COLONIAL POLICE IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

THE CASE OF THE AMBONESE ARMED POLICE (1897-1942)

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Abstract:

This dissertation argues that during the late 19th and early 20th centuries the Ambonese, an amalgamation of ethnic minorities in the colonial state of the Dutch East Indies, constituted an essential presence in a special unit of colonial police called the armed police. The work of the Ambonese in their own homelands helped to create the basis of a colonial state that would help to form East Indonesia which would itself serve as a unit in the future state of Indonesia. In bringing together a region under the banner of an archipelago-wide state the Ambonese armed police were strengthening the state as well as cohering a larger identity for peoples in the colonial state. The story of the Ambonese armed police in their homelands is that of an amalgamation of ethnic groups, largely minorities, in the periphery of what would become a nation-state working in the colonial structure of policing in a way that brought disparate groups together. The armed police were the crucial element in helping to spread the colonial state as an institution that fostered integrated service for peoples throughout the archipelago. This is a case study of a colonial police constabulary as well as an exploration of an articulation of unity in diversity in a colonial state that would become Indonesia.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction

The Stowaways of History

The journey from Maluku, the Spice Islands of antiquity, to western Europe is an old road. The tendency is to think of the connection between the storied East and the vaunted West as a creation of the European Age of Discovery, but the path between the two is worn and has been at least since spices made their way to the Roman Empire. In this light, one particular voyage in 1951 from Ambon to the Netherlands was part of a continuum though this thought would likely have been of small comfort to the passengers headed to a new life, one they had not anticipated and whose permanent course was still a mystery.

The ships in question were carrying former soldiers of the Netherlands East Indies Army and their families. They were refugees from an aborted attempt to set up an independent state in Maluku, Republik Maluku Selatan. Conventional perception of these people, the understanding that reigns in much of the historiography, is that they were Dutch loyalists whose allegiance to the vanishing empire precluded their assimilation into the emergent Indonesian state. Hopelessly outmatched in an attempt to stand athwart history yelling stop, these soldiers – referred to as the Ambonese – were being evacuated to Holland, perhaps to rearm and try again against the nascent Indonesian state. Or so rumor had it. The historical image of the Ambonese (a slippery term, as will be elucidated), the one that largely guides an incomplete conventional perception, is this: native soldiers,
vassal to the European power, remaining steadfast to a military and cultural code that bound them to the departing Dutch.

But history has stowaways and so too did these ships. For after a few days at sea it was discovered that the tarpaulin over the lifeboats covered not empty space but actual stowaways: policemen. The numbers vary. There were either 55 or 67 policemen who had snuck aboard.¹ This against roughly 12,000 soldiers and their families.² It is generally agreed that the policemen in question were Ambonese fleeing the Andi Aziz affair of 1950 (in which a former captain of the KNIL wrested control, briefly, of Makassar). These policemen were assimilated into the other passengers and ended up serving as ship’s police before docking in Holland.³ What is most striking for our purposes is how there was no formal evacuation of police alongside the soldiers. The fact that these men were stowaways communicates the lack of authorized inclusion of the police in the Dutch/Ambonese retreat. This is symptomatic of the way in which history has rendered both the Ambonese and police as well as Ambonese police. Much has been left out.

The Phenomenon of the Colonial Police

¹ Steijlen claims the former in personal communication sourcing his *RMS van Ideaal tot Symbol; Moluks Nationalisme in Nederland 1951-1994*; Wigard (Museum Maluku) claims the latter in personal communication sourcing: www.nationalarchief.nl/aankomst/achtergroninformatie/anderegroepen/polisi.asp
³ Sahertian, *Vertrapt Vernederd, Maar... Niet Gebroken*, introduction passim.
We see police out of the corners of our eyes in history and literature. Still, there is a rich if discrete tradition of their stories in the Western literature of high colonialism. Joseph Conrad wrote of Eurasian colonial police in his novella *Falk.* In his South Seas collection, *The Trembling of a Leaf,* Somerset Maugham’s short story “The Pool” provides insight, as does Graham Greene’s more comprehensive treatment, his novel *The Heart of the Matter.* In Kipling’s *Plain Tales from the Hills,* in the story “The Mark of the Beast” we meet Strickland who Silvestri describes as the definitive portrait of a colonial police officer ‘going native’ to operate undercover. In Anthony Burgess’s delightful *Time For A Tiger,* the first in his Malay trilogy, we have the lamentable archetype of the dissolute colonial policeman, Nabby Adams. This character is of a piece with Trollope’s observation that the Indian Police served as a refuge for the mediocre younger sons of prominent English families, ne’er-do-well boys who lacked the ambition or ability to secure for themselves a commission in the army or a place at university and whose families were at a loss for what to do with them. Dickens’ son joined the Bombay police (and later the North-West Mounted Police in Canada) after being unable to secure another profession.

Before he wrote under the pseudonym George Orwell, the future author Eric Blair was a policeman in Burma. Orwell wrote little directly about his experiences in Burma (*Burmese Days* is his single novel-length rumination), and he wrote even

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4 Sherry, “Conrad and the Bangkok Times.”
5 Silvestri, “The Thrill of ‘Simply Dressing Up’: The Indian Police, Disguise, and Intelligence Work in Colonial India.”
6 Campion, “Authority, Accountability and Representation: the United Provinces police and the dilemmas of the colonial policeman in British India, 1902-39.”
7 Thacker, "The Mystery of Francis Jeffrey Dickens, N.W.M.P., And Eric Nicol’s Dickens of the Mounted"
less – directly - about his experiences as a policeman. The exception is his essay “Shooting An Elephant” in which he observes that in his job one saw the dirty work of empire at close quarters.

The story in this essay is straightforward: an elephant gets loose; the elephant causes damage in the surrounding community; Orwell in his capacity as a policeman finds himself compelled to shoot the elephant. The story within the story is more thought-provoking. The escaped elephant has caused damage, but by the time Orwell catches up with it it has settled peacefully. But Orwell shoots the elephant anyway because it is expected of him. Orwell describes his realization of himself in that moment as an absurd puppet, a conventionalized figure of a sahib having to do whatever was expected of him. This tells us a bit more of the role of the police in the colonial experience, namely it complicates a narrative of strict domination and oppression (a tempting view given the deprivations brought on by the colonial project), an incomplete view that obscures richer themes equally worthy of note.

History has paid more attention to military history and this has tended to help police history remain more obscure. Something along the lines of Barbara Tuchman’s heralded exploration of the early days of WWI, The Guns of August, has

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8 At least, as Orwell saw it. In Orwell: The Road to Airstrip One (25), Slater quotes Orwell’s feelings, noted in The Road to Wigan Pier, on returning to England on leave in 1927. Orwell was disgusted by the system he had served for five years in Burma, particularly the effects he saw it having on both the peoples of Burma and on himself as a policeman.
pride of place while policing history searches for any recognition at all. This is lamentable, as a prejudice to see things in classically military terms clouds an understanding of the evolution of state control.

Bayley identifies three reasons for the persistent failure of scholars not to address policing history, particularly vis a vis military history: 1) police are rarely important actors in great historical events 2) policing is not glamorous 3) constraint, control, suppression are not pleasant though war can be made to seem heroic. Military history makes for better copy. And attempts to shoehorn policing history into the military history establishment, the network of military institutions that provide succor, aid, and comfort to scholars, fall flat. This is not surprising: the soldier-scholar is a tradition while the idea of a policeman-scholar is much less of one. Moreover, military historians are as interested as ever in drums and boots and battles and leaders as opposed to less orthodox fields of inquiry. There is a hierarchy and a bias in military history and within this policing is not seen as serious stuff. Benedict Anderson puts it memorably: “Like God, scholars tend to be found on the side of history’s big battalions.”

Yet the difference between the police and military in the modern era is profound, leading to a need to pay heed to both. In the modern era police and militaries generally have different agendas. Policing refers to the arrangements

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10 Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis, 6.
11 Roger Spiller, “Military History and Its Fictions.”
12 Andrew Bacevich, personal communication at Boston University December 2007.
13 Benedict Anderson, “Review of C Smit’s De Dekolonisatie van Indonésie”
14 The modern era should be understood to mean after the dual establishment of the London Metropolitan Police Service and the Royal Irish Constabulary in the 1820s. This dissertation focuses on police in the modern era, also the period of high colonialism.
made in all civilized countries to ensure that the inhabitants keep the peace and obey the law.\textsuperscript{15} In the modern era, police are especially suited to upholding the nation-state, particularly arbitrary conglomerations of diverse groups because they have the capacity to uphold normative strictures as opposed to the undifferentiated application of force that is the special province of the military.\textsuperscript{16}

Policing as an activity, a localized one typically, is ancient.\textsuperscript{17} A few relevant notes on policing should be made here: First, the notion of control versus killing is much preferred in places such as Southeast Asia in which populations are smaller and people are always needed, making killing less advantageous than controlling. Second, the police are the extension of state authority with which citizens have the most day-to-day contact.\textsuperscript{18} Third, the police function is historically the subordinate role of the military. The police in a modern society do not generally recognize enemies and are even less intent on destroying enemies, as is the charge of military men. Police think in terms of public order.\textsuperscript{19} Fourth, and somewhat related to the third, is that the role and nature of the police is malleable, that is to say that it changes over time. Schulte Nordholt and Van Till write on the jago, the rural bandit, and his place in orders colonial and pre-colonial. They contend that crime, criminality and criminals are not static terms, but dynamic social categories which

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item http://www.met.police.uk/history/definition.htm (website for London’s Metropolitan Police – the first modern police department).
  \item The distinct roles of the police are addressed in de La Mare’s conceptual \textit{Traite de la Police}.
  \item Dray-Novey, “Spatial Order and Police in Imperial Beijing.”
  \item Bayley, “Police Forces in Army-Ethnic Security Designs.”
  \item van Doorn, Jacques. \textit{The Soldier and Social Change}, 159. Also in van Doorn and Hendrix, \textit{Ontsporing van Geweld}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
are closely connected in their understandings to the formation of the state. 20 This is also true with policemen in history.

Perhaps, therefore, it is best to think of the difference between the police and the military less as one of strict definition than as a tension that exists between two poles. Furthermore, let it be said that we are dealing here with modern policing and the modern conception of the military as well as modern policemen. Certainly militaries have historically served the function of both internal policing and agents of external security and aggressive action. But what we are concerned with is the bifurcation, that development which saw the advent of modern policing. 21 And it is the latter upon which wanted light is being cast here. In Imperial Policing, Sir Charles Gwynn makes the wry observation that, unless they attain the dignity of small wars, police operations are not mentioned in despatches.

Moreover, the phenomenon of colonial policing was a broad one. The European powers had colonies and colonial forces throughout the world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Policing was practiced in myriad ways throughout, though common themes and questions for exploration do emerge. The following will serve to give a sense of the extent of the colonial policing project by sampling the variety of worldwide literature available and some of the salient observations made.

Working from West to East we can profitably begin in Africa. The ubiquitous Killingray teamed up with Clayton to produce Khaki and Blue: Military and Police in

20 Schulte Nordholt and van Till, “Colonial Criminals.”
21 For further, contextualized, exploration, see Charney, Southeast Asian Warfare 1300-1900. It has no mention of police, and that is fairly typical.
British Colonial Africa. They argue that the police remained a colonial responsibility (never becoming a federal one), a move that they see as inspiring local confidence as the police issue was not aggregated with other, larger debates. The governments of colonies are not to be seen, as some simplistically claim, as agents for extension of the center's capitalism. The colonial government had to mediate between the interests of metropolitan and local capital. The alien nature of the colonial state gave it, paradoxically, a curious form of legitimacy. In Imperial Policing: The Emergence and Role of the Police in Colonial Nigeria 1860-1960 Ahire takes a less sanguine view, dividing the period into two phases: militaristic (1860-1914) and civil (1914 – 1960). In both periods the police serve as useful tool for political subjugation and economic exploitation.

Regarding the Middle East, we have Neep’s Policing the Desert: Coercion, Consent and the Colonial Order. Neep challenges the convenient binary between coercion and consent in policing. He argues that it is generally construed that in the metropolitan environment consent is more prevalent and in the colony coercion reigns. But his case study proves more complex. Here coercion to mean blunt violence was present amongst the Bedouin when the French arrived but the use of it through policing provided a new understanding of social order, impacting the Bedouins and furthering the consent. Neep’s is a call to complicate the false binary (in the colonial sense) between coercion and consent.

Kroizer cleaves to thick description of elites to foster discussion, delineating in From Dowbiggin to Tegart: Revolutionary Change in the Colonial Police in Palestine During the 1930s the competing views of colonial police there: Dowbiggin's civilian
model ("a notebook is to the policeman what a rifle is to the soldier") and Tegart’s subsequent militaristic model ("gangs of banditry, armed with rifles, cannot be dealt with by policemen with note-books"). Caspi tracks developments from the colonial to the national in *Policing the Holy Land, 1918-1957: The Transition From a Colonial to a National Model of Policing and Changing Conceptions of Police Accountability*.

Some of the most exciting work (not to mention the lion’s share of the scholarship) comes out of India. Bhat provides an early view in *Judiciary and Police in Early Colonial South Kanara, 1799-1862*. Here we can understand the original role of the police: that of an instrument of control by and for colonial masters. But the evolution is key. Indeed, scholarship that represents the Indian Army simply as a tool of imperial repression seriously misrepresents the complexity of the relationships involved. By the middle of the 19th century the police were performing all types of duties, and in this creating order and not just upholding it. Silvestri notes that the police and not the army was the primary coercive force in India during the last four decades of colonial rule.

Sen offers a thoughtful thesis in his *Policing the Savage: Segregation, Labor and State Medicine in the Andamans*, namely that the strategy of the colonizer there was not to try to civilize the Andamans directly but to control tightly the local prison colony so they would affect by diffusion the local population. In the Andamans inmates from outside the islands were conditioned to be model subjects. Upon finishing their sentences they were settled in the islands where it was intended that

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23 Silvestri, “The Thrill of ‘Simply Dressing Up’: The Indian Police, Disguise, and Intelligence Work in Colonial India”
they would influence the community. It is an engaging take on the circuitous route control can wend.

Southeast Asia is no country cousin in the field. Of particular interest are explorations of the place of ethnicity in colonial policing. Stephens writes that it was Raffles himself who took the control of policing out of the hands of native chiefs (where it typically resided in pre-colonial Southeast Asia) and put it in the hands of European officers while Malays themselves continued to perform the duties of policing. This is echoed in Reminiscences of an Indian Official by Cavenagh, an Irishman (that is to say a product of colonialism himself) who may or may not have been making an expressly profound statement on the nature of colonial policing when he wrote that the Malays in many respects resembled his own countrymen (that is to say, the Irish). As elsewhere, colonial policing was an essential aspect of the colonial project: “A prerequisite to economic development was the assurance of law and order alongside attendant matters of ethnicity. Indeed, the maintenance of peace was always an important justification for the colonial presence and access to an armed force continued to uphold British authority. The physical appearance of the Sikh soldiers and policemen so prominent in colonial troops was itself intimidating.”

French Indochina is no small matter (Womack’s contribution on the Garde Indigene in Hack and Rettig’s Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia is notable), but it is the Philippines that yields perhaps the most significant trove. From the official

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24 Morse, “The Administrative History of the British Dependencies in the Further East.”
25 Andayas, A History of Malaysia, 211-212.
1929 *Philippine Constabulary Regulations* to Coats’ *The Philippine Constabulary: 1901 – 1917* (which emphasized a progression from a military to civilian model for the Constabulary), there are no English language resources on colonial policing in Southeast Asia more accessible than those from the Philippines. McCoy’s *Policing America’s Empire* is the preeminent work drawing on themes he first began to develop in an earlier project on the development of the nation-state in the Philippines.26

What is important regarding this all too brief tour is that whereas colonial policing may have been bound by borders the colonial policing project was not. Empires shared tactics.27 When we speak of colonial policing what is common to the experience can be more significant than what is not. Generally, police forces served not only to police peoples locally but also to create a stronger state that could be used by a more distant center to effect control. Often this is argued to take the form of pitting groups, typically ethnic groups, against one another. This can be called stranger policing. What the historiography sometimes fails to take into account are cases in which the opposite occurred, when the colonial project used policemen from an area to police that same general area within this larger dynamic of strengthening of the state, leading to the bringing of that area together under the banner of the state. This way of considering colonial policing is in concert with the general trends of research but illuminates an understudied aspect of the mechanisms of control.

26 McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, 61.
Central to the conversation of colonial policing is the Irish Question. Jeffries elucidated this in one of the first treatments of colonial policing, *The Colonial Police*. There is, so far as I know, no other European writing during the high colonial era so authoritative as Jeffries. He ties the history of colonial policing back to Ireland, one of the original sites of the European colonial project. He argues that the most powerful influence on the development of colonial police forces during the nineteenth century was not that of the police of Great Britain, but that of the Royal Irish Constabulary. He takes the matter further, asserting that modern police history itself begins not in Britain itself but in Ireland, with the passing of the Irish Peace Preservation Act in 1814, when Peel was Irish Secretary.\(^{28}\)

The Irish Question envisions a rough division between two types of police forces, one colonial and armed the other metropolitan and focused on community-building. The former would be more military in nature, the latter civilian.\(^{29}\) The origin of this understanding is in the 1820s innovations of Sir Robert Peeler (from whom is derived the terms “bobbies” and “peelers” for British police) whose commissions created both the London Metropolitan Police and the Royal Irish Constabulary. This is not to say that Peeler invented policing but that the structures of colonial state policing and questions of relation between the colony and center can be traced to his innovations, which would find worldwide purchase. To cite but one example: *Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative*

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\(^{29}\) Resonance of the military/police distinction can be found in the conduct of the Black and Tans, World War I vets in the employ of the Royal Irish Constabulary 1920-21. See Leeson, *The Black and Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence 1920-1*. 
Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, The Gold Coast and Kenya by Deflem explores the tension between gendarmerie of the Irish Constabulary model and the civilian/Metropolitan model. The question is about how these two models relate to one another and how accurate it is to ascribe to each a separate place.

Anderson and Killingray have elucidated the conventional contours of this relationship, to mean dissemination of the ideals of the center to a distinct colony, in Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control 1830-1840. In their chapter “Consent, Coercion and Colonial Control: Policing the Empire, 1830-1940” they are careful to concede that no consensus on policing has emerged and that focus on models may obscure more than reveal. Nevertheless, they endorse the idea that the evolution of a civilized colony might be measured by the style of policing required. The gap between center policing and the colony had more to do with advances in the center than decline in the colonies, which could and often did catch up. To be fair to Anderson and Killingray, they do not wholly endorse this understanding, preferring to pay more attention to more strictly local developments.

Brogden turns the conventional standing on its head, offering the provocative thesis that the lessons of coercion from the colonies were used to police social dissent in the center, especially labor unrest. He traces his contrarian argument through a careful historiographical survey. He concurs with Jeffries as to the inception of modern police history in Ireland with the tenure of Peel, but contends that there exist only marginal differences between the colonial police and nineteenth century British policing and not the sharp polarities often depicted in the orthodox comparisons between the Metropolitan Police and the Royal Irish
Constabulary. Brogden maintains that colonial police work, and perhaps in turn British police work, was pre-eminently missionary work to legitimate external governance. Colonial police history, he concludes, is essentially the history of that socialization of police work. But he strikes the balanced note of Anderson and Killingray, ultimately stating that differences were of degree rather than in intent and organization. He is not trying to deny that there were certain distinctions between the policing of Britain and the policing of the colonies, but rather suggest that the two types of policing are not separate categories but ranged on a continuum, in which some features are more heavily weighted towards the extremes than others.  

Sinclair and Williams focus on the two-way nature of exchange (an amicable compromise) in their article “Home and Away”: The Cross-Fertilisation between 'Colonial' and 'British' Policing, 1921-85.” This draws on Sinclair’s earlier work in which she endorses the notion that the study of colonial policing has been heavily if not overly influenced by consideration of the Irish Question. The debate (Anderson and Killingray at one end, Brogden at the other extreme, Sinclair and Williams in the middle – though it should be pointed out that none is particularly strident in her view) is related to the larger “laboratories of modernity” question.

It should be noted that the model is not without strong detractors. In his article “The Irish Model and Empire: A Case for Reassessment” Hawkins argues that the semi-military character of the Irish constabulary set it apart. He contends that

30 Brogden, “The Emergence of the Police – The Colonial Dimension.”
31 Sinclair, “Get into a Crack Force and earn 20 pounds a Month and all found...’ The Influence of the Palestine Police upon Colonial Policing 1922-1948.”
the constabulary system was developed in Ireland so thoroughly in response to local circumstances that one might easily be skeptical of its having any real common ground with forces in other parts of the world. He suggests that the assumption of common ground in terms of a protean Irish model has not been helpful and that, in his view, substantiating the link to colonial policing has not yet been accomplished. Generally speaking, however, most scholars have found the Irish Question to be useful and I would associate myself with that stance.

But where do the Ambonese stand in all of this? What is the answer to the Irish Question being posed here? Where do I stand in terms of the Ambonese colonial police experience? I would count myself temperamentally with Sinclair and Williams, if nothing else. But I really think that what is called for is a repositioning of the Irish Question (though I find Hawkins a bridge too far). Transference between the center and the colony misses the point. Here it’s more about how the two are bound more closely. What I am interested in is how policing makes the state stronger, how policing brings the two closer together. The Irish Question is about relation. I am concerned with union.

Zinoman sees how the prison had an opposite effect in Vietnam. He argues that incarceration fomented nationalism rather than suppressed it. His excellent work on prisoners in French Indochina, The Colonial Bastille: A History of Imprisonment in Vietnam, 1862-1940, deals with the development of nationalism amongst the incarcerated. What I am talking about here echoes the idea of the colonial state birthing an interaction that came to play an important role in creating a coherent state, but where Zinoman looks inside the walls I look to the men
patrolling those walls. Spivak’s provocative essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, asks about the dispossessed and their place, but I am focused here on what one might call the marginally possessed: those who did not occupy positions of great privilege but were still part of that colonial state. It is easy to leave them out. Ultimately, who is their constituency? The old colonials saw them primarily as loyal servants. The modern states of Southeast Asia privilege rebellious nationalists. Moreover, policemen make problematic heroes for history, engrained as they are in the fabric of everyday life.

What is lacking from the debate of the Irish Question is what it means to be Irish, what it means to be a minority group within an empire. What is called for is consideration of the indigenous policemen themselves as a lens for understanding. If the Irish Question necessarily poses a binary between a military style and a civilian style of colonial policing, it misses the notion that through a general (if not completely linear) progression from a military to a civilian model the effect for the colony is a strengthening of the state. The effects on the metropole are intriguing but another question.32 What is significant here about the Irish Question is how a borderline style of policing between military and civilian (the armed police) can bring a minority outlying group further into the state, through the participation of indigenous policemen. Minority involvement in policing helps to bind the state. Consent through praxis serves to effect hegemony.

The gewapende politie, the armed police, are the focus of this project. Armed police, or constabularies, when employed in the colonial project are a police unit

32 See Winichakul’s excellent chapter on this very question in his seminal Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation.
that exists to facilitate transition. Military police or marechaussee or gendarmerie lie at one end of the spectrum of policing, civil police lie at the other. My contention is that the armed police or constabulary, are the critical link between military control and a civil policing regime, particularly when employed in the outer areas of a colony. There are different views on what these terms mean and precise definitions of these terms are by no means undisputed. Indeed, one of the aims of this project is to provide a case study of what a constabulary or armed police is in the colonial project. Moreover, uncertainty about these terms is one of the outstanding questions of current scholarship on colonial policing.

In *Police Power and Colonial Rule Madras 1859-1947* Arnold argues for understanding the armed police as just such a dynamic force. The colonial constabulary largely suppressed indigenous policing, serving to involve policing as a part of the maturation of the colonial state. The police were always under civil control, a tool of the state. The armed police in particular were in the lead in suppression, this over the army and regular police. This makes sense because they served as the bridge between the two.

In his chapter “Double-Edged Swords of Conquest in Indochina” Eckert subscribes to the notion of gendarmerie as a military corps, but argues for a further interpretation. He points out that the word derives from ‘men at arms’ and thus may be thought of as a constabulary for heavy police action. I largely agree with this understanding of the distinction between a gendarmerie and a constabulary: a gendarmerie at one extreme may function like a constabulary, especially a constabulary that is more military in orientation. The germane observation is that
gendarmeries are more comfortably associated with militaries whereas constabularies are more firmly considered police.

In Das and Verma’s “The Armed Police in the British Colonial Tradition: The Indian Perspective” the authors argue that the armed police should not really be seen as police. By this it is meant that the armed police are not about solving crime or upholding the law: they are about upholding order. As such they are very military in nature and anathema to the development of civil society. I understand this perspective, but I think that this view does not allow for how the armed police develop and are themselves developed.

To that end it is critical to understand that the personnel of the armed police or constabulary were more likely to be indigenous than the personnel of the military which retained a stronger presence of Europeans. In the context of Australia, and making the point that indigenous agency was critical, Richards writes that the line between military and police action was extremely blurred and that the Native Police of Queensland amounted to one such force that not only straddled this line but did so with indigenous personnel. The notorious history of the unit, and the killings ascribed to it, demonstrate the complexity of the colonial encounter.

Tate in “John P Clum and the Origins of an Apache Constabulary, 1874-1877” takes the discussion further. He argues that as agents of acculturation this constabulary in the American West undoubtedly undermined many traditional aspects of tribal society. In the long run, however, the personnel of the constabulary may have preserved far more than they destroyed; their engagement with the
colonizer afforded them an opportunity to glean what could be won by engagement with the developing state.

An even more dynamic view of the armed police or constabulary is explored in Singh’s “Locating the Bilhar Constabulary, 1920-22: An Exploration into the Margins of Resistance.” The police are often seen as the undifferentiated agents of the state but sometimes they may be seen as agents of resistance. Here the police were amenable to the nationalist energy, going on strike at one point in alliance with nationalist aims. In this action they demonstrated agency, and, moreover, the sometimes decidedly unmilitary aspect of the relationship of policemen to the state. At roughly the same time (1919), and half a world away in Boston, Governor Coolidge was dealing with his own police strike, an event that would thrust him into the national spotlight and the presidency. Police history can be seen as very much a global project.

The best case for thinking of the armed police in the way in which I am thinking of them is in Kituai’s *My Gun, My Brother: The World of the Papua New Guinea Colonial Police, 1920-1960*. Contrary to much post-colonial scholarship, Kituai stresses the sense of engagement indigenous policemen had with the colonial state. This should not be gauged as passive reaction to colonization. Kituai asserts that the colonial policemen were actively engaged in binding together the territory through their police work and thereby helping in the emergence of an independent state.

Kituai argues that his subjects had much in common with policemen the world over. He writes of the police as individuals, as actors in institutions which
they partly fashioned for themselves and as agents of foreigners and foreign ideas that became local verities. The irony in the success of colonial rule in Papua New Guinea, as in most other colonized countries, was that the people there were often used to sustain colonial domination. Such domination and control was both physical and psychological, operating in the policy known to the French as the policy of the oil stain – la tache d’huile – the civilizing influence will percolate for certain fixed centers to the surrounding countryside.

The men considered that their being Papua New Guinean contributed to their success; they established lasting friendships wherever they were posted; they believed they were on a civilizing mission; and they were committed to upholding the integrity of the police force. The police were enthusiastic carriers of the “civilizing mission”: they rationalized their behavior and took praise for themselves as those who “broke bush” and opened a “new road” for those were were just “unpacified villagers.”

According to Kituati, researchers have been right to see the police as intermediaries, but in doing so they have underestimated the role of policemen themselves. He argues for a better understanding of the tension between police as simple instruments of colonial policy and police as those who themselves had a vision of a better way and were anxious to convert others. Kituai is not attempting to totalize the experience of the entire force, rather he is arguing for a more robust understanding of the experiences of indigenous policemen. Armed with inadequate professional police skills, the .303 [a type of gun], and the poorly developed

techniques and methods of the colonial police in general, and of the Royal Irish Constabulary in particular, the achievements of the paramilitary police of the Papua New Guinea were exemplary for which they should be proud and remembered, maintains Kituai. Previously unknown peace and order, the men said, was realized in the villages from the 1920s to the 1960s. The policemen's excellent records are not without tarnish - they were also the violent enforcers of an authoritarian and paternal regime – but these were real accomplishments as Kituai reckons it. These men were not cargo cultists, mimicking foreign mores. They were armed policemen in all the complexity therein.

As impressive as his scholarship is, Kituai is not beyond challenge. In “Reinventing Policing Through The Prism of the Colonial Kiap” Briathwaite argues that Papua/New Guinea colonial policing was an institution that adjusted to global models very quickly but that this was harmful and contributed to tyranny through moving urban models to a rural place. Briathwaite is correct to point this out, but I do not believe that he contradicts Kituai so much as complements him. In “The Civilising Influence: The Colonial Transformation of Rossel Island Society” Liep and Affleck (1983) agree that the process of penetration by colonial powers in New Guinea was uneven. What they further argue, however, is that when penetration did occur enterprising engagement was constructive to the formation of the state.

To summarize, the Irish question broadly posits a spectrum of policing (from military to civil) as mediated through the colonial project. Differences in interpretation abound among scholars, but within those parameters we find the armed police, or constabulary. The goal of this project is to understand the armed
police in the Dutch East Indies as experienced by an indigenous group known as the Ambonese in their homelands.

Colonial Police in the Dutch East Indies

The National Police Museum of the Republic of Indonesia (Museum Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia) in Jakarta opened in 2009. It was at that time, and remains to this day, the official representation of the police in Indonesia and their history. As such, the way in which it deals with policing before and during the Dutch period is significant. The Museum’s relevant display renders police history in this manner:

“Long before the arrival of the Western nations, people in the Indonesian archipelago had been familiar with such policing duties as the maintenance of peace and order. At the time, the organization and nature of such tasks were still traditional done by the palace soldiers of the many kingdoms in the Archipelago... When the VOC was replaced by the Dutch Indies government, the Police’s organization and structure changed as the government established a variety of police units (such as the Plantation police and the Field Police) in the name of upholding peace and order.”

This is accurate and succinct but incomplete as it does not mention the armed police who served an important role in the development of the police, namely the bridge that facilitated the change described.

An official Indonesian police history continues:

“The colonial authority had formed police troops in Indonesia. The police under the colonial authority, however, acted as a tool for them in order to control and force the society to abide the rules of the ‘penjajah’ [invader]. The way the police acted was to use force or violence as their primary tool. The police under

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34 Police Museum in Jakarta [Museum Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia], visit April 8 2010
such circumstance was designed to operate in a highly-tensed environment to force the community to be always abiding to the colonial authority."\(^{35}\)

This is also accurate but incomplete as it does not explore the role of indigenous personnel. We are told what was done with them but not given a sense of what was done by them, how their agency was expressed in becoming policemen.

The modern police of the Indonesian archipelago can be traced back to regulations promulgated by Raffles on February 11, 1814. In these edicts Raffles made the village headman responsible for policing his own village and required him to organize a regular night watch. At the same time he created the administrative police whose duties kept them closer to colonial officials.\(^{36}\) With this Raffles laid the foundation of the Dutch East Indies police, but it should be understood as a beginning and not be judged by a greater standard than that. Raffles built the village police on the myth of the Javanese village and peace as constants, a myth that would have precluded any serious need for policing. He also did not provide through the administrative police or the village police a means by which to extend control robustly into outer territories.

In the years from the 1870s to the 1890s paramilitary armed forces, which had been part of the colonial army led by non-commissioned army officers and had carried out some police duties, were phased out and replaced by a corps of police agents. This corps was organized out of the administrative police attached to Dutch

\(^{35}\) Sutanto, *Indonesian National Police Today*, 1. [N.B. the original is in English and the translation is provided by the author of the text cited]

\(^{36}\) Shiraishi, “A New Regime.” This is echoed by Stephens, “The Administrative History of the British Dependencies in the Further East.”
and native administrative officials. The establishment of the corps of police agents marked the real beginning of the professional police in the Dutch East Indies, concurrent with the creation and development of the armed police and the further development of the village police and the administrative police.37 This dissertation is focused on the armed police.

Locher-Scholten argues that the history of the colonial police force is one of the least known chapters in Dutch colonial history. Both the army and the civil service have received extensive treatment, but only a few studies from before 1942 are devoted to the subject of the colonial police.38 This has been addressed in large part by Bloembergen’s 2009 authoritative history of the colonial police in the Dutch East Indies (De geschiedenis van de politie in Nederlands-Indie: Uit zorg en angst), but Bloembergen would be the first to argue that her comprehensive treatment by its very nature provides further avenues for exploration.

In November 2009 I attended the Second GERN workshop on colonial and post-colonial policing, held at the Sorbonne in Paris.39 I also attended the Third GERN workshop, held at KITLV in Leiden in September 2010.40 I presented preliminary findings from my own research at the Third GERN workshop, but it was at the Second GERN workshop that my research topic began to become more

37 Bloembergen, “Between Public Safety and Political Control. Modern Colonial Policing in Surabaya (1911-1919).”
38 Locher-Scholten, “Explorations.”
39 “The GERN is a research network that unites some forty centers, and researchers of various disciplines including sociology, history, and law, who work on issues of norms and deviance in ten European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).”
http://www2.cnrs.fr/en/228.htm (most recently accessed September 19, 2012)
40 KITLV is the Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies at Leiden in the Netherlands.
focused. I had been interested in the Ambonese as policemen before attending the workshops, but the workshops helped me to refine my topic in the following ways.

First, it became clear that work on indigenous policemen in the colonial world would complement work on European policemen in the colonial world. I am grateful to Hill (author of the magisterial multi-volume official police history of New Zealand) and Williams (of the International Centre for the History of Crime, Policing and Justice at Milton Keynes) for enlightening conversations between panel sessions. These discussions resonated with my exploration of the literature available. In particular, it seemed to be a general area of agreement within the group that the colonial project in outer areas largely employed a system of stranger policing in which one group, often ethnic, was employed to police another in a system of “un-like” policing. This dissertation seeks to challenge that orthodoxy with the experience of the Ambonese in their home areas who were engaged not so much in stranger policing as they were in the broadening and strengthening of a group association with the state and with that the strengthening of the state.

Second, Bloembergen conducted a joint presentation with Klinkers who studies colonial policing in Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. During post-discussion questions it became evident that there were serious differences in the ways that policing was conducted in outer areas in the two different Dutch colonial spheres (e.g. the marechaussee42 figured more prominently in the Caribbean). In particular the larger sphere, the Dutch East Indies, seemed to merit an investigation

41 For an outstanding book on the phenomenon of European policemen in the colonial world see Bickers, Empire Made Me.
42 The marechaussee were a unit of military police. They will be discussed further.
into how outer areas were policed in ways that sought to strengthen the state. The session as a whole was very interested in understanding how to distinguish constabularies, armed police, marechausse, military police, and other forms of policing not only in the Dutch colonial world but throughout the colonial policing project. It is my contention that a precise understanding of these terms must be contextual that, broadly speaking, they lie in a spectrum from military policing to civil policing with constabularies or armed police serving as the critical link between the two. This is especially relevant in outer areas where it is the role and nature of a constabulary or armed police to bring such areas into a network of police control rather than tolerating a system of isolated areas of police control. This dissertation is a case study of one such unit.

The significance of the link between the Ambonese and the armed police lies in how it promoted the strengthening of the state. As the Ambonese were incorporated into the armed police in their own areas, and as the armed police gained strength the state was enhanced. From the GERN workshops I had a good sense of what I felt required investigation, and time in the archives gave me a sense of the challenges of methodology in undertaking the current study.

There is a lot about the military and a small amount about the colonial police in the Dutch East Indies, but almost nothing about the police force in Ambon. This project is an effort to redress that imbalance. Materials for this project were not solely gathered in the archives, where records about the police were not accorded the same organizational rigor as those of the military. This was due in large part to the fragmented nature of the armed police. Searching for records on the police
(found within larger lists of other issues pertinent to administration of the interior, such as agriculture and transport), I would look within them for mentions of the armed police and within that the Ambonese. Materials from the homelands of the Ambonese were not as plentiful as those from areas nearer Batavia, though still considerable.

