policy process. It is here that the dynamics of that process, in terms of who is advantaged and who is disadvantaged, in what ways, and by what means, are most clearly displayed. To Cardoso, the relationship between interest groups in civil society and the state is based more on the criteria and mechanisms of cooptation than on the mechanisms of representation. In other
words, those who control the state apparatus select various people to participate in the decision-making system, a selection process that will be extended to include even the most powerful of social forces, and even sectors of the lower classes. But they will never subscribe to the idea of representation. The delegation of authority from below is not encouraged. On the contrary, the decision regarding who will be called to collaborate, and for how long, is made at the apex of the pyramid of power.44

This modal pattern of interest group articulation, one in which governmental and private sector institutions interlock, has been characterized as corporatist. It is a characterization which has been applied to widely different regimes in different regions of the world and at different stages of socioeconomic development. Typically, corporatist regimes have adopted strategies and procedures (usually manifested as public policy) for consultation or intermediation with large and potentially powerful business, financial, and labor organizations, and such procedures "have the effect of excluding from real political influence individuals and groups unfortunate enough not to have been coopted." 45

Stepan, Wiarda, and others have linked the discussion and analysis of corporatism in Latin America to Catholic cultural traditions which posit the organizational relationships of society as reflect those of the human body or corpus. Each individual "part" of society has a specialized role to play in conjunction and cooperation with the roles of the others; the health of the national organism (hence the term "organic state") is predicated on the
disciplined cohesive, cooperation of the separate segments. At the apogee resides the state, possessing and exercising the cerebral functions of command and coordination. In the case of the Korea and the other East Asian NICs, the cultural imperatives of Confucianism, the division of society into a hierarchy of functionally differentiated social classes, emphasis on harmony and stability, as well as paternalism and obedience, may contribute toward or be used to legitimate the normative bases for state corporatist structures and processes.

Schmitter has suggested two broad distinctions which enable the concept of corporatism to accommodate the profound differences in historical experience and regime type that blanket application of the term may conceal or obscure. First, he settled on an empirically bounded specification which focuses on a set of directly observable, institutionally distinctive traits involving the actual praxis of interest representation rather than a political culture focus. Thus, the concept may be compatible with several different regime types. Second, he disaggregates the concept into "societal" and "state" variants or sub-types. To Schmitter, corporatism is defined as

a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for
observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.\textsuperscript{48}

Such a conceptualization captures the inversion of state-society power relationships in a way that Liberal-Pluralism and Marxism do not and allows the concept wide explanatory utility.

The structures and processes of societal corporatism which arise from the intersection of public and private sectors are viewed as partial and reciprocal in nature. Societal corporatism is a genteel, negotiated form found in the advanced industrial states of Western Europe and Scandinavia. It has evolved through the dynamics of liberal economic and political institutions, through gradual accumulation and concentration of economic power in the hands of large firms, financial institutions and labor unions, and through the inexorable if incremental involvement of government in the planning, management, and stabilization of increasingly complex economic systems.\textsuperscript{49}

The structure and practice of regimes utilizing state corporatism are, to Schmitter, best characterized as experiencing delayed capitalist development in which the state has taken a dominant, autonomous role in shaping both the distribution of political power within society and the direction of economic development. In such societies corporatism signifies not the decay of Pluralism, but its abortion: it represents an attempt to satisfy rising popular demands for economic improvement while controlling the political process through which such demands are expressed. In domestic politics, state
corporatist regimes are authoritarian, but not necessarily totalitarian: they presume to organize political expression, not to determine its content in any detailed and pervasive way. In foreign policy, they tend to be nationalistic and mercantilistic, reflecting an acute sensistivity to the vulnerability which late development involves.50

In this way, the preeminence of the state and the modal pattern of interest representation in late developing societies is partly a historical legacy (post-colonialism) and partly a result of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie which makes a liberal, private enterprise style of development unworkable and unlikely. On the one hand, proponents of state corporatism assume that the state can represent a national interest higher than any sectoral interest and that pursuit of the national interest necessitates the shaping and stabilization of relations between the state and various organized interests that appear and proliferate as industrialization and social mobilization proceed.

Malloy suggests that corporatism represents a compromise that channels and controls the demands made of the state while accepting their legitimacy; a way of ensuring political stability essential for furthering national development within a context that addresses, if not satisfies, popular expectations. 51

Manoilesco, one of the early proponents of modern corporatist theory, understood the state corporatist sub-type as an institutional and political response to a
particular process of transformation that the highly
stratified international political economic system has
undergone in the 20th century. The dominant causal factor
was the relations between peoples or nations rather than
classes within individual nations. The functional
specialization of sanctioned peak organizations divides the
polity into vertical units of interest aggregation thereby
enhancing the role of the state's technical expertise in
coordinating interests via policy. It also expands the role
of the state in national economic planning and international
political and economic bargaining.

The "vertical pillaring" of interest aggregation
provides an alternative to "horizontal consciousness" or the
"spirit of class" embedded in Marxist perspectives, e.g.
a nationalist spirit of corporative belonging. Such a
corporatist ideology can serve as a powerful means of
controlling the discourse on national development issues as
well as political and economic rights due individuals and
groups in the highly charged crisis environment of most
developmentalist, bureaucratic-authoritarian states.

There have been several attempts to disaggregate
Schmitter's original concept of state corporatism which has
been criticized as far too simplistic to deal successfully
with the multiplicity of national experiences. One attempt
has been to create dichotomous categories or sub-types
variously described as populism and post populism;
incorporating authoritarian systems and exclusionary authoritarian systems; and inclusionary and exclusionary corporatism. The other attempt has been to further disaggregate the concept to allow for differing state policy strategies aimed at obtaining societal compliance with regime goals.

It is usually argued that inclusionary state-corporatism occurs at a time of low industrialization, waning oligarchic domination of economies dependent on the export of primary products, and relatively low levels of political mobilization. A modernizing elite supplants the old order and directs economic development toward industrialization and increased self-reliance. Control of the state machinery is abetted by mobilizing and allying with the popular sector, usually urban working classes or, in some cases, the peasantry. In the economic sphere, policies of import-substitution are emphasised in pursuit of increased industrialization and self-reliance. The mobilized popular sector serves not only as a mechanism of regime support but, also, as an expanding consumer market for domestically produced goods and services.

Exclusionary state-corporatism may be viewed as succeeding or superseding the inclusionary variant usually during conditions of economic stagnation caused by the exhaustion of export substitution possibilities and the resultant intensification of political and economic struggle.
over distribution. It is characterized by the domination of bureaucratic-military elites over decision-making. The strategy most commonly adopted is first, to exclude the popular sector from having significant access to the policy-making processes of the state and second, to restructure the popular sector's organizational bases with a view toward optimizing limited and controlled access to the centers of power.

Proponents of further disaggregation of the concept noted that while the concept of corporatism was valuable as an initial approximation of the rules governing state-society relationships and the representation of group interests, it missed much of the give and take of politics. Taking as a starting point the role of the state in interest representation the "inducements versus constraints" argument makes it possible to deal more adequately with the diversity of power relationships present in a given system. Systems of interest representation are not identical everywhere; there are major differences in the degree of structuring of the popular sector within and between national cases as well as the method through which such structuring is achieved. In this context, state-corporatism is viewed as involving an interplay between inducements and constraints.

The notion of an interplay between inducements and constraints is consistent with standard discussions of the dialectical nature of state-labor relations in general.
"Inducements" may be viewed as strategies or policies through which the regime attempts to motivate organized labor to support the state, to cooperate with its goals, and to accept the constraints it imposes volitionally. In other words the structuring of group representation through provisions for official recognition, monopoly of representation, compulsory membership, as well as direct and indirect forms of economic and political subsidy are quite distinct from strategies or mechanisms of constraint which directly compel compliance from labor leaders and organizations.

On the other hand, "constraints" may be viewed as strategies or policies utilized by the state elites to produce compliance by the threat, or actual application, of negative sanctions or disadvantages. Such sanctions or constraints could include denial of official recognition, criminalization of non-compliance activities, surveillance and harassment of individuals and organizations, as well as attempts to stigmatize or delegitimate certain forms of thought or behavior. Inducements, in contrast may be seen as involving the application of advantages for the targeted group.

Though we may distinguish between inducements and constraints, it should be emphasised that these are not diametrically opposed or mutually exclusive phenomena. Both are utilized to affect social control by influencing
behavior along the lines preferred by the state elites. Constraints affect social control through the application of negative sanctions or disadvantages manifested in various forms of repression. Inducements, while involving the application of advantages, affect social control through such mechanisms as preemption and cooptation. Both are different strategies utilized by the regime to advance essentially the same result, if not perfect control the, at least, hegemonic domination of the targeted group--usually organized labor.

The empirical description of the good state corporatist model is one in which a relatively autonomous state standing apart from and above civil society actively organizes, structures, and sanctions societal interests in order to control the perniciously selfish struggle of faction as a way of promoting the common national good. There thus appears to be a close relationship or elective affinity between the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime type and the practice or utilization of forms of state-corporatism as the characteristic modal form or style of the policy process linking key societal groups with the state and one another. This will be rendered accutely clear in the ensuing case study of organized industrial labor in Korea.

The normative underpinnings of the model rest upon the notion that social, political and economic competition is
debilitating and therefore wrong. The state's legitimacy resides in its technical expertise and nationalist bona fides; the former implies the objective superiority of statist policy while the latter implies its moral primacy. The state's supremacy is not opprobrious but proper and gains in merit to the extent that it promotes or advances the interests of specific social constituencies even as it subordinates and manipulates them in the overall national interest.

An evaluation of such policy should consider the degree to which state corporatist policies fulfill the normative expectations inherent in the conceptual framework. This is particularly important in light of the admonition of Cardoso and Faletto that the state represents a discriminatory relationship (the domination of one part over the rest) which "must appear to the national consciousness to be the expression of a general interest" and "consequently, the state constitutes a relationship of domination incorporating an ideology that masks that partiality." We need therefore to evaluate the extent to which reality matches the rhetoric of state corporatism.

In the next chapter we will delineate the origins, make-up, and ideology of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state in contemporary Korea. We will also delineate the regime's policy process by focusing on decision groups, agenda building, articulation and implementation strategies.
Attention will be paid to those aspects of the policy process which may be interpreted as state corporatist in character. Such analysis will inform us of the specific qualitative context within which industrial labor policy is devised and implemented in contemporary Korea.
Endnotes


3. Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In" ITEM: Bulletin of the Social Science Research Council, 1, 1982. p.5.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp. 1-2.


13. Ibid., p. vii.


15. Ibid., p.xii.

16. Ibid., pp. xii-xiii.

17. Trimberger, op. cit., p. 4.

18. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

19. Ibid., p. 5.

21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

23. Skocpol, in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, op. cit., p.8.


27. Horowitz, op. cit.


29. Ibid., pp. 4-5.


32. Haggard and Moon, op. cit., p. 145.


34. Ibid.


43. Ibid., p. 41.

44. Ibid., p. 43.

45. Staniland, op. cit., p. 74.


47. For excellent discussions of societal corporatism in advanced industrial democracies refer to Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe Schmitter eds., Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making (Beverley Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982).


49. Staniland, op. cit., p. 74.

50. Staniland, op. cit., pp. 75-76.


52. Schmitter, op. cit., p. 35.

53. Ibid. pp., 35-36.


Chapter III

The Emergence of Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism and the State-Incorporation of Organized Industrial Labor in South Korea

The conceptual utility of state corporatism under bureaucratic authoritarianism as an alternative analytical framework for understanding policy in newly industrializing, post-colonial states is discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter the specific historical and structural factors which in the Korean context gave rise in the 1960s and 1970s to the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Industrializing Regime (BAIR) of the Third and Fourth Republics are examined.

By examining the historical and cultural antecedents of the contemporary developmental state as well as the political and economic imperatives of the Korean BAIR's national development goals and strategies, this chapter will seek to clarify the functions of labor policy and, the role of industrial labor and unions in the Korean development process. It contends that several internal and external constraints are crucial in explaining the patterning of state policy particularly as it pertains to industrial labor's relative political disadvantage and weakness viz. the state and important socio-economic groups and classes.
State and Society in Traditional Korea

Elitist and exclusionary politics in the contemporary era have antecedents in the Korean past. Indeed, a tradition of authoritarianism pervades Korea's political history. But, modern Korean bureaucratic-authoritarianism is only tangentially related to pre-modern culture and tradition. While Korea's cultural legacy of Confucianism and history of feudalism may be viewed as contributing factors, modern bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the Korean context has primarily emerged as a consequence of the specific historical experience of the country's integration into the modern world political and economic system.

One long-held view is that Yi dynasty rule (1392-1910) was predicated upon a strong, centralized bureaucratic state based upon the Confucian model imported from China and adapted to indigenous Korean conditions. From a comparative perspective, traditional Korean authoritarianism falls somewhere between that reflected in Japanese and Chinese patterns of Confucian social order. Although the Koreans appropriated the Chinese ideal of a "virtuocracy" for their rulers, members of the landed gentry or yangban class were openly competitive in their pursuit and use of power, much like the daimyo of Japan's samurai caste.

Ethnic, linguistic, and cultural homogeneity within a geographically compact and intellectually introverted realm contributed to making the traditional Korean polity
singly homogeneous and centralized in contrast to other Confucian societies in Asia. These factors induced an enduring perception among many historians that "Korea was probably the most centralized and uniformly administrative state in traditional Asia." The widely-held view was that this centralization of power has created a "politics of the vortex" wherein everything in Korean politics has had to be played out at the center of highest authority. The institutional structure of the ancien régime coupled with the ideological tenets of Koreanized Confucianism (wherein the notion of a loyal philosophical or political opposition is rejected) historically situated the central political authorities of the state in positions of unrivaled power and relative autonomy. Influences from mass or civil society did not dominate national politics and the policy process.

A more recent alternative interpretation of the Yi state holds that "the ostensible centralized and autocratic structure was merely a facade the obscured the reality of aristocratic power" wielded by the yangban. The Yi dynasty state's major task was short-run maintenance and adaptation necessitated by intense competition with the landed gentry over revenues generated from the agricultural production of peasant tenant farmers. The state assumed responsibilities in the economy primarily to raise revenues, but always to the levels of adequacy rather than surplus, and not with the
intention of generating surpluses for economic growth programs. The bureaucratic structure of the state was adapted to the political and economic needs of the aristocracy and therefore "lacked the autonomy and the extractive capacity usually associated with strong states." The monarchy competed with the aristocracy for shares of a relatively static pool of wealth producing, in political terms, a state that was superficially strong at the center, but with weak linkages to the national periphery. From this perspective, the structural and cultural continuities of Korean tradition have contributed toward but, not of themselves determined the emergence of bureaucratic authoritarianism in the post-Yi dynasty period.

However, in explaining the historical emergence of a strong state accompanying weak development of social groups or socio-economic classes, we may point to the different paths of modern state formation traveled by East Asian and Western European societies. That is, in the Western experience social differentiation towards the end of the feudal period preceded modern state formation. In the Western experience, the state developed as a differentiated entity out of civil society and had a distinctive character associated with the way in which the social groups or classes constituting civil society accomplished the transition from feudalism. For example, in Europe the rise of a commercial merchant/entrepreneur class in the 16th and
17th centuries undermined the socio-economic bases of feudalism and aristocracy—contributing to its eventual replacement by more pluralist systems. Social transformation preceded the formation of the Weberian modern bureaucratic state.

In contrast, in the Confucianized societies of East Asia a socially differentiated civil society emerged from an agrarian bureaucratic (in the cases of China and Korea) or feudal (in the case of Japan) setting as a product of policies advanced and implemented by a relatively strong, centralized, bureaucratic state apparatus. The threat of European colonialism spurred small factions of revolutionary elites to seize the levers of the state so as to transform socio-economic relationships that were perceived as stagnant and weak. In other words, the sequence of modern state formation is reversed and the state-civil society relationship inverted in the Western and East Asian experiences. In the Korean context, this suggests a certain cultural legitimation of and disposition toward authoritarian politics and policy processes as an important explanatory variable linking contemporary forms of authoritarianism with the country's past.

An important distinction needs to be drawn between the enduring influences of traditional political culture that may facilitate bureaucratic-authoritarian rule; and a contemporary political culture which may regenerate or
reformulate traditional culture partially as an outcome of current institutional structures and regime policies on the one hand, and partially as an ideology masking the more utilitarian partiality of the contemporary regime on the other. This regeneration and promotion of traditional values, such as obedience to authority and the emphasis on community over individual, by state elites may be viewed as a social control mechanism useful in consolidating bureaucratic-authoritarian rule. The notion that traditional political culture, alone, explains modern authoritarian institutions and practices needs to be rejected because it fails to consider fully more significant and concrete structural factors emanating from more recent historical events.

Current bureaucratic authoritarianism in Korea is but tangentially related to an identifiably indigenous Korean authoritarian tradition. Rather, there is a discontinuity in modern state formation between Yi and post-Yi dynasty eras. Purely domestic determinants of state formation are secondary in importance when compared to the political, economic, and social changes wrought by Korea's progressive incorporation into the modern world political economy, first by the Japanese colonization of the peninsula between 1905 and 1945; and later by American military occupation (1945-1948) and bi-lateral alliance (1948-present). For much of the 20th century the main architects of modern Korean state
formation have been foreigners and the most influential preoccupations and concerns exogenous to the peninsula.

In 1905, an expansionist Japan defeated tsarist Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, thus achieving the long-sought goal of primacy in Northeast Asia and suzerainty over the Korean peninsula. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed and subsumed as a colony within the regional political economy of the greater Japanese empire. As a colony, the traditional Korean political order was replaced by the colonial state apparatus of metropole Japan which itself, as a late industrializing country, was dominated by a dynamically interventionist developmental state. In the Japanese metropole "it was the state that conceived modernization as a goal and industrialization as a means, that gave birth to the new economy in haste and pushed it unrelentingly as an ambitious mother her child prodigy."  

In Meiji Japan the state was the dominant instrument in political and economic life. When projected onto occupied Korea in the form of a colonial apparatus with enormous strength, autonomy, and resulting extractive and manipulative powers, the state essentially functioned to mobilize human and material resources to serve the interests of the metropole. These imperial interests were both economic and political; economic in that the colonial state was designed to generate and extract increased agricultural and industrial surpluses primarily for repatriation to Japan.
and, political in that the Korean peninsula was to serve as a springboard for the projection of Japanese imperial aspirations into Manchuria and northern China.

Japanese colonialism in northeast Asia was defensive in nature in that the Japanese elites perceived imperial expansion as necessary in fending off the encroachment of Western imperial powers, particularly Russia. It was offensive in nature in that it sought to harness the resources of an underdeveloped northeast Asian periphery to a rapidly modernizing Japanese industrial economy. With rapid development conceived of as vital to national survival Japan's colonial enterprise in Korea was highly conscious and well planned. Although much of the planning was derivative of an already waning European colonial experience, Japan's hurried colonization "imparted an architectonic, structured and structuring quality to the enterprise." The goals were both the expansion and "deepening" of Korean agricultural and industrial production and the promotion of expansionist Japanese national security strategies.

As an instrument of metropole Japan, the colonial state stood above Korean society. In so doing, it exercised authoritative and highly coercive control over the peninsula's population. It quickly dissolved the Yi monarchy, subordinated, pensioned-off, or coopted the remnants of the yangban aristocracy, purged Korean
bureaucrats, and mobilized other elite elements into pro-Japanese organizations. The aggressive development of the agricultural economy left many Korean landlords economically well situated but without their former political power (being dependent on the state) and diminished and discredited in the eyes of their nationalist countrymen for cooperating with the Japanese overlords. Thus, in the Korean context there is precedent for economic elites that are divorced from substantial political power and that are dependent upon statist authority for the maintenance of their wealth and social position. Throughout the Japanese occupation the colonial administration was careful to restrict the development of indigenous (i.e. Korean) capital. Industrial investment and production was overwhelmingly dominated by ethnic Japanese and firms from the home islands.

By 1938 Japanese-owned enterprises produced three-quarters of the gross value of industrial output, comprised 60% of all firms, and accounted for 90% of paid-up capital. Significant Korean interests (i.e. sectors with over 20% Korean capitalization) were not in manufacturing but, in trade, real estate, agriculture, and non-bank financial institutions. Therefore, at the close of the colonial period, there were relatively few Koreans who could be thought of as constituting a significant class of domestic capitalists.
Open Korean nationalist resistance, such as the March 1, 1919 uprising, was ruthlessly crushed by the Japanese military, and covert opposition was relentlessly ferreted out by the kempetei, the much feared secret police. Significantly, the colonial state preoccupied with control and stability, relied for its efficacy on coercive police powers with the result that the police (civilian and military) became of central importance to policy implementation. Those Korean aristocrats, landlords, and minor bureaucrats who managed to cling to a semblance of social status had only weak and dependent social, economic, and political ties to the colonial state. The state's links with civil society were designed primarily to thwart and coopt dissent, not to provide meaningful political participation to the Emperor's subjects.

In general, the colonial state dramatically strengthened central bureaucratic power in Korea, as a means of disciplining and mobilizing human resources and extracting agricultural and industrial surpluses at unprecedented levels for diversion to Japanese consumers in the home islands or the rapidly expanding military effort in China. Instead of the traditionally inert bureaucracy with attenuated links to peripheral society, there was implanted a pervasive and dynamic mechanism, typified by the national police, for penetrating to the extremities of domestic society which was driven by an imperative for compelling
cooperation and coordination from all segments of the population.

In this way, the Japanese metropole was responsible for "an extreme skewing of Korean bureaucratic power in the direction of ponderous, overgrown centralization; (and) bequeathed to postwar Korea a formidable bureaucratic weapon that could rapidly accelerate or severely retard new forms of political participation."

By 1945, the mental template of the positive interventionist state was imprinted on the minds of a generation of Koreans who were about to be freed from the colonial yoke. Superimposed over an authoritarian political culture tradition, this template is viewed here as contributing greatly to the eventual emergence of modern bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the Korean context.

**Liberation and Division: the Koreanization of Cold War Cleavage**

It is clear that the state in colonial Korea was an overdeveloped administrative apparatus. What is less self-evident is the reason why this state form was not only sustained in the post-liberation era (given its negative association with an almost universally reviled condition of national subjugation) but, indeed, amplified and enhanced. One might attempt to explain it in purely political culture terms, as a compulsive national longing for paternalistic security; or in purely pragmatic terms as a conscious
attempt to reassert national prestige or undertake much-needed economic development projects. But, in the final analysis, the positive, interventionist, over-developed, post-colonial state in Korea was sustained and enhanced more by exogenous than endogenous factors.

Liberation from Japanese colonialism did not bring a respite from authoritarianism. That is a pivotal tragedy in modern Korean history. Unlike Japan, national liberation did not entail political liberalization primarily because of the nature of the liberation process, which divided the peninsula into separate Soviet and American occupation zones and the progressively incorporated these zones into the spheres of influence of the respective superpowers. As the WWII Soviet-American alliance precipitously dissolved into the mutual antagonism and competition of the insipient Cold War, the geopolitical security interests of the two great powers quickly came to dominate domestic Korean affairs. North of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) Soviet occupying forces exploited the revolutionary atmosphere by abetting the consolidation of power by pro-Soviet groups bent on instituting a revolutionary political and economic order. South of the DMZ American occupying forces dedicated themselves to aggressively suppressing the revolutionary movement while facilitating the consolidation of a pro-American, conservative political and economic regime.

While initially exhibiting a great deal of uncertainty
and drift as to precisely what it was to accomplish, the American Military Government in Korea (AMG) steadily moved to place liberalization and democratization on the back-burner and revive the strong state apparatus both to preserve an emerging but shaky Korean conservative coalition and to construct an anti-communist bulwark in defense of American strategic interests in the Far East. Indeed, the official history of the AMG states that the "basic principle" guiding the American occupation was that "an orderly, efficiently operated and politically friendly Korea was more important than pleasing and winning enthusiastic cooperation of all the Korean people." To implement this overarching strategic goal, the AMG kept the structure of the colonial bureaucracy intact while placing Koreans, many promoted from the lower echelons, in the senior positions recently vacated by repatriated Japanese. And to what purposes was this revivified state put? It was not used to induce and shepherd rapid social transformation and economic development, nor for mobilizing and channeling a politically activated population into forward-looking pursuits. Rather, it was preoccupied with maintaining the privileges of an small and anachronistic conservative regime in the face of intense popular upheaval as well as acting to further American security interests by containing the spread of leftist revolution and Soviet influence (viewed as one and the same by most American officials at the time).
Commenting in the Weberian tradition, Dahrendorf has posited that

[as] a medium and instrument of domination, bureaucracy stands at the disposal of anyone who is called upon to control it. And, as a constant in political conflict it accompanies and supports whatever group is in power by administering its interests and directives dutifully and loyally.

During the colonial period, the Japanese progressively insinuated Koreans into the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy where they characteristically served with competence, dedication and zeal. During the period of the AMG the Korean bureaucracy was an extension of the American state, primarily dedicated to serving American interests—not as a complete American creation or product—but as a hybrid creature with Korean, Japanese, and American genes.

The most powerful institutions of the bureaucracy at this time were the national police and the constabulary (the forerunner of the Korean military). As the main enforcement and surveillance instrument of Japanese colonialism, the national police force was the largest (25,000 men) and most well equipped institution in the country. For reasons of security and stability, the Americans chose to maintain the police structure and function much as before the Japanese surrender and, in 1947 created the Korean Constabulary as a paramilitary auxiliary designed to support the police in controlling domestic disturbances. Most members of the national police had served under the Japanese colonial
administration and most of the officers in the constabulary were former Korean officers in the Japanese armed forces.

In as much as the Korean bureaucracy was nourished by large infusions of economic and technical assistance from the U.S., it became the target of inter-elite takeover in the form of the anti-communist and conservative Korean Democratic Party (KDP). As the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States worsened, the prospects for the planned national reunification diminished to the extent that various Korean political parties began jockeying for positions of power in post-AMG Korea. Chief among these groups was the conservative KDP. When the AMG disbanded and formal independence was declared in 1948 (August 15, for the ROK, and September 9, for the DPRK), the arch-conservative KDP led by Syngman Rhee gained control of this powerful state bureaucracy. And while substantial backing for Rhee's new government came from the landlord class, it could not supplant U.S. military and financial support that remained the most important pillar of Rhee's regime.

**The Korean War and the Politics of Permanent Crisis**

The centrality of American support became painfully obvious when military forces of the DPRK launched a surprise invasion across the DMZ on June 25, 1950. The intensity of the DPRK's blitzkrieg caused the rapid disintegration of military resistance and Rhee's political control in the ROK,
and only the hurried arrival of U.S. and eventually United Nations troops prevented a forced reunification of the peninsula on the DPRK's terms. The Korean War was at once a civil war between Korean factions, and an international war between rival great power blocs. The war ended in stalemate when China intervened to prevent the eradication of the last shattered remnants of the DPRK's forces and the reunification of the peninsula under the auspices of the ROK. Also, the great powers chose, over the objections of their respective Korean proxies, not to widen the scope of military activities. And, while an armistice was reached in 1953, no formal peace treaty between the ROK and DPRK has as yet been signed—technically, the war is not over.

This state of suspended civil and international war has given Korean politics an unnatural quality for the last 35 years. The Korean War intensified the internalization of international politics (i.e. the Cold War) in Korea's domestic politics. This has produced in the Korean context a regime which perceives itself to be immediately threatened by enemies foreign and domestic—a kind of siege mentality predicated on internal and external crises. Conversely, the situation has induced a "koreanization" of U.S. foreign policy in the East Asia, the U.S. manipulating a succession of ROK regimes, but occasionally and increasingly being manipulated in security affairs by these same Korean regimes.
To a great degree, class or interest group politics have been delegitimated and muted in South Korea by the trauma of the war because interest group political competition is often cast as abnormal and inappropriate in the decidedly unnatural condition of war without end. In addition, the situation provides state elites with a cogent and persuasive (although often exaggerated) rationale for utilizing overtly coercive measures against those opposing regime policy. The threat to regime and national security is no mere chimera in the Korean context, but a reality that had been validated in the war itself and again in the form of sabotage and border incursions since the artificial division of the country. From this perspective, the war instilled an ideological homogeneity (anti-communism) in an already ethnically and culturally homogeneous population which has functioned to set strict parameters on the range of policy debates and development options. This has been characteristic of every post-war Korean regime.

