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The Chinese sages as communicative actors

Loo, Andrew, Ph.D.
University of Hawai'i, 1994

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THE CHINESE SAGES AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTORS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY MAY 1994

By Andrew Loo

Dissertation Committee:
Roger T. Ames, Chairman
David J. Kalupahana
David Chappell
Graham Parkes
Steve Odin
ABSTRACT

This dissertation is based on Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action. Habermas uses communicative action as his main notion for distinguishing among four types of social actions: teleological, normatively regulated, dramaturgical and communicative action. The main characteristics of communicative action are: (1) the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action, (2) who try to reach an understanding about the interpretation of what constitutes the action situation, and (3) who try to coordinate their actions by way of agreement, or "consensus."

Communicative action emphasizes G. H. Mead's "symbolic interaction" and the use of the media of language to bring a focus upon a "central experience of a unifying consensus-bringing force of argumentive speech." 1 In this way one can achieve an intersubjective validating "consensus," as ways of cooperating and adapting actions in a communicative situation. Communicative action is also seen by Habermas from the standpoint of a "formal-pragmatics," and not primarily as a semantic or grammatical enterprise. This will lead to carrying out a critique of ideology, which will reconstruct communicative competence within an ideal "emancipatory context to prevent deformation of praxis stemming from our varied competencies." 2 These are the minimal goals of communicative action.

Our main task is to apply the lessons learned about communicative action to two pre-Han Chinese traditions in the context of "words-deeds," which involves (1) a theory of action (li, ritual action; or wu-wei / yu-wei as non-deliberative, spontaneous action/deliberated, instrumental actions), (2) a theory of language (cheng-ming, rectification of names, and wu-yen, the non-spoken doctrine), (3) t'i (body, corpus, the body of tradition) and (4) tao, as the Confucian moral, linguistic tao, and the natural, ineffable tao of the Taoist. 3 Under these four rubrics, I will emphasize in the Confucian tradition the prominence of li, ritual action, while in the Taoist tradition, the focus will be on te, Potency and tzu-ji, spontaneity or the internal dynamism of all things, so-of-itself.
I shall inter-relate the Confucian li, t'i, cheng-ming, and tao and similarly wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, t'i and tao for the Taoists and show how they form an "integrated" concept cluster comprising their hermeneutical situation. This will bring about a rapprochment between the Confucian and Taoist as a "fusion of horizons." The emphasis will be on commonalities between Confucian thinking and Taoist experience. We can take our stance between the two traditions in order to give us a better perspective to be more aware to do the archaeology for discovering the shift in paradigm from a more yang to a more yin tradition. Correlatively, the main thrust of Taoism is a perduring effort at the criticism of the Confucian ideology of the "tao of moral suasion," for which they reconstructed a naturalistic tao.

In general, the Confucian and Taoist sages are expert hermeneutic practitioners. They can explicate the relation between words and deeds, which abound in the Analects and in Mencius. They also can interpret the polarity between knowledge and action, which, in the Taoist case, becomes the "discarding of knowledge" (wu-chih), and wu-wei, of acting in a non-interfering way. In the Taoist camp this can be exemplified by the "non-spoken" doctrine. Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" is also based on gestural meanings as the advent and promise of generating semantic potentials, or meanings. Tao provides the general background, or horizon, for the focusing of "insistent particularities" that would keep us on the concrete level.

We would also stress the side of "communicative receptivity," which builds upon the "passive" and "active" aspects of communicative action. In this regard, the main Taoist concepts which depict the spontaneous dimensions are wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu, which emphasizes the non-contending, non-competitive aspects of our communicative receptivities. David L. Hall calls wu-wei, non-assertive action, wu-chih, non-principled knowing, and wu-yu, objectless desires. We will advance a concept of Chinese "sweet reasonableness" instead of the Western stress on "rationality." The clue to this reasonableness is the paradigm exemplified in Chuang-tzu's "goblet rationality," which is a metaphorical-evocative method of creating new and startling meanings, values, and significances.
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CHAPTER I.
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

1.1: INTRODUCTION: HERMENEUTICS AS THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADITION.

I ask initially why the Western hermeneutical tradition has important consequences and application for the interpretation of pre-Han Chinese thought. How is it possible to obviate the post-Kantian rationalistic thinking which is a priori and universalistic in intent, especially after the modifications of Kantian premises through the hermeneutical writings of Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Dilthey, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas? Alternatively, how can we contrast Western "rationality" with a sweet "reasonableness" of Chinese thinking? How is hermeneutics different in its general features when it takes an intercultural understanding as its main goal? In short, how does Western logocentric thinking compare with a Chinese type of "correlative" thinking, which has at its basis "analogical projections" as its main frame of reference? Most important of all, how does "communicative action" modify rationalism through Habermas's inclusion of the American pragmatic tradition of George H. Mead, especially in regard to the latter's emphasis on social psychology in the conversation of gestures, and the role of interpersonal and symbolic interactionism?

According to Habermas, communicative action is "the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations. The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement."¹ The three major features here are (a) understanding, (b) coordination, and (c) agreement, or consensus.

Habermas asks, "How is communicative action different from the three other 'action-concepts'?" These are (1) "purposive-teleological actions" which are the actions involved in the realization of the speaker's own ends-in-view and are oriented toward "success," at getting someone to form a belief or "intention" to influence one another (Max Weber), (2) the consensual action of those who simply actualize an already existing normative agreement are "norma-
tive regulated actions," and (3) the presentation of self in relation to an audience are "dramaturgical actions." Communicative action is not "success-oriented" as in (1), but is "consent-oriented."

These three types of actions are only "one-sided" due to their limitations in the use of language in relation to the three formal worlds, while communicative action is more applicable to intersubjectivity and interpersonal interactions among the three worlds: the objective-social-subjective worlds. Also communicative action is intimately connected with Mead's "symbolic interactionism," Ludwig Wittgenstein's language games, J. L. Austin's theory of speech-acts, and Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. These aspects are exemplified in "symbolic reproduction," across the board, in the use of linguistic media in the institutions of science, art, law, democratic institutions, economic and educational systems. Consensus is based on "intersubjective" recognition of validity claims, which are communicatively agreed upon with "reasons," "better argumentation," or grounds for justification of arguing for "validity claims."

In political theory, consensus or agreement is the problem of the "social contract," which Habermas solves by means of agreements based on "mutual recognition" (intersubjectivity) within the "structure of communicative action" and the way we institutionalize communicative procedures in the public sphere.

A norm is valid only if it is one that could be agreed on by all concerned as participants in a practical discourse.

Another way to clarify what communicative action involves is to contrast it with three basic interests which Habermas distinguished in his earlier work, *Knowledge and Interests*: (1) a technical, or instrumental interest which governs the empirical and analytic sciences, (2) a practical interest which comprises the domain of "historical-hermeneutic" sciences, and (3) an emancipatory interest which can be features of the "human sciences," or the "humanities," which Habermas would call the "critical social sciences." He opposes (1) with (2), which contrasts the technical-instrumental interest with communicative action; he also would also draw a parallel between (3) and (2): The concept of ideology plays the same role in a (3) critical
Critical social science is a critique of ideology of the Marxian type: ideology in Marxian philosophy distorts the relationship of an authority by using "violence" (power, domination and control) over labor. Communicative action is a mainly an hermeneutical art aimed at "reaching understanding."

Stephen K. White claims that when Habermas shifts from his Knowledge and Interest to his Theory of Communicative Action, he moves away from an "epistemological" approach by "relinquishing the strong transcendental claims about knowledge" as a constitutive interest. But he retains the "technical" and "practical" interests by transferring them to a "strategic" orientation as exemplified by Max Weber's monological, purposive-teleological to a more "intersubjective-contextual" orientation.

Strategic rationality is the familiar means-ends conception. Contextual rationality...is a notion associated with...social anthropology. Here rationality is taken to mean 'conformity...to norms'...that is it conforms to the beliefs and social norms in the context of which it occurs. This shift from the transcendental is important to obviate the claims of "universality" which will be advanced by Habermas as a "generalizability of interest." Universalized means "communicatively shared," that is, there is a test of reciprocity demanded of all participants to withstand discursive testing that is acceptable to all participants; they discover a generalizable interest in the process of validating claims.7

Herbert Fingarette says that Habermas's interest (1) is a "formalistic," analytic movement which is exemplified by Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and by the logical analysts of the Vienna Circle and their critique of science, language, and knowledge. This is why it is a "behavioral or physicalist" approach to human conduct. Such behaviorism would contrast with a philosophy of language espoused by L. Wittgenstein, G. Ryle, J. L. Austin, and P. F. Strawson in regard to Habermas's interest (2) which emphasizes the use of "natural languages," the performative functions of gestures (li, ceremonial acts, rituals), and the function of language in its illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects. Fingarette wants to establish a strong connection between "performative formulas in our own language and ceremony"; Austin
says that "ultimately all utterances are in some essential way performative." It would seem that the switch over to performative aspects of language obviates the strictly analytic, behavioristic interpretation of language. I am in accord with Fingerette's emphasis on the ceremonial act (ritual action as gesture) as a performative, illocutionary act.

For correct use of language is constitutive of effective action as gesture is. Correct language is not merely a useful adjunct; it is of the essence of executing the ceremony.

The important point to acknowledge is that language (symbolic reproduction) takes place within a "culture," a "language community," and within "institutions." Wittgenstein emphasizes that "language games" take place in "language communities" with their network of ground rules and rule-governing definitions within the context of what the French would call, parole or langue; this contrasts with the "idiolect view" of a solipsistic, private language, which gives us no possibility of "translation" and is non-communicative from one person to the next. The Universalist assumes that the potentialities of communication are always greater than we believe, and that translation in the strictest sense is unnecessary since there is no radically alternative language into which or from which translations could be made.

Among the Universalists is Noam Chomsky, who puts strong emphasis on the innateness of "grammatical competence" and transformation grammar. And between these two extremes, Wittgenstein recognizes the "language community" with the features of "communality" and "commonality" in which the rule-governing feature of language games will vary from culture to culture, just as Peter Winch recognizes the fact that the recognition of the rules is a key to the understanding of customs and mores in a culture. These views of language involve mostly the "intracultural" aspects of meaning, translation, and transformation into another idiom, or idiolect. This bears on the project of a philosophy of culture in terms of "intercultural" commensurability.

The application of a "field-focus" model to language as a clue to "culture" means that one cannot depend upon semantics and syntactics as final determinants of our use of language, and that the pragmatic aspects of language usage is more important in determining cultivation,
socialization, and personality development. On the field-focus interpretation, culture is holographically determined, and

is objectively vague...Any part 'abstracted' from the whole adumbrates the whole. As a consequence, the elements of a field are synecdoches whose partiality advertises the complexity of the whole. In place of precise 'locus,' one employs vague 'focus.'

A field-focus model compares very well with Ferdinand Saussure's "diacritical" method of analyzing language, in which the parts contribute "cumulatively" in meaning to the larger and larger "wholes" of units of language.

One major advantage of communicative understanding is its combination of the insights of speech-acts theory with Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. The paradigm case of speech-acts is also oriented to the same goals as communicative actions, which is to reach understanding. Speech-acts, such as illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances, are to be "embedded in contexts of action." Habermas's emphasis is not on syntactics nor semantics, for he wants a "formal-pragmatics" which emphasizes the communicative competence of language-in-use in normal speech; this competence ties in with Wittgenstein's "meaning is use" doctrine. The term "use" has the implied meanings of acts, activities, actions, performances, etc., which are practical, and pragmatic.

Habermas is particularly critical of "Intentionalist" (reference) and "truth" semantics. He spent considerable time in criticizing the meaning-intention semantics of H. P. Grice and David Lewis, particularly in their definition of "convention" and their confusion of the relation of perlocutionary acts to illocutionary acts, where the former act is "indirectly giving something to be understood," and the latter pertains to the speaker's intention of "saying something." The fatal flaw in the meaning-intention thesis is their reference to the 'internal' perspective of the participant, that is, that speaker's knowledge or belief must be given a wholly objectivistic or physicalistic account.

Habermas also revises the communication-intention semantics of John Searle by modifying his "taxonomy" of "illocutionary force" (assertive, directive, commissive, declaratives,
and expressives) and substituting a new taxonomy which shows the way speakers "engage" themselves, or have "performative attitudes" in speech-act activities: he uses "constatives, regulatives, expressives, communicatives, and operatives." The first three performative attitudes conform to the three-world orientation: constatives to the objective world, regulatives to the social world, and expressives to the subjective world; communicatives, however, serve the ways we "organize speech," while operatives (inferring, calculating, counting, classifying, etc.) are the application of generative rules.

Habermas's shift to a formal pragmatics, in order to explain communicative action as functions of "social actions," builds upon the structural components of the "lifeworld": of society, culture and personality; the correspondent "pragmatic" functions emphasize the "competencies" that result in the processes of "social integration, cultural reproduction and socialization." Natural language plays an important role in the preservation and transmission of articulated world views, which "persist in symbolic forms in linguistic embodiments," and stores the cultural contents for further interpretation, evaluation and expression. Such world views include cultural interests of art, science, morality, religion, etc.. with their values of "truth, goodness, beauty, holiness, and importance." To summarize: the lifeworld forms a background and horizon for the hermeneutical circle in the interpretation of tradition, to which I shall now turn.

1.1.1: THE HERMENEUTICAL ARCS OF INTERPRETER AND TRADITION

"Tradition" is preserved, embodied, and reproduced in "symbolic forms" (in a wide sense to include not only language, but other non-discursive forms: myths, dance, music, etc., as discussed by Suzanne Langer and Ernst Cassirer. The hermeneutical arc of "tradition-interpretation" occurs within a cultural context, and the hermeneutical arc is "the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter." The interplay of part-whole, text-context, offers an interpreter the production of the meaning and reading of all sorts of texts, including natural objects and cultural artifacts.
For Hans-Georg Gadamer, the hermeneutical circle is constituted by the interpretation of tradition, and used by an "interpreter" to obtain meaning from "texts" and cultural/historical phenomena (tradition as antecedent meanings), but it is the refining of these "anticipatory meanings" from the "fore-structure" which Gadamer takes to be the basis for our pre-understandings, prejudgments, etc., of our lifeworld. Gadamer holds that these pre-understandings are based on the "commonality that unites us in a tradition" and will thereby form a "perfect unity of meaning." It is our fore-conceptions which gives us our unity of meaning, that is, we can agree upon our fore-conceptions of Kantian or Aristotelian (schema) categories, or other core, philosophical concepts which will provide us a means for consensus in meanings. However, Gadamer holds that we should never accept "uncritically" the antecedent "tradition" and "sociopolitical conservatism." Each confrontation with our culture is a "critical challenge" to any tradition.

Paul Ricoeur describes Gadamer's approach as a "hermeneutics of tradition" and contrasts it with Habermas's "critique of ideology." This difference indicates a basic change in orientation between Gadamer and Habermas; Habermas switches from the Heideggerian ontological view of the "world" to the phenomenological "lifeworld"; the main feature of this shared lifeworld is the "intersubjectivity" found in a culturally, pre-interpreted framework, which forms the "background" for communicative action. This cultural intersubjectivity is important for Chinese thinking since "semantic truth theories" do not operate in their culture and therefore the kinds of argumentation using analytical, dialectical, and analogical modes which are construable in "objective ground or reference" would imply that an alternative kind of validity will be required, since the seeming absence in classical China of speculations concerning 'truth' or 'falsity' in any strict sense may be understood as a consequence of a kind of correlative thinking which does not lead to 'logical' or 'rational' objectivity. The minimal requirement is "intersubjectivity" (interpersonal), which is found in Habermas's communicative action, without reference to a semantic truth theory.

Patrick Heelan, however, draws another implication from Heidegger and calls it the
"existential-hermeneutical" structure of the interpreter, that is, Dasein-being-in-the-world; and he further wants the hermeneutical circle to be embedded in a theory of perception as espoused by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in which acts of perception are "embodied" as "texts" in the World.

Perception is the historical way in which Dasein's understanding of Being is articulated by the interpretation of 'texts' in the World according to the conditions and processes of the hermeneutical circle. Hence, perception is a way of "reading" the text of nature, and such perceptual texts respond to the correlative "hermeneutical intentions" in experienced readers.

The paradigmatic hermeneutical activity of Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" is mainly based upon the phenomenology of perceptual readings of the meanings in its lifeworld. Heelan further elaborates:

If what is revealed to perception is revealed by interpretation, then the 'text' is in some sense a sign. In methodological hermeneutics, a sign is first known and then interpreted. In existential hermeneutics, the sign need not be first known; because if it were, its 'text' in turn would have to be known, and so on to absurdity. In "perceptions," as well as in "Interpretations," the signs which are "unconcealed" are "inexhaustibly" rich, complex and varied enough so that "Interpretations" know of no end, or finality, and are hence "incompletable." These factors answer the question of when an interpretation is almost completed.

While Gadamer is interested in the historical "horizon," and how the present is never isolated from the past, his main point is that "in a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on," for there is a fusion of the new and old growing together as we look at history. This is the "fusion of horizons." But, some phenomenologists still retain the "transcendental" viewpoint of the "lifeworld": i.e., Alfred Schutz interprets the "lifeworld" as the common, "unthematically given horizon" within which communication moves. Since the lifeworld has that penumbra of "vagueness" about its various aspects, the horizonal Tao is also "vague," chaotic, and indeterminate. The Chinese would call this "unthematic horizon" tao. Tao is a cumulative tradition of human activity, the horizon of lifeworlds. In this regard, Habermas wants
to interpret horizon and lifeworld in "everyday" layman terms; an communicative practice is for participants to give "narrative presentations" of events that take place in their lifeworld. And, the lifeworld is "never rendered totally transparent" in Habermas's view, since it is horizontally vague and we can always re-interpret the "shared" stock of our heritage, beliefs, or premises.

The communicative model of action is distinctive from the other types of social actions in regard to its use of language and reference to the "pre-interpreted" three formal "worlds": subjective-social-objective. Here, Habermas is advocating "action" in its relation to ontological worlds, since he intends to use "actions" mainly as "only those symbolic expressions with which the actor takes up a relation to at least one world (but always to an objective world as well)."

In summary, we should not simply identify the lifeworld with features of "certainty," "decidedness," the "given," or unproblematic, so in the next section, I shall examine in more detail the "horizontal" features of the lifeworld that makes for vagueness, chaos, and indeterminancy.

1.1.2: HORIZONS OF LIFEWORLDS.

We must be clear about the fact that "horizons" and "lifeworld," though related, have different boundaries and scopes of application, because horizons "shift, expand, or contract," to form contexts, boundaries, domains. Communicative acts involving speakers and hearers must be practiced in a reflective way, in that the participants of communicative action "reflects" upon the way the three formal worlds "integrate" to form a common "framework of interpretation." Reflection, used in this context, gives us the possibility of Habermas's "reconstructive science," or a "universal pragmatics," taken in the sense of the reconstruction of a "framework of interpretation" in the organization of the three formal worlds and the lifeworld. This framework can be used as a heuristic device to discover new relationships and to further communication. In fact, "self-reflection" is the dominant methodology of the critical social sciences. We should be clear here that "reflection" may take us to a second-level interpretation, an interpretation of our interpretations. More significantly, self-reflection emphasizes the "internal perspective" of
communicative participants, that is, they are able "intuitively" to assess their validity of their
claims and relate them to the context of speech-acts:

Individuals who act communicatively self-reflectively aim at reaching understanding about something in the world by relating their interpretations to three general types of validity claims which are constitutive for three basic types of speech acts: a claim to truth raised in constative speech acts, a claim to normative rightness raised in regulative speech acts, and a claim to truthfulness raised in expressive speech acts.39

Paul Ricoeur emphasizes that "concrete reflection" (first level) is an effort to recover what it is for something to exist, or the desire to "interpret": concrete reflection is not an "act of intuition," but glimpsing of things through a "mirror of the objects and acts, symbol and signs," which mirror "discloses," as aisthete, and reflects things as they are. Hence, "reflection must become interpretation" through this mirroring, or disclosure of things as they are. Reflection, then, can be based upon the "framework of interpretation," a filtering through cultural filters of the stream of experiences. However, we must realize that reflection is too often identified simply with discursive, analytical thinking (in Chinese, this is called yu-wei thinking, deliberative-calculative-purposive thinking) and we shall see that we need to complement reflection with an intuitive and holistic comprehensions, such as the competencies, skill, deftness, and tacit knowledge which is exemplified in a Cook Ting. These tacit skills, or knacks of how we know, are called wu-wei activities, since they are non-deliberative, spontaneous, knowing-that's. We will also find in Chuang-tzu that "reflection" is best typified by the "mirroring" of objective events as they happen and we "hold and let go" perceptions, only temporarily, as they come to us.

The utmost man uses the heart like a mirror; he does not escort things as they go or welcome them as they come, he responds but does not store.40

Hall and Ames focus upon "tradition" as a horizon providing an "interpretive context," and pose some conceptual contrast of "traditional" versus "historical" cultures: among these contrasts are transcendence/immanence, duality/polarity, agency/personalization, reason and causality in history, etc. But the one criterion for judging these cultures is in terms of kinds of "rationality" they espouse, i.e., aesthetic or logical rationalities.41 The difference is mainly that historical cultures tend to stress moral obedience to external (transcendent) "principles and
laws," while traditional culture stress "the aesthetic character of ritualistic participation," which have rules that are "constitutive and immanent to persons performing the ritual. Hence, the rationalities involved are "logocentric" which appeals to archai, or principles, for historical cultures, while "aesthetic rationality" applies in traditional cultures.

In regard to the Chinese context, there is no definition of "philosophy" as beginning in "wonder," nor is there a sense of a "perennial" series of problems which resist resolution, or a contrast of a historical vs. traditional societies as the basis for "philosophy"; even the sense of "tradition" or "history" needs ethno-focus. The minimal view we can take as a point of departure is that "tradition" is the result of a view of "history" by the Chinese as "becoming aware of the past" which is stated in terms of the sage-kings: Yao, Shun, Yu, Wu, etc. In that sense, the interpretive context is "tradition" taken over a period of time, with a continuity of issues and problems as solved by the tao of Yao, Shun, Wu, etc.. Tradition is the confrontation and conversation of subsequent thinkers with their past, the Ancients. Philosophy is exemplified by the tradition which is "laminated layers" sedimented in the Six Classics, as well as the rituals, symbolic forms in the arts, artifacts and institutions which are transmissible to future generations.

Analogously, when we consider Confucius as a "transmitter" and interpreter of the tradition of the Chou institutions, he is performing an important hermeneutic task for Chinese philosophy. He is reflecting the "spirit" of the Chou lifeworld when he brings it under scrutiny and interpretation. Normally, the first impression we get when we consult Confucius is the fixity of tradition which gives a "conservative" view of Confucius; much more "creativity" and flexibility can be accorded to Confucius himself in his interpretation of the Six Classical Texts. For example, Ch'ien Mu claims that the Chinese tradition of scholarship places "value on similarity and convergence rather than difference and divergence," and scholars are transmitters, not innovators.

It is here that we need to distinguish between a first-level interpretation of a reference
tradition as against a second-level interpretation, which is an interpretation of an interpretation. Confucius is doing a first-level interpretation, while Ch’ien Mu is pointing to second-level interpretations, which must converge upon and identify with the original scholarship of first-level interpretation of a reference tradition. Chuang-tzu would do second-level interpretation, since his is a critique of the ideology of the Confucian-Mohist tradition, while Hsun-tzu does both kinds of interpretations and arrives back at a basic Confucianism.

Ch’ien Mu’s viewpoint tends toward a “conservative” reading of Confucius. What is more important in communicative terms is consider the "openness" of the horizons of the lifeworld of the Chou culture which can highlight the "narrative" histories and their significance found in the chronicles in the Book of History and the Book of Documents. The “communality” found in the "linguistic community" of the ancient cultures of Hsia, Yin (Shang), and Chou, is embodied in the artifacts and the classical texts, which form the "body" (ti), or "corpus" of the tradition, in which Confucius develops his concepts of li, jen, yi, and chih (ritual action, "authoritative person," signification, and knowing as “realization”). Most of all, for Confucius the body of the Chou works was good enough to be “repeated” (re-enacted) in history as a heritage to transmit. Yet, the transmitted ritual actions change from generation to generation; also several other aesthetic dimensions are associated with ritual actions: i. e., evocative, expressive, and “modeling” (fa).

The enactment of ritual (li) with personal significance is not bare imitation of an abstract form; it is the representation of a model (fa), the re-enactment of concretely embodied li. Any lifeworld is subject to a "culturalistic" bias. Wittgenstein’s "forms of life" and "rule-governed" behavior comprise the ways that Winch would analyze a society. At the same time, language "communities" are also selective, as are other factors of culture, society and personality. Since the lifeworld is "the store of the interpretive work of preceding generations," the more we take for granted the cultural stock of knowledge, the less we need to pre-decide our validity claims. Habermas sees that the lifeworld could be "culturally" biased, and its methodology could be an "ethnomethodology" which may be too parochial, too limited and nct
global enough. In Gadamer's idiom, the "conversation is us" means that the dialogical method is part and parcel of Habermas's communicative action. And the notion of dialogue (lun-yu, Analects)
is culturally specific and historically bound, and while one speaker may feel secure that a conversation is happening, another may be sure it is not. The power relations that condition and limit dialogic possibilities need to be interrogated.  

In short, are we having a pseudo-conversation? How do we know we are genuinely trying to communicate with each other?

In the activity of inter-cultural philosophy, we can claim that instead of being "ethnocentric" we should claim to be "ethno-focal," that is,

We have merely highlighted certain elements of our culture and omitted or downplayed others, creating no more than the illusion of an orthodox cultural context from which to launch our thinking.

In focusing on the milieu of Chinese thinking, we should not take the cultural milieu as a "simple given." The radial-centripetal model of Han thinking means that the cultural influences which are on the outskirts (the barbarians) are always "assimilated" to the foci, the sociopolitical center, and all outside influences are absorbed, assimilated, and accommodated so that the Chinese consider themselves "sons of Han." In the same vein, Western "ethnocentrism" would insist upon the Judeo-Christian metaphysics and cosmology as a "universe" created by an Absolute God, which is an impossible construal in Chinese thought.

Ultimately, the worlds depicted in the Chinese lifeworld becomes the foci, or core of horizons, in which all social actions are "grounded" in a "background" of settled, or sedimented convictions. The lifeworld background serves as the "source of situation definitions" and serves as the "store of the interpretive work of preceding generations." Merleau-Ponty calls this storing, "sedimentation": "Truth is another name for sedimentation." The sedimentation of the lifeworld is the sum total of our cultural achievements which we can draw on as pre-interpreted, taken-for-granted heritage.
There is no one singular way of grounding of our "validity claims"; the grounding depends upon the kind of utterances involved: For example, descriptive utterances are grounded in states of affairs, normative statements by establishing the "acceptability" of the standards, and evaluative statements by the "preferability of values." In general, these are different claims for truth, rightness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or alternatively Whitehead's emphasis not on the truth of a proposition, but on importance, or interestedness). Most of the Western validity claims depend upon dichotomies of belief/desire psychology, mind/body dualism, subject/object, individual/public, or strict definition of logical consistency or validity. Even Habermas's emphasis of "inter-subjectivity" would be suspect if it is based upon "universalistic" Kantian assumptions. To obviate the Kantian universalism, Habermas would rather advocate that universality is better considered as the "generalizability of interests" (the emancipatory), which contribute to freeing up the conditions for validating claims by means of the better argument. Chad Hansen asks more general questions about Chinese philosophy in regard to rationality/irrationality: "Does Chinese philosophy have a concept of reason?" and "Do Chinese philosophers give reasons for their views?" The latter bears on Habermas's justification for "validity claims," which we need to define more broadly in the Chinese context of "reasonableness."

Finally, in a "critique of ideology," Habermas says that there are "systematic distortions of communication" which can be illustrated by such phenomena as: "loss of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, confusion of orientations, enomie, destabilization of collective identities, alienation, psychopathologies, breakdown in tradition, withdrawal of motivation, etc." The "deformations of praxis" sets the stage for a reconstruction effort within a "critique of ideology." On the other hand, other pathological communication are found in psychoanalytic deviant acts of neurosis, speech pathology, deformed language games, and compulsive behaviors. These are forms of pseudo-communication in which there is a breakdown of "symbolization," which is called "de-symbolization." Confucianism must also be seen from the perspective of its selection from the Six Classics in which it will perform a "critique" of Hsia, Yin, and Chou
dynastic ritual and thought in evaluating and preserving what is good and discarding what is bad in order to further the transmission of the best heritage.

Habermas also proposes that there are "non-linguistic symbol systems," such as "gestures," "ritual" acts, institutional artifacts, etc., which are, in principle, expressible in words. There are continuities between these pre-linguistic symbols and the "verbalized" symbols. Merleau-Ponty is interested in the beginnings for "incipient meanings" in the processes of the "lived body" as a synergistic system, a synaesthetic synchronization of sound and vision,

There is a sense in saying that I see sounds or hear colours so long as sight or hearing is not the mere possession of a quale, but the experience of a modality of existence, the synchronization of my body with it, and the problem of forms of synaesthetic experience begins to look like being solved if the experience of quality is that of a certain mode of movement or a form of conduct.

Another example is in a "dubbed film," for the spectator, the "words take up the gestures and and the gestures the words."

In summary, we have traced the Western hermeneutical tradition in Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and Ricoeur, in so far as they have contributed to the discussion of the hermeneutical circle of tradition-interpreter, "text-interpretation," "speech-action," "meaningful action" (Ricoeur), "communicative action" (Habermas), "the conversation is us" (Gadamer). Ricoeur's theory of action is illustrated as a "text-action," as a "structured work," an ergon (Gadamer), and Ricoeur anchors this interpretation of a "work" in Aristotle's mimesis, the "imitation of action," especially as exemplified in the "emplotment" of a narrative. A narrative forms its own world, as self-reference and non-ostensive reference to the larger, "outside" world. It is like any work of art, which displays a "world of its own" in which it carries out the narrated, mimesis of our "lifeworld."

1.2: RATIONALITY AND SWEET REASONABLENESS.

One of the major aims of Habermas in categorizing and describing different kinds of social actions is to characterize and test a criterion of "rationality" by comparing it to Weber's purposive-teleological action, as well as normatively regulated and dramaturgical actions:
Communicative actions always require an interpretation that is "rational in approach." For this purpose, Habermas makes a general distinction between two kinds of rationality: cognitive-instrumental rationality and communicative rationality.

In regard to Chinese thinking, Antonio Cua draws a contrast between what is "reasonable" as against Western rationality; the latter is based on "logical consistency," and the canons of inductive and deductive methods; whereas reasonableness pays heed to convention, though not uncritically...addresses itself more to the sense of concrete significance of rationality in actual circumstances...and is obviously tradition or culture bound...but is not a matter of arbitrary subjectivity, for it is open to discursive argumentation and justification.

The last mentioned criteria of "discursive argumentation and justification" is close to Habermas's "force of the better argument" and "claims to validity," which help to distinguish between reasonableness and rationality. Reasonableness, for Cua, does make claims toward "objectivity." It is also "conventional," and "rule regulated," but there is still an attempt to be impartial in our exercise of reason, since reasonableness cannot be completely divorced or separated from motivations, passions, and solutions of problematic issues in practical contexts. Reasonableness, as seen by Cua above, is a "concrete rationality" in practice. Also, Cua in his analysis of Hsun-tzu's "concrete rationality" is interested in the role of retrospective history in the reasoning process, because it is this appeal to history which makes the exercise of Confucian rationality both 'concrete' and contingent. 'It is in culture and history that an analogical projection finds its anchorage and not in rules and principles of a priori ratiocination.'

Such analogical projection is "retrospective history," harking back to history and ancient culture, as the basis for "reasonableness." Cua calls this a "backward character of analogical projection" and hence is part of the Confucian tradition of referring back to the sage-kings, or the slogan of "Back to the Ancients."

1.2.1: FROM ANALOGY TO CORRELATIVE THINKING.

Analogical thinking (shu) is what leads to "correlativity." Analogical projection is the...
closest thing to "reasoning" available in the Chinese tradition. The aims of correlative thinking have in common with inferential thinking the Later Mohists's classification (lei) of "kinds" of things based on similarities, using lun (criteria for sorting out, even-ing out), but not on the rationalistic premise of "natural kinds" or "essentialistic or real definitions" based on "essences."

Such 'reasoning' permits non-inferential access to concrete details and nuance. For example, one may appeal to the categories of correlative 'kinds' (lei) to organize and explain items in the world... inclusion or exclusion in any particular 'kind' is a function of perceived analogy and similarity, rather than any essentialistic notion of strict identity.5

But, Hsun-tzu and the Later Mohists are "radical nominalists" and concrete details are more important than conceptual ideas.

A contrast used in the West is to compare the striving for a priori, pure reasoning, and "universality" of Immanuel Kant and compare it with the empiricist tradition of David Hume, who is a sweetly reasonable person while he is de-theologizing, and de-mythifying, the concept of causality and transform it into "connectedness" (metonymic), without the "necessity" Kant attached to causality. Hume emphasizes empirical factors such as "contingency," "contiguity," "propinquity," "vividness," etc.. Michel Foucault notes that Hume and Kant are inverses of each other on the matter of causality; the former made it the "general interrogation of resemblances" (identity and differences) and the latter, by isolating causality (formal category) inverts the problem of establishing the "synthesis of the diverse."6 The Chinese do not ask the Kantian transcendental questions about the "possible conditions" for knowledge or questions about the reality behind the appearances of phenomena. Nor is pre-Han thought embroiled in proto-scientific issues of causality.

Even with Hume, there is a paradoxical divorce between reason and passion, which leads to a dichotomy between theory and practice: for Hume knowledge is mostly theoretical, since he distinguishes between an agent's behavior and an observer giving his account in theoretical terms.7 Most notably, for Hume practical knowledge is explained on "analogy" with the perceptual acquisition of information and hence practical knowledge is identified with particulars, whereas theoretical knowledge is universal, generalized, and cumulative.
We must recall that Western "causal thinking" began in an atmosphere of criticizing "correlative" thinking of the early Milesians, Anaximander, Empedocles, and the Atomists. The correlative tradition lasted up to Galileo's time, from which Kant took as his point of departure the application of a universal *mathesis* (and Leibniz's Universal Character) for the foundation of the new sciences. Foucault would say that at this point Mechanism took over and efficient causes were the ruling causes for the new sciences.

What is ironic is the later development of the "Hegelian dialectics" which seems to combine the trend from Heraclitus process philosophy and mutual reciprocity of opposites with the correlative tradition. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard would try to deconstruct and reconcile Hegelian dialectics and its "teleological" assumptions. Dialectics lead to a "linear and analytic model," and also presumes

a putative whole in accordance with which claims of systematic coherence might be made...while analogical arguments are determined by a primary analogate (i.e. yin/yang) serving as a source of analogical argumentation.

Since China did not have a *logos* background, dialectics did not have deep roots, except in the Sophists, Hui Shih and Kung-sun Lung. In this regard, Chuang-tzu serves the same function as Nietzsche in his critique of dialectics.

In a more contemporary mode, Hall and Ames would side with Heidegger's "reasoning" which emphasizes the "openness" in his sense of thinking. In broad outlines, Heidegger makes a distinction between scientific/technological (technicity), or calculative-instrumental thinking (Chinese *yu-wei* thinking) and "meditative thinking"; the latter is found in the *Gelassenheit* and *On the Way to Language*. Heidegger would qualify *techne*, which has the original sense of "producing," "art," or "handicraft," and gives *techne* an *apophantic* meaning of "letting appear," "revelatory," and "unconcealment" (*aisthesis*). And, meditative thinking has close affinity to the Taoist communicative receptivity and *wu-wei*, *wu-chih*, *wu-yu* kinds of thinking. Richard Rorty discusses the kind of philosophical thinking as "edification," calls John Dewey, Wittgenstein and Heidegger edifying philosophers.
A. C. Graham would support some of what Cua regards as "rational," but he has some real doubts that the kind of logic which was put forward by the Later Mohists is a full-blown logic. Though the Mohists is a first attempt toward a "rationalistic" trend, Chinese thinking is closer to the "analogical" (shu, a likening to something) and "correlative" thinking of the yin-yang, and five "processes" (wu hsing) type. Graham holds that Western thinking on rationality is logocentric and uses logical consistency as a criteria to "test" one's thinking, but this should not replace the task of thinking itself. On the other hand, it is suggested that in "inter"-cultural conversation,

Intercultural communication patterned by productive vagueness is not strictly a rational procedure, but a reasonable one. Such communication is not logical but analogical...to communicate is to articulate differences. Hence, the contrast is between logical: analogical :: rational: reasonable. Graham holds that Western thinking tends to "centre on conflicting opposites (truth/falsehood, good/evil), the Chinese on complementary polarities"; and their conceptual schemes differ, in that the West stress the "truth of contradictory propositions," but the Chinese simply matches the polarity of inclusive pairs of mutually interrelated pairs of terms: i.e., yang-yin, Chuang-tzu's "this-that," etc.

In this same regard, Graham's emphasis on analogical and correlative thinking is what Hall calls "first problematic thinking" as against the "causal" thinking of the West, which he calls "second problematic thinking." Graham draws the contrast between "rationality" (Western logical and causal [analytic] thinking) and "correlativity" (basically Chinese analogical thinking, but Graham prefers to also use other terms such as "pre-logical" and "proto-science" before Galileo).

But the proto-science which prevailed before Galileo was still a pre-logical structuring of a cosmos by (the)correlation of the similar/contrasting and contiguous/remote (Roman Jakobson's terms). Hall and Ames would rather make a contrast of rationality/correlativity taken from the perspective of "aesthetic rationality" rather than from the logical, logocentric kind of rationality.

The 'aesthetic' version of the rational/correlative distinction is grounded
in the sensitivity to and an appreciation of the insistent particularity of their respective cultural sites and epochs.\textsuperscript{15}

An alternative statement of this aesthetic rationality is what Hall calls "first problematic thinking" which is the "absence of the belief in a single-ordered world, and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order."\textsuperscript{16}

It has been pointed out that "means-end" notions are more primitive than "cause and effect," which is a more "theoretical" notion. "Cause and effect is observer's language; means and end is participator's language."\textsuperscript{17} Hence, causality is second problematic thinking, while means-end thinking can rely on communicative action as correlative of "participatory" and intersubjectivity, or agent-centered criteria. In his \textit{Reason and Spontaneity}, Graham contrasts two kinds of language: poetic language of "ends" and a scientific language of "means."

Ends-language (EL) synthesizes in a concrete whole, [Means language (ML) analyzes and abstracts from the whole]; EL particularizes, ML generalizes; EL defines ostensively, ML defines by substitution of symbols; EL responds in awareness of a new particular by 'analogizing,' ML applies laws; EL clarifies the subjective factors, ML the objective; EL systematizes a cosmos by synthesizing the harmonious or conflicting reaction to things in larger and larger wholes, ML by subsuming propositions about things by wider and wider laws.\textsuperscript{18}

This comparison of EL and ML languages parallels Hall and Ames logical and aesthetic kinds of order.

Whereas logical order is disclosed by pattern regularity indifferent to the actual content of the particulars constituting the order, aesthetic order discloses the \textit{ad hoc} unity formed by irreplaceable items (non-substitutable items)...logical order discloses pattern unity; aesthetic order discloses unique particulars.\textsuperscript{19}

Graham's use of poetic language is bent toward the "aesthetic" and "intrinsic ends" in artistic activities, which are "ends" without the sense of purpose, or non-purposive ends; in this sense it is a Taoist \textit{wu-wei} kind of ordering. Also poetic language follows the pattern of Jakobson's paradigm/syntagm, metaphor/metonymy. Means language is that kind of instrumentality/technicities involved in problem solving, scientific investigations, hypothesizing, and confirmation/testing of hypotheses.

Graham suggests some alternative kinds of rationality such as analogical, correlative,
imaginative simulation, and parallelistic thinking; logical consistency is not the criteria as an adjunct test for validity for these kinds of more reasonable thinking processes. For example, parallelistic thinking is not artificial, but builds upon the continual play of "comparisons and contrasts," through "defining key terms" (i.e., yin/yang) and making "finer discriminations" (light/dark, male/female) between things that are possible and capable of being yoked together in a parallel fashion. The combination of comparisons and contrasts, "yoked" together, gives the developing themes a paradoxical flavor connecting a wide range of phenomena: art, medicine and religion. Elsewhere, Graham emphasizes the "weighing" (chuen) of "practical" advantages and disadvantages of Chinese thinking in the way they perceive and utilize analogies, appeal to precedent, concentrate their insights in aphorisms, fascinate themselves with numerical symmetries, and sometimes reason analytically, very much as we do.

Hansen has reviewed the long career of Graham in regard to rationality and such problems as fact/value dichotomy, contrastive anti-rationalism of Chuang-tzu, and nominalism/realism. For Hansen, however, Western rationality depends upon the Euclidean deductive-proof, demonstration system along with a belief-desire psychology. What is of intrinsic interest for us is his conclusion of Graham's investigation as it bears upon "language":

The Chinese viewed language as playing essentially a guiding role, not a descriptive one. (They were interested in ethics, not metaphysics). Their interest in language centered on the word, not the sentence. They based their analysis of disagreement (pian) on how we project distinctions on things, not on our proofs and presuppositions. Thus they had no sentence-based is-ought distinction...The concept of knowledge is closer to skill than to belief.

In summary, the focus on "word" instead of sentence is probably based upon the fact that most people do not believe that Chinese has a "grammatical" structure. The Chinese solves this lack of grammar through language as name/actuality (ming/shih) and its comportment with nominalism. The word is not necessarily the important factor of meaning, since Ricoeur would point out that the unit of meaning involves more than words, sentences, and can involve larger units such as paragraphs, and even whole texts and "works" in general. Any word takes on social-historical fossilizations, and changes yielding cumulative meanings within a larger context.
and depth of cultural understanding through repeated re-contextualizations in our dialogical conversations.

1.2.2: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AS A DIALOGICAL CONVERSATION.

Habermas characterizes Weber's rationalization as a "monological" approach which is concerned with the successful adaptation of an individual organism in its adaptation to its contingent environment, its deliberation of alternative courses of action, and the attempts to control by coercion, or force some of the conditions of the environment, which can lead to a form of "instrumental mastery" of environment. Weber parts company with communicative action, in that the monological approach is not "interpersonal," but focuses only on the "purposive activity of a solitary acting subject." 24

For Habermas, communicative rationality is primarily "dialogical" and is defined in terms of "the unconstrained unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentive speech, to assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld." 25

This statement contains the criteria of how we get any kind of consensus: "the force of the better argument." 26 Dialogical activities display both "communality" and "commonality" found in the processes of reaching understanding amicably. By aiming at consensus, interpersonal relationships between participants presupposes "formal commonalities" that contribute to and are constitutive for the "reaching of any understanding at all," i.e., fore-conceptions, conceptual schema, etc. 27

Habermas uses "rationalization" to mean the increasing of the rationality or reasonableness of social action. In communicative action, as contrasted with purposive-teleological action, rationalization is the "extirping those relations of force" which are set in the very structures of communication, and by attainment of "consensual regulation of conflicts" hence overcoming "systematically distorted" communication. 28 This enterprise of rationalization is Habermas's "critique of ideology." His aim is the reconstructive science which provides methods for the overcoming of "systematically distorted communication" due to "force" (coercion) and aims
toward the ideal of "unrestricted and unconstrained communication," or the assurance of guaranteeing the openness of our horizons of communication.

The key turning point is comparing a strictly logocentric, agonal-dualistic, dichotomizing logic which emphasizes "force" (domination and control) as against a more "sweetly" reasonable way of dialogical and mutual reciprocity (cooperation, negotiation and compromise), which tends to separate East and West. There will be some point of overlapping consensus between communicative action and communicative reception which acts to bring about a fusion of horizons of Habermas's communicative action with the Chinese drive toward sweet reasonableness. Also, Graham points to the kinds of "binary oppositions" used in yin-yang, dark-light, etc. types of correlative thinking. Correlative thinking can be contrasted with the "chain of oppositions" that J. Derrida points to as part of logocentric thought in the West. Furthermore, these chains of oppositions are dualistic: Being/Becoming, Appearance/Reality, Reason/Experience, etc.

Graham has indicated that "arguments" are very rare in Confucius, while Mo-tzu sets out from "empirical facts" to support his arguments. Mo-tzu had a great interest with dialectics and argumentation (pien) and this constitutes the first textual evidence of "rational discourse." But the Later Mohist's form of argumentation (pien) is not the Western form of logic requiring the discipline of "formal procedures," rather it is better called an "art of discourse." Graham also points out that Lao-tzu's use of poetic language is another way of "deconstructing," or undermining conventional oppositions. In the West, it is Kuhn's proposal that there are "paradigm shifts" which account for "correlative switches." Hence, if we consider the "minimal" kind of rationality such as that of Steven Lukes, which depends upon the criteria of the logic of the "law of contradiction" and a minimal theory of coherence, Chinese rationality would not even meet the minimal limin or floor of Western rationality. In Chuang-tzu, the living logic is "this" becomes "that," and vice versa, in a relativity of perspectives.

Graham suggests that there is a parallel between Western Sophist thinking, which is a and Chuang-tzu's answer to Hui Shih, the Sophist and the Later Mohists.
We have a continuing controversy over the place of reason, in which Chuang-tzu answers Hui Shih and is in turn answered by the Mohists.

Hui Shih’s Ten Theses led to paradoxical results. Chuang-tzu dealt with these in order to draw out the undecidability of “this” and “that,” especially in settling an argument by bringing in a third party.

Hall points to some residue of “irrationality” in Western philosophy which has been excavated recently by Heidegger in his questioning of the Seinsfrage and the residue of “mystery” in the ontology of Being. Hall calls this enterprise in the West, “self-referential inconsistency,” which is also identifiable with the mood of “irony,” the inability to explain why things are as they are in this world. It is this irony which produces “paradoxical” gems in Chuang-tzu and Hui Shih. Hall also claims that we must recognize “aesthetic and mystical resources” as elements in reconstructing our philosophies; in both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, the “mystical” borders on the limits of language: “Whereof one cannot speak, be silent.” The appeal to the “aesthetic and mystical resources” gives some Western philosophers a way to make intimate connections with the Chinese worldview. Oriental philosophies are “putatively aesthetic,” while Anglo-European thought is basically “rationalistic” (logos and archai, principled). But neither is able to achieve their announced ideals, East or West. It should be noted that even in Wittgenstein’s language games, there may be “mutually incoherent games” based on different rules which define the “culture”; this “incoherence” give us rules of “alternative discourses” which create “vagueness,” rather than certainty, in communication actions and receptions across certain boundaries.

Similarly, we can see this self-referential inconsistency in Chinese philosophy too. K. M. Wu sees this in his interpretation of Chuang-tzu, especially in the “uselessness can be useful”: i.e., the useless tree, the useless gourd; “great utility is useless.” Wu is also against reading and interpreting Chuang-tzu in literalistic-cognitive terms, as a “problem-solving” approach which is typical of Western philosophy; rather it is Chuang-tzu’s “indirection” through
the use of metaphoric and evocative language that is typical of his "goblet rationality." This is the beginnings of a "sweet reasonableness."

For Hall, another source of irrationality is in our cosmogonic myths: In Plato's *Timaeus* there is an "imposition of order through persuasion" (*peitho*)--i.e., the process of rationalization:

Reason overruled Necessity by persuading her to guide the greatest part of things that becomes towards what is best; in that way and on that principle the universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over Necessity. (*Timaeus*).

Chaos, the primordial beginnings, or origin of things, is already "irrational," from which such terms as "confusion, disorder, and the yawning abyss" are synonyms. Hence, it is this "reasonable persuasion" that sounds "sweetly reasonable," because it involves some "rhetorical" persuasion, in the same way that illocutionary "force" is a gentle way of "persuasion" to have people act in accordance with speech-acts. However, we must remember that Plato said long ago that the *Timaeus* is a "likely story," a myth.

Another fundamental approach is that of "commensurability" which Richard Rorty defines as anything that can be brought under a "set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement (consensus) can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where statements seem to conflict." In this same vein, Richard Bernstein would compare three main features of rational disputes: "incompatibility, incommensurability, and incomparability." Incompatibility is based on logical consistency/coherence criteria, which means that Chinese logic may not qualify in this regard. Whereas the "incommensurable" movement would involve Thomas Kuhn and his paradigm shift and Paul Feyerabend's *Against Method*, where he attempts to be more "reasonable" than "rational." I reserve "incomparability" for Chinese counterparts, particularly for the two major Taoists, Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. They stress *tzu-ian* to be the "uniqueness of phenomena," hence it is an "incomparable" viewpoint. East-West philosophy is "incomparable," rather than incompatible or incommensurable.

For Habermas, what is most important is the control of the "irrational" factors of "systematically distorted communication," which is usually associated with "action" as
domination, or the use of force. Cognitive-instrumental rationality is considered by Habermas to be a derivative form of communicative rationality, but there are features of the former which gives clues to problem-solving actions as reactions to "stimulated responses." Graham calls this in Chinese *ken-yiing*. These outer stimuli Habermas calls "quasi-actions," which give us indicate a subject's capacity for action. Habermas would accord these quasi-action only a "figurative" sense of rationality.

Habermas criticizes Arthur Danto's "basic actions" as identified only with "bodily movements." Habermas believes that Wittgenstein's "rule-governed behavior" and Danto's "basic action" are both misleading: "A bodily movement is an element of an action but not an action." In this regard, Habermas makes a distinction based on "causal" and "semantic" relevance, where the latter "embodies a meaning." I would like to reserve this distinction to connect actions which are "bodily" (†) and yet continuous with the "gestural" forms of "symbolic interaction," which are also considered an advent toward communicative action. Merleau-Ponty says that human gestures "signify" and "inaugurate a meaning" and form its own syntax for signifying.

According to Michael Polanyi there are three types of semantic meanings: (1) indication (designation, deictic function), (2) symbolization, and (3) metaphorical meanings. He gives a supporting analysis by the use of his subsidiary-focal structure of language, and through the emphasis of selective "intrinsic interest" he places on one or another of the triadic aspects of the subsidiary-focal-ourselves structure as a means of distinguishing these various kinds of semantic meanings. He points to the "indwelling" within the "tacit" dimensions of our subsidiary clues in our background (proximal) awareness of field-focus "personal" involvements or interactions. This indwelling is an "extension of our body" into things like probes, instruments, or intellectual tools and dwelling in them in order to gain more knowledge. It is Cook Ting's knife, the extension and indwelling of his spirit.

Mead gives the paradigm case of gesture-mediated interaction of two dogs approaching
each other, circling, and presenting gestures and "adaptive responses" to the other dog, which is the beginning of signal-languages. Mead calls this dog paradigm the "conversation of gestures." It is the "adjustments" which are made by the dogs to each other (stimulus-response) which then makes it a "significant gesture." Mead defines gesture as "the beginnings of social acts which are stimuli for the response of other forms" and the criteria is whether a gesture has an "idea," or "intention." Behind intention is a "significant symbol"; when it calls out the "meaning" in the other it reaches the status of "language."

Mead's theory of action, the conversation of gestures, is hailed by Habermas as the "paradigm shift" from purposive rationality to communicative action. Since Mead is also part of the pragmatist tradition, his paradigm shift is a critique of the Pragmatist's "instrumentalist" means-ends reflective method which is still purposive-teleological to a more "communicative" theory of action, where "the theme of intersubjectivity and self-preservation" again comes into the foreground. The concept of the "taking of the attitude of the generalized other" is part of this participatory communicative action. Habermas is also quite appreciative of Mead's "discourse ethics" which recognizes the "emancipatory" conditions from all blockages to communication. Mead also recognized the use of language as a "medium for reaching understanding" and language as a medium for "coordinating action and socializing individuals."

Mead viewed the transition from gesture-mediated to symbolically mediated interaction exclusively under the aspect of communication; he shows how symbols arise from gestures and how symbolic--intersubjectively valid--meaning conventions arise from natural meanings.

Mead still seems to be tied to "intentional semantics." Though Mead would define "meaning" in terms of gestures, Merleau-Ponty takes gestures as the matrix of "incipient" meanings: There is a threefold relationship of a gesture to first, second organisms, and to "subsequent phases" of social acts and this threefold relationship constitute the "matrix" within which meaning arises. These relationships follows Mead's perspective on "the gesture in general, and the vocal gesture in particular, which indicates some object of common interest." Communicants can "call out" meanings in the other as a "significant gesture," or "symbol."
Mead stresses the "internalization" (or embodiment) of the "external conversations of gestures" as the essence of thinking and intelligence in social actions, sharing the "same meanings" for all members of a language community. Most of all, this internalization is based on the mechanism of a "generalized other," or "taking the attitude of the other," or putting your ego into the shoes of the "alter." Polanyi does point out that "indwelling" can be illustrated when we find acceptance to moral teaching through "interiorization":

To interiorize is to identify ourselves with the teachings in question, by making them function as the proximal term of a tacit moral knowledge, as applied in practice. This establishes the tacit framework for our moral acts and judgments.

The tacit dimension involves a penumbra, or fringe, of vagueness which we cannot articulate very well even when we do something skillfully. Indwelling amounts to tacit knowledge which is "personal," rather than impartial or non-committal observers.

Habermas points out that Mead's paradigm "explains the evolutionary transition from subhuman interaction mediated by gestures to symbolically mediated interaction." Mead's communicative theory lacks several things, which can be remedied by Wittgenstein's "rule-governed behavior," and by an emphasis on communicative action by restricting it more toward "reaching understanding." But most of all, Mead lacked a phylogenetic perspective, though he emphasized the ontogenetic development along evolutionary lines only. This lack has to be supplemented by Durkheim's origins of religion and his view that ritual is the "preserved fund of social solidarity" stemming from the sacred foundation of primitive society and the subsequent "linguistification" based on a "rationalized lifeworld with differentiated symbolic structures."

Habermas concedes that there are several kinds of validating claims: i.e., truth-claims concerning states of affairs, normative claims involving standards of judgment, and claims concerning the "appropriateness" in regard to shared values. Whitehead also says that the four criteria for testing of philosophical propositions are "validity, truth, interest and importance." Validity and formal truth are normally judged in terms of logical consistency, while interest and importance are matters of "feelings" and their expression. In summary, dialogical conversation
can be validated through various approaches to gain consensus. In the next section I shall deal with the active-passive aspects of communicative action and receptivity.

1.2.3: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND RECEPTIVITY.

In order to tie in with the formal-pragmatics of active-passive aspects of communication, Hall sets forth Arthur Deikman's distinction between the "action" mode and the "receptive" mode:

The action mode of organization functions to provide the primary means for the manipulation of the environment. 'The action mode is a state of striving, oriented toward achieving personal goals that range from nutrition to defense, to obtaining social rewards.'...The receptive mode concerns the intake of the environment rather than its manipulation. Its attributes...are 'diffuse attending, paralogical thought processes, decreased boundary perception, and the dominance of the sensory over the formal.'

Communicative receptivity is tied in very intimately with the need to consider the incipient meanings which can be generated from quasi-actions and "bodily movements and operations" in order to inaugurate and embody meanings in his actions or receptivities. Hall ties the active mode to "causal efficacy," whereas the receptive mode is exemplified in the meditational, Tantric mystical tradition, as well as to the "holistic," "a-causal orderedness" (Jung's synchronicity). These latter receptivity traditions are all "indifferent" to causal explanation.

We can illustrate this by taking a lesson from the I Ching; communicative "receptivity" is the yin side of the polarity of "passive-active" (the latter is the yang side). For the Chinese, according to Graham, "correlative thinking" using "binary oppositions" (i.e., yin/yang) are complementary of each other. The practice of the West excludes one side of an opposition and emphasizes the priority of the other: "The West strives to abolish B and preserve only A." Appropriate both sides of an opposition ought to be preserved in order to achieve mutual validity and consensus of viewpoints. In this regard, it is not just the limitations in the exercise of the dominance of power, coercion, or restrictions of horizons. Hall wants to maintain a "balancing of the active and receptive modes," the yang/yin forms of experiencing. Hall further sees the Buddhist view of causation as "the cause-situation as a 'network' of interde-
pendent, co-existent and freely cooperating forces." Analogously, K. M. Wu refers to Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" as a "network of relations," when he is talking about human "piping" and its "resonance" with heavenly piping.

In order to determine a criteria of rationality for Chinese sweet reasonableness, I shall use Hali's main thesis that Western Reason is based upon a logocentric (archai, or principles), vis-a-vis the Taoist Chaos, or an-archai: to "carve" the Uncarved Block leads to determining and differentiation of a "privileged" order from among the "sum of all orders," forming a corpus of "discursive knowledge," while the grasping of lao, the Uncarved Block is a matter of intuition, and not of reasoning. In Whitehead's terms, there is enough "chaos" and "vagueness" to display some aesthetic "patterning" (order) as well as portraying the "novelty," or spontaneity of creativity.

Another form of Chinese reasonableness is based on "centrality" and "constancy" (chung, yung) which involve "compromise" and "negotiation." Also, the Taoist emphasis on pliancy, fluency, and suppleness (new-born babe) can be contrasted with the Western "violence," "coerciveness," and "irruption," which Heidegger illustrates the enterprise to "wrest Being from Becoming." Most of all, Mencius would point to the "heart-mind" (hsin), as a "sense of the heart," rather than that of the head.

K. M. Wu would liken Chinese reasonableness with Chuang-tzu's "goblet rationality," which is a "logic of life" and not a coldly calculating machine mind. Goblet rationality is attuned to the resonance of what things are in themselves, subject to the evocative, suggestiveness of receptivity to metaphor, image, parable, narrative, and poetic uses of language. Goblet words are the "metaphors" and "images" (meaning complexes, hsiang), which fill with fresh flow of meanings which have not yet attained that clear-cut discrimination (pien) which make the evocatives literal "things." There always remains a residue and an aura of "non-discursiveness" in the creation of metaphors, images, etc.

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The tacit, forgetful use of instruments (signs, tallies, words, fish-traps, goblets) obtains in the atmosphere of self-forgetfulness... Heaven and earth fill those imperfect vessels (goblets, tallies, etc.) with their perfections which shines through their very imperfections. Their imperfections are a metaphor for perfection. Imperfection represent the peculiarities of individuals, to be creatively used as metaphor and goblet for perfection.¹⁰

He further adds that

Such fluid goblet rationality is typical of Chuang Tzu. And that for good reason, he would add, for it is a fitting way to reflect (on) the flow of reasonableness in actuality.¹¹

The essence of goblet rationality is based on the fact that the writer can disown what he "intends" or "means," and the reader is forced to provide his own interpretive meaning when he reads and understands the matter of the text, not literally, but with a "metaphorical," poetic attitude.²² The writer tips the goblet toward the reader, full of polyvalent meanings, which the reader may receive, accept or reject, and he in turn will fill the tipped goblet with his responsive (kan-ying) meanings, and vice versa. The goblet may be half empty, rather than half full. Goblet rationality is closer to correlative thinking and has the features of "ambiguity, vagueness, and incoherence," which are associated with metaphorical use of language, rather than the sense of "univocity" associated with rational thinking: "Metaphorical and imagistic language is grounded in correlativity."²³

This goblet rationality is also analogous to Rorty's distinction between systematic philosophy and edifying philosophers. Rorty characterizes "edification" as "incommensurable" ways of talking with an incommensurable vocabulary. Edification also consists in the "poetic" activity of thinking up "new aims, new words, or new disciplines." It is, thus, an "abnormal" kind of discourse:

For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings.²⁴

I suggest that this "evocative" mode of goblet rationality complements the alternative view of "rationality" as "sweet reasonableness," which is centered in "communicative receptivity," a sensitivity to passive-responsiveness, and social cooperativeness i.e., Cook Ting and his "skill" (knack) in concentration, or focus upon being responsive to the "insistent
particularities" of the joints, divisions, and tendons (articulations) practices his butcher art, and yet sees the whole body (τοῦ) of the ox.

1.3: COMMUNICATIVE "CONSENSUS" AND AESTHETIC RATIONALITY

Hall raises some questions in regard to "consensus" and "consensual understanding" which border on problems and issues of the relation of the theorial/theory/praxis. First, consensual understanding is dependent on the consideration of praxis as "action," which is suspect in its association that "action expresses 'true' principles (archai vs. chaos)." Actions in the Greek political tradition aim at "greatness," "glory," which are deemed important "agonal" values in a culture. Hence, Hall concludes that consensus is at bottom "valuational" (political, ideological), and not just "rational" in import. Second, in the public arena, the dialogue for consensual understanding depends on "ideologically manipulated issues."  

Most of all, any appeal to tradition as the authority for consensus, according to Hall, is an appeal to "narrow provincialism." Other narrow appeals to "sacred pasts," or to "history," are equally suspect. The Chinese may be too tradition-bound as contrasted with historical peoples, placing more reliance on tradition as their mode of gaining consensus. Clifford Geertz has made a crucial distinction between anthropological/cultural reasons for local/provincial cultural experience-near and global/ experience-distant viewpoints. In this regard, Habermas would say that we share a common heritage, which is our "lifeworld" from out of our past, but there is no guarantee that we all see these past events in the same perspective.

Previously in this paper, it has been noted that the lifeworld is a taken-for-granted, pre-decided bunch of premises which one share as "communal," and holds in "commonality" for consensual understandings. However, there is always the confrontation of tradition with criticisms and novelties of the present situation and hence the possibility for the dissolution of consensus of lifeworld premises. If one add to that the suspicions of "rationalizations" or valuational ideologies, it is difficult to decide what is of intrinsic value and what contributes to the achievement of a rationalized order. A good example of an unreliable interpretation of
"shared" historical reasoning is pointed out by Phillip Huang. In 1543, parts of the Book of History was found to be a forgery. This and the fact that the Duke of Chou declared in 1122 B.C. that the Shang dynasty was conquered by the Chou because the last king of Shang could not "continue to enjoy the mandate of heaven" now makes it much more difficult to re-interpret the lessons from the past.

Hall has distinguished three kinds of praxis: praxis as production (Marxist), praxis as communication (Peirce), and praxis as "action." Habermas combines the latter two into "communicative action." Hence, there will be some unwanted associations with "action" which may need to be discarded, or qualified, in favor of less "aggressiveness" and "self-assertiveness." One distinguishing feature of communicative action is that it is not oriented toward "success" as is evidenced by purposive-instrumental actions, but aims at reaching understanding. One can extend this so that it will accord with the Taoist criteria of being "non-contentious," or non-contending.

For Hall, it is "tradition" which is the source of a self-conscious sense of consensus; the sharing ("we") of a consensual understanding in the lifeworld of a tradition, however, may involve some "alternative" cultural sensitivities and viewpoints which in turn may dissolve consensual understanding. This is the same point that Ch'ien Mu makes in regard to tradition as a matter of "similarity" and "convergence," in order to achieve consensus within a tradition (a philosophic school (chia), a discipleship). And Mencius considers these deviations as "heterodoxy." There have been many controversial debates on what is "orthodox" and what is heterodox; Mencius in a long section in 3B/9, attacks Yang and Mo as "heterodoxy." Ch'ien Mu, also, takes Chu Hsi to task in his supplementary commentary of Ke-wu, in the Great Learning, in using his own ideas to fill the gap that existed in the interpretation of this Classic, Chu Hsi has obviously violated the dictum of 'transmitting but not innovating.'

Hall characterizes Western "cosmology" as a view of a "consensual world" which is something in which we are comfortable, something intelligible and therefore contains a ratio for
measuring, or gives us a rational explanation of our lifeworld. One may start off with a comfortable *mythos* of a world, but gradually shift over to a secularized *logos*, a bid for the "rationality" (*ratio*-commensurability, measurability) or "intelligibility" of an "ordered cosmos," hence a "logical explanation" for the metaphysical existence or "reality" of a universe.

In the West, the "tradition" seems to be a technological understanding and trust in the theoretic grounding of scientific method as the main means for "imposition" of consensus, an announced kind of "scientism." Technology, not science, the *logos* of *techne*, is now accepted as the common schema within which there might be realized some degree of unity and coherence at the level of social practice. As a consequence of this development, technological visions are being forced to accomodate to the technological imperative. This "scientism," or the "machine, calculating-mind," is in stark contrast with the more "humanistic" tradition in China. This "humanistic tradition" is the matrix of consensus for the continuity of the values of "ritual, habit and individually supported institutions," from which they will select the best for transmission of their cultural values. The Chinese do not have a scientific-technological tradition, sufficient to accomodate a scientific "consensus."

**1.3.1: AESTHETIC "CONSENSUS".**

It is even more difficult to arrive at an "aesthetic" consensus. The artistic tradition emphasizes uniqueness, novelty, creativity, and makes it difficult to get an aesthetic consensus, because of the categories of the individuality of tastes, stylistics, genre, literary dictum, standards of *wen* (elegance, flowering of ornamentation), and interpretive procedures for applying a living prosody, etc. Aesthetic "tastes" are something which one does not dispute, though there may be consensual agreement in valuing or interpreting a work of art. K. M. Wu suggests a paradigm for aesthetics is like the "culinary art." The art of life (and politics) is like "boiling a small fish" and "eating it." He also suggests a "musical hermeneutics," which brings about harmonizing effects in our culture. Wu holds that aesthetics must be thought of as a "cosmic attitude."
Hall's questioning of a "converging" consensus is seen in the Habermas's-Gadamer's debate on the latter's presupposition: that "hermeneutical clarification" leads back to consensus which has been "reliably established through converging tradition." Habermas claims that, in principle, any consensus is "suspect" of being enforced by a "pseudo-communication," especially in regard to the "prejudgmental structure" of the understanding of meaning. Here one cannot tell whether an achieved consensus is a "true" one. Hence, we need a critical understanding to distinguish between the true and delusionary (systematically distorted communication). This "critical" understanding of meaning was pronounced by Mead in his universal discourse to be the "formal ideal of communication." According to Mead, a kind of "democracy" would exist in an ideal case wherein "each individual would carry just the response in himself that he knows he calls out in the community." Even in Mead, the emphasis on "universality" or "democracy" is a Western preoccupation, for which the Chinese have no counterpart tradition.

This kind of consensus that Mead considers as "calling" out in the other the same attitudes toward our symbolic interactions with one another, is in accordance with a sort of "discourse ethics," or discourse manners. Hence, the basis for consensus is possible in the way a society uses its language in its practice of the illocutionary force of its various "performative verbs," i.e., is how words are used to perform acts of assertions, give directions, commit oneself to a position, express our feelings, and make declarations. I shall show later that for the Chinese, most of the graphs that have yen (speech) as a component part are locutionary and illocutionary in semantic potential and significance.

Ricoeur, contrasting the "hermeneutics of tradition" and the "critique of ideology," considers that "consensus" must be something that is entertained as a "regulative idea," especially in regard to projecting of communicative goals to "anticipate an unlimited and unconstrained communication." Hence, any "distortions" must be based upon a "regulative idea" such as "the overcoming of cultural distance" when the transmitted works of the past are interpreted. A critique of Ideology, involves a critical "re-construction" of heritage.

Ricoeur evaluates Habermas's basic "interests," within the context of the critique of ideology.
Hall identifies Western "creativity" with the agents exercise of agonal "power," the domination or coercion upon others; whereas the possibility of "ek-stasis" (with its complement of "enstasis") will give us the experience from within, rather than external power being exercised on us and dominating and controlling us. This self-creative process must be "grounded in the dynamics of aisthesis." Aisthesis is a function of "enstasis, ek-stasis, and constasis." Gaining consensus, then, is a selective, creative form of life. And aisthesis is a holistic response to our perceptual and lifeworld; Merleau-Ponty would agree that the "lived body" is not simply a physical object, but should be better compared to a "work of art" and it is best thought of as a "nexus of living meaning"; Following Herder, the "lived body" is a sensorium commune, Kant's sensory manifold, an aisthesis.Aisthesis is not an "instant" response, but rather repetitions of whole-part stimulations and sensitivities of response. It is a re-visiting of the same experience in enhanced ways. Whitehead calls it "vivid immediacy" re-visited. Since Hall believes that "consensus" is primarily "valuational," it is not the propositional forms which are deemed as "interesting" or "important." Aesthetic order "transcends language," while at the same time, an aesthetic critique does not "dismiss rational or logical systems," but incorporates and harmonizes them with the aesthetic criteria of "intensity" and "contrast," which are the main criteria of Whitehead's aesthetic order. It is also pointed out by Hall and Ames that aisthesis deals with perceptions and phases of experience which are "more primordial or primitive than consciousness," i.e., Whitehead's mode of causal efficacy is not the normal form of causality, but an incipient type of meaningful acts and emphasis on "feelings." Whitehead's "symbolic reference" involves both "causal efficacy," on the one hand, and "presentational immediacy," on the other hand. Causal efficacy is fairly "un-conscious," almost reflex movements like a jelly-fish advancing toward its prey.

Merleau-Ponty compares the "lived body" to a work of art, instead of emphasizing the body as a physical object. He also analogizes this identification with the spoken word as not
only significant through the medium of individual words, but also through prosody items: intonation, gesture, and facial expressions as incipient meanings about to be inaugurated. Our lived-body is comparable to a work of art in that it is a "nexus of living meanings."21 The lived-body brings aesthetic expression into being or makes it effective, and does not merely translate it. Our motor habits and intentionalities find their expression in works of art, such as poetry. Poetry may be narrative in form, informative and inaugurating incipient meanings in novel use of words, in the same way a painting suggests or evokes mood, variety, and novel perspectives. Merleau-Ponty takes painting as the archetype of the lived body tending toward a work of art. This view parallels the aim of aesthetic harmony, on the "theorlal" level, based on the "articulation of differences" and the correlation of these differences in "polar relationships" which brings about a "balance of opposites."22 Most of all, the kind of unity aimed for in aisthesis is never "finally completable" (ironic), just as in hermeneutics there is no "finality" to richness of interpretations. The particularities defining the (aesthetic) order are unique and irreplaceable items whose nonsubstitutability is essential to the order. No final unity is possible on this view alone, were this so, the order of the whole would dominate the order of the parts, cancelling the uniqueness of its constituent particulars.23 The unity arrived at by holographic details is only an ad hoc unity of irreplaceable items; take away any one item in an organic work of art and the piece falls apart.

1.3.2: LANDSCAPES AND POETRY; RITUALS AND MUSIC.