In Jakarta and the Hague and elsewhere information on the Ambonese armed police proved elusive. The methodology of this project can be understood as looking for crumbs along many trails, and one of the difficulties lay in the lack of sources on policing on the ground. In working on this dissertation I was sometimes asked why I was not looking at other things. Sometimes I was asked why I was not doing a close reading of the diaries of Ambonese policemen (see Bickers’ work on a European policeman in Shanghai) or interviews of retired armed policemen (see Kituai’s work on policemen in Papua) to understand better their world. Like any other people, policemen have rich thought worlds. But this project is driven in large part to give voice to those for whom the record is scant. I am certainly in favor of using diaries, letters, and interviews but in this case they are not, to the best of my knowledge, available in this case. The challenge undertaken here as elsewhere is to work with the sources that we do have.

Another reason I choose to focus on the armed police as a unit is because I hope that this decision will serve to complement the work that has been done on the

43 For example, upon finishing a manuscript author E.M. Forster used to send one copy to Virginia Woolf and another to his good friend Sergeant Bob Buckingham of the Metropolitan Police. He respected the literary judgment of both: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2008/aug/14/em-forster-middle-manager/?pagination=false (accessed last September 22, 2012)
colonial police in the Dutch East Indies. I have mentioned Bloembergen’s 2009 book. Another approach would have been to focus on the secret police. Whether it’s the Frumentarii of ancient Rome or Mussolini’s OVRA, secret police are intriguing. This has certainly impacted the study of policing in the Dutch East Indies. Bloembergen and Shiraishi have both attacked the problem of the secret police. Tellingly, both have concluded that there is more roar than bite there. This is not to say that the study of the secret police is not viable. It is vital. But with strong work in hand we can profitably look to complement it.

What writing on the secret police has addressed can show us what a work on the armed police can offer by taking another approach. To see this we can look first to intelligence policing broadly. In Empires of Intelligence, Thomas writes that successful intelligence policing could be found in policing the elite. Burgeoning nationalist and communist movements received an inordinate amount of attention from the intelligence police, proportionate to the populace as a whole. Certainly one can make the argument that the threat of a communist or nationalist insurrection justified the attention paid by the secret police, but in my opinion the driving force was more that which animates Stoler’s Along the Colonial Grain, namely that the fears of colonials overshadowed any verities on the ground.

In the Dutch East Indies Benda acknowledges that the secret police cracked down forcefully on the nationalists, while at the same time acknowledging the

44 Shiraishi, “Policing the Phantom” and “A New Regime”; Bloembergen, “Koloniale staat, politieestaat?: politieke politie en het rode fantoom in Nederlands.”
limited scope of both the movement and the state.47 This is not to downplay the significance of the development of communism in the Dutch East Indies.48 It is to say that nationalism and communism were not the sole players, perhaps even not the major ones, in the development of the state. Van der Kroef writes that it has been the fashion to look to the effectiveness of the Dutch colonial police and surveillance apparatus, as well as disunity within nationalist ranks, for the failure of Indonesian nationalism in the 1920s. He argues rather that the Dutch colonial regime was at no time in any danger from the nationalist movement and that it was, in fact, the organizational revolution of the Japanese occupation that provided Indonesian nationalism with its eventual success.49 I would associate myself with that thought, adding that the organizational development he speaks of was preceded by organizational development during the Dutch colonial period. One such case is the armed police within the entire colonial policing apparatus.

An example may illustrate the distinction between the world of intrigue of the secret police and the more mundane world with which we are concerned here. Police cooperation between the secret police in British Malaya and the police in the Dutch East Indies had proven quite effective, though it had perhaps served to reinforce an exaggerated threat. In this spirit of international police cooperation a bulletin was sent, relaying a message from the New York City Police Department warning of the All-America Anti-Imperialist League [an offspring of the ACLU] and officials of the League, including, “Clarence Darrow, criminal lawyer of known

47 Benda, “The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia.”
48 See McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism.
49 van der Kroef, “Indonesian Nationalism Reconsidered.”
communistic ideas." In the place where Alfred Russel Wallace formulated the theory of evolution contemporaneous with Darwin, Clarence Darrow, the great defender of the teaching of evolution, was suspect. That the colonial state was worried about certain groups is important, but so are other, more mundane mechanisms of control.

The secret police which dealt with the nationalist and communist movements, then, are not the only entities deserving of attention in the history of colonial policing in the late Dutch East Indies. They are important, but it is incumbent upon us not to make too much of them in the history of the colonial police in the Dutch East Indies, particularly if it means neglecting other germane topics. This is one reason why this project focuses on other policing topics, acknowledging the excellent work on the secret police that has been done.

The police force as a whole in the Dutch East Indies was quite small (34,000 in 1930) vis a vis the population, as was the army (37,000 in 1930). Furthermore, it was concentrated on Java/Sumatra. These are the numbers for the general police (Algemene Politie) for the years noted:

1921: 18,341
1925: 25,704
1928: 31,644

But of these police, these are the numbers for the Outer Islands (not Java/Sumatra):

1921: 3,315
1925: 4,732

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50 GMR 1929 No 1095x.
51 Citing the census of 1930, van der Eng puts this at a total of 60.98 million persons, 41.71 million from Java and 19.27 million from the rest of Indonesia [van der Eng, “Bridging a Gap”]
1928: 7,204

A few points should be made. First, it makes perfect sense that most of the police should be on Java/Sumatra as that is where most of the populace continue to reside. But what this tells us about the task of policing, of consolidating and maintaining control, in the Outer Islands is significant. They had to do a lot over vast distances with few people. Second, these numbers are for the general police and not the armed police, who had different duties. Third, this ratio understates the significance of the challenge faced by the armed police in the Outer Islands because they were more important in the periphery than they were even in central areas.

Shiraishi stresses that the armed police were more important on the Outer Islands to keep problems from spreading, notably to keep small problems small in the recalcitrant parts. The armed police could be considered as three different units. In Aceh, the unit remained largely military in nature. In Java it was used primarily to crack down on agrarian unrest. It was in the Outer Islands of the east, however, that it served more as a constabulary in the pacification role that is key to state consolidation. As previously argued, the armed police formed a bridge between a military police and a civilian police in the development of the police force.

Jeffries argues that there is a general pattern to this phenomenon and that it is appropriate to divide the development of the colonial police in the British experience into three main phases, with significant overlap and adjustment for local

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52 Shiraishi, “The Origin of Modern Surveillance.”
53 This understanding is echoed in an article on the armed police published in the Dutch East Indies during the period, De Indische Gids. 1916 II, 1000.
54 Particularly in Schulte Nordholt and van Till, “Colonial Criminals”
55 Shiraishi, personal communication in Kyoto 3/7/11.
conditions. First, there are more or less improvised conditions for securing basic law and order. Second, semi-military constabulary forces are formed, modeled on the Royal Irish Constabulary. These constabulary forces are not only suitable for peacetime police work under the conditions of development but they may function as defense units in time of war. Third is the conversion of these semi-military constabularies into civilian police forces.\textsuperscript{56}

In the particular case of the Dutch East Indies the first large-scale use of military police was in Aceh in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century. The military police unit formed was called the marechaussee. The armed police was the constabulary unit that reached the zenith of its power in the decades after. They were eventually supplanted by the field police (\textit{veldpolitie}). The whole process occurred roughly between 1890 and 1940. That this was a fast development of state institutions is a part of the argument of this dissertation. A greater part of the argument is that this rapid strengthening of the power of the state was possible only because of the participation of indigenous policemen.

\textbf{The Ambonese Question}

Regarding the Dutch East Indies there has been scholarship about the Ambonese and there has been scholarship about colonial policing, but the two have not been explored together. Richard Chauvel’s work on the Ambonese is the

\textsuperscript{56} Jeffries, \textit{The Colonial Police}, 32-33.
standard text, but he addresses the police only as a poor cousin to the military.

David Henley's work on Manado, *Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context: Minahasa in the Dutch East Indies*, is in a similar vein. De Moor and Teitler have both written on the Marechausse in Aceh (“The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, 1700-1950” and “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890-1920,” respectively) but both focus on the military and internal army debates. Locher-Scholten and Bloembergen have written more specifically on the police (respectively, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920” and “Between Public Safety and Political Control: Modern Colonial Policing in Surabaya 1911-1919” as well as Bloembergen’s monograph) but neither centers on the police as a unifying colonial-wide force, choosing instead to focus on the local situation. Of these four, none is specifically interested in the Ambonese either. What I am writing about here is how the traditional understanding of ethnic minority employment by the colonial authority can lead not only to division amongst local people (a standard reading, or rather reaction to this largely fallow topic) but to creation of statewide entities that can help to strengthen the emergent state.

Antonio Gramsci is the philosophical lamp of this project, shining light on the historical traces. Gramsci’s was a thorough and broad-ranging mind who, under the terms of his imprisonment, was able to communicate only through letters and notes which he was unable to organize before he died. His collected notes thereby make
for challenging reading. This is not said to diminish the impact of Gramsci, but it does mean that I will be using some of his broader themes, understanding that a full appreciation of his thought would by necessity go deeper. I do not claim this to be a full exegesis of the man and his life, though I would bring to light a perhaps not so trivial piece of information. Gramsci is known to be Italian, but his native land, Sardinia, is notable for the successive periods of colonialism it has experienced. Gramsci himself was the grandson of an Albanian immigrant who worked for the government as a colonel of gendamerie in Sardinia. Gramsci, therefore, is the scion of a minority policeman in the outer islands of a variegated nation-state. It is of crucial importance to understand that Gramsci developed his ideas in a specific historical context in the period of imperialism.

I am most interested in Gramsci’s interconnected concepts: hegemony through consent expressed in praxis. Gramsci writes that “the essential ingredient of the most modern philosophy of praxis is the historical-political concept of ‘hegemony.’” Sassoon argues that hegemony is undoubtedly the key concept in Gramsci’s thought, but one in which Gramsci saw force and consent as interdependent. Roger concurs that Gramsci did not mean hegemony simply in the sense of preponderant authority. Roger contends that Gramsci was articulating something distinct in positing hegemony as a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent. In this vein Gramsci adds a new dimension to our

\[57\] A visit to the Gramsci archives in Rome was particularly helpful, as have been the scholarly studies of his work.

\[58\] Kiros, *Toward the Construction of a Theory of Political Action; Antonio Gramsci*.

\[59\] Sassoon, *Approaches to Gramsci*, 97.


\[61\] Sassoon, *Approaches To Gramsci*, 94.
understanding of hegemony, extending it to include the practices of gaining state power, and in maintaining that power once it has been achieved.\footnote{Simon, \textit{Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction}, 22-23.}

A crucial element of this kind of hegemony is consent. Gramsci saw force and consent as interdependent, and hegemony as a relationship of compromises.\footnote{Ibid, Pg 94 and 96.} Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion.\footnote{Gill, \textit{Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations}, 52.} Ultimately, consent must rise as force withers. Gill argues that, for Gramsci, hegemony universalizes its own interests and ensures that it “can and must become the interests of the other subordinate groups.”\footnote{Ibid, 119-120.} Hegemony is used in the sense of influence, leadership, consent rather than the alternative and opposite meaning of domination. It has to do with the way one social group influences other groups, making certain compromises with them in order to gain their consent for its leadership in society as a whole.\footnote{Sassoon, \textit{Approaches To Gramsci}, 13.}

Furthermore, hegemony through consent must be expressed in action or practical activity or praxis. Diggins maintains that Gramsci insisted that people’s real conception of the world is found in their practical activity.\footnote{Diggins “The Misuses of Gramsci,” 141-145.} Praxis, as understood from Aristotle to Marx, is bound to action or practical activity but it is not simply action or practical activity. The philosophy of praxis refers to the nexus between theoretical and practical activity, above and beyond a codeword for
Marxism to escape the notice of prison censors. Praxis is concerned with bringing together modes of thinking with that which is implicit in practical life. Praxis is the significance of action vis a vis thought; praxis is the relationship of thought and action. Praxis is not thought equals action or action equals thought, but the relationship between the two. They inform one another and in so doing they inform on one another. Gramsci said that every man is an intellectual. By this he meant that the average worker had practical activity even if he did not have clear theoretical consciousness of his activity. The two are bound. How do we know the philosophy of a man? Through his practical activity, through his praxis. What is done is related to what one actually believes, at least in part. It is an approach to the world of the subaltern whose thoughts are often to be gleaned through deeds.

Praxis is itself bound with consent, to be understood to include agency.

When I speak of agency, the ability to make an expression of autonomous action, I am associating it with Gramsci’s consent. Agency is fundamental to the enterprise. I argue that in the particular historical context in which I am writing, the existence of hegemony connotes agency. Alliance with the hegemonic power is autonomy or expression thereof. Gramsci saw force and consent as interdependent, and that consent must be predicated on the independence of actors, understood to be often imperfect but viable nonetheless, and their actions or praxis. We can see strengthening of the state through the praxis of policing: hegemony effected through consent expressed in praxis.

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68 Hoare, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 28
69 Ibid, 637.
70 Forgacs, Antonio Gramsci: Selections From Cultural Writings, 330(Q8 §169).
In *Hegemony, Discipline and Control in the Administration of Police in Colonial India* Kumar and Verma speak of the ways in which this was done, using the Gramscian lens discussed here. The British achieved hegemony specifically through the use of a criminal justice system and native police. This relied less on fear and less on violence per se as the numbers of police available precluded that possibility. It was the police system itself that managed control, particularly as it was based on the burgeoning consent of the populace but more importantly for our purposes as it was based on the consent and praxis of indigenous policemen. This is very much in line with the ways in which we will look at the armed police.

Police control in the archipelago was always asserted and maintained by few police and those police were almost exclusively indigenous. Roughly a third of the colonial army was European. The police force was more than 96% indigenous. Moreover the colonial budget was too small, the territory and the population numbers too large for any sort of strong state surveillance regime as envisioned in a true security or police state. Particularly in the outer islands, the enormous change in the strengthening of the state was brought about with only modest means. Within that it was the police force that exerted authority, the military called only in emergencies and quite rarely. This would not have happened in the way that it did without indigenous policemen.\(^71\) Moreover, this kind of indigenous presence was not universally true in the Dutch East Indies. Mrazek writes of the role of surveyors in the system of colonial control, tasked with penetrating the dark interior to measure the islands by pure rationality and thus bind the state. But very few of

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those surveyors were indigenous. The Dutch were determined not to let the
‘natives’ see their masters watching.\textsuperscript{72} Not so with the police. With the police there
was no such separation of indigenous from the apparatus of state control.

This dissertation is specifically about the Ambonese in the armed police in
the homelands of the Ambonese. As such, it is appropriate to address the idea of
ethnic history. Informed by Wolters, Tambiah and Andaya, I consider that different
ethnic groups amalgamated by the state under the term Ambonese worked as
policemen in their own areas and nearby areas, the homelands of the Ambonese.
The metaphor of an upturned lamp, whose intense light at the center fades with
distance, is used here but multiplied. The idea here is of many upturned lamps,
illuminating one another and together constituting another light. The original
ethnic identity remains, but it shines with that of others as a force for the state.
Furthermore, this larger light is only possible by the participation of individuals, in
this case of Ambonese policemen.

In theories of ethnicity it is important to recognize the role of elite groups in
the creation of ideology. But ordinary people are also of consequence, particularly
in how they execute their daily activities. Ethnicity in this case study of Ambonese
policemen in the homelands of the Ambonese is related both to the recognized
group identity of individual policemen and to how that identity was impacted by
their actions in the world, namely by how they associated themselves with the
larger group of the burgeoning colonial state and other ethnic groups within that. A
group’s ethnic consciousness arises from contact with other groups, those perceived

\textsuperscript{72} Mrazek, “From Darkness.”
as different. But this does not necessitate a clash. Constructive consciousness is a viable outcome; different groups can recognize themselves as “leaves of the same tree.”

This approach to ethnicity acknowledges both the explanatory value of ethnicity as well as its dynamism. Furthermore, it is predicated on acceptance of ethnic communities as not static, but as identities that can and do change over time. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia where a historical dearth of population led to porosity of ethnic boundaries as rulers endeavored to attain subjects. This can lead to a perceived lack of precision in terms, but this may in fact prove the point, namely that ethnic identity is subject to constant change and shifting of components.

The focus here is on the Ambonese armed policemen in a particular time, in a particular place, in a particular unit of police, not on policemen generally of the Dutch East Indies or Indonesia. To whom does the term “Ambonese” refer? In this study I use the term to refer not only to people from Ambon proper, though they are essential to the integrity of the group. The actual Ambonese were the original stone around which others were joined to make the cairn or ahu. They had a long history with the Dutch, though one less substantial than it would become. They were

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73 Andaya, *Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka*, introduction, passim.
74 Ibid.
75 The police in Indonesia as a whole are themselves under-discussed though there is some very good work done on the other side of policing: Rush, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910*; Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades of the Straits: Smuggling and State-Formation Along a Southeast Asian Frontier*; Peluso, *Rich Forests, Poor People*. 
heavily recruited for military service in Aceh before the Manadonese, another group which might have had its name used for such a purpose. No other group had enough critical mass in the amalgamation to threaten use of the term Ambonese, and the term Ambonese remained.

Beginning in the late 19th century recruitment of Ambonese into the Dutch colonial armed forces increased significantly with the war in Aceh, though Ambonese would always remain a minority force within the army and constitute a smaller group than the Javanese. There had been earlier alliances, economic and military, between Dutch and Ambonese (famously in the case of Captain Jonker), but this sustained and wide-ranging affiliation was of a different degree.76 In this context, the term Ambonese refers to personnel from Ambon, greater Maluku, Manado, and Timor who served in the colonial apparatus. With the exception of Papua New Guinea which was problematic to integrate into the early Republic, the homelands of the Ambonese comprise roughly the eastern border of Indonesia – a series of islands that begins at the tip of north Sulawesi (Manado) and extends down to Timor (west Timor) the southeastern extreme of Indonesia. Maluku is the name of the area that roughly approximates this.

The term Ambonese used in a collective manner was a fluid term of convenience, the boundaries of which can seem almost artificial. This has also been said of the term Indonesian itself and I do not think that is irrelevant. Ambonese thus refers to a minority amalgam entity prominent in the colonial structure originating from the eastern extreme of the archipelago. If that seems vague it is

76 Broos, Snel en geruischloos: Etniciteit en organisatie bij het Korps Marechaussee van Atjeh gedurende de periode 1889 tot 1941.
because the word itself was used as a term of convenience, expanding and contracting as suited the occasion. I am not critiquing that practice. I am arguing that certain groups were considered together, with the term Ambonese (or Moluccan) used in this collective sense. This is of a piece both with the historiography and the documentary record.

In 1980 Teitler, writing specifically on the KNIL (Royal Netherlands-Indies Army), explains it in this way: “The Indonesian soldiers were generally divided into two categories. The smallest of these two, albeit of the highest quality, comprised Amboynese, Menadonese, and a few Alfurian and Timorese soldiers (together often termed ‘Amboynese’).”  


These authors were speaking mainly of the military but this understanding of the term Ambonese existed with the police also. In an 1897 government edict Manadonese and Ambonese were specifically mentioned together for armed police duty on Java, as a concession to the failure to recruit local Javanese and Madurese in Aceh.

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79 Chauvel,”Ambon’s Other Half: Some Preliminary Observations On Ambonese Moslem Society and History.”
81 van Soeren, *Molukse Geschiedenis in Nederlandse Bronnen*.
82 de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian”, 64; de Moor, *Westerling’s War*, 53-54.
sufficient numbers. In a 1907 report on the reorganization of the police on Java, Manadonese and Ambonese are again mentioned together, this time as “Menadonese Amboinese” and as Amboinese Menadonese” with note made of their prowess, though as a minority part of a force that was largely Javanese. In a 1916 police proposal Ambonese is explained to include Manadonese as well as Alfur people, those from Ternate, and others while Bataks and Timorese are closely associated. A 1931 report on the conversion of the armed police to field police groups Ambonese, Manadonese and Timorese together.

My interest is less in delineating when and to what degree any given group was considered or not considered Ambonese, but in how they were brought together to police peoples in their home areas under the common banner of the state. Stranger policing uses a deliberate form of ethnic antagonism. This can happen with police. It can also happen with militaries, as in the case of the Ambonese in the KNIL. The focus in this project, however, is on policing that involves local people in their home areas. The military used the Ambonese against others of the archipelago in their non-Ambonese home areas to strengthen the state. In the home areas of the Ambonese the Ambonese were used as police to strengthen the state. Both of these things happened at the same time. Home policing led to the formation of deeper and longer-lasting institutions. The military employment of the

83 RA 1901 I, 141.
84 Boekhoudt, Rapport: Reorgranisatie van het Politiewezen of Java en Madoera (Uitgezonderd De Vorstenlanden, De Particuliere Landerijen En De Hoofdplaatsen Batavia, Semarang En Soerabaja) 1906-1907, 234.
85 Besluit 23 April 1920 No: 29
86 BB 3632 [1931]
Ambonese led to the making of an ethnic military caste of a disparate group of people, one that would find many of its members leaving the archipelago at the time of independence. In the police these same disparate groups were brought together within their homelands in a way that would strengthen the state by creating an institution that would remain, namely the police.

**Religion, Education, and the Ambonese**

Religion is not a focus of this dissertation. Here religion is important as it served as a way for the state to identify allies. Religion in this sense essentially means Christianity because the Muslims of Ambon generally did not participate in the late colonial state, though they were a substantial population of the area. For many observers discussion of the Ambonese simply must be about Christianity. For this project, however, the Christianity of many in the home areas of the Ambonese is taken as a given. More importantly, in a large way the emergent colonial state in the Outer Islands did that too. As such, it was logical for the state to incorporate the Ambonese. Religion is treated more as signifier than signified, understanding that other people will validly treat it very differently. Religion was for the colonial state one sign of good alliance. We might profitably think of Dreyfus:

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87 This is not to say that the Indonesian military is without issues related to ethnicity. But this is to say that the Indonesian military does not have segregated units of Ambonese soldiers used as an antagonistic counterweight to non-Ambonese and stationed in non-Ambonese areas.
89 Bartels, “From Black Dutchmen to White Moluccans: Ethnic Metamorphosis of an East Indonesian Minority in the Netherlands.”
his own personal Judaism is, in the narrative, perhaps less important than what it says about fin de siècle France as the state there was strengthened.\textsuperscript{90}

The Ambonese, Christian or otherwise, were not the impetus for the formation of the Indonesian state. In their role as armed policemen they were, rather, an expression of the initial formation of the state. Van Klinken writes, “The most important contextual element in Ambon is a degree of penetration by the state into society that is high even by Indonesian standards. Modern administration expanded into the eastern part of the archipelago with increasing intensity throughout the twentieth century. Ambon was the base for this bureaucratic colonization.”\textsuperscript{91}

Christianity is important in considering the Ambonese as armed police because Christian privilege was the norm among the Ambonese throughout the existence of the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese. But this privilege was exercised through integration more than antagonism within the armed police. The story is of how a group of Christian policemen, often regarded as a tool to be used against Muslim, power, effected a successful struggle to help cohere an emergent nation-state in which the majority of the population would be Muslim. This is not to say that religion is not important. The origins of religious difference are important, but the greater concern here is how they are experienced by the colonial encounter.

The emergent colonial state in the Outer Islands regarded the Christianity of the Ambonese who worked for the state as a present condition, one to be used to the

\textsuperscript{90} Brown, \textit{For The Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus}.
\textsuperscript{91} Van Klinken, \textit{Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia}, 90.
advantage of the state. Bartels and Chauvel, respectively, cast some light on the proportions and verities involved: “During the colonial period, the Ambonese Moslems were eclipsed by their Christian brethren although they made up about one-third of the population. Today they constitute at least half of the Ambonese population but the fiction remains, both in Indonesia and in Holland, that the Central Moluccas are essentially Christian islands.”92 “The religious composition of the Ambon and Lease islands is difficult to ascertain with any accuracy, but is has been estimated as being roughly equally divided between Moslems and Christians... The Moslem community did not participate in the late colonial enterprise... Unlike Kapitein Jonker, latter day Moslems regarded joining the colonial army as akin to becoming a kafir.”93 Jonker is an illustrative case. A legendary figure, he was a Muslim who fought for the VOC in campaigns in Makassar, Jambi, and Bantam. Despite his service, he died under suspicion of organizing a revolt against the VOC. His reputation was later associated with the martial image of the Ambonese, despite the fact that later Ambonese were Christian. Religion in the Ambonese experience is often more signifier than signified.94

Christianity played a role in a related endeavor, education. Ambon was a center for teacher training in the homelands of the Ambonese. This also helped to create a sense of a coherent island-wide colonial state. Chauvel writes that, “There is a strong association in our minds between the expansion of a western-

94 Broos, Snel en geruisloos, 30.
style education, particularly Dutch-language education, for Indonesians and the emergence of the nationalist movement... The link between education and opposition to the colonial regime was not nearly as clear for Ambonese... The prevailing ambition of educated Ambonese in the first decades of the 20th century was to achieve equality with Europeans, through working within the system."95 In the homelands of the Ambonese we can see in the experience of education the same as we see in the experience of the armed police: the foundations of the Indonesian state being laid through engagement through the colonial state. This would not, in and of itself, lead to the formation of Indonesia. But the contribution of the Christian Ambonese is significant.

It is important to be clear on some issues regarding who and who was not considered Ambonese. First and foremost, I am guided by the colonial state’s definition of Ambonese, one in which the Ambonese participated in the Gramscian manner discussed. It was the state that defined the Ambonese originally. Ambonese participation followed, but the term Ambonese was not a signifier for local people. Why are the Timorese included? Because the documentary evidence bears it out: Timorese Christians were identified as good possibilities for work under the Dutch and referred to in conjugation with the other groups of the Ambonese. Furthermore, the Ambonese are largely Christian groups from Eastern Indonesia and the Timorese are of a piece with that.

This speaks to the thesis of this project: that in working as policemen in their

home areas the Ambonese strengthened the state. The Ambonese working for the Dutch East Indies, policing for the state, is significant for the incorporation of the rough eastern border of the archipelago. From Manado to Rote, this sweep is part of the whole. And, as Winichakul has noted, what defines the periphery ends up impacting the definition of the center and the whole. This understanding of the Ambonese also serves as counterpoint to other representations of these groups as separatist, be it RMS, Permesta, or the independent state of East Timor. I am not arguing against the validity of those perceptions of the Ambonese. I am arguing for a more robust understanding.

Martial Race Theory and the Ambonese

Martial race theory has long been intertwined with the Ambonese and it needs to be addressed here. Martial race theory is the idea that certain racial or ethnic groups make better fighters than other groups. It has its roots in a corrupt understanding of Darwinism. On The Origin of Species was published in 1859; the Sepoy Mutiny occurred in 1857. It was the Sepoy Mutiny that augured a forceful dissemination of ideas of martial race theory as one way to forestall future mutinies by indigenous forces. But the pernicious impact of martial race theory is more than a mangling of legitimate scientific advance.

There are three levels of misconception that pertain to martial race theory. The first is easily dispensed with: there is no scientific basis for the idea that some

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97 Kiernan, Colonial Empires and Armies, 1815-1960.
groups of people are better at fighting than others according to race. The second is less straightforward. The assumption with martial race theory is often that it was an orthodoxy among colonial officials and that they acted in certain ways because they themselves believed in it. But colonial officials themselves were not completely taken with the idea.\textsuperscript{98} This is particularly true in the case of the Ambonese. A 1910 article in a Dutch East Indies publication has the author expressing studied disdain for the notion that the Ambonese were somehow inherently better suited for warfare than the Javanese.\textsuperscript{99} De Moor writes that any discourse on martial races that stressed inherited attributes, of the sort associated with the British, never existed in the Dutch East Indies.\textsuperscript{100}

This leads to the third misconception, one regarding the use of martial race theory as a thin disguise for the technique of divide and conquer, window-dressing for a strategy of pitting groups against one another rather than a sort of assent to a biological imperative. In this understanding pitting groups against one another is the concrete manifestation of an idea that underlies martial race theory and predates it. The notion of privileging one group over another to enhance rule was not a new idea: the British had done it previously with the Scottish Highlanders whom they used against the Irish and then, in another part of the Empire, the Indians of the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{101} Let us first understand the phenomenon to understand better the misconception associated with it.

\textsuperscript{98} Kaushik, "Recruitment Doctrines of the Colonial Indian Army: 1859-1913."
\textsuperscript{99} De Indische Gids 1910 I
\textsuperscript{100} de Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers,” 59, 64.
\textsuperscript{101} McNeil, “Petticoated Devils’: Scottish Highland Soldiers in British Accounts of the Indian Rebellion,” 77-94.
The practice of pitting groups against one another is a tried and tested one but it exploded with the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. As an example, before 1857 the colonial army in India was drawn predominantly from Bengal. But the Revolt was most intense in the very areas that had supplied the best recruits to the Bengal Army. Accordingly, the post-1857 reorganization of the army entailed a dramatic fall in members from such traditional recruitment areas. Recruitment of Bengalis was now prohibited and almost overnight the hitherto backbone of the colonial army became ‘feeble even to effeminacy.’ Sikhs as a martial race were now not so much discovered as created\(^\text{102}\), and they would be employed as both soldiers and police.\(^\text{103}\) Constable makes a pertinent observation when he writes that differences between groups were neither orientalist invention made out of whole cloth nor eternal verities but rather a middle ground catalyzed and exploited by the British.\(^\text{104}\)

The phenomenon was a global one in the colonial era, in the military and police. We can see this in Francophone Africa with the Tirailleurs Senegalais of Niger.\(^\text{105}\) The British in Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) sought to bolster ethnic categorization despite a lack of prior clear-cut ethnic identity so as to effect control.\(^\text{106}\) In Indochina the garde indigene evolved out of the police indigene, recruited from central Vietnam to police in Cambodia. The Khmer were later

\(^\text{102}\) Mahmud, “Colonialism and Modern Constructions of Race: A Preliminary Inquiry.”
\(^\text{103}\) Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920.
\(^\text{104}\) Constable, “The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Western India.”
\(^\text{105}\) Vandervort, “review of Djata’s The Bamana Empire by the Niger: Kingdom, Jihad and Colonization, 1712-1920”
recruited into the army itself for greater balance. Moreover, the garde itself was less a small army than it was a provincial police force by its character, goal, and organization.\textsuperscript{107} In the Philippines the US avoided the Tagalog majority and recruited by ethnolinguistic group.\textsuperscript{108} Notably, this was not the only instance of the United States using ethnicities like chess pieces in her armed forces: In the Civil War the Union segregated the army into ethnic regiments.\textsuperscript{109}

Such state facilitated antagonism absolutely did happen. The Ambonese became such a group in the Dutch East Indies, and they were used at times for this purpose, particularly in the military. The misconception lies, however, in the idea that it is the only thing that happened, that such antagonism was uniformly the norm and that stranger policing in particular was almost universal. Deflem\textsuperscript{110}, Anderson and Killingray\textsuperscript{111}, Arnold\textsuperscript{112}, and Kirk-Greene\textsuperscript{113} all speak to the importance of stranger policing mediated through this understanding of martial race theory and its more concrete application. At the conference in Paris noted above I observed a consensus as to the broad use of stranger policing. No one endorsed martial race theory, but most contended that the practice of using groups against one another in policing was the standard practice.

\textsuperscript{107} Womack, “Ethnicity and Martial Races: The Garde Indigene of Cambodia in the 1880s and 1890s”
\textsuperscript{108} Meixsel, “American Exceptionalism.”
\textsuperscript{110} Deflem, “Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast, and Kenya.”
\textsuperscript{111} Anderson and Killingray, \textit{In Policing the Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940}.
\textsuperscript{112} Arnold, \textit{Police Power and Colonial Rule}, 59
\textsuperscript{113} Kirk-Greene, “Damnosa hereditas: ethnic ranking and martial race imperatives in Africa.”
The argument of this dissertation is that the employment of minorities in policing was not uniformly stranger policing. The Ambonese armed police served to strengthen the state through their participation as minority policemen in their home areas. Their feelings towards the Dutch are worthy of investigation, but so are their actions in support of the state. Education was one vehicle which served to bring together the peoples of the archipelago; it raised consciousness of a collective identity. I argue that working as policeman served in a similar way to develop a constituency through functionality, as it did with stranger policing. Ambonese armed policemen worked for the state bringing them closer to it and strengthening that state which encompassed the archipelago. That this happened in what can be seen as an ad hoc manner (ie police reorganizations were not the result of a master plan) shows the agency of indigenous actors. The state was able to proceed only with their participation and thus had to develop with it.

The Ambonese are exceptional because of the great variety of peoples amalgamated under that term. From Rote on the edges of Australia to Sangihe and Talaud flush against the reaches of the Philippines, the Ambonese referred to disparate peoples under a common banner. It was a remarkable feat of consolidation of peoples within the state. Furthermore, the exploration here is of a particular iteration of the Ambonese that has gone unexplored. Typically the Ambonese are thought of as a martial group used in the military against the Javanese and others. This is a very real part of their history, but so is their work as policemen within their home areas. In bringing together a region under the banner of an archipelago-wide state they were strengthening the state. The story here is of
an amalgamation of ethnic groups, largely minorities, in the periphery of what would become a nation-state working in the colonial structure of policing. Their work furthered rule, but their story has not yet been told. The armed police were the crucial element in helping to spread the colonial state. They helped to make Eastern Indonesia a part of the larger political unit that became Indonesia.

Chapter 1 has been an introduction to this topic and an elucidation of methodology and approach. In addition to arguing for the state-strengthening work of the Ambonese armed police in their home areas, a goal of this project is to provide a case study of an armed police. It is further hoped that this will also provide a broader understanding of the Ambonese experience in the late colonial period. The armed police strengthened the state through their development and spread; in this regard the Ambonese experience was one less of antagonism than amalgamation.

Chapter 2 will deal with the origins of the armed police, particularly how the origins of the armed police are affected by the experience of the Ambonese marechaussee during the war in Aceh. The military in Aceh introduced a special unit of military police, the marechaussee, to effect control there, having found conventional military tactics imperfect for what they hoped to accomplish. At the same time locally controlled armed police units were being established in the colony, long before the reorganization of 1897. The Ambonese were a robust presence within the military and the marechaussee. This was the true beginning of
such a presence within the colonial authority, inside and outside the homelands of the Ambonese, and both would serve to strengthen the state.

Chapter 3 will deal with the first reorganization of the police in 1897. This was the beginning of the true armed police, in Ambon and elsewhere. Previous attempts at police control had been control in local areas. The armed police were concerned with extending control over much greater areas. In this they were not simply taking over from an existing local force but trying to fashion a new sense of control, one the military had not been able to effect. This was not a local attempt to spread out so much as a colony-wide effort to have a uniform police presence over the whole, controlled at the local level. The Ambonese were integral to this project from the beginning; the armed police were as significant in the homelands of the Ambonese as in any other part of the archipelago. Furthermore, stranger policing may have been an intention but it did not become a reality despite serious concerns about the quality of the personnel the state was taking in to strengthen itself.

Chapter 4 will deal with the second reorganization of the police in 1912. This marked the high point of the armed police. This reorganization was spearheaded by Posno with Hoorweg at his side. The civil powers of the police expanded as the military powers were de-emphasized. The tension between central and local control grew more fraught as the armed police were centralized but also technically still in the hands of local authorities: the armed police went from being the area-wide tool for the region to a centralized force in which regional control was exercised. Within this the Ambonese were the most statistically significant group within the armed police in their own homelands. This created tension as the
Ambonese armed police sought to be accorded the same status as the Ambonese in the military.

Chapter 5 will deal with the third reorganization of the police in 1918. This saw the introduction of the field police and the gradual abolition of the armed police. The armed police in the Ambonese homelands persisted into the 1930s, well after the archipelago-wide dissolution of the unit had been decided upon. The armed police were replaced for the exigencies of the world economy, losing out to the more powerful military which sought to maintain itself by assuming some of the role of the armed police. In this reorganization Hoorweg makes a strong case for the success of the armed police in accomplishing the task of strengthening the state, particularly in the outer islands. In the outer island area of the homelands of the Ambonese we see great reluctance to end the armed police. We also see the continued presence of local personnel within local areas with overlap between areas as well as greater function between areas in the forms of armed police activity.

