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Rural transformation in northern Thailand

Sittitrai, Werasit, Ph.D.
University of Hawai'i, 1988

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U·M·I
RURAL TRANSFORMATION IN NORTHERN THAILAND

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 1988

By

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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to describe and explain changes occurring in rural northern Thailand from the beginning of the fourteenth century through the latter part of the twentieth century. The study utilizes the rural transformation framework to reconstruct a process of change in the political, socio-economic, and demographic spheres of rural life, concentrating particularly on the research site: Chiangmai province, Saraphi district, Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villages. The descriptions and explanations are presented through seven periods of transition from the early Chiangmai kingdom period (1296-1557) through the present time (1980). Primary emphasis is placed on the villagers' perspectives on and interpretations of changing phenomena which crucially affected their lives. These phenomena center on changes in demography, relations with ruling groups and the government, and methods of livelihood, particularly those related to agriculture and commercialization. These are the aspects of modernization in which the villagers were seen to take an active part, responding to them and interacting with them within the larger system throughout history. It is also shown that the villagers perceived both beneficial and detrimental impacts from modernization; their responses, if any, to emerging economic opportunities spanned the range from primarily subsistence oriented to entrepreneurially profit-maximizing. The study ends with the author's interpretation that in large part the rural transformation in northern Thailand is characterized by the encapsulation of the villagers and their growing dependence on the world capitalist economy.
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ORTHOGRAPHY

The orthography here follows Haas (1956) as modified and cited in Moerman (1968: 210-211). The usual spelling or government official spelling is retained for common Thai words, place-names and title-names. For convenience and simplification in writing, it indicates neither tone nor vowel length.

b  b, as in baby

k  voiceless unaspirate velar stop, rather like English hiccup, French café

m  m, as in mother

l  l, as in look

n  n, as in nice

ng  ng, as in sing (but can occur initially)

p  voiceless unaspirate bilabial stop, rather like sport

ph  p, as in pin

s  s, as in sit

t  voiceless unaspirate postdental stop, rather like staff

th  t, as in toe

w  w, as in walk or how

a  a, as in father

e  e, as in they

i  i, as in machine
o  o, as in hope
or low back rounded vowel, rather like o in song
or aw in law
ae low front vowel, rather like a in pat or mat
er mid-central vowel, rather like e in her or i
in third
u high back rounded vowel, rather like oo in soon
y high central unrounded vowel made, says Haas,
"by raising the center part of the tongue while
keeping the lips in relaxed or protracted position"
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Research Problem and Conceptual Framework

The main objective of this study is to examine socioeconomic and political changes in rural northern Thailand. The inquiry centers around the following questions: What have been the major changes in rural northern Thailand?; What are the phenomena which have created the conditions for change or caused, reinforced, and accelerated change?; How have villagers responded to changes? The study presents a holistic picture in which the interrelationships of the individual villagers, households, villages, districts, provinces, regions, the country in general, and the international community are examined. It will also show the dynamics and process of change particularly the incorporation and encapsulation of the region and villages in the political and socioeconomic national and world system. Throughout the emphasis will be on the perspective and interpretation of the villagers.

An extensive interest in the study of change in rural communities can be recognized in the literature. For example, Barrington Moore, Jr. studied rural changes in China before the Communist Revolution (Moore 1966). Guy Gran examined the changes due to agricultural commercialization and population growth in the Mekong Delta, and Samuel Popkin did a study of the political economy of rural change in colonized Vietnam (Gran 1977; Popkin 1976 and 1979). Rural change in Southeast Asian societies was analyzed by James Scott and Ben Kerkvliet (Scott
and Kerkvliet 1973; Scott 1976). The effects of villagers' motivations and political actions on the dynamics of change in a number of rural communities were examined by Joe Migdal (Migdal 1974).

In particular, a significant amount of work has been done on rural Thai communities. For example, Andrew Turton studied changes in political and jural structures in a northern Thai community (Turton 1976). Christine Mougne examined the socioeconomic and demographic shifts in a northern Thai village (Mougne 1981). Anan Ganjanapan used a production relations model for understanding the change in commercialization of rice in northern Thailand (Ganjanapan 1984).

The literature on peasants not only depicts the changes in rural communities, but also suggests causes for them, ranging from local forces of nature to foreign intervention. Of these suggested causes, the most often mentioned in the modern history of rural change are the various features of modernization.

The process of modernization in this study will be defined broadly as the process of introducing or initiating new things—new technology, new practices, new values, new situations, and new circumstances. The process of modernization is not limited to only one aspect of society. For example, what Nash defined as modernization, the growth in capacity and facilitation of application of science to the process of production, is in my definition only one aspect of modernization (Nash 1984:6). Viewed in this broader sense, the process of modernization need not be unidirectional (i.e., proceeding in a set of well-defined stages) and can depend significantly on local conditions and situations. Modernization can also be both vertical or externally
introduced and horizontal or internally motivated. In other words, the process can reflect impositions and penetration from "larger," "higher," or "stronger" levels, e.g., from urban centers to rural communities or from industrial countries to agricultural societies, or the novelty can be locally invented or purposefully brought in through local initiatives. The horizontal spread of modernization is also quite possible, such as from one village to another. The modernization process can have detrimental or beneficial effects on different groups of villagers in different places and at different periods of time.

Modernization has many features such as colonization, expansion and bureaucratization of government, the introduction of the process of capitalist production, and commercialization of agriculture and trade. Components of these features include such examples as the improvement of the economic infrastructure, the introduction of advanced technology, and new patterns of consumption. What follows is a brief review of selected studies on the impact of the process of modernization in rural societies.

Eric Wolf's study of peasant communities in Mexico, Guatemala, and Central Java in many instances found that rural change resulted from colonial rules. The colonial administration imposed tribute payments, taxes, and labor services on village communities creating a burden for individual villagers. In Central Java these colonial charges on landownership were so severe that landholding was no longer considered a privilege but became a burden which occupants tried to share with others. In Mesoamerica, economic pressure from administrative charges
accelerated tendencies toward greater village egalitarianism and levelling (Wolf 1975:10-12).

In Agricultural Involution Clifford Geertz presents extensive evidence of the impact of Dutch colonial rule on the livelihood of Javanese peasants. Under this system of administrative capitalism over the cash crop plantation economy, the Dutch alone regulated selling prices and wages, controlled the output, and even dictated the processes of production. Between 1830 and 1870, under its Culture System, peasants had to pay land taxes in cash or either cultivate government-owned export crops on one-fifth of their land or work 66 days of the year on government-owned estates and projects (Geertz 1963:48-53).

Along the same lines, Guy Gran's study of the Mekong Delta in the period from 1880 to 1930 gave impressive evidence of the French colonial rule's impacts on rural change. As a result of the commercialization of rice, the colonial rule accelerated intensive and extensive use of land for export rice production. Chinese middlemen and French exporters transferred burdens and losses suffered due to fluctuations in rice prices and changes in world market demand directly to the peasants. Land became a market commodity, while a profit maximizing attitude penetrated rapidly into the villages. Some peasants took advantage of economic crisis to accumulate land and power through a western legal system which allowed one to bring suit against a poor neighbor; this resulted in a concentration of land ownership and social restratification. Norms of assistance in life crises, reciprocity, generosity, and other redistributive pressures gradually eroded or were undermined. Through administrative expansion, the colonial
government would improve the collection of taxes on land and duties on commercial activities to fulfill its own increasing fiscal demands (Gran 1977:2-8).

One study offering a systematic explanation of the impact of colonial rule on changes in peasant communities was that of James Scott and Ben Kerkvliet. Based on evidence from Lower Burma, Cochinchina, and Central Luzon, Scott and Kerkvliet concluded that colonial rule accelerated processes of rural transformation which included social differentiation, growth of a permanent state apparatus, commercialization of agriculture, and concentration of landownership. These processes undermined the traditional social insurance patterns—the kin-groups, the villages, and the patron-client bond; thus resulting in increasing pressures affecting the peasants' welfare. For example, in the three areas, commercialization of rice for export was accelerated under colonial policies. Between 1900 and 1935, the peasant in the commercialized sector experienced extreme instabilities in both his access to subsistence resources and his level of real income. His continued access to land and employment was increasingly uncertain, and the real value of his crop or wage was beyond his control (Scott and Kerkvliet 1973:244-247).

James Scott elaborated on these arguments in The Moral Economy of the Peasant. He said the growth of the colonial state and its commercialization of agriculture complicated the subsistence security dilemma of the peasantry in many ways. For example, it imposed an ever widening sector of the peasantry to market-based insecurities; and it reduced or eliminated a variety of traditional subsistence safety
valves (subsidiary occupations) which had helped peasant families through years of poor food crops (Scott 1976:57).

Joel Migdal in his *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution* put an emphasis on the worldwide imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the central factor in vast changes which shook the largely rural societies of the world. Colonization gave rise to the centralization and expansion of state authority, the commercialization of agriculture, urbanization, and industrialization. These processes in turn gave rise to further pressures and stresses on peasant livelihood: population growth, patron withdrawal from traditional roles, increasing government demands such as taxes and forced labor, market exploitation, and the market's effects on income (Migdal 1974:18-19, 91-92).

Barrington Moore, on the other hand, argued that the changes in rural China were not generally caused by foreign intervention. It was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the impact of commercialization, industrialization, and other features of modernization caused rural changes and generated pressures on the welfare of large numbers of peasants (Moore 1966). Terry Rambo suggested that pressures on peasants' subsistence guarantees and welfare resulted from the impact of indigenous central government intervention, civil disturbance, natural disasters, and other extra-village pressures (Rambo 1977:179-188).

Two studies, one by Samuel Popkin and another by Theodore Schultz, are among those which present modernization as a process which is necessary and beneficial in and of itself (Popkin 1979; Schultz 1965). Schultz showed that Thai farmers responded promptly and normally to
market initiatives which played an important role in the transformation of traditional agriculture and society. Popkin said that the process of modernization not only introduced new political and economic opportunities for villagers, new ways of cooperation, new groups of elite, and new technology, but also helped to undermine many village institutions which had blocked the political and economic opportunities for advancement. Individual villagers did not oppose or resent modernization provided they saw or learned to see profitability and personal material gain (Popkin 1979:66; Schultz 1965:58, 197-198).

Of the studies, a few not only highlighted the features of modernization as causes of change, but also emphasized villagers' responses to the changing situation. Scott and Kerkvliet put emphasis on villagers' responses to the forces of modernization (Scott and Kerkvliet 1973). Popkin pointed out that in order to understand how, why, and when rural Vietnam changed economically and politically during the colonial period, one needs to examine more than just French-imposed policies. In addition, one must look at how the distribution of communal resources, as well as patterns of self-interest prevailing in the villages prior to colonial rule determined local responses to external regulations and extractions (Popkin 1976:431, 461). Migdal suggested that villagers were not radically egalitarian by nature, nor did they conform to local norms without resistance. There was a dynamic tension between personal interest struggles and changes generated outside the villages. To comprehend the process of change, one had to examine individual villagers' situations, motivations, and responses to pressure (Migdal 1974:14).
This study uses a conceptual framework called the rural transformation process to analyze rural northern Thailand to find answers to the three key questions posed earlier. The term "transformation" as used here refers not only to changes in outward form or appearance and degree, but also to changes in context, conditions, and structure. Its essence lies in the dynamics and process which are continuous but not necessarily unilinear. The transformation framework will assist in the depiction of changes in significance or function, even when the external form or pattern appears to be "traditional" or unchanged.

The rural transformation framework consists of two interrelated parts: the phenomena causing the change and the villagers' responses to these phenomena. The phenomena directly or indirectly causing, reinforcing, accelerating, and creating conditions for rural change are the three features of modernization: (a) population dynamics (suggested by e.g., White 1976:269; Bennett 1961:270; Mamdani 1972; Migdal 1974:92-103; Scott 1976:36, 63, 66; Geertz 1963; and Gran 1977); (b) the role of the ruling groups and the central government (as suggested by Scott and Kerkvliet 1973; Moore 1966; Rambo 1977; Cohen 1981; and Turton 1976); (c) commercialization of agriculture and trade (see, e.g., Scott and Kerkvliet 1973; Gran 1977; and Anan 1984).

However, these phenomena alone do not create change in rural communities. Equally important are the responses from the villagers (see, e.g., Scott and Kerkvliet 1973; Popkin 1976; and Migdal 1974). In other words, the impact of the above-mentioned phenomena can be negated, unaffected, or accelerated by the reactions of the villagers; villagers may reject, ignore, unwillingly comply with, eagerly accept, or even initiate changes.
In describing the villagers' responses and explaining their meaning, this study will have as its background two debates in the field of peasant studies: the impact of modernization as detrimental and disruptive (e.g., Scott and Kerkvliet 1973; Scott 1976; Wolf 1969) versus its being beneficial (e.g., Popkin 1979), and the question of whether villagers' responses to economic opportunity are subsistence oriented (e.g., Scott 1976) or entrepreneurial and profit maximizing (e.g., Popkin 1979; Schultz 1965). In brief, one side in the first debate sees the features of modernization (e.g., expansion of central government and the capitalist market economy) as causing traumatic effects on villagers (Scott 1976:9; Wolf 1969:279-281). The other side argues that modernization has beneficial effects in and of itself: it introduced beneficial technology, improved the welfare, and opened new political and economic opportunities for villagers to grasp in order to achieve personal material gain (Popkin 1979:66, 182; Schultz 1965: 58, 197-198). In the second debate, one side feels that the majority of villagers did not always take advantage of opportunities for material advancement, nor did they commercially invest in and accept modern technology because they were cautious of falling below the subsistence level (Scott 1976:26, 34; Wolf 1969:xiii-xv; and Moore 1966:203-204, 253). The opposing viewpoint is that villagers are entrepreneurial-rational actors who aspire to economic progress and are always on the lookout for new chances and opportunities. They are always willing to innovate and respond quickly and positively to economic incentives that might bring personal short-term profits and long-term benefits to individual families (Popkin 1979:18-31, 64; Migdal 1974:14-17, 51-61; and Schultz 1965:26-28, 50, 163-164).
This study will not subscribe to either side of these two debates because in reality villagers may not be strictly holding to or conforming to one or the other of these implied sets of norms and orientations. What seem to be two conflicting hypotheses in these debates may only be two interpretations of phenomena which can exist side by side with different emphases in different situations and for different kinds of villagers (e.g., socioeconomic status, classes, livelihood situations). Villagers may perceive the impact of modernization as detrimental and resent it or they may find it beneficial and appreciate it, depending upon the situation and the specific impact being examined. Similarly, their motivations and norms may be simultaneously subsistence oriented and aimed at entrepreneurial profit maximization. There may be varying emphases in different places during different periods of time; and there may be differences in degree and attitude depending upon status group, socioeconomic conditions of the household, age group, or stages in the household cycle. Evidence to this effect exists in several studies done in northern Thailand and elsewhere.

For example, Scott himself pointed out that colonial rule in Southeast Asia introduced transportation networks which increased the ability to collect taxes but at the same time facilitated the government's distribution of grain to needy villagers during food shortages (Scott 1976). Scott also indicated that his explanation on the 'risk averse' or 'safety first' orientation applied to a particular kind of peasants--those living close to the subsistence margin (Scott 1976). The work of Chayanov suggested that the villagers' main goal in life might be dynamic and not describable as simply a static desire to
secure subsistence or to make economic progress. Villagers placed a value on labor-consumer balance which is the perceived balance between the satisfaction of family needs and the desire to avoid drudgery especially when the consumption levels were fixed (Chayanov 1966:5-7). Turton studying a rural northern Thai community found that some rich peasants had become capitalist farmers by grasping economic opportunities for profit maximization; poor villagers were still concerned primarily with their subsistence and may have used both self-provisioning and commercial strategies to meet these subsistence needs. An increasing desire, especially on the part of younger households, to participate in production for the market became noticeable after 1950 (Turton 1976:276, 292).

Moerman, who studied another village in Chiangrai, also found that young villagers in the 1960s became more entrepreneurially profit oriented. This was a result of emerging economic opportunities and personal needs. Before 1960 many villagers also produced for subsistence (primarily) and for commercial profit (secondarily). Risky investments and profit maximization had already become as or more important than subsistence production for some villagers. However, despite the social and economic change, the subsistence orientation and morally kin-based reciprocity possibly still persisted among the majority of villagers (Moerman 1968:144, 182-192).

Moerman raised the interesting point that not only were structural changes and different circumstances crucial in influencing the villagers' economic and political orientation, but different values and attitudes among different groups of villagers in different places
were also very important. The villagers of Ban Ping who were ethnically Lue (as opposed to Yuan of northern Thailand) possessed traditional values of hard work and frugality, found little allure in leisure, were involved in trading ventures, and already had a firm grounding in the concept of commodities (items with a price). Their involvement in modern commercialization and expression of entrepreneurial orientation was only a change in degree; for many other northern Thai villagers who lacked this trading tradition, it was a much more drastic change.

During the 1970s, the Multiple Cropping Project team found that many villagers in the Chiangmai Valley had become increasingly entrepreneurial. They became commercial in their productions and interactions. However, the majority of villagers still gave priority to subsistence production. The team further indicated that the villagers' goals and orientations varied even for the same villager at different stages of his life and according to their socioeconomic status (Phrek, et al., 1980). The last example is Behrman's study of supply response among Thai peasants during the 1960s. He found that peasants responded positively and rapidly to market opportunities and profit incentives. They would produce non-traditional products, e.g., cash crops, if market conditions suggested that sufficiently profitable returns might be expected. However, near subsistence peasants, unlike middle or well-to-do peasants, would attempt to lessen the risk due to market fluctuations by first planting enough area in rice to ensure sufficient food. Only afterwards would they allocate the remaining land, if any, on the basis of expected profit returns (Behrman 1968:236).
In summary, this study will attempt primarily to depict the process of rural transformation in northern Thailand and analyze it, as well as to ascribe meanings to important changes resulting from the three interrelated features of modernization: population dynamics, the role of ruling groups and the central government, and the commercialization of agriculture and trade. The study will also attempt to present a view of the villagers' perceptions and responses to those changes. It will discuss whether they resented or appreciated the impacts of modernization, and it will analyze the extent to which they were motivated by a subsistence orientation or entrepreneurial spirit in response to economic opportunities.

1.2 Methods and Information

1.2.1 Selection of the Province, District, and Villages

The selection of the research site: Chiangmai province, Saraphi district, Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villages was done with the intention of providing a meaningful picture and understanding of the rural transformation process in northern Thailand. This research site is not claimed to be typical of the region; it is, however, one of the areas which has shown the most extreme change over the last century and thus is a logical area for a study of rural transformation. Nor does this piece of work claim that the rural transformation process described and explained herein represents all of the changes in rural northern Thailand.

This is not a village study, even though most of the time was spent in the villages learning from the villagers and their environment.
It is a study of the process of rural transformation in northern Thailand holistically depicted and explained by what has happened in two villages in the Saraphi district of Chiangmai. This province represents the research site, although emphasis has been placed on Nong Faeg and Khua Mung for concreteness.

Chiangmai province was selected because of its long history as the capital of northern Thailand. It is also distinctive in terms of its demographic transition, political and administrative modernization, urbanization, and commercialization. Of its 19 districts, Saraphi is one of the oldest with many of its villages having a history of change dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century. By 1980, Saraphi district was one of Thailand's most advanced in terms of fertility decline, intensity of cropping, modernized agricultural production, and commercial market involvement. Since 1980 it has been labeled as one of the "advanced agricultural areas" of the country by the National Economic and Social Development Board.

The villages of Nong Faeg and Khua Mung were selected because of their long history of change. Nong Faeg dates to the first half of the nineteenth century and Khua Mung to the second half of the nineteenth century. Both communities share many characteristics, e.g., wet rice cultivation, northern Thai ethnicity, cultural practices, and rapid fertility decline. However, there are some differences, such as the pattern of village household layout (oval cluster for Nong Faeg and long spread along a road for Khua Mung); distance to the district center (4 kilometers for Nong Faeg and 11 kilometers for Khua Mung); and topography of the land (lesser amount of low-flooded
agricultural land in Khua Mung). By the second half of the 1970s a significant distinction had arisen between the two villages due to the varying degree of villagers' response to commercialization; Nong Faeg remained an intensively cropped area with rice as the main crop, while Khua Mung had become an intensively cropped area of highly commercial production with garlic as one of its main crops. This distinction, whether viewed as two points on a linear curve or two different paths of change, helps to illustrate that over time villagers' responses to changing phenomena can vary.

1.2.2 Methods of Gathering Information

In the process of gathering information for this study, primary emphasis was placed on villagers' interpretations of changing phenomena as perceived by the author. In describing and explaining events, information was gathered on both the objective physical level and the more subjective mental level. For example, a count would be made of the number and frequency of some materials or incidents, but then meanings would be sought through reconstructions of villagers' perceptions of reality through verbal discourse, language expressions, and observations of behavior.

An attempt has been made to describe the interpretation of phenomena in the societal context of institutional norms and rules. In other words, the relationships between words and objects and meanings and phenomena are rule governed. In order to understand these rules, one has to understand the structure of the society and communities in which the rules are operative. While the villagers' interpretations are governed by their experiences and institutional norms and rules,
the researcher's interpretations are governed by his presuppositions, values, and experiences. These presuppositions and values are the result of individual background and the structure of the society or community from which he originates. These differences in background can result in different conclusions by different researchers.

In addition, interpretation is an important means of explaining or ascribing meanings to rural phenomena. Researchers interpret what they observe. The assumption here is that the researcher can rarely totally share the villagers' consciousness and experiences. Therefore, there are at least two levels of interpretation occurring during this village study. One level is the villagers' interpretations themselves; the second is the researcher's interpretation of the phenomena and further his interpretation of the villagers' interpretations. Different degrees of confidence in and combinations of these interpretations can lead to different pictures and explanations of the same phenomena in similar studies (Anscombe 1958; Foucault 1976; Austin 1962, 1975; Shapiro 1976; Rabinow and Sullivan, eds., 1979; Connerton, ed., 1976; Geertz 1973; Myrdal 1969; Schutz 1967; and Taylor 1971).

In light of the above considerations, six methods of collecting information were utilized in this study.

1. Participant Observation

The author moved into Nong Faeg village for 18 months (March 1979 to November 1980) in the household of a small landowning villager. The household consisted of the husband, whose hobby was handicrafts, the wife who was also a vendor of agricultural produce, two well-educated sons, and a nephew (son of a deceased son).
spent in two households in Khua Mung: one of a small landowner, the other of a landless wage laborer. The author assisted in the households' everyday tasks and agricultural work, and also helped regularly in the agricultural tasks of the other villagers in Nong Faeg, Khua Mung, and a few adjacent villages. In addition, the author participated in cultural, ceremonial, and religious activities. Finally, the author went with villagers to take part in non-agricultural jobs outside of the villages, e.g., trade and vending in the markets, work in agricultural produce warehouses, and home construction. Unconventional information, e.g., gossip and quarrels, was gathered and interpreted with caution.

2. Oral History

The technique of oral history was used to gather autobiographies and stories from villagers of different ages: some old, some middle-aged; some young. This was to allow the pasting together of broken pieces of information and to provide an accuracy cross-check on events, perspectives, norms, values, behaviors, and actions to be used in depicting the process of rural change and villager response. Participating villagers were asked to provide comparisons of past and present or describe changes over a period of time. These were then cross-checked against existing published work done in the area in the past; if discrepancies occurred, further inquiry was undertaken.

Two information collection methods were used: tape recording and notetaking, either during the interview or afterwards. It was found that the best method was to take brief notes during the interview and then construct more detailed notes from these and memory after
the talk was completed. This was because many of the villagers were conscious of the tape recorder or became distracted by the researcher's attention to notetaking.

3. Indepth Interviews

Similar methods were used for the indepth interviews as for the oral histories. However, issues in the indepth interviews would be particular topics such as expansion of the residential area due to population growth, change in the labor exchange system, resentment towards district officials, marriage practices, and land loss and acquisition.

An emphasis was placed on both details of incidents as well as opinions from various groups of villagers. As in the case of the oral histories, sometimes things were discussed with villagers more than once to provide a cross-check for consistency of answers. Villagers of different ages, sexes, social status, and roles were included, e.g., headmen, monks, craftsmen, laborers, and vendors and traders. There was also time for discussions with a few district officials, policemen, agricultural extension officials, and rural development workers.

4. Group Discussions

Inspired by the work of Oscar Lewis (1951) on small meetings and learning experiences from group discussions, this technique was used informally when a group of villagers (two or more) was found talking or working together. The author would join the group and engage them in small talk covering specific issues related to this study. Close attention was paid to shared opinions as well as to those on which there were contradictory views in the group. Local proverbs and old
sayings were occasionally quoted by the villagers to support their own opinions.

5. Household Survey

During the author's stay, a survey of households in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung was done by the author and research assistants. Information was required from each household covering:

a. household members: number, relationship, sex, age, occupation, education, etc.

b. health and standard of living: levels and indicators

c. land acquisition and land loss

d. land ownership and tenure

e. crops grown and livestock raised in a yearly cycle

f. sale and purchase of rice

g. income from fruit trees

h. desired number of children

i. primary and secondary sources of livelihood

j. size of house lot

k. size and type of home.

A cross-check was done in 40 percent of the households in each of the two villages for all of the above. Two of the questions, namely those on household members and land ownership and tenure, were deemed of sufficient importance to merit being rechecked in all the households. This was done with the assistance of the villagers and numerous corrections were made to this information.
6. Documentary Research

Access was obtained to old records, government documents, census information, journal articles, local newspapers in the North, and books and theses completed by researchers in different areas of Chiangmai including Saraphi district.

It should be noted that the author made frequent visits to other villages, in particular to one village adjacent to Nong Faeg and another in a tambon next to the tambon containing Khua Mung. Some observations, oral histories, and indepth interviews were taken in these villages to provide additional cross-checks and to gather information which might enhance the author's understanding of the transformation process in the area.

1.3 The Setting

Northern Thailand is the third largest region of the country in terms of population; its population in 1980 was 9,074,103. In terms of land area, it constitutes one-third of the country with an area of 169,645 square kilometers (National Statistical Office 1980). On the North and West this region is bounded by Burma, on the East by Laos, on the Northeast by three other northeastern Thai provinces, and on the South by five provinces of central Thailand. The region consists of 17 provinces which can be divided into two groups. The nine upper provinces sharing a similar northern Thai dialect and culture include Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Maehongson, Lamphun, Lampang, Payao, Nan, Phrae, and Tak. The eight lower provinces have a dialect and culture more closely related to central Thailand; they include Kamphaeng
Phet, Nakhon Sawan, Phichit, Phitsanulok, Phetchabun, Sukhothai, Uttaradit, and Uthai Thani. (See Maps 1, 2, and 3.)

The socioeconomic characteristics of the northern Thai population as of 1980 are as follows: 7.25 percent of the population lives in urban areas with the remaining 92.75 percent residing in rural communities. Literacy rates in the North are comparatively high with 91.4 percent of all people aged 10 years and over in the urban areas being able to read, while the figure is 82.08 percent for the rural areas. Occupationally, farmers and farm workers account for 79.83 percent of the population above 11 years of age.

Chiangmai is the largest province in the North with a population of 1,154,850 in 1980 (National Statistical Office 1980). Its land area of 20,107 square kilometers is divided administratively into 19 districts, 174 tambon, and 1,406 villages as of April 1980. The province has a common boundary with Chiangrai, Lampang, and Lamphun to the East, Tak and Lamphun to the South, Maehongsorn to the West, and Burma to the North. The census of its population in 1980 indicated that 8.8 percent lived in urban areas and the other 91.2 percent in rural regions. 92.4 percent of the population in urban areas and 77.7 percent in rural areas are literate. Again, farmers and farm workers dominate the occupational makeup with 66.26 percent of the total population above 11 years of age.

Saraphi district is about 10 kilometers south of Chiangmai City. It is bounded by Lamphun province and Hangdong, Muang Chiangmai, and Sankamphaeng districts. Its total land area of 128 square kilometers is divided into 12 tambon. The total population in 1980 was 61,217 of which 53,931 (88 percent) lived in rural areas. Communications and
Map 1. Transportation routes connecting Nong Faeg and Khua Mung with other rural communities and urban centers (1980)
Map 2. Districts of Chiangmai Province
Map 3. Transportation Routes in and around Chiangmai Province in 1977
transportation between Saraphi and other areas are good. At the
district center there are three major transportation routes: the
Lamphun-Chiangmai Road, the northern highway, and the northern railroad
each of which connects to Chiangmai on the northern end and to Bangkok
to the south. The district center has an office of the government
long distance telephone service.

The two field study villages, Nong Faeg and Khua Mung, are located
in Saraphi district in nearby tambon. The two tambon containing these
villages will be referred to in this study as the field study area.
In other words, the villagers referred to herein were either residents
of Nong Faeg or Khua Mung or of nearby villages.

Nong Faeg is approximately 4 kilometers from the Saraphi district
center; Khua Mung is about 7 kilometers away from Nong Faeg. In 1979
and 1980, the road leading to Nong Faeg was an all-weather paved road.
The paved portion of this road terminated before reaching Khua Mung,
leaving a dirt road in good condition passing through Khua Mung.
Electricity was brought to Nong Faeg at the beginning of the 1970s,
while Khua Mung did not receive it until the end of that decade. The
first radio in Nong Faeg, and possibly in all of Saraphi district,
was brought in during the 1940s. The first black-and-white television
set arrived there in 1973 or 1974. By 1980 there was one color TV
in Nong Faeg and two in Khua Mung, a considerable number of black-and-
white TV in each village. Also almost every household owned a radio.

In 1969 the Ministry of Interior chose Nong Faeg as a "Development
Village" of class A, which meant that the villagers were receptive
to modern technological methods and procedures. Several socioeconomic
development programs were inaugurated in 1971. Although Khua Mung did not receive such a title and subsequent assistance, its villagers received several prizes and awards during the 1970s for highest yield production and other agricultural accomplishments. In economic production terms, Nong Faeg in 1980 was a rice growing, commercial multiple cropping village, while Khua Mung was a garlic and rice growing, commercial multiple cropping village. In Khua Mung, many villagers grew garlic as their main crop and then sold it to obtain money to purchase rice for household consumption. In the eyes of villagers in the district, Khua Mung villagers were entrepreneurs and Khua Mung was a 'garlic village.' In the eyes of the district officers, the villagers of Nong Faeg were peaceful and obedient, while those of Khua Mung were hard-headed and stubborn.

In 1980, the total population of Nong Faeg was 913 people living in 239 households (about 18 households whose members lived in another cluster of houses and attended temple in another village are not included in these figures). Khua Mung had 972 people living in 257 households. The average household size was 3.8 in both Nong Faeg and Khua Mung. Approximately 41 percent (99 households) of the total households in Nong Faeg were landless and 31 percent (75 households) fell in the category of small landowning households. In Khua Mung, 32 percent (81 households) were landless and 27 percent (70 households) were small landowning. There were 12 landless wage laboring households in Nong Faeg and 21 in Khua Mung.

The primary source of livelihood in both villages was glutinous rice cultivation. This was slightly more common in Nong Faeg, where
159 households (66.5 percent) relied on this source, than in Khua Mung where 150 households (58.4 percent) depended on it. None of the villagers in Nong Faeg relied on garlic growing in the main season as their primary source of livelihood, while 23.3 percent (60 households) in Khua Mung did so. If one examined secondary source of livelihood, this distinction became even more apparent. In Nong Faeg, only one household (0.4 percent) depended secondarily on main season garlic, while in Khua Mung 117 households (45.5 percent) did so.

In terms of standards of living, the village households could be classified into five categories: very poor, poor, moderate, well-to-do, rich. The categorization of these standards of living was based on the system of economic ranking for the purpose of reckoning contributions primarily to the temple or sometimes also to the village school and other village affairs. The temple committee in ranking village households considered household conditions which reflected wealth, patterns of consumption, and relations of production. The ranking of contributions ranged from exemption (because one is very poor, one is exempted from the collection of money or can give as much as one wants to) to 1000 baht. The categorization in this research was a revision of this system. I took the list of households with the economic ranking and discussed it with a number of villagers of different socioeconomic conditions. We updated the ranking of the households and adjusted it using additional criteria which enabled us to categorize them into five groups; these criteria were regularity and security in income earning or employment, supports from kin, savings, sales and purchase or loans of rice, and hardships in making
a living or meeting subsistence. This procedure also required additional observations and collection of the villagers' expressions. For example, among the distinctions between the poor and the very poor was their access to rice for subsistence. The poor just barely had enough rice to eat all year round with what they earned and some loans. An expression describing the situation of their livelihood was "what we earn today is only barely enough for tomorrow." On the other hand, the very poor often not having rice to eat, sometimes were able to eat only one meal a day. They always had to borrow rice to eat but many times no one lent them rice because they came to borrow too frequently and often they were not able to pay back the rice. Their livelihood situation could be perceived from the expression, "what we eat this evening is what we earned this morning" or for some households it was "what is earned today will have to become the payment for what we borrowed to eat yesterday."

The differentiation in standards of living within the two villages was more extreme in Khua Mung. It had the larger number and percentage of both the rich and well-to-do households as well as the very poor. Nong Faeg, on the other hand, had much larger percentages of moderate and poor households. The similarities and differences between these two villages, as outlined above, should provide an interesting and provocative illustration of the rural transformation process in northern Thailand.
Table 1
Distribution of Household Size (1979-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Household Members</th>
<th>Number of Households Nong Faeg (%)</th>
<th>Number of Households Khua Mung (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2 (0.8)</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2 (0.8)</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>10 (4.2)</td>
<td>11 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>20 (8.4)</td>
<td>15 (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>37 (15.5)</td>
<td>46 (17.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>51 (21.3)</td>
<td>60 (23.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>73 (30.5)</td>
<td>87 (33.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>37 (15.5)</td>
<td>30 (11.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 (2.9)</td>
<td>7 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>239 (100.0)</td>
<td>257 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Distribution of Agricultural Land Ownership (1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of land owned (in rai)</th>
<th>Number of Households Nong Faeg (%)</th>
<th>Number of Households Khua Mung (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very large (15+)</td>
<td>6 (2.5)</td>
<td>18 (7.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large (9-14.9)</td>
<td>13 (5.4)</td>
<td>28 (10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (4-8.9)</td>
<td>46 (19.2)</td>
<td>60 (23.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small (0.1-3.9)</td>
<td>75 (31.4)</td>
<td>70 (27.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless</td>
<td>99 (41.4)</td>
<td>81 (31.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>239 (100.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>257 (100.0)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3
Distribution of Standard of Living by Households (1979-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard of Living Level</th>
<th>Number of Households Nong Faeg (%)</th>
<th>Number of Households Khua Mung (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>7 (2.9)</td>
<td>13 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-to-do</td>
<td>24 (10.0)</td>
<td>41 (16.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>87 (36.4)</td>
<td>85 (33.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>80 (33.5)</td>
<td>59 (23.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Poor</td>
<td>41 (17.2)</td>
<td>59 (23.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>239 (100.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>257 (100.0)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER II

VILLAGERS' LIVES BEFORE THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

This chapter attempts to describe the villagers' way of life from the beginning of the early Chiangmai kingdom until the end of the nineteenth century. Explanations will be presented on changes in their lives primarily as responses to three interrelated phenomena both internal and external to their rural communities: population dynamics; demands from and changes introduced by the ruling groups and the government; and the beginning of commercialization.

In brief, during the early period of the Chiangmai Kingdom (1296-1557), lives of villagers in northern Thailand, particularly Chiangmai, were seriously affected by wars and demands on labor and taxes from the ruling groups. The land was thinly populated and labor was the most important resource for the state. Rural communities were not isolated from the hierarchical control of the state and villagers were, though primarily self-provisioning, not always self-sufficient. Significant mechanisms used by the ruling groups to bring villagers' allegiance and to justify their demands included, other than coercion, sociopolitical hierarchical strata, grants for land occupation and utilization, ideological beliefs and rituals, and protection from bandits as well as enemy states.

Between 1558 and 1774 was the period of wars and Burmese occupation. Villages faced hardships resulting from wars and heavy demands from
the ruling groups, both Thai and Burmese. Oppression was so great that it led to a series of revolts by the villagers.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, the Chiangmai state was rebuilt after the Burmese were defeated. It was the period of repopulation and resettlement of rural communities by the northern Thais and war captives of other ethnicities. Nong Faeg was probably resettled during this time. Phenomena affecting villagers' lives included low population density, introduction of some new crops, establishment of demands from the ruling groups, and the emergence of limited trade opportunities as well as the beginning of economic and political relationships with western countries, especially Great Britain.

The second half of the nineteenth century saw an increase in population and rural resettlements in Chiangmai which was possible due to the absence of wars, repopulation of northern Thai citizens and war captives, and immigration of such ethnic groups as the Chinese. At the same time, control and demands from the ruling groups increased particularly towards the end of the century when the central Thai government increased its intervention in the administration and taxation of the northern provinces. Heavy burdens from the demands and oppression of the ruling groups led to three major peasant rebellions in Chiangmai between 1889 and 1902.

This period also saw an emergence of private land ownership as a result of decline in the traditional power of the northern kings. Commercialization of the northern Thai economy began its early stage as a result of intervention from foreign governments and central Thai officials. Villagers became involved, though to a limited extent,
in trade as an opportunity to meet demands from the ruling groups more than to achieve prosperity.

2.1 The Early Chiangmai Kingdom Period (1296-1557)

As early as the eleventh century, there were several principalities or petty states of various ethnic groups in the upper Mae Khong river area which included parts of present-day northern Thailand, Burma, China, and Laos. By 1282, King Mangrai from Chiangsaen was successful in conquering the major Kingdom of Hariphunchai and several other chiefdoms. In 1296, Chiangmai was built to be the capital of the Lanna Kingdom (Aroonrut 1977: 61-63; Chusit 1982: 5). As time passed, the kingdom became prosperous and powerful during the reign of King Tilokaraat (1441-1487). In 1558, the Burmese conquered Chiangmai and the Lanna Kingdom and except for a few brief periods ruled until the end of the eighteenth century.

There is no specific knowledge of the villagers' way of life in the area of Nong Faeg and Khua Mung during the early Chiangmai kingdom period. However, there are several old records available from which one can sketch a picture of rural life in those days. It is relevant to depict villagers' livelihood since then partly because the older settlement of Nong Faeg possibly dated back to that period. These old records are collections of historical incidents and/or laws, legal procedures, and social rules. Some parts of them are probably original written texts from the early Chiangmai kingdom period but other parts may have been added later, or represent written documentation of originally oral traditions. The following is a brief explanation of
Map 4. Thai Kingdoms and Principalities in the Upper Mae Khong River during the Early Chiangmai Kingdom Period (Tanabe 1981:202)
some of them. (For further discussions in detail of the Lanna old records see Aroonrut 1977: 14-60.)

Mangrai Sat, Wat Sao Hai copy, was found in Sao Hai temple in Saraburi province. It was written in Thai Yuan characters on forty-eight two-sided palm leaves. The first section, at least, is believed to have been written during King Mangrai's reign. It was translated into central Thai language by Prasert Na Nakorn and published in 1971. Mangrai Sat includes specified rewards for a few good deeds, but mostly consists of fines and other punishments for private and public offenses, e.g., physical, property, and relationship abuses.

The Land Tenancy Laws, Wat Fai Hin copy, were found in Fai Hin temple in Chiangmai province. What was found was incomplete and has only eleven pages of Thai Yuan characters written on palm leaves. There was no written date given; however, some parts of it might have been written during the reign of King Mangrai. The translation used here was done by Aroonrut. The Laws cover several topics such as paying of land rents, damaging others' irrigation systems, opening new rice fields, and buying and selling rice.

It should be noted here that one should be more or less skeptical about the implementation of the laws since it was subject to influence by the powerful. Also, some parts of the laws should be understood as codes of what should be done, not necessarily what was done.

The Chiangmai Chronicle, written originally in Thai Yuan, was translated into Central Thai language by Sagnuan Shotisukraat, and published in 1971 by the Committee on Historical Documents under the Office of the Prime Minister. There is a debate on who wrote it and when it was written. The Chronicle, however, covers the period before
Chiangmai was founded as the capital city in 1296 under the Mangrai reign until the reign of King Phuttawong during the nineteenth century.

In a rural community, which might have been as small as five houses, land was cleared of trees and bushes for house lots, small vegetable gardens, and rice fields which might be irrigated. Among several kinds of vegetables and spices grown and/or cared for were pepper vine, siri vine (phet), banana, sugarcane, squash, bottle gourd, taro, sesame, ginger, tumeric, beans, and garlic. Cotton was also grown. Trees that served some practical use were planted or were not cut down when the land was cleared. Some examples include coconut, betel palm, sugar palm, and bamboo.

(Skinner said that sugarcane was introduced into Siam by the Chinese in 1810. Within a few years it became one of the most important export crops, mainly as a result of high demand for sugar in the world market during the first half of the nineteenth century. The peak production and export of sugar in Siam was 1859. Its production was facilitated by an influx of the Teochiu Chinese who were skillful agriculturalists, especially in sugarcane [Skinner 1957:46, 217]. What Skinner said about the introduction of sugarcane in 1810 contradicts the claims in Mangrai Sat that sugarcane had already been grown, at least in the North, during earlier times. One suspects that: (1) the Chinese might have just introduced new varieties of sugarcane; and/or (2) sugarcane was grown in limited quantity earlier, but not until the beginning of the nineteenth century was it cultivated extensively.)

Animals which were raised around the houses, on grass land, and in rice fields during the non-planting season included oxen, cows, buffalos, chickens, ducks, and pigs. It was more common for kings,
aristocrats, and administrators to own elephants and horses than for villagers. However, several old records mentioned the caretaking of elephants as though they could have been privately owned by commoners during that time (Mangrai Sat: 43, 57, 79; the Laws of Phracao Nan cited in Aroonrut 1977:26). (Also, a report in 1830 of villagers who owned many elephants in an ironsmith village may suggest the continuation of an older tradition of villagers owning elephants [Blundell 1836:612].) (The examples for names of crops and domestic animals are drawn mainly from Mangrai Sat 1971:56-57, 82-88, 114-117.)

Mostly glutinous rice was grown in the fields once a year. Rice fields were either rain-fed or irrigated. We do not know what percentage of the lowland rice fields were irrigated. However, in some areas, it must have been extensive for there were numerous detailed old laws and regulations which posed fines relating to the building, management, destruction, and maintenance of the weir spirit houses, irrigation weirs and canals, and the use of irrigation water (Mangrai Sat 1971:97, 101; Aroonrut 1977:129, 315-317). 

Tadayo Watabe studied rice husks contained in old bricks and found that during the eleventh and fifteenth centuries the round type of rice was dominant in northern Thailand. The large type was second, and the slender type was least common. Although the size of the husks does not tell whether the rice is glutinous or non-glutinous, the author, based on the distribution and dating of the three sizes of husks since the sixth century, concluded that the round type was lowland glutinous, and the large type was upland glutinous. The slender type, however, was lowland non-glutinous and was introduced or was spread sometime later in northern Thailand (Watabe in Ishii ed. 1978:3-14).
There were two kinds of irrigation systems: the large authority-initiated and the small villager-initiated. The first kind was well-documented in some old records. For example, before the Early Chiangmai Kingdom Period, Phraya Juang of Chiangsaen ordered the building of an irrigation system using corvee labor (Phraya Prachakitkorajug 1964: 144). The Muang Khaeng irrigation system which feeds the area of several tens of thousands of rai (.4 acre) in today's Mae Rim, Sansai, Chiangmai, and Saraphi districts was built in 1281 by the corvee laborers of the Mon state of Hariphunchai (Lamphun). The main canal in this irrigation system is 34 kilometers long (Kraisri 1965: 2; Ishii ed. 1978: 21).

Rural communities in the early Chiangmai kingdom period were reasonably self-provisioning, though not necessarily self-sufficient. Rice, vegetables, spices, and animals were produced not only for home consumption, but also for other internal functions such as barter exchange, rent payment (for land, buffalos and cattle), fine payment, propitiatory offering to ancestral spirits, religious ceremonies, and temple offerings. Money in the forms of silver coins or silver lumps (ngern), and shells (bia) was used in transactions but probably much more so in and around cities than in rural areas. For example, in Mangrai Sat, fines for crimes and malbehaviors were often specified in terms of money. Yet, in those days the state laws like this would not have been implemented or known in distant rural communities. Even where the laws were enforced, the payment of fines and fees might have been made in the forms of agricultural produce (e.g., rice), animals, and labor because money was scarce.
Evidence on the kinds and use of money in trade and other activities, and on the commercial value of rice is found in Mangrai Sat, the Land Tenancy Laws (Wat Hua Fai copy), other old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 128, 315-323, and some studies of old northern Thai coins such as by le May 1926, 1961, and by Kneedler 1961.

The majority of villages were not isolated. Their livelihood and land use, among other things, were affected not only by family needs and village customs, but also by external forces, and interactions with the outside world. For example, wars among northern Thai town-lords, and between Chiangmai and Ayudthaya could have caused migration (through escape or capture) and consequent discontinuity in cultivation. Needs for some necessities, and economic opportunities led to barter and trade transactions with other communities and in town markets. For example, there was a market built by King Mangrai in both his previous capital, Gumkam, whose site is now in Saraphi district, and his later capital, Chiangmai (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971: 20, 35; and Aroonrut 1977: 93). Furthermore, rulers of the Chiangmai kingdom desired unification so that they could consolidate their control over food, labor, and other resources. This led to the imposition of tax collection, rent collection, military conscription and labor corvee; and at times the desires of the rulers to collect food, wealth and labor (or slaves) led to raids on towns and villages (on such raids see Chiangmai Chronicle 1971: 67). Among the means by which Chiangmai rulers subjugated townsment and villagers were not only military force and coercion, but also the idea of reciprocity between the ruler's protection and the subjugated's produce and labor, as well as
formation of other ideological concepts, in particular spirit cults. These techniques were also means to form, maintain, and expand hierarchical relationships among sections of a kingdom's population.

Sourcing from old records and laws, the hierarchical relationships among six groups of population—kings, aristocrats, officials, monks, commoners and slaves—will be examined so as to better depict and understand villagers' lives in those days. These groups of people belonged to different strata reflecting hierarchical differences in terms of socio-economics as well as politics and legality. Their hierarchical differentiations had three distinctive characteristics. First, the hierarchy was almost totally in an order of progressive advantages. For example, the higher one was in the hierarchical structure of strata, the wealthier, more prestigious, privileged, and influential he became or was likely to be. However, according to the laws, he had to pay a greater amount of fine than a person of a lower stratum did for some offenses, e.g., an adultery offense (old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 154-155).

Second, the state carefully designed the laws to perpetuate the hierarchical relationships, allow the ruling groups to maintain their control and status quo, and ensure the standing of the privileged groups. Here are some examples of how the laws explicitly differentiated the six strata, with penalties imposed on those who broke these laws. Commoners who dressed like aristocrats or high officials would be fined. It was against the ways of society for one to behave like those of higher or lower statuses. One who was born in a high/respectable family but said it was a low/bad family had to be beaten. In walking, sitting, sleeping, one had to give the right of way and
priority to those of higher statuses. A non-aristocratic person should not hope to become a ruler. Also, one who was not blood-related to a high official should not hope to become a high official (from old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 191-193, 215-216). Furthermore, within some, if not all, strata, the laws differentiated members of each stratum into different status groups. For example, some old laws divided commoners into two groups: (1) the higher or better-quality commoners such as medicine men/women, astrologers, literati, and the well-to-do. These commoners were considered to be rare, and were given some privileges. For instance, upon committing death-penalty crimes, they would not be sentenced to death. Instead, they would be sent into exile, or would be permitted to be on probation three times for death-penalty crimes before a death sentence was allowed; (2) the poor or minor commoners who were mostly villagers. They outnumbered the first group and were not privileged (old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 185-186).

Third, considering differences among groups of population in terms of not only status privileges but also ownership of means of production and relations of production and economic conditions, the stratification seemed to have two overlapping formations. One was 'status groups' which were categories of people with differentiated and hierarchical hereditary and ritual status. In this period, they were kings, aristocrats, officials, monks, commoners, and slaves. Each category or status group had certain privileges and/or disadvantages. These privileges were not only in the forms of advantages in the means and relations of production, but also specific authorities granted, and better life styles. While this structure of status stratification
was kept intact by combined systems of beneficial exchanges, traditional beliefs, and enforcement; it could also be, at times, the issue or root of conflict among status groups. The other formation was 'classes' which were aggregates of people who occupied the same positions relative to the means and relations of production (e.g., in terms of ownership and control of the means of production). Members of each aggregate lived under economic conditions of existence that were distinctive but related to those of other aggregates. The economic as well as political positions and conditions shared among an aggregate's members could sometimes put it in a hostile opposition to other aggregates. The manifestations of the opposition could vary from some small-scale and less violent 'everyday resistance' to some large-scale and violent revolts. (This definition of classes is based on Marx 1963:124 and Sharma 1978:10.)

Although status groups and class divisions did not always match, they overlapped and perpetuated each other. In other words, the norm of status tradition, its sanctions, and the laws gave a higher status group greater privileges, authority, opportunities for better economic conditions and life styles, and access to a greater amount of land and labor at its disposal. An example is a division between aristocrats and commoners. However, a 'class' division was likely to be less permanent than status divisions. A 'class' could be formed from one or more status groups or even from certain members of various status groups who at the time shared similar economic conditions, and means and relations of production. Besides, two groups of people could be in conflict as opposing status groups, or as opposing classes, or as both status groups and classes simultaneously. Unfortunately, this
can be only an analytical suggestion based on minimal clues found in old records and laws (e.g., references on aristocrats/landlords, officials/moneylenders, and commoners/tenants/debtors).

The kings (phraya), at the highest stratum, were the rulers of the people, and claimed to be the sole owners of all land in their kingdoms (e.g., Mangrai Sat 1971:110). The king would grant a temporary prebendal right over an amount of land to aristocrats and officials. Unlike other rewarded properties from the king such as slaves, animals, clothes, and jewelry which became privately owned, the land had to be returned to the king when the grantees died or were deposed (Mangrai Sat 1971:108-109), and other old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977:115).

Similarly, the king solely owned other natural resources including forest products, wild animals, and ores. Those who found any of these had to submit them to the king; if not, they would be imprisoned and/or fined (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971:38; and other old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977:120-122). Some of the laws specified that if a person found valuable natural resources and submitted them to the king, he or she would receive one half of them (Mangrai Sat 1971:48; and other old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977:120).

Other than natural resources, harvests from the royal fields, taxes, and tribute, the king and his royal treasury also received incomes from a part of fines, of properties which were stolen and recovered, from the properties of murderers who were sentenced to death, and from wars in forms of valuables and slaves (e.g., old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977:166-167).
Aristocrats (cao) were blood-related to the kings and the kings' wives. They were usually given important offices and/or a prebendal right over some land, wives, animals, slaves, and other privileges. Generally, aristocrats who were more closely related to the kings held higher positions in the military and civilian offices. However, it was also a function of their abilities, and the favors they did for the kings. A few aristocrats might not have high official administrative or military positions but they were important to the king because they looked after the cultivation and collection of harvests in the royal fields. Most villagers were awed by the aristocrats because of their authority, or their influence derived from control of wealth, and their access to manpower and political connections which at times enabled them to circumvent the laws when it was to their advantage.

Officials (khun) in general were able commoners (and some aristocrats) who were entitled and given offices, positions, and prebendal access to a certain amount of land and other properties, and control over a certain number of the population (e.g., Chiangmai Chronicle 1971: 20, 33, 49; and Mangrai Sat 1971: 4). Their abilities included those in fighting, enforcement of law and order, planning, administering, and just about anything that pleased the kings. Even though there was a separation between the military and civilian division, sometimes titles, positions, and personnel overlapped, were repeated, or were shared.

According to old records and laws, there were in the civilian division about five to eight, and in the military division about eight to ten hierarchically ranked titles or positions; from cau saen (one who controls a hundred thousand men) down to nai sib in the army (one who
controls ten foot-soldiers), or nai gwan (a village headman) in the
civilian service (Aroonrut 1977:139-142, 145-146, 156-158, 188). This
hierarchy also specified a chain of command. The number of such titles
and ranks depended on, among other things, the needs, size, and situation
(wars or peace) of the kingdom. For example, an official of other
functions could be ordered to also be a por wiak (recruiter of corvee
laborers), and a tax collector (old records and laws cited in Aroonrut
1977:147-148, 164, 165). Here is another example. When the Chiangmai
kingdom expanded during the reign of King Tilok (1442-1487), an
increasing number of non-aristocratic officials were sent to rule towns
and small regions. In older days, the preference, the norm, and the
majority of practices were that the aristocrats were sent to rule.
For example, King Mangrai sent two of his sons to rule each town of
Chiangrai, and Phrao (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971:34). (On norms and
practices of aristocratic rules see old records and laws cited in
Aroonrut 1977:101-103.) However, there had been at least an exceptional
case. In 1283 King Mangrai entitled Khun Fa, a non-aristocrat official,
to rule Lamphun (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971:11, 20).

Villagers were also awed by officials especially those of high
and important rank. Partly it was because of their authority in imple-
menting laws. In practice they could interpret or circumvent the laws
in their favor by using their influence. In addition, much of the
officials' income was closely tied to villagers' livelihood. For
example, officials legally received parts of taxes, fees, and fines
collected from villagers. However, they could squeeze more from them
to increase their own wealth and/or to send more of the collected
produce and money to the royal treasuries to please the king. Besides,
it was stated in some of the old laws such as Mangrai Sat that commoners had to obey and pay great respect to officials (Mangrai Sat 1971: 61. There was no punishment specified in the laws. This probably means that the authorities could state the punishment if the cases were brought forth.). Other old laws were more specific. For example, the laws of Kosaraat stated that any commoner who insulted or verbally attacked a 'titled one' (an official or a titled aristocrat) would be made a slave (cited in Aroonrut 1977: 216). Also, according to the Thammasat Chiangmai Laws, any villager who disobeyed his/her village headman had to be chased out of the village or had his/her cultivation halted (cited in Aroonrut 1977: 216).

In general, commoners of both sexes were called phrai (Mangrai Sat 1971: 21-22). However, when it came to official labor obligations, phrai probably meant more to be male commoners even though women might have also been subjected to some labor corvee. (There is only a brief reference which seems to suggest some state labor demands on women. A set of old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 209.) Commoners, from poor villagers to well-to-do townsmen, were in actuality and in the rulers' eyes the most crucial force in both the economic production and military. For example, it was written in Mangrai Sat that commoners enabled the king to rule his kingdom, and commoners were scarce. In addition, there were sets of laws designed to give protection to commoners from abuses by officials. For example, officials who tortured and oppressed commoners had to be deposed; and officials who took or seized fruits from commoners' orchards without the owners' permission would be fined (e.g., Mangrai Sat 1971: 8, 11; and old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 159-163). Also, during the rice cultivation
seasons, officials should not keep commoners for official labor work but had to return them to (tend) their fields (old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 210). It should be noted that by offering these laws of protection to commoners to prevent jeopardizing the commoners' livelihood too much, the state benefitted in (1) minimizing commoners' discontent in the state and (2) maximizing state revenue from taxes and tribute. Yet, there was still no guarantee that commoners were in practice well-protected according to the laws from abuses by influential aristocrats and officials.

At the same time, according to the laws, incentives for economic production and other benefits were given to commoners. For instance, after having opened a new rice field, a commoner was exempted from rents and taxes on the land for three years. A poor commoner who borrowed some money from an official who was his/her patron to invest in agriculture was exempted for three years from an interest charge (Mangrai Sat 1971: 6). Commoners were also protected from abuses by their landlords. For example, the laws prohibited a landlord from cancelling the arrangement with his tenant in order to rent the land to another person who offered to pay a higher rent (Mangrai Sat 1971: 102; the Land Tenancy Laws [Wai Fai Hin copy]: 2).

Yet, commoners could not own land. They either worked on the royal fields, or on land which was assigned to or put under the jurisdiction of aristocrats and officials, or on monastery land. The arrangement was either sharecropping or fixed renting. In addition, commoners were obliged to fulfill labor corvee of ten days per month (Mangrai Sat 1971: 5), labor obligations as requested by their landlords (Mangrai Sat 1971: 105), taxes and tributes (old records and laws cited in
Aroonrut 1977: 164-165, 168-169), and military conscription (Mangrai Sat 1971: 2). Penalties were imposed upon those who did not fulfill these obligations. For example, a landlord could terminate a rentee's tenancy if this rentee often refused or ignored his/her requests (e.g., to help in the fields or with household work) (Mangrai Sat 1971: 105). Also, punishments for avoiding official labor corvee included being tied (as 'tied and left in the sun' or 'imprisonment'), and being beaten (old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 210).

Another group was the Buddhist monks, who did not quite belong to the category of commoners because they were not obligated for labor corvee, taxes and tributes, and military conscription. The influence of the monks should not be overlooked as their important roles in society extended beyond the religious sphere into politics, legislation, judicial process, and education. For example, as early as the fourteenth century during the reign of King Guna, Buddhist monks were sometimes asked to be judges in legal cases. Some of the kingdom's laws and regulations were adapted from the Buddhist precepts with the help of Buddhist monks (old records and laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 29-30, 67, 145, 259).

Also, during the reign of King May-gut (1551-1558) some aristocrats, officials, and commoners requested a few top-ranked monks to go to ask the king to improve his administration, reduce taxes, and eliminate oppression (Aroonrut 1977: 67, 70-71). In education, Buddhist monks were the sole teachers of how to read, write, of ethics, handicrafts, and medicine (Aroonrut 1977: 254-255; 1981-1982: 15-28).

Another piece of evidence reflecting the special influence, and privileged socio-economic position of the monks was the existence of monestery slaves (kha wat) and the Glebe land (na wat). The monastery
slaves were peasants, war captives, or the king's servants who were assigned or donated mostly by kings (possibly also by high-ranked aristocrats and officials) to some Buddhist temples. These people and their families were to take care of the temples and the monks, place their labor at the monks' disposal, and often to work on land and to give a portion of the harvest to the monks. However, they were exempted from state corvée and military conscription (an old record cited in Aroonrut 1977: 233). There was evidence of the donation of monastery slaves as early as the thirteenth century. King Mangrai donated 500 households of war captives to Kan Thom temple (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971: 25), and Phraya Ngum Muang donated 70 households to Chom Thong temple (an old record cited in Aroonrut 1977: 231). In 1567 Queen Wisutti They-wi of Chiangmai donated residents of five villages to be the monastery slaves of Ban Pae temple (now in Chom Thong district, Chiangmai), and issued to the villagers a written order on a silver plate. This plate saved the villagers of these five villages from being war captives when the area was invaded by a king from Burma in 1632 as he honored the queen's order (Kraisri in Prakong et al. eds. 1978: 52-54). Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, the number of monastery slaves was greatly limited. This was possibly because the Burmese rulers attempted to limit the influence of the Buddhist monks, and the practice of large-scale donation of monastery slaves has not been revived since.

There is no clear evidence that Buddhist temples were granted ownership of land before the fifteenth century. However, there were a few cases of temples being granted all or part of the harvest on
some land. An example is King Mangrai's grant to Kan Thom temple (Chiangmai Chronicle 1971: 25). Nevertheless, it was written in the Laws of Mangrai that the ownership of some land could be given to Buddhist temples with the king's permission (Mangrai Sat 1971: 109-110).

It was not until the fifteenth century, according to available evidence, that a temple actually owned land. King Sam Fang Gaen (1401-1442) seemed to be the pioneer of this practice as he granted a right of land ownership to Mung Muang temple. The practice was increasingly popular during the reign of King Tilok (1442-1487), and especially during that of King Muang Geo (1495-1525). The land under these grants included the temple sites, and specific agricultural land, usually near the temples. These land grants were significant because for the first time ownership of land, particularly agricultural land, was allowed. In other words, temples owned some land, and 'inherited' it (keeping the land even if the head priests were replaced or died). In addition, in those days no other group of the Lanna population was authorized to maintain private ownership of land. This was an indication of, and probably a reason for, the flourishing influence of the Buddhist monks in society. However, since the end of the eighteenth century, the practice seemed to disappear, possibly because: (1) there was a long period during which it fell out of favor as the Burmese rulers did not encourage such a practice; (2) there was an increasing need for agricultural land during the following centuries as land could then be privately occupied and later owned by commoners; and (3) the Chiangmai rulers began to rely less on the religion and monks, and more on their officials in the kingdom's administration for control.
The lowest group in the hierarchical strata was the slaves (kha) who, unlike commoners, were exempted from state corvee and taxes. Everyone in society, from the king to commoners, could own slaves although most slave-owners were those with titles and ranks or wealth who lived in the vicinity of towns. Slaves were treated as a form of private property and a commodity as they could be bought and sold (on prices of slaves, and the buying and selling of them see old laws cited in Aroonrut 1977: 238-242). However, it was not until during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that slave trade became a profitable business and flourished (e.g., Blundell 1836: 604). Slaves could also be used to pay debts and fines (the Laws of Kosaraat, and the Laws of Lanna cited in Aroonrut 1977: 238). In addition, slaves—especially those who were war-captives—could be sent to a more powerful king as tribute, and could be given to distinguished army commanders and soldiers as a reward. Slave-owners could even hire out their slaves for tasks such as climbing betel nut trees and carrying things in order to obtain the daily wages earned by their slaves (Mangrai Sat 1971: 74-75). Slaves had to render labor services demanded by their owners which could include going on a trade expedition, household services, producing handicrafts, and building. Other than such substantial uses, one also enjoyed social prestige and derived wealth display effects from owning a number of slaves.

There were several types of slaves which were indicative of the ways by which one became a slave. Each old record and piece of law does not always specify similar types of slaves. However, it can be inferred from these sources that in general one became a slave as the result of wars, economic difficulties, legal punishment, and being born
to enslaved parents. For example, the Thammasat Chiangmai Laws state that there were four kinds of slaves: (1) ones who were born to female slaves; (2) ones who sold themselves to be slaves; (3) war-captives; and (4) certain crime convicts (as cited in Aroonrut 1977: 227). The four types of slaves in the Laws of Lanna were: (1) those who were born into slave households; (2) those who were bought to be slaves; (3) war-captives and crime convicts; and (4) those who agreed to become slaves in order to obtain protection and patronage (as cited in Aroonrut 1977: 228). The Laws of Kosaraat indicate five ways of becoming a slave. Two ways, which particularly provided some clues of general livelihood in those days, were: (1) inability to pay debts thus becoming slaves to the lender; and (2) being cured from a close-to-death illness thus becoming slaves to the one who provided the cure (as cited in Aroonrut 1977: 228).

Even though they were in the lowest social stratum, slaves were, at least according to the laws, guaranteed some rights and welfare. For example, slaves could inherit properties (Mangrai Sat 1971: 7; the Thammasat and Laws of Phraya Mangrai: 28). Also, if a slave became ill and his/her owner did not take care of his/her illness, anyone who restored the slave to health would be the new owner (the Laws of Kosaraat cited in Aroonrut 1977: 243). Slave-owners could not kill their slaves at will (the Laws of Kosaraat cited in Aroonrut 1977: 244). In addition, when having problems with their owners, slaves could ask for protection and justice from any aristocrat and official free of charge (the Laws of Kosaraat cited in Aroonrut 1977: 244). However, if a conflict occurred, it was probably unlikely that a high-ranking person would interfere with the business of one of his kind in favor of a slave.
There was, at the same time, an attempt, especially on the part of rulers, to limit the number of slaves, or so it appeared in some of the old laws. For example, it was written in Mangrai Sat that when a male slave who had children with a female slave died, his children would become commoners because commoners were rare (Mangrai Sat: 7). This possibly showed a conflict between the noblemen's attempt to increase their own power and property in the form of slaves on one hand, and the rulers' (or the state's) attempt to maintain or increase the number of free citizens who worked on agricultural land, and were subjected to state labor corvee and tax demands.

To keep the hierarchical structure of differentiated social strata intact, the ruling groups went beyond legal rules and sanctions, coercion, and exchanges of physical protection for produce and services. They formulated and used certain ideological links for the same goal. The case of guardian spirit cults was an example.

Guardian spirits consisted of deities, spirits of ancestral kings, benevolent giants and ghosts who gave protection and brought prosperity to the kingdom and its people when rituals and offerings were properly given (Aroonrut 1977: 267-268). The guardian spirit cults dated back to the time before the Early Chiangmai Kingdom period. Some of the spirits had long been recognized as not only guardian spirits, but also as benevolent figures in a legendary part of Buddhism. Examples were the two giants (Pu Sae and Ya Sae) and the thirty-two giant children (Kiti 1981-1982: 121-133). Rulers of the kingdoms used the guardian spirit cults to help reinforce their political and economic power over villagers in two ways. First, they established or gave an official recognition to certain guardian spirits and placed them in a hierarchy.
The spirits of the rulers and the cities were at the higher levels than those of the villagers and rural communities. Second, the rulers (and sometimes important aristocrats and high officials) appointed themselves to a legitimate role of ritual patronage in the guardian spirit cults by approving, setting, and chairing rituals, and also by mediating and communicating with important spirits. So, as the ruling groups would claim, these guardian spirits would fully provide both protection and prosperity. This patronage helped justify, among other things, the rulers' legitimacy in ruling and demanding taxes, tribute, labor, and loyalty from their people.

2.2 The Period of Wars and Burmese Occupation (1558-1774)

During the reign of King May Gut (1551-1558), the Chiangmai kingdom was weak and in turmoil. Commoners in particular suffered greatly from heavy labor corvee, taxes, and tribute. It was recorded that people everywhere mourned as they had to work hard and could not pay heavy taxes and tributes; while the tax collectors were mean. There was fighting and robbery; there were droughts and the people had nothing to eat. (An old record cited in Aroonrut 1977: 71-72.) This was a precursor to worse times—the two hundred years of war, a time full of fights, slaughter, brutal rapine, and enslavement (Blundell 1836: 693).

The Burmese seized Chiangmai in 1558, and after 1578 a Burmese viceroy and a group of Burmese officials were sent to rule northern Thailand. Meanwhile, a large number of the northern Thai population were taken as war captives to Burma. Those who were left behind were subjected to demands by the Burmese for tribute, taxes, labor corvee
(e.g., building Burmese temples in Chiangmai city), and supply of food and conscripted troops when the Burmese engaged in wars. In terms of laws, the Burmese seemed to allow the use of the Lanna laws but with some changes and the addition of some Burmese laws (Mangrai Sat 1971: 94; Aroonrut 1977: 72-75).

Chiangmai was under Burmese rule until the latter part of the eighteenth century, except for a few brief periods. For example, it was ruled by the Ayutthaya kingdom for a brief period of time during the seventeenth century. There were also several attempts by northern Thai rebels to recover the region's independence and end the Burmese oppression. Some of them were successful. For example, in 1628 and 1727 the northern Thai freed the region from the Burmese for about 30 years at a time (Aroonrut 1977: 76). However, during these periods of time, it seemed that the Chiangmai rulers behaved like the Burmese, imposing heavy taxes and brutally oppressing their own people as well as other ethnic groups who lived under their rule (Blundell 1836: 693). The oppression by ruling groups led to a series of peasant revolts beginning in 1728 (Anan 1984: 40).

In 1774 the northern Thais seized Chiangmai back with the help of a large army sent by King Taksin of Thonburi. However, it was not until 1804 that the Chiangmai troops and the Bangkok troops finally chased the Burmese out of northern Thailand. After 1774 Chiangmai and other chiefdoms such as Lamphun, Lampang, Nan, and Prae became tributary states under the Siamese kingdom. These chiefdoms were obliged to send tribute, laborers, and whatever else was demanded by the Siamese, and army troops to assist Bangkok in times of war (Aroonrut 1977: 85). War
captives were occasionally sent to Bangkok as gifts from the northern state chiefs to please the Siamese kings (Prani 1963 Vol. I: 6).

From 1774 until the mid-nineteenth century, the laws and their implementation were probably similar to those used during earlier times, i.e., the judgments were based on old laws and customs but they could be influenced by the powerful. The use of favors and influence in the judicial process seemed to persist as late as the end of the nineteenth century (Ramsay 1976: 19-20; Prani 1963, Vols. I and II). It was only in 1891 that the central Thai government laws were implemented in Chiangmai (Tej 1977:69; Calavan 1975: 195). Yet, the change in the administrative organization began earlier. During the reign of King Kawila (1782-1815), in addition to the ruler of Chiangmai (caoo chee wit), there were four other high aristocratic ranked positions with specific titles. (Some of these titles were mentioned in Blundell 1836: 601-625, 688-707.) The later Kings Rama the fourth and the fifth ordered the appointment of a few other titles, resulting in a total of seven top aristocratic titles most of which were unprecedented (Aroonrut 1977: 116, 278). Also King Kawila formulated a cabinet consisting of four high official positions similar in function to those of the Siamese Four Ministries (catusadom) (Aroonrut 1977: 142-143). This system of administrative organization endured until 1884 when the central Thai government set up a new system of government in Chiangmai (Tej 1977: 65).

2.3 The First Half of the Nineteenth Century

The beginning of the nineteenth century was a period of repopulation of Chiangmai city and the vicinity, after the Burmese were driven
out of Chiangmai. From the time that King Kawi1a rebuilt Chiangmai in 1796 until the mid-nineteenth century, the Thai Yuan who were hiding from the danger of war were encouraged and collected to resettle in and around Chiangmai. Also, many Burmese who were defeated in various towns including Chiangsaen were taken captive and brought to settle on the Chiangmai plains, later being assimilated (Le May 1926: 213). The Chiangmai kings also sent armies to conquer such communities and towns as those of the Thai Yai, Thai Koen, Thai Yong in the Shan states, and Thai Lue in Sipsongpanna as in the years 1802, 1804, and 1839 (Cohen 1981: 17, 49; Tanabe 1981: 201, 204). These captives were brought back and ordered to settle in and around Chiangmai City, for example in Saraphi, Sanpatong, and Sansai district (Kraisi 1965: 7-8; Cohen 1981:17; Vanlapa 1976; University of Chiangmai Geography Dept. 1977:58).

