INFORMATION TO USERS

This reproduction was made from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this document, the quality of the reproduction is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help clarify markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark, it is an indication of either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, duplicate copy, or copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed. For blurred pages, a good image of the page can be found in the adjacent frame. If copyrighted materials were deleted, a target note will appear listing the pages in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed, a definite method of "sectioning" the material has been followed. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. For illustrations that cannot be satisfactorily reproduced by xerographic means, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and inserted into your xerographic copy. These prints are available upon request from the Dissertations Customer Services Department.

5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases the best available copy has been filmed.
LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE MAY 1984

by
Andrew Lyall Temple

Dissertation Committee:
Norman Meller, Chairman
Wimal Dissanayake
Yasumasa Kuroda
Fred W. Riggs
Robert B. Stauffer
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Few pieces of creative work were ever accomplished in true isolation. There are always helpers and support groups—some recognized, some not. The present writer’s support group has come from many sources.

Professors Norman Meller, Fred Riggs, Robert Stauffer, and Ralph Miwa (the latter at the time Director of the Center for Governmental Development) are thanked for the use of their initial data, for research funds, and for scholarly guidance. John Staples, former graduate student, helped with the initial coding. Chuck Wall, former senior, and Helen Carey of the University of Hawaii Computer Center, gave invaluable aid in the computer field.

The former Governor of Hawaii, the late John Burns, the Senate President, the late Dave McClung, and the other twenty-four Senators of the Hawaii 5th Legislature extended many courtesies to the author as a legislative intern. The President of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders, Maurice A. Donahue, cleared the way and urged his colleagues across the country to respond to what is identified as "Questionnaire II" in this study.
Professor Richard Chadwick of the Political Science Department gave hours and hours of his time to help with the myriad computer programs and problems.

Without the supporting role of the University of Hawaii budget for computer time, none of this could have been accomplished.

My spouse, Esther Nielsen Temple, contributed much by entering text on the computer. My daughters Lyallyn, Lisa, Tamara, and Paula, and my grandchildren Tia and Jamie Smith and Colby Lyall McIlhenny gave up trips and family visits and outings. Although she never knew about it, my mother's "Flossie Lyall Scholarship" made it all possible.

A reward for patience is due my Committee: Political Science Professors Yasumasa Kuroda, Norman Meller, Fred Riggs, Robert Stauffer, and East-West Center Communications Researcher, Wimal Dissanayake. Additionally, Dr. Kuroda was most helpful with statistical questions, Dr. Riggs with generating ideas and hypotheses to test, Dr. Stauffer with wise advise, and Dr. Dissanayake with support. Particular praise and appreciation go to the Chairman, Norman Meller, who, even though "retired," put in hours and days carefully scrutinizing and critiquing every page of copy.

To all, a heartfelt mahalo a nui loa.
ABSTRACT

"Who...Says what...In which channel...Modulated by what factors...To whom...With what effect...And why?"

The purpose of this study was to relate communications theory to legislative-executive communications and to see how they may focus upon political processes. Its aims were to discover key variables in legislative-executive communications, to see if communications patterns might shed any light on how well the founding fathers separation of powers doctrine was working today, and to explore the roles of communications in the pursuit of political resources.

To obtain information on legislative-executive communications, questionnaires were mailed once to 54 governors and twice to 273 and 278 legislative leaders in the 54 states and territories of the United States. Replies were received from 42 governor's offices and 164 and 202 legislative leaders—return rates of 78%, 60%, and 78% respectively.

Data was sought and analyzed on: the frequency of communications between governors and legislative leaders; what form they took (e.g., face-to-face, telephonic, group, personal letters, or duplicated messages); channels (e.g., direct, via governor's or legislative leader's staffs, or via
other informal or third, non-governmental persons); and what they communicated about (e.g., governor's programs, personal attitudes, support, content of measures, organizational matters, and vetoes).

The most frequently used form of communication in which the governors were directly involved was reported as face-to-face, with the use of the telephone second. Least popular were letters and duplicated messages. As to channels, the most frequently used were those involving the governor's staff, followed by direct contact. The least used were informal or non-governmental third persons. The subjects most often discussed were reactions to or requests for support for general gubernatorial programs and policies, and seeking and giving information on personal attitudes.

The variable which most affected communications frequency was found to be party identification. Other strong variables were political cooperation, several orientation variables, a measure of information seeking, and two variables on influence and access to power. Friendship, surprisingly, did not turn out to be a strong variable. Increases in communications associated with friendship could be explained more easily by other relevant factors. Friendship proved to be most helpful between members of opposition parties.

In an attempt to identify a vague, underlying, intervening variable discovered during the course of the study, a
new construct, dubbed "the y factor," was formed by developing a scale using certain cutoff scores for population, affluence, centralization of decision making and a professionalism index. This "viscid," "choking," or "sticky" variable appeared to vary with response rates, communications frequency, party, centralization of legislative decision making, and bargaining frequency.

Also discovered during the analysis was a tendency, other things being equal, for respondents (whether governors or legislators) to report that they initiated communications to the other more frequently than the other perceived receiving them. This was called "the initiator complex."

Respondents reported initiating more communications to a governor or legislative leader who was perceived as having more bargaining power. Bargaining activity also correlated with higher communications frequencies.

The governors who listened and provided opportunities for feedback had a higher rate of communications flow and were given more positive ratings by the legislative leaders.

Satisfaction with the communications patterns between legislative leaders and governors correlated with a rise in communications. Satisfaction was also higher the nearer a respondent's office was to that of the governor. Older respondents tended to be more satisfied than younger ones.
Legislative leaders from the north and west and those from states with a lower y factor were also more satisfied with the communications system. The less educated legislators and those from less populated states tended to place themselves higher on the satisfaction scales. Not unexpectedly, the satisfied legislator was more friendly toward his/her governor, more cooperative, more supportive, and a member of the governor's party or faction. A weak correlation was noted between satisfaction on the part of the legislative leader and: general agreement between a governor and legislator, control of the legislature by the governor's party, a more powerful governor, a governor with more power over the budget, a legislature with bargaining powers, interparty competition, and residence in a state with more equal income distribution.

Favorable responses to a governor's communications seeking support for his programs were more often found among legislative leaders in states with partisan competition than in those where the competition was less.

Communications were found to be used in ameliorating political conflict.

The data in this study confirmed that if one is perceived to be in the same group or circle, communication flows and satisfaction reigns. However, deeper probing disclosed that persons on the outside of the circle often minimize this
handicap while pursuing a special goal or interest by drawing a bigger circle. This action was identified as creating a circle of interest—what might be called in Hawaiian a "hui hoihoi."

The communications patterns discerned in this study indicate that communications are indeed vital to the accomplishment of political goals under a system of government incorporating separation of powers. Official communications channels were found to be open and remarkably well balanced between the leaders of the legislative and the executive branches of the American states and territories.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** .......................... iv  
**ABSTRACT** ................................. vi  
**LIST OF TABLES** ............................ xiv  
**LIST OF FIGURES** ........................... xvii  

## CHAPTER I. LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Literature</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Design</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER II. METHODOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obtaining Communications Data</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Survey: Legislators</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First Survey: Governors</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report to the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Second Survey: Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A New Construct?</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy of Survey</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Handling</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER III. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ABOUT COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES, METHODS, CHANNELS, AND SUBJECT MATTER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Communications Variables</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators' Perceptions of Communicating with the Governor</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governors' Perceptions of Methods of Communication with Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of Perceptions of Governors and Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjects of Communications with the Governor—as seen by the Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison of the Perceptions of Governors and Legislative Leaders over the Subjects of Communications</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Channels of Communication Between Legislative Leaders and Governors  76
Legislative Officers as Channels  80
The Correlates of Blocked or Open Communications  82
Summary  85

CHAPTER IV. WHY DO LEGISLATORS COMMUNICATE WITH GOVERNORS?

Friendship  88
Orientation  95
Enlightenment  100
Power  102
Summary  109

CHAPTER V. VARIATIONS ON THE COMMUNICATIONS THEME

Sources of Information  110
Frequency and Satisfaction with Communications other than Directly to Governor  117
Impact of Population on Communications  124
Party and Faction  126

CHAPTER VI. SOME CORRELATES OF COMMUNICATION

Satisfaction  142
Centralization of Decision Making  148
Bargaining Power  150
Bargaining Activity  151

CHAPTER VII. POSTLUDE AND PRELUDE

Who  154
Says What  155
In Which Channel  159
Modulated by What Factors  162
To Whom  170
With What Effect  172
And Why  174
Hui Holohi  175
Marrying Communications Theory and Political Theory  177
Further Research  180

APPENDIX A. QUESTIONNAIRE I: LEGISLATORS  185
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE I: GOVERNORS  190
APPENDIX C. QUESTIONNAIRE II: LEGISLATORS  195
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>Descriptions and Sources of Variables Used in This Study</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E</td>
<td>Studies of Relationships to Response Rate</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix F</td>
<td>Notes to Chapter III</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix G</td>
<td>Coding</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Membership in the Governor's Party and Response for American Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Senate Offices Held and Response for American Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. House Offices Held and Response for American Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Party and Response for American Legislative Leaders</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Party and Response for American Governors</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Comparison of Distribution of Offices Held by Legisleader Respondents, with Offices Within 54-Polity Universe, 2nd Survey</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Legislative Office and Response, 2nd Survey</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Membership in Governor's Party and Legisleader Response, 2nd Survey</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Legisleader Party and Response, 2nd Survey</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Percentage of Response Under the V Factor and Party</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Frequency of Communications Initiated by Legislative Leaders to Governors and Governors to Them</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Median Frequencies of Ranked Legisleader-Governor Communications as Reported by Legisleaders</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Median Frequencies of Ranked Governor-Initiated Communications with Legislative Leaders as Reported by Governors</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Median Frequencies of Ranked Legisleader-Initiated Communications with Governors as Reported by Governors</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>COMPARISON OF MEDIAN-RANKED COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES BETWEEN GOVERNORS AND PRESIDING OFFICERS AND MAJORITY LEADERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATIONS IN GENERAL SUBJECT AREAS--LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>A COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION FREQUENCY AS MEASURED BY MEDIANS FOR SELECTED SUBJECTS BY RANK, PARTY, AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE GOVERNOR'S PARTY--LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>COMPARISON OF THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF RANK AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE GOVERNOR'S PARTY ON THE MEDIAN FREQUENCIES OF SELECTED COMMUNICATIONS SUBJECTS--LEGISLEADERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>COMPARISON OF GOVERNORS' AND LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS, BY SUBJECT, EXPRESSED IN MEDIANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>FREQUENCY OF USE OF INFORMAL CHANNELS VERSUS POLITICAL COOPERATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT &quot;YOU TO GOV&quot; (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH FRIENDLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLEADER TO GOVERNOR CHANNELS AND SIX VARIABLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A LEGISLEADER IS MOST APT TO INITIATE A CALL OR LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT &quot;YOU TO GOV&quot; (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH &quot;USEFUL INFORMATION ON STRATEGY&quot; (USFINFO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DIRECT &quot;YOU TO GOV&quot; (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE GOVERNORS (LINFLUG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT &quot;YOU TO GOV&quot; (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH ACCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>USE OF LEGISLEADERS' STAFF MEMBERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>USE OF GOVERNORS' STAFF MEMBERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
29. USE OF LEGISLEADERS' AND GOVERNORS' STAFFS ... 119
30. SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH
GOVERNOR'S STAFF AS REPORTED BY LEGISLEADERS
AND GOVERNORS ... 119
31. AVERAGE FREQUENCIES OF CHANNEL USE, PERCEPTIONS
OF LEGISLEADERS ... 124
32. ROW RANKS AND MEANS OF RESPONSES ON SIX MEASURES
OF SATISFACTION IN SIX CATEGORIES ... 129
33. COMPARISON OF FREQUENCY OF CHANGING POSITIONS
WITH FREQUENCY OF IN-PERSON COMMUNICATIONS ... 133
34. EFFECT OF PARTY COMPETITION ON GOVERNORS'
PROGRAMS ... 136
35. HIGH AND LOW CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING
VERSUS FOUR COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES ... 149
36. CORRELATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CERTAIN
VARIABLES CORRELATED WITH RESPONSE RATES 1
AND 2 ... 222
37. TESTING POPULATION AS A CONTROL VARIABLE ... 223
38. STATE SCORES ON "THE V FACTOR" SCALE ... 224
39. "THE V FACTOR" AND RESPONSE RATE 1 ... 225
40. "THE V FACTOR" AND RESPONSE RATE 2 ... 225
41. FREQUENCIES OF FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS WITH HOUSE
SPEAKERS INITIATED BY GOVERNORS IN 21 STATES,
AS PERCEIVED BY THE GOVERNORS AND THE
SPEAKERS ... 228
42. CORRELATIONS AMONG THIRTEEN ORIGINAL
COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES, QUESTIONNAIRE II
(LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS) ... 231
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure                                      page

1. The Number of Communications with Governors  Initiated by 37 Legislative Leaders in 1969  
   Response, Categorized by their 1968 Responses.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  45

2. Median Frequencies of Communications Initiated by  
   the Governors and by the Legisleaders--AS  
   PERCEIVED BY THE LEGISLEADERS.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  50

3. Median Frequencies of Communication Initiated by  
   the Governors to the Presiding Officers of the  
   Senates and by the Presiding Officers to the  
   Governors--AS PERCEIVED BY THE GOVERNORS.  .  .  .  56

4. Perceptions of Governors and Legisleaders of the  
   Frequency of GOVERNORS' INITIATIVES in Four  
   Subject Matter Areas.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  72

5. Perceptions of Governors and Legisleaders of the  
   Frequency of INITIATIVES BY LEGISLEADERS in  
   Six Subject Matter Areas.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  74

6. Number and Percentage of Communications per  
   Channel Between 202 Legisleaders and their  
   Governors--LEGISLEADER PERCEPTIONS  .  .  .  .  .  .  78

7. The Relative use made of Legislative Officers as  
   Channels.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  81
1.1 INTRODUCTION

Public policy can be viewed as the major dependent variable which political science seeks to explain (Dye, 1965: 198). Among the major contributors to public policy in the United States are the legislatures of our states and territories. In the formative years of our nation, legislatures were the most powerful organ of state government and were looked to by the average citizen for initiation and wisdom in the formulation of public policy (United States...: 38).

There has been little fundamental change in legislatures over a long period of time (Jewell & Patterson: 518, 524). Rhyne (p. 118), as reported in Vital Speeches, claimed state legislatures are the most outmoded organ of state government and are not responsive to the needs of the people. Moreover, in the past half century or so, legislatures are more and more being eclipsed by governors and the executive branch, not to mention national and local governments. Perhaps this has come about because legislative structure and framework are generally more rigidly prescribed in state constitutions than is the executive branch, and therefore
less adaptable to changing political and social conditions. 

*Newsweek* stated that:

Ultimately, except in the few states where prohibitively cumbersome initiative movements are legal, only the legislatures can change themselves. Until they do, in the foreboding words of Professors Adrian and Press, "...our state governments will remain sick, sick, sick." (["The Sick State...", p. 32; Press: 165]

One wonders now in what ways or through what channels the people's voice is being heard and acted upon in legislative chambers—and to what extent the people are seeing the legislatures as effective recipients for demands. Edelman (p. 4) says:

...many of the public programs universally taught and believed to benefit a mass public in fact benefit relatively small groups. We can show that many business regulation and other law enforcement policies confer tangible benefits on the regulated businesses while conveying only symbolic reassurance to their ostensible beneficiaries, the consumers.

Because American legislatures are highly visible bodies and because they play an important part in codifying local mores and societal rules, a number of studies have been made of them. The traditions of normative, case, and behavioral studies have been applied.

In public administration the discovery of the administrative process in the early 1930's was followed by a concern with "human relations" in general and motivation in particular. By the early 40's war led to the need for more powerful planning techniques (and budgeting and program plan-
ning). Because of concern with incentives as well, the focus of the management problem shifted to leadership in the late 40's. Some of this concern led to an interest in communication techniques (Gore: 2).

In the legislative field, communications do not yet appear to have been as widely studied. This is somewhat surprising since "how we communicate determines how we relate, just as how we relate determines how we communicate" (Duncan: 261). Fleishman (p. 450) states that an important aspect of the behavior of individuals in organizations is the communications process, and the more complex the organization, the more complex the communications problems. Communications and control are decisive processes in organization (Deutsch: 367)—in fact Whyte (p. 126) goes so far as to say "control communications and you control." Etzioni (p. 75) claims that without communications, power is aimless, and without power, communications are without impact.

Legislators and governors are very much concerned with relating to each other and to constituents. They are also concerned with power, organization, control, and political resources. Their decisions, collectively, affect millions of people. Political information is essential. Political information requires both formal and informal communications. Communications, then, is of major interest in the study of legislative-executive functions.
1.2 THE PROBLEM

As a beginning step in the study of legislative-executive communications, descriptions of the frequency, kind, and channels of communications are needed. As Harold Lasswell (p. 37) asked of an act of communications in general:

Who
Says What
In Which Channel
To Whom
With What Effect?

To these succinct questions could be added:

Modulated by what factors
And Why?

What patterns and variables are there in legislative-executive communications? What independent variables affect such patterns as might be discernible—party, faction, position, method of selection of legislative leaders, personal or political friendship, size of the state or size of the legislative body, relative power of executive and legislative branches, availability or size of staff, physical proximity of the actors, the personalities or attitudes of the actors, patronage, or even merely the number of bills introduced or passed? Or might there be clusters of variables, or underlying variables still to be identified?

Is there a frequency of communications between legislative leaders (hereafter frequently shortened to "legisleaders") and governors, or does the doctrine of the separation
of powers cause the parties to consciously avoid communicating across legislative-executive boundaries? Are there identifiable networks between governors andlegislators, and if they do exist, are they overloaded or blocked? What are the essential differences between the various states, or groups of states, if any, in executive-legislative communications? What effect do these differences have, and upon what? Does staffing have any effect upon communications patterns?

Where and how do legislative-executive communications fit into more general sociological, political, or communications theory? Is it possible to develop an organized body of information derived from legislative-executive communications upon which an optimum communications system can be developed (Bavelas & Barrett: 463)? What already appears in the literature that may bear upon the problem?

1.3 THE LITERATURE

Frank Dance (1968: 121) defines communications as eliciting a response through verbal symbols and other means. David Berlo (p. 165) says, "When we communicate we intend to affect—to have influence on—our environment and ourselves." McLuhan (pp. 3,4) describes communications as an extension of man's central nervous system. Basically, communications has four variables: the communicator, the mes-
sage, the channel, and the receiver (Deutschmann: 170). Feedback may be considered as a new round of communication. A seminal work on the science of feedback, cybernetics, was, of course, Norbert Weiner's *The Human Use of Human Beings.* Its most basic function seems to be to serve as a stabilizing mechanism for both the individual and society (McLeod: 218). As such, communications serve to manage conflict and integration and to guarantee social order (Duncan: 240), one of man's needs (Duncan: 253).

"Communications are most likely to reinforce existing positions, then to activate latent positions, and least likely to change or counter existing or latent positions" (Berelson & Steiner: 541). Father Ong (p. 115) claims the spoken word has more power than the printed word and in Highsaw and Bowen (p. 53) it is estimated that 75% of all communications are of an oral nature.¹

But what causes communications to occur? Along with the postulated need of human beings for a relatively constant flow of communications to maintain personal equilibrium (McLeod: 222), coupled with Roy Grinker's discovery (p. 136) that blocking interpersonal communications is one of the

¹ Dance (1968: 125-6) in "The Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Institute in Technical and Organizational Communication," characterizes the authority of the spoken word as: dialog, naturalness (spontaneity), simultaneity, participation, and responsibility. The authority of the printed word is described as: monolog, artificiality, sequentiaity, alienation, and dependency.
best means of evoking anxiety, the desire to make an impression on others is a strong motivating force (Davis: 459). The desire to enhance one's own values (as measured by knowledge, skill, power, etc.) must also be a strong motivating factor. McLeod (p. 207) writes of the cathartic effects of communication whose basis was the frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard, Doob, Miller and Sears.

Festinger (pp. 271-282) suggests three forces that determine when a group will communicate about a given topic:

(1) When the perceived discrepancy in group opinion regarding the topic is great;

(2) When the topic is highly relevant to the functioning of the group; and

(3) When the attraction of the members to the group is high.

Festinger also sees three forces as determining who will receive the communication:

(1) The magnitude of the discrepancy in the member's position;

(2) The more likely it is that the influence attempt will succeed with a given person; and

(3) The extent to which the individual is desired as a group member.

McLeod (p. 215) also sees the giving of orientation, opinion, and suggestions as being more frequent than the asking for such things, with there apparently being more sending of communications than receiving in group activity (which probably means some are falling on deaf ears!). Re-
latedly, Hovland and Weiss (p. 650) write of a "sleeper ef-
fect"--the more rapid forgetting of the source as compared
to the message and "...a decrease after a time interval in
the extent to which subjects agreed with the position advo-
cated by the communication when the material was presented
by trustworthy sources, but an increase when it was present-
ed by untrustworthy sources."

Dance (1968:123) says change and communication are insep-
arable and act on each other. Today there is more communi-
cation and a wider range of subjects, all of which work
against inertia and bring about even more rapid changes.
Such changes, Dance believes, are part of the modern crisis
of authority.

Although a search of the literature reveals greater focus
upon human communications theory, it appears that not a
great deal has as yet been applied or tested against legis-
lative behavior. Patterson studied inter-personal relations
within the Wisconsin Assembly and produced several sociome-
tric diagrams which illustrated the informal friendship
structure of that house which tended to lessen differences
and provide channels of communication. Fiellin observed
communications activities of the New York delegation to the
US House of Representatives and found communication activi-
ties helpful to the Democrats. He identified three services
performed by the communications network of a group within
the legislature: it provides "trustworthy" information, cues, and adaptive norms. A legislator, following such cues, is able to avoid deviation difficulties with his group.

Jewell and Patterson (p. 203) claim that "There is an inherent contradiction between party and committee leadership. Party leadership is centralized; committee leadership is decentralized." In addition, legislators are organized for strong leadership—which often emanates from the governor's office (Jewell: 104). In the South, according to Ramsone (p. 149), legislative leadership may be the first of the governor's many functions. Legislative leaders may thus experience role ambivalency because of the demands made on them by both the executive and the legislative party (Jewell & Patterson: 128). All of this may have linkage with communications research where it has been found that centralized communications networks are more efficient while decentralized networks give greater satisfaction to their members (McLeod: 219-20).

McLeod (p. 216) recognizes that informal communications arise within formal groups. Frequent departures from formal lines of communication channels, however, are one of the best indices of the inability of the formal organization to

2 It has also been found that in the United States, the weaker the party system in a state, the more pressure groups are likely to influence state government (Berelson & Steiner: 419).
function effectively or to satisfy the emotional wants of its members.

Since today considerable emphasis is being put on communications, there is the danger of equating high frequency with good communications. Too high a frequency of communications raises the risk of overcommunicating and of thereby draining a top official's time, whether he/she be business executive, governor, or legislative leader.\(^3\) Etzioni (p. 74) suggests a very high responsiveness may have a negative effect on the energies of such elite as aforementioned, who, being preoccupied with attempts to respond to all groups, are prevented from moving in any one direction.

Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson (pp. 185-7) touched on communications very briefly in their classic study of the legislative system. They found one of the important activities of legislative officers to be communication with the governor, administrative departments, the public, and other legislative leaders of both houses.

Discussions of equilibrium or cognitive consistency theories occasionally mention the relationship of imbalance or dissonance to the frequency or kinds of communications. Homans (p. 112) states that if the frequency of interaction

\(^3\) In Highsaw and Bowen (pp. 63, 53, 29) it is stated that restraint and balance are necessary ingredients of a good communications system, and it is postulated that there is probably a law of the conservation of communication.
(of which communication is a part) between two or more persons increases, the degree of their liking for one another will increase, and vice versa. He further states (p. 120) that the more frequently persons interact with one another, the more alike in some respects both their activities and their sentiments tend to become—if they are social equals and their jobs are not sharply differentiated. These postulates would appear to have relevancy for the legislative arena.

Newcomb (p. 395) speaks of a persistent "strain toward symmetry" and states that one of the advantages of symmetry, particularly of cognitive symmetry, is the ready calculability of another's behavior. A second advantage in symmetry is the confidence it gives one in one's own cognitive and evaluative orientations. Both calculability ("counting noses") and the assurance that one is not alone are important to legislators and governors. Newcomb assumes a persistent strain toward symmetry underlies communicative action.

Newcomb further states that there is a strong tendency for humans to orient themselves toward objects in the environment and to relate with other humans oriented toward those same objects. Communications, he says, are the most common and usually the most effective means by which one in-

* It is a recognized phenomenon that hostages often get to liking their captors and that soldiers develop great respect for those against whom they have fought the hardest.
fluences and/or informs himself about another. One might think of the legislative program as a chief "object" in legislative-executive communications.

For Homans (pp. 209-219) the nature of communications can provide a key to the relationships between persons. For example, super-subordinate communications (father-son, boss-employee) are apt to revolve mostly around orders and engender respect--or sometimes antagonism. Communications among equals (brother, friends) are more open and informal (e.g., they are more apt to contain "dirty" stories). An examination of communications between legislative and executive persons may similarly indicate whether the actors perceive of themselves in a super-subordinate or equals role.

In a personal conversation with the writer, Albert J. Abrams, Secretary of the New York Senate, suggested that offices in government can be classed as male or female. He generally classed legislators as aggressive and male. He considered public works, for example, as male, but education, health, and welfare as female. Male and female offices could not, he believed, communicate well with each other and so understand one another. To him this dichotomy helped explain why some departments could not get along with legislators and did not fare well in legislative rulemaking and appropriations.
Despite the interesting questions and applications raised by a review of the literature, no study of the patterns of communications between governors and legislators has been found. To help fill this gap, in 1968 the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders and the National Governors Conference cooperated with the Governor and Legislature of the State of Hawaii and with the University of Hawaii's Center for Governmental Development in a study of legislative-executive communications. The resultant study (Meller & Temple) became a departure point for this work.

1.4 THEORY

Our founding fathers feared the tyrannies of both minorities and majorities. They attempted to devise a system of government at both state and national levels that divided up governmental powers and tended to set up one group or branch to check on or counterbalance another. Although, for instance, the governor might derive his legislative powers from his constitutional duty or prerogative of addressing the legislature on the state of the state and from signing bills into law, such powers were incomplete without the concurrence of the legislature. Likewise, with few exceptions, the legislature could not pass laws without the assent of the governor. Again, generally, the governor could not install many of his key officers without the concurrence of at least one house. By having the governor elected on a state-
wide basis and the senators and representatives elected by smaller and different electorates, varying forces and "publics" were represented and came to have a role to play.

Although strongly led and disciplined parties or groups have from time to time gained temporary control of local or state politics (a phenomenon apparently not fully foreseen by our founders), the inherent forces in the different electorates have tended to break up concentrations of power by either majorities or minorities and led to "...not minority rule but minorities rule..." in the words of Robert A. Dahl (p. 132).

This division of power has required cooperation or compromise between competing elements in the body politic in order to formalize or legitimate public policy. Therefore, individuals or groups who have sought political power in order to obtain a larger share in the distribution of payoffs and the converting of their preferences into public policy have had to resort to political maneuvering. As Lewis Froman, Jr., says, this is "...merely an elaboration of a primitive form of bartering" (49). And what men and women barter are political resources as no one individual or group in our American society generally has enough of its own to

\[5\] Political resources are many and varied but consist of such things as: votes, wealth, knowledge, party organization, news media, social status, physique, constitutional or statutory position, control of force, friendship, language/ethnic/cultural group identity, energy, and staff.
implement the public policies it desires.

To bargain, to come to compromises and agreements, to build winning coalitions, and to get one's preferences considered, one must communicate.

The purpose of this study was to relate communications theory to legislative-executive communications and to see what light may thereby be cast upon the political process. One of its aims was to discover key variables in legislative-executive communications; another was to determine if communications patterns shed any light on whether the founding fathers' conception of the separation of powers doctrine has applicability today; and still another was to explore the roles of communications in bestowing, bargaining for, or withholding that life blood of politics—political resources.

Insofar as communications go, would they provide any clues as to whether the separation of powers and checks and balances doctrines are working? Do communications data confirm that political bargaining goes on and would a study of the data reveal who may have the better bargaining position? Do staff persons fit into the communications network and, if so, how do they contribute to the political process? Are informal networks replacing formal ones? To what extent might communications/interaction be an indicator of legislative-executive relations (e.g., cooperative, confrontational, partisan, friendly)?
The following statements, many based on more general theories or hypotheses mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, were tested:

1. It is hypothesized that legislative leaders and governors of the same party will communicate more frequently than governors and legislative leaders of differing parties.

2. Legislators who express personal friendship for their governors will communicate more often with them than those who do not express friendship.

3. The more legislative leaders believe they can enhance their values through discussions with the governor, the greater will be the frequency of communications with him.

4. The more frequent the in-person communications between legislative leaders and the governors, the greater the satisfaction expressed with the communications system.

5. The greater the opportunity of legislative leaders to participate in discussions with their governor, the greater the satisfaction of participants with the communications system.

6. Legislative leaders who most frequently communicate with the governor in person will also be the ones who are most satisfied with the use of staff by the governor in communications.

7. The higher the frequency of communications in one channel, the less the frequency in other channels.

8. A strong political relationship with the governor will result in more frequent in-person communications than will a strong personal (friendly) relationship.

9. The more distant the political relationship with the governor, the more the use of informal or non-governmental persons in communications with the governor will be found satisfactory.

10. The more frequent the in-person (direct) communications, the more frequently will changes in position on legislative policy after communication be reported.

11. Communications will follow the formal structure more than the informal.
12. Both legislative leaders and governors will see themselves as initiating communications (especially the in-person type) more frequently than receiving communications.

13. The staff of legislative leaders will supplement, not replace, direct communications between the legislative leaders and the governor.

14. Both legislative leaders and governors will see themselves as using staff or other intermediaries more frequently than will the recipients.

15. Oral communications will exceed written communications in frequency in the interchange between governors and legislative leaders.

16. The more frequent the communications between governor and legislative leader, the higher the hierarchical rank of the legislative leader and the more positive comments he will have about the governor.

17. The political party organization will be more frequently used as a source of information by legislative leaders in states in which party competition is greater.

18. After an exchange of communications, legislators in states with high party competition will go along with the governor's programs and correspondingly change their anticipated votes more frequently than legislators in non-competitive states.

19. In legislatures with centralized decision making, legislative leaders will turn more to the party organization for information on the governors' programs than will legislative leaders in legislatures with decentralized decision making. Legislative leaders in legislatures with decentralized decision making will turn more toward other legislative leaders than will the legislative leaders of centralized decision-making legislatures.

20. Legislators who are part of a decentralized decision-making system will express greater satisfaction with communications in general.

21. One of the purposes for which executive-legislative communications will be used is to ameliorate political conflict between the two branches of government.
1.5 Research Design

During the spring of 1968 a questionnaire on legislative-executive communications was devised by Professors Norman Meller, Robert Stauffer, and Fred Riggs in cooperation with Dean Ralph Miwa, Acting Director of the Center for Governmental Development of the University of Hawaii. The questionnaire was designed to be answered by legislative leaders and, slightly modified, by governors. The legislative leaders surveyed were Majority and Minority Leaders,6 Speakers, and Presidents or Presidents Pro Tem of the Senates.7 The questionnaire sought information on staff size, groupings affecting communications, personal and political relationships to the governor, the nature and frequency of personal and written communications between the governors and legislators, and the use of staff or other intermediaries in

6 "Majority" and "Minority" Leaders (generally capitalized) refer to specific officers whose posts are officially recognized by the legislative rules and not to those persons who may have some leadership role in the majority and minority parties. For brevity, Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders are sometimes lumped together in this study and called "leaders of the majority."

7 Unfortunately, in about 36 states "the Lieutenant Governor problem" (Citizens Conference on State Legislatures: 19) causes the role of the chief senator (usually designated president pro tem) to be less clear cut than that of the speaker of the house. This arises because the president pro tem shares varying degrees of power with the lieutenant governor. The term "Presiding Officers" as used in this study refers to House Speakers, Senate Presidents who are not lieutenant governors, and Presidents Pro Tem under lieutenant governors. In other words, the term "Presiding Officer" refers to the highest ranking elected legislator in each house.
communication process. (See Appendices A and B for copies of these questionnaires.)

During the summer of 1968 the headquarters of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders sent the questionnaires to 273 state and territorial legislative leaders. A second mailing to nonresponders followed.

At the same time, Governor John A. Burns of Hawaii, responding to a resolution of the National Governors' Conference (Appendix B), sent questionnaires to the governors of the states and territories in the summer of 1968.

There are three general disadvantages to mailed questionnaires: (1) returns are generally poor, usually less than 50 percent, (2) inability to validate responses, and (3) uncertainty that the respondent intended actually filled out the questionnaire (Kerlinger: 397).

Return rates on the 1968 questionnaires were considered acceptable. This conclusion was based on a return rate of 60% for the legislative leaders and 78% for the governors. Legislators' returns were received from 88% of the senates, 94% of the houses, and 98% of the states.

---

8 See pages 60-63 of the 1967 Yearbook of the WSCLL entitled "The State Legislature: Winds of Change" for the state and territorial offices contained in the Questionnaire I universe. Due to normal turnover, some twenty persons differ from those printed in the Yearbook.
At the National Convention of the State Legislative Leaders many legislator respondents were contacted and ambiguities cleared up. For instance, many had left questions or cells unanswered or had used check marks instead of numbers to indicate frequencies.

Only rarely did it appear a staff member had completed a legislator's questionnaire (perhaps because many of them either do not have staff or staff which performs personal services). This was confirmed by the fact that those legislators who were contacted in Honolulu indicated familiarity with the questionnaire. It was more common, however, for a staff member to have completed the questionnaire for the governor. In many such instances these questionnaires were completed by key staff persons, such as a legislative aide or press secretary to the governor. Although it is to be expected that many governors would authorize staff men to complete the questions on their behalf, this was apparently encouraged by the third person wording of the questionnaire. Contrastingly, the legislators' questionnaire used first and second person wording.

Before all replies were in, a preliminary report consisting primarily of frequency counts and the results of basic statistical findings was presented to the national convention of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders in a special workshop in Honolulu in December of 1968 (Mell-
er and Temple). That report was based on 156 legislative leader replies from 49 states and from 31 governors. The findings in the present study supersede those in the Meller and Temple report.

A second questionnaire, designed to probe for still more information is reported in more detail in Section 2.5, "The Second Survey: Legislative Leaders," in the chapter on Methodology.

Additional state information, such as interparty competition, bills introduced and passed, affluence and income distribution, governors' powers, centralization of legislative decision making, professionalism, and population were obtained from government and other documents and coded for use as variables.

1.6 ANALYSIS

From the responses descriptive data were obtained, coded, aggregated, and analyzed. Whom the respondents talked to, what they talked about, what channels were used, what factors modified communications, what effect communications had or correlated with, and why respondents communicated were studied. A number of statistical models were used and are listed as the findings are reported.
Chapter II

METHODOLOGY

2.1 OBTAINING COMMUNICATIONS DATA

In Chapter I it was noted that Fleishman (1967:450) stated that an important aspect of the behavior of individuals in organizations is the communications process, and the more complex the organization, the more complex the communications problems. As each is a complex political subsystem, it can be hypothesized that the legislative and executive branches of state and territorial governments will have intra- and inter-communications problems.

As reported earlier, Fiellin (1962:78) attributed three services to the communications network of but a single group within the legislature: it provided "trustworthy" data, informative cues, and adaptive norms to the members. With respect to legislative leaders, Wahlke et al (1962: 1857) found that one of the important functions performed by legislative officers was communication with the governor, administrative departments, the public, and other legislative leaders of both houses.
Given the breadth of communications encompassed and the probable complexity of each sub-system's communications network, these studies give credence to the wisdom of narrowing attention to but one type of communications--those between legislators and chief executives.

To start, first one needs to identify, categorize, and measure the communications to be studied. The categorization utilized must be that which is best designed to achieve the purposes of this study. Communications can be oral, written, made by sign, or through the use of "body language." They can be direct or indirect and can be on a one-to-one basis or in groups. They can be counted by having an objective tally taken of every time one person speaks to another, or of counting the number of words exchanged, or measured by estimating the impact or intensity of a communication, as for example, the difference between a casual "Hi, Jack" and an authoritative leader's order to "Kill that bill." The very physical act of communicating may itself constitute the communication of a message, not alone to the parties participating, but also to those observing.

In devising this study, observing and counting sign language (nod of the head, a pulled ear lobe) was ruled out as unfeasible. Similarly, observing and tallying the total number of times a presiding officer spoke to or was spoken to by the governor was also regarded as prohibitive in terms
of costs, as well as potentially unproductive by virtue of invasion of the communicants' privacy.9

It was therefore decided that the most efficient way to obtain information on the kinds and frequency of communications between legislative leaders and governors was to contact these officers directly and ask them. The disadvantages of this approach arise from the failure of some to respond, the difficulty of perfect recall on the part of even the most cooperative respondent, and differences of interpretation in responding. Additionally, because of the lack of resources to conduct personal interviews, the investigation had to be conducted by mail. This subjected the inquiry to the three disadvantages noted in Section 1.5, Research Design. Despite these disadvantages, given the constraint of limited resources, the survey method remained the most appropriate.

9 Some systematic observations of the physical act of communication between legislators, as on the floor of the legislative chamber, have been attempted. Routt selected eleven Illinois senators and counted and analyzed their interpersonal contacts the first fifteen minutes of each hour the senate was in session for about 2 1/2 months in 1937. See G. C. Routt, "Interpersonal Relationships and the Legislative Process," The Annals, Vol. 195 (1938), pp. 129-136. Norman Meller observed and counted informal interaction on the floor among 61 members of the Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly during the 28 hours that House was in session in June 1967. See Norman Meller, "Papers on the Papua-New Guinea House of Assembly," New Guinea Research Bulletin, No. 22, January 1968, published by the Australian National University,
2.2 THE FIRST SURVEY: LEGISLATORS

As mentioned in Section 1.5, questionnaires were sent out to legislative leaders in the spring of 1968. Counting some latecomers, the responses grew to 164. Statistical checks were then made to determine whether the replies on hand were reasonably representative of the whole population (universe) addressed.