Chapter 6 will deal with the field police and the legacy of the armed police up to the beginning of the Second World War. The field police had similar duties to those of the armed police, particularly in outer areas, but control of the field police was no longer centralized as it was with the armed police. This return to local hands was possible because the armed police force itself had been made more established over the archipelago. This occurred in conjunction with resurgence of the marechaussee who were brought back to more prominence to perform tasks for which the non-police military were not fully suited. The Ambonese armed police
were essentially folded into the new field police and though the concept of stranger policing persisted, in practice the Ambonese remained in their homelands.

The Conclusion will speak to what came after the evolution of colonial state control that has been demonstrated in this dissertation. The Dutch East Indies state had been consolidated by the beginning of the Second World War. This state remained viable through the Japanese period and the British/Australian interregnum of 1945-1946. The peripheral areas that had become part of the larger state would experience continuous police control through these tumultuous years before becoming part of the Indonesian state.
Chapter 2 – The Marechaussee

In the previous chapter we looked at the historiography of colonial policing and discussed the Ambonese as a privileged group within the colonial state in the archipelago that would become Indonesia. In this chapter we will look to the broader political context that enabled the rise of the armed police. We will discuss the marechaussee in Aceh, a group that paved the way for the armed police, and also explore how the Ambonese became a privileged group for the colonial state. Finally, we will look to the early armed police units that predate the Police Reorganization of 1897 that established the colony-wide system of armed police.

Colonial Politics From a Policing Perspective

There exists a quite famous photograph from the early period of what came to be known as the Acehnese War. Victorious men, faces hard from the fight and for the benefit of the camera, scowl menacingly as they flourish their swords and rifles. The Dutch had at last managed to exert a degree of control over the resistant northern tip of Sumatra. It was a proud day for the colonial forces, as their enemies lay – literally – underfoot. In the picture can be seen the torn bodies of Acehnese, corpses bloodied in the mud. The disturbing violence of the photograph is not, however, what makes it notable here. Though considered a Dutch victory, there are only a few European faces in the photograph. The colonial forces here are indigenous. Were we to meet people like them today we would consider them Indonesian, just as we would consider Acehnese to be Indonesian. But the men in
this photograph have a different story, and ethnicity is not all of it. When we look more closely at the uniforms in the photograph we can see that the colonial forces here are not soldiers. They are policemen.\textsuperscript{114}

One way to look at this picture is to see the violent hand of the Dutch colonial authority, and that would not be unfair. Another way to look at this is to see the ways in which the colonial imperium of divide and conquer found life. This would also be warranted. I am interested in something different, however. Namely, I wish to explore how from such a moment of bloody division could come a national police force that, while certainly imperfect, grew through the colonial eras into a pillar of the Indonesian nation-state.

Politics feature broadly in this study, but these are the internal politics of the police and not politics in the larger sense of Metternich. The politics here are humbler ones, but it is important to get a brief sense of the broad view to understand them better. For this let us first consider the observations of J.S. Furnivall, explore the pertinent implications of the Ethical Policy, and appreciate the situation in the Outer Islands.

J.S. Furnivall’s \textit{Colonial Policy and Practice} is the celebrated witness to the commonalities and discrepancies of late colonialism in Southeast Asia. Furnivall is writing quite late in terms of empire, but this can be seen as giving him even more of an overarching perspective. He writes at the outset that the primary concern of empire is order and not conquest. The British system, by his reckoning, does this

\textsuperscript{114}This photograph is found in Taylor’s “Aceh Histories in the KITLV Images Archive, First International Conference of Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies February 24-27 2007” as well as in Hack and Rettig, \textit{Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia}, 162.
chiefly by imposition of laws developed in Europe and other parts of the empire.\footnote{Furnivall, \textit{Colonial Policy and Practice}, 10.} He contrasts this rather unfavorably with the Dutch system. Furnivall regards the Dutch system in the Netherlands East Indies as a dual system in which Dutch power is undergirded always with deference to local custom. The key principal is that of “like over like.”\footnote{Furnivall, \textit{Colonial Policy and Practice}, 264.} It is intriguing that for Furnivall one of the key signs of development in the Dutch East Indies was the traffic cop. He notes in particular that, until recently (1948), there was no organized police force in the rural areas.\footnote{Furnivall, \textit{Colonial Policy and Practice}, 180.} The function of the police, of which Furnivall is approving, is not just that of an agent of control but of an agent that extends control.

Debate on the Ethical Policy cannot be justly dispensed with in a paragraph.\footnote{Vandenbosch, \textit{The Dutch East Indies}, 63-73 provides a brief but succinct discussion of the “Ethical Policy”. One could also profitably consult the successfully ambitious histories of Indonesia by Vickers or Ricklefs.} But simply put, the Ethical Policy was an effort to imbue Dutch policy to the colony with a current of moral obligation. Where this departed from the white man’s burden or mission civilisatrice was in the emphasis on the material over the cultural. What had been a site for economic exploitation was to become something more equitable in dispensation.\footnote{van der Kroef, “Indonesia and the Origins of Dutch Colonial Sovereignty.” To wit, “The nineteenth century also laid the foundation of the new policy of humanitarianism known as the ethical policy: education, public health, and social welfare became major concerns of colonial statecraft.”} It can be traced to an 1899 essay published in \textit{De Gids} by van Deventer, endorsed royally two years later.\footnote{Artistic genesis, however, goes back to Multatuli’s (Douwes Dekker’s) \textit{Max Havelaar} (1859) The titular Max Havelaar was an official on Java, but it should be}
crucial step towards Indonesian independence, less because the Dutch envisioned that at the time (though some did) but because it served as a conduit for the tools of independence, both intellectual and functional. The effects of the Ethical Policy were such that they enabled independence. The late colonial era, to include the Ethical Policy, saw movement (especially bureaucratic movement here) to foster the burgeoning nation-state.\textsuperscript{121}

**The Marechaussee in Aceh**

Nowhere do we see this more clearly than in the Outer Islands. The Aceh War can be seen to have marked the beginning of a new era of expansion. A series of successful expeditions were mounted from the 1890’s: battles on Lombok, Jambi and Kerinci on Sumatra, Ceram in Maluku, Banjarmasin in Kalimantan, Bone on Sulawesi, Bali, and Flores were all military victories for the colonial state. The second phase of expansion, however, was that of enacting a system of control over newly “pacified” areas, especially the establishing of government posts. The notion that archipelago had been under Dutch control for centuries is a Java-centric misconception. What was different about this period was a systematic maintenance and extension of administrative power into the Outer Islands.\textsuperscript{122} This was the

\footnotesize{noted that he came to Java from Amboina. Not to put too fine a point on it, but Ambon is nothing trivial in the history of Indonesia.  
\textsuperscript{121} Benda, “The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia.”  
\textsuperscript{122} Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate.”}

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milieu in which the Ethical Policy was conceived and born. Aceh is important here because it was in the Aceh experience that the modern police of Indonesia were born, or rather what would come out of Aceh would allow for the modern police of Indonesia.

By 1873 Dutch treaties with the British following the opening of the Suez Canal had cleared the way for the Dutch to attempt control over areas they had long claimed. The reasons for this are many but a brief reckoning is this: By the early 1800’s Aceh was a commercial and political power, producing over half the world’s supply of pepper. In the latter nineteenth century the British, owing to conflict politics in Europe, found it in their interest to support Dutch claims in Indonesia, strengthening control by the Dutch and exciting Dutch desire for further control. Many Acehnese, naturally, saw things quite differently.¹²³ War developed, the Dutch used conventional military forces in the early years of the conflict, but by 1898 they realized that these would not prove sufficient for rule over areas subjugated. What was needed was a new instrument, one that would control in ways in which the military had proved insufficient.

The war in Aceh led to the development of the marechaussee and the armed police. To understand better this process it is helpful to understand the circumstances of conception and imagination that undergirded the conflict. By the dawn of the 20th century the European colonial race was at its zenith, at the time of

¹²³ Ricklefs, A History Of Modern Indonesia, 135.
its truly global phase.\textsuperscript{124} The Dutch were no small part of this race, as was all of Europe. Indeed, German resentment over what she perceived to be colonial scraps would be one of the inducements to the World War. The Netherlands was not to be left out, and the Dutch East Indies was her stake (minus smaller islands in the Caribbean). Thinking in terms of empire, thinking in terms of clashes with great powers, the conflict in Aceh was seen as the place where the Dutch Empire would be made. The stakes were high, and the stakes were what was to become Indonesia. The battle over Aceh would be the start of not only the pacification of the archipelago, but in a very real way the creation of the archipelago. What had before been a loose collection of islands was now to be seen, really for the first time, as an integral whole.

We can view this profitably from another angle. In July of 1873 a Constantinople newspaper announced that the Ottoman Government had decided to send eight warships to Sumatra to prevent any hostile attacks on Aceh. The report was false, based on nothing more than the hopes of a pan-Islamic party, but statesmen in Holland, and some in Batavia, made the mistake of seeing it as part of a world-wide pan-Islamic movement which posed a threat to all the 'Christian Powers' in Asia.\textsuperscript{125} But this telling incident enlightens us more about the Dutch than about the Acehnese or the Ottoman Empire. What we see here is that the Dutch viewed the fight over Aceh in grand terms of empire. This was not just a battle for a

\textsuperscript{124} Notably, the imperial powers of the era (to include the Japanese) found it efficient to foster modern and indirectly controlled institutions in the colonies to enable expansion and control. Prasenjit, “Asia Redux.”

\textsuperscript{125} Reid, “Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia.”
particular piece of land atop one island. This was a call to arms for an idea of colonial ownership that would come to define the Dutch East Indies, and Indonesia.

In July of 1891 Snouck Hurgronje went to Aceh at the behest of the Netherlands-Indies government. State authorities sought expertise regarding the Achehnese. They were particularly conscious of the strength of Islam at a provincial and international level. Snouck Hurgronje had established himself as an expert on the subject of Islam with his works on Muslims on the Arabian Penninsula and on the city of Mecca, where he had first encountered peoples from the Dutch East Indies. What he was being called upon to do in Aceh was to find a way to save the military mission, to leverage his intellectual expertise to formulate a winning strategy of domination. He was an academic who served in a policy role, but more than merely an inspirer of abstract notions of policy. His motives are expressed in this way:

“We may certainly add that [resolution in Aceh] also provides the solution in so many other aspects of the problem to the future relationship between the people of the Indies Archipelago and us... A people is never thankful even for the benefactions superimposed by foreigners... However, if on the other hand by means of association, which is desired by both sides, the stage is reached where both the Javanese and the Netherlands have achieved the greatest possible common intellectual ground, then there will be no need to speak about gratitude to foreigners because what was foreign will have become part of oneself; there will be only Eastern and Western Netherlands, who politically and nationally form a unity, irrespective of the difference of race.”

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126 Rahim, *Muslim In Indonesia*, 3.
127 Sofyan, *Perang Kolonial Belanda Di Aceh*, 178. N.B. The anti-Semitic undertones of this text (the author purports Snouck Hurgronje to be Jewish) are noted, but where an argument is formulated as opposed to a prejudice articulated it is considered and examined.
This was not a vision that saw merely a pacified port for commercial exploitation. Rather, this was a grand vision for unification.\(^{129}\) This catholic view is of a piece with the later Ethical Policy. To view Snouck Hurgronje’s work in Aceh, to view the conflict in Aceh, as a simple exercise in military conquest is to miss this key development. Aceh was a conflict that was being lost because of an adherence to the strict military model of the time. The collaboration of Snouck Hurgronje and the colonial state would birth a form of policing new to the land and to the state, one that would not only enable success in Aceh but that would serve as a model for pacification throughout the islands.

What is important here is to understand that the success of Dutch efforts in Aceh hinged on the deployment of a military police force in both a military and a civil capacity. It was a hybrid organization, but one that was pointed in the direction of civil control. Violence was still very much present, but so now were other tools of control. The other critical element is the duplication of efforts begun in Aceh. The deployment of the marechaussee, and what it stood for, would be exported.\(^{130}\) With the war won and lessons learned, the colonial state could now devote resources and manpower to the pacification of large areas in the Outer Islands where it had before exercised only nominal control.\(^{131}\)

Snouck Hurgronje was at the fore in this effort to increase control over the Outer Islands. He designed the Short Declaration that facilitated the establishment of

\(^{129}\) Van Niel, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje: In Memory of the Centennial of his Birth.”

\(^{130}\) Cribb, Robert. *The Late Colonial State in Indonesia*, 67. The use of marechausse in Kalimantan and Sulawesi is noted, specifically to wield civil power.

\(^{131}\) Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia.”
of Dutch suzerainty over the territories nominally ruled by Indonesian potentates.\(^ {132}\) Power was to be of a certain type, both civil and military, that is say it would not abjure violence but it would seek the more elegant but no less inherently sinister vehicle of administration. Snouck Hurgronje’s reports contain clear evidence of bureaucratic consideration. Adopted by the government, they acquired the status of policy statements. A strong advocate of colonial government, Snouck Hurgronje’s primary concern was the maintenance and extension of Dutch authority.\(^ {133}\) New police units would serve this vision of the archipelago.

In 1898 Governor General, C.H.A. van der Wijck became convinced of the wisdom of Snouck Hurgronje’s views on Aceh. Van der Wijck appointed Major J.B. van Heutsz Governor of Aceh. It was van Heutsz who would directly introduce the marechaussee to Aceh, with Snouck Hurgronje collaborating directly in this effort.\(^ {134}\) Van Heutsz saw the tactical value of this new unit, but he also held strong views on who should be entrusted with civil authority, namely civil servants. He maintained, however, that in war officers should take over the civil administration. This led to the use of marechaussee officers in military and civil positions as civil administration was implemented.\(^ {135}\) Moreover, it facilitated the civil/military function of the marechaussee that would lead to the position of policing in the burgeoning network of control over the archipelago. Snouck Hurgronje’s vision


\(^ {133}\) Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesians Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate.”

\(^ {134}\) Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 13. He observes that an Acehnese nobleman made the direct suggestion to use mobile units.

\(^ {135}\) Cribb, “Military Rule in the Netherlands Indies” and van den Doel “The Economic Position of the Uleëbalang in the Late Colonial State.”
would be effected by this new, practical activity and Aceh would be “pacified.” Van Heutsz would be rewarded by being named Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies in 1904. The rise of a policing regime for the archipelago would thus be implemented.

Role of the Marechaussee in the Colonial State

The common understanding of Dutch control in the late Dutch East Indies is that the effort was undertaken by the Dutch colonial army, the KNIL, with a racial strategy of divide and conquer. Clearly much is correct in this iteration, but it is not complete in and of itself. Two elements that are missing from such an understanding: 1) the role of the police, and 2) how ethnicity factored into control not in the way of divide and conquer.

The first is more easily considered. That the police played an important part in the extension of state control is a readily agreeable one. Anderson notes that under the Ethical Policy there was a huge extension of the state apparatus deep into native society concurrent with a proliferation of functions to include those of the relatively small KNIL and a complex of police forces. The specific need for police arose largely from the limitations of the efficacy of military power and the expanded ambitions of the colonial state. Dutch military historian Petra Groen notes that the nineteenth century policy of abstention had been dictated by the technical

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limitations of the military apparatus: a simple profit-and-loss analysis showing that
military expeditions in impenetrable jungles would not pay off and possibilities for
expansion were thereby reduced.\footnote{Locher-Scholten, “Dutch Expansion in the Indonesians Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism Debate.” Locher-Scholten observes that the Dutch would consistently overestimate the efficacy of military force. See also Groen, \textit{Militant Response}.} Moreover, the KNIL could only do so much in
terms of continuous control because the idea of a permanent standing army of
territory-wide reach was a relatively new practice.\footnote{Ralston, \textit{Importing the European Army}, 11.}

It is important to understand how our perception of the KNIL is incomplete
because it is in understanding these gaps within the military attempt at control that
we can perceive the police. The Dutch empire in Southeast Asia was able to expand
when it stopped trying to accomplish its goals with European agents of control and
relied instead on indigenous personnel. Once this source of manpower existed
expansion was possible.\footnote{Bossenbroek, “The Living Tools of Empire.”} And this expansion happened with the use of innovative
police forces, born of the Aceh experience, and through incorporation of minorities.

Structurally, the marechaussee was a military unit subject to army
regulations, but from the beginning it was also understood to be a police corps, and
specifically a gendamerie, or an armed police.\footnote{Puype and Boekwijt, \textit{Klewang: Catalogus van het Legermuseum}, 56. The term marechaussee derives from “men with arms.”} From the beginning too they were
seen as a break from past tactics, and as the formation of an elite force.\footnote{Teitler in “The Mixed Company” refers to the marechaussee as elite troops, as does Pramoedya in the opening chapter of \textit{This Earth of Mankind}.}

Particularly in the Lombok affair of 1894, Dutch Colonial Army military tactics were
seen as lacking. This, in combination with the burgeoning zeitgeist that would lead

to the Ethical Policy, led to a new emphasis on law and order, with control paramount. This was still, at this stage, within the military sphere but entailed a need for new tactics for control.\textsuperscript{142} The KNIL standard had been to advance in long closed columns with long maneuvering. This was suitable for mass action in the open field (one imagines the Battle of Waterloo), but not against what later generations would term an insurgency. The solution was the Aceh Formula, a counter-guerilla force, in which the marechaussee operated in a number of highly efficient, mobile and autonomous operating teams.\textsuperscript{143}

Snouck Hurgronje and van Heutsz inherited a situation in which the army could only operate within a kilometer of their established lines, a purely defensive posture. Hurgronje called this “a damnable system that our soldiers [are] sentenced to, like a monkey on the chain.” The solution was the marechaussee who had been established in the Government Decision No 2 April 1890, but whose role was enlarged in Government Decree of 13 January 1897 No 1 Military Police Corps. This changed the role of the corps from that of a police for the military to an external force, especially in terms of patrol operations, also called “little war.”\textsuperscript{144} Their focus was to consolidate territory conquered for the colonial state by continuous and unremitting patrolling.\textsuperscript{145} Among its many civil-military tasks, the most important were guarding the bridges and railroads, mapping areas unknown to the colonial state, registering the native population, checking people visiting the markets, and disrupting the smuggling of weapons. The marechaussee began pursuing these

\textsuperscript{142} De Moor, “Warmakers in the Archipelago.”
\textsuperscript{143} Van Doorn and Hendrix, \textit{Ontsporing van Geweld}, 113-115.
\textsuperscript{144} Broos, \textit{Snel en geruischloos}, 13.
\textsuperscript{145} De Klerck, \textit{History of the Netherlands East Indies: Volume II}, 368.
activities in 1893, but it was only in the 1897 were these practices codified.\textsuperscript{146} The process of policing for the colonial state owed much to decisions on the ground and actions initiated by the praxis of policing. From the beginning the role of the marechaussee, that which pointed them in the direction of policing rather than that of the classically military, was to be of the people. They were not an alien force controlling from without, but a part of the landscape, that is to say an indigenous force of the colonial state controlling from within. From the beginning they were projected beyond the military line because the notion of a line does not exist for police. They do not contest over area, they control absolutely; theirs is a monopoly of violence in the Weberian sense.\textsuperscript{147}

At the end of 1891 the corps consisted of two officers (almost undoubtedly European) and 217 men, 204 of whom were indigenous. By the beginning of 1899 there were 20 officers and 1,212 men, the vast majority of whom were indigenous. Soldiers selected from the infantry were allowed into the corps, with a commitment from two to six years of service. Only the best were recruited, and the unsuitable were sent back to their army units. Training consisted of drill, gymnastics and fencing, target shooting, pioneering exercises, field exercises, and learning the Malay language. Knowledge of Achenese language and customs was considered indispensable because it allowed the marechaussee local area knowledge and familiarity with the Achenese population.\textsuperscript{148}

The marechaussee prepared for and engaged the enemy on very different

\textsuperscript{146} Teitler, \textit{The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition}, 14.
\textsuperscript{147} Weber, \textit{“Politics as Vocation,”} 78.
\textsuperscript{148} Broos, \textit{Snel en geruischloos}, 9.
terms than the army had. Language training and lessons in geography and ethnography were as important as shooting and drill. They trained differently from the military, using carefully designed and realistic scenarios with a simulated environment involving indigenous extras and copies of indigenous houses as well as practice interrogations. Above all they were directed towards a future role: that of protecting the public and supporting the legitimate authority of the state.\textsuperscript{149}

**Ethnicity and the Marechaussee**

Ethnicity is integral to the formation of the state. Generally speaking, ethnic factors have been neglected in the study of armed forces.\textsuperscript{150} In the case of the Ambonese there exists the incomplete understanding of the Ambonese as the backbone of the KNIL. While this may be true in a sense, it is not confirmed statistically. The Ambonese were always a minority within the KNIL (the Javanese were always the majority) and they were not the first or only minority group brought in to counterbalance the Javanese majority. While the intent to divide and conquer was real, minority incorporation into the developing entity was equally valid though less studied and understood. This pertains to the marechaussee as well as the armed police.

The marechaussee were the prototype for the police units that would, especially regarding the role of indigenous personnel. Though indigenous

\textsuperscript{149} Van Doorn and Hendrix, *Ontsporing van Geweld*, 113-115.
\textsuperscript{150} Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 3.
personnel were the majority within the marechasee in Aceh (there were only ever a negligible number of Acehnese within the Dutch forces), this was still a momentous step because it put a new degree of power within the hands of indigenous personnel. This would extend in due course to other areas (the home areas of the Ambonese for this study) where like would rule over like. Still, the principle remains: in Aceh control was created, extended, and maintained by the use of indigenous manpower in policing. But before we look to the Ambonese role in this let us first consider the non-Ambonese within the marechussee in Aceh.

The Javanese were the largest group within the marechaussee, as they were the largest group within the KNIL. This was always true, myths about the Ambonese notwithstanding. It is no exaggeration to say that the Ambonese were crucial to the KNIL, but it is not true to suggest that they ever had numerical superiority.151 Most of the Javanese recruits were landless peasants for whom the military (and thus the marechaussee) was an alternative source of income when farming was not viable.152 The Javanese had a reputation (amongst many Dutch) for being poor soldiers, but this is at odds with their fighting in the Java War (1825-30). Moreover, this is distinctly at odds with their work as marechaussee at which Javanese personnel were regarded as successful.153 There was nothing lacking in Javanese performance, but the Dutch were always suspicious of them. This was, in large part, due to the sheer numbers of them, a critical mass that always had the Dutch wary. In the KNIL

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151 Personal e-mail correspondence with Groen [March 29, 2009].
152 Broos, Snel en geruischlaos, 28.
153 De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, 1700-1950,” 64.
they received lower pay and worse conditions than their Christian counterparts (few of the Javanese were not Muslim), but this should not be read in such a way as to exaggerate the lot of the Ambonese. What this does tell us about the Javanese in the marechaussee is that it is important to disaggregate myth from the empirical without discounting the power of myth on the empirical.

Other groups besides the Javanese and the Ambonese were part of the Dutch colonial forces, but very much in supporting roles. The Madurese had historically been a source of soldiers for the Dutch, but this had waned since 1883. In large part this was due to the decline of Dutch co-operation with the barisan system. Under this system, which had roots in the existing indigenous courts, a Madurese was more of a part-time soldier called up for specific battles. In this way soldiering was more of a supplement to income. Dutch use of such a system was not widespread throughout the archipelago, making the Madurese an important part of the colonial system before the war in Aceh. But this system was not one that sustained a large, standing array of military and police forces for the archipelago such as would come after Aceh. Madurese who did take to Dutch soldiering full-time before the war in Aceh were not disreputable as garrison soldiers, but poor pay and distance from home disinclined them from enlisting in large numbers during the Aceh conflict and beyond. Elsewhere on Java, the Sundanese were seen as similar to the Javanese and no special emphasis was ever laid upon them. Their numbers were never robust. Off Java, Raffles had used black Portuguese troops, called Topasses, in Bengkulu. The Bugis of Makassar had allied with the VOC, taken part in the Padri Wars, and had later fought against the British in 1831. The Makassarese participated in the
Aceh War, but not in large numbers. An attempt to employ the Acehnese after the Aceh War, as a means of winning a dangerous ethnic group over to the Dutch side, was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{154}

Outside the archipelago we have the Japanese and the Africans. The practice of employing foreign soldiers dates from the 1620s when the VOC raised companies of Japanese and Chinese. This was before the closing of Japan in 1636. The Dutch would look to the Japanese again in the 1860s, though this would be frustrated by the Meiji refusal to cooperate. Between 1831 and 1872 the Dutch recruited about 3085 men in West Africa, mainly in the territory of present-day Ghana and Burkina Faso.\textsuperscript{155} They were known for operating well in the local climate, but it should be noted that it was also observed that they showed no greater resistance to local diseases than the Europeans. The Aceh War was the last conflict they participated in, and they never served in great numbers in the marechaussee itself. But during their time in the KNIL they were regarded well.\textsuperscript{156}

In part this was credited to their alien nature. A professor of geography in Amsterdam, praised the Africans soldiers for ‘[their] almost innate grudge… opposite the Malay race.’\textsuperscript{157} But this was creative thinking – there was no actual basis for any rivalry. Both groups were wholly ignorant of each other until contact. It would have made as much sense for the Africans and the indigenous inhabitants of the archipelago to make common cause against the Dutch. This did not happen

\begin{itemize}
\item De Moor "The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950," 66.
\item Broos, \textit{Snel en geruischloos}, 34.
\item De Indische Gids 1886 I, “Iets Over De Militaire Politiek in Indie.”
\item Van Kessel, “Black White: African Soldiers in the Netherlands East Indies.” Also, see van Kessel’s “African Mutinies in the Netherlands Indies.”
\end{itemize}
because there was little interaction between the two. The African recruits sided with the Dutch for a variety of complex reasons, mostly financial, but all with rational arguments. From the Aceh War onward the Dutch felt greater pressure for much larger numbers of personnel than they were able to import economically from abroad. The needs of the colonial state began to outstrip the ability of the state to economically provide itself with African recruits. At the same time that reasons for African employment abated, reasons for Ambonese engagement sprouted.

Considerable employment of the Ambonese themselves dates only from the nineteenth century. Neither the Ambonese nor any other minority held a centuries-long pride of place with the Dutch. De Moor refers to the notion of a strong historic bond between the Dutch and the Ambonese as received wisdom which had greatest currency in the twentieth century. It was only in the last decades of the nineteenth century, he writes, that the ethnically pluriform category of “Ambonese” was successfully turned into a military ally, alongside the gradual disappearance from the KNIL of the other, previously favored minorities, namely the Bugis and Madurese.158

The ethnic dimension of the KNIL explains the roots of the use of the Ambonese in policing. The growing place of the Ambonese in the KNIL can be tracked through Dutch colonial publications. An 1884 piece ponders the subject of indigenous personnel over European recruits.159 Swift on its heels, an 1885 article discusses the phenomenon of the Ambonese once in the military. The report is not

159 De Indische Gids 1884 II, “Inlandsche of Europeesche ambtenaren in Indie?”
good, though it does end on a hopeful note for future employment of Ambonese soldiers. Recruitment of the Ambonese continued and seemingly improved, but this enthusiasm was not unbridled. In particular, it is noted that the Ambonese were likely to make alliances that would serve their own interests above those of the Dutch. This was seen to be mitigated, however, by the idea that the Ambonese would respond to logical appeal. The implication is that the Ambonese would stay loyal as long as they were adequately compensated for service.

What is important here is that minority recruitment into the military was not a new idea, but large-scale involvement of the Ambonese was and it was concurrent with an effort to pacify the archipelago at large. This was not a development that occurred without some hesitation on the part of the Dutch, but the military did embrace the Ambonese as the process gained momentum. The vehicle that helped enable this was the police.

In discussing the role of ethnicity in general, and the Ambonese in particular, in the marechaussee in Aceh I rely on Broos’ figures and descriptions. This is in large part due to the fact that I have found the latter to be corroborated broadly by the historiography. Generally speaking, the infantry was larger and contained

160 De Indische Gids 1885 I, “Hoe werken de Ambonezen op het bundelen van het Indische leger?”
161 De Indische Gids 1886 I, “Iets Over De Militaire Politiek in Indie.”
162 Teitler, “The Mixed Company”, 155. It should further be noted that the figures for the marechaussee in Aceh, through Broos, are the only ones I was able to locate. I have consulted with the historians at the Defense Ministry in Holland and they cannot produce rival figures, nor do they contest his. In other words, the marechaussee outside of Aceh – of whom there were few [slight numbers on Java noted in the Staatsblad, under the infantry] – are not discussed here, but as the
more ethnic groups than the marechaussee. Still, there was a wide variety of groups in the marechaussee: besides Ambonese and Javanese there were Sundanese, Madurese, Bugis, Bataks and Malays. There were a few Achenese but no Chinese (they remain listed at zero throughout). Africans too were represented, but their numbers fell off until they were simply amalgamated, curiously, with the Europeans. Throughout, Europeans are less than ten percent, numerically quite small though it should be pointed out that they occupied the command positions. Within all this diversity the Ambonese were over-represented based on their actual population vis a vis that of the archipelago.

For the years 1891-1899 the Ambonese start at a robust 30% of the corps, increasing to over 40% by century’s end. At their height, in 1893, they comprised almost half of the marechaussee. Until 1893 the corps was comprised solely of Javanese and Ambonese. The Other Natives listed are mainly Javanese, with, for example, about 2 Africans per year and 14 and 28 Sundanese in 1898 and 1899, respectively. One point worth making is that within the “Ambonese” category the Menadonese comprised the largest group, though they were physically very different in appearance from those from the area of Ambon. The latter were Melanesian and more closely resembled Papuans. The term Ambonese is used for those from Menado until the 1930s when they were disaggregated. Why is this? For an answer we can look to a contemporaneous colonial publication. An 1893 article mentions an Ambonese military chaplain, in Aceh since 1882, noting that he

\[\text{\textsuperscript{163}}\] De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950,” 64.
“actually comes from Saparoea. He held the difficult task in [ministering] to the native Christian soldiers... [we have a] favorable impression of [his] speech at the grave of some dead Ambonese (the Christian soldiers of the Minahassa and Ternate are included under that name).”

In a loose sense, the Ambonese were understood to be Christian soldiers from the East, the center of which was Ambon which became the namesake for the created sub-group within the marechaussee. It should also be pointed out that the dynamics spoken of here are for the marechaussee and the military. The police would have their own experience.

For the period 1900-1912 the Javanese attain numbers to rival those of the Ambonese, having previously had only half the numbers of the Ambonese. During this period, however, the Ambonese retain indisputable plurality. Sundanese go from a third of the Ambonese figure to a negligible number. Also, there are smatterings of Madurese, Bugis, and three dozen down to a single dozen Malays, declining over the period. At the same time the institution of the marechaussee was itself expanding beyond Aceh. Harvey writes that in 1905 KNIL units were sent in to pacify the Bugis of South Sulawesi, erstwhile Dutch allies. Aside from regular army units, a special company of entirely Amboñese Marechausse was employed. I was unable to locate her source for this (perhaps it was not a wholly segregated company, but one with many Ambonese), but even were this not precisely the case the fact of the rumor shows an expanding awareness of the Ambonese and their employment by the colonial state.

164 De Indische Gids 1893 I, 703.
For the period 1913 to 1920 Javanese, Bugis, and Malays are again listed as ‘Other Natives’, but the Timorese are not. 1913 was when the Timorese likely first served in the marechaussee. Assuming they are not amalgamated with the Europeans, they were included as Ambonese. The history of the Timorese as Ambonese is worthy of note here. Brooks notes that the idea of the “Timorese” is itself a label of convenience, one applied by the Dutch. In 1870 some officers suggested, based on experiences gained in Timor and Rote, that Timorese should be recruited for the army. Not coincidentally, many were Christian. Initially they were not as valued as other Ambonese. Though they fought in the war in Aceh, they were only gradually brought into the marechaussee (1913). In the 1910s and 1920s, they were seen as a valuable and useful category; and it became hard to imagine the army without the Timorese.\textsuperscript{166} 1913 also saw the marechaussee incorporated into the infantry, having previously been simply part of the military. The marechaussee never completely disappeared, however, and in the pre-World War II period they would experience a considerable renaissance.

From 1921-1929 there is no breakdown of ethnicities with the Ambonese listed separately, but indigenous are still well over 90% of the personnel. From 1921 until 1941 it is unclear who the largest ethnic group within the corps was. In the period 1930 to 1937, the Military Police Corps is no longer listed separately in the colonial records but integrated into an overall indication of the infantry. For this period Javanese are consistently 10 points higher than Ambonese, but this is in part because in 1936 Menadonese are for the first time listed separately. They come in

\textsuperscript{166} De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army,” 65.
at 4,499 or 17.05% of the infantry. This puts the old amalgamated “Ambo
tese” in line with previous stats: 8,299 and 31.45%. Timorese are listed separately, coming in at about 5 points the whole time, the same as the Sundanese. Madurese, Bugis, Achenese, and Malays are listed and all are below 1 point. Chinese are listed, but at 0 points the whole time. From 1937 through to 1941, the colonial reports mentioned nothing about the composition of the Military Police Corps and the army. This is due to the perceived aggressive intent of Japan. In the run-up to war strength figures were kept secret.\(^{167}\)

What the numbers show is that the Ambonese rivaled the much more populous Javanese in participation in the marechaussee. What should be further stressed, however, is that this numerical parity was matched by the evaluation of their performances. In other words, though the Ambonese were over-represented in the marechaussee their performance was only considered to be equal to that of the Javanese. In addition, service to the state here was in mixed units. From the turn of the century, in the marechaussee in Aceh, personnel from all over the archipelago that would become Indonesia were working together in mixed units in support of the state that would become Indonesia, albeit against the Acehnese (Indonesian struggle with Aceh would continue until the tsunami of 2005, at least).\(^{168}\)

\(^{167}\) Broos, *Snel en geruisloos*, 36.
\(^{168}\) De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, 1700-1950” De Moor writes, “The image of the Javanese as not good soldiers is in odds with the Java War (1825-30) and the way they were valued within the army. They proved themselves (Javanese) quite good in the Korps Marechausse, freed of European bureaucracy. Conversely, the Europeans wholly created an artificial caste from Ambon. In the Korps Marechausse, Ambonese and Javanese were mixed for
Despite a considerable amount of energy expended disparaging them, the Javanese worked well in the marechaussee and with the Ambonese.\textsuperscript{169} Bogaard, a colonial official, wrote that the Javanese and the Ambonese complemented each other well, the Javanese being seen as more deliberate whereas the Ambonese were perceived as being more aggressive.\textsuperscript{170} JCJ Kempees, an officer who worked with Javanese in the marechaussee wrote positively about the Javanese and the Ambonese in 1905. His pointed conclusion was that “the combination of Amboinese and Javanese in a brigade is a happy [one].”\textsuperscript{171} The experience of the marechaussee in Aceh saw Amboinese and Javanese mixed together for the first time. Crucially, it was seen to have gone well. In 1910 the idea of such integration was introduced to the army as a whole,\textsuperscript{172} but met with less sanguine results (likely due to less institutional flexibility within the military).

The success of the marechaussee from 1900 to 1918, in which different ethnicities worked side by side, and were compensated on an equal footing - in the marechaussee Amboinese and Javanese soldiers were listed equally, receiving equal pay regardless of their ethnicity - demonstrated the success of a multi-ethnic constabulary formula. With the end of the Aceh War in 1914 came the complete pacification of the archipelago. Large wars of conquest within the archipelago were a thing of the past. But in 1918 the idea of the mixed company was abolished as the first time and both proved good.” See also Teitler, “The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition.”