The effect of U.S. hegemony in South Korea was not only to sustain conservative political forces but to influence the economic structure of Korean society so as to spur the maturation of a native bourgeoisie. During the reconstruction era the Rhee regime was perennially besieged. Rhee's dogmatic nationalism and autocratic manner prevented the development of any solid social foundation for his regime. Unwilling and unable to insure the position of the
landlord class (the U.S. had rammed through 2 major land reform programs before and during the Korean War) and too intimately (and corruptly) tied to U.S. aid programs, his Liberal Party regime failed to promote aggressively the economic agendas of either the landlord or fledgling industrialist classes.

By the 1950s South Korea was a society undergoing economic transformation. Capitalism was emerging as the dominant form of social relation economically and the political power of capital was steadily increasing. Economic growth in the reconstruction period was fueled mostly by U.S. economic aid and military spending although the agricultural economy stagnated due to the availability of inexpensive grains imported via the PL 480 program.

During the 1950s the Korean economy and state were heavily dependent upon foreign aid, not only for long-term growth prospects, but even for day-to-day functioning. Almost 90% of Korea's manufacturing industries relied on foreign (overwhelmingly American) grants during the 1953-1960 period and almost half of the total general government expenditures were financed by this foreign aid. Economic growth was built on an edifice of sand in that it was not domestically self-sustaining, as evidenced by sharp drops in GNP in 1959 and 1960 following reductions in American aid. Business growth was sluggish due to the fact that the new business elite profited from subsidized credit and access to
cheap foreign exchange rather than from increasing industrial production. Significantly, the bureaucracy benefited from corruption in the form of payments received for favorable treatment granted to the emerging business elite thus establishing a clear post-war symbiosis of state/domestic capital interests.

The period of the Rhee regime witnessed the continued subordination of bourgeois interests to those of the state but with important differences from the colonial era. First, bourgeois economic interests were growing at an accelerating rate with the first of the chaebol, giant business conglomerates which were to come to dominate the Korean economy established during this period. Second, the era's flourishing corruption, while reprehensible in many ways, established linkages through which private bourgeois interests could informally influence state decision-making. Had both these trends, a growing bourgeoisie and flourishing corruption, continued in the environment of political and economic drift characteristic of the Rhee regime, it is quite possible that bureaucratic authoritarian politics would not have emerged in contemporary Korea. Instead, a pluralist, class-based politics characterized by a state progressively penetrated and influenced by steadily expanding domestic capital interests might have emerged. The industrialization processes of the post-Korean War period brought forth neither a hegemonic national industrial
bourgeoisie nor a well-developed and highly activated industrial proletariat.

**Setting a Pattern: Emergence of the Industrial Proletariat and Its Relationships with the State**

An insipient industrial proletariat had emerged as a consequence of imperial Japan's policies of industrializing the Korean peninsula and integrating it within the political and economic framework of the greater empire. Prior to Japan's aggressive colonization and the infusion of Japanese state and corporate capital there had been virtually no indigenous industry and therefore no genuine, indigenous industrial proletariat. But the Japanese strategy of land consolidation, which progressively drove hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers off the land and into the cities, coupled with the emphasis on rapidly developing mining and manufacturing facilities, mobilized an industrial workforce of 400,000, they produced 35% of the total national product by 1945.

The first Korean labor organization was founded in 1898, and by 1919 there were 25 such labor organizations. Most were small, localized, anti-colonial, and short-lived. During the somewhat liberal period of the 1920s when the official policy of the Japanese Government-General was that it "would not oppose the wholesome development of trade unions," the formation of labor organizations steadily increased. While initially these unions were primarily
concerned with issues such as wages and working conditions, they quickly took on class-oriented and revolutionary characteristics due to the activities of radical Japanese agitators and the progressively exclusionary and repressive measures of the colonial regime.

Probably the most dramatic incident of union militancy was the three month-long strike of stevedores and transportation workers at the port city of Wonsan on Korea's northeast coast in 1929. The 1,350 members of the Federation of Labor Unions of Wonsan had struck over various grievances including corporate and government recognition of their union. All demands were met except union recognition upon which the company and colonial government would not compromise. When the union continued the strike, the area's commerce was completely obstructed and the colonial authority of Japan felt openly defied to the extent that the government jailed the leaders and disbanded the union. This action became an important precedent for a later generation of Korean leaders.

As Japan shifted to a war economy in the 1930s, the colonial regime increased the industrial mobilization of labor while also increasing its political exclusion by officially suppressing independent unions and disbanding or absorbing them into the Patriotic Industrial Association (Sampo), a peak organization controlled directly by the state. As such repression became more severe, the insipient
Korean labor movement progressively assumed the character of a more radicalized, illegal, violent, and often anti-colonial movement. Radical labor organizers, many of them communists, were quick to infiltrate labor organizations to exploit not only class-based antagonisms but, in as much as most industries were Japanese owned and operated, nationalist grievances as well. In 1934 a *Platform of Action of the Communist Party of Korea* was adopted which stressed the fusion of Marxist-Leninist and nationalist goals:

1) Complete national independence by violent overthrow of Japanese rule; 2) establishment of a workers' and peasants' Soviet government; 3) confiscation (without compensation) and distribution of all land and property of landlords; and 4) an eight-hour day and radical improvement of labor conditions.24

Subsequently, the labor movement and labor unions developed in a highly radicalized and politicized manner in the colonial context; on the one hand, they struggled against the conditions of industrial exploitation engendered by the alliance between private capital and the developmental colonial state, and on the other against the depredations of an alien occupation threatening national and cultural extinction. The colonial period produced a Korean labor movement that had been dramatically mobilized for industrial production but radically politicized due to the exclusionary and repressive policies of a colonial state bent on pursuing a state capitalist development model. Upon the collapse of the colonial administration, this industrial proletariat
enthusiastically collaborated in the forming of the Korean Peoples' Republic as well as the seizure and operation of factories and businesses across the peninsula.

It is evident that the colonial period incubated a highly mobilized and politically activated popular sector in that worker and peasant unions (Nodong Chohap and Nongmin Chohap respectively) mushroomed around the countryside in a spontaneous and decentralized manner immediately after the Japanese surrender in August, 1945, and before the arrival of American occupation troops in the south. In large part, they busied themselves with cultivating land and operating businesses owned by Japanese nationals, but they also occasionally seized the assets of Korean landlords and businessmen. Such activity indicates that there were well developed socio-political bases for an autonomous, grassroots labor movement and industrial union organization in the post-war era--a top-down structure organized from above was not needed.

Deactivating the Labor Movement

The explosive and completely autonomous process of local and national union organization culminated in November, 1945 when representatives of these various Nodong Chohap met in Seoul to form an umbrella organization known as the All Korea Council of Labor Unions (Chosun Nodong Chohap Chunkook P'yungwie Hoewha or simply Chunp'yung).
Chunp'yung claimed a total membership of 553,408, affiliated with 16 national unions organized according to industry and with 223 branches (chibu) and 1,757 locals (chibang) nationwide. The politicized nature of the organization is evident in that all ten members of the executive board were former political prisoners with several being acknowledged communists. But, while the AMG initially viewed Chunp'yung as reformist, conservative Korean elements, including the police and bureaucrats, viewed it as radical and revolutionary. The increasing drift on the part of the AMG toward preoccupations with stability and anti-communism changed its attitude toward the union and progressively cast Chunp'yung as the object of widespread distrust and suppression.

In December, 1945 the AMG issued Ordinance no. 34 which prohibited strikes and established a National Labor Mediation Board to arbitrate labor-management disputes. Soon thereafter similar boards were established in the provinces with a bourgeois bias evident in that the overwhelming majority of members were businessmen, professionals, and employers. In truth, "the boards were little more than employer's associations, the typical device for translating economic influence into political power." The AMG also held former Japanese properties in trust until they could be turned over to a recognized Korean government. By controlling the appointment of plant, factory and
business managers (375 as of February 1946) the AMG not only
was able to exercise considerable control over unions, but
continued and reinforced a pattern of entrepreneurial
reliance on connections (both honest and corrupt) with the
state bureaucracy rather than on individual responsibility
and initiative as the most important avenues to economic
success.

When Chunp'yung coordinated the massive general
strike of September 1946, it included in its list of demands
both economic (i.e. wages, working conditions, freedom to
organize, etc.) and political (i.e. the release of political
prisoners, an end to reactionary terror, and a transfer of
government power to people's committees) criteria. The AMG
interpreted this as clear evidence of a radical leftist
agenda serving the interests of the communists in North
Korea by destabilizing conditions in the south. After
considerable turmoil the general strike was broken and along
with it Chunp'yung's dominance of the labor movement. The
AMG moved to outlaw the communist party and purge leftist
organizations, including Chunp'yung, in 1947. By September
of that year only 13 Chunp'yung affiliated unions with a
total membership of 39,786 were still operating.

In March 1946, a right-wing labor federation called the
Federation of Korean Trade Unions for the Promotion of
Independence (Daehan Dongnip Ch'oksung Nodong Ch'ongd'ong
Maengwhe or Noch'on) was organized by anti-leftist
nationalists who were coming to dominate politics in order to counter the leftist Chunp'yung. As a creation of the emerging elites, the former had virtually no grass-roots bases and was purely a top-down organization designed, as its platform of democracy, neo-nationalism, labor-management harmony, and anti-communism demonstrates, to combating its counterpart. While initially miniscule in terms of membership, after the dismantling of Chunp'yung, Noch'ong became the only regime-sanctioned labor organization in Korea and functioned to reorganize the industrial workforce within a deradicalized if not depoliticized organizational framework.

With the recognition of the independent ROK government in 1948, Noch'ong was faced with the task of appearing to function as a genuine worker's organization. However, its history as a politically motivated, pro-regime union organization hindered the accomplishment of such goals as advancing the socio-economic and political status of workers, organizational expansion, union democratization, and independence from political interference. Disunity and political struggles among various factions in gaining the patronage of various political elites hampered the growth of democratic unionism, reinforcing the political dependency of the federation. Indeed, in 1952 when the Rhee regime, built around the old Korea Democratic Party, restructured itself and adopted the new appellation of the Liberal Party it
incorporated Noch'ong into the party as one of its five social organizations.

**Incorporation of 'Noch'ong' in the Second Republic**

Organized labor and the other groups, were not to be left independent of the guidance or protection of the regime. The old Japanese model of organizing society and linking organizations to the statist elites was reformulated so that "within the party, these groups exercised no noticeable influence, but rather were instruments of transmitting government directives to the members of their several organizations." Thus, a pattern of vertical linkage, leadership cooptation, and regime manipulation characteristic of corporatist interest representation or intermediation is discernible not only in the Japanese colonial period, but also in the Rhee era's preoccupation with anti-communism and regime maintenance. To this point there is little evidence to suggest that this structuring process resulted from economic considerations related to development model or the interests of domestic or foreign capital.

In addition to the inherent problems of a labor union movement striving to be viable in the virulently anti-communist environment of the immediate post-Korean War period, the process of genuine union organization was frustrated by other factors as well. The leadership of the umbrella Noch'ong federation was coopted through its Liberal
Party affiliations, and national and local unions nodong chohap were penetrated by the right-wing, Anti-Communist Youth Organization and harassed by the national police. As a result, the organized labor union structure became the authoritarian regime's instrument for instituting social control in the form of political quiescence amongst the industrial workforce. It had ceased, with the demise of Chunp'yung, to be an autonomous entity advancing the interests of its constituency either viz. the state or domestic capital primarily because of regime concerns about security and stability. It had not occurred as a consequence of any manifest desire on the part of Rhee to boost industrial development or assist domestic capitalists in confrontation with a class conscious labor movement.

In April, 1960 the Rhee regime, having lost legitimacy and authority because of rampant corruption and election fraud, was toppled by a student-led popular uprising. This was followed in May, 1961 by a military coup d'état that installed a junta led by army general Park Chung-hee. The junta, calling itself the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), moved immediately to suspend the legislature and disband all political parties. It also dissolved all existing labor organizations but, within a few months it deliberately reorganized them under the auspices of a "new" peak organization, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions, (Hankook Nodong Chohap Ch'ongyunmaeng or,
confusingly, Noch'ong).

The professed goal was to eradicate factionalism, purge the union leaderships of corrupt power-brokers, and promote genuine labor organization around the West German model of industrial unionism. But the latent function was to continue a corporatist tradition of vertically linking the labor movement and union organization to the incumbent political regime via the mechanism of a subordinated, state-sanctioned and manipulable structure. However, whereas the Rehee regime had included labor as a subordinate component of the ruling Liberal Party, the strategy of the Park era was exclusionary to the extent that Noch'ong was not incorporated directly into the ruling coalition.

The reorganized Noch'ong was not an autonomous entity produced by the voluntary participation of the rank-and-file membership or even of branch or local union officials, but the creature of top-down decision-making on the part of a new dominant political elite. It served as a mechanism for facilitating economic mobilization of the workforce while, at the same time, depoliticizing and deactivating labor organization. And initially, the restructuring was prompted more by the political concerns of the junta, i.e. regime maintenance and internal security, rather than by economic concerns relating to development agenda or bourgeois bias.
The Installation of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regime: The Third Republic

Though not a bureaucratic-authoritarian coup, the military coup d'état of 1961 set the stage for the emergence, if not the installation, of bureaucratic-authoritarianism. It was this regime that progressively introduced the mechanisms of state-corporatism into the Korean context. O'Donnell's conceptualization of the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin America stresses the economic determinants of military intervention in the polity. The argument is that the military institutes regime change in the face of a national political crisis arising from an increasing politization and activation of the popular sector.

The increased class-struggle resulting from an advanced stage of industrialization engenders a political-economic crisis which cannot be resolved within the context of the existing political order. The result is that an elite coalition, of which the military is only a component, sponsors or sanctions the military takeover to preempt, deactivate, and exclude the popular sector.

By contrast, in Korea, the political crisis leading to the 1961 coup had little to do with popular activation arising from internal class cleavages, particularly that which might have obtained as a result of an advanced stage of industrialization. Economic explanations for military intervention in politics, for example, to facilitate
industrialization strategies or please foreign capital, do not hold in the Korean case. Unlike many Latin American cases, industrialization had yet to attain levels approaching industrial take-off. Non-elites, particularly organized industrial labor, had been (for reasons discussed earlier) politically quiescent rather than highly activated and posed little or no threat to nascent industrial deepening or take-off.

Political cleavage was most manifest between elite groups struggling for positions of power within the contexts of the recognized political parties and the national legislature. While economic growth was sluggish, there was no pronounced economic crisis such as a severe recession or inflation to exacerbate class-based differences. So the conditions for a truly bureaucratic-authoritarian coup had as yet to develop.

The crisis was precipitated in the main by a perception, on the part of a small fraction of the military, of increased threat to the national security posed by the erosion of public order in the wake of the student revolution and vociferous demands by radical students for reunification talks with the DPRK. The shallowness or outright absence of widespread popular support for the post-Rhee regime of Prime Minister Chang Myun (Second Republic) may be inferred from the ease with which the very small faction of dissident military officers toppled the regime.
The causal sequence outlined by O'Donnell wherein economic crises lead to regime change needs to be modified in the specific case of the 1961 Korean coup. Korea had not yet attained a level of industrialization and unstable class cleavage requisite of his conceptual framework. However, two important aspects of his framework did obtain as a result of the coup. First, it was during this Third Republic that the contemporary dominant regime coalition emerged; a coalition that conforms very closely to O'Donnell's expectation. Second, a perception of economic crisis, if not the reality, was utilized by the coup makers to legitimate, if not instigate, their action. That the coup makers were concerned about economic policy had some basis.

The coup almost immediately resulted in an overt shift in economic policy on the part of the new regime; deemphasizing import substitution industrialization and emphasizing rapid growth via the creation of an export platform based upon manufactured products. In the Korean case, political and economic concerns were inextricably entwined in the perceptions of the coup makers to the extent that economic crisis must be viewed as an important factor pushing the military's intervention.

During the Third Republic, Park forged a pact of domination, an alliance or coalition of elites which came to exercise political and economic hegemony over the rest of
The composition and structure of that state coalition is characteristic of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model, e.g. an alliance of the military, civilian bureaucracy, technocratic planners, and domestic big business, in close association with foreign political and, increasingly, capital interests. It was this coalition that progressively came to manifest the classic political characteristics of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state—comprehensive in the scope of its authority, interventionist in society’s affairs, penetrating in its intrusiveness, repressive in limiting political participation, highly bureaucratized, dependent upon technocratic planners, and highly reliant upon foreign sources of economic and political support.

It was this elite coalition acting through the governmental apparatus of the state in a top-down manner that progressively introduced corporative policies toward organized labor and used these policies to pursue a variety of goals—invoking an effort to shape the behavior of the labor movement by integrating it into the economic development program while excluding it from avenues of political power.

Regime Ideology and the Development Agenda

The officers who led the 1961 coup were motivated by many factors; perceived threat to the national security,
continued prevalence of decadent Confucian ideas and customs, extreme factionalism of political parties, and pervasive corruption in the government. They were also alarmed over the Chang government's intention to sharply reduce the size of the military, thus eliminating positions and retarding promotions in the officer corps. The 700,000 man military was the largest single institution in Korea and held a monopoly on the use of deadly force. The officer corps had benefited from American tutelage to the extent that it "was one of the most intensively westernized sectors of the society in terms of work tempo and work habits" giving it a well-defined corporate identity and impressive organizational cohesiveness. When the coup occurred there were no other groups, elites or non-elites, capable of effectively resisting the military's arrogation of power unto itself.

The manifest rationale for the military seizure of power was predicated on the assumption that civil rule had been a total failure. The military revolution was designed to "enable a new elite...to take over the nation and the State" and institute "a national, common people's revolution, a revolution of national consciousness, and a turnover of generations." The Military Revolution marked a clear break with past political elite coalitions in that the great bulk of the officer corps, particularly the middle and junior ranks supporting the coup, were of non-elite,
rural backgrounds with few ties to the Korea's socio-economic elite classes--except at the very highest levels. The military had not been an elite institution prior to 1961, and its new power and status emanated from strategic bases within the formal state structure, rather than from bases located in civil society.

Concerning the ideology of the Military Revolution, it is important to note the influence of earlier revolutionary models on the development perspectives of the junta officers. Park Chung-hee, who quickly emerged as the junta strongman, cited five examples of revolutionary development as providing lessons which inspired emulation: the modernization movement of Sun Yat-sen in China; the revolution of the "Young Turks" led by Kemal Attaturk; the Egyptian Revolution, led by Nasser and the Free Officer Corps; the post-WW II reconstruction of West Germany; and, most significantly, the Meiji Restoration in Japan.

The economic development implications are informative in that four of these examples (China, Japan, Turkey, and Egypt), had in common the fact that they were late or late-late developers confronted with conditions of internal backwardness as well as external threat. All four were examples of Trimberger's model of "revolution from above". The West German example was one in which a nation physically partitioned and economically in ruins rose to become an industrial powerhouse in only 15 years. In all five cases,
Park noted the salience of guidance provided by strong leadership in implementing rapid industrialization strategies essential for the attainment of national security and autonomy.

Within months of the coup, Park was justifying the military's seizure of power primarily in terms of promoting economic development by arguing that "I want to emphasize and reemphasize that the key factor of the May 16th Military Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in Korea:"

We must not hesitate for a moment. Indeed, there is no time even to think, if we consider the present situation. With a strong enemy across the 38th Parallel, this economic struggle takes precedence over combat or politics. Our only remaining alternative is to concentrate creative energy on the problems of the national economy and proceed to recovery. We have to accomplish, as quickly as possible, the goal of an independent economy. We must manage our own affairs as our own responsibility. Before May 1961 this was the primary objective which made me undertake the revolution. Independence! There is no other net to catch this elusive goal except economic independence.

Park reasoned that Asians, Koreans in particular, needed to attain economic equality first, and build a more equitable political system afterward. He believed that the "economic conditions which served to provide backgrounds for (democratic) development in Europe have not yet been established or, even if so, incompletely, in Asia."

In a backward country like Korea it was necessary to achieve economic development to improve the living standard of the people as a prerequisite to building an eventual...
democracy. In the transitional period, which would eventually stretch out over two decades, it would be necessary to adhere to a system of controlled or remedial democracy, which Park called "administrative democracy" in order to achieve the rapid economic growth requisite of modern democratic processes. The intellectual bases for a statist political economic structure are, therefore, clearly evident in the writings of the dominant architect of the new order.

Forging the Pact of Domination

Park rationalized that "democracy should be established by administrative means, not by political means" and, concomitantly, "efforts should be made to increase the efficiency of administrative control as far as possible." During the Third Republic (1963-1971), the civilian bureaucracy emerged as an important task elite of the new Korean state for it was charged with devising the actual implementation strategies of policies outlined by the political elites of Park's presidential Secretariat and the regime's ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP). More precisely, the bureaucracy was enhanced as a political economy tool of the executive branch, insulated from responsibility to the nation's courts and legislature and "frequently deeply involved in exercising its influence for the benefit of the government, or so-called 'ruling' party."
Examples of government agencies actively involved in support of the DRP were the national police; the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA); local governmental units which actually serve as administrative field offices for the central government as local autonomy has yet to be granted; the national broadcast system (KBS); government publications; and any regulatory agencies having a big business clientele and therefore "likely to serve as major channels for providing funds for the government party through their power to grant or withhold government favors."

The attitude of administrators toward their clientele has been governed by a clearly understood hierarchical norm which emphasizes the notion of rule rather than service. From the perspective of the bureaucracy, service in the form of obedience is owed to the political elite, whereas to clientele, government action is generally regarded as a favor rather than an obligation. Consequently, the bureaucracy's clients have usually been in the unenviable position of begging for special favors rather than requesting or demanding abidance with legal requirements.

As a military man, Park was socialized to the importance of planning processes in the successful operation of large, modern institutions. As the principal architect of the new regime, Park argued that "in order to maintain the priority of the public interest, it is urgently
necessary to have an economic plan or long-range development program through which reasonable allocation of all our resources is feasible." As a consequence, long-range economic development planning, wherein the state exercised strong but indirect influence over national development strategies, became an integral characteristic of the entire Park era (1961-1979).

The first Five Year Economic Development Plan was instituted in 1962 and successive plans have been developed and implemented without interruption to the present. This dedication to long term planning has important political implications in that the successful attainment of the plan's targets are optimalized to the degree that political and economic stability and continuity are maintained. The maintenance and continuity of the political and task elites is justified and legitimated by the imperative to facilitate the overall national development plan.

This dedication to the planning process brought to political prominence the technocrats (technicos) characteristic of O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian model. The regime eventually created the Economic Planning Board (EPB) to coordinate as well as develop comprehensive indicative planning and gave the EPB's director the cabinet rank of Deputy Prime Minister, the third highest-ranking post in the government. Other new creations were the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) which corresponds to
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Ministry of Construction (MC) which controls important public works expenditures. Eventually, semi-public "think tanks", such as the Korea Development Institute (KDI) and the Korea Institute of Science & Technology (KIST), were established or enhanced to provide the institutional bases for linking thousands of technocratic planners with the very highest political and bureaucratic offices of the state.

Studies of the development of classes of Korean capitalism demonstrate that accumulation and the rise of private industrial capital in Korea has been as much a political process as an economic one. The distinctness of the Korean case is the nature of the relationship between the state's political elites, e.g., those who develop economic development strategies and enshrine them as national policy, and the task elites, e.g., those who actually translate policy intentions into reality. At the outset of the Military Revolution the SCNR members moved to subordinate commercial and industrial capital by implementing the Special Law for Dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation and arresting most of the leading industrialists of the day.

Eventually a compromise was worked out whereby criminal sanctions were dropped, illicit assets were confiscated and the industrialists were to build factories to be turned over
to the government as well as pay cash fines totalling $16 million. Having been so "sensitized" to the public sector's political dominance, industrial capital was purposely incorporated into state policy as the primary engine of pursuing rapid GNP growth strategies.

Under Park, the government instituted formal monthly export promotion meetings between cabinet officials and management officials of the chaebol industrial groups at which the president himself often exhorted increased exports and awarded export medals to the most compliant corporate officers. In 1975, the state strengthened its policy of "guided capitalism" by statutorily specifying the criteria through which chaebol could qualify as General Trading Companies (GTCs) eligible for preferential low-interest industrial loans, export licenses and import licenses. Qualification criteria include trade penetration of a specified number of countries in different geographic regions and a minimum annual export volume, neither of which are within reach of any but the largest firms.

It is these GTC groups which have greatest access to foreign and domestic capital resources. Korean industrialists were also, at the order of the state, vertically organized into corporatist peak organizations such as the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), the Korea Trader's Association (KTA), the Korea Employer's Association (KEA), and the Korean Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI),
all of which facilitated state/industry communication via such mechanisms as the monthly export promotion meetings closely monitored by Park and the Blue House staff. Very quickly "a pattern was established whereby substantial assistance was given to established businessmen who proved themselves capable of initiating new manufacturing and export activity." It is clear that this patterned incorporation of domestic capital by the state exhibits both inducements and constraints.

While several of the chaebol, the large, oligopolistic industrial groups were established before Park came to power, the great expansion in their number and size was midwifed by the Park regime. The chaebol, harnessed to the policies of rapid growth, became the titans of domestic industrial and commercial capital as well as the shock-troops of Korea's export surge. This was accomplished primarily through the control over and preferential allocation of financial resources, e.g., low interest loans, import/export licenses, and tax assessments by the state.

The combination of coercive stick and recompensive carrot allowed the political elites to integrate domestic industrial capital into the state, but in such a way as to render it a junior partner--dependent and subordinate. This is not to say that big business lacks influence. Indeed, as the Korean BAIR has come to rely upon economic performance as legitimating and facilitating its rule,
chaebol influence has increased. This, plus the political
entre made possible through symbiotic financial
relationships and corruption, adds an often overlooked
dimension of the BAIR model; that it is not static in that
the power relationships characterizing the symbiotic elite
coaition may evolve and change in accordance with the
actual developmental experience of the particular regime.
However, domestic capital has yet to emerge as the dominant
faction in the Korean BAIR.

Foreign public and private capital has played an
extremely important role in Korean economic development.
Prior to the Park regime, foreign capital was represented
principally in the form of U.S. economic and military
grants-in-aid. In 1964 the state shifted the emphasis in
national economic development strategies from import
substitution industrialization (ISI) to promotion of the
export-platform and abetted this program in 1965 by forcing,
through extra-constitutional means, the normalization of
relations with Japan over the vociferous protests of
opposition political parties and radical students. And in
1966, the regime introduced the first foreign direct
investment law to induce foreign investment.

As a consequence, the structure of foreign capital
progressively shifted in favor of loans and foreign direct
investment (FDI), with loans far outstripping FDI. Between
1961 and 1976, only 7% of foreign funds entering Korea were
in the form of FDI. Korea has become the largest debtor in Asia and the fourth-largest internationally with an outstanding foreign debt of $45.3 billion (about 50% of annual GNP) as of 1986 and a debt-service ratio of 20.5%.

While relatively small in comparison to foreign loans ($1.4 billion as of 1982), FDI contributed to Korea's economic development by generating employment and transferring technology.

However, by relying overwhelmingly on loan capital rather than FDI and channeling that foreign capital to domestic capital through government controlled financial institutions such as the Korea Development Bank and the Korea Foreign Exchange Bank, the state has kept foreign capital at arm's length and rendered domestic industrial capital dependent and subordinate. The position of the national bourgeoisie in Korea is characteristic of associated dependent development and analogous to that of the Brazilian bourgeoisie described by Evans:

As a class that never achieved a hegemonic political position and never really had a "project," it is easy to relegate the dependent national bourgeoisie to...a class which was forced to admit that "in order to preserve its social power intact, its political power must be broken."...Since the political power of local capital cannot flow from its dominant role in the process of accumulation, it must depend on the nature of its ties to the "technobureaucracy."

However, one important difference is that, even in the face of heavy international financial exposure entailed in intimately linking the Korean economy to those of Japan and
the United States, the Korean BAIR has deliberately kept national economic development in Korean hands and avoided significant foreign transnational corporate (TNC) interference in the economy.