A basic aesthetic question which is frequently raised in Chinese aesthetics is how to relate calligraphy, landscape painting, poetry (odes), music-ritual (Confucian li-yueh), dance of Cook Ting, and literature in a meaningful way. For example, K. M. Wu describes the practiced hand and brush in calligraphy as the "simple naturalness of the painter painting the world"; it is the lived body of the painter who "walks into his own painting--singing the world as he lives at home (indwelling) in it." It is his world of his own making (tsao hua), hence he is at home in it. It is his cosmic attitude, his completeness of his sociality with his inner and the outer (nei-wei) worlds. It is also the hand, the motor intentionality, which encapsulates calligraphy as a consummate poetic (poiesis-technē) art:
The brush just moves as it 'paints' the flow of things with the calligrapher's hand, the hand in the world introducing itself into the world, and the world going into the mind-heart moving as the hands moves—in simple naturalness, yet according to the social conventions governing the calligraphic condensation of images, ideas and imaginations in specified patterns.24

From the practice of calligraphy (poetry), it is but a short distance to landscape painting, a cosmic attitude. A brief poem is frequently inscribed in the fringes of Chinese landscape painting. This is a good attempt of the meeting of poetry, calligraphy, and painting.

This polar type of correlating differences is typical also of art as Whitehead sees it. He calls it the "vivid intensity of polar contrasts." These differences in Whitehead's terminology are functions of "insistent particularities." The details of a work of art adumbrates the whole (holistic intuition).

Confucian thinking presupposes a preference for 'aesthetic order' involving the emergence of a complex whole by virtue of the insistent particularities of constituent details...to the extent that the various orders which characterize our modes of togetherness are functions of the insistent particularities whose uniqueness comprise the orders, we are authors of an 'aesthetic' composition.25

One should not forget that uniqueness is a major characteristic of any work of original art. The Confucian measure for aesthetic harmony is based on yi defined as "aesthetic rightness":

Rightness as aesthetic harmony is a function of concrete, immediate precognitive choices made by the creator or appreciator of a given harmony...That the alternatives as such are not consciously entertained indicates only that these are not candidates for reflective deliberation... agony is involving clearly discriminated aesthetic choices aimed at the realization of the most intense form of harmony.26

Whitehead would call this agony the "feelings of contrast," the felt many as one, a "synthesis of entities into oneprehension."27 Hence, aesthetic rightness, yi, is the harmonizing of disparate elements within an intuitive, holistic context, without the use of yu-wei, analytic deliberative-purposive thinking. Also, aesthetic rationality is justifiably judged by the criteria of "incomparability," since the synthesis of every aesthetic event is a unique, novel, spontaneous work of art. Most of all there is always a penumbra of "vagueness" when we focus on the horizontal field, aspects which are still "chaotic," fuzzy, and a "blooming buzzing confusion." Whitehead always wants us to recognize the proper amount of vagueness along with width and
richness of aesthetic events. There is a sense of rhythm of the yin-yang forces, each complementing each other, to the extent we see the rhythm of broad nature, the constancy (chang), regularity and continuity of man's dispositions, and the coincidences (Jung's "synchronicities") of rhythmic interactions, which forms the poetic cycles of man's expressiveness in the creative arts of mankind.

Hall inclines to an "aesthetic rationality" when he interprets Whitehead's creativity:

Whitehead claims that the function of Reason is to promote the art of life... Reason promotes the art of life by promoting the self-discipline of vivid immediacy. Here we find the basis for uniting the aims of theoretical and practical reason in an aesthetic methodology. Theoria and praxis are united by aisthesis. The conclusion that "theoria and praxis are united by aisthesis" is repeated by Hall in his discussion of Dewey's "aesthetic quality" of the "consummatory phase of experience":

For Dewey, both intellectual enquiry and moral action require the aesthetic quality if they are to be integral modes of experiencing. The consummation of an act of experiencing necessarily involves the aesthetic quality. This is the ground of Dewey's resolution of the dichotomy of theory and practice. Theoria and praxis are are conjoined by aisthesis.

In either Dewey's or Whitehead's version of aisthesis, one notes that the trichotomy of theoria/theory/praxis means that the dichotomy of "theory and practice" is shifted to that of "theoria-praxis," which can be translated as "contemplative, holistic intuition" and the practice of "constasy" to produce aesthetic "harmony." Theory, for the Chinese, can be lun, (as in Chuang-tzu's Chi Wu Lun), which was translated by Graham as a criteria for "sorting out," or "The Sorting Which Evens Things Out."

The Chinese do not have a tradition of dichotomizing theory-practice, knowledge-action, and words-deeds. These would be the parallels of Hall's theorial/theory/praxis trichotomy and dichotomies therefrom. If there is "mutual reciprocity" (complementary oppositions) of oppositions, then these dichotomizing moves of the West would be modified and become "sweetly reasonable" opposites which are Interpenetrating, and Interactive "hinges" which swings In and out, across and then disappears into the "Other."

There is no separated "altereity" but a
"belonging together" of opposites (Dasein being-with-others-in-the-world), in a somewhat "centering" and centripetal mode. Harmony, or harmonization, is an aesthetic criteria similar to the integration involved in organic "wholes," or alternatively, holistic intuitions of concrete "insistent particularities" integrated into aesthetic wholes, or works of art. The world is not a machine, but a "work of art."

Harmony is to be contrasted with logocentric criteria of consistency, coherence, simplicity and elegance. The latter two criteria tend also to be aesthetic in character. In his phenomenology, Peirce held that aesthetics is the science of ideals, ethics is based on aesthetics, and logic is based on ethics. Whitehead uses "harmony" as an aesthetic measure of "the combination of width and narrowness" of feelings, and the tensions of contrasts:

Triviality is due to the wrong sort of width;...it is due to width without any reinforced narrowness in its higher categories...Some narrow concentration on a limited set of effects is essential for depth; but the difference arises in the levels of the categories of contrast involved.

For Whitehead, the cosmological doctrines of "immanence of law" and "cosmic epoch" promotes the notion of a "plurality of world-orders": In aesthetic terms, there is no single world-order which works of art must display. Alternative world-views (cosmic epoch) enriches the right sort of width, depth, and enhancement of vivid immediacy.

Hall would say that "holistic" intuition is to be taken in the sense of "constasy," which is an integrating form of understanding, in contrast to "ecstasy," which is to stand apart from "enstasy," which looks inward. Hall associates the constatic mode with F. S. C. Northrop's "the Undifferentiated Aesthetic Continuum." Constasy is connected with the "receptive mode of consciousness."

What if we were to ask after the nature of things as construed from the receptive mode of consciousness? Would we not be required to envision the world in terms of non-assertiveness in thought, action and feeling? And would not this lead us to picture the world as patterned by relations among events indifferent to causal explanation...The understanding of such a world is possible because of the sense of constasy, which allows us to experience the Totality as the sum of all termini of acts of intuition.

The pattern of the world which is "indifferent" to causal explanation is the key of pointing
toward "order within Chaos," or "disorder." And our holistic intuition of constasy is the integral
"wholeness" which may be a novel kind of "harmonious" integration of the tension of contrasting
elements in the "clutch of vivid immediacy," Whitehead's way to describe "aesthetic rationality."
In Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead speaks about "tragic beauty" as the kind of beauty that
displays "irreducible contrasts." At the same time, this is part of his thesis that beauty is wider
than truth, and from this "truthful beauty."38

An aesthetic "harmony," then, is a "holistic understanding." Too often the term "intuition"
connotes only an "immediate grasp," a synoptic comprehension, or something which involves a
"faculty" of intuition as compared with deliberative understanding. Instead one may focus on
the whole "lived body," such as the "heart-mind" (hsin) and sensations-perceptions (aisthesis)
which form the incipient beginnings of our perceptual interaction with the world and receptive
intake and manipulation of our environment. Hall gives a practical example of T'ai Chi Ch'uan,
which involves the harmony of ecstatic and enstatic "balance" and "centering."39 which
constitutes the two fundamental criteria of T'ai Chi Ch'uan contributing to the "constatic" unity of
the holistic understanding:

The senses of 'where one is' and 'where the other is coming from' allow
instances of knowing, doing and feeling to be creative processes that promote
constatic unity.40

The Eastern counterpart of Eros is the mystic's claim that he cannot express what he has
experienced, that tao is "ineffable," beyond words, but one can still try to "allude" to it, in the
same way that poets have been able to "evoke" a feeling, attitude, or aura about tao.

For Taoists this aesthetic form of communication is dependent on the "loss of self" in
favor of the "emptiness" of the Other, the loss of its "own-being" (Buddhist an-atman, no-self ).

Communication of the profoundest sort ultimately involves the dissolution of
selfhood...The ground of all communication is a sense of otherness...insofar as
one can appreciate the intrinsic excellence of each insistently particular item in
the Totality. Such appreciation involves insight into the absolute uniqueness of
each item...its just-so-ness (tzu-ji). Then it is truly other.41

In summary, communicative activities and receptivities can be judged on aesthetic rational
grounds, rather than logocentric ones. We shall now shift to an examination of the "performative" (techne-making) aspects of our use of language to further communicative participation.

1.4: PERFORMATIVES IN SPEECH ACTS AND EMBODIMENT OF MEANING IN CULTURAL OBJECTS AND CUSTOMS.

"Performative" speech acts are not evaluated simply in terms of two usual kinds of "semantics." Habermas refers back to Carnap's analysis of "reference" semantics and Frege on "truth" semantics. However the advent of a theory of speech-acts represents the "first step toward a formal type of pragmatics which extends to noncognitive modes of employment," i.e., the "performative" active aspects of the use of language. The third person is not a participant in the communicative process. In order to have communicative experience we must adopt a performative attitude and participate, be it only virtually, in the original process of reaching understanding...he can understand the meaning of communicative acts only because they are embedded in contexts of action.

Reaching an understanding is not a matter of semantics, or semiotics, but of the pragmatics of action, of praxis, in a performative dimension. This pragmatic competence is also found in Wittgenstein's "use" theory of meaning, which designates how to act in a context of usages of language.

Habermas speaks of the need to move beyond semantics to pragmatics. "What comprises the main features of a 'formal-pragmatic'?" It is formal because it states the conditions which are to be fulfilled, or satisfied, when we (speakers, hearers) understand a speech-act, illocutionarily. We are not interested in locutionary acts, since locutions have a propositional content which refers to the truth and falsity of the utterance. Illocutionary acts, on the other hand, is based upon the rhetorical "force," or mood, with which the propositional content is uttered. Pragmatics is not simply a supplement to semantics, as meanings, intentions, conventions, etc. It is an analysis of the formal conditions under which speakers can make and understand meaningful utterances.

Among these formal conditions are such things as the institutionally bound (convention), the
"engagement," "commitment," or "performative attitudes" one exhibits toward illocutionary speech-acts (performative acts), the ways communicative actors seek agreement with one another about the three worlds (objective-social-subjective), and how these can be displayed in constatives, regulatives, and expressives.

Habermas pointed out that Austin's characterization of the "performative" (vs. constative) aspect of linguistic utterances is tied intimately with "institutionally bound" speech-acts such as baptising, appointing, announcing, etc., which are normatively regulated speech acts. Thereby, Habermas would call these "regulatives," which means that they occur within the world-context of the social. Here it is well to re-emphasize the complementary receptive/passive side of speech-acts, since the performative aspect also contains an integral aspect of receiving the illocutionary/rhetorical force. Communication is interactively an active-passive affair.

Hall and Ames utilize Derrida's neologism differ-ence in making their distinction about language of presence, absence, and "deference":

Meaning is always deferred. It cannot be present in language as structure ... but focusing upon language as event, language as constituted by speech acts does not solve the problem either, because once more, the supplemental character of language--this time its structure--has been shifted to an inaccessible background.

The theory of speech-acts must be modified to allow for receptive/passive, recessive/hidden/mysterious aspects of communicative acts. As a matter of interest, Strawson criticizes Grice's criteria of intentionality by citing the fact that sometimes there are "sneaky" or hidden intentions which are not "wholly overt," yet one can be recognized and stated with conviction.

The speech-acts theory is an integral ingredient in defining communicative actions and "receptions." The use of illocutionary and perlocutionary speech-act in its due measure of function goes a long way in defining communicative action. For example, Strawson justifies the "illocutionary aim" as the "hearer understanding what is said and undertake the obligations connected with the offer contained in the speech act." Habermas incorporates this illocutionary aim in defining communicative action as "the type of interaction in which all participants harmon-
ize their individual plans of action with one another. Also, since the basic unit for a speech-act is not dependent upon semantics (the meanings embodied in words, letters, or group of symbols), but is the act "I perform" in and by issuing an utterance, such as proclaiming, swearing an oath, christening, etc. Here one is not just looking at words, symbols, sentences, phrases, or paragraphs, and their meanings, but at the practical "realities" of the situation of using these speech-acts.

Habermas insists on placing speech-act theory within the aegis of "formal pragmatics," rather than in the older distinctions of phonetics, semantics, and syntax (grammatical). Pragmatics is the praxis of "competencies" with which speakers-hearers use of speech-acts ultimately reach understanding, the same goal as communicative action. A very crucial distinction is that illocutionary acts are concerned with "reaching understanding," while perlocutionary acts go beyond understanding to such things as emotional, or rhetorical effects upon an audience. Hence, Habermas recognizes the "constitutive rules" for speech acts which Searle had established. Thereby his formal-pragmatics consists of the rules constitutive of illocutionary acts so that any participant who knows the constitutive rules will know the conditions under which these illocutionary acts, needed for communicative understanding are acceptable.

It is the solid achievement of Austin that he, and the ordinary language philosophers, demythologized several myths about language: Among these are F. H. Bradley's rejection of psychologistic theories of thinking: "thinking is not 'having' images or ideas, but uses ideas to refer to other objects." Language has the same characteristics as a "logical or mathematical calculus" (logistics viewpoint), linguistic rules are "immutable and inviolable"; words function in an unum nomen, unum nominatum way (every word must be the name of some sort of things). Austin played a major role in excoriating such myths.

Habermas analyzes how Searle tries to give an "ontological" grounding in terms of the "direction of fit" of the five types of speech acts: assertive, commissive, directive, expressive and declaration, i.e., when the arrow points downward, the sentence is supposed to fit the facts and when the arrow points upward, the facts are supposed to fit the sentence. Habermas
arrives at the conclusion that Searle restricts himself to the perspective of the speaker and disregards the dynamics of negotiation and intersubjective recognition of validity claims—that is, the building of consensus. The relation of the speech-act theories of Austin and Searle requires correction on some intersubjective factors and consensus in arriving at communicative understanding. The "illocutionary" force of course needs to account for the patient, the hearers, and the communicative receptivity" factors. Perlocutionary effects depends on audiences and the "interactivity" of communicative participants, as a "rhetorical" force. Rhetoric is a double-edged sword, since it persuades others while recognizing the recipient's potential for suasion and therapeutic-catharsis therefrom, which K. M. Wu called the "cathected self."

John R. Searle insists that the "literal meaning" of "the cat is on the mat" also depends for its completion on an "implicit (tacit) knowledge" which is "holistically structured knowledge": Tacit knowledge "does not stand at our disposition." We cannot make it "conscious" though our convictions do form a pre-interpreted "system" or "structure." For Habermas, as for Searle, it is the taken-for-granted convictions, in a pre-reflective background, which are not taken to be problematic, since the basic elements intrinsically (self-evidently) define one another. The body of "tacit" knowledge forms a basic portion of the horizons of the lifeworld, from which consistent, consensual understanding can proceed toward the mutual intersubjective understandings, interpretations (the pre-interpreted), and normal usages or application within our carnal, down-to-earth language.

1.4.1: MERLEAU-PONTY'S "LIVED BODY."

At this juncture, the founding of the concept of the "lived body" would be quite relevant, especially in its sense of "flesh meets flesh in the flesh of the world." Merleau-Ponty sees this relationship of "carnal intersubjectivity" as "logical objectivity" in which reason and order is established, or founded. At the same time, this carnal intersubjectivity is also a "logos of the aesthetic world" which is revealed in the theory of perception and serves as the base for constituting the "mystery" of reason and order in our experiences.
In Merleau-Ponty's thought, logical objectivity and carnal intersubjectivity are related as the founded and the founding (Husserl's *fundierung*). On the one hand, the 'pregiven' meanings constituted by the body as projecting project of the world are the founding source of any subsequent meaning-structures our reflective consciousness may produce...Reason and order are in this sense a fundamental fact of our experience—the *logos* of the aesthetic world which as the perceptually revealed base...may be called the 'mystery' of rationality.¹⁵

The body is the receiver of the legacy of past experiences and there is a system of motor intentionalities which are stored there as the "wisdom of the body," or as "tacit knowledge" of the kind that Searle and Michael Polanyi point out as the bodily "lifeworld," as a "holistically, tacitly structured knowledge."

Using the criteria of "intersubjectivity" we see a requirement that communicative receptivity focuses upon the attitude of "hearers" in their response to illocutionary and perlocutionary forces. As "listeners," they also have a "performative attitude" through being a "patient" rather than an active "agent," and listeners recognize "coordinative" interactions which may involve imperatives and normative expressions. These constitutes the "pragmatics" of response to speech-acts. The hearer must recognize the various "performatory" verbs and their grounding in the conventions of our language. Immanent to the speech-act are hermetically sealed contents of utterances which can guarantee illocutionary success, if the hearer adopts the attitude of the other and cooperates in coordinative activities which make up the interpersonal relation.

The relation of speakers to hearers are not simply thought of simply in the communicative-theoretic of Karl Buhler. Here, the sender-(sign)-receiver is determined by three functions: cognitive, appellative, and expressive functions, which correspond to "symbol," "symptom," (indication, index) and "signal." Communicative action is not simply the "transmission" of sender to receivers. In using a language,

Communication theory is further articulated from within--through the formal analysis of rules for using linguistic expressions—and not from without—through a cybernetic reformulation of the transmission process...in the formal-pragmatic concept of interaction among speaking and acting subjects, interaction that is mediated through acts of reaching understanding.₁₆
It is the "interaction" of speakers and hearers, senders and receivers that becomes the criteria for communicative action-reception theory. We must be aware of the fact that the locutionary is the act of saying, making a statement or a proposition, while the illocutionary takes over other grammatical functions such as indicative, imperative, and subjunctive. Also, Ricoeur points out that

The illocutionary leans upon mimicry and gestural elements and upon the non-articulated aspects of discourse we call prosody (intonation, delivery, mimicry, gestures). 17

There is also a subsidiary problem involved in the "unintended effects" of the perlocutionary, while utilizing illocutionary force. The "interpersonal" and interactive aspect of participants in reaching consensus and understanding is much more important in the support of the validity claims of illocutionary speech acts. Perlocutionary force involves discourse as "stimulus," strong emotion, and affective dispositions. Austin also points to the fact that illocutionary speech acts are "conventionally regulated." These acts have an internal connection with that speech act, whereas perlocutionary effects remain "external to the meaning of what is said." 18

One other difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is:

As the meaning of what is said is constitutive for illocutionary act, the intention of the agent is constitutive for teleological action. 19

"Intentionalist" semantics has a teleological (purposive) bent to it since it emphasizes "success" in goal attaining. In this case communicative speech acts do not stress but are only interested in "reaching of understanding". Perlocutionary speech acts are aimed at teleological effects. Over long periods of time illocutionary expressions become "embedded" as "hermetically" sealed packages of meanings which are "conventionally" agreed upon as a general consensus of opinion or customary ways in which we say things, and symbolically relate them to our performance of deeds, such as christening a ship, swearing an oath, judging a person "Guilty!" or even asking someone to "pass the salt, please!"

There are pre-linguistic roots for communicative action. The three structural compo-
nents of speech-acts are divided into "asserteric, appellative, and expressive" (propositional, illocutionary, and expressive) and correlate with cognitions, obligations, and expressions.

When Searle started to re-classify Austin's "illocutionary verbs" he arrived at these three basic classes of speech-acts. When these functions are placed into Mead's "symbolic interactionism," then communicative acts can serve the main functions of (1) reaching understanding, (2) coordinating action and (3) socializing actors. In the latter case,

One of Mead's fundamental insights is that socialization processes take place via linguistically mediated interaction.20

With regard to (2), the illocutionary correlates with "sanctions" and obligations generated in "games" that children play, in which B as the reference persons, takes the role of the authoritative parent and directs A to perform certain acts:

B understands this role in the sense of a norm that entitles the members of the social group to expect certain actions from one another in certain situations, and that obligates members to meet the legitimate expectations of others. ...

Appellatives, or illocutionary statements, are not used generally to achieve "consensus."

This is especially true when they are stated in "imperative" form. In a normative context, speakers want to direct someone to do something by asking the hearer to submit to his will, or cajole or coerce someone to do something involuntarily. Appellatives are intent statements expressed in imperative forms with the expectation that someone should execute a command, or reject it by saying "no."22 A sweetly reasonable approach to an imperative, or a command, is to leave room for the communicative recipient to be able to maneuver without loss of face, be able to negotiate and compromise, if necessary, in order to blunt the harshness of the order.

An appellative is also illustrated in Mead's mechanism of "the taking of the role of the other toward oneself." Taking the "perspective of the other" falls into a hermeneutic of the "fusion of horizons," which a child learns to do when he becomes part of the baseball team. He has to coordinate all of the nine perspectives on the team in order to function as a member of the team. Hence, he prepares for actions on the field of others in an appropriate way that
connects their imperatives, norms, etc., toward himself. He experiences positive and negative sanctions when he either commits good baseball practices or makes errors. The mechanism of the child and his relation to a reference person also involves the use of personal pronouns. "The deictic expressions used to identify persons," are part of the process of the child's understanding of the norms involved in the "I-me-you-they." This is the way a child accomplishes a sociopsychological concept of "identity."

From the standpoint of socialization, this side of the process of socialization presents itself as the development of an identity. Mead deals with this through the rubric of a relation between the 'me' and the 'I.'

In brief, the identity of the "me" is summarized by all the internalizations of the norms and adopting of the expectations of reference persons. The generalized other, in which the child re-structures a superego--a "me"--orients him to normative validity claims. Hence, in the use of personal pronouns, the child masters his language of reference to collectivities, groups, and others and his identity can be stated in the medium of language so that he can make his references to identities known to others while, at the same time, he understands the "I" his own subjective world to which he has seemingly privileged access.

These customary ways of conventionally sealing into our language "hermetic" packaged meanings is a "sedimentation" in words of our deeds evoked by communicative acts and interactions. My thesis is that the "conversation of gestures" is an incipient, virtual language and has continuity with the sedimentation of our later words. But language is also sedimented not in a linear fashion, but as a holistic project of interactions among its various elements, including the gestural base. Gestures then are an integral part of the "network of interactions." The language of gestures is at the base of our cultural gesticulations and sociation of persons with their societal roles and responsibilities; Mead would hold that "significant symbols" develop in the give-and-take of alter and ego, in their taking the generalized "attitude" of the other. It is also the "embodiment" of our incipient meanings into the corpus of our heritage or tradition, whether verbalized or non-verbalized.
Ricoeur summarizes two aspects of illocutionary force by dividing it into two categories: (1) the application of speech-acts as an "inscription of discourse," i.e., Dilthey's project of wanting to "explain" (erklären) what is "understood" especially in the human or social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), and the projects undertaken by Weber and Searle, the use of "ideal types" or "ideal models" and (2) he further points to an action as a social phenomenon, as a "form of institution" (illustrated in Joel Feinberg's "recording or registering" of ascriptions of responsibilities as "blame" in the legal code).

Thanks to this sedimentation in social time, human deeds become 'institutions'...in the meanings as articulated from within these sedimented or instituted works. 25

The "internalization" of norms and their values thus tend to become institutionalized in social roles. For example, this accumulation of our traditional knowledge and ritual actions can be the basis for the Confucian Correction of Names doctrine: It can provide us with the sedimentation of the early Chou dynasty, its sociopolitical structure, its hierarchy of offices, honors, status, function and privileges, its ritual actions performed over dynasties, and transmitted through chronicles and records. The transmission of the tradition is made integral with the sage-kings and their modeling accomplishments. They are the ancient exemplars of the achieved virtues and values to be transmitted. In short, the performatives and prescriptives of the Chou dynasty are transmitted as models to be emulated, not just to be copied en toto, and hence the rituals, or li-performances, were handed down to be observed in sacrifices, offerings, mournings, marriages, anniversaries, and all rites of passages.

In summary, we need to adopt the sweet reasonableness of the Chinese. Sweet reasonableness (vs. logocentric reason) yields the atmosphere of mildness of praxis, i.e., conduct based on centrality and constancy (as displayed in the Chung Yung). Here, the focus is on compromise and negotiation for reaching consensus. In China, there were institutions which were reasonable in their function and roles, such as the elaboration of a ritual to produce elegance (wen) and harmonious fluency. This can be contrasted with Heidegger's discovery of the "violence" (irruption) and coerciveness in the Western agonal attempt to wrest Being from
Becoming. From here, I shall go on to examine the complementary of the harmonization and agonal aspects of self-other, ego-alter, and I-Thou within the context of communicative activities and receptivities.

1.5: COMPLEMENTARITY OF ALTER AND EGO IN COMMUNICATIVE RECEPIVITY AND DIALECTICAL RECIPROCITY.

In section 1.1 above, the hermeneutical circle was identified as composed by the arcs of "tradition" and "interpretation." Gadamer adds another twist to this by supplementing tradition with having the dimension of "language," on the one hand, and takes the dimension of "Thou," as a "person," on the other hand.

Ultimately, "tradition" is "embodied" in language: It is transmitted, not impersonally, but through the medium of language, via "I's" and "Thou's."

Tradition is not simply a process that we learn to know and to be in command of through experience; it is language, i.e., it expresses itself like a 'Thou.' A 'Thou' is not an object, but stands in a relationship with us...we consider that the understanding of tradition does not take the text as an expression of life of a 'Thou' but as a meaningful content detached from all bonds of the meaning individual, cf an 'I' or a 'Thou.'

The "Thou" is one of the "interlocutors" in discourse which refers back to the question of "Who is speaking?" The use of personal pronouns is a "deictic function" (also called "indexical expressions") of discourse, which is to "point out" with "insistent particularity" just who is indicated in the specific context of a communicative situation. The Chinese term is chih, (to show, point out). Watson translates Chuang-Tzu as follows: "To use an attribute to show that attributes are not attributes is not as good as using a nonattribute to show that attributes are not attributes." Graham translates chih as "meaning": "Rather than use the meaning to show that the meaning is not the meaning use what is not the meaning." Graham and Schwartz disagree on translating chih: Schwartz prefers to use "attribute," "property," "predicate," and
Fung Yu-lan wants to use "universal," while Graham wants to use a finger "pointing out" in the sense of "meaning." To "show" or to "point out," indicate, designate, is to use one's index finger as a "fundamental" gesture for the sake of particularizing our communicative context. It is a "presentational" rather than a "re-presentational" view of language. Heidegger would trace "deictic" back to Latin, dicere, to say, and the Greek deiknumi, to show, point out, indicate. Fung Yu-lan also delineates the use of chih, by Kung-sun Lung, as pointing to "universals," while the Later Mohists says that chih is only used to designate "particulars":

Kung-sun Lung's universal cannot be designated and thus shown, and hence: 'What it grasps certainly cannot be designated.' In its doctrine of the universal, Kung-sun Lung's group approaches what western philosophy would term realism, whereas the Later Mohists approach nominalism.

Ricoeur points to another function which "deictic" or "ostensive" indicators serve. He anchors speech with the "reality" indicated "around" the speaker or hearer, or readers. He says,

In living speech, the ideal sense of what is said turns towards the real reference, towards that 'about which' we speak. At the limit, this real reference tends to merge with an ostensive designation where speech rejoins the gesture of pointing. Sense fades into reference and the latter into the act of showing.

Fingers are used to point to a "situation" that surrounds our discourse and we do this by pointing out the landmarks within the situation by means of a "gesture," a "finger pointing," or by using linguistic indicators, such as adverbs of place and time (here, there), demonstratives (this, that), and the tense of the verb. These are "oblique references."

Searle would go even further and point out that all sentences or utterances cannot be made determinate without assuming an "implicit contextual knowledge," an implicit worldview. The "literal meaning" will always have an aura, or penumbra of "incompleteness" around it. Here, one assume a fundamental background knowledge which is "tacitly" supplemented with standardized expressions. The generalized context is a holistically structured knowledge in which basic elements intrinsically define each other, so that no knowledge stands on its own.

For Gadamer, the "Thou" is identified with "historical consciousness," since it is the "person" who bears the history of the past in its "otherness." There is a dialectical reciprocity
between the "I" and "Thou": The relation is "self-relatedness" or a "reflexive" one, a claim on the "intersubjectivity" between negotiations of validity claims and counterclaims, communality, commonality, the "belongingness of subject-object," and the general "openness" in listening to tradition and others.\(^\text{13}\)

The formulation 'I and thou' already betrays an enormous alienation. There is nothing like an 'I and thou' at all--there is neither the I nor the thou as isolated, substantial realities. I may say 'thou' and I may refer to myself over against a thou, but a common understanding (Verstandigung) always precedes these situations. We all know that to say 'thou' to someone presupposes a deep common accord.\(^\text{14}\)

In the last analysis, it is the "I" that is just as important as the "Thou," since in any interpretation of tradition, there is an appropriation and an "assimilation" to the personal "I" and its understanding of the past.

All meaning is related to the 'I'--the meaning of what is handed down to us finds its concretion in which it is understood, in its relation to the understanding 'I'--not in the reconstruction of an 'I' of the original meaning.\(^\text{15}\)

In the fullness of understanding, what is "Thou," the tradition, becomes "I," the self-understanding, the appropriating interpreter. We become the self-relatedness of the other in a reflective manner, we reflect them.

Gadamer does not mention Buber's "I-Thou" or "I-It," the primal words," and the primary "poles" of relationships between man-and-man (face to face) and man-and-passive-objects. Buber indicates the "dialogical" and "polar" as against a simple "dialectical" relationship. The "I-Thou" relation can also be the ontological situating of both human being and language, the "spokenness" of language in a living situation. Buber writes,

When will the dialectic refer to the presence of the living man facing us? When will the dialectic of thought become dialogic, an unsentimental, unrelaxed dialogue in strict terms of thought with the man present at the moment?\(^\text{19}\)

Most of all, I and Thou refers to "bodily presence," or face-to-face, in a dialogue process. This is quite close to Merleau-Ponty's insistence on the "lived body" as the primary expression of a "We":

I am embodied in the world as one dimension of that primordial all-comprehen-
Being of ‘many foci’ which Merleau-Ponty calls the ‘fundamental We’ of the evolving human community. In the ‘absolute presence’ of carnal intersubjectivity, flesh meets flesh in the flesh of the world, and man can now become a living mirror for his fellow man.17

Ricoeur sees this I-Thou "conversation" as limited only to that which is "face-to-face." He speaks of "short" and "long" intersubjective relations in which the long intersubjective relations are sustained by "an historical tradition," mediated by social institutions, social roles and collectivities.18 The short relation is "intertwined" within a limited, particular historical process, in the interpretation of texts which requires bringing the far nearer to us.

Habermas also draws a line between normal everyday communication in which intersubjectivity is indicated in (1) a "reflexive use of language." For Habermas, intersubjectivity cannot be maintained without the reciprocal "self-representation" of speaking subjects, i.e., in French, "Je me," "I, myself," as contrasted with (2) an analytical use of language in which individuals are subsumed under some "class," or the "categorization of objects." It is "paradoxical" that

the relations between I, You (other I) and We (I and the other I's) are established through an analytically paradoxical achievement. The speaker identifies himself with two mutually incompatible dialogic roles and thereby secure the identity of the I as well as that of the group...The analytical use of language is embedded within the reflexive use, since the intersubjectivity of everyday communication cannot be maintained without the reciprocal self-representation of speaking subjects.19

The deictic function of language seems to be more flexible in terms of mutual reciprocity, dialogical or dialectical reciprocity, than "class-oriented" analytical inquiry, applying the I-Thou relation is applied to the problem of communicative action. For Mead, the social problem is one of "identification" (numerical and generic), of individual autonomy and "responsibility," and the relation of "ego" to "alter ego." In Mead's concept of "identity" there is a dependence upon the presupposition of others to "identify him generically and numerically."20 Generically, one can speak in terms of alter/ego, self/other, etc.. but numerically, it is necessary to identify first, second, and third persons, who are speaking, and refer to them as reference persons, along with the deictic pronouns applicable to them individually, or as a group. Mead calls this the
ontogenesis of "signal languages." This is already the beginnings of a "dia-gestural" conversation, and forms the general mechanism for the beginning of "self-consciousness" or the appearance of the "self." If gestures are traced back to their original matrix from which they spring, one finds that they involve a "larger social act" of which they are but "phases."21

Another extension of the "Thou" is Gadamer’s reference to fellow men (the Other), and our being able to make "predictions" about their typical behavior patterns. This knowledge he calls "human nature" and is the subject matter of the "human sciences." Moreover, "tradition" is to be understood this way too, by methodically "excluding all subjective elements" in regard to it and discovering what the "matter" of tradition is, its "human nature."22 But obviating subjective elements means that one must concentrate on the "matter of the text" in interpretations and not focus upon subjective, autobiographical author intentions. This calls for a sense of "distance" in the claim for impartiality and objectivity: to keep the validity "claim of the other person at a distance,"23 and this prevents subjective factors from creeping into an "interpretation." This is also called "decentering" as well as involving the factor of "distanciation" in judgments of validity claims. With the knowledge of the three worlds, objective-social-subjective, decentering prevents the dissolving of ego, and its subjectivity; this also makes it possible to adoption of the perspective of a "third person" who may be a "non-participant."24

The "Thou’s" are the Others: you, a person, a tradition, human nature, a living language, a lived body. They are not as something "alienated," an "alterity," not "separated," but as in Buber the "I-Thou" is the primal word, diacritically reciprocal and communicatively related to each other. For every alter, there is an ego. In existential terms, I’s and Thou’s are part and parcel of We, the belongingness of "I-Thou" and Heidegger’s Dasein being-in-the-world or being-with-others. In Chinese terms it is the wu-wo (I-me) relation. For Mead, the "I" stands for the "subjectivity of a desiring and feeling nature," and the "me" stands for the character shaped through "social roles."25 The "me" also stands for the "fusion" of a me-situation and I-response, the organism (" I ") and its interaction with its environment (me).28
For Mead, the ideal communication community calls for an "ego-identity that makes possible self-realization on the basis of autonomous action." Autonomy involves "self-determination," "self-realization," "self-respect" and "self-worth." Mead's characterization, here, is within the individualistic side of the "liberal democratic" viewpoint. For Habermas, the ideal context of communicative action is in the form of the non-authoritarian and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived.

The "emancipatory" dimension is a situation in which there will be freedom from hidden forms of "domination" and "repression." Mead corrects his "individualism" by means of the relationship of "l-me." It is an attempt for the ego to identify with an alter, as a "reference" person. This reference person is the generalized "other," or alter ego. Mead and Durkheim determine the identity of individuals in relation to the identity of the group to which they belong. The "unity of the collective" is the point of reference for the communality of all members. This is expressed in the fact that they can speak of themselves and each other in the "first-person plural" We. The use of personal pronouns, to reiterate, is the "deictic" function of language which points out individuals within appropriate contexts for purposes of identity and reference for social role and function. It is the process by which an ego is being shaped by the social We. It is the intermeshing of the interchangeable perspectives of "I's" and their possible relations to "thou," "you," "him," "her," or conversely to "me" in the roles of second and third persons. This is also the origin of the personal pronouns and the "deictic" function of language and serves also to explain the socialization of individuals, or the formation of personal identity within the medium of linguistic communication, the identification of I-you-they.

1.5.1: WU-WO; ALTER-EGO.

The Chinese wu-wo relationship is the "l-me" of Mead. There are three distinctions that can be made of the self: (1) chi (ego-self based on li as advantage, profit), (2) wo (first-person
denoting high status, an exalted self), and (3) wu (nominative position generally). Etymologically, wo designates a nominative use originally, but by the 7th to 3rd B.C., it was replaced by wu in the nominative position, and wo assumed the objectified "me" or "us." The fact of wo with high status is how others see wo. This status is exalted within a social framework, a distinction Mead has made between a self and a generalized "other." Moreover, Mead does not take the self as an isolated "I." And adequate conception of Mead's socializing self "would require both the 'I' and the 'me' as interdependent explanatory categories." Calvin Schrag offers an alternative way of thinking about the "hermeneutical space of communicative praxis." It corresponds to the context within which Habermas's formal pragmatics operates and displays the "competencies" of the hermeneutical subject: competencies in "conversation, habits, skills and institutional involvements" in the hermeneutical space of communicative praxis. We speak, act, work, play and assume social roles within this space of communicative praxis, and we can ask, "who is speaking?" "who is writing? or authoring?" and "who is acting?" Hence, the subjectivity of the implicated self emerges from the communicative praxis context through the roles played in interpreting roles. Schrag calls this the "heterarchical self" (vs. a monarchical, sovereign self), since it depends on others for its development.

The kind of heterarchical self Schrag advocates is quite a contrast with Mead's emphasis in the liberal democratic viewpoint of a "sovereign" autonomous self of the Kantian tradition and with the slogans of "dignity of the individual" and "uniqueness" characteristics. The monarchical self has its "seat of authority, its 'authorship' within itself—in its private sense perception and its private thoughts." The heterarchical self bears the "inscriptions of a language community and a community of social practices" in its emergent roles of responses within a socio-public and historical world.

From the standpoint of a "field-focus" model of explanation, the heterarchical sociality of the self is an open horizon with the interchange of personal cultivation and sociality.
architectural sociality also assimilates the give and take of persons-in-context, within a language community with its commonality of purpose of making their communicative actions known to the "generalized others" (Mead) as "reference persons," who are located, sited, and indwelling within the framework of the community of inquirers, sharing their horizon of the lifeworlds of subjective-social-objective worlds.

In summary, Habermas describes the fallacies of some interpretive sociologies which build upon three fundamental fictions: "(1) the autonomy of actors, (2) the independence of culture and (3) the transparency of communication." These are errors which obstruct binding together the "web of communicative actions," the "network of communicatively mediated cooperation," and the integration of the person in the light of his cultural traditions. Habermas insists that these fictions can be obviated by the "systems" approach of Talcott Parsons coupled with the notion of the "lifeworld." Also, using Parsons, Habermas was able to round out his systematic communicative theory. This gave his theory of interpretive sociology "self-steering" mechanisms (cybernetics) in a "systems" approach along with the grounding in a lifeworld. The above fictions are transferrable into the communicative action context and did obviate some of the problems of communicative action as power domination, and also account for communicative receptivity in its passive aspects.

These fictions would immediately undermine and shut off the communicator as a participant with others in an inter-subjective encounter. They would block off the emancipatory interest, and be an obstacle to inquiry. As a consequence, they would stand as an obstacles and "block the path of inquiry," which Peirce claims is the motto of the pragmatic method.

In regard to the fiction of (1) the "autonomy" of communicative actors, Schrag has substituted a heterarchical self, which I shall show is very close to the pre-Han views of both Confucianism and Taoism, especially the "sociality" inherent in these tradition. In regard to (2) the "independence" of culture, Chinese culture plays an important role in the socialization of the person-in-context, and in regard to (3), the putative "transparency" of communicative actors and receivers, our discussion of reasonableness and goblet rationality would leave us with a residue of deeper
mystery, and opacity in gathering knowledge, which the Taoist would emphasize by saying, "Discard knowledge!"
CHAPTER II.

PRE-HAN CONFUCIAN INTERPRETATION OF TRADITION

2.1: THE CONFUCIAN HERMENEUTICAL SITUATION.

I approach communicative acts from two directions, by positing a continuity and a mutual reciprocity between (1) verbal-symbolic (linguistic) and (2) non-symbolic gestural interpretations. In this way, the Confucian tradition with its emphasis on "words and deeds" can be traced back to a foundation in li (ritual action, ceremony, propriety) on the side of "action" (deeds), and from the side of "words" to the doctrine of the Correction of Names (cheng-ming). Primarily, ritual actions are built up from "fundamental gestures," which over time attain a consensus of its own syntax and symbolism. We can embed, or embody, the interactions of words and deeds within a larger framework (t'i, body, corpus) of the "social" (Intersubjective) world, and at the horizon of a lifeworld of tao-te. However, there are some quirks in using English to translate the term tao. The definite article "the" tao cannot be used in the Chinese language, since this has implications of a metaphysical, "universal" tao. The Chinese do not have definite articles in their language. Nor do they have capital letters (say Tao, for example.)

The schema for our discussion will be (1) yen, words, speech, and language (2) hsing, action, deeds, practices, and praxis, (3) t'i, body, embodiment, corpus framework, "structure" and (4) tao and their interrelations. That is, yen-hsing will become meaningful words-action within the t'i of tao-te. For example, one can relate li to t'i as embodiments of yi (significances in meaning and values):

The notion of the formal li action overlaps with t'i, body, in that...li actions are embodiments or formalizations of meaning and value (yi) that accumulate to constitute a cultural tradition...like a body of literature or a corpus of music, these rituals continue through time as a repository of the ethical and aesthetic insight of those who have gone before.

What are the implications in asking, "How do we do things with ritual actions (li)?" instead of Austin's query of how to do things with words. Li-actions become gestures (mudras for the Buddhists) which contribute to the embodiment of values, signifiers, symbolizers, etc., in order
to form a sedimented, meaningful "tradition." There are answers to these fundamental ques-
tions of how we can consider painting and music as a gestural-performative "language," and in
the other arts and crafts. The tacit language of Cook Ting as he carves an ox is another example.

The corpus (?) of the Chou-Confucian tradition can be considered as an attempt
to create the conditions for a "dialogical community." Gadamer fostered phronesis, (ethical
know-how), which is the joining of "ethics and politics"; phronesis can become a "living
reality" when the citizens assume the "noblest task" of decision making and assuming of
personal responsibility, instead of conceding the task to "experts." Praxis, in the application of
phronesis, requires choice and deliberation about what is to be done in concrete situations.
We call on Confucius to cull out and make the selective choices from the ancient sage-kings
using them as models, exemplary persons, cultural heroes, and apply institutions for emulation
or instantiation in the present sociopolitical context. Confucius is "selective," and also exercizes
a critique of "ideology," especially of those practices and institutions which are oppressive and
do not contribute to "emancipating," or freeing up conditions under which his disciple-scholars
can attain positions in government, irrespective of their birthright. Good men can perform good
deeds, even in a hierarchical sociopolitical system.

Since the main goal of communicative action and receptivity is to "reach understand-
ing," I shall try to show a commonality between the Confucian and Taoist camps. The Chinese
compound of tao-fe is a common, shared orientation of both the Confucians and the Taoist.
Though there may be differences in the several alternative senses of fao-fe, there is still a
continuity in the way Confucians and Taoists use their language "commensurately" in discussing
aspects of tao or fe. A Confucian speaks about li, ritual action, as a fe, a virtue, and an excel-
lence. Hall and Ames speaks about tao-fe in the paradigm of field-focus, with the concept of fe
as the particular focus, and tao is the field, horizon, and background. In the Confucian context,
fe has a specifically "moral" sense attached to it, while Confucian virtues takes on a "normative
force" within a deference pattern, shown in particular virtues of li, yi, chih, and jen.
The moral tao will be the cumulative interactive forces of the virtues of li, yi, chih, and jen all of which contribute to the integrity of the sociopolitical body. Te, or Potency, for the Taoist, however, lacks the moral qualities attached to virtues, but does indicate a more generalized aptitude or capacity of man and his "sociality" and interrelations with nature in general. Following Kant, li is informed by te (otherwise it is barren, formalized, and there is no completion of activity). Te, which is the regularity (chang) of nature, is impotent without li, since spontaneity (tzu-jen) without form is randomness.

Later I shall parallel the Taoist counterparts for (1) notions related to "actions," exemplified by the more "communicatively receptive" concepts of wu-wei, wu-yu and tzu-ja, as acting-so-of-itself, causa sui, and (2) words as part of the "non-spoken" doctrine (wu yen), thus illustrating the fragility and limitations of language in going from names to actuality, and the "discarding of (conventional) knowledge," or wu-chih, (3) li as the integral experience of self and nature, forming a constasy, and (4) tao. The non-spoken doctrine is illustrated by the parable of the Wheelwright's denigration of "books" as the words of the long since dead sages, the "dregs and sediments of those old men."

But books are only a collection of words. Words have what is valuable; the ideas they convey. But these ideas are a sequence of something else--and what that something else is cannot be conveyed by words.

The non-spoken doctrine also represents a "tacit" dimension of knowing, in that most of the craftsmen (Cook Ting, the Wheelwright) know-how-to-do-something but cannot tell you what it is that they know. The Wheelwright also undermines the Confucian trust in going "back to the ancients." For the Taoists, it is the "live" words, and the spontaneous, living, natural bodily movements which are significant.

In summary, our major aim is to compare and contrast the Confucian and Taoist viewpoints, not only for their commonality and similarities of viewpoints but also for their differential and complementary viewpoints. A full-blown tradition has several sides, which when based on complementarity, will not sell differences short. Instead, the continuities of a stabilized tradition are consensually redeemed in the Confucian and Taoist communicative traditions.
2.1.1: COMMUNICATIVE SITUATIONS.

The other side of communicative action is called communicative receptivity. Both aspects comprise the "communicative situation." In a broader sense they may also be called the "hermeneutical situation." In a cooperative process of reaching understanding, one of the first tasks is finding a common base from which the participants "define" their communicative situation. Within this framework, other important features may be embedded such as the horizons of a lifeworld, and the interaction of objective-social-subjective worlds.

Richard Bernstein calls this the "background consensus," since all communicative action takes place against the "intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, and mutual trust." But the consensus breaks down if not "redeemed" by validity claims. As the background consensus, the lifeworld is the sociocultural milieu in which communicative action takes place. Mead would say that role-playing (role-taking-the-attitude-of-the-other) defines our various encounters between ego and alter. Symbolic reproduction of personal development, socialization, and cultural identity will be the result. It is the take-it-for-granted "certainties" of the lifeworld which is presupposed in any lifeworld. Like cultural traditions, the competencies of socialized individuals and solidarities of groups form the "resources for the background of lifeworld certainties," which contribute to a definition of action situations.

The Confucian, Mohist and Taoist lifeworlds can be illustrated by their continuities which are a "shared" community of interpretation when participants act communicatively within a "horizon of a lifeworld." It is within these hermeneutical situation-contexts that we can confirm the interaction and intersubjectivity of "words and deeds, or the unity of "knowledge and action." These presupposed understandings of their various worlds are already "pre-interpreted" continuities and serve as shared premises for their arguments, beliefs, and convictions.

The interpretive matrix of tradition has previously been construed to be the core of the "hermeneutical situation." Oftentimes, tradition is considered a "given," but this is a "conservative" reading. A more processual, creative outlook, would emphasize that heritage and
reinterpret the past embodied values and try to make them dovetail in with present actualities. Habermas believes there is a conservative "counterweight" in trying to reach consensus in understanding. This counterweight, however, can be balanced off by a "decentration of worldviews." De-centering is the process of making less "subjective" the worldview in favor of the more objectivating attitudes; At a formal level there is a systematic connection with "reasons," with validity claims accessible to "objective assessment." 

Graham points out a "web of conventions" as the background for performative speech-acts, but further questions Fingarette on whether all utterances are essentially performative. Performative speech or gesture assumes meaning within a "web of convention." Deeming someone "Guilty" acquires a force of an "irrevocable deed," when done within a legal structure or context. Hence, "ilocutionary" gestural acts are also significant when considered within a context of "perlocutionary" effects on audiences.

For instance, if the compound words-deeds is the focal point for the interpretation of traditional ideas, the mutual reciprocity of this compound is a preliminary condition within Chinese rationalizing of making "good words and good deeds" accord with one another. As an example, W. T. Chan says that the rise of Chou culture over Shang is a shift from honoring "spiritual beings" (Shang's reference to ti, as the "tribal lord becoming the God for All") to the emphasis on t'ien ming, the Mandate of Heaven. As a "humanistic" movement in the exercise by the man of virtue (te), virtue is dependent upon "good words and good deeds." T'ien ming (destiny) depends upon virtue (te) rather than on the "pleasure of some mysterious, spiritual power" in the development from Shang to Chou.

W. T. Chan says the term te did not appear in the Shang oracle bones. It first appeared in early Chou documents. Te was also the main theme of The Great Learning: ming ming te explains the meaning of the highest excellence (te, virtue), "to manifest his clear character" (virtue). Ming has several additional meanings: it means to "make clear" to clarify, and it also means "enlightenment," "lofty," or "illustrious." Hence, ming ming te denotes the "illustration of
the illustrious te.\textsuperscript{16} Ming ming te is to make manifest one's excellences, to actualize, make real our inherent "powers."

An emphasis on \textit{t'i} (corpus, bodily) involves some kind of "organicism." I shall use "organicism," temporarily, in the Aristotelian sense of the interrelations of parts-wholes in their functioning within "biological organisms." Thomé Fang has used \textit{sheng-sheng} as an illustration of what he calls a philosophy of "enlivened Nature." He connects this organicism to the I Ching. For the I Ching sage, \textit{tao} is the source of "creative creativity" in which \textit{tao} of Heaven and Earth and Man become "co-creative" agents for the continuance of life.\textsuperscript{17} Later, I would like to invoke the "sociality" of Whitehead, the view of "societies of societies" as part of his philosophy of "organism," to give better metaphors of the "constitutive" patterns of how things are emergent from processual events. Whitehead's sociality, composed of societies within societies appears to contribute to the "uniqueness" view of the individual operating in Chinese sociality.

In the Chinese case, the fundamental 'uniqueness' of each person is tempered by the degree to which the weight of a shared cultural tradition is, through patterns of deference, constitutive of each member of the community.\textsuperscript{18}

Thome Fang uses Whiteheadian terminology to interpret the I Ching, especially showing the metaphysics of the I Ching in terms of "creative creativity" (\textit{sheng sheng}). The Chinese repetition of words in a compound term (\textit{chien}) appears to be an attempt to emphasize "overlapping" significances: i.e., creative creativity, enlivened Nature, etc.. The later Neo-Confucians translates \textit{sheng sheng} as "the perpetual renewal of life."\textsuperscript{19} Such rhythmic modulation of dynamic change and response is typical of the character of the alternation of \textit{yin} and \textit{yang} (k'un is the passive principle, and ch'ien as the creative principle). It also shows the organicism of nature and emphasizes "life processes." Fang lists three life principles: (1) the principle of extensive connection, (2) the principle of creative creativity, and (3) the principle of creative life as a process of value-realization.\textsuperscript{20} Joseph Needham suggests that Chinese cosmology offers to Western science a view of organism which challenges the "linear conceptions of causality" through its view of the world as a "mutually interdependent and interpenetration of elements."\textsuperscript{21}
The kind of organicism involved in China may not entail the emphasis placed upon the Aristotelian primary analogate of a "biological organism," in which parts-wholes are construed to be interdependent for a specific "purpose, telos, or end." Aristotle also gives a substantialist account of matter-form, and potentiality-actuality, whereas Whitehead's philosophy of organism is a non-substantialist process philosophy. Whitehead's view may be closer to what ThomÉ Fang is espousing. Also, the Chinese do not have an organicism which postulates a single putative whole in which "the night is when all cows are black," which is typical of the Western metaphysical monism of a teleological Hegelianism. In this regard, Lee Yearley distinguishes between two models of "organisms"—(1) the model of discovery, or the ontological model which reflects a "hidden ontological reality" and (2) a developmental model—such as Mencius's model, in which "fulfillment occurs only if an organism is both uninjured and properly nurtured."22 But the Chinese do not have a sophisticated "biological" theory, such as Aristotle's. Hence, the main analogical images are Mencius's "plant growth" on Ox mountain, and the man who wanted to pull at his rice plants to make them grow faster. In general sheng means "generation, growth," especially in the context of nurture (yang, cultivation). Graham has pointed to the use of sheng, in ordinary language, as meaning "health, longevity," and the value of the life in terms of "livelihood."23

Lao Sze-kwang believes that Mencius systematizes some of the insights of the Confucian tradition, among which is the idea of the "transformation (hua) of mind, the transformation of society, and instructions on practice." He finds Mencius's concept of hsing, human nature to be similar to "innate capacity" in the use of language, and similar to Chomsky's innate "grammatical competence."24 A case can be made for a Mencian formal-pragmatics in the use of "performatives" as an "illocutionary competence." It is the "black box" through which one processes linguistic inputs and emerges with a product of the Four Germs.

Ch'ien Mu focuses on the fact that the Analects were "yu-lun," recorded sayings which were only compiled a century after Confucius's death. Some say that Mo-tzu never wrote any-
thing, and the Mencius was also a cooperative, "corporate" syncretic effort, with Mencius, Kung-sun Ch’ou and Wan Chang as contributors. It was only during the time of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu that one "authors" a book. We are not even sure in Chuang-tzu’s case what was later interpolated into his work. Ch’ien Mu adds that what seems original with Mencius is only his ideas on hsing (human nature) which Mencius did not take credit for, but tried to be self-effacing about. Hsing was probably only “implicit” in the Analects because the Master did not discuss Heaven, nature, human nature, destiny, and similar "metaphysical" ideas. The main thesis of Ch’ien Mu is

the ideal of transmision of ancient ideas and not the innovation of new ones...To engage in learning is to learn to be human. The great way of humanity resides in the commonality, and not the diversity, among men.  

For Ch’ien Mu, it is the convergence of identity, rather than the diversity of difference that makes a doctrine worth transmitting. Hence, there is only transmission of an "identical ancient mind," a very conservative viewpoint, with no innovation, or invention of new ideas.

As a counterpoint to Ch’ien Mu’s conservatism, Hall and Ames insist that the very “creative making” of a tradition obviates conservatism, while at the same time, they point to the "provincialism" and "parochialism" that accompany the "institutionalizing" of a corporate Confucian "tradition" taken in its reliance on traditional culture. Yet, the emphasis on "traditionality" as against the Western "historicist" emphasis is the "storehouse" of the Chinese tradition, which can be stabilizing and applicable even in modern context.

Graham suggests that we should not forget that "spontaneity" is as much a part of the Confucian, as in the Taoist tradition. He relates this back to the relation of "stimulus-response" (kan-ying). The Confucians, unlike Taoists, discipline the response by rules, among which is the Mean taken from the Chung Yung:

Before pleasure or anger, grief or joy, emerge, one speaks of the 'Mean'; when, emerging, all accord with measure, one speaks of 'Harmony.' The 'Mean' is the ultimate root of the world, 'Harmony' is the universal Way of the world.

It is this imposition of due "measure on spontaneity" which is the difference between Confucians
and Taoists: One might say that the Taoist agrees with the Confucian in assuming that action
starts from spontaneity. By "laying down rules" the Confucian adjusts his spontaneity to "due
measure," while the Taoist go on to the "dispassionate mirroring of things as they objectively
are." One can speak of the due measure as an "accomodation" (com=with, modere=measure).

For Graham, there is spontaneity of patterning which is "pre-logical" in the activity of
correlative thinking, since even at the base of a gestalt in perception there are "gestalt switches"
(Kuhn). Hence, spontaneity is modified when a set of linguistic rules are patterns imposed
upon the raw data of our perceptions. These patterning may be a conceptual schema, a
Kantian schema, or other patternings the Chinese employ such as metaphors, images,
models, parallelisms, paradigms, etc.. For Graham, the analytic (contra to the correlative)
has no place for the correlative thinking as spontaneous patterning in which a
gap is filled by a flash of insight; it has to propositionalize it as the loose
inference by analogy outside the bounds of strict logic.

The analytic tests the correlatives, but it is, at bottom, dependent upon the spontaneous patter-
ing of the correlative. Hence, if one digs below exact knowledge one always scratches up
against the "correlative at its foundations," always searching for the "metaphorical roots" of a
Chinese/Western concept.

Graham also points out that "order," or "due measure" is best illustrated in The Great
Learning, which derives "good order in state, family and persons from 'extending knowledge.'"
Furthermore, Graham points to the earliest use of li as "pattern" in Chuang-tzu's "The Autumn
Floods" dialogue. This patterning includes the alternation of yin-yang, rise and fall, birth and
death, but does not include standards of "moral conduct," which the Taoist would deny
vigorously. He also claims that the use of li influences the Neo-Confucians to take over and
augment it to mean "principles." Graham does not like to use the term "principle" for li, but
prefers "pattern"; so Thomé Fang's deeming sheng sheng as a "principle" of creative life may be
re-interpreted as "patterns" of creative life.

What is the content of the tradition which is transmitted by Confucius? How did he
select those items of importance to be transmitted? Graham goes back to the Axial Age and comes up with at least four fundamental ideas from the lifeworld of the Chou (tao of Chou), or the sense of their "continuing tradition." The main themes are: (1) "an exceptionally tight yet widely held extended family structure (2) which subordinates youth to age, (3) which centers social duty on filial piety and (4) relations with the other world on the cult of ancestors." Even as early as the Shang Oracle bones, there is evidence of ancestor worship. In summary, this is partially the ontogenesis of the Chou tradition. However, we only see the "origins" of the "family." To fill out the measure of order as displayed in The Great Learning, there was the "immortal empire," t'ien hsia, "all under Heaven." The implication is that the sociopolitical synthesis at the time of the Chou had a certain amount of "stability" inherent in it which are valuable for transmission of an enduring heritage for subsequent cultural interpretations.

2.1.2: TRANSMISSION OF CULTURE.

Within the problematics of strict translations for transmission, Mencius points to two things which throws doubt on a literal belief in transferring the Book of History and the need for Confucius to write the Spring and Autumn Annals. For example, in 7B/3, he says,

If one believed everything in the Book of History, it would have been better for the Book not to have existed at all. In the Wu Ch'eng chapter I accept only two or three strips.

And in 7B/2,

In the Spring and Autumn period there were no just wars. There are only cases of one war not being quite as bad as another.

Also, in 4B/21, he shows why Confucius wrote the Spring and Autumn Annals:

When the wooden clappers of the true King fell into disuse, songs were no longer collected. When the songs were no longer collected, the Spring and Autumn Annals were written.

In this case, Confucius tried to emulate and use the earlier chronicles as a model for the "appropriation of the didactic principles therein."

Aside from the importance of the "family" or the "clan law," the most important concept advanced by the Chou is t'ien (Heaven) as the supreme authority to legitimize the Mandate of
Heaven and replaces the shang-ti (the Lord on High). Hence, the Chou was justified in defeating Shang, due to their misrule and violation of the Mandate of Heaven. Benjamin Schwartz points out that tao was realized in human history, and then was lost in every dynasty. Tao is advanced by Confucius to be a “normative,” moral standard for political leaders: Good men do good deeds. Schwartz characterizes the transmitted Analects as a “normative” sociopolitical document.

Tao refers to nothing less than the total normative sociopolitical order with its networks of proper familial and proper sociopolitical roles, statuses, and ranks, as well as to the ‘objective’ prescriptions of proper behavior—ritual, ceremonial, and ethical—that govern the relationships among these roles.34

The Confucian tao is best exemplified in the Correction of Names doctrine, since it is the Way to formulate the total normative and sociopolitical order and its functions. Tao includes the sedimentation of li (rituals, ceremonies, rules of proper conduct) which have been transmitted through the Six Classics from the Chou feudal period. As Fung Yu-lan points out, there were individual li as well as those li for the states, which govern such affairs as war/peace, chivalry, and spheres of influences among nations during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States period.35 The reliable and stable li accumulates and becomes the sociopolitical tao.

There is also a connection with the achievement of tao and the idea of the “universal kingship: of “all under Heaven” (t’ien hsieh). But the social and political are never separated, hence the unity of the “socio-political” is equiprimordially meaningful. Also, the development of later cosmological viewpoints such as yin-yang, and the Five Processes (wu-hsing of Tsou Yen) fit into the idea of a mundane kingship having cosmic importance. The three shared orientations which tie in with each other are: (1) the idea of a universal, all embracing sociopolitical order centering on the concept of a cosmically based universal kingship, a “radial,” “centripetal” viewpoint with the Emperor as “center,” (2) the more general idea of the primacy of order in both the cosmic and human spheres, a “cosmomorphic” viewpoint, and (3) the dominant tendency toward a holistic “immanentist” view of order.36
Tao was achieved when the sage-kings had actualized the civilized patterns of a "normative culture" in which human beings can achieve their full humanity (jen). The sage-kings were prior to Chou; they were the first "civilizers," or in Shun's case, the first hydraulic engineer. But their moral character and virtue is why they are referred to as "models," paradigms or exemplars of patterns of "good words and good deeds." It follows that tao is the realization of the "moral" imperative in a holistic sense. That is why tao resides in the "legendary" sage-kings, and when transmitted by Confucius resides in his breast. It has become a "convention" to go back to the sage-kings, whether they are earlier or later. Hsun-tzu preferred the later sage-kings, such as Tang and Wu, who succeeded the tyrant Chieh.

Ricoeur also points out that "narration" in the Six Classics is a way of "emplotment," or the tradition of the "encoding" of the chronicles and historical events forming the cultural heritage to be transmitted. With narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the "invention of a plot," which brings together the "temporal unity of a whole and complete action." This completion of action is part of Aristotle's definition of art imitating the action of life, the mimesis of nature.Narration and emplotment has a double function: narration about historical or cyclical events and narration in story-telling. This raises the question of whether the Chinese worldview can be discussed in a non-mimetic way, especially in view of a homology between a human body and its counterparts in the cosmic body (i.e., Ho-shang Kung commentary). The Chinese may not need the cosmology of an "imitation" of nature in order to either tell a historical chronicle, or an allegorical story.

2.1.3: DIVINATION AND ERUDITION.

In the archaeology of the West, Foucault points to the 16th Century's belief in the great metaphor of the "Book of God," which gives the immanent order of things, within the visible marks stamped upon the earth. The "book" is divinatio and eruditio, both parts of hermeneutics. Language is like a "mirror" which reflects the network of marks in nature, as secret indicators of the particular truth. Divinatio is of interest to us, in that Schleiermacher uses it as a
method for "intuitively" putting oneself in the place of the author, or of the original writer, and for knowing the author's intention better than the author does of himself. For instance, he says,

Using the divinatory, one seeks to understand the writer intimately (unmittelbar) to the point that one transforms oneself into the other... (which) depends on the fact that every person has a susceptibility to intuiting others. 40

The emphasis on divination as signs, or images applied to nature, is visual rather than audient which bears upon the importance of the arts, whether the visual arts, or the plastic arts, are more fundamental: The Confucian emphasis on li-yüeh (ritual-music) means that ritual is rhythmic, audient, resonant, and tuning, whereas the emphasis on hsiang (image) is visual (linguistic graphs, rather than homophones). Music is on par with poetry, in its rhythmic features; painting and sculpture follows visual effects. However, in landscape painting, poetry and calligraphy becomes part of the integrity of the painting.

In the Chinese context, the early book of divination is the I Ching; the I Ching sages of yore (Fu Hsi) were searching for hsiang (images) in which the book of nature is written. 41 Fu Hsi invented the eight basic trigrams, which later formed the symbolized "hexagrams" by means of which they become "images" or "emblems" traceable to, or indicative of phenomena.

Heaven and earth change and transform, and the sage imitates them. Heaven administers the constellations (ch'ui-hsiang, hang out images) for which the sage makes images. 42

Wang Pi, in his commentary on the Ho-shang Kung, said "Heaven hangs out images (ch'ui-hsiang) so that fortune and misfortune can be seen. Before things occur, he has to plan for them." 43 The sage makes the "images" and these "hexagrams" have lines which are "judgments" that reveal and de-cipher the "hidden" meanings in nature. Divination enables us to see through the "images," the "signs, or visible marks" of nature through our capacity of "intuition," "empathy," or a Mencian "sympathy." The images are meaning-clusters.

Later, in the Han period, divination also involves "revelation" from the spirits on high, in which Celestial Masters (shen jen, divine man) is sent from Heaven to save mankind, a soteriological mission, by means of a celestial scripture (t'ien shu) which teaches us to return to
an ideal government which will contribute to the goal of Great Peace (T'ai-p'ing). And the role of the chen jen is to transmit the true text, while denouncing the "perverse texts," to the governing prince of high virtue. Other revelatory texts attributed to Fu Hsi and King Wen are the Ho-t'u and Lo-shu, which are sent to man in the River Text and on the back of a large tortoise.44

On the side of erudition, the other half of a hermeneutics, the "exegesis" of biblical texts is an example of bringing in a "textual history" to bear on the interpretation, "the legible words of the scriptures, or the sages of antiquity, have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition."45 In the West, these words are esoteric discourse representing exoteric disciplines and the revealed word of God. Hence, there is an "eternity" in these "marks," since

The truth of all these marks—whether they be woven into nature itself or whether they exist in lines on parchment and in libraries—is everywhere the same: coeval with the institution of God.46

The Taoist will take "wisdom" in a pejorative sense: Chih can mean "wit," or "intelligence," according to Graham.47 It can also be translated as "cleverness" in the Taoist context, along with the association with two concepts wu-chih and wu-yu. The Tao Te Ching says,

(the sage) constantly insures that the people are without erudition (wu-chih) and without desires (wu-yu). (ch. III)

"Without erudition and without desires" means being without the "base knowledge and exaggerated desires":

erudition is not a true understanding of the workings of the cosmos, but is rather a knowledge of the artificial and contrived which inhibits any true understanding of tao.48

The difference is between wu-wei understanding and yu-wei understanding of the Confucians, though the latter will invoke wu-wei activities in some of their political writings.

2.1.4: LI IN THE ANALECTS

When one surveys the many passages in regard to li, ritual action, in the Analects, they amount to only a dozen or so. But li is also part of a web of interrelations among other major
virtues: *jen, chih, yi*. What is of interest to us is that they do fall into several categories, which we shall also try to extend in our later discussion. One immediate category is the frequent appearance of the compound of ritual action and music (*li-yüeh*), which has at least four chapters: 3/3, 8/8, 14/12, and 16/2. D. C. Lau points out that Book 3 consists mostly of the theme of *li-yüeh*. 3/3 is of special interest in that it asks what does a man of *jen* have to do with the rites? and if he does not have an interest in the rites, what could he possibly have anything to do with music? Why is *li-yüeh* mutually entailed with each other? We can recognize that music and rituals are non-discursive symbolic acts; that is what Suzanne Langer and Ernst Cassirer point out as "symbolic forms." Both *li-yüeh* are not in "words"; once we use words to describe them, such as prescribing "rules" for our rituals or our music, we discursify them. One may note also the performative aspects of music and ritual—their performance is their meaning, value and significance—their aesthetic rightness (yi) and harmony. It is the rhythmic feature of music which poetry and ritual both have invested in their repetitions and enactments.

Additionally, there are many other passages that deal with music alone: 2/4, 3/20, 3/23, 3/25, 7/14, 7/32, 8/15, 11/1, 14/13, 16/5, and 17/9. We should also note that music accompanies the Odes, which are sung—as stated in 3/20 and 8/15, where the kuan chu is the first Ode, which is characterized as "joy without wantonness, and sorrow without self-injury." And there is a moral quality attached to different kinds of music: in 3/25, the shao (music of Shun who took over from Yao) is "perfectly beautiful and perfectly good," while the wu (music of King Wu), while perfectly beautiful is not "perfectly good," since King Wu came into power by overthrowing the Yin by military forces. The importance of music is the kind of "harmony" which it creates (cf. 1/12, 3/23). Music can soothe a disturbed heart while martial music would stir one's patriotism, or lead one to hatred and war.

Another category is the comparison of previous dynasties (Hsia, Yin and Chou); there are three passages: 2/23, 3/9, and 3/14. These are interesting passages since the claim is made that we now can know with some certainty what these previous dynasties represented and embedded in their ritual practices, which have been described in some of the Six Classics, and have come down to us with the values, significances, and importances embodied in customs,
Institutions and artifacts which are here for our perusal. It also entails the fact that rituals and traditions (fao) will undergo changes from dynasty to dynasty: Chou built upon the rites of Yin, and as a result Chou is more "resplendent in culture." That is why Confucius said, "I choose Chou."

The most interesting result of ritual action are the psychological attitudes and emotional sentiments which are produced through the practice of rituals. 1/13, 8/2 and 17/8 designate six basic moral qualities, and associated "faults": among these are the positive "spirit of the rites": attitudes of respect or reverence (kung), trustworthiness in word (hsin), courage (yung), straightforwardness (chih), carefulness, or cautiousness (shen) and firmness (kang). Fingarette calls these "cliche virtues" associated traditionally with the man of jen:

'Courteous,' 'diligent,' 'loyal,' 'brave,' 'broad,' 'kind' (13/19, 14/5, 17/8)—these are the traditional virtues...the possession of such virtues is not sufficient for establishing that a man is jen (Cl. 5/18, 5/7, 14/2, 14/5). 49

Fingarette would say that we should not "psychologize" these virtues with the language of "will," "emotion," and "inner states." 50 But the major virtues of jen and chih (wisdom) are also interactive with the practice of ritual action. In 14/12, the complete man, the accomplished person (cheng jen) displays knowledge, freedom from desires (wu-yu), courage, accomplished by various talents, skills, crafts and is refined (wen) by the rites and music.

D. C. Lau has sorted out several layers in the Analects: his basis is how Confucius is referred to, as "tzu ="the Master said" (which includes the first fifteen books), or in Book 10 and the last five books, where he is referred to as "K'ung Tzu" (Master K'ung). Book 10 is a collection of aphorisms showing how Confucius carried himself in daily life in his deportment, etiquette, and within the "constraints" (yueh—see 6/27, 9/11—Legge translates yueh as "restraints," while Lau translates it as "brought back to the essentials by the rites") of certain rules of behavior in certain social situations. A third layer is a later interpolation since it has Taoist recluse, "the madman of Ch'u" (also mentioned in Chuang-tzu's chapter 4); Lau calls these apocryphal stories. 51 We would expect more references to fi-yüeh in the last five books also.

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In 2/5, we see the importance of ancestral respect in the observance of the major rites of honoring one's parents when they are alive and comport with the mourning rites when they depart from us. Mencius would carry out detailed discussions of ritual in regard to the three years mourning, burial caskets, and the proper amount of expenditures for a decent burial.

2.2: THE SAGE AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTOR.