\textsuperscript{169} De Moor, \textit{Westerling’s War}, 54.
\textsuperscript{170} Bogaard, “De Militaire Gids van 1902.”
\textsuperscript{171} Broos, \textit{Snel en geruischoos}, 27.
\textsuperscript{172} De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, 1700-1950,” 65.
marechaussee was brought into the infantry. The military police experience was seen as not relevant to the army. In the infantry, companies were formed along ethnic lines and fought separately. No joint company of ethnically mixed infantry was ever established. An ideological battle between military elites was effectively won by pro-Ambonese officers and lost by those who favored integration (the Javanese were still viewed with disdain in military circles and there was not a sizeable pro-Javanese faction in the debate).173

The military rejection of the lessons of the marechaussee did not mean that the lessons themselves were lost. The techniques of military or quasi-military or constabulary policing would flow not to the army but to another group, the armed police. Here ethnic tensions would not be eliminated (as they were not in the marechaussee), but there was a more equitable diffusion of power within the context not of a privileged group or martial race but of home territory. The marechaussee had introduced the idea of taking coercive power to the people of a territory as policing does. The next steps would be to make that power more local by entrusting it to locals, across the archipelago.

The Armed Police

The marechaussee laid the foundations for the robust armed police that came after them, but early units called the armed police were extant before the police

reorganization of 1897 that brought them into greater prominence. From 1897 the job of the armed police in the Outer Islands was to pacify the areas that had only recently been subjugated by the state. The armed police were preferred to the maintenance of military units for reasons of function and cost, and they came to be seen as a necessary consequence of the needs of the state.¹⁷⁴ The marechaussee, a military unit, never had the presence outside of Aceh that the armed police had. Establishing state control in the Outer Islands would be a charge of the armed police. We will see this evolution in coming chapters. What we are concerned with here is how early units of the armed police developed in such a way that they were a viable and available alternative to the use of marechaussee units on a large scale outside of Aceh.

The armed police were a particular effort to assert the authority of the state while abiding by the spirit of the Ethical Policy in moving towards non-military, civil authority. The police themselves were, more than any other agent of authority, close to local people. The armed police were the most forward-looking of the police, in terms of state cohesion. The roots of the armed police are deep, but their history proper can be traced through the three meaningful police reforms between 1897 and 1920. After the final reform the Netherlands-Indies officially (although not effectively) had a centralized modern police force with distinct divisions (a general police divided into administrative, field, city, and investigative units).¹⁷⁵ But they would not have gotten there without the crucial years between, the years that spanned reform. Before those years the armed police were amorphous. After that

¹⁷⁴ BB 3663
¹⁷⁵ Bloembergen, “Colonial State, Police State?”
they would be gone. They were a power of transition, and that is why they are important. Without the transformative armed police the chasm between the Dutch East Indies state (especially in the Outer Islands) and the period that came before would not have been bridged, at least not in the way that it was.

We have seen that there were police-like actors in Indonesia long before the period of high colonialism. The armed police did not replace them. The armed police are not the story of how the village police were replaced by a new colonial village police. While this did occur, the armed police were about a new type of police. It was a constabulary, a colony wide force that promoted the coherence of the colonial state and therefore that of its successor, Indonesia. In the process it produced a new identity of the Ambonese who played an important role in this development. I concur with Teitler in his contention that the need to have more forces to control the archipelago was seen as an opportunity for progressivism. Such forces could be a way to build the nation, a school for the nation. The experience of the marechaussee supported the contention that the peoples of the archipelago could be an active part of this process.\textsuperscript{176}

Despite the important contribution of the armed police in the forging of the state there is very little discussion about this in the postcolonial period. Indonesian historiography tends to mention little before 1945, and typically only the field police are noted. This is true at the National Police Museum in Jakarta, but it is also reflected in \textit{Sejarah Perjuangan Mobile Brigade Polisi R.I. Sumatera Utara/Aceh Tahun 1945-1961} (a history of the Mobile Brigade’s efforts in Aceh) and the

\textsuperscript{176} Teitler, \textit{The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition}, passim.
Indonesian *Community Policing Training Manual* amongst other places. I attribute this to the Dutch focus on their retreat from the archipelago and the Indonesian emphasis on the construction of the national police, obscuring the full history (particularly under the fog of the Japanese period.) Another reason is that the historical record was, as Poeze describes it “buried in extremely complex discussions of the history, development, and organization of the Indies police.”

Bloembergen notes that at the World Exhibition in Paris in 1900 the Dutch sponsored an exhibit with a scene of well-dressed police and prison guards, but no mention at all of the armed police.

In discussing the armed police it is first necessary to consider the *pradjoerits.* They were first created by the Governor of Java in 1799 and were “native armed forces to be established to maintain peace and order.” They are best understood as police soldiers, the distinction with the marechaussee being that they were drawn from existing forces under the command of native officials. In other words, they were not Dutch units so much as indigenous organizations lightly seconded to colonial interests. But they were the direct forebears of the armed police. According to a state report in 1933, the Armed Police Corps, established in 1912, arose partly from the pradjoerits, partly from other local small corps of armed policemen. A decision recorded in the journal of the Governor-General in 1849

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177 Poeze, *Political Intelligence in the Netherlands Indies*, 230.
178 Bloembergen, *De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie*, 78
179 They were found throughout the archipelago: Memories van Overgave Manado 1910
180 2.10.36.04.Openbaar Verbaal. 08/14/1911 V (1926)
noted that a decision was made by the governor-general of 1843 to codify rules regarding the formation of pradjoerits on Java. This decision was affirmed, noting that the pradjoerits were using weapons designed in accordance with those of the army. Indeed, the line between the pradjoerits and official state forces (particularly early, pre-colony-wide armed police) was diminishing by the 1840s. A state publication notes that in Palembang in June 1849 there was a force of “75 pradjoerits (here practically synonymous with armed policemen) and 100 armed natives.” Palembang would, in fact, serve as the site of the first force called an armed police; in 1864, 300 men became armed police out of the existing pradjoerits.

Even though Palembang would be the first in name, it was a much more universal phenomenon. What is notable is that, years before the marechaussee became an official force in the Dutch East Indies as a whole, local sites were creating corps of police soldiers out of existing pradjoerits. In 1859 a garrison battalion was established in Batavia, but in 1862 it was replaced by a corps of police soldiers with a strength of 178 officers, NCOs and men, for patrol duty in the city Batavia. This was replicated in the residence Bantam. In each of the divisions and in Tjaringin Lebak a corps of armed police was set up, comprising members from another area rather than the Bantam population. Since 1863 the colonial government had in

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181 De Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie, 57-59.
182 Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 1911, 228-233
183 Staatsblad No. 177. 1864.
184 RA 1881 I, 165.
185 RA 1897 I, 133-134. Also in Koloniaal Verslag 1878 and in Koloniaal Verslag 1862.
the outlying areas a single armed police force, investigative with no enforcement powers, standing under the supervision of the residents and staffed by indigenous personnel. 186

In 1876, Article 1 of the Rules of Order and Discipline in the police forces armed policemen in the Dutch East Indies was included as No. 21 in the Staatsblad (a governmental gazette) of 1876. It describes the role of the armed police force as follows, "The armed policemen are intended to, as part of the supreme authority of the Head of the regional administration, help the local administration in maintaining peace and order." 187 The edict was noteworthy for several reasons. First and foremost is that it was colony-wide, even though authority rested locally. That is to say, it was exactly that development we are concerned with here: how local and disparate elements were brought into a national, state structure. Tellingly Section II states that information regarding conditions of commitment for armed policemen shall be published in different languages, both "Native and Chinese." This was a clear effort to communicate the local and colony-wide nature of the power of the armed police to include the various peoples of the archipelago. Another noteworthy aspect of the announcement was the attention given to the punishment for a variety of misdeeds by the armed police which included desertion, incorrigibility, and - quite specifically - extreme immorality. The maintenance of order within the armed police would be the model for the maintenance of order in the state. 188

186 Bloembergen, *De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie*, 43-44.
187 *Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur*, 1911, 228-233

188 Staatsblad No. 21. 1876. N.B. Barnard notes a similar focus on punishment in Malay states, “Rulers for Rulers.”
There were armed police forces emerging throughout the Dutch East Indies, though this was still prior to the first major police reorganization of 1897. In particular, the corps in Bengkulu and Palembang proved useful both in detecting criminals and in controlling local disturbance. This was true also in Sulawesi, though complications arose when the small patrol services were incapable of handling major disturbances. The usefulness of the corps in the Lampong districts and Timor was also noted, though recruitment proved difficult and greater compensation was considered a solution in attracting about 20 persons per region, preferably former soldiers.\textsuperscript{189} A corps of 22 was set up in Ternate in 1878.\textsuperscript{190} Outside Java and Madura (presumably it had already been accomplished on Java and Madura) the armed police were to be supplied with both a rifle and a sidearm with good leather. Measures were being taken in particular to improve the strength of the armed police in the Outer Islands and to use them specifically for police duties and not others.\textsuperscript{191} By 1881 there were armed police forces in at least Palembang, the Western division of Borneo, Riau, the Lampong districts, on the East Coast of Sumatra and Aceh, and in Timor.\textsuperscript{192} At the time of the revolution in Banten in 1888 there were two forces stationed in Caringin and one in Lebak. Their equipment requirements were based on those of the pradjoerits and their dress code was the same as that of the armed police in the Outer Islands.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{189} Koloniaal Verslag 1878, 79.
\textsuperscript{190} Staatsblad No. 72. 1878.
\textsuperscript{191} Staatsblad No. 132. 1878.
\textsuperscript{192} RA 1881 I, 165.
\textsuperscript{193} Bloemeren, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 43-44
The armed police in Aceh are of special note, particularly as they predate the more effective marechaussee. A decision of 11 March 1881 called for the formation in Aceh of an armed police corps of 215 men\(^{194}\) which would replace the military forces and facilitate their withdrawal. They were deemed successful, at least in the beginning. A report of 1882 speaks highly of the corps. The armed policemen were seen as an extension of military power, but one particularly suited to civil order. They are specifically praised for curbing robberies and detecting and deterring thieves. The report notes that it expects further praise to be forthcoming and that the armed police will become more and more conducive to ensuring security for the state.\(^{195}\)

This begs a question, however: If the armed police in Aceh were doing such good work, why the introduction of the marechaussee? The answer comes in the report quoted above. It argues that as soon as government officials are able they will do without the army. The report envisions that military forces will be withdrawn (not only in Aceh but in Sulawesi and Timor as well), accompanied by the creation of police who maintain order and peace, and the breaking of local resurgent opposition.\(^{196}\) The armed police were not getting the job done fast enough, but they were the preferred instrument of control. The idea was to get the army out, increasing the role of the police as they withdrew. The marechaussee, as a hybrid force that leaned more towards the military side of the equation, were a way to achieve that end more quickly. The armed police came first but they were not

\(^{194}\) Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 1911, 228-233
\(^{195}\) 2.10.36.04.Openbaar Verbaal. 08/14/1911 V (1926)
\(^{196}\) Ibid
strong enough for the task at hand. The military was brought in, especially a military police unit, the marechaussee. The armed police were able to assume greater responsibility after this, though they had existed before the introduction of the marechaussee.

A military view of the transition from marechaussee to armed police (with the understanding that the armed police actually predated the marechaussee though not in robust enough numbers not to require military assistance) was published in the colony in 1917. It recapitulates the military standpoint that accompanied the development and deployment of the armed police. According to this view, it was entirely logical to develop an Armed Police Corps to allow the army to concentrate on Java. This was seen as good move to ensure defense of the colony. The armed police would ensure peace, order, and safety. This would especially be true in areas that had only recently been brought under state control. The army would be available to take over in times of extreme turmoil, the armed police holding the line until they arrived. Furthermore, the army was eager to see the creation and implementation of the armed police because they resented the burdens of the marechaussee. The work of the marechaussee (policing) was seen as a secondary task of the military. Perhaps more grievously, the KNIL had to provide men and arms of the infantry for the marechaussee. As the military saw it, “this dilution of the milk could no longer be tolerated.”

The marechaussee was a task the military establishment was happy to quit. The armed police had been gradually emerging over the course of several decades.

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197 Indisch Militair Tijdschrift. No 3 Maart 1917.
The time for fruition had come. Throughout the period before the major reorganization of 1897 the armed police existed and they existed in such a way that there was a constant readjustment of their comportment and role. This is in line with the very function of the armed police: a liquid force to enable the coherence of the state.

In this chapter we have looked to the expansion of the colonial state at the end of the 19th century which demanded a more robust system of control for the archipelago. The marechaussee were the force that turned the tide in Aceh. In so doing they created conditions that allowed for the introduction of more robust policing units, specifically the armed police. The armed police were the force that arose to further the task of consolidation of control. Within this evolution of policing power we can see the rise of the Ambonese as a privileged group for the state. The early armed police units predate the Police Reorganization of 1897, but it is this Reorganization that established the colony-wide system of armed police. In the next chapter we will focus on the Police Reorganization of 1897. We will look to how the Ambonese as armed police worked to further colonial state control in their own homelands.

\(^{198}\) Staatsblad No. 26. 1887.
Chapter 3 - The Reorganization of 1897: The True Beginning of the Armed Police

The armed police were meant to be a colony-wide police force, but uniform application of practice was an aspiration for the future at the time of the Reorganization of 1897. The job of the armed police differed throughout the archipelago. This despite the fact that the armed police had begun the process of establishing a uniform police force throughout the colony that could enforce law and order over a large area, as opposed to simply within cities and villages. Stranger policing was, from the beginning, not the rule but rather the exception when it came to the armed police. This was true on Java as well as on the Outer Islands, including the homelands of the Ambonese. This chapter will explore the structural and personnel verities brought about under the Reorganization of 1897 especially as experienced by the Ambonese armed police in their homelands.

The Reorganization of 1897

The first major, colony-wide reorganization of the police occurred in 1897. The Ethical Policy had not yet become the official policy of the land, but it was in the zeitgeist. Police reform was particularly of the times, as it allowed for the bringing of law and order to the indigenous peoples as well as colonial control. Here we have the Janus face of the Ethical Policy: try to do good for the indigenous people of the
archipelago while doing well for the colonial state. A major plank of this was the elimination of indigenous methods of control such as the pradjoerits (largely on Java, but the principle held in the Outer Islands, particularly the homelands of the Ambonese) and the establishing of a method of control more in line with the aims of the colonial state and more firmly under its aegis. This could not be done at a blow: an attempt to create an armed, non-military body completely under central authority with actual reach into the Outer Islands at this point in time would have been a fool’s errand. There simply was not enough groundwork laid in terms of government infrastructure for such a civilian entity. With the war in Aceh very much smoldering incrementalism was the order of the day. Into this came the armed police under the Reorganization of 1897.

As we have seen, the armed police existed before 1897. These, however, were local efforts to replace the pradjoerits and cannot be seen as part of a colony-wide endeavor. Change here came from the bottom up and not the top down. The need for the armed police as a replacement for the pradjoerits was felt on the ground and percolated up to Batavia as an idea. In 1870 it became part of the conversations about police organization. With the Banten uprising it became a more present concern. On Java in particular it seemed a good way to act rapidly and decisively in the face of disturbances, without having to use the more cumbersome army. An 1893 memorandum from the Director of Internal Administration Uljee recommended the armed police, but advised that they be under the Department of War, to prevent a civil-military clash of authority.¹⁹⁹ Uljee, however, would not have

¹⁹⁹ Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 66-67
his way regarding military control. This is because – and this is crucial – the special strength and innovation of the armed police lay in the fact that they were not military. Furthermore, they were able to bridge the gap from local to state control because they were not wholly of one or the other.

The armed police were to be the “iron fist” of the BB, the Binnenlands Bestuur or Domestic Administration, the civilian ruling body of the colonial authority. It was understood from the beginning that this was not a police body in the sense of having investigative powers, but in the sense of being capable of repression, especially on an emergency basis. What distinguished this from a military unit (aside from tactics) was the fact that it was controlled by civilians and not the army. In addition, the degree to which it was in local (not Batavian) hands was not inconsiderable. The army could withdraw while local powers like the pradjoerits could be brought into the fold. The armed police were the middle men, the link between. Under Director of Internal Administration Arends, and within the Reorganization of 1897, the armed police were formalized within the colonial authority and designated the official replacement of the pradjoerits.200

The armed police as the Iron Fist of the BB should not be an image that occludes their significant role of beginning the gentle wrestling of authority from the local. Indeed, the armed police – under the resolutions of 1897 – would still very much be creatures of the local, but subsequent reorganizations would change this. The first step, however, was taking authority from the pradjoerits. The armed police, as a civilian body, were the way this was done. One rejected method was a

200 Boekhoudt, Rapport: Reorganisatie van het Politiewezen, 234. Also in Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie, 57-59.
proposed militia, an irregular army but one under firm Dutch control. Van Heutsz actually favored this idea, as an extension of the marechausse concept he had pioneered. He wanted a hybrid marechaussee-militia force, but he did not propose the civilian body that would come to be.\textsuperscript{201}

Plans for a militia had been proposed since the Java War, when the need for a heavy military hand dissipated (and was also needed for conquest elsewhere) but the need for law and order remained despite rejection of the militia model. Local militias did exist (particularly in Ambon and Menado), under the control of the local Residents, but these were not largely consequential. Discussions for a colony-wide militia continued (as time went on the conversation changed to consideration of a militia as a theoretical supplement to the military for external defense), but to no avail. This was largely on the basis of the argument that a militia would be too expensive. As a coda, there was discussion of levying a special defense tax to create a military police “to be recruited from among the trusted natives (Amboynese, Menadonese, Timorese)”, but by 1900 these particular discussions were dormant\textsuperscript{202}.

The armed police would take over from the pradjoerits, in the tactical spirit of the marechaussee, but in civilian hands. This would happen instead of the formation of a militia. Before discussing the particulars of the armed police as a result of the 1897 Reorganization it is important to acknowledge how deeply unsatisfying they were as a force. The armed police who came out of 1897 were very imperfect and this lack of polish communicates their value: they were the formative stage, the lava cooling from hot military action to the rock of the state. In

\textsuperscript{201} Teitler, \textit{The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition}, 35.
\textsuperscript{202} Teitler, \textit{The Dutch Colonial Army in Transition}, 22.
discussing the pradjoerits who preceded the armed police Arends wrote about the value of the pradjoerit corps at the outbreak of rebellion. He was disdainful. He found them to be undisciplined and also contended that they could not be counted on in times of danger. He argued that they remained village men at heart and doubted that they could be counted on to shoot their friends and family.

These sentiments would be repeated about the armed police, post-1897, because the divide between the armed police before and after the reorganization was not so very great. After 1897 the police still had weak organizational structure, little direction, low status, and low pay. Lack of discipline, performance failure, and abuse were noted. Their value, however, was in what they portended for the future. The failures of the armed police (observed from the first) were to be corrected, under the aegis of the asserted superiority of European police control. The ways in which the armed police failed would be prelude to fixes. Policing was the state’s road to legitimacy.\(^{203}\)

In 1900 HED Engelhard, retired assistant resident, wrote an authoritative critique of the armed police in a colony publication. His main criticism had to do with lack of oversight: residents not only had responsibility for recruitment and appointment, but also for promotion, transfer, demotion and dismissal of armed policemen. They had to ensure discipline, allocate arms and ammunition, as well as oversee supplies of clothing and food. As the residents were usually too far removed from such paramilitary matters they left this supervision to subordinates who were often even less competent. The biggest problem for the armed police was

\(^{203}\) Bloembergen, *De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie*, 66-67
a lack of thorough civilian oversight. Engelhard concluded that there was no unity in leadership, recruitment or training for this supposedly colony-wide force.

Engelhard was, of course, correct: the transference of authority to the civil realm was rather abrupt and greatly ineffective. But it was also a necessary bridge, the birth pains of a civil state. Oversight would grow, the civil authority would improve in wielding the armed police, but the early efforts were not good. Engelhard enumerates horrors within the armed police post-1897. Opium was traded and stolen goods were embezzled. Personnel were mostly recruited from the lowest stratum, "if not the scum of Native society, people too lazy to use manual labor in their livelihood." Engelhard found armed policemen of highly suspect reputation, noting that many individuals were addicted to drink and gambling. For them the uniform of the armed police was little more than a good disguise in which to continue their malevolent ways. Engelhard writes that some administration officials confided that in times of disturbance in the region the armed policemen were the first to be disarmed in order to avoid further calamity. One administrator, when he was away on tour, took away all the weapons of his force. Even when the policemen were not depraved they were still problematic. One lieutenant had to reject thirty Timorese police from a remote mountain area because they were "almost complete savages" and could not understand Malay.204

Engelhard provides some quite titillating copy, but the point he seemed to miss was that by having rogues inside the tent instead of outside the tent, so to speak, they were helping to cohere the state. A political entity composed entirely of the worthy is an interesting thought experiment, but what we have are nation-states in which the just and unjust are represented. Police forces, to a greater extent than the military because of their deep and daily connection with the population, are of the people and their humanity.

In 1907 Boekhoudt was to voice similar complaints about the armed police on Java specifically, echoing concerns about control and unity. According to him, recruits were untrained, "an undisciplined mob." Their subsequent training was also below par: some forces did not participate in marching or shooting at all. He notes that only the armed police in Pekalongan did gymnastics, but that was because they were the only ones who had the necessary equipment. There were no barracks (Engelhard also notes this disapprovingly) and in this absence no esprit de corps could develop. There were no mixed race brigades. An officer in the infantry or the general staff of the army should have performed technical inspection regularly, but that happened at most once a year. The residents of some regions rarely or never requested inspection at all.

Furthermore, each resident used his discretion for different tasks, with different results. This can be seen with the issue of patrolling. In Banyumas they put armed police on the roads after an alarm of theft; in Cirebon they occupied the road on Chinese holidays at fixed points in the Chinese district. The corps of
Pekalongan and Ponorogo walked rounds in the capital every night. In Bojonegoro, however, the armed police were considered useless for patrol even in the daytime. Despite such variance there were bright, or at least less dim, points: in places where the armed police were gathered in a whole kampong (in Ponorogo and Banyumas), or garrisoned in government warehouses (in Cirebon and Pekalongan) the armed policemen were seen as valuable, though more for their military rather than policing capabilities. 205

Criticism of the armed police post-1897 was largely correct. But the armed police were a work in progress. They were not working towards a perfect model of the armed police. On the contrary, they were heading towards their own extinction. The armed police, as the link between military and civil authority, were phased out as they succeeded. The year 1897 was a watershed because it was the first iteration of the idea that the armed police were colony-wide in scope, though we know already that in practice it was more a case of unity in diversity.

To understand this evolution we can look profitably to the heritage of the marechaussee in regards to the armed police. In 1910 van Leeuwen wrote in a colony publication, urging institution of a military police force to replace the present police forces. His suggestion was that the current, skeleton marechaussee would be augmented by cavalry who would be converted into marechaussee to replace the police who, he felt, were hardly up to the task. The intent of the article is to

205 Poorthuis, *Van Zelfredzaamheid tot Politiestaat*, 20. Also in Bloembergen, *De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie*, 79-80; 83-85. [N.B. By 1905 an armed police corps consisted of an indigenous sergeant, two indigenous corporals, and 24 indigenous armed policemen, Bloembergen].
disparage the work of the armed police and encourage the expansion of the 
marechaussee. But in this argument we can see why the military police were an 
enervated force. That is to say, the idea of a military police had, in action, been 
supplanted by 1910 by the concept of the civil police.

Van Leeuwen’s point is, of course, correct: the armed police were not up to 
the standards of the marechaussee. They should have been, as they had inherited 
the task of the marechaussee. This is why van Leeuwen calls for their 
reinstatement. This made great sense from the perspective of the Dutch authority: if 
the state maintained military control, keeping it out of the hands of the more 
egalitarian police and in the hands of the more select military, perhaps the 
development of a state more dependent on indigenous personnel could have been 
better thwarted, in favor of a state more closely controlled by the Dutch. But that 
is not what happened. The task of the marechaussee - certainly a task they were 
“better” equipped to do - fell to the armed police, who were inarguably “less” 
equipped. This augured a state less in the hand of the Dutch, one better able to 
assert itself locally into the control of a different authority. Van Leeuwen is, 
advertently or inadvertently, sounding the alarm for a loss of control. He was right 
in what he was saying. But the tide of history was not his.207

By 1897 the armed police had “a clear-cut job”: they had replaced the 
pradjoerits, namely on Java, near the seats of government which could not easily

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206 Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme.” The colonial police force was a nearly all-Indonesian service... Unlike the army, which consisted of 25-30% Europeans, the police had only a few European commanding officers in the ranks, 3-4% of the total police force.

207 De Indische Gids 1910 I, “Indische Cavalerie als berden politie.”
and quickly be reached by a military power. The armed police in the Outer Islands were less advanced than the armed police on Java, but their duties too were emergent.\textsuperscript{208} Emergent, but hardly “clear-cut.” In the Outer Islands in particular the mandate of 1876 was still operative in all its vacuous glory: “The armed policemen are intended to, under the supreme authority of the Head of the regional administration, be helpful to the local administration in maintaining peace and order.”\textsuperscript{209} Still, there was more specificity than had existed before 1897. On Java the role of the armed police had expanded. There they escorted transports of prisoners and kept watch over ammunition magazines, salt warehouses and train stations. But their main task was to prepare for riot duty. On Java the armed police had essentially a repressive role. In the Outer Islands their writ was interpreted locally as: 1) facilitate elimination of the military; 2) respond to ethno-religious conflicts; 3) prepare for border disputes, to mean the contingency of a foreign enemy; 4) enable improvement of administration/ consolidation of authority; 5) monitor new companies (especially on Sumatra’s east coast and Belitung).\textsuperscript{210}

In comparison with the situation on Java, the armed police in the Outer Islands played an important and particular role in the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule. The specific duties of the armed police are the parts that make up

\textsuperscript{208} Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur, 1911, “De Gewapende Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie,” 228-233.
\textsuperscript{209} RA 1897 I, 133-134. Cites Rules of Order and Discipline for the corps established in 1876 n St 21, St 1887 N 26. Also in Tijdschrift for het Binnenlandsch Bestuur 1900, 303-343: The Armed Police Corps Servers On The Outer Territories Operation of the Rules of Order and Discipline established by Ordinance on January 21, 1876 (No. 21). Rules for armed police emanating from Batavia preceded the establishment of the armed police as an institution for the archipelago as a whole.
\textsuperscript{210} Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 79-80
the whole. The armed police in the Outer Islands were different from the armed police on Java (where they were largely for riot control) and Aceh (where they had a more military role to play). But by 1897 the intent of the armed police in the Outer Islands was consolidation of authority. Violence was in no way absent from their writ, and the capacity to respond to riot was certainly valued. But there is a contrast with Java and Aceh here. On Java the state had a long and fulsome presence. On Aceh war conditions persisted, albeit to a lesser degree than they had. The challenge in the Outer Islands was different, though not alien. They were an armed force, ready to act, but they were in the hands of the civil authority seeking to consolidate its hold.

And it was a formidable task. In 1897 the population ratio, police to civilians, in the colony was 1:4872. In 1896 there were only 1535 armed policemen outside Java (By 1902 there would be 13 formations of armed police on Java and 16 in the Outer Islands). The 1897 reorganization increased that to 2218, but the effects on each area were small. Sumatra’s east coast went from 354 to 456, but that was an exception. In Aceh there were only 127, on the West Coast of Sumatra 138, in Ambon and Manado 160, and 13 in New Guinea. The armed police could only do so much, particularly in terms of actual dispensation of violence. It was, therefore, in the implied threat and in the attendant increase of administrative control that the state exercised real power.

Even with these innovations, though, their small numbers were still the

\[\text{De Indische Gids 1929 I, "Politie, Leger en Veiligheid in Nederlandsch-Indie"}\]
\[\text{Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 67-69.}\]
\[\text{Bloembergen also notes the attempts to impose uniform rank, salary, and clothing.}\]
overriding factor of their limited impact. But they were the seed that would sprout the oak. This was particularly the case in the Outer Islands. On Java the armed police had taken over more directly from the pradjoerits. In the Outer Islands the armed policemen were to a greater degree arrogating authority from the void, not of people and place but of an idea of a greater place called first the Dutch East Indies and then Indonesia.213

**The Ambonese Armed Police From 1897**

The armed police in the Outer Islands, as a constabulary, had an expeditionary mission to extend and consolidate control. This pertains to the Ambonese armed police. Moreover, this function was less important on Java. Quite understandably Java gets the lion’s share of attention in the historiography. This is true for policing. As such there could be an erroneous impression of the armed police, that their function was almost exclusively repressive in nature. It is true that on Java they performed a largely riot control function. But the mission in the Outer Islands was different in that the focus was on the aforementioned extension and consolidation of control.

In 1883 a report was issued on the “Introduction of New Arrangements of the Judiciary in the Provinces.” This applied to Sulawesi, Timor, Manado, Ambon, and Ternate. It stated that from July 1, 1882 the judiciary and police in said provinces would be under the authority of European officials as stipulated in the various agreements concluded by the governors of the respective areas under the sovereignty of the Dutch. This administration would work in concert with “standing empires.” The police and judiciary were seen as key to making such an arrangement practicable; the Dutch would assert power in these areas alongside and in concert with indigenous structures. The law and the courts were the means to this, the place where the colonial and local authority would meet. The legal scholarship this might engender is intriguing, but we are focused on the role of the police in extending control, something at least as important in the colonial enterprise as the law itself.214

The crucial element of service of the Ambonese as armed policemen was work in the homelands of the Ambonese. We are used to thinking of the Ambonese in terms of divide and conquer (as has been discussed), as separatist and divisive. But this is belied by the diverse nature of the Ambonese as well as by their employment within their own homelands. In the homelands of the Ambonese, an extensive part of the archipelago, the Ambonese were not used to divide and conquer so much as they were a minority group privileged within the system to effect greater control. It was common wisdom to draw police units from a different group from the population they policed, but this did not prove to be feasible in

214 Koloniaal Verslag 1883, Appendix H No. 10
practice. This phenomenon was different from that experienced by the military, echoing a global dichotomy.

The reality of the armed police shows something other than the classic divide and conquer nostrum. This is not surprising with the armed police when we think of their stated purpose. The reason for being of the armed police was to bridge the gap from local control to colony-wide control through the police, that force of the state closest to the people. That this was done through the use of locals in their home areas is no surprise when thought of in that way. It worked because policing used local people while at the same time expanding what the notion of that meant. What had been, for example Kei, became ever more Ambonese within the government. This is not to say that this was the first encounter between the groups. Rather it is to say that it was a binding of these groups within the emergent state under the rubric of the Ambonese.

This is what happened, but it was not the state’s original intention. The initial idea for recruitment under the Reorganization of 1897 stemmed from Batavia and held that it was advisable not to recruit from the residence where the armed police were established. It was directly stated that “the [armed] policemen should have another nationality and if possible another religion than [that of] the native population.” On Java this meant two options: 1) recruiting Ambonese 2) failing that,

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216 Kirke-Greene, ‘Damnosa Hereditas’: ethnic ranking and the martial races imperative in Africa.” He writes, “There is, too, the marked difference, not always easily explicable... between the ethnic composition of the army and of the police.”
Madurese and Javanese who would be stationed far from their homes.\textsuperscript{218} It proved impossible on Java, however, to recruit solely from those outside the areas where they were to be stationed.

On Java it was intended that the pradjoerits be replaced by Ambonese armed police both because the Ambonese were seen as reliable and because there were not enough Javanese willing to work in other areas of Java. As a consequence, the judgment from Batavia was that these forces were no different from the old, lamentable pradjoerit corps. This served to further the idea that the Ambonese armed policemen were better; had they been available they would have proved better at the job. This counterfactual would prove to be resilient. In the eyes of many in the government the Ambonese were ideal recruits. Nevertheless, most of the brigades on Java were comprised of Javanese.\textsuperscript{219} This was a failure on two fronts: an inability to recruit enough Ambonese to serve as armed policemen everywhere, and an inability to staff fully each unit of armed police with personnel from outside the immediate area. The original directive in 1897 acknowledges this problem.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{218} Boekhoudt, \textit{Rapport: Reorgranisatie van het Politiewezen}, 234.
\textsuperscript{219} De Indische Gids 1905 II, “Eenige beschouwingen in verband met het huidige politie-vraagstuk”, 988.
\textsuperscript{220} RA 1901 I, 141. N.B. An unusual word is used for indigenous person in the last sentence, “dier” which translates as “beast/animal.” Bloembergen provides some insight into the use of this term to describe armed policeman: “It may also have been used towards a group that still need to be trained = tamed?... I haven’t come across ‘dier’ but I encountered very often the difference use of ‘the training’ of European policemen, and ‘the taming’ of indigenous policemen.” [November 2, 2011 e-mail from Bloembergen]. For my own part, I believe we can see something about the colonial view of the indigenous, as it relates to the Ambonese. Here the Ambonese and others are lumped together as “animal/beast.” This seems to militate against the idea of Ambonese privilege. In this sense it shows how the police as a force brought together disparate groups in the archipelago not only through their work but through their very nature: they were perhaps all “dier” to the colonial authority.
What is important to understand is that from the very beginning the idea of stranger policing was never fully operative within the armed police, despite how colonial officials may have felt about the Ambonese as stranger armed policemen. Moreover, the Ambonese were not universally understood as ideal. In 1905 the resident of Banyumas criticized the Ambonese in a letter to his counterpart in Ambon. His predecessor had believed that they were prone to abuse alcohol and he preferred Javanese armed police. The current resident did not share that particular sentiment (though he noted it), but he did find that Ambonese armed policemen lacked the martial vigor of Ambonese marechaussee (the Ambonese were the “great backbone of the marechaussee”) particularly when forced to work alongside Javanese armed policemen.221

In 1910 a Dutchman wrote a sort of letter to the editor of a Dutch colonial publication. He referenced an early article that praised the Ambonese soldier as policeman, to the explicit detriment of the Javanese. The writer disagreed with the view that the Ambonese soldier had any more inherent military ability or martial fortitude above and over the Javanese. More to the point, he also disputed the notion that Ambonese soldiers were good as policemen, particularly in the role of constabulary policing under discussion. He makes the particular observation that what was considered daring among Ambonese soldiers would serves as a liability in policing in which he writes, “[In police work] it is never possible simply to target and kill and wound. Rather, the police try to calm and sedate by acting to prevent

This is a rough democracy of treatment that goes against the idea of the Ambonese as apart from the others of the archipelago.

221 Boekhoudt, Rapport: Reorganisatie van het Politiewezen, 234.
calamities... after crimes occur greater sobriety is required than can be expected of the Amboinese.”222 The irony of answering prejudice with prejudice aside, the letter is evidence of dissent regarding the idea of stranger Ambonese armed policing as the ideal.

Even in places on Java where the Ambonese were praised for having higher levels of military readiness than their Javanese counterparts, it was noted that only a fraction of the armed policemen on Java were Ambonese. Banyumas and Patjitan were noted as specific locations of Ambonese armed police. But formations in Blora and Bojonegoro were half Javanese. Elsewhere (Cirebon, Wonosobo, Ponorogo, Trenggalek, and Banyumas and Patijitan again) there were formations of exclusively Javanese armed policemen. It is diplomatically noted that local officials were not recruiting Ambonese out of either ignorance of the law or out of “absence of agreement to it.”223 Regardless, the reality of the armed police on Java after the Reorganization of 1897 was a force that cannot be described simply as an Ambonese, stranger police.