The salient factor here is the degree to which the Korean state has been successful in translating its plans into effective realities. Many countries have instituted economic planning mechanisms, but relatively few have been as successful as Korea in obtaining results. Effective implementation has rested on the state's ability to elicit effective compliance. In addition to controlling access to large reservoirs of low-interest foreign capital the state has wielded a wide array of inducements and constraints over domestic industry in the form of licenses and export and import quotas.

For example, in order to qualify for increased access to raw materials, a company must export an increased amount of finished or semi-finished industrial goods. It is also common knowledge amongst Korean businessmen that failure to aggressively pursue the government's vaunted export targets may result in increased tax levies or audits resulting in criminal prosecutions. In the Korean context, a corporation and its officers have very little hope of successfully resisting government pressure via the judiciary as it is not independent of the executive branch.

But the actual enforcement of such sanctions is rarely
needed in as much as the rapid growth and export-oriented strategies have tended to benefit the chaebol immensely. Hyundai, Samsung, Lucky/Goldstar, and Daewoo, are only a few of the chaebol groups which have surged to international prominence as a direct result of the development strategy. While certain chaebol, such as Kukje and Myungsung, have been allowed (some say assisted) to fail by the authorities, they are the exception and not the rule. And their demise serves to demonstrate to other chaebol the potential penalty for not adhering to government guidelines.

The symbiotic, commonality of interest between state and chaebol has helped the latter to profit to the degree that they further regime economic strategies. And, it is well-known that successful firms "contribute" part of their profits to the coffers of the ruling party, patriotic defense programs, and certain expenses (such as domestic and foreign travel) of the office of the president. Obviously, under such circumstances the distinction between public and private sector, between state and civil society becomes somewhat nebulous.

The limited and restricted politics of the administrative democracy institutionalized by the junta's "civilianization" in the Third Republic furthered their basic interests by 1) securing at least a vestige of legitimacy viz. civil society and American allies by appearing to adhere to representative political institutions
while, 2) providing the mechanisms to retain power by dominating those institutions. The support of the military and civilian bureaucracies, the creation of a powerful secret police, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), and the increasingly incestuous financial relationship between regime and big business, allowed Park and the ruling DRP a seemingly insurmountable advantage over any and all opponents.

The progress of the export-oriented development strategy provided a material incentive for acquiescence to, if not outright support for, the ruling coalition and the policy of rapid growth. Export-oriented industrialization did generate employment outstripping population growth and, combined with an agriculture policy which kept food prices for urban workers low, contributed to electoral victories for Park and the DRP in 1963 & 1967; the victory margin actually increased between 1963 (1.6%) and 1967 (10.4%) indicating significant popular support for the state's developmentalism. Yet, Park felt compelled to revise the constitution in 1969 to permit him to run for another term of office and in October 1972 he institutionalized bureaucratic authoritarian rule in the Yushin (Revitalizing Reform) constitution establishing the Fourth Republic (1972-1979).
Formal Institutionalization of the Korean BAIR

The Yushin reforms effectively made Park president for life and allowed him to dispense with party and legislative politics and rule by decree. The event amounted to a coup in office and, rather than representing a basic change in power relationships, merely recognized and institutionalized changes that had already taken place by the close of the Third Republic. Under the Fourth Republic's system, the institutional pillars of Park's support were the military, the KCIA, and the DRP. From the standpoint of policy processes the Presidential Secretariat became the locus of policy formation to the detriment of the formal cabinet.

The KCIA performed wide-ranging implementation and enforcement functions that were both formal and informal in nature, while the DRP became an instrument for electoral mobilization but was no longer effectively functioned as a vehicle of policy input. The DRP failed to function as the transmission-belt for bourgeois interests because Park actively discouraged such a development. He emasculated the party's policymaking role in the National Assembly by limiting its activities to interpolation and creating the Yujunghoe—an executive-appointed bloc of assemblypersons assured one-third of the Assembly's seats. Members of the Yujunghoe were to represent the national interest and were appointed from various specialized and prestigious professions. In this way, even the legislative branch
became imbued with the efficientist ethic of the technobureaucracy.

The enshrinement of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in the Fourth Republic was the result of both internal and external forces. In the 1971 elections, Park had won handily (53.2% to 46.8%) but the DRP had slipped badly (only 47.7% of votes in 1971) indicating an uncertain future for the regime should Park be removed from the scene. The opposition speculated that Park would change the constitution again in 1974, with Park being made president for life and further elections suspended. However, the timetable was moved up to 1972 primarily in response to rapid changes in the international environment--events which deeply affected the security perception of the Park regime.

Among these events were President Richard Nixon's Guam Declaration of 1969; the U.S. intention to reduce military forces in Asia (including the withdrawal of one infantry division from Korea); the PRC's admission to the U.N. following Taiwan's ouster; the rapprochment between the U.S. & the PRC as well as Japan & the PRC reflected in the visits of Nixon and Tanaka to Beijing; and North Korea's growing diplomatic offensive. The response of the Park regime was to implement a national emergency decree on December 6, 1971 in order to cope with the changes in the international situation.

On December 26, the DRP-controlled National Assembly,
without the participation of the opposition parties, passed a bill that gave Park broad emergency powers to rule by decree. By July 4, 1972 the government had negotiated the North-South Joint Communique proposing a process for the eventual reunification of the peninsula. Martial law was subsequently declared on October 17. It empowered an Extraordinary State Council to "announce by October 27, 1972 the draft amendments to the present constitution with the view of peaceful unification of the nation." Once again, the cause of the overt installation of bureaucratic-authoritarian rule was not unbalanced growth and industrial deepening.

However, economic factors did play some role. By the end of the 1960s, the labor surplus ended, and increases in the industrial workforce began to require increased wages. Fei and Ranis note that once this point is reached, income distribution begins to shift in favor of labor leading to a more sustained expansion of consumer demand and, therefore, the domestic market. Increasing wage rates and increased focus on the domestic consumer market would have conflicted with the established industrial policy of rapid, export-led development based on Korea's prime resource endowment--cheap labor.

As a consequence, the state intervened in industrial relations in order to contain rising wages within limits that would not threaten the comparative advantage of low
labor costs in the international export market. Wage rates were determined institutionally via the government mechanism of wage guidelines, rather than by market forces. One recent study noted that the "forced containment of wage pressure during this period of rapid growth aroused a distributional conflict between capital and labor and, broadly speaking, between the power bloc (the state apparatus, the local bourgeoisie, and international capital) and the popular masses (the working class, marginals, farmers, and progressive intellectuals)." This led to the increased political mobilization of the labor movement and the activation of the previously dormant industrial union structure as the rapidly growing labor force recognized its conflict with capital. Once again, perceived economic crisis contributed to strengthening bureaucratic-authoritarian controls.

State-Corporatist Structuring of Organized Industrial Labor in the Park Era

In as much as the formal labor legislation provided a legal basis for strengthening industrial labor's rights and advancing its interests viz. capital as well as the state, the regime responded by revising the laws in such a way as to increase its powers of regulation and regimentation of the working class in order to preempt any challenge to the export-led development strategy. Rapid economic growth had clear priority over social equity and labor rights in the
policy agenda of the regime. Industrial unions, particularly those in the export-oriented manufacturing sector, were forcefully integrated into the regime's industrial policy in a manner that minimized their potential to inhibit or disrupt that strategy by effectively asserting their group or class interests. Individual corporate interests were not to interfere with the pursuit of the national interest as defined by the state elites.

This process of state regulation was epitomized by the enactment, in December 1969, of the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labor Unions and the Settlement of Labor Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms (later incorporated into the Yushin labor law framework), which prohibited union organization and work actions in such firms without the state's expressed permission. This had the effect of severely restricting the unionization of foreign invested plants in the important free export processing zones located in Masan and Iri, as well as foreign invested firms in the large Kumi industrial complex near Seoul.

With formal avenues of remedy or access closed off by state intervention and extended repression (exclusion), labor activity began to manifest itself outside of the officially sanctioned union structure. Illegal strikes, work stoppages and unsanctioned union organization occurred in both domestic and foreign-owned firms. The culmination of such activity was the spectacular self-immolation of a
young garment worker and union organizer, Chun Tae-il, in protest of intolerable working conditions, low wages, and state repression at Seoul's giant Pyungwha market.

This action rallied church groups, such as the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) and Young Christian Workers (YCW), as well as student groups, and opposition political parties to the cause of social justice and the rights of industrial workers. It also lead to increasing politicization of social justice and industrial relations issues at a time when the regime was trying to minimize them. Therefore the desire to control and defuse labor's activities and to keep wages down contributed to Park's decision to formally install via Yushin the bureaucratic authoritarian regime which had progressively emerged, de facto during the Third Republic.

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, there are essentially two types of political incorporation of organized labor observed in the historical experiences of developing countries. The first type is "party/movement incorporation," characterized as a mobilization of the industrial working class as an adjunct ally of one or more elite faction engaged in an intra-elite struggle for dominance. In this context organized labor is seen as augmenting the power of the dominant elite coalition. The ultimate consequence would be a kind of "inclusionary" politics in which organized industrial labor has a role,
albeit junior, in the regime coalition.

The second type is "state incorporation" characterized by working class incorporation into a formal institution of the state bureaucracy. In the latter case incorporation is aimed at preempting an emerging organized labor movement, stymieing political and economic competition on the part of labor, and excluding organized labor from significant influence on the policy process, all in the interest of the elite state coalition. The former type emerges from a weak state-strong social group milieu while the latter type emerges from a strong state-weak social group context.

In the case of Korea, the process of incorporation approximates the latter type--state incorporation. During the Park era, the already weak industrial labor movement was progressively organized and incorporated into the officially sanctioned and state-dominated institutional framework (Noch'ong), administratively linked to the government through oversight and regulation by the Office of Labor Affairs lodged in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and aggressively policed by the labor affairs bureaus of the National Police and, more importantly, by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).

During the Park era, particularly in the Yushin period of the Fourth republic, the KCIA came to assume a critical role in the penetration, cooptation, and manipulation of the organized industrial labor movement. Penetration and
cooptation were facilitated by implementation on the part of the KCIA of the "organizing cadre" system whereby union leadership at various levels was permeated with actual agents or individuals "controlled" by the agency. The most spectacular example of this process occurred in 1974 when the KCIA engineered the election of its candidate to the presidency of Noch'ong and actively suppressed the protests of rival federation candidates. An example of KCIA intervention in labor-management dispute resolution occurred in 1978 when the KCIA not only negotiated the resolution to a bitter industrial dispute but, the KCIA representative was an actual signatory to the new labor contract.

One method for analyzing the state's structuring of organized industrial labor along state-corporatist lines is to look at labor legislation. Upon seizing power in 1961, the military junta immediately set about amending the existing labor codes to suit its security and developmental agenda. These amendments to the Labor Union Act, Labor Dispute Settlement Act, Labor Standard Act, and Labor Committee Act, were carried out in 1963 at the time of the installation of the Third Republic and reveal the use of both inducements and constraints in the process of incorporation.

The Labor Union Act set the conditions for the establishment of labor unions in industrial firms. It guaranteed the right to organize and receive recognition
from management and the state. The principal amendments were as follows: 1) a regulation was added specifying that when the purpose of a worker's organization is to obstruct the ordinary operation of already existing labor unions, it shall not be recognized as a labor union. This gave an existing union the sole sanction to represent the firm's employees and protected the established union from competitors. 2) Provision was made for the establishment of a Labor-Management Council which would give the local union leadership a formal venue for de jure if not de facto co-equal status with management. 3) A provision strengthening the prohibition against political activities on the part of labor unions was added to isolate unions from linkages with political parties or activist organizations. 4) Provision was made that a union was considered to be established only upon certification by the state bureaucracy (the OLA), a provision which rendered the union dependent upon official state recognition for its very existence. 5) The sole right to nominate an official to convocate an extraordinary general union conference was given to the OLA. 6) The principle of criminal prosecution of employers for unfair labor practices was changed to one of providing relief to the individual worker or union whose rights were violated, thus softening the consequences for employers who violated the provisions of the labor code. 7) Finally, all unions were induced to reorganize on the basis of industry, along the lines of the
West German industrial federation system.

The Labor Committee Act was amended to provide for a tripartite system weighted in favor of state-appointed representatives of the public interest. The amendment provided for three representatives each for labor and management and five for the public interest. Labor committees at the local, provincial, and national level were empowered to preside over interpretation of labor law and policies but, only the members representing the public interest were entitled to handle matters such as the cancellation or change of a union's charter, dissolution of a union, or interpretation of government decrees affecting labor. The amended law specified that the public interest representatives of the national-level Central Labor Committee were to be appointed by the president, and those of local labor committees were to be appointed by the relevant cabinet minister. This dramatically enhanced the ability of the state to influence the outcome of labor-management negotiations by giving the highest state authorities the crucial swing vote.

The Labor Standard Act was amended to provide improved provisions for retirement allowances, working hours, rest hours, annual paid leave, guaranteed post-natal recuperation periods for female employees, education scholarships for employees under 18 years of age, and increased penalties for those who violate prescribed labor standards. The law
formally provided for improved working conditions and its enforcement would offer workers the state's protection from gross abuses in the workplace.

The Labor Dispute Settlement Act was amended in such a way as to allow the Labor Committee to assign special adjustment commissioners to participate in the settlement of labor disputes. The union was required to obtain the approval of the Labor Committee as to the propriety of an act of dispute before entering into a work action. Mediation functions were transferred to the authority of the Labor Committee and the mediation decision was given the same effect as a collective labor-management agreement. In addition, the local union was required to seek the permission of the national industrial federation before entering into a formal dispute.

Most significantly, the law expanded the category of public utilities in which the right to job actions, including strikes, was severely restricted. Industries added to this list were communications, monopoly (salt, tobacco, etc), mining, petroleum supply, stock market, and banking. The government also was assigned the authority to define additional enterprises as public utilities as it saw fit. These amendments had the effect of excluding a large number of workers in certain industries from full recourse to legal remedy and subordinating the union locals to the authority and control of the regime-dominated labor
committees as well as to the more easily coopted and controlled national industrial federations.

The 1963 amendments to the labor statutes may be summarized as providing both inducements and constraints as part of the process of state-incorporation of organized industrial labor in contemporary Korea. The inducements included guarantees of the right of association and organization, provisions for improved labor standards, and the opportunity to elicit the support of the state in confrontation with management through appeals to the state-appointed public interest representatives on the labor committees. The constraints included significant restrictions over the formation of competitive unions, implementation of acts of dispute, and most importantly dramatically strengthening government intervention through the pivotal role of bureaucratic agencies and state-appointed public-interest representatives.

These amendments were severely criticized by the Noch'ong (FKTU) and opposition political parties as attempts to restrain the labor movement for the purposes of economic development instead of contributing to the resolution of labor-management problems but, all attempts to overturn or rewrite the laws failed to pass the regime-controlled National Assembly. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the regime increased its usage of labor legislation to subordinate industrial workers to the development plan by implementing
the **Special Measure Act on Labor Unions and Labor Dispute Settlement in Foreign Invested Enterprises** in 1970.

The stated purpose of the act was to induce foreign capital investment in manufacturing industries such as electronics, chemicals, textiles, ceramics, transportation, machinery, and tourism. The act severely restricted union formation, job actions, and collective-bargaining in firms with $100,000 in foreign capitalization or, less than $100,000 if all production was exported. The impact was to prevent workers or unions from inhibiting the expansion of export-platform production in the emerging industrial estates and export-processing zones. The act was the capstone of the state-corporatist labor legislation of the Third Republic which has been characterized as "restraint of labor union activities and active government intervention in labor-management relations and labor problems for the purpose of achieving the national objective of economic growth, and at the same time, strengthening legislation for the welfare of the workers."

As economic growth and structural transformation accelerated in the 1960s, union membership and the number of unions increased to the extent that by the end of the decade union leaders were claiming that about 25% of the organizable workforce had been enrolled. In addition, the number of collective labor-management agreements multiplied rapidly indicating active unionization on the part of rank-
and-file workers. But, in spite of such increases in unions and membership the condition of low wages—the foundation of the export-led industrialization strategy—continued into the early 1970s.

Certainly excess labor supply contributed to suppressing wage increases but, so did the lack of bargaining power on the part of industrial unions. Given the emphasis in industrial policy on fostering the rapid expansion of domestic capital accumulation via favoring large, oligopolistic firms, the expanding labor sector failed to attain a substantially increased distributional share of the national income in spite of steady increases in GNP.

The inequitable distribution structure resulted in a steady increase in the number of labor disputes and the regime, apprehensive of setbacks in meeting its planned development goals responded by increasing intervention in the resolution of such disputes. Indeed, the great majority of labor disputes recorded during this period were resolved through the mediation of bureaucratic agencies of the state. In this way, the development of direct labor-management relations was skewed by the omnipresence of an emerging state-corporatist labor structure.

Under the Yushin system enacted in December 1972 labor law underwent changes similar to those that took place in other areas of the Korean political economy. Under the
Constitution of the Third Republic labor was guaranteed the three basic rights of association, collective-bargaining, and collective action, but the Yushin Constitution of the Fourth Republic introduced important modifications. First, while collective bargaining is the formal structure within which employer and employee relate to one another, the Yushin Constitution imposed the limitation that the purpose of collective bargaining was to "ensure the improvement of productivity in cooperation" between labor and management.

Second, collective action by workers in support of collective bargaining was restricted by a clause that said workers who exert a "strong influence" on the nation, government, or economy could have their "rights to collective action limited or withheld" as specified by law.

While the 1963 Constitution stressed the importance of union action for the protection of workers; the Yushin Constitution placed union action and economic development in opposition to one another and stressed the necessity of limitations on union actions. Actually, several months before the Yushin Constitution was promulgated a series of national emergency decrees (Kooka Bowei Bup) were implemented, one of which formally outlawed strikes of any kind in any industry. This particular decree remained in effect until the Yushin system was dismantled following the assassination of Park in 1979.
Following the pattern established previously, the Yushin system's Extraordinary State Council amended the labor statutes in March 1973. The substance of the amendments was as follows.

In the Labor Union Act, the function of the labor-management council at each firm came to be defined as a consultation organ seeking to improve productivity and dispute resolution through mutual cooperation. This council was enhanced at the expense of the union in that it provided an alternative venue for negotiation and dispute resolution in the corporatist spirit of cooperation rather than confrontation. Also, emphasis was placed on union organization by firm rather than by industry so that a more atomized enterprise unionism would undermine the potential power of unions organized on an industry-wide basis. Finally, matters concerning labor disputes were to be decided at a general union conference usually held once a year. These amendments had the effect of diluting union power viz. management.

The Labor Dispute Settlement Act was amended so that the President was given the authority to designate as public utilities "businesses run by the state, local self-governing bodies or state-run enterprising bodies, or businesses or enterprising bodies which will exert great influences upon the national economy." In this way, the President could, by fiat, deprive workers in designated industries--
category into which any industry or firm could be lumped—of important rights granted in other statutes. In addition, the authority to decide the lawfulness of a labor dispute was transferred from the labor committee to an administrative agency, the Office of Labor Affairs. Also, mediation functions were transferred from the labor committees to the OLA and the latter was given the power to investigate labor disputes. In this way, the amendments increased the intervention of the bureaucracy and rendered the unions further subordinate and dependent upon the state for support viz. management.

The Labor Committee Act increased the term of office for members from two to three years and provided for the appointment of the committee's chairman by the President instead of his election from amongst the ranks of the public interest members. This was done in the interest of "greater specialization and efficiency in business". In this way, the highest political authorities came to exercise direct control over the labor committee system. During the Yushin era the role of the labor committees was deemphasized but, they served as an important adjunct to the bureaucratic oversight of the OLA. Both labor and management found it very difficult to resist the settlements proposed by either the OLA or the labor committees.

While the 1973 amendments to the labor laws were on the whole constraints, in 1974 other revisions of the law were
carried out in response to the first "oil shock" of the OPEC price increases which had an adverse effect on the Korean economy. The most important reform of this Emergency Measure for Labor Management Relations may be seen as an inducement of labor compliance in that labor standards were improved and strengthened, and workers were given preferential rights to wages from failing enterprises (although not over mortgages, taxes, or public charges).

The end result was that while formal protection under the Labor Standard Act was extended and strengthened, laws concerning collective action by labor and union-management relations became much more constraining as regime intervention and guidance markedly increased. In both the Third and Fourth Republics, the regime progressively usurped responsibility for resolving labor-management disputes in the interest of maximizing national security and facilitating the accomplishment of the national development plan.

**Informal Mechanisms of Policy Enforcement**

Of more importance during the Yushin era, however, than the formal, legal system were two extra-legal means employed by the regime to elicit compliance and quiescence from labor: cooptation and manipulation of union leadership and the pervasive use of police power.

At the local level, Park's ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), was most often the mechanism coopting and
manipulating union leaderships. The DRP was in a position to render a variety of political and economic services to unions. Party funds could be made available for union functions and programs; the party could influence the activities of the Labor Inspectors Office; and party officials could informally persuade recalcitrant employers to be more open to union problems--if union leaders were amenable to using their offices to further the regime's national security and economic development goals.

Of equal or greater importance, however, was the fact that the DRP represented one of the very few legitimate avenues of access to the power structure open to union leaders. In an era of media controls, legal proscription of political affiliation for organized labor, increased powers for the bureaucratic agencies, and regime-controlled legislature, working through the DRP represented one of the only viable legal options open to unions and their leaders. Opposition parties were sympathetic but powerless to gain redress of grievances, the press was heavily censored, and the FKTU (Noch'ong) leadership served at the pleasure of the state, so that local union leaderships were not only induced to cooperate but constrained as well.

Of greater consequence than the DRP in affecting union compliance and quiescence were the activities of the National Police and KCIA. The latter effectively neutralized the FKTU leadership by placing its hand-picked
candidate in the Noch'ong presidency in 1973. From that point on, workers embroiled in disputes at the local level could not count on the effective organizational support of their own peak organization.

The strategy of controlling union leadership was aimed at preventing the outbreak of industrial conflict which could endanger the success of the economic development strategy and internal social stability. Illegal job actions and strikes did occur but, when they did the national police and the KCIA were employed to "dissuade" rank-and-file workers and union leaders from breaking the law. Agents of the security services regular visit union offices and trouble makers, actual or potential, are warned or taken in for interrogation and intimidation. Illegal work stoppages usually resulted in the arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of rebellious union officials.

The risks of running afoul of the authorities were increased in that a striker could be charged with breaking the stringent national security or anti-communist laws, which carried far stiffer penalties than the labor laws. A conviction for any offense has grave consequences in Korea. Each citizen has a personal dossier permanently on file at his/her neighborhood or village office; an arrest or conviction for violation of the labor or national security laws can make it very difficult to obtain employment in the future. These techniques of repression had the effect of
preventing labor disputes from breaking out into the open even though they are not official components of the government's formal labor policy; none of the labor laws mention a role for the DRP, National Police, or the KCIA.

Because of official and unofficial intervention in labor-management affairs, collective-bargaining in the 1970s became a rather perfunctory act and formal job actions dropped precipitously. Labor was effectively harnessed to the national development and security programs of the bureaucratic-authoritarian Yushin regime via the increased implementation of policies which structured the labor movement into patterns of interest intermediation characteristic of state-corporatism. While inducements played a role in this process, the regime increasingly relied upon policies which constrained the organized industrial labor movement within a set of parameters which severely restricted the options for promoting labor interests.

Summary

Bureaucratic-authoritarianism has emerged as the dominant form of political economy in contemporary Korea out of the historical interaction of internal and external factors. While Korea's authoritarian heritage has facilitated such an emergence it is not viewed here as the determining factor. Rather, it is the result of the Korean
peninsula's progressive incorporation into the international political and economic system and the manner in which powerful indigenous groups have reacted to that incorporation.

The policy of state-incorporation of organized industrial labor has been a product of enduring elite concerns about national security as well as economic growth and development. Particularly, state-corporatism has come to be a key policy mechanism for maximizing the attainment of the Korean BAIR's national development strategy. This will be fully explored in the next chapter.
Endnotes


22. Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 84.


28. See the discussion in Hamilton, op. cit., p. 32.

29. KITU, op. cit., p. 266.


31. Ogle, op. cit., p. 73.

32. Ibid.


34. Ibid., pp. 292-294.


39. Ibid., p. 176.


41. Park, "Our Nation's Path," op. cit., p. 204.

42. Ibid., p. 208.

43. Cho, Suk-choon, "The Bureaucracy," in Wright, op. cit., p. 78

44. Ibid.; and for additional insight into the power of the bureaucracy see Bun Woong Kim and Wha Joon Rho, eds., Korean Public Bureaucracy (Seoul: Kyobo Publishing, Inc., 1982).


47. Hahn-been Lee, op. cit., p. 35.


52. Korea Herald, February 6, 1983. p. 3.


54. Peter Evans, op. cit., p. 41.

55. Hamilton, op. cit., p. 46.


60. Ibid., p. 367.


63. Im, op. cit., p. 253.

64. For an excellent discussion of free export zones in Korea see Tsuchiya, Takeo, "Masan: An Epitome of the Japan-ROK Relationship," in Free Trade Zones & Industrialization of Asia, a special issue of AMPO: Japan-Asia Quarterly Review, 8, No. 4, and 9, Nos. 1-2, 1977. pp. 53-66.


67. Interview with Director of Asian-American Free Labor Institute (AAFLI), February 1981.


70. Ibid., p. 21.
71. Ogle, op. cit., p. 149.


73. For example, the average rate of increase in labor productivity between 1960 and 1970 was 13%, but the average annual increase in wages in manufacturing industries was only 6%; cited in Kwon Doo-young, "A Study of Optimum Wage System," Journal of Labor Studies, 4, (Seoul: Labour and Research Institute, Korea University, 1973), p. 53.

74. For example, the composition of employee's wages in the distribution of national income increased from 34.1% in 1961, to only 37.3% in 1973; see Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1975, p. 360f.

75. Refer to Kim Hyung-bae, op. cit., p. 47.

76. Ogle, "Changing Character..." op. cit., p. 143.

77. Ibid.


79. Ibid., p. 25.


Chapter IV

Environment, Process, and Content of Labor Policy in Korea's Fifth Republic

What emerges from the previous historical discussion of the politics of industrial labor policy in Korea is that it has evolved, for the most part, in an environment of continuous or endemic crisis. It has not been the incremental product of peaceful and routinized negotiation between contending social forces, but, rather, has resulted from the exogeneous and endogenous conditions of crisis concomitant with colonialism, foreign occupation, civil war, and rapid socio-economic development. In earlier chapters it was argued that such conditions facilitated the rise of a distinctive form of developmental state herein characterized as bureaucratic-authoritarian in nature. This state is associationally linked to organized societal groups via a structured system of interest representation exhibiting state-corporatist manifestations. In this chapter we will delineate and elaborate upon the distinctive environment within which contemporary policy has been fashioned, the specific structures and processes which have functioned as the main arenas of policy-making, as well as the specific content of labor policy as it applies to industrial labor in Korea's Fifth Republic.
Crisis Environment

During the colonial period, labor policy was primarily the product of the mother country's imperial ambitions for economic exploitation and territorial expansionism. The emphasis was on economically mobilizing the Korean workforce while, at the same time, preventing political activization. The relatively liberal labor policies obtaining in Japan proper during the immediate post-WW I era never fully applied to Korea and liberal attitudes toward organized industrial labor, in both Korea and Japan, steadily eroded as Japan's war economy accelerated. The colonial state's labor policies were progressively the result of responses to outside political and military crises rather than responses to internal needs or desires.

With the defeat of imperial Japan, the American Military Government (AMG) introduced reformist labor legislation which served as the prototypical foundation for formal Korean labor law after 1945. The exogeneous origin of the foundations of post-WW II labor legislation is significant in that it pointed the development of the industrial labor union movement toward "economism"--a preoccupation with economic interests and issues a la the American model--and away from "politicism"--a preoccupation with class relationships and pursuing political power--characteristic of the highly-politicized and activist labor movements of post-WW II Europe. In addition, the
progressive American obsession with minimizing the opportunities for political instability and social unrest which could facilitate communist expansionism contributed to a dramatic reversal of policy priorities in the late-1940s, away from promoting individual and group rights and toward increasing emphasis on national security and administrative controls.

