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ANGST AND PHILOSOPHY: A HERMENEUTIC
PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
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TO

BARBARA ANN COE

in whom primordial Angst discloses
a deep and resonant Dasein.

We also wish to express our deep gratitude to several persons who made this work possible. Thus to Professor J. L. Mehta, whose friendship and kindness helped open many long-hidden doors to the deeper meaning of Heidegger's path of thinking, our deepest thanks. To Maxine Kurtz, who read our early drafts and offered very useful criticisms, we again owe a debt of gratitude. To Dr. Michael S. March, who demanded that the rapidly fading dream of this work be reawakened to become a reality, we are profoundly grateful. To Doreen Hendrix, who typed our first struggling drafts, and to Mrs. Toby Cohen of the A&D Typing Service, in Denver, Colorado, who completed the project, we thank you for your patience with us. Finally, to Tom Abrums, who in 1960 attempted to show us the path to writing more than subjectivist scribbles, our most sincere thanks are offered.
ABSTRACT

This essay seeks to explore the meaning and significance of Angst from the standpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology. Employing a five chapter structure, the essay investigates this phenomenon from two modes of hermeneutic inquiry: what we have called the "macro-" and the "micro-" approaches to hermeneutics.

Chapter I traces the development of our ground phenomenon, "primordial Angst," from 6000 BCE to the time of Jacob Boehme. In doing so we attempted to uncover four facets of primordial Angst, facets we termed "onto-theological Angst," "strictural Angst," "pneumatical Angst," and finally, "passional Angst."

Chapter II explores the first in-depth treatment of Angst and the hermeneutic horizons which made Søren Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angst possible. We discovered that Angst for Kierkegaard must be grasped by an organic and collateral hermeneutic which we termed the "cognitive" as opposed to the "experimental/psychological" approaches.

Chapter III examines primordial Angst from the perspective of Martin Heidegger's early mature thought. We attempted to again display the hermeneutic horizons of this perspective, showing how Heidegger saw Angst as the condition of the possibility of Dasein's authentic mode of Being as well as the basic attitude of scientific Dasein.
Chapter IV inquires into Angst from the viewpoint of existential thought. There we looked at Jean Paul Sartre in juxtaposition to Paul Tillich with regard to their markedly different visions of Angst, again attempting to disclose their respective hermeneutic horizons as well as their conclusions.

Finally, Chapter V returned to the macro-hermeneutic perspective, attempting to summarize, contrast, and compare the micro-hermeneutic of the three preceding chapters. Then we suggested that at the very epicenter of the Angst phenomenon there resides an equally primordial Urwille, or a basic craving for ontological wholeness on the part of Dasein. Thus to bridge the abyss between the finite and the infinite, Dasein created "representational thinking."

We argued that only by dwelling in primordial Angst and by abiding in Gelassenheit, the renouncing of representational thought, can Dasein overcome all cognitive distinctions and dwell as one with Being, through what the later Heidegger called "meditative thinking."
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INTRODUCTION

The general purpose of this essay is to inquire into the role of Angst in Western philosophical thought. Here, in this "Introduction," we hope to suggest to our readers a kind of cognitive map or guideline to what follows in the body of our work. This brief Introduction, therefore, seeks to prepare a ground, to build a foundation, to set the stage for a special kind of inquiry into the phenomenon of Angst: a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation.

Thus our specific purpose is to allow what we shall call "primordial Angst" to show itself, in itself, and in its own way through an expanded application of the hermeneutic phenomenological method. To state such a purpose unambiguously, however, requires several preliminary comments in the service of clarity. Thus here, in the pages that immediately follow, we hope to discuss two basic issues that will, we hope, aid the reader: (1) why Angst has been left untranslated; and (2) how we intend to employ the hermeneutic phenomenological method.

But before launching into these substantive issues, one important general comment seems necessary and appropriate at the very outset of this work. We must state unequivocally that this essay is neither a work in depth-psychology nor specifically in what has become known as "existentialism." Indeed, we are decidedly not interested here in discussing "anxiety" per se as these two
disciplines have used that term to describe either a psychological state or a general feeling of "uneasiness" that creeps in like some mute fog to drift hither and thither through the darker moments of everyday existence. On the contrary, to allow primordial Angst to show itself requires us to get behind and beneath the depth-psychological and the "existentialist" concepts of "anxiety" to the rock-bottom ontological condition that grounds these concepts to begin with. And so to distinguish our horizon of concern to one which is ontological, we designate the ontological condition of the possibility of everyday or psychological anxiety by the key term, "primordial Angst." Now the means by which we hope to secure primordial Angst's self-revelation is neither germane to depth-psychology nor "existentialism" as such, rather our approach was founded by Martin Heidegger in his Magnum Opus of 1927, Sein und Zeit, which he called "hermeneutic phenomenology," or the phenomenology of understanding and interpretation with regard to human beings. Thus the "methodology" of the present dissertation takes its point of departure from Heidegger and is further refined by the method of Hans-Georg Gadamer in his Wahrheit und Methode. Our own contribution to this methodology, and this is a point the reader might want to keep in mind in what is to follow, is to bifurcate the hermeneutic phenomenological enterprise into two spheres of concern: the "macro-hermeneutic" sphere and the "micro-hermeneutic" sphere.

In the macro-hermeneutic phenomenological approach, the approach of both our first and final chapters, we seek to grasp the
phenomenon of primordial Angst in the broadest possible horizon of its self-revelation. More specifically, in Chapter I, we attempt to display in broad terms how primordial Angst shows itself from pre-philosophical times up through the late medieval-early Renaissance period of Western civilization. And in our final chapter as well we again seek to show how primordial Angst has shown itself in the Western tradition put there in the period following Hegel; that is, the period that culminates in contemporary philosophical thought. Again our hope is to present the broadest possible horizon from within which Angst can show itself.

The three intervening chapters between our first and final ones are markedly different in both scope and intent; they are micro-hermeneutical chapters. By "micro-hermeneutical" we mean that our focus goes from the broadest possible perspective to one which is almost microscopic in detail, one which explores the precise horizons of Angst's self-disclosure within the purview of individual thinkers. Thus in these three chapters we must concern ourselves with topics such as the influences on Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Tillich so that Angst can show itself against the background of their respective positions. Likewise, we hope to examine the various texts wherein Angst plays a significant role and again to display the horizon wherein Angst shows itself. Finally, we hope to examine in some detail precisely how Angst reveals itself specifically within these texts. But the purpose of this detailed, almost microscopic analysis of Angst is precisely to ground the final macro-hermeneutical
interpretation of primordial Angst offered in our final chapter. Thus, without the "micro-hermeneutics" of Chapters II, III and IV, we would have no grounds, no hermeneutical foundation upon which an adequate "macro-hermeneutical" interpretation of primordial Angst and its role in contemporary thought could be offered.

Therefore the macro-hermeneutics of Chapter I establishes the horizons for the micro-hermeneutics of Chapters II, III and IV of the present work. In turn these three intermediate chapters establish the grounds for the final horizons of primordial Angst suggested in Chapter V, which in itself encompasses the preceding four chapters. But is this not a circle and a vicious one at that?

To answer this question we must explore more carefully the hermeneutic phenomenological method as it was conceived by both Heidegger and Gadamer: a task to which we shall return momentarily. For the moment we must return to the two substantive issues mentioned above that we promised to discuss after this propaedeutic issue. We shall find that the answer to the somewhat paradoxical question concerning the vicious circularity of micro- and macro-hermeneutics is contained in the second substantive issue we promised to address.

Again these two are: (1) why have we not translated Angst throughout this dissertation into "anxiety," "dread," or "anguish," the three most popular conceptions of Angst? (2) how does Angst show itself in Western thought, or how does the method of hermeneutic phenomenology light up the horizons for Angst's self-disclosure?
Let us begin by examining these issues, from a hermeneutic perspective one by one.

First, concerning why Angst has been left untranslated, we submit that there is not, nor can there be, an adequate translation that fully conveys the intricate subtleties of primordial Angst, the Angst we seek to disclose here. Hence, rather than a translation, such Angst requires a phenomenological description and interpretation—a major task of the present dissertation. But why do the translations of Angst offered previously strike us as being inadequate? In order to answer this question let us explore these popular translations of Angst interpreted in a post-Freudian world as either "anxiety," "dread," or "anguish."

John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, the translators of Sein und Zeit, admit that their choice of the word "anxiety" for Angst was really a choice of the least objectionable of several alternatives. Of those they considered, namely, "anxiety," "dread," "uneasiness," and "malaise," they opted, of course, for "anxiety." They admit, however, that "in some ways 'uneasiness' or 'malaise' would be more appropriate still." In a later work, MacQuarrie discusses this selection of the word "anxiety" in greater detail, noting:

It must be acknowledged . . . that it is not altogether a satisfactory translation. It suggests too much day-to-day anxieties of ordinary life rather than the rare and subtle emotions that the existentialists wish to designate by the German word Angst.
Now MacQuarrie and Robinson specifically justify their selection on the grounds that Angst has generally been translated as "anxiety" in post-Freudian psychological literature. What they are admitting, in our view, is that their selection is based upon an appeal to convention, a circumstance that has had profound and far-reaching regrettable consequences. Not only does an appeal violate one of the basic hermeneutical canons articulated by Heidegger (see below, page 11), but even more importantly, it results in radically misleading of the readers of Being and Time into viewing Angst simply as "anxiety" and nothing more. This casual linking up of Heidegger's term Angst with post-Freudian psychological literature thereby places a distinctly psychological coloring on the meaning of Angst, a coloring that prevents our seeing Angst in its true hermeneutical light.

A fortiori, and from the standpoint of hermeneutical phenomenology, the "anxiety" interpretation of Angst is phenomenologically both trivial and misleading. Heidegger has shown that Angst is part of the universal condition of being human, and is therefore an ontological "category," or what he calls an "Existenzial" of that being whose Being is an issue for it, namely Dasein. Very briefly, these Existenzialien of Dasein include Verstehen (understanding), Befindlichkeit (disposition or attunement), and Rede (speech or discourse). Each is equiprimorially present in Dasein, and each characterizes its essential character: Dasein's essence lies in its existence. It must be constantly borne in mind that these
Existenzialien are ontological "categories" of Dasein rather than its ontical characteristics. As MacQuarrie and Robinson note, "Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being, ontical inquiry is concerned with entities and the facts about them." From Heidegger's perspective then, the use of "anxiety" for Angst places Angst directly under, indeed squarely within, the purview of ontic everyday experience rather than within the ontological and a priori conditions that make everyday experience possible. But Angst is precisely ontological. It is Dasein's primordial disposition or attunement to Being (Grundbefindlichkeit). To see Angst as mere "anxiety" is, therefore, to confuse the ontological condition of the possibility of feeling itself with a specific and derived mode of feeling which Heidegger calls "uncanniness."

A second popular translation of Angst has been the word "dread." Using "dread" gives rise to pressing difficulties even beyond the use of "anxiety." Therefore, in our view, to interpret (translate) Angst as "dread" is erroneous for a different set of reasons as we hope to show below.

Walter Lowrie, translator of Søren Kierkegaard's work on Angst, Begrebnet Angest, which Lowrie curiously entitled The Concept of Dread, informs us that it was a Professor Hollander who was responsible for translating the Danish word Angst (or Angst in contemporary Danish) as "dread" in Hollander's 1924 publication of the first English translation of some fragments of Kierkegaard's work. Lowrie goes on to point out that after a desperate search for
a better translation, everyone simply agreed to continue to employ the word "dread" for Angst. Nonetheless, Lowrie himself confesses that the "dread" translation is inadequate, noting: "We have no word which adequately translates Angst."\(^9\)

Six years later, Lowrie may have compounded the mistranslation error by allowing Rollo May to employ the word "anxiety" in place of "dread." Dr. May reports:

The question is whether the psychological meaning of "anxiety" . . . is not very close—in fact much closer than the term "dread"—to what Kierkegaard meant by Angst. Professor Paul Tillich, who was familiar with both the psychological meaning of Angst and Kierkegaard's works, believed this to be true.\(^\)\(^1\)

To Paul Tillich's interpretation of Angst we shall return in Chapter IV, but here it should be pointed out that in this quote May appeals to the authority of Tillich, another form of an appeal to convention, and an appeal which seems grounded in a popular conception of Angst or even a fanciful idea of its primary meaning.

The third popular translation of Angst comes from the Frenchangoisse meaning "anguish" in English. The popularity of "anguish" for Angst stems from Jean Paul Sartre's interpretation of the meaning of Heidegger's Angst discussed from within the framework of L'Être et le Néant,\(^1\) translated in 1946 by Hazel Barnes as Being and Nothingness.\(^1\)\(^3\) Angoisse is Sartre's own choice for Angst, and it must be admitted that it is indeed etymologically related to Angst (see below, page 22) as is the English word "anguish." But in this case etymology fails us in shedding clear light on the issue of whether Angst may be appropriately translated by "anguish." However,
a simple definition of anguish does not. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "anguish" as: "extreme pain either of body or mind: excruciating distress."\(^{14}\) This reference to great pain is, as far as we know, neither present in Angst as interpreted by Kierkegaard or Heidegger, nor, for that matter, in Sartre's own work. Thus, while Hazel Barnes was technically correct in translating angoisse as "anguish," the translation is somewhat misleading, introducing as it does an element of extreme pain that is absent from either the German or the French.

From this brief and extremely provisional analysis it seems apparent that the three popular translations of Angst leave a great deal to be desired. None in and of itself is either appropriate or adequate to convey the subtle complexity of the phenomenon of Angst. Thus we propose here to show how Angst requires its own self-disclosure to demonstrate its own meaning and to display its own role not only in contemporary philosophical thought but in Western thought as a whole. This brings us, therefore, to the second issue with which we must deal here, the issue of how we intend to employ the hermeneutic phenomenological method in the service of Angst's self-disclosure.

Hermeneutic phenomenology, as that term will be used throughout this dissertation, takes its point of departure from the following passage in Heidegger's Sein und Zeit:

> Our investigation will show in itself that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method is interpretation. The Logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of a
hermeneutin through which the authentic meaning of Being (which belongs to Dasein itself) and the basic structures of Dasein's ownmost authentic being can be revealed to Dasein. The phenomenology of Dasein is hermeneutic in the original sense of the term, denoting the business of interpretation.\textsuperscript{15}

Crucial to this passage is the relationship between interpretation and the Existenzial, "understanding" (Verstehen). For hermeneutical phenomenology, Dasein's understanding is itself the precondition of the possibility of interpretation. How is this so? As indicated above, the understanding as an Existenzial is a basic ontological structure of Dasein's own-most being. It is not, therefore, a "category" in the sense of traditional Aristotelian or even Kantian philosophy, since the term "category" must be reserved for characteristics of the being of entities whose character is precisely not that of Dasein. Understanding is characterized as being equipriordial in Dasein along with "disposition" or "attunement" (Befindlichkeit) and "discourse" or "speech" (Rede). These three Existenzialien universally apply to all Dasein; that is, to man as Dasein.

The grounding of interpretation in the Existenzial of understanding is accomplished by an elucidation of the "fore-structures" of that understanding. These are the Vorhabe (fore-having; or what we have in advance of our interpretation), the Vorsicht (fore-sight; or what we see in advance of our interpretation), and the Vorgriff (fore-conception; or what we grasp in advance of our interpretation). Heidegger believes that these are the essential pregiven conditions which make any interpretation of our experience possible. Such a
view is the basis for the "hermeneutic circle," through which finite understanding is made possible. Regarding the circularity of this method of understanding, Heidegger himself observes:

Any interpretation that seeks to contribute understanding must have understood in advance that which it seeks to interpret . . . but if interpretation must operate within what is previously understood and if interpretation draws its sustenance from it, how is interpretation to generate scientific results without moving in a circle, especially if the presupposed understanding still operates within our plebian acquaintance with man and the world? But according to even the most elementary rules of logic, this circle is a circulus vitiosus.16

But despite the prima facie appearance of vicious circularity, Heidegger maintains that to see the circle as being vicious constitutes a basic misunderstanding from the ground up of the primordial act of understanding.17 Why is this so? Heidegger answers that such a view is rooted in an unexamined and essentially groundless presupposition regarding a "definite ideal of knowing (bestimmten Erkenntnisideal)"18 which fails to grasp the circle as a concrete expression of Dasein's Existenzialien; which are again the essential structures of human being. Thus Heidegger further observes:

This circle of understanding is not a closed loop in which some kind of arbitrary knowledge operates, rather in the circle is the expression of Dasein's own existential fore-structures. The circle is not reducible to simple viciousness, neither is it one to be merely tolerated. Indeed, within it lies concealed the positive possibility of a primordial kind of knowing. Of course, we can seize upon this possibility in an utterly lucid manner only if we have fully understood that our first, last, and constant task is to never permit what we have in advance, what we see in advance, and what we grasp in advance TO BE DETERMINED BY FANCIES OR POPULAR CONCEPTIONS. Rather we must make this scientific theme secure by working out these forestructures with reference to the things themselves.19 (Italics and capital emphasis added.)
What is essential in this passage, we suggest, is two-fold: first, that interpretation is never to be guided by "fancies or popular conceptions," and then secondly, that such interpretations are a result of "... working out these fore-structures with reference to the things themselves." Regarding the first, it seems reasonable to believe that appeals to convention or authority, circumstances encountered in the mistranslations of Angst discussed above, come under the general heading of the expression "popular conceptions" as discussed in the above quote. Such a working out of these fore-structures is, of course, an echo of the Husserlian dictum that has become the banner of all phenomenology: To the things themselves! It is decidedly these fore-structures of the understanding which serve to unfold the things themselves through the act of interpretation. For hermeneutical phenomenology, therefore, the interpretation must be done in a manner whereby the things themselves show themselves on their own terms, rather than the throwing of an external signification over them based upon fancy or popular conceptions.

This elucidation discloses the grounds for our earlier criticism of the glib appeals to convention and authority in the translations of Angst into "anxiety" on the one hand or "dread" on the other. Such translations are in fact interpretations that are in no way guided by the ontological dimension of Angst. Rather, they have been continually employed in marked insensitivity to Angst's ontological dimension uncovered by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. As a result, one can easily understand the difficulties of
the nonhermeneutical and subtle interpretation of Angst that occurs in simple translations.

But how is a positive hermeneutical interpretation worked out concretely from within the fore-structure of the understanding? Perhaps the answer to this question lies in the following description: In order for me to seek to comprehend something, it must first show itself to me by becoming an "object" of my concern. But for it to become such an "object," I must have at very minimum a pre-given referential context wherein I recognize this "object" as something of concern to me. This referential context, which may be based on past experience, cultural assimilation, education or back-grounds of other kinds, provides the fore-having (Vorhabe) structure of my Existenzial, understanding. Thus, in order to appear to me as an "object" of my concern at all, I must have a pre-given but extremely provisional grasp of the object of my concern.

Next, to begin anything like even a provisional interpretation of this "object," I must adopt a point-of-view or perspective whereby insights into the meaning of the "object" are made possible to me through my act of interpretation. This perspective or viewpoint takes the first "rough cut" on my interpretation and guides my insights into the meaning of the "object" by a kind of pre-given vision of that meaning. This pre-given vision guides my very point-of-departure for interpretation. It is the fore-sight (Vorsicht) structure of my Existenzial, understanding.
Finally, if the "object" is to become transparent to me at all through any act of interpretation, I must possess in advance a provisional grasp of its meaning for me. This provisional grasp serves as a "transcendental" clue to the meaning of the "object" which then guides my interpretation on its way toward comprehending the "object" itself. This pre-given grasp may be final for me so that I seek to underpin my pre-given grasp by appealing directly to the "object" of my concern for confirmation of that grasp. On the other hand, it may be extremely rough and provisional, so that I am poised in anticipation of a more complete grasp of the meaning as it unfolds itself. But in either case, what makes these alternative modes of a pre-given grasp possible is the fore-conception (Vorgriff) structure of my Existenzial, understanding.

Bearing these formal ontological structures of the understanding in mind, it is not difficult to see how the dynamic process, the give and take of play, occurs between the interpreter and the object of his interpretation. One concrete example of how this process takes place is in the dialectical inter-play between an interpreter and a text whose meaning the interpreter seeks to comprehend. What happens in this dialectical inter-play? First, the interpreter, as Gadamer points out, projects an overall meaning on the text in advance. This "fore-projection" has the character of a projected meaning of the text in something like a Gestalt. It occurs, says Gadamer, once an initial meaning emerges from the text itself as the interpreter reads and comprehends what the text is
"saying." This initial meaning emerges from the text itself only because the interpreter has, in the fore-structures of his understanding, expectations of a particular meaning of the text as his Vorgriff. The task of the interpreter is constantly to be on guard against employing in his interpretation or grounding his interpretation in his own fancies or the popular conceptions of meaning that are not in the text itself but that result from conventional interpretations. Thus, the working through of the interpreter's fore-projection is a dialogue between fore-structures of the understanding in one side and what emerges from the text itself on the other. In this dialogue, there is the character of the give and take of play.

To be sure, the hermeneutical dialogue is a difficult enterprise at best, and one filled with the many pitfalls inherent in guarding against the thoughtless use of extremely subtle fancies and popular conceptions which serve as detriments to clear comprehension. But the interpreter, if successful, is rewarded by an intellectually honest accomplishment: his interpretation is firmly grounded in the meaning of the text itself rather than in appeals to convention or authority.

With this in mind, Chapter I which follows immediately will address the origin, growth and development of primordial Angst, seen as a dark reflection of the abyss metaphor in the history of Western thought.
FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

1 The method we intend to employ in this dissertation, namely the hermeneutic phenomenological method, was first discussed by Martin Heidegger in his work Sein und Zeit, Erste Hälfte in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 8 (Halle: Niemeyer Verlag, 1927). The method has been considerably expanded upon by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his work Wahrheit und Methode (Tubingen: Paul Siebeck, 1960).


4 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 227, note.

5 Ibid., p. 67.

6 Ibid., p. 31, note 3.


8 Ibid., "Translator's Preface," p. X.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


13 Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).


16. Ibid., p. 152.

17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.

20. This shift to the first person is nothing more than the use of the phenomenological "I," which must be used in phenomenological descriptions following Husserl's general approach to phenomenological investigation. We shall employ this tool again in our concluding chapter.

21. "his" likewise means "hers" throughout the present work.

CHAPTER I

ANGST AND THE TRADITION

The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities or Being as the abiding ground of entities; for "ground" becomes accessible only as meaning and in itself is the abyss of meaningfulness.

–Martin Heidegger, 1927

The Question at Hand

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the Vorgriff (fore-conception) of understanding that will sketch the background for the general hermeneutical horizons within which the role of Angst in Western thought is to be interpreted in this dissertation. Such a task, however, is somewhat problematic since in the literature of Western thought there are few specific references to the phenomenon of Angst prior to J. Boehme's tangential references to it in his work of 1610, entitled Aurora or Die Morgenroeth im Aufgang. Moreover, Angst does not emerge as a specific theme for philosophical investigation until over two hundred years later in S. Kierkegaard's Begrebret Angest of 1844, a work that can be traced indirectly back to Boehme's influence through the writings of Von Baader, Hamann, and Schelling. There is, therefore, a general dirth of materials on the specific topic of Angst prior to Kierkegaard's seminal work.

This fact may be due in substantial part to a general lack of interest in distinguishing Angst from fear. Additionally,
however, there are few references to Angst because the term is neither rationalistic nor, for that matter, even Greek. Angst is therefore excluded from the classical lexicon of Greek philosophy, a lexicon which includes such illustrious terms as nous, logos, psyche, arete, moira, hen panta, or ananke to name but a few. Thus, there is little direct history to trace in attempting to underpin the phenomenological interpretation of Angst in contemporary thought. Moreover, since the distinction between fear and Angst has been fundamentally blurred in the Western tradition, the resulting vague idea of Fear/Angst has referently been dismissed by philosophers as being anti-rational and therefore an anathema to philosophy; a kind of heresy that has no place in the pristine towers of rationalistic thought.

What this all means is that underpinning the hermeneutic phenomenological conception of Angst is an elusive and somewhat risky business. But in order to accomplish the task at hand, we must not shrink away from the tradition of Western philosophy; rather, we must confront it both cautiously and selectively—cautiously because no forced interpretation will disclose Angst in the tradition, and selectively because one cannot possibly consider the role of Angst in the entire history of Western thought in the scope of a single chapter. The problem then is one of appropriating a suitable point of departure for this investigation. To this end hermeneutic phenomenology, the "methodology" of this dissertation, requires a return to the original concept of Angst itself as a means whereby a
"first cut" or provisional understanding of the phenomenon is made possible. Thus, the etymology of the term "Angst" may be helpful in fixing a point of departure for seeing Angst as it unfolds itself throughout the developing tradition of Western thought from the very aurora of history to the present. With these considerations to guide the initial interpretation of Angst, we now turn to its etymology with a gaze fixed upon the growth of the phenomenon from a physical feeling to an ontological apprehension.

**Etymology of Angst**

According to the lexicon of "Indo-European Roots" in The American Heritage Dictionary, the word "Angst" comes from the Indo-European stem, angh- meaning roughly "painful, tight, or painfully constricted." Tracing Angst retrogressively from the present to Greek times, the following list reveals the conceptual integrity of angh- throughout the classical and Old High German linguistic traditions:

- Suffixed from angh-os-ti became in German Angst and in Old High German Angest.
- Suffixed from angh-os-to became in Latin angustus, meaning "narrow."
- The root angh- became in Latin angere, meaning "to strangle or draw tight."
- The root angh- became in Greek anchine, meaning "to squeeze."
- The root angh- became in Greek anchone, meaning "a strangling."

This list is by no means exhaustive. The etymology of Angst appears to be likewise bound to the Greek concept of Ananke, the force of binding necessity, an additional connection which incidently does not appear in the special lexicon cited above. Nevertheless
the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the close knit relationship between Angst and Ananke, a relationship vividly revealed by the American depth psychologist, James Hillman, and one suggested earlier by Heinz Schreckenberg. If these two thinkers are correct in their analyses (and there is no reason to suspect that they are not), then the etymological history of Angst goes far deeper than the Indo European root angh-; indeed it goes into the very ground of prehistory itself. On the basis of Hillman's insight, we may extend the root of Angst back into the ancient Near Eastern civilizations; beginning with contemporary Arabic iznak and ending at the founding concept of ancient Egyptian hnk which, like the Latin angustus, also means "narrow."

It must be pointed out that this connection between Angst and Ananke appears to be the responsibility of Hillman rather than Schreckenberg. Hillman notes that Schreckenberg's evidence for the Near Eastern connection between Ananke and hnk "... extends far further than this digest and it tallies with the more usual etymologies of Ananke, relating it with the German eng (narrow), with angina, angst and anxiety, and agchein (Greek) to strangle, and with agham (Sanskrit, evil)."

Provisional Analysis

What is revealed about Angst in these etymological excursions into the murky and remote dawn of human history? First, it is clear that early man experienced Angst as an intense physical sensation
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<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>iznak</td>
<td>-the cord that binds yoked oxen</td>
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<td>Arabic</td>
<td>hannaka</td>
<td>-necklace</td>
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<td>Arabic</td>
<td>hanaqu</td>
<td>-strangle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaldean</td>
<td>hanakin</td>
<td>-fetters lain on the necks of prisoners</td>
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<td>Hebrew</td>
<td>anak</td>
<td>-chain formed necklace</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syriac</td>
<td>hnk</td>
<td>-chain, suffocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkadian</td>
<td>hanaqu</td>
<td>-constrict, strangle, to wind tightly around the neck, as the band of a slave</td>
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<td>Coptic</td>
<td>chalak</td>
<td>-ring</td>
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<td>Old Egyptian</td>
<td>enek</td>
<td>-surround, embrace, strangle</td>
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<td>Old Egyptian</td>
<td>hng</td>
<td>-throat</td>
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<td>Old Egyptian</td>
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rather than a self-conscious emotion. This is not hard to understand when it is observed that there is no clear evidence to suggest the presence of self-consciousness in primitive man, a point to which we shall later return. Secondly, Angst was experienced by ancient man as a binding force; later perhaps, even a metaphysical force which in the Greek world-view came to be Ananke, the goddess of necessity, who binds the gods and men alike, and who with Chronos, the god of time, keeps the cosmos together.

But all of this is preliminary and serves only as a "first cut" on an explicit interpretation of Angst. It seems clear that as this phenomenon discloses itself throughout the Near Eastern, Greek, Roman, Old High German, and Modern German traditions, it alters the face that it shows. From primitive terror of death by strangulation to the subtle and complex existential and phenomenological interpretations of it in contemporary thought, Angst seems to turn around a central theme: a pre-reflective apprehension of how Dasein is restricted or thwarted by Sein. To couch this in the theological context that dominates all but the very tip of the Western tradition of thought, Angst is, then, the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss between God and man. In the following section, we shall attempt to ground this interpretation by an examination of mythopoeic thought and its consequences for primitive man.

Angst and Mythopoeic Thought

It can be argued, successfully one would think, that prehistoric man is not yet Dasein. Why is this so? For one thing,
primitive man does not yet possess an explicit concept of World as the transcendental totality of entities which, as a whole, forms a meaning context wherein his ownmost being is understood and interpreted. For another, primitive man appears to relate to his environment in a magical way rather than in a way governed by explicit onto-cosmological guidelines for understanding and interpreting his ownmost being. What we will argue here that the concept of World comes into being through the medium of mythopoeic thought: that kind of thinking which speculates on the origin and the telos of the Cosmos and which is expressed in poetic myths of creation. Indeed, the meaning and significance of the creation myth phenomenon seems to be precisely that it represents a first effort to articulate (Rede) a new and fundamentally ontological understanding (Verstehen) of Being which results from an enormously powerful but pre-reflective apprehension (Grundfindlichkeit) which reveals that primordial Chaos logically precedes Cosmos. As we shall see, this primordial Chaos is almost universally schematized in the metaphor of the Abyss.

This pre-reflective apprehension of meaninglessness behind the lived-world is what we shall call "primordial Angst" in this chapter. It may be described further as an apprehension which is at once both fascinating and daunting: fascinating because of the enormous power and intensity of the feeling, and daunting because of the terror it engenders. Primordial Angst, then, is a kind of "gut-level" apprehension of an absolute groundlessness of being expressed as an Abyss; a feeling that there may be no meaning to
existence in the lived-world of experience; a feeling that there may be no transcendental unity to experience; a feeling that there may be no transcendental meaning context that abides behind and beyond the lived experience of primitive man. This feeling, as we hope to show in the following pages, has many faces throughout the history of Western thought. It is the purpose of this chapter to discover these faces and to show how primordial Angst is at the center of each. Let us begin, however, with a look at the ground phenomenon, primordial Angst.

**Primitive Man and His Environing World**

The texts of the ancient Near East show beyond doubt that primitive man did not "think" or reason as does modern Dasein. The evidence suggests, for example, that primitive man did not use as a conceptual tool anything like an independent principle of casualty. Likewise, he was not capable of formally distinguishing between reality and appearance, between subject apart from object, or between internal and external use of time and space as we, modern and thoroughly scientific Dasein, understand these concepts. Rather, primitive man appears to have enjoyed a special magical relationship with his environment, often substituting the conceptual for the perceptual and often seeing personality and will in what we call "inanimate objects." This appears, in fact, to be the root of Animism and is a direct intuition of an "I-Thou" relationship between ancient man and the "objects" of his experience, such as stones,
trees, animals or the wind. Each of these, along with the potent natural forces of the earth, was for primitive man imbued with a unique personality and will of its own. No one has described this special relationship better than has Henri Frankfort, who observes: The world appears to primitive man neither inanimate nor empty but redundant with life; and life has individuality, in man and beast and plant, and in every phenomenon which confronts man—the thunderclap, the sudden shower, the eerie and unknown clearing in the wood, the stone which suddenly hurts him when he stumbles while on a hunting trip. Any phenomenon may at any time face him, not as "It" but as "Thou." In this confrontation, "Thou" reveals its individuality, its qualities, its will. "Thou" is not contemplated with intellectual detachment, it is expressed as life confronting life, involving every faculty of man in a reciprocal relationship. Thoughts, no less than acts and feelings, are subordinated to this experience.9

When this special relationship between man and his environment is disrupted or uprooted by the operations of inexplicable "natural" forces that defy understanding and interpretation, primordial Angst is first revealed. Primitive man, who in abject terror, quakes in the face of a thunder and lightning storm that sets the trees ablaze, who watches in anger and frustration as the flood carries off his mate and offspring, who gazes with horror at the leprosy that emasculates his own flesh, and who can do absolutely nothing about these experiences; this man begins to know Angst in its most terrible and dark face; for it is not so much the phenomena themselves that give rise to his terror, awe, and horror as it is the first primitive urgings to question why are these things happening? and by far more important, why are they happening to us? Primordial Angst, then, is here a pre-reflective apprehension that something is wrong, or out of place in the way that "things should
work" or in the magical relationships that form a "I-Thou" animistic meaning-context wherein primitive man interprets his lifeworld. It is in the awful mystery of this "Why?" that primordial Angst is first revealed, because to that question there is at the outset no satisfactory answer. Thus, it is in primordial Angst that the first primitive attempts at an answer are made possible by an overwhelming demand for justification and meaning to chaotic experience.

Answers to such questions and demands take the form of mythopoeic thought, the means whereby primitive man transcends the naivete of Animism and emerges into a Cosmos: a new conceptual order wherein man becomes Dasein—a being who is set over against Being as the transcendental totality of all beings in a contextual and referential World. The significance and meaning of World as Cosmos is now capable of being revealed in an elaborate and sometimes obscure system of mutual interconnections. It remains now to show how mythopoeic thought was carried out in those different civilizations which have profoundly influenced the western traditions. To do this we need to look at their respective creation myths.

The Creation Myths of the Ancient Near East

In the Mesopotamia of the dawn of History (c. 5000 to 3500 BCE), an early creation myth that typifies mythopoeic thought declares that in the beginning there was only Nammu, the great goddess-mother and the oceanic abyss. Nammu was conceived as a vast womblike no-thingness from which all beings emerged. In a much
later Babylonian version of the creation (c. second millennium BCE) entitled the "Enuma Elish," the tale of primal and abysmal mother is reinterpreted as vengeful Tia'mat; who must be slain by Marduk, god of Babylon, so that her corpse can be split into the dome of sky above and the earth below, thereby forming Cosmos. It is not incidental that in this creation myth, Marduk fashions men to serve the gods as though by afterthought, for in so doing, he forever places Babylonian Dasein in the yoke of slavery to the gods.

In Egypt, an entirely different set of circumstances obtained. In the beginning, it was said, there was only Nun, the father of all being and likewise conceived as a watery abyss. From Nun arose Atum, the primeval hillock identified by the very ancient Egyptians as the creator god. Atum, in turn, created the Enniad of the Egyptian pantheon: Shu-Tefnut, Geb-Nut, Osiris-Isis and Seth-Nephthys. In the Egyptian account, there is also identified the primeval Ogdoad, or "Eight Weird Creatures" that make up the watery Abyss. The Ogdoad was, as we shall see, to profoundly impact the later Genesis account of creation. There were: Nun, the abysmal waters and his consort, Naunet; Kuk, the darkness and his consort Kauket; Huh, the boundless stretches of the formless and his consort Hauket; and finally Amun, the hidden intangibility of the abyss and his consort, Amunet.

In the Hebrew version of the creation myth at least three of these Egyptian Ogdoad reappear as the primordial condition present before the creation of the universe by Yahweh. "In the beginning of
creation," the Book of Genesis begins, "when God made heaven and earth, the earth was without form and void, with darkness over the face of the abyss . . . " The King James version translates the Hebrew phrase "hosek al-penai tehōm" as "darkness was upon the face of the deep." But as Gerhard Von Rad has suggested, the word "tehōm" in Hebrew is unquestionably related to Tia'mat, the Babylonian abyss mentioned above. Likewise it is clear that the darkness referred in the Hebrew version, "hosek al-penai tehōm," hosek is a clear echo of Kūk, the Egyptian primordial darkness.

In the Greek tradition, Homer was acutely aware of the primordial waters of Okeanos, "from whom the gods are sprung." But in Hesiod's Theogony, the abyss metaphor is replaced by airy chaos, conceived by Hesiod as a yawning gap " . . . that is filled with heat when Zeus makes his thunderbolts." Along with Chaos, Earth and Eros form the primordial trinity that was present before the creation. Thus, Chaos in very early Greek mythology was neither a watery abyss nor a formless disorder, but rather the yawning gap between the dome of heaven and earth. A second Greek account of creation is given in Plato's Timaeus, but we shall for the present pass over it here with the promise to discuss it again in a later section of this chapter. There special attention will be devoted to the Timaeus in relation to Ananke or "necessity." Suffice to say for the present that for Plato, Chaos was indeed envisioned as a primal and disorderly movement, but not specifically as an abyss.
Early Dasein's World

What is revealed in these respective creation myths is a mode of being wherein newly emerging Dasein finds itself vis-à-vis the Cosmos-Ontos that is created. In Mesopotamia and Babylonia, as was indicated above, Dasein became secure in mythopoeic thought by determining its place in the Cosmos as a slave to the whims of the gods. Thus, the Cosmos was envisioned as a limitless political state in which there was created a fundamental world order upon which Mesopotamian Dasein could depend. Dasein's primary virtue, then, was well defined and well understood. It was one of absolute obedience to the gods. And what was the reward for such obedience? It was the protection of the gods and the reception of rewards and favors from them for health, wealth, long life, honor, and perhaps most important, many sons.21

Egyptian Dasein was apparently very secure in the vigor of Egypt's youth in the old Kingdom. The life giving waters of Nile delta, teeming with lush greenery in the midst of the baked and arid desert, instilled a sense of confidence in life for the early Egyptians; that is, the life affirming waters demonstrated that the principle of Ma'at was functioning as the guarantor of Egypt's abundance. Ma'at, an Egyptian goddess, was interpreted by ancient Egyptian Dasein as the principle of justice or truth, a principle, moreover, that applied equally to all the gods and goddesses as well as to humans through the medium of the Pharoah. Belief in Ma'at extended throughout the roughly forty centuries of Egypt's glory.
Hence, the role of Dasein in the Egyptian cosmos was to conduct its life in accordance with the principle of Ma'at, for without such a principle, the chaos of Nun would surely return. "Ma'at," says Von Rad, "guarantees the continuance of world, of both the cosmic world and the social world of men. Gods and men live by it." Dasein's place in the Egyptian Cosmos, then, was not only to conduct its life in accordance with Ma'at, but to "... translate it into reality and hand it on." Ma'at therefore is Egyptian Dasein's solution to the daunting apprehension of primordial Angst. By capturing Being in the web of Ma'at, Egyptian Dasein was redeemed from the terrors and awe of the primal forces and ruthless Mit-Dasein of the "barbarian" people surrounding Egypt. Belief in this primary universal force of justice and truth therefore serves to cover-over the more primitive primordial Angst that was engendered by the apprehension of the dark abyss of Nun.

In the ancient Hebrew tradition, it was the power and personality of Yahweh himself that defined the proper role of Hebrew Dasein vis-à-vis a monotheistic conception of Being. Yahweh's original covenant with Israel for the first time defines a specific ontic role of Dasein in the Hebrew tradition in the form of the Ten Commandments. Dasein's ontological role, however, was grounded in the notion of fearful reverence. Thus, it was a direct personal commitment of faith in God or a reverential "fear of the Lord" that provided the ontological ground for Hebrew Dasein's conception of Being in ancient Israel. If Hebrew Dasein's primordial Angst was lessened
through the vehicle of the Yahweh-Israel covenant, it was clearly never eradicated. Indeed, Angst is most visible in the wisdom and prophetic literature of the Old Testament, again later surfacing in the synoptic gospels of the New Testament, as we shall see.

As we hope to show in the following section concerning the Joban theme, primordial Angst becomes visible as "onto-theological Angst," a facet of Angst that is at the very root of Hebrew Dasein's understanding and interpretation of Being. Indeed, such modes of Angst show themselves as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Hebrew Dasein perhaps far more than any other Near Eastern tradition, again as we shall presently see.

As for the Greeks, it must be remembered at the outset that the so-called "pre-Socratic" thinkers, Thales, Anaxamander, Anaximenes et al., were utterly unique in the Greek tradition of thought even in their own time. Indeed, their not so primitive attempts to account for change, apparently without recourse to a deity, is precisely what makes their contribution to Western thought so valuable. It is this Ionian proto-scientific account of change coupled with a free spirit of inquiry that set these early lovers of wisdom apart from their contemporaries; and specifically from the earlier cult religion centering around the Bull-god, Dionysus.

Dionysian cultism was brought to Boeotia by Thracian tribes who were migrating from their homeland. The cult of Dionysus spread rapidly throughout Attica, to the Aegean Islands, and finally to Peloponnesus itself. The essence of such rituals centered around
the unique concept of orgy, a term which originally meant simply, "act of ritual," and which was a word specifically used in connection with the Eleusinian mysteries and the Dionysian omophagia. The descriptions of the contents of such orgies can hardly be interpreted as simple degeneracy or insanity. Rather, ancient Greek Dasein, since its survival depended upon nature's moods, both happily celebrated the birth of Spring and dreadfully mourned the death of Fall. These rituals were, in short, the praxis of mythopoeic thought, whereby primordial Angst was assuaged in a quest for union with the divine.

The excesses of these cults were soon tempered by the Homeric Greeks; that is, the cannibalism and sexual excesses were checked and rechanneled into more ritualized and therefore more cerebral practices that led down the path to Western mysticism. The Dionysian cults became merged with the Eleusian agricultural rites, and ultimately by the seventh century BCE they blended with Orphism to form a unique religion based upon a combination of the notions of original sin, divinity of the soul, and transmigration.

The frenzy of cultism, with its goal of union with the divine, reveals the pre-reflective apprehension that characterizes primordial Angst. It was only later that such Angst became devitalized in Orphism, but it was originally the potent foundation upon which the Greek mystery cults stood. Primordial Angst again determines the conditions which made possible the frenzied orgies, ritual sacrifices, drunkenness, sexual abandonment, and bestial dances of the Dionysians. In such practices, Dasein was freed from
ontic concerns and merged, so it is claimed with Being or nature's essence in the form of Dionysus the Bull-god. Hence, these were colorful and primitive attempts to merge with the divine, an ecstatic union that establishes a firm precedent for the mystical tradition of the West, a tradition that as we shall see provided the medium whereby Angst was to manifest itself from the time of Augustine to that of Jacob Boehme.

Our point in this discussion, however, has not been to minimize in any way the role of the so-called pre-Socratic philosophers in the Greek tradition. Rather we have tried to point out that as twentieth century thinkers, we often tend to obscure the importance of the mystery cults of ancient Greece. For a fortiori even the proto-scientific gropings of Thales can be interpreted as being imbued with primordial Angst. After all, the three doctrines of Thales, namely: (1) that water is the nature of all things; (2) that all things are possessed with a soul; and (3) that all things are filled with daemons or gods, implies the presence of mythopoeic thought par excellence; namely, that the gods cause motion, is a notion firmly grounded in the primordial Angst tradition that has been the topic of this section. Such Angst is the Grundbefindlichkeit for the other Ionians as well; for behind their attempts to explain the nature and operations of the cosmos there lurks the realization that to explain change is in some sense to rob it of its power over Dasein. So, when Aristotle ignores the second and third propositions of Thales, and focuses in on Hylozoism,
he covers over the glimmer of primordial Angst that shows itself in Thales' thought expressed in the early doctrine of the soul and of demons to explain motion.

Thus, for early Greek Dasein, the cult practices captured Being and allowed Dasein, if only for a flickering moment, to participate in Being personified in the form of Dionysus. This meant that Dasein's place in such a Cosmos was originally conditioned by the forces of nature and only then grew through the stages of sympathetic magic, totemism, daemonism, and finally the mystery gods of the cults. Dasein's place was one of worship and sacrifice and orgiastic ritual participation to quell the primordial Angst which looms close indeed to the surface of such a world-view.

Angst and the Near Eastern Wisdom Literature

The cosmologies we have discussed in the previous section, namely those of the Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Hebrew, and Greek civilizations, are each self-contained in their respective ontological assumptions regarding the Cosmos. But in the Near Eastern texts as a whole there is a jointly shared theme that discloses another face of primordial Angst. It is the task of this section to discover this new face which we shall designate as "onto-theological Angst," to distinguish it descriptively from "primordial Angst."

Onto-theological Angst can occur only in Dasein's life-world where the transcendental totality of beings is interpreted as a Supreme Being, which then becomes schematized as a pantheon of
deities or of a monotheistic God. Onto-theological Angst, then, refers to a pre-reflective apprehension of a disrelationship between Being and beings, interpreted as a breakdown in relations between "Deity" and the "creatures of god." This apprehension arises as a source of objective uncertainty regarding the relationship between man and God, which prior to the apprehension was certain and secure, grounded so to speak in the priestly dogma which grew out of the creation myths that gave meaning to the life-world of Dasein. When the apprehension occurs, Dasein is fundamentally uprooted from the gods or God as the transcendental ground or source of its world, and is left in the face of an abyss of meaninglessness.