There are four fundamental traditions within which pre-Han Chinese sages have functioned: the I Ching sage, Confucian, Mohist, and Taoist sages. Chung-ying Cheng has the thesis that both the Confucian and Taoist "metaphysical" tradition derives from the I Ching.

There are social and political considerations which emphasizes certain distinctive names for each of the sages within different cultural ideals for these cultural heroes. Two intermediate names may be used in common in all traditions: These are (1) hsien 

jen and (2) shen jen; the former refers to a "worthy person," who is not a full-fledged sage, but may within a hierarchical system be judged as the prominent person of "dignity," status, or position in a niche. Schwartz indicates that while Mo-tzu would use "noble man" occasionally, his term of preference is hsien jen, while on the other hand, Confucius would emphasize "noble man-gentleman," but he often refers to hsien jen also. Hsien jen implies that there would then be degrees of merit, or status, associated with the office and its functions to which reverence, honor, or deference is paid in virtue of their station and their duties (well-place) within the Correction of Names context.

For example, the Doctrine of the Mean implements the Correction of Names doctrine.

Benevolence (jen-1) is the characteristic element of humanity (jen-2), and the right exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness (yi) is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy (hsien jen) are produced by the principle of propriety (li).

(trans. Legge, 20/5)

Hence, it here is given the sense of "proper behavior," or "appropriateness," rather than simply "ritual action." Note also, the deference schedule of "decreasing measure of love," or propriety as a principle of "graded-love" within the sociopolitical hierarchy, with the focus on "family" (relatives) first; the Correction of Names takes this graded hierarchy into account.

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Also, in *The Great Learning*, (ch. 10), it is noted that the ruler will first be "watchful over his own virtue" and if he has virtue, he will have the people with him. And if the "ruler’s words are evil, the same words will be uttered back to him in an evil way." Hence, the ruler must rule by example and be cautious in his words-deeds. Therefore, we have the principle that the ruler only rules at the pleasure of the people. That is the Mandate of Heaven:

Take heed from the Yin (Shang) dynasty. It is not easy to keep the Mandate of Heaven. This shows that by having the support of the people, they have their countries, and by losing the support of the people, they lose their countries.

The prescriptions to the rulers of the Empire are commonplace; if you are a man of virtue and do good deeds and have good words, you will have the support of the people, otherwise, you will lose the Mandate of Heaven. Mencius emphasizes this support of the people, which the Analects probably implicitly recognize but does not highlight.

It is Hsun-tzu, who later interprets *li*, ritual action, as a winnowing "fan," an "institution" for demarcating differences and "fixing distinctions" (*pieh*), of replacing the Mohist equality with differentiation. And the job of the sage is to be able to sort out (*tun*) this hierarchy into graded differences, of ranks and degrees, based on the criteria of "ability, virtue, and merit."

The rites put wealth and goods to their uses, mark outwardly noble and humble status, by (effecting variations in) abundance and paucity create differences, and by greater elaborateness or diminished simplicity achieve what is appropriate...Those who lack virtue shall not be ennobled, those who lack ability shall not be given office, those without merit shall not be rewarded, and those without guilt shall not be punished.

This is a considerable departure from the Mencian-Confucian emphasis on the "virtue" of jen as a natural kind of differentiation, instead of Hsun-tzu’s *li* as a "conventionalized" way of making determinations within a hierarchy.

### 2.2.1: WORTHIES AND GOOD MEN: HSJEN-JEN AND SHAN JEN

The Confucian would call higher ranking worthies, *chün-tzu*, the superior man, the gentleman, the exemplary person. James Legge would call him the "virtuous" man, or a person of character. Schwartz would point out that most of these appellations are "non-elitist" in connotation, that is, Confucius is not interested in the aristocratic background of his disciples but
in their achievement as an elite group of learners. Graham would trace it back to some 
"aristocratic" origin. Schwartz also describes Mo-tzu's main emphasis on hsien, the man of 
worth, or the sage. The principal feature of a hsien is based on "merit," hence, rulers should 
appoint men of worth, and promote them, so this is the first form of a "meritocracy." Confucius' 
preference for chin tzu (superior man, gentleman) is a term of "ethical evaluation, as well as a 
designation of status" and the contrast is between the ju, (literally) who is a superior man, a 
person educated in the six arts: knowledge of the rites, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, 
and mathematics, and the ju, who is the "small, mean man." Hence, the role of education 
must also be moral in character and prepare students to obtain some position of worth.

The other more common term is shan jen, or "good" man. While hsien jen seems to be 
a social term, as seen within a hierarchy of a socio-political structure, shan jen is best seen in 
the "ethical context." Schwartz points this out as Confucius' use of an "ethical vanguard" to 
achieve control in a normative system:

Confucianism conservatively stresses that good societies are made by 'good 
men' (shan jen) and not by institutional or social conditioning.

The continual harkening "back to the ancients" becomes the model of the good man and the 
appreciation of the sage-kings as its best exemplar. In the Doctrine of the Mean, Shun was 
considered one of the first hermeneuticist,

since he loved to question others, and to study their words, though they might be 
shallow... he took hold of their two extremes (tuan-end, limits), determined the 
Mean, and employed it in his government of the people.

Ames would give an interpretation of hsing (human nature) in terms of shan, the acquisi-
tion of "degrees of deftness and facility" in doing something:

Hsing, then, is its proper course of development during its process of sheng 
(growth) ... The locus of hsing, then, is not some isolatable self, but one's self as 
the center of relationships that are, over a lifetime, deepened, nurtured and 
extended with varying degrees of deftness and facility (shan).

I would interpret hsing, here, as part of the ideal of the craftsman, as an "adept," one who is 
"good at" the use of his tools of his trade, while at the same time, the sage is one who is adept at 
using the various virtues, excellences, etc, as tools in his trade.
In Analects, 7:26, Confucius contrasts the sage and the good man, shan jen.

The Master said, 'I have no hopes of meeting a sage (sheng jen). I would be content if I met someone who is a 'gentleman' (chün tzu)...I have no hopes of meeting a good man (shan jen). I would be content if I met someone who has constancy.'

For Legge, constancy is the "single-hearted, steadfast man; the good man, who in his single-heartedness has built up his virtue; the chün tzu, the man of virtue in large proportions." Hence, it is a matter of degrees, with the sage (sheng jen) being the "highest style of men." In summary, worthies and good men (hsien jen, shan jen) are of lower degrees than the higher chün tzu and the highest degree is the sage, sheng jen.

Yen Hui is described as a jen che (6:7), a characteristic he shared with the worthy, hsien jen of old (7:15)...but the hsien jen does not rank with the sheng jen, but is at least as high as the jen che. 

Max Kaltenmark presents a ranking of seven categories of sages within three domains (heaven-earth-man), and their functions in a hierarchical sociopolitical structure. This is found in the Taoist’s work, T’ai-p’Ing Ching, dating around the end of the sixth century. The top two ranks are shen jen and ta shen jen (divine men, also called Celestial Masters): their task is to govern the Primordial Breath (ch‘ü) and to govern Heaven; (3) the chen-jen’s task is to govern Earth, and they are emissaries to deliver the revealed texts to the ruling princes; (4) the hsien-jen (the Immortals) govern the four seasons, they transform themselves in accord with the seasons; (5) the ta tao jen govern the Five Elements and they are good at divination; (6) the sheng-jen (Confucian sage) govern the harmonization of ch‘ü, the alternation of yin-yang; (7) the hsien-jen (worthy) govern the writings of the wen-shu (erudites and specialists in oral and written expressions). Among the common people, the more intelligent can become shan-jen (good, free people) and ascend the steps of the hierarchy.

The chün tzu (the Superior Man, exemplary person) is mostly the “ideal moral character” (D. C. Lau) with a socio-political excellence; hence, he would fit in closest to (3) and (4) above. Confucius denied that he could be called sheng jen, jen che (authoritative person) or even a chün tzu.
Confucius and Mencius...sought the highest sphere, but the method which they used was different from that used by the Taoists. The Taoist method was to discard knowledge, and so to forget the self, and by this means to enter the sphere of undifferentiable oneness with all creation. Confucius' and Mencius' method was the accumulation of righteousness, by this to overcome the self and so be able to enter the sphere of undifferentiable oneness with all creation...The Confucianist sages were enthusiastic souls, the Taoist sages men of imperishable calm.17

Confucius says, that at the age of fifty, he realized the ming of ti'en; at sixty, "my ear was attuned"; and at seventy, "I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the mark." While Mencius was to use his hao jan chih ch'i (the flood-like ch'i) to get an understanding of tao and accumulate righteousness. Hao jan means "great to a supreme degree."18

Chuang-tzu's chen jen achieves oneness with tao through "sitting and forgetting." Both sages, however, would achieve their transcendence-in-immanence in a somewhat mystical vein in the mystery of existence. Mencius' statement is that "All things are complete within us" (7A/4), and Chuang-tzu says, "All things with oneself are one." For Confucius, the sage realizes ti'en-jen ho-i is the primary truth of a communicative actor.

2.2.2: MO-TZU'S SAGE: THE CHÜ TZU

In contrast to the Confucian noble man, who uses moral suasion, by bringing to bear on the ruler his moral power (te), the Chü Tzu is an "activist-pacifist," who is the Man of Universal Love (chien ai). He is an activist in that Mo-tzu insists on "how to act" (wei), which is then explained as "willing and doing";19 this has implications for the communicative relations of "words and deeds," since Mo-tzu also speaks about "words" in the dialectic skill and knowledge of "methods," as Graham points out in his studies of the Later-Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science.20 At the same time, Mo-tzu is considered the Chü Tzu, the Grand Master, who is a great charismatic leader with an "organized" group of disciples who would come to the aid of beleaguered small states. Mo-tzu would insist that "warfare is not acting in accordance with tao" and he was not only a "moralist or theorist of pacifism."21 Mo-tzu also would use the precedent of the sage-kings to justify his principle of Universal Love.22
Hansen would like to characterize the names (ming), which society uses as vocabulary to guide our conduct, as a way (tao) to effectuate our behavior. Hence, it is the coding in language which constitute our linguistic "taos"; for example, the moral prescription of a Confucian is given the name of tao, while Mo-tzu would use a "universal" standard as a way to evaluate his tao (chien ai). Hence, the linguistic taos would differ, though the name tao may be used, it would signify something different.

The Moist pattern of behavior guidance differs from the Confucian. Both are learned patterns characterized by differences in language—specifically stressing different terms and making different distinctions. They both call their guidance systems dao.23

Mo-tzu proposes a thought experiment of two friends (rulers): an universal vs. a partial ruler is to be measured against the doctrine that they are "sincere in word and decisive in deed" and their word and deed are made to agree like the "two parts of a tally," so that there is no self-contradiction between their words and deeds. You would trust your family to the "universal" friend, as against the "partial" friend; hence the principle of Universal Love (chien ai) is fundamentally whether you trust their words to eventuate in deeds.24

Here we have a good contrast already of the communicative actors of Confucius as against Mo-tzu. In terms of an interpretation of tradition, Mo-tzu even uses the same terms as Confucius in the Five Great Human Relationships, with the exception that one does not "love" in a graded-hierarchical sense, from family outward, but we should love all universally (chien ai). This also meant that Mo-tzu was more interested in the common people than the graded hierarchical structure of the aristocracy. But Mo-tzu also accepts the Confucian "virtues" of jen, li, yi, and chiin, though he emphasizes yi over jen. Furthermore, Graham points out that the basic difference between the Confucian and the Mohist is that the former derives the Five Great Human Relationships stated in The Great Learning, beginning from social bonds from kinship and extended to state and Empire the virtues learned in the family.25

The other major theme between these two communicative actors has to do with Heaven and ming, or the Mandate of Heaven. Schwartz shows that the ming-fatalism argument is para-
Mo-tzu's Heaven plays a far smaller role in human affairs than does the Heaven of the contemporary Confucianists with whom he was in contact... The Mohist operates within the situation as he finds it in the firm belief that human actors basing themselves on Heaven as a 'model' will play the decisive role in shaping the future.28

The Confucian seems to think that Heaven and ming does play a role in the patterns of "destiny" and history. The cycles of order and disorder of tao is a function of Heaven's dispensation, hence Mo-tzu argues that it is "fatalistically" acceptable to the Confucian. Heaven "speaks" (words), but Heaven's "actions" are beyond our control. On a more mundane level, Confucians continuously warn us that our words and deeds must accord with each other, and that our knowledge and actions must also be in harmony.

For Mo-tzu, the three "tests" for verifying a statement is (1) "one bases oneself first of all on the actions of the sage-kings, (2) one relies on the consensus of mankind drawn from their own experience, and (3) one relies on the "pragmatic" consequences (yung) of a given mode of belief."27 These criteria are fairly "action-oriented" and depends less on what is said, communicatively speaking, it is the actions that will "speak" louder than the "words." Also, in terms of a social theory, the second criterion seems to be more like "poll-taking."28 In order to gain some "consensus" in support of communicative participation or interaction. Most of all, Mo-tzu depends upon the application of a "utilitarian" measure to bring about consensus. But the first criterion does go back to the sage-kings as the "standard."

There is nothing like taking Heaven as one's 'standard.' Heaven's actions are all encompassing and selfish... Thus the sage-kings took Heaven as their standard and their actions were effective.29

It is the actions or deeds of the sage-kings which serves as the normative standard even for the contemporary lifeworld. Hansen believes, however, that the three standards, when interpreted pragmatically, amounts to "historical conformity, social conformation, and ease in application, and pragmatic usefulness."30

Taken as a whole, the Mohist's three criteria are all pragmatic-instrumental, or purpose-teleological, deliberative-calculative, yu-wei thinking, rather than the communicative ration-
ality desired by Habermas. The Mohists are aiming at consensus and intersubjectivity in their utterance of some communicative emphasis on *chien ai* in its altruistic aspects. This consensus should not depart from the conservative viewpoint of going back to the ancients, and putting up the model of the sage-king as a "standard." Even the Confucian standard depends on *jen*, as benevolence, which also has altruistic and intersubjective overtones.

Schwartz makes two important points in regard to the use of language which will contrast Mohist thought with later Taoist viewpoints:

The entire preoccupation in Taoism with the antithesis between spontaneous, nonpurposive, and "natural" modes of behavior (wu-wei) and deliberate, calculating and purposive modes of action (yu-wei) may at least in part have represented a sharp reaction against the extraordinary highlighting of the latter within Mohist thought.31

And,

... The later Mohist dialecticians strive to create is a kind of 'scientific' language for dealing with the world... On the other side, they strongly defend what is essentially a 'common sense' view of experience based on the human 'lifeworld' (Husserl's *Lebenswelt*) against the attacks of later 'sophists' and Taoists, such as Chuang-tzu, who have lost all faith in the power of human language to provide a true view of reality.32

The difference is the fundamental attitude toward yu-wei and wu-wei, which are important to the way you try and describe reality: It is paradoxical to try and convey the indescribable by means of "discursive" symbols of language. The wu-wei aspects of nature is the manifestation of tao in its "non-being," chaotic aspects, and may only be accessible through non-discursive means, i.e., through myth, poetry, dance, music, etc..

2.2.3: THE SAGE AND THE FALLENNESS OF TAO.

Hall indicates the origin of "discriminations" as part of the first holes bored into hun-tun, the beginning of "artifice" and yu-wei thinking:

... The Taoist sage claims that good and evil are born into the world by virtue of the artifice of rational distinctions.33

Any discriminations we make are only selective among items in our attention, or awareness. We sometime fail to see the conventionality of the distinctions that occur between people who are engaged in discriminating, or trying to agree to define their terms, while they are arguing, or
at the same time they take-for-granted the communal and commonality of usages from their own lifeworld. The Way, then, becomes "flawed"; K. M. Wu calls this the "waning" of tao.34

The beginning of the "falleness of tao" is the fall from the Utopia of the "primitivists." In the Outer Chapters, Ch. 22, we get a "devolutionary" statement of the "contrived" nature of Good-will, Duty, and the Rites.

The Way is incommunicable/The Power is impenetrable/Goodwill can be contrived/Duty can be left undone/The Rites are a shared pretence. Hence, it is said, The Way lost, only then Power: Power lost, only then Goodwill: Goodwill lost, only then Duty: Duty lost, only then the Rites. The Rites are the Way's decorations and disorder's head.35

This devolutionary sequence is also found in ch. XXXVIII, of the Tao Te Ching:

When we neglect the Tao/Then Te arises/When we neglect Te/then benevolence arises...righteousness arises...ceremonies and rites arises, etc.

...In defense of the Confucian side, however, Mencius offers the Eros-like "flood-like ch'i" (breath) which when "nourished with integrity and place no obstacle in its path will fill the space between Heaven and Earth" (2A/2). Furthermore, this flood-like ch'i unites rightness (yi) with the Way and through accumulated "rightness" one can understand the ch'i and also understand what is in your "heart-mind" (hsin). And the most important lesson by caring for one's flood-like ch'i is the trust we put on our words from our "heart"; this is the compound of words-deeds in which the ch'i moves the will (chih) which eventuate in actions. In this case, Mencius is countering Kao-tzu's belief that there is no relation between our "words" and our ch'i.

It is right that one should not seek satisfaction in one's ch'i when one fails to understand in one's heart. But it is wrong to say that one should not worry about it in one's heart when one fails to understand words.36

It should be noted that here the floodlike ch'i is the "spiritual" (shen, soul-like) portion of the intricate interrelationship of heart-mind and body, which is illustrated by Mencius as mutually reciprocal actions, or functions, rather than a mind-body dualism. Furthermore, Mencius believes that "hearing and seeing" are unable to "think" and the organ of the heart is what thinks.37

Mencius could also tie in the flood-like ch'i with his famous "aetiological" speculation of
the "origins," and beginnings of the Four Germs (luan) which led to the discussions of "human nature" (hsing). The Germs are the accumulation of "right" little acts which makes us see the (moral) Way. The Germs may be considered "innate," on the one hand, while on the other hand, they are the product of acquisition or accumulation, by habitual acts of "rightness." The Four Germs also account for the generation of jen, li, yi, and chih (2A/8, 4A/27). The Four Germs are also related to liang chih, a sort of moral intuition, which is the inherent "goodness of hsin," the heart-mind. Mencius visualizes it in relation to decision making in our acquisition of knowledge and learning when applied to practical moral situations. Mencius also distinguishes between the part of the "body" (t'i) which is of larger importance (ta-t'i, greater body) and that of smaller importance (hsiao-t'i, smaller body);

He who is guided by the interests of the parts of his person that are of greater importance (ta-t'i) is a great man; he who is guided by the interests of the parts of his person that are of smaller importance (hsiao-t'i) is a small man.38

The greater part is hsin, the more "spiritual" part of man, and the smaller part are the emotions, desires and feelings closely related to the bodily (t'i) aspect of man. Mencius believes that we are all capable of being sages, provided we recognize the Four Germs as the beginnings of "goodness," and the sage is simply the person who expands these beginnings until he reaches "the apogee of human relationships." 39

Mencius likes to see man as a whole (both smaller and larger selves). There is an "attunement" of the whole body, mind, spirit, floodlike ch'i, etc. K. M. Wu reinforces the concept of "attunement" with "resonance with the piping of Heaven." Hall and Ames translates the main passage in the Analects, 13/3, on the Correction of Names, using "attunement," (where D. C. Lau would translate it as "sounds reasonable.")

When names are not properly ordered, what is said is not attuned, things will not be done successfully; when things are not done successfully, the use of ritual action and music will not prevail.40

The various sages have the task as communicative actors to have some affinity with "attainment of tao," on the one hand, and then, even with the correlative Taoist obstacle of not
being able to describe, discuss, or discriminate the whole detailed processual movement of tao, in our "natural" language, would still try to communicate this "theoretical," constancy to others. This fung-chiao (communication) becomes the interaction of "words-deeds" to participants in the communicative act, or as communicative recipients. It does require a "creative imagination" to picture and portray the core of that Confucian-Chou synthesis which is being transmitted.

The sage, according to Mencius and Hsun-tzu, is responsible for inaugurating good sociopolitical order and hence are creative communicative actors. Good societies are made by good men who are able to embody in themselves the li-performances of the culture and society and they communicate this by "example." Hence, sages are part of the vanguard elite, who profess to know tao (chih tao, to understand) and is able to suffuse it with the spirit of the ritual and enliven the people with an interest in good social order. As Hsun-tzu says, The various categories of li cannot implement themselves ... It is only when one obtains the (right) man that they can be actualized. Without the right man, they are lost. The law is the principle of good order. The noble man is the source of the law. Thus if one has a noble man, even if the law is rudimentary, its effect will be widespread.41

The problem with the Legalists was the fact that they thought that having established the law (fa), that it would be an autonomous system which would implement and "run itself." However, for the Confucianists, the li needs to be re-novated and re-enacted over and over again to retain its original spirit and the intent by noble men (chün tzu).

It is in the Correction of Names that the sage is a master communicator by his "attuning" of persons and meaningful relationships (yi, as signifying) within various media: "language, ritual actions, and music." Hence, the emphasis will be on the "performative" aspect of language and music. These varying media are complementary, interpenetrating, and mutually reciprocal. The sage is a master of communication...communication is irreducibly interpersonal...in which self, society and state are correlates determined through communication.42

It is the performative force of actions which apply to all naming; one needs to identify the position, its functions, duties, obligations, and scope or limits within the larger hierarchical structure in which the niche, status and honors are prescribed as "my station and its duties."
The "attunement" or "resonance" is to the traditional "models" of ritual actions, music, poetry and metaphorical or imagistic language used in the Six Classics.

The sage appeals to present praxis and to the repository of significances realized in the traditional past in such a manner as to set up deferential relationships between himself, his communicants, and the authoritative texts invoked. This is the importance of the musical hermeneutics of K. M. Wu, which shows us the aesthetic attitude as a cosmic response, attunement with the music of the spheres. A broader interpretation is to call it an Aesthetic Hermeneutics based on aesthetic criteria for judging aisthesis.

2.3: WORDS AND DEEDS; SHUO-WEN AND THE TEXTUAL EXEGESIS.

We can trace the references of "words-deeds" in the Analects to the following:

1/7, 1/13, 1/14, 2/23, 2/13, 2/18, 4/22, 4/24, 4/26, 5/9, 5/18, 7/24, 8/4, 9/29, 13/3, 14/4, 14/5, 14/21, 14/29, 15/5, 15/18, 15/22, 16/4, 16/6, 17/18, 18/8.

The Correction of Names doctrine is covered in 12/17, 13/6 and 13/13, with the main passage as 13/3. This latter passage is not just a theory of "names and actuality," which may be only a "referential" theory of language, but the end of the passage has specific views regarding the practicality of words-deeds:

Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned. (trans. D. C. Lau)

This interpretation by Lau indicates that it is what a gentleman says in a practical situation (praxis) that is an important indication of his earnestness, honesty, or integrity, and not casualness in his "conduct" (hsing) or behavior. Hence, the use of language is pragmatic "competence" which emphasizes the "performative" dimension.

Just as there is an illocutionary force for performative speech-acts, there are illocutionary gestures which involve "body" gestures, body-images, and appearances (countenance, physiognomy); for example, in Analects, 11/20:

Is one who simply sides with tenacious opinions a gentleman? or is he merely putting on a dignified appearance (se)?

And in 12/20, The Gentleman is
A man who is straight by nature and fond of what is right, sensitive to other people’s words and observant of the expression on their faces, and always mindful of being modest... while the man seeking fame and glory may be a man who is putting up a facade of benevolence which is belied by his deeds.

Mencius is much more direct; in 8A/15-16, he says,

How can a man conceal his true character if you listen to his words and observe the pupils of his eyes?...Can an unctuous voice and a smiling countenance pass for respectfulness and frugality?

These are the psychogenesis of a “body-language,” in which the tone of voice (prosody), the shrug of a shoulder, throwing up the hands to show despair, or loss of control; forms of “greetings” such as the Chinese asking whether one has “eaten, yet, or not,” and the “smile” that hides or throws up a facade, or hides an inscrutableness of hidden motives. In the context of li, ritual practices, other virtues such as modesty, trustworthiness, loyalty, (hsin, chung), courage, uprightness—Analects 8/2 and 17/8—become integral parts of the words-deeds compound, i.e., in Analects, 15/18,

The gentleman has morality in his basic stuff (chih, natural disposition) and by observing the rites puts it into practice (hsing, conduct). (trans. D. C. Lau)

Ritual actions builds upon our dispositions and eventuates in our practices.

The formalization of ritual practices takes place within the framework of the main Confucian virtues. Ritual practices have roots in specific religious ceremonies, a sacred resource which gives an aura of “spirituality” to these rites—Analects 8/2 and 17/8, both speak to the “spirit of the rites” (stated negatively as wu-li, that is, without the spirit of the rites)—as well as specific social and political scenes, in which the ceremonial, festive occasions, and even ordinary everyday gestures congeal into unwritten signs of understanding, consensus, and participation, which are the marks of ritual practices. It is the use of illocutionary verbs or the prescriptive, moral and normative language used by the Confucian in moral suasion toward rulers that makes it a rhetorical enterprise. This can also be displayed in one of the major Confucian virtues of hsin (true to one’s word), which is the combination of the signifier of (jen + yen, man + speech), and means living up to one’s stated norms and achievement within the minor virtues of trustworthiness, being honest and sincere in one’s (performative) speech acts
We see this trustworthiness in *Analects*, 1/13,

Yu Tzu said, "To be trustworthy in word is close to being moral in that it enables one's words to be repeated."

What is "usable in speech" is close to Wittgenstein's "meaning is use," or better yet, meaning is proper "usage." Usages are repeated consistent occasions of use in language, worthy of being repeated from generation to generation. Hence, the Correction of Names is meaningful within a "use theory of meaning" and specifically within the "performative" aspects of speech-acts. This direction is away from the "semantic" toward the "pragmatics-usage" viewpoint of language, hence, words-deeds go hand in hand.

Habermas also points out that "speaking and acting are not the same," structurally, but functionally, they share in the "performative aspects" of "how to do things with one's words" of Austin. In *Analects*, 1/14 and 4/24: "The gentleman is quick in action but cautious in speech." The performative side predominates here, over the side of descriptive speech. The moral, here, is that one should be judged by his service by example, by what he does, rather than by his "precepts." And validity is a matter of accepting or disclaiming, a process of *shih-fei's* (according to Hansen) in the guiding of our "conduct": "*Shih-fei* represents the basic form of assent/dissent response." One validity is a matter of accepting or disclaiming, a process of *shih-fei's* (according to Hansen) in the guiding of our "conduct": "*Shih-fei* represents the basic form of assent/dissent response."

Habermas also would like to reduce validity claims to a procedure of "yes/no" answers to claims and counterclaims. Hence, the *vis-a-vis* encounter of participants using words-deeds for communicative consensus, validity confirmations, and *shih-fei* responses are part of the "performative" and "illocutionary" usages of our symbolic and non-symbolic gestures and their incipient emergent meanings. Moreover, Chad Hansen strongly agrees with Habermas' shift in paradigm from "semantics" to "pragmatics": for Hansen the important point is that language has a role of "guiding behavior," which will predominate over the "descriptive" role. Chinese philosophy is best understood as based on "pragmatics" rather than "semantics," and hence can be used for "guiding actions and co-ordinating social interaction."

The Chinese do not distinguish clearly the "declarative" (descriptive) mood from the "imperative."
However, the prescriptive function of language informs the Chinese view of language as the descriptive function informs ours. The base of prescription is the ming—not the sentence. (Ming 'command' is the usual verbal form of ming 'name').

Western linguistics tends to start with the "sentence" as the unit of meaning, rather than the "word," or "name." Ricoeur would even agree with Emile Benveniste that the unit of meaning is more than the sentence; it is the work, the text, the cumulative corporate text, a hermeneutics of beyond the "sentence" to "text" and ultimately to language as a "system," such as in Saussure.

2.3.1: ARCHÆOLOGY OF WORDS-DEEDS: SHUO-WEN

For an archaeology of yen ( giorno ), we go to Shuo-wen 3-466.

Speaking directly means yen; talking about difficulties means yu; and thus the character yen has a kou (mouth) as one of its components. All the characters which conveys the meaning of 'speaking,' therefore, has yen as their component, i.e., yu ( ゆ ) means 'to argue and to state'; lun ( る ) means 'to talk about difficulties and questions,' hence lun nan is 'to reply to difficult questions.'

And at Shuo-wen 11-1030-11-1033, we have a few examples of "illocutionary " force, each of these having yen as a signiflc on the left:

- chao ( 称 )—to proclaim as a king, to appeal to, to encourage, issue an imperial mandate.
- kao ( 賞 )—to grant, as title of honor, title of nobility, to enjoin, to order, to inform a superior.

Searle would classify "proclaim" as a "declaration" (Austin—as "exercitive"), while to "grant" would be Searle's "directive" and Austin's "exercitive."

There is also an important connection between yen and yi ( 語 ), "meaning, signification, intention." In Shuo-wen 8-1110:

From the heart-mind, examine (cha), and look into yen (speech, language) and "know" its meaning (yi).

It is this association with meaning, significance, that makes speech, or language the way to knowledge (chih) and hence, a cognate of the examination into language as the way to "know" gives us the compound of the "unity of knowledge-action."
There is also a frequent emphasis in Confucius and Mencius, in their use of 興, 興, usually translated as "will, purpose, intention, motivation." Fingarette would translate the many references in the Analects to 興 and place them in several categories.

1) will related to action (hsing)—1/11, 5/25, 11/25, 18/11
2) will to speech (yen)—15/22, 18/8
3) will as purpose (chih)—1/8, 1/11, 2/28, 8/7, 8/24, 11/25, 12/1, 12/2, 13/20, 14/25, 14/32, 18/8, 19/8, 19/10

Fingarette would point out that 興, or will, should not be taken as a psychological faculty, such as the Platonic view of the soul "writ large," nor should we "psychologize" any of the Confucian virtues, such as 仁, 礼, 興, and 义, since these virtues are not connected with the language of "will," "emotion," and "inner states." In the Chinese context, 興 is best construed in the sense of motivations, drives, or better, Merleau-Ponty's "motor intentionalities" (cf., bodily intentionalities), which leads to meanings, significations, and importances (义 as signification). 興, in this sense, would not be a push from behind but rather an analogical projection "toward" (chih, 興, as a locative "to"). Fingarette also contrasts the 興-tzu with the egoist: the gentleman, "yields (讓) his will to tao, and never imposes by means of will (chih) on others," while the "egoist" does impose his will. In this regard, 讓 also means "deference"; hence, to yield to the other is part of tolerance for others, a reciprocity inherent in the meaning of 相, "likening to oneself of others," which are also observed in the customary deference within the context of the Five Great Human Relationships.

Will (chih) is also related to 义 (meaning, significance). In Shuo-wen 8-1110,

義 (义) is derived from the sounds (sheng 聲) in our heart (hsin, heart-mind). 興 (興) (will, intention, purpose, motivation) has the 興 (heart) radical and to stop' (shih, Mathews, radical 33, 豸)—when put together means, "Where the heart goes, or what rests in the heart."

Hence, the heart-mind (hsin) is broader and an integral power (fe) than simply an intellectual power operating and embodied in words-deeds. This integration of the heart-mind is an "appropriating" of 义 (signification, meaning) to 興 (motivations).
But the hermeneutical aspects of *yen* (speech, language) include two other sets of distinctions: (1) *yen* in its relation to "discrimination," "arguments" (*pien*). Hansen and Graham consider this to be the basic function of how language becomes important, through the initial distinctions we make in language and discriminations in our sense-perceptions. *Pien* is composed of *yen*, in the middle, flanked by *hsin* (acid, bitter) on each side: hence, *pien* has the sense of "wrangling," or bitter arguments, (2) hermeneutically the term "explanation" is quite important, especially from Dilthey's point of view; in this case, however, the radical is *hsing* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)) meaning "fortunate"—but looks like *hsin*, \(\frac{艸}{艸}\) "acid, bitter."—and when combined with *mu*, eye (\(\frac{目}{目}\)), makes up \(i\) (\(\frac{月}{月}\) to spy, to lead on). This significance of *i* is a radical which forms several such hermeneutical characters which means "to explain, to interpret, to translate": (a) *i* combined with *yen* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\) Mathews--3064); (b) *i*, combined with the silk radical (\(\frac{繭}{繭}\) Mathews--3063) gives us another character with the signification of "unravelling a silk cocoon," or "explaining" by unravelling, unloosening a skein of silk, which in cultural terms calls attention to the basic industry of sericulture; (c) *shih* (\(\frac{石}{石}\) Mathews--5824) which is composed of *i*, as significate, and *pien* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\) radical 165, to separate, to distinguish) also means to "explain, interpret, or translate," and (d) *chieh* (\(\frac{刀}{刀}\) Mathews--628) is what I call the Cook Ting character, in which horn-knife-ox forms "unloosen," such as to unloosen an ox, hence to unravel and ox, is to explain. In short hermeneutics "explains" by "seeing" (divining) the "fortunate" (*hsing*).

The other important half of the compound of words and deeds is *hsing* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)) which means to act, walk, to do, conduct oneself, practice, etc.). In Shuo-wen 3-227, *hsing* means, Man's walking slowly and walking fast. The graph is the meeting of streets, cross-roads (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)); the left part of the graph is *ch'ih* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)) and the right part *ch'u* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)) and these mean (1) to step with left foot and (2) step with right foot, respectively. *Ch'ih* means short steps or walking hastily with short steps; *ch'u* means to stop walking.

Also, in Karlgren's *Grammata Serica Recensa*, # 748, shows crossroads as earlier graphs.

Other meanings for *hsing* are "to stretch out, draw out induce"; "to go on tour of inspection"; *hang* (\(\frac{艸}{艸}\)), "to arrange in order, file, rank"; and "to act virtuously" (le *hsing*, 德行).
It is interesting that Mencius says in 6B/2,

The trouble with a man is surely not his lack of sufficient strength, but his refusal to make the effort... One who walks slowly, keeping behind his elders, is considered a well-mannered younger brother. One who walks quickly, overtaking his elders, is considered an ill-mannered younger brother.

The manners of walking is a clue to one's conduct; their actions bespeak their words.

In its performative aspects: *hsing* is to act, to do; also to use (*yung*); to employ a person for work (*shih*); to bestow, confer upon (*ts'uu*); to carry out, to act to practice (*shih*). In *Analects* 111:

The Master said, 'Is it not a pleasure, having learned something, to try it out (practice it) at due intervals?'

(Legge says, "to learn with a constant perserverance and application?", and in his footnote, he mentions the fact that *shih* is composed of "double wings," hence, "the rapid and frequent motion of the wings of a bird in flying," used as an image "to repeat, to practice."). Most of all, the performative aspect of words in its illocutionary force can be manifest in most of the graphs with *yen* in its components, which can be verified by any cursory survey of the *Analects*. Finally, the use of wu-wei and yu-wei, and wei-wu-wei, makes the term *wei* (to act, to do, to deem, to conduct oneself), the main term that becomes important to show what actions, deeds, and conduct is all about, especially in the Confucian and Taoist contexts..

In summary, the *Shuo-wen* shows the etymological connections between words-deeds (*yen-hsing*). Many of the characters, with *yen* as radical, have a performative aspect and illocutionary force associated with them, i.e., *chao* (*proclaim, issue a Royal edict, etc.*). And *hsing* has many variant meanings which leads to one's general conduct, behavior, practice, praxis, and application.

2.3.2: PERFORMATIVE-PRESCRIPTIVE APPLICATIONS OF WORDS-DEEDS.

Somewhat more revealing on the verbal side of the words-deeds compound is the "verbal or linguistic tao." The graph of *tao* breaks down into the component of *ch'ê*.
which means "to walk, to pass over, to go over," and shou (ㄏㄠ ), which means "head, foremost." And all characters composed with the signfic ch"o are "verbal" in character. For example, tung chieo (щение) (communication) is a transaction of passing through, penetration, and gives us verbal understanding.

Taking the verbal tao as primary, its several derived meanings emerge rather naturally: to lead through; road, path; way, method, art, teachings; to explain, to tell... at its most fundamental level, to denote the active project of 'road making.'

Most of all, the verbal tao is the "legacy" (generative and embodying a heritage, tradition) received from preceding generations and embodied in language, which forms the lifeworlds of communicative participants in their cultural contexts. But a proviso must be made that the verbal aspect of tao is couched in "performative-prescriptive" dimensions, since rhetoric and moral persuasion is the Confucian tao. However, there is the other side of tao, which is ritualistic-gestural, which is non-verbal as yet, though verbalizable, incipiently. Alternatively, Hansen will also claim that the Taoist have predominantly a "linguistic" tao, which is probably non-prescriptive, non-normative, and the te associated with this te-tao may be "tacit" knowledge, skill, aptitude, etc.12

There is a point made by Schwartz that Confucius is not facing any language "crisis", which is a much later development in Chuang-tzu. The fact that Confucius is using "rhetorical," persuasive force in moral suasion, prescriptive tenets for rulers to follow, makes him comfortable with "performatory" language. It is the normative aspect of language, in which the realized "taos" of the past achievements of the sage-kings are used as prescriptive norms of li, rituals, and this acceptance in the orthodoxy of Confucianism leans heavily on the prestige of the ancientness of the Six Classics as "authoritative" grounding for his transmitted viewpoints. Even Mo-tzu would go back to the ancients and the sage-kings as the "standard" test for his statements. Schwartz summarizes this tendency as follows:

(Confucius) is no sociological behaviorist, he does not believe that playing a certain role will automatically 'internalize' the spirit of li... Yet Confucius' central problem is that this 'regulative function' of language by no means works automatically... One might perhaps say that the focus of the 'ideal' is to be found
in the persons of sage-kings, sages, noble men, past and present, and in the will of Heaven. 13

Graham reinforces this fact that Confucius does not use "arguments," but is comfortable in just stating his positions, while Mo-tzu and Later Mohists, actually argue their positions. However, even in the I Ching, it is the far-reaching influences of the charismatic sage in his words-deeds which will affect generations to come, hence even in his room he must be careful of what he thinks and say, because these words-deeds will reverberate all through "under the Heavens":

If the superior man abides in his room and his words are not well spoken, he meets with contradiction at a distance of more than a thousand miles. How much more then from near by. Words go forth from one's own person and exert their influence on men. Deeds are born close at hand and become visible far away. Words and deeds are the hinge and bowspring of the superior man... Through words and deeds the superior man moves heaven and earth. 14

There are also many passages in the Mencius which related words to deeds. Whereas in the Analects, the relationship is more direct, more "aphoristic," or in the form of quotable "proverbs," in some of the hermeneutical situations in Mencius’s various discussion with different Kings, Dukes, etc. words may predominate over action, especially in his discussion of "heretical" viewpoints, such as those directed against Mo-tzu, Yang Chu, and Kao-tzu. Also, Mencius takes to task the "village worthy," who, in 7B/37, is

(The man who says,) 'What is the point of having such great ambition? Their words and deeds take no notice of each other, and yet they keep on saying, 'The ancients! The ancients!' Why must they walk along in such solitary fashion?'... Such is the village honest man.

Also, the qualities of countenance and physiognomy of the sincere person is cited in 4A/15:

How can a man conceal his true character if you listen to his words and observe the pupils of his eyes?...Can an unctuous voice and a smiling countenance pass for respectfulness and frugality?

If we look back on the continuity between non-symbolic and symbolic responses to words and deeds, the point is that before one reduces everything to the "lingual" dimension, there is that which is pre-linguistic in such phenomena as art, dance, music, etc., Ricoeur points out these conditions in Gadamer's "art and historical consciousness." 15
In general, it is not just the kind of words used by a King that is appropriate, but words can be like weapons and can kill, or murder someone, even when the King is at "play." At the very outset of 1A/1, in talking to King Hui about benevolence and righteousness, Mencius inveighs the King not to use the word li, "profit," and traces out the consequences of how this usage will influence the ministers, other feudal lords to the common man, and the subsequent imperilling of the nation-state. 

The symbolic uses of music by the King is reflected onto the general public in that it sends a "gestural" message as to whether the King is sympathetic to the weal or woe of the common people or not. This is similar to what Heaven does, in 5A/5: "Heaven does not speak but reveals itself by its acts and deeds." K. M. Wu says,

> The experience of a situation is meaningful when seen to be signified by a non-linguistic sign, such as 'body language.' Music pervades the air, and colors and smells charge the situation with polythetic coherence.

Even more significant is a passage on "benevolent music":

> Mencius said, 'Benevolent words do not have as profound an effect on the people as benevolent music.'

Even Confucius cites the "moral qualities" of certain kinds of music as having a bad effect on social attitudes, which would become standard practice in the evaluation of kinds or genre of art, literature, poetry, painting, music, etc.

> In 5A/6, we have an interpretation of the first passing of the throne to either a son or a man of merit, i.e., Yao to Shun, and the issue of what were the criterial marks of the "mandate" or Decree of Heaven?

> All this was due to Heaven and could not have been brought about by man. When a thing is done through no one, then it is the work of Heaven; when a thing comes about though no one brings it about, then it is decreed.

Mencius also realizes the risks and dangers involved with heterodox words; in 2A/2:

> From biased words I can see wherein the speaker is blind; from immoderate words, wherein he is ensnared; from heretical words, wherein he has strayed from the right path; from evasive words, wherein he is at his wits' end. What arises in the mind will interfere with (governmental) policy, and what shows itself in policy will interfere with practice (hsing).
Mencius could later also criticize Yangist and Mohist viewpoint as "heresies" and compare it with a traditional Confucian, orthodox interpretation. 10

From a hermeneutical point of view, Mencius explains the consequences of what words represent in 4B/17:

"Words without reality are ill-omened, and the reality of the ill-omened will befall those who stand in the way of good people."

Also, in 5A/14, the interpretation of an ode:

Hence, in explaining an ode, one should not allow the words to obscure the sentence, nor the sentence to obscure the intended meaning. The right way is to meet the intention of the poet with sympathetic understanding.

Most of all there should not be too much literalness in interpreting the odes. Since Mencius quotes so profusely from the Book of Odes and the Book of History, we can see many situational meanings from the words of these classics, which can have a hermeneutical application to present existential situations and realities. Furthermore, these parables from the past, though in chronicle-narrative forms in the Book of History, are "evocative," suggestive, and poetic.

It is the connection of li, ritual action, and its links with "countenances," which are studied by watching detailed movements in ritualistic actions: In 7B/33,

To be in accord with the rites in every movement is the highest virtue...When one invariably keeps one's word it is not to establish the rectitude of one's action. A gentleman merely follows the norm and awaits his destiny 20

One can teach by examples the movements of a ritual as part of a "gestural" language, which is teaching by "example," and frequent "practice, practice" will make them "second" nature.
2.4: WORDS AND DEEDS; THE PHYLOGENESIS OF LI.

I would like to ask the phylogenetic question of "Where do rituals come from?" and "How do they develop into regularized and routine actions to organize and embody our cultural meanings and significances?" As noted above, in 2.1, W. T. Chan indicated how the Shang Culture, with its emphasis on "spiritual beings" and the shang-ri, was a bridge to the Chou dynasty with its "humanism" and secularization of the heavenly beings. Hence, the phylogenesis of ritual action depends on this "disenchantment" (Max Weber) of the holy, sacred realm for the more profane and secular, temporal-historical realm. Furthermore, Fung Yu-lan points out that the Tso Chuan says,

Ceremonials (li) constitute the standard of Heaven, the principle of Earth, and the conduct of man. Heaven and Earth have their standards (tsae), and men take these for their pattern, imitating the brilliant bodies of Heaven and according with the natural diversities of Earth (the Five Elements).

Hence, there is a Heavenly basis for li, which serves as the sacred realm for li.

I will concentrate on two viewpoints which bear on the developmental aspects of how ritual actions become regularized and organized in such a way to "order" the sociopolitical body and go on later to reflect order in the cosmic body, as a "cosmomorphic" viewpoint in China. I cite Emile Durkheim and David L. Hall in their speculations about the origins of how ritual actions became established and serve to bring about some of Durkheim's goals: (1) a rationalized worldview, (2) the development of moral and legal norms and sanctions, and (3) the growth of personal individualism with "autonomy" and individual dignity.

Habermas characterizes Durkheim as providing the main theme of social and cultural "solidarity," the formation of the "collective consciousness," and the beginnings from a primitive society that has a basis as a totally "integrated" society; that is, a "religious cult," something like a total institution that encompasses and normatively integrates all actions, whether in the family or in the area of social labor. Here, every transgression of a norm has a significance of sacrilege. What is of immediate interest is to trace the long, gradual "linguistification" of the original religious consensus in its transference of meanings from the sacred to the secular.
In this process of linguification, Durkheim joins company with Mead and his evolution of the "conversation of gestures" of the two encircling dogs in their use of "significant symbols" which comprises the differentiation into important aspects of our rationalized worldviews, the development of our moral-legal codes, the development of the self taking the attitude of the other, the socialization of an ego-alter, and an "I-me."

What is also important for Durkheim is that he considers "solidarity" as the original starting point of a primitive society rather than the Western emphasis on "sovereignty" (personal autonomy, self-determination, independence, and a solipsistic, rugged individualism). Furthermore, an individual becomes sociated within the larger society within which he is born into, develops and matures. The social nature of persons is always acknowledged within a larger social setting. Both Durkheim and Mead are interested in this differentiation in the larger society and the internalization of social norms from the consideration of the attitude of the others, the "collective-consciousness" on the part of Durkheim and Mead also points to a "mob consciousness" as part of the infectiousness of gestures of communication among animals and the participation of the "other"; in this regard, this is similar to Durkheim's reference to Rousseau's "general will," while Mead has a similar response in terms of the "universality" of discourse:

Sociality gives the universality of ethical judgments and lies back of the popular statement that the voice of all is the universal voice (vox populi), that is, everyone who can rationally appreciate the situation agrees.5

For Mead, this is a step toward an ideal communication community. His "discourse ethics" is similar to the "community of inquirers" of Peirce, in which there is the "emancipatory" interest of not "blocking the road to inquiry." Habermas also has in interest in a "discourse, or communicative ethics" in which two factors are contributary to it: communicative action and his theory of formal pragmatics. His discourse ethics states that only those norms can claim to be valid that meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.6

He proposes a principle of universality:
Every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests.7

One should note that it is the acceptability of the practical consequences (formal pragmatics) which we use to gauge the validity of our norms. Universalizability is expressed through the "generalizability of interests"; universalizability is an empirical issue, not a priori.

Generalizable interests, or interests that express the common good, are those interests that all participants in a practical discourse could accept with good reasons, that is, those interests that admit of a 'rationally motivated consensus.'

Confucius's social theory of a person is "irreducibly communal." This is in sharp contrast with Descartes's autonomy and absoluteness of individual consciousness, for Confucius this issue does not arise since experience is, ab initio, intersubjective.9

The term "solidarity" is translated as ho, which means sociopolitical harmony (t'ien-jen ho-i). This harmony also has the integrity of organic, or communal intersubjectivities of "societies of societies" (Whitehead). Alternatively, Durkheim would try to make the differentiations within a structured society by means of the principle of "division of labor," which would form an "organic solidarity," rather than a mechanical one of the summation of the parts, and the legal system is based on the "moral" functioning of the occupational roles of the work force:

The legality of a contract...means that legal claims can be sued for...Durkheim, however, is not satisfied with this response. Even the obedience of modern legal subjects has to have a moral core.10

If one were to push the t'ien-jen ho-i doctrine to its fullest extension, one will be faced with the problematic issue of "collective responsibility." For example, Kenneth Ch'en points to Han Confucianism and Tung Chung-shu's interpretation of how heaven and man is connected so intimately that "abnormal or catastrophic events" occur in the natural world if man acted evilly.

This Han Confucianism...in this system man is not considered an individual but as a collective being or as the people, symbolized by the emperor and his functionaries. The well-being that results from meritorious efforts is not shared by the individual man but by the abstract concept of society or the collection of people.11

Also, the Taoist had a doctrine of ch'eng-tu, which meant that
the good or evil performed by the ancestors would influence the destiny of the descendents. 12 

In short, the sins of our fathers are visited upon the subsequent generations. Ch'en, in this case, is bringing in the "collective responsibility" as a collective karma within the context of how Buddhist thought used Chinese terms to interpret karma as the fruition and realization of the burden of guilt, which is transferable from societies to societies.

From the Confucian viewpoint, the organic solidarity of the socio-political is evident from the very beginnings of any society, and the moral suasion of the literati (ju) to the ruler, the consideration of hsing, as punishment is a precursor to fa, law, are all of one body (f), a corporate holistic development, which is also the solidarity envisioned in the Correction of Names, i.e., rulers rule, ministers ministers, etc.

Primarily, Durkheim's linguistification process would treat criminal law, at first, as a 'punishment of sacrilege,' the 'profaning of the holy,' the 'violation of taboos,' etc. Punishment is a ritual that restores the disturbed order...Condemning the sacrilege is thus merely the other side of venerating the sacred...Punishment is understood as expiation. 13

Hall and Ames also take hsing, as "punishment," as a precursor of Confucius basis for the later use of fa, law." 14 Furthermore, for Durkheim, the rituals of expiation eventually means "reparations" which are to be paid as a kind of "tax":

Ritual offerings are taxes paid at first to the gods, then later to the priests, and finally to the state authorities. Private property is a later derive. The rights of the gods pass first to the collectivity; property rights are then differentiated according to sub-collectivities, tribes, and families. 15

Thence, property takes on a "magical" bond between the divinities and the persons in the later secularized societal units and institutions. This "mana" is endemic and embodied in all objects considered sacred, taboo, or benficial. Also, li, ritual action, has as one component the ritual vase (li) which is used in religious ceremonies. 16 Hence, the importance of li as "sacrificial ceremonies" in the ancestral temples, often in deference to departed ancestors, mourning rites, etc. There is a sense of "formality" in regard to these ceremonial activities, which is based on the mana embodied in li-performances.

The same kind of linguistification is echoed by Confucius in regard to ritual practices
culled from the heritage of the Ancients. The Shang and Chou dynasty, as contained in the Six Classics, gives us the vocabulary of the shift of Shang's emphasis on "spiritual" beings and Chou's disenchantment of the residues of the sacred to a full-blown secularizing of the socio-political body (t'I), the body politic. For example, there is an extension of li, "rites," from its early restricted usage as a relationship obtained between ruler and deity (the holy, sacred) to the generalized notion of a pervasive social structure (t'I) and li is associated with a cognate of ti (as body, solidarity).

Stressing the holistic nature of ritual action (li), the cognate character 'body' (t'I), also reflects an intimate and important relationship with yi (signification, meaning, importance) in that this can be interpreted as a physical rendering of meaning and value. 17

This is why Fingarette can refer to the residual of the "sacred" in the secular in his study of Confucius and ritual action: i.e. the "magical" quality associated with ritual action, along with the use of speech-acts or performatives to bring about the illocutionary force of gestures, incantations, and symbolic references. 18 Even Hsun-tzu would call for the observance of li as a "holy rite."

The linguistification process is closely allied to the Confucian project of the Correction of Names. Li is the establishment of the "moral order" within a system of hierarchical niches of social values, in ranks and degrees honor, or priority of importance in functions of offices, which becomes the embodiment of sociopolitical "virtues" (te, powers and their moral significations). Li's primary function is social arrangement and social formulation of the ascending and descending hierarchical structure in order, to "form" (make, shape, mold) the society and its sociation of persons (self-cultivation). Linguistification is giving proper names for the position, offices, job descriptions, and specialized "division of labor" functions. Correction of Names also has the task of preserving the intimate ties to the "Mandate of Heaven" in which anyone abrogating his niche and its function would contribute to luan (disorder), of a sociopolitical order. In Mencius 1A/1, King Hui of Liang is asked not to talk about li (profit) but instead to talk about benevolence and rightness (jen, yi), otherwise "the state will be imperiled."
Gadamer characterizes a religious "cult" to include the factors of ritual and custom:

The ritual and ceremony, all forms and expressions of religious observance that are already established, can be repeated again and again according to hallowed custom without anybody feeling it necessary to pass judgment upon them. Moreover, we can extend it, ritual action, to something formulable (hsing, to form, to shape, to mold) in speech-acts as gestural "performatives." The gestural language of it is an essential form of making— a primary cultural gesticulation, a "creativity" based on making of a culture—for to "culture" is to make, organize, structure, or embed order and values in cultural artifacts and institutions. When Gadamer points to the early "ritualistic cults," especially the religious cult, the observance of offering sacrifices to the gods become fixed eventually in "custom."

Gadamer indicates that aesthetic and religious experiences usually go hand in hand; "poetic" and "religious" speech lead to the early development of the gradual transition from "ritual" to the "work" of "literature" illustrated by such activities as

the choreographical staging of the choral lyric...in the spectacle (theoria) of the tragedy...which prizes were awarded even though it was embedded in the context of religious life...on the road to the autonomy of the text...intended for reading. Religious experiences can become embodied in aesthetic makings of works of art, whether written, sculptured, or danced. It was through the "cultic rituals" that most of the Greek religion is transmitted through the "mythical tradition" stemming from Homer to Hesiod, with the poetic compositions of the lives of the gods of Olympia.

The self-understanding of Greek poetry begins with Hesiod's proem in which the muses appear before the poet and make their promises to him: they are capable of telling both much that is false and much that is true. Myth is much that is false and much that is also true. Hence, in Greek civilization, the mytho-poetic tradition looms very large at its inception; whereas the mytho-poetic is lacking in the Chinese horizons of their earlier culture.

The relative absence of a strong cosmogonic tradition in classical China militated against the sense of reason as rationalization as the construal of order from antecedent chaos. The influence of anything like a mythos-logos contrast is not readily discernible in classical Chinese thought.

In the "primitivists" writings of Chuang-tzu, he emphasizes the small, utopian, organic
society in which there is no need for even writing, and that knotted strings were all that were necessary, and no one ventured beyond their smaller society in miniature, since they were all perfect utopias. It is that "integrity/solidarity" of small societies which were already where tao is embodied, and any fallenness from that original state is already a departure from the Golden Age, the "waning" of tao.

In a similar vein, Hall goes along with Gadamer's interest in the conjoining of art and religious sensibilities and consider these as a rubric for joint analysis and compares this with the moral and scientific in another category of cultural sensibilities:

Anglo-European culture is usually narrow when it demonstrated on its theoretical side by the theoretical importance of scientific rationality; on its practical side, it is shown by the characterization of religious interest in terms of ethical praxis. Moreover, Durkheim derives his moral and legal systems form the religious, sacred differentiation.

The binding force of moral agreement grounded in the sacred can be replaced only by moral agreement that expresses in rational form what was always intended in the symbolism of the 'holy,' the generality of the underlying interest. The appeal to the "general interest" or the "common will" follows along with Rousseau as a basis for the "binding force" (sanctions) for our legal code. On the other hand, Hall would point to the religious as the source of the "mystical" portion of our religious experience, as an "irrational" element which he calls "self-referential inconsistency."

E. R. Dodds would display the evidence for the Greek religious cults and their four types of divine madness as based on changes in customary norms. The four types are:

- Prophetic madness, whose patron is Apollo.
- Telestic or ritual madness, whose Patron is Dionysius.
- Poetic madness, inspired by the Muses.
- Erotic madness, inspired by Aphrodite and Eros.

Nietzsche made famous the tension between the Apollonian and Dionysian. But there are two main features which are part of the customary norms of the Dionysians which should be of interest to us.

Dionysian experience is essentially collective or congregational...the two great Dionysiac techniques—the use of wine and the use of the religious dance—have
no part whatever in the induction of Apolline ecstasy. The two things are so
distinct that the one seems most unlikely to be derived from the other.27

This ecstatic experience eventually leads to the theory of "catharsis" as part of the dramatic
experience when one views the spectacle of the tragedy. It also leads to "ecstasy" as a state of
rhapsodic, "possession" by something given by a "divine" spirit, much like an epileptic seizure.

The many types of religious cults in Greece added to the customary mores of the polis
as time goes on. Each cult becomes an esoteric society within a larger society, i.e., the Orphic
strains within a Pythagorean society, where the Orphic motto of "shed no blood" leads to the
Pythagoreans "avoiding contact with butchers and huntsman, with their unclean and polluting
habits."28

2.4.1: HALL'S DISCUSSION OF HOW RITUALS DEVELOPED.

We will now turn to Hall's discussion of how ritual actions develop. Hall would trace the
development as a logos of techne,29technology as the logic of "making," rituals as the
repetitive, organized methods of creativity, exercised in the production of social and cultural
artifacts and civilizational, industrial tools and products, or "works" of man. Instead of focusing
on the "material" or "substantive" side of technology, it is the side of making, using "techniques"
which utilizes the most "efficient" means to ends in a way to "organize and control" our human
experience and expression of them in our cultural makings of our artifacts, gestures, language
and institutions. The various "stages" of the logos of techne are:

(1) the stage of personalization, or self-creation: the use of preconscious tools
associated with dream symbolism that helped to order the preconscious
experience of early man.

(2) religious and aesthetic rituals that served to put the individual in touch with
the primary ontological realm; this becomes the basis for the rationalized
worldview.

(3) myths developed to function as "rationalization" of ritualistic practice.

(4) the language of gesture and speech developed for interpersonal communication
between the inner privacy of each individual with the public realm of
communal existence.30

The logos of techne, depicted by Hall, also fits Justus Buchler's distinctions of three
modes of human production in his theory of judgment. Judgment has three dimensions: doing, making, and saying, corresponding to active, exhibitive, and assertive judgments. Hence most of the aesthetic, artistic products are exhibitive judgments.

A poem consists of words, but ordinarily it is an exhibitive judgment, primarily a shaping or molding. It may assume assertive import for one person or another... Doing, making and saying, then, the three modes of judgment, are functional rather than structural distinctions.  

*Techne*, or making, is also functionally connected with saying and doing. Heidegger, however, would say that *techne*, is "neither art nor handicraft," rather it is production by the "letting appear" of things so that they are "disclosed," "unconcealed" (*aletheia*). Hence, we can exhibit through our work of art what we are trying to say by doing something to our media materials.

When we apply *techne* in regard to (1) the dream-symbolism, we can draw upon a broad and deep tradition of this subject in Greek culture. Dodds points out that dream-structure depended on a socially transmitted pattern of belief and such dreams are closely related to myth, the dream-thinking of the people, as the dream is the myth of the individual. There are three types of dreams which are distinguished: (a) the "symbolic" dream, which "dresses up in metaphors, like a sort of riddle, a meaning which cannot be understood without interpretation," (b) the "vision" which is a "pre-enactment of a future" and (c) an "oracle" where a priest, god, or impressive person "reveals without symbolism what will or will not happen, or should or should not be done." The oracle is most important, since it is a "divine" dream, a god-sent dream, though it is a "culture-pattern" dream which belongs to the "religious life of the people."

Perhaps we can say that the *I Ching* is also part of the preconscious experience of the Chinese people, as a form of "oracular" divining of patterns, images (*hsiang*, hexagrams) in nature, which will form the substrate for the art of "divination," in the same vein, that oracle bones were used to read the cracks in bones as patterns of divination of good fortune or ill-omen. At the same time, we should be aware that dream-phenomena does not seem to have a widespread cultural importance, as is typical in the West, where even in the time of Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, the theories of the Middle Ages on "dream interpretation" were still in vogue.

The instances of reference to dream in Chinese philosophy is most manifest in Chuang-
tzu not knowing whether he is dreaming that he is Chuang Chou dreaming he is a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he is Chuang Chou. In the same regard, Graham points out only two other references to dreams in the philosophical literature, one in Hsun-tzu and another in the Later Mohist definition of dream. Hsun-tzu, in talking about storing knowledge in memory, says we should not "let dream play disorder on our knowledge." While the Later Mohist definition is a terse statement of the difference between sleeping and waking:

'Sleep' is the wits not knowing anything. 'Dreaming' is supposing to be so while asleep. 38

We have also seen that Hall and Ames underplay the mythos-logos tradition in Chinese thought, due to the absence of strong cosmogonic myths. Hall says,

Most myths, and the rituals associated with them, suggest primordial experience of the threat of negative Chaos... but the existence of myths such as may be found in Taoism suggests that this experience was not universal. 38

Also, it is pointed out that Anglo-European myths of cosmogenesis and cosmology has led to the use of these myths as technological tools of "rational control." For example, in the Timaeus, the final outcome is that Peitho, as an "irrational" force, tries to persuade Reason to rule over Material necessity.

In Hall's schema, from step (1) to step (3), there seems to be a gap between dreams to myth, overleaping ritualizing religious ceremonies (2). However, this leap-over would not deter the last step (4) of "linguistification" of the sacralized ritual and the disenchantment process of transference into the secularized rituals, and language. If we take both Durkheim and Hall in their laying out the steps, or stages, there is a gradual linguistification, symbolization, and transference, or conversion from gestural or cultural gesticulation to a stabilized ritual code, and there is an intersubjective communication within a shared medium of language. Given the context of the developmental steps, ritual begins to take on various important characteristics, even if we disregard the significant break away from the mythical:

(ritual) best enables one to co-ordinate and discipline superordinate amounts of energy. A ritual is a set of rhythmic, repetitive actions that function to save experiences on the one hand and to re-present or evoke experience on the other. 40
Same gesture, same invested meanings, that is worthy of repetition. Ritual becomes part of the racial memory, because Rituals are symbolic activities that both co-ordinate and contain the original experience, and allow the experience to be re-collected. Foucault would underpin N-performances as happening and rooted in a "ceremonial space," one that has its own directionality. The taxonomies of the Chinese encyclopedia is site-specific, spatial more than temporal, i.e., designing buildings to face in certain directions and sites, just as the emperor would face south, in order to perform the appropriate gesture. Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered, the most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of space... the Chinese encyclopaedia quoted by Borges, and the taxonomy it proposes, lead to a kind of thought without space, to words and categories that lack all life and place, but are rooted in a ceremonial space. Hence the aim of archaeology is to discover the site-specific areas, or regions, in which ceremonial spaces are being constructed to accommodate gestural practices which are invested with social and religious significances and call for our reverent attitudes toward the sanctity of that ceremonial space.

2.4.2: HABITS AS THE BASIS FOR RITUALS.

Rituals "harmonizes the rhythms of social life," which gives it an aesthetic, poetic basis, since rhythm is part of the poetic experience, which gives order and structure to our ordinary experiences. But most of all, since ritual has a sacred, religious base, they have as their purpose "communicating with what is eminently real," which is also the reality involved with answering the question of the "source" of our existence, such as Tao, as a creative source of the myriad things. We see the rhythm of life in the changes in the seasons, the movement of the celestial bodies, the sun and moon, and stars, etc., and we see the movements of our social life in birth, childhood, maturity, decay and death, what we call the "rites of passage." And the rituals will "harmonize with these rhythms," for otherwise one would be out of "timing" or "tuning" and not resonate on the same plane as our ecology.

The ideal of ritualizing is the formation of habits, which are energy-saving in the long
haul. Even in Aristotle, *hēxis* (state, characteristic, habit, habituation) plays an important part in his *Nichomachean Ethics*. *Hēxis* is the counterpart of *tē*, the Potency to act in non-deliberated ways.

*Hēxis* is defined as our condition *vis-à-vis* the *pathe* (emotions). *Aretē* is a *hēxis*. *(1106a)*

Virtue (*aretē*) is a *hēxis*. *Hēxis* is one of the three parts of the soul: emotions (*pathe*), capacities (*dynamis*), characteristics (*hēxes*). In short, virtue is partially built up through habituation. Practice makes perfect. Habit further points out habits can provide the "basis for the development of complex civilized cultures" in a way that ritualistic societies never could, since in primitive societies, every ritual had to be participated in with conscious enthusiasm. *(44)*

What gets lost over time is the vitality of that original enthusiasm.

Typically the West looks at rituals as habit-forming, while the Chinese try to avoid "formalizing" and making ritual too rigid, inflexible, and intractable to changes, since rituals undergo changes from dynasty to dynasty. Therefore, even though habits become time-and-energy saving by becoming "institutions" and operative without our being conscious of their functions and importance, it is equally true that when rituals are practiced without an intrinsic "spirit" (*shen*) that goes along with it, then it becomes too formalized and empty in gesture.

From the historical point of view, Fung Yu-lan traces the issue of the phylogenesis of *li* from Confucius' *Analects* to the later Confucians in the Warring States period, when Confucius' disciples would contribute to the *Li Chi* (Book of Rites) and the *Hsiao Ching* (Classic of Filial Piety). Since Confucius is claiming to be a "transmitter and not a creator," he would emphasize the *li* as traditional *mores* and offer no general theory about the genesis of *li*. But it is only during the end of the Warring State period, with Hsun-tzu and the *Li Chi* Confucians that they speculated about what and where *li* comes from and represents, i.e., the *Li Chi* says,

The *li*, following human feelings, act as regulators (*ch'ieh*) and refiners (*wen*) of them, so as to keep the people within bounds... By means of the *li*...one may hold to the mean. *(45)*

Hence, Fung concludes that *li* is the "mould imposed from without which will maintain men in this
correct mean." Based on the *Doctrine of the Mean*, there is the attempt to "maintain the social gradations that are necessary if there is no conflict between man and man." In Aristotelian terms, *li* is *hexis* which is intimately connected with *pathē* (emotions, passions); hence a psychology of the passions in relation to the formation of the "spirit of the rituals" would give rituals passional content instead of formalized and rule-regulated empty gestures.

The *Li Chi* also take up at least four interrelated issues explaining the functioning of *li*: (1) the interrelation of *li* and *i* (righteousness): "The sage-kings formed the lever of the standards of justice (*i*) and the ordering of the *li*, so as to regulate human feelings with them." (2) the interrelation of *li* and *fa* (law): "The *li* serve to put interdictions in advance of what is about to take place, while law makes interdiction on what has already occurred." (3) includes the Confucian emphasis on *li* and *yueh* (music), and (4) Hsun-Izu explains that the "sacrificial rites" are the expression of man's highest emotional spirit: "The height of altruism (*shu*), faithfulness (*hsin*, true to one's word), love and reverence" and these represent *li* as the "completion of propriety and refinement (*wen*)."

Max Weber characterizes "custom" as dead, when there is the case of "regularity" in the course of social action that is determined by custom or self-interest.

The term custom stands for 'habitation in accustomed action' which is so 'numb' that the normative internal structure of the habit has shrivelled up and there remains only sheer habituation, unconsciously functioning compliance with rules. Weber's steps in disenchantment flows from (1) the "inspiration" of charismatically influential figures who possess a special capacity to create original meanings, (2) the great world religions all go back to a founding figure who is prophetic in their revelation of the word and were exemplary in their conduct of their lives, and (3) the intellectualizing of the prophetic by priests, monks and teachers who take the new ideas and rationalize" them into dogmas, sacraments and
rituals, in order to pass it on as a tradition. Therefore the sacraments and rituals preserve the elements of the sacred and divine inspirations, in much the same way that Confucius preserved the sacred side of the Yin and Chou dynasties by “routinizing the rituals” for transmission of the tradition.

One other way of looking at rituals is the rules, regulative ideas, that goes along with the gestural. This formulation of rules puts into language what the gestures are trying to point to, since language can extend the gestural and motor intentionalities into symbolic formulae, which can then be sedimented and preserved in the Six Classics, i.e., Book of History, Book of Odes. It is through recognizing these rules that Winch believes we can gain a key to the understanding of the mores, customs, and unwritten codes of a culture, which is based on Wittgenstein’s view of language as rule-regulated. Hence, there is a continuity between our gestures, on the one hand, and rules, or symbolizations of our rituals, on the other hand.

Graham follows through on the terminology of *li* and *fa*, during the change-over to Legalism in the Book of Lord Shang (Shang-tzu-circa 361-338 B. C):

> Duke Hsiao of Ch’In is afraid that the world will criticize him if he alters the *li* ‘ceremonies, conventions’ and *fa* ‘standards, laws’ handed down from the past ... These are words of which we generally translate *li* in Confucian contexts by ‘ceremony’ and *fa* in Legalist by ‘law’... For the Legalists the *li* have no significance except as the customs current at the time (Shen Tao says explicitly, ‘For the *li* follow custom’). As for *fa*, it is the old word for a model or standard for imitation (model), now assuming a specialized sense as the standards enforced by punishments, so laws.

Graham is pointing out here that *li* and *fa* can undergo “linguistications” which would change the orientation of how we consider ritual, customs, law, and standards (*fa*) as later interpretations of traditions reach the period right after Hsun-tzu and the switch over to Legalism. Even Hsun-tzu would benefit from the critical juncture from the Later Mohists and Chuang-tzu as well as the beginnings of Legalism of Shen Tao and Han Fei.

We take Hsun-tzu as standing squarely within the Confucian tradition with his contra-alliance on Mencius’ theory of the goodness (evilness) of human nature.
In fact, Hsun-tzu re-makes the Confucian II to become less natural and more conventional, an artifice, and learned behavior. But, there is no dichotomy of nature/artifice, so that Hsun-tzu does build upon Confucian ritualistic habits and customs as well as perform a second-order hermeneutical critique. He answers both questions about the origins and purposes of rituals as well as the questions of how, or functionally, they work within a sociopolitical structure. Hsun-tzu starts by recognizing the six basic emotions which humans display and ties this in with the basic self-interest of the "war of all against all." This primary allocation of scarce economic resources becomes the reasons for establishing II, ritual actions, to apportion, allocate and economize on material resources to meet man's basic instincts toward unlimited wants and desires.


In ch. 2 of The Great Learning, the term hsin (to make anew, to re-novate the people) is introduced, and in ch. 7, hsiu shen and cheng chih hsin (correct his heart-mind) is the further extension of the doctrine of self-cultivation. To renovate the people, the ruler must cultivate his person (hsiu shen); shen is a physical body and also means "person": Legge points out that shen means body, and persons; this led Chu Hsi to change the beginning statement of ch. 7, from hsiu shen to hsiu hsin (heart-mind), in order to obviate the physical basis for shen as physical body. The rest of ch. 7 goes on to show that a person (shen) in cultivating himself is cognizant that his heart-mind involves emotions, dispositions and passions also:

What is meant by saying that cultivation of the personal life depends on the rectification of mind is that when one is affected by wrath...fondness...worries and anxieties...his mind will not be correct...This is what is meant by saying the cultivation of the personal life depends on the rectification of the mind.2

2.5.1: SHEN AS THE "LIVED BODY"

The "lived body" (shen) is built on the foundation of the togetherness of the physical bodily self and its other aspects of the "floodlike ch" of Mencius, the emotional, dispositional,
and passional side of the heart-mind. The same applies to ritual actions, which also involve disciplining of both body and mind (spirit, shen) to organize and enact a creative social order among selves and their “others,” in which ritualization implies the “sociality” of all with all.