Labor policy was not only lowered on the agenda of policy priorities but, also, the protection and promotion of labor rights were emphatically subordinated to the pursuit of such higher policy priorities as internal security and national defense which entailed the deactivation of the labor sector. It was the American impetus that initially and, perhaps, irreversibly enmeshed Korea's internal labor policy process with crisis-ridden, external concerns related to the country's precarious international strategic position.

In the preceding chapter we noted the deleterious effects on the autonomy of incipient industrial labor organizations of the regime's preoccupation with internal state-building (i.e., increasing the efficacy of governmental power) coupled with the necessity of thwarting the determined external threat to national survival posed by the hostile belligerence of the DPRK. The penultimate crisis of contemporary Korean politics, the civil war, remains as yet unresolved and continues to imbue virtually
all policy areas, including labor policy, with sensitive political implications. The enduring mutual hostility between the contending regimes manifests itself in the form of "low intensity" warfare and casts all dissidence with regime actions in a potentially subversive light.

The Park era's linkage of rapid economic growth based on export-led industrialization with national security strategies further "politicized" policies toward industrial labor organizations in such a way as to emphasize the subordination of their group interests to the national interests of security and economic development and, concomitantly, the increased "exclusion" of organized industrial labor organizations from mechanisms of meaningful in-put into the making of policies most fundamentally affecting labor's status and well-being in Korean society. As economic performance progressively came to be the foundation of the emerging Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regime's claim to legitimacy, the more important it became to insure industrial labor's cooperative participation through economic mobilization and its political quiescence through the mechanisms of state corporatism. As this was true for the Park regime of the Third and Fourth Republics, it remained so for its successor, the Fifth Republic of Chun Doo-hwan.
Crisis and Reform in the Fifth Republic

On October 26, 1979 President Park Chung Hee was assassinated by his long-term protege and director of the KCIA, Kim Jae-gyu. Kim had been a classmate of Park's in the second graduating class of the Korean Military Academy in 1946 and had retired from the army as a major general and close personal confidante of the president. At his trial subsequent to the assassination, Kim testified that he had killed Park as a result of a dispute over the severity of policies designed to quell anti-government demonstrations during the spring and summer of 1979 as well as personal animosity toward Park's abusive chief of Blue House security, Cha Ji-chol. Kim favored conciliation and concessions whereas Cha, the chief of the presidential bodyguard (a powerful and influential position during the Yushin era), urged increased repression via direct applications of military force. When Park finally sided with Cha, Kim killed both men and their security detail at a KCIA-hosted dinner party adjacent to the Blue House on the night of October 26, 1979.

In as much as president Park had created the Yushin system as his vehicle of personal rule, his death left the structure without its core and its decline was precipitous. During the years of the Third Republic Park had developed three institutional pillars of support for his regime; the DRP, the armed forces, and the KCIA. His establishment of
the Yushin system as the Fourth Republic in 1971 was a
demotion for the DRP whose role in the reconstituted
legislative branch was undermined by the newly created and
presidentially appointed Yujonghoe constituency in the
National Assembly. Kim Jae-gyu's arrest and implication in
the assassination of Park discredited the KCIA as a power-
broker during this period leaving the military as the
regime's sole locus of defacto power. The army, however,
was also in disarray following allegations of complicity in
the assassination plot by martial law commander and chief of
the army general staff Gen. Chung Seung-hwa who was deposed
in a coup within the army on December 12, 1979. Thus, the
structure of the Yushin system was dissolving into chaos
around Park's constitutional successor, former-Prime
Minister Choi Kyu-ha.

As a life-long bureaucrat Choi had no political power
base of his own within the regime. Pressed by opposition
demands for reform, increasing demonstrations by university
students for democratization, rising labor militancy, as
well as by the internal fracturing of regime solidarity, he
proved indecisive and vacillating in attempts to devise a
transition of power and authority. The situation was ripe
for a reassertion of praetorianism which occurred as a
powerful faction of military officers coalesced around the
leadership of the commander of the Defense Security Command
(DSC) unit of the Martial Law Command, Maj. General Chun
Doo-hwan. The DSC is the army intelligence unit charged with monitoring and preventing internal subversion in the armed forces and was the unit responsible for investigating the assassination of president Park. Gen. Chun was situated at the center of domestic intelligence-gathering operations and utilized the position to progressively propel himself and fellow classmates from the KMA's 11th graduating class into power as the core of a new political elite coalition.

On December 12, 1979 Chun's faction struck against their opponents within the army by attacking defense headquarters in the Yongsan district (site of the UN command and 8th U.S. Army headquarters) and deposing Gen. Chung Seung-hwa as chief of staff and martial law commander. This move also led to the purging of hundreds of other ranking officers from the Korean military establishment and the elevation of supporters of the Chun faction. On April 14, 1980 Chun had himself appointed acting director of the KCIA (now renamed the Agency for National Security Planning) thereby unifying all state-security agencies under his personal control. This move set off a new wave of student demonstrations which, together with strident opposition party calls for democratization and increasingly violent labor unrest, provided the pretext for overt military intervention on May 17, 1980.

The new Martial Law Decree No. 10 (proclaimed, ironically, on May 17, 1980, one day after the 19th
anniversary of Park's 1961 coup) prohibited demonstrations, banned all forms of political activity and labor strikes, closed the university campuses, outlawed criticism of present and past presidents, prohibited the spreading of "groundless rumors", and imposed prior censorship of the news media. The National Assembly was disbanded, political parties were dissolved, politicians arrested, student leaders imprisoned and their organizations suppressed, and national labor federation officials fired en masse. On May 31, 1980, the Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) was established, ostensibly to assist "the President in directing and supervising Martial Law affairs" and to "examine national policies." The 25-member SCNSM headed by President Choi and composed of cabinet members and high-ranking military officers was supposedly the supreme governmental body during the martial law period. However, in terms of policy, de facto power resided in the 31-member Military-Civilian Standing Committee (MCSC) headed by Chun and composed of 18 active-duty military officers of field grade and 12 ranking government officials. The four concurrent members of the SCNSM and the MCSC who constituted the core of the military power group were Chun himself, Gen. Ro Tae-wu (commander of the Capital Garrison Command), Gen. Chung Ho-yung (commander of the Special Forces), and Gen. Ch'a Kyu-ho (deputy chief of staff of the army).

From a formal policy perspective, the MCSC's 13
separate subcommittees made all decisions affecting the state. Through the subcommittees the MCSC exercised both legislative and executive functions until October 22, 1980 when much of its function and membership was incorporated into an 81-member Legislative Council for National Security (LCNS) appointed by the military-dominated junta. The LCNS included not only former members of the SCNSM and MCSC but also social notables chosen by the junta as representatives of various functional groups; lawyers, professors, bureaucrats, leaders of social organizations, etc. The LCNS acted as an interim legislature until April, 1981 when the National Assembly was inaugurated following the March, 1981 general elections.

In reality the LCNS was a hand-picked body that did little to initiate or develop "public" policy. Rather, the LCNS provided the veneer of legitimacy for junta policies by ratifying the decisions made previously by the SCNSM and MCSC subcommittees. Nine subcommittee chairmen from the MCSC were among those who eventually came to dominate the operations of the LCNS. The LCNS' major task was to "purify" the political system and reshape the political landscape by purging both the old DRP power structure's "Yushin remnants", and members of traditional opposition groups such as student leaders and the New Democratic Party (NDP). By utilizing the Special Law for Political Renovation, for example, by the end of July, 1980 almost
9,000 people including politicians, government bureaucrats, KCIA officers, university professors, and officers of state-run organizations were ousted from their posts.

In addition, the news media and publications industry were purged with several hundred writers and journalists dismissed and 172 periodicals closed-down. Finally, Kim Dae-jung, a major opposition politician and 23 of his followers were arrested, tried, and convicted by a military court-martial on charges of sedition stemming from the Kwangju uprising of May, 1980. In this manner the new political power-strata (kwolyok ch'ung) cleared the way for the installation of a reconstituted BAIR in South Korea. It represented a change of regime but not of state structure in that essentially the same interests composed the power-strata and the economically-privileged strata (kyungjae t'ukkwon ch'ung) even though a significant number of personalities were changed.

Process of Labor Law Revision

In regard to labor policies, the sub-committee on labor of the LCNS presided over the thorough revision of the labor laws in line with "purifying" labor organizations and restructuring key institutional relationships between workers, unions, and other social interests. This sub-committee was composed of 5 LCNS members, only one of whom (Chung Han-joo, acting chairman of the FKTU) had any significant background in labor issues or union affairs. In
reality, however, this subcommittee merely ratified the input or "guidance" provided by former SCNSM and MCSC staffers who carried out the actual revision of the legal codes prior to the enpaneling of the subcommittee. These staffers were by and large middle-grade officers in the military and security agencies whose primary interest and motivation lay in protecting and promoting the installation of the new authoritarian order under Gen. Chun. For example, Lee Ki-beck, a former military officer and chairman of the Steering Committee of the Legislative Council, identified the new regime's primary concern when he stated that "no labor disputes should be allowed to flare up to destroy social order and national security." It is interesting that this statement coincided with the announcement on December 24, 1980 of the formation of the subcommittee to revise the four basic labor laws and that the amended laws were formally promulgated just six days later on December 31. This supports an interpretation that the laws were revised prior to and independent of the subcommittee's activities. The subcommittee's role was to mask and legitimate the activities of other individuals more closely linked to the new authoritarian order. This "formalism"--a discrepancy between form and reality--has been noted as characteristic of Korean policy processes and has been found to be "even more marked in the Fifth Republic than was the case in the preceding republics."
Many of the junior staff people were eventually incorporated into the influential and powerful Presidential Secretariat as advisors to the chief executive specializing in various policy areas. Once again, fundamental changes in labor policy had been produced out of a context of crisis rather than normalcy or routine. One highly-placed official at KDI who had been included in discussions over revisions in the law stated that "several of the labor specialists consulted by the LCNS had aggressively argued the case for liberalization of the law and increasing labor union rights, but we were overruled by the hard-liners preoccupied with the maintenance of stability and security."

Revision of the labor laws during this transitional period of crisis demonstrated not only concern for political stability and national security but, also, for economic productivity as well. A clear pro-management bias on the part of the new regime was demonstrated in that the substance of the revisions was drawn mainly from proposals submitted to the interim LCNS by the Korean Employer's Association (KEA) the official peak organization representing all employers in Korea--whereas no proposals put forward by the umbrella labor federation (the FKTU)--were incorporated into the law. The newly elected National Assembly of 1981 was constitutionally prohibited from overturning the revisions of the labor laws enacted by
the LCNS and had to accept the work of its predecessor without dispute or modification. Thus, the newly revised labor legislation of the Fifth Republic was totally the product of elite-controlled, statist processes and devoid of input from the most impacted constituency, organized industrial labor.

The pro-capital bias of the de facto policy-makers resulted from an awareness of the role that economic downturn and labor unrest had played in the political crises of 1979-1980. Park's assassination and Chun's military coup were both critically influenced by economic decline (negative GNP growth in 1980) and rising labor militancy. Therefore, a desire to preempt further political and economic disruption (and so enhance growth opportunities) by deactivating and subordinating industrial labor organizations and memberships should also be viewed as important motivations in the redefinition of policy priorities and the rewriting of labor laws in mid-1980.

The economic difficulties of the 1978-1979 period had sparked a widespread series of labor disputes and strikes which proved to be critical factors in the political crisis which lead to the assassination of president Park as well as the subsequent coup d'etat of Gen. Chun and his establishment of a new authoritarian order as the Fifth Republic. In February 1978 the Dong-il Textile Company was the focus of an intense struggle for control of the union
local involving management, female and male workers, the Korean National Textile Workers Union (KNTWU), and an activist religious organization called the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM). In a series of actions aimed at protesting rigged union elections several female union leaders were jailed and 127 others fired by the firm and blacklisted by the KNTWU authorities.

In another incident in a different part of the country, four KNTWU officials were arrested and jailed for 18 days during December, 1978 and January, 1979 as the result of a protest at the Kukje Weaving Company plant in Pusan. They had protested the employer's attempt to place pro-management workers in positions within the union as well as the employer's refusal to negotiate with the branch union president. Among those arrested for handing out leaflets at the plant entrances were the KNTWU general-secretary, a national vice-president, the local union branch president, and its director of organization. The Kukje Weaving Company owner was then vice-president of the Korean Chamber of Commerce.

In early 1979, the mostly female workforce from the Y.H. (Yong Ho) wig factory engaged in an illegal strike to protest several months of unpaid wages. The company owner had absconded to the United States to avoid financial difficulties and the workers had occupied the factory premises in an attempt to prevent the liquidation of company
assets by creditors before the settlement of their wages in arrears. When police evicted them from the plant, the strikers moved their protest to the headquarters of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP or Shinmin Dang) in Seoul and began a hunger strike. Their forceful eviction by the national police after several days resulted in many injuries and arrests as well as one death among the strikers and touched-off a wave of anti-government protests by NDP members, university students, and workers which ultimately lead to Park's murder and the collapse of the Yushin system.

In April 1980, coal miners angered at the perceived corruption and collusion of their union president and mine company officials rioted in the small town of Sabuk northwest of Seoul. The 3500 miners held off several hundred combat police for several days while they destroyed mine property, assaulted company and union officials, and issued demands for a redress of grievances to company management and government officials alike. The authorities eventually acceded to their demands, which included replacing the corrupt union officials, but the leaders of the uprising were arrested and several sentenced to long jail terms as a result of the fracas. The Sabuk incident occurred during the state of martial law and only weeks before Chun's coup.

These incidents were merely the most spectacular of a
rising tide of labor militancy which, together with massive student demonstrations, characterized the 1979-1980 period and which the military and business elites found to be profoundly provocative. In the first five months of 1979, for example, there were 7,300 labor disputes at 5,826 firms, of which 6,019 disputes (82.45%) were caused by delayed wages. Official sources routinely understated the level of labor strife in that many labor disputes and job actions, including illegal strikes, often go unreported in the censored media and unrecorded in government publications.

In an interview conducted in early 1981, the president of the Korean Labor Welfare Corporation (a government sponsored organization) told me that "there are dozens of illegal strikes going on around the country right now that you will never hear about because the authorities don't want you to." The overriding priority of the new labor policy was to revive faltering economic productivity without interference from industrial workers and their unions.

**Institutions and the Structure of Labor Policy in the Fifth Republic**

The constitutional framework of the Fifth Republic (March 1981 - December, 1987) was based on the document proclaimed on October 27, 1980 which replaced the Yushin charter of 1972. Technically it was the eighth revision of the first constitution adopted in 1948, but in fact was a substantially new document drafted by the junta-dominated
Constitutional Amendment Deliberation Committee (CADC) in the summer of 1980. Prepared in closed sessions, it utilized revision drafts prepared by the National Assembly, executive branch, major political parties, and university professors, before the May 17, imposition of martial law.

Once again, the constitutional order was crafted to fit the needs of an emerging political elite rather than that new elite conforming itself to an established constitutional order. It was approved in a referendum held in October 1980; 91.6% of the voters endorsed it while the country was still under martial law. The document provided for essential rights and freedoms of citizens but contained a clause which qualified and diminished enumerated constitutional protections. Chapter One, article 35, paragraph two states “The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare.” This clause empowered the government to suspend or modify constitutional rights and protections at its discretion thereby undercutting their effectiveness in constraining governmental power and prerogative.

Chapter one, article 31 extended constitutional guarantees to workers, but maintained several qualifications and stipulations reminiscent of the previous Yushin order. The three paragraphs of the article are as follows.

1) To enhance working conditions, workers shall have
the right to independent association, collective bargaining and collective action. However, the right to collective action shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law.

2) The right to association, collective bargaining and collective action shall not be granted to public officials, except for those authorized by the provisions of law.

3) The right to collective action of workers employed by the central government, local governments, state-run enterprises, defense industries, public utilities or enterprises which have a serious impact on the national economy may be either restricted or denied in accordance with the provisions of law.23

Paragraph one, while assuring the right of independent association and collective bargaining and action, enabled the state authorities to substantially restrict those rights through implementation of the subsequent labor legislation. Paragraph three represents the incorporation of the Yushin system's Martial Law Decree #10 into the body of the new constitutional order and endowed the state with the discretionary power of deciding which enterprises have "a serious impact on the national economy". This article had the effect of rendering the protective utility of constitutional provisions for labor rights dependent upon the subsequent subsidiary legislation produced by the junta-manipulated LCNS.

As might be expected, the constitution of the Fifth Republic established a governmental system dominated by a strong executive. Article 51 of the constitution gives the president the power to suspend the freedoms and rights enumerated within the document and "to take special measures
with respect to the powers of the Executive and the Judiciary." This was to facilitate the executive's discretionary response to a "time of natural calamity or a grave financial or economic crisis, or of hostilities or similar grave extraordinary circumstances threatening the security of the State."

The president retained the right to invoke special emergency decrees, such as those utilized by Park in the Yushin era, declare martial law, and dissolve the national assembly. These powers, coupled with the mandated indirect election of the president by an electoral college effectively insulated the executive branch from constraints emanating from societal interest groups or institutions such as the courts and the National Assembly. The concentration of governmental power within the executive branch and its attenuated administrative agencies structurally distances state from society in the Korean context. The institutions which formed the bedrock of the Fifth Republic maintained, and in some cases strengthened, the key structural characteristics of bureaucratic-authoritarianism established by its predecessor, Park's Fourth Republic.

Commenting on that regime, Burmeister notes that

This conscious consolidation of prerogatives within the executive branch enabled Park to circumvent possible opposition from the legislature based on interest articulation and independent party initiatives. This early establishment of executive hegemony, combined with the ability to rely on loyal agencies of coercion...gave the Park regime the power to push
through key economic and political changes against the
will of vested interests and public opinion in
general.27

Policymaking in the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime of the
Fifth Republic was the prerogative of the highest
administrative echelons located within the executive branch
and is characterized and portrayed more as an exercise in
 technocratic decisionmaking than as the product of political
negotiation. The regime was able to suppress or manipulate
popular and special interest initiatives in the policymaking
process because local or functional interests had no open,
formally institutionalized channels to government.

The new president made his philosophical predilections
clear at the very outset of the Fifth Republic by
enunciating his views on the roles and functions of social
interests and the constraints on group competition in
Korea's Sae Shidae or "New Era". To the extent that the
regime was constituted as a vehicle for his personal rule
(as was the case with Park Chung-hee), Chun Doo-hwan's
philosophical dispositions give insight into the rationale
for the creation of political and governmental structures as
well as the political style of the regime. Some examples
include:

The national situation of today does not permit any
continuation of the extreme partisan strife that could
imperil the national foundation, not the demagoguery
that could degrade national ethics....we must devote
concerted efforts to advancing the interest of society
as a whole, transcending the interests of the
individual, the political group or party, and the local
community....There should be no bystanders in such
heroic endeavors. All the people must now join the 
march into the new era under the banner of national 
harmony.28

It is my wish that the people will never lose 
confidence in themselves, that they will place greater 
trust in the government and the president and that they 
will work in harmony and concert, each doing his best 
to carry out his designated duty as if it were for his 
personal benefit....When the public and the government 
have full understanding of and trust in each other, 
view things with an affirmative and magnanimous 
attitude, and closely cooperate in complete unity, I am 
sure that we will have nothing to fear, no matter how 
difficult the international and domestic situations 
might be.29

Politics of the future must not be undisciplined, 
encroaching upon other sectors of a pluralist society; 
rather, it must strive to faithfully carry out its 
intrinsic role of maintaining social order and fairly 
adjusting differing interests. In other words, 
reasonable bounds and humility must be established. 
When those in politics perform their intrinsic duties 
in society, then those in other sectors of society such 
as the economy, national defense, education and culture 
will be prouder of their own roles and will find 
greater reward in doing their best in their chosen 
field to contribute more to national development. I 
want to reiterate that the time has come to end the 
cult of politics, one of the oldest evils in modern 
Korean history, that has persistently impeded healthy 
national development.30

Stepan admonishes us to consider the programmatic and 
instrumentalist impacts of such thinking on the formal 
institutional arrangements constructed by the regime to link 
state and society. The authoritarian and state-
corporatist overtones are rather obvious in the previous 
statements; a delegitimation of unfettered interest group 
competition, an enunciation of a clear, overarching, 
nationalist agenda, and the notion of a society constituted 
of different sectors with discernable and intrinsic
functional roles and duties. In as much as organized industrial labor constitutes the single largest interest association in the country, and the revolutionary appeal of North Korea's Marxist-Leninist ideology is directed at the working classes (from such immediate proximity) there is little wonder that the state seeks to preempt and manipulate its potential power.

The Executive

The president presides over an impressive array of bureaucratic agencies which are invested with policy functions. The following is a list of those executive-branch agencies that have either a potential or actual role in the development and implementation of industrial labor policy. The relevant agencies and officials are (1) the president, (2) the Presidential Secretariat, especially the chief-of-staff, (3) the National Security Council, (4) the Agency for National Security Planning, (5) the State Council, (6) the prime minister, (7) the deputy prime minister (who also serves as minister of the Economic Planning Board), and (8) the Ministry of Labor. The mix and salience of each of the above's importance and participation varies according to the nature of the policy under consideration. In addition to the above executive agencies other parastatal institutions also participate in the development and assessment of labor policy. Chief amongst these are the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and the Korea Development Institute (KDI).
Following Lee Hahn-been's typology it is possible (recognizing that there may be significant overlap) to divide these actors and agencies into two functional categories; "political elites" who enunciate core decisions and, "task elites" who seek to develop appropriate implementation strategies. The political elite category subsumes the president, the Presidential Secretariat and its chief-of-staff, the National Security Council, and the State Council. The task elite category subsumes the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) and the Ministry of Labor as well as other pertinent agencies such as the National Police.

The Presidential Secretariat is dominated by the Director-General—the president's chief of staff—and the chief presidential secretaries who cover specific functional areas, including labor policy. The Presidential Secretariat and the Office of the Prime Minister are the two principal bodies responsible for the supervision and coordination of the activities of the state bureaucracy with the former exerting the most salient political influence. Under Park, the secretariat was the initial arena of policy formulation and this continued to be much the case, with some modification, under Chun's Fifth Republic.

The influence of the members of the secretariat is linked inseparably to their "power of propinquity"—access
to the president as well as the latter's dependence on the former on a daily basis. These are the president's trusted, hand-picked advisors and in the immediate aftermath of the regime's installation the secretariat was dominated by hard-liners--mostly ex-military officers whose predominant concern was for security, stability, and (as a consequence) economic recovery. Several of these men had participated in the reform of the labor laws under the guise of the LCNS and were amongst those least receptive to liberalization of labor policies.

The catch-phrase of the new regime was the rapid attainment of a "Second Economic Takeoff". The priority placed upon the return to high economic growth levels within a context of wage and price stability was perceived as instrumental in undercutting popular dissent and asserting regime legitimacy. Officials were concerned about the adverse impact that rising wages were having on the international competitiveness of Korea's manufactured exports. Labor peace was seen as essential to the expeditious attainment of the second takeoff so, at least for the short run, industrial labor should be disciplined and deactivated via state policy.

One labor specialist, a university professor purged by the regime in 1980, stated that "These new Blue House people are afraid that the unions will cause political as well as economic turmoil and are determined to prevent that at all
costs." And, in a related vein, an officer in U.S. Army intelligence observed in early 1981 that "The Koreans (government) are really paranoid, they see fifth-columnists (North Korean agents or sympathizers) everywhere and tend to overreact to dissent and crackdown on people when it is really, according to our best estimates, unnecessary." And the Labor Attache at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul added that, "The new government is primarily concerned about security matters and right now (early 1981) it tends to see the unions and workers in general as potential threats to public order. As a result, the new labor legislation drastically limits the ability of unions to organize and represent workers."

The National Security Council (NSC) and the State Council (SC) are also institutions integrated into the labor policy process. Both institutions are constitutionally mandated to advise the president on issues concerning internal and external matters of state. As was previously mentioned, in the highly-charged, crisis-ridden politics of the Korean Peninsula all policy areas may have national security implications. Therefore, important labor policy matters may be discussed at NSC or SC meetings. In as much as the SC functions as the president's cabinet, labor issues are much more likely (except during times of intense labor activism) to surface here than at the NSC.

Constitutionally, the State Council is a consultative
body and as such has no formal decision-making power. The meetings are held once a week and are attended by the president, the prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet ministers, and other agency heads. The actual meetings tend to be rather formal (with the president sitting physically apart from and above the others present) and serve more to oversee and coordinate executive-branch activities than provide a venue for free and frank discussion of policy implications and alternatives. The latter is much more likely to take place informally—over lunch or dinner—or in direct bilateral discussions between the president, his personal staff, DJP officials and cabinet officers than in a formal SC meeting. But it is at the NSC and SC meetings that labor issues are located on the policy agenda and the government’s formal response is articulated if not actually formulated.

Dr. Nam Duck-woo, a former deputy prime minister and EPB director during the Park regime discussed several of the more salient issues considered in labor policy decision-making in the following way during a 1980 interview.

You have to understand that labor policies have to address several areas of concern. National security implications are very prominent as are those of economic stability and growth. But it is not by accident that these are of paramount consideration. North Korea has demonstrated that it is a threat to our security and we must have high economic growth in order to generate employment. After all, the economy has to generate over 500,000 new jobs every year to absorb new entrants into the labor force. Various interests complain that they are ignored or hurt by the
government and I suppose at times that's true but, we (the policymakers) have to look at the big picture.39 The priority had been for high-growth strategies in order to generate maximum employment opportunities for a rapidly expanding industrial and commercial workforce. It was his belief that no Korean government could tolerate or respond to unrestrained interest group pressures and still provide maximal security and rapidly expanding economic growth and employment opportunities.

We may glean from his comments that the interests of various societal groups do get considered or represented in the decision-making process at the highest echelons but, indirectly and technocratically, rather than directly and politically. Organized labor's interests have been determined selectively by a concerned but relatively insulated policy elite; policy was made for labor, not by labor. Subsequent to the interview Dr. Nam was named the first prime minister of the Fifth Republic in mid-1980, an interesting indication of the continuity of policy personnel, direction, and style between the Fourth and Fifth Republics. In a follow-up interview conducted in the prime-minister's office in November, 1980 Dr. Nam stated that "We (the new government) are determined to do our best for industrial workers and other segments of society. Current restrictions should be seen as temporary and will moderate as our political and economic situation stabilizes."40 While this may have been the intention, liberalization of
labor policy has failed to occur, for reasons that will be discussed subsequently, during the duration of the Fifth Republic.

As a consequence of the Fifth Republic's retention of the strong presidency, the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and cabinet ministers tended to be technocrats rather than politicos and therefore more a part of the task elite than the political elite. Though the Chun regime initially attempted to enhance the status of cabinet ministers viz. the secretariat, an orientation as implementors rather than innovators or formulators of policy coupled with the rapid turnover of cabinet ministers (there were five different labor ministers in the seven-year period) in the Fifth Republic undercut the potential significance of ministerial input to the policy process. With the exception of the ANSP, most ministries on the whole play a subordinate, implementation role in the policy process. They are the source of pertinent information to the political decision-makers but, in the main, serve as transmission belts of regime policy downward to relevant bureaucratic and social constituencies, rather than upwards from those constituencies to the political elites themselves. This is a significant difference between pluralist and statist policy processes.

The strategic role of the ANSP--formerly the KCIA--is much different and stems from its unparalleled capability to
collect, interpret, and transmit policy-related information as well as from its unique dual function in the Korean polity as both the main external and internal national security organ and the indispensable, personal tool of political power and governance for the president. The previous chapter discussed the role played by the KCIA in the suppression/resolution of labor disputes, contract negotiations, and the manipulation of union elections and officials. Due to its involvement in the assassination of president Park, the ANSP was temporarily overshadowed by the military's Defense Security Command as the main instrument of state surveillance and repression in the early 1980s. However, it was (as predicted by an ANSP officer during a 1981 interview) progressively resurrected and returned to its former role as one of the primary instruments of presidential power by the mid-1980s. Together with the National police and units of the Defense Security Command, the ANSP remains one of the main instruments of state intervention in labor union affairs.

