FOSTERING A POLITICAL SOCIETY IN SOUTH KOREA
THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN FUTURES STUDIES

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ABSTRACT

For the purpose of this dissertation, democracy will be understood as a political system in which people create and organize alternative futures and then choose from among these alternatives in order to perpetuate a better community life. Based on this definition, I argue that Korea has not fully developed democracy. One of the reasons for this has to do with the underdevelopment of a political society wherein people can learn how to explore diverse futures, create and develop alternative policies accordingly, and plan for the improvement of their lives. In a political society, individuals can be redefined as being political whenever they pursue alternatives to the status quo. In this sense, the word “political” can be reinterpreted as “actively involved in creating alternatives.” Through this dissertation, I address the possibility that a political society can be nurtured by laypersons’ participation in foresight activities that encourage individuals to improve self-efficacy in terms of their ability to impact their futures. In order to assess the possibility, I provided Koreans with tailored foresight activities and found that these activities helped cultivate a can-do attitude toward the future.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Before I went to Hawaii in 2006, I had lost my way in my career. I loved my job as a journalist in South Korea but became less convinced that I would still be proud of myself as a journalist in the future. I was not sure what to write. To make matters worse, I did not know how to observe a society. I could see Korean society through my senses, but it was transforming into a monster that I could not understand. This problem was fatal to a journalist, and I wandered about aimlessly in the streets.

At that time, Jim Dator passed by Seoul, Korea, like a gust of wind. I instinctively attempted to catch the wind and asked where it came from. What this means is that as a journalist, I interviewed Professor Dator and introduced his perspectives, theories, and methods on futures studies to Korean readers by publishing an article. Despite the article’s length, fortunately many readers found it very interesting! I especially enjoyed the discussion with him on how to “fairly” investigate what is going on in a society and how to imagine diverse futures based on the investigation. Since then, I decided to give up my job and follow him to study futures studies— the best decision I made in my life. I was convinced that I could be a “real” journalist who sheds light on what changes a society and what people should do in order to adapt to the changes.

My learning journey at University of Hawaii was more productive and fruitful when I met Professor Roger Ames, who teaches Chinese and comparative philosophies. Through the lens of Ames, I could look back on how I had been raised as a Korean and an East Asian in terms of inherited cultures. Moreover, Ames encouraged me to contribute to futures studies by reflecting East Asian cultural heritage. He never allowed
me to stop at just studying what futures studies is and always urged me to reinterpret what I learned in my own terms in order to create a third perspective by applying triangulation, which emphasizes a “three-among-many” rather than “either-or” understanding of cultural differences. As a result, this approach led to tailoring futures studies to Korea by considering aesthetic sensibilities of East Asia.

Even though I had two great teachers, I could not have completed my dissertation without helping from professors Debora Halbert, Richard Chadwick, and Edward Shultz. Professor Halbert opened my eyes to develop a scale that assessed self-efficacy toward the future, which is a crucial element of my dissertation, not to mention that she gave me very detailed comments and feedback to advance my dissertation. Professor Chadwick always welcomed me and provided excellent and warm tutoring for me to deepen my arguments. I really enjoyed the time with him in discussing the relations between futures studies and leadership. Last but not least, Professor Shultz was not only a professor who taught me how Korean history was useful and meaningful for elaborating my dissertation, but also my mentor who always convinced me that I could muddle through for a brighter academic life.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purposes of the Dissertation

The dissertation aims to assess to what extent foresight activities can help individuals in South Korea cultivate self-efficacy toward the future. Individuals with self-efficacy toward the future can have beliefs that they effectively influence conditions that would (re)shape their lives in the future. Based on this argument, this dissertation examines the effectiveness of foresight activities on an individual level.

This assessment can be a basis for fostering a political society in Korea. For the purpose of this dissertation, democracy will be understood as a political system in which people create and organize alternative futures and then choose from among these alternatives in order to perpetuate a better community life (Bezold, 2006; Choi, 2005; Toffler, 1970). Based on this definition, I argue that Korea does not have a fully developed democracy. One of the reasons for this has to do with the underdevelopment of a political society wherein people can learn how to explore diverse futures, create and develop alternative policies accordingly, and plan for the improvement of their lives. In this definition, I referred to Toffler (1970), Bezold (2006), and Choi (2005). Toffler coined the term “anticipatory democracy” to mean a process that combines citizen participation with future consciousness. Bezold (2006) notes that anticipatory democracy “reinforces the importance of developing shared visions” and “enlightened participation with foresight” (pp. 49-50). Bezold also points out that anticipatory democracy needs to develop diverse approaches for individuals who, being at different levels and coming from a diversity of perspectives, may not accept, appreciate or recognize the legitimacy of shared visions. Choi’s definition of democracy that I heavily rely on is a political system in which political parties and leaders competitively organize alternatives and then citizens choose from among these alternatives. In my definition of democracy, I highlight that democracy can be consolidated by people who have futures consciousness.

1 It can be useful to distinguish political society from civil society. Cohen and Arato (1994) explain that political society is mediation between civil society and state. Choi (2005) also argues that political society that is independent of civil society is an institutionalized political system, in which political parties organize
other words, Korea has not fully established conditions that encourage individuals’ participation in visioning alternative futures. In a political society, individuals can be redefined as being political whenever they pursue alternatives to the status quo. In this sense, the word “political” can be reinterpreted as “actively involved in creating alternatives.” Through this dissertation, I address the possibility that a political society can be nurtured by laypersons’ participation in foresight activities that encourage individuals to improve self-efficacy in terms of their ability to impact their futures.

In order to assess the effectiveness of foresight activities, this dissertation set three tasks. The first task was to determine what to measure. This led to the creation of a scale that statistically assesses self-efficacy toward the future by modifying an existing scale in the field of education. The second task was to determine what types of foresight activities were given to participants in Korea. This task consisted of two studies: one was to provide a control group with one future scenario and a treated group with four different futures scenarios and then test whether the treated group increased self-efficacy toward the future more than the control group; the other was to provide individuals with hands-on futures workshops and then test to what extent futures workshops helped them improve self-efficacy toward the future. Lastly, the third task was to determine how to offer these foresight activities. This task aimed to tailor futures studies to Koreans by alternatives to the status quo. For Tocqueville, institutionalizing political society meant governing people by making policies and enacting laws. Regarding the underdevelopment of political society, Sunhyuk Kim (2000) argues that “the low institutionalization and underdevelopment of political society” is “one of the chronic problems of Korean politics” (p. 147). Kim also asserts that consolidation of democracy can hardly be achievable without institutionalizing political society that is composed of political parties and their affiliated networks, organizations and campaigns. I take a political society to mean a combination of two elements: one is the public sphere, which refers a space for unconstrained exchanges of ideas (Habermas, 1989); the other is the notion of a learning society, in which individuals are able not only to learn new trends and emerging issues of the future, but also to be empowered to develop alternative futures. See also Chapter two for the discussion on political society.
analyzing their own cultural characters. Thus, the primary purpose of this dissertation was to assess to what extent the tailored foresight activities helped participants in Korea foster a can-do attitude toward the future.

1-2. Background

1-2-1. Political Self-Efficacy in Korea

My study on self-efficacy toward the future was ignited and developed by studies on political efficacy in Korea. Kim (2002), among others, argues that political efficacy in South Korea has become low, so Koreans have a low degree of political participation and a high degree of political alienation (Boyer & Ahn, 1991; Ga, 2007; Ha & Lee, 2008). By definition, political efficacy is political self-efficacy, which is “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process…the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about the change” (Campbell et al., 1954 in Madsen, 1987, p. 572). Ga (2007) and Kim (2002) point out that the domination of patriarchy, distrust in government, corruption of politicians, and lack of the public sphere for unconstrained exchanges of ideas are linked to the low level of political efficacy in Korea.

One of the most conventional indicators by which to assess political efficacy is the turnout of voters. Voting enhances political efficacy. In Korea, the turnouts in general elections have continued to decrease significantly. And, the turnouts of presidential elections generally were higher than those of the general elections, but demonstrate the same trend. Decreased turnout of voters is found in many countries, but those in Korea are salient compared to other countries in terms of the decreasing rate (Lee et al., 2010).
One might argue that people would have a low level of political efficacy in an authoritative regime because their votes might not count in elections. People do not have any say about what an authoritative government does. However, the decreased turnout of voters in Korea does not make sense because Koreans successfully revolted against the military and authoritative regime in 1987 and achieved a more democratic government.

Political efficacy is associated with an intervening variable between an electoral system and the decision to vote (Karp & Banducci, 2008). For example, voters feel higher political efficacy in proportional representation (PR) systems than those in single-winner elections or mixed-election systems. In PR, if 30% of voters support a particular party, then roughly 30% of seats will be won by that party. Therefore, people do not think that their voting is a waste. The Netherlands is a case that demonstrates how PR encourages voters to vote (Karp & Banducci, 2008); for instance, the turnout of the Dutch voters was 80.35% in the 2006 general election. New Zealand’s case also supports the idea that PR is better to raise political efficacy. In the 1990s, New Zealand replaced the majoritarian system with PR. As a result, there was a significant shift in mass opinion toward more political efficacy (Banducci et al., 1999). Voters felt more flexibility in making choices because wider social representations appeared on the political stage.

However, the South Korean case does not follow the trend that PR systems have shown elsewhere. Korea had the single-winner election system but has mixed it with proportional representation since the local election in 2002 in order to increase the effective impact of individual votes and to protect minority rights. According to the new mixed election system, in the case of the general election in 2004, 227 congressmen were elected by the single-winner election, and 46 congressmen were elected by the
proportional representation at total.\textsuperscript{3} Since then, every Korean voter can vote for two: one is for a candidate running for the National Assembly in a voter’s district, and the other is for the political party that the voter prefers. This new electoral system seemed to be, to a degree, effective in raising the turnout of voters, which was 60.6\% in 2004 in comparison to the turnout of voters in 2000, which was 57.2\%. That result showed an increase of 3.4 percentage points. However, under the same mixed-electoral system, the turnout of voters in 2008 was 46.1\%, which was a decrease of 11.1 percentage points compared to that in 2004. Regarding this unexpected decrease, Kang (2008) pointed out that many people in their 20s and 30s did not vote in 2008 because they were not satisfied with the performances of major political institutions such as the President, the National Assembly, and the government in general. In addition, these voters expressed that the existing political parties did not properly reflect their political desires and ideology. Moreover, we can learn one more fact that the effort to mix with PR did not effectively work in Korea, even though the mixed election system incorporated political minorities, such as the Democratic Labor Party. It can be argued that the mixed system failed to have a shift toward positive attitudes about democracy in terms of turnout of voters.

Can it be argued that decreased turnout of voters is interpreted as increased political apathy? Yoon (2008) asserts that the decreased turnout of voters is not enough evidence to prove political non-involvement in Korea. In advanced democratic countries of the West, people also experience decreased voter turnout. However, citizens have initiated more unconventional political participation such as consumer boycotts,

\textsuperscript{3} The mixed-election system was initiated in 1988 in Korea. However, this mixed-election system was not a “real” one because political parties had seats of proportionate representatives according to how many seats each political party had from the single-winner election. Hence, this mixed-election system did not reflect minorities’ voices. Thus, the Korea Supreme Court ruled that this mixed-election system was unconstitutional in 2001.
unofficial strikes, and riots since the 1970s (Norris, 2002 in Yoon, 2008). Hence, conventional political participation, such as voting or campaign activities, becomes unpopular, while unconventional political participation is increasing. The latter is also increasing in Korea. The frequency of riots and the number of participants of riots in Seoul has seriously increased between 1990 to 2003 (Chung, 2004).

Reasons for this increased unconventional participation are found in the literature. Since Korean civilians democratized their country by removing the authoritarian regime in 1987, they have had freedom of expression and have practiced it through participating in riots and demonstrations. Consequently, more Koreans began to express their opinions not only on political issues, but also on any issues related to their daily lives (Chung, 2004). Schoolgirls, mothers with their buggies, and even a cooking-lover association have taken part in candlelight vigils to protest against the government (Yoon, 2008).

Given these facts, it is hard to determine whether Koreans are less interested in political involvement, but it is manifest that Koreans have diverse political desires and goals. I argue that the rise of polycentricity, which was recently identified in Korea, is associated with the diversity of Korean society. In general, a polycentric society is a society in which multiple centers exist. Chalmers et al. (1997) point out that polycentric societies consist of associative networks, which are more powerful in shaping public policy than political parties.

In Korean contexts, Korean society is being transformed into a polycentric society due to devolution, democratization, and pluralization of society from a very mono-centric and authoritarian society (Choi, 2007). This transformation can be observed
in public policies -- for example, one that deals with issues of water management, like construction of dams. In the past, an authoritarian government dealt with these issues by imposing overarching rules on stakeholders without negotiating with them. But, this imposition does not work any more. For example, Lee and Shin (2011) argue that because of globalization, devolution, and privatization, multiple actors enter into areas of public policy and play important roles in influencing policies and decision-making. While Korean society is moving toward a polycentric society, the existing political parties and government are not aptly coping with this change. It can be argued that this is one of the reasons for why constituencies do not vote but rely on unconventional political participation in Korea. Riots and demonstrations could be a tool for people to challenge the existing unfair or inefficient conditions but at the same time could be a threat to democracy if these unconventional activities lead to populism or anti-intellectual political movements.4

I found that little of the available literature tackles how Korean society deals with varied political desires. As a result, there are few frameworks developed on how to identify and categorize their diverse desires. Without frames, political parties and government would have difficulty with articulating a new political agenda created by new political activists. Also, citizens would remain in the low level of political efficacy. Thus, I grappled with what is making Korean society diverse, how diverse the new political

4 Korean scholars debate on whether unconventional political participation leads to populism or an alternative to a representative democracy. Choi argues that alternative policies could be shaped by political parties, not by unconventional political movements (Jemin Son. 11 June 2008. Jangjip Choi: The current regime might be on the way out. Kyunghyang Shinmun). On the contrary, Ha argues that a political party system does not work in Korea and that this is why unconventional political movements occur (Son, Lee, & Lim. 18 June 2008. Debate on the reasons for candlelight vigils between Dr. Park and Dr. Ha. Kyunghyang Shinmun).
activists exist in Korea, and how this diversity could be optimally and manageably categorized.

Regarding these questions, I argue that the foresight activities that I provided in Korea could be opportunities for participants to sort out the diversity in an effective way, experience diverse futures scenarios, and exercise alternative policies and consensus building. This way, participants could increase self-efficacy toward the future. The Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies (HRCFS) categorizes all imaginations or ideas on the future into four images of the future (FIF): Continued Growth, Collapse, Disciplined Society, and Transformational Society. The images about the future are based on realities that people perceive at every moment, and people extrapolate their future from these realities. If one collects all images of the future that people have, one can be aware of all desires pertaining to what people want and do not want. HRCFS proposes that all societies can have at least four images of the future, which contain four different aspects of the future. I do not argue that FIF is a perfect tool to see all images of the future in the world. Rather, FIF can be a useful tool to illustrate how optimally diverse images of the future can be displayed in a condensed form.

As I remarked, democracy is a political system in which people competitively create and organize alternative futures and then choose from among these alternatives in order to perpetuate a better community life. I argue that Koreans need to develop this political system. For this purpose, Koreans should develop a political society in which

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5 According to Janis (1982), consensus decision-making searches for ways to agree on an action or policy by obtaining tacit or assumed agreement, while critical thinking is characterized as the examination of a wide variety of alternatives from many perspectives or concerns. (Irving Janis. (1982). *Groupthink.* Houghton Mifflin, N.Y.).
people can learn how to create and develop alternative policies and plans for the improvement of their lives. Through this dissertation, I address the possibility that political society can be nurtured by laypersons’ participation in foresight activities. For example, futures workshops are effective in revealing “how much unacademic people in particular feel the need to express themselves and produce their own ideas” (Jungk, 1977, p. 58). Moreover, they can encourage participants to have significant relationships with the world in which they live (Park, 2009b). Foresight activities can also provide opportunities to uncover the reality of the world (de Certeau, 1984) and to create something that the participants have to invent for a better world (Jungk, 1977). In short, through participating in foresight activities, people can construct “valuable and grounded opinions about the present situation, outline visions, hopes and fears about the future, and express a drive for change” (Novaky, 2006, p. 690). Political society can become more future-oriented by people who have futures consciousness.

1-2-2. Futures Studies in Korea

In examining literature and performing projects at the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies, I became confident that through participating in futures workshops, individuals could imagine alternatives to the status quo, organize like-minded people and develop alternatives with others, participate in political decision-making, and continuously renew reality in local and global communities. Based on this confidence, the dissertation proposes that futures workshops can play significant roles in bringing about not only increased self-efficacy toward the future, but also political efficacy.
However, my research has shown that Koreans have difficulty developing futures thinking. More concretely, Koreans do not fully internalize one of the core beliefs of futures studies -- that is, stepping out of the present is a better-informed way to identify new problems and opportunities of the present. Historians also step out of the present and explore the past, but what I mean by “stepping out of the present” is to create teleological visions, which maintain a distance from the present. Plato’s “Ideas” or Judeo-Christian’s “God” are examples of teleological visions, which pursue logos or foundational principles. Koreans were less inclined to elaborate this type of vision in their cultural contexts (Choi, 1989; Park, 2009).

One of the reasons for this has to do with the dominance of aesthetic sensibilities. A list of authors argue that East Asians’ aesthetic preferences are characterized as correlative, particular, polar, processual, contextual, appropriate, relation-centered, accommodating, floating, holistic, and indeterminate (Choi et al., 2007; Hall & Ames, 1987; Jullien, 2000; Masuda et al., 2008; Nisbett, 2003; Shin, 1998). In comparison, aesthetic preferences in what Heidegger critiques as the “theo-ontological” tradition tend to be unconditional, universal, dualistic, teleological, logical, alternative, substance-centered, exclusive, linear, analytical, and judgmental. In contrast to this theo-

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6 Jungho Choi (1989), one of the founders of the Korean Society of Future Studies, argued that Koreans lack a transcendental attitude. As a consequence, Koreans have not developed futures studies. Choi asserted that this transcendental attitude was essential to elaborate futures studies. Choi pointed out that the lack of it has to do with the dominance of Confucianism, which pursues practicality. Sangin Chun, president of the Korean Society of Future Studies, argued that one of the reasons why Koreans have difficulty constructing futures studies has to do with absence of traditions of European Enlightenment, rationalism, and evolutionary view of history that cultivate Western futures studies, in Korea (discussions through emails with Chun, May 15, 2009).

7 This theo-ontological way of thinking is substance-oriented. Ames (2010) argues that from the 19th century, Western philosophy criticized its own ontological thinking – for example, “Heidegger uses the language of theo-ontological thinking, Whitehead criticizes misplaced concreteness, Dewey criticizes the philosophical fallacy, Derrida criticizes the logocentrism” (in Yu, 2010, p. 87).

8 We can find substance ontology in Plato’s “Ideas” and Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover,” which are
ontological tradition, contemporary Western philosophical movements, such as pragmatism, phenomenology, post-structuralism, hermeneutics, and existentialism, do not agree with foundational thoughts which rationalize one’s experience in order to make it teleological and systematic. Philosophers in these movements refuse the idea that there is a conscious agent who makes the grand design or the orderly progress in the world.

I do not argue that all futures studies aims to produce foundational and teleological visions. In fact, all of them are very different. For example, some futurists regard foresight activities as process-oriented and participatory (e.g., Cuhls, 2003); other futurists aim to accommodate diverse values in envisioning (e.g., Ogilvy, 1992); and, still others emphasize diverse conversations and multi-framing rather than probability and rationality in forecasting futures (e.g., Ramirez & Ravetz, 2011). However, despite the substances that are ultimate objects, exist in their own right, and undergo changes. Bell (1997) points out that a “rational, hypothetic-deductive system of thinking, a kind of though experiment” drove Plato to write the Republic (p. 63). Regarding foundationalism, Descartes is one of the classical foundationalists, who believe that there exists non-inferential justification or infallible belief, which is self-evident. We might call these authors’ way of thinking rational or substantial.

Pragmatists like William James and John Dewey agree that experience is not given but processual, ongoing, and evolving by re-clarifying questions (James’s Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 1907) and continuous inquiries on indeterminate situations (Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1938). These authors fought dogmatic ideas.

In general, phenomenology studies passive and active experiences: perception, imagination, thought, emotion, desire, volition, and action. Phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty argue that humans store and refine experiences through responding to and coping with diverse situations, and in turn, the situations “show up” for them as “requiring [their] responses” (Dreyfus, 2002, p. 368).

Post-structuralism also supports the idea that existence (or human experience) is made from mutually constitutive processes.

Regarding hermeneutics, for example, Gadamer (1976) casted a new understanding on the self by arguing that humans look at the present with patterns of behaviors in history and explore the future through reflecting values or preferences so humans can form a “fusion of horizons” and make eyes open to “new possibilities that is precondition of genuine understanding” (Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1976. Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linge. California: University of California Press, p. xxi).

In his book Being and Nothingness Sartre (1943) claimed as follows: “Existence precedes and rules essence.” Sartre reputed the Cartesian view, which is to consider “the self” as a given and fixed substance. Instead, Sartre argued that the self is redefined as a self-making in situations. Regarding this argument, existentialists often say, “What I am cannot be separated from what I take myself to be” (refer to: plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism).

This is based on discussions with Roger T. Ames through emails on March 2012.
differences, one of the commonalities that the field of futures studies shares is to make the future foreseeable as clearly as possible by creating hypothetical visions. All futurists can agree that creating clear visions of the future efficiently prepares people for the future. This is a basic idea of futures studies.

Interestingly and not surprisingly, in the second half of the 20th century, Korean scholars and government officials attempted to foresee the future as clearly as possible in order to catch up with economically advanced countries. They regarded futures studies as teleological so they adopted the field as a tool to develop their economy in the 1970s. They believed that a teleological vision could push Korean society into a developed society.

However, they did not understand that the aesthetic preferences in East Asia -- for example, holism -- might discourage Koreans from developing singular causal or token-causal claims in forecasting the future. As a result, they remained in developmentology, which is still a dominated form of futures studies in Korea, and did not fully develop the discipline as a social science, critical study, or a field that invokes aesthetic criteria.  

In recognizing Korean aesthetic preferences, I tailored futures studies to Korea and attempted to shape an indigenized type of it. I call it aesthetic futures studies, which begins from the primacy of vital relationality. Holism, which is a salient element in East

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15 Han-Been Lee, the former vice Prime-Minister, founded the Korean Society of Future Studies in 1968. There are now 71 members including Professors, CEOs, and politicians. No academic course about futures studies has been offered by the members. I also found no Korean academic journal that focuses on futures studies. There are a very small number of articles that deal with futures studies. For example, I used three major search engines, which serve to find Korean academic articles, such as KISS, DBPia, and eKoreanStudies, and I found only five articles that dealt with futures studies from 1973 to 2007.
Asian culture, is a corollary to this relationality. I utilize holism to indigenize futures studies. A holistic approach appreciates every element of the whole, does not favor any element of it, and assumes that everything is inter-connected. Hence, aesthetic futures studies stresses that all alternatives are not mutually exclusive but are rather interdependent and co-existing. In this sense, this aesthetic approach can provide individuals or organizations with a bird’s-eye view on the many possibilities of the future.¹⁶

Furthermore, aesthetic futures studies is floating and indeterminate. Ogilvy (1992) might support aesthetic futures studies, saying that futures studies should “transport us from a world where we could plant our feet firmly on the ground of foundations laid in the concrete of scientific materialism…to a world where we float or fall…and never come to rest on firm foundations” (p. 47). Both aesthetic one and Ogilvy highlight a simple fact that everything is ever-changing. In this assumption that the future is dynamic and uncertain, this dissertation examines whether the achieved aesthetic futures studies can be meaningful and useful in Korea in terms of self-efficacy toward the future.

1-3. Research Questions and Design

This research was designed to assess to what extent foresight activities could help individuals cultivate abilities that foster self-efficacy toward the future. Ability is not a “fixed attribute,” but “a generative capability in which cognitive, social, motivational, and behavioral skills must be organized and effectively orchestrated to serve numerous

¹⁶ Fuerth (2009) argues that “topsight” is a “supra-system perspective of a complex system; an awareness of how all the parts work together to create a whole, and how specific events relate to each other to shape the evolution of the system” (p. 19). Fuerth’s topsight seems to be similar to a bird’s-eye view at first glance, but this bird’s-eye view is different from topsight in the sense that an observer with the bird’s-eye view would be affected and changed by objects. Topsight is like a god’s-eye view.
purposes” (Bandura, 1993, p. 118). In this sense, this research argues that foresight activities can help individuals extend capabilities that are associated with self-efficacy toward the future.

1-3-1. Scale Development

For assessing whether foresight activities would be effective, I had to develop an appropriate measurement. I reviewed articles that dealt with the assessment of the effectiveness of foresight activities in the field of futures studies. For example, van der Duin et al. (2009) investigated how strategists and policy-makers at Dutch Ministries evaluated futures research that they carried out in the past. The respondents answered that futures research helped them detect emerging signals, inspire futures-oriented thoughts, and set the futures-relevant agenda. However, the assessment was limited to a post-test. Since the authors did not conduct a pre-test, they did not know the baseline of participants. In other words, the authors could not assess to what degree the futures activities affected the individuals and how intervention programs changed the individuals’ attitudes toward the future. This assessment has another limitation in that the assessment was conducted with the individuals who already knew what futures studies were. So, one might point out selection bias (or a statistical bias), in which there is an error in choosing individuals. In this case, the assessment cannot be generalized and extended to make predictions about the entire population.

There is another example. Hungarian futurist Novaky (2006) explored how futures studies motivated Hungarian grassroots movements to take part in actions for designing alternative futures. Novaky provided four Hungarian case studies using
participatory futures methods: one case from the field of vocational training, two cases concerning regional development, and one case concerning national development. According to Novaky (2006), participatory futures studies expresses that “all those concerned take part in the process of working out the possible alternatives of the future, whose future is being addressed, and who will take part in realizing it” (p. 688). People in Hungary who experienced participatory futures studies proved that common citizens could provide useful remarks, suggestions, and expectations about the future. Unfortunately but not surprisingly, the participants generally did not believe that decision-makers would respond by building on their opinions.

Regarding the assessment of Hungarian cases, it was blurred to what extent interventions were effective in the real world and how interventions changed individuals’ attitudes toward the future, because Novaky did not provide the comparison group tests. Another weak point of Novaky’s assessment is that there was no clear indication of what to measure. Did she want to measure how the futures workshops helped individuals express their opinions about the future or helped them develop abilities to create alternatives? Or, did she want to test whether the futures workshops helped individuals actively engage in making public policies? It is important to remember “what gets measured, gets done.” As Georghiou and Keenan (2006) point out, “Despite the spread of foresight experience across Europe and beyond, there has not so far been a systematic attempt to understand its effects [of foresight experiences]” (p. 762).

I realized that there were not enough articles in the field of futures studies on the degree to which foresight activities affect individuals’ performance. Hence, I looked at other fields and recognized that the field of education could give me good examples
about scales to measure individuals’ change after interventions. A researcher in Korea developed a scale to measure how individuals self-assess their attitudes toward learning. The researcher, Jaeim Bahng at the Department of Education at Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea, explored a number of articles that dealt with how to develop a life-long learning society.

Bahng focused on the articles, assuming that humans are born to be homo-eruditio, who enjoy learning and nurturing themselves. The philosophy of erudition, which is derived from the Latin word *erudite*, contends that learning has been misunderstood as a sort of study skills, or teaching and learning affairs. Rather, erudition suggests four directions in order to recover humans’ learning instinct: learning as learning-and-asking (學問); learning after emptying (餘白); learning for harmonizing with one’s own particularity (和而不同); and learning as mutual communication (意識疏通). The former two can be categorized as awakening (覺), and the latter two as ways of living with others in win-win strategies (相生). In order to evaluate individuals’ erudition level, Bahng developed a scale of erudition in 2010, which evaluates how adults self-assess their attitudes toward learning.

Like Bahng, educators want to create a learning society, in which not only students but also adults keep learning in order to solve diverse and complex problems that they (would) have. Futurists also want to create this learning society. For example, Molitor (2009) argues that “scenario deliberations inherently entail learning” (p. 85). Bell also strongly posits that futurists ought to be able to create a “learning community or, as the social psychologist Donald T. Campbell used to call it, an experimenting society”
(Slaughter, 2007, p. 104). Therefore, the assessment of the efficacy of foresight activities should aim at evaluating whether foresight activities can help individuals create a learning society, in which individuals are able not only to learn new trends and emerging issues of the future, but also to empower them to develop alternative futures and put them into action.

Bahng used the five factors of andragogy from Zoonsang Han (2001), and found 59 items that load on the factors. The five factors of the scale are (1) an ability that shapes new meanings, (2) a self-directed ability, (3) an ability that makes a decision and puts it into action, (4) an ability that challenges the status quo, and (5) an ability to learn something new by cooperating with others. Bahng surveyed 301 adults whose age ranges were from 20s to 60s in Seoul, Korea. Bahng found the erudition scale valid and reliable by using SPSS 12.0 for Windows.

This scale was very interesting to me as a futurist, in a sense that the five factors of the scale are related to abilities that can foster self-efficacy toward the future. However, I needed to modify the scale to make it relevant to foresight activities. I narrowed down the five factors to four and the 59 items to 20 in the context of futures studies, thereby reflecting attributes of futurists that were demonstrated in the futures literature (Bell, 2005; Dator, 2002; Dian, 2009; Inayatullah, 2006; 2009; Moura, 1996; Novaky, 2006; Sardar, 1996; and, Slaughter, 1999).