To test the null hypothesis—that there is no significant difference in membership or nonmembership in the governor's party between those legislators who responded and those who did not—a tally was made and a chi square test run. Membership or nonmembership in the governor's party was found to be random so far as response was concerned (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor's Party</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Sample N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On a 2x2 contingency table the formula used for finding chi square was:

\[ X^2 = \frac{N(|AD-BC|-N)^2}{(A+B)(C+D)(A+C)(B+D)} \]

Responses by Old Confederacy\textsuperscript{11} versus the remaining 39 states and 3 territories showed that Northerners plus "Ter- ritorials" replied better (62\%) than Southerners (48\%); however, it was not statistically significant ($p = .20$, two tailed). Responses by office (presiding officers, Majority and Minority Leaders) indicated that in the senates the leaders of the majority replied better (69\%) than did the Minority Leaders (52\%), but again it was not statistically significant (see Table 2). In the lower houses the Speakers responded significantly better (71\%) than did the Majority and Minority Leaders in the house (51\% and 49\%) (see Table 3). The reason for this difference is unknown.

\textbf{TABLE 2}

\textsc{Senate offices held and response for American legislative leaders}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidents and Presidents Pro Temp</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leaders</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leaders</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 3.62$, $df = 2$, $p = .20$, two tailed\textsuperscript{*}

(*Where the degrees of freedom were greater than 1, the $X^2$ formula used with these tables was: $\newline (O_{ij} - E_{ij})^2 \over E_{ij}$ \newline $X^2 = \sum_{i=1}^{r} \sum_{j=1}^{c} \newline From Siegel \textit{op.cit.-}, p. 104.)

\textsuperscript{11} The "Old Confederacy" consisted of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
TABLE 3

HOUSE OFFICES HELD AND RESPONSE FOR AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speakers</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leaders</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leaders</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 6.13, \text{ df } = 2, \text{ } P = .05, \text{ two tailed.}\]

Also, Republicans responded in significantly greater numbers than did Democrats (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

PARTY AND RESPONSE FOR AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>266*</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 3.90, \text{ df } = 1, \text{ } P = .05, \text{ two tailed.}\]

(*The four legislators belonging to the Popular Democratic Party in Puerto Rico, two belonging to Puerto Rico's SR Party, and one independent Virgin Islander--a total of seven--are excluded from this table.*)
2.3 THE FIRST SURVEY: GOVERNORS

Subsequent to the receipt of governors' questionnaires reported upon in Section 1.5, Research Design, additional questionnaires were received from eleven governors bringing the total responses to 42 out of the 54 solicited for a response rate of 78%.

To test the null hypothesis—that there is no significant difference along party lines between those governors who responded and those who did not—a chi square test was run. So far as response rate was concerned, no significant difference was found between Democratic and Republican governors (see Table 5).

Responses by the ten geographical regions (REGION), by the "Old Confederacy" versus the remaining states and territories (NOSO), by state population, and by affluence (AFFLU) were also compared. All were found to be random. Also randomly related to the returns from governors were responses grouped by the following characteristics: Size of the leg-

---

12 Two governor's questionnaires were received from Hawaii—one prepared by the Governor himself (which was used), and the other by his Press Secretary. This provided an opportunity to study one staff member's perception of what he conceived his chief's responses would be. It ought also be added that the aide to Governor Connolly of Texas wrote that since the Governor was going out of office in three weeks, they saw no reason to complete the questionnaire!

13 For brief descriptions and the sources of variables used throughout this study, see Appendix D where they are listed alphabetically by their coding abbreviations.
### TABLE 5

**PARTY AND RESPONSE FOR AMERICAN GOVERNORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>53*</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 1.51$, df = 1, $p = .30$, two tailed.

(*Puerto Rico's Governor was a Popular Democrat and is not included in this tally as that party does not have strength in any other jurisdiction.)

There was, however, a tendency for governors from the 25 states with legislatures which rank higher on the overall FAIR criteria to respond more (92%) than those from the 25 states ranking lower (72%). $X^2$ was 2.17 with one degree of freedom; $p = .20$, two tailed. (The territories were not included in the Citizens Conference study so governors from the territories were omitted.)
2.4 **REPORT TO THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE LEADERS.**

Before all replies were in, a preliminary report consisting primarily of frequency counts and the results of basic statistical findings was presented to the national convention of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders in a special workshop in Honolulu in December of 1968 (Meller and Temple). This study was based on 156 legislative and 31 gubernatorial replies, and has been superseded by the findings herein reported.

2.5 **THE SECOND SURVEY: LEGISLATIVE LEADERS**

As a result of the study of the responses to Questionnaire I, of a review of the literature, and of suggestions from respondents, a supplemental questionnaire was constructed and pre-tested. It probed for more information such as the legislatures' perceptions of the relative power of legislatures and governors; the relative power of officers within the legislatures; the motivation, direction, satisfaction, and effect of communications; the attitudes of legislators toward their governor and colleagues, specifics about the communications net itself; and miscellaneous additional background data. This became Questionnaire II.

Acceptance of an unsolicited, unexpected, and much appreciated invitation from the executive office of the National
Conference of State Legislative Leaders (NCSLL) to attend the national convention of the NCSLL in November of 1969 in Atlanta provided an excellent opportunity to launch the second survey. At Atlanta the President of the NCSLL was contacted and agreed to sign a cover letter for Questionnaire II (see Appendix C). Eighty-three of these questionnaires were delivered to appropriate officials in attendance at the convention. From this group replies were eventually received from 67 (81%). The writer's presence in Atlanta also made it possible for him to talk with many legislative leaders about the second survey and answer specific questions raised.

Following Atlanta, the second series of questionnaires were mailed out that same month under University of Hawaii aegis to the remaining addressees. Supplemental requests to those who had not responded to the first wave were mailed in December, and a final, third wave was similarly dispatched in March, 1970.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\) Here is a summary of the surveys:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Survey</th>
<th>Second Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governors</td>
<td>Leg'ldrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universe:</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replied, States Only:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replied, States + Terr's:</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The universe consisted of 273 persons for Questionnaire I. For Questionnaire II it consisted of 278 because of organizational changes in some legislatures. Questionnaire II was sent to all 278 office holders. For possible future use in longitudinal studies, Questionnaire II was also sent to those who responded to Questionnaire I but who were no longer included in the 1969-70 universe.
Response within each category of office\textsuperscript{16} for the 202 replies to the second legislative questionnaire closely approximated the distribution of that office within the total universe of 278 (see Table 6).

**TABLE 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officeholders Within Universe</th>
<th>Officeholders Responding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presiding Officers:</td>
<td>37 31 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leaders:</td>
<td>37 32 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leaders:</td>
<td>33 32 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>101</em></td>
<td>278 202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Exceeds 100% due to rounding.*

Responders were compared with nonresponders on three potentially important characteristics of legislative leaders. In each case, using the chi square test for the two independent samples, the null hypothesis was tested for any significant difference between the groups. These characteristics (This included those Questionnaire I responders who were retired, defeated, elected to the state senates, became governor, or were appointed to the federal cabinet or other national position.) A total of 351 Questionnaire II's were thus distributed, to which 243 responded. However, only 202 of the 243 were within the 1969-70 universe of 278.

\textsuperscript{16} By office is meant the category of the position held: Presiding Officer, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader.
are summarized in Tables 7, 8, and 9.

**TABLE 7**

**LEGISLATIVE OFFICE AND RESPONSE, 2ND SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presiding Officers:</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leaders:</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leaders:</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 1.47, \, df = 2, \, p = .50, \, \text{two tailed.} \]

**TABLE 8**

**MEMBERSHIP IN GOVERNOR'S PARTY AND LEGISLEADER RESPONSE, 2ND SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor's Party</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = .90, \, df = 1, \, p = .50, \, \text{two tailed.} \]

**TABLE 9**

**LEGISLEADER PARTY AND RESPONSE, 2ND SURVEY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Universe</th>
<th>Returns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 9.00, \, df = 2, \, p = .02, \, \text{two tailed.} \]
The null hypothesis was accepted as to rank and as to membership or nonmembership in the governor's party. But 81% of the possible 134 Republicans while only 65% of the Democrats responded. As indicated in Table 9, the difference in response rates between Republicans and Democrats proved significant, the same finding as for the first questionnaire (see Table 4). This will be considered later in the analysis.

No significant differences in party, rank, or membership in the governor's party were found between those who were contacted at Atlanta and those who were reached by mail. Although not statistically significant, there was a tendency, given the marginals, for the Atlanta contacts to have been members of the governor's party at a higher than expected rate.17

Likewise, no significant differences were found in party, rank, or governor's party membership among the responses to the three mailed waves of Questionnaire II. Given the marginals, there was tendency for the Republicans to reply in the first wave, for presiding officers to reply in the first and second, and for majority and minority leaders to reply in the third wave at higher than expected rates.

17 It was also observed that, although not significant, the Atlanta contacts tended to be from the more populous states, probably measuring their greater economic capacity to send their legislators to a convention of this nature.
2.6 **A NEW CONSTRUCT?**

Party, rank and membership in the governor's party (GP) are attributes that are associated with individuals. In order to see if any state characteristics affected response, the response rate (percent responding of those queried) for each state was examined. Total state responses, rather than that of individual legislative leaders, were then used as cases in the statistical manipulations.

The details of these studies, using a number of possible relevant variables, are given in Appendix E. To briefly summarize the Appendix, it was found that population (POPULATN),\(^{16}\) section (NOSO), and affluence (APPLU) correlated significantly with response rate (RESPR1) from Questionnaire I. Population, centralization in legislative decision-making (DMCENT), and Grumm's Professionalism Index (GRUMMS) each correlated significantly with response rate (RESPR2) from Questionnaire II. Further analysis showed that these variables appeared to be influenced by an underlying, unidentified variable. Whatever it was seemed to be held together by those things in the environment which put pressure on political actors or caused the flow of activities to be slowed or become "sticky." A new, inchoate, contextual construct dubbed "the \(y\) factor" was developed in an attempt to identify or describe this underlying variable.

\(^{16}\) The reader will be reminded that descriptions of this and all other variables are found in Appendix D.
This still-to-be-perfected construct can serve to alert researchers to a contextual or environmental variable which may act as a kind of drag, resistance, pressure, or stickiness in some states re such other variables as: response rate, communications rate, innovativeness, voter turnout, highway expenditures, legislative activity (such as bills passed per day), and bargaining activity. (See Table 32 in Appendix E for a listing by states.)

Tests showed the $y$ factor acted as an intervening variable for $\text{RESPR1}$ and as an intervening and conditioning variable for $\text{RESPR2}$.

Interestingly, the new construct appeared to have little effect on party, nor party on it. Out of the many variables used in this study, only two appear to be differentially represented in the responses from the legislators in both questionnaires: i) the $y$ factor, and ii) party. Both residence in a state with a high $y$ factor and Democratic Party membership were associated with lower rates of response. Of the two, the $y$ factor appears the stronger influence. In Questionnaire I Democrats from states with lower $y$ factors responded four percentage points better than Republicans from states with higher $y$ factors, and although Republicans from states with higher $y$ factors responded better (70%) than Democrats from states with lower $y$ factors (69%) in response to Questionnaire II,
this was only by a minor one percentage point. Another way of saying this is that the party difference of response tended to be wiped out by differences in the \( y \) factor, so that Democratic states with a low \( y \) factor gave a better accounting of themselves, either approximating or exceeding Republican states with a high \( y \) factor. Within a party the \( y \) factor produced dramatic differences in the response rate, and, indeed, caused a somewhat greater spread in the percentages than did the party variable. (See Table 10.)

**TABLE 10**

PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSE UNDER THE \( V \) FACTOR AND PARTY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response Rate</th>
<th>Lower ( V ) Factor States</th>
<th>Higher ( V ) Factor States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 1</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate 2</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the analyses which follow, further effects of the \( y \) factor (coded VISCID in the variable lists) are reported from time to time.
2.7 ADEQUACY OF SURVEY

Earlier, reference was made to several disadvantages of the survey approach method adopted. One was the low response, often resulting in a return rate of less than 50%. However, in this study the return rates for the governors' and both legislators' questionnaires were sufficiently high to be treated as acceptable.

With regard to legislators in Questionnaire I, this evaluation is based on the three-fifths response rate and on the spread of replies received which covered 91% of the 53 senates, 90% of the 50 houses, and 96% of the 53 states and territories addressed. No significantly disproportionate categories of responders were found, other than that a larger component of the Republicans than Democrats replied, a greater proportion of legislators from states with a lower factor replied, and in the lower chambers proportionately more Speakers replied than in the other two categories of Majority and Minority Leaders. All of these may have some, but believed to be minor, effect upon interpretations of the survey findings, and will be referred to subsequently, as appropriate.

19 The legislators of American Samoa were not included in the Questionnaire I survey, but those of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were. Unicameral houses (Guam, Nebraska, and the Virgin Islands) were classed as senates. Both houses of the American Samoa Fono were included in the Questionnaire II survey.
The response rate for Questionnaire II was also considered acceptable; it encompassed 73% of the 278 legislators in the universe. Replies were received from 98% of the senators (53 out of 54) 96% of the houses (49 out of 51), and 100% of the 54 states and territories included in the survey. In addition there was little missing data in Questionnaire II, seldom exceeding 3 or 4%. Again only needed to be kept in mind are the y factor and party variables which were found to be associated with significantly different response rates on Questionnaire II.

Another objection sometimes raised to the questionnaire method concerned the matter of validation. Not all responses could be corroborated by personal checking. However, a large number of the Questionnaire I replies for which explanation was necessary were clarified personally by the legislators during their attendance at the national convention of the NCSLL in Honolulu in December of 1968. At the same time it was observed that those with whom the questionnaires were discussed were familiar with their contents, which lent support to the belief that most, if not all, of the questionnaires returned were completed by the legislators themselves.

With respect to Questionnaire II, whenever a question arose, the attempt was made to interview the respondent at Atlanta. There were, however, few instances where there was
a need to remove ambiguities. About a dozen questionnaires were mailed back to the respondents for clarification of certain points or completion of a missing page. The fact that this survey's replies were signed enabled such supplemental inquiries to be made when necessary.

For the governors survey there was a 78% response rate (42 out of 54). No significant differences were found between replying and nonreplying governors. Except for one governor, who granted a 105 minute interview, governors' responses could only have been checked through a mail inquiry, and it was not believed necessary to institute such mail follow up. Although some governors obviously replied personally, many questionnaires were completed and signed by a key staff member, usually the official most responsible for legislative liaison. As these persons had an excellent vantage point from which to observe and be a part of the interplay of communications between the governor and legislative leaders, references in this study to the "governors' questionnaire" will treat the governor as respondent in all cases.

Although it is to be expected that many governors would authorize staff to complete the questions on their behalf, this was apparently encouraged by the third person wording of the questionnaire. The legislleader questionnaires used first and second person wording.

*This practice is akin to that of James A. Robinson in interviewing Congressmen. He (or his interviewers) talked with nine staff assistants who had considerable knowledge of the Congressman's work and authority to speak for him. (Robinson:225-226)
Previously it was mentioned that among possible disadvantages of the surveys were lack of perfect recall and differences in interpretations when a respondent is asked to report on the kinds and frequencies of communications he has had with his governor. For example what is the numerical equivalent of "frequent"? In counting the number of times one talked to the governor in a week, does one include the "Nice day" greetings on a chance meeting in the corridor, a half hour spent over a drink discussing athletics, or only those conversations in which legislation, political appointments, or similar "official" matters are topics of conversation?

The premise acted upon is that for any specific group in a survey, the measure for nonnumerical responses will have relatively similar weight. While a few respondents will have marked "very frequent" and a few "occasionally" for the same number of exchanges that most will mark as "frequent," in using aggregate data these will tend to balance out.

Similarly, in counting communications some respondents may include the "Nice Day" exchanges while others will hold strictly to "official" conversations. Considered in the aggregate, patterns here can be posited. The legislator who does not like the governor or who is practically unknown to the governor is likely to engage in fewer "Nice day" greetings as well as have fewer substantive contacts. It is as-
sumed that in the aggregate, social interplay both results from and affects the substantive contact, and that the leader with many social invitations from the governor will also be the one exchanging views with him more frequently on legislation, appointments, etc., and vice versa. Therefore, the reporting of frequency will be taken as giving a reasonable measure of the interaction between a governor and the legislators of a state.

It is possible that the most important or politically sensitive messages will tend to be exchanged in person between governors and legislators, while the more routine ones are handled through staff or informal channels. But, since one of the concerns of this study is communications volume, all channels have been added together without attempting to assign weighting. Thus, the variable SUMTEN (sum of five posited channels, both directions) was created to obtain a count of the communications passing between the governor and the legislators regardless of whether communication was accomplished by direct contact, through staff, etc.

Asking the respondent to report numerically on his contacts means, of course, that it is no more accurate than his memory and is colored by his perceptions. There may in fact actually have been six time-differentiated exchanges, but the respondent may perceive them as fewer or greater in num-
ber. Again the assumption is that those leaders who actually do have more frequent contacts will perceive themselves as having them and err in favor of inflating their number. The converse may also be assumed. Even though the exactitude of the frequency response may be questioned, a precise measure is unnecessary to establish a general construct separating those who frequently communicate from those who have few occasions to enter into communication.

2.8 DATA HANDLING

All responses to the questionnaires were coded and the data entered on Hollerith cards for use with counter-sorters and computers. Also entered for use as additional variables was general state information, such as interparty competition, size of legislature, bill data, industrialization, legislative professionalism, conflict, policy output variables, and comparable other measures obtained from government documents and research studies. The coding used in this study is given in Appendix G. The punch card data bank and the original completed questionnaires are on file with the Political Science Department, University of Hawaii.
Chapter III

DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS ABOUT COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES, METHODS, CHANNELS, AND SUBJECT MATTER

"Interim studies, programs, special sessions require constant interplay of relationships," stated one legislator. But so do regular sessions. This chapter explores some of the relationships between governors and legislative leaders in terms of the frequency and subjects of communications, the ways or methods of communications (oral, written), and the channels used (direct, via staff, etc.).

3.1 PRIMARY COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES

This study employs two ways of measuring frequency of communications. In Questionnaire I the ordinal system of marking "very frequently, occasionally, seldom, or never" is used. In Questionnaire II an actual count of the number of times communications occurs in a given period is requested. From the latter it is possible to construct a ratio scale.²²

²² It was assumed that those who marked "very frequent" on Questionnaire I would also report more frequent contacts on Questionnaire II. To check this assumption a study was made of the responses of the 37 legislators who answered both questionnaires and who had the same governor, same party control in the legislature, and held the same offices in 1969 as in 1968. The results, which support the assumption, are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Number of Communications with Governors Initiated by 37 Legislative Leaders in 1969 Response, Categorized by their 1968 Responses.

**Questionnaire I.** On Questionnaire I respondents were asked to indicate frequencies of in-person face-to-face, telephone, and group meetings—as well as frequencies of personal and duplicated message exchanges. Besides the types of exchanges, the subjects of exchanges were probed along such broad categories as giving information on person-
al attitudes, on the attitudes of others, on organizational matters, and on the content of measures. Reactions of respondents to gubernatorial vetoes or anticipated vetoes and to general gubernatorial programs and policies were also sought.²³

Questionnaire II. In addition to the three variables derived from question 1 (DIRINCOM, GOVTOLL, LLTOGOV) indicating the frequency of direct communications (to and from), respondents were asked under question 3 on Questionnaire II (Appendix C) to indicate the frequency of their use of the five different channels listed.

Questionnaire I dealt with the methods of communication, such as face-to-face meetings or personal letters. Questionnaire II probed for the channels used. Ten channels (five to the governor, five from the governor) were presented to each respondent and he was asked to indicate the number of times per week, on the average, he and the governor used each channel. Answers on Questionnaire II thus initially provided 13 communication variables.

No attempt was made to weight the types of channels of communication in relation to each other.

²³ See Note 1 to Chapter III in Appendix F.
3.2 *Legislators' Perceptions of Communicating with the Governor*

"Communications between Governor and myself has (sic) become very infrequent in last few months. He has broken his word too many times so I refuse to meet with him at this time." That was the comment of one legislative leader providing additional insight as to why his responses on Questionnaire I indicated a very low frequency of communications with the Governor.

Out of the 164 replies to Questionnaire I only 3 legislators (2%) said they "never" initiated face-to-face meetings with the governor.

All three "never" men were presiding officers and one was even a member of the governor's party who had endorsed (but not strongly supported) his election. It seems somewhat bizarre that the "never" category was used by three presiding officers (one of a senate, two of houses) but not by a single one of the 46 minority leaders! There is always the possibility that an idiosyncratic element may help shape communications, and this may be the explanation.

*Overall Perceptions:* The cases of the three men serve to highlight the overall picture. As shown in Table 11, communicating with the governor is the rule rather than the exception.²⁴

---

²⁴ In this study medians are derived from aggregate discrete categories taken directly from the 1-2-3-4-5 ratings of
### TABLE 11
FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATIONS INITIATED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS TO GOVERNORS AND GOVERNORS TO THEM

(Both as Perceived by the Legislative Leaders and Expressed as Percents of the Number Responding in the Particular Category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Freq</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Occly Seldm</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total %a</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to Face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-Gb</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-L</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-G</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-L</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-G</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-L</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Letters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-L</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicated Msgs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-L</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a: Percentage totals vary slightly because of rounding.
b: "L-G" stands for "Legisleader to Governor," "G-L" for "Governor to Legisleader."

---

The questionnaire but treated as though they had an underlying continuous distribution which makes the tenths possible. The tenths are desired (rather than whole numbers) in order to get a more distinct ranking. Medians are used rather than means because the scales are ordinal. **NOTE: The lower the median figure, the higher the frequency.**
Legislators perceive themselves as initiating face-to-face communications with the governor a little more frequently than they see him initiating communications with them (median for legislator--initiated communications being 2.3, for governor-initiated being 2.5).

The medians for telephone contacts are again only .2 apart, but the mode for governor-initiated telephone contacts drops to "Seldom."

Legislators report that both they and the governors initiate group meetings with about equal frequency. Governors send more in-writing communications, especially in the realm of form letters or duplicated messages. This seems logical since the governor has many more legislators to contact than legislators have governors.

Figure 2 is presented to show visually the legislators' perception of the frequencies with which governors and legislators initiate communications by the five methods surveyed.

The old folk adage about the grass being greener on the other side of the fence appears to have application to legislative leaders, or so it seemed when they were asked to respond to the frequency of face-to-face meetings and other methods of communications which they, other leaders of their own house, and leaders of the other house have with the gov-
Indeed, the figures in Table 12 show that the respondents not only tend to think the grass is a little greener across the fence, but that the grass in the more distant pasture is greener still. In the twenty paired comparisons, respondents reported they communicated more frequently than other leaders only twice, matched them in three instances, but communicated less in fifteen instances. In Table 12, as one goes from column A to C to E or from column...
B to D to F, the numbers get smaller fifteen times out of twenty—indicating a higher reported frequency. Thus Proposition 11 of Section 1.4 is supported.

**TABLE 12**

**MEDIAN FREQUENCIES OF RANKED LEGISLEADER-GOVERNOR COMMUNICATIONS AS REPORTED BY LEGISLEADERS**

(Ranked from 1 to 5 by Legislators with "Very Frequently" scored as 1 and "Never" as 5.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>RESPONDENT'S HOUSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to Face:</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Meetings:</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Letters:</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicated Letters/Messages:</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranges of &quot;N&quot;:</td>
<td>134-148</td>
<td>126-142</td>
<td>101-139</td>
<td>98-110</td>
<td>90-126</td>
<td>90-100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 enables the reader to compare the respondents' own communications with the governor (that is, both self-initiated and governor-initiated), their perceptions of the communications of other legislative leaders in the same house, and those of legislative leaders in the other house. Comparison of columns A, C, and E with B, D, and F in the
above table shows a slight increase in frequency (numerical scores lower) fifteen out of twenty times as one moves to the right, evidencing the "grass is greener" effect.

Table 12 also indicates that word-of-mouth communications are utilized more frequently than written forms. Whether initiated by the legislative leader or the governor, face-to-face communications were reported as more frequently employed than written messages. To a lesser degree, the same also applies to group meetings and to telephonic communications. Proposition 15 (Section 1.4) was thus supported.

In face-to-face, group meeting, and telephonic communications, legislators not only see themselves as taking the initiative slightly more often than the governor (numbers increase from column A to column B), but they perceive their colleagues both in their own house and in the companion legislative house as also initiating communications with the governor slightly more frequently than he does with them (medians increase slightly but consistently from column C to D and and column E to F). The differences become quite marked where personal letters and duplicated letters and messages are concerned, but in the opposite direction.

The frequency of communications, of course, will depend upon many factors beside the form employed. And communications with the governor may not necessarily be the prime concern: "We had more difficulty in communication with
leaders of our own party in the state Senate (than with the governor)," reported one respondent.

3.3 GOVERNORS' PERCEPTIONS OF METHODS OF COMMUNICATION WITH LEGISLEADERS

The governors, in reporting on communications, see a distinctive difference in the frequency of their initiating group meetings with legisleaders as compared with such group meetings initiated by legisleaders, a difference greater than any other form of communication.25 Governors think they initiate group meetings with senate and house Presiding Officers and with Other Leaders in the house 0.4 of a point more frequently than they see these legisleaders initiating group meetings with them. Governors perceive of themselves as initiating group meetings 0.3 of a point more frequently than the reciprocal for senate and house majority leaders and Other Leaders in the senates (see Tables 13 and 14).

Out of the 18 comparisons of face-to-face, group, and telephonic communications between Tables 13 and 14, only in the initiating of telephone calls by house majority leaders do governors concede the frequency race, and that barely--a 3.0 median for governors compared to 2.9 for legisleaders. The governors also see "other" senate leaders as initiating

25 A comparison table to Table 12 reflecting the governors' perceptions cannot be constructed since Other Leaders, as used on the governors' questionnaire, does not necessarily refer to Minority Leaders, the term used on the legisleaders' questionnaire.
as many telephone calls to the governor as he initiates to them (2.8).

**TABLE 13**

**MEDIAN FREQUENCIES OF RANKED GOVERNOR-INITIATED COMMUNICATIONS WITH LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AS REPORTED BY GOVERNORS**

(Ranked from 1 to 5 by Governors, with "Very Frequently" scored as 1 and "Never" as 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRESIDING OFFICERS</th>
<th>MAJORITY LEADERS</th>
<th>OTHER LEADERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Senate</strong></td>
<td><strong>House</strong></td>
<td><strong>Senate</strong></td>
<td><strong>House</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to Face:</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Meetings:</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Letters:</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicated</td>
<td><strong>0.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters/Messages:</td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranges of N:</td>
<td>35-41</td>
<td>33-39</td>
<td>30-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presiding officers, as expected, were seen as having higher in-person communication frequencies (lower scores) than majority leaders or "other" leaders. Not expected was a higher frequency between governors and "other" leaders than between governors and majority leaders, even though their general distributions were similar.²⁶

²⁶ The term "other leaders" is ambiguous, as it was not defined on the questionnaire. It appears from the data that some governors took it to mean minority leaders, other committee chairmen or leading legislators who were neither presiding officers nor majority leaders. A check
TABLE 14

MEDIAN FREQUENCIES OF RANKED LEGISLEADER-INITIATED COMMUNICATIONS WITH GOVERNORS AS REPORTED BY GOVERNORS

(Ranked from 1 to 5 by Governors, with "Very Frequently" scored as 1 and "Never" as 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRESIDING OFFICERS</th>
<th>MAJORITY LEADERS</th>
<th>OTHER LEADERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face to Face:</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone:</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Meetings:</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Letters:</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicated Letters/Messages:</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranges of N:</td>
<td>33-38</td>
<td>29-34</td>
<td>33-38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To visually illustrate governors' perceptions Figure 3 is presented. The interchange between governors and senate presiding officers is typical of all six groups shown in Tables 13 and 14.

Note that there was a .7 difference between majority leaders as GP and as NGP but only a .2 difference between corresponding "other" leaders. By having approximately the same medians regardless of governor's party, and by staying "in the middle" it would appear "other" leaders are an undefined mixture.
Face-to-Face Telephone Group Personal Duplicated

Figure 3: Median Frequencies of Communication Initiated by the Governors to the Presiding Officers of the Senates and by the Presiding Officers to the Governors—AS PERCEIVED BY THE GOVERNORS.

NOTE: N = 33 to 41 (some governors did not check all cells).

Medians of in-person communications were calculated for Senate and House Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders broken out by chambers whose majority was of the same party as the governor (GP) and by those whose majority was not (NGP). The results are shown in Table 15.
TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF MEDIAN-RANKED COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES BETWEEN GOVERNORS AND PRESIDING OFFICERS AND MAJORITY LEADERS

(When the Governor's Party (GP) is in Control of a Chamber and when the Opposition Party (NGP) is in Control— as Reported by Governors)

(Ranked from 1 to 5 by Governors, with "Very Frequently" scored as 1 and "Never" as 5.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Presiding Officers</th>
<th>Majority Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G to LL</td>
<td>LL to G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP NGP GP NGP</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP NGP GP NGP</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Senate**

(1) Face to Face: 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.6 1.9 3.1
(2) Telephone: 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 2.6 3.2
(3) Group Meetings: 2.8 2.2 3.0 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.2

Ranges of N: 22-24 16 21-23 16 18-20 16 17-19 16

**House**

(4) Face to Face: 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.6 1.8 2.8 1.6 3.2
(5) Telephone: 2.1 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.5 3.3 2.3 3.5
(6) Group Meetings: 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.3 2.3 2.9 2.5 3.3

Ranges of N: 21-23 15 20-22 15 18-20 18 17-19 16

The most pronounced differences occurred within the lower chambers and relate to whether the same party controls both the executive and the legislative body. Governors claimed
to have commenced communications with Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders of their own party in the house from .2 to a full median point more frequently than with corresponding leaders of the opposition party.27 Governors reported leaders of their own party in the house came to them from .6 to 1.6 of a median point more frequently than did corresponding leaders of the opposition.28

The picture is different for the senates. Differences were not as large (ranging from .0 to .7 of a median point) and the governors reported they asked for group meetings with presiding officers of opposition-controlled senates, and received initiatives for more group meetings from them, than from leaders of senates controlled by members of their own party. Note that group meetings are reported being almost as frequent as face-to-face meetings in all but one of the NGP columns, whereas in the GP columns face-to-face meetings are much more frequent than group meetings. It is further noted that group meetings with the opposition are more frequent with Presiding Officers than with Majority Leaders. All this suggests that communicating through group meetings is an important way of working out differences caused by divided party control. It also supports Proposition 21 (Section 1.4), that communications will be used to

27 Compare columns (1) and (2), (5) and (6) of rows (4), (5) and (6).

28 Compare columns (3) and (4), (7) and (8) of rows (4), (5) and (6).
ameliorate political conflict, although the form may vary.

Although governors think they approach Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders of their own party more frequently than the reverse, their responses still indicate both groups initiate communications about evenly.29 However, the governors also believe they approach the opposition Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders more often and more consistently than they report the opposition leaders approach them.30 If the governors' perceptions are reasonably accurate, one of the explanations may be that the governors see themselves as requiring the cooperation of chambers which are in the control of the opposition more than the leadership of those chambers feel they need the governors' cooperation—Proposition 21 again. Governors are no doubt anxious to obtain as many confirmations and to have as much of their programs adopted as possible, hence their working with opposition leadership. This is underscored by one reply which read, "With our legislature being overwhelmingly in favor of the opposition party we have a unique and difficult job and have to rely upon a genuine selling and convincing method to win the necessary votes to get our legislation through."

29 Columns (1) and (3) and (5) and (7) of each row.
30 Columns (2) and (4) and (6) and (8) of each row.
It has already been noted that Presiding Officers are perceived as being involved in more frequent communication exchanges than Majority Leaders, but this party control breakout (Table 15) shows there is a slight but consistent tendency for Majority Leaders of the governor's party in both chambers to be seen as engaging in group meetings with the governor more frequently than Presiding Officers do. If the governors' perceptions are accurate, the explanation may be that the Majority Leaders wanting to meet with the governors feel they are not as free to bypass their Presiding Officers as they would like; therefore, they engage in a group meeting which includes Presiding Officers yet gives Majority Leaders direct contact. Presiding Officers would probably have fewer compunctions about direct, one-on-one meetings with the result that governors report Presiding Officers call for group meetings less frequently than Majority Leaders.

A comparison between the 30 cells of Table 13 and the corresponding 30 of Table 14 shows that the Governors believe they initiate communications more frequently (24 times out of 30) than legisleaders and that there is little chamber differentiation. The writer had initially hypothesized that communications with senate leaders would be more frequent because of the additional role of senators in appoint-

31 Compare columns (1) and (5) and (3) and (7) of rows (3) and (6).
ment confirmations, but this was not supported by the data. However, the Governors report both initiating and receiving more communications with the Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders not of the governors' parties in the senates than in the houses. The larger memberships of the lower chambers are probably not the cause as it would have shown up in comparing Tables 13 and 14. Could it be that there is more of an exchange with the opposition in senates because of the confirmation function? However, if so, it would seem that communications with the GP leaders would increase also, so this anomaly remains unexplained.

3.4 COMPARISON OF PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Proposition 12 is supported in that governors and legislative leaders each perceive of themselves as initiating more in-person communications than they receive from the other. This phenomenon will be called the initiator complex. For example, legisleaders of all ranks report in the aggregate that they originate face-to-face meetings of a median point more frequently than they perceive governors taking the initiative (2.3 to 2.5, Table 11). Conversely, governors report they begin face-to-face meetings with sen-

32 Compare rows (1) and (4), (2) and (5), (3) and (6) of each NGP column in Table 15. The range of the differences vary from .1 to 1.0 of a median point.

33 See Note 2 in Appendix F.
ate Presiding Officers at 1.8 median frequency, but that senate Presiding Officers open face-to-face meetings with them at a frequency of 2.1 (Tables 13 and 14). Comparable figures for Speakers are 1.9 and 2.1.

The largest discrepancies were disclosed in group meetings. Governors perceive of themselves as calling for group meetings with the Presiding Officers of each chamber .4 of a median point more frequently than they see Presiding Officers calling such meetings. With Majority Leaders and Other Leaders the differences between inviting and being invited to group meetings run from .3 to .4.

Other comparisons can be made by noting corresponding cells between Tables 13 and 14.34

Face-to-face communications are seen as most frequently used by both governors and legislators. Governors regard telephone calls as the next most used channel whereas legislators identify group meetings. Governors report making telephone calls to Presiding Officers and receiving telephone communications from all ranks of legislators more frequently than calling or being asked to group meetings (Tables 13 and 14). Legislators report originating and

34 Out of the 30 measures of the Governors' perceptions, in only six cases do Governors feel the legislators initiate more or equal activity. Four of these cases are in the initiation of personal letters and two in telephone calls to the Governor. See also Note 2 to Chapter III in Appendix F for a more specific study of the initiator complex.
receiving requests for group meetings involving themselves and the governor more frequently than telephone communications (Tables 11 and 12).

Curiously, although the governor and legislleader each thinks, on the whole, that he initiates more in-person communications than the other, each also thinks the other generally writes more personal letters.

Both governors and legislleaders agree that the governors generate more duplicated letters. Here is one area where both groups are in accord.

Twenty-six percent of the legislleaders (42 out of 164) reported they used indirect or other informal means of communicating with the governor or his staff members, but only 12% of the governors (5 out of 42) reported that legislleaders used such means. Likewise, 45% of the governors indicated they used indirect or other informal means of communicating with legislleaders whereas only 23% of the legislleaders reported their governor did such a thing. This lends support to Proposition 14 of Section 1.4 that in the use of staff or other intermediaries, the initiator of the communication will see himself employing that channel more than will the recipient.
3.5 **SUBJECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR--AS SEEN BY THE LEGISLATIVE LEADERS**

Both legislators and governors were requested to indicate the frequency with which their communications concerned a number of specified subjects. The questions differed somewhat, depending on whether the legislators or the governors were initiating the communications (see Parts 2 and 3 of Questionnaire I, Appendix A). The question on gubernatorial programs and that on vetoes are each treated as comparable and so provide parallel data for both legislators-to-governors and governor-to-legislators. The other six subjects give uni-directional data only. Table 16 gives the subjects in order of decreasing frequency of use.

In order to see if rank, party, or membership in the governor's party had any effect on the subjects of communication, medians were calculated for the various categories. For simplicity's sake only three types of communication were studied: (1) the general gubernatorial program, (2) vetoes (because these two subjects appeared in both legislator-to-governor and governor-to-legisleader forms), and (3) personal attitudes (with data available only in legislator-to-governor form). The results are shown in Table 17.

The governors' programs: The legislators perceive of the governors as asking for more support for gubernatorial programs than they see themselves initiating communication regarding them.
TABLE 16
FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATIONS IN GENERAL SUBJECT AREAS--LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LL to Gov*</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Gov to LL*</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.6 123</td>
<td>LL reaction to or for requests for support for general gubernatorial programs and policies</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 125</td>
<td>LL seeks or gives information on personal attitudes</td>
<td>Gov requests support or opposition to particular measures</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 123</td>
<td>LL seeks or gives information about attitudes of others on measures</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9 117</td>
<td>LL seeks or gives information on content of measures</td>
<td>Gov requests support on other matters</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 123</td>
<td>LL seeks or gives information about organizational matters</td>
<td>131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 122</td>
<td>LL gives reaction to gubernatorial veto or anticipated veto or Gov asks or gives information about veto actions</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approximately 3 1/2% of the respondents used an "X" or a check mark instead of the requested 1, 2, 3, etc. These were eliminated by hand from the aggregate figures. Approximately 21% of the respondents did not give any answer in this area.