Nong Faeg was probably resettled during the first or second decade of the nineteenth century. (This hypothesis is based on: (1) physical evidence of ruins from previous settlements at the village; (2) reports of the existence of many well-settled villages around Chiangmai city between 1829 and 1835 by Richardson [Blundell 1836]; (3) the calculated dating of the Nong Faeg old temple; and (4) the story of a villager who was an architect for King Kawilorat (1854-1870) [Kingshill 1976: 378].)

The resettlement and establishment of villages especially in the areas beyond the immediate vicinity of the city were significantly accelerated not only by Britain's first victory over Burma in 1825, but also by the Chiangmai kings' policies of frontier expansion, tax collection, and control.

The picture of villagers' way of life in the Chiangmai area has to be drawn mainly from the journals and reports of Richardson who visited
Map 5. Northern Thailand and Surrounding Regions (Cohen 1981:13)
northern Thailand between 1829 and 1835. He observed that most villagers lived in bamboo houses, many of which had an uncomfortable appearance. Although there may have been more wooden houses in big towns, even a high-ranking aristocrat of Lamphun lived in a small bamboo house (Blundell 1836: 613, 618, 636). Fruit and other useful trees, such as coconut, betel nut, and bamboo, were grown on the house compound land which was fenced if it was in town and unfenced if in a rural village. Villagers in general wore simple dress of blue or black cotton. Betel nut chewing and cigarette smoking were common among villagers. However, opium smoking and gambling were scarcely known, and drunkenness was uncommon (Blundell 1836: 602). Some villagers told me that from what they heard from previous generations, the food back then was also very simple. It consisted of steamed glutinous rice, vegetables, fish, small crabs, chicken and birds, but rarely did they get other kinds of meat. For seasoning they used salt which had to be brought from outside, some kinds of curry spices, chillies, and home-made fermented fish (pla ha).

As for villagers' livelihood, Richardson's reports show that during the first half of the nineteenth century it had not changed much from before. In general, lowland villagers cultivated glutinous rice by transplanting and many areas of the rice land were irrigated. He said:

Much of the valley near the town (Chiangmai) is under cultivation, which is all prepared by irrigation, and the grain is transplanted, yielding upwards of one hundred-fold, though the fields are never left fallow. (Blundell 1836: 696)

Crossed the May-Haut about knee deep, by which the paddy between this and the village is irrigated; nearly all the paddy in the plains of the valley of May-ping (where Chiangmai and Lamphun are situated) is cultivated in some way. (Blundell 1836: 611)
Cultivation is conducted with a good deal of care by irrigation and transplanting... (Blundell 1836: 603)

However, it should be noted that the area of land under cultivation was not yet large; as Colquhoun observed during his journey in the early part of the 1880s, "... only one-twelfth of the available ground is cultivated" (Colquhoun 1885: 108). Also, large irrigation systems from the earlier days were not everywhere (more in the west and south of Chiangmai city) and some of them were probably not revived or improved yet. A few new systems might have been under construction such as the Khun Khong weir in Sanpatong district during the late 1840s (Cohen 1981: 36).

The villagers also grew many other things such as cotton, maize, sugarcane, tobacco, peanuts, chillies, coconut, betel nut, oranges, pummaloes, pineapple, mangoes, sugar palm (palmyra), and guavas (Blundell 1836: 603, 614, 694, 696). However, from what they heard, elderly villagers in the field study area told me, that until the beginning of the twentieth century many of the useful trees and fruit trees, for example, bamboo, tamarind, mango, and sugar palm, were also wild. (Richardson said pepper, cloves and all the finer species of spices were unknown there at the time of his visits. This contradicts the account in Mangrai Sat on pepper vine. See Blundell 1836: 603; and Mangrai Sat 1971: 86.)

Richardson described the use of paddy and garden lands in the Chiangmai-Lamphun area as: "the crops follow each other in uninterrupted succession" (Blundell 1836: 603), and "the fields are never left fallow" (Blundell 1836: 696). I suspect he overgeneralized and overemphasized the degree of what seemed to be an annual system of double- or
multiple-cropping. In my understanding, during that time the commercialization of rice and cash crops had not yet flourished. Besides, the man-land ratio was still very low, and the irrigation systems in some areas were limited in terms of extensiveness and quality due to the early stage of settlement or resettlement. Therefore, rice was planted only once a year in the rainy season ("The general seed-time is in July and August, and the harvest in December and January . . ."). Blundell 1836: 603), or only in the dry season for topographically low paddy fields. It is possible that a few villagers among those who planted rice or semi-low land might have grown rice twice a year, especially if it was necessary for their subsistence consumption. This double cropping would consist of a floating rice variety for the rainy season, and a dry season variety for summer. Other crops such as tobacco were planted in small plots after the rice was harvested. What elderly villagers in the Nong Faeg area said supports this argument. 

"Up until the beginning of the twentieth century, villagers usually grew rice once a year. Other than a small area in which garden crops were grown, most of the fields were left empty or for cattle and buffaloes to graze." (See also Kingshill 1976: 379. His interview in 1954 of an elderly woman who was born in 1880 confirmed this.)

Among those phenomena which significantly affected or influenced villagers' livelihood during this period were:

(1) the population density which was still low. In 1830 the population of the entire state of Chiangmai was only 50,000 and for Chiangmai town and Lamphun town it was only 20,000 and 14,000 respectively (Brailey 1969:25). Blundell also observed that the northern Thai region was so thinly populated (Blundell 1836: 603);
(2) the introduction into the region of new crops by Burmese, Siamese, Chinese traders, and Europeans. (A British official introduced Pernambuco--South American cotton.) (Blundell 1836: 603);

(3) establishment of demands from the ruling groups (rulers, aristocrats, and officials of considerable administrative importance and power) in the forms of: (a) occasional labor corvee, (b) taxes. In the 1830s, peasants in the state of Chiangmai paid a rice tax of four baskets (tang) per plough (Richardson cited in Cohen 1981: 44). Every cultivator without exception, at the close of the harvest, paid into the government granary a quantity of grain equal to what he might have sown (Blundell 1836: 700). According to McLeod who was in Chiangmai in 1836-1837, taxes were also imposed on cotton, tobacco, safflower, betel nuts, and chillies (Colquhoun 1885: 255-256). In an area in Chiangrai, there were no resident aristocrats, no royal land, and the villagers paid no rice taxes; they paid tribute only (Turton 1975: 36), (c) tribute (suai) which included agricultural and forest products and handicrafts e.g., rattan, mats, red onions, garlic, and kapok (Cohen 1981: 33), iron ware and iron products (Blundell 1836: 612), orchids and thatch (Kunstadter 1969: 72); and

(4) the early and limited commercialization of the northern Thai economy.

It was not clear what old villagers in Nong Faeg may have heard from their forefathers about trade during the first half of the nineteenth century. They could only recall vaguely that some villagers bartered or sold limited quantities of cattle, buffalo, tobacco, and cotton. Richardson provides further information on trade of Chiangmai in those days. He observed that the trade of northern Thailand was still limited,
selling raw cotton to the frontier provinces of China; cattle, ivory, and sticklac to British Burma, and cattle and grain with the hill tribes on the west bank of the Salween river including the Red Karens. In return, manufactured goods, cloth, metal, and slaves were bought (Blundell 1836: 604, 689, 695). A major part of the trade was in the hands of the Yunnanese caravan merchants some of whom settled down in the towns of northern Thailand (Blundell 1836: 619, 697).

As early as during the 1830s, rice production and cattle raising were encouraged, though still to a limited extent for trade, by: (1) the presence of Burmese British subjects who were working teak out of forests in Chiangmai and sending it to the Burmese port of Moulmein (Ramsay 1976: 22); and (2) the northern Thai aristocrats' agreement with the British on an unrestricted trade in cattle (Blundell 1836: 604, 695). Most of the rice and cattle trade was in the hands of the northern aristocrats (Richardson cited in Cohen 1981: 40) who either possessed surplus rice and cattle or acted as middlemen between villagers and buyers. Not only did the aristocrats sell goods such as cattle to Bengalee and Haw or Yunnanese traders, but some of them also sent their peasant clients on trading expeditions of their own (Richardson cited in Cohen 1981: 40). However, a number of villagers were also engaged in some trading with the aristocrats or directly with traders (Blundell 1836: 620--"... they all lived by trade or agriculture, ..."; and p. 695--"I did not urge him to give the people an order to sell, but permission to do so."). At least, many villagers were not self-sufficient for such items as salt, cotton, cattle and buffalo, metal ware, and earthenware.
Finally, further evidence of the beginning of commercialization of the Lanna economy was in the medium of commercial exchange. Previous to this period, there were three methods or mediums of trade: barter exchange, Lanna silver currency, and salt as a medium of exchange. In the 1830s, while barter exchange was still predominant particularly in rural areas, the Madras rupee from British Bruma was increasingly used, first as payment for cattle trade, then for teak concessions; and thus became an important medium of exchange in the Lanna economy during the second half of the nineteenth century. (On the use of rupees and Lanna silver currency, see Blundell 1836: 693, 704.) This was not only an indication of the emerging commercialization, but also of the British domination in the Lanna money market which persisted until approximately the turn of the century when the Bangkok government and trade were to gain dominance. Despite the widespread use of rupees, there was evidence of the existence, and possible use, of a limited number of small Siamese coins in Lamphun by the 1830s (Blundell 1836: 691).

2.4. The Second Half of the Nineteenth Century

The crucial and interrelated phenomena affecting villagers' livelihood during the second half of the nineteenth century were changes in population; demands from the northern Thai ruling groups and their government which were increasingly influenced by the Siamese rule; changes in the economic bases of the northern Thai kings, aristocrats, and officials which led them to accumulate private land; and changes in the characteristics of the northern Thai economy especially with respect to its increasing commercialization. This period of time was
a very crucial point in the history of rural transformation in the area. As one will see, by the end of this period, villagers' livelihood became increasingly involved politically and economically with the outside world. Villagers were entering into the twentieth century—a time period of new life styles; new consumption tastes, land enclosure, commercialized use of land, new patterns of land usufruct, new cultural arrangements, new laws, orders, and forms of government.

2.4.1 Population Dynamics

Estimates of the population size during this period of time will be presented first. Then will follow a discussion of the historical context of the population reproduction, immigration and ethnic complexity, internal migration and settlement which affected villagers' livelihood directly (e.g., the amount of land under cultivation, and intensity of cultivation) and indirectly (e.g., through the expansion of commercialization).

According to Richardson, the population of Chiangmai city in the 1830s was under 20,000 (Blundell 1836: 602). During the 1870s, Edwardes reported that the population of Chiangmai city probably amounted to 15,000 people (Edwardes in Chatthip et al., eds. 1979: 135). Yet, in the 1890s Curtis wrote that it was generally conceded that about twenty thousand souls were within the Chiangmai city walls (Curtis 1903: 294). It was possible that population in the city was periodically decreased due to migration to settlements in rural areas. For the state of Chiangmai, the total population was estimated to be only 50,000 in 1830 (Brailey 1969: 25). In the 1890s, Curtis reported that the
population within and surrounding the city walls, including up and down the river bank was about one hundred thousand (Curtis 1903: 294). Hallet's 1890 estimate of the population of Chiangmai state (Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Chiangsaen, Phrao, Fang, and Maehongsorn) was 700,000 (Hallet 1890: 98) which, suggested Cohen, seemed to be excessive (Cohen 1981: 54). Other than these reports there are still others by missionaries and travellers who described an increasing populace and a greater density of people in various areas in the North (e.g., in Chiangmai and Lamphun by Freeman 1910: 80-81).

The increase of population in the area resulted from a significant population reproduction in the absence of major wars with the Burmese. (In Lamphun, Richardson was told of how wars, especially with the Burmese, had kept down population and laid waste entirely many large towns. [Blundell 1836: 693].) It was also a result of immigration. The following section will focus on different groups of immigrants from other states or regions, and how they contributed not only to the repopulation of some remote areas and expansion of cultivated land, but also to an expansion of trade and market.

Immigrants including war captives from other regions such as Burma, southern China, the Shan states, mountain area tribes, and central Thailand added to the population increase of the Chiangmai kingdom. Up until the second half of the nineteenth century, wars between Chiangmai and the Shan states and turmoil in the Shan states brought many Shan war captives and refugees to settle down in the Chiangmai kingdom (e.g., Cohen 1981: 17). In addition, the Chinese, the Haw, the Shan, the Meng, some Moslems (with a Semitic appearance), and the British subjects of various ethnic identities came to settle
down or stay temporarily in response primarily to the lure of benefits from increasing commercialization. What follows is a discussion of business activities, especially those of the first three groups, and immigration into northern Thai towns and villages during the second half of the last century.

A sizable immigration from China to central Thailand began in the early part of the nineteenth century, and increased up until the beginning of the twentieth century (Skinner 1957: 52-63). The majority of the Chinese immigrants were the Teochiu and the Hakka from the province of Kwangtung, the Hokkien from Fukien province, and the Hainanese from Hainan Island (Skinner 1957: 32-35; 1961: 4-5, 20). The major causes or reasons for their immigration during the nineteenth century were: difficulties in livelihood in China such as floods, droughts, frosts, crop failures, plague epidemics, foreign wars and internal rebellions; better economic opportunities in Thailand such as in trade, agriculture, labor hiring, transportation services, and commodity processing business, e.g., rice mills and saw mills; and facilitation provided by improved services of steamships with cheap fares and the elimination of the Chinese government's ban on emigration (Skinner 1957: 30-32, 67). Their contribution to the expansion of the Thai economy and their influence on change in agriculture, among other things, should not be underestimated. For example, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Chinese immigrants introduced and/or facilitated the growth of the commercial cultivation in Siam of pepper, cotton, and especially sugarcane which became one of the most important export crops almost through the end of the century.
(Skinner 1957: 46-47; Ingram 1971: 123-127, and on page 22 Ingram shows that the top-in-value six exports from Siam in 1850 were: sugar at the top, then raw cotton, hides, horns and skins, sapanwood, sticklac, tin and tin utensils.)

Later, many Hainanese and Teochiu migrated to northern Thailand (Skinner 1957: 86). However, the first Chinese groups which were present in the North were the Yunnanese who took inland routes from southern China. The Hainanese were chiefly involved in fishing, boat-building, sawmilling, lumber selling, pig raising, petty trading of local products with villagers and exporters, and start up of the first permanent markets. The Teochiu as early as the mid-nineteenth century were the dominant Chinese settlers in the major commercial towns of Rahaeng (Tak), and Chiangmai. One of the explanations for this phenomenon was that the Teochiu were shrewder in business, with sufficient capital, more skill, and a strong preference for trade of greater volume and quality, especially of regional and foreign import and export goods (Skinner 1957: 86-87).

In addition to large-volume trade, petty trade, and vending (Bock 1884: 230), the Chinese in northern Thailand also introduced a kind of currency (Hainanese pottery gambling chips), setting up gambling dens, and mostly were able to get the concession-monopoly on production and sale of many commodities and on tax collection. However, before the beginning of the twentieth century when trade between northern and central Thailand began to flourish, the extent of trade in the hands of these Chinese seemed to be secondary to that in the hands of the Haw (Yunnanese) and the Shan. As far as the size of Chinese
population in the North is concerned, there is no available record of it. Yet, historical accounts of the Chinese monopolists during the 1870s and 1880s give the impression that there were already quite a few Chinese not only in Chiangmai city, but also in smaller towns (such as Phrao which is about 70 miles from Chiangmai city) and villages (Ramsay 1971: 88-90, 157; Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds. 1979: 137, 142; Chusit 1980: 32; Colquhoun 1885: 295-296; Bock 1884: 247; and Hallet 1890: 365).

The Haw were the Yunnanese of southern China who came to Chiangmai in their caravans for trade for such things as wax, opium, scissors, ironware, brass bells, sickles, skin jackets, silk cloth, straw hats, musk, lead, chillies, and pigs (Bock 1884: 230; Hallet 1890: 210; le May 1926: 188, 204, 231). In addition to their well-known interstate trades, the Haw were also responsible for more local movements of rice, tea, opium, and salt. One of the main things they bought to bring back to Yunnan or to sell elsewhere was cotton (Moerman 1975: 154). Their trading caravans to Chiangmai probably date back to the early Chiangmai kingdom period, though to a more limited extent. Their inter-regional trade which covered Yunnan, British Burma, northern and central Thailand continued at least until the 1920s (Moerman 1975: 155; le May 1926: 188, 197, 204-205, 231-232). A few villagers in both Nong Faeg and Khua Mung still remember the Haw caravans which came into the area as early as in the 1890s or stories told them by their parents about the visits of Haw traders long before that. Sickles, scissors, and scales from the Haw traders were among popular commodities which the villagers bought or bartered for. They also revealed that
a few Haw traders came to the villages nearby to settle down, and some of them married local girls. The Haw also came to settle in Chiangmai city and other towns (Mote in Kunstadter 1967: 491).

The Shan were also important caravan traders during the second half of the nineteenth century although their trade was less 'international' in character than that of the Haw. They came from the Shan states such as Chiangtung to northern Thailand and British Burma with their caravans to buy cattle and sell lead, chillies, salt, and British manufactured goods such as textiles, dyes, and kerosene. A sizable number of the Shan settled down both in towns and villages (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 130-131; also for Saraphi district see Calavan 1977: 26), and many of them opened sundry stores selling mainly British goods. Their immigration, caravan trades, and stores were encouraged and mostly protected by the British because the British were not only concerned with profiting from the teak industry in northern Thailand but also with expanding the market for British goods. This does not mean that all Shan traders, store-owners, and sellers were British subjects even though it seemed that the majority were (Moerman 1975: 156; Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 141; Cohen 1981: 46).

Shan trade and immigration continued at significant levels from at least the second half of the nineteenth century through the beginning of the twentieth century. Cohen suggested that by the end of the last century the Shan controlled most of the secondary store trade in northern Thailand (Cohen 1981: 46). After the Shan Rebellion in 1902 and the more direct administration of northern Thailand by the central
Thai government, the Shan trade seems to have persisted for at least a few more decades. Le May observed that in the 1920s there was a gradual decline in the trans-frontier trade between northern Thailand and Burma but an increase in trade with Siam through the Chinese. However, at the same time trade with the southern Shan states increased (Le May 1926: 101).

Other than the Chinese, the Haw, the Shan, there were two more ethnic groups that moved into Chiangmai: the Meng (or Mon, or Talien), and the Moslems. It is possible that many of the Meng migrated into northern Thailand from southern Burma after the eighteenth century especially during the time of wars between Burma and northern Thailand. Some of them possibly became war captives or victims of slave-catching incursions and were subsequently brought into Thailand (Luang Wigit Wathakarn ed. 1969: 68; Blundell 1836: 693). Another possibility is that some Meng had been in northern Thailand since the founding of their Hariphunchai kingdom (A.D. 657-1282) (Aroonrut 1977: 63; Kraisri 1965: 8). Villagers with Meng blood are still found in Chiangmai and Lamphun areas. Also, the Meng Spirit Dance in the case of illness is still practiced in various parts of Chiangmai including the area of my field study.

There is not much information on Moslems who live in Chiangmai city and surrounding villages. In Saraphi district, there have been a few Moslems scattered in many villages while there have been a few villages where they constitute the majority of the residents (e.g., Calavan 1977: 26). It is possible that some of their ancestors were the Bangalees who came there through Burma as cattle dealers and such during the first half of the nineteenth century (Blundell 1836: 691).
It is also possible that some of these Moslems came to the district during the second half of the nineteenth century. Some of them have become local moneylenders and landlords. An old villager in Nong Faeg was told that during the latter part of the nineteenth century his grandparents borrowed a buffalo and some blankets from a Moslem who lived in a nearby village. Later they were not able to pay the debt, therefore the Moslem seized 6 rai of their land which was one-third of all the rice land they 'owned'. It should be noted that these Moslems were not the same population group as the Haw who were the Islamic Chinese from Yunnan.

British subjects also added to the increasing population of the Chiangmai kingdom during the second half of the last century and the beginning of this century. (There might have been a few subjects of other western countries. For example, there was one French and one Danish timber company at the end of the nineteenth century.) (Cohen 1981: 42-43; Ramsay 1976: 25.) British subjects included the Burmese, the Shan, the Red Karens, the Mussulmans (from British India), and the Peguan (Cohen 1981: 43; Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 127, 141). However, the majority were the Burmese, the Shan, and probably also the Karen who came into northern Thailand as workers and foresters in teak timber operations and as traders. They eventually settled down and became storeowners in towns and villages. The British subjects could be divided into groups: those who were directly involved in the timber operations or were servants to company management or foresters, and those who were not. For the latter, protection by British authorities was usually sought and often was granted as it benefitted both parties (Cohen 1981: 46).
There is no comprehensive record on the number of these British subjects in northern Thailand; there are only bits and pieces of information. For example, during the 1870s in a teak forest area in Chiangmai there were about 400 British subjects working in the timber operations and about 200 more working as guards (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 127). In Chiangmai city, there were about 150 British subjects during the same period of time (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 141). According to le May, in the 1880s there were thousands of Burmese and Shan British subjects earning their living in northern Thailand (le May 1926: 57). According to Ramsay (1979: 290 as cited in Cohen 1981: 54) in 1903 there were 3,490 Shans and Karens registered as British subjects at the Chiangmai consulate.

Finally, internal migration to existing communities or to new settlements, and repopulation of deserted settlements were signs of not only increasing population but also the expansion of the land under cultivation. As mentioned earlier, the Chiangmai kings encouraged and/or ordered such migration and repopulation in order to expand political control, increase state revenue (e.g., taxation), and stimulate the economy (e.g., production and trade). Accordingly, they sent aristocrats or appointed officials to administer these communities. For remote areas, the king's policy of expanding the frontier was also a result of fear of an expansion of British influence (Cohen 1981: 49). Nong Faeg expanded to a sizable village as demonstrated by the fact that during the 1880s Cao Noi Luang (an aristocrat) who was appointed a commune headman took up residence in Nong Faeg (Kingshill 1976: 166; Calavan 1975: 92). Its expansion resulted from
population reproduction, and, according to old villagers, migration from other rural communities and from inside or around Chiangmai city. Khua Mung was possibly founded during the second half of the nineteenth century as a result of migration from other villages and from areas near the city. By 1900, according to some old villagers in the field study area, Nong Faeg had probably 40 households and Khua Mung had about 30 households. It should be noted that this kind of migration was not unusual. Calavan described a family which, in 1865, moved to Sansai commune from an area closer to Chiangmai city. At that time the area, which in 1970 had become two adjoining villages with 186 households, had only 8 households (Calavan 1975: 96, 133). At the same time, a number of aristocrats were moving to reside in the rural areas of Chiangmai. Some of the villagers became frightened and moved away. However, others moved in because they felt the aristocrats could maintain local peace, stabilize land claims, and organize villagers to develop large irrigation systems (Calavan 1975: 100-101).

Archer who travelled in the North in 1887 observed that:

Many of the new-comers first reside in the capital, but as by degrees they have opportunities of becoming better acquainted with the surrounding country, they begin by cultivating the most promising land in the neighborhood; others join them, and thus villages are founded; and when a longer residence and increased population have given a feeling of greater confidence and security, settlements are gradually formed farther from the capital. (cited in Hallet 1890: 352)

Other than the voluntary small-scale migration of population, there were also cases of official larger-scale repopulation by the kings' encouragement. An example was the case of Fang (about 100 miles north of Chiangmai city). In 1880, there was an official proclamation
to the public announcing a voluntary migration to Fang led by a thao (a commoner administrative assistant; see Calavan 1975: 51, 176). Chiangmai citizens, serfs, and certain groups of Burmese Shans were allowed (up to the maximum of 1,000 men of 20-60 years of age, with an unlimited number of women, children, and older men) to repopulate Fang without any restriction on land claims, provided that they agreed not to exploit honey trees and teak (Hallet 1890: 348).

A few years later, many people ("over a hundred households") moved from Phrao (44 miles from Chiangmai city) to Fang because of the monopolies in Phrao granted by the Chiangmai king on spirits, pork, and tobacco, and the imposition of a tax upon sticklac (Hallet 1890: 365). This evidently was a case of migration to flee the ruler's demands on taxes and restrictions on production and sale of some important consumption items and commodities.

Settlements were also founded, expanded, or repopulated by the king's command, usually by war captives. For example, in 1842 some minor officials were ordered by Cao Phuttawong to lead fifty-seven families of Shan war captives to settle on a bank of the Wang river (Cohen 1981: 17). Consequently, at least two settlements were founded. One is now known as Nam Ton Village, the other is Sen Kantha Village. Both are in Sanpatong district of Chiangmai. Probably one or two decades later, some villagers from Nam Ton searched for new land, e.g., suitable land to graze cattle during the wet season, and thus settled a community called Ban Phae (Cohen 1981: 17). Its population was soon augmented by a large number of Shan who fled from the turmoil of the internecine warfare and banditry that plagued the southern Shan States.
in the 1860s (Cohen 1981: 17). Similarly, during the reign of King Kawila (1782-1815) Lue war captives from Sipsongpanna in Yunnan and Muang Yong in the Shan States were brought to camp temporarily outside the Chiangmai city wall. Later, they were sent to settle in towns or villages in Phrao, Samoeng, and Maerim (Tarabe 1981: 201, 204). In 1840, a large group of people was sent from Lampang to repopulate Payao (le May 1926: 232). To cite another example, Lue war captives were brought from Sipsongpana to settle in Chiangkham, Chiangrai in 1840-1846 (Moerman 1975: 152). The repopulation of Chiangsaen was similar to this last example. In 1881, King Chulalongkorn of central Thailand decided to repopulate Chiangsaen. According to Hallet, "the king ordered a list to be made of the descendants of captives that had been taken from the state so that they might be sent there" (Hallet 1890: 203). When completed, the list consisted of the names of 500 men from Lamphun, 1,000 from Lampang, and 370 from Chiangmai (Cohen 1981: 49; see also le May 1926: 214 for a slightly different account).

2.4.2 Demands from the Ruling Groups

Villagers' livelihood during the second half of the nineteenth century was also greatly affected by the demands made by the northern ruling groups. These demands became increasingly burdensome to villagers in large part due to the growing domination by the Siamese. The following discussion will show differences between the demands and their effects on villagers' lives shortly before and shortly after 1873, the year tax farming and monopolies on production and sale began in Chiangmai. Taxes imposed after 1873 were heavier, their collection was more strictly enforced, and corvee was not eliminated. These
increased demands in addition to some oppressive actions by the ruling groups (e.g., land and property seizure) led later to peasant resistance and rebellions.

2.4.2.1 Mid-century to 1873

Between 1850 and 1873, demands from the northern kings and aristocrats still consisted of taxes, tribute (suai) in the form of local products (mostly non-staple) and natural resources, and corvee (labor not paid for and forcibly recruited to serve the needs of the ruling groups). In the area of my field study, only taxation and corvee were imposed but tribute payment was usually enforced in those areas which were more remote from cities.

Before any discussion on taxes and corvee is given, it is necessary to describe three categories of land occupancy in the context of the nineteenth century: 'private' holdings, 'assigned' holdings, and the royal fields. 'Private' holdings were not really privately owned land because in general up until the end of the last century there was no private ownership of land. All land nominally belonged to the king. Commoners merely had rights of occupancy which were inheritable but could be taken away at the will of the rulers. In practice, a villager cleared a piece of forest land and/or an abandoned rice field, making it his 'private' holding. The process in general was probably like what happened in the Nong Faeg area as an informant told Kingshill, "A long, long time ago rice fields of today were just jungle. Later, when someone liked to work this land, they just informed the Kamnan, cut down the vegetation, and laid claim to the land" (Kingshill 1976:
However, the land might be claimed or seized by the king to be his royal fields, or by administrators who were given a prebendal right over a certain amount of land in the area. Yet, villagers did manage to keep their 'private' holdings in two situations. One was when no aristocrats or officials were sent to administer the areas or if sent were given prebendal rights over only a portion of the land in the areas; or where the areas were remote and beyond the reach of state administration. The other situation was when local administrators who were given prebendal rights left the 'private' holdings alone and only required payment of taxes without claiming the land or adding it to their "assigned" holdings.

For the 'assigned' holdings (na khum), the king granted a prebendal right over a certain amount of land to an aristocrat or commoner official according to his title or rank. ("The whole of the land nominally belongs to the chiefs, but in practice they grant certain districts or provinces to the numerous princes. . . . These princes pay no taxes, but they take care not to let the people off" [Bock 1884: 157].)

The land would be under the aristocrat or official only during his tenure. When he was out of office or at his death, the right over the land would return to the king. In many cases, the aristocrat was also the local administrator of the area, residing in a village and managing the collection of taxes, the reoccupation of the abandoned rice fields, the resettlement of the area, and the expansion of cultivated fields. The land that a local administrator claimed to be under his prebendal right could include not only the fields cleared by the villagers before he came to the area, but also the fields newly
cleared under his management. He also had the right to support or deny land claims of villagers in his jurisdiction. Moreover, he could assign land to new households to clear and cultivate on the condition that they had to meet his requirements concerning rent, taxation, corvee, good agricultural husbandry, etc. If the requirements were not met, the land would be taken back and assigned to other households (Calavan 1975: 127-129 for example).

The royal fields were choice rice land selected to be part of the holdings of the throne. The king ordered his administrators to claim or clear away any land and manage it by corvee of village labor. Calavan gave an example of the arrangement on the royal fields:

My informants reported that Cao Mahawong required each commoner household in his jurisdiction to cultivate one rai muang of the royal fields. This agricultural corvee (called ka kan) occurred in the two rice seasons each year—the rainy season crop (na pi) extending from August to December and the early season crop (na do) from April to August. For the rainy season crop Cao Chiwit and Cao Mahawong received all of the yield. For the early season crop there was the standard tenant arrangement of beng koeng (divide in half) with the aristocrats getting half and the obligatory tenant household getting half. (Calavan 1975: 130)

The administrators might be able to keep a small part of the paddy from the royal fields while most of it went to the royal granary. Sometimes, a royal field might be assigned to an administrator and thus become an assigned field or Na Khum. It should be noted that the way each local administrator managed the "private" fields, assigned fields, and royal fields might have been different. An example was the difference between Cao Mahawong (1870s onward) of tambol Sansai and Cao Noi Luang (1880s onward) of tambol Nong Faeg. Cao Mahawong
closely and strictly controlled and supervised the agriculture and land use in the area and actively expanded the rice fields and irrigation system under his management while Cao Noi Luang seemed not to do as much in such control, supervision a land improvement.

Taxes seemed to be a payment for the use of land, and according to the ruling groups, for exemption from corvee to be in the army or to work for the king and aristocrats (Aroonrut 1977: 147). A portion of harvests of rice and a few other crops, especially those with high market demand, was required. Taxes would vary in different places and time. For example, in rural Chiangmai the rice tax was two baskets of paddy for one basket of seed sown during the rule of King Kowilorot (1854-1870) which was double the tax during the previous period (Chusit 1980: 25). In Upper and Lower villages in Saraphi District, according to Calavan, villagers paid one-third of the dry season crop as tax on their "private" holdings (Calavan 1975: 131) (and/or as rent on land--part of the Na Khum assigned to them by the local administrator). There was no clear information on "private" land tax in the area of my field study. However, from what some villagers said, there had always been taxes on rice and a few other crops. The rice tax was collected not on the basis of the amount of land 'owned' as in Upper and Lower villages, but by the amount of seed sown or the number of buffaloes and ploughs in use. For the 'assigned' holdings, villagers who cultivated them were required to pay rent in paddy to the local administrator who sent part of it to the king (also Cohen 1981: 33; Calavan 1975: 131). Therefore, the king collected paddy from the rent, taxes, and from his royal fields. For example, Kingshill recorded that Cao Luang of Chiangmai (probably 1854-1870) sent five elephants
at a time to bring his paddy from Nong Faeg village to Chiangmai city (Kingshill 1976: 379).

As citizen commoners (as opposed to Westerners' subjects, and slaves who were exempted from taxes and labor corvee—Aroonrut 1977: 246), in exchange for the use of land and irrigation water villagers were ordered to provide free labor on many occasions. This labor could be grouped into four categories: agricultural/irrigation related tasks; general (mostly household) services; skilled services; and army (e.g., Calavan 1975: 123-124) and unskilled construction services. The effects of these demands on ability to cultivate the land should be noted.

First of all, villagers had to spend a considerable amount of time working in the royal fields, fulfilling obligations on irrigation work not only for their own rice fields but also for the royal fields on which they were obligated to carry out corvee. They were required to meet standards and satisfy rules of cultivation, e.g., continuing cultivation each year, in order to keep the right of occupancy. These demands were most strongly enforced in the areas where aristocratic administrators were very active in controlling and expanding agricultural land, labor, and irrigation systems to maximize yields and revenue under their jurisdiction (see examples in Cohen 1981: 32; and Calavan 1975: 129, 132, 136). As a result, some of the villagers had to hire others to fulfill these obligations or to work for them in their fields, or even give up their land occupancy and become tenants on the royal fields or on the fields of other landowners (Calavan 1975: 138).
Secondly, the recruitment of villagers as skilled craftsmen and soldiers was very unpredictable in terms of time of summoning, the period of service, and risk of punishment for work perceived as poor by the superiors. There was one case of a Nong Faeg villager who was a carpenter fleeing to another district further away from the city to avoid being summoned to work in the city as a skilled craftsman. Finally, most of the demands were strictly enforced with stiff penalties imposed if the demands were not met. According to some villagers, such penalties included seizure of properties and beatings.

It seems reasonable to believe that many of these demands emphasizing maximization of land use, size of land under cultivation, and good crop husbandry benefitted many villagers (e.g., better water control, better crop protection methods, and more cultivatable land for rent. Calavan 1975: 132-134). For instance, Phaya Kham irrigation canal, part of which is in Khua Mung and Nong Faeg, was constructed under Phaya Kham, a local administrator, around 1867 (Abha 1979: 1). Later, Cao Mahawong was responsible for the improvement of a part of this canal and the construction of several feeder canals (Calavan 1975: 137). However, the increase in land utilization was also accompanied by heavier taxes and required labor which in some cases totalled up to six months of villagers' time annually (Ramsay 1976: 28). Therefore, they were more beneficial for the kings and administrators who gained more control and received more produce (taxes, rents, and paddy from their own fields) from the larger harvests, filling up their granaries and increasing their earnings through the trade of their surpluses.

In other words, the agricultural management demands made by the ruling groups were of some benefit to the villagers but were intended
primarily to benefit the ruling groups. Another point to support this argument is that the assignment of aristocrats to administer rural areas during the second half of the century was partly to support the ever increasing number of aristocrats (Cohen 1981: 39; Calavan 1975: 60).

2.4.2.2 1873 to the End of the Century

A major change in demands from the northern ruling groups and the central Thai government occurred in 1873 as a result of the transformation of Chiangmai from a tributary state to a province of Thailand which occurred between the 1870s and the 1930s. The major pressures that led to such a change were increasing tensions between British teak merchants and the northern Thai aristocrats and the intervention of the British officials and the central Thai government. This change rendered benefits that were shared among the elite groups (northern aristocrats, central Thai officials, and Chinese tax farmers) while villagers suffered.

From the middle of the century, teak trade and teak timber operations grew rapidly and opened up a good source of income for the Chiangmai king and aristocrats who were forest owners. Demand for teak from and competition among timber companies and foresters increased. Some forest owners exploited the situation by demanding bribes before they would lease forest land and some of them frequently leased the same forest to more than one bidder. The British merchants and subjects also suffered from disorder and banditry. In one case soldiers of the Chiangmai ruler massacred Burmese foresters and their families on the grounds of harboring dacoits. The British foresters and merchants who dominated the timber teak business in northern Thailand then relied on the British officials in Burma and Bangkok to put pressure upon the
central Thai government to have such deceptive practices halted and to provide order and safety. The central Thai government at that time was willing to intervene as it had witnessed Britain's takeover of Lower Burma and it felt there was a serious British threat of annexation of northern Thailand. It also saw an opportunity to expand its control in the region. Among the actions taken were lawsuits concerning timber operations brought against the Chiangmai king and some of the aristocrats; the 1874 Anglo-Siamese treaty aimed at ensuring protection for British subjects and British commercial interests in northern Thailand; and for the first time, the stationing of a Siamese commissioner at Chiangmai as an attempt to forestall British intervention, to improve police, commercial, and legal administration, and to regulate a new system of leasing forests (Ramsey 1971: 60-63; Ramsay 1976: 23; Bailey 1974: 442; Tej 1977: 62; Cohen 1981: 50; Vanlapa 1976).

The effects of these actions on villagers' lives and land use were immense and intensive as the following discussions will demonstrate.

Between 1870 and 1873 thirty-two lawsuits were brought against King Kawilorot after his death by a group of British subjects concerning, among other things, seizures of their properties. Cao Inthanon who was the interim ruler of Chiangmai at that time had to take the responsibility. The cases were brought to the Siamese king and a court in Bangkok. Having lost eleven lawsuits, Cao Inthanon had to pay about 320,000 baht. Lacking sufficient cash, he had to borrow some money from the Siamese king and promised to pay him back within seven years (Prani 1963, vol. 2: 61). In order to pay the debt and
increase revenue, Cao Inthanon introduced in the same year a system of tax farming. By this system, tax farmers, mostly Chinese, who offered the ruling aristocrats the highest sum of collected tax or of promised income were granted a monopoly right of collecting the tax, performing some activities, or selling and buying certain items. It was first imposed on sticklac, betel nuts, wax, cloth, and on gambling and opium dens. For example, Edwardes who visited Chiangmai in the mid-1870s reported that a Chinese paid the third Chief of Chiangmai about 8,001 rupees a year for his monopoly in sticklac. The people were not allowed to sell to anyone except the Chinese who bought it at about one-fourth the price for which they could sell it. The same held true also for betel nut which was one of the most important products and exports of Chiangmai. A Chinese paid an annual sum of something under 1,000 pounds to the second Chief for his monopoly (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 137).

In 1884, a new commissioner, Prince Pichit, was sent from Bangkok to establish a new system of government for Chiangmai. At this time, the king of Chiangmai was adding to his income through imposition of a monopoly system on liquor-brewing and pig-slaughtering. According to one report, he was given this assistance as reward for his cooperation in the new change in government (Tej 1977: 65). The monopoly was implemented quickly and benefitted not only the king but also other ruling aristocrats. Colquhoun wrote during the first half of the 1880s that the sale of spirits was a monopoly held by a Chinese who was
reported to be in secret partnership with one of the Chief aristocrats. This Chinese paid twelve thousand rupees a year for the license of monopoly on making, distilling, and selling liquor as he liked and in any locality he chose (Colquhoun 1885: 295). Tax farming and monopoly were not only implemented in areas near Chiangmai city. Hallet who was in the North during the 1880s described how they were also implemented in Phrao which is 70 miles from Chiangmai city.

... the officials of the district agree to sell the spirit for the Zimme (Chiangmai) monopolist, adding a thirtieth to the price for their trouble. The people are not allowed to distill liquor for sale, or even for private use. The monopoly on pigs brings into the monopolist one rupee for each pig killed for spirit-worship, and one and a half rupee when killed for ordinary consumption. One-tenth of this amount goes to the officials for collecting the tax. The tobacco monopolist mules the people to the extent of one-fourth of the amount that is sold. (Hallet 1890: 365)

There was yet another burden to villagers who already suffered from the taxes and monopolies previously imposed. The weight of the tax burden during that time is documented in a 1885 government report on taxes in the northern provinces which showed that villagers, most of whom were rather poor and short of cash, annually paid two thaeb (about 160 satang) per person for cutting rattan or bamboo, for picking kapok. They also had to pay cash for owning fruit trees such as coconut, mangoes, and for planting tobacco and tea (Chusit 1980: 25).

Another reform introduced by Prince Pichit in 1884 was the substitution of a land tax of one-half rupee per rai (.4 acre) for the payment of tax in kind. This meant that for the first time it would have been possible for Bangkok to collect a portion of revenue from the North if this reform had been more effective (Ramsay 1971: 102; 1976: 24; Cohen 1981: 51). By 1885, central Thai officials shared with the
northern ruling aristocrats a large income earned from taxes and payments as well as bribes from Chinese tax farmers (e.g., Chusit 1980: 32). The villagers, as usual, gained nothing but more burden. In addition, some of the Thai officials, for example Phraya Pet Pichai, the Thai Commissioner at Chiangmai in 1887-1889, even embezzled money from the collected taxes and timber duties without sharing it with the northern Thai aristocrats (Vanlapa 1980: 61). Therefore, it can be concluded that during those last two decades, the reason for increases of taxes and improved efficiency in tax collection was not just the Siamese government's need for an increase in revenue and control for its administrative reform, but also some Thai officials' benefits from embezzlement.

In 1889, a new commissioner, Prince Sopon Bandit, introduced several reforms in taxation. He attempted to improve the efficiency of the land tax collection system (Vanlapa 1980: 62). (The Thai officials collected the tax instead of the tax farmers, and collected it with no exemptions even for aristocrats' land.) In addition, many new taxes were levied and the method of assessing taxes was revised while government's and aristocrats' corvee was not eliminated. For example, for betel nuts, siri vine, and coconut, taxes were no longer collected on the nuts and leaves but instead on the trees. Therefore, villagers had to pay taxes even on trees that did not bear nuts or were not very productive. In addition, tax farmers often offered a very high bid because of the competition for the right to collect taxes and hold the monopoly rights to produce and sell commodities. This resulted in the winning bidders being strict and at times very cruel to the
villagers in collecting taxes and operating the commodity monopoly in order to make a profit (Vanlapa 1980: 62).

During the last decade of the century, the commissioners took greater liberties with the financial administration of the outer provinces. In Chiangmai, the commissioners introduced import and export taxes in 1891. Ninety percent of the collected tax was kept to spend locally on the commissionerships while only 10 percent was given to the local administration (Tej 1977: 70). These import and export taxes had indirect impacts on villagers' livelihood; for example, tax farmers who were also merchants and monopolists would increase taxes and reduce prices paid to villagers for traded commodities in order to make up for the import and export taxes that they had to pay.

The new system of taxation and monopoly plus corvee after 1873 had both direct and indirect impacts on villagers' livelihood. Old villagers in the area of my field study remembered stories told by their grandparents on the issue. They were told that villagers thought twice before planting or keeping any crops or trees because the taxes and monopolies which applied to many items were strictly collected and exacted a heavy toll. They also had to consider that part of their time was required for corvee labor. In Phrao district during the 1880s, cotton planting was neglected because people thought a tax would be levied on it; and many people migrated from Phrao to Fang to avoid the new system of taxation and monopoly (Hallet 1890: 365).

The new system of taxation and monopoly, especially the land tax which had to be paid in cash, had positive and negative effects on the villagers' involvement in commercialization and monetarization; it
simultaneously encouraged and discouraged this involvement. The new system coerced increased involvement because many villagers had to produce more in order to sell enough so they would have the money to pay the higher taxes. In other words, villagers were indirectly forced to be more active in the production and sale of crops and livestock, and in labor selling so they could earn money to pay taxes, to buy liquor, and necessities such as salt from other regions whose prices were high due to the import taxes.

On the other hand, involvement in commercialization and monetarization was still limited because in part the taxation and monopoly system itself also discouraged many villagers' involvement. Most items which were needed in the region's markets or exported out of northern Thailand such as tobacco, coconut, betel nut, cotton, buffalo and cattle (Cohen 1981: 44; and Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 137-138) were heavily taxed. Therefore, many villagers did not produce or reduced production of them drastically in order to avoid or minimize taxes.

The burden of taxes, labor corvee and their strict enforcement as well as oppressive actions by the ruling groups also led to resistance and rebellions. An example is the 1889 peasant rebellion led by Phaya Phap, a village headman in Sansai district, Chiangmai. Oppression and harsh punishment triggered it. Many villagers did not have money to pay tax. As punishment, tax collectors tied up four villagers and left them outdoors for 4-5 days. Angry villagers requested Phaya Phap to lead their resistance against the Siamese government, the northern aristocrats entitled to tax collection, and
the Chinese tax collectors. The 2,000 villagers, poorly armed and
untrained, marched to the outskirts of Chiangmai city, but before
attacking the town they were suppressed by Chiangmai government armed
forces (Chusit 1980: 24-34; Ramsay 1979: 283-297).

In 1902, a number of villagers joined the Shan-led Phrae rebellion
because they resented increased taxes and corvee labor required by
the Siamese government's 1889-1900 tax reforms. The rebels attempted
to take over some northern Thai provinces, and killed Thai officials.
They were soon repressed by government forces (Ramsay 1979: 290-293).

In addition, in 1902 at Phrao district of Chiangmai, 600 villagers
marched on the district office to protest orders of the district
officer for labor corvee for road construction. Gunfire stopped them.
A similar incident occurred in the same year in Maetaeng district of
Chiangmai. In both cases, villagers' anger and resentment were caused
by their perception of the labor corvee as unjust and oppressive.
They had thought that the capitation tax would replace labor corvee
but found that labor corvee increased after the imposition of the tax

2.4.3 Change in the Economic Bases of the Northern Aristocrats

The takeover of the northern ruling aristocrats' political and
economic power by the central Thai government and its commissioners,
especially during the 1890s, led these aristocrats to accelerate their
accumulation of land, which became their new economic base and source
of perpetual income. They did so primarily by seizing many villagers'
land by force, by means of accusations of witchcraft, and by cheap
purchase. They also appropriated some unoccupied arable land. The
results of these actions included some expansion of land under cultivation, expansion and improvement of some irrigation systems, and migration to and settlement in remote areas. Villagers were also discouraged from accumulating land and wealth and from increasing their agricultural production and sale.

Starting in the 1870s the king of Chiangmai and aristocrats gradually began to lose some of their power as the kingdom of Siam was imposing constraints on them. Not until 1896, however, did their political and economic power dwindle significantly. At this time they were forced to concede to the Siamese government their power over teak concessions, then state revenue administration (the state financial affairs, revenue collection and treasury), and finally labor corvee.

In 1874, the commissioner of Chiangmai began to take 25 percent of the timber tax collected by the principalities of Chiangmai, Lampang, and Lamphun, and at the same time continued to restrict some of the king's and aristocrats' autonomy in the teak forest concessions. By the early 1890s, the northern princes were already stripped of many financial benefits and were not allowed to have a substantial share in the import and export taxes imposed in 1891 (Tej 1977: 70). Moreover, during the 1890s large teak companies, four British, one Danish, and one French, rather than individual lessees as previously, dominated the teak industry in the North (le May 1926: 58). These companies competed for a number of forests containing teak worth thousands of dollars. The depletion of teak resources in Lower Burma and the rising price of teak were among the reasons why teak operations were greatly expanded into Northern Thailand after 1885 (Cohen 1981: 42). The king and aristocrats took advantage of competition to extract bribes from
the companies. The companies thus put pressure on their governments and the central Thai government for improvements in the situation (Ramsay 1976: 25). In response to this pressure the central Thai government, which had unsuccessfully attempted to extract a greater share of the timber tax from the northern princes and had wanted to further incorporate the North, established the Forest Department within the Ministry of Interior in 1896. The Department, first situated in Chiangmai, was designed to supervise the granting of leases and the collecting of royalties from the northern ruling aristocrats.

In 1897, the northern ruling aristocrats agreed to surrender their rights to lease and supervise forests in return for a share of the revenue collected by Siam's Forest Department. This was done after a strong push from the Siamese government, with promises that the princes would make even more money under the new system and the threat that the British government would take undesirable actions against Thailand if there was no such reform (Ramsay 1976: 25-26; Tej 1977: 96-97; Cohen 1981: 51, 55). Consequently, the position of the northern ruling aristocrats was further weakened and in practice an important source of their income was also seriously curtailed. The income of aristocrats who resided in rural areas and local aristocratic administrators was also reduced, because previously they and their children were recipients of a portion of the concession fees paid annually by foreign lumber companies (Calavan 1975: 139).

Song Suradet, the Commissioner of Chiangmai, substantially increased the central government's influence in the northern tributary state between 1893 and 1897. Still, he was frustrated because he could not regulate, among other things, the financial administration of the
ministry system introduced in Chiangmai in 1884 (Tej 1977: 141, 143; Ramsay 1976: 24, 26). For example, in 1893 the minister of agriculture of Chiangmai refused to hand over the revenue collected from taxes to the minister of finance. Three years later, Chiangmai's minister of finance reversed this position by refusing to provide money for the expenditure of the ministries (Tej 1977: 143). Furthermore, most taxes collected were kept in the private storehouses of the kings and aristocrats and little or no distinction was made between their own money and tax revenues (Ramsey 1976: 28). Therefore in 1898 Phraya Song Suradet took advantage of the death of Cao Inthanon of Chiangmai, while his potential successor was in Bangkok, to seize total control of financial affairs including tax farming management (Ramsey 1976: 26; Tej 1977: 143).

The Chiangmai aristocrats consequently were outraged and strongly protested Phraya Song Suradet's actions to King Chulalongkorn and also promised to cooperate with the Bangkok reforms if the commissioner was sent away. King Chulalongkorn did withdraw Phraya Song Suradet and sent a new commissioner, Phraya Si Sahathep, who implemented many substantial reforms in 1899 and 1900. Some of these reforms directly resulted in the northern ruling groups losing more of their economic power and sources of income. For example, under the new bidding process of the tax farming system, the ruling aristocrats were to grant permits to tax farmers only after they obtained permission from the Commissioner to do so (Ramsay 1976: 27). In addition, after 1900 special stronghouses were built for storing government money and collected taxes. New accounting and budgeting practices, controlled by Thai officials were introduced to keep accurate records (Ramsay 1976: 28). Other
reforms undertaken did not directly reduce the ruling aristocrats' income but threatened to take away some of their economic base. For example, a capitation tax of four baht per year per man replaced corvee (Ramsey 1976: 28). This reform abolished the major source of labor which the aristocrats could demand according to their titles and positions. It should be noted that all of these losses were taken seriously by the ruling aristocrats because they were still heavily indebted to King Chulalongkorn by, among other things, the fines resulting from their loss of lawsuits in 1873 concerning teak concessions (Tej 1977: 145).

The losses of crucial political and economic power and sources of income and labor plus the realization of inevitable losses under the Bangkok policy of centralization, along with the need for money to pay their debts to King Chulalongkorn, led the northern ruling aristocrats to look for other sources of power, income, and labor. Most of them found other sources of income through taking control of land which they no longer considered as a nominal possession but as their private property which could be inherited. Having done so, they gained access to, or generated, a new source of labor on their land—labor from their tenants. Tenancy was a contractual exchange of the use of land for rent and also a relation in which some of the sakdina (Thai feudal) obligations for free labor such as on irrigation work and domestic work had to be fulfilled if the villagers wanted to continue renting the land. Besides, many tenants, and even other villagers, often entered some kind of patron-client relations with the aristocratic landlords who thus gained access to additional free labor.
The context and extent of the ruling aristocrats' appropriation of land in each period of time differed. For example, during the 1870s and early 1880s which was the period of resettlement of old towns such as Fang and Chiangsaen, there were reports of hundreds of people annually being driven from their homes by their fellow villagers to settle in the remote old towns. These people suffered property damage, banishment and had their rice fields seized on charges of witchcraft or phi ka (evil spirits in human form) (McGilvary 1912: 204; Bock 1884: 334-335; Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 136). The aristocrats often benefitted from the villagers' banishment because they were usually behind the accusations and planned to seize the land as they were not afraid of taking phi ka's land. Sometimes, using no accusation, the ruling aristocrats would just seize the villagers' land by force, or attempt to seize their wealth (Bock 1884: 157), thus causing the villagers to migrate. Therefore, during the 1870s and early 1880s such land confiscation not only benefitted the aristocrats economically, but was also used as a means of forced migration for the resettlement of remote old towns. ("The proliferating aristocracy was anxious to expand and resettle old secondary towns for defense and especially for support for some of their number appointed as administrators" [Calavan 1975: 60-61].)

Many villagers who became Christians suffered property damage (houses and rice bins burnt, cattle stolen), accusations of being phi ka, and banishment by other villagers and aristocrats during the 1860s and 1870s (Prani 1963, Vol. 1: 259). Whether it was because these Christians behaved differently, for example by eliminating the ancestor spirit worship, and thereby offended other villagers, or
because some aristocrats who disliked missionaries were behind these attacks, the results were similar—banishment, land seizure, and migration. The opposition and accusations rooted in religious differences were reduced after 1878 when King Chulalongkorn, under pressure from the American Consulate in Bangkok, issued to the North an order of freedom of religious beliefs (Prani 1963, Vol. 1: 269-270).

During the 1890s, the ruling aristocrats' appropriation of land increased. Their prime motivation—seeking a new economic base—was more obvious. The means of appropriation of villagers' occupied land most often used by the king and high-ranking aristocrats was forced confiscation. The petty aristocrats or local aristocratic administrators probably used forced cheap purchases and accusations of witchcraft or phi ka, which was often followed by the banishment of the accused occupants from the land. Most of the time, victimized villagers did not dare to resist or protest, for if they did they always found even bigger troubles as the aristocrats were not reluctant to use their influence and inflict harsh measures on those who resisted. Other villagers did not help the victims even if they sympathized with them for fear of the aristocrats. For example, around 1890, Cao Inthanon, the ruler of Chiangmai, appropriated almost 2,000 rai of peasant rice land and unoccupied arable land in Sanpatong and Comthong districts (Cohen 1981: 35). This act of appropriation is called yam (literally "trample on") which meant, in the context of that particular time, a confiscation of land by force while referring to the ruler's absolute right and authority over land as justification. Some of the rice land near Nong Faeg village was appropriated in the same way by a high-ranking aristocrat during that time. After the appropriation, most former
owners of the land continued to cultivate it as tenants, although many may have moved away.

There are also examples of land appropriation by local aristocrats through means of accusations of witchcraft or phi ka. To the north of Lampang during the second half of the 1890s, a local aristocrat stole money from an illustrious well-to-do villager. Seeking justice, this villager went to court. Feeling insulted and denied the proper respect, the aristocrat was so angry that he arranged to have the villager and his family accused of being witches or phi ka. They were driven out of the village and their rice fields were claimed by the aristocrat (Curtis 1903: 125-126). In Nan province a similar thing happened to a well-to-do villager who refused to sell his rice land to a local aristocrat. In this case, in addition to facing the accusation of being phi ka and being driven out of the village, the villager and his family had their lives threatened and their property destroyed (Freeman 1910: 48-49). From several old records and what old informants heard, this kind of aristocratic appropriation of land by means of accusations of witchcraft or phi ka was not unusual. Moreover, there were many cases of local aristocrats' successfully seizing or forcing cheap purchases of villagers' land and property without having to invoke the phi ka accusation.

The accumulation of privately owned land by northern aristocrats using such means as land appropriation, seizure, and forced cheap purchases had several effects on land use. First of all, the area of land under cultivation was expanded because some unoccupied arable land was appropriated and brought under cultivation and also because villagers who lost land opened new land for cultivation in nearby areas
or in other districts (e.g., Freeman 1910: 132; Curtis 1903: 126).

Second, some of the irrigation systems were expanded or improved under the direction of the aristocrats to feed water to their newly confiscated land. For example, in the 1890s Cao Inthanon ordered a village headman to have a secondary canal dug in order to irrigate his newly appropriated land at Thung Phaci in Sanpatong district (Cohen 1981: 36). At the same time, these irrigation improvements also benefitted some villagers' land nearby. Third, the newly imposed supervising system employed by some of the aristocratic landlords and the improved irrigation systems resulted in an increased intensity of cultivation on at least some of the appropriated land.

Finally, the king's and aristocrats' seizure of villagers' land, money, buffaloes, and other property was heard of and feared by most villagers. Even land occupied by village headmen was not exempted from appropriation. For example, in Sanpatong district all of a village headman's land (20 rai) was appropriated by Cao Inthanon in 1890 (Cohen 1981: 47). Similarly, said an old informant, an aristocrat took all of the land occupied by a headman of a village near Nong Faeg. Money that some villagers had saved from their petty trading, and additional buffaloes that the villagers raised for sale or to plough more land were seized by some local aristocrats (e.g., informants from the field study villages; Bock 1884: 157; Freeman 1910: 101; Curtis 1903: 125-127; and in Calavan 1975: 122--an informant confirmed the discretionary power of aristocrats over the villagers' lives and property). This was one of the major reasons why many villagers did not pursue trade ventures and land expansion, and were discouraged from accumulating and displaying their wealth. Curtis observed that:
... they [the northern aristocrats] are a selfish self-seeking class, and have not the interest of their people at heart. . . . The parasitical life of the chaus upon the peasants is the cause of a state of stagnation. Here we have a rich, tropical country, and a people fairly industrious, and pastoral in their instincts and habits, yet the land is undeveloped, and the people are in a state of lethargy. (Curtis 1903: 122-123)

It should be noted that in some cases villagers were responsible for land seizures by some aristocrats because they felt threatened by increased economic differentiation in the village. In many cases the villagers' envy of better-off villagers plus the belief in witchcraft or phi ka helped some local aristocrats to successfully use their influence as a means to seize the better-off villagers' land and possessions. In practice, certain villagers would threaten and/or forcefully drive the accused family out of the village while the aristocrat just stayed home and waited to hear how his plan worked. Then, because of the villagers' fear of phi ka's vengeance and/or knowing the will of the aristocrat, the land and possessions of the accused family were left for the aristocrat to claim (Curtis 1903: 239-243). The land was then rented out or cultivated by hired laborers. The tenants were villagers from other villages, those who were not afraid of phi ka, and those who believed that phi ka would affect only the aristocrat and his/her family.

2.4.4 Increasing Commercialization

During the second half of the nineteenth century, the northern Thai economy became increasingly commercialized and monetarized. However, the extent of the commercialization and monetarization was still somewhat limited when compared to that of the following century. Three distinct characteristics of the northern Thai commercialization
in this period should be noted. First, considering the importance of trade, the increasing commercialization seemed not to be as much in the sphere of crop production, e.g., rice, as in the areas of forest products and livestock. This was the opposite of what was occurring in central Thailand. Still, the production and sale of crops were sizable and, towards the twentieth century, ever increasing.

Second, this change in the economy of northern Thailand was part of a similar change in the larger system. However, the change in each society occurred at a different pace and resulted in a different degree of commercialization. Commercialization in northern Thailand began later and increased or expanded more slowly through the 1840s than that of Lower Burma, Cochin China, and central Thailand (Leckie in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979; Suwit 1978; Siriluck 1981; Suthy 1975; and Owen in Siam Society Collected Articles 1976: 73-141).

Third, by the beginning of this century central Thailand began to replace British Burma in dominating the northern Thai trade and economy.

This section will first present a general description of northern Thai commerce during the second half of the nineteenth century. Then, it will discuss phenomena which encouraged and reinforced the increasing commercialization and monetarization. The relationship between this change and villagers' lives will be addressed throughout the discussion.

In addition to historical incidents such as the imposition of import-export taxes paid in cash, descriptions from several journey notes of foreigners also indicate the increasing commercialization and monetarization of the northern Thai economy. As early as the 1870s, commercialized trades already flourished in the North. The following
descriptions are drawn from Edwardes' journey account (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 117-145). The trade of the North was large enough to make Rahaeng (Tak) an important commercial port. Timber from the upper provinces was rafted at Rahaeng. Not only was a large quantity of manufactured goods sold in the province itself, or carried by peddlers eastward to the Laos state, but it was also the emporium for the trade between Bangkok and the northern provinces including Chiangmai, Lamphun, and Lampang. The value of the manufactured goods imported was no less than 50,000 pounds per year. Examples of imported goods included powder, shot, muskets, Swedish matches, boots, thread, needles, muslin, and flannel.

The principal export of Rahaeng was teak timber, the majority of which went to British Burma, and some went to Bangkok. Rahaeng also exported to Bangkok some of the products obtained from other northern Thai states, for example coconut and miang (fermented tea leaves) from Chiangmai; beeswax, sticklac, ivory, horns, hides, coconut, chillies, and garlic from Lampang (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 120-122, 143).

Chiangmai was probably the most important state in the North not only politically but also in terms of volume of commerce. In Chiangmai city, Edwardes observed that there were about 100 shops selling British clothing materials and manufactured goods. The sizable exports from Chiangmai primarily to British Burma and secondarily to central Thailand included teak, sticklac, betel nut, coconut, cutch (catechu), miang, lacquer, buffaloes and cattle, horns, and hides. For teak timber, about 35,000 logs per year went to British Burma and only 1,000 to
2,000 logs per year went to Bangkok. The chief import to Chiangmai from central Thailand was salt which was used not only for consumption, but also as a medium of exchange. It was reported that silver rupees from British Burma were increasingly used in economic transactions, especially since a formal agreement was made in 1856 between the British and the Thai rulers to accept rupee as a medium of exchange (Chusit 1982: 48). But more important, this resulted from an increase in trade between British Burma and northern Thailand and the practice of the teak companies to pay their employees, contractors, and forest owners in rupees. Leckie confirmed that the coinage used in the North was the Indian rupee and not Siamese money (Leckie in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 100). However, salt was still a medium of exchange in the Chiangmai market as late as the 1870s (Le May 1926: 250). Next in importance to salt and of greater value were British manufactured goods whose value, said Edwardes, amounted to about 30,000 pounds a year (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 139-140).

Trade of local products also occurred among the northern states. For example, cotton grown in Chiangmai was supplemented by cotton from Lakhon (Lampang) and Phrae. Tobacco, chillies, garlic, and salt were sent from Lakhon to Chiangmai from which the Lakhon people obtained their supply of miang and betel nut. (The principal trade routes with British Burma were the Salween River and overland by cattle caravans. In central Thailand they were mostly by the Mae Ping River to Bangkok via Raheang [Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 138, 143].)

Journey accounts written during the 1880s reveal a picture of the increasing commercialization in this period of time. Based on Hallet's notes Cohen wrote, "From the major commercial centers of
Chi anglai and Lampang to Yunnan and Chiangtung to the North went cotton, dye-woods, sticklac, native tobacco, salt, gold leaf, gold dust, ivory, horns and copper in return for opium, iron, copper utensils, walnuts, brass pots, bronze ox-bells, Chinese silk goods, straw hats, horses, mules, steel swords, and steel ingots. To Moulmein in lower Burma went cattle, ivory and stick-lac while imports included gold leaf, silk goods, and British-made textiles and hardware. To the Kayah (Red Karen) State went cattle, water-buffaloes, salt and betel nut in change for slaves, tin, and stick-lac. There was also a sizable volume of trade with Bangkok by river. Imports included salt (from the Gulf of Siam) and a wide range of British manufacturers including textiles, hardware, and kerosene. Teak, dye-woods, horns, stick-lac, gums, honey, nitre, lacquer-ware, opium, and fermented tea (miang) were among the goods shipped downstream to Bangkok" (Cohen 1981: 40). It should be noted that Hallet also mentioned the export of elephants from Chiangmai to Moulmein (Hallet 1890: 296). (On Chiangmai's export of gum and sticklac to Bangkok see le May 1926: 45; on Chiangmai's trade in the hands of the Shan and Haw caravans see Bock 1884: 189, 230; and on the cotton export to Yunnan through the Haw traders see Colquhoun 1885: 50-51.)

During the 1880s, the inter- and intra-regional trade of the North was even more prosperous. For the inter-regional trade, the prosperity resulted primarily from an increase in trade with Bangkok mainly through the Chinese; while trade with British Burma and Yunnan was maintained. The opening of branches of foreign firms in the North contributed to a growth of the trade. For example, in 1889 the first British merchant firm established its permanent branch in Chiangmai while the trade link between Chiangmai and Bangkok had already been started earlier
by American and Chinese traders (British Consular Reports 1889: 29). In 1897, a Swiss firm had branches in both Chiangmai and Lampang. These foreign companies relied on Chinese merchants who worked as their agents in buying, selling, and transporting goods between Chiangmai and Bangkok (Siriluck 1981: 143-144). However, by 1902 most European and American firms discontinued their operations because they could not compete with Chinese traders as the trade was on too small a scale to be remunerative for them (British Consular Report 1902: 12).

Among important items of inter-regional trade were teak and forest products from the North; salt, kerosene, and British and American manufactured goods from Bangkok; and British manufactured goods from British Burma (Freeman 1910: 8994; Curtis 1903; and Leckie in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 87-116). The value of trade was significant. For instance, in 1898 imports from Bangkok represented about 70.5 percent of the total imports into northern Thailand.

For the intra-regional trade, rice, salt, tobacco, and metalware were still the most important trading commodities (e.g., Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch, eds., 1975). (Salt was also produced in the North at Nan—see Thompson 1941: 346.)

Several interrelated phenomena encouraged and reinforced the increase in commercialization and monetarization in northern Thailand during the second half of the nineteenth century. First, European governments, particularly the British, pushed, encouraged, and facilitated the expansion of northern Thai commerce. For example, the British government exerted its influence through the central Thai
government to ensure that its trade with northern Thailand went
smoothly and to protect its subject traders.

The central Thai government responded positively in order to
protect not only British but also its own interests. For instance,
the central Thai government protected the British companies and branches
in Chiangmai because it desired the British support against the much
more greatly feared French in the Northeast (Brailey 1974: 462). In
addition, the British were very important to the central Thai govern­
ment in terms of commercial interests and income from taxes. The
British had four big commercial companies, the first of which opened
in 1855, and four big banks, the first of which opened around 1889,
which greatly contributed to the growth of the import and export trades
by providing capital and credit services (Siriluck 1981: 148-153).
With these companies, banks, and such, by the end of the nineteenth
century some 90 percent of the total value of Siamese trade was in
British hands (Turton 1976: 268).

Second, the Thai government encouraged and accelerated commerce
in the North through the role and operation of Chinese merchants and
the tax farming system by which it benefitted in terms of business
expansion as well as administrative demands.

An example is the case of Mr. Teng (who later received a sakdina
rank of luang) a Chinese merchant from Bangkok who became very
successful in business in the North around the turn of the century.
He used his investment and utilized the support and close relationships
with the Chiangmai kings and the Thai commissioners in Chiangmai such
as Prince Narin, to manage large teak timber operations, become the
biggest opium tax-farmer, and purchase a large amount of good land in the North (Siriluck 1981: 78-80). It should be added that the business by Chinese was also facilitated by the central Thai government's policy. Chinese were allowed to travel and trade throughout the country only if they paid a head tax every three years. (The tax was 1 baht and 50 satang per head per three years before 1828, and 4 baht and 25 satang per head per three years between 1828 and 1909. Siriluck 1980: 43, 57.)

The tax farming system and monopoly trade enforced by the governments reinforced the emergence of an important group of what could be termed 'merchant capitalists'; some of their business discouraged production and free trade while other facets of it facilitated the expansion of commercialization. These tax-farmers and monopoly traders were mostly Chinese who through the bidding system became monopolists in tax-farming and/or the buying and selling of some commodities. Some of them operated only locally, but others owned businesses in many places including northern provinces and Bangkok.

These Chinese shared some important characteristics of the merchant capitalists (Kay 1975: 64-67, 86-119); they operated in a system of household production of commodities and monopolized the unequal exchange, that is buying cheap and selling dear, with the goal of expanding operations. In tax-farming, they made profits by collecting more money from taxes than they paid to the authorities for the monopoly right. They used their capital and some of their profits to reinvest and expand their operations by covering some territory or more taxed items. The monopoly traders paid annual
monopoly fees to the authorities who guaranteed their sole right on certain commodities to buy from villagers and sell to buyers such as Bangkok merchants or foreigners. They also monopolized imported manufactured goods by having caravan traders sell the imported goods to them only (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 140). Some of these tax-farmers and monopoly traders later expanded their businesses by opening other kinds of trade, commercially related services, and stores. (King Chulalongkorn said, "The tax-farmers used the profits they made to invest in various trade and business." See Siriluck 1981: 77.) Some of them also bought land and became rent capitalists, making money from shares and rent, and expanding operations by obtaining more land (Bobek 1962: 233-240; Fegan 1979: 20-25). The operations of these merchants paved the way for the development of the present-day middleman merchants and landlords.

Third, the expansion of the teak timber business in the North, especially since 1880 (Cohen 1981: 42), led to a substantial increase in demand for rice from forest workers who did not produce food. Moreover, there was a considerable need for rice in new settlements, resettled towns, and expanding towns as the rice fields were not yet fully developed or there was a greater non-agricultural population living within the city walls. For example, Hallet reports the export of rice from Phrao to Chiangmai city and to Fang in the 1880s (Hallet 1890: 366). Moerman also reports rice trade from a village in Chiangrai to purchasers who came from Phayao and Chiangmai, and through the villagers' caravans which travelled and sold rice in villages and towns as far south as Phrae, and to British lumber concessionaires.
such as in Chiangmuan (Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch 1975: 159, 163, 167).

Rice increasingly became a commercialized commodity and its price fluctuated according to supply and demand. For example, rice in Phrao sold for 8½ buckets per rupee. But in times of scarcity, e.g., in 1884, it sold for 5 buckets per rupee (Hallet 1890: 366). Moerman also reports that in a year of crop failure, rice prices were fourteen times higher than normal (Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch, eds., 1975: 163). Some villagers grew rice for sale, separately from the rice for their subsistence although most villagers sold just their rice surplus (Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch, eds., 1975: 163). Its sale was made with the calculation of costs of transportation and expected profit in mind (Hallet 1890: 353; Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch, eds., 1975).

The scale of rice trade was limited, but still considerable. From Hallet's and Moerman's notes it is probable that rice sales were substantial in volume and rather extensive in distance. It should also be noted that the king and aristocrats controlled a large number of rice fields and received a great quantity of paddy. For example, Cao Inthavaroroat (1898-1909) collected 20,000 thang of rice (approximately 200 tons) (Prani Sirithon 1963, Vol. 2: 109). Although he used much of the rice to feed kinsmen and officials, some of it was probably left to be sold. Of course, the market for the sale of rice in the North could not compare with that of central Thailand where foreign exports of the rice were already flourishing (Cohen 1981: 41).