17 The concept of andragogy which is alternative to pedagogy is based on two assumptions: “first, a conception of learners as self-directed and autonomous; and second, a conception of the role of the teacher as facilitator of learning rather than presenter of content” (Reischmann, 2001, p. 22). In comparison, pedagogy focuses on methods of teaching within the boundaries of schools.
Let me take an example to show how to revise the scale by using the articles above. Dian (2009) argues that futures-oriented people have a tendency to actively engage in detection of emerging issues, which can impact a society in the future, and disseminate them to communities, politicians, and companies. With regard to these attributes of futures-oriented people, I drew the following items from the original 59 items that Bahng made: “There are changes about everyday rules that regulate human behavior” “I take part in improving society,” and “I am interested in the problems of my community.” From another example, Dator’s (2002) explication of how to be a good futurist, I drew the following items: “I am always curious about what happens in the world”; “I am good at creating unique methods whatever I do”; “I make an effort to leave a familiar life, and live in a new way.”

With the selected items, I conducted a twenty-question survey, which was a form of self-assessment in order to determine whether the reliability and dimensionality of the revised scale were satisfactory (SPSS v. 19). The participants included 269 college students aged 18 to 30 from several universities in Korea during June, July, and August of 2011. The result indicated that the reliability (cronbach’s alpha, α) was satisfactory. Furthermore, the four measurement dimensions (or factors) were accepted because the fit indices had good values. I named this revised scale “a Scale for futures consciousness” because I assume that the Scale assesses to what extent individuals can increase self-

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18 According to Johan Galtung, future consciousness is being conscious of what is possible, probable, and desirable in the future (Lombardo 2007). Moreover, Oystein Sande (1972) presented six dimensions of future consciousness: length, level of interest, influence, optimism, expectations, and values. For example, influence, one of the dimensions, shows how individuals feel that they can influence future events. Expectations can be the contents of future consciousness. I slightly changed Galtung’s future consciousness into “futures consciousness,” that is, future with s in order to emphasize plural possibilities of the future.
efficacy toward the future through participating in foresight activities (for the Scale, see Appendix I).

1-3-2. Procedure

1-3-2-1. Study One: the Control Group v. the Treated Group

In this research project, I evaluated whether a treated group with four futures scenarios increased self-efficacy toward the future more than a control group with one future scenario. This is hypothesis one. The treated group was given four scenarios of the future of Korea in 2040. The control group was given one scenario of the future of Korea in 2040 (for the full scenarios, see Appendix II). Figure 1-1 presents a comparison group design. Four futures scenarios consisted of FIF, and each scenario was written in roughly 100 words. One scenario for the control group contained one of the four images of the future labeled Continued Economic Growth. I conducted pre-tests and post-tests to measure the degree of change occurring as a result of the treatment.¹⁹

Figure 1-1. Comparison Group Design

¹⁹ The pretest-posttest design is widely used in academic research to compare participant groups and measure the degree of change occurring as a result of treatments or interventions (Campbell, and Stanley, 1966; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). One example can be found in the field of education, when researchers want to examine the effectiveness of a new teaching method upon groups of students.
One strong point of this design is that the comparison group design provides researchers a clear cause-and-effect relationship through comparing the treated group with the control group. However, one weak point of this design is to sacrifice external validity (Shuttleworth, 2009). External validity is the process of generalization, in which results of the test can be extended to make predictions about the entire population. In general, a large number of participants improves external validity.

One of the meaningful results is that both the treated group and the control group increased self-efficacy toward the future after experiencing futures through reading scenarios. Even though this test only provided individuals with the short narratives of the future, the individuals changed their attitudes toward the future to some degree. However, the hypothesis one was not statistically supported. I could not determine whether the treated group with four futures scenarios increased self-efficacy toward the future more than the control group with one future scenario.

1-3-2-2. Study Two: Futures Workshops

I provided a total of 88 Korean adults with futures workshops in Seoul, Puchon, and Kwangjoo. Participants followed the futures-visioning process. A futures workshop is regarded as a futures-visioning process, which aims at “helping an organization or community plan for and move towards its preferred future” (Dator, 2009a, p. 1). The components of the futures-visioning process are in this order: (1) appreciating the past, (2) understanding the present, (3) forecasting aspects of futures, (4) experiencing alternative futures, (5) envisioning futures, (6) creating the preferred futures, and (7)

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20 Refer to this website: [www.experiment-resources.com/pretest-posttest-designs.html](http://www.experiment-resources.com/pretest-posttest-designs.html)
institutionalizing futures research (Dator, 2009a). Each step has its own process of successfully performing its own mission. I followed the futures-visioning process in providing South Korean adults with futures workshops. Due to the time limits, I had participants go through the visioning process from the part of appreciating the past to the part of envisioning futures. Participants exercised alternative policies with four scenarios of Korea in 2040 and discussed possibilities and desirability of the alternative futures for three to four hours. At every workshop, I conducted pre-tests and post-tests to measure the degree of change occurring as a result of the futures workshop. Hypothesis two is that a futures workshop can help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future.

Intentionally, I did not use the comparison group design in this second quasi-experiment. First of all, there were time limits. I could not administer two kinds of the futures workshops at the same time. Second, I did not want to provide a fake futures workshop that would only offer one future scenario for participants. In recruitment flyers, I announced that I would provide a futures workshop. Participants expected to experience a “real” futures workshop. Thus, I did not want them to be disappointed by a controlled workshop with one future scenario.

Last but not least, I assumed that I did not need to have a control group. The participants who were not exposed to futures workshops could be regarded as a control group because they were raised in a society that pursues only one future. I problematize Korea’s tendency to pursue only continued-economic growth. I wanted to challenge Koreans to create alternatives by letting them participate in the futures workshop. The scenario of continued economic growth is the “official” view of the future of all modern governments, educational systems, and organizations (Dator, 2009a, p. 8). South Korea
has also pursued the future of continued economic growth to the point of chasing extreme economic growth, which negatively impacts Korean society (Choi, 2005; Kim, 2000; Schmid, 2002; Whang, 1971). In this sense, all participants were given the four scenarios of the future of Korea 2040: Continued Growth, Collapse, Discipline, and Transform at the stage of experiencing alternative futures of the futures-visioning process.

The results of the workshops were very significant in terms of individuals’ changes. The participants increased self-efficacy toward the future through the futures workshops. The ability to shape new meanings was the biggest increase while the ability to make a decision and put it into action was the smallest. The ability to challenge the status quo was the second biggest increase. In comparison, the ability to learn something new by cooperating with others was not significantly increased.

In order to collect more information on whether the futures workshops would be effective on an individual level, I asked an open question: How do you think that the futures workshop affects you in terms of preparing for your future? Each participant was allowed to write about this question.

Most of them wrote that they had not deeply and seriously thought about the future before the futures workshop. For them, the future was regarded as inaccessible. However, after the workshop, they opened their eyes to new possibilities and desirability of the alternative futures. Some of them wrote that they came to have a strong responsibility for future generations once they had the confidence to create futures. Many participants became aware that they needed more diverse future-visions, which were supported by diverse values. Participants also agreed that they had to forecast plural
futures rather than predict one future. Given these comments, I also had confidence that futures workshops were effective for individuals to change their attitudes on the future and to cultivate capabilities to create alternative visions.

The other interesting finding was that I identified very different visions that have not been discussed and not officially found in Korea prior to this workshop. Interestingly enough, many participants wanted to bring the future of discipline or of collapse or of transformation into reality when I asked all participants which future scenario *should* come true in the future. Namely, I asked them their preferred futures. In Kwangjoo, a city in the southern part of Korea, a majority of participants preferred the future of collapse in which people would not produce the necessities of life for selling, but for sharing with other people. In Seoul and Puchon, a majority of participants preferred the future of a disciplined society in which people would be aware of the limits to growth and conserve resources. A more interesting finding is that the second majority of the participants in Seoul and Puchon, selected the future of a transformational society as their desirable future. In the scenario, Korean society would be dramatically transformed into a post-human society, where humans and AI (artificial intelligence) merge into post-humans. Only 18 participants out of 88 preferred the future of economically continued growth. The results of the futures workshops demonstrated that current Koreans aim at very different goals. This is how the futures workshops can contribute to revealing a real Korea.
1-4. Overview of the Chapters

The dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction that deals with the purposes, background, research design and questions of this dissertation.

Chapter two tackles the issue of whether a representative democracy is problematic in South Korea. Given the facts that the turnouts of voters have seriously decreased, and trust in government and political parties is very low, one can conclude that the Korean democratic system needs to be adjusted. However, at the same time, unconventional political participation has incredibly increased. What do these contradictory phenomena imply for Korean political lives? Moreover, Koreans face the rise of polycentricity in Korea. In a polycentric society, political parties become less influential while associative networks become more powerful in political decision-making (Chalmers et al. 1997). Associative networks are amorphous and non-hierarchical, so they are temporarily formed by problem-focused interactions and disappear after they solve problems. How can a representative democracy function well in a polycentric society? Does Korean democracy progress or retrogress? What are contemporary scholars missing in discussions on democracy in South Korea? Through grappling with these questions, I aim to discover where Korean democracy is heading and how this Korean shift can be interpreted for revaluing epistemological agreements of democracy. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on more democracy in Korea by addressing new governance that embraces the well-being of future generations and anticipatory government.
I believe that futures studies can provide room not only for negotiating and networking, but also for shaping new meanings and challenging the status quo to find alternative visions. However, according to the research, Koreans have not been inclined to develop futures studies. Chapter three, therefore, addresses the question, “Why do Koreans have less-developed futures studies?” In investigating the reasons for this, I adapt the theory of Ferdinand de Saussure’s langue and parole by exploring scholarly debates on whether contrary-to-fact reasoning is less prevalent in languages that express Chinese-influenced cultures than in English.21 Counterfactual thought is an integral part of envisioning alternative futures because alternatives are created by inference from an event that is contrary to the facts. So, if one is not inclined to appeal to counterfactual language, one would not be prompted to develop futures studies.

Through chapter three, I found that Koreans have less-developed futures studies due to the domination of aesthetic sensibilities. Based on this finding, chapter four explores the possibility of aesthetic futures studies in East Asian contexts through converging the Daoist perspective with Dator’s futures studies. Aesthetic futures studies emphasizes a holistic approach. In this approach, all alternatives are not mutually exclusive but are rather interdependent and co-existing. This expression might derail what I mean. I know that in decision-making one envisions multiple combinations of possible actions and degrees of action within each type. But one has to continue to keep an eye on diverse possibilities in order to have a bird’s-eye view of the real world, and this view could be a firm basis for envisioning diverse futures.

21 I do not argue that China and Korea are not able to perform counterfactual reasoning. Every culture can have and develop counterfactual reasoning. However, some cultures are not very interested in elaborating counterfactual reasoning due to their cultural or linguistic backgrounds or their aesthetic preferences. Thus, one who is less interested in counterfactual is not necessarily passive with regard to using counterfactual reasoning given the dominance over one’s perception of what is possible.
Chapter five explicates to what extent the futures workshops can help individuals cultivate self-efficacy toward the future. As I mentioned earlier about the research design and questions, I provided Koreans with foresight activities. At every activity, I emphasized a holistic approach. Thus, I was confident that I offered tailored futures studies. I analyze the results of the futures workshops and discuss implications of the research and future research. Through chapter five, I attempt to suggest a new measurement Scale in order to assess how foresight activities would be effective. The new Scale can be useful for creating a political society. This political society can be a basis for consolidating democracy in South Korea.

Chapter six, with concluding remarks, explores how aesthetic futures studies can be developed for policy makers to identify the policy agenda. Turoff’s policy Delphi suggests that after two-dimensional distributions of four futures according to probability and desirability, we should assess which future is the most important and the most valid. Through discussing the importance and validity of the futures, participant can be exposed to diverse futures that some of them like or dislike. They have an opportunity to learn different visions and values that are opposed by some groups. Each participant can give comments and must vote for which comment is more important and valid. By collecting discussions, we can update and revise the two-dimensional distributions of the four futures. We can also achieve a more diverse policy agenda.
CHAPTER 2
THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH KOREA

“The cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy.”

(John Dewey, 1927, p. 144)

2-1. Introduction

Korea was democratized in 1987 when people revolted against the military and authoritarian government. The military regime promised democratic presidential elections without governmental intervention for the first time there. Because Koreans achieved democracy through considerable sacrifices, Koreans celebrate the year 1987 as the original year of Korean democratization.

However, when Koreans celebrated the 10th anniversary of the democratization in 1997, scholars gathered together and asserted that Korean democracy came to a standstill. Song (1997), among others, argued that Koreans had not fully developed their democracy (Chang, 1997; Lim, 1997). Song (1997) pointed out that political decision-making was exclusively given to political leaders, the process of which was called an “ultra-elitist agreement” (p. 76). That is why common people felt frustrated and disempowered, as evidenced by decreasing voter turnouts year by year. In addition, Lim (1997) asserted that the Korean government did not allow for Korean citizens to publicly pursue diverse ideologies, for example, socialism or communism. It meant that there were few public spheres, in which people could freely exchange any ideas. Moreover, Chang (1997) applied O’Donnell’s delegative democracy to the Korean
situation and argued that after democratization in 1987, presidents in Korea tend to think of themselves as kings who exclusively represent the people, often neglecting the Congress and the Judiciary. Therefore, political decisions are processed by certain individuals, not by democratic processes. In short, democracy in Korea still remains between a transitory democratic society and a consolidated (i.e., institutionalized) democratic society.

It was fifteen years ago when scholars criticized Korean democracy. How is democracy treated at present? Is there any change in democracy in Korea? Scholars still respond to this question negatively and are more critical about Korean democracy by arguing that Korean democracy is in crisis, based on the facts that the turnout of voters has seriously decreased and that trust in government and political parties is very low.

However, at the same time, one can find a new trend in Korean democracy, namely, the steady increase of unconventional political participation. The number of rallies and demonstrations in Korea has continuously increased. What do these contradictory phenomena imply about Korean political lives? Does Korean democracy progress or retrogress? What are contemporary scholars missing in discussions on democracy in South Korea? Through grappling with these questions, I aim to discover where Korean democracy is heading and how this Korean shift can be interpreted for revaluing epistemological agreements of democracy.

Scholars argue that there are stages of democratic development. For example, Diamond (1996) proposes that consolidation of democracy is the “process of achieving broad and deep legitimation” (p. 33), and Schmitter (1992) asserts that “if consolidation sets in, the democratic regime will have institutionalized uncertainty in certain roles and policy areas” (p. 158). Contrary to these arguments, Crotty (2005) points out that “transition to democracy can be virtually endless; consolidation of democracies is hard to achieve. There is no format, or many times not even an identifiable starting point, for a democratic evolution to begin” (p. 524). For Korean scholars, even though it is difficult to distinguish the two stages, the insistence to look at the two states differently is important in terms of theoretical options.
Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on “more democracy” in Korea. What I mean by more democracy is “the cure for the ills of democracy” (Dewey, 1927, p. 144). Dewey (1927) interestingly explains democracy in two ways: one is the form of democracy; the other is the idea of democracy. The political forms of democracy imply a system of government, majority rule, voting, a ballot box, and so on. The idea of democracy indicates a wider and fuller idea on how to perpetuate a better community life. In the idea of democracy, each person receives what they as unique persons need to have to become fully who they would be, and in return, gives back everything they can to the groups to whom they belong. According to Hickman (2002), Dewey’s democracy is “not a system of government, but a way of living…[and] a process of evaluating our experiences, individual and communal alike…[so] democracy and education are the methods of value-creation.” Through this process of democracy, Dewey wanted to create a Great Community as a society which consists “in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain” from the standpoint of the individual (Hickman & Alexander, 1998, p. 294).

In this notion of a Great Community, I emphasize that the existence of the Public is very important for a sustainable society. The Public should take care of the well-being of the current generation and of the future generation as well in situations wherein humans now have unprecedented power on Earth. We should be responsible for the consequences of our behaviors. In this sense, I take “more democracy” to mean a new process of democracy in which the current generation should reflect voices of future

23 Available at http://www.ikedacenter.org/thinkers/hickman_lecture.htm
generations. For this purpose, democracy in Korea should be an anticipatory democracy, one that combines citizen participation with future consciousness (Toffler, 1970). Good democracy prepares for the uncertainties of the future. I believe that this democracy can support Dewey’s “more democracy” that cures the ills of democracy by accommodating more diverse voices and putting them into practice. Next, I will present statistical data that demonstrate the present situations of democracy in Korea.

2-2. Conventional and Unconventional Political Participation

A representative democracy in South Korea is coming to a crisis in terms of turnout of voters. The turnout of general elections has continued to decrease significantly: 77.7% in 1981, 71.9% in 1992, 60.6% in 2004, and 46.1% in 2008.24 Table 2-1 presents the turnout of voters in the general elections.

Table 2-1. The turnout of voters in the general elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General elections</th>
<th>Turnout of voters</th>
<th>Type of regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11th in 1981</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>Military and authoritative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th in 1985</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>Military and authoritative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th in 1988</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>Military and authoritative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th in 1992</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th in 1996</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th in 2000</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th in 2004</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th in 2008</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24 These figures are from the Republic of Korea National Election Commission. Available at http://www.nec.go.kr/engvote/main/main.jsp
The turnout of voters in presidential elections generally was higher than that of the general elections, but followed the same direction as the general elections: 89.2% in 1987, 80.7% in 1997, 70.8% in 2002, and 63.0% in 2007.\textsuperscript{26} There was and is no mandatory voting in Korea. Table 2-2 presents the turnout of voters in the presidential elections.

Table 2-2. The turnout of voters in the presidential elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential elections</th>
<th>Turnouts of voters</th>
<th>Type of regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7\textsuperscript{th} in 1971</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>Military and authoritative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14\textsuperscript{th} in 1987\textsuperscript{27}</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>Military and authoritative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15\textsuperscript{th} in 1992</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\textsuperscript{th} in 1997</td>
<td>80.7%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17\textsuperscript{th} in 2002</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18\textsuperscript{th} in 2007</td>
<td>63.0%</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given these data, one can argue that democracy does not work well in Korea. More people did not and would not vote. They talk about democracy but do not do democracy. Unlike the decrease of conventional political participation, unconventional

\textsuperscript{25} One can notice that the turnout of voters in the recent general election in 2012 increased compared to the previous election in 2008. This 19th election was a bit extraordinary: unprecedented political campaigns were carried out by not only political parties, but also movie stars, pop singers, famous professors, novelists, poets, and individual podcasters. They were heavily using all kinds of electronic devices and Internet tools, such as Twitter, Facebook, and blogs, in order to encourage people to vote. One of the reasons for this has to do with the current government’s secret surveillance of civilians. Many citizens got upset about this unlawful surveillance. Refer to this news article:
http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=2012040401091

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{27} Korea was democratized in 1987 when people revolted against the military and authoritarian government.
political participation, such as protests and demonstrations, has steadily increased. According to the National Police Agency in Korea, the number of rallies and demonstrations was 6,857 in 1995 but went up to 11,837 in 2003. This increase is remarkable. Table 2-3 presents the number of rallies and demonstrations in Korea between 1995 to 2003.

Table 2-3. *Number of rallies and demonstrations in Korea

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No.*</td>
<td>6,857</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>6,179</td>
<td>7,684</td>
<td>11,750</td>
<td>13,012</td>
<td>13,083</td>
<td>10,165</td>
<td>11,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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It is apparent that most unconventional political participation occurred in Seoul, and there are data supporting this fact. Kyungryul Ahn, a former congressman, cited the data of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency and said that between 1999 and 2008, the number of rallies and demonstrations increased from 5,742 in 1999 to 7,503 in 2008. Table 2-4 presents the number of rallies and demonstrations in Seoul between 1999 to 2008. Ahn pointed out that there were nearly 17 rallies and demonstrations every day in Seoul. The frequency of rallies and demonstrations per one million persons was 736 in Seoul; 548 in Hong Kong; 207 in Washington, DC; 186 in Paris; and 59 in Tokyo in the year of 2007. Seoul ranked the 1st in the frequency of the political activities among these cities.

Table 2-4. *Number of rallies and demonstrations in Seoul

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
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<th>2008</th>
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<tr>
<td>No.*</td>
<td>5,742</td>
<td>5,979</td>
<td>5,367</td>
<td>4,106</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>6,689</td>
<td>5,708</td>
<td>5,766</td>
<td>7,188</td>
<td>7,503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 Ahn published the data in 2009. The data is available at http://www.anky.or.kr.
29 Ibid.
Given this information, it can be argued that conventional political activities are fading away while unconventional political activities are getting popular. In extrapolating these tendencies to the future, one can forecast that a representative democracy in Korea would lose its luster in the medium term or even become obsolete. Who would be supporters of a democratic system boosted by voting? Who would deserve to administrate in government and to enact laws as an elected member of Congress without delegacy?

However, low turnout of voters can also imply that people are basically satisfied with what their government is doing and that they get more personal satisfaction from spending their time, energy, and money on other things. Thus, people let government do its thing, turning out only to protest when things go wrong. This implication is partially right. After a society is democratized, people are less interested in democracy and instead become more interested in economic issues.

Two articles bolster this hypothesis. One is from the National Intelligence Council’s *Global Trends 2025*, published in 2008. In forecasting the future of democracy in 2025, the NIC’s report said that many East Asians “put greater emphasis on good management, including increasing standards of livings, than democracy” (p. 87). This forecast is related to the other supportive article, by Jung (2005), who cited a survey performed by Election Studies in 2004 and showed that 70% of Koreans were dissatisfied with democracy. However, Koreans are not interested in consolidating democracy or curing the ills of it, but are paying attention to economic security and regional developments (Jung, 2005). It is not only because of increasingly bloody competition in a
capitalistic system, but also due to increased mobility that results from globalization. People have to move from place to place, so they do not care about what regional government is doing and concern themselves instead with how to survive rapid change.

In Korean political contexts, people are not satisfied with what their government is doing. As mentioned before, unconventional political participation has increased (Ga, 2007; Kim, 2008; Kim, 2002). If they had been basically satisfied with their government, protests and demonstrations should have decreased or been steady in frequency. In fact, Koreans do not trust in their government. The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International shows that Korea ranked 43rd among 180 countries in 2007 and still 43rd among 182 countries in 2011. Koreans think of their government as one, to some degree, corrupted by the bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, and embezzlement of public funds. Distrust in the national congress is even worse. Kim (2008) cited the survey data in 2005 from the World Value Survey and said that only 20% of Koreans trusted in the national Congress, which was the lowest rate among compared countries. Given this information, one can conclude that Koreans distrust in political leaders and parties.

Like Koreans, people in advanced industrial countries are less interested in voting (Dalton et al., 2004; Kim, 2002; Kriesi, 2009; Yoon, 2008). There are reasons for this: for example, people are skeptical about politicians and political parties, so they want a shift

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30 The data is available at [www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org).
31 Jim Dator (2001) argues in his article “Judicial Governance of the Long Blur” (*Futures*, 33(2), 181-197) that more people rely on judiciaries than legislatures or administrations, because people want to have rapid and efficient decision-making over controversial issues. Elected legislatures and government officials attempt to avoid making decisions over conflict issues in order not to be criticized by people and to be re-elected.
from a representative democracy to a direct democracy and to an advocacy democracy (Dalton et al., 2004). People are also doubtful of governmental abilities. This phenomenon is observed in European countries after the European Union (EU) was launched. Decision-making processes in a country are controlled by the EU level, which reduces the “electoral accountability of political decision-makers” (Kriesi, 2009, p. 157). The Korean government is also heavily influenced by the World Trade Organization or International Monetary Fund. In accepting economic policies from these organizations, the Korean government could not reflect the wishes of the people (Kim, 2002). Thus, people do not feel that they can influence their government, and the power of the vote is weakening. People also have growing frustration with representative government in situations where government often fails to deal with transnational issues, such as climate change or energy depletion (U.S. NIC Global Trends 2025, 2008), and cannot appropriately adapt to rapidly changing situations, in which, for instance, people have more opportunities to take part in decision-making by using diverse Internet tools (Yoon, 2008).

More importantly, Choi (2005) argues that the existing political parties do not properly represent the desires of the electorate (Choi, 2005). Instead, the parties are conservative and intent on maintaining the status quo. Voters are therefore alienated from this conservatively biased party system, and thus they do not vote. As Almond and Powell (1978) also point out, it is clear that the actions of voters depend, to a large degree, on the alternatives provided to them by the political parties. If there are not enough

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32 Advocacy democracy “empowers individuals, citizen groups, or nongovernmental organizations to participate in advisory hearings; attend open governmental meetings; consult ombudsman to redress grievances; demand information from government agencies; and challenge government actions through the courts” (Dalton et al., 2004, p.128).
alternatives in this conservatively biased party system, then voters are abandoned. In these annoying circumstances, people cannot help but rely on unconventional political participation, which is becoming normal and usual in daily politics. I expect that this trend will accelerate when Korean society is transformed into a polycentric society. Next, I will elaborate on this society.

2-3. The Rise of a Polycentric Society in Korea

Korean society seems to be moving toward a polycentric society, in which multiple actors are participating in decision-making and shaping public policies (Choi, 2007; Chun, 1995; Kim, 2007; Kwon et al., 2007; Lee & Shin, 2011). In a polycentric society, political parties become less influential while associative networks become more powerful in political decision-making (Chalmers et al., 1997). Associative networks are amorphous and non-hierarchical, so they are temporarily formed by problem-focused interactions and disappear after they solve problems. The current democracy in Korea is based on a representative system in which political parties “should” reflect and stand for people’s desires. If Korean society moves into a polycentric one, a representative democracy would not be able to function well in it.

Polycentric society, in general, is a society in which multiple centers exist. This definition is somewhat counterintuitive, because the word center denotes that there is only one center and that others are not the center or are in the periphery. So if we use the word “center,” we have to admit the fact that there is a hierarchy, through which a dominant authority makes decisions and shapes policies. Given this common sense, how
can we address the possibility of a polycentric society? Is polycentricity a pun or a utopian ideal?

The idea of polycentricity was introduced by Michael Polanyi through his book titled *The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders* (1951). Polanyi considered how to facilitate a society in which all citizens are allowed to have freedom of expression while keeping rules and laws and revising them, if they agree to change them. Based on this thought, Polanyi coined the term polycentricity and took it to mean a social system in which “maintaining order…depends on allowing people to have the freedom to interact with each other on their own initiative.” Polanyi attempted to figure out how optimal relations between individual liberty and social order could be achieved. He concluded that the relations could be realized if the social order were attained by spontaneous order.

Spontaneous order, in other words, is dynamic order, which is “grounded on freedom and spontaneously emerging from mutual adjustment of free actions” (Jacobs, 1997, p.15). Examples might include the following: “perception of Gestalt, evolution of the embryo from the fertilized cell, and the entire evolution of species [which] is commonly thought to have resulted from a continued process of internal equilibration in living matter, under varying outside circumstances” (Polanyi, 1941 in Jacobs, 1957, p. 5). These examples imply that Polanyi analyzed the complex world from a biological and holistic perspective.

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33 Michael Polanyi is the younger brother of Karl Polanyi, who wrote *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. K. Polanyi is one of the profound thinkers of the 20th century in the field of economics. M. Polanyi was born in Hungary and was a physician, but after he moved to the UK, he shifted his interests to political science.

34 This quotation is from http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-13-number-3/michael-polanyi.

35 Gestalt means a physical, biological, or symbolic pattern of elements, showing that the elements are unified as a whole. The wholeness that gestalt connotes is not a sum of the all parts but is something transformed by connected parts. This perspective evolved to a complexity theory, which deals with artificial intelligence, general system theory, non-linear theory, and systems engineering.
More specifically, according to Aligica and Tarko (2012), spontaneity means that “patterns of organization within a polycentric system will be self-generating or self-organizing,” in the sense that “individuals acting at all levels will have the incentives to create or institute appropriate patterns of ordered relationships” (p. 247). Again, the authors emphasize the role of individuals’ interactions based on free will in adapting to and reshaping social order. The interactions are organic so they do not come from rules or manuals but from one’s experiences, which evolve within a community. In terms of the effectiveness of spontaneity, Su and Hung (2009) interestingly compare spontaneous clusters with policy-driven ones, arguing that “spontaneous clusters have the capacity to evolve…spontaneous sources of order provide inherent order that evolution has to work with ab initio and always” (p. 618, emphasis in original). In this sense, it can be argued that spontaneity has to do with continuous adaptation to changing situations. It can be further argued that spontaneous organizations or groups are amorphous and endlessly moving. As I remarked, this notion of spontaneous grouping is a tie-in with Dewey’s democracy as a process of creating values.

In contrast, planned order or corporate order involves the exercises of an overriding authority over members of a group or a society. Some examples might include “formal gardens, machines, and a company of soldiers on parade” (Polanyi, 1941 in Jacobs, 1997, p.16). Hence, the planned order is not organic but designed in advance on purpose. It is worth noting that Polanyi did not favor either the spontaneous order or planned order. Rather, he proposed that the efficiency of both orders depends on the size of a group: if the size of a group is large enough, then the spontaneous order could function better than the planned order.
After polycentricity came into existence, authors addressed and practiced polycentricity (e.g., Aligica and Tarko 2012; Boyte 2011; Karkkainen 2004; E. Ostrom 1972, 2002, 2010; V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). V. Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) formulated a concept of polycentricity and applied it to govern metropolitan areas. E. Ostrom (1972) further developed polycentricity in order to create an alternative to the market system and the state’s governance, which have many limits with regard to handling and managing so-called “common-pool resources”—water management, irrigation, forests, and fisheries. Ostrom called the resources the 4th type of goods.36

In modern and complex societies, the market or states often fail to manage this type of resource efficiently, because many actors are struggling with decision-making in the areas of it. In this situation, E. Ostrom (2010) focused on how “diverse polycentric institutions help and hinder the innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievements of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” (p. 25). This inquiry reveals the central interest of those who research polycentricity. Ostrom also emphasized the need to confront complexity instead of neglecting or rejecting it in a polycentric society. Through her profound research and progressive activities, Ostrom proves that multiple-centered governance should be considered and facilitated in consuming and reserving natural resources. In 2010, she, as the first female scholar, won the Nobel Prize in the field of economic science for her contributions to a better-informed society.