The Legislature

The unicameral legislature is constituted of the National Assembly. The National Assembly has historically been a weak force in Korean politics mainly because the government party has habitually held a controlling majority (until the April 1988 elections) of the seats. Legislators
rarely initiate policy, rather, legislation originates in the executive branch and is submitted to the National Assembly by the Office of Legislation (Bupiae Ch'uh). The main function of the assembly is its ability to debate and publicize issues openly with protection against arrest as long as the body is in session. An additional power granted by the constitution is that of interpellation—the right to summon government officials to answer questions concerning government policies.

In the Fifth Republic three factors served to undermine the potentially significant role of the legislature in the labor policy process. First, the system of prior censorship in place between 1980 and 1984 prevented much of the assembly's often heated discourse from appearing in the media and, therefore its ability to serve as an arena for publicizing issues was effectively circumvented. The regime reduced restrictions during the 1984-1985 period, allowing the press to print or repeat verbatim statements or accurate summaries of assembly debate, but censorship was not eliminated and could be tightened at any time the regime saw fit.

Second, the perennial control of the legislature by the government's Democratic Justice Party (DJP or Miniung Dang) meant that there was no effective way for opposition parties to defeat government-sponsored initiatives. The electoral laws rewarded the party winning the largest number of
assembly seats (always the DJP) in the 92 two-member districts with a two-thirds majority of the 92 at-large seats within the assembly, enough seats to prevent opposition attempts to frustrate government policy initiatives. The government has permitted no local autonomy in the formation of political parties or in provincial elections. This coupled with the ability of the DJP to appoint assemblymen to the at-large seats renders DJP assemblymen more dependent for their positions upon executive-branch and DJP leaderships than upon the grassroots support of local constituencies or special-interest groups. With little likelihood of fissures occurring within the ruling party's ranks, eloquent or impassioned debate served little functional purpose. There was also little reason for the ruling party to negotiate compromises on specific pieces of legislation given its virtually assured dominance of the assembly.

Third, article six, paragraph 3 of the supplementary provisions to the constitution states that "Laws legislated by the Legislative Council for National Security and trials, budgets and other dispositions effected thereunder shall remain valid, and may not be litigated or disputed for reasons of this constitution or other reasons." The new legislature inherited the legislation of the junta-controlled LCNS en masse and, given the lightly-contested domination of the body by the government's DJP, was
functionally prohibited from altering those policies. The 1980 constitution had dissolved all pre-existing political parties and replaced them with the government's party (DJP) and a number of "opposition" parties, chief amongst whom were the Democratic Korea Party (DKP or Minhan Dang) and the Korean National Party (KNP or Kukmin Dang). However, most Koreans considered these parties to be "opposition" parties in name only and they were given the derisive appellation of "sakura" (Japanese for "Cherry Blossom") as a way of indicating their false colors.

These regime-sanctioned opposition parties, mired in permanent minority status, mounted only token opposition to the state's policy agenda between 1981 and 1985 when they were swept into oblivion by the National Assembly elections of February, 1985. A truly independent opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP or Shinhan Minju Dang) led by Lee Min-woo but backed by still-banned major opposition figures Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, was organized to fight for basic reforms, including the rights of labor, in the National Assembly.

In May of 1983, Kim Young-sam, the former president of the opposition Shinmin Dang (NDP) staged a 23-day hunger strike demanding improvement in political rights. This provided the context for dissidents to regroup themselves by forming the Council of the Democratic Peoples in June. Within a year this group became the Council for the
Promotion of Democracy (CPD) chaired by Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. Faced with pressure from a reinvigorated opposition coalition, the Chun regime changed tactics from hard-line repression to "decompression" measures in the later part of 1983, releasing political prisoners from house arrest, removing restrictions on political activities, and providing increased tolerance of such activities.

The CPD became the NKDP in January of 1985 and emerged in February as the major opposition party. The NKDP was a hard-line opposition party that pushed for constitutional revision. Contrary to the intentions of the Chun government, "decompression" tactics only served to animate a broad spectrum of anti-regime forces who organized themselves into their struggle organizations of the Minjung democratic movement and allied themselves with the NKDP. Labor organizations participating in this alliance included, among others, the Seoul Federation of Labor Movements, the Korean Federation of Christian Workers, the Inchon Federation of Laborers, and the Laborers' Council for Welfare.

The entry of genuine opposition parties into the National Assembly provided the labor movement and their various collective associations with legitimate avenues of input to the policy process and was crucial to the partial revision of labor statutes in December, 1986. However, the
sanctioned union structures, such as the FKTU, had little overt role in this process.

This is not to say that the unions do not seek influence or redress of grievances through the national assembly. During a series of interviews conducted during 1980 and 1981 at the headquarters of the FKTU and 14 of the 16 national industrial federations there were uniformly affirmative responses to whether or not the union leaderships tried to elicit the support of members of the National Assembly. Indeed, a newly-elected DJP assemblyman dropped by the national headquarters of the Korean Railway Workers' Union while one of the interviews was in progress. However, in the Korean context there are two somewhat unique circumstances that characterize the relationship between interest groups and assemblymen. First, since the government party has habitually controlled the assembly there is little to be gained by developing close relationships with out-of-power opposition parties, even though they may be philosophically or programatically more sympathetic to the position of industrial labor organizations than is the ruling party. As one officer of the Korean Federation of Electrical Workers Union put it, "We have more in common ideologically with the opposition parties than with the ruling party but, the opposition has no power so if we go to them with our problems we can expect their sympathy and good words but little real help. Whereas
if we go to the ruling-party (DJP) we may be able to get at least some intercession on our behalf."

There is also a substantially different dynamic governing the relationship between interest groups and legislative representatives in the authoritarian environment of contemporary Korea and that of a more democratic, pluralist system. In response to my question about how they pressured assemblymen to support union demands one officer of the Federation of Korean Seamen's Union replied, "Your words 'pressure' and 'demands' are really inappropriate, we don't pressure them or demand things, rather, we go to the DJP assemblymen as supplicants—to beg." As he said this he held out his cupped hands emulating a beggar and the two other union officials grinned and nodded in agreement.

With the sanctioned opposition parties fundamentally powerless the unions were forced to go to the rather unsympathetic governing party to seek whatever redress of grievances might be obtained. Given the fact that the DJP assemblymen owed their sinecure more to their elite patrons in the executive branch than to electoral constituencies, interest groups, particularly labor organizations, had to supinely request support rather than aggressively apply pressure to assemblymen and party officials. The end result was that during the first four years of the Fifth Republic, political parties and the legislative branch did not provide a viable avenue for the effective upward articulation of
group interests *viz.* the state apparatus. This condition changed slightly during the last three years of the regime due to the rise of independent opposition parties.

**The Bureaucracy**

The Ministry of Labor (MOL or *Nodong Bu*) is the principal bureaucratic agency administering industrial labor matters. The MOL is formally mandated to manage and coordinate matters related to standardization of working conditions, occupational stability, job training, insurance and social welfare for workers, and labor disputes. It organizationally comprises the Bureaus of Planning and Management, Labor Cooperation, Occupational Stability, and Job and Labor Insurance. Under its jurisdiction are the Offices of Local Labor Administration, Rehabilitation, National Labor Science Research, the National Job Training Center, and the Central Labor Commission. Its main function is to administer or implement the basic policies and laws pertaining to labor affairs.

Prior to 1981, labor affairs had not attained ministerial status but were handled by the Office of Labor Affairs (OLA or *Nodong Chung*), an independent agency within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA). Without cabinet status and housed in the unimportant and underfunded MHSA, the OLA had been without significant influence in labor policy-making circles within the government. Rather, the OLA served principally as a source of data.
pertaining to labor issues and as a basic instrument of state intervention into labor union affairs as well as the labor-management relationship itself.

In 1981, the Chun regime implemented a 1979 recommendation made by the previous government's Administrative Improvement Research Committee and elevated labor affairs to ministerial status. This was seen as a significant step forward by pro-labor interests in that it guaranteed representation of labor affairs at the weekly meetings of the State Council. In the status conscious hierarchy of Korean bureaucracy such formal parity with other socio-economic decision-makers such as the EPB, Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), Ministry of Finance (MOF), and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) is quite important in maximizing a fair hearing of respective ministerial positions.

But, in reality, the status of the MOL viz. other cabinet ministries is one of marked inferiority. Funding, manpower, prestige, and morale are low in comparison with other ministries. A 1981 visit to the MOL's Bureau of Planning and Management at the newly opened headquarters building in Seoul's industrial Yungdeungpo district revealed twelve to fifteen people engaged in little activity in a very small room. In spite of the general lack of activity, the bureau chief and his deputy demonstrated little interest in providing information on current goals or projects.
It is difficult to determine what are standard operating procedures in Korea's labor policy process, as there must be. One possibility is that standard operating procedures concerning policy-making have become formalized within ministries and other governmental organizations, whereas the patterns of interaction between such organizations are, to a great extent, ad hoc and formally uncharted. Below the State Council (SC), there is no institution which provides middle-level bureaucrats the opportunity to coordinate policy or inter-ministerial affairs. Such a situation would impede horizontal communication and inter-ministry bargaining.

More realistically, there is an identifiable hierarchy or pecking order in the bureaucratic establishment with certain ministries possessing more resources and exercising much more influence than others. In a government obsessed with national security and economic growth the policy process has been decisively dominated by such prominent and senior ministries such as Home Affairs, Finance, and Trade and Industry, as well as agencies such as the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP). The MOL's rather ineffectual articulation or advocacy of labor rights and reform has been more the result of united intra-governmental opposition to pro-labor issues than of poor coordination or miscommunication.

Incentive for the MOL to aggressively assert or
negotiate policy initiatives is mitigated by the fundamental consensus formed amongst the highest echelons of the political and bureaucratic elite concerning the relationship between economic growth, regime stability, and national security, a kind of "group think" which stifles intra-regime dissent. In Confucian tradition, there is no concept of the loyal opposition—dissenters are not rewarded, they are removed. Modern Korean authoritarianism perpetuates this tradition. To the extent that labor policy is subordinate to the regime's overall economic policy, the EPB's indicative planning procedures (now into the sixth five-year plan) constitute the economic parameters within which labor policy is constrained. Overarching goals of high productivity, employment generation, and wage and price stability leave little room for the MOL to maneuver.

Complicating matters is the fact that the ministers of labor, who are all political appointees, have never been presidential intimates and have therefore never held central positions in the making of basic policy decisions. There is, for example, little evidence that any minister of labor has ever forcefully represented constituent interests at meetings of the State Council or been successful in pushing through major policy reforms. While often sympathetic to labor's initiatives, the MOL has, on the whole, been ineffective or lethargic in advancing constituent policy initiatives, such as a national minimum wage, pressed upon
them by the FKTU or national industrial union federations.

This is not surprising given the primary *de facto* task relegated the ministry by the regime of maximizing a national or statist presence in the conduct of labor-management affairs. This statist presence and function is a manifestation of the elite’s fundamental consensus mitigating or opposing the effective representation of labor interests through sanctioned avenues such as the MOL and FKTU. Kwon Joong-dong, Korea’s first labor minister clearly spelled out his ministry’s main priority as “maintaining a balance between the three parties concerned with labor-management problems—workers, employers, and the government”. The intent was to sustain the tripartite character (workers, employers, and the state) of the labor relations process established under the previous regime. He asserted that government participation as the balancer was necessary in order to pursue three subsidiary goals: strengthening worker’s bargaining power viz. employers, minimizing costly confrontations between labor and management, and getting workers and labor organizations to operate within procedural channels mandated by law.

With an eye on the distributive implications of unrestrained wage demands he also noted that,

Distribution must also consider the productivity issue—distribution without productivity is dangerous. The financial capability of business is important when we talk about distribution issues....Social welfare is wonderful, but the government must consider the ability
of business to pay.

Using a catch-phrase of the regime, the new minister emphasized that the framework for building a welfare state could only succeed if labor, management and government cooperated. And, as far as industrial labor was concerned, that manifested itself in the revised labor statutes.

**Basic Labor Laws of Korea's Fifth Republic**

The most important statutes effecting labor are the six basic labor laws and their respective implementing decrees; the Labor Union Law, Labor Dispute Adjustment Law, Labor Committee Law, Labor Standard Law, Labor-Management Council Law, and the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labor Unions and the Settlement of Labor Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms. These laws are the primary mechanisms for formally structuring or articulating the relationship of industrial labor with the state as well as other societal interests.

The Labor Union Law (Nodong Chohap Bup) states as its purpose,

to guarantee, pursuant to the constitution, the autonomous right of workers to enjoy freedom of association, collective bargaining, and collective action, and to improve the economic social status of workers and contribute to the national development by maintaining and improving working conditions and enhancing welfare of workers.56

The law contains provisions for defining, regulating, establishing, managing, and dissolving unions. It also
contains chapters dealing with collective bargaining, unfair labor practices, and penal provisions for violations of the code. Article 13, paragraph one of the law makes it relatively easy to organize a union local in that the approval of only 30 employees or one-fifth of total employees at a workplace is necessary. This article was again revised in late 1987 to permit the establishment of a union at the initiative of only two employees at the workplace. It also ostensibly protects and enhances the viability of union locals by prohibiting (Article 3, paragraph 5) the establishment of competing unions in the same workplace. The law and its implementing decree also offer protection from employer attempts to prohibit or bust unionization attempts (Article 39). Such protections had been instrumental in facilitating rapid and widespread unionization of industrial workers throughout the 1960s and 1970s—-to a peak of 1.119 million as of July, 1980.

However, there were a number of provisions which may be viewed as having adverse effects on union power and autonomy. First, Articles 13 and 15 contain provisions requiring the acceptance or certification of union charters by various "administrative authorities" (the MOL, provincial governor, mayors of Seoul or Pusan, etc.) before the labor organization can obtain legal status. Article 16 stipulates that the administrative authorities may cancel or alter a union's charter when it violates a law or an order or is
likely to harm public benefits and Article 32 uses much the same language in deciding to order the dissolution of a union or the reelection of its executive officers.

Collectively, these articles function as a cornerstone of state-corporatism in that the state arrogates unto itself the right to determine who will represent worker interests and on what terms through sanctioning the establishment of unions—only organizations willing to abide by the regime's rules can legally represent worker interests. Unions that defy regime policy are either denied formal sanction from the outset, as in the case of the Chonggve Garment Workers' Union in 1980-1981, or have their charter revoked, as happened to the union at the Control Data/Korea plant in 1982.

Second, Article 12 of the Labor Union Law states that a union, shall not be allowed to conduct any act, in the election of any public office, in order to support a specific political party or have a specific person elected, nor shall a union be allowed to collect political funds from its members, or divert union funds to political funds. In this way, the unions are theoretically protected from being exploited by any political party (as was the case under Rhee), but they are also prevented from voluntarily allying with any given political party or attempting to form a Korean version of a Labor Party. This provision prevents what would seem to be the politically natural alliance of
the organized labor movement with opposition political parties and restricts the viable avenues for representation of organized labor's interests.

Third, Article 12-2 of the Labor Union Law represented a major change which sought to prevent "third-parties" from participating in union affairs or labor-management relations. It states,

A person other than a worker who has actual employment relations with the employer, or concerned labor union, or other persons having legitimate authority under law shall not engage in an act of interference for the purpose of manipulating, instigating, obstructing, or any other act to influence the concerned parties in an establishment or dissolution of a labor union, joining or disjoining (sic) a labor union, or in collective bargaining with the employer.60

This provision is aimed at preventing other social groups from aiding unions in confrontations with employers or the state. Initial targets were activist religious groups like the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), a protestant group heavily involved in the Chonggye Garment Workers Union protests, and the Young Christian Workers (JOC), a Catholic organization advised by the Maryknoll order and dedicated to raising worker consciousness.

However, it has since been utilized in attempts to prevent activist college students from engaging in union organizing and worker consciousness-raising activities by obtaining assemblyline jobs under false pretenses. The government and employers were worried that the relatively well educated and ideologically motivated students would
imbue the workers with radical economic and political ideas undermining firm profitability and political order. Student activists so discovered are usually fired by the concerned firms but rarely prosecuted by government authorities.

Prosecution would be a serious affair in that the penalty for conviction is imprisonment not to exceed three years or a fine not to exceed 5 million won (about $7,500.00 as of April, 1988) approximately one year's pay for the average industrial worker. The law also dropped previous provisions for the punishment of employers found committing unfair labor practices, substituting merely the restoration of required conditions as a remedy. Punishment of offending employers was not reinstated until December 17, 1986.

The Park regime had introduced the concept of organizing local unions in particular industries around national-level union federations (Sanbyul Nocho) under the FKTU with the goal of rationalizing and standardizing industry-wide collective bargaining procedures. As a result, by the end of the 1970s collective bargaining in several industries, such as textiles, railways, and monopolies, was conducted by officials of the relevant union federation. Article 33 of the revised laws permitted the participation of representatives from the FKTU and national federations to participate in collective bargaining procedures only under special circumstances and with the permission of the administrative authorities. As a result
national and industry-wide collective bargaining processes were formally eliminated. This situation undercut the power and authority of the federations and introduced "enterprise" unionism, the representation of workers on a plant by plant basis, as the characteristic form of union organization in Korea. This was generally viewed by pro-labor analysts as internally weakening the union movement viz. management and the state.

This situation was partially reversed in December, 1986 when revisions were made in Articles 12-2 and 33 restoring the ability of the national federations to represent or assist union locals. Article 12-2 prohibiting third party interference in unit union affairs was revised to read that "a general federation of unions or an industrial federation of unions to which the trade union concerned is affiliated shall not be considered as third parties." And Article 33 concerning collective bargaining was altered to state that unit trade unions "when they have reported to the administrative authority with the approval of the majority of union members, may entrust negotiations to the federation of unions with which they are affiliated." These revisions return the FKTU and national union federations to prominent positions in the labor relations system. The change reflected the government's acceptance of the desirability of industry-wide collective bargaining in certain industries, such as textiles, as well as, the
stabilization of the regime's political control. Organized labor was no longer felt to pose a significant threat.

In addition to coercing unions to organize and operate within a state-sanctioned and controlled framework, the Labor Union Law functions to prevent the development of institutional linkages which would cut horizontally across society. By diminishing the opportunities for the autonomous formation of broad-based social alliances (unions, federations, opposition parties, student activists, and church organizations) the law contributes to the social isolation of organized industrial labor as well as its vertical articulation with the state—key structural characteristics of Schmitter's state-corporatism model. Unable to develop linkages to other social organizations and interest groups, the labor movement has only statist institutions (the MOL, labor committees, and the labor-management councils) to which to turn as legitimazed vehicles for the representation of worker interests viz. the state and employers.

The Labor Committee Law (Nodong Ouiwonhoe Bup) provides the legal basis for Korea's tripartite labor dispute adjustment system. Article one states that the purpose of the law is to "effect democratization of labor administration and fair adjustment of relations between labor and capital," through the creation of a hierarchically ordered system of labor committees constituted of equal
numbers of members representing labor, management, and the public interest. Labor representatives on the various committees are recommended by the unions, management representatives by business organizations, and the decisive public interest representatives by the president, minister of labor, or other concerned ministers.

When labor and management fail to resolve a dispute through bilateral negotiation, it is referred to the appropriate labor committee for consideration and disposition. Disputes contained within a province or special-city administrative unit (Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu) are handled by a Local Labor Committee while those effecting unusual or unique industries or areas are handled by a Special Labor Committee specifically enpaneled for this purpose. Industrial disputes spilling across provincial lines are handled by the Central Labor Committee as are appeals of decisions rendered by the administratively inferior local and special committees. The public interest members are usually appointed from the ranks of government administrators, academics, lawyers, and others with substantial experience (10 years or more) in labor affairs.

The public interest representatives wield the crucial swing-vote on the various committees and are mandated to maintain neutrality in decision-making—a stricture to which the available evidence indicates they well adhere. There is no evidence that the committees systematically favor labor
or management in the rendering of decisions. In fact, during my interviews of union officials and rank-and-file workers, no complaints were expressed concerning the decisions rendered by the various committees. One long-serving member of the Central Labor Committee intimated that, "We (the public interest representatives) really try to avoid bias and, while we do disagree with one another from time to time, we do our best to arrive at a decision which is just for labor and management, as well as in the overall interest of the nation."

Nation-wide, local labor committees handle between 300-400 labor disputes a year on average, while the national-level Central Labor Committee deals with between 30-40 on a yearly basis. The law's function is less to interject a systematic bias into this labor dispute settlement process than to reduce overt labor-management conflict and assert state hegemony over that process. The labor committee system does not necessarily subvert or circumvent labor or management rights, but it does locate and constrain the formal exercise of those rights squarely within the context of superordinate national or statist interests. The intersection of private and public sectors manifested in this tripartite system displays the hierarchical ordering and functional differentiation characteristic of state-corporatist systems as well as the degree to which industrial labor organizations (and employers, too) are
dependent upon the goodwill of the government as the final arbiter of group interests.

The most controversial piece of labor legislation introduced by the Chun regime was the Labor-Management Council Law (Nodong Kwulli Hoeoui Bup). Article One states that the purpose of the law is to promote the common interests of labor and management through their mutual understanding and cooperation; thereby seeking peace in industry and making a contribution to the development of the national economy. Located in each plant and composed of an equal number of members representing labor (in a unionized plant the union president is to head the worker's delegation) and management, the councils are to provide a venue for dealing with all matters except collective bargaining which, as stated in Article Five, remains the sole province of the established labor union.

The law's protagonists argue that the council system augments the union's role in representing worker interests, but critics charge that the council functions to supplant the unions in plants where they already exist and inhibit organization attempts in workplaces without unions. The more effective the plant's council at negotiating areas of contention between labor and management, the more it may serve to undercut or back-channel the union. There is substantial evidence that the councils find it very difficult to avoid touching on wage issues as they tend to
dominate worker concerns. Indeed, one study found that 40% of the firms surveyed admitted that the conclusion of a union contract was the only role of the council and an additional 43% answered that the council assumes the role of joint consultation concerning productivity as well as issues of collective bargaining.

This council system is, of course, influenced by elite notions of proper labor-management relationships. Speaking before a group of foreign businessmen, the head of the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry summed up this perspective by saying, "In Korean management, superiors strive to be fair and good to their subordinates while subordinates express loyalty to their superiors regardless of reward....This implies that the ties between labor and management are like family relationships, not so-called 'labor contracts.'" Paternalist management that conceives of its workers in familial terms, as its subordinate children, is unlikely to treat them as legitimate equals at the council table.

While the council system does little to enhance the representation of worker interests at the enterprise level, it does undermine the authority and importance of the established union. This situation is exacerbated by the attitude of government officials who have a discernible state-corporatist agenda. In February 1983, then-Minister of Labor Chung Han-ju addressed a joint meeting of union and
management officials at which it was reported he
told the meeting that productive and cooperative labor-
management relations should become the driving force
for the country's second economic take-off and the
foundation for a "great, advanced Korea." The nation's
chief policymaker in labor affairs said that both labor
and management should fulfill their responsibility
before advocating their rights. "Mutual trust and
respect should become the basis for
cooperative...relations. Productive labor-management
relations will be helpful not only for the individual
development but also for the prosperity of the nation
as a whole.68

The state's position indirectly buttressing managerial power
is not only displayed through the council but, also, through
the enterprise's Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement)
program which embraces the twin themes of labor-management
cooperation and increasing labor productivity.

A government that emphasizes responsibilities over
rights and collapses individual interests into a
generalizable national interest is unlikely to allow the
council system to tilt too much in favor of worker interests
if that jeopardizes firm profitability and the comparative
advantage of manufactured exports.

In order to minimize the potential threat of such a
tilt, Article 27 of the Labor-Management Council Law
restates the prohibition against third parties participating
or intervening in the process, a prohibition which prevents
activists, professional negotiators, or representatives of
the national union federations or FKTU from advising or
aiding the union local. A general lack of formal education
and technical expertise in law and administration
characterizes most local union leaderships; consequently, the lack of outside assistance is far more debilitating for the worker's organization than for the employer. Given the rough commonality of interest between management and government in areas such as productivity and international competitiveness, the council system functions to coopt the representation of worker interests within yet another elite-dominated institutional procedure.

The Labor Dispute Adjustment Law, (Nodong Jaengi Chojung Bup), governs the union's right to exercise its ultimate weapon, collective job-actions, in seeking redress of grievances viz. employers. Article one states that

The purpose of this law is to effect a fair adjustment of labor relations and to prevent and settle labor disputes, so that peace in industry may be maintained and contribution may be made to the development of the national economy.

Article 4 prohibits formal labor disputes in national and local government agencies, public corporations, transportation industries, mining and petroleum industries, public utilities such as water, electricity and natural gas, medical and public health facilities, stock transaction and banking, broadcasting and communication, as well as any enterprise designated by the government as "a business whose suspension or discontinuance is acknowledged to endanger the national economy or threaten the daily lives of the people." The concluding clause tenders the government critical discretionary authority in deciding when and where
labor may engage in collective action.

Article 12 limits collective job actions solely to the premises of the concerned enterprise a prescription which effectively removes demonstrations or strike activity from public view. Article 13 prohibits acts of dispute which would prevent the normal maintenance or operation of factories or workplaces and empowers the government to unilaterally suspend such job actions on its own volition. Article 13-2 restates a prohibition against the intervention of third parties in acts of dispute, a circumstance which prevents sympathy actions on the part of other unions as well as demonstrations of solidarity by other social groups. This article initially pertained to the FKTU and national industrial federations but was revised in December, 1986 to except them from the law's application.

Article 14 prescribes a 20 to 30 day cooling off period after the filing of a formal act of dispute with the Ministry of Labor before collective action can be undertaken by the local union. Subsequent chapters prescribe lengthy and complex procedures for conciliation, arbitration, mediation, and emergency adjustment of labor disputes under the oversight of the government dominated labor committee framework. The upshot is that recourse to the worker's ultimate job action weapon, the strike, while not formally outlawed, has been so constrained as to be almost impossible to utilize both legally and effectively. Violation of the
above strictures is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or fines up to 10 million won ($13,500.00 as of 1988).

The strictures embodied in the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law are augmented by the Provisional Exceptional Law Concerning Labor Unions and the Settlement of Labor Disputes in Foreign Invested Firms. This is the only labor legislation from the previous Park era incorporated without revision into the Fifth Republic's labor code. Article one states that the purpose of the law is to create special provisions concerning the establishment of labor unions and the settlement of labor disputes in order to promote labor-management cooperation in foreign invested firms and to accelerate the inducement of foreign capital.

The law prescribes government regulation of the establishment of unions and state-controlled mediation of labor disputes in enterprises in which foreigners have invested over $100,000.00 in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law. The law's intent is to extend special protection to foreign invested enterprises the disruption or closure of which would obstruct the development of the national economy or threaten the daily livelihood of the people.

While originally aimed at facilitating the establishment of export-processing zones in places like Masan and Iri, the law has aided the state's attempt to address the expressed concerns of foreign capital by diminishing the autonomy and power of industrial labor
unions in those firms. Unionization could lead to increased wages and other economic disefficiencies which would undermine the comparative attractiveness of investment in Korea viz. other NICs. This concession to foreign capital underscores its importance to and presence in contemporary Korea's bureaucratic-authoritarian order and particularly the Chun regime's emphasis on augmenting foreign loan capital with foreign direct investment (FDI).

Article one of the Labor Standards Law, (Kulo Kijoon Bup), states as its purpose the setting of standards of working conditions in conformity with the constitution, in order to secure and improve the worker's normal livelihood, and to achieve a sound development of the national economy.

The law establishes standards for the negotiation of labor contracts, wages, hours of work and rest, safety and health conditions, child and female labor, accident compensation, and employment regulations. The fundamental criticisms of the law arose in three areas; lax enforcement of safety and health provisions, insufficient protection for minimum work hours, and the initial lack of a minimum wage policy.

The industrial accident rate for Korea has been a point of controversy among the unions, employers and government for decades and has yet to be resolved favorably from the FKTU's point of view. While fully comparable figures are difficult to obtain, Korea's official industrial accident rate (.21 - .25 compensated accidents per 1,000 persons
is not only two to three times that of OECD countries but higher than that of other East Asian NICs as well. A consistent complaint lodged by rank-and-file workers interviewed was the inadequate protection provided by the Ministry of Labor's safety inspectors; most prominently cited were the problems of corruption and insufficient manpower allocated to safety inspection.