For central Thailand, the growth of rice exports began in 1855 when the Bowring Treaty of free trade with the British was signed.
In 1852, rice was only 2.7 percent of its total export value; by 1867 it was 41.1 percent; and by 1887-1888 it was 78 percent. In terms of volume, rice exports of Siam increased from 212,000 pounds in 1860 to 1,020,000 pounds in 1899 (Owen in *Siam Society Collected Articles* 1976: 90-91). Another indication of rice export prosperity is the building of rice mills. Rice mills facilitated the growth of rice exports because they provided not only milled rice for convenience and lower costs in transportation, but also a pool of capital for the export business. (On investments from the Chinese and Siamese princes and nobles see Leckie in Chatthip, *et al.*, eds., 1979: 93.) The first steam-powered rice mill in Thailand was constructed in Bangkok in 1858, and belonged to the American Steam Rice Milling Co., Ltd. It changed hands several times and finally ended up in Chinese hands. By 1867 there were five important rice mills in Bangkok. The number increased to 11 rice mills in 1879, 23 in 1889, and 29 by 1894 (Leckie in Chatthip, *et al.*, eds., 1979: 92-93; Ingram 1971: 70). By 1896, the total number of rice mills, all of which were in Bangkok, was thirty. Four of them belonged to western companies, and most of the rest belonged to the Chinese with only a few belonging to the Siamese (Suthy 1975: 102). The majority of rice exports from Siam went to Hong Kong, China, and Singapore under the direct control and handling of Chinese millers (Ingram 1971: 73; and Owen in *Siam Society Collected Articles* 1976: 95-99).

Fourth, an increase in demand for crops and other products between communities, towns, and regions led to an expansion of production and commerce. Many villagers needed some basic necessities which they
could not produce or produced insufficiently, for example, food crops such as rice, garlic, chillies, miang (fermented tea leaves), cotton thread and fabric, ironware, salt, nails, beeswax, and livestock such as buffaloes, cattle and pigs. Some of these were produced in nearby villages or towns but others had to be brought from other regions and were sold only in city markets. A few villagers even developed a taste for some new consumer goods such as kerosene and shrimp paste (ka pi), which were rather expensive because they were imported from Siam (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 139). In order to obtain these commodities, the villagers had to produce surplus to sell and bought or bartered the products they needed. For instance, villagers in non-agricultural Lawa villages who produced ironware had to trade their products for rice and other necessities (Colquhoun 1885: 51).

Colquhoun's observations about agriculture seem to support the idea that many villagers produced enough surplus for trade—after some of it was extracted by the ruling groups. He said, "The principal rice-harvest is in November; another crop is ready in July. . . . In the hills of the Shan country the usual crops are a glutinous rice . . . , cotton and sessamum. The rice and sessamum are reaped in September or October, and the cotton is picked from December to April" (Colquhoun 1885: 108, 110).

Information given by some old informants in the Nong Faeg area can further illustrate this change. From what they heard, during the last four decades of the last century and after, there was a noticeable increase in population and in demand for things from outside the rural communities. There were more merchants coming to sell and buy things.
At the same time, more villagers went out and traded, sold, and bought goods in other villages and towns. An example is the cattle trade which had been popular in the area up until the 1970s. Still most villagers grew rice once a year as well as some garden crops. The validity of this information is supported by the autobiography of a Nong Faeg woman who was born in 1880, recorded by Kingshill. She said that she collected some fruits and vegetables and took them to the market when she was eighteen years old. Children of eighteen years of age, and those who were big and strong, would try their best to sell things in the market. One of the reasons for the young villagers to do so was to have money to buy beautiful clothes and jewelry in the Chiangmai city market. Villagers wove the clothes themselves. There was nothing more expensive than cloth at that time. Usually the villagers bought thread in the market. To go to the city market in Chiangmai, which is 10 to 15 kilometers from the village, the villagers had to wake up at 2:00 a.m., cross the big rice field south of the village, and cross the river to walk to the city (Kingshill 1976: 374-380).

Colquhoun similarly reports that in the Chiangmai city market, some of the villages from which many vendors came were very long distances from the city (Colquhoun 1885: 127). Bock also observed that in the Chiangmai city market there were many women who came from the suburbs or neighboring villages to sell their produce (Bock 1884: 229). About rural trading, Edwardes said: "Much business, however, is said to be done in the villages." A report on villagers' trade caravans by Moerman supports what the old villagers said about

Fifth, other than products from outside the villages, villagers needed money. The effort of some villagers to earn cash was noteworthy especially during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Their ways of earning money included not only working for teak timber companies, but also producing handicrafts and garden crops which became income-generating commodities, and undertaking trade ventures. They used money for taxes which had to be paid in cash, to buy products from outside, and in many places to buy land. For example, Mr. Goul, the British consul at Chiangmai, wrote in 1889 of a case in a village where some villagers did not have money to pay taxes. They offered to the tax collectors their payment in kind but the tax collectors insisted on cash payment. The tax collectors then seized and tortured three men and one old woman who did not have money to pay the tax (cited in Chusit 1980: 26-27).

Calavan reports that during the same period of time some villagers in two Sansai villages in Chiangmai were allowed by the local administrator to cultivate temporarily some unclaimed lowland. The villagers grew rice during the rainy season and in the winter season some garden crops such as tobacco, beans, and garlic. From these fields, they could accumulate enough money to buy land, repay debts, and to pay for the cure of an illness (Calavan 1975: 134-135). Also, Moerman in his study of a village in Chiangrai was told that in those days villagers who were caravan traders or caravan crew members, made quite a sum of money from their trade expeditions. Most of the land
purchases in the old days were made from this money (Moerman in Skinner and Kirsch, eds., 1975: 167-168). Therefore, it should not be surprising to hear that cash earned from petty trade and other supplementary-income jobs enabled some villagers to accumulate more land and wealth through continuing commercial activities, land purchase, and money lending. By the end of the nineteenth century there had already emerged economic differentiation among commoner villagers, most of whom lived in bamboo houses.

Sixth, the northern kings and aristocrats also had needs which were fulfilled by the increase in commercialization. For instance, they traded items such as rice, cattle, and slaves obtained in two different ways: (1) some items were seized by force or collected from the villagers as tax and rent payments which the kings and aristocrats used first for their own purposes or consumption and secondly as items for sale; and (2) some items were bought with the express purpose of selling them for a profit. Then, they would use the money to buy luxuries, build houses, increase their influence, and further invest in trading expeditions. Therefore, the kings and aristocrats played a very important role in trade during this time, similar to the central Thai princes and aristocrats (Leckie in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 93; Siriluck 1981). In addition, they were the most important purchasers of imported manufactured products whose value amounted to 30,000 pounds per year in Chiangmai alone (Edwardes in Chatthip, et al., eds., 1979: 140). Hallet mentioned that Cao Ubon, a daughter of Cao Kawilorot (1854-1870), was one of the largest traders in the country (Hallet 1890: 103). Colquhoun, Brailey, and Grandstaff noted
how well the slave trade of the northern kings and aristocrats with the Kayah State and central Thailand had flourished (Colquhoun 1885: 53-54; Brailey 1969: 27; Grandstaff 1976: 137).

The kings' and aristocrats' demands and business reinforced the process of monetarization. Through their trades, the income from teak forests earned in rupees, and the demands for taxes paid in cash, Indian silver rupees became the dominant medium of exchange in the northern Thai economy.
CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION
OF THE NORTH (1900-1921): VILLAGERS' RESPONSES TO
LAND ENCLOSURE, WEAKENING POSITION OF THE
ARISTOCRATS, GOVERNMENT ENCROACHMENT, AND
COMMERCIALIZATION

This chapter will describe villagers' responses to population
growth and the beginning of land enclosure, the weakening position
of the aristocrats and their subsequent migration to rural areas,
central government encroachment, and increasing commercialization,
including agricultural production for sale and wage labor hiring.
These changes, alone or in concert with socio-economic conditions in
villages and households, generated new situations and problems for
villagers, particularly in regard to maintaining a minimum livelihood,
improving household economic conditions, and dealing with land scarcity,
the government's harsh demands, and emerging economic opportunities.
The responses of villagers ranged from willing acceptance, taking
advantage of the opportunities as they arose; through conditional
acceptance and endurance; to outright resentment and resistance. The
choice of responses was dependent upon several factors such as sub­
sistence, dignity, and fear of repressive government measures. The
explanations will be incorporated into the description of the social
history of transformation in the two villages of Nong Faeg and Khua
Mung.
The trends in northern Thailand since the beginning of the twentieth century have been increasing integration with central Thailand, increasing government encroachment, bureaucratization of administration, modernization of infrastructures, and increasing commercialization.

Each of these individual aspects of the transformation had varying significance and occurred at differing paces in different times and locations. The years 1900 and 1921 delineate two distinguishable periods: 1900 marked the beginning of the political-administrative integration of the North into Thailand and the centralization of government; 1922 was the first year of obvious economic integration of the North with central Thailand and saw the expansion of the production of rice as a cash crop. It was during this period that the government started to modernize the country by providing infrastructures, especially railroads and irrigation systems, which they felt would further facilitate the economic integration and growth of the North.

As in Chapter II, the emphasis of this chapter is on the effects on villagers' livelihood, of changing population, the northern aristocrats' demands and benevolence, the central Thai government's policies and programs in the North, and the commercialization of agricultural produce and necessities. Because information on the two field study villages is available for this period, the situation in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung will be emphasized.

One conclusion of this chapter is that many villagers migrated in an effort to cope with pressure from land enclosure in their communities, improve their economic condition, and escape heavy demands for taxes and corvee labor from the government. Most villagers
resented the increasing government encroachment but conditionally resigned themselves to it and complied with the government's policies and programs.

Economic changes included production of more rice and dry season crops such as tobacco and garlic, increased agricultural employment, and overall higher trade. Most villagers were driven to involve themselves in increased agricultural production and trade in an effort to earn cash to pay increasingly burdensome government taxes. To the majority of villagers, involvement in these often-called "new economic opportunities" offered neither the promise nor the lure of a better life but was instead the only visible possibility of being able to earn enough to maintain a minimal standard of living. On the other hand, a small percentage of villagers were already well enough off that the new taxes imposed by the government posed little problem for their livelihood. Involvement of these villagers in the "new economic opportunities" was an effort to make their lives more comfortable and economically secure.

3.1 Population Dynamics: Increases and Decreases in Village Population in Response to Changing Phenomena

During the first two decades of this century, the dynamics of population size in the field study area were not only a result of natural causes (e.g., reproduction, mortality, and epidemic) but also of villagers' responses to their socio-economic needs, pressure from other villagers, and pressure from government demands. An examination of how villagers coped with these natural phenomena, their needs, and internal and external pressures will provide an understanding of the
transformation of their livelihood. The villagers first used their own resources to cope with their problems and needs. When they could not find a way out of trouble by relying on local resources and connections, when they did not dare to radically resist or revolt, or when they believed they might be better off elsewhere, they migrated. Most of the time, these migrants left reluctantly and resented being forced to leave their home villages.

Probably a more frequent response of the villagers to demands from the government and the better-off in the villages was verbal expression of their resistance to what they perceived as unjust and of their feelings concerning their disadvantageous position in society.

3.1.1 Phenomena Contributing to an Increase in Population

Since the turn of the century, according to old villagers, the population in the field study area had increased considerably as a result of natural reproduction and immigration. Villagers explained that back then people did not have any control of the increase in natural reproduction. They kept on having children as long as they had sex or until menopause. Also, it was because there were no wars and because most villagers needed, or justified that they needed, a lot of children to help them clear new land, improve the occupied rice fields, and take care of younger children, home garden plots, and cattle. Moreover, villagers in general saw that with a rather high infant mortality rate, it was better to have an extra number of children some of whom would survive and take care of their old parents and their properties. Meanwhile, the children were of great help in the house, fields, and in foraging, with a good prospect of increasing the family's
properties through income earning, sharecropping, and acquiring more land through marriages. The villagers also increasingly recognized that production of rice and dry-season crops provided opportunities for sale as well as home consumption. This created an increasing demand for labor, and the villagers felt that by having more children they could benefit economically. Ten or more children, while not typical, was not uncommon.

Another reason for having many children was that childcare did not require considerable resources. Children needed only one to two pieces of new clothing each year and three inexpensive meals per day.

There were villagers, however, who were too poor to feed many young children and as a result attempted to use various methods to limit and space births; most of which were unreliable, unacceptable and/or dangerous.

When asked, some villagers said, "Back then you not only needed more children to guarantee that you would have some adults, but you also needed some extra children in case the government recruited laborers. Besides, you needed as many helpers as you could get to help feed each other after the majority of what you earned was taken as taxes to feed government officials and aristocrats."

In addition to increases in population by natural reproduction, there was immigration. The larger group of immigrants were people from other villages who moved into Nong Faeg and Khua Mung to marry the residents of the two villages, and/or to buy some land and settle. They were from both landed and landless households.

In many nearby villages, but not in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung, these immigrants also included people of other ethnic groups such as the
Yorng from Lamphun, the Haw, and the Semitic Moslems. A smaller but significant group of immigrants was the northern Thai aristocrats who came from Chiangmai city to live in rural villages. They came primarily because their socio-economic and political bases in the cities were undermined by the central Thai government's political and administrative reforms. Old villagers in Nong Faeg mentioned that there were about ten aristocrat households during that time. Some of them came to Nong Faeg before the end of the last century, others came during the first decade of this century. It seemed that those who moved in before the turn of the century managed to claim the ownership of some "assigned" holdings and/or royal fields in the area (see also Calavan 1975: 246). According to some villagers, the aristocrats bought much land in the area as they were wealthy and also earned cash from loan interests, rice and cattle sales. Besides, land was not expensive to them, and the fact that the villagers were awed by the aristocrats meant the latter group could buy land at lower prices. While most of these aristocrat households owned a considerable amount of rice land, few had up to 30-40 rai. They enjoyed both prestige and comfort from being well-to-do and having tenants and wage laborers work on their land and in their houses. On the other hand, in Khua Mung there seemed to be no immigration of aristocrats except for a few children of minor aristocrats moving in during a later period. However, an old villager of Khua Mung was told that at the turn of the century, an aristocrat from Chiangmai city came in to claim and force-buy a lot of rice land in the area. During the first ten years of this century, this aristocrat resided in a village to the north of Khua Mung. He contracted his land to sharecroppers and asked a few villagers in each
village near his rice fields to collect his share of rice. During this period, some Chinese merchants came in to buy the rice and those villagers (some of whom were also overseers of the aristocrat's land) carried the money to the aristocrat. This informant's father was one of the aristocrat's rice collectors.

3.1.2 Phenomena Leading to a Decrease in Population

The number of village residents was not ever increasing. Besides epidemics and high rate of infant mortality, population size was kept down by villagers leaving in an attempt to cope with or reduce pressures generated from land enclosure, inequality in land distribution, the government's heavy demands for taxes and labor recruitment, and people's desires to improve their lot.

According to a few elderly villagers, Nong Faeg had about 70-80 households and Khua Mung had about 50-60 households by 1920. The population of these two villages was sufficient to contribute to the problem of land scarcity. The villagers explained that at the turn of the century in the vicinity of the two villages there was already no land to claim. Practically all the land was occupied. The problems of land scarcity and unequal distribution were intensified as the aristocrats came in to occupy a large amount of land. An example was Cao Burirat—possibly the largest aristocrat landlord in the district—who owned about 1000 rai (Prani 1963, Vol. II: 248). By 1915-1920, villagers saw increasing land fragmentation due to family inheritance. In Nong Faeg and several villages in the area, approximately one-third of the total households occupied no land or an amount of land that
was too small to provide sufficient livelihood. These poor households had to supplement their rice and earnings through wage labor.

This problem of land scarcity and great disparities in land ownership also was intensified occasionally by heavy floods and pest attacks on rice. A few villagers remembered, for example, a big flood around 1918-1920 which resulted in low rice yields. In addition, it was sometimes difficult to obtain rice from others because natural calamities resulting in a low rice harvest covered a large area, and many villagers already would have sold much of their last year's extra rice either to Chinese merchants or to workers at Khun Tan. (This information fits what Chatthip reported concerning a flood and rice sales in the North. "Some of the towns were flooded, and others did not have enough rain. The yield will not be as plentiful as last year. This year, monthons in the Northwest have sold their rice supply outside to various other monthons much more than usual." Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 182.)

Considering their situation, many Nong Faeg villagers decided to try their luck elsewhere, and the first wave of out-migration took place during the period 1900-1921. The number of parties of migrants from Nong Faeg might have totalled more than 30; while from Khua Mung it was about 10. Many of them were landless and some were small land occupants. At least for Nong Faeg, there were also a few migrants from households with medium size landholdings, and whose livelihood was not hard-pressed. The pressure on land in Khua Mung was not as serious as in Nong Faeg possibly because it had a smaller number of households and the villagers could get access (by renting or sharecropping) to some rice land from a few aristocrats who occupied a lot
of land in the vicinity. Moreover, most of the land in the village vicinity was either high or semi-low land which could be fruitfully planted with rice once and twice a year respectively. On the other hand, in Nong Faeg at that time more than half of the rice land was low where only single cropping in dry season was possible, and semi-low where double cropping per year was possible. (It should be noted that with changes in rain situation and water control, the majority of Nong Faeg land was either high or only semi-low in the 1970s.) Unlike yields from high land, rice yields from low and semi-low land were more subject to floods and were lower. Production fluctuated considerably from year to year. (For the villagers there were three situations as far as growing rice on flooded conditions were concerned. In the first situation, there was too much water--the water was too deep--for any rice to grow. In the second, enough water was present to require the planting of floating rice, and in the third situation the water level was low enough so that non-floating rice could be planted. "High land" is the term used by the villagers to describe land which usually is not flooded during any time of the year. Non-floating rice could be grown on high land in both rainy and dry seasons. "Semi-low" is used to describe land which is flooded during the rainy season but the water level does not rise too high to prevent the planting of floating rice. In the flooded rice fields where the water level fluctuated significantly over the rainy season, this rice had the ability to elongate its stem as the water level rose. The yield of this rice was rather low because of high water and weeds. On this kind of land, non-floating rice was planted in the dry season.
"Low land" is flooded heavily in the rainy season and the water level is too high to plant any kind of rice. Rice could be planted only in the dry season.

Fang district of Chiangmai was the most popular place and Phan district of Chiangrai seemed to be the second most popular place to which the villagers migrated. These places were very far away, especially when the villagers had to travel by foot or carts. Such places still had some land to be cleared and claimed, and a lot of land (usually cleared, better-quality, and close to the residential areas) was available for sale at prices cheaper than in the migrants' home villages. This expression "available and cheaper" for the villagers connotes not only the empirical condition of land availability and prices, but also the existing relationships between the poor villagers and the well-to-do landed villagers. An old villager explained, "We had enough land for everyone in the village, but it was not made available and the prices were set rather high. Some well-to-do villagers wanted to hold on to their land so they refused outright to sell or just set a high price for it. Yet, when poor villagers pledged land to them, the wealthy villagers set a low price for it."

Considering household economic situations, there were generally two groups of migrants. Many villagers migrated because of their serious poverty (see Scott 1976 on a subsistence motivation). On the other hand, some land-owning villagers did not have such a bad livelihood but desired to own more land and improve their standard of living (see Popkin 1979 on economic advancement motivation). For example, a very poor landless villager from Nong Faeg sold his buffalo and a
small house lot and became an owner of a sizable piece of rice land in Fang. Another villager who owned some land in Khua Mung sold half of his land and gave the rest to his daughters. He, his wife, and sons moved to Phan where his household economic status was improved from lower moderate to well-to-do. These examples seem partly to support an argument (e.g., Kerkvliet 1986: 18, 120, and my own) that villagers both attempt to maintain a standard of subsistence (Scott 1976) and seek economic security and a better living (Popkin 1979). While some villagers seek one of these two goals more than the other, others seem to attempt both simultaneously.

Besides the availability and inexpensiveness of land in new places, other conditions were attractive to villagers. The central government had a policy encouraging settlement in remote towns where settlers were needed to clear jungles, expand and develop rice fields and build up communities. Local administration of the policy generally welcomed migrants. Tax on rice land in the new areas was also much lower than that on land in people's home villages. Villagers also were able to avoid unnecessary risks by visiting the new settlements and then come back to make a final decision before selling their land and houses. This was one of the reasons why the first wave of migration occurred over 2-3 years.

Adding to the causes of villagers' suffering and the consequent migration were heavy demands by the government in the forms of the newly introduced capitation tax of 4 baht per man (18-60 years old), other taxes, military conscription, and labor recruitment for construction work without pay. Especially during the first two decades of this century, government officials in the North were directed to build
roads, bridges, and rest-houses. The central Thai government needed better systems of communication and transportation to facilitate the expansion of its centralized administration and control of the region. Also, there was a growing number of visits to the North by dignitaries from Bangkok, partly to inspect the implementation of the reforms (Prani 1963, Vol. II: 188). These roads and bridges provided convenience and were a way to express respect to the visitors. In addition, the British put pressure on the central Thai government to improve communication and transportation so as to enhance British economic interests and safety for British subjects.

It was difficult for villagers in Saraphi district to avoid such government demands. Saraphi is not far from Chiangmai city and during the 1900s there was already a district officer at the district center implementing government demands and programs. Villagers learned that resisting or protesting the government could lead to heavier suppression and even death. For example, many villagers were aware of the 1902 incident at Mae Ngat in another district of Chiangmai when about 600 villagers protested the district officer's order for labor corvee. Six of the villagers were killed (Ramsay 1976: 29).

The government's collection of capitation tax and labor corvee, and the consequent migration, must have resulted in widespread and noticeable hardship for the villagers. The Chiangmai British Consular Report reported in 1911 a steady migration to the British territory because of the intolerable hardships resulting from taxes and corvee. Punishments for those who did not pay taxes, and who avoided corvee were severe. These punishments included hard labor, fines, and even imprisonment. Unable to resist directly or protest against the
government demands, villagers sought other means to adjust. A few villagers in some villages were successful in relying on a social norm of "villagers helping each other against malevolent outsiders." A villager in Khua Mung explained that in this case some village headmen tried to help a few poor villagers by under-reporting the number of male villagers subject to the capitation tax. However, this kind of tax avoidance could be done only to a limited extent. Some villagers permanently migrated to remote areas, while a few others temporarily moved away during the tax collection time. Yet, the government never quit attempting to claim the tax and potential laborers. Some well-known aristocratic officials were sent to persuade or compel the escaped villagers to come back (Prani 1963, Vol. II: 211).

Inside the villages, there was also pressure to force some villagers to move away. Those households accused by other villagers of owning phi ka felt some pressure to leave. In some cases accused villagers were banished. However, after 1904 villagers had to be more cautious as the headmen told them that the government issued an order prohibiting phi ka (evil spirit in human form) accusation. Still, at least until the 1920s several households were still facing phi ka accusations and severe sanctions from other villagers. Some of these unfortunate households were banished from the villages, or pressured to go through a ritual of exorcism. Others decided to migrate away because of fear and bitterness resulting from threats and 'excommunication'. A few people might have used phi ka accusations in order to force or scare away villagers thus relieving pressure on available land. Possibly, it was also a means to avoid land fragmentation through marriage between landed villagers and poor landless villagers. The
accused villagers were usually landless or had only small landholdings. Meanwhile, the majority of the villagers might have participated because they believed in the existence of phi ka and/or saw benefits from the incidents.

(Other than dealing with land problems, phi ka accusations might have been used by villagers to sanction disagreeable behavior such as open and extreme flirting. Even today, young men are still told not to court certain pretty flirting girls who are believed to possess phi ka.) In other areas of the North, phi ka accusation was used by aristocrats to banish and claim land from some villagers (Chatthip 1984: 78).

Two other phenomena reducing the village population were child mortality and epidemic. Most villagers lost babies especially those younger than one and a half years old. The range of such loss was from two babies up to 8-9 babies per mother. Also, many children died between the ages of 3-10. There was also an epidemic, possibly malaria, during the 1910s and many villagers died of it. (One possible outbreak of this epidemic occurred as many villagers in the area went to work on the Khun Tan railroad tunnel or to sell food there. They contracted malaria and came back to their villages and infected others [see also Kingshill 1976: 23].)

(Although the construction of other parts of the northern railroads might have been done primarily by Chinese workers [Skinner 1957: 115], the tunnel seemed to be built mostly by hired northern Thai villagers. See le May 1926: 149.)
3.2 The Central Thai Government Political and Administrative Reforms

3.2.1 Weakening Position of the Aristocrats

As the central government undermined northern Thai aristocrats' benefits, many of these local elite moved into rural areas. Their presence posed new problems for many villagers.

During the first two decades of this century, the central Thai government's centralization policy and administrative reforms became increasingly directed against the northern aristocrats. At the very beginning of the century, the northern aristocrats were stripped of the crucial elements comprising their political power and economic privileges, for example, as Tej put it, "... the prestige and power of the northern royalty and nobility was undermined by the abolition of their right to demand official and personal services from the common people (phrai) and by the substitution of a standard commutation tax of 4 baht per year. Their economic position also was weakened when the value of their debt-slaves was halved and by the declaration that no one born in and after 1897 or aged over sixty could become a slave" (Tej 1977: 149).

In the area of taxes, the central Thai government increased its share of timber tax from 25 to 50 percent on the grounds that its officials were doing all the work and thus saving the princes from being fined for maladministration of the forest concession (Tej 1977: 149). In addition, a revenue commissioner (Khaluang Sanphakorn) was sent to assume the tax collection authority from the aristocrats and the Chinese tax farmers. Several aristocrats were recruited to work
in the commissioner’s tax office, for example, Cao Noi Singkaew who worked there from 1903 to 1912 (Prani 1963, Vol. II: 193).

The Prince of Chiangmai was reduced to little more than a figurehead, especially after Chiangmai’s financial and judicial administration was taken over in 1909 and 1915 (Tej 1977: 114, 160, 203). Consequently, the Prince and aristocrats not only lost their judicial authority and influence, but also another part of their incomes extracted from legal fines and court fees. Furthermore, in rural areas and outer towns, the traditional "kin muang" position of local aristocratic administrators was legally abolished and replaced by the government official positions around 1901. (Kin muang which means "to eat the town" or "to govern," refers to the traditional assigned and unsalaried administrator who had the right to claim land and demand taxes and labor from the people in his jurisdiction.)

During the same time, many aristocrats were given positions as salaried officials in the reformed provincial administration (Tej 1977: 67). Many became important officials in the provincial centers. Some became district officers, for instance Cao Noi Ping at Phrao (1902), and Cao Worayat at Saraphi (1912). In Chiangmai, the predominance in number of the northern Thai in offices was shown in a government document which reported that in 1919, 80 percent of the officials who held positions higher than district officer were northern Thais; while only 20 percent of them came from Bangkok (Saratsawadi 1982: 46). Many of these aristocrats not only held government offices, but also owned business operations and much rice land.

Other aristocrats either refused to work for the government or were not offered any official positions. They sought their own
fortunes elsewhere, such as in teak timber operations, trade, building and renting out village markets, and in the accumulation of land. Some of this latter group of aristocrats still stayed in Chiangmai city, but many of them migrated to district centers and villages. There were also several aristocrats who strongly opposed or were suspected of opposing the central Thai government reform and ended up being arrested and exiled to provinces remote from Chiangmai and Bangkok (Tej 1977: 161).

Villagers perceived and coped with the presence of aristocrats now living among them in four ways: (1) villagers saw the aristocrats as being both demanding and benevolent, (2) people felt an increasing encroachment of both the government and the aristocrats as outsiders with wealth and power, (3) sometimes the villagers were compelled to comply with the aristocrats' demands and behavior, but other times they were willing to accept the change and benefits, and (4) villagers saw an increase in socio-economic stratification in the villages as a result of the aristocrats' immigration and residence.

Many villagers were awed by aristocrats' wealth, influence, and status. Some of the aristocrats were notorious for being demanding and oppressive. For example, several old villagers said that up until the early part of this century a few aristocrats still seized villagers' land and abducted villagers' daughters. Also, they themselves and/or their men came to seize or shoot villagers' cattle for their feasts. If the cattle owners were present, they could not do anything but sadly witness the slaughter and might be given a piece of meat from the slaughtered cattle. In other areas of the North, phi ka accusation
was used by aristocrats to banish and claim land from some villagers (Chatthip 1984: 78). The informants added that no villagers dared resist the aristocrats because that time was the period of Aja Cao (aristocratic authoritarianism). They explained that the aristocrats were blood-related to the ruler of Chiangmai. Even though some of them did not have administrative authority, they had local minions and outside connections. The informants knew of some villagers who resisted the aristocrats and ended up getting killed in the villages or having their heads cut off at the Tha Wang Tan execution ground. (For aristocrats' power over villagers' lives, see also Calavan 1975: 122.) The villagers added that these oppressive aristocrats were residing in other areas such as tambon Sansai and Chiangmai city.

The aristocrats also ordered villagers to do irrigation work, and even build their houses. Villagers were bitter over the corvee but felt that it was not as oppressive as the seizure of their properties and daughters which not only disrupted their livelihood, but also hurt their feelings. The aristocrats had no right to seize their things, and the villagers were anguished over not being able to do anything about these unjust actions. The informants concluded that, "The aristocrats always won. Look at the case of Cao Noi Ping of Phrao as an example. He killed several villagers who protested against unjust and heavy labor corvee some 80 years ago. He was sentenced to death by the central Thai government. Yet he was given a pardon because the Chiangmai ruler made a request to the central Thai king."
In the villagers' eyes, a few aristocrats were benevolent. For example, the aristocrats introduced the *ta-leo* sign to the villagers. This was a woven bamboo charm placed in rice fields to ward off insects and animals. Some of the wealthy aristocratic administrators gave rice to poor villagers during the difficult time of crop failures such as Cao Mahawong of Sansai (Prani 1963, Vol. I: 123). Also, the aristocrats themselves came in or sent their men to inspect closely and supervise cultivation and irrigation work so that even a lazy villager had to work hard at communal tasks. Some of the aristocrats' irrigation work, which was intended as a means to claim more land or to improve the aristocrats' land, also helped control water in the general area, including much of the villagers' land. Later, these irrigation canals were expanded and served more of the villagers' land. An example is the case of the two irrigation systems in the Sansai-Khua Mung area: Phaya Kham and Cao Mahawong from which most land in Khua Mung village draws water.

In addition, harsh punishment for buffalo thieves and murderers by some aristocratic administrators meshed well with the villagers' perception of what protection of life and property should be.

Many villagers appreciated some aristocrats who helped improve transportation in the area. During the 1900s, for example, Cao Rachabut Khamty, an aristocrat, directed government road construction projects which included a dirt road connecting Chiangmai city to Doi Suthep, and another one to the border of Chiangmai and Lamphun. (This information is confirmed by Prani 1963, Vol. II: 250.) In the 1900s, Cao Cakrakham of Lamphun ordered construction of many roads from
Lamphun city to the outer district centers, including one to a river bank across from Hangdong district of Chiangmai which is not far from Khua Mung. (This information is confirmed by Prani 1963, Vol. II: 323.) Many villagers did not realize that these road projects were not the aristocrats' but the government's projects. However, when a central Thai official directed a road construction project, most villagers said it was a government project. These roads facilitated and encouraged many villagers in their trade journeys, seeking occasional employment, and in visiting relatives. At the same time many villagers had mixed feelings about these road projects, especially those who saw some benefits from the new roads but were required to contribute much labor to the construction.

Inside the villages, the increasing number of aristocrats in residence during that time further emphasized village social stratification. Around the turn of the century several aristocrats moved into Nong Faeg. (None seemed to have gone to Khua Mung.) Five of them were brothers or close cousins. One of these aristocrats was the employer of Ui Som (Grandfather Som), an old villager who was born in 1900. Ui Som recalled that while few commoners then were well-to-do, most of the aristocrats were. They owned many cattle, and a lot of rice land. Some also had considerable cash (several hundred thaeb). Aristocrats had the largest wooden/tile roofed houses in the village. They hired poor and landless villagers to raise their cattle and to be their agricultural employees (luk cang). Although a few other villagers were wealthy enough to hire laborers, most luk cang worked for aristocrats.
These aristocrats not only had luk cang who stayed with them and worked for them but also had some poor neighbors who would come in to do other household work such as hand-mill their rice. These "helpers" in return received rice bran to feed their pigs, or sometimes some rice. Some of them had close relationships with the aristocrats and could obtain protection, rice or cash loans, medicines and other help from the aristocrats. In other words, some of them entered a patron-client relationship with the aristocrats. Ui Som's family was, as he put it, "a poor/suffering and in-need-of-money family." Therefore, Ui Som at 11-16 years of age, took care of a few buffalo owned by two aristocrats and one commoner villager, and occasionally received a small amount of cash as wages, most of which went to his parents. (A few villagers said wages were paid in cash more often than in rice, and it was about 60-75 satang per month per buffalo.) During this time, Ui Som stayed with an aristocrat (buffalo owner) who provided him with meals and once a year gave him a piece of clothing as a gift. Ui Som was required also to do other household tasks for his employer. When he was 17 years old, he moved and stayed with an aristocratic village headman who hired him as a luk cang. There, he and the children of his employer worked together and participated in labor exchanges with other villagers in order to cultivate about 18-20 rai of rice land. He also was required to take care of a few buffalo and do other odd jobs around the house. For this, he received about 45-75 thang of paddy in addition to about 40 thang of his employer's rice which he ate each year. His employer harvested approximately 700-800 thang of rice each year most of which was glutinous although some was nonglutinous.
In general the amount of rice received by a luk cang depended upon the size of yields, and whether or not the employers saw their luk cang as diligent and hard-working. Ui Som added, "Life was difficult as a luk cang of either an aristocrat or a well-to-do commoner. Yet, it was even more difficult in my case because my employer was both a well-to-do aristocrat and a village headman who had both authority backed by outside aristocratic administrators and higher status. In general, villagers were like slingshot stones, manipulated and directed by the shooters--the rulers. Luk cang were worse off than other villagers because we were the kind of slingshot stones that had to take off before the shooters shot us. In other words, we had to show that we worked hard and performed jobs even before we were ordered to do so. If we didn't do this we would receive less rice, or be fired as our employers could always find some other poor villagers to be their luk cang."

For Ui Som to supplement his earnings and accumulate some money for a better future, his employer allowed him to work elsewhere during the dry seasons when there was no work in his own rice fields. His employer also benefitted by letting him work elsewhere during this period because he did not have to provide food for him. Ui Som usually went to the area north of Chiangmai city and earned wages from selling his labor for jobs such as digging irrigation canals. Ui Som was a luk cang until he was 22 years old, then he married a woman from a small-landowning family. He moved into her home, worked on her parents' land and occasionally hired himself out as an agricultural wage laborer.
The high status of aristocrats in Nong Faeg was expressed in such ways as language and the mad my (wrist tying) ritual. These aristocrats initiated new practices in the existing ritual of mad my in the villages by specifying that the number of threads to be tied around the wrist of a blessed person had to be different for aristocrats, commoners, and slaves. Seven strands were suitable for an aristocrat while nine strands were necessary for a slave. It was against the will of the aristocrats and would cause bad luck if a commoner used the number of thread strands specified for aristocrats. However, these two social rules were not kept for long. Several decades later, especially after most aristocrats in residence had died, villagers adopted the number of thread strands previously used only for aristocrats. They said it would enhance the blessing.

Other villagers were expected to call the aristocrat's cao. Besides meaning aristocrats, this term also suggests that the bearer is related to the king and superior to common people. Sons and daughters of immigrant aristocrats usually were called cao by the villagers, e.g., Cao Kham Tan--son of Cao Noi Luang of Nong Faeg. Grandchildren of the aristocrats or children born in the twentieth century were not called cao. Villagers gave several explanations for this decline in the practice of using the term. One explanation was that the era of the northern Thai aristocratic administration began to end in the early twentieth century. Indications of this decline included moves by the central Thai government which drastically reformed the administration in the North and sent an officer to each district, the death of such influential local aristocrats as Cao Mahawong of
Sansai in 1912 and the last aristocratic ruler of Chiangmai--Cao Kaew
Nawarat who died in 1939, and finally the overthrow of the central
Thai royal and aristocratic rule in 1932. Also, most aristocrats in
the area married commoner villagers and their children, who led lives
like other villagers and were not given titles or recognized by the
Chiangmai royal court. The practice of referring to people related
to aristocrats as cao depended upon their personal and family wealth,
influence, government positions, frequency of contact with high
aristocrats in the city, and relationships with the villagers. For
example, a commoner wife of Cao Kham Tan was not called cao whereas
a commoner wife of Cao Khwaen of Sansai was. Even an influential
commoner official could be called cao by villagers. For example, the
district officer of Sanpatong district from 1912 to 1918 was called
cao because he was an aristocrat-like authoritarian (Cohen 1981: 58).

During the period of 1900-1921 villagers were unhappy over the
arrival of the aristocrats in their midst. However, as they put it, if
they could not avoid them, they might as well learn to cope with
them and draw the most benefits from them. They cited the old saying,
"If you're going to get wet, you might as well take a bath." Thus
some villagers viewed the residency of the aristocrats indirectly as
bringing merit and blessings to them and their villages. The aristo-
crats were asked and persuaded, through social pressure, prestige
systems, and flattery, to provide large cash and rice contributions
for social and religious events. These contributions reduced the size
of contributions needed on the part of other villagers, especially
the poor ones. Besides, the villagers saw these contributions from
the aristocrats as allowing for a larger temple complex and larger
religious ceremonies through which the villagers thought they might earn more merit. In addition, some villagers received help and advice from the aristocrats who were literate, had good connections, and were familiar with the operation of the world outside the villages. As a final example, the intermarriage between members of the aristocrats' households and other villagers accelerated the process of assimilation socially as well as economically as ownership of aristocrats' land was inherited outside the aristocrat circle. This way of responding to change--making the best of the unavoidable--is unique neither to this situation nor this period of time. Examples already given and to appear later seem to show that it is an important aspect of rural transformation in the area.

3.2.2 Villagers' Perceptions and Responses to the Reforms

This section will describe the political and economic objectives of the central Thai government's political-administrative reforms in the North, internal obstacles to these reforms from the aristocrats and villagers, and support for the reforms via external British influence. It will also analyze why villagers resented many while appreciating a few of the government's programs and its officials.

In 1900, the central Thai government began its political-administrative reforms in the North. The primary objectives of the reforms were to unify the country, improve the efficiency of the administration, and consolidate the control of all regions under the same centralized government. The government also saw an increase in revenue from taxes and fees as a result of these reforms. By turning the northern tributary states into Thai provinces, the government
gained further control over the region in the face of imminent British influence. Another objective of the reforms as implemented by Prince Damrong, who was in charge of the reforms in the North in 1900, was that they would eliminate the redundancy and conflicts in the administration's official positions and personnel (Chakkrit 1963: 243). This increasingly centralized system of administration and control from Bangkok would also prevent possible conflicts between the British and the people of the North that might have given the British an excuse for colonizing the North. Meanwhile, these reforms benefitted the government in terms of increased control over labor and revenue from capitation tax, other taxes, and royalties and duties collected on extraction of natural resources such as teak. For instance, the central Thai government established the Forest Department in 1896 and completely reformed the administration of forest and wood harvesting. One major consequence was a large increase in government revenue from teak production which grew from 686,000 baht in 1896-1900 to 1,771,000 baht in 1916-1920 (Suthy 1975: 149). These increases in state revenue and available manpower were crucial to the government as they were required to accomplish the national administrative reforms and to begin the country's modernization in the areas of education, irrigation, and transportation.

Every aspect of the reforms was not implemented simultaneously in all the various regions, rather it depended on the decisions of the Special Commissioners from Bangkok and local circumstances. In the North, one of the obstacles to the reforms was opposition from the aristocrats. However, it was more in the form of a lack of
cooperation than radical resistance. This was partly because the government stationed a number of soldiers in outer cities including Chiangmai to keep law and order, and to prepare for any violent opposition. In addition, a countrywide police force was organized in 1906; police stations were gradually erected in the North. The aristocrats realized their weak military position and complied with the reform policies. On the other hand, some of the aristocrats felt that the undesirable changes did not suddenly take away all of their social prestige and privileges. Indeed, many of them were given benefits such as salaried official positions in the newly introduced monthon administrative bureaucracy, given the right to work teak concessions, and exemption from the commutation tax (e.g., Tej 1977: 108; and Cohen 1981: 56).

The rulers of the northern states, though resentful, agreed to receive a fixed salary in lieu of their share of royalties collected from the concessionaires and of the head tax (Cohen 1981: 56). For example, Cao Inthawarorot agreed in 1909 to give up his share of taxes and teak royalties for a monthly payment of 25,000 baht (Ramsay 1971: 262). In general, the central Thai government dealt with the troubles from regional aristocrats by suppressing them with force, exiling them, compromising or bargaining with them, and occasionally slowing down pace of the implementation of some aspects of the reforms (Tej 1977: 152-156, 168-170).

In an effort to build support for its administrative reforms, improve communication, and further cultural assimilation, the central Thai government implemented changes in language, education, and actively solicited contributions for the building of schools in some district
centers. Central Thai was ordered to be the official language in the North in 1893 and was required to be the primary language in the education of both missionary-founded and other schools. Though the teaching of the northern Thai language was not forbidden, it was relegated to a secondary role.

Beginning in 1902 education programs and schools were introduced to a limited extent, mostly in large cities and towns. These schools were successful, as the government intended, in educating and preparing some northern Thais to be officials serving the central Thai administration in the North (an expression of King Rama V in Saratsawadi 1982: 32). A few good students were sponsored by some high Bangkok officials in Chiangmai to attend the Civil Service School in Bangkok and returned to become important officials. An example is Phra Sriwaranurak who was of a non-aristocratic family in Chiangmai and in time became a Saraphi district officer (1926-1929) (Prani 1963, Vol. I: 303-305). The government founded a Civil Service School in Chiangmai in 1916. The objective here was to train minor officials, and sons of aristocrats and other officials to become able government civil servants, without having to send them to receive training in Bangkok. This school was closed in 1925 (Prani 1963, Vol. II: 379).

These reforms were also encouraged by the British who benefitted from them. The new administration and centralized government control further guaranteed British investment in teak operations and trade. This new day of law and order guaranteed the safety of Englishmen and their subjects, and of trade on routes from northern Thai towns to Moulmein (Suthy 1975: 252). The abolition of slave and traditional
labor corvee was also welcomed by the British as it allowed people to hire out their labor freely and to go on trade journeys (British Consular Report 1900: 12). The British needed the northern Thais as supplementary laborers to the Khamu in teak operations. Moreover, the British did not have to negotiate with various northern rulers and aristocrats, but dealt only with the central Thai government. Finally, this desirable improvement in administration, communication, and transportation was done without cost to the British. At the same time, in 1905, the British began to lend substantial sums of money (at an interest rate of 4.5-6 percent between 1905 and 1924) to the Thai government. Although Great Britain was not the sole lender, it was the major one, especially by the 1920s. Most of the money was used for construction of railroads, other infrastructures, and for national financial stabilization. In addition to benefitting from the interest earned on the loans and gaining increased influence in Thailand, the British were able to use a loan made in 1909 as a part of a bargain with the Thai government that gave them three Malay states (Ingram 1971: 181-182).

Villagers in general viewed and responded to these government reforms in two ways: (1) They resented the increasing demands and restrictions and they resisted, helplessly complied or conditionally accepted them, or (2) willingly accepted the benefits or grasped at new opportunities resulting from the reforms.

3.2.2.1 Resentment

There were four major areas of change imposed by the government which significantly affected villagers' livelihood and caused resentment
on the part of the majority of villagers: (1) the encroachment of government through a new system of provincial/rural administration; (2) the collection of the capitation tax; (3) the implementation of new military conscription laws; and (4) the promulgation of new laws concerning land tax collection and other land regulations. In brief, the villagers' resentment towards the government and its officials centered around the fact that their livelihood suffered from those government impositions, and they felt oppressed and humiliated (e.g., Chatthip 1984: 77). Most villagers, especially those in the field study area, did not dare to radically resist or revolt. Their resistance was non-violent and non-confrontational and took the forms of verbal expressions and attempts to avoid and minimize the demands and changes.

In 1900, the centralized system of provincial administration modeled after the British system in use in Burma and Malaya, was implemented (Chakkrit 1963: 83). The five tributary states of the North--Chiangmai, Lamphun, Lampang, Phrae, and Nan--were administratively placed under a monthon (division) called "Monthon Tawantok Chiang Nya" which became "Monthon Phayab" in 1901. During 1901-1902, officials were sent from Bangkok to fill in the great majority of important administrative positions in Monthon Phayab (Saratsawadi 1982: 46; Chakkrit 1963: 258). The new administrative boundary system also systematically subdivided the monthon into khwaeng (districts), which were then divided into khwaen (tambon or cluster of villages), which were divided into ban (villages) (Chakkrit 1963: 244-245). Administrative positions for each unit were specified. However, only those
positions at the district office level and above were salaried official
government positions. The position of rural community headmen was
neither official nor salaried (Chakkrit 1963: 567).

Most of the villagers felt these changes. They knew of the
establishment of the district office in Saraphi (for Nong Faeg), and
in Hangdong (under which Khua Mung used to be). They also knew
the district officers, many of whom were central Thai officials, carry
out orders imposed on the villagers, from central Thai officials in
Chiangmai city. (Evidence on the proportion of northern Thai to central
Thai officials came from the list of Saraphi district officers. Also,
a government document recorded that in 1919 in Chiangmai, the majority
of the district officers were central Thais while the majority of
the lower officials were northern Thais. Saratsawadi 1982: 46.)

The traditional aristocratic local administrators were replaced
by the supposed-to-be elected positions of khwaen (tambon headmen)
and kae ban (village headmen) who had to implement government directives
in villages. In general, villagers did not want to become tambon and
village headmen under this new administrative structure. Partly, they
saw these positions as being quasi-official and requiring the enforce-
ment of government orders, which were resented by most villagers.
Consequently, many times the district officials had to request or
verbally coerce some villagers to accept the jobs. In Nong Faeg, the
son of a local aristocratic administrator became a village headman
while in Khua Mung the village headman was a commoner.

Many aristocrats made certain that villagers knew it was the
central Thai government and officials who caused these changes and
imposed various demands. Growing government control was felt by the villagers through headmen implementing government demands and participating in oaths of allegiance ceremonies. Once a year, the tambon and village headmen had to go to Chiangmai city to drink sacred, weapon-dipped water as a way of symbolizing their allegiance to the central Thai government (Chakkrit 1963: 567). Several old villagers in the area still remembered the headmen's participation in these ceremonies until they were abolished in 1932 (also see Calavan 1975: 117; Prani 1963, Vol. I: 284-286).

Ceremonies and oaths strengthened government coercion as they made it more and more difficult for tambon and village headmen to refuse to accept orders from district officials. Many villagers bitterly expressed the feeling that the ceremonies and oaths were used as an unjust means by the government to force and symbolize their subjugation.

The worst change at that time in the villagers' eyes probably was the imposition of the capitation tax on men aged 18-60. According to the "Regulation on Collection of Taxes to Replace Corvee in Montthon Phayab of 1900," this head tax was intended to replace the traditional labor corvee system. It was even called "Kha Raeng Thaen Ken" (money charged to replace corvee) (Cit 1974: 228). Most villagers assumed and were told that it would completely replace corvee. In addition, they hoped that the remoteness of the villages would minimize the government's tax collection efforts. To their disappointment they soon found that they were heavily taxed and simultaneously often were recruited to do labor work.

The central Thai government needed money, particularly to pay the salaries of an increasing number of officials; to build irrigation
systems in other areas of the country such as the Rangsit system (1890-1907), and the Pasak system (1915-1924); to complete the construction of other infrastructures, especially the northern, eastern, and northeastern railroads; and to attempt to reduce the amount of foreign loans (Suthy 1975: 96; Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 86). Foreign loans amounted to one million pounds sterling in 1905, 4.6 million pounds sterling in 1909, and three million pounds sterling in 1924 (Ingram 1971: 181). In 1921 the estimated government spending deficit was 1.3 million pounds sterling (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 88).

The capitation tax provided the government with an efficient means to collect money and goods (in case villagers did not have cash to pay taxes), and also to register available labor through records on the number of taxpayers and issued tax receipts. Meanwhile, the government got access to some free labor as those who did not pay taxes were seized and forced to do government construction/maintenance work for 20-30 days (villager informants; and Chusit 1981: 54). An informant said it was a very serious matter when a poor laborer household could not pay taxes and some male members were taken away for a month. With the grown-up men gone, the wife and young children lived miserably, relying heavily on scavenging and sometimes begging rice. They felt not only the pain of hunger but also the pain of humiliation. The following evidence shows that there was a large number of men who could not pay the capitation tax. The numbers show only those who were actually seized to do government labor work as punishment but there probably were many others who could not pay the tax and managed to escape. In 1917, 402 men were seized in Chiangmai, Chiangrai, Lamphun,
and Maehongsorn. In 1918, 268 men; 93 men in 1919; 7,051 men in 1926; and 4,448 men in 1927 (Chusit 1981: 58). The increasing number of these victims of the law was possibly due to increasing efficiency and strictness of government enforcement, in addition to a growing number of poor villagers.

Many poor villagers in the area of the field study had to pay the capitation tax with their rice, borrow money, or sell their necklaces. A few had to put some of their children to be luk cang in the service of better-off-villagers so they could receive some cash to pay taxes. Some informants also heard that travelling villagers were stopped by checkpoint officials and asked to produce their tax receipts. "It was a way to threaten villagers who thought of avoiding tax payments," they added.

The government introduced an efficient means to collect head and rice land taxes by giving authority and responsibility to district officers who demanded and supervised collection by tambon and village headmen (Chakkrit 1963: 214; Tej 1977: 113, 175). Villagers said officials from district offices once in a long while came to the villages. Occasionally, the tambon headmen were ordered to report to the district offices to hear new policies and receive instructions (e.g., Chakkrit 1963: 567). Moreover, after 1917, the government became more strict in the collection of capitation tax by setting up tax receipt checkpoints on traffic routes and at some markets. The officials then arrested or demanded bribes from villagers who could not present their tax receipts. This added to the villagers' resentment towards the government.
For the whole country, the capitation tax had been one of the highest sources of tax income. It amounted to about four million baht in 1905, about 7.7 million baht in 1915, and ten million baht in 1927, while the estimated population of the country was around 8-9 million between 1911 and 1919 (Ingram 1971: 185, 46). In the North, during the first two decades it replaced rice land taxes as the government's largest source of income.

In addition to this new, heavy, and enforced tax, villagers were still subject to government labor recruitment for infrastructure construction and maintenance. Most villagers felt hard pressed and resented this worsened situation. They did not dare, however, to resist openly. Villagers remembered the harsh measures the government took against a villagers' uprising in Sansai in 1889 (for details see Vanlapa 1980; Ramsay 1979). Many villagers attempted to reduce or escape pressure from government demands by migrating to remote areas. Meanwhile, people from other parts of Thailand were coming to northern Thailand for the same reason. In the 1890s-1910s, a few thousand Khamu from Laos came to work for teak operations in northern Thailand so as to avoid the heavy capitation tax and labor corvee imposed by the French, and also to earn good wages offered in teak operations (Suthy 1975: 157).

A few very poor villagers managed to avoid the taxes with the help of the village headmen. And there were other villagers who protested with arms against the government, e.g., the Mae Ngat incident of 600 armed villagers in 1902 (Ramsey 1976: 29); the Phrae incident of the rebelling Shans and northern Thais in 1902 (Ramsay 1979: 290,
293); also the Holy Men rebellions in the Northeast in 1902 and in the South in 1909 (Tej 1977: 153, 161). One might argue that these uprisings were encouraged or led by local aristocrats who lost their benefits as a result of the Thai government reforms. Still, what was more important was the motivations of the villagers who joined the uprisings—feelings of being repressed, seeing their livelihood worsen, and their subsistence threatened (see also Tej 1977: 152).

Such outbreaks of major uprisings disappeared in the 1910s, partly because of government repression. But also perhaps because, as a constructive response to peasant resistance, the government issued laws in 1912 that permitted local officials to recruit labor only for special occasions and then only if the laborers were paid (Chusit 1981: 54).

Another government law which affected villagers’ lives was military conscription. Before the turn of the century, northern Thai villagers were only conscripted as soldiers in the event of war. In 1905 an act was passed whereby every year men were conscripted for two-year military service (Tej 1977: 181). It was not efficiently implemented in the northern and northeastern provinces, however, until several years later.

The government’s purpose for conscription was not only to strengthen the national military forces and improve the system of registering men, but also to further break ties between the common people and local aristocrats (Tej 1977: 224). Old villagers from Nong Faeg and Khua Mung said villagers both then and now always tried to avoid the conscription. Some escaped to other areas for a few years. A few villagers were captured, imprisoned and forced to do heavy labor
work. That punishment, said some elderly people, was not as bad as what aristocrats had once done to defiant people when those caught were sometimes beheaded. Some village headmen helped their villagers by under-reporting the number of eligible men. Those who were helped were generally from poor households with no other male members.

I have no information about villagers becoming gendarmes or policemen during the first two decades of the century. But an old villager from Khua Mung told me about his experience during the 1930s. He and another five fellow villagers who were about twenty years old, were conscripted to be policemen in 1930 and stayed in the service for two years. He was sent to a very remote district of Chiangmai and received about 11 baht per month. While others did not like to be conscripted policemen, some did. They said it was a government service job with some status which often provided them with good credentials, and connections with government officials. Many of these ex-officers later became village headmen.

The government reform of land regulation began with its enforcement of the Land Tax Collection Act of 1900. This law was not only designed to enable the government to effectively collect more agricultural land tax, but also to greatly reduce the political-economic influence and position of the local aristocrats by abolishing their land tax exemptions. In addition, it placed the authority for land tax collection and other land regulations in the hands of government officials, and officially recognized local headmen. In brief, this new land Act specified a land measuring unit as a standard for taxation --the Rai Phasi (tax plot), which is about .4 acres. The rate of tax collected for irrigated rice land in Saraphi district was 50 satang
per rai, and for the rain-fed rice land in remote districts such as Fang it was much cheaper. Between 1906 and 1910, the government introduced a new land tax system which not only classified rice land into five categories according to its quality, but also increased the tax rates. (The Thai government was able to revise and increase the tax rate when the British agreed that the tax on land owned by British subjects could be raised to the rates of British Burma. See Ingram 1971: 77.)

For the government, this new system of "lower tax for worse land" was intended to reduce antagonism resulting from the implementation of this new standardized tax system of higher rates. In the North, this revised land tax system was implemented in 1917 and the irrigated rice land in Saraphi was taxed 60 satang per rai. However, it was not until 1939 that this new land tax system was revised and fully implemented. The government also attempted to administer and officially legalize all land occupations, and transfers by issuing the Land Certificate Act of 1901 and the Consolidated Land Act of 1908. Also, around 1908 a system of fees for land registration and transfers was established. However, all these regulations on legal land ownership rights, land transfers, and fees were only implemented in several provinces in central Thailand (Feeny 1982: 95-97; Yano 1968: 853).

The change in land tax collection and regulations affected both the villagers' livelihood and their perception in many ways. First the villagers increasingly sensed the encroachment of the central Thai government. They also felt that part of government authority which was given to the tambon and village headmen. These men had authority
concerning the size of and right over land owned and the amount of cash paid for land taxes. For example, the tambon and village headmen were authorized to measure and specify the size of each household's owned land for the purpose of tax collection.

These village headmen could be benevolent and protective of their villagers, very strict to everyone, or helpful only to well-to-do villagers. Informants from both villages said some headmen helped their villagers by under-reporting the sizes of their rice land while making sure that everyone actually had the land he or she really owned and did not claim part of adjacent rice fields. Headmen, with implicit consent from the rest of the villagers, generally helped under-report the amount of land belonging to the poor and those villagers facing great economic or subsistence difficulties. However, there were also headmen who helped well-to-do villagers unjustly claim additional land from others.

Second, the new local administrative system and the new tax law made tax collection more efficient, causing villagers to suffer and become resentful. The system of issuing tax receipts made it especially difficult for villagers to avoid paying the tax. Also, old villagers said money was difficult to obtain. Things that they sold were cheap and wage labor hiring was still rather limited and low paying. They also had to pay a few other taxes in addition to land tax. To show that the rate of land tax of 50-60 satang per rai was high for them, they gave examples of expenditures and prices of things during 1910-1920. Daily labor wages for rice transplanting were about 5-6 satang. Face powder cost only 1 satang for a small cup while a handful size package of fermented tea leaves (miang) cost 1-2 satang. A buffalo
cost about 30-60 thaeb (1 thaeb or 1 rupee was mostly referred to by villagers as about 80 satang even though its value fluctuated from 75-110 satang). A good durable local-made cotton shirt cost about 30-40 satang. For curing his/her serious illness, a villager gave 3 thaeb to a traditional doctor. The money a groom gave to his bride as a token for marriage and paying homage to her ancestral spirits was 2-3 thaeb. A villager collected 1-3 satang for his/her annual ritual of matrilineal ancestor worship. Lastly, one could spend 12-15 satang in a local market to get a big basketful of fresh produce and groceries. Many district officials and tambon headmen arrested or fined some villagers who did not pay the tax. Many villagers had to borrow money from others to pay the tax for several years. Some ended up selling part of their land, or sent their children to be employees (luk cang) of the loaners.

Third, some villagers began to learn to accept and make use of the new concept of right to legal ownership. For example, the tax receipts in which sizes and plots of land owned were specified were used to guarantee the ownership of land they rented out or bought elsewhere. This contributed, in many places, to the acceleration of land accumulation and land enclosure. In addition, a few villagers began to require written agreements signed in front of the tambon headmen or in front of district officials when others sold or pledged land to them. In cases of disputes over size or ownership of land, some villagers began to use the tax receipts as evidence to support their arguments. (This was a difficulty that some villagers faced. On one hand, they wanted to under-report the size of their land to reduce
the land tax. On the other hand, they wanted to accurately record on the tax receipts the size of their land to prevent future land disputes.)

This does not mean that the traditional concept and norm of private property did not exist and/or was replaced totally and suddenly by the new concept of right to legal ownership. In general, villagers knew the physical boundary and amount of their land. However, wills of land inheritance were still done mostly only by verbal declarations before the owners (usually parents) passed away. Land disputes usually were resolved by testimony from other villagers in front of their village headman. From what some villagers said, the acceptance of the new concept and legal means to secure ownership seemed to depend upon, among other things, the preference and personality of the headman, the proximity of the villages to the district center, and the socio-economic status of the villagers. In addition, the new land regulations during this period did not suddenly turn land into a commodity. By that time, land had already been bought, sold, pledged, and had cash value at least since the last part of the nineteenth century. In the area of the field study, the contribution of land regulations to the conversion of land into a commodity was rather minimal when compared with the effects of land enclosure, the beginning of cash crop production and double cropping, and an increase in the market demand for rice.

3.2.2.2 Appreciation

Despite the government policies and programs which the villagers resented, there were a few policies and programs which many villagers
viewed as being helpful to them: the slave abolition laws, the implementation of the central government's criminal code, and the Khun Tan railroad tunnel project. Although they feared repressive measures by the government, many villagers used the benefits from these policies and programs, together with their view of the government as providing some help, as a rationale for their conditional resignation to the government. In other words, some villagers perceived the government as illegitimate but they were not successful in resisting and opposing its demands and oppression. Other villagers considered the government to be conditionally legitimate as long as it provided some benefits. A few villagers believed that the government had legitimacy as long as the good kam or karma (deeds, results of one's deeds) kept it in power. Most villagers relied on such benefits and religious doctrines to ease their discontent and to pacify themselves or help them accept their ill fate. The following discussions will provide some illustrations for these arguments.

The abolition of slavery was a long process that occurred over some forty years and was accomplished through several laws decreed by King Rama V. In brief, in 1874, a decree applying only to central Thailand was issued whereby the value of slaves born in 1868 was to depreciate progressively to nothing by 1889. Under this decree, slaves born in 1868 would be emancipated at the age of twenty-one years (Tej 1977: 57; Calavan 1975: 87). In 1897, another decree was issued providing that no one born after December 16, 1897 could either sell himself/herself or be sold by others. This decree was partly intended for the North as the 1874 decree had not applied there (Ingram 1971: 62).
The attempt to abolish slavery proceeded gradually until 1905 when there was a decree against further slavery. Children of slaves no longer automatically became slaves and the sale and purchase of slaves were forbidden. Also, those who were already slaves were to have 4 baht each month deducted from their value and they were to become free when their purchase price had been reduced to zero (Calavan 1975: 171). Finally, in 1911 a decree was promulgated to entirely abolish slave status (Chusit 1981: 44). However, there was a lag in enforcing the abolition decrees in the North. The aristocrat slave-owners, especially those in rural areas, were not willing to lose their slaves, who had cash value, provided free labor, and symbolized high social prestige and status. In the area around the field study villages, a number of slaves were not set free until almost 1920.

King Rama V and the government benefitted from the abolition of slavery in several ways. First, both the Bangkok and provincial aristocrats and nobility were deprived of slaves—a saleable commodity and a source of labor, income, and social prestige. This thus weakened the power base of the monarchy's potential opposition, and of provincial aristocrats who opposed national political-administrative reforms. Second, abolition of slavery increased the commoner population and, therefore the number of taxpayers. Revenue collected by the government increased directly from the capitation tax and indirectly from other taxes such as land and excise taxes levied on people's ways of livelihood. It also increased the number of commoners who then could be conscripted into the military. Third, the government saw that an increase in the number of free citizens was needed in order to open
new rice land, to improve the production on existing agricultural land, to supply labor to the increasing commercialized production of the country's rice, cattle, teak, tin, and rubber, and to add to the number of potential consumers.

Together with the abolition of corvee, abolition of slavery allowed more personal freedom and the geographical mobility necessary to promote economic ventures. A consequence was an increase in not only the number of traders, but also economic incentives in increasing production and trade. Fourth, foreign travellers and the British consuls frequently said that corvee and slavery were oppressive, uncivilized and inhumane. Thai officials often had to respond to the concerns and complaints from British officials and other Westerners (e.g., Suthy 1975: 250-251; Anchalee 1981: 235-239). Therefore, the Thai government hoped that the abolition of slavery would help maintain its national sovereignty and good international relations. Western powers could not use the presence of slavery as an excuse to "civilize" and colonize the country or not to give loans and technical assistance.

The government's attempt to abolish slavery was greatly appreciated by most villagers because a few were slaves themselves, some had relatives who had become slaves, and others just resented the idea of slavery. A few old villagers recalled that the majority of slaves they knew were treated by their aristocratic owners like khrua (goods, commodities, things for sale), and other times as objects to give away as gifts (on a slave being given away as a gift, see also Calavan 1975: 170). Some slaves from the field study area heard about the slave abolition decrees. However, their owners did not want to set them
free because slaves were cheaper to have and use and in a more subordinate position than wage laborers who were available. Thus, a few of these slaves ran away to Chiangmai city or Lamphun city and worked as household servants or laborers there. A few of them came back to the villages many years later. (The informants did not want to give specific illustrations possibly because they did not want anyone to know the identity of the once-slave related villagers. A detailed story of a runaway slave was given by Calavan 1975: 171-172.)

These old informants, especially from the Khua Mung area, also remembered how most villagers who usually did not like government officials appreciated their serious attempt to implement the slave abolition decrees. Around 1917-1920, district officers and officials came into the villages both in Hangdong and Saraphi districts, to demand that slaves be set free. (This information is confirmed by informants from tambon Sansai. See Calavan 1975: 194.) Local aristocrats, commoner villagers, and slaves were called for a meeting and told about the government policy and laws on slavery. These villagers commented that the new government was not totally oppressive and demanding after all. Because of the slavery abolition by the government, land and other properties, but not people, could be seized in case of heavy debts. Some villagers did have some positive feelings about slavery because in times of subsistence crises they could sell themselves or their children as a desperate final solution. But at the same time these villagers were acutely conscious of the numerous socio-cultural and legal conditions that made this new status a painful and dreadful one. Even after slaves became free persons, the scar
of this lowest status marked them, and children of slaves were also treated as if they were slaves.

With the disappearance of slavery as a means to cope with economic or subsistence crises, poor villagers turned to rely on the luk cang relationships. This was true also for aristocrats and well-to-do villagers who needed dependable, domestic laborers. A poor villager could always become or send a child to be an employee (luk cang) to earn some money or to pay debts in times of economic or subsistence difficulties. To the poor villagers, an employee was better-off in his/her status and rights than a slave. In addition, employees often received extra help and protection from their employers. It seemed that an increase in the popularity of the luk cang relationships during this period was due not only to the government enforcement of slave abolition, but also to land enclosure, the government's heavy tax demands, and the aristocrats' and large landowners' needs for dependable and permanent labor. Moreover, it was also an adaptation of rural residents to the abolition of slavery, whose existence served some functions in rural communities.

In addition to abolition, many villagers complimented the central government for taking over the Chiangmai judicial administration, and attempting to apply the criminal laws to aristocrats and commoners alike. Before the implementation of administrative reforms, villagers saw aristocrats as belonging to a separate social group which controlled laws and always protected its members against commoners and slaves. After the reforms, when conflict arose with commoners and slaves, the aristocrats who committed crimes were seized and received severe
sentences. A few of them, through their aristocratic connections and because they were aristocrats, were given legal pardons or received lighter punishments (e.g., Prani 1964, vol. II: 131). Others had to face punishment as severe as the death sentence. For example, several villagers in the area of the field study knew the case of Cao Noi Khao who was executed for hiring a killer to murder a commoner (also Prani 1964, Vol. I: 162-163). It was the first time that an aristocrat was convicted and executed in Chiangmai because of such a crime against commoners. Villagers saw that aristocrats were now subject to the same laws as commoners. To the villagers, the implementation of the government's new criminal code and judicial process introduced the principle of equality under the law and dissolved the structure of aristocratic absolutism. To the central government the implementation of this principle and the execution of aristocrats served as a warning to any aristocrat who intended to resist political integration and administrative reform.

Finally, many old villagers still remembered how they and their village fellows made money by selling rice and other produce at sites of government construction projects such as roads and railroads. The Khun Tan railroad tunnel connecting Lampang and Lamphun was a popular place of vending and the one which the villagers talked about the most. During the 1910s, many villagers from several villages in Saraphi district including Nong Faeg and Khua Mung would occasionally make a several-day trip to sell things there. An old villager from Nong Faeg said she and her friends carried mangos, siri vine leaves, tobacco, rice, dried betel nuts, and coconuts to sell to construction workers at Khun Tan. She added that it was good that the government had
construction projects which opened an opportunity for villagers' trade. Villagers, at least since the last forty years of the last century, always needed money for household uses, savings, buying cattle and land, and paying taxes. The Khun Tan project was better than several other projects because, according to several old villagers, the workers were not forced laborers but hired wage laborers. Therefore, not only was the project not oppressive, but used voluntary paid labor. Thus, the workers earned some money and could afford to buy things the villagers sold. Other than selling produce, a number of villagers in the field study area who went to Khun Tan became wage laborers. They earned a wage of about 90-100 satang per day which was considered satisfactory (see also le May 1926: 149).

These villagers had mixed feelings about this. They saw the government as not directly and intentionally giving them this economic opportunity. Rather, it was the government's heavy taxes which forced them busily to vend and hire themselves out.

3.3 Commercialization of the Region and Incorporation of the Village Economy with the Larger Economic System Through Increasing Use of Cash, Increasing Trade and Wage Labor

This section first will describe the important changes in the commerce of the North at both the regional and village levels. Second, it will elaborate on phenomena which enhanced and facilitated the region's commercialization. Finally, an analysis of villagers' motivations and pressures for accepting and participating in new economic opportunities will be presented.
During the first twenty years of this century, the commerce of northern Thailand increased considerably—both internally and with other regions, particularly central Thailand and British Burma. The region's commercialization was enhanced and facilitated by an improvement in transportation, an increase in the amount of currency in circulation and monetization, an increasing availability of credit in trade, and the government's termination of monopoly trade.

The villagers increasingly participated in cash earning activities including trade and vending, servicing with capital (ox-cart transportation, buffalo/bullock for land tilling), and labor selling. The motivations and pressures behind these changes were: the government's heavy demands that taxes be paid in cash and labor recruitment; the villagers' own needs in maintaining and improving their livelihood; and increasing/emerging economic opportunities.

3.3.1 Distinctive Changes in the North's Transfrontier Trade
and Trade with Bangkok

The growth of trade in the North with British Burma and Bangkok during 1900-1923 was sizable. In 1898 the total trade (imports plus exports) of the region with British Burma, Bangkok, Southern Shan states, Yunnan, and Indo-China was about 743,000 pounds sterling. In 1914, it increased to about 1,512,000 pounds sterling, or 100 percent in six years (Suthy 1975: 264). The value of total trade with Bangkok was the highest, and that with British Burma was second in both periods (in 1898 trade with Bangkok was 383,333 pounds sterling while with British Burma it was 269,680 pounds sterling; in 1914 trade with Bangkok was 920,000 pounds sterling and with British Burma was
472,000 pounds sterling). A closer examination reveals that during this period, imports from British Burma had the highest value. It increased from 82,668 in 1898 to 211,000 pounds sterling in 1914. The dominance of the British imports in the region over other foreign importers (Switzerland, Germany, United States, and France) was maintained until around 1930. Towards 1940, Japan seemed to replace Great Britain as the leading supplier of goods to the North (Suthy 1975: 258-259). On the other hand, between 1898 and 1914, imports from Bangkok decreased from 233,333 to 200,000 pounds sterling. This decrease occurred despite the increasing use of the railroad which reached Lampang in 1914 and replaced much of the river transportation with Bangkok. In other words, Bangkok fell from the position of leading destination for exports from the North, holding 70.5 percent of the imported goods trade in 1898, to being the second leading importer holding only 42.5 percent in 1914.

The value of exports from the North increased considerably and Bangkok remained the largest buyer. Exports to British Burma increased from about 187,000 in 1898 to about 261,000 pounds sterling in 1914; whereas those to Bangkok increased from 150,000 to 720,000 pounds sterling during the same period (Suthy 1975: 264).

An examination of the kinds of goods imported and exported will make clearer the changes in the economy of the North. This together with some old villagers' oral histories may explain how the villagers' economy was increasingly becoming a part of the regional and world markets. Major commodities imported from British Burma included cotton and silk manufactured goods, apparel, and other goods such as household
utensils (British Consular Reports 1890-1926). Unlike other commodities, imports of cotton manufactures increased markedly throughout the period 1900-1920. From Bangkok, the imports included British textiles, hardware, salt, and kerosene. What old villagers said matched this macro-level phenomenon.