36 E. Ostrom (2010) describes four types of goods: common-pool resources, public goods (peace and security of a community), private goods (food, clothing, automobiles), and toll goods (theaters, private clubs, daycare centers). Compared to other goods, the common-pool resources are highly related to subtractability of use and difficulty of excluding potential beneficiaries, according to Ostrom.
Based on these authors’ achievements, Boyte (2011) argued that practices of polycentricity transformed politics into the citizen-centered one, in which diverse actors horizontally interact with one another, co-create dynamic communities, and valorize self-directed actions. Karkkainen (2004) also asserted that a polycentric society demonstrated an example of post-sovereign governance, which exhibits three attributes: “non-exclusive, non-hierarchical, and post-territorial” (p. 75). Post-sovereign governance works for the protection of aquatic ecosystems and for conservation of global biodiversity. Moreover, Aligica and Tarko (2012) argue that polycentricity should be considered as political objectives, like liberty and justice. They argue that the dispersion of decision-making that a polycentric society is aiming at is a key element of democratic society. Aligica and Tarko also posit that the success of a polycentric society depends on whether the society allows and performs self-correction. In the field of futures studies, Grupp and Linstone (1999) interestingly propose that modern polycentric societies can be a model for negotiating systems from the perspective of sociology. They posit that technological foresight has a potentially important role to play in strengthening these systems in their capacity to learn and innovate. Grupp and Linstone’s argument is fascinating because it relates futures studies to a polycentric society by proposing that futures studies provides people with room to discuss and bargain over diverse social problems, and a polycentric society needs to develop that kind of negotiating space.

2-3-1. Korean Cases on Polycentricity

In Korean contexts, a number of authors argue that Korea is moving toward polycentric society. For example, Chun (1995) argued that Seoul as a metropolitan society was already in the process of polycentrism in terms of employment and workers’
residencies. Chun posited that in order to analyze population and employment density patterns in Seoul, one should develop a polycentric perspective. Chun’s geographical analysis was one of the seminal arguments that reoriented the nature of the Korean metropolitan city as multi-nucleate. He applied a structural perspective to examine how it could be said that Seoul was changing into polycentric society. Chun’s work also implied that the change of physical structures influenced people’s ways of thinking.

As democracy has matured in Korea, multiple actors, such as NGOs (Non-government Organization), local governments, and private firms, have begun to engage in making public policy. This new situation was believed to be a good sign for the development of democracy, but at the same time, caused new conflicts among political actors. In the past, the centralized government’s order, control, and regulation were believed to be an effective means of delivering public services. This was the case under the mono-centric society. However, as society became polycentric, these ways were less effective and caused various resistances from the public. In order to mitigate the conflicts, Kim (2007) argues that public service delivery must be based upon polycentricity and that the public choice theory and the new governance theory should be elaborated and applied. These theories assume that diverse participation and networks could play significant roles in delivering public services.

Kwon et al. (2007) investigated how the monolithic government could not support industrial clusters, which had no specific administrative boundaries. For example, the Dongnam region in Korea has been set up as an industrial cluster for mechanical engineering and the metal industry since the late 1970s. As the Korean economy got closer to, and connected to, the global economy, the Dongnam region should have been
competitive and adaptive to the growing economy. However, in reality, no administration took care of the industrial cluster, because the cluster consists of the six local cities and provinces of Busan, Ulsan, Gyeongnam, Daegue, Gyeongbuk and Cheonnam. As a result, in this enlarged cluster, “a problem has risen from geographic mismatch between metropolitan-wide industrial cluster and its administrative boundary” (Kwon et al., 2007, p. 272). In order to cure the newly recognized problems, the authors propose that local governments develop inter-governmental views and build up regional innovation committees, and the intervention of the central government should be reduced on regional affairs.

Moreover, Choi (2007) provides empirical studies on how networked and polycentric governance functions in Korea. He argues that Korean society is being transformed into a polycentric society due to devolution, democratization, and pluralization of society. This transformation can be observed in public policies, such as, for example, one that deals with issues of water management, like construction of dams. Regarding water resource supply, Choi (2007) found that the governance has changed from “a form of policy community, which can be characterized by its closed membership and stability in relationships, to a form of issue of network, where the membership is enlarged to include various participants” (p. 174). He interestingly posits that polycentric governance brings about anticipatory accountability, which involves “forecasting of changes, and preparation for compliance or adaptation to the changes” (Choi, 2007, p. 191). It is because participants in the networks convey new knowledge and their preferable visions in cooperation. Thanks to this positive effect, polycentric society can be an alternative, which reflects desirable futures for citizens.
Lee and Shin (2011) identify polycentricity through social issues pertaining to how new towns in Korea should be developed. They investigated current developments at the edge of Seoul over the last two decades and found that the new town-development process “reveals tension that exists between pro-growth and environmental conservation groups, friction between the municipal and provincial governments and the central government…and conflicting interests among diverse actors in relation to deregulation” (p. 2). Hence, the authors found that even though local residents and actors pursued polycentric governance in order to resolve the tension and friction, the state still remained in the old paradigm, which named the state as the only authoritative power in forming new towns. This case study clearly demonstrates that complicated governance is emerging and should be seriously considered as an alternative to state-centrism for developing Korean cities in a more balanced way.

The discussions on the rise of polycentric society in Korea are rudimentary but meaningful in two ways. First, as I emphasized, current Koreans need to create alternatives to a representative democracy to challenge the overarching power of the central government. As Korean society has been developed economically and politically, citizens have also diversified their desires and ways to achieve them. However, it is still hard for them to bring their political desires into reality through the current political system of representative democracy. In this situation, there are two options: one is that a representative system should be replaced with alternatives such as an entirely proportional representative system; the other is that a representative system should evolve into more democracy that reflects diverse desires of people in Korea. The rise of
polycentricity indicates that both citizens and political parties should figure out how to negotiate with the opponents in peace and harmony.

Second, as Lee and Shin (2011) mentioned, the rise of polycentric society causes new problems such as a severe tension between pro-growth and environmental conservation groups in Korea. This tension ignites political conflicts between a group that promotes continued economic growth and one that desires a disciplined society. Those who believe a society should continue to grow argue that the present generation has enormous abilities to make progress in a society. If individuals’ freedom is limited, their can-do spirit disappears and the society will regress. By comparison, those who believe a society should be disciplined by values of sustainability argue that continued growth from modern industrialization and materialism causes environmental disasters and energy depletion at present. These people argue that humanity will be extinct unless it stops the careless consumption of resources. Thus, this tension highlights the complex relationship between individual liberty and social order. The concept of polycentricity gives a hint at what can be an optimal way to balance individual desires and public choice. Next, I will elaborate on this way.

2-3-2. Political Parties v. Associative Networks

Chalmers et al. (1997) provide a profound insight into how to identify a seminal form of polycentric society. The authors investigated contemporary political movements in South America such as those in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela and found a new form of political associations called “associative networks.” People in these countries experienced moribund political parties, oil shock, runaway inflation, increased
integration into the global economy, and dire economic realities. In these devastating situations, there was a mushrooming of varied movements: neighborhood-based, church-linked, gender- and human rights-oriented, indigenous, and environmental movements. These diverse movements turned out to be associative networks wherein multiple actors formed non-hierarchical structures and shaped public policy in the structures. Given these examples, we can learn that associative networks organically grow in order to adapt to a rapidly changing society when government is too weak to help citizens. Chalmers et al. (1997) argue that polycentric society consists of associative networks.

These associative networks practice their power and shape political agenda through comparatively open-ended and problem-focused interactions. The networks are “distinctive not only in the way they link people with decision-making centers, but also by their multiplicity and relatively rapid reconfiguration over time” (Chalmers et al., 1997, p. 545). These networks seem to be a guerrilla band that is not official but wants to change political situations. Associative networks need three sets of requirements: (a) organizations and procedures that coordinate the multiple decision centers and constantly changing networks, (b) a framework of rights that makes participation in associative networks possible, and (c) popular-sector strategies that make the most of the opportunities and avoid the pitfalls of the new form (Chalmers et al., 1997, p. 577).

In addition to these sets of requirements, Rhodes (2000) proposes that the success of polycentric governance depends on four conditions: “(1) a sufficient flow of reliable information must be maintained between its members; (2) cooperation between sectors and departments is possible and valued; (3) expert judgment is respected; and (4) uncertainty between members is reduced through their long-term relationship” (in Choi,

It is worth noting that “the growth of associative networks is not the growth of civil society, but the growth of its connections with the state” (Chalmers et al., 1997, p. 569). Associative networks developed when civil society became weaker due to things such as the economic crisis and the globally connected market system. Political representatives were also not efficiently helpful to citizens in these devastating situations. Citizens did not want to watch the collapse of civil society, but they attempted to invent political structures to influence society, the state, and the world. This is one of the reasons why polycentric society emerged and mediates between civil society and the state in order to empower citizens.

From a citizen’s perspective, political parties and representatives became more interested in winning elections than in mediating people’s demands. The existing political parties do not properly represent the desires of the electorate. Instead, the parties tend to maintain the status quo. Voters are therefore alienated from this conservatively biased party system, and thus they do not vote. “In a more polycentric state where alliances vary greatly from issue to issue, parties are less able to do this than they ever were. The electoral-representative links usually provided by parties and party systems are even more under strain. More and more individuals and organizations become involved in order to meet the demands of the political process and to develop and use skills independent of particular interests or particular policies” (Chalmers et al., 1997, pp. 569-570). The political parties are pressured to be formless and extremely flexible to reflect
the various desires of citizens. Is this request to political parties reasonable? Can they be formless and flexible? Through the exploration of associative networks, it can be argued that reconfigurations of the representative democracy are ongoing in political arenas.

2-3-3. Great Community and Public Sphere

Polycentricity needs to be animated as a practical and achievable form. Next, I will compare polycentricity with Dewey’s “Great Community” (1927) and Habermas’ “Public Sphere” (1989) in order to identify diverse façades of polycentricity and to animate polycentric society. The concept of the Great Community was introduced by John Dewey in his book *The Public and Its Problems*, published in 1927. Through his book, Dewey responded to Walter Lippmann, who published his famous book *The Phantom Public* in 1927. Lippmann pointed out that the public was not a tangible and physical entity but a phantom, which exists only in perception. Dewey agreed with Lippmann’s claim that the public became bewildered by new technologies such as the steam engine, electricity, and the telegraph. These modern technologies transformed a traditional community into a Great Society, in which individuals could not establish public opinions but were scattered and underpowered.

However, Dewey asserted that the Great Society could be transformed into the Great Community through interactive communication among individuals. People of the Great Community could shape public opinions to influence society; the public would therefore no longer be a phantom. In order to form opinions, the Great Community should consist of and be facilitated by “fullness of integrated persons who have a clear consciousness of a communal life” (Dewey, 1927, p.149). In this sense, education plays a
crucial role in shaping the Great Community. Education is a means to bring about the idea of the Great Community.

Dewey fascinatingly stated that the purpose of the Great Community would be to cure the illness of democracy. Under Dewey’s definition, democracy is community life itself. The Great Community is a society in which each participant can develop their experiences of being individuals whom they would want to be in the future by using resources of a community, and at the same time, each one has to provide a community that they belong to with their own resources for growing the community. Dewey kept orienting democracy toward a better community life in order to remind people of the ideal form of democracy.

The Great Community can be brought about by the “perfecting of the means and ways of communication of meanings” and “freedom of social inquiring and of distributing of its conclusions” (Dewey, 1927, p.166). Through expanding meanings, the Great Community can produce and develop symbols and signs that reflect communal lives and experiences. Also, the accumulated symbols and signs become the culture of a community. If the symbols and signs are interpreted as art, Dewey (1934) argues that the existence of art is “proof that man uses the materials and energies of nature with intent to expand his own life” (p. 25). This attitude toward life connotes that life is placed in “uncertainty, mystery, doubt, and half-knowledge,” so in order to deepen and intensify one’s life, one has to learn how to utilize imagination and art (Dewey, 1934, p. 34). The Great Community, then, presents “an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings which are appreciated and mutually referred by each to every other on the part of those
engaged in combined action” (Dewey, 1927, p.153). Hence, the core values of the Great Community are fraternity, liberty, and equality.

In short, one can develop one’s experience by using all the resources of the Great Community, and at the same time, the Great Community can grow itself by accumulating each participant’s developed experiences. Through remaking and renewing the idea of democracy, the Great Community continuously evolves. This is what Dewey implied democracy was.

In terms of Dewey’s emphasis on the free and unconstrained exchange of ideas, Habermas’ Public Sphere is similar to the Great Community. Habermas (1989) investigated how the Europeans formed and developed the public sphere in history. The public sphere is a civil society in which public concern of the private sphere of a civil society should be discussed. Since the 16th century, thanks to the improvement of the art of navigation, international trade has flourished in European countries, especially Italy. Hence, so-called capitalists appeared around that time and achieved wealth and political power. They then sought to engage in and influence their societies, later the states. In order to expand their power into the political realm, the new class of bourgeois created the public sphere by using the press and diminishing the overriding authority’s press censorship.

As a result, Parliament, political associations, and civil society appeared. From this moment, publicness (or publicity) became organs of the state. Thus, the unconstrained exchange of ideas came to be a core value of the public sphere. Publicity is the “common perspective from which the citizens mutually convince one another of what
is just and unjust by the force of the better argument” (Habermas, 1995, p. 124). Like Dewey, Habermas also emphasized efforts to renew dominant ideas through a procedural reason in which reason put itself on trial at all levels.

Given the importance of publicness, what the public sphere pursues is to “give the public the means of forming an opinion” (Habermas, 1989, p. 66). Accordingly, the success of the public sphere depends on “both quality of discourse and quantity of participation” (Calhoun, 1999, p. 2). Habermas (1989) also asserted that the rational-critical discourse is a key method to grow the public sphere. For example, in the early 18th century, London had 3,000 coffee houses (and salons in Paris), where people critically discussed all affairs of state administration and politics. As Habermas (1989) pointed out, civil society came into being “as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority” (p. 19). In other words, since the state was composed of an “impersonal locus of authority,” civil society could appear as a counterpart of the state (Calhoun, 1999, p. 8). Nowadays, many forms of civil society can be found—for example, trade unions, religious groups, and student organizations. These examples display dense networks of civil associations, which are separated from the state but seek to control the state.

Based on these discussions of the Great Community and the Public Sphere, I attempt to identify characteristics of them and compare them with polycentric society as follows:

Table 2-5. Comparisons among the Great Community, Public Sphere, and Polycentricity

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Great Community</th>
<th>The Public Sphere</th>
<th>Polycentric Society</th>
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Through comparing the characteristics among these three political ideas, I found useful insights for elaborating on how to redefine democracy. As I remarked, this chapter aims to investigate how a representative democracy does not work well in the Korean society. One of the reasons for this has to do with the fact that times have changed. The aforementioned political ideas demonstrate this fact. In most countries, democracy means

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37 Robert Dahl introduced polyarchy in his book *A Preface to Democratic Theory* in 1956 and developed it in another book, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, in 1971. Dahl took it to mean pluralistic democracy in a complex industrialized society, in which citizens had diverse interests and tried to achieve them at their best. More diverse groups took part in decision-making, and various classes were involved in politics. In these situations, Dahl argued that political power should be dispersed and decentralized.
a representative system in which political parties mainly represent citizens’ interests. However, as Dewey (1927) clearly observed in the early 20th century, a representative democracy did not function well in a complex industrialized society. Due to the appearance of huge urban cities, citizens could not easily form their opinions and advance them as public opinions. They were manipulated by distorted information and were too busy pursuing their daily lives to have discussions on political affairs. Bureaucratic government and complex political systems also hindered citizens from engaging in politics.

The United States of America established a representative democracy after the U.S. became an independent country in 1776 and set up a government in 1789. Of course, at that time, the representatives were only whites, propertied, and male elites. Moreover, transportation and communication technologies were not substantially developed to facilitate communication between politicians and citizens. Hence, the nation needed a representative system in which representatives and political parties could reflect the interests of citizens who remotely lived with one another.

However, thanks to technological developments such as advanced communication technologies, citizens changed their attitudes from being reactive to becoming proactive toward their government in everyday politics. As society developed, diverse groups emerged and wanted to influence society and control the state in order to realize their interests. From this time, the real problem of politics was not how political leaders effectively take turns to occupy administration and Congress through elections. Rather, it is about how to mediate the various desires of citizens. In this sense, democracy should be a political system in which all citizens can live in harmony with common
interests and values while pursuing their own interests. This democracy assumes that there are pluralities of citizens’ interests and that all citizens agree to pursue a commonality of values. For Dewey, the commonality of values is communal life itself. For Habermas, it is publicity, wherein all individuals publicly exchange their ideas. Both Dewey and Habermas stressed the importance of communication. They also highlighted that the idea of democracy should be amended according to changed situations. Dewey (1927) said that the cure for the illness of democracy is more democracy. Habermas (1996) also argued that the critique of reason is its own work. Both of them underline a pragmatic evolution of democracy.

The discussions on polycentricity, the Great Community, and the Public Sphere are very important to consider when a representative democracy in Korea does not work very well. They uncover why political parties and systems become less influential and why, at the same time, unconventional political participation and formless associative networks become more popular and powerful in Korea. People in Korea are now asking the existing political parties to adapt to new situations when Korea faces the rise of polycentricity and people’s desire for consolidating democracy. I suggest that in order for the Korean government and political parties to adapt to the new situations, they have to facilitate new governance that addresses “more democracy.” Next, I will discuss this issue.

2-4. More Democracy by Considering Future Generations

Now, I move to “more democracy” by addressing what contemporary scholars are missing in discussions of democracy. Few Korean authors deal with future generations in
terms of how to reconsider democracy from a lens of future people. Future people can be defined as ones yet to come whom the current generation will never meet, but whose lives the current generation influences by the way the current generation lives today. In this definition, future people cannot physically be in the present, so they cannot have physical voices and rights to vote. They have no chance to influence a current government. Hence, a number of scholars argue that the present generation should be representatives for future generations (Agius, 1986; Bell, 1994; Kim and Dator, 1994, 1999; Inagaki, 2007; Slaughter, 1994; Stone, 1994; Tonn, 1991; Tough, 1993a, 1993b; Tremmel, 2006; and Yazaki, 1994). For these scholars, future generations signify not only our posterity, but also actual people who should have voices against inappropriate policies and rights to vote for changing the improper policies. However, how can democracy function well in order to take care of the physical and psychological well-being of future generations?

An example displays that the present generation develops public policy that requires the present generation to balance the welfare of the present generation with those of future generations: German Congress members attempted to add the principle of intergenerational justice to their Constitution since 2006. The Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations (FRFG) supported the German Congress members. FRFG was created as the Association for the Rights of Future Generations in Oberusel, Germany, in 1996. A group of European students founded it to promote intergenerational justice in terms of ecology and economy. The students held a series of youth congress meetings

38 As an example of a policy for future people, the Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement on climate change. One of the major purposes of the Protocol is to urge industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This is not only for the current generation, but also future generations.
that discussed how to make new intergenerational laws and to test whether public policies support a sustainable society, from 1997 to 1999. Since 2000, FRFG has organized a European congress. For example, FRFG held the 1st European Congress, titled “Our Common Future,” at Hanover, Germany, in August 2000, with 330 young decision makers from all over Europe. FRFG also sponsored the symposium “Rights for Future Generations,” in Tutzing, Germany, in 2002. In addition to those activities, FRFG published the book titled *Handbook of Intergenerational Justice* in German in 2003 and in English in 2006. Since 2006, FRFG has supported German Congress members in order for them to put intergenerational justice into practice in the German Constitution.

For FRFG, intergenerational justice signifies justice between generations by resolving the structural problem of current democracies. Tremmel (2006), the founder of FRFG, addresses the weaknesses of democracies that ignore opinions of minority groups, raising an interesting question: “If only these future individuals, who are born in the next 200 years, could vote on energy policies, this would create a huge majority which would facilitate a quick shift to renewable sources of energy” (p. 189). Future generations are a minority at present in terms of the power of their voices. But if they had voices, they would be a majority that could affect current policies. However, in democratic systems at present, it is hard for politicians to act in favor of generations to come. The current democracy reflects only desires of the present generation, who has the right to vote.

Even though the current democracy is limited, FRFG moved a step forward. In November 2006, more than 100 German Congress members gathered together and introduced a proposal to change Article 20b and Article 109 of the Basic Law. The bill aims to introduce a new Section 20b into the constitution, within the section where the
aims of the German state are defined, and to change Section 109, where the national budget policies are laid down, as follows:

- **Section 20b**: the state must consider the principle of sustainability, and must protect the interests of future generations in its decision (a new Article 20b would be an expansion on the 1994 addition of Article 20a mandating ecological sustainability).

- **Section 109, Paragraph 2**: in managing their respective budget, the Nation and the Länder (federated state) shall take due account of the requirements of the overall economic equilibrium, as well as the principle of sustainability and the interests of future generations.\(^{39}\)

FRFG directly spoke to power—those who make policy. In order to implement these intergenerational laws, FRFG specifically worked with the younger Congress members. FRFG believed that the younger representatives were more responsible for future generations because today’s policies would have more effects on the young than on the old. That is why, in considering future generations, political struggles move from battles between the left and the right into those between the young and the old (Tremmel, 2008).

In spite of all the efforts that the younger German Congress members made, the institutionalization of Intergenerational Justice, one of the main demands of the FRFG, could not be implemented in the 16th German Bundestag. Paragraph 2 of Section 109,

\(^{39}\) Refer to www.intergenerationaljustice.org
which limits new debts in the financial constitution, was also not passed. Fortunately, the new debt brake that was introduced by other persons with different reasons was adopted in the 16th German Bundestag. FRFG stated that the new debt brake limited new indebtedness, which was far better than the new Article 109: the German Parliament, with the necessary majority of 2/3, approved the implementation of a debt brake into the German Constitution. The Minister of Finance called it “a historical decision for generational justice.” Starting from the year 2016, the new constitutional fiscal rule will apply a new debt limit of 0.35 percent of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

Today, many governments go deeper in enormous amounts of debt, which plagues the spirit of democracy. Tomov (1999) points out that the crisis of contemporary political systems and government comes from “the accumulation of debt,” which leads to the “consumption of the future” (p. 77). Tomov asserts that people need government aimed at the future. Furthermore, Kim and Dator (1999) interestingly take “more democratic” to mean “establishing institutions and processes that are specifically intended to determine policies that have the goal of benefiting future generations while either similarly benefiting present generations or even deferring the benefits of the present in favor of the future” (p. 6). In order to provide future generations with benefits, governments should reduce national debts.

In order to address a more democratic way for future people, I take another interesting case: Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr (1993), decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. Oposa was a lawyer, and Factoran was Minister of the Department of

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40 Refer to Jim Dator’s unpublished article, “Governmental Foresight: A Review of Institutional Alternatives.”
Environment in the Philippines. Oposa worked for 43 children who asked the Philippines’ government not to deforest for the benefit of future generations. The children filed a lawsuit against the Philippines’ government on behalf of future generations. In its decision, the Supreme Court ruled, “In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice.” The majority of the Court said, in part:

Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue on behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” … Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

The Supreme Court ordered the defendant to “cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country” and “cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

The children of the Philippines opened a new world for future generations and reoriented democracy as well by boldly displaying how the current generation takes care of the future. In another example, Israel, Hungary, and Finland recently set up institutions that ensure the interests of future generations. The primary goal of these new institutions is to keep an eye on movements that could harm future generations—in other words, to become “the watch-dog” (Tremmel, 2006, p. 196). Although each country’s situation regarding its treatment (or its consideration) of future generations varies, it can be expected that sooner or later diverse governance that ensures the well-being of future people will be created.

2-5. Anticipatory Democracy and Governance

In order to develop more discussions on more democracy, I refer to futurists’ ideas. For example, Toffler (1970) defined anticipatory democracy as a process that combines citizen participation with future consciousness. This definition signifies that the success of a democracy depends on how to create a futures-oriented attitude. Baker (1978) explored how anticipatory democracy worked in the United States and provided cases, such as the Hawaii Commission on the year 2000, the Commission on Minnesota’s Future, and Iowa 2000. Hawaii 2000, among all future-oriented Commissions, was the seminal event that encouraged citizens to envision their futures by considering continuously changing technology, environment, energy, economy, culture, and governance. Table 2-6 presents examples of the state futures commissions as follows:

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43 Refer to http://www.elaw.org/node/1343
Table 2-6. United States’ futures commissions (Chi, 1991, p. 48)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the 1970s</th>
<th>In the 1980s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals for Lousiana (1972)</td>
<td>Commission on Virginia’s Future (1982-84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future of South Dakota (1977-80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force on the Future of Illinois (1977-80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon 2000 Commission (1978-81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choices for Pennsylvania (1979-81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission on the Future of Nevada (1979-80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bezold (2006) noted that anticipatory democracy “reinforces the importance of developing shared visions” and “enlightened participation with foresight” (pp. 49-50). Bezold further argues that anticipatory democracy needs to develop diverse approaches for individuals who, being at different levels and coming from a diversity of perspectives, may not accept, appreciate, or recognize the legitimacy of shared visions. Later, Bezold
elaborated upon anticipatory democracy with a concept of aspirational futures, which must meet five conditions to be activated: (1) be legitimate: a vision must be inwardly accepted as fully legitimate; (2) be shared: vision works by posing a collective challenge, aligning people, and generating a group spirit in which people move toward the vision; (3) express people’s highest aspirations for what they want to create in the world; (4) stretch beyond the limits of current realities; and (5) conceivably be achievable within a specific time frame (pp. 84-85).

I found other cases that demonstrate how future-oriented governance could be facilitated. In France, renowned futurist Bertrand de Jouvenel created what he called “The Surmising Forum,” in which “experts from many different fields will bring special forecasts so that they may be formed into general forecasts” for public debate and discussion and then for legislative action (de Jouvenel, 1965, p. 277). In addition, “Johan Galtung from Norway, Robert Jungk from Austria, Eleonora Masini from Italy, John and Magda McHale from Scotland/Hungary, Bart van Steenbergen from the Netherlands, Andrej Sicinski from Poland, Ota Sulc from Czechoslovakia, Igor Bestuzhev-Lada from the USSR, and many more formed ‘Mankind 2000’ in 1965” (Dator, 2009b). Mankind 2000 was a meeting in which participants explored diverse futures and was transformed into World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF) in the early 1970s. At that time, there were severe conflicts between capitalism and communism. However, WFSF did not discriminate among people from communist countries and instead encouraged them to participate in the meetings of WFSF and to express communistic visions. WFSF was exploring diverse futures through seeking for a more democratic way at that time.
Chi (1991) also concluded that foresight became a necessary tool to improve state government. This is because government assumes the following: (1) foresight can help state leaders better anticipate changes in their social, economic, and physical environment; (2) foresight can help develop long-range goals for any institution of state government; (3) foresight can help state leaders and managers make more informed and wiser decisions through careful deliberations; (4) foresight can enhance communication and collaboration among the three branches of state government and the public (Chi, 1991, p. 47).

Chi traced which state government carried out foresight activities during the 1970s and 1980s. He found that through these activities, governments in the US learned how to move from traditional practices into foresight projects in terms of foresight in state government. Table 2-7 presents the differences between traditional practices and foresight projects (Chi 1991). For example, foresight projects are future-oriented, anticipatory, and emerging issue-oriented whereas traditional practices are present-oriented, reactive, and crisis-driven.

Table 2-7. Differences between Traditional and Foresight Projects (Chi, 1991, p. 58).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional practices</th>
<th>Foresight projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-term (1-2 years)</td>
<td>Long-term (5-10-20 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>Anticipatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis-driven</td>
<td>Emerging issues-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental budget-making</td>
<td>Prioritizing in budget-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency database</td>
<td>State database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency-wide planning</td>
<td>State-wide planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One-time projects | Ongoing projects
--- | ---
Informal or no mechanism for long-term policy development | Formal, institutionalized mechanism for long-term policy development

However, most, if not all, previous foresight projects have been “one-time projects without a measurable record of continuous implementation” (Chi, 1991, p. 58). For example, their final reports of the futures projects prepared in several states were neglected; their long-term planning was discarded by succeeding administrators. The reasons for this, according to Chi (1991), have to do with structural instability, discontinuity in funding, and ever-changing personnel who take part in foresight activities. Chi (1991) also pointed out that a “foresight project cannot be implemented effectively without appropriate training and incentives for those involved since foresight requires expertise in futures research techniques” (p. 59).

As Chi mentioned, political realities around governmental foresight are more complex than expected. In other words, there are many obstacles that prohibit government from carrying out foresight projects. Van der Duin et al. (2009) find that Congresses often hesitates to support governmental foresight activities because the foresight activities pursue long-term plans, in which many in the electorate do not seem to be interested. Tremmel (2006) also addresses the lack of voices about the future in political systems at present, in which politicians cannot act in favor of generations to come. Politicians always have pressure from the electorate, who force them to focus mainly on the urgent issues of the present rather than important issues of the future. Tonn and Petrich (1998) raise other reasons for why governmental foresight does not continue.
They argue that people are very busy living in a very competitive society, so people do not have enough time to support governmental foresight activities even though government encourages people to take part in national foresight activities.

2-6. Concluding Remarks

This chapter addressed the reasons for why a representative democracy in Korea is in crisis by examining the trends of conventional and unconventional political participation, distrust in political leaders and parties, the rise of polycentric society, and the lack of discussions on future generations and future-oriented governance in South Korea. It found that a representative democracy is in crisis in Korea and that there are needs for more democratic or alternative governance in order to reflect political desires of citizens.