Character of Wisdom Literature

In the ancient Near Eastern tradition, such onto-theological Angst is most poignantly revealed in the wisdom literature tradition. "Wisdom literature" is a generic name used to designate a specific genre of writings in the ancient Near Eastern texts such as, for example, the Old Testament of the Bible. Generally speaking, there appears to be two contrary species of wisdom literature: (1) The "Old Wisdom" wing, a conservative, didactic, pragmatic, and optimistic body of writings that include instructions to youths aspiring to high positions, collections of proverbs and precepts, an emphasis on moral character and proper demeanor, as well as support for the prevailing social climate of opinion; and (2) the "Theological Wisdom" wing, a radically questioning, openly challenging, and
critically evaluative body of writings that include questions of moral integrity, dialogues concerning the purpose of existence, monologues on the emptiness of human life on Earth as well as profound questions concerning the reasons why the innocent suffer. The _locus classicus_ for the Old Wisdom wing in the Hebrew tradition is the Book of Proverbs of the Old Testament. In the Egyptian tradition, it is _The Instruction of Amen-em-ope_. 28 Finally, in the Mesopotamian tradition, it is the _Noun List_ 9 of Sumer. The major examples of the Theological Wisdom wing are principally Job and Qoheleth in the Hebrew tradition, _The Divine Attributes of Pharaoh_ 30 in the Egyptian tradition, and _A Dialogue about Human Misery_, also called "the Babylonian Theodicy," 31 in the Mesopotamian tradition.

In a chapter of this scope it is clearly not possible to examine each of these texts in detail, nor, we suspect, would such a task prove useful to the question at hand. Thus, to ground the discussion of onto-theological _Angst_ in the Wisdom Literature, we will discuss it within the context of a theme which each of these cultures shared; namely the theme of innocent suffering, sometimes called "The Joban theme."

**The Joban Theme**

The earliest version of the Joban theme is to be formed in an ancient Sumerian text written c. 6000-5500 BCE wherein the theme of innocent suffering first appears. W. G. Lambert, translator of a series of plates he has entitled the "Mina-Arni" texts, shows that
the problem of innocent suffering may begin with Mina-Arni stating: "I have been treated as one who has committed a sin against his God." The theme is carried further in S. N. Kramer's translation of "Man and His God," wherein a formerly rich, wise, and uprighteous man is now tormented with sickness and anguish for no justification he can understand. But adhering to the Mesopotamian belief that no man is free of sin, the protagonist accepts his fate, prays for deliverance, and receives it finally; but again with no justification for such deliverance. In yet a later version, this time in the form of a monologue entitled, "I Will Praise the Lord of Wisdom," also known as "The Babylonian Job," a morally upright man is abandoned by his friends and his god. In the depths of onto-theological Angst, he cries out:

I gave my attention to supplication and prayer; sacrifice was my rule; the day for reverencing the god was a joy to my heart! ... I wish I knew that these things were pleasing to one's god! ... Who knows the will of the god's in heaven? A final example of the Mesopotamian versions of the Joban theme is entitled, "The Babylonian Theodicy." In this work, closest in style and format to the Old Testament Book of Job, the protagonist is once again an innocent sufferer who is comforted by a single friend instead of three as in Job. Bemoaning his unjust suffering, the protagonist pleads with onto-theological Angst, "Can a life of bliss be assured? I wish I knew." His traditionalistic comrade advises him to have patience and hold firmly to his faith; for, "the way of the gods is remote, ... knowledge of it difficult."
In a third millennium BCE Egyptian text entitled, "A Dispute over Suicide," there occurs an internal debate of a man with his soul as to the expediency of suicide when life becomes impossible: again onto-theological Angst is revealed when the protagonist laments:

To whom can I speak today?
I am laden with wretchedness
For lack of an intimate (friend).
To whom can I speak today?
The sun which treads the earth,
It has no end.

Likewise in this Egyptian tradition, a second version of the Joban theme is dated at roughly the second millennium BCE and is entitled "Tale of the Eloquent Peasant." This work is concerned, however, with the general problem of justice rather than with onto-theological Angst. It must be mentioned, if only for the sake of completeness, that there are in it marked literary parallels to Job placed within the context of the principle of justice à la Ma'at vis-à-vis innocent suffering.

Finally, there is the Old Testament Book of Job itself, considered to rank among the greatest works of world literature ever produced in its own right (i.e., apart from being a Book of the Old Testament). The story of Job's suffering; of the attempts of his friends, Eliphaz, Bilbad, Zophar, and Elihu to advise and console him; of Job's demand for Elohim to justify himself to Job; of God's awesome questioning that ultimately convicts Job; and of Job's return to the grace of God: these facets of the tale are well known and require no elaboration here. What is important to discuss
here is the place of onto-theological \textit{Angst} in the Book of Job. From our point of view, such \textit{Angst} is disclosed as the primary disposition or the \textit{Grundbefindlichkeit} of the entire poem. How is this so?

Reduced to its essence, the Joban theme can be posed in the form of questions from the righteous sufferer to his deity which might proceed along the following lines:

Why, God, must I suffer when I have lived in accordance with your divine commandments? Why must I suffer when I am therefore guilty of no sin against you? Why must I suffer when I have trusted in you completely, held you in reverence, and maintained my faith in you as the Creator and sustainer of my being and of Being itself?

Surely, these questions are no mere request for information. They go far deeper than that into the grounds of a creature-creator relationship—a relationship originally established in the mythopoeic thought which gave rise to the creation myth in the first place. At root, then, these questions are more of a \textit{demand} by the creature that the creator \textit{justify}—not simply explain—why the righteous suffer.

But in a broader context, the questions demand a divine assurance that the intentions of God are, at least in the case of Israel, consistent with the Old Covenant. Archetypal Job, then, is a \textit{Dasein} thrown into a world of suffering that is incapable of clear interpretation. Further, this \textit{Dasein}, fallen from the Grace of Being, must endure the pregnant silence of God's voice, hoping for deliverance from a terrible fate literally worse than death. But what is this terrible fate? Surely it is not just the anguish of physical suffering. Indeed, Job has shown that such anguish can be
endured. Rather it is onto-theological Angst, the Angst in the still voice of Elohim's silence, from which Job seeks deliverance. And what does God's silence reveal? It reveals for Job as Dasein a heretofore unsuspected abyss existing between creator and creature, between archetypal Job and his god or gods. But at root, what Job as Dasein experiences in God's silence is that it is impossible for Dasein to fully understand and interpret God as the transcendental totality of Being; a realization that jars Dasein and uproots it from its complacent and smug grasp of God qua Being as such. In Job's case, therefore, he demands a face-to-face confrontation with Elohim as a direct result of his onto-theological Angst, crying out:

Terror upon terror overwhelms me
it sweeps away my resolution like
the wind
and my hope of victory vanishes like
a cloud . . .
I call for help, but thou dost not answer;
I stand up to plead, but thou sittest aloof
thou hast turned cruelly against me
and with thy strong hand pursuest
me in hatred.42

To be sure, these are strong words; especially those of the last line cited where Job believes Elohim hates him. This is possible, we suggest, only because of the abysmal depth of Job's onto-theological Angst. Such Angst is no mere ontic feeling of "anxiety," "dread," or "anguish." It is a basic disposition toward the ground of Job's being, or perhaps more to the point, toward the absence (silence) of
the ground of Job's being. Thus, it is this onto-theological Angst, an immediate but objectively uncertain recognition of an infinite abyss that separates Dasein (Job) from Sein (Elohim) that gives the Joban theme, the theme of innocent suffering, its profoundly touching point, power, and universality.

This theme and the onto-theological Angst that is uncovered in it, are carried over, of course, to Deutero-Isaiah where it again emerges in the theme of the Suffering Servant. It again reappears in the New Testament in the synoptic gospels as the theme of the Suffering Savior. Thus, this universal theme of suffering and the Angst revealed in it provides a major theological and ontological nexus between the Old and New Testaments. But to inquire further into this point would take this discussion far afield from its present course. Thus, with some regret, we now move on to an examination of primordial Angst as it was uniquely interpreted by the ancient Greek tradition. For there, in ancient Greece, the etymological guide of Angst as a constricting, choking, binding, and restricting apprehension shows itself most clearly in the Greek conception of Ananke as necessity.

Angst and Ananke—The Greek Contribution

To begin the discussion of Angst and Greek thought it is necessary to backtrack as promised to Plato's account of the creation of the Timaeus; for in this work there is disclosed another facet of the Angst phenomenon which we shall call "strictural Angst" to
distinguish it descriptively from the "primordial Angst" and the "onto-theological Angst" of the previous sections. Structural Angst, as a face of primordial Angst, shows itself as a pre-reflective apprehension of the restrictions placed in Dasein's will by onto- logical necessity, a notion schematized by the Greeks as the goddess, Ananke.

Turning, then, to the creation myth according to Plato's Timaeus, it is argued that the ordering of the Cosmos from the primordial Chaos, or pre-ontological state of disorderly motion, was carried out by the Demiurge as the efficient cause of such ordering. This would not have been possible, however, had it not been for the aid of two independent first principles who in their personified forms were utterly independent from the Demiurge. According to the Cornford translation, such an ordering was accomplished in the following way:

Now the forgoing discourse . . . has set forth the works wrought by the craftsmanship of Reason [Nous]; but we must now set beside them the things that come about by necessity [Ananke]. For the generation of this universe was a mixed result of the combination of Necessity by persuading her to guide the greatest part of the things that become towards what is best; in that way and on that principle this universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over Necessity.43 (Italics added.)

The reader will recall from the opening section of this chapter that there appears to be strong evidence for an etymological connection between Angst and Ananke interpreted by the Greeks as "necessity." In the Timaeus passage above, Ananke appears as the errant cause of creation. Ananke, then, is a principle that has the
following characteristics associated with it for the Greeks:
Rambling, digressing, irrational, irresponsible, deviating, irregular, and random. 44 For Plato, Ananke is a true arche, that is, a "first principle" not derived or derivable from anything else. Its role as errant cause in the creation myth is, we propose, a schematization of the first blush of stricture Angst, the Angst experienced in the pre-reflective apprehension of limits to reason and more specifically to freedom of the will. This view finds confirmation in Plato's depiction of Ananke given in the Cratylus. Plato there observes that the idea of Ananke "... is taken from walking through a ravine which is impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion—and thus is the derivation of the word necessity." 45

The Character of Ananke in Greek Thought

But the conception of Ananke as binding necessity, or of "no way out" of a given situation, predates Plato's writings and goes back to Orphic and Pythagorean mythology where Ananke was mated with the great serpent Chronos. Thus, Ananke (necessity), and Chronos (time), form a binding ring encircling the entire Cosmos, limiting the possibilities of our intellect, will, and desires. One cannot exist without the other and the results for Dasein are nowhere better described than by Hillman.

Time and Necessity set limits to all the possibilities of our outward extension, of our worldly reaches. Together they form a syzygy, an archetypal pair, inherently related, so that where one is the other is too. When we are under the compulsion of necessity, we experience it in terms of time, e.g., the chronic complaints, the repeated return of
the same enclosing and fettering complexes, the anxiety occasioned by the shortness of our days, our daily duties, our "deadlines."46

This extremely insightful observation discloses the role of anxiety in Greek thought, but it only hints at a much deeper role of Angst as an ontological phenomenon rather than its ontic form. For ontological Angst as the necessity which binds men, the gods, and the Cosmos itself is clearly prior to the anxiety of man. Such anxiety can only be an ontic manifestation or individual instance of ontological or strictural Angst.

This strictural Angst first strikes here as well as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Greek Dasein. It is only then that it can be interpreted and understood through schematization and personification as Ananke, mythologically interpreted as a goddess but later becoming the idea of necessity in philosophic thought. As an idea, Angst-Ananke is interpreted as an errant cause which Dasein recognizes in the irrational, the irresponsible or the indirect, and which possesses the attributes of rambling, disgressing, etc., discussed above. Ananke becomes in the soul (psyche), the producer of irrationality and frustration. It becomes in the broader context of the Cosmos, the dialectical opposite of Nous, of which the Cosmos is then an admixture. The absolute and literal centrality of the idea of Ananke is revealed in R. B. Owens' "The Knees of the Gods"47 where she is interpreted as the spindle of the universe. She governs the movement of the soul (and thereby its freedom) as well as the motion of the stars. Ananke, then, as the personification
of Angst is the "still point of the turning universe" for the Greeks, who must be persuaded by Nous to "guide the greatest part of things that become toward what is best."

The idea of necessity viewed apart from its strictural Angst associations becomes stripped of its irrational power by the time of Aristotle's Metaphysics. In that work Ananke becomes an internal principle identified as a function of the nature of things, defined as "that which impedes and tends to hinder, contrary to purpose." This bland, mechanical, and leveled interpretation of Ananke is what has in Hillman's view determined our thinking about Ananke ever since. It is a perfect example in our own view of how the power of Angst has been fundamentally and systematically covered over by the Western metaphysical tradition; an indictment frequently made by Heidegger, but not, so far as we know, in this instance.

Ananke and the Tragedians

This leveled view of Ananke was certainly not appropriated by the Greek tragedians, the contemporaries and in many ways the competitors of the Greek philosophers. For the tragedians Ananke retains all the power of strictural Angst. Consider, for example, the plaintive cry of Aeschylus' bound Prometheus:

Oh Woe is me!  
I groan for the present sorrow  
I groan for the sorrow to come, I groan  
questioning where there shall come a time  
when He shall ordain a limit to my sufferings.  
What am I saying? I have known all before,  
All that shall be, and clearly known; to me,  
nothing that hurts shall come with a new face.  
So much I bear, as lightly as I can,
Destiny that fate has given me; for I know well against Necessity [Ananke], against its strength, no one can fight and win.

Like Job, Prometheus suffers not from physical anguish, but rather from the Angst of his existential situation. But unlike Job, Prometheus fully understands that situation as the re-striction of his freedom, and his will.

Euripedes, in his Alcestis, defined the utter aloofness of the goddess Ananke: "She alone is goddess without alter or image to pray before. She needs no sacrifice." Ananke is not a power to which man can appeal. As a goddess she binds the freedom of both gods and men. From her web, no escape is ever possible. Thus, the metaphors attached to the conception of Ananke as goddess are binding, encircling, cords, nooses, collars, knots, spindles, wreathes, harnesses, and yokes: all metaphors for her re-strictive and con-strictive aspects in a strictural context, the birth of which is the Grundfindlichkeit of strictural Angst.

Hence, at the roots of Greek thought, primordial Angst becomes strictural Angst personified by the goddess Ananke as necessity. In the philosophy of Aristotle, the Angst is covered over and buried. In the tradition of the tragedians, the Angst shows clearly through. It is Schreckenberg who has made possible an understanding of the role of Ananke in Greek thought, and his discovery must be accorded a place of honor among the accomplishments of contemporary hermeneutics.
We shall return to the notion of stricture Angst in the concluding chapter of this work, but a fuller investigation into it at this point would not contribute further to this chapter. We pass on, therefore, to an examination of Angst as it shows itself at the historical convergence of the Near Eastern and Greek traditions, the roughly one thousand year period known as the Hellenistic period of late antiquity.

Here the theme of uprootedness is again encountered with renewed intensity; and again Angst in the face of the abyss shows itself as a central core of gnostic thought. Thus, it is to Gnosticism that we now turn as the locus classicus for such Angst. It should be noted, however, that in moving from the early and middle periods of Greek antiquity directly to the gnostic synthesis of East and West, our intent is not to skip over the ethical systems of Stoicism and Epicureanism or the contributions of Neo-Platonism to a full account of Angst. For indeed, Angst is there in these traditions with high visibility, in stoic thought in particular. But space limitations require that the proverbial line must be drawn somewhere, and so we regretfully omit until a later occasion discussion of them.

**The Angst of Gnosis**

In this section, we hope to uncover and describe phenomenologically another facet of Angst which for the sake of clarity we shall call "pneumatical Angst" to distinguish it descriptively from
the three facets discussed previously. It would be helpful to repeat here, however, that these facets are not mutually exclusive. To be sure, they are but differing ways of interpreting the ground phenomenon of primordial Angst as the pre-reflective apprehension of the essential incompleteness and ambiguity of the life-world revealed first in the terror and awe experienced by primitive man in the face of the abyss or of Chaos. The differing facets are hermeneutical interpretations of this primordial Angst, interpretations possible only within the context of a Cosmos as Ontos. This having been noted, we turn now to a general description of Gnosticism as propaedeutic to the discovery of pneumatical Angst in the Hellenistic period.

General Features of Gnosticism

Very generally speaking, the world of Hellenistic Dasein was permeated with uprootedness, change, value confusion, and a general ontic anxiety in the face of bustling confusion, especially at the early stages of the eclecticism that resulted from Alexander's conquests. Likewise it was an exciting, robust period of vast spiritual change. But beneath the stacatto lifestyle of cosmopolitanism, the dark current of ontological Angst moved forward as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Hellenistic Dasein, the horizons of which had considerably expanded by virtue of a syncretic blending of the cultures of the Near East on the one hand and of Greece and later Rome on the other. More specifically, the characteristics that
marked the Hellenistic world-view wherein pneumatical Angst is revealed are: (1) the growth of Hellenized Judaism, with Philo of Alexandria as its chief spokesman; (2) the development and dissemination of Babylonian astrology, magic, and fatalism; (3) the flourishing of the Eastern mystery cults, such as Zoroastrianism, and their evolution into spiritual mystery religions; (4) the rise of Christianity to prominence and influence; (5) the general efflorescence of Gnosticism from Coptic and Hebrew sources; (6) the upsurge of transcendental philosophical movements of late antiquity, beginning with Neopythagoreanism and culminating in Neoplatonism.

Against this background, Dasein was ontically a cosmopolite; that is "a good citizen of the cosmos." Such citizenship was a moral end for Dasein, meaning that Dasein was in possession of the universal logos qua citizen of the Cosmos. This gives rise to an utterly new phase of being-in-the-world, the concept of being-a-private-person or a "self"; an idea that was not possible in the tribalistic mentality of the Near East nor, for that matter, in the city-state Weltanschauungen of Hellenic Greece. Dasein was no longer "of the polis" or "of the tribe," but rather of the Cosmos itself. As Dasein, man was freed to pursue his own ends; a big step indeed, as it makes possible for the first time the interpretation of a free-being whose allegiances are to himself first and to his community second. But such freedom also fundamentally uprooted Dasein, cutting it off from the cultural traditions and presuppositions that had previously provided a pre-reflective meaning context.
for interpreting the flux of the life-world. Hellenistic Dasein was therefore forced to regain new grounds for interpreting existence; for at first glance, the isolated world seemed cold, hostile and markedly alien. That thought tended to permeate Hellenistic Dasein's understanding of its environing world as we shall see.

The Grundbemfinlichkeit that accompanies this understanding (Verstehen) was, of course, Angst; a basic Angst which shows through in the writings of the Gnostic tradition. So, in order to understand the Angst of Hellenistic Dasein it is necessary first to understand something of the religio-philosophical movement known by the collective and generic name, "Gnosticism."

The English word "gnostic" comes from the Greek word "Gnosis" which means "revealed knowledge." Thus, Gnosis is not to be confused with Episteme or "discursive knowledge." Rather, Gnosis has a religious, spiritual quality to it that aligns it with the province of faith more than of reason, the heart more than the mind. Specifically, Gnosis means a revealed knowledge of a transmundane God. It was considered to be a practical form of knowledge whereby the essence of man, his spirit or pneuma, could attain salvation and return to the Godhead beyond the evil Cosmos. For gnostic thought, then, this world was not the creation of the ultimate, transmundane God. Rather it was created by a malevolent Demiurge, sometimes associated with Yahweh, who was utterly ignorant of the transmundane Godhead above his limited being. For the gnostic it is the malevolent ignorance of the Demiurge that accounts for evil and suffering
in this iniquitous world. Dasein in this scheme is a being thrown violently into an alien creation; that is, Dasein experiences the Cosmos as being alien to its pneumatic essence, but does not understand why this is so. Hell is in this world, not in the next, and from it there is no exit.

**Synopsis of the Canons of Gnosticism**

A systematic but cursory synopsis of the philosophical canons of Gnosticism will provide the means for seeing the pneumatical Angst that is at the core of this tradition. But it must be noted first that in gnostic metaphysics, man is not Dasein but a combination of the flesh, the soul, and the spirit, an interpretation consistent with Hellenistic thought in general. With this in mind the metaphysics of Gnosticism may be expressed in the following summary:

1. **Theology**—for the gnostic world-view as a whole, Being is interpreted as a radical, multifaced dualism. Thus, the polar opposites of God-world, spirit-matter, light-darkness, good-evil, and life-death permeate the Being of the Cosmos as well as the being of man. The high-God or Godhead is interpreted as an utterly transmundane being who has nothing whatsoever to do with this universe. The Godhead is, in short, WHOLLY OTHER, beyond finite words. This Cosmos was created by an ignorant and evil Demiurge, who, as one of malevolent "Archons" or rulers of the Cosmos, serve an end of fully enslaving man, chaining him to this opprobrious creation. Deliverance is possible only through supernatural revelation in the form
of Gnosis or a dual knowledge of the Godhead and the world beyond this world that is man's spiritual home.

2. **Cosmology**—the Cosmos is likened to a vast prison wherein the earth is seen as the kind of dark form of solitary confinement. Around the earth move numerous spheres which, according to various systems, range from 7 to 365 heavens. These spheres or heavens separate man from returning home after death. The spheres are the domains of the Archons, who exercise a tyrannical rule called the **Heimarmene**, a term meaning "universal fate." It is the purpose of the **Heimarmene** to enslave man on earth at the epicenter of the spheres.

3. **Anthropology**—man is seen as the ontic focus of this elaborate metaphysics. He is composed of three parts: the flesh, the soul, and the spirit, but only the first two of these were created by the Archons and are thereby subject to **Heimarmene**, their tyrannical rule. The third part of man, the spirit (**pneuma**), while being encased in the soul, is seen as a "divine spark" or a portion of the Godhead's eternal substance. This spark has fallen into the world and is held captive there by the evil Archons in a benumbed and intoxicated sleep. Only through the **call** of Gnosis can the spark be awakened to its true condition and thereby liberated from the prison of the Archons. This call comes from the Savior who provides the knowledge necessary for the attainment of salvation.

4. **Eschatology**—it is the radical dualism of the gnostic theology, outlined at the outset of this synopsis, that grounds the
doctrine of gnostic salvation. The goal of gnosticism is to release
the inner man, the pneuma or divine spark that is his essence from
the dark prison of his soul, his flesh, his world, the spheres, and
the cosmos itself. The final end is to reunite the pneuma with the
source of its being: the divine essence of the High God. To
accomplish this goal, man must first know and understand the Godhead
as well as his own divine essence as the co-eternal spark of the
Godhead. Such knowledge is precluded by man's ontological ignorance,
a function of the bondage of his flesh and soul to the tyrannical
rule of the Archons. Gnosis must be given, therefore, in the form
of a transmundane revelation by a Savior from the world of light
beyond this Cosmos. In many accounts, particularly those discovered
at Nag Hammadi, this Savior is identified as Jesus of Nazareth. The
purpose of the Savior is to outwit the Archons, penetrate their
spheres to transmit the call to awaken the pneuma from its slumbers,
and to give to it the blessed Gnosis necessary for salvation. When
all of the pneumata are reunited with the high God, the Archons will
cease to be and the Cosmos will collapse. Transparent through this
summary is a single motif concerning the plight of gnostic man: his
alienness from this world and the Cosmos of the Archons. Such alien-
ness is interpreted by Hans Jonas and Susan Taubes as a form of
metaphysical homesickness, a longing for a return to a home beyond
this world where gnostic man truly belongs. Such a haunting longing
is an experience of ontic "uncanniness," of "not-being-at-home-here";
an ontic feeling made possible by the pneumatical Angst at the
ontological level which we seek here to penetrate. From the standpoint of gnostic man, however, alienation is a mark of spiritual excellence; for he who experiences it has had the call and has thus taken the first step on the way back to the Godhead as the very ground of his Being. In the literature of Mandaean Gnosticism, the Befindlichkeit of alienness is a root metaphor, and it has come to define a basic characteristic of Gnostic thought up through the present.

The Role of Pneumatical Angst in Gnosticism

The Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst, therefore, shows itself as the pre-interpretive ground of Gnostic metaphysics. Pneumatical Angst is experienced to Gnostic Dasein as the pre-reflective apprehension of Dasein's Geworfenheit or its state of "being-thrown" into an alien world which itself is interpreted as being evil. Dasein thus experiences a fundamental Angst, a dark and foreboding terror of the World itself as the abyss; a place where estrangement and utter isolation is the "natural state" of Dasein's existence on a permanent basis. As with Job's onto-theological Angst and Prometheus' stricture Angst, this is no mere ontic anxiety, dread, or anguish; although these are indeed present. Rather, pneumatical Angst is a pre-reflective apprehension of the helplessness and homelessness of Dasein, of the isolation and depravation of this world, of the utter bondage of man to the Archons, and the vacuity of existence as a thrown-projection into a meaningless state. For gnostic Dasein
there was no release save through salvation from this evil existence:
the Naassene Hymn observes of the gnostic spirit:

Therefore, clothed in a watery form, she grieves, toy
and slave of death.
Sometimes, invested with royalty, she sees light.
Sometimes, fallen into evil, she weeps.
Sometimes she weeps and sometimes she rejoices; ... Sometimes she finally finds no exit, because her
wandering ways have led to a labyrinth of evils. 58

Gnostic man as Dasein is therefore a being-in-an-alien-world. Such a
world is understood as evil and a place where Dasein is not at home.
This understanding (Verstehen) is articulated (Rede) in the gnostic
texts specifically as alienness, homelessness, anxiety, and thrown-
ness. But Dasein's first and foremost access to such an understanding,
interpretation, and articulation is the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst.
Pneumatical Angst is therefore related to primordial Angst inasmuch
as the abyss, a metaphor frequently used in Gnostic thought, is
gnostic Dasein's daunting apprehension of the nature of Cosmos.
Indeed the Cosmos and the World are themselves interpreted as the
primordial abyss, a fact graphically displayed in "The tripartite
Tractate" of the Nag Hammadi Library where the primordial Angst that
gives rise to the creation myth shows itself in the form of pneu-
matical Angst. In this work, the origin and history of the universe
is given from the creation to its anticipated conclusion. The first
part of this three-part work appropriates as its points of departure
a description of what is utterly transcendent, the Godhead, the
Father who "is the root of everything," the "depth, the abyss, and
the Unengendered One." 59 But while the high God is the divine abyss,
conceived as the outer darkness of the Cosmos into which the Archons fall; and this becomes the world:

The beings of his likeness, however, were exceedingly afraid . . . Therefore, they fell down to the pit of ignorance which is called "the Outer Darkness" and "Chaos" and "Hades" and "the Abyss." He set up what was beneath the order of the beings of thought as it had become stronger than they. They were worthy of ruling over the unspeakable darkness, since it is theirs and is the lot which was assigned to them.  

This abyss of ignorance, the unspeakable darkness, is the world or the Cosmos wherein the Archons by virtue of the Heimarmene are worthy of ruling. From this perspective, the evil world of gnostic man is interpreted as the abyss itself, an interpretation that is consistent with other features of the gnostic belief system concerning the Cosmos, the Archons, and the imprisonment of man. Thus, pneumatical Angst shows itself in its fascination form as the spiritual longing for salvation from an evil world of darkness and ignorance which is ruled by equally evil Archons whose task and delight it is to imprison the divine spark of gnostic man. Through the notion of the Savior who will bring salvation, hope is restored, but the ontological uprootedness that makes hope necessary is never fully obliterated. In this vision of Being, moreover, the ontological ground of gnostic Dasein slips further away, beyond the very Cosmos itself to "another world," another realm of Being that is an evil world of darkness and ignorance which is ruled by equally evil Archons whose task and delight it is to imprison the divine spark of gnostic man. Through the notion of the Savior who will bring salvation, hope is restored, but the ontological uprootedness that makes hope necessary is never
fully obliterated. In this vision of Being, moreover, the onto-
logical ground of gnostic Dasein slips further away, beyond the very
Cosmos itself to "another world," another realm of Being that is the
true place where Dasein is finally at home. The ontological ground
of the ontic or lived-world is Hell itself, interpreted in the
metaphor of the abyss, a place into which gnostic man is thrown, is
utterly alone, and is radically alienated from his true being.

This is not the place to draw out the Heideggerian implica-
tions of this view, a point which both Jonas and Taubes take
seriously. Here it is only necessary to remark that the force of
Gnosticism in general and its concept of the evilness of creation in
particular have been transmitted by Augustine and the Apostolic
Fathers as prime examples of heresy in early Christian times. Yet,
Augustine was a Manichean Gnostic for nine years before becoming a
Christian. His mysticism is therefore not due simply to his encounter
with Neoplatonic thought, as we shall see in the next section.
Rather it is also related to the deep mystical strain in Gnosticism
as well; for gnostic thought contains the seeds, so to speak, of much
of the Christian mystical tradition in the West. Notions such as
the divine spark of man's spirit, the Godhead above God, and the
yearning for union with the Godhead are the very essence of Eckhart's
thought and of the Friends of God movement whose mystical work, the
Theologica Germanica, was to profoundly influence Luther and the
Protestant reformation around him. There is, then, an unbroken line
from the pneumatical Angst of Gnosticism to the mystical or what we
shall call "passional Angst" of the third century and beyond. To show this, we turn now to the place of Angst in the mystical tradition of the West.

**Angst and the Mystical Tradition**

The mystical tradition of the West extends well back beyond written history into the remote stirrings of mythopoeic thought itself. Much of this has been sketched previously in this chapter and need not be retraced here. We only remark in passing that the ancient cult practices of the Thracians discussed above were "mystical" to the extent that the ultimate goal of such practices was ecstatic union with the Deity.

What, then, is mysticism? Rufus Jones provides one classical answer:

> I shall use the word mysticism to express the type of religion which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence. It is religion in its most acute, intense and living stage. (Italics added.)

This definition is not accepted universally. In fact, in 1899, Dean W. R. Inge provided twenty-six separate definitions of mysticism. He felt comfortable with none of them. It was only after a half century of study and reflection that the following definition occurred to him as being one that was adequate:

> Mysticism means communion with God, that is to say with a Being conceived as the supreme and ultimate reality. If what mystics say of their experience is true, if they have really been in communion with the Holy Spirit of God, that is a fact of overwhelming importance, which must be taken into account when we attempt to understand God, the world, and ourselves.
The reference to understanding "... God, the world, and ourselves" is of crucial importance within the context of the present inquiry. We have thus far attempted to show that in the Western tradition of thought, understanding (Verstehen) is equiprimordial with articulation (Rede) and the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst as interrelated modes of interpreting the ground of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Much of that tradition can be generally characterized as mystical in its outlook; an outlook that extends in an unbroken chain from pre-history to contemporary thought. Thus, if Angst is truly pervasive as the condition of the possibility of Dasein's interpretation of being-in-the-world, such Angst must likewise be capable of revealing itself in the Western mystical tradition. The discovery of Angst in the mystical tradition is the purpose of this section. As in the previous sections, we shall here designate the primordial Angst revealed in this section as "passional Angst" to distinguish it descriptively from the other faces of the ground phenomenon of primordial Angst; namely "onto-theological Angst," "strictural Angst," and the "pneumatical Angst" discussed above.

Passional Angst, then, may be described as a pre-reflective apprehension of the uselessness of human Wille (will) in passionately seeking to attain union with ultimate Being. Put in other words, passional Angst is the apprehension of a profound barrier between the soul and the Godhead, a barrier that is a result of this soul's willfulness, the soul's passionate craving, so to speak, for union with the Godhead.
The aim of mysticism, the essence of its telos as a life philosophy, is nowhere better stated than by Evelyn Underhill. Now we have said that the end which the mystic sets before him is conscious union with a living absolute. That Divine Dark that Abyss of the Godhead of which he sometimes speaks as the goal of his quest, is just the absolute, the Uncreated Light in which the universe is bathed, and which—transcending, as it does; all human powers of expression—he can only describe to us as dark. But there is—must be—contact "in an intelligible where" between every individual self and this Supreme Self, this Ultimate. In the mystic this union is conscious, personal, and complete. 66

The Divine Dark and the Abyss of the Godhead referred to in this passage provide the first clue to the role of Angst in the mystical tradition. We have seen the Godhead described as the "Divine Abyss" before in the previous section on the "pneumatical Angst" of Gnosticism. Now it is appropriate to observe the "Divine Abyss" metaphor throughout the mystical tradition and to show how it is intimately bound to what we have termed "passional Angst."

Origins of Christian Mysticism: Philo and Paul

The origins of Christian mysticism can be traced to the Jewish thinker, Philo of Alexandria who wrote about 25 CE., and who attempted to synthesize Hebrew and Greek thought into a hodgepodge of Platonic and Stoic thought, the Law of Moses, Pythagorean numbers, and even the legal code of Rome. But Philo's major contribution to the Western tradition came in the form of his blending of the Stoic conception of the Logos as the creative force of the universe with the Judaic concept of Wisdom (Sophia) 67 and with the Nous or the immanent soul that is the God within, the spark of the Logos that yearns to return to its home.
Philo's doctrines were to profoundly influence the New Testament Gospel of John. It is, of course, the profound Logos mysticism of John that chiefly distinguishes it from the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, and Luke. The doctrine of the Word or the Logos that was to later play an important role in the notion of the Third Person (Holy Spirit) in the Catholic trinity can therefore likewise be traced back to Philo of Alexandria.

It was, however, the apostle Paul of Tarsus who was chiefly responsible for much of the spread of Christian mysticism. Paul's personal commitment to build the Christian Church was grounded in the famous mystical vision on the road to Damascus of Jesus as the Christ, calling Paul to the service of the Lord. Paul says that he knows of a Christian man (obviously himself) who was caught up into paradise and heard "words so secret that human lips may not repeat them."68

Paul's Christian message, however, was not above borrowing from other religious traditions. From the Eleusinian mysteries, for example, he very likely borrowed the concept of the mystical Eucharist. From Hellenic orientalism, he may have borrowed the sacrament of Baptism.69 But his mysticism was indeed his own: the ecstatic experience of his confrontation with the Christ was ineffable, yet "when a man is using the language of ecstasy, he is talking with God, not with men, for no man understands him; he is no doubt inspired, but he speaks mysteries."70

It is, however, in Paul's letter to the Romans that passionale Angst as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Christian Dasein first
reveals itself. In Romans 7 Paul interprets his own being as that of a miserable creature, who in his willfulness can do only what he does not wish to do. Paul writes:

For I know that nothing good lodges in me— in my unspiritual I mean— for though the will to do good is there, the deed is not. The good which I want to do, I fail to do; but what I do is the wrong which is against my will; and if what I do is against my will, clearly it is no longer I who am the agent but sin that is lodging in me . . . In a word then, I myself, subject to God's law as a rational being am yet, in my unspiritual nature, a slave to the law of sin.71

What is founded in this passage is the first inkling of what will later come to be known as "The Dark Night of the Soul," an intense disposition that is frequently described as a period of chaos and helpless misery wherein the soul feels abandoned by God to spiritual anguish even beyond that of Job. St. John of the Cross, who coined the phrase, "Dark Night of the Soul," says: "That which the anguished soul feels most deeply is the conviction that God has abandoned it, of which it has no doubt; that he cast it away into darkness as an abominable thing . . ."72 The literature of mysticism shows that the Dark Night, as the painful consequence of passional Angst, is a necessary stage in mystical development that precedes union with the One whether the mystic union is conceived of as being theistic, pantheistic or monistic. Underhill believes that it is both a necessary and sufficient stage,73 one that provides the final purga-tion of will and desire and which compels the mystic towards complete and final detachment; an abandonment of will that is the necessary condition for the life of unity with the Absolute. Passional Angst
is therefore the ultimate trial of mystical consciousness: John of the Cross says:

This is one of the most bitter sufferings of this purgation. The soul is conscious of a profound emptiness in itself, a cruel destitution of the three kinds of goods, natural, temporal, and spiritual, which are ordained for its comfort. It sees itself in the midst of the opposite evils, miserable imperfections, dryness and emptiness of the understanding and abandonment of the spirit in darkness.\(^74\)

The phenomenon of the Dark Night is interpreted by John of the Cross as an "emptiness of understanding," an "abandonment of the spirit in darkness." This, we believe is another way of saying that in the Dark Night mystical Dasein apprehends in the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst a withdrawal of the ground of its being; a barrier that robs mystical existence of its meaning or signification. This Grundbefindlichkeit interpreted in the metaphors of darkness and emptiness, renders impossible any understanding (Verstehen) or articulation (Rede) of Dasein's ontological frame of reference—that is, the meaning-context of divine union with the one has slipped away into the dark night, has left Dasein homeless and alone without support or comfort from the source of its being. Such is the sense of passional Angst. But a hermeneutically deeper description of such Angst is made possible as the various mystics of the tradition show their own interpretations of passional Angst. Thus, we turn to an examination of passional Angst in the tradition, starting with St. Augustine of Hippo.
St. Augustine

The Confessions of St. Augustine are the clearest sourcebook for his personal mysticism in general and for the passional Angst of the Dark Night of Augustine's soul in particular. Regarding Augustine's general mysticism, the locus classicus for its articulation is in Book VIII of The Confessions. While the tale of Augustine's conversion is familiar to many, it is worth repeating here in his own words as it shows lucidly that passional Angst was indeed the very condition that immediately precipitated Augustine's conversion:

But when a deep consideration had from the secret bottom of my soul drawn together and heaped up all my misery in the sight of my heart; there arose a mighty storm, bringing a mighty shower of tears... I cast myself down, I know not how, under a fig tree, giving full vent to my tears; and the floods of mine eyes gushed out, an acceptable sacrifice to Thee. And, not indeed in these words, yet to this purpose, spake I much unto Thee: And Thou, O Lord, how long? how long, Lord wilt Thou be angry, for ever? Remember not our former iniquities, for I felt that I was held by them. I sent up these sorrowful words; How Long? how long? "tomorrow, and tomorrow?" Why not now? Why not is there this hour an end to my uncleanness?75

The story continues, of course, with Augustine hearing from a neighbor's house the voice of a child saying, "Take up and read; take up and read." Augustine, believing this to be a command from God, opened the New Testament at random to Romans 13:13-14. Augustine continues:

I seized, opened and in silence read that section, on which my eyes fell: Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying: but put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, in concupiscence. No further would I read; nor needed I;
The parallels between the Dark Night of Paul's experience and that of Augustine are striking. Each interpreted his present existence as a state of willful sin. Each desired, indeed, passionately craved salvation from sin, and each experienced the passional Angst that precedes and paves the way for union with the One. Augustine understood his relationship to God only because of the Angst he felt in the face of his self-willed life of debauchery. His decision to pray in his unique manner, "how long wilt Thou be angry," reveals passional Angst concerning the disrelationship between God and himself. His cries and tears represent the Dark Night that preceded his conversion.

Augustine's mature understanding of passional Angst in itself, that is, apart from the attendant phenomenon of the Dark Night, is shown in his important distinction between "chaste" and "servile" fear. We should not expect this distinction to be between "chaste Angst" on the one hand and "servile fear" on the other because, as was indicated in the opening pages of this chapter, the formal distinction between Angst and fear begins with Kierkegaard.

Augustine's description of servile fear is comparable to what we attempted to describe in the Introduction as ontic "dread." Thus, servile fear is ontic rather than ontological. It is a dread of circumstances that are in the world of man's concerns which cause worry or disquiet. Servile fear is that experienced in a long term
illness, or that experienced in the threat of having to go to prison or that experienced in the loss of one's reputation. Augustine likens "servile fear" to the feelings of an adulterous wife who is anxious that her husband might discover her secret affair; or worse, that she might be caught by her husband in the arms of her lover.

"Chaste fear," on the other hand, is an ontological feeling that endures forever. Properly speaking it is passional Angst; the Grundbedinglichkeit that results from a desire for God and His justice. It is ontological in the sense that it utterly transcends the cares of the everyday world and comes from a basic disposition toward God as the ground of one's being. Augustine likens "chaste fear" to the feelings of a chaste wife, who rather than dreading that her husband will return, anxiously awaits her husband with an apprehension that he will not return. This "chaste fear" or passional Angst is here described as an apprehension of a loss of the Christ-man relationship once it is established. Says Augustine: "And as His tarrying is now feared, so after this coming, His leaving will be feared. That will be chaste fear, for it is tranquil and secure."77

We conclude this discussion of Augustine with a brief observation that will prove valuable in the next chapter, namely that for Augustine man's heart is a profound abyss, an interpretation that was to profoundly touch Eckhart and his followers. Augustine says:

If by "abyss" we understand a great depth, is not a man's heart an abyss. For what is there more profound than that abyss? Men may speak, may be seen by the operation of their members, may be heard speaking: but whose heart is seen into? What he is inwardly engaged on, what he is inwardly
capable of, what he is inwardly doing, or what proposing, what he is inwardly wishing to happen or not to happen, who shall comprehend?8

The abyss metaphor is for Augustine related to the inwardness of man's soul, to his freedom to choose his own concerns, and to his openness to the possibilities before him. It does not appear to be directly related to passional Angst but is worth mentioning here because it sets the stage for many later interpretations of Angst and the abyss, especially as these later play a key role in Kierkegaard's notion of Angst as dizziness. "One may liken dread to dizziness" says Kierkegaard. "He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy . . . Thus dread [Angst] is the dizziness of freedom."79

Transitional Period to the Fourteenth Century

For the next twelve centuries following Augustine, mystical thought played an important role in fostering and developing the thought of the Western tradition. The passional Angst that is implicit in this thought was likewise transmitted with varying degrees of visibility even in Scholasticism's ongoing debate over the priority of intellect or of will. In a chapter of this scope, it is impossible to pinpoint each instance where passional Angst reveals itself during this period. In general, however, it can be said that it finds its greatest visibility in the German mysticism of the fourteenth century. There, the profound power of Angst shows itself vividly in the writings of Johannes Eckhart, more commonly known as Meister Eckhart.
We propose, therefore, to examine his thought in some detail in the pages to follow. It would be helpful, however, to at least outline the course of how the mystical tradition was transmitted from Augustine to Eckhart so as to see that indeed there is no one thousand year void between these two thinkers.

The transmission begins with Augustine's heir to mystical Christianity, the Pseudo-Dionysius. This mystical genius dated his works to coincide with those of Paul of Tarsus and claimed to be the Areopagite of Acts 17:34, no doubt to lend greater authority to his thought. This Pseudo-Dionysius, whom we shall simply call "Dionysius," appears to have been a Syrian Christian who wrote either late in the fifth century or early sixth century. His work was a blending of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and of the Christian faith, a fact that makes him a forerunner of the form of mysticism that was practiced in Eckhart's time. Dionysius wrote four major works, the *Mystical Theology*, *The Divine Names*, the *Celestial Hierarchy* and the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*. The latter two, however, need not concern us here since they are largely concerned with organizational matters of the Christian Church. But the first two, the *Mystical Theology* and the *Divine Names*, establish the framework for the mystical tradition that was to influence Eckhart profoundly.

Very briefly, in the *Divine Names* Dionysius shows the absolute impossibility of attributing a positive name to the Godhead. God is so utterly transmundane, Dionysius claims, that one can approach Him only by way of negation (*via negativa*). The negative path
to God begins with the abandonment of both the will and the intellect in the quest for God. Man is advised to enter the "darkness of unknowing," where the soul transcends the mind and is merged with the Godhead. In the Mystical Theology, Dionysius displays these thoughts with eloquence in his letter to Timothy:

Guide us to that topmost height of mystic love . . . where the simple absolute and unchangeable mysteries heavenly truth lie hidden in the dazzling obscurity the Secret Silence . . . and thee dear Timothy I counsel that, in the earnest exercise of mystic contemplation intellect can perceive, and all things in this world of nothingness . . . thou strain towards a union with Him. For by the uncreasing and absolute renunciation of thyself and all things thou shalt in pureness cast all things aside . . . and so shalt be led upwards to the Ray of that divine darkness which exceedeth all existence.81 (Italics added.)