Tu Wei-ming says that hsiu shen is “taking care of the body” and in sociological terms the body is precious and should be kept intact and presented to our parents at all times free from injury, and accidents at death. This is shown in Analects, 8/3, when Tseng-tzu makes a symbolic gesture by showing his hands and feet to his disciples before his death. One must respect one’s body like a sacred vessel. Since self-cultivation in its literal meaning refers to the cultivation of the body, there is a rich reservoir of body-related language in the Confucian classics.

Paralleling the bodily aspects of self-cultivation is ritual language which is a gestural apparatus, utilizing the instrument of the body also, but the gestural is already an incipient act of “significative intent,” which works toward the completion of a process of symbolization, or the symbolic interactionism which goes along with communicative action. Also, teaching by example (shen chiao, body teaching) is more effective than yen chiao, teaching by words. There is also learning by “models,” which is “to learn ritual, music, calligraphy, dance, by imitating the movements of the hands, feet and body of the master,” a kind of “mimetic dance.”

Ricoeur discusses hermeneutic phenomenology by showing that the linguistic sign can “stand for (mean) something only if it is not the thing”; and the whole game begins when we exchange sign for thing, and signs for other signs. Hence, phenomenology begins when we “interrupt our ‘lived experience’ in order to signify it” and in so doing we distance ourselves from the core of our lived experience by “signs” which serves as substitutes for our lived bodily experience. It is just at this point that Merleau-Ponty inserts his “lived body”:

a pattern of my bodily behavior endows the objects around me with a certain significance both for me and others. The meaning of the gesture is not contained in it like some physical or physiological phenomenon. The meaning of the word is not contained in the word as a sound. But the human body is defined in terms of its property of appropriation.

For the Chinese, body is not simply a physical issue, but must be thought of as an act of
“appropriation,” which is the beginning of our transfer of our “lived-bodily” experience to our signs and symbols. Appropriation is based on the Heideggerian paradigm of “disclosure and appropriation” which is introduced in the hermeneutical context of interpretation.6

Habermas would say that not all bodily movements are meaningful, or significant, unless they are “semantically relevant bodily movements” as contrasted with “causal relevance.” He would also point to “actions embedded in play or teaching practices (language games) as meaningful communicative actions.” How much more so is Merleau-Ponty’s view of “motor intentionality” a form of a primordial meaningful situations?

We are brought to the recognition of something between movement as a third person process and thought as representation of it, something which is an anticipation of, or arrival at the objective and is ensured by the body itself as a motor power, a ‘motor project,’ a ‘motor intentionality.’7

And, at the same time, he defines a “body image” as the identification of motor tasks in which one subject’s left hand is immediately identified with his partner’s, his actions modeled on the others, and the subject also projects himself as a separate reality in the other. One learns about one’s own body through identifying it with the Other’s movements. This is similar to Mead’s “taking the role or attitude of the generalized Other.”

Phenomenology is like the explicit revival of this virtual event which it raises to the dignity of the act, the philosophical gesture. It renders thematic what was only operative, and thereby makes meaning appear as meaning.8

Hermeneutic phenomenology is the construal of “meaning” in the main thrust of a philosophical gesture which has a “historical” (Gadamer’s “effective-historical consciousness”) sedimentation in the human sciences, the ‘lived experience’ which it is concerned to bring to language and raise to meaning is the historical connection, mediated by the transmission of written documents, works, institutions and monuments which render present the historical past.9
There is always an interest in "revivifying" of that underlying lived "bodily" experience which has now been sedimented over time in our historical consciousness. We are also cognizant that ritualization also produces symbols which carry and bear these historical projections for us to transmit from one generation to another. Durkheim's linguistification of sacred sacrifices and ceremonies is part of this symbol making. Gadamer reinforces this issue:

The Greeks distinguished between two kinds of productive activity (techne): manual production which fabricates utensils, and mimetic production which does not create anything 'real' but simply offers a representation. Ricouer calls these mimetic production, "mimicry and gestures."

Ricoeur also speaks to the linguistification of the sacred by pointing to a "pre-narrative consciousness" of the mythical narration. It is this transition from the enigma of the "symbolic function of myth" to its centering in two foci, (1) the expression in language and (2) in a myth the symbol takes a form of narration. The enigma is that myths have to be symbolized and expressed in narrative form in order to transmit the "felt and lived" mythical experience before being narrated.

The myth-narration is only the verbal envelope of a form of life, felt and lived before being formulated. This form of life expresses itself first in an inclusive mode of behavior relative to the whole of things, it is in the rite rather than in the narration that this behavior is expressed most completely, and the language of the myth is only the verbal segment of this total action. There is a close connection between symbolizing our felt totality toward our world via myth and its ritualization. Language itself points beyond to a model or archetype, which the symbol imitates and repeats.

Imitation in gestures and verbal repetition are only the broken expression of a living participation in an original Act which is the common exemplar of the rite and of the myth.

It is also at this juncture, before the linguistification begins, that Langer and Cassirer would point to the non-discursive function of myth, art, music as the beginning of symbolization of the non-verbal forms, which already embody meanings and value, as much as the narrated form, and even when narrated as poetry, there is a large area of the non-discursive—metaphorical, expressive, and the evocative—that escapes pure narrative as literal, descriptive products.

The "lived bodily experience" can also be seen from the standpoint of the hermeneutical
circle, as arc-ing back and forth between tradition and interpretation. The reproduction of the lifeworld is a continuity of "renewal of tradition" and "breaks with tradition." And, the hermeneutical arc is not a linearly laying out of text in sentence-after-sentence form. The alleged circularity of this arc already precludes a linear chain of oppositions explanation, as well as the contrary viewpoint of a dialogical reciprocity of parts to presumed wholes. Ricoeur says,

A text is more than a linear succession of sentences. It is a cumulative, holistic process...guess and validation are in a sense circularly related as subjective and objective approaches to the text. But this circle is not a vicious circularity.

And Ricoeur continues that "it is construing the details that we construe the whole." This construal can be a "holographic" growth of the details, adding cumulatively to the whole; the details contain the seeds of its own development, causa sui,

To understand oneself in front of the text is quite the contrary of projecting oneself and one's own beliefs and prejudices; it is to let the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have of myself.

We let the meanings of the work itself "emerge" as we extend and enlarge the self and its horizon of understanding. Each constituted whole hermeneutical circle depends upon interpretation and explanation becomes an enlargement of our "fusion of horizons," of old and new interpretations of the tradition, and the novel present.

We can also revise our visualization of the hermeneutical arc-circle, since even Ricoeur points out that there is a "spiral" in the arcing back and forth in the "apprehension of projected worlds and the advance of self-understanding in the presence of these new worlds." And Emilio Betti, in discussing Gadamer's existential foundation of the hermeneutical circle, would compare it to "extending our unity of the understanding of meaning in concentric circles." It is this latter pattern which is also typical of the Chinese operating from a foci, a locus as a center with concentric, centrifugal movements outward from that center, and vice versa.

Merleau-Ponty would point to the "primordial expression" of the "lived body" as the beginning of the "advent," or the promise of meaning. And it is the "gesture" which would "signify beyond its simple existence in fact, to inaugurate a meaning."
All perception, all action, which presuppose (our first oriented gesture), and in short every human use of the body is already primordial expression...the primary operation which first constitutes signs as signs, makes that which is expressed dwell in them through the eloquence of their arrangement and configuration alone, implants a meaning in that which did not have one—inaugurates an order and founds an institution or a tradition.22

In Justus Buchler's terminology, the primordial expression of the gesture is an "exhibitive" judgment, in which the arrangement, configuration of the materials and techniques of the making (techne) is primary, and the "message, coding or encoding" as an "assertive" judgment is secondary as a function of judgment.

2.5.2: THE GESTURE AS MOTOR INTENTIONALITY.

The "lived body" is a complex bodily apparatus beginning with simple "petite" perceptions: a "glance" (the chiasma, the accomodation and convergence of my eyes in seeing), the "hand" (as grasping movements and in its pointing gestures), and the "body" as a "system of systems" devoted to the external retrieval and perception of the world.23 But the primary expression of the lived body is a form of "cultural gesticulation" that involves us in history, that will provide the "sedimentation" of acquired meanings in our cultural objects and tradition:

"Truth is another name for sedimentation."24 "Speech is comparable to a gesture" and a gesture is a "signifying apparatus" which arouses in our bodies "corporeal (motor) intentionalities."25

Merleau-Ponty would, however, use painting as an example of the primary expressive system resulting in a style of a "tradition" in an art form, which inaugurates meaning in cultural objects which are transmitted to us. Art is a form of expression, a cultural gesticulation.

Just as our body, insofar as it lives and makes itself gesture...so the history of painting which runs from one work to another, rests upon itself and...converge by the sole fact that they are efforts to express.26

The history of painting is the "corpus" of the heritage of all painters and their product, as their lived bodies embodying their values of their artistic efforts at expression.

There is also an interaction and intersubjectivity involved with getting the meaning of
gestures. The "spectator" learns sometimes about himself, when someone else reveals to him the meanings of a situation. As interlocutors engaged in a communicative act, the sense (meaning) of the gestures is not given, but grasped or understood, that is recaptured by an act on the spectator's part.

The communication or comprehension of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, or my gesture and intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's intention inhabited my body and mine his.27 Hence the lived body is the source for the "gesturing" which embody meanings, or significative intentions as incipient meanings being inaugurated as "motor intentionalities." All signifying has a corporeal, carnal base of departure; the relation of signs to signs "allude" to the "silences" that are found in language, which indirectly refer to a signification. These silences are motor intentionalities which comprise the basis of our gestures.

Speech is comparable to a gesture because what it is charged with expressing will be in the same relation to it as the goal is to the gesture which intends it... my corporeal intending of the objects of my surroundings is implicit and presupposes no thematicization or 'representation' of my body or milieu.28

Gesturing has to be considered within a horizon surrounding my body, as "sociality" expressing itself, as a social environment; in this regard the horizon includes the three formal worlds (subjective-social-objective). Hence, gesturing within communicative action and reception arrives at mutual understandings and explanations of our non-symbolic interactions and serves as the base for symbolic reproduction of our society and culture.

In the controversy between Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty claims that the issue which separates himself and Sartre is the presence or absence of an "interworld"; Sartre's philosophy is based on a Cartesian dualism in which the pure consciousness of pour-soi confronts the opaque matter of en-soi and there is no "in between," or a "third" world to bring them together. Whereas, Merleau-Ponty is able to take the "lived-bodily" experience as

Embodied subjects open into a common world, a world 'in between' them—in short, an inter-subjectivity where subjects inter-act, perspectives merge, and truth comes-to-be.28

Hence, the lived-body is made "flesh" within an incarnate world with the fusion of inner and outer
horizons of lifeworlds. This makes sociality possible for Merleau, but becomes a problem of the "Other" for Sartre.

In regard to "sociality," Tu Wei-ming considers "ritualization" in the Confucian context as ideally a "dynamic process of self-cultivation (hsiu shen) in the spirit of filiality, brotherhood, friendship, discipleship, and loyalty." In short, self-cultivation is a prominent Confucian concept which depends on the "sociality" and recognition of others in human relationships. Hence, Tu would agree with Gadamer that "gesture is something wholly corporeal and wholly spiritual at one and the same time." Following Merleau-Ponty, we will place emphasis on the "continuity" of gestures, from the non-verbal to the linguistic gesture of words, speech, language. The Chinese terms for gesture (shou-shih, hand-power) is the relation of the hand to the "power" or "influence" of signs made by the hand. Moreover, Mead also emphasizes, in The Philosophy of the Act, the interplay of the "eye and hand" in the pragmatic manipulation of "things" that become for us perceptual "social" objects through the "resistance" things offer when our hands are in contact with things in the world. Most of all, whether it be hand, or glance, they will function within a "network of intentions" and form a web of relationships to inter-support disparate senses, in a synergistic fashion.

Mead, also, is involved in a psychogenetic approach, based upon evolutionary theory of Darwin, in the stages of "conversation of gestures" he points to the signal-language of animals and the genesis of the subsequent adaptation and adjustments we make to get "significant symbols" in propositional speech, which when verbalized becomes a "symbolic reproduction" of our culture in a full-blow language. Most of all, Mead's ideal of communication is based on the sense of "democracy." In which each individual would carry just the response in himself that he knows he calls out in the community. That is what makes communication in the significant sense the organizing process in the community. It is not simply a process of transferring abstract symbols; it is always a gesture in a social act which calls out in the individual himself the tendency to the same act that is called out in others.

Democracy is defined here in terms of a social act of "calling out" in others the attitudes I have of myself. Democracy is constituted both by the demos (vox populi) interacting within the polis
It is the "internalization" of meaning structures that is of intrinsic interest to us, since the "embodiment" of meaning becomes a "social object," one in which one gesture calls forth in another the same meaning, and hence one can anticipate such gestural stimulus-response as communicative praxis between participants.

The model of internalization says that the subject finds itself again in something external, inasmuch as it takes into itself and makes it own something that it encounters as an object. The structure of assimilation differs from that of reflection by virtue of the opposite direction: the self related itself to itself not by making itself an object by recognizing an external object, in an action schema or a schema of relations something subjective that has been externalized.\(^36\)

This act of making one's own is an "appropriation," which in the acts of internalizing also makes external what is our subjective world, as the extended "social object." This also is the fusion of the horizons of the "I-me" in the pragmatic adaptation of someone to an "other."

Fingarette depicts the "magical" aspects associated with the shamans and primitive man's effort to control his environment, "the power to accomplish his will directly and effortlessly through ritual, gesture and incantation" and Confucius' words in the Analects seem to suggest this magical power.\(^37\) Among his examples is the noble person, whose charisma, or "influence," is like "wind blowing through grass" and in the Analects, 15/5, Shun sits on this throne facing south and everything in the Empire is taken care of, a kind of magical wu-wei; in Shun's case, there is no need to accompany the posture, or gesture, with incantations (verbalizing), since assuming the posture facing south is a sufficient, "fundamental" gesture. Shun's act becomes fixed and embody meanings of the ruler's privileged position and function in terms of his "directionality" in ruling those "under Heaven" (fien-hsie). It is a "primordial expression" by means of his "gestural gesticulation" involving his whole "lived body."

2.5.3: MUSIC AND THE PERFORMATORY ASPECT OF SELF-CULTIVATION.

The gesture of facing south has the effect of the "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" force (the performatory vs. the assertoric) of making our "words" do things for us, in the same vein that the posture-gesture "performs" a function by making meanings of our gesture, even as incipient, or "virtual" meanings. Habermas calls the performatory, the "action character of speech acts."
Using assertoric and expressive sentences means that the speaker performs a speech act with them. Performative sentences such as 'I assert that p,' or 'I confess that p,' are expressions of this action character.38

Fingarette does make an analogy between the performances of music to that of li-ritualizing. On the performative side, the sociopolitical ordering has to be considered to be like a reproduction of a musical score and its performance.

One of Confucius's recurrent theme is the social harmonizing intrinsic to music; it is then a bent toward aesthetic rationality and aesthetic harmonization. Social harmony is like musical harmony; it has an integral beginning, middle and coda-ending. During the performance, the cumulative temporal dimension takes on a symphonic harmonizing of all items of the score. Confucius, in enjoining the ruler toward creation of social harmony, also points out the wen, the elegance attained in the leisure arts as part of the curriculum of the ruler, including calligraphy, poetry, the Book of Odes, Book of Rites, etc. The Six Classics follow the six arts which serves as the curriculum in the self-cultivation of the noble person.

Music is audient, based on hearing, hence, "orality," which was the original way of transmission of tradition, is normally contrasted with sight, the visual tradition. One says, in transmission, "Thus, have I heard." Most of our early tradition is an oral tradition which is transmitted as myths, legends, poetry, etc. The orality of poetry is an important part of its prosody; poems are made to be read rhythmically and audiently. Tradition is this "historical influence" which is transmitted to us through the media of language, whether spoken or written it is this "fusion of horizons," which brings the heritage of the past and motivates our response to the past in the present. Gadamer gives us the hermeneutical importance of this "call," or "hearing" (audient effect of our efective-historical consciousness) and its relation to language:

Thus it is literally more correct to say that language speaks us, rather than we speak it...language constitutes the hermeneutical even proper not as language...but in the coming into language of that which has been said in the tradition, an event that is at once assimilation and interpretation.39

Hall and Ames agree with K. M. Wu's musical hermeneutica, which means that the Chinese language is not predominantly a propositional, referential language but emphasizes the
performative-pragmatic aspects of language:

We shall be construing Confucius understanding of the activity of communication as encompassing ritual action (li), and music and dance as well as spoken and written discourse...In fact, given the pragmatic, performative character of Confucius's language it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that it is music—a musical performance.

The important item to emphasize here is that li, ritual action, has a main function of "ordering," "arranging," hierarchical structuring, providing overtones or overlaying of intersecting functions of offices, positions, persons, etc. Music also has an augmenting function in "complementing" our "words" with rhythmic poetic effects:

For Confucius, the ultimate source of music, like ritual action is the contributed significance of the person-in-context. What does one who is not authoritative (jen) in his person have to do with ritual action or with music? (Analects, 3/3)

Confucius always put li-ylleh together as a compounded term, hence heightening their performative aspects. Hence, li is intimately related to music in that ritual action is a "repository through which meaning can be transmitted and from which it can be appropriated."

The Chinese language is a musical language, tonal all the way through, non-syllabic (holistically one tone capable of nuancing into upper, lower, level, rising tones) and thereby possesses a musical, performative-hermeneutic function, one in which "attunement" and "resonance" rather than reference is important. The language is one of deference involving shu, mutual reciprocity, and also jang (yielding).

The recognition of excellence (fe) in tradition or in interpersonal occasions a yielding (jang) to that excellence which, when communicated appropriately, serves as a model to which others will also yield. This yielding begins with "listening." Confucius first 'listens' to the excellences of tradition and of present praxis and through this deferential act thereby attunes himself. Having attuned himself to the tradition, he can channel and transmit li.

Harmonizing, then, is the attunement of one's ears, eyes (chiasma), and other perceptual senses in a synergistic fashion, so that a cumulative, holistic hermeneutical arc is formed, with particulars as details, contributing to the meaning within the wholes. It is the "lived body" and its phenomenological perceptions, the glance, the touch, the gestures, which contribute to the communicative holistic intuitions of the hermeneutical arcs.
2.6: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS THE LANGUAGE OF ACTION.

Alan Chan, in his comparative study of the commentaries of Wang Pi and the Ho-shang Kung, gives an assessment of these works in terms of two fundamental "hermeneutical turns" in their interpretation of Lao-tzu's Tao Te Ching. The Ho-shang Kung commentary is tied to a "referential" thesis, that names point to "things" named in the world (ming-shih, names-actuality). A similar view is held by Tung Chung-shu in his Ch'un-ch'iu fan-lu (Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Summer Annals):

The Spring and Autumn Annals examines the principles of things and rectifies their names. It applies names to things as they really are...If we inquire into principles according to their names and appellations, we shall understand. Thus names and appellations are to be rectified in accordance with [the principles] of Heaven and Earth.

Mencius believed that Confucius wrote The Spring and Autumn Annals, the Ch'un Ch'iu, in order to carry his Correction of Names into practice, by the application of the principles of proper names to fit real social-political, historical contexts, i.e., if the minister plots to kill his ruler, then it will violate the righteous principle of the minister not being a minister, and therefore, names will not fit actualities (Mencius 3B/9 and 4B/21). Similarly, Tung Chung-shu also identifies a Ho-shang Kung homology of the parts of the body of man and Heaven; yang refers to the upper half of the body and yin to the Earthly, bottom half of the body. Furthermore, the Ho-shang Kung's interpretation is concerned with what is "said," "who" said it and "why." That is, it is related to external factors, such as autobiographical or historical accounts to which the text "refers." Whereas, Wang Pi uses "language" to relate key-words to the same "phonetic" family, i.e., virtue (fe) means "to obtain" (fe*). Wang Pi also constantly make "cross-references" to the Tao Te Ching in order to interpret and render the meanings of words in context and in the light of "integrating" the text as a whole. In short, the commentary and the text "hangs" together and insightfully reveals meanings and discovers connections.

In one sense, Wang Pi's hermeneutics is similar to Saussure's "language of difference," which is characterized as one

in which meaning is not a function of reference but is discovered by noting the differences of the signs within the system...language does not re-present (make
present) objects or ideas, but rather aims to constitute meaning through the usually implicit articulation of the differences among linguistic units.  

Ricoeur calls Saussure’s method the “diacritical” method in regard to linguistic signs, in that signs function only through their “differences” and “systematizations.” So the Chinese language is not only one of “differences,” but it is also a language of “deference” (to defer, postpone the yielding of meaning) instead of being a language of “reference” which does not defer meanings, but insists on the presence or absence of designated, indicated things, whether they be abstract or concrete particulars.  

Merleau-Ponty characterize the diacritical as follows:  

Speech is always only a fold in the immense fabric of language...Language is understood only through the interaction of signs and makes sense only by being combined with others.  

Ricoeur describes the “suspension” (a deferral) of meanings in an open work:  

Like a text, human action is an open work, the meaning of which is ‘in suspense.’ It is because it ‘opens up’ new references and receives fresh relevance from them, that human deeds are also waiting for fresh interpretations which decide their meaning.  

A language of deference, vis-à-vis languages of presence and absence, does not depend on the fact of “referencing,” but involves that language of shu, “likening” through indirect means, and therefore the language of deference is the language of shu, the act of giving and receiving deference involves comparison and contrast, hence analogy. Additionally, Foucault points to the three levels of language: commentary, text, and writing as a “stigma, mark” inscribed in the fabric of the world. So that an art of naming is reinforced by substitution and “reduplication,” which is capturing that name:  

of enclosing and concealing it, of designating it in turn by other names that were the deferred presence of the first name, its secondary sign, its figuration, its rhetorical panoply.  

Names are given other names, substitute names. Then we defer and organize the text around these names and proliferate them indefinitely. That is why the Taoist would say that tao is “nameless,” and only created or generated things have names, the beginning of discourse.  

According to Schwartz, Confucius and Mo-tzu both seem to believe that language
provides us with an "image" of the true order of things, and Mo-tzu goes on to try and build a "scientific" language to give us a more precise picture of reality. 11 The idea of language based on "images" (hsiang) can be tied to the I Ching. Wang Pi also had an interest in "images" as a fundamental element of our language. In this same regard, Graham says that both Hsuntzu and Mo-tzu had a nominalistic view of language as names fitting objects (actuality, shih), while the Taoist would delineate the limitations of language. But Confucius discovered the iconic, diagramatic hsiang (models) of the I Ching, as

\begin{quote}
      diagrams structurally related to phenomena both directly and through the models... The Master had said, 'The sages established models (hsiang), to exhaust the ideas, provided diagrams to exhaust genuine and false, attached verbalizations to them to exhaust what they had to say.' 12
\end{quote}

The iconic, according to Peirce, is such signs that their "qualities resemble those of that object." 13

Most Chinese characters have remnants of pictographic, iconic resemblances, such as depicted in Karlgren's Grammata Serica Recens. Hence, both Confucius and Mo-tzu may have had "referential" intentions of interpretation in their Correction of Names doctrines. On the other hand, the audient, homophonic differences are also clues to how words may sound so much alike that homophones were used as "loan" words, which over time may have changed the significations of the graphs. It is just as coherent a system if we use homophones, or phonetic differences, along with tonal nuances, to characterize the diacritical differences in a spoken language as it is to concentrate on the graphical or orthographic changes in characters over time.

Functionally, another way of obviating a referential bias of language is to show the performative, normative-prescriptive, aspects of language as against the descriptive, designative, or ostensive function of language. It is "propositional reference" which is the usual way we interpret propositions, assertions as statements which have truth-value, or the meaning of a proposition is the state of affairs it "refers" to. The Chinese is less interested in truth semantics. Hence, if we emphasize the performative-prescriptive aspects of language, we are on the way to
avoiding a referential view of language. This is also our emphasis on the mutual reciprocity of the compound words-deeds, in order to bring out the "performative-active" aspects intrinsic in our language to guide conduct (hsing) or incite us to cooperate in our communicative actions and receptions. It also points to the other aspect of symbolic interactions, which a language serves as a medium where we connect signs to signs, and signs back to gestural incipient meanings.

Ricoeur has another approach to reference, which he construes as intrinsic to narratives: i.e., in both fictional and historical narratives.

But it is precisely insofar as fictional discourse 'suspends' its first order referential function that it releases a second order reference, where the world is manifested no longer as the totality of manipulable objects but as the horizon of our life and project, in short as Lebenswelt (life-world) as being-in-the-world. Hence, it is a non-ostensive reference, a "self-reference" intrinsic to the story, narrative or text. What is interpreted is the "world in front of the text," a "proposed world." It is the reader who triggers this self-reference, or second order reference.

Ricoeur also offers a more fundamental way of appraising the problem of "referentiality"; it begins with the problem of "representation," "standing-for," or "taking-the-place-of." In the context of fiction, this representation, however, can function as "revealing and transforming." The contrast is between a "representational" and a "presentational" theory of meaning. The work of fiction is revelatory of character traits, the capture of the flux of events, and the following upon the way of the emplotted moves through the story. The Chinese iconic, pictographic "words" are "concrete reflections" of the lifeworld and not "abstractive" from the world and put in classes, concepts, or universals, which can at best re-present what they have abstracted from the stream of experience.

Ricoeur further distinguishes between propositional reference and "metaphorical" reference.

Propositional reference atomizes and identifies. Hermeneutical reference displays and makes manifest...configurative wholes...by placing it within a network of goals, intentions and purposes...against a backdrop of a play of metaphors...what Paul Ricoeur calls 'metaphorical reference.'

The configurative whole, the whole-part relationship of the hermeneutical circle is not an analytical breakdown of the whole into simples, but a complex of holistic synthesis of cumulative
Interpretive details. Also, this play of metaphors is quite important in the "goblet rationality" of Chuang-tzu. Metaphors evoke, are suggestive of startling and novel meanings as insightful new ways of seeing things, in their tzu-jen, spontaneously emergent patterns.

If Interpretation plays an important role as the criterial mark of "hermeneutical reference," it is what happens in a text that becomes important for "reference":

For us, the world is the totality of references opened up by texts...Texts speak of possible worlds and of possible ways of orienting oneself in these worlds. In this way, disclosure plays the equivalent role for written texts as ostensive reference plays in spoken language. Interpretation thus becomes the apprehension of the proposed worlds which are opened up by the non-ostensive reference of the text. 17

Metaphorical reference is poetic reference; poetic discourse is non-referential and centered on itself, hence self-referential or having an immanent structural integrity for its interpretation.

Ricoeur wants to borrow Jakobson's "split reference," where the paradigmatic and syntagmatic are inverses of each other. Hence, "the poetic function reference is the inverse of the referential function."

Heidegger's main concept is "appropriation," the process by which we get the "revelation of new modes of Being." Appropriation is the making into one's own (anegnen):

When something is understood but is still veiled, it becomes unveiled by an act of appropriation, and this is always done under a guidance of a point of view, which fixes that with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted. 18

 Appropriation is "revelation" and "disclosure," the unveiling of the veiled, the disclosure of the undisclosed (aetheia), from a "point of view" (a perspective), which in Heidegger is from the base of the forestructure: fore-concepts, fore-sight, and fore-havings. Metaphorically, Graham indicates that ming "bright" is the word for "enlightenment" of the sage, which is also compared with a "mirror reflecting things exactly as they are," and le** means to "get" is used for "insight"; these are all metaphorical ways of saying that one is "grasping" something in the thinking process, hence, is similar to "appropriation" when we "interpret and organize rather than passively reflect." 19

The Chinese counterpart of appropriation is ke wu (the investigation of things) or ke hsin
(in Mencius, the investigation into the heart-mind). In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, 16/4, *ke ssu* (to think, to surmise) surmises about the spirit (*kwei shen*, the energetic *ch'î*, or the operation of Heaven and Earth–Legge):

> The *Book of Odes* says, 'The coming of spiritual beings cannot be surmised. How much less can we get tired of them?' Such is the manifestation of the subtle. Such is the Impossibility of hiding the real (*ch'eng*, sincerity, Integrity).
> (trans. W. T. Chan)

Hence *ke wu* means to reveal and make manifest the "subtle," the "hidden" in the investigation of the heart-mind (*ke hsin*) and things (*ke wu*). This parallels the *I Ching* statement that

> The aspect of it which cannot be fathomed in terms of the light and the dark *yang* and *yin* is called spirit (*shen*).20

*Ke wu* is the process to "appropriate," to "unconceal the concealed," the mystery of "spirit."

Also, Mencius says in 4A/20, "It is only the great man who can rectify (*ke*) what is wrong in the sovereign's mind."

In Confucius, *ke wu* is his investigative and narrative discourse of the world of the Chou historical chronicles and other earlier dynasties. The "images" presented in those narrative histories may be a legendary ancient sage-king, or real characters in real time. But his synthesis in imagination of what was narrated does bring out the locus, or place of reference, the situational meanings, and normative-prescriptive lessons or morals to be emulated, or performed according to the ideal of the sage-kings or other historical cultural heroes, Hou Chi, Fu Hsi, King Wen, P'eng-tzu, etc. Confucius would re-create an imaginative world for our perusal based on the Six Classics. He preferred the Chou because they improved upon the antecedent dynasties. His imaginative synthesis is what make the Six Classics interesting not only as literature, but as an index to the horizon of the lifeworld of the Chou. We tend to forget the fact of "imaginative creativity" can be deemed a Confucian virtue, since harking back to the ancients is for the purpose of imaginatively rehearsing the experiences of the ritualized society and culture of the Chou, to re-enact and re-live their world, even if vicariously.

2.6.1: THEORIES OF NAMING: *MING-SHIH*

In a broader comparison, we go to Foucault's discussion of Condillac's and Destutt's
views on the "language of action." In a theory of "generalized nomination" (theory of naming),
the function of language is to name, "to raise up representation or point it out, as though with a
finger," indicating things by "a mark, a notion, an associated figure, a gesture of designation."21
The main contrast is between "indication," or primary designation, versus the primacy of
"judgment" (attribution, predication).

The language of action is spoken by the body... (man's) face is agitated by
movements; he emits inarticulate cries—All this is not yet either language or
even sign... As long as it is a simple extension of the body, action has no power
to speak; it is not language. It becomes language, but only at the end of definite
and complex operations: the analogy of relations.22

This analogy of relations is shu, which is "likening to oneself what is felt in others." Also at the
primary base of language, the "indicative" mode is better thought of as "pointing," showing, or in
Buchler's terms "exhibitive-aesthetic" and not specifically assertive or descriptive; the latter is
closer to attribution or predicative judgment..

At this juncture, the discussions of Ricoeur on what constitutes a myth and a symbol is
significant, since it extends the viewpoint of a "primary designation" of the language of action.
For Ricoeur, we start with the fact that "symbolic signs are opaque,"
because the first, literal, obvious meaning itself points analogically to a second
meaning which is not given otherwise than in it... This opacity constitutes the
depth of the symbol, which, it will be said is inexhaustible.23

The latter feature of depth and inexhaustibleness is good for hermeneutics, since we can carry
on interpretation indefinitely, without committing ourselves to a "finality" about our interpretations.
Furthermore, the analogical factors are the concrete factors in relating signs and symbols to their
analogical meanings, and this has importance for the language of action and the performatory
aspects of illocutionary force. The various incipient symbols for "defilement" is an example
offered by Ricoeur, which translates to such self-evident notions as:

The literal and manifest sense, then points beyond to something that is like a
stain or spot.24

In the Chinese context, Franklin Doeringer applies Ricoeur's opacity of symbols to
interpret some of the I Ching's emphasis on hsiang (images, symbols). He notices that the I
Ching envisions two kinds of realities:
And whatever lacks form, however, defies predication (attributes), for it offers nothing by which it can be clearly apprehended. Nonetheless, if the formed is said to emerge out of the unformed, there must be an intermediate stage when what is to realize full form just begins to appear. It would be protean (incipient) and though perceptible, still too vague (opaque) to be described with precision.25

And these protean, just about to begin to be, incipient forms are called hsiang, clusters of meaning or indications of impending forms of transformation.

Wilhelm goes back to Lao-tzu who said that “every event in the visible world is the effect of an ‘image’,” that there is a concealment (yin), mysterious (hsuan), abstruse, nameless, etc. for the “unseen world.” But the images serve as a “theory of ideas” and has two functions:

The Book of Changes shows the image of events and also the unfolding of conditions in statu nascendi. 26

Hence, it is like the “intermediate” state of change, which is incipience, or protean, and ready to emerge out as a visible form, or image (hsiang). So the holy men and sages who are in contact with those above and before forms through direct intuition can intervene and predict what can be divined as fortunate or misfortune. The symbolic hexagrams will hold the mysterious, the subtle, the deep, which is associated with the red-color vermillion (hsuan). This is also the area of language which Heidegger points to as the “mystery” which seems to be residual in our articulation of things.

On the more conventional side of naming, Hsun-tzu writes about the purpose of naming.

Therefore the wise (sage) made for them apportionments (distinctions) and instituted names to point out objects: In the first place in order to clarify noble and base, secondly, to distinguish same and different...This is the purpose of having names.27

Also, the method is one of “assimilating and differentiation” of the cumulative evidence of the senses. And in line with the definition of naming of classes of things (fei):

whatever is the same in kind and the same in essentials (ch'ing), the representation of a thing by the senses is the same.28

In Hsun-tzu, names become not even names, but become “place holders” used in common, conventionally. Empirical observation forms the basis of his doctrine of the Correction of Names.
Names are not fixed, but only the means by which one attempts to understand different realities.29

It has been pointed out that Hsun-tzu's conventionalism uses a lot of the categories defined by the Later Mohist logic, since he treats language as a creative, conventional act, which over long periods of time cumulates the meanings that words have.

Hsun-tzu is quite prepared to draw on their (Mohist) categories to provide us with a more precise defence of what he considers to be the true language of the sage-kings, even while he attacks many of the Mohists' substantive doctrines..."A name has no inherent appropriateness. One names by establishing a convention. Once the convention is fixed, the usage becomes established and we call it appropriate." 30

2.6.2: THEORY OF ROOTS

There is a theory of roots which goes along with the theory of the language of action. Roots go back to a stock of basic cries (phonemes), which are purely indicative or referent to some "thing" or event, in some cases it is pure onomatopoeia. These roots may appear in several languages and are considered as rudimentary words. In Chinese, Wang Pi compares fe* (meaning virtue), with fe** meaning (to obtain, to get) as homophones and therefore interchangeable, even as loan words, and he posits some "family resemblances" based on same sounds: same sounds have cognate meanings. Even though Chinese is a pictographic language, with etymological roots and radicals, the audient elements give us semantic clues as to meaning, archaic derivations, and dialected differences. The etymological tracing of homophones as "loan" words is part of the Shuo-wen lexicon, as well as Karlgren's Grammata Serica Recensa, which is based on "paronomastic" rhymes or audient, orality relationships to graphical developments: the closer the numbers assigned to the graphs, the closer their paronomastic, or cognate relationship. For example, yi (meaning, signification) is #957, and chih (will, purpose, motives) is #962; the "distance" is quite close, near.

Foucault also mentions that in a generalized theory of naming, the two functions are that of "primary indication," on the one hand, and "primary attribution," on the other hand. This connects up with the Chinese designation as chih, the finger pointing to things. The former is illustrated as gestures, which in its natural origin (as cries) has the role primarily of "designation"
and the latter in its verbal role a "judgments," or articulation of attributes, properties, qualities of things. Language build on roots; the Chinese have "roots and radicals" which form the building blocks of their signs and characters. In this way, they can substitute the radical as elements for proliferation of more complex characters, similar to the alphabetic configuration of words.

In line with Derrida's view of language as "substitution," Foucault points out that primary designation gives us the principle of "connection" in which we "link one content with another" and a principle of substitution, which permits the "substitution of a sign with what is indicated." Hence, we have "connection" and "substitution" as an opposition and yet both displays an affinity which enables language to operate smoothly.

Similarly, Gadamer distinguishes two functions of a sign within the interpretive process, that is, when we take interpretation as chih (a pointing out)

We can distinguish two different senses of interpretation: point to something and point out the meaning of something. 'Point to something' is a kind of 'indicating' that function as a sign. 'pointing out what something means,' on the other hand, always relate back to the kind of sign that interprets itself. Thus when we interpret the meaning of something we actually interpret an interpretation.

Hence any sign substitution is already an interpretation of an interpretation. Gadamer goes on to point out that a "gesture" is comparable to a "sign" and something that also may conceal what it may point to, and in that concealment, interpretation will make clear what is confused, unclear, or vague.

Gadamer also traces the beginning of "symbol" in the Greeks: Symbol is the Greek term for a token of remembrance.

A host breaks some object in two (tessera hospitalis) keeping one half for himself and the other half to the guest. If the two pieces could be fitted together again to form a whole in an act of recognition, then the symbol represented something like a sort of pass used in the ancient world; something in and through which we recognize someone already known to us.

A symbol is an act of remembrance, a recognition of a part which fits into a larger whole and "completes" the whole. This is the same as Plato's Symposium in which spherical creatures are split in two and go around looking for their other half. It is also the Chinese custom of the "tally,"
or "talisman," which is to be fitted together in order to get the holistic intuition of how things fit into a social whole. Chinese characters are tallies, since they fit together roots and radicals, with semantic significs which give clues for cognate meanings.

Mead would use the "hand" as an example of the beginnings of the isolation of physical objects and make them "social objects" by the way we manipulate things in the world. He says,

I have emphasized the importance of the hand and the building up of this environment. The acts of the living form are those which lead up to consummations such as that of eating food--we present it to ourselves in terms of the manipulated object.34

Hand signals can serve as substitutions, by which we can multiply the number of signs and add gestures to proliferate more information. This forms a gesture-language. Also, substitution permits these multiplications of further signs based on the "analogy of relations" (shu, likening, similarity and difference) which is a fundamental way we extend our language and meanings.

Basic to the "analogy of relations" is its functioning in extensions to the more literary parts of our language: such as metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, etc. while at the same time, differences can be extended in oppositional thinking in chains of dichotomous oppositions, as well as in correlative, polar thinking which is more interested in mutual reciprocity among our notions. How do we get rid of the problems associated with the substitutions of literal and metaphorical meanings?

We do not really free ourselves from the theory of substitution...we substitute the system of connotations and commonplaces...The decisive moment of explanation is the construction of a network of interactions...Such is the fundamental feature of explanation which makes metaphor a paradigm for explanation of a literary work...In which we make sense of all of a metaphorical statement.35

The nature of language then is "diacritical," a building up of a cumulative network of analogy of relations. This is the message of Saussure.

In summary, the analogy of relations goes through the stages of language development, Derrida shows the "analogies" in Condillac's stages of writing:

This is the general history of writing conveyed by a simple gradation from the state of painting through that of the letter; for letters are the last steps which
remain to be taken after the Chinese marks (ideographs) which partake of letters precisely as hieroglyphs partake equally of Mexican paintings and of Chinese characters...an alphabet simply diminishes the confusion of their number, and is their succinct abbreviation.\textsuperscript{36}

Based on the "analogy of signs," this becomes the means for dissemination, proliferation of signs in constituting languages.\textsuperscript{37}

We are interested how symbols and signs function in the process of substitution, and how they contribute to the extension of our communicative interactions, symbolic interactions (Mead). Gadamer holds that "symbol" means something to "facilitate recognition," of what we commonly share in beliefs, dogmas, or religious experiences, and the "awakening of a shared consciousness of something through its own expressive power" that the work of art facilitates our own recognition of our lot in our world.\textsuperscript{38} This is the role of the symbolic in a work of art. Each of us will experience a work of art in their own expressive ways. In the context of the I Ching, we can see the hexagrams as symbols, with an interpretive text of what these symbols portend as "signs" of what is indicated by the symbols: fortune, misfortune, etc. The original images (hsiang) become symbols and signs of phenomenal reality by shu, the analogy of relations.
2.7: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS THE CORRECTION OF NAMES IN THE
SOCIOPOLITICAL ORDER.

In the Confucian tradition, the interpretive context includes the Correction of Names as aspects of the compound "words-deeds" and the unity of "knowledge-action," in both the "performative" and normative-regulative (prescriptive) modes; Hall and Ames interprets *chih* (to know) in its "performative" aspects as "to realize" one's self, or one's *fe* (Potency): in interpreting *Analects* 6/23, *chih* as "realizing" takes in both aspects, that is (1) "making a world real" (2) as well as "achieving excellence" in an authoritative (*jen*) person. \(^1\) Analogously, Antonio Cua takes the "unity of knowledge and action" (*chih-hsing-ho-i*) to mean that the Chinese assume "the primacy of practical reason" construed as "plausible presumptions," that is, appeal to shared knowledge, belief, or experience, as well as to established or operative standards of competence. Confucian argumentation is "rhetorical," and involves the use of enthymemes (practical syllogisms) and arguments from example. \(^2\)

The entire Correction of Names project has to be thought of as a way of using language in a "corporate" (*tf*) manner, that is, talking about the roles and functions of a sociopolitical body as the whole interrelating of a hierarchical structure with its functional division of labor and what Durkheim calls a corporate, "collective consciousness," which is also a feature of an organic solidarity of a society and culture. Since it is not the individual consciousness that can be recorded as the legacy of the world-view, the Correction of Names doctrine depends upon the kind of language and culture which constitutes the lifeworld which is to be organized, structured, hierarchized, and serve to conserve the semantic potentials and capacity giving meaning, value, and significance to the "interpretation" of the stored-up contents of a culture.

The Correction of Names does not take place within a vacuum of abstractive names and empty functions. As Habermas points out, "From the semantic point of view, language has a peculiar affinity to linguistically articulated world views." \(^3\) The description of a social organization, then, is an organic description along with the performative aspects of the roles, within the functional structures of an organic solidarity desired by the Correction of Names doctrine. That
is why we need to underpin the Correction of Names with an "organicistic" viewpoint, so that what doubts Mencius had toward the Spring and Autumn Annals containing the main thematic of Correction of Names, and just wars, and Hsun-tzu's critique are also relevant in either proving the doctrine or casting doubt about its veracity.

When Chad Hansen advances his "mass-noun" hypothesis in order to explain the "concrete but holistic" ("stuff"), rather than the "universal" or "class" (abstractive), he regards the Correction of Names, when interpreted strictly, reduces to a common sense rule of one-name-one-thing. This seems simplistic, since the aim of Confucius is to give a "functional" explanation of the organic, hierarchical structure of the sociopolitical and the roles, offices, organizations, duties and obligations, etc. In short, the Correction of Names is "one-name, many functions," like a t'ï-yung type of explanation. And Hansen's conclusion supports a nominalism that is informative after he takes us through the Mohists discussion of chien, or compound names (i.e., Kung Sun-lung's "hard-white" and "ox-horse") and 11 (a division of chien, 11-sameness and 11-difference). The mass-noun hypothesis helps explain why Chinese philosophy is nominalistic, since it is simultaneously concrete, this-worldly and yet monistic (sic!), organistic rather than pluralistic and particularistic.

The Correction of Names is not simply a sociopolitical "theory" waiting for the interpretation of the variables in it and applied within a practical (praxis) context. After all, the doctrine came about when Confucius was asked, "What is the minimal thing you need to do in order to bring about order within a body politic such that it will function, efficaciously, without too much contention, and avoid risks and dangers of falling into anarchy?" And the Confucian answer is based upon a number of undergirding assumptions of what constitutes a praxial, yet ideal society, in which tao prevails. Somewhat later, Hsun-tzu said that since the decline of the Chou dynasty, names are in confusion, hence, 'If a true king should arise, he will certainly follow some of the old names and invent some new names.'
2.7.1: ORGANICISM AND SOCIALITY.

We need to go back to a much more fundamental project in Whitehead to establish the idea of "sociality" as a paradigm for the Confucian thrust to provide a social context for personal development. Whitehead was interested in two contrasting kinds of social order: (1) "extensive connection" is a more general notion than the relation of whole to parts. Whitehead has an affinity with the doctrine of "internal relations" (Leibniz), but his interest in extensive connection is to involve both internal and external relations together, and (2) it is organic, or "social" order, which the philosophy of organism is primarily interested: a "society" is a "nexus of actual entities, ordered among themselves." But this ordering is not in mathematical terms. Sociality as the nexus of actual entities can be the extensive connections of concrete parts-to-parts, rather than of parts-to-whole. Hence, focus-field is internally related in which site-specific interconnectives are "intra-worldly" (Lee Yearley). Mead defines "sociality" as follows:

Sociality is the situation in which the novel event is in both the old order and the new which its advent heralds. Sociality is the capacity for being several things at once (a plurality of systems).

Durkheim also distinguished a "mechanical," mathematical sense of order from "segmentally" and "functionally" (organic) differentiated societies; the former is like a "segmented earthworm" and the latter has the "heart" as the organ which is a central organ (like the state) coordinating and subordinating parts to the rest of the organism. In Whitehead, moreover, the more fundamental question in regard to "sociality," order, societies of societies, etc., are premised on the general subject-matter of "What is Life?" What is a "living" nexus of cells, molecules, etc. to which the Chinese would answer in terms of the constituents of ch'i, and yin-yang alternations. Whitehead, parallels this distinction of mechanical/organic with the two modes of division in analysis: the genetic mode and coordinate, or morphological analysis. In the genetic mode, the actual entity is seen from the standpoint of "process," "growth from phase to phase," in which processes are also seen as "integration and reintegration" and this genetic process is not seen in physical time.

Physical time makes its appearance in "coordinate" analysis and coordinate analysis is
from the standpoint of the "physical" pole only, together with its possibilities of division into concrete sub-regions. Hall identifies the genetic approach with "aesthetic order," and the morphological with "logical order." Whitehead is against our use of simplistic "analogical thinking," which does not make use of "processual" kinds of thinking; hence, Whitehead provides the doctrine of "symbolic reference" which is a method of "correlation" between causal efficacy and presentational immediacy. Therefore, *shu*, or analogy of relations is a basis for a more advanced type of "correlative thinking." Furthermore,

Whitehead's argumentation is fundamentally analogical. His primary analogate is the 'actual occasion' as an instantiation of creativity characterized by freedom, transience (immediacy) and novel purpose. His doctrine of 'cosmic epochs' relativizes forms of order, thus moving his analogical procedure closer to those of the correlative mode. 

Whitehead would also emphasize the "polar" kinds of thinking between the physical/mental poles.

This type of organic society of societies is illustrated in Thome Fang's *sheng sheng* as the "principle of growth" and answers the fundamental question of "What is Life?", but Fang's notion is similar to the sense of Whitehead's "concresence," as "drops of experience." Graham notes Mencius uses plant "growth" as an analogy for the development of the four "germs" or "beginnings."

Mencius...conceives of *hsing* in terms of development requiring nurture and avoidance of interference may be seen from his frequent comparisons with plant growth, for example of the vegetation on Ox Mountain. (6A/6).

Schwartz makes a problematique of the term "organicism" by criticizing Needham's use of it in the metaphor of "biological organism" and proffer instead the metaphor of the "family" and also that of "bureaucratic organization." His preference is that we should use instead of the whole-part relation the dominance of "holistic immanentist view of order." In all events, a society is like the cell, the family, which has a society of a society of a society which are the interrelations among the members of the family: husband-wife, father-son, elder brother-younger brother to wider societies of societies of societies of the extended family, clans of the hundred names, etc.

It is not simply a linear ancestral relationship but a cumulative "holographic" growth pattern.
For Schwartz, the problématique is still there:

Families ought to constitute harmonious wholes. They do not necessarily do so, and it is on the rock of this ethical reality that the notions of the preestablished, unproblematic holistic order founders. 17

Also on the cosmological level, ancestor worship involves the family metaphor, since all the departed are still with us in some shape or form, from the original ancestor to the present.

As a metaphor for the cosmos, it suggests a world of entities and energies held together in familial harmony under the authority of the high god. As a model for the sociopolitical order, it projects the picture of an immanent order based on networks of clearly defined roles, and statuses and ideally held together by a system of sacred rituals. 18

There is a "cosmomorphic" model to ground the Correction of Names, which would include the whole immanent living order from the gods down to the people, each person having their own niche, their station (wei, position, status) and their duties.

Finally, Whitehead is cognizant of chaos and "disorder" in our search for order in nature. A society arises from "disorder" in reference to the "ideal" for that society. 19 It undergoes changes which favor the society if the wider environment (ecology) is adequate for its functioning, or it may decay and go out of existence. Whitehead points to the cosmic epoch in which these societies rise and fall, and societies are subject to an "epochal theory of time," and "quantum" leaps such as displayed in an electronic society. There is always a bit of "chaos" which we cannot predict to assure us that the future will always be like the past, an eternal recurrence. These considerations make up Whitehead's "aesthetic cosmology."

We can also complement Whitehead's view of "societies of societies" with Mead's emphasis on the "social character of perception," which he discussed in the Philosophy of the Act; the schemata for the perception of permanent objects are formed through the "interplay of eye and hand" and the "manipulatory experiences" of the resistance of external objects gives us a social perception we can share by calling out "the taking of the attitude of an alter ego."

Merleau-Ponty's "lived body" is also a version of the social base for perception, with its inner and outer horizons. It shows that perceptions of bodies overlap, become flesh on flesh, become incarnate (embodied) in each other, and enlarges the fusion of horizons indefinitely.
The human individual thinks first of all entirely in social terms. This means not that nature and natural objects are personalized, but that the child's reactions to nature and its objects are social reactions and that his responses imply that the actions of natural objects are social reactions. 20

2.7.2: SOCIAL ROLES AND CORRECTION OF NAMES.

Graham evaluates Confucius use of names in terms of their sociopolitical roles: the names must be suitable for, and fit the social functions of the office. Graham reiterates, "the crucial thing, however, is the naming of social roles, i.e., the ruler rules, the minister ministers, etc." In Analects 13/3, the main purpose of the Correction of Names is presented as follows:

Therefore what the gentleman names is sure to be sayable, and what he says is sure to be performable. 21

Whatever the gentleman says is do-able, "practicable" (praxial) (D. C. Lau), and there is a mutual reciprocity between speech-actions, words-deeds. W. T. Chan also points out that the main aim of the doctrine of Correction of Names is the "establishment of a social order in which its names and ranks are properly regulated (cheng, corrected)," but it also has an important connection to words-and-action, and "in its philosophical aspect, the correspondence of name and actuality" (ming-shih). 22

Tu Wei-ming tries to establish a traditional "linkage" between jen, li, and chih; he believes jen is the source in which "symbolic exchange" comes into existence. There are intimate connections between the Confucian virtue and the Correction of Names. And if Confucius gives ontological priority to jen over the other Confucian virtues, then jen is a necessary condition without which li, becomes "ritualism," and chih becomes "cleverness" or would have no meaning at all. This enterprise of taking pairs of values as linkages is similar to the task of giving ontological priority to one of the four Confucian virtues over the others. It may slight one of the pair by giving it a "pejorative" meaning and destroy the paired-complex. Hall and Ames would rather discuss jen as person-in-context, or the use of Wayne Booth's "field of selves." Tu Wei-ming mentions "field of influence," which is also taken from Booth. 23

The aim is to yield a "coherent semiotic structure" (Correction of Names structure) for
*jen,* in which the meanings of *li* and *chih* is shaped; in this regard Tu quotes *Analects* 3:3:

"Thus, a man who is not *jen* can have nothing to do with *li.*" And in 15:32, "Even if a man's *chih* is sufficient for him to attain it, without *jen* to hold it, he will lose it again." We can suggest that even more fundamental is the *li-*gesture as it operates as an originating *te,* a potent Act, as virtual virtues (Tu calls this the "raw stuff" of humanity), which when organized and arranged into a coherent hierarchy becomes the conventional Confucian virtues of *jen,* *li,* *chih,* and *yi.*

Alternatively, we can contrast the Confucian and the later Mohists; Graham depicts the Mohist theory of naming as purely "nominalistic":

To call an object 'horse' and extend the name to another which is like it, the same in kind (lei). To decide whether a name fits you therefore require as standard (fa) something similar, and where the similarity is only of part, the relevant part as criterion *yin*... Referring and saying merely tells us what an object is like. The standard is a criterion (*yin*) stated in a definition. The Mohists would consider the Confucian Correction of Names doctrine as a graded hierarchical scheme, an aristocratic-elitist system, for which the Mohists would make "corrections," regulations for a more egalitarian, meritocratic bureaucracy than the Confucian one, which the Mohist thinks is based essentially on kinship, nepotism, and clan laws: it will require "the realization of the model in one's own person, and that one becomes (embodies) a person of authority as a significating (yi) being" for the Correction of Names to work.

We must also try to give purchase for the "family" as the center and origins of the socio-political order. In *The Great Learning,* Chu Hsi remarks,

Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives.

It can be said that "government" is from the family, centrifugally outward to the clans, neighborhood, larger communities, and into the nation-state, and ultimately into the cosmic scale. But the way up and the way down is the same. Hence, the Corrections of Names should start from the language used in the framework of familial terms: filiality, brotherhood, etc., and their roles and their functions within a hierarchy. Then from the family outward, the extension to the cosmic
order of heaven and earth, is still in familial language: i.e., in later history, the repeated reference is to "Heaven and earth as the mother and father of the ten-thousand things" and to the Emperor as the "father and mother of the people."

Another use is made of filial piety from the Book of Documents:

Filial piety—nothing but filial piety and devotion to your brothers—this is being active in government... Why must what you call 'serving in government' be the only form of governing?

One must "act" like a father to one's people, in order to be a good "ruler." And the misuse of language, then, needs correction, since any confusion in words also disturbs the functioning of social roles and imperils the society.

But, at bottom, setting up the names, or the schema for the Correction of Names depends ultimately on the ways of "carving" out from existence what is deemed as the basic notion of "discrimination" (pien), at the point when language begins to carve out of the flux of things some actuality (shih), to which names are given. In this regard, Hansen has pointed out that pien has two equivocal senses: (1) argument in the Western sense is synonymous to "proof" and (2) pien also means a "quarrel, a dispute, a disagreement." In the Later Mohist, there is also the attempt to "define" some of the basic terms in a system and relate them into a larger moral system. Moreover, there is the basic problem of the Correction of Names with a fundamental relation between ming-shih (name-actual). By comparison with the Taoists, Hall says that the "carving of the Uncarved Block" produces the "discursiveness" we normally desire in names, words, language, etc., but mainly it carves out "a privileged order" from among the sum of all orders in Chaos. This privileged order is what Chuang-tzu would point out as one perspective among many which are relative to our shih-fei's. The Confucian yu-wei Correction of Names doctrine is one among the privileged schemas and must be contrasted with the wu-wei Taoist model.

If we focus on another Confucian work, The Great Learning, we will find similarities to the nominalistic trend of "likening something to something else" in the main concept of ke-wu, the "arriving at things." For instance, Graham interprets ke-wu as following from "integrity of..."
intention" (ch'eng yì) which extends the perfecting of knowledge of oneself of the things to which one is reacting (kan-yìng), and using shu, the "likening them to oneself and reacting (yìng) from their standpoints."31 Graham prefers "integrity" instead of "sincerity," since ch'eng has the radical ch'eng "become whole" which is to "integrate, make integral, achieve integrity." Schwartz says ch'eng also has the meaning of "individualized"—to make whole.32 The concept of shu, of "likening to oneself" is like Mead's taking the attitude of the "generalized other." Shu is the fundamental method of analogy, the comparisons of similarities and differences.

At the base of language, we extend language through the "analogy of relations," such relations as being similar, different, etc.. Also, in terms of "integration" of knowledge and action, there is a presumption of inclusion of "taking the attitude of the other," or "reacting from their standpoint" as kan-yìng, stimulus-response. Furthermore, the emphasis is on "integrity" as a holistic concept.

Integrity is being spontaneously whole, the Way is the spontaneously on course. Integrity is the beginning and end of a thing; unless it is integral there is no thing...Integrity is not only spontaneously making oneself whole, it is the means of making other things whole...It is the Potency (fe) in our nature, it is the Way to join outer and inner.33

Integrity is what makes a thing "things," without integrity, there is no-thing. In Heidegger's terms, it is being-as-a-whole, which gives a thing its "holistic" authenticity.

There is a fundamental assumption in The Doctrine of the Mean, which is especially relevant to the spontaneous harmony in nature:

The early Chinese tradition simply acknowledged a spontaneous harmony in nature with which human beings, through concerted effort, can effect integration, thereby enriching both their natural environment and themselves.34

That spontaneous harmony has the senses of chung as "equilibrium," or "rest," and yung as "constancy." In an aesthetic cosmology, this socializing harmony has its points of equilibrium in our responses and the harmonization of the tensions contributed by contrasts held in constancy relationships, i.e., the Five Great Human relationships.

The Five Relationships supplied just such a set of social definitions, delineating the degrees of respect due to and the levels of responsibility corresponding to the various social personae.35
Hsun-tzu construed ritual as a "communal performance" and hence also serves as an important part of a "moral education" too. Hence, rituals "harmonizes the rhythms of social life," which gives it an aesthetic, poetic basis, since rhythm is part of the poetic experience, which gives order and structure to our ordinary experiences. In Analects, 12/13,

Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect. Govern them by moral force, keep order among them by ritual, and they will keep their self-respect and come to you of their own accord.

Most of all, since ritual has a sacred, religious base, they have as their purpose "communicating with what is eminently real," which is also the reality involved with answering the question of the "source" of our existence, such as tao, as a creative source of the myriad things.

Li serves to maintain and reinforce all distinctions among the social roles, ranks, and statuses of the social order, assigning to all of them their proper functions and forms and thus serving to assure the peace and harmony of 'society.'

This latter function is a primary reason for the Correction of Names. Taking the two functions together, we have a "cosmographic" way of regularizing the functioning of Li, on the social level and on the cosmic level, tying it back to a "holy rite," a spiritual base which will pervade heaven, earth and man. Hence, at bottom, the genesis of ritual is a poiesis, "poetic making," with art (aesthetic harmony) and religion functioning together, in its source and resource in the original religious cult and its observations of its worldview of its lifeworld. Another reenforcement of the sacred base is made from the image of sha-hui (a deferential assembly gathering around the sacred pole erected in the center of the community) which is the ancestral temple where the local deity was enshrined.

What is important is that Hsun-tzu, in his combative refutation of Mencius' theory that human nature is good, goes to the other extreme and starts with the six basic human "emotions," which makes man's desires, likes and dislikes, pleasure and anger, joy and sorrow, the basis for his "love of profit (li)" and this generates the "war of all against all" (Hobbes);
Consequently if you indulge man’s nature, if you follow the authentic (desires) in man, you inevitably start off in jostling and grabbing, take the course of violation of allotments and disordering of pattern, and become settled in crime. Hence there must be transformation by teachers and standards, the Way of the ceremonial and the right, before you can start off in forbearance and deference, take the course of the cultured and patterned, and become settled in the ordered.

Graham calls the basic emotions, *ching* (the passions), which later becomes a common term used by Mencius, Sung Hsing, and Han Fei-tzu.

In the above, there is a problem of “allotments,” an economic problem on the distribution of scarce resources, which is the basic problem to be solved. Everyone expects to satisfy their desires and wants for goods and services, hence “disorder” results, and we need a sage to do the apportioning (fen) and the “division of labor” of the various arts, crafts, occupations, etc.

The former kings hated the disorder, and therefore instituted the ceremonial and the right to allot portions, in order to nurture man’s desires and provide what he seeks, and ensure that the desires are never in excess of the things and the things never inadequate to the desires, the two developing in support of each other. It is from this that ceremony originates.

But most of all, we must remember historically that Hsun-tzu was writing after the Later Mohists and, as Graham says,

What he sees as his main ideas makes his ‘Correction of Names’...has close connexions with the Canons, and may be seen as largely a digest of Later Mohist disputation for Confucian use.

Hsun-tzu’s critique of the Correction of Names must be interpreted through the eyes of the Mohist Canons. Hsun-tzu was able to move from Mencius’ emphasis on *jen*, as the spontaneous process of defining our “shoots of human goodness,” to the main preoccupation with *li*, ritual action:

Hsun-tzu sees ceremony as the alternative to punishment in imposing order on man’s anarchic desires...As for *yi*, ‘the right, morality,’ its importance remains constant...For Hsun-tzu *yi* is the defining characteristic of the human.

Hsun-tzu’s distinction of what is “learned” is not natural but “artifice” also means that most of what is man-made (artifice, conventional) is learned, or acquired.

‘Whatever in man cannot be learned or worked for is called ‘nature’; everything in man which he can become capable of by learning and can bring to completion by working for is called ‘artifice.’
When *li* and *yi* (morality) are emphasized by Hsun-tzu, what he has in mind is that our social memory will understand the authentic places for the ordering of social roles and their allotted status and functions. Hsun-tzu puts the main stress on the ordering and refining of the passions, he does see ceremony as rooting man not only in family and state but in cosmos..."Ceremony has three roots. Heaven and earth are the root of generation, the ancestors are the root of one's kind, ruler and teacher are the root of order."45

While Hsun-tzu may emphasize the external institutionalizing of a system of *li*, the Confucian is more interested in the internalizing the experience of the enstasy, or the spirit of the *li*.

2.8: WORDS AND DEEDS: *LI* AS COSMIC ORDER. THE 77 OF THE UNIVERSE.

In Hsun-tzu, the system of *li*, ritual action, is part of the whole fabric of the cosmic order.

We find Hsun-tzu linking the system of *li* to the larger cosmic patterns:

> The heaven and earth are harmonized by it (the *li*); the sun and moon are illumined by it, the four seasons derive their order from it...good and evil are controlled by it, and joy and anger find their proper expressions through it.4

Here the word *li* is elevated to the status of a principle of order governing both the common and the human order, which is a "cosmomorphic" viewpoint. To Hsun-tzu the good order of society is described as the "universal order of civilization." And this universal order, when applied to the cosmic level, becomes a kind of "natural law." And it is the task of the sage to discover this reign of law in nature and in society. Schwartz further holds that this cosmomorphic attitude is already latent in the Analects: it is the attitude of infusing ritual action *li* with the proper spirit that gives *li* its legitimacy and authority. *Li*, then, connects us with the larger, heavenly spirits.2 In fact, "the noble man regards the numinous or sacred element of the rite as lying within the rite itself."3

For Hsun-tzu, another function of *li*, is what the sage, or the intellectual elite, "allots" in serving as the vanguard to actualize the "spirit of the *li,*" which is a "holy rite." In the Discourse on Heaven.

Heaven and Earth generate the gentleman, and the gentleman patterns Heaven and Earth. The gentleman is the third aligned with the Heaven and Earth...
Without the gentleman, Heaven and Earth would be un-patterned, the ceremonial and the right unorganized...and all who belong among living men, await the sage to allot them their portions.

Hsun-tzu ultimately generalizes li to cosmic proportions, as part of the making of li the organizing principle, almost like natural law, which means that fen (Heaven), in Hsun-tzu becomes a paradigm shift to “Nature,” shorn of the purposive character of the Confucian-Mencian fen”; Heaven is not the source of morality, for Hsun-tzu, but it is Man’s “patterning” of Heaven through artifice, wei, or convention.

Hsun-tzu’s concept of Heaven is obviously closer to tao of the Taoist than to fen (Heaven) of Confucius and Mencius. Their fen is still purposive, and the source and ultimate control of man’s destiny, but Hsun-tzu’s fen is purely Nature.

This radical rationalistic approach gets rid of the anthropomorphic use of Heaven and becomes a naturalism which embraces all phenomena under the skies, and the possibility of generalization of the application of li, as cosmic patterns. Man is rooted in the patterns of Heaven and Earth.

Ceremony has three roots. Heaven and earth are the root of generation, the ancestors are the root of one’s kind, ruler and teacher are the root of order.

Hence there is a basis for the “holy rites,” and this is our connection of Hsun-tzu to Durkheim, the linking of the sacred with the secular.

There is an intimate connection between law (fa) and ritual action. The earliest tradition to which Confucius held to is that he did not use fa (as penal law), because fa is a later concept, but Confucius refers only to hsing (punishment). In the classical Chinese tradition, “ritual action derives from the attempt to imitate the regularity and order of nature,” but this is not to be generalized to the notion of Western scientific view of “universal law,” because fa originally meant hsing, to punish. There is as much an ambiguity between two versions of “law” in Western thought, natural vs. moral law (i.e., Kant’s moral law within and the starry skies above). The kind of social harmony which is aimed at is only achieved within the broadest cosmological, social, and natural contexts. The universe of heaven, earth and man form a triad, in fen-jen ho-i, the ho-i is the embodiment of the person in social and natural contexts, the integrity of the
Confucian jen-tao (as contrasted with len-tao). Ritual actions, then, are achieved as appropriations from and within these contexts. In Anålects, 1/12,

Yu Tzu said, 'Of the things brought about by the rites, harmony is the most valuable...but to aim always at harmony without regulating it by the rites simply because one knows only about harmony will not, in fact, work.' (trans. D. C. Lau).

The sense of "appropriateness" (suitableness, jy) is one of the hallmarks of achieved ritual actions. Furthermore, jy as compared with y is different in that "y differs significantly from ritual action (jy) in that it is neither intersubjectively integrating nor personal." 8 Hall and Ames depict jy as re-enactments of the ruler in his attempt to connect and maintain a relationship with the spirits and the gods, thus serving a cosmic linkage, while at the same time, extend y from his court outward to the people so that they can participate in their "station and their duties" within the sociopolitical system as heaven on earth, len hsia.

These rituals were constituted in imitation (mimesis) of perceptible cosmic rhythms as a means of strengthening the coordination of the human being and his natural and spiritual environment...each participant would have his proper place, his iel,...where to stand. 8

In a hierarchical system, one should know his status, (station) and his duties (obligations).

2.8.1: MYTHICAL WORLDVIEW AND CORRECTION OF NAMES

There are fundamental differences between mythical worldviews, which Durkheim calls the collective consciousness; this is typical of, and constitutive of archaic societies. In a sense, this mythical worldview is hun-tun, the not-yet-beginning-to-be before the drilling of holes in hun-tun. It is the "social solidarity" that Durkheim holds as the "cultic" ideal.

The norms of the kinship system draw their binding power from their religious foundations. The members of the tribe are thus always a cultic community. Social control requires a cultically anchored, religious grounding, violations of the central norms of the kinship system count as sacrilege. 10

Cassirer points out in the mythical thinking of an archaic, primitive mind that the relationship of the part does not merely represent the whole, but really specifies it; the relationship is not symbolic and intellectual, but real and material. The part, in mythical terms, is the same thing as the whole, because it is a real vehicle of efficacy—because everything which it incurs or does is incurred or done by the whole at the same time. 11
In literary terms, this is the functioning of the synecdoche, where the part is made to stand for the whole.

Ritual action (li) inaugurates incipient meanings, values, and importances within the li, or body of the sociopolitical, and the Correction of Names doctrine will probably still retain some of the residue of the social solidarity of mythical thinking, giving it a religious or sacred base. We can institute a whole system of li, which covers ancestor worship, departed spirits, mourning ceremonies, to eating etiquette. The latter relation is that of ming to li, which points to the "performative" in the naming of ritual deeds; in Austin's terms the act of naming is itself a speech-act, i.e., to deem (wei) something as meaningful.

To use the name or perform the ritual action meaningfully entails drawing an analogy between past and present circumstances to evoke this vested significance (yi, significance).²

What needs to be explained is the "fragmentary and marginal" sense in which myths have functioned in China. Schwartz offers from Levi-Straus' definition of a structural view of myths, (1) that myth is like a language, in that there is a "code embodying the deep structures" of the socio-cultural formations and compares this with (2) myth is preeminently story—stories in which actors, divine or human, relate to each other as separate somewhat unpredictable beings involved in dramas, laden with the contingent, the unexpected and the unresolved and point toward an unknown future...However, the ancestral spirits, incorporated as they are into the ordered society of the lineage, do not participate in stories. They perform their functions in the ritual order.³

This viewpoint at least gives us a definitive way of looking at ritual action as a "re-enactment of a drama" which is played out in an Olympia, or in a Shang-li's Heaven. And the departed ancestors do participate in ritual ceremonies, still, which is a cosmomorphic viewpoint, while still incorporating the organic, social solidarity of the mythical worldview. Polanyi indicates the "embodiment" of larger meanings in which "ritual embodies the myth":

What gives a rite this larger meaning is, of course, the myth that it recreates. The rite is therefore embodied in the myth...but it is perhaps even more the rites and ceremonies that recreate its expressed actions. Each serves as a 'frame' for the other's 'story.'⁴
The methodology utilized in a theory of naming, paralleling that of ritual action, would be based on the paradigm of *shu*, analogy of relations of the language of action: analogies based on contrast and similarity. In Levi-Straus' structural view of myths, the multiplicity of the observations is united in a totality. Myth constructs a 'gigantic mirror-effect,' where the reciprocal images of man and the world is reflected *ad infinitum*, perpetually decomposing and recomposing in the prism of nature-culture relations... By analogy the whole world makes sense, everything is significant, everything is explained within a symbolic order, where all the positive known facts...may take their place with all their rich abundance of detail.

But he is describing the collective "savage mind," the mind that thinks in "concretistic" ways when they draw analogies and contrasts: based on "homology and heterogeneity," "equivalence and inequality," "identity and contrariety." The savage mind makes his symbols and relate them by analogical methods of similarities and contrasts, like a work of art. Hence, there is an advantage in contrasting the mythical world-view, since it is a "togetherness," a "belongingness" (*Ereignis*) of all things, prior to *pien*, discrimination from the flux, distinctions, differentiations.

There is a lot of Chaos churning around in that mythical world, where concrete imageries tell stories with deep structural meanings. Joseph Campbell subdivides myths into two orders: (1) mythology that relates you to your nature and to the natural world, and (2) mythology that is strictly sociological, linking you to a particular society.

Now, the biblical tradition is a socially oriented mythology. Nature is condemned... Nature religions are not attempts to control nature but to help you put yourself in accord with it.

We would put the Confucian into (2) with its emphasis on the social, and Taoism into (1) with its tendency toward Nature.