Table 4
Selected Imports Into Northern Thailand from Burma
(values in pounds sterling)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cotton manufacture</th>
<th>Silk manufacture</th>
<th>Apparel</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>7,537</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>48,489</td>
<td>5,984</td>
<td>8,183</td>
<td>26,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>71,003</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>10,221</td>
<td>38,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>17,035</td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td>5,442</td>
<td>28,358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: British Consular Reports cited in Suthy (1975: 267)

During the last few decades of the nineteenth century, Chiangmai was already importing cotton from other northern Thai towns such as Lampang (Lakorn), and Phrae because its own cotton production was not sufficient. However, a small quantity of raw cotton was exported from Tak (Rahaeng), and Phrae (through Chiangmai) to Bangkok and Yunnan (Edwardes in Chatthip et al., eds., 1979: 122, 140-141). The cultivation of cotton in the North decreased considerably until around 1910. Afterwards the region had to rely heavily on the imports of cotton material and yarn from or through British Burma. (See Le May 1921: 99
for information on the North’s reliance on cotton yarn imported through Burma during the 1920s. The reliance on imported cotton yarn was also true for the whole country, not so much due to insufficient cotton cultivation as to lack of efficient cotton spinning mills. In 1913 the value of cotton yarn imports was 2,411,998 baht. Also see Chatthip et al., eds., 1981: 72.) Oral histories from villagers support the evidence from the macro level. By 1900, some villagers in the field study area still grew sufficient cotton for yarn spinning and cloth weaving. Many others relied almost totally on cotton yarn imported from or through Burma. During the 1910s, most villagers bought all of their supply of cotton yarn from the local markets (there was one between Nong Faeg and Khua Mung, and another further south, towards Lamphun), Chiangmai city markets, and from Shan and H"{a}w tradesmen. Cotton was still grown only in small quantities by a few villagers for making ceremonial thread, and candlewicks. In addition to problems of availability or suitability of land for cotton production, water control and pest attacks, villagers preferred to buy imported cotton yarn because of its good quality and its availability in many colors. In addition, many villagers thought cotton growing was a waste of time because they could or needed instead to earn cash and rice from hiring out their labor, trade, and vending. Due to the convenience and popularity of purchased yarn, many of the younger villagers did not learn how to spin raw cotton into thread. This further contributed to villagers’ growing reliance on imported cotton yarn. On the other hand, imported manufactured cotton material and apparel were not welcomed in the villages because they were too expensive, and less durable than local loom-woven material and hand-woven clothes.
As earning a livelihood became more difficult and time-consuming, cash earnings were sought and a smaller number of villagers became specialists in weaving material and making clothes for sale. Most of their customers were those villagers who invested their effort/labor in rice and cash earnings through wage labor and trade rather than in cloth weaving. An old villager said one could earn some money by staying home, weaving material and making clothes. For example, a short piece of colorful cloth was sold for 24 satang and a local style dark-blue shirt was sold for about 30-40 satang.

There was an increasing demand for salt and kerosene in the North. Most salt consumed in Chiangmai was from Bangkok. Villagers said their basic staples included rice, chili peppers, salt and fermented fish. Most of the latter was made at home once a year from small fish and salt. The villagers usually bartered rice for salt from Shan tradesmen who occasionally came into the villages. Sometimes they did the bartering or bought salt at local markets and at Chiangmai city markets. Most villagers relied on candles, wood-resin torches, and coconut oil lamps for light because kerosene was highly priced and difficult to obtain. Although salt was not cheap, kerosene was very expensive. These high prices were primarily due to transportation costs. (Around 1891 in Chiangmai city, the price of kerosene was about five times the prevailing price in Bangkok and salt was about twenty times as high. See Chiangmai British Consular Report 1891: 9.) However, for the majority of villagers the price of salt was more or less affordable because they considered it a necessity and also because they could earn cash by selling labor and produce, especially rice which was much welcomed by traders in bartering.
Exports from the North to British Burma included teak, cattle, elephants, mules, ponies, rice, sugar, and tobacco. In 1919 and 1921, export of teak peaked while export of animals reached its peak in 1914. Exports of rice, sugar, and tobacco also increased considerably during the 1910s. Meanwhile, the value of exports to Bangkok from the North significantly expanded, especially when the railroad was extended farther north. This was an indication of the beginning of central Thailand's strong competition with British Burma for the economic domination of northern Thailand. Major exports to Bangkok included teak, hides, horns, and sticklac.

Up to the mid-1890s, about half of the teak output was floated to Burma via riverways but afterwards a greater proportion was sent to Bangkok. For example, in 1896-1900 the annual number of logs floated to Bangkok was 82,000 and in the next decade the annual average rose to 108,000 (Suthy 1975: 163-164). The export of sticklac increased considerably, especially towards the end of the 1920s. Available statistics show that Thailand exported sticklac valued at 180,000 pounds sterling in 1923-1924, and a large part of it came from the North (le May 1926: 99-100).

As far as villagers in the field study area were concerned, much of their increased agricultural produce might have become items for transfrontier and inter-regional export. However, some of the products became intra-regional trade items. For example, some villagers sold rice, tobacco, and cattle to residents of nearby and distant villages. In addition, some villagers sold glutinous rice and tobacco to merchants who would subsequently sell them to teak companies and forest
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Cattle and Elephants</th>
<th>Elephants, Mules &amp; Ponies</th>
<th>Teak</th>
<th>Rice</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
<th>Tobacco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>93,172</td>
<td>7,936</td>
<td>78,522</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-1912</td>
<td>56,322</td>
<td>15,307</td>
<td>74,168</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>96,775</td>
<td>28,712</td>
<td>58,113</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>31,672</td>
<td></td>
<td>95,580</td>
<td>5,574</td>
<td>662</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>72,043</td>
<td></td>
<td>56,090</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>593</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>94,570</td>
<td></td>
<td>95,257</td>
<td>3,870</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>57,103</td>
<td></td>
<td>53,441</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: British Consular Reports, 1897-1926
lessees. Company workers were paid cash wages and provided shelter and food comprising rice and curry spices as well as tobacco (Suthy 1975: 158). Sometimes, villagers also were hired by the merchants to mill rice and/or to transport (by shouldering baskets or in the villagers' carts drawn by oxen) rice to collecting stations. The villagers also increasingly grew tobacco during winter (January to March) not only for home consumption, but also for sale to merchants who acted as middlemen between villagers and teak companies and lessees. Available evidence on the number of teak companies and lessees and of teak operation workers suggests that a large quantity of glutinous rice and tobacco was needed annually. For example, in 1902 there were 83 forest lessees from foreign companies and of local background in Chiangmai, Lamphun, Lampang, Nan, Phrae, Phayao, and Tak (Chusit 1981: 47) and several thousand teak workers. Information was available on the number of Khamu, who made up the majority of the forest workers. In 1896 there were 4,000 and in 1901 there was an influx of 1,700 more Khamu (Suthy 1975: 156, 157). In 1940, there were again about 4,000 Khamu (Suthy 1975: 159).

The villagers also sold glutinous rice, some ordinary rice, cattle, and tobacco either to tradesmen who came into the villages, or at local and Chiangmai city markets. Some of this rice, cattle, and tobacco became part of exports to British Burma and Bangkok. Rice was first reported to be exported in large quantities to British Burma in 1910. In 1910, the total weight of rice exported to Burma was 568,347 pounds. It increased to 1,335,744 pounds in 1914, and 2,640,000 pounds in 1925 (British Consular Reports 1910-1925). There was no evidence on the
kind of rice that was exported to British Burma but it was probably both glutinous and ordinary. This was because the central and southern Burmese used ordinary rice as their staple and needed glutinous rice for special occasions and desserts. In the meantime, the Shan in the northeast of Burma and the Khamu who came to work in teak operations ate glutinous rice. In addition, evidence suggests northern Thailand did not produce much ordinary rice. One document reported that even in the 1920s nearly all the rice exported from the North was glutinous (Cohen 1981: 59).

Although some villagers in the North were already cultivating a small amount of dry season ordinary rice for sale as early as the 1900s, the total output of ordinary rice seemed to be very low, at least until around 1920. Ordinary rice was, however, in demand in the North by a few thousand (1910-1920) central Thai government personnel and Chinese settlers and railroad workers (e.g., Skinner 1957: 115, 199). It seems that, around 1920, rice export from the North to other Thai regions was well under way. A 1919 report said, "This year, monthons in the Northwest have sold their rice supply outside to various other monthons much more than usual, ..." (Chatthip et al., eds., 1981: 180).

The villagers seemed also to play a significant role in the production of cattle for export. Most villagers raised buffalo and bullocks, averaging 1-3 head per household, even though several households owned ten or more head of cattle. Buffalo were raised to plough rice fields and to sell to other villagers, or merchants who in turn sold them to butchers and exporters. Bullocks were very popular in
that time, as they were efficient in ploughing high land and pulling carts and retained their popularity until the 1960s when villagers began replacing bullocks with tractors and pick-up trucks. Quite a number of villagers, especially in Nong Faeg, were cattle merchants who bought and sold cattle between villages and even between districts. A few well-to-do villagers invested money in and made profits from cattle raising with the help of other villagers hired as their cattle caretakers. Cattle trade was probably the first business the villagers engaged in that required large amounts of cash and significant travelling.

Selling and buying of labor power was also an integral part of the whole process of increasing commercialization. The extent of the labor sales and the wages earned fluctuated significantly as a result of fluctuating prices, demand for various products, and the general trade situations. For example, a particular well-to-do villager was willing to pay well and hire more villagers to take care of his cattle and work in his dry-season crop fields when there was a high market demand paying good prices for cattle and dry-season crops. He and his sons were too busy trading, and selling ox-cart transportation service to spend their time taking care of cattle and doing field work profitably. In addition, he could not rely on the labor exchange system because only a few villagers cultivated a considerable amount of dry-season crops.
3.3.2 Phenomena Enhancing Commercialization and Economic Incorporation

Several changes occurred in the economic sphere of the North that enhanced the commercialization of the region and the incorporation of the village economy into national and international markets. Among the significant changes were the construction of roads and railways, an increase of currency in circulation, the use of credit in trade, the mutually supporting roles between Shan and Chinese traders, and the end of aristocrat-controlled trade.

The government built many new roads and bridges, and improved existing roads, especially those connecting provincial towns and district centers. Many of these construction projects began in the 1900s but the major ones seemed to start between 1910 and 1920. For instance, the construction of a road connecting Lampang and Chiangmai began in 1914. In 1916 the road between Chiangmai city and Lamphun city was improved while the construction of a road between Phrae and Nan began (Chusit 1981: 44). Many district officers also recruited villagers to build and improve additional small roads connecting villages and district centers. Meanwhile, some villagers and government officials could use a few roads built by some foreign teak companies. From around 1900 up until 1914, the two popular trade routes into the North were: the overland routes from British Burma, Yunnan, and the Shan states, which were dominated by Shan and Yunnanese caravans of packmen and animals; and the river routes from Bangkok, dominated by Thais and Chinese. Differences in the cost of transport, relative prices, and variety of imported articles were responsible
for the existence of these two main trade routes (Suthy 1975: 262). By the second half of the 1900s, the establishment of the northern railroad began to cause a trade diversion to Bangkok. Before the advent of railroads in the North, the cost of transporting goods from Moulmein in British Burma was about five times higher than from Bangkok (Suthy 1975: 262). However, a business trip between Bangkok and Chiangmai, a distance of approximately 500 miles took about three to four months (Suthy 1975: 269). In addition, access to boats was sometimes difficult even though in busy times up to 1,000 boats were engaged in transporting goods between Bangkok and Chiangmai.

The cost of river transport increased considerably—from 5.5 rupees per 100 pounds in 1894 to 10 rupees in 1905, and 15 rupees in 1906-1908 (Suthy 1975: 269-270). By the end of 1905, the northern railroad reached Paknampho. Many traders began to use both trains and boats to transport goods to Chiangmai, thus saving two weeks of transport time and about 20 rupees per two and a half tons of goods in the cost of transportation (Suthy 1975: 271). In 1914, the railway reached Lampang and consequently the majority of the river traffic with Bangkok ended. During 1915-1921, although some commodities were transported between Chiangmai and Bangkok by boats, most were transported by trains to Lampang and from there by pack animals (Suthy 1975: 273). During 1915-1921, not only did commodities imported from Bangkok become more diversified, but more importantly the costs and time of transportation were reduced greatly after the advent of the railroad. The use of the rail link between the North and Bangkok led to a gradual
decline in the North's transfrontier trade but an increase in its trade
with Bangkok (Suthy 1975: 274-275).

During these first two decades of this century, there was a rapid
increase in the amount of currency circulated as a result of the
increased use of money as a medium of trade transactions and as a
commodity to be bought and sold for profits. At the same time, cash
prices and wages began to replace barter and wages paid in kind.
Villagers were able to earn a larger amount of cash from sales of their
produce and their labor, which increasingly had cash value. Trade
and labor hiring became easier and covered greater distances as
villagers could turn goods and wages in kind into cash. The dual
currency system of the Indian rupee and central Thai baht in the North
further facilitated such changes. Both kinds of money were widely
used and accepted in transactions. During the early 1900s, the use
of the rupee continued primarily through transfrontier trade and teak
operations, whereas the use of the Thai baht increased in significance
and amount through trade with central Thailand, and by the government's
requirement that taxes and government salaries be paid in baht.

This dual currency system and the seasonal fluctuation of the
exchange rate resulted in changes not only in prices, the demand for,
and the supply of goods, but also of labor. (Effects of the exchange
rate on regional and transfrontier trade were explained in Suthy 1975:
282-286.) The villagers in the field study area often failed to make
a profit or even lost money because they could not keep up with the
information on exchange rates between rupee and baht and the fluctuating
values of the money. Many times they were taken advantage of by
merchants and employers who made further profits during the transactions by using an obsolete exchange rate that enabled them to pay less but sell for more. The villagers attempted, though not very successfully, to cope with this problem of fluctuating money value by doing calculations and transactions in satang (a smaller unit of money), and occasionally acquiring information on money value from villagers who went to trade in Chiangmai city.

The use of business credits and cash advances between merchants facilitated the expansion of commercialization. By the end of the last century, business credits were already extended by Bangkok and European importers to northern Thailand (Suthy 1975: 261). After that, the use of credits became increasingly popular not only between Bangkok and northern merchants, but also among traders in the North. Large importers and wholesalers, most of whom were Chinese, began to extend a wide range of credits to Chinese and Shan retailers who set up shops in small towns and district centers, or who travelled and traded from village to village. These shop owners sometimes also gave cash advances to Yunnanese and Shan caravan traders to buy goods for them from other countries. In addition, during the first quarter of this century there seemed to be an efficient division of specialization in trade--the Chinese controlled businesses in town centers while the Shan and Yunnanese maintained control over the retailing trade in outlying districts and villages (Suthy 1975: 259-260). However, from some villagers' memories, during 1900-1920 there were already a few Chinese occasionally coming to the villages to buy rice, sell piglets and buy mature pigs. The expanding use of credits, cash advances, and
supporting roles in trade characterized a special relationship between these two groups. One of the consequences of the above relationships was that each group of merchants had more time and access to resources by expanding their operation and thus helped increase the area and degree of commercialization. For example, the Shan traders neither always had to travel across the border to buy and sell goods, nor to limit the size of their operation by the amount of cash on hand. They could be middlemen between villagers and Chinese wholesalers in Chiangmai city and were able to have higher purchasing power. Therefore, they could spend more time trading more goods and covering more villages.

Finally the central government's termination of trade monopoly on local products and imported goods also contributed to the increasing commercialization of the North. Villagers felt encouraged to produce and trade in the more competitive situation where the trade of products was not officially monopolized and prices fixed by Chinese concessionaires under the direction of northern aristocrats. Some aristocrats' private monopolies, especially in bulk trade between regions, also were eliminated, partly as a result of their weakening political and economic bases. According to a few villagers, among the results of such change were: villagers now could bargain over prices, could choose which merchants to do transactions with, and felt relieved that the imposition of restricted trade was cancelled.
3.3.3 Motivations and Pressures for Participation in the "New Economic Opportunities"

Between 1900 and 1921, the majority of villagers in the field study area either initiated or increased their participation in the market system and the buying and selling of labor. Many of them, particularly Nong Faeg villagers, went not only to Chiangmai and Lamphun cities, but also to distant villages and districts, to trade, vend and seek employment. Never before had villagers travelled so far in large numbers to become involved in such activities. This behavior was the villagers' response to increased government demands for cash tax payments, government pressure for labor conscription without compensation, villagers' own needs to maintain and improve their livelihood, and increased economic opportunities. Often these were interrelated.

3.3.3.1 Pressure from Taxes and Labor Recruitment

As mentioned earlier, the central government, with its increasingly efficient administration, demanded and collected taxes in cash, and occasionally recruited many villagers to do government construction work without pay. Some examples of heavy taxes were the capitation tax of 4 baht, land tax of 50-60 satang per rai, and the tax on cultivation of tobacco of 4 baht per rai (the rate of tobacco cultivation tax in 1900, Chusit 1981: 53). In addition, some household members were recruited by the government. Their absence from the household's earning activities caused other members to find ways of compensating for the economic loss. A primary result of all this was that villagers were compelled or indirectly forced to increase
participation in cash earning activities, mainly garden crop production, trade or vending, and selling of labor. Only villagers who owned or had access to land could earn from rice and other crops. Tobacco and dry-season glutinous and ordinary rice were probably the most popular crops for both consumption and/or sale. According to old villagers, many villagers grew some tobacco and a few villagers grew some ordinary rice for sale. Many villagers had to sell their limited supply of glutinous rice to pay the capitation tax, and relied on vending and wage labor to supplement their needs for food and other necessities. Fruit trees such as coconut and betel nut were planted and their production harvested for sale. The following examples of prices and wages earned by villagers illustrate how difficult it was for villagers, especially the poor, to meet the government's demands.

The average yield of both kinds of rice was about 30-45 thang per rai and the average price in 1900-1920 was about 40-50 satang, even though in some good crop years the price dropped to about 13-20 satang per thang. During 1910-1920, the wage for transplanting rice was 5-6 satang per day. The daily wage in kind for work in rice fields was about 2-3 thang of rice (it has been only one thang since the 1940s) and, added the villagers, "Unlike nowadays, back then some rice field owners were more generous and let the employees scoop earned rice without close inspection." One example involving transportation was an ox-cart owner who charged a man from a nearby village 5 satang for transporting a wooden rice measuring bucket (a one thang size) from Chiangmai city.
3.3.3.2 The Need to Maintain and Improve Their Livelihood, and the Increased Economic Opportunities

In general, villagers could be crudely classified into two groups: the better-off who had considerably more than just enough or were able to provide for themselves in such a way as to enjoy a moderate or comfortable standard of living; and the poor who had barely enough to live by and endured a very low standard of living, even with loans and help from others. Every villager wanted to improve his/her standard of living and sought long-term security for a comfortable livelihood. Here, a combination of Scott's subsistence ethic and Popkin's investment logic and norm of advancement seems to explain villagers' motivations, the pressures on them, and their responses. (See also Evans 1986; Moise 1982; Kerkvliet in Scott and Kerkvliet, eds., 1986: 120.) I also suggest here that in the analysis emphasis should be put on villagers' differing socio-economic conditions, which significantly influenced levels of pressure on their livelihood, frames of motivations and goals in livelihood, and the villagers' actual accomplishments. It seems that Scott's explanation and Popkin's explanation refer or apply to different groups of villagers, i.e., Scott's to the poor and Popkin's to the better off.

For example, poor landless villagers were subject to lesser taxes but stood the same chance of being recruited for labor as the better-off villagers with land. But because these poor villagers' livelihood was at a level which villagers described as "what was earned today was enough only to eat for today," the capitation tax of 4 baht per male and occasional labor recruitment adversely affected their already
difficult livelihoods. Unlike better-off villagers with a comfortable livelihood, larger resources and better opportunities, most of these poor villagers were able to secure only marginal livelihoods and realized that advancement was beyond their ability. They were paid in kind for their labor in crop cultivation, cattle caretaking, and shoulder-carrying more often than in cash. In addition to their labor, they could earn only small amounts of cash from inexpensive handicrafts and foraging for such things as edible leaves and mole crickets. All these earnings, both in kind and cash, were essential for maintaining a marginal livelihood.

Meanwhile, better-off landed villagers often earned cash by selling surplus produce. Some of them became middlemen in the trade of rather expensive items which required a sizable amount of cash capital such as rice, cattle, rice threshing baskets, and ox-carts. They also did not have to sell their labor to earn cheap wages but earned substantial cash by providing ox-cart transport services. It was much easier for them to maintain their livelihood and improve their standard of living because of their access to larger resources and better opportunities. They could, with their sizable land holdings and increasing market demands, produce rice and tobacco surpluses for sale, and could also hire workers. As a consequence of road improvement, possession of ox-carts, cash capital, free time, and a rather secure livelihood, the well-off could afford to do some trading and vending, manage cattle raising, and sell ox-cart transportation services. With increasing earnings and savings through trade profits and loan interests, and the out-migration or indebtedness of some other
villagers, many of the better-off villagers also managed to buy more land and cattle, and build new houses. Finally, their wealth and influence over several other villagers' livelihood would sometimes permit them to ignore sanctions against some of their cruel and unjust actions, which selfishly provided for their economic advancement. As an example, some villagers described a rich landowner with a poor tenant who produced a reasonable amount of rice but not enough to satisfy the landowner. The landowner was so angry that he forced the tenant to leave, thus causing this man and his family great hardship. The villagers saw this as very cruel and unjust of the landowner, gosipped about the incident, and made sure that the landowner knew of their feelings. The landowner, however, although aware of and understanding the displeasure of the villagers, was immune to it and did nothing to help the poor suffering family.

For the poor, their primary concerns and needs in materials centered around obtaining at least a marginal amount and quality of food, shelter, and clothes in order to subsist. All wanted to improve their livelihood and leave their poverty behind, but only a few of them had opportunities and resources to attempt to do so. During this time, economic pressures and difficulties were generated by population increases, land enclosure, and a heavy-handed, demanding government. As a result, most of the poor villagers had to struggle and managed to do little more than maintain their marginal livelihood, although a few of them considerably improved their standard of living. Increasing commercialization, trade, and opportunities for employment provided economic opportunities for poor villagers to earn provisions for subsistence, cash to pay taxes, and money to buy some land and cattle.
These poor villagers primarily increased selling their labor, foraging, making handicrafts, and small-scale vending. Some of them managed to sharecrop on a piece of land and/or risked investing in cattle and pig raising. Yet, the hardship continued. During that time, in rural areas, trade, the amount of cash in circulation, and employment were increasing, although slowly and on a limited scale. Therefore, even though some labor was needed as, for instance, more crops were grown, more cattle were raised, and more houses were built, competition for employment was also present. This was because many more villagers, including the not-so-poor ones, sought cash earnings and villagers came from other villages to work in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung.

Other than the very large landowners, most employers tried to first fulfill their labor requirement through the labor exchange system (simply exchange). However, sales of such handicrafts as bamboo baskets, fish traps, and foraged items were limited as many other villagers also had such skills.

These poor and needy villagers first tried to help themselves through wage earning activities before they asked for help or borrowed. This was not only a matter of dignity, but also because a social norm of "self-help first" prevailed. The following examples illustrate the norm and seem to refute an often externally romanticized view of village society.

According to some old villagers, most villagers did not want to lend money to others because cash was difficult to earn and they were afraid of not getting it back. Some villagers managed to borrow
money in times of great need either from better-off villagers, who
required property as loan security, or from very close relatives.
The needy villagers were still reluctant to borrow money as they saw
other villagers lose land or have their children become household
employees to pay off debts. In addition, only poor villagers who had
tried hard but still were unable to secure their marginal livelihood
were helped by their relatives, and by other villagers through several
acceptable individual methods and social mechanisms. These methods
included a right to pick up leftover rice after harvesting; a right
to beg for rice from door to door (mostly in villages other than their
own); free meals at village temples; rice loans without interest from
kin, neighbors and the temple; and a special charity practice (tan
tord) by which once in a long while monks and villagers collected rice,
clothes, blankets and other necessities to give by surprise to a few
needy villagers or monks who were in need or intended to leave monkhood.

This norm of "self-help first" was not identical to yet not con­
tradictory in nature with Kerkvliet's description of entitlement norms
of a Philippine village (Kerkvliet 1986: 112). Both sets of villagers
shared the belief that each villager is entitled to help for survival
or subsistence. In these northern Thai villages, however, an emphasis
was placed on the rule of self-help first. For example, villagers
would ask and find out from rice beggars why they had to beg. After
hearing their story an amount of rice would be determined, from none
to several litres of rice according to the reasons given. This does
not mean that norms of entitlement did not exist in these northern
Thai villages. People were expected to do all they could themselves
first. Then, there were norms that say, "The poor are entitled to receive help in livelihood and kindness from the better-off." In Philippine villagers, norms of entitlement could range from "to assist those with inadequate means to live decently" to "minimal and inadequate help" (Kerkvliet in Scott and Kerkvliet, eds., 1986: 112, 117). However, in rural northern Thai villages norms of entitlement did not refer to the right of the unfortunate to be helped to live decently. Help usually was rather meager. In addition, most of the forms of help were occasional, incidental, and circumstantial, resulting in only short-term relief and at times unreliable. To illustrate this latter characteristic, the picking of rice left after harvesting could result in only a few handfuls of rice, especially in the rice fields of villagers who began around 1910-1920 to harvest the fields clean and use bamboo mats to capture all the rice grains while threshing. Also, there was a 5-6 year period of time when no one in the villages organized a special charity (tan tord) for very poor and needy villagers.

There were also a few social sanctions within the villages against villagers who were obviously mean and selfish, especially to the poor and needy villagers, for example, those villagers who give little help to destitute neighbors or gave help in such a way as to insult the recipients. These sanctions included gossip, the giving of nicknames, and the use of poetic phrases. Usually, mean and selfish villagers learned about others' gossip about them through close friends or relatives. The same was true for nicknames given by other villagers describing either the person's distinctive personality or a particular
act. Whether the nicknames described the good or bad qualities of
the person, villagers avoided using nicknames when the persons were
present. Examples of nicknames were "ci" and "thi" both of which were
put after a person's name such as "Ma Ci" or "Ma Thi" which meant Mr.
Ma was mean, calculating, took advantage of others, and was selfishly
stingy. Finally, in those days villagers used poetic phrases in
courting, praising, teasing, criticizing, and cursing behaviors of
other villagers which were not socially or morally acceptable in the
community. A few villagers were good enough at this poetic composition
that when they saw or heard of an incident they could, in a short period
of time, compose a poetic phrase sharply describing it. Other
villagers then picked it up and passed it along.

Among popular poetic phrases were those which teased, blamed,
announced, and listed sanctions against such unacceptable behavior
as being cruel to poor and desperate villagers, and men having sex
with their wives's sisters. This gossiping, giving of nicknames, and
the use of poetic phrases had some value as measures limiting
unacceptable behavior even though they were indirect and non-
confrontational. However, according to the villagers, there were
always a few who occasionally ignored such sanctions. Thus other
villagers sometimes used more radical means, such as face-to-face
cursing and stealing fish from fishing nets or traps and paddies
belonging to those mean villagers who ignored the sanctions.

Again, these non-confrontational means of sanctions and resistance
seem to be similar to what Kerkvliet called everyday resistance in
a Philippine village (Kerkvliet in Scott and Kerkvliet, eds., 1986).
Everyday resistance was the villagers' attempt to resist those better-off people who treated them unjustly. It included such indirect and non-confrontational means as name calling exclusively against better-off or more powerful classes and sabotage. However, in those northern Thai villages the phenomenon included sanctions and resistance by the unfortunate ones and/or by other villagers against anyone who was cruel to poor and needy villagers even though this "anyone" often was the better-off.

One of the consequences of the government's demand for taxes and some villagers' attempts to improve their standard of living was increasing stratification among villagers. According to several informants, the number of both poor and better-off villagers increased. And within these two general classes the poor became poorer while the better-off became wealthier. The trends of economic mobility in the villages during those days were that poor villagers rarely became well-to-do while well-to-do villagers rarely became poor but rather, often became wealthier. The standard of living of the poor was stagnant or declined not only because they were taken advantage of by, for example, being charged interest on rice and cash loans, but also because their subordinate and weak position caused them to be most affected by the government's demands and other villagers' selfish pursuit of economic advancement. For example, an old villager said, "For us, the poor, seeking money to pay taxes did not mean just working harder and eating the same skimpy meals. It meant that we, unlike the better-off, had to work a lot harder, run around to seek cash
earings, and eat worse meals because more of our time, produce and earnings had to be used to fulfill the government's demands."

The better-off were less affected by tax demands as they had rice and cash surpluses and better opportunities to earn more. Meanwhile many of them took advantage of the situation and enriched themselves. For instance, a few of the better-off villagers not only charged high interest on rice and cash loans such as 3 thang interest for every 10 thang of borrowed rice; but, they offered very low prices to poor villagers who wanted to sell some rice when they were hard-pressed for cash. This increasing economic stratification was manifested not only in differences in wealth, and standard of living but also in certain interpersonal relationships as patron-client and household employment (luk cang), verbal expressions describing selfish and cruel better-off villagers, the use of nicknames, and poetic phrases. These types of relationships and verbal expressions appeared to become very popular during that period of time.
CHAPTER IV
RESPONSE TO PRESSURE AND OPPORTUNITY AMIDST POPULATION GROWTH,
GOVERNMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS, AND EXPANSION
OF COMMERCIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE
BETWEEN 1922 AND 1970

This chapter will describe and explain changes due to three
phenomena: population dynamics, government programs, and commercial-
ization. The role of the aristocrats is no longer a focus because
their authority and influence had diminished on the regional scale
and in particular in the field study area. Several levels of explanation
will be offered simultaneously to provide a holistic view: for
Thailand as a whole, for the North, for Chiangmai province, for Saraphi
District, for the field study area which included the two tambon the
field study villages were in, and finally for Nong Faeg and Khua Mung.
Then explanations of villagers' responses to these phenomena, par-
ticularly of the aspects which affected their way of life, will be
offered.

Briefly, the significant factors during the period of 1922-1970
were rapid population growth, government's bureaucratic administration
and modernization programs, and commercialization and expanding trade.
The population increased rapidly throughout this period, in particular
during the 1950s and 1960s after the introduction of various government
health programs. In the field study villages, there were occasional
reductions in the growth of population primarily due to epidemics and
out-migration, however, the result was still a net increase in population. This period also saw increasing encroachment of government bureaucratic administration and control, and the advent of its modernization program in rural communities. Villagers responded to these changes with both resentment and appreciation, and not uncommonly with a combination of these feelings. In the economic sphere, commercialization and trade were rapidly increasing and expanding. Production and commerce in the North became an integral portion of that of the whole country. Villagers became involved with the commercialization of rice and cash crops. There were several interrelated phenomena enhancing commercialization, agriculture, and the economic incorporation of the village economy into the national and international market. Some of these were improvements in transportation and irrigation, the single currency system, population pressures on agricultural lands, government policies and programs, and the roles of middlemen merchants. Among the villagers, some insisted on maintaining their self-provisioning orientation while others grasped the emerging economic opportunities for coping with subsistence pressure or enhancing their economic well-being and began to enjoy such additional inducements as urban/manufactured consumer goods.

4.1 The Political-Economic Context of Rapid Population Increase and High Fertility

4.1.1 Rapid Population Growth

Between the 1920s through the 1960s, population in northern Thailand grew more rapidly than previously. Available census data show a three-fold increase in population for the whole country from...
9.2 million in 1920 to 26.2 million in 1960. This can be compared to a two-fold increase during a previous one hundred year period: from four million in 1782 to eight million in 1882 (Mahidol University 1982: 1). By the beginning of the 1960s the country had a population growth rate which peaked at 3.2 percent per annum, one of the highest rates in the world at that time. For Chiangmai, the population grew from 349,600 in 1920 to 798,483 in 1960 (le May 1926: 85; Mougne 1981: 69). The average increase per year was 11,222 which was significantly higher than the average of 3,329 per year between 1830 and 1920 (Brailey 1969: 25; le May 1926: 85).

This rapid population growth can best be explained by a high level of fertility and a decline in the level of general mortality, especially after 1949. Using the crude birth rate as an indicator of fertility, the rate (number of births per 1000 population per annum) for Thailand was estimated to be 45-50 from 1920-1955 (Bourgois-Pichat cited in Suchart 1971: 50-51). By 1965, the crude rate was still as high as 37-41 and only slowly declined to 34.5 in 1971 (Suchart 1971: 5; Tieng 1978: 6). Available data for Chiangmai show that in 1955 the crude birth rate was 41. Though the rate has declined since then, it was still as high as 36 in 1962 (Mougne 1981: 72).

Foreign immigrants coming to Thailand made some contribution to the pre-World War II growth rate, but their contribution has been negligible since then. Examining the largest group of immigrants, the Chinese, the number of China-born Chinese in Thailand only increased from 370,000 in 1919 to 750,000 in 1947. In the North their number
increased from 5,200 in 1919 to 16,300 in 1937, and then dropped to 9,700 in 1947 (Skinner 1957: 201).

In Saraphi district, the population increased from 41,219 in 1938 to 56,897 in 1964 (Kingshill 1976: xi, 19). In the field study village of Nong Faeg, the number of households increased from about 70-80 in 1920 to 167 in 1953, and to 194 in 1964 (Kingshill 1976: xi, 30-31). The average household size also increased from about 5.04 in 1953 to 6.3 in 1964 (Kingshill 1976: xii, 23, 30). In the village of Khua Mung, the number of households jumped from about 50-60 in 1920 to 166 in 1950 and 200 in 1960. The average household size was approximately the same as in Nong Faeg. Oral histories from the villagers confirm that the rapid population growth was a result of high fertility, i.e., the villager had many children. This conclusion can be drawn from interviews of sample villagers born before 1921, sixty of whom were from Nong Faeg and sixty of whom came from Khua Mung. Examining the children of this group who were live born and survived past their second birthday, it was found that seventy-eight of them had four to eight children, twenty-one had nine to thirteen children, seventeen had one-three children, and four had never married and had no children.

The number of live-born children was still large despite the high rate of infant mortality through the 1940s. It was estimated that for the country as a whole, one-third of live births died within their first year of life (Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine 1930: 228). In the field study area, for example, many individual elderly villagers reported that three to four of their children died before reaching two years and some said that as many as six to seven of their
offspring had died by that age. In 1953 in Nong Faeg deaths of live-born children reached 31.7 percent in sampled couples, widows, and widowers born before 1908 (Kingshill 1976: 65). In spite of this, 31 percent of the total 1953 population of Nong Faeg was children fourteen years of age and under (Kingshill 1976: 305). There is no information for this percentage for Khua Mung. A 1949 survey of Saraphi district, however, shows that out of the total surveyed population of 30,313, children aged fourteen and younger accounted for 30.05 percent of the population (Bau 1951: 4).

The increase in the number of villagers due to immigration was not as large as that due to fertility. In both villages during the 1950s about 6 to 8 percent of the population was immigrants and the great majority of these were those who had married into the villages. For Nong Faeg the percentage of villagers moving out as a result of marriage balanced the percentage moving in for the same reason. In the case of Khua Mung, the percentage of emigrants by marriage was a bit smaller than the same percentage for immigrants.

Many of the Chinese immigrants came to Chiangmai as rice merchants, rice mill owners and workers, irrigation contractors, petty traders, and store owners following the completion of the northern railroad and in response to the rice export boom and expansion of irrigated rice land in the 1920s (Anan 1984: 147-152,169). However, none of them ever moved to settle down in Khua Mung, and only one Thailand-born Chinese family moved into Nong Faeg in the mid 1970s.
4.1.2 Phenomena Facilitating the Rapid Population Increase

The rapid growth of population during this period seems to have resulted from phenomena similar to those perpetuating the growth of population during the beginning of the century: high fertility due to the unavailability of effective birth control methods and perceived advantages of having many children. One possible explanation is that most women continued childbearing through the end of the reproductive age span (physiologically) regardless of experience with infant mortality. Meanwhile, a few women attempted to limit their family size through traditional methods of birth control, e.g., herb medicine, or through a culturally acceptable or socially common practice, e.g., ceasing to have intercourse after 35 or 40 years of age; but prior to the onset of menopause.

Contrary to these efforts of a few were government programs that encouraged a high level of fertility between 1920 and 1965. In addition, the government began to emphasize public health service programs, thus reducing mortality. The serious desire on the part of the government to increase the rate of population growth was evident in a statement made by the Minister of the Interior sometime between 1910 and 1920:

"Development of the country, all in all, rests upon the people. On the defense side, a growing population certainly means a growing number of troops. From the macroeconomic point of view, increase in population will inevitably encourage the growth of agriculture, commerce, and industry resulting in probably an abundance of goods and services. As we have seen, the Government's national development programs are financed mainly with reserves from tax sources, which in turn will rise in volume in step with population growth. Thus you will see how essential is the
number of people to our national development, and we have to face the problem of how to increase it. (quoted in Mougne 1981: 61)

In 1942 Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram stated that 18 million people were not sufficient and at least 100 million would be needed to achieve national 'greatness' (power and prosperity) (Mougne 1981: 61). During his administration, 1939-1956, there were two significant programs attempting to rapidly increase the population: marriage promotion and large family protection.

Government through its Marriage Promotion Program encouraged Thai people to marry young so as to have children early. A large scale propaganda program was launched which included group wedding services and the coining of slogans.

This program might have been very effective elsewhere, but in the field study area it seemed to make little impression and found little acceptance. Villagers said that it was because the program was not mandatory and there were no substantial awards for participating in it. A few villagers also commented that the encouraged practices did not mesh with the socio-economic conditions of the times. This refers to the general socio-economic difficulties resulting from conflicts generated by a growing population living on a limited land base and the hardships experienced during the Great Depression (1929-1937) and the Second World War.

Examples of these difficulties included deflation and the inability of the villagers at various times to sell such commodities as rice, other crops, handicrafts, pigs, and fowls at a good price. Villagers were forced to become more self-provisioning. Wages and the demand
for hired labor in agriculture declined while at the same time the availability of nonagricultural jobs was very limited. During World War II, important goods such as medicine, kerosene, and metalware became very expensive and in short supply. The large rise in cost of living persisted after the war had ended (Pasuk 1980: 87). These conditions resulted in poverty and a severe drop in cash income. Many villagers had to eat rice mixed with banana and edible roots such as yams (see also Anan 1984: 155). There was an increase in the borrowing of cash and rice, in the loss of land ownership through foreclosure, and in the sale of gold and silver ornaments. Many villagers, unable to pay taxes, faced threats and pressure from authorities. Many villagers were forced to sell personal belongings, e.g., buffalo, cattle, land, etc., and to migrate in order to pay debts and/or taxes. There were confiscations of property or threats of confiscation by the authorities to villagers who had not paid taxes during the 1930s. (For Central Thailand see Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 217.)

Many villagers responded to these difficulties by postponing their marriages. Some parents discouraged their children from marrying by pointing out the importance of maintaining the existing number of working household members. Losing a valuable member of the household or having to feed additional persons through marriage could worsen a family's economic situation. Many young lovers were also reluctant to marry as they foresaw difficulties in establishing new separate households. In addition, opportunities for meeting and courting among young people in a socially entertaining atmosphere became limited as there was a decline in the frequency of and participation in merit-making festivals and other social or religious ceremonies. (The same
phenomena occurred in Central Thailand during the Great Depression: see Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 218.) The villagers said as a result there were fewer villagers married before they reached twenty years of age after the 1930s (also Kingshill 1976: 375). Since the 1930s the trend has been toward getting married at a later age, i.e., 20-23 years old. In 1953 in Nong Faeg, for example, there were only two persons under twenty who were married (Kingshill 1976: 24). Explanations for this change included not only socio-economic hardship during the Depression and World War II, but also increasing acute economic problems associated with the rapid increase in population, rise in landlessness, and an increasing monetization of everyday life. Mougne found similar phenomena affecting the postponement of marriage in a village in Maetaeng (Mougne 1981: 93).

On the other hand, the government program promoting large families received considerable attention from the villagers. Under the "Welfare of Persons with Numerous Offspring Act," cash rewards were given to villagers who had many children and who made themselves known to the authorities through the district offices. In Nong Faeg, the villagers said that there were at least seven or eight couples who received the cash reward. An example was Grandfather Taa who was 63 years old in 1980. He had eight children when he received a cash reward from the government during the late 1940s or early 1950s. Another example was a villager from Khua Mung who was 64 in 1980. During that same time period he went to the district office and received about 400 baht for having seven children. He said there were at least ten to fifteen Khua Mung villagers who received some cash from the government for having seven or more children.
According to the villagers, this government incentive did not have much effect on the number of children the villagers decided to have. As there were no effective birth control methods, there was little choice involved in the number of children born to a couple. It was true that this program might encourage a few villagers to marry young and start having babies right away. However, what was evident from the villagers' statements was that the program only justified having many children which was natural, inevitable, and even desirable for many villagers. In other words, for those who really wanted many children, this program gave them an additional incentive to do so. Meanwhile the program was a comfort for those who happened to have but did not really want many children. Furthermore, the program through its propaganda and cash incentives made villagers become very conscious, for the first time, of the number of children they had and their individual levels of fertility. In addition, it was one of the earliest programs meeting the approval of the majority of villagers and positively linking an issue central to the livelihood of villagers to a national policy. Many villagers showed their understanding of this policy aimed at increasing the population and recognized their own contribution to it. This is also a good example of how villagers' interests and perceptions sometimes go well beyond their everyday life, livelihood activities, and village boundaries. An illustration is the statement made by a Khua Mung villager:

"Back then the country did not have so many people. Although some places like Saraphi were already rather crowded, other districts such as Fang were still less inhabited. The government saw that the country needed a lot of people as manpower to bring in more prosperity."
That was why the program encouraging parents to have many children was introduced. The money given by the government was a reward to those who helped the government in reaching that national goal.

Another effect, the decline in mortality, seemed to be the most important achievement of the government programs, contributing to high rates of population growth especially during the 1950s. Before 1950 the lack of hygienic practices and medical services, wartime conditions such as food shortages, and widespread disease spread through large-scale migration increased the death rates. Although medical services were available at the McCormick missionary hospital in Chiangmai city, only a few villagers could overcome their negative feelings towards the costs involved and distrusted modern medical treatment. Ill villagers relied on either traditional healers who used herbs and sacred words, or tambon doctors who were licensed by the district office and normally used both traditional herbs and some modern medicine. It was not until after the Second World War that public health and medical services were greatly improved. These changes in concert with the socio-economic context of the improved economy and the end of the war facilitated rapid population growth. Among the most important changes in the area of public health was the implementation of the United Nations Malaria Control Program which began DDT spraying in Saraphi district in 1949. Deaths resulting from malaria declined especially among infants and children. For example, in Nong Faeg there was an increase in the parentage of population in the three years of age and younger age group. It was also suggested that there was an increase in the average household size in Nong Faeg from 1949 to 1953 due to
the improvement in public health and malaria control (Kingshill 1976: 20). Between 1952 and 1958 nationwide spraying of DDT covered every community, reducing malaria cases by 80 percent by the end of this period (Mougne 1981: 131). Other epidemic diseases such as smallpox and cholera were brought under control and caused few deaths when compared with previous epidemics (Mougne 1981: 132; Pasuk 1980: 90). Death rates for the country as a whole were reduced from 30 per thousand during the first half of the century to 20 per thousand in the 1950s and 13 per thousand by 1960 (Mougne 1981: 131).

Public health and medical services have greatly improved since 1950. An increasing number of villagers learned more about sanitation, hygiene, and modern medicine from the government public health offices through the village headmen, from hospitals, from media such as radio and television, and from medicine vendors and "injection doctors." By the early 1950s in some villages such as Nong Faeg, the great majority of villagers had already built toilets and accepted these as both a sanitary arrangement and a socially preferable practice. In Nong Faeg in 1953, 72 percent of the surveyed households had toilet facilities (Kingshill 1976: 62). Unfortunately, in other villages such as Khua Mung there were only a few toilets in 1980. The remoteness of the villages and the fact that villagers put higher value on other activities such as building large homes and investing in land and crops may partially explain the differences.

Modern medicines such as sulfa, quinine, and aspirin became available to villagers through both government and private outlets. The government also provided vaccinations for diseases such as smallpox
and distributed medicine for infants, supplied by the United Nations, to village midwives (Kingshill 1976: 246). In the early 1950s there were already some medical services available at the Saraphi district health center. A few villagers from Nong Faeng travelled to hospitals in Chiangmai city when they were ill or ready to give birth (Kingshill 1976: 25, 197-198). Khua Mung villagers also began to use such services, but to a lesser extent. There was an increasing number of "injection doctors" who resided in or occasionally came to the villages. Some of them were trained in medicine while in the military; others had been nurses or assistants to medical doctors in towns. These "doctors" offered a more expensive service than other local healers, but they used modern medicines and injections which many times proved to be immediately effective. Their services, though unlicensed and thus illegal, gradually increased in popularity due not only to their ability to heal patients but to their willingness to adjust their services and arrangements to fit the local perspective. They did not object to the patients' use of other local healers and herb medicines. When the illness became serious, the doctor would recommend that the patient go to the hospital because he was concerned about saving his patient's life and also about his own reputation. Moreover, though the cost of their services was high by the villagers' standards, the deal offered by many "injection doctors" was that the payment would be made after the patient was well. If a patient died the payment would still be made to show gratitude for the doctor's attempt, but usually the amount of the payment was smaller than when the doctor succeeded. This deal had several important consequences for the
villagers. One was that the doctor demonstrated confidence in his own abilities which brought psychological comfort to the patients and their families. This type of deal also relieved ill villagers of immediate economic pressure because they did not have to prepare a large sum of money for each treatment or visit. Payments were postponed until the end of the service in a lump sum, or sometimes by installment. This gave the villagers time to collect cash from savings, loans, sale of produce, mortgage of property, or selling of ornaments. There were even cases of patients paying the doctors with livestock or shares of crops in their fields.

All these health and medical improvements contributed considerably to a reduction in death rates and a rise in the live birth rates. In 1955 in Chiangmai, for example, the crude birth rate was as high as 41 per 1000 (Tieng 1978: 5). The average annual population growth rate in Chiangmai grew from 1.5 percent between 1919 and 1947 to 3.1 percent from 1947 to 1960. These high levels of fertility and low levels of mortality together with the improvement in the economy and a reduction in out-migration led to an increase in the total population of Saraphi district as well as within the field study villages.

4.1.3 Phenomena Resulting in Occasional Reductions in Population Pressure

During the period of rapid population growth between 1920 and 1965, there were a few periods of reduction in population pressures as a result of epidemics, high rates of infant mortality, and emigration of villagers especially to Fang and Phan. One of two disastrous epidemics remembered by Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villagers was a malaria
epidemic which ended in 1923. The second one in 1930 was of influenza or pneumonia and caused as many as 70 to 100 deaths in some villages. The rates of infant mortality were consistently high until 1950. According to villagers, there was a distinct increase in infant deaths around 1930 and 1939 through 1945 which corresponded to periods of economic depression, epidemic outbreak, and World War II. Evidence confirms that the increase in infant mortality during the Second World War also occurred throughout the country (Mougne 1981: 114, 142).

It was estimated that the probability of a child dying before age five was only 10 percent in the mid 1970s, which was less than half the risk for the period between 1937-1947 (National Research Council 1980; Knodel, et al. 1987: chapter 3).

The third phenomenon resulting in temporary reductions or stabilization in the population was emigration. The following section will first describe emigration in different areas of Chiangmai with an emphasis on Nong Faeg and Khua Mung. Then it will be shown that economic difficulties and subsistence pressure were the underlying reasons and motivations for most emigration, although the prospect of economic improvement and long-term investment profit were motivations for some. Related phenomena, e.g., increasing cash value of rice and residential lands, accumulation of land by moneylenders, division of inherited land, and legal enforcement of foreclosure will be discussed. The last section will deal with villagers' experiences with the "marketing" and cash value of land and how emigration and land sale impacted on land ownership.
In Chiangmai province, population increased from 349,550 in 1920 to 440,694 in 1930, but decreased from 543,846 in 1937 to 535,664 in 1947 (Anan 1984: 220). One of the most popular places for emigrants to settle was Chiangrai province. The distinctively high average growth rate in Chiangrai was 2.2 percent between 1919 and 1947 and 4.1 percent from 1947 to 1960. This increase was largest in the provinces of the Upper North and it was primarily a result of immigration (van der Meer 1981: 16-17). In Saraphi district, the population decreased from 41,219 in 1938 to 40,289 in 1947 and only slightly increased to 40,371 in 1952 (Kingshill 1976: 19). However, it is worth noting that in a few areas of Chiangmai, such as Fang and Sanpatong, the population steadily increased due to immigration. For instance, the overall population of Sanpatong district increased from 45,455 in 1930 to 56,916 in 1937 and to 65,883 in 1947 (Anan 1984: 200-221).

Emigration of villagers during this period seemed to be common in many areas of Chiangmai. The dominant underlying reasons for migration were economic (Mougne 1981: 206; and for Thailand see Visit, et al., 1979: 55). Cohen found that between 1920 and 1940 about 20 percent of Ban Talad villagers in Sanpatong emigrated to such places as Chiangrai. It seemed that most of them did so in order to avoid continuing as or becoming landless tenants in their home village (Cohen 1981: 80). Narujorn wrote that because of a land shortage in Samoeng district many villagers moved to settle in Fang during the 1940s (Narujorn 1977: 9-11). Mougne found that during recent decades many villagers of Ban Pong in Maetaeng district migrated to Fang, Chiangdao, and Phrao to settle on cheap cultivable land. Many of them also moved
to remote mountain miang (tea) growing villages and either managed to accumulate considerable wealth or found only a minimal livelihood as wage laborers (Mougne 1981: 187-188). Before 1940 there was also a large number of immigrants from districts which had a history of dense population and from earlier centers of commercialization such as Saraphi and Sanpatong who were seeking agricultural land and settlement in Maetaeng (Mougne 1981: 175). During a visit to a village in Fang, it was found that most villagers came from Saraphi and Phrao of Chiangmai and Ban Tha of Lamphun.

A large number of villagers moved away from Nong Faeg and Khua Mung between 1920 and 1980. Emigration from Nong Faeg seemed to occur on a large scale between 1935 and 1965. For example, one old villager recalled that around 1935 there were six Nong Faeg families which moved to settle in a village in Fang. Also in 1941 there were thirteen families which migrated there (Kingshill 1976: 21). The total number of emigrants is not available, but evidence suggests it was on a large scale. For instance, in a village in Fang where most Nong Faeg emigrants have settled there were about 130 households of Nong Faeg emigrants and their descendants. Moreover there were quite a few Nong Faeg villagers who have moved to other areas such as Chiangdao, Sankamphaeng, Lamphun, and Chiangmai city. According to villagers, a large scale migration from Khua Mung occurred between 1950 and 1960 as a result of droughts and economic difficulties. Even though the number of emigrants seemed to be lower than in Nong Faeg, the new settlements included many places in Chiangmai such as Phrao, Sansai,
Maetaeng, Chiangmai city, and districts in Chiangmai such as Phan, Fang, and Maesai.

The primary reasons for the emigration in both villages centered around economic difficulties and subsistence pressure rather than entrepreneurial ambitions. However, economic security and wealth in the long run were definitely desirable. Most emigrants from both villages owned no land or owned at most a small house lot and/or a small plot of rice land. A collection of oral histories from emigrant families reveals that most emigrants with property had to sell it in order to finance their move and to repay debts. This property consisted of rice land, house lots, houses, and livestock. Typical sales made by emigrants, which gives some idea of the economic hardships they faced, include the sale of 0.1 to 3.25 rai of rice land (four rai is an average minimum subsistence requirement for a household), a house lot of 0.1 to 0.75 rai, a house, cattle, and buffalo. Many others owned no land at all. Moreover, a considerable percentage of the emigrants were indebted.

Some emigrants had suffered greatly because of extreme poverty and wished to emigrate in an attempt to escape this suffering. Other emigrants were a little better off, but the prospect of moving to a new place with the possibility of a better life there was attractive to them. Those faced with extreme poverty were in situations involving increasing debts, year after year sale of "green rice" (khai khao khiao), no inheritance of rice land, no ownership of a house lot or rice land of sufficient size. Following are two example cases.
Tha was heavily indebted before he decided to move to Fang around 1950. He and his family sold their only valuable belongings: a bamboo hut and two buffalo; and used the majority of the cash received to pay debts. He and his family members settled in Fang and became tenants and agricultural laborers. He said:

"We were desperately poor and often did not have enough to eat in our home village. We had many children to feed. It was becoming difficult to find a piece of land to rent and finding a wage earning job became more competitive. Many of us, poor landless villagers, had to go as far as Sanpatong district to find agricultural work. If we would have had enough to eat, we wouldn't have moved."

Grandmother Jan moved to Fang around 1955. She was a landless tenant in her home village. Seeing the possibility of eliminating her poverty and improving her livelihood, she sold a 0.75 rai house lot, a small house, a rice bin and two buffalo for a total of 3500 baht. With her savings, she carried about 3700 baht to Fang. There she bought a 0.75 rai house lot and 10 rai of rice land (of which only 7 or 8 rai were cultivable) for almost 3000 baht. She felt that her livelihood improved from a poor one to a moderate one.

For villagers who had no debts or small ones, their emigration was easier and could be more fruitful. For those who owned some land, the emigration could be painful when they lost it through foreclosure or had to sell it for cash to pay debts. Indebtedness in the field study area has been widespread and had serious consequences, more so than was estimated for the northern region as a whole (according to the 1953 Economic Farm Survey, only 4.8 percent of the farmers in the North were indebted, Ministry of Agriculture 1955: 110-115). Bau
estimated that in 1949 in Saraphi district no more than 15 to 20 percent of the farmers were indebted (Bau 1951: 13). Yet, from oral histories, it can be estimated that households with substantial debts for an extended length of time fluctuated between 20 and 50 percent throughout the period of 1920 to 1965 in the field study area.

Debts increased rapidly for poor landless families because they tended to borrow cash and rice for subsistence and would increase their indebtedness even more when crises would arise. Landowning households also became indebted by borrowing for subsistence, investment in dry season crops, and financial crises, e.g., funerals or bribes for officials in times of military conscription. Interest was generally charged on borrowed cash and rice, and added quickly and significantly to the original debt. Often, the lender would deduct the first month's interest from the borrowed amount when they handed cash or rice to the borrower. The interest rate charged varied between 3 and 15 percent per month, depending upon such factors as the amount of the loan, the personal relationship of the debtor and moneylender, and the general state of the economy at the time the loan was made. Bau found that the interest rate could be as low as 2 percent per month on a very large loan with land as collateral. Villagers would frequently lose title to their land through this type of loan (Bau 1951: 12; for Sanpatong district see Anan 1984: 179).

There were landowners and landless tenants who had to secure loans by promising to pay in kind at an agreed price at harvest time. This was known as "selling green rice" and was used to meet consumption or urgent-crisis needs for cash or rice just before or during the
planting season. Most of the time the interest added was from 50 to 100 percent of the borrowed amount. Bau described how in 1949 in Saraphi district money borrowed in July could be paid back in paddy in November at an agreed price of 3.50 baht per thang; the prevailing price of paddy at the time was 6.50 baht per thang (Bau 1951: 12).

A survey of villagers in the North in 1962/1963 confirms the widespread nature of "selling green rice" and notes that an agreed price on "green rice" was generally one to two baht per thang less than the harvest price (Pantum, et al., 1965: 42).

Since "selling of green rice" is a form of loan which uses the borrowers' crops as collateral and repayment, it has become widely practiced since 1920 when there was a boom in rice sales and the rice export trade. Rice increasingly became a commercialized and marketable commodity with fluctuating prices in different places and times. Moneylenders would accumulate rice through this practice and make profits in two ways. First they charged their interest in percentage of crop and would suppress the price of rice when they bought it green. Second, they would stockpile rice from borrowers, and would only sell it to merchants when the price was high. Some moneylenders would allow their debtors to repay in other crops such as peanuts, soybeans, and tobacco, and became wealthy through trade of such products. It should be noted that the "selling green" of garden/cash crops other than rice was practiced on a limited scale between 1940 and 1960 when villagers were in great need of cash or rice, but only became widespread and frequent in the early 1970s.
Prior to the advent of rice commercialization, the "selling of green rice" existed, but did not involve any profit taking through the marketplace. In these cases, certain villagers who usually did not farm would purchase "green rice" from other villagers who were desperate for cash. The purchase would be at a price lower than the expected price at harvest time. In doing so, the villagers who bought the "green rice" would stretch their money and acquire a sufficient amount of rice for their own annual consumption.

"Selling green rice" perpetuated more serious debts because the ability to repay the debt depended upon crop yields; a crop failure meant disaster and still heavier debts. Furthermore, fluctuations in the market price of rice could significantly affect the moneylenders' willingness to purchase and the prices they offered. Consequently, selling land and emigrating provided villagers an opportunity to break free of this cycle of poverty and indebtedness.

As inherited land was divided equally among children generation after generation, individual land holdings became smaller and smaller especially since villagers usually had many children. Sometimes it was not even practical to divide the land among the children. As far back as the 1920s many villagers were already inheriting only one third to two rai of land which was insufficient for even the subsistence needs of a household. As they were too poor to buy additional land or to rent land to supplement their food production, emigration offered the only possibility to increase their land holdings. Many times a villager would offer to buy the shares of his brothers and sisters in order to prevent the size of a family plot from becoming too small.
and thereby economically unproductive or to protect the land from purchase from outside the family. The children whose land was purchased would move away when they could not afford to buy or rent land in their home village and they were not satisfied to stay and become agricultural wage laborers. Sometimes if none of the children could come up with the cash to buy out his/her siblings' interests in the family plot, the family land would be sold to other villagers and the proceeds divided among them.

Grandfather Kham and Grandmother Som were an example of a landless couple who lived in Nong Faeg. His parents had nine children and owned three rai of rice land. During the 1920s their parents died and none of the children could afford to buy all the shares in the land. The land was thus sold for 300 thaeb and the money was divided equally among the children. Grandmother Som's grandparents (on her mother's side) had eight children and 18 rai of land. They were indebted and the moneylender seized about six to seven rai for an overdue payment. When they died, each child inherited about one rai except for the one who had cared for the parents who received three rai. Grandmother Som's mother received roughly one rai and married a landless villager. They had seven children. When they were later indebted and realized that the land was too small to divide among their children, they sold it for about 100 thaeb. Grandmother Som thus inherited no land.

Interestingly enough, many villagers did not see these situations as a negative manifestation of population pressure, but thought of them as the effects of increasing commercialization and government
encroachment. They saw that and became more limited while there were many more people; simultaneously, things became objects of cash value and consequently got more expensive. Increasingly, they saw themselves as depending on cash for everyday items and services from paying for the delivery of a child to the financing of funerals (which had gradually changed from simple burials to ceremonial cremations). Rice could be sold easily at a good price, and cash could buy almost anything. Consequently, interest rates on rice or cash loans were always increasing. Meanwhile, by relying on the law and government officials, moneylenders could more easily enforce the strict repayment of loans.

Land became more expensive not only because more people needed it to subsist, but also because it could bring wealth through the commercial production of crops. It could be rented out for cash, or it could be turned into fruit orchards which yielded large amounts of money, increasing the value of the land above that of a corresponding plot of rice land. Inheritance became more complicated and oftentimes tragic. Because of more offspring and a fixed land base, the size of individual land inheritance dwindled rapidly. For example, in 1980 one 64-year-old villager from Khua Mung said that during his father's generation land scarcity did not appear to be a problem; but he perceived it as a problem for his generation. His father owned approximately eight rai of land and had eight children; upon his father's death each child inherited about one rai of land. This villager and others saw this as a change which seriously affected their livelihood. Family members fought each other in attempts to get more land shares and more cash. There was an increasing reliance on government officials
and law enforcement to settle disputes over inherited property between relatives and disputes over foreclosure and land boundaries.

However, as mentioned earlier, some villagers migrated, attracted by the prospect of occupying more land which would mean immediate socio-economic improvement and profitable long-term investments. They could not afford to buy land in the Nong Faeg/Khua Mung area where land prices increased especially fast due to rapid population growth and increasing commercialization of agriculture. For example, a rai of good rice land in the area was sold for 40 to 70 thaeb (an old currency unit roughly comparable to the baht) around 1915 to 1920. Between 1949 and 1953, a rai of such land would cost about 3000 baht (see also Bau 1951: 17; Kingshill 1976: 26). In 1949, loans made using the land as collateral could be as high as 75 to 100 percent of the appraised value of the land (Bau 1951: 12). By the 1970s, a rai of land was selling for around 1000 baht. Larger pieces of land of lower quality with no irrigation such as in Fang were often considered more desirable than irrigated but very small pieces of land in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung. With a larger piece of land with lower yield one could still have enough to eat and a good possibility of producing extra rice and animals to sell for cash to spend or save. Moreover, land could be improved, as in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung by irrigation systems built by the villagers and the government. Meanwhile, land in Fang and Phan was a lot cheaper and more available than in Saraphi. For example, in 1950 a rai of land in Fang was sold for approximately 250 to 300 baht (see also Kingshill 1976: 26). During the 1960s, a Khua Mung villager moved to Fang and bought eight rai of land for about 6500
baht (800 baht per rai). In 1972, a rai of rice land in Fang would go for around one to two thousand baht (Potter 1976: 26).

To the villagers remaining in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung, the emigration caused by population increases, land scarcity, and economic difficulties meant the availability of land for them to buy. Emigrants who owned land sold their land to fellow villagers at a local market price. Many, however, had to "sell" their land to the moneylenders at an artificially low price due to foreclosure. There were a few cases in which emigrants would receive a high price for their land as the buyers were their relatives and wanted to help them out. A survey of fifty households in each village on the question: "Did you ever buy rice land from emigrants prior to 1961?" reveals that a little less than 20 percent of the Nong Faeg correspondents had purchased land and about 30 percent in Khua Mung had done so. The percentages show the considerable impact of emigration and land sale on landownership in the villages. If these samples are representative, they confirm the problem of landlessness in Nong Faeg as being more serious than in Khua Mung. There were more emigrants, but fewer cases of land purchase in Nong Faeg, as a greater number of the Nong Faeg emigrants were landless.

Emigration also contributed to land accumulation in the villages. For example, a Nong Faeg villager advanced from being a small landowner to a medium one by purchasing land from emigrants. He inherited three rai of rice land and bought four rai from two villagers who moved to Fang during the 1920s and 1930s. He also bought two house lots amounting to 1.25 rai from two other villagers moving to Fang in the
The money used to purchase the land came from selling rice and tobacco and raising animals and poultry. A large landowner in Khua Mung bought about 20 rai of rice land from emigrants who moved to Fang and Phan between 1940 and 1960. The money used to buy the land came from moneylending, selling rice and cash crops, and operating a rice mill.

4.2 Government Bureaucratic Domination and Modernization Programs in Rural Villages

Chapter III described the implementation of political and administrative reforms in the North and the success of the encroachment of the Central Thai government upon rural communities. This section presents a continuing picture of the expanding and strengthening bureaucracy which increasingly controlled parts of the villagers' lives through its administration and modernization programs.

By the 1920s the government's imposition of authority and control on the northern aristocrats, replacing the compromising and bargaining of old, made the centralized bureaucracy independent of their influence. During the 1930s, the traditional legal authority of the aristocrats was totally undermined by the 1932 coup d'etat, establishing a constitutional regime, and the death of the last Chiangmai king, Cao Keo Nawarat, in 1939.

This section will emphasize not only the increasing domination of the government bureaucracy and its expansion of programs in rural areas, but will also relate villagers' perceptions of and responses to these phenomena. First it will be shown that many significant
changes in government policies and programs resulted from both the Thai political situation and the influences of the United States and international organizations, such as the United Nations. Then will follow discussions of important government programs which affected the lives of the villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung.

In brief, villagers during this period felt much more influenced by the government's administration and programs than in previous times. While they saw a few programs as purely beneficial or detrimental to their well being, many other programs could be simultaneously resented and appreciated. As had happened in previous decades, villagers expressed their resentment in various forms, e.g., uprisings, resistance movements, and demonstrations.

4.2.1 The Political Context

Between 1922 and 1970, the central Thai government continued its efforts at centralization of authority and consolidation of the separate regions of the country by strengthening its bureaucratic administration, especially at the provincial and district levels. National integration, the sovereignty of the central government, and the establishment of law and order were the main thrusts of the government's policies during this period. The bureaucracy was expanded and utilized both as a tool to govern the country and shape societal change and as an agency for completing routine tasks such as population registration and tax collection. The government and its bureaucracy increasingly dominated and influenced many aspects of the villagers' lives, e.g., birth registration, compulsory education, trade, property ownership,
and death certification. The strengthening of the bureaucratic administration in rural areas was accomplished by increasing the number of officials, expanding their authority, issuing new laws and regulations, and seeing to their improved implementation and enforcement. The most significant change resulting from this was that the bureaucracy increasingly affected aspects of life in the rural communities. For example, enforcement of the Local Administration Act of 1914 gave the village and tambon headmen formal government authority, and the small salaries they were paid in the 1930s brought them into the bureaucracy as semi-officials.

The government's direct role in commercial agricultural production before 1950 was minimal when compared to its subsequent role in promoting the development of modern agricultural production, technology, and trade. During the period of 1922-1950, its role was largely confined to promoting cotton production, creating land tax exemptions, and founding the credit cooperatives in the 1930s. Investment in irrigation by the government was only 38 percent of the investment in railways between 1921 and 1941 (Feeny 1982: 78). Instead efforts and resources were directed toward increasing the bureaucratization of the administration, improving the system of law enforcement, expanding control in the villages, and constructing railways and roads. These not only enhanced national integration, government control, and the authority and prestige of the elite, but also served as important symbols of modernity. One method of increasing control was the rapid expansion of the Thai police force. The countrywide police force was first organized in 1906; by 1954 there were already 42,835 policemen.
The number increased to 51,395 in 1965 and to 74,000 in 1970 making the ratio of police to population 1 to 485 (Lobe 1977: 75). As a further example, the Accelerated Rural Development Program was established in 1965 with the stated purpose of developing roads, modernizing public facilities, and improving communications within the country, but with the hidden agenda of increasing government control and combatting the communist insurgency.

After the late 1930s, Thailand was pulled further into political alliance with the United States and into the "assistance network" of the international organizations. The period between 1950 and 1966 saw the emergence of an established military-authoritarian regime and the creation of the first national economic plan; both of these were significantly influenced by the United States. At the same time, the economic modernization of the country was partially influenced by international institutions such as the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). By the end of the 1940s Thailand was already receiving some assistance from international organizations, for example a malaria control program was provided by the United Nations.

By this time, political and economic relationships between Thailand and the United States were already well-established. For instance, Thai trade with the United States increased from about three million U.S. dollars per year during the pre-World War II period to sixty million dollars in 1949. Over the same period, the number of U.S. firms doing business in Thailand increased from two to fifty (Anan 1984: 251). By 1960 the government admitted that imports from the
United States were the fastest growing and largest in the country (First National Economic Development Plan, 1961-1966). As a result of this developing relationship, U.S. influence replaced that of the British.

Seeing the possibility of obtaining additional assistance and benefits from the United States (and responding to internal and external political pressures), the Thai government in 1950 openly adopted a strong anti-Communist policy and signed the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement with the U.S. In the same year, with U.S. help, Thailand received for the first time a loan for 25.4 million dollars from the World Bank. The amount of direct U.S. economic and military aid was considerable, for example between 1950 and 1975 it totalled 49 billion baht (Girling 1981: 96; Thompson 1975: 16-17). Technical advice and assistance in economic infrastructure construction programs were given through the United States Operation Mission (USOM), the forerunner of the USAID. In many parts of the countryside, e.g., in Nong Faeg, technical advice on agriculture and animal husbandry was provided to villagers by American agricultural advisors and through United States Information Service leaflets (Kingshill 1976: 9, 301).

In 1958, the Thai military-authoritarian regime was established by Field Marshal Sarit. The United States approved of and supported this regime which permitted it to bring Thailand under its political sphere of influence and guide Thailand's economic development in a direction more conducive to U.S. interests. Not only did the U.S. help stabilize the regime through military aid, support of counter-insurgency programs, and construction of roads and highways; but it
also worked with the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Colombo Plan to assist in the establishment of the Thai National Economic Development Board (NEDB) in 1959 (the NEDB 1967: 37). To the government, the first national development plan from the NEDB was important not only as a guideline for the country's economic changes, but also as a requirement for obtaining further loans and aid from other countries and international agencies. The aim of this plan was to promote nationwide economic growth through agricultural modernization, business investment, infrastructure construction (e.g., transportation and electricity), and enhanced political stability.

4.2.2 Resentment

During this period, villagers became increasingly aware of the government's influence through a large number of government activities and programs; the majority of these were imposed on the villagers. Some of the programs were totally contrary to villagers' preferences, but a few others were viewed with mixed feelings—both resentment and appreciation. Some of the government's impositions were demands, e.g., the capitation tax, which were carried over from previous times. Others were new programs or demands which seemed beneficial to the local communities, but which actually caused suffering and resentment on the part of many villagers.

4.2.2.1 Rural Administration

(a) District Officers

During the early period of centralized provincial administration, a number of local aristocrats were appointed to be district officers.
In 1907, the name of the administrative divisions of the country, previously known as Khwaeng (meaning district), was officially changed to Amphoe (also meaning district). This change in title and the accompanying change in administrative structure was intended to enable the central government to replace local authorities with Siamese officials, thus fully implementing its control and rural policies. Initially there was an insufficient number of Siamese officials to fill all the district officer positions, therefore some of the northern aristocrats were appointed. Many of these were lesser aristocrats as the Siamese government saw their promotion as a way of winning support and allegiance. These appointed district officers were given official administrative titles such as Khun, Luang, and Phra. These titles and appointments persisted through until 1932 when the constitutional regime began.