Rank appears to have little effect on the frequency of discussions of the general gubernatorial programs, but being a member of the governor's party most positively does. In line with Proposition 1 of Section 1.4, Legislative leaders
TABLE 17

A COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION FREQUENCY AS MEASURED BY
MEDIANs FOR SELECTED SUBJECTS BY RANK, PARTY, AND MEMBERSHIP
IN THE GOVERNOR'S PARTY--LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS

(Scores are expressed in Ranks from 1 to 5 by Legisleaders,
with "Very Frequently" as 1 and "None" as 5. Figures in
Parentheses are Number of Legisleaders Responding to the
Particular Cell.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM</th>
<th>VEToes</th>
<th>PERSONAL ATTITUDES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GP)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>2.4 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.6 (56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJORITY)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>2.4 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADERS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.6 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINORITY)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>2.6 (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADERS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.6 (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>2.0 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBERS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.1 (78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-GP)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>3.5 (59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEMBERS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>3.3 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.8 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.5 (74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL)</td>
<td>G-LL</td>
<td>2.4 (134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSE)</td>
<td>LL-G</td>
<td>2.7 (129)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: In this Table the 3 1/2% who responded with an "X"
instead of a number are included; thus the N's in the Total
Response columns are slightly higher than comparable N's in
Table 16. Three of the five "Total" medians remain
the same as in Table 16, but the median for Governor's
Program in the LL-G column has increased from 2.6 to 2.7 and
the median for the vetoes in the same column has decreased
from 3.6 to 3.5 (in both cases the effect of the X's present
was to move the median toward 3 since most X's were coded as
3).

who are members of the governor's party discuss their reac-
tions to his program and policies with him significantly more frequently than do nonmembers.\(^{35}\)

Republicans claim to initiate discussions with the governor about his programs and policies somewhat more often than do Democrats. However, note from Table 17 that party qua party makes no significant difference as to the frequency of discussion of the three subjects tabulated.

**Vetoes:** It is assumed vetoes scored lowest in frequencies because there are relatively few. The intensity of the communications at the time a veto is anticipated or has occurred is not measured here. One legislator did explain his lack of responses in cells on vetoes with, "None in this state — thank God!"

It was found that Minority Leaders reported initiating communications about vetoes significantly more than did Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders\(^{36}\) Conversely, Minority Leaders responded that the governors asked for or gave them information about vetoes or anticipated vetoes more frequently than the Majority Leaders and Presiding Officers reported (G-LL) the governors communicated similar information to them, but the difference is not as marked.


\(^{36}\) Significant at the \(p = .10\), two tailed, by use of the median test. Siegal, *ibid*, pp. 111-116.
A study of the effect of membership in the governor's party showed that the above statement should, however, be further modified to read: **Minority Leaders of the same party as the Governor initiate communications about vetoes significantly more frequently than do leaders of the majority**,\(^37\) (whether members of the governor's party or not) and than do Minority Leaders not of the governor's party.\(^38\) As to be expected, Minority Leaders not of the governor's party send such communications the least frequently of any of the above groups (see Table 18).

**Legislators' personal attitudes:** Curiously, as shown by Table 17, there appears to be a tendency for legislators to seek or give information on personal attitudes in the inverse order of rank. But as both Table 17 and 18 show, and confirming Proposition 1 of Section 1.4, **being a member of the governor's party significantly affects the frequency with which a legislator discusses his personal attitudes with the governor**.\(^39\) Both Minority Leaders and leaders of the majority bring up personal attitudes about as frequently when they and the governor belong to the same party. Of all

---

\(^37\) Here, also, "leaders of the majority" refers collectively to Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders.

\(^38\) Chi square = 10.59, significant at \(p = .001\), two tailed, by the median test.

\(^39\) The difference in frequency between leaders of the majority who are governor's party members and those who are not is significant at the \(p = .001\) level, two tailed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
TABLE 18

COMPARISON OF THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF RANK AND MEMBERSHIP IN THE GOVERNOR'S PARTY ON THE MEDIAN FREQUENCIES OF SELECTED COMMUNICATIONS SUBJECTS—LEGISLEADERS

(Ranked from 1 to 5 by Legisleaders, with "Very Frequently" scored as 1 and "Never" as 5)
(Figures in Parentheses are Number of Legisleaders Responding in that Particular Cell)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Leaders of Majority, Leaders</th>
<th>Leaders of Minority, Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GP</td>
<td>NGP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor's Prog:</td>
<td>2.2 (52)</td>
<td>4.6 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vetoes:</td>
<td>3.1 (49)</td>
<td>4.0 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Attitudes:</td>
<td>2.1 (51)</td>
<td>3.7 (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the groups studied, Minority Leaders not of the governor's party reported having the fewest occasions to discuss personal attitudes with the governor. This would be expected a priori because of the barriers of rank and party differences. Also, opposition Minority Leaders may not wish to "tip their hand" in any way by communicating with the governor.

It can be seen from Table 18 that Minority Leaders serving chambers controlled by a party opposed to that of the governor have the highest frequencies of communications. Tension is presumed to run higher when the majority leadership of a chamber and the governor are of different parties. The finding that GP Minority Leaders have the most frequent
communications is thus in line with communications theory, which suggests that tension increases communication for those perceiving themselves to have interests in common.

3.6 COMPARISON OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS OVER THE SUBJECTS OF COMMUNICATIONS

In order to compare governors' and legisleaders' perceptions of the nature of communications, Table 19 and Figures 4 and 5 were created. Although legisleaders' responses dealt more on a one-to-one basis (e.g., "you" or "Gov to you") and governors dealt with groups (e.g., "governor to senate" or "to Gov from Leaders, House"), the results appear comparable.

Figures 4 and 5 represent Table 19 pictorially, except that for simplicity the medians of the two chambers have been averaged.
TABLE 19

COMPARISON OF GOVERNORS' AND LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR COMMUNICATIONS, BY SUBJECT, EXPRESSED IN MEDIANs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Govs' Sens' Perc'ns</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Govs' Reps' Perc'ns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>GOVERNOR INITIATED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.9 2.4</td>
<td>Support for general gubernatorial program</td>
<td>1.9 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0 2.6</td>
<td>Support or opposition on particular measures</td>
<td>2.0 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 2.9</td>
<td>Requests for support on other matters</td>
<td>2.7 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 3.7</td>
<td>Information about veto actions</td>
<td>2.7 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LEGISLEADER INITIATED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Senate</td>
<td>From House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 2.5</td>
<td>Information about personal attitudes on measures</td>
<td>2.2 2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 2.5</td>
<td>Reactions to general gubernatorial program and policies</td>
<td>2.2 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 2.8</td>
<td>Information about content of measures</td>
<td>2.6 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 2.8</td>
<td>Information about attitudes of others on measures</td>
<td>2.6 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 3.4</td>
<td>Information about organizational matters</td>
<td>2.9 3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 3.5</td>
<td>Reaction to gubernatorial veto (including anticipated veto)</td>
<td>2.8 3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The N for the governors ranges from 33 to 40; for legislators, from 56 to 69.
According to the governors, they initiate as many communications to one house as to the other in the four subject areas surveyed. They also discern the legislative leaders initiating communications in the six areas surveyed at approximately the same rate from each house in each category. Senators and representatives also see the governors as being the first communicator in the four subject areas in about equal frequency with each chamber, except that house leaders...
believe the governors come to them more often with respect to vetoes.

But legislators of both chambers report the governors coming to them less frequently in all four subject areas surveyed than the governors believe they do (Figure 4). Governors perceive themselves as starting communications on their programs .5 of a median point more frequently than do senators or representatives.40

Similarly, chief executives regard themselves as initiating requests for support on particular measures .6 of a median point more frequently than the legislators observe these same requests being made (significant at \( p = .10 \), two tailed).

The greatest divergence in perceptions, as measured by medians, was in the communications on vetoes (Table 19). Governors perceive themselves as coming to house leaders .7 of a median point more frequently than did the recipient

40 Significant at \( p = .10 \), two tailed. In these and the following tests of significance the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test for Large Samples has been used even though Siegel *op.cit.* says both \( N \)'s should be larger than 40. His test for small samples calls for \( N = N \) and both being 40 or less. He provides no intermediate test where one \( N \) is less than 40 and one greater, as in these cases. However, since the number of governors answering ranges from 33 to 40, the large sample test was used and assumed to be reasonably accurate. (A trial was made with the smaller \( N \) being raised to 40 by multiplying each category by a constant and then comparing results. The results indicated using an \( N \) of slightly less than 40 would give very similar results but on the conservative side.)
Figure 5: Perceptions of Governors and Legisleaders of the Frequency of INITIATIVES BY LEGISLEADERS in Six Subject Matter Areas.

House leaders, and as coming to senate leaders 1.0 median point more frequently than senators perceived the same communications. The latter (governor to senate) is significant at $p = .025$, two tailed.\(^1\)

\(^1\) Although the difference in medians re vetoes is greater than the differences on requests for support on particular measures, the significance is not as high. This is probably because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on the difference in categories as well as on the cumulative total. In the support on particular measures, for example, all governors marked either "very frequently," "frequently" (the mode), or "occasionally," with no responses at all in the "seldom" and "never" categories.
Not only do the governors think they go to the legislative leaders more often than the surveyed legislers, but the governors see the legislative leaders coming to them more often than the surveyed legislers state they go to the governor. *2 (Figure 5). This difference in perception is believed to arise because the governors deal with many legislators whereas the legislators deal with only one governor.

While governors may consider legislators from the "lower" chamber as initiating communications slightly more frequently than senators, the house legislers report their own initiative frequencies as somewhat less than are reported by senate legislers. Again, this is probably a function of the size of the two bodies. Governors deal with more representatives, but each individual representative may get somewhat less of the governor's time than each senator.

Although differing in their perceptions of frequencies, both governors and legislers report the subject matter of communications posited in the questionnaires falling in roughly the same relative order. The most consistent difference is that governors see organizational matters as being least communicated about whereas legislers see vetoes

*2 In responding, the governors may have had in mind not only the presiding officers, and majority and minority leaders who were surveyed in this study, but also such other legislative leaders as chairmen of important committees.
3.7 CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AND GOVERNORS

As stated earlier, Questionnaire II, among other things, probed for the channels used by governors and legisleaders in communicating with each other. The findings are presented in Figure 6. This figure is based on the composite of the number of communications initiated each week in each channel during legislative sessions, as reported by 202 legislative leaders from 54 jurisdictions.*3 The percent of the total communications reported is also shown for each channel as well as for each nexus.

The give and take of communications, as reported by the legisleaders, is remarkably well balanced. Legisleaders claim to originate 935 messages to the governor each week. That is 50.5% of the total communications being sent and received. These 202 respondents claim the governors begin 915 interchanges to them each week, or 49.5% of the two-way total. Thus legisleaders again saw themselves as initiating more communications than the governor, although the difference was slight.

---

*3 See Note 3 in Appendix F.
The findings also indicate that, in the aggregate, an increase of communications in one channel does not decrease the use of another channel.** Thus Proposition 7 of Chapter I (greater use of one channel reduces use of others) was not supported, but Proposition 13 was (legislative staff supplements, not replaces).

The governor's staff plays a very important role in legislative-executive communications. This is attested to by the fact that 57% of all communications reported originated by governors and legislators is said to pass through the governor's staff. Of all communications, 37% goes through the governor's staff, alone, but an additional 20% have as intermediaries both the governor's staff and the legislator's staff. See Figure 6.

Next in importance to the governor's staff, so far as quantity is concerned, is the direct channel. "Direct contact is best and fastest," noted one legislator. The direct channel accounts for 28% of the total interchanges reported.

Legislators' staffs are involved in 26% of the total (6% going through the legislators' staffs only and an additional 20% going through both the governors' and legislators' staffs).

** See Note 4 in Appendix F.
Figure 6: Number and Percentage of Communications per Channel between 202 Legislators and their Governors -- LEGISLEADER PERCEPTIONS.
Informal persons, such as friends or party leaders, are reported to play a minor role in legislative-executive communications. According to the legislator respondents in this study, only 9% of the 1,850 messages initiated each week during legislative sessions go through informal or third (non-governmental) persons. Interestingly, the higher the political cooperation reported (POLICOOP), the greater the frequency of communications in the informal or third person channel—even though the use is still comparatively small. See Table 20.

**Table 20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Cooperativeness</th>
<th>Average Frequency</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Cooperative:</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative:</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral:</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposed:</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Opposed:</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus it can be seen that Proposition 9 (Section 1.4) was not supported: that the lower the political relationship with the governor, the more the use of informal or non-governmental persons in communications with the governor will be found satisfactory.

As stated above, as seen by the legislators, the comparative numbers of communications initiated by the governor.
and by themselves are remarkably similar within each channel. Only in starting interchanges through the governor's staff to legislators do legislators see the governor as taking the initiative more often than they do (20% to 17%). In the other four channels legislators see themselves as having a minimal 1 or 2% lead.\footnote{It was noted that only about 8% of the respondents of Questionnaire II gave a figure in the right-hand column (governor to respondent) which differed from the left-hand column (respondent to governor) in question 3 of QII. Variations down the rows of question 3 were much greater than across the two columns. How much this similarity across columns may be due to "set response" rather than to the actual perception of equality in the give and take of communications is not known.}

3.8 LEGISLATIVE OFFICERS AS CHANNELS

Despite the democratic concept of direct access to top leaders and the lack of party discipline in the United States, based on question 19 of QII, the legislators in this study report that 73% of the rank and file will go through a legislative leader to communicate with their governor. Similarly, fifty percent will communicate directly. (Total percentages equal 123% because of other responses.) It is recognized that the views of legislative leaders may be inflated and multiple channels may be used. Nonetheless, legislators' perceptions of the importance of the role of legislative officers as channels helps develop a fuller dimension of this aspect of the legislative process. This is shown in more detail in Figure 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presiding Officers</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leaders</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leaders</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chairmen</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Figures add up to 123% because of some multiple answers.

Figure 7: The Relative use made of Legislative Officers as Channels.
3.9 THE CORRELATES OF BLOCKED OR OPEN COMMUNICATIONS

Question 10 of Questionnaire II asked if the legislators ever felt their channels of communications to the governor were blocked (variable = BLOCKED). Responses were as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never blocked</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom blocked</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally blocked</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently blocked</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very frequently blocked</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As would be expected, the less the channels were reported blocked, the higher were communications to and from the governor in direct channels. Interestingly, the use of informal persons and the governors' and legislators' staffs showed random correlation. This would suggest either that the use of channels through informal persons and staffs was not blocked as direct channels sometimes were, or, that in responding, legislators thought only in terms of direct communications. Blocked leaders did not even report turning to party organizations for information on the governors' programs. Use of non-direct channels did not increase when the direct channels were blocked. Apparently blockage results in a decrease in communications, not a re-routing.

*6 Nonparametric correlations with BLOCKED, using Kendall's tau were: DIRCCM .32, GDIRCTLL .29, LLTOGOV .27, LLDIRCTG .26.
Low blockage, and high communications frequencies, showed positive correlation with more overall satisfaction with the communications system, more opportunity to talk and more encouragement for feedback. Low blockage went along with increased respect and positive feelings for the governors with more reports that they were able, democratic, communicative, leaders, liked, listeners, strong, informed and trustworthy. Blockage had little to do with liberal or conservative labels. Blockage correlated only .12 with characterizing gubernatorial programs as inexpensive and .13 with the governor's being perceived as party oriented. Relations were more friendly, supportive and cooperative when little or no blockage was reported. Legislators who did not feel blocked in their communication efforts characterized the governors' programs as good, goal oriented, well staffed (coordinated), innovative, realistic, meaningful, socially concerned and substantive.

Rank correlated positively, but not significantly, with BLOCKED—that is, the higher the rank, the less the blockage. Rank correlated positively and significantly with the frequency variables DIRCOM and DIRINCOM. Thus the findings reported in this and the preceding paragraph support Proposition 16 of Section 1.4 in that higher rank and more positive ratings go with greater communications frequency. This

*7 Assuming, for the purposes of this discussion, a hierarchy of rank from Minority Leader through Majority Leader to Presiding Officer.
does not, however, address causation. Does one obtain rank because one communicates well or frequently or does one communicate because one has the rank?*

The question naturally arises as to whether the above correlations might not result from belonging to the governor's party or faction. When a stepwise regression was run with 18 possible contributing independent variables, only 6 exceeded the 1.5 F ratio cutoff specified. Such variables as party, being a member or nonmember of the governor's party or faction, being politically cooperative or uncooperative, or of higher or lower rank did not enter into the equation. But the variable which contributed the most to low blockage was friendliness with the governor (FRIENDLY). Other variables which helped to explain or were associated with low blockage were: Being one who placed reliance on personal contact with the governor for information on his programs (SRCPRCON), being one who attempts to influence the governor (LINFLUG), rating the governor communicative (COMMITIVE), being from a low population state (HILPOP0N), and considering that the governor had well-coordinated and staffed programs (WELSTAFD).

* It is interesting to note that the governor of one state responding to this study has since risen to national rank and is often called "The Great Communicator."
The strongest three of the six variables measured the respondent legislators' style: FRIENDLY, SRCPRCON, LINFLUG. Two appeared more concerned with legislator's perceptions of the governor: COMNTIVE, WELSTAFD. One variable was completely independent of the actors' control: POPULATN. The smaller the population, the less legislators perceived channels as blocked, suggesting that sheer size contributes impediments to communication. And population, of course, is one of the contributing elements to the \( y \) factor.

3.10 SUMMARY

In this chapter it was shown that the most-used channel of communication between legislators and governors runs through the governors' staffs, with direct, face-to-face communications being the second most-used channel. The governor's staff, then, plays a major role in legislative-executive communications—at least in terms of frequency of use.

Both governors and legislators saw the give and take of interchange between them as being balanced. However, in the aggregate, governors and legislators each saw themselves as initiating somewhat more communications than did the other. This was dubbed "the initiator complex."
No doubt because one's own problems and goals are paramount to him, legislleaders were reported by governors as coming to them most frequently on personal attitudes. The governors were seen by legislleaders as coming to them most frequently with requests for support for general gubernatorial programs and policies. This probably accounts for the finding that governors perceive themselves as initiating communications more often with the opposition leaders in control of chambers than in receiving messages from such opposition leaders. The governors need to get their programs adopted. The public has come to look to the governors, rather than the legislators, for formulating and supporting governmental programs, so the governors have the greater need for interbranch cooperation.

Minority Leaders of the same party as the governor and the governors themselves apparently see the veto as a point where these Minority Leaders may exercise real decision-making power over legislation. Reflecting this, the frequency of communications initiated by both governors and Minority Leaders increases considerably when veto talk arises.

With few exceptions, if a subcategory of legislleader (e.g., Democrats) has less total numerical communicative interaction with the governor, the accompanying tendency is for those in the subcategory to rely more upon staff as intermediaries and less on the direct communication channel.
Neither high nor low interaction nor direction from which the communication initiates appears to have much relation to the percentage of use made of the informal person channel.

Distance from the governor in terms of party or position results in less communication, stochastically, as does being a legislator in a state with a higher \( y \) factor, or being a Democrat.

The rank and file legislators communicate more frequently with their governor through legislative officers than by direct contact, according to legislator's perceptions, but the direct channel is also frequently used.

Blockage of communication channels results in an overall decrease in communications, not simply a re-routing. Low blockage correlates with positive feelings of legislative leaders toward governors and more overall satisfaction with the communications system.

Of the independent variables discussed in this chapter, the one associated with the greatest variation in communication frequency between legislative and executive officers was being a member (GP) or nonmember (NGP) of the governor's party.

In the following chapter the focus of the study will be on "why" legislative and executive leaders communicate.
Chapter IV
WHY DO LEGISLEADERS COMMUNICATE WITH GOVERNORS?

Assuming "Man is a communicating creature" (Steinberg: 2), this chapter will look at some of the factors believed to enhance legislative-executive communications. Questionnaire II (Appendix C) included several items thought to be indicative of factors which trigger or encourage the flow of communications, and reliance will be mainly on the responses engendered.

4.1 FRIENDSHIP

One such item included was a query on the subjective factor of friendliness. Homans had hypothesized a generation ago that if the degree of their liking for one another between two or more persons increases, the frequency of their interacting would also increase (Homans: 120). Friendship, then, may not only ease communications, but be a reason for communicating.

In this study a variable labelled FRIENDLY was measured by the 5-point scale of question 41. For counting communications frequency six variables were used. Five were the data in each of the five channels of "You to Gov" of ques
tion 3 of Questionnaire II. In addition, a summary variable was created consisting of the sum of the five channels: SUMLL5.

Friendliness was expected to correlate highly with communications frequency, as stated in Proposition 2 of Section 1.4 (page 14). This expectation was based on the belief that one feels more comfortable and at ease with a friend and because of the give and take, as well as the sharing relationship implicit in friendship. In referring to communications studies, Barnlund noted that "These studies and others strongly underscore a tendency to prefer communications with those who reinforce rather than reject our world view, because they are more comfortable and satisfying to be with" (Barnlund: 80). Initially this a priori assumption was borne out when attention was turned to the frequency of communications in the direct channel LLDIRCTG, as indicated in Table 21.

---

These variables measure the number of times in a four-week period that the legislator initiates communications through a particular channel and were coded:

- LLDIRCTG: Directly to the governor.
- LLINFMLG: Through "informal persons."
- LLGSTFG: Through the governor's staff.
- LLLSFG: Through his own staff.
- LLGSSLG: Through both the governor's staff and his own staff.

(See also variable descriptions in Appendix D.)
TABLE 21

MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT "YOU TO GOV" (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH FRIENDLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legisleader Classifies His Relationship with the Governor as:</th>
<th>Average Direct Communications</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Friendly</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfriendly</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Unfriendly</td>
<td>8.0*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This anomaly was created when one of the two men who classified their relations with the governor as most unfriendly reported 16 direct communications in a four-week period. The other reported no communications.

A Kendall's tau Correlation Coefficient of only .27 was found between LLDIRCTG (going directly to the governor) and FRIENDLY. (Dropping the "most unfriendly" respondents—considering them as a possible quirk—only raised the correlation to .28.) In addition, friendship played only a random part in the other four channels. It made little difference when all ten channels of communication were totalled as a correlation of .28 was also found. See Table 22.

Even these low correlations tended to disappear when other factors were taken into consideration. The .27 for LLDIRCTG and FRIENDLY was reduced to .17 when controlled for GOVPARTY and to .15 when controlled for GOVPARTY, DEMOREP, and the y factor, VISCID.50 Similarly, the correlation of 50 The use of partial correlation assumes a linear relationship among the variables and a study of scattergrams...
TABLE 22

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLEADER TO GOVERNOR CHANNELS AND SIX VARIABLES

Broken out by all Respondents (202 cases):
Members of the Governor's Party (113) and Nonmembers (89)

Correlations of less than .20 not shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LLINFLMG</th>
<th>LLLSTFG</th>
<th>SUMLL5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LLDIRCTG</td>
<td>LLGSTFG</td>
<td>LLGSLSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIENDLY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRYFIND:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPLINFO:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINFLUG:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCESS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOREP:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGP:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a number of cases the correlations of the frequencies in the five channels were less for both GP and NGP members than the correlations for the respondents as a whole! This is possible in correlations and should not be confused with means wherein it is not possible.

.20 between SUMLL5 and FRIENDLY was reduced to .11 when controlled for membership or nonmembership in the governor's

showed the relationships to be generally linear.
party (GOVPARTY). Any role friendship qua friendship might have in facilitating the communications of legislateurs as a whole with their governors was completely wiped out when the correlation was controlled for the single variable POLICOOP—the result was a correlation of 0.51.

When a stepwise regression was run, friendliness proved to be insignificant except for nonmembers of the governor's party (NGP on GOVPARTY) communicating through informal persons (LLINFMLG), and this proved to be a negative factor. In other words, members of the opposition party who were friendly with the governor tended to avoid the use of "informal persons." Although not statistically significant, it was noted that NGP legislateurs who were friendly to the governor tended to use direct communications as well as the governor's staff more than did all GP respondents (.27 compared to .15 on direct and .21 to .05 on staff). A priori, it was expected that GP legislateurs would use the direct channels more since the GP group would be expected to have a greater percentage of "friends," although it is recognized that the legislateurs would contain both persons friendly and unfriendly to the governors.

51 GOVPARTY correlates -.36 with SUMLL5 and is reduced only .04 to -.32 by controlling for FRIENDLY. POLICOOP correlates .34 with SUMLL5 and is reduced to .28 by controlling for FRIENDLY. So apparently they do not have a reciprocal effect. The fact that POLICOOP enhanced the frequency of communications was brought out in Chapter III.
Although legislatures' responses on LLDIRECTG (You to Gov) and GDIRECTL (Gov to You) correlate .75, a study was made to see if there might still be a significant difference accounted for by friendship in the legislators' perception of the frequency of communications they initiate as compared with that of communications they see initiated by the governors to them.

A minor difference linked with friendship showed up. It correlated .34 with GDIRECTL (as compared to .27 in the other direction) and was reduced to its lowest correlation, .11, by controlling for political cooperation (as compared to .00 in the other direction). Nonmembers of the governor's party had a slightly higher correlation between direct communications initiated by the governors and friendliness, .30, than GP members, .26. These were reduced to .20 and .08 by controlling for political relationship.

DIRCOM (the sum of communications initiated by the legislators and by the governors to each other) correlates .33 with FRIENDLY and .41 with POLICOOP. Respondents classifying their relationship to the governor as unfriendly averaged 4.4 direct communications per month (DIRCOM) compared to 12.0 for those calling their relationship friendly. Those 64 respondents who classified themselves as "Most Friendly" averaged 15.9 direct, in-person communications but the 46 classifying themselves as "Very Cooperative" on the
POLICOOP variable averaged 19.11 communications per month. Proposition 8 (Section 1.4) was thus sustained.

The expectation that friendship would be accompanied with an increase in communications between legislators and the governors, Proposition 2 (Section 1.4), has received only limited support. Barnlund's statement (above) that people prefer to communicate with those who hold similar views does not necessarily apply to the legislative world according to the data in this study. (It is recognized that even legislators of the same party do not always think alike; however, members of the same party are assumed to hold more policy views in common with each other than they do with those of another party.) In the legislative world, it would seem, communications are more utilitarian or extrinsic--increasing when politically supportive roles are being played or, in the case of opposing party participants, increasing when friendship may provide an excuse to discuss some matters with a governor not of one's own party. (More of this in Chapter VII.) Friendship and the number of direct communications rose together, but that rise could be explained by factors other than friendship, such as political cooperation.
4.2 ORIENTATION

Question 11 of Questionnaire II attempted to discover under which of four conditions a legislator was most apt to contact his governor. The "average man in the street," with his civic education on separation of the branches of government, would probably say that legislative leaders would be inclined to contact the governor to try to win him to the legislator's point of view rather than to just find out what the governor thought. But the responses to question 11 show a different tendency.

One hundred seven, or 53%, of the respondents indicated they would be most apt to initiate a call or letter to the governor if trying to find out (TRYFIND) whether they and the governor were in general agreement on an item. Forty-one, or 20%, would initiate communications if they wanted to swing (TRYSWING) the governor to their way of thinking if he was on the fence. Twenty-seven, or 13%, said they would be most apt to approach the governor if they wanted to convert (CONVERT) him to their position, and twenty-one, or 10%, indicated they would contact the governor when they and the governor were in general agreement (AGREEMENT). Thirty-one, or 15%, noted that they do not contact the governor and four legislators, 2%, failed to answer question 11. (The percentages add up to 113% due to some multiple answers.) These responses, crosstabulated with communications frequen-
cy, are shown in Table 23. Note that only the "Don't Contact Gov" and "Trying to Find if in Agreement" rows relate significantly to communications frequency. In addition, the "Trying to Find if in Agreement" (TRYFIND) category was very responsive to the GCVPARTY variable. Although 53% of all 202 respondents checked "Finding if in Agreement" when divided by party affiliation, only 31% of the NGP members did so in contrast to the 70% of the GP members who indicated this choice.

As shown in Table 22, TRYFIND correlates .30 with LLDIBCTG. This drops to .27 for NGP respondents and .14 for GP members. In the use of the governor's staff (LLGSTFG) in trying to find out if the legislator and the governor are in general agreement, there is a similar significant difference between GP and NGP members. For NGP legislators the correlation between LLGSTFG and TRYFIND is .26, but for GP members only a random .03. These findings were contrary to expectations. It was assumed that governors normally play a strong leadership role in state affairs and that legislators of their parties would be anxious to know the direction of the governor's leadership on various items and so communications frequency thereon would rise. But, although 31% of the NGP respondents and 70% of the GP respondents reported they would initiate a call or letter to the governor to find out if they and the governor were in agreement, it did not appear to actually affect overall communications fre-
quencies that much--as measured by correlations. However, these data may be reconciled. If the governor keeps his party members well informed on his programs and intentions, there is no need for the legisleaders to inquire.

Using the sum of the communications legisleaders initiate (SUMLL5), there is a .33 correlation between TRYFIND and all communications of NGP members but only a random -.01 for GP members. This difference is statistically significant. Although only a third of NGP members said they would try to find out where the governor stands, apparently they actually do follow through as their overall communications frequencies rose. On the other hand, seven out of ten GP members said they would try to find out, but their overall communications frequencies apparently does not reflect a follow-through. Even when controlling for party, friendliness, and political cooperation, there was essentially no change in the correlation between TRYFIND and SUMLL5. As stated in the preceding paragraph, it would appear that if the governors keep the GP members well informed, there is no need to initiate enquiries. The NGP people do, however, have to ask.

When the data were subjected to stepwise regression, it was found that TRYFIND was significant enough to have value as an independent variable predicting frequency of use of the informal channel (LLINFMLG), and the channel using both
staffs (LLGSLSG) for GP members. The TRYFIND variable could also be used to predict: that is, if one knew an NGP legislator's response on TRYFIND, one could reasonably predict whether he would have a high or low frequency on SUMLL5.

Table 23 is given to present visually the variations in frequencies (condensed) found for question 11 of Questionnaire II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A LEGISLEADER IS MOST APT TO INITIATE A CALL OR LETTER TO THE GOVERNOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crosstabulated with the Sum of the Communications Frequencies in the Five "You to Gov" Channels, Legisleaders' Perceptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCY (SUMLL5)</th>
<th>V.LOW</th>
<th>LOW</th>
<th>MED</th>
<th>HIGH</th>
<th>V.HI</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOST-APT-TO-INITIATE-WHEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying to Find if in Agreement:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying to Swing Governor:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trying to Convert Governor:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When in General Agreement:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader Doesn't Contact Gov:</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The frequencies of communication were arbitrarily condensed into five approximately equal numbers of respondents (along the Totals line) in order to present this table.

#198 respondents checked 227 responses.
With regard to legislators ascertaining if they and their governor are in general agreement, a statement by Theodore Newcomb is pertinent:

In short, it is an almost constant human necessity to orient oneself toward objects in the environment and also toward other persons oriented toward those same objects. To the degree that A's orientation either toward X or toward B is contingent upon B's orientation toward X, A is motivated to influence and/or inform himself about B's orientation toward X. Communication is the most common and usually the most effective means by which he does so (Newcomb: 395).

Since legislators of the governor's party initiated relatively fewer inquiries to the governor, they must either have felt they already knew their governor's orientation or else they were not nearly as interested in his position (unlikely) as were respondents of the opposition party. More likely, the greater expressed desire on the part of opposition members to learn if they and the governor were in agreement represents the wider gap in orientation which, in line with Newcomb's hypothesis, they are trying to narrow.

One possibility for the NGP leaders contacting the governor might be to enlist his aid or concurrence in signing some special legislation or in granting some administrative favor. Legislation cannot normally become law without the
governor's assent. So an NGP member will often try to work through a majority member to get legislation through the legislature and then will need the governor's concurrence as well. Bargaining often brings minority groups what they cannot achieve straight on.

4.3 **ENLIGHTENMENT**

Information (enlightenment) is one of the eight primary values humans seek, as suggested by Lasswell and Kaplan (Lasswell & Kaplan: 55). So is skill. Question 39 of Questionnaire II read: "In discussion with the governor do you sometimes pick up useful information on political strategy and skills?" The question was designed to find whether or not the legislators thought these values could be obtained from their governor. The variable USFLINFO (thus derived) had Kendall's tau correlation coefficients of .32 with LLDIRECTG and with SUMLL5—seeming to indicate an association between it and the frequency with which legislators felt they could pick up information on political strategy and skills in direct discussion with their governor. This relation is also portrayed in Table 22.

When controlled for friendliness to the governor, this coefficient became .27, .21 when controlled for membership in the governor's party, and .20 when controlled for political relations. When controlled for all three at the same
time, plus the \( v \) factor, VISCID, it became .16. It also registered .16 when controlled for GOVPARTY and VISCID alone. Since the "true correlation" for a coefficient of .32 based on 201 cases should be no lower than .19 in 19 cases out of 20, some other variables must, indeed, be contributing to the 10% variance initially attributed to USFLINFO.\(^{52}\)

When analyzed by membership or nonmembership in the governor's party (see Table 22), no statistically significant differences between GP and NGP members vis-a-vis the USFLINFO variable showed up. However, it turned out under stepwise regression to have predictive value for the frequencies of communication by GP legislators in using the governor's staff (LLGSTFG), using both staffs (LLGSLSG), and for overall communications (SUMLLS). NGP leaders must either believe the governors cannot teach them much in the way of political strategy and skills or, more likely, that the governors are not going to be giving away any political tips in the presence of the opposition.

In summarizing this section, Proposition 3 of Section 1.4 is supported, and the data do show, that one reason to talk to the governor is to gain the value of enlightenment as measured by "useful information" (USFLINFO) in this study. Table 22 supports this via correlations, table 24 via a

\(^{52}\) Variance = \( r^2 \) which is (.32 x .32 = .1024 or 10%).
breakout of average frequencies.

TABLE 24

MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT "YOU TO GOV" (LLDIRECTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH "USEFUL INFORMATION ON STRATEGY" (USFLINFO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PICK UP USEFUL INFORMATION</th>
<th>MEAN FREQUENCY OF DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequently:</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally:</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom:</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never:</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4 POWER

"Power is participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the values K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H...'what men seek in their political negotiations is power...'" (LASSWELL & KAPLAN: 75)

It is reasonable to assume that communications will have some relation to the pursuit of power. Questionnaire II included two questions—9 and 38—designed to measure the extent to which legislator-governor communications were perceived as involving power. The answers to question 9 became coded as LINPLUG (legisleader attempting to influence governor) and question 38 became the variable ACCESS (respondent believed access to governor increases power to influence).

The responses show that the frequency of direct communications by legislatures and their attempts to influence
their jurisdiction's governors do rise and fall together as depicted in Table 25.

TABLE 25

MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATIONS IN THE DIRECT "YOU TO GOV" (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE GOVERNORS (LINFLUG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attempt to Influence Governor</th>
<th>Avg Direct Comm's</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Frequently:</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently:</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally:</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom:</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never:</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't talk with Governor:</td>
<td>0.1*</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*One of the 15 respondents who checked that they did not talk to the governor on LINFLUG nonetheless reported one communication under LINFLUG.

LINFLUG correlates .36 with the overall SUMLL5 for all respondents, .14 with SUMLL5 for GP members, and .40 for NGP members as shown in Table 22. The differences of .36 to .14 and .40 to .14 are statistically significant. This finding that members of the governor's party report what appears to be an almost random interest in trying to influence their governor on legislative or administrative policy was surprising. It would seem that one of the purposes for having a governor of one's own party in office is to enable a legislator to better carry out his own goals--to better enhance his own power. Nor does it seem likely that legislators who have risen to leadership positions would merely be content
to let the governor of their party make all decisions. Possibly this disinclination is revealed by the correlation of .25 between LINFLUG and the frequency of communications in the direct channel (LLDIRECTG), low as that may be.

When controlling for friendliness to the governor, political relations (POLICOOP), and membership in the Democratic party, the correlation between LINFLUG and SUMLL5 drops from .36 to .26 for all 202 cases. Separately, FRIENDLY causes a drop of only .04 (to .32) and drops the correlation to .35. POLICOOP and DEMOPEP, when controlled for simultaneously, drop the correlation to .25—the same as when controlling for GOVPARTY alone.

The lowest correlation found for LINFLUG and SUMLL5 was .22 attained when controlling simultaneously for friendliness, political relations, and membership in the governor's party.

When controls were run on the 113 respondents who were members of the governor's party, little change from the .14 was found. In working with the 89 respondents who were not members of their governor's party, the correlation dropped only .04, to .36, when controlling for friendliness. Thus about 13\% (36 squared) of the variation in the sum of the five channels of communication initiated by the NGP legislators might be explained by their attempts to influence the governor on legislative and administrative policy.
When looking at the responses by channel of communication utilized by legislators, a different pattern shows up for GP as distinguished from NGP members. Members of the governor's party who report trying to influence the governor are more likely to choose the direct channel (LLDIRECTG) (.25 with a significance of .004) whereas NGP members try going through the governor's staff most (LLGSTFG) and only secondarily go directly to him (.36 and .32 respectively). Nevertheless, even though it may be the second choice for NGP legislators, their desire to try to influence the governor accounts for more increases in direct communications frequency than such a desire does for GP members. And whereas there is a correlation of .25 between NGP members and LINFLUG for the informal persons channel (LLINFMLG), this channel correlates but -.07 for GP members. And to further demonstrate the difference, GP members correlate .00 on use of the governor's staff in the LINFLUG variable. See Table 22.

Within the LINFLUG variable, there are statistically significant differences between members and nonmembers in the governor's party in employing the informal channel (LLINFMLG), the governor's staff channel (LLGSTFG), in the use of both the governor's and legislator's staffs (LLGSLSG), and in the sum of the five channels (SUMLL5).
Stepwise regression indicates LINPLUG has value among GP members for predicting frequencies of communications in the direct channel and the legislator's staff channel. For NGP members it has value in predicting similar frequencies in the informal and governor's staff channels.

The second variable designed to measure power involvement was ACCESS. As with previous variables studied in this chapter, it, too, was found to be linked generally with communications frequency. See Table 26.