We have cited this passage at length because again and again throughout the tradition of Western mysticism its themes and terms reappear. Thus from Dionysius, the light (or divine Darkness tradition) of mysticism proceeds in varying degrees of intensity down to Proclus (c. 412-490), the last of the Neoplatonists; to John Scotus Erigena (c. 850), the translator of Dionysius from Greek into Latin; to Anselm (1033-1109), who was a major transmitter of mysticism in the early Middle Ages; to Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153), the great Benedictine father who mightily influenced Dante; to John of Fidanza or Bonaventura (1227-1274), whose mystical bent was couched in the language of Scholasticism; and finally to Johannes Eckhart (1260-1327), whose thought must now be sketched out.82
Meister Eckhart

The choice to single out Eckhart for a more detailed investigation is not arbitrary, to be sure. In Eckhart's pantheistic mystical thought there resides much that has influenced German Metaphysics in general and, as we hope to show, Heideggarian ontological phenomenology in particular. Thus, we strongly suspect that in order to understand Heidegger's concept of Angst, one must see the role that Angst plays in Eckhart's thought. Indeed such Angst is bedrock in Eckhart's thinking, but it shows itself hermeneutically—that is, through a phenomenological interpretation of Eckhart's notion of ultimate detachment from the world, the will, and ultimately from God Himself, so that union with Being in the Godhead can be won.

Eckhart's thought does not appear to take the form of an elaborate metaphysical system. Rather it is to be gleaned chiefly from the accounts of Dominican Nuns who attempted to transcribe his sermons as Eckhart preached to them. It will be useful, however, to examine several features of his thought at the foreground through which his unique form of passional Angst can be seen. We propose to initially sketch out three central features of his thinking and then show how passional Angst is at their center. These features are: (1) the distinction between the Godhead and God, (2) the notion of the soul and its two parts, and (3) the description of how the soul unites with the Deity in utter detachment.

First, concerning the Godhead and the Christian God, Eckhart held that there is a basic distinction between these two concepts of
Divinity. The God of the Church, Lord of Creation to whom man prays, is a living God. He is the Holy Trinity; namely, the God the father, God the Son (as the Logos or "Word" or uttered thought of the thinker), and God the Holy Spirit (as the love between the Father and the Son). Knowledge of God is possible in two ways: (1) Cataphantically by means of the via negativa. This results in a limited knowledge of God at best, (2) Apophantically by means of a divine union with the Godhead achieved only in utter detachment, the extinguishing of desire and self-will. This results in mystical union or pure knowledge of God.

The Godhead, on the other hand, is well beyond the range of man's discursive intellect. The Godhead is an "unnatured nature," an unplumbed "abyss" (Abgrund)\(^3\) that is at once the totality of all Being and the nothingness itself. As totality the Abgrund is Being while all creatures (entities) have being—that is, they participate in the Being of the Godhead or the Divine Abyss. But, says Eckhart, the Godhead and God "... are as different as heaven and earth."\(^4\) The Godhead is a self-revealing process which takes place in a single moment—the Eternal Now. Such a process is an outpouring, an emanation that occurs when the Word, the Logos is uttered. The Godhead utters, the word "God" is uttered, thus establishing a separation between the two. The "uttered" God becomes the divine Subject: a triune essence of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But the Godhead who utters is completely transmundane and is therefore unknowable by the discursive intellect. Thus,
knowledge of the Godhead is of a different order than that of God. It must be apophantically given as what Eckhart called an "unknowing knowledge" revealed in Christ as "Divine Knowledge." 

But the essence of Divinitas, the God within the Godhead is Divine detachment (Abgescheidenheit). Says Eckhart: "For God is God because of His immovable detachment; and from detachment He has His purity, His simplicity and His unchangeability." Detachment is likewise a property of Being itself conceived as Divinitas.

Our second point concerning Eckhart's thought concerns his doctrine of the soul. As the Godhead is the "unnatured nature" and the unplumbed "abyss," so too is the soul of man, conceived as a "divine spark" of the Godhead's essence. Eckhart states, "The soul has a spark in her which has been in God eternally: life and light. And this spark is conveyed into every man together with his soul." What makes possible the union of the soul with the Godhead is therefore twofold: first, the "divine spark" of the soul is the self-same essence of the Godhead's being; secondly, the utter Abgescheidenheit or Divine Detachment must be duplicated in the soul before union is possible. Thus detachment from all desire, the self-abandonment of the will is the necessary condition for union with the Godhead. But how is this possible in man, who is finite, limited, and a creature of the world?

Eckhart says that man lives in two realms of being: the "inner man" and the "outer man." The outer man is concerned chiefly with the phenomenal world of the senses: he is the busy
man, the man of ontic activity, the man who burns up the soul's power in pursuit of sensual experience. The inner man, on the other hand, uses his inner powers to guide his worldly concerns as is necessary, but has in his essence the inner strength to completely detach himself from the world and engage in mystical contemplation of the Godhead. Such detachment takes the form of a self-renouncing abandonment of worldly concerns attained in a destruction of self-will.

Thus mystic union is totally contingent upon the renouncing of self-will in the form of detachment. It can occur only when the soul has thus readied itself. Eckhart describes this means as follows:

Now our Lord says: "No-one hears My word or My doctrine unless he has abandoned himself. For he who would hear the Word of God must be completely self-abandoned [detached]." In the eternal Word that which hears is the same as that which is heard. All that the eternal Father teaches is His being and His nature and His Godhead. He reveals this fully to us in His only begotten Son, and He teaches us that we are the Son. If a man had emptied himself completely, in such a way that he had become the only-begotten Son, he would possess what is possessed by the only begotten Son . . . When God sees that we are the only begotten Son, he hastens toward us so eagerly, and acts as if His Divine being would break assunder and be annihilated in itself, in order that He may reveal to us the whole abyss of His Godhead and the fullness of His being and of His Nature. Then God hastens towards us so that it may be our own, just as it is God's own. In this God has joy and happiness in abundance. Such a man dwells in the knowledge of God and the love of God, and becomes none other than what God himself is. (Italics added.)

The role of passional Angst in this schema is, we hope, obvious. Detachment means the abandonment of self-will so that the soul can merge its will with God's will and thereby attain union
with the Godhead. Thus, it is in the pre-reflective apprehension of the limiting force of self-will that the commitment to detachment is made possible. The Dark Night of Ignorance of the Godhead as the ground of mystical Dasein is particularly poignant:

It has been said that three things impede a man so that he cannot know God at all. The first is time, the second corporeality, the third multiplicity. As long as these three are in me, God is not in me, nor does He work properly in me. St. Augustine says that this is due to the avarice of the soul, because it wants to grasp and possess so much; hence it clutches at time and corporeality and multiplicity and thus loses what it has. For as long as the craving for more and more is in you, God can never dwell nor work in you.90

Eckhart nowhere emphasizes the Dark Night of the Soul, but it is implied by passages such as the one cited above. Thus, the passional Angst of this section shows itself not through the dark glass of the absence of God, but rather directly as the initial apprehension that precedes total detachment or the complete abandonment of self-will so that man's will can merge with the divine will of the Godhead in the ecstasy of mystical union. Too, this is a function of Eckhart's pantheistic mysticism which differs radically from the Christ mysticism of St. John of the Cross.

From a hermeneutical standpoint, Eckhart's thought discloses passional Angst as the condition of the possibility of a new understanding (Verstehen) in Dasein; namely, that self-will or selfish craving for union with the Godhead is counterproductive for Dasein. Indeed, self-will must be completely abandoned with utter detachment taking its place so that the true humility that is necessary for Grace permeates Dasein's being. Such an understanding is not
possible save through passional Angst, the Grundbefindlichkeit through which mystical Dasein is born-again. The Grace of the Godhead is given only to the truly humble. Such Grace cannot ultimately be a product of self-will. Thus, through passional Angst, mystical Dasein is united in the No-thingness of the Divine Abyss: its divine spark is merged unsought and unrequited with the self-same essence of the Godhead. Mystical union is attained.

The Rede that corresponds to such Verstehen and Befindlichkeit is the silence of internal orison. In such prayer, the Logos or Divine Word is given full expression. Thus, this silence is a true articulation of a new understanding that is born in the Grundbefindlichkeit of passional Angst. It is not Gerede or the "chatter" of the ontic world; rather it is true communication between Dasein and Sein, between the soul and the Godhead.

In Eckhart, then, passional Angst shows itself in a striking and powerful culmination of the Augustinian tradition. But there remains one final figure who, technically speaking, stands outside of this tradition and is still a profound mystic with and equally profound sensitivity to passional Angst. Thus, it is to this final figure that we now turn, for his contributions to mystical thought profoundly influence the post-Kantian German Idealists who in turn influenced most of the thought of Søren Kierkegaard.

Jacob Boehme

The final figure to be considered in this section is Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) whose contribution to Western philosophy has
largely been covered over. This has been due perhaps to the early obscurity of his thought as well as to his wholly pantheistic and alchemical nature mysticism. Yet, Boehme's essential insights into the ultimate Yes and No of Being, that is, his formulation of the dialectic, as that term was understood by Hegel, assures him an important place in the history of Western thought, particularly German thought. William Inge notes, for example, that Sir Isaac Newton "shut himself up for three months to study Boehme, whose teaching on attraction and the laws of motion seemed to him to have great value."92 Too, Boehme's influence on the post-Kantian Idealists such as Franz von Baader, Schelling, and Hegel was profound, especially with regard to his theosophical dialectic.

Concerning passional Angst and Boehme, it must first be noted that the path from Eckhart to Boehme passes through the Protestant Reformation and specifically through the religious philosophy of Martin Luther. Strictly speaking, Luther was not a mystic, but he did show an affection for the mystical piety of John Tauler (c. 1300-1361), who was Eckhart's spiritual heir, and for the Theologica Germanica, the sourcebook of the mystical "Friends of God" movement associated with Henry Suso (c. 1295-1365). Luther so loved this work that he published an incomplete edition of it in 1518.

Jacob Boehme was born, raised, and buried as a Lutheran, and even in his most alchemical period still considered himself to be within the framework of Lutheran doctrine.93 Thus, to fully
understand Boehme's thought, a task we cannot attempt here, it must be placed in the joint context of (1) his alchemical influences; namely Theophrastus Bombastus Paracelsus (1493-1541), Sebastian Franck (1500-1545), and Valentine Weigel (1553-1588) as advocates of Nature Mysticism; and (2) of Luther's doctrines of personal piety, the opposition of love and wrath in God, the problem of justification, freedom of the will, and textual interpretation of creation stories.  

Boehme's writings are made far more complicated and obscure than seems necessary by the blending of these two influences with a smattering of technical philosophical jargon urged on him by his more pedantic friends (a jargon which he understood only marginally at best). But to see the role of what we have termed passional Angst in Boehme's thought is not difficult. Indeed, it is on the very surface of his doctrine of the Fall of Man. Yet to understand the role of passional Angst for Boehme, it will be necessary to cursorily outline three important dimensions of his thought. These are: (1) the doctrine of the Godhead as the Ungrund or abyss, (2) the doctrine of Urwille or the free-will of the Godhead that gives rise to generation and the dialectic, and (3) the doctrine of the Fall of Man and its consequences for the soul.

First, the doctrine of the Godhead is a direct result of Boehme's mystical experience, which came during the spring of 1600. In his Epistles Boehme describes his first mystical encounter as follows:
For I saw and knew the Being of all beings, the ground and the unground (Ungrund); the birth of the holy trinity; the source and origin of this world and all creatures in divine Wisdom (Sophia) . . . I saw all three worlds in myself, (1) the divine, angelical, or paradisaical; . . . (2) the dark world . . .; (3) the external visible world . . .; and I saw and knew the whole Being in evil and good, how one originates in the other . . . so that I not only wondered but also greatly rejoiced. 96

In this vision the whole of the Godhead as the Divine Ungrund or abyss was revealed to Boehme. Thus, he believed the Ungrund was there from eternity, a pure no-thingness (Nichts) dwelling in the absolute silence of eternity, self-contained, a complete unity without distinctions, unknowing and unknowable, the great hidden and invisible. 97 Meontic, the Godhead, is beyond all dichotomies of good and evil, Yes and No, freedom and desire; yet all of these are contained within the Godhead, who is not even known to Himself.

But in the core of the Godhead, where all dichotomies are united, there resides a dark and irrational craving for self-revelation, for nature as creation, for a ground to the Ungrund; a doctrine that was derived apparently from Boehme's interpretation of the gospel according to John. 98

The nothing hungers after the something, and his hunger is the desire . . . For the desire has nothing that is able to conceive. It conceives only itself, and draws itself to itself . . . and brings itself from abyss to byss (vom Ungrunde in Grund) . . . and yet remains a nothing. 99

Thus the craving or desire for self-subjectivation for the purpose of the Ungrund's self-knowledge on the one hand, and the equal craving or desire towards self-emanation and objectification
on the other, is the first instance of the great dialectic of Being
instigated by the dark and irrational Urwille or primordial will of
the abyss. From this initial step, the Ungrund or abyss of the
Godhead manifests itself as God in a primal act of self-consciousness.

The doctrine of the Urwille, the second point to be dis-
cussed, is in itself dialectical. On the one hand it is the free,
untainted essence of the abyss of Ungrund. But on the other hand,
it is also a form of selfish craving or desire for self-knowledge as
the Godhead manifesting itself in creaturehood of nature. Thus,
free-will assumes the form of ontological desire as an entity in the
life of the will. This is the second instance of the great
dialectic, the Yes and the No of all Being:

The One, as the Yes, is pure power and life, and is the
truth of God, or God himself. He would in Himself be
unknowable, and in Him would be no joy of elevation, nor
feeling, without the No. The No is the counterstroke of the
Yes, or the Truth, in order that the Truth may be manifest
and a something, in which there may be a contrarium, in which
the eternal love may be loving, feeling, willing, and such
as can be loved.100

Thus, the Urwille sets into motion the dialectical forces of
the great Yes and No of Being: As free-will in the Godhead, it is
manifested as love and grace; as craving or desire in the Godhead
it is manifested as wrath and darkness.

Concerning the third topic, that of the doctrine of the Fall
of man and its consequences for the soul, Boehme begins with a
description of the "essential man" [Urmensch]. God made man as
a being who suffered no strife, no earthliness, and no flesh.
Urmensch did indeed have a body, but it was pure and completely
transparent to the celestial light. Such a being was androgynous, a mixture of the inner and outer worlds, was lord over creation, and was likewise possessed with free-will. It is this last feature of Urmensch which made possible the transcendent Fall of man. The Fall took place, in Boehme's interpretation, in Adam's (identified as Urmensch) sleep. Specifically, in his pure state of Being before the Fall, Adam did not sleep since the dialectic of sleeping and wakefulness had not yet risen. Thus, Adam gazed with open eyes at divine consciousness. But stirring in his free-will was desire and craving for disunity, for a knowledge of self, for the knowledge of good and evil. In Eternity Adam turned away from union with God, slipped into sleep, and woke in Time (the temporal realm) to find that he had emerged into a new form of being, namely existence, and, moreover, an Angst-filled existence. Here at last, Angst is named explicitly as a theme for interpretation. What does Angst mean for Boehme? It is discussed in five of his writings in various guises: In Aurora (xiii, 118) it means the cause of sadness and joy in man; in Von der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi (II, iii, 13), Angst is what prevents eternal darkness; and in Zweite Schutzschrift gegen Balthasar Tilke (141), Angst is an idle nothing; in Von der Gnadenwahl (111, 5), Angst is man's longing for primordial freedom as he lives a life of torment and death; and then in Tafel der Drei Principien (39), Angst is interpreted as the well-spring of hell-fire in the soul of a sensitive man. But the most complete
description of Angst is given in Von der Gnadenwahl where Boehme says that Angst is:

A root of feeling, the beginning ... of mind, a root of ... all painfulness ... a manifestation of the eternal unfathomable will in the attraction ... a cause of dying ... the very root where God and Nature are separated ... [where] the manifest sensible eye arises. 106

The reference here to "a root of feeling, the beginning of mind" is extremely provocative. It is tempting to think that what is being described here is Befindlichkeit (a disposition or attunement) that provides access to being-in-the-world. Yet, this interpretation is not hermeneutically sound, for it comes from within a pre-hermeneutical phenomenological horizon that is itself basically theogonic. It is, therefore, not yet the phenomenological Angst akin to twentieth century thought, but it is a vivid depiction of the Angst of mysticism. Why is this so? Because Boehme's conception of Angst is intimated bound up in the Fall of man as a result of man's exercise of free-will in the Fall of a sort of Cosmic or angelic boredom with the unitive life. Essential man slipped into existence from a desire, a craving for the knowledge of Good and Evil. He chose, and in so choosing became Dasein, a being-in-the-world. Angst, then, is in this instance the apprehension of the loss of God's grace due to a deliberate act of self-will. The consequence of this apprehension is precisely what we have termedpassional Angst or Angst as the apprehension of a profound barrier between the soul and the Godhead, a barrier that is a result of the soul's willfulness.
In Boehme, then, passional Angst clearly shows itself as a facet of primordial Angst, or Angst in the face of the abyss. For here the "longing for primordial freedom" in the abyss of the Godhead is heard as a plaintive cry for a return to unity in the Godhead. Boehme says that Angst is: "... the tension between man's two wills. Man remembers his lost unity; he longs for his primordial freedom as he lives a life of torment and death." It is this powerful and compelling interpretation of Angst that was ultimately to become the indirect source of Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angst through the media of Schelling, von Baader, and principally Hamann. Thus, in the next chapter, we shall discuss Kierkegaard's concept of Angst in the light of these nineteenth century interpreters of Boehme and the passional Angst of the mystical tradition of western thought.

Summary

In this initial chapter, we have attempted to present in an extremely cursory fashion the hermeneutical Vorgriff that will guide the understanding and interpretation of Angst that is to be presented in the chapters to follow. The discussion appropriated as its point of departure an etymological investigation of the term "Angst." This sought to provide a clue to approaching the phenomenon of Angst as it reveals itself throughout the Western tradition.

The second major section of the chapter undertook to establish Angst in its most primordial manifestation—Angst in the
face of the abyss—as a root metaphor that runs throughout the tradition. This central Angst was called "primordial Angst" to establish its essential nature, and was described as a pre-reflective apprehension of the "wrongness" in the sense of incompleteness or meaninglessness which first grasps primitive man in the face of cosmic forces that are beyond his understanding. This "primordial Angst" is itself the condition of the possibility of mythopoeic thought, a form of willful ordering that resulted in the creation-myth phenomenon. Examples of the creation myths of ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel and Greece were then discussed in the light of this interpretation.

Then, in our third major section, the primordial Angst of the previous section was dis-covered as a major facet of the Wisdom Literature of the Ancient Near East. Noting that only after the creation myth phenomenon can primitive man become Dasein, it was revealed that Dasein dwells in a new face of primordial Angst as Dasein. This we called "onto-theological Angst" or the pre-reflective apprehension of a dis-relationship between Being, interpreted as Deity, and beings, interpreted as creatures. This interpretation was then grounded in an examination of the theme of innocent suffering or the Joban theme, one which was shared by the Near Eastern cultures in general.

Next, in our fourth major section, Angst was discussed from the standpoint of the Greek tradition as the primordial Angst that is contained in the concept of Ananke (necessity) in Greek
thought. This facet of primordial Angst was called "strictural Angst" or pre-reflective apprehension of the restrictions placed on Dasein's freedom by Ananke (necessity). In this section, the interpretations of Ananke provided by Homer and Hesiod, Plato and the tragedians, and of Aristotle were discussed, observing that the strictural Angst core of Ananke becomes buried in the rationalistic interpretation of necessity offered by Aristotle.

Our fifth major section attempted to show that in gnostic thought there occurred, as a result of the eclecticism of the Helenistic worldview, a new face of primordial Angst which might be called "pneumatical Angst," or a pre-reflective apprehension of the utter alienness of the spirit (pneuma) to the ontic world. Here the general characteristics of the gnostic interpretation of Being were discussed, and it was shown that anxiety was indeed among them. But of more importance, it was pointed out that the "pneumatic Angst" of the Gnostic worldview became a crucial nexus between gnostic and post-gnostic Christian mysticism of the next ten centuries.

Finally, our sixth major section inquired into the place of primordial Angst in the Western mystical tradition. In this section Angst reveals itself as the pre-reflective apprehension of the barriers that exist between man and God or the Godhead due to self-will and desire as modes of mystical Dasein's being. This facet of primordial Angst was therefore called "passional Angst" to designate its connection with the problem of self-will and desire. In this section the mysticism of Philo, Paul of Tarsus, Augustine, the
Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart, and Boehme were touched upon briefly showing how passional Angst was indeed central to their respective writings.

This summary, then, concludes this chapter.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER I


4 Ibid.


7 Hillman, "ONAP," pp. 97-98. cf. the "Special Lexicon" inclusion where Anchein is translated as "to squeeze."


12 Indeed, such an account reveals a great deal about the role of Dasein in the Mesopotamian Cosmos. For such Dasein the Cosmos was conceived as a vast universal political State. Dasein's proper role was obedience at every level, according to Frankfort. Thus, the presuppositions of the time colored the understanding,
disposition, and articulation of Ancient Mesopotamian Dasein much as does the technological presuppositions of our own time, namely that we are captives of our own presuppositions about the nature of Being, cf. Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, pp. 217-33.

13 Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, p. 59. Note: to be sure, this is not the only creation myth of Egypt. The Memphite theology tells an analogous tale with emphasis in the role of "the Word" in the creation process. Too, there are other creation myths such as that offered in the Book of the Dead. The one discussed here is therefore representative, cf. Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, p. 60 for other accounts.

14 Ibid., p. 63.

15 Ibid., p. 61.

16 Genesis 1:1 New English Bible (hereafter cited as NEB).


18 Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, p. 249.


21 Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, p. 220.

22 Frankfort admits that there is a possibility that he has mistranslated Ma'at as "justice," "truth," or "righteousness." It is equally possible, he notes, for Ma'at to mean "order," "regularly," or "conformity." His choice of the former set, as he again freely admits, is based upon a subjective judgment grounded in his
general understanding of Egyptian culture. Thus free admission is, of course, consonant with sound hermeneutical practices. See Frankfort et al., Before Philosophy, p. 116.


24 Ibid.


26 Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 127.

27 Ibid., p. 128. Cornford points out that Aristotle's interest in the first proposition of Thales overshadowed the second and third propositions. Here is a clear example of covering-over fundamental (indeed, in this case founding) concepts of philosophy.


30 ANET, pp. 432-34.

31 Ibid., pp. 438-40.


34 ANET, pp. 434-37.
35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., pp. 438-40.

37 Scott, The Way of Wisdom, p. 43.

38 Ibid.

39 ANET, pp. 405-07.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., pp. 407-10.

42 Job 30:15-21 (NEB).


44 Hillman, ONAP, p. 108.

45 Ibid., p. 98.

46 Ibid., p. 99.


49 Hillman, ONAP, p. 106.

50 Aeschylus, "Prometheus Bound," as cited in Hillman, ONAP, pp. 100-01.

51 Euripedes, "Alcestis" as cited in Hillman, ONAP, p. 102.
52 Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 25. Note: we are indebted to this work for much of the discussion of Gnosticism. Professor Jonas was one of Heidegger's students and is a hermeneutic phenomenologist par excellence in his own right. Jonas himself has not failed to see the Angst of Gnostic thought and explicitly recognizes the prima facia connection between Heidegger's thought and Gnosticism but cautions against concluding from this that the former is derived from the latter.

53 *The Nag Hammadi Library*, ed. James M. Robinson, translated by the members of the Coptic Gnostic Library Project (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977). Note: this is an extremely valuable source parallel in importance to the *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* as a sourcebook of the Western tradition. The references to Jesus as the Gnostic Savior are especially prevalent throughout this work, a fact not surprising since it appears to be the library of Coptic Christians. It may be worth pointing out to the reader that while we have not specifically included a section on Christianity proper and the role of Angst in that tradition, this does not mean that no such Angst is present in Christian thought. Indeed, Angst is always present as a universal phenomenon of Dasein's Grundbefindlichkeit. Thus while Christianity is not discussed here, one can observe the spiritual Angst behind the ontic references to anxiety in the "Sermon on the Mount" of Matthew 8:25-34, where Jesus says in part:

"Therefore I bid you put away anxious thoughts about food and drink to keep you alive . . . Is there a man of you who by anxious thought can add a foot to his height? . . . So do not be anxious about tomorrow; tomorrow will look after itself" (NEB).


This was, of course, not surprising. Gnosticism was the great competitor to Apostolic Christianity and at one point had a far greater number of converts than did the early Christian church. Willison Walker, for example, believes the "Gnostic Crisis" (i.e., the challenge of Gnostic thought) was responsible for the development of Apostolic Creed, as well as the coalescence of power in the Bishops of Rome, Smyrna, or Ephesus. Thus, upon the challenge of Gnosticism is the Catholic Church built, according to Walker, cf. Willison Walker, *The History of the Christian Church*, rev. ed. (New York: Scribners, 1958), pp. 58-59.


66 Underhill, *Mysticism*, p. 73.

67 Proverbs 8:1-30 (NEB).

68 2 Corinthians 12:3-4 (NEB).

69 Katsaros and Kaplan, *WMT*, p. 117.

70 Ibid., p. 116.

71 Romans 7:18-25 (NEB).


76 Ibid.

77 Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos (XXVII, 8), as cited in Erich Przywara, An Augustine Synthesis (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970), pp. 415-16.

78 Ibid., XLI13, as cited in Przywara, An Augustine Synthesis, p. 421.

79 Kierkegaard, CD, p. 55.

80 Harkness, Mysticism, pp. 68-69.


82 This enumeration is by no means complete. Many exceedingly important but minor figures in the mystical tradition have been omitted because a long list would add nothing to the body of the present chapter. For readers interested in a complete listing, Evelyn Underhill provides an exhaustive account in her appendix entitle, "A Historical Sketch of European Mysticism from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Death of Blake," in Mysticism, pp. 453-73.

83 Meister Eckhart, "Sermon XX," as cited in James M. Clark, Meister Eckhart: An Introduction to the Study of His Works with an Anthology of His Sermons (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957), p. 224. It is this notion of the difference between the God and the Godhead that led to Eckhart's condemnation as a pantheist. There is no doubt that his pantheistic mysticism differs markedly from the Christ-mysticism of St. John of the Cross. Likewise, therefore, primordial Angst becomes schematized very differently in Eckhart than in John of the Cross. In Eckhart, passionate Angst is more high-minded and even intellectual pantheism whereas in John of the Cross it appears to be passionate in all senses of that term, but
specifically with regard to Christ's passion. The latter's mysticism
is the Christ mysticism of a theistic versus pantheistic conception
of Being.

84 Meister Eckhart, "Sermon XII," as cited in James M. Clark,
Meister Eckhart, p. 41.

85 C. F. Kelley, Meister Eckhart on Divine Knowledge (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 7. Note: this work is
a highly technical analysis of the concept of Divine Knowledge in
Eckhart. It clears up much of the conceptual confusion that surrounds
Eckhart's thought that results more from Eckhart's mystical language
than from the difficulty of his thought.

86 Meister Eckhart: Selected Treaties and Sermons, translated
by J. M. Clark and J. V. Skinner (London: Farber and Farber, 1958),
p. 164 as cited in John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's
Thought (Drexel Hill, Pennsylvania: Oberlin Publishing Co., 1978),
p. 12 (hereafter cited as MEHT).

87 Franz P. Pfeiffer, Meister Eckhart, translated by C. de B.
Evans (London, 1924), Sermon XXIII, as cited in Katsaros and Kaplan,
WMT, p. 219.

88 Caputo, MEHT, pp. 14-15. We are much indebted to Caputo's
insights in this section, especially on his interpretation of the
soul, detachment, and the Godhead in Eckhart's thought.

89 Clark, Meister Eckhart, Sermon XXX, pp. 223-24.

90 Ibid., Sermon XIX, pp. 218-19.

91 Space does not permit a discussion of other mystical
thinkers whose contributions to the literature on passional Angst
and the Dark Night of the Soul provide an important and sizable
contribution toward understanding Angst in the mystical tradition.
Specifically Eckhart's disciple John Tauler (1300-1361), Henry Suso
(1295-1365) along with the Friends of God movement make a profound
contribution. Too, the Dutch mystics Jan Ruysbroeck (1293-1381)
and Gerard Groot (1340-1384) likewise display a keen sensitivity
for passional Angst. But the spirit of passional Angst as the
Dark Night of the Soul is, of course, the direct product of Juan de
al Crux (St. John of the Cross), (1542-91) and his spiritual mentor,
St. Teresa the Carmelite who in contrast to Eckhart's pantheistic
mysticism represent the "Christ-Mysticism" of the décalcid carmilite
Catholics.

93 Stoudt, *Jacob Boehme*, p. 147.

94 Ibid., p. 149.

95 Ibid., p. 56.


104 Ibid., 3, 4 as cited in Stoudt, *Jacob Boehme*, p. 269.


107 Ibid.
CHAPTER II

KIERKEGAARD AND ANGST

Deep within every human being there still lives the anxiety [Angst] over the possibility of being alone in the world, forgotten by God, overlooked among the millions and millions in his enormous household.

—Søren Kierkegaard, 1837

The Question at Hand

On a storm-drenched afternoon in 1767 somewhere on the wind-swept Jutland heaths, a small shepherd boy of eleven sits huddled in the rain at the top of a hillock, grimly watching his sheep on the monochromatic heath below him. A flash of lightning reveals his pinched and gaunt features: his wind tousled hair, his pale lips, his red-rimmed eyes lifting upwards to the leaden gray sky. Slowly he rises, his small hands clenching into fists, a rage growing within him. Another lightning bolt. He shakes his white-knuckled fist at the heavens, but the booming crescendo of thunder obliterates his shrill impassioned curse against the Holy Ghost for allowing the hopelessness, the poverty, the hunger, and the loneliness into his young life.

Here, in a moment of profound rage, the boy who became Søren Kierkegaard's father first felt the stirrings of what we called primordial Angst in the last chapter. Michael Kierkegaard interpreted the experience, however, in the light of primordial sin—the
unforgivable sin of cursing the Holy Ghost. His abysmal guilt, his utter self-loathing for committing a sin that precisely because it was unpardonable must pass on to his children and their children, made this Jutland Dane a morbid melancholic man imbued with an inordinate sense of guilt as well as an abiding belief that he and all that was of his flesh was destined for eternal damnation. This became his "dreadful secret" that he was incapable of revealing to anyone for decades of his life.

It was not until 1844, over seventy-five years after the Jutland experience, that his son, Søren Kierkegaard, was able to understand and interpret the condition which made Michael Kierkegaard's sin possible. Indeed, it was not his father's general anger at the vicissitudes of the shepherd's life, nor was it even the explicit frustration he felt at the poverty, the isolation and apparent hopelessness of his existence on the Jutland heath. Rather than any external condition, the possibility of cursing the Holy Ghost came from within his father's spirit as a manifestation of what we have called primordial Angst—the Angst in the face of an abyss of meaninglessness.

Our purpose in this chapter, therefore, is to show hermeneutically just how Kierkegaard came to understand Angst as the condition of the possibility of not only his father's sin, but of all sin. To accomplish this purpose, however, several guidelines for interpretation must be mentioned so as not to mislead the reader; for in entering upon a discussion of Kierkegaard's concept
of Angst, we must depart from the macro-hermeneutical interpretation of primordial Angst and focus in via a micro-hermeneutical approach on the Angst which showed itself to Kierkegaard, the first thinker to seriously treat this powerful phenomenon.

Thus in the pages to follow, we shall set the stage for the micro-hermeneutical approach by sketching out the hermeneutical landscape with broad brush strokes to show the overall background of Kierkegaard's method of philosophical investigation. Only when this task has been worked through, we suggest, can the "figure" of the phenomenon of Angst show itself against this "background," somewhat as would a figure appear against the ground in terms of Gestalt theory. In any case, once this background concerning the influence of previous thinkers on Kierkegaard's thought has been worked through, we can then visualize the context in which Kierkegaard's dialectical method of philosophical investigation reveals itself. Only after these methodological considerations have been illuminated we will be in a position to understand and interpret how Kierkegaard's romantic notion of the "master-thief" led to a more philosophical notion of "presentment" as the concept which ultimately led to the discovery of Angst. Finally, after all these considerations have been rendered sufficiently transparent, we will be able to hermeneutically inquire into the phenomenon of Angst as Kierkegaard himself understood it. We submit that in no other way will Angst reveal itself in Kierkegaard's thought, unless we betray the integrity of hermeneutic phenomenology by forcing a fabricated
and utterly inappropriate interpretation of Angst on Kierkegaard; that is to say, one grounded in the "fancies and popular conceptions" which undermine and betray the rigor of hermeneutic phenomenology as a discipline. What is required, therefore, is a detailed examination of Kierkegaard's discovery of primordial Angst—a task of micro-hermeneutics.

Hence in this chapter, as well as in Chapters III and IV, we are not seeking to trace the history of a concept. Rather we are attempting to uncover the horizons within which Angst can possibly show itself in itself, and in its own way rather than by whitewashing and thereby covering over the very possibility of micro-hermeneutic phenomenological disclosure. Our purpose, in sum, is to light up the horizons, to illuminate the background, to bring to the full light of day the conditions which made possible the disclosure of Angst as a phenomenon of significant import to the philosophers considered in this dissertation. It is only by carefully and rigorously working through how each writer paves the way for the self-revelation of Angst that its final role in contemporary philosophical thought will allow itself to be seen. Thus, micro-hermeneutics will be our methodological clue for the three chapters concerning primordial Angst in the positions of Kierkegaard, Heidegger (Chapter III), Sartre and Tillich (Chapter IV). Only then can we return to the macro-hermeneutics or the overview of primordial Angst's role in contemporary philosophical thought—the purview of our concluding chapter.
We begin our micro-hermeneutical task by turning to the first in-depth treatment of Angst as a theme worthy of philosophical investigation. The work to which we refer was the product of Virgilus Haufniensis, a Kierkegaardian pseudonym meaning significantly enough, "watchman of Copenhagen." This seminal work was entitled Begrebnet Angst [The Concept of Angst], subtitled, A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin.

Often called the "father of Existentialism,"² Kierkegaard's impact on contemporary thought—particularly contemporary European thought—can hardly be overestimated. Certainly twentieth-century phenomenological ontologists and existential thinkers, whether they agree with Kierkegaard or not, owe a profound debt to his analysis and description of Angst in relation to human freedom. Furthermore, as Rollo May has shown,³ an entire school of existential psychiatry is deeply grounded in Kierkegaard's contribution to the literature on Angst and its relationship to the phenomenon of the Demonic.

In view of Kierkegaard's considerable influence on contemporary thought and especially with respect to Angst, it is truly tempting to seek to hermeneutically interpret the whole of his pseudonymous authorship as an extended analysis and clarification of that phenomenon; for as we shall see, Angst is for Kierkegaard the psychological pre-condition of the possibility of human freedom. It is man's departure point for mental-spiritual development toward Christianity and the eternal as the spirit's absolute
telos. But if this general interpretation is tempting, it is also misleading; for any attempt to distill the essence of Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings to a single concept is nothing short of a flagrant reductionism. As Howard V. and Edna H. Hong have observed, Kierkegaard must be read "organically and collaterally, not linearly or atomistically as some hapless writers on Kierkegaard have suggested." The almost uniform perspective of such hapless writers, the Hongs continue, is an appeal to "... a single work (usually a pseudonymous work) as a means for interpretation and critique."

With this observation in mind, we decline to join the ranks of such hapless writers by yielding to the reductionist temptation. Rather, in this chapter we hope to show that the phenomenon of Angst must be approached collaterally and organically rather than linearly or atomistically. Thus, this chapter will approach Angst from three distinct but related sources: (1) from within the purview of Kierkegaard's general existential method of philosophizing; (2) from within that of his Journals and Papers as a reflection of his immediate apprehension of the meaning and significance of Angst; and finally (3) from within the horizons of Begrebnet Angest [The Concept of Angst] as the work of the psychologist Virgilis Haunniensis, Kierkegaard's "alter-ego" in the discussion of Angst. This should provide a collateral hermeneutical context in which Angst in Kierkegaard's aesthetic or pseudonymous mode of thought can be better understood.
Here at the outset, however, the micro-hermeneutical horizons for the present analysis may be significantly expanded if a preliminary issue is discussed before launching into the major tasks outlined above. This is the question of the direct influence on Kierkegaard as the basis for his own interpretation of Angst in Begrebnet Angst. Not only is this question somewhat interesting in itself, but its significance resides in openly inquiring into the originality of Kierkegaard's interpretation. It is thus to this propaedeutic question that we turn in the next section.

The Horizons of Influences

This question is difficult to unravel for several reasons. First, it is clear from Kierkegaard's Journal entries and the footnotes within Begrebnet Angst that he was familiar with the basic writings of the Christian Church Fathers,\textsuperscript{5} as well as with the gnostic tradition.\textsuperscript{6} Likewise Kierkegaard was acquainted with some of Jacob Boehme's thought\textsuperscript{7} and refers to St. John of the Cross on one occasion.\textsuperscript{8} Furthermore it is very possible that through Franz von Baader's works, particularly his Vorlesungen . . . über religiose Philosophie [Lectures Concerning Religious Philosophy],\textsuperscript{9} Kierkegaard became acquainted with the thought of Meister Eckhart, although this is not confirmed in the Journals and Papers.\textsuperscript{10} Be that as it may, Kierkegaard, as an intellectual product of nineteenth century thought, was well acquainted with the works of his immediate predecessors, J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling, F. E. D.
Schleiermacher, J. G. Hamann, and of course with G. W. F. Hegel, all of whom were at least capable in principle of directly influencing him with regard to *Begrebnet Angst*’s interpretation of Angst.

Concerning textual reference to the phenomenon of Angst in particular, Kierkegaard indirectly cites von Baader in *Begrebnet Angst* and directly discusses the contributions of Schelling and Hamann, as we shall momentarily see. But of all these thinkers, Hamann appears to have had the greatest influence on Kierkegaard. Specifically, as early as 1842 Kierkegaard was to write in his *Journals*.

In Volume VI, p. 194, of his works, Hamann makes an observation which I can use, although he neither understood it as I wish to understand it nor thought further about it: "However, this Angst in the world is only proof of our heterogeneity. If we lacked nothing, we should do no better than the pagans and the transcendental philosophers, who know nothing of God and like fools fall in love with lovely nature, and no homesickness would overcome us. This impertinent disquiet, this holy hypochondria..."\(^{11}\)

The passage is concluded in the last footnote to *Begrebnet Angst*:

"...is perhaps the fire with which we season sacrificial animals in order to preserve us from the putrification of current secunda."\(^{12}\)

As can be seen from these observations, Hamann did influence Kierkegaard concerning the meaning of Angst, but only indirectly, or perhaps more accurately, collaterally; for as the passage shows, while Hamann's comments are useful to Kierkegaard, he did not understand the phenomenon of Angst in the same way as did Hamann.

But this gives rise to an even deeper question: How did Kierkegaard "wish to understand" the phenomenon of Angst by 1842?
The answer to this question seems clear. The Journal entry cited above is but an addendum to an earlier entry (likely written in sequence), wherein Kierkegaard for the first time describes the significance of Angst in relation to original sin:

The nature of original sin has often been explained, and still a primary category is lacking—this is anxiety [Angst]; this is the essential determinant. Anxiety is a desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy; anxiety is an alien power which grips the individual, and yet one cannot tear himself free from it and does not want to, for one fears, but what he fears he desires. Anxiety makes the individual powerless, and the first sin always occurs in weakness; therefore it apparently lacks accountability, but this lack is the real trap.13 (Italics added.)

Thus as early as 1842, Kierkegaard understood the ambiguous power of Angst that was to be worked out concretely in Begrebnet Angest two years later. Our point here is that his interpretation is markedly different from that of Hamann.

Another contributor to the literature on Angst discussed by Kierkegaard is Schelling. In an important footnote within Begrebnet Angst, the pseudonymous author Virgilus Haufniensis observes:

Schelling himself has often spoken of anxiety [Angst], anger, anguish, suffering, etc. But one ought always to be a little suspicious of such expressions, so as not to confuse the consequences of sin in creation with what Schelling also characterizes as states and moods in God. . . . Schelling's main thought is that anxiety etc., characterize especially the suffering of the deity in his endeavor to create (CA., p. 59, note).

Having said that, Haufniensis virtually dismisses Schelling's contribution to the literature on Angst. More interesting perhaps is the unpublished draft of the above passage where Jacob Boehme is linked with Schelling. The draft notes in the margin: "Jacob
Boehme, Schelling. 'Anxiety [Angst], anger, hunger, suffering.' These things should always be eyed with caution; now it is the consequence of sin, now the negative in God—\textit{το \textepsilon \textsigma \rho ου} [the other]." Therefore it is clear that both Schelling and Boehme were considered by Kierkegaard in his collateral development of the concept of \textit{Angst}, but neither of these giants were directly responsible for Kierkegaard's interpretation.

One final predecessor demands some discussion; namely, Franz von Baader. While Kierkegaard does not refer to von Baader's concept of \textit{Angst} directly in either \textit{Begrebnet Angest} or in the \textit{Journals and Papers}, he does criticize this predecessor on two principal points in footnotes to \textit{Begrebnet Angest}. In a footnote on page 39, for example, Haufniensis says "... concerning the significance of temptation for the consolation of freedom," von Baader overlooks an important immediate term in the transition from innocence to guilt. Significantly enough this immediate term is \textit{Angst}. In a second footnote, twenty pages later, Kierkegaard criticizes von Baader as being a thinker who "... did not take into account the history of the race," a crucial point in the discussion of "objective \textit{Angst}" in \textit{Begrebnet Angest}. From Haufniensis' viewpoint, this omission (in tandem with von Baader's interpretation of finitude and sensuousness as sinfulness), leads von Baader's interpretation close to the edge of the Pelagianistic heresy, a position to which Haufniensis (and Kierkegaard himself) was unquestionably opposed.
In view of this evidence, perhaps it would prove more fruitful to suggest that Kierkegaard's concept of Angst was not the product of any direct influence. Rather, it may prove useful to suggest that the Angst of Begrebnet Angest was a phenomenon that showed itself to Kierkegaard first as a personal experience rather than as a cognitive idea. Only after many years of struggling with, indeed, consistently thinking through the implications of Angst in this personal life, was Kierkegaard able to formulate the concept that becomes the essential theme of Begrebnet Angest. This interpretation is but a mere skeletal structure that this chapter seeks to flesh out. But to accomplish this aim, the present chapter must begin with an attempt to grasp Kierkegaard's general method of doing philosophical investigation; for without this group as the micro-hermeneutical background to the concept of Angst, Begrebnet Angest becomes an enormously difficult work to understand, interpret, and discuss from a hermeneutical point of view.

As our next question, we must inquire into Kierkegaard's method, which in our view is a synthesis of two dialectically opposing perspectives. By way of introduction, however, we observe that on the one hand, there is what we shall here term "the cognitive approach to method" which is grounded in the apodicticity of logic and science and is carried out via the principle of consistent thinking. On the other hand, there is what we shall call "the experimental/psychological approach to method" which is grounded
in experimentation and is carried out via penetrating psychological observations.

But before turning to these matters, one last propaedeutic point remains to be mentioned: we are indeed aware of the significant role Angst plays in Either/Or, as the "root energy of the aesthete as he tries to flee from finitude with demonic energy"; of the role it plays further in Fear and Trembling as the Angst before the demands of religious faith; and finally of the important role it plays in The Sickness Unto Death as the essence of melancholy and despair as the spirit moves toward its destiny.

Yet any full dress treatment of these ramifications of Angst in Kierkegaard's thought is beyond the scope of the present work. It is our task here, after all, to discover the essential role of Angst in Kierkegaard's thought rather than showing how that role is employed throughout the pseudonymous authorship. We will adhere to this delimitation as strictly as is possible so to serve the greater purpose of the dissertation, an inquiry into the role of Angst in Western philosophical thought.

This having been said, we turn now to a discussion of Kierkegaard's method as the micro-hermeneutical horizon within which his concept of Angst can be understood and interpreted.

The Micro-Hermeneutical Horizons for Interpreting Angst in Kierkegaard's Early Thought

In this section, as was indicated above, it is our task to provide a horizon from within which Angst can be understood and
interpreted in Kierkegaard's thought. In the first section of this chapter it was argued that Kierkegaard's thought as a whole must be approached both collaterally and organically. Here we propose to take this seriously. Thus, in the pages that follow we hope to show that the concept of Angst can best be understood when Kierkegaard's method of philosophical investigation is seen as the hermeneutical horizon in which Begrebnet Angst is couched.

We further argued above that Kierkegaard's method is neither linear nor atomistic, and hereby submit that it is the product of two dialectically opposing approaches that when unified provide an exceptionally rigorous means of carrying out scholarly investigations within the tradition of the Geisteswissenschaften [the spiritual sciences]. It was the totality of the spiritual sciences seen from the viewpoint of human existence that concerned Kierkegaard, as we shall see.