As an illustration, the following were the titles of Saraphi district officers under this new administrative system:

1. Khun Bamrung Ratkhet
2. Cao Worayat Na Chiangmai
3. Luang Nikhorn Paokhet
4. Luang Anumat Rachakit
5. Phra Sriwaranurak
6. Ammat Tree Wanthurat
7. Khun Sanit Pracharat (1929-1936)

The years in office for the first through sixth of these officers were not recorded. However, it is known that Cao Worayat Na Chiangmai was in office sometime between 1912 and 1921. This affirms that the
establishment of the new district office system could have begun around 1907. The fact that some of the early district officers were northern Thai aristocrats or relatives shows that the hierarchically centralized appointed system of district offices was not fully implemented in Chiangmai and other places in the North until the 1930s.

Considering their origin, the source of their authority, and their roles, the district officers were the government in the eyes of the villagers. Between the 1920s and 1960s, villagers saw the district officers as outsiders who were placed in the area by central Thai authority and who did little more than order villagers around, regulate local practices, and involve themselves in activities for private interests. An old informant in the field study area illustrated this by saying that district officers in Sansai and Sankhamphaeng became involved in or supervised the digging or excavation of irrigation canals. Using their positions, they then used the opportunity to claim newly irrigated lands or force-buy such land inexpensively from the villagers.

Another story told by a Nong Faeg villager related to a new irrigation dam to be built at Mae Faeg (North of Chiangmai) around 1935. Many Nong Faeg villagers had hoped to go there and settle on the potentially fertile and valuable land. However, the district officers refused their right to claim or settle on the land. The villagers resented this, first because they could not claim the land, and second because they knew the district officers had the authority and weight of the central government behind them, thus rendering the villagers powerless. They said that they could not resist the officers'
orders even though they knew full well that the officials wanted a portion of the land for themselves and for their influential landlord friends.

(b) Tambon and Village Headmen

Changes were not confined to the district level. The khwaen (a cluster of villages) was changed to tambon. The local leaders of a tambon, although not full government officials, now formally represented the government. In 1956 the Tambon Administration Act created the tambon councils; each tambon had a council which was chaired by a tambon headman and included all the village headmen in the tambon as council members.

During this period, all headmen, although remaining village residents, were given authority to keep law and order and resolve conflicts in their villages according to the 1914 Local Government Act. While this rural administrative reform was going on, many headmen were given a title to signify their entry into the government administrative system. For example, a Nong Faeg tambon headman was given the title khun in 1927. In the Mae Rim district of Chiangmai, a tambon headman was also granted the title khun in 1921 (Tanabe 1981: 205-207).

Headmen responded to the change differently. An increasing number of them, from the villagers' point of view, had become the administrative apparatus of the central Thai government. Accordingly, they were more responsive to the demands and reasoning of the government than to the needs and justifications of their village fellows. As one old villager from Nong Faeg explained:
Before that time, headmen were local leaders. They either were ordinary villagers who gained respect from others or descendants of local resident aristocrats. Their authority, with some exceptions, was primarily locally based and usually backed by traditional local norms. But after 1930, the headmen's authority was the central government, and thus outside based and backed up by the country's laws. This change created a gap or a distance between headmen and villagers.

According to elderly villagers, not all headmen behaved the same way. Some were eagerly responsive to government demands and took advantage of the situation by expanding their influence and grabbing additional benefits. They learned to use or manipulate laws, district officials, and policemen for their own gain. Other headmen complied with government officials, but responded to government demands only occasionally. A few headmen attempted to ignore the role of government and to protect the interests of the villagers. They were usually labeled "stubborn" or "ignorant" by government officials. When asked why headmen reacted so differently to this change, the informants said that it depended on the personality of the headman, village socio-political context, communal sanctions, opportunities to either escape responsibility or gather additional authority and power, and the strength of enforcement from government officials.

From the point of view of a headman, he said he felt like a 'puppet' to the government. This was probably similar to what Moerman observed in a northern Thai village, "In the old days, one was elder of the village. Now the headman is merely the hired messenger of the officials" (Moerman 1969). From the government point of view, it was generally the case that the headman's role was to facilitate engagement between the villagers and officials and from the villagers' point of view
the headman's role was to minimize the necessity for such engagement (Bilmes 1980: 188). However, in the field study villages in 1980 it was also true that some villagers (mostly wealthy, or young, outgoing and active in commercial production and trade or business) preferred to become acquainted and deal directly with the officials.

For instance, liquor distilling and gambling were considered a part of rural life by most villagers and village leaders. As early as the 1950s, however, laws against these activities were strictly enforced especially in the villages not so far from the district office. The district office issued an order to tambon and village headmen saying that these two activities had become illegal and were therefore forbidden. Villagers neither understood nor approved of this directive. They viewed it as an intrusion into their lives and personal as well as communal privacy (using villagers' terms). Many headmen agreed with the villagers but had been ordered to enforce the law. It was said that the Nong Faeg headmen were much stricter in enforcement than those in Khua Mung. This was possibly due to the closer proximity of Nong Faeg to the district center. Consequently, there were more visits by district officials and policemen in attempts to ferret out illegal gambling and liquor establishments. Khua Mung, being further away, was thus more difficult to access. One additional factor was that gambling and distilling were more widely practiced and socially acceptable in the Khua Mung community. Thus, even had the headmen chosen to enforce the law, they would have had a much more difficult time in actively enforcing and justifying it to resentful villagers.
However, there were cases when the headmen were on the villagers' side, for example, in the traditional practice of removing timber from the forest or buying timber from villagers in other districts for construction of houses and temple in the village. It became illegal sometime during the first half of this century and the law was strictly enforced since the early 1960s. The villagers resented the change but learned to cope with this law implementation by paying the bribe demanded by the police at the roadside checkpoints; all costs added up would still make the wood cost less than the sawmill prices (see also Bilmes 1980: 189). Generally, the village headmen personally approved illegal acquisition of wood and did not report cases of such activities to the police. In the 1970s, access to illegally cut timber was more difficult as the forest officials were increasingly strict in their enforcement. Besides, Saraphi was rather far from districts in which construction quality timber was available and a few more checkpoints were set up making a higher risk of getting caught and higher chances of paying bribes at the checkpoints. Villagers thus bought and dismantled house structures belonging to other villagers in the district, or using bricks and cement blocks in constructing their houses.

This process of bureaucratization of the headmen leading to drastic changes in the structure of headmanship and the behavior of the headmen was very effective. For the North, the process had two purposes. First to draw the headmen into the bureaucratic hierarchy, and second to win their loyalty and obedience to the central Thai government. The headmen were delegated considerable authority, granted
privileges, and assigned symbols of hierarchy. For example, a headman could seize a suspect and send him or her to the district office. In addition they received a nominal sum of money from the government monthly, had a right to withhold 3 percent of the taxes they collected for the government, and were granted some tax exemptions. They were given a uniform similar in appearance to official government uniforms. Finally, after 1939, the law required them to be able to speak and write in the central Thai language.

In addition to these changes in the authority, privileges, and distinguishing characteristics of a village headman, a new method of selection was introduced. In the past, headmen had been selected by the villagers without the interference or presence of government officials. Villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung said that the district administration became directly involved in the selection of the headmen after the 1920s. District officers would appear in the village when there was a vacancy in the headman position; any change in the leadership of rural communities had to be reported to government officials. Sometimes district officers selected someone they knew well and "told" the villagers that the man was good and capable; therefore he should be the next headman. Afterwards it was announced that the person had been "elected." Other times, a district officer came into the village to organize the process of nomination and voting. The official would then clearly and obviously make known his choice for election. There were cases where the officials would appear and not interfere with the selection process; however, based on the oral histories, the interference of officials in easily accessible villages was not at all uncommon.
One result of this change in selection process was that the officials gained the allegiance of the headmen. The headmen realized that the district officers had the power and authority to place them in this position or to remove them from it. For the officials, direct control of the selection or election process helped reduce the chances that any headman would not implement government directives. They wanted to be sure that the new generation of headmen had no potentially rebellious leaders to direct the villagers against officials as had happened during the period 1900-1921.

The loyalty and subservience of the tambon and village headmen to the central Thai government was reinforced in many ways. Often members of the Royal Family or high government officials would come to the North; headmen and villagers of the communities around Chiangmai city were ordered to greet them and show their respect. Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villagers distinctly remember one such occurrence when the Thai king traveled to Chiangmai sometime between 1925 and 1932. The district officers would hold meetings of all tambon and village headmen twice a month at their offices. The tambon headmen were required occasionally to attend official meetings by the governor; if unable to attend, they were required to send a proxy. At all of these meetings, the headmen were instructed in the demands of the national government and the requirements of the district office's plans and programs (see also Kingshill 1976: 108). At the same time they were required to report on the success or failure of their assignments from previous meetings. As a final example, the headmen were praised
or rewarded by the officials if they could collect all the taxes and handed in time to the district offices.

(c) The Administrative Village

Originally a cluster of homes was a "natural" village community. This was a unit which received some allegiance from its members, provided social identity, organized communal affairs, and culturally bound its members' lives. Temple affiliation usually defined a village community.

One crucial aspect of the administrative reforms at the district and village levels was the identification and counting of all the villages. After the 1920s, the government introduced the administrative village as the smallest rural administrative governing unit and implemented this process throughout rural Thailand. The rationale for this subdivision was its natural suitability for administration and its convenience for the government. Unfortunately, the natural village was not always suitable for use as an administrative unit. Sometimes it had too many households, other times the households would be scattered and spread too widely; thus, it was not an effective unit for the district and village headman to control. Therefore in some cases a well-populated or geographically large village would be divided into two or more administrative villages with one headman and no more than 60 to 80 households (today the number is 100 to 150 households). There were exceptions to this. At times the primary reason for an administrative division was politics or political security. At other times an administrative village could remain rather large if it was
still in the process of dividing or if the villagers and the headmen insisted on maintaining the existing unit.

The division of villages was mostly dictated from the top down, accordingly it would sometimes cause damage to the village community and resentment among the villagers. This would occur when the administrative village was at odds with the natural village community and the process of division led to conflicts among the villagers. In other cases, given the existing political and socioeconomic divisions in the village, villagers were happy to see this happen. The headmen were often pleased with the reduction in burden and responsibility associated with this division. One headman took care of 240 households in a village, but after its division he was only responsible for 80. This was one reason why during the 1970s and 1980s it was often the headmen themselves who initiated the idea of forming a new administrative division in a large village.

Nong Faeg was divided into two administrative villages around the 1930s and Khua Mung was subdivided into two villages during the early 1940s. Shortly after the division, most of the villagers were resentful because they now saw direct government intrusion into their affairs and their community. They disliked the way their village was officially assigned numbers splitting the community into "Cluster 6" and "Cluster 7" rather than being the "Village of Nong Faeg." They had no choice but to use these numerical designations when in contact with the officials or dealing with matters such as registration and taxation. Villagers' sense of identity began to change because now each group of villagers resided in a "different" village with separate
headmen and administrative procedures. Communal tasks and shared responsibilities had to be divided between the two groups on agreeable terms which were often very difficult and troublesome to attain.

This division not only caused direct resentment, but also instigated social divisions and conflicts which created still further resentment. For example, Nong Faeg villagers began to label each other according to the cluster (Mu) in which one resided. Assessment of blame and scolding previously directed at individuals now were directed at cluster, e.g., "Only people from Mu 7 would do this." Competition and comparisons between the two clusters arose spontaneously, e.g., "How many Mu 6 people were giving to the temple?" or "Mu 7 did the canal cleaning faster." Factionalism, accusations, gossip, hatred, and conflicts which had existed before continued, but now problems between the clusters also arose regularly.

Government development programs and funding assistance often perpetuated the conflicts, jealousy, and dislike between the two clusters. The government now officially saw two villages, Cluster 6 and Cluster 7, where only one had existed before. As a result, it would sometimes bring a development program or provide assistance to only one cluster depending upon its own rationale and justifications and the ability of the individual headmen to draw government support. Cluster 7 might benefit from some program, but not Cluster 6. Likewise, negative factors might only affect one cluster. For example, Cluster 6 was known for illegal liquor production and consumption; thus, officials visited Cluster 6 more frequently for strict searches than they did Cluster 7.
Fortunately, the tensions and conflicts did not become too serious or too widespread. This might be explained in several ways. Nong Faeg village had never had serious factional problems prior to the administrative division. The temple affiliation of Nong Faeg villagers had always been strong; there was only one temple for Nong Faeg and it was situated near the administrative dividing line. The head monk had a strong personality and drew the respect and obedience of all the villagers in both clusters. Socio-economic interactions, e.g., exchange of agricultural labor, marriage, and attendance in household ceremonies, between individuals and households occurred without reference to the neighborhood of cluster boundaries. And finally, the economic classes (wealthy, moderate, and poor) were evenly scattered throughout the village, resulting in a lack of economic distinctions between the two clusters.

The administrative division of Khua Mung into two clusters, Mu 9 and Mu 10, did not cause as much resentment among the villagers there. Only the monks and a small number of villagers were unhappy to see that the administrative division perpetuated and crystallized the factionalism and conflicts between the villagers of clusters 9 and 10. The majority of villagers were either unconcerned or thought it should have been this way all along since the political socio-economic separation already existed. The phenomena maintaining the unit of Nong Faeg were not operative in Khua Mung. In particular, socio-economic classes, kinship groups, and marriages tended to be confined to one cluster or the other, thus crystallizing the opposition between them. Mu 9 was the well-off side and Mu 10 was the poorer side; and
the economic transactions between villagers of the two clusters were on an unequal basis. Mu 9 villagers were the moneylenders, farm employers, and landlords, while Mu 10 villagers were the borrowers, wage laborers, and tenants.

Khua Mung had only one temple, but it was on the Mu 9 side rather than in the middle of the village. This fact and the personalities of the monks and temple personnel (who were often from Mu 9) tended to weaken temple affiliations among the villagers, especially those from Mu 10. Unlike Nong Faeg where the households clustered in an oval about the temple, the layout of Khua Mung tended to increase divisions as the households were scattered for more than a kilometer along a road. Mu 9 was on the north end of the road and Mu 10 along the south end. Only a few of the villagers from either cluster had the opportunity to meet socially with the villagers from the other cluster often.

In summary, the administrative division of the villages had differing detrimental impacts on the two villages. In Nong Faeg the villagers felt more resentment towards the division, as it tried to separate the village. Most of the Khua Mung villagers, however, did not feel much resentment, as the division only tended to reinforce preexisting social and economic differences. There were still a few villagers in Khua Mung who expressed some regrets and unhappiness with the division, e.g., one who said: "If there was no Mu 9 and Mu 10 division, the gap and opposition between the two parts of Khua Mung village might not have become this serious."
4.2.2.2 Registration and Taxation

A new system of registration of villagers was introduced after 1920 that was extensive, effective, and strictly enforced. Unlike the previous registration systems, this one was systematically applied through bureaucratic procedures and well-kept records. This was made possible by the expansion and improvement of the local administration system.

As the villagers said, it was the first time that the government administration and registration system "felt like a fish net wrapped around our lives." The system was made necessary by the government's desire to gain extensive control over the villagers' lives and its need to systematically and effectively extract benefits from them in the forms of labor and cash. The labor required was of two forms: military conscription and occasional labor conscriptions. In the field study area, the cash requirements were for many different types of taxes to be paid in cash. The majority of these taxes were abolished during the late 1920s, or the 1930s and 1940s. Examples of these taxes were: a head tax collected from every male aged 18 to 60 to support government expenses during World War II; salary taxes; poll taxes; taxes for salt and for garden crops such as peanuts, tobacco, garlic and pepper; silk taxes; sugar palm taxes; pig breeding taxes, educational levies; inheritance taxes; land taxes; and capitation taxes (Rangsun 1985: 87-230).

An analysis of the structure of these taxes suggests that many of the important ones were collected equally from all villagers regardless of their socio-economic status and ability to pay. This resulted
in detrimental effects for both the villagers and the government itself. First, since the majority of the villagers were poor, the government could not impose taxes at an excessively high rate; accordingly, it was not able to raise as much money as it wished. Second, this regressive taxation put burdens on the poor villagers who thus felt more pressure than the well-to-do. As a result, the poor's resentment toward the government grew. In addition, it had macroeconomic effects on the country because it prevented the majority of citizens from being efficient producers (they were not encouraged to produce, save, and invest) or good consumers (they had insufficient funds left to buy or exchange for products). The following sections will describe the tax collection and the villagers' perceptions of labor and tax requirements.

Many of the villagers in the field study villages remembered the military and labor conscriptions very well. They dreaded both because the work was hard, dangerous, and deprived households of valuable labor. The military conscription was nothing new, but it was now much more effective as the government's bureaucratic apparatus (the network of district officers and tambon and village headmen) was spread throughout the country. During the Second World War, villagers suffered not only from military conscription, but were also drafted for government labor. Older villagers in Saraphi still remembered the hardship of being conscripted laborers for carrying food supplies and constructing an airplane runway. Many were forced to assist in the construction of a road at Mae Malai leading to the Pai district. These conscriptions, although at the demands of the Japanese, were carried
out effectively through the assistance of the Thai authorities and the Thai registration system. Many of the villagers who were ordered to go had to supply their own oxen and carts to carry food for the troops. When the oxen died, the meat had to be shared. Those who owned no cattle were no better off as they were then required to shoulder-carry their load of the food. Escape attempts did occur, but were rare and often unsuccessful. Many villagers comforted themselves by looking at this as karmic destiny or by trying to appreciate the meager minimum pay they received (it was not clear that pay was even given to everyone or in every case). The general feeling, however, was one of extreme bitterness and resentment towards this oppressive demand on labor. Many villagers died because of the intensity of the work or illness caused by it. One Nong Faeg villager recalled that one of her brothers had returned from Mai Malai only to die of illness resulting from heavy shoulder-carrying.

In 1954 the government introduced a new Conscription Act requiring all men had to report to the district office at 18 to obtain a military conscription certificate. On reaching 21 years of age, the certificate holders would be summoned to a drawing, and some of them would then have to serve in the military for one and a half to two years. The strict and extensive registration imposed on the villagers made it difficult for them to escape conscription. Birth registration, household member or vital statistic registration, and death registration in conjunction with pressure placed on the headmen by district officers enable the officials to maintain tight control (see Public Registration Act 1956 as an example). In addition, the government placed such
importance on efficient military conscription that it assigned an officer to every district office to oversee its enforcement. As a result a villager could not just ignore the summons, escape into the jungle, or migrate to remote towns to avoid it as they had done in the past.

Villagers said that before 1950 many young men would avoid the draft by entering the monkhood. After 1950, many of them sought to avoid it by locating corrupt officials who would take bribes of several thousand baht (now several tens of thousand baht) in exchange for a service exemption for a young villager. The young men usually resented both the conscription and the consequent need for bribery. The parents who had to provide the money, often by borrowing, had mixed feelings. They resented the conscription and the corrupt officials, but at the same time they thought they were lucky to have a means of avoiding the service conscription of their sons. When asked: "Did you have a right to resent the bribery system when you were perpetuating it?", a typical answer was, "Yes, because, first, we had no choice. The government imposed conscription on us without considering our need for labor, support from our sons, and our desire not to risk our sons' deaths in fighting. Second, the officials were greedy. The military needed a certain number of men anyway. If we did not bribe them, while others did, these crooked officials would definitely recruit our sons in place of the bribers' sons into the service."

In addition to these feelings, many villagers, especially the poor, despised the inequality of opportunity for escaping conscription. The poor felt that since they lacked the funds for large bribes, their sons had much greater chances of being conscripted than those of the
One poor villager in Nong Faeg said: "The rich could afford the bribery and keep their children away from the army. The children could then stay home and work and make them richer." In other words, the conscription and bribery system served to indirectly perpetuate economic differentiation in the villages. Poor villagers felt there might have been better ways of running this system: "The officials could have made the whole system more just by asking for only a minimal amount of money or a conscription exemption could be made for a poor family with only one son."

Turning to taxation as a means of extracting capital from the villagers, many of the Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villagers recalled the education levy and the head tax (capitation tax). The government imposed the education levy when implementing the Compulsory Primary Education Act of 1921 because the national budget available for education programs was low (1.9 percent of the total national budget in 1916, 3.0 percent in 1921, and 7.0 percent in 1930). Thus, the government expected the public to share the costs of this program (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 19, 118-121). Every able-bodied male aged 18 to 60 years had to pay between 1 and 3 baht. The amount of money collected varied according to the economic condition of each district. In practice, the government was not able to collect the educational levy from many villagers. It was estimated that only 30 percent of those men who paid the head tax also paid the educational levy. This was probably due to the lack of severe penalties for non-payment and less severe enforcement than in the case of the head tax. In addition, many villagers did not have enough money to pay several kinds of taxes;
and they felt that the collection of the educational levy was unjust. The government not only forced them to go to school, but it also made them pay for a program, which even though potentially beneficial, they had not requested. The educational levy was abolished in 1929, only to be replaced in 1939 by the collection of the Primary Education Contribution in which every male between 20 and 60 years of age paid one baht per year. This was terminated finally in 1950 (Rangsun 1985: 94).

Before 1925, the head tax was 4 baht per year, collected from every male aged 18 to 60. Then in 1925, the tax was increased to 6 baht and collected from every male between 20 and 60. The government only allowed payment of this tax in cash, unlike in older days when payment in kind was sometimes allowed. Strict enforcement was observed and serious penalties were placed on those who refused or failed to pay the head tax. For instance, according to the Ranchupakarn Act of 1925, any villager failing to pay the head tax was to be seized by the headmen or district officers and forced to do government work for twenty days. One Khua Mung villager remembered several cases of poor villagers in the tambon who were unable to pay the tax. They were taken by the district or police officers and put to hard work on district office lawns or road construction projects. In other areas in times of economic difficulty, for example in 1932 when the price of rice dropped drastically, there were large numbers of villagers who did not pay the head tax or other taxes. District officers were empowered to seize the villagers' properties for sale to pay the accumulated taxes. This was done in several cases and was then used as a threat to encourage compliance with the law (Chatthip, et al.,
Villagers, fearing such seizures, had to reduce their consumption or borrow money in order to pay the taxes. The strict enforcement, severe punishments, and the new registration system made tax avoidance very difficult. The collection of the head tax was so effective that it became a major source of government revenue; government income from the head tax was as high as 7 million baht per year (Rangsun 1985: 184). The head tax was finally abolished in 1939.

During the 1920s taxes were collected on various crops grown by the villagers. Some of these crops were commercially grown, e.g., sugarcane, while others were grown for both commercial sale and home or community consumption, e.g., cotton and peanuts. Several other kinds of cash taxes were levied on the villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung. Among these were inheritance taxes, pig raising taxes, and slaughtering taxes.

The inheritance tax was announced in 1933, but not enforced in the field study area until 1935. At that time, it was one of the few taxes allowing a maximum value for exemption; that is, only if the value of the inherited properties exceeded a certain amount were the villagers required to pay the tax. According to one Nong Faeg villager, in the 1950s an inheritance tax of 7 baht per rai of land was collected. This amount of money would buy a chicken at that time.

The pig raising tax was collected according to pig count prior to 1892 and by weight thereafter. It was enforced until 1930 when it was abolished and the government introduced a new set of licenses and taxes related to slaughtering of both pigs and cattle. The rate was rather high, about 5 baht per pig.
For these taxes, the villagers' resentment was not only a result of the amount of money to be paid, but was also caused by the feeling that the government was increasingly intruding into their personal lives with more sets of rules and regulations governing their normal or daily activities. As one of the villagers in Nong Faeg put it: "Wasn't that a displeasure and insult to have to ask for a license in order to slaughter our own livestock and to have to pay tax for a traditional and normal practice like inheritance?"

Land taxes were yet another form of taxation significantly affecting the villagers' livelihoods. The land taxes, although fluctuating at times, in general showed an increasing trend. For example, old villagers in the field study area said that around 1900 the land tax was 30-50 satang per rai. It grew to 100 satang per rai after 1910 and to 25 satang per rai for low quality land and 8 baht per rai for high quality land on any land owned over 5 rai after 1939 (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 190).

With the changes and growth of land acts between 1936 and 1965, the registration of land became more precise and effective. However, it took many years to upgrade the system of securing land rights. For instance, the 1936 land law allowed a district officer to issue a certificate of land occupation a preemption certificate both of which allowed the holders to cultivate and transfer the land legally (other than through inheritance). In 1952, a new Land Act fully implemented the legal means of land ownership and thus turned land into a fully marketable commodity. A systematic land use census taken by tambon headmen was set up by the government. This report would be done and
sent to the district office every two years where it was used as the basis for taxation.

These land laws and registration systems helped to secure the landownership of many villagers. However, they were sometimes used by influential persons to cheat villagers or to seize their land. Also during this period, the government strictly enforced a standard unit of land area measurement, the standard rai, which was 0.4 acres. The traditional local rai was not standardized, but was determined by the land areas around which dikes were built, and could thus be of almost any size. In Nong Faeg and Khua Mung, the enforced use of the "tax rai" was beneficial as villagers now knew how much land they owned and cultivated. However, it was also resented by many villagers because the government now knew exactly how much land was to be taxed. Some tenants also disliked this because the landlords began to assess rents based on the size of the parcel in "tax rai" rather than the approximate size of the land or the amount of yield. During this period, there were many cases of rent adjustment, usually resulting in higher rents for the tenants.

4.2.2.3 Conflict Resolution

Another case of increasing government intrusion into the lives of the villagers was the government's direct involvement in the resolution of conflicts among villagers. Previously, conflicts were resolved according to local customary practices and the judgments of the village headmen or the resident aristocrats. After the 1920s the villagers felt that this traditional system of conflict resolution was undermined and replaced by the government legal system. It could be said that
the expansion of the central Thai administration and its penetration into the village jural system was facilitated and accelerated not only by the countrywide establishment of district offices and police stations, but also by some of the tambon and village headmen and villagers themselves who eagerly grasped the opportunities to utilize the newly introduced formal legal procedures for their own benefit. Thus, attitudes toward this change tended to be mixed; it was detrimental for many villagers, but for others it was beneficial.

According to old villagers in the field study district, the district officers and policemen occasionally visited even as early as the 1930s; the improvement in roads and means of transportation made this much easier for them. In the 1940s the policemen sometimes patrolled the villages and tried to enforce the official laws, becoming involved in conflict resolution and trying to ferret out illegal gambling and liquor distillation. The frequency of these visits gradually increased. These visits were viewed by the villagers as imposing on the headmen and villagers pressure to implement and enforce the new formal legal system.

According to accounts from elderly villagers, there were three aspects involved in this change. First, officials put pressure on the village headmen to enforce the formal legalities and direct sanctions, e.g., sending villagers to be fined or imprisoned. A villager from Khua Mung related one example in which a headman was told by local district officers that if he didn't enforce the new system for conflict resolution, he would be removed from his post and possibly even punished.
Second, many village headmen eagerly utilized the new law and order system to replace some or all of the traditional arbitration means. They realized that the new formal legal system, backed up with official authority, could greatly enhance their authority and influence. For example, a village headman could send outspoken villagers who gave him trouble to the district office; the charge would be disobedience to official authority or acting against the government. The government issued laws to protect officials or those representing official authority, e.g., village headmen, by fines or imprisonment imposed on those who insulted or disobeyed them. The headmen could thus decide on their own which cases to send to the district office or could deal with the cases locally in an arbitrary manner (see also Kingshill 1976: 113).

Third, some villagers learned how to use the formal legal system for conflict resolution. One reason they chose to do so was that this new system was more effective in administering justice. When a headman was weak or could not enforce the settlement of a case, a villager could appeal to the district officers or the police on a formal legal basis for a just resolution. Another reason villagers chose to use the new system was that it provided them the opportunity for fair play. If one person used the new system to settle a conflict, then others would also ignore traditional practices and turn to the new system. This the villagers felt provided them with a similar level of punishment, equal sizes of fines, and similar levels of embarrassment.

At the same time, some of this new system was detrimental and therefore resented. According to stories from villagers, even as
early as the 1930s and 1940s there were some villagers and outsiders who learned to manipulate the formal legal system and used the authority of the officials to take advantage of other villagers. Some used it to circumvent traditional village norms. For instance, there was one case of a moneylender who turned to the police for the appropriation of his debtor's property. Under the traditional norms and practices in the area, the seizure of property from a very poor debtor lacking money to pay his debt was generally considered unkind and not allowed.

In addition, some rich and influential villagers successfully applied legal sanctions to suppress other villagers' expressions of resentment against them. The powerless villagers could not rely on either the headmen or the government for satisfaction. They would express their dissatisfaction by verbal expressions, such as "having money is having the power to push people around," or even the physical destruction of property (e.g., burning haystacks on the influential villagers' rice land), and, on rare occasions, even revenge killing.

It should be noted that during the period between 1920 and 1970 the most common means of conflict resolution in the field study area was still a non-confrontational method of sanctions, compromises, and informal settlements by the headmen or elders. The formal legal procedures and laws were generally only applied when there was a serious crime or unsettled disputes over wealth and property.

4.2.2.4 Modernization and Development Programs

During the period between 1920 and 1970 there were many modernization efforts and rural development programs introduced or imposed by the government. The villagers in the field study communities viewed
the majority of these programs before 1950 as irrational or unjustified demands from the authorities. Only after 1950 were any program efforts made which, in the villagers' eyes, were beneficial to them. The following section will present descriptions and discussion of a few of the programs resented by the villagers.

4.2.2.4.1 Social Modernization Programs

In 1938 Phibun Songkhram became the Prime Minister of Thailand. Inspired by the Great Depression, conflicts with Western powers, and the World Wars, he had a strong desire to modernize the country; thus, between 1939 and 1944 he announced a Rattha Niyom policy. This policy encouraged and enforced many changes aimed at modernizing the country. For example, people were now required to dress in a certain way, speak with proper language, use locally produced Thai products, and trust and obey the national leaders. In addition, there were certain practices that were forbidden as they were viewed as archaic or backward. The order forbidding betel nut consumption was the one most enforced and resented in the villages; it was imposed because Prime Minister Phibun regarded betel nut consumption as a trait of the unmodernized and uncivilized.

Betel nut was normally chewed by most villagers who started when they entered their teenage years. Not only was it pleasant, but it was a traditional practice which had sociocultural symbolic significance. For instance, the wealth and status of a villager could be ascertained from his/her set of betel nut containers: whether they were made of valuable materials, whether the set was large and filled with many kinds of condiments, how well the set was maintained, and whether one
could afford a person to care for it and carry it for him/her. Therefore when the announcement was made of an end to betel nut chewing, many villagers were very upset and felt that it was the government which was being irrational and uncivilized, not them.

After a short time, the government realized that no one was obeying this order. It then ordered the district officers and policemen to enforce the policy strictly. The tambon and village headmen were ordered to assist in the cutting down of all the betel nut trees in the villages. In addition, those caught chewing betel nut were fined by the officials who witnessed the act.

In some villages, the villagers talked the headmen and officials into leaving a few betel nut trees; this was the case in Nong Faeg. However, the majority of the trees were cut down. Resentment toward the government was widespread in rural areas. Many villagers suffered because of their addiction to betel nut and because the supply became scarce and expensive. Some villagers felt even further oppression because they lost their means of livelihood; these were the villagers in the betel nut business.

Another area in which imposed changes for modernization purposes caused great resentment on the part of the villagers was formal education. In 1921 the government began the compulsory primary school system and simultaneously introduced the education levy, even though this was soon abolished. Both the compulsory system and the levy were forced on the villagers. Another levy meant yet another sum of money to be paid to the government. In the early days of implementation, all villagers under 30 years of age were ordered to attend classes;
later, older villagers were also forced to go to adult schools. Even though many villagers managed to avoid these classes by being very old or being poor and absolutely needing to continue working, most villagers were required to attend school for some period of time. This caused a great deal of resentment on their part.

In 1929 the government issued the Sangha Governing Act which resulted in the reform and centralization of the Sangha (Buddhist monks) hierarchy. The village temples and monks were then formally and legally subject to the religious ruling group in Bangkok, the Sangha Council, and its regulations. With this centralization of religious authority and the educational system which had been imposed, the government further stripped the villager of autonomy in their sociocultural lives. A boy was not allowed to become a novice until he had completed at least one year of primary school. Many villagers naturally resented this further imposition as the government forced its views of the importance of higher education on them; as one Khua Mung villager said: "The government has no right to interfere with the villagers' cultural practices."

4.2.2.4.2 Economic Modernization Programs

One of the government economic programs in the rural areas was the credit cooperatives. The first credit cooperative in Thailand was established in 1916 (Cohen 1981: 151); however, the first one in Chiangmai was not created until 1934. By 1949 there were already 21 credit cooperatives operating in Saraphi district. The cooperatives secured money from the government at the rate of 6 percent interest and lent it out again at 8 percent for long-term loans of 4-15 years or 10 percent for short-term loans between 1 and 3 years. The objective behind establishing
the first cooperatives in 1916 had been to relieve poor farmers of indebtedness and thus help them to avoid losing their land. However, since 1961 the government loan policy has changed from being welfare oriented to investment oriented. Therefore, loans were being given only to farmers who were indebted because of farm operations, or to those who wished to expand production (Cohen 1981: 155).

The cooperatives' loan services were viewed differently by various groups of villagers. For landowners, the cooperatives presented an opportunity for them to buy additional land, pay off other debts, and invest in the expansion of their farm operations. It was reported that in the 21 co-ops in Saraphi district in 1949 there were 344 members with total outstanding loans of 209,538 baht. These 344 members were all landowners with 103 of them owning less than 6.25 rai and the rest owning more than this (Bau 1951: 12). Thus, for many landowners the system was very beneficial.

There were four reasons for which many other villagers despised this program and thus the government. First, the government made no attempt to design the program such that all villagers could benefit equally; the loans from the cooperative required a mortgage. Villagers with small pieces of land or no land were thus excluded from the program. Elderly villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung explained: "Villagers in general felt that the government was unjust and unfair to concentrate attention and assistance to only the landowners while ignoring the landless who would need help first and the most. The government money only went into better-off families, helping them to
keep their land, expand their land, and increase their production. This would lead to an increasing gap between the rich and the poor."

Second, many of the landowners resented the program because it allowed privileges to be granted. The fund for loans was limited and competition was stiff. "Usually villagers with a larger amount of land or with better connections with the officials had priority in getting the loans and would also get larger amounts and better terms on the loans," said some of the villagers in the field study area.

Third, many villagers, particularly in Khua Mung, disliked the 1961 change in policy in that the government would help only those expanding their production and thus perpetuated indebtedness. One of them said: "The new policy is aimed at benefitting only the entrepreneurial farmers. At the same time it pushed villagers to invest and produce more. The sales and profits were, however, unreliable because of unpredictable outputs and instability in price and market. Therefore, those who borrowed and invested had a high probability of not eliminating their debt, but falling into more debts and more borrowing."

Fourth, the villagers saw that, intentionally or not, the government perpetuated the wealth and influence of the well-to-do villagers. Many landowning villagers borrowed money from the cooperatives and made a profit by lending it out again to needy villagers at higher interest rates. Thus, the government not only let the landowners who were already wealthier have the benefit of borrowing money themselves, but they allowed these richer villagers to use the cooperatives' loans to take advantage of the poorer villagers.
In 1966 the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives was established to provide credit and loans to farmers' groups, farmers' cooperatives, and individual farmers with funds from the government. Its branch office in Chiangmai was established in 1968.

4.2.2.4.3 Political Modernization Programs

After the 1932 coup d'état, the democratic constitutional government attempted to get villagers involved in parliamentary elections; this was one of the forms of political modernization pursued by the government. However, to the villagers, voting was one more task demanded by the district officers. They resented it because they were ordered to vote in the elections that they did not understand and saw no benefits in doing so. Being compelled to comply, they felt another aspect of their subjugation to the government which they resented.

4.2.2.5 Reactions

The phenomena described above are all instances in which the villagers developed a strong dislike or resentment toward the government and its officials, who they felt were responsible for the changes. Some of these changes and programs increased their subjugation to the government, some brought humiliation and embarrassment, and some stripped the villagers and their communities of privacy and autonomy. The villagers in this period gradually began to feel the central Thai government: its presence, its functions, and its power. Most villagers at one time or another faced at least one of these programs and resented it. Many of the villagers could conceptualize that it was not individuals but a whole body of offices and a network of
officials who were continuously controlling them; they felt an oppressive domination by the government. An illustration of this was provided by one Khua Mung villager: "The government, with its extensive administrative arms and its control of power that was far beyond us, could always issue unjust orders accompanied by the enforcement of severe sanctions."

Villagers in this period, especially those who perceived persecution or oppression, did not always tolerate it. In 1924, there was the Holy Men of Nong Ma Kaew Rebellion in the Northeast because the villagers had suffered through years of drought and were being hard-pressed by the tax collectors. In the same year in Udon there was resistance by the villagers to tax collection. Between 1932 and 1936 there were petitions and demonstrations against the government cooperative programs, which villagers perceived as unequal in benefits and permitting the rich to take advantage of the poor; one such petition had over 5,000 villagers' signatures on it. In Korat in the Northeast in 1959, there was a millenarian resistance (Phim Thai Newspaper 1924: 8; Chatthip, et al., 1980; Ramsay 1979: 294; Prani 1963: 54-56; Thompson 1967: 389; and Sittidej 1977: 23, 49-54).

In the field study villages there were no incidents of resistance or rebellion; there was only verbal resistance and an expression of unwillingness to cooperate in government programs. According to villagers, there were various reasons for modest resistance rather than rebellion. Local officials in the field study area would often allow the villagers leeway in avoiding rules and regulations. The government's providing of assistance or benefit programs eased the
villagers' discontent. Many villagers' perceptions were also influenced by karmic doctrines. They saw that the government and officials were their superiors; this superiority and its legitimacy were derived from earning a greater amount of merit in their previous lives. The villagers were thus karmically destined to trust and be subordinate to them, and their consequent suffering was a result of misdeeds in previous lives. Discussions with many villagers revealed that although some villagers truly believed in their karmic justifications, others used these explanations to comfort themselves for their powerlessness over the inevitable oppression or unjust orders from the government and its officials. For example, realizing that the power of the ruling groups and the government made resistance a mortal or serious risk, these villagers relied on some religious or karmic explanations to pacify themselves for their ill fate, e.g., a villager said, "Those who oppressed us would be punished in their next lives even though we cannot do anything to them now." The most important reason for their conditional resignation, however, was probably a fear of government repressive measures. As one elderly Khua Mung villager said: "The government was so powerful and impossible to oppose. It was just like the sun which one cannot even look directly at, much less touch or affect in any way." Interestingly, some of the analogies used by the villagers in describing their perception of the power of the government and its officials were similar to those used in describing the aristocrats in older days.

Under the pressures of increasing and extensive demands from the government, various village norms and mechanisms assisted poor and
needy villagers in coping with the pressures placed on their livelihood or subsistence. These norms and mechanisms which had persisted from the previous period included: the right to gather leftover rice after the harvesting, the right to beg for rice door-to-door, free meals and rice provided at the village temples and at household ceremonies, rice loans without interest, and the charity practice of tan tord. However, due to rapid socio-economic changes these forms of help became less frequent, more incidental, and more circumstantial. After the 1960s, many of these forms of aid were no longer functional, e.g., the tan tord and free interest rice loans from non-close-kin.

4.2.3 Appreciation

While villagers saw some government programs as being forced upon them and were resentful, they also saw other policies and programs as being of help to them. Among the government actions they appreciated were those relating to transportation, agricultural modernization, health, welfare, and law and order.

4.2.3.1 Transportation

Between 1920 and 1970 transportation improved tremendously. The completion of a railroad connecting Bangkok and Chiangmai in 1922 facilitated the export of rice from the North. Villagers in the field study area remembered how easily and for what high prices they could sell their rice during the 1920s and early 1930s. Before the coming of the railroad from the district center to Chiangmai city, the villagers would have to awaken at 2 a.m. and spend the whole day walking to the city; afterwards, they could just walk to the district center.
and catch a train. By the 1950s there were two trains each day into the city and a regular bus service passing through the district center (Kingshill 1976: 292). In 1916 the government improved the road between Chiangmai and Lamphun connecting the Saraphi district center to Chiangmai city. Then a dirt road connecting Khua Mung and Nong Faeg to the main road to Chiangmai city and Lamphun city was built in 1937. By the 1950s the Chiangmai-Lamphun road had become a paved all-weather highway, but the village road could still only be used during the dry season. It was gradually improved until in 1974 it too became an all-weather road. This road made it convenient for the villagers to come out of the villages everyday for trade or work. Many villagers began to use bicycles; in 1953 there were 40 bicycles in Nong Faeg, and by 1965 there were 122 bicycles, one motorcycle, and five minibuses (Kingshill 1976: xii). For transporting produce, ox carts were still in use even in the 1950s and 1960s, although their popularity was decreasing. In 1953 in Nong Faeg there were only 10 carts.

Improvements in transportation were generally beneficial. However, as a few villagers pointed out, they did have at least one negative side effect: it was now much easier for the government officials to come visit and bring with them "unpleasant orders."

4.2.3.2 Agricultural Modernization

The government also assisted villagers in both irrigation products and agricultural technology. Although the government put priority on building and improving transportation, e.g., railroads, a number of irrigation projects were completed even early in the period. Two irrigation improvement projects in the field study area were provided
by the government. One was the Old Ping Irrigation system in which
the Royal Irrigation Department constructed a large concrete weir across
the Ping River in 1939-1941; this benefitted a large land area in
Saraphi district (Bau 1951: 3). The government also provided funds
to improve the Tha Wang Tan weir in 1956; in 1969, the Tha Sala weir
was improved to be permanent concrete. In addition, the government
enacted a law in 1939 regulating communal irrigation systems.

With these irrigation projects, a huge area of rice land was
irrigated. Most villagers appreciated the government's assistance
with these projects. With better irrigation they saw that diversification
of crops was now possible, dry season cultivation could be done,
and the value of their rice land increased. One old villager from
Khua Mung said with appreciation: "For farmers, it was a blessing
to have irrigation. A reliable supply of water brought expected yields.
Also, irrigation systems since 1939 have brought enough water for a
second rice planting and garden crops." (See also the account of an
elderly lady in Kingshill 1976: 379.)

The villagers were also grateful for the government's construction
of a permanent weir at Tha Sala. Before its construction, all the
villagers benefitting from the weir had to contribute labor and
resources to rebuild the weir across the Ping River which was washed
away during the flood season every year. The task was burdensome and
posed some danger, thus the villagers were happy to be rid of it.

Irrigation systems provided great benefits but also created conditions for conflicts over the supply and use of water among villagers
and between villages. However, the government irrigation regulations
and intervention of government officials could help to reduce these
conflicts or arbitrate them.

The government also introduced and supplied several other types
of modern agricultural technology. Most of this technology was viewed
as beneficial by the villagers at that time. Only after 1970 did some
of them begin to realize that acceptance of new agricultural technology
was not always advantageous. Among the technologies introduced were
new strains of rice which had higher yields and stronger pest and
disease resistance. Improved varieties of rice seeds were provided
to the villagers in Saraphi district free of charge in 1940. The most
significant variety was a glutinous rice which gave a yield almost
30 percent higher than most local varieties (Bau 1951: 15).

Improved varieties of cash crops were also introduced. For
example, between 1935 and 1940 villagers in the field study area began
to plant Virginia tobacco. New varieties of peanuts, soybeans, and
other crops were first introduced in the 1950s; the government also
supplied new types of fish to the villagers for breeding (see also
Kingshill 1976: 111). The use of chemical fertilizers, under experiment
in the late 1940s, was introduced in the 1950s to a limited number
of villages in Saraphi district. Only in the 1960s did villagers begin
the widespread use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and insecticides.
By the late 1940s the government had begun its program of cattle disease
control; official veterinarians regularly visited the villages (see
also Bau 1951: 18; Kingshill 1976: 110). In 1968, the Department of
Agricultural Extension was established, and by the 1970s there were	tambon agricultural extension workers stationed in the field study
area.
4.2.3.3 Health Programs

Among the serious health problems in the villages between 1920 and 1950 were influenza, malaria, and child mortality. During the 1920s there was an outbreak of malaria in the area resulting from the return of men who had gone to work on government railroad tunnel construction. In 1930 there was a major epidemic of influenza or pneumonia killing as many as 100 Nong Faeg villagers and 60 in Khua Mung (see also Kingshill 1976: 23). During the period of 1920 to 1950, malaria was probably the disease that caused the most illness and deaths among both children and adults in both Nong Faeg and Khua Mung. In addition to evidence from oral histories, an FAO survey in 1949 seems to confirm this statement. Of the 17,695 agricultural workers in Saraphi district, 8,776 of them (50 percent) were stricken by malaria and lost working days because of it (Bau 1951: 23).

Since 1950, illness and child mortality have been reduced by various government programs. The government introduced the WHO UNICEF Malaria Control Program in 1949. DDT sprayings began in 1950 in the field study area. Medicine for malaria was also provided by the program through government health officials and the tambon doctors (these were villagers, sometimes traditional medicine men, who were selected by district officials to receive training and be licensed to distribute modern medicines. The tambon doctor system was first established in 1907 but was not very active until the 1950s). Government services for immunization and vaccination became increasingly available. The improvement in roads and transportation made it possible for villagers to visit doctors in Chiangmai city at the two government health centers.
established in the 1950s and at non-government centers such as McCormick hospital and Dr. Chinda's hospital which were known to villagers since at least the early 1950s.

4.2.3.4 Law, Order, and Regulations

According to villagers, a few aspects of law and order were improved by the increasing presence of government authority. For example, cattle thefts gradually decreased as the traditional organized crime prevention system was revised and strengthened by government authority. To elaborate a little, cattle raising became very popular and made an important contribution to the villagers' livelihoods. During the 1930s and 1940s, periods of economic hardships, cattle theft became frequent. Many villagers revived their traditional crime prevention system, i.e., when there was a theft, an alarm would be sounded, male villagers would rush out of their houses under the leadership of the headmen, and the thieves would be pursued. This was not always effective. District officers and policemen began to support this self-help system by instituting patrols and providing armed officers to chase after the thieves. Thieves who were caught were then sent to the district and provincial centers for serious punishment. In many cases, the villagers approved of policemen killing thieves without bringing them to court for legal processing. This killing reportedly deterred thieves, resulting in less cattle theft. In addition, village headmen were legally charged with enforcing law and order. They and their assistants were allowed to carry and use arms. Besides, challenging the headmen now meant challenging the government and its troops of armed officers.
Some of the regulations introduced by the government were appreciated by the villagers. For example, in 1930 the government introduced the metric system as the official standard measure for paddy purchase (British Consular Report 1937: 24). In the North, the metric system only took effect after 1936. This attempt at modernization made to facilitate the commercialization of agricultural produce set the villagers free from one of the conditions which had allowed rice merchants to swindle them. In particular, the standard measures in conjunction with government enforcement of their implementation gradually replaced the variations in older measures such as coconut shells and baskets which the rice merchants had used to their advantage.

4.2.3.5 Social and Economic Welfare

At times during this period the government implemented programs and actions which were beneficial to their social and economic welfare in the eyes of the villagers. Some of these were tax reduction, education, and government assistance in times of difficulty or need.

In 1932 the new government, the Constitutional government of the People's Party, came to power and began the land tax reduction program. Land taxes were initially reduced by 20 percent and later by 30 percent. In 1939, the new Revenue Code abolished the capitation tax and the fixed rate land tax based on size and location. It established instead a land tax collected according to the total appraised price of the land. The land price in each area was determined by a committee consisting of district officers, tambon headmen, and selected respectable local residents. This locally determined system of land pricing and the resulting tax was considered just and appropriate in the villagers'
eyes. Even so, on occasion the system would be abused as local elite would use their positions on the price committees to protect their own investments and to patronize other villagers.

One other feature of the new tax system which appealed to village landowners, large and small alike, was that it allowed a tax exemption for 5 rai of residential and garden areas for each household. (Two of the reasons for a change in the land taxation system were for the government to gain popularity and to prevent rural unrest or disorder during the economic difficulties of the Great Depression (1929-1937) and the Second World War (1939-1945). During these times when rice prices dropped drastically, consumer goods were rare and expensive, and indebtedness among the villagers was widespread, the new government tax policy was greatly appreciated by the villagers.

The government had attempted to provide formal primary education to villagers even before 1921 when the Compulsory Primary School Act was introduced. As of 1918 there were already 2,423 local public schools with approximately 100,000 students and 3,000 teachers. After 1921, the expansion of educational services was evident. By 1948 there were 18,066 local public schools with 2,500,000 students and 63,000 teachers (Kingshill 1976: 85). However, in the field study area the public primary school was not established until the 1930s. The village schools originally only offered education through grade 4 which was the level established as compulsory. (In the 1960s the compulsory education level became grade 6.) The villagers in general did not go to school beyond grade 4; for example, in Nong Faeg in 1953 there were only two villagers who had studied as high as the seventh grade (even the head school teacher had not).
This did not mean that the villagers were unappreciative of the educational program. Before this time, only a few men knew how to read and write, and then only in the northern Thai language which they had learned from the monks or their fathers. Central Thai was considered privileged knowledge; only a few men in the villages, mainly members of aristocratic families, were literate in this language. The villagers in the field study area remembered how one man had to pay an aristocrat-related person to write him letters or documents in Central Thai and others had to save money to pay this person for teaching them Central Thai. During the period between 1910 and 1930, Central Thai was taught in the temples by the monks; only villagers who became monks or novices could learn the language. As still happens often today, many villagers would join the temple out of a desire to receive an education. Thus, before the 1930s the only ones who knew Central Thai were those born to aristocratic families, the wealthy, or those who became monks and novices.

Villagers responses to the government compulsory education program varied between different groups as well as through time. Many of the aristocrats or well-to-do who knew Central Thai disliked the program because it cost them one of their sources of status, prestige, and income. However, the majority of villagers were grateful for the program for a variety of reasons. First it gave everyone an equal opportunity to receive an education. Second, the government gave everyone who did well in school and completed the primary education system between 1920 and 1940 the opportunity to become a local primary school teacher, regardless of economic status. This equal opportunity employment was also extended to those ex-novices or ex-monks who had
received a high ecclesiastical education and had a good knowledge of Central Thai. They too could become primary school teachers receiving 8 baht per month. After the 1920s and until probably the early 1970s a rough equivalence between levels of ecclesiastical education and secular education was allowed. Thus one could use time as a novice or monk to establish the academic requirements for a higher secular education. Third, the collection of the educational levy was resented by the villagers, but at the same time it was equally collected from the rich and the poor. Thus the villagers may not have felt it was justified, but at least they thought it was fair. An old villager from Khua Mung explained: "The levy was unjust because the government collected so many kinds of taxes already; why couldn't it just provide education free of charge? Actually, to make the program a just one, the government could have collected the levy from the better-off. Worst came to worst, it was tolerable that money was collected from the rich and the poor alike." This was the feeling among the villagers while the benefits of education for them and their children was not so clear in their perceptions.

After the education program had existed for two or three decades, many villagers came to realize that it benefitted them and their children in several ways: for contacts and communication with the government offices, with the Chinese and Central Thai traders, and in looking for off-farm employment in provincial cities where the Central Thai language was commonly used. Yet, they still felt that education should not be compulsory. An adult working on a farm should not be forced to go to adult classes; and villagers should have the
choice of sending only some of their children to school while others could be home, working on the farms, and thus requiring no education.

The villagers also at times viewed the government as benevolent when it would provide assistance in times of economic difficulties or subsistence hardship. For example, during the drought and rice famine in Thailand in 1919, the government Rice Control Board distributed rice to the villagers in the forms of free welfare assistance and loans. There were also times in which some land areas were exempted from taxes because of difficulties even though the government knew this would result in a reduction in national revenue (Chatthip, et al., 1981: 190, 195).

Other than rare, but serious, droughts, the other major cause of crop failure in the Saraphi district was flooding (Bau 1951: 23). Most older villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung remembered the big flood of 1953. The flood occurred at the worst time, just as the rice plants were beginning to sprout grains and when the rice supply in the villagers' bins was low. The flood destroyed both the rice in the fields and in the rice bins. The villagers were left without food and requested help from the government; the government in turn responded by purchasing rice from Chinese merchants and periodically distributing 5 litres of rice to each village household member. Villagers mentioned with appreciation: "The government even counted and gave 5 litres of rice to baby household members." Subsistence assistance from the government in such situations has been common up through the present time. There have also been other forms of welfare assistance, for example the distribution of blankets to poor villagers during years with bad winters.
4.3 Increasing Commercialization of Agriculture and Expanding Trade: Market Forces and the Government's Role

This section will begin with a description of the increasing commercialization of agriculture and the expansion of trade at both the regional and village levels. After that it will elaborate on the phenomena which affected the progress of the commercialization process. Finally, it will analyze the villagers' motivations and the pressures placed on them to accept and participate in the commercialization and the new economic opportunities afforded by it.

In brief, the period from 1921 to 1970 was marked by an evident increase in the commercialization of agriculture and trade in the northern region. Through an extensive network of markets and pricing systems, northern Thai villages were commercially linked not only to Bangkok and other regions of the country, but to the world market as well. This was chiefly a result of the economic integration of the North, facilitated by the completion of the northern railroad, the influence of the Chinese merchants, and the political integration of the region which was aided by the expansion of the local administration system. Various government programs and policies, favorable market demands and the market system, and the rapid growth of population and scarcity of land enhanced and facilitated this commercialization of the agriculture system. Other phenomena, for example natural disasters and World War II, were responsible for disrupting the commercialization. Two distinct differences from the previous time were that, first, the government began to intervene directly in the promotion of agricultural production for export, and, second, that the agricultural production
and trade in the North became very sensitive to the world economic situation.

Interactions between these external phenomena, the process of commercialization, and the villagers' responses showed up in the transformation of arrangements for land, labor, and capital. Villagers increasingly participated in the agricultural commercialization, as well as in old and new cash generating activities, e.g., trading and vending, servicing of support vehicles (truck and mini-bus transportation, tractors), off-farm employment, and the selling of labor. Prior to 1921 the motivating pressures behind this change were the government's demand for taxes and labor, the villagers' needs, and the emerging economic opportunities. Between 1922 and 1970, these motivations persisted in differing degrees, but were supplemented by new economic opportunities and the induced attractions of urban/manufactured consumer goods, modern construction materials and furniture, and other amenities and services.

4.3.1 Commercial Production of Rice and Cash Crops and the Integration of the Village Economy into the World Economy

By the beginning of the period (1922-1970), the commercial significance of Great Britain and Burma to northern Thailand had begun a rapid decline. In part this was caused by the introduction of the northern railway system. This was totally unexpected by the British, who had participated in the construction of the railway, figuring that this new means of transportation would secure their supply of teak, create a market for their manufactured goods, and provide access to reliable supplies of rice for their colonies. Reductions in Burmese
trade resulted not only from the opening of the railroad, but also from the imposition of duties on matches, cigarettes, and silk goods by the British Government of India and from increasing banditry on the Burmese side. By 1925 Burmese imports to northern Thailand had dropped to 139,778 pounds compared to 211,000 pounds in 1914. Exports from northern Thailand to Burma also decreased from 261,000 pounds in 1914 to 169,296 pounds in 1925 (Cohen 1981: 75; Suthy 1975: 258-259, 264).

British imports remained dominant in the region until around 1930. At this time, Japanese imports took the lead until after World War II when the United States began to dominate the import scene. By the beginning of the 1950s British political and economic influence in both northern Thailand and the country as a whole had been totally replaced by the influence of the United States.

For the Thai government, the completion of the northern railroad connecting Chiangmai and Bangkok in January 1922 assisted in the implementation of the government's modernization objectives in two ways. It aided in the expansion of the political-administrative system in the North, and it increased agricultural production for both internal consumption and export.

In the early days of the railroad there were some problems such as high freight costs and insufficient numbers of cars (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 103-104). Waterway transportation between Bangkok and the North was also still in use. Despite these drawbacks, the railroad contributed greatly to the expansion of production and trade in the North. In 1924 and 1926 the British Consul observed that the rice export business had stimulated growth in agriculture and the
expansion of agricultural lands in Chiangrai and the Chiangmai valley (Cohen 1981: 59). This suggests that the expansion of production and of agricultural lands with irrigation had not been economically beneficial until the emergence of a viable and lucrative export market.

In understanding the increasing commercialization of agriculture and trade in northern Thai villages and their economic integration into the larger systems, an examination of the commercial production of rice alone is not sufficient. One must also examine the commercialization of non-staple cash crops, which came after that of rice, and other aspects of the villagers' livelihoods, e.g., cash earning activities which were closely related to the commercialization and change. The following sections will examine rice, non-staple cash crops, animals, trade, and outside employment.

4.3.1.1 Rice

The advent of large-scale commercial production of rice in the North in the 1920s and the increasing integration of the village economy into the world economy did not only occur because the northern railroad was constructed. It also depended on the fact that Bangkok became the most important commercial port for the North and had strong connections with the international markets for rice, e.g., in the Netherlands East Indies, Japan, and China (Cohen 1981: 59). In addition, there was a boom in the demand for rice on world markets beginning in 1922. The post-World War I economic boom and resulting population growth kept the price of rice high, making it attractive to exporters. Prices increased gradually, peaking between 1925 and 1929 (Ingram 1971: 38). In 1923 the British Consul at Chiangmai
reported that large amounts of rice were being exported; in 1924 not only was a constantly increasing amount of paddy exported by rail, but rice mills made possible the export of husked rice (Cohen 1981: 59). The increase in rice exports was rapid. In 1925 rice exports from the North by railway alone amounted to 650,000 piculs and by 1935 had increased to 1,300,000 piculs (Ingram 1971: 47). Prices of glutinous rice increased with demand, from 51 to 58 baht per 1000 kilograms in 1920 to 80 baht per 1000 kilograms in 1924 (British Consular Reports 1924). The increase in price might have been even larger except for the fact that the 1920 price was already unusually high due to a severe drop in rice production during the extensive 1919 drought (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 180-182).

Imports to the North also increased with the coming of the railway. Trade of manufactured goods increased not only because villagers had increasing access to cash, but also because stores increased in number and the delivery of goods from Bangkok became reliable. As early as 1923, there were reports of an increasing flow of goods such as hardware, petroleum, machinery, matches, and cutlery into the North (Economic Conditions in Siam, Reports 1923).

During the rice export boom of the 1920s, rice mills—a symbol and tool of commercialization of agriculture—were established in rural northern Thailand. By 1930, there were already 11 rice mills in Chiangmai (British Consular Report 1930). Most of these were small with a milling capacity of 20 to 30 tons per day as compared to the larger mills in Bangkok with capacities of 100 to 200 tons per day (Ingram 1971: 70). However, rice milled locally accounted for 35 percent of the total rice exports from the North (Ingram 1971: 47).
By 1954 the total number of rice mills had increased to 28 in Chiangmai and 62 in the whole northern region.

The rice export boom ended in 1929 with the onset of the Great World Economic Depression. Economic difficulties and disruption of exports then continued through the turmoil and inflation of the Second World War. From 1945 through 1954 the government monopolized rice markets, partly due to the need to pay 1.5 million tons of rice designated as war reparations for Thailand's role on the losing side of the War. The government also used this monopoly as an instrument to depress rice prices for the benefit of urban consumers. Throughout the period of monopoly, the government fixed the price for surplus rice sold to the Rice Office at about 20 percent below the price at which the government sold the rice to private exporters. This placed the burden directly on the rice farmers. For example, during the Korean War of 1951 to 1953 there was a rice export boom, even so it was estimated that rice farmers received only one half of the price they could have obtained in the free market (Anan 1984: 162-163).

In 1955 taxation on rice exports, known as the rice premium, was established. Its effects were similar to those of the postwar monopolistic control, however, the rice premium was more systematic in extracting cash taxes from exporters thus resulting in an increase in the country's revenues. Exporters were levied a tax at between 25 and 35 percent of the total value of the exported rice (Ingram 1971: 247; Ammar 1975: 236). The rice premium contributed as much as 17 percent of total government revenues in the first few years after its introduction (Pasuk 1980: 225). This was favorable to the government as the increased revenues replaced those lost by the reductions in
land taxes and the abolition of the capitation tax. During the late nineteenth century, these two taxes together had accounted for 8 to 12 percent of state revenue (Pasuk 1980: 221). This new form of revenue had the side benefit of eliminating the collection of two forms of tax which had caused much resistance and resentment on the part of the villagers; the rice premium program thus assisted the government in avoiding or reducing resentment among rural people.

Another major motive behind this program was to depress the internal price of rice to subsidize urban rice consumption (Pasuk 1980: 225). The resulting low cost of living in urban areas then reduced dissatisfaction with the government, facilitated development of the industrial sector, and reduced urban wages and hence the cost of production of urban goods and services which were purchased by the rice farmers (Pasuk 1980: 227).

Meanwhile, the government tried introducing and encouraging modern agricultural technology such as chemicals (for example, fertilizers and insecticides), new crop varieties, and the double cropping system on a large scale. Irrigation construction and improvement projects were also carried out by the government. Profits and market situations became increasingly attractive to the villagers whether they were trying to increase their earnings, eliminate debts, or just make ends meet. As a result, a double rice cropping system was used extensively in many areas of Chiangmai, in particular in Saraphi district in the 1940s. (In one tambon of Saraphi district, a second crop of rice and dry season garlic cultivation was introduced on a limited scale by an aristocrat in residence at the turn of the century [Calavan 1977: 151].) In 1949 in Saraphi district it was reported that 27,133 rai
(about 61 percent of total cultivated area) was used for follow-crop cultivation in the dry season. This was roughly divided into 45 percent dry season rice, 9 percent peanuts, 2 percent soybeans, 2 percent vegetables (mainly garlic), and 1 percent tobacco (Bau 1951: 9). The dry season rice grown extensively since the 1940s in the district and field study villages was primarily a non-glutinous variety intended for sale rather than home consumption (Bau 1951: 15; Kingshill 1976: 50; and information from elderly Khua Mung villagers).

Triple cropping had been practiced in Saraphi district since the early 1950s, but on a very limited scale, even though double cropping was already rather extensive (Kingshill 1976: 29). It was only in the late 1960s that the practice became popular with many households (Anan 1984: 258; information from Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villagers).

The modern days of agricultural technology and manufactured inputs probably began with the use of tractors. Prior to 1950 the use of tractors in northern Thailand was virtually nonexistent. Villagers in the field study areas and elsewhere used only buffaloes, oxen, ploughs, and simple hand tools (Pasuk 1980: 207; Bau 1951: 19). By 1954 there was at least one tractor doing ploughing service in the field study area (Kingshill 1976: 9, 48). Villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung began using hand tractors in the 1960s. At the national level, use of tractors in agriculture increased from 32,000 wheel tractors between 1958 and 1961 to 144,000 tractors between 1966 and 1969 (Pasuk 1980: 208). Data from a survey of over 2000 households in the North show that households which owned tractors increased from 56 percent in 1979 to 62 percent in 1982 (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 1982: 74). At the same time, the country's use of
manufactured agricultural inputs increased rapidly. For example, fungicides and insecticides went from 49,000 tons between 1954 and 1957 to 506,000 tons between 1966 and 1969. Use of chemical fertilizers also increased from 76,000 tons in 1954-1957 to 890,000 tons in 1966-1969 (Pasuk 1980: 208). However, in the field study area they were not widely used until the late 1960s; then they were used in the cultivation of cash crops such as garlic, vegetables, peanuts, tobacco, and non-glutinous rice.

4.3.1.2 Non-staple Cash Crops

The commercialization of garden crops or non-staple crops occurred later than that of rice and at a slower pace without any dramatic export booms. Only after the first half of this century did the commercial production of garden crops progress significantly, finally becoming intensive in the 1970s.

At the turn of the century, one of the most important cash crops for export in the North was cotton. The coming of the railway in 1922 reduced cotton trade through the transfrontier route and stimulated the importation of manufactured cloth from abroad, primarily from Britain and Japan. Women in the cities and towns were the first to give up spinning and soon were followed by the villagers (Curtis 1903: 159-161). In 1926 it was reported that the export of cotton had ended and that scarcely sufficient cotton was even grown for home use (Le May 1926: 99). By the 1930s cotton cultivation had decreased to a level such that most of the cotton used by commercial weavers in Chiangmai and Lamphun was imported (Andrews 1935: 127). In the field study area,
the villagers said that during that time only a few looms and spinning wheels were in use and only a few cotton patches were tended.

As cotton cultivation faded out, villagers in the district around Chiangmai grew vegetables such as tomatoes, cabbage, cauliflower, and peas in much larger amounts for sale in Chiangmai and Lamphun cities (Andrews 1935: 30). Older villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung recalled that in addition onion, garlic, chilli pepper, tobacco, and beans were grown to meet the demands of the markets in town; both demand and price on these items tended to fluctuate.

Tobacco was an important trade item in the North and in the field study area during the early portions of the century. In 1924 the tobacco area under cultivation in the North was estimated to be 14,000 rai (Cohen 1981: 68). A survey done in 1930 and 1931 revealed that tobacco was generally grown for the primary purpose of home consumption with only the surplus going to market (Zimmerman 1931: 142). In 1936 the British Tobacco Company introduced Virginia tobacco and by 1938 approximately 6,000 rai of it were growing in Chiangmai. This area increased to 47,000 rai by 1967 (Cohen 1981: 68). Informants in the field study area reported that the cultivation of tobacco was widespread until the late 1960s when villagers stopped growing it because: it required intensive inputs of labor and capital, it was highly susceptible to pests; climate and water supply made the yield very unreliable; and the price was not satisfactory given the increasing costs of the inputs.

Soybeans and peanuts were also among the popular crops in the field study area. They were in demand in the Bangkok markets since the late 1920s when Thailand was mostly importing them from China.
Given the higher demand for peanuts, more cultivation area was allocated to them. For example, in Saraphi district in 1949, 4,430 rai of peanuts were grown as opposed to 1,046 rai of soybeans (Bau 1951: 9). It was also reported in 1954 that villagers in Nong Faeg preferred growing peanuts to soybeans (Kingshill 1976: 50). Although villagers had grown these two crops for a long time, new varieties were introduced in the late 1930s and high yield strains were brought in and widely cultivated in the late 1960s.

As early as the 1940s garlic had been one of the important cash crops in Saraphi district given the strong market demand in Bangkok (Bau 1951: 8). However, in the field study villages it was not grown extensively until the late 1960s when new varieties, fertilizers, and insecticides were generally available. In the 1970s garlic became the most important dry season cash crop in Nong Faeg and, other than rice, became the most crucial main crop in Khua Mung.

Longan has been the most important income generating fruit tree in Saraphi district. The trees bear fruit once a year for villagers to sell. Because Nong Faeg began growing longan long before Khua Mung, there were more longan trees in Nong Faeg. One additional contributing factor was that the soil in Nong Faeg was more suitable for the growth and bearing of fruit of these trees. There were probably longan trees in Nong Faeg long before the fruit became a marketable commodity. In the late 1940s villagers in Saraphi district were already making money selling longan to fruit merchants from outside or in the town markets. During the 1950s its increasing popularity drove the price of this fruit up. At that time villagers grew the trees in the
courtyards around their houses rather than in large orchards. Each household in Nong Faeg was reported to have an average of two to four trees during the 1950s (see also Kingshill 1976: 37).

Informants said that there were not many trees for both social and economic reasons. First, the villagers had not yet commercialized fruits as they had rice and other cash crops. Longan was still considered an occasional benefit or a free gift from nature (see also Kingshill 1976: 38). Second, the price and yield of longan fluctuated greatly. The longan from a single tree might sell for 90 baht one year and only 20 baht the next; a tree that bore a great deal of fruit one year might be barren of fruit for the following two years. Finally villagers knew that both rice and residential land were increasingly limited. Yard space had to be preserved for the building of homes for the children who married and set up their own households. Longan trees required a long lead time before bearing fruit, usually 5 to 10 years if planted as seeds and 3 to 5 years if branches were transplanted. Once they bore fruit then, it made no sense to cut them down. Moreover, the branches and trunks of these trees broke easily, especially during the strong winds of April. Thus, building a home too close to or directly under longan trees was not safe.

Some of the villagers indicated that during the 1950s and early 1960s wealthier villagers owned large numbers of longan trees and earned a large amount of income from them. This was in part because they owned more yard space on which to grow them. The wealthy increased the number of trees and the amount of income generated by them in the 1970s, resulting in a larger gap between the rich and the poor. For
example, in the 1950s in Nong Faeg a well-to-do household might own four or five longan trees while a poor household would have one or two. By the 1970s, the same well-to-do household might have 40 trees while the poor one only had four. The annual income from the trees might be 20,000 baht for the wealthy household but only 2,000 baht for the poor one. For poor villagers during the 1950s and 1960s, the income from longan trees was important but with limited land they would rather plant edible and faster growing trees or plants with reliable yields such as banana, coconut, or vegetables. In the 1970s this attitude persisted, but many poor villagers had put more emphasis on the growing of longan because the sizable income possible was tempting and there were new varieties of longan which were smaller and took up less land space.

The longan grown in the area was mostly of the traditional varieties. Only in the late 1960s were the new varieties, now popular in the markets, brought in and adopted by the villagers. This change to improve the variety of fruit was evidently commercially motivated. The effects of the commercialization of longan were apparent in the 1970s. In response to the forces of commercialization and the marketplace, the villagers changed the way they acquired seedlings, increased the land devoted to longan orchards, invested in orchards, and changed the way they sold the fruit. The commercialization had clearly changed the villagers' perception and attitudes toward longan trees.

4.3.1.3 Animals

Buffalo and cattle were raised in Saraphi district for work in the rice fields, for sale, and, to a much lesser degree, for meat
consumption. Until the early 1960s buffalo and cattle were still the primary means used by villagers to pull carts and carry produce home or to market. In 1949 a survey of 6,339 households showed that 3,201 of them owned 5,203 head of buffalo and 1,708 households owned 3,488 head of cattle. Of the buffalo-owning households, 58 percent owned one buffalo, and only 1 percent owned between six and ten buffalo. In the cattle-owning households, 30 percent owned one and 4 percent owned between six and ten (Bau 1951: 16-18).