This chapter also found that many governments in the world made efforts to be future-oriented. Since the 1960s, governments have been interested in and carried out many foresight activities. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, governmental foresight activities enjoyed prominence. Even though there was a lull in governmental foresight during the 1990s, the governments of Australia, England, Finland, the Netherlands, and Singapore resumed and revised their foresight activities in order to prepare for the uncertainties of the future after many unexpected events occurred, such as the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Foresights activities help detect blind spots that may impact a society with unexpected shocks. As I remarked, good democracy prepares for the uncertainties of the future.
However, many governments still lack funding, the public’s support, and experts who know how to adapt to foresight. In particular, the weakness of the current democratic systems is one of the obstacles that discourage government from continuing foresight activities. Contemporary democracy mainly reflects what the current generation wants to do by voting, which the majority always wins. Choi (2005) points out that while the democratic government in Korea pursued growth as its top policy priority and thus expanded market competition and the market-driven logic of efficiency to a far-reaching extent, Korea has been divided into two extreme poles, the haves and have-nots. Students and civilians argue that a new Korea should seek balanced and sustained growth. Helgesen (2001) also proposes that Koreans now have to ask themselves “What do we want our society to be like?” and argues, “It is time to challenge development as something almost outside the reach of humankind” (p. 102). Nonetheless, few have answered how democracy would function better when the current democracy has forsaken its role to mediate the ill effects of class inequality and social disintegration. Further, few have dealt with how democracy could work in situations wherein people distrust political leaders and parties and are dissatisfied with democracy itself.

In this sense, it is very important to develop discussions of a political society in Korea. In general, a political society mediates between civil society and the state (Choi, 1993; Cohen & Arato, 1994; Im, 2000; Kim, 2000). Cohen and Arato (1994) differentiate political society from civil society by pointing out that political society deals with democratization while civil society deals with liberalization. Examples of institutions of political society are “[political] parties, electoral mechanisms, forms of bargaining, and legislatures” (Cohen & Arato, 1994, p. 53). The authors mentioned that political society
came into existence in order to create a room for negotiating between organized civil society and authoritarian regimes.

Some authors intend to move the locus of democratization from the state to society and strengthen new roles of diverse groups, associations, and the public in political arenas. For example, Im (2000) highlighted the role of political society in order to consolidate democracy. Democracy needs to institutionalize a political society for supporting political parities, electoral campaigns, and representative organizations for better reflection of the interests of the electorates. Im (2000) argues that a dense network of civil associations also improves democratic governance. Cohen and Arato (1994) also assume that political society is a society where political actors and parties play important roles in enacting laws, making policies, and representing the desires of constituencies. Choi (1993; 2005), furthermore, attempts to reshape the roles of political parties, which not only provide alternative policies for curing current social problems, but also educate citizens to be political activists for reforming society.

I argue that these discussions are mainly dealing with attributes of a political society within a political party system. They insist that political parties should facilitate a political society in order to develop democracy. However, as I discussed, political parties become less powerful in polycentric society. The existing parties do not reflect diversity in terms of people’s political desires. Thus, citizens do not trust in political parties but trust in diverse associative networks that are more efficient in satisfying the desires of citizens, specifically in the areas where multiple stakeholders are engaged in decision-making. For example, in dealing with environmental problems, increased multi-
stakeholder participation and capacity improvement are necessary in order to establish accountability as a means of achieving sustainable development (UNEP, 2012).44

Therefore, we can ask who can facilitate a political society instead of political parties. I define a political society as a society wherein people can learn how to explore diverse futures, create and develop alternative policies accordingly, and plan for the improvement of their lives. In a political society, individuals can be redefined as being political whenever they actively become involved in creating alternatives. Through this dissertation, I address the possibility that a political society can be nurtured by laypersons’ participation in foresight activities that encourage individuals to improve self-efficacy in terms of their ability to impact their futures.

A political society is also interested in “rational legislation, participatory politics, and civic self-governance” (Bohman & Rehg, 1997, p. iv). A political society is opposed to the idea that the public cannot be allowed to take part in decision-making or forming policies. This elitism assumes that citizens are regarded as passive and reactive. In contrast, a political society asserts that citizens should be thought of as proactive, so establishing a consensual form of self-government is necessary.

44 One can also find the summary of the report done by UNEP at www.travel-impact-newswire.com, titled Asia’s “Green Challenge”: Changing Consumption Patterns, Emission Cuts & Management of Water & Chemicals.
CHAPTER 3
WHY DO KOREANS HAVE LESS-DEVELOPED FUTURES STUDIES?

“The alternative for a developing country is not so much between alternative futures but between whether or not to try to have a future, a relatively ordered future.”
(Hahn-Been Lee, 1970, p. 215)

3-1. Introduction

Futures studies can provide room not only for negotiating and networking, but also for shaping new meanings and challenging the status quo in finding alternative visions. Foresight abilities can play a significant role in promoting democracy in a polycentric society. However, in my research, Koreans are not inclined to develop futures studies. Based on this research, I address the question “Why do Koreans have a less-developed system of futures studies?”

Since coming into existence as a social science in Europe and the U.S. in the early 1960s, futures studies has successfully spread to other regions and prevailed throughout the world. However, no Korean universities have yet offered any academic program in the field. A number of Korean intellectuals have passionately organized communities for futures studies in the past, but few have developed the discipline as a social science or critical study.45

45 For example, the Korean Society of Future Studies, founded in 1968, has not offered futures studies yet. As another example, the Korean Association for Policy Studies (KAPS) was founded in 1991 and asserted from the beginning that KAPS should provide decision-makers with futures studies and that policy studies should offer futures studies because it deals with problems of the future (Han et al., 1992). However, no one has yet offered future studies at the university level. Refer to this article: Han, Youngwhan, et al., 1992.
One can object by saying that Korea performs foresight activities. For example, the Korean government carried out *Korea in the Year 2000* in 1971 and followed this with *Korea 2020* in 1994. The current administration has also established the Presidential Council for Future and Vision in 2008 in order to provide policy makers with futures issues. In addition, research centers funded by the government such as the Science and Technology Policy Institute or the Korea Institute of Public Administration executed foresight projects. Moreover, Korean scholars practiced futures methods. For instance, Han-Been Lee, a former professor at the Seoul National University, founded the Korean Society of Future Studies in 1968. The Society still exists and performs futures research. Given these facts, one might argue that Korea did put effort into developing futures studies.

Despite these examples, I still argue that Koreans are not inclined to futures studies and, as a consequence, they have not fully developed it. It might be fairer to say that Koreans understand why foresight activities are important to develop the economy but that they do not fully internalize one of the core beliefs of futures studies—that is, forecasting plural alternatives. Envisioning multiple alternatives is an essential part of futures studies. By definition, futures studies is to study futures, a plural form of the future. Hence, if one is not inclined to forecast plural alternatives, he would not be prompted to develop futures studies. In this sense, it is hard to find this kind of futures studies in Korea. Koreans want to identify one clear, most probable and dominant vision that they will face in the future.\textsuperscript{46} This can be supported by what Korean futurist Hahn-

\textsuperscript{46} Futurist Sohail Inayatullah has observed a similar issue. He has taught futures studies at Danjiang (淡江)
Been Lee (1970) mentioned: “The alternative for a developing country is not so much between alternative futures but between whether or not to try to have a future, a relatively ordered future” (p. 215). For Koreans, various alternatives are not adoptable but seem fictitious and meaningless, even though Korea is out of a developing country. Before examining how Koreans have adapted to futures studies, I will briefly explain how futures studies has been developed in modern times.

3-2. The Rise of Futures Studies in Modern History

For those who are not familiar with futures studies, it can be beneficial to explain how futures studies emerged and evolved, specifically in modern times. A study of the future emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when modern sciences began to play a significant role in (re)shaping society. At that time, people had confidence that humans could foretell the future by using rational sciences. For example, in Newtonian mechanics, an object will stay at rest or continue at a constant velocity unless acted upon by an external unbalanced force. Therefore, Newtonians think that an object exists independently without being influenced by the variables of time and space. Based on this assumption, Newtonians argue that the world is like a machine that operates without being influenced by any observer. Given this confidence, some authors, such as H. G. Wells and Ossip K. Flechtheim, introduced foresight and futurology as a study of the future in the 1930s and 1940s.

University in Taiwan for several years. Inayatullah (2003) points out that “[for the Taiwanese,] moving from futures studies qua social sciences to futures studies qua critical theory and emancipation has not been easy……They look forward to the development of clear schools, with clear debates among the schools” (p. 1077). His observation suggests that the Taiwanese need an unquestionable science that shows them the right thing to do.
However, after humans experienced the negative effects of modern science—for example, the destructive power of atomic bombs through World War II—a number of authors re-oriented and re-developed the study of the future in Europe and in the U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s. They changed the deterministic view about the future into skeptical, critical, and cultural epistemologies (Inayatullah 2002; Krawczyk & Slaughter 2010). In addition, the authors organized international groups, such as the World Futures Studies Federation and the World Future Society in the 1960s, in order to share concerns and hopes about the future. Consequently, futures studies, as an academic discipline and critical study, was established and developed throughout the world.

In the field of futures studies, forecasting probable futures with present and past knowledge is called extrapolative futures research. Actually, this was regarded as the most common method to forecast the future. However, futurists moved forward to an area of normative (or prescriptive) futures research, which is driven by values such as sustainability, well-being, harmony, and fairness. Masini (1993) notes that extrapolative futures studies “were mainly elaborated during the 1950s and the 1960s; more recently, there appears to be a greater interest in normative [futures] studies” (p. 22). In this way, futures studies transitions from a study of what the future would be or could be to what the future should be.

One of the reasons for this transition is that more futurists, especially in the so-called third world, are pursuing desirable futures. As a society becomes a more complex entity, the gap between a probable future and a desirable future increases, due to a variety of views on what constitutes a desirable future. Normative futures research is adopted not only by future-thinkers of developing countries, but also by environmentalists and
ecologists. For the latter, it is not necessary to forecast the exact future, because the most likely future is not always the most desirable. Instead, what environmentalists and ecologists want are not “good predictions, but indications of what alternative futures seem available and what their characteristics are” (Robinson, 1990, p. 821).

Indeed, futures studies is spreading around the world (Bell, 2002; Kuosa, 2009). An educational non-profit organization, Acceleration Studies Foundation, provides foresight graduate programs—global list. According to the global list, 22 universities from 16 countries offer primary (part- and full-time) M.S. and Ph.D. programs in futures studies. Moreover, according to the World Futures Studies Federation (WFSF), in 2008 there were 55 tertiary futures studies in the world: 19 universities offer futures studies programs; 14 universities incorporate futures studies; two short courses at universities in futures studies; and 18 single units of universities offer futures studies.

However, compared to other academic disciplines that came into being at the same period as futures studies, futures studies is arguably not popular yet. For example, public policy emerged as a significant subfield within the discipline of political science in the late 1960s or early 1970s.47 Public policy programs and futures studies had a successful beginning from the same starting line, but the former is offered by almost every university whereas the latter is offered by a few (Slaughter, 2007).

Dator (1997) argues that futures studies does not fit in current universities where scholars pursue positivistic sciences. In addition, modern academia emphasizes a present-oriented approach. Economics, sociology, and politics began to be disciplines that are

present-oriented and nomothetic. This tendency dominates classrooms at universities over the world. Scholars at modern universities stress that they are ‘interested in reconstructing past reality by relating it to the cultural needs of the present’ (Wallerstein, 1996, p. 30). Moreover, Rejeski and Olson (2006) argue that universities are overly governed by the trend of market-based solutions, which do not allow for long-term thinking. Slaughter (2007) also argues that it has been “very difficult for proposals involving futures thinking [and] applied foresight, to gain traction’ during the time of the ‘ascendancy of the neo-cons and their associated market-oriented ideology” (p. 98).

However, futures studies is steadily growing and, at the same time, is being transformed. According to Masini (2010), futures studies has permeated into many cultures. For example, in Africa, futures studies is regarded as an academic discipline to resist tyranny and injustice. In France, futures studies is called prospective, which implies action-oriented futures thinking. In India, futures studies is thought of as a third-world utopia.

According to Marien (2010), futures studies is intermingled with other disciplines. For instance, many universities mix existing disciplines with ideas of futures studies in order to provide new academic courses, such as the following: Futures, Sci-Fi, Utopian and Dystopian Studies; Forecasting and Modeling/Simulation; Philosophy (Normative Alternative Futures); Integral Studies and Thinking; Ethics and Values Studies; Actuarial Science and Risk Management; Sustainability and Development (Economic) Studies; and Religious Studies (Future Beliefs). Futures studies is also
spreading in Internet-based forms.\textsuperscript{48} In short, these transformations of futures studies reflect the fact that futures studies is evolving. The evolution is identifiable with progress.

Furthermore, futures studies (often called foresight) in governments has been popular since the 1960s (Alsan & Oner, 2004; Chi, 1991; Dator, 2009c; Keenan & Popper, 2008). The diffusion of governmental foresight activities was also initiated by scholars and futurists (Dator 2009c). For example, the exemplary report \textit{The Limits to Growth}, by the Club of Rome, massively affected many governments of the world in the 1970s and challenged them to think in future-oriented ways for a sustainable growth. American sociologist and futurist Daniel Bell also influenced governmental foresight. Bell, who became famous with his book, titled \textit{The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting}, initiated the Commission on the Year 2000 in 1965. The Commission attempted to identify structural changes in society that would have long-term social impacts and sought to create alternative futures on critical issues that society would face. Nowadays, governments carry out their foresight activities in order to prepare for the uncertainties of the future after the occurrence of many unexpected events, such as the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, the SARS outbreak in 2003, and the U.S. financial crisis in 2008. Through carrying out many foresight activities, governments learn how to move from traditional practices into anticipatory projects (Chi, 1991). Like other governments, the Korean government carried out foresight projects. However, the approach that the Korean government has taken is unique; in other words, it mainly focuses on economic development rather than exploring diverse alternative visions.

\textsuperscript{48} For example, FERN (Foresight Education and Research Network), STFN (Shaping Tomorrow’s Foresight Network), and ASF (Acceleration Studies Foundation).
3-3. Three Forms of Korean Foresight Activities

The South Korean government is also carrying out foresight activities. In many cases, the Korean government regards futures studies as developmentology, focusing on economic development-focused vision. In comparison, there are two different types of futures studies found in Korea: present studies and alternative futures. I will examine what attention futures studies has received in Korea.

3-3-1. Developmentology

The Korean government engaged in foresight activities to catch up with economically developed countries. Experiences of Western powers during the late 19th century and the Japanese invasion in the first half of the 20th century led Koreans to focus strongly on building economic power that was believed to secure their wealth and security. In this socio-economic context, Koreans translated Western futures studies as a tool to grow their economy. For example, the Korean Society for Future Studies transformed Western futures studies into Korean Developmentology for a growth-focused vision (Lee, 1970). The Korean Society for Future Studies was a leading scholars’ group. They introduced futures studies in Korea and published the academic journal Mirae rul Munnunda (An Inquiry into the Future) from 1968 to 1988 to encourage Koreans to think about the future and to prepare for the unpredictable.

The Korean futurists were impressed by the United States’ project, The Year 2000, which Daniel Bell among other scholars initiated in 1964. The Korean futurists gathered together to set up a similar project: The Year 2000 in Korea in 1968. The Korean government supported them to transcend the project into Korea in the Year 2000 in 1971.
This project was the first foresight activity undertaken by the Korean government from 1970 to 1971 (Ministry of Science and Technology, 1971). *Korea in the Year 2000* aimed at forecasting changes that would take place by the year 2000 in terms of population, economy, science, technology, social environment, and ethics. This forecast provided Koreans with a desirable future, in which people live in an economically prosperous, urbanized, internationally opened, and peace-loving country.

Foresight activities of the Korean government did not resume until the late 1980s. The Roh government’s foresight project, *Korea 2020*, was begun in 1989. This project was carried out by the 21st Century Commission, the first civilian-led Presidential Council for envisioning the future. Its basic assumption was that Korea in 2020 should be a more unified, economically developed, scientifically advanced, and culturally prosperous country. This future aimed for Korea to take part in reshaping a new order for a new global society with stronger nations in the 21st century. However, this project neglected negative possibilities, which might threaten Korea’s survival in the future, such as environmental pollution or oil depletion.

This foresight activity triggered Korean journalists’ reactions, which reflected how commoners viewed the foresight activity. Here, I brought news articles’ headlines that dealt with the project of *Korea 2020*: challenge, independence, creativeness, revolution, unification, globalization, hub of the world, rise of Asia, and a syndrome of Park Jung-Hee. Among these words, “globalization,” “hub of the world,” and “a syndrome of Park Jung-Hee” can be connected to economic growth. “Unification,” “independence,” “rise of Asia,” and “revolution” can be interrelated with political development. “Challenge” and “creativeness” can be interpreted as required properties
that Koreans should possess in the 21st century. Based on these headlines, one can conclude that Korea is liable to pursue economic growth in envisioning the future.

This economic growth-oriented intention that the Korean government seeks in foresight activity remains the same after the new regime. For example, Kim Young-sam’s government (1993-1997) took power and maintained the foresight activities that mainly focused on how to develop the economy. This tendency perpetuates in Kim Dae-jung’s government (1998-2002), Roh Moo-hyun’s government (2003-2007), and the current government, even though there are many voices that are opposed to it. For example, Choi (2005) pointed out that while the democratic governments in Korea pursued growth as their top policy priority and thus expanded market competition and the market-driven logic of efficiency to a far-reaching extent, Korea has been divided into two extreme poles, the haves and have-nots. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Korean government has regarded futures studies as developmentology, which has not waned yet.

3-3-2. Present Studies

What can be called present studies is the other form of the Korean adaptation of futures studies. In 1970, Korean scholar and member of the Korean Society for Future Studies Kah-kyung Cho (1970) first mentioned this adaptation. Cho understood that humans could extrapolate the future from data of the past and present, so futures studies could be an empirical science. For Cho, the future becomes better by synergism, in which interdisciplinary cooperation takes place. He interestingly proposed that present studies should be facilitated before futures studies was performed. However, Cho did not
elaborate on present studies. Rather, he moved toward phenomenology, in which one cannot say that something exists without experiencing it.

In the 1990s, Korean scholar Tae-chang Kim (1999a) also moved from futures studies to present studies. Kim saw the flow of time as one-dimensional: the living (or continuing) present. In a sense, the living present can be interpreted as the present moment and is the only time for human beings to bring something into reality. The meaning of the living present becomes clearer when Kim compares futures studies with future generations studies. Kim (1999b) argues that future studies “tend to look at the future from now forward,” whereas future generations studies “attempts to place now within the web of the interconnected past, present and future looking backward and forward” (pp. 286-287). Kim is right in terms of what future generations studies is, but he misunderstands futures studies, because futures studies also considers the past as a significant element in critically understanding driving forces that push a current society toward a more restrictive set of alternative possible futures.

However, we have to pay attention to Kim’s misunderstanding about futures studies, because his misunderstanding results from East Asia’s cultural backgrounds, which are based on classical Chinese philosophy such as Confucianism. In this culture, empiricism plays a significant role in shaping attitudes toward the future. One cannot say that he knows something without experiencing it. Likewise, one cannot claim that he or she explores the future without experiencing it. We can find an example that supports this empiricism in Confucius’ Analects: when Zilu, one of Confucius’ students, asked how to serve the spirits and the gods, Confucius replied, “Not yet being able to serve other people, how would you be able to serve the spirits?” Zilu asked another question to the
Master: “May I ask about death?” Confucius answered, “Not yet understanding life, how could you understand death?” This conversation between Zilu and Confucius implies that to know something is “to authenticate [it] in action” (Ames & Rosemont Jr., 1998, p. 55). In this sense, the future cannot be proved until it will occur in East Asian cultures. Hence, the present is the only meaningful time to validate knowledge.

3-3-3. Alternative Futures

This is the third form of the Korean adaptation of futures studies. This form was partially found in the book Korean Futures, produced by the Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University in 1975. This book suggests that Korea’s future should be plural because foresight activities should envision multiple possibilities in order for Koreans to prepare for unexpected challenges properly. For this purpose, the Asiatic Research Institute invited sociologists, political scientists, and economists from Canada, Italy, Japan, and the United States. At the conference, scholars debated on how to achieve economic growth in considering Korea’s heavy dependence on foreign investment, the economic gap between urban areas and rural areas, and the military tension between the South and the North. Director of the Asiatic Research Institute Jun-yeop Kim asserted that the main goal of futures studies was to be sensitive to probable problems of the future (The Asiatic Research Institute, 1975). This is a different interpretation of futures studies in comparison to previous concepts of futures studies in Korea in terms of plurality. However, the project undertaken by the Asiatic Research Institute turned out to be a one-time academic activity.

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Korean sociologist Kyung-dong Kim elaborated on futures studies and attempted to create plural alternatives. Kim (1988) argued that the purpose of futures studies was to study images of the future rather than to predict the future, and he explained several futuristic methods: genius forecasting, trend extrapolation, the Delphi\(^{50}\) method, simulation, cross-impact matrix, scenarios, decision trees, historical analogy, and gaming. Kim contributed to the building of future-oriented thought. Furthermore, Kim (1988) emphasized the significance of normative forecasting in Korea, saying, “Since we cannot predict the future, we have to create desirable futures” (p. 313).

However, Korean society has not seriously paid attention to alternative futures and normative forecasting. Rather, developmentology has been regarded as the strongest form of futures studies by Koreans. By comparison, alternative futures are seen as the weakest form of futures studies, while present studies is emerging as a new transformation of futures studies. One reason alternative futures may be less compelling in Korea is that the Korean language is less amenable to using counterfactual analysis. I will explicate this subject later. Table 3-1 presents Korean adaptations of futures studies as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is possible?</th>
<th>Developmentology</th>
<th>Present studies</th>
<th>Alternative futures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The future can be predictable; determinism; Systemic approach</td>
<td>The future can be better by synergism; consensus is primary; interdisciplinary</td>
<td>The futures can and should be forecasted; indeterminism; interdisciplinary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{50}\) The Delphi method was invented by people at RAND in the early 1960s. The RAND researchers aimed to forecast important issues by using expert panels through practices of the Delphi, which was designed to “encourage a true debate, independent of personalities” (Gordon 2009:1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is wrong?</th>
<th>Lack of political independence and rapid socio-economic transformation</th>
<th>No bridge between Westerns and Asians; present generation and future generations</th>
<th>Identifying post-industrial society; decolonizing Western knowledge, pursuing quality of life</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is desirable?</td>
<td>Highly industrialized, economically prosperous, urbanized, internationally open, and peace-loving</td>
<td>Conversational communities where participatory discourses take place</td>
<td>Self-actualization, Self-fulfilling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-4. Contrary-To-Fact Reasoning in China and Korea

I do not begrudge the intention of improving of economic power, which is worth pursuing. Instead, I argue that Koreans have the tendency to look for one dominant future. As I remarked in chapter two, in polycentric society, there are multiple desires requested from diverse citizen groups. If it is true that Korea is moving towards a polycentric society, there should be foresight activities that pursue plural alternatives.

However, it is very important to examine why Koreans are less inclined toward plural futures. To investigate the reason, I adapt the distinction of Ferdinand de Saussure’s langue and parole by exploring scholarly debates on whether contrary-to-fact reasoning is less prevalent in languages that express Chinese-influenced cultures than in English. Counterfactual thought is an integral part of envisioning alternative futures because alternatives are created by inference from an event that is contrary to the facts. So if one is not inclined to appeal to counterfactual language, one would not be prompted to develop futures studies.
Italian futurist Masini (1993) defines futures studies as a study that is related to the principle of what-if, and what will happen if. What-if questions are frequently used for counterfactual reasoning. For example, what if aliens are living with us on Earth? Or, what if there were no tests at school? Counterfactual reasoning functions in exploring diverse opportunities and alternatives, which one did not realize, or in regretting what one has done or not done. In order to find out more alternatives and consider consequences of the alternatives in relation to future problems, one can use counterfactual reasoning.

Accordingly, this chapter addresses the following question: If there are significant differences in the counterfactual reasoning ability between the Chinese-influenced world and the Western world, what encourages and discourages the development of counterfactual reasoning?

3-4-1. The Chinese Case on Counterfactual

What is “counterfactual”? Webster’s New World College Dictionary gives the following definition of the term: adjective: contrary to the facts of an event, situation, etc.; noun: a counterfactual idea, assumption, or argument. This definition is not enough to understand counterfactual inference. Tetlock and Belkin (1996, p. 3) explain what counterfactual is with an interesting example:

Historians have been doing [counterfactual inference] for at least two thousand years. Counterfactuals fueled the grief of Tacitus when he pondered what would have happened if Germanicus had lived to become Emperor: “Had he been the sole arbiter of events, had he held the powers and title of King, he
would have outstripped Alexander in military fame as far as he surpassed him in gentleness, in self-command and in other noble qualities.

In this sense, we understand that counterfactual reasoning is a kind of what-if question or thought experiment. There is nothing new about counterfactuals in any culture or country. However, in the 1980s, scholars had serious debates about whether Chinese are poor at using counterfactual reasoning. Bloom (1981) opened the debate in his book *The Linguistic Shaping of Thought*, arguing that counterfactual thought is more difficult in Chinese than in English. Bloom points out that Chinese are not as productive with counterfactual reasoning as Americans. He concludes that the Chinese language makes it hard for the Chinese people to elaborate on counterfactual reasoning. In regard to Bloom’s argument, Elman (1983) notes that “In Bloom’s pioneering discussion, the distinctive cognitive legacies of Chinese and English are analyzed and quantified according to the degree to which each language encourages or discourages the development of specific cognitive schema” (p. 612). Elman states that Bloom for the first time shows how the linguistic differences between Chinese and English are matched with the conceptual differences between Chinese and Westerners.

Bloom’s argument prompted other arguments, which led to a chain reaction in scholarly fields. Wu Kuang-ming and Angus Charles Graham argue that many Chinese lexical and syntactic markings express counterfactuals, whereas David Hall and Roger Ames posit that Chinese lacks both a language of entification and of condition-contrary-to-fact expressions (Bodde 1991). For example, Wu (1989) asserts that Bloom’s argument is wrong: first of all, regarding the lack of Chinese counterfactuals, Wu argues that “eighty-four examples of Chinese counterfactuals are listed, and forty-four more
from Dobson are mentioned.”51 Second, regarding the poor Chinese performances on Bloom’s counterfactual tests, Wu responds that “the tests are about topics remote to Chinese people, and in English-like formulation.”52 Third, regarding the difficulty of translating a single complex English sentence into a single complex Chinese sentence, Wu responds that “yet the Chinese language can faithfully translate English sentences, but in different linguistic devices.”53 Finally, regarding the Chinese confession about the lack of counterfactuals, Wu argues that “Chinese (historical, philosophical) literature has many counterfactuals; the confession must mean that the Chinese do not express themselves in the abstractive manner of the English manner of the English language.”54 Wu concludes that both English and Chinese have many words to express counterfactual inference.

However, Hall and Ames (1987) have a different perspective from that of Wu. They argue that the Chinese do have words to express counterfactual reasoning, but they have not been interested in developing it. Hall and Ames think of counterfactual inference as an *either-or* sensibility that is based on rational choice and ethical thinking. They argue that the relative absence of the either-or sensibility shows that “the classical Chinese would have found scientific and ethical reflections and deliberations unappealing” (p. 265). Hall and Ames interestingly posit that Confucius transformed the choice of *ethical* mode into the choice of *aesthetic* mode. The choice of an ethical mind entails a judgment of which is right or wrong, while the choice of an aesthetic mind entails a pursuit of a right thing to do in the present by considering viable relationships with others.

52 Ibid
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
For example, *yi* (appropriateness or rightness) is an important word that reflects a Confucian way of thinking. Hall and Ames (1987) argue that *yi* seeks aesthetic harmony, which is “a function of concrete, immediate, precognitive choices made by the creator or appreciator of a given harmony” (p. 266). For Confucius, there is no alternative but action in accordance with relational appropriateness among people. Hence, Confucius did not need to develop counterfactual reasoning.

With regard to Hall and Ames’ argument about either-or sensibility, Graham expresses a different opinion. Graham (1989) posits that “the either-or sensibility awakens with Mo-tzu, *pien* ‘argumentation’ being essentially arguing out which of two alternatives is X and which is not” (p. 398). In addition, Graham (1989) shows that “Classical Chinese has, among other ‘if’ words with different and still imperfectly analyzed functions, a very common counterfactual *shih* 使 ‘supposing that’, often reinforced by *chia* 假 ‘falsely, pretending,’ with a whole family of alternative phrases, not to mention the rather rare negative *wei* 微 ‘if there were not’” (p. 395-396).

However, it can be said that Mo-Tzu’s idea was short-lived in China. Shin (2004) argues that Mo-Tzu was popular in the Warring States period, but during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) the rise of Confucianism to orthodoxy caused the collapse of Mo-Tzu. Shin points out that after the Ch’in and Han Dynasty, China set up a hierarchical society, which abolished Mo-Tzu’s egalitarian idea. As Whitehead (1925) points out that actualization is “a selection issuing in a gradation of possibilities in respect to realization in that occasion” (p. 159), the Chinese tradition had Mo-Tzu’s idea but did not select it in order to develop. Like this way, the Classical Chinese tradition uses
counterfactuals but does not elaborate counterfactual reasoning, which is less important in the culture. As I remarked, in a Chinese holistic culture, counterfactual reasoning—in other words, singular causal or token-causal claims—has not appealed to people. This is what happened in Korea too. Now, let us move to Korean cases, which tell why Koreans do not intend to elaborate on counterfactual reasoning.

3-4-2. Korean Cases on Counterfactual

Several articles are presented, which imply why Koreans find it difficult to internalize the logic of counterfactuals.

3-4-2-1. Subjunctive Mood

When Koreans learn English grammar, they have a hard time understanding the subjunctive mood. The subjunctive mood is ‘a verb mood typically used in dependent clauses to express wishes, commands, emotion, possibility, judgment, opinion, necessity, or statements that are contrary to fact at present.’\(^{55}\) For example, one might consider the statements “If I were a bird, I could fly to you” or “If I had not met you yesterday, I would have failed a math test today.” The use of the subjunctive mood is not easy for Koreans (Kim, 1991).