Thus we will divide this section into two subsections so that both approaches may be discussed. In the first subsection, which follows, we shall explore Kierkegaard's cognitive approach. Then the next subsection will examine the experimental/psychological approach.

The cognitive approach to method—the Vorgriff of the understanding. An absolutely essential source for understanding Kierkegaard's thought is his Papirer (Journals and Papers). Perhaps more than either the pseudonymous aesthetic writings or
the Christian discourses written under his own name, the entries in the *Journals* provide a personal side to Kierkegaard's thought that compliments and strengthens the two other dimensions of his authorship.

The Danish editors of these *Journals and Papers* have shown that as early as 1836, when he was twenty-three years old, Kierkegaard was already attempting to come to grips with a "system" for methodically exploring what he called his "project." The editor's description of this project is worth repeating here because it displays in one passage the many colorful threads in the rich tapestry of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authorship. The editors suggest that the project was

The collection of material for a characterization of the spirit of the Middle Ages through a general historical study of the age's distinctive features in all areas of the spiritual intellectual life, in literature, art, religion, science, and social conditions, concentrating on a more thorough and concrete study of the reflection of the folk genius of the Middle Ages in poetry, legends, fairy tales, and stories, especially on the personifications of the representative ideas rising out of the medieval folk life's world of consciousness: Don Juan, Faust, the Wandering Jew, and all this in the light of a more abstract Hegelian-philosophic parallel interest in a comprehensive delineation of the stages of intellectual-spiritual development, including "world-history" as well as the single individual's "microcosm," by way of defining concepts such as: the classical, the romantic ("dialectical"), the modern, comedy, tragedy, iron, humor, resignation, etc., etc.19

To say the least, this is astonishingly ambitious. But even so, what the description lacks is any thread of coherence or a unifying principle which pulls together the rich colors and tones of this elegant tapestry of thought. Gregor Malantschuk suggests that this
unifying thread is the concept of "anthropological contemplation," discovered by Kierkegaard in 1838 as the key to making it possible to philosophize in the older sense of classical Greek philosophy. It was this classical philosophy which "... unreflectively assumed as a beginning—that on the whole there is reality in thought." From this Kierkegaard concludes, "but the whole line of thought proceeding from this assumption entered into a genuine anthropological contemplation which has not yet been undertaken." (Italics added.)

It was Kierkegaard's intent to not only undertake the task of anthropological contemplation, but to carry it out to the best of his ability. If the task were to be successfully carried out, it would require at minimum an apodictic point of departure from which all other conclusions could be derived; that is, a methodological Archimedian point.

Kierkegaard found his archimedian point in the Socratic principle expressed by the maxim, "know thyself!" As early as 1835, Kierkegaard was aware of its apodictic power, noting in the Journal, "One must first learn to know himself before knowing anything else (γνωθι σεαυτόν)." Nine years later, the author of Begrebet Angest echoes the maxim in different language: "And this is the wonder of life, that each man who is mindful of himself knows what no science knows, since he knows who he himself is, and this is the profundity of the Greek saying γνωθι σεαυτόν which too long has been understood in the German was as pure self-consciousness,
the airiness of idealism" (CA., p. 79, note). To assert the truth of this vision is, of course, one thing, but to offer compelling evidence for it is quite another. However, Kierkegaard does precisely that via an indirect but compelling proof that runs along the following lines: one cannot have an understanding of humanity in general, that is, the conditions which make being human possible, unless one begins with self-understanding. More specifically, it can be argued that "Every person must fundamentally be assumed to possess that which is fundamental to being a person. . . ." If this were not the case (the indirect proof continues), then "... at various times fundamentally different people have been produced, and the universal unity of mankind is abolished." This alternative proposition, however, could not be the case, since "... every person possesses in himself, when he looks carefully, a more complete expression for everything human than the summa summarium of all knowledge that he acquires by learned studies." Therefore (the indirect proof concludes), "... what holds here in a profound psychological decision is unum noris omnes [if you know one, you know all]. When the possibility of sin [for example] is shown in one, it is shown in all, and all that is left to the ideal arena of observation are considerations of more or less [sin in the individual]." Thus the ground of Kierkegaard's overall method may be characterized as the principle of unum noris omnes. As we shall see, it is this anthropological Archimedian point that grounds both
aspects of Kierkegaard's method, the cognitive approach as well as the experimental/psychological approach to the *Geisteswissenschaft* of philosophy.

Let us now focus attention upon these two aspects of the overall method. We shall begin with an analysis of the elements inherent in the cognitive approach. Then in the next subsection we will move on to a discussion of the experimental/psychological approach.

What we have here termed "the cognitive approach to method," while being ultimately grounded in the extra-methodological assumption of *unum noris omnes*, takes its operational launching point from the principle of "consistent thinking." Consistent thinking meant for Kierkegaard a rigorous and thoroughly scholarly approach to a "comprehensive view of life's manifold forms, especially of human existence, with an emphasis on subjective actuality and its relationship to Christianity as the base." It is this principle, the principle of consistent thinking, that lies at the root of all logic and mathematics. As the root of apodicticity, it became for Kierkegaard the model for all scholarly treatment of other subjects as well. The most visible use of consistent thinking in Kierkegaard's cognitive approach is the extensive use of indirect proof, a technique exhaustively employed in *Begrebnen Angest*.

Gregor Malantschuk sees the operational function of consistent thinking as follows:

The ideal in all spheres of scholarship is to reach a scientifically and scholarly correct treatment of the subjects investigated. An ideal achieved only by way of thorough
consistency. The two auxiliary disciplines which must be considered in this connection are logic and mathematics, the whole structure of which rests on the principle of consistency. Consistency, or more accurately, consistent thinking, is the implicit but indispensable premise for these two disciplines; consequently they become the norms for a consistent and thereby scholarly treatment of other areas of scholarship.\textsuperscript{31}

Indirect proof (as well as direct proof), therefore, must follow the demands of consistent thinking if it is to merit the name of scholarly activity; for all rules for making judgments must be reducible ultimately to thinking consistently. Otherwise, the result will be what Kierkegaard's pseudonymous author in \textit{Begrebet Angest} calls "fantastic thought" (i.e., that which is grounded in fantasy or which fantastically explains everything).\textsuperscript{32}

Kierkegaard appropriates the basis for his cognitive method from his readings of F. C. Sibbern, especially the work entitled \textit{Om Erkjendelse og Granskning} [On Knowledge and Research].\textsuperscript{33} Sibbern's work allowed Kierkegaard to define the parameters of his cognitive approach and to apply this approach in three stages: First, with regard to his general project, Kierkegaard was able to work his way consistently through previously given solutions to problems within the disciplines that concerned him, and only then arrive at a verification or rejection of these solutions. Secondly, Kierkegaard was then able to construct fresh viewpoints on these problems, and again, by consistently thinking through their implications, could establish their essential correctness. Finally, Kierkegaard could, with this groundwork behind him, then apply the
verified conclusions in arenas of thought that were within the purview of his fundamental project. All this was possible only through the power of consistent thinking as the first element of his cognitive approach to method.

A second major element of the cognitive approach was likewise inherited from Sibbern. This is the concept of "collateral" or parallel development of the individual's mental-spiritual being. During 1838, Kierkegaard read and absorbed Sibbern's work, Bemaerkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betraeffende Hegels Philosophi, betragtet i Førhold til vor Tid [Observations and Investigations Particularly on Hegel's Philosophy, Seen in Relation to Our Time]. From this work, he gained the following essential insight: "... the development of the mental-spirital content in the realms of both external and internal actuality takes place simultaneously along many lines." (Italics added.)

While there are many different specific collateral concepts, indeed as many as there are types of mental-spiritual qualifications, there are, Sibbern claimed, "The genuine synthetic unities in a special sense or the genuine synthetic combinations of two forming a third..." and "such triads as we have, for example in cognition, feeling, and will." Kierkegaard did not agree, however, that all the synthetic unities were co-equal. Rather as we shall see in our discussion of Begrebnet Angest, he believed that one of each pair dominated the other. Thus in Begrebnet Angest, for example, the eternal dominates the temporal,
freedom dominates over necessity, and so on. He did, however, concur with Sibbern that cognition, feeling, and will were indeed co-equal.

Kierkegaard next worked out the collateral qualifications that were of especial concern to him by consistently thinking through what is entailed in the concept of human existence. Those most frequently employed, especially in *Begrebnet Angest* are: temporal-eternal, necessity-freedom, finite-infinite, and body-mind-spirit. Likewise Kierkegaard used the coupled concepts of being-essence and quality-quantity frequently throughout the corpus of his writings. There Kierkegaard was able to project these qualifications over the broader based triad of cognition, feeling, and will to display the basic existential structure of the individual as interpreted from different perspectives. This process is neatly summarized by Kierkegaard in the *Journals*:

If the understanding [Forstanden], feeling, and will are essential qualifications in a man, belong essentially to human nature, then all this chaff that the world development now occupies a higher level vanishes into thin air, for if there is a movement in world history, then it belongs essentially to providence, and man's knowledge of it is highly imperfect . . .

The great individual is great simply because he has everything at one . . . [he] . . . is not thereby different from the insignificant individual by possessing something essentially different or by having it in another form . . . but by having everything to a greater degree.

The collateral. Thus armed with the cognitive weapons of consistent thinking and the principle of collateral development, Kierkegaard was prepared to undertake an understanding and interpretation of human existence in
the light of Christianity. Kierkegaard believed that only through the decidedly Christian viewpoint could the existential categories or qualifications of the human spirit be explicated and described. He specifically thought that only in relation to the eternal of Christianity did the qualification of innocence-guilt, finite-infinite, faith-doubt disclose themselves within man's spirit. Therefore, it is from the eternal standpoint of Christianity that the world and its most important occurrence, human existence, can be grasped essentially. Says Kierkegaard: "... The true Christian view, that universally human existence does not explain Christianity and that Christianity is not simply another factor in the world, but that Christianity explains the world..." ⁴³ As we shall see in the section of this chapter which discusses Begrebnet Angest, it is the phenomenon of Angst itself that ultimately makes possible the individual's understanding and appropriation of the Christian understanding of the world. Here we remark only in passing that to attain that understanding, the individual must begin his development from a non-Christian, totally aesthetic point of departure; and then, through a series of qualitative leaps or individual commitments, can he rise to the Christian understanding of the world. Gregor Malantschuk sees this clearly as being within the purview of Begrebnet Angest. His comments are worth repeating here because they capture the overall task of Kierkegaard's intent in writing the work on Angst. Malantschuk observes that:
The single individual must constantly begin his development from below and from the existential point of view, must go through a prolonged process before he has the courage and earnestness necessary to make the decision regarding Christianity. . . . Virgilius Haufniensis in The Concept of Anxiety [Begrebnet Angst] takes upon himself the task of depicting the mental-emotional aspect of man . . . [and] points unflaggingly to the fact that the actual transition from these mental-emotional positions to a new position which Christianity offers can occur only by a qualitative leap.44

This discussion of Kierkegaard's cognitive approach to method may be concluded by observing that as our analysis has shown, Kierkegaard was anything but an undisciplined thinker. On the contrary, the essence of his cognitive approach is the rigorous application of logical canons to the task of consistently thinking through the implications of any given perspective on the qualifications of the human spirit. Yet to interpret Kierkegaard's thought from this perspective alone is to miss his thrust completely; for running collaterally to the cognitive approach is a dialectically opposed approach which, rather than being grounded in the canons of logic, is grounded in the experience of the human drama. Thus in the next subsection, we hope to describe the second major element of Kierkegaard's method which we will descriptively term "the experimental/psychological approach."

As we shall see, it is only when the synthesis is completed regarding these two approaches that Begrebnet Angst in general and the concept of Angst within it can be understood and interpreted hermeneutically. Thus we turn now to a brief discussion of the role of experiment and psychological observation in Kierkegaard's method.
as the second half of the hermeneutical horizon within which Angst may be seen in Kierkegaard's thought.

The experimental/psychological approach—the Vorsicht of the understanding. We have suggested that the experimental/psychological approach to method in Kierkegaard's thought is the experiential counterpart to the cognitive approach. BUT BOTH APPROACHES ARE UNITED AT ROOT IN THE GENERAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSUMPTION OF UNUM NORIS OMNES. How is this so? Kresten Nordentoff provides the clearest answer to this question, observing:

In the final analysis, all understanding is self understanding. An "objective" understanding of one's surroundings, which is not grounded in self-understanding, is either triviality or a demonic illusion. Only by means of self-understanding can a genuine understanding of one's surroundings come into being. Therefore, self-understanding is the conditio sine qua non for the areas of knowledge which are under discussion here—and therefore, Kierkegaard's psychology is based upon self-analyses.45

Thus Kierkegaard's psychology, as well as his logic of consistent thought, begins in self-introspection as the apodictic center from which knowledge of others can be based. But moving from self-knowledge to knowledge of others requires verification of the conclusions drawn on the basis of the unum noris omnes principle; for self-knowledge can always be deceptive regardless of how cognitively rigorous one's consistent thought is with regard to the qualifications of the human spirit. This problem is solved by Kierkegaard in the experimental method of observing others to confirm or refute the conclusions drawn from self-knowledge. With
this in mind, the quote cited above in the previous subsection takes on new meaning.

... every person possesses in himself, when he looks carefully, a more complete expression for everything human than the summa summarum of all knowledge he acquires by that method [i.e., by learned studies].

This means that:

Therefore, what holds here in a profound psychological decision is unum noris omnes. When the possibility of sin is shown in one, it is shown in all, and all that is left to the ideal arena of observation are considerations of more or less.

The experimental/psychological approach, then, is grounded in self-understanding to the extent that from such understanding Kierkegaard was able to establish his perspectives and hypotheses. But these require confirmation in the field of experience—that is, in the marketplace, at church meetings, and/or at the theater. The means for carrying out such observations was empathetic insight and the uncovering of the hidden and deeper dimensions of the subject's spirit. But to accomplish these ends the psychologist must get beyond the illusory veil of simply visually observing his subject. Rather the hidden and deeper well-springs of the spirit reveal themselves to the psychologist only when the subject is closely and empathetically listened to. Psychological observation is therefore an auditory rather than visual mode of observation.

But purely clinical, objective, and disinterested knowledge is not enough in the Kierkegaardian approach to psychological observation. Indeed, argues Kierkegaard, precisely because clinical
knowledge is disinterested, it reveals nothing of the passionate and frequently demonic feelings within the subject's spirit. The psychologist must listen in silence for the spirit's dark and hidden passion to slip "out to chat with itself in the artificially constructed nonobservance and silence" of psychological experiments and observations. Manifestly, this quest for knowledge requires interested knowledge. So the more the psychologist is interested in the subject, the more sound and profound will be his knowledge of the subject. Thus in 1844 Kierkegaard wrote in his Journal: "Psychology is what we need, and above all, expert knowledge of human life and sympathy with its interests. Thus, here there is a problem the solution of which must precede any talk of rounding out a Christian view of life." This passage shows the intimate and even necessary connection between psychology and Kierkegaard's ultimate goal of articulating the existential qualifications, particularly with regard to the Christian view of life. Psychology must precede a rounding out of the Christian view of life.

But this psychology, rather than being objective and disinterested, is passionately interested in the human subject. It was on this very point that Kierkegaard parted company with his mentor in the cognitive approach to method, F. C. Sibbern. Kierkegaard remarked that Sibbern was satisfied with simply describing human emotions in a dispassionate way. As a result, says Kierkegaard, Sibbern's approach to psychology lacks "an eye for the disguised passions, for the reduplication by which one passion takes
the form of another."50 Bearing this passionate, fundamentally interested quest for confirmation in mind, Nordentoft summarizes economically the role of the master psychological observer as well as the validity of his conclusions:

That the requirement of responsible self-understanding is both existentially and scientifically valid can . . . be seen in Climacus' discussion of "the subjective thinker" in *Concluding Unscientific Postscripts*. First (and last), one learns that this thinker must have fantasy and feeling; he must be able to talk poetically and ethnically, and he must be able to think dialectically. But, especially, he must have passion.51 (Italics added.)

**The Existential Horizon of Begrebnet Angest**

To display this passionate quest in its broadest possible hermeneutical context, we must inquire into the ends toward which it was employed, namely the confirmation or rejection of the qualifications of the human spirit as it progresses through the stages on life's way to Christianity. Our purpose in including this section is to display concretely how the dialectical approach to method was employed. This will pave the way for explicitly bringing to light the context of *Begrebnet Angest*: that is, the micro-hermeneutical horizon wherein the 1844 work on *Angst* fits into Kierkegaard's thought. This section should therefore ground our interpretation of Kierkegaard's method in a specific and concrete manner. We may begin with the experimental/psychological aspects of the soul's quest for the eternal of Christianity. Consider, for example, the experimental/psychological aspects contained in the following *Journal* entry written by Kierkegaard in 1837:
It would be interesting to follow the development of human nature (in the individual man—that is, at various stages) by showing what one laughs at on the different age levels, in part by making these experiments with one and the same author . . . and in part by way of the different kinds of comedy. It would—together with research and experiments concerning the age level at which tragedy is most appreciated and with other psychological observations about the relation between comedy and tragedy . . . —contribute to the work I believe ought to be written—namely, the history of the human soul (as it is in an ordinary human being) in the continuity of the state of the soul (not the concept) consolidation itself in particular mountain clusters (that is, noteworthy world-historical representatives of life-views).

To attain the broader goal of writing the history of the human soul, three methodological syntheses had to occur to bring together both poles of Kierkegaard's dialectical method. These syntheses were: (1) the means of depicting the different mental-spiritual stages of human development; (2) the means of showing the specific way whereby the mental-spiritual element of man moved from one stage to the next; and (3) the means of displaying concretely the goal toward which the mental-spiritual in man was moving. It would perhaps be helpful to consider each of these syntheses in brief as a more delimited micro-hermeneutical horizon of Begrebnet Angest.

The depicting of the stages. Kierkegaard, using insights gained from Sibbern, Møller, and perhaps Martinsen, was able to see that in order to successfully describe the stages he would have to begin with a psychological approach of self-analysis that is then confirmed in observations of others. Then using the cognitive approach of consistently thinking through the full implications of
his conclusions, he was able to classify these observational results into personality types (noteworthy world-historical representatives of life-views), which could then serve as paradigms for the stage they each represent. In the passage immediately cited above, this experimental/psychological approach clearly shows itself in the reference to "... research and experiments concerning the age-level at which tragedy is most appreciated and with other psychological investigations ..." In this passage, Kierkegaard outlines summarily his plan for depicting the first stage (the aesthetic) from the experimental/psychological point of departure. The existential dialectic is that of the tragic vs. the comic. Its analysis will reveal the inner conflicts of the individual by showing the object of his laughter. The reference cited at the end of the passage, "... particular mountain clusters (that is, noteworthy world-historical representatives of life-views)," shows that the cognitive approach is already and simultaneously at work, seeking to think through consistently the psychological archetypes of the stages of mental-spiritual development as to Christianity. Of the types that are negatively oriented toward Christianity, the chief world-historical figures are Don Juan, Faust, and Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew. The positive figures are Job, Abraham, Socrates, and Hamann.

The depicting of the means. The means whereby the mental-spiritual element of man moves from one stage to another was what
Kierkegaard called "the leap." The theory of the leap, conceived by 1835 as the transition from the human to the Christian stage of existence, is most consistently worked through in a series of Journal entries written in 1844. Kierkegaard begins to consistently think through the theory of the leap by asking the following question:

How does a new quality emerge from an unbroken quantitative determinant?

I am a poor man who does not have many ideas; if I get one, I must take care that I hold on to it. A leap.

The Platonic moment . . .

Every quality consequently emerges with a leap.

Is this leap then entirely homogeneous. [sic]

The leap by which water turns to ice, the leap by which I understand an author, and the leap which is the transition from good to evil. More sudden, Lessing's Faust, the evil spirit, who is as hasty as the transition from good to evil.

A qualitative difference between leaps.

The paradox.

(1) Effect upon Hegel's whole contribution -- to have thought through a skepticism -- method -- impossible.
(2) Transition from aesthetics to ethics
(3) from ethics to religion . . .

Kierkegaard continues to unfold and elaborate upon this initial theory over the following six Journal entries, concluding that qualitative changes can never be derived from quantitative changes, a position repeatedly demonstrated in Begrebnet Angest. It may be remarked in passing that the experimental/psychological confirmation of the qualitative leap is observed in the "pathos-leaps" which take place within the sphere of existence itself. Thus the "dialectical leaps" mentioned in the above-cited passage appear to be the
result of the cognitive approach. The pathos-filled leaps seem to bespeak the experimental/psychological approach. The final synthetic form of the theory of the leap, which likewise included leaps from possibility to actuality and leaps from actuality to possibility, is the synthetic unity of the pathos filled and the dialectical leap structures. Together these four species of leaps are held by Kierkegaard to depict how man moves from one stage of existence to another.

The depicting of the goal. The goal of mental-spiritual development, according to Kierkegaard, is to attain the eternal perspective in the new existence medium of Christianity. This is possible only after the individual has left behind the aesthetic and ethical realms and has conquered doubt, or more precisely, the passionate form of doubt known as "despair," and has entered the realm of faith. Again we suspect that this conclusion is the synthesis of the cognitive and the experimental/psychological approaches. As for the cognitive, Kierkegaard saw that there is nothing absolute and eternal in the empirical world; indeed, to believe that there are such "contingent absolutes" expresses a manifest contradiction. The only place where the eternal can be said to exist, is in man himself. Thus, only man can be addressed by an eternal transcendent power; and accordingly the new existence medium must be based upon the fact that man is the only synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. Hence, not only is it possible for
man to attain this new existence medium, but **eternity beckons to him.** Says Kierkegaard in 1840:

> I become conscious simultaneously in my eternal validity, in, so to speak, my divine necessity, and my accidental finitude (that I am this particular being, born in this country at this throughout all the various influences of changing conditions). The latter aspect must not be overlooked or rejected. On the contrary, the true life of the individual is its apotheosis, which does not mean that this empty, contentless I steals, as it were, out of this finitude, in order to become volatized and diffused in its heavenward emigration, but rather that the divine inhabits and tolerates the finite.

On the experimental/psychological side, the goal of the eternal is shown concretely in *Begrebnet Angest*. We offer here but a brief preview of what will be discussed in our third major section of this chapter. The path of the mental-spiritual development begins in innocence, with the spirit as yet unawakened in a kind of spontaneous, unbounded existence as yet unaware of good and evil. Through a pre-reflective apprehension of the possibility of freedom (as pure possibility), he awakens through the mediating phenomenon of Angst to the aesthetic stage of existence. He is the synthesis here of the psychic and somatic; the spiritual is still only a possibility.

It is only by a qualitative leap, i.e., the concrete choice of the individual made in the light of finitude's emptiness, that the next realm or sphere of existence, called by Kierkegaard the **ethical stage**, can be entered. But seeing beyond finitude to the eternal, Socrates, a major paradigm for ethical, was able to grasp the eternal ideas: the Beautiful, the True, and the Good. These
eternal ideas or Absolutes were, of course, the basis of the
Socratic ethical life-philosophy. Specifically, Kierkegaard argues
that for Socrates the idea of the Good provided the model for how
man had ought to act in order to be in concert with this Absolute
idea. Furthermore, the ethical stage shows itself in Judaism;
for God, as Spirit, places ethical commandments upon an entire
people, and to Him they are answerable for their conduct. From a
psychological perspective, man cannot live up to the absolute demands
of the ethical because of Adam's fall and the subsequent problem of
hereditary sin. Such sin is an ontological condition which precludes
man's possibility of meeting ethical demands in any absolute sense.
Thus, the spirit has arrived at the point where the ethical
collapses, finding itself now in despair before absolute guilt for
its sinfulness. At this point, only faith in the Christian message
that man is a redemption-requiring sinner, only faith in Christ as
that redeemer can save the individual, allowing him to enter the
eternal realm. As we shall see, if the eternal is resisted by man,
that is, if man clings to the finite and temporal facets of human
existence, he will proceed to move progressively deeper into an
intensified form of Angst which becomes the ultimate despair of
absolute guilt. It is only then, through a leap of faith, that the
spirit can consciously appropriate with passionate inwardness the
absolute truth, the eternal of Christianity. Lest the reader believe
that this extremely truncated description has taken us far afield
from our purpose, we will call upon Hong and Hong to show how it is related. "In the Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writers have described at length how man's guilt and sin continually assume more conscious (intensified) forms the more he tries to put distance between himself and God's eternal purpose for man."63

Thus in the depiction of the goal of mental-spiritual development, Kierkegaard again synthesizes the cognitive and experimental/psychological approaches, with the latter approach taking the form of a description of the actual stages of human existence that he encountered in his psychological observations. The whole of Begrebnet Angest, is, we suspect, precisely this description interlarded with a heavy dose of anti-Hegelian polemics and what one author has characterized as "... a parody on the theological textbooks to which Kierkegaard was subjected by his professors of divinity."64

As the section has attempted to show, then, the dialectical approaches to method, which were characterized under the two broad rubrics of "cognitive" and "experimental," become synthesized in Kierkegaard's sweeping method of investigating the subjective qualifications (again, not categories) of the human spirit. In the broadest possible sense, the whole of Kierkegaard's authorship—the pseudonymous, the Christian, and that of the Journals and Papers—is both the expression of as well as the fruit of this dialectical approach to the problem of human existence.
The discussion of one further issue was promised at the outset of this chapter. There we indicated Kierkegaard must be approached collaterally and organically, not linearly or atomistically. Thus it must be seen that the phenomenon of Angst as Kierkegaard understood it did not spring full-blown into his philosophical lexicon. Indeed, as we suggested at the end of the section on influences, it may be more fruitful to begin to hermeneutically understand and interpret Angst in Kierkegaard's thought if we dispense with the notion of one conceptual predecessor and start from the following hypothesis: the phenomenon of Angst became a topic of passionate interest for Kierkegaard based upon his own personal feelings regarding his early relationships to other significant people in his life, such as his father, Michael, and his rejected fiancée, Regine Olson. Too, on a more cognitive plane, the phenomenon of Angst arose as a result of Kierkegaard's early encounter with Christianity through his family and its rigorous ethical demands. It appears that the young Kierkegaard could deal with such demands intellectually, but clearly not emotionally. This interpretation is at least partially grounded in the following Journal entry:

If I had had faith, I would have stayed with Regine. Thanks to God I now see that . . . I would have married her—there are so many marriages which conceal little stories. That I did not want, then she would have become my concubine; I would rather have murdered her. —But if I were to explain myself, I would have had to initiate her into terrible things, my relationship to my father, his melancholy, the eternal night brooding within me, my going astray, my lusts and debauchery, which, however, in the eyes of God are perhaps
not so glaring; for it was, after all, anxiety [Angst] that made me go astray, and where was I to seek a safe stronghold when I knew or suspected that the only man I had admired for his strength was tottering.65

Kierkegaard was later able, through the unum noris omnes principle, to conclude that Angst is a basic disposition—a necessary condition to the human spirit. Angst is, therefore, a basic qualification of the human being's subjective actuality. This conclusion was grounded in the apodicticity of self-analysis, and was experimentally confirmed by almost continuous observations of his father's enormous melancholic Angst. Specifically, Kierkegaard employed those means that were to become the experimental/psychological approach to wrest his father's dreadful secret from him. The factual existence of the dreadful secret and the Angst associated with it, seen from the standpoint of the unum noris omnes principle, revealed the disposition of Angst to be a universal human phenomenon. So this phenomenon required both consistent thought and further experimental/psychological observation to confirm earlier conclusions regarding its staggering power over human subjectivity. Only later, as he worked through the writings of Boehme, von Baader, Schelling, and Hamann, was Kierkegaard able to pull together in his unique existential synthesis his father's melancholic Angst, his own Angst (which made him go astray) and the primordial Angst of which Boehme and Schelling spoke, to see Angst's essential role in human existence as a pre-reflective apprehension of the infinite freedom of possibility.
To ground this interpretation as well as to develop it collaterally and organically, we must more closely examine the way that Kierkegaard consistently thought through his early experience of Angst. For it is abundantly clear that his mature interpretation of Angst is the result of several interlarded stages of understanding and interpreting Angst's power. The next section will, therefore, attempt to specifically deal with this issue as a final description of the conceptual horizon wherein Angst shows itself in Kierkegaard's thought.

Presentiment as the Immediate Horizon for Angst

Kierkegaard's relationship to his father, Michael P. Kierkegaard, has been the subject of much discussion in connection with the phenomena of melancholy and Angst. The basis for such discussion appears to stem, at least in part, from the previously cited Journal entry, written after Kierkegaard had broken off his engagement to Regine Olson. Let us return to this passage in the light of this new disclosure.

I would have married her—there are so many marriages which conceal little stories. . . . But if I were to explain myself, I would have had to initiate her into terrible things, my relationship to my father, his melancholy, the eternal night of brooding within me, my going astray, my lusts and debauchery which, however, in the eyes of God are perhaps not so glaring; for it was, after all, anxiety (Angst) that made me go astray, and where was I to seek a safe stronghold when I knew or suspected that the only man I had admired for his strength was tottering.66

The haunting echo of the Angst which made the young Søren "go astray" when he could find no safe stronghold in his father shows
the obvious personal Angst of Søren Kierkegaard in the face of Michael Kierkegaard's melancholy. It would not be accurate or at all fruitful to argue that Kierkegaard derived the concept of Angst directly from his father's personal melancholy. However, it could well be argued that such melancholy may have provided the existential conditions that led Kierkegaard to develop consistently an intermediate set of concepts between melancholy and Angst. Specifically, at an early age Kierkegaard set out to appropriate and consistently think through the idea of the "master-thief" as a personified and romantic means of "stealing" his father's secret from him; thus forcing into the open what was concealed in Michael Kierkegaard's melancholic inclosing-reserve [det Indesluttede].67 The idea of the master-thief, however, still did not lead directly to seeing Angst as the complex phenomenon offered for discussion in Begrebnet Angst. Rather this path was circuitous, leading next to the concept of "presentiment" as the gate through which Kierkegaard had to pass on his way to the Angst of Begrebnet Angst.

So it was Kierkegaard's desire to pry open his father's secret and to expose the reasons for his melancholy that gave birth to several early and romantically wistful Journal entries concerning the "master-thief." The master-thief, says Kierkegaard, "... is not a man who tries to lead others astray; on the contrary, he dissuades them from leading such a life."68 This same desire to heal his father's melancholy led Kierkegaard through the master-thief idea to discover a broader sweeping phenomenon which was
capable of uncovering the hidden. This was the phenomenon of "presentiment." Specifically, Kierkegaard came to believe that certain presentiments concretely led to revealing the hidden psychic motivations that held the individual in the demonic power of inclosing reserve. This discovery of presentiment appears to surface in 1837. In a Journal entry of that year Kierkegaard discloses his first insight into presentiment:

A certain presentiment seems to precede everything which is to happen . . . ; but, just as it can have a deterring effect, it can also tempt a person to think that he is, as it were predestined; he sees himself carried on to something as though by consequences beyond his control. Therefore one ought to be very careful with children, never believe the worst and by untimely suspicion or by a chance remark . . . occasion an anguished consciousness in which innocent but fragile souls can easily be tempted to believe themselves guilty, to despair, and thereby to make the first step toward the goal foreshadowed by the unsettling presentiment—a remark which gives the kingdom of evil, with its stupefying, snakelike eye, an occasion for reducing them to a kind of spiritual paralysis. Of this, too, it may be said: woe until him by whom the offence comes.69

In the margin to this entry, Kierkegaard wrote: "The significance of topology with reference to a theory of presentiment."70 We submit that in this passage is revealed an immediate predecessor of the phenomenon of Angst as Kierkegaard understood that phenomenon in 1844. This interpretation may be grounded by Kierkegaard himself in Begrebnet Angest, where he says: ". . . the nothing of anxiety [Angst] is a complex of presentiments, which, reflecting themselves in themselves, come nearer and nearer to the individual, even though again, when viewed essentially in anxiety, they signify a nothing . . . ."71
Thus, while presentiment is not identical with Angst, it appears to be at least intimately linked with Angst. This link, we suggest, provided the key to a more mature understanding of the phenomenon of Angst itself. How is this so? To answer this question, we must observe more closely the phenomenon of presentiment itself in Kierkegaard's thought.

As was seen above, presentiment means an apprehension which precedes "everything which is about to happen." But such a presentiment could not be anything like a conceptually transparent pre-vision. On the contrary, presentiment is so dark and murky that it fills the soul with Angst. Says Kierkegaard:

All presentiment is murky and rises all at once in the consciousness or so gradually fills the soul with anxiety [Angst] that it does not arise as a conclusion from given premises but always manifests itself in an undefined something; however, I now believe more than ever that an attempt should be made to point out the subjective predisposition and not as something unsound and sickly, but as an aspect of normal constitution.72 (Italics added.)

Here we see that presentiment is an aspect of normal and subjective predisposition wherein one experiences Angst in reference to "an undefined something." To be sure, this early discussion of presentiment lacks the usual rigor and conceptual clarity of Kierkegaard's consistent thinking. But as with the phenomenon of presentiment itself, the notion of presentiment was emerging gradually as a theme for philosophical investigation.

Not until September 10, 1839 would Kierkegaard more clearly express his view of presentiment. On that date in his Journal,
Kierkegaard not only defined presentiment, but describes its operational horizons with almost post-Husserlian phenomenological rigor.

Presentiment is not linked to the direction of the eye's orientation toward existence and its future but to the reflex of the eye's direction toward the past so that the eye, by staring at what lies behind it (in another sense, ahead of it) develops a disposition to see what lies ahead of it (in another sense behind it).

For example, if A is the present, the time in which we are living, and B the future, then it is not by standing in A and turning my face toward B that I see B; for by turning thus I see nothing at all, but when C is the past, then it is by turning toward C that I see B, just as, in fact, in Achim V. Arnim's novel the presentiment eyes of Alrunen were situated in the back of his head, whereas his other two eyes, which were farsighted in the ordinary way—that is, two regular eyes—were in his forehead just like the eyes of other men, or that part of the head turned toward the future.73

Thus by 1839 Kierkegaard was able to articulate his understanding and interpretation of presentiment as a temporally orienting phenomenon in which the future is apprehended by reference to the past. As such, presentiment has a close relationship to the category of possibility; that category under which the phenomenon of Angst will later be discussed in Begrebnnet Angest.

In summation, then, the place of presentiment in Kierkegaard's thought may show itself through several different facets.74 These are: (1) "historical presentiments," which arise when the individual absorbs himself in history's driving forces; (2) "prophetic presentiments," which arise when these historical forces are interpreted from within a religious or "prophetic"
perspective; (3) "personal presentiments," which arise when the individual contemplates his own destiny, and finally, (4) "psychological presentiments," which arise when the experienced observes "on the basis of a person's single utterance . . . can get a survey of all the consequences of his lifetime." 75

While the first two of these four may be said to have a close bearing on the cognitive element of Kierkegaard's thought, the final two appear to have an equally close bearing on his experimental/psychological thought. Moreover, and equally important, the latter may even have been derived from the former, since in Kierkegaard's own personal life his earliest personal and psychological presentiments were the result of his relationship to his father's dreadful secret. This became, we suspect at least, the basis for the master-thief idea which in turn made possible the theory of presentiment. As was shown above, the first clear recognition of the phenomenon of presentiment was entered into the Journal in 1837. But during the same year, Kierkegaard entered another entry describing presentiment, only this time in relation to the cognitive and dogmatic problem of original sin. We are thus nearing Begrebnet Angest. Kierkegaard notes:

For something to become really depressing there must be first of all, in the midst of all possible favors, a presentiment that it might just be all wrong; one does not become conscious of anything very wrong in himself, but it may lie in the familial context; then original sin displays its consuming power, which can grow into despair and have a far more frightful effect than the particular whereby the truth of the presentiment is verified. 76
The final transition from the theory of presentiment in regard to original sin to the concept of Angst and original sin had to wait until 1842, two years prior to the publication of Begrebnet Angst. Kierkegaard says:

The nature of original sin has often been explained and still a primary category has been lacking—it is anxiety [Angst]; this is the essential determinant. Anxiety is a desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy; anxiety is an alien power which grips the individual, and yet one cannot tear himself free from it and does not want to, for one fears, but what he fears he desires. Anxiety makes the individual powerless, and the first sin always occurs in weakness; therefore it apparent lacks accountability, but this lack is the real trap.77

With this transition from presentiment to Angst as background, we are now prepared to move from the method of Kierkegaard to his application of that method to the phenomenon of Angst.

In the preceding sections, the methodological background of Kierkegaard's thought has been outlined and briefly discussed in an attempt to show that Angst is not some irrational theme which Kierkegaard arbitrarily selected as one worthy of philosophical investigation. Rather, this discussion has tried to show the centrality of Angst to the cognitive, the experimental/psychological, and now specifically to the personal/existential dimensions of Kierkegaard's life and thought, taken as a whole. It is our hope that the micro-hermeneutical parameters have been adequately established so that the phenomenon of Angst in Begrebnet Angst can show itself in itself and in its own way. With this in mind, we turn now to Begrebnet Angst.
The Concept of Angst in Begrebnet Angest

Preliminary Considerations

We move now from the micro-hermeneutical horizons of Angst to the specific depiction of that phenomenon given in Begrebnet Angest. The path for this transition has been paved, it is hoped, by a somewhat detailed account of Kierkegaard's personal encounter with Angst in the face of his relationships to his father and Regine Olson. From the perspective of this dissertation, such relationships allowed Kierkegaard not only to discover what we earlier called "ontic Angst," but much more importantly, that discovery made possible a deeper ontological understanding of Angst as something like the Grundbefindlichkeit of the human spirit. Certainly Kierkegaard did not use the term Grundbefindlichkeit, but the following quotation shows that he understood well enough the ontological significance of Angst. In 1837, Kierkegaard wrote:

Deep within every human being there still lives the anxiety [Angst] over the possibility of being alone in the world, forgotten by God, overlooked among the millions and millions in this enormous household. A person keeps this anxiety at a distance by looking at the many round about who are related to him as kin and friends, but the anxiety is still there, nevertheless, and he hardly dares think of how he could feel if all this were taken away.

Two years later the ontological significance of Angst appears to have touched Kierkegaard at even a deeper level. Again in the Journal he wrote: "All existence [Tilvaerelsen] makes me anxious, from the smallest fly to the mysteries of the incarnation; the whole thing is inexplicable to me, I myself most of all. My distress is
enormous, boundless; no one knows it except God in heaven, and he will not take compassion on me. 31

Thus we see that by 1839 Kierkegaard had already attained remarkable breadth and depth in his reflections on the ontological significance of Angst. It now remained for him to couch these insights into the framework of his overall architectonic: the rigorous examination of the qualifications of the human spirit, consistently thought through, tested, and verified through the experimental/psychological approach. To be sure, Begrebnet Angest is an outstanding example of the unum noris omnes principle employed in the service of this rigorous analysis both from the cognitive and the experimental/psychological approaches.

One further point must be made before turning to Begrebnet Angest itself. It is not our purpose here, nor would it serve any purpose at all in this essay, to provide a page-by-page commentary on Begrebnet Angest. Further, it is not our task to explore each of the subtle psychological insights into Angst offered in that work. In our view, Kresten Nordentoft 32 has addressed this problem with insightful precision, and we see no reason to duplicate that effort. Our purpose here is much less demanding. It is to show the essential elements of Kierkegaard's description of Angst that were to provide the ground upon which the role of Angst in contemporary philosophy is based. That, after all, is the purpose of this dissertation, and a purpose to which we intend to hold fast.
Thus we turn now to **Angst** in *Begrebnet Angest*, bearing in mind that we are here dealing not only with Søren Kierkegaard, but also with the pseudonymous psychologist, Virgilus Haufniensis, "the watchman of Copenhagen." This is despite the fact that Kierkegaard considered publishing it under his own name.

**Begrebnet Angest—The Cognitive Dimension**

We would do well to begin this discussion by asking the rather basic question, namely, why did Kierkegaard-Haufniensis write *Begrebnet Angest* in the first place? The answer to this question should provide us with a specific guideline for interpreting the phenomenon of **Angst** in *Begrebnet Angest*. Stating our conclusion first, we note that Kierkegaard-Haufniensis wrote the work largely as a polemic against Hegel. This is shown in the opening lines of the book's "Introduction." Here the author states that his purpose is to show that "the system" of Hegel not only fails to recognize the integrity of the **Geisteswissenschaften**, but indeed the system robs thought itself of its proper rigor, leading to fantastic and murky results. Says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis on the opening page of *Begrebnet Angest*:

> The view that every scientific issue within the larger compass of science has its definite place, its measure and its limit, and thereby precisely its harmonious blending in the whole as well as its legitimate participation in what is expressed by the whole, is not merely a *prim desiderium* [pious wish] . . . not merely a sacred duty . . ., it also serves the interest of every more specialized deliberation, for when the deliberation forgets where it properly belongs, . . . it forgets itself and becomes something else, and thereby acquires the dubious perfectibility of being able to become anything and everything. (CA., p. 9)
Even a superficial reading of the Introduction to Begrebnet Angest will show that for Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, Hegel's system had indeed become "anything and everything." One principal task, indeed the principal prima facie task of the work, was to correct Hegel's error with respect to two disciplines within the Geisteswissenschaften; specifically, dogmatics and psychology. Thus, after showing the conceptual confusion he sees resulting from an uncritical acceptance of the Aufheben (annulment) principle in the realms of logic and dogmatics, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis states the specific thesis of Begrebnet Angest:

The present work has set as its task the psychological treatment of "Anxiety [Angst]," but in such a way that it consistently keeps in mente [in mind] and before its eye the dogma of Hereditary Sin. Accordingly, it must also, although tacitly so, deal with the concept of sin. Sin however, is no subject for psychological concern... (CA., p. 14)

From the beginning, then, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis distinguishes between the conceptual rubrics within Begrebnet Angest: (1) the phenomenon of Angst as a concern of psychology; and (2) the problem of "hereditary sin" as a concern of dogmatics. Thus psychology must be confined to illuminating Angst as the condition which made hereditary sin possible. Angst can never explain hereditary sin itself. Moreover, any attempt to confuse these two roles, would lead back to the error of betraying the integrity of the Geisteswissenschaften.

The point of departure described here, namely that psychology must confine itself to showing the conditions which make
hereditary sin possible, circumscribes very neatly the role of Angst in Kierkegaard-Haunfiensis' work. We shall therefore attempt to remain within this circumscription in order to avoid the difficult problem of hereditary sin, which, strictly speaking, is beyond our scope of concern here.