In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, 16/2, the term *ti-wu* appears, which is roughly translated as the "embodiment in things." It is interesting that Legge would trace *ti* back to *sheng* (to give birth to), whereas W. T. Chan takes a more essentialist approach and translates it as: "They form the substance of all things" (and footnotes this as Chu Hsi's interpretation of *ti-wu*). The context is:...

Confucius said, 'How abundant is the display of power of spiritual beings! We look for them and do not see them. We listen to them but do not hear them. They form the substance of all things and nothing can be done without them.'
Another suggestive way of looking at the "lifeworld" is to consider it as the "lived body" (I) of Merleau-Ponty, which has the ability to become "incarnate" and "made flesh" when we say we can "embody" or "embed" meanings in our activities, works of art, and institutions. The lived body is the integration of the interactive three formal worlds, the objective-social-subjective worlds and its creativity within the spatial and temporal horizons of organic life processes. The lived body is the sum total of all perceptual processes when we interact with nature and human nature. The Chinese counterpart for this perceptual base is *hsin*, the heart-mind, since it is more a matter of thinking with one's heart, than in one's head. It is more than thoughts, since it includes emotion, passions, inclinations, etc.. Hence, though I may suggest "structure" or "framework" closer to the physical sense, it is the living presence of the body (I) which is more dynamic, processual and meaningful.

Most of all, I is "relationality," "sociality," that is, the Whiteheadian view of "societies of societies" as organic quanta of individuals relating to each other. In this respect, there is an important reason to switch from I as "lived body" to *shen*, as person, self, etc.. In *The Great Learning*, the concept of *hsiu shen*, self-cultivation, is the main theme running throughout the work. Legge uses "cultivation of the person" and in his footnote even shows that Chu Hsi tried to identify one occurrence of *shen* with *hsin*, the heart-mind:

Here Chu Hsi... would again alter the text, and change the second *shen* into *hsin*... But this is unnecessary. The *shen* in *hsiu shen* is not the mere material body, but the person, the individual man, in contact with things, and intercourse with society... Lo Chung-fan, however, says *shen* is the body of flesh. 17

*Shen* is always mutually reciprocal with its "intercourse with society." Merleau-Ponty would also emphasize the body made "flesh" and construe this to be one of the important characteristic of the lived body, its "incorporation" into social aspects, *vis-a-vis* the living encounter with others in its horizon of motor intentionalities. 18

In regard to personal cultivation, Hall and Ames, in discussing Margery Wolf's *Women in China*, states the main contrast between Western and Eastern ways of looking at sexism and
feminine ethics based on some unstated assumptions from the Western viewpoint:

There is an unstated assumption in this literature that any indigenously Chinese alternative of personal realization, male or female that would appeal to its own vocabulary of relationality, interdependence, hierarchical roles, complementarity and difference, must be ruled out of court, and that the single standard for evaluating personal realization is the autonomy, independence, equality and freedom bedrock in the white liberal democratic, industrialized West. 19

In the correlative thinking of the Chinese, the method of mutual dialogical reciprocity is in the forefront for their communicative understanding and consensual understanding which also characterizes their holistic immanent perspectives.

2.8.2: T' I AS THE COSMIC BODY.

From the Chinese horizontal perspective, the term t'i (body) may involve some tendency toward the “metaphysics” of organismism as a “biological” metaphor, as noted by Needham; Schwartz prefers to contrast Needham’s paradigm of the “organism” as biological order with the Chinese “family” metaphor. 20 T'i would also point to the integration of the “body” (corpus) of classical texts (construed as the “substance”) of the tradition. There are two other concepts which construe t'i to mean “substantial”: i.e., t'i-yung (substance-function; Matthews 6246 says “theory and practice, doctrinal and practical”) and pen-t'i; (also pen-mo, roots-branches—pen-t'i lun=ontology). Chung-ying Cheng does give two senses to these concepts: (1) t'i, in pen-t'i, is ontological in import, and is often used to express the notion of an “original substance,” but not the notion of Being (since the Chinese would rather talk about Non-Being as the source of Being), and (2) t'i, as a verb, means to “embody” and “assimilate a given reality into the given framework of human existence.” Hence, t'i also implies comprehension/absorption/embodiment.” 21 Also, in Matthews, to embody is “to be able to put yourself in the place of another,” a sense of “appropriation” (absorption), “assimilation,” and “accommodation” (comprehension), which are the three core concepts in Piaget’s psychology. Later, we shall see that Wang Pi has a lot to say about t'i as pen-t'i, pen-mo, and t'i-yung.

If we consider t'i as the hermeneutical “body” of texts, the whole and its insistent particularities builds into an organic whole, not as a substantial, but as “holographic” in its growth.
patterns. This is similar to the appropriation in a hermeneutical circle, in which the parts contribute cumulatively to the whole, and the whole reciprocally reflects on the insistent particularities. In a holographic model, the detailed particularities already contain the patterning, or veining, for the emergent, holistic pattern. Moreover, Hansen has a correlative viewpoint of comparing tao as the "doctrine," or the "body (corpus) of discourse," as a set of traditional texts attributed to the sages.

The texts contained poetry, history, rules of etiquette, religious ritual, and so on. The sages in writing these texts intended certain patterns of behavior by the people and society. Those patterns of behavior constituted the tao/way of the sage-kings.22

The holographic model, moreover, means that li, ritual actions, is an organizing force to incorporate meaning, values, polish (wen), or elegance according to an aesthetic criteria of harmonizing these disparate elements into an organic whole. Li, as aesthetic harmonizing, is seen in music, ceremony, incantations (chants), proclamations, decrees, mandates, announcements (ling, command, imperatives) and any and all gestural components which accompany the verbalized poetic rituals.

Habermas offers Humboldt's view that there is an intimate connection between "structures of lifeworld and structures of linguistic worldviews," hence language and culture are "constitutive" (immanent) for the lifeworld itself.23 Similarly, in the West, Foucault points to the 16th Century's belief in the great metaphor of the "Book of God," which gives us the immanent order of things, in the visible marks stamped upon the earth. The "book" is divinatio and erudito, both parts of hermeneutics.24 Hence, language is like a "mirror" which reflect the network of marks in nature, as secret indicators of the particular truth. Schleiermacher speaks about a "divinatory method" for "intuitively" putting oneself in the place of the author, or original writer, and we can know the author's intention better than the author does of himself. For instance, he says,

Using the divinatory, one seeks to understand the writer intimately to the point that one transforms oneself into the other... (which) depends on the fact that every person has a susceptibility to intuiting others.25

In the Chinese context, the early book of divination is the I Ching; the I Ching sages of 153
yore (Fu Hsi) were searching for hsiang (images) in which the book of nature is written. Fu Hsi invented the eight basic trigrams, which later formed the symbolized "hexagrams" by means of which they become "images" or "emblems" traceable to, or indicative of phenomena. Later, Wang Pi has a great interest in "images" (hsiang) and in his commentary on the I Ching, he says,

Heaven hangs out images (ch’ui-hsiang) so that fortune and misfortune can be seen. Before things occur, one has to plan for them.

This is traceable to a statement in the I Ching:

Heaven and earth change and transform, and the sage imitates them. Heaven administers the constellations (ch’ui-hsiang)…for which the sage makes images.

The sage makes the "images" and these "hexagrams" have lines which are "judgments" and reveal and de-cipher the "hidden" meanings in nature. Divination enables us to see through the "images," the "signs, or visible marks" of nature through our capacity of "intuition," "empathy," or a Mencian "sympathy." Alan Chan says that Wang Pi avoids the "referential" point of view when he discusses the relationships of image (hsiang–hexagrams), meaning (yi) and word (yen):

When meaning is understood, as Wang Pi argues, words and images can then be forgotten…As Wang sees it, "words" and "images" are like the tools of the hunter or fisherman’s (traps or nets).

Chuang-tzu also says that when we get the meaning of our words, then words can also be forgotten.

What we must avoid doing is to associate hsiang, "images," with the Western "idea" which stands for some mental "idea", a private interior language. Hansen calls this the Western common-sense model of language, that is as "mentalesa," the association of ideas with the sounds of our language (phonemes). Rorty calls this the "idea idea" theory: ideas mirror reality.

Ideas are to words in language as characters are to sounds. Ideas are strung together in the mind to form mental sentences or beliefs.

And Hansen concludes that classical Chinese philosophers did not formulate any mental (mind) language theory. Hsiang cannot be considered as an "Inner psychic state," nor some "objective" transcendental pattern endemic in things in the universe.
On the side of erudition, the other half of a hermeneutics, the "exegesis" of biblical texts is an example of bringing in a "textual history" to bear on the interpretation, which are "the legible words of the scriptures, or the sages of antiquity, have set down in the books preserved for us by tradition." In the West, these words are esoteric discourse representing esoteric disciplines and the revealed word of God. Hence, there is an "eternity" in these "marks," since

The truth of all these marks—whether they be woven into nature itself or whether they exist in lines on parchment and in libraries—is everywhere the same: coeval with the institution of God.

Even in the Chinese context, with the emphasis on the practical side of knowledge, practical "wisdom" came to have a pejorative sense attached to it. Chih can mean "wit," or "intelligence," according to Graham. It can also be translated as "cleverness" in the Taoist context, along with the association with two concepts wu-chih and wu-yu. For example, in the Tao Te Ching, ch. III,

(the sage) constantly insures that the people are without erudition (wu-chih) and without desires (wu-yu). 'Without erudition and without desires' means being without the 'base knowledge and exaggerated desires' and erudition is not a true understanding of workings of the cosmos, but is rather a knowledge of the artificial and contrived which inhibits any true understanding of Tao.

Chuang-tzu would also call this "discarding of knowledge" and "desireless desire" along with the self-emptying or "loss of self" associated with the ego-self: the wu-wo complex.

The artifacts which bear embedded meanings and values are seen in early man in his initial attempts at technology (logos of techne) in his making of tools, implements, and instruments. As Mead sees this interaction of an organism with its environment, it is the incipience of a "social act":

Primitive man keeps en rapport with implements and weapons, by conversation in the form of magic rites and ceremonies...the bodily selves of members of the social group are clearly implemental as the implements are social...The others and the self arise in the social act together.

Again, in Hsun-tzu, the "logos of techne" refers to the techniques of the potter and the tool of the woodworker; these implements and tools are part and parcel of the establishment of rites, ceremonies and a code of conduct. It defines the sociability of persons in society. If we apply this sociability back to the issue of self-cultivation, without using the dichotomies of private-public,
personal-impersonal, then the kind of self worth cultivating is one that emphasizes the sharable characteristics which we want in communicative action, those of "communality" of gestural (ll) and symbolic interactions evidenced in language. Tu Wei-ming wants to think about self-cultivation with the self as the center, and the concentric circles that define the self as "family, community, country, and the world," each of these circles are realms of selfhood, which can lead ultimately to the "authentic human possibility for ethicoreligious growth."38 This growth is not simply horizontal, but is an ever broadening process as well as a deepening process. This is a better characterization of the hierarchical structure, not only to see it as a vertical process, but concentrically and centrifugally working from the family outward.

Merleau-Ponty speaks about the anonymity of the artifacts from the past: It is the indefinite pronoun "one," which refers to a "multiplicity of I's or even a general I."

I conceive analogically the kind of man who lived in it. I interpret their behavior by analogy with my own, and through my inner experience, which teaches me the significance and intention of perceived gestures.37

The past cultural world is present with us now and we can feel a close presence to the past, if one were able to interpret the "one," not as an impersonal I, an anonymous veil, but a generalized "we" with whom we can associate with in an enlivened lived bodily experience, but one should also reproduce as much of the lifeworld in which the meanings, values, and significances were originally embedded in the "things" themselves for posterity's sake.

In the Confucian context, when Confucius says that Heaven is in me, he has a religious mission to transmit the heavenly speech as the linguistic tao. He becomes the "wooden clapper" to announce as an alarm bell that tao may not prevail in this world, and hence we must re-double our effort for the rulers to become morally and religiously more responsible in instituting the moral pattern of the good of tao. Confucius says in 17/19:

What does Heaven say? Yet the four seasons run their course through it and the hundred creatures are born through it. What does Heaven say?

Schwartz says that Confucius compares himself to Heaven, and he must act as Heaven acts, and he must also similarly complement his action with the linguistic aspects of tao, by
"modeling himself on Heaven," or "cosmographically" identify himself with Heaven. But Confucius keeps saying that he would not want to speak for Heaven, for Heaven is the impersonal order which is nature and its processes does not suggest "deliberate thought or discrete, finite decisions."

If tao, however, did prevail in the world, the routines, habits, and patterns of behavior that govern the good society would be so pervasive that the need for using speech would be much diminished.

We have seen that ritual gestures, are non-spoken, as yet un-verbalized, but can be just as effective to point out and organize patterns of behavior, without the accompanying "incantations."

The Taoist would prefer the non-spoken wu-wei tao to the yu-wei, deliberative linguistic tao.

Polanyi also has pointed to the "tacit" dimension of our awareness and knowledge, which is based upon subsidiary-focal awareness as activities of "personal participation and indwelling of clues" which become "embodied" (I7) when we try to symbolize the object of our focal awareness. He says symbolization is the process that is "self-giving" rather than self-centered "indications."

The symbol, as an object of our focal awareness, is not merely established by an integration of subsidiary clues directed from the self to a focal object; it is also established by surrendering the diffuse memories and experience of the self into this object, thus giving them a visible embodiment.

Beyond the incipience of gestures which "indicate" (deictic function), our symbolizations (Mead's participation of taking the role of the other) become "embodied" through intersubjective taking the role of the other and puts into objects of interest values, significances (yǐ), and importances of our sociations, personal development and cultural associations.


We have seen from Graham's analysis of the Doctrine of the Mean, that integrity (ch'eng) brings together the tao-te character of our words-deeds: integrity is making the compound of words-deeds what Schwartz calls the "holistic" immanental unity, the joining of the outer and inner. Whereas, Graham interprets the broader compound of tao-te as the context in which Potency (te) is the potentiality to act in accordance with tao. In the Analects, 7/6.
Be intent on the Way (tāo), be grounded in Potency (lé), rely on nobility, take recreation in the arts.

Tāo is the power to move others (charisma) and bring them within the proper course of human conduct (prescriptive-normative tāos) and the organization of government (tāo of ruler-ruled); hence, it is the tāo-of-tāo, an immanent sense of an insistent particular operating in accordance with tāo. There is also the tāo-of-a-specific-tē: there will be the tāo of Man, which is human conduct as the "moral" tāo, and tāo of government, the moral suasion for rulers to be "good" rulers. Moral suasion is the use of prescriptive-performative speech-acts to guide and "influence" ruler's conduct (hsing), which we can call the "linguistic" tāo (Chad Hansen).

The body of writings together with the outcome of a correct interpretation was the Confucian tāo-way. The rectification of names consisted in saying "shih/this is the (kind of) thing or behavior referred to by the such-and-such expression (word) in the texts."[2]

The Confucian tīen-jen (in the phrase tīen-jen ho-i) is the counterpart of the Taoist's tāo-te, because tīen is the counterpart of tāo: "Tao (a designation of the whole) is a functional equivalent of tīen."[4] In that case, tīen is the field in which jen is the focus, or the person-in-context. Here field-focus is reciprocal in the unity of tīen and determinate human beings, hence tīen-jen ho-i, is the mirroring of persons in "reciprocal focusing."

2.9.1: THE HORIZONTAL FEATURES OF TAO.

The field-focus model also can be stated in terms of "horizon-core," hence it can also be stated in terms of a hermeneutical "horizon," that of the interpretation of tradition within the horizon of a "lifeworld." A true conversation takes place between people when we place ourselves in the "horizon" of the other; this is similar to Mead's "taking the attitude of the generalized other." In so doing we discover and integrate with their standpoint, their perspective, and horizon. The historical horizon which has been transmitted is already a "fusion of horizons," within a tradition:

The historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon. The horizon is, rather, something into which we move and that moves with us. Horizons change for a person who is moving. Thus the horizon of the past, out
of which all human life lives and which exists in the form of tradition, is always in
motion.5

There is a close relationship of "tradition" as the already "closed horizon" of a past (historical
horizon) and the "horizon of openness" of the future. The horizon of the present is fused with
the horizon of the past, from which "tradition" comes. Habermas, in his review of Gadamer's
Truth and Method, calls this the "interlacing of horizons."6

The term horizon is taken by Heidegger from Husserl, and re-interpreted to obviate the
"transcendental" aspects of consciousness, getting rid of the "eidetic reduction"; both Gadamer
and Habermas will also use "horizon" in more everyday terms and Habermas will illustrate this
everydayness of depicting a "lifeworld" by the fact that most people can give "narrative presenta-
tions" in order to objectivate his lifeworld.

Narrative practice not only serves trivial needs for mutual understanding among
members trying to coordinate their common tasks; it also has a function in the
self-understanding of persons. They have to objectivate their belonging of the
lifeworld to which, in their actual rules as participants in communication, they do
belong.8

This parallels Ricoeur's characterization of narratives as having a "world" "in front" of the text,
displaying non-ostensive self-references depicted in the narrative world. This emphasis of the
lifeworld as depictable as a narrative accords also with Ricoeur's discussion of "emplotment" in a
narrative and a theory of action.9 Alasdair MacIntyre would also point to the "narrative" character
of "tradition": A tradition

not only embodies the narrative of an argument, but is only to be recovered by
an argumentative retelling of that narrative which will itself be in conflict with
other argumentative retellings. Every tradition therefore is always in danger of
lapsing into incoherence and when a tradition does so lapse it sometimes can
only be recovered by a revolutionary reconstitution.10

Horizon, then, will take on such connotations as "situation, context, perspective," and
such gestalt compounds as focus-field, background-foreground, core-horizon, etc.. The "focus-
field" model can also be used in explaining two compounds: fien ming and tao-te. For example,
the ming (particular causal conditions) of fien (the "world," the sheer horizon), or the focus-field
relation in which the sage has

established a peculiarly immanent relationship with fien (horizon, field) which
permits his access to the ming of t'ien both in terms of understanding and of influence. The more intensely focused he is, the greater is his awareness of the role he can play in determining these conditions (ming).11

And tao-te forms a compound common to both Confucians and Taoists:

The focus of the Taoists' discussions is predominantly a cosmological account of the cyclical process of existence where te is regarded as categorial: the pre­
sencing of a particular. In the Analects, on the other hand, te would seem to be specifically social and moral in its applications: the extent to which through patterns of deference, the influence of the particular takes on normative force.12

Hence, Te
denotes the arising of the particular as a focus of potency in the process of existence. As a total field this dynamic process is called tao; the individuated existents in this field, its various loci are called te.13

Another way of characterizing tao-te, using Hall's discussion of chaos, is to designate the "sum of all orders" as tao, whereas, te is "one of the orders" which is inclusive of insistent particularities, and ming as "particular conditions." Hence the total field, tao, is the "sum of all orders."14

The mutual reciprocity of tao-te can be found also in Lao-tzu's ch. XXI, where in line 1,

A constitution of the great Te only follows from tao.

Lau would locate and particularize te in the movements, operation (constitution) of the "man of great virtue."15

The commentary in Ch'en brings out mutual reciprocity of tao-te:

Yen Ling-feng states, 'Te is the form of tao, and tao is the content of Te—these two are mutually dependent for their existence. . . . tao and its te are not two things, but simply two conditions of one thing or two aspects of one entity.16

We can also discuss the ming of t'ien, as well as the te of tao; horizons are not simply "sheer" background, or field, since horizons accomplishes a gestalt shift; what is focus becomes field, core becomes open horizons, etc. The localized "insistent particularities" find their place within the various shades of global backgrounds, near and remote. The same kinds of consideration can be applied to Hall's complementarity of Eros and Irony, which provides the drive toward the "holism" (compleatability) of aesthetic and religious harmonies, which is also a Tao-te relationship. Eros is the drive toward "wholeness" or "integrity" and Irony pulls us back to the "finiteness" and limitations of insistent particularities.
Ricoeur emphasizes that the concept of horizon should be thought of in a dialogical sense, in the assimilating of horizontal features to a methodological "placing of oneself in the other's point of view" (similar to Mead's "taking the attitude or the role of the other"). "The horizon is the horizon of the other," but one does not forget one's own horizon and attempt to treat the other as an absolute objective other. This is most relevant in view of the intersubjectivity involved in "fusion of horizons," the self and the other, in communicative actions and receptions. Furthermore, in terms of "distance," there is a near, far, and remote or "open" horizon, in much the same way that "distanciation" involves our historical understanding as past, present and future. Hence, no horizon is absolutely closed, nor is any horizon unique (the idea of a single horizon encompassing all points of view). Our perceptual consciousness is always perspectival and is essentially "incapable of the total synthesis of horizons" of all times and places. Hence, the message is Eros is always trying for "completeness" but Irony always pulls it back from the abyss.

Merleau-Ponty points out there is a "double horizon": both spatially in relation to the "lived body," i.e., an "inner" horizon and the surrounding "objects" "horizon, and temporally the horizons of time-consciousness, in which is displayed the double horizon of Husserl, the horizons of "protention and retention."

With the imminent future, I have the horizon of past which will surround it, and therefore my actual present as the past of that future. Thus, through the double horizon of retention and protention, my present may cease to be a factual present quickly carried away and abolished by the flow of duration, and become a fixed and identifiable point in objective time.

If we apply this to the double horizon within the hermeneutical situations as set up by the Mencius, we have a better background, or horizon of the Confucian lifeworld, since Mencius is speaking with historical Kings, Dukes, or feudal lords in a conversational, dialogical manner, including the historical aspect of time-consciousness and under the particularized historical conditions (ming, as causal conditions). This is to be compared with the pungent morsels of tid-bits brought together and sorted out (lun) as the Analects; Lun-yu is the "sorting out" (lun) of
yu (conversations of the disciples), in order to reconstruct the Confucian corpus. The Analects is mostly anecdotal or a series of maxims or proverbs. Mencius also has the epochal view of when another sage will appear again, in cycles of five hundred year intervals. This is a good example of a "cyclic philosophy of history."

2.9.2: HISTORY AND THE WAXING AND WANING OF TAO.

As part of this theory of history, the main theme is whether the Way is "lost," or whether the way still "prevails," in an ascendency. It seems that outside of the paradisical Golden Age when the Way originally prevailed, there is an alternation between the waxing and waning of the Way, like the yin/yang alternation of Tsou Yen. The usual way to refer to these events is, the Way was "lost" and needs to be "recovered" or the Way is in "decline" (shuai). The use of the term "fall, or fallenness" of the Way is only our metaphorical Western way of the "fall from paradise" or a "Golden Age." Another term used in this same situation is luan, which typifies the situation in which "confusion and disorder" will result, if benevolence and rightness is not followed. This is evident in Mencius 1A/1, in which the King asked Mencius what he has brought with him that will "profit" (li) his kingdom. The moral lesson is that if everyone of the King's administration were to ask what would "profit" him, then there will be luan, danger or risk to the kingdom.

Girardot has traced the term luan back to the Shu Ching, where it had the opposite meaning of "order" (ch’iin), rather than "disorder"(luan):

Thus the Shu Ching luan takes the meaning of 'order', 'aptness for government'...In the Tso Chuan, King Wu says, 'I have of ministers, capable of government (luan ch’en) ten men, one in heart and one in practice.'

Analects 8/20 parallels the fact that:

Shun had five officials and the Empire was well governed. King Wu said, 'I have ten capable officials (luan ch’en).'

Legge explains in the footnote that luan ch’en means "governing, i.e., able ministers." And the two meanings for luan are: "(1) 'to regulate' and (2) just the opposite, 'to confound,' 'confusion.' " Much later, Mencius would translate luan ch’en as "rebellious ministers." Also the term hun-tun is traced to the Shih Ching where hun refers to a barbarian tribe known as the hun-i. In the Tso
Chuan and a certain Confucian pattern of meaning related to the use of hun-(tun) and iuan is brought into relief. Whereas the Tso Chuan at times links iuan with the creation of a 'civilized' order by the Confucian sage heroes, the term hun is related to a certain tribe of Jung barbarians mentioned in the Ch'un Ch'iu.22

Later, Mencius would refer to the ta-ian in his Golden Age story (3B/9), modeling it on Confucius's references to the model virtues of Yao and Shun in Analects 8/18, and 8/19. But the ta-ian, or the "great confusion," is a good metaphor for the watery chaos that existed during the time of when Yao put Shun in charge of getting rid of the flood waters. Hence, as a hydraulic engineer, Shun and Yu brought order from out of the chaos of the waters. The ta-ian is a "devotion" of good order attained and after Yao and Shun everything goes downhill. The Taoist go back even to the beginnings, a state of "universal balance between awareness and spontaneity without sages!"23 This denigration of the sage is typical of both Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, who prefers to speak about the Perfect Man, the chen jen.

There are periods of order, alternating with disorder; this is taken into account when Mencius evaluates the four kinds of sages: Po Yi, Yi Yin, Liu Hsia Hui and Confucius, within the horizon of whether the moral tao prevailed or had fallen into disuse, whether "order prevailed" or whether there was "disorder." Po Yi "took office when order prevailed and relinquished it when there was disorder;" so he was a good-time office filler, but his main characteristic is that he always achieved an "unsullied character," not deigning to lower himself in bad times, or disorder, as if it would stain his reputation. Whereas, Yi Yin took office under any and all conditions, whether order prevails or not, because he thought he had been enlightened and could awaken the people he served by showing them the Way. His policy seemed to be a risky and dangerous one, and Yi Yin might be considered an "opportunist" and would have had his head chopped off. Yet for all the fraught dangers involved, Mencius characterized Yi Yin as the "responsible" one. But, the most patient was Liu Hsia Hui, who was more modest in serving even bad Princes in lower stations and office, but through his example of tolerance and forbearance, even under straitened circumstances, and Mencius called him "easy-going."24
In 7B/15, Mencius again emphasizes that we are after all talking about Po Yi, Yi Yin, and Liu Hsia Hui, as influential "sages," whose influence will reach to a subsequent "hundred generations." So, there is some "charisma" which outlasts their historical existence. It is the "influence" over a period of time that makes for the importance of a sage: In 7B/32, it is the words that endure.

Words near at hand but with far-reaching import are good words...The words of a gentleman never go as far as below the sash, yet in them is to be found the Way. What the gentleman holds on to is the cultivation of his own character, yet this brings order to the Empire.

Po Yi purges any covetous man of his "covetousness" and Liu Hsia Hui would make a "mean man" more generous and a narrow-minded one most tolerant. This is set within the background of whether they took office, or not, in good times or in bad times. It would seem that Po Yi would keep his "unsullied character" regardless of good or bad times, but mostly under good times he would serve a Prince, while Liu Hsia Hui is a bit more patient and under the most straitened circumstances, he can show by his example his ability to endure even in thick or thin. In this latter case, it would seem that even Confucius, in the Analects, 1B/2, says that Liu Hsia Hui was dismissed three times as a judge, and hence there is a certain amount of "flexibility" which is involved in "bending" in the service of his Princes, therefore, the characteristic of being "easy-going." Also, In Analects 1B/8, there are men who "withdrew from society," among which are Po Yi, who would do that when tao was in disuse, but

The Master commented, 'Not to lower their purpose or to allow themselves to be humiliated described, perhaps, Po Yi and Shu Ch'i.' Of Liu Hsia Hui and Shao Lien he said, 'They, indeed, lowered their purpose and allowed themselves to be humiliated, but their words were consistent with their station, and their deeds with circumspection. That was all.'

Confucius was the "timely" sage, who would "remain in a state, or would take office, all according to circumstances." In communicative action and receptivity, timing is of the essence, that is, the te (potencies, acts, ming—causal conditions) must be in accordance with tao, which is that horizon of the lifeworld of the traditional society and its interpretations in terms which will bring to bear the meanings, values, and norms of each aspect of the subjective-social-objective
world-views embodied into a "fusion of horizons." It is the judgment of the appropriateness of our "ritual actions," propriety within a particular context, and most of all the extension of our horizons to include the socialization of persons within a traditional society. The best sage is the one who can tie, or better synchronize, his receptivities and respond to the needs of the people, and focus his charisma and influence to be exercised to its full "potency." This synchronization is part of the meaning of attunement and resonance with the waxing and waning of tao. This was part of the main reason for the Book of Changes, to realize that there are changes and transformations that events go through and fortune and misfortune follows upon the kind of decisions and efforts one makes. To realize this is to be wise, a sage.

Lee Yearley compares these four sages and emphasizes that apart from Confucius, the "timely sage," the three other sages were followers of "rules" as to certain things they would do in serving their prince; whereas a "timely sage" alone does "all according to circumstances."
The four virtues are practiced within situations which will bring about a "good person" doing the right thing under the appropriate (yi as aesthetic rightness) circumstances.

Truly virtuous action differs from actions that arise either from habits or rules. Virtuous people act from extended inclinations not from accepted rules.25

What is most significant in deeming Confucius a "timely sage" is the way the passage ends with reference to the rhythmic character of "timing" in terms of a musical analogy:

To open with bells is to begin in an orderly fashion; to conclude with jade tubes is to end in an orderly fashion. To begin in an orderly fashion is the concern of the wise while to end in an orderly fashion is the concern of a sage. (5B/1)

There is an orderly, aesthetic harmonizing of a musical composition, which has a beginning, middle and an end, like any historical narrative, and ends in a coda of "socialized." aesthetic-symphonic harmony. This timeliness, rhythmic effects which harmonizes and leads to aesthetic holistic reasonableness. In between the career of music are "illocutionary forces" operating in its performative character to produce perlocutionary effects on the audience. In the Analects, 3/20, The Master said, "In the kwanchu there is joy without wantonness, and sorrow without self-injury." And in 3/23, the Master talked of music to the Grand Musician of Lu, saying,
'This much can be known about music. It begins with playing in unison. When it gets into full swing, it is harmonious, clear and unbroken. In this way it reaches the conclusion.'

To be communicatively aware of the waxing and waning of tao is to be in "tune," or attuned to the cosmic nature of the "resonating," rhythmic waxing and waning of the tao. This person is Confucius, the timeliest of all sages. Hence, the "timeliness" is important in terms of when the Way prevails or not; and your words and actions are accordingly different. In 14/3, Confucius says,

'When the Way prevails in the state, speak and act with perilous high-mindedness; when the Way does not prevail, act with perilous high-mindedness but speak with self-effacing diffidence.'

There is also a situation when wu-wei is significant: in 15/5,

'It is a ruler who achieved order without any action, it was, perhaps, Shun. There was nothing for him to do but to hold himself in a respectful posture and to face due south.'

And in 14/38, destiny, however defined, is about to happen, or has happened, what can be done to avoid or embrace destiny? or is destiny simply sheer fatalism?

'It is Destiny if the Way prevails; it is equally Destiny if the Way falls into disuse. What can Kung-po Liao do in defiance of Destiny?'

In terms of the musical metaphor, when the Way prevails, the music should be happy, and vice-versa, since something is out of tune, un-attuned to the circumstances of the times. It is also part of the I Ching sage to recognize the "divination" apparatus to foretell fortune or misfortune and stay in tune with the changes and transformations of the yin-yang as it does its rounds through the sixty-four hexagrams. The origins of this processual changes is in the original images (hsiang) which become symbols (the trigrams/hexagrams); it is the recombinant feature of the changes in the pictorial representations which ultimately gives us the meanings, values, and significances of our divinations. Hence, the erudition of the I Ching text combined with the commentary of the Ten Wings establishes a horizon of tao-te (focus-field), of all under Heaven, tien hsia. The hermeneutical circle is the cumulative horizons of the tao-te appropriations.

Tao is an achievement concept, which means that it is not a fatalism based upon
ming as destiny, historically fated, or inevitable. Tao is becoming-itself and has no first ground. Tao is a "groundless ground," since it has no ground itself, but tao is a totality or a sum of all orders. Among the sages, the timely sage knows when things are in tune or out of tune with the general tenor of a culture or civilization and can change his attitude toward speaking or doing things (words-deeds). As Schwartz points out, the metaphor Way is found in many civilizations, but in the Analects it takes on an extended meaning, which we have connected with the Correction of Names doctrine operating within a sociopolitical organization.

Tao refers to nothing less than the total normative sociopolitical order with its networks of proper familial and proper sociopolitical roles, statuses and ranks, as well as to the 'objective' prescriptions of proper behavior—ritual, ceremonial, and ethical—that govern the relationships among these roles...it also embraces the 'inner' moral life of the living individual.26

The Confucian tao is the "moral tao," a series of "prescriptive" ordinances capable of being performatively uttered and executed with perlocutionary force.

Graham takes Fingarette to task in regard to consideration of the Way in such metaphorical terms as "crossroads," "walking the Way, paths, tracks, or the weighing of alternatives as though on a balance (chuan)." The claim by Fingarette is that Confucius does not consider alternatives within a choice and responsibility framework of Western thinking. This kind of thinking is based on purposive-teleological rationalization, instead of "communicative action."

The posing of alternatives, of means to be chosen to get to certain ends, is part of the means-language and not of ends-in-themselves (ends-language, EL), which are intrinsically sought ends without regard to instrumental means. Choices are not made in the abstract as a logical choice between means A and B, in order to get to Z. In communicative action it is the consensus arrived at about the communicative-interpretive hermeneutical situation and the cooperative planning to achieve understanding, regardless of the success or failure of the plans. In the Confucian context, Graham points out it is a matter of desires, inclinations, spontaneities, which are important, rather than laying out logical choices among alternatives. In comparison, logical choices are two-valued and dichotomatic, while Chinese alternatives are mutual polarities:

Chinese thought tends rather to conceptual polarities with A and B each requiring the other for adequate articulation.27
Confucian thought is better considered in terms of aesthetic order, which is sustained by ritual, music, and performative naming in comparison to the order sustained by laws and punishments, which is "rational," as espoused by the later Legalists. In Analects, 13/3, the main Correction of Name passage, there is a linkage made between this doctrine and "punishments."

When names are not correct...affairs will not culminate in success...rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music does not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes.

If the Correction of Names is not observed and made adequate, it will lead to disorder and "law and punishment" will need to be used in order to bring the Correction of Names back to its standard of ordering sociopolitical bodies and the societies of societies therein. The Correction of Names is a "linguistic" tao, a "classificatory scheme" (lei) which Hansen says appeals to the "linguistic community" for its appropriate pro and con attitudes, in their shih-fei activities or their classifying of good/bad, beautiful/ugly, high/low evaluations.

Taoes are, thus, linguistic. They are systems of names that lead to conventionally appropriate behavior. Any claim that there is some tao that cannot be told is significant and distinctive only against a background assumption that taoes are normally interpreted as prescriptive discourse.

Since it is prescriptive, it is the "moral" tao, for it prescribes through the proprieties of rites, ceremonies and language usage what is appropriate behavior, demeanor, correct or tactful language, etiquette-wise, including gestural sequences and their incipient values, along with their being "institutionalized" within the corpus of the Confucian texts.
CHAPTER III.
PRE-HAN TAOIST INTERPRETATION OF TRADITION

3.1: THE TAOIST HERMENEUTIC SITUATION.

The situational context for understanding the Taoist is based on their view of “nature” as spontaneity, tzu-jan. It is the operation of Nature as an internal dynamism, or Potency (fe), of “Insistent particulars” that are self-starting, self-producing and self-completing and contributing to the larger context of tao (tao-fe). One should take the uniqueness of tzu-jan in its “inclusivity” (comprehensive, mutually related, complementary, holistic, etc.) rather than conceiving tzu-jan to the state of “exclusivity,” i.e., as sovereign, separate, isolated, individualized, independent, abstractive, equality, private, etc.) From here on, I shall discard the concept of “power” and use Potency throughout our discussion to obviate the Western concept of “power” which has the meaning “domination and control,” as extrinsic and emphasizes exclusivity. Instead I shall use Potency as spontaneity (tzu-jan), and reflexive, self-creativity in a sense of “inclusivity.” The latter sense of Potency as “self-creativity” (tzu-hue, self transforming, so-of-itself) will be used whenever I use Potency.

As mentioned above in 1.2, Bernstein uses “incompatibility, incommensurability, and incomparability” to evaluate the rationality or reasonableness of thinking, East and West. Here, the uniqueness aspect of natural and aesthetic phenomena points to the “incomparabilities” of things, because of their uniqueness, each in itself and for others. Hence, holographic details are unique and their immanence of holistic patterns are not “regularities” or “uniformities.” This is the eternal return of “natural law” in the Western scientific sense.

Richardson and rationality are notions which presuppose the indefinite substitutability of the elements comprising such a world...the ‘aesthetic’ is a cosmological in the sense that the particularities defining the order are unique and irreplaceable items whose nonsubstitutability is essential to the order.

The nonsubstitutable, uniqueness also means “immanence” insofar as each “holographic” particular or detail (loci) defines its own particularized field (whole). Instead of some external force impinging or influencing the fuller operations or development of the particular. It is...
"part-part," rather than "part-whole," where the whole is some extraneous totality. A holographic quality means "bringing the field of relationships into focus from one particular place or locus," a locus on site-specifics which also remains "open and available for further inclusion" of more details.  

Ames makes a distinction between considering "individual" in two senses: (1) a Western view of "individual" generates such notions as "autonomy, independence, equality, privacy, freedom, will," etc. and (2) "individual as uniqueness" would be defined in an aesthetic context with relational terms as "enrichment, harmony, edification, poignancy, intensity, parity (vs. equality) and creative efficacy (vs. freedom)." In the uniqueness viewpoint, the model is not individuation, but in "achieved relationships: in which the self is "irreducibly social" and yet refreshingly novel.  

3.1.1: TZU-JAN AS SELF-CREATIVITY.  

Whitehead's self-creativity, the "creative advance" in his process philosophy, is an ultimate of the ultimates, and hence it is "creativity" in a unique sense, since creativity is novelty, transience and freedom. Even Wang Pi, in his later commentary, suggests that _tzu-jan_ is an ultimate and is the same as _tao_. 

_Lao-tzu_ declares that the sage practices the way of inaction. Wang Pi explains: 'To be naturally so (_tzu-jan_) is sufficient; to act, one will end in defeat.' Lao-tzu says, 'The way never acts.' Wang Pi says, 'This means to follow (_yin_) what is naturally so.'  

Everything in nature has its own unique conditions for its self-existence (_causa sui_, cause of itself). Its Potency (_te_) to particularize is its _ming_, its "processual conditions" for life. If dynamic change is site-specific, located in a particularized locus, then the order generated out of this creativity is self-creative  

Order is reflexive: It is self-organizing and self-renewing; it is 'self-so-ing,' _tzu-jan_. By naturalizing novelty, it makes the emergent order irreversible... Order is thus always local (site-specific).  

Order can be considered as localized, site-specific; it is the tracking of holographic details to scan them for emergent patterns that becomes the focus within the larger field.
Furthermore, "process depends upon description grounded in aesthetic order" and order itself (whether logical or aesthetic) is "bipolar":

It should be possible, when attempting to access the flow of things, to invert the polarities and give pride of place to aesthetic order. And vice-versa; logical order is not completely divorced from aesthetic order. However, logical order can be a sub-species of aesthetic order.

The transformations (hue) in nature are also, *tzu-hue*, that is self-transforming in itself, beyond the control of man; hence, man cannot "contend" with nature, but must release it to individualize and actualize itself (self-realization). The emphasis on *tzu-hue* obviates the need for explanation of why things transform, since they transform themselves. No amount of analysis of experience will allow one to discover a "cause of creativity," since it is *cause sui*. No reason (*principia, archai*) is needed for explanation of the self-creative act.

Spinoza views things that are "self-caused" as a *conatus*, a natural tendency of things in act.

A being does not move from potency to act except under the influence of a being already in act.9

Neville points this out as the "incipiency" to act. This explains in part the indifference of the Taoist in searching for causal explanations, since this is typical of their *wu*-attitudes, which lets things happen as they are able to, without contending with them, without intervening or supervening upon them, because each thing has its unique integrity in themselves to develop itself. Chuang-tzu's viewpoint is "hold for a moment and let go"; K. M. Wu indicates this tendency of Potency in Chuang-tzu's *yin shih*, which is to affirm-and-follow-along-with.10 What we need to build upon is this concept of *tzu-jan*, spontaneity, and relate this main focus to *tao-fe*. This will also place *tzu-jan* in the dimension of *wu-wei* activities associated with communicative "receptivities," instead of the *yu-wei*, deliberative-calculative, purposive-teleological kinds of thinking. In the focus-field, *fe*-*fao*, *fe* is understood as "this particular focus" or "the intrinsic excellence of this thing."11

To support the viewpoint of Chuang-tzu's "hold and let go," we can point to the "goblet" rational techniques in the genre of "lodging words" (*yu*, "saying from a lodging-place"), words
which are held "temporarily" such as in an "imaginary conversation" or a thought experiment.

In Chuang-tzu's terminology to 'lodge' (yu) is to assume the temporary standpoints from which the sage judges with the 'This' according to 'what he goes by,' in contrast with the fixed positions from which the unenlightened apply the 'This' which 'deems' (wei).12

It is the flexibility and openness of adopting an attitude of "borrowing a standpoint in order to sort the matter out" (liun), an ecstatic, a stepping back, or adopting a "temporary standing place" from which one can look at things as they are deemed (wei) by others. However, the thing to remember, in Chuang-tzu, is not to fix things or to let them "sediment" or settle into ossification, but to be flexible and "let go" when you no longer need the fish trap, or the ensnarement of words.

In the context of communicative action and communicative receptivity, the Taoist emphasis on wu-wei, wu-chih, and wu-yu is non-instrumental, non-purposive-teleological thinking. Hall indicates that this sort of thinking is globally "spiritual," since it is holistic, holy and gnostic:

The ultimate terminus of any true act of understanding is (intuition of) Chaos, one has achieved the beginnings of noninstrumental understanding...the recognition of the ontological parity of all things.13

Chuang-tzu would point to the non-instrumental by giving examples of the benefit of "uselessness", like Lao-tzu's empty space between the spokes of the wheel, the uselessness of a mammoth gourd, and the uselessness of a gnarled old tree. These are examples of pu-tsei, wu-so-yung, or non-usefulness, which conventionally means tsi, neng, yung, as useful.14

3.1.2: TAO-TE AND THE PARADIGM OF FIELD-FOCUS.

On the more concrete level, one should be receptive to the "insistency" of the particulars, the tzu-ja (unique) character of each individual thing, respecting their contributions, and negotiations and consensus with the larger cooperative plans of action and receptions. It is the exercise of the le of every "insistent particularity" in relation to its comprising the larger tao of a culture, society, or personal situation. The compound interrelation of focus-field, tao-le, can serve to give us a consensual understanding of hermeneutical situations, the interpretive
contexts of a tradition. Te, in fāo-fe, is the "particular focus" ("virtuality") which "extends the context of signification (importance) to all phenomena." The values are in the holographic details which are "extended" in value to the larger wholes as emergent patterns. The emphasis on focus-field, as fāo-fe, is a "part-part" rather than a "one-many" or "part-whole" model, in which there is the absence of the metaphysical assumption of the "one behind the many or Being behind beings."

The focal center is not in any sense discrete or independent, but is rather intrinsically related to and interdependent with its field. The field is always entertained from some particular perspective or other, and is thus implicate within that perspective.

And the "wholes" that are formed from the holographic details are not "circumscribed or holistic, but is elastic and open," which is the open horizontal "wholes" that are constituted by the field. Polanyi calls the background "subsidiary awareness" and the foreground "focal awareness." A holistic intuition of fāo always has an "open horizon" to it; in fact, fāo is the sum of all orders (possible open horizons), and the fāo is one of the orders. This "part-part" relationship as focus-field is quite amenable to the "nominalistic" trend in language and also to the "hold and let go" mirroring of perception in Chuang-tzu. It also recognizes the "insistent" particularities of the holographic details as they contribute to and emerge as horizontal mappings. For example, when the focus-field model is applied to the Five Human Relationships (lun),

Each lun as the focus and articulation of a particular field of roles is holographic in that it construes its own field...The totality (holistic) is itself nothing more than the full range of particular foci each defining itself and its own particular field.

While we have stressed li in the Confucian context as a complement of fāo, here in the Taoist context, we need to stress fāo, natural aptitudes, skills, abilities as the "presencing of the particular" in the horizontal-field of fāo. The content of fāo is Potency, a moral power to build the human world in Confucius, while for the Taoist, it is the Potency for things to operate tzu-jen, sui generis (of his, her, its, or their own peculiar kind, unique), and cause sui (self-caused). Both want integration with wholes—holistic intuition of entity for the Confucian "spirit" and constancy for Taoists. Hence, fāo is a commonality between the Confucian and the Taoists.

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Te, Potency, is also an achieved concept, that is, it is not simply a capacity which is to be exercised at will, directionless, and though often un-intended because it is unpremeditated, it is still to be defined as the Potency, which is pu te yi, Inevitable:

The Taoist, however, wants to show that the Way is, not that which the sage desires, but the course on which he inevitably (pu te yi) finds himself in his illuminated state (ming)...what sets moving on the course that is inevitable is called 'Potency.'

In Tao Te Ching, ch. XXXI, Lao-tzu says, "Weapons are not auspicious things. Only when he has no other choice (pu te yi) will he use them." Hence, Inevitability means "only when he has no other choice." The exercise of such Potency from oneself is called "order," or self-ordering, and hence self-so, or tsu-jan, and so-of-itself. But Potency is to be exercised by recognizing the "Inevitability" (pu te yi), or as K. M. Wu calls it, "cannot help but be on the course of the Way." This "necessity" is a criteria of knowing that one is moving on the course of the Way, or else one's ordering is going to go astray from the Way. What cannot be helped is beyond our control. However, "necessity" should not mean logical compulsion, but rather "contingency," or the "dependence" upon the Way to stay on course. It is contingent rather than necessary, because Hall says that "process entails uniqueness." He also notes a notion of continuity between unique particulars that is "correlative" rather than "causal." What is also important to distinguish, according to Graham, is not to take pu te yi, the inevitable in which one has no choice, as the spontaneous freedom from compulsion, since this would be to emphasize a "dichotomy," which Chuang-tzu would want to leave behind.

Graham would define te as "spontaneous aptitude" or "Potency," the inherent capacity of a thing to perform its specific functions successfully, such as "bodily powers as eyesight and hearing." Furthermore, he supports the viewpoint of te as "aptitude, knack, skill, or tacit knowledge," "virtuosity," as justifiable only in the context of the non-conscious, non-deliberate, conditions:

The highest te is wu-wei without deliberate consideration (i wei)—a term which seems to mean something like a conscious concern with specific sequences of action. The man of lower te is very conscious of such specific consequences
and thus must be conscious of not losing his te. He is thus already in the realm of yu-wei.24

This is the moral of the Tao Te Ching, ch. XXXVIII. It reinforces the difference between higher and lower te and wu-wei and yu-wei thinking. The wu-wei man is not afraid to lose his te, and hence is able to complete what he sets out to do.

In a Whiteheadian-Taoist world, each and every phenomenon is causa sui, containing within itself the principle (seeds, germs) of its own unique development. Though Whitehead though does talk about "polarity," however noting an asymmetry in the relationship of prehensions to the prehended, in a unidirectional fashion. Whereas, the important Taoist notion is fan, the reversal of the processes of nature when it reaches certain limits and its "return" to the "tranquility" of lao (source). For the Taoist this is an attempt to show the reaching of the "limits" (lau, chiao) of natural processes and an ultimate returning 25

Hall explains the contrast between self-creativity and the dominance of power:

Creativity is always reflexive and polar. It is essentially self-creativity. Power relations are characterized by otherness, dependence and extrinsic relationships. Creativity is expressed through mutuality, deference and intrinsic relationships. Power is expressed through rational, volitional, or passion acts of construal 26

Accordingly, power relations are yu-wei (i-wei=extrinsic-Instrumental), and self-creativity is wu-wei (mutually-Intrinsic relations). Power seems to be unidirectional in its impact. However, in a more "comical" context, K. M. Wu suggests that Chuang-tzu uses laughter as its own creation ex nihilo to evoke in the lao of non-being, the darkness of the "not-yet-beginning-to-be-a-beginning." From this darkness comes the freedom of playfulness and roaming (hsiao yao yu) in the beginning of all things by means of laughter, frolic, fun, poking fun at things, and irony.27

A distinction is made by Frank B. Farrell who calls the Chinese sign-systems, "ecological," rather than the Western technological use of sign-systems, which are formal, "logistic," mathematisable ideal systems.

The Chinese, under the influence of Taoism, view nature as a system too complex and too much in flux to be captured in the grids of rational speech. The leading thinkers in China often turned to poetry because poetry offered a way of
matching the rhythms, complexity, and ambiguity of nature in a way that science could not. 28

The Chinese were not analysts, so instead of analysis and "articulation" into linear sequences, they had a system

of *condensing* a thought into a few short lines, a concrete image, or an aphorism. One hopes the condensed image or thought will capture the essence of a moment in a way that long, articulated sequences cannot. 29

This condensation is seen in the *Analects* as aphorisms, epigrams, proverbs, and in the shorter pungent anecdotes in Chuang Tzu. Poetic metaphors are examples of "condensation," since metaphors are a "lyric poem in minature," according to M. C. Beardsley. Polanyi would hold that a "work of art" is a "metaphor" and he uses I. A. Richard's terms of "tenor-vehicle" to explain how the power of metaphor lies in our capacity to embody an object of principal interest (the 'tenor') in another remotely similar (but also intrinsically interesting) object (the 'vehicle'), thus giving the first object a new sharp and emotionally charged meaning. 30

This can also explain how a metaphor, or a concrete image, or aphorism when condensed can "carry over" (*meta-phora*) intrinsic meanings to other contexts.

3.1.3: THE MUTUAL RECIPROCITY OF NATURE-CONVENTION.

There is a broad polarity between Nature-convention which Confucius did not raise as an issue, though after the Menclan discussion of hsing, the Four Germs (*tuan*) become "innate" nature. Afterward, Hsun-tzu begins to make the distinction more separative. The issue becomes more focused on *li*, ritual action, as "convention, custom" as against the Taoist "ontological turn" to nature as dominant, ecological (as compared with convention as *yu-wei*, calculative, machine-minds). Graham points to Hsun-tzu as the first Chinese philosopher to insist on separating "nature" and "nurture." 31

Graham states the distinction was a constant in Chinese thought between Confucians and Taoists of what is Heaven and what is Man:

Whatever is within the control of deliberate action (*yu-wei*) derives from man, whatever comes from outside it derives from Heaven. 32

Alternatively stated,
All that is outside man's control, which he must accept as the unalterable conditions of his existence, including his own nature, is the decree of Heaven (ti'en ming): all that is within his control belongs to the sphere of human action (jen shih). The answers to this question has taken three forms. Confucians want Heaven to be on the side of human morality, Mo-tzu escapes it by appeal to Heaven's Intent to an a priori demonstration, but it was Chuang-tzu who takes the issue head-on and makes Heaven the source of spontaneity, which is "axiologically" neutral or value-free. This may be compared with the Confucian ti'en, which has a moral purpose and serves as a prescriptive base for moral suasion. On the other hand, Hsun-tzu is on the "borderline between Heaven and Man":

Heaven is morally neutral and responsible for everything which comes about of itself without human intervention. Man creates morality and manipulates for moral ends the resources which Heaven has put at his disposal. Hsun-tzu finally uses the criteria that whatever is "learned" cannot be nature, but is "artifice."

Graham confirms a "complementary" solution, rather than a dichotomous difference between Heaven and Man. In ch. 6, of the Chuang-tzu

To know what is Heaven's doing and what is man's is the utmost in knowledge. Whoever knows what Heaven does lives the life generated by Heaven. Whoever knows what man does uses what his wits know about to nurture what they do not know about. To last out the years assigned you by Heaven and not be cut off in mid course, this is perfection of knowledge. (CZ 8, G 84)

The dichotomy breaks down in the unknowability of whether Man is his own agent of his actions, or of Heaven acting through him. Hence, a reciprocity of the polarity must be involved. In ch. 20,

To be skilled in what is Heaven's and deft in what is man's only the perfect man (chih jen) is capable of that...The perfect man hates Heaven, hates what is from Heaven in man, and above all the question 'Is it in me from Heaven or from man?' (CZ 20, G 106)

The term "sage" as "wise-man" is Confucian: the Taoist say, "Discard the Sage!!", especially if he claims to be speaking for or from Heaven. The mystical aspects of Lao-tzu tend to coalesce with Chuang-tzu's "hinge, pivot, or axis," where the opposites swing in and out, endlessly on its center. And though these dyads are treated almost as equal, D. C. Lau suggests that in the female vs. the male, and the weak vs. the strong, Lao-tzu would give the female-weak side an "ontological priority," or "preferred status." What we should remember is the lesson from
Foucault, who shows that analogies are "reversible" since they are "semblances of relations":

An analogy may also be turned around upon itself without thereby rendering itself open to dispute... (the vegetable is an animal living head down, roots buried in the earth) 37

So, the reversibility in Lao-tzu is part of his correlative thinking.

Hansen raises this issue of Nature-convention in the context of two main issues in Confucius: (1) the Correction of Names to solve a problem of "linguistic scepticism" and (2) the concept of jen, humanity and its educational function of character-building. Confucius never clearly raised the question about "social conventions" and "nature": All social forms (ritual, music, poetry, etc.) "modify our nature" so that we perform more easily and well, acquiring natural skills through "practice," which eventually becomes second "nature." 39 In short, Confucians believe everything they do is "natural," inclusive of any form of ritualizing. The interpretations of (1) and (2) involves setting up examples of how names are "naturally" used in action (performatives), how political leaders "can influence and guide behavior using the codified tradition" and how the goal of character (jen) education is achieved as "natural" despite its "arising from practicing conventions."

Fung Yu-lan quotes the Kuo-Hsiang commentary in regard to this artificial/natural complementarity:

All that is Heaven or man is 'naturally so' (tzu-jen)... From the point of view then, what the the early Taoists called action (yu wei) may also be called inaction (wu-wei).... The result is that where the higher and lower are made complementary to each other, the sovereign remains still whilst the minister Is active... and there is really no such thing as (artificial deliberate) action.' 39

In Chuang-tzu, the best exemplar of the mutual reciprocity of dyadic opposites is Penumbra and Shadow--their dynamic reciprocity--Penumbra as questioner and Shadow as responder can be reversed, because the relation of dependence is a reciprocal dependence (hsiang tai--interdependence, or mutual dependence of things.) Chuang-tzu elaborates this ontological interdependence into three points (1) self-identity--each things is judged as "just so" (jen) in its being so, and "not so" in its being not so. (2) If so, then a thing exists not only because of being identical with itself (self-identity), but also
because being fit to be judged as such (value judgments of *shih-fei*), i.e., Hui Shih says that "this" is involved in "that," and (3) the validity of judgments depends on the perspective, i.e., the loach can live in damp places. In summary: In this way things are inextricably interrelated for their unique identities (*sui generis, tzu jen*). After all, one can always reverse an argument, while the validity of judgments depends upon perspectives.40

Also, in *Chuang-tzu's* Outer Chapters, there are several examples of illustrating what is of Nature and what is of man:

"What is of nature is internal. What is man is external...That oxen and horses should have four feet is what is of nature. That a halter should be put on a horse's head, or a string through an ox's nose, is what is of man. (ch. 17).

We are happy when the Te or natural ability of ours is fully and freely exercised, that is, when our nature is fully and freely developed 'The duck's legs are short, but if we try to lengthen them, the duck will feel pain...Therefore we are not to amputate what is by nature long, nor to lengthen what is by nature short.'(ch. 9)

What is of Nature, then, is unique, peculiar to a thing (*sui generis*), not just the "common" inheritance we get from Heaven as an innate "capacity," or a potentiality, but to be considered functionally in the exercise of our Te "natural ability."

As Graham points out, *hsing*, or human nature, has a descriptive and a prescriptive side and it is the latter moralizing effect that is Confucian. In Mencius *hsing* takes on the meaning of *liang chih*, a moral intuition.

But Chinese *hsing* and Western nature do have an Important similarity, reinforced on the Chinese side by the assumption that *hsing* is generated by Heaven; they seem to function both as descriptive and prescriptive concepts...*Hsing* is conceived as prescriptive, the course of *sheng* proper to a *hsing*.42

Besides, Graham points out that Chuang-tzu seldom used the term *hsing*, but instead defined Nature as spontaneity, *tzu-jen*, and compared it with *yu-wei* style thinking, which also correlative brings in the contrast of "artificial, conventional." Also, Graham points out that in Chuang-tzu's time there were some psychological terms, such as daimonic (spirit, *shen*)43 and that the use of *ching* as "quintessential"44 was also found in the literature, used to characterizing the pure "essence" of the energising *ch'i*. 

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Also, the meaning of Chi Wu Lun, as an "equalizing," or natural equality of all things, taken in its counterpart metaphor of the "pipings of Heaven," means that the sounds made by people are all different, of "disputing voices," and peculiar-unique-deferential, rather than attempts to equalize by making everything commonly so, not differentially and uniquely, tzu-jen, so-of-itself, "so" (jan). The deferential tzu-jen's of the myriad things is part of the perspectivism pointed out by Chuang-tzu: Using Hansen's translation,

"Without pil'other there is no woif, without woil no choice between alternatives.'
This is rather close, but we don't know what is made the cause (scepticism). It is as if there were some chen/real tsai/minister: premier and yet, for some special reason we have no evidence of it. That it can be followed seems enough to trust in, yet we cannot make out its features—it has facticity but no features.45

For Chuang-tzu, there was no Mencian "true ruler," no greater part (te-t'i) of our body or organs, which is the "heart-mind," hsin, that rules over our chi', our emotion and passions, or our thoughts.

Chuang-tzu's view is that a heart that issues such judgments is a natural product of environment and history (ecology). A heart accumulates judgments (shih-fei's) and is shaped by its reactions by its past patterns of shih-ing and fei-ing. The heart is just the accumulation of pro and con reactions.46

It was Chuang-tzu who heaped satire and irony on the quarrels between the Confucians and Mohists. He made it the basis of showing the relativity put upon the values of the "virtues" of Goodwill and Duty (Burton Watson uses "benevolence" and "righteousness"). Another way the two disagree is to say "That's it" (shih) and "That's not" (fei), representing the Confucian and Mohist, respectively. Another approach to Chuang-tzu and the Confucian virtues as "conventional" and not "natural" is to trace back to the "beginning." While Western phenomenology wants to go back "to the things themselves," Taoists want to go back to before there were "things," judgments, and conventions. In ch. 2 (Chi Wu Lun),

The men of old, their knowledge had arrived at something: at what had they arrived? [1] there were some who thought there had not yet begun to be things—the utmost, the exhaustive, there is no more to add. [2] The next thought there were things but there had not yet begun to be borders. [3] The next thought there were borders to them but there had not yet begun to be 'That's it,' 'That's not' (shih-fei).
Another parallel movement is the primitivist's claim that Shen-nung was the last Emperor of the Golden Age, since he had emphasized agricultural communities and small fiefdoms which were so self-sufficient that they did not have to go outside of hamlets to trade with others. After Shen-nung came the Yellow Emperor who opposed Shen-nung, who "reigned without resorting to weapons and armor," and instituted the formalities of "ruler and ministers and of superior and inferior, the rites for father and son and for elder brother and younger, the union of couples as husband and wife." The devolution began with the Yellow Emperor.

Hansen interprets the above three "beginning" stages as follows: The first is primitive Taoism; the second is the Taoism of Shen Tao—who holds that there is a thing without distinctions—a "one" which is indivisible and thus incommensurate with language (with shih-fei distinctions), and the third is the stage which has not yet reached language—the judgments of shih-fei. The first stage is also the state in the beginning, before there was not-yet-beginning-to-be-a-beginning, there was Chaos (hun-tun), and there were no "borders." It was an undifferentiated aesthetic continuum. The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norms. It is by a 'That's it' which deems that a boundary is marked...To 'discriminate between alternatives' (pien-argument) is to fail to see something.

Also, Hansen is not committed to Chuang-tzu being a mystic—who is defined as one who is "ignorant of what is so of things." The mystic is one who is agnostic in the last analysis, in that he does not know that he may know. The sceptic asserts that no distinctions or terms unqualifiedly reflect reality. The mystic similarly holds that no distinction or term does so, but goes on, paradoxically, to make a distinction (between one and many) and apply a term (one). He seeks to make a discriminative judgment about the making of distinctions. He asserts that distinctions divide something that is mystically and incommunicably 'one.'

Theoretically, Chuang-tzu stops with skepticism, while emotionally he adopts the wonder, humor and optimism of the mystic. Apart from the not-yet-beginning-to-begin-to-be stages, ch. 13, the "Way of Heaven," details the nine steps in the "devolution": (1) Heaven, (2) Way and Power, (3) Goodwill and Duty, (4) portions (fen, division) and responsibilities, (5) title and performance (Correction of
Names), (8) suitable men in charge (hsien jen, worthy), (7) inquiry and inspections, (8) judging right and wrong (shih-fei), and (9) reward and punishment. Step (6) is elaborated in Ch. 12, where Chuang-tzu states, "In an age of Utmost Potency, they do not elevate worth or employ ability." This is the elevation of the "worthy," or the hsien jen, which both Mo-tzu and Hsun-tzu held would be a politically effective policy in selecting personnel to administer government.

In hermeneutical terms, the Taoist is providing a critique of "ideology" at step (3). Chuang-tzu lampoons the Confucians and Mohists at this point of Goodwill and Duty. Each claimed that their ideology is better than the other, a "this" versus a "that." The discriminations (pien) they make are based on their perspectives (only in step (4) do they not recognize that their reference standards are different, i.e., as Mo-tzu's chien ai. From step (3) there is a slippery slope all the way down to the fixity of the ideological warfare of Confucius and Mo-tzu.

Chuang-tzu goes back to more fundamental depths; "Horses Hooves," ch. 9, describes the primitive pre-history of man.

In the age when Power was at its utmost, men lived in sameness with the birds and animals, side by side as fellow clansman with the myriad creatures; how would they know a gentlemen from a knave? Then came the sages, trudging along after Goodwill, straining on tiptoe after Duty, and for the first time the world was in doubt; Immersing in the flood to make Music, or picking to pieces to make Rites, and for the first time the world was divided...Then, unless the simple unhehn block were damaged, who would make the libation vessels? (G 204).

Damaging the unhehn block to make vessels is the crime of the craftsman. Ruining the Way and the Power to make Goodwill and Duty is the most pernicious error of the sage. Furthermore, Hsiao Kung-chuan sees the breaking up of the Uncarved Block as the beginning of instruments of government. Starting with the instruments of civilization; the ruler's first act is to appoint officials. 50

In the broader interpretation of tradition, if it is not considered a linguistic tao, then one may call attention to the purely tacit knowledge and underlying skills, to the gestures, and to the non-verbalizable aspect of Cook Ting's aptitudes as a butcher-craftsman. Habermas points to the "tacit" knowledge of the lifeworld as an example of a "prerreflective" kind of knowing. 51
Chuang-tzu held that since we do not "know-that" things are what they are (wu-chih); we know "how-to" (tacit skills), but we may not "know-that" something is true, workable, or efficacious, unless we act upon our supposed knowledge. Hence, Chuang-tzu has some advice about not following knowledge to the source, for when the source vanishes from view we cannot go any further, and discussion stops. What is important in this regard also is the rare mention of li, as patterns; in the "Know Little" dialogue, ch. 25.

The regularities (li, patterns) which things possess, words exhaust, knowledge attains; they extend throughout but no further than the realm of things. The man who perceives the Way does not pursue them to where they vanish or explore the source from which they arise. This is the point where discussion stops." (G 152).

There is a point where "interpretations" must come to "rest," in the still-point of the hinge of feo. One can only use holistic intuitions to go that far and no further.

What is difficult to assess in Taoism between knowing-that (propositional knowledge) and knowing-how (proficiency or skill) is that we cannot make a simple identification between the distinction of knowing-that as being "theoretical" knowledge and knowing-how as "practical" knowledge. This is because the dichotomy of theoretical and practical is not a well-formed distinction in Chinese culture. Even a Westerner, like D. S. Shwayder, holds an analogical viewpoint in respect to theory and practice:

'practical knowledge' may be understood only on analogy with 'theoretical knowledge.'

If Chinese thinking is basically analogical, metaphorical, and poetic, then one will be hard pressed to be able to analogize and define propositional statements and their conformity with truth or states of affairs, or to compare the metaphorical on analogy with "literal" meanings.

3.2: THE TAOIST SAGE AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTOR.

The Taoist sage, the chen jen, recognizes the nine devolutionary stages from the utopian "beginnings," of Heaven, feo and fe. There is a point however where they go back to the "ultimate ancestors." Within this framework, then, the Confucian or Mohist sage is so
conventionalized and artificial, that the term "sage" is to be denigrated. "Discard the sage" is their cry. The sage is made the butt of jokes, sarcasm, and ironic and comic themes. Chuang-tzu makes some outrageous statements about sages, who he says possess only conventional knowledge, cleverness, wit, and finite and limited knowledge. Most of all, he declares his utopianism, (primitivist strain) to be the reference condition of a "true morality" (Taoist a-morality):

In an Age of Perfect Virtue, the worthy are not honored, the talented not employed. Rulers are like the high branches of a tree, the people like the deer of the fields. They do what is right but do not know that this is 'righteousness.' They love one another but do not know that this is 'loyalty' (chung). They are trustworthy (hsin) but do not know that this is 'good faith.' They wiggle around like insects, performing services for one another, but do not know that they are being 'kind.'

This utopian morality condemns both Robber Chih and the paragons of virtues of the conventional kinds.

Without the Way of the sage Robber Chih would not walk...with the birth of the sages the great robbers arises. Smash the sages, turn the thieves and bandits loose, and for the first time the world will be in order.

In this same regard, Hsiao summarizes Chuang-tzu's political philosophy with three tenets: (1) basically, human nature is good, like Mencius, but they should be let alone (tsai yu) (2) Chuang-tzu was pessimistic about government, and (3) what was needed was freedom (t'ien fang) in society, with no need for a superior man's transforming people through teaching. People, left to their own devices, are good people and will govern themselves wisely.

3.2.1: TAOIST SAGE: THE CHEN JEN.

Even with this denigration of the sage, the kind of chen jen Chuang-tzu is seeking is an unknown sage, who comes from the hermit tradition, such as a Lieh Tzu. This links up with the viewpoint of Lao-tzu's anarchism of ruler and subjects, even though the Tao Te Ching is written and directed toward the prince. In ch. XIX, Lao-tzu says, "Spurn sagacity (discard the sage), and repudiate erudition" (discard knowledge). Wang Pi interprets: the sage is able to respond to tao and the needs of the people. Chuang-tzu is only interested in the subjects, who would not
like to be interfered with (the less the better). Regardless of what names are given to various kinds of Taoist "sages," they have in common the fact that they are governed by wu-wei, rather than by yu-wei, purposive-instrumental knowledge. This is relevant to the issue of communicative action and communicative reception which we have discussed in Part I and II.

For example, Lao-tzu's sage, or ideal man, when compared with Chuang-tzu's True Man (chen jen), is depicted as leaning more heavily on such qualities as "tranquility, simplicity, genuineness, and reserve" which seems to tend toward communicative receptivities, while the True Man emphasizes the "loftiness and transcendental qualities of this state of mind." These latter qualities are described as "independent, creative and aesthetic." 

The chen jen is a person of pervasive te. He extends his Potency and becomes "co-extensive" with the natural direction of his tao-context. In this extension of his Potency, he also is "self-transforming" (tzu-hua) of his te, and in this extension he is not only involved in self-realization, but also displays his intensive influence in his sociopolitical charisma, the exemplification of his intrinsic excellence (te).

From the perspective of his diffusions throughout his context, he has become a larger focus of what is that is self-transforming (tzu-hua). To the extent that his broad presencing has possibilities for creativity and novelty, so too does he.

The chen jen fulfills his spontaneity, tzu-jen, his naturalistic/humanistic te, his self-so character. His spontaneity is his self-creativity, an emergent arising within a tao-context.

The chih jen (ultimate man, perfect man) is characterized as one who will

rest within the bounds that know no excess, hide within the borders that know no source, wander where the ten thousand things have their end and beginning, unify his nature, nourish his energy, unite his virtue and thereby communicate with that which creates all things. (ch. 19)

Here we have a mature person who not only does things naturally but becomes fully realized to become "one" with the "creator" (tsao wu che) and as a "companion" of Heaven. To be able to wander (yu) with unbound freedom (hsiao yao) with the "creator" of the ten thousand things is to trace things to their beginnings and their endings in nature. He becomes spontaneously "one" with the creative, transformative process (tzu-hua). The chih jen always follow, but does not go first.
When a man does not dwell in self, then things will of themselves reveal their forms to him. His movement is like that of water, his stillness like that of a mirror, his responses like those of an echo... Because he is one with it, he achieves harmony; should he reach out for it, he would lose it. Never does he go ahead of other men... but always follows in their wake." (ch. 33).

The chen jen is a man of gnosis; he is able to get a revelatory insight into the nature of non-being, into the way that things transforms. He is able to communicate this from the divine source of non-being to the general populace, through his non-discursive ways of talking and gesturing about tao. He mirrors the alternating of the yin-yang, waxing and waning as tao transforms so-of-itself. The chen jen realizes the tzu-jen character of self-transforming things (tzu hua). And in so doing, he is enlightened (ming) to the nature of the world.

Michael Saso characterizes the chen jen as a "tao-realized" person. Chen jen is a person awakened to the presence of tao generating from within, a person not afraid of "mistakes," not complacent, who ascends to lofty heights, and is neither burned by fire nor wetted by water. The knowledge of the chen-jen allows man to ascend to tao while the knowledge of the world of change leads away from simplicity into the complex world of multiplicity. Tao-conditioned knowledge allows the adept to sleep soundly at night without dreams, awake without worries, eat simply and breathe deeply from the heels rather than from the throat. To sum up, the chen-jen is a person for whom tao is the only "true ruler" within. He is the source on which all things depends while in the state of transformation. Though within the phenomenal, there is also the invisible, unmoved and the unchanging. There is a passed on, but not a possessed; that is, the state of wu is opposed to the condition of yu, represented as Immanence, or Beginnings, or as received or possessed (wu-wei chih tao, vs. yu-wei chih tao, tao of wu-wei and tao of yu-wei). The chen jen knows the difference between the kind of Confucian tao of yu-wei, as against the Taoist tao, which is wu-wei. Dilworth points out that the meditative practices of sitting and forgetting. "Fasting of the mind" is common to both the Taoist and Buddhist sagely tradition:

The sage, in both traditions, lets things be in his mirrorlike mind and takes no
purposeful action (wu-wei)...In the final analysis, however, Chuang-tzu and the other Taoists affirm the Tao's substrative reality, which the Buddhists replace with an existential reality.  