The design of the armed police on Nias in 1902 is emblematic of the alternative: non-stranger armed policing. The local colonial authority on Nias decided that the armed police should be composed of "the benevolent part of the population of central Nias." In 1902 the government replaced military patrols with armed police. In accordance with the stated intention of the colonial government in Nias, these personnel were recruited "as much as possible from the people themselves." The colonial authority in Nias judged that these individuals were

222 De Indische Gids 1910 I, "Indische Cavalerie als berden politie."
223 Boekhoudt, Rapport: Reorganisatie van het Politiewezen, 234.
familiar with the land, language and people and were thus in a better position do to do policework than the soliders who had been used previously. The local administration likely also felt that even greater independence from Batavia could be enjoyed by selecting and using locals as armed police. This is in accord with the actions of the residents in the other Outer Islands who also established recruitment rules at their discretion. The resident of the Southern and Eastern Division of Borneo, for example, stipulated that half of the recruits should come from outside the residence.224 More in line with the situation on Nias, however, the resident of Manado stipulated that the corps there could only consist of Ambonese, though some were specifically noted as being Timorese.225

This more muted enthusiasm for the Ambonese as armed police (compared to the less restrained endorsement of the military Ambonese) coupled with the ready use of Javanese armed police undermined from the start any functional reality of fully stranger policing, even on Java. As the seat of power, Java might be expected to have been the site of fully stranger policing. But this was never the case. The practice of recruiting like to police like would win out over the ideal of alien policing and over any attempt to use Ambonese as armed policemen everywhere. This was mainly pragmatic (not enough Ambonese were recruited), but we can see strategic advantage: local recruits knew the language, the country and the people more effectively than outsiders. The failure of full stranger policing (especially with Ambonese on Java) may really have been a strategic blessing in disguise as it

224 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 81-82.
225 Memories van Overgave Manado 1910 J Van Hengel
allowed for armed policing of locals by locals under local authority. This was a mechanism of strengthened control for the colonial government.

**Economics, Recruitment and, the Ambonese**

Why did the Ambonese begin to join the colonial authority as military and police around the time of the Aceh war? We have seen some of the advantages for the state. What were the inducements from the Ambonese perspective? One of the truisms of colonial policing, per Hill among others, is that maintaining police is cheaper than maintaining a military. But how did the microeconomics of colonial policing affect recruitment of the Ambonese?

Gramsci talks about how a crucial element in the development of hegemony is the destruction of the economy and its replacement by the state. Parsons explores this phenomenon in Kenya. With the economic farming base destroyed, recruitment of Kamba was enabled, according to him. Parsons calls this the “Ghurka syndrome”, citing Enloe.\(^{226}\) This contradicts popular images of African colonial recruitment in which soldiers for the colonial authority were directly impressed into service rather than volunteering under compelling circumstances.\(^{227}\) This is not to argue that impressment did not occur, rather impressment does not represent the totality of the experience in the colonial project. Indeed, focus on impressment may

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\(^{226}\) Parsons, “Wakamba Warriors are Soldiers of the Queen: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Marital Race 1890-1970”

\(^{227}\) C.S. Forester’s *The African Queen* contains a literary rendition of this popular idea, demonstrating its penetration.
misrepresent the forces at play. Specifically in the context of Indonesia, Jackson argues that state-building and nation-building are processes of political integration rather than strict domination by coercion. Regarding Darul Islam, which he considers a relatively anomalous armed rebellion, Jackson maintains that it is in traditional societies that physical coercion and traditional authority are the types of power most frequently and effectively used. Modern societies on the other hand, such as the colonial authority, use economic rewards, changing basic values, and persuasion as types of power.\textsuperscript{228}

With the economy destroyed and no other options available, the decision to join the colonial army is hardly a completely free choice. But it should be noted that such a decision was always a minority one and actions are almost always girded by constraints. This is a pragmatic understanding of agency, but a viable one nonetheless. And we can see a concrete example of this in the archipelago amongst the Javanese where recruitment for the army followed a seasonal pattern. Registration for the army usually took place between January and March. This was a period in the farming cycle when landless peasants had little to do. From April to August, however, the cycle returned to a productive period with the rice and sugarcane harvest and the number of applicants for the army was negligible. In September and October there were recruits again, depending on the harvest: if the harvests were poor, the number of registrations was high. The colonial authorities relied on this predictable pattern for recruitment.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{228} Jackson, \textit{Traditional Authority, Islam, and Rebellion}, 289.
\textsuperscript{229} De Moor, “The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950,” 61.
Boy argues that his phenomenon was also evident amongst the Ambonese. Throughout most of the nineteenth century the Ambonese were not eager to enlist in the army, especially as it meant leaving their homelands. This was also the attitude of local leaders who feared the loss of jobs and incomes. Not until 1895 did this change markedly, due to the falling prices of cloves. As a result of this loss, many Ambonese had to find other sources of income. The army was a solution for those who had could not find jobs as colonial civil servants. It was at this time that the Ambonese became enthusiastic soldiers and the myth of centuries of Ambonese-Dutch amity began to form. But this relationship was predicated on a basis of privilege, economic and social.\textsuperscript{230}

De Moor agrees that before the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century the Ambonese were a less than major part of the colonial state. He further concurs with Boy as to the importance of the decline in clove production in changing the economy of the homelands of the Ambonese, but he demurs by arguing for the importance of the actors in the colonial state alongside actors in existing indigenous structures in spurring recruitment. He points out that most of the displaced workers in the clove industry took up in other agricultural sectors such as nutmeg, cocoa, and coffee, and in fishing. Second, de Moor dates the increase in Ambonese enlistment from the mid-1870s, as a result of an intensive recruitment effort by civil and military officials to meet the needs of an expanding colonial state. Recruiting parties were sent out to Ambon, the enlistment bounty was greatly increased, and the Ambonese chiefs were paid for every recruit they brought to military service. This

\textsuperscript{230} Knapp, “Tjengkeh, kompeni, agama”, 28-29.
coordination resulted in a gradual increase in recruits. Preferential treatment once in the colonial state (higher pay, better pensions, and better food) encouraged the Ambonese to develop the appropriate self-image – that of a community with an age-old military tradition, and with a reputation for having been loyal allies of the Dutch ever since the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{231}

The Ambonese who joined the army and/or the police did so for a variety of reasons. The economic base of cloves was declining and recruitment by the state (not impressment) was growing. A minority of Ambonese joined the colonial state as a result of these trends. What is common in this is that both of these trends are largely economic. Mohamed argues for the importance of economics in another context. Detailing a mutiny in Somaliland, he stresses that it was not the cultural taboo of working with dung that led to the mutiny, but the expanded demands for salary, home leave, pensions and other material concerns.\textsuperscript{232} Furthermore, those who worked for the colonial state often did so to better their economic situation rather than turn to it out of complete desperation. Other alternatives did exist, largely in agriculture. This sort of exercise of agency would redound to the advantage of the colonial state. And, as we shall see, recruitment of Ambonese armed police in later years was served by even more improved economic inducements.

After the Reorganization of 1897 Ambonese privilege within the armed police became an established practice. This was also true, however, for Javanese

\textsuperscript{231} De Moor, "The Recruitment of Indonesian Soldiers for the Dutch Colonial Army, c. 1700-1950," 64.

\textsuperscript{232} Mohamed, "The 1937 Somaliland Camel Corps Mutiny."
and Madurese who were stationed outside their home areas. These amounted to a firmly established conceit that improvement in the police was brought about by better salaries, particularly as it pertained to the armed police. This understanding does not, however, account for another advantage of policing, peripheral to economics but to the advantage of both the state and the recruit. This advantage is the social mobility policing affords recruits, as argued by Greenhut, Khalidi, and Bayley. Work for the colonial state can be seen as a matter of almost bourgeois aspiration rather than a matter of survival. Though the state is saving money it is also enriching some locals as well as bringing them into a colonial order in which they now have an elevated position and stake as compensated agents of that state. Policemen are invested in the survival of the state by their improved position. In this way a thrifty alternative to military power has the additional effect of enabling social mobility even as more local people join the state.

Furthermore, police pay empowers those less advantaged than those who join the army, as it was the even less well off who ended up in the police. In the colonial scheme police were second-class, those who could not make soldier, poor cousins to the army. In the specific case of the Ambonese the police was very much the second choice job after the army, and both of those only after the civil

233 Boekhoudt, Rapport: Reorgronisatie van het, 234.
235 De Moor, Westerling’s War, 53.
236 Silvestri, “The Thrill of ‘Simply Dressing Up’: The Indian Police, Disguise, and Intelligence Work in Colonial India.”
service. The police was a step up for many, one taken from a not elevated first position for many. Unlike in the army, Indonesian officers of the rank of sergeant first class did not need any knowledge of the Dutch language. Lieutenant of KNIL R. Boonstra wrote in 1902 of the reluctance of many Ambonese to join the armed police due to the fact that in their eyes the position of policeman equated that of "the ordinary natives." This was most likely an accurate understanding of the attitude of the soldiers with whom Boonstra dealt. Those who were unable to prove themselves suitable for military jobs, however, were more amenable to the lot of the police.

As they generally came from a lower stratum of society the police were a more democratic source of workers for the colonial state. This proved another advantage when the Ambonese armed police served amongst the people of their home areas: they maintained even less distance from the general local populace as the armed police were closer to the majority of the people, both proximately and in terms of status. The middling nature of police work has a way of drawing people together. This is in line with Thompson’s argument about distant elites in Niagara solidifying control by bringing in the middle class (farmers, inn keepers, artisans) to serve as constables at the local level. Police in this sense can serve as a glue of the nation-state; a magnet in a bucket of nails – giving coherence, a shape through force.

\[237\] Chauvel, *Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists*, 44.
\[239\] Bloembergen, *De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie*, 81-82
\[240\] Thompson, “Local Authority and District Autonomy: The Niagara Magistracy and Constabulary, 1828-1841”
None of this contradicts the notion of the police as agents of oppression. The general populace is often kept in line by other, perhaps slightly more elevated members of the general populace.\textsuperscript{241} Put succinctly, the people over the people are often of the people. In the homelands of the Ambonese the Ambonese armed police experience was less a matter of the authority oppressing the people than it was a case of members of the general populace oppressing the general populace in the relatively well-compensated service of the authority.

In subsequent chapters we will deal further with decommissioning of the armed police, the assertion that the Outer Islands had been pacified and that different structure of control were now to be entrusted. What is important to stress is that this is the very nature of the armed police as they existed in the Dutch East Indies. The armed police were not to be kept and maintained into perpetuity. The armed police were part of the actualization of control, hegemony, and pacification in the Outer Islands. Having effected an imperfect network of control they were able to relay authority to other bodies. The armed police were not the first authority to visit the Outer Islands but they were the first colony-wide authority actually to assert itself in the archipelago as a whole. This happened both structurally through unifying the armed police and through the employment not of stranger policing but through the use of local recruits. In the next chapter we will look to how the administrative structure of the armed police evolved and how the armed police brought in even more indigenous personnel in to extend even greater control.

\textsuperscript{241} Hardy, \textit{Reluctant Imperialist}, passim.
Chapter 4 - The Reorganization of 1912: The Apex of the Armed Police

In the previous chapter we looked at the Reorganization of 1898. The armed police were a disparate collection of largely paramilitary bodies not much different from the pradjoerits they had replaced. The armed police were technically unified, but they were still very much a collection of independent forces under the control of local governance. With the Reorganization of 1912 the armed police would begin to resemble a more modern police force with less focus on the military aspects. Consolidation of authority and upholding the law would be the more important tasks. Patrolling for presence, as opposed to patrolling to contact and engage with an enemy, was dominant. The apprehension of criminal elements would receive greater emphasis. The Ambonese would play a large part in this. The homelands of the Ambonese would receive special attention in the form of personnel and support and the Ambonese would fill the ranks and largely police their own. In so doing they would consolidate authority in the region and more tightly bind the region to the larger state. The Ambonese armed policemen would experience privilege as a group under the authority of the state, thereby helping to give greater coherence to an Ambonese identity.
The Reorganization of 1912

As we have seen, the first Reorganization of the police came in 1897. This is despite the fact that much of the historiography attributes the first major Reorganization to be that of 1912. This is most likely due to the fact that Boekhoudt wrote his bulky report on crime and policing on Java and Madura in 1906-1907 and this served as the base for the police reform in 1912-14. These are the sorts of very understandable misperceptions that define the study of colonial policing: the murky origins of units and structures, roles and functions. This complicates tracing the threads, not only of the police broadly but especially of the armed police. To better understand the Reorganization of 1912 and the armed police let’s first look at how 1912 has been (erroneously) understood as the first Reorganization of the armed police in particular.

An official Indonesian internal history of the police renders it succinctly. The armed police were formed in 1912 and then used as a tool of the Dutch East Indies government to rule civilians in these areas. The main tasks of the armed police were to: 1) ensure security, order and tranquility; 2) maintain power in times of disorder until the army could take over; and 3) consolidate control in new areas. The armed police were paramilitary and headed by officers. Personnel were mostly drawn from the army. The corps itself was divided into divisions, then sub-divided into brigades, and further sub-divided into detachments. The armed police were under the auspices of the interior administration. The armed police grew quickly, but were not very good at combating crime largely because they did not have expertise
This is a fine if perhaps too neat rendition of the armed police around 1912. Importantly, it covers the myriad general responsibilities of the armed police. This is important because the armed police served different roles in different areas of the archipelago. The strongly military function of the armed police in Aceh is conceded as well as the riot control powers of the armed police on Java. For the other Outer Islands the job of consolidation of control is accounted for. In this framework we can see satisfaction for the challenges of the newly conceived, archipelago-wide colonial authority.

Shiraishi fleshes things out a bit. As he understands it the armed police were formed in 1912 out of the remaining pradjoerits and other local paramilitary police units. Each residency received one division and each regency a platoon-size detachment. Each division was commanded by a captain seconded from the colonial army, and the entire armed police was placed under the department of internal administration. Its force strength, initially five thousand, reached ten thousand men within a few years. Shiraishi has rightfully identified the penetration and robustness of the armed police, particularly how quickly the armed police became a powerful presence. The numbers he cites are quite a development from the modest force of 1897.

As to the situation in East Indonesia, van Franssen starts by dating the inception of the armed police corps to 1911. In 1912 a division was posted to Ambon where it was staffed by personnel who were originally pradjoerits. In

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Ambon the role of the armed police was specifically delineated. The armed police were subservient to civilian authority and their duties were to: 1) ensure inland peace, order and security; 2) maintain authority in times of trouble until the Army could take over; 3) establish effective control in areas where it is necessary to establish control. Note that the duties of the armed police in Maluku are the duties of the armed police colony-wide. This became more a matter of practice and less merely the aspiration than it had been in 1897.

Having considered the ways in which some Indonesian, Japanese, and Dutch scholars have broadly viewed the armed police and the Reorganization of 1912 we can look at Posno’s report itself. In March 1910 A.B.J.W. Posno, a retired major of the cavalry, served as a technical inspector of the armed police in Java and the Outer Islands. He provided an outline proposal for the reorganization of the armed police force, an organization that he (as well as his predecessors, Engelhard and Boekhoudt) deemed quite necessary. Posno would go on to serve within the Reorganization that he himself had conceived, becoming an administrator as well as an advisor. His own efforts would parallel the general Reorganization of police between 1912-1914. His deputy was a former army officer, A. Hoorweg, who would later serve as the architect of the field police.

To understand the thinking of the administration in the archipelago regarding police reform in the mid-1910s, it is useful to examine what one Dutch official had to say. P.H. Fromberg Sr. was a former member of the Supreme Court

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244 Van Franssen, Bronnen Betreffende De Midden-Molukken, 646.
245 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 102-106.
and was regarded as the foremost expert on modern Chinese popular movements in the colony. Fromberg was consulted by the minister of colonies as to the administrative structure of the police. Fromberg identified his position on the problem neatly and simply: “there is practically no chief of police in the Netherlands Indies.” Posno shared this concern regarding his area of responsibility, the armed police.

According to Posno central technical leadership was the solution to the problems of the armed police. In a vast opinion of over 300 pages, later summarized by Hoorweg, Posno explained why. First, he argued, with centralization armed police officers would be used more and more for ‘normal’ policing, enabling the military to diminish its presence. Second, fewer troops would be needed for training if centralization were in force. Third, without centralized control there was no clear recruitment policy nor were there any limitations on the duration of appointments. Centralization would alleviate that too. Hoorweg and Posno also voiced a need for greater military-style discipline, but the core of their criticism was similar to that of Engelhard and Boekhoudt: the main problem was the lack of central control and appropriate supervision. This, of course, dovetailed with the needs of the Ethical Policy, a blueprint for the emergent state of the Dutch East Indies. Within this policy the Outer Islands received special notice in a dispatch from Java: “The necessary funds are earmarked for a complete reorganization of the

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armed policemen in the Outer Territories... The proposal is a result of the contract
to the ex-major of Cavalry Posno.”

Posno’s opinion served as the basis for the reorganization of the armed
police, an undertaking that was done at no small expense. The new leadership role
of chief of the armed police, a job created by Posno would be filled by Posno himself
with Hoorweg as his right hand man. The armed police remained in the department
of the interior. Under their leadership, the armed police corps became more
uniform in structure. There were 21 divisions now: one for Java and Madura, and
one for each of the twenty other major islands. As we have seen, each residency
received one division (comprised of detachments), commanded by an active duty
captain from the army. Retired military officers served as the heads of detachments
(consisting of teams). Detachments were divided into teams of 20 men, or half
teams of 10, serving in support of local governments. There was a proposed
reorganization of barracks and a central depot for recruiting and training.

These measures amounted to an intent to further militarize the armed police
in may respects, particularly in terms of centralization of authority. With two
military men doing the reforming this is not surprising, but it is important to
remember that what they proposed was not always fully implemented. The reforms
that Posno envisioned led to tension with the local, civilian colonial authorities who
had enjoyed more unfettered control over the armed police before Posno assumed
his duties. Posno sought to limit local authority by narrowly defining their powers

247 Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur 1911, “De Gewapende Politie In
Nederlandsch-Indie,” 228-233.
over the armed police. Under the new scheme the heads of regional administration monitored the armed police but Posno, as the chief of the armed police, also held disciplinary powers. Two masters would be served: the civil authority and the retired military man, Posno. Such a situation seems untenable and it was. But this is an important element of the nature of the armed police: they can serve midway between military and civil authority, and this tension is very much part of the organization.\textsuperscript{249}

Under the official language of the reorganization the armed police were explicitly “under the supreme authority of the head of the regional administration.” Furthermore, they were “obliged to provide all services... they are assigned by the head of local government.” The reorganization goes on to state “the head of local government exercises disciplinary authority over the corps.”\textsuperscript{250} This would seem to be rather clear-cut: the boss is the civilian head of the regional administration. But this was not the case because Posno also had his orders. As chief of the armed police Posno was charged with “the technical leadership of that corps, including the recruitment, training, armament and administration, also maintaining discipline in the corps.” Posno was also given power to transfer division personnel “provided that the transfer of the division... [be] made after consultation with the head of the regional administration, in whose district that personnel [are] posted.”

\textsuperscript{249} Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 102-106.
\textsuperscript{250} 2.10.36.04.Openbaar Verbaal. 08/14/1911 V (1926) 1911 N.B. A list of specific punishments is provided as well as a repetition of the 1876 edict that these be given in different languages, Malay, Chinese, etc.
Furthermore, “the chief of the corps is authorized on all matters concerning the armed police... to correspond [with civilian and military authorities].”

There are clear conflicts in these orders. The chief has to “consult” and “correspond" with the civilian bosses while both have claim to disciplinary powers. Such a set-up seems ripe for abuse and confusion. That, of course, is exactly what transpired. This was not a failure of the armed police, however, but their moment of great triumph. They made the seemingly impossible possible by making the central government and the regional government work together in a wildly imperfect manner that guided the colony towards nation-statehood. There were other signs of development: a central depot for training was established at Sukabumi, though full training of all recruits there was still an aspiration. Barracks residence was established in principal for the force as a whole, though this too was not fully practiced. The sum of all this was a police force separate from the village police and the general police largely.

But in the day-to-day operation the imperfection of the system meant incidents. In February 1914 an armed policeman, Maoek-Baoek, shot the civil lieutenant governor of North Beloe (Timor and Dependencies), JC van Leeuwen, in the leg. The immediate cause was that van Leeuwen had sought to discipline the policeman, something the central armed police authority was supposedly in control of and which right had been taken from local authorities. The investigation into the

251 Bijblad op het Staatsblad 1913, 184-186. Provisional Instructions for the Chief of the armed police corps in the Dutch East Indies, established by Article 2 of the Decree of 26 November 1912 No. 47.
252 Almanak Nederlands Indie 1933, 267.
253 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1915, 423.
incident concluded it was an attempted murder. Armed with this decision the Resident of Timor and Dependencies filed a complaint with the director of the interior administration about what he saw as the deteriorating relationship between the government and the armed police. According to the Resident this was caused by the Reorganization of 1912. He argued that the old system (under which the local civilian administration was in charge of management, training, and discipline of the armed police) had been a far superior one to the present system. He concluded that the old ties between government officials and the armed police had been broken.

The criticism was shared not only by the Resident of Timor and Dependencies, but also by other administration officials who expressed their dissatisfaction with the armed police through the MP for the Liberal Union RRL de Muralt (a former colonial civil engineer). At the end of October 1914 Muralt claimed in parliament that discipline in the armed police corps was undermined because the authority of local government officials had eroded. Central control over the armed police was being called into question and in a very public way. Muralt’s version of the past, in which local control had been paramount and so things had worked well, was simply not supported by the evidence. This contentious issue of control was the birth pain of true central authority.\(^\text{254}\)

In 1914 a major investigation into the activities of the armed police was launched, partly in response to the attack in North Beloe and parliamentary questions. The study showed that objections to the new scheme were not limited to

\[^{254}\text{Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 102-106.}\]
Timor and Dependencies. There was widespread frustration that centralization of the technical leadership of the armed police had taken away disciplinary action from civil servants. Armed policemen increasingly felt that the division commander of the armed police and not the Resident (the civil authority) was their boss. The claim was made that armed policemen ignored orders from administrative officials, culminating in the contemptuous behavior of armed policemen who no longer saluted civilian authorities.

Posno reacted quite sarcastically to this study. In his opinion, discipline should remain in his hands. "No two drivers for a horse," was his response, not acknowledging that just such a situation existed. Diplomatically, Governor-General Idenburg concluded that the relationship between the civilian government and the armed police left much to be desired. This prompted the government to once again send a circular stressing that the armed police were at the service of the local board. Commanders of divisions of the armed police were reminded that they had to follow the instructions of these civilians.255

The primary reform Posno instituted was the centralization of the armed police in tandem with regional leadership. We have seen the complications this engendered, but the advantage was considerable: there was regional control in a network of colony-wide control as opposed to regional authorities who reported back to the metropole. This period was also the high water mark of the armed police in terms of size, influence, and importance.256 The result of this was a unit of

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police that was both substantial and organizationally structured in a unique way. It was a colony-wide force in both form and weight.

**Praxis and Ambon: The Work of the Armed Police**

Gramscian praxis refers to action or practical activity but it is not simply action or practical activity. Praxis is concerned with bringing together modes of thinking with that which is implicit in practical life. Praxis is the significance of action vis a vis thought; praxis is the relationship of thought and action. Through practical activity, through praxis, we can gain insight into what one actually believes. It is an approach to the world of the subaltern whose thoughts are often to be gleaned through deeds.

By 1911 the pacification in the Outer Islands was proceeding successfully, due in large part to the actions of the armed police. It was noted in a colonial publication that the proof of this was that mining companies felt more comfortable in expanding their operations in the Outer Islands. The maintenance of authority over thousands of coolies ("who are often not of the best elements") was stated to require substantial, organized, well-disciplined forces of armed policemen. The author argued that the job of the armed policeman should be widened further, especially as that meant an expanded writ in dealing with popular movements of a
serious nature. This type of control, he contends, was more in line with the original job of the armed police, including the maintenance of order over coolies.257

The powers of the armed police in the Outer Islands would continue to evolve during this period. Discussion of use of the armed police for military purposes was decidedly overshadowed by an emphasis on extension of their burgeoning police powers. A British naturalist on a trip to Papua was guarded by five Ambonese armed policemen.258 This expansive exercise of the power of the armed police was not out of the tenor of the times. For the Residents of the Outer Islands, it was desirable that the power of the armed police be substantially broadened. The Resident of the Southern and Eastern Division of Borneo wanted to deploy armed police to monitor cinemas and dice games. The Resident of Bali and Lombok wanted to use armed police to help in collection of taxes and in supervising cock fights. The Resident of Aceh wanted to use them for supervising roads and markets. The Resident of Bengkulu wanted the armed police to help with monitoring livestock, particularly infectious diseases among hogs and the non-use of underage, crippled or injured draft animals.259 The Residents seemed to view the armed police as a catch-all force to address a wide range of problems. In reality, however, the armed police never got the wider police powers many of the Residents in the Outer Islands wanted. The discussion merely confirmed the ambivalent position of the armed police, a force still growing away from its military origins into a more civilian body. Moreover, it shows a growing desire for control by colonial

258 New Zealand Botanical Society Newsletter, 77, 19.
259 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 81-82
officials and the increasing viability in realizing control. The armed police were an active part of this development.

By 1912 the corps was unified and more than 10,000 strong. By point of comparison it should be noted that in 1910 the armed police stood at 4379 men. In 1911 the budget called for 4308 men, 453 men on Java and 3855 on the Outer Islands. This was a strength of more than seven infantry battalions, or more than one third of the field army.\textsuperscript{260} The Reorganization of 1912 called for about 11,000 men, with 400 for Aceh alone. This was a quantum leap, from 4000 to 10000 men.\textsuperscript{261} The armed police covered the whole of the Dutch East Indies in 23 divisions, two on Java and the rest throughout the archipelago. This was a much changed armed police from 1876, but it was very much still the armed police.\textsuperscript{262} The armed police were not an organization that had existed forever nor would they be around forever. Indeed, in twenty years they would almost entirely disappear as an organization. The armed police were a transitional body for the state and as the state developed it would outgrow its need for the armed police.

Over and above any reforms instituted by Posno in 1912 the armed police were still to be the “armored fist” of the interior administration, armed with carbines that were updated in 1923.\textsuperscript{263} Officially they were still not an investigative body and still had a semi-military bearing, but they were most definitely not the marechaussee. Governor-General Van Heutsz had been very enthusiastic about the work of the marechaussee in Aceh, particularly the role of the Ambonese. He had

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\item[	extsuperscript{260}] Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 81-82.
\item[	extsuperscript{261}] Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlandsch-Indische Politie”
\item[	extsuperscript{262}] Encyclopedia of the Netherlands East Indies 1919, 446.
\item[	extsuperscript{263}] Van Franssen, \textit{Bronnen Betreffende De Midden-Molukken}, 646.
\end{enumerate}
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brought equal vigor to the job of pacifying and opening up the Outer Islands. The reorganization of the armed police in 1912 was a direct outcome of this, but it was also an evolution away from the marechaussee, a military body. The “armored fist” of the interior administration had non-military duties to: 1) ensure domestic peace, order and security; 2) maintain authority in times of trouble before transferring responsibility to the army; 3) establish controlled conditions in areas recently brought under effective control by providing support to the civilian authority and in protecting the public.264 This was difficult to implement because it was a period of transition in the consolidation of the colonial state.

Because of the nature of local control, duties of the armed police differed with no two armed police units exactly alike. But this was less true in 1912 than it had been in 1876. Furthermore, units on Java and in Aceh differed greatly from units in the other Outer Islands that were largely alike. The duties of one Outer Island unit after 1912 can be seen as representative of other Outer Island units after 1912. Here we will look at the instructions for the armed police of the Celebes and Dependencies.265 I am using these instructions in a manner similar to that of Barnard.266 A scholar of Southeast Asia, Barnard has used police manuals as “a window on to the changing world of authority in Malay states at the dawn of the twentieth century.” Manuals reflect the complexity inherent in the modernization of states transitioning from tradition. Barnard emphasizes that these documents are

264 De Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie, 60. N.B. the specific statute cited is St 1912 no 576.
265 KGP 1913. BB 3596.
266 Barnard, “Rules For Rulers”
obscure and that their distribution lists are unknown, though he asserts that they were likely disseminated widely.

I agree with Barnard’s view that such manuals or lists of instruction are valuable historical documents. Furthermore, their obscurity makes them valuable but also requires we be judicious in their use. I am using the instructions of the armed police in Celebes and Dependencies to talk about the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese because they are extant. This manual was the most extensive document I was able to locate in either The Hague or Jakarta regarding procedure in the Outer Islands after the Reorganization of 1912. I think that the instructions for Celebes and Dependencies are most like those for the homelands of the Ambonese, particularly as Manado itself can be physically found on the island of Sulawesi. Barnard’s work underscores the importance of this approach.

The first section is concerned with physical fitness. “The purpose of the various exercises is [to provide] the framework for making the men fit to [do] and continue to do their job.” It is seen as having other practical effects: imbuing a sense of strict obedience to orders, developing the paramount skill of marching, and producing a powerful physique. It states that “a strong constitution is produced and maintained by exercise” and that exercise also has a moral dimension “to enable the man, even in the midst of danger, hardship and fatigue, to do his duty.” In addition the instructions require that the armed police be exemplars in “dress, behavior, etc.” and implement all exercises and service with “punctuality and order.”

The second section describes the chain of command in which the division commander reports to the chief of the corps whereas smaller subdivisions report to
their immediate chiefs. The civilian authority is not mentioned directly but this section explicitly states that the duties of the corps are not exclusively military, but part of civilian authority. Civilian authority and the armed police are viewed as mutually supportive, but there were disagreements. The creative tension between the civil authority and the armed police was crucial to the extension of authority into the Outer Islands.

The third section lists the practical duties of the armed police, among which are:

- Exercises in closed and scattered order
- Exercises in patrol
- Checks for fitness
- Transport [of] prisoners, etc.
- Practice marching discipline, ordinary night and secret marches [all areas]
- Surrounding houses and kampongs
- Engaging and securing bivouacs
- Investigating, chasing, and destroying of small parties of criminals
- Detection of hostile or recalcitrant chiefs and escaped criminals
- Laying ambush, cover
- Securing workers [in] not completely [pacified] areas
- Attacking the enemy from a fortified compound or small building, etc.
- Shooting practice - stop the exercises in various postures [for instruction]
- Pioneer exercises, consisting in making bivouacs and canopies
- Simple crossings over deep rivers (rafts, bridges, ferries)
- [Overcoming] barriers to a bivouac and clearing up enemy barriers
- Further theoretical instruction, as far as necessary.
- Man with a pack [must] march 30 miles along good road, subject to usual rest

This is a far cry from the police as we think of them today, but perhaps not. Shooting is one element (they are the armed police, after all), but the bread and butter of the armed police is patrolling and skills needed to conduct successful patrols. Why patrols? Because patrols establish presence and enable timely responses to the demands of the state. Today police patrol to establish presence, to
show their power. The armed police did the same thing in the Outer Islands. This patrolling was not patrolling for its own sake, but was a way for the armed police to establish a network of control. They were establishing a presence (patrolling) to actualize that control. Patrolling brought local non-police into the network and also furthered control by involving the indigenous persons who were armed policemen.

A third of the personnel in the army were European but the police were almost exclusively indigenous. The army did not interact with the people as the armed police did nor did they conduct patrols as the armed police did. The development of this system of interaction was begun under the marechaussee and continued within the earliest iterations of the armed police. Unlike the general police and the military the armed police were tasked with going out and spreading the authority of the state in a unique way.

The ninth section provides a model for a patrol report, asking for such things as the commander, the date of patrol, the strength of the men, the weather, the disposition of watches set, etc. Patrols lasted several days and could be within or between cities and towns. The details required could be those asked of a military patrol except for the lack of an intimation of purpose. There is a section on the report for “Mission” but the entry is blank. This omission gives a sense of the job of the armed police. The armed police are not being directed to go out and engage an enemy, but simply to patrol. While apparently unfocused, patrolling was a way that the state extended its authority into the everyday lives of the people. It is subtle, seemingly unobtrusive (largely), and it is done through such prosaic activities.
Battles may win wars, but the constable on the beat is the daily enforcer of hegemony. It is this daily activity that solidifies the organization of indigenous personnel that was the armed police. The armed police were valuable both in being and in becoming, as an agent for the state and as a developing tool for the colonial and post-colonial states.

A long list is given in section twelve of the “Instructions Regarding the Service and the Field Patrol Service.” I will list the first sentence of indicative instructions here. These are not measures to be done for rehearsal, but for employment in the field. They speak for themselves, denoting the daily work of the armed police. These activities are related to military patrolling, but with an added emphasis on establishing a presence to enforce the idea of the state:

4. To do a search [house], small children should quickly be taken away.
7. In areas where we have not known, as soon as one can try to obtain information.
8. If we have to ask about a road, don’t just ask the way that they would take, but also about the roads that lead in completely different directions.
9. It is desirable that each department maintains its own patrol area, in which they soon become familiar with the people in their areas.
10. Needless pollution of houses and yards should be resisted.
11. If you must bivouac in homes, choose those most suitable.
12. Random walking should be avoided by a patrol, it tires [the men] unnecessarily and is not conducive to a good mind.
13. If you encounter a very different enemy action, submit a ‘Secret’ report with a detailed account of his deeds.
16. For patrols to search or pursue enemies hiding on and near villages, don’t tear up the road, walk beside the footpath. [to disguise numbers]
24. With every scuffle adhere to the middle view. In this way the least losses are incurred.

Section eleven brought military and police skills together for the investigation of robberies:
Robbery investigation demands careful preparation, but they can never be done at random. Through careful and tactful questioning, try to determine the whereabouts of the wanted people, or places where their favorite wife lives or the houses of relatives. When the location of the wanted people is determined with a large certainty, plan for testing this, preferably at the break of day. It is recommended that we mask our intentions by deceiving shortly before by patrolling in completely different directions. If we are discovered proximate to the shelter in an untimely way then search determinedly as soon as possible. Be careful: It is never too late to ensnare oneself in a firefight. Search for the escaped in the immediate area, then immediately send patrols in all directions. Carefully search ravines, bushes, rivers, etc. Also look at the traces left by the enemy, which, if they find them, can be followed with enough patience. No one can disappear, go "trackless". Don’t rest until you discover the track. The direction in which it runs, in many cases, is in connection with what has become known, about the family residence, the location of houses and the family of the subject. It is where he has probably gone. A lot of raids meet with success because it often happens that the person sought by these restless methods has nowhere safe to overnight and he offers his submission.

Part detective, part infantryman, the armed police in the investigation of robberies has achieved the ultimate in control with the last line: faced by the undeniable power of the state the subject simply gives in. These instructions show a force that is in theory to be equally at home with both police work and military action. Hegemony is to be achieved through such consent.

None of this should be seen to make light of the shortcomings of the armed police. They were a replacement for the pradjoerit system and they were supposed to be an improvement, but it was sometimes difficult to understand how much of an improvement they were over the pradjoerits. In 1915 the division commander in Bengkulu was accused of drunkenly assaulting women. During an uprising in Jambi in 1916 rebels were able to subdue a number of armed policemen, showing the
tactical deficiencies of the force. Elsewhere riots were brought on by the armed police who needlessly shot and set houses afire.

Even when the transgressions of the armed police were not of an overly criminal nature, they could still be a sloppy and embarrassing body. On one occasion the Resident of Yogyakarta came into the barracks of the armed police for an inspection. The detachment commander was in his pajamas and asked, while still sitting, if the resident had any problems with him remaining in his pajamas. The Resident, of course, did not like even being asked. This incident probably tells us as much about the quality of the armed police as it does relations between the police and the interior administration, but it also shows us a force that was feeling its own strength and power within the state. One divisional commander of the armed police, a former infantry captain, issued a commanding statement to ordinary natives saying that the fulfillment of general police regulations was now in his purview.267 That the armed police acted atrociously, that they abused their authority, is not surprising during this period of major transference of power in the Outer Islands. A new entity, the Dutch East Indies, was being fashioned out of the existing population in an egalitarian way.268 The state was empowering much of the population. The presence of sub-optimal personnel is consistent with broad recruitment.

Clearly the armed police fell short of the ideal, being criticized as being poor soldiers and poor policemen. But such criticism is both accurate and beside the point. The armed police were the missing link between military and civilian rule,

268 Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers, and Separatists, 44.
between conquest and hegemony. They would be unsatisfactory as soldiers while still being expected to execute military duties. They would also be unsatisfactory as police while still being expected to execute police duties. As for personnel, they were trying to bring into the process of control indigenous personnel from a stratum of society lower than the Dutch had previously employed to enforce authority. What is truly notable is not how bad the armed police were, but how effective they became in a relatively short time.