The number of cattle increased through the 1950s and 1960s. In Nong Faeg in 1954, 68 percent of the households owned at least one buffalo or one bullock; some villagers had as many as eight head of cattle. Of those households possessing them, the average was two head (Kingshill 1976: 52). In Khua Mung informants said that there were more oxen than in Nong Faeg because there were more ox-carts and because oxen worked better than buffalo in the higher and dryer rice fields there. (Nong Faeg in the early 1950s had approximately ten ox-carts [Kingshill 1976: 53].)

Until the late 1960s, buffalo and cattle were one of the most important marketable commodities a villager could own as well as being crucial to agricultural production. Buffalo and cattle were frequently bought and sold inside the villages, between villages, and in the "buffalo markets" which operated two days a week. Near the field work area there were two of these markets: one within the Lamphun province boundary and the other in Saraphi district. At the market in Saraphi in 1949 usually a few hundred head would be on show and about 50 or 60 were sold or bartered each market day (Bau 1951: 11). The buffalo and cattle markets not only provided a trading place for villagers
from different areas, but also connected villagers with Central Thailand and Bangkok as cattle dealers came to buy and sell animals, transporting them by rail (village informants; Bau 1951: 11). The price of an adult buffalo in the 1950s was between 800 and 1,000 baht, while an ox would sell for 500 to 700 baht (Bau 1951: 11; Kingshill 1976: 54).

Villagers viewed buffalo and cattle as extremely valuable. One could sell them when young or raise them and use them for work in the fields, pulling carts, and carrying things. Afterwards one could skin them and easily sell their meat. They were both a reliable source of cash income and an emergency source of cash during hard times. As one villager in Nong Faeg said: "A buffalo back then was very important to our lives both in terms of livelihood and market. It was just like a friend and a pot of gold. We saw it everyday; we went to it when we needed help in ploughing or carrying rice; and then we used it when we needed cash." In the 1960s as villagers began to rely on tractors for ploughing and trucks for transportation, the use of buffalo and cattle declined. Fewer and fewer households raised buffalo and cattle and ox-carts were gradually made obsolete.

In addition to buffalo and cattle villagers also raised pigs and poultry. Pigs were primarily raised for cash; thus compared to buffalo and cattle, pig raising was much more a commercialized activity. A villager would buy piglets and after raising them for a period of time would sell them when offered a good price or when in need of cash. The market for pigs was mostly in the hands of local traders, a few of whom were Chinese, who would travel from one village to the next by ox-cart and bicycle, or later by motorcycle and truck.
Both pig and poultry raising increased in popularity between 1940 and 1970. A survey of Saraphi district in 1949 showed that of 6,339 surveyed households, 4,679 or 74 percent were engaged in pig raising with an average of two pigs per household. In the same survey, 5,695 households raised chickens or ducks or both; and the total poultry count was 119,665 chickens and 18,662 ducks (Bau 1951: 18). It should be noted that pigs were raised primarily for sale, while poultry was raised as a household sideline activity for both home consumption and sale. By the end of this period, eggs and live poultry had become more of a commodity; however, it was not until the late 1970s that commercial poultry raising businesses arose in the field study area.

Pig raising lost popularity during the 1970s. This can be attributed to factors having to do with the economic situation or commercialization. As the price of pigs increased, so did the cost; accordingly, the investment and risk associated with them was high. Raising a pig to grow faster and heavier in a short time required feeding it with costly manufactured pig foods. The cost of these foods was a constantly increasing function, while the market price underwent week to week fluctuations. Finally, it was time consuming to raise a pig; and, in the 1970s, the economic and work opportunities for the household women increased over those available in earlier years, making it less likely that they had time to tend to pigs.

4.3.1.4 Trade

In addition to agricultural production for sale, one other aspect of the increasing commercialization was the expansion of the commercial trade business, supported by traders and markets in the locality which
were in turn connected to a larger market system. There were four types of traders and one form of market existing in the field study villages between the 1920s and 1940s; after the 1950s a second form of market was established. The four types of traders were village vendors, village traders, itinerant traders, and large scale merchants. The two forms of markets were stores in the villages and marketplaces established outside of the villages. It should be noted that this classification has been made in accordance with the way villagers perceived the situation.

Many villagers were involved in trade between the 1920s and 1960s. Prior to and in the early portions of this period, more men than women were involved in trade and the trade was in commodities such as cattle, buffalo, and rice. Trading was often done by long, distant group journeys. Later as the market networks in rural areas expanded, this type of trade gradually diminished, becoming exceedingly rare. Some of the men were still functioning as itinerant traders traveling from village to village, but rarely spent more than a night away from home.

After the 1940s women assumed a dominant role in trade as village vendors and traders. Their relative and absolute numbers increased in part because the majority of the men who stopped trading stayed home and cared for the children, did the household chores, and saw to agricultural work while the women were out trading. Another factor was the overall increase in trading opportunities presented by the rice boom and the period after post-war inflation had passed.

The majority of the women involved in trading did so as village vendors; they would occasionally go out to the markets to sell goods made in their homes or agricultural produce from their gardens and
fields. The commodities marketed included condiments, baskets, paprice, candles, husked or milled rice, vegetables, fruit, and eggs. The mix of these commodities changed with time. Prior to the 1960s it was primarily handmade items; since that time it has shifted to agricultural produce and livestock. One additional change was that the vendors would spend time preparing their products in order to increase the price and profit margin: for example they would boil the corn and pickle the vegetables. Handmade crafts and goods became increasingly rare; only the older villagers would make them and sell them in the tambon or district markets. This was caused by a decreasing popularity in handmade items relative to manufactured goods, and the amount of time which had to be invested in their production. Some of the village vendors sold produce because they had a surplus over household needs; others intentionally produced more than they could use with the intention of selling it at market. Since the 1950s the latter group has increased in size.

A second group of traders was the village traders; these were people whose activities included buying products from villagers and then selling them at the markets. The majority of these village traders operated on a seasonal or part-time basis. The commodities they would deal in would vary with the seasons, their own agricultural production, what they could obtain from the villagers, and what was in high demand in the markets.

Profits earned by traders in a single trip to market would vary between about 20 baht and several hundred baht. In the field study villages, small- and medium-scale traders earning between 20 and 100 baht per trip were the most common. The amount of investment and the
profit realized by these traders varied with the volume and types of commodities they would buy and sell, market demands and prices, the degree of competition in a given commodity, and the location of the markets. For example, a trader might have to pay a little more for transportation to a city market, but might receive a much higher price there than at the district markets.

Most of the village traders were farmers; trade to them was a part-time occupation even when the income was very significant to their households. They would go to market at 4:00 a.m. and return between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m. The remainder of the day would then be devoted to tending and preparing agricultural produce from their land or purchasing goods from other villagers for sale the next morning. During crop season they would rush back to help in the fields, stop going to market, or request help with the trading from others.

The village traders functioned primarily as middlemen; as such their contribution in facilitating the growth of commercialization in village life was significant. They formed the link between the village economy and the outside markets in both communicating to the villagers what the market demands were and in supplying the results of the villagers' labors to satisfy those same demands. At the same time, they brought manufactured goods into the villages, introduced urban tastes in consumption to the villagers, and provided additional information on what to produce and what would sell.

Nong Faeg had a larger number of village traders than Khua Mung. Informants in both villages felt that this was because Nong Faeg had begun trading long before Khua Mung, had gotten involved in cash crop production earlier, and was in a more convenient location for accessing
other markets and towns. Additionally, Nong Faeg produced more goods for sale, including both garden crops and fruits and handicrafts such as rattan mats, mattresses, coconut water dippers, and large threshing baskets. Nong Faeg was noted for the quality of its crafts and the abilities of its craftsmen. Craft production began to die in the 1970s with the increasing popularity of manufactured goods; since local handicrafts no longer brought great benefits to their makers, the younger generation never bothered to learn the art from their elders.

Available information on the two villages suggests that commercialization not only began earlier in Nong Faeg than in Khua Mung, but also progressed at a faster rate. This only remained true until the 1960s. In the 1970s, Khua Mung's agricultural system had become more commercialized than that of Nong Faeg, and village life and interaction became more businesslike and impersonal.

The third type of traders active in the area were the large-scale merchants who dealt with villagers through quantity purchases of rice, cash crops, and longan and through loans. The majority of these merchants were Chinese, but a few were northern Thai. They would come into the villages from their homes in the district centers, Chiangmai city, or suburbs of Lamphun. There were a few cases, especially after the 1940s, in which the villagers would travel to seek them out. In addition, some villagers would function as brokers for these merchants in dealing with the other villagers. By doing so they would receive both tangible benefits and the gratitude of both parties to the trading.

The last type of trader was the itinerant merchant who would occasionally pass through a village to buy and sell. Some of these merchants were Chinese, Indian, or Central Thai who sold manufactured
goods or medicines. Others were local northern Thais who sold necessities like clothing, knives, and pots and traded agricultural produce, seedlings, pigs, and poultry. The first group was more closely connected with the towns and cities, while the second group was village based and moved from one rural area to another. Few of the villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung between 1922 and 1970 were itinerant traders.

Patterns of change in the numbers and types of traders since the 1920s could be discerned from conversations with the villagers. The number of village vendors, village traders, and itinerant traders increased throughout the early part of the period, peaking during the 1950s and 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, the number of village vendors had stabilized or was increasing very slowly because many villagers were taking advantage of the services of the village traders rather than going to central markets themselves. At the same time, the number of village and itinerant traders was decreasing; this resulted from the introduction of local markets in the villages which were more convenient for the villagers, from improved communication and transport, and from competition among traders for access to produce, prices, and sales. Market demands and prices were much more subject to fluctuation and very difficult to predict; consumption tastes of the villagers were also changing.

Some traders left the business because they saw difficulties coming, others were forced out of business, or became indebted. One example is Mr. Kaeo, a Khua Mung Villager who had moved from an adjacent tambon, who had been an itinerant trader.

I had been a trader selling and buying things between villages since the early 1950s. My father was one also. When he was too old, I took his job.
In his day, he carried goods on his shoulder and walked from village to village. He sold many things, mostly household necessities like knives, cloth, earthenware pots, and bamboo baskets. When I first became a merchant I also walked; later I used a bicycle. My goods in the beginning were mostly local made but later on I sold some goods from the towns, and sometimes I sold piglets. Trade became more of a business.

My father could just buy things from some villages and sell them at others. Sometimes he knew the villagers so well that he did not have to pay them for their goods until a month later when he had sold some or all of the goods. During my time, however, it was more difficult. I had to calculate and speculate on the price well to make enough profit. During the 1960s the trade did not go well. Villagers' tastes had changed. They no longer like locally produced things but asked to buy Bangkok-made goods. Clothes and cloth material made in a village that used to be well known and sold well were not popular anymore. Traders with motorcycles loaded with manufactured goods were more welcomed by the customers. Also, villagers went to the market more often, so they bought things there that were sometimes cheaper, had more to choose from, and represented modern tastes. My sales went down gradually until I decided to quit being an itinerant merchant. Later I opened a store at my house instead. It has been doing well.

The role of the large-scale merchants increased after the 1950s with the increasing commercialization of cash crops. In the late 1960s and 1970s their role expanded to include the sale of manufactured agricultural inputs such as chemical fertilizer. Villagers could obtain fertilizer on credit and pay it back in rice after the harvest. Many of the merchants began buying land and converting it into longan orchards. Some established rice mills or agricultural produce warehouses which bought products from villagers, hired villagers to process and pack these products, and then transported them to Bangkok. These products included tobacco, garlic, peanuts, soybeans, and onions.

Turning to an examination of the types of markets in the field study area, recall that they were of two types: stores in the villages,
and markets outside. A store would usually be a space underneath a villagers' house which the owner would turn into a place for selling items ranging from notebooks to soaps, medicines, and candies.

In the field study villages, the first stores were established in the late 1940s. By the early 1950s there were three stores in Nong Faeg, one of which was seasonal, and two in Khua Mung of which one was again seasonal. As time passed, the stores increased in number and variety of goods. They carried a wider selection of primarily manufactured goods. In the 1950s the stores began to sell raw foods such as vegetables and some meat if it was available. In the 1960s more foods became available and cooked foods also appeared. These food items were purchased by the store owners from both inside the villages and outside at the markets. Sometimes the store owners would cook and prepare the food they sold themselves. Vegetables were obtained both from the owner's gardens and from villagers who would collect them and sell them to the store. In the late 1960s there were even a few food stands selling local noodles or snacks, but these operated on a seasonal basis. In the 1970s food stands became increasingly common; they also changed from being open when work in the fields was slack (and the vendors were not busy) to operating when the villagers were busy in the fields (and sales would be greater because the villagers lacked the time to prepare their own food).

By the end of the 1970s food stands which were open year-round were common in the field study areas.

The establishment and changing nature of the village stores shows that the villagers were increasingly being integrated into the outside world and that commercialization had a growing influence in their lives.
For example, the advent of a demand for prepared foods was a sign of
the villagers' preoccupation with activities intended to provide either
subsistence or profit, thus making it a worthwhile tradeoff to purchase
food in order to leave time for these other activities. A villager
in Nong Faeg explained: "The cooked food, when it first came, was
good food that twice a month people bought to give to monks. Later,
a few villagers bought it to eat in the rice fields or for dinner during
the agricultural season. They said it saved them valuable time; time
loss could mean losing money or some of the crops. For the poor, this
meant they could work longer hours and finish quickly so that they
could rush to accept another piece-work employment and make as much
as possible during the limited months of the agricultural season.
Back then, most villagers still did not like the idea of cooked food
and criticized those few who relied on it."

In addition to the stores there were the markets which the
villagers could attend to buy and sell goods. The majority of those
going to market were women, and most of them went there to buy rather
than to sell. There were very few women who regularly went to sell
at the markets. Before the 1950s there were only a few markets the
villagers could visit: those in Chiangmai city, the district market,
the buffalo market, and one in a tambon near the field study villages.
After the 1950s the number of markets increased. Some of them were
open all day every day, e.g., the city markets. Others opened every
day, but only in the early morning or evening like the district market
in Saraphi and the market in an adjacent Lamphun district. There were
also two buffalo markets which opened twice a week for buffalo and
cattle trade, but which later began to also sell dry goods, clothes,
and cooked food. One of these was established in 1940 in one of the tambons of Saraphi district (Bau 1951: 11). In the late 1960s an all-day, every-day market was built on the side of the road connecting Saraphi with Chiangmai city.

In the field study area there were several small markets, usually one per tambon. These markets would open early in the morning and activity would generally stop by 9:00 a.m. A few vendors were from district towns selling manufactured goods, but the majority of the vendors were villagers from the villages immediately around the market. They sold mostly raw food items, although there would usually be a few stands with cooked food and condiments. Some villagers would come to sell mushrooms and eggs and then buy fish and rice, but the majority came to just buy. According to the older villagers, many of these markets evolved from traditional markets where transactions were undertaken by barter exchange and, to a lesser degree, with cash. Also the markets changed from places where anyone could sell to operations requiring a market fee for space. The means of transport to the markets changed from walking and carts before the 1950s to use of bicycles in the 1950s and the addition of bus service in the 1960s. (For example, in Nong Faeg in 1954 there were only 40 bicycles, but in 1964 there were 122 bicycles, one scotter, and five pick-up buses [Kingshill 1976: xii].)

Although the market became increasingly modernized and commercialized, one still occasionally would witness aspects of the more traditional marketplace. For instance, an old village lady could make some pop rice the night before and walk to the market at 4:30 a.m. to sell
it. She would be happy earning 10 to 15 baht. Another might bring a bucket of milled rice to sell and end up exchanging it for eggs with another vendor.

4.3.1.5 Outside Employment

Some villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung were already involved in various kinds of outside employment during the early part of this century, e.g., agricultural work in other villages, woodcutting in other districts, and house or temple construction. They would generally only hire out on a seasonal basis, even when the jobs were available year round; this was because of the priority given to their own household's agricultural activities which were their secure source of livelihood. In general even the landless wage laborers would give priority to agricultural work in their own villages over less predictable outside work for the same reason.

The coming of the rice export boom created more opportunities for outside employment. As the demand for labor in rice production for consumption and commercial purposes increased, larger numbers of villagers sought work outside the village. When the boom in non-staple cash crops in the late 1940s began, labor needs increased both in the laborers' home villages and outside of them; consequently many villagers chose to work in their own villages rather than elsewhere. The introduction of double and triple cropping further enlarged the local need for labor and thus exacerbated this situation. It was only with the introduction in some villages of new high yielding rice varieties requiring less time to ripen for harvest and differing planting times that outside employment again became possible. Since
not all villages grew these new varieties, the growing seasons and
harvest times in different villages varied; accordingly there were
more opportunities for villagers to complete the work in their home
village and still be able to work in the fields elsewhere.

In the field study villages those who most often hired themselves
out were landless villagers or small landowners. For the most part
they were hired within their home villages, but until the 1960s a few
of them would often go to work for wages or payment in rice in Hangdong,
Sanpatong, and Chomthong districts (see also Bau 1951: 20). To
illustrate the potential size of this labor pool note that in Saraphi
district in 1949 landless villagers made up 11 percent of surveyed
households and small landowners (under 3.25 rai) made up an additional
22 percent, i.e., a third of the village might be available (Bau 1951:
6). In Nong Faeg, available evidence showed that in 1954 out of a
total of 167 households, five were owner-cultivator, 115 were owner-
cultivator, 29 were tenant, and 18 were landless non-cultivator house-
holds; 10 of these 18 were the households of landless farm laborers
(Kingshill 1976: 30-31). The number of landless households in the
village was not as high as might have been expected between the 1920s
and 1950s because many of the landless villagers had already emigrated.

One response of the villagers to the increased demand for agri-
cultural laborers was the introduction of a hiring system known as
piece-rate hiring (cang mao) in the 1930s (see also Anan 1984: 234).
Under this system, a band of laborers would agree to complete a given
agricultural piece of work for a certain payment in an agreed amount
of time. This benefitted the laborers because they could work quickly
thus maximizing the number of jobs completed before the agricultural
season ended. The landowning employers also benefitted because they would pay less for the same amount of work under this system than under the system of paying daily individual wages.

The system of piece-rate hiring demonstrates the range of responses by villagers to emerging economic opportunities. The laborers were still primarily subsistence oriented, struggling to raise their earnings (in cash or in kind) so as to secure their subsistence throughout the year. The system at the same time brought out the desire for profit maximization since the prices paid were subject to dealing and bargaining, and the laborers could control how much they made by working faster to complete more jobs in a season. Information gathered in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung revealed that the villagers did consider "opportunity costs" when deciding which method of payment and hiring to use. For example, one elderly villager said that he estimated how much rice he would earn under the piece-rate system, compared it with what he would make if paid a daily wage, and opted to join a group of laborers for piece-rate work.

The landowning employers, on the other hand, wanted lower payments for labor to reduce the production costs. For small landowners, a lower cost meant more rice left for subsistence needs after payments to the piece-rate laborers. For large landowners, lower cost meant a significantly higher profit from the rice sale. These landowners preferred this system also because it provided them with more safety against fluctuations in market demand and price; keeping production costs low was, as one villager said, "playing it safe" against factors beyond the control of the landowner. One additional advantage to low
production costs and maximizing profits was helping to cover losses in bad years.

During the 1940s and 1950s, socio-economic conditions, too, changed. The demand for labor remained high, but labor became more available because of increases in the number of landless and small landowning households due to land loss, inherited land division, and the establishment of landless households by young married couples. Evidence from the government agricultural census showed that in the three northern provinces, Chiangmai, Lamphun, and Lampang, the average size of a land holding decreased from 8.9 rai in 1950 to 7.6 rai in 1963. For Chiangmai alone, it dropped from 9.4 rai in 1950 to 7.5 rai in 1963 (National Statistical Office 1963). In Sanpatong district a similar change was reported for the village of Ban Sapong: in 1930 households having less than 3 rai accounted for 3 percent of the landowning households; 4 percent in 1940; and 7.7 percent in 1950 (Anan 1984: 197). In Saraphi district at Santonkok, a village near Nong Faeg, the average area of landownership dropped to 5.2 rai in the late 1960s. Small landowning households were dominant among the landowners while landless households accounted for 41 percent of the total households (Bruneau 1980: 4, 8). Interviews with some villagers in Santonkok in 1980 revealed that during the 1920s and 1930s medium landowning households were dominant and landless households represented only half of what they were in the 1970s.

The only available data for the field study villages were for Nong Faeg. In 1954 there were 120 landowning households and 47 landless ones; of the landless ones, 10 belonged to wage laborers and 29 to tenants (some of whom were probably "junior-working together," i.e.,
villager couples who worked for or with their parents on their parents' land, both parties generally consuming rice from the same granary). The average land per household was 4.6 rai (the total number of households was 167 and the total land area was 768 rai [Kingshill 1976: 31]). Residents of the two villages indicated that there was an increasing proportion of landless or small landowning households. By the 1950s, the majority of Nong Faeg and a large number of Khua Mung households were either landless or small landowning, relying on land renting and wage labor for their livelihood.

Labor became more available because many villagers in other tambons or districts would be free for engaging in agricultural activities in the villages. This often occurred because the land in their home villages was either too small or the water supply inadequate for dry season crops. In addition, the improved transportation made it easier for them to seek employment elsewhere.

The landowning employers, of course, took advantage of this increase in labor availability by starting to reduce the rates paid for piece-rate hiring (a similar situation in Sanpatong district was explained in terms of class contradiction, see Anan 1984: 240). If a group of laborers would not agree to the rate offered, there was always another group ready to jump in. Soon large numbers of employers grasped this opportunity to maximize their profits and the lower rate became the standard.

Laborers facing economic pressures due to this lower rate responded by working more quickly and taking less care at their job. This was a form of resistance to the employers; as one villager said: "To us laborers, we thought it was unjust for the employers to use the
situation to benefit them and take advantage of us who were poorer and in need of rice. But we could not do anything directly because it was part of the rules and the business deal. We resented them and could only get back at them through the rules and the deals. We worked at the quality we were paid for. This way we benefitted two ways: revenge and finishing the job more quickly which meant we could look for another place of employment. If they did not care about our feelings and livelihood, why should we care about their crops?"

According to the villagers, there were some landowning employers who resisted the temptation of these lower payment rates and higher returns. These were the ones who had close ties (e.g., kin, patron-client, or friendship) with the laborers, or who did not agree with taking advantage of villagers who made a living by hiring themselves out. However, some of these were forced to change by conditions. As one villager in Nong Faeg said: "I heard that there were also groups of piece-rate laborers who wanted to finish quickly and often did not do a good job by any standard. The employers therefore learned to set or bargain for a lower payment."

This conflict grew to the point where villagers on both sides came up with alternative responses. Some adopted the percentage-sharing or proportion-sharing system in which the laborers would finish the job as quickly as they could, but with good quality, so their payment would be large; since the proportion was fixed at an agreed level, it was to their advantage to maximize output. Because this required immediate payment, it was mainly used for harvesting activities. In practice the proportion of shared output was between 10 and 15 percent (see also Anan 1984: 241-242).
Some stayed with the piece-rate system. Other villagers turned to the daily wage system. Some hired on a seasonal basis for all agricultural activities with an agreed upon payment at the end of the season. An additional reward in rice would be provided if the crop was good and the output was satisfactorily large. A few relied on the luk cang (agricultural employee attached to a landowning household) system in securing their labor supply and avoid constantly bargaining over wages. Those on the daily wage and piece-rate system learned to adjust the arrangements and payments in response to differing situations. In the 1920s and 1930s the daily wage for work in the rice fields was two baskets (tang) per day. After the mid-1940s it dropped to one bucket (thang) per day or if paid in cash, the value of that amount at the current price of paddy. In 1949-1954 it was about 6 or 7 baht (Bau 1951: 20; Kingshill 1976: 43). Though the rate of payment was low, daily wage employment was easy to find and the payment rate was secure and predictable; as one villager put it: "you work for one day and you always get one bucket of rice that you and your family can live on for two days."

Of those retaining the piece-rate system, a few kept it in its original form, but many put more effort into the dealing and bargaining so as to keep the payment reasonable and the quality of the work satisfactory. Other villagers introduced a payment schedule based on the land area involved with payment usually made per rai. This system allowed both the employers and laborers to more systematically calculate the amount of work involved before entering into an agreement. This was a fine example of the villagers' use for their benefits of a government imposed measure: the standard rai used for registration and taxation.
Hiring and payment systems became increasingly innovative and complicated. Different systems or combinations of systems became the standard for particular agricultural tasks. For example, in Saraphi the daily wage, proportion-sharing, or piece-rate systems were used for harvesting activities, piece-rate was used for lifting and bundling of rice seedlings, and daily wage or piece-rate was used for ploughing and transplanting (see also Bau 1951: 22). Note that this discussion of agricultural employment is by no means intended to indicate that this was the predominant form of labor organization in the area. Between 1922 and 1970 most of the work was still done by household labor and/or labor exchange between households; in most cases hired labor was only used as a supplement to these. Only a few households relied primarily on hired labor throughout the main rice season; however, for dry season rice and other cash crops hired labor was predominant. One of the main reasons for this was that the dry season crops brought in cash which could be used to pay the laborers.

The responses of villagers to agricultural employment reflected a trend towards increasing commercialization of agriculture with the villagers' livelihoods becoming integrally bound to commercial agriculture. For instance, wage and payment rates became standardized across villages; businesslike dealing and contractual bargaining became an inevitable experience in pursuing one's livelihood. As an example, in the piece-rate system the laborers had to organize group members on a business agreement basis; it was necessary to learn to speculate and/or calculate the amount of time spent and the amount of payment necessary in order to make the work beneficial and satisfactory for all the laborers and to keep the group intact. The amount of payment
given to an individual laborer played the most crucial role in keeping
the members from splitting up to join other bands, seeking more secure
forms of hiring, e.g., daily wages, or looking for non-agricultural
employment outside the villages.

One type of employment which was available outside the villages
was assisting with non-staple cash crop production, a direct result
of the commercialization of agriculture. Help was needed in the cul­
tivating and harvesting of the crops, e.g., preparing land, preparing
seedlings, planting, weeding, harvesting and threshing. In the late
1950s and early 1960s some of the villagers in Khua Mung and Nong Faeg
would occasionally hire out to assist in the production of dry season
crops. By the late 1960s and 1970s villagers began to hire out more
often as the cropping systems became more intensive and labor was
increasingly in demand. These were predominantly landless villagers
who did not cultivate any of their own crops, or small landowners who
were periodically free of work in their own crop plots. The involve­
ment in outside labor only increased to a certain level because the
production of larger areas of dry season cash crops within the villages
themselves increased, thus creating more local employment opportunities.

Another form of outside employment was the processing of agricul­
tural produce. The first crop to require extensive assistance of this
type was tobacco. Some of the elderly in Khua Mung remembered the
establishment of tobacco curing stations in district villages around
the 1930s. These stations would sometimes hire labor from outside
the villages in which they were situated; however, until the late 1950s
none of the villagers in the field study villages had gone to work
at these stations.
In the 1960s there were two large tobacco curing stations and three tobacco drying and processing factories in which a few of the young women from Nong Faeg began working. The number of workers in these plants from Nong Faeg increased significantly in the late 1960s and the 1970s. One young woman said that they preferred working there because the work was indoors and was not as tedious as agricultural work in the fields. This employment was continuous unlike the agricultural work; and the daily wages were higher than those in the rice fields making substantial earnings possible. Payment was made in lump sums, which made it easier for the village girls to take this money and invest it in their household's cash crop production. Some of the village girls disliked working there because the supervision was strict and little freedom and fun were allowed like existed in the rice fields. The work in the factories was not as tedious as in the fields, but it still could become real drudgery when done day after day.

In the 1960s some merchants, mostly the Chinese, began establishing cash crop warehouses in many of the villages of Saraphi district. The owners of these warehouses would buy cash crop produce from the villagers in bulk and then serve as middlemen for the sale to merchants in Chiangmai city or in Bangkok. The primary crops they concerned themselves with were garlic, peanuts, soybeans, and red onions. Some of the produce required processing by hired workers. For example, the owners needed workers to shell peanuts before packing them in large jute bags. Garlic needed to be trimmed and tied into bunches or have the bulb removed from the step and be separated into cloves before being packaged. In the 1960s the wages for this work were paid at a daily rate. As in the tobacco processing barns, women dominated
the work force, and only a few men were hired for the carrying and loading of produce. Nong Faeg villagers began working in these factories earlier and to a greater extent than Khua Mung villagers; the number of Khua Mung villagers so engaged has remained very limited. There are several possible reasons for this. First, Nong Faeg had a longer history of contact with the outside; this indirectly encouraged the youth to grasp the opportunities for such employment. Second, Nong Faeg was geographically closer to most of the processing barns. This made it more convenient in terms of time and cost for transportation, and also meant that it was easier to get information about employment availability. Third, by the end of the 1960s both villages were extensively involved in commercial agricultural production. A few Khua Mung villagers became engaged in the produce processing business and became merchant middlemen; this created a large demand for labor within Khua Mung itself. Finally, Nong Faeg had a larger number of landless and small landowning villagers who were more likely to seek outside employment.

For the men of the two villages, the primary outside job during the dry season was construction. Again, more men from Nong Faeg sought this kind of employment. This was in part due to the reputation the men of Nong Faeg enjoyed since the turn of the century as capable carpenters. The skill was always passed on to the younger generations. Thus, Nong Faeg ended up with a large number of carpenters, cement and brick workers, and experienced unskilled laborers. Nong Faeg construction personnel were widely known in distant districts and other provinces, hence they could acquire information on new opportunities much more easily than the villagers of Khua Mung. Improved roads and
means of transportation facilitated the villagers' involvement in these activities. Even as early as the 1950s this type of activity was already common in Nong Faeg; as Kingshill observed: During the dry season, when agricultural work is slack, many of the younger men commuted daily to the city for work for which they usually contract in groups (Kingshill 1976: 291).

During the 1940s and 1950s the majority of the construction work available was in the Chiangmai and Lamphun cities, suburbs, and district centers. Beginning in the second half of the 1950s, construction work became increasingly available in the villages because of the secondary priority which villages placed on their homes. Once they were satisfied with the amount of land they owned, they then turned to improving their homes (Kingshill 1976: 55). This attitude was partially due to new tastes brought in from urban areas, and was facilitated by the available cash from cash crop production and outside employment. Therefore, as one village described, villagers skilled in construction would be busy during the dry season building new homes for newly married couples or making improvements or new homes for well-established older couples.

Construction employment and home building were two facets of the commercialization of rural life. Construction work involved villagers selling their labor for daily wages or in a contractual piece-rate agreement at some market rate. Much of the work was a result of the expansion of urban residential towns and commercial centers. Business skills again had to be developed in contracting for work and in obtaining construction materials unlike in the old days when one constructed homes primarily of wood and materials provided by the owner of the home. House building and improvement became possible because of money
earned through cash crop production, i.e., commercialization. Materials would be purchased from stores or warehouses in town, thus tastes and styles imitated urban modernity and served as a symbol of success in capitalizing on economic opportunities which arose, e.g., agriculture and outside labor. In the 1950s homes changed to wooden structures with tile roofs; then in the 1960s brick walls and window glass appeared in a mixed modern-traditional style. House styles then served as both a means of socio-economic differentiation and an additional lure to commercialization and progress.

The villagers earned considerable money from construction jobs, especially the skilled workers who could make three to four times what could be earned in the same time for agricultural labor. Thus, by the 1960s there were a few villagers engaged in construction jobs full-time and year-round. As with other external employment, most of the villagers so engaged were landless or small landowners (with a few medium-sized landowners being involved), implying that most of the money earned was for subsistence or improvement of the household standard of living.

The villagers' increasing involvement in private sector employment was a result of increasing commercialization and at the same time encouraged further commercialization. For example, one construction worker would use some of his earnings to invest in his wife's trade. It also enabled him to invest in more than one cash crop; he would then use more of his earnings to hire the laborers required for the cash crop production because he and all of his children were employed full-time outside of the village.
4.3.2 Phenomena Enhancing Commercialization and Economic Incorporation

Between 1922 and 1970 several phenomena occurred in the political and socio-economic sphere in the North which enhanced the commercialization in the region and furthered the incorporation of the village economy into the national and international markets. Many of these phenomena resulted from changes in the national and international scene and represented a holistic perspective on societal transformation in which changes at the micro- and macro-levels were closely interrelated. Throughout the course of modernization, these interrelationships became more complex and extensive.

Among the most significant interrelated phenomena were improvements in transportation and irrigation, the single currency system, government policies and programs on agricultural development and rice export, and the role of middlemen merchants in agricultural production and trade.

4.3.2.1 Improvements in Transportation and Irrigation

Transportation in the North had gradually improved after the turn of the century. During the period 1922-1970 there were two unprecedented improvements in transportation which greatly facilitated commercial trade between communities in the North and those outside the region. One was the completion in 1922 of the Northern railroad. The other was the expansion of the all-weather highway system beginning in 1956; this work was undertaken by the U.S. and Thai governments primarily for military and political purposes and secondarily to enhance economic development (Pasuk 1980: 194). Nationwide the all-weather road system
expanded from 760 kilometers in 1949 to 5,045 kilometers in 1968, and the dry season road system expanded from 5,030 kilometers in 1949 to 9,880 kilometers in 1968 (Pasuk 1980: 195).

Changes which affected Nong Faeg and Khua Mung villagers were as follows. The main road connecting Saraphi district and Chiangmai city had already been improved by the government in 1916. Since then, it was gradually improved to an all-weather road. The road connecting Khua Mung and Nong Faeg to the main road at the district center was built by the government in 1937; for many years it was a dry season road. By the late 1960s after many improvements it had become a red dirt road which cars could navigate with some difficulty in the rainy season.

With these improvements, villagers were better connected with the town and city markets. Trips that had taken days were reduced to only a few hours. Fragile and perishable goods and produce like vegetables and eggs could be quickly transported to markets. As one of the Khua Mung villagers put it: "travel to a market was not a far and dreadful task anymore." However, one Nong Faeg villager said: "A better road and improved transportation did not make us produce and sell more. It just encouraged and facilitated what some of us always wanted to do."

In addition to allowing easier export of goods, the improved roads and transportation systems made it easier for merchants to come into the villagers' homes and fields to buy their agricultural products. The inconvenience involved in selling their products encouraged the villagers to increase their involvement in commercial production in agriculture through the merchants. A Nong Faeg villager stated: "Many
decades ago it was not like this. Since the 1950s, merchants came to us. We could bargain right here in the village. The payment was made immediately and the merchant himself was responsible for taking away the produce."

For the rice merchant, improved transportation was a boon to their rice trade. For example, in 1949 rice bought in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung by Chinese middlemen merchants could be transported for sale to the large rice mill in Saraphi district center. From there, the owner of the rice mill would ship and sell milled rice to Bangkok by train directly from Saraphi district. The shipment was reliable and fast, taking only three days to travel the 743 kilometers by rail to reach Bangkok, as compared to several weeks by boat (Bau 1951: 11).

After the 1920s the government invested much effort in the improvement of irrigation. Some of the systems were newly constructed while older temporary structures were made permanent. In Chiangmai province four major irrigation systems were constructed or improved between 1922 and 1972:

1. The Mae Faeg System (1928-1930) benefitting 70,000 rai;
2. The Mae Ping Kao System (1937-1941) benefitting 44,900 rai;
3. The Mae Kuang System (1948-1954) benefitting 60,000 rai;

(Thailand Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Royal Irrigation Department.)

In the field study area, the construction of the Mae Ping Kao system resulted in the expansion of rice production because the control of the water supply reduced risks from flooding and drought. It also allowed villagers to plant a double crop of rice, one of which was
a dry season variety for sale (see also Kingshill 1976: 379). The expansion and increased intensity of rice production in the area continued, as did that of some non-staple cash crops, as several small-scale irrigation systems were improved by the government during the 1950s and 1960s. Improved irrigation also aided in the adoption of certain high yield rice varieties which had higher yields when the land was well irrigated.

Evidence on a regional level showed that the average rice yield per hectare for irrigated land was significantly higher than for non-irrigated land. The following are data for the North in units of metric tons produced per hectare harvested:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type of land</th>
<th>average yield (1958-1963)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>irrigated</td>
<td>3.1 2.5 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.1 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-irrigated</td>
<td>1.8 1.8 1.8 2.1 1.7 1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Hseith and Ruttan 1967: 320).

The average rice yield in the North increased primarily due to irrigation improvement, but also due to the introduction of new rice varieties (mougne 1981: 266). For instance, throughout the North the average yield (metric tons per hectare harvested) went from 1.70 in 1950-1956 to 2.07 in 1957-1963 and to 2.67 in 1964-1970 (Welsch and Sopin 1972: 266).

4.3.2.2 The Single Currency System

During the period 1900-1921, cash transactions began to replace the barter system. The use of a dual currency system involving the Indian rupee and the Central Thai baht was practical and convenient because the Northern Thais engaged in trade with both British Burma
and other frontier states and with Bangkok. The dual currency system then aided the growth of commercialization in the North during this period.

After 1922, trade with Bangkok gradually gained dominance over transfrontier trade. The dual currency system was no longer advantageous in most aspects of trade, pricing, market and credit systems. In addition, the Thai government, having gained political control in the North, enforced the use of the baht as the national currency. The transition between the Central Thai baht and satang was gradual and smooth; the satang was used as a means and medium for making this transition. The rupee was equated with the thaeb which was in turn made up of many satang (70-110 depending upon the exchange rate at the time), and 100 satang made 1 baht. Soon the baht was the single dominant medium for economic transactions; this facilitated increasing trade between the North and Bangkok as well as other Thai regions.

4.3.2.3 The Role of the Chinese Merchants

The opening of the railways and increased demand for rice in the international market created opportunities in both the rice trade business and rice milling business in Chiangmai. Soon, the Chinese merchants controlled both these aspects of the rice business in Chiangmai city and several of the district centers. Some of these merchants were residents of Chiangmai who started the business there and then moved it to the district centers. A larger and increasing number were immigrants from Bangkok.

There was no specific information available on Chinese rice merchants, but available figures do show that the Chinese population
in five northern provinces (Chiangmai, Lampang, Lamphun, Phrae, and Nan) increased from 3,626 in 1919 to 6,989 in 1929 and to 11,625 in 1937 (Anan 1984: 151). The extensive role of the Chinese merchants in the rice trade could be seen in the ever increasing number of rice mills.

In Saraphi district, the Chinese merchants operated as middlemen and took control of the rice trade. Some sold rice purchased from villagers to the large rice mills in the district; others sold at Chiangmai city, to larger Chinese rice merchants, or to rice mills in the cities. For example, in 1949 there was only one large rice mill in Saraphi district with a milling capacity of 45 tons per day. This rice mill was owned by a Chinese who bought about 5000 tons of paddy per year; 60 percent of this was purchased from middlemen merchants, most of whom were also Chinese, and the other 40 percent direct from the villagers. The premium milled rice was sold to Bangkok Chinese rice wholesalers and the bran which contained broken rice was sold at the district market for feed (Bau 1951: 10). According to the rice mill owner, Saraphi district in the late 1940s already produced so much surplus rice that between 480 and 600 tons per month of premium milled rice (960 to 1200 tons of paddy) could be shipped to Bangkok (Bau 1951: 11). Since that time, this rice mill has expanded both its milling capacity and rice trade operation. By the beginning of the 1970s there was also another large rice mill in the district which further facilitated the rice trade and enhanced commercial production of rice among the villagers.

It should be noted that there was a second kind of rice mill established in the villages in the early parts of this period; these
were small mills with a capacity of 1.5 to 2 tons per day, primarily owned by the villagers. These operated on a different basis and with different objectives than the larger mills owned by the Chinese merchants. With the advent of rice mills, the process of husking rice had become a commercial service and its by-products were salable commodities. Villagers brought rice and paid cash for milling it, e.g., 0.10 baht for milling 20 litres of paddy (Bau 1951: 10). The rice mill owners would then sell the mixed bran which contained some broken rice and husk. Only occasionally would these small mill owners operate as middlemen for the Chinese merchants.

According to village informants, some rice mill owners stockpiled rice and waited to sell it at a good price. This rice was from their own land, shares from their tenants, or extra rice earned from interest on loans to poor villagers. In Nong Faeg, according to one of the rice mill owners, the first rice mill was built in 1925 and by 1954 there were two in the village. In Khua Mung, the first rice mill was established in 1957. Owners of the mills were usually well-to-do landowning villagers. In the late 1960s, very few of the village rice mill owners were Chinese who had moved into the district.

The role of the Chinese merchants in enhancing agricultural commercialization was not confined to trading of rice and other cash crops with villagers, but included the extension of loans to villagers in advance for crop purchases. The merchants would encourage villagers to borrow for agricultural investment and also provided loans for household consumption or emergencies. Reports of villagers supported the results of a survey done in 1949 which showed that villagers in the field study area borrowed from Chinese merchants in Saraphi district
or Chiangmai city in order to buy land and draft animals, invest in agriculture, make home improvements, cover emergency expenses, and, in some cases, even to provide subsistence. The interest rate could be as high as 2 or 3 percent per month. The proportion of indebted households ran as high as 30 percent (Bau 1951: 12; village informants in Khua Mung and Nong Faeg). The villagers were thus forced into commercial agricultural production to help pay debts; that is, they had to not only produce enough for subsistence, but also enough additional to pay back debts and interest. To do this required cultivating and investing in crops which had high commercial value and good market demand. This was difficult to predict and thus they did not always make a profit. Therefore, many villagers became trapped in a cycle in which debts led to commercial production which in turn led to increased indebtedness, and so on.

Debts and cash advance payments for crops were used by the merchants to secure their supply of crop produce. When the rice price was high, e.g., between 1922 and 1929 and after World War II, the merchants would compete with each other for rice supplies from the villagers. One way of ensuring their supply was through incurred debts as in the practice of "selling green rice." The merchants made an agreement with a villager who came to borrow money or rice that he would return the equivalent amount of rice at harvest time plus whatever interest was owed. Sometimes the merchants would approach the villagers and offer them an amount of money to spend, telling them that they could return it in the form of rice crops sometime in the future, usually at harvest time. They would entice the villagers by saying things like: "Just take it and spend it as you like. You
don't have to worry about the payment as it will be many months from now. The rate for payment in rice is a usual standard; everyone nowadays does it." If the harvest was insufficient to cover the debt, part of the debt could always be deferred to the harvests of the following years. Of course, interest was already calculated and deducted from the agreed upon price for the crops. This was a lure which some villagers could not resist.

The system of cash advance payments to secure supplies extended to other commercial crops including longan. As early as the 1950s merchants were already buying longan fruits and making payments when the trees had only just bloomed. In the 1960s the merchants introduced a system of large cash advances for longan with the intention of monopolizing the market for an extended period. This was well accepted by the villagers as a lump sum of cash was always attractive and the merchants took the risk of fluctuations in market price and longer collection times if the fruit borne in a given year was insufficient. The system usually worked similarly to a loan with an agreement being made on the price of longan per basket or kilogram. For example, if an agreement was made to pay 1000 baht at a prearranged price of 10 baht per basket, the merchant then had to collect 100 baskets of longan from one or more harvests. After the late 1960s this system increased in popularity, and the villagers responded by investing money and effort in their longan trees so that the yields were high and they could retire this "debt" so as to receive another cash advance.

The system was well accepted by the villagers because it matched their perceptions at the time, and it fit well in the economic context. The lump sum was always useful for subsistence, emergencies, or general
spending. The villagers who had felt the instability and unreliability of the commercial marketplace were always willing to have the merchants assume the risks of price fluctuation and insufficient annual yields, which might persist through two or three years. One can easily then conclude that the role of the merchants and the villagers' dealings with them served to bring the villagers and the rural economy further into the network of commercial production of crops and into the market system.

As might be expected, in the long run this system of advance payment and loans had detrimental effects on many of the villagers. During the periods of low rice prices, the merchants started to view land as an investment commodity. Advance payments and loans were then used as a means of acquiring land instead of rice supply from the villagers. The merchants would still make loans, but would increase the interest rates and require the land as collateral; they would also lower the prices they were willing to pay in advance. For example, a cash payment made in July might be only half of the market price for the rice in the harvest month of November (Bau 1951: 12). This created further indebtedness on the part of the villagers which could easily lead to seizure of their land by the merchants. An illustration of this is one Khua Mung villager who lost part of his land during the 1960s. "The low price of rice given for the advance payment meant that at harvest time I had to give many more buckets of rice to the moneylender. Even in a good year, the rice left to me was not enough to eat for the whole year so I had to borrow again. The debts became bigger and bigger this way."
The fact that many of the merchants were not from the villages placed them outside of the norms and sanctions against unfair behavior normally imposed within the villages. In addition, they could rely on the law enforcement agencies for upholding the agreements and undertaking land seizures. Those merchants and moneylenders who were from the villagers cared less and less about generosity and kindness when they could rely on legal means to enforce agreements and still claim to be doing a just and fair thing. Many villagers in the field study area agreed that by the 1960s the concept of "reasonable" in economic transactions and interactions had begun to change, e.g., in paying rent and loans. "Reasonable" previously had meant "generous, helping, kind, and willing to offer a second chance to fellow villagers in an inferior or disadvantageous position"; afterwards it came to mean "doing everything in accordance with the agreement." The latter usage and meaning came from those who were in a superior economic position, e.g., the landlords, moneylenders, and merchants.

It is probable that the outside merchants were the first to define "reasonable" in this manner. Some villagers may have attempted to interpret it this way before this time, but generally there were social sanctions brought to bear preventing its widespread use. As the economically powerful outside merchants applied this definition with increasing frequency and the backing of official law enforcement, it became increasingly common even within the villages. The use of this new concept of "reasonable" served to foster an increasing entrepreneurial attitude among some villagers and to further enhance the system of commercial production and business.
Accounts gathered in conversations with many villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung showed that before the 1930s debts were often incurred when the villagers had to borrow rice to eat in years of crop failure or low yield. Unable to pay debts, which in many cases increased every year, a number of villagers lost part or all of their land (see also Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 184-186 for similar phenomena in other parts of Thailand). When the irrigation systems were built and improved after the late 1930s, the incidence of crop failure decreased. However, many villagers had begun to borrow money for other reasons including investment in cash crop production, animal husbandry, subsistence, conspicuous consumption, home improvement, and even gambling. Until the end of the 1960s there were incidents of villagers losing land to accumulated debt for all of the above reasons. After 1960 there was an increasing frequency of debt-incurred land loss due to failure or financial losses in cash crops and the high cost of educating children (for evidence on debt-caused land losses in Saraphi district see Bau 1951: 12; for other parts of the North see Chatthip 1984: 79).

Villagers of Nong Faeg and Khua Mung also revealed that the merchants often used tricks and deception to make debts more serious and thus take the villagers' land. The deception came in two forms. In the first, the merchant would claim that the amount of the loan was higher than it actually was. Sometimes they would produce a fraudulent document in which the amount of the loan had been altered. With his influence and connections, the merchant usually succeeded in seizing the villager's land. The second form involved pressuring the villager to sign that the amount of loan was larger than it
actually was claiming that the difference was the interest to be paid. In some cases, the merchants would not require that land be put up as collateral provided the villager was willing to sign an agreement for a larger loan amount than was given as an alternate guarantee. These agreement documents with the false amounts would then later be used in legal proceedings in which the merchant moneylenders always won (this type of deception and land loss was found in Central Thailand as early as 1919, see Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 185-186).

In summary, the merchants played a direct role in enhancing the commercialization of agriculture by the ways in which they traded with and made loans to villagers. They further influenced the commercialization by their seizure and accumulation of land. This caused many villagers to become tenants and landless laborers, often working on commercial crop production on the very land they previously owned.

4.3.2.4 Government Policies and Programs

The government issued policies and implemented programs which resulted in or facilitated the expansion of commercialization in agriculture. During 1922-1954 the government's direct intervention was small compared to later periods; but there were still a few policies and programs which had some effect. Between 1922 and 1932, its major policy thrusts in these areas were aimed at increasing agricultural exports and improving the transportation infrastructure. Some government authorities felt that developing the country's economy and increasing exports required diversification of crops, that education and stimulation should be given to Thai farmers who were still comparatively content with their livelihood, and that some tax exemptions
and reductions should be given to encourage production and commercialization of agriculture (Chatthip, et al., eds., 1981: 224, 236-239). However, very few actions were taken to implement these ideas until the 1950s.

Between 1955 and 1970 government intervention in agricultural commercialization increased and its role in the countryside became more direct. Among its major programs were: commercial production of diversified rice and non-staple cash crops; market control and export taxes for rice; introduction of modern agricultural technology and manufactured inputs such as high yield crops, chemical fertilizers, and tractors; allocation of funds for credits to villagers for agricultural investment; improvement of transportation and communication; improvement of irrigation; and establishment of contact networks with foreign markets. These programs enhanced the commercial production of agriculture among villagers and also increased the dependence of the villagers' livelihood on commercial markets. For example, through government encouragement and socioeconomic pressures villagers produced more cash crops for sale. The amount of crops produced and sold depended on the middlemen merchants and the markets. With the use of modern inputs introduced by the government since the 1950s, villagers were increasingly affected by the international market supply and prices of these mostly imported inputs.

Some of the programs had a more direct and significant impact on the commercial production of crops among villagers. For example, the rice tax or rice premium introduced by the government in 1955 indirectly pushed villagers to expand non-staple cash crop production in the dry season. The premium was collected from exporters
for each ton of rice exported. One of its objectives was to support the domestic rice prices; with the export price fixed in the world market, the domestic price would be lower than this by at least the amount of the premium (Mougne 1981: 266; Pasuk 1980: 226). The exporters struggled to maximize profits, so they passed the burden on to lower levels: wholesalers and middlemen. These in turn passed it on to the farmers by purchasing rice at lower prices which allowed them to turn a profit on resale. Faced with reduced rice prices many villagers responded by cultivating various non-staple cash crops which had increasing prices and demand. The rice tax thus indirectly encouraged or compelled the expansion of the commercial production of non-staple cash crops.

Many villagers in the field study villages recalled the times in the 1960s when the price of rice was so constantly low that the cash profit from commercial rice production was less than half that which could be obtained from non-staple cash crops (see also Cohen 1981: 130 for similar incidents in Sanpatong district of Chiangmai in 1967-1968). Some villagers began cultivating high yielding rice varieties, both glutinous in the main season and non-glutinous in the dry season, hoping to improve their income per rai of cultivated land. However, they discovered that without proper water inputs and chemical fertilizers their high yield varieties did not produce as much as the government had told them (see also Tanabe 1981: 354). In Khua Mung in the dry season water was not as abundant as in the rainy season, especially in dry years, and the rice required eight to ten times as much water as other crops. Therefore, an increasing number of
villagers turned to cultivating non-staple crops rather than rice during the dry season.

The system of land rents during the dry season adapted in response to the growth of commercial production of rice as a cash crop and its potential for generating high profits. Before the 1960s tenants continuing to use land during the dry season could do so either free of charge or at a nominal fee of 5 to 10 thang of rice out of one dry season rice crop. If the tenants planted non-staple cash crops they were required to pay up to 20 to 30 baht per rai or they would give what they wished to the owners depending on how much profit they realized and how close the socio-economic ties with the landowners were.

During the 1960s, the rent system for dry season non-staple crops remained relatively unchanged; but for dry season rice, an increasing number of landowners insisted on using the same rental system as for the main rice crop, i.e., a 50-50 sharing basis. However, most landowners still kept the traditional practice of providing an additional 5-10 thang of rice to their tenants. The difference in the rice and non-staple cash crop rental systems might be attributed to the villagers' perception that commercial production of non-staple crops required more investment and had a higher risk of loss, while rice would keep for a long time and could always be sold. Besides the villagers could always eat the rice themselves whether it was glutinous or ordinary.

Tenants responded to the rental system by increasing their non-staple cash crop cultivation during the dry season. Some landowners, seeing low rice prices and/or the low rental they received from their
tenants, took back all or part of their land and cultivated non-staple cash crops themselves. Consequently, after the mid-1960s the cultivation of dry season rice was no longer as dominant as it had been in the 1940s and 1950s.

4.3.3 Pressures and Motivations for Participating in Commercialization and Economic Opportunities

Between 1922 and 1970 most villagers became increasingly involved in commercialization and took advantage of economic opportunities because of pressures from government demands, rapid population growth, and land limitations. Other factors encouraging the villagers were their subsistence needs, their desire to maintain and improve their standards of living, and the lure and inducements of the urban way of life and manufactured commodities. Again, the degree of involvement in commercialization and the resulting economic opportunities depended upon the socio-economic conditions in each individual household.

4.3.3.1 Pressure from Government Demands and Population Pressures on Land

The government placed constant demands on villagers for both taxes and labor, especially before the 1950s. Demands increased during the difficult times of war and economic depression, e.g., obligatory war-time cash contributions and military conscription. These demands forced the villagers to earn cash by hiring out or engaging in the commercial production of crops in order to pay taxes or to hire labor to replace those who had been officially recruited. For some villagers this was their first involvement in such activities, for others it
was merely a change in degree of involvement. The pressures varied for different socio-economic groups of villagers. The ones who suffered the most were those who owned the least: the poor small landowners and landless villagers. For poor villagers, fulfilling these government demands meant a reduction in food consumption and at the same time a need to seek more employment or additional land to rent. An illustration was one landless Khua Mung villager. He said that around 1939 or 1940 his father had to pay a head tax of 30 baht for five men in the household in addition to 10 baht for the education contribution and the wartime contribution. The obligatory payments to satisfy other demands totalled 50 baht per year. At the time, the labor wage for transplanting was only 3 baht per rai and dry season ordinary rice was sold for 30 baht per 100 tang. His household was forced to eat less, borrow rice and money, rent land for dry season crops, and seek labor wage employment just to survive and be able to pay government obligations, rent and interest. A former Khua Mung school teacher who was a small landowner said that he only earned 20 baht per month as a teacher, which was only enough to pay off the government demands. He thus left his teaching job and became engaged in the commercial production of dry season cash crops, e.g., peanuts and soybeans, which were much in demand after the Second World War. The profit he made from these crops enabled him to buy more land, begin moneylending, and start a cash crop trading business which made him wealthy.

The obligatory education system also put pressure on villagers to earn more money to support their children's education. The four years of compulsory school for children between 8 and 14 cost them
considerably in terms of lost agricultural labor, helping hands for household chores, and additional cash expenditures, e.g., books, uniforms, lunch money, school activity expenses, and transportation. The poor villagers responded in two ways: increasing their commercial involvement in labor and crops to earn more cash, and resisting. The forms of resistance included not sending the children to school at all, or not sending them on days when there was labor demand (for either household production or income producing employment), a need for someone to care for the younger children, or even when their only school uniform was dirty. To the villagers, these were both justifiable forms of resistance and practical actions.

After the 1950s it seemed that direct tax demands from the government decreased and economic opportunities to earn money or rice increased. Unfortunately, within the villages the employment and land rental arrangements had become more strictly businesslike, which was unfavorable to many poor villagers. For example, in Khua Mung some rich villagers began to charge interest on rice borrowed to be paid back in labor. One landowner became wealthy during the 1950s and 1960s by demanding that villagers who borrowed rice or money pay back with interest in dry season crop products instead of rice at harvest time. With the crops he had a better opportunity to make a high profit.

Population pressures on the land also became strong enough to force the villagers into commercialization. The following section discusses the effects of population growth in terms of physical and socio-economic consequences and pressures placed on the villagers.

In the early part of the period 1922-1970 the population of lowland Chiangmai increased steadily, but the rate of expansion of the
valley agricultural land was also significant. However, after the late 1940s the population continued to grow rapidly, but the increase in agricultural land slowed. The resulting population pressures were a manifestation not only of the population to land ratio but of the changing nature of the related landownership distribution. The proportion of landless and small landowning households increased, as did the number of large landowners. This phenomenon was a consequence of the land limitation, fragmentation due to traditional inheritance patterns wherein land was divided evenly among children, and loss of land due to debts. In other words, it was a time of increasing concentration of landownership and land fragmentation which resulted in an increasing number of tenant farmers and pushed the villagers to take advantage of commercial opportunities.

Evidence from the early 1930s showed that the average proportion of landless households had already reached 27 percent for all communities observed in Chiangmai (Zimmerman 1931: 26). Between 1950 and 1962 for the North as a whole, the proportion of households owning less than 15 rai increased from 57.6 percent to 63.9 percent, while those holding more than 60 rai increased from 2.6 percent to 3.4 percent (Mougne 1981: 278). The percentage holding over 30 rai doubled from 16.1 percent in 1962 to 33.7 percent in 1974 (Mougne 1981: 276). In Chiangmai province the government agricultural census of 1963 found that the average area of land holdings had diminished significantly, from 9.4 rai in 1950 to 7.5 rai in 1963. Also in 1963 the proportion of tenant holdings was 36 percent, accounting for 33 percent of the total agricultural land area (Bruneau 1980: 3). For Saraphi district
in 1949, 60 percent of 44,452 rai surveyed was cultivated by the owners, and 40 percent by tenants (Bau 1951: 5).

Small land holdings increased in number and proportion until they became dominant. For example, in 1949 in Saraphi district 50 percent of the holdings had an average size of only 3.5 rai. There were 215 households with under 1 rai under cultivation and seven households with land holdings of 63 to 110 rai (Bau 1951: ii, 6). The trend of land concentration continued in this direction. In surveyed villages in Chiangmai province in the late 1960s it was found that small landownership (under 6 rai) was predominant while the number of large landownerships had grown (Bruneau 1980: 4, 19).

Despite a large-scale outmigration during this period, the population density was still very high and increasing. In 1947 the density of Saraphi district was 420 persons per square kilometer (Bau 1951: i, 4). In 1971 it had increased to 471 persons per square kilometer, making it one of the most densely populated rural areas in Thailand and the world (Potter 1976: 19).

For Nong Faeg the average agricultural land area per village household in 1954 was 4.6 rai (calculated from information given by Kingshill 1976: 31). The average had decreased to 3.6 rai by 1972 (Potter 1976: 56). The largest landholding by a villager in 1954 was 32 rai, and the majority of landholders were small holders who worked their own land and/or rented additional areas from other villagers (Kingshill 1976: 33, 55). There were no available data for the comparable time frame in Khua Mung, however, villagers confirmed that similar trends and changes had occurred there. Between the 1940s and
1960s there were many small landowners (1 to 4 rai) who sold their land and emigrated. The largest landowner had approximately 80 or 90 rai, and there was a larger number of villagers holding large quantities (20-40 rai) of land than in Nong Faeg. Both villages suffered from population pressure and land concentration, although Nong Faeg had the greater population pressure and Khua Mung had a higher degree of land concentration.

In general the responses of villagers to population pressures and land concentration can be categorized as: (1) economic, e.g., expansion of arable land, irrigation of land, intensification of land use, improvement of agricultural technology, increases in commercial production, and finding non-agricultural outside employment; (2) demographic, e.g., fertility control; (3) economic-demographic, e.g., rural out-migration; and (4) political, e.g., land reform or land redistribution movements (adapted from Billsborrow 1986: 21). In the villages of Saraphi district, responses were of the economic or economic-demographic forms, with the former becoming predominant as the other forms of response became limited by conditions or unavailable. The economic means most often chosen by the villagers were an intensification of land use and the adoption of modern agricultural technology. Of course, the availability of these means was a function of the socio-economic condition of the particular household with the poorer villagers having the most limited options.

In Saraphi district in 1948 from a surveyed area of 44,450 rai, it was found that the area being cropped was 67,881 rai (Bau 1951: i); this showed that the area under the double cropping system was
extensive. This situation held true for the nation as a whole; in Thailand between 1950 and 1967 the area planted in rice rose only 0.9 percent per year, while the area cultivating all other crops (including dry season crops) expanded by an average of 9.4 percent per year in response to increasing demands in the international market (Mougne 1981: 267).

In Nong Faeg and Khua Mung the worst-off villagers confirmed that double cropping, the use of high-yield rice varieties, and hiring of paid labor were the best and most popular means of coping with the inevitable pressure placed on the land by population increases and with the land concentration problem. For example, in 1954 in Nong Faeg the average holding was 4.6 rai per household with an average rice yield of 40 thang per rai (Kingshill 1976: 46). With only a single rice crop per year, the quantity that could be produced was barely sufficient for subsistence. (184 thang of rice or roughly 1840 litres of milled rice would be obtained; a person consumes one litre of rice per day; thus, an average household of five members would need 1825 litres per year, which agrees with the amount produced leaving virtually no excess.) This assumed, of course, that the yield was good and there were no additional food needs or cash requirements. In reality this amount of rice alone was insufficient to support even the lowest standard of living.

The villagers thus had to seek opportunities for employment, try to cultivate dry season crops, improve the rice yields, seek additional land to rent, and/or speculate about which crops would earn the highest return. The poorest villagers might just plead with the landowners to
sharecrop in the dry season, try new rice varieties to improve the yield and the market value, or hire out more often. Small landowners invested in some peanut cultivation and would plant the rest of the land with dry season rice.

Some of the push to pursue these economic opportunities came from the well-off villagers. With the increasing concentration of landownership, those with a large quantity of land would need more tenants to rent a portion or all of their land. The preferred tenants were those under the most economic pressure who needed to produce more by double cropping. Both parties benefitted from this arrangement as the tenant earned enough to maintain or improve his standard of living, while the landowners picked up additional income. It should be noted that this situation was not entirely uniform and peaceful. The landowners' desire to maximize their profits was often expressed in terms of increased economic pressures on the tenants; this impacted the tenants' livelihoods and also increased their sense of injustice. For example, according to villagers in the field study area by the end of the 1960s a few landowners were demanding that tenants cultivate the types and varieties of crops which the landowners preferred. If the tenants refused, e.g., because they perceived a higher risk with these crops, they would be replaced by other tenants. A few of the landlords also stopped the traditional practice of giving the tenants an additional share of rice over the 50 percent to which they were entitled. Finally, many landlords stopped assisting in rice crop investments for their tenants while still insisting on their 50 percent share from the total gross output. The pressures of population and land concentration coupled with the low socio-economic status of the
tenants to make it difficult or impossible to avoid such ill treatment. To make up for the losses, many tenants sought additional earnings from available opportunities in this increasingly commercial economy.

4.3.3.2 Motivations

Closely interrelated with the pressures described in the previous section were the motives of the villagers for increased engagement in commercialization and new economic opportunities. The range of opportunities available increased relative to earlier periods, but the results for different classes of villagers were still the same. The well-off villagers aimed to secure their economic well-being and make it even more comfortable; while the poorer villagers tried to secure their subsistence and hoped for improvement in their standard of living in the long run.

The socio-economic advantages of the wealthier villagers made it easier for them to find and grasp economic opportunities and to realize greater benefits from them than it was for the poor. However, the poor did take advantage of opportunities for their own motives and in whatever fashion their socio-economic situation and position allowed. For example, they had to be cautious in taking risks, and thus were unable to take advantage of many of the opportunities which presented themselves. Here are a few examples of opportunities which they could grasp in the midst of increasing commercialization. The poorer villagers would hire out for commercial production of agriculture. They would rent land to produce more rice, and plant other crops so as to gain cash for household expenditures. The sale of "green rice" was yet another opportunity which they seized on in response
to the growing commercialization of rice. The grasping of economic opportunity even extended to the sexual sphere through an increase in prostitution, i.e., commercial sex. During the 1960s some village girls went into prostitution in order to help their families through economic crises, serious indebtedness, or extended illness of household members; some viewed it as a way to improve their standing in the long run. This job was difficult and considered degrading; it thus resulted in a loss of social status for the family. Therefore, the motivations behind it were generally subsistence necessity or a desire to escape the poverty-suffering cycle.

Some opportunities were available to both rich and poor villagers, but in differing degrees and contexts. For example, both took advantage of outside non-agricultural employment. For the poor, the positions which were available were generally wage labor; for the rich, who had the opportunity to become well-educated, the positions were those such as teacher, office clerk, and government official. The poor collected products and sold them at the local markets; the rich became middlemen merchants or traders of cash crops with the wholesalers in the towns. As cultivation intensified in the 1950s and 1960s, the poor would buy one or two buffalo to hire out for ploughing; the rich would invest in eight to ten head and sell them for profit in the markets. Data from a 1949 survey confirm this by showing that the majority of the villagers with no land or less than 3.25 rai owned no buffalo or cattle; there were only a few who had between one and five head. On the other hand, the majority of the large landowners (over 15.75 rai) owned one to five head and some of them owned up to ten (Bau 1951: 17-18). The same conditions held for involvement in pig raising. The landless
and small landowners raised two pigs while the larger landowners raised three or four (Bau 1951: 18). The motive for raising animals and selling them for the poor was either subsistence or profit maximization, depending upon the economic/livelihood situation of the household. For the very poor, the cash return from an animal sale was used to meet immediate and crucial needs; the animal was kept as "live savings" to be used in those times of subsistence crisis which were expected during the course of a year. For the slightly better-off, animal raising was for earning profits which could then be invested in the next round of animals, until the accumulated profit was high enough to buy a piece of land or improve the long-term economic standing of the household.

For the rich, raising animals was a pure profit-making proposition to maintain and enhance their already high standard of living. Often their profit maximizing activities were facilitated by the additional opportunities which they monopolized as the rich. For example, the establishment of rice mills in the villages was a profit making response to emerging opportunity in the rice milling service and the commercial sale of bran and broken rice. The competition was limited by the extreme expense of opening a mill. Another example was higher education for children, which only the well-off could afford. If necessary, they could even fall back on the sale of some of their land to finance this, a phenomenon which began occurring in the field study villages in the 1960s. For instance, a Khua Mung villager sold 10 rai of his rice land to finance his sons' higher education. The sending of children for higher education was for many villagers an economic
opportunity which would bring profit in terms of upward mobility in social status and economic contribution from the educated children.

The use of social sanctions to control villagers who were obviously pursuing maximum profit and selfishly interacting with others persisted in forms similar to the previous period, e.g., gossip, the assignment of nicknames, and not attending household ceremonies or activities (funerals, weddings, house-blessings, ordainment, etc.) of the selfish villagers. Both the rich and the poor were subject to these sanctions. However, the poor received special consideration and were forgiven more easily with the justification that they were living at subsistence levels and just trying to make ends meet. For the same act a rich villager might be blamed for being selfishly stingy, but a poor villager was said to do it out of necessity and said to have no other choice.

Many of the better-off villagers perceived that money, land, and outside contacts were more important than their fellow villagers' opinions or village norms. This was especially pronounced in Khua Mung. One villager said: "Back then, I and a few others began to think that our own well-being and profit were more important. We could always use the money to hire laborers both inside our village and from other villages. Our land was always needed by tenants. Besides, money meant a lot more than it had in the far past. It could bring our children to schools in the cities. It could buy the amenities in life. Most of all, used properly, money could bring more money."

As that villager mentioned, one of the motivations for profit maximization was to acquire the amenities in life, which were described as "the urban way of life and modern goods." In the field study area,
many of the villagers' motivations and behaviors were affected by the lure and inducements of urban life and manufactured commodities. The richer villagers responded earlier and could handle the novelty of them better than the poor because they could afford them and had more opportunities to learn about them. In the early 1950s there were already sewing machines, bicycles, modern furniture, modern house construction materials, and modern cement toilets with septic tanks purchased and installed by the wealthier villagers (see also Kingshill 1976: 56, 62). A few of the richer villagers had also begun to adopt costly and ostentatious forms of ceremonies, such as weddings, funerals, and ordinations, which more closely imitated urban styles (for similar changes in a Chiangrai village, see Turton 1976: 279). For example, in earlier times a young man just moved in with his wife without any wedding ceremony. The ceremony adopted by many of the well-to-do villagers involved fancy decoration of the home, a feast with glutinous and non-glutinous rice and some Central Thai dishes served, urban dress for the bride and groom, and rituals which imitated urban wedding ceremonies.

Many manufactured goods came to be considered necessities, both because of acquired tastes and lack of alternatives. Examples were cooking utensils, soap, manufactured clothing, and food items like fish sauce. Even the children began to demand modern toys and sweets made in urban factories. Toward the end of the 1960s, not only were the rich spending on modern goods, modern home improvements, and costly ceremonies, but a few of the poor were doing so by using their savings or loans. By this time there were already a number of poor villagers
who were in serious debt because of such expenditures. A considerable number of the middle-income villagers sold some or all of their land to pay debts caused by similar types of spending.

Such suffering was the end result for those villagers who spent all their savings and lost their land; they forfeited the opportunity to gain from the commercial production of agriculture. However, in general the result of the introduction of modern goods and the modern way of life was that villagers attempted to produce more for sale and tried to earn more by utilizing the economic opportunities emerging from the increasing commercialization of agriculture.
CHAPTER V
LIVES UNDER PRESSURE DURING THE PERIOD OF POPULATION
REPRODUCTIVE REVOLUTION, DIFFICULTIES WITH THE
GOVERNMENT, AND INTENSIVE COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION
OF AGRICULTURE BETWEEN 1971 AND 1980

The decade of the 1970s was marked by drastic reduction in the population growth rate through fertility decline, intensive commercial production of agriculture and trade, and involvement in political collective actions which were responses of villagers to political and socio-economic pressures. In general, growth in production was impressive and so was pace of modernity. However, adding to the classic case of modernization, 'hunger amidst plenty, and poverty amidst prosperity' (Wallerstein 1977: 29) has persisted and has been perpetuated. After many decades of modernizing the country in this direction, in 1980 in the field study villages approximately one half of the villagers were poor or very poor while the rich had become distinctively wealthy.

5.1 The Population Reproductive Revolution

Beginning in the early 1970s and continuing into the following decade, birth rates fell substantially reversing trends of the previous time period. Contraceptives were one reason for the change as were health programs from the central government. But other reasons were components of the modernization process.
5.1.1 Rapid Fertility Decline

The beginning of fertility decline in Thailand was in the 1960s initially, as it seemed, in urban areas and at the end of the decade in the countryside. Although there were many debates about the existence and extent of this decline in the 1960s, it was clearly seen to be both rapid and pervasive in the 1970s and afterwards.