Chuang-tzu denigrates the status of the "sage" (sheng jen), and prefers to use chen jen, or the "authentic person," the True Man. The chen jen is spontaneous, belongs wholly to Heaven, does not yet make any distinction between benefit and harm, self and other, even Heaven and man...(For the sage, there has never yet begun to be Heaven, never yet begun to be man).  

Someone in whom neither Heaven nor man is victor over the other; this is what is meant by the True Man. The chen jen must thus satisfy at least two criteria: (1) he must recognize that there is no "dichotomy" between Heaven and Man, self and other, benefit and harm, etc.. This means that man is ultimately joined in an intimate "sociality" with nature, and (2) the chen jen is "spontaneous" and self-creative. Tzu-jen for the chen jen is self-caused (Immanent from Itself) like all phenomena and man and nature are causa sui. The context of application of the True Man, chen jen, takes place by denigration of the sage in the chapter called "Riffing Trunks" in which it is said that because the sage exists, then Robber Chih exists; so we should get rid of the sage, and "discard the wise."  

In speaking about different kinds of sages, it is pointed out that there is more emphasis on a "higher level of mind" in Chuang-tzu than in Lao-tzu:  

Lao-tzu seldom alludes to levels of mind, whereas Chuang-tzu frequently touches on and develops the notion of a lofty and unique level of consciousness.  

For example, in Tao Te Ching ch. LVI, the "Abstruse Unity" refers to the level of "undifferentiated knowledge--the level of tao." In that context "not seeking to set oneself apart by external "displays," or exercising a certain attitude of "detachment" would be a first step toward obtaining the "abstruse unity" of tao. The self must undergo some kind of dissolution in order to acknowledge that the tao-te of things has its own "integral" self, functioning as tzu-jen, as unique individualities. Regardless of the "level of consciousness," Chuang-tzu seems to have the same goals in obtaining "unity, or oneness with tao." The self is dissolved in order to adequately "mirror" the objectivity of the self-transformation of things. The criteria of judgment is whether
one is a communicative actor in achievements of ecstasy, enstasy and constasy. This gives an important "integrative" criteria of how well the Great Man, Perfect Man, Utmost Man has met the test of the solidarity of tao.

Chuang-tzu writes about the time when there are no sages. In "Mending Nature" (ch. 16) one does not assume a universal balance of awareness and spontaneity without sages. This is appropriate because Utopia is placed not as an indefinite period in the past but at the absolute origin. After that comes the "devolution," which leads inevitably to the problem of the "fall," or "waning of tao." Morality is something that is spontaneous and comes from man's nature, as long as there is observance of the perfection of the primitivistic state of the Golden Age. 16 Graham describes the Taoist ideal of Shen Nung as the Agricultural sage, "he teaches without issuing decrees or imposing punishments, and he works in the fields side by side with them." 17

Chuang-tzu provides many accounts of the "devolution" from a state of nature to the rise of civilizations. In ch. 9,

However along come the sages huffing and puffing after jen reaching in tiptoe toward righteousness (yi) and the world for the first time had doubts."

We seem to have something like a primitive harmonious anarchy, followed by the unaccountable rise of a new notion of good and evil among those called the sages. It is in then that the yu-wei consciousness emerges. 18

The original culprits were the 'cultural heroes' (sage rulers) who have brought into being the entire project of civilization. The Confucian man of jen who may represent the highest level of the lowest te acts with conscious intent of becoming good. 19

"The highest level of the lowest te" is Lao-tzu's way of gauging the worth of the highest te belonging to the man of wu-wei. In opposition is the lowest te, belonging to the yu-wei man. The Tao Te Ching, ch. 11, says, "Everyone understands that which makes 'goodness' good. And thus the concept of badness arises." This is the beginning of the perspectivity of standards in the yu-wei tradition.

If one builds upon Hall's discussion of Eros as the drive toward tao, the "spiritual"
ascension aspect of the Taoist sage would include *sheng jen* (The Holy Man, not the preferred Confucian sage as a "moral persuader"), *shen jen* (The God Man, or spirit man), *chih jen* (The Perfect Man, Graham—the Utmost Man), *chen jen* (The True Man) and *hsien jen* (The Immortals). Chuang-tzu also writes about the Great Man (*ta jen*). The *shen jen* is a "God Man, living on a distant mountain called Ku-she, and his skin is like snow." The God man leads a hermit-like existence and is capable of "drinking the morning dew...riding a flying dragon, and wanders over the four seas" (ch. 1, *Chuang-Tzu*). The *sheng jen*, on the other hand, "unites himself with all things, leaves the chaos as it is, and...participates in all ages and achieves simplicity in oneness" (ch. 2). The *chih jen* is "like a god...A man like this can ride the clouds and fogs, and straddle the sun and moon, and wander over the four seas" (ch. 2), and in the "Autumn Floods" dialogue, the Utmost Man (*chih jen*)

In fathoming the beauty of heaven and earth penetrates the patterns (li) of the myriad things...It is this I call the fundamental Root from which one can have a full view of Heaven...Whoever knows the Way is sure of penetrating the patterns, whoever penetrates the patterns is sure to be clear headed in weighing things...and will not use other things to his own harm." 19

The importance of "weighing," or the *liun* (sorting out of patterns), becomes the path to illumination (*ming*). This is a common sharing of the concept of *li* as "patterns," which becomes "principles" by the Neo-Confucians; Graham prefers "models" (*hsiang*).

Finally, the *chen jen*’s "knowledge could ascend all the way up to *tao*" (ch. 6). 20

What they seem to have in common is that they can all "ride the clouds" and "wander the four seas." They all seem to, metaphorically, be able to "fly around like Lieh-tzu," or have an "out-of-body" (psychokinesis) experience of making the body like "dry wood" and "dead ashes," a loss of self, which is part of Chuang-tzu's "free and easy wandering" beyond the borders of Nowhere:

To thus enter into the rhythm of things we must lose ourselves in it, that is become absolutely quiet inside (‘dead ashes’) and out (‘dry wood’)...Then we see that we usually call such ‘tunes of things’ (symphonic resonating rhythm)...this is the story of life...the story of the logic of the life of things. 22

Also, to fly around like Lieh-tzu is to be able to cease to be obstructed by things;
Possession of the Way is thus a capacity for dealing effortlessly with external things. Its theoretical limit is absolute power, or rather absolute liberty; instead of controlling things, the sage ceases to be obstructed by them. Liah-tzu riding the winds is an image, not of mastery, but of free, unimpeded movement.

Yu means wandering, an “ambulatory” metaphor, similar to tao as a “road” or a spiritual path to be followed.

Yu, referring to a quality of nondirectedness in locomotion, specifies the manner in which that spiritual path is followed... It connotes absence of attachment to any one particular perspective on it.

Also Yu is the kind of wandering which is the trick of walking “without touching the ground.” Hence, it is easy to visualize Liah-tzu’s “riding the winds” in an out-of-body experience. Yu, can also be discussed in terms of Gelassenheit, the letting wander, the letting go of temporary perceptions, the letting be of things, which are tzu-jan, so-of-themselves:

Gelassenheit is the experience of the power which overpowers Dasein, not by its violence, but by its retreat and withdrawal. That is why Heidegger calls Gelassenheit ‘openness to the Mystery.’

As Lao-tzu says in ch. 1,

Abstruse and again abstruse/This is the gate of all mysteries.

3.2.2: GNOSTIC SAGES AND HOLISTIC INTUITIONS

Communicative action for the gnostic sages involves a “holistic” intuition of the “horizon” of tao. Even if they envision The Good, or tao, and return to try and tell others about it, can they really ask the “gnostic questions”? Schwartz puts these gnostic questions in the horizon of Chuang-tzu’s interest in the School of Names (ming-chia) and the later sophists of Hui Shih, K’ung-sun Lung, and Yin Wen-tzu:

Can one really set up an opposition between being and nonbeing? In doing so, is one not speaking of the ineffable nonbeing as a “something”? Can one apply the notion of the opposite to the ineffable? Can there be any temporal priority between the two?

How does language “refer” to non-being, as a some-thing, as a no-thing? This is an instance of Chaos as mysterious, dark, abstruse, etc. The fragility of language as the tool for the “attainment” of tao, and this illustrates the non-spoken doctrine of Chuang-tzu. He is building upon the nature of the poetic, that is “language-bound” and uses the ordinary meanings of words.
that have conventionally accrued to them. However, each person responds to the poetic word in his own way, a unique reading of the pure “signs,” the imagery in the poem. This process seems to have validity for all people who recognize the image. Poetic language works with the ambiguities of language and tries to give the words “intentional meanings.” The “ambigulated” person will be torn between yu-wei, conventional thinking habits and wu-wei adaptations of language and perceptions in the wu-modalities. A balancing act sets up contentious tensions in any person who is trying to keep to the way of tao-te. What one arrives at is pu fe yi, out of the “necessity” that a thing is what it is perceived as in a mirror, reflecting its “object-status” for all. However, the attainment of these wu-meanings are similar to gestural meanings which are embodied in words; Merleau-Ponty suggests that these “gestural meanings” are immanent in speech.

Gestural meanings...once understood, endows the philosopher’s writing with the value of adequate signs...their conceptual meaning must be formed by a kind of deduction from a gestural meaning which is immanent in speech...The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and contains its meaning in the same way as the gestures contains it. This is what makes communication possible. 28

There are many occurrences of images in the Tao Te Ching, especially of the yin-type, such as water dwelling in low places (ch. VIII), the “obscure womb” (ch. VI), the tranquility of the female (ch. X), and the “spirit of the valley.” Poetic meanings are evoked through imagery, which are suggestive of metaphorical figures of speech, or the completion of an analogy given the relations of the elements in a proportion (a:b:c::d). Hence, through parables, anecdotes, self-referential inconsistencies, etc., on can still “evolve” a sense of what tao means.

Hall also integrates the three kinds of mystical (aesthetic) states of ecstasy, enstasy and constasy within the Taoist tradition. Aesthetic and mystical experiences contribute to constasy as the unity, belongingness, and togetherness of man in the universe. The theorial intuition, upon which the most direct understanding of self-creativity (reflexive) may be based, is the sense of a primordial harmony in illustrating the self-creative activities of each item of the totality in accordance with its insistent particularity. On this view,
the primary mystery is not how things hang together in an ordered fashion, but rather why things sometimes fall apart. The problem is the source(s) of disorder (Chaos).29

On a cosmic scale, one can construe the "lifeworld" as sheng-sheng, which Thomé Fang would call a philosophy of "enlivened Nature"; hence, it answers the question of What is Life?''

Nature is power, or vital impetus, creative in advance and conducive to the fulfillment and consummation of life capable of being partaken of by all beings.30

And the accompanying principle is the "principle of creative life": In the I Ching, "Hsi tz'u ehuan":

Tao operates incessantly with the rhythmic modulation of dynamic change and static repose, thus continuing the creative process for the attainment of the Good and completing the creative process for the fulfillment of Nature, which is Life.31

Thus for the I Ching sage, tao is the source for "creative creativity" in which tao of Heaven, Earth and Man become "co-creative" agents for the continuance of Life. Thomé Fang is using Whiteheadian terminology to interpret the I Ching, especially with the outlook of showing the metaphysics of the I Ching in terms of "creative creativity." Such rhythmic modulation of dynamic change and repose is typical of the character of the alteration of yin and yang (k'un as the passive principle, and ch'ien as the creative principle). It is also an attempt to show the organism of nature and life processes. Furthermore, two other main concepts accompany sheng-sheng. In the I Ching, the main concepts are yi, change, and hua, transformation.

Stanislaus Lokuang commenting on the I Ching reinforces Thomé Fang's sheng-sheng concept:

Metamorphosis was called change in the Book of Changes. Yi means change and change means metamorphosis (hua-sheng) or production by the perpetual renewal of life (sheng-sheng).32

Schwartz, however, indicates that there is a "reverse" of influence from Confucian and Taoist sources back into the Ten Wings Appendices:

It is a version of a correlative cosmology which focuses not so much on the overall grand patterns and regularities of the natural and human worlds as on the vastly varied and contingent world of shifting situations and circumstances.33
Taoist influences include (1) "the alternation of yin and yang is called tao" and the processes of yin and yang create all the myriad things, and (2) the system of the changes "is without thought and acts by wu-wei," "it is still and unmoving," "that which cannot be fathomed in the yin and yang is the numinous or divine (shen)."  

Hall’s main points are: if we are going to be sweetly reasonable in the Chinese sense, then we should (1) take Chaos and Intuitive constasy as "groundless" ground rather than the Western logocentric-archai and (2) to carve out from the Uncarved block of Indeterminacy, a creative, newly minted spontaneity which is not subjected to simple efficient, linear causality, but serves as a "network" of the intake of the natural environment (kan-ying arousal-response) as focal cross-sections of the indeterminate "horizontal" tao. Man is not separated from nature but is intimately entwined and embodied (‘f’ in nature, in constasy with tao. Hall also emphasizes the point that efficient causality is especially rejected by the Taoist with their wu-wei notions:  

It is the capacity of individuals for wu-wei, wu-chih, and wu-yu that promotes the possibility of meaningfulness among events in nature that are not construable in terms of efficient causes.  

The "skill," talent, capacity, knowledges of Cook Ting is not simply "technical" skill, for when Cook Ting is asked to instruct the Duke of what his tao, or "skill" is, he is practicing an intersubjective "communicative action." In short, Cook Ting’s techniques are "technical," on the one hand, and "communicative" praxis, on the other hand. One may refer here to Aristotle’s techné, defined in terms of purposive actions in making or fabricating (poiesis) something. Praxis is otherwise "practical" and invoiced in tandem with lexis (speech, symbolic interactionism) and characterizes the form of human interaction displayed in intersubjective communication. Cook Ting "listens" to where the hollow spaces are and inserts his knife in the interstices, just as the "pipings of Heaven" always harkens from hollow logs and natural wind, producing silences and whooshes, a non-spoken doctrine. Also, in the story of the Wheelwright, he says,  

There is a knack in it somewhere which I cannot convey to my own son, which my own son cannot get from me.  

Alternatively, Hall sees two kinds of power: theoretical power and theorial power. He
also couches it in terms of an "androgyne vs. agonal" conception of human being. An androgyne is mutually reciprocal interaction of yin-yang, the containing of both sexes at one and the same time, and not the dichotomy of male/female as mutually exclusive. Also, there is another opposition of theory/praxis, which has to be dealt with, in the application of theory to practices.

How would this apply to the chen jen in considering how his fe contributes to his termini of holistic intuition of an Integral tao? Are there two modalities of fe?: one Confucian in the yu-wei tradition, and the Taoist's adoption of wu-wei attitudes toward actions/passions, yin/yang, communicative actions/receptivities, contending/non-contending modalities of fe, the Potency to accord with tao? Perhaps, another perspective on two kinds of "Power" or Potency, is to compare the power of will in the existentialist sense (the freedom to act de novo), an "agonal" conception of the application of theoretical power into applied technological contexts (practices of science) in a power of ecstasy of the will-to-power, with a non-ecstatic sense of "constasy," the union with the Taoist generative source or resource in which all things stand together in the self-creative process of an aisthesis.

3.3: THE POTENCY OF TZU-JAN: SPONTANEITY AND SELF CREATIVITY, THE POTENCY TO ACT.

If the world is tzu-jan, then it is self-creative in its particularities and concreteness, and one may formulate a criterion for determining what is called an "ontological truth":

Ontologically the truth is to be found in the unique reality of a thing, which cannot, of course, be named. Cosmologically construed, however, truth is context-dependent.

Hence, tzu-jan is sui generis--unique in its own right, and this provides us with a clue for the ontological truth of things, each in its own right. But taken in the cosmological context, of Nature-in-context, the fe-of-tao is illustrated in the ming-of-t'ien:

The ming of t'ien is called hsing; to lead out and accord with this hsing is called tao... Hsing is not an inborn nature, a predetermined potential that is actualized and completed...literally, hsing is nature-in-context.

The chen jen realizes the tao-fe within the broad "wandering," yu, within the nature-in-context.

If fe is connected with tzu-jan, the focusing on the particular potencies that lead to the
exercise of "following on the Way" (yin shih) that which is "naturally so," "self so" (tzu-jen), then the exercise of natural aptitudes, such as skills of Cook Ting, is not just random behavior, nor do they follow rules set down for constraining our actions. There are knacks or appropriate ways which we learn to do certain sequences of skills and we learn these unconsciously sometimes, or by practice they become second nature, and hence when called upon to act, we effortlessly do the correct thing without much hesitation or thought. One should also obviate connecting te with the "nature of a thing" (hsing), since Chuang-tzu seldom, if ever, uses hsing in his works. Instead we should connect te with tzu-jen, an "uncaused self-arising" as a major precept.

3.3.1: THE POTENCY TO ACT.

As Graham pointed out in sec. 3.1 above, the exercise of te is a natural aptitude in such a way as to recognize the "inevitability" (pu te yì) of being on the course of the Way.

There is a commonality of the use of te in both the Confucian and the Taoist traditions.

The focus of the Taoist discussion is predominantly a cosmological account of the cyclical process of existence where te is regarded as categorical: the presencing of a particular. In the Analects, te would seem to be specifically social and moral in its application; as patterns of deference, the influence of the particular takes on normative force.

The presencing of the insistent particularities is the focus of the emergent arising within the larger field-contexts of t'ien and tao, where the larger background horizons of the cosmological relations of things exist, which mutually enhance each other in their affinity. There is a final attunement of the self and other natural forces of the ch'i, the yin-yang movement of the tenuous ch'i. Cosmologically,

in the Taoist literature, it denotes the arising (tzu-jen) of the particular as a focus of potency in the process of existence. As a total field this dynamic process is called fæa; the individuated existence in this field, its various foci, are called fae.5

Tao-te and t'ien-te can form compounds, but are differentiable by means of focusing of the particular in the larger whole, and vice versa.

The Great Tao is so expansive, it reaches in all directions. All of individuated existence arises because of it. (ch. XXXIV)
Te and t’ien are differentiable only as a matter of focus or emphasis. Te designates any particular disposition of the whole, as foci in “deference patterns” of the scope or range of care and concerns. An ellipse has a double foci (or centers), which is better than a circle with one center, since horizontal changes and shifts in focus, could mean two “centers,” which are not permanently fixed, yet still relating to each other centripetally and centrifically, together and belonging to an elliptical situation. A double foci can reflect yin-yang alternation in deferential patterns of more yin, less yang, etc., and still maintain the continuity of tzu-yan.

Hall suggests that the West gives metaphysical ultimacy to creativity by interpreting it in terms of a “presumably” more fundamental concept of Power—whether it is established by the root metaphors of will (volitional action), the power of rationality (formism), or the power of Eros (passion).

God, nature, passion and practice are the four vessels of power...expressed in three modalities: directly in command and indirectly through the agencies of rationality and love. Nietzsche is a prime example of will-to-power, power as a volitional perspectivism and the ability to dominate and “control” of our knowledge gathering activities. It is to Habermas’s credit that he criticizes the Nietzschean volitional human “interest” and provides an “emancipatory” society wherein communicative action can take place among its societal members.

In contrast, the Taoist creativity is a non-volitional, a wu-wei type of cosmogony. The center of creation is from non-being, which is wu-wei and tzu-yan (spontaneity, so-of-itself, hence, self-creativity). And non-being is Becoming-Itself.

For the Taoist, the source of novelty in the natural world are the self-creative centers of experiencing which are the final real things. Each center emerges ex nihilo in the sense that it emerges from him, the creative source, by virtue of yang, the creative act...Becoming-Itself...Nameless Tao, is the reciprocal interfusion of finite centers of experience. The Taoist source of creativity is the non-being aspect of tao, from non-being to being. Neville, who is interested in creation ex nihilo in the Western sense, interprets creation ex nihilo to be basically, male-like or yang, if it is to be considered from the ontological point of view.

Considered cosmologically,
The yin elements of feeling the past, and the yang elements of creating a new being from them, are strictly correlative. 10

The wu-wei type of attaining their ends (without emphasizing the means, technē) is non-instrumental, intrinsic fe operating within contexts of non-striving for goals, since most things complete themselves, so-of-itself, without Interventions. Here, one should realize the necessity of "holding for a moment," and the main thing is to "let go," "let things be" themselves (ts'ai yü). This is not the Weberian purposive-teleological kind of social actions, which would "construe elements in nature as "successful outcomes of causal sequences" and view their relationship as an "extrinsic" character. Such a construal is in fact tantamount to selecting a "single order of nature," a "cosmos" from the matrix of all possible orders and calling that the "order of nature." 11

An example of "a-causal orderedness" is exemplified by Jung's term of "synchronicity" in three types of contingent, accidental types of phenomenon: (1) the simultaneous coincidence of psychic events with objective process, (2) the coincidence of psychic states of dream or vision with objective events, (3) and an event happening in the future represented by a dream or vision in the present. 12 For the Taoist, the I Ching tradition of divination required no "causal explanation." Instead one is asked to believe the yarrow stalks explain "coincidental phenomena" which provide "meaningful correspondences." 13 Such synchronistic coincidences come from the source of the sum of all possible orders (chaos), which is determined by the matrix out of which all orders come, from the way we like to carve up, or cut out real things, from the "big blooming buzzing confusion" of William James. In reality, discriminations (p'ien) are being made, which are "selective" abstractions from the horizon of tao.

Tao is non-being, Becoming-itself. In Becoming-itself no specific order is discriminated from the complex of orders whose members continually super­vene one upon the other in the rhythmic yin-yang flow of creative process. The Taoist language of the creationist 'no-principle' (wu-ti) determines a context that is itself the sum of all orders (chaos). 14

The Taoist need not refer to causality, because aesthetic experience does not need a causal analysis. Hall goes on to talk about the "teleological" notion of creativity, in the sense that creativity is the aim of life, and it is the "immediate aim of each event as an aesthetic
process." If we take this to mean that it is not a "purposive," teleological enterprise, that it is non-purposive (wu-wei), or in Kant's terms a "disinterested interest" in aesthetic experience, then the termini of our intuitions is the goal realized in the attainment of the "still-point" of tao. One attains the "still-point" effortlessly, without contending over means or ends, or ends attained which are without beginning or finality. Moreover, ch. 8 in Chuang-tzu places emphasis on the poignancy of the fact of transformation:

'Don't interrupt hua ('the change')...What is the great Change-Making (tsao wu che) doing with you and where is it carrying you?...The cosmic powers gives me the body, makes me burdened with living process, reduces the burden by giving me old years and gives me death to make me rest. One who sees life rightly sees death rightly.'

Thus life and death are mutually implicated.

3.3.2: THE SOTERIOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF TAO.

Livia Kahn talks about the "soteriological" function of tao. This gives a salvific and religious dimension to tao. Human beings and the created world become related in a productive and caring process of creation.

Human beings are with tao, tao is within human beings...The workings of tao in the world are such that it wills people toward salvation.

Having accomplished its soteriological mission in the world, tao, then fully embodied in the realized human being, returns to its origins, goes back to emptiness and non-being. And in this reversal,

Being takes non-being as its mother. Non-being takes emptiness as its mother, emptiness takes tao as its mother, and tao has nature as its foundation.

Tao is rich enough to take care of Confucians and Taoists and the "hundred other voices."

The goals can be a Confucian "social" harmony, as well a larger Grand Impartial Harmony.

Whitehead provided an alternative to the notion of creativity using terms of "freedom, transience and novelty." At the same time, a self-creativity is implied among aesthetic events; with as much reflexivity as the Chinese use tzu- for "self," hence self-creativity is tzu-jan, so-of-itself. In Whitehead, self-creativity is interpreted in process categories, such as causa sui and sui generis, "cause of itself" and "unique of its own kind" and not in "substantialist," subject-
predicate logic. The four causes of Aristotle, which begin with the substance-attribute ontology, is an essentialist, categorial logic which is not suitable to explain the process of the Becoming-Itself, tao. It does not need the logos, or an archai, to give it a "rational" explanation. Hun-fun is primordial harmony and is similar to an aesthetic organic whole which comprises all kinds of Potencies which contribute to the contrasts, tensions and variety in unity. These contribute to the Totality, or holistic intuition in a work of art. Neville points to the "incipiency" resident in tao as the expression of ontological creativity.

There are several views of how one can characterize te, Potency, as it operates in different contexts. One approach is through considering te as (a) a "selected perspective" on the whole, with enough elasticity to be extended through Integration to (b) holistic-integrating notions such as the "Uncarved Block," the infant, the larger person (te jen), and water which is undifferentiated enough to be enveloping a host of conditions, similar to the homogeneity of Chaos, or hun-fun. The more te approaches the holistic characteristic of tao, the more each collapses into each other, then forming the compound tao-te. Chuang Tzu also describes te as a "unifying principle":

There is a harmonious order, a regularity, a pattern realized in the process of existence that is empirically evident and which brings a unified perspective on diversity, oneness to plurality.

Alan Chan poses the alternatives offered by Wang Pi in regard to li (principles): that li represents (1) a principle of unity or (2) a principle of causation. In the latter case, tao may be described in terms of a "beginning" and the "mother" or the world. In the former case, Wang Pi describes "One" as identified with wu (also ch'yi, the generative force which is a "unifying" One). No matter how causation is couched, it is in terms of the self-creativity and the creative power (te) of tao, which is of importance as nature develops and maintains itself.

In the Lao Tzu, in ch. X and LI, there are identical lines pointing to the Dark Potency, or the Abstruse Te.

It engenders them (the myriad things), cultivates them, it engenders them, but does not appropriate them; It does things to assist them, but does not claim
that they depend on it; it nourishes them, but does not attempt to control them. This is called the abstruse fe.\textsuperscript{25}

The important thing is not to interfere when things are already running so well by themselves. So that in ch. LVII,

\begin{quote}
Therefore, the Sage states: I remain non-active (wu wei) \& the people are transformed of their own accord... I do not intervene \& the people are prosperous of their own accord.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

These are ways of characterizing wu-wei activities in dealing with the people.

From the standpoint of non-interference with the process of self-transformation (tzu-hua) there are several approaches. Hall, K. M. Wu, Robert Allinson and Livia Kohn have contributed to this discussion:

1. Hall does not emphasize "transformation"; rather, he emphasizes the Uncarved Block, prior to the not-yet-beginning-to-be of anything.

   The Taoist does not stress transforming activity. Action assumes the necessity of control, which interfere with the natural spontaneity of things in themselves... His vision of nature is as if it were an uncarved block, a matrix of possible orders passive to infinite patterning... the artistic created work is unconstrained, uncaused, spontaneous. Creativity is self-creativity.\textsuperscript{27}

   Transformation is self-transformation, tzu-hua. The "holographic" details already contain patterns of emergent, the arising of over-all patternings of insistent particularities.

2. K. M. Wu calls the process wu hue (transformation of things). The first three chapters of Chuang-tzu center on hua (changes): the big fish changes to bird--and ends with the interchange of butterfly and Chuang Chou. The structure of hua is explained in ch. 2, in which one must be aware of such ontological interchange.

   Awareness requires becoming 'dead wood and ashes' in regard to the object self (wo) and to the entanglements with thoughts and worries, knowledge and schemes. Such awareness does not relieve one from change but enables one to come back home in change. One roams in change as one soars high in enjoyment of one's bird's eye view of the world... Soaring and roaming, one become one with all things. To lose (sang) oneself is to be One... Synthesis for Chuang-tzu is expressed in 'all things are one horse,' 'All things are one with me.'\textsuperscript{29}

But before order, we need fen (distinctions) before interchange happens. All distinctions of me and you and our argumentive distinctions (pien) make one aware of the fact that there is nothing
better than harmony (ho) with the Heavenly "whetstone" of equality in distinction (t’ien ni, Heavenly horizon). In surveying all these distinctions (fen) we suddenly realize we have already been engaging ourselves in changes (hue). The Uncarved Block has to be broken into pieces in order for things to begin to interchange, wu-hue.

However, in regard to self-creativity and the matrix of non-being,

Non-doing expresses non-being, and non-being, with being-with beings...Non-being, as expressed expressed in the True Man's non-doing, is the not-yet-beginning of the beginning of things. As long as it is not-yet-beginning, however, it is an incipient power of beings to fulfill themselves; it is the Heavenly chi (entelecheia in things, the Prime mover, Plato's receptacle and Aristotle's hypo-keimenon).29

This incipiency is the ready to begin to act, to put one's %, or natural ability, into action; Heavenly chi is the natural spring for actions in the universe, the incipient of tao.

(3) Allinson instead emphasizes "spiritual transformation," the transformation and awarenesses of understanding changes and transformation. Spiritual transformation is to be contrasted with mystical transformation, since there is no special, secret knowledge which one must learn or to which only a special and select group of initiates is privy. Spiritual transformation is equally available to all and is not dependent upon either the esoteric, special understanding of hidden truths or the special practice of certain exercises, techniques of breathing, or "sitting and forgetting" in meditation.

Spiritual transformation is best likened to a change in one's level of consciousness, in which one undergoes a transforming of one's personality and one's perspective. Mystical transformation is the sense of becoming one with the cosmos, by losing one's identity in some kind of undifferentiated unification with the All. The spiritual is noetic, but it is not intellectual. It is a sudden insight, the 'aha' experience. Hue is translated as 'worldly transformation of things,' but this is metaphorical and derivative from a higher transformation, the spiritual.30

Spiritual transformation is one of the fundamental alternatives to mystical experiences: Allinson would distinguishes spiritual transformation from Lee Yearley's three types of mysticism: (1) the mysticism of "unity" (typical of India), (2) the mysticism of "union" with God, the Western viewpoint, and what Yearley calls an (3) intraworldly mysticism.

Intraworldly mysticism ...focuses intently on the perception that is directly present before you but pass on to another perception when a new perception comes or the old one fades. This 'hold and let go' approach sees life as a
cinema show, a series of passing frames, a kaleidoscope of ever-changing patterns... Unlike other forms of mysticism, no absolute reality is sought. Rather the mystic seeks a way through the world...to help someone to obtain a new viewpoint on normal experience. 

One might conclude that Allinson’s spiritual transformation goes beyond “intraworldly mysticism” because it goes beyond the initial stages of “hold and let go” to a higher level of consciousness. At the same time, one must start from the intra-worldly “hold and let go” in order to go toward achieving the higher transformations of the daemonic in us.

Graham interprets the culminating, consummatory experience of Cook Ting in his concentrated eye-ing of the ox as an “aesthetic” experience.

The daemonic force which condense in him is something like the daimonion of Socrates, not quite personal yet wiser than himself. Even the effortless grace with which Cook Ting carves an ox comes from the daemonic in him... Heaven, as the controlling power has a strong numinous resonance.

And concerning death, Chuang-tzu expects no personal immortality, but is satisfied that in the dissolution of the body, he will remain as the constantly transforming (hau) continuum out of which the body had condensed from the tenuous ch’i, and into which, proceeding out of that assume new forms.

He will not be reincarnated as a person but will still be alive in the living who come after him. In Taoism the most sceptical of philosophies, two things hit rockbottom—that in spontaneity one should prefer the reaction when perfectly mirroring things as objectively they are, and that no viewpoint has privileged status.

All things “return” to their source as constancy of self-transformation. This “return” to the non-being of tao amounts to the “nothingness of the cipher zero” (emptiness), according to the Kuo-Hsiang commentary:

To say that tao produced all things is to say that each and all came of themselves, and to say that all things possess some (quality) which they derived for tao, that is to say that they derive it from themselves... In ch. 6, it is stated that tao is capable of nothing: to say that anything is derived from tao means that it comes of itself... In the last resort it is self-derived and self-transforming.

The important thing is to realize that tao is non-being, but as Graham points out, this non-being (or Being) is such that no Chinese thinker ever conceives of a “Reality” which is “behind the veil of appearance.” The Chinese use the existential verbs yu meaning “there is” and wu
meaning "there is not" and is nominalizable in the form of "what there is" (something) and "what there is not" (nothing); But these terms apply only to concrete things (primarily as shih, "solid," "full," and tenuous, or "empty," hsui). There is no "copula" in the Chinese language that corresponds to "to be," which means both "existence" and "essence" of what something is, in itself.

(4) Livia Kohn is interested in transformation in our language, particularly as the effect of transformation in shifting awareness in the religious texts to the practices, which is of soteriological concern. This means that the understanding one gets working through wu-wei, wu-chih, and wu-yu is a shift in awareness of the daemonic:

The preparation of the mystic novice produces a shift in individual perception and understanding and is paralleled by a transformation of meaning of the very same words. What was called important in our conventional, yu-wei language is now superfluous.

All texts are written in ordinary language that can be read with any kind of mind-set and they are not all equal in value, or contributing to one's soteriological goals. One must remember that the main concern in this case is on tao, which is free from the conventional ways, the yu-wei methods of conventionalizing our knowledge. This concern constitutes the main reason for the wu-chih, non-instrumental knowledge based on wu-wei.

Tao, on the other hand, is free from knowledge (wu-chih) and consists only of ineffable, emptiness and non-being... By examining the words of the scriptures, which are esoteric, you can understand the difference between emptiness and reality. If you do not understand that you will look at it and see no difference. Then knowledge becomes wu-wei knowledge and can be wondrous and subtle, as well as desirable.

Using the metaphor of the mirror, tao is a moving mirror, which is clean and pure and does not gather dust; nor does it store knowledge of the conventional yu-wei, deliberative-reflective kind. Hsun-tzu, a contemporary of Chuang-tzu, would otherwise insist that the heart-mind (hsin) functions mainly to "store" the racial memory. However, Livia Kohn insists that most of the Xishang jing (Western Ascension) presents the mystical meaning of tao in the language of ordinary life by resorting to various images and metaphors, in the same way that the Tao Te Ching does. Wu-wei knowledge (wu chih) are "empty" words since they must evoke the ineffable, emptiness, and non-being aspects of tao.
Every so often nature displays some "sports," some "mutants, or monsters," which are out of the ordinary of the "natural kinds" of things. Allinson points out that the monsters and freaks as shown in Chuang-tzu's anecdotes contributes to our "spiritual transformation." In fact they are narrators who tell us of their plight, but this is a great literary device to change our consciousness, which is the criteria of judging of our "spiritual" transformation. And things do not follow a rigid pattern of "natural kind's" evolution. One can trace the "germs" back to water, pools which generate "spontaneous life":

The seeds of things have mysterious workings...In the water they become Break Vine...Green Peace plants produce leopards and leopards produce horses and horses produce men. (ch. 18, trans. Watson, p. 117)

And in Webbed Toes (ch. 8)

Therefore the truly right person does not fail to maintain his life as destined or natured. Therefore, for him webbed toes are not abnormally joined, and the extra finger is not a superfluous appendage; what is (by nature) long is not too long and what is (by nature) short is not too short. (G 200)

In equalizing of all things, one should expect the unexpected, and should let things be as different as they are unique. It is not the commonalities that give us the classes of things, the essences which can be stated in definitions. A thing is tzu-jan, like hun-tun, who when holes in were bored in him to conform him to a "standard," arranged as a person having a face or countenance is forced to be like us, and hun-tun died. K. M. Wu goes ever further and points out that "Ch'i Wu Lun," the even-ing out of all things, is one long metaphor. One finds in ch. 2, of the Chueng-tzu an ironic chapter full of surprising uses of metaphors. There is not a rational argument for ontological parity of all things here, but rather, their mobility, fluidity of perspectives, and ultimate mystery. Ch. 2 is a good example of "evocative discourse."39

This raises the issue of what tao means as the "One", as a "unity." In this regard, Hansen debunks Shen Tao's absolute view of the Oneness of tao. Oneness becomes the kind of goal that mystical monism aims at, a "one" which is without distinctions and "incommensurate with language" in that It is not capable of shih-fei distinctions.40 This kind of Taoism confuses the issue of whether there is a "single-cosmos" in the Western sense, which also involves us with a metaphysics of "the night in which all cows are black." A controversy arises:
Is it a metaphysics of "unity," an offshoot from the metaphysics of union (with God), or is it as Yearley suggests that Taoism is an "intraworldly mysticism" which does not involve absolute unity, Oneness, etc...

In summary, the emphasis by the above authors on tzu-jen, the spontaneity of things in their self-creativity have their implicates in the ordering beginning from the not-yet-beginning-to-begin-to-be of the Uncarved Block from which the myriad things derive, the source of non-being and its counterpart in perception of the generation of things and its "commensurability" in language. The emphasis of self-transformation is also an implicate of tzu-jen, in the sense of the "uniqueness" (sui generis) of things, not because the things are isolated, individuated independent things, but because they are self-transforming (tzu hua) with other things, inter alia. Hence, K. M. Wu calls this an ultimate kind of "sociality," the interpenetration of all things, man, nature, and earth.
3.4: THE POTENCY OF WU-WEI (NON-INTERFERING ACTION).

Everything in the universe has its own unique ie, an inner dynamism that acts in accordance with ito. These individual excellences (ie, ereth) contribute to a hierarchy of deference patterns, with knowing, acting (willing) and feeling corresponding to the main themes of the Taoists of wu-chih, wu-wei, and wu-yu, respectively. This rubric of wu-terms will be discussed in separate sections below. They will be shown to be mutually reciprocal in their interrelationships and interpenetrating. Deference can be defined in wu-wei terms: one can "forbear" and have the patience not to act out our desires (wu-yu), or our knowledges (wu-chih), and thereby, these "deference patterns" result from the "mutual recognition of the intrinsic excellences (ie) of events in nature."

Wu-chih (knowing), wu-wei (acting), and wu-yu (feeling) are functions which must be taken holistically as an integrated processual whole, and not treated as isolated aspects. Deference means "difference," and also means to "delay," "defer," and to emphasize the "differences" between these functions, as well as their interrelations with each other in the communicative action-reception context. Deferring leads to non-contention, non-coercion, and non-interference with the natural development of Potency (ie) in self-creative activities and self-realizations of human beings and their accordance with their ecological natural settings.

The wu-complexus can be taken to be a counterpart and parallel development by the Taoists of words and deeds, actions and language, as an interrelated phenomenon within the whole philosophical traditions of a "hundred contending voices." Thus, I treat wu-wei in this section with regard to the action side of the wu-complex. In the next section, I treat wu-chih as part of the language side of the words-deeds compound (knowledge-action).

The signifying of wu-wei acts or activities, when compared with yu-wei activities, should not be confused with the conjugations of wu, i.e., if wu is taken to mean "non-being," then any variants of negation should be symmetrical, such as analogizing on non-being: i.e., the non-action (variants: inaction, unaction, without action, lack of action, void of action, etc.). These ways of interpreting wu-wei, as a simple negation are not very illuminating in its application.
When a double positive is involved, such as wei wu-wei (try and act in a non-active way), as found in Lao-tzu's ch. LXIII: Here, he uses wei-wu-wei (line 1) and shih wu-shih (line 2), and the confusion is compounded. For example, Ch'en translates,

He (Lao-tzu) takes 'non-action' as his activity/ He takes 'non-interference' as his affairs.2

W. T. Chan translates:

Act without action/ Do without ado.3

Victor Mair keeps Ch'en's sense:

Act through non-action/ Handle affairs through noninterference.4

But Mair clarifies wu-wei in his glossary:

Wu-wei does not imply absence of action. Rather, it indicates spontaneity and non-interference.5

One concludes that the better translation of wu-wei is (1) non-interfering action. Another sense is what K. M. Wu calls (2) "non-deliberated"6 (non-conscious—perhaps "tacit" skills) actions. Here, non-calculative thinking is opposed to purposive-teleological thinking—yu wei thinking. This does not mean wu-wei acts are simply blind random, chance, or purely coincidental actions. The latter sense goes along with the basic distinction of wu-wei and yu-wei thinking (spontaneity and choice-making deliberations). However, non-interfering and non-deliberated actions are not contraries. They are complementary; they underlie the whole rubric of spontaneity, so-of-itself, letting things go its own way (Geissenheit, tsei yu, hsiao yao yu—free and joyful wandering), and allowing them to develop their inner dynamism without interfering with their inner necessity (pu fe yi) to be on the course, or Way, or riding the wave of tao.

A third way of characterizing wu-wei is to contrast it with (3) non-instrumental or "intrinsic" value. Hall and Ames seem to suggest that yu-wei (instrumental) thinking is to be contrasted with wu-wei (intrinsic, non-instrumental) thinking. Even the Confucian virtues of li, jen, chih, and yi can be construed in an intrinsic sense (non-instrumentally). Confucius talks in wu-wei terms even in his performative-prescriptive formulae to rulers. In summary, wu-wei is non-interfering, non-deliberative, non-purposive or non-instrumental actions.
3.4.1: THE YIN SIDE OF TAOISM.

The wu-attitude is yin, female. Wu-wei is female; she is recessively passive. On the side of communicative receptivity, she will be a paradigm or model for non-contention, non-coercion and non-intervention. In the Jakobson schema of paradigm-syntagm, yin-yang is the major metaphor (vs. metonymy) for the characterization of "binary oppositions," or correlativity:

It is plausible to surmise that correlativity is primarily, though not exclusively, metaphoric (synchronous, spatial, based on similarity) and only secondarily metonymic (diachronic, temporal, based upon linear connections), since connections shaped by temporal linearity more easily give rise to efficient cause explanations.

Graham returns to the discovery of the Lao-tzu B text in the Ma Wang-tui manuscript and sets forth the earliest list of yin-yang binary oppositions:

Whenever sorting out be sure to use the Yin and Yang to make plain the overall scheme. Heaven is Yang, Earth is Yin.

In the West, Foucault returns to esoterism in the 18th Century in the phenomenon of the written work, contrasted with the spoken work, speech. The latter is the female part of language.

At all events, the latter (female) is stripped of all its powers; it is merely the female part of language. Vigenere and Duret tell us, just as its intellect is passive, writing, on the other hand, is the active intellect, the 'male principle' of language. It alone harbours the truth.

In the West, distinctions are made between the "active" and "passive" intellect of Aristotle. The male principle is identified with the "supplement" for the spoken word, according to Derrida. Derrida's analysis of Rousseau's Essay on the Origins of Language emphasizes that writing is a "dangerous supplement" to maternal soft speech:

The supplement that 'cheats' maternal 'nature' operates as writing; and as writing it is dangerous to life...The dangerous supplement...is properly seductive; it leads desire away from the good, path, makes it err far from natural ways, guides it toward its loss or fall and therefore it is a sort of lapse or scandal.

For Rousseau, the origins of language depend on passion and need, and the maternal voice of the mother to the child is the beginnings of speech, supplemented by reason and writing. It is interesting that among contemporary writers on sexism, Julia Kristeva proposes,
the 'semiotic' as a specifically maternal dimension of language, and both
Irigaray and Helene Cixous have always been associated with *écriture féminine*.
Wittig, however, has resisted that movement, claiming that language in its
structure is neither misogynist nor feminist, but an instrument to be deployed for
developed political purposes.  

The female in its maternal (Mother) aspects is what Lao-tzu identifies with *fēi*.

Lao-tzu's use of the metaphor of *fēi* has the gender of "mother," which traces back to
early Chinese religious foundations, and is further based on the metaphor of the "family."  

There are "nurturing" aspects to mothering, besides serving as a generatrix, or matrix for
creation. *Yin-yang* is a family metaphor with close intimate ties of kinship. Its product is the
"pliancy" of the new born babe (ch. X). In *fēi*, *yin-yang* is the paradigm case; it is the only
primary exemplar among the other sets of correlative pairs of active/passive, dark/light, etc.. *Yin*
and *yang*, comprises a whole class of complementary opposites, such as shade and light, rest
and motion, female and male, etc.. These complementary opposites are "symbolic of
universal change and transformation."

*Yin* is always the phase of difference, and *yang* always the phase of identity in
the process of change (*yin*)...Hence *fēi* can be seen as a creative source of
the world of differences of things.  

In the *I Ching*, *yin* is the "receptive" side, whereas *yang* is the "creative" side, but it takes
two to tango in the wandering dance of life.

The Creative knows the great beginnings. The Receptive completes the finished
things...The nature of the creative is movement...The nature of the Receptive Is
repose.  

The Creative is the incipiency of things about to happen from within the matrix of generation, but
it is not-yet-beginning-to-be. And it is significant that *yin* and Eros strive to "complete" the move-
ments toward creativity. Even in the West, the myths of androgynous beginnings is conceived of
as a "Wholeness in which both sexes are conjoined."  

The major metaphor of Lao-tzu is the female as the symbol of *wu-wei* and spontaneity
(*tzu jan*); this has links with the source in non-being (*wu*).

The spirit of the valley never dies...this is called the 'mysterious female'. (ch. VI,
trans. D. C. Lau)
She acts "by not acting," (wu-wei); she is also called the "gateway" to the "abstruse womb." \(^{16}\)

She also represents the "nonassertive, the uncalculating, the nondeliberative, nonpuposive process of generation and growth."\(^ {17}\) These features characterize the wu-wei, non-being aspects of tao.

In this regard, Graham quotes Hsun-tzu, who feels that Lao-tzu is only one-sided, on the female side:

Lao-tzu had some insight into drawing in, none into stretching out.\(^ {18}\)

Also, in the Lu-Shih Ch’un-Ch’iu, "Old Tan valued weakness (yielding)." But it is on the basis of the passive that activity arises, which is the passivity of the female giving rise to the progeny.

In the world’s intercourse the female constantly by stillness conquers the male. It is because she is still that it is proper for her to be below. (ch. LXI, LXXVI)

Here, the female characteristics are retained by the new-born babe, in its pliancy, softness, and flexibility. To revert from adulthood to the new-born babe is to return to the source of "fecundity, the dark, the valley, the female, the gate and root of all things," the non-being, or wu-wei aspects of natural tao.\(^ {19}\)

In action the passivity of the sage is female; in contemplation the suspension of the thinking by which the earth controls the breath and other energizing fluids of the ch’i, allowing them to harmonize by themselves and set the direction of spontaneous motion is rather a return from adulthood to the state of the newborn babe. Reversion is the source of all fecundity, the dark, the valley and the female, the gate and root of all things.\(^ {20}\)

Fung Yu-lan points out that male and female is discussed in Chuang-tzu’s "Tien Hsia" chapter, (ch. 33) referring to Kuan Yin and Lao Tan,

They made weakness and humility their outward expression...They were aware of the masculine, but they maintained the feminine...they were conscious of good repute, but also maintained no repute (wu-wei). To maintain no repute is a way of avoiding real disgrace, and this is the method of the Lao Tzu Book discovered for making life whole and shunning injury.\(^ {21}\)

We must note that "repute," reputation, fame, glory, etc., form an integral part of the "non-spoken" doctrine, for by practicing non-spoken attitudes, one avoids the political traps of seeking, being "ambitious," hankering after wealth, glory or fame. Furthermore, Lao-tzu can be considered to be an adherent of a mother-goddess (Kuan Yin) because of his use of the
"mother" metaphors: the "creator of things" (tsao-wu-che), the creative principle (tsao-hue), and the "true ruler" (chen tsai or chen chun), which is used by Chuang-tzu in ch. 33, "Above he wandered with the Creator." When asked, how do things come into being?

The Taoist answer is they come into being because of wu-wei, for no particular reason, cause, as such, the birth or growth of things (tzu-jen) is simply a natural process. It comes from a "groundless ground."

In the Great Man dialogues, Chuang-tzu discusses how the Great Man is "impartial" and "catholic" in his attitude:

The Great Man joins together the partial to become impartial... he has an appropriator and makes them his own, but he does not cling to one or another. This ability is his Potency to be "comprehensive" and treat everything as having patterns (li) proper to themselves (tzu-jen), having its own context, or ecology, for self-creative development. The Great Man is catholic, and non-partisan and therefore is impartial toward all the myriad things

The Way is not partial to one or another, and so does not have the name of one rather than another, and so does not do one thing rather than another, and in doing nothing there is nothing it does not do (wu-wei).

3.4.2: WU-WEI AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT.

Wu wei is basically a political concept. The ruler rules best who does nothing, who does not contend or interfere with the people in their livelihood. For the Primitivists, this impartiality of tao makes it "a-moral." Morality is useless in ordering society, because it serves whoever wins power; a strong enough thief carries off the whole box. Hence, in political ordering and administration, both Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu would operate with the concept of tsai yu: letting the world be (Gelassenheit). Tsai yu is tzu-jen taken in the political context of a doctrine of laissez faire. People are left alone because Chuang-tzu would consider the stress on social equality (chī wu) and also on the wandering type of "freedom" (tīen fang).

If there could be achieved the complete natural freedom (tīen fang) and lack of imposed restrictions so that 'the people are like wild deer' then one could tolerate the existence of 'rulers like the branches of tall trees' and forget about them. (Lao-tzu, ch. LXXX)...Chuang-tzu said, 'I have heard of letting mankind
alone, but not of governing mankind. Letting alone (ts'ai yu) springs from the heart that otherwise people will pollute their innate nature and set aside their te. When people do not pollute their innate nature and set aside their te, then is there any need to govern mankind? 24

Graham also points out that ch. 18, "Mending Nature" has as its main theme that the people lived in "utmost oneness" (chih-l) and that "during this time things were constantly so-of-themselves (tzu jan) without anyone doing them." This period of "utmost oneness" is also equivalent to the "wordless unity" (non-spoken doctrine), before the "decadence" or devolution of man. 25 And the reference to this wordless unity also sequences itself on the practical arts stemming from instruction through practical demonstration of Shen-nung (agriculture), Fu Hsi (hunting), Yu-ch'ao (building nests in trees to escape wild beasts), Sul-jen (discoverer of fire), etc. 26

The common people have a constant nature; their "natural" capacity, te, which they all alike possess. It is called their natural freedom (t'ien fang), which they felt were without restrictions nor restraints, nor lacked knowledge and wisdom, or were neither contentious nor disorderly.

'The world does not simply need governing; in fact it should not be governed.' And once the principle of equalizing things have been made clear, then to set up a standard, according to one man's notions of right and wrong, which all the masses of the people must either conform or defy, is obviously most unreasonable. 27

Ts'ai yu is an extreme libertarian philosophy. The reasons why ts'ai yu did not develop into a revolutionary democratic movement is the anarchistic voice of protest of both Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, to the extent that they did not have a positive attitude toward institutions, administrative organizations, or other forms of social organizations, sufficient to organize and provide an ideal to the people to fight for.

D. C. Lau says that Ch'ien Mu defines ts'ai yu as "the given freedom that is not unbridled", whereas Graham defines it as freedom from "separating pens." 28 Lau, further, says that "confining pens" appears in the Lu-Shih-Chun-Ch'iu and has the sense of "ridding of one's confinement" (Graham translates this as "Getting Rid of Pens"). 29 Moreover, Graham translates the title of Chuang-tzu's ch. 11, (Ts'ai yu) as "Keep it In Place and in Bounds." 212
However, Graham suggests that *tsai yu* did not possess the Western sense of "individualism" and reverence for democratic "institutions." Even the term "revolution" does not apply to *tsai yu*, since Chuang-tzu holds contempt for "organization, institutions, and systems." For him, "revolutionaries" are those who have lost all "hope" in institutions and their role in government. But in the primitivist's assumptions, *tsai yu* has both a positive and negative restrictive side. "Keeping things in bounds" also means that

*Tsai yu* allow the people to act according to their nature and power but deny them opportunities to over-indulge and be diverted to the wrong objects.

Graham pointedly says that it is not "democracy," that Chinese political philosophy has its own talents for self-government exercised through the "kinship" (nepotism) organization, which is more regarded in Western political theory as "anarchistic" rather than "democratic."

Even the later Kuo-Hsiang Commentary on Chuang-tzu emphasizes the *tsai yu* aspects of *wu-wei* and *yu-wei* activity:

When there is a change of social circumstances, new institutions and morals spontaneously produce themselves (*tsu-jen*). To let them go (*tsai yu*) means to follow the natural and be *wu-wei*, i.e., without action. To oppose them and to keep the old ones that are already out of date is to be artificial and *yu-wei*, i.e., with action.

There is also the recognition that the natural (spontaneous) versus the artificial (contrived, deliberate) is the criterial mark for distinguishing *wu-wei* from *yu-wei* activities.

It is important not to accuse Chuang-tzu of being an "egoist" (*wei wo*), when he says he would rather drag his tail like a turtle in the mud (of the universe) than serve a ruler in office, since the world, the empire, should not be managed, governed *per se*, but should be self-governing (*tsai yu* and *tsu-jen*).

As a social thinker, Chuang-tzu combined a rugged individualism (tramps and vagabonds, and recluses) and nonchalantly vivacious sociality. If one carefully guard oneself, things will of themselves grow vigorous and sturdy to take care of oneself is to care for all things under heaven. To be selfish in this manner, to be self-ish is to be naturally non-selfish. Therefore he would rather drag his tail in the mud like a turtle than be embalmed in the temple.

A true ruler cares more for himself than for the management of the world. In short, self-govern-
ment leads to the world governing itself, and this is the best government there is. This is the utopian society of Chuang-tzu.

The ideal government of antiquity is preferable to absolutism and to an authoritarian feudal system. It is better to abolish the present government and return to the Utopia of the original past. Anarchism is preferable to Absolutism. But there are two kinds of Chinese anarchism: (1) the Confucian ideal of society is one that is ruled not by force, or coercion (hsing, punishment) but by li, or ceremony within a hierarchical system (hierarchical anarchism—an oxymoron).

The ceremonial acts which are perfectly voluntary for all participants include the issuing and obeying of a properly ritualized command of a ruler to minister. And (2) Lao-tzu's art of government, from the viewpoint of the ruler, is the Shen-nung ideal. The ruler is a teacher of agriculture to a simple hearted people who do not hanker after "goods difficult to obtain." But if Shen-nung is thought of as an Emperor, with people as his fiefs and servants, then the sageliness of Shen-nung did not achieve the maintenance of the order which his wisdom alone should influence. It is not anarchistic enough, for it is a "paternalistic" anarchism. What is held in common between (1) and (2) is the ideal that "wisdom" of the sage-ruler will influence the governed in such a fashion, charismatically, that all virtues will be secondary, when viewed from the "enlightenment" of the ruler and sage. Furthermore, as Graham points out in the context of the Hsui-nan-tzu,

Shen-nung did not, like a Taoist sage, rule by the wordless influence of his Virtue (fa), his teaching consisted of specific injunctions which his subjects voluntarily obeyed ... He did issue fa 'laws' in the broad sense of models or standards, as in the 'Law of Shen-nung'... he also issued a corresponding 'Prohibition of Shen-nung.'

Shen-nung is an administrator (cheng) as well as a law-giver.

3.4.3: WANG PI'S COMMENTARY ON TAO

Wang Pi wants to establish the relation between wu-wei with non-being: "The foundation of being lies in nonbeing" (Lao Tzu, ch. XI). "Reversal is the movement of tao." The way of the sage is to practice wu-wei: As Lao-tzu says, "The way never acts." Wang Pi says, "This
means to follow what is naturally so (tsu-jen)” (ch. XXXVII). The metaphor is used of returning to the root/branches, which is tao as the source (the mother) of creation.

The sage’s first step is to return to the ‘root.’ The ideal ruler realizes the importance of ‘honoring the root and putting to rest the branches’ (ch. L.VII). …The people must be supported, and that is one of the meaning of ‘putting to rest the branches.’

Wu-wei is “honoring the root.” The sage will lead the people away from falsehood and return to the true. The assumption is that the people will follow the example of the sage as a matter of course. But they will hardly know that the sage is governing at all (wu wei). In one of the Taoist Tales, Raymond Van Over states the question put to the Nameless Man, “What would be done in order to carry on the government of the world?”

Let your mind find its enjoyment in pure simplicity; blend yourself with the primary ether (ch’i); In Idle Indifference: allow all things to take their natural course; admit no personal or self consideration; do this and the world will be governed.

The importance of Wang Pi’s interpretation of the basic terms of tsu-jen and wu wei is to point out two things, that “what cannot be designated” is also “ultimate” and, on the practical level, tsu-jen characterizes the way of the sage himself. When applied to tao, tsu-jen does not suggest anything specific, X as “suchness” would be just as appropriate. Wang Pi simply indicates that tao is not tied to any “specific mode of operation.” But again,

The concept of tsu-jen is applicable to the world of nature also, for it is perceived to be ‘modeled’ on the Way. In other words tsu-jen serves to capture the sense of an inherent order in a Taoist universe. Wang Pi says, ‘Heaven and earth abide by tsu-jen. Without their doing or making anything, the ten thousand things themselves govern one another and put their affairs in order.”

It is at this crucial juncture that tsu-jen is given some kind of “causal” interpretation: using the concept of yin (shih), which K. M. Wu also pointed out as “following” upon the course of tao. This “following” also has another sense, using shun, which also means to “follow upon.” But this is not a “causal” explanation. Alan Chan says,

The common word shun, which suggests the sense of flowing along with the current, is sometimes used by Wang Pi. But the word that Wang uses most often in this context is yin. In addition to the primary meaning of ‘to follow,’ yin also has a cognitive dimension, which the word shun does not have. As noun, yin means reason or cause, and their meaning is carried over to the verbal...
usage. To follow tzu-jan involves a way of knowing and being; it is a realization of tzu-jan. 41

Part of our understanding of wu-wei, of following what is happening in natural events, is the cognizance of fan, reversal, and the inter-dependence of evaluative dichotomies which we also see in Lao-tzu: in the Tao Te Ching, the evaluative dichotomies are beautiful/ugly, good/bad, high/low, long/short, front/back. So, it is important to keep regarding our evaluative categories as reliable, adequate, and constant guides for action (wu-wei).42

Everyone understands that which makes 'beauty' beautiful. And thus the concept of ugliness arises... Therefore the Sage undertakes affairs of 'non-action' and disseminates the 'non-spoken' teachings. (Ch III)

In short, wu-wei thinking involves the realization that the relativization of one's perspective makes most standards that we set become irrelevant, inconstant, and not a worthy guide for our actions, whether they be ordinary or political actions. When a Confucian says shih, the Mohist says fei. We have relativity of standards of behavior, which is the inconstancy of yu-wei thinking that Chuang-tzu pointedly used to show the bankruptcy of yu-wei thinking. The relativity of standards makes it difficult to consider them "constant" guides for action.

Since we have emphasized the "ritualistic" aspect in Confucianism, any tendency toward a "rigidity" toward formal ritualism is to be balanced off by the Taoist call for the spontaneity, flexibility, fluidity, "naturalness" of the new-born babe. We may call this reversion to natural spontaneity the return to the "innocence," purity, and incipiency of the new-born babe. It is wu-li (non-ritualizing) in counterbalance with the yu-wei, Confucian tendency to "ritualize," whereas the Taoist takes the conventional as anti-natural. Rituals are wei, a conscious, deliberated pursuit for conventionalizing the web of relations in society, which for the Taoist is a counter-tzu-jan, or wu-wei. Even when the Taoist have rituals for "cosmic renewal," it is the return to the beginnings of the beginning-to-be of Hun-tun.

Chuang-tzu takes this relativity of opposites to its extreme positions in the use of indexicals, this/that, pi/ shih, shih-fei, etc., in order to provide perspectives for these paradigmatic opposites.
In Chinese, the *pi/shih* indexical demonstratives is used by Chuang-tzu to show that the functions of all discriminations, evaluations, classifications, are relative to some 'changeable' context of judgment. These indexical pronouns *shih*/this and *pi*/that are "born together". But they are equivocal or ambiguous when *shih* is translated as either 'this' or 'right', and *pi* as either 'that' or 'wrong.' Hence, these indexicals have different referential values.  

Graham indicates that *pi* is a demonstrative, while *shih* is a "resumptive," which resumes a contrast of what went on before (*shih* is resumptive in that it means "the aforesaid, the one in question"); whereas *pi/shih* is another set of contrasts of demonstratives:  

*Pi* ...which contrasts with *shih* ('the one in question/ the other one'), with *ts'yu* ('the one here/ the one there') and with the personal pronouns (I, you/ he).  

Hansen's argument is that the reference of language is not fixed. Chuang-tzu extends this argument about indexicals to claim that all dichotomies of language behave in the same way. This extension equivocates on different meaning of *shih*. *Shih* is (1) an indexical "this" and (2) a generalized judgment "right," or "correct." Chuang-tzu thus trades ambiguity, and equivocates by jumping from the perspectival references of "this" and "that" to the conventional judgment of *shih-fei*. Graham provides a historical account of *shih-fei* based on the early Confucian-Mo-tzu controversy over absolutes in regard to universal love, destiny, and music, which lead to two alternatives: *shih-fei* can be used either  

(A) of a thing which 'is-this' (an ox, a horse) or 'is-not', or (B) of an assertion... which 'is-this' is the *right* alternative) or 'is-not'....It is the latter use of *shih* and *fei* (translated by 'right' and 'wrong') which concerns philosophers.  

At the same time, Graham emphasizes that Chuang-tzu discredits all *pien* (arguing out of alternatives) because *pien* is drawing "distinctions" too tightly, inflexibly, and fixing the alternatives such that when the distinctions are pushed too far, they end up as paradoxes. For example, note Hu Shih's observation that at the moment of death a thing is simultaneously "alive" and "dead." In this case, Chuang-tzu is  

criticizing the distinguishing of fixed alternatives, 'this' for what fits one's naming and 'that' for all outside its scope (ox and non-ox, this and that).  

And Chuang-tzu uses this distinction as the pivotal point for his poetic use of language, or "goblet" rationality.
As soon as I lay down a distinction between waking and dreaming, it is impossible to know whether I am awake or dreaming. The kind of language Chuang-tzu approves is that which spontaneously shifts viewpoints, makes only fluid distinctions, does not tie words to fixed meanings, guides in a direction without committing to any one statement, discourse which he compares to a type of vessel designed to tip over if filled to the brim—that language, poetic rather than logical in which he himself writes.48

Hansen, on the other hand, would trace political anarchism to linguistic anarchism. The thesis of primitivism judges only that pre-linguistic level of behavior is natural and acceptable. Hansen claims this as part of the "anti-language" attitude of Lao-tzu; However, Hansen overstates the case when he goes as far as to say that Lao-tzu "abandons language," since (1) language is society's way of teaching us to "discriminate" in rigid socially approved ways and (2) language guides our conduct along conventional lines and dampens down our spontaneities (tzu-jan).49 The most Hansen can claim is that language does not just do (1) and (2). Even Lao-tzu recognizes with Chuang-tzu the limitations of our language when we try to use it evocatively and metaphorically to adumbrate the mysterious (miao), ineffable, unutterable features of tao.

Graham indicates that Chuang-tzu uses "this" as that which "deems" (wei shih) as contrasted with his use of "this," "according to what one goes by" (yin shih). In the former case, to "deem" is to make fixed, rigid distinctions, whereas yin shih is to make "fluid" distinctions varying with circumstances. Errors will arise when we make too rigid distinctions.50 Flexibility, fluidity, and originality are close to Whitehead's criteria of creativity as transience, freedom and novelty.51 Chuang-tzu regards

wei as either contriving-making knowledge, as we make firewood, or contriving a 'good' and a 'bad,' for oneself. Such wei implies conscious pursuit, a 'following after knowledge.'52

In ch. LXXVII, of the Tao Te Ching, Lao-tzu uses the metaphor of the stretching of a bow, and the compensations one makes to its pulls and pressures, augmentation of the deficient, or reducing of the excessive. Graham comments:

Lao-tzu is making the point that man always strives to enlarge A at the expense of B, fighting the natural course of things in nature which 'reverts to B,' and so balances A and B.53

This is that "weighing" (chuan) of the probability of "reversal," that counterweights, or balances of
the mutual reciprocity of things, of being able to predict just about when something is going to be risky, perilous, or unsuccessfully and politically unsound. Also, in ch. V, Lao-tzu sees the natural course of things to be "un-jen, cruel, ruthless," treating everything which rises and passes away as like the straw dogs, used for sacrifice and thrown away afterwards and trampled. This reversibility becomes the hinge, pivot, socket of the Way in Chuang-tzu, where opposites swing endlessly between each other, and balances the stretch of the bow.

Chuang-tzu asks about a debate. If a third party is brought in to settle the debate, there is now a third perspective. Only the man of gnosis can truly adapt to the myriad situations of life without a vested interest in preconceptions and "partiality," "bias," etc. since he has no need for self-assertion, dominance and control. By "adapting" to a specific situation "temporarily," he does not mean to "control" but only to "get by." This is again similar to "hold and let go" of our perceptions. For Chuang-tzu's true man (chen jen) has no need to control anything.

The notion of a sage or of the political order as a 'power' for 'correction' presupposes the whole notion of fixed views on 'right and wrong.' Chuang-tzu takes for granted the unredeemed state of the political.

The effect of the sage becoming entangled in government and power responsibilities—and yet maintaining his full inner detachment is impossible.

In a world of "little understanding" in which most men live, evil rulers are as "natural" as Confucian moralists, whose moral suasion of rulers makes them just as involved and embroiled in political and moral affairs, both performatively and prescriptively.

Chuang-tzu disclaims the view that there is an absolute, heavenly, or natural 'giver' of the content of any particular system of prescriptive discourse and turns on the question whether the distinctions in such discourse and the shih-fei judgments based on them might reflect some natural order of things.

The Confucian wu-wei depends on ceasing to aim at something "deliberately." Hence, wu-wei for Confucius would emphasize the "intrinsic" aspects of the values of virtues, li, yi, jen and chih, rather than their instrumental values. In political terms, the ruler must treat the people not as instruments or pawns, but as open "vessels" or ends which are intrinsically willing to receive "governance." But generally, it is the ruler who does nothing; the administrative ministers do the dirty (yu-wei) work.

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It is the multitude of metaphors and images used by the Taoist which speaks through
indirection about the "ineffable" tao as empty, void, does nothing, and is quiescent. In Lao-tzu:
It is Mother, water and the big bag (mind as bellows), the infant as greedy and pleasure oriented.
Chuang Tzu uses the sounds of the "piping" of heaven earth and men, the Great Clod, "belching
out breath," and the hollowness of bowl and vessel, as comparable to the emptiness of the
bellows in the Tao Te Ching. The openness of doors and windows, this emptiness make the
wheel and the house useful instruments in daily life, the usefulness of empty space. The
behavior of the sage and the bellows is similar. The good person acts in the world like the
bellows; he never contends with others, his virtue always depends on tao. The mirror is an
image of the purified mind of the sage, which only reflects and never evaluates.

Then the images of the higher levels of consciousness are to be attained by the mystic.
He must have the proper kind of eyes and ears. Comparison can be made with the deaf-mute
who cannot hear the notes plucked on the cosmic lute. The subtle sounds of tao are the
manifestation of the musical harmony of the universe. All existence is sound or at least like
sound. There are the pipings of heaven, earth and man, and the chirping of birds. Another
metaphor is the seed or root of a plant. Shapeless and subtle, it is latent in everything just as
the seed of any given plant contains the entire plant at any time and is never completely out-
grown however high it may shoot (ch. LXIV). The ascension of the mystic through the trans-
f ormation of its very own words and images is Eros' steep climb through the ongoing transfor-
mation of its very own words and images. Foucault has pointed out that "analogy" has both the
feature of "reversibility" and "polyvalency" which is why there is such a wide applicability of root
images.

The metaphors for wu-wei are to get rid of the attitude of "much ado about nothing," to
be "everywhere at home, 'fit and comfortable' in the flow of things", etc. Graham points to
Chuang-tzu's ch. 13, "The Way of Heaven," where water is used as the mirror of reflecting the
wu-wei character of existence: When water is still, its clarity can reflect "the hairs of beard and
eyebrows";

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Emptiness and stillness, calm and indifference, quiescence, Doing Nothing, are the even level (p’ing) of heaven and earth, the utmost reach of the Way and the Power... Doing Nothing, are at the root of the myriad things. Wu wei is a very broad political concept which concerns everything we do or try and act upon. In ordinary affairs, everyone is trying to pursue their own interests, with some regard for others, but in most cases for themselves. Hence, they invent "punishments and rewards" which are the useless kinds of things that the Taoist point out are comparable to the uselessness of useless things (as Chuang-tzu points out the gnarled tree). Going back to the roots, to the non-(wu-) aspects of tao, is to return to the source and matrix of all Becoming-Itself, the resource for wu-wei, the acting by non-Interference.

3.5: THE POTENCY OF WU-CHIH AND THE NON-SPOKEN DOCTRINE

In Cook Ting are shown a peculiar combination of wei (doing) and not knowing (wu-chih). Wei is a kind of selfless concentration that accompanies one's care and concentration. The ideal deed has three characteristics--(1) it is non-conscious, not deliberate (2) it is a staying on with things—the spinal meridian and (3) it is crucial to life. In a word, we are at our best when we follow along with nature. One can then be non-deliberate (spontaneous). Yuan tu means to feel our ways through the invisible vital spinal artery of the energy (ch’i) that pervades the inner self and the entire cosmos. In a typical sense, Polanyi refers to the "subsidiary awareness" accompanying "tacit knowledge"; Cook Ting concentration focuses so intently that he forgets the "background" items in detail, but he sees the ox as a whole, in all its orifices, joints, and hollows, the tao of the ox. His te is on and rides the meridian (spinal column) of tao.

It is this immersion in the "whole" which is typical of the "mirroring" of the sage in which one sees every hair of one's beard in detail, if one is still (the still-point of tao).

If water is still, its clarity lights up (ming) the hairs of beard and eyebrows, ... If mere water clarifies when it is still, how much more the stillness of the quintessential-and-daimonic, the heart of the sage... At rest he empties, emptying he is filled, and what fills him sorts itself out. Emptying he is still, In stillness he is moved, and when he moves he succeeds (wu wei).

Thence, the sage is the craftsman ideal of Cook Ting.
3.5.1: WU-CHIH AND WU-YEN (NON-SPOKEN DOCTRINE).

But when one asks the craftsman-butcher, how he knows, he says, "I don't know, I just do it, but I cannot 'explain' it to you." This accords with Chuang-tzu's linguistic skepticism, that one cannot say for sure how one can use words to detail operation. Hence, it becomes the non-spoken doctrine which is an important ingredient of wu-chih. It is the operation of Potency, te, and what we cannot say about the te in its development and operative efficacy. Similarly, Whitehead's basic "causal efficacy" cannot be stated in propositional form, but only as feeling, as "prehensions," the feeling of feelings.