**TABLE 26**

**MEAN FREQUENCIES OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIRECT "YOU TO GOV" (LLDIRCTG) CHANNEL CROSSTABULATED WITH ACCESS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feel Access to Governor Increases Power to Influence</th>
<th>Avg Direct Comm's</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Considerably:</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some:</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little:</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None:</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor not Accessible to R:</td>
<td>.9*</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Six of the 22 respondents who said the governor was not accessible to them under ACCESS nonetheless reported from 1 to 4 communications under LLDIRCTG.

ACCESS correlated .40 with SUMLL5. This dropped to .26 when controlled for membership in the governor's party (GOVPARTY) and to .25 when controlled for political relations with the governor (POLICOOP). If controlled for both, simultaneously, the correlation became .21. Friendliness
caused a drop of only .05 (from .40 to .35) and party (DEMORP) of only .01.

When the data were analyzed by membership or nonmembership in the governor's party it again became evident that among GP legislators there was a lower correlation (.16) between communications frequency and the feeling that access to the governor increased their power to influence. Nevertheless, stepwise regression showed that ACCESS does have value as a predictor of communications frequency in the direct channel (LLDIRECTG).

Nonmembers had a correlation of .41 on the SUMLL5 variable. This .41 is reduced to .38 when controlling for either friendliness or political relationship (POLICOOP) and to .36 when controlling simultaneously for friendliness, political relationship, and party (DEMORP). So, among nonmembers of the governor's party (which of course contains both Democrats and Republicans), ACCESS appears, as stated earlier, to explain about 13% \( r^2 = .36 \times .36 \) of the variance in communications frequency.

The patterns of use of the five channels by GP members, as distinguished from NGP members, linked with the variable ACCESS are similar to those of the other variables. Correlations of the direct channel used with ACCESS are a little higher than for other variables (see Table 22). The direct channel correlates slightly higher than the governor's staff channel for NGP legislators (.37 to .34).
Controlling for party (DEMOREP) had negligible effect. Controlling for the $y$ factor (VISCID), since it had been found to have some effect on response rate, was found to drop the correlation from .37 to .30 for NGP legisleaders in the direct channel (LLDIRECTG). Controlling for the $y$ factor also raised the correlation from .26 to .31 for communications going through both the governor's and the legisleader's staffs (LLGSLSG) (77 cases). So the $y$ factor may have been masking communications to a small extent in the governor's staff-legisleader's staff channel.

The analysis of the LINFLUG and ACCESS variables would seem to indicate that members of the governor's party do communicate directly with their governor in order to enhance their power, and the frequency is related to expressed desire to influence. However, legisleaders not of the governor's party are much more apt to communicate with the governor—apparently to influence him. Those NGP respondents expressing a desire to influence use four of the five channels for LINFLUG and three of the five channels for ACCESS in a statistically significant degree. Proposition 3 (Section 1.4) is again supported in that the pursuit of power appears to be a reason for communicating.
4.5 **SUMMARY**

It is interesting to note that of the variables examined which were expected to bear relationship to an increase in communications, the two measures of power proved to be the strongest. Next came desire to gain useful information and political skills. Proposition 3 of Chapter I (Section 1.4) was supported: The more legisleaders believe they can enhance their values through discussions with the governor, the greater will be the frequency of their communications with him.

Legisleaders not of the governor's party were more apt than GP members to communicate more in all channels in order to learn of the governor's position on an issue. Friendship, rather than being linked with communications within a party, turned out to be tied more with the frequency of communications among legisleaders of the governors' opposition parties.

The next chapter will turn attention to sources of information, the frequency and satisfaction with communications, impact of population on communications, and party and faction.
Chapter V

VARIATIONS ON THE COMMUNICATIONS THEME

5.1 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Legislators need reliable sources of information. They cannot personally study all the bills introduced in a session because of the volume of submissions and the many demands on their time. Therefore, they seek other and much less time-demanding ways of coming to decisions about various bills and programs.

As initiative for new laws and policies has shifted in America from the legislatures to the executive, the governors' programs have taken on increased importance. They have often become more controversial, too. Therefore each legislative leader must feel a considerable need to know more about his governor's program--to identify those portions he can support, or those he will oppose.

The legislative leader generally has several sources of information available to him about legislation and the governor's programs. Owen Porter (46) listed eleven plus "Other" sources legislators turn to for information and advice on legislation (not necessarily just for governors' pro-
grams) outside the respondents area of specialization. The two main sources he found in Virginia and Michigan were "knowledgeable legislators" and "discussion or debate in committees, on the floor, or in caucus." Together these accounted for 59% of the response of Virginia legislators and 56% of Michigan legislators. Eight sources for information and advice on governors' programs studied in this research, based on item 36 of Questionnaire II, were:

1--Personal contact by the legislator with the governor. (SRCPRCON)
2--Contact with the governor's staff. (SRCGESTAF)
3--Talking with "informal persons"—those not members of the government but friends or relatives of the governor. (SRCINFML)
4--The legislator seeking to find out what his own staff knows or has heard about the governor's program. (SRCURSTF)
5--Using newspapers, radio, and television. (SRCNEWS)
6--Picking up knowledge and attitudes toward the governor's program from other legislative leaders. (SRCOLDRS)
7--Using the legislator's party's leadership and organization for analysis and comments on the governor's program. (SRCPARTY)
8--Using written messages from the governor as sources of information about his program. (SRCWRMSG)

A study of the results confirms some expectations. One hundred fourteen (60%) of the 190 replying said they place a "Great Deal" of reliance on personal contact with the governor. Fewer reported relying on personal contact "Some": 44 or 23%.

53 The coding abbreviation for the variable is given in parentheses, with "SRC" standing for "source."
When the "Great Deal" and "Some" responses are considered, the most popular sources of reliable information were other legislative leaders (87.2%), the governor (83.2%), the governor's staff (79.6%) and written messages from the governor (67.2%). It is not unexpected that legislators would report putting this high a reliance (87%) on their peers. They know them best and tend to trust them more. Fellow legislators share the same milieu and so would be expected to be under similar pressures and, in a general sense, have a comparable perspective. This is also in line with Porter's findings.

Porter (46) found only 3% of the Virginia and 6% of the Michigan legislator respondents turning to "administrative agencies, governor's office." The questionnaire on which this study is based did not list administrative agencies, but the governor and his staff were reported as principal sources of information on the governor's program as stated above.

The least-used sources are "Party organization" (40.7%) and "Informal persons--friends, etc." (33.9%). Not only did these receive low ratings in the combined "Great Deal" and "Some" categories, but many respondents indicated they place no ("None") or "Not Much" reliance on these two sources about the governor's program and wishes.
It was thought likely that when channels were blocked, legislators might turn to the party for information or guidance, and although there was some tendency toward that, the relationship between BLOCKED and SRCPARTY was essentially random. Similarly, the more FRIENDLY legislators reported themselves to be with the governor and the more cooperative (POLICOOP), the more they also tended to report relying on the party (SRCPARTY) as a source of information, but these relationships did not reach significant proportions. In this, positive attitudes toward the governor held by individual legislators probably enhanced their good feelings toward the party, collectively, and use of the party. Likewise, a collective good feeling shared by the party members encouraged individuals to have positive feelings toward the governor.

The low use of "Informal Persons" as a source came as something of a surprise. The legislators' responses to this portion of question 36 of Questionnaire II are consistent, however, with their responses about channels (in question 3) as reported in Chapter III. It could be that the legislators were answering in a socially acceptable manner or that many of their friendships were formed among the staff and legislative personnel with whom they dealt, and so their communicating was reported as occurring under a more "official" category.
When comparing respondents' frequency of direct communication (DIRCOM) with the extent of reliance they placed on personal contact with the governor (SRCPRCON), we find a Spearman's coefficient of .51. SRCPRCON correlates with other frequency measures as .45 (LLDIRCTG), and .30 (SUMLL5). The greater the frequency of direct communications reported, the more reliance is placed on personal contact with the governor as a source of information. It is to be assumed that the more a legislator talks to the governor, the more that source is open to him. Likewise, those who place more reliance on personal contact with their governor for information about his programs (SRCPRCON) will naturally seek to communicate with him more frequently.

Of those legislators whose initiation of communications (SUMLL5) with their governor were in the group arbitrarily classed as "below average," 43% still placed a "Great Deal" of reliance on personal contact with their governors concerning the governors' programs. Among the "average" group 63% marked a "Great Deal" and 76% of the "above average" group checked off a "Great Deal."

Those who like to obtain their information straight from the governor's mouth also reported receiving communications through the governor's staff and his written word. They ap-

---

5 The correlation between BLOCKED channels and low personal contact with the governors (SRCPRCON) is a Kendall coefficient of .40.
paren tally put much less stock in the other sources of information: informal (non-official) persons, news media, other legislators, the party, or even their own staff. Correlations between SRCPRCON and these other sources are not significant, nor are correlations between the remaining "source" measures and several measures of frequency of communication.

Being a Republican or Democrat does not change reported reliance on personal contact, nor does legislative rank. The give and take of discussion enhances knowledge, trust, friendship, and political cooperation. This can be inferred from the questionnaire data by applying statistical "massaging." Those who rely on personal contact with the governor for information about his program, as measured by SRCPRCON, also consider him accessible (ACCESS=.56), communicative (COMMATIVE=.39) and willing to listen (LISTNING=.35). The opportunity for talk (OPTALK correlates .49) and feedback is also reported present (FEEDBACK correlates .54). (Those who rate their governors low on the opportunity to talk or on the encouragement of feedback also rate them low on the items listed here.) This all relates to obtaining useful information, too, of course (USFLINFO=.44). These legislators tend to be supporters (RIVALRY=.47),56 and to be of

55 All correlations in this paragraph are based on Kendall's Tau B.

56 On the RIVALRY variable, rivalry is expressed as a low number, i.e., "1," support as a high number, i.e., "5."
the governor's party (GOVPARTY=.44) and faction (FACTION=.43). It would seem that friendliness may enhance some communications (FRIENDLY=.41), trust may grow (TRUSTY=.43), the legislators will think the governor has a good program (GOODPROG=.38), and concurrent political cooperation will help get it through (POLICOOP=.47).

Respondents to the survey thought that legislative officers who worked most closely with their governors came to have a more relaxed and informal relationship with their governors than did other legislators (Questionnaire II, question 35). Only 32, or 11%, of those responding felt relationships became more formal. Four, or 2%, volunteered that there was no change (the questionnaire gave only the options of "More formal" or "Less formal").

Contrary to the old saying that familiarity breeds contempt, the legislators reported that those officers who worked with their governors gained more respect for them (question 34). Six volunteered that the level of respect remained the same. Thirty-six, or 20%, thought respect lessened. One hundred thirty-seven, 77%, thought respect grew.

Those who thought respect grew were statistically (and significantly) more friendly, supportive and cooperative and of the same party.57 There was no correlation between FORMAL

57 RESPECT correlated .37 with FRIENDLY, .39 with lack of
and RESPECT nor between FORMAL and being FRIENDLY, etc.

5.2 FREQUENCY AND SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNICATIONS OTHER THAN DIRECTLY TO GOVERNOR

Both governors and legislateurs are pressed for time. Especially during a legislative session there is seldom time enough to read all bills, talk with all constituents who drop in or call, visit as many colleagues as would be liked, or have as many governor-legislator discussions as desired. For this reason, at least, staff persons supplement the activities of their principals. This study was interested in ascertaining whether the use of staff persons in communications was satisfactory, indifferent, or might cause resentment, rejection or dissatisfaction.

Both legislateurs and governors were asked if legisla- 
ners regularly use one or more legislateurs' staff members to communicate with their governors. Responses were rather similar—as shown in Table 27.

Both groups questioned were also asked if the governors regularly use a governor's staff member to communicate with legislative leaders. Results were correspondingly affirmative on use of governors' staffs—as shown in Table 28.

RIVALRY (where a higher score meant less rivalry), .40 with POLICOOP and .22 with being a member of the governor's party. These were nonparametric correlations using Kendall's tau.
It is evident that both governors and legislators perceive the governors' staffs as playing much greater roles in legislative-executive communications than legislators' staff members. This is not due only to the fact that all governors had at least some staff, whereas many legislators had none at all, as will be seen later.

Governors were also asked if legislators regularly initiate communications with staff members of the governors' offices and if the legislators regularly use their own staff to communicate with staff members of the governors' offices. According to the governors, legislators generally talked directly to a governor's staff member rather than communicating with that staff member through the legislator's own staff, see Table 29.
TABLE 29
USE OF LEGISLEADERS' AND GOVERNORS' STAFFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LL Direct to Gov Staff</th>
<th>LL thru LL Staff to Gov Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although these channels via staff must be assumed to be reasonably satisfactory or they would not persist, that was proved by asking both governors and legisleaders if they were satisfied with communications when the governor communicated with legisleaders through a governor's staff member. Findings are reported in Table 30.

TABLE 30
SATISFACTION WITH COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH GOVERNOR'S STAFF AS REPORTED BY LEGISLEADERS AND GOVERNORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legisleaders</th>
<th>Governors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>.102 75%</td>
<td>35 97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No</strong></td>
<td>26 19%</td>
<td>1 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stated did not communicate thru staff</td>
<td>8 6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It seems natural enough for the governors to be satisfied, but it is indeed an interesting finding that the great majority of legisleaders also register satisfaction with this method of communication. (The data do not show whether the eight legisleaders who volunteered that they do not communicate through staff did not do so because of dissatisfaction with such an arrangement, or for other reasons.)
When a correlation was run between data in the direct "You to Gov" and "Gov to You" channels and satisfaction with the governor's communicating through the use of staff members, GGSLLSAT, only low correlations were found between frequency and satisfaction—.11 with GDIRCTLL and .14 with LLDIRCTG. So apparently satisfaction with the use of the governor's staff, although high, is not necessarily related to frequency.

A finding that warms a researcher's heart by displaying great reliability came from the responses to question 5 of the second questionnaire. Compared to the 75% response on Questionnaire I, with the only change in wording being the substitution of "you" for "legislative leaders," 78% of the respondents to the second survey also said they were satisfied with the governors' use of their staff members to communicate with legislative leaders.

Questionnaire II went on in question 6 to ask if legislators found communicating with the governors by the use of one or more of their own staff members satisfactory (not asked in the earlier questionnaire). Two thirds (76) of the 114 legislators who responded said "yes," one third (38) "no," and 88 indicated they had no staff member to use.

This lesser role legislatures' staffs play in legislative-executive communications is illustrated in another way. In part 2 of the Legisleader Questionnaire I, respondents
were asked to indicate the frequency of the use of themselves and their staffs in communicating about certain subjects. The "you" column had from 121 to 133 responses per subject ranging from 2.59 to 3.48 on a scale from 1 (very frequently) to 5 (never). However, only 39-45 responses per subject were given in the "your staff" column—and these ranged from an average of 4.72 on three subjects down to 4.82 on one (see Appendix A). (Again illustrating how a person attributes more to others than to himself, respondents thought other leaders in their chamber used their staffs slightly more frequently, ranging from an average of 4.55 to 4.79.)

In the earlier questionnaire, Q1, legislators were asked how many persons were employed on their staffs. Responses ranged from none to thirty-nine with an average of 3.3 and a mode of 1 for 164 respondents. Twenty-six legislators reported no staff.

The 42 governors reported a range of staff from 4 to 94 members, with an average of 21.

Only 20 of 164 legislator respondents to Q1 said a member of their staff specialized in liaison work with the governor's office. It may be assumed that most, if not all, of those not replying did not have so specialized a staff member.
Among governors, 36 (86%) of the 42 respondents on this question said a member of their staff specialized in liaison work with the legislatures.

Besides staff, there are other routes for the transmission of messages between governors and legisleaders. Asked in QI, Part 4, if they or other legisleaders used any indirect or other informal means with the governors or governors' staff members, 42 (27% of the yes-no response) said "yes," 114 said "no," and 8 failed to give any response. For those indicating frequency (only 34), the average was "occasionally."

Conversely, 38 (25%) of the 154 legisleaders responding said their governors used indirect or other informal means (excluding staff) of communicating with them. Again, a smaller number reported frequency, but for the 23 who did, the frequencies reported averaged between "occasionally" and "quite often."

Question 7 on QII inquired if legisleaders communicated satisfactorily with the governor through personal friends, party leaders, lobbyists or similar third, non-governmental persons. Only 14% of the 202 legisleaders indicated that they did. Some 63% stated they did not use third persons and 20% said it was not satisfactory. Even a smaller percentage--12% of the 202--agreed that having the governor communicate with them through non-staff third persons was
satisfactory (question 8). Twenty-seven percent said it was not satisfactory and 58% said the governor did not use third persons. (The "no responses," or blanks, equalled about 3% for both questions.)

It would appear that if a legislleader cannot speak directly to the governor, he would find it most satisfactory if a governor's staff member were to talk with him or if one of his own staff talks to the governor. Third persons are less satisfactory.

Just how satisfactory communications via the governor's staff can be is confirmed by analyzing the data. One hundred forty two legislleaders reported satisfaction with the use of the governor's staff by the governor; 38 reported dissatisfaction. Arbitrarily selecting the more communicative one-third of the respondents on the DIRCOM variable, their average on the satisfaction-with-the-governor-using-staff scale, GGSLLSAT, was compared to the average of the less active two-thirds. The more communicative group averaged 4.48 to the less communicative group's 3.98 on a 1-5 scale, 5 being satisfactory. Therefore Proposition 6 (page 14), that legislative leaders who most frequently communicate with the governor in person will also be the ones who are most satisfied with the use of staff by the governor in communication, is supported.
The mean number of times the governors or the legislators sent messages to each other through the ten different channels posed in question 3 of QII, as reported by legislators, is shown in Table 31. The important role of the governor's staff in legislative-executive communications is also highlighted therein.

**TABLE 31**

**AVERAGE FREQUENCIES OF CHANNEL USE, PERCEPTIONS OF LEGISLEADERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor, thru governor's staff, to legisleader:</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader, thru governor's staff, to governor:</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader directly to governor:</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor directly to legisleader:</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader, thru both his own staff &amp; governor's, to governor:</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor, thru both his own staff &amp; legisleader's, to legisleader:</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader, thru &quot;informal persons,&quot; to governor:</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor, thru &quot;informal persons,&quot; to legisleader:</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legisleader, thru legisleader's staff, to governor:</td>
<td>1.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor, thru legisleader's staff, to legisleader:</td>
<td>1.0*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Frequencies for "thru legisleader's staff" rows are unreliable in that those not having a staff member sometimes reported "0."

5.3 **IMPACT OF POPULATION ON COMMUNICATIONS**

It was hypothesized that the population of a jurisdiction would influence the use of channels—that in the more populated states the greater volume of communications would cause a shift from direct contact between governors and legislators to going via staffs to reduce communications overload. The data bore this out.
Using HILOPOPN as a variable (wherein the 27 least populated polities were coded "1" and the 27 most populated "4"), the results were as follows: In the least populated states and territories legislators communicated directly with their governors an average of 6.2 times in four weeks compared to 3.9 for the more populated ones (LLDIRCTG). Again, legislators perceive governors of the least populated entities communicating directly with them 5.2 times in four weeks versus 3.3 for those entities with higher populations (GDIRCTLL). In both cases the differences were statistically significant.

Although legislators in the more populous states and territories communicated with their governors through informal persons only 2.0 times in the designated time span compared to 1.3 for sparser areas, it was not statistically significant (LLINFMLG). But governors used informal persons (GINFMLLL) 1.8 times in the comparable period for the more populous states and territories compared with 1.1 in the less--and that difference was statistically significant.

Differences in the use of governors' staffs or of legislators' staffs (not both joined) did not show much variation. However, when both staffs were involved as links in the communications chain, significant differences were disclosed. Legislators from populous areas sent messages to their governors by utilizing both staffs an average of 4.9
times in a four-week period compared to their counterparts from less populated areas 2.3 (LLGSLSG). Leaders reported their governors communicated with them via both staffs at the average rate of 4.5 for the more populated jurisdictions and 2.3 for the lesser (GGSLSLL).

Although not statistically significant, 50% of the legislators in "the upper 27," referring to population size, rated the frequency of communications as "about right," compared to 60% in "the lower 27."

5.4 PARTY AND FACTION

Republican legisleaders are more active than their Democratic brethren—or so it would seem when the responses of Republican and Democratic legisleaders on communications are first compared. It appears these Republicans are more communicative, are better supporters of governors, think the governors of their states are more able and have good programs, try to influence their governors more, rely more on personal contact with the governors and so on. However, when the data are analyzed further and Democratic leaders and their interactions with Democratic governors as compared with Republican leaders with their governors are studied, many of the differences disappear. (One difference that didn't disappear was response rate, discussed in Chapter II and Appendix E.)
Republicans first appear to have the lead because twice as many Republican legislators (73) had Republican governors as Democrats (38) had Democratic governors, and so the cumulated averages for Republicans as a whole are higher.

Although the 89 Democratic legislator respondents came from jurisdictions which averaged slightly higher in the population variable (HILOPPN) than did the 108 Republicans, 2.4 to 2.3, Democratic respondents came from a wider variation in state populations when the party occupying the gubernatorial chair was also taken into consideration. Republican population means remained remarkably similar, 2.3 for those 73 with Republican governors and about the same, 2.4, for those 35 with Democratic governors. The 51 Democratic respondents under Republican regimes came from the least populated states, averaging 2.2, whereas those 38 under Democratic governors came from the more populous states, averaging 2.7.

Republican respondents reported an average sum of 43 communications per four-week period during legislative sessions in ten channels to the Democrats' 30 (SUMTEN). Republican legislators reported a frequency of 55 when they had Republican governors, Democrats 38 to their party's governors—a very significant difference. When the legislators had a governor of the opposite party, Republicans reported 19 com-

---

58 On a scale of "1" for the 27 least populated states and territories and "4" for the 27 most populated.
Communications per period to the Democrats' 24. So it seems Republicans are more communicative to governors of their own party—as are Democrats—but where legislators and governors bear unlike party labels, the Republican drop-off is 65% to the Democrats' 37%.

Republican legislators reported 12 communications per four-week period directly to and from the governors of their states or territories (DIRCOM) to the Democrats' 9. When same-party pairing was incorporated into the analysis, the following developed: Democrats averaged 13 communications directly to and from their Democratic governors but only 6 directly to and from Republican governors. Republicans talked more to Republican governors, 16, than the Democrats reported to theirs, but less to Democratic governors, 4.

Among the major interests of this study are satisfaction with the communications system and the use of staff as part of that system. The responses indicate that Republican respondents were somewhat more satisfied on five of the six measures used, as can be seen in Table 32 as five of the row ranks in column 4 are higher ("1" is higher than "2," etc.) than the row ranks in column 3. When only respondents with respect to governors of their own party are considered, (columns 5 and 2), Republicans still are more satisfied in four of the six measures.
### Table 32

**ROW RANKS AND MEANS OF RESPONSES ON SIX MEASURES OF SATISFACTION IN SIX CATEGORIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DLL with Repub Governor (N=51)</th>
<th>DLL with Demo Governor (N=38)</th>
<th>All with Repub Legislator (N=89)</th>
<th>All with Demo Legislator (N=108)</th>
<th>RLL with Repub Governor (N=73)</th>
<th>RLL with Demo Governor (N=35)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>1.6#</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSSLLSAT</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLGSAT</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLIGSAT</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GILLSAT</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversat</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>3.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The top figure in each cell is the cell’s rank within that row. The higher the figure, the more satisfied the respondents.*

Both Republicans and Democratic legislators report greater satisfaction with communications coming from the governor through his staff (GSSLLSAT) than with communications going to the governor through the legislator’s own staff (LLGSAT). (Satisfaction with direct communications with the governor was not measured but is a part of both FREQUENCY and OVERSAT.) Curiously, in communicating with governors via their own legislative staff personnel, both Republicans
and Democrats reported more satisfaction in such interaction with Republican governors than with Democratic governors (LLSGSAT), although admittedly the difference is very little (3.74 to Democratic and 3.76 to Republican governors) and is not statistically significant.

When on their own initiative the governors use their own staffs to communicate with the legislatures, the Democratic legislators show the widest variation in satisfaction, depending upon whether it is a Republican or Democratic governor: a spread of .72. This compares with the Republicans' .33 in a similar situation (GGSLLSAT). The opposite occurs when legislative staff members are used by the Legislatures for communication with the governor and the legislator initiates the action: .02 for the Democrats and .72 for the Republicans (LLSGSAT). Republicans report a greater satisfaction in the use of their own staff members if they are communicating with a governor of their own party (LLSGSAT).

Although respondents as a whole report the least satisfaction with the use of personal friends, party leaders and similar third, non-governmental persons (LLIGSAT), Democrats report a higher satisfaction with such messengers when they as legislators use them in initiating a communication to a Republican governor.

The reasons for these differences in the responses of Democratic and Republican legislatures are not known. The
possibility that the anomalies may be caused by the absence of staff on the part of the legislators does not seem valid as the percentages of respondents replying to the LLSGSAT variable were similar: 56% for Republicans and 57% for Democrats. All legislators can receive messages through the governors' staffs, but only those legislators with staff are included in the LLSGSAT variable. This reduces the numbers in some cells to as small as eleven, and reliability may be low.

Of the thirty cells in Table 32 reporting satisfaction (excluding the first row which reports FREQUENCY), the highest satisfaction score was reported by Democrats receiving a communication from a Democratic governor through a member of the governor's staff (GGSLLSAT). (It is presumed satisfaction with direct communications would have been even higher--if it had been measured.) The lowest cell was of Democrats receiving a communication from a Democratic governor through informal persons (GILLSAT).

Both the highest and lowest overall satisfactions with the communications system (OVERSAT) were reported by Republicans: the highest when working with Republican governors and lowest when working with Democratic governors.

Republican legislators reported an average of 3.5 on a scale of 1 to 4 on reliance on personal contacts with their governors (Democrats and Republicans) as sources of informa-
tion (SRCPRCON) to the Democrats' 3.2. However, this changed to 3.7 for Republicans and 3.8 for Democrats when same-party-pairing was introduced.

Of the eight sources of information studied in question 36 on Questionnaire II, only informal persons had less reliance than party organizations. However, in studying the reliance respondents put on party organizations (SRCPARTY), Republicans averaged 2.40 to the Democrats' 2.15. When paired with governors of their own parties, Republican legislators still placed more reliance on party organizations than did Democrats, 2.43 to 2.22, respectively.

Proposition 17 of Section 1.4 hypothesized that party organizations would be more frequently used as sources of information by legislators in states in which party competition was greater. Although correlations were in that direction, they were not statistically significant. SRCPARTY had a Kendall's tau correlation of .11 with IPCR4, of .06 with AGREE, and of .18 with PCNFCT. Therefore Proposition 17 was only weakly supported.

Fifty-nine percent of the Republican respondents said they would be most apt to initiate a call to the governor if they were trying to find out if they and the governor were in general agreement on an item (TRYFIND). The corresponding Democratic percentage was 51%, a statistically significant difference. This changed to 71% for Republican and 68%
for Democratic legislators when dealing only with governors of their own party, a difference not statistically significant. However, this helped show that party linkage of the two branches of government does influence legislator communications on this type of matter.

On a scale of 1 to 5, Republicans averaged 3.2 in attempting to influence governors on some legislative or administrative policy (LINFLUG). Democrats averaged 2.8. Again the difference nearly disappeared (became 3.5 and 3.4, respectively,) when confining responses within the same party.

The more frequent the in-person (direct) communications, the more frequently the respondents reported changing their positions—see Table 33.

**TABLE 33**

**COMPARISON OF FREQUENCY OF CHANGING POSITIONS WITH FREQUENCY OF IN-PERSON COMMUNICATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Changes</th>
<th>Mean Frequency of In-Person Communications</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Many times:</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times:</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once or twice:</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None:</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus Proposition 10 (page 14), tying change of position with frequency of direct communications, was supported.
When asked which person changes or modifies his position more after legislator-governor discussions (MODIFIES), both Republican and Democratic legislatures average about the same when reporting on same-party governors.

Overall, the give and take of change is reported as more equal under Republican governors. (In the following table, if the respondent thought the legislators modified their position more it was coded "1," if the governor, "5." "Neither change" or "about equal" was coded "3.")

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Republican Legislators:</td>
<td>2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democrat Legislators:</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans Serving with Republican Governors:</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats Serving with Democratic Governors:</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans Serving with Democratic Governors:</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats Serving with Republican Governors:</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, Democrats serving with Republican governors gave the rating closest to "neither change" or "about equal." Republicans with Democratic governors thought the legislators modified their positions more. This is consistent with the following findings on the variables INFLUENCE and CHANGED.

The fact that governors may modify their positions does not mean they have no influence on legislative policy outcomes. Averaging the responses of all legislator respon-
dents indicated a "moderate" influence, Democratic respondents varied more widely in their perceptions of gubernatorial influence. On the INFLUENCE scale of 6 ("great deal") to 1 ("negative influence"), they credited Democratic governors with an average 5.30 to Republican governors' 4.82. Republicans ascribed 5.14 to governors of their own party and 4.85 to Democratic governors. 59

Democrats may perceive themselves as having changed their votes only once or twice after receiving communications from their governors, but the aggregate data (CHANGED) show they report changing under Democratic governors more than Republicans do under Republican governors, 2.16 to 2.06, respectively, (on a scale of 1 equalling "no" to 4 equalling "many times"). Democratic legislators reported more changing under both same- and opposite-party governors than did Republicans. The most difficult to "convert" is apparently a Republican legislator serving with a Democratic governor: 1.39; as against this, Democrats with Republican governors averaged 1.59.

Thomas Dye (p. 147) stated that the governor of a one-party state cannot inspire intense loyalty and that legislators run independently of the governor and have no political stake in the success of the governor's program. To test this, in part, a breakout of the GOALONG and CHANGED vari-

59 Although small, there was a tendency overall for Democratic governors to be perceived as more influential.
ables by IPCR4 was run. IPCR4 was recoded into Austin Ranney's (p. 65) four categories. As can be seen from Table 34, legislators did report going along with the governor's program and changing their anticipated votes less in one-party or one-party modified states. Therefore Dye's statement above and Proposition 18 (Section 1.4) were supported.

TABLE 34
EFFECT OF PARTY COMPETITION ON GOVERNORS' PROGRAMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competitiveness</th>
<th>GOALONG*</th>
<th>CHANGED**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modified One-Party Republican:</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-Party:</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified One-Party Democratic:</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-Party Democratic:</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A coding of 4 = go along "Fully" with governor's program; 1 = "Not at all."
**A coding of 4 = changed anticipated vote as a consequence of a communication from the governor "Many times;" 1 = "No."

In the preceding chapter it was suggested that the desire for achieving the primary values of enlightenment and skill might increase communications with governors if the legislators thought conversations with them resulted in obtaining useful information on political strategy and skills (Question 39 of Questionnaire II--USFLINFO). Democrats with Democratic governors had the highest USFLINFO average (3.03--"occasionally") of the six groupings looked at (see the column heading to Table 32), and Republicans with Republican governors followed closely with a 2.95 average. Both
Democratic and Republican legislators averaged 2.20 ("seldom") when opposite-party governors were involved.

Since the respondents in this study are legislative leaders, they were asked if they served as a channel of communications between the governor and other legislators (question 20 of Questionnaire II) and, if so, did they sometimes feel overloaded with communications (OVERLOAD). Of the 79 considering themselves channels, 7% said they were "often" overloaded, 25% said "sometimes" and 69% said "no." Party-wise, Democrats felt less overloaded with an average of 4.4 while Republicans averaged 4.2 (on a scale of 1, 3, 5 with 5 being not overloaded). Republican legislators with Republican governors registered the most overloaded and that was only 4.0—between "sometimes" and "no." Democratic legislators with Democratic governors averaged 4.4. One wonders if the Republican legislators are "more overloaded" because party discipline may be a little tighter than for Democrats. Both Democrats and Republicans under opposite-party governors were the least overloaded of all, as one might expect, 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.

On a scale of 1 to 5, Republican leaders overall averaged 3.7 on cooperative political relations with governors (POLICOOP), whereas Democrats averaged 3.2. However, when corrected for "same party," the averages became 4.1 for Republicans and 4.2 for Democrats, obviously not statistically
significant. The difference in party apparently accounts for the perception of cooperative relationships.

Since there is a correlation between communications frequency and the legislators' perceptions of their governors' abilities (e.g., SUMTEN correlated .24 with ABLEGOV), ABLEGOV was studied in relation to partisanship. Statistically significant differences on how Republican and Democratic legislators rated the governors of their states on ability became insignificant when Democrats with Democratic-governors ratings were compared to those of Republicans with Republican-governors. This insignificant difference was repeated when Democratic with Republican governors were compared to Republicans with Democratic governors on programs (GOODPROG). However, Republicans rated Democratic governors significantly higher on ability (4.7 on a semantic differential scale from 1 to 7) than Democrats rated Republican governors (3.8). Legislators of both parties consider governors of their own party able, but in "crossover evaluating" Democratic governors fared better.

Interestingly, when the responses of Republicans in states with Republican governors and Democrats with Democratic governors were compared, there was a significant difference on the BRGMPWR variable. Republican responses averaged 3.1 to Democrats 2.4 (on a scale of 1 to 5, with 3 being equal and 5 favoring the legislature), which would in-
dicate that the Republicans in those states with Republican governors thought the legislature and governor had about equal bargaining powers. The Democrats with Democratic governors perceived a tendency for the governors to have a stronger position from which to bargain than did the legislature.

Not only did Democrats think their Democratic governors had more bargaining powers, they also reported that their governors used them more in attempting to influence the legislature than the Republican legislatures reported their Republican governors used bargaining powers. (Republicans averaged 3.21 on GOVBARBN with the higher the number meaning the higher the use.) When, in addition, Democratic legislators' reaction to Republican governors' use (3.46), and the converse (3.80), are also taken into consideration, both Republican and Democratic respondents agree that they perceive Democratic governors as having more bargaining powers than the legislators and that Democratic governors try to use these bargaining powers more than do Republican governors.

The statistics of the preceding paragraph seem to reflect the fact that Democrats actively pursue programs more than Republicans do. Republicans are known to be more laissez faire in their political philosophy.
Question 30 of Questionnaire II asked the respondents where lobbyists go first in their state on desired legislation. It has been hypothesized that lobbyists talk first to the people they think have the most power—in this study, would it be with the governors or with the legislators? The difference in the aggregate responses between Republican and Democratic legislators was statistically significant on LOBBYIST. With a coding of "1" for going to the governor first, "3" for a "don't know," and "5" for going to the legislators, Republicans averaged 4.44 and Democrats 4.16. All respondents (in the aggregate) saw lobbyists going more often to legislators when Republican governors were in office: 4.40 for Democrats with Republican governors and 4.61 for Republicans with Republican governors. Although lobbyists still were perceived as going more often to legislators than governors in the states with Democratic governors, it was less so: 4.09 for Republicans with Democratic governors and 3.83 for Democrats with Democratic governors.

Zeigler and Baer (p. 167) found a difference in parties also. They said, "Republican legislators interact more closely with lobbyists and tend to rely upon them for information more extensively than do Democratic legislators."

Differences in perception of governors' party orientation versus their personal orientation (PARTYORN) were insignificant except that Republican legisleaders saw Democratic gov-
ernors as significantly more party oriented than Democrats perceived Republican governors (5.4 to 4.4 on a semantic differential scale of 1 to 7). Interestingly, legislators regard same-party governors as more personally oriented and opposite-party governors as more party oriented. That may arise because leaders see any differences they have with their same-party governor as arising from personal motives rather than from party interests. When the governor is of the opposite party, differences are probably perceived as party positions because the respondent legislator is less aware of differences within the other party. Each party naturally tries to present a more united front in the legislature and to the public.

Both Republicans and Democrats rated governors of their own party as leaders with an average of 5.4 and 5.6 respectively on a semantic differential scale (LEADER). But there was a significant difference between the ratings given governors of the opposite party. Democrats assigned Republican governors an average 4.3 rating, whereas Republican legislators gave Democratic governors a 5.0 average—only .4 of a point below what they gave governors of their own party. Democrats were much less generous, rating Republican governors 1.3 points below Democratic governors. This finding parallels that of ABLEGOV above.
Chapter VI
SOME CORRELATES OF COMMUNICATION

6.1 SATISFACTION

The role of satisfaction, beyond that with staff as reported in Chapter V, was explored. In order to have a score for all 202 cases (not just 72 as with the raw data in OVERSAT), a composite satisfaction score was devised. This was done by adding the scores on ten variables which subjectively seemed related to overall satisfaction. They were modified slightly so that the maximum possible on each variable was 5 and thus all variables had equal weight.

COMPOSAT, as the new derived variable was named, was correlated with the ten contributory variables, and the correlations ranged from .42 to .69. COMPOSAT correlated .69 with the 72 OVERSAT responses, apparently supporting the intention of having a broader "satisfaction" variable which could substitute for OVERSAT.

---

60 Many questionnaires had been mailed out before it was discovered that the questions on OPTALK and OVERSAT were left out. Later mailings included questions 45 and 46 of Questionnaire II.
Computer runs showed that COMPOSAT correlated well, as expected, with such communications variables as:

- LLDIRECTG .30
- DIRINCOM .39
- DIRCOM .37
- SUMTEN .31
- SRCPRCON .46

Proposition 4 of Section 1.4 (Section 1.4)—the more in-person communications the greater the satisfaction—is thus supported as all but SUMTEN of the above measure direct (in-person) communications between legislators and governors.

One communications item turned out contrary to expectations, however, although it was not significant. COMPOSAT correlated a -.12 with COMINIT, which would imply that those most satisfied with the communications system tended to have governors whom they reported as initiating conversations more frequently than the legislators initiated them. Perhaps legislators like being sought out, more than just having an open door available to them.

When run against state averages of subject matter variables, only one significant correlation appeared: AVLVETO -.39. It may have been, however, that since state averages were used, they masked any relationship.

Except for the TIME it took to get to their governors’ offices from their offices (the less time, the more satis-
fied), most "environmental" variables only showed tendencies without significance, (e.g., AGEGROUP, NOSO, EDUCTION, POPULATN, LEGSIZ). Satisfaction with the communications system tended to rise the older the legislator, if s/he was from the north and west, if the respondent had less education, and came from a less populated state. The effect of the size of the legislature on satisfaction was essentially random.