Angst first emerges, then, as the condition of the possibility of sin. We must now inquire into how Kierkegaard-Haunfiensis describes this pre-condition. Prior to Adam's sin, the first sin which is at once the fall of man, Kierkegaard-Haunfiensis maintains as did Boehme before him \textsuperscript{88} that primal man is in a dreaming state. As a dreaming spirit primal man is totally ignorant of sin. Kierkegaard-Haunfiensis describes this state as follows:

In this state there is peace and repose, but there is simultaneously something else that is not contention and strife, for there is indeed nothing against which to strive. What, then, is it? Nothing. But what effect does it have? It begets anxiety [Angst]. This is the profound secret of innocence, that it is at the same time anxiety. Dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing, and innocence always sees this nothing outside itself. \textsuperscript{(CA., p. 41)}

Hence, Angst is first and foremost a pre-reflective apprehension of the nothingness that is outside the dreamlike state of the innocent spirit. Nevertheless, says Kierkegaard-Haunfiensis, its existence cannot be denied. It is pre-reflective because as innocence the spirit has no "self-consciousness" of sin yet, and therefore has nothing to reflect upon in relation to itself. It is apprehensive because a basic disposition is strongly experienced directly, yet it has no direct object which threatens it; as, for example, does
the explicit phenomenon of fear. It is precisely upon these grounds that Kierkegaard-Haufniensis provides his classical distinc-
tion between Angst and fear, a distinction that is almost univer-
sally recognized today. Says the author:

The concept of anxiety [Angst] is almost never treated in psychology. Therefore, I must point out that it is alto­gether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom's actualty as the possibility of possibility.89 (CA., p. 42)

In this quotation is the first explicit definition of Angst: freedom's actualty as the possibility of possibility. Much of what follows in Begrebnet Angest seeks to give birth to the meaning and significance of this pregnant concept of Angst. We too shall continue to return to it in the remainder of this section. The previous psychological definition of Angst may then be supplemented by a dialectical determination which has become the locus classicus for citing the Kierkegaard-Haufniensis concept of Angst. This locus classicus is marked by its psychological ambiguity. Says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis:

When we consider the dialectical determinations of anxiety [Angst], it appears that exactly these have psychological ambiguity. Anxiety is sympathetic antipathy and an anti­pathetic sympathy. One easily sees, I think, that this is a psychological determination in a sense entirely different from the concupiscenta [inordinate desire] of which we spoke. Linguistic usage confirms this perfectly. One speaks of a pleasing anxiety, a pleasing anxiousness [Beaengstelse], and of a strange anxiety, a bashful anxiety, etc. (CA., p. 42)

This characterization may be compared with the 1842 Journal entry in which the italicized English words above are made somewhat clearer.
The nature of original sin [hereditary sin] has often been explained and still a primary category is lacking—this is anxiety [Angst]; this is an essential determinant. Anxiety is the desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy, anxiety is an alien power which grips the individual, and yet one cannot tear himself free from it and does not want to, for one fears, but what he fears he desires. Anxiety makes the individual powerless, and the first sin always occurs in weakness; therefore, it apparently lacks accountability, but this lack is the real thing.90

Thus sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy are the psychologically dialectical poles of the phenomenon of Angst interpreted in the light of Kierkegaard-Haufniensis' consistent thought principle within the cognitive method. Today we might say, as does Walter Kaufmann, that Angst "... involves a deep ambivalence. We are divided against ourselves and want something that another part of us does not want."91

Angst is likewise dialectically couched in another element of the cognitive approach, that of a distinction between objective Angst and subjective Angst. Kierkegaard-Haufniensis does not give much space to objective Angst, and if Vincent McCarthy is right this is because in order to discuss subjective Angst, it must have a conceptual counterpart from which it can be distinguished—objective Angst.92 It is certainly clear that objective Angst claims only four pages of Begrebnet Angest, and much of that is taken up in a lengthy footnote criticizing Schelling in this use of Angst as a concept.93 Subjective Angst, on the other hand, and in the broadest sense claims almost two thirds of the total book, a sizable difference to say the least.
Nevertheless, objective Angst is for Kierkegaard a quantitative rather than qualitative phenomenon; it is the total amount of Angst in creation that has existed and grown in incremental amounts since Adam's first sin. Thus objective Angst is grounded in Adam's original sin and is expressed as "... the reflection of the sinfulness of the generation in the whole world" (CA., p. 57). It is the effect of sin in non-human existence [Tilvaerelse] that Kierkegaard-Haufniensis calls objective Angst (CA., p. 57), concretely expressed in Biblical phrase of Romans 8:19, "the eager longing of creation" (CA., p. 58). What Kierkegaard-Haufniensis seems to mean in using this Biblical phrase is that expressions such as "longing," "expectation," etc., imply a preceding state co-present within the individual and from which he longs to be delivered. This feeling, this longing, is primordial Angst, proclaiming itself mutely but powerfully. Simple longing alone is not sufficient to deliver the individual from the preceding state.

The discussion of objective Angst concludes with the recognition that it is a digression from the true purpose of Begrebnet Angst, which for Kierkegaard-Haufniensis is the illumination of subjective Angst. Subjective Angst is therefore described as follows:

Anxiety [Angst] may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility, laying hold to finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness. (CA., p. 61)
So with subjective Angst we return again to the metaphor of the abyss with which we concluded the first chapter of this work. It is not only the abyss that renders the spirit utterly dizzy. Indeed it is the spirit that makes dizziness possible as it stares at the possibilities before it. This is true not only for Adam as primal man. It is equally true for every subsequent individual as well. But what happens next for the dizzy individual who grasps at the finite ontic world to support himself in the face of the abyss of ontological possibility? Kierkegaard-Haufniensis says it is the leap that comes next: "In that very moment everything is changed, and freedom, when it again rises [from the abyss] sees that it is guilty. Between these two moments lies the leap, which no science has explained and no science can explain" (CA., p. 61). We may summarize this dialectical process in the following way: At the outset, primal man, namely Adam, was in a dreamlike state of innocence. But contained within his being, a being that is a composite of the psyche and the body synthesized in spirit (CA., p. 85), is the pre-reflective apprehension of freedom as an ontological condition of being human. The more such a pre-reflective state becomes reflective, the more possibility raises itself as the specter of non-actuality. Possibility therefore shows itself as non-actuality or a "no-thingness." At the moment of conscious reflection, the spirit stands at the face of the abyss peering down into the bottomless chasm of its possibilities (one of which is sin as original sin for Adam; namely, eating of the
forbidden fruit). The infinite possibilities are both attractive and frightening: Attractive because any one of them can potentially be actualized; and frightening because when one is actualized, another existence mode for the individual comes into being; i.e., he has made an existential choice. Hence all other possibilities are at least for the moment precluded. But just because the choice is made, this does not quell Angst. On the contrary Angst is always there as long as the individual has before him an infinite number of possibilities; Angst is there, in other words, as long as he exists.

For Adam as primal man (the world-historical paradigm par excellence), this means that he innocently and dizzily stared down into the abyss of ontological possibility. In the dizzy state, he leapt into that abyss, thereby actualizing the possibility of sin through an act of choice. Adam emerged from the abyss in a new existence medium, namely ontological guilt. Thus in this extended metaphor, the fall of man is interpreted as the leap into the abyss of ontological possibility as an intentional act of freedom. Note that none of this explains hereditary sin. It does not, indeed cannot, deal with the question of why Adam took the leap. That question is clearly germane only to the dogmatic realm rather than to the psychological. The latter realm, the Geisteswissenschaft of psychology, can only inquire into the subjective condition which makes sin possible, namely the Angst of dizzying freedom.

Still within the framework of the cognitive aspect of the method, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis explores the qualifications of the
human spirit in the light of Angst as the pre-condition of sin. To be sure, consistent and dialectical thought is employed to a degree that has led many commentators to observe that Begrebnet Angst is, in the words of at least one, "... Kierkegaard's most difficult work. The subject matter is extremely dense." Dense it may be, but in our view, it is not difficult provided the distinction between the cognitive and experimental/psychological aspects of Kierkegaard's methods are used as a hermeneutical guide to Begrebnet Angst.

One further point concerning the cognitive approach to Angst must be dealt with: the relationship of Angst to temporality and eternity: for it is these issues which, as we shall see in the next chapter, drive the Heideggerian interpretation of Angst. Likewise the relationship of Angst to temporality and eternity is, of course, bound up in the self as the synthesis of body–mind–spirit. Thus these too must enter the discussion to complete the realm of the cognitive approach to Angst.

Just as man is the synthesis of the psyche and the body, says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, he is also the synthesis of the temporal and the eternal (CA., p. 85). Just as spirit is the third factor in the former synthesis, "the moment" is the third factor in the latter. By the concept of the moment, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis means the positing of the eternal in the present. This does not imply the positing of the eternal in time, for that is the ultimate paradox of Christianity. The moment is a qualification of human subjectivity much as the present is a category of time. Thus it
is an atom of the eternal in man that corresponds to man's eternal spirit. Says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis: "The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not another synthesis but is the expression of the first synthesis according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and body that is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is posited, the moment is present" (CA., p. 88). But what does this have to do with Angst? It will be recalled that Angst has to do with possibility. Put in this present context, the moment corresponds to the future. Thus the spirit projects itself into the future-moment when it seeks to actualize one of its infinite possibilities. Hence Angst is the ontological feeling that arises in the spirit as it leaps into the futural moment. Kierkegaard-Haufniensis observes:

Just as ... the spirit . . . when it is about to posit the synthesis as the spirit's (freedom's) possibility in the individuality, expresses itself as anxiety [Angst], so here the future in turn is the eternal's (freedom's) possibility in the individuality expressed as anxiety. As freedom's possibility manifests itself for freedom, freedom succumbs and temporality emerges . . . (CA., p. 91)

From these descriptions and analyses Kierkegaard-Haufniensis concludes that "the possible corresponds exactly to the future. For freedom, the possible is the future, and the future is for time the possible" (CA., p. 91). So, the author observes, "an accurate and correct linguistic usage therefore associates anxiety [Angst] with the future" (CA., p. 91).

In the previous sections we saw that the temporal-eternal is but one of the existential qualifications of the human spirit that
must be developed collaterally with others such as necessity-freedom, and the finite-infinite. In the course of consistently thinking through Angst in Begrebnet Angest each of these are developed, thus rounding out the task of Kierkegaard's cognitive approach to philosophical investigation. This subsection may be concluded by observing that with one half of our discussion on Begrebnet Angest now behind us, there remains the task of interpreting Angst from the standpoint of the experimental/psychological approach.

**Begrebnet Angest--The Experimental/ Psychological Dimension**

As was seen above, the experimental/psychological approach is the experiential and dialectical counterpart to Kierkegaard's cognitive approach. Thus we would reasonably expect that Begrebnet Angest would discuss Angst from the experimental/psychological approach if these two modes are of equal importance to his thought. As we shall see, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis not only does so, he does so with such rigor and clear thinking that many of his psychological observations, although they pre-date Freud and the psychoanalytic movement, are still relevant in understanding and interpreting Angst and its important relationship to neurosis. The essential chapter in which this dimension reveals itself is in Chapter IV of Begrebnet Angest, entitled "Anxiety [Angst] of Sin or Anxiety as a Consequence of Sin in the Single Individual."

From one perspective, the discussion offered in this chapter of Begrebnet Angest is a synthesis of the cognitive and the
experimental/psychological approaches; for the existential qualifications of "good" vs. "evil" in relation to Angst are thoroughly thought through. But in the broader context of the chapter's overall function within Begrebnet Angst, we believe that it is an experimental/psychological contribution first and foremost, and a cognitive one secondarily. Why is this so? We answer, because its basic thrust is a discussion of inclosing reserve [det Indesluttede] as the essence of the demonic; the very problem which the young Kierkegaard suspected was at the core of his father's melancholy, as well as the key to his own ontic Angst in relation to Regine Olson.

While Angst about Evil manifests itself in repentance, a kind of repentance, moreover, that stands before the qualitative leap, Angst about the Good shows itself in the inclosing reserve of the demonic. The demonic is a term describing a condition wherein the individual wants to remain unfree. Specifically, the individual wants to remain in the bondage of sin on a permanent basis. Hence, his Angst becomes a profound terror of becoming good, of becoming free. The phenomenon of the demonic, says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, first appears in the New Testament in Matthew 8:28-34; Mark 5:1-20; Luke 8:26-39; as well as Luke 11:14. According to Matthew, for example, the demonic is demonstrated in the following way:

When he [Jesus] reached the other side [of the sea of Galilee] in the country of the Gadarenes, he was met by two men who came out from the tombs; they were possessed by devils, and so violent that no one dared pass that way. "You son of God," they shouted, "what do you want with us? Have you come here to torment us before our time?" In the distance a large herd of pigs was feeding; and the devils begged him: "If you drive
us out, send us into that herd of pigs." "Begone!" he said. Then they came out and went into the pigs; the whole herd rushed over the edge into the lake, and perished in the water.

The men in charge of them took to their heels, and they told the whole story and what had happened to the madman. Thereupon all the town came out to meet Jesus; and when they saw him they begged him to leave the district and go. 100

In the revision of this story as told by Mark and Luke, the details are essentially the same except that there is only one demoniac. Jesus asks him, again in both accounts, "What is your name?"; to which the demoniac responds his name is "Legion." "This was because," says Luke, "so many devils had taken possession of him. And they begged him [Jesus] not to banish them to the Abyss." 101

Kierkegaard-Haunphiensis notes that the demonic has been previously interpreted in three ways: (1) it has been viewed as an aesthetic-metaphysical phenomenon where the demonic comes under the rubrics of misfortune, fate, etc., and is treated with the sympathy that one would treat, for example, a madness resulting from a birth defect; (2) it has been viewed as an ethical phenomenon where the demoniac has been condemned, persecuted, discovered and punished; or finally (3) it has been viewed as a medical-therapeutical phenomenon, where the demoniac is treated as a sufferer who requires treatment in order to be cured.

These three interpretations correspond to the somatic, psychic, and pneumatic spheres of being human, a correspondence suggesting that the phenomenon of the demonic is of far greater scope and complexity than had previously been supposed. Indeed,
says the author, "... there are traces of it in every man, as surely as he is a sinner" (CA., p. 122). It is necessary, therefore, to examine the demonic experimentally and psychologically in order to show that Angst is at its epicenter. With this in mind, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis notes:

The demonic is anxiety [Angst] about the good. In innocence, freedom was not posited as freedom; its possibility was anxiety in the individual. In the demonic, the relation is reversed. Freedom is posited as unfreedom, because freedom is lost. Here again freedom's possibility is anxiety. The difference is absolute, because freedom's possibility appears here in relation to unfreedom, which is the very opposite of innocence which is a qualification disposed toward freedom. (CA., p. 123)

On the strength of the observation, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis concludes that "the demonic is inclosing reserve, and the unfreely disclosed" (CA., p. 123). The characteristics of the demonic appear to be, therefore, precisely those which Kierkegaard saw in his father. Likewise they are the self-same characteristics which drove the young Kierkegaard to develop the "master-thief" concept. One of these characteristics is that inclosing reserve is the mute, and self-expression of what is mute must "take place contrary to its will, since freedom ... revolts and now betrays unfreedom in such a way that it is the individual who in anxiety [Angst] betrays himself against his will" (CA., p. 123).

In a haunting passage which cannot help but be autobiographical, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis betrays Kierkegaard's veil of pseudonymity; and with the ghost of Michael Kierkegaard before him,
he confesses: "It is incredible what power the man of inclosing reserve can exercise over such people, how at last they beg and plead for just a word to break the silence, but it is also shameful to trample upon the weak in this manner" (CA., p. 125). Thus the psychological method is used to ferret-out the enormous power of the demonic. The good, against which the inclosing reserve of the demonic rebels, is manifested in the act of "disclosure" as the means whereby the dark secret of the demoniac may be released. For what determines whether a phenomenon is demonic, says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, is "... the individual's attitude toward disclosure, whether he will interpenetrate that fact with freedom and accept it in freedom. Whenever he will not do this, the phenomenon is demonic" (CA., p. 129).

Hence, inclosing reserve and its relationship to disclosure is a theme based upon Kierkegaard's experimental/psychological approach to method, especially as that approach was used in attempting to get his father to disclose his dreadful secret thereby restoring himself to freedom. Kierkegaard-Haufniensis now brings the principle of consistent thought to bear on these experimental/psychological considerations. As a result, the rest of the chapter demonstrates the breadth of his cognitive method by consistently thinking through the implications of the demonic. The discussion culminates in a graphic discussion of the essential attributes or characteristics of inwardness and certitude as what has principally been lost in the demoniac's commitment to unfreedom. It may be
worthwhile here to explore these characteristics in brief, for they will re-emerge as important dimensions of Heidegger's conception of Angst in the next chapter.

For Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, then, the definition of "inwardness" is given as "earnestness." Earnestness, in turn, is likened to Rosenkranz's definition of "disposition" [Gemüt]. Since we have used the term "disposition" to characterize the Befindlichkeit of Angst in the previous chapter, it might prove useful to examine how that term is used respectively by Rosenkranz and Kierkegaard-Haufniensis. For Rosenkranz, then, the term "disposition" refers to a specific state within the individual experienced as a unity of feeling and self-consciousness. He explains: "... The feeling unfolds itself into self-consciousness and vice-versa, that the content of self-consciousness is felt by the subjects as his own. It is only this unity that can be called disposition." From the perspective of Kierkegaard-Haufniensis, the concept of earnestness "is a higher as well as the deepest expression for what disposition is" (CA., p. 148). So rather than becoming a dogged, habitual way of conducting one's existence, earnestness can never become mere habit because it is constantly a fresh and original relationship to one's existence; that is, a relationship qualified by the eternal rather than the temporal, for inwardness has the character of the eternal. "Whenever inwardness is lacking, the spirit is finitized. Inwardness is therefore eternity or the constituent of the eternal in man" (CA., p. 151).
It is with these observations that we leave the phenomenon of the demonic as the paradigm of the experimental/psychological approach in Begrebnet Angest to the phenomenon of Angst. As Kierkegaard-Haufniensis himself was fond of saying in another context, "further than this psychology cannot go" (CA., p. 45). Thus at bottom, the demonic is a state wherein freedom is lost. With this loss, the truth of inwardness and certainty is likewise lost, and the demoniac is inclosed in a melancholic reserve, deprived of faith and the eternal of Christianity—the only means for allaying, but never eliminating the Angst that is a necessary part of human existence.

In the closing chapter of the work, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis offers a summary description of Angst. He observes:

Anxiety [Angst] is freedom's possibility, and only such anxiety is faith absolutely educative, because it consumes all finite ends and discovers all their deceptiveness. And no grand inquisitor has such dreadful tortments in readiness as anxiety has, and no secret agent knows as cunningly as anxiety how to attack his suspect in his weakest moment or to make alluring the trap in which he will be caught, and no discerning judge understands how to interrogate and examine the accused as does anxiety, which never lets the accused escape, neither through amusement, nor by noise, nor during work, neither by day nor by night. (CA., pp. 154-55)

From this passage the author of Begrebnet Angest concludes that to be educated by Angst is to be educated by the infinity of possibility. But such an education demands from the individual a painful tuition. For when a person faces possibility qua ontological possibility, while grasping at finitude before the face of the abyss, he realizes with equally profound ontological Angst that "he can
demand nothing from life and that the terrible, perdition, and annihilation live next door to every man . . ." (CA., p. 156). Thus the burden of passionately facing one's possibilities with inwardness is the aim of such an education. The ability to attain this end comes only through faith, understood here as "the inner certainty that anticipates infinity." Faith, then, is the only means for alleviating the daunting ontological Angst which the individual must face in the school of possibility. Says Kierkegaard-Haufniensis:

He who sank in possibility . . . sank absolutely but then in turn he emerged from the depths of the abyss lighter than all the troublesome and terrible things in life . . . For him, anxiety [Angst] becomes a serving spirit that against its will leads him where he wishes to go . . . Then anxiety enters into his soul and searches out everything and anxiously torments everything finite and petty out of him, and then it leads him where he wants to go. (CA., pp. 158-59)

Thus it is only after having attained the standpoint of faith that Angst takes on an entirely new significance for the human spirit; namely it now serves as a potent purgative power whereby the petty, the superficial, the finite are banished from the spirit, allowing it to boldly dwell in the eternal promise of faith. Further than this Kierkegaard-Haufniensis as psychologist cannot go, for to do so is to take up the gauntlet of the Christian writings, a challenge clearly beyond the pseudonymous author of Begrebnet Angest. Thus, Kierkegaard-Haufniensis concludes his work with, "Here this deliberation ends where it began. As soon as psychology has finished with anxiety [Angst], it is delivered over to dogmatics" (CA, p. 162).
Preliminary Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted to reveal the collateral and organic development of Angst in Kierkegaard's aesthetic thought. Our aim has been micro-hermeneutical rather than historical. Specifically it has been to light up the horizons from the broadest to the most focused wherein Angst shows itself in its own way through Kierkegaard's thought. Our understanding and interpretation has disclosed that the broadest horizon for seeing Angst from Kierkegaard's perspective shows itself as "anthropological contemplation." For Kierkegaard such contemplation required a dialectical methodology which we have called here "the cognitive approach" and "the experimental/psychological approach." The underlying presuppositions upon which this dialectical method is built are: (1) the Socratic "know thyself!" as the apodictic source of all knowledge; and (2) the unum noris omnes principle whereby self-knowledge can be universalized.

To be sure, we have touched upon a vast amount of material in this chapter in the need to rigorously describe the horizons of Kierkegaard's aesthetic thought on our way to the phenomenon of Angst. We have discussed background influences, methodological considerations, the intermediate concepts that led to the discovery of Angst, and finally the phenomenon of Angst itself as it was unfolded in Begrebnet Angest. All of this has been attempted so that Angst could reveal itself in its own way in Kierkegaard's thought without recourse to the "fancies and popular conceptions"
which betray the integrity of hermeneutic phenomenology as a discipline. As to the adequacy of Kierkegaard's ontical depiction of Angst, the following chapter will display how Angst's essential structures as Kierkegaard described them provides the firm ontic foundation for Heidegger's ontological and phenomenological interpretation of Angst. Indeed it is possible to state that virtually every ontic feature of Heidegger's description of Angst is to be found in what has been revealed here.

On the other hand, it seems to us that a hermeneutic phenomenological disclosure of the full ontological meaning of Angst was not possible in Kierkegaard's analysis and interpretation. This has nothing to do with any lack of rigor or cognitive acuity on Kierkegaard's part. Nor has it to do specifically with the hereditary sin context Kierkegaard establishes to reveal Angst's meaning. We believe, rather, that Kierkegaard's inability to deal with the full hermeneutic phenomenological role of Angst lies precisely in the state of the art of philosophy itself at the time Kierkegaard wrote. More specifically, Kierkegaard was prevented from revealing the full hermeneutical significance of Angst by his entrapment within the assumptions of Western philosophy that were so ingrained in the intellectual tradition of the West that they were not challenged until the rise of Nietzsche to intellectual prominence. There are two basic reasons for this entrapment.

First, while Kierkegaard's principal concern was to reveal the ethical dimension of human existence, what Blackham has seen
as the "how" of existential choice, it remains clear that he uncritically accepted the view that at the radix, existential man remains something like a res cogitans, a "thinking substance," to which the predicates of understanding, feeling, and will are attached. For while Kierkegaard takes despair as his point of departure rather than Cartesian doubt, man is conceived as a subjective spirit rather than as pure Dasein.107 Without rehashing how this leads inevitably through "subjectivism" to ontological solipsism, we remark only in passing that such a position casts grave reservations on the adequacy of the unum noris omnes principle to account for the existence of existential qualifications in others.

Secondly, Kierkegaard's reliance on the rigorous logic of consistent thinking to refine the findings of the "know thyself!"; his further reliance on the unum noris omnes to universalize these findings; and finally, his early reliance on experimentation and psychological observation to confirm these findings all reveal his dependence on the principles of Geisteswissenschaften to verify, confirm, and substantiate something like "objective truth," even in the face of the subjective truth which is the highest truth for the existing individual. Thus while ethical or existential truth is characterized as "objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness,"108 the truths of anthropological contemplation rely on an interpretation of truth as objective certainty attained only in a verification process of interested observation. To entertain both of these models of truth
simultaneously may have been possible for Kierkegaard's dialectical genius, but as we shall see in the next chapter, the first of these views leads down the path to psychologism, and the second naively assumes that the principles of natural science can successfully be applied to the *Geisteswissenschaften*. As we shall see presently, the birth of Husserl's phenomenology is specifically traced to his reputation of psychologism as a vacuous enterprise, and Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophy* finds its strength in showing that the principles of natural science specifically do not apply to the *Geisteswissenschaften*. In fairness to Kierkegaard we are compelled to state that all of these criticisms are appropriate only with regard to the purely aesthetic and pseudonymous writings. After all, Kierkegaard's primary concern was not with positivistic science, but rather with the canons of the subjective thinker, the thinker whose existence to the decisive issue rather than his objective essence. Thus we are not claiming that Kierkegaard was a secret positivist, but merely that the assumptions of the *Geisteswissenschaften* permeated the intellectual climate of opinion of which Kierkegaard was a part. Indeed, it is precisely against such assumptions that much of Kierkegaard's polemic writings are directed especially those which take exception with Hegel.

Turning from these broad concerns to *Angst* in Kierkegaard's thought specifically, we may preliminarily observe that indeed he did set the stage for *Angst* to reveal its role in later philosophical thought. Kierkegaard's discussions of the distinction
between Angst and fear, for example, or of his interpretations of nothingness, freedom, temporality, and resoluteness established the permanent ontic foundation for later phenomenological and existential revelations of Angst's role in later thought. Yet, we must likewise observe that Kierkegaard's analysis does not, indeed, cannot, get beyond the ontic "vulgar" psychological interpretation that covers over the full hermeneutic ontological role so thoroughly described and interpreted by Heidegger. With this our preliminary conclusions draw this chapter to a close, pointing the way ahead to how Martin Heidegger, the subject of our next chapter, attempted to deal with Angst.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER II


2. The term "existentialism" is in our view, a complete misnomer. To exist means to in some sense to "stand-out" from the background, to be unique; a point which Heidegger, for one, insists upon. Thus there cannot be an "ism" of existence since -ism implies a coherent system of doctrine. If each Dasein ek-sists in the sense of standing out individually, then there can be no collective doctrine or -ism of such existence. The two are incommensurate.


5. Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers demonstrate an in-depth understanding of the Church Fathers. cf. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, editors and translators, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, 7 vols. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1967-78) (hereafter cited as JP.). We shall cite the volume number plus the Hong's entry number and the number in the Journals and Papers assigned by the Danish editors of Søren Kierkegaard's Papirer, 20 vols., I-XI (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909-49). In the latter series of numbers, "A" designations refer to Journal entries, "B" to drafts of published works, and "C" to reading notes. Then, if appropriate, we shall provide the date if given that the entry was written. Thus for the references to the Church Fathers, see JP., vol. 1, 583 (II A 750); vol. 2, 2867 (X A 288); vol. 4, 38:30 (X A 119); vol. 4, 4093 (II A 436); and vol. 6, 6677 (X A 434).

6. JP., vol. 1, 219 (II A 127) and 1309 (237); vol. 5, 5227 (599) and 5350 (II A 702). Also see Manichaeism entry in vol. 1, 1302 (I A 2).

7. JP., vol. 1, 884 (III A 125); vol. 5, 5010 (VIII A 105).

8. JP., vol. 6, 6397, (X A 323).

10 There is no mention of Eckhart, as far as we know, in any of Kierkegaard's works.


12 Søren Kierkegaard, _The Concept of Anxiety_, translated by Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 162, footnote (hereafter when a passage is cited directly from this translation, we will follow the convention of referring to the source as "CA," and then give the appropriate page number). cf. footnote 85 below.


15 Kierkegaard sided with Augustine against Pelagius concerning the doctrine of hereditary or original sin on the grounds that the Pelagian view "... permits every individual to play his little history in his own private theater unconcerned about the race"; cf. _CA_. p. 34.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 _Papirer_, I, pp. xi-xvi, as cited in Gregor Malantschuk, _Kierkegaard's Thought_, p. 11. Note: we are indebted to Malantschuk's discussion of Kierkegaard's dialectical method as the source of our own view of the two approaches discussed in this section. It is generally agreed that Malantschuk's contribution is exceedingly important in understanding Kierkegaard's thought. Thus we have no reservations in relying on the hermeneutical soundness of his interpretations, which like our own seek confirmation across the broad spectrum of Kierkegaard's authorship. We are, therefore, extremely grateful to Malantschuk and wish to acknowledge that fact here.

20 Malantschuk, _Kierkegaard's Thought_, p. 11.
21. JP., vol. 5, 5100 (I A 75), August 1, 1835.

22. Ibid.


24. JP., vol. 5, 5100 (I A 75), August 1, 1835.


30. Ibid., p. 105.

31. Ibid., p. 106.

32. CA., pp. 25-26, 28, 32-36, 122, 207.


36. Ibid; note: the quote is from Malantschuk, not Sibbern.
We had best deal with this term at this point. "Qualifications of the mental-spiritual" in human existence are existential categories of being human, much like the Existenzials of Heidegger's thought. Thus they are not categories in the sense of Aristotle or Kant, because categories apply to things, not humans.

Sibbern, Bemaerkninger, p. 130; as cited in Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 128.

Sibbern, Bemaerkninger, p. 131; as cited in Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 128.

Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 128.

Ibid., pp. 129-30.


Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 257.

Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, pp. 2-3.

Papirer, V B 53, p. 112; as cited in Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, p. 6.

Ibid.

This is, of course, the view of the pseudonymous author Victor Ememita the "victorious" religious recluse or solitary individual or Either/Or. Yet, the auditory method is confirmed by Virgilus Haufniensis in Begrebnet Angest, so there is reason to suspect that it grew out of Kierkegaard's own approach to psychology. We shall consider this point again when we discuss the "master-thief" idea in connection with the phenomenon of "presentiment."

Nordentoft, *Kierkegaard's Psychology*, p. 4; note: Nordentoft does not identify the source of this quote.

Ibid., p. 5.

*JP.*, vol. IV, 4400 (II A 163), September 20, 1837.


Ibid., p. 115.

Ibid., p. 153.

Ibid., p. 154.

Ibid., p. 132.

*JP.*, vol. 3, 2345 (V C 1), n.d., 1844.


Ibid.

Ibid., p. 160. Despair (Fortvivlelse) is, of course, an intensified form of Angst as is shown explicitly in the *Sickness Unto Death*, p. xii. In the light of this chapter's purpose, namely the display of Kierkegaard's concept of Angst, we decline to complicate our analysis by discussing the associated phenomena which themselves are grounded in Angst such as melancholy, despair, anguish, etc. Nordentoft has done this and in our view has done it well. Thus, we will remain true to the task of the chapter, the illumination of the phenomenon of Angst and only Angst in Kierkegaard's thought.


This difficult term, like the term "Angst," has no exact equivalent in English. It has been translated by Thomte as "inclosing reserve," by Lowrie as "shut-upness," a word that is certainly more graphic than "inclosing reserve," and by Malantschuk as "closed-up-ness." Thomte's translation is employed here because "inclosing reserve" seems to have the flavor of a basic disposition, again in a Shakespearian sense, as a mode of being toward the demonic. This will become clear in Section II 3. Thomte's translation is in CA., p. 123; Lowrie's in CD., p. 110, and Malantschuk's in Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 27.

We are not suggesting, of course, that Kierkegaard himself was explicitly aware of the difference between the ontic and the ontological as was Heidegger later, or even that Angst was understood and interpreted by Kierkegaard himself as Dasein's Grundbefindlichkeit. But we are suggesting that all of these notions are present but unarticulated in Kierkegaard's thought.
80 CA., p. 57. Note: In an extremely important footnote, Thomte clarifies the meaning of Tilvaerelse. It is worth citing in its entirety. He notes:

"The Danish terms Tilvaerelse (vb. vaere til) and Eksistens (vb. eksistere) are both translated into English by the word 'existence' (vb. to exist). Tilvaerelse corresponds to the German word Dasein (was da ist), and it usually denotes the outer observable existence in time and space. To make more explicit the distinction between 'existence' in the existential sense and 'existence' as an outward observable existence, the German word Dasein might well be used for the latter; CA., 'translator's notes,' p. 226, Note 26."

This, it almost goes without saying, is not the meaning Heidegger gives to Dasein, and if Thomte is correct, then Heidegger has his terms for existence reversed.

81 JP., vol. 5, 5383 (II A 420), May 12, 1839.


83 The draft of the title page has Kierkegaard's name as author. cf. Papirer, V B 42, N.D., 1844.

84 Since it is difficult to determine precisely where Haufniensis differs from Kierkegaard, we will follow McCarthy's example of using both names as individuals responsible for the work. cf. McCarthy, Moods in Kierkegaard, p. 36.

85 Quotes directly from the Concept of Anxiety will follow the passage cited without footnotes unless one is needed. This will provide quicker access to the reference for the reader.

86 Kierkegaard, in his categorization of the Geisteswissenschaften, included both dogmatics and psychology under the subjective rubric. Cf. Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 139.

87 The reader will recall that psychology as a discipline had in Kierkegaard's time a much broader meaning than it does today.

88 Supra, Chapter 1, p. 80.
As Thomte points out, there is much debate over this initial characterization from within the corpus of Kierkegaard's own drafts. The Danish editors of Kierkegaard's Samlede Vaerker, says Thomte, "assume that the term 'the possibility of possibility' is a slip of the pen and that the intended reading is 'the possibility of freedom'." Thomte does not think that this is tenable. He argues that the term "possibility" must be understood in relation to its context; namely,

"When man is psychically qualified in unity with his naturalness, and the spirit is sleeping, human freedom does not manifest itself. Anxiety [sic] is the qualification of the dreaming spirit, and when the spirit becomes awake, the difference between oneself and the other is posited. In the dreaming state, spirit has a presentiment [!] of the freedom that follows when consciousness is awakened. This presentiment of freedom, this state of anxiety, is spoken as 'freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility.' It is also spoken of as 'entangled freedom, where freedom is not free in itself but is entangled, not by necessity, but in itself.' cf. 'translator's notes,' p. 235, note 46."

90 JP., vol. 1, 94 (III A 233), n.d., 1842.


92 McCarthy, Moods in Kierkegaard, p. 41.

93 Supra, p. 104.

94 McCarthy, Moods in Kierkegaard, p. 36.

95 Thomte points out that the Danish word is Øiblikket [the moment], comparable to the German, Augenblick, meaning "a blink of the eye." In CD, Lowrie translated Øiblikket as "the instant," but this loses the sense of continuity with the Latin momentum meaning from movere [to move] the merely vanishing. Compare CA., pp. 87-88 with CD, pp. 78-79.


97 Supra; footnote 66.
The discussion concerning Angst about Evil runs approximately four pages in Begrebnet Angest as opposed to the thirty-six or so pages concerning Angst about the Good and its attendant loss of freedom. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Angst of Evil much like the section on Objective Angst discussed above, may be seen as an architectonic device that allows Kierkegaard-Haufniensis to contrast the demonic with repentance. The major point of this discussion is that repentance is virtually a useless passion in the face of Angst since it cannot free the individual from his Angst. Only faith can accomplish that, and the discussion of faith is reserved for the concluding chapter of Begrebnet Angest.

Kierkegaard-Haufniensis defines the good in the following ironic way: "The good cannot be defined at all. The good is freedom. The difference between good and evil is only for freedom and in freedom, and this difference is never in abstracto but in concreto." CA., p. 111, note.

Matthew 8:28-34 (NEB).

Luke 8:30-31 (NEB).


Ibid.

Ibid.

Kierkegaard-Haufniensis paraphrases this definition, says Thomte, from either of two passages from Hegel: (1) "Faith must be defined as the witness of the spirit to absolute spirit, or as a certainty of the truth," or (2) "Faith may be defined as being a witness of the spirit to spirit, and this implies that no finite content has any place in it."; cf. G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophie der Religion, Part One, C, I, 2, Werke, XI, pp. 206, 213; J.A., XV, pp. 222, 229; Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, I, pp. 212, 218; as cited in CA., "translator's notes," p. 253.


109 By "vulgar" we do not mean "tasteless." Rather we use the term as in the Latin *vulgarus* meaning "common" as distinguished from "refined" or, more appropriately perhaps in this case, "esoteric."
CHAPTER III

HEIDEGGER AND ANGST

In the abyss of terror, courage recognizes the virtually unexplored realm of Being: that openness into which each entity returns as what it is and what it can be.

-Martin Heidegger, Postscript to What is Metaphysics?

The Question at Hand

On a crisp wintry morning in the early 1920s, a young German scholar places another log on the dying fire in his study's fireplace. As the warmth fills the room, he squints through his study window, drinking in the dazzling freshness of the rustic Black Forest snowscape. Just outside the window an old wooden water pump stands half-buried in the snow. Beyond the pump and down the hill, an evergreen tree, its branches laden with white mounds of snow, obscures the scholar's vision of a graceful Alpine skier effortlessly slithering through the natural moguls of the powdered slopes. The scholar turns his gaze to the blank page before him. He picks up his nib-point pen and carefully dips it into the inkwell to his right. With a moment's glance at the portrait of Blaise Pascal that hangs on the study wall, he bends to his task, penning: "40. Die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst als eine ausgezeichnete Erschlossenheit des Daseins." [The primordial disposition of Angst as a distinctive means of disclosing Dasein.] Another morning's work begins for the young Marburg philosophy professor, Martin Heidegger.
With this vision in mind we may state that the purpose of this chapter, very broadly speaking, is to come to grips with what happened that morning in Heidegger's Black Forest study. More precisely, we will seek here to understand and interpret Heidegger's notion of primordial Angst and its role in his early mature period, the period from 1921-1929. It was during these years that Heidegger spent considerable time working through the full implications of primordial Angst, specifically addressing the phenomenon in four major works: Being and Time, What is Metaphysics?, On the Nature of Ground, and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Of these four, it is the first two that will concern us here since they represent the principal works wherein primordial Angst plays a significant role. In the latter two works while primordial Angst is indeed mentioned, Heidegger introduces no further substantive material than what went on before in Being and Time and What is Metaphysics?

Our main task in this chapter, then, is to hermeneutically come to grips with Heidegger's interpretation of Angst as it shows itself in Being and Time and in What is Metaphysics? We believe that evidence will show that Heidegger developed Kierkegaard's psychological-ontic interpretation of theological Angst into a full-dress ontico-ontological description and interpretation of primordial Angst as we ourselves discussed that term in Chapter I. Moreover, we submit that the role of primordial Angst in Heidegger's early mature period has been misunderstood by many, abused by some, but essentially grasped by none save Heidegger; all of which may account for why he abandoned
primordial *Angst* as an explicit theme for further investigation after 1929.  

Yet, Heidegger's understanding and interpretation of primordial *Angst*, like Kierkegaard's theological interpretation before him, serves as a bridge to later interpretations of the phenomenon. In the following chapter we shall consider two such interpretations; those of Jean Paul Sartre and Paul Tillich. Hence we do not claim that Heidegger's is the final or even the furthest-reaching understanding of primordial *Angst*; but his is, we submit, a major milestone along the path toward grasping the role of *Angst* in contemporary philosophical thought. To be sure, Heidegger's understanding and interpretation of primordial *Angst* is vastly more developed than was that of Kierkegaard, because Heidegger focuses in upon the ontico-ontological dimension of the phenomenon; a dimension which allows *Angst* to transcend the confines of a theological or even ontically psychological interpretation that held Kierkegaard partially captive in the traditional metaphysics of the West.

Thus to prepare the hermeneutic background against which *Angst* can show itself in the light of *Being*, we must very carefully carve out the horizons that make a vision of such a background possible. And, following the micro-hermeneutical precedent established in the previous chapter, this means moving from the broadest to the most narrow focus of Heidegger's thought concerning primordial *Angst*. For without this propaedeutic material as the ground upon which the figure of primordial *Angst* can be seen, Heidegger's subtle distinctions, his
sometimes ponderous language, and his tendency to obfuscate rather
than illuminate thoroughly basic concepts will render the micro-
hermeneutical path that lies before us one filled with linguistic
pitfalls and cognitive barriers. To prevent these circumstances from
becoming a problem, we shall lay out this chapter in the following
way: after this preliminary material is covered, we shall examine
the major influences on Heidegger's thought both prior to and during
the period between 1921-1929. This will provide the broad picture of
Heidegger's general approach to philosophy. Following that, we will
discuss Being and Time: its central purpose and its major insights,
with an eye toward the horizon within which primordial Angst emerges.
Next, we shall discuss the distinction between fear and primordial
Angst as revealed in sections 30 and 40, respectively, in Being and
Time, giving particular attention to the essential revelation of Angst
in section 40. Then, after discussing the significance of this
Grundbegründlichkeit with respect to Being-toward-Death, resoluteness,
and temporality, we shall focus in upon the essential place of primor-
dial Angst in the Inaugural Lecture, What is Metaphysics? The chapter
will then close with some preliminary observations concerning
Heidegger's contribution to a full display of Angst's essential role
in contemporary thought. We shall also raise several points con-
cerning what is to follow in Chapter IV.

Having charted the course of the present chapter, we must once
again stress that our purpose here is to dis-close the role of Angst
in Heidegger's early mature thought from the standpoint of
micro-hermeneutics. This means that rather than forcing our own interpretation over Heidegger's, like some fresh coat of paint over a weathered masterpiece, we will seek here to allow the rich colors of Heidegger's portrait of primordial Angst to show themselves in their own way. As in the previous chapter, our task is to build the framework, to set the lighting, so to speak, so that the rich colors of the portrait reveal themselves in their opulent but subtle hues. For primordial Angst is not merely some muted background theme in Heidegger's general philosophical portrait; rather it is a vivid centerpiece which reveals the nexus between Dasein and world in Being and Time. This centerpiece becomes highlighted in What is Metaphysics? as the same nexus made more specific in terms of the relationship between scientific Dasein and scientific understanding as the problem of how finite transcendence and therefore "mastery" is possible.

We will now begin upon the path toward seeing primordial Angst as it shows itself in Heidegger's thought. Our first steps, then, take us through the doorway to the world of Heidegger's early period, the world of the Black Forest study where Being and Time was written, where the first ink traces began to fill out Angst's portrait.

The Horizons of Influence

We must make it clear from the outset that essentially one and only one philosophical question guided Heidegger through the mazelike forest-path of his philosophical thought: this was the omnipresent "Seinsfrage"—the question of the meaning of Being. We shall see how Heidegger came to the Seinsfrage momentarily, but for the present
let us examine how this guiding question was initially articulated.

Heidegger asks as the very outset of *Being and Time,*

Do we have today an answer to the question of what is really meant by the term "entity?" Absolutely not. Hence it is imperative that the question of the meaning of Being should be raised anew. Are we today left in the awkward position of not understanding the expression, "Being?" Absolutely not. And so an attempt should be made in the first place to awaken an understanding of the meaning of the question. The concrete working-out of the question concerning the meaning of "Being" is the aim of the following essay. (SZ, p. 1)

Thus to have access to Heidegger's general thought at all—to understand Heidegger, we must recognize that the Seinsfrage is the one concept that abides at the center of that thought. The analytic of Dasein, the illumination of its Exiszential structures, the portrait of primordial Angst and its relationship to death, authenticity and temporality are all undertaken in the name of the Seinsfrage. How, then, was this guiding question initially formulated as a possibility for Heidegger?

The clearest expression of Heidegger's philosophical training as well as his academic apprenticeship years at Marburg is provided by Heidegger himself in the brief but biographically pregnant essay, "My Way to Phenomenology." In this work, Heidegger reveals that at the outset of his academic training at Freiberg he was committed to theology rather than philosophy. Yet during his spare time, he says, he was able to read with growing enthusiasm Husserl's *Logical Investigations.* Heidegger explains why he spent his free time in this manner.
I had learned from many references in philosophical periodicals that Husserl's thought was determined by Franz Brentano. Ever since 1907, Brentano's dissertation "On the Manifold Meaning of Being since Aristotle" (1862) had been my chief help and guide of my first awkward attempts to penetrate into philosophy.11

From this passage it becomes clear that Franz Brentano was Heidegger's first philosophical mentor rather than Husserl. It was Brentano, moreover, whose problematic, "the Manifold Meaning of Being" remained with Heidegger long after he had disassociated himself from Husserl's transcendental or "pure" phenomenology. But at the outset, Heidegger absorbed Husserl's Logical Investigations with only one end in mind: to gain an answer to the question, "... what is its [Beings'] fundamental meaning? What does Being mean?"12 Nonetheless, this first plunge into Husserl's thought failed miserably, Heidegger admits; explaining that "... my efforts were in vain because I was not searching in the right way."13

By 1911, two years after entering Freiburg as a student, Heidegger's enchantment with the Seinsfrage burgeoned to the point where he elected to abandon formal theology. But while he was now committed to the study of philosophy, the humanities, and science,14 he still spent considerable time discussing with the theologian Carl Braig "Schelling's and Hegel's significance for speculative theology as distinguished from the dogmatic system of scholasticism."15 It was no doubt here that Heidegger first encountered the phenomenon of primordial Angst as seen through the eyes of Schelling's interpretation of Jacob Boehme. But as yet there has been no confirmation of
this as fact, so it remains for the present merely a good possibility which makes sense. Nonetheless, the confirmed fact that Heidegger maintained an active interest in theology, even after devoting himself to the philosophy curriculum, shows that he still considered theology to be a very viable alternative to ontology as the structure of metaphysical inquiry.

Then, Heidegger was led once again to explore Husserl's phenomenological thought through the medium of the philosopher Heinrich Rickhert's star pupil Emil Lask, whose two works, The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of the Categories, A Study of the Dominant Realm of Logical Form (1911) and The Doctrine of Judgment (1912), showed the marked influence of Husserl's Logical Investigations. Heidegger was now approaching phenomenology. Once again he was frustrated in his attempt to understand Husserl; this time because he could not fully grasp, "how thinking's manner of procedure which called itself 'phenomenology' was to be carried out." The problem, says Heidegger, was really one of being almost transfixed by the essential ambiguity of Husserl's work; namely that Husserl in Volume I of the Logical Investigations specifically refutes psychologism in logic by showing that thought and knowledge are in principle not reducible to pure psychology. But in Volume II of the same work, Husserl describes the precise "psychological" acts of consciousness which are necessary for the constitution of knowledge. Clearly, then, there is a contradiction between Volumes I and II regarding the status of psychologism. "Accordingly," Heidegger concludes,
"Husserl falls back with his phenomenological description of the phenomena of consciousness into a position of psychologism which he had just refuted."^{20}

* A fortiori, Husserl's later insistence in *Ideas I* that pure phenomenology "... as the most fundamental region of philosophy, is an essentially new science ..."^{21} served only to alienate Heidegger. This was so because such a vision placed philosophy firmly under the shadow of science; that is, it made science the paradigm for philosophical investigation. This was clearly a position which Heidegger was unable to accept. Heidegger therefore rejected transcendental or pure phenomenology at the outset of his philosophical career; a fact which goes far towards explaining why terms such as "consciousness," "idea," "ego," etc., are not a general part of Heidegger's philosophical lexicon.