Jung et al. (2005) performed an interesting test on how Korean college students avoid using the subjunctive mood in writing essays in English. The authors asked thirty students to write in both a controlled-writing session and a free-writing sessions in which the students translated 32 Korean sentences into English and described their activities in the past, present, and future forms of tense. The researchers counted the number of sentences.

\(^{55}\) Refer to the Wikipedia: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_mood
correct expressions of the subjunctive in their writings. The results showed that in the controlled writing the students used 44.07% of tense and subjunctive forms correctly. However, in the free writing, the accuracy rate was higher, 90.92%. The researchers argue that one of these reasons might be related to the students’ avoidance of uncertain expressions, which are mainly the subjunctive forms. Jung et al. point out that 70% of Korean students who participated in the English tests did not understand the logic of the subjunctive mood regardless of whether they otherwise had good English proficiency.

According to this research, the students have intralingual errors, which arise when a particular distinction does not exist in a certain language: for example, the use of “make” instead of “do” by Italian learners because the make/do distinction does not exist in Italian (Ellis, 1994). In addition to this, intralingual errors also arise when the learners fail to fully comprehend a distinction in the target language (Ellis, 1994).

Other articles also support the conclusion that students think the subjunctive mood is the most difficult part of English grammar (Kim, 1988; Kim, 2007). The articles find that it is not easy for Korean students to fully understand the difference between a conditional sentence and a subjunctive sentence. Kim (2007) argues that the Korean students are confused when constructing a consequential sentence that follows a subjunctive sentence.

3-4-2-2. Korean Modal Expression

Korean linguists argue that Korean words that express conjecture or speculation are based on factual inference (Kang, 2010; Lim, 2008). For instance, Lim (2008) examined how Koreans use ghet (-glyph-), which is a future marker or morpheme in Korean
grammar. There are two main reasons that a Korean speaker or writer uses *ghet* in a Korean sentence. One is that when she observes a fact, she uses *ghet* to tell what is next. Here is an example:

유리창 너머 아버지가 차를 타는 것이 보인다. 곧 집으로 들어오시겠(ghet)지.

(Through a window I see my father parking his car in our house, so I guess that he will come to the house soon).

In this case, the speaker has a clear clue to forecast a future. The other reason is that when she believes the other’s knowledge or integrity, she uses *ghet* to tell what is next. The following is another example:

이 음식은 어머니가 만들었으니 맛있겠(ghet)지.

(This food is made by my mother, so it will be delicious).

In this case, the speaker trusts her mother’s cooking ability through her experience. In short, Koreans use *ghet* in forecasting the future by factual reasoning as well as by personal experiences. Kang (2010) also argues that *ghet* is used to express strong conjecture under a situation, in which a speaker actually sees a clear precursor. Thus, one can conclude that the Korean future marker *ghet* is based on factual inference, not on counterfactual inference.

3-5. Discussion

As this chapter argues, counterfactuals are not as prominently used in Chinese and Korean languages as they are in English. In order to examine the reasons for this, this
chapter uses Saussure’s linguistic concepts of langue and parole. **Langue** is “a single organizational structure which accounts simultaneously for both human speech and human reason” (Harris & Taylor, 1989, p. 210, emphasis in original). The other of Saussure’s linguistic concepts, **parole**, which reflects langue, is the act of speaking and the utterance of people, so parole is specific to each speaker.

The difference between them can be easily understood by using the analogy of a chess game: “To engage in a game of chess both players must first know the langue of chess -- the rules of movement and the overall strategy of how to play; Langue imposes constraints on, and provides a guide to, the choices each player can make in the act of playing the game; The actual choices characterize parole -- the ability to apply the abstract knowledge of chess (langue) to a specific game-playing situation” (Danesi, 2003, p. 64). In this sense, parole is regarded as an individual’s strategy to use language in writing and speech. Thus, with regard to counterfactual reasoning, the parole in China and in Korea strategically discourages their peoples from developing counterfactual reasoning.

This chapter strongly posits that one of the strategic reasons for the less-favorable need to develop counterfactual reasoning has to do with the dominance of aesthetic sensibilities in Korea. As I mentioned in chapter one, a list of authors argue that East Asian aesthetic preferences are characterized as correlative, particular, polar, processual, contextual, appropriate, relation-centered, accommodating, floating, holistic, and indeterminate (Choi et al., 2007; Hall & Ames, 1987; Jullien, 2000; Masuda et al., 2008; Nisbett, 2003; Shin, 1998). Table 3-2 presents the differences of aesthetic preferences as follows:
Table 3-2. The differences of aesthetic preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East Asia</th>
<th>Western theo-ontological tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Buddhism, Daoism, Confucianism</td>
<td>Ancient Greek thoughts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic preference</td>
<td>Context-inclusive</td>
<td>Objective-focused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Attending to background and relations with objects”</td>
<td>“To grasp its object as closely as possible”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How are these East Asian aesthetic preferences associated with the less-favorable need to develop counterfactual reasoning? First of all, most counterfactuals focus on singular causal or token-causal claims of the form—for example, event A caused event B.\(^56\) Thus, counterfactual reasoning is linear, analytical, logical, and exclusive. However, for those who prefer contextual and holistic approaches, counterfactual reasoning is not appealing. For instance, holism does not favor any component but appreciates and accommodates all parts in order to optimize the totality of the effect that all parts can produce collaboratively. Holism does not contrast with rationalism, but includes it as one element in the whole as reasonableness.\(^57\) In other words, holism differentiates rationalism from reasonableness. Rationalism is led to reductionism, which selects one specific element for explaining one’s whole experience while reasonableness considers one’s experience as one that is continuously changing. Reasonableness in holism pursues aesthetically consistent relationships of all parts.\(^58\)

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\(^56\) Retrieved from this website: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-counterfactual/

\(^57\) This is based on discussions with Roger T. Ames through emails on March 2012.

\(^58\) Roger T. Ames at University of Hawaii interestingly interprets Classical Chinese words and presents them in light of the primacy of vital relationality and its corollaries—for example, the correlation between two aspects: 陰陽 (yin and yang), 道德 (focus and its field), 天地 (heaven and earth), 天人 (heaven and
Second, counterfactual reasoning aims to seek alternatives. If individuals are disappointed with the outcomes they received, they are more inclined to seek information about alternatives, even if they anticipate this exploration might bring about regret (Summerville, 2011). Thus, the motivation to use counterfactuals basically comes from disappointments about a certain result or event, so individuals want to reverse it as if it had not happened. In order to reverse it, alternatives can be created. However, for those who have a relation-centered paradigm, this strategy would not work. The following text can offer a reason for this:

In Korean calligraphy, if a stroke is done wrong, the artist cannot erase nor correct it. He has no choice but to draw the next stroke so as to hide the previous mistake, to make the next stroke harmonize with the first unsatisfactory one. And if one line of characters is wrong, he must strive to make the next line free of errors, but the most important thing is that the next line of characters should help and support the first one. On the finished page of a calligraphy piece, stroke and stroke, character and character, line and line should help each other. It is this relationship between lines, strokes and characters that helps to overcome any mistakes made in the work (Shin, 1998).

As this text points out, Koreans do not erase or correct an incorrect stroke. Rather, Koreans create harmony in between the past and the present, between what they have
done and what they will do. Based on the relationality and connectedness of Korean calligraphy, Koreans try not to organize the chaos that he or she makes by accident but adapt to the chaos in expecting a better chance to create novelty. In this sense, a language of condition-contrary-to-fact has less meaning for the Koreans. Values of life can be created by endless relationships with the past, even though the past has flaws. Everything is irreversible in an aesthetic mode.

However, the relation-centered paradigm also produces a side effect in Korea. In relation to the lack of counterfactual reasoning, I found that few science fictions (SF) have been published in South Korea, because few novelists have written SF. Koreans like SF movies and novels, but these movies and novels are produced by foreigners. Korean SF has never been popular even though Korean fantasy novels have attracted many readers. For these reasons, Park (2004) argues that Korean readers think of Korean SF as infantile and cheap. Cho (2007) also points out that most Korean readers like to purchase foreign SF, not Korean, because most advanced technologies arise from Western countries. So Koreans think that Korea still lags behind the West in science and technology.

Besides this post-colonial approach, the aforementioned relation-centered paradigm can give a reason. Djuna is one of a small number of Korean SF novelists who have led Korean SF since the late 1990s. She/he published several SF novels, such as Navi War (1997), A Duty-free Area (2000), The Pacific Express (2002), A Proxy War (2006), and Teeth of the Dragon (2007). Some critics say that Djuna is the only SF novelist in Korea. It is very interesting to know how she/he lives in Korea. Djuna is not

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her/his real name, but her/his pen name. Nobody knows who Djuna is, and the author never exposes him/herself to the public. Journalists can interview Djuna only through email. This is why Djuna is called a faceless writer, which is very strange in Korea. One journalist asked Djuna why she/he is hiding herself/himself, and Djuna answered, “It is because I do not have to go to the place where I do not want to take part in, and I do not have to have relationships that I do not want to make. This is very difficult in Korea.”\(^{61}\) Djuna’s answer gives us a hint about why there are few Korean SFs. In a way, if one wants to write SF, one cannot help but avoid Korea’s relation-centered paradigm. Of course, Koreans can understand and use counterfactual reasoning but do not like to develop it.

Hyo-jae Lee (2003) is one of the leading Korean scholars studying how Korean patriarchal authoritarianism has affected and changed Korean society. She argues that Korean patriarchal authoritarianism causes hierarchical authoritarianism in the realms of officialdom, a boss-led factionalism in the realm of politicians and sectarianism or nepotism in a society. These side effects of the Korean patriarchal authoritarianism can explain why Koreans prefer not to develop diverse alternatives. It is because their fathers, bosses, and presidents are presumed to know everything, so others do not have to or should not create alternatives which might be seen as challenges against the fathers, bosses, and presidents.

Lastly, counterfactual reasoning assumes that novelty comes from disjunction while aesthetic sensibilities in East Asia suppose that it comes from junction with the past.

\(^{61}\) Refer to this news article in July 2008. Available at: http://news.hankooki.com/lpage/culture/200807/h2008070402383884210.htm
Jullien (2000) aptly compares the differences between Greek thoughts and Chinese ones. The Greek views are based on logos and posit that “in regard to any discourse, there exists another that is opposed to it” (Jullien, 2000, p. 46). So, the Greek views exclusively judge which is right or wrong, because the purpose of logos is “to grasp its object as closely as possible” (Jullien 2000, p. 47). By comparison, “the basic principle of aesthetics in China, in both painting and poetry, is for the meaning, the pleasure, ‘not to exhaust itself at first glance’ but to develop endlessly” (p. 53). Jullien (2000) takes an example: “Chinese scholars for two thousand years read their first literary work, The Book of Songs, to take stock of this effect” (p. 53). Chinese do not fix the meanings of their classics such as The Book of Songs. Rather, they elaborate on the meanings of the classics by continuously adding their commentaries on the texts of the classics. Another example is the combination of xiao (孝) and remonstrance (jian 諫), where jian is inclusive: “We can do better” rather than “You are wrong.”

Why do Chinese scholars elaborate on their classics? Ames (1994) argues that Western historical figures “reflect discontinuity with what has gone before, but the Chinese intellectual tradition is generally characterized by a commitment to continuity” (p. xx, emphasis in original). Western scholars challenge the ideas of the mainstream, whereas Chinese scholars embody, express, and amplify their tradition. According to Ames, Chinese philosophical ideas evolve not through a dialectical process of thesis and antithesis, but through “a process of organic growth” (p. xxi). This argument has to do with indeterminism, which gives the benefit to doubt—in Jullien’s words, “detour grant[s] access” (Jullien, 2000, p. 7).

62 Roger Ames provided me with this example by email, September 2012.
Furthermore, Ames and Rosemont (1998) assert that a novel future “emerges out of a continuing past” (p. 234). Rosemont and Ames (2009) also argue that the future evolves from the endless dialogues between the past and the present in a succinct way: “Tradition is entirely different from habit…A real tradition is not the relic of a past that is irretrievably gone; it is a living force that animates and informs the present” (p. 22).

3-6. Concluding Remarks

This chapter examined why Koreans are not inclined to develop futures studies by exploring Korean adaptations to futures studies in modern times and by using linguistic analysis of counterfactual reasoning. It found that even though Koreans were early adopters of futures studies, they have not fully developed the field. One of the reasons for this has to do with the dominance of aesthetic sensibilities in Korea. In East Asian cultural contexts, Koreans developed their own strategies for survival, which were characterized as correlative, particular, polar, processual, contextual, appropriate, relation-centered, accommodating, floating, holistic, and indeterminate. These characteristics discouraged Koreans from elaborating foundational futures studies, which pursues linear, logical, rational, and exclusive explanations on human experiences. Thus, in order to create Korean futures studies, one has to consider these aesthetic preferences with regard to Koreans. In the next chapter, I will explore how aesthetic preferences in East Asia can be utilized to form an alternative approach to futures studies.
CHAPTER 4
THE POSSIBILITY OF AESTHETIC FUTURES STUDIES
IN EAST ASIAN CONTEXTS

“Salt interacts with butter in your baking.”
(In an illustration of holism)63

4-1. Introduction

Through chapter three, I argued that Koreans have a less-developed futures studies due to the domination of a specific type of aesthetic sensibility, which is holism. Based on this finding, in chapter four, I explore the possibility of aesthetic futures studies in East Asian contexts through converging the Daoist’s perspective with Dator’s futures studies.

More concretely, this chapter analyzes the four images of the future (FIF) that make up the core method of Dator’s futures studies (Bezold, 2009; Dator, 1979, 1981, 2002, 2009c; Jones, 1992) through the lens of the Zhuangzi,64 which is one of the most highly regarded Classical texts in East Asia. Zhuangzi together with the Daodejing (道徳經)65 can be considered the two primary texts of the classical Daoist tradition.

Throughout Chinese history Daoism has been associated with the aesthetic dimension of

63 Refer to vocabulary.com
64 Zhuangzi is believed to live in the reigns of King Hui of Liang or Wei (370-319 BC), according to the Historical Records of Si-ma Qian (145-89 BC). He was a representative Daoist and philosopher. Here, I mean the Zhuangzi the texts written by Zhuangzi.
65 Daodejing is one of the Classical Chinese texts, which, according to Ames and Hall (2003), was composed more than 2000 years during a turbulent period of Chinese history for providing alternative visions of reality.
the human experience: an inspiration for art, calligraphy, poetry, and so on. We can thus appeal to it as an authoritative statement of the Chinese aesthetic sensibility.

James A. Dator is a Western political scientist focusing on futures studies in considering logical and useful alternative images of the future. Zhuangzi is a Chinese historical figure who represents Daoism—a rival philosophy to Confucianism—in pursuing interdependence of all that exists in the world (Ames, 1998) and leaning towards “the cult of intuitiveness and spontaneity in both political and private action” (Graham, 2001, p. 5).

While they look different, my research has found that there are very important commonalities between Dator and Zhuangzi. This chapter specifically focuses on how the two figures see the world, and posits that this comparison can provide another way of thinking to the field of futures studies: aesthetic futures studies. I argue that aesthetic futures studies aims to foster self-efficacy in terms of individuals’ ability to influence their futures in imagining appropriate visions that make relationships significant with the assumption that the future is indeterminate. So, it is important to enjoy chaos that brings about creativity.

I will elaborate this argument, but now, I explain the idea of “self-efficacy toward the future.” The concept of self-efficacy itself was introduced by Bandura (1977) to understand why individuals would engage in certain behaviors to achieve their goals. If one perceives self-efficacy, then one is confident to carry out necessary actions and expand sufficient effort. In other words, self-efficacy is the mediator between knowledge and action. I expand this concept into the field of futures studies by adding “toward the
future” following self-efficacy. What I mean by self-efficacy toward the future is that if one perceives it, then one is confident to imagine alternative futures and put them into action.

4-2. Background and Statement of the Problem

Comparative studies have pervaded many academic fields. Futurists also have caught up with this trend in areas of decolonized futures (Dator, 2005; Nandy, 2004, 2006; Sardar, 1993, 1994), indigenous futures (Azam, 2002; Chen, 2002; Inayatullah, 2005), and comparing foresight (Alsan & Oner, 2004; Habegger, 2010; Keenan, 2008). Comparative studies are not new in the field of futures studies. In fact, futures studies has identified itself as a form of comparative studies that deals with diverse cultures.

However, it is found that few futurists have dealt with East Asian thought such as Confucianism or Daoism in order to shape a new way of thinking about the future. For example, in Futures there are only 22 articles between 1985 and 2011 that mention Confucianism; there are only 13 articles between 1978 and 2011 with reference to Daoism (Taoism). Making matters worse, none of the articles that mention Confucianism seriously considered it to be a legitimate perspective that can provide a new way of doing futures studies. In relevant articles on Daoism, only Emblemsvag and Bras (2000) and Ramirez and Ravetz (2011) grapple with it. Emblemsvag and Bras (2000) say that Daoism can produce a new paradigm for science and engineering by providing awareness of how change is understood and managed. But this article did not propose that Daoism could shed light on creating indigenous futures studies. Ramirez and Ravetz (2011)
interestingly deal with Daoism to challenge what has been taken for granted by “letting go of a priori categories and established definitions” (p. 483). I will elaborate on this later.

Additionally, the other eleven articles did not recognize Daoism as localizing futures studies within its cultural context (Inayatullah, 2002). These articles just raised a similar question: why don’t researchers consider Asian thought such as Daoism or Confucianism to reorient Western ideas such as capitalism, modernism, or scientism? They have not tackled how Asian thought can contribute to creating alternatives to Western futures studies more.

As Inayatullah (2002) aptly points out, futures studies must be localized in the “language of participants, in their ways of knowing and experiences” (p. 115). Taiwanese futurist Kuo-Hua Chen (2002) also posits that the Taiwanese should find a “local version of futures studies” (p. 212). As a way of addressing the issue of how to localize futures studies in East Asian contexts, I attempt to shape aesthetic futures studies through identifying Daoist aesthetic sensibilities. As I remarked in chapter four, East Asian aesthetic preferences are characterized as correlative, particular, polar, process-oriented, contextual, appropriate, relation-centered, accommodating, floating, holistic, and indeterminate.

Holism among the aesthetic preferences in East Asia is a salient character of the Daoist. Holism does not favor any component but appreciates and accommodates all parts in order to optimize the totality of the effect that all parts can produce collaboratively. According to Ames, holism does not contrast with rationalism, but
includes it as one element in the whole as reasonableness.\textsuperscript{66} Rationalism leads to reductionism, which selects one specific element for explaining one’s whole experience while reasonableness considers one’s experience as one that is continuously changing. Reasonableness in holism pursues aesthetically consistent relationships of all parts. Therefore, my questions concern how Dator’s FIF can be re-interpreted by the holistic perspective and, based on the reinterpretation, how to form an indigenous futures studies in East Asian contexts. These questions are significant, as many futurists emphasize the importance of creating indigenous futures studies (Inayatullah, 2002; Masini, 2010; Sardar, 1993).

4-3. Dator’s FIF and Zhuangzi’s Aesthetic View

In order to find the third perspective that creatively accommodates both attributes of Dator’s futures studies and Zhuangzi’s Daoism, I have examined both of them by answering the following questions: (1) What do they look for? (Objects of research); (2) How do they achieve their goals? (Methods); (3) What are their goals? (Purposes); and (4) How do they communicate with people? (Language). Table 4-1 presents comparisons of Dator with Zhuangzi.

Table 4-1. Comparisons of Dator with Zhuangzi

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<tr>
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<th>Dator</th>
<th>Zhuangzi</th>
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<tr>
<td>Objects of research</td>
<td>Forecasting four alternative images of the future</td>
<td>Deeply understanding interdependence of all that exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Analyzing continuity and discontinuity of issues that could impact society in 15 to</td>
<td>Following dao (道), which is the ongoing field of human</td>
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\textsuperscript{66} This is based on discussions with Roger T. Ames through emails on March 2012.
As a result, I came to several findings: Dator forecasts four alternative images (ideas and beliefs) of the future, while Zhuangzi deeply understands interdependency of all that exists at present. In order to imagine the four alternatives, Dator uses futures methods, which analyze continuity and discontinuity of issues and events that could impact society in 15 to 50 years. In order to understand the interdependency of things at present, Zhuangzi reconceptualizes dao (道), which is translated as “the Way Making” by Ames and Hall (2003). Sinologists interpret dao as “the ongoing field of experience” (Ames, 1998, p. 2), “the manner of changes” (Coutinho, 2004, p. 31), or “what patterns the seeming disorder of change and multiplicity” (Graham, 2001, p. 7). These interpretations identify the dao as process-oriented, holistic relationships, harmony with particularism, correlativeness, and novelty that is not predetermined (Ames & Rosemont, 1998; Ames & Hall, 2003). Dao is a “participatory unfolding of experience together where one’s own contribution is one’s warrant for belonging.”

Regarding purposes, Dator facilitates people’s reaching their preferred futures by exploring four images of the future while Zhuangzi provides wisdom that enables one to

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67 This definition is borrowed from Roger Ames by email (September, 2012).
“free oneself from a world dominated by chaos” (Watson, 1996, p. 3). The wisdom has to do with how to live in harmony with all that exists.

How do they communicate with people? Dator offers logical, useful, and meaningful statements of the future in order for people to forecast diverse and practical futures whereas Zhuangzi presents somewhat vague, indeterminate, and non-principled conversations on dao in order for people not to assume any knowledge is fixed and given. In other words, Zhuangzi gives the benefit of the doubt.

In the comparison, I conclude that both Dator and Zhuangzi attempt to understand how the world has changed. The world that we live in is very complex and continuously changing at every moment. It echoes Heisenberg: at the moment we observe an electron, at that moment the electron is gone. What is a reasonable way to capture how the world is changing? In other words, how can we see the whole?

For Dator, to categorize all realities into FIF is a reasonable way that grasps the truth of how the world changes: Continued Growth, Collapse, Disciplined Society, and Transformational Society. The attributes and assumptions of Dator’s FIF are succinctly explained (Dator, 1979 in Dator, 2002, p. 10) as follows: (Figure 4-1 presents the diagrams of four images of the future).

*Continuation (usually “continued economic growth”);

*Collapse (from [usually] one of a variety of different reasons such as environmental overload and/or resource exhaustion, economic instability, moral degeneration, external or internal military attack, meteor impact, etc.);
*Disciplined Society* (in which society in the future is seen as organized around some set of overarching values or another—usually considered to be ancient, traditional, natural, ideologically-correct, or God-given);

*Transformational Society* (usually either of a high-tech or a high-spirit variety, which sees the end of current forms, and the emergence of new [rather than the return to older traditional] forms of beliefs, behavior, organization and—perhaps—intelligent life-forms).

Figure 4-1. The Diagrams of FIF

In developing FIF, Dator (1979, 2002, 2011) was influenced by the works of Bell and Mau (1971) and Polak (1973), who emphasized that people’s images of the future are very important to forecasting diverse futures. For example, Polak (1973) argues that in history, human societies have been driven by images of the past and have been motivated by positive images of an idealized future. Dator moved one step forward. Based on research, teaching, and consulting on what people believe to be true about the future, Dator collected and analyzed as many images of the future as he could. Then, he
condensed the diverse images to one of the four major (or generic) images of the future (Dator, 2002). One can say that FIF were empirically extracted from documented sources of people’s ideas and beliefs about the future.

For Zhuangzi, having a bird’s eye view is the best way to see the world as it is. As Kohn (2011) points out, Zhuangzi provides a “bird’s-eye view of how the universe functions” (p. vii). The bird’s-eye view sees the world without favoring any thought, issue, or event in the world. As in Buddhism, this view reflects the idea of an absence of worldly desires in one’s mind. It is indeed difficult to have this kind of bird’s-eye view. For example, if you are a capitalist, you are not trying to see the world from a communist perspective and vice versa. If you are an environmentalist, you are not trying to see the world from a developer’s perspective and vice versa.

But how can there be a view without one perspective or another? Zhuangzi looked for a synoptic, comprehensive, and inclusive view of the world rather than a partial and biased view. In the Zhuangzi, “Everything has its that, everything has its this. From the point of view of that you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, that comes out of this and this depends on that – which is to say that this and that give birth to each other” (Watson, 1996, p. 34-35, emphasis in original). Zhuangzi tried not to support any idea or belief but accommodated multiple and different recognitions. For Zhuangzi, heaven and earth are not separated but are one attribute. According to the Zhuangzi, “Ordinary men discriminate among [things] and parade their discriminations before others. So, those who discriminate fail to see [the Way]” (Watson, 1996, p. 39). In comparison, the sage “harmonizes with both right and wrong and rests in Heaven the Equalizer. This is called walking two roads” (Watson, 1996, p. 36).
Pierre Wack also asserted that seeing the world consists of three elements: a holistic perspective, interconnectedness, and the accommodation of new insights (Burt and Wright, 2006). Wack argues that through this seeing, one can anticipate events before they might happen. In addition, Dator emphasizes that in order to see the world, users of FIF should not favor any alternative image because each idea of the future has the same possibility and probability of occurring. It can be argued that the user’s guide underlines the bird’s-eye view for providing a more inclusive worldview. I propose that this bird’s-eye view can be a basis for creating an aesthetic futures approach, in which no alternative future should be considered better or more probable than any other.

Furthermore, Zhuangzi’s synoptic view and Dator’s FIF do not stop at only envisioning but go one step further and focus on the “very now” as a way of producing an optimal future. Ames and Hall (2003) interpret dao as way-making that connotes “a forging of an always new way forward” (p. 58) and de as “the particular as a focus of potency or efficacy within its own field of experience” (p. 59) when they translate a daoist’ classical texts Daodejing (道德经). Thus, they want to point out that daoist not only understand the world, but also attempt to make life at present significant by generating “cognitive, moral, aesthetic and, spiritual meaning” (Ames & Hall, 2003, p. 60). Imagining diverse futures should connect to a process that produces optimal, appropriate, desirable policy now. Next, I will elaborate on attributes of aesthetic futures studies.

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69 Curry and Schultz (2009) point out that FIF provide “useful sorting and construction scaffolds for organizing a large variety of drivers and insights about change” (p. 55-56). I think that FIF offers not only a logical sorting process, but also enable users of FIF to multiply their images of the future by getting exposed to FIF.
4-4. Attributes of Aesthetic Futures Studies

The attributes of aesthetic futures studies can be summarized as follows: aesthetic futures studies (1) pursues appropriate rather than exclusive alternatives, (2) finds an aesthetic moment rather than a predetermined moment, (3) dances with chaos rather than controls it, and (4) uses both the useful and the useless.

4-4-1. Pursuing appropriateness rather than exclusive alternatives

The aesthetic sensibilities need a holistic way of thinking, which means one should assume that everything is interconnected. In other words, East Asians rely on a relation-centered paradigm. In the relation-centered paradigm, aesthetic futures studies emphasizes that the future can be shaped by identifying who is related with whom on a certain future. Aesthetic futures studies pursues appropriate visions that could and should come true in the future for making one’s relationships significant with others. This developed relationship could contribute to perpetuating a better community life. In order to make relationships significant, aesthetic futures studies encourages citizens and stakeholders to participate in shaping futures research design processes. As Robinson (2003) aptly points out, one of the most important elements that enable successful futures research is interactive social research that allows people to experience changes brought by themselves. When citizens and stakeholders are involved in forming the futures research process, they can increase self-efficacy towards the future. It is worth noting that Cuhls (2003) argues, “[N]etworking and cooperation in identifying future options is as—in some cases even more—important than the tasks of forecasting” (p. 96). The mutual learning approach also allows for negotiation, openness, and engagement.
In addition, I also re-interpret Dator’s FIF as an example of aesthetic futures studies that reflects appropriateness because Dator’s FIF does not encourage people to choose one of the alternative images. Applying FIF is not a game to pick up one out of four alternatives. FIF does not provide any hint or clue in distinguishing one from the other in terms of probability. Based on this impartiality, participants should consider all four images impartially and at the appropriate time. FIF’s impartiality can be related to Zhuangzi’s pluralism that rejects any single truth. Wong (2003) argues that in an ethical stance, Zhuangzi believed that “each [ethical code] succeeds in honoring certain values at the cost of sacrificing others” (p. 409).

4-4-2. Finding an aesthetic moment rather than a predetermined moment.

Aesthetic futures studies waits for an aesthetic moment. It is very difficult to capture the aesthetic moment when one feels that something is beautiful. It is also difficult to say when the aesthetic moment is, because the moment appears and disappears in an instant. Regarding the aesthetic moment, Li Zehou (2006) interestingly posits that the excellence of the Zhongyong (中庸 : can be translated as “to hit the mark in the everyday”\textsuperscript{70} or “focusing the familiar”\textsuperscript{71} ; it is also one of the Four Books of the Confucian canonical scriptures) is to grab the aesthetic moment in which people feel good. According to Li, the moment when people feel good is when something seems to be appropriate in efficiency, for example, not too long and not too short. The Zhuangzi also explicates when the aesthetic moment is:

When I chisel a wheel,’ says the carpenter to Duke Huan, ‘if the stroke is too slow it slides and does not grip, if too fast it jams and catches in the wood. Not too slow, not too fast; I feel it in the hand and respond from the heart, the tongue cannot put it into words, there is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my son and which my son cannot learn from me. (Graham, 2001, p.6)

In this passage, Graham (2001) emphasizes spontaneity as a core concept that conveys Zhuangzi’s philosophy. The word “spontaneity” in English can mean random and totally caused at the same time: for example, the tree grows spontaneously from the seed. Neither of these meanings is relevant to Zhuangzi, who takes spontaneity as the cultivated efficacy of the craftsman or martial artist or butcher. The optimal spontaneity comes from one’s experiences, not from rules or manuals. The experiences of the carpenter, for example, empower him to know what speed is appropriate for cutting the wood: not too fast and not too slow. This is an aesthetic moment.