**Agency and Ambon: Personnel of the Armed Police**

Gramscian praxis is itself bound with consent, to be understood to include agency. Agency is the ability to make an expression of autonomous action. Agency is fundamental to the colonial enterprise we are examining. The armed police were not conscripted personnel. Alliance with the hegemonic power in the case of the armed police is autonomy or expression thereof. Gramsci saw force and consent as interdependent, and that consent must be predicated on the independence of actors, understood to be often imperfect but viable nonetheless. Becoming an armed policeman was an expression of agency.

Posno’s notes for the 1912 Reorganization contain a musing regarding the constabulary in the neighboring Philippines. He notes that the scouts are part of the American army but also of the people. They constitute for Posno, “sort of an armed policemen.” In looking ever so slightly north, to the Philippines to America, Posno was ruminating on the place of the armed police, that body even closer to the people
than the army. We can look to the famous picture of the Philippine Scouts at attention to the American flag. Becoming something, something that had not been, but what? Filipino? American? Police? The place of identity in the armed police was ever present in the evolution of police control in the archipelago.

In the archives in Jakarta is a set of re-enlistment papers for an armed policeman. The policeman in question was an Afghani, a Muslim, an older man, an armed policeman signing up (again) in Aceh to work on the side of the Dutch, on the side of the greater state. The Jakarta archives have nothing further on him, before or after these pages. Who was he? All we know is that he was, through the enterprise of the armed police, part of Indonesia emerging.

Unfortunately, there is no more about this remarkable individual – including whether or not he was unusual in being an Afghan policeman in Aceh. But at the time of the Reorganization of 1912 we do begin to have more substantive figures about the Ambonese armed police. Regarding this period Locher-Scholten writes that “Police recruitment patterns among the different Indonesian ethnic groups are not very clear.” I very much agree with this assessment. This project has from the beginning been an effort to construct the narrative of a part of the colonial authority that has largely been lost to history, including internal histories of the Indonesian police. From the beginning of the armed police, like policing like was the rule in the homelands of the Ambonese and beyond. This was certainly the case around the time of the Reorganization of 1912 when Ambonese armed policemen

269 2.10.36.04.Openbaar Verbaal. 08/14/1911 V (1926) 1911
270 BB 3627.
were understood to work in their own homelands or other Christian areas with some presence in Muslim areas. Nevertheless, Ambonese units, or largely Ambonese units, also operated outside their homelands, particularly on Java.

Scholarship has, in fact, privileged such units, though they were the exception and not the rule. Our examination here very much complements work on those units since both types of study illuminate the Ambonese experience as armed police.

By way of comparison, in 1900 these are statistics regarding the armed police near and in the homelands of the Ambonese:

Menado/Gorontalo: 1 European instructor, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 30 men.
Ternate: 0 European instructor, 1 sergeant, 3 corporals, 26 men.
New Guinea: 2 European instructors, 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 40 men.
Timor: 1 European instructor, 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 50 men.

The armed police were a presence in the Outer Islands at the turn of the century, but they were still limited in terms of manpower compared to what they would become after the Reorganization of 1912.

The first year for which we have substantive figures is 1913, after the Reorganization had gone into effect. The numbers here are from the training school at Sukabumi, from two separate sets of figures of armed police. The first is from a group designated as ready for transfer in late October 1913. The other is from those designated as trained and available from early December of 1913.

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272 2.10.36.04. Openbaar Verbaal. V 16 S 1913 (62)
274 Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur 1900, 344.
There is no indication where the first group was to be transferred, but it is likely that many of them were headed to their own homelands. These men may have received limited training in Sukabumi, having already worked as armed policemen in their own homelands. Sukabumi would be in this sense a conduit for these armed policemen. This would be in line with Sukabumi’s emergence as a national center for the training of police (including the armed police), a status it was aspiring towards but had not achieved at the time of the Reorganization of 1912.

We see in this first list that there are many more armed policemen at this time than there were in 1900:

Ready for transfer [October 23, 1913]: 1 Batak (Muslim)

Ready for transfer in 1 month: 37 Ambonese (Christian), 27 Manadonese (Christian), 6 Bataks (Christian), 5 Javanese, 2 Bandjarese, 1 Riauers, 2 Pontianakers, 3 Ternatans, 2 Malays, 1 Timorese (Muslim)

Ready for transfer in 1 ½ months: 27 Manadonese

Ready for transfer in 2 months: 26 Ambonese (Christian), 32 Bataks (Christian), 12 Bataks (Muslim), 7 Bataks (Animist), 1 Javanese, 1 Padanger, 1 Bandjarese, 1 Ternatan (Christian), 1 Manadonese (Christian)

Ready for transfer in 2 ½ months: 31 Manadonese (Christian), 11 Ambonese (Christian), 4 Ambonese (Seram - Christian) 2 Ambonese (Kei - Christian), 1 Ternatan (Christian)

Ready for transfer in 3 months: 57 Manadonese (Christian), 13 Ambonese (Christian), 17 Bataks (Christian), 2 Bataks (Muslim), 1 Padanger (Muslim), 5 Papuans (Christian), 1 Ternatan (Christian)

Ready for transfer in 3 ½ months: 30 Manadonese (Chr), 18 Ambonese (Christian), 3 Ambonese (Muslims) 36 Bataks (Christian), 6 Bataks (Muslim), 3 Papuans (Christian), 1 Batavian (Christian), 1 Ternatan (Christian)

Ready for transfer in 4 months: 69 Manadonese (Christian), 2 Ambonese, 1 Timorese
Ready for transfer in 4 ½ months: 25 Manadonese (Christian), 13 Ambonese (Christian), 3 Timorese (Christian) 275

There are some salient points to be made from the information above. First, there is a striking number of Ambonese listed, in comparison with the numbers from other groups. It could mean that there was a high percentage of Ambonese at Sukabumi only at this particular time, but I think this is unlikely. It is probable that around these years Ambonese were always a strong contingent at Sukabumi.

Training at Sukabumi was in principle for all armed policemen, but in practice such universal training was the exception at this time. Real universal training at Sukabumi would be realized only with the coming of the field police. Ambonese were favored within the colonial system and this may be a manifestation of that.

The policemen noted in this group are those ready for transfer, possibly meaning transfer off Java. A lot of these were Ambonese and would be transferred back to the homelands of the Ambonese. They had been brought to Java to help standardize the armed police, Posno’s great aim in the Reorganization of 1912.

Accordingly, armed policemen from the homelands of the Ambonese were being brought to Sukabumi in great numbers for two reasons: the importance of like policing like and the importance of the homelands of the Ambonese, the vast stretch of land and water that comprises the eastern border of the archipelago.

Consolidation and control of the Ambonese armed police meant greater consolidation and control of the political entity that the archipelago had become.

275 BB 3617 KGP 49 1913 Overzicht Recrutenopleiding Sukabumi 23 October 1913
Second, Manadonese are listed separately from other Ambonese. The military would not do this until the 1930s. Timorese are also listed separately, also around the time when they first served in the marechaussee in Aceh though they had served as armed police since the late 1800s. What this shows is a different appreciation of ethnicity by the police, one we have been discussing throughout. Specifically, the military was more concerned with the Ambonese as an alien force to use through a policy of divide and conquer, whereas the police were more sensitive to the notion of like over like. Understanding the Manadonese as different from other Ambonese would be of greater efficacy in staffing both in Manado and other parts of the homelands of the Ambonese. Other Ambonese are specified as being from Kei and Seram. This would also be helpful in deciding how to allot personnel geographically. The Ambonese are both the sum of all the ethnicities that comprise the Ambonese and individual groups within that larger term.

Third, religion is listed sometimes but not always. What this shows is that religion could be important for a particular group’s identity but it was not the most important or only important identifier for armed policemen. Also, some armed policemen are specifically noted as animists and some with no religion.276

There is in addition to a surprising array of ethnic groups. Many Bataks are noted, but a good number of other groups are represented as well. The armed police were to be the first archipelago-wide police, and centralized training for representatives throughout the islands was a strong step in that direction. Few

276 Help with the translations is from the Flemish scholar Frank Dhont of Yale (e.g. “heiden” translates as heathen but may be better understood as animist). E-mail communication of January 16 2013.
Javanese are listed, possibly because they are considered elsewhere and not deemed those to be transferred because they would not be transferring out of Java, though some were. This does not preclude the possibility of transfer within Java. In short, what the list indicates is What this does show, however, is that ethnicities and religious groups were brought together within the armed police in a way that the military largely abjured.

In this same document two short-term detachments are mentioned for the month of October. The specific tasks of the detachments are not noted. They may have been training exercises or they may have been in response to a request for assistance, urgent or otherwise. Whereas in the list above no Javanese are noted here we have Javanese as the plurality in both detachments. These detachments were to remain on Java, emphasizing the strength of the idea of like policing like. What we do not see in these detachments is stranger policing: Javanese armed policemen are being sent to police on Java even though there are Ambonese armed police who could conceivably have been sent to do the job.

Both detachments were sent out on October 23 to return on November 1. There was a detachment sent to Madiun consisting of the following: 17 Javanese, 2 Ternatans (Muslim), 1 Madurese (Muslim), 1 Manadonese (Christian), 1 Bandjarese (Muslim), 1 Ambonese (Christian), 2 Malays (Muslim). And it should be observed that a correction was made: originally they were to be sent out with the 17 Javanese and the one Ambonese (Christian) and the 2 Ternatans (Muslim). A correction was made six days later that they were sent out with the more diverse complement

277 BB 3617 KGP 49 1913 Overzicht Recrutenopleiding Sukabumi 23 October 1913
listed. The religion of the Javanese is either superfluous or not important. Another detachment was sent to Tuban at the same time. It consisted of 12 Javanese, noted as ready for transfer, along with 5 Bengkulunese, 4 Niasers, 2 Padangers, and 6 Pontianakers.

It can be observed that no personnel from Nias are listed as ready for transfer but they do comprise part of the detachment to Tuban. Furthermore, there are Bandjarese noted both as ready for transfer as well as listed on the detachment to Madiun. Some in the detachment to Madiun are Ambonese. I believe that these individuals are considered separately from those noted as ready for transfer because they were to remain on Java. This all amounts to a striking diversity within the principle of like over like policing: the majority are Javanese but there are a number of other groups. Such an arrangement would be an effective way for the state to extend and consolidate control as it both utilized locals and helped to create the idea of a united archipelago, first the Dutch East Indies and then Indonesia.

The principle of like over like policing that is being expressed here is both state-defined and creative. The state considered those from a certain area to be Ambonese and in employing them together gave force to the assertion of that lump identity. This does not mean that indigenous personnel necessarily saw themselves in those terms. This dissertation focuses on the work of the armed police in the Gramscian sense discussed in the introduction. Most certainly a Manadonese armed policeman based on the island of Ambon would be considered “unlike” in many ways. The state, however, considered that person to be an Ambonese armed police and would generally keep him within that area. Like over like policing refers to how
the state defined terms and how the state created those terms in practice. The striking diversity within like over like policing refers to the practice of employing a sizeable non-Ambonese minority to work alongside the Ambonese majority. This co-employment brought together in the homelands of the Ambonese disparate groups from the archipelago. United refers to armed policemen working together in integrated units with state-defined locals forming the majority - a majority that is itself a construction of disparate groups. Like over like policing describes the practice of the state. The idea of a united archipelago was in being at this time, but the evidence presented here seeks to argue for the functioning of a united archipelago through the institution of the armed police.

Another group is mentioned in the records, one that was at Sukabumi at roughly the same time, December instead of October. They are designated as trained and available. These armed policemen may have been trained at Sukabumi in a more thorough capacity. They may have been trained as were the policemen of the first list but not yet available for transfer. Javanese may be underrepresented here because the efforts of the training were to support the entirety of the archipelago, privileging those from the Outer Islands or headed there. There are few Javanese because the aim of Sukabumi at this time was to standardize armed police units elsewhere in accordance with the institution on Java, obviating the need for a large Javanese contingent. Some Javanese are mentioned, including some who were to be kept on at headquarters, but they are largely absent. This study is less concerned with Javanese armed policemen, but evidence has been provided about their robust existence, and we will see more evidence of that in the next chapter.
Regardless of what kind of training the armed policemen here did or did not receive, regardless of where they may or may not have been going, and regardless of who may not be represented in the documentation that we do have, there are armed policemen here in numbers that dwarf those of 1900. The armed policemen we can see are largely from the Outer Islands, a presence that would serve to consolidate, standardize, and thus provide coherence for the institution of the armed police, in accordance with Posno’s reforms.

In putting all of these different groups together and entrusting them with the power of the state the Dutch were creating a powerful force that would one day facilitate the rule of different powers. Far from conquering by dividing, the colonial state brought different groups together in a way that both unified and allowed for local groups to retain authority in their own areas. This act was one of strengthening and binding the state. Sukabumi became one of the proving grounds for the emergent nation-state, effecting unity in diversity. The following is a representative selection from the second group:

Trained and available beginning December: 1 Manadonese (Christian), 1 Manadonese (Muslim), 1 Ambonese (Muslim), 4 Bataks (Christian), 1 Batak (Muslim), 1 Ternatan (Muslim), 1 Sundanese (Muslim), 1 Bandjarese (Muslim), 1 Javanese (Muslim), 1 Riauer (Muslim)

Trained and available end of January: 27 Manadonese (Christian), 14 Ambonese (Christian), 5 Ambonese (Ceram - Christian), 1 Ambonese (Kei - Christian), 1 Ternatan (Christian), 40 Bataks (Christian), 9 Bataks (Muslim), 2 Bataks (Animist)

Trained and available mid-February: 50 Manadonese (Christian), 2 Ambonese (Christian), 8 Bataks (Christian), 4 Papuans (Christian), 1 Ternatan (Christian), 1 Bandjarese (Muslim)
Trained and available mid-March: 22 Manadonese (Christian), 30 Ambonese (Christian), 8 Ambonese (Muslim), 2 Ternatans (Christian), 6 Timorese (Christian), 18 Bataks (Christian), 2 Bataks (Muslim), 3 Papuans (Christian), 1 Padanger (Muslim)

Trained and available mid-April: 51 Manadonese (Christian), 3 Timorese (Christian), 1 Timorese (Muslim), 6 Timorese (Animist), 2 Bataks (Christian), 1 Batak (Muslim), 5 Ternatans (Christian)\textsuperscript{278}

Here again, it cannot be said with certainty where they were to be sent, though it is likely they were headed outside Java. Handwritten notes in the margins, not very legible, seems to indicate that from a group immediately available many were headed off Java, lending credence to the idea that the school at Sukabumi was favoring training for those to go to the Outer Islands at this time to standardize the armed police in an effort to consolidate and strengthen the organization. What were the reasons these men went where they went? Like an Afghan in Aceh, the reasons are not apparent. What is clear for the evidence, however, is that the armed police were training personnel from around the archipelago and training them together towards a common purpose using diversity within the general principle of majority like over like.

What we can conclude from comparing the figures from 1900 and 1913 is that the numbers of armed police increased, and that they increased especially in terms of Ambonese who received training. I am suggesting that the Ambonese through the armed police had a greater investment in the colonial state than other

\textsuperscript{278} BB 3617 KGP 49 1913 Overzicht Recrutenopleiding Sukabumi, 5 December 1913
groups and that due to the stationing of Ambonese armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese this bound these Ambonese homelands more closely to the nascent state. This is reflected in the more complete, more telling, figures that we have from 1918 and which will be addressed in the next chapter.

What both groups (ready for transfer and trained and available) show is the preponderance of Ambonese. Ambonese (including Manadonese and Timorese) are mentioned more often than other ethnicities. Christian Bataks make up a strong rival presence. This is reflected even in those who failed in training: 12 Menadonese (Christian), 3 Ambonese (Christian), 15 Bataks (Christian), 1 Batavian (Christian), 2 Sundanese (Muslim), 1 Padanger (Muslim), 4 Bataks (Muslim), 3 Niassers (Muslim), 4 Javanese (Muslim). Furthermore, this bias towards Ambonese in training is multiplied in the field since the numbers reflect those trained at Sukabumi and not the totality of armed police in the area. Looked at together this indicates a much increased presence of armed policemen in the homelands of the Ambonese and elsewhere. Lastly, all indications are that recruits were trained together. This was an articulation of unity through diversity with the Ambonese playing a leading role.

There is an economic component to the bias towards the Ambonese as well. As with the military, Ambonese armed policemen received preferential treatment. This would have certainly helped with recruiting. The advantages the Ambonese enjoyed were considerable. In 1913 the daily patrol pay for Ambonese armed policemen in Sulawesi was almost twice that of other armed policemen in the area.\textsuperscript{279} Personnel in the homelands of the Ambonese were allowed extra pay owing

\textsuperscript{279} BB 3596 KGP 1913.
to what was judged to be the expensive lifestyle of the region.\textsuperscript{280} These would help explain the high number of Ambonese at Sukabumi. Another consideration is the commonality with the Dutch education program for certain groups in the archipelago. This helped to create the underpinnings of the Indonesian independence movement as it fostered. Both the education system and the police education system can be seen as having a cohesive effect, though it should be noted that Christian groups may have felt a kinship with Christian Dutch that Muslims from the archipelago did not.

Such privilege shows the importance the state assigned to bringing the Ambonese into the project of the armed police, especially in their homelands and in encouraging them to serve in other areas as a minority part of the force. But this is in contrast to the notion of paying them more to have them simply perform stranger policing. Furthermore, the advantages of the Ambonese armed police were not as great as the advantages of the Ambonese in the military, a segregated force stationed largely outside the homelands of the Ambonese. Ambonese in the military made considerably more, had better schools for their children, and had access to better medical care.\textsuperscript{281} As a consequence the Ambonese who worked as armed police were those who could not join the military. We have seen this before. What is notable about the situation as it existed in 1912 is that colonial authorities who dealt with the armed police argued for higher pay for Ambonese soldiers who

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{280} Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1913 No. 331. [N.B. distance from Java likely explains the perception of a more expensive lifestyle in the region]
\item \textsuperscript{281} 2.10.36.04. Openbaar Verbaal. V 16 S 1913 (62)
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
became armed policemen, but they were ultimately unsuccessful in their case.\textsuperscript{282}

Advantages for the Ambonese armed police would decline after 1912, bringing the lot of the Ambonese armed policeman in line with that of other armed policemen throughout the archipelago. We will see more of this when we look at the Reorganization of 1918.

In this chapter we have looked at how the armed police evolved as an organization structurally throughout the archipelago. Under the guidance of Posno, and within the Reorganization of 1912, the armed police became a more standardized and unified organization than they had been under the Reorganization of 1898. The force became less a paramilitary body and one more in line with that of a modern police force. The work of consolidating areas for control was furthered by an increased emphasis on presence patrolling and through the marked increase in personnel. We have looked at statistics from the new police school at Sukabumi to see how the Ambonese figured in the armed police at this time. The Ambonese were a strong presence at Sukabumi, demonstrating the commitment of the colonial state to the consolidation of control in the homelands of the Ambonese as well as the increased involvement of Ambonese in the operations of the state as armed policemen. The Ambonese were certainly a privileged group within the state, but as armed policemen they were never segregated from the other ethnic groups of the archipelago. In their service as armed police the Ambonese both worked with other Indonesians and retained power in their own homelands, both functions redounding

\textsuperscript{282} Besluit 23 April 1920 No: 1929
to the cohesion of the state. In the next chapter we will see how the armed police as an institution dissolved but how the Ambonese policemen, the state, and the other groups of the archipelago became more interconnected.
Chapter 5 - The Reorganization of 1918: The Decline of the Armed Police

In the previous chapter we looked at how the armed police were operating at the height of their institutional authority. But even though the Reorganization of 1918 would see their official dissolution their power continued to grow in the Outer Islands. The armed police would expand their practical reach as well as become a more integrated force. The Ambonese armed policemen would do the work of consolidating the state through the expanded powers of their actual police work in the islands. But they would also make the armed police an increasingly pluralistic force, working with other ethnicities more and more as time passed. In this chapter we will look at how the Ambonese armed police in their own homelands and beyond were joining with other ethnic groups to constitute a police force for Indonesia.

The Reorganization of 1918

Before we speak of the particulars of the conversion from the armed police to the field police it is important to note the climate in which all of this took place. The armed police had been instrumental in consolidating the gains of the state in the Outer Islands, but their work was not fully complete. This will be seen in the ways in which the armed police lasted in the homelands of the Ambonese. Nonetheless, the incomplete work of the armed police was truncated at least partially out of
economic concerns. The armed police had not fully outlived their usefulness but they had done enough to merit being eliminated in a tough economic climate.\footnote{Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 231.}

During World War I Holland had maintained an imperfect neutrality. The Dutch military did not fight in the Great War, but its need was not in question due to the perils of attempting to stay out of conflict. The Dutch military in the 1920s could always point to external threats, in Europe and in Asia, be it Germany or Japan or the specter of communism. These fears were overblown and convenient at times but ultimately accurate, certainly in the case of the Axis (though it should be pointed out the Dutch military did not do well against either Germany in Europe or Japan in the Dutch East Indies, capitulating so quickly as for some wag to raise the question of whether or not the military was even worth the bother). It should also be pointed out that the army in the colony, one third European, had a natural lobby in politics because so many of its members were white. It was easier to get support for maintaining their jobs. The police force had less protection because it was more than 95\% indigenous. The importance of maintaining the military would contribute significantly to the demise of the armed police.

The other, and very much related, part of the climate was the Great Depression which had worldwide ramifications.\footnote{Rickclefs, \textit{A History Of Modern Indonesia}, 233.} In the immediate aftermath of the war the economy in the colony had been robust. But the Great Depression came and the police lost roughly fifteen percent of their number.\footnote{Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme.”} The weight of the

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\textsuperscript{283} Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 231. \\
\textsuperscript{284} Rickclefs, \textit{A History Of Modern Indonesia}, 233. \\
\textsuperscript{285} Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme.”
military and economic turmoil resulting from the Great Depression would negatively impact the fortunes of the armed police in even greater ways. Austerity and military prognostications of threats external (read Japan) and internal (read communism and nationalism) would mean cutting the cheaper police to keep the more expensive army. This would result in the rise of the field police.²⁸⁶

Hoorweg, Posno’s chief deputy, was tasked with the Reorganization of 1918. In the late 1920’s he reflected on what had happened. All plans for the police in the archipelago were wrecked as a result of the economic downturn, he wrote a decade later. Consequently, limiting expenditures on government services became the byword of the day. The general police and the armed police were marked for sacrifice. The armed police in particular degenerated significantly through austerity, to the detriment of the state’s interest. The new field police, however, were expanded as will be seen in the next chapter.²⁸⁷

Bureaucratic competition between the military and the police generally ends with the military winning, and this was the case here.²⁸⁸ The irony is that the armed police were both cheaper and more effective at the work they did. The army triumphed because of their prominence in the state and because they could always point to the danger of a major external invasion.

²⁸⁶ Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 234-236: “It was violence versus conscience in the army-police discussion, with money as the key factor... The civilized field police and the violent army were the winners.”
A contemporaneous military publication article is illustrative. It was written in two letters to the editor, one in 1916 and one in 1917. In the first letter the author argues that the army is four times as expensive as the armed police, leading him to conclude that the armed police should be expanded and the army contracted. He goes on to list the things that make the army so expensive: artillery, cavalry, general staff, commissariat, physicians, topographical services, flying machines enormous pension expenses. The author goes on to note that the armed police are much more self-sufficient: having a less robust medical service, buying second-hand arms, and using the interior administration for leadership instead of a costly alternative structure. He finishes with a brief history of the armed police, arguing that the military was used largely in times when there was no armed police. He expresses frustration with those who understand neither the differences in function nor cost between the army and the armed police. He renders the two in this way: the armed police is the auxiliary driver, who sits besides the owner-driver and helps him keep the cart clean. The Army is the repairman who is called in the event of a serious defect.\(^{289}\)

In the second letter, in 1917, the author expands on his earlier views, in a more colorful way. He describes an army post in the more distant areas of the archipelago: a post, deep inland, with neat barracks, kitchen, bathrooms and lavatories, including officers’ canteen with a billiard table, soldiers’ canteen with a billiard table, infirmary with a doctor and nursing staff, housing for officers and for married non-commissioned officers. He expresses exasperation with this,

\(^{289}\) *Indisch Militair Tijdschrift* No 4 April 1916, “Die Goedkoope Gewapende Politie.”
contrasting it with his description of the armed police: twice as far inland, 40 men of
the armed police under a detachment commander, no barracks, no inventories, no
spare clothes, no medication, nothing. The author points out that he is not
celebrating the extreme austerity of the armed police as he paints them. He is
observing that they are effective despite the limitations of their resources. He
argues that if the armed police receive increased funding they will not only be able
to better perform the task they have been addressing but will also be important
against dangers to come. He doesn’t elaborate as to what these dangers are –
communists, Japan, nationalists – but his sentiment rings clear: the armed police
will be of use against myriad threats.290

Despite such support the Reorganization of 1918 would be the last for the
armed police. Further discussions would be centered not around making the armed
police more effective, but on how to get rid of them. The armed police were a force
of transition. This helps account for the numerous reorganizations, to include the
introduction of the marechaussee. A lot of adjustment went on over the course of
thirty years. The armed police would remain in the Outer Islands for another
decade, but by 1918 the armed police had passed the time of their greatest strength.

In 1918 the official Dutch rendering of the armed police was a matter of
record. The armed police corps consisted of 22 divisions, of which 19 were in the
Outer Islands (one for each province) and 3 were in Java. Where extensiveness of
the area made it necessary the divisions were separated into two or more sub-
divisions. This was the case in Timor, Ambon, and Sulawesi. The armed police were

290 Indisch Militair Tijdschrift No 4 April 1916, “Die Goedkoope Gewapende Politie.”
at the service of the Civil Government for: a) the assurance of peace, order, and safety in the interior; b) the maintenance of authority in times of disturbance, until the army, if necessary, could take over the task; and c) the establishing of regular conditions in districts which had only recently come under effectual authority, by giving support to the law and, by forcing obedience if necessary to orders given, and by protecting the “loyal” population against “bad elements”. The armed police was a means of government at the service of the interior administration. It was specifically noted that it was not to be a police force in the narrow, everyday sense of the word, but to be somewhere between the general police and the army in maintaining order in the colony.291

Nicely elided in the official account was the independence of the armed police. Control of the armed police was in the hands of both the civil government and the chief of the armed police. Furthermore, we can see that the three major tasks of the armed police (law enforcement, riot control, expansion and consolidation of authority) were those of the Reorganization of 1912 and of the Reorganization of 1918. What changed over time was progress towards goals. For example, over time more and more armed policemen received centralized training at Sukabumi. But this only increased the speed with which the armed police would be replaced. The better the armed police were, the more successful and professional they became, the closer they drew towards their own extinction. The armed police

291 *Yearbook of the Netherlands East Indies*, 270-271
started out bad and get better, eliminating their own reason for being and leading to their replacement by the more progressive field police.\textsuperscript{292}

The armed police at the time of the 1918 Reorganization were still highly imperfect. It was not hard to find trouble within the ranks of the armed police. This is in keeping with their nature as a force of transition, as discussed. The rules of discipline for the armed police still had to account explicitly for punishing abuses of opium and excessive consumption of alcohol. Armed policemen were still recruited from the less advantaged sectors of society. A government spokesperson for police affairs stated in 1919: "The elements among whom recruitment will take place lack those capacities of order, discipline, hygiene, and hierarchy, which no good policeman can do without in his public behavior."\textsuperscript{293} Furthermore, the Chief retained ultimate authority for dismissal of an armed policeman, keeping discipline within his own ambit. This recourse not to civil authorities but to the armed police command structure speaks to the nature of the armed police at that time: they were a bit more gang than a modern police force would be in the ideal.\textsuperscript{294} But the times were changing, due in large part to the very existence of the armed police.

The armed police were marked for demise because they had served their purpose. This birth of the field police was, of course, induced by economic concerns (the field police were cheaper and getting rid of the armed police freed up money for the army), but the success (if one cares to call it that from the perspective of the

\textsuperscript{293}Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme,” 98.
\textsuperscript{294}Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1919 No. 372.
colonial state) of the armed police was as much a part of the end of the armed police as anything else. The armed police had not ended criminality in any sort of way. But what they had done was enable the withdrawal of the military from the maintenance of daily order and consolidation of control sufficiently that a more locally controlled police force, the field police, could be introduced. That it took two units (army and field police) to take over from the armed police speaks to the complexity of the armed police mission. De Jong put the matter well in describing the successful yet imperfect term of the armed police: “A fierce and often sordid battle was fought on the subject of the army, the armed police, and the field police... Despite the many good things the armed police [did] in days of combat and pacification, it definitely provided grist [for] its demise.”

The passing of the armed police was certainly not immediate and there were advocates on both sides of the issue. Some wanted the armed police to be folded gradually into the field police, while others wanted a swift finish for a disgraceful force. Whichever camp an observer was in (the armed police had done well, the work of the armed police would have been done better by the military and now the field police), the days of the armed police were numbered.

The numbers tell the tale. The police covered an area of 1,914,000 kilometers and a population of 50 million. By 1924 there were 25,000 police

296 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
297 De Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie, 61-62
298 Van den Doel, “The Late Colonial State in Indonesia,” 75.
299 De Indische Gids 1919 I,“Veld of Gewapende Politie?”, 657-658.
officers for the general police, with 20,000 on Java. Java had 3000 field police, 3 cities with a city police force of 4,350, and rural/non-field police numbering 13,500. The police on Java also had 780 horses, 2,500 bicycles, and 420 motorcycles. The armed police should be considered in light of that. By 1921 the armed police consisted of 10,000 men. Their budget had risen over the years only to begin to decline in the 1920s: 4 million f in 1907; 10 million f in 1916; 21 million f in 1921; 20 million f in 1922; 19 million f in 1923; 17.5 million f in 1924. In 1922 the budget of the field police would be only 1.7 million f, a fraction of the budget for the armed police. The difference, however, is not apparent by considering the amount of money alone. The field police were cheaper (a great attraction afforded by the consolidation of authority that had occurred under the armed police) and their budget was headed in the opposite direction as that of the armed police. The armed police looked increasingly dispensable.

It is important, however, not to speak of the police in absolute terms but in a ways that acknowledges the diversity within the force. The development of the field police on Java was swifter than that of the field police in the Outer Islands. The reason is that the task of consolidation, the major task of the armed police in the Outer Islands, was still ongoing. The riot suppression capabilities of the armed police were the primary concern on Java and they were easily transferred to the field police. Consolidation was still needed in the Outer Islands, necessitating the continued presence of the armed police. In 1924 the population of the Outer Islands was gauged to be 15,000,000 over an area of 1.8 million kilometers. Of these people

301 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
302 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 234-246
there were 14 million indigenous persons alongside 46,000 “foreign orientals” and 34,000 Europeans. There were 10,000 armed police and only 4,500 general police. Effectively the entire force was in the Outer Islands by this point with few or any armed policemen left on Java.

Hoorweg explains the reasons for the change. With the onset of improved political conditions, especially in those provinces where people were most familiar with the state’s authority, the necessity for the armed police diminished. The government became sympathetic to wishes for a less militaristic force. This was the first tentative step that led to the implementation of the field police. Business interests in the Outer Islands were instrumental in this, especially after the establishment of the field police in Java. The government decided at this time to use the armed police more and more like the field police (in more established areas) and then replace the armed police with field police. The process was unfolding when, in 1922, the military and the civilian colonial authority joined together and committed to disbanding the armed police and handing their duties to the army. Hoorweg refers to this as the beginning of their demolition.

Steps towards the armed police’s demise had begun, but it would be some time in coming for the Ambonese. Before looking to that, however, it is wise to see exactly how the armed police were eliminated. Hoorweg was not eager to see the armed police disappear. He could not do anything about the rejuvenation of army

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303 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.” N.B. By this time there were projected cuts of 7000 armed policemen.
power in the face of global circumstances, but he could speak for policing generally and the slow withdrawal of the armed police in the Outer Islands. He spoke for three separate standpoints: political, governance, and military.

Hoorweg’s political perspective argues that the presence of the army intrinsically alienates the populace whereas the armed police are to involve themselves with the population. He compares the army to a daily guest in places only recently placed under colonial authority. With the army, the population continues to feel oppressed and in the fist of a tyrant. The replacement of the army by armed police meant a vote of confidence from the government and a relief from military pressure. For that reason, what Hoorweg terms “the peace process” should continue in the Outer Islands. He judges that the replacement of the armed police by the army constitutes, from a political perspective, a step backwards as regards “pacification”.

Hoorweg’s perspective on governance argues that the armed police had a closer, more democratic connection to the population. Under the system of the armed police the heads of the administration and population had closer contact. The arrangement instilled confidence and educated both sides. The armed police better imbued the relationship with “the spirit and principles which should characterize our administration.” Hoorweg references the 1920 view of the military commander of Sumatra’s west coast. Comparing patrol reports on Nias, between when he was a colonel and a few years ago when he was chief of staff in Padang, he has this to say: “My conclusion now is that the use of [military] patrol leaders and governing bodies should not be recommended. Maybe this use [was] in the early
years of establishment of our authority necessary or desirable to immediately
[establish] control... But the use of armed police at this stage of the peace is
recommended over that of military."

Taking the perspective from a military viewpoint, Hoorweg suggests that the
military should focus on military tasks. He writes that the army is incapable of
following the same development process as the armed police. In trying to do so the
army has an impossible task on its hands and is disregarding its own nature. He
quotes van der Jagt’s speech at the People’s Council in which he said that soldiers
and police act deeply in their own vocations, and that the more deep the action the
more diverse the philosophies. Van der Jagt went on to say that a good cop is a bad
soldier and a good soldier is a bad cop, yet each is in itself a useful and indispensable
element in the state. Hoorweg notes that Cohen, Resident of Surabaya, echoed those
sentiments which Hoorweg himself fully endorses.

Hoorweg’s conclusion is a fitting epitaph. He writes that the replacement of
the army by the armed police in the Outer Islands is an indicator of the peaceful
development of these regions. The replacement of the armed police by the army, on
the other hand, disturbs the natural peace process in those areas. Close contact
between government officials and the chiefs and people of the area will be lost in the
process, despite the administrative advantages to the state. Furthermore, the
replacement of the armed police force by the army deprives the state of a police
force that, after overcoming many difficulties, has been built and developed into a
force that is ready for the job with which it has been tasked. Hoorweg’s final
thoughts are that the maintenance of a strong force of armed police in the Outer
Islands brought great advantages from political, administrative, and policing perspectives. The presence of a strong occupying army, however, constituted a great disadvantage manifested in the gradual militarizing of the whole administration. Specifically talking about the Outer Islands, Hoorweg concludes that the replacement of the armed police means a changing role, from that of educator to that of ruler.  

Hoorweg’s views must be taken with a grain of salt, he was heavily invested in touting the success of the armed police due to his role in running the armed police. But he is not wholly wrong in arguing that most of the state and the population involved in the debate favored the armed police over the military. Nor is he incorrect in saying that the armed police had success. But these forces did not carry the day. Despite forceful defense by Hoorweg, and notwithstanding that in the Outer Islands (especially in the homelands of the Ambonese) the armed police would hold on for quite some time, the armed police would make way for the emergence of the field police and the return of the politically powerful army. The future would be shared by these two institutions, but it was a future made possible by the armed police. Without the consolidation effected by the armed police the army would not have been able to return. The field police for their part would not have been robust enough to work without this control.

Consolidation in the Outer Islands of the archipelago had relied on the armed police, but the state judged that the time of the armed police had passed. In 1923 the role of the armed police in the Outer Island was specifically addressed. Point 1: 

305 BB 3663
The policy stated that, as a general principle, military presence should be reduced as the political situation improves. Point 2: In areas where troops have already withdrawn it would be inadvisable for the armed police to turn the task of policing over to the army. Point 7: The armed police, as a link between the army and the general and field police, must continue. Nevertheless (also in Point 7), in those areas where the development of political and economic conditions allow, the armed police are to be gradually replaced.