A second salient area of concern has to do with the very long working hours prevalent in most manufacturing firms. In 1980, the U.N.'s International Labor Office found that Koreans employed in industry worked, on average, the longest hours of any nation surveyed - 52.8 hours for men and 53.5 hours for women. Article 42 of the Labor Standards Law specifies a 48 hour work week which may be extended an additional 12 hours when mutually agreed upon by the employee and management. However, many of the rank-and-file workers interviewed, particularly those in the garment, textile, and electronics industries complained of forced overtime, sometimes in excess of the 12 hour limit specified in the law.

No minimum wage provision was made in the 1980 laws in spite of the fact that labor unions had long lobbied for such. Low wages have been a perennial cause of labor-management disputes over the years and the FKTU made yearly recommendations to the MOL concerning the implementation of such a law. Finally, in December, 1986, the National
Assembly passed a minimum wage law aimed at setting minimum wage levels for blue and white collar job categories. The exact wage schedules are to be fixed by the labor minister as of November 30 each year and subject to deliberation by a tripartite subcommittee organized under the assembly's Minimum Wage Deliberation Committee. Once again, the public interest or state representatives will possess the crucial swing-vote in the process. As of the time of this writing, the precise economic impact of the new Minimum Wage Law remains undetermined.

**Conclusions**

The enduring internal and external emergencies or crises confronting contemporary South Korea have facilitated the rise of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state basing its legitimacy on the provision of national security and rapid economic growth. The backbone of the rapid growth strategy has been heavy reliance on the export-oriented industrialization model pioneered by Japan. The viability of the model rests on Korea's comparative international advantage in the production of labor intensive manufactures, a condition which depends in great part on a disciplined, low-wage labor force. The Korean developmental state, as reflected in Chun Doo-hwan's Fifth Republic, continued the tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism established during the preceding era of Park Chung-hee.

On the theoretical or ideological level, the Chun
regime articulated a policy agenda imbued with the rhetoric of organic statism, the sublimation of the individual within the corpus of the nation. On the operational level, the regime utilized labor legislation in a state-corporatist manner so as to aggregate and encapsulate organized industrial labor, as well as control the terms of its articulation with the state.

In the Korean context, the Chun regime practiced a variant of the exclusionary incorporation model fashioned by its predecessor, Park's Yushin system. The Chun regime maintained the tradition of an internally weak and politically isolated labor movement, but demonstrated an ambivalence as to the utility of emphasizing the peak organization concept--the FKTU and industrial union federations--as a way of organizing the state-labor linkage as had been the case under Yushin. Rather, initial emphasis was placed on fragmenting the labor movement by introducing unit or enterprise unionism as the principal organizing characteristic and maximizing the barriers to the establishment of horizontal, intra-societal linkages. The precise impacts of this process are the focus of the next chapter.
Endnotes


4. Ibid., p. 133.


11. Personal interview with Kim Soo-kon, senior researcher, Korea Development Institute, March 1981.


15. Ibid., p. 11.


23. Ibid., pp. 181-182.

24. Ibid., p. 182.

25. Ibid., p. 185.

26. Ibid.


35. Personal interview with a professor of labor relations purged by the military junta in 1980. Interviewed in May, 1981.


39. Personal interview with Dr. Nam Duck-woo, research associate, East-West Center, Honolulu, April, 1980.

40. Personal interview with Dr. Nam Duck-woo, Prime-Minister, Republic of Korea, Seoul, October, 1980.


49. See the discussion in the next chapter.


55. Ibid., p. 182.

56. Unless otherwise noted, all references to Korean labor laws are from, Labor Policy Bureau, Labor Laws of Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Labor, 1981). op. cit.


60. MOL, Labor Laws of Korea, op. cit., p. 17.

61. AAFLI, "Perspectives on the Relationship...," op. cit.

62. FKTU news, op. cit., p. 4.

63. Ibid., p. 6.

64. Personal interview with member of Central Labor Committee, Seoul, March 1981.


68. Korea Herald, February 1, 1983. p. 3.


70. Personal interview with official of the FKTU, Seoul, May 1981.


72. Ibid., p. 6.


Chapter V

State and Industrial Labor in Korea's Fifth Republic

On the conceptual level, state-corporatism stresses the organization of specific constituencies into relatively few categories that are characterized as singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated. In contemporary Korea, constituencies organized within these categories are grouped around peak associations representing the interests of business (Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), Korean Employers Association (KEA), Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI)), the professions, (Korean Federal Bar Association (KFBA), Korean Federation of Educational Associations (KFEA)), farmers (Saemaul) movement, and the Federation of Agricultural Co-operatives (FAC)), and industrial labor (Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). Analysis of the dynamics of state-corporatism must take into account that the social and economic position of a specific group affects its relation to the state, as well as the fact that the group's relation to the state (and other societal groups) affects its political, economic, and social position.

On the operational level, state-corporatism constitutes a specific mechanism for linking or articulating these various vertically structured corporate interests with the state. As one such peak association, the FKTU has been
created, sanctioned or licensed by the Korean state and granted a deliberate monopoly of representation over the country's entire trade union movement in exchange for accepting certain state controls on its leadership selection and the articulation of constituent demands. The previous chapters discussed the historical contexts, political processes, and legal mechanisms which have fostered or accompanied the emergence of such conditions in modern Korea.

However, simply noting the type or structure of interest organization does not, in itself, empirically establish the degree to which such an interest association actually functions as the dominant institution through which specific interests are mediated. How important or useful is the peak association to the state's ability to manipulate the bulk of the labor movement or intervene in the activities of unions? What is the mix of inducements versus constraints employed by the state in order to coopt, preempt, or coerce labor union organizations? What has been the organization's response, in specific instances and over time—resistance, quiescence, or positive acceptance? What have been the political, economic, and social impacts on organized labor and the labor movement in general? Answers to these questions are not self-evident. Therefore, this chapter will address the above questions by investigating and analyzing the evolution of organized industrial labor's
re-incorporation which accompanied the installation and maintenance of the Fifth Republic. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the political and economic impacts of this process on the industrial labor movement, union organizations, and the country as a whole.

An initial task, therefore, is to investigate the degree to, and manner in, which organized labor interests in Korea are channeled and represented by its principal institution of interest intermediation, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU or No Chong).

As discussed in chapter three, the FKTU was founded in 1949 to counter the inroads the leftist labor organization, Ch'un Pyung, was making in the organization of the liberated Korean worker's movement. By 1979, it consisted of 17 industrial union federations (Sanbyul Nocho) covering 566 branches (chibu) and 4,175 local chapters (punhoe) with a total membership of over 1.11 million workers, 14.5% of a non-agricultural work force of 8 million people. Since 1976 its membership had grown by about 100,000 per year. It was then, as now, the largest organized interest group in the country and the only umbrella union federation legally recognized and sanctioned by the state. As such it aggressively guards its status against the activities of company-sponsored labor-management councils common in the large, anti-union chaebol conglomerates, as well as activist church and student organizations, both of which are viewed
with animosity by the FKTU leadership.

The FKTU does not, itself, engage in collective bargaining, but rather acts as organized labor's national spokesman and provides guidance for member unions' efforts to improve workers' standards of living and working conditions. It also provides substantial financial and manpower support to the affiliates' organizing efforts through labor education programs. In such capacity it has effectively steered the Korean labor movement in the direction of economic unionism and away from overt politicization of union activities and worker consciousness. It has been criticized as being timid when confronting management on issues of worker welfare and organizing goals, as well as too connected to ruling party and government interests. However, given the country's post-WW II political environment, there has been little realistic alternative to such an approach irregardless of the personal wishes of the organization's leadership.

The nature of the FKTU's relationship with the state has fluctuated widely over time, dependent on the political atmosphere and the condition of the national economy. Even before the transition from the Park to the Chun regime dramatically altered its fortunes, the FKTU's power and influence had been restrained by the Yushin system's restrictions on collective bargaining and job actions and the small percentage of the workforce that was actually
unionized. The state's intention has been to utilize the FKTU as a mechanism establishing the organizational and philosophical parameters within which the evolution of the labor movement was permissible. Attempts to interfere in and influence trade union affairs have tended to concentrate on the FKTU and the industrial federations (Sanbyul Nocho) but, overt interference also occurs (as we shall see) as one moves down the organizational structure to the local chapter level. At the local level, the most pervasive threat to established unions comes from employers with government intervention usually occurring as a last resort in resolving disputes.

The interactive nature of the state-FKTU relationship can be observed in the events immediately surrounding the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. By analyzing the events of that period, we can gain insight into the ability of the state to intervene as well as the limits of state power. We also gain insight into the some of the intra-institutional dynamics of collaboration, quiescence, and resistance within the FKTU itself.

The FKTU and the Installation of the Fifth Republic

At the demise of the Yushin era, the FKTU was in considerable internal disarray caused by its exclusion from the corridors of power and internal power struggles. In spite of pledges of loyalty to the regime and determined lobbying efforts no trade union official was among the
presidentially-appointed Yujunghoe representatives named to the National Assembly and the one former labor representative had been dropped in 1978. Institutional morale had been further damaged when four officers of the Korean National Textile Workers Union (KNTWU) had been arrested during the bitter Kukje Weaving Company dispute over unfair labor practices including the rigging of the local branch union elections. These events, plus a new round of price increases coupled with stringent anti-inflationary policies by the government, caused the FKTU leadership to engage in the symbolic protest of boycotting the New Year's reception hosted by the government's Office of Labor Affairs (OLA). And, due to factional feuds within the organization, the FKTU's own New Year reception was boycotted by most presidents of the 17 Sanbyul Nocho.

As economic and political discontent, fueled by rising unemployment and inflation, mounted during the first half of 1979, the labor movement in general and the FKTU in particular could not be effectively insulated from the impact of the increasingly open challenges to the Yushin order posed by the growing opposition forces including the New Democratic Party (Shinmin Dang), student demonstrators, and church activists. Upon the return of opposition leader Kim Young-sam to the Shinmin Dang chairmanship (he had been removed in 1975) his party sought to present itself as a social democratic alternative to authoritarianism and to
link labor and social reforms to the termination of the
Yushin system.

Nor was the state able to effectively stem the
increasing influence of activist church groups, students,
and some intellectuals on local branch union affairs
notwithstanding increased efforts by the security agencies.
The atmosphere encouraged increasingly more frequent labor
protests and demonstrations against specific grievances,
expressed by refusals to work excessive overtime, brief but
strident sit-ins and work stoppages The FKTU itself joined
in the calls for change via increasingly outspoken criticism
of the government's stringent wage and price policies and
the lax policing of labor law violations and industrial
safety requirements as dramatized by two recent mine
disasters.

The FKTU progressively found itself torn between
government pressures to resist the forging of cross-cutting,
coaitional linkages with sympathetic dissident groups as
well as calls to strengthen discipline over individual
branch locals. The government pressed the unions to stress
welfare, social, cooperative, educational and recreational
services for memberships partly through their own
initiatives and partly through the government's New Village
Movement (Saemaul Undong) program at each work place. On
its part, the FKTU sought concessions from the Park
government and buttressing of its status in the political
and economic order by raising such issues as political representation in the Democratic Justice Party (DJP); co-determination of wage levels and industrial policy; labor law reform; better enforcement of labor standards requirements; and wage increases commensurate with the rising cost of living.

Seeking to give the FKTU leadership some satisfaction, the government made a few gestures such as, the establishment of a special labor affairs committee within the ruling DRP to be chaired by the Prime Minister; increasing informal government guidelines for monthly minimum wages from $62 to $83; and promises for more effective policing of businesses violating the labor code failing to pay overdue wages. However, these concessions proved insufficient in helping the FKTU or industrial federations weather the approaching political storms caused by increasingly active labor participation in the opposition to the Yushin order.

Mounting labor militancy manifested itself in increased confrontations with both employers and the state. In August 1979 the Y.H. Company incident proved the decisive turning point in the futures of the Yushin system, the unions, and the nation as a whole. As mentioned in the last chapter, the Y.H. (Yung Ho) incident made headlines when the national police used excessive force in evicting from the Seoul headquarters of the main opposition NDP (Shinmin Dang) party
hunger-striking female workers protesting several months unpaid wages. In the process one woman worker was killed, several injured and arrested, and several NDP members roughed up for showing solidarity with the protesters. The Y.H. incident provoked not only more wide-scale protests but, also, increased the government's determination to use the instruments of repression to quash them.

When the government removed Kim Young-sam from his seat in the National Assembly and leadership role in the NDP, the party began a boycott of the National Assembly, universities erupted in protests and, for the first time, large numbers of industrial workers, most notably in the southern industrial cities of Pusan, Masan and Kwangju, began to join dissident students, NDP supporters, and church activists in street battles with the combat police. The regime became acutely aware that an increasingly politicized and activated labor movement was in the process of joining the emerging opposition coalition; this spurred increased government attempts to preempt such horizontal linkages via usage of the national security laws and the development of new labor legislation targeting outsiders and third parties.

The FKTU leadership was confronted with the difficult dilemma of how to officially respond to events such as the Y.H. incident. To aggressively support the workers' (their constituents) actions, many in violation of several labor and national security laws, would antagonize the regime and
endanger their own positions. To condemn the worker's actions would damage the FKTU's credibility in the eyes of their rank-and-file membership. The leadership resolved this dilemma in favor of the state by refraining, for the most part, from directly commenting on the Y.H. incident. The exception was the Korean National Textile Workers' Union President Kim Yong-tae, later rewarded with the FKTU presidency for his loyalty to the regime, who spoke in support of the government crack-down, echoing charges of communist subversion against church activist groups such as the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) who had egged on the protesters.

While less outspoken, most national-level union officials considered the church groups and students as divisive and provocative elements undermining and endangering the established order of which they were a part. As a consequence, the FKTU leadership used the occasion to issue a statement criticizing outsiders as well as employers for creating conditions conducive to labor and social unrest. Reactions such as this have discredited the FKTU in the perceptions of rank-and-file members, labor activists and outside observers. To the extent that the FKTU leadership demonstrates greater sensitivity to the expectations of the government than to those of its constituents, we may discern characteristics of cooptation and preemption in the organization. The exact mixture of
inducements versus contraints utilized by the state in conditioning such a response is not fully observable but, fear of forfeiting a position of some considerable status, income, and (albeit marginal) influence is certainly a factor in this case.

The willingness of the regime to resort to such sanction was demonstrated when the FKTU held its national convention at the organization's Yoido auditorium on October 20, 1979--just one week before Park's assassination. The proceedings were both orderly and orchestrated in that, as a result of criticizing government policy, the incumbent FKTU president Chung Dong-ho, concommitantly head of the Korean Chemical Workers' Union, was forced by the KCIA to withdraw his candidacy prior to the election. This threw the election to the clearly identified government candidate Kim Yong-tae (mentioned above); the delegate vote being 300 for, 86 against, and the remaining 116 abstaining. The only challenger, Kim Chung-ju of the Railway Workers' Union, a union with a somewhat liberal reputation, declined an offer to serve on the FKTU's Executive Council because of long standing differences between his union and the Korean National Textile Workers Union. A clearer manifestation of a state-corporatist mechanism for controlling the process of leadership selection and, hence, organizational direction and activity is difficult to imagine.

The election resulted in a major turnover of personnel
on the Executive Council, the FKTU's supreme decision-making venue, largely on the basis of political reliability determined by a special screening panel organized within the organization. At the convention, Kim Yong-tae's keynote speech towed the regime line by sharply attacking the UIM and other Christian activist groups for seeking to misguide (e.g. politicize) the labor movement.

However, the convention delegates also demonstrated a desire to stake out positions independent of the regime by adopting a number of formal resolutions demanding relaxation of government restrictions on the basic rights of workers; more efficient enforcement of unfair labor practice and employment security laws; introduction of co-determination in government and Saemaul Undong enterprises; as well as resistance to outside influences. It appears that while the state occupied an hegemonic position of dominance over the FKTU, it did not completely control it. The organization is of sufficient size and complexity that total control is neither possible, nor particularly desirable. A peak association such as the FKTU has utility as an instrument of state-corporatism only so long as its constituent members believe that it has at least some ability to reflect and advance their interests.

The October 26, 1979 assassination of President Park Chung-hee and the rapid disintegration of his Yushin system created a window of opportunity for the unions to break free
of state control. For the FKTU this manifested itself in the ousting of Kim Yong-tae from the presidency on February 8, 1980. His own Korean National Textile Workers' Union brought charges against him for embezzling union funds, for taking bribes from employers in the textile industry, and for abuse of office by siding with employers against the workers. His successor, Chung Han-ju of the Korean Port Workers Union, was heavily criticized by the leaders of the Banking, Chemical, Transportation, Railway, Communications, and Tourist federations as a remnant of the Yushin era and another "government" appointee; but a majority of the federations went along with his election so as to retain influential places on the Executive Council.

At the local chapter level, unions increasingly asserted a desire for independence and autonomy within the FKTU and industrial federation structure notwithstanding the admonitions of the federation and the warnings of the government. Turbulence reached its peak during the Sabuk coal mine incident during the third week in April when some 3500 coal miners, with the support of local inhabitants, took over the town for nearly four days. The incident started as an internal union matter with the protest of only 30 miners against the local union president for having signed a wage agreement providing a 20% pay increase instead of the 42% demanded by the rank-and-file membership. Charges against the president had been filed with the local
authorities but they had persistently refused to take any action against him.

When the workers assembled in protest at the union hall, the police promised to arrange a meeting with the union leader. But when he failed to appear the crowd spilled out into the street in protest. The police then charged the crowd with their jeeps, injuring several of the miners and sparking a city-wide riot in which one policeman was killed and fifty people injured. At this point, the government pressured the employers, the Dongwan Consolidated Coal Mining Company (one of the biggest coal producers in the country) into negotiations which acceded to most of the miners demands and ended the uprising.

In the aftermath, several corrupt officials of the union local were arrested as well as the company director together with 30 miners who had participated in the uprising. Also arrested was the president of the mine workers' federation, Choi Jung-sup against whom the charges were clearly political stemming from his outspoken criticism of the national police, KCIA, and Kangwon Do provincial authorities for their share of responsibility in the incident. The Sabuk incident was immediately followed by other labor protests such as the sit-in by over 1,000 workers at the Dongguk steel mill in Pusan, which also led to violent protests and clashes with police. This incident too was settled with the company capitulating to most of the
workers' demands which substantially exceeded government wage guidelines.

Similar disputes spread across the country in rapid order. In Seoul, 600 workers at the Royal Machinery Manufacturing Co. began a sit-in, demanding a 40% wage increase and the payment of 400% annual bonuses. The action sparked an identical sit-in by workers at the adjacent Tongyang Machinery Company who demanded the same raises as the workers at the Royal plant. Also in Seoul, 20 female workers fired in a dispute at the Dong-Il Textile Company staged a hunger strike in the president's office at the headquarters of the FKTU demanding its aid in getting them reinstated at the firm.

The demands for wage increases, back pay, increased annual bonuses, and honest union leadership were manifestations of a fundamental desire on the part of workers to have independent unions which would function to influence the distribution of the benefits of economic expansion. It became increasingly apparent that as workers witnessed rapid industrial development of their nation in the 1970s "[a] quiet change of opinion spread among laborers, poverty is not our destiny and society should be held responsible for it." That unions had not had significant distributional impact on economic policy is without doubt. What is interesting is that the consciousness of the working class to its political/economic
situation was undergoing a transformation -- continued state calls for self-sacrifice in the interest of the nation were becoming less and less effective. The government's long-standing, assiduous attempt to prevent the casting of state-labor or labor-management issues in overtly class terms was in danger of breaking down. Labor relations were rapidly assuming the ambience of the classic battle over distribution of economic surplus.

In an April 30th interview, Lee Pil-won, the only woman bureau chief at the FKTU, stated labor's emerging perspective quite well by observing that "[o]ver the last decade, industries were one-sidedly encouraged with various administrative favors by the government while laborers were forced to reserve their right[s] for the economic development of the nation," and concluded that "now [is] the time when balanced distribution of wealth between employers and employees should be carried out in all fairness amid social efforts to erase the absurdities of the past. The consciousness of workers concerning both their socio-economic situation and the political relationships affecting that situation had been significantly raised during the 1970s.

In addition to employers and the regime, industrial workers had come to define their own labor organizations as part of the political problem. In May the emphasis of labor activism shifted from confrontation with employers to
factional disputes within organized labor itself. On May 9th, 2,300 members of the National Metal Workers Union held a sit-in at the FKTU headquarters' auditorium to condemn "government-patronized leaders" and "to realize democratic labor unions," and demand the expulsion of the federation president, Kim Pyong-yong, and his staff for collaboration with employers and the government. The demonstrators accused the federation leadership of rigging the previous election and demanded the repeal of martial law which restricted the basic rights of workers.

On May 13th, 2,000 workers attending a rally at the FKTU headquarters started an impromptu sit-in demonstration after the official ceremonies were over. Accompanied by boisterous renditions of "We Shall Overcome" and the "Laborers' Song", spokespersons for the the various unions represented trooped to the lectern to demand labor rights and social justice. As one newspaper reported it,

A laborer who took the rostrum shouted through the microphone that 'we can't retreat even a step from here until leaders of political parties come and promise to guarantee laborers' full right, (sic) receiving deafening applause and shouts.

The laborer in his 20's further called on the National Assembly's Constitutional Revision Deliberation Committee to fully reflect the plight of laborers in the course of rewriting the constitution.

After every radical word against some figures (union leaders) with their personal names, the attendants burst into shouts and applause in a show of support, yelling such words as 'kill him' and 'that is right.'

Such demonstrations, violations of martial law prohibitions,
lead a number of newspaper editorials to "construe the current labor controversies as a call by the working masses for the elevation of their status in the course of national economic development."

On May 15, the editorial of the Korea Herald stated the case for labor reform in the following manner:

Workers are now moving actively to regain their rights, which they had long been forced to forego. On the excuse of various particularities of the national situation, workers have not been allowed to say what they want to or claim what they believe they deserve. They seem to have now given up waiting for others to give the lost rights back to them and begun struggling to recover them on their own. It is a due course of action, we believe, considering the changes taking place in the country these days....Our support, without any reservation, goes to the workers moves, particularly the platform charted by the labor representatives in the meeting on Tuesday at the Federation of Korean Trade Unions [the incident cited above]. At the same time, we would like to call for the repeal of some of the laws related to labor affairs, which served as devices to prevent the rightful exercise of workers' rights. In disregard of the desires of workers, these laws have been effective in supporting political power as well as its pursuit of economic expansion at all costs.14

Now, not only the opposition parties, radical students and activist church groups were speaking the previously unspeakable but, workers, union representatives, and a wider cross-section of Korean society were becoming increasingly sensitized and sympathetic to the political and economic situations of industrial workers. In short, while industrial labor was becoming increasingly activated in terms of both perceiving its political economic condition and undertaking political actions designed to alter that
condition, the issue of industrial labor's rights was becoming politicized for Korean society as a whole.

Had this process of decentralization and liberalization continued, it seems probable that a much more autonomous and politically active labor organization would have emerged. The ingredients for such a transformation; emerging class consciousness, increased grass-roots attempts to use union locals to confront employers and corrupt union officers, development of horizontal ties with activist groups, demands for reduction of government interference in the FKTU and industrial federations, increased societal awareness of and sympathy for labor's trevails, public calls to reduce legal restrictions on the exercise of rights by organized labor, had all manifested themselves by early Summer, 1980.

All this was altered by the Martial Law Declaration of May 17, 1980 and the progressive military takeover culminating in the assumption of the presidency in August by Gen. Chun Doo-hwan. The new military junta quickly moved to "purify" the political atmosphere by arresting major Yushin and opposition politicians, dissolving existing political parties, banning critical publications, sanitizing the mass media, and ending public demonstrations of all kinds. Then the new order turned on the labor unions with a purification campaign that was intended not only to serve punitive or security objectives but also was designed to elicit the support of a younger generation of union leadership which
had long chafed under a rigid rank and seniority system by opening up new opportunities for advancement with the wholesale removal of the older leaders.

In the aftermath of the military takeover, the FKTU found itself in a difficult and uncertain position. On the one hand it fell under the new regime's scrutiny for having participated in the corrupt practices of the Yushin system and on the other it was suspect for coming to play an increasingly activist, though still cautious, role seeking reforms and greater union freedom during the interim period from October 1979 to May 1980. The Martial Law Decree of May 17 placed severe restrictions on public assembly, organizing activities, and most forms of labor dispute. And the new regime had issued seven sets of guidelines for labor unions from July through December of 1980, such as "Guidelines for Labor Union Activity Under Martial Law" (July 1, 1980), "Guidelines for the Purification of Labor Unions" (August 21, 1980), and "Prohibition of Labor Activities by Purged Labor Union Officials" (November 4, 1980). The new regime was bent on establishing a new state-corporatist order that would preempt the emergence of an autonomous union movement.

The new authoritarian order's initial blow fell on August 19, 1980 with the forced removal of 11 out of 17 presidents of the industrial federations (Sanbyul Nocho) and one FKTU vice-president on charges of corruption, their
replacement by handpicked interim successors, massive purges at all levels of organized labor unions, and the dissolution of local and regional labor committees. On the surface, the impacts of this measure were not all bad for the union movement in that many of those ousted were, indeed, corrupt remnants of the Yushin era who had worked hand in glove with government and employers or enriched themselves at the expense of their rank-and-file constituents.

However, the removal of corrupt leaders from the top also did nothing to enhance union independence or autonomy in that they were no more free to choose their own leaders than before. In one fell swoop, the new statist elites effectively accomplished three important goals: the preemption of incipient institutional autonomy, the re-subordination of industrial labor's peak-organization to the state, and the cooptation of institutional leadership. The impact on organized labor was summed up by a report by the Asian-American Free Labor Institute in the following manner:

Thus ended for the time being the hopes for liberal reforms and the emergence of a revitalized and more effective labor movement....[recent events] do not leave much immediate hope for meaningful dialogue with labor or any other group seeking to be heard. In the eyes of the military the overriding priority will now be to revive the economy without interference from the unions.16

This emphasis on economic revitalization was underscored by the reshuffling of the president's cabinet on September 2, a move which brought a number of prominent economic planners
and technocrats into the inner-circles of the regime and signaled a return to the growth-first development strategies of the past.

Another dramatic example of the regime's alteration of the structure of the union movement was the forced merger of two of the industrial federations. In September, 1980 the National Port Workers' Union was merged with the National Transport Workers' Union to form a new entity known as the Korean Port and Transport Workers Union. While the official explanation was to increase the membership and clout of two of the smaller union federations, the more pertinent cause was the government's desire to tame the obstreperous port workers unions. It also had an important demonstration effect on the other federations, the state could withdraw its sanction, and the perqs and status that went with it, should the federation incur the displeasure of the regime.

Not only the top leadership of the FKTU and industrial federations were the target of the government's purge. In a second round of expulsions on September 10, 1980, 191 leading trade unionists were excluded from union activity of any kind. On two separate occasions, many of these people were subjected to prolonged interrogation (one to three weeks), indictment for various violations of martial law, and/or several weeks of "purification education" (sunhwa kyoyuk) at a special camp in Samch'uk. One such camp veteran, the former president of a Seoul chemical union
local, told me during a mid-1981 interview that the government lumped all effective (e.g., activist or confrontational) labor leaders together with communists and subversives and treated them with equal suspicion. As he put it,

The government always says that we are communists just because we fight for our rights. We're not communists. We don't have any sympathy for North Korea. All we want is justice and the chance to live a decent life. But, no matter how many times you say that, they never hear you. 17

Those purged or convicted of criminal activity were barred from holding union offices again for periods of between one and three years. The actual prospects of becoming a union officer in the future were slight in that companies would be loath to hire someone convicted of violations of the National Security Law or labor laws.

As part of the restructuring of labor organizations, the government ordered the dissolution of 105 regional branch unions (chibu) on August 21. The branch unions were grass-roots organizations which formed an intermediary level, based on size and craft, between the various industrial union federations and their affiliated local union chapters (punhoe). In the case of the Metal Workers Union, for example, a local organization with 1,000 or more members was known as a branch; one with less than 1,000 members was considered a local chapter, which together with other chapters formed a branch. The size of branches varied by industry and type of corporate ownership. In the case of
the textile industry, dominated by private, domestic ownership, branch unions were often organized by geographic region and could have more than 10,000 rank-and-file members scattered across many different firms.