Correlations of COMPOSAT with what might be termed "political" variables were the strongest. In descending order, the satisfied legislator was:

| More friendly   | FRIENDLY  | .54 |
| More cooperative| POLICOOP  | .52 |
| A supporter     | RIVALRY   | .46 |
| Member governor's faction or party | FACTION | .38 |
| Associated with gov'r of same party | PTYMATCH | .26 |

Although not statistically significant, composite satisfaction tended to be higher in those states in which the governor's party had control of the legislature, the governor had both more total power and more power over the budget, the legislature had bargaining powers, and where income distribution was more equal. Composite satisfaction also tended to be higher among legislators who were in general agreement with the governor.

It was anticipated that the following variables would show some correlations with composite satisfaction, but the relationship was close to random: Workload (BILLIN, BILLS%,
centralized or decentralized decision making (DMCENT), professionalism (FAIR, GRUMMS), and conflict (FCNFCT, IPCR4, PCNFCT) appear to have little effect on satisfactory (or unsatisfactory) communications between legislative leaders and governors. With DEMCON (-.12), a slight tendency toward more satisfaction in Republican controlled legislatures was shown. This is consistent with the finding reported in Section 5.4, that Republicans tended to be more satisfied with the communications system as a whole.

A further study of the composite satisfaction variable reveals the not unexpected fact that evaluations or judgments of the governors and their programs get higher scores when legislative leaders are satisfied with the ebb and flow of communications. For example, COMPOSAT correlates with legislative leaders perceiving that:

- The governor's program is substantive and meaningful. \( \text{SUBSTANT} = .53 \)
- The governors are able and trustworthy. \( \text{MEANFUL} = .51 \)
- The governors' programs are realistic and good. \( \text{ABLEGOV} = .50, \text{TRUSTY} = .48 \)
- The governors are informed \( \text{REALSTIC} = .47 \)
- The programs are socially concerned \( \text{GOODPROG} = .44 \)
- The governors are liked, strong, and leaders. \( \text{INFORMED} = .42, \text{LIKED} = .40, \text{STRONG} = .34, \text{LEADER} = .34 \)
- The governors are democratic and innovative. \( \text{SOCALCON} = .41, \text{AUTOCRAT} = .33, \text{INOVATIV} = .32 \)

Interestingly, whether a governor is conservative or liberal (LIBERAL .06), or whether his programs are seen as expensive or inexpensive (EXPNSIVE .07) is immaterial. Even
whether he is party oriented or personally oriented carries little weight (PARTYORN .11) so far as satisfaction with the communications system is concerned.

Those satisfied also often use the governors' staffs as sources of information on the governors' programs (SRCGSTAF .23). Although neither the governors' staffs nor the legislators' own staffs inhibit satisfaction with the communications system, they don't enhance it much either.

In the area that might be classed as "information seeking," the data disclosed that the more "satisfied" respondents also more readily sought useful information from the governors (USFLINFO .37) and tried to find out their governor's position (TRYFIND .25). There was only a very slight tendency for them to also try to find out if they were in agreement with their governor on issues (AGREEMNT .10).

On those items which attempted to measure whether governors and legislators influenced or changed each other's behavior, there were mixed findings. COMPOSAT correlated .48 with ACCESS, showing that satisfaction with the system went along with a belief that they had access to power. COMPOSAT correlated .35 with INFLUNCE, indicating that a belief that the governors' communications influenced policy outcomes was acceptable. Likewise, respondents who were satisfied tended also to be those who attempted to influence their governor on legislative or administrative policies (the correlation
with LINFLUG was .32). Those who reported they sometimes changed their anticipated vote because of a communication from the governor were nonetheless generally satisfied with the communications system, as shown by a correlation of .29 with CHANGED. Perhaps this satisfaction fostered a willingness to change.

COMPOSAT was random when compared to those who would try to swing their governor their way if he was on the fence (TRYSWING .04) or would try to convert their governor if he was opposed to the respondent's position (CONVERT .02). Essentially random also was a comparison of COMPOSAT with MODIFIES showing that satisfaction with the system was not limited to whether it was the governor or the legislators who modified their positions after discussions (-.05).

Legislators reported they were more satisfied with governors who provided for FEEDBACK and an opportunity to talk back (OPTALK). Analyzing the responses of the 72 who received and answered item 45 of Questionnaire II, overall satisfaction with the communications system (OVERSAT) correlated .39 with OPTALK and .59 with FEEDBACK. COMPOSAT correlated .42 with OPTALK (N=72) and .59 with FEEDBACK (N=197). Proposition 5 (Section 1.4), that links legislators' satisfaction with opportunity to participate in discussions with the governor, was thus affirmed.
6.2 CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING

Wayne Francis ranked the 50 states according to a measure of centralized decision making in the legislatures. Alabama, for instance, ranked highest and is noted for the strong position of the governor. Florida ranked lowest and tended to keep control in the committees and away from the governor (Francis: 75). In this study of communications these scores became a variable labelled DMCENT.

The question was posed as to whether centralization of decision making had any influence on communications frequency or other variables. To determine this, respondents were given the scores of their states and were grouped into three categories of roughly equal numbers of respondents. The lowest ranking third (n=67) was then compared by T-Test with the highest ranking third (n=70). Results showed that communications frequency between governors and legisleaders was higher in states with low centralization. Table 35 illustrates this point.

Interestingly, within the total communications that did exist, legisleaders took the initiative more frequently (COMINIT) if they were from a more highly centralized state: .80 for the high versis .55 for the low centralization group (the higher the positive number, the more the legisleaders initiate). But neither group perceived the governor as initiating more communications than the legisleaders (which would have resulted in a negative number).
TABLE 35
HIGH AND LOW CENTRALIZATION OF DECISION MAKING VERSUS FOUR COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES

(Low numbers equal higher frequencies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Lo-Group</th>
<th>Hi-Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDIRCTLL (Times governor uses direct channel to Legisleader)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGSTFLL (Number of times governor goes via governor's staff)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRCOM (Total direct communications of respondent to governor and governor to respondent)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMTEN (Sum of communications in the ten channels studied)</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As to the extent they placed reliance on personal contact with the governor for personal information (SRCPRCON), both groups were about equal: 3.34 for the low group vs. 3.31 for the group from more highly centralized states.

Proposition 19 of Section 1.4 hypothesized that legislators from more highly centralized decision-making states would turn more to the party organization for information on the governors' programs. An analysis of the data shows a weak tendency in that direction, but nothing significant. Proposition 19 also hypothesized that legislators from states less decentralized would turn more to other legislative leaders for information on the governors' programs. This, too, proved to be the direction of the data, but too
weakly to be statistically significant. Thus Proposition 19 did not receive much support.

Respondents from centralized states also turned out to belong more frequently to states having more of the factor: 3.1 to 1.2.

In terms of the composite satisfaction score (COMPOSAT), little difference in frequency of communications was noted: 30.7 for the respondents from states with low centralization to 29.6 for the respondents from high states. Likewise, correlation with the variable OVERSAT was random. Therefore, Proposition 20 of Section 1.4 was not supported. Whether a legislator was or was not from a legislature characterized as having centralized decision making had no discernable relation to overall satisfaction with the communications system.

6.3 BARGAINING POWER

When the legislative leaders perceive of legislators in their state as having more bargaining powers than the governor on the variable BRGNPOWR (N=41), they report 50% more direct communications from the governor (GDIRCTLL) than those who report their governors as having more bargaining powers than the legislators (N=77). They also report 54% more communications initiated by both the governor and them-
selves (DIRCOM). Looking at all ten channels (SUMTEN) there are 31% more communications to and from legisleaders who think the legislature has more bargaining powers.

Legisleaders reporting the legislators having more bargaining powers reported that the governor initiated communications more often to the legisleaders than they to him (COMINIT). Apparently he has to come to the legislature to help get his programs through. Legisleaders reporting the governor with more bargaining power reported that they (the legisleaders) did the most initiating. So it appears that the least powerful, when desiring a favor or support, initiate the moves.

6.4 Bargaining Activity

In the course of bargaining, those legisleaders who report that the governor very frequently bargains (N=28 on GOVBARGN) report that the governors come to them directly (GDIRCTLL) 63% more frequently than do those legislators who report the governor seldom bargains (N=33). But when all ten channels (SUMTEN) are considered, the difference is only 4% more frequently.

Those legisleaders who report that their governors seldom bargain report that they, the legisleaders, place more reliance on personal contact with the governor as a source of information about his program (SRCPRCON) than those who re-
port their governors bargain more frequently. Legislators who perceive their governors as bargainers still claim to initiate more communications than their governors (COMINIT). (Unlike BRGNPOWR, the GOVBARGN variable only reports bargaining—not who has the best bargaining position.)

In studying the responses of those who say the legislators seldom or never bargain versus those who bargain frequently or very frequently (LEGBARGN), we find bargainers still talking more. In the governor to legisleader channel, GDIRCTLL, those legislators who bargain report 67% more communications. Those respondents also report 40% more communications in both governor to respondent and respondent to governor channels (DIRCOM) and 11% more communications in all channels (SUMTEN).

Whether legislators are grouped by those who report seldom bargaining (N=47), or by those who report bargaining frequently or very frequently (N=56), they all initiate more communications to the governor than he to them. This is consistent with "the Initiator Complex" discussed in Section 3.4 and Proposition 12 (Section 1.4). However, the "seldom bargaining" respondents report an initiating average of 1.19 versus the "frequently bargaining" group's .29 (with 0.0 meaning initiatives are even).

As either the governors or the legislators increase their bargaining activity the governors' use of their staffs as a
communication channel rises (GGSTFLL). According to the data, the governors also use their staffs more when the legislature is perceived as having more bargaining power than the governor. The 77 respondents who thought the governors had the best bargaining position reported that the governors communicated with them through the governors' staffs 7.03 times. The 41 who thought the legislature had the most bargaining power reported governors coming to them via the governors' staffs 8.95 times, a 27% difference.

Governors with reputed bargaining power as well as governors and legislators who frequently bargain tend to come more from the states higher in the y factor.

Respondents reporting higher composite satisfaction scores (COMPOSAT) tend to come more from states where the legislators have more bargaining power as well as from states where the governors seldom or never bargain.
Chapter VII

POSTLUDE AND PRELUDE

Who
Says what
In which channel
Modulated by what factors
To whom
With what effect
And why?

This study has explored these questions as they pertain to legislative-executive communications. This chapter will summarize some of the findings and suggest further areas of research.

7.1 WHO

Forty-two state and territorial governors and one hundred sixty-four legislative leaders constituted the "N" of the first phase of the study. Two hundred two legislators made up the second phase. These respondents were at times the "Who" and at other times the "To Whom." They consisted of Republicans and Democrats and members of a few "other" parties in the territories. Some legislators were members of the same party as the governor, some were not. Some were friendly to the governor, some were not; some were politically supportive; some were not. All had many political resources at their disposal and surely sought more.
Besides governors, the respondents were lieutenant governors, presidents pro tempore of senates, speakers of houses, and majority and minority leaders of legislative chambers. They ranged in age from one in his twenties to three over seventy years old and in formal education, from two who had only completed the eighth grade through twenty-four reporting possession of doctorates.

7.2 SAYS WHAT

Governors reported they most frequently communicated with legislative leaders about support for their general programs and policies. Next in frequency was their request for support or opposition to particular measures, then requests for support on other matters. The lowest frequency rating was given by the governors to providing information on veto actions. Senate and House leaders agreed with the above order of gubernatorial initiatives, although the legislators' perceptions were that the governors came to them on each subject matter less frequently than the governors saw themselves initiating communications. The most striking disparity in perceptions was on the governors' seeking support on particular measures. Here the governors saw themselves approaching the legislators much more frequently than the legislators reported they were being contacted (an average of 2.0 for the governors and 2.6 for the legislators—"2" being "frequently" and "3" being "occasionally").
Legisleaders reported they most frequently communicated with their governor on their reactions to general gubernatorial programs and policies. Therefore, both governors and legisleaders saw this subject as most frequently dealt with. However, legisleaders reported that the governors came to them on gubernatorial programs more than the legisleaders went to the governors about such programs.

Legisleaders perceived communications informing their governor on their personal attitudes regarding measures as being almost as frequent as giving reactions to general programs (see the bottom half of Part 2 of Questionnaire I). Next in importance, based on frequency, was the legisleaders informing their governors of the attitudes of others on measures. Fourthly, legisleaders saw themselves as informing their governor on the content of measures. The penultimate subject matter, of the six suggested on Questionnaire I, was on information about organizational matters. The subject of vetoes, they recorded, was the least frequently discussed. However, the governors' perceptions were that the legisleaders came to them less frequently on organizational matters than on vetoes. In fact, the differing perceptions regarding the frequency of communications on vetoes provided the largest disparity of all between the governors and the legisleaders. The governors' perceptions on legisleaders communicating with them on vetoes averaged out at about 2.75 with the legisleaders' at about 3.50 ("3" being "occasionally" and "4" being "seldom").
Questionnaire II, completed by legislative leaders only, also revealed that 92% of the legislative leaders attempt to influence their governor (from seldom to very frequently) on some legislative or administrative policy. Eleven percent of the respondents reported they initiated a call or letter to their governor when they were in agreement on an item: 54% when trying to find if they were in general agreement on an item, 21% when trying to swing the governor their way if he was on the fence, and 14% if they were trying to convert him to their position.

Some 52% of the legisleaders reported they would initiate a conference with the governor (even if they did not normally communicate with him) if some item of considerable importance to them arose and they were either unsure of his position or thought he was opposed. (Forty-four percent of the 107 who responded said such conferences brought the governors closer to the legisleaders' positions, 36% were unsure, 21% said "no" and 3% did not answer.)

As to other matters which were the subject of communications, it may be assumed that a great deal of talk goes on about politics, as a favorite subject of politicians, but it was neither asked for on the questionnaires nor volunteered.

The aforementioned communications patterns give some insight into the practical, everyday efforts of governors and legislative leaders to accommodate to the principle of sepa-
ration of powers introduced into the American system of government by our founding fathers. Governors are primarily concerned with programs, legislators with particular measures which may impact on their constituencies. The governors cannot put through their programs without the concurrence of the legislature. With few exceptions, bills passed by the legislatures do not become law until assented to by the governors. Each needs the political resources of the other to legitimize public policy—to formalize how the advantages and disadvantages of society are to be authoritatively distributed.

Judging solely from the fairly close balance of aggregate communications initiated by each branch, one branch does not overly dominate the other, suggesting a balance of political resources and powers (as sought by the founders).

61 Twenty-one legislatures reported they did not normally seek communication interaction with the governor because of the separation of powers doctrine. Nevertheless, their average frequency of direct communications with the governor (DIRECT) was 78% of the average for all 202 respondents and 93% of the average of all respondents for all channels (SUMTEN). Their reported actions suggest that their reluctance to communicate was not very strong.
7.3 In Which Channel

Two different types of channels were explored: In Questionnaire I, for both governors and legislative leaders, perceptions were sought regarding face-to-face meetings, telephone calls, group meetings, personal letters or memos, and form letters or duplicated messages. In Questionnaire II, the channels explored were direct dialogue between the governor and the legisleader, through "informal persons," through the governor's staff, through the legisleader's staff, or through both staffs.

Both governors and legisleaders reported via Questionnaire I that the face-to-face, in-person meeting was the most frequent form of communication used between legisleaders and governors. Overall, group meetings were the next most frequent according to the perceptions of the legisleaders, followed by the use of the telephone. The governors perceived telephonic communications and group meetings as about equal in frequency—it depending on the office of the legisleader. (This will be discussed in more detail in the "To whom" section of this chapter.)

The fact that group meetings were requested by both governors and senate presiding officers more frequently when the senates were not controlled by the governors' party suggests that the group meeting may be an important channel for working out differences caused by divided party control.
Personal letters or memos in frequency followed the oral types of communications, with the gubernatorial group and the legislators' group each thinking the other wrote more personal letters. Duplicated letters or messages were the least used as reported by both governors and legislative leaders, but when employed were more frequently initiated by governors.

Among the general findings was the fact that an increase of communications in one channel did not decrease the use of another channel. A blockage of communication channels was found to result in an overall decrease, not simply a rerouting of communications. Apparently if a governor, for example, wanted to deny access to his political resources to a legislleader, denial occurred in all channels.

The governors' staff personnel were found to play a major role in legislative-executive communications. In fact, the data from Questionnaire II of this study showed that they were seen as being involved in more communications between governors and legisleaders than flowed directly between governors and legisleaders.62

---

62 This study did not probe the role of staffs in strategizing, influencing policy, or acting as gatekeepers. However, it can be assumed that the men and women on the governors' staffs are, for the most part, highly experienced and competent persons. As such, they no doubt influence public policy and appointments. Certainly this study shows they have ample opportunity to analyze, modify, and attempt to influence legislative-executive outcomes because of their key role in communications.
Although written in regard to Congressional staffs, the observations of Harrison Fox, Jr. and Susan Hammond (p. 1) are surely as pertinent to legislative or gubernatorial staffs:

...Congressmen have come to view staff assistance as important both to policy formulation and to power acquisition. Control of staff is an important resource. Furthermore, the activities and communications of staff serve as the current medium of exchange within committees for producing ideas, research, hearings, legislation and for securing power.

A low correlation was found between high frequencies in the direct channel to and from the governor and satisfaction with the governor's use of one or more of his staff members. Most legislators were satisfied with the use of the governor's staff, but those satisfied were not necessarily only the frequent communicators. At best, this correlation only weakly supports Proposition 6 (Section 1.4) which would have legislators most frequently communicating with the governor in person also being most satisfied with his use of staff. Informal, non-governmental intermediaries, such as personal friends or party leaders, were reported as playing a minor role in communications between legislators and governors. This would indicate that direct, official channels are sufficiently open as to seldom make evasive or compensatory strategies necessary. In the political processes of bargaining over and "perfecting" legislation, neither legisla-

63 However, a different treatment of the data, presented earlier in Section 5.2, gave stronger support for Proposition 6.
tors nor governors are making extensive use of persons not elected by or responsible to the electorate.

Even when they had staff (and some 16% of those answering the question on staff said they had none), legisleaders seldom used their staff as a communications link with the governors. Legisleaders' staffs were, however, more frequently involved in communications when personnel on the governors' staffs were also involved. Thus it appears legislators' staffs supplemented, and did not replace, communications directly to the governors, thereby supporting Proposition 13 (Section 1.4) which hypothesized such a relationship. As a result of their minor role in legislative-executive communications, legisleaders' staffs would not have as many opportunities to act as gatekeepers or as message manipulators as governors' staff personnel.

Two thirds of the legisleaders reported they were channels for communications between the governor and other legislators, but less than one out of three of this group felt they were ever overloaded with such communications.

7.4 MODULATED BY WHAT FACTORS

Party was found to correlate with the most variation in communications, as hypothesized in Proposition 1 (Section 1.4). It took two forms: Democratic/Republican and being a member/nonmember of the same political party as the gover-
nor. The latter form correlated with the most pronounced differences.

Being a member of the governor's party (GP) related most with changes in the frequency of communication—GP legislators communicating more with governors. They discussed the governors' programs and policies with their governors more than did nonmembers of the governor's party (NGP). They discussed personal attitudes with their governors significantly more than NGP leaders. What has been pointed out in general is also true even for the opposition in that governors claimed they approached opposition presiding officers and majority leaders more frequently than these leaders came to them. So in both cases, whether working with members of his own party or with members of the opposition, governors thought they approached the legisleaders more often than the legisleaders approached them.

Governors communicated more with GP leaders of the legislative chambers than with NGP leaders—with one interesting exception: Governors claim to have conveyed to and to have received more communications from NGP senate presiding officers via group meetings. This is not true for house presiding officers. (It is speculated that this anomaly may exist because of the normal senate function of confirmation.) It suggests that group meetings may have particular utility in working out problems caused by divided party control and, cautiously arranging resource exchanges.
Another area in which the GP/NGP dichotomy shows differences is in the attempts to learn about or influence the governors' positions. GP members, much more than NGP members, said they would initiate communications to the governors if trying to ascertain if they and the governors were in general agreement on an item. The frequency of communications reported did not appear to bear this out. However, NGP members who comparably said they would originate such communications actually did show an increase in communications frequency.

The first thing discovered about the effects of party as a variable was that Republican legisleaders responded significantly better to both questionnaires as reported in Chapter II. (Republican governors also responded better--85% to 74% for the Democrats--but it was not statistically significant.) Despite analyzing the data for possible causes, the reason for this remains unexplained.

Party, as such, made no significant difference as to the frequency of subjects discussed. Republican legisleaders, however, communicated more frequently with Republican governors than Democratic legisleaders with Democratic governors. On the other hand, Republican legisleaders communicated less with Democratic governors than Democratic legisleaders with Republican governors. (In other words, Republicans had both the highest and lowest average frequencies when communicat-
ing with governors, depending upon political party.

There was no difference in parties, though, in reported reliance on personal contact with the governors as a source of information.

Overall, Republican legislators were more satisfied with the communications systems than Democrats. They also reported the widest variations in satisfaction, being most satisfied when Republicans held the gubernatorial chair and least when Democrats did. Democratic legislators reached neither the highest nor lowest averages.

Republicans reported placing more reliance on their party organization as a source of information than did Democrats on theirs. However, party organizations rated low with both groups—seventh out of the eight sources measured. As stated previously, this may be because party leaders (discounting nominal title holders) are generally active members of the governor's administration or of the legislature. There are few Ghandi-like, party leaders who have great political influence but hold no official government position.

Changes in policy positions may come about from legislator-governor discussions, requests from the governor, and general gubernatorial influence. The data in this study revealed a fairly well-balanced give and take between legislators and governors (nationally speaking). It is interesting to note two minor departures from this observation of
"well-balanced" communications: Republican legislatures as a whole report they modify their positions more after discussions with Democratic governors. Democrats serving with Republican governors reported the modification as being more equal, if positions were changed at all.

Democratic respondents reported changing their own anticipated votes more frequently than did Republicans after communications from the governor—whether the same or opposite party. Proposition 18 (Section 1.4) was affirmed in that legislators from one-party states were shown to be less apt to go along with a governor’s program or change their anticipated votes than legislators from states where the parties were more competitive. Without need to rally around the party as a unifying force, the legislature is somewhat more independent of the executive branch.

Republican legislators in states with Republican governors reported the legislatures and the governors had about equal bargaining powers. Democratic legislators in states with Democratic governors perceived the governors as having a somewhat stronger bargaining position. Additionally, both Republican and Democratic respondents serving with Democratic governors reported those governors tried to use their bargaining powers more than was reported by legislators in states with Republican governors. It is believed this variance comes about because of a difference in basic party phi-
losophies. Democrats are more program oriented, especially as concerns welfare and labor, and Democratic governors no doubt try harder to put their programs through the legislature. Republicans tend toward upholding the principle of laissez faire, so Republican governors may be under less pressure to achieve programmatic objectives.

Friendship, surprisingly, was found to play only a minor role in legislative-executive communications. Although an increase in the frequency of communications paralleled higher degrees of friendship, they were generally accounted for by other factors. An exception was found for members of the governors' opposition, wherein friendship did play a role. In such a situation, friendship is apparently exploited to overcome the barriers of party differences in order that some otherwise blocked political objective may be pursued. Friendship, then, can be considered a political resource, and as such gives minimal support to Proposition 2 (Section 1.4).

Political relations, on the other hand, proved to be a more significant variable, correlating with an increase in both frequency of communications and overall satisfaction.

If a person is to play the game of politics, s/he must have political resources. But since few persons have enough resources in and of themselves to achieve their goals, they must resort to a form of bartering. The governor has pres-
tige, visibility, access to benefits derived through his administration, and is generally the key figure in his party in the state--so legislators desire to be seen with him, to offer "suggestions," and to capitalize on what resources working with the governor may bring. Conversely, the governor needs the legislator's support and goodwill in passing legislation, in implementing programs, and in helping the governor garner votes in the legislator's district. Therefore political cooperation, with its exchanges of resources, is born. Even though friendship is a political resource (as stated above), political cooperation would seem to bring more resources. This provides the explanation for Proposition B (Section 1.4), ranking political over personal relationships in influencing frequency of direct communications, being upheld.

Speaking stochastically, communication frequency and satisfaction rose with the pursuit (or is it realization?) of power and enlightenment and their attendant political resources.

A prototypal construct, called "the y factor" was created out of population, geographical section, affluence, degree of decision-making centralization, and professionalism of the legislatures (see Appendix E). This variable correlated with response rate and communication frequency--statistically, the more the y factor associated with a state, the less the response rate and the communication rate.
The communications system was modulated by a perception of communication blockage. If blockage was reported, there was also a decrease in the frequency of communications and of satisfaction with the system. Blockage was found to be associated with decreased communications, not a re-routing of them via different channels.

The population of a state was found to impact on communications frequency—the more populous the state, the lower the frequency and the higher the incidence of blockage. Also, the less the population, the greater the direct contact between legisleaders and governors. Population pressure also correlated with the governors' more frequent use of informal persons and the greater use of both governors' and legisleaders' staffs. Satisfaction with the communication system tended to rise with lower populations.

The time it took physically to get to the governor's office from the legisleader's office had an impact on communications frequency—the shorter the time, the more frequent the communications. Time (distance) also modulated satisfaction in that the closer the physical proximity of the offices, the higher the satisfaction with the communications system.

A reduction in the frequency of communications accompanied centralization of decision making in the legislatures. However, the more centralized the legislature, the greater the share of communications initiated by legisleaders.
Bargaining power appears to cause a rise in communications, particularly directed toward the person or institution perceived as having the best bargaining position. A rise in bargaining activity correlates with a rise in the use of the governor's staff as a communications channel.

7.5 TO WHOM

According to legislators' perceptions, as reported in Questionnaire II, the give and take of communications between the governors and the legislative leaders is remarkably well balanced: 50.5% being initiated by legislators and 49.5% by governors.

Judging only from communications frequencies, it would appear the hope of our founding fathers is being fulfilled in regard to balancing the executive with the legislative power. As our state and territorial governments are currently constituted, the two branches must work out compromises, consensus, and joint programs if any programs are to be implemented at all.

The aggregate data in this study revealed a tendency for both governors and legislative leaders each to think they initiated the most in-person communications to the other. This was tagged "the initiator complex" and confirmed Proposition 12 (Section 1.4) hypothesizing this effect.
Governors and legisleaders prefer, however, to talk to members of their own party. Democratic legisleaders averaged 24 communications per four-week period to Republican governors, but 38 to Democratic governors. Republican legisleaders averaged 19 communications to governors of the Democratic party but 55 to Republican governors.

Overall, governors believe they talk or meet with leaders of the senates and houses about equally. However, governors report they communicate with opposition presiding officers and majority leaders in the senates more frequently than with those officials in the houses. Within the same party, though, governors report sending to and receiving from house Presiding Officers and Majority Leaders more nonwritten communications than from the senate.

Governors report both sending and receiving more communications to presiding officers of both houses than to majority leaders. This differentiation is particularly true for telephone calls, especially those initiated by the governors.

Governors report Majority Leaders of both houses request group meetings more often than do Presiding Officers.

If we consider Presiding Officers, Majority Leaders, and Minority Leaders as roughly hierarchical, then there is a tendency for legisleaders to seek or give information on
personal attitudes in the inverse order of rank (Minority Leaders most frequent).

As would be expected, Minority Leaders not of the governor's party had the lowest frequency of communications to and from the governor. When a veto is being discussed, however, communications between a governor and the Minority Leaders of his party (chambers being in control of the opposition party) rise to a higher frequency than all other subjects. This nicely accords with what the pragmatics of executive-legislative relations would suggest.

According to legisleaders' perceptions, the other legisleaders in their house have somewhat more frequent communications to and from the governor than the respondents themselves. In addition, the legisleaders in the other house are seen as even having a slight edge in the communications' totals over both the respondents themselves, and the other legisleaders in the respondents' chambers--the well-known "grass is greener" phenomenon.

7.6 WITH WHAT EFFECT

This study did not attempt to measure causality, but it seems reasonable to assume that the correlations between the "composite satisfaction" variable, COMPOSAT, and several measures of communications frequency mean that a high frequency of communications between governors and legisleaders
had the effect of increasing satisfaction with the communications system. This finding supported Proposition 4 (Section 1.4).

The greater the opportunity to talk and to engage in feedback, the higher the satisfaction as well. Thus Chapter I's Proposition 5 (Section 1.4) was supported.

The higher number of requests for group meetings reported when the gubernatorial office and the legislatures were controlled by different parties leads one to believe that this form of communication is effective in working out compromises and facilitating the legislative process, in line with Section 1.4's Proposition 21.

The data in this study show that legislators believe that a governor's communications—even if he is of the opposite party—have influence on legislative policy outcomes. This was also confirmed by legislators reporting they had changed anticipated votes as a consequence of receiving a communication from a governor. The same effect occurred even if the governor were of the opposite party, albeit not as frequently.

Almost half of the respondents who reported they initiated conferences with the governor over some item of importance to them reported the governor moved closer to their position. A third remained unsure of the effect of the conferences.
Frequent communications, through working together, brought about a more relaxed relationship between governors and legislators. Contrary to the popular saying that "familiarity breeds contempt," over three-fourths of the legislative respondents reported that working more closely with the governors increased respect.

A high communications rate is strongly correlated with increasing satisfaction, cooperation, and positive feelings for the governor and his programs, and it would appear more likely that the communications are the cause rather than the effect.

7.7 AND WHY

As Lewis Froman said (p. 72), "...the politics of discussion involves attempts to reach consensus or agreement and to avoid annoying disagreements and arguments." Beyond this generality, several specific variables were targeted for research.

Communication was undertaken by legislators in the pursuit of power, at least as that is measured in this study by data on legislators attempting to influence the governor and by their expressing the feeling that access to the governor increases their overall influence.
Communication was also enhanced by the desire for useful **information** on political strategy and skills. To the extent that this is conceptualized as desire for enhancing the values of legislators, it supports Proposition 3 (Section 1.4).

While **friendship** appeared to encourage communications under limited conditions, it was found to be mixed with other intervening variables under most other conditions. Nevertheless, it at least provided an opportunity, and sometimes proved to be a reason, to communicate, especially for legislators not of the governor's party.

**7.8 HUI HOIHOI**

Heretic, rebel, a thing to flaunt.  
But love and I had the wit to win —  
We drew a circle that took him in.  
Edwin Markham

In the Hawaiian language a word for circle is "hui" a word for interest or concern is "hoihoi." ("Hui" is commonly used in the Islands to denote a circle of friends, business partners, or persons whose involvement with each other focuses on or revolves around a particular interest or concern.) Using these colorful words, the idea or concept of creating a circle to further one's interests has been dubbed "Hui hoihoi."
The data in this study show that communications flow most readily when political, economic, social, and value interests are similar. Identification with another actor or role player enhances exchanges of talk, meetings, and letters. The sharpest and strongest symbol of mutual self-interest displayed in this study is political party, and its corollary, membership/nonmembership in the governor's party. If one is perceived to be within the same political party circle, communications is facilitated and satisfaction tends to reign.

It is interesting to note that being on the outside of a party circle does not stop communications. Consciously or unconsciously one or more players simply draw a new circle which includes the person(s) he or she wants to reach, and communications continue to flow. (For example, recall that in Section 7.2 it was stated that 52% of the legislators reported they would initiate a conference with the governor over some issue of importance to them even though they did not normally communicate with the governor.)

Nonmembers of the governor's party create a *hui hoihoi* when they draw on friendship to make their circle bigger than party interests in order to communicate with their governors about legislative or administrative policy.

For example, although this study generally did not try to explain cause and effect, it is noted that where friendship
for the governor is higher among nonmembers of the governor's party, so are attempts to influence the governor, to obtain useful information, and to initiate conferences. Friendship is also associated with the belief that such conferences, once held, bring the governor closer to the legislature's position. Also greater than for unfriendly persons is satisfaction with the communications system.

The data also indicate that it is the "weaker" person or group who generally takes the initiative to draw the bigger circle. The fact that the legislators initiated proportionately more communications than the governors when the governors were reported to have more bargaining power illustrates this point. The converse was true when the legislators were perceived as being in a better position.

7.9 MARRYING COMMUNICATIONS THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY

This study has shown empirically that a great deal of communications occurs between the executive and the legislative branches of state and territorial governments—and it is primarily an oral, as opposed to a written, subculture. The governments are so structured (patterned generally off the federal model) that neither the governor nor the legislature can "rule" without the other since control over governmental acts is constitutionally divided. The powers of governors and of legislatures may vary, but always they are
separated, none following the parliamentary model combining legislative and executive powers. Therefore, to move programs, governors must either have enough political resources to successfully confront the legislators or, more commonly, s/he must woo and bargain with legislators in order to gain enough political resources to implement their gubernatorial programs. Legislators, less apt to have programs on the scale of governors, nonetheless have "pet" projects, bills, or appointments they would like facilitated. Therefore they, too, must woo and bargain with the governors. This provides great opportunities for the exchange of political resources. A study of the data in this research indicates not only that these activities are going on, but that as measured by communications they are reasonably well balanced.

The data gathered and analyzed show very active exchanges in several channels, but primarily through the principals and their staffs—not third or informal persons. Political parties, not originally envisioned by our founding fathers, nor generally given a formal place in the structures of state and territorial governments, play a significant role. Analysis of the data indicates party membership determines to a great extent one's communication boundaries. But party organizations qua organizations did not rate very highly as sources of information, a critical need for the legislators. Such sources are primarily other legislative leaders, the
governors, and governors' staffs with news media, informal third (non-governmental) persons, and party organizations playing a minor role.  

The need for enhancing values and obtaining political resources was discovered to outweigh friendship, so that it was overshadowed by political cooperation which was found to be a key variable and correlated highly with communication/interaction frequencies. Friendship, however, could be useful as, for example, in serving as an entree in the creation of a new circle of interest or hui hoihoi in an attempt to gain a political favor or resource.

According to the data obtained, communications channels within the formal structure of state and territorial governments (party barriers aside) are generally open and used, thus obviating the need for informal or devious channels. This bodes well for current stability and maintenance of open systems of government (assuming the constituents' needs are being considered—a question not directly addressed in this study).

---

64 Of course the party leader is generally the governor or a gubernatorial candidate and key party leaders often hold legislative or executive positions. In those cases, going to the governor or to other legislators may be going to the party—but reference to a party chairman or party functionaries outside of legislative-executive circles is apparently rare.
Where the electorate kept the political parties "on their toes" (as in two-party states) it was found that legislators and governors tended to communicate more and express greater satisfaction with the flow of communications. In working with the data one also got the impression that legislators and governors in competitive states worked together better to develop, pass, and implement party programs. They interacted more to mutually increase their political resources in order to ensure their political survival.

7.10 FURTHER RESEARCH

Why Republicans (both governors and legislators) responded better than Democrats in this study remains an unanswered question. Although a factor which slowed down response rates (among other things) was identified and labelled "the y factor," it applied to states and not to political parties. No variable was identified in this study which explained why Democrats and Republicans should differ in response rates. It was conjectured, for example, that the more highly educated might more readily support this type of research and so respond better—but no significant difference was found in the education levels of Democratic or Republican respondents. Further research might turn up one or more interesting variables which cast light on this question.
Some other areas in which Republicans and Democrats responded differently were:

- In the total number of communications sent and received in ten channels (SUMTEN).

- In the reliance placed on the party organization as a source of information about the governor's program and wishes (SRCPARTY).

- In the perception and use of bargaining power (BRGNPOWR and GOVPARGN).

Given all of these differences, there may be some unrecognized bias in the surveys which the author was unable to detect. There is also the intriguing possibility that Republican and Democratic legislators are different.

Another matter which might be pursued is the very rudimentary "Y factor" construct and its relation to communications. Further research could help identify and define this still little-understood variable and its role.

Since the Homans hypothesis (Homans: 120)—that as the degree of liking among two or more persons increased, interaction would increase—did not receive clear-cut support in this study, more research could delve into the role of friendship in state politics. Is it overshadowed by or subservient to political expediency? More precise measures of both friendship and political expediency could be designed and then used in measuring interaction or communication.

A further matter to investigate is whether the data in this study run counter to Barnlund's hypothesis (Barnlund:
That people prefer to communicate with those who hold similar views. Or was another principle operating, involving need or expediency?

With experience or longevity, do communications patterns change? Over time, is there more direct communication, for example, or more satisfaction with the system because it is understood better and more effectively used? The data developed by the surveys did not permit of use for this form of inquiry.

More open-ended research on the subjects discussed among governors and legislators may have been fruitful. This study posited a limited number of specific subjects (such as organizational matters, vetoes, etc.) but it did not invite the respondents to report their own perceptions—from exchanges on the weather and other trivia to weightier matters. Perhaps some important subjects, whether in terms of importance or of time, were missed in the items listed. How much time is taken up discussing constituents' concerns, for example? With time duration weightings included, perhaps quite a different way of describing or categorizing even the subjects posed by the surveys would have emerged.

Why do members of the legislators' own staffs figure so poorly in legislative-executive communications? Is their social standing a factor, or their relative inexperience, or the perception of their lacking "clout"? hierarchy of mes-
sengers on the governor's staff? Does he use certain ones for the more important or critical items and lesser staff members for other items? Is the staff either not designed to provide or incapable of providing essentially political information (Porter: 45)? This study made no attempt to study these aspects of legislative-executive communications. The importance of the governor's staff was manifested, and this very fact warrants further inquiry.

The use of factor analysis and path analysis on this or future data should prove most fruitful in shedding additional light on groupings and on possible causal order.

Judging from both oral and written anecdotal comments volunteered, the personality of the governor, quite apart from such factors as his party membership, power, or citizenship in a state high in the y factor, influences communications. This whole area could be researched more thoroughly beyond the semantic differential (on page 7 of Questionnaire II) used in this study.

It would be very interesting to compare the results of this study with legislative-executive communications patterns nationally as well as with findings from studies of parliamentary democracies and communications in dictatorial or communist nations.
In short, legislative-executive communications, only just opened by the analysis in this thesis and the surveys on which it is based, constitutes a fascinating field, rich with promise for the understanding of the political process.
Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE I - LEGISLATORS

On the following pages is a copy of the first questionnaire sent to legislative leaders in the initial research effort referred to in Section 1.5 of Chapter I.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AND GOVERNORS

A study by the University of Hawaii, on behalf of the State of Hawaii and the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders.