How can one create the aesthetic moment? Imagine that there is a four-string ukulele, a Hawaiian musical instrument. Players can create musical harmony with the ukulele. No one can play well with a one-string ukulele. One needs four strings to play. Like the ukulele, aesthetic futures studies provides a well-tuned four-string ukulele for people to play themselves. Then, the player can focus on how to create musical harmony

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72 This description on spontaneity is borrowed from Roger Ames by email (September 2012).
73 Regarding spontaneity, Su and Hung (2009) interestingly compare spontaneous clusters with policy-driven ones, arguing that “spontaneous clusters have the capacity to evolve…spontaneous sources of order provide inherent order that evolution has to work with ab initio and always” (p. 618). In this sense, it can be argued that spontaneity has to do with continuously evolution.
in plucking each string. The well-tuned four strings imply four images of the future, which are impartially distributed for citizens to forecast their futures.

Aesthetic futures studies prompts individuals to make the space for new imaginings by experiencing the aesthetic moment. European foresight seems to catch a glimpse of what the aesthetic moment creates. Van der Steen et al. (2010) argue that foresight does not make choices for the future, but allows for “more space for interpretation, intuition, argumentations” than forecasting does (p. 43). Again, foresight activities should be initiated by and based on fairly diverse alternatives of the future.

In terms of the effectiveness of spontaneity, Su and Hung (2009) interestingly compare spontaneous clusters with policy-driven ones, arguing “spontaneous clusters have the capacity to evolve…spontaneous sources of order provide inherent order that evolution has to work with ab initio and always” (p. 618, emphasis in original). In this sense, it can be argued that spontaneity has to do with continuously adaptation to changing situations. It can be further argued that spontaneous organizations or groups are amorphous and endlessly moving.

4-4-3. Dance with chaos

In aesthetic futures studies, chaos itself is not judged as one that should be controlled. Chaos is a process of change. There is an interesting story on chaos in the Zhuangzu:

The emperor of the South Sea was called Shu [Brief], the emperor of the North Sea was called Hu [Sudden], and the emperor of the central region was called Hun-tun [Chaos]. Shu and Hu from time to time came together for a meeting in
the territory of Hun-tun, and Hun-tun treated them very generously. Shu and Hu discussed how they could repay his kindness. “All men,” they said, “have seven openings so they can see, hear, eat, and breathe. But Hun-tun alone doesn’t have any. Let’s trying boring him some!” Everyday they bored another hole, and on the seventh day Hun-tun died (Watson, 1996, p. 95).

This story illustrates that chaos should not be controlled but could be enjoyable. It would be better for humans not to disturb a process of change, but to adapt to it. Dator has used the metaphor of “surfing tsunamis” for many years to describe “the magnitude of challenging forces sweeping towards us from the futures” (Dator, 2009c, p. 34). Tsunamis are too large to avoid, and the only way to survive one is to surf it. For a surfer, a big wave is enjoyable. In this sense, change can be pleasurable. The metaphor of tsunamis also connotes that the world we live in consists of absurdity and craziness, which are not easy to understand in rationality due to a lack of causality. In this kind of the world, we should endure the absurdity and craziness cheerfully.

However, one has to learn how to use the power of the change in order to create the future with pleasure and excitement. In order to learn it, it is necessary to understand that dancing with chaos implies awareness of the function of fluctuation. Wheatley (1994) interestingly argues, “The things we fear most in organization—fluctuations, disturbances, imbalances—need not be signs of an impending disorder that will destroy us” (p. 20). Instead, she asserts that chaos is “the primary source of creativity” (p. 20). Wheatley assumes that we live in a quantum world, where there is the observer effect. What does this mean?
Austrian Physicist Erwin Schrödinger performed a famous thought experiment, well known as Schrödinger’s cat. In this experiment, Schrödinger proposed putting a living cat in an enclosed box, along with a device containing a vial of hydrocyanic acid. This device has a 50% chance of releasing the acid, thereby killing the cat. Because both the cat and the device are enclosed within a box, nobody can determine the cat’s fate until the box is physically opened. Schrödinger, being a physicist, used this experiment to help explain how light could be a particle or a wave, but once observed, it settles into a definite state. In a more general sense, an observation or a measurement itself affects the outcome. If a tree falls in the woods but there is no one around to hear it, does it make a sound? Thus, Schrödinger’s cat implies that nobody knows the world until we actually observe the world. If there is no observer, there is no world. In this sense, Wheatley does not seem to praise that we live in chaos; rather, she wants to emphasize that one cannot expect any consequences of an event without interacting with it. In other words, we should reflect and figure out our own contribution and characters in the drama that we create (Park, 2009b).

In the field of futures studies, Ramirez and Ravetz (2011) interestingly describe part of the nature of chaos. The authors introduce the concept of being “feral,” which means wild but previously domesticated. For example, feral species are ones that were tamed and lived in farms but become wild. Likewise, feral futures are ones that were domesticated but become totally unexpected. Examples include the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in the United States of America in 1979 or the story of the Taliban that was Mujahedeen, supported by the US, but became terrorists who attacked the U.S. The
feral futures were regarded as manageable in predictability but turn out to be totally unpredictable.

In order to prepare for feral futures, Ramirez and Ravetz (2011) suggest meta-rational approaches, which are different from rational approaches in terms of how to tackle chaos. Meta-rational approaches are based on Zen and aesthetics. Zen is a Buddhist doctrine that enlightenment can be achieved by self-correction through meditation and direct intuitive insight. Thus, a Zen approach requests that people go beyond epistemological agreements accepted in a society and practice unusual thoughts and ideas. The authors find an example in Daoism, arguing, “[Daoism] involves a not-to-be-defined experiential journey seeking Zen where, like in Zen, words are not of help” (p. 483). According to the authors, aesthetics deals with sensing and gut feelings. However, we have to make sure that such sensing and gut feelings must be the product of cultivation rather than simply random experiences. An educated imagination that can make productive correlations is essential.

In short, whereas a rational approach focuses on more data and modeling, meta-rational approaches “let go of the established epistemology…create the conceptual space to reconsider the situation anew…identify and seek and explore and begin to establish new connections…finally opt for those imagined futures whose meta-pattern best connects to those experienced as corresponding to those of the living, the viable, the vivid, the sustainable” (Ramirez and Ravetz, 2011, p. 484, quotes selected). In this sense, the meta-rational approaches are similar to that of aesthetic futures studies. But aesthetic futures studies is more interested in dancing with chaos, not controlling or beating it.
4-4-4. The Use of the Useful and the Useless

Aesthetic futures studies is interested in how to use both the useful and useless—in other words, both acceptability and unacceptability. The reason for this is that today’s usefulness (or acceptability) can turn out to be useless (or unacceptable) tomorrow, and vice versa. However, it is difficult to use both of them, as Zhuangzi contended: “All men know the use of the useful, but nobody knows the use of the useless” (Watson, 1996, p. 63). Why is it difficult? Of course, no one wants to use the useless, which seems to be impractical and less effective at present. Thus, the question that I want raise is not how to use both of them but whether the use of both is more practical and effective than the use of the useful. Can it be a practical strategy?

The use of the useful and useless has to do with indeterminacy. Coutinho (2004) aptly argues that when a text is indeterminate, “knowledge of its context can help to delimit possible and probable meanings” (p. 8). Regarding indeterminacy, what Zhuangzi said merits consideration: the sage “recognizes a this but a this is also that, a that which is also this. His that has both a right and a wrong in it; his this too has both a right and a wrong in it” (Wang, 2004, p. 210). This statement sounds paradoxical and ridiculous. However, for Zhuangzi, to use ridiculous and absurd expressions is a strategy for accommodating “the changes of all things and the shifts of meanings and viewpoints” (Wang, 2004, p. 197). Jullien (2000) also sees this way of speech as “fluctuating speech” in the Zhuangzi, saying, “By oscillating according to the situation, fluctuating speech embraces reality from all angles, constantly espousing the spontaneous movement of things” (p. 13). In order to delimit possible meanings and to accommodate changes, aesthetic futures studies evenly spreads out diverse alternatives without prioritizing any
alternative. Thus, people do not need to identify any alternative—predetermined, fixed, or given. Due to this setting, the alternatives themselves become available as they are.

A number of authors studying the *Zhuangzi* propose that Zhuangzi had a strategy for using his indeterminate words (Coutinho, 2004; Wang, 2004; Wu, 1990). In chapter 27 of the *Zhuangzi*, one of the paragraphs says, “[Dwelling] words make up nine tenths of it; [double-layered] words make up seven tenths of it; goblet words come forth day after day, harmonizing things in the Heavenly Equality” (Watson, 1968, p. 303). In this passage, we can acknowledge that Zhuangzi used three kinds of words: dwelling, double-layered, and goblet words. Zhuangzi explained that dwelling words are like words for parables, figurative descriptions, and imaginary conversations, which, in turn, lodge readers and listeners for creating new ideas and meanings. Double-layered words are like quoted words from what wise or exemplary men said, such as proverbs or maxims. Goblet words reflect the core of Zhuangzi’s philosophy of communication. A goblet is a wine cup that tips when it is full and rights itself when it is empty. Wu (1990) interpreted that goblet words are “tipping toward the situation so as to contain it as fully as [the goblet words] can” (p. 370). Therefore, goblet words imply endless changes, which is what Zhuangzi seeks to adapt to. Wang (2004) aptly points out that Zhuangzi “enjoys staying with all possibilities, never attempting to close the door on any” (p. 204). This is a strategy for using both the useful and useless.

The useless is typically seen to be nebulous and ridiculous. However, aesthetic futures studies believes that any useful idea in the future should appear to be ridiculous (Dator’s 2nd law of futures studies). And, “useless” is a judgment made by persons without sufficient imagination. Regarding how to gather ridiculous ideas, Zhuangzi
suggested that “beggars, cripples and freaks [should be] seen quite without pity and with as much interest and respect as princes and sages” (Watson, 1996, p. 4). Zhuangzi attempted to listen to anyone, even if he or she was seen as a ridiculous or useless one. Both Zhuangzi and Dator underscore awareness of the useless.

FIF enables people to use both the useful and useless. Each image of the future has its own merits and demerits and has its own values and beliefs that could (or should) be realized. Even in Collapse, one can find some positive things to make a society better than other societies. For example, Cuba can be seen as an economically collapsed country due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the trade embargo enforced by the United States. However, Cuba has also become one of the healthiest countries (the average lifespan is 77.6 in 2006)\textsuperscript{74} in the world and “the only nation in the world which met the WWF’s (World Wide Fund for Nature) definition of sustainable development.”\textsuperscript{75}

Each image can be seen as an alternative to the others. For example, Collapse and Disciplined Society and Transformational Society could all be alternatives to Continuation. The image of continued economic growth was shaped in societies in which people carried out projects of modernization and industrialization in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} Centuries. Since the second half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century, modernization has been blamed for causing environmental, ecological, economic, and energy crises. When we discuss disadvantages of modernism or industrialism, the three alternatives to Continuation should be seriously considered in order to re-orient the values and beliefs embedded in the Continuation future. In short, FIF is based on “historical archetypes, deep patterns

\textsuperscript{74} Refer to the CIA’s \textit{the World Factbook}, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html

\textsuperscript{75} Quotation from Wikipedia entry: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuba
that reoccur through time,” which are distinguished from other futures scenarios (Inayatullah, 2009, p. 78).

In order to overcome the dichotomy between useful and useless, aesthetic futures studies is interested in multiplying alternatives. Nandy (2006) appropriately argues, “I consider all futures studies to be a game of design: When you multiply the number of designs you multiply your choices” (p. 91). Nandy’s argument has to do not only with the freedom to explore alternatives, but also with the freedom to multiply them. By multiplying alternatives, a futurist can become a creative artist who wants access to a “collective soul [and] tacit knowledge” (Nandy, 2006, p. 89).

Based on multiple alternatives, humans can enjoy seeing more livable and exciting worlds. The more alternative images practitioners of futures research create, the better the results they can achieve in terms of the efficiency of a futures project. Beers et al. (2010) argue that an overarching vision that “incorporate[s] multiple, different images” of the future “may have better chance to escape becoming associated with negative imagery” (p. 730). Multiple alternatives give fewer concrete directions, which in turn give individuals more freedom to choose what strategy is most appropriate.

Table 4-2. Attributes, Values, and Applications of Aesthetic Futures Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>Relationality</td>
<td>Encourage people to participate in shaping futures research design process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic moment</td>
<td>Spontaneity</td>
<td>Make more space for interpretation, intuition, and arguments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dance with chaos</td>
<td>Experimental spirit</td>
<td>Shape new meanings and challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the useful &amp; useless</td>
<td>Indeterminacy</td>
<td>Create an overarching vision that incorporates multiple, different images of the future</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.5. Concluding Remarks

For over three decades, Jim Dator has taught students a “four images” futures method that embodies the philosophy of the Manoa School\(^{76}\) of futures studies. As Jones (1992) observed, a number of Dator’s students learned FIF and have actively engaged in numerous futures research and workshops throughout the world. Bezold (2009) emphasized that FIF has “evolved over time…and had a significant effect on the growth of the Institute for Alternative Futures (IAF) and our development of aspirational futures\(^{77}\)” (p. 123). Inayatullah (2008) specifically uses FIF as a method of creating alternatives in his integrated methodology, Six Pillars. Curry and Schultz (2009) favorably compare FIF with other futures scenario methods.

Appreciating these works on FIF, I attempted to re-conceptualize FIF through the lens of Zhuangzi in order to localize Western futures studies. The frame I offer is the concept of aesthetic futures studies. Its attributes can be summarized as follows: Aesthetic futures studies aims to improve self-efficacy towards the future in envisioning appropriateness that makes relationships significant with the assumption that the future is


indeterminate. So it is important to enjoy chaos by using both the useful and the useless because chaos brings about creativity.

Besides reconfiguring Western futures studies to work better in East Asia, aesthetic futures studies can contribute to expanding an area of futures studies. One can divide the field of futures studies into three areas by considering three perspectives that theorize the future: ontological futures studies, epistemological futures studies, and value-oriented futures studies. Note that these futures studies are not mutually exclusive in reality but compatible with one other.

First, in the history of futures studies, a number of authors pioneered ways to theorize the future by addressing the following issues: how the future can be said to be perceived at present; into what categories one can sort images of the future; and what the various modes of futures thinking are (Amara, 1981; Bell, 1997; de Jouvenal, 1967; Jungk, 1973). De Jouvenal (1967), among others, argues that the future can be analyzed within two fields: a field of liberty and power, and a field of uncertainty. Based on the ontological point of view, the authors explore the future in three categories: possible, probable, and preferable futures (Amara, 1981). Thanks to these authors, the future has been conceptualized in more detailed ways so that humans can more readily imagine, explore, and forecast futures.

Second, another set of authors have attempted to theorize the future from the epistemological point of view by addressing the following issues: what knowledge of the future is, how that knowledge is acquired, and how we can know what we know about the futures (Inayatullah, 1990, 2002; Sardar, 1993; Slaughter, 1993). Inayatullah (2002),
among others, posits that the future is multifaceted, so at least three approaches should be applied to know the future: the empirical, the interpretive, and the critical. These authors emphasize how to interpret and problematize epistemological agreements about the future. In order to elaborate epistemological futures studies, for instance, the authors utilize decolonizing theories, post-structuralism, and existentialism.

Third, other authors have theorized the future using a value-oriented perspective (Masini, 1993; Ogilvy, 1992; Robinson, 1990; Tonn, 2010). These authors suggest a transition from a study of what the future would be or could be into what the future should be. One of the reasons for this transition is that more futurists, especially in the developing countries, are pursuing preferred futures. As a society becomes more complex, the gap between a probable future and a preferred future increases due to the increased variety of views on what constitutes a preferred future. Environmentalists and ecologists also develop value-oriented futures using normative futures research. For them, it is not necessary to forecast the exact future, because the most likely future is not always the most desirable. They do not pursue good predictions. Instead, they do figure out “indications of what alternative futures seem available and what their characteristics are” (Robinson, 1990, p. 821). The value-oriented futurists believe that values can be shaped and supported by stakeholders and citizens.

Aesthetic futures studies can contribute to creating a new area of futures studies, which is to assess the effectiveness of futures studies on an individual level. Aesthetic futures studies assumes that the real world is filled with more chaos and unexpected events than ever, so the future lies in greater uncertainty. In this assumption, a question can be raised—“How is man to live in a world dominated by chaos, suffering, and
absurdity” (Watson, 1996, p. 3)? Aesthetic futures studies changes the question to “How can man perceive and improve a can-do spirit (or self-efficacy) in terms of capability to impact the future in a world dominated by chaos, suffering, and absurdity?” To what degree can foresight activities and futures studies help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future? Can individuals, therefore, effectively influence conditions that would (re)shape their lives in the future? I will attempt to answer these questions in the next chapter.

Aesthetic futures studies reflects not only holism, but also other aesthetic preferences that are salient in East Asia. I plan to develop aesthetic futures studies further to accommodate aesthetic preferences in the future. But when I went to Korea in 2011 in order to assess to what extent foresight activities help improve participants’ ability to influence their future, I selected holism among others to make it into the foresight activities that I provided Koreans with. Aesthetic futures studies, as I define it here, is futures studies that is based on the primacy of vital relationality. In this sense, I believe that even though Koreans have less-developed counterfactual reasoning, Koreans can develop futures studies with their cultural backgrounds.

In order to display how aesthetic futures studies functions, I suggest the following: for improving self-efficacy toward the future, aesthetic futures studies proposes that one has to (1) give the benefit of the doubt to our current visions, (2) invite more people to discuss and revise our visions, (3) continuously study diverse futures, and (4) make our relationships more significant in revising our visions.
CHAPTER 5
A CASE STUDY IN SOUTH KOREA

“The only one who knows is the one who understands that he must always learn again, and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought himself to the point where he continually can learn. This is far harder than possessing information.”

(Martin Heidegger, 2000, p. 23)

5-1. Introduction.

Throughout the previous chapters, I argued that South Korea faces a new situation as Korean society becomes a polycentric one, in which political parties are less influential while associative networks are more influential in shaping public policies. In order to adapt to and prepare for this polycentricity, Koreans should create more room for negotiating and networking with diverse groups in forecasting balanced- and better-informed futures. Not only political leaders and parties, but also laypersons should take part in forecasting alternative futures.

However, as I found, it is not recommendable to transplant foundational futures studies in Korea. As I remarked, foundational futures studies assumes that there are theories and methods that could predict the future, or at least rationally judge which future is more probable or less probable. In chapter three, I discussed how this foundational attitude toward the future often led to using counterfactual reasoning, which
prefers singular causal or token-causal postulations\textsuperscript{78} in forecasting the future. In modern times, Korea imported this type of futures studies from the West and utilized it for developing its economy. However, I learned that this foundational approach to the future turned out to be a one-time project and never developed in Korea. Hence, no Korean universities have offered futures studies as a discipline so far.\textsuperscript{79} Because this foundational approach does not work in Korea for developing futures studies, I attempted to find an alternative approach by reflecting aesthetic preferences in East Asia. This is what I explained in chapters three and four. I refer to this alternative as aesthetic futures studies that reflects the concept of holism in order to understand diverse possibilities of the future.

Moreover, I argue that this holistic futures studies could provide foresight activities that help Koreans improve self-efficacy in terms of their capability to influence the future. Individuals with self-efficacy toward the future could actively engage in exploring and forecasting diverse-alternative futures, and imagining their preferred futures. I further argue that these individuals can foster a political society wherein people challenge the \textit{status quo} for creating and perpetuating a better community life. Korea needs these individuals with self-efficacy, because Korean society is moving toward a polycentric one in which people need to take part in decision- and policy-making through negotiating and networking with others.

\textsuperscript{78} Token causality is often used for the diagnosis of a patient, such as, for example, a person struck by lung cancer after 30 years of smoking.

\textsuperscript{79} The Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology has a plan to set up a graduate school program in futures studies in 2013—a first in Korea. However, this futures studies program reflects a foundational approach to the future, one that assumes that the future can be predicted. Jim Dator, the director at HRCFS (Hawaii Research for Futures Studies), has advised the Institute's faculty not to orient futures studies as foundational or predictable, but as explorable approaches that forecast diverse alternatives. I am currently unsure of whether this suggestion will be accepted.
I also needed to consider how to provide foresight activities in a practical way, so I tailored to my needs the foresight activities that I learned at the Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies. In order to tailor foresight activities to Korea, I carefully let the participants know about the attributes of aesthetic futures studies—for example, impartiality of four alternative futures, value- and relationship-centered visions, and holistic approaches. In this emphasis, I requested that all participants not prioritize any alternative and accept that each alternative had the same possibility of occurring in the future. I intended to provide them with a holistic view about the future.

In addition, I made significant efforts to clarify the meanings of the word “alternative” in every workshop. There are reasons for this. First, the word “alternative,” which is a key concept for futures studies, connotes “exclusive” or “inferior” in Korean contexts. For instance, the Korean translation of the term is 대안 (대안), which is often negatively taken to refer to ideas that split and disrupt public opinion. There is another example used negatively: an “alternative” school in Korea is regarded as a school that marginalized from public schools and exists only for maladjusted students. Hence, if I used the word “alternative” in a futures workshop, I might give the participants the wrong impression—namely, that alternative futures pursue a rupture or discontinuity from the past and present, an understanding that I did not intend to provide. In the field of futures studies that I rely on, alternative futures imagine both continued and discontinued visions based on experiences of the past and present. Alternative futures also pursue participatory and open-ended visions, not exclusive and fixed ones.

Therefore, I needed to re-translate the English word alternative into the Korean 적절 (적절, “appropriateness” in English). This translation reflected one of aesthetic
preferences in East Asia—relation-centered or interconnected. In the same vein, I re-translated “futures studies” into “future generations studies” (미래 세대 학, 未來世代 學) in the Korean language. What I intend by placing “generations” between “future” and “studies” is to let the participants understand that the word “generations” (세대, 世代) aptly embraces a purpose of futures studies: creating reasonable visions through which the present generation can think of itself as one that not only connects the past generations with future generations, but also appropriately realizes dreams both of the past generations and of future generations. I know that a list of scholars formed future generations studies in the 1970s and actively utilized it in the 1990s and 2000s.80 However, in the futures workshops, I did not intend for future generations studies to be a branch of futures studies, but rather another name for futures studies that fit in a Korean context.

My next goal was to invent a scale that could assess self-efficacy toward the future and to what extent the futures workshops equipped with aesthetic sensibilities could help Korean individuals cultivate self-efficacy toward the future.

There is a difference between acquiring futuristic methods and being able to use them efficiently and consistently under various difficult situations. Bandura (1990) aptly points out that success requires “not only skills, but also strong self-belief in one’s capabilities to exercise personal control” (p. 9). In this sense, I assert that successful

80 In future generations studies, future generations are defined as people yet to come who we will never meet, but whose lives we influence by the way we live our lives today. In the early 1970s, scholars began to discuss why and how the present generation takes responsibilities for generations to come, because they worried about nuclear war, nuclear radiation, and nuclear wastes, which are capable of destroying the humanity itself. Green (1980), among other scholars, adopted our duty to posterity in considerations of environmental ethics, ecological sustainability, and energy conservation (e.g., Agius, 1986; Barry, 1978; and, Bell, 1994). In the 2000s, some leading scholars made further attempts to enact laws that incorporate our duty to posterity (Tremmel, 2006).
futures studies relies on not only creating visions, but also improving one’s can-do spirit toward the future. Therefore, futures studies should be concerned with both envisioning futures and empowering individuals to exercise personal adaptation to the future and participation in creating the future. Aesthetic futures studies emphasizes the importance of increasing self-efficacy toward the future and of setting up futuristic society.

Futuristic society consists of individuals with four abilities: (1) an ability to shape a new meaning, (2) an ability to make a decision and put it into action, (3) an ability to challenge the status quo, (4) and an ability to learn something new by cooperating with others. I drew the notion of the self-efficacy scale from the one created by Bahng (2010), who determined five essential abilities for designing a learning society. Based on Bahng’s findings, I tailored Bahng’s scale to the field of futures studies by encompassing attributes of futurists. Bell (2005), among others, dealt with characteristics of futurists (Dator, 2002; Dian, 2009; Inayatullah, 2006; 2009; Moura, 1996; Novaky, 2006; Sardar, 1996; and, Slaughter, 1999). Through classifying the commonalities among the attributes that these authors pointed out, I determined that four abilities were crucial to facilitate a futuristic society in which individuals have high self-efficacy toward the future. In turn, perceiving self-efficacy toward the future can spur an individual to influence conditions that would (re)shape her life in the future. In this sense, the four abilities can construct factors (or dimensions) that could comprise a scale assessing self-efficacy toward the future on an individual level.

5-2. Study One: Scale for Self-efficacy toward the Future

5-2-1. Participants and Procedure
A total of 269 college students were recruited from several universities in Korea. Their participation in the survey was voluntary, and there were no monetary incentives. Study 1 was approved by the Committee on Human Studies at the University of Hawaii (CHS #19186). All participants were assured of confidentiality and their right to withdraw from this research at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. This research was conducted from June to August 2011. The original questionnaire was developed in Korean for Korean participants. The attached English version of the questionnaire (Appendix I) was translated for readers. However, it did not undergo back-translation since this particular study was targeted at Korean participants. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 30 years with a mean of 21.4 years (SD = 1.79). The sample consisted of 67% female participants and 33% male participants.

5-2-2. Measures

Based on the attributes of futurists, I crafted the “Self-efficacy toward the Future Scale,” consists of four subscales: (1) an ability to shape a new meaning, (2) an ability to make a decision and put it into action, (3) an ability to challenge the status quo, and (4) an ability to learn something new by cooperating with others. Each subscale includes five items that are correlated and support the designated ability. For example, “the ability to shape new meanings” consists of the following five items: “I am always curious about what happens in the world,” “I am good at creating unique methods for whatever I do,” “I am better than others at finding something new,” “I question and analyze what others take for granted,” and “When I encounter a problem, I take it as an opportunity.” The full explanations for each subscale are provided in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1. Questionnaire: Items Assessing Self-efficacy toward the Future

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to shape new meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am always curious about what happens in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I am good at creating unique methods for whatever I do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I am better than others at finding something new.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I question and analyze what others take for granted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. When I have a problem, I take it as an opportunity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to make a decision and put it into action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6. I can apply what I learned in class to reality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I am good at identifying problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. I take part in improving society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I organize the learning process myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. I am honest about my weak points.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to challenge the status quo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. I make an effort to leave a familiar life and live in a new way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. I have opportunities for self-reflection about who I am.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. I am interested in the problems of my community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. When I become enlightened, I put new knowledge into practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. I develop critical thinking by learning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability to learn something new by cooperating with others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16. I become aware of new concepts and knowledge by learning together with other people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. I come to develop my knowledge by learning together with other people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
18. I care about and help others by learning together with other people.

19. I find and make something new from others.

20. I learn more when I have a meeting with others.

5-2-3. Statistical Analysis

The scale included 20 items in total, tapping into the four different domains of ability, which are associated with self-efficacy toward the future. Responses to the items were measured on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). A greater value represents a higher level of ability that futurists are supposed to have and utilize. Each subscale of the Self-efficacy toward the Future Scale was calculated using the mean of items. Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations, are shown in Table 5-2. Each subscale yielded medium to high reliability, and the alpha reliabilities ranged from .76 to .90 in the sample (See Table 5-2).

Table 5-2. Reliability, Means, and Standard Deviations of Subscales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>α</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1 Ability to shape new meanings</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2 Ability to make a decision and put it into action</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3 Ability to challenge the status quo</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4 Ability to learn something new by cooperating with others.</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To determine how well the scale measures the concept of self-efficacy toward the future, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed using AMOS 19.0.
As shown in Table 5-3, the outcome of the CFA of each subscale indicated that the measurement model has an acceptable fit except for the chi-square test. The chi-square test, by itself, is not necessarily an indicator of a poor fit (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). A non-significant goodness-of-fit $\chi^2$ value is desired, but this may be unlikely with large samples (Kline, 1998). To overcome this weakness, many researchers use an alternative fit index, such as CFI or IFI, which is not influenced by sample size. In this sense, the measurement model was accepted because other indices had good values.

Table 5-3. The outcome of Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the Self-efficacy toward the Future Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>Model fit index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1  Ability to shape new meanings</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (5) = 26.22, p &lt; .001, CFI = .95, IFI = .95$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2  Ability to make a decision and put it into action</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (5) = 10.35, p &lt; .07, CFI = .98, IFI = .98$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3  Ability to challenge the <em>status quo</em></td>
<td>$\chi^2 (5) = 10.82, p &lt; .06, CFI = .98, IFI = .98$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4  Ability to learn something new by cooperating with others.</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (5) = 42.87, p &lt; .001, CFI = .96, IFI = .96$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: CFI = Comparative fit index; IFI = incremental fit index

5-3. Study Two: the Control Group v. the Treated Group

5-3-1. Participants and Recruitment

A total of 371 college students were recruited from several universities in Korea. Their participation in the survey was voluntary, and there were no monetary incentives. Study 2 was approved by the Committee on Human Studies at University of Hawaii (CHS #19186). This research was conducted from June to August 2011. The
original questionnaire was developed in Korean for Korean participants. The attached English version of the questionnaire (Appendix I) was translated for readers. However, it did not undergo back-translation since this particular study was targeted at Korean participants. Participants were between the ages of 18 and 30 years with a mean of 21.7 years (SD = 1.89). The sample consisted of 69% female participants and 31% male participants.

5-3-2. Measures and Procedures

Study 2 was to assess whether a treated group with four futures scenarios increases self-efficacy toward the future more than a control group with only one future scenario. This was hypothesis one, which was based on the idea that a business-as-usual future dominates in Korea and that to create alternatives, plural visions of the future should be exposed to Koreans.