The branch structure made it possible for a large number of local chapters to collectively negotiate a single standardized contract with a number of different firms in the same region and industry. While not without their drawbacks, the branches performed several significant functions in that they promoted union solidarity, helped to standardize wages and conditions, and enhanced the bargaining positions and power of unions and workers in particular regions and industries.

The government renamed the local chapters as branches (danwi nocho) in a symbolic attempt to enhance their status, but the fundamental purpose was to fragment collective union strength at the regional level and dramatically undercut the power of the national industrial union federations by replacing them with enterprise-level unions that were considered weaker and easier to control. This reorganization, coupled with the "third party" prohibitions of the soon-to-be-announced revisions of the labor code resulted in a precipitous decline in union membership, from a peak of 1,119,572 in July 1980, to 922,317 by the end of February 1981--a decline of over 197,000 members or 17% of the unionized workforce. This dramatic reversal of the
organizing successes of the previous two decades continued well into the era of the Fifth Republic. As of the close of 1985 total FKTU membership had fallen to only 775,940, a decline of 343,632 members or 36% when compared to the 1980 figures.

While all national unions suffered losses, the most dramatic membership losses during the 1980-1986 period occurred in the Automobile Workers Union (82,000), Seamen's Union (70,000), Textile Workers' Union (69,000), Chemical Workers' Union (70,000), Metal Workers' Union (28,000), and the United Workers' Union (35,000). Since many of the firms in these industries are small--employing comparatively few workers, unions organized at the enterprise level tend to be weak and vulnerable to employer domination. In a context where such small unions are prohibited by law from associating or negotiating at a regional or industry-wide level, union membership carried with it few benefits.

A case in point was presented during a 1981 exchange with a Seoul taxi driver, a former member of an Automobile Workers' Union local (in Korea, AWU workers do not assemble autos, they drive them). When queried about union membership, Mr. Han offered the following reply:

Before it was okay, but now it's different. Before they changed the system (from industrial to enterprise unionism) we had some strength because the Seoul taxi drivers could face the company owners in a big group. Now we can't do that anymore. It's just company by company now. My company has only 14 drivers. How are we going to stand up to the boss? If he says you've
got to drive 12 or 18 hours today, what can we do? If we make trouble we could get fired and who would help us out? I've got a family so, I've got to make a living as best I can. If, in the future, the government changes things back the way they were I'll probably join the union again, but now it's no good.22

But, a counter-argument was offered by another Seoul taxi-driver who had remained in the union after the law's revision. Mr. Han reasoned that even though it was much weaker than before and the new atmosphere made things difficult, "any union was better than no union at all." 23

An initial result of this state-induced reorganization was a gradual increase in the formation of new local chapter unions in the workplace. However, this occurred as a response to the dissolution of the larger branch unions and the weakening of the federation concept. The new enterprise-level unions were lacking in organizational expertise and at a severe disadvantage viz. their employer counterparts. The importance of the industrial and branch union structure to the labor movement was underscored when, in late 1986, the law was re-interpreted allowing the industrial federations to, once again, aid local chapters in contract negotiation and dispute resolution. Within one year, total FKTU membership climbed to over one million again; primarily in those unions which had suffered the most drastic membership declines in 1980-1981.
The Reaction of the FKTU to the New Environment

From June through August 1981 I visited the headquarters of the FKTU during which I interviewed several middle and upper echelon officials including 4 bureau directors, two vice-presidents, and the general secretary. Attempts to meet with them earlier had been frustrated by the institutional turmoil resulting from the recent shake up and, the summer vacations of the senior staff. The interviews were open-ended, lasting between 45 minutes to two hours, and I met with several of those interviewed on more than one occasion. Based on the interviews I arrived at four general conclusions concerning the organization as of that time, preoccupation with and emphasis on problems related to institutional maintenance, emphasis of economic issues and welfare functions on behalf of the membership, a clear notion of the optimal paths to political input coupled with a palpable ambivalence that such input would be effective, and manifest differences of perception and opinion between middle and upper echelon officials.

Institutional maintenance concerns centered around the negative impacts of the December, 1980 changes in the labor laws which had a) introduced the enterprise union system, b) deleted the union shop provisions of the previous law, c) complicated the process of effective collective bargaining in large industries, such as textiles, and d) prohibited third party intervention in dispute adjustment procedures.
The enterprise union and union shop provisions made the process of increasing union memberships and organizing new workplaces more difficult and complex. The dramatic membership decline in the Automobile Workers' Union was often cited as an example of the deleterious consequences of those policy changes.

Not only did declining memberships reverse past organizing successes and threaten worker solidarity but, they also meant less money, in the form of membership dues, flowing into the FKTU. The longer collective-bargaining and contract negotiations dragged on, the greater the pressure on workers to settle for less than desired or needed and, the less capable the unions would appear to the rank-and-file. And, the prohibition on third party interference had seriously diminished the links between the FKTU and the local chapters. There were several allusions to the potential irrelevance of the FKTU if this last measure was not deleted or modified.

A second problem area emphasized was the need for the FKTU to assist its affiliated unions in improving wages and working conditions, as well as, combatting employer's unfair labor practices. This entailed the dual strategy of educating the membership through various outreach programs, seminars, and publications, as well as lobbying pertinent government authorities. The FKTU sponsored seminars and other educational programs aimed at the officers of union
locals from around the country and, published its own newspaper, *Hankuk Noch'ong*, on a monthly basis. Those interviewed felt that improvements in wages and working conditions should also be supported by lobbying pertinent public authorities for more sympathetic treatment by employers and better enforcement of the labor codes.

There was virtual unanimity as to the focus of FKTU lobbying efforts, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP or *Minjung Dang*), the National Assembly, and the Ministry of Labor (although not necessarily in this order). Continuing a tradition started under the Rhee regime, the FKTU leadership believed that the only political party worth courting was the DJP—no one interviewed suggested any of the then opposition parties. On the other hand, only one of those interviewed, the general secretary Lee Yong-joon, mentioned the Blue House as a focus of lobbying by suggesting a presidential decree might reverse some of the most malodorous revisions of the labor codes (no such decree was issued). The National Assembly was also mentioned as a lobbying target but, only three assemblymen (out of 276) were singled-out as sympathetic to organized labor's cause. The Ministry of Labor was also a target both in terms of lobbying for policy revisions and, more importantly, to get more effective enforcement of the existing legal protections of workers.

More significant than the venues mentioned was a
general lack of enthusiasm or conviction that meaningful revision of labor policies in ways that would favor unions or workers was neither likely nor possible in the foreseeable future. The FKTU staff realized that the regime had just revised the labor laws with the specific intention of weakening the labor movement and was unlikely to dramatically reverse course in the near future. The staff also knew that the legislative branch was very weak viz. the executive and bureaucracy and, therefore, working through the National Assembly was unlikely to pay any positive dividend in the near future. It was understood, at all levels, that the prospects for meaningful change lay several years away, at best. Because of this recognition, the overall atmosphere at the headquarters was, quite understandably, one of general demoralization. Only the general secretary sounded an upbeat note by saying, "while the unions had nothing to say about [recent] revisions of the labor laws, we'll just have to work even harder than before, within the system, to guarantee the rights of the workers." But the general tenor of the headquarters was of a senior staff frustrated and disheartened by what was perceived as very serious setback inflicted on the FKTU and the rest of the organized labor movement by the new regime. This condition was compounded by knowledge that there was little, if anything, the organization would, or could, do to effectively alter its predicament.
All of those interviewed strongly emphasized the external environment as a critical factor determining the organization's role and function. This included both the international environment—the confrontation with North Korea—and the domestic environment—the hostility of the military-dominated regime toward the labor union movement. Initial interviews were always prefaced with an admonition to understand the national emergency context within which the FKTU and all other unions were forced to operate. However, several of the middle-grade officers expressed opinions that the national security issue was over-exaggerated by the regime, an excuse to weaken and control labor.

The usual explanation for this was the military's desire to hold on to power and to support growth-first economic policies. While there was considerable dissatisfaction with this situation, the FKTU officials expressed resignation to it, rather than defiance or resistance. With the new regime totally in control of the mechanisms of coercion, there is little else that they could effectively hope to accomplish through resistance.

Finally, there was a striking difference of opinion manifested between the bureau chiefs and their superiors as to the nature of the most pressing problems confronting the organization. While senior FKTU officials emphasized the economic and organizational difficulties facing the organization, the middle-grade officers centered their
critiques on the external political environment constraining FKTU activities and, on the internal institutional environment as well. Middle-grade officers were concerned with the day to day problems of organization (particularly the diminished status of the national federations), collective bargaining, and dispute resolution, but such concerns were clearly secondary to those involving political factors.

The middle-grade officers were highly critical of the government for habitually interfering in the operation of the trade union movement, particularly the FKTU. Government intervention (one official used the word "control") stemmed from three conditions; an obsession with national security matters, a bias toward industry and employers, and a desire to create the image (but not the reality) of a trade union movement, primarily for foreign consumption. The confrontation with North Korea makes not only the government (e.g., the military) but, the general society suspicious of and antagonistic toward those who create social discord. The threat is real but, the government and employers exagerate and exploit the situation to discredit and cow the labor movement.

Government bias in favor of employers, they thought, stemmed from industry's financial contributions to the ruling party and other political elites. One of the bureau chiefs said that, "Industry uses too much capital to donate
to political parties (e.g., the ruling party) and to special
government projects so that little is left to spend for
workers welfare." The allusion to special projects refers
to corporate contributions to national defense purchases,
party campaign funds, and the funding of presidential travel
but, could also apply to political payoffs and corruption.
These assertions, of course, are difficult if not impossible
to verify but, there was this conviction on the part of the
bureau chiefs.

Finally, during an interview attended by several bureau
chiefs one of them asserted that, "The government wants to
use us [the FKTU] as a symbol for impressing foreigners, to
fool them into thinking that Korea has a real labor
movement. The problem with the current FKTU leadership is
that they accept this role." The other two bureau chiefs
present nodded in agreement. When I asked why the
government would care what foreigners thought the response
was, "Well, all modern countrys have organized labor
movements so Korea should seem to have one too - to get
respect." Whether or not this is true, it is evidence of
a lack of confidence in the ability of the organization to
carry out its manifest mission due, in great part, to
government constraints.

The middle-level officers were also critical of the
FKTU's internal leadership and institutional dynamics.
Decision-making within the organization was attacked as
being, "from the top-down, not bottom-up...the junior people have nothing to say in the No Ch'ong's direction." Not only was the path of decision-making monopolized by the "elected" officers (president, vice-presidents, general secretary, and the Executive Council) but, the legitimacy of those decisions was also impugned. There were several statements which were highly critical of the modus operandi of the top leadership including; "The leadership does not push labor interests", "Our problems result from government pressure and the timidity of our leadership", "here there's a tendency for the leadership to work together with management and government over the interests of the workers." Much of the criticism was aimed at past leaders (most of whom had been purged the previous year) but, there was suspicion aimed at the current leadership, as well.

Many in the post-purge leadership were viewed as suspect because they had been government appointed and approved--those who were not had been rejected as candidates for office--and therefore bore the stigma of regime cooptation. Most of the current No Ch'ong and Sanbyul Nocho presidents had previously been Sanbyul Nocho vice-presidents and were tainted by the legacy of the Yushin era and the dubious blessing of the new regime. For the above external and internal reasons, the middle-grade officers felt the FKTU had only a limited ability to effectively advance the cause of organized labor.
The constraints placed on the organization by the state were recognized as both obvious and opprobrious by the FKTU's officers, although the middle-level officers were much more outspoken in their criticisms. Whereas the senior leaders emphasized institutional maintenance, service to constituents, and working within the framework of the new system, the middle-level officers emphasized the relative futility of such a strategy given the constraining political environment and the lack of autonomous and aggressive organizational leadership.

The cooptation of the senior leadership could be viewed as a function of both constraints—the application of sanctions, or the threat thereof—as well as inducements, in the form of access to status, income, power, and perquisites (limited as these may be). However, none of the senior leaders interviewed demonstrated an enthusiasm for the new policies concerning organized labor and, the middle-level officers evinced not support, but a hostile resignation to their situation. My interpretation was that the FKTU, on the whole, demonstrated acquiescence rather than acceptance or resistance to the state's dominance and intervention.

Despite the state's hegemonic position, the FKTU was not quite a monolithic, centralized and obedient vehicle of state policy and could, upon occasion, act as an organization manifesting a sense of corporate mission and possessing significant internal dissent. Rivalries among
the leadership based on personality; differing interests and emphases among the staff; a pervasive dissatisfaction with their relationship to the state; conflicts among the various industrial federations; as well as regional factors left sufficient leeway for occasional leadership contests, criticism of government policies, and labor protests.

In addition, there was a diminished capacity and little attempt on the part of the FKTU to systematically dominate or intervene in the internal affairs of either the industrial federations—which usually operate like independent fiefdoms—or local branch unions. In the immediate aftermath of the installation of the new authoritarian regime, there was little evidence that the FKTU was to be utilized either to mobilize the labor movement in support of regime policies or to tamp down or channel an activated industrial labor sector. In mid-1981, the FKTU's main concern seemed to be survival and finding a proper role for itself in the new era.

The Reaction of the Industrial Federations to the New Environment

In the summer of 1981 (June through August) interviews were conducted at the Seoul headquarters of fourteen of the sixteen national industrial union federations, Sanbyul Nocho. Those fourteen federations included:

Railway Workers' Union
Federation of Korean Textile Workers' Unions
Federation of Korean Mine Workers' Unions
Korean Federation of Electrical Workers Unions
Federation of Foreign Organization Employees Unions  
Korean Federation of Port & Transport Workers' Unions  
Korea Seamen's Union  
Korean Federation of Bank And Financial Labor Unions  
Korea Monopoly Workers' Union  
Federation of Korean Chemical Workers' Unions  
Federation of Korean Metal Workers' Unions  
Federation of Korean Printing Workers' Unions  
Korea Automobile and Transport Workers' Federation  
Korean Tourist Industry Workers' Federation

Only two federations, the Korea Communications Workers' Union and the National United Workers' Federation, refused to arrange interviews. As was the case at the FKTU, the format was open-ended discussion with senior (presidents, vice-presidents, and general secretaries) and middle-level (bureau directors) officers and lasted from 45 minutes to two hours, depending on the interviewees' wishes.

Three general questions were initially posed to those interviewed: What have been the major impacts on your federation of the recent revisions of the labor laws? What are your relations or contacts with the government? What are the biggest problems facing your federation now? Other questions focusing on labor-management relations, funding, relations with the FKTU, etc., were also asked but, the goal was to allow the interviewees to develop the focus and content of the discussion as much as possible.

The interviews indicated that while there was substantial agreement on several areas of concern, there was/is also a substantial diversity of opinion and concern across the various federations. Areas of substantial concern centered on issues of institutional maintenance and
the focus of political contacts and lobbying activity.
Areas of diversity ranged across issues of labor-management relations, government intervention, services offered to affiliated local union chapters, and future organizational goals.

Institutional maintenance concerns stemmed primarily from recent revisions in the labor laws. The most negative impacts were identified as the introduction of the enterprise union system, the termination of union shop provisions, the prohibition on third party involvement, the maintenance of de facto no-strike prohibitions, low worker morale; and the loss, or late-payment of union dues. The introduction of the enterprise union system was unanimously cited as having the most negative consequences for the federations of all the labor code revisions for the obvious reason that it significantly diminished the role and influence of the federations viz. their affiliates. By obviating the regional and craft branches (chibu) and eliminating the federation's role in collective bargaining and dispute resolution the federation was restricted to tertiary functions such as service, welfare, and education functions. The director of planning at the Seamen's Union put it this way:

We were strong in contract negotiations last year because of our unified status. This year our power is gone because of the enterprise union system. This year there are problems. Power has developed to the other side [employers].31
As a result, memberships declined across the board but most precipitously in the Automobile and Transport Workers' Union, Seamen's Union, Textile Workers' Union, and Chemical Workers' Union federations.

Some of the officials surveyed admitted that there were some beneficial aspects of the enterprise system. Chief amongst these was that it would force the local chapters to become more self-reliant and develop organizational and negotiating skills that they did not previously have. Some of those surveyed hoped that it would contribute to the development of increased solidarity amongst the workers at the actual workplace and that this would benefit the entire labor movement in the future. This, however, was a minority opinion.

The next most salient negative impact cited was the termination of union shop provisions. This provision had been most responsible for the dramatic increases in union membership during the Yushin era and compelled all workers in a plant where a union was organized to join. It also prohibited the establishment of any competing unions where a union already existed. The demise of the union shop allowed workers to drop out of the union and still continue working at the plant and, more importantly, allowed the establishment of competing—often pro-management—unions at the same workplace. The upshot was that the termination of union shop protections contributed to declining memberships.
at the local chapter-level as well as the establishment of employer-dominated competing chapters.

The prohibition on third party involvement in collective-bargaining, labor dispute settlement, and local chapter organizing activities terminated, for the time-being, the strong, supportive role that the federations had traditionally played in these important areas and buttressed the new enterprise union system. These two revisions combined to render some of the federations, particularly the Automobile and Transport Workers' Unions and Seamen's Union, virtually irrelevant to the local chapters. And, the third party prohibition caused not only the Textile Workers' Union difficulty, but the textile industry as a whole. Without the traditional industry-wide negotiations in which the federation had coordinated the unions' position viz. employers, the 1981 negotiations dragged well into June before they were finalized through the intervention of the Ministry of Labor. This caused considerable trouble for the unions and employers, as well. This inconvenience to major industries was the major reason that the application of the third party prohibition to the federations was amended out of the laws in 1986.

While the 1980 labor law revisions outlawed strikes only in specific industries (defense, communications, finance, etc.), they allowed the government immense discretionary power to define when and where strikes were
permissible and, prescribed such time-consuming, preliminary processes as cooling-off periods, compulsory conciliation, arbitration, and mediation procedures that legal strikes were de facto impossible. Most of the federations objected to this situation but, some felt that it was really not that much of a problem. For example, the Electrical Workers' Union, Railway Workers' Union, Monopoly Workers' Union, and Banking and Financial Workers' Union federations are essentially public employees and, therefore forbidden to strike.

The general secretary of the Electrical Workers' Union implied that the right to strike was not necessarily in the national interest by stating, "Strikes are dangerous to our country. We can't be that greedy." While others felt that without the right to strike, labor is at a serious disadvantage versus employers. For example, an official at the Monopoly Workers' Union referred to a recent airline pilots strike in the United States and noted wistfully, "It's really a good country. Conditions for unions are really good there." The two other officers present nodded in enthusiastic agreement.

The other most frequently mentioned impacts of the 1980 revision of the labor laws were low membership morale and loss or late payment of union dues. These two conditions were the consequence of the government crackdown and the restructuring of labor organizations. Morale was low
because the hopes of the previous year for independent unions and a stronger labor movement had been dashed by the military takeover and the new legal restraints placed on labor. Not only were memberships declining but, there was increased non-payment of dues to the locals and to their affiliated federations. The financial squeeze on those unions suffering membership declines was quite significant (the Textile Workers' Union budget declined 20%).

All of the union officials interviewed expressed the opinion that the federations needed to increase efforts to educate and motivate their constituent memberships to recover the prestige, numbers, and solidarity of the pre-coup era. There was also widespread awareness of the necessity of increasing welfare services to their respective memberships. The Seamen's Union and the Mine Workers' Union, in particular, emphasized the development of medical facilities and educational funds for the children of their members. These were the areas left open by the state and, therefore, where the federations could make the most significant contributions to their affiliates.

The focus of political contacts and lobbying activities were very much the same as those mentioned at the FKTU headquarters only in a somewhat altered order. At the federation level, the officers generally listed the Ministry of Labor as the government entity with which they had the most frequent contact. Such contacts were maintained on a
social level, with the federation president paying periodic social calls on the Minister of Labor (once every month or two) just to maintain cordial relations and, on a case by case basis when a serious labor-management problem or dispute was ongoing.

The federation officers were almost unanimous in their belief that the recent elevation of labor affairs to ministerial status would enhance organized labor's representation in the government. The general opinion was that the ministry was usually sympathetic and responsive to organized labor's lobbying efforts but, that the MOL was a weak ministry viz. other government agencies and often unable to effectively promote the FKTU positions to the rest of the government. On several occasions, federation officials singled out the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as the government agency most responsible for overriding pro-labor/union programs forwarded by the MOL. This was generally interpreted as continuing evidence that economic development strategies still dominated the government policy agendas.

The concept of lobbying should be understood in a somewhat different way than it is usually used by American political scientists. I was often corrected when I used the term to indicate the application of pressure on the MOL, political parties, or legislators. Most of the union officials interviewed thought that "pressure" had the wrong
connotations and, that what they usually did was more in the realm of asking favors or soliciting good will and aid. Without the ability to donate funds or establish aboveboard working relationships with political parties or specific legislators, there is little "pressure" that can be brought to bear. This condition was compounded in 1981 by the political atmosphere resultant from the recent military coup d'état.

All of the union officers surveyed identified the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) as a target of "lobbying." None felt that the opposition parties were of much value and, indeed, several mentioned that courting opposition candidates could be counter-productive and jeopardize relations with the DJP and government bureaucracies. The opposition parties at this time (1981) were generally considered to be "sakura" parties and more or less tame--more for a demonstration of representative democracy than its substance. This represented a reassertion of the ruling party/organized labor connection that had, in varying degrees, been characteristic of post-WW II Korean politics.

But, the connection was neither strong nor intimate. Most of the officials interviewed identified only the same three members of the National Assembly that the FKTU leadership had as sympathetic to organized labor. All of those interviewed indicated a great deal of diffidence as to the ability of the federations to influence DJP or National
Assembly policy-making in the short run. Almost all of those interviewed expressed a belief that things were bound to improve as time passed and the political atmosphere normalized.

Officials at several federations indicated that the political situation of the unions had worsened under the new regime and, therefore, they tended to doubt that solicitation of the DJP, National Assembly, or MOL would produce significant change. The strategy to be followed, from their point of view, was to try to work within the constraints of the new system, an attitude summed up by an officer at the Mine Workers' Union as, "Right now we can't do as we wish. We'll just have to do our best and convince the authorities that we are not a danger to the nation." Many officials, surprisingly, supported the position that economic growth had to precede attempts at equity—basically the Park regime's argument. But others, such as this official at the Monopoly Workers' Union argued that "In the past, the economy was directed by economists and bureaucrats without much sympathy or understanding for the problems of the workers. That needs to change. Things are different now as compared with the 1970s."

Questions of labor-management relations drew mixed responses. The officers of some federations, such as the Seamen's Union and Automobile and Transport Workers' Union, felt that relations were very bad. The director of planning
at the Seamen's Union complained that employers thought of their companies in family terms and "think of their workers as their children, who should be obedient and quiet. This attitude makes labor-management relations very difficult for the workers." Another, an official of the Textile Workers' Union, stated that, the current dialogue with management is very bad and, in the past non-existant. In fact, it is still non-existant. Employers view unions as the enemy. People are too concerned with the national security issue and view unions as a threat. We must work very hard to overcome that image in their minds.

But, many officials interviewed expressed the opinion that there were no significant problems between labor and management. Opinions on labor-management issues divided along the line of employer-type. Public sector industrial federations such as the Banking and Financial Labor Union, Monopoly Workers' Union, Railway Workers' Union, and Electrical Workers' Union, expressed little dissatisfaction with the current situation. However, private sector federations such as the Metal Workers' Union, the Chemical Workers' Union, Seamen's Union, Automobile and Transport Workers' Union, and Printing Workers' Unions expressed considerable animosity toward employers and severely criticised the state of labor-management relations.

Officials at all the federations emphasized the need to improve services and education for the memberships of their affiliates as a way of improving union solidarity and
strengthening support for the federation. It was clear that this was an area in which the unions could excel and, along with striving for eventual revisions of the labor laws, were emphasised as the primary future goals of the federations. Very few of the federations emphasized working closely with the FKTU or with one another.

The strong impression was that the institutional organization of the labor union movement lacked internal cohesion, solidarity, strength, and confidence. This was caused in part by internal conflicts, lack of leadership legitimacy, and the need to respond to different constituent needs. But, it was more the result of the external constraints--the use of public policies--to weaken the institutional and sociological bases of organizational support.

Neither the FKTU nor the industrial federations were empowered by the Chun regime, at its installation to function as vehicles for organizing or mobilizing organized labor in support of regime goals. Rather, these institutions were dramatically weakened and reduced to limited service, educational, and welfare functions. Whatever demonstration effects or motivational functions they may have provided were intended to deactivate and depoliticize labor issues. The Chun regime's emphases were aimed at achieving a weak, docile, and disorganized labor movement. These are integral characteristics of
exclusionary state-corporatism.

Disciplining Local Chapter Unions

Because of the internal and external problems discussed above, the FKTU and industrial federations provided little or no assistance to local chapter unions (danwi nocho) threatened by employers and/or government repression. Under assault, in the early installation period were several local chapter unions which had, for various reasons, incurred the new government's displeasure. In December, 1980 the government ordered the dissolution, citing Article 32 of the Labor Union Law, of the troublesome Ch'onggye Garment Workers Union on the grounds that the bulk of its membership were ineligible for union membership (their factories had fewer than the number of employees required to qualify for union organization under the Labor Union Law and their employers were vociferous in their opposition to unionization). The union had for a decade attempted to organize the hundreds of young garment workers employed under the most deplorable conditions in the many small factories and shops at the large P'yunghwa (Peace), T'ongil (Unification), and T'onghwa (Harmony) Market areas near Seoul's great East Gate.

The initial unionization attempt had been frustrated by the Park regime leading to the protest suicide of one of the organizers, Chun T'ae-il, and the founding of the activist
Urban Industrial Mission. When the union resisted, their offices were forcibly closed by 600 riot policemen on January 22, 1981. A few days later, on January 30-31, a contingent of union members protested the dissolution by staging a sit-in protest at the offices of the Asian-American Free Labor Institute from which they were shortly expelled and arrested by police. Two protesters, including the mother of the martyr Chun T'ae-il, were seriously injured when they attempted suicide by jumping from the second storey windows.

At the Bando Trading Company, a number of dissident union officers were ordered purged by the government. When they refused to comply, they were ordered expelled from the Textile Workers Union (which they dutifully were) and openly harassed by the employer. Such harassment is an ubiquitous company tactic against recalcitrant workers and entails shifting the offending employee to menial or janitorial jobs, inconvenient shifts, or transfer to branches or subsidiaries located in other districts or the countryside. These tactics allow the company to avoid technical violation of provisions in the labor laws forbidding unfair labor practices. In addition, the police maintained surveillance inside the shop and hauled workers off for periodic interrogation. Eventually over 300 union members were purged by the company, effectively busting the union, and the company suspended its operations on January 31, 1981.
Another case of union-busting involved the union at the Seoul Commercial Company. The union had been under intense government pressure from September, 1980 to June, 1981 when the police finally arrested seven union officers for publishing an objectionable union newspaper. Two officials were ultimately jailed, the Seoul city administration (which has jurisdiction over local labor affairs) ordered the entire union leadership replaced, the company fired the entire executive committee of the union, and the union fell under the control of a company-sponsored leadership.

The process of union-busting as a strategy for disciplining and subordinating organized industrial labor continued well after the Chun regime had firmly consolidated its hegemonic position. Two of the most well-known, if not notorious, cases are those of Control Data/Korea and the Wounpoong Textile Company, both of which culminated in 1982.

Control Data/Korea was a branch of a U.S.-based transnational corporation specializing in the manufacture of semi-conductors. In 1980 two of the union's officers had been purged in the regime's purification campaign. In December, 1981 a long-simmering confrontation over wages and working conditions (principally the company's frequent "speed-up" campaigns where the number of pieces per minute passing under the worker’s microscopes was significantly increased) erupted in violence when a large gang of hired
thugs and male workers attacked a group of female union
members on the plant premises. No disciplinary action was
taken by the company, nor were charges filed against the
assailants by the police. In March, 1982 six union
activists were fired provoking an illegal 9-day strike and
sit-in demonstration by over 300 workers (out of the total
workforce of 350) demanding the reinstatement of those fired
and improvement of working conditions.