Part 1. Background Information

Name of State ________________________________________________________________

Name of office you hold in Legislature __________________________________________

Your party affiliation __________________________________________________________

Number of persons employed on your staff _______________________________________

If you specialize in liaison work with the Governor's Office, how many and in what way? ________________________________________________________________

If there are recognized political groupings or party factors which materially affect legislative leader-executive communications, please explain: ________________________________________________________________

Is your office in the same building as that of the Governor? _________________________

On the average, for you to leave your office and call on the Governor in his office takes: i) less than a minute; ii) 1 up to 3 minutes; iii) 3 up to 5 minutes; iv) 5 up to 10 minutes; v) 10 minutes or over. (please circle most appropriate time)

Relation to the Governor:

Personal relationship (please check most appropriate statement)

I consider the Governor an old personal friend ______

I have known the Governor a long time, but not as a friend ______

My contacts with the Governor are limited to formal duties ______

Other (please explain) _________________________________________________________

Political relationship (please check most appropriate statement)

I strongly supported his election campaign ______

I endorsed his election ______

I neither supported nor opposed his election ______

I went on record against his election ______

I strongly opposed his election ______
### Part 2. Communications to Governor Initiated by Legislative Leaders

**How do you and the other legislative leaders personally communicate with the Governor?**

(Please indicate frequency by placing one of the following numbers in each of the boxes, as appropriate: 1 = very frequently; 2 = frequently; 3 = occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your communications</th>
<th>Other leaders in your house</th>
<th>Leaders in other house</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In person - face to face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person - by telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person - in group meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing - personal letter or memo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing - form letter or duplicated message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

Do you and the other legislative leaders regularly use one or more staff members to communicate with the Governor? (If "no," please complete the following without regard to the staff; if "yes," please indicate frequency for both legislative leaders and staff by placing one of the following numbers in each of the boxes, as appropriate: 1 = very frequently; 2 = frequently; 3 = occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of legislation initiated comm.</th>
<th>You</th>
<th>Other leaders in your house</th>
<th>Their staff</th>
<th>Leaders in other house</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inform. on content of measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform. on personal attitude regarding measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform. about attitudes of others on measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform. about organizational matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to gubernatorial veto (incl. anticipated veto)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to general gubernatorial program/policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

---

187
### Part 3. Communications to Legislative Leaders Initiated by Governor

How does the Governor personally communicate with you and the other legislative leaders? (Please use the same numbers to indicate frequency.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor communicates</th>
<th>to you</th>
<th>to other lead.s</th>
<th>leaders in other house</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In person- face to face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- by telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- in group meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- personal letter or memo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- form letter or duplicated message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

("nature of "Other"): 

Does the Governor regularly use one or more of his staff members to communicate with legislative leaders? (If "no," please complete the following without regard to his staff; if "yes," please use the same numbers to indicate frequency in each of the boxes.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Gov. initiated com.</th>
<th>Gov. to you</th>
<th>staff- Gov. to you</th>
<th>Gov.-leg. to leg.</th>
<th>Gov.-leg. to others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for general gubern'l program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support on particular measures (incl. request for opposition to measures)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for support on other matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about veto actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

("nature of "Other"): 

If the Governor regularly communicates with legislative leaders through use of one or more of his staff members, do you find this arrangement satisfactory? If not, please explain: 

__________________________________________
Part 4. Informal and Indirect Communications

Do you or the other legislative leaders use any indirect or other informal means of communication with the Governor or his staff members (as by personal friend or party leaders to carry messages and requests)?

If "yes," please explain and indicate frequency:

Does the Governor use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with you or other legislative leaders (other than personally or by staff member)?

If "yes," please explain and indicate frequency:

Part 5. Negotiations, Strategy Planning, Informal Relations

Do you or other legislative leaders meet with the Governor or anyone acting on his behalf to plan legislative strategy, conduct negotiations, etc.?

Please specify by placing a check in the appropriate column on each line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>You</th>
<th>Other Leg. Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>Occas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freq.</td>
<td>Occas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The Governor personally
b. Governor's staff member
c. Governmental official not on Governor's staff
d. Non-governmental intermediary, as party leader, personal friend, etc.

If "frequently" for b, c, or d, please describe the office or role more specifically:

Part 6. Conclusion

Please put here any general comments you may wish to add on the way in which liaison is handled between legislative leaders and the Governor's office:

Date:

Name:
Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE I - GOVERNORS

The following is a copy of a National Governors' Conference Resolution which was instrumental in obtaining data for this study:

National Governors' Conference
60th Annual Meeting
Cincinnati, Ohio
July 21-24, 1968

XXXIII

EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE LIAISON STUDY

WHEREAS, through the good offices of Governor John A. Burns, it has been brought to the attention of the National Governors' Conference that the University of Hawaii is conducting a study of liaison between the legislatures and the offices of the Governors in all states, and

WHEREAS, a survey of this nature promises to provide useful data which should enable Governors to evaluate the organization and practices affecting executive-legislative liaison in the several states, and

WHEREAS, confidentiality of individual replies from the Governors would be observed by the study team at the University of Hawaii, without identification of particular states in any published reports:

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the National Governors' Conference that all Governors be urged to cooperate in the study of legislative liaison by responding to questionnaires that may be distributed by the study group at the University of Hawaii.
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Part 1. Background Information

Name of State ____________________________________________________________

Number of persons employed on gubernatorial staff __________________________________

If any specialize in liaison work with the legislature, how many, their titles, and in what way ____________________________________________________________

(If more space is required, please use back of this sheet)

If there are recognized political groupings or party factors which materially affect executive-legislative leader communications, please explain: ____________________________________________________________

Are the offices of the Governor and the legislative leaders in the same building? ____________________________________________________________

On the average, for the presiding officers of the legislature to leave their offices and call on the Governor in his office takes: i) less than a minute; ii) 1 up to 3 minutes; iii) 3 up to 5 minutes; iv) 5 up to 10 minutes; 10 minutes or over. (please circle most appropriate time)
## Part 2. Communication Initiated by Governor to Legislative Leaders

How does the Governor personally communicate with the legislative leaders?

(Please indicate frequency by placing one of the following numbers in each of the boxes, as appropriate: 1 = very frequently; 2 = frequently; 3 = occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gov. communicates:</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>presid. officer</td>
<td>majority leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- face to face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- by telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- in group meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- personal letter or memo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- form letter or duplicated message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

Does the Governor regularly use one or more of his staff members to communicate with legislative leaders? (If "no," please complete the following only with relation to the Governor; if "yes," please indicate frequency for both Governor and staff by placing one of the following numbers in each of the boxes: 1 = very frequently; 2 = frequently; 3 = occasionally; 4 = seldom; 5 = never)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Gov. Initiated Communication</th>
<th>from Governor to:</th>
<th>from Staff to:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate Lower House</td>
<td>Senate Lower House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for general gubernatorial program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support on particular measures (incl. request for opposition to measures)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for support on other matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about veto actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

If the Governor regularly communicates with legislative leaders through one or more staff assistants, does he find this arrangement satisfactory? __________

If not, please explain: ____________________________________________
Part 3. Communications Initiated by Legislative Leaders to Governor

How do the legislative leaders personally communicate with the Governor?  
(Please use the same numbers to indicate frequency.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leaders Communicate:</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>presid.</td>
<td>majority leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- face to face</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- by telephone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In person- in group meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- personal letter or memo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In writing- form letter or duplicated message</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

Do the legislative leaders regularly initiate communications with staff members of the Governor's office?  
(If "no," please complete the following only with relation to the Governor; if "yes," please indicate frequency for both Governor and staff by using the same numbers to indicate frequency.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Leg. Initiated Communication</th>
<th>to Gov. from Leaders</th>
<th>to Staff from Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>Lower House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about content of meas.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about personal attitudes on measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about attitudes of others on measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about organizational matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction to govern'l veto (incl. anticipated veto)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions to general govern'l program and policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*nature of "Other":

Do the legislative leaders regularly use their own staff to take messages to the Governor personally?  
Do the legislative leaders regularly use their own staff to communicate with staff members of the Governor's office?  

Part 4. Informal and Indirect Communications

Does the Governor use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with legislative leaders (other than personally or by staff members -- as by personal friend or party leaders to carry messages and requests)? 

If "yes," please explain and indicate frequency: 

Do the legislative leaders use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with the Governor or his staff members? If "yes," please explain and indicate frequency:

Part 5. Negotiations, Strategy Planning, Informal Relations

Does the Governor or anyone acting on his behalf meet with legislative leaders to plan legislative strategy, conduct negotiations, etc.? Please specify by placing a check in the appropriate column on each line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. The Governor personally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Governor's staff member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Governmental official not on Governor's staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Non-governmental intermediary, as party leader, personal friend, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If "frequently" for b., c., or d., please describe the office or role more specifically:

Part 6. Conclusion

Please put here any general comments you may wish to add on the way in which liaison is handled between the Governor’s office and legislative leaders:

Date: 

Name: 

Date: 

Name: 
Appendix C

QUESTIONNAIRE II: LEGISLATORS

LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

On the following pages is a copy of the second questionnaire sent to legislative leaders as outlined in Section 2.5 of Chapter II.
LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

This is part of a study being conducted at the Center for Governmental Development at the University of Hawaii in cooperation with the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders and the National Governors' Conference.

The purpose of the study is to try to identify personal, social, political, economic, and institutional items which may affect communications between legislative leaders and governors -- and thus the workings of our state governments.

Please work rapidly and "tell it like it is." You will help the study most if you give your first and candid impressions. In return, all responses will be held confidential.

1. During the legislative sessions, about how often do you, on the average, initiate direct communications with the governor each week and how often does the governor initiate direct communication with you? (Please use a number like "0", "1", or "10.")

   You initiate Governor initiates

   Directly between governor and yourself
   Thru "informal persons" such as personal friends, party leaders
   Thru the governor's staff
   Thru your staff
   Thru both the governor's staff and your staff

2. In addition, about how often do you both meet and talk in an average week as a result of happenstance or being present at the same gatherings?

3. There are perhaps five channels or routes by which a legislative leader can communicate with the governor, or vice versa. About how often do you, on the average, use each channel each week during legislative sessions in going to the governor and how much does the governor use each channel in coming to you? (Please put dash in channels not used.)

   You to Gov  Gov to You
   Directly between governor and yourself
   Thru "informal persons" such as personal friends, party leaders
   Thru the governor's staff
   Thru your staff
   Thru both the governor's staff and your staff

4. As to frequency, does the governor initiate communications to you:

   Too little
   About right
   Too much

5. If the governor communicates with you through the use of one or more of his staff members, do you find this arrangement satisfactory?

   Yes
   No
   Does not use staff

6. If you communicate with the governor through the use of one or more of your staff members, do you find this arrangement satisfactory?

   Yes
   No
   Do not use staff

7. If you communicate with the governor through personal friends, party leaders, lobbyists, or similar third persons, do you find this arrangement satisfactory?

   Yes
   No
   Do not use third persons

8. If the governor communicates with you through the use of personal friends, party leaders, lobbyists, or similar third persons, do you find this arrangement satisfactory?

   Yes
   No
   Does not use third persons
9. In talking with the governor do you attempt in some way to influence him on some legislative or administrative policy?  
   - Very frequently  
   - Frequently  
   - Occasionally  
   - Seldom  
   - Never  
   - Don't talk with governor  

10. Do you ever feel channels of communication to the governor are blocked?  
   - Very frequently  
   - Frequently  
   - Occasionally  
   - Seldom  
   - Never  

11. Under which of the following four conditions are you most apt to initiate a call or letter to the governor?  
   - When you and the governor are in general agreement on an item  
   - When you are trying to find out if you and the governor are in general agreement  
   - When trying to swing the governor your way if he is on the fence  
   - When trying to convert the governor if he is opposed to your position  
   - (You don't contact the governor)  

12. If you do not normally talk with the governor, but some item arises of considerable importance to you over which the governor has control, do you initiate a conference with him if you are unsure of his position or if you think he is opposed to yours?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - Never had the need so far  

13. If the answer is "yes" above, has the conference brought the governor closer to your position?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - Not sure  

14. If you normally do not seek communication interaction with the governor, is it because of:  
   - Difference in party  
   - Difference in faction  
   - Personal dislike  
   - Separation of powers doctrine  
   - His attempts to dominate  
   - It is useless  
   - Other (please write in)  

15. When the governor is presenting his goals to you, to what extent does he encourage questions, comments, or counterarguments?  
   - To a great extent  
   - To some extent  
   - Very little  
   - Don't meet with governor  

16. If your state has generally-recognized, fairly stable factions in one or both parties:  
   - Does the governor belong to the same faction that you do?  
   - Do you and the governor belong to opposite factions of the same party?  
   - Do you belong to a different party than the governor?  
   - Your state does not have recognised, fairly stable factions  

17. In your experience, if the governor is of your party and/or faction, do you tend to communicate more with the governor or less if he holds opinions different from yours on legislative policies?  
   - More  
   - Less
18. If the governor is not of your party or faction, do you tend to communicate more with the governor, or less, if he holds different opinions than you on legislative issues?

19. Do most rank and file legislators in your house go directly to the governor or do they communicate through one of the officers?

- Directly to the governor
- Thru the presiding officer
- Thru the majority leader
- Thru the committee chairman
- Thru the minority leader
- Other:

20. If you serve as a channel for communications between the governor and other legislators, do you sometimes feel overloaded with communications?

- No
- Sometimes
- Often
- Not a channel

21. Judging from your experiences in discussions between legislative leaders and the governor, who do you think changes or modifies their position more?

- The governor
- The legislators
- Neither

22. When the governor's legislative program is presented, to what extent do you generally go along with it?

- Fully
- Partially
- Hardly at all
- Not at all

23. Do you recall instances where you have changed your anticipated vote as a consequence of a communication from the governor?

- Many times
- Several times
- Once or twice
- Never

24. How much influence would you say the governor's communications have on legislative policy outcomes in your state?

- A great deal
- Moderate
- Little
- No
- A negative influence

25. This study involves basically seven people whose generally used titles or positions are listed below. First, please put a line thru any position not used in your state. Next, place an "X" after your position. Thirdly, please put a "1" after the person you communicate most with during the months your legislature is in session, a "2" after the second most frequently communicated with, and a "3" after the third most frequently communicated with, and skip the rest:

(Please mark yourself and three others only — we aren't set up to code more!)

- Governor
- Lieutenant Governor
- Senate President
- (other than a Lt Governor)
- Senate Majority Leader
- Senate Minority Leader
- House Speaker
- House Majority Leader
- House Minority Leader
- Other:
26. Previous studies indicate there are some states where conditions (derived from the constitution, laws, custom, or election practices) are such that the governor has a number of powers (balances of funds, appointments, administrative decisions, veto, party or factional organization) that he can use to influence or control the legislature while the legislature or legislators seem to have few counter powers. In some states the legislature has more powers with which to influence the governor than he the legislature, while in still a third group of states the powers of the governor and of the legislature are about equal. Which conditions best describe your state?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The legislature has more powers to bargain with than the governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The legislature and the governor have about equal bargaining powers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>The governor has more powers with which to bargain than the legislature.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Does the governor use his bargaining powers in attempting to influence the legislature?

- Very frequently
- Frequently
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

28. Do the legislators use their bargaining powers in attempting to influence the governor?

- Very frequently
- Frequently
- Occasionally
- Seldom
- Never

29. Considering the condition you checked in #26 above, does talking to or writing the governor:

- Help to equalize the powers of the legislature vs. those of the governor.
- Help to unbalance them still further in the direction indicated in #26.
- Have little effect on the balance of power.
- Have no effect on the balance of power.

30. In some jurisdictions lobbyists go first to see legislators on desired legislation, in others they go first to see the governor. Where do they go first in your state?

- Governor
- Legislature
- Don't know

31. Who is the "Chief of the Legislative Party" or has the most influential office in your state senate?

- President (who is not Lt Gov)
- President Pro Temp
- Majority Leader

32. In your state, what person, group, or attribute generally plays the largest real or actual (not just formal) role in choosing the legislative leaders?

- Governor
- Legislative leadership
- Lobbyists or pressure groups
- Majority faction of majority party
- Party leadership
- Seniority
- Other

(Please mark only one category in each column)
33. In each house of your legislature, which officer is most responsible for or most involved with putting through, or helping to put through, the governor’s programs?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>House</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Governor</td>
<td>Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President (Not Lt Gov)</td>
<td>Vice Speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Pro Tem</td>
<td>Majority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Leader</td>
<td>Majority Floor Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority Floor Leader</td>
<td>Administration Floor Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Floor Leader</td>
<td>Minority Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Leader</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. Based on your experience or observations, do you think the officers you checked above have more or less respect for the governor, as a result of their working with him and his program, than other legislative leaders of their same party or faction?

35. Do you think the officers checked in 33 above have a more formal or less formal (more relaxed) relationship with the governor, as a result of their working with the governor and his program, than other legislative leaders of their same party or faction?

36. Please indicate the extent of reliance you place on each source of information about the governor’s program and wishes by placing an “X” in each vertical column opposite the row description which best fits your case (just one “X” in each column)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal contact with Gov’s staff</th>
<th>Informal contacts—friends, etc</th>
<th>Your Newspaper &amp; TV</th>
<th>Other legislative leaders</th>
<th>Party messages from Gov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not much</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

37. Most legislators who rise to positions of leadership can probably be classed as either rivals or supporters of the incumbent governor — whether of the same party or not. Some legislative leaders may be competing for the governor’s chair, or for popularity, or for decision-making power. Others may be classed as supportive because the furtherance of their interests (legislative programs, an appointment) is best served by supporting the incumbent governor. Since we are interested in how such relations may affect communication patterns, please indicate for the six legislative officials we are studying which of these two characteristics more nearly describes each incumbent’s relations with the present governor. (Please include yourself but cross off positions not used in your state.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senate President Officer (Other than Lt Governor)</th>
<th>Rivalry</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Senate Majority Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Minority Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Speaker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Majority Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Minority Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
38. Do you feel that your access to the governor increases your power to influence legislation and appointments, get funds allocated, and obtain favorable administrative decisions?  
- Considerably  
- Some  
- Little  
- None  
- Governor not accessible to me

39. In discussions with the governor do you sometimes pick up useful information on political strategy and skills?  
- Frequently  
- Occasionally  
- Seldom  
- Never

40. To which party do you belong?  
- Democratic  
- Republican  
- Other

41. Considering friendship alone, without regard to party, public position, etc., how would you classify your relations with the governor?  
- Most friendly  
- Friendly  
- Neutral  
- Unfriendly  
- Most unfriendly

42. However, taking into consideration your position, your party or faction, and your relations with your colleagues, how would you classify your political relations with the governor?  
- Very cooperative  
- Cooperative  
- Neutral  
- Opposed  
- Strongly opposed

43. In what age group do you fall?  
- 60's  
- 50's  
- 40's  
- 30's  
- 20's

44. In your formal education, what was the highest diploma awarded?  
- Doctorate  
- Master's, LLB, or Professional  
- BA or BS  
- Associate of Arts (16th)  
- Senior High School  
- Junior High School  
- Grammar (8th)  
- Elementary (6th)  
- Other

45. In meetings and discussions which include the governor, what opportunity do you have to talk (whether you do or not)?  
- Considerably  
- Some  
- Little  
- None  
- Don't meet with governor

46. Looking at the communications of all types and by whatever route between yourself and the governor, overall do you consider the communications system?  
- Very satisfactory  
- Satisfactory  
- Neither one nor the other  
- Unsatisfactory  
- Very unsatisfactory
In the "Semantic Differential" technique below, you are asked to describe the incumbent governor and his program by means of ten adjective pairs. For example, if you thought the governor was extremely fair you would check the space next to "FAIR" on a FAIR-UNFAIR continuum. If you thought he was neither wise nor foolish on a WISE-FOOLISH continuum, you would check the middle (neutral) blank of the scale. Please do not omit any line. Work rapidly; we are still interested in your first impressions.

THE GOVERNOR

ABLE _______ INEPT
AUTOCRATIC _______ DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNICATIVE _______ UNCOMMUNICATIVE
CONSERVATIVE _______ LIBERAL
FOLLOWER _______ LEADER
LIKED _______ DISLIKED
LISTENING _______ NONLISTENING
STRONG _______ WEAK
UNINFORMED _______ INFORMED
UNTRUSTWORTHY _______ TRUSTWORTHY

THE GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM

GOOD _______ BAD
DRIFTING _______ GOAL ORIENTED
WELL STAFFED (i.e., coordinated) _______ BADLY STAFFED
INNOVATIVE _______ TRADITIONAL
EXPENSIVE _______ INEXPENSIVE
UNREALISTIC _______ REALISTIC
MEANINGFUL _______ MEANINGLESS
SOCIA/LY UNCONCERNED _______ SOCIALLY CONCERNED
PARTY ORIENTED _______ PERSONALLY ORIENTED
WINDOW DRESSING _______ SUBSTANTIVE

Name: ____________________________ State: ____________
Position in Legislature: ______________________ Date: ____________
Kindly check back to see that you did not inadvertently skip a question.

MAHALO NUI! (Thanks much!)
Appendix D

DESCRIPTIOINS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES USED IN THIS STUDY

(Alphabetically by Coding Abbreviation)*

ABLEGOV = "ABLE GOVERNOR": A measure of how able or inept a respondent considered his governor. Based on a 7-point semantic differential scale on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 36/8.

ACCESS: A measure of how much a legislator believes his access to his governor increases his power to influence political outcomes. Based on the 4-part scale of question 38, Questionnaire II. Col 22/8.


AGEGROUP: "AGE GROUP": Age decade in which respondent fell (e.g., a person of 63 would be coded 6). Based on question 43 of Questionnaire II. Col 30/8.

*NOTES FOR THIS APPENDIX:

(1) LL stands for Legislative Leader throughout.
(2) Where variables exist on punched cards, their column number and card (record) number are given. Some variables, however, particularly those derived from other variables, were never punched but were created and existed on computer disks. They are labelled simply "DISK."
(3) Cards not labelled (i.e., 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9) contain data on legislative leaders. Governors' cards are so labelled.
(4) Questionnaire II referred to herein can be found in Appendix C.
AGREE = "AGREEMENT INDEX": Inasmuch as conflict is one of the chief ingredients of politics, a high amount of agreement on important issues would not be expected, and Francis' study bore this out. However, the legislators of some states exhibited higher levels of agreement or consensus than others. Therefore Francis rank ordered the 50 states on the basis of the 1963 data and an Agreement Index was formed (1=high agreement, 50=low agreement). (In the course of this study it was found that AGREE correlated .35 with PCNFC, .07 with PCNFCT, and .34 with PRESGP.) Source: Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States. Chicago: McNally, 1967, 44-45.

AGREEMENT = "GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNOR": Whether or not respondent reported he would be apt to initiate a call or letter to his governor to find out if they were in general agreement on an item. Based on one item in Questionnaire II. Col 45/6.

ATLANTA = "ATLANTA CONFERENCE": Whether or not respondent was at the 1969 National Conference of State Legislative Leaders and in which of three "waves" he responded to Questionnaire II. See column 5 of Card 6 in Appendix G for more details. Col 5/6.

AUTOCRAT = "AUTOCRATIC OR DEMOCRATIC": Where respondent placed his governor on an autocratic-democratic 7-point semantic differential scale. Based on an item on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 37/8.

AVLVETOOG: Average frequency of communications initiated by legislators in the house and senate to the governor on vetoes or anticipated vetoes as perceived by the governors. Averages are used for economy since it was rare to find responses which differed between the chambers. Col 42/GovCard 1.

AVOLIPFG: Average frequency of communications initiated by other legislative leaders in the house and senate to the governor, in person, face to face, governor's perception. Averages are used in the interest of economy since preliminary analysis found little significant differences between the two items averaged. Col 26/GovCard 1.

AVOLIPGG: Average frequency of communications initiated by other legislators in the house and senate to the governor, in person, in group meetings, governor's perception. Averages are used in the interest of economy since early analysis found little significant differences between the two items averaged. Col 28/GovCard 1.
BILSPDAY = "BILLS PER DAY": The average number of bills enacted per session calendar day found by dividing the number of enactments in 1968 and 1969 by the number of calendar days in session. Source of data was from a copy of the worksheets for the then forthcoming volume of The Book of the States as furnished the writer by the Council of State Governments.

BILLIN = "BILLS INTRODUCED": The number of bill introductions less resolutions (where separately identified) for regular and extra sessions in 1968 and 1969. Source of data was from a copy of the worksheets for the then forthcoming volume of The Book of the States as furnished by the Council of State Governments.

BILLS% = "PERCENT OF BILLS INTRODUCED THAT WERE PASSED": The number of enactments divided by the number of bills introduced in the 1968 and 1969 regular and special sessions. Source: From a copy of the worksheets furnished by the Council on State Governments by enclosures to their letters to the writer dated January 28 and February 22, 1970.

BLOCKED = "CHANNELS BLOCKED?": Whether respondent believed channels of communication to his governor were never, seldom, occasionally, frequently, or very frequently blocked. Based on question 10 of Questionnaire II.

BRGNPOWR = "BARGAINING POWER": Whether, according to respondent's perception, the legislature or the governor had more bargaining powers, or whether they were about equal. Based on question 26 of Questionnaire II. Col 23/7.

CALDAY = "CALENDAR DAYS IN SESSION": The number of calendar days the legislature was in session in 1968 and 1969 divided by ten and rounded. Source: Letter of Jan 28, 1970 from the Director of Research of the Council of State Governments to the writer. Cols 47-48/5.

CALL: A measure of the time it takes, on the average, for the responding legislator to leave his office and call on the governor in his office. Col 17/LLCard1.

CHANGED = "CHANGED VOTE": proclivity of respondent to change his anticipated vote as a consequence of a communication from the governor. Based on question 23 of Questionnaire II. Col 12/7.

COMINIT = "COMMUNICATIONS INITIATIVE": Derived by subtracting the figure the legislator respondent reported the governor initiated in direct communications with him in Question 1 of Questionnaire II (columns 9 & 10, card 6) from the number of times the legislator reported initiating direct
communications with the governor (columns 7 & 8, card 6). The intent is to measure whether the legislator or the governor initiated the most communications—as perceived by the legislator. A positive number means the legislator initiates more than the governor. Zero means both the respondent and the governor initiate equally (or that neither initiates!). A negative number means the governor initiates to the legislator more frequently. DISK

COMMUN = "COMMUNICATIVE": A measure of how communicative or uncommunicative the respondent LLs report their governors to be. Based on a 7-point semantic differential scale found on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 38/8.

COMPOSAT = "COMPOSITE SATISFACTION SCORE": A variable derived from adding the scores for FREQUENCY, GSSLLSAT, LLSSG, BLOCKED, CLOSER, FEEDBACK, OPTALK, OVERSAT, COMMUN, and LISTNING. In some cases the raw scores were modified slightly so that the maximum for any one variable was 5 in order that all had equal weight. Scores for COMPOSAT for each legislator were based only on those variables having responses. Thus a raw total derived from 9 responses was divided by 9, that for 5 responses by 5, etc. The higher the score, the higher the satisfaction. DISK

CONVERT: A dichotomized variable indicating whether or not the LL would be apt to initiate a call or letter to the governor if he were trying to convert the governor from opposition to support of the LL's position. Based on an item of question 11 of Questionnaire II. Col 48/6.

DEMCON = "DEMOCRATIC CONTROL": The number of chambers in each state controlled by the Democratic Party as reported by the respondents in Questionnaire II. If the Democrats were in the majority in both houses, the state was coded 2, if one, 1, and if in none, 0. Col 47/4.

DEMOREP = "DEMOCRAT, OTHER, REPUBLICAN": A trichotomized variable indicating whether a legislator is a member of the Democratic, Republican, or "other" party. Basically a nominal level variable, it can also be treated as ordinal in terms of its "Democraticness"—going from 0 (Republican) through 1 (Other Party) to 2 (Democrat). Derived from question 40, Questionnaire II. Col 25/8.

DIRCOM = "TOTAL DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS": The sum of the two figures for the number of communications initiated directly between the governor and the respondent by the respondent and by the governor; that is, the first "channel" in question 3, Questionnaire II. Cols 13-14 & 23-24/6.

DIRINCOM = "DIRECTLY INITIATED COMMUNICATIONS": The total of the number of times the respondent perceived he initiated
direct communications with the governor and the number of times the governor initiated direct communications with him (question 1, Questionnaire II). Since the "direct communications" of question 1 are essentially the same as those "directly between governor and yourself" in the five-part breakout of question 3, this designation is used simply to distinguish between the sources of the data, i.e., question 1 rather than question 3. Col 7-8 & 9-10/6.

DCENT = "INDEX OF CENTRALIZATION IN DECISION-MAKING": A centralization index for legislatures ranging from 0 to 1. If the legislative respondents thought the most important decisions were made "in the governor's office" or "in policy committee," a 1 was assigned. If the most important decisions were reported to be made "in party caucus," a .5 was assigned. No points were given if the respondent said "in regular committee meetings" or "on the floor." In each state the scores were totalled and then divided by the number of responses. Therefore a high score—approaching 1—indicates highly centralized decision-making. Source: Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States, Chicago: McNally, 1967, 72-78. Cols 33-34/4.

EDUCN = "EDUCATION LEVEL": An 8-point scale standing for the highest diploma awarded, from 1 for the sixth grade to 8 for doctorate. Based on responses to question 44 of Questionnaire II. Col 31/8.

EXPNSIVE = "IS GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM EXPENSIVE?": A measure of how expensive (coded 1) or inexpensive (coded 7) the respondent thought his governor's program was. Based on the 7-point semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 50/8.

FACTION: LL's report as to whether he belongs to the governor's faction, is a member of a faction to which the governor does not belong—although of the same party, or belongs to a different party. Derived from questions 14, 16, and 40 of Questionnaire II. Col 68/8.

FAIIR = "F.A.I.I.R. OVERALL RANK": A composite rank for each legislature based on how each state legislature measured up to minimal standards of legislative capability in five major categories of Functionality, Accountability, Information handling capacity, Independence, and Representation. (In this study it was found FAIIR correlates with its five major characteristics as follows: with Functionality, .71; with Accountability, .79; with Information handling capacity, .88; with Independence, .65; and with Representativeness, .53. The separate categories were not used in this study because of their fairly high correlation with FAIIR as a whole. Source: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, "Report on an Evaluation of the 50 State Legislatures," 1971. Cols 45-46/4.
FCNFCT = "FACTIONAL CONFLICT": This scale was designed by Wayne L. Francis to measure conflict between factions within the legislatures. It was based on responses to a questionnaire. Partisan conflict (PCNFCT) was .00 in Alabama but factional conflict was .41, for example. In this study it was found that factional conflict correlated .07 with Francis' Agreement Index (AGREE) and .16 with pressure group conflict. Source: Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States, Chicago: McNally, 1967, 44-45. Cols 50-51/4.

FEEDBACK: The extent to which the governor encourages questions, comments or counterarguments when presenting his goals to legislative leaders—as reported by the LL. Based on question 15 of Questionnaire II. Col 60/6.

FORMAL: Variable measuring whether LL's report legislative officers as becoming more or less formal in their relationships with the governors as they work with them. Based on question 35 of Questionnaire II. Col 69/7.

FRIENDLY = "FRIENDLINESS WITH GOVERNOR": This variable, ranging from "Most Unfriendly" to "Most Friendly," was derived from the 5-point ordinal scale used in question 41 of Questionnaire II (Appendix C). It reflected how a legislator classified his relations with his governor. Col 28/8.

FREQUENCY = "FREQUENCY": LL's report as to whether the governor initiates communications to the respondent too much, too little, or about right. See question 4 of Questionnaire II. Col 33/6.

GDIRECTIL = "GOVERNOR DIRECT TO LEGISLEADER": The number of times in a week, multiplied by four, that the LL reports the governor communicates directly with him during legislative sessions. Based on frequencies reported in the "Gov to You" column of question 3 of Questionnaire II. Cols 23-24/6.

GGSLLSAT = "GOVERNOR THRU GOVERNOR'S STAFF MEMBER TO LEGISLEADER SATISFACTORY?": A "yes" or "no" response to whether legislator finds governor's communicating with him thru a member of the governor's staff satisfactory—if the governor uses staff for communicating. Based on question 5 of Questionnaire II. Col 34/6.

GGSLSLL = "GOVERNOR THRU HIS STAFF AND LEGISLEADER'S STAFF TO LEGISLEADER": The number of times in a week (times four) that the legislator reports the governor communicates with him via both the governor's staff and the legislator's staff during the legislative sessions. Based on part of question 3 of Questionnaire II. Cols 31-32/6.
GGSTFLL = "GOVERNOR COMMUNICATING THRU HIS STAFF TO THE LEGISLEADER": The number of times in a week (times 4 when coded) that the legislator reports the governor communicates with him via the governor's staff during the legislative sessions. Based on part of question 3 of Questionnaire II. Col 27-28/6.

GILLSAT = "GOVERNOR TO LEGISLEADER VIA INFORMAL PERSONS SATISFACTION": A "yes" or "no" answer as to whether respondent finds governor's communicating with him satisfactory through informal persons (e.g., personal friends, party leaders without government posts) -- if the governor uses such a channel. Based on question 8 of Questionnaire II. Col 40/6.

GINFMLLL = "GOVERNOR TO LEGISLEADER VIA INFORMAL PERSONS": LL report of frequency of communications to him from governor via informal persons such as personal friends or party leaders. Based on one of the "Gov to You" channels of question 3 of Questionnaire II. Col 25-26/6.

GINI = "GINI INDEX OF INCOME INEQUALITY": This is a Lorenz curve of what exists serving as a single, summary measure of income inequality. The Lorenz curve is drawn by plotting the percent of cumulative state population on the horizontal. The higher the index (e.g., Mississippi = .506 versus Utah = .393) the higher the inequality. The GINI Index used in this study is based on the year 1959, but no radical changes in relative state positions are assumed to have taken place in 10 years. Source: David Verway, "A Ranking of State by Inequality Using Census and Tax Data," Review of Economics and Statistics, 48 (1966), 317. Cols 28-30/4.

GOODPROG = "GOOD PROGRAM": A measure of how good or bad the responding LL5 reported their governors' programs. Based on a 7-point semantic differential scale found on page 7 of Questionnaire II, Appendix C. Col 46/8.

GOVBARGN = "GOVERNOR BARGAINS": Respondent's perception as to whether his governor uses his bargaining powers in attempting to influence the legislature. Question 27 of Questionnaire II. Col 24/7.

GOVPARTY = "MEMBERSHIP OR NONMEMBERSHIP IN THE PARTY OF THE GOVERNOR": A dichotomized nominal variable based on the legislator's either being a member of the same party (GP) as the governor or not (NGP). Derived from items 14, 16, and 40 of Questionnaire II. Col 72/8.

GOVTOLL = "GOVERNOR TO LEGISLEADER": The number of direct communications initiated by the governor to the respondent in a legislative week, times four. See question 1 of Questionnaire II. Cols 9-10/6.
GRUMMS = "GRUMM'S PROFESSIONALISM INDEX": Using 1963-65 data Grumm developed an index based on (1) the total length of legislative sessions at that time, (2) legislative expenses, (3) legislative services (such as a legislative reference bureau), and (4) the compensation of legislators. (For this thesis it was found that Grumm's Index correlated .80 with direct dollar measures of the biennial compensation of legislators as of September 1969, and so the use of compensation as a separate variable was dropped after using it in some initial calculations.) Source: John G. Grumm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Output," a paper prepared for the Conference on the Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, Michigan, July 28 to August 3, 1968, page 27. Cols 69-71/4.

GUSESTAP = "GOVERNOR USES STAFF": Dichotomized variable indicating whether the governor reports using one or more of his staff in communicating with LL. Part 2 of the Governors' Questionnaire. Col 20/GovCard 2.

HILOPOPN = "HIGH OR LOW POPULATION": The 54 states and territories were grouped into the 27 most highly populated pol­ities and the 27 lowest for study purposes. Col 5/8.

HINATR = "HIGHWAYS-NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY FACTOR SCORES": The factor scores for each state on one factor of a factor analysis of twelve policy variables surviving from an original 26. This factor's major components are measures of rural highway mileage and highway expenditures, plus measures of fish and wildlife services and expenditures for natural resources. In other words, these factor scores give an overall measure of the general policy orientation of a state (therefore of its legislature) toward highways and natural resources. Data are from the year 1962. Source: Ira Shar­kansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Poli­tics, Economics, and Public Safety," American Political Sci­ence Review, (Sep 69), 867-879. Cols 42-44/4.

INFLUNCE = "INFLUENCE": LL's perception of amount of influence the governor's communications have on legislative poli­cy outcomes. See question 24 of Questionnaire II. Col 13/7.

INFORMED: The legislator's rating of his governor as an informed or uninformed person on a 7-point semantic differ­ential scale from page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 44/8.

INOVATIV: The legislator's rating of his governor as a traditional or innovative person. From a 7-point semantic differential scale on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 49/8.

IPCR = "INTER-PARTY COMPETITION (RANNEY)": An "index of competitiveness" ranging from 0.00 (total Republican suc-
cess) to 1.00 (total Democratic success) for the years 1946 to 1963 for 48 of the 50 states and 1958 to 1963 for Alaska and Hawaii. Devised by Austin Ranney as an adaptation of the Dawson-Robinson measure, it is based wholly on elections for governor and state legislators and therefore is particularly applicable for this study. (For this research the scores were multiplied by 100 to eliminate the decimal.) Source: Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, Politics in the American States, Boston: Little, Brown, 1965, 61-99. Cols 66-67/LL2.

IPCR4 = Same as IPCR but duplicated on State Characteristics Card 4 for use with state runs.

LEADER: The LL's rating of his governor as a follower or leader on a 7-point semantic differential scale. An item on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 40/8.

LEGBARGN = "LEGISLATORS BARGAIN": Respondents' perceptions as to whether the legislators of their state use their bargaining powers never, seldom, occasionally, frequently, or very frequently in attempting to influence the governor. See question 28 of Questionnaire II. Col 25/1.