The treated group (N = 103; ages: 18 – 26; a mean: 22.5 years; SD = 1.95; 74% female, 26% male) was given four scenarios of the future of Korea in 2040, which were titled as follows: (1) Korea: Uncharted Waters towards the Great Seven, (2) New Beginning with Uncontracted Capacities, (3) Conserver Society for Survival, and (4) AI (artificial intelligence) Society: Emergence of the Space-like (for the full version of the four scenarios, see Appendix II). In contrast, the control group (N = 269; ages: 18 – 30; a mean: 21.4 years; SD = 1.79; 67% female, 33% male) was given a business-as-usual scenario: “Korea: Uncharted Waters towards the Great Seven.” Each scenario was made of, more or less, 100 words in the Korean language. Table 5-4 presents a simplified
overview of the distinguishing features of each driving force for the four scenarios of the future. Table 5-5 presents future scenarios of Korea 2040 in a short-narrative version.

Table 5-4: Seven Driving Forces and their Applications on the Four Scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Driving Forces</th>
<th>Four types of futures scenarios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>Sufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>Dominant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Conquered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Dynamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Accelerating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Corporate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-5. Scenarios of Korea 2040 in a Short-Narrative Version

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four futures</th>
<th>Scenarios of Korea 2040</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue</td>
<td>It has been a really spectacular journey for Koreans to become one of the Great Seven (G7) countries that are most economically powerful in the world, since North and South Korea were reunited in 2025. In 2021, the new regime of North Korea attempted to work closely with South Korea in order to overcome economic collapse and finally agreed to unite the two Koreas as one nation and two states for a while. Through this unification, Korea could pursue further economic growth without worrying about a decreasing population. The current Korean population is 81 million people in 2040, and two out of ten are foreigners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse</td>
<td>After the crisis of the world economy occurred in 2015, lots of people (33% of the total population) moved from urban cities to rural areas for farming and fishing. The Korean economy was stagnant, and unemployment was climbing for decades. It is mainly because the Korean economy was based on cheap oil. However, the economic crisis turned into a basis for a new beginning. Some Koreans declared, “If the state can’t save us, we need license to print our own money”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and suggested local currencies that are a basically mutual credit system: for example, people provide their labors for buying goods instead of spending money, and share jobs with the unemployed. Since the late 2030s, Koreans have used Gross National Happiness (GNH) to measure the progress of society towards amusement, fun, and spiritual well-being.

| Discipline | The collapse of the global capitalist system and the ecological crisis of the early 21st century led to mass starvation and huge migrations around the world. Then, a new global political governance system called the G-15 emerged in 2021. It includes the 15 most important nations in the world working together to solve transnational energy, environmental, and food problems. In 2025, the G-15 tightly regulated the global financial system. All citizens were issued a “Resource Access Card” and all corporations had to add an ecological debt to their balance sheets. In order to adapt to new situations, Koreans created the Conserver Society, in which people disciplined themselves to exhibit “growth without waste” and “expansion through efficiency.” |
| Transform | In accordance with Ray Kurzweil’s forecast, Koreans in 2040 observe the convergence of robotics, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, new materials, nanotechnology, space exploration, and other related high technologies. Korean society is being dramatically transformed into a post-human society where humans and AI (artificial intelligence) merge into post-humans. There is no clear line between human-beings and AI. The post-human is a new species that can live much longer and much smarter than human beings. Additionally, the post-humans begin space exploration and colonization. Eventually the new species evolves from “human-kind” to “space-kind” that separates humans from post-humans. |

The students were asked to read the scenario(s) of the future carefully and answer the questions on the survey sheet. The treated group, especially, was told that the possibility of each scenario was the same. I emphasized it in order for them not to have any favored scenario or priority among the scenarios. Through this emphasis, I attempted to embrace aesthetic sensibility, which is holistic, in the process of the survey. In order to assess the degree of change occurring as a result of the workshop, I used pre-test and
post-test non-equivalent control group design. One group (the treatment group) is measured twice, once before treatment and once after treatment. The other group (the controlled group) is measured at the same two times, but does not receive treatment. Paired samples t-test comparing the means of the pre- and post-test was conducted to assess whether participants’ responses were statistically different over time. In addition, independent samples t-test comparing the means of the treated group and the controlled group was conducted to assess whether participants’ responses were statistically different between the two groups.

5-3-3. Statistical Analysis and Results

Table 5-6 presents both the control group’s and the treated group’s self-efficacy toward the future prior to and immediately following the interventions. In both groups, significant improvements were found for S1 (ability to shape new meanings, \( p<.0001 \)), S2 (ability to make a decision and put it into action, \( p<.0001 \)), S3 (ability to challenge the status quo, \( p<.0001 \)), and S4 (ability to learn something new by cooperating with others, \( p<.0001 \)). Based on this result, I concluded that individuals who are exposed to any kinds of future scenario itself, in general, tend to develop their self-efficacy toward the future more than those who are not.

Table 5-6. Two-group comparisons using Paired Samples t-Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition (subscale)</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pre-test</th>
<th>Post-test</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

81 The pre-test/post-test design is widely used in academic research to compare participant groups and measure the degree of change occurring as a result of treatments or interventions (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). One example can be found in the field of education, when researchers want to examine the effectiveness of a new teaching method upon groups of students.
The controlled group (N=269)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>The Control Group</th>
<th>The Treated Group</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>3.2733</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>3.7590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>3.2096</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>3.7258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>3.2354</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>3.7886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>3.5635</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>3.9243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The treated group (N=103)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>The Control Group</th>
<th>The Treated Group</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>3.2816</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>3.8388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>3.3694</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>3.7806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>3.3347</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>3.9245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>3.7015</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>4.0469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, Table 5-7 shows that the difference between means of the controlled and the treated group is not statistically significant. Thus, the hypothesis one was not supported.

Table 5-7. Two-group Comparisons using Independent Samples t-Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (subscale)</th>
<th>The Controlled Group</th>
<th>The Treated Group</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>.4856</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.5571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>.5163</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.4112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>.5532</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.5898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>.3609</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.3454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-4. Study Three: Futures Workshop

5-4-1. Participants and Recruitment
A total of 88 volunteers (42 male and 40 female; six people did not provide their sex) participated in the futures workshops. I partitioned participants into broad age groups: 1 person (ages 18-19), 24 persons (20-29), 25 persons (30-39), 26 persons (40-49), 7 persons (50-59), and 1 person (60 and above). Participants were recruited from three cities in South Korea—Seoul, Puchon, and Kwangjoo. I contacted some NGOs and asked if their members were interested in participating in a futures workshop. If they said “yes,” I placed recruitment flyers on their websites in order to recruit participants. Their participation in the futures workshops was voluntary, and there were no monetary incentives. Study 3 was also approved by the Committee on Human Studies at University of Hawaii (CHS #19186). All participants were assured of confidentiality and their right to withdraw from this research at any time without penalty or loss of benefits. The workshops were conducted from July to August 2011. Seoul is the capital city of South Korea, and its population is about 10 million (the whole population of South Korea is about 50 million). Kwangjoo is a medium-sized city in the southern part of Korea, and its population is about 2 million. Puchon is located in the suburban area of Seoul. It is one of the fastest-growing cities in Korea in terms of population, which is about 0.8 million. I conducted the futures workshops not only in the metropolitan city, but also in the medium-sized city and the suburban area to recruit diverse populations.

5-4-2. Measures and procedures

I administered a three-hour futures workshop and observed to what degree futures workshops encompassing aesthetic futures studies would help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future. In comparison to the previous research, which recruited only college students (Study 1 and 2), Study 3 recruited Korean adults. I
provided Korean adults with a futures workshop utilizing futures-visioning processes and hands-on activities. Hypothesis two was that individuals would increase their self-efficacy toward the future after participating in the futures workshop.

Participants followed the futures-visioning process (see Figure 5-1; full explanations of the process are in Appendix III). They progressed from the first step (appreciating the past) to the fifth one (envisioning the future) for three hours. Regarding the procedure of the workshop, Table 5-8 illustrates what content the futures workshop covered. In general, participants learned history and the essentials of futures studies, explored alternative scenarios for Korea 2040, and discussed possibilities and the desirability of the alternative futures. At every workshop, I provided paper-and-pencil surveys before and after the workshop to measure the degree of change occurring as a result of the workshop. With regard to the statistical analysis, a paired sample T-test was conducted to assess whether the means of the pre- and post-test were statistically different from each other.

Figure 5-1. The futures-visioning process
Table 5-8. The Futures Workshop Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Contents covered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First 10 minutes</td>
<td>Build rapport with participants</td>
<td>The pre-test and introduction: the purpose and process of the futures workshop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 minutes</td>
<td>Enhance knowledge of futures studies</td>
<td>State history and the essentials of futures studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-minute break</td>
<td>Encourage participants to understand the lecture by themselves</td>
<td>Futures studies can help create alternative futures, which are possible, probable, and preferable. The field offers its own methods and theories necessary to forecast diverse futures. There are four images of the future: Continue, Collapse, Discipline, and Transform. Each future has a different assumption, but its possibility to occur in the future is the same with that of others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 minutes</td>
<td>Conduct a futures-visioning process from the first step to the third step</td>
<td>Divide the participants into four groups and let them answer the following questions: Note that X could be an organization or a community that the participants wanted to envision for. 1. Appreciating the past: When, why, and by whom was X first established? What, when, and why were the major challenges X faced over its history? What were the consequences of those challenges? How did the following influence its development? (Natural environment and resources, leaders, internal groups and culture, external</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

82 The questions that I used come from this article: Hawaii Research Center for Futures Studies, Envisioning a Sustainable Hawaii 2050: A handbook for workshop facilitators.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 minutes</td>
<td>Conduct the fourth step: experiencing alternative futures</td>
<td>groups and culture, and technology at the time of establishment vs. new technologies over the time).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 minutes</td>
<td>Debrief by each representative of each group</td>
<td>2. Understanding the present: What are the major good things about X now? What are the major problems you face now? What are their cause(s)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Exploring the futures: What are the major trends in the following areas? (Population, environment, natural resources, economics, culture, governance, and technology) What are the major emerging issues that could stop the major trends?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hand out copies of one future to each participant so each one initially only knows about the future they will experience. Note that I did not let them know whether their scenario is Continue or Collapse or Discipline or Transform. Ask them to read it and answer the following questions: What will lifestyles, values, and purposes of the future people in your scenario be like? How do the future people solve the problems that the current generation faces? What are the new problems that the future people see? What will X be like in your future scenario?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>One representative from each of the four futures reports back to the entire group their answers to the questions. Before this activity, the facilitator reads aloud the relevant alternative future so everyone in the audience learns what the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 minutes</td>
<td>Reinforcement of importance of forecasting alternative futures</td>
<td>Encourage participants to develop a holistic approach with four images of the future in forecasting futures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike the survey research, I intentionally did not use the comparison group design in the workshops. First of all, it was not practically possible to administer two types of the futures workshop in control of research environments including time and place. Second, it would be unethical to provide a fake futures workshop that offers only one future scenario for participants in a controlled group. In recruitment flyers, I announced that I would provide a futures workshop. When participants applied to join in a futures workshop, they were supposed to experience a “real” futures workshop. Ignoring participants’ expectations about futures workshop would be inappropriate in the context of Korea.

Last but not least, I assumed that I did not need to have a controlled group. The participants who were not yet exposed to futures workshops could be regarded as a controlled group because they were raised in a society that pursued only one future. I problematized Korea’s tendency to pursue only continued economic growth. I wanted to challenge Koreans to create alternatives by letting them participate in the futures workshop. The scenario of continued economic growth is the “official” view of the future of all modern governments, educational systems, and organizations (Dator, 2009a, p. 8).
South Korea has also pursued the future of continued economic growth to the point of chasing extreme economic growth, which negatively impacts Korean society (Choi, 2005; D. Kim, 2000; Schmid, 2002; Whang, 1971). In this sense, I requested that Koreans create plural alternatives to the future of continued economic growth by participating in futures workshops. For these reasons, I used the time-series design, in which a series of observations was made over time.

5-4-3. Statistical Analysis

Table 5-9 presents reliability, means, and standard deviations of variables performed with participants at the futures workshops.

Table 5-9. Reliability of Variables in the Futures Workshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Reliability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to shape new meanings</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to challenge the <em>status quo</em></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Six people did not answer the questionnaire*

Table 5-10 presents participants’ self-efficacy toward the future prior to and immediately following the intervention. Significant improvements were found for S1 (ability to shape new meanings, p<.004), S2 (ability to make a decision and put it into action, p<.020), and S3 (ability to challenge the status quo, p<.004). However, even though an increase was found for S4 (ability to learn something new by cooperating with
others), the increase was not statistically significant (p<.181). Given this result, hypothesis two was partially supported.

Table 5-10. Pre- and Post-test Comparisons using Paired Samples t-Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pre-test</th>
<th>Post-test</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>3.5433</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>3.7610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>3.5431</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>3.7006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>3.4933</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>3.7171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>3.8811</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>3.9726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-4-4. The Open-ended Question and Responses

In order to collect subjective responses from participants on how the futures workshops would be effective on an individual level, I asked an open question in post-tests: How do you think that the futures workshop affects you in terms of preparing for your future? Each participant was allowed to write his or her answers to this question.

Most of them said that they had not deeply and seriously thought about the future before the futures workshop that they participated in because they regarded the future as inaccessible. However, after the workshop, they opened their eyes to new possibilities and desirabilities of the alternative futures. Some of them wrote that they felt a strong responsibility for future generations after they had gained the confidence to create futures. Many participants became aware that they needed more diverse future-visions, which were supported by diverse values. Participants also agreed that they had to forecast plural futures rather than predict one future. They expressed that the futures workshop
encouraged them to imagine their preferable futures and to work with others to make the future better. Some of them learned how to conduct a futures-visioning process.

In contrast, some participants pointed out that the workshop time was not enough to discuss the future. Others expressed that alternative futures were not practical and realistic. One participant opined that it was not useful to have diverse futures. Table 5-11 presents how the participants responded to the open question:

**Table 5-11. Responses to the Open Question**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>% of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The plural visions are helpful to understand diverse façades of the future.</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-oriented visions are worth exploring.</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A futures-visioning process is beneficial for forecasting the future.</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The workshop enriches my understanding of futures studies.</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The workshop is helpful for understanding diverse façades of the present.</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The workshop encourages me to consider the well-being of future generations.</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The workshop is helpful for identifying my life goals.</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The workshop encourages me to have confidence toward the future.</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5-4-5. Votes for Probability and Desirability among Four Scenarios

Table 5-12 presents what futures were preferable and probable to participants. I asked all participants about which future scenario *should* and *could* come true in the future. Regarding preferable futures, in Seoul and Puchon, a majority of participants preferred the future of a disciplined society, in which people would be aware of the limits
to growth and have to conserve resources. The second majority of the participants in Seoul and Puchon selected the future of a transformational society as their desirable future. In the scenario, Korean society would be dramatically transformed into a post-human society, where humans and AI (artificial intelligence) merge into post-humans. By comparison, only 18 participants out of 88 preferred the future of economically continued growth. That is, 20.4% of the participants at the workshops pursued this future.

Regarding the probable future, a majority of participants in Seoul I, Kwangjoo I and II, and Puchon expected that the disciplined vision could come true in the future. The second majority of Seoul I, Kwangjoo I, and Puchon also expected that the collapse vision could come true in the future. Only a majority in Seoul II expected that economic growth could occur. These expectations reflected how Koreans looked at the future, which was not close to economic growth.

Table 5-12. Probable and Preferable Futures of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seoul I (N=28)</th>
<th>Seoul II (N=13)</th>
<th>Seoul III (N=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>Preferable</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>Preferable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline (41%)</td>
<td><em>Continue</em> (39%)</td>
<td><em>Continue</em> (58%)</td>
<td><em>Continue</em> (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse (38%)</td>
<td>Transform (29%)</td>
<td>Discipline (17%)</td>
<td><em>Collapse</em> (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform (17%)</td>
<td>Discipline (25%)</td>
<td>Transform (17%)</td>
<td>Transform (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue (4%)</td>
<td><em>Collapse</em> (7%)</td>
<td>Collapse (8%)</td>
<td>Discipline (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kwangjoo I (N=8)   Kwangjoo II (N=7)   Puchon (N=19)
** Table 5.2: 3-Dimensional Diagrams of Probable and Preferable Futures of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probable</th>
<th>Preferable</th>
<th>Probable</th>
<th>Preferable</th>
<th>Probable</th>
<th>Preferable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discipline</strong> (50%)</td>
<td><strong>Discipline</strong> (66%)</td>
<td><strong>Discipline</strong> (57%)</td>
<td><strong>Collapse</strong> (57%)</td>
<td><strong>Discipline</strong> (58%)</td>
<td><strong>Discipline</strong> (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse (33%)</td>
<td>Continue (17%)</td>
<td>Transform (29%)</td>
<td>Transform (29%)</td>
<td>Collapse (24%)</td>
<td>Transform (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue (17%)</td>
<td>Collapse (17%)</td>
<td>Collapse (14%)</td>
<td>Discipline (14%)</td>
<td>Transform (18%)</td>
<td>Collapse (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transform (0%)</td>
<td>Transform (0%)</td>
<td>Continue (0%)</td>
<td>Continue (0%)</td>
<td>Continue (0%)</td>
<td>Continue (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % shows how many citizens chose the designated future.

** The workshop of Seoul II was held in a medium-sized university, and most of the participants were undergraduate students.

Figure 5-2. 3-Dimensional Diagrams of Probable and Preferable Futures of Participants
5-5. Discussion

This chapter attempted to assess to what extent foresight activities could help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future. In order to do this, this chapter assessed a measurement model by applying a modified scale (originally from the field of education) to future studies. The Self-efficacy toward the Future Scale was assessed by confirmatory factor analysis because the four factors of the scale were constructed based on theoretical frameworks. Through developing this scale, this chapter could identify four abilities that were associated with self-efficacy toward the future. Thus, it can be argued that individuals with self-efficacy toward the future can have the ability to shape new meanings, the ability to make a decision and put it into action, the ability to challenge the status quo, and the ability to learn something new in cooperation with others. These abilities are crucial elements to prepare for, adapt to, and evolve with social changes. Again, a success of futures studies heavily relies on how efficiently to foster self-efficacy toward the future.
This chapter also assessed whether the treated group with four futures scenarios increased self-efficacy toward the future more than the controlled group with only one future scenario. This assessment aimed at testing hypothesis one, which assumed that diverse futures could be more helpful to improve self-efficacy toward the future than a single future could be. For this purpose, independent samples t-Test was performed. As a result, hypothesis one was not statistically supported. There was no significant difference regarding individuals’ self-efficacy toward the future between the treated and the controlled group. One of the reasons for this might have to do with short narratives that were given to participants. Priming participants with short-narrative scenarios was not enough to stimulate or change their attitude toward the future. In addition, two groups may not be comparable due to the nonequivalent sample size. The sample size of the controlled group was 269 while the sample size of the treated group was 103.

However, this chapter found that both groups increased self-efficacy toward the future through reading future scenario(s). The differences between pre- and post-tests were statistically significant. Thus, it can be argued that foresight activities are meaningful and useful for raising individuals’ can-do spirit toward the future. Even though the difference between the treated and the controlled group was not statistically significant, it is worth recognizing which group was more helpful for fostering abilities that were associated with self-efficacy toward the future: the treated group increased more in two abilities—“ability to shape new meanings” and “ability to challenge the status quo”; the control group increased more in two other abilities—“ability to make a decision and put it into action” and “ability to learn something new by cooperating with others.”
With regard to assessing the effectiveness of futures workshops, hypothesis two, which assumed that futures workshops could help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future, was partially supported using paired sample t-Test. All abilities, with the exception of the fourth one (ability to learn something new in cooperation with others), were increased by the futures workshops. One reason for this is that Koreans tend to internalize the value of cooperation with others in their daily lives, as evidenced by Koreans’ historical background. For example, Confucian ethics influenced Koreans to accept collectivistic values, such as harmony, relationship, and cooperation (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Park, Rehg, & Lee, 2005). Even though this tendency with Koreans cannot be generalized in a current postmodern society, which can be characterized as hybridization and fragmentation (Han & McPherson, 2009), the group-based values are still influential in Korean society. Thus, it can be argued that participants in the futures workshops were less interested in developing the value of cooperation with their community members.

Given the comments of participants in response to the open question, I had confidence that futures workshops were effective in encouraging individuals to change their attitudes toward the future and to cultivate capabilities of creating alternative visions (See Appendix IV for examples of how the participants expressed their opinions on the futures workshops). Moreover, I found that a holistic approach to the future was meaningful and useful for Koreans to explore diverse futures, imagine plural alternatives, and create room for understanding others’ thoughts and ideas about probable and preferable futures. In this sense, aesthetic futures studies could be elaborated more in the service of enriching East Asians’ perspectives on the future.
One of the interesting findings is that participants wanted to pursue alternatives to an economic-growth future. This was astonishing when compared to what Koreans pursued in the past. Since Korea began to be modernized from the late 19th century, Korea always has aimed to catch up with economically advanced countries. The political catchphrases of munmyong kaehwa (in late 19th century), development (1960s-70s), and the advanced country (1980s to the present) are based on the idea that Korea should pursue economic growth. However, the results of the futures workshops presented that current Koreans aimed at different goals. This is how futures workshops can contribute to revealing current desires of Koreans.

In conclusion, a study on self-efficacy toward the future could be useful for assessing the effectiveness of foresight activities. It can be further developed to assess to what extent which foresight activity could be more helpful to individuals for improving can-do attitudes toward the future, under certain conditions and in certain cultural contexts. This could be my future research. Next, in the final chapter, I will discuss implications of this Korean case study in terms of how to develop connections between futures studies and policy and democracy.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS NEXT?

“Without forecasting, there is effectively no freedom of decision.”

(Bertrand de Jouvenel, 1967, p. 276)

6-1. Dynamic v. Stable

In a nutshell, this research project assessed to what degree futures studies could help individuals increase self-efficacy toward the future. Through this assessment, I evaluated the effectiveness of futures studies on an individual level.

This research is very important in three ways: first, the future is becoming more unpredictable and dynamic. Thus, futures studies should highlight how to develop individuals’ can-do attitude toward dynamic and uncertain futures. Van der Duin and den Hartigh (2007) aptly point out that if the future is “fickle and changing,” it “requires not adaptation, but rather adaptability” (p. 153, emphasis in original). Linstone (2004) also emphasizes that “unprecedented management adaptability becomes crucial” (p. 195). Of course, in many ways, people suppose that the future will be stable and predictable. Under this assumption, the role of futures studies should be to focus on how to raise the accuracy of predictions. For decision-makers, it is imperative to control and manage the future, so futures studies should provide them with rational tools to know “tomorrow.” I do not depreciate the effort to make predictions more accurate. Instead, I argue that it is also crucial—more significant if the future seems chaotic—to elaborate on how futures
studies helps persons improve their capacities for coping with the uncertainties of the future.

Second, any study on the “effectiveness” of social science needs an indigenous perspective. Every culture is unique in terms of people, history, customs, social systems, resources, and environments. Even though futures studies is an academic discipline and has advanced theories and methods, it should not be generalized in application, because there is uniqueness to each culture. In this sense, it is required to tailor futures studies to a certain area in order to evaluate the effectiveness as properly as a researcher could. Through modifying futures methods and theories, my research project attempted to form an indigenous futures studies, which I believe can be a more effective tool for identifying a policy agenda in South Korea.

And third, this research on self-efficacy toward the future can contribute to studies on political efficacy in South Korea. As I mentioned, Koreans face a continued decrease in voter turnout. This phenomenon implies that a representative democracy is going downhill. It also indicates Koreans’ low level of political efficacy. Koreans do not feel that they influence the government, Congress, and society. Koreans should consider this message: “A vote-less people is a hopeless people.”

On the contrary, more Koreans are involved in unconventional political participation, such as demonstrations and riots, which are increasingly being used to push people’s demands forward. I argue that the rise of polycentric society could exacerbate this trend when political parties are less influential in shaping policy and making political

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decisions. In this situation, I suggest that Korea should adapt to polycentricity wherein multiple centers exist. Such a society requires negotiating tables, which are facilitated by individuals who have high political efficacy. Thus, it is right time to investigate how to raise Koreans’ political efficacy. I propose that increasing self-efficacy through foresight activities can lead to an increase in political efficacy.

6-2. Assessing the Effectiveness of Foresight Activities

In the field of futures studies, there are few articles that deal with the assessment of efficacy of futures workshops. Why have futurists paid little attention to the assessment of the efficacy of futures workshops? One of the reasons for this has to do with customers’ avoidance of the assessment. Customers like to initiate discussions about a certain future that they want to articulate, but they do not want individuals to evaluate futures activities provided by the customers. They fear that they may have trouble if the result of the assessment is opposite of what is intended.

However, it is very important for futurists to develop the assessment skills to evaluate the efficacy of foresight activities such as futures workshops in order to develop futures studies. Figure 6-1 shows why it is important to develop the assessment skills.

84 Jim Dator. (2010). Personal email communication. Years ago, Dator asked the Hawaii Judiciary to assess the effectiveness of the futures activities that Dator provided for the Judiciary; the Judiciary turned down Dator’s suggestion.
Figure 6-1 presents how a public policy progresses. At screening stage, researchers should find people’s needs for a better public policy. At the scoping stage, researchers should consider which methods, analysis, and workplans are needed to meet the people’s needs. At the assessment stage, researchers should provide appropriate treatments and assess whether the treatments are effective or not. At the reporting stage, researchers should report what they found to government, NGOs (Non-government Organizations), or a group of people. Finally, at the monitoring stage, researchers should track how the newly suggested methods and treatments will be formed into a new policy or a decision-making process. In this sense, if futurists miss the third stage, that of assessment, they cannot go further and their projects will be useless or turn out to be a one-time project.

6-3. Political Efficacy

Chapter five explained how to develop a scale that assessed self-efficacy toward the future. Perceived self-efficacy toward the future is similar to the concept of futures consciousness. According to Johan Galtung, future consciousness is being conscious of
what is possible, probable, and desirable in the future (Lombardo, 2007). Thus, one with perceived self-efficacy toward the future can have the confidence to forecast possible and probable futures and to imagine preferred futures. In this sense, I argue that the scale is to assess each individual’s can-do spirit toward the future, and foresight activities are treatments that cultivate individuals’ self-efficacy toward the future. In addition, I propose that the created or increased self-efficacy toward the future enable individuals to create or increase their political efficacy. Hence, what I ultimately aim at through providing foresight activities is to help Koreans increase their political efficacy.

Beaumont (2011), among others, asserts that political efficacy is a capacity for influencing actual policies by political participation (Finkel, 2003; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Lee, 2006; Parkinson, 2007; Pasek et al., 2008; Tewksbury et al., 2008). Beaumont (2011) found that socio-political learning was effective in raising political efficacy. For example, acquiring skills for political action was associated with increased perceptions of political capacities, such as political competence and confidence. Besides these skills, Beaumont (2011) proposed that experiences in a politically active community, engagement in political discourse, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts were helpful to improve political efficacy.

In the area of media and communication, Lee (2006), Tewksbury et al. (2008), and Kenski and Stroud (2006) wrote that uses of media influenced political efficacy. Lee (2006) asserted that there were internal and external political efficacies: the internal one was associated with age, political membership, newspaper reading, exposure to online

Moreover, Oystein Sande (1972) presented six dimensions of future consciousness: length, level of interest, influence, optimism, expectations, and values. For example, influence, one of the dimensions, shows how individuals feel that they can influence future events. Expectations can be the contents of future consciousness.
news site, and use of the Internet to send political messages; the external one was associated with successful experience of political actions. Lee (2006) found that political efficacy could be reinforced or weakened by media use. For example, interactive democracy such as real-time chat or emails was effective in increasing both political efficacies. In contrast, visiting public websites weakened political efficacy, because individuals were disappointed by the lack of practical information. Tewksbury et al. (2008) found that news browsing was positively associated with internal political efficacy, and browsers of news believed themselves to be as socially and politically efficacious because they knew something about a wide variety of news. Kenski and Stroud (2006) defined political efficacy as feelings of competency and beliefs that one’s actions are consequential. They argued that the use of the Internet was not positively significant to political efficacy while preference for political parties was significant.

Finkel (2003) and Pasek et al. (2008) related civic education with political efficacy. Finkel (2003) wrote that exposure to participatory methods such as role playing, simulation, or mock elections are associated with increased political efficacy. Pasek et al. (2008) posited that student voices programs encouraged students to raise “political efficacy by combining elements of service learning (engagement with community problems) with a focus on the political system as a problem solving institution” (p. 28). They found that even though the younger generation is disengaged with voting, civic education has an effect on internal political efficacy, which is a belief about one’s own competence to understand and participate in political life. Moreover, Parkinson (2007) asserted that increased political efficacy relied on having regular institutionalization of processes like citizens’ juries. Parkinson (2007) argued that “deepening democracy is by
the proliferation of better mini-publics, the extensive use of small-scale deliberative processes” (p. 23).

Finkel (2003) and Parkinson (2007) can provide reasonable explanations for how futures workshops could be positively effective on political efficacy. As Parkinson (2007) found, individuals can gain political efficacy “from seeing others like them being taken seriously in public decision making” (p. 26). Futures workshops provide participants with exercises of alternative policy and opportunities to forecast consequences of the policy. Finkel (2003) aptly argued that democracy could be taught by training programs, which encourage participants to develop democratic traits such as trust, political tolerance, and senses of one’s own efficacy as a citizen. Futures workshops create a room for expanding one’s ideas and for negotiating with people whom they may disagree with. It can be argued that futures workshops can consolidate democracy in Korea through practices of futures studies.