Two officers of the American parent firm were detained
by a large group of female union members on a visit to the
Korean plant in late May and were released when police,
called by the management, stormed the room where they were
held and arrested 50 of the workers. Seven of the ring-
leaders were detained for several hours, interrogated, and
severely beaten by the police. When union members attempted
to protest to the Minister of Labor, not only did he refuse
to see them but, they were arrested in the bargain. On July
15, about 30 male employees, incensed over rumors that the
union's militancy was causing the parent company to consider
ceasing operations in Korea, locked the factory gates and
physically assaulted the female union members sending five
of them to the hospital in serious condition. Five days
later, the parent company announced the closure of the
Korean plant.

Another well-known case involved the long-simmering
confrontation between labor and management at the Wounpoong
Textile Company in Seoul. Over 50 members of the union had been arrested and subjected to prolonged interrogation by the police during the government's December, 1981 purification campaign. Four of those arrested were sent to re-education camps and ten others were fired by the company. The company tried to intimidate the remaining workers by slowing production and spreading rumors that further union action could cause the factory to close. The company also incited a protracted campaign of physical intimidation and violence on the part of male employees and hired thugs against the mostly female union members.

On May 12, 1982 about 30 male white-collar employees cursed, stripped, and beat over a dozen female workers near the company's main gate and within full view of a city policeman who refused to intervene. On September 27, over 100 male employees demolished the plant's union office, beat several women officers of the union, and kidnapped the union president, Ms. Chung Sun-soon, who was released only after 17 hours of threats and beatings. The union members responded with a sit-in protest and hunger strike and, were again attacked by hired thugs and supervisory personnel, this time aided by the national police. As reported by one source,

At 6 p.m. on the third day (of the sit-in), plainclothes policemen were sent in on the pretext of evacuating those workers who had collapsed. About 250 workers were dragged out of the factory. Fifty-eight of them were taken to a hospital with injuries incurred during the confrontation, which took place while
uniformed police stood by. The next day, the remaining workers were forced out by tear gas.43

All together, over 650 strikers, both male and female, were driven from the plant. Subsequent protests by the union members, church activists, and students led to hundreds of more arrests and the jailing of over 40 union members. By the end of 1982, the union had been effectively broken. One foreign-resident with close ties to the Young Christian Workers (JOC), a church-related activist organization wrote me that, "With the crack-down at the Wounpoong plant, the government has destroyed the last truly independent union in Korea."

The above cases demonstrate the ways in which the new regime and employers cooperated in achieving a common purpose, the weakening and subordinating of labor unions. During this period, the government either turned a blind eye to company-inspired violence and intimidation aimed at union members or, joined with employers to place the full weight of the state behind a pro-business resolution of disputes. None of the companies cited above was subjected to government pressure and, in none of the above cases were hired thugs or pro-company employees arrested or prosecuted for egregious acts of mayhem directed toward workers and union officials (even though those most abused were women). On the other hand, the state demonstrated that it would intervene decisively in labor disputes that threatened economic or social order by harassing, arresting,
prosecuting and jailing recalcitrant trade unionists.

The government rarely prosecuted union members under provisions of the labor laws, rather, those union leaders charged in the Control Data/Korea and Wounpoong cases were prosecuted for violations of the Law on Illegal Assembly and Demonstration. This is a general practice on the part of the government. By charging union protestors under the provisions of the Law on Illegal Assembly and Demonstration, the Public Security Law, or the National Security Law, the government renders the specific labor-management bases of the dispute moot; casts the defendants in the opprobrious role of radical endangerers of public or national security (as "Reds" or balgaenggi); and virtually assures itself of a conviction carrying harsher penalties than the labor laws. Conviction under the provisions of the above laws usually preclude future employment in the same or similar industry or occupation.

Reemergence of Union Activity - 1983-87

As the immediate shock of the 1980 coup faded, there were stirrings of resistance to the constraints imposed on the labor movement. But, the most significant changes occurred outside of the institutional framework of the FKTU or Sanbyul Nocho and at the grass-roots level. A spate of new local union (danwi nocho) formation and agitation was accompanied by increased horizontal contacts between unions
and other groups in society, notably students and church groups. On March 10, 1984 the Korean Labor Welfare Society (Hanguk Nodongja Pokchi Hyupuihoe) was established outside of the framework of the FKTU with the primary objective of promoting revision of the labor laws in ways favorable to labor. The effort became the focal point of the formation of an emerging pro-labor coalition constituted of workers, students and church groups, such as the Catholic Committee for Justice and Peace (Ch’unjukyo Chung’ui P’yunghwa Wiwunhoe) which submitted a draft revision of the labor codes to the National Assembly, spread information among workers, and demonstrated support of workers' rights.

Union organization and reform protests were accompanied by a steady rise in labor disputes during 1984 and, as a result, there was an increase in administrative intervention by the government. Asia Watch, a human rights watch dog organization found that the 1983-84 period witnessed the systematic obstruction of union organization and activities by both employers and the government. Employer tactics included intimidation, harassment, arbitrary transfer, reduction of working hours, demotion to part-time status, verbal and physical abuse, the use of hired thugs to frighten, and outright dismissal of union or labor activists.

Government complicity in the violation of worker rights included refusal to accredit independent unions,
delay of approval, preferential certification of competing pro-employer union applications, and pressure on the affiliated industrial union federation to refuse recognition of independent or recalcitrant unions. The conclusion of some observers was that,

[ever since late 1980 when the Chun regime broke up the national organizations of the unions and reduced primary union organization and negotiating activity to the company and the company union, workers have been isolated in their dealings with powerful cartels and national companies with huge material and financial resources. Under the present situation, workers in individual companies are overwhelmed by hostile forces -- the companies, the police, the national labor union federations, and varicus government accrediting and investigating agencies. The labor laws are also stacked against them because they favor the companies and are easy to manipulate, and the courts can provide little defense.45

However, such repressive conditions failed in the long-run to terminate local union struggles for independence, economic improvement, and social justice. Instead, the struggle intensified in many workplaces and important cross-cutting alliances continued to be forged with other sympathetic social groups.

The labor movement received a crucial boost on February 12, 1985 with the stunning electoral performance of a new and truly independent opposition political party in the parliamentary elections. The New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP or Shinhan Minjudang) had been formed less than one month prior to the National Assembly elections yet, won 28.7% of the vote (second only to the ruling DJP’s 35%) and 67 of the 276 seats in the assembly. While still in the
minority it signaled an important political change—not in the structure of power, for the DJP still dominated the assembly, but in the structure of the opposition. An independent and aggressive opposition party led by previously banned politicians (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) emerged to play a leading role in both the National Assembly and the communications media. This meant that organized labor and the labor movement in general had new avenues of input to the policy process and the public consciousness. The impact was almost immediate.

In 1985, a series of spectacular labor disputes at major companies, including Sungdong Textiles, Hyosung Mulsan, Shinhanil Electric, and Daewoo Apparel, led to a series of heated confrontations on the floor of the National Assembly between opposition assemblypersons and those of the ruling party for the first time in the short history of the Fifth Republic. Utilizing the assembly's power of interpolation, the opposition exposed government officials to vigorous and pointed public interrogation, which could be reported verbatim in the news media, on government actions and policies toward labor. On July 4, 1985 the Minister of Labor, Cho Ch'ul-kwon, was subjected to a very uncomfortable grilling about his Ministry's failure to protect workers from company violence and union-busting tactics. While little satisfaction was immediately forthcoming, it served to embarrass the minister and government as well as, push
labor issues into the media and the public eye.

1985 marked the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to the partial revision of two of the labor laws, the Labor Union Law and the Labor Dispute Adjustment Law, as well as impetus for a minimum wage law. With the arrival on the scene of the NKDP and a more accessible National Assembly, the FKTU began a determined lobbying effort to exact some semblance of reform from the government. The organization desperately needed to demonstrate that it was not a timid tool of the government. An image enhanced by the August 1, 1985 sacking of five ranking officials (a vice-secretary general and four bureau chiefs) for abetting and defending the sit-in occupation of the FKTU president's office by striking chemical company workers.

On February 28, (in the immediate wake of the National Assembly elections) the FKTU called for the revision of the restrictive 1980 labor laws and established a political deliberation committee "to realize trade unions' participation in political activities as a pressure group," at its annual convention. On August 25, the FKTU submitted to the National Assembly a petition with the signatures of one million workers demanding revision of the labor laws. With the threat of the labor vote swinging heavily to the opposition parties, the increased contacts between church and student groups and labor, and the chaotic
nature of collective bargaining in key industries, such as textiles, the laws were partially revised, with the support of the government on December 17, 1986.

The revisions of the law were mainly sops to the FKTU and industrial federations in that they removed third party restrictions on those organizations. The immediate result was that memberships in several of the federations shot up to pre-1980 levels. Workers in the Seamen's Union, Automobile and Transportation Workers' Union, Textiles, and others could, once again, utilize the federation's offices and expertise in organizing, collective bargaining, and dispute resolution procedures.

This is not to imply that the process of establishing labor rights and pursuing legal reform was without significant difficulty and hardship for union officials and the rank-and-file worker. The list of abuse and repression is a very long one indeed and even a partial retelling would take many pages here. But, the process of reform was possible due to the labor movement's ability to progressively break out of the vertical pillaring and isolation imposed by the structural characteristics of state-corporatism and establish linkages (albeit tenuous ones) with other societal interests.

It may be that the Chun regime's diffidence as regards the utility of the peak associations--their weakening and limitation during the 1980-1986 period--allowed or compelled
the local chapters (danwi nocho) to look elsewhere for sympathy and effective support. In the final analysis, the regime's policies of repressive exclusion did not successfully preempt or coopt the drive for effective unions, they merely held the lid on until pressure from below became too strong to resist.

Spring and Autumn Annals: Korean Labor in 1987

The Spring of 1987 brought a surge of popular protest against the Chun regime as it began to back away from promises of constitutional reform and political liberalization leading to the presidential elections scheduled for the end of the year. At first students (as usual) were in the vanguard but, as the month of June progressed the protest demonstrations grew progressively more widespread with increasing participation by blue-collar workers and, more importantly, the middle class. On June 29, in a dramatic reversal of past policies, president Chun's chosen successor, ex-general Ro T'ae-woo, stunned the nation with a series of proposals for liberalization that were intended to undercut the protest demonstrators and enhance his election chances in the Fall.

The effect on the labor movement was electric, in the six months following Ro's statement over 3600 labor disputes erupted across the country. This time not only small and medium firms were affected, but the giants of industry, the
chaebol conglomerates such as Hyundai, Daewoo, Kia, and Samsung. The strikes revolved around a range of issues from wages to working conditions; but at the center were demands for autonomous unions and demands that the benefits of economic growth be distributed more equitably. These were essentially the very same demands voiced by labor union members in the 1979-1980 period. The repression of the Chun era had for the most part coerced the labor movement into quiescence but, it had not altered its innermost aspirations. The exclusionary state-corporatist policies of the Chun regime had failed to provide enduring bases for effective interest intermediation that were even marginally satisfactory to workers or their organizations.

In mid-July, the officers of three-dozen FKTU affiliates met to organize an independent alternative to the FKTU called the Committee for the Democratization of Trade Unions whose rallying point is the direct election of union officers by the rank-and-file memberships. The FKTU's endorsement of Chun's suspension of debate on constitutional reform (the move which had touched off the nation-wide protests in April and May) formed the focal point of renewed criticism of the organization as a representative of government rather than worker interests. While the leadership has argued that the political situation over the previous seven years left them little choice, renewed evidence of leadership cooptation has sparked a renewed
democratic trade union movement within the ranks of the FKTU itself.

A more important qualitative change was the formation of independent and autonomous unions free from management cooptation as well as outside of the official FKTU structure. These democratic unions (minju nocho) are unaffiliated with the government-sanctioned FKTU and, therefore, free of its' taint. These minju nocho have attempted to create a new national federation or peak organization called the National Council of Trade Unions (NCTU or Chun Nohyup) to compete with the FKTU. The government's response has been to refuse recognition of Chun Nohyup and other minju nocho organizations.

Following the Ro declaration, the MOL began to signal employers that things were changing and they could no longer rely on the government intervention in the face of legitimate worker grievances. In August, 1987 Minister of Labor Lee Hun-ki outlined the government's new disposition by saying that "the government's underlying policy is that any labor dispute should be resolved through negotiations between management and labor. It is desirable that the government not intervene in disputes." As labor protests snowballed through September and October, the government continued to back away from its' previous pro-employer stance.

Even president Chun, with the end of his term only
months away, reversed course and underscored the failure of his previous policies as well as the potential power of a truly independent labor movement when it is able to represent its own interests on its own behalf by noting that, "[t]he current labor unrest can be attributed to the growing desire of laborers for fair distribution of wealth and more autonomy. This must be accommodated as a necessary pain to be experienced in the course of industrialization."

At the close of the Chun regime, as at the beginning, labor policy was undergoing significant transformation. One of the high-priority items to be dealt with by the Sixth Republic's new (1988) National Assembly, in which the government party was for the first time in the minority, was further revision of the labor laws. Exclusionary, state-corporatist labor policies had failed in the short-term.
Endnotes


4. Personal interview with Mr. George Curtin, director, Asian-American Free Labor Institute, Seoul, November, 1980.

5. AAFLI, op. cit., p. 12.

6. Ibid., p. 18.

7. Interview with Mr. George Curtin, op. cit.


10. Ibid.


15. AAFLI, "Overview of the Political and Economic Transition," op. cit.


18. Personal interview with the Director of the International Affairs Bureau, FKTU, Seoul. April, 1981.


21. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., June, 1981.

30. Ibid., August, 1981.


37. Personal interview with President of the Textile Workers' Union, op. cit.


39. Ibid., p. 194.

40. Asia Watch Committee, op. cit., p. 196.


44. Personal correspondence from foreign advisor, Young Catholic Workers (JOC). December, 1982.

45. Asia Watch Committee, op. cit., p. 206.

46. Ibid., p. 228.


51. Kim, Taigi, "Political Economics of Industrial Relations in Korea", Korea Labor Institute, Seoul: Korea, September, 1989. p. 29.

52. Ibid., p. 15.


Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusion

Analysis of the policy process can demonstrate the salient importance of the role played by the state in the political and economic development of Third World countries. In the case of post-WW II Korea, the state has developed along authoritarian lines into an institution possessing substantial power (the ability to intervene in the affairs of civil society so as to effectively implement decisions) and relative autonomy (the degree of independence of decision-makers from influences emanating from bases in civil society). The substantial degree of relative autonomy enjoyed by the contemporary Korean state substantially inverts the notion of the state-society relationship embedded in both the orthodox Liberal-Pluralist and Marxist models of politics.

The Korean state possesses such power and relative autonomy as the result of factors both internal and external to the Korean political system. The authoritarian political institutions characteristic of traditional, Yi dynasty, Korea were undergirded by a particularly orthodox interpretation of Confucianism which produced a contemporary political culture emphasizing hierarchy, deference to authority, social harmony, and the subordination of the individual to the group. However, contemporary
authoritarianism in Korea owes as much to external variables as to those which are internal. Korea's progressive incorporation into the modern international political economy provided both strategic and economic imperatives legitimating, if not necessitating, the development of a strong, interventionist state.

Japanese colonialism forcibly implanted on Korean society a state which was designed to extract maximum societal compliance to its security and economic development policies while minimizing or excluding popular participation in the process of policy-making. The colonial state's autonomy supported the efficient execution of Japan's imperial policies and, it was hoped, the rapid attainment of her goals. While altered in some respects, substantial relative autonomy has continued to be a central characteristic of the post-colonial Korean state. Joint American-Soviet occupation of the peninsula at the close of WW II guaranteed that the emerging international Cold War confrontation would critically influence Korean development.

The Korean War may be viewed as the internalization of great power conflict and, from a policy analysis perspective, the most decisive event in Korea's post-WW II history. The war's unresolved status has allowed successive regimes to arrogate immense decision-making powers unto themselves and, gives all aspects of the policy process a salient national security dimension, a condition with few
international parallels. Post-WW II American strategic goals of containing the expansion of Soviet influence and communist ideology led to the integration of South Korea into the United States' defense perimeter and the concommitant transfer of material and organizational resources to successive regimes in the southern half of the peninsula. Until the mid-1960s, this relationship provided the bases for the rise of a political elite which was not critically reliant or dependent upon domestic resources for support.

The elite coalition which eventually emerged from the military's seizure of power in 1961 manifests a composition characteristic of bureaucratic-authoritarian models observed in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. The alliance of military officers, bureaucrats, technocratic planners, domestic capital, and foreign strategic and economic interests is quite clear in the Korean context. In Korea, the state's autonomy from bases of domestic support is more extreme than in the Latin American context because of the unprecedented American strategic commitment and presence augmenting and undergirding the role of foreign capital.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1961 coup the fiercely anti-communist Park regime was quick to seize upon rapid economic growth via export-led industrialization as a way of underwriting national security goals in the enduring struggle with North Korea. If Korea's bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes may be said to have had a national project, it is the maximization of national security via the telescoping of economic and social development into as short a period as possible. The Park regime unabashedly based its hopes for legitimacy on the rapid and successful attainment of these twin goals and sought to minimize the disefficiencies of internal dissensus through the creation and implementation of corporatist institutions and structures which would control or obviate the potentially pernicious consequences of factionalism.

Park's idea of the developmental state was informed by a conceptualization of the organic nature of society and its relationship to the state, society was divisible into functionally differentiated and hierarchically ordered components with the state exercising key decision-making powers from a position above and apart from other social interests. Whether or not this was a deeply held philosophical conviction or merely a contrived rationalization aimed at legitimating dictatorship is an important question that cannot be answered here (Korean officials do not write "kiss & tell" memiors). Regardless of the intensity of Park's belief in the organic-state concept, it provided a philosophical justification for state supremacy over public policy decision-making and the creation and implementation of a system of limited pluralism (Corporatism) wherein the state mediated the representation
of group interests.

The system of state-corporatism has, in the Korean context, been applied to different societal groups (business, farmers, the professions, etc.,) with different degrees of intensity. The social group most adversely impacted has been organized industrial labor. While it may be argued that other corporatized social groups have experienced a kind of "inclusionary" variant of the model in that they have been allowed access to avenues of policy decision-making (e.g., the chaebol), the same cannot be said of organized industrial labor. Labor has experienced the "exclusionary" variant of state-corporatism in that the state has acted, regardless of its rhetoric, to sanction, limit, preempt, co-opt, and repress the organizations through which the industrial labor movement may legally seek the representation of its collective interests. By dominating the organizational structures, FKTU, industrial union federations, and local chapter unions, the state has tried to control and minimize the potentially negative impacts that the labor movement might have on national security, regime stability, and rapid economic development.

The Korean state developed a variegated set of inducements and constraints to elicit labor's compliance with regime policies. Inducements aimed at union leaderships included enhanced status, prestige, income, and power over constituents, as well as at least the hope that
progress on labor issues could be made through the sanctioned and legal processes left open by the state. Inducements aimed at rank and file workers included promotion of the right to organize, at least marginal state protection from the worst excesses of employer exploitation, and the state's support for wage increases. In the latter instance, workers benefited from the regime's confrontation with North Korea in that real incomes could not be allowed to fall as the absolute impoverishment of the working classes, as has occurred in a number of other developing countries, could only help incur the kind of social instability and erosion of support that could lead to regime change or conquest at the hands of the North Koreans. For this reason, the regime has supported continuous increases in the real incomes of industrial workers as long as they are kept below increases in labor productivity.

Constraints aimed at union leaderships have included intimidation, removal from office, arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment for various offenses, as well as the legal parameters established by the labor codes. Constraints on the rank and file worker have included all of the above including exposure to abuses perpetrated by employers. The state's easy recourse to unrestrained discretionary power has left both union leaderships and rank and file memberships very much at the dubious mercy of statist authorities.
The Chun regime's assumption of power in 1980 led to an alteration of the system of state-corporatism that increased the level of political exclusion by introducing legislation that further debilitated an already weak system of labor organization. The links between the FKTU, industrial union federations (Sanbyul Nocho), and local chapter unions were seriously diminished through the introduction of the enterprise union concept, deletion of union shop protections, and the initial classification of the FKTU and Sanbyul Nocho as third parties to be excluded from collective bargaining and dispute resolution activities on the part of the local union chapters. The Chun regime was uninterested in utilizing the peak association structure as a vehicle for mobilizing or positively channeling the labor movement in active support of the regime and its policies. Rather, the government was primarily interested in preempting and re-subordinating the incipient labor activation of the 1979-1980 period in support of policies aimed at maximizing social stability, national security, and economic growth.

In this it was initially successful. Labor was reduced from a potentially powerful and autonomous interest group, allied with an emerging social coalition opposing authoritarianism (students, opposition parties, activist church groups, etc.,) to a relatively weak, isolated and quiescent entity incapable of frustrating either the new
authoritarian order's installation or its policies of reinvigorating high-growth economic policies.

The anti-labor biases of the system have long been apparent to workers and their organizations but, due to the relative hardness of the Korean state, they have lacked the power to autonomously alter or overthrow the state-capital alliance. However, when the regime has weakened or collapsed due to internal discord or mass protest, there has usually occurred a concomitant and dramatic upsurge in worker demonstrations, union organizing, strikes, industrial actions, and other manifestations of worker dissatisfaction.

A recent study on political change and labor unrest by the Korea Development Institute (KDI) notes the clear correlations between the two factors in 1960 (anti-Rhee uprising), 1979 (Park Assassination), 1985 (return to partisan politics), and 1987 (Roh's democratization declaration). Indeed, the general thematic tone of Roh's June 29 declaration—political liberalization, opening of popular access to government, and restoration of democratic and human rights—presented an opportunity for the industrial labor movement to test the parameters of the possible. And this they did in great numbers immediately following his statement.

While labor unrest played a marginal role in the events that led up to presidential-candidate Roh's pivotal June 29 pledge to liberalize and progressively open Korea's
political system, the industrial labor movement quickly weighed-in on the side of reform with massive demonstrations of political and economic muscle. In the immediate aftermath of Roh's declaration government policy and action as regards the resolution of labor management disputes became pronouncedly less pro-business and interventionist. Roh's official position effectively reversed course on over two decades of anti-labor and pro-growth state policies by emphasizing reduced intervention (repression) and the promotion of social development (distribution) policies over growth. With diminished government intervention, the burden of conducting labor-management disputes was shifted, at least temporarily, primarily to corporate officials and worker organizations.

Macro-level analyses of the impacts of state-corporatism often overlook important micro-level conditions within labor organizations. Interviews of FKTU and industrial federation officials displayed differing responses to the re-incorporation process instituted by the new regime. There were a few officials at all levels who evinced mild acceptance or enthusiasm for the new order's system. However, the dominant response was one of frustrated quiescence to a political reality beyond their ability to significantly influence. There was little overt expression of opposition to the new situation but, this may represent an unwillingness on the part of those interviewed
to speak frankly to a stranger under somewhat dangerous conditions or the fact that most of those opposed had either been purged or had resigned and were unavailable for comment.

Blanket condemnation of the unions as vehicles for regime domination should be modified to recognize both the politically and economically limited contexts within which activities are possible, as well as the amount of dissensus and negative cooperation forthcoming. The positive consequences also need to be examined in greater detail. There is evidence that the enterprise system has forced local chapter leaderships to work harder at developing the expertise needed to run an effective union operation at the plant level as well as evidence that greater class consciousness and union solidarity has occurred. In addition, increased repression and attempts at isolating labor appear to have had only marginal success and have led to more attempts at creating horizontal relationships between labor and other societal groups which cut across the fabric of Korean society.

In spite of the state's attempts at isolation and repression, organized industrial labor was able to benefit from the changing national and international environment so as to influence (if not determine) significant reform of the labor codes. The emergence in 1985 of a viable opposition party with surprising strength in the National Assembly made
it possible for organized labor to gain alternate avenues to publicity and agenda building independent of those controlled by the state. Increased contacts with students and activist church groups continued to politicize labor issues and, the difficulty of conducting industry-wide collective bargaining activities also created pressures for reform.

External factors such as Seoul's hosting the 1986 Asian Games as well as the demonstration effect provided by the collapse of the Marcos regime in the Philippines made it politically and economically more dangerous for the regime to crack-down on increasing manifestations of dissent, including that of organized labor. And finally, the Chun regime's desire to host the 1988 Olympic Games provided a lever to opposition groups to lobby successfully for major constitutional reforms in the spring and summer of 1987. The regime's moves to frustrate reform and quell dissent were decisively mitigated by fear of causing the games to be cancelled thus, causing extreme embarrassment to the nation.

Indeed, the regime's conundrum resulted in fissure within the ruling elites. Roh Tae-woo was able to outmanouvre Chun in 1987 and replace him and his system (the Fifth Republic) with a less confrontational and repressive political order by early 1988.

The Chun regime's unwillingness and inability to decisively quell the rising tide of broad-based opposition
to the institutions and personalities of the Fifth Republic provided a window of opportunity for organized industrial labor to flex its muscles both within and without the formal structures of state-corporatism. The dramatic display of worker and union rejection of and resistance to the state's dominance, as embodied in the thousands of job actions and strikes which erupted in the fall of 1987, give evidence to the failure of the regime to achieve a long-term deactivation of the labor movement.

Conclusions

The events of late 1987 and early 1988 demonstrate that, in the final analysis, state-corporatism was a failure in terms of effectively representing worker or union interests to the state and other societal actors (and thereby enlisting labor peace), as well as in ensuring the state's unopposed, hegemonic domination of the industrial labor movement. At best (from the regime's point of view) the variant of exclusionary state-corporatism practiced in the Fifth Republic temporarily repressed and submerged labor activism. At worst (again from the regime's point of view) state-corporatism exacerbated the situation and mandated even more problematic state-labor and labor-employer relationships.

Indeed, the wave of militant labor activism which swept the country in the late 1980s contributed to economic
stagnation and declining exports. By early 1990, the Roh government exhibited signs of slipping back into traditional growth-first policies and adopted increasingly repressive tactics towards the labor union movement. These moves were aimed at minimising production losses caused by strikes and keeping a lid on inflationary wage pressures. This was viewed by some as a "pre-emptive" strike by the regime, to weaken and intimidate workers in advance of the annual industry-wide collective bargaining negotiations.

However, the opposite impact was achieved when massive labor demonstrations and strikes aimed at higher wages, better working conditions and, most significantly, union independence and autonomy swept the country in May 1990. While there had been only 67 labor disputes up to April 5, there were scores more during May and early June—including large and violent strikes put down via police intervention at several chaebol industrial complexes such as Samsung and Hyundai. Unfortunately, the 1990s are beginning much as did the 1970s.

In concluding this analysis of state-industrial labor relations in contemporary Korea the following three observations are in order. First, there is little chance that industrial peace can be achieved until workers perceive that a new and respectable social contract has been established which provides for acceptable levels of socio-political equality and economic equity. These are extremely
difficult conditions to objectively ascertain, and as an American I will not attempt to prescribe them here. Suffice it to say that true labor peace will come only when industrial workers subjectively feel that they are decently treated in both socio-political and economic terms.

Second, this perception of socio-political equality and economic equity will be maximized to the degree that autonomous and independent labor organizations are enabled to honestly represent worker interests before both management and the state. Until true autonomy is achieved, workers will perceive government policies as illegitimate and their individual and collective status as unjust--clear prescriptions for endemic strife. Only independent union organizations can legitimize real labor discipline and create an atmosphere for support of labor laws, collective bargaining negotiations, etc.

Third, autonomous unions and a free labor movement can exist only in a political system which provides for conditions of free association, liberal debate, and equal treatment before the law. The Korean political system must be opened to the free and equal participation of workers and their representative organizations. Participation without representation, as under state-corporatism, clearly failed to advance worker interests or ensure labor's quiescence. While democratization is an often stoney and torturous path it offers the optimal prospect for the attainment of social,
economic, and political relationships which may minimize violence and political instability and maximize economic productivity and social welfare—conditions long-sought by both the state and industrial labor in contemporary Korea.
Endnotes


6. Ibid., p. 74.


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