LEGCONTL = "LEGISLATIVE CONTROL": The position of a respondent within a legislature and the degree of control of that legislature by the party of the governor:

3 = Majority member of a legislature controlled by the GP (Governor's Party);
7 = Minority member of a legislature controlled by the GP;
6 = Majority member of a chamber controlled by GP but with other chamber controlled by NGP (nonmembers of governor's party)
5 = Minority member of a chamber controlled by GP but with other chamber controlled by NGP;
4 = Majority member of a chamber controlled by NGP but with other chamber controlled by GP;
3 = Minority member of a chamber controlled by NGP but with other chamber controlled by GP;
2 = Majority member of a legislature controlled by NGP;
1 = Minority member of a legislature controlled by NGP. Col 21/8.

LEGENX = "LEGISLATIVE EXPENSE": Legislative expenditures (for legislators' salaries, legislative reference bureau expenses, committee work, etc.) as a percent of the total state expenditures. Source: Table 1 of the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures Research Memorandum entitled Legislative Fiscal Support," revised, July, 1969.

LEGSIZE = "SIZE OF LEGISLATURE": The total authorized membership of both houses (or of the one house, if unicameral).

LIBERAL: The respondent's rating of his governor in terms of conservative (coded 1) to liberal (coded 7) based on the 7-point semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II.

LIKED: The legislator's rating of his governor in terms of liked or disliked based on the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II.
Col 41/8.

LINFLUG = "LEGISLEADER ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE GOVERNOR": A variable based on a 6-part ordinal scale derived from question 9 of Questionnaire II (Appendix C) wherein it is asked how frequently the respondents attempt to influence their governors on some legislative or administrative policy.
Col 42/6.

LINO V = "LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION SCORES": A crude outline of the pattern of diffusion of 88 new programs or policies among the American states, created by Walker. The states with high scores (e.g., New York = .656) tend to adopt new programs much more rapidly than those at the bottom (Mississippi = .298). Source: Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, June 1969, 880-899.

LISTNING = "LISTENING": LL's perception of where his governor lies on a 7-point semantic differential continuum from Listening to Nonlistening (page 7 of Questionnaire II).
Col 42/8.

LLD I RCTG = "LEGISLEADER INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTLY TO THE GOVERNOR": The number of times in a four-week period that the legislatures initiated communications directly to their governors as reported in the "You to Gov" columns of question 3, Questionnaire II.
Cols 13-14/6.

LLGSLSG = "LEGISLEADER INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR VIA BOTH THE GOVERNOR'S STAFF AND HIS OWN STAFF": The number of times in a four-week period that the legislatures initiated communications with their governors by way of both the governors' staffs and their own staffs as reported in the "You to Gov" column of question 3, Questionnaire II.
Cols 21-22/6.

LLGSTFG = "LEGISLEADER INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR THROUGH THE GOVERNOR'S STAFF": The number of times in a four-week period that the legislatures initiated communications with their governors by way of the governor's staff as reported in the "You to Gov" column of question 3 of Questionnaire II.
Cols 17-18/6.
LLIGSAT = "LEGISLEADER TO GOVERNOR VIA INFORMAL PERSONS SATISFACTION": A yes or no answer as to whether the respondent found communicating with the governor through informal persons (e.g., personal friends, third, non-governmental persons, etc.) satisfactory. See question 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 38/6.

LLINFMLG = "LEGISLEADER INITIATING COMMUNICATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR THROUGH INFORMAL PERSONS": The number of times in a four-week period that the legisleaders initiated communications with their governors by way of informal persons as reported in the "You to Gov" column of question 3 of Questionnaire II. Cols 15-16/6.

LLLLSTFG = "LEGISLEADER THRU LEGISLEADER'S STAFF TO GOVERNOR": The number of times in a legislative week (times four) that the legisleader initiated communications to the governor via the legisleader's own staff. Data taken from question 3 of Questionnaire II. Cols 19-20/6.

LLSGSAT = "SATISFACTION WITH LEGISLEADER TO GOVERNOR VIA LEGISLEADER'S STAFF": A yes or no answer as to whether the respondent found communicating with the governor through one or more of his (the LL's) own staff members satisfactory. See question 6 of Questionnaire II. Col 36/6.

LLTOGOV = "LEGISLEADER TO GOVERNOR": How often during the week (times 4) the LL initiates communications directly with the governor during a legislative session. From question 1 to Questionnaire II. Cols 7-8/6.

HOBBYIST: Legisleader's belief that lobbyists go first to the governor (coded 1) or to the legislature (coded 5). "Don't know" responses were coded "3." Based on question 30 of Questionnaire II. Col 30/7.

NEANFUL = "IS GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM MEANINGFUL?": The degree to which the respondent rated his governor's program as meaningless (coded 1) to meaningful (coded 7). Taken from the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 52/8.

MODIFIES: LL's perceptions as to whether governor, legisleaders, or both equally, or neither changes position following discussions. See question 21 of Questionnaire II. Col 10/7.

NGP = "NOT MEMBER GOVERNOR'S PARTY:" See GOVPARTY variable.

NOSO = "NORTH-SOUTH": The eleven states of "The Old Confederacy" (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) were coded 2, the remaining 39 coded 3, and the four territories were coded 1.
OPTALK = "OPPORTUNITY TO TALK": LL's perception as to whether he has no opportunity, little, some, or considerable opportunity to talk with the governor in meetings and discussions, or whether he doesn't meet with the governor at all. See question 45 of Questionnaire II. Col 32/8.

OVERLOAD: If the respondent LL thinks of himself as a channel between the governor and other legislators (and 121 did), does he not feel overloaded, sometimes, or often feel overloaded? See question 20 of Questionnaire II. Col 7/7.

OVERSAT = "OVERALL SATISFACTION": A variable measuring each LL's report of his overall satisfaction with the communications system with the governor. See question 46 of Questionnaire II. Col 34/8.

PTYMATCH = "PARTISANSHIP OF LEGISLEADER AND HIS GOVERNOR MATCHED OR OPPOSING?: If a legislleader other than a Republican or Democrat had a governor of a different party it was coded 1, if a Democrat had a Republican governor it was coded 2, a Republican with a Democratic governor was coded 3, a legislleader other than a Democrat or Republican with a governor of his own party was coded 4, a Democrat with a Democratic governor was given a 5, and a Republican with a Republican governor was coded 6. Disk

PARTYORN = "PART ORIENTATION": A measure of how party or personally oriented a respondent LL considered his governor. Based on a 7-point semantic differential scale on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 54/8.

PCNFACT = "PARTISAN CONFLICT": This scale was designed to measure conflict between the parties within the legislature and not in the elections. It was based on responses to the question whether there was a "heated partisan fight" over certain matters of policy. It was found to vary greatly from state to state. A low score meant low conflict. This Partisan Conflict scale correlated -.76 with Hofferbert's Interparty Competition rank ordered scale (not used). Source: Wayne L. Francis, Legislative Issues in the Fifty States, Chicago: McNally, 1967, 44-45.

POLICOOP = "POLITICAL COOPERATION": How cooperative or opposed the respondent LL rated himself on his political relations with the governor. See question 42 of Questionnaire II. Col 29/8.

POWERBUD = "GOVERNOR'S POWER OVER THE BUDGET": A measure of the governors' power over their states' budgets on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high) taken from Joseph A. Schlesinger's "A Combined Index of the Formal Powers of the Governors." The reliability of this index was upheld by a study of Thad L. Beyle's as reported in "The Governor's Formal Powers: A View from the Governor's Chair," Public Administration Review, 28/No. 6 (Nov/Dec 1968), pp. 540-545.

POWERTOT = "GOVERNOR'S FORMAL AND INFORMAL POWERS": A measure of each governor's total combined power on a scale from 6 (low) to 19 (high) as devised by Schlesinger (see POWERBUD). The budget power, appointive power, tenure potential, and veto power were combined to form this total combined power index.

REALISTIC = "IS THE GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM REALISTIC?": The degree to which the respondent rated his governor's program as unrealistic (coded 1) to realistic (coded 7). Based on the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II.

REDIST = "REDISTRIBUTION RATIO": The summary measure of redistribution is the ratio of expenditure benefits to revenue burdens for the lowest three (of nine) income groups, constituting a measure of the influence of political variables in the allocation of the burdens and benefits of public policies. Source: Brian W. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," American Political Science Review, 44, (June '70), 508-522.

REGION: Ten regions of the U.S. (New England, Border States, etc.). Please see the initial page of Appendix G, Coding, for details.

RESPECT: LLs' reports as to whether they believe legislative officers have more or less respect for the governor as a result of their working more with him. See question 34 of Questionnaire II.

RESPR1 = "RESPONSE RATE FOR QUESTIONNAIRE I": The percent of response from the universe of each state. The number of responses was divided by the number of legislatures surveyed. See RESPR2 for examples.

RESPR2 = "RESPONSE RATE FOR QUESTIONNAIRE II": The percent of response from the universe for each state. The number of responses was divided by the number of legislators surveyed. For example, the Wyoming legislature has all six positions that are being studied, and all incumbents responded for a response rate of 100%. Nebraska has but one legislator being surveyed--there being no majority or minority
leaders and no second house. Since the Speaker of the Senate responded, Nebraska's response rate was also 100%, whereas Hawaii's was only 33% since only two of the six then current incumbents responded to Questionnaire II.

RIVALRY: An indication by the respondent LL as to whether he supports the incumbent governor or considers himself a rival—whether of the same party or not. See question 37 of Questionnaire II. Col 7/9.

SOCALCON = "IS GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM SOCIALLY CONCERNED?": The degree to which the respondent rated his governor's program as not socially concerned (coded 1) to socially concerned (coded 7). Derived from the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 53/8.


SRCGSTAP = "GOVERNOR'S STAFF AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondents put on the governors' staffs as sources of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 8/8.

SRCINFML = "INFORMAL PERSONS AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondents put on informal persons, friends, etc., as sources of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 9/8.

SRCNEWS = "NEWSPAPERS & TV AS SOURCES": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondents report putting on newspapers and TV as sources of information about the governor's programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 11/8.

SRCOLDRS = "OTHER LEGISLATIVE LEADERS AS SOURCES": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondent LLs report putting on other legislative leaders as sources of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 12/8.

SRCPARTY = "PARTY ORGANIZATION AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondents report putting on their party organization as a source of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 13/8.
SRCPRCON = "PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNOR AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondent LLs report putting on personal contact with the governor as a source of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 7/8.

SRCHRSTF = "YOUR STAFF AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondents report putting on their own staffs as sources of information about the governors' programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 10/8.

SRCHRMNG = "WRITTEN MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNOR AS SOURCE": A variable measuring the extent of reliance the respondent LLs report putting on written messages from their governors as sources of information about their programs. See question 36 of Questionnaire II. Col 14/8.

STAFFSAT = "GOVERNOR FIND COMMUNICATING THRU HIS STAFF SATISFACTORY?": A variable based on the question to the governors: "If the Governor regularly communicates with legislative leaders through one or more staff assistants, does he find this arrangement satisfactory?" Col 41/Gov2.

STRONG: The legislleader's rating of his governor in terms of weak (coded 1) to strong (coded 7) as taken from the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 43/8.

SUBSTANT = "IS GOVERNOR'S PROGRAM SUBSTANTIVE?": The extent to which the respondent rated his governor's programs as window dressing (coded 1) to substantive (coded 7). Based on the semantic differential on page 7 of Questionnaire II. Col 55/8.

SUMLL5 = "THE SUM OF FIVE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS INITIATED BY THE LEGISLEADERS": The total of all communications initiated by legislators to their governors (as reported by the legislators) using the five "You to Gov" channels of question 3 of Questionnaire II. DISK

SUMTEN = "THE SUM OF TEN COMMUNICATION CHANNELS": The total of all communications initiated both by governors and by respondents to each other (as reported by the legislators) using the five channels of question 3, Questionnaire II. DISK

TIM2: A variable giving the approximate amount of time it takes for the presiding officers of the legislature to leave their offices and call on the governor in his office. Based on a question in Part 1 of the Governors Questionnaire (Appendix B). Col 17/GovCd1.
TRUSTY = "TRUSTWORTHY GOVERNOR": A measure of how trustworthy or untrustworthy respondents considered their governors. Based on a 7-point semantic differential scale given on page 7 of Questionnaire II.

TRYFIND = "TRYING TO FIND OUT IF RESPONDENT AND GOVERNOR ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT": A dichotomized variable based on whether or not the legislatures report that of 4 possible reasons for initiating communications they are most apt to initiate a call or letter to the governor when trying to find out if they and their governors are in general agreement on an item. Based on question 11, Questionnaire II. Col 46/6.

TRYSWING = "TRYING TO SWING THE GOVERNOR THE RESPONDENT'S WAY": A dichotomized variable based on whether or not the legislatures report that of four possible reasons for initiating communications they are most apt to initiate a call or letter to the governor when trying to swing him their way if he is on the fence. Based on question 11, Questionnaire II. Col 47/6.

USFLINFO = "USEFUL INFORMATION": A variable designed to try to measure roughly one of the eight primary values of Lasswell and Kaplan, enlightenment, which the legislatures may feel they derive from their discussions with their governors. USFLINFO is made up of a 4-part ordinal scale based on question 39 of Questionnaire II (Appendix C). Col 24/8.

Y FACTOR: See VISCID below.

VISCID: A new construct, dubbed "the y factor," which appears to measure a constraining force on response rates (and some other variables) discovered during the course of this study. See Appendix E for details.

VOTER = "PERCENT OF POPULATION CASTING VOTES": Percent of civilian population, including aliens, of voting age (including 18-, 19-, and 20-year olds where appropriate) as of November 1, 1968, who cast votes for United States Representatives. This figure is about 6% lower than the percentages of votes cast for President. However, in the absence of percentages of votes cast for state officers, it is considered more comparable for purposes of this study than the Presidential figures. (The Arkansas figure was estimated since votes for unopposed candidates are not counted.) Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1971. (92nd edition) Washington, D.C., 1971.

WELSTAFO = "WELL STAFFED OR COORDINATED": A measure of how well or badly coordinated (staffed) the respondents reported their governors' programs to be. Based on a 7-point seman-
tic differential scale found on page 7 of Questionnaire II, Appendix C.
Appendix E

STUDIES OF RELATIONSHIPS TO RESPONSE RATE

The findings that a higher proportion of Republican legislators responded than Democrats was puzzling. Therefore an antecedent, spurious, or intervening variable was suspected. A rather laborious search was undertaken to see if such a variable could be found. It was determined that it did exist, and affected even differences in political party affiliation. That search is reported here. This Appendix also supports certain statements made in Chapter II under "A New Construct."

States as Cases

To begin the quest, a number of variables which might influence Party and Response Rate were identified. These variables were then used as third or test variables for Party and Response Rate. In order to use variables thought relevant, such as Population and Affluence, states were used as cases so that state characteristics, not just individual legislator characteristics or attributes, could be used. From a 51-variable MCORRE correlation program run, five variables having a correlation of .30 or more with

65 The 51-variable matrix consisted of the following variables (see Appendix D for descriptions, except for those variables marked with an asterisk, as they were subsequently dropped from the study and no definition is provided):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCOUNT*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRFM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILLIN*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILLS%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILSPDAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALDAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTR*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMCON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMRR*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMCENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAIIR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCNPCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUNCT*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENE/$*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENXED*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRUMMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILD*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HINATR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INFOHC*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEP*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDUST*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPC*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPGUBC*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGEXP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGSIZ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINOV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNGCP*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPOLRL*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSPLG*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTPF*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10FQG*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10FQM*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10FQN*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10FQQ*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M10FQS*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCNFCT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESGP*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDIST</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPNE*$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPRR*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPR1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPR2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITS*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEL-ED*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire I's response rates were singled out for closer study, as were four more correlating with Questionnaire II's. Additionally, DEMCON, a measure of the control of the governorship and the legislature by Democrats, was included because of its relationship to party.

These ten variables correlating with Response Rate 1 (for Questionnaire I) and Response Rate 2 (Questionnaire II) are shown in Table 36. The correlation (r) and the probability (p) (two-tailed) that the relationship, as measured by chi square tests, is significant is included. The direction in which the correlation runs is also given (e.g., the first line reads, "The greater the affluence, the greater Response Rates 1 & 2," and the second line reads, "The greater the bills passed per day, the smaller the response rate for Questionnaire I, but the greater the response rate for Questionnaire II"): Party membership (as an individual attribute) was significant in the replies to both questionnaires. However, when state response rates were compared with the ratio of Democrats in office to the number of offices in that state, no significance was found. DEMCON proved nonsignificant. So did IPCR, Ranney's interparty competition scale wherein high scores indicate more Democratic election successes and low scores more Republican successes over a seventeen-year period.

Through a series of variable stackings using third and fourth variables as controls and standardization after the manner suggested by Rosenberg, it was found that most of

66 "One of the major analytic tools in survey research is the operation which Kendall and Lazarsfeld have labelled 'interpretation.' As an analytic model, interpretation is the explanation of a relationship between two variables by means of an intervening variable called a 'test factor.' The criterion for determining whether an interpretation has been effected is whether, when one stratifies by (holds constant) the test factor, the partial associations disappear or are reduced. ...if such a reduction occurs, then he may conclude that the control variable is a 'contributory factor.' ...One method which does enable us to cut through the considerable variation among partial correlations and subsequent ambiguities and to obtain a single table showing the relationship between two variables when one or more test factors are 'controlled' or 'held constant' is standardization. ...standardization provides a simple summary measure of the effect of the control variable." From Morris Rosenberg, "Test Factor Standardization as a Method of Interpretation," Social Forces, 41 (October 1962), 53-61.
### TABLE 36

**CORRELATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF CERTAIN VARIABLES CORRELATED WITH RESPONSE RATES 1 AND 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable and Response Rate</th>
<th>Response Rate 1</th>
<th>Response Rate 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THE GREATER THE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFFLU, the greater RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>.31 .05</td>
<td>.17 .20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILSPDAY, the smaller RESPR1</td>
<td>-.25 .30</td>
<td>.30 .20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the greater RESPR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMCON, the smaller RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>-.25 .90</td>
<td>-.09 -.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMCENT, the smaller RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>-.34 .20</td>
<td>-.36 .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRUMMS, the smaller RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>-.12 .30</td>
<td>-.44 .05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCR, the smaller RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>-.30 .50</td>
<td>-.07 .20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOSO, the greater RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>.38 .02</td>
<td>.04 .30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILLS%, the smaller RESPR1</td>
<td>-.08 *</td>
<td>.39 .20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the greater RESPR2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOP, the smaller RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>-.15 .01</td>
<td>-.36 .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTER, the greater RESPR1 &amp; RESPR2</td>
<td>.33 .20</td>
<td>.10 .30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chi square table and probability (p) was not worked out as correlation (r) was less than .10.

For example, the results of using Population as a control variable are shown in Table 37. The High Response Rate 2 percentages in each partial (expressed as proportions) are then multiplied by the ratio of that partial's N to the overall N. These resultant "standardized" figures are then added for the summary table and compared with the original percentage or proportion (e.g., .19 + .20 + .00 + .00 = .39 or 39%). If the difference between the columns in the summary table has been reduced, as from 33 to -3 in this instance, then the control variable is said to have "contributed." In this case it appears that almost all the variation in responses attributed to
the variables washed out. Response Rate 1 was mainly affected by the Population, North-South, and Affluence variables. Response Rate 2 was primarily affected by the Population, Centralization in Decision-Making, and Grumm's Professionalism Index variables. But it was noted that results were often conditional. For example, low Population continued to be equated with a high Response Rate 2 under low Grumm's Index, but was random under high Grumm's. A study of these conditional factors suggested that there was an underlying factor which was only partly measured by the variables used.

### TABLE 37

**TESTING POPULATION AS A CONTROL VARIABLE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERY LOW POPULATION</th>
<th>LOW POPULATION</th>
<th>HIGH POPULATION</th>
<th>VERY HIGH POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRUMMS Low High</td>
<td>1(2e)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3(3e)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRUMMS High Low</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RR2</th>
<th>8=88%</th>
<th>0=0%</th>
<th>9=75%</th>
<th>1=100%</th>
<th>0=00%</th>
<th>3=38%</th>
<th>0=00%</th>
<th>3=25%</th>
<th>24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multiplier:</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50 = .22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 = .26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 = .22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 = .30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raw:</th>
<th>.88</th>
<th>.00</th>
<th>.75</th>
<th>1.00</th>
<th>.00</th>
<th>.38</th>
<th>.00</th>
<th>.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stdzd:</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY,**

**GRUMMS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.63 - .30 = .33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.39 - .42 = -.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grumm's Professionalism Index is in fact due to variations in Population.
A new, artificial variable was created by developing a scale as follows: A cut-off point was determined which resulted in the highest chi squares for the appropriate response rate (Response Rate 1 for Affluence and North-South, Response 2 for Centralization and Grumm's, and a "best fit" for Population which significantly affected both rates). A six-point scale was thus developed and the points for every state computed. One point each was given for a population of 2,600,000 or more, for being a former Confederate state, for having an Affluence factor score of 2 or less, for having a Centralization score of 47 or more and for having a positive score on Grumm's Professionalism Index. (See Table 38 for a listing of the states and their total scores using this scale.)

Table 38

STATE SCORES ON "THE Y FACTOR" SCALE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>CT</td>
<td>DE</td>
<td>FL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>IN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>ME</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>MI</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>MN</td>
<td>MO</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>NJ</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>OR</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>TX</td>
<td>AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UT</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>WY</td>
<td>NY</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>GA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>VT</td>
<td>WY</td>
<td>OH</td>
<td>WS</td>
<td>LA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Noting that the more the points, the more they seemed to slow down responses or make things "stickier" or more "viscid," this new variable or construct was dubbed "the y factor." The higher the score, the more the state appeared to contain the y factor.

This new construct, arbitrarily designating states with scores of 0, 1, and 2 as being low on the y factor and the rest as being high, was tested against Response Rates 1 and 2 and resulted in the following tables, 39 and 40:
TABLE 39
"THE V FACTOR" AND RESPONSE RATE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low V Factor</th>
<th>High V Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Response Rate 1</td>
<td>13e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Response Rate 1</td>
<td>23 = 82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 17.80, \text{ df } = 1, \text{ p } = .0005, \text{ one tailed, } \phi^2 = .41. \]

TABLE 41
"THE V FACTOR" AND RESPONSE RATE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low V Factor</th>
<th>High V Factor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Response Rate 2</td>
<td>15e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Response Rate 2</td>
<td>19 = 68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ X^2 = 9.00, \text{ df } = 1, \text{ p } = .005 \text{ one tailed, } \phi^2 = .22. \]

The y factor was used as a test variable on Population, Section (North-South), and Affluence versus Response Rate 1. Randomness resulted in all three cases, indicating that the underlying y factor apparently accounted for the previously significant variances.

When the y factor was used as a test variable on Population, Rate 2, randomness resulted in the states with a higher y factor. However, a low Population and low Grumm's Index correlated with higher response rates in the states with lower y factor scores, but it was significant only at the p = .10 level, two tailed. In all three cases, there was a marked drop in the differences between the columns when standardized on the y factor, indicating its presence in the variances caused by Population, Centralization, and Grumm's Professionalism.
As noted in the beginning of this Appendix, these analyses have been based on states as cases. As also noted, several party-related variables (IPC, DEMCON, and IPCN), did not significantly correlate with higher response rates. But Republicans, as individuals did -- for both questionnaires. Therefore tables were constructed using the \( y \) factor as a test factor for Party with individual legislators as cases.

Working with Response Rate 1, it was found that Party became random in the states with a low \( y \) factor, but Republicans responded better in the states with higher \( y \) factors, with probability at the .05 level, two tailed. For Response Rate 2, the opposite occurred in that Party became random under the states with higher \( y \) factors, but Republicans responded better than Democrats (with significance at the .05 level, two tailed) in the states with low \( y \) factors.

Using Rosenberg's standardization technique, and working with both response rates, it was found that Party and the \( y \) factor had little or no effect on each other. So apparently they are measuring two different things.

In summary, responses to both questionnaires appear to be representative of the universe being studied with two exceptions. Republicans responded better than Democrats and responses from states with a low \( y \) factor were higher than from states with a high \( y \) factor. The latter variable, a new construct, also acted as an intervening variable with Population, North-South, and Affluence for Questionnaire 1 and with Population, Centralization, and Grumm's measure of Professionalism for Questionnaire 2.
Appendix P
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

Note 1:

Part 2 of Questionnaire I (see Appendix A) furnished 45 possible variables wherein the legislative leaders or their staffs initiated communications with the governors, as follows:

1) 15 communication variables broken out by 5 types of exchange and 3 kinds of legislative initiators (however, 4 variables had less than a 67% response) and
2) 30 communication variables broken out by 6 categories of the nature of the exchange and 5 kinds of legislative initiators (9 of the 30 had less than a 67% response).

Part 3 of the same Questionnaire provided 31 variables wherein the governors or their staffs initiated communications with the legislatures as follows:

1) 15 communication variables broken out by 5 types of exchange and 3 kinds of recipients of governor-initiated communications (3 variables having less than a 67% response); and
2) 16 communication variables broken out by 4 categories of the nature of the governor-initiated exchanges and 4 kinds of legislator and staff recipients (4 variables having less than a 67% response).

The "Other" categories had been provided on Questionnaire I for open-ended responses should any respondents desire to add different categories than those provided. However, so few respondents completed "Other" cells that they were dropped as variables.

---

67 Rudolph Rummel reports that no methodological work on the problem of "How much missing data can be allowed?" seems to have been published (Rummel: 261). This writer has arbitrarily selected 33% as a working figure.
The presence of an "initiator complex" was suggested from a study of the aggregate data in Tables 13 and 14 (Section 3.3) derived from responses to the governors' questionnaire. This is visually illustrated by noting in Figures 2 (Section 3.2) and 3 (Section 3.3) that whoever is doing the reporting comes out on top (has the higher frequency--except for letters and messages). (Note that in Figure 3 only senate presiding officers are shown.)

As a further check on this finding, it was desired to see if both governors and legislators perceived the frequency of the same set of communicative acts similarly. If Governor Doe of State A said he initiated face-to-face meetings with Speaker Jones "Very Frequently," did Speaker Jones also see Governor Doe's initiatives as "Very Frequent" -- or as only "Frequent" or "Occasional"?

Responses from both the governor and the speaker of the same state were available for 21 states. (Speakers were selected, rather than again using senate presiding officers, to give more breadth.) The data were cast into Table 42.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Freq</th>
<th>Occs</th>
<th>Seld</th>
<th>Nevr</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Median*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governors' Perceptions:</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speakers' Perceptions:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The medians are derived from aggregate discrete categories taken directly from the 1-2-3-4-5 ratings of the questionnaire but treated as though they had an underlying continuous distribution which makes the tenths possible. The tenths are desired (rather than whole numbers) in order to get a more distinct ranking. Medians are used rather than means because the scales are ordinal. The lower the number, the higher the frequency.
Here we see that there is a considerable difference in perception over the same acts. Collectively, the governors believe they initiated face-to-face meetings at a median frequency of 1.8. However, speakers perceived these same initiatives to have a much lower median frequency -- 2.8.*

Note 3:

Some respondents left blanks, amounting to about 9% of the total. (However, only one man (or speaker) out of the 202 returning questionnaires left all ten items or channels blank.) For some types of analysis complete data are needed. Rather than reduce the sample by eliminating all replies with one or more pieces of missing data, a Missing Data Program (DCORWMD), developed for use in the Dimensionality of Nations Project of the University of Hawaii, was run.

In the Missing Data Program an estimate is developed for the missing data by use of multiple regression techniques. One or more variables which correlate with the variable having the missing data are used as the independent variables. The estimated data are thus worked out from the regression equations found. As an example, although a mean figure could be used, the estimate is statistically improved if we know that communication frequency is higher for members of the governor's party than for nonmembers and we know the respondent's party status. The estimate can be refined even more if we know that the respondent is a presiding officer and that presiding officers have higher rates of communication than do majority leaders.

After the data were complete, a University of California at Los Angeles BMD02D Program of Correlation with Transgeneration, which gave sums of variables, was run on the University of Hawaii computer.

Note 4:

It was originally hypothesized that as communication frequency rose in one channel, it would drop in another (Proposition 7 of Section 1.4). For example, the more legislators spoke directly to the governors, the less would be the need to go through the governors' staffs. As one test of this hypothesis, a correlation of the thirteen variables with each other was run. This correlation is reproduced in Table 43.

*The difference between the governor's and speakers' data has a chi square of 4.95, a "p" of .05, and is two tailed.
A study of the table shows that all channels of communication studied in Questionnaire II either correlate positively with each other or are random. Therefore the hypothesis of Proposition 7 is not supported. An increase in one channel is either accompanied by no change in another or by an increase.

The lowest correlations (actually random except for correlation with each other) are between the two variables measuring communications routed through informal persons and the rest of the communications variables.
TABLE 43

CORRELATIONS AMONG THIRTEEN ORIGINAL COMMUNICATIONS VARIABLES, QUESTIONNAIRE II (LEGISLEADERS' PERCEPTIONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HAPPEN</th>
<th>LLINFMLG</th>
<th>LLLLSTFG</th>
<th>GOVTOLL</th>
<th>GINFMLLL</th>
<th>GLLSTFLL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LLTOGOV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAPPEN:</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLDIRECTG:</td>
<td>.72 .56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLINFMLG:</td>
<td>.05 .08 .05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLGSFTG:</td>
<td>.30 .27 .21 .26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLLLSTFG:</td>
<td>.28 .33 .14 .12 .25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLGSLSG:</td>
<td>.23 .10 .05 .09 .58 .36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVTOLL:</td>
<td>.75 .58 .74 .01 .28 .21 .09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDIRCTLL:</td>
<td>.49 .61 .74 .08 .19 .07 .04 .66</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINFMLLL:</td>
<td>.11 .17 .19 .70 .09 .19 .08 .14 .18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGSTFLL:</td>
<td>.32 .39 .27 .26 .76 .24 .42 .35 .30 .15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLLSTFLL:</td>
<td>.17 .28 .13 .13 .27 .75 .21 .14 .11 .14 .15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GGSLSLL:</td>
<td>.21 .13 .06 .12 .48 .40 .87 .10 .09 .09 .51 .25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on a 202-observation DCORWMD run, with some missing data.
Appendix G

CODING

The data used in this study (all three surveys) were entered on 80-column Hollerith cards. On all cards the first two columns contain the code for the states and territories based on Kenneth Janda's groupings (JANDA: 252), which are in turn consistent with the Bureau of the Census regional definition (with the exception of Delaware, which the Bureau considers a border state). Alaska, Hawaii and the territories were not included in Janda's list and have been assigned numbers in the eighties and nineties. State abbreviations are in accordance with U. S. Post Office usage. Note that by use of column one alone, data can be sorted by regions. (Numbers in parentheses below are the numbers of respondents from that region from the first legislators survey.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NEW ENGLAND (24)</th>
<th>WEST NORTH CENTRAL (24)</th>
<th>BORDER STATES (18)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 CT</td>
<td>31 IO</td>
<td>51 KY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 ME</td>
<td>32 KS</td>
<td>52 MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 MA</td>
<td>33 MN</td>
<td>53 OK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 NH</td>
<td>34 MO</td>
<td>54 TN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 RI</td>
<td>35 NE</td>
<td>(55 DC-not used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 VT</td>
<td>36 ND</td>
<td>56 WV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 SD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MIDDLE ATLANTIC (15)</th>
<th>SOLID SOUTH (17)</th>
<th>MOUNTAIN STATES (31)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 DE</td>
<td>41 AL</td>
<td>61 AZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 NJ</td>
<td>42 AF</td>
<td>62 CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 NY</td>
<td>43 FL</td>
<td>63 ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 PN</td>
<td>44 GA</td>
<td>64 MT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 LA</td>
<td>65 NV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EAST NORTH CENTRAL (15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 IN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 OH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 WS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WESTERN STATES (11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71 CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72 OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73 WN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERRITORIES (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91 AS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 GU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 PR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 VI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GOVERNORS

CARD 1

1: Region (see introductory paragraph above). GREGION1*

2: Number assigned a state or territory within a region. Thus columns 1 and 2 combined give state or territory code (see introductory paragraph). STATE

3: Blank.

4: 1=Responded (42); 0=No response from the Governor of that state or territory--there were 12, but they are not used except as "dummies." G4

5 & 6: Blank.

7: 1=Democrat (20); 2=Republican (22). PARTY

8 & 9: Blank.

10 & 11: Number of persons employed on gubernatorial staff (Responses varied from 4 to 94 with only one left blank.) STAFSIZE

12: 1=If any specialize in liaison work with the legislature (36); 2=If none specialize in liaison work with the legislature (6). SPECLIZE

13: Blank.

14: 1=There are recognized political groupings or party factors which materially affect executive-legislative leader communications (28); 2=Reported no groupings (9); no response (5). GRUPINGS

15: Blank.

16: The offices of the governor and the legislative leaders are in the same building (38); 2=Offices not in the same building (3); No response (1). OFFICES

17: On the average, for the presiding officers of the legislature to leave their offices and call on the governor in his office takes: 1=Less than a minute (3); 2=1 to 3 minutes (17); 3=3 to 5 minutes (10); 4=5 to 10 minutes (4); 5=10 minutes or more (3); No response (5). TIME

*The right-hand column contains variable names. However, many variables were not used in this study. Some may be used in future articles or publications.
Communications initiated by Legislative Leaders to Governor, Part 3, are recorded here (prior to Part 2) to be consistent with the order taken in the legislative leaders questionnaire. Averages are coded in the interests of economy since early analysis found few significant differences among the four items averaged. These averages are of the responses given; occasionally a governor left a cell blank. Columns 20 through 25 record the responses for the type of communication initiatives taken by senate and lower house presiding officers and majority leaders: 1 stands for very frequently; 2=frequently; 3=occasionally; 4=seldom; 5=never:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Response Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20: In person--face to face:</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 AVPMIIPFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21: In person--by telephone:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 AVPMIPTG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: In person--in group mtgs:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 AVPMIPGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: In writing--personal letter or memo:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4 AVPMXPLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24: In writing--from letter or duplicated message:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6 AVPMWDMG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns 26 through 31 record the responses for the type of communications initiatives taken by "other legislative leaders" in both houses (each is an average of two cells on the Questionnaire):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Response Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26: In person--face to face:</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 AVOLIIPFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27: In person--by telephone:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 AVOLIPTG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29: In person--in group mtgs:</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 AVOLIPGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29: In writing--personal letter or memo:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6 AVOLWPLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30: In writing--form letter or duplicated message:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7 AVOLWDMG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31-37: Blank.

38: 1=Legislative leaders regularly use their own staff to take messages to the governor personally (6); 2=Do not use staff (33); no response (3). LSTAFFG
The following columns, 39-45, record the frequency and nature of communications initiated by legislatures to their governors as the governors report them. The averages from the figures for both house and senate are used for economy since it was rare to find responses which differed between the houses. Frequency coding is as above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

39: Information about personal attitudes on measures: 7 17 11 3 0 4 AVLPAATTG

40: Information about attitudes of others on measures: 2 14 13 7 0 6 AVLATTOS

41: Information about organizational matters: 1 13 8 11 2 7 AVLORGNS

42: Reaction to gubernatorial veto (or anticipated veto): 4 10 12 7 1 8 AVLVELOS

43: Reactions to general gubernatorial program and policies: 3 20 8 4 0 7 AVLPROGS

44: Information about content of measures: 5 12 13 5 1 6 AVLCONTG

45: Blank.

Columns 46-52 record the nature and average frequency with which the legislatures of both houses initiated communications to the governors' staffs:

46: Information about personal attitudes on measures: 12 12 7 3 0 8 AVLPAATS

47: Information about attitudes of others on measures: 4 16 8 5 0 9 AVLATTOS

48: Information about organizational matters: 2 8 12 11 0 9 AVLORGNS

49: Reaction to gubernatorial veto (or anticipated veto): 7 8 9 5 1 12 AVLVELOS

50: Reactions to general gubernatorial programs and policies: 8 13 8 2 0 11 AVLPROGS

51: Information about content of measures: 8 14 10 1 0 9 AVLCONTG

52-73: Blank.
Communications initiated by the governors to legislateurs, Part 2 of the Governors Questionnaire, begin with Column 74. Again, in the interest of economy, averages are coded since little significant difference was found between the four responses of senate and lower house presiding officers and majority leaders:

74: In person--face to face: 19 20 12 0 0 0 AVGIPFPM
75: In person--telephone: 5 9 21 4 1 2 AVGIPTPM
76: In person--in gp meetings: 4 13 16 7 0 2 AVGIPGPM
77: In writing--personal letter or memo: 3 3 12 17 4 3 AVGWPPLPM
78: In writing--form letter or duplicated message: 2 1 7 16 11 5 AVGWDMPM
79: Blank.
80: "1" for card number.

CARD 2

1: See opening page to this Appendix. REGION
2: Number assigned a state or territory within a region. Thus columns 1 and 2 combined give state or territory code. See opening page to this Appendix. STATE
3-5: Blank.

The following six columns are the averages of the communications initiated by governors to "Other Legislative Leaders" in both Senate and House:

6: In person--face to face: 5 21 15 0 0 1 AVGIPFOL
7: In person--telephone: 3 12 14 9 1 3 AVGIPTOLL
8: In person--in gp meetings: 4 14 16 5 1 2 AVGIPGOL
9: In writing--personal letter or memo: 3 2 11 18 3 5 AVGWPPLOL
10: In writing--form letter or or duplicated message: 1 1 8 15 11 6 AVGWDMOL
11: Others: 1 1 0 2 1 38
20: Does the Governor regularly use one or more of his staff members to communicate with legislative leaders?
Yes (38)
No (2); No response (2).

Columns 21 thru 25 reflect the average frequency and nature of communications reported from the Governor to the Senate and House:

21: Support for general gubernatorial program: 13 16 8 2 0 3 AVGPROGL

22: Support on particular measures (including request for opposition to measures): 8 23 9 0 0 2 AVGPARTL

23: Requests for support on other matters: 3 14 16 6 0 3 AVGOMATL

24: Info about veto actions: 6 9 13 7 2 5 AVGVETOL

25: Other: (no coded responses).