The total fertility rate is a measure of average number of births per woman throughout her reproductive age span. In Thailand it declined from a range of 6.3 to 6.6 in the early 1960s to between 5.4 and 5.8 in 1970 and to between 4.5 and 4.9 by 1975 (National Research Council 1980). This study is similar to the National Statistical Office's two studies showing a national decline in fertility of 22 percent between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. The decline was concentrated mainly in the northern and central regions (the two Surveys of Population Change cited in Knodel, et al. 1987: chapter IV). These findings were confirmed by calculations based on the 1980 census data which revealed a drop in the rate from 6.59 in 1965-1969 to 5.41 in 1970-1974 to 3.88 in 1975-1979; a total decline of 41 percent. For the North as a whole, the trend was the same but the numbers were a little more drastic: 6.26 in 1965-1969, 4.74 in 1970-1974, and 3.23 in 1975-1979; a decline of 48 percent, making it the largest decrease for any region of the country (Knodel, et al. 1987: table 4.1).

The fertility decline occurred in both urban and rural areas. Even though the existing fertility rates were generally a little higher in rural than in urban areas, the rate of decline in rural settings was faster. This was the case for both Thailand as a whole and the
Table 6
Enumerated Population for Census Years 1911-1980 and Adjusted Populations for Census Years 1960-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Date</th>
<th>Enumerated Population (in 1000s)</th>
<th>Intercensal Annual Growth Rate</th>
<th>Adjusted Population (in 1000s)</th>
<th>Adjusted Annual Growth Rate</th>
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</thead>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>11506.2</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
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<td>14464.1</td>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>17442.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
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<td>44824.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Knodel, et al. 1987, Table 3.2

northern regions. Available evidence showed that for urban Thailand (municipal areas) the total fertility rate was 2.95 in 1970-1974 and dropped to 2.59 in 1975-1979; a -12.2 percent change. For rural areas it went from 5.24 to 4.12 during the same period, a change of -21.4 percent. For the North, urban areas went from 2.97 to 2.54, a -14.5 percent change; while rural areas went from 4.37 to 3.34, a change of -23.6 percent, the most rapid change in rural Thailand (United Nations ESCAP 1986: 14-15).

The population of Thailand increased from 26.2 million in 1960 to 34.3 in 1970 and 44.8 in 1980; however, the growth rate continued to drop. The country's rapid decline in population growth rate was a manifestation of a rapid fertility decline. Even with a rapid decrease in infant mortality rates, the population growth rate
continued to decline from 3.2 percent in 1960 to 2.6 percent in 1980 (Knodel, et al. 1987: tables 3.2 and 3.5).

For Chiangmai, the population went from 798,433 in 1960 to 1.03 million in 1970 and 1.15 million in 1980 according to the population and housing census. The population growth rate and the total fertility rate, however, decreased. For example, the growth rate went from 2.5 percent in 1962 to 1.4 percent in 1970. The crude birth rate dropped from 36 per 1000 population in 1962 to 21 per thousand in 1970 (Mougne 1981: 72). Census data show that the average number of children ever born live to a thousand women (15 years of age and over) was 3,216 in 1970 but only 2,207 in 1980. Somphong and Hogan showed that the total fertility rate (nuptial) of Chiangmai was constantly decreasing from 4.42 in 1968 to 2.29 in 1976 (Somphong and Hogan 1979: 24). The ESCAP study found that the total fertility rate of Chiangmai was 3.00 in 1970-1974 and dropped to 2.61 in 1975-1979 (United Nations ESCAP 1986: 37). Chiangmai was one of the first areas in Thailand to experience a fertility decline, beginning in the 1960s and was accelerated by the expansion of the McCormick Hospital family planning program. After that it became one of the provinces with the lowest fertility rate.

In Saraphi district, the population went from 56,897 in 1964 to 60,288 in 1971 and grew only slightly during the 1970s to 61,217 in 1980 (Potter 1976: 18-19; National Statistical Office 1980). Its total fertility rate dropped from 2.20 in 1970-1974 to 1.85 in 1975-1979, making it the lowest rate in the country with the exception of Bangkok (United Nations ESCAP 1986: 37). This rapid decline in fertility could also be seen in the proportion of younger children. In 1949 children
aged fourteen or younger accounted for 30.1 percent of the population in Saraphi district (Bau 1951: 4). In 1970, the proportion was still as high as 39.5 percent, but dropped drastically to 23.7 percent in 1980 (National Statistical Office 1970 and 1980). Even when the age categories for children were examined more closely, the success of birth control programs in reducing fertility was apparent. For example, the 0-4 year age group made up 6.8 percent of the population in 1980, whereas it had been 10.7 percent in 1970.

The same trends of change held true in the field study villages. The population of Nong Faeg grew from 842 in 1953 (Kingshill 1976: 30-31) to 875 in 1972 (Potter 1976: 27) and 913 in 1980. For Khua Mung the population in 1980 was 972. In terms of households, Nong Faeg grew from 167 in the early 1950s to 206 in 1972 and 239 in 1980, while Khua Mung went from 166 in the 1950s to 257 in 1980. Evidence of the fertility decline could be seen in the average household size and the number of children born, which were already showing significant signs of change by the end of the 1960s (see also Potter 1976: 28). The average household size in Nong Faeg went from 5.0 in 1953 (Kingshill 1976: 65) to 3.8 in 1980; a similar decrease occurred in Khua Mung. The number and proportion of younger children also declined; this was a consequence of a reduction in live births due to birth control, not a result of increased infant mortality. In Nong Faeg, children in the 0-10 age group dropped from 21.7 percent of total surveyed population in 1954 to 12.1 percent in 1984 (Kingshill 1985: 55). For children in the 0-4 age group, the change was 14.6 percent in 1953 to 6.7 percent in 1980, i.e., roughly the same as the drop for the entire district. In the case of Khua Mung there was no data for
comparison, only the one piece of data that the proportion of children in the 0-4 age group in 1980 was 5.9 percent.

Further evidence of the fertility decline was apparent in the decreasing number of primary school students. In Nong Faeg there were 103 students in 1953, 122 in 1968, but then only 78 in 1974 and 47 in 1984 (Kingshill 1976: xv, 88; Kingshill 1985: 18). In Khua Mung the headmaster of the school said that a similar change had occurred there. By the late 1970s several schools in the district had already closed down for low student enrollment. Since very few cases of village children attending schools in the district center or city occurred, it seems likely that this closure was because of a reduction of the number of children being born in the villages.

Population pressures in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung were high in the 1960s and became even more serious with the slight increases in population during the 1970s. Without the rapid fertility decline at that time, the situation could have become extremely serious for the villagers. A less significant factor in the population dynamics of the villages was out-migration; a few villagers moved to settle in other districts where land was cheaper and easier to buy or where wage labor employment was more plentiful and the costs of living lower. However, it should be noted that the price of land elsewhere had drastically increased until the price differences between home land and land elsewhere were not as great as in the past. For example, in a tambon in Fang district where the majority of villagers from Nong Faeg had moved, the land (mostly good for only one crop per year) cost 330 baht per rai in 1953 while in Nong Faeg land cost 2000-3000
baht per rai. In 1980, the same land in Fang cost 7500-8000 baht per rai while the price of Nong Faeg land increased to 10000-18000 baht per rai. In addition, a number of villagers moved in and out as a result of marriages. But in general, these factors did not seem to significantly alter the size of the village population (see also Kingshill 1985: 17).

5.1.2 Phenomena Contributing to the Rapid Fertility Decline

The radical decline in fertility in rural northern Thailand was not a natural phenomenon nor was it a change initiated and accomplished by the villagers themselves. The decline seemed to primarily result from reduced reproductive rates among married couples due to the practice of birth control methods. These were introduced into the villages by the government and private family planning agencies. The acceptance and use of birth control methods were facilitated and accelerated by the existing cultural setting, the socio-economic conditions in the area, and the villagers' own perceptions and needs (see also Knodel, et al. 1987: chapter 10). The following is an explanation of these interrelated phenomena which contributed to the fertility decline in rural northern Thailand, particularly in Chiangmai and the field study area.

5.1.2.1 Government Policy and Support of Efficient Family Planning and Related Health Programs

Until the late 1950s the official stance, especially among military leaders, was strongly pronatalist. The first challenge to this view came in 1959 in a World Bank economic mission report which
recommended that the government seriously consider the adverse effects of high population growth on the nation's economic development and advised limiting family size through the dissemination of birth control information (Krannich and Krannich 1980: 15). The government responded positively to this recommendation because economic development was a major goal at that time, and because the World Bank was influential in the international politics of finance and loans. The pressures for a change were reinforced and strengthened by the interest of several key health officials and Thai scholars. In 1961 the Cabinet declared that birth control was allowed as a private and voluntary practice, although it prohibited the dissemination of public information on family planning. Since that time numerous study committees have been appointed and several national population seminars have been held to discuss the issue, the first of which occurred in 1963. In 1964, the first pilot project called the Potharam study took place; its results showed considerable receptivity to the practice of contraception among the study population (Institute of Population Studies 1971). In 1966 the Population Research and Training Center was established at Chulalongkorn University, then in 1970 its name was changed to the Institute of Population Studies. It was the first and the most important agency undertaking demographic/population research and providing education in the subject at the master's level. In 1967 the Prime Minister signed the World Leaders' Declaration on Population sponsored by the United Nations.

In 1968 the Cabinet permitted family health services, which had been successfully introduced through the Potharam pilot project, to
be extended to other parts of the country. The targeted group was married women with children. That same year a Population Unit was established in the National Economic and Social Development Board and was assigned the task of making final recommendations to the Thai Cabinet concerning the population issue. In addition, that year the King of Thailand publicly expressed his concern over the high rate of population increase and endorsed the extension of family planning services. Throughout the next decade financial support, technical advice, and external pressure were supplied by various international agencies. Some of the most significant support came from the Population Council in the form of seminars, studies, and the establishment of the Institute of Population Studies.

Finally in 1970 the Thai Cabinet announced a formal population policy aimed at slowing population growth through support of voluntary family planning as an official government program. The government's commitment and strong support of this policy was evident when the Ministry of Public Health and the National Social and Economic Development Board successfully incorporated the National Family Planning Program into the Third National Social and Economic Development Plan (1972-1976). The stated objectives were:

1. to reduce the population growth rate from over 3 percent to 2.5 percent by 1976;
2. to inform and motivate eligible women, particularly those living in rural and remote areas, about the concept of family planning and to make services readily available throughout the nation; and
3. to integrate family planning activities and overall maternal and child health services, and thus mutually strengthen activities in these closely related fields.

The activities of the family planning program had begun prior to the official announcement in 1970. By the mid-1960s contraceptives were already being supplied to mothers in Bangkok and a number of provincial hospitals. In 1971 nurses and auxiliary midwives were allowed to distribute birth control pills and condoms; thus, by the end of this year these birth control devices were widely available in rural areas. Contraceptive acceptance and continuation of its use were encouraged by the decision in 1976 to provide the pill, the IUD, and sterilization free of charge at all government rural health stations. These activities resulted in a rapid increase in the number of acceptors of contraception in Thailand. For example, between 1965 and 1968 there were 187,000 new acceptors, and another 130,000 in 1969 and 229,000 in 1970. By 1971 there were 408,000 new acceptors with an average of more than 450,000 new acceptors recruited in each succeeding year. As further evidence of the widespread acceptance and rapid application of these techniques, the proportion of women (currently married in the reproductive age range of 15-44) using contraceptives went from 14.8 percent in 1969 and 1970 to 26.3 percent in 1972-1973 and to 36.7 percent in 1975 (Samphong and Hogan 1979: 6-7). This rose to 53.4 percent in 1978 then 59.0 in 1981 and to 64.6 percent in 1984 according to three rounds of the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey. The figure for the North was increasing along with the rest of the country however, it was reaching higher levels. For example, it was
as high as 65.8 in 1981 and 71.4 percent in 1984 according to the second and third round of the Contraceptive Prevalence Survey.

The government family planning program was successful not only because it was a well-organized and efficiently implemented system of birth control services, but also because it was accompanied by the extensive establishment of related medical services and health programs. Health centers became more available and more easily accessible to villagers who wanted family planning services, contraceptive allergy or complication treatment, child immunization services, and other health care. The number of health and midwife stations increased from 2,119 in 1965 to 7,340 in 1984, and the number of provincial and district hospitals rose from 237 to 620 in the same period of time (Knodel, et al. 1987: table 3.6). In terms of accessibility of government outlets for contraceptive supplies and services in rural areas; the average travel time to the nearest health station went from 55 minutes in 1971 to 25 minutes in 1979, while the time to the nearest hospital was reduced from 159 minutes to 96 minutes. The percentage of villages within 5 kilometers of the nearest health station went from 72 in 1971 to 94 in 1978 (Knodel, et al. 1987: table 9.4).

Family Planning in Chiangmai was introduced in 1963, making it one of the earliest areas to receive these services. The program led by Dr. Edwin B. McDaniel of McCormick Hospital soon expanded into rural areas through the introduction of mobile family planning clinics. Pills were the first thing offered, followed by injectable contraceptives in 1965. The McCormick program was a great success, providing services to 116,000 new acceptors between 1963 and 1977. Its
introduction of contraception had paved the way for the coming of the National Family Planning Program in Chiangmai and Lamphun.

A survey done in 1976-1977 showed that in Chiangmai the proportion of current users among married women between 15 and 44 years of age was 55.6 percent (Somphong and Hogan 1979: 85). Another study of 3,805 married women between 15 and 49 and not pregnant at the time of the survey, gave a figure of 58 percent for all rural areas of Chiangmai in 1980. This figure seemed a little low, however, upon the exclusion of women between 40 and 49 (and thus close to the end of their reproductive span with less need for birth control), the percentages in lower age groups ran from 65 to as high as 78 (Tieng 1986: 27).

In Nong Faeg and Khua Mung family planning had been known and practiced since the latter part of the 1960s. Services and formal education were provided by the McCormick Hospital mobile teams and the family planning clinic at the Hospital in Chiangmai city, which was no longer too far or difficult to reach. Later, the villagers began to use the well-organized and efficient government services. From information gathered in discussions with villagers in both villages it seemed that villagers in rural Chiangmai were in general receptive to the new idea of modern birth control. One example to support this statement is the case of Ban Pong village, 50 kilometers north of Chiangmai city, a pilot project was introduced there in 1966 with a mobile family planning unit assigned to visit the village. In 1968 an assessment was done and found that 90 percent of the villagers knew of modern contraception, compared to 10 percent in 1966. The contraceptive prevalence rate had increased from 5 percent to 37 percent over the same period (McDaniel and Tieng 1973: 11).
In 1972 in Nong Faeg there were 47 couples practicing birth control; the primary method was pills, but vasectomies and injections were also observed. Similar evidence was unavailable for Khua Mung. However, in 1980 the majority of women in both villages who were married and of reproductive age were using birth control methods. Reasons for the small proportion of women not using birth control included menopause (or an incorrect assumption of the onset of menopause), cessation of sex with the spouse, allergy to temporary methods as well as an unwillingness to be sterilized, waiting to have the first child, or wishing to have others. The impact of family planning practices on fertility could be seen in the small number of children per family in 1980. This study examined all currently married couples which had been married for 1-11 years (the period when modern contraceptives were generally available) and had at least one child. Excluded were those separated, divorced or widowed, or married more than once. Of the total 70 such couples in Nong Faeg, 76 percent had one child and 24 percent had two children. In Khua Mung, 77 percent of the total 79 couples had one child, 20 percent had two children and approximately 3 percent had three children.

The villagers responded well to family planning for many reasons. First, medical doctors and nurses (from both the McCormick Hospital and the government) introduced the program and provided services. Villagers had learned to trust and respect doctors and nurses, knowing that their intentions were good and they meant no harm to the villagers. Second, the villagers were receptive to trying new things provided they posed no threat to their lives or livelihood, especially after seeing that others practiced these techniques with no apparent harm.
Third, many of them had learned that government programs could be of benefit to them. Family planning from the government seemed beneficial since it was similar to the programs introduced earlier by the McCormick Hospital and made contraceptive services cheap or free. The government also established tambon health centers and a district hospital in Saraphi. The villagers could visit these outlets for family planning services, help with complications from contraception, and general health services. Fourth, for many villagers the adoption was a matter of government persuasion by the government officials themselves or through village headmen. They were reluctant to use birth control, but felt they dare not refuse. Some would come to appreciate the services, but others would avoid further visits and decide to not use them. Finally, and most importantly, the villagers saw that the family planning program answered their needs, conformed to changing socio-economic conditions, and did not contradict the existing cultural setting.

5.1.2.2 Latent and Continuing Demand for Fertility Control

According to elderly informants, even as early as the turn of the century there were some villagers expressing their desire to limit the number of children they had. The demand for an effective and acceptable means of controlling fertility increased after the early 1950s. The desire to limit family size was accompanied by a gradual reduction in family size preferences as a result of rapid socio-economic changes both at the household level and in the societal context. For example, child bearing and rearing became increasingly costly, a major economic burden. Reductions in infant and child mortality as a
consequence of government health programs increased the number of surviving children, and thus raised the average number of living children and the average family size.

Evidence from a variety of sources showed that on the national level infant mortality was reduced from 74 per 1000 live births in 1966 (1970 census) to 44 in 1976 (1980 census) (Knodel, et al. 1987: table 3.5). In rural Chiangmai it was estimated to be 69 per 1000 between 1968 and 1972, and rapidly decreased to 53 over the 1973-1976 time frame (Somphong and Hogan 1979: 33). Another source revealed that infant mortality in Chiangmai had declined remarkably from 131 per 1000 live births in 1947 to 69 in 1963 and to 21 in 1978 (Tieng 1986: 42).

In a survey of currently married women between 15 and 44 years of age, it was found that family size preferences dropped from an average of 3.9 children in 1969-1970 to 3.0 in 1984 (Knodel, et al. 1987: table 4.6). In a survey in rural Chiangmai in 1976-1977 husbands interviewed indicated that the mean ideal family size was approximately 2.6 (Somphong and Hogan 1979: 32). In the same survey, talking with women having three or more living children, it was found that 97 percent of them wanted no additional offspring (Somphong and Hogan 1979: 68). Another survey in Chiangmai in 1967 showed that 46.7 percent of ever-married women felt that a family size of three children was ideal; a follow-up study in 1979-1980 showed that the mean ideal size was 2.7 children, with 81 percent of the respondents wanting three or fewer children. The ideal family size was even lower among younger married women, just slightly higher than two for women under 25 years of age (Tieng 1986: 9-10).
In the field study villages couples became less concerned about child mortality after the late 1950s so that they rarely thought of having additional children just in case some died and others would live. Recorded evidence showed that in the early 1950s there was already at least one villager couple which wished to have an effective birth control medicine since they already had three children and desired no more. Many of the poorer villagers also expressed a desire to have fewer children (Kingshill 1976: 65). A study in 1972 indicated that most of the women in Nong Faeg did not want large families, but at the same time wanted a minimum of two children (Potter 1976: 29).

Interviews with villagers in 1980 revealed that the demand for smaller family size and use of birth control had existed for many decades, becoming even stronger as time went on. One elderly Nong Faeg couple who had seven children said that they wished they had only two children, and even in earlier times had only desired three or four. Another 50-year-old couple said they took advantage of birth control when it became available and stopped at three children. A few older poor villagers felt that having many children was good because each child could hire out and earn money or rice for the household. Similar situations held in Khua Mung. One woman with six children said she had wanted to limit the number of children, but that birth control only became available after the birth of her youngest daughter. Another woman received a sterilization immediately after delivering her fourth child; this occurred 15 years ago. Many of the older villagers with large numbers of children said that they wished they had had medicines to stop at four or five.
In general the villagers, particularly the younger couples, in 1980 wanted a small number of children; the majority saying one or two was fine, very few wanting three. Many of those who said they wanted two might not to actually have more than one considering that their only child was already 8-10 years old and yet they were not planning another pregnancy. In Khua Mung, one 41-year-old couple started using contraceptives after having a single daughter who was 11 years of age in 1980. Another couple in the same age range stopped at two children. One couple in their early twenties said they waited three years before having their first child and would probably consider having a second child in the future; however, they strongly believed that one or two children were enough. It was apparent that contraceptives were used widely, mostly as a means of limiting the number of children, but also for birth spacing. Apparently, the number of children did not vary with degree of poverty or wealth.

In summary, effective means of birth control were unknown or unavailable in the past, but the demand had already existed for smaller families. This latent demand and previous ineffectual attempts to limit births and preconditioned couples to adopt modern contraceptive technology when it became available. For older villagers, their unfavorable experiences with large numbers of children, their latent desire to limit family size, and their view of the present socio-economic situation prompted them to encourage and strongly support the adoption of modern contraceptives by their children and other villagers. With the increasing desire for small families, the demand for effective fertility control strengthened significantly.
Socio-economic changes and household economic conditions played a crucial role in the initial and ongoing receptivity of villagers to limiting the number of births. Distinctive and extensive socio-economic changes had occurred in rural northern Thailand between the 1920s and the 1960s including rapid population growth, increased population pressure on land, improvement of transportation, communication, and other economic infrastructures, expansion of health and education services, modernization of production technology, increasing commercialization of agriculture, expansion of the market system, monetarization of everyday life, increasing availability of manufactured goods, and changes in consumers' tastes. The only one of these changes which became less significant in the 1970s was population growth, which continued but at a much reduced rate.

Those changes, directly or indirectly altering various aspects of the villagers' lives and perceptions, and in turn causing a desire for fewer children that bore directly on the rapid fertility decline include the increasing availability of women's employment, its importance to household economic conditions, increasing educational costs for children, the decreased importance of a large number of children on household farms and for old age security, the ever growing financial burden of child bearing and rearing, the increasing age of first marriage, the decreases in infant mortality, the shrinking land availability in rural communities of both agricultural and residential land, the increased exposure to and adoption of urban ways of life, the growing availability of non-farm and urban employment, and the
desire for manufactured goods. These factors did not have the same impact on every villager. One major determiner of the influence of each one was the economic condition of a particular household which could reinforce, lessen, or neutralize the importance of a given effect.

Take for example, Mr. Lop, a 36-year-old Nong Faeg villager living with his 31-year-old wife and 15 year old daughter. He and his wife were both landless agricultural laborers; he also occasionally earned some money by playing in a local band for household and village ceremonies. He said: "I was born in a large family. My parents had nine children and owned only 3 rai of land. My parents wished they had fewer children, maybe about five would have been enough. Fortunately there was practically no cost to raising children in the past and when we children reached 10 to 12 years of age we could help both in the house and by hiring ourselves out for rice or money to bring home. Agricultural jobs were available; some of us also raised our own buffalo for hired ploughing and for sale and took care of rich villagers' buffalo to earn rice and cash. We wore simple clothes and ate simple meals. The cost of living was still low and there would be days where we would spend no money at all. Some food could be foraged from the canals, rice fields, and backyards. In the last 10 to 15 years everything changed rapidly. Just the opposite of what I had described."

At this point his wife added:

It is true. I also came from a large family of eight. My parents had 13 but five died during delivery. My parents also had only 3 rai of land. I am happy with my only child because the doctors are good now and it is not likely I will lose this one. It is so costly to live nowadays; everything costs money. Having a
child costs a lot, from before the time she was born until the end of our lives. I mean we had to pay for pregnancy care, delivery costs, powdered milk, clothes, medicine, school, and everyday expenses. When I was young I never touched any money, but now a few baht each day goes to the children for candy and sweets. They want new clothes because everybody else has them. We want our child to go for higher education and that will cost even more money. I know of many villagers who sold land to send children to schools and colleges in town. We have no land so we have to work hard to save up for that. Loans will of course be inevitable when the need arises, being poor makes the burden heavier. Speaking of work, having a child is a loss in earnings for me, the mother, especially when the child was still young. Sometimes we had to take turns going out to work and bringing in rice or cash. With all these difficulties and burdens, how can we or villagers in general want many children?

When asked about old age security and a large number of children, this couple and many other villagers agreed that they did not need many children to take care of them. One or two were sufficient if the children were responsible and capable financially. To make them responsible and capable, parents gave them a good education or a large piece of land. Many children would fight among themselves and generally had the land they inherited divided up into small pieces. The villagers had seen some old parents with lots of children, but none of them were well-cared for by the children. So they felt the best way to gain security was to have few children and save up money or land to use when they were old. Wealth and savings became a form of old age security which was safer and more reliable than children. One villager in Khua Mung illustrated this with an analogy: "Just like a wood log lying on the side of a walkway. If the log is empty, people are just going to walk by not noticing its existence. If the log is covered with delicious-looking mushrooms, people will see it and pay attention
to it. Similarly, if parents are wealthy or have money, children will flock over them and even distant kin will claim to be close kin." A Nong Faeg villager gave another analogy similar in the context, "A tree with a lot of fruits always attracts birds."

Interestingly, discussions with many of the villagers revealed the perception that the relationship between large numbers of children and old age security was in many cases an artificial one. In other words, it was a means for the villagers to justify having more children when in practice they had no choice in the matter due to lack of contraceptive means.

When the question was posed of the relationship between number of children and household economic condition, it was found that the better-off villagers could cope much better with the economic burden of having children. The cost of having children was so high that the poorer villagers suffered a heavier burden from it. For example, the two cans of powdered milk per month needed to feed a baby while the mother worked cost her wages for a period of 10 to 15 days. One poor woman said: "We are poor and have no choice but to go and hire ourselves out. When we buy food and necessities for our babies, we have to eat less. For the rich to do so, they only have to skip their deserts or put less money into their savings that month."

The first impression arising from what the villagers said was that poorer villagers would tend to have smaller numbers of children (see also observations in the field study area, e.g., Kingshill 1976: 65; Potter 1976: 28). However, examining the results of a survey of over 200 families in each village, it was found there was little
correlation between the number of children and the economic standing of the household, the majority of them having between one and three children. Further discussions with villagers of varying economic status indicated that in the past the poor had wanted to have more children, but in 1979-1980 most villagers felt that because of changing socio-economic conditions it was no longer a viable option. As one rich villager in Khua Mung said: "It is true that the poor suffered more from the cost of having additional children but the rich also paid a price for each additional child. As we are not poor, our children expect us to spend more on them—expensive clothes, motorcycles, expensive schools and higher education, military conscription bribes, and even luxurious wedding ceremonies and receptions. At the same time, with additional children we still had to spend on hired hands, investment in agriculture, and take the risks of losing money; yet we had to sacrifice our comfort, amenities, luxurious goods, and even sight-seeing trips."

This villager's feelings were confirmed by opinions taken from many other villagers. There was a propaganda slogan from the family planning program which said: "One child will keep you poor for seven years." When it was first introduced, many villagers doubted it; the poor felt that the additional children meant more helping hands in wage earning, while the large landowners thought they had sufficient land to divide among the children. However, in the prevailing economic conditions of 1979-1980, most villagers had come to agree that it was true. They felt further that it should be: "One child will keep you poor and make you suffer for twelve years." The thirteenth year was
when the child finished primary school and was finally grown up enough
to take care of him/herself and help in household economic activities.

5.1.2.4 Persistence of Adaptive Cultural Setting

In rural northern Thailand, many of the cultural features and
characteristics were capable of persisting and adapting or changing
to fit rapid and drastic socio-economic changes. Those conducive to
the limitation of family size and adoption of birth control included
parental repayment expectations, reproductive decision making, female
autonomy, gender preference, principles of Theravada Buddhism, and
extensive cooperation and relationship networks among the villagers.

Most villagers shared the expectation that their children would
support them in old age and thereby repay the support they had received
while young. The ideal was that parents would receive full support
and comfort from their children in old age, i.e., all of their children
would help to see that their food, housing, and cash supply were good,
and would come to care for them when they were ill. Traditionally
it was a source of great pride to parents to be able to live comfortably
under their children's care without having to work and to have all
of their children tend to them in illness or attend the funeral of
one of the spouses.

In reality the majority of parents still received some care from
their children or grandchildren. However, socio-economic changes put
great strains on these practices, e.g., the children sometimes worked
far away or had to work from before dawn to after dusk each day, thus
leaving their parents alone. In some cases, the children had no respect
for and gave little care to their elderly parents. Because their
economic base was outside of the village, it mattered little to them if they became the objects of village gossip because they ignored their elderly parents. In other cases the parents had spent all of their money or sold all of their land to educate their children who then found jobs in the cities and only occasionally sent money to their parents.

This unfavorable and sometimes painful experience led villagers to adjust their idea of parental repayment and old age security in a way which reduced the desired number of children. The old perception was that a large number of children was necessary to guarantee support in old age; the adjusted perception was that a smaller number of children was an even better guarantee of this support. One, two, or three children were sufficient to insure support (for a similar finding in a survey in rural Chiangmai in 1976-1977, see Somphong and Hogan 1979: 70). Villagers felt that children were more capable of repaying their parents if they came from small families. With one to three children, the parents could spend more time with each child, get closer to them, take better care of them, and invest more fully in each one. Investing in their children meant giving them the best education possible or providing them with more assets. With this type of investment, the children had a better chance of doing well and becoming wealthy, thereby being in a better position to support their parents in old age. Some villagers adjusted their perception in an even more radical fashion; they believed that the children no longer had to give them money, instead the best 'repayment' the children could make was to do well on their own and never have to come asking their parents
for money. The parents then could save to support themselves in old age.

In the North, the most common self-comforting excuse given by the parents for why their children failed to care for them was that the children had to first care for their own families and children. Often heard was: "He had his own family with many children, so he could not take care of me"; or "He is better off than we are, but he had many children on whom he had to spend a lot of money." This was just one more reason why parents found it desirable for their own children to limit the size of their families; it left them more capable of caring for the parents.

Another emerging attitude among parents which resulted in a desire for fewer children was the feeling that the best way to provide for security in old age was for the parents themselves to save money. They would then be able to live off their savings and accumulated assets, which were more assured and reliable than depending on their children for support. After all, children could die, be far away, be financially indigent, or just turn bad and be unwilling to support their parents. Another desirable side effect of this situation was that the savings and accumulated wealth would encourage the children to give their parents more support, attention, and care. The majority of the villagers stopped turning over inheritances to their children while they lived; this forced the children to stay in contact and also gave them some resources to turn to in old age.

Yet another cultural trait which was conducive to limiting the number of children was an increasing tendency of couples to make
reproductive decisions themselves with less outside interference. In rural northern Thailand, and Thailand as a whole, the decisions on when to have children and how many to have are primarily the responsibility of the married couple (see also Knodel, et al., 1987: Chapter 8); parents and other kin play primarily an advisory role. From discussions with villagers it became apparent that a change had occurred in this aspect of societal behavior. In the old days, intervention in births was generally not possible therefore practically no one made reproductive decisions. Whereas around the turn of the decade 1970s couples often requested opinions about how many children to have and when to have them from their parents or grandparents, more recently they turned to simply making the decisions themselves without this input.

In addition, couples received strong encouragement to limit the number of children from numerous sources. At wedding ceremonies, for example, fellow villagers and older villagers who assisted with or attended the ceremony often advised the couple to have no more than two or three children. This was a rather drastic change from the past when a common blessing at such ceremonies was: "have a house full of children and grandchildren." Their parents also would advise a couple to have only a few children for reasons of economic and social practicality and because they didn't want to be excessively burdened with helping to care for the grandchildren. One grandmother in Khua Mung said: "It is all right to have grandchildren to play with or to care for them sometimes, but no grandparents now wanted to take care of a child full-time or tend many grandchildren. We want to live
out our lives in peace with lots of rest and some of us do still have work to do. If the couple wants many children and must care for them, they must hire other villagers to do so now. In our village, one person opened a day care center for babies and pre-school children. I do not like the idea of a stranger or non-relative caring for one's children; but the more children a couple has, the more they must rely on this service."

This is related to another change regarding child care by relatives. In the past, when grandparents or other relatives were asked to occasionally care for the children, the couple generally did not pay or provide provisions for them. Since the beginning of the 1970s, payments and/or provisions were now expected on both sides, although the rate and amount given varied greatly depending on such factors as the closeness of the relationship. However, the rate of payment was culturally mediated so that it did not become an economic business transaction of a form which was culturally unacceptable in relations between kin. For example if a village couple asked the wife's parents to care for a child each day during harvest season they felt obligated to provide some money, but called it "petty cash to buy sweets for the child" (or soap, baby powder, milk, broken rice for porridge, etc.). Not all parents expected this, but others would very verbally and openly express their wishes for payment. By 1980 it had become the norm to give or receive this payment; only when the payment was too low or the requested amount too high was it deemed inconsiderate to ask about it.
At the time of the field study, many villagers thought it was ridiculous to have many children. If a couple kept on having babies, most villagers would believe that one of the couple must have some problem with the contraceptives. If a couple decided to have too many children and thereby suffered economically, no one would sympathize with them or help them out.

Other cultural attitudes which worked against high fertility were the norms of female autonomy and gender preference. In rural Thailand a strong female socio-economic position was recognized and considerable autonomy had existed at least since the turn of the century. Families in rural areas were traditionally centered around female members, e.g., the matrilineage in northern Thailand (Turton 1972). Similarly, the matrilocal pattern was preferred and dominant in the North (Potter 1976: 151). The family home and a larger share of property was typically allotted to the one who cared for the parents in old age, customarily and preferably the youngest daughter. Within the families, women had considerable decision-making power and usually took care of the family finances (Knodel, et al. 1987: Chapter 8). In addition, women were involved in vending and trade, although usually to a lesser degree than men. Since the beginning of the century, the women's role in this matter has increased and, at present, has become predominant over that of the men.

Because of the need for them to bear children, female autonomy in reproductive matters before contraceptives became available was limited. According to the villagers, in pre-contraceptive days the number of children depended primarily on the natural physical capacities
and sociosexual behavior of the couple. If they were still fertile, the question of more children devolved to whether they were still having sex or not. The women culturally and practically had little say on the frequency of sexual intercourse. Usually only after they reached 35-40 years of age or so could the women choose to stop having sex and justify it. After contraceptives became available, females gained control over their pregnancy. The village women in general took an active role in deciding how many children; as they pointed out, this was because they had more at stake since they were the ones who experienced the hardship of pregnancy, the pain of giving birth, and bore most of the burden of child rearing (see also Knodel, et al., 1987: Chapter 8).

Traditionally there was a preference for sons (see also Knodel, et al., 1987: Chapter 5); however, it was not as strong as in many other societies. When births were unregulated, gender preference could not affect the number of children. Once contraception was easily available, however, gender preferences became influential in determining whether a couple would have one or two children more than their natural preference. For example, a village couple might have two girls and want a boy; they might then try to have one or two more children. If they had an additional daughter, they might stop because the cost of an additional child was higher than the value of a son to them.

One should also note that gender preference was influenced by socio-economic conditions. In the field study area, some villagers expressed a preference for daughters in addition to a son or two, because experience showed that sons did not care for their parents
as well as daughters did. Sons would also tend to live far from the parents, where jobs and residential land were available. Another situation in which a daughter preference manifested itself was in some villages of Chiangmai and Chiangrai where work as prostitutes was acceptable and widely practiced due to limited alternative employment and increasing demand for urban prostitute services. These changes in preference did not in general affect the dominant norm of having a small number of children.

Theravada Buddhism is the religion of the vast majority of the Thai population. As practiced in Thailand, Buddhism poses no barriers to the use of contraception and the norm of small families (Knodel, et al., 1987: Chapter 8). Discussions with villagers in the field study area confirmed this. Although some religions view use of contraception as a form of taking life, the villagers indicated that this concept was not applied to the use of contraceptives in Thailand. The monks who were interviewed in fact approved of family planning. They felt that even if contraception was a form of taking life, it was necessary to prevent further economic suffering for parents and children, just as killing animals was necessary to produce food for survival. They also added that Buddhism specified levels of proper behavior; the level for ordinary people allowed many things, sexual pleasure and birth control among them.

Finally, the physical and cultural setting of the rural northern communities contributed to the acceptance of contraceptives and the norm of few children. Houses tended to be clustered rather than spread out; in addition, there was a long history of cooperative efforts such
as labor exchange, work in irrigation, and community and household ceremonies. This physical proximity and regular and extensive contacts with neighbors allowed the villagers to share experiences, set examples, and influence each other's behaviors, especially as regards such behaviors as reproduction. Many village wives first learned about contraception and the high cost of bearing children from their neighbors or agricultural labor exchange partners. A village woman attending her annual matrilineal descent group ceremony just before she got married learned from her older cousins how they had suffered economically and physically (e.g., in terms of health and beauty) from having more than two children; the woman only wanted one child thereafter. A man learned of vasectomy from villagers in a neighboring village while they were collectively cleaning a public irrigation canal. The experience convinced him that the operation did not cause a decrease in physical strength or sexual desire and that he should have it done after having a few children; he later did.

5.2 Difficulties with the Government

Meanwhile, villagers encountered difficulties with the government. Their responses ranged from radical conflict to conditional resignation to the power and authority of the government and its officials.

5.2.1 The Political Context

In the early 1970s the government under the military domination of Field Marshal Thanom pursued political stability through political repression and economic growth, aided by U.S. military spending and economic capital. Political strategy in this government was under
the control of the Minister of Interior, General Prapas, who believed that a government could maintain power through systematic repression provided it had the support of foreign businesses and foreign governments, in particular those of the United States. This government was not as successful as had been that of General Sarit, which had received good support from private businesses because it promoted their growth and protected them from extortion and administrative restrictions. Sarit's government had reduced the power of the administrative bureaucracy and of the police in economic matters; these agencies had previously used their power to issue permits and check business irregularities and registrations to engage in various forms of corruption at the expense of the public and especially to the detriment of business (Pasuk 1980: 72-73). The Thanom government was unable to restrain the growing influence of the bureaucracy and the police, thus making it unpopular with businessmen. In addition, it lost popularity both with the army and with business because it pursued the personal business interests of and supported monopolies by the families of Thanom and Prapas.

Among the signs of growing resentment was increasingly open criticism from the business sector of the corruption in government, even though there had been corruption in Sarit's time as well. This criticism was an expression of the jealousy of the businessmen, technocrats, and army toward the power monopoly in the hands of the administrative bureaucracy. Ironically, it was Thanom who first criticized public corruption while seeking to discredit Sarit after his death
and thus gain popularity for his own succession. Discontented army personnel consolidated around General Kris Srivara who had vast business interests himself, sitting on 50 company boards.

Jealousy and discontent on the part of business and the army were probably the main reasons for the eventual downfall of Thanom's regime. A second reason was popular discontent which became overt as farmers, workers, and students began demonstrating against repression. Many of the urban middle class held the liberal view that political democracy might provide the necessary safety valve for the expression of popular discontent without jeopardizing their own privileged positions. Extensive contacts with Western countries, especially the U.S., had reinforced this view. By 1972 most of the middle class and the army were willing to accept, or even encourage, the introduction of parliamentary democracy to replace the military government.

Rural poor, small farmers, and urban wage laborers increasingly expressed their discontent and resentment over general economic difficulties and the repressive rule of the government. Increasing antagonism between the rural rich and poor resulted from the people's perceptions and experiences, and was encouraged by newspapers and student demonstrations. The improved communications in the country facilitated the spread of such news and helped to stir people's emotions. Among the topical issues of the day were the government's favoring of foreign investment over local production, encouragement of foreign technology and imports over local made products, corruption and power monopoly, lack of attention to rural poverty, and overreaction in counterinsurgency activities, e.g., burning down an entire village
and killing innocent people. In some rural areas, the villagers openly expressed their unhappiness and resentment but were quickly suppressed.

In urban areas, where the mass media could more easily draw the attention of the public, strikes demanding wage raises, minimum wage guarantees, and labor welfare broke out with increasing frequency among workers. The average number of strikes had been 18 annually between 1965 and 1972, but soared to 501 a year by 1973 (Pasuk 1980: 79). A significant drop in rice production due to harvest failure occurred in 1972, and in 1972-1973 inflation reached 19 percent, the highest rate since the end of the Second World War (Pasuk 1980: 78). This inflation was also fed by world-wide inflation which resulted in increased prices for imported raw materials such as oil.

The partial military withdrawal of the U.S. in 1967-1969 and a decrease in military aid (from 75 million U.S. dollars in 1969 to 65 million in 1970 and to 61 in 1972) created a balance of payments deficit and caused an economic slump. This resulted in a loss of confidence in the government in the military and business sectors (Pasuk 1980: 57). Since the Thai government was so dependent on the U.S. for economic prosperity and political stability, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam was one of the crucial catalysts leading to the collapse of the Thai military government in late 1973.

October 1973 saw the student-led uprising which caused the overthrow of the dictatorship of the military clique of Thanom. The high degree of freedom which followed in the period 1974-1976, known as the "democratic period," provided opportunities for underprivileged workers and farmers to participate more actively in politics. With
the support of the university students in Bangkok and the countryside, workers and farmers joined in a series of strikes, demonstrations, and other forms of protest both locally and nationally, aimed at securing long neglected rights and needs from the government and other influential groups such as the factory owners and the landlords.

In urban areas, particularly in Bangkok, the average number of strikes per month was 29 in 1974, 20 in 1975, and 11 in 1976 (Morell and Chaianan 1981: table 7.3). In 1975, the Labor Relation Act was passed legalizing the formation of labor unions and implementing an official daily minimum wage. Between 1973 and 1976 the strength of the organized laborers succeeded in driving up the minimum wage a few times; the number of unions increased from 15 in 1973 to 153 in 1976 (Pasuk 1980: 160).

Similar progress for farmers peaked in November 1974 when the first national level peasants' organization, the Peasant Federation of Thailand (PFT) was established. Pressure from the PFT contributed greatly to the passage of two crucial pieces of legislation: the Land Rent Control Act of November 1974 and the Land Reform Act of January 1975. Neither of these pieces of legislation was successfully implemented because they threatened the interests of local landlords and the political-economic ruling groups. However, the PFT was successful in settling many local demands and in politicizing the majority of landless and small landowning farmers through its actions and its newspaper, the Thai Farmer.

On the regional level, roughly one hundred government-sponsored farmers' groups joined in a federation known as the Northern Union
of Farmers' Groups (NUFAG). In contrast with the PTF, which represented small and landless farmers, the NUFAG was primarily composed of better-off landowners whose main objectives were access to credit and markets. Both organizations operated independent of government guidance and control.

In early 1975, the conservative status quo groups began to gain power. These groups included core people in the military and business circles, politicians, and members of the middle class who began to view the intensity and extent of strikes and demonstrations as a lack of law and order which produced a high level of insecurity that could jeopardize their positions and interests. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China and official contacts with new Communist governments in the region also created a sense of alarm and fear among the influentials and a large segment of the population.

Among the tactics used by the groups seeking to restore the status quo were the establishment of right-wing reactionary groups and the assassination of the leaders of the farmers and workers; this was intended to undermine the power of the farmers' and workers' organizations and to destabilize the civilian faction in the government which was favoring the underprivileged. The groups included Nawaphon, Krathing Daeng, and the government-supported Village Scouts. The assassination schemes organized by the landlords and right-wing groups were also extensive. Between April and August 1975, 21 PFT leaders were killed, 11 of them in the North alone. One of these was Intha Sribunruang, the president of the Northern PFT and the editor of the Thai Farmer (Bowie and Phelan 1975: 5, 7).
The military finally reestablished control in the bloody coup of 1976. The new government's stated policies still retained the objectives of national security, commercial production of agriculture, infrastructure development, and public administrative development as in the first three national plans (1961-1976). However, in its fourth plan (1977-1981) emphasis was placed on agricultural diversification and increased productivity through the adoption of modern technology, provisions for agricultural credits and price stabilization, encouragement of foreign investment, and development of export/import and import-substitution industries. Although the economic development style and repressive measures were reinstalled, the new government sought some popularity with the underprivileged, especially the farmers, through its introduction of various programs. Some of these programs were actually beneficial and provided safety valves for the pressures of discontent, others were mere lip service, intended to show that the government knew of their problems and cared about their well-being.

An example of the latter kind was the '1979 Year of the Farmer' program.

As in the previous period, some of the programs and government actions could easily be classed as mostly resented or mostly appreciated by the villagers, with a few giving rise to mixed feelings. Also as before, the attitude of the villagers toward programs depended on their socio-economic condition; the same program could be simultaneously appreciated and hated by two different groups. The resulting feelings would depend critically on the objectives and style of implementation of any particular program. For example, some programs were intended to benefit farmers who were commercial producers, others tried to
benefit all farmers, but in their implementation only ended up helping the well-to-do farmers. As a result of their experiences in politici-
zation between 1973 and 1976, many villagers were now willing to not only critically examine the programs and the government itself, but were also ready to openly criticize them if the need arose.

5.2.2 Resentment

During this period some of the most resented government programs and actions were the implementation of the Land Rent Control act, price support schemes, and carryover programs from previous times such as those relating to rural administration, registration and taxation, conflict resolution, and other rural modernization and development programs. Some of these will be described and examined so as to depict villagers' responses in this period.

5.2.2.1 The Land Rent Control Act

The Land Rent Control Act of 1974 had the potential to benefit small and landless farmers as it guaranteed tenancy rights for six years once the tenants had begun working on the land. Rents could only be collected once annually regardless of how many cultivation periods there were in a given year. The party paying the costs of production would deduct one third from the output of main season crops, then the landowner was permitted to collect no more than half of the remainder as rent. In the event of a poor harvest, the rent was to be reduced; and no rent could be collected if the harvest was less than one third of normal. An official supervisory committee was to be set up at the district level to implement the act, enforce its
provisions, and settle disputes between landowners and tenants. This committee was to be headed by the district officer and its members included three other district officials, tambon headmen, and five tenants and three landlords representing each tambon (Anan 1984: 396-397).

The northern organization of the PFT used this law as the primary means of increasing its activities and establishing branches in the districts of Chiangmai. The rapid growth of the PFT testified not only to the pervasiveness of the tenancy problem, but also to the political awareness of the farmers there. The activities of the PFT and its student allies in disseminating information on tenancy rights and forcing their implementation resulted in open confrontations between the PFT and the tenants on one side and the landlords and officials on the other. In many cases, large landlords refused to abide by the new law and the PFT would support a fight by the tenants through the court system (for an example of such court cases in Sanpatong district see Bangkok Post, August 7, 1975). Most of the time, the landlords would win with the assistance of the officials who often not only refused to implement the law, but would not inform farmers of it and would not establish the stipulated supervisory committee. Many tenants also feared to insist on their tenants' rights for fear of invoking the landlord's wrath and losing tenancy which was their primary means of livelihood. The fear was very widespread after the assassination of PFT leaders. Consequently, the PFT's success in enforcing the implementation of this law was minimal. For example, in the
district of Doi Saket of Chiangmai only 4.5 percent of the tenants were allowed to pay the legal amount of rent (Anan 1984: 399).

In the field study villages in 1979-1980, villagers did not really want to discuss the PFT and its actions. However, information gathered did indicate that there were some tenants who attempted to obtain their legal tenancy rights, especially in the case of Khua Mung. Most of the small landowners and landless villagers said that they would like to see the law effectively implemented. For example, one Khua Mung villager said: "The arrangements in the law are really to benefit us, the unfortunate people in the village. It will allow us to have security in tenancy, not having to worry about being chased off the land. The legal rent is not only moral in giving more to the poorer party, but it is also traditional because, unlike now, in the past the costs of production including even the rice sown were given back in rice to the party providing them before the output was to be divided."

A few Nong Faeg villagers expressed similar sentiments and added that the wealthy should be considerate and try to understand the situation of the poor who were also entitled to their livelihood and well-being; as an old saying went: "the aristocrat's heart and the commoner's heart are hanging in the same place."

It is worth noting that when probed some villagers were definitely in favor of replacing their present arrangements with the new legal tenancy and rent arrangements. However, many others were satisfied with their current arrangements and just wanted the alternative made available. The former group felt that it was not fair for the
landowners to claim 50 percent of the output when they did not put any effort into the cultivation and the burden of production costs was placed on the tenants' shoulders. These included labor costs, buffalo renting or raising costs, the cost of tractors, food costs during labor exchanges, cost of rice seedlings, and the cost for maintaining the irrigation canals. In the past many of these costs had been shared or covered by the landowners. For example, the cost of land ploughing (direct costs for tractor or the equivalent value of buffalo rent) was deducted and given to the party providing the service before the output was divided on a 50-50 basis. Many landowners in the past had also come to help the tenants during the harvest and shared the cost of the food in labor exchange. Whether they came to insure the efficiency of the harvest and guard against deceit in the amount of the harvest or not, their help and cost sharing were appreciated by the tenants. Another traditional practice was the granting of a gift of additional rice to the tenants after the division had been made. This rice gift was an expression of appreciation for the tenants' hard work to produce a high output, a way of offsetting irrigation canal maintenance for which the tenants supplied money or labor annually, or merely a way of assisting those who were in a lower/poorer position.

In 1980, only a few landowners had kept these practices. The tenants either paid the production costs themselves, or if the landlord covered some of the expenses, the equivalent value in rice was removed by the landlord from the total output before the remainder was divided 50-50. Some landowners still came to the harvest, but were less
helpful and generally just supervised or watched for cheating. No food or money was provided for labor exchange, no rice gift was given at the end of the harvest to offset irrigation canal maintenance costs which could be as high as 30 baht per rai of land rented in 1980. The tenants had no choice but to accept these changes, and they especially resented the landowners demanding more at the tenants' expense as production costs and economic difficulties increased. As poor villagers in Nong Faeg said: "Nowadays we spend a lot of cash and labor in rice production on rented land; and the whole half year, even with a good crop, results in less rice than what we can live on. It is better to work for wages." Khua Mung villagers added that if they rented land it was necessary to grow rice or garlic in the main season and then supplement their income with earnings from two rounds of dry season cash crops and occasional wage labor.

Data from a survey of Nong Faeg done in 1980 showed that in Nong Faeg landless non-cultivating households made up 20 percent of the households, while landless tenant households accounted for 16 percent. In the majority of the landless non-cultivating households, the primary source of livelihood was either wage labor or skilled work (e.g., construction). The tenants' households relied on glutinous rice production as the primary livelihood source with dry season cash crops and wage labor as secondary sources. In Khua Mung, landless non-cultivators made up 9 percent and tenant households 18 percent. The landless households were primarily dependent on wage labor alone; the tenant households were evenly divided between glutinous rice cultivation and main season garlic growing. The majority of these also engaged in either
main season garlic growing or dry season cash crops as a secondary source of livelihood.

Only tenants who agreed to abide by the rules and arrangements of the landlords could rent land. To protest meant to lose tenancy because in the landlords' eyes each tenant was "just another tenant," while there was a large supply of villagers wanting to rent land. If one had trouble with one landlord, it could mean difficulties with others because in tenancy matters it was tenants versus landlords. As one landlord said: "Who wants a trouble making tenant?"

On the other hand there were a few farmers who didn't take a strong interest in the new Land Rent Control Act. They admitted that it would be beneficial if the new tenants' rights were enforced, but their socio-economic conditions were such that it made little difference to them. One such class of farmers was those who rented land from their parents and still followed the traditional nominal fee arrangements, e.g., one third of the total output after deducting production costs (there were, however, a few parents by this time who demanded the strict businesslike landlord-tenant arrangements). Villagers who had patron-client ties with their landlords often fell into this category as well. They were often satisfied with the exchange of benefits with their patron, even though the rent was still charged on a 50-50 basis. An interesting feature of this class of villagers was that they latently supported the new law and shared the resentment of landlords and officials who ignored it.

Whatever the degree of success of the short-lived implementation of the new law in 1975 and 1976, the impact on villagers in terms of
feelings and politicization was strong and extensive. Most villagers
in the field study area knew Intha Sribunruang because he lived in
a village in Saraphi district. Many of the villagers were upset with
his death and were angry not only at the assassin, but also at the
"ones who hired the assassin." The villagers were convinced that he
had been killed because he had led the enforcement of the new tenancy
law and felt that the landlords and officials were responsible for
his death. As for the government, they were bothered that it did not
attempt to enforce the new law or to protect the peasant leaders.
Some villagers' resentment was very strong, and they expressed their
views that the poor farmers and tenants were the victims and the land-
lords, capitalists, and government officials were unscrupulous
suppressors.

5.2.2.2 Price Support Schemes

In the mid-1960s the government began price support schemes with
two objectives: stabilize the price of rice and other cash crops to
benefit farmers, and to sell farm inputs, particularly fertilizers,
to farmers at low prices. The government had initiated a rice price
support program in 1965, however, until the mid-1970s it had contributed
to virtually no change in rice prices. In 1969 the government took
a more direct approach by purchasing paddy at supported prices, but
the impact was minimal due to inefficiency in implementation and a
very restricted budget.

In 1975 the government made another attempt to intervene in the
rice markets. It promoted exports by reducing the rice premium 50
percent and setting a new controlled price for retail milled rice of 75
baht per thang, a 50 percent increase over the old price (Anan 1984: 376). The measure had short-lived and limited impact, if any at all. No millers bought paddy at the guaranteed prices, so the government turned to direct purchases from farmers as a means to support the paddy price. In 1975 the Farmers' Marketing Organization (FMO) was established to administer this program with a budget intended primarily for rice and sugar purchase and later for other cash crops. The budget for this program went rapidly from 535 million baht in 1977-1978 to 1130 million baht in 1979-1980. However, the supported prices of rice were never high; thus, the majority of the farmers did not benefit. Only large landowners had the opportunity to benefit from rice sale, while large-scale corruption benefitted the officials and rice millers (Anan 1984: 377).

In the field study area this government program and the FMO were known to the villagers for selling low priced fertilizers and buying farm produce at guaranteed prices. Their experiences with the FMO led them to ignore or resent government assistance on agricultural prices and marketing. Not so surprisingly, what Turton found in 1969 in a district in Chiangrai held true in Saraphi district between 1979 and 1980 (Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 115-116). The program of rice and garlic price supports raised the hopes of villagers but had almost a negligible effect, apart from encouraging corruption and benefitting a handful of already well-to-do farmers and merchants in the district. Many villagers heard from the media that each year the government was allocating more money for purchases at guaranteed prices, but for some
reason they could never sell their produce at these prices. Reasons for this can be extracted from what the villagers said.

"Accurate information and sincere encouragement on the guaranteed price program have never been given directly to us. Usually, the officials buy most of the quota of rice or garlic from merchants or rich landlords. When we are allowed to sell some of our produce, we are paid for it with low prices because the government is very strict in subtracting for moisture content, trash content, less than standard weight, wrong coloration, and damaged or broken produce. We have to sell because we have spent a lot of money on transportation to get to the district center and for renting silos to store our produce."

Selling rice to the Chinese merchants, on the other hand, was much easier. According to villagers in both villages, the Chinese merchants generally offered a price just below the support price, e.g., 1 or 2 baht per thang cheaper. However, the merchants paid for transporting the rice away, they were not picky about the quality, and they paid the farmers on the spot. The guaranteed price, by comparison, was unpredictable and unreliable. The villagers also had to wait days or weeks before receiving payment. Some of the district officers even recommended that villagers sell to the merchants instead of to the government.

In Nong Faeg in January 1981 heavy rain and floods hit during harvest time; a portion of the rice was damaged. The guaranteed price at the time was 38 baht per thang of ordinary rice and 35 baht per thang of glutinous rice. However, the rice was above the allowed moisture content and couldn't be accepted by the officials. The
merchants, on the other hand, were willing to buy it at 30 baht per thang for ordinary and 25 baht per thang for glutinous. The villagers were extremely happy to be able to sell this damp rice which would soon spoil if not properly treated.

The villagers in Khua Mung seem to have had worse experiences with the program, and their resentment was much more strongly expressed through verbal expression, reluctance to accept government offers, and lack of cooperation with government officials. This may be largely due to the fact that more of the Khua Mung villagers ordered low priced fertilizer from the FMO. The fertilizer did not arrive at the village on time, accordingly the villagers, unwilling to wait, purchased fertilizer from other sources. They said that they would remember how badly the government had treated them. Villagers also felt that the government was careless and unconcerned in helping them. In a newspaper popular in the village (Thai Rath, 28 September 1979) the director of the FMO was quoted as saying: "The FMO sold some spoiled fertilizer because thorough examinations were not possible. Any farmers who purchased spoiled fertilizer can make a request for replacement." Many of the villagers who read this or heard about it said bitterly: "If we bought some spoiled fertilizer and we wanted a replacement, we have to go through a long bureaucratic process and wait for months."

Also in 1979, some Khua Mung villagers tried to sell their garlic at support prices. A few villagers were sent to "beg" the government officials to come into the village to buy. Finally they came, but purchased only a truck load. The villagers had to divide the sales
resulting in a miniscule sale per household. Then the FMO officials told them that they had to bring their garlic to the district center, as the FMO could no longer afford transportation costs. The villagers did this and had to store their garlic in rented silos. Not only did they have to pay for the silos, but while waiting their garlic began to spoil. To avoid total disaster they had to sell it cheaply to the merchants. On returning they found that others who had not taken their garlic to the FMO had sold it to merchants in the village at a slightly higher price than that offered by the FMO.

5.2.2.3 Demands and Orders

One of the new demands in this period was a requirement for political cooperation from the villagers. The government organized two groups in rural areas for securing the status quo and countering insurgency: the Village Scouts in 1971 and the Thai National Protection Volunteers in 1978. Many villagers in the field study area were recruited by and persuaded to receive training from these organizations each year. They were often ordered to take part in these organizations by participating in official ceremonies and even by opposing organized protest against the government. The villagers hated this because it was another form of conscription which wasted time; it sometimes jeopardized their livelihood; and it placed them in opposition to fellow villagers whose causes they often supported. For example, in 1980 the villagers were asked by the district office to contribute generously to supplement the government funds for the training of the Thai National Protection Volunteers. Prior to this time they had been asked to give 10 to 15 baht per household to purchase guns for the
village representatives of the Volunteers. In the mid-1980s another request was made for one baht per household member to support a national program. What started out as a "voluntary" contribution at the national level was in practice converted into a required payment at the local level. This was common in the Thai bureaucratic chain of command as the lower officials tried to please their superiors by promptly and efficiently responding to their superiors' demands. To the villagers it was best described by: "With all the taxes and then these money collections from those of us who do not have much, it is just like trying to squeeze blood from a crab."

Many of the villagers tried to avoid government orders, rules, and regulations. They did this because many of the government demands did not fit their culture, needs, or the prevailing circumstances in a rural situation. Marriage registration was one such regulation which the villagers viewed as neither fitting their needs or suited to the rural circumstances. The rationale used by the government for enforcing it was simply not accepted by the villagers. Since about 1970, the government had encouraged and attempted to enforce marriage registration. This could require a couple which had already been married forty years to register their marriage if they wished to become members of a farmers' cooperative or the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC).

From the district officers' point of view, marriage registration facilitated dealings with the villagers' legal transactions concerning land ownership, inheritance, household registration, land sales, and responsibility for debts to the farmers' cooperatives and the BAAC.
There was no question that some of the villagers, primarily the landowners and wealthier ones, accepted the importance of marriage registration since they were frequently involved in legal and commercial transactions and often wished to borrow money from the co-ops and the BAAC; they felt that registration gave some legal protection to their wealth and properties. Many of the other villagers, however, did not see the necessity of this registration; they also saw a conflict between this registration and some of their traditional norms and practices. Traditionally a husband and wife retained their own last names and their respective ownership of properties such as houses and land, i.e., each of them maintained full ownership of any property or land they had acquired through gifts, inheritance, or purchases. Thus the disposition of their property was according to each of their individual wills. These villagers found marriage registration particularly oppressive. Consider the case of a man marrying for the second time and registering the marriage, supposing both he and his new wife have children at the time of the marriage. If either parent died without leaving a written will, their stepchildren according to the law had as strong a legal claim to their property as did their natural children. In most situations, the villagers were much more strongly attached to their natural children than to their stepchildren, thus they resented an equal distribution of property. In 1979-1980 several cases of such conflict between traditional norms and the legal effects of marriage registration arose in the field study area.

The villagers came to increasingly resent the government officials and their use of authority because they often were seen to use this
authority to oppress the villagers and many of them were corrupt. In the experience of the villagers, it was not uncommon for an official to use his authority to illegally demand cash from villagers. For example, one official told a villager that he had to pay a price if he wanted to receive fast and convenient service or special favors; the villagers especially disliked this because they saw it as the official's duty to provide these services.

The villagers resented official corruption for at least three reasons. First, the villagers saw that some officials illegally appropriated government funds and properties which they viewed as morally wrong even though it might not affect them directly. "These officials are disgusting. They are greedy and dishonest," commented one villager. Second, they often saw funds which had been earmarked for them taken by these corrupt officials, e.g., the funds for the Transfering Money to Rural Area Program (ngoen phan). Finally, the villagers found it necessary to bribe officials, and there was no alternative if they wished to fulfill some of their needs. These bribes were often necessary just to continue with some practices which had always been a part of rural life, because the government issued laws forbidding or restricting them. For example, the possession of newly cut teak or other kinds of construction-quality wood without a license or a receipt from a mill; the production, sale, and possession of homemade liquor; the use of a litre can rather than the officially sanctioned kilogram in commercial transactions. The officials would be especially active in enforcing these types of laws with the intention of squeezing bribes out of their villager victims. Sometimes, villagers
broke the law, e.g., the wood law, were seized and punished through the legal system. To many officials, this served not only to fulfill their job responsibility, but also as an occasional reminder for other villagers of what the officials could do to them if they did not comply with the officials' demands. A few cases of these incidents occurred in the field study district during the late 1970s.

5.2.2.4 Reactions

During the decade ending in 1980 many villagers came to perceive the government and its officials as oppressors, associated with the wealthy and landowners. They saw that the government helped to perpetuate inequalities and blamed it for not helping them. They had become more politically critical of their low position in society, and had some grasp of the socio-economic structure as indicated by their constant references to the differences between their status and that of the ruling groups. For example, they felt that the policy makers who lived comfortably and worked in air-conditioned offices would never see things the way villagers and farmers did, thus they were incapable of creating programs suitable for the villagers' needs which would truly benefit them.

The villagers learned during the period 1973-1976 that attempts to radically change the existing situations were not likely to be successful. For example, in the field study district, leaders of the PFT and college students in 1975 tried to encourage the implementation of the Rent Control Act. Many villagers joined these leaders in protesting against the landlords' high rate of rent. Some tenants, as a result of their protests, were denied their continuing use...
of land and the PFT leaders helped by bringing the cases to court. However, during 1975 some PFT leaders were assassinated and in 1976 the movement was suppressed by the government. From this same phenomenon, the villagers learned different lessons. The poor and landless or tenants learned that any attempt along this line was always in vain. The rich and landlords, however, learned that they were with the powerful groups of the country which would preserve the status quo and thus their interests were always protected.

The majority of the villagers were not passive in their reactions or their resistance; they used all available culturally appropriate means. Their forms of resistance did not change much from previous periods, however, they did adopt some of the newer forms, e.g., learning to use and also avoid the existing formal legal system. They learned that the extra-legal power of an organized group could sometimes be effective; they learned to think and express themselves in new terms relating to structural contradiction and oppression, e.g., khud rid (exploitation) and kod khi (oppression). The following are some examples of resistance in the field study villages.

In past years the government had built a water gate that controlled the water flow from above an irrigation weir in the Ping River into the main irrigation canal. The villagers found that the narrow concrete channel allowed little water to flow down to the main irrigation canal. Complaints were sent in, but there was no government action; many of the villagers therefore went to break part of the concrete channel and thus widen it.
When villagers were unhappy with negligent or irresponsible local officials, they might try to find ways to replace them or improve their performances. For example, in 1980 in the Khua Mung area there was a negligent official tambon midwife; her bad services and insulting attitude toward the villagers were notorious. A village headman handed the district health official a petition signed by many villagers requesting a new midwife; nothing happened. The headman and the villagers then threatened to appeal the case to higher authority; following this, their demands were met.

There should be little doubt that a greater proportion of the villagers now realized their potential political power than in the past. At the same time, their resentment and bad experiences with the government and its officials was considerable, and accumulating further. Why then did they so rarely organize for political action to change or correct bad situations? In other words, what interpretation can be placed on the conditional resignation of the villagers?

The answer may well be in their livelihood situations and their perceptions or fears about possible consequences of their actions. In terms of livelihood, the existing economic conditions and socio-economic relationships between villagers, although keeping some poor and causing them suffering while enriching others, allowed them to subsist and to hope for some improvement. Radical changes might disrupt these existing situations and cause them to lose what they currently had.

The majority of the villagers no longer believed in or had changed their beliefs in karmic explanations of inequality, superior
subordinate relations and subjugation of the inferiors, and suffering due to oppression. Some villagers said: "after death, there is nothing. Someone is well-off because he or she inherits a lot of property, works hard, is lucky in economic ventures, or is just very greedy." Other villagers said: "Most government officials and businessmen acquire great wealth and authority not because of their past lives or good karma, but because they are corrupt and grasp the opportunities to use their authority and influence to take advantage of those who are powerless." What they believed in now was bureaucratic dominance, repressive measures, and vengeance by power groups which compelled them to obey government authority.

The government officials often made it clear to the villagers that the relationship between them was exceedingly asymmetrical, i.e., the officials had almost complete control over any engagement and its outcome. The officials could make the villagers ill at ease by using strategies such as speaking in a dialect unfamiliar to the villagers. The villagers were thus often apprehensive about the outcome of any engagement with the officials; they had a good chance of being humiliated and acutely embarrassed (see also Bilmes 1980: 186-187). However, this situation and the villagers willingness to confront officials did change as a result of the "democratic period" between 1973 and 1976. The villagers were braver and did dare to confront officials on occasion, but they still recognized and feared the repressive measures and harsh vengeance which could be brought to bear on them, especially after 1975. An example of this was the assassinations of peasant organization leaders in the district in 1975 and
1976. There were other cases of villagers conflicting with tambon headmen, but then becoming quiet after a "visit" by the police.

In 1980 there was a clash between a group of provincial excise tax officials and a group of villagers led by an assistant tambon headman. The clash resulted from long-term resentment on the part of the villagers toward the officials who came regularly to inspect the production and possession of homemade liquor, and the validity of sales licenses for cigarettes and liquor. They often harassed the villagers by being deceitful in their inspections so they could make additional money from the fines. In this particular incident, one of the officials was wounded in a physical fight with the villagers who believed that the officials were again harassing villagers with their inspection. Although it was clear to the district officials and the villagers that the excise tax officials were not following proper inspection procedures, the assistant headman was seized and taken to court. The outcome of the situation was not in favor of the assistant headman and unjust in the villagers' eyes. The villagers thus learned that in the face of these repressive measures, it often made more sense just to resign themselves to the situation rather than to risk their livelihood and lives.

There were also some villagers who reacted positively to government programs and actions, even when the rest of the villagers were reacting negatively. Examples of this were some of the wealthy villagers who stood to benefit the most from many programs. They were willing to comply with government demands. They maintained at considerable personal expense a public relationship with certain officials
in order to intimidate other villagers and to see that no laws harmful to their interests were efficiently implemented. These might include feasting, bribing and other such practices. They could also use their social influence and economic relations to limit the ability of their fellow villagers to express themselves politically.

5.2.3 Appreciation

There were some programs intended to benefit the villagers which were successfully implemented. The benefits were often substantial and the villagers did appreciate them; this had the side effect of easing the feelings of conflict and resentment toward the government and its officials. As in the previous period, some of these programs were of more benefit to some villagers than to others, especially the wealthy villagers. When this was the case, these villagers would be extremely pleased with that program, while the rest of the villagers would resent not only the program but also the unequal treatment associated with it.

5.2.3.1 The Program for Transferring Money to Rural Areas

In 1975 the government introduced the ngoen phan aimed at providing direct local development grants to villagers through the district offices and the tambon committee. Each village would request funds for a development or public work project, and the majority of the funds granted would then be used to hire villagers in the dry season, allowing them to earn some cash. In 1975, a fund of 2,500 million baht was allocated to be divided equally among the 5,023 tambon in Thailand. The fund was increased to 3,500 million baht in 1976,
but then the program was suspended in 1977. In 1978 it was reimplem­
mented with a fund of 1,600 million baht and by 1980 had increased
to 3,500 million baht (Anan 1984: 366). The projects implemented
included construction and improvement of roads, bridges, irrigation
channels, and public buildings. In 1978 the daily wage offered by this
program was 20 baht, and the program required that at least 60 percent
of the money be spent on wages (Anan 1984: 367).

In the field study villages, the ngoen phan program, now officially
known as the Rural Job Creation Scheme, sponsored many public work
projects such as cleaning and deepening irrigation canals. The
villagers who wished to work on the projects had to sign up quickly
because a quota was set on the number of positions. In the case of
canal digging pay was provided on a piece work basis, e.g., 35 baht
would be paid for digging a certain standardized length of canal.
The average villager could finish one or two pieces of work a day.

The villagers appreciated this government program because it
allowed them to make money easily; further, they perceived that the
government was the source of the money making this possible. As one
villager in Nong Faeg said: "It was the first time that the government
rather than demanding money from us, gave some money directly to us
and the poor had the opportunity to receive it." The amount of money
received from this program was substantial for the villagers, being
about 200 to 350 baht per person for the whole season.

However, there were some negative feelings about this program
as well, due to malpractice in implementation, more specifically because
of corruption, embezzlement, and favoritism. For instance, in the
field study area the money was sometimes not fully paid to the villagers because some officials and locally influential people were corrupt. The villagers knew of some headmen in the area who expropriated the funds but did not dare to report it to the district office. At the same time, a newspaper reported that a tambon headman in another area was under investigation because many villagers had reported his corruption to the district office. Many headmen in the area used their authority and influence in the program to do favors for their followers, e.g., by giving priority in sign-up to them. One headman even demanded that 55 villagers who signed up pay for a calculator which he said he bought to figure their wages. Sometimes the villagers would not receive wages for work done until one or two months later.

Along with this new program came new ways for the wealthy to take advantage of the poor. For example, after a poor villager had signed up to work on a project he was allowed to borrow money from the richer villagers or the headmen to be paid back upon receipt of his wages. If the headmen were the moneylenders, they would just take the money the poor villagers owed them directly from the fund. As an example, a villager was assigned 10 sections of canal to dig meaning he should receive 350 baht. Before the work even began, the headman would ask whether he needed cash, and if he said yes would promptly give him 200 baht (20 baht per assigned section). At the time of wage payment, the headman would then take all 350 baht owed the villager as repayment. This practice had become so widespread in Saraphi district that the district officer was forced to expressly forbid it. Despite this, in 1980 there was at least one such case of a headman in a village
adjacent to Nong Faeg which was reported to the district office. The number of reported cases was not high primarily because the villager feared the vengeance of the rich or the headmen; and also because, although they were taken advantage of, the villagers still received some benefits from the program.