6-4. Future Research

The field work that I performed in Korea demonstrates significant findings. The most striking one is that both the plural visions and the single vision helped participants improve self-efficacy toward the future. Why is this finding remarkable? It has been long debated which term is more useful and logical in the field of futures studies: the plural futures or the singular future. The majority of futurists prefer “futures” to “future” because they believe that humans cannot predict the future but can forecast plural futures. This belief has been granted as logical and useful for several decades. However, my research presents that both of them turned out to be helpful in raising individuals’ can-do
spirit toward the future. Whether with the plural form or the singular, futures studies itself is consequential in improving abilities to shape new meanings, make a decision and put it into action, challenge the status quo, and learn something new by cooperating with others. It is important to note that in neither case was I seeking to predict the future but instead offering people a possible future—it was just numbers of possible futures that differed.

However, it is worth exploring and creating diverse visions in Korean contexts. This effectiveness of the plural visions was salient in the futures workshops. The majority (42%) of the participants of the workshops expressed in an open question that it was necessary to explore the diverse alternative visions for creating a preferred future. They became aware that futures studies was not to predict the future but to forecast alternatives to a business-as-usual future. In this sense, four images of the future are a starting point for Koreans to forecast diverse futures. The variety of the futures emerges from four images of the future.

One of the productive findings is that participants of the workshops appreciated the holistic approach that I emphasized at every workshop. In the holistic approach, participants were not allowed to prioritize any future vision over others. They realized that each vision was unique and would be an alternative to other visions. A successful futurist keeps watching which future is neglected by people and stresses that the neglected future could come true soon.

However, it is not easy to say “no” when everyone says “yes” in order to make a balanced vision. For example, the Queen of England visited the London School of Economics in 2008 and asked, “Why had nobody noticed that the credit crunch was on its
way?” (British Academy Forum, 2009). Of course, there were people and organizations who warned about the financial crisis in advance, but the warning was ignored. What if there were a system that continuously produced diverse assumptions about the future without any prejudice? What if a branch of the government aimed to act as a watchdog and to give people alternatives to dominant visions? In chapter four, I argue that a bird’s-eye view can offer a way of not missing any significant issues and events that will affect society in the future. I believe that futures workshops can convey more balanced views on the future so people can better prepare for the future. The impartiality of balanced views could create room for negotiating and reflecting diverse values. This is what aesthetic futures studies seeks to envision.

Aesthetic futures studies is worth addressing to diverse façades of the future and detecting emerging issues but needs to be connected with policy. Outcomes that aesthetic futures studies produces should be meaningful and useful for policy makers. Through this research project, I found an interesting connection between foresight activities and policy. As I mentioned in chapter five, I asked participants of the workshops to vote for which vision was preferred and feasible. The result of their votes was astonishing and unexpected. The majority (42%) of the participants (N=69) imagined that the disciplined future would be most probable in 30 years. In the disciplined future, economic growth would be suspended by energy depletion, environmental disasters, and a crisis of capitalism. The following is the short-version scenario of the disciplined future as I already described in chapter five:

The collapse of the global capitalist system and the ecological crisis of the early 21st century led to mass starvation and huge migrations around the world. Then, a
new global political governance system called the G-15 emerged in 2021. It includes the 15 most important nations in the world working together to solve transnational energy, environmental, and food problems. In 2025, the G-15 tightly regulated the global financial system. All citizens were issued a “Resource Access Card” and all corporations had to add an ecological debt to their balance sheets. In order to adapt to new situations, Koreans created the Conserver Society, in which people discipline themselves to exhibit “growth without waste” and “expansion through efficiency.”

Interestingly, the majority (38%) of the participants (N=82) expressed that the disciplined one would be preferred. The disciplined future mentioned that Koreans would facilitate the emergence of a conserver society, in which people do more with fewer resources and collaborate with people from North Korea in order to survive the harsh situation.

What does this result imply? Why did the participants imagine that the disciplined society would and should come true at the same time? What policy agenda can we achieve from this situation, where the probability is in accordance with the desirability of the future? Some feedback from participants can give clues on these questions: there would be no political and military conflicts between South and North Koreans; green policy would be executed in order to rehabilitate Mother Nature; the government would reduce the gap between the rich and poor; and stability would be more desirable than adventurousness.
The second majority (32%) of the participants (N=69) expressed that the collapse future would be most probable. On the contrary, regarding desirability, the second majority (26%) of the participants (N=82) preferred the continued-growth future. It can be summarized that people expect social collapse but want economic prosperity. People acknowledged that social capabilities for growth were weak, but unrealistically, people pursued continued growth with feeble capabilities. How can we interpret these controversial responses? I had participants discuss this discordance between the preferred and the probable future. We concluded that if we pursued economic growth without considering the possibility of the collapse future, we might see that there would be serious conflicts between the rich and the poor, the pro-growth and the pro-distribution, and the consumer-oriented and the conserver-oriented. We also might find that the Korean government would favor elites and brutally treat those who are not able to compete. This is because the majority of a society wants to grow economically.

What is more interesting is that people preferred continued growth but regarded this future as the least probable. Only 17% of the participants (N=69) imagined that the continued growth would come true in the future. What causes this dissonance? In this situation, if the government seeks a continued-growth policy, what policy resolutions could there be? What would people say about the resolutions in terms of pro, con, and neutral? These questions could identify a policy agenda.

Another unexpected finding is that the transformative future was chosen as the third probable and preferable. In fact, regarding desirability, participants voted for the transformative future at a similar preference with the continued-growth one. Of the participants, 24% chose the transformative while 26% of them selected the continued-
growth. I did not identify who preferred this future, but it was clear that the overall participants selected the transformative future as their second most desirable at the workshops in Seoul 1 and 2, Kwangjoo 2, and Puchon (see Table 5-12). This result was not expected, because the transformative vision would look crazy and weird. In this vision, humans would become post-humans who cannot be distinguished from robots and explore the universe freely. Technology would be exponentially developed and change everything. Androids and humans would collaborate in shaping public policy.

Even though this vision seemed absurd, many participants preferred it. It can be argued that Koreans regard technology as the main driving force to push the current society into the future. That is why Koreans were not uncomfortable with radical technology. However, we have to understand that the transformative vision is a double-edged sword. Radical changes that the transformative one imagines can reflect people’s desires and, at the same time, imply the rise of dynamic situations that many people might not adapt to, leading to an unstable society. What do people want to transform into? This question can identify a new policy agenda.

Figure 6-2 shows that the disciplined future was selected for the most likely future and the most preferred one by participants of the futures workshops that were held in Korea in 2011. Regarding probability, the second most likely future was the collapse while the least likely future was the continued one. The transformative future was placed in between the collapse and the continued. Through analyzing these results, we can understand how Koreans forecast the future according to their beliefs on which future would be realized. Regarding desirability, the continued future was selected as the second most preferable while the collapse was the least preferable. The transformative one was
in the middle, between the collapse and the continued. This result also indicates which
vision Koreans want to bring in reality.

Figure 6-2.Two-Dimensional Distribution of the Desirability & Probability

For those in policy studies, Figure 6-2 can be useful for evaluating what policy
issue would be considered by people as preferable and feasible. For example, a policy
that seeks continued-economic development is regarded as preferable but not feasible. If
a policy assumes that capitalism will collapse, it is feasible but not preferable in Korean
contexts. If a policy is based on radical technology that will drastically reshape a society,
it will be controversial. It is also significant that the severe tension between the continued
future and the collapse future is on in Korea. In this tension, a question arises: how can
Koreans make a balance between the desirability and the feasibility of the future? The
equilibrium point might be the disciplined future. However, we have to acknowledge that
there are two groups at odds: one is looking for economic growth by sacrificing
minorities; the other is looking for spiritual growth by suspending economic development.

This analysis is not enough to attain a reasonable and diverse policy agenda. I
should go further. Turoff (2009) provides a way of developing the analysis. Turoff’s
policy Delphi suggests that after two-dimensional distributions of four futures according to probability and desirability, we should assess which future is the most important and the most valid. Through discussing the importance and validity of the futures, participants can be exposed to diverse futures that some of them like or dislike. They have an opportunity to learn different visions and values that are opposed to these of some groups. Each participant can give comments, and each one has to vote for which comment is more important and valid. Turoff (2009) proposes that “the hope is that out of these conflicting worldviews a synthesis might result, by proposing new resolutions evolving out of rationales that had some common agreement among different groups” (p. 2). By collecting discussions, we can update and revise the two-dimensional distributions of the four futures. We can also achieve a more diverse policy agenda. Table 6-1 illustrates how to use futures studies for attaining policy agenda as follows:

Table 6-1. A Process of Policy Futures Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Participants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st phase</td>
<td>Provides participants with four scenarios of the future.</td>
<td>Experience the futures and exercise alternative policy in each scenario and add specific policy. Vote for Desirability and Probability of each future.</td>
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<td>2nd phase</td>
<td>Draw a two-dimensional distribution and place each future on it according to the degree of Desirability and Probability.</td>
<td>Give comments on the disposition of each future. Discuss what causes the discordance between Desirability and Probability. Vote for Importance and Validity of each future.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd phase</td>
<td>Draw a two-dimensional distribution and place each future on it according to the degree of Importance and Validity.</td>
<td>Give comments on the disposition of each future. Discuss what causes the discordance between Importance and Validity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th phase</td>
<td>Produce the updated two-dimensional distribution and summarize discussions.</td>
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After experiencing diverse futures, participants would discuss what they experienced more with family, friends, and co-workers; pay more attention to relevant stories in the media; and even, in some cases, research the issues in the library or on the web (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Futures workshops will be more useful if participants could be selected randomly so as to ensure heterogeneity of groups. In this sense, I assert that it can be possible to consolidate democracy through practices of futures studies.

In conclusion, for my future research, I have to provide more Koreans who live in other regions with futures workshops in order to collect more diverse responses concerning the future of Korea. I also have to identify to what degree a holistic approach of futures research can help individuals explore various futures without prejudice and encourage them to increase self-efficacy toward the future. More importantly, I should see how these foresight activities can foster a political society in which people voluntarily organize groups for forecasting futures and creating alternatives to perpetuate a better community life. Finally, I want to see the emergence of future-oriented people who are responsible for their behaviors and future generations.
Appendix I: Questionnaire

Survey material for consent and the test

As part of my Ph.D. research at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, I am conducting a survey that assesses the effectiveness of the futures workshop in South Korea. Results of the study will be made available to all participants of the futures workshop. With the assistance of my fieldworker I will appreciate it if you could complete the following questionnaire. Any information obtained in connection with this study that can be identified with you will remain confidential. In any written reports or publications, no one will be identified and only group data will be presented. You are free to withdraw your participation at any time.

If you have any questions about the research, please E-mail to SeongWon Park seongwon@hawaii.edu or parkers49@hanmail.net.

Thank you very much for your participation.

This study focuses on your attitude toward the future. There will be 2 sections to this survey. Please read the instructions **VERY CAREFULLY** before you answer any questions. Your sincere intent to participate in this study is crucial for the success of this project. Thank you.

Section 1

Directions: For each of the statements below, please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement as best as you can.

The response scale is as follows:

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Undecided or Neutral
4. Agree

5. Strongly Agree

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
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<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am always curious about what happens in the world.</td>
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<td>2. I am good at creating unique methods whatever I do.</td>
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<td>3. I am better than others at finding something new.</td>
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<td>4. I question and analyze what others take for granted.</td>
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<td>5. When I have a problem, I take it as an opportunity.</td>
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<td>6. I can apply what I learned in class into reality.</td>
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<td>7. I am good at identifying the problems.</td>
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<td>8. I take part in improving society.</td>
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<td>9. I organize the learning process myself.</td>
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<td>10. I am honest about my weak points.</td>
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<td>11. I make an effort to leave a familiar life, and live in a new way.</td>
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<td>12. I have opportunity for self-reflection about who I am.</td>
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<td>13. I am interested in problems of my community.</td>
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<td>14. When I become enlightened, I put it into practice.</td>
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<td>15. I develop critical thinking by learning.</td>
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<td>16. I become aware of new concepts and knowledge by learning together with other people.</td>
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<td>17. I come to develop my knowledge by learning together with other people.</td>
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<td>18. I care about and help others by learning together with other people.</td>
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Section 2

Directions: Please read each of the following scenarios that forecast Korea 2040, each one of which has the same possibility that occurs in the future. And, please answer the questions as best as you can.

Scenario One:

It has been a really spectacular journey for Koreans to become one of the Great Seven (G7) countries that are most economically powerful in the world, since North and South Korea were reunited in 2025. After the former North Korean leader Kim Jung-il was dead in 2021, the new regime of North Korea attempted to closely work with South Korea in order to overcome economic collapse, and finally agreed to unite two Koreas as one nation and two states for a while. Through this unification, Korea could pursue further economic growth without worrying about decreasing population. The current Korean population is 81 million people in 2040, and two out of ten are foreigners.

Scenario Two:

After the crisis of the world economy occurred in 2015, lots of people (33% of the total population) moved from urban cities to rural areas for farming and fishing. Korean economy was stagnant, and unemployment was climbing for decades. It is mainly because Korean economy was based on cheap oil. However, the economic crisis turned into a basis for a new beginning. Some Koreans declared, “If the state can’t save us, we need license to print our own money,” and suggested local currencies that are a basically mutual credit system: for example, people provide their labors for buying goods instead of spending money, and share jobs with the unemployed. Since the late 2030s, Koreans have used Gross National Happiness (GNH) to measure the progress of society towards amusement, fun, and spiritual well-being.

Scenario Three:

The collapse of the global capitalist system and the ecological crisis of the early 21st century led to mass starvation and huge migrations around the world. Then, a new global political governance system called the G-15 emerged in 2021. It includes the 15 most important nations in the world working together to solve transnational energy,
environmental and food problems. In 2025, the G-15 tightly regulates the global financial system. All citizens were issued a “Resource Access Card” and all corporations had to add an ecological debt to their balance sheets. In order to adapt to new situations, Koreans created Conserver Society, in which people discipline them to exhibit “growth without waste” and “expansion through efficiency.”

**Scenario Four:**

In accordance with Ray Kurzweil’s forecast, Koreans in 2040 observe the convergence of robotics, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, new materials, nanotechnology, space exploration and other related high technologies. Korean society is being dramatically transformed into a post-human society where humans and AI (artificial intelligence) merge into post-humans. There is no clear line between human-beings and AIs. The post-human is a new species that can live much longer and much smarter than human-beings. Additionally, the post-humans begin space exploration and colonization. Eventually the new species evolves from “human-kind” to “space-kind” that separates humans from post-humans.

For each of the statements below, please indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement.

The response scale is as follows:

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Undecided or Neutral
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am always curious about what happens in the world.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. I am good at creating unique methods whatever I do.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
3. I am better than others at finding something new.

4. I question and analyze what others take for granted.

5. When I have a problem, I take it as an opportunity.

6. I can apply what I learned in class into reality.

7. I am good at identifying the problems.

8. I take part in improving society.

9. I organize the learning process myself.

10. I am honest about my weak points.

11. I make an effort to leave a familiar life, and live in a new way.

12. I have opportunity for self-reflection about who I am.

13. I am interested in problems of my community.

14. When I become enlightened, I put it into practice.

15. I develop critical thinking by learning.

16. I become aware of new concepts and knowledge by learning together with other people.

17. I come to develop my knowledge by learning together with other people.

18. I care about and help others by learning together with other people.

19. I find and make something new from others.

20. I learn more when I have a meeting with others.

For statistical purposes only. Please indicate your:

Age: __________ years old
Sex: ① male ② female

Major: ___________________________

Year in school:
① Freshman
② Sophomore
③ Junior
④ Senior
⑤ Graduate

Thank you for your participation!!
Appendix II: Four Scenarios of Korea 2040

Future One: Korea: Uncharted Waters towards the Great Seven (G7)

It has been a really spectacular journey for Koreans to become one of the Great Seven (G7) countries that are the most economically powerful in the world, since North and South Korea were reunited in 2025. After the former North Korean leader Kim Jung-il died in 2021, the new regime of North Korea attempted to work closely with South Korea in order to overcome economic collapse, and they finally agreed to unite as “one nation and two states” for a while. Through this unification, Korea could pursue further economic growth without worrying about decreasing population. The current Korean population is 81 million people in 2040, and two out of ten are foreigners.

Seoul, the capital of the united Korea became much bigger than in the past. Over 20 million people now live in Seoul. Seoulions are multi-national like New Yorkers or Singaporians: they are from mostly Asia but also from North America, Europe, and Africa. They come and go to/from China, Russia, and Europe by fantastic maglev trains that are made in Korea. New cities have emerged as the Korean economy flourished for a long time; for example, Nampo, Gaesung, and Najin, in which people practiced capitalism under the North Korean regime, are much more prosperous.

The concept of “peak oil” turned out to be false. Koreans found new oil and gas deposits all around the world, with oil-producing countries. They even identified massive oil reserves in the ocean floor near Nampo city in the northwest of Korea. Koreans developed not only electronic technologies but also nano and bio technologies. Brilliant engineers and doctors applied these technologies to medical diagnostics in order to cure cancer, which was quite successful.

Leading conglomerates in Korea have expanded their markets and strengthened not only economic powers but also political powers. For example, Chaebol Kim, CEO of Taehan energy company was elected President of Korea in 2030, and still maintains political power supported by the Korean Federation of Corporate Organizations that exclusively engage in bargaining over public policies with government. Given this situation, many young people have a dream to be a private entrepreneur. One survey shows that 67% of college students want to run their own company in order to earn a considerable amount of money and then purchase Deep Flight, a luxury private submarine made in the U.S.A.
Future two: *New Beginning with Uncontracted Capacities*

More and more Koreans decided to leave urban areas to go to rural areas for farming and fishing. People who moved from cities to the countryside were only thousands in 2010. However, after the crisis of the world economy occurred in 2015, the numbers of people becoming farmers or fishermen radically increased year by year, and now 15 million people (33% of the total population) live in rural areas. On the contrary, many cities have been abandoned and became slums because of the decrease of the Korean population from 2018. The population in South Korea is about 42 million people, which is the same number as in 1990. There are 16 million people who are over 65 years old, up 300% in 35 years.

The Korean economy was stagnant, unemployment was climbing, and many families could not pay their bills for decades. It is mainly because the Korean economy was based on cheap oil. When the oil crisis occurred in the Middle Eastern countries again in 2014 due to political turmoil, the oil price was skyrocketed. No country could stop this crisis. One out of two Korean conglomerates went bankrupt and many people were laid-off.

However, this crisis turned into the basis for a new beginning. Some Koreans declared, “If the state can’t save us, we need license to print our own money,” and suggested local currencies that are a basically mutual credit systems: for example, people provide their labors for buying goods instead of spending money, and share jobs with the unemployed. No-dong Park, one of the most powerful politicians in South Korea, is one of the founding fathers of this local currency movement. One of his political slogans is still popular among people: “Economic crisis is a crisis of a community.” Many Koreans do not produce the necessities of life for selling, but for sharing with other people. As the new beginning started, Koreans did not use the Gross National Product (GNP) as an indicator to measure economic growth, but use the Gross National Happiness (GNH) to measure the progress of society towards amusement, fun, and spiritual well-being.

Due to this radical change, two distinguishable phenomena were observed: one is the decrease of Christianity and the increase of Buddhism in Korea. Some scholars argue that when a society moves from capitalistic materialism to spiritual materialism, in which people relish “small is beautiful,” Buddhism better fits in this society than Christianity. The other is the decentralized government: the central government became weaker and local governments became stronger. People established participatory democracy, which involves the ordinary citizen fully in the decision-making processes.
The collapse of the global capitalist system and the ecological crisis of the early 21st century led to mass starvation and huge migrations around the world. Then, a new global political governance system, now known as the G-15, emerged in 2021. It includes the 15 most important nations in the world working together to solve transnational energy, environmental and food problems. In 2025, the G-15 tightly regulated the global financial system. All citizens were issued a “Resource Access Card” and all corporations had to add an ecological debt to their balance sheets.

Ironically, the economically developed South Korea invited the economically collapsed North Korea, in order to replace a Consumer Society with a Conserver Society in 2030, because North Korea had become a perfect model to facilitate the Conserver Society. The Conserver Society arose from a deep concern for the future, and the realization that decisions taken today, in such areas as energy and resources, may have irreversible and possibly destructive impacts in the medium to long term. In fact, excessive consumption was driving the energy depletion and the current environmental crisis. For example, the Arctic Ocean lost all of its ice in 2040, which in turn, gave rise to the sea level that resulted in coastal erosion of about 2.6% of total area of the Korean peninsula.

In order to stop these disasters, Koreans created a new strategy for facilitating Conserver Society in 2021: “Doing more with less.” This strategy was aware of the limits to growth and was designed to change people’s behavior whether or not they changed their values. While it certainly was desirable to thrifty people who conserved resources, this strategy assumed that people wanted to have a growing economy. By being more efficient and less wasteful, steady growth could be maintained with less use of energy and other resources, thus doing more with less. So far, the project of the Conserver Society has been successful. But, Koreans still need to discipline themselves to exhibit “growth without waste” and “expansion through efficiency.”

As the Conserver Society functioned well in Korea, the Green Party of united Korea has achieved political power since 2034. All public policy focuses on energy and food for survival. The government is strong enough to control people’s behaviors. Few people complain about this authoritarian government. In order to find an optimal solution about energy and food problems, the Green Party created a network of transnational research universities with the G-15, funding them substantially to do the research and development needed. These were called “Global Green Universities” and they soon became the most prestigious universities on the planet.
Future four: *AI Society: Emergence of the Space-like*

In accordance with Ray Kurzweil’s forecast, Koreans in 2040 observed the convergence of robotics, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, new materials, nanotechnology, space exploration and other related high technologies. Korean society is being dramatically transformed into a post-human society, where humans and AI (artificial intelligence) merge into the “post-humans.” There is no clear line between human-beings and AIs. The post-human was known formerly as cybernetic, and now is a new species that can live much longer and much smarter than human-beings.

Additionally, the post-humans began space exploration and colonization. Eventually the new species evolved from “human-kind” to “space-kind” that separated human from post-human. Some Korean post-humans traveled to Mars, which was a historic event in Korean society. They investigated what kinds of life-forms lived in Mars. Since a pioneering scientist declared in 2011 that life is more broadly distributed than restricted to the planet Earth, many scientists had attempted to find new life-forms on Mars, and some Korean scientists finally found some of them in 2030.

After human-beings thought of themselves as post-humans or space-kind, they became aware that human thoughts on marriage, religion, education, and Mother Nature should be changed. For example, as American anthropologist Margaret Mead pointed out, humans see a *pre-figurative* society, in which the young people can take on authority because experiences can be achieved by not only years of experience, but also uploading data from computers that are connected to human brains. Mother Nature is obsolete and Artificial Nature is spreading. For instance, post-humans can be omnipresent by using the technology of holography.

No one think of herself as a South Korean or a North Korean, but as an U-Korean. The letter of U implies ubiquitous, so an U-Korean signifies one who lives in a virtual reality, and identifies herself as an united Korean, even though two Koreas have not been physically united yet. Corea Lee is one of the founding fathers who created the company that provided virtual realities, and was re-elected as Chairman of U-Korea, which is the board of the directors which makes decisions about the future of Korea. Chairman Lee was a disabled person until the late 2030s, but became one of the first post-humans that combine human bodies with computers, by getting help from nanotechnology. Some of the directors are androids, and the youngest director is a nine-year-old girl who teaches quantum teleportation for graduate students at Space University.
Appendix III: The Futures-Visioning Process

The components of a futures visioning process are as follows (Dator 2009:2-3):

I. Appreciating the past:

First is a discussion of a common understanding of the history of the community or group involved, going back ‘to the beginning’ of the community or group if possible and not just the immediately-remembered past. It is not possible to think usefully and creatively about the future of anything until you understand its rationale for coming into existence, the many different facets of its past.

II. Understanding the present:

Second is a discussion of the problems and possibilities of the present. Until people are able to vent their concerns and/or satisfactions with the present, they will often be unwilling and unable to think usefully about the future. They may resist futures activities as ‘pie in the sky’ avoidance of urgent problems of the present unless allowed to vent. They should also understand that sometimes solutions to present problems lie ‘just ahead’ over the horizon – to see ‘the future’ as a reservoir of solutions (and new challenges!), and thus that it would be a mistake to try to solve current problems without first engaging in a complete futures process.

III. Forecasting aspects of the futures:

Third is a discussion of possible challenges and opportunities from the futures (using as a default a roughly 20-50 year time horizon). It is absolutely essential that everyone have some sense of what is likely to be ‘new’ about the future, as well as what aspects from the past and the present might or should be brought forward into the futures. What are the major continuing trends, novel emerging issues, and significant continuities from the past that will result in the present at a later time (aka, ‘the future’)? We often use the term ‘surfing tsunamis’ to convey these interacting components of the future.

IV. Experiencing alternative futures:

Fourth, and the most crucial of all, is an experience in one or more of at least four alternative futures that are based upon different mixes of the trends, emerging issues, challenges and opportunities from the future, and also based upon different idea about how the world works. There is no single future ‘out there’ to be predicted. There are many alternative futures to be anticipated and pre-experienced to some degree.

More specifically, this step asks organizers to carry out these elements:
1. If possible, there should be four rooms, each decorated to depict one of the four alternative futures. If it is not possible to decorate the rooms, then each room should have written copies of the one future that will be read and discussed.

2. All four futures should not be distributed to the participants beforehand. Each participant should initially only know about the future she will experience.

3. One person from each group should serve as the reporter for the group. She should keep time and see that all questions on the instructions are answered and recorded.

4. At the end of the process, the reporter from each of the four futures should report back to all participants the answers to the questions from their group. Before each reporter tells the entire audience her group’s response to the questions, the overall manager should read aloud the relevant alternative future so everyone in the audience will learn for the first time what the future is, and can understand the group’s responses to it.

5. It is very important to collect this written material. Indeed, it is recommended that each participants in each future write down her answers to each of the questions, and that these anonymous written answers be provided to the organizers for analysis. (Dator 2009:10-12, summarized by Seongwon Park)

V. Envisioning the futures:

Fifth is a futures visioning exercise in which participants now are better prepared to envision a preferred future for the community or group 20-50 years hence, based on the past, present, and alternative futures discussed previously. Visioning a preferred future is the main purpose of this entire exercise. But visioning should take place only after participants have become aware of what is new and what is old, and what challenges and opportunities lie ahead, in order to create one or more preferred futures for the community or group.

VI. Creating the futures:

Sixth is a discussion and decision of what to do now and in what sequence in order to begin moving the community/group towards the preferred future. Futures visioning is not just about imagining a preferred future. It is about using that vision to decide what to do now in the present in order to move towards the preferred future.

VII. Institutionalizing futures research:

One conclusion of that discussion and decision is of the necessity of setting up some kind of an ongoing ‘futures’ unit which can keep the future-oriented process going. This should include some kind of a ‘scanning process’ which continues to ‘look ahead’ for emerging challenges and opportunities in the immediate and more distant futures, in
order to inform the community/group (and its leaders) about them. A related aspect is either to agree on a time in the future when this entire process will be undertaken again (eg., to agree to repeat the process if five years), or a way in which the futures participative process can begin again if the original vision is felt to be insufficient in the light of experience and/or information about new challenges and opportunities from the futures.
Appendix IV: Examples of Participants’ Answers to the Open Question

"<서술형 질문>

여러분이 경험한 미래워크성이 여러분의 미래를 준비하는 데 어떤 영향을 미쳤다고 생각하실까요? 축적하고, 자유롭게 써주세요.

* 가장마음으로서, ‘영문사고’ 가족도 모둠으로 주었습니다.

‘하디는 가짜 미래를 제시받았는데, 가짜 봉투의 ‘이건 아니야’를 (음반)해놓았다’

영동은 꼬였는데, ‘가짜 사짜’를 잘못해오게 바로 우리 해설이라도 했을 때 ‘아! 놀아!’ 하고 다짜고짜 가짜에 설려했는데

더도사게 됐습니다.

"<서술형 질문>

여러분이 경험한 미래워크성이 여러분의 미래를 준비하는 데 어떤 영향을 미쳤다고 생각하실까요? 축적하고, 자유롭게 써주세요.

내게 가장

내가 바람직하다. 내가 많은 많은 않았던 사소한

바람이 아닌대도 많은 힘을 가진다고 믿었어요.

더라도 이렇게 진명 왜가지 가깝고 비워냅니다.

בנייה에는 나라의 정착에 가까운 방향으로 소리가 받아들여 줄 수 있어서

트로했었죠. 자기의 일이 업데이트.
여러분이 경향한 미래예측에서 여러분의 미래를 준비하는 데 어떤 영향을 미쳤다고 생각하십니까? 숙각하고, 자유롭게 써주세요.

만약 준비된 내용이 되돌아오지 않으면 일관되지 않음을 보입니다.
그리고 여러분의 생각에서 시작하기 양과 다양한 방법으로 예측하여 미래를 준비해야 한다.

여러분이 경향한 미래예측에서 여러분의 미래를 준비하는 데 어떤 영향을 미쳤다고 생각하십니까? 숙각하고, 자유롭게 써주세요.
<Instructor's Question>

여러분이 경험한 미래워크심이 여러분의 미래를 준비하는 데 어떤 영향을 미쳤다고 생각하시나요? 솔직하고, 자유롭게 써주세요.

비에이에 따라 구체적인 방법을 제시하고 있는 기회가 되어 주었습니다. 
또한 아가운 이에 따라 생각하는 자세를 갖게 된 것입니다.

원래의 목표를 치명하고 아름다운 여러분 구체적인 모험을 
나스다 고려하고 흥미롭게 생각할 수 있도록 노력하고 있습니다.
여러가지 이에 대해 고민해 보았습니다.

<Statement>

I am a type of person who do not plan very often because it often changes. I am happy with what's going on at the moment without being too much stressed on future. However, after listening to the workshop, I feel it's important to think about future, not just about me but also about other things around me.

Thank you for all the insight/knowledge you've given us today.
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