Columns 26 thru 30 give the average frequencies for certain types of initiated communications reported by the governors as from their staff to Senate and House:

26: Support for general gubernatorial programs: 21 11 3 1 0 6 AVSPROGL

27: Support on particular measures (including requests for opposition to measures): 19 14 3 1 0 5 AVSPARTL

28: Requests for support on other matters: 8 10 15 3 0 6 AVSOMATL

29: Info about veto actions: 9 6 5 10 3 9 AVSVETOL

30: Other: (No coded responses.)

31-40: Blank.

41: If the Governor regularly communicates with legislative leaders through one or more staff assistants, does he find this arrangement satisfactory?
Yes(37)
No(1); No response(4)
43: Do the legislative leaders use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with the Governor or his staff members? Yes(9); No(31); No response(2) LINDCOMG

44-46: Blank.

Columns 47 thru 50 report the types of persons meeting on behalf of the Governor, and the frequency, in response to the question: "Does the Governor or anyone acting on his behalf meet with legislative leaders to plan legislative strategy, conduct negotiations, etc.?" (Responses for Senate and House have been averaged for economy of data processing.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Occurrence</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>The Governor personally:</td>
<td>18 20</td>
<td>3 1</td>
<td>GPERSNLY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Governor's staff member:</td>
<td>21 15</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>GSTAFMBR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Governmental official not on Governor's staff:</td>
<td>4 24</td>
<td>9 5</td>
<td>GVTOFFCL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Non-governmental intermediary, as party leader, personal friend:</td>
<td>2 17</td>
<td>17 6</td>
<td>NONGVITAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51-56: Blank.

57: Does the Governor use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with legislative leaders (other than personally or by staff members)? Yes(23); No(18); No Response(1) GINDCOML

58-60: Blank.

61-62: Interparty Competition (Ranney). See IPCR in Appendix D.

63-66: Blank.

67: Governor's Budget Power (see POWERBUD in Appendix D. POWERBUD
1(5); 2(2); 3(1); 4(7); 5(26); Undetermined(1) (Guam).
1(5); 2(2); 3(1); 4(7); 5(26); Undetermined(1) (Guam).

68-69: Governor's Total Combined Power Index (see POWERTOT in Appendix D. POWERTOT

70-71: Age of Governors as of 1969. GOVAGE

71-74: Blank.

75: Same Governor in office in 1969 as in 1968? 1=No(12); 5=Yes(30) GOV69.

76: Same Governor in office in 1970 as in 1968? 1=No(15); 5=Yes(27) GOV70.
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

QUESTIONNAIRE I

CARD 1

1: See opening page to this Appendix.  

REGION

2: Number assigned a state or territory within a region.  
Thus columns 1 and 2 combined give state or territory code.  
See opening page to this Appendix.  

STATE

3: Number assigned individual legislator respondent within each state. Columns 1, 2, and 3 together thus form an identification number for all respondents. As a "variable" these three columns collectively are called: 

CASEID

4: Member of same party as the governor?  1=Yes (89); 2=No (75) 

GPNGP

5: Office held by Senate respondents: 1= Lt. Governor (1);  
2=President (12); 3=President Pro Tempore (20);  
4=Majority Leader (26); 5=Minority Leader (23).  

SOPFHELD

6: Office held by House respondents:  1=Speaker (36);  
2=Vice Speaker (1); 3=Majority Leader (22); 4=Minority  
Leader (23).  

HOPFHELD

7: Party affiliation: 1=Democrat (75); 2=Republican (98); 3=Other (1).  

PARTYAFF

8-9: The sum of column 20, 21, and 22 subtracted from 15 to get "in person" communications total with high equalling 15 and low=0. These are face-to-face, telephone, and group in-person meetings with the governor taken from Part 2 of Questionnaire 1.  

INPERSON

10-11: Number of persons reported employed on the legislator respondent's staff.  

NUMPERS

12: Does anyone on your staff specialize in liaison work with the Governor's Office?  1=Yes (20); 2=No (72); blanks (72).  

LIASON
13: Blank.

14: Are there recognized political groupings or party factors which materially affect legislative leader executive communications?  1=Yes (67); 2=No (28); blanks (29).  

15: Blank.

16: Is your office in the same building as that of the Governor?  1=Yes (141); 2=No (14); 3=Committee Room (0); 4=No office, use chamber only (9).  

17: On the average, for you to leave your office and call on the Governor in his office takes:  1=less than a minute (36); 2=1 to 3 minutes (63); 3=3 to 5 minutes (31); 4=5 to 10 minutes (8); 5=10 minutes or over (8); no response (18).  

18: Personal relationships to the governor:  1=An old personal friend (64); 2=Friendly, often despite being of opposite party (17); 3=contacts limited to formal duties (60); 4=Have known the governor for a long time but not as a friend (21); no response (2).  

19: Political relationship to the governor?  1=I strongly supported his election campaign (74); 2=I endorsed his election (12); 3=I neither supported nor opposed his election (7); 4=I went on record against his election (28); 5=I strongly opposed his election (43).  

Columns 20 through 36 deal with "How do you and the other legislative leaders personally communicate with the governor?" The responses called for were:  1=Very frequently; 2=Frequently; 3=Occasionally; 4=Seldom; 5=Never:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSENT HIMSELF:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20: In person--face to face:</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>LPACECG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21: In person--by telephone:</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>LPHCNEG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: In person--in group mtgs:</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>LGROUPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: In writing--pers'1 memo/1tr:</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>LLETTERG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24: In writing--form 1tr/dup msg:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>LDUPMSGG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25: Blank.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER LEADERS IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSE:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26: In person--face to face:</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>OLPACECG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27: In person--by telephone:</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>OLPHONEG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28: In person--in grp mtgs:</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>OLGROUPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29: In writing--pers'1 1tr/memo:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>OLETTERG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30: In wrtng--form 1tr/dup msg:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>OLDPMSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31: Blank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LEADERS IN OTHER HOUSE:
32: In person--face to face:  26  50  38  12  0  38 LOHFACE
33: In person--by telephone:  15  29  42  19  3  56 LOPHONE
34: In person--in group mtgs:  11  42  46  12  0  53 LOHGROUP
35: In wrtng--pers'l ltr/memo:  2  16  30  35  11  70 LOHLETTER
36: In wrtng--form ltr/dup msg:  3  8  10  41  28  74 LOHDPMSG
37: Blank

38: Do you and the other legislative leaders regularly use one or more staff members to communicate with the governor? 1=Yes (33); 2=No (121); 3=No response (10).

USESTAFF

Columns 39 through 72 are concerned with the nature of legislative initiated communications. See Questionnaire 1. Again, 1=Very frequently; 2=Frequently; 3=Occasionally; 4=Seldom; and 5=Never:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RESPONDENT:
39: Info on personal attitudes:  24  38  39  19  13  31 LPERSATG
40: Info on att's of others:  22  29  43  21  14  35 LATOTOTH
41: Info about org'l matters:  15  19  43  24  27  36 LINFORGG
42: Reaction to gub'l veto:  24  29  21  27  27  37 LREVETOG
43: Reaction to gub'l prog/pol:  24  37  39  14  15  35 LGUBPOLG
44: Info on content of measures:  17  29  35  24  16  43 LCONTNTG
45: Blank

RESPONDENT'S STAFF:
46: Info on personal attitudes:  0  3  4  9  29  119 C146
47: Info on att's of others:  0  2  4  9  29  120 C147
48: Info about org'l matters:  0  4  5  7  29  119 C148
49: Reaction to gub'l veto:  0  5  2  5  33  119 C149
50: Reaction to gub'l prog/pol:  1  5  3  5  31  119 C150
51: Info on content of measures:  1  4  5  4  25  125 C151
52: Blank

OTHER LEADERS IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSE:
53: Info on personal attitudes:  9  34  31  23  7  60 C153
54: Info on att's of others:  10  24  38  23  6  63 C154
55: Info about org'l matters:  8  18  30  27  18  63 C155
56: Reaction to gub'l veto:  9  19  13  29  20  69 C156
57: Reaction to gub'l prog/pol:  9  35  30  16  11  63 C157
58: Info on content of measures:  8  24  34  20  12  66 C158
59: Blank

STAFF OF OTHER LEADERS IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSE:
60: Info on per'l attitudes:  0  4  3  11  22  124 C160
61: Info on attitudes of others:  0  4  2  9  23  126 C161
62: Info about org'l matters:  0  3  3  8  24  126 C162
63: Reaction to gub'l veto:  0  3  1  7  26  127 C163
64: Reaction to gub'l prog/pol:  1  4  3  7  25  124 C164
65: Info on content of measures:  2  6  4  6  20  126 C165
66: Blank
LEADERS IN OTHER HOUSE:

67: Info on personal attitudes: 13 28 28 13 3 79 C167
68: Info on attitudes of others: 11 25 33 13 2 80 C168
69: Info about org'l matters: 9 18 26 19 12 80 C169
70: Reaction to gub'l veto: 14 21 14 21 11 83 C170
71: Reaction to gub'l prog/pol: 13 34 19 12 5 81 C171
72: Info on content of measures: 12 22 26 14 7 83 C172

73: Used to identify cards with Estimated Data entered.
    1=Estimated Data present; Blank=no Estimated Data.
74: "1" entered if respondent responded to Q1 (1968) only (52).
75: "1" entered if respondent responded to both Q1 and QII (1968 and 1969-70) (112).
76: "0" if respondent answered Q1 or Q1I and Q2.
    Blank if respondent answered only QII (1969-70) (130).
77-79: Serial number which permits ordering all the respondents by state alphabetically--Alabama through
    Wyoming--followed by American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. SERIAL
80: Card number: 1

CARD 2

1 through 3: See Card 1 under Legislative Leaders. CASEID1

4: Blank

How does the Governor personally communicate with you and the other legislative leaders? (1=Very frequently;
    2=Frequently; 3=Occasionally; 4=Seldom; and 5=Never.):

NOTE: In the next 5 items the figures on the upper row are raw data; figures on the second row of each question have
    had the "No Response" answers transformed into estimated data and added to the other columns by the Missing Data Pro-
    gram.)

TO RESPONDENT:

5: In person--face to face: 33 40 39 22 8 22 GFACEL
      34 48 49 25 8 0

6: In person--by telephone: 18 31 31 40 18 26 GPHONEL
      18 40 45 43 18 0

7: In person--in group meeting: 15 31 64 22 4 28 GGROUPL
      17 38 80 25 4 0

8: In writing--pers'l ltr/memo: 9 18 49 45 14 29 GLETTERL
      9 19 61 61 14 0

1 2 3 4 5 NR VARIABLE
9: In writing--form ltr/dup msg: 7 12 34 42 31 38 GDUPMSGL
    7 14 37 75 31 0

10: Blank

TO OTHER LEADERS IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSE:
11: In person--face to face: 17 40 37 11 5 54 GFACEOL
12: In person--by telephone: 9 31 30 28 7 59 GPAONEOL
13: In person--in group meetings: 8 37 47 13 3 56 GGROUPOL
14: In writing--pers'1 ltr/memo: 5 25 31 32 11 60 GLETEROL
15: In writing--form ltr/dup msg: 1 14 27 31 25 66 GDUPMSOL
16: Blank

TO LEADERS IN OTHER HOUSE:
17: In person--face to face: 17 43 28 9 3 64 FACELOH
18: In person--by telephone: 8 32 29 20 6 69 PHONELOH
19: In person--in group meetings: 11 34 41 8 3 67 GROUPLOH
20: In writing--pers'1 ltr/memo: 6 19 34 27 7 71 LETERLOH
21: In writing--form ltr/dup msg: 3 12 25 28 22 74 DPMSGLOH
22-24: Blank

25: Does the governor regularly use one or more of his staff members to communicate with legislative leaders?
   1=Yes (122)
   2=No (31); No response (11).  

GSTAFFLL

NATURE OF GOVERNOR-INITIATED COMMUNICATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOVERNOR TO RESPONDENT:</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>NR</th>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26: Support for gub'1 program:</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>GSUPGUBL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27: Suppt for part'lar measures:</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>GPARTMSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28: Suppt req's/other matters:</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>GOTHMATL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29: Info about veto actions:</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>GREVETOL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(The second row of figures in line 26 have had the "No Response" figures transformed into estimated data and added to the other columns by the Missing Data Program.)

30: Blank

STAFF TO RESPONDENT:
31: Suppt for gen'l gub'1 prog: 25 38 25 15 15 46 C231
32: Suppt on particular measures: 30 31 23 18 14 48 C232
33: Suppt req's/other matters: 19 28 34 22 11 50 C233
34: Info about veto actions: 18 21 14 23 32 56 C234
35: Blank

GOVERNOR TO LEGISLATIVE LEADERS IN RESPONDENT'S HOUSE:
36: Support for gub'1 program: 11 40 33 12 7 61 C236
37: Suppt on part'lar measures: 12 33 38 13 5 62 C237
38: Suppt req's/other matters: 7 33 36 18 5 65 C238
46: If the Governor regularly communicates with legislative leaders through use of one or more of his staff members, do you find this arrangement satisfactory? 1=Yes (102); 2=No (26); 3=Does not come through staff (8); no response (28).

47: Blank

48: Do you or the other legislative leaders use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with the Governor or his staff members (as by personal friend or party leaders to carry messages and requests)? 1=Yes (42); 2=No (114); no response (8).

49: If "yes" above, please explain and indicate frequency: (Responses were placed in the category following which seemed closest in meaning to the following words): 1=Daily (2); 2=Frequently (5); 3=Quite often (3); 4=Occasionally (12); 5=Infrequently (12); no response (130).

50 & 51: Blank

52 thru 60: Do you or other legislative leaders meet with the Governor or anyone acting on his behalf to plan legislative strategy, conduct negotiations, etc.?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONDENT</th>
<th>PRO OCC NUR N/R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>52: The Governor personally:</td>
<td>59 74 23 8 PLANPERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53: Governor's staff member:</td>
<td>59 80 25* -- PLANSTAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54: Gov't off'l not on Gov staff:</td>
<td>45 76 28 15 PLANOPFL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55: Nongov'l, e.g., friend:</td>
<td>47 66 62 33 PLANFRND</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| *(The second row of figures in line 52 has had the "No Response" figures transformed into estimated data and added to the other columns by the Missing Data Program. They are accessed by using cards with a "1" in Column 73.)*

OTHER LEGISLATIVE LEADERS:

| 56: The Governor personally: | 52 68 4 40 C256 |
| 57: Governor's staff member: | 47 66 9 42 C257 |
| 58: Gov't off'l not on Gov staff: | 25 51 29 59 C258 |
| 59: Nongov'l intermd., e.g., pty.ldr:11 59 34 60 C259 |

60 & 61: Blank.
62: Does the Governor use any indirect or other informal means of communicating with you or other legislative leaders (other than personally or by staff member)? 1=Yes (38); 2=No (116); no response (10).

63: If "yes" above, indicate frequency (see 49 above for descriptive words): 1 (0); 2 (6); 3 (3); 4 (10); 5 (5); no response (140).

64 & 65: Blank.

66 & 67: Interparty competition. Low numbers equate with Republican success, high numbers with Democrat, on a scale from 0 to 99. (See also IPCR in Appendix D.)

68: 1=Member of same party as Governor (89); 2=Not member (75).

69: Blank.

70: Respondent a senator? 1=Yes (82); 5=No (82).

71: Respondent a representative? 1=Yes (82); 5=No (82).

72: Rank: 5=Speaker, Lt Gov, President or President Pro Tempore (69)
  4=Majority Leader (49)
  1=Minority Leader (46)

73: 1=This card contains some estimated data ( )
  0=This card contains no estimated data, but there is a matching card which does ( )
  Blank=No estimated data for that respondent ( )

74: 1=Responded to Questionnaire 1 (1968) only (52)
  0=Not in above category (112)

75: 1=Responded to both Questionnaires 1 or Questionnaires 1 & 2 (164)
  Blank=Respondent answered only Questionnaire 2 (1969-70) (130)

77-79: Serial number which enables ordering all the respondents by state alphabetically followed by the four territories.

80: Card number: 2
LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

QUESTIONNAIRE 2

CARD 6

Note: Response figures which follow are based on 202 replies out of a universe of 278.

1: Region (see introductory paragraph to this Appendix).

2: State or territorial number within the Region. Together columns 1 and 2 identify the state or territory.

3: Number within the state or territory assigned each respondent. Columns 1, 2, and 3 together thus form an identification number for all respondents.

4: Blank.

5: Was respondent at Atlanta Convention of the National Conference of State Legislative Leaders in November 1969 and in which "wave" did the legislator respond?
   1=At Atlanta and responded in first wave (30)
   2=Not at Atlanta but responded in first wave (72)
   3=At Atlanta and responded in second wave (19)
   4=Not at Atlanta and responded in second wave (24)
   5=At Atlanta and responded in third wave (12)
   6=Not at Atlanta but responded in the third wave (45)

6: A "1" was punched in this column for all respondents outside the 202 of the universe of 278. These were legislators who had responded to Questionnaire 1 but were no longer in the 1969-70 universe because of defeats at the polls, retirements, election to governor, appointment to the federal cabinet, etc., for a total of 41. But for the primary 202 respondents used in this study, column 6 is a blank.

The following codings refer to questions 1 through 19 of Questionnaire II (definitions are also given in Appendix D). No frequency count is given for columns 7-8 thru 31-32 as there was a very wide range of frequencies given by the respondents (from 0 to 99):

7-8: "You initiate."

9-10: "Governor initiates."

11-12: "Happenstance meetings."
13-14: "Directly between governor and yourself--You to Gov."

15-16: "Thru 'informal persons' such as personal friends, party leaders--You to Gov."

17-18: "Thru the governor's staff--You to Gov."

19-20: "Thru your staff--You to Gov."

21-22: "Thru both the governor's staff and your staff--You to Gov."

23-24: "Directly between governor and yourself--Gov to You."

25-26: "Thru 'informal persons' such as personal friends, party leaders--Gov to You."

27-28: "Thru the governor's staff--Gov to You."

29-30: "Thru your staff--Gov to You."

31-32: "Thru both the governor's staff and your staff--Gov to You."

33: Frequency: Too little = 1 (88), About right = 3 (110), Too much = 5 (2), Blank = 777 (2).

34: Governor thru staff satisfactory? Yes=5 (142), No=1 (38), Coded 3 (2), Blank=777 (20).

35: Does not use staff: not used.

36: You to governor thru your staff satisfactory? Yes=5 (76), No=1 (38), Blank=777 (88).

37: Do not use staff: not used.

38: You to governor thru friends satisfactory? Yes=5 (28), No=1 (40), Coded 1 (1), Blank=777 (133).

39: Do not use third persons: not used.

40: Governor to you via third persons satisfactory? Yes=5 (24), No=1 (54), Blank=777 (124).

41: Does not use third persons: not used.

42: Attempt to influence governor? Very frequently=5 (20), Frequently=4 (45), Occasionally=3 (85), Seldom=2 (34), Never=1 (2), Don't talk with governor=0 (15).

43: Blank.
44: Channels blocked? Very frequently=1 (23), Frequently=2 (22), Occasionally=3 (45), Seldom=4 (54), Never=5 (55), Blank=777 (3)

45: General agreement: 21 checked this item. AGREEMENT

46: Trying to find out if in agreement: 107 checked this item. TRYFIND

47: Trying to swing the governor: 41 checked this item. TRYSWING

48: Trying to convert the governor: 27 checked this item. CONVERT

49: Not used.

50: Initiate a conference? Yes=5 (105), No=1 (17), Blank=777 (80). INITCONF

51: Not used.

52: Conference bring governor closer? Yes=5 (47), Not sure=3 (38), No=1 (22), Blank=777 (95). CLOSER

53: Difference in party? 53 checked this item. PARTYDIF

54 & 55: Not used.

56: Separation of powers doctrine? 21 checked this item. SEPOWERS

57: Attempts to dominate: 20 checked this item. DOMINATE

58: It is useless: 33 checked this item. USELESS

59: Not used.

60: Governor encourage questions, etc.? To a great extent=5 (62), To some extent=3 (63), Very little=1 (56), Don't meet with governor=0 (16). FEEDBACK

61: Blank.

62 thru 66: Question 16 was not coded but used in conjunction with other items.

67: If governor is of your party, do you communicate more/less on differing views? More=5 (99), About the same (volunteered) was coded 3 (6), Less=1 (38), Blank=777 (59). SAMEPRTY
68: If governor is not of your party, do you communicate more/less on differing views? More=5 (27), Volunteered: About same=3 (4), Less=1 (94), Blank=777 (77). DIPARTY

69-72: Question 19 was not coded or used in this study.

73: 1=This card contains some estimated data,
0=This card has no estimated data but there is one for this respondent which does contain estimated data.
Blank=There was no estimated data compiled on this respondent.

74: 1=Responded only to Questionnaire 1 (1968) (0).
0=Responded to Questionnaire 2 and possibly also to Questionnaire 1 (202).

75: 1=Responded to both Questionnaires 1 and 2 ( ).
0=Responded only to Questionnaire 2 ( ).

76: Blank.

77-79: Serial number for card sorting.

80: Card number: 6.

CARD 7

1 through 3: Regional, state, and personal identification numbers as explained for Card 1.

4 & 5: Blank.

6: (Not used in statistical study because of infrequency and scattering of responses.)

7: If respondent serves as a channel for communications between governor and other legislators, does he/she sometimes feel overloaded with communications?:
   5=No (83)
   3=Sometimes (30)
   1=Often (8)
Not a channel or no response (81) OVERLOAD

8: Blank.

9: Who does respondent think changes or modifies their position more?:
   5=The governor (21)
   3=It's about equal or neither change (120)
   1=The legislators (55) MODIFIES
10: Blank.

11: To what extent does respondent go along with governor's program when it is presented?:
   4=Fully (32)
   3=Partially (157)
   2=Hardly at all (11)
   1=Not at all (0)
   No response (2) GOALONG

12: Does respondent recall changing anticipated vote as a consequence of a communication from the governor?:
   4=Many times (1)
   3=Several times (39)
   2=Once or twice (86)
   1=No (73)
   No response (3) CHANGED

13: How much influence does governor's communications have on legislative policy outcomes?:
   6=A great deal (64)
   5=Moderate (90)
   4=Little (38)
   3=No (3)
   2 (Not used)
   1=A negative influence (4)
   No response (3) INFLUCE

14 thru 22 were responses to question 25 but were not coded nor dealt with in this study.

23: Who has the most bargaining power?:
   5=Legislature (41)
   3=Governor and legislature about equal (81)
   1=Governor (77)
   No response (3) BRGNPOWR

24: Does the governor use his bargaining powers in attempting to influence the legislature?:
   5=Very frequently (28)
   4=Frequently (59)
   3=Occasionally (75)
   2=Seldom (33)
   1=Never (2)
   No response (5) GOVBARGN

25: Do legislators use their bargaining powers in attempting to influence the governor?:
   5=Very frequently (13)
   4=Frequently (43)
   3=Occasionally (95)
   2=Seldom (42)
   1=Never (5)
   No response (4) LEGBARGN
Responses to 26 thru 29 are based on responses previously given to question 26—does talking to or writing to the governor:

26: Helps equalize powers (64)  
27: Unbalances still further (5)  
28: Has little effect on balance of power (104)  
29: Has no effect on balance of power (1)  
No response (28)

30: Lobbyists in respondents state go first to:
5=Legislature (147)  
3=Either or unknown (33)  
1=Governor (18)  
No response (4)

31: Blank.

Columns 32 thru 67 were based on questions 31, 32, and 33 but were not used in this study.

68: Does respondent think legislative officers have more or less respect for the governor as a result of working with him and his program?:
5=More (137)  
3=Same (not an option on questionnaire, but stated by some) (6)  
1=Less (36)  
No response (23)

69: Does respondent think legislative officers have more formal or more relaxed relationship with governor as a result of their working with him and his program?:
5=More formal (32)  
3=Same (not an option on questionnaire, but stated by some) (4)  
1=Less formal (157)  
No response (9)

Columns 70 through 73 are blank. NOTE: There was no estimated data for Card 7, thus column 73 remains blank.

For columns 74 through 76 and 77 through 79, see Card 6.

90: Card number: 7.

CARD 8

1 through 3: Same as for Card 6.

4: Blank.
5: The 54 states and territories were ranked on population. The highest 27 were arbitrarily coded "4," "High Population," the lowest 27 as "1," "Low Population." Low population ran from 30,000 (American Samoa) to 2,500,000 and high population from 2,700,000 to 19,300,000 (California).

6: See Card 6 explanation.

7 thru 14: Record extent of reliance respondents place on certain sources of information about the governor's program and wishes per question 36:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
<th>14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4=A great deal</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3=Some</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2=Not much</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1=None</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 thru 20: Not coded here. Used as a basis for the RIVALRY variable, Column 7 of Card 9.

21: Coding of extent of governor's party control in legislature in which respondent has membership:

8=Majority member of a GP-controlled legislature (76)
7=Minority member of a GP-controlled legislature (33)
6=Majority mbr of split legislature, respondent's chamber controlled by GP (14)
5=Minority mbr of split legislature, respondent's chamber controlled by GP (6)
4=Majority mbr of split legislature, respondent's chamber controlled by NGP (13)
3=Minority mbr of split legislature, respondent's chamber controlled by NGP (6)
2=Majority member of an NGP-controlled legislature (37)
1=Minority member of an NGP-controlled legislature (17)

22: Respondent's feelings as to whether his/her access to the governor increases his/her power to influence legislation and appointments, get funds allocated, and obtain favorable administrative decisions:

4=Considerably (58)
3=Some (63)
23: Not used in this study.

24: Does respondent report picking up useful information on political strategy and skills in discussions with the governor?
- 4=Frequently (43)
- 3=Occasionally (78)
- 2=Seldom (45)
- 1=Never (35)
- No response (1)

25: Party to which respondent belongs:
- 2=Democrat (89)
- 1=Other (5)
- 0=Republican (108)

28: How respondent classifies his relationship to governor, based on question 41:
- 5=Most friendly (64)
- 4=Friendly (88)
- 3=Neutral (36)
- 2=Unfriendly (12)
- 1=Most unfriendly (2)

29: How respondent classifies his political relationship to governor, based on question 42:
- 5=Very cooperative (46)
- 4=Cooperative (69)
- 3=Neutral (27)
- 2=Opposed (46)
- 1=Strongly opposed (14)

30: Respondent's age group:
- 7=70's or above (3)
- 6=60's (22)
- 5=50's (53)
- 4=40's (80)
- 3=30's (42)
- 2=20's (1)
- No response (1)

31: Respondent's educational level, based on question 44:
- 8=Doctorate (24)
- 7=Master's, LLB, or Professional (82)
- 6=BA or BS (51)
- 5=Associate of Arts (14th) (9)
- 4=Senior High School (31)
- 3=Junior High School (3)
- 2=Grammar (8th) (2)
1=Elementary (6th) (0)

1=Elementary (6th) (0)

1=Elementary (6th) (0)

The 3 responses in column 33 were later coded as "0" in column 32.

35: Blank.

57: Rank of respondent: 5=Presiding officer. 4=Majority leader. 1=Minority leader. 

The responses to columns 58 through 67 (the dittoed and last page of Questionnaire II) were designed primarily for any longitudinal studies which might be undertaken later. They were not used in this study.

68: Faction and party codes:

5=Member of governor's party AND faction (84); 4=Member of the governor's party (18);
3=Member of governor's party but NOT of his faction of the party (11); 2=(Not used.) 1=Not a member of the governor's party (89). 

Columns 69 through 72 were used for quick card sorting. A "1" in column 69 identified the respondent as a member of the governor's party and faction as in 5 for column 68. Those represented by 4 above were punched on column 70, those by a 3 as 1 in 71, and those by a 1 as 1 in 72. Column 72 was used for the GOVPARTY dichotomous variable since all who were not NGP (1 punch) were GP (0 punch). 

For an explanation of columns 73 through 79, see Card 6.

80: Number of card: 8.
1 through 3: Regional, state, and personal identification numbers as explained for Card 1.

4 through 6: Blank.

7: In Question 37 of Questionnaire II, respondents were asked to indicate rivalry with or support for the governor for each of the incumbents of positions being studied. From this was extracted the response of the respondent himself and it was coded in column 7, Card 9:

- 5 = Support for the governor (99);
- 3 = Neutral (5);
- 1 = Rivalry with the governor (81);
- Missing (17).

RIVALRY

8 & 9: "In-person Communications" variable. See INPCOM in Appendix D.

10 & 11: Blank.

12 through 14: "Directly Initiated Communications" variable. See DIRINCOM in Appendix D.

15 & 16: "Total Direct Communications" variable. See DIRCOM in Appendix D.

17 through 19: "The Sum of Ten Communications Channels." See SUMTEN in Appendix D.

20: "VISCID" variable: A new construct which appears to measure a constraining force on response rates discovered during the course of this study. See Appendix E.

21 through 23: "Communications Initiative." See COMINIT in Appendix D.

24: Blank.

25 through 73: Blank.

74 through 79: Please see Card 6.

80: Card number: 9.
STATE CHARACTERISTICS
CARD 4

1-2: Number assigned each state. See introductory page of this Appendix. NOTE: The territories were not coded on this card as the type of information given herein was only available for states.

3: Blank.

4-5: The states numbered in alphabetical order for card sorts.

NOTE: Hereafter only the columns and the variables thereon will be given. Definitions of variables used are in Appendix D. Variables not used in this present study are marked with an asterisk (*).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOSO</td>
<td>RESPR1</td>
<td>RESPR2</td>
<td>POPULATN</td>
<td>LEGSIZ</td>
<td>LEGEXP</td>
<td>LINOV</td>
<td>INDUST</td>
<td>AFFLU</td>
<td>GINI</td>
<td>IPCR4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMCENT</td>
<td>GENEPS*</td>
<td>GENXED*</td>
<td>WELED*</td>
<td>HINATR</td>
<td>FAIR</td>
<td>DEMCON</td>
<td>PCNPCT</td>
<td>FCNPCT</td>
<td>PRESGP*</td>
<td>AGREE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTER</td>
<td>BILLIN</td>
<td>BILLS%</td>
<td>CALDAY</td>
<td>BILSPDAY</td>
<td>IPGUBC*</td>
<td>GRUMMS</td>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>REDIST</td>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>CARDST4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY


---

68 Where known, University of Hawaii Library call numbers are given for quick reference.


McLEOD, Jack M. "The Contribution of Psychology to Human Communication Theory" in Frank E. X. Dance, ed.; *Human


INDEX

NOTE: The page numbers listed first for variables (those words or acronyms spelled with all capital letters) refer to the pages where the variables are defined/described.

ABLEGOV ... 203, 141, 145
ACCESS ... 203, 115, 146
Adrian and Press ... 2
AFFLU ... 203, 28, 35, 222
affluence ... 220, 223-225
AGEGROUP ... 203
AGREE ... 203, 132, 144
AGREEMENT ... 204, 146
ATLANTA ... 204
AUTOCRAT ... 204, 145
AVLVETOG ... 204
AVOLIPFG ... 204
AVOLIPGG ... 204
bargain ... 178
bargaining ... 152
bargaining powers ... 139
Barnlund ... 89
Bavelas and Barrett ... 5
BILIN ... 205, 145
BILLS ... 205, 29, 145, 222
BILSPDAY ... 204, 145, 222
blockage ... 82, 87
BLOCKED ... 205, 82, 113
BMD02D Program ... 229
BRGNPOWB ... 205, 138, 144, 150, 152
Burns, John A. ... 19
CALDAY ... 205
CALL ... 205
Center for Governmental Development ... 13
centralization ... 35, 224-225
Centralization in Decision-Making ... 223
CHANGED ... 205, 134-136, 147
Changing Positions ... 133
channel ... 137
channels ... 76, 80
chi square ... 25
COMMIT ... 205, 143, 148, 151-152
communication boundaries ... 178
Communications Frequency ... 133
communications theory ... 177
COMPETITIVE ... 206, 84-85, 115
competitiveness ... 136
COMPOSIT ... 206, 142, 145-147, 150, 153
compromises ... 170
GOALONG ••• 135
GOODPROG ••• 209, 116, 138, 145
Gore, William J. ••• 3
GOVBARGN ••• 209, 151-152
governor as respondent ••• 40
governor-initiated communications ••• 227
Governor's Party ••• 69, 87
governor's party membership ••• 25
Governor's Program ••• 69
governor's staff ••• 114, 117
governors ••• 71-72, 75, 178
governors' staffs ••• 179
GOVPARGN ••• 139
GOVPARTY ••• 209, 116-117
GOVTOLL ••• 209, 46, 231
GP ••• 35, 55-56, 58, 61, 66, 69, 87
Great Communicator, The ••• 84
group meetings ••• 58, 62
Grumm's Index ••• 225
Grumm's Professionalism Index ••• 223-224
GRUMMS ••• 209, 29, 35, 145, 222-223
GUSESTAF ••• 210

HAPPEN ••• 231
Hawaiian language ••• 175
HILOPOPN ••• 210, 84, 125, 127
HINATR ••• 210
Homans, George C. ••• 88
hui hoiihoi ••• 175, 179

in-person communications ••• 61, 170
INFLUENCE ••• 210, 134-135, 146
Informal Channels ••• 79
informal means ••• 122
Informal persons ••• 79, 112-113, 132, 179
informal relationship ••• 116
INFORMED ••• 145, 210
initiator complex ••• 61-62, 85, 152, 170, 228
INOVATIV ••• 145, 210
interaction ••• 180
interactions ••• 179
interpretation ••• 221
IPCR ••• 210, 221-222, 226
IPCR4 ••• 211, 132, 136, 145

Jewell & Patterson ••• 1
joint programs ••• 170

Kendall's tau ••• 82
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test ••• 68, 74
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Two Sample Test for Large Samples ••• 73

LEADER ••• 211, 141, 145
Leaders of Majority ••• 69
OVERLOAD ... 214, 137
OVERSAT ... 214, 129, 131, 142, 147, 150

Party ... 126, 220, 226
Party and Faction ... 126
party competition on governors' programs ... 136
party functionaries ... 179
party leader ... 179
Party organization ... 112
party organizations ... 178
PARTYORN ... 214, 140, 146
PCNFCT ... 214, 132, 145
personal
    contact ... 115
Personal Attitudes ... 69
personal contact ... 111, 115
personal letters ... 63
personal relationships ... 168
POLICOOP ... 214, 93, 113, 116-117, 137, 144
Political Cooperation ... 79, 115, 179
political relations ... 167
political resource ... 167
political resources ... 168, 178
political survival ... 180
political theory ... 177
politics of discussion ... 174
Popular Democrat ... 28
Population ... 35, 124, 126, 220, 222-223, 225
POPULATN ... 214, 35, 85
power ... 153, 168, 174
POWERBUD ... 215, 144
POWERTOT ... 215, 144
Presiding Officers ... 66
Press, Charles ... 2
Proposition 1 ... 16, 65, 68, 162
Proposition 2 ... 16, 89, 94, 167
Proposition 3 ... 16, 101, 108-109, 175
Proposition 4 ... 16, 143, 173
Proposition 5 ... 16, 147, 173
Proposition 6 ... 16, 123, 161
Proposition 7 ... 16, 77, 229-230
Proposition 8 ... 16, 94, 168
Proposition 9 ... 16, 79
Proposition 10 ... 16, 133
Proposition 11 ... 16, 51
Proposition 12 ... 17, 61, 152, 170
Proposition 13 ... 17, 162
Proposition 14 ... 17, 63
Proposition 15 ... 17, 52
Proposition 16 ... 17, 83
Proposition 17 ... 17, 132
Proposition 18 ... 17, 136, 166
Proposition 19 ... 17, 149-150
Proposition 20 ... 17, 150
Proposition 21 ... 17, 58-59, 173
PTYMATCH ... 144, 214

Ranney, Austin ... 136
REALSTIC ... 215, 145
REDIST ... 215
REGION ... 215, 28
Republicans ... 66, 226
research, further ... 180
respect ... 215, 116-117
response rate ... 220
Response Rate 1 ... 221-222, 225
Response Rate 2 ... 221, 223, 225
response rates ... 180
Response Rates 1 and 2 ... 222
RESPR1 ... 215, 35, 222
RESPR2 ... 215, 35, 222
Rhyne ... 1
RIVALRY ... 216, 115-116, 144
Rosenberg, Morris ... 221
Routt ... 24
Rummel, Rudolph ... 227

satisfaction ... 119, 130-131, 142, 173
Sick State ... 2
Siegel, Sidney ... 25-26, 73
skill ... 136
SOCALCON ... 216, 145
SPOP ... 216, 222
SR Party ... 27
SRCGSTAF ... 216, 111, 146
SRCINFML ... 216, 111
SRCNEWS ... 216, 111
SRCOLDRS ... 216, 111
SRCPARTY ... 216, 111, 113, 132
SRCPRCON ... 216, 84-85, 111, 114-115, 131, 143, 149, 151
SRCURSTF ... 217, 111
SRCWREMSG ... 217, 111
staffs ... 121
STAFFSAT ... 217
standardization ... 221
state characteristics ... 220
state governments ... 170, 177
Steinberg, Charles S. ... 88
STRONG ... 217, 145
SUBSTANT ... 217, 145
SUMLL5 ... 217, 89, 114
SuMTen ... 217, 42, 127, 143, 149-152

Temple, A. L. ... 13, 20
territorial governments ... 170, 177
Territorials ... 26
test factor ... 221
the v factor ... 35
third persons ... 122
TIME ... 217, 143
TRUSTY ... 217, 116, 145
TRYFIND ... 218, 132, 146
TRYSWING ... 218, 147
two-party ... 136

University of Hawaii ... 229
useful information ... 175
USFLINFO ... 218, 101, 115, 136, 146

v factor ... 218, vii, 36-38, 85, 87, 108, 150, 153, 168, 224-226
values ... 179
veto ... 86
Vetoes ... 69, 73
VISCID ... 218, 108
VOTER ... 218, 222
votes, changing anticipated ... 136

VFLSTAFD ... 218, 84-85
Whyte, William H., Jr. ... 3
word-of-mouth communications ... 52

Zeigler and Baer ... 140