At this point the policy begins to deal with the fait accompli of the takeover by the army, despite acknowledging the stated advantages of the armed police. Point 9: transferring the service of the armed police to the army will bring a significant reduction in the armed police. Point 10 acknowledges the shortcomings of turning the functions of the armed police over to the army by terming it a temporary measure, but it also provides reason for doing so. Point 10 also notes that the work of pure police service by the army is made in connection with the demands of our policy in the Outer Islands. This is stated as temporary but also that it must be done until financial circumstances will have improved significantly.306

The military, in an austere economic environment, found a reason for continued funding by reclaiming the militarily disdained task of policing. This was possible largely because the armed police had succeeded at the consolidation task the army had not been suited for. The army could take the funding and allow the work of policing to fall to the less robust field police, who themselves came into being only because of the success of the armed police. The interior administration

306 BB 3314
allowed that the military would have to give up the policing task at some
undetermined point in the not so distant future, but there was little danger of that if
the economic situation did not improve. In short, the success of the armed police
had created a situation in which – despite fairly universal agreement that the armed
police were preferred to the army – they could easily be replaced by the army. It
would be fair to say that the armed police were doomed because of their very
nature: they were always a unit of transition, though this transition did not happen
as quickly in the Outer Islands. The armed police lasted longer in the homelands of
the Ambonese than elsewhere.

Praxis and Ambon: The Work of the Armed Police

Gramscian praxis refers to action or practical activity but it is not simply
action or practical activity. Praxis is concerned with bringing together modes of
thinking with that which is implicit in practical life. Praxis is the significance of
action vis a vis thought; praxis is the relationship of thought and action. Through
practical activity, through praxis, we can gain insight into what one actually
believes. It is an approach to the world of the subaltern whose thoughts are often to
be gleaned through deeds.

In 1919 there was an incident on Java. Haji Hasan lived in the village of
Cimareme near Bandung. He refused to sell his share of rice to the government
under the tax system then in place. Hasan was a prominent man, a haji, and he only
increased his stature by saying that he was keeping the rice to feed the people in the
village who he felt depended on him. He refused when ordered by the Dutch resident to come out of his house. This resulted in a standoff. Ultimately, the house was fired on by 15 armed policemen, out of a total of 27 who were involved. Soldiers had come with the Dutch resident, but it was the armed police who did the shooting, killing Haji Hasan. Locher-Scholten writes, “The armed police who killed Haji Hasan were all ‘natives.’ They are anonymous in the reports except for their officer, the Moluccan Raes.”

Here we have the Ambonese armed policeman on Java, involved in an incident that would only contribute to calls for their dismissal.

The situation was different in the Outer Islands where the death knell for the armed police was delayed despite lingering concerns about their quality, a problem regarded as unclear. The armed police remained in economically less developed, less pacified areas like Sumatra’s east and west coasts, Banka, Billiton, Bali, and Lombok to help local police and administration maintain authority. Papua and Timor were singled out as areas where the armed police were particularly effective, places within the orbit of Ambon. This was the situation in the 1920s, concluding only in the 1930s. By then the Japanese threat was imminent and militarization was in full blossom. Further militarization in the Dutch East Indies, however, did not negate the fundamental system of regional and colonial police control. The armed police continued to be a force (in fact and not merely legacy) in the Outer Islands after the Reorganization of 1918, particularly in the homelands of the Ambonese.

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308 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.” Also in De Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie.
The armed police in 1922 were still a robust organization. In that year General Major KFE Gerth van Wyk and the inspector general of police A. Hoorweg visited the Resident of Amboina L. van Sandick to discuss the replacement of the armed police by army divisions. Sandick expressed in writing his hope to discuss the opposite, replacing the military in his area of responsibility with further armed police (we can only assume Hoorweg liked that idea too).

Lest this intention seem overly cheeky, Sandick cited Articles 7 and 21 of his instruction (Official Gazette 1867 No. 114) “When there is a cheaper means of power that is sufficient, it is to be used.” General van Wyk gave as good as he got, arguing for the necessity of the military, nay the strengthening of the military, not because they would do the job of the armed police better, but because of the external threat. Sandick agreed, while still making his point that the armed police were better at the task in which they were employed. He said that the general interest of the colony had to take precedence over regional interests but that the cheaper armed police should be retained and the army kept in reserve to intervene when and where needed. But this assent reads less as true agreement than a bow to the inevitable. He is not really agreeing but making the case for the armed police.

Sandick made sure to close his remarks in the same vein of dissent veiled (thinly) in seeming agreement: “Well, I wish to note my satisfaction with the armed police in this residence, as currently organized... In this regard, I delay my proposal of August 8, 1922 No. 5665/30, which also concludes with my satisfaction with the armed police. As a result of my recent mission to the region of Ternate, I

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309 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
communicate my opinion that the garrison of infantry in Ternate ought to be maintained - this is contrary to the proposal of the Resident Tip that the garrison infantry be replaced by armed police.” Sandick is agreeing to keep the Ternate infantry in the interests of maintaining the status quo, though he points out that the Resident actually wants them replaced by armed police. Sandick couldn’t resist pointing out in his cool way that he wasn’t alone in wanting more armed police and not a replacement of the armed police by the army. His reluctant concession speaks to the acceptance of the armed police as a force to support the government in the Outer Islands.

This visit is representative of the view taken by administrators in the homelands of the Ambonese. They were not disinterested parties, of course. They were civilians who wished to enunciate the principle of civilian control. And what is key here is that they had done that: the armed police were maintaining consolidated control. Arguments for replacement by the military proper were predicated on the superior quality of soldiers over policemen, the external threat, and counter-intuitive economic reasoning (the police must be cut in austere times for the sake of the costlier and by no means more effective military). These arguments were not predicated on perceived problems on the ground; the civilian authorities were satisfied and the military did not disagree with the source of that satisfaction. Without contrary evidence we can make the claim that the armed police were doing the job of consolidating and maintaining control.

Hoorweg’s trip in 1922 produced specific reports regarding the armed police.

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\[310 \text{ BB 3314}\]
in three important areas of the homelands of the Ambonese: Ambon itself, Timor, and Manado. In Ambon it was found that the region needed 24 brigades of military and 26 brigades of armed police. Contrary to the prevailing attitudes, this actually meant a reduction of four brigades of military and maintenance of the existing number of brigades of armed police. In Timor a plan was crafted to reconfigure 33 infantry brigades of 22 men each into 44 teams of 16 or 17 men each in order to “be an important part of the armed police service.” The Resident stated his feelings clearly writing that the preference of his administration was to maintain civilian resources, embodied in the armed police. This could be justified even if only on economic grounds: the armed police were simply that much cheaper than the military. In Timor it was held that maintaining the armed police was in the interest of bringing peace to the Outer Islands. In Manado the Resident argued that the replacement of the armed police was neither necessary nor desirable. The armed police, patrolling or not, gave by their mere presence a sense of security and had a preventive influence. This was noted as being of particular value in the hard to reach outposts of the Manado area.311

In each case the civilian authority resisted re-militarization. This is not unexpected, but it should be seen in light of the history of the armed police. The armed police had not begun life with so sterling a reputation. Their development was concurrent with the consolidation of control in the Outer Islands. The civilian authorities attest to this. The field police would be small consolation for loss of the

311 BB 3663
armed police. This tension would set the stage for the rest of the 1920s. The military and the field police had the writ to replace the armed police, but the civilian authority was against it and they delayed the inevitable when they could.

By 1924 this was the status quo. In 1926 the resident of Manado signaled defiance but conceded defeat. He wrote that his predecessor had acknowledged that because of the favorable political situation the armed police could be replaced, based on the idea that the army could operate without the armed police. The resident admonished that such a centralized use of power should only be used if administrative measures were inadequate or if it were a newly subject area where a military government was still needed. He went on to say that he had fought this development “as vigorously as possible” but that now, three years, the army had replaced the armed police in some places in Manado. And in 1929 Hoorweg would still feel compelled to point out: “If I remember correctly, it took an army brigade in the Moluccas about three or four times as much [material, personnel] as the armed police... This is quite understandable when one thinks of the demands... for the medical and physical care of the soldier and the high cost of the army barracks.”

By the 1930s resistance to the dissolution of the armed police diminished with time. Still the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese lasted well into the 1930s which is significant because it came at the behest of the civilian

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312 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
313 Memories van Overgave Manado 1926 J Tideman
administration. Hoorweg minced no words in his appraisal at the turn of the
decade. He wrote that the austerity measures of 1924 and 1925 had brought about
a change in policing in the Outer Islands. The armed police was as good as
completely wiped out so that the corps, which had once had 500 teams and 10,000
men, now had only 43.5 brigades or 870 men remaining. The field police were a
weak substitute. The total strength of the two corps of troops outside of Java
numbered less than 4000 men, a loss of 6000 men. Hoorweg lamented that only
those who had experienced difficulties, like those that accompanied the creation and
training of the armed police in 1912, understood the work that had gone into
transforming a loosely coherent armed police into a well-disciplined, reliable police
force possessed of a confident esprit de corps. He concluded that had the
government understood the scope of the turbulent times they would realize “what
vandalism has been [perpetrated] on the power resources of the state.”

In 1932 the last remnant of the armed police had disappeared on Java and by
1933 only one division of armed police remained in Manado and only one remained
in Ambon. Proposals were laid converting the armed police on Manado to field
police while the remaining armed police in Ambon were to work largely in Papua.
In 1933 came an official yet pithy obituary, though perhaps in its brevity it adds a
sort of stoic dignity to a forgotten ancestor of Indonesia, speaking as it does to the

315 This is confirmed by Alamanack Nederlands Indie which states that there was
armed police in Maluku up until the late 1920s [perusal of editions of/from 1930s in
which were named various commanders].
316 De Indische Gids. 1929 I. “Politie, Leger en Veiligheid in Nederlandsch-Indie”,
451-457.
317 Almanack Nederlands Indie 1933 1, 267. Also in De Jong, De Organisatie Der
Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie.
unity of the archipelago: “Armed Police: [Regarding] the dissolution of all the former corps of armed policemen. Dissolution [of] all previously existing forces, both in Java and outside Java... [this] was an armed police force for the whole of the Netherlands East Indies.”318

Agency and Ambon: Personnel of the Armed Police

Gramscian praxis is itself bound with consent, to be understood to include agency. Agency is the ability to make an expression of autonomous action. Agency is fundamental to the colonial enterprise we are examining. The armed police were not conscripted personnel. Alliance with the hegemonic power in the case of the armed police is autonomy or expression thereof. Gramsci saw force and consent as interdependent, and that consent must be predicated on the independence of actors, understood to be often imperfect but viable nonetheless. Becoming an armed policeman was an expression of agency.

It was in the homelands of the Ambonese that the armed police lasted longest.319 At least until 1930 the Ambonese were understood as a significant amalgamation within the armed police. They (particularly Christian Ambonese) had pride of place within the force while also working alongside others from the archipelago.320 In this we see Indonesia itself, a land of many ethnicities bound

318 Almanack Nederlands Indie 1933 1, 267.
319 Indische Verslag 1931, 450.
320 RA 1930 I, 288.
together by the force of the state. Plurality was codified within the Ambonese armed police.

As I have noted before, we have little directly from the armed police themselves. Their voice is in the paperwork left behind. But the 1919 Padoman newsletter tells us something.\(^{321}\) The paper bills itself as the voice of the army, navy, and armed police. It addresses its intended readership in this way: “The nation’s people of the Indies (Ambon, Java, Manado, Sumatra, Sunda, Timor etc…) we are all military children of the [same] nation.”\(^{322}\) The document speaks of all soldiers (Ambonese, Manadonese, Javanese) helping one another. It invites peoples of all languages (“whether from Java, Ambon, or Manado”) to work together.\(^ {323} \) The prose is certainly high-blown and less than concrete. In this it is like rhetoric the world over. What should be noted is that the idea of unity was expressed in both the present and future tenses, addressing both a segregated military and an integrated armed police. In this newsletter we can see how the common occupation of armed police (alongside the more well-understood military) served to bring together different ethnicities from around the archipelago.

The ethnic integration of the armed police in the Outer Islands outside of the homelands of the Ambonese employed an imperfect system of like over like policing. The Ambonese were a minority presence, but they were a strong minority presence. There was usually a sizeable contingent of Ambonese working with a majority Muslim population especially in leadership roles (sergeant, corporal). The

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\(^{322}\) Padoman: Soera anak militair, marine dan gewapende politie 1 April 1919 [No. 1]

\(^{323}\) Padoman: Soera anak militair, marine dan gewapende politie 10 August 1919 [No. 9]
Ambonese were certainly a force within the armed police, but not more than a third of the armed policemen in these areas. Javanese were usually the Muslims in question. Javanese were not the majority of the population on these Outer Islands, of course, making this an imperfect system of like over like policing.

Nevertheless, the Ambonese were not a segregated force cowing a population with whom they did not share a religious background. They cannot be fully understood as a sort of segregated strike force for the Dutch, as has been sometimes assumed. They served in an integrated force. And it should be pointed out that there were individual armed policemen from many different ethnic groups, representing an impressive diversity from around the archipelago (and beyond – Africa, India, Afghanistan). The Ambonese were one important component of an integrated majority Muslim state power.

Like over like policing refers to the practices and definitions of the state. The point is well taken that many of the armed policemen that the state defined as Ambonese were working in places in which they were likely considered strangers. Furthermore, even though armed policemen may have been of an identical background to the people they policed other factors may have made them strangers to the people they policed, eg religion, economics, family ties etc. The state considered certain groups to be Ambonese. The state kept many of these persons in the homelands of the Ambonese, generally keeping an ethnicity dominant in their home area, eg a plurality of Manadonese in Manado. This was the creation of “ethnicity” by fiat. The focus here is on the result of this action by the state: the armed police became a pluralistic and not segregated force in the homelands of the
Ambonese. This was accomplished by 1) keeping a plurality of the force in the homelands of the Ambonese “Ambonese” as defined by the state; 2) maintaining a large percentage, if not plurality, of the armed police in any area as persons from the broad ethnicity of that area; 3) by bringing in other groups as well, notably Javanese. This is no way precludes indigenous feeling of being policed by strangers. What this does argue is that the state’s method of state-defined like over like policing through the institution of the armed police led to a greater coherence of power for the colonial state by effecting a diverse force within an increasingly centralized police body.

We have strength figures for the armed police from 1918.\textsuperscript{324} Blanks next to ethnic terms seem to indicate an expected presence; at the very least they indicate the institutional possibility of such participation. Let us consider those for the armed police in areas that were not homelands of the Ambonese:

\textsuperscript{324} BB 3619.
West Coast of Sumatra January 1 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 7 sergeants, 10 corporals, 60 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 7 sergeants, 4 corporals, 105 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 2 sergeants, 7 corporals, 134 men] [Animists: 4 men]
Sundanese:
Javanese: [Muslims: 3 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Christians: 1 men] [Muslims: 1 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Christians: 1 men]
Timorese [Christians: 2 corporals, 25 men] [Animists: 18 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 1 men]
Niassers: [Christians: 1 corporal, 35 men] [Animists: 1 men]
Banjarese: [Animists: 1 men]
Makassarese:
Alfuros: [Christians: 7 men] [Animists: 4 men]
Torajans: [Animists: 16 men]
Rotinese: [Christians: 2 men] [Animists: 1 men]
Florese: [Christians: 3 men]

West Coast of Sumatra March 1, 1918.
Ambonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 10 corporals, 62 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 7 sergeants, nine corporals, men 115]
Bataks: [Christians: 2 sergeants, 10 corporals, 143 men] [Animists: 4 men]
Sundanese:
Javanese: [Muslims: 2 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Christians: 1 men] [Muslims: 1 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Christians: 1 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 25 men] [Animists: 19 men]
Ternatans:
Bugis: [Christians: 1 men]

East Coast of Sumatra March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 4 sergeants] [Muslims: 20 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant] [Muslims: 7 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 sergeant] [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 13 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 10 sergeants, 18 corporals, 316 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 32 sergeants, 32 corporals, 469 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 4 sergeants, 7 corporals, 111 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 3 sergeants, 12 corporals, 93 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 10 men]
Madurese: [Muslims: 1 men]
Butonese: [Muslims: 1 men]
Niassers: [Muslims: 1 men]
Acehnese: [Muslims: 3 men]
Sikhs (India): [Muslims: 1 men]
Makassarese [Muslims: 8 men]
Timorese: [Muslims: 5 men]
Borneo March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 4 sergeants, 3 corporals, 29 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 22 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 4 men] [Muslims: 3 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 13 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 9 sergeants, 15 corporals, 206 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 corporal, 28 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 3 sergeants, 7 corporals, 27 men]
Timorese [Muslims: 3 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 32 men]
Dayaks: [Christians: 1 man]
Chinese: [Other religion (Confucianism/Buddhism): 1 man]

Jambi March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 2 corporals]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 1 corporal]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 7 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 8 sergeants, 7 corporals, 106 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 6 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 2 corporals, 46 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 22 men]

Western Division of Borneo March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 2 sergeants] [Muslims: 6 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 1 corporal] [Muslims: 4 men]
Bataks:
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 18 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 6 sergeants, 13 corporals, 163 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 3 sergeants, 19 men]
Malays elsewhere: [Animists: 1 man] [Muslims: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 61 men]
Timorese:
Ternate:
Bugis: [Muslims: 21 men]

Belitung March 1, 1918.
Ambonese:
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant]
Bataks: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 14 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 6 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 9 sergeants, 11 corporals, 78 men]
Malay SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 41 men]
Timorese:
Ternatans:
Bugis: [Muslims: 18 men]
Sulawesi March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 8 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 4 sergeants, 3 corporals, 22 men] [Muslims: 2 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 25 men] [Animists: 6 men]
Sudanese: [Muslims: 2 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 14 sergeants, 21 corporals, 327 men]
Africans: [Christians: 1 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak):
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 1 sergeant, 46 men]
Timorese [Christians: 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 66 men] [Animists: 32 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 1 corporals, 2 men] [Animists: 3 men] [Muslims: 1 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 4 sergeants, 1 corporal, 45 men]
Acehnese: [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 20 men]
Banjarese: [Muslims: 4 men]

Bali and Lombok March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 2 sergeants, 2 corporals]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeant, 3 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 8 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 8 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 17 sergeants, 25 corporals, 249 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 sergeants, two men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: men 51]
Sangirese: [Animists: 6 men]
Timorese:
Ternatans: [Christians: 1 men]
Bugis: [Animists: 2 men] [Muslims: 57 men]
Chinese: [Other religion (Confucianism/Buddhism): 2 men]

Tapanuli March 1, 1918.
Ambonese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 1 corporals]
Manadonese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 3 corporals]
Bataks: [Christian: 1 sergeants, 8 men] [Animist: 1 men] [Muslim: 1 corporal, 4 men]
Sundanese:
Javanese: [Muslims: 14 sergeants, 14 corporals, 128 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 4 corporals, 19 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 12 men]
Niassers: [Christians: 1 men] [Animists: 8 men] [Muslims: 1 corporals, 10 men]
Timorese:
Ternatans:
Bugis: [Muslims: 106 men]
Lamong March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 2 corporals, 31 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 1 corporal, 37 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 corporal, 2 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 2 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 7 sergeants, 12 corporals, 66 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 corporal, 5 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 2 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 6 men]
Ternate: [Christians: 2 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 7 corporals, 27 men]
Madurese: [Muslims: 1 men]

Bengkulu March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 5 corporals]
Manadonese: [Christians: 4 sergeants]
Bataks: [Muslims: 2 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 15 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 6 sergeants, 8 corporals, 82 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 2 corporals, 19 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 28 men]
Timorese: [Muslims: 1 men]
Ternatans: Bugis: [Muslims: 77 men]
Chinese: [Other religions (Confucianism/Buddhism): 1 men]

Bangka March 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 1 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 2 sergeants]
Bataks:
Sundanese: [Muslims: 2 corporals, 33 men]
Javanese: [Muslims: 13 sergeants, 11 corporals, 100 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 8 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 2 sergeants, 6 corporals, 111 men]
Achenese: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 1 men]
Timorese:
Chinese: [Other religions (Confucianism/Buddhism): 1 men]
Ternatans: Bugis: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 42 men]
Madurese: [Muslims: 1 men]
We can look now to the homelands of the Ambonese for the figures there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Animists</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ambon (Jan 1, 1918)</td>
<td>21 sergeants, 20 corporals, 170 men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manadonese</td>
<td>5 sergeants, 14 corporals, 182 men</td>
<td>3 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>2 corporals, 61 men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malay SWK (Sarawak)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1 men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timorese</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Ternate</td>
<td>9 men</td>
<td>9 men</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<th>Animists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Ambon (Feb 1, 1918)</td>
<td>24 sergeants, 22 corporals, 176 men</td>
<td>1 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manadonese</td>
<td>6 sergeants, 14 corporals, 182 men</td>
<td>3 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>2 corporals, 64 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay SWK (Sarawak)</td>
<td>1 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays from elsewhere</td>
<td>1 men</td>
<td>2 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>2 sergeants, 1 corporals, 32 men</td>
<td>67 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternate</td>
<td>9 men</td>
<td>9 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims: 1 men</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Christians</th>
<th>Animists</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ambon (Mar 1, 1918)</td>
<td>23 sergeants, 22 corporals, 174 men</td>
<td>1 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manadonese</td>
<td>6 sergeants, 14 corporals, 181 men</td>
<td>3 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>2 corporals, 63 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
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<td>1 sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay SWK (Sarawak)</td>
<td>1 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays from elsewhere</td>
<td>1 men</td>
<td>2 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timorese</td>
<td>2 sergeants, 1 corporals, 33 men</td>
<td>67 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternate</td>
<td>9 men</td>
<td>9 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bugis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td>Muslims: 1 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\[325\] BB 3619.
Ambon April 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 24 sergeants, 22 corporals, 182 men] [Animists: 1 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 6 sergeants, 14 corporals, 186 men] [Animists: 3 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 2 corporals, 71 men]
Sundanese:
Javanese:
Malay SWK (Sarawak): [Muslims: 1 men]
Malays from elsewhere: [Muslims: 3 men]
Timorese [Christians: 2 sergeants, 1 corporals, 33 men] [Animists: 81 men]
Ternate: [Christians: 9 men] [Animists: 9 men]
Bugis:

Manado January 1, 1918
Amboinese: [Christians: 4 corporals, 30 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 11 sergeants, 13 corporals, 100 men] [Animists: 8 men]
Javanese: [Christians: 1 sergeant]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 corporals, 38 men] [Animists: 2 men]
Timorese:

Manado February 1, 1918
Amboinese: [Christians: 4 corporals, 24 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 13 corporals, 99 men] [Animists: 8 men]
Javanese:
Bataks: [Christians: 1 corporals, 34 men] [Animists: 2 men]
Timorese:

Manado March 1, 1918
Amboinese: [Christians: 3 corporals, 25 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 14 corporals, 100 men] [Animists: 8 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 corporals, 32 men] [Animists: 2 men]
Javanese:
Timorese:

Manado April 1, 1918
Amboinese: [Christians: 3 corporals, 25 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 14 corporals, 100 men] [Animists: 2 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 corporals, 32 men] [Animists: 2 men]
Sundanese:
Javanese:
Malays SWK (Sarawak):
Malays from elsewhere:
Timorese:
Ternatans:
Bugis:
Timor January 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 12 sergeants, 13 corporals, 47 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 11 corporals, 76 men]
Ternatanees: [Christians: 15 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 56 men] [Animists: 1 corporals, 9 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 273 men] [Animists: 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, 207 men]
Javanese and Malays: [Christians: 1] [Muslims: 2 Javanese, 1 Malays]

Timor February 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 14 sergeants, 12 corporals, 51 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 13 corporals, 80 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 15 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 60 men] [Animists: 2 corporals, 9 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 11 sergeants, 13 corporals, 284 men] [Animists: 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 213 men]
Javanese and Malays: [Christians: 1] [Muslims: 2 Javanese, 1 Malays]

Timor March 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 13 sergeants, 12 corporals, 58 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 8 sergeants, 13 corporals, 79 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 15 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 60 men] [Animists: 2 corporals, 9 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 11 sergeants, 13 corporals, 275 men] [Animists: 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 236 men]
Javanese and Malays: [Christians: 1] [Muslims: 2 Javanese, 1 Malays]

Timor April 1, 1918
Ambonese: [Christians: 13 sergeants, 12 corporals, 50 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 7 sergeants, 13 corporals, 77 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 15 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 60 men] [Animists: 2 corporals, 9 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 11 sergeants, 12 corporals, 267 men] [Animists: 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 198 men]
Javanese and Malays: [Christians: 1] [Muslims: 2 Javanese, 1 Malays]
For further depth we have figures over a few consecutive months, showing the relative stability of numbers (this was also true, broadly, in the areas of the non-Ambonese – see the entries for the West Coast of Sumatra above). What we see is not only the local job for the local man (i.e. mostly Ambonese in Ambon and mainly Manadonese in Manado), but that the Ambonese (and other Christians of the archipelago as well as non-Christians from elsewhere in the Dutch East Indies) were well-represented throughout the homelands of the Ambonese.

This is not to say that distribution of ethnicities was uniform over the area. Within the homelands of the Ambonese non-Ambonese were never more than a third of the armed policemen in any given area just as Ambonese outside of their homelands were never more than a third of the armed police in any given area there. But the homelands of the Ambonese had fewer Muslims (and no Javanese Muslims) as armed policemen than the other areas had Ambonese as armed policemen. In other words regarding the armed policemen the homelands of the Ambonese were more heavily Ambonese than the other, non-Ambonese areas were non-Ambonese. The Ambonese armed policemen were an important part of the armed police elsewhere (connecting them to the greater archipelago) as well as having a uniquely powerful position within their own homelands (giving them a special stake in the state that encompassed the archipelago). The fact that few Ambonese Muslims worked for the colonial state (as has been discussed previously) impacts the figures. Nevertheless, the preponderance of the various constituent groups of the Ambonese in Ambonese areas other than their own speaks to the reality of the Ambonese as an idea for the state. By working in places in East
Indonesia other than their immediate homes the Ambonese armed policemen were linking a region within itself and to the state. This was aided by the strong presence of Ambonese armed policemen in units outside of the homelands of the Ambonese, both on Java and in the other Outer Islands.

Moreover, much as Sukabumi was connected to the various outposts of the armed police on Java and in the Outer Islands so too were the homelands of the Ambonese connected in their webs of authority. Ambon proper had detachments to Ambon, Saparua, Banda, Tual, Dobo, Wahai, Amaha, Piru, Gesar, Buru, Saumlaki, Tepa, Fak-Fak, Merauke, and Digul. Manado had detachments to Manado, Donggala, Gorontalo, Kola Ubobagae, Paleleh, Timombo, and Toli Toli. Timor had detachments to Kupang, Ende, Waingapu, Roti, Kisar, Kalabaki, Tjamplong, Noil Fako, Niki-Niki, Atambua, Larantoeka, Lomblen, Reo, Maumere, Gapoe, Boa Wai, Badjawa, Ruteng, Mau Sambi, Karumi, Melalo, Bima, Sumbawa, Taliwang, and Savu. There was developing a regional coherence that was itself part and parcel of the developing colony-wide coherence. Indonesia was rising, and the Ambonese with her.

The last figures we have for the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese are from 1933. By this time Timor is no longer mentioned, but Ambon and Manado retain their armed police. Ambon has, in fact, managed to increase further the extent of armed police presence into Papua. This is shown in a separate entry for Northern Papua, though it was still under the jurisdiction of Ambon proper:

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326 BB 3632.
Ambon
Ambonese: [Christians: 18 sergeants, 17 corporals, 105 men] [Muslims: 3 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 19 sergeants, 14 corporals, 58 men] [Muslims: 2 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 15 men] [Animists: 1 man]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 1 corporal, 16 men]
Javanese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 1 men] [Muslims: 7 sergeants, 15 corporals, 138 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak) and elsewhere: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 5 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 5 corporals, 47 men] [Animists: 26 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 1 corporals, 6 men] [Muslims: 1 men]
Bugis: [Christians: 11 men] [Animists: 3 men] [Muslims: 1 sergeants, 16 men]
Papuans: [Christians: 1 men] [Animists: 9 men]

Northern Papua
Ambonese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 7 corporals, 21 men] [Muslims: 4 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 12 sergeants, 6 corporals, 27 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 5 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 1 corporals, 4 men]
Javanese: [Christians: 1 sergeants] [Muslims: 2 sergeants, 4 corporals, 62 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak) and elsewhere: [Christians: 1 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 1 corporals, 19 men] [Animists: 1 corporals, 6 men]
Ternatans: [Christians: 6 men]
Bugis: [Christians: 1 men] [Muslims: 10 men]
Papuans: [Muslims: 10 men]

Manado
Ambonese: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 2 corporals, 7 men] [Animists: 10 men]
Manadonese: [Christians: 5 sergeants, 3 corporals, 21 men]
Bataks: [Christians: 1 sergeants, 1 men]
Sundanese: [Muslims: 2 men]
Javanese: [Christians: 1 men] [Muslims: 7 men]
Malays SWK (Sarawak) and elsewhere: [Muslims: 1 men]
Timorese: [Christians: 2 men]
Bugis: [Muslims: 2 men]
It is significant that we are now seeing Javanese Muslims whereas before they were absent. Also we are seeing Ambonese Muslims as well. Muslims have gone from being a small number of the armed policemen in the homelands of the Ambonese to a robust minority presence. This speaks to their diversity and their spread, their catholicity so to speak. The Ambonese armed police were an increasingly integrated institution responsible for bringing a large swath of territory, far from Java, to within the control of that which would become Indonesia. What they did was what Indonesia would become, unifying through an imperfect diversity.

The growing parity with other groups in the archipelago, Javanese Muslims in particular, is reflected in economics. As has been seen, Ambonese armed policemen were earning almost twice as much as other armed policemen, 60 f versus 34 f per day. This was true even if a Batak sergeant was overseeing Ambonese men: the lower-ranking men would make more than their leader. By 1917 this discrimination had been ended as a legal matter, but the practice persisted. By 1920, however, Ambonese armed policemen were receiving 40 f per day. Advocates for the Ambonese complained that this wage was too low to sustain recruitment of the Ambonese. They argued that the Ambonese had living costs that called for a higher salary. The asked for increase was to 50 f per day and not the 60 f per day that had been the wage before 1917. 327

This is important for several reasons. The first is that pay for the Ambonese armed policemen was now very close to that of other armed policemen. The second

327 Besluit 23 April 1920 No: 1929
has to do with the ramifications of the first: recruitment may have suffered but this only made the armed police force in the homelands of the Ambonese more diverse, redounding to the Indonesian character of the armed police. Third, this change in compensation represents a change over several decades.

As far as the armed police and economics are concerned the Ambonese were not being maintained as a separate, divisive entity within the state. As has been noted, scholarship often asserts the independent status of the Ambonese. What is being presented here complements that scholarship; these are different parts of the fuller picture. Here we have the Ambonese being brought into the state on equal terms with others in the archipelago. This was a process that occurred through the institution of the armed police. The Ambonese and others, such as the Javanese, were brought into a new state. It did not happen instantaneously. It required institutions and the building of institutions of which the armed police are one.

In this chapter we have seen how the armed police were regarded as an institution whose time had passed. In an austere economic climate the army would take over the tasks of the armed police to ensure their own funding in the state. This handover was possible only because the armed police were seen as having been more or less successful in consolidating authority in the Outer Islands. Local officials objected because this meant taking power out of their hands and centralizing it in Batavia. This demonstrates the continuing coherence of the archipelago-wide state. Moreover, within the armed police the Ambonese were becoming increasingly integrated with others throughout the islands. They were
working in their own homelands and abroad as armed police within a system of non-stranger policing. Their legacy would be seen in the field police who are the subject of our next chapter.
Chapter 6 - The Field Police and Military Resurgence

The Ambonese\textsuperscript{328} had been effective at linking the homelands of the Ambonese to the central government in three ways. First, they had employed like over like policing in that the strongest contingent in any area within the homelands of the Ambonese was composed of Ambonese from that general area. Second, significant numbers of non-local Ambonese were to be found in each area within the homelands of the Ambonese providing each area with authority figures of the state from nearby areas. Third, Javanese and others from elsewhere in the archipelago served in the homelands of the Ambonese in increasing numbers as time passed. By the time of the demise of the armed police the force was diverse in a way that represented the archipelago. This, combined with the increasingly effective centralization that had occurred over the course of three reorganizations, enabled the formation of a government for the entire archipelago of which the homelands of the Ambonese were a part.

The field police inherited the status of the armed police as a police force for the archipelago, but they shared the former duties of the armed police with the military. In this chapter we will look at the legacy of the armed police in the field police and the military. We are specifically concerned with the homelands of the Ambonese where the armed police lasted longest.

\textsuperscript{328} The Ambonese are: Ambonese from Ambon proper, those from Greater Maluku, Manadonese, and Timorese.
The Field Police

The other side of the decline of the armed police was the field police. The heritage of the armed police was split roughly into two: the army took the paramilitary aspect and the field police took the civil element. The armed police had their own central authority structure but also answered to local civil authority, as did the field police. They did not replace the village police but were seen as increasing their effectiveness by assuming part of the role of the armed police. With the coming of the field police, power was locally held. As to what the local population thought of the field police, perhaps we can look to the words of one European police officer from the field police. Allowing for some license: “In the big cities the police is called [city police] and outside the big cities: [field police]... unlike the police in Holland the police in NI occupied itself with everything. When you had some difficulty, e.g. with filling in of your [tax form] or with your wife you went to the police. It was all quite informal.”

From pradjoerits to the field police is a journey, but both end with local power. The difference is that the field police existed in a system of larger, archipelago-wide control which did not exist at the time of the pradjoerits. The armed police were set up as a semi-military police force with the intention of being later developed into a regular civilian police force. The field police were created as

330 Poorthuis, Van Zelfredzaamheid tot Politiestaat, 31-32.
331 NIOD 400.2004
an intermediary between armed police and village police, and as one further step on the road to a ‘normal’ police force.”

The field police, fittingly enough, is where Indonesian police history begins in the sense that the field police are recognized as the first police unit that looked not to the minute and to the particular, but to a broader sense of control. An official history has it that the field police were formed in 1920 from among the best police officers. With the establishment of the field police, according to this Indonesian source, the colonial state had achieved a tool to fully support the government on the outskirts of authority. The armed police are not mentioned.

The intent to form the field police dates to 1918, but it was the Cirameme case (Hadji Hasan being shot by the armed police over a forced rice delivery) mentioned in a previous chapter that served as the direct impetus. In response to the outcry that resulted the governor general announced in an address to the Volksraad on September 1, 1919 that ‘where [a subversive] movement exceeds the bounds [they] will bite iron.’ The Volksraad discussed the shooting and the creation of the field police on the same day. Within a month, the governor-general decided to organize a field police force, the field police, as an instrument of repression against ‘local excess.’ This decision had the effect of making regional police chiefs responsible for a gamut of police agencies: the city police force

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333 Roesmanhadi, Memahami Kebijaksanaan dan Strategi Kapolri, 28-29.
334 Bloembergen, De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie, 172-173
335 Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme,” 93. Remarkably, the relationship between the two branches was barely mentioned.
(stadspolitie), field police (veldpolitie), administrative police (bestuurpolitie), and village police (desapolitie).

The field police began to be organized in 1919 and had replaced the armed police by 1922-1923 except in the homelands of the Ambonese, specifically Maluku and Manado. The centralized armed police had been replaced, and the locally controlled field police were that replacement.\textsuperscript{336} It should be noted that such a decentralizing move was not without criticism. In a lengthy article in the early 1930s, D.H. Meyer, an official with experience in administrative affairs in a number of different regions, sketched the gloomy consequences of decentralization. He argued that centralization was of the utmost importance in order to counteract subversion that transgressed regional and even national boundaries.\textsuperscript{337} But an event on Java had carried the day, with ramifications that rippled to the Outer Islands despite protests against the wisdom of the action.