In spite of their differences, the rift between Heidegger and Husserl had not yet reached the point where a reconciliation was impossible. Indeed, Husserl remained Heidegger's mentor, despite their vastly different views of philosophy. This was so precisely because Heidegger believed Husserl's Sixth Investigation in Volume II of the *Logical Investigations* to provide a more meaningful basis for the enterprise of phenomenology. Specifically, Heidegger saw in this Sixth Investigation that the self-manifestation of phenomena which occurs in acts of consciousness according to phenomenology had been conceived more originally by the Greeks, Aristotle in particular, as Aletheia, or the unconcealedness of what is present in
self-revelation. Heidegger believed that this unconcealing, this self-revealing of and by the phenomena themselves, was a breakthrough in an absolutely fundamental sense for phenomenology. "That which phenomenological investigation rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought," Heidegger comments, "proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such."

This earth-shattering insight into Aletheia, as a more primordial vision of the phenomenological enterprise, unlocked the door for Heidegger to a new horizon of phenomenological investigation; one centered upon seeing phenomenology as a discipline rooted in the history of the Western ontological tradition. Accordingly, this tradition must be called into account to adequately deal with the historical dimension of the Seinsfrage. But there was likewise a negative dimension to this insight: the truth of Aletheia and its subsequent utter neglect by the Western metaphysical tradition revealed to Heidegger the enormous power of that tradition to cover over and even deeply bury fundamental insights of potentially monumental importance to the Seinsfrage. Thus history must be considered in connection with phenomenology to yield the full fruit of philosophical ontology. Husserl's vision manifestly failed to grasp this significant dimension.

Heidegger found the means to overcome this lack by absorbing the Lebens-philosophie (philosophy of life) of Wilhelm Dilthey and his friend Count Paul von Yorck, who together constitute the third major
influence on Heidegger during his early mature period. Specifically, Dilthey sought to ground philosophy in the experience of life itself, which he called "lived-experience" (Erlebnisse), rather than in the cognitive apodicticity of consciousness a la Husserl. By "lived-experience" Dilthey meant: ". . . teleological units of meaning . . . objectified in the cultural productions of man . . . [which are] connected together into the structural unity of his life history." This approach, in contradistinction to Husserl's, emphasizes not the facts or the things themselves, but rather the meaning of being Human, as the primary reality which must precede any understanding of the things themselves. Such meaning, as a decidedly human self-understanding, is necessarily historical since Erlebnisse are provided meaning, that is, are made meaning-full, by the historical context in which they occur. Accordingly, Dilthey observes: ". . . man does not understand his own self by means of any kind of rumination upon himself . . . only through an understanding of the historical reality generated by him does he obtain a consciousness of his capacities, for good or for ill." Thus, to obtain access to self-understanding, which according to this view must be taken as the alpha point of philosophical investigation, requires approaching human being from the standpoint of the Geisteswissenschaften. In these "human sciences" the apodicticity comes not from the causal explanations or the mathematical paradigms of natural science; rather it comes from placing human understanding (Verstehen) ahead of scientific explanation (Erklärung). For Dilthey, then, the appropriate
methodology for obtaining self-understanding in terms of the Geisteswissenschaften was hermeneutics, the art of interpreting life itself, and which we discussed in some detail in the Introduction to the present work.

But while Heidegger found in Dilthey's thought a more satisfactory approach to the problem of the Seinsfrage (seen in terms of human being), he sensed that there remained in Lebensphilosophie a basic and fatal weakness: an unexamined presupposition which takes the "science" of the Geisteswissenschaften as the absolute paradigm of truth. This position entraps Dilthey's philosophy within the confines of science as the source and sustainer of such truth. Thus for Dilthey, as well as for Husserl, the Wissenschaft of the Geisteswissenschaft appears to be more primordial than philosophy itself, to say nothing of the Aletheia of Being that makes philosophy unique.

It was Dilthey's close friend and associate Count Paul Yorck of Wartenberg who filled in the gaps of both Husserl's and Dilthey's unexamined dependence on the apodicticity of scientism. Specifically, Yorck, Heidegger tells us in Being and Time, criticized Dilthey for failing to emphasize "... the generic difference between the ontic and the historical" (SZ, p. 404). Heidegger seized upon this difference of course and interpreted it within the broader context of a radical ontological difference—one which provided full access to the Seinsfrage. Yorck's insight thus led Heidegger to grasping the essential distinction between the ontic realm of entities (Seiendes) and the historical realm of human being (historicity). But this distinction required a more original unity in which both could be
grounded. The impact of this insight on Heidegger is neatly summarized by J. L. Mehta, who observes:

For the historical (as distinguished from the ontic) to be conceptualized philosophically, it is necessary that both the historical and the ontic should be comprehended under a more original unity making it possible to compare and contrast them with each other. This can be done only when it is realized that the question of historicity is an ontological question about the way historical existence is constituted, that the problem of the ontic is likewise an ontological problem about the constitution of non-human essents, of vor-handen entities in the wide sense and that the ontic comprises only one domain of what is.\textsuperscript{26}

Having thus acquired the necessary tools for distinguishing the ontic from the historical modes of being, Heidegger still required a direct means of approach to the Seinsfrage. This requirement could be met only by finding a key and paradigmatic entity that was at once both ontic and ontological in its Being. For Heidegger there was only one such entity: man himself. But to see man as the only ontico-ontological entity required a precise description of him in terms of his precise ontico-ontological characteristics. Thus man, as the entity which has access to Being, is characterized as a unique mode of Being called "Dasein," a term we shall consider in detail momentarily. Hence to understand how Dasein can be at once ontic and ontological, to understand how Dasein can even ask the Seinsfrage to begin with, we must first understand the ontic everyday characteristics of Dasein. Here Heidegger was influenced in a fourth way by the thought of Søren Kierkegaard, whose approach to primordial Angst was discussed in the previous chapter.
As will become apparent, Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger was delimited to illuminating the ontic properties of Dasein (if Heidegger is to be taken at his word in *Being and Time*). Heidegger therefore borrowed several key concepts from Kierkegaard to fill in what he called the "Existenziell" or ontic dimension of Dasein's mode of being. And, of course, he acknowledged his debt to Kierkegaard. Among these were the familiar themes of situation, resoluteness, and choice, death, authenticity, repetition, possibility, the anonymous "they," and, of course, the phenomenon of Angst itself. To be sure, the relationship between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is extremely subtle and worthy of a full-dress study in its own right. This task has been undertaken with some degree of success by Michael Wyschogrod in his book *Kierkegaard and Heidegger*. Our purpose here is not to comment further on their relationship; it is rather to observe that indeed, Kierkegaard was a major influence on Heidegger's notion of primordial Angst, but that Heidegger's ontological concerns took him beyond Kierkegaard's theological and psychological treatment of the phenomenon. We shall, however, examine the relationship between the two thinkers in greater detail once we reach Chapter V where such comparisons become useful.

Yet looming large behind each of these specific influences on Heidegger's early mature period was the virtual omnipresence of two other figures whose presence dominates the entire problematic of *Being and Time*. These two figures are, of course, Immanual Kant and Franz Brentano.
With regard to Kant, it is clear that as a student at Freiburg Heidegger could not have helped being imbued with the spirit of Neo-Kantian philosophy; a view which dominated the universities of Germany around the turn of the present century. Indeed Heinrich Richert, Heidegger's philosophy professor, was himself a Neo-Kantian. This meant that Heidegger's first attempts to penetrate into philosophy took place within the Neo-Kantian intellectual climate regarding the problems of values on the one hand, and epistemology on the other. The central problem for Heidegger, therefore, that is, the problem of ontology, was assumed to have been dissolved permanently by Kant himself.\(^{31}\) It was against this traditional mainstream that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant demonstrates that Kant's purpose in writing the *Critique of Pure Reason* was not primarily for the sake of epistemology, but rather for the sake of laying a foundation for metaphysics. This Kant interpretation, later published as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, was conceived during 1925-26, several years prior to the publication of *Being and Time*, and was meant to be the first salvo against the tradition of Western metaphysics which never saw print as a part of Heidegger's *magnum opus*.\(^{32}\) More specifically, in the Kant interpretation Heidegger struck at the roots of Neo-Kantianism by showing that Kant's purpose in the first *Critique* was to lay the groundwork for metaphysics; that is, not the *metaphysica specialis* of the schools (i.e., theology, cosmology, and psychology), but rather *metaphysica generalis*, the question of ontology. Thus *Being and
Time can be seen as an attempt to return to this fundamental Kantian problematic carried out from within another Kantian motif: the inquiry into the a priori conditions of the possibility of understanding and interpreting Being.

None of this, however, would have been possible without the seminal influence of Franz Brentano on the young Heidegger. As we saw above, it was Brentano's dissertation which gave rise to the Seinsfrage itself as the abiding theme of Heidegger's thought. But Brentano further influenced Heidegger in other, more subtle ways. First, from Brentano Heidegger learned to understand and appreciate the nuances of Greek philosophy. This, of course, led ultimately to the discovery of Truth as Aletheia, another cornerstone of Heidegger's thought. Then secondly, it was from Brentano that Heidegger learned an appreciation for neo-Scholastic philosophy in general and that of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus in particular. Brentano's doctrine of intentionality is unquestionably related to the neo-Scholastic interpretation of that concept, a point which neither Husserl nor Heidegger could possibly overlook.

Thus Brentano stands behind much of Heidegger's early mature thought, secretly moving it toward a confrontation with Neo-Kantian doctrines, urging it toward the Truth of Being as Aletheia, and securing it in a neo-Scholastic tradition of which Brentano himself was a part. None of this speaks to the enormous influence Brentano had over Husserl, the founder of transcendental phenomenology. And so in an indirect way as well, Brentano's influence was shown through
Husserl to Heidegger, urging Heidegger on to an inquiry into the
question of Being in a new and primordial way that was not open to
the Neo-Kantian tradition that dominated German philosophy prior to
the success of Being and Time.

This brief sketch by no means exhausts the many important
influences on Heidegger during his early mature period, a complete
listing of which would have to include Nietzsche and Pascal, for
example. But the six thinkers that we have discussed here made
far-reaching, profoundly deep, and therefore major contributions to
Heidegger's thought during this period; contributions without which
Being and Time could not have been conceived, much less written.

Still, we must concur with Mehta's observation that Being and Time
is decidedly not simply a continuation of the agenda of these
thinkers; nor is it specifically a deepening of their perspectives.
Rather, their joint influence, the confluence of their impact on
Heidegger, allowed him to hermeneutically deepen the one question
which concerned him: the question of the meaning of Being, which
we have here designated as the Seinsfrage.33

With regard to the three "sights" of the hermeneutic under-
standing that are necessary for any interpretation to take place
(and which we discussed at the outset of this essay), we see that:
Husserl provided the Vor-sicht, the pre-view or the way of seeing
phenomenologically into the Seinsfrage in advance; Dilthey and Yorck
provided the Vorgriff, the pre-conception or means of conceiving
hermeneutically the Seinsfrage from the standpoint of historicity;
and Kierkegaard, Brentano and Kant provided the Vorhaben, the pre-
position or what we have as part of our Dasein given in advance of
approaching the Seinsfrage. Thus the essential difference between
the ontic and the ontological realms manifest themselves in Dasein
as: (1) the Existenzial or ontic mode of human being, on the one
hand; and (2) the Existenzial or a priori ontological conditions which
undergird the Existenzial in Dasein's Being, on the other hand. In
order to fully grasp the ontological dimension of being human,
however, it is necessary to take as our point of departure the
ontic, everyday experience of Dasein and only then penetrate through
this level to its ontological superstructure. This penetration or
breaking through is, as we shall see, possible only through the
medium of primordial Angst the very phenomenon for which we are
searching in this dissertation.

The Hermeneutical Task of Being and Time

It cannot be overemphasized that Being and Time is at its
radix a foundational inquiry into the question of the meaning of Being.
The analysis of Dasein which takes up the bulk of the published
portion of Being and Time, therefore, is clearly propaedeutic to
this essential question. So while Being and Time may seem to concern
itself with philosophical anthropology, couched in the raiments of
what Heidegger called "fundamental ontology," it is first, last, and
always directed to the ontological problems raised by Seinsfrage.
Hence it is clearly not a work of "existential thinking" as that
term has been used by the followers of Jean Paul Sartre; neither is it a work of Existenzphilosophie as that term is used by the followers of Karl Jaspers. In fact, in a letter to Professor Arthur H. Schrynemaker, written in October of 1966, Heidegger tersely states: "Today it is hardly necessary anymore to remark explicitly that my thinking is a matter neither of Existentialism or Existenzphilosophy." Of course, this is but an expanded re-echo of the earlier denials on this score given both in the Letter of Humanism and the work on Nietzsche. But why are all of these disavowals necessary to begin with? The answer has to do with the manner in which Heidegger carries out his "fundamental ontology" or analysis of Dasein's Existential structures. This analysis takes its launching point from the ground definition of Dasein as that specific entity, indeed the only entity, whose existence precedes its essence. This formula "Dasein's existence precedes its essence" has become as much the motto of existential thinking in the Sartrian sense as "to the things themselves!" became for Husserl's phenomenology. So what is required here perhaps, is to unpack the meaning of Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as the only entity which is at once ontical and ontological, and whose existence as a mode of being precedes its essence as an entity among other entities in the world.

What then is this curious entity called Dasein? Heidegger himself answers:

If the question of Being is to be precisely formulated and rendered completely transparent to itself, then any elaboration of it . . . requires an explication of how Being is to be viewed, how its meaning is to be understood, and conceptually
grasped; it requires preparing for the possibility of choosing the proper entity as our paradigm, and working-out a genuine access to this entity. [But] looking at, understanding and conceiving of, choosing, and making accessible are constitutive aspects of questioning and are thus themselves modes of Being of a particular entity; which, as questioners, we ourselves are. Accordingly, to work out the question of Being means to render transparent a questioning entity in its being. . . . This entity, which we ourselves are and which has questioning as one of its possibilities of Being, we shall designate by the term Dasein. (SZ, p. 7)

Thus Dasein is that entity, indeed the only entity, which questions Being, which has an abiding interest in Being, and which is capable of dis-covering hermeneutically the hidden meaning of Being. All of this is possible only because Dasein, as a questioner, has a privileged access to Being through questions.

But how then are we to grasp this entity which we ourselves are; and, moreover, where does the phenomenon of primordial Angst fit into such a grasp? To answer both parts of this question requires the patience necessary to work through several facets of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world; a world which for the most part reveals itself to us through our concrete, everyday experience. For surely it would not do to construct some kind of ontological balloon which drifts unmoored hither and thither through the rarified currents of pure speculation. On the contrary, philosophy has seen far too many such balloons: a circumstance that has led it down the path to the vacuity of solipsism on the one hand and pure scientism on the other.

First, then, we must take our point of departure from Dasein's ontic and everyday mode of being so that we may come to
primordial Angst as the "phenomenological window" through which the ontological structures of our ownmost Being are revealed to us as Dasein. But let us not run ahead of ourselves. It is necessary to backtrack so to follow behind Heidegger, step-by-step in his disclosure of the basic structures of Being-in-the-world. Only in such "following behind" will we come to fully grasp Dasein's existenziell possibilities of Being-in-the-world.

Dasein's Ontic Horizon: Everyday Being-in-the-World

There are three components of this horizon which require at least some preliminary clarification so that the complex "wholeness" of everyday Being-in-the-world can show itself in its own way. These are: (1) "Being-in" as such, (2) "the-world" itself, and (3) Dasein's mode of Being-in-the-world. Let us look at each of these individually as the necessary foreground upon which primordial Angst can later show itself.

First, Heidegger examines the notion of "Being-in" from the standpoint of what it means to be in a world.\(^{37}\) Starting from the familiar everyday experience that each of us has personally, we notice several features that give us a clue as to what is meant by being in the surrounding environment that may be called "world." One thing we notice, indeed cannot help but notice, is that we share this world with other Dasein about whom we concern ourselves with solicitude; that is, we love others, or we hate them, we are perhaps generally indifferent to most. Too, we use them, we honor
them and so on. But, says Heidegger, we behave towards others in a manner of general solicitous concern which in turn makes possible these more specific modes of how we "treat people." What, then, is their mode of Being as other Dasein in the world? It is to be present alongside us, to dwell with us in the world.

Secondly, we tend to believe that the everyday world is populated with "objects" or "things" such as: flowers, trees, paintings, books, ideas, even "things" such as hopes, beliefs, or dreams. Since Descartes we have called these "things" by the technical name, "objects," because they are said to have a different mode of Being than that of a conscious "subject." The "things" of the world are sometimes called "physical objects" if they are extended and "objects of thought" if they are "mental." What then is their collective mode of Being? Heidegger says that it is to be simply present before us for contemplation. Employing a special modifier to designate the mode of Being germane to "things" of this type, Heidegger calls them vorhanden entities, or entities which are, to translate literally, "before our hand." The mode of Being with regard to the vorhanden entities, therefore, is to be present on the scene, to be simply on-hand in the environment for theoretical contemplation, in short to be seen, touched, smelled, etc., as things in themselves.

But the very condition of the possibility of grasping "things" as vorhanden entities, argues Heidegger, is a more original and pre-reflective awareness of their place in the referential context...
of meaning. Prior to "seeing" anything as an "object of thought" or a "physical object," we pre-reflectively grasp its meaning through the hermeneutic understanding as a tool or "means" (Zeuge) for accomplishing our projects. All entities in the world, therefore, have what Heidegger calls a pre-reflective usefulness context that is an integral part of the world of our concerns. To designate this aboriginal mode of Being in which all entities participate but which the assumptions of Cartesian metaphysics prevents us from seeing, Heidegger gives this more original mode of Being the special modifier "Zuhandensein" to display entities in their contextual usefulness to us. Thus we are not "subjects" standing over against "objects" which are primarily vorhanden as Descartes would have us believe, rather we concern ourselves in a world with other entities which we use as means to complete our projects. For example, the primary mode of a typewriter's Being is clearly not to be contemplated as an object of art. Rather, it is to type the paper, book, poem, or review that is a matter of concern to its user. Or, to use a more Heideggerian example, the hammer is for driving nails, not for reflective contemplation.

From this we see that to view the world as being made up of vorhanden entities is to become trapped in a subject-object split from which there is no escape. However, we can easily see that when a tool is broken, misplaced or just not handy, its mode of Being, namely its handiness, reveals to us that the primary mode of its Being is Zuhandensein rather than Vorhandensein. Thus it is with all
entities with which we dwell in the world. No matter how complex the pattern of their usefulness to us, we would not concern ourselves with them if we did not have a place for them within the world of our concern. This reveals that their primary mode of Being is practical rather than theoretical, zuhanden rather than vorhanden, and that it is only when Dasein sees and interprets entities from the theoretical or contemplative point of view that zuhanden entities become vorhanden. At the pre-reflective level of spontaneous everyday Being-in-the-world, then, all entities are zuhanden first before they become vorhanden through a switch in Dasein's attitude from praxis to theoria. What does this mean precisely with regard to being "in-the-world"?

Four points show themselves in response to this question. First, we are clearly not "in" something like a container. Rather we are "in-the-world" in the sense of "dwelling alongside" in a concern filled circumspect way. Thus "in" has the sense of the Latin "habitare," meaning to "dwell alongside," to "abide with," or "to be familiar with." It is precisely this familiar and tranquil at-homeness of the world that characterizes our everyday mode of being-in.

Secondly, our everyday relationship to "objects" at the pre-reflective level has nothing to do with any subject-object split that grasps all entities as mere "things" or "objects of our consciousness." Thus the subject-object split of traditional
epistemology is undercut when "in-ness" is seen as being more primordial than reflective or representational thinking.

Thirdly, other Dasein are already in-the-world sharing it alongside our ownmost Dasein. Thus the problem of solipsism is revealed for what it is, a cognitively manufactured antimony that results from mind-body dualism.38

Finally, being-in, as a comfortable dwelling alongside other entities, reveals to us that we are thrown into a world we did not create;39 a world that was here long before us and will very likely remain long after we have died. So to be-in means in this sense to be "thrown-in."

The second structure of the Being-in-the-world complex is the character of the world itself: its "worldhood,"40 or perhaps better, its "worldishness."41 As we have just seen, "being-in" reveals itself in our pre-reflective preoccupation with vorhanden objects, other Dasein, and zuhanden tools. But the character of the world, says Heidegger, discloses itself primordially through our relationship to zuhanden entities, the tools we use everyday.

Specifically, our recognition of a tool as a useful object carries within it a kind of second-order recognition of the purpose or destiny which runs ahead of that tool's specific usefulness. Such usefulness is then projected to the total context of why we use tools. We use the hammer, for example, to drive the nail into the wood that is used to build our house. The house is used to provide shelter so that we may continue to carry out other projects of
useful concern to us. Furthermore, zuhanden entities, as tools, have their own mode of being: the typewriter is for writing papers, the clock is for telling time, the eraser is for making corrections; and this mode of Being discloses the worldly character of the total usage context. But how is this so? Heidegger answers that the worldly character of the world shows itself through our recognition, insight if you will, of the essential inner-connectedness of the purposes or destinies to which we put tools. In this insight, we recognize the world as the totality of all meaning-contexts, the ultimate reference system that holds usefulness and purpose together as a whole. But this worldly character of the world is not itself a thing. Rather as the "totality-of-all-possible-purposes" (Bewandtnisganzheit): the world reveals itself as no "thing" at all. It is rather "nothing." It simply is the ultimate referential context to which usefulness is put by Dasein, existing as what Heidegger calls the "for-the-sake-of-whom" (worum-willen)\textsuperscript{42} that again makes up to totality of the pre-given referential context of our Being-in.

The final structure mentioned above as requiring some preliminary clarification is how Dasein is in the world. This structure addresses the question of who is it that is Dasein, or who is it that finds itself thrown into the world. Once again our everyday experience reveals the answer to us. Specifically, we discover ourselves as being thrown into a world which we share along with other Dasein; each of which is also circumspectly preoccupied with
its own projects. This general "togetherness" of Dasein's circum-
spect and preoccupied mode of being has led, Heidegger claims, to
the collective notion of the ever present, anonymous, and totally
impersonal entity called "das Man"; which may be translated as
"people," "one," "they," or any other collective noun that refers
to all of us in general but none of us in particular. The finite,
all-pervasive power and presence of this general entity is shown in
such expressions as: "They say that one should never look a gift
horse in the mouth," or "they think that his behavior was shocking,"
or "one simply does not do that sort of thing!"

In our everyday ontic concerns the power of the anonymous
"one" or the "they" is vast indeed. According to Heidegger the
"they" dictates to us the nature and scope of a vast number of our
concerns. Characteristically, we relinquish personal responsibility
over to the "they" for making many ill- or non-considered choices
and decisions; and the "they," in turn, provides us with a kind
of fictitious security: a source of values according to which we
may govern our lives. The "they" lives and breathes in and through
us, touching our lives and determining the "roles" we play. It
governs the expectations we have of ourselves, of our families;
indeed, of our society and our very culture. Heidegger himself
explains:

We enjoy and gratify ourselves as "people" enjoy; we read,
see, and judge literature as "people" see and judge; we
even disassociate ourselves from "the herd of humanity" as
"one" disassociates. The "they" which is never distinct
and [yet] which everyone is (but not as the sum total) pre-
scribes the everyday mode of being [Dasein]. (SZ, pp. 126-27).
More than merely an ontic structure, the "theyness" that
governs our ontic choices is also an Existenzial of Dasein; it is
the ontological condition of the possibility of Dasein's most
general understanding and interpretation of its ownmost mode of
Being. Hence, the "theyness" that characterizes our everyday mode
of being is at once Dasein's pre-ontological interpretation of
Being-in-the-world and at the same time the ontological condition
which makes possible our daily, averaged, public, and impersonal
mode of existing "inauthentically" in the world.

These three basic elements of everyday Being-in-the-world,
therefore, lead to a most important distinction: everyday Being-
in-the-world is for the most part an "inauthentic" mode of being.
This implies, of course, that there must likewise be an "authentic"
mode of being from which the "inauthentic" mode can be distinguished.
Further, this authentic mode of Being must be the more original;
the more primordial mode of Dasein's existence, since by the very
prefix "in-" of "inauthentic" we designate a privation of something
that was a more original state. "Inauthentic" is therefore a
pritive mode of the more primordial "authentic" mode of Dasein's
Being-in-the-world. But prior to discussing what this authentic
mode of Being might entail, we must first grasp how it is possible
for our everyday or ordinary experience, the experience that is so
familiar to us, to be inauthentic in the first place. We must
understand, therefore, what it is that makes possible the inauthentic
mode if the authentic is more primordial.
To address this problem Heidegger observes that included in the list of a priori Existenzials which ontologically constitute Dasein's being (a list which includes the ontological "categories" of understanding (Verstehen), Disposition or Attunement (Befindlichkeit), and speech or discourse (Rede)), there must be added a fourth Existenzial which may be called fallenness or forfeiture (Verfallen). It is precisely this fourth Existenzial that is the a priori condition that makes possible the privative mode of Being-in-the-world that has been termed Dasein's inauthentic mode of Being. Specifically, the absorption of Dasein into the "theyness" of the publically interpreted world shows itself ontically through the phenomena of "chatter," or empty talk, "curiosity" or empty inquisitiveness, and "ambiguity" or empty understanding. Each of these are present in Dasein's everyday mode of Being. We need not concern ourselves with the details of the derived modes of Verfallen here: we must only note in passing that the three ground the Existenzial and show its a priori presence in everyday life.

Heidegger repeatedly insists that Verfallen is not anything like a fall from a "purer" or "higher state of Being." Neither is it a display of man's inherent evil (whatever that might be). Rather, fallenness or forfeiture is co-equal with understanding, disposition, and speech as Existenzial a priori conditions of Dasein's Being. Thus, Verfallen is the ontological ground of Dasein's seeking out of the inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world as its source of everyday comfort and security. Heidegger gives what amounts to an
unintentional and most ironic example of this *Existenzial* from the realm of his personal experience, in describing how it was that *Being and Time* came to be published.

"Professor Heidegger—you have got to publish something now. Do you have a manuscript?" With these words the dean of the philosophical faculty in Marburg came into my study one day in the winter semester of 1925-26. "Certainly," I answered. Then the dean said: "But it must be printed quickly." The faculty proposed me *unico loco* as Nicolai Hartmann's successor for the chief philosophical chair. Meanwhile, the ministry in Berlin had rejected the proposal with the explanation that I had not published anything in the last ten years.

Now I had to submit my closely protected work to the public. On account of Husserl's intervention, the publishing house Max Niemeyer was ready to print immediately the first fifteen proof sheets of the work that was to appear in Husserl's *Jahrbuch*. Two copies of the finished page proofs were sent to the ministry by the faculty right away. But after some time, they were returned to the faculty with the remark: "inadequate." In February of the following year (1927), the complete text of *Being and Time* was published in the eighth volume of the *Jahrbuch* and as a separate publication. After that the ministry reversed its negative judgment half a year later and made the offer of the chair.45

Heidegger's disclosure of his "closely protected work," a work which was not only incomplete but uncompletable in principle,46 displays how in seeking Hartmann's chair he himself gave in to the "they-ness" as a condition of his emanent promotion. Needless to say, the results of the pre-mature disclosure for the sake of a desirable appointment displays Heidegger's human or "inauthentic" side; a side not often seen by many of Heidegger's students *in absentia*.

It is fallenness, then, that gives inauthentic Being-in-the-world the special quality of being "... a guarantee of the trustworthiness, genuineness, and fullness of all possibilities of being."47 However, in the phenomena associated with V...
ambiguity, curiosity, and chatter) we notice, says Heidegger, a kind of deep and ontically unexplicable uneasiness: a feeling of agitatedness or alienation from our true selves. This uneasy, agitated alienation, rather than spurring Dasein to explore the depths of the feeling, forces Dasein to turn away from agitatedness, to shun and cover over the alienation, so as to seek comfort and security in its everyday mode of Being-in-the-world. Ontically, "procrastination" is an example of such a drive to overcome the alienation, "refusing-to-consider" is yet another, "temper tantrums" may be yet a third. Heidegger explains that this comfort seeking has to do with the abyss metaphor we introduced in our first chapter. The phenomena of temptation, comfort, alienation and self-entanglement ... characterizes the special kind of being that belongs to fallenness. We call this agitatedness of Dasein ... its "headlong plunge." Dasein plunges from itself into itself, into the abyss and emptiness of inauthentic everydayness. But this plunge remains hidden from Dasein due to its public interpretation; so much so in fact, that it is interpreted as advancement or luring concretely. (SZ, p. 178)

Here the familiar echo of the earlier chapters re-echoes once more: Dasein plunges into an abyss of ontological meaninglessness. Like Kierkegaard's "dizziness at the face of the abyss," Dasein experiences a whirling and continuous dizziness at the edge of Verfallen's abyss. But this whirling dizziness is a major connection point between the authentic and inauthentic modes of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Therefore we must ask: what is the a priori condition that makes the dizziness and whirl possible? Clearly in our ontic everyday mode of Being-in-the-world fallenness is not
revealed to us in any overt way. Thus our access to Being which makes dizziness possible must be grounded in one of the other three existential "categories" of Dasein's manner of existence. It seems clear that of the three other Existenzials: understanding, disposition, and speech, the most likely candidate, indeed the only candidate that can make dizziness possible is disposition or attunement (Befindlichkeit). For the attunement that we each have to the Being, which undergirds everyday curiosity, chatter, and ambiguity, reveals their inauthentic nature. Moreover such attunement reveals this fact with a vengeance that strikes us dumb. We are rapidly approaching primordial Angst.

We thus come to the nexus between fallenness (Verfallen) and disposition or attunement (Befindlichkeit). Since we have explored Verfallen in some detail, we must now return to a broader discussion of Befindlichkeit. For with Befindlichkeit we come at last to the immediate horizon of that for which we are searching: the role of primordial Angst in Being and Time.

The Last Horizon—the Existenzial, "Befindlichkeit"

In the Introduction to this dissertation we observed that there are at least three equiprimordial Existentials that constitute Dasein's mode of Being. These were: (1) understanding (Verstehen), (2) disposition (or attunement) (Befindlichkeit), and (3) speech (or discourse) (Rede). There we discussed in some detail how each "category" displays a way that Dasein is its disclosedness.
Here there is little need to retrace that groundwork. To do so would only delay our arrival at the goal we are seeking; namely, an understanding of primordial Angst within the context of Being and Time.

Having worked through an analysis of Dasein's everyday mode of Being-in-the-world, we now have at our disposal both the opportunity and the conceptual tools to examine the one Existenzial which concerns us primarily: the Befindlichkeit of Dasein. Angst, as the reader will no doubt recall, is the utterly primordial disposition or attunement (Grundbefindlichkeit) of Dasein. So to clearly understand Angst, we must first deal with Heidegger's discussion of Befindlichkeit.

In the first place we must reiterate that at its very root Befindlichkeit means "to find oneself in a situation," "to be attuned to the world" in a pre-reflective, non-thematic way that "disposes" us to the ontic world of our circumspect preoccupations. Existenti­ally, we experience Befindlichkeit through our ontic moods (Stimmungen): and, of course, it is Dasein's Befindlichkeit that makes all moods possible. It almost goes without saying that Dasein always finds itself in some specific kind of mood: a good mood, a bad mood, a curious mood, a frivolous mood, a contemplative or reflective mood, and so on. But no matter what mood we are disposed to at the moment, we always are in a mood of one type or another. This shows that Dasein is first and foremost an entity that is delivered over to Being without much choice in the disposition of
its deliverance. We find ourselves, in other words, in a factical situation which we ourselves did not create; namely, that we are—we exist factically (i.e., as a naked and brute fact). This fundamental recognition comes over us: it dawns on us through our moods, revealing how it is that we are attuned to the world on a day-to-day basis, and that we are so attuned. From this perspective, Befindlichkeit may be seen to possess at least three ontological characteristics: (1) it reveals Dasein as an entity thrown into a world it did not choose; (2) it reveals that Dasein is vividly overtaken by its moods in a very profound sense indeed; and (3) it reveals that Dasein's primordial encounter with entities is not simply theoretical. Rather Dasein is "touched" or "affected" by the things themselves.

This-being-attuned-to-disposition is therefore Dasein's primary access to the world, which when taken in tandem with understanding (Verstehen) and speech (Rede) constitute the ontological foundations of Dasein's Being; the very foundation that undergirds the ontic, work-a-day preoccupation with which we each busy our individual lives.

To display the far-reaching meaning of Befindlichkeit in our ontic or existenziell mode of being, Heidegger explores how Befindlichkeit undergirds one of the most intense personal feelings we can possibly encounter—the ontic phenomenon of fear. Heidegger will later use this phenomenal analysis of fear as the precedent for the phenomenological analysis of primordial Angst. Thus the analysis
of fear has two purposes: (1) it discloses that fear is an ontic and inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world; and (2) it sets the stage for how Angst, as the a priori condition which makes fear possible, is to be analyzed.

As did Kierkegaard before him, Heidegger observes that in order to fear, there must be a specific threat to us that is coming towards us. While this feature of fear is about as far as Kierkegaard was prepared to go in Begrebnet Angst; it is certainly not far enough for Heidegger's quest to penetrate to the very essence of fear itself. Heidegger therefore separates the phenomenon of fear into three components; each of which must be clearly understood if we are to grasp the phenomenal meaning of fear. These three parts are, in brief: (1) the "before what" (das Wovor) element, or the nature of the threat to us; (2) the fearsome experience itself (das Furchten); and (3) the "about what" (das Worum) we fear, or the who-gets-threatened element. Since these same elements will be used again in the later ontological analysis of Angst, it would be helpful here to see how Heidegger employs them in analyzing fear.

First, the "before what" element refers to the "entity" which threatens us. It can be a vorhanden object, a zuhanden tool, or another Dasein: but in any case, says Heidegger, we must discuss at least six sub-elements to finely tune the Wovor of fear: (1) what threatens us has the character of harmfulness (Abtraglichkeit) in its relationship to us. (2) There is a distinct range of harm that can be done by what threatens us. Thus its harmfulness shows itself
as coming from a definite region in our circumspect world. (3) The region from which the harmful comes is well known to us and now has something eerie (geheuer) about it. (4) The harmful is not yet within range of attack; but it is drawing closer, radiating its harmfulness—it is this which accounts for its threatening manner. (5) The harmful is not so far off that it can be neglected; rather it is imminent. (6) Finally, the fact that the harmful has not yet attacked contains within itself the possibility that it might not attack. Yet this exact possibility serves only to heighten the intensity of the fear. 55

Secondly, "the fearing itself" (das Furchten) element shows itself as occurring when we allow what is threatening to matter to us or concern us. Our circumspect pre-occupation interprets something as being fearsome because "bearing fearful" is an internal possibility of our primordial Befindlichkeit. It is precisely because of our Befindlichkeit structure, therefore, that we can circumspectly recognize something as being a threat to us to begin with. 56

Third, the "above what" element, or the what-is-it-that-gets-threatened element is, of course, Dasein's ownmost potentiality for well being. Indeed, only Dasein can be afraid since it is the only entity for whom Being is an issue. Thus fear discloses Dasein in a privative way, making conspicuous the need for everyday comfort and security by the intense absence of these feelings during fear. 57
Heidegger takes great pains to show how "fearing for [the sake of] others" (SZ, p. 141) is at root grounded in being-afraid-for-oneself. He also shows that the fear cognates of alarm, dread, and terror are each variations of the basic fear phenomenon. In view of our repeated insistence that primordial Angst is not dread or even terror per se, it would be useful here to demonstrate from Heidegger's own perspective the grounds for our assertion. Heidegger says:

There can be variations within the constitutive moments of the full phenomenon of fear . . . resulting in differing ways of being fearful . . . [For example,] in so far as that which threatens, in its mode of "not right now but at any second" suddenly breaks into our preoccupied being-in-the-world, fear becomes Terror (Erschrecken) . . . The before-what of terror is for the most part well known and familiar. But if, on the other hand, that which is threatening us is something completely unfamiliar to us, then fear becomes Dread (Grauen). Moreover, where the threatening has the character of being dreadful, and at the same time it is encountered suddenly, then fear becomes Horror (Entsetzen). (SZ, p. 142)

We can see from this passage, then, that dread, horror, and terror are modes of fear rather than of primordial Angst itself. Now since primordial Angst is the ontological a priori condition of the possibility of fear, it must be at the same time that a priori condition which makes dread, terror and horror possible. But manifestly, primordial Angst is a higher order or phenomenological phenomenon that makes these phenomenal manifestations possible. For this reason primordial Angst can never be equated with dread, terror or any other fear-related ontic phenomena. Why? Because such an equation violates the differences between the ontic and
and ontological realms. Not only that, but the related phenomena of timidity (Schüchternheit), awe (Schue), anxiety⁵⁹ (Bandigkeit), and astonishment (Stutzigwerden) are all ontic phenomena grounded in the phenomenal paradigm of fearfulness (Das Furchten). Of course, the explicit reference to "anxiety" here should not be overlooked.

With this analysis as a guide, we may now proceed to a discussion of primordial Angst itself. For in our laying bare of the ontical structures of Befindlichkeit as a constitutive element of Dasein, we have come at last to the final horizon of primordial Angst—the ontological dimension of Befindlichkeit. We may now see the role primordial Angst plays in Heidegger's thought as the most original, the furthest-reaching, and the only means whereby Dasein has access to an understanding and interpretation of the ontological significance of Being-in-the-world.

We have traversed the many horizons from the broadest to the most narrow so to prepare the ground for this interpretation. We have moved from the broadest of Heidegger's brushstrokes—the Seinsfrage, to the finer brush work of the Dasein analysis of Being and Time. To complete Heidegger's portrait of primordial Angst, then, we must now examine the finely detailed brushwork that highlights the phenomenon of primordial Angst itself. It is to this task that we now turn without further delay.
Angst in Being and Time

Heidegger, after having displayed the full ontic disclosure of Being-in-the-world, now seeks for a means of hermeneutically understanding and interpreting the existential wholeness of the Being-in-the-world phenomenon. The key to such an understanding, he insists, is the phenomenological interpretation of Angst. In section 40 of Being and Time he allows what we have called primordial Angst to show itself in this light by contrasting it with the ontic phenomenon of fear discussed earlier. Primordial Angst as an ontological phenomenon is contrasted with fear as an ontic phenomenon by use of the same analytic structures that were used previously: (1) the "before what" (das Wovor) element, or the nature of what makes us Angst-filled; (2) the Angst-filled experience itself; and (3) the "about what" (das Worum) element, or who is it that experiences primordial Angst.

Heidegger begins his analysis by discussing the relationship of forfeiture or fallenness (Verfallen) to both the ontic phenomenon of fear and the ontological phenomenon of primordial Angst. Heidegger reasons that fallenness implies a "fleeing from." Now in fear we flee from what threatens us, as we have seen; but in primordial Angst there is no specific entity that threatens us in our circumspect preoccupation with the world. Thus, fallenness shows Dasein turning away from itself in primordial Angst; that is, turning away from its authentic mode of being itself. That there is nothing specific to flee from in primordial Angst seems clear
enough, but the essential question to concern us here must be what such an objectless turning away and fleeing reveals phenomenologically to us. A closer examination of the structures of primordial Angst may be useful here.

First, the "before-what" element of primordial Angst is manifestly not some vorhanden or zuhanden entity, nor is it some other Dasein along with us in the world. Were that the case then we would of course be experiencing fear rather than primordial Angst. Let us, then, retrace the sub-elements introduced in the analysis of fear as they are now applied to primordial Angst: (1) what threatened in fear, namely the harmful entity with which we are concerned, is completely absent in primordial Angst; for in Angst we are Angst-filled precisely because we cannot determine what it is that threatens us. (2) Moreover, unlike fear which detects the threat as coming from a well-known region, in primordial Angst the threat comes from nowhere (i.e., no specific region). (3) In fear, that well-known region takes on an "eerie" quality to it as it threatens; but in primordial Angst the world itself and as a whole loses its significance completely: everything becomes eerie, because nothing remains familiar. (4) Whereas in fear we feel that the threatening is not yet here but is drawing nearer, in primordial Angst the amorphous threat is already here; it is a-directional and a-temporal in this sense. (5) In fear we detect the threatening as being so close that it demands immediate attention; but in primordial Angst the threat is neither close nor far, neither here
nor there: it surrounds us completely. (6) Finally, during fear we can hope that what threatens will not attack since it has not attacked as yet. Not so in primordial Angst. In such Angst we are not attacked by anything, and yet we feel ourselves under constant attack from no-where and from no-thing. Thus it is the world itself that is the "before what" of Angst, experienced ontologically as the silent apprehension of thrown Being-in-the-world as such. Says Heidegger:

What oppresses us is not this or that much less the sum of the vorhanden things together; rather it is the possibility of the zuhanden [referential context] in general; that is, the world itself. As soon as Angst has abated we are accustomed to saying in everyday language, "it was really nothing." What it was, was ontically hit upon indeed in this manner of speaking. Everyday language tends to busy itself with discussing the zuhanden [mode of being]. The "before-what" [element] that Angst is Angst-filled about (Wovor die Angst sich Angstet) is not anything zuhanden in the world. Nevertheless, this nothingness of the zuhanden [mode of being], which is understood only by circumspect everyday language, is not total Nothingness. The nothingness of the zuhanden is grounded in a more primordial something— in the world. This world, however, ontologically belongs in an essential way to the being of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. Thus if the no-thing; that is, the world as such, shows itself as the "before-what" of Angst, it may be said then that the "before-what" that Angst is Angst-filled about, is Being-in-the-world as such. (SZ, p. 187)

Thus the second element, the apprehension of primordial Angst itself, discloses the world in Dasein's pre-reflective experience of its world-hood; namely the outermost phenomenological horizon of the no-thingness which lights up in the totality of destinations (Bewandtnisganzheit) that is the meaning and referential context of world. What Dasein apprehends in primordial Angst, then,
is the vacuousness of the world as entities slip away into the abyss of meaninglessness. "The world," says Heidegger, "has nothing more to offer much less so the being-with of others" (SZ, p. 187). In robbing Dasein of its plebian and comfortable, even smiling self-understanding, primordial Angst throws Dasein back upon its ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world. Primordial Angst therefore, isolates (vereinzelt) Dasein, freeing it to project itself upon its ownmost authentic possibilities. Thus, primordial Angst frees Dasein, making it possible for Dasein to choose itself concretely, but not in the psychological and ontic manner of Kierkegaard.

Rather, for Heidegger primordial Angst is the phenomenon that displays in a pre-reflective way the ontological conditions which undergird any choice whatsoever. In contrast to Kierkegaard, then (for whom Angst was the ontic possibility of possibility), Heidegger shows primordial Angst to be existenzial and ontological possibility of possibility: the "ground" of ontological freedom. 60

Third, the "about what" or the "who-it-is" that apprehends in primordial Angst is again Dasein as a Being-in-the-world. Heidegger spares no small effort to show that the "before-what" element (das wovor der Angst), and the "about-what" element (das worum der Angst) are identical. This selfsameness, Heidegger argues, assures us that in primordial Angst we have found at last a distinctive disposition capable of a full-dress phenomenological analysis and hermeneutical interpretation. Heidegger explains:
The existential selfsameness of the disclosure and the dis­
closed, therefore, makes it clear that in this [selfsameness] the world has been disclosed as world, that Being-in has been disclosed as pure, thrown, and isolated potentiality for Being, and that with the phenomenon of Angst a distinctive Disposition has become a theme for interpretation. (SZ, p. 188)

Hence primordial Angst radically isolates Dasein from the "theyness" of the public world by disclosing it in its naked solus ipse. Angst-fully isolated in the nothingness of the world's Bewandtnis­
ganzheit, Dasein's ownmost Being-in-the-world is thereby made transparent to itself.

The ontic manifestation of this ontological phenomenon is "uncanniness" or "eerie ness" (unheimlich). Strictly speaking we do not directly "experience" primordial Angst. It is a condition which makes experience possible. Hence, what we "experience" is this marked sense of "uncanniness" which overpowers us in primordial Angst. So when such uncanniness--precisely when it overtakes us, we flee into the tranquil, public world of ontic familiarity. Simultaneously, of course, we flee from the uncanniness. Furthermore, ontic uncanniness can strike anytime, in any place. It pursues Dasein relentlessly in the darkness as well as in the full light of day, in the battlefield or in a loved one's arms. As constitutive of Dasein, the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst is itself a concrete mode of Dasein's Being-there (Da-sein). Like some ontological shadow of our Being, Dasein can never, under any circum­stances, escape Angst.
Hence, we see that the simple and phenomenal "feeling" of fear is possible only as a fallen-into-the-world mode of primordial Angst; an Angst which as fear is no longer authentic, and as such is hidden from itself. It is precisely this phenomenological analysis, this understanding and this interpretation that has wrested primordial Angst from its hiddenness by Heidegger's analysis.