The normal sense of knowledge is to follow out a learned system of naming and construing how we use our language in evaluating (shih-fei) and guiding our behavior. Learning a language from childhood is the beginning of some sort of "social control," in which the child is enculturated unconsciously. The child "knows" how to shih-fei the distinctions through the use of language, and language allows the child to know and do what "language allows them to do," because distinctions made in language causes attitude changes in the child. But,

No objective truths exist to which one's language can correspond; what exist are those ways in which particular groups use a language to divide up the world.

Hence, there is no correspondence between our words and the things of the world (ming-shih). The non-spoken doctrine tries to undermine the referentiality of the School of Names by discarding knowledge which is based on a simple relationship between what one says and then speaking about things out there (the Realist viewpoint).

The paradigm case of wu-chih is the "non-spoken" doctrine as it applies to "political commands," especially in Lao-tzu's Tao Te Ching:

The non-spoken doctrine denotes a 'political' command and not just to yen, as 'spoken language' ... 'Those who are wise do not dispense political decrees (to the people), while those who dispense political decrees are not wise.' (ch. LVI)

(Other references to the non-spoken doctrine are: ch. II, XVII, XXIII). In ch. II, the term non-spoken describes an "unissued and yet prevailing command," a tacit "approval" or "unwritten code" of some prescription or imperative. Non-spoken teachings are teachings of nonformal
precepts. In ch. XXVII, "one who is adept at speech and adept at travel" refers to someone who
is adept at disseminating the "unspoken teachings" and administering a "non-active" (wu-wej)
government.

Thus, we know that 'no-action' has the advantage. The unspoken teachings, the
advantages of 'non-(interfering) action'—I shall consider this the parent of my
teachings. (ch. XLIII)5

"Parent of my teachings" means the "root of my teachings." Hence, non-interfering action (wu-
wei) and the non-spoken teachings (wu-chih) go hand in hand as root metaphors. In fact, since
the "weak and soft" subdue the "strong and brittle" (active government), then the basic teachings
(the "non-spoken teaching" and "non-interfering action") are manifestation of the weak and soft,
and as such will prevail to set up proper order in the nation, since it will conquer the strong and
stiff (inflexible).

In Chuang-tzu, ch. 22, "Knowledge Roams North," the Yellow Emperor said:

'The knower does not say, the sayer does not know, so the sage conducts a
wordless teaching.' 6

This non-spoken teaching is something one does not plan for, since that would be yu-wei, instru-
mental thinking, nor does one deliberate, calculate, choose and make decisions; It should be
spontaneous, immediate intuitive knowledge, not propositional chains of reasonings.

'Don't ponder, don't plan, only then will you know the Way. Settle on nothing, work at nothing, only then will you be firm in the Way. Follow no course, take no guide, only then will you grasp the way.' 7

As an extreme viewpoint, the non-spoken teachings may involve doing away with
language entirely, which is a bit difficult to imagine, since Chuang-tzu says, "words do not
simply say nothing, they do say something," and we can "fix" or determine meanings in
language, which may be referential in some cases, illocutionary locutions in others, and
prescriptive or performative In the main. The fai of the Taoist is not the moral fai of the
Confucian, which is prescriptive (shih-fei) language, hence a linguistic fai. And since
conventional language is constantly changing, there is no "constant," absolute, guide to behavior
in all circumstances and times. 8

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Since, there is nothing ultimate or "constant" in our use of language within our social practices, then Lao-tzu's insight, in ch. 1, is that tao is not constant, because it is not utterable and "commensurable" in language. No tao is constant because no name is constant, since names are conventional, in most cases, arbitrary, and subject to prescriptions which color linguistifications in the construction of language. Language grows and proliferates, disseminates with a life of its own, not in a "value-free" context. But mainly, tao is not a name, but because one conventionally wants to give it a name, one should call it the "Great."

Tao does not call itself tao, tao is absolutely silent. We must speak, but any description we come up with would be false. Any description involves the subject/object dichotomy, so anything we say about tao must be false.9

In ch. XXV, Lao-tzu also says,

The yin and yang are the great in force. Tao is great in both. We merely give it the name 'Great' because of its greatness. But with a given name (tao) it should not be compared with the names for other things...For that would be far off the mark.10

In regard to this ascription of "names," K. M. Wu suggests that "non-being" (tao) is a "byname" or a "given name" (a temporary place holder); in fact, non-being is a mere "evocative cipher," an "ironic metaphor," which does not refer to a thing, entity, or designate a definite characteristic of things.

In speaking "about" tao, it is a necessary to use wu-wei, wu-chih words, "empty words" (Allinson) which are not loaded down with the usual connotations or usages, which distort what we are trying to say in a univocal manner. "Empty words" are those which are poetic, evocative, non-discursive, holistic intuitions; they are like the "goblet" words that Chuang-tzu wants as wu-wei type words, freshly minted to accord with the "hold and let go" of our perceptions of natural events. Eventually, words are done away with altogether. "The fish trap exists because of the fish, words exist because of intentions (meanings); once you've gotten the intention, you can forget the words." (ch. 26).

The Tao Te Ching says: "Who knows does not speak, who speak does not know." (ch. LVI).
The achievement of self-transformation, or of fao, is a kind of unity. All speech adds to unity and destroys that unity. Philosophy exists, as it were, after the fact. The only way of not destroying unity altogether is through the use of empty words: it is all right to go on talking about self-transformation and fao so long as we use empty words. Once words have been forgotten, we may use them again. 11

Allinson goes on to compare "empty words" with "mythical" language: "It is not absolutely false, but neither is it absolutely true." 12

Another way to approach "empty words" is to give it new meanings in startlingly new contexts, such as the poetic function of the use of old words with new settings within a creative, poetic genre. As with Nietzsche, old words are like coins worn down and need new minting to purchase new values and significance in the living work of art. That is, we "forget" how the original coin had that metaphor imprinted on it and the shop-worn metaphor is no longer "lively," or relevant any more. Gadamer calls attention to the "poetic language of pure signs":

Words are not simply complexes of sound, but meaning-gestures that point away from themselves as gestures do...each person responds to the poetic word in a unique intuitive fashion that cannot be communicated to others...the function of the poet is a shared saying, a saying that possesses absolute reality simply by virtue of its being said...in this sense, all poetry is mythical, for like myth the evidence we give to it depends upon this saying. 13

Gadamer agrees with Allinson; that is, poetic language tends toward "myth."

3.5.2: GOBLET WORDS AS EVOCATIVE-ALLUSIVE DISCOURSE.

In communication, Chuang-tzu's style is an evocative one, through the use of his parables, anecdotes and poetic language, essentially the use of "goblet" words. The reader and hearer are stimulated to make novel and startling disarming meanings by filling old words with new signs and symbolic meanings. Hence, Chuang-tzu uses speech in an "open-ended" and "indirective" fashion in order to evoke in the hearer the reader's own life forces through the use of stories, parables, anecdotes, etc. For example, in the beginning chapter, there is a legendary myth:

When a description lets the hearer perform, it does not describe at all--'in the northern darkness there exists a very big fish'--here description functions as a parable, is thrown-beside-the-inexpressible. The hearer is provoked (evoked) into journeying and exploring on his own, and creatively discover that 'inexpressible.' 14
Goblet words are polyvalent, not like propositions with univocal, literal meanings. Goblet words have their source from Chaos, the standpoint of non-being:

Heidegger expresses...the typical one-track mind in a being standpoint...
In contrast, the non-being standpoint produces the mind that is flexible, evocative, and often satirical. Non-being is free of serious one-track logic. It can walk two or more tracks at once, using only metaphorical goblet words and stories that carry two or more meanings at once.\(^15\)

Graham uses Jakobson's schema to explain correlative thinking. Jakobson delineated the six factors of communication, which are: addresser, message addressee, context, common code and contact (contiguity). Jakobson correlated these functions in parallel fashion, according to which predominates. In this way he defines the poetic function as the function that puts the accent on the "message for its own sake"

Jakobson takes as basic the interlacing of two fundamental modes in which signs are arranged--selection and combination, (metonymy and metaphor) along two orthogonal axes in place of simple linearity of the spoken chain endorsed by de Saussure--the poetic function is the alternation in the relation between these two axes.\(^16\)

Since Jakobson holds that the message is centered on itself, the poetic function prevails over and dissolves the referential function. Prose also produces this effect once the message begins to exist for itself instead of being crossed by the purpose that carries it towards the context it verbalizes. That is the reason why Jakobson considers the referential function to be "split."

In poetic language, the pairing of sense and the senses tends to produce an object closed in on itself, in contrast to ordinary language, and its thoroughly referential character. In poetic language, the sign is looked \textit{at}, not \textit{through}. In other words, instead of being a medium or route crossed on the way to reality, language itself becomes 'stuff,' like the sculptor's marble. This is close to Jakobson's poetic function which consists essentially in accentuating the message as such at the expense of the referential function. Finally the closure of poetic language allows it to articulate a fictional experience.\(^17\)

Poetic language also presents a secondary "self-reference," within the work of art itself, therefore one may speak of these fictive experiences of the reader as "non-ostensive reference" within the context of the poem. Jakobson is important because his crossing of metonymy and metaphor gives the basis for "correlative thinking," along with his analysis of the "poetic function" which has a fictive base but serves also to avoid some of the problems of
referential thinking. Significantly, the tendency toward "correlative thinking" pushes toward the
direction of poetry.

We see from Derrida as from Chuang-tzu and Lao-tzu that language which
deconstructs oppositions has to take the direction of poetry... Lao-tzu is a poem
which sets out to break the habit of thinking in dichotomies, something/nothing,
male/female, knowledge/ignorance. 18

Lao-tzu teaches three levels of knowledge: (1) conventional knowledge (Confucian-
yu-wei thinking) (2) knowledge of reversibility and (3) skepticism-mysticism, or knowledge that is
no-knowledge, wu-chih. In Chuang-tzu, there is no single ineffable tao, and hence there is no
knowledge of a single ultimate tao (nor a single linguistic tao). 20 The mystical dimensions of
language requires the abandonment of the ordinary types of sensual seeing, hearing, and
knowing, since tao is "invisible, inaudible, and subtle." (Lao-tzu, ch. XIV).

On a higher level, sensual perceptions are quite different from ordinary, everyday
perceptions, since here the viewpoint is more intuitive, more unconscious, more theoretical, and
less dependent on a singular viewpoint. It is sub species aesthetitatis.

When the intention dies and becomes a pure stream of consciousness,
sensual input is turned into a series of floating images and sounds. They may
make sense on a higher and subtler level, but never do they lead to emotions,
desires or ordinary knowledge (hence wu-yu, wu-chih, ...This new level of
understanding leads to a different way of looking at the world, to a redefinition
of words and concepts, to the development of new images, metaphors, and
symbols. 21

The Tao Te Ching considers the higher level of understanding,

The highest kind of person hear of tao, they silently practice it., when the
lowest kind of person hear of tao, they laugh heartily at it (ch. XLI).

When the higher levels of detachment are reached, one is able to respond to the demands
made from without, but one's inner mind remains free from judgments and thoughts.

Conventional knowledge is easily subject to doubt and refuted. Hence, for the Taoist it
lacks value and one should simply "discard (conventional) knowledge." Western analysis
focuses on "propositional knowledge" (knowing-that), whereas the Taoist focuses on practical
knowledge (cum skill, knowing-to or knowing how-to). 22 Knowing-how-to is to use a linguistic
form as part of a behavioral response to some situation. To use a linguistic form is to conform to
social conventions. Knowing names is knowing how to apply them in accordance with these conventions. For the Taoist the correctness of the "skill" is not a "mapping of reality," or the conformity of the skill to conventional practices. In fact, for Lao-tzu such conventional knowledge is only "cleverness," or "glibness." To know, to learn (chih), is to have an acquired or learned skill, to discriminate and divide (and name) shih/stuff in accordance with the system of distinctions in the language (the names), and to have acquired the appropriate desires and attitudes leading to the approved-of actions.

3.5.3: ON THE ROAD TOWARD CONSTASY.

On the higher level of detachment, then, constasy functions to bring to a head the "togetherness, belongingness" of things rather than the incessant division (pient) of discriminations into a chain of distinctions, or differentiation.

Things are not experienced as the 'night when all cows are black.' Things, events, phenomena still exist in themselves. But the sense of their existence promotes an experience of their relatedness (togetherness, belongingness) rather than their distinction.

Constasy is the reaching of the "stillpoint" of tao, the state of the hinge of Chuang-tzu which swings endlessly in and out on its socket. It is when opposites no longer are separate, dichotomized, but are interdependent and interpenetration. This is also

the 'stillpoint' of tao in which therein lies the sense of the sacredness (spirituality) consequent upon the envisioning of all things sub species aeternitatis...A knower who discriminates in order to discover the nature of things, misses that nature. It is no-knowledge (wu-chih), 'theoria,' the experience of constasy, the sense of the reciprocal interfusion of all things, that tells us of nature.

Thetoria is a form of wu-chih, since it is not deliberated yu-wei knowledge, but "holistic intuition."

In order to reach the still-point of tao, one forgets all distinctions. Hence, it is Yen Hui's sitting and forgetting which Chuang-tzu recommends as the method for gaining wu-wei, and as well wu-chih, the higher kind of knowledge which consists in the discarding of knowledge that is no-knowledge. This stillpoint of tao is also the attainment of the hinge, or pivot, of tao, the center where all binary oppositions are annulled, cancelled and merge into each other.
The state of constancy is reached through the exercise of theoria. The relation of theoria (holistic intuition) and wu-chih is achieved by the Taoist through the "discarding of conventional wisdom." In the West, this is to "discard" the dichotomizing of theory and practice, of theoria and theory, and of all sorts of other dichotomies.

The kind of knowledge that results from theoria the Taoist call wu-chih. Wu-chih is, in fact, 'no-knowledge.' It is called no-knowledge in that it is a state which is not that of knowledge; it is not a piece carved out of the total realm. It is a sharedness of the uncarved totality. Such knowledge in the West we call mystical...This insight into the totality is often rather casually associated with ecstatic experience. However, Taoism is a Nature mysticism.

Furthermore, the grounding of our experiences in the theorial attitude is a mode of aesthetic experience, which we call the "enjoyment" phase of experience, or what Dewey calls "consummatory phase of experience," or a "peak experience" by Maslow.

In more practical terms, Lao-tzu's reversibility of political terms makes the Confucians and Mohists "meddlers" in political matters, since their political prescriptions are never constant and become ad hoc advice only. Reversal of "attitudes" of ruler, subjects, ruled, people, punishment, reward, goodness, rightness, propriety, and wisdom allows one to counterpoint and transform in language the reversal of values associated with the linguistification of political theory (wu-chih). Wang Pi comments on "reversibility":

Here lay the fundamental difference between the Confucianists and the Taoists: 'The Yi (I Ching) and Lao-tzu are mutually explanatory. Both books agree that for a thing to reach the highest point of its development is for it to start going in the reverse direction. This is the general law to which transformations conform.'

For Wang Pi, the non-spoken doctrine goes back for justification to the original root of non-being (wu). Emptiness (hsu) and non-being are parts of the original root.

If the Tao cannot be spoken, the 'silence of non-being is the original root of its all.' But silence and speech are not opposites. This interpretation amounts to the use of Laozian ideas in explanation of the Yi (I Ching); it is not true to the original idea of the Yi. The Laozian return is one of return to the root, to the destined condition, and the emphasis here is on nonbeing, whilst the Yi Amplifications the emphasis is on going and coming without end, i.e., on Being.

The Taoist tao may be better thought of as non-linguistic since it is ineffable, indescri-
bable, etc. In ch. 2, (Ch'i Wu Lun), almost every mention of tao is paralleled with a similar claim about language.

By what are tao hidden that there can be chen/real and weifalse? By what is yen/word: language obscured that there can be shih and fei? How can there be conduct without there being a tao/way? How can there be yen/words: language that are pu-k'o/non-assertable? Tao/ways develop as we act, things become so by being weilcalled so. Tao/ways do not have boundaries, yen/words: language does not have norms. 

This parallels the first chapter of the Tao Te Ching: "Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao." But one may remember that the second mention of tao has the sense of "to speak," while the first occurrence mentions tao as the ti (body, or force which structure the universe). To arrive at a mystical gnosis of that energetic-structure (ch'i) of the universe is the achievement of constasy.

Language and its meaning-gestures are only part of the surface of "rippling waves" which causes agitations to the emotions (wu yu) and our conventional attitudes, which we must overcome in order to attain constasy, the fusion of ecstasy and enstasy. To get beneath the waves to the still-point of quiescence of tao is the aim of wu-yu.

Human knowledge can be changed...The adept comes to understand the permanent truth of all and even 'knows the starting point of the primordial source of the world's beginning.' This knowledge, however, is so far beyond sense based forms of cognition that it cannot be expressed in language or even described as a form of knowing in the ordinary sense. Rather, it is a way of beyond-knowing, of 'unknowing' as the texts have it (as meditative thought) .

Like the rippling waves metaphor, life is like a galloping steed. To "hold and let go" in that ambience appears to make it impossible for language to go beyond these limitations, to catch hold and say every bit of information as we experience wave after wave. Hence, the fragility and frailty of our language can only be "redeemed" when we do return to the source of our non-being, tao. It is the ecstasis to the "unknowing," the beyond-conventional-knowing which starts one back to the source of non-being, before there is a not-yet-beginning-to-be-a-beginning.

These words refer to the knowledge of the man at the axis, hinge of tao. Such a man not only has this kind of knowledge...Given a man of this sphere, he has forgotten all distinctions. In his experience there is only the undifferentiable
'one'...he dwells in the undifferentiable one. Because he has to forget distinctions, therefore he needs to discard knowledge: And this is the method which the Taoists employed in aiming at the highest sphere.32

The Confucians are the ones who love to roam "in" the world, while Lieh-tzu prefers to ride the clouds in a "wandering" (yu) and in the enjoyment of being able to fly from his body, in an out-of-body experience.

Chuang-tzu dislikes pien, the arguing out of alternatives (shih-fei), but does not mind the kind of thinking called lun (to "sort out, grade, arrange"), which is used throughout with a favorable sense. The sage needs to sort out the elements of his situation in their interactions and interrelations until he can respond to it in a spontaneous (tzu jan, "so of itself") way. Like Cook Ting, who, when he comes to an especially intricate knot or bone and muscle, pauses until he has assimilated all the information. He then cuts through with a single deft stroke. Cook Ting can respond to very fine tissues and arteries that one would not know how to analyze or describe in detail. But he attains the insight and illumination in which his tacit knowledge is holistically intuitive, so that he can act immediately without fear of doing the wrong thing.

Wu-wei and wu-chih are both intimately related to political behavior. Hansen holds that anarchism and the critical anti-language in Lao-tzu go hand in hand. To begin with there are two major stages: (1) In primitive Taoism judgments are made only on the prelinguistic level as natural (tzu-jan) and acceptable. The primitivist's argument goes as follows,

Names presuppose social conventions for classifying and separating things. Acquiring ming (names) affects our natural inclinations to discriminating behavior. It reshapes our desires in accord with socially-governed performance criteria. Knowledge or wisdom consists in embracing these orthodox word contrasts. Knowledge is, therefore, a species of social constraint on our natural spontaneity.33

It is paradoxical that a conduct-guiding process is internalized and then language used to manage our conduct. Hence to preserve natural behavior, we must reject all conventions. This includes language, including the politicizing of language of society and culture, i.e., rewards and punishment, the locus of authority and power, the cult of ancestor and shang ti, t'ien ming, li or ritual practices, etc.
(2) The critical theory of Lao-tzu is anti-social, anti-conventional and ends in an "anti-language" theory. The latter characterization, on the part of Hansen, is a bit overblown.

Lao-tzu formulates the connection between language and tao most clearly in his theory. Taoist political anarchism follow from linguistic anarchism. When society teaches us its language, it encourages the disposition to discriminate in rigid (and socially approved) ways... Lao-tzu also suggest that natural behavior requires abandoning language...Unlike Mencius, this is a radical step for it requires that we abandon distinctions, desires, and deliberate, concept-guided action.34

The Taoist wu-wei (no deeming) explains in what sense it is non-interfering, non-contending action. Lao-tzu opposes action based on language and names. Mencius and Lao-tzu disagree on how rich and extensive these natural dispositions are. They do agree in championing the guiding of behavior using these dispositions rather than a linguistic tao. Lao-tzu prefers a wordless, or non-spoken (wu-yen) doctrine. The ineffable tao challenges the discursiveness of language, especially when it is considered as shih-fei "guides" to action.

Chuang-tzu, however, did not contrast language with the natural/conventional dichotomy. He is open to how shih or fei can be alternative ways of conventionalizing language in the manner of the Mohist and Confucians. He was open about the perspectives from which one can start making "discriminations" or "distinctions" (pien).

We cannot coherently formulate an account of an absolute standpoint. We cannot define the realist's faith that we should make a single ideal language constant...Pragmatic benefits surely follow from using language as others do...He calls this openness to alternative possibility 'enlightenment.'35

The paradox is seen in the Taoist language, which teaches us to discriminate between natural and conventional behavior. We use shih for natural behavior and fei for conventional behavior.

One of Lao-tzu's theme is that of "discarding of sageliness": As a human virtue, sageliness (chih, wisdom) is inferior to the ideal of non-interfering action (wu wei), the Ideal of tao.

Indeed all virtues are secondary when viewed from the Tao-ist light... He agrees with Lao-tzu that sageliness is an 'ornament' (wen) to be discarded (ch. XIX)36

Wen also means artificial culture; Taoist do not prefer the Confucian sage of sheng jen, since his virtues are inferior to the way of wu-wei and tzu-jen. The Taoists prefer to use their own terms for sages: chen jen, hsien jen, chih jen, etc. Confucian knowledge is instrumental.
(yu wei) knowledge. Wang Pi says,

'If one relies on instrumental knowledge and does not follow the nature of things, one will surely lose the Way.'

Self-knowledge (wu-chih) is said to be above instrumental knowledge (see Lao Tzu ch. XXXIII), for self-knowledge embodies the wisdom of tzu-jen. Furthermore, wisdom and sageliness are human constructs and should be abandoned. A Taoist "sage," however,

'return to the true' as contrasted with wei, the false. Hence, the concept of fan or return based on the true/false opposition is a way of describing the movement of the Way.

3.6: THE POTENCY OF WU-YU: DESIRELESSNESS AND MIND-FASTING

The complex of wu-wei, wu-chih and wu-yu is interrelating and interpenetrating. It can also be tied in with the concept of wu-shen (no self), which I shall deal with in more detail in section 3.8 below. It is the loss of the "personal ego-self," which is referred to by such phrases as "before I was born," or the Buddhist's "original face":

The sage who attains oneness with the Tao returns to this state of primordial purity, or harmless innocence, or selflessness (wu shen).

The self, then, empties itself out (kenosis) and becomes selfless (no-self). It is in Chuang-tzu that the return to tao is the original state of not-yet-begining-to-begin-to-be, or pure incipience. The spiritual adept, who is interested in this return, visualizes and rejects "all that your self or intention might desire (yu)" and envisions complete freedom from all desires, which is the beginning of of the chen jen (sagehood).

The term yu (to seek, to desire, to pursue) appears in many contexts in the Tao Te Ching. Ch. I says:

Some people constantly dwell in 'Non-Being'!Because they seek (yu) to perceive its mysteries!While some constantly dwell in 'Being'!Because they seek (yu) to perceive its boundaries.

Comments: yu (desires) implies perspectivism; Lao Tzu is using the word yu (seek) as an auxiliary verb. "Desires" (yu) is like the English expressions "point of view," "in view of," and "from a certain point of view or standpoint," i.e., "dwelling in the perspective of Being (Non-Being)."

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3.6.1: WU-YU: DESIRELESS DESIRE.

It is in ch. III that Lao-tzu uses wu-yu:

By not displaying that which can be coveted (k'o yu)! One can prevent the people's hearts from becoming agitated (pu luan)...the sage...constantly insures that the people are without erudition (wu-chih) and without desires (wu-yu).

Comments: "Erudition" is knowledge of the artificial. Desires are not man's natural desires, but rather those desires which arise from the distortion of nature through contention (cheng), and arbitrarily imposed values. The stress in line 2 is non-contending (pu cheng), which is the prime interpretation of wu-wei:

One can prevent the people from contending one with another. By not considering precious those things difficult to come by (scarce, economic goods).

And particularly in ch. LXIV, "Therefore the Sage desires not to desire/And does not value articles difficult to acquire." Other passages are: ch. XV says that "those who maintain these principles do not seek (yu) self-satisfaction." In ch. XXIX it states, "One who seeks (yu) to govern the world, and exerts himself in attempting to do it."

Ch. X, speaks about "pliancy" which accords with the child. It's advice is, "One should concentrate his vital forces (ch'i) and attain a state of pliancy. But can he assume the bearing of a child?" The comment is that "They are all made to be harmonious and without desires like children," and "when the vital forces are consolidated and a state of pliancy is attained, the mind is in its highest level of tranquility." Hence, pliancy and flexibility, adaptability and comprehensiveness, are ideal qualities for the control, or subduing of our desires. It would seem that natural desires of the child are innocent ones, since the child is not yet able to comprehend "contending" things which adults desire as economic goods, but sometimes the child is also polarized as being "greedy" too.

Lao-tzu's Taoism is another version of the Mencian disagreement with Mo-tzu and Kao-tzu who believed one's motivations were acquired from words: language; Lao-tzu held that desire (like its companion, wei/deliberate action) is generated by names and distinctions, i.e., by learned conventions. Lao-tzu, on the one hand, confronts the Confucians
with the view that conventional attitudes and desires arise from the acquisition of a system of
names and from learning the evaluatively loaded distinctions that are associated with names in
a conventional system of discourse. At the same time, he seems to suggest that abandoning all
names and reverting to "natural" behavior would result in "correct" behavior. Insofar as Lao-tzu
thought right conduct could be achieved without convention and language, his theory—like that of
Mencius—is a kind of innate realism.

For example, wu-yu, in political contexts, point to "favors and disgrace" (ch'ing-ju),
which represent the contingencies and perilousness of the political world. As Wang Pi puts
it, "Desires, however small, give rise to striving and conflict"; hence the theme of desirelessness
is applied to actual political practice. This is the importance of ch. LXIV which says, "Therefore
the Sage desires not to desire, And does not value articles difficult to acquire." Moreover, in
ch. XIII, "Why do we say that favor and disgrace are both sources of anxiety? Because favor is
also a base affair. If one receives it he feels anxious. And if he loses it he feels anxious."
Comment by Wang Pi: "To have favor there must be disgrace; to have glory there must be
disaster; Favor and disgrace are on the same level; glory and disaster are the same." One can
begin to realize the importance of the Tao Te Ching as a "political" document which goes
through a critique of political terminology which linguistify administrative and governmental
activities.

Having no desire is further identified with being 'empty' (hsu). The desire for empti-
ness is the one desire that is exempted from the call to limiting one's desire. To be empty
is a positive way of describing wu-wei because it signifies a mode of being characterized by
tranquility or quietude (ching). For Wang Pi, hsu (empty) and ching are synonymous:

Tranquility and non-acting (wu-wei) are what is meant by 'residence.' If one
forsakes tranquility, acts on impetuous desires, abandons humility and abuses
one's authority, then things will be disturbed and the people will become
perverse.

The sage's ideal of "desirelessness" is emulated by the people and they are then not greedy
and contentious in their dealings with each other. And the sage's practice of hsu and ching
can also be contrasted with yu-wei, instrumental thinking and desiring:
The distortion of original purity of tao arises with the development of yu-wei consciousness and the conceptualization of the world. Once the people come in contact with this classified world, they draw on in thoughts and worries. Continuously accepting one thing and rejecting another, they forever strive for gain and fame, wealth and honor. At this point tao is lost.

Tao may be recovered and the spirit purified by reversing the yu-wei kind of thinking by going back to one's Inner nature, and emptying out our emotions and senses (wu-yu). Different meditation procedures, such as visualization, inner observation, and concentration (enstasy) raise physical and spiritual consciousness to a new level. Tao is recoverable in its wu-wei purity.

Graham likes to think of the spontaneity displayed by Cook Ting as a "craftsman" type of skill, "knack," or operation of "wits." In Chuang-tzu, the numerous examples of craftsman (Wheelwrights, potters, etc.) illustrate that "action starts from spontaneity and Is guided by wisdom," but there is no need to lay down rules, for the Wheelwright said that he could not pass on his skill to his son. In Chuang-tzu, the chen jen adjusts spontaneous Inclination to measure, he reduces wisdom itself to its essence, the dispassionate mirroring of things as they are. The metaphor of the mirror can be traced through early and late strata of Chuang-tzu.

This guidance of mirrored objectivity of "things" is something the craftsman will try as a slogan, "Follow the Way," hold temporarily any stimulus and respond to it, then let go! This kind of concentrated focusing tries to shut out any "emotional disturbances," wu-yu, which will get in the way of his concentration. He needs to have a clear mirror with no interference from the "turbidity of the passions." It is not a purposive-teleological awareness, with fixed goals and trying to find adequate means to an end;

But he has no fixed ends, only fluid goals to which he spontaneously tends, which will accord with the Way to the extent that he is indeed aware of all factors relevant to them. The more aware he is, the more likely he is to attain them.

3.6.2: MIND-FASTING AND LOSS OF SELF.

Mind-fasting is used to get to rest, "evenness" (p'ing), an equilibrium. The sage does not let "agitations" cloud his vision.
He keeps the heart empty and lets the external scene fill it, sort itself out in its own objective relations, and then 'move' him (tung). His heart has the 'evenness' (P'ing) ... the neutrality to all human ends, of the universe itself. Having achieved this mirror-like lucidity, he no longer has to evaluate (morality), even to judge that 'It is good to be still'; it is enough that he does not value anything in the universe above his own clarity of vision ('nothing is sufficient to disturb his heart'). 'When he moves, he succeeds.' His response hits exactly on the Way, the te (Potency).

Sitting and forgetting, mind-fasting, makes one realize that all things are on an "even" plane, an ontological plane of parity. Hence, when Yen Hui is at his culminating stage of sitting and forgetting, Confucius volunteers to join him.

Chuang-tzu is interested in gnostic questions which may reflect his contacts with the School of Names. Can anyone set up an opposition between being and nonbeing? If so can one apply the notion of the opposite to the ineffable? Can there be any temporal priority between the two? And if nonbeing cannot be considered as a separate something, can we really think of the "determinate" and "separate" things as "somethings" apart from "nonbeing"?

To Chuang-tzu the true gnosis required nothing less than to shatter our ordinary understanding of the world about us. i.e., in ch. 2, the trance-like mystic experience of Nan Kuo-tzu—like a withered tree and the mind like dead ashes, or Lao Tan with his 'form and body seem shrunken like a withered tree.' 'I was letting my mind (hsin) wander to the beginning of things.'

And in ch. 21, Yen Hui is advised by Confucius on how to achieve the higher gnosis by "letting his mind fast."

'Unify your will. Don't listen with your mind, but listen with the ch'i: hearing stops with the ears: the mind stops at signs (or concepts?) but ch'i is empty and yet all things depend on it.' tao gathers in emptiness alone. Emptiness is the fasting of the mind. (ch. 3)

According to Heinrich Dumoulin, gnosis is the kind of knowledge which is self-knowledge and includes knowledge of the world and the knowledge of salvation (soteriological). In the Taoist case, the kind of knowledge attained in mind fasting, wu-chih, based on wu-wei (meditative acts) is also based on the model of:

gnosis, 'to know oneself' actually means 'to recognize oneself, to rediscover and regain one's true 'self' which has been obscured by ignorance.'

Only a certain kind of knowledge has "salvific" powers for the attainment of tao (t'i tao).

One can also attain mystical techniques in dealing with skills or crafts, such as Cook.
Ting did. Chuang-tzu has Confucius say, "He keeps his will undivided and concentrates his vital spirits (ch'i)" (ch. 19). We have seen in Lao-tzu's ch. X, above, that the concentration of the spirits is what gives the "floodlike ch'i" its "pliancy" in which it can harmonize all the life forces into a whole viewpoint, or perspective. In that same regard, the term chieh (loosening, unloosening, bond-loosening) is significant for Cook Ting, since his knife loosens the whole ox and in one deft stroke it falls to the ground. The term chieh also means "explanation." To explain is to cut up, carve up into distinctions.

There are four freedoms: (1) maintain our body and life (2) with it we can keep our life whole (3) with it we can nourish those with family ties to us; and (4) with it we can exhaust living out our natural years. This completion of our natural years is the "carving-loosening"—in the completion of our distinctness (fen), of our total self, body and all (peo shen). To cut up the "uncarved block" and form yu-wei instruments (of government) and nourish one's life is to speed up the living out of our natural years ahead of time, instead of longevity based on re-tuning and resonance of the original purity of tao, the Uncarved Block.

Things come into existence as if an ox (niu) were carved (chieh) with a knife (wu; tao) out of darkness (ming, rich confusion, chaos (hun fun)). By this cutting and carving, the Duke of Wen is duke and the Cook Ting is cook mutually distinguished...And the completion of himself by exhausting his years and dying is Lao Tan. Thus he completed himself because he loosened himself from the bond (hsuan chieh—bond loosened). Thus distinction leads to change, and change obtains in distinction.

Graham says "loosening" is "losing selfhood" (liberation from selfhood), so that one comes back home to what has always been "Identical" with everything conscious or unconscious in the universe. Hence, we nourish ourselves by "dwelling In" the cosmic dances that carve and undo these oxen of things. We carve in order to put back together into a holistic intuition of how the parts fits and work together in the whole, a "tallying up" of the world.

Also, since wu-yu indicates "feelings," it is close to how ecstasy is expressed. Feelings, here, is close to Whitehead's general idea that, at bottom, prehensions are feeling of feelings. It is feeling, not as a response to external stimuli, but an internalizing. Hence, en-stasy responds as an inward looking process of subjective dimensions which involves wu-chih and wu-wei.
Wu-yu is *sui generis*, and is neither cause nor effect of conditions beyond itself...In addition to wu-wei and wu-chih, there is a third mode of participation in the processes of nature — wu-yu. Wu-yu is the concept of objectless desire, which is the subjective form of feeling associated with instances of wu-chih and wu-wei. Together the three notions articulate the differences between the notion of creativity, and the correlative concept of power...which in Western thinking suggests the correlative concepts of domination and control.

Wu-yu is best attained by the fasting of the mind that freely flows and responds to the endless changes (*hua*) of the "this" and the "that." A state in which 'this' and 'that' no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted in the socket (of the universe), it responds endlessly. He who quietly dwells in this hinge and this socket is then not an agitated man. The hinge-socket is "empty," hence, the sage should empty out his mind of forms of distractions and keep his heart-mind empty and let in the external stimuli. As perceptions come and go, the emptied heart-mind is able to reflect objectively what is naturally so (*tzu-yan*). This *kenosis*, or emptying out of the self-interested egoistic drives, as well as all *yu-wei* conventionalized knowledge, is that "loosening" of the self from the agitative distractions of the conventionalized world and the letting be of the natural spontaneity that come into one's ken.

Yet when talents, emotions, senses and knowledge are all fasted away, one is simply dead;...that is, become absolutely quiet inside ('dead ashes') and out ('dry wood').

Chuang-tzu disagrees that one becomes "dead." He counsels that one is mistaken about what cannot but do and be, which is usually taken to be the sway of desires and sensory appetites. One's passions and appetites, he explains, are not what one-cannot-help-but-be (*pu te yi*—according to Graham—"cannot do otherwise"). One inadvertently reveals oneself to the discerning observer. One cannot help but do or be oneself in a specific manner, despite one's occasional thinking, feeling, and pursuit of a quite different way of life. Discernment of one's true self and bringing-in-line one's actual self back to one's basic self, is what Chuang-tzu calls mind-fasting. The main aim of mind-fasting is ultimately a release from the bondage of the being-standpoint, *yu-wei* thinking. One can then enter the calm peacefulness of the realm of non-being.

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Michael Saso compares the feo-te compound as the matching of the tally, or talisman.

When a match is made between the interior man and feo through a state of union, there is then peace. Each is one-half of the talisman. However, when there has not yet been a match, there will be disturbances due to the fact of the multiplicity of change and death facing the person. To be "one" with feo, then, is to match up the unity of the heart-mind (hsin) and attain a ch'ang hsin (unmoving constancy of the heart)

It is the unchanging peace and harmony of the heart emptied of desires (for self-glory, aggrandizement, or fame) while living within the world of change, that actually leads to union with feo...It is like the symbol of quiet water. Men can see their images in still water. It is the status of the ch'i (fe, life-breath) which is perfected by harmony with nature's changes,

Green in the spring with youth, red in summer with adulthood, full in harvest and old age, resting in winter and death, eternally reborn with the cycle of nature.

Te is the earthly half of the contract (tally), which needs be in "accord," "resonant" (attuned) with feo.

Harold Roth suggests this "tallying" in the "syncretist" writings, (Chuang-tzu, chs. 11-15). There one finds an interlocking of common terms such as: The Way of Heaven, Non-action, Stillness, and Emptiness. In ch. 15, it is the "finicky notions" of the hermits who hold to the position that "The Way of Heaven is blended with the Power which is in the sage." And in ch. 11, "To be exalted by Doing Nothing (wu-weil) is the Way of Heaven, to be tied by doing something (yu-weil) is the Way of Man." The sovereign or ruler is identified with the Way of Heaven, and his minister is identified with the Way of Man; The ruler can rule without acting, but let his ministers act (yu-weil) for him, and everything will be done of its own accord as well as nothing will be left undone. The shift in syncretist writings is to practicality; in ch. 13,

The Way of Heaven is empty and formless. Empty, then it does not wear out. Formless, then there is nothing that it bumps against...The Power is the lodging of the Way...wu-weil), this we call the 'Way.' To lodge it, this we call the 'Power.' Therefore there is no gap between the Way and Power.

To "lodge" our Potency in the world is to be able to embody it in this world and be aware of the
To "lodge" our Potency in the world is to be able to embody it in this world and be aware of the invisible tao's manifesting itself in this world. If everything tallies out, and one is resonant with tao, there will be peace, and desirelessness will be attained. Man is only one-half of the tally, which gives him the incentive to tally up with the ecology of nature, with Heaven and Earth.

In summary, the syncretist writings combine many quiescent, yin-type concepts. They are all reflective of water as being still, just as the female is still, quiescent, yielding, and receptive of the yang-forces. Chapter 13, "The Way of Heaven," places all these tranquility images together:

Emptiness and stillness, calm and indifference, quiescence, Doing Nothing, (wu-wei) are the even level of heaven and earth, the utmost reach of the Way and the Power (te), therefore emperor, king or sage finds rest in them. At rest he empties, emptying he is filled, and what fills him sorts (jum) itself out. Emptying, he is still, in stillness he is moved, and when he moves he succeeds. (G 259)

The sage, the chen jen, holds temporarily the elements of the world for a moment, empties himself out, and remains still in order to reflect precisely the sensltiveness of phenomenal existence with perfect clarity (ming, illumination). He allows the world to move him, not he the agent, or mover, or interferer with the world, since all things move of themselves (tzu-hue, tzu-jen).
3.7: THE POTENCY OF T'I-SHEN (BODY) AND THE INSIGHT OF COSMIC ORDER.

In this section I deal with t'i as body, especially in its physical aspects as well as its relation to the psychosomatic, the "lived" experiential body as "embodiment" (Merleau-Ponty). In a later section, 3.9, I deal with the "unspoken tao" as not embodiment-able, based on Wang Pi pointing to wu and li (principle, pattern) and considering the ultimacy aspect of tao. I defer till later the metaphysical discussion of wu, li, t'i-yung (substance-function), etc.. T'i is used in this section mainly as "embodiment," with no association or connotation as to the metaphysics or reality of things (substance-function).

Alan Chan says that tao is characterized by Wang Pi in the language of "transcendence," and that means it is sui generis (without dependence on determination or limitations), and cannot be named by language. This insight is crucial to the understanding of Lao-tzu as a whole. Tao is known to us in the sense of its "constancy" (chang) and is manifested in the world, as seen in the plenitude of nature, in the multiplicity of things. On the deeper level, according to Wang Pi, the manifested tao may be understood negatively as wu and positively as li (its "principles," patterns); both are sui generis: each gem stone has its own uniqueness of its own kind of veining, hence is non-classifiable. In ch. I, Tao Te Ching, tao is the underlying "reason," li, or "structure" of the cosmos, so-of-itself (tzu-jen). Due to the inadequacy of language, tao is beyond language and thought. The Way may be understood as wu (non-being), which sets it apart from the domain, or realm of beings. The use of non-being to explain the concept of wu in Wang Pi's commentary is thus justified, if the negativity is properly recognized.

One can contrast Michael Saso's two views of tao, based upon the doctrine of "transcendent duality," which features (1) tao of yu-wei (Tao of Immanence, the microcosm) and (2) the state of "transcendent absolute," the tao of wu-wei. (1) is also given the names of T'ei-chi, or hun-lun (Chaos), which is the first mover of yang (second mover), and yin (third mover) in the generation process. Saso characterizes the causal sequence as follows:

The Tao of Permanence (Tao of Transcendence, Wu-wei chih tao) is the first in a series of generating causes, which in the act of generating is unmoved and unchanged. From the generated state of chaos comes by movement the principle yang, and by quiescence the principle yin.
One needs to obviate the sharp "duality" of transcendence/immanance (wu-wei/yu-wei tao's) and emphasize the mutual reciprocity of "transcendence in Immanence." As with Wang Pi, ultimately tao is wu, Becoming itself and includes Chaos, hun-lun, yin-yang, etc.. This gives the Confucians the availability of a tao of Immanance, the yu-wei chih tao, which is also available to the Taoists. Later, I shall try to correct for this transcendence-in-immanance through Lee Yearley’s discussion of mysticisms of union, unity, and intra-worldly, along with Hall's discussion of ecstasy, enstasy and constasy.

What is also important in Saso's characterization of the Taoist "transcendence" is how one draws a line for separating the Taoist from the Buddhists: The process of generation of the tao into the ten thousand things is called sheng (life, birth, and generation) which is not intended by Buddhist philosophers, since

the real world as empty or illusory, or the identity of consciousness with transcendent mind (Prajna), both possible doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism, are inadmissible to the religious Taoist.

For the Taoist, the states of wu and yu are both "real and both existentially different." Graham states this difference as follows:

But if the immaterial is a Nothing which complements Something, it cannot be isolated; the Immanence of the Tao in the universe is not an accident of Chinese thought; it is inherent in the functions of the words yu and wu... Even Buddhism... puts the main stress on the unreality of phenomena. For Taoists, on the other hand, it is concrete things which exist and are solid or real, the Tao which does not exist and is tenuous or unreal.

Only solids are concrete and real and existent; tao's are unreal and not existents. The world consists of solids and tao's. Wu and yu are complementary of each other. There is no need to go behind the "illusory appearances" to look for a more real noumenal reality, which is a dualistic way of characterizing reals and existents.

Whitehead solves the problem of transcendence-in-Immanence in his Science in the Modern World when he discusses "Abstraction." It is the issue of how Universals relate to Particulars. But the details point to "dependence on (1) determination and (2) limitation." Stated formally,
In the essence of A there stands a *determinateness* as to the relationship of A to other eternal objects, and an *indeterminateness* as to the relationships of A to actual occasions. Since the relationship of A to other eternal objects stand determinately in the essence of A, it follows that they are internal relations... relationships constitutive of A.\(^6\)

And in regard to "selective limitations":

Primarily the spatio-temporal continuum is a locus of relational possibility, selected from the more general realm of systematic relationship. This *limited* locus of relational possibility expresses one limitation of possibility inherent in the general system of the process of realisation.\(^7\)

Hall also points out that in "determination," one had to select out of Chaos, one *tao* among many possible *tao*’s, among the sum of all *tao*’s which are possible. Any *tao* is "limited" to one among the many, pervasive *te*’s, ubiquitous in the world.

3.7.1: WANG PI’S COMMENTARY ON LI (“PRINCIPLES”) AND T’I (EMBODIMENT).

For Wang Pi, the notion of principle (\(lh\)) serves to explain the manifestation of *tao* in nature. Philosophically, *tao*, as "principle", points to the non-duality and creative power of the Way; politically it is paralleled by a system of government led by an enlightened king—a Taoist ruler. However, the idea of "principle" in Wang Pi’s commentary on the *Lao-tzu*, along with the notion of *wu*, lacks the sense of "ontological independence" that is apparent in the later development of the concept in Neo-Confucianism. In this case it is permissible to abandon the standard translation of \(lh\) as "principle" (reason, rational) and to render it by "pattern" or "model" (Graham points out that Chuang-tzu also agrees with this usage), and Wang Pi uses it as a "heuristic" concept, to articulate the way in which *tao* is related to the world, and its implication for the task of self-cultivation as an emphasis on the creative power of *tao*—a principle of "causation," i.e., understanding *tao* as "causal" in being described as the "beginning" and the "mother" of the world.\(^8\) *Tao* is the greatest "nickname" of all designations for what can be expressed. Lao-tzu said,

> Constrained, I would designate it ‘*tao*’; And if forced to assign it a name, I would call it ‘Great.’ (ch. XXV)\(^9\)

Alan Chan wants to retain "principle" to show Wang Pi’s contribution to Neo-Confucianism; though \(lh\), as principle, has all the earmarks of the logocentric/causal/rationalistic Western...
features which can be obviated by "correlative thinking." Perhaps, even li is only "metaphorically" or "analogically" significant when expressed as "principle," "reason," or as "rationality." On the other hand, considered in a "heuristic" sense, Polanyi defines li as "inventive" or involved in the ingenuity in "discovery." Hence, Wang Pi can consider li, as principle, within a logic for discovery. However, the main conclusion arrived at by Wang Pi is that tao-wu-li is not embodi-mentable (li):

Tao is the designation of wu. There is nowhere it does not penetrate; there is nothing which does not follow from it. Metaphorically it is called tao. Quiet and without shape (wu-li), it cannot be made into an image. This is why tao cannot be embodied (li). Thus it can only be intended (chi) and emulated.11

Graham's advice is for us to remember that there will always be a traceable number of "analogies" which will attach to such basic concepts as "principle," "substance," "reason, "natural law," etc., in Western and Chinese culture. Just as analogies attach to chi as "breath" and to li as "veining" in Chinese originary correlative thinking, one can think in terms of "analogy" with the Greek hule and Latin materia as "materials' utilized in making an artifact" and

'matter' has behind it a larger model, of a universe created by God for a purpose, from which the transparently metaphorical 'laws of nature' also derive.12

Even more difficulty will be attached to tracing analogical reasoning about the most funda-mental concepts of "truth" and "being," and "liberty." And most of all this analogical reasoning can be cast within the context of the question of the very idea of a "conceptual scheme" (Davidson) as well as a fundamental speculation about "linguistic relativism."

The important application of li (embodiment) was exemplified when Chuang-tzu said, "Heaven and earth were born (sheng) together with me." In short, tao is "embodied" in me. This is similar to Confucian (and Neo-Confucian) statement, "heaven and earth and all things form one body (li)." Chuang-tzu's unity of self and world has as its purpose to effect a severing of all connections between the world and the self.

For Confucianism took the practice of benevolence toward others to be a central tenet, while Chuang-tzu's doctrines pushed egocentrism to the extreme limit...
between the world and the self. Transcending life, wandering beyond this world, and equalizing things are but ingenious paths to the realization of this objective.  

Here, Hsiao Kung-chuan emphasizes an extreme egocentrism, for Chuang-tzu. One can also make a case for the extreme "sociality" of Chuang-tzu in that his self-renunciation fulfills the true self:  

Cook Ting nourishes himself by disappearing into his thickness knife, dancing through the spaces in an ox. This is a selfless self-ing, a self-forgetting self-fulfillment.  

Fung Yu-lan would emphasize the egolism (wei wo) of Yang Chu finding its way into both the philosophy of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu:  

Lao-tzu's philosophy, then, is that of Yang Chu advanced one step forward; while that of Chuang-tzu is Yang Chu's philosophy pushed yet another step forward.  

Hsiao argues that Chuang-tzu's eliminating of the distinction between the world and the self embodies two principles: (1) not to belabor oneself for the good of the world; that is to say, I will not interfere with others (wu-wei), and (2) that each person should pursue his own predilections; that is to say, others shall not interfere with me (tsai yu). By expanding these principles, asserting that the world and the self should not interfere with or impose upon each other, one is led to the ideal of non-governing (anarchism), and to the political method of letting the world alone (tsai yu, letting the world be, laissez faire). This anarchism is also evident in the last lines of Lao-tzu's ch. XXVIII, in which the sage, when he becomes a head official in government, will not "divide" the Uncarved Block, and hence he will institute the best government which is "no government" as an instrumentality. This is what Chuang-tzu visualizes as the primitive state of no government, or even the need to govern at all. The highest administration of the sage is to return to the Uncarved Block, to an emancipated social solidarity.  

K. M. Wu argues for the "sociality" (broad sense of it) of Mencius who states that "All things are already complete in oneself (himself)." While Chuang-tzu said, "Heaven and earth were born together with me," Chuang-tzu does not require a prior cosmic principle of harmony. Mencius otherwise does presuppose, a pre-established harmony and a "sociality" in a simple
mystical monism. Chuang-tzu's statement is more guarded, because it was preceded by a confession of his ignorance about whether there exists the "true lord" of this cosmic event of co-births of things. Chuang-tzu proposed a radical sociality. Although he states, "all things are one," the one here means each thing in its own ("what is"), "so," tzu-jan, its peculiar, constant, and unique, self-reflexive "so."

Things are 'one' in their respective peculiarities. Everything is one as many, and the same in the fact of their mutual differences. When they are themselves, then they are one in being such. This oneness is the sociality which, far from dissolving individualities, depends upon them to obtain. This is Chuang-tzu's radical sociality that is in nature. It is this "sociality" which is the "unity" or "one-ing" with the world. Whitehead takes the "one," not in the sense of a numerical "1":

The term 'one' does not stand for 'the integral number one,' which is a complex special notion. It stands for the general idea underlying alike the indefinite article 'a or an,' and the definite article 'the,' and the demonstratives 'this or that,' and the relatives 'which or what or how.' It stands for the singularity of an entity.

Teilhard de Chardin asks the basic question of metaphysics and religion as follows: "What is the manifold, and how can one unify it?" One can turn the question around to "What is unity, and how can we show its manifoldness?" Manifoldness may also be thought of in terms of the "chaotic," which has to be synthesized, unified in some kind of whole; whereas one can also posit a putative "whole" which is a "single universe" or "cosmos." Chardin says,

For the East, unity arises from suppression; for me it grows from concentration.

Heinrich Dumoulin interprets this to mean that, "the West--is oriented toward tension and concentration, the East toward release and dissolution." The West is agonal and irruptive (violent), while the East is the "inner" dissolution of the self, which when considered as "suppression" is wu-ju, the "desireless desire," vital for being on the road toward the meditative acts of sitting and forgetting, mind-fasting.

This sociality is also reflected in the "lived body" of Merleau-Ponty. To paraphrase: I have no means of knowing the human body other than that of living it, as a drama played out in it, and losing myself in it.
I am my body, at least wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same time my body is as it were a 'natural' subject, a provisional sketch of my total being. Thus experience of one's own body runs counter to the reflective procedure which detaches subject and object from each other...the body is not an object, and awareness of it is not a thought of it.  

Graham has indicated that both Chuang-tzu and Hsun-tzu hold that it is more than a simple physical body which is involved. It is the daemonic (shen) in Cook Ting, which impels him toward the intuitive thrust of the vital force, which leads the knife on through the ox smoothly. What is this vital thrust (shen)? It has three meanings: (1) That which draws out everything as it is, (tsu-jan), giving birth to things as they are, the elan vital of the universe (2) What shen does to man is his shen, the vitality and spiritousness of man. Lack of human shen in human health leads to unconsciousness or madness. Human shen is the alertness, the luster of the eye, the vitality behind ching (the essence of chi!), or the source of life and chi, the ability to activate (3) the daemonic wonders one can perform when at one with shen is also shen (divine spiritedness), like the Socratic daemon. And it is this affinity of the human shen which seeks to be in correspondence with the cosmic elan vital, which is the Ho-shang Kung's correspondence of the parts of the human body to the elements of the universe.

Like Cook Ting, the discovery of the world is through probings into the depths of ourselves. To reveal or release such depths-of-ourselves which echo the world is tao of the Cook who attained the divinity of his skill in the undoing (releasing) of the ox. Such divine spiritousness have to do with ordinary sensory faculties (sensory seeing--kuan, chien) where the Cook sees nothing but oxen. The intent of seeing (chih) dominates where he no longer sees the whole ox, but merely specific places.

Shen is also joined with yu (desire) a peculiar combination. The pull and urge of the spirit of man is so much at one with him that it can be called 'desire'; it is the appetite of life itself that desires and pulls him as he goes in the ox. He is all knife in the ox, he, the knife, and the ox, all three are at one in the desire of the spirit.

3.7.2: T' I AS THE COSMIC BODY.

Unlike most mystical traditions, in China the physical body (shen), as opposed to the "personal body" or self (chi, the individual's sense of ego-identity), is not the part that has to be
suppressed and overcome. Rather, one's physical so-being is a positive basis for mystical attainments. It is fundamentally part of tao, not only because it is the most natural aspect of human existence, but also because it is a replica of the cosmos, i.e., the Ho-shang Kung holds that the body follows the cosmic rhythm spontaneously. It builds upon the constancy (chang), regularity and synchronicity of changes (hue, transformations) in nature. It is not surprising that the Ho-shang Kung is operating within the philosophy of Tsou Yen's ying-yang School, since Fung Yu-lan traces the Grand Norm, Yüeh Ling (Monthly Commands), Kuan-tzu, and the Lu-shih Ch'un-Ch'iu as all illustrating the homology between man and its correlate in the cosmic rhythms. For example, the Lu-shih Ch'un-Ch'iu's doctrine of the Great Unity (ta-t'ung) correlates man's eyes, ears, nose, etc., with Heaven and Earth:

Heaven, Earth and all things are like the body of one man, and this is what is called the Great Unity (ta-t'ung). The multiplicity of ears, eyes, noses and mouths... this is what is called the Multiplicity of Differences (chung i). 25

The physical body is where mystical practice starts. If there is no physical being, no vessel for the spirit, then there can be no foundation of tao to work with.

To attain perfect oneness, one must first reach perfect health. Only by fulfilling one's life-span and living to an eminent old age can one properly prepare for the higher stages (attunment of physical healthy body with the healthy, ecological cosmic body--Ho-shang Kung doctrine). Nourishing the body on the pure energy of the five directions and meditating on them by means of visualization is one and the same process. 26

The results of the practice directs both the body and mind. Meditational techniques, quietistic, concentrative exercises and ecstatic excursions on the higher and lower heaven, this will lead to the re-interpretation of oneself as a cosmic being. The Ho-shang Kung's commentary identifies the correspondence of man's body (t'î) with the cosmic body (hsing, form). 27 It should not be seen as a simple "correspondence" of man's body to cosmic body in the image of microcosm to macrocosm. It would be just as significant to think of the "cosmomorphic" relationship as a "radial" centering in man's body, centripetally to the rest of the natural phenomena in the world, for the tao of man is central in this relationship. The five-zone model (wu-fu) illustrates this centrality, which is a cosmic extension of man and earth at the center radiating outward.
The five-zone theory defines the relative focus of an 'inner-outer (nei-wei)'
circle...this 'radial' solar system seems pervasive in the Chinese world order.
It is a centripetal order articulated outward from a central axis through patterns
of deference.29

The Shuo-wen defines shen as kung, the (physical husk). The pictogram is a human
torso with two legs. Next, it takes ku as "body" and defines it as li (physical structure). Taoism
contrasts fao with the mind (psyche), which is divided into two aspects: the agents of spirit
and virtues, on the one hand, and the human powers of intellect, emotions, and senses on the
other. Since the Chinese like to visualize things as having a center and concentric circles
emanating from that center, fao is visualized in the center and the mind and its aspects are
arranged concentrically around the nucleus of fao. The physical body is not considered
part of the periphery but, since it represents the image (hsiang) of the entire structure (hsing),
it forms part of the nucleus of fao. All violent emotions and tensions of humanity are linked
to the conscious mind (yu-wei).

Hence the Taoist works toward wu-hsin, or no-mind. Spirit is the unconscious, beyond
the ordinary mind and furthers mystical realization. The mind obstructs it. The attainment
of complete union with emptiness and nonbeing thus leads to a state of no-mind (wu hsin)
defined as the ultimate dissolution of humanly defined thinking and feeling into fao. Many of
the texts agree that one should dissolve the personal body in favor of the more cosmic physical
body (hsing) and that the proper method of doing so is by understanding the way the mind
functions. The mind with its organizing power of knowledge, desires and emotions is the
connecting link between the senses and the personal body or individual identity of the shen.

The thesis of K. M. Wu's Chinese aesthetics characterizes an integrative, holistic
"cosmic attitude" toward all things, the pipings of Heaven, Earth and Man. Hence, it is a musical
"hermeneutics."

The cosmos-breath (ch'i) flows through the painter's brush's beautiful execution
into letters, calligraphy, and paintings, composing the very tapestry (wen) of the
universe.32

Thus, "every human activity is artistic, and every aesthetic act is cosmic." This cosmic attitude is
part and parcel of the li (embodiment) of the universe, and aesthetic activity is the main cosmic

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attitude to make "integral" our lived body and its experiences. It is the embodiment of the fusion of horizons between the Merleau-Ponty's viewpoint of the inner and outer horizons of man and Nature.

Lee Yearley would confirm this cosmic attitude with the athesis in Chuang-tzu's "master image of life." His root metaphor

is esthetic perception and attachment rather than the more normal—and for Confucians more central—master image of the perception of human beings and attachment to them. Relations to human beings imply enduring attachments but esthetic relations do not.

The ti of the universe is an esthetic perception (athesis), something to hold and let go, release them to their transformative destiny, just as Chuang-tzu would mourn for his dead wife, with sorrow and yet with joy by thumping a tub. He reaches reconciliation by releasing her to the transforming natural fluidity of the flow of things.

Chuang-tzu's dreaming of a butterfly is a situation which is so interfused, interdependent, and interchanging that we are uncertain of where we are. This example correspond with the Confucian li-yüeh aesthetic criterion: li, "decorum" and yüeh, "music." The essence of li is "control," and that of yüeh is ho, "harmony." Control restrains, harmony blends. Li holds to a distinct integrity. Yüeh flows in mutual interchange of the whole promoting the many, which pervades our life. It is this twofold life-experience, both Taoist and Confucian, which art reflects. Hansen's analysis of the li-yüeh, ritual-music, emphasizes it as another one of the common heritage between Confucians and Taoists:

Confucius uses li-yüeh 'ritual-music' as a compound term in the Analects. Both are transmitted tao. Both guide performance. We best understand Confucius as using the study of guiding literature to be the study of tao ... These literature forms—music, ritual, poetry—share this. We interpret them in performance. We practice and learn these different tao. We delight in performing them.

Chuang-tzu hears the "music of the universe" as the "resonance, attunement, and tuning or overhearing" of the piping of the heavens, earth and man.

The Potency (te) of music is its evocation of musical overtones and becomes the ambience of the Taoist ecological-atmosphere and is a proper counterpoint to the gravity of the
Confucian rhetoric of "moral suasion":

The Taoist stress a cosmological account of the cyclical process of existence where Te is regarded as categorial; the presencing of a particular. In the Analects, Te would seem to be specifically moral and social in its application; the extent to which through patterns of deference, the influence of the particular take on normative force. Taking away the cosmological, their differences closes significantly.

Just as Chuang-tzu's Umbra and Penumbra converse with each other, Chuang Chou and the butterfly co-dreaming bring out this point. Phenomenon is perceived together to see whether it is in tune or needing re-attunement. Also, in Chinese medicine, the regulation of Yin and Yang forces tune the bodily interior to the exterior, as in T'ai Chi Ch'uan.

These are the broader aspects of the musical hermeneutics. The "sounds" of the world are not chirping of birds only, for they are "wild meanings," and incipient ways to sing the world. T'ai Chi is based on the medical premise that we are born in a "balanced state" and when we are ill, we are simply "out of balance," or out of "harmony" with the Chi forces (Yin-Yang).

K. M. Wu re-interprets statements in Mencius and Chuang-tzu of the mystical "oneness" of Tao in such a way as to get rid of the view of a metaphysical monism. If "constancy" is another way of stating the cosmic harmony which is presumed to be a "quality" of a whole, then an "holistic" attitude must be taken toward all things. Each is in its own (tzu-ji), what it is in itself in its uniqueness ("one-ness"), and at one with itself, appropriately as making one's own. Wu compares Mencius and Chuang-tzu in their own version of this social harmony of man with heaven and earth: (1) Mencius--"All things are already complete in oneself (me)" and (2) Chuang-tzu--"Heaven and earth were born together with me." However, this is preceded by skepticism, stating that he was ignorant about whether there exists the "true Lord" of this "cosmic event of co-births of things." From these premises, Chuang-tzu goes on to talk about the "One," which when coupled with what he says about the One equals two and then three, and
then the ten thousand things. He finishes by saying that we must "let things be as they are," as "tzu-jen. This togetherness of the triad of man, heaven and earth is a fusion of the horizons of the "existentiality" of Dasein bring-in-the-world (t'ien jen ho-i). Tao is not simply One whole, but a "sum of all orders or wholes" and te is "one of the orders" from a particularized perspective.39

Hansen compares skepticism and mysticism and believes that Chuang-tzu does prefer the finality and the ends of mysticism, but rather takes a non-committal attitude of skepticism and not "absolute mysticism," thus asserting the "one-ness" of tao.

Chuang-tzu notes that there is 'an end' to that kind of shih-ing (conventional) and says that when we deal with what comes after that end, we do not know 'what is so of things.' We christen that ignorance of things 'tao.'...The mystical monist's formula, 'all things are one' has no role beyond the skeptic's 'we don't know what is so of things.'40

One-ness of things is either the result of adopting a perspective that treats them as similar, or a result of refusal to adopt any system of discrimination. In Hui Shih's Ten Thesis, there is some tao, some perspective which deems that some bunch of things are alike, and some point of view in which they are different, that is, "the deeming of shih denotes stalks along with pillars, lepers with the beautiful Hsi shih," all unlike and incongruous. While some taos link and deem them one, Chaos is rich enough, one can select out one tao for unification of one among many taos, from the sum of all possible taos.

There is a tao which would generate any desired pattern of shih-ing and fei-ing. Whatever pattern of response one adopts becomes a way--a tao which can be selectively abstracted would fit one among patterns of shih-ing and fei-ing. It is like breaking up hun-tun into different patterns of shih-fei, by the judgments we make.

The artificiality and conventionality of taos and language are underlined by using k'o\permissible. 'If we are k'o\permitting something, then it is k'o\ permissible: 'If things are called such they are such, if not such, then not such.'...A tao is formed from our conduct.41

Hansen is more interested in the linguistic or verbal taos, which includes evaluative shih-fei systems, judgments about values. The Confucian tao is closest to the moral, cultural sensibility; Aesthetic norms are also part of a tao.
3.7.3: INTRA-WORLDLY MYSTICISM

Pure trance states have a very modest place in the Lieh-tzu. The ideal state is not one of withdrawal, but of heightened perceptiveness and responsiveness in an undifferentiated world.

If nothing within you stays rigid, / Outward things will disclose themselves, / moving, be like water, / still, be like a mirror. / Respond like an echo. (CZ, ch. 33).

Unlike many mystical schools, Taoism does not seek an absolute, unique and final illumination different in kind from all other experiences. Its ideal state of enhanced sensitivity, nourished by withdrawal into absolute stillness, is the same in kind as more ordinary and limited sorts of spontaneous dexterity, tacit skills, deftness, etc.

One can combine the three kinds of mysticism of unity, union, and intraworldly mysticism that Lee Yearley sets forth, and correlate them with Hall's distinctions of the mysticisms of ecstasy, enstasy and constasy. The intraworldly view is "hold and let go"—replace old perceptions with new ones, to view an alternation of a fresh viewpoint, which will "allow one to view the world in a new way." It does not simply seek "unification" (one-ness) with a "single" reality, or "union" in or with a higher being. Chaos is a pluriverse, and not a single-cosmos. The advantage of the intra-worldly viewpoint is its emphasis on the focus-field as "part-part" and not "part-whole." In Chuang-tzu, the ascension is from ecstasy to constasy, which is Eros flight to wander in the wild blue yonder seeking the theoria of the completion of the passion of love, while at the same time, Chuang-tzu displays the "ironic side" by playing up Hui Shih's paradoxicals and self-referential inconsistencies. Dilworth points out the difference between Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. The former is dialectical (which results in a higher synthesis) in method, while the latter is "agonistic," which is the paradoxical and self-referentially inconsistent, especially when Chuang-tzu deals with Hui Shih and Kung Sun Lung. But ultimately, the idea of the pivot, or hinge, of tao synthesizes the differences between the paradoxical, or anti-ithetical.
The display in literary metaphorical stories, parables, and anecdotes gives us both sides of *Eros* and *Ironic*. Coupled with this is Chuang-tzu's experience of self-creativity and the Potency to act within the network of relationships established by the "lived body" and its completion in the constasy of non-verbal experiences (*wu-chih*).

Ecstasy involves referring one's experience either beyond or outside one's present self... The intrinsic connection of alienation and ecstasy should be quite obvious. Ecstasy is the experience in another, of meaning and value, which can serve as the basis for thinking, acting, or feeling that freely takes the experience of that other into account. Alienation, on the other hand, is the forced another.45

Alienation involves other-determination (Heidegger calls it the "they-self"). Whereas ecstasy is a "free" and wandering-enjoyment act, much like the "consummatory phase" of aesthetic experience.

The aesthetic experience is the experience of infinite *ellusiveness* which both permits the enjoyment of a thing in itself and simultaneously suggests an infinitely complex world created by the object enjoyed, (work of art). Ecstasy is a deferential act; deference characterizes those situations in which 'principles' qualify acts of self-creativity rather than serve as determining sources of order.46

Ecstasy is accompanied by the en-stasy occasioned by the experiencing of oneself as the locus of excellence (the Potency of one's *fe*). The ultimate conditioning experience is that of constasy --"the sense of all things standing together in a multivalent complex of spontaneous orders." The constatic sense is the mystical vision which serves as the background of the two-fold form of aesthetic experiencing of ecstasy and enstasy. Taoism is a form of Nature mysticism. It is to be contrasted with the Western view of "holiness" as grounded in ecstatic experience, which has an "extrinsic" reference to a creationist God as the Source from beyond our experiences.

We need to emphasize the "complementarity" of ecstasy-enstasy-constasy.

*Ek-stasis* is the experience in and through another. It is the possibility of ek-stasis and its complement en-stasis, the sense of being experienced from within, that allows for the exercise of creativity as opposed to power. Underlying both ecstasy and enstasy in the creative act is the con-static sense. This is the experience at one and the same moment of both the enstatic and ecstatic intuitions of the Totality as individualized in terms of the internal and external references of *wu-chih*, *wu-wei*, and *wu-yu*.47

Livia Kohn correlates the ecstatic and the enstatic. The return to oneness with *tao* is described in two distinct yet interrelated ways. There may be either an ecstatic or an enstatic experience of

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in two distinct yet interrelated ways. There may be either an ecstatic or an enstatic experience of immortality (*sub species aeternitatis*).

The sage may return either in a whirl of ecstatic freedom, liberated from all, or he may find oneness in an ever deepening absorption in Tao, a dark, trance-like merging of consciousness. The ecstatic model tends to emphasize the psychological, over the physical level of reality. Typically they make statements as 'make your mind (no-mind) and go along with the changes,' or 'climb upon the clouds and mists, ride flying dragons and wander beyond the four seas.' (CZ, ch. 33)

These statements are strongly shamanistic: for example, the flight into higher realms, the feeling of an out-of-body consciousness, and the freedom from the limits of this world.

The enstatic model understands Tao or the One as the deep underlying root or source of all changes and transformations. Tao is truly permanent; it is 'being' in its most essential (sense). The underlying ground is stasis—so is the realized state...expressed in terms like 'embrace, preserve, harmonize and recover.' The ultimate state is described in terms of fullness and stability. Intense tranquility and restfulness pervade the adept.

Enstatic imagery emphasizes oneness and merging. It is full of darkness and the shading of light (the shaded light is the *yin* side). It is like the ultimate state to death. It is characterized by innocence and utter simplicity, a state of purity in the sense of originality. These are the ways the *Tao Te Ching* typifies the quietistic withdrawal and the return to simplicity (*p'u*, the uncarved block). It is also typical of "immortality." Stated in terms of the "lived body" of Merleau-Ponty, when we have insight into the bodily surroundings as an enstatic experience of the "sociality" of selves and Nature, we attain the fusion of the inner and outer horizons of interacting perspectives.

3.8: THE POTENCY OF SELF-LOSS: *WU-WO* (*KENOSIS*)

There is a commonality and continuity of the exercise of Potency (*te*) in Confucian and Taoist contexts. The Taoist texts, like their Confucian counterparts, emphasize the overcoming of the ego-self in order to dissolve the boundary between "self" and "other," i.e., Yen-Hui sitting and forgetting. Yen Hui's Potency (*te*) is integrated with and serves to focus what has been construed as "other."
In the Analects, 12/10, Confucius talks about 'accumulating fe,' 'cultivating' it, 'piling it up' and 'extending' it. This accumulation of fe is called ch'ung fe and overcomes muddled judgments and achieves meaning and value in the world. In extending fe, one can also point to the use of ch'eng (integration) used in the Doctrine of the Mean in which the possessor of "sincerity" (ch'eng) does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself, he completes other men and things also. This extension of one's self to other selves is part of his effort for "integrity" (ch'eng). Ch'eng becomes self-integrity, the particular becomes co-extensive with its own particularity in that it overcomes the "other" and accommodates the other into its own field of influence. The completion of others, being-with-others, is that "sociality" of self with others. Self-integrity and self-cultivation are cognate activities. The Taoist's mind-fasting is used as one meditative techniques of "sitting and forgetting" and hence contributes to the "dissolution of the self," just as the Confucians would talk about "self-cultivation" within a larger "sociality." For Chuang-tzu, the technique of sitting and forgetting refers to the "discarding of knowledge" (wu-chih) and "emptying of the mind" so as to become One with tao, to be integral with tao (accord with tao). Discarding of knowledge is to get rid of the need of making "distinctions" (pien) of right and wrong (shih-fei), "this" and "that," etc., and emptying of the mind is also emptying it of the conventional socialized distinctions, so that one dwells only in the "pivot" of the circle of the tao, swinging endlessly in and out.