Dissent aside, the field police were installed at the expense of the armed police. The new unit had a new writ. Their duties were fourfold: They were: 1) to conduct security outside the cities/villages, particularly in places where conditions were deteriorating; 2) to help in avoiding requests for assistance by the military through ensuring security, peace and order; 3) serve as a police force capable of fast, adept action with the rights to investigate and carry guns; and 4) carry out preventive work, including investigations.\textsuperscript{338} This is a different set of tasks than that of the armed police, who were much more focused on consolidating control. There

\textsuperscript{337} Poeze, “Political Intelligence in the Netherlands-Indies,” 237.
\textsuperscript{338} Roesmanhadi, \textit{Memahami Kebijaksanaan dan Strategi Kapolri}, 28-29.
is a heavier emphasis on investigation in a move towards a more civilian type of policing.

The field police were installed within a few years. By 1924 a colonial publication noted a strong presence of the field police within a broader police development. In 1905, according to the publication, there were outside of the village police only 5000 police on Java which it terms “temporary nannies and babysitters.” At the same time in the Outer Islands there were 4000 “worthless pradjoerits.” These rather contemptuous terms reflect the low estimation in which these forces were held by the state. By 1920, however, the Outer Islands had acquired a corps of 10,000 armed policemen and 25,000 other policemen. On Java meanwhile there were 20,000 total policemen of whom 3000 were field police. The publication observes approvingly that the police of the colony were “bear[ing] good fruit for the security situation in the Dutch Indies.”

Shiraishi fleshes this out a bit. The field police were subsumed by the general police, a broader category that included all of the different types of police except the armed police. He writes that the strength of the initial field police in 1923 was three thousand field police agents, with 780 horses, 2,500 bicycles, and 420 motorcycles. The force expanded to about ten thousand men in a few years. Each unit, called a detachment or brigade, was on average thirty men strong, and was led by a posthouse commandant or group chief. These units were stationed in ninety barracks all over the Indies. Field police agents were recruited from outside the region but from the same linguistic area; in this they were following the pattern of

339 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
the armed police who had also eschewed the notion of stranger policing for the more workable system of like policing like within an expansive sense of region. Two hundred inspectors and sixty chief agents were recruited from the Netherlands. Nine army officers were appointed commissioners of police first class to act as regional leaders. In Java, field police were placed under a leader responsible for two residencies, and where there was a city police force, its chief doubled as leader. A small intelligence branch was attached to each field police detachment.\footnote{Shiraishi, “A New Regime of Order,” 56, 59.}

In addition, on Java the field police consisted of mobile units of twenty to sixty persons stationed in 83 places throughout Java and Madura. Units of field police there, like the armed police, lived in barracks that also housed women and children. Like other members of the police force the field police carried revolvers. It should also be noted that the field police were to receive the centralized training that had been essentially aspiration for the armed police, denoting further bureaucratic control.\footnote{Locher-Scholten, “State Violence and the Police in Colonial Indonesia circa 1920: Exploration of a Theme,” 93.}

By the end of the 1920s Hoorweg could look at the new force on Java with some contentment. He felt that progress that had been made through the new force on the island. He wrote that the before the field police the situation in the countryside had been unsatisfactory, and “Sarikat Islam won more and more authority among the native population.” The time had been ripe for the introduction of a field police which he says he had planned long ago and had waited for years to implement. Without undue modesty, Hoorweg writes that through
speed and skillful action the new unit was able to support civil authorities who had been described as very much in need of help.

Hoorweg noted that the success of the field police on Java was attested to in the government’s response to a request by the Volksraad for a report on the field police. This report was discussed in a series of articles in a Batavian newspaper, concerning what the paper described as the death knell of the armed police. The newspaper asked the question: why is there now on Java, in the form of the so-called field police, a fake army, modeled at least by half on the unnecessary armed police? This answer from the government was that the existence of a paramilitary police force was needed and that the field police as currently constituted would stay within their police powers. Specifically, the government adduced the railway strike of 1923 and lauded the performance of the field police noting that their action, “once again prove[s] that they deserved a favorable opinion.”

The railway strike of 1923 was fomented by Sarekat Islam. In putting down the strike the field police showed their ability to engage politics and violence in service of the state.

Hoorweg’s missive was supposed to be a valedictory, but the situation in the colony was not static. Events intervened and what had looked like a bright future for the field police in 1929 was quite different in 1938. A colonial publication notes that the field police were well-organized from 1920 on. On Java the duties and fitness of the field police could best be compared and equated to military-style, rural policing in the Netherlands. Favorable comparison could also be made with the

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Gendarmerie in Belgium and France and the Carbaniri in Italy, according to the publication. In 1932, however, economic conditions were difficult and the government had to decide what would be cut. The idea of eliminating or reducing the marechaussee met with fierce resistance from the military (the marechaussee was a military unit). It was recommended that the task of the constabulary be given to the marechaussee from the field police. The field police would therefore bear a proportionate share of layoffs.

Objections were raised against the plan in the Volksraad. Arguments against the idea highlighted the unsuitability of the soldier to act as a policeman. The publication observes that the field police and marechaussee were completely different. It notes that, the police use racial kinsmen, members of the population itself, who speak the language of the area and are familiar with its manners and customs. This like on like policing serves to reduce misunderstanding and conflict between the “benevolent” part of the population and the police. The writer states that the army, by contrast, is made from “a conglomerate of races.”

What is being lamented here is the idea of stranger policing. The Ambonese were also a conglomeration of races but their employment in the homelands of the Ambonese was based on having a core of locals in any area with a strong presence of other Ambonese from other areas. These in turn were supplemented by those from other areas of the archipelago. This was also a conglomeration of races, but one quite different from the stranger policing the publication here disdains.

The article continues by noting that a soldier never wins the confidence of the population. Police, on the other hand, gain proper authority as they stay a long
time in an area in order to gain knowledge of the area as well as to form personal relationships and an awareness of particular local circumstances. Despite this, the author concludes, the government has decided to downsize the field police by 600 men. The marechaussee and the remaining field police would share duties.344

The Field Police in Ambon and the Outer Islands

While the previous section pertains largely to Java, we will now look to the field police in the Outer Islands and how they came to be. On Java nationalist troubles required the riot control skills of the field police, rather than the more heavy-handed tactics of the armed police. The story in the Outer Islands is different. While the nationalist movement on Java preoccupied the state there, the work of the armed police in the Outer Islands was carrying on and, through this, was working to consolidate further power and control, power and control which would hold through the coming Japanese period and the British/Australian interregnum.

The field police in the Outer Islands are important because in the change from the armed police to the field police we see the success of control in the Outer Islands. Jones puts it well: “Today's Brimob is in some ways the direct heir of a police unit that existed in Dutch colonial days. In 1912, the Netherlands Indies Government formed an armed police unit called Gewapende Politie that was later replaced by another unit called Veldpolitie that had the same duties. These duties

were among others: to act as a quick response unit, to maintain public order and security, maintain civilian rule, avoid requests for military assistance, and consolidate newly acquired territories.”

My slight disagreement would be that Brimob is more the heir of the armed police tradition on Java and that what Jones terms a replacement was more of an evolution. But I do think she gets it largely correct, in a way that other histories do not. I find, however, that there is a better rendering still, one contemporaneous to the process of transition from the armed police to the field police. In 1924 a colonial publication stated that in the Outer Islands the replacement of the army by the armed police went hand in hand with the progress of pacification and economic development. The replacement of the armed police by the field police, in turn, continued this development.

The military conquest of the Outer Islands had been followed by a policing regime (the armed police) that took police power out of local hands and gave it to a unit that, in theory, was shared in its control between both local and colony-wide authority. With the coming of the field police we see control returned to the local level. This may seem like a reversal (police power went from local to central to local), but this was a progression for the state: the local police of wide-ranging authority (pradjoerits often served this function) had been out of the control of the colony-wide state before the armed police but after the armed police the local police of wide-ranging authority (now the field police) were within the control of the state at a local level. The distinction is that power went from (at first) local non-state

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345 Jones, Reforming the Indonesian Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB), 9.
346 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
hands to (finally) local state hands now within a larger network of control – this conversion a triumph for the state. This state had made its presence felt in the Outer Islands.

By 1922-1923 the field police, initially organized in 1919, had largely replaced the armed police except in Maluku and Manado. In 1925 transformation in these islands began too. But the Outer Islands were different and they did things differently. This was not only true for the homelands of the Ambonese: Bali, Lombok and Aceh all experienced the conversion in ways different from the conversion on Java. In the homelands of the Ambonese, however, a colonial publication explained the situation. It stated that in 1924 the maintenance of order, peace and security in the Outer Islands was entrusted to the army, the armed police and the other units of police (general police). It noted that the government jurisdictions in the Outer Islands were infinitely greater than those on Java, presenting greater challenges to the police. It further stated that, “quite honestly, among the general police there is no coherence and unity to be found. Army and armed police are the binders of authority in this vast area.” This is all to say that the colonial authority was aware of the difference between Java and the Outer Islands, and that because of the necessity of the armed police the state was content to let the armed police fade away rather than expire rapidly.

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348 De Jong, *De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie*, 62-63.
349 1929 GMR 3254
350 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
Furthermore, the process of replacing the armed police with the field police was done with reluctance in the homelands of the Ambonese, though it definitively did occur; the armed police gradually became the field police. In 1929 Hoorweg described the process, including a further appeal that the army be reduced. He wrote that the field police would come to dominate the armed police as more time passed. The armed police “will fade into the background and finally as good as disappear.” The remaining armed police, those still in Maluku and Manado, would come under new training requirements and gradually be switched over to the field police. He goes on to state that the duties of the field police would be approximately similar to those of the former armed police, though the ranks and titles of the field police would apply. The weapons - klewang and repeating rifles - would remain the same but carbine machine guns would be introduced as was increasingly the case for police on Java. Thus organized, the new field police would take up the old tasks assigned to the armed police. Hoorweg concludes with the hope that this conversion would enable a situation such that “the army in many regions of the Outer Islands can be withdrawn.”

By 1931 the process of transformation was well under way, though there remained the essential difference between the field police in the Outer Islands and on Java. A government record described it succinctly. In the Outer Islands the field police was more directly created by the transformation of the armed police into field police. On Java the field police were more concerned with riot control whereas in

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352 Indische Verslag 1931, 450.
the Outer Islands they were more engaged by the ongoing task of building up the state and consolidating power. In 1933 a government communication stated that the replacement of the armed police by the field police was proceeding apace in Ambon, but the communication also expressed concern that the field police would not have the same paramilitary capabilities as the armed police. It concluded that the field police in “Moluccas (New Guinea) [should have] a little more military value... than normal for the field police in general.”

The replacement of the armed police by the field police in the homelands of the Ambonese continued efforts to extend the state’s control. With the coming of the field police there would be a network of radio stations throughout the homelands of the Ambonese for use by the police. These networks would be poised for international communication, implying the coherence not only of the colonial state to itself but of the colonial state to the broader world. The stations formed a network whose continued presence was possible because of the field police. None of this, of course, would have been possible without their direct antecedents in terms of extending the state, the armed police. There are permanent stations in a lot of different places. This shows how widely the state was able to extend and maintain its network. This is a testament to what the armed police did and to what the field police were able to inherit. The list covers areas that had stations capable of both sending and receiving messages as well as those capable only of receiving messages. There are also future stations listed, showing the growing strength of the state. These places are throughout Maluku and the western part of Papua. It is a

353 1933 GMR 4404.
broad coverage over a broad area on the map, a crucial part of an archipelago-wide state:

Present send and receive stations: Ambon, Banda, Wonreli (Kisar), Saumlaki, Tual, Dobo, Merauke, Tanahmerah, Fakfak, Manokwari, Seroei, Sorong, Ternate, Tobelo, Batjan, Sanana, Babo, Boela, Hollandia

Present receive stations: Saparoea, Amahai, Geser, Wahai, Piroe, Namlea, Tepa, Larat, Okaba, Moeting, Laiwoei, Djailolo, Weda, Inanwatan, Bosnek, Anggimeeren, Hollandia (Sarmi)

Needed send and receive stations: Mappipost, Midden Vogelkop, Atinjoemeer, Kaimana, Mimika, Leksoela, Riring, Pioniersbivak (Mamberamo)\(^{354}\)

The ethnic composition of the field police in the homelands of the Ambonese was to follow the trends of the armed police. Integrated units were dominated by locals, with other Ambonese and those from other areas forming a significant contingent. In 1924 a colonial publication stated that the foundation of the field police was to be members of the population itself, those who know that language, manners, and customs of the country. This would be done to avoid “misunderstanding and conflict” between the population and the police.\(^{355}\) The way of the future was to be the way of the past: an integrated force with strong local ties. A 1931 report on conversion of the armed police to field police in Manado continues to observe that Ambonese, Manadonese, and Timorese are preferred.\(^{356}\) The field police in the homelands of the Ambonese would no more embrace stranger policing than had the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese.

\(^{354}\) BGS 30 Juni 1937 No 1445
\(^{355}\) Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
\(^{356}\) BB 3632, 1931.
By the late 1930s the armed police would be gone but their legacy and legend would live on. A 1937 memo on Maluku and Papua relative to international relations notes that before the army took over from the armed police in Maluku in 1924 “the [armed police] unit on Buru and Sula Islands was the only means of power.” The memo goes on to note that the field police had logically taken over the work of the armed police in 1934. Continuing in the efforts of the armed police, the field police had achieved significant pacification in the area and could now devote more time and energy to pacification in Papua.357 The armed police were gone, but the policing they had practiced was in no way forgotten.

The Recrudescence of the Military

And so the field police and the army took over from the armed police who faded away, flickering out in the homelands of the Ambonese. We have discussed how and why it occurred, but I wish to delve deeper into the ramifications. The Dutch insistence on military control over civil authority as exemplified in the debate over the demise of the armed police would contribute to their inability to hold on to the colony after the war. The Dutch had had a strong partner in control in the armed police. By replacing the armed police with the field police the state also ceded considerable authority for policing back to the army. The army wanted the official task of policing to ensure continued support for the military in an austere economic climate. But the military did not engage with the population in the ways

357 BGS 30 Juni 1937 No 1445
that the armed police had. They were a reactive and heavier-handed type of power than that of the armed police. The result of this was that the Dutch lost an important form of power, of control, that they would miss sorely during what they would term, ironically, Police Actions. The military proved rather good at winning battles, but they were unable to extend control into the Outer Islands in the ways in which the armed police had excelled.

The story of how colony-wide, large unit policing in the archipelago bifurcated into colonial (Bijzonder Politie) and nationalist (Mobile Brigade) rival forces is not within the ambit of this project, but the conditions that enabled it are. The legacy of the armed police would live on in the field police, in Japanese units, and in postwar units right down to the present Brimob. This is not to say that these units have not changed over time; Brimob nationally is more as the armed police were on Java specifically, that is to say a riot suppression force. What would not persist, however, was Dutch authority over these forces in the coherent manner it had enjoyed with the armed police. This breakdown can be traced to the decision to re-empower the military, particularly in the Outer Islands.

The Dutch colonial state had global concerns in the 1920s and 1930s. They had always had global concerns, of course, but the period between world wars saw the state concerned with the external threat to the colonies in the form of the Japanese. The Japanese had economic concerns in the Outer Islands that were closely watched by the state: nickel, iron-ore mining rights in Sulawesi are specifically mentioned in government reports.\footnote{1933 GMR 4404} At the time of the creation of the
field police, the colonial army was focused on the threat of foreign powers.\textsuperscript{359} The field police were seen as part of the security formula for a colonial state\textsuperscript{360}, but the military had the more powerful role in the state’s security apparatus as they had always had.

The move towards military authority was not some sort of reactionary move without extenuating circumstances. It may very well have been the wisest course of action at the time, particularly with the Japanese invasion looming. By moving back to military authority from an evolving civil, policing control the Dutch ceded in the archipelago power that would come to aid the nationalist cause. The economy and the strength of the military within the state carried the day. Civil policing, the kind concerned with the consolidation and maintenance of authority over large areas in the vast and still loosely knit archipelago, lost.

The focus here is on the police. But it is important to acknowledge the view from the military side. It was claimed at the time that the army was better suited for the job of political-policing, that is the sort of work that the armed police had been performing for the past twenty years.\textsuperscript{361} This was, of course, a claim being made at a time when the concerns of finance weighed heavily on the army. The army had not before this time advocated for its expertise in the sort of policing the armed police had been doing for the past decades. But now, faced with budgetary concerns, it was invoking supremacy at the task. That might have been true, the army might have been better suited to policework. But the army had not opposed

\textsuperscript{359} Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
\textsuperscript{360} Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1939 “Een En Ander Betreffende ‘De Indian Police,” 571.
\textsuperscript{361} BB 3663, 1924 “Leger, Gewapende Politie En Bezuiniging”
the creation of the armed police in any concerted way, nor had it provided
strenuous objection when the marechaussee experience led to the creation of the
armed police as opposed to an expansion of the marechaussee into the role that the
armed police would fill.

In short, the military could have held on to the political-police task quite
readily through the institution of the marechaussee but did not. Now that times
were tight the army was arguing not so much that the marechaussee should take the
lead from the armed police that was always its due, but that the undifferentiated
army as a whole should. And this assertion is made with specific mention of the
Outer Islands where the armed police had accomplished what the army had not.

In the end, the military replaced the armed police alongside the much less
robust field police, a unit more constrained in its duties than the armed police. It is
important, however, to understand the nature of the dissent not only because it
points to past success in consolidation of territory but because it portended the
difficulty the Dutch would have in reasserting control during the Independence
period. Contemporaneous correspondence from the Interior Administration is
emphatic in stating not only the success of the armed police in the homelands of the
Ambonese (specifically for consolidation and control) but that the reintroduction of
the army alongside a diminished field police would retard a process of accumulating
power for the state that had been underway.362

Hoorweg would also offer a final word, this in 1929, one that can be
profitably seen as a eulogy not only for the armed police (which one might consider

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362 BB 3663, 1924. Also Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1924, “De Nederlands Indies Politie.”
a trifling concern) but for the sort of control over the archipelago that would be necessary were Dutch rule to last to mid-century, which it most certainly would not due to the Japanese, the nationalists, and the errors of the Dutch. One line, spoken reprovingly, is particularly apt: “A good cop is a bad soldier and a good soldier is a bad cop, yet each is in itself a useful and indispensable element in the state.”

The study of the late period of Dutch rule is not as robust as it might be, and that is true for study of Outer Island colony-wide policing units as well. What we are doing here does not significantly ameliorate that, but a few words can be said. A robust colony-wide police effort called the armed police aided the consolidation of control, particularly in the Outer Islands and specifically the homelands of the Ambonese, binding them to the state. By the mid-1930s the armed police were gone, replaced by the military and a weaker force, the field police. The marechaussee underwent a renascence that would last until the ultimate departure of the Dutch in 1949.

The rise again of the marechaussee is a final note for colonial constabulary policing in the archipelago. As we have seen, the marechaussee never went away completely after the war in Aceh. They were present throughout the period under discussion, particularly on Java, though it must be noted that they were very much a token force when compared to the armed police. They are, in fact, considered for much of the period as a simple sub-unit of the infantry. As to the extant historiography on the latter-day marechaussee Teitler notes that energy for innovation and reform in the unit had waned by 1918, with the completion of the

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major wars of pacification.\textsuperscript{364} Bloembergen notes their existence in 1922 at a riot in Java where they ceded authority upon arrival of the field police.\textsuperscript{365} Cribb confirms the institutional tension between the marechaussee and the field police.\textsuperscript{366} Locher-Scholten is more expansive writing, “In the 1930s, 500-600 men from the field police in Java were replaced by units of military police (marechaussee). To police officers and civil servants this was a dreadful scenario, for it ran counter to their vision of colonial development, which was seen as evolving from a period of ‘pacification’ to a civil society with normal policing.”\textsuperscript{367} These are, however, minor points in the literature. The rise of the marechaussee and the decline of the field police are hard to detect in the history of the era.

The marechaussee were not as effective as the armed police. This was the opinion of its advocates, but it is supported by events on the ground, particularly those noted by the Residents quoted in the previous chapter. The move back to military responsibility for police work in the Outer Islands was met with disapproval by the civilian authority. The militarization of policing may have led to decreased support for the state in the Outer Islands. During World War II this may have been a reason for initial support of the Japanese invasion in those areas.

Despite this, the marechaussee had their advocates. As early as 1920 the marechaussee were receiving renewed praise, this time as a source for the work of

\textsuperscript{365} Bloembergen, \textit{De Geschiedenis van het Politie in Nederlands-Indie}, 134.
\textsuperscript{366} Cribb, \textit{Gangsters and Revolutionaries}, 31.
the armed police.\textsuperscript{368} Such observations would not be isolated, the applicability of those from the marechaussee to the work of the armed police would come to be increasingly viable as a general concept, the underlying reality being a different story. Nevertheless it would come to gain such credence that the middleman of the actual unit, the armed police proper would come to seem, and be, superfluous. This is not to say that opinion of the marechaussee as superior to the armed police was instantaneous and unanimous. Indeed, we have seen how great a factor were economics and the power of the military within the government. But an ambivalent view still redounded to the benefit of the marechaussee who were themselves the insurgent force challenging the position of the armed police.\textsuperscript{369} This view would be answered in the same year (1923) by a much more robust celebration of the virtues of the marechaussee.\textsuperscript{370} A rejoinder, though a futile one, was offered from the field police – a defense of a type of control maintenance whose success ought to have been the articulation of its worth - but momentum was with the militarization of policing.\textsuperscript{371}

By 1926 the armed police were still very much a force in the Outer Islands, but here too the militarization of the policing project was under way.\textsuperscript{372} In Aceh in particular the marechaussee were enjoying a new life, one that would be sustained until the Japanese invasion.\textsuperscript{373} The Ambonese were very much a part of the

\textsuperscript{368} 2.10.36.04. Ministerie van Kolonien: Openbaar Verbaal. V 14-12-1920
\textsuperscript{369} De Indische Gids 1923 I, "Marechaussee als Politie," 458.
\textsuperscript{370} De Indische Gids 1923 II, "Legerpolitie," 765.
\textsuperscript{371} BB 3663, 1923.
\textsuperscript{372} Van Franssen, Bronnen Betreffende De Midden-Molukken, 647.
\textsuperscript{373} Poorthuis, Van Zelfredzaamheid tot Politiestaat. Also Womack, “An Abandoned Army: The KNIL and the Japanese Invasion of Northern Dutch Sumatra”
marechaussee. By the 1930s the process of militarization was highly developed. A new development, however, was the involvement of numerous groups in policing, to do some of the work formerly done by the armed police. There were still advocates for the suitability of a civilian police instead of a military body for the job vacated by the armed police. As for the details of the writ of the military police, they were under military authority with some distinct regulations.

The conversion to a military policing regime would continue unabated until the coming of the Japanese. The problem, however, was that the military police were unable to cover the needs that the armed police had served, even with the help of the field police. To be certain, this had much to do with the world situation, and by this I largely mean that in difficult economic times Holland was preparing for war with Germany while the Dutch East Indies were preparing for war with Japan. The military was temperamentally unsuited for police work while at the same time distracted by international concerns. To supplement forces there were efforts to raise old indigenous units and establish new militias. In 1936 a barisan corp at Madura and a formation at Mankunegoro were proposed. In that same year plans to establish corps of ex-soldiers in certain parts of the outer provinces were suggested. An auxiliary volunteer defense force throughout the archipelago was proffered as an

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374 GMR 1928 No 254. Also, Indische Gids 1930 I "Het Korps-Marechaussee te Atjeh."
375 GMR 1930 No 605.
376 BB 3588 [1932] "Leger-Politie". Also, De Jong, De Organisatie Der Politie In Nederlandsch-Indie, 85
377 Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1933 II No 272. Also, BB 3531 1935.
378 GMR 1938 no 1188 11. Also Alamanack Nederlands Indie 1939 I, 385.
379 WO 208/1388.
idea in 1941.\textsuperscript{380} Conscription of Europeans had been implemented in 1939 but it was not until the second half of 1941 that a native militia was finally introduced on Java, Madura, Ambon and in Manado.\textsuperscript{381} But these would not be very effective when war with Japan came. Any speculation about the performance of the armed police had they still existed would be only conjecture.

Notwithstanding the coming war, however, the work on consolidating control continued as did the necessity for it for the unity of the archipelago. The state as a force was not dependent on any one master. The work of involving the homelands of the Ambonese in the state continued despite global concerns as it would continue despite a different regime in charge in Batavia. After the world war the Dutch would return and try to re-establish control. One of the tools for this was the marechaussee (part of a new post-war amalgamation with the military police, known as the Corps of Military Police/Marechaussee).\textsuperscript{382} An anticipated police schema for the United States of Indonesia prominently included the resurrection of the armed police.\textsuperscript{383} The nationalists would counter with their own such force. After independence the police would be a civilian force only to be militarized in the 1960s as power slipped from Sukarno. After the fall of Suharto the police would become civilian again in 2000. The story is the story of policing in the archipelago, power moving between civilian and military as control by the state was consolidated.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{380} WO 208/1603.
\item \textsuperscript{381} Teitler, “The Mixed Company: Fighting Power and Ethnic Relations in the Dutch Colonial Army, 1890-1920,” 40.
\item \textsuperscript{382} Van Veen, \textit{Tjampoer Marecheplisie}, passim.
\item \textsuperscript{383} 2.10.14 Ministerie van Kolonien: Openbaar Verbaal. 3798.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In this chapter we have seen how the field police and the army replaced the armed police. The Ambonese role in this project remained what it had been under the armed police, particularly as the armed police lasted longer in the homelands of the Ambonese than they last anywhere else in the state. Less than a decade elapsed between the elimination of the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese and the Japanese invasion. The story of Ambonese policemen as constabulary police under the Japanese is the next part of their story, one that merits telling. In the conclusion of this dissertation, however, I will offer some thoughts as to the implications of the research that has been presented.
Conclusion

This dissertation has argued that the Ambonese, through their work as armed police in their own homelands, helped create the basis of a colonial state that would help to form East Indonesia which would itself serve as a unit in the future state of Indonesia.

Chapter 1 discussed the historiography of colonial policing as well as the Ambonese. Chapter 2 dealt with the origins of the armed police, particularly how the origins of the armed police are to be found in experience of the Ambonese marechaussee during the war in Aceh and in the broader political context of the archipelago. Chapter 3 addressed the first Reorganization of the Police in 1897, the beginning of the true armed police in which the armed police (particularly in the homelands of the Ambonese) were not simply taking control from existing local forces but trying to fashion a new sense of control. Chapter 4 focused on the Reorganization of 1912 in which the armed police began to resemble a more modern police force and in which the Ambonese largely filled the ranks in their own homelands. Chapter 5 discussed the Reorganization of 1918 which brought about the gradual abolition of the armed police though the armed police in the Ambonese homelands persisted into the 1930s. Chapter 6 dealt with the field police and the return to local power that was possible in the homelands of the Ambonese and beyond owing to the consolidation of authority that the armed police had helped to bring about.
The implications of the research presented in this dissertation can be broadly grouped into two categories: implications for the history and historiography of Indonesia, and implications for the history and historiography of colonial policing. An appreciation of the former may cast additional light on the latter so I will discuss them in that order.

The formation of a broad state in the eastern part of the archipelago, one that would connect with and remain connected to Batavia/Jakarta, was not inevitable. The Ambonese armed police played a vital role in this history. The Ambonese as armed police were exceptional for two major reasons: 1) they were deemed to be exceptional by the state which invested resources in them; 2) the homelands of the Ambonese cover a very broad, very diverse part of the country, that of Eastern Indonesia. What is significant in this dissertation is how the Ambonese armed police helped create the basis of the archipelago-wide state in the Outer Islands, particularly in the homelands of the Ambonese where the armed police served longer than anywhere else in the archipelago.

The Ambonese armed policemen expanded the power of police work in the islands. This has been shown throughout this dissertation, but the idea of the expansion of police power attending the formation of the state is not a very challenging or new idea. What is new here is the presentation of a case in which a broad group of ethnicities was brought into the state in an integrated fashion, both within that broad group (the Ambonese) and with other groups throughout the archipelago. Police power in the homelands of the Ambonese was a continuous process of bringing groups together and of empowering the Ambonese within their
homelands and within the state alongside other indigenous persons in the archipelago in the homelands of the Ambonese and beyond. This experience was one less of antagonism than of amalgamation. The armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese were an increasingly pluralistic force, working with other ethnicities more and more as time passed. The Ambonese armed police in their own homelands and beyond were joining with other ethnic groups to constitute a police force for Indonesia. In so doing they were also forming Eastern Indonesia and Indonesia itself.

To emphasize this point it needs to be qualified. In this dissertation we have spoken of like over like policing as contrasted to stranger policing. The experience of the Ambonese armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese can be termed almost like on like policing, as it falls short of the ideal. For the Ambonese like over like in a strict sense is present in Manado and Timor, though in Ambon proper the broader sense of Ambonese is employed. But within this condition of almost like on like policing the East is exceptional. In other areas of the archipelago the Javanese predominate. It is in the East that local people were empowered over and above the Javanese. This lends itself to a more pluralistic understanding of state formation in this context: the processes the occurred in the homelands of the Ambonese were not the same as those that occurred elsewhere for the armed police. This apparent weakness (the lack of universality of like on like policing) is also a strength in that it shows the universality of armed policing, the different ways in which the armed police were implemented and experienced. This important institution was pervasive in the colonial state, but experienced in different ways. Disparate groups
were brought together under the banner of the state through disparate paths. It is an affirmation of the possibility of unity in diversity.

The Ambonese had been effective at linking the homelands of the Ambonese to the central government: 1) by employing like over like policing in that the strongest contingent in any area within the homelands of the Ambonese was composed of Ambonese from that general area; 2) by having significant numbers of non-local Ambonese in each area within the homelands of the Ambonese, providing each area with authority figures of the state from nearby areas; 3) by having Javanese and others from elsewhere in the archipelago serve in the homelands of the Ambonese in increasing numbers as time passed. These, combined with the increasingly effective centralization that had occurred over the course of three reorganizations, enabled the formation of a government for the entire archipelago of which the homelands of the Ambonese were a part. In so doing they would consolidate authority in the region and more tightly bind the region to the larger state. The Ambonese were certainly a privileged group within the state, but as armed policemen they were never segregated from the other ethnic groups of the archipelago. In their service as armed police the Ambonese worked with other Indonesians and retained power in their own homelands, both functions redounding to the cohesion of the state.

The implications of this extend beyond the academic borders of Indonesian police history to the larger history of Indonesia. The Korte Verklaring and the Ethical Policy occasioned Dutch measures taken to extend the colonial state through the use of the military and the armed police. What the functioning of the Ambonese
armed police in their homelands shows us is that local engagement in this effort was central to its success. The colonial history of Indonesia is a history of indigenous people helping to create a unity that would transcend the colonial state. What is remarkable is not that local people did this, but that they did it together with local people from other areas, auguring a unity that would transcend the colonial state. We see this in the police academy at Sukabumi and we see this in the need of the armed police use of Malay as a precursor to Indonesia’s national language. We see cohesion in the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese and beyond.

During the Second World War constabulary units continued to operate in Eastern Indonesia, under the control of the Japanese. In the year after the war constabulary units in the area were nominally under the authority of the Australians, but in practice they were left to their own devices. This would redound to the advantage of the nationalists, as would the heavy-handed practices of the British on Java who had significant problems in overseeing police units there. Exploring the dynamics of the war and post-war is the next logical area of research to understand the experience of the Ambonese as constabulary police in their homelands.

After the post-war occupation period there came an actual, short-lived state of Eastern Indonesia, an entity that the armed police in the homelands of the Ambonese had long been working to bring about. From the Ethical Period to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia we see a remarkable development: the creation of a colonial state or an alternative independent state that may have gone forward separate from the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch colonial experience is
often considered ineffective, especially as compared to that of the British in South Asia and Malaya. What this dissertation has argued is that the Dutch colonial state actually enjoyed remarkable success in the field of constabulary style colonial policing in East Indonesian. The state of the Netherlands East Indies may never have been able to achieve Snouck Hurgronje’s dream of an archipelago united on an equal basis with his small homeland in Western Europe, but the State of East Indonesia was more possible than we may now appreciate. The administration of the Netherlands East Indies adjusted to the shifts and changes of the time, from the turn of the century to the Revolution. A cohesive state was reified throughout. What served as a model for later Indonesia could have been a model for something else, for an independent state of East Indonesia. The suggest of this dissertation is this: the experience of the Ambonese armed police in their homelands shows the development of an adaptive, strong state that would contribute to the state of Indonesia but formed a state in East Indonesia before that. The unifying experience of the Ambonese armed police in their homelands was not directed at a pre-determined end point. Rather the unifying power of the state and the people within the state shows the perils and promise of state-building in maritime Southeast Asia.

Beyond Indonesia, this dissertation has attempted to contribute to the field of colonial policing. The Irish Question, explored in the introduction of this dissertation, asks about the nature of the interaction between the center and the periphery in a state of in a burgeoning state. Previous discussions of the Irish Question have focused on issues of antagonism and dominance and how the one informs the other, but above all the Irish Question has been seen to address
The contribution of this dissertation as to the role of constabulary-type policing in the periphery vis a vis the center is to offer that such policing in and of itself can bind a state more strongly. It functions in service of the state, yes, but in its exercise it helps to build, bind, and cohere. The effects of the Ambonese armed police in state-building speak to the a new consideration of the Irish Question: to what extent are constabulary units in the periphery significant not only in controlling the population for the state but in empowering the population in service of the state? Both, ultimately, serve the interests of the state.

This understanding of the Irish Question suggests a method of control that may be more significant than has previously been understood. Policing was the state’s road to legitimacy. The evolution of the various components of the police apparatus that have been articulated in this dissertation speaks to that. Policing over broad areas such as the homelands of the Ambonese, a kind of policing formerly unknown in the archipelago, only began to emerge with the idea of a larger East Indonesia and of Indonesia proper. This development, along with the ethnicity by fiat that was the state’s creation of the expansive category of Ambonese, was not coincidental but fundamental. The Irish Question should include consideration of how the state builds both police units and identities, political and ethnic.

The role of Gramsci in this dissertation is one I hope will be applied to other studies of colonial policing. Scholars approach colonial policing with trepidation, owing to the difficulty of securing indigenous voices. Police have less education than other actors within the state, such as educators and military personnel. Furthermore, police institutions retain less of a palpable historical tradition than
political and military institutions. As such, scholars of colonial policing must look to
the deeds of colonial police. The occasional diary or memoir from a relatively high-
ranking indigenous or European policeman is invaluable, but so are the actions of
police. A Gramscian approach, a consideration of deeds being as expressive as
words, is a profitable one, though scholars must be careful to emphasize the
complexity inherent in such a understanding of consent. The growth of the
Ambonese armed police was contingent on material, bread and butter, issues far
and above any ideological motivation (if any). In pursuing a Gramscian
understanding of colonial police we aren’t looking for a joyful collaboration with an
alien colonizer; we are trying to comprehend how the power of the state works its
way through and beyond the actions of history’s actors.

A word is warranted regarding pacification projects generally. This
dissertation was researched and written during the waning days of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It cannot help but be informed by those experiences, projects that
largely eschewed an embrace of colonial policing as a long-term endeavor in favor of
on the fly police advising projects undertaken by soldiers trained in infantry and
armor. Most account of these police training efforts acknowledge failure. This
outcome is predicted by the history of the Ambonese armed police in their own
homelands: the creation of a viable, legitimate policing apparatus cannot be done
without long investment by both the colonizer and the colonized. Other, external
control is rightly termed occupation and is finite.

Finally, there develops a tendency to erase police history from debate even
as the concerns of colonial policing assume greater importance. This dissertation
could be seen as an effort to counter that, but I want to be clear that a study like this should not be read as prescriptive. Indeed, the lessons of colonial policing can be read as strongly anti-colonial because while colonial police forces can be seen as the servants of high colonialism they are more fully read as the early stages of a functioning independent nation-state. If the goal of colonial policing is to erect a state edifice permanently under the control of a distant colonizer it will likely fail. Ultimately, the empowering of local people that policing calls for can result in a more integrated, more equitable state. But this is in no way assured. The study of pacification projects needs to be open to accepting outcomes positive and negative, guided above all by the historical record.
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