Heidegger concludes this analysis by observing that while authentic or primordial Angst is rare, even physiologically conditioned anxiety is factually an ontological problem. For only because Dasein is Angst-filled in the very ground of its Being can anxiety manifest itself physiologically. So the most distinctive characteristics of primordial Angst is its power to essentially isolate Dasein; thus bringing it back from Fallenness and revealing to it that both authenticity and inauthenticity are radically potential modes of its Being. Primordial Angst therefore, strips Dasein of its illusions; revealing the world's entity structure in an undisguised manner; revealing, moreover, that Dasein for the most part inauthentically clings to the circumspect world for security.

By way of summary, then, primordial Angst has shown itself to be an explicit mode of Being-in-the-world precisely because it is Dasein's most fundamental disposition. As such, the phenomenological significance of primordial Angst reveals itself as the distinctive and utterly unique way of Being that frees us for
understanding and interpreting our ownmost authentic potentialities to become what we will. Thus primordial Angst is at the deepest possible level, our ontological apprehension of freedom to become our ownmost potentiality for Being.

Throughout the remainder of Being and Time, Heidegger continues to build upon this basic interpretation showing how primordial Angst reveals that care is the basic meaning of the being of Dasein. In section 41, for example, he shows that because primordial Angst reveals Dasein's potential to become its ownmost future possibilities, it follows that an essential part of Dasein's being must consist in its anticipatory or futurally oriented nature. Dasein, therefore, is always anticipating itself in its Being. But at the same time it was shown earlier that Dasein is already thrown into a world that it did not create. It therefore has a "past" orientation toward its Being as well. Primordial Angst shows that the full ontological structure of Being-in-the-world is phenomenologically a unity of three characteristics: (1) anticipating oneself as a mode of being; (2) being already thrown into the world; and (3) dwelling in the world along with other entities. Heidegger sums all this up by observing: "This Being fills in the signification of the term 'care' (Sorge), which is employed in a purely ontological-existenzial manner" (SZ, p. 192). Care, then, is the a priori condition of the possibility of Being-in-the-world.
In section 50, which Heidegger entitles, "The Display of the Existential-Ontological Structure of Death," primordial Angst is again called upon to show itself as Dasein's Grundbefindlichkeit; but this time in the context of apprehending its ultimate existential potentiality—death. First, Heidegger reveals that the existential-ontological structure of death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational, and non-surpassable possibility; one which is furthermore a distinctively impending event. Secondly he observes that Dasein does not generally have any explicit or theoretical knowledge of its impending Death. Rather it is through the phenomenon of primordial Angst that the specifically existential-ontological significance of death reveals itself to Dasein. Says Heidegger:

Throneness towards death shows itself originally and forcefully in the disposition of Angst. Angst in the face of death is Angst [standing] before one's ownmost, non-relational, and non-surpassable potentiality-for-Being. The "before-what" of this Angst is Being-in-the-world itself; its "about-what" is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. We must not confuse Angst in the face of death with a fear of becoming decrepit. Angst is not some arbitrary and random feeling of faintheartedness in someone; rather it is a revelation through Dasein's most basic disposition that Dasein is a thrown being which exists toward its own end. (SZ, p. 251)

Thus, primordial Angst reveals not only Dasein's basic freedom to become its potentialities as we saw in Section 40, but it also reveals the ultimate limit to those potentialities we each must face alone: death is Dasein's ultimate destination. Viewed from the everyday perspective of the ontico-existentiell world, to exhibit ontic anxiety in the face of death at the hands of a firing squad, for example, is considered cowardly (SZ, p. 254). This is because the anonymous "they"
publicly interpret such anxiety as fear in the face of an impending event, namely the unknown that may or may not follow the rifle's discharge. Such misunderstood Angst is therefore interpreted as the "faintheartedness" mentioned in the passage above. Needless to say, this is completely beside the point when we discuss the foundational dimension of primordial Angst.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the relationship between death and primordial Angst is that Being-toward-death is essentially an authentic "living-through" of our full Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst. Specifically, since every understanding (Verstehen) must be accompanied by an equiprimordial attunement or disposition, the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst allows Dasein to ontologically interpret death at the final horizon of all possible potentialities for Being within its existence. At the same time, however, primordial Angst reveals that death, as Dasein's ownmost, non-relation, non-surpassable potentiality, is radically inexplicit or ambiguous with regard to the time of its occurrence. So then, death always remains ahead of us as a constant but non-specific threat, obscurely looming just over the horizon of the future as the nothingness of Dasein's non-being. Heidegger states:

. . . the disposition which is capable of holding open to Dasein the constant and sheer menace which arises from Dasein's ownmost isolated being, is Angst. In Angst Dasein finds itself face to face with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence. . . . For this reason, the basic disposition of Angst belongs to the self-understanding of Dasein from its very depths. (SZ, p. 266)
Another facet of primordial Angst within Being and Time emerges in regard to the "call of conscience" which summons Dasein back from the "theyness" of unauthentic existence to the resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) required for choosing one's authentic self. Primordial Angst plays a key role in both dimensions of Dasein's wholeness and authenticity. Let us see how this is so.

Specifically, it is through primordial Angst that Dasein:

(1) hearkens to the silent call of conscience (das schweigende Reden des Gewissens), (2) accepts existenzial guilt, and (3) wills to become authentically resolute. We must consider each of these briefly in relation to primordial Angst: (1) The call of conscience comes from the depths of Dasein's being in the Befindlichkeit of uncanniness. The call is attuned by Angst, therefore, and "... is what makes possible at the outset Dasein's ability to project itself on its own-most possibilities" (SZ, p. 277). (2) The existenzial guilt of Dasein comes likewise from the depths of its being, showing itself as the nullity of thrown-Being-in-the-world. Thus, this guilt (which is not to be confused with existenziell guilt in a psychological or religious sense à la Kierkegaard) is the content of the call that is revealed through primordial Angst. It is decidedly not incidental that the ontological origin of the nullity of Dasein vis-à-vis the phenomenon of Angst becomes the primary theme of What is Metaphysics?, which we shall consider shortly. (3) Resoluteness, then, is defined by Heidegger as a "... wordless, Angst-ready, self projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty" (SZ, p. 297). Such resoluteness allows
Dasein to become authentic by forcing Dasein to face primordial Angst so as to: a) hearken to the call of conscience, b) accept its disclosure of guilt, and c) to provide Dasein with the resoluteness to become a genuine self. Such is the ontological wholeness-making of primordial Angst in relation to resoluteness.

Finally, this entire analysis, with its manifold descriptions of the meaning or significance of primordial Angst is for the most part recast in the light of Dasein's temporality. To fully understand how temporality throws a wholly new light on Heidegger's portrait of primordial Angst, we must first see how Dasein is essentially a temporal entity to begin with.

Dasein, it will be recalled, is an entity whose essence is its existence. Dasein's existence is comprised of the four Existenzials: understanding, attunement or disposition, fallenness, and speech. Primordial Angst is, of course, the most basic attunement of the second Existential listed above, "disposition." But since the Existenzials are equiprimordially constitutive of Dasein, they cannot be truly separated one from another. Hence, every understanding has its disposition, every disposition its fallenness, every fallenness its articulation through speech. What then, is the temporal signification of this complex entity called Dasein, and how is it related to primordial Angst?

To begin with, temporality, like the Existenzials of Dasein, has constitutive elements called "moments" or "ecstacies": the future, the present, and the past. One moment cannot be fully isolated
from the others any more than can one of Dasein's Existenzials be isolated completely from the others. Yet we can distinguish between these elements phenomenologically by inquiring into the temporal condition toward which each of Dasein's Existenzials is primarily oriented. Let us therefore briefly summarize how Heidegger interprets the temporal significance of each of Dasein's Existenzials, reserving the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst for last.

First, to "understand existenzially" means to project ourselves forward toward our potentiality of Being. Such a projection, in terms of Dasein's wholeness, has been termed "resoluteness." Now when resoluteness is given a temporal signification it may be called "anticipation." Thus, the full meaning of Dasein's understanding is "anticipatory resoluteness," which is a phenomenon that is primarily oriented toward the future. 68

Secondly, fallenness is interpreted from the standpoint of curiosity to show its temporal character. Curiosity, then, busies itself with a potentiality-for-seeing (in the broadest sense of that term). Letting enties be encountered in this manner is grounded primarily in the present, since Dasein allows enties to circumspectly show their presence in the "now."69

Third, speech is what makes possible the full articulation of all of Dasein's Existenzial structures as well as their temporal significations; so it in itself has no specific primary temporal significance apart from the general signification of present found in
the act of speaking. Grounded in the full unity of the moments or ecstacies of Dasein's temporality, speech spans the temporal moments or ecstacies.

Finally, to comprehend the primary temporal orientation of Dasein's Befindlichkeit structure is to comprehend that both fear (as an inauthentic disposition) and primordial Angst (an authentic one) are primarily grounded in the "has been" (ist gewesen) of the past. Let us examine this in greater detail.

In the first place, says Heidegger, having a mood as a manifestation of attunement or disposition brings Dasein face to face with its thrownness. Hence, ontologically speaking, moods are a result of Dasein's having-been-thrown into the world. The "having-been" structure of thrownness, therefore, reveals that the primary temporal ecstasy of disposition is the past. Dasein can be brought face to face with thrownness only if in the essence of its being it is its "has-been." With this in mind, Heidegger shows the temporal structure of both fear and primordial Angst in terms of their moments. His intent is to show that neither of these phenomena are possible without their temporal structure, a structure that is grounded in the "has-been" of thrownness.

Fear, Heidegger reminds us, is an inauthentic disposition. How then does its existential significance lie in what "has-been?" Fear is possible only on the basis of a specific threat, as we have repeatedly seen. So to fear we must let something threaten us from within our world; and moreover, we must await it as it comes closer
to us. Thus fearing is "the expectation of an approaching evil (malum futurum)" (SZ, p. 241); a kind of reaching-out into the future which makes us forget in a confused and hindering way our ownmost being. In fear we focus in upon what it is that threatens. But such a reaching-out into the future is itself possible only because we forget our factual thrownness as the original condition of our Being-in-the-world. Fear, then, is ultimately grounded in this forgetfulness of our authentic, thrown selves. In fear we forget ourselves so as to escape through flight. What discloses itself in having-been forgotten is, of course, what we might call "the past."

Primordial Angst, on the other hand, is an authentic disposition; indeed Dasein's most primordial authentic disposition. Such Angst therefore brings Dasein into confrontation with thrownness, disclosing the uncanniness of everyday Being-in-the-world. Heidegger has shown that the "before-what" and the "about what" structures of primordial Angst are one and the same thing, namely Dasein's ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world as such. Clearly, then, there is no specific threat which threatens Dasein in primordial Angst: rather the threat comes from within Dasein itself as Dasein is overtaken in the apprehension that the environing world is completely losing its significance for Dasein. The nothingness of the world's worldhood announces itself here through the phenomenon of primordial Angst. The world and all that is in it loses its contextual meaningfulness and the abyss of meaningless, the ontological nullity with which entities are shot through and through shows itself to a mutely
transfixed Dasein. So Dasein is thrown back on its ownmost isolated and naked existence as a thrown Being-in-the-world. Moreover, it recognizes that our awareness of primordial Angst has a quality of repetition to it. This suggests that we can recognize our thrownness repeatedly as primordial Angst overtakes us. Hence we do not forget our essential thrownness in primordial Angst as we did in the inauthentic phenomenon of fear. On the contrary, we stand poised for resoluteness in primordial Angst, remembering our thrownness with crystal clear-headedness. Primordial Angst, then, is grounded in the ecstasy of "having-been." Heidegger discloses the ontico-ontological significance of this fact: "the resolute person knows no fear, understanding precisely the possibility of Angst as a mood which does not hinder or confuse but rather literates him from vain possibilities and permits him to be free for authentic ones" (SZ, p. 344).

With that observation Heidegger completes the final touches to his portrait of primordial Angst in Being and Time. The deep background has been filled in, the foreground displayed in its vastly rich complexity, and the details highlighted in bold relief. As we abandon this metaphor we note that true to his own phenomenological method, Heidegger has taken us around several full sweeps of the hermeneutic circle; steadily deepening our awareness of the ontological significance of primordial Angst and steadily fashioning progressively vaster horizons wherein primordial Angst can disclose itself.
Yet this exhaustive display was decidedly not Heidegger's final word on such Angst. In fact, in the next section we shall see that primordial Angst assumes an even broader horizon in Heidegger's thought after 1927, when at some point he came to see that fundamental ontology, precisely because it uses the language of metaphysics, can never approach Being in itself. 71

As we will soon see, the new portrait of primordial Angst displayed by Heidegger in "What is Metaphysics?" has had equally far-reaching consequences for contemporary philosophical as well as for the Geisteswissenschaften. This new portrait, however, has earned for Heidegger as much criticism, even ridicule, as it has of praise; and to put the matter in this way is to state it much more positively than many of Heidegger's more vocal detractors would allow. So let us turn now, again from the micro-hermeneutical perspective, to the view of primordial Angst presented in the 1929 Inaugural Lecture, "What is Metaphysics?" to see why this is so.

Angst in "What is Metaphysics?" 72

We come now to Heidegger's final full-dress illumination of primordial Angst. In many important ways, the discussion of this phenomenon in "What is Metaphysics?" carries the revelation of Angst's role in Western thought much further than was displayed in Being and Time. In the Inaugural Lecture, primordial Angst is shown to be not only the a priori condition of the possibility of finite human transcendence, but of any scientific knowledge whatsoever. To be sure, this is a claim which if true is of
monumental importance to philosophy to say nothing of its monumental significance to human thought in general. Let us therefore examine it in greater detail.

Heidegger begins by observing that the question "What is Metaphysics?" has two essential components: (a) what the question concerns, in this case "metaphysics," and (b) from whose standpoint the question is being asked, in this case "Dasein." So, the question "What is Metaphysics?" must include Dasein as the questioner in what is being questioned. The reader will recall from the section entitled "The Hermeneutical Task of Being and Time" above, the Dasein was defined by Heidegger in Being and Time as an entity which questions. Thus, in this address to the faculties and students of Freiburg University, Heidegger observes that as a community of scholars, the university's mode of being is governed by the questioning of science. Given the basic truth of this statement, Heidegger asks: "What happens to us, essentially in the grounds of our Dasein, when science becomes a passion to us?" (WM, p. 1/G. p. 103); for surely, science in the broadest sense of that term has indeed become the passion of those Dasein whose primary environing world (Umwelt) is the university.

To answer this question requires some in-depth analysis. Heidegger observes that there are three elements to Dasein's scientific existence: (1) scientific Dasein has a relationship to the world which allows him to seek out entities by allowing them to become objects of investigation so as to determine their essential ground; (2) in this activity, scientific Dasein submits to the things
themselves so that they may reveal themselves through science;

(3) in the pursuit of science, scientific Dasein, as an entity which questions, actually "irrupts" into the whole realm of entities in the particular way, so that these latter entities become illuminated by showing what they are as well as the mode of being or how they are. From this analysis we may conclude that over against this scientific relationship to the world there is really nothing to consider beyond Dasein's concern for entities and Dasein's irruption into the world of such entities. Hence, scientific Dasein must concern himself only with examining entities, and beyond that nothing.

Heidegger then asks the metaphysical question, the question that "goes beyond" (meta-) the entities (physics): What about this "nothing?" (WM, p. 3/G. p. 105). Clearly the nothing is rejected by science as a kind of cognitive vacuousness or nullity, which if taken seriously can only serve to undermine intellectual rigor and precision of science as a discipline. However, by steadfastly insisting that the purview of science is restricted to the entities alone, science calls upon the nothing; indeed uses the nothing as that over against which entities reveal themselves. Hence, concludes Heidegger, science tries to ignore the nothing but in the same breath it surreptitiously admits the nothing into its hallowed chambers and laboratories. Says Heidegger: "With this reflection on our immediate existence as one determined by science, we find ourselves embroiled in the midst of a controversy. Through this controversy a
question has already evolved which requires only an explicit formulation: How is it with the nothing?" (WM, p. 4/G., p. 106).

Heidegger then proceeds to show that the nothing which science employs is: (1) clearly not an "object" because to make the nothing into an "object" clearly expresses a contradiction; and 2) the nothing is beyond even the purely logical negation of the totality of entities; that is, "non-being" pure and simple—for the conceded nothing is itself the a priori condition of the possibility of the "not" and of negation as a logical activity. Where then, asks Heidegger, are we to find the nothing? How, moreover, can we even know what to look for? It would be most useful perhaps to begin our search from the standpoint of ordinary experience: we use the term "nothing" everyday in our ordinary commerce with the world. We can even define the nothing as "the complete negation of the totality of entities" (WM, p. 6/G., p. 108). But this provides only a formal concept, not the nothing as science employs it in itself. Yet this possibility has revealed an essential clue, says Heidegger: in order to negate the totality of entities we must first encounter that totality in our daily lives; and, in fact, this is precisely what does occur when we find ourselves in the midst of this totality which we call "the world." Thus, in a pre-reflective manner the world is what we experience originally as being prior to reflective. Only then can we negate this world in a reflective manner. Says Heidegger:

> No matter how fragmented our everyday life appears to be, it still treats entities, no matter how obliquely, as unities of the whole. Even then—especially then, when we are not
busy with things or with ourselves, we are overcome with this wholeness; for example, in genuine boredom. Boredom is still far off when we are merely bored with this book or that play, with that busyness or this indolence. Boredom breaks-in when "one is [profoundly] bored." Profound boredom, drifting back and forth through the abysses of human existence like a muted fog, draws all things, all men and oneself with it into a peculiar indifference. This boredom reveal entities as a whole. (WM, pp. 7-8/G., p. 110)

Another possibility wherein the wholeness of entities is revealed "... in the joy of the existential presence--and not simply the person--of a loved one" (WM, p. 8/G., p. 110). It is through such specific moods (Stimmungen) that we discover how we are in the world, as well as that we are along with other entities in the world. In moods the totality of the world reveals itself to us in a particular way, but the revelation simultaneously covers-over the nothing for which we are searching here. There is only one key disposition, one special mode of attunement, that reveals the nothing--the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst.

Here, in "What is Metaphysics?," Heidegger is very explicit about the features of primordial Angst, describing them in close detail. Primordial Angst, then, possesses the following characteristics: (1) It is not reducible to a common ontic "anxiousness" (Angstlichkeit) that is truly grounded in some kind of nervousness (Furchtsamkeit). As was shown in Being and Time, primordial Angst differs absolutely from fear. (2) Such Angst has associated with it a kind of calm; a quiet peace that prevades Dasein. (3) In such Angst we "feel" uncanny; with all things, including one's Dasein, sinking into indifference and insignificance. Indeed, there is no meaning to
the world to cling to in primordial Angst. (4) Primordial Angst reveals the nothing. (5) In such Angst we are suspended: we hover in suspense as the totality of the entities, its meaning and significance for us slips away from us. Pure being-there (Da-sein) is all that remains: naked and vulnerable to the nothing. (6) Primordial Angst strikes us dumb, robbing us of our ability to say anything meaningful. We chatter or talk compulsively, but this only proves the all-pervasiveness of the nothing that peeks through the empty chatter. But in the vivid moments that follow this fleeting Grundbefindlichkeit, we say that it was "really nothing" that gave rise to primordial Angst. With these characteristics of the Grundbefindlichkeit that discovers the nothing, Heidegger is prepared to deal in a clearer way with what can be said about the nothing.

In order to obtain an approach to the nothing, man must be changed, says Heidegger, into his Da-sein: an event which occurs each and every time we experience primordial Angst. Indeed, Heidegger seems to imply that without primordial Angst man cannot become Dasein! In primordial Angst, then, the nothing is encountered along with the totality of entities as they slip away into superfluousness. Primordial Angst reveals that the essence of the nothing in the nihilation of the totality of entities. "In the clear light of the nothing of Angst," says Heidegger, "the original openness of entities as such arises: that they are entities—and not nothing" (WM., p. 11/G., p. 114). Further, it is only because of primordial Angst that Dasein can grasp the things themselves because "only on the ground
of the original disclosure of the nothing can the Dasein of mankind approach and penetrate entities" (WM., pp. 12-13/G., pp. 114-15).

This is the very essence of science. Thus to be Da-sein means precisely "being-held-out-into the nothing" (WM., p. 12/G., p. 115).

Such a being-held-out-into (Hineingehaltenheit) means that Da-sein is already beyond the entities as a whole; a condition which we commonly call "transcendence." Without such transcendence we could never relate to the totality of entities in a scientific or, for that matter, any other way. Neither could we relate to ourselves. Thus Heidegger concludes: "Without the original disclosedness of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom" are possible (WM., p. 12/G., p. 115).

But this gives rise, says Heidegger, to a vastly important question: if transcendence means being held out into the nothing, and if, moreover, the nothing is disclosed only in primordial Angst, then must it not follow that in order to exist at all, we must constantly hover in primordial Angst? To this important question Heidegger answers that yes, "Angst is there. Only it is sleeping" (WM., p. 14/G., p. 117). This is because Dasein falls into the world of public concerns in primordial Angst; indeed it is primordial Angst which impells Dasein into ontic preoccupation. The nothing is distorted in forfeiture as we turn toward and thereby lose ourselves into the public world. In its nihilating essence, "the nothing directs us precisely toward being" (WM, p. 13/G., p. 116). So the nihilating activity of the nothing goes on "... continuously, without our
everyday manner of knowing" (WM., p. 13/G., p. 116). The nothing shows darkly through our glib ontic preoccupation from time to time; but for the most part it remains hidden. In the activity of negating we see the more primordial nothing showing itself as the ontological condition that makes negation possible. But far more powerful are the other means whereby it shows itself. Says Heidegger:

However frequently or in how many ways negation--explicit or not--permeates all thought, it is by no means the only fully compelling witness for the revelation of the nothing that essentially belongs to Dasein. For negation cannot claim to be either the only or even the leading mode of nihilative behavior in which Dasein remains shivering in the nihilation or the nothing. More abysmal than the vapid aptness of rational negation is unbending opposition and the acrimony of abhorance. A deeper answer is required to explain the sorrow of failure and the mercilessness of prohibition. More oppressive is the bitterness of privation. (WM., p. 14/G., p. 117)

Yet for all this, primordial Angst does not stand in opposition to gladness or simple joy, or even to the tranquil ontic contentment of everydayness--provided that we are daring enough to face Angst openly. Primordial Angst stands outside all such opposition. Says Heidegger, "... in secret alliance with the serenity and mellowness of creative yearning" (WM., p. 15/G., p. 118). But primordial Angst, even as it sleeps within Dasein's ontic mode of Being, can awaken at any moment, needing no stupendous event to awaken it. It is always there lurking just beyond the fringe of awareness; waiting to reach out to seize and transform us.

Hence the question "What is Metaphysics?" becomes answerable only with reference to the finite transcendency of Dasein, a
phenomenon originality revealed in primordial Angst. Specifically, metaphysics means the inquiry that seeks to go beyond entities, to go over beings, so as to recover them as a whole and as such for our understanding. Thus the primordial Angst which reveals the nothing is what makes the question of entities possible in the first place; a fact that the scientific community must recognize if it is to be true to its own roots. For although that community of scholars and scientists would prefer to ignore the nothing, it must recognize that scientific Dasein is itself possible only to the extent that it holds itself-out-into the nothing in pure wonder of primordial Angst. Indeed, says Heidegger, "the presumptive sobriety and superiority of science becomes a laughable absurdity, if it does not take the nothing seriously" (WM., p. 18/G., p. 121). Furthermore, it is only because the nothing discloses itself in primordial Angst that science can make entities the object of scientific investigation; for without primordial Angst, no transcendence is possible. Thus without such transcendence, we, as scientific Dasein, could never "get beyond" the things themselves in order to understand them. Primordial Angst, therefore, is at the very root of science.

In the "Postscript" to "What is Metaphysics?" written in 1949, Heidegger clarifies some of his observations on primordial Angst, specifically in connection with several major and paradigmatic objections raised by his detractors against the lecture. These objections are: (1) The lecture makes the "nothing" the sole subject of metaphysics, leading to a philosophy of nothingness—the "last
word" in Nihilism. (2) The lecture raises an isolated and morbid mood, namely Angst, to the status of a key mood. But this mood, say the detractors, is "the psychic condition of the nervous and of cowards . . . " (Nachwort, p. 101/G., p. 305). The resulting philosophy of Angst paralyses the will to act and undermines the stout-hearted attitude of the courageous. Finally, (3) the lecture declares itself against logic, arguing for a philosophy of pure feeling, which "endangers precise thinking and the certainty of action" (Nachwort, p. 101/G., p. 305).

Here, of course, we are concerned basically with the second of these objections. But Heidegger's answer to the second sheds much light by implication on the other two as well. Specifically, regarding the charge that the lecture raises primordial Angst to the status of a key mood that paralyses the will and undermines courageousness, Heidegger responds along the following lines of thought:

In the first place, no matter how hard science tries to find Being among the totality of entities, it can only come up with the sum of these entities: never Being itself. Rather only in the Nothing, which shows itself in primordial Angst, does Being reveal itself as the essential "other" that is distinguished from the entities. Moreover, only in primordial Angst can this revelation of Being take place as the negation of the entities; a negation, moreover, made possible by the nothingness. Thus if we do not, out of sheer cowardliness, "... avoid [hearkening to] the silent voice that attunes us to the terrors of the abyss ... we will hearken to the
experience of Being, appropriated as the wholly 'other'" (Nachwort, p. 102/G., pp. 307-08), from which each entity, indeed all entities, are distinguished.

Therefore, to detach primordial Angst from Being is to force it into an ontic, psychological feeling that is utterly beside the point of the lecture. Heidegger says:

Readiness for Angst is [the ability] to say "yes!" to the earnestness of things; to fulfill the highest demand which alone touches man's essence. Only man among all entities when called to by the voice of Being, experiences the wonder of wonders: that entities are. Therefore the entity that is called in its very essence to the truth of Being is always attuned in a primordial way. The clear courage for primordial Angst vouches for the most mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of Being. For close to primordial Angst—as the terror of the abyss—abides awe. Such awe, illuminates and covers—over each dwelling place of mankind, within which he comfortably abides in the abiding. (Nachwort, p. 103/G., p. 307)

Angst interpreted as sheer anxiety is seen as a kind of psychological dread of dread. Such a vision always fails to grasp the essence of primordial Angst. This essence is as the above quote shows, a kind of ontological courage—the courage to steadfastly and stoutheartedly face the terrors of the abyss that is at the very heart of Dasein's ontological structure. Purely psychological anxiety, again as Heidegger earlier showed in Being and Time, is only a confused fear; a kind of inauthentic feeling that has essentially nothing to do with primordial Angst as that phenomenological phenomenon has disclosed itself in this, the present chapter. Heidegger concludes his discussion of Angst by noting that to the degree that we degrade
primordial Angst and its essential relationship to man and Being, we likewise devalue the essence of courage. Heidegger states:

In the abyss of terror, courage recognizes the virtually unexplored realm of Being: that openness into which each entity returns as what it is and what it can be. This lecture advocates neither a "philosophy of Angst," nor does it seek to give the surreptitious impression of a "heroic philosophy." Its only thought concerns that which dawned on the western intellectual tradition at its very outset, but nevertheless remains forgotten—Being. (Nachwort, p. 103/G., p. 308)

With this observation we see that Heidegger has worked his way through primordial Angst only and as always to return to his point of origin, the Seinsfrage: a return that is consistent with his quiet passion for the Hölderlin poem, Hymn to the Rhine wherein Hölderlin says: "... for, how you begin is what you will always remain."75

Preliminary Conclusions

In this chapter we have attempted to display from the perspective of micro-hermeneutics the meaning of primordial Angst in Heidegger's early mature thought. What, then, are we to make of this exceedingly detailed approach to the phenomenon? What can we conclude concerning such a meaning that has not already been said by Heidegger himself in "What is Metaphysics?" and especially in the "Postscript" to that work?

We begin to answer these questions by observing that our comments are only rough and provisional at this juncture of the essay. Fully considered comments must await the disclosure of what follows in Chapter IV; for Heidegger's impact, like that of Kierkegaard before him, must be finally assessed in the overall light of the responses
by his successors to his contribution. This macro-hermeneutic task we propose to undertake in Chapter V once the full display of the role of Angst in contemporary philosophical thought has suggested itself.

So by way of answering the above questions preliminarily, we may observe three points that will require a more comprehensive discussion in Chapter V: (1) Heidegger clearly elevates primordial Angst from an ontic, psychological, phenomenal phenomenon to an ontological, a priori, phenomenological phenomenon. (2) Heidegger in doing so prepares the ground for illuminating two fundamental problems that go beyond his own analysis of primordial Angst: Angst in relation to a full dress treatment of the Nothingness, and Angst in relation to ontological courage in the face of such Nothingness. (3) Heidegger furthermore brings the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey into concert with Kierkegaard's vision of Angst, displaying an ontically grounded approach to the ontological substructure of the phenomenon. (4) Heidegger accounts for Verstehnen as being more than merely cognitive by tying understanding to Angst as Dasein's basic or primordial disposition. This accounts for our non-cognitive modes of understand, a big step indeed. (5) Heidegger's use of primordial Angst seems to provide unity to the vast ontic diversity of experience, covering in the process contingencies such as fear, boredom, etc., which are not covered in previous attempts to seek a complete ontology. (6) Heidegger's concept of Angst in relation to Nothingness, is what ultimately grounds the possibility of science.
Over against these accomplishments there stands an important set of concerns which require macro-hermeneutical discussion and examination if we are to finally judge Heidegger's contribution as being one which goes beyond purely historical significance. These concerns delve deeply into the ground of hermeneutic phenomenology itself and thus go well beyond the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst:

1. Heidegger's account of the phenomenological phenomenon called primordial Angst may, after all, be at root an ontological construction which cannot in principle be grounded in ontic experience. There is a major leap to be observed between the ontic "uncanniness" we do experience and the ontological Angst which Heidegger claims makes it possible. We can only assume Angst is there. We never experience it.

2. This gives rise to the much deeper problem of grounding Dasein's ontological structures to begin with; a problem which Heidegger himself admits takes precedence over ontological inquiry. In Being and Time he asserts that the roots of Dasein's analytic are ultimately existenziell or ontic: therefore the ontical priority of the Seinsfrage becomes plain. Heidegger himself had to abandon the Seinsfrage from the standpoint of fundamental ontology because one cannot get to Being from Dasein's being.

3. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's existenzial structures are challenging and illuminating; perhaps for some even exciting. Certainly they are creative, and for that purpose alone may be well worth our attention. But we may still ask with propriety: do his
descriptions and the underlying concept of Being to which they point adequately account for the manifoldness of Dasein's general experience? And, moreover, does this account do so more economically than any other alternative description? To this question we may add two additional subquestions: a) does Heidegger's recognition that there could never be a second half to Being and Time suggest that by using Ockham's razor he himself cut the very heart out of his early mature thought? and, b) does not Heidegger's elaborate revelation of Dasein's ontological structures add up to yet another instance of what Plato in the Timaeus called "a likely story?"\(^{78}\) Surely, the inconclusiveness of Heidegger's ontology, when taken in concert with what Caputo has revealed as his essential mystical tendencies,\(^ {79}\) lends credance to such a possibility. But more important, if Heidegger is requiring us to think in a more primordial way, and moreover this requirement is to have meaning and significance for us as thinkers beyond mere academic experience, then there must be important ontical consequences for us as human beings trying to find meaning to fragmented existence. Indeed, this may be the radical connection between hermeneutic phenomenology and pragmatism; namely the "cash value" of which the interrogating the meaning of Being has for us ontically. The major contribution of Sein und Zeit, then, may be ontic after all.

4. Heidegger's use of the language, symbolism, and categories of Gnosticism seems to reveal a hidden dependence on that tradition which is never clearly brought to light in Being and Time. Furthermore,
the gnostic-like notions of thrownness, the call, and of Dasein's
inauthentic alienation from Being in everyday Being-in-the-world are
taken as givens as Heidegger's analysis of Dasein and its ontological
structures. Indeed, thrownness is explicated as a direct product of
Verfallen and Angst is taken to be a direct manifestation of Dasein's
Befindlichkeit. Heidegger's use of gnostic themes has particularly
significant consequences for our own discussion of primordial Angst,
and so we must examine this issue in detail in Chapter V.

5. Finally, there is the question of the architectonic
purpose to which Heidegger employs the phenomenon of Angst. To deny
that Angst plays an absolutely essential role in the early mature
period of Heidegger's thought is wholly unsupported, as we have
attempted to show here. Certainly much more than simply just another
"mood," Angst—primordial Angst—is Dasein's basic disposition or
mode of attunement toward the world. Moreover, Angst is, again as
we have tried to show, at the very root of scientific Dasein's mode
of Being. Thus, Angst is called into play as the key means for dis­
closing: (1) how fear is possible, (2) how other moods are possible,
(3) how Dasein's own Being-in-the-world is possible, (4) how Being­
toward-death is possible, (5) how anticipatory resoluteness is possi­
bile, (6) how apprehension of the nothing and therefore finite trans­
cendence is possible, and finally, (7) how scientific Dasein and there­
fore scientific knowledge itself is possible. To be sure, this is a
very heavy load for one phenomenon to bear in the writings of a major
Western philosopher. We must ask then, what is the essential role of
Angst in Heidegger's thought: is it truly a "phenomenological window" through which Dasein's mode of Being is disclosed to it? Or, is it a simple zuhanden concept used by Heidegger to get to the Seinsfrage? Is it both? Or, perhaps, is Angst as Heidegger depicts it really what he says it is; namely, Dasein's primordial attunement to Being? This very important question must remain unanswered until our concluding chapter. We mention it here to display the vast scope of problems that remain open to question, questions which demand responses.

In conclusion, then, in this section we have attempted to lay bare in a skeletal way just some of the problems, promises, and processes that are associated with Heidegger's concept of Angst as primordial Angst. In Chapter V we shall return to these issues. There a more complete analysis will be possible once we have worked through the role of Angst in the two other contemporary thinkers that will concern us in this dissertation, the subjects of the following chapter.

Thus in the chapter which follows we shall examine the role of Angst from two markedly different perspectives as paradigms of Angst's role in contemporary thought: representing the a-theistic interpretation of primordial Angst, we shall examine the phenomenon in Jean Paul Sartre's magnum opus, L'Être et le Néant: Essai d'ontologie phenomenologique and L'Existentialisme. Then, representing what we shall call the "meta-theistic" interpretation, we shall consider Paul Tillich's works, Systematic Theology and The
Courage to Be. These two works, while clearly not the full display of Angst's role in contemporary philosophical thought, will serve as paradigms from which we may draw some fundamental insights into Angst's contemporary role. Our aim, then, is to see how more contemporary thinkers took over the tradition that we have tried to illuminate here so to unpack fully the macro-hermeneutical freight that surrounds Angst as a philosophical phenomenon. With this in mind, we turn then to the role of Angst in the thought of Sartre and Tillich.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III

1 This description is based upon a photograph taken from within Heidegger's study in the Black Forest. Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study, trans. by J. L. Mehta (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 72. Note: in the "Chronology" appendix to this work, we are told that the cottage at Todtnauberg was built in 1922 when Heidegger went to Marburg as an "Associate Professor." Cf. p. 181.


3 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Erste Hälfte. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 8 (Halle: Niemeyer, 1927). We have used here the 6th Edition (Tubingen: Neomarius Verlag, 1949), p. 184. Note: the present author is responsible for all translations taken from Sein und Zeit as well as from the original Inaugural Lecture "Was ist Metaphysik?" He wishes to acknowledge, however, the assistance of MacQuarrie and Robinson in their English translation of Being and Time as well as from R. F. C. Hall and Alan Crick in their early translation of What is Metaphysics? found in Warner Brock, ed., Existence and Being, Gateway Edition (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), pp. 325-61, and the more recent translation of Was ist Metaphysik? by David Krell in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 95-112. Our attempt at useful translations was undertaken for two purposes: (1) to provide consistency from one of Heidegger's works to the other, and (2) to correct some flagrantly obvious errors found in earlier translations. (We shall follow our translations with SZ and give the page number from Sein und Zeit in the text. Likewise, translations from Was ist Metaphysik? will be designated WM.)

4 We designate this period as the "early mature period" because by 1926 when Sein und Zeit: Erstes Hälfte was completed, Heidegger was already an "Associate Professor" at Marburg, but had not as yet obtained the depth of his later period of the past 1929 period, i.e., the period after the famous Kehre.


8 Heidegger's critics on the concept of Angst are legion, a fact he himself alludes to in the postscript to Was ist Metaphysik? A clue to understanding the scope of such criticism is given by Herbert Spiegelberg in Volume one of The Phenomenological Movement. After labeling a section head, (5) Anxiety (sic) and Nothingness, Spiegelberg proceeds to say without further ado: "Few items in Heidegger's philosophy have given rise to more protests and even ridicule than these." Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, Volume I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 331.

9 Father William Richardson saw the essential significance of this radix of Heidegger's thinking and questioned Heidegger about it in a letter to him which became the basis for Heidegger's own "Introduction" to Richardson's work, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. Specifically, Richardson asked Heidegger, "How are we to understand your first experience of the Being question [Seinsfrage] in Brentano?" Heidegger responds by offering a full display of the significance of the problem during his early mature period culminating in Heidegger's repudiation of Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger says, according to Richardson's translation:

"The Being-question, unfolded in Being and Time, parted company with this [Husserl's] philosophical position, and that on the basis of what to this day I consider a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology."

The reader might observe that this letter was written to Richardson in April of 1962. Cf. William J. Richardson, S. J., Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. viii-x.


11 Ibid., p. 74.
Steiner observes that Heidegger derived at least some of his background material on primordial Angst from Karl Barth's commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, (1918), which led to Heidegger's examination of Kierkegaard's work on theological Angst. Steiner also observes that other influences on Heidegger's Angst concept include: Rudolf Bultmann's notion of a "theology of crisis" and de-mythologization; studies and lectures on St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Luther; and finally Pascal. Cf. Steiner Martin Heidegger, pp. 73-74. On another occasion it would be important to display the manner of such influences, but the scope of the present dissertation precludes such an analysis.


In Sein und Zeit Heidegger generally acknowledges Kierkegaard's influence through several footnotes; this is especially so on page 140 where Angst is explicitly mentioned. Says Heidegger
regarding the phenomena of fear and Angst: "The most comprehensive advancement in the analysis of Angst as a phenomenon and certainly most comprehensive in the theological context of a psychological exposition regarding the problem of hereditary sin was accomplished by Søren Kierkegaard." Heidegger again acknowledges Kierkegaard's existenziell influence on p. 235, and yet again on p. 338 regarding "the moment."

28 Mehta, Martin Heidegger, p. 8.


30 Seidel, in his work on Heidegger and the pre-Socratic thinkers points out that the origins of Heidegger's thought can be traced back to Parmenides and Heraclitus. Thus they too, along with our six thinkers discussed here must be included in the list of primary influences on Heidegger's thought. Cf. George J. Seidel, O. S. B., Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics: An Introduction to His Thought (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1964), p. 2, passim.

31 Richardson, Heidegger, p. 27.

32 This was the promised first section of Part II of Sein und Zeit, which was never published.

33 Mehta, Martin Heidegger, p. 22.


36 Heidegger himself points this out in his Brief über den Humanismus (Letter on Humanism) to Jean Beaufret of December, 1946. In that letter Heidegger states: "Sartre's key proposition about the priority of existentia [actuality] over essentia [essentiality] does, however, justify using the name 'existentialism' as an appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort. But the basic tenet of 'existentialism' has nothing at all in common with the statement from Being and Time--apart from the fact that in Being and Time no statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed since as yet there is still a question of preparing something cursory."

37 Heidegger explains that there are essentially four ways in which the term "world" is used: (1) "world" is used in the "ontic" sense, meaning the totality of entities that are vorhanden objects; (2) "world" functions ontologically to signify the Being of those entities, such as say the world of the mathematician means the world of possible objects germane to mathematics; (3) "world" has another ontic signification, namely as the place where Dasein lives or dwells; and finally, (4) "world" so used to indicate the ontological-Existenzial concept of the world's worldhood or the a priori character of the world. *SZ*, pp. 64-65.


39 If this is beginning to sound like an expanded re-echo of the Gnosticism we discussed in Chapter I, it seems clear that there is at least some flavor of Gnosticism as is well pointed out in an article by Susan A. Taubes entitled, "The Gnostic Foundations of Heidegger's Nihilism." Taubes shows that Heidegger shares the following themes with the Gnostics: essential strangeness, throwness, Angst, noise, and the call. She introduces her argument by noting that gnosticism does not necessarily run directly through Heidegger's philosophy, but rather it impels and directs its course. Cf. Susan Taubes, "The Gnostic Foundations in Heidegger's Thought," The Journal of Religion 34:3 (July, 1954):156. We shall discuss this important relationship again in greater detail in Chapter V; but for the moment we must observe that during the Summer term of 1921, Heidegger lectured on the Gnostics at Marburg. Cf. Steiner, Martin Heidegger, p. 78.

40 Cf. Heidegger, "Von Wesen" (E.T.), pp. 47-81. Here Heidegger gives a historical account of the world concept from early Greek to Kant. Mehta's synopsis of this section is helpful. Mehta, Martin Heidegger, p. 148, note 9.
The term "worldishness" was coined by Magda King. Cf. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 118. The term denotes the worldly quality of the world as the focus of our circumspect preoccupation with entities. Hence in this sense, "worldishness" means the quality of being "worldly" in contradistinction to "secular."

In English this distinction is neither as clear nor as abundantly used as it is in German. Hence our rendering fails to adequately capture the profound significance of the anonymous personal pronoun in *Being and Time* and in the German language.


We coin this expression to display the full structure of *Befindlichkeit* as being attuned to the world and thereby disposed to such an attunement; a factual state which shows itself in our moods.

"Das Worum die Furch Fürchter . . ." may alternatively be translated as "that about which fear is fearful," the translation provided by MacQuarrie and Robinson. Cf. *SZ*, p. 141.

"Grauen," a word meaning: "to have a horror or an aversion to something," is clearly closer to "dread" than is the term "Angst."

"Bandigkeit," a word meaning: "anxiety, uneasiness, apprehension, fear, dread," is clearly an ontic mode of phenomenological Angst. Hence to glibly interpret Angst as "anxiety" fails to grasp the latter's phenomenological significance from the very outset. Cf. footnote 73 below.

It is somewhat curious that Wyschogrod chooses to neglect a comparative analysis of Angst in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, although he does discuss Heidegger's notion of Angst in Being and Time. Cf. Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger, pp. 106-07.

SZ, p. 189.

Ibid., Cf. Section 41 through Section 44.

SZ, p. 249.

SZ, pp. 250-51.

However, as Heidegger was to later explicitly state in the 1943 "Postscript" to "What is Metaphysics?," this does not mean that he is advocating a kind of "heroic philosophy" which goes beyond the basic question with which he is concerned--the question of the meaning of Being. Heidegger is merely pointing out that primordial Angst is systematically and fundamentally misunderstood and interpreted as a psychological anxiety suffered by those who are "fainthearted."

This, of course, is another gnostic theme that Heidegger may have borrowed after his 1921 lectures on Gnosticism.


SZ, p. 337.

Ibid., p. 346.

Ibid., p. 349.


As was indicated in footnote 3 above, the present author accepts responsibility for the translations from "Was ist Metaphysik?" Our source for such translations is Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe.
Band 9, "Wegmarken," (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975). The pages given here will correspond to those in the lecture followed by those in the Gesamtausgabe separated by a slashmark. The Lecture will be designated "WM" and the Gesamtausgabe by "G."

73 This is an extremely important statement, because it implies that man can be changed into Dasein only through the phenomenon of Angst. If so then Angst undergirds the whole of fundamental ontology, carrying with it vast significance beyond what was revealed in Being and Time. Heidegger's own words are: "Geschieht in Dasein des Menschen ein solches Gestimmtsein, in dem er vor das Nichts selbst gebracht wird? Dieses Geschehen ist möglich und auch wirklich-wenn gleich Selten genug—nur für Augenblicke in der Grundstimmung der Angst." This we translate as:

"Does there occur in the Dasein of Mankind such a kind of attunement in which Dasein is brought face to face with the Nothingness itself? This occurrence is not only possible—it is real—although infrequent enough—for a moment in the primordial mood of Angst." (WM, p. 8/G., p. 111)

74 Martin Heidegger, "Nachwort zu: 'Was ist Metaphysik?'", Gesamtausgabe Band 9, (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976). Here we shall designate the postscript passage citings as Nachwort. We shall give the original pagination followed by that in the Gesamtausgabe again separated by a slash.