5.2.3.2 Agricultural Credits

There were three government-sponsored institutions through which farmers could obtain loans: the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), the agricultural cooperatives, and the government-sponsored farmers' groups which were founded in 1974. The BAAC provided loans directly to farmers and through the co-ops and the farmers' groups. In addition, these institutions also engaged in the sale of subsidized low-cost chemical fertilizers to their members on both cash payment and credit terms.

During the Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976) the government had begun emphasizing making funds available to farmers through the BAAC. As a result the amount of its outstanding loans went from 662 million baht in 1968 to 4,556 million baht in 1975 with the majority being given directly to farmers and the remainder given indirectly through the co-ops and the farmers' groups. The extent of their services could be seen from the number of members which went from 0.8 million in 1971 to 1.3 million in 1975-1976 (NESDB 1977: 12-13, 19).

There was another source of agricultural loans: the commercial banks. In 1975 commercial bank loans for agriculture were only 5 percent of their total lending. However, when the economy stagnated
between 1975 and 1978 and the banks were left with large excess reserves and had an 8 percent interest guarantee from the government, they increased their agricultural loans. Consequently the money made available through these institutions grew from 2,800 million baht in 1974 to more than 19,000 million baht in 1979 (Anan 1984: 370). The government also took a direct hand in 1979, requiring commercial banks to expand agricultural loans to 13 percent of their total deposits; the banks had preferred non-agricultural business loans which could earn higher interest.

Despite the increase in available institutional credits, the supply was still limited and was unequally distributed; even the government recognized this. For example, until 1975 farmers who received agricultural credit were only 10 to 15 percent of the total. This was mostly because the BAAC required collateral on loans and most of the farmers did not have title deed to their land. The majority of the BAAC's customers were the wealthy whose average landholding was twice the national average (NESDB 1977: 13). In 1978 almost half of the credit extended was concentrated in the central region where commercialized agriculture was extensive. Similarly, institutional credit extended in Chiangmai province was large as this was an area of intensive agricultural production.

In the field study villages, the use of credit obtained from the BAAC and agricultural cooperatives was very popular, Khua Mung villagers relying more on their services for intensive cash crop production than the villagers in Nong Faeg. The villagers appreciated the credit program because of its low interest rates and the considerable sum
it made available to each farmer. Villagers were allowed considerable freedom in spending the money, even though they had officially signed loans saying it would be used solely for crop or livestock production. A Nong Faeg villager said that when he first took out government institutional loans the interest was 0.8 percent per month, while the local moneylenders were charging 2 to 3 percent. At the time of the field study, the government rate was 1 percent while the moneylenders were charging 4 to 5 percent. The amount of money available could be large since the villagers were allowed to borrow for various purposes. One villager in Khua Mung in 1979 borrowed 2,000 baht for a pig loan, 6,000 baht for an ox loan, and 12,000 baht for a garlic loan. He then applied all 20,000 baht to his garlic production.

The BAAC, although requiring collateral, allowed the villagers to pay just the interest at the end of August each year, and then made additional loans available if desired. This was superior to the terms offered by the moneylenders in two ways. First, the interest was much lower. Second, the BAAC would allow loans to be extended, i.e., the principal carried over, provided the interest was paid each year; the moneylenders, on the other hand, held the villagers strictly to the terms of the agreement and demanded payment at a set time. If the villagers could not pay, they sacrificed their collateral; many villagers in Nong Faeg and Khua Mung lost their land this way.

The loans from government institutions were often used by the villagers to fulfill personal needs. A few Nong Faeg villagers borrowed money ostensibly for agriculture, but then used it to pay for their children's education. One 60-year-old Khua Mung villager
who had been a member of an agricultural cooperative for eight years
said that he had first borrowed 5,000 baht from the cooperative in
order to pay a debt he had incurred by borrowing from a local money-
lender for home improvement. He said the interest charged by the
cooperative was one third that charged by the moneylender. Then last
year he had borrowed 15,000 baht to invest in cash crops; he had not
been able to pay this back yet because he had spent most of the money
on his sick daughter.

The credit institutions also assisted farmers in the purchase
of cheap fertilizer and in marketing their goods. For example, low-
cost fertilizer could be obtained from the district cooperative with
payment not made until 7-9 months later. The district agricultural
cooperative in 1980 bought garlic from members who were in debt at
a price of one baht above the local market price at the time. In other
words, if a member was in debt 5,000 baht, he was allowed to sell enough
garlic to the cooperative to pay off his debt and recover his trans-
portation costs.

The villagers also saw some negative aspects to this credit
program. For the poor, this was another government program which
favored the rich and perpetuated inequality. After all, acquiring
a loan required one to have property as collateral or to obtain a
guarantee from several members of the institution; thus landless
villagers or small landowners were unable to take advantage of the
program. There were a few rich villagers in the field study area,
particularly in Khua Mung, who would borrow money from the credit
institutions and lend it out to poor villagers at four to five times
the interest rate they were charged by the institutions. The poor villagers just saw this as another way of making the rich richer. The rich, of course, really appreciated the way the government opened up one more avenue for them to earn a profit and increase their chances of being able to seize some poor villager's land.

Many villagers also resented the inevitable corruption and sometimes poor quality of the service provided. For example, many times the sacks of fertilizer purchased from the cooperatives on credit had 46 or 47 kilograms in a supposedly 50 kilogram bag; sometimes the fertilizer was old and spoiled. Prices for fertilizers at the cooperatives were not always less than market prices, and the fertilizer merchants would often provide more flexible payment plans. Finally, many villagers were upset that the government encouraged borrowing and production for sale, but had no programs to effectively guarantee crop production, price levels, and market demand. This meant that the farmers were the most likely victims when something went wrong.

In addition to the above-mentioned programs the government continued to provide many services and programs which were perceived as beneficial by the villagers. For example, the agricultural extension program was expanded considerably. Between 1971 and 1976 the ratio of agricultural extension officers to farm families went from 1:8000 to 1:1158 (NESDB 1977: 14). By 1979 there was already one official agricultural extension worker residing and working in each tambon in the field study area. These workers helped solve problems of agricultural production, introduced high yield crop varieties, and taught the use of modern inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, and
insecticides. The villagers appreciated this program as it allowed them to increase their production and reduce damage to rice and other crops. There were some complaints that the extension workers did not try to mingle enough with the villagers to learn their problems, their perceptions, and local conditions; this was felt to have somewhat reduced their effectiveness. One example was an attempt to introduce a transplanting technique which involved using strings to create lines of seedlings. The extension workers tried in vain to get the villagers to use this technique, but the villagers felt that their traditional techniques of just planting in almost straight lines were much less work, took less time, and were just as effective. Another time the workers introduced a fast-growing and fast-ripening strain of rice; a few villagers tried it but came away angry over the results. It turned out that it sprouted seeds and ripened much faster than the other varieties used in the area, thus attracting all the birds. Before they realized it or could do anything about it, the birds ate the seeds and wasted most of the crop.

Some services provided by the government that were a big help to the villagers were the improvement of the main roads leading to the villages, the introduction of electricity, and health and family planning services. Welfare assistance for villagers in distress was provided; for example, in 1979 the provincial welfare officials came to the field study area to provide storm relief in cash for villagers to repair their homes. The villagers appreciated the aid even though the money was not always sufficient for full repair and there were some problems of unfair distribution. The help in easing subsistence and economic pressures improved the government's image greatly.
Another problem which the government helped with was that of road robbery; in the 1970s there were increasing numbers of these robberies, some of which resulted in villagers being killed. In most villages at least one resident was a victim or the relative of a victim. As motorcycles became more popular in the 1970s, the robberies became more frequent and more violent. Wires might be placed across the road at night to kill or injure a motorcyclist to allow his belongings and motorcycle to be taken. The villagers themselves would sometimes go after the robbers but had little success since the robbers often came from other districts or were the spoiled sons of influential villagers. The police began to seriously pursue these robbers, killing some of them during capture. This put a halt to this type of robbery. The villagers in general did approve of the killings and they were grateful to the police for putting a stop to the robberies. There was not too much sympathy for the robbers as most villagers did not believe they were doing it because of extreme poverty.

During the late 1970s parliamentary elections were introduced; the villagers soon learned how to derive benefits from political action and proper use of the system. A few villagers hoped that this system of representation might improve their socio-economic conditions because elected politicians could bring the villagers' concerns to the attention of the government. Some sought help with personal as well as communal matters, especially near election time when the politicians were most apt to help in order to gain popularity and votes. The help they would request included both use of influence to improve matters and funding of projects beneficial to the village; they learned how to bargain
for these things in exchange for votes. For example, the villagers would collectively decide the amount of money needed to improve a road or build a temple, prepare a proposal for the politician, and then offer to exchange the majority of votes for his assistance in obtaining what they wanted. The villagers often played one politician against another in an attempt to drive up the amount they could obtain and to maximize their benefits.

§ 5.3 Intensive Commercial Production of Agriculture

This section will describe how the commercial production of agriculture intensified during the 1970s as a result of the villagers' responses to increasing opportunities in agricultural commodity trade, government policies and programs, and the villagers' own needs and situations. The higher intensity and growth of production did not result in any improvement in the distribution of wealth, but in fact enhanced the economic differentiation among villagers. The benefits of commercialization as well as the pressure from subsistence needs and economic difficulties motivated the villagers to step up production. These motivations not only led the villagers to depend on commercialization for their livelihood, but also made the intensive commercial production self-perpetuating.

§ 5.3.1 Policy and Growth

The government's main objectives in economic development in the 1970s were agricultural growth and diversification, export promotion, expansion of private enterprise, and encouragement of foreign investment (NESDB 1972 and 1977). These aspects were chosen to interrelate
in such a way as to allow Thailand to participate in the world commercialization. For example, agricultural production was being oriented toward the world market for profit; thus, diversification and high productivity were necessary. Fruitful commercial production required modern technology, machinery, and manufactured inputs imported from abroad; therefore foreign investment was necessary to build import substitution industries while the commercial production for export brought in foreign exchange for purchasing imported inputs and goods. Loans were acquired for infrastructure modernization to support economic growth, but then part of the gains realized from growth would have to go back for debt payment. Financial support was generously given to Thailand because its strategy of economic development was under the guidance and influence of the United States and the World Bank (Pasuk 1980: 63; World Bank 1980).

Between 1958 and 1966 the average rate of GNP growth was 8 percent per annum due to increases in production and export and inflows of foreign monies in the forms of grant aid, loans, private foreign investment, and U.S. military spending. Then in 1967 a slump resulted from a bad rice harvest, a fall in world prices for tin and rubber, and a reduced inflow of foreign money. In 1973 the GNP growth rate increased due to high prices for rice, rubber, tin, and maize on the world markets (Pasuk 1980: 85).

There seemed little doubt that Thailand had been successful in its economic growth policy; as a World Bank mission team put it: 

"... the rate of growth since 1960 has been impressive and is matched by few developing countries. From 1960 to 1976, economic growth was
both rapid and broadly based, with all sectors participating in the growth process." (World Bank 1980: 6) According to the same report, the GDP growth rate (in constant 1962 prices) in agriculture between 1960 and 1977 was 4.9 percent and the GNP (at market prices) grew at an annual rate of 6.8 percent during 1970-1977. Rice production increased continuously from 5 million tons in 1953 to 10 million tons in 1976, and the total agricultural exports grew steadily from 4,797 million baht in 1953 to 18,170 million baht in 1976 (Pasuk 1980: 332, 345). Import substitution industries were successful in reducing imports of consumer goods from 74 percent in 1960-1972 to 66 percent in 1978, and manufactured exports increased from 1.4 percent in 1960 to 21.2 percent in 1978 (Suthy 1982: 437; Pasuk 1980: 349).

However, in terms of the overall economic situation, Thailand was not doing so well. Since 1973 the Thai economy has been characterized by instability. For example, balance of trade and current account deficits had increased rapidly from 25,600 million baht in 1977 to 58,000 million baht in 1980 (Somsakdi, et al., 1983: 81). Also, since at least 1975 the total outward remittance ratio was higher than the net inflows of direct foreign investment. The total outward remittance ratio was 20,391 million baht in 1972-1978, while the total foreign direct investment was 13,432 million baht. During this period, the highest percentage (41 percent) of the total outward remittance went back to the U.S. The total debt outstanding also increased steadily, from 322 million dollars in 1970 to 3,700 million dollars in 1979 (Suthy 1982: 431-450).
In the midst of this rapid economic growth, income disparity and economic differentiation within the country were enhanced. The rural-urban income differential was still very high, and rural income was becoming even more unequal (Turton in Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 108). For example, in 1978 the per capita income for Bangkok was much greater than that in other regions; in the Northeast, it was 15 percent of Bangkok's, while in the North, it was only 24 percent (Trairong 1980: 6). Another possible poverty indicator was malnutrition. In 1973, 55,000 children under the age of five died of malnutrition (Turton in Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 108).

In the North, data in 1982 revealed that the value of the region's gross domestic product was the second largest in the country (excluding Bangkok). However, its per capita income was the second lowest among all the regions. The per capita income of the country (including Bangkok) was 17,450 baht while that of the North was only 11,424 baht (Sangkhom in Luchai, et al., eds., 1985: 84-85). In the nine provinces of the upper North, the per capita income for Chiangmai was 13,754 baht second only to Tak's, and the lowest was Nan's which was 7298 baht. In addition, according to the National Economic and Social Development Board the population living in poor villages in the upper North accounted for 1.6 million (Sangkhom in Luchai, et al., eds., 1985: 86-87). In the field study villages, there were in 1980 approximately 34 percent of the total Nong Faeg households considered poor in addition to another 17 percent very poor. In Khua Mung, 23 percent was poor and another 23 percent was very poor.
The increasing concentration of landownership and the problems with land tenure were indicative of the increasing economic differentiation. In 1968-1969 a survey found 14 percent tenant households and 4 percent part owner/part tenant households for all of Thailand (Turton in Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 112). The average percentage of tenants and partial tenants among farmers in 26 provinces of central Thailand in 1974 was 56 percent (Turton in Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 113). In addition, for the North and for Thailand as a whole between 1962 and 1974, the percentage of small landholdings decreased while that of large landholdings increased distinctively (World Bank 1980: 34-35). The area rented in the North was 19 percent in 1971; for Chiangmai in 1973, 35 percent of the land was rented (Van Der Meer 1981: 95). A survey of Chiangmai valley in 1973 showed that 33 percent were partial tenants and 31 percent were tenants only (Van Der Meer 1981: 167). Finally, a survey of 130 villages in the North by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1979 and 1982 revealed that while 29 percent were renting others' land in 1979, by 1982 the percentage had increased to 32. However, the percentage of total area rented between the two years had dropped slightly (Ministry of Agriculture 1982: 61). This implies that since the arable land increased only slightly during this period, the competition for land to be rented among villagers increased, and the amount of land available was smaller.

Figures for landlessness (owning no land) were generally available from small-scale studies, most of which indicated that the present level of landlessness was very high and had increased over the last four decades. For example, a survey in a district of Chiangmai in
1974 found 36 percent of the households were landless (Turton in Turton, et al., eds., 1978: 112). A village study in Chiangmai found that 48 percent of the households were landless (Bowie 1980: 9); and yet another village study reported 44 percent in 1980 (NESDB Economic and Social Journal 1980(4): 35).

5.3.2 Intensive Production and Extensive Involvement in Commercialization

The intensive cultivation of land in the Chiangmai valley began in the late 1960s and increased through the 1970s. The cropping intensity index, a measure of the number of crops grown on the same piece of land in a given year, was 163 percent in 1978 (Phrek, et al., 1980: 21). In other words, a large proportion of the agricultural land was cropped more than once a year using the double and triple cropping systems.

In rural areas of the Chiangmai valley there appeared to be a correlation between intensive cultivation and small size of landholdings (Phrek, et al., 1980: 29). This suggests that double and triple cropping were used as a means of coping with problems produced by population pressure and land limitation. In Saraphi district in the 1970s the population density was about 470 people per square kilometer, and the average landholding size was 5.3 rai. The distribution of farms was 40 percent owner operated, 27 percent partially rented, and 33 percent full tenant (Phrek, et al., 1980: 28, 30). The majority of the land was being double and triple cropped by the late 1970s.

The intensive production of crops and involvement in commercialization were also evident in the field study villages by the mid-1970s.
The following will present the villagers' responses to economic opportunities in the cultivation of rice and other cash crops, animal raising, and employment in trade or business. This will be followed by an explanation of how the villagers' involvement here impacted on economic differentiation in the rural communities. Similarities and differences between Nong Faeg and Khua Mung will be discussed.

5.3.2.1 Rice and Other Cash Crops

The usual cycle of agricultural production in Nong Faeg began with glutinous rice, primarily for home consumption. After the harvest was finished, the villagers would plant soybeans, peanuts, garlic, chili peppers, vegetables, and/or ordinary rice. Double cropping was the standard practice, while some villagers practiced triple cropping. The cultivation was intensive not only in the number of crops grown on the same piece of land in a year, but also in the number of different crops grown in a season. Most of the villagers diversified their crops, e.g., after rice they planted soybeans on some land, peanuts on other land, garlic and chili peppers on a third plot, and some vegetables in the fields near home. If water was available and the land had previously produced satisfactorily, no space was left empty. As longan became a reliable source of high income, many villagers devoted a portion of their land, usually close to a road or to home, to a longan orchard. Newly planted longan trees were small, but could bear fruit because they were grown from branch seedlings. This made it possible to cultivate chili peppers and garlic on the land around the trees in the orchard. Many villagers made the cultivation even more intensive by planting cabbages or lettuce on the edge of each garlic plot in
order to, as one villager put it, "avoid wasting the little space there was, and to catch the water and fertilizer overflow from the garlic plants."

As a further illustration, one landless villager rented 7 rai of land from a villager in an adjacent village. The yield of rice during the main season from this land was 500 thang which was divided with the tenant receiving half. In the dry season, he and his wife planted, with the help of hired labor and exchange labor with relatives, 3 rai of peanuts and 4 rai of soybeans. They also planted a rai of dry season garlic on land belonging to his mother on a nominal fee basis (whether he paid or not and how much he paid depended on the profit made for that season). The cost of dry season cultivation on the 7 rai was about 200 baht per rai. In previous years, he had planted 4 rai of ordinary rice and 3 rai of soybeans in the dry season; but this year water was scarce, thus he changed to the scheme given above. He would also work as a carpenter and skilled construction worker earning 50 baht per day; jobs of this type were abundant during the dry season. Some of the money earned was fed back into cash crop production. His wife was a small vendor, often going to the market to sell things such as eggs and banana leaves; she also functioned on occasion as an agricultural wage laborer. Although landless, this household represented a typical intensity and diversity of income producing activities for Nong Faeg. In 1979 and 1980 the reduction of water supply in the dry season resulted in only double cropping with diversified crops. However, a few wealthier villagers dug underground water wells in their fields and did some triple cropping
cultivation of high return crops such as vegetables and chili peppers. On some lands low in water, only one rice crop was possible for the entire dry season.

In Khua Mung at the beginning of the 1970s the cropping pattern was similar to that in Nong Faeg. Then when market demand for dry season garlic intensified, a few villagers converted their rice fields to raised patches and grew garlic instead of main season rice. These villagers turned huge profits, so others soon followed them. In 1975-1976 the production went well and the price was high, so profits were sizable, e.g., one household made a profit of 40,000 baht from the sale of their garlic crop. There were some years in which everyone who had access to land and capital grew main season garlic and used the profits to purchase rice to eat. This was an extreme case of commercial production of agriculture in which entrepreneurial profit maximization was pursued. Many villagers admitted to this, but others claimed that they only had access to small plots of land which were insufficient for subsistence if rice was grown. They used their commercial, riskier crops to provide both subsistence and a possible increase in their standards of living. In Khua Mung the general pattern of cropping if main season garlic was planted was to follow it with pumpkin or soybeans and then raise a third crop of chili pepper or soybeans. Sometimes if the water supply was low, they would plant chili pepper and soybeans simultaneously. Those farmers who grew main season rice followed a cropping pattern similar to that of Nong Faeg.

As an illustration, one landless household in 1980 rented 2 rai from a villager in an adjacent village. The rent was 1500 baht per
rai for the entire year. He borrowed 7000 baht from an agricultural cooperative and invested in main season garlic and then in soybeans. He earned 7000 baht from the garlic and 1900 baht from the soybeans. Since the water supply was tight that year and their garlic income was low, they were afraid to invest time and money in other crops; thus, they worked as wage laborers during the remainder of the year. Some households in Khua Mung planted both rice and garlic in the main season in order to guarantee subsistence and at the same time earn a profit. When the garlic price would drop for a year or two, the villagers would also reduce garlic production and increase rice cultivation in the main season.

Here is an example of a mixed crop pattern in the main season. A well-to-do villager owned 12 rai of land. He planted 5 rai of glutinous rice and 4 rai of garlic in the main season, the remaining 3 rai was turned over to his married son for cultivation. After the rice harvest, he grew soybeans, pumpkins, and watermelon on separate portions of the rice land, while on the garlic land he grew pumpkin first then followed it with soybeans. For garlic alone he had borrowed 20,000 baht from the BAAC and added some of his own money to this. That year he turned a profit on the garlic of only 12,000 baht.

Looking at the aggregate data, in Nong Faeg 61.5 percent of the households planted glutinous rice in the main season, while 27.6 percent were not involved in cultivation. In Khua Mung, 50.6 percent cultivated both rice and garlic during the dry season, 21 percent planted only garlic, 14 percent only glutinous rice, and 13 percent were doing no cultivation. As mentioned before, in 1979 and 1980 some villagers began to shift toward rice production because garlic prices were low,
making the risk of indebtedness and the cost of rice for consumption high. In terms of rice sale and purchase, both villages had 23 percent of households engaged in rice sale; however, in Nong Faeg 36.8 percent of the households bought some or all of their rice, while in Khua Mung the figure was 54.9 percent. There were two possible explanations for the difference. The primary reason was that many Khua Mung villagers sold garlic to buy rice to eat. The other reason was that wage labor was generally paid in cash rather than rice, because most of the work was done on garden crops. Even when the labor worked on rice fields, the landowners preferred to pay in cash and save the rice for their home consumption needs or stockpile it to sell it at high prices to those planting garlic alone.

There were major changes in the sources of livelihood in both villages. Whereas several decades ago most villagers had relied on rice production for home consumption, in 1980 in Nong Faeg the primary source of livelihood (most important to subsistence) was glutinous rice in 66.5 percent of the households, skilled work or salaried jobs in 12.6 percent, cash crops in 7 percent, and agricultural wage labor in 5 percent. In the more commercially oriented Khua Mung, 58.4 percent relied on glutinous rice, 23.3 percent on main season garlic, and 8.2 percent on agricultural wage labor. Secondary sources of livelihood which had in previous decades been only regular supplementary jobs or wage labor, now encompassed a wider variety of work. In Nong Faeg, 58.6 percent relied secondarily on cash crops, 12.1 percent on wage labor, 9.2 percent on store businesses or vending, and 9.2 percent on salaried jobs or skilled work. In Khua Mung, 45.5 percent relied
secondarily on main season garlic, 24.5 percent on cash crops, and 7.8 percent on wage labor; the proportion involved in stores, vending, salaried positions, and skilled labor were very small here. It is worth noting that 5.8 percent of the Khua Mung households had rent received on their land as the secondary source of cash; this type of earning was virtually nonexistent in Nong Faeg.

Dry season ordinary rice cultivation which had been widespread in earlier decades was no longer popular in these two villages for two interrelated reasons: first, it was unsuitable in the preferred patterns of multiple cropping, and, second, it returned little profit. In Nong Faeg in 1979 only 15.5 percent of the households produced dry season ordinary rice, and this dropped to 5.9 percent in 1980. Soybeans and peanuts were first and second in popularity for those two years. In Khua Mung in 1980, only 0.4 percent grew dry season ordinary rice, and in 1980 no one cultivated it. Soybeans were also the most popular dry season crop, with pumpkins being second most popular.

In the decade of the 1970s, the practices of cash advance payment to secure supplies of agricultural produce or turn a profit from market speculation were extended by the merchants into the non-staple cash crops. Previously, this had only been done with rice and longan. Before long, advance payments were being made for pumpkin, chili pepper, leaf vegetables, and especially garlic. Merchants or village middlemen would approach villagers for their crops which were still in the patches and almost ready to be harvested. The price was decided for the entire patch and the money was paid. Garlic owners who agreed to this were generally either in urgent need of money (e.g., for emergencies, debt
payments, or subsistence) or preferred to not risk price fluctuations and crop damage. Some villagers also felt it was convenient to let the buyers handle the harvest and transportation, leaving the villagers free to pursue other employment. Another practice sometimes used was to buy garlic in the patches by the kilogram. In this case, the buyers offered a price per kilogram to the villagers, but the villagers were then responsible for the harvest. Again payment was usually made in advance to secure the crop. Using this system, the merchants did not have to worry about the quality of the garlic hidden underground and price fluctuation before harvest could earn them a handsome profit, especially since the price they offered was always rather low. At times they could sell it for twice what they had paid.

5.3.2.2 Fruits

The villagers in both villages said that one could sell and buy almost anything in the 1970s. Fruit trees around the house were one source of large sums of money; there was a market for longan, coconuts, mangoes, and bananas. Longan was an important source of cash income for villagers in Nong Faeg; many poor villagers relied on income from longan sales as a source of subsistence. For example, there was one landless wage laborer's household which bought one third of its rice for subsistence from its longan sales. The years the trees did not bear fruit were the years they borrowed or worked extra hard to make ends meet. For the better-off, longan income was used for home improvements, education of children, cash crop investment, emergencies, military conscription bribes, and even legal settlements.
The demand for longan increased even more in the mid-1970s when the fruits were packaged and sold on the international markets. Market demand and the prospect of high profits led to changes in the system of longan trade. In the 1950s it was popular to sell the fruits when the trees bloomed, and it was agreed that if the tree bore no fruit, the money would be returned to the merchants (Kingshill 1976: 37; village informants in 1980). In the 1960s, longan was usually sold through advance cash payments as described previously. By the late 1970s the villagers were selling longan by the blooms, by advance cash payments, and by collecting and vending the fruit themselves. The bloom system and the self-sale systems increased in popularity. Some villagers would mix these systems with some trees being sold by the bloom and others being harvested and sold by the villagers themselves. This change occurred as a form of profit maximization and because it had no prospect of threatening their subsistence or existing economic situation.

Presently, the sale by blooms is practiced such that there is no agreement to return the funds if the trees bear no fruits; once the payment was made the villagers kept the money regardless. Only on rare occasions would the villagers agree to return the money, e.g., when the buyer was close kin or patron or when the buyer was given a higher price in exchange for an agreement to return the funds. This is a good example of how the villagers learned to turn the market system to their own benefit. Experience taught them that the demand for longan was always high and that the prices were generally good, especially after it became an export item. The prices offered by the
merchants were generally lower than what they could make by selling it directly; thus villagers invested in labor to pick and pack the fruit and in transportation to ship it out.

Additional factors which increased the commercial production of longan were the market demand for different varieties which might bear fruit before the normal season, the use of manufactured inputs, and improved irrigation through use of pumped water. This investment in increasing the yield was usually done for profit maximization, but in some cases was done due to debt pressures, since villagers could use the cash in advance system to eliminate their debts. The price of longan increased tremendously from 100-500 baht per tree in the 1950s (Kingshill 1976: 37) to 700-3000 baht in 1980. In Nong Faeg in 1980 71.1 percent of the households earned some income from this source, in Khua Mung the figure was 50.5 percent. Table 7 shows the percentages of households earning the specified amount from longan sale in 1980.

Table 7
Value of Longan Sales by Percentage of Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Longan Sales (baht) in 1980</th>
<th>Nong Faeg</th>
<th>Khua Mung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-999</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-9999</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000-29999</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 30000</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.2.3 Animals

The 1970s saw a rapid decrease in the raising and use of buffalo and cattle. The reasons for this were threefold. First of all the use of land for multiple cultivation of cash crops put a limit on the available grazing land. Second, animal care required work which wasted time that might otherwise be used in income producing activities. And finally, many of their functions were taken over by tractors and minibuses. However, the majority of the villagers still continued to earn some by raising animals and relied on animals in part for their livelihood.

In Nong Faeg 65.5 percent of the total households earned some money from animals, as opposed to 28.8 percent in Khua Mung. When probed, the villagers of Khua Mung said: "Raising animals consumed time and required attention. Most of us spend all the time in the fields and did not even have time to cook for ourselves more than once a day. The animals left at home might starve or get stolen. There is no room in the fields to raise any of them and if your animals walk through others' crop fields, you'll have to pay for the damages. It's just not profitable or worth the trouble."

Those who raised pigs got involved in the commercialization network in the 1970s through the purchase of manufactured pig food. Never before had the villagers had to pay for medicine and expensive feed, but it was the only way to ensure the fast growth of the commercial breeds of pigs with higher weights, thereby increasing the sum of cash earned. Local breeds of pigs or pigs raised with traditional feeds (bran, broken rice, leftover food, banana trunks and greens) took too
long to become big and heavy; their price was lower because they weighed less, pigs being sold by the kilogram, and because they were older.

In the late 1970s in the field study area, one company introduced a system of commercial pig and chicken raising in which the villagers would sign an agreement to deliver a certain number of animals to the company; the company provided all the feed and medicines necessary and would then buy the pigs back at market price. The costs which the company had covered were then deducted from the total sale and the villagers received the remainder in cash. The villagers became totally tied up with the company through debts (they were responsible for the cost of the feed and medicines, and also for providing the animals at some future time, even if many of them died for some reason), and were at the mercy of market prices, supply and demand of feeds, and the welfare of the animals. There were a few villagers who joined the company program, but the majority of them were skeptical about the benefits, especially since the amount of money and the associated risks were high.

5.3.2.4 Trade, Business, and Employment

In this period, many villagers became involved in trade or business, which in some cases became their major source of livelihood and in others was merely a supplementary source of income. Trade activities, business, and outside employment in salaried or contractual work became alternative means of livelihood for landless villagers. This was an undeniably positive aspect of the increasing modernization in rural society. These alternatives helped to reduce the competition
for wage labor jobs in agriculture and often meant higher pay and more security in employment.

In Nong Faeg 99 households were landless; of these 51 were involved in land renting or land sharing, while the other 48 had as their primary means of livelihood such activities as vending, itinerant trade, salaried jobs in the city, skilled and unskilled construction work, motorcycle repair services, and operating stores. Only 12 of these households were made up of primarily agricultural wage laborers. In Khua Mung, 81 households were landless, with 57 of them renting or sharing land, three of them taking advantage of sources as discussed here, and the other 21 being primarily agricultural wage laborers. A villager might take advantage of several different means of employment in earning his livelihood. An examination of these means demonstrates that the villagers were extensively tied into the commercialization and increasingly connected to the world outside (see Table 8).

It should be noted in Table 8 that the number of households involved in a particular type of employment was not necessarily indicative of the degree of involvement and the level of significance to livelihood. For example, consider produce trade. In Khua Mung the types of commodities traded included garlic, pumpkin, and longan which were expensive, traded in bulk, and required huge investments of money. On the other hand, the majority of the produce traders in Nong Faeg traded in vegetables such as cabbage and chili pepper. The size of the trade was small, and the investment and credit required were not
large. In Nong Faeg, only a few villagers who had sufficient amounts of cash or credit became involved in longan trading.

Table 8
Types of Employment by Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employment</th>
<th>Number of Households Nong Faeg</th>
<th>Number of Households Khua Mung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produce trade</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store in village</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vending</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled work</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaried work outside</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled work outside</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government service</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service with Capital</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(rice mills, minibus, tractor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longan orchard caretaker</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural wage labor</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.3 Motivations and Pressures

The villagers' participation in intensive agricultural production and their increased involvement in commercialization in the 1970s were primarily a result of continuing population pressure on the land and competition for available sources of livelihood and avenues to prosperity. Many were driven by subsistence needs or a strong desire to improve their situation. Others were out to make money to improve their standards of living, which were already rather comfortable. Meanwhile, the lure and inducements of the urban lifestyle with its amenities, conveniences, and manufactured goods were increasingly
Table 9
Distribution of Relationships with Land by Households, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship to Land</th>
<th>Nong Faeg Number of Households</th>
<th>Khua Mung Number of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(percent)</td>
<td>(percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner non-cultivator</td>
<td>19 (7.9)</td>
<td>12 (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner cultivator</td>
<td>77 (32.2)</td>
<td>48 (18.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner/tenant</td>
<td>44 (18.4)</td>
<td>116 (45.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenants</td>
<td>38 (15.9)</td>
<td>46 (17.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior working-together a</td>
<td>13 (5.4)</td>
<td>9 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free cultivation b</td>
<td>0 (0.0)</td>
<td>2 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landless non-cultivator</td>
<td>48 (20.1)</td>
<td>24 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>239 (100)</td>
<td>257 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Junior working-together refers to households of villagers who do not live in the same households as their parents' but work with their parents on the parents' land. Both parties usually consume rice from the same granary.

b Free cultivation refers to households of villagers who cultivate others' land for a specific period of time without having to share the harvest or pay rent, but free of charge. The owners of the land are sometimes kinsmen of the users. Other times, they are not related but the free cultivation of land is a reciprocation such as for the users' services.
difficult to ignore. Newly emerging normative practices and sanctions added to the pressures.

Population pressures pushed villagers to seek new alternatives for livelihood. Among those alternatives were increased intensity of commercial agricultural production and extensive market involvement.

The adoption of double and triple cropping and the entry into business ventures were intended to benefit not only the villagers who were landless or small landowners, but also to improve the situation for their children. They hoped to live a life with some comfort and conveniences; and, at the same time, to save enough to buy land elsewhere, send some children onto higher education, and open a business or venture which could be passed on to their children. For the wealthy the desires and motivations centered on increasing their bank savings, building new homes with modern conveniences, sending their children to college in the city or in Bangkok, and following the example of several rich landlord villagers who had moved to modern homes in the suburbs of Chiangmai city.

Population pressures on the land were felt by the villagers in the form of limited residential space, and shrinking inheritances after division of the land among the children. In Nong Faeg the average size of an agricultural landholding (as opposed to residential or orchards) dropped from 4.6 rai per household in 1953 (based on data in Kingshill 1976: 31) to 2.8 rai in 1980. In Khua Mung, there were no data for comparison, but in 1980 there was only 4.3 rai per household. It should be noted that 4 rai was roughly the minimum subsistence size for a household of four members who survived off the rice raised,
assuming a yield of 50-60 thang per rai. It was therefore a necessity for these small holdings to be cropped intensively to provide subsistence and necessary expenditures, e.g., clothes, food to go with the rice, medicine, production investment, occasional re-roofing and house repair, and sociocultural requirements.

Two other considerations enter in when discussing the population pressure on the land. First, the average size of holdings is based on the total agricultural land owned by the villagers residing in each village. In reality, the majority of villagers did not own or owned very little land, and if they rented they had to give away part of the output as rental payment. For instance, in Nong Faeg 41.4 percent of the households were landless, while 31.5 percent were thus in Khua Mung. The number of households dependent on others for use of land was very high in both villages. Had land been abundant or not concentrated in the landlord's hands, this dependency would have been greatly reduced. The rents tended to be high, e.g., in Nong Faeg it was half of the crop for rice and 200 to 300 baht per rai for dry season rents. In Khua Mung it was 1000 to 2000 baht for the entire year, but rent contracts had to be signed for a number of years and the total rent for the entire period had to be paid in advance. The landlords were unconcerned with tenants' crop failures, and although the tenants could quit before the agreed time, their rent money was not returned.

In Khua Mung the land arrangements tended to be much more business-like and possessed more profit-maximizing characteristics than in Nong Faeg; land concentration was also much higher in Khua Mung. In Khua
Mung the total amount of owned land was only about 400 rai greater than in Nong Faeg, but the percentage of large (9 to 14.9 rai) and very large (15 rai plus) landowners was distinctively higher. In Khua Mung, 17.9 percent of the households fell into these two categories, while only 7.9 percent in Nong Faeg did. The largest landholding in Khua Mung was 33.5 rai, in Nong Faeg 23 rai; there was one absentee landlord in Khua Mung who held a little over a hundred rai.

The second consideration was the number of children; having a smaller number of them was an advantage in that it reduced expenditures on them which were becoming increasingly costly in the changing socio-economic situation. It also eased the pressure on residential and agricultural land somewhat. However, the villagers did feel that they had fewer helping hands to work in the house, thereby freeing the parents to work and earn, or to go out and earn some money themselves. In 1979-1980 children aged eight and above were helpful in many household chores, in feeding the animals, undertaking minor agricultural tasks, and earning daily wages from the neighbors by such tasks as shelling peanuts or separating cloves of garlic. These wages helped to offset household expenditures and the children's school expenses. Sending children to primary school was compulsory, but sending them for further education had become necessary and normatively practiced as a means of coping with the pressure on land, competing for employment, and providing alternatives and opportunities for improving the household standard of living in the long run. Improved medical care and quality of food helped people to live longer; thus, the number and proportion of elderly increased. This implied an increase in family
socio-economic dependency and burden of different degrees. In Nong Faeg in 1953 the percentage of people aged 60 and above was 5.9 percent of the total population (50 persons; Kingshill 1976: 304); but, by 1980 it had increased to approximately 9.6 percent. In Khua Mung the elderly made up 10.5 percent of the 1980 population (102 people).

To further support arguments about existing family economic dependency, one can examine the number of household members contributing economically to the household and the number of villagers primarily economically dependent on the household. It is found that, on the average, the number of dependents was not much smaller than the number of contributors. In Nong Faeg, 49.8 percent of the households had two contributors and 19.2 had three, while 35.1 percent had no dependents and 60.7 had one to two dependents. For Khua Mung, 48.2 percent had two contributors and 19.1 percent had three, while 28.8 percent had no dependents and 61.8 percent had one or two.

From observations, during this period the grasping of opportunities was more a matter of pressures than motivations. The poor villagers were primarily under subsistence pressure and had to compete with others in accessing and securing the means of their livelihood. Land became increasingly limited and the number of landless households rapidly and continuously increased as the case of Nong Faeg shows. In 1972 there were 739 rai of rice land owned by village households and the number of landless households was 67 (32.5 percent) (Potter 1976: 56-57), while in 1980 the total land was 680 rai and the number of landless households had gone to 99 (41.4 percent). (The reduction of rice land was a result of rice land being converted to residential
areas or fruit orchards by villagers, in addition land was bought by outsiders in other villages and towns.) Farm mechanization, e.g., tractors and threshing machines, and manufactured chemical inputs, such as weed killer, reduced the demand for hiring laborers, therefore increasing the competition. Most small and some medium landowners still needed to rent land and also would occasionally hire themselves out as a supplementary source of livelihood. The well-off villagers also had to compete with others for access to labor (e.g., in peak season), for capital to invest in production, for production supplies (e.g., for a limited supply of cheap fertilizers or high quality garlic seedlings), for produce supplies if they were traders or middlemen merchants, and for marketing produce to Chinese merchants at the best price.

Much change in the village communities in both form and context centered around the increasing competitive pressures. For example, the practice of aiding the poor in earning rice decreased. In the past, poor villagers could always ask a landowner who they knew well to allow them to help in the harvest and thereby earn some rice. It was a normative practice that the landowners would not reject their offer and always gave them a small additional amount over and above the wage rate. In the late 1970s this practice was undermined in part because the number of offers of help a landowner received increased, i.e., because of competition among those needing to work in the harvest. A poor villager might ask a landowner for employment and be rejected either because the landowner was already allowing another poor villager to assist in the harvest or because the landowner already had sufficient
labor to finish the task in the required time and did not wish to "waste" any rice for labor return.

Competitive pressures in making a living and earning a profit led to changes in the support and care of household dependents as well. Many elderly were left at home alone from before dawn until after dusk; they had to care for themselves during this time. In the past, food was often prepared by other household members before they departed for work and there was always somebody around the house to care for them or keep them company. In 1980 they were often just left with some money to buy cooked food or, in some cases, with orders from their children to do laundry and prepare food for when they returned from work.

Many of the villagers' responses to competition and involvement in commercialization perpetuated further competition and involvement. In Khua Mung the well-off had begun to enforce norms of economy and diligence. Having beef for dinner or taking a nap in the afternoon were looked down upon as indicating extravagant spending and laziness. Behaviors which were encouraged included working in the crop fields on bright moon-lit nights, leaving the house before dawn and returning after dusk, rarely spending money on high cost food items like beef, planting all the space on a piece of land with cash crops, and not spending too much time with your own or others' household ceremonies. The rich villagers viewed these as desirable normative practices for everybody, but poor villagers felt that the rich were pushing the practices to justify their existing behaviors, some of which deviated from the traditional norms and practices in the villages. For example,
many of the rich refused to go or stay to help in a house blessing with the justification that they had to hurry to work in the garlic fields. They also believed that prestige and social acceptance came from success with cash crops, wealth, and big houses, not from the number of attendees at a ceremony as in the past. As one villager put it: "money can always buy and hire." A rich villager refused to extend a loan payment deadline for a small landowner on the grounds that they had an agreement and the debtor had wasted money on frequent consumption of beef. He had heard the sound of beef chopping often, and also claimed that the debtor family was just too lazy to seek employment to earn money. These entrepreneurial norms and practices seemed to be well accepted by the majority of the well-to-do and moderate means villagers, and even by a few of the poor who saw personal benefits from such behaviors and attitudes. Such extreme efforts to promote entrepreneurial spirit appeared very minimally in Nong Faeg. This might partly be due to the lower degree of cruciality accorded the intensity of commercial production in livelihood there. A Nong Faeg villager explained: "Khua Mung villagers became more like that when they began to grow garlic during the main season and sell garlic to buy rice. If they don't do well they will not only lose profits, but will also have no rice to eat. Nong Faeg villagers will not risk that much just to make more money, especially now that we see the Khua Mung villagers are in serious debt and not as wealthy as they appear. There are only two villagers in Nong Faeg who planted main season garlic, but on a more limited scale than their rice production."
The forms of villagers' responses, increasing involvement in commercialization and intensive production, led to the perpetuation of the existing socio-economic structure which in turn further perpetuated these forms of response. Simply speaking, intensive commercial production and involvement in outside markets helped the villagers in their livelihood, but at the same time the wealthy remained wealthy and the poor stayed poor or got worse. Only rarely was it seen that the rich became less wealthy, but practically none of the poor had become better-off. The villagers in the field study area perceived this, and clearly indicated that they thought the explanation lay in the differences in opportunities presented to the different socio-economic classes and in the ability of the different classes to grasp them. Opportunities here were defined as economic opportunities in commercial production and trade, as well as opportunities to take advantage of the worse-off. The villagers gave many examples of small landowners who lost their land to the wealthy through accumulated debts. They also gave the example of the well-off villagers who could invest more in crop production and trade ventures and thus earn a great deal more than poor villagers, who could only hope to make small investments on small plots they could access.

The following will illustrate the self-perpetuating structure and conditions in the two villages in terms of buying and selling rice. In Khua Mung 61 percent of the very large landowning and 50 percent of the large landowning households sold excess glutinous rice, while 69 percent of the very poor and 61 percent of the poor always purchased some or all of their glutinous rice for consumption. In Nong Faeg
every very large and large landowning household sold excess rice (both
glutinous and ordinary), while 63 percent of the very poor and 33
percent of the poor households bought some or all of their glutinous
rice supply. Looking at extra income from fruit trees, it was evident
that those who owned large amounts of rice land also earned more from
their trees. In Khua Mung, 77 percent of the landless households did
not earn from fruit trees at all, while 61 percent of the very large
landowning and 46 percent of the large landowning households earned
4000 baht or more in 1980. Similarly in Nong Faeg, 58 percent of the
landless earned nothing, while 67 percent of the very large and 62
percent of the large landowning households earned 10,000 baht or more.
Examining home improvements or repairs over the last five years, it
was found that twice the proportion of very large landowners as land­
less made some such improvements or repairs. If one examined items
or conveniences indicating wealth, it was clear that the more land
one owned the more expensive the items that person possessed. In Khua
Mung, 50 percent of the very large landowners possessed expensive items,
such as TV, tractors, refrigerators, etc.; the percentage was 67 in
Nong Faeg. Only 6 percent of the landless in Khua Mung and 11 percent
in Nong Faeg possessed any of these items.

The perpetuation of the socio-economic structure can also be seen
in terms of land acquisition. In both villages, the majority of the
small landowning households had inherited only the land they had, while
the majority of the large and very large landowning households had
both bought and inherited their present rice land. In terms of rice
land disposal and landlessness, in Nong Faeg 50 percent of the landless
households had never had land because their parents were landless, had too little land to divide for the children, or had lost their land due to debts. About 11 percent of the landless households had become so through their own accumulated debt. In Khua Mung, the proportions were 19 percent who did not inherit and 4 percent who lost land through their own debts. It is worth noting that the information on landlessness due to debts may be underrepresented, especially in the case of Khua Mung, because the villagers were very sensitive about it. A number of villagers especially small and medium landowners, had been losing portions of their land to debts. In Khua Mung, many villagers were being forced into selling part of their land to pay off accumulated debts incurred because of the intensive commercial production of agriculture.

The involvement in intensive commercial production was also self-perpetuating. Once the villagers became deeply and extensively involved in it, it became difficult to withdraw. In intensive commercial production, their relations with the market had become a dependency in a cycle order. They borrowed to invest; in order to obtain good yields they had to emphasize the use of mechanization and chemical inputs whose costs constantly increased. The price of produce fluctuated greatly and was totally dependent on national and international markets. A large part of their cash earnings had to go into the repayment of loans. If they made good profits they would want to invest more and continue producing for the market. If they did not make profits, they had to continue borrowing and producing because in their economic context it was the only way of earning sufficient
money to make their loan payments. In the case of main season garlic, the size of the profit from the produce was crucial as it meant more rice to eat, more money to pay debts and spend. The villagers also had to spend considerably to turn land into raised patches for garlic, thus continuing commercial production on the land was necessary at least until the cost of the land alteration had been recovered. For those who rented, there were high advance payments and contracts with periods of years. The money paid in advance for rent was often borrowed with interest as high as 5 to 10 percent per month. Continuing investment and sale were necessary until the rent had been paid off by the profits.

The villagers turned to intensive commercial production in agriculture for subsistence and to improve their standards of living. Khua Mung clearly shows that many villagers used garlic for their subsistence; 27 percent of the landless grew main season garlic as their primary means of livelihood. If one further broke this down and examined landless tenants, who had to pay rent as well as provide for subsistence, the figure went up to 46 percent. They had to continue growing because their subsistence and existing standard of living were at stake. In 1980-1981 some villagers began to reduce their intensive commercial production. In Nong Faeg this was because of a limited water supply, while in Khua Mung it was because of difficulties with market prices and accumulated debts. In other words, in Khua Mung at this time the withdrawal, even though it came at a cost, was done because the existing level of commercial production was threatening their subsistence and existing standard of living.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study, primary emphasis has been given to the villagers' perspectives on and interpretations of changing phenomena which are crucial in their lives. These phenomena center around changes in demography, relations with ruling groups and the government, and methods of livelihood, particularly those related to agriculture and commercialization. These are the aspects of modernization in which the villagers take an active part, responding to them and interacting with them within a larger system throughout history.

This is not to say that other factors, aspects of modernization, and changes are unimportant. In reality, they are, but the villagers often take them for granted or view them as consequences of the three phenomena outlined above. Examples of such factors are the physical environment, communication and transportation, and foreign assistance. The more intensive commercialization of Khua Mung, with the growing of main season garlic for subsistence and profit, was only possible because of the high topography of the village's agricultural land. The extensive expansion of multiple cropping in both of the field study villages came about only because of the reduction of low and flooded land areas. The villagers in both villages are aware that higher lands remained unflooded and that much of the low land area is no longer susceptible to annual flooding because of government construction and improvement of irrigation systems. Prosperous longan production in
Nong Faeg is viewed as a consequence of both suitable climate and soil for the growth of the longan trees and the promotion of the fruit to national and international commodity status through government and private business sector efforts. These efforts include government-sponsored longan day festivals in Chiangmai and Lamphun, establishment of canned fruit factories by both the government and private sector, and Thai fruit festivals for trade promotion in other countries.

The improvement of communications and transportation, which facilitated the changes in the villagers' perceptions and actions, is viewed by the villagers as a product of government programs, with inputs from the commercial business sector. Newspapers, magazines, radio and television are acquired by the villagers from the commercial sector, but are under the strict control of the government. The content of presentations in the media centers on the glamour of the urban lifestyle, growth in production as representing development, and national security concerns, which translate into obedience to the government and defense against hostile ideologies and foreign attacks. These media also brought news that led to further frustration and resentment, as villagers heard more of what the government claimed to do for them but never actually did.

To a researcher, the three themes—population growth, commercialization, and the state's expansion—serve well as devices to analyze villagers' perceptions and changes that are crucial in villagers' lives. In addition, these themes incorporate other features into the analysis, particularly those which are not, or might not be, perceived by the villagers, for example, the resettlement and
establishment of villages throughout the Chiangmai kingdom during the nineteenth century became possible because of the British victory over Burma. This forced the Siamese government to accelerate the process of political and economic incorporation of the North into the country, due to fears of expanding British influence as a colonial power. The harsh controls and repressive measures used by the government since the late 1950s were encouraged and influenced by U.S. anticommunist insurgency policies.

Finally, pressures from foreign countries and international agencies were instrumental in the adoption of a population growth reduction policy and birth control programs. By demonstrating this, the study contributes to arguments made in other studies of rural societies, emphasizing the crucial roles of population, government, and commercialization in the process of change (e.g., Scott and Kerkvliet 1973; Moore 1966; Geertz 1963; Wolf 1969; Gran 1977; and Scott 1978).

The author chose to conceptualize the process of change in the framework of rural transformation, i.e., the interactions between features of modernization and the villagers' perceptions and actions. The intention was not only to present the changes from the villagers' perspective, but also to allow the reader to make his own interpretation. This does not imply that the rural transformation framework used here is totally free of subjectivity and presupposition, but it does permit a presentation of the different perspectives of the parties involved in the change: the villagers, the government, and others, including the author himself. On the other hand, alternative
development models, whether one examines the conflict theory paradigm's explanation of capitalist expansion (e.g., Marx 1967; Galtung 1971; Wallerstein 1979; Wilber, ed. 1973; Payer 1974; Stauffer 1977; and Feder 1982) or the structural-functionalist paradigm's economic growth model (e.g., Apter 1965; Rostow 1971; Lerner 1958; Rogers 1969; Shultz 1964), concentrate only on very specific relationships and speculative results. These characteristics may, in fact, preshape the outcome of the study in such a way as not to allow the process of reconstructing the dynamics of change from the villagers' perspective and may not leave room, or include the information necessary for other interpretations to be made or analyzed.

The structural-functionalist paradigm views society as a social system consisting of interrelated parts in a state of equilibrium. Tensions exist, but tend to resolve themselves or to be 'institutionalized' in the long run. Changes can occur, not drastically, but as a process of adaptation to new needs and functions, compromising or deleting conflicts. The three features of change are adjustment, growth, and invention, all occurring within the existing social structural system. Change is equated with or viewed as a contribution to the ongoing development process in a direction which is desirable and beneficial to both the villagers and the government. There are some less successful portions and flawed parts, but the government could always work harder with assistance from foreign countries, such as the United States, and international agencies, such as the World Bank, to create more fruitful and accelerated development. Economic growth, particularly the capitalist style, is the primary goal and
serves as the main indicator of change. Investment and other efforts should be targeted at population groups or areas with the greatest economic potential, i.e., a 'build on the best' strategy. Benefits from growth will then 'trickle down' from the rich to the poor, or be channeled to them through government welfare programs. Examples of these studies on rural Thailand include works by Kingshill, de Young, Wijeyewardene, Potter, Moerman, Calavan, van der Meer, Feeny, and the World Bank.

The nature of the changes presented in such studies is, however, incompatible with the conclusions drawn from this research. This study finds the opposite of statements such as:

Life in the village was therefore simple with few complications, because of their relative isolation... Thus on the whole, rural life in Northern Thailand tended to change very slowly. (Kingshill 1985: 10-11)

Most Thai peasants are independent farmers living in a subsistence economy. (de Young 1955: 75)

We are on surer ground in discussing internal stratification. Clearly this is universally low in Thai villages... Thai villages must be characterized as egalitarian. (Wijeyewardene 1967: 74)

It also takes issue with the rather static and ahistorical change presented by Potter (1976) which emphasizes the dominance and functioning of various structures existing in each village. This approach works well for depicting changes in the forms and elements of the structures, but fails to reflect changes in the societal and historical context. For example, while a temple may have existed as a structural element in a village throughout history, its meaning and significance to the villagers may have undergone a radical change, e.g., from a unifying force to a source generating internal factionalism.
This study also fails to find changes occurring in directions and fashions similar to those presented by Moerman's argument. He claims that change was minimal and superficial during the twentieth century, and never affected the existing social and economic structure in the villages of northern Thailand (Moerman 1968: 191-192). The results here also disagree with the statement along the line of the 'build in the best' or 'trickle down' model:

It may be that national programs should concentrate on rural ambitiousness, not cooperation, and on developing not communities, but aggressive individuals. Perhaps the state's unpleasant role in encouraging economic development should be to train and reward the ambitious, while providing compensatory social services for those whom they outdistance. (Moerman 1968: 144)

Calavan's work is along the same lines as Moerman's and indicates that changes in rural northern Thailand resulted in economic improvement especially in terms of the growth of production for profit. Subscribing to Schultz's model which views the incorporation of farmers into the system of modern commercial production of agriculture as desirable (Schultz 1964), Calavan feels that changes which were occurring slowly could be accelerated by the government introducing all farmers to modern technologies. This would result in genuine economic improvement which would benefit most villagers (Calavan 1977: 174).

This study also is at variance with van der Meer's, which describes fundamental changes only in terms of the economic development of agriculture, i.e., fast growing output and exports. This study disagrees with the claim presented in van der Meer's work that rural changes in northern Thailand happened in a desirable direction, but not fast enough or in as efficient a manner as could be desired. Conflicts
in land use, decreasing farm size, land loss, and impoverishment are in his study seen as obstacles to achievement of rapid growth of production and economy, instead of as consequences of the existing model of development and the nature of socio-economic change. His conclusion is that accelerating this development and change could be done within the existing social order and regime through the implementation of effective policies (van der Meer 1981: 1-3, 5). These recommended programs include intensification of farming systems, increasing investment in capital and commercial production, and improvement in agricultural technology (van der Meer 1981: 244-250).

This is similar to Feeny's work which argues that the growth of agricultural productivity and the increase in real income per capita were occurring and were in a desirable direction, but needed further government efforts to accelerate them. Feeny sees increasing socio-economic differentiation and inequality as obstacles on the road to modernization that would be eliminated in the long run by the process of technical and institutional change. The 'trickle down benefits' perspective is evident in the statement that the achievement of maximized social welfare would require growth in productivity (Feeny 1982: 58, 108-117, 121-125).

Finally, the World Bank's study of conditions during the 1970s finds that changes occurring in Thailand are positive: rapid economic growth and reduction of the proportion of population living below the poverty level (World Bank 1980: 6-7, 62). Further success in the directions advocated and supported by the World Bank can be achieved by increasing inputs and education to provide productive growth and
technological efficiency, and by the incorporation of all farmers into the growth process by replacing subsistence rice production with commercial production of cash crops (World Bank 1980: 90-91).

In this research I found that the rural Thai society is neither static nor changing in only a minimal way. Instead, the changes are significant in both the structure and context of rural society. The extent of the change in the socio-economic and political aspects is much greater than could be explained through the changes in structural elements or by the growth in agricultural productivity and the economy. The explanations offered in the previously mentioned studies are insufficient for an understanding of many crucial aspects, e.g., the inevitable encapsulation of the villagers, their dependence on the larger system, and, to use Wallerstein's words, the persistence of "hunger amidst plenty, and poverty amidst prosperity" (Wallerstein 1977: 29).

What is intrinsic to the structure of the transformation that left approximately 50 percent of the households in Khua Mung and Nong Faeg poor after a century of what some claimed to be "positive change and economic growth"? The explanations offered by the conflict theory paradigm of the capitalist expansion contribute more to the understanding of the nature of change in the process of rural transformation in northern Thailand. Basically, the argument is that the change was ubiquitous and primarily intra-systemic, arising from contradictions and conflicts originating in the economic sphere of production. Changes in the modern world have been characterized by the emergence of capitalist modes of production and their increasing predominance over
precapitalist modes (Wolf 1982: 73-100). The capitalist economy is identified by the domination of the capitalist class. This consists of those individuals or entities who own or control the means of production and control the production of commodities to be sold in the market for maximum monetized profit for reinvestment. The production and profit maximization in such a system requires proletarianization (i.e., villagers become landless wage laborers), cheap and abundant supplies of raw materials, innovation in production technology, extensive market networks, and division of labor (Dillard in Wilber, ed., 1973: 60-67; Wallerstein 1974 and 1979). The capitalist economy develops unequal and dependent linkages among units within a country and within the world system (Frank in Wilber, ed., 1973; Wallerstein 1977). This is distinct from the structural-functionalist perspective which views expansion of capitalist economy as positive growth in the system's economy.

In rural northern Thailand, the periods before the nineteenth century were distinguished by the dominance of pre-capitalist modes of production in which land, labor, and production were under the control of the kings, chiefs, or aristocrats. Surpluses were generated by the labor of slaves and villagers on the land belonging to the ruler, while extraction of these surpluses was done through political authority and military power in the form of taxes, forced labor, and tribute. The mechanisms used to insure that the transfer of surpluses occurred on a predictable basis included coercion, used by the aristocrats and officials, establishment of sociopolitical hierarchical strata,
ideological beliefs and rituals, and gratitude for rewards and protection.

The capitalist mode of production began emerging at the beginning of the twentieth century, exhibiting several aspects of structural change, such as the emergence of private landownership, the abolition of slavery, the political and economic integration of the North into the Siam state, and the rice trade boom (see also Turton 1976; Cohen 1981; and Anan 1984). There was increasing concentration of landownership and consequent increases in landlessness. Means of access to both land and labor became monetized and increasingly mediated by market mechanisms which treated them as commodities. Agricultural production, particularly in rice and non-staple crops, became commodity production oriented to profits realized on the market and increasingly required capital expenditures to continue. The capital and profits returned to the owners of the means of production were reinvested for expansion of production; meanwhile landless villagers were forced to go to those owning and controlling the land for permission to use it in exchange for whatever price or size of shared output demanded by the owners.

The emergence of fixed rent arrangements, especially those requiring cash payment, was another manifestation of the capitalist mode. Unlike the 50-50 sharing arrangements of land rent in which both output and risk were almost equally shared, fixed rent was a means used by landowners to maximize their profits by sale of land use rights for a specific purpose and period of time. The rent rates were high because of the owners' desire to maximize income and the rates increased because they were tied to the current market value of land and due to the
degree of competition for access to land in the community. Both of these were increasing with occasional fluctuations, according to the market price of primary cash crops grown in the area (see also Anan 1984: chapter VI). As an illustration, the fixed rent in the field-study area in the 1950s was 10-15 thang of paddy per rai which was less than or close to the rate of 50-50 sharecropping as the average yield of rice per rai was 30-50 thang (Kirshill 1976: 30).

There were aspects of precapitalist relations attached to the arrangement. For example, the landlords generally returned some rice to the tenants as a customary gift. In addition, if the harvest was poor, the landlords whether in the case of fixed rent or sharecropping, usually took a nominal fee with subsistence of the tenants in consideration. In the 1970s, however, landlords rarely returned rice as a gift to the tenants. Nominal fees in case of a poor harvest also became an exception, especially in the case of Khua Mung. Landlords increased rents in cash to high levels and all of them seemed to work in concert, as a class, in establishing a similar rate to maximize their income. For example, in the early 1950s the rate was 60-90 baht per rai (calculated from 10-15 thang at the price of 6 baht per thang for the main season while continuing use in the dry season was usually free of charge) but it increased to 1000-2000 baht per rai per year in 1980 (in Khua Mung). The rent had to be paid in advance and no refund was made regardless of crop failure or other setbacks.

Many villagers became tenants who were economically dependent and at the mercy of the landowners (see also Mougne 1981: 272-273, 347-348, 483) while other landless villagers sold their labor power
to the owners of the means of production in both agricultural and non-agricultural spheres. In return, they received an amount of wages determined by the owners of land or capital at the market price of labor. As the number of landless villagers increased, their competition for jobs also increased and so did their dependency on the owners of the means of production. In practice, the owners realized that the size of profits in commodity production depended significantly on costs of production and level of surplus produced.

Generally, the owners tried to keep wages as low as possible and sometimes replaced labor with modern technology, with lower costs and higher efficiency, such as in the use of threshing machines and weed-killing chemicals. For example, the daily wage in the 1920s-1930s was 1 tang (approximately 30 litres). After World War II it became 1 thang (20 litres) and the wage in kind remained fixed through the present time.

In addition, in the 1970s, another precapitalist relation, the fellowship in labor exchange, was increasingly undermined as the capitalist relations increasingly became dominant and the effects of the capitalist transformation were manifested. First, there was an increasing proportion of households which neither owned nor rented land and thus could not participate in the labor exchange. Second, many small landowners were facing economic pressure in making ends meet and seeing opportunities in wage earnings. They thus hired labor to work on their land and sold their labor to increase their earnings as much as they could during the peak labor demand period instead of spending time returning labor-days to others in the labor exchange.
system. Third, the labor exchange system did not work well in the commercial production of many cash crops, especially the main season garlic, as the production involved much precision in timing and quality of tasks to ensure maximum profits. By hiring labor, employers could place definite demands and strict controls over the laborers.

Fourth, the use of wage labor helped maximize profits as the costs of feeding members of labor exchange groups were eliminated. The costs were increasingly high, e.g., from 27 baht per meal for 20 persons in 1953 (Kingshill 1976: 43-44) to 160 baht in 1980 which could be used to hire 6-8 laborers per day. (Reduction in family size due to birth control and increasing involvement in children's education will also have evident effects on the decline of labor exchange in the near future.)

New socio-economic differentiations and consciousness emerged in rural communities, not as in previous periods in terms of aristocrats, commoners and slaves, but in terms of classes of better-off landowners, worse-off small landowners and poor landless villagers based on ownership and access to the means of production, and accumulation of capital and wealth through commercialization of agriculture (see also Bowie 1980; Turton 1976). Terms like 'the owners', 'the landless' and 'the tenants' were used by villagers to differentiate economic control and dependency. Villagers who were landless but could have access to capital for investment in commercial production of cash crops were differentiated from the landless in general. The division of villagers in this sense was manifested not only in the organization of production but also in the political sphere as the control of the means of production and the interrelated ability to contribute funds to public matters were translated
into political power. In the sociocultural sphere, the same tendencies held true. For instance, in a ceremony or communal festive activity the poor landless or small landowners usually did the hard labor tasks and sat with those of a similar socio-economic class, away from the rich landowners. In the economic sphere, similar divisions existed between landowners who sold surplus rice and the landless who had to buy for their subsistence the rice surplus that they themselves or their class produced but whose supply was controlled by the owners of land or rice mills (see also Wolf 1982: 77-79).

From the perspective of the world capitalist political and economic system, information gathered in this study reveals that the capitalist relations of production and capitalist commercialization not only are self-perpetuating but also perpetuate the structure of dependency and the status quo. The capitalist development model of the United States and the World Bank aiming at macro economic growth and commercialization of villagers' agricultural production makes villagers vulnerable to fluctuations in world market demands for their products and for their capital inputs (see also Stauffer 1977). Another consequence is increasing dependence on imported consumer goods and disruption in rural industries following the expanded commercialization in the early part of this century (Resnick 1970: 60) and the incoming of multinational corporations since the late 1960s (Suthy 1982: 441).

In addition, during the last few decades, many villagers experienced land loss and serious indebtedness as a result of their involvement in the commercial production of agriculture as well as the entrepreneurial strategies increasingly utilized by many landowners to accumulate profits
and land at the expense of other villagers. The capitalist dependency was accelerated extensively and intensively by the profit extraction operations of multinational corporations especially those of the United States and Japan (Suthy 1982: 431, 448-449). Influenced also by the United States, the Thai government adopted the anti-communist policy against insurgency and policies in favor of capitalist-styled development. In addition, birth control programs supported worldwide to reduce population pressure on resources could be viewed as a diversion from attacking the problem of unequal distribution of wealth and ownership of the means of production.

However, the development and manifestation of the capitalist system did not occur all at once in unidirectional stages. To understand the nature and dynamics of the transformation, it is necessary to be able to view the process of change in a convoluted way (Anan 1984: chapter VII) and to be able to capture the coexistence of precapitalist and capitalist relations. For example, villagers in this study use a precapitalist form of relations, the labor exchange system, in rice cultivation primarily for subsistence and chose the capitalist relation of wage labor hiring for their commercial production of non-staple cash crops. Also, the luk cang system of employment demonstrates a coexistence of the capitalist dependence relation between the landless and landowners and a precapitalist relation, the patron-class ties, which, to use Bruneau's explanation, "gives the whole a certain cohesion and veils the nascent antagonisms" (Bruneau 1980: 20).

Another example is the rent capitalist system, which is a combined form of precapitalist and capitalist relations (Bobek 1962: 233-240;
Fegan 1979: 20-25). This conceptualization helps capture a contractual relation in which landowners squeeze surplus from their tenants/debtors in the forms of shares and rent. In addition to the exaggerated claim on gross return, the landowners desire to expand operations by obtaining more land. Credit is often used to secure claims and expand operations. The understanding of the merchant capitalist system helps in capturing the essence of such practices as 'selling green rice' or 'cash advanced payment' in the dynamic process of transformation in the rural economy (see also Kay 1975: 64-67, 86-119; Bruneau 1980: 1, 19). In addition, to understand the capitalist transformation, it is necessary to examine the impact of the 'state capitalism' in the lopsided relations between the bureaucracy and villagers and their competition for access to and control over economic resources (Cohen 1981).

Similarly, this dissertation's findings are compatible with the claim that in rural Thailand the capitalist markets for the means of production remain only partial. Anan finds, for instance, that most surplus labor is still extracted by extra-market mechanisms and only a moderate amount of surplus captured is reinvested in the capitalist-commercial production of agriculture (Anan 1984: chapter VII). My study finds also that access to capital in commercial production investment is achieved through kin and many times with low or no interest charged. However, in the case of some cash crops, such as main season garlic, the means of production are accessed through the market system. Reinvestment and expansion of operations are pursued as long as the market prices are still favorable. Finally, this study agrees with Kahn that the analysis of dynamics of rural change is "not easily derivable
from Marxist theories of the capitalist mode of production, or from theories of the articulation of mode of production" (Kahn 1982: 3). Kahn suggests that the change is marked by market penetration of the reproductive circuits of peasant enterprises. In other words, their economic reproduction is increasingly dependent on the world market through the process of 'commoditization' of production (Kahn 1982: 3). However, this study finds that in northern Thailand the capitalist system has penetrated both the reproductive cycle and reproduction organization. Allocation of the means of production is done through both capitalist market mechanisms and pre-capitalist non-market mechanisms. Under the new circumstances of this century, some Thai villagers remain primarily concerned simply with reproduction (e.g., subsistence) but many more increasingly behave like petty capitalists aiming at expanding production in order to increase money revenues and investment.

In conclusion, the explanations offered by the conflict theory paradigm can well capture the nature and direction of the rural transformation in northern Thailand, i.e., the encapsulation of the villagers into the world capitalist system which occurred as the capitalist relations and the process of proletarianization emerged and became increasingly dominant. With some modifications of the theories to account for villagers' perspectives, the pace and dynamics of the process of change in addition to the complexity of possible outcomes both beneficial and detrimental could be better understood.

A main argument in my study is that rural transformation was increasingly capitalist in nature, which brought increasing impoverishment and the feeling of resentment among a large population of villagers.
Occasionally, some serious situations, e.g., those involving hunger were alleviated. These might occur when villagers could get help from some precapitalist relations; or when the state gave welfare assistance and the means to reduce or plan family size (thus lessening some of the economic pressure); or when various opportunities emerged in employment and trade; or the villagers themselves took up radical means in trying to subsist in times of emergency, such as the time in 1978 when over a hundred villagers in a district of Chiangrai stole rice after having gone without food for a few days (see Setsiam 1979: 112). These modifications and remedies, however, could not alter the nature and direction of the transformation which increased the economic insecurity and subjugation of the majority of villagers.
APPENDIX

UNITS OF MEASUREMENT

Area Measure

1 rai (6.25 rai = 1 hectare) = 0.16 hectare
(2.5 rai = 1 acre) = 0.40 acre

Volume Measure

Unhusked Rice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units in Central Thai</th>
<th>Variations before Standardization</th>
<th>Standardization in terms of Metric System (1930)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>thanan (konahn)</td>
<td>= 20 to 40 thanan</td>
<td>1 litre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sat (bushel)</td>
<td>= 20 to 40 thanan</td>
<td>20 litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thang (bucket)</td>
<td>= 80 to 100 thang or sat</td>
<td>20 litres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kwien (coyan)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000 litres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units in Northern Thai

thang (basket) = 28.1 to 31.6 litres

Milled Rice

pan
mun

Weight Measure

Unhusked Rice

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Units in Central Thai</th>
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Units in Northern Thai

\text{tang} = 13.1 \text{ to } 16.5 \text{ kilograms} \quad 15 \text{ kilograms}

Source: Anan 1984: Appendix A.

\begin{tabular}{lc}
\textbf{Currency} & \\
\text{baht} & \text{Thai monetary unit} \\
 & \text{1 baht} = 100 \text{ satang} \\
\text{thaeb} & \text{Indian rupee in the form of a silver coin.} \\
 & \text{During the dual currency period, 1 thaeb} = 70-110 \text{ satang (varied exchange rate).} \\
\end{tabular}
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