For Graham, the fasting of the mind is training for the Way as the "refining of the energising fluids," the breath control comes "from deep down in one's heels, rather than from their throats." In short, the deepest breathing is to renounce control of the ch'i, and in so doing the self dissolves. And tao is what accumulates the tenuous which results from deep breathing exercises. This attenuation, or concentrating of ch'i, is the fasting of the heart-mind.

The analogy of a sage to craftsman may help us to understand what it means to dissolve man in Heaven, suspend division, treat everything as one... posing alternatives and following verbal instructions is suspended. 'The greatest pien is unspoken,' the oneness of the Taoist vision is a kind of 'unity in variety' of Western aesthetic.
Deep breathing puts one's ch'i in touch, in tune with other ch'i's, and ultimately with the cosmic ch'i. Self-loss is the dissolution of the perspective of the subjective self, the ego-identity, the wo-self. To lose oneself is to dissolve the standpoint of the subject. It does not mean to abolish the self, since it is the "I" which does the losing. It is the abolition of the fixed subjective standpoint, or a de-centering of the self away from its subjectivity.

Dissolution of fixation in the subject is called the Great Awakening (the solution is through ming, clarity, illumination, enlightenment, or the Great Awakening).

...The stages are dreaming (not awakening), awakening (awakening from not awakening) and the Great Awakening (awakening from awakening) (awakening without awakening), not knowing (ignorance), knowing, knowing that we are not sure (wu-chih, skepticism)...To greatly be awakened is to be awakened from both uncritical dreaming and uncritical awakening. For we may still be dreaming, and we are incapable of checking on it.

The dissolution of a fixed standpoint makes for a relativity, or contingency of natural happenings.

Once we are awakened to the Great Awakening, we can then selflessly "follow the respective yes-es (this, that) of things," "tarry in many ordinaries," and thereby dwell in the pivot of tao and respond endlessly.

Also, with Cook Ting, the "spontaneity" of the knife sliding into the natural places in the ox is chieh, the unloosening and undoing of the ox:

Chieh is the central notion in this story of undoing the ox. Chieh has significance, as 'dissolution': After myriads of generations and we meet one great holy man who understands the dissolution (chieh) of the mystery. (ch. 2)

The mystery is solved by chieh, the act of grabbing the ox by the horn (niu chiao) and using the knife (tao) and separating (fen--eight + knife) and creating borders (chen) out of natural mounds (feng). When borders are created, we have discrimination, distinctions and arguments (pier). It is the beginning-to-be of things, the carving out from the Uncarved Block things, vessels, instruments, governmental institutions, etc. It is the beginning of an Initiation of an "explanation" (chieh), unloosening the various elements and seeing how their carving out fits together, or tallies.

In ch. 2, after confessing that he has lost his self, Mr. Basis explained the situation with an overhearing of various piping. Then he goes into further stories of reciprocity and of a "this"
with a "that," birth with death, and relativity of standards of value and thing interchanges, into and with others. These are not just perspectives but the very subjecthood itself changes. Here there is the relativism of the subject, an existential relativism. One can call it a non-subject. It is no ordinary subject describable as a this and a have-been-born, a Chuang Chou and a butterfly. Non-subject is what (wu-subject) does when there is the losing of its self (wo-self). Here, the wu-subject forgets itself and can claim "no-wo," (wu-wo).7

The various pipings in nature depends on emptiness, the self-emptying (kenosis). To see is to see emptiness (to see silence such as the wind blowing over the empty hollows, the hidden fao, the "darkness"), to see withered wood and dead ashes, to see the very loss of the self. Vision is for the detection of a lack, emptiness and ignorance of the origin of things.

Thus such vision is an audient one, what is commonly called contemplative to meditative vision (theoria). This is when we hear the howling winds--by seeing how things of quiet (chi) and empty hollow (hsu). Such seeing of equality in the emptiness of things is in turn due to the emptying of the self (hsin chai, sang wo). A self emptying leads to hearing of the winds arousing things. Such hearing in turn leads to an audient event of vacuous quietude.8

This is the interactive senses crossing each other in synesthesia.

Who does the piping? To even ask this question we must first lose ourselves and our fixed mind, or standpoint. As we empty out (kenosis) of the body of its desires, wu-yu, so we can "empty-mindedly" listen to the heavenly piping, the audient visions of Nature as it blows though the hollows, rills, and dead logs. We "overhear" and interchange (wu hua) with things, even when Chuang Chou was dreaming, he was not sure of his "self," the interchange of the wo-self with others (the butterfly). Robert Allinson says we should have "empty words" in order to once again talk about fao and use old words bereft of old connotations and poured-in new "goblet" meanings.

The project is to forget (or not operate through) one's conscious mind. One does not therefore become a kind of vegetable; rather one becomes capable of acting spontaneously from one's intuitive or non-evaluative mental center. If one is successful in mental forgetfulness, one can be said to have achieved the state of unity with fao. At one juncture of the text, one is enjoined to forget's one's self in order to achieve entrance into Heaven.10

K. M. Wu also takes up the wu-wo relationship when he interprets chapter 2, "Chi Wu
Tun, of Chuang-Tzu, especially in the activity of "mind-fasting" (hsin-chai) and self-losing (wu sang wo, self losing the self).

If the obtrusive self (wo) is let go of, then the authentic self that has been doing the losing, the self-shed self will appear as the self-that-has-lost-itself, as empty as dry wood and dead ashes. Such wu-self is a catharted self, whose authenticity is certified precisely in its activity of self-catharsis (sang wo).

This also relates to the concept of wu: the "catharted" self is the "un-wo-ing of wu." Hence, "wu-wel" appears in its own act of self-disappearance: it is authenticated by its self-catharsis.

When the object-self (wo) is lost, the catharted subject-self (wu) becomes the authentic self, its own-self (tzu-jan). "Such spontaneity is a catharted one, a home-coming to the self." This wu-self appears of itself as "natural, free, and spontaneous." This loss of self is a "self-emptying" (kenosis) in the vision of seeing things audiently as "quiet," "silent," and empty-hollow" and that all things are equal (Ch'i Wu Lun). It is also the emptying-of-mind so that we can "listen" to the piping of Heaven.

The catharted wu-self is further to be thought of as simply no duality of I-me, but simply an "I." Graham makes this interpretation when the sage sees through all dichotomies, such as the I-me, self-other relations, etc. They are only "about-to-be."

The Taoist sage is unselfish, neither by acting out his nature nor by obeying moral principle, but by seeing through all dichotomies including self and other. ('The utmost man has no self'). It appears... the sage thinks of other people as 'I'. When another man wails too; it is simply that all the way up from that which they depend on to be-about-to-be, he is with him in recognizing him as an 'I'. How would I know what it is I call recognizing as 'I'? This kind of "empathizing" is an ultimate "dissolution" of the self into a no-self. Like the "pivot" or the "hinge" of Chuang-tzu, what is I becomes 'I," and vice-versa. Graham explains this further by saying "as a man I dissolve and let Heaven act through me."

In ch. 15, "Finicky Notions," Chuang-tzu discusses the cultivation of the "daemonic" and "quintessential" energies as a means to reconciliation with death. In death, he transforms with other things. His dying is like going to "rest." He will win his final escape by the philosophical Taoist union with the cosmic process, which is conceived not as a flight beyond life and death, but as "actual" immortality. Yangism says, "preserve one's body; keep life intact, nourish your
certainty of death. In ch. 6, "The Teacher Who is the Ultimate Ancestor," a dying man drags himself to a well to look at his disfigured body and wonders what "the Maker of Things" is turning his body into. Therefore, Chuang-tzu discusses the Way in impersonal terms, and hence treats death without personifying it.

'In losing selfhood I shall remain what at bottom I have always been, identical with all the endlessly transforming phenomena of the universe.'

The liberation of selfhood is seen above all as a triumph over death, a sense of "immortality." One is still self-transforming among all other things.


The mystic adept eventually become fully one with tao in their meditative practices. From the self, the mystic adept recovers the spirit, and from the spirit moves on to the truth of the universe itself. Livia Kohn points out that in the Xisheng jing,

the ascent is described as having moved from the personal to the cosmic body, the adepts proceed to become one with the qu* (human body), with spirit and tao, to ultimately taking up residence in the heavens above. The key to this ascent into the subtler realms of the universe is the initial transformation of the personal into the cosmic body, the attainment of a state without a personal ego-identity, of no-self (wu-shen). (Note: qu* is pin-yin for hu.)

In the ascent, the adept mirrors the flow of existence. However, he seems to have no control over its transformations (tzu-hue). When the adept attains constasy with tao, he completes an attunement with tao. At this moment a new feeling of self emerges, a self no longer limited to the wo-ego of the personal body, he becomes the sage who attain oneness with tao and returns to the state of primordial purity, of harmless innocence, of selflessness. He returns home, to a homecoming, as a cathected self.

Yen Hui's various stages of losing his self by mind-fasting illustrates the self-forgetting until he finally finds his way back home again in the quiescence of tao, the pivot or hinge of tao.

Taoists are not looking for a mystical experience that is connected with our un-Chinese habit of puzzling about ultimate reality. There is nothing behind the waves, rippling surfaces of things. We tend to evaluate the mystical by whether or not we think it provides an additional and superior access to reality independent of sense perception and reason, and treat as incidental any improvements in mental and physical health.
The last steps seem to be from the world of distinctions to the "fluidity" and flexible use of distinctions, in the absolute illumination which may still deserve to be called "mystical." A major criterion is the appraisal of Taoism in the strength of how to "hold fast to oneself by clarity and emptiness." Training of the mind in clarity and emptiness (flexibility, openness) is recognized as an aid to the application of Confucian virtues in government. However, the Taoists wish to discard both the benevolent and the right, and only "trust solely to clarity and emptiness."

Chinese aesthetics and creativity is not only a technique to be mastered but also an articulation of a "deepened subjectivity." This is the main thesis of Hsu Fu-kuan. As an aesthetic theory, it points to the source of inspiration which humanity shares with heaven, earth and the myriad things. Therefore it is a cosmic "attitude." The aims of attainment of a true subjectivity (wu-self, called the "cathected self" by K. M. Wu) depend on the complete transformation of the self by various methods (1) the establishing of the will, (2) the emptying of the mind, (3) the fasting of the heart and (4) the nourishing of the great body (ta-f'; -Mencius).

Deepened subjectivity centers upon the 'great foundation' (ta-pen) of the cosmos. As a result, it harmonizes different forms of life and brings humanity into tune with nature, so that the distinctions between subject/object, self/society, and man/nature are unreal and thus transformable.22

This togetherness of things to each other is the "sociality" side of Taoism. It is Whitehead's "society of societies." It is not just an "egoism" (wei wo), but must be considered a purified self by its interdependence with everything and everyone else.

True subjectivity opens up the privatized ego so that the self can enter into fruitful communication with others. The ultimate joy of this communicability allows us, in Chuang-tzu's phrase, to roam around with the Creator (tsao wu che). Since even the gap between Creator and creature is bridgeable, when human beings create art they participate in the transforming and nourishing process of heaven and earth.22

This roaming around with the tsao wu che, the Creator, gives the chen jen an internal resonance (enstasis) with aesthetic harmony (constasy).

The internal resonance of the vital forces (ch?) is such that the mind, as the most refined and subtle ch? of the human body is constantly in sympathetic accord with the myriad things in nature. The function of affect and response (kan-ying) characterizes nature as a Great Harmony and so informs the mind.23

The mind forms a union with nature by extending itself metonymically. Jakobson's metonymy is
accord with the myriad things in nature. The function of affect and response (kan-ying) characterizes nature as a Great Harmony and so informs the mind. 23

The mind forms a union with nature by extending itself metonymically: Jakobson's metonymy is characterized as being "contiguous." 24 Therefore, there are no ruptures between man and nature.

The creative process is "contiguous" (as in Jakobson), acting in togetherness, thereby establishing an ultimate "sociality" through aesthetic harmony.

The Chinese artist would paint landscapes by the techniques of harmonious blending of inner feelings and outer scenes. It is his process of inner "spiritual" transformation and participation with Nature. It is his understanding of the interflow of things, in their self-creativity (tzu-jan, spontaneity) and their contribution to the internal resonance of his ch'i with the greater body (l'i) of Nature.

Chuang-tzu recommends that we listen with our ch'i rather than with our minds, and we can hear the internal resonance of the vital forces themselves that we listen to the 'music of heaven' (t'ien-lai) as our inner voice. The all-embracing ch'i enables the total transposition of man and nature. As a result the aesthetic delight we experience is but the harmonious blending of inner feelings and outer scenes. 25

The process of returning to nature involves unlearning and forgetting as well as remembering.

For Chuang-tzu the precondition for us to participate in the internal resonance of the vital forces in nature is our own inner transformation, which is a "spiritual" transformation. Neville points to three sorts of goals of "religious" practices: "sanctification, visionary experience, and sageliness." 26 These are "spiritual" transformations which can be embraced in the resonances of ch'i.

The West isolates separate the entities: artist, idea, art work, intuition, revelation of adequacy, audience, relation, harmony, event, and the thing in itself. In China such barriers break down in the cosmic.

Every human activity is artistic, and every aesthetic act is cosmic, in everything we do, we utter the 'language of the ocean, language of the sky,' which cultivates our cosmic sense of justice, of truth. Aesthetics is reflective sensibility, primarily attitude. 27

The three kinds of pipings become attempts to produce resonances, the so-of-Itself---spontaneous blowing of the wind over orifices, hollows, holes, etc..
Human piping is resonance with thing-resonances (earthly pipings). Heavenly pipings 'yet-to-begin' to yet -to-begin all these.'

All are resonating vibrations of the ch'i in its alternation of yin/yang. In order to hear the Heavenly piping there must be a "loss of conscious, objectivating self, the undoing of the self." It is not just the loss of the self, but it should be a no-self (wu-ch'i)

Losing one's ego enables one to overhear the interactive involvements among three pipings...selflessly listening we discern three pipings.

We must remember that li-yueh (ritual-music) is fundamentally the fact that

singing and dancing balance and harmonize by tuning the resonance of things— that is, smooth our inner resonance, sublimate and unify our thinking, feeling and willing and harmonize them with nature.

On the way to the higher phases of meditation, there is ordinary everyday exercise of our te, our aptitude, skills, and adeptness such as Cook Ting’s penultimate concentrative skills of seeing the whole ox. Cook Ting loses himself in his single-mindedness and there are other stories put out by Chuang-tzu which shows the same facility of adeptness, which serves as the model for the sagely state of wu-wei, wu-ch'i, and wu-yu combining together to enable our second-nature tacit skills. It is also the dance of Cook Ting which resembles the T'ai Chi Ch'uan:

In the T'ai Chi Ch'uan there is activity Initiating itself to call for the life force, whereas the cook just follows along on the paths of lines and ligaments in the ox; he does not cut. The T'ai Chi act may be a balancing activity between two extremes to center oneself on oneself. The cook neither balances nor enters. He merely follows along and stays on.

Since the lost self (wo) differs from the losing self (wu), to lose one’s self is not to die (dead wood), but die only to the assertive self (wo-self), the formed and set mind. Just as a snake sheds its skin, so does the self-shedding occurs.

Livia Kohn provide some of the detailed steps and phases in the techniques of mind-fasting, meditation and self-forgetting. The stages in meditative practices are: (1) to develop the body from an individual entity to being part of the larger framework of nature, to complete oneness with tao. The body goes beyond wu-yu, the sensual gratification. Through meditation practices, one is trained to see and feel the distance between the underlying truth of perfection.
and the surface rippling waves of emotions, passions and desires, (2) one abstains from eating the five grains and hot and spicy food. Drugs or herbs replace these. The body is cleaned and emptied of harmful and superfluous matter. This physical transformation leads to strengths which were unknown before. (3) The adept enters the more meditative practices, gymnastics and breathing. This becomes the main source of nourishment. Absorption of ch'i is practiced by visualizing the five energies of the five directions entering the body from heaven through the nose and from the earth through the mouth. These energies are then stored in the five orbs and make practitioners independent of outer food and air. There is no longer any need to eat or breathe. (4) the higher trance state has now been laid. The inner ch'i, the ch'i that has been absorbed, is the pure seed (ching, quintessence) of tao within the body. Thereby, the adept's physical constitution itself is re-organized from profane to a sacred level. The flesh and bones of the body are no longer of individual solidarity, and only of cosmic energy. The conscious mind with its passions, emotions and intentions are all considered as unbridled and artificially constructed (images and metaphors) forces.

Once this is realized, the true physical yet cosmic body and one's sense-based yet unemotional (wu-yu) and well-controlled mind become the storehouse of inner nature, the habitation of the spirit, which is the vehicle for tao. Keep your will dispassionate and remain in non-interfering action (wu-wei), meditate with concentrated imagination and active conscious thinking. One will then establish freedom from desires (wu-yu) and no longer know the difference between ordinary thought, i.e., acquisitive vs. meditative thought. Complete wu-wei, non-interfering action is then attained.

3.8.3: TI-L-TAO, EMBODIMENT OF TAO.

When the complete wu-wei state is attained, this represents the creation of integrity in the self-less sage. He has attained the ti-l-tao, the embodiment of tao, the unification of ecstasy, enstasy and constasy.

Chuang-tzu's self-less sage enables the creation of wholeness. His sagehood has the components—a womb-like emptiness and an atom-like purity. Emptiness enables others; purity establishes itself. Both combined describe his creativity... Perhaps purity is the womb. Perhaps reduction through laughter
attains creative purity. Laughter is a womb-like creativity, for laughter is usually evoked, an active passivity. The sage is laughed at (How useless), in which he wombs forth the smallness of his laughter...Such creation without active creation is what Chuang-tzu called a mirroring and an echoing.34

The womb-like creativity is Plato’s “Receptacle” as the matrix of Becoming-Itself, it creates by not creating. It is also Socrate’s “midwifery” bringing forth from dialectics the truth. It is a self-creating. The sage is pure emptiness, the more we watch him the less we see in him. He is revealed only by the way he lives as Nameless, Merit-less, and self-less. Lao-tzu was correct when he says, “When the small man hears about the Way, he laughs.” (ch. XLI). For Chuang-tzu “comic” laughter is the only way to embody a creation ex nihilo: i.e., One faces death, as in life, as a continuous transformation of all things, endlessly re-cycling itself, just as Chuang-tzu faced the death of his wife, beating on a tub and singing.

One can compare Chuang-tzu with Hsun-tzu, who suggested that detachment is desirable, but it does not require disengagement. In fact Chuang-tzu goes farther than this: one is caught in the world as it is, and we cannot get out of it. Even a posture of withdrawal would itself be a form of engagement, since it is only a detached self, but such detachment is impossible in the light of the fact that we are inter-involved with everything and everyone else. Hsun-tzu does follow Chuang-tzu, but rejects the Taoist assumption that to be the disengaged “spectator,” one must “withdraw from the world”; the mind is subtle enough to be able to be engaged in action and emotion yet be, as “spectator,” detached at the same time. (this is the view of “mind as director” of Hsun-tzu).35 For example, in the magpie story, ch. 20, the hunter observes that each of the creatures has forgotten its real interest—i.e., “attached” to immediate gratification, is about to lose their lives. This showed Chuang-tzu that what he observed is a network of mutual “trouble-making” in which all creatures are caught, by their attachments; he cannot distance himself for by simply observing is itself a mode of involvement. You are in the world at all times yourself, and you can’t get out of it. The real adept has attained a degree of detachment-in-engagement that is so subtle that he can actually concentrate with complete singleness of mind, such as Cook Ting as the compleat Butcher. He teaches us “how to care for life” (yang sheng) just as Cook Ting does not touch the bone with his knife.
If one cannot become disengaged from the world, but must at best be active yet unattached (wu wei, wu yu), so also, he cannot step outside himself in meditative withdrawal, to view the self as an other, an object of analysis, and its 'true ruler.' (non-ecstasy).  

Chuang-tzu rejects that there is a "true ruler" in the self, a director of our minds. Hsun-tzu in his "Dispelling Obsession" mentions the mind's capacity for "emptiness," "unity" and "stillness"; he is led to this by Chuang-tzu for a mind to be partial to anything at all is for it to be unbalanced, and therefore the mind cannot make "appropriate" choices. The mind must first understand the Way before it can approve it and it must first approve it before it can abide by it and reject what is at variance with it.  

Hsun-tzu becomes ultimately an "unattached" Confucianism, in an esoteric aspect, seeing Confucian norms as a kind of "conventional" game. He becomes the cool, detached, objective, analytical and he shifts from one to the other side, to the engaged, committed, almost poetic and passionate.

It is the matured self which can roam and wander in the realm of freedom (tsai yu) which allows for the "doubled" terms of wu-wu (thinged by things), on the one hand, and allows for the self-forgetful "fit-and-comfort" of things, on the other hand.

In the natural transmutation of the self: 'Emptying, one is still self-composed...one moves, moving with the fullness of oneself'. The self-emptying operation is that reductive process that keeps the self clear of thoughts about oppositions, for their inner emptiness swallows their desires and energies. Being out of touch with worldly allurements as they are, the self acts at will, and whatever it does hits the mark.

In regard to "fit-and-comfort," Graham points to "stillness" and "effortlessness" in the effortless practices of Cook Ting. Subjective serenity leads to an objective fit (tennis shoes, or the belt around one's waist). In the self-emptying of oppositions in the hinge of the socket of tao is the ontological homecoming constituting true "sociality":

First, to come home to one's nature and for each self to return to its root, returning to the Primitive through non-doing, to its own unwrought simplicity (pu, uncarved block). Such a true form of reverting to the true form of everyone's Innate Beginning is, to act naturally of oneself (tzu-jan) from the very nature of oneself. It is the natural ways to go back to life pure and simple and 'finding rest in Heaven.'

Nature is thus the value beyond all joy and sorrow, all good and evil.
3.9: THE POTENCY OF TAO-TE WITHIN THE HORIZON OF THE TAOIST LIFEWORLD.

In this section, I shall treat of the tao-te in its more metaphysical (ontological-cosmological) aspects. Hall says that the ontological "characterizes a thing in terms of its just-ness (tzu-jan)." Above, I have characterized ontological predicates, such as sui generis (unique of its own "kind," beyond classification or kinds, wu-lei, no-class); causa sui (self-caused, self-creativity)—causa sui indicates the immanent power of things, their te, Potency to exercise their full potentiality to develop their own telos, or end-in-itself; and tzu-§an (naturally so, so-of-itself).

Lao-tzu says, "tao that can be spoken of is not the 'eternal' tao." Eternal is chang, "constancy" (fei chang tao). Eternal does also mean "forever, from time immemorial" and in the Chinese context, this is also possible since there has not-yet-begin-to-have-had-a-beginning, so that tao has always been with us, constantly so. In this same regard, Hansen points out that tao here cannot be named because it is not a "constant" name, since the "reference changes with each utterance of the name," an in-constant name, perhaps because anything nameable is inconstant in terms of its reference.

In ch. 1, Tao Te Ching, there are two "tao's" mentioned in the first line. The second tao (means "to speak, the spoken tao") is not a "constant (chang) tao." Also, the second line of Lao-tzu is that "the name which can be named is not the (eternal) constant name," which has more to do with the in-constancy and fragility or inadequacy of language in pointing to (chih) tao. The multivalent meanings accrued for a name makes it un-constant, and un-useable in a univocal sense, hence, inconstancy.

Any social practice, any conventionally based way of doing something that can be spelled out and expressed to serve as a guide can also be altered. If it can be advocated—captured in prescriptive discourse—then it can be modified. There is nothing ultimate or 'constant' in such systems. And, as the Lao-tzu points out, the reason no such discourse is constant is that language (names) is inconstant—artificial, conventional, changeable. No tao is constant because no name is constant.

Two broad implications also follow from the above statement: (1) the ontological tradi-
tion of the Chinese is non-essentialistic, since classification is not fundamental for classifying of the Being of things, as in Aristotle's dictum that "usually and for the most part" things have essences, defining characteristics which we can put into "real definitions," classes, logrify them, set up a taxonomy, (2) on the realist/nominalist controversy, the Chinese have never had a serious problem with this issue as the West had; the Chinese are "nominalistic" through and through.

3. 9. 1: CHAOS AND COSMOLOGY.

Another broader characteristic, ontologically, is that the Chinese would prefer a metaphysics of "Being (yu) comes from Non-Being (wu);" the latter is Chaos fundamentally. This means, by contrast, that

Cosmological perceptions in the West is the notion of a single-ordered cosmos in which the essential character of the individual items is determined in relation to rules or laws or patterns of meaningfulness that include some possibilities and exclude others. Chaos, the Implicate Order, the hologrammatic pluriverse is a context within which many orders obtain. The unity of these orders is, obviously, not propositionally expressible but is nonetheless experienceable at the level of mystical intuition.

The cosmological is characterized in terms of its "character being determined by other things." that is the "sociality" of things in the way they relate to each other. And as K. M. Wu says, the aesthetic attitude is a cosmic attitude in which everything in Heaven, earth, and man is interrelated and interpenetrate each other, as in a work of art. Hence, the cosmological order is best exemplified through the aesthetic, rather than the logical order. The mystic, however, sees the ontological and cosmological as the constancy where all things stand together.

In contrast with the character of the Western cosmological viewpoint, Chaos, or hun-fun, is an intuition of "primal harmony," which have none of the negative chaotic aspects of "disorder or confusion," "dark, formless void," or "yawning gap or abyss." Hun-fun is an intuition of primal harmony which is both spontaneous and ordered. For the Taoist, the source of novelty in the natural world are the self-creative centers of experiencing which are the final real things. Each center emerges ex nihilo to the sense it emerges from yin, the creative source, by virtue of yang, the creative act. But the unity of these polar contrasts in a single relation of becoming assures that there can be no ultimate metaphysical separation of the two dynamisms (yang-yin).
Tao-fe is based on Chaos, as the source of intrinsic fe's which have their context within the larger whole of tao, the process of yin-yang alternation, which is always "contiguous," and merging, without sharp separation or violent irruptions.

Graham discusses tao-fe and emphasizes the use of Potency for fe, because ever since Confucius these have been "paired" together and discussed as a rubric: "a person's fe is his potentiality to act according to tao."

It is the spontaneous aptitude (knack), the inherent capacity of a thing to perform its specific functions successfully. Like the Way, it belongs to man no more nor less than to other things.

Hsiao Kung-chuan says that tao-fe came to mean "ethics" or "the ethical" only in later Chinese usage. Lao-tzu's wu-wei is the proper method for government—the only thing that should be scrupulously avoided and whenever alluded to come into practice is that misgovernment induced by purposive action (yu-wei). Hence, the attitude is either yu-wei or wu-wei and this definitely points out the difference between the Confucian and the Taoist tao. On the other hand, while the Confucians want a hierarchical structure for the prescriptive tao to be embedded in its Correction of Names doctrine; is there also a vertical hierarchy within the Taoist camp?

Robert Neville points out that the civilized life become detached from the religious aspect (the spiritual, the sacred) of the harmony with tao.

The civilizing life does not adequately acknowledge and express its roots in the relation between the eternal and named Dao...in the originating impulse of incipient non-being. The Daoist path thus is a celebration of emptiness, of nothingness, or relaxation into a womb-like unactive readiness (emptiness in spokes of the wheel, the hollow of the bowl)...There is an attitude shift from present life, a letting go of striving, a welcoming of the spontaneous impulses grounded ontologically in the eternal dao.

Most of all, Neville holds that Taoism ends up with a total harmonious viewpoint of a "vertical harmony among the various horizontal levels of reality," but the lower levels of creativity are encouraged, from the bottom up. The religious, soteriological message, the salvation of man, is to return to the harmony of tao. Hall and Ames disagrees with Neville in regard to the vertical hierarchical summing up of the horizontal levels of reality:

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The Taoist totality if resolutely 'horizontal'--there are no absolute hierarchies built upon implicit ontological claims. No 'great chain of being' or 'ladder of perfection' exists in the Taoist cosmology; only the 'parity of all things' (ch'i wu), where each thing is insistently itself.

In that same regard toward the soteriological, Wang Pi also says, When the sage embodies tao--responds to it by being wu-wei--the resulting 'harmony' may then be expressed poetically as a merging of the human and the divine.

The Great is that which cannot be designated by language; it cannot be named, thus it is simply called the "realm." Lao-tzu says there are four realms. In ch. XXVI,

The four great things are: Man models himself on earth, earth models itself on Heaven, and Heaven models itself on tao. Tao models itself on the naturally so (tzu-jen).

This is the 'model,' the hierarchical structure of the Taoist world.

In Wang Pi, the idea of using t'i-yung to stand for "substance-function" is a later development.

Wang Pi uses yung as the function of an object which is dependent on wu--such as a window. The idea of yung is mostly paralleled with that of t'i, 'benefit, or profit' which together describe the unlimited resourcefulness of the Way. The word t'i does not appear in Lao Tzu. Wang Pi uses t'i as a counterpart to 'form,' 'shape:' and verbally to denote the 'embodiment' of the Way.

This is recognized by two translators, despite the fact that they favor the identification of wu with substance. Paul J. Lin does not use the term t'i for "substance", but uses "body." Ariane Rump also uses body as "embodying x" or metaphorically as "one body with x," or simply "one with x." But Lin says, emphasis on substance "cannot cease to embody non-being." And Rump says, "There cannot be substance without non-being."

Wu, in Wang Pi, depicts heuristically the nature of tao as "empty": which means transcending the domain of ordinary understanding mediated by language.

Li ('principle', pattern, model) describes the world of beings as it is related to Tao, 'principle' suggests order and harmony, which ideally underlie the phenomenal world... The sense of the Taoist cosmos is fundamentally expressed by the concept of tzu-jen, the 'naturally so' that mediates between the two ends of the dialectic of wu-li. The Way of wu is 'modeled' (fa) on what is naturally so, and this is reflected in the natural and spontaneous functioning of the universe.

The dialectic is not just between non-being and being, but more precisely between "non-being"
and "principle" (wu-li). Wu is also applied metaphorically to the notion of the "Uncarved Block": "The wu is formless and without ties, constant and cannot be named." Thus, if one wishes to reach the Way, there is nothing better than to keep the "Uncarved Block," which is characterized as utter simplicity which is not admixtures of things that are not naturally so.

If wu is not properly understood, then, what is metaphorical is turned into the literal. The interpretation of metaphysical concepts of wu (non-being), li (principle), and t'i-yung is part of Wang Pi's interest to lay out a cosmological framework for interpreting Lao-tzu and the I Ching. The latter heuristic concepts of li, and t'i-yung is original with Wang Pi. Also the identification of wu with the Uncarved Block is a major emphasis in Wang Pi. But regardless of whether we emphasize the fact that Wang Pi does not identify wu, li, and t'i-yung with the "substance" tradition; it is the lesson that tao is wu-t'i, it cannot be embodied (t'i).

Wang Pi said, 'Tao is the designation of wu. There is nowhere it does not penetrate; there is nothing which does not follow from it. Metaphorically it is called Teo. Quiet and without shape (wu t'i) it cannot be made into an image. Thus it cannot be embodied (t'i). Thus it can only be intended (chih) and emulated.'

Tao is not a "thing," hence it is without form, shape (hsing); it is before form (hsing erh shang-I Ching). In itself it is pervasive and yet not embodimentable.

W. T. Chan in describing the neo-Taoism of Wang Pi does emphasize the terms pen-wu and pen-t'i in transcendentalist and "substantialist" language.

Wang Pi went beyond the realm of names and forms to ultimate reality, namely original non-being (pen-wu). According to the Lao-tzu, non-being transcends all distinctions and descriptions. It is the pure being, original substance (pen-t'i) and the one in which substance and function are identified. It is whole and strong. And it is always correct because it is in accord with principle (li).

Wang Pi's commentary is sprinkled through and through with the use of li, as principle. He is the precursor of the Neo-Confucianists who come much later. Though the Neo-Confucianists would rather talk about 'tien-li, as the principles of nature decreed by Heaven ('tien ming), while Wang Pi would substitute in Lao-tzu li for any mention of ming, or fate, in interpreting the latter's text.

In the cosmography of the Ho-sheng Kung, every outward action has its internal
counterpart. There is "correspondence between the administration of the country and that of the human body" as the cornerstone of his interpretation of tao. In ch. III, *Tao Te Ching*,

'Therefore in the government of the sage, he empties their minds but fill their bellies, weakens their wills but strengthens their bones.' Comment: This states that the sage governs the country in the same way as governing the Body. Eliminate desires and get rid of unsettling troubles. That is carry the Way and embrace the One. 18

The *Ho-shang Kung* interprets the "bodily" qualities as part of an analogy, or correspondence between body functions and governmental functions. "The sage governs the state in the same way he governs the body." This is highly unique to the *Ho-shang Kung*.

Mysterious refers to heaven; in man it is the nose. Female refers to earth, in man it is the mouth. Heaven nourishes man with the five breaths (of the five viscera). The five breaths are clear and rarefied. They form the spirit and essence, hearing and sight, voice and sound, and the five natures (of the five viscera). He who governs the body should eliminate feelings and get rid of desires, so as to make the five viscera empty. The spirits will then return to him. 17

Their soul (kuei) is called hun, and hun is male. It is in charge of what leaves and enters (the body) though the nose, which is connected with Heaven. Thus the nose is the "mysterious." One can take "Chaos" as the sum of all possible horizons in which one "construes," interprets, and build creatively anew a lifeworld. This is source and resource for creativity, novelty, and spontaneity bound together in a world which "may be glued together by imponderables, but that is irrelevant for understanding causal explanation." 18 Also, 

*Tao* is not organic in the sense that a single pattern or telos could be said to characterize its processes. It is not a whole, but many such wholes. It is not the superordinate One to which the Many reduce. Its order is not rational or logical, but aesthetic. 19

For the Taoist, there is no need to ask the "causal" questions, since *wu-wei, wu-chih, wu-yu* are dispositions not to "predict" and "control" events in our environment in order to successfully adjust or adapt to it through "causally efficacious action." 20 Moreover,

If no specific conceptualization of order defined in terms of 'principles,' 'laws,' and 'causes' is provided, there is no necessity to believe in a first beginning of all things. It is for this reason that the Taoist, with his claim that nature is an infinite source of creativity, a matrix of all possible orders, requires no explicit cosmogonical myth. 21
Instead, the Chinese have the Uncarved Block, *hun-tun*. But how is this pointing out *t'ao*? *Tao* is that "infinite source of creativity," similar to the Receptacle of Plato's *Timaeus*, the Mother, the "Matrix of all possible orders." The *tao-te* relationship is definitive of the "lived body" in its symbolic interaction (Mead) with ego and alter, within a personal and social context of core experiences within the horizon of the taken-for-granted lifeworld. As Mead says,

> When a self does appear it always involves an experience of another; there could not be an experience of a self simply by itself...when taking the attitude of the other becomes an essential part in his behavior, then the individual appears in his own experience as a self; and until this happens he does not appear as a self.  

When the true self appears, it is the "loss" or "emptying out" of the me-self, or the alter ego. As Heidegger would characterize "authenticity" of a self, it is an "appropriation," a "making one's own," which is the integral self which has already discarded the "call" of, and short-comings of the "they-self."  

Schwartz, in discussing the possibility of the "immortality" cult based on Huang-Lao, points to the concept of "li t'ao," the "embodiment of tao." However, he interprets this drive toward the "cult of personal immortality" within the Huang-Lao tradition and identifies it in terms of a "mystical gnosis" or the "mystical yearning for dissolution into tao." In a sense, we can compare this with the "wu-self losing the wo-self," as discussed above by K. M. Wu. Those who want longevity, eventually interpret it as "immortality," and try to achieve an "embodiment of *t'ao*" and hence attain some kind of immortality in a "transfigured" form. However, in the Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu philosophy, this is a this-world-affirming attitude instead of a "transcendent," other-worldly mysticism. Another important myth connected with immortality and the Yellow Emperor is found in the *Chuang Tzu*, Ch. 6:

> The Yellow Emperor got it (*li* t'ao, the embodiment of *t'ao*) and ascended to the cloudy heaven.

Lao-tzu's ascension to the West, after he left the *Tao Te Ching* with the gate-keeper, is part of this mythical theme. Also, in ch. 6, Chuang-tzu mentions fourteen people, who are True Men...
and Women able to "attain tao" (te-tao), along with the Yellow Emperor, prominent among them are Fu Hsi who "received tao and entered into the womb of vital force (ch'i)" and P'eng-tzu who lived a long life from the "age of Shun to the age of the Five Dynasties." The image of that womb-like return to the source as a final resting place seems quite apt for the Taoist, since rest and tranquility (ching and hsu) is part of the emptiness of hun-tun.

The embodiment of tao (i tao) can be focused on Eros and its theoria ("seeing") of The Good. When Hall discusses speculum, as a reflecting, or mirroring, plane, it can also be interpreted as an "aetiological speculation," or the construal of "origins, beginnings," "causes," and the "co-rising," of all things. The Taoists, both Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu, spend considerable effort at evoking some sense of the "origins" (the not-yet-beginning-to-be) of tao. Theoria, also means "viewing, speculation, contemplation, the contemplative life." Theoria is a holistic vision of a contemplative life. Theoria, as "viewing" means a "spectacle" (kuan, to see from above) so that when Voegelin interprets the beginning of Plato's Republic...

I went down, yesterday, to the Piraeus, with Glaucon the son of Ariston, to offer my prayers to the goddess, and also wanting to see the festival, in what manner they would arrange it, since it was conducted for the first time. He concentrated on "I went down" as the theme of the "descent", so that "the way down and the way up is the same" would allow for the "return of Eros" after it has seen The Good; but it is the "spectacle of joyous festival" that is just as important in the opening scene, because it foretells, or foreshadows the spectacle of The Good, on the way up, of Eros striving to complete itself.

Eros involves the search for the Truth, which is the kind of experience "transcending propositional language" altogether. It is the "holistic intuition" of The Good (and the aesthetic quality of Beauty contained therein).

Eros is "ecstatic" in that it is this transcendence, or "stepping away from" language, but this "ecstasy" is also a rapture, or a "possession" (enthousiasmos, enthusiasm), or "inspired utterance of the prophets," possessed by a god (entheos) or "divinity" (mania, divinely inspired madness, according to Socrates).
The actualized philosopher... warned by the ecstatic intuition of wisdom occasioned by the sense of Eros, faces a world patterned by the failures of understanding.  

The descent of Eros after it has seen the utopian Good, like all "enlightened" sages, "sees" the world differently, ironically. We need a similar *speculum* for the audient, sound-based attunement-resonance *vis-a-vis* the visual imagery of "seeing" the Good, which has the indeterminacy of the Uncarved Block, and Chaos.

3.9.2: TAO AS THE FUSION OF HORIZONS.

Merleau-Ponty uses the concept of *chiasma* which is the "fusion and exchange" of the glances of two people, of two points of view, or in visual acuity, it is the accommodation of the eyes to focus to bring about a fusion of fissioned points of view. It is as valid a procedure to speak about the *chiasma* of two perspectives based on sounds, of speech tones, musical phrasings, and drums talking to each other. Merleau-Ponty speaks about *chiasma* in terms of vision, but one can translate freely to sounds. As soon as glances meet, we are no longer wholly two, and it is hard to remain alone. This exchange realizes in a very short time a transposition--a *chiasma* of two "destinies," two points of view. M. Wu also mentions this *chiasma* in trying to resolve some dualities in Taoism, such as knowledge/ignorance, doing/not-doing, etc.

One must return from meddling in 'petty cognitive enterprises' which injure virtue (fe) to a quiet discernment of the living *chiasma* between knowledge and ignorance... *chiasma* is a medical term to highlight the living fusion and exchange between knowledge and ignorance--and is used by Merleau-Ponty in *The Visible and the Invisible.*

The evocation of Eros is as good a "description" of tao, which is inspiration toward the ideal of "wholeness" (holistic) and completability of our knowledge, the holistic intuition of the Way "beyond Being":

Eros lures us toward the realm of *theoria*, toward the completeness of understanding; Irony calls us back to the sphere of praxis where all claims to completeness are found faulty... Eros urges upon us the intuition of completeness and harmony and then mocks every attempt at the concrete actualization of this insight.

Eros and Irony are complementary drives.

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Tao, however, is beyond all description, since it is "ineffable" and "mysterious." Western associations of Eros are "Love," in the sense of agape, though Care and "concern" (Heidegger) may be closer to the Chinese sense of love, ai, which in the context of jen (benevolence, or Universal Love, chien ai of Mo-tzu), means the intimacy of "kinship", and "belongingness" of kinship (ch'in, familial intimacy) and "humanity" in general. In Heidegger, it will be Care as the integral equi-primordiality of understanding, mood, and discourse. In a similar vein, just as Eros is "seeing" the "unification" of the Good, Beautiful, and the True, Tao, also, is the integral (it?) "spiritual" experience of the mystical intuition of the union of Heaven, Earth, and Man; Milton Chiu calls this fe-tao, the "attainment of tao" and cites Chuang-tzu when he discusses the "magical" or "shamanistic" practice of achieving "ecstasy and mystical union" of the True Man (chen jen): "His knowledge was able to climb all the way up to tao like this." 37

In ch. 17, Chuang Tzu discusses li (pattern); when one has attained tao one has a clear view of the total, holistic pattern of Nature.

Whoever knows the Way is sure of penetrating the patterns, whoever penetrates the patterns is sure to be clear-headed in weighing things, whoever is clear-headed in weighing things will not use other things to his own harm.38

Chuang-tzu sees "life is like a stampede, a gallop," and the Utmost Man (chih jen, Perfect Man) is capable of "fathoming the beauty of heaven and earth penetrates the patterns of the myriad things." Here, there is an aesthetic cosmological perspective. Also, the concept of "weighing of things" (chuan) is similar to the sorting (lun) of things to make them uniquely "a parity," by being tzu-jen, so-of-itself, peculiarly "so"; since it would also depend upon the "fasting of the mind," as in the Yen Hui and Confucius dialogue, and the forgetting of all distinctions, ultimately. Then, we are at the "mystery of mysteries."

In one sense, one can parallel what Chuang-tzu is trying to say and do with the Gelassenheit of Heidegger, as the letting go, letting be to the "openness to the mystery":

It lets the mystery be as a mystery, experience it in its mysteriousness... In Gelassenheit, man is de-centered in favor of a centering on Being or Ereignis (togetherness, belongingness, 'constancy')... Heidegger has broken the spell of the metaphysics of presence precisely in order to hearken to the mystery within
out the "emptiness" of signs, words, language and fragile, limited, and does not "point" like a finger(chih) to get to the heart of the matter.

K. M. Wu is interested in comparing Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception of things in that it intimates the "lived world" as a total integrated "horizon" with Chuang-tzu's striving to extend the context of the total picture of human nature and Nature as a whole, that is the source of spontaneity bringing about the ten-thousand things. Chuang-tzu also sees the "lived world" as a "horizon of life," a Lebenswelt, the importance of metaphor in our construing of life, and a natural emergence of the reasonableness of life in terms of his scepticism and perspectivism, rather than the absoluteness of the One-ness of tao. Tao is this horizon of the lived world. Tao is also that ecstatically horizontal process of a life which can stand outside of itself, in ecstasy, and with Eros on its side it can pierce through the horizontal character to ascend into Heaven itself and "participate" with The Good:

The first state of ecstasy is a spiritual freedom...The realized one ascend into heaven, becomes an immortal and survives in eternity as a spirit being. He floats along with the changes and joins in the interplay of yin and yang...The higher one ascends, the purer the spirit becomes and the more light will be radiated by the Immortal.

The metaphor of light is important in representing the "spirit" pointing to the cosmic force of tao, its light and radiance. The attainment of nonbeing is the complete union with emptiness and quiescence. It is the point where there is the dissolution of the self in its conventional yu-wei thinking. It is the juncture where wu-wei, wu-chih, and wu-yu integrates and become one with tao. As dust piles up on the mirror, the mirror is no longer able to commune with the light of heaven. Light is another potent metaphor of the hsin (heart mind). The sage's relationship with tao parallels the concave mirror's association with the sun and light:

The great sense of mystery surrounding mirrors, and likewise the hsin, is best illustrated by describing a mirror that purportedly had the power to generate fire.

Just as the mirror can project light, the sage who has cleaned his bright mirror, "whose inner being rests in the Great Serenity will send forth a Heavenly light," the aura of tao, or the fire and radiance of tao.
EPILOGUE:

When one compares Habermas's communicative action with the hermeneutical interpretation of tradition with the Chinese counterparts and their core concepts, one finds, at the outset, that the Western theory of action aims primarily at the embodiment of "rationality" with an attempt at grounding in a "logocentric archê" such as logos and logic. Furthermore, the theory of action emphasizes the aggressive, dominating, coercive and overpowering aspects of social experience, whereas, a complementary notion for Chinese hermeneutics should be called "communicative receptivity," which builds upon the cooperation of yin-yang polarity, of the "active" and "passive" aspects of communicative action and receptivity.

To accommodate communicative action within the Chinese context, one re-interprets "symbolic" objects in a broad spectrum to include non-verbal signs such as gestures, which contributes incipient meanings; hand signs as natural signs; posturing and postures; facial countenance; "sitting and forgetting" as the show of "inner" countenance; body gesturing, or the body's dispositional set to express meaning; and symbolic extension to such artifacts as the establishment of relations, institutions, and legal systems as man's attempt to "ritualize," and regularize the many forms of gesturings, posturings, and dispositional behavioral patterns. On the other hand, verbal words, utterances in speech and writing, are, lastly, the achieved paradigm to be correlated with the non-verbal background items listed above. These verbal symbolic objects become "Institutionalized" and "culturalized" in language and embodies the meanings in the horizon of a "lifeworld."

Also, performatve utterances, or speech acts, have their analogues in the "gesturing" one finds in the context of ritual performances, musical presentations, or literary expressions (wen as literature), and most of all, the application of artistic, aesthetic criteria to judge modes of performing in the praxis of the "arts." In this wider interpretation, the Confucian project is an attempt to gather together the "regulations and institutions" found in the Six Classics, which forms the tradition to be "Interpreted" (à hérmenéutical enterprise), assimilated and then transmitted as a heritage. This becomes the Confucian corpus of a tradition based upon the Six
Classics (History, Odes, Documents, Ritual, Music, and the Spring and Autumn Annals).

At the same time, when Habermas considers the "rationality" of communicative action, if one focuses only on the active side, then the Taoist concepts of wu-wei, (non-Interfering actions) will alert us to the fact that this is only a one-sided partiality for energetic activity, instead of practicing the "reversibility of opposites," and assuming a more passive stance, such as sitting and forgetting (as in Chuang Tzu, or any meditative tradition), or "letting happen of things" (I'sai-yu, the Chuang-Tzu Invention of "letting the world alone"), so that it can spontaneously act, so-of-itself (tzu jan).

What I would like to advance is a concept of Chinese "sweet reasonableness" in their thinking about thinking. The clue to this reasonableness is the "communicative receptivity" and the paradigm is "attunement," during cooperative communicative communality, the give and take of a conversation, a dialogue of passive-negatives and active-positives as displayed in communicative situations. One needs to revise drastically Habermas's criteria of "intersubjective validation." Habermas discusses this as "rationalization" when he subjects Weber's purposive-teleological actions as one of the main form of "rationalization." 1

Analogously, one should adopt the perspective of the Chinese and look at their ways, or methods, of making things, situations, and utterances "reasonable." Sweet reasonableness (vs. logocentric reason) has the atmosphere of mildness of praxis, conduct based on centrality and constancy (as displayed in the Chung Yung), and the focus is on some compromising and negotiating involved in reaching consensus. There are institutions which are also reasonable in their function and roles, such as the elaboration of a ritual to produce elegance (wen) and harmonious fluency, which matches the pliancy and suppleness of the new-born baby. This is contrasted with Heidegger's discovery of the "violence" (irruption) and coerciveness in the Western attempt to wrest Being from Becoming. 2 Habermas also develops a theory of "ideology," which is construed as part of the Marxian systematic distortion of communication by the hidden exercise of force. 3 There are other subsidiary issues which are ingredient features of communicative action, such as the "horizontal," or "background" features of the three worlds:
subjective, objective, and the social world; and mainly the presuppositions of a taken-for-granted "life-world" which can serve as a bridge to Gadamer's "fusion of horizons." The grounding of this is in Heidegger's pointing to the "forestructure" of the understanding and Gadamer's discussion of the inheritance of "pre-judgments" in our understanding.

I would like to advance the thesis that the linguistic tao is the sum total of all such "horizontal" lifeworld items, in the same way that Hall thinks of Chaos as the sum total of the indeterminates in our worldview. At the same time, the whole issue of "validation" in terms of intersubjectivity is part of the problem of the gaining of "consensus" and needs to be detailed in more depth in order to confirm the sweet "reasonableness" of Chinese thinking. In this regard the term "validation" seems not so sweetly reasonable, that is, one normally does not expect to be challenged constantly to justify our every twist and turn in our speech-acts.

The Chinese world of thinking and reasoning about things, events and situations can be "rationalized" through the clarification of the core-concepts of Confucius and the Taoist. From the former, the transmission of the culture of the Three Dynasties, exemplified in the Six Classics, is the "tradition" which Confucius interpreted by li, yi, jen, and chih. But for my purposes, the structure of li, ti (body), cheng ming, and tao needs to form an "integrated" corpus of core-concepts to mutually interrelate, interpenetrate and bring about mutually reciprocal discovery of the interpretation of "tradition," the hermeneutical situation required for a "fusion of horizons" between the Confucian and Taoist perspectives in their "life-world." For the Taoists, we need to explicate the brace of wu-concepts: wu-wei, wu-yu, wu-chih, wei-wo (self-loss), and their interrelation to ti, ming, and tao. Communicative action-receptivity, in its application to these core-concepts, will include problems and issues which both divides and brings together Confucian thinking and Taoist experience. What differentiates the Confucian and Taoist thinking can be characterized in terms of instrumental, yu-wei thinking which is prescriptively goal-oriented and noninstrumental, intrinsic wu-wei thinking which emphasizes the tzu-jan, spontaneous, non-deliberative aspect of thinking.

The Confucian and the Taoist interpretations of communicative action can be explained
utilizing li, li, cheng ming, and tao. The main focus is the Confucian sage and the Taoist chen jen as master communicative actors. One can place themselves between the Confucian and Taoist traditions and discovered the archaeology for discovering the shift in paradigm from the more yang, Confucian tradition and the more yin, Taoist tradition by examining their contrasting concepts of li, ming, li, and tao. If the doctrine of cheng ming is tied to a philosophy of language and symbolic interaction (Mead), then a body or corpus of symbolic objects can be seen in the artifacts of institutional objects, legal, ritual systems, and cultural refinements, developed as creative, aesthetic products. And it is in the context of communicative "receptivity" (kan-ying or stimulus-response) that is the "forgotten" side of communicative "action"; communication is an active-passive affair aimed at consensus of participants.

In general, the Confucian and Taoist sages are expert hermeneutic practitioners. They can explicate the relation between "words" and "deed," which are found in many passages in the Analects and in Mencius. In the Taoist case, this becomes the "discarding of knowledge" (wu-chih) and the relation of non-action or wu-wel. Also, in the Taoist camp this will be the "non-spoken" doctrine. The interrelation and interpenetration of li, as ritual action, and cheng ming, the doctrine of the Correction of Names, gives the "speech-action" complex that Habermas considers component parts of communicative action. It is the "bodily" aspects for the basing of gestural meanings, the advent and promise of generating semantic potentials, or meanings. And tao provides the general "background" or "horizon" for the focusing of "insistent particularities" that Hall points to Chinese thinking as keeping us on the "concrete" level, and accords very well with Whitehead’s view that philosophy is the "critique of abstractions."
ENDNOTES.

ABSTRACT

3. The term tao will be used in lower case, (except in quotations where they are capitalized) and will be italicized because it is a Chinese (foreign) term. This will obviate the temptation to consider tao as a “transcendent” entity, like God, which in English needs to be capitalized. The Chinese do not have capital letters.

CHAPTER I: COMMUNICATIVE ACTION

1.1: INTRODUCTION: HERMENEUTICS AS THE INTERPRETATION OF TRADITION.

11. Hall and Ames (2).
26. Habermas (2), p. 82.
27. Hall and Ames (2).
28. Heelen, p. 44.
29. Heelen, p. 49.
1.1 (cont.)

31. Habermas (2), p. 82.


33. White, p. 103.

34. Habermas (2), p. 95.


42. See Doctrine of the Mean, ch. XXVIII:
   "I have learned the ceremonies of Chou, which are now used, and I follow Chou."  
The Four Books, trans. Legge, p. 188.


44. Ch'ien Mu, p. 32.

1.2: RATIONALITY AND SWEET REASONABLENESS.


3. Hall and Ames (2).


5. Hall and Ames (2).

6. Foucault, p. 162.


8. Hall and Ames (2).


11. Hall and Ames (2).

12. Graham (8), p. 64.


15. Hall and Ames (2).

16. Hall and Ames (2).

17. Mayo, p. 279
1.2: (cont.)

19. Hall and Ames (2).
32. Bernstein (2), p. 82. Albrecht Wellmer discusses Steven Lukes' minimal rationality criterion.
37. Hall and Ames (2).
40. Hall (2), pp. 53-54.
41. quoted in Bernstein (1), p. 61.
42. Bernstein (1), p. 82.
44. Habermas (2), p. 12.
46. Polanyi and Prosch, pp. 74-75 ff.
47. Polanyi (2), p. 16.
52. Mead (1), p. 78.
64. Hell (2), p. 373.
1.2 (cont.)


1.3: COMMUNICATIVE RECEP TIVIT Y AND AESTHETIC RATIONALITY.

6. Huang, pp. 87-95.

72. Wu (1), p. 35.
73. Hall and Ames (2).
74. Rorty, p. 360.
75. Wu (i), p. 55.
76. Wu (2), p. 236.
79. Hall and Ames (2).
83. Wu (2), p. 133.
86. Hall and Ames (2).
89. Whitehead (1), p. 287.
90. Moyers, pp. 281-282.
1.4: PERFORMATIVES IN SPEECH ACTS AND EMBODIMENT OF MEANING IN CULTURAL OBJECTS AND INSTITUTIONS.

   In "reference" semantics, the semantic content of the bearers of meaning is determined by relations to designated objects or states of affairs. Whereas in "truth" semantics, the meaning of a sentence is determined by its truth conditions. The turn to speech-acts and illocutionary force is a step away from the "representational" function of language to a "formal-pragmatics" in which there is an attempt toward an "unbiased analysis of the multiplicity of illocutionary forces."

   As an ordinary language philosopher, Austin was able to get rid of several myths in the philosophy of language along with the fact that "Austin contends that the basic unit of my communication with you is not the group of symbols—letters and words—or the semantic meaning of these symbols, but the act I perform in and by using this utterance." p. 202.


7. Hall and Ames (2)


1.5: COMPLEMENTARITY OF ALTER AND EGO IN COMMUNICATIVE RECEPTIVITY AND DIALOGICAL RECIPROCITY.


3. Habermas (3), p. 102. Deictic expressions include not only personal pronouns, but also adverbs of time and place (here/now) and demonstratives (such as Chuang-tzu's "this" and "that").

   Cf. also, Habermas, vol. I, p. 124, in which he points out that Garfinkel was interested in the "context-dependency" of "indexical expressions" which can be made more "explicit" by means of further space-time specifications or other characterizations. This context-dependency is part of the necessary condition for the normal use of our language, so that the participant in a speech situation uses indexical expressions by tying them to the initial hermeneutic situation, an interpretive context.


   Graham says in Disputers of the Tao, "The verb chih 'point out' is the one nominalized by Kung Sun-lung in his 'Pointing and Things.'" Watson translates chih as "attributes," Graham uses 'meaning.' p. 263.


   The School of Names may have "hovered close to something like universals." But, Graham insists that the Later Mohists were generally "nominalists."

   Graham (1) says, "The verb chih 'point out' is the one nominalized by Kung Sun-lung in his 'Pointing and Things.'"

   Cf. also, Fung Yu-lan (3), pp. 52-53 on chih as pointing.

   Cf. also, Foucault, p. 104: on the theory of naming: "to name is to "point" as with a finger, a gesture of indication, and not primarily an act of "predication."


   "Anything which focuses is an index. Anything that startles us is an index. The pole star is an index, or pointing finger, to show us which way is north."


16. Buber, p. 28.


1.5: (cont.)

31. Habermas (3), p. 35. 35. Schrag, p. 27.

CHAPTER II. CONFUCIAN TRADITION-INTERPRETATION

2.1: THE CONFUCIAN HERMENEUTICAL SITUATION.

13. Fingarette (1), p. 13. for li in Two Chinese Philosophers has con­
15. W. T. Chan, p. 3. truth conditions, while li suggests 'patterns'
16. W. T. Chan, p. 87. running through things."

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2.1: (cont.)
40. Schleiermacher, p. 98.
42. Wilhelm/Baynes, p. 320.
43. Alan Chan, p. 129.
44. Kaltenmark, p. 24.
45. Foucault, p. 33.

46. Foucault, p. 34.
47. Graham (1), p. 201.
48. Ch'en, p. 65.
49. Fingarette (1), p. 41.
50. Fingarette (1), p. 43.
51. Lau, see Appendix 3, Confucius: The Analects.

2.2: THE SAGE AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTOR.
5. Schwartz, p. 76.
8. Hsiao, p. 87.
15. Kaltenmark, p. 32.
27. Schwartz, p. 184.
29. Schwartz, p. 166.
32. Schwartz, p. 162.
33. Schwartz, p. 164.
2.2: (cont.)


2.3: WORDS AND DEEDS: SHUO-WEN AND THE TEXTUAL EXEGESIS.

   Cf. p. 92 ff "Discourse must be placed under the category, no longer of writing but rather of the work, that is, under a category which pertains to praxis, to labour. Discourse is characterized by the fact that it can be produced as a work displaying structure and form," hence, a "structured work."
13. Schwartz, p. 94.

   In 6B/4, Mencius makes an argument about "profitability" as against benevolence and righteousness.
19. Mencius, p. 78. See also 3B/9 in which he discusses the heresies of Yang and Mo.
20. Mencius, 7B/33, p. 201.
2.4: WORDS AND DEEDS: THE PHYLOGENESIS OF U.

12. Kenneth Ch'en, p. 70.
15. Hall and Ames (1), p. 79.
26. Dodds, p. 64.
27. Dodds, p. 69.
32. Dodds, pp. 103-104.
40. Hall (2), p. 44.
41. Hall (2), p. 44.
42. Foucault, p. xix.
43. Peters, p. 83.
2.4: (cont.)


2.5: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS THE CREATIVITY OF THE 'LIVED BODY' AND THE EMBODIMENT OF MEANING.


Cf. also, Hall (2), in which he mentions that Munford finds the "symbol-making activities of primitive human beings the beginnings of technological development." p. 62.


32. see Mathews, *Chinese English Dictionary*: 5838 and 5799.


34. Merleau-Ponty (1), p. 121.


37. Fingarette (1), p. 3.

38. Habermas (2), p. 68.


42. Hall and Ames (1), p. 279.

2.6: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS THE LANGUAGE OF ACTION.

10. Foucault, p. 43.
16. Schrag, p. 28.
22. Foucault, p. 105.
29. Dilworth, p. 77.
30. Schwartz, p. 312.
34. Habermas (3), p. 44.
36. Derrida, p. 313.
2.7: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS CORRECTION OF NAMES IN THE
SOCIOPOLITICAL ORDER.

   "Prof. T. de Laguna has shown that the somewhat more general notion of
   'extensive connection' can be adopted as the starting point for the investigation
   of extension, and that limited notion of 'whole and part' can be defined in terms of it.
17. Schwartz, p. 418.
27. Schwartz, p. 33.
35. Wawrytko, p. 240.
36. Tu (2), p. 17, fn. 16.
37. Schwartz, p. 300.
39. Hsun-tzu, trans Burton Watson,
   p. 157.
44. Graham (3), p. 68.
2.8: WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AS COSMIC ORDER, THE 77 OF THE UNIVERSE.

1. Schwartz, p. 121. See also, p. 301.
2. Schwartz, p. 121.
5. Hall and Ames (1), p. 113
11. cited in Polanyi and Prosch, p. 137.
24. Foucault, pp. 35-36.
25. Schleiermacher, p. 98.
27. Alan Chan, p. 178.
29. A. Chan, p. 33.
31. Foucault, p. 33.
32. Foucault, p. 34.
33. Graham (1), pp. 139-140.
34. Ch'en, p. 65.
38. Schwartz, p. 123.
40. Polanyi and Prosch, p. 75.
2.9 WORDS AND DEEDS: LI AND THE HORIZON OF TAO-TE, THE 'FUSION OF HORIZONS' IN THE SOCIOPOLITICAL ORDER.

3. Hall and Ames (1), p. 239.
4. Hall and Ames (1), p. 239.
6. Habermas (6), p. 221.
7. Mehta, p. 54.
24. Mencius, trans Lau, 2B/13:3
CHAPTER III: TAOIST TRADITION-INTERPRETATION

3.1: THE TAOIST HERMENEUTICAL TRADITION.

1. Hall and Ames (2).

2. Hall and Ames (2).

3. Hall and Ames (2).

4. Alan Chan, p. 77.


6. Hall and Ames (2).

7. Hall and Ames (2).


9. quoted in Dilworth, p. 108.


11. Hall and Ames (2).


13. Hall (1), p. 239.


15. Hall and Ames (2).

16. Hall and Ames (2).

17. Hall and Ames (2).

18. Hall and Ames (2).


25. Ch'en, see ch. XXXVI and XL in regard to fan as reversal and antithesis.


30. Polanyi and Prosch, p. 151.


35. Note: CZ is Chuang-tzu, trans. Graham, G=page number in Graham.


37. Foucault, p. 21.


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3.1: (cont.)

47. Graham (1), p. 72

50. Hsiao, p. 296.
52. Shwayder, p. 208.

3.2: THE TAOIST SAGE AS COMMUNICATIVE ACTOR.

5. Ch'en, p. 120.
6. Alan Chan, p. 82.
7. Ch'en, p. 108.
9. quoted in Kohn, p. 58.
12. Dilworth, p. 91.
15. Ch'en, p. 249.
30. Fang, p. 239.
32. Lokuang, p. 61.
33. Schwartz, 392.
34. Schwartz, p. 304.
3.3. THE POTENCY OF TZU-JAN: SPONTANEITY AND SELF-CREATIVITY, THE POTENCY TO ACT.

16. Lao Sze-kwang, p. 280.
29. Wu (1), p. 76.
37. Kohn, p. 128.
38. Kohn, p. 129.
### 3.4: THE POTENCY OF WU-WEI (NON-INTERFERING ACTION)

3.4: (cont.)

3.5: THE POTENCY OF WU-CHIH, THE NON-SPOKEN DOCTRINE.
11. Wu (1), p. 84. 32. Fung (3), p 32
15. Wu (2), p. 83. 36. Alan Chan, p. 84.

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3.6: THE POTENCY OF WU-YU: DESIRELESSNESS AND MIND-FASTING.


3.7: THE POTENCY OF Tt-SHEN (BODY) AND THE INSIGHT OF COSMIC ORDER

12. Graham (6), p. 82. 27. Kohn, p. 109. “strictly speaking, the
13. Graham (6), p. 84. same terminological distinction that was found
to exist between shen and hsing (form), in the
14. Hsiao, p. 308. case of the body applies to hsin and shen in
the case of the mind.”
15. Wu (2), p. 382. 28. Hall and Ames (2)

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3.7: (cont.)

29. Kahn, p. 108.
36. Hall and Ames (1), pp. 244-245.
39. Hall and Ames (2).
42. Lieh-tzu, trans. Graham, p. 5.
44. Dilworth, pp. 86, 89.
47. Hall (2), p. 250.
49. Kohn, p. 152.

10. Aillinson, p. 143.
3.8: (cont.)

33. Kohn, pp. 140-141.
34. Wu (2), p. 94.

3.9: THE POTENCY OF TAO-TE WITHIN THE HORIZON OF THE TÂOIST LIFEWORLD.

2. Hansen (4), p. 34.
6. Graham (1), p. 188.
9. Hall and Ames (2).
10. Alan Chan, p. 87.
11. Alan Chan, p. 60.
12. Alan Chan, p. 66.
15. W. T. Chan, p. 316.
17. Alan Chan, p. 139.
26. Kohn, p. 76. The Western Ascension reaches out to immortality and one-ness with Tao.
27. Chiu, p. 270.
31. Voegelin, p. 52.
32. Peters, p. 113.
35. Wu (1), p. 98.
3.8: (cont.)
37. Chiu, p. 279.
42. Kohn, pp. 151-152.
43. Oshima, p. 75.

EPILOGUE

CHINESE GLOSSARY

ai (love, concern) 愛

chien ai (Mo-tzu Universal love, love without distinction) 兼愛

chai (fasting) 齊

hsin chai (mind fasting) 心齋

wo chai (self fasting) 我齋

chen jen (authentic person, true man, the Taoist Sage) 真人

cheng (personal ordering, correction, rectification) 正名

Cheng ming (Rectification or Correction of Names)  正名

cheng (contention) 爭

chi (itself, oneself, self) 己

chien (Later Mohists compound names, i.e., ox-horse, hard-white) 凱

chih (know, realize) 知

chih (finger, pointing, pointer, "attribute") 指

chih jen (ultimate person-Taoist Sage) 至人

chih (wisdom) 智

chih (intention, will, purpose) 志

ching (quintessence) 精

ching (quiescence, stillness) 精

chuan (weighing, balance, scale) 錦

Chu Tzu (Molzu-an Sage, or Master) 金巨子

ChuH Tzu (exemplary person, gentleman-Confucian Sage) 子

chung (doing one's best, loyalty) 恭

Chung Yung (Doctrine of the Mean) 中庸

ch'ang ("constant") 常
ch'eng (sincerity/truth/integrity—"The Great Learning")

ch'i (hylozoistic vapors, energetic fluid)

ch'i (equalize)

Ch'i wu lun (ch. 2. Chuang-tzu—The Sorting that Even Things Out)

ch'in (family members, intimate)

fa (penal law, model)

fen (portion, division, allotment)

ming-fen (names-allotment in Spring and Autumn Annals—Schwartz)

ho (harmony, match, correlate)

T'ien-jen ho-i (the harmony of Heaven and Man)

hsiang (image—l Ching)

ch'ui hsiang (hang-images from heaven, constellations—l Ching)

hsiao chih (little understanding, vs. fa-chih, great understanding)

hsien jen (worthy man)

shang hsien (elevation of the worthy—Mohist)

hsien jen (immortal—Taoist)

hsin (heart-mind)

hsin (true to one's word)

hsing (bodily figure, form)

hsing (human nature)

hsing (cane, punish, punishment)

hsing (conduct, behavior, action)

wu hsing (five-processes, Tsou Yen)

hsiu shen (self-cultivation)

hsu (emptiness)

hsuan (mysterious darkness, abstruse)

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hun-tun (Primal Chaos, Con-fusion)
i tuen (heterodox teachings)
jen (persons, others)
jen (benevolence, authoritative person)
ju (like, as, analogy)
ju (Confucian literati)
kan-ying (stimulus-response)
ying (respond, mirror things as they are)
ke wu (arriving at the things', investigation of things)
kuan (to observe, see from above, meditative insight)
kuei shen (ghosts and spirits)
k'o (can (do), acceptable, permissible)
lei (class, kind, grouping)
li (profit, benefit, advantage)
li (pattern, model, law, principle)
li (ritual action, propriety, ceremony)
li-yüeh (ritual and music--Confucius)
liang chih (intuition, immediate knowledge by acquaintance--Mencius)
luan (confusion)
m'ing (clarity, illumination, enlightenment)
m'ing-shih (name and actuality)
pen-ši (substance)
pen-mo (roots and branches)
p'ih-shih (that and this-yes)
p'ien (discrimination, distinction, argument)
p'ut'yi ('the inevitable', 'what one cannot do otherwise')
sang wo (loss of objectifiable self)
shan ('good', shan jen–Mencius)
shang-li (Shang deity)
shen jen (spirit (filled) man)
sheng jen (sage, Holy one)
shih (raw stuff of humanity, vs. wen as elegance, cultured, refined)
shih/fei (yes/no, right/wrong, affirm/deny)
shou shih (hand gesture, hand-power)
shu (deference, unifying thread in Confucius)
shun (compliance, in accordance with)
ssu (reflecting, thinking, realizing)
ta hsueh (The Great Learning)
tao-shu (Tao pivot, Hinge, the Way of things)
tao-te (field-focus, horizon-core)
te (virtue, Potency, excellence, naturalness)
ti tao (attain or reach the Tao)
tsaï yu (Chuang-tzu–letting be, letting things alone, laissez faire)
tsaö wu che (the Creator of things)
tuan, (chiao)[limits, germs, seeds–Mencius’s Four germs]
tung chiao (communication)
tzu-hua (self-transformation)
tzu-jan (so-of-itself, naturally so)
ti (body, embodiment, corpus, tradition)
ti tao (embodiment of the Tao)
ti-yung (substance-function)
t‘en fang (natural freedom, liberty)
t'ien hsia (all under heaven, the Empire)
t'ien lai (heavenly pipings)
t'ien ming (Mandate of Heaven)
wei wu wei (doing by not doing—Lao-tzu)
wen (refinement, ornamentation, elegance, culture)
wu-wei (non-interfering action, non-deliberative acting)
wu-chih (non-conventional (yu-wei) knowledge, non-spoken doctrine)
wu sang wo (I lose myself, self-loss)
wu (exalted self)
wo (objectifiable self)
wu-yu (desireless desire, purposeless, impartial desires)
yen-hsing (words-deeds/actions/conduct)
yi (rightness, signification, meaningfulness, appropriate)
yi (intention, motivation)
yin-yang (coincidence of oppositions, male/female polarity)
yin shih (follow on this, to affirm and follow along with)
yung (use, usefulness)
wu-so-yung, pu-tsai (useless)
tsei, nung, yung (useful)
yung (ordinary, usual, commonality)
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