75 Mehta, Martin Heidegger, p. 7.

76 SZ, p. 13.

77 Ibid.

78 Plato, Timaeus, 29d, 1-3.

79 Caputo, The Mystical Element of Heidegger's Thought, p. 223. Passim. While Caputo recognizes, of course, that Heidegger rejects the name of "Mystic" as vehemently as he does the name "Existentialist," the parallels between his later thought on Being and the insights of mystical "thought" are simply too obvious to be ignored. Hence, the Seinsfrage too, since it prevades Heidegger's total literary output, has the essentials of mysticism. In our view, Caputo simply cops-out when after 238 pages, he asserts: "The best thing we can do with Heidegger's thought is to leave it uncategorized . . . " One does not have to be a genius to understand that a philosophical position either has mystical elements or it does not given virtually any definition of mysticism. In our view, although we cannot develop it fully here, Heidegger does have elements of mysticism in his early mature thought; otherwise his discussion of the Nothing and Angst's revelation of it is nothing more than empty words.
In anguish (angoisse) I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself.

-Jean Paul Sartre,
Being and Nothingness

The Question at Hand

On a dark, starless night somewhere in France, a middle-aged, wall-eyed man looks out of his prison camp window as he listens urgently to the animated interrogation taking place behind the closed door of the office across from his barracks cot. Amid the high-pitched, German accented accusations, he hears the sharp crack of a slap, a yelp, and then the interrogation continues; punctuated often by the muted thuds of mayhem. The wall-eyed man startles at the soft tug at his shirt sleeve. Angrily he swirls to discover the placid face of a priest. "It's time, Jean-Paul," says the priest softly. The wall-eyed man looks beyond the priest down the long orderly row of cots. At the far end of the barracks several other priests are waiting for Jean-Paul Sartre to continue his discussion of Heidegger's Being and Time. "Yes, I see," Sartre says, as they start down the corridor together. He notices that over his shoulder the questions and sounds of violence have stopped. The office door opens and crisp footfalls echo throughout the barracks. Later, outside in the still and
Almost a quarter of a century earlier, a young Prussian army chaplain with intense blue eyes stands transfixed in the thundering fire-flashes of the German cannons against the rainy night sky. Numbly he looks down at the blood drenched bodies of his closest friends. Too many lay slowly dying on mud-bespattered stretchers, their screams and death moans weaving a spell of grotesque madness ablaze with cannon fire. Several are already dead, the rain making tiny wet exclamation points on their mercifully closed eyelids. One young officer fiercely gazes up at the chaplain's ensignia; his mangled body broken like a discarded dime-store manikin. A cigarette dangles from his lips as he stares intently at the small crosses on the chaplain's collar. One hacking, body heaving cough and the life-light goes out of his eyes. The chaplain digs his fingernails into his palms and gulps down his choking nausea. The dead, the dying, the red rags on the stretchers where legs and arms should be; the fire-flashes, the cannon's roar, the smoke, the rain and endless mud all swirl in together in this magic madness. With a shudder that shakes the very foundations of his being, something changes in the chaplain's blue eyes. Many years later Paul Tillich was to confess that this night at the battle of the Marne, "... absolutely transformed me. All my friends were among these dying and dead. That night I became an existentialist!"
These two scenarios, each markedly different from the other, convey a common bond that runs like a broken and painful varicose vein through the first half of the twentieth century; namely, the ultimate frustration, the horror, the terror, the utter absurdity of Dasein's grande accès de folie, the phenomenon of world-wide war. The hermeneutic implications of such a phenomenon require, in our view, further understanding and interpretation beyond even the excellent phenomenological analysis of J. Glenn Gray's work, *The Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle.* Although such a task is not possible here, we feel compelled to state that there appears to be a direct relationship between the world-war phenomenon and the rise of modern existential thinking, of which Sartre and Tillich are both profoundly articulate representatives. At this point, however, we must limit ourselves to the vorsichtige observation that in the world-war phenomenon we suspect that Dasein's mode of Being-in-the-world, as well as the referential context of the world phenomenon itself, undergo markedly radical ontological shifts; specifically from a "world of circumspect concern" to a "world of fearful and decisively negative circumspect concern." Dasein, then, is no longer a Being-in-the-world only, but rather is a Being-in-a-violent-world. Such an ontological shift cannot help but have serious and longlasting ontic consequences. To be sure, there are numerous works of art, history, and existential philosophy that support this interpretation, detailing how the uprootedness of values and vast populations due to the two world wars contributed to that phenomenon known as "existentialism." Our
two scenarios merely seek to grasp graphically the lived-situation of these two philosophical giants of that philosophical mode of thinking, lived-situations which contributed to their respective existential positions, one a-theistic and the other what we call "meta-theistic."

But we raise this issue here for one and only one purpose: to ground phenomenologically what may at first appear to be a psychological report on the origins of Sartre's and Tillich's respective existential positions. As we see it, both Sartre and Tillich revised their basic philosophical and ontological frameworks largely due to their world-war experiences: in Tillich's case, from a position of Idealism and Neo-Kantianism to modern existential thought; and in Sartre's from transcendental phenomenology to the ethical praxis of existential thought.

But why have we chosen these two thinkers to represent how primordial Angst manifests itself in the so-called "existentialist movement"? There are several reasons: First, it is clearly not possible to discuss primordial Angst from the standpoint of each thinker who by choice or otherwise has deserved the label "existentialist." Indeed, the phenomenon of existential thinking, and the place of Angst within it, is by no means limited to phenomenological ontology. Hence the phenomenon of "existentialism" has clearly a much broader scope than that of phenomenological philosophy; extending into virtually every facet of Western culture and capturing the total artistic spirit of the milieu de siècle of the West.

Since we are concerned here with the phenomenological and ontological self-revelation of primordial Angst, we have therefore
selected two representatives from opposing sides of the philosophic existential viewpoint to reveal how Angst shows itself in their respective positions. Sartre, of course, is an avowed atheist and thus his depiction of Angst will significantly differ from that of Tillich. Too, Tillich's existential position on theological concerns such as Angst and courage clearly assures him an important place in this chapter.

The second reason we have chosen these two thinkers is because their respective displays of primordial Angst should reveal the extent to which primordial Angst has shown itself at roughly the mid-point of the present century. Thus with the forthcoming discussion to culminate our textual self-revelation of Angst, we hope to prepare for an understanding and interpretation of Angst's role in contemporary philosophical thought that unpacks some of the metaphysical freight of Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's seminal analysis.

Finally, we have selected these two thinkers because of the close detail, the richness, and the depth of their antipodal treatments of Angst. This depth, richness, and detail should provide much fertile ground for contrasts and comparisons regarding the hermeneutic role of Angst in our time from the perspective of phenomenological ontology, and will be part of the horizon of our final chapter.

To accomplish these tasks, the present chapter will be set out in the following manner: In Part 1, which follows immediately
after this introduction, we shall examine Sartre's depiction of *Angst* as "*angoisse*," focussing in upon (a) the hermeneutical horizons of his thought, (b) his display of *Angst* in *Being and Nothingness*, and finally (c) his shorter display of that phenomenon in "Existentialism is a Humanism." We shall conclude Part 1 by attempting to raise some issues and questions regarding Sartre's disclosure of *Angst* in the atheistic "existentialist" view.

Then, in Part 2 we shall look into Tillich's theistic depiction of primordial *Angst* as "ontological anxiety," focussing in upon (a) the hermeneutical horizons from whence springs this description, (b) his display of *Angst* in the *Systematic Theology*, and then (c) upon his second display of that phenomenon in *The Courage to Be.* To conclude Part 2 we will attempt to raise several major issues and questions specifically regarding Tillich's disclosure of *Angst* from the "meta-theistic existentialist's" point of view. Finally, we shall briefly conclude this chapter by attempting to point out the path that remains ahead of us in our quest for discovering the role of *Angst* in contemporary philosophical thought. In this way we hope to provide a bridge to the fifth and final chapter of this dissertation.

Having thus established the course of the present chapter, we turn now to the self-revealing of primordial *Angst* in Sartre's thought. We must observe in the first instance how Sartre approached the phenomenon from within the hermeneutic horizon of his predecessors and their philosophical positions as the most sweeping vista within
which primordial Angst can possibly show itself. It is to this task that we now turn.

Part 1. Sartre on Angst

A Point of Departure

In the two preceding chapters, we sought to disclose the essential role of primordial Angst from the inside out, so to speak. By this we mean that our attempt has been to show as a necessary first step the micro-hermeneutical context wherein Angst can show itself without having to undergo any forced or misleading interpretations that cover-over and prevent its self-disclosure. With regard to how primordial Angst reveals itself in Sartre's thought, we cannot abandon this hermeneutical motif of this inquiry into the horizons of Angst's self-disclosure despite the double character of the present chapter. To be consistent, therefore, there must be no shortcuts.

With this in mind, Part 1 will be organized in the following way. First, we will consider some of the major influences on Sartre's philosophical development up until the time of Being and Nothingness. Secondly, we hope to explore some of the general argument of Being and Nothingness in a very cursory way so as to set the stage for what is to take place third, our attempt to make possible primordial Angst's disclosure as angoisse in Sartre's magnum opus. Fourth, we propose to mention almost in passing Sartre's second discussion of angoisse in his public lecture of 1946, "Existentialism is a Humanism." Finally, we shall conclude
Part 1 as promised in the introduction to this chapter with an attempt to raise some fundamental issues and questions for further discussion later at the macro-hermeneutical level of Chapter V.

With these considerations to guide as the Vorsicht of the present discussion of Angst in Sartre's thought, we may turn now to the hermeneutical background from which Being and Nothingness emerged as one of the principle texts of existential thought in the contemporary period.

The Horizons of Influence

To even begin to grasp the philosophical and more specifically the phenomenological horizons of Sartre's thought, it is necessary to keep in mind that he was first, last and always a French intellectual whose philosophical roots are deeply embedded in the ground of Cartesian dualism. Indeed, the influence of Descartes upon Sartre is lucidly apparent from the very first page of Sartre's first technical phenomenological study, La Transcendance de l'ego: Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique [The Transcendence of the Ego: Outline of a Phenomenological Description]. In this work, Descartes' cogito is discussed in the light of both Kantian critical thought and Husserlian transcendental phenomenology; specifically, Kant's principle of the cogito's universalizability and Husserl's époche of transcendental consciousness. What is Sartre after here? It is clearly and distinctly the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito as the fundamental point of departure for phenomenological studies.
Nowhere is this interpretation better confirmed than in the lecture, _Existentialism as a Humanism_ where Sartre says:

There can be no other truth to take off from than this: I think; therefore, I exist. There we have the absolute truth of consciousness becoming aware of itself. Every theory which takes man out of the moment in which he becomes aware of himself is, at the very beginning, a theory which confounds truth, for outside the Cartesian _cogito_, all views are only probably, and a doctrine of probability which is not bound to a truth dissolves into thin air. In order to describe the probably, you must have a firm hold on the true. Therefore, before there can be any truth whatsoever, there must be an absolute truth; and this one is, simple and easily arrived at; it's on everyone's doorstep; it's a matter of grasping it directly.11

Such apodicticity along with the radical dualism implied in it of consciousness of something as indubitably certain appears to be Sartre's major appropriation from the Cartesian approach to philosophy. Among Descartes' notions Sartre rejects are both substance and, of course, the notion of God as _causa sui_. Indeed, as Sartre discloses in _Les Mots_ (The Words) one day, when he was about twelve years old, God, in the traditional sense of Christian metaphysics, "... tumbled into the blue and disappeared without giving any explanation."12 This is, then, the first recognition of Sartre's avowed atheism. At the age of twelve!

When both God and substance are abandoned, Sartre is left with the apodicticity of consciousness with regard to both the "I think," and that about which the _cogito_ thinks; a radical dualism between consciousness per se on the one hand, and what we are conscious of on the other. Thus implied in this point of departure is the fundamental perspective of Cartesian thought: that philosophy's
basic tool is clear and distinct **intuition** as apodictic certainty rather than the sometimes long and sometimes uncertain process of academic argumentation pure and simple. As Grene has seen, "The cogito is not an argument: in the Meditations, there is no 'therefore' between 'I think' and 'I am.' I am, I think, Descartes declares, this is true every time I say it." Sartre appears to agree, and the need for God as *causa sui* is wholly abandoned. Thus, while Sartre abandons Cartesian theistic metaphysics in his excursion into phenomenological ontology, he fully approves of, as did Husserl, Descartes' method of **apodictic intuition as the point of departure for the enterprise of philosophy**.

We come, therefore, to the second major influence on Sartre's philosophical development, Edmund Husserl. As was the case with Heidegger, of whom we shall say more in a moment, Sartre saw in the phenomenological investigations of Husserl the possibility of a new revolution in the philosophical enterprise. But Husserl's influence came relatively late in Sartre's development.

In a film interview shot mostly during 1972 entitled, *Sartre by Himself*, Sartre discloses that as late as 1933 he was unaware of Husserl's existence. "I didn't know who Husserl was," says Sartre; "he wasn't part of the French cultural tradition..." But once Husserl did come under Sartre's vicelike cognitive grasp, Husserl's influence upon him was immense. In the same interview referred to above, one interviewer, Andre Gorz, asks Sartre: "Where
did you get the idea to go to Berlin to study Husserl?" The response to this question is most informative and sheds much light on the relationship between the two phenomenologists. Sartre reports:

[Raymond] Aron paved the way for me, by introducing me to Husserl's theory. Only in a very cursory fashion, I might add. At the time I read a work by Gurvitch on the intuition of essences in Husserl's work; and I understood that it was very important. And he [Aron] helped me fill out the forms and applications for my trip to Germany; since he had been to the Berlin Institute. So there I was in Berlin, reading Husserl and taking notes on what I read, but without any knowledge of what Husserl was all about, except the smattering I had gleaned from Gurvitch. I didn't even have the vaguest notion about the concept of intentionality. So I set about reading Husserl's Ideen.16

At this point another interviewer, Jean Pouillon, breaks in to ask Sartre: "And in what order did you read Husserl, first the Ideen, or did you start with the Logische Untersuchungen?" to which Sartre replied:

Ideen, and nothing but Ideen. For me, you know, who doesn't read very fast, a year was just about right for reading his Ideen. I wrote my Transcendence de l'Ego in Germany, while I was at the French House there, and I wrote it actually under the direct influence of Husserl; although I must confess that in it I take an anti-Husserl position . . . and after all that long process had taken place, I was absolutely pro-Husserl, at least in certain areas, that is, in the realm of the intentional consciousness, for example; there he really revealed something to me, and it was at that time in Berlin when I made the discovery.17

From Husserl; then, Sartre learned at least three major points. First, that it is the pre-reflective cogito that is the point of departure for philosophical certainty; secondly, that phenomenology concerns itself with the cogitationes, or the "objects" of thought through the intentionality of consciousness or the target of one's thought; and
third, that the *epoché*, the phenomenological method of bracketing-out factual notions extraneous to the essence of the phenomenon, was the clue to phenomenological reduction in Husserl's approach to phenomenology. It was from these perspectives that Sartre was able to discuss with confidence the manifold classes and types of intentional "objects" that concerned him in *Being and Nothingness*; such as the body, values, the psyche, love, the emotions and so on, all based upon his thorough comprehension of transcendental phenomenology.

Sartre's fundamental disagreement with Husserl seems to center around one major point: whether there is a transcendental ego that governs and ultimately stands behind individual consciousness. Sartre believed that this could not be the case since such a transcendental ego would require direct contact with another kind of reality completely different from itself. A two-fold reality structure, he reasoned, would further require a third mode of reality that would dialectically capture both the ego and its objects: the so-called *hylé* of Husserl. Sartre believed that this ultimately reduces phenomenology to a transcendental idealism. What we perceive directly, Sartre reasons, must be seen as material for the ego's intentional activity; and the intentional object itself is interpreted as a product of the ego's activity on the "sense data" of consciousness. This leads in Sartre's view to the idealistic notion that every object of consciousness must relate to the intentionality of a transcendental ego; a commitment that need not occur if we reject at the outset the notion of a transcendental ego. Applying a kind of
phenomenological Ockham's razor, Sartre argues that in reality there is no such ego, transcendental or otherwise, that undergirds consciousness: rather "the Ego is the interiority of consciousness when reflected upon by itself." Thus consciousness has no content: all content is on the side of the objects. So consciousness must be something like pure spontaneity: "a sheer activity of transcending towards objects." Hence ideas, representations, sense data, etc., are not, according to Sartre, contents in consciousness but rather contents for consciousness. In short, "consciousness is a great emptiness, a wind blowing towards objects." Therefore for Sartre, in opposition to Husserl, consciousness is intentionality.

With Being and Nothingness, Sartre further expanded his list of charges against Husserl to a total of nine: (1) Husserl suffers from a Berkeleyan idealism by refusing to grant existential status to Being; (2) Husserl is a pure immanationist, and is thus unfaithful to the original aim of phenomenology; (3) Husserl cannot escape the "thing-illusion" by introducing passive hylé and the doctrine of sensation into his concept of consciousness; (4) Husserl cannot move to existential dialectics because he remains trapped in mere appearances and purely functional descriptions; (5) Husserl is really a phenomenalist rather than a phenomenologist; (6) Husserl provides merely a caricature of true transcendence, which must get beyond consciousness to world, and beyond the immediate present to the past and the future; (7) Husserl is really a transcendental solypsist in introducing transcendental subjectivity; (8) Husserl cannot deal
with the obstructiveness (coefficient d'adversité) of our existence which we experience immediately; and finally, (9) Husserl mistakenly thinks that an eidetic phenomenology of essences can lay hold of freedom. From the standpoint of Being and Nothingness, the last criticism is clearly the most serious as we shall see in our discussion of that work. 21

Many of these criticisms became apparent to Sartre only after his encounter with his third great mentor, Martin Heidegger, whom Sartre met personally in 1935. 22 The first mention of Heidegger's name in Sartre's published works occurs in his work of 1939, Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions [Outline of a Theory of the Emotions]. 23 In this work Sartre ". . . adds Heidegger's ideas to those of Husserl within the same paragraph without implying any essential difference between the two." 24

Sartre's point of departure, however, which we have seen to be the apodicticity of the cogito and therefore consciousness, placed him in direct opposition with Heidegger's depiction of Dasein as that Being which is already there--thrown into a pre-given world. As we shall soon see, for Sartre Being is radically split into the for-itself (pour-soi) or consciousness, and the in-itself (en-soi) or the totality of entities within the intentional purview of consciousness. This is a fundamental distinction regarding the nature of Being that cannot be bridged in principle and one which reaffirms the very split Heidegger sought to go behind in Sein und Zeit. Nonetheless, Sartre never directly attacks Heidegger regarding Being's
unified totality in the latter's position; and in general he sees Heidegger's solutions to the manifold problems of phenomenology as being superior to Husserl's,\textsuperscript{25} despite their fundamentally different views concerning apodicticity and the subject-object implications to which it leads.

More specifically there seems to be six major areas of disagreement between these two phenomenological ontologists regarding their fundamental assumptions. Without going into detail here, we may sum up these areas as follows: (1) Sartre very clearly rejected the elimination of the Cartesian and Husserlian notions of consciousness from Heidegger's conception of \textit{Dasein}. (2) Sartre also objected to the inadequacy of Heidegger's hermeneutic descriptions to capture man as an entity whose projects bring fundamental ontic modifications into the world. (3) Sartre disapproved of Heidegger's insistence that death is man's only authentic project. (4) Sartre believed that Heidegger is completely remiss in failing to see the bodily and sexuality as \textit{Existenzialien} of \textit{Dasein}. (5) Sartre argued against Heidegger's insistence that the futural mode is primary, is one-sided and misleading. (6) Finally, and most important in the context of the present dissertation, Sartre utterly rejected Heidegger's attempt to ground the phenomenological conception of the nothing in the \textit{Grundbeseindlichkeit} of \textit{Angst} rather than in the negative element that is the essence of human spontaneity.\textsuperscript{26}

We may conclude this generic portrayal of these influences on Sartre's emerging career by mentioning briefly their more mature
outcomes in his specific plan for a synthetic approach to the phenomenological enterprise. In 1947, he proposed to the Société française de philosophie,

a synthesis of Husserl's contemplative and non-dialectical consciousness, which leads us to a contemplation of essences, with the activity of the dialectical, but non-conscious, and hence unfounded project that we find in Heidegger, where we discover that the primary element is transcendence.27

This is indeed an interesting interpretation of Heidegger's thought as being dialectical with regard to existence; and we must, of course, agree with Spiegelberg that it is a misinterpretation28 if not an outright misrepresentation of Heidegger's thought. But its inclusion in the proposal cited above is important, because it discloses yet another major influence upon Sartre that requires discussion from the hermeneutical perspective; namely, the influence of Hegel's dialectical method.

As with Husserl, Sartre did not become aware of Hegel until at least 1933. In the previously cited film interview of 1972, on the coat-tails of Sartre's admission that Husserl did not come to their early attention, Simone de Beauvoir adds: "We didn't even know who Hegel was!" to which Sartre responds, "That's right, we didn't."29

Be that as it may, the dialectical interplay of concepts in Being and Nothingness; that is, the specific interplay between Being on the one hand and Nothingness on the other, and the for-itself's desire to become a Being-in-itself-for-itself, may all be taken as evidence of Hegel's methodological influence upon Sartre that becomes
progressively more visible by the time of Sartre's second major work, Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of Dialectical Reason). In Being and Nothingness, the whole tenor of Sartre's argument in Section III of the Introduction, entitled, "The Dialectical Concept of Nothingness," displays Sartre's keen understanding of and appreciation for Hegel's Treatise on Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind regarding the dialectical concept of Nothingness. And what is more, the en-soi-pour-soi distinction is generally speaking Sartre's expanded re-echo of Hegel's an-sich and für-sich; a fact that accords Hegel an especial place in Sartre's influences.

Naturally as an existential thinker Sartre takes exception to much of Hegel's thought. In Being and Nothingness for example he takes Hegel to task at the very outset regarding the latter's conception of Nothingness, noting: (1) Hegel never got beyond the logical formulation of Non-Being in order for human reality to be encompassed by it (BN., p. 46). (2) Hegel insists that the notions of Being and Non-Being are logically equal. On the contrary, argues Sartre, it is logical that non-being be dependant upon Being as the negation of a more original Being (BN., p. 47). (3) Finally, Sartre objects to Hegel's inadvertent bestowal of a covert kind of being upon non-being by granting to both equal ontological status (BN., p. 44).

Thus Hegel's influence over Sartre is bi-polar. On the one hand the substantive issues of the en-soi and pour-soi are reflections of Hegel's an-sich and für-sich. But far more important for Sartre in the long run was the influence of Hegel's dialectical method, a
method that is used throughout Being and Nothingness. One may transcend Hegel's categories, but one either employs or chooses not to employ the dialectical method. Sartre is clearly on the first side of this option.

One further potential influence on Sartre's thought requires mentioning in passing; for it is a tenuous connection at best. We refer to the possible influence upon Sartre of Jules Lequier, the nineteenth century contemporary of Kierkegaard, and the so-called "father of French existentialism," who devoted his entire intellectual life to an analysis of freedom. Sartre may have come under Lequier's influence thanks to his friend and colleague, Jean Genève, who in 1936 wrote his doctoral dissertation on Lequier while at the Sorbonne. Lequier was convinced that the Western philosophical tradition, with the exceptions of Aristotle and Fichte, had been covertly opposed to the hypothesis of real human freedom, while at the same time pretended overtly to advocate it. He found this to be especially true of the scholastic philosophers upon whom he lavished a scathing and bitter wit. Jean Wahl in his own work on Lequier claims that Sartre has found no more fitting formula "for affirming his existentialism" than that devised by Lequier: "FAIRE, non pas devenir, mais faire, et, en faisant, SE FAIRE" [TO CREATE, not to become, but to create, and in creating, to CREATE ONESELF.]

For us the validity or invalidity of Wahl's claim remains fully an open question if by it he means that Sartre was truly influenced by Lequier. But right or wrong on that account, Wahl is at
least accurate concerning the fitting formula for Sartre's existential thought, a topic to which we will return momentarily. Nonetheless, Lequier is not mentioned in Being and Nothingness, nor as far as we know in any other of Sartre's published writings. It is, therefore, only a possibility of an influence; one we mention here so as not to exclude such a possibility from our hermeneutical sketch of the cognitive horizons of influences on Sartre's philosophical development.

In conclusion, this vastly truncated sketch in no way pretends to be complete regarding the influences upon Sartre's thought. Being and Nothingness is vastly rich in discussion and polemic against many influences. Time and space constraints with regard to the present chapter require, however, that we at least mention in passing some aspects (but again clearly not all aspects) of the influences of Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel and possibly Lequier on Sartre's thought. It is our hope that we have met the minimum requirements for hermeneutical clarity regarding these vistas of influence.

With the propaedeutic discussion completed, we turn now to a general overview of Being and Nothingness as the broader hermeneutical context wherein Sartre displays how primordial Angst first shows itself in his thought. In this way we hope to prepare the ground for a direct discussion of Angst as angoisse in both Being and Nothingness and still later in the public lecture entitled "Existentialism is a Humanism."
Some Relevant Elements of Being and Nothingness


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Being and Nothingness, Sartre's answer to Heidegger's Being and Time, was originally conceived in 1930. Due to Heidegger's influence no doubt, Sartre's work was changed in direction and focus during the time that he was a prisoner-of-war in 1940-1941. Consequently, it was directly after his release in 1941 that he undertook Being and Nothingness, publishing it in 1943. These facts are important but not as important hermeneutically as the circumstances that prompted the change in direction of the work. Specifically in Sartre by Himself, we discover the essential role Heidegger played in this change. The interviewer, Jean Pouillon, observes: "It was when you came back from the prisoner-of-war camp that you wrote Being and Nothingness." Sartre responds:

Yes, because during my stay in the camp I had read Heidegger--I had read him before, but it was then that I really went into his work deeply--and three times a week I used to explain to my priest friends Heidegger's philosophy. And that, plus my own personal thoughts--which actually were a continuation of Psyche [an unfinished and unpublished work], a work I had written some time before but which at that point in my thinking was influenced by Heidegger--gave me more or less the elements I needed to put into writing. And my notebooks--which were subsequently lost--were full of observations which later found their way into Being and Nothingness.37

It would appear from this passage that at root this 722 page chef-d'oeuvre of contemporary French phenomenological ontology is itself an ethical, praxis oriented, interpretation of Heidegger's own Meisterwerk, Being and Time; that is, one viewed from the standpoint of the Cartesian dualism, the Husserlian phenomenology, and the
Hegelian dialectics that we discussed in the previous section. To ground this interpretation, however, some sense of the work's general overview, its introduction, four parts and conclusion, might be helpful to our hermeneutical task.

The Introduction to Being and Nothingness is in our opinion by far the most opaque sixth of the text. Very broadly speaking, it is concerned with an analysis of the cogito as pre-reflective cogito and with why the pre-reflective cogito must be the apodictic point of departure for any phenomenological ontology worthy of that name. Sartre also contrasts and compares his own position with idealism and realism, and explains his theory of the "trans-phenomenality of Being": a doctrine which maintains that "... the object of consciousness is always outside and transcendent, that there is forever a resistance, a limit offered to consciousness, an external something which must be taken into consideration." Moreover, it is here that Sartre presents his initial distinction between the pour-soi as Being-for-itself or consciousness and the en-soi as Being-in-itself or non-conscious Being, and, of course, his famous "ontological proof" of Being that manifestly displays his mastery of Hegelian dialectics.

Part one of Being and Nothingness, entitled "The Problem of Nothingness," concerns itself with how the pour-soi and the en-soi as dialectical opposites can both participate in Being. Sartre, following Heidegger's definition of Dasein as a questioning entity, argues that the pour-soi can question only on the condition that at
the radix of consciousness there exists a nothingness: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being—like a worm" (BN., p. 56).

Thus, that man is his own Nothingness at the center of his Being, and, moreover, how he can bring this nothingness into Being, is the central focus of Part One. We learn here that for Sartre the Nothingness is disclosed to us in the phenomenon of primordial Angst, which as Sartre sees it is best described as a kind of phenomenological "Anguish." His term, of course, is angoisse. Man, Sartre continues, tries to flee from this anguish and in doing so he plunges into "bad faith" (mauvaise foi). Through the phenomenon of bad faith, Sartre's equivalent for Heidegger's "inauthenticity," we discover the basic difference between the being of man (as pour-soi or consciousness) and the being of the en-soi or Being-in-itself. This difference is that man is an entity "who is what he is not and who is not what he is." Man chooses himself, in other words, existing toward what he will be in the future. Bad faith, then, is man's attempt to capture his own essence: to say that he is a philosopher, an executive, or some other static thing, concept or entity. Such an attempt robs humanity of its necessary essence; namely, its freedom as translucent consciousness.

It is, of course, Part One with which we shall principally concern ourselves in the present work. But for the moment it will be hermeneutically useful to continue our synopsis of the entire text to construct the full horizon wherein Sartre's interpretation of primordial Angst shows itself.
Part Two, entitled "Being-for-Itself," discusses the pour-soi in the light of "selfness," and includes such germane topics as the immediate structures of the for-itself such as: facticity, values, and possibility. Likewise Part Two discusses Sartre's views of temporality from the phenomenological and ontological perspectives, as well as reflection and its temporal structures. The part concludes with an analysis of finite transcendence as the negation of the en-soi: a condition, which is made possible by the ekstatic projection of consciousness (pour-soi) through nothingness into the realm of the world (en-soi).

Part Three, entitled "Being-for-Others" concerns itself with three problems: (1) the existence of other persons, (2) the phenomenology of the body, and (3) a phenomenological analysis and description of our relationships to other persons. The Gestalt of this analysis serves two basic purposes: First, it brings the body into the field of existential knowledge by considering the internal relationship of the senses from within the ekstatic knowing relationship. Secondly, it shows us that the body, as what is seen by the gaze of the other, is the "outside perspective" of the pour-soi, which is in the midst of the en-soi, as a specific part of the totality of Being.

Part Four, entitled, "Having, Doing, and Being," is concerned with the en-soi itself from two perspectives: (1) how the pour-soi as freedom can exist in the midst of the en-soi; and (2) how the pour-soi does exist in this midst by either acting, possessing, or
attempting to become one with it. Sartre concludes the part by presenting his outline of existential psychoanalysis.

Finally, the conclusion of the text outlines both the metaphysical and ethical implication that result from this arduous labor. Sartre at the end promises another work wherein these implications can be fully worked out. The promise concludes Being and Nothingness.

This cursory summary has not intended to portray the breadth and depth of Sartre's work in any detail whatsoever. We have merely attempted to display the bare-bones structure of the work that serves as little more than an expanded table of contents. Yet hermeneutically, what emerges from this synopsis is an indication of the scope of Sartre's expansive response to Heidegger's Being and Time, again written from the perspective of a radical dualism that takes its point of departure from the pre-reflective cogito of Descartes and Husserl.

With these observations in mind we now return to Sartre's Part One with an eye toward examining in closer detail his unique approach to the phenomenon of primordial Angst. This approach is carried out within Chapter One of Part One, entitled, "The Origin of Negation" (BN., pp. 33-85).

To grasp the meaning of the Nothingness, Sartre tells us, we must decidedly not grant to it any covert ontological status as did Heidegger (in Sartre's view) in his statement: "das Nichts selbts nichtet."42 Rather, for Sartre, Nothingness "... ne se néantise pas, le Néant 'est néantisé" (EN., p.58); which can only be translated as "Nothingness does not nihilate itself, [but rather] it is
nihilated." There is, then, no active existence to Nothingness: it is
pure negation—the condition of all verbal as well as experienced
negativity. To ground this interpretation, Sartre raises two
fundamental and propaedeutic questions: (1) What is the synthetic
relation which we call Being-in-the-world? (2) What must man and
the world be in order for a relation between them to be possible?"
(BN., p. 34).

With regard to the first question, Sartre agrees with Heidegger,
that man is indeed a questioning being, a being which as a question
asker stands "... before a being which we are questioning" (BN.,
p. 35). Now at bottom, argues Sartre, each answer must be either
affirmative or negative. Sartre anticipates any objections to this
basic distinction by noting:

There are questions which on the surface do not permit a negative
reply—like, for example, the one which we put earlier, "What
does this attitude reveal to us?" But actually we see that it
is always possible with questions of this type to reply,
"Nothing" or "Nobody" or "Never." Thus at the moment when I
ask, "Is there any conduct which can reveal to me the relation
of man with the world?" I admit on principle the possibility
of a negative reply such as, "No, such a conduct does not exist."
This means that we admit to being faced with the transcendent
fact of the non-existence of such conduct. (BN., p. 35)

Sartre's point is, of course, that there exists the permanent possibility
of a negative reply to any question. For example, in the very simple
question: "How are you?" there is the negative possibility of a reply
such as "I feel terrible!" Here, the "terrible" represents the
negativity that stands behind the feeling as well as the response,
as that to which the response refers; namely a "nothingness as its
origin and foundation" (BN., p. 56). Hence, man's synthetic relation, which we call Being-in-the-world, is one of questioning that which is in-the-world in such a manner as to anticipate either a positive or negative reply.

With respect to the second question; "What must man and the world be in order for there to be a relation between them," Sartre responds that the questioner-questioned polarities determine the character of man (as questioner) and the world (as questioned). As such, the two metaquestions asked above display the interdependence of man and world. Thus the answer to the first inquiry is simultaneously the answer to the second—it is Réalité humaine, Sartre's equivalent of Heidegger's Dasein (as a questioner) which stands in the transcendental totality of entities in a referential context known as world. What distinguishes man from the world is his ability to question, as well as the permanent possibility of negation in any reply to questions he poses.

This having been established, Sartre takes us to the next major step in his interpretation of the problem of nothingness. He says that at the very moment when our questions seem to lead us to Being, we encounter a new difficulty: "... the question itself has revealed to us suddenly that we are encompassed with nothingness. The permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questions about being" (BN., p. 36).

After displaying the permanent possibility of nothingness as revealed in negations; namely that "the necessary condition for our
saying not is that non-being be a perpetual presence in us and outside of us, that nothingness haunts being" (BN., p. 44). Sartre discusses Hegel's dialectical interpretation of the nothingness (BN., pp. 44-49). This is followed by his interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of such Nothingness (BN., pp. 49-36). It is at this point that Sartre introduces the vastly important concept of the négatités, a word which like Angst and Dasein has no precise equivalent in English. Sartre notes that in describing human reality, there exists a set of concepts such as "absence, change, otherness, repulsion, regret, distraction, etc." (BN., p. 55), that are not merely objects of cognitive judgment. On the contrary, argues Sartre, such realities are experienced, opposed, feared, etc., by man as a mode of his being, as a mode of acting. Within such realities, as a necessary condition for their very existence, there resides fundamental negation as the essence of their reality (BN., p. 55).

It is in the context of Sartre's analysis of Heidegger's interpretation of nothingness that the object of our search, the phenomenon of "angoisse," first appears in Being and Nothingness. Sartre notes that according to the Heideggerian version of Nothingness,

There exist . . . numerous attitudes of "human reality" which imply a "comprehension" of nothingness: hate, prohibitions, regret, etc. For Dasein there is even a permanent possibility of finding oneself face to face with nothingness and discovering it as a phenomenon: this possibility is Anguish [angoisse]. (BN., p. 50)
From the perspective of the present dissertation, this passage is important because it establishes that for Sartre angoisse is equivalent to the primordial Angst of which Heidegger speaks in both Being and Time and in the Inaugural Lecture, "What is Metaphysics?"

As will become apparent, however, the role of primordial Angst for Sartre is vastly different than the role assigned by Heidegger to that phenomenon. But the relationship of identity is here apparently pre-supposed by Sartre; and that, of course, is a point of both micro- and macro-hermeneutical significance.

In section V of Chapter One, which Sartre entitles "The Origin of Nothingness" we come to the epicenter of Sartre's interpretation of Nothingness. It is here that he raises specifically the vastly important question: "... where does nothingness come from?" (BN., p. 56), responding that nothingness cannot "nihilate itself" as Heidegger thought, because that state of affairs would make the nothingness an actor upon itself. To be an actor in such a manner requires ontological status as a Being. This is, of course, a contradiction with respect to nothingness, since nothingness cannot at once both be and not-be. Hence, Sartre coins a new term that avoids Heidegger's famous apparent contradiction, "das Nichts selbst nichtet." Sartre suggests that nothingness "is made-to-be:" (BN., p. 57). That is, nothingness is nihilated by Being and is thus acted-upon.

If this is so, then we must raise this fundamental question: what kind of being is so constituted that it can bring nothingness
into the world? Such a Being, says Sartre: (1) cannot be *en-soi*, since that is a manifest contradiction; (2) cannot be passive in relation to nothingness; and (3) cannot *produce* nothingness. Rather, this Being "... must be its own Nothingness" (BN., p. 58). Such a Being *is man*; man seen as *réalité humaine*: a questioner who has the permanent possibility of nothingness residing in the core of his Being-in-the-world.

But this gives rise to a second question: "What must men be in his being in order that through him nothingness may come into being?" (BN., p. 59). Sartre's responses is that *réalité humaine*, precisely because it is a being that can question Being, is capable of modifying that Being through the process of questioning. In posing the question, man steps out of Being to retire "beyond a nothingness" (BN., p. 69). The name given to this possibility to secrete an isolating nothingness into Being is, of course, freedom. "Human freedom," says Sartre, "... precedes essence in man and makes it possible; the essence of the human being is suspended in his freedom. What we call freedom is impossible to distinguish from the *being* of 'human reality'" (BN., p. 60).

Sartre then displays how freedom is intimately bound together with the appearance of nothingness; arguing that freedom is precisely the condition which makes such an appearance possible as negation. How is this so? First, Sartre points out, *réalité humaine* can detach itself from the world through questioning and doubting only
because freedom is such that it provides to man the possibility of such self-detachment. This is Descartes' doubt, Husserl's *epoché*, Hegel's mediation and Heidegger's transcendence.

What interests Sartre here is the temporal operations of freedom since both questioning and doubting are modes of behavior. For such behavior assumes, according to Sartre, "... that the human being reposes first in the depths of being and then detaches himself from it by a nihilating withdrawal;" (BN., p. 61): the nihilating withdrawal of questioning or doubting. We observe that in the phenomenon of remembering, for example, there is a distinct separation, a nihilation, that exists between consciousness in the present and consciousness in the immediate psychic past; an experienced separation which allows man to make this cognitive distinction to begin with. Thus says Sartre, "what separates prior from subsequent is exactly nothing" (BN., p. 64). It is this nothingness that provides the condition of the possibility of denying all or part of the world, the precise condition necessary for transcending, and thereby understanding and interpreting the world. But with regard to the temporal dimension of experience, Sartre's basic point is: "It is necessary then that conscious being constitute itself in relation to its past as separated by this past by a nothingness" (BN., p. 64). It is this nothingness that structures consciousness, for "... consciousness continually experiences itself as the nihilation of its past being" (BN., p. 64). The term for this process of nihilation is freedom. Indeed, consciousness exists only as consciousness of nihilation.
Having thus displayed the identity of nihilation, nihilating consciousness, and freedom, Sartre raises a question of basic concern to our own work here, one which demands full citation at this point precisely because in it is displayed the immediate horizon wherein the phenomenon of primordial Angst, interpreted by Sartre as angoisse, reveals itself. Sartre therefore begins as follows:

if the nihilating consciousness exists only as consciousness of nihilation, we ought to be able to define and describe a constant mode of consciousness, present qua consciousness, which would be consciousness of nihilation. Does this consciousness exist? Behold, a new question has been raised here: if freedom is the being of consciousness, consciousness ought to exist as consciousness of freedom. What form does this consciousness of freedom assume? In freedom the human being is his own past (as also his own future) in the form of nihilation. If our analysis has not led us astray, there ought to exist for the human being, in so far as he is conscious of being, a certain mode of standing opposite his past and his future, as being both his past and his future and as not being them. We shall be able to furnish an immediate reply to this question; it is in anguish (angoisse) that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, a question for itself. (BN., p. 65)

With this passage we have arrived at Sartre's specific and detailed interpretation of primordial Angst, as that precise phenomenon wherein man, as réalité humaine or Dasein, "... gets the consciousness of his human freedom." Let us now examine this description and interpretation in closer detail.

**Primordial Angst Interpreted as "Angoisse" in Being and Nothingness**

Sartre's principal discussion of primordial Angst is to be found in Part One, Chapter One, Section V of Being and Nothingness.
This fact is important if only because it displays the architectonic priority of Angst's role in Sartre's phenomenological ontology. Specifically, Sartre believes that it is necessary to describe and interpret Angst (as angoisse) as logically prior to any discussion of the major topics of Being and Nothingness; namely, Being-for-itself, Being-for-Others, and Having, Doing, and Being. Our purpose here is to explore why this is so by working through Sartre's depiction of angoisse in the light of his essential project: the illumination of human consciousness as absolute freedom.

Sartre begins his analysis and description by pointing out that the depictions of Angst by Kierkegaard and Heidegger do not appear to contradict one another. The paragraph in which this is stated is important because it reveals Sartre's point of departure regarding the phenomenon of Angst. Sartre says:

Kierkegaard describing anguish (angoisse) in the face of what one lacks characterizes it as anguish in the face of freedom. Heidegger, whom we know to have been greatly influenced by Kierkegaard, considers anguish instead as the apprehension of nothingness. These two descriptions of anguish do not appear to us contradictory; on the contrary the one implies the other. (BN., p. 65)

Now Sartre's angoisse, like Janus of Roman mythology, wears two distinct faces: the first looks toward the future possibilities of réalité humaine, and the second looks towards man's past. We must discuss these separately.

Regarding futural angoisse or "angoisse in the face of the future," the phenomenological paradigm is the abyss metaphor, the metaphor that runs through our own analysis. Sartre begins this
discussion by stating that Kierkegaard was right in seeing that "anguish is distinguished from fear in that fear is fear of beings in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself" (BN., p. 65). His proof of this truth is couched in an analysis of vertigo, approached as an expanded phenomenological description of Kierkegaard’s discussion of subjective Angst in the face of the abyss. In Sartre’s interpretation, vertigo is decidedly not a fear of falling into the abyss; rather it is a "fear" of throwing ourselves into it as an act of deliberate choice. Angoisse, then, is not a fear of some threatening thing. Au contraire, says Sartre, it reveals itself as the fear of fear itself within man. As a graphic example Sartre suggests that man faces angoisse when he, like the recruit who reports for active duty, is more afraid of being afraid than of death itself.

But the phenomenon of angoisse is highly complex: if a threatening situation is apprehended from the standpoint of how man expects himself to handle a given situation, then what is experienced is angoisse. But if the same situation is apprehended from the viewpoint of how it will affect his Self if he mishandles the situation, then what he is really experiencing is, says Sartre, fear. The vastly important difference between these two situations is that in the former there is an internal apprehension of the "Self" in the face of what threatens; but in the latter situation, what threatens is "... an unreflected apprehension of the transcendent" (BN., p. 66). By "transcendent" in this particular context Sartre means that which threatens the Self. Yet, these exclusive phenomena, says
Sartre, are intimately bound together in the constant internal switching: fear experienced to our apprehensive consciousness of fear and vice-versa. In such a switching, when one becomes self-conscious of one's fear, one then experiences the angoisse of reflective apprehension of the Self as being caught in a web of fear provoking circumstances. For example, Sartre suggests that when someone loses all of his money in a stockmarket crash, he may be afraid of impending poverty. But a moment later, when he wrings his hands and says to himself: "What am I going to do? But what am I going to do?", he has imported his ownmost Self into the poverty threatening situation; and hence changes his fear of the situation into a reflective apprehension of his Self as precisely what it is that gets threatened. In this reflective grasp, the feeling changes from fear to angoisse.

However, continues Sartre, there appear to be circumstances wherein angoisse is not mixed with fear; such as, for example, someone is charged with an important mission that may very well be beyond his capabilities. In this case he may experience angoisse but not fear at all with regard to the possibility of failure; for it is not failure that is at stake, rather it is how well he will rise to the challenge.

Hence in these examples Angst as angoisse reveals itself in different ways. As vertigo in the face of the abyss, our anguish shows itself first in fear—the precipice is to be avoided, as in the stones upon which one could slip, or the crumbling turf that may give way beneath us. These circumstances are threats to be avoided.
but are external possibilities which can act upon us at any time. Thus they are possibilities to be feared. And since such possibilities are precisely those "owned" by each of us as we stand at the face of the abyss, they exist only for us at that precise moment when we gaze transfixed into its beckoning fathomlessness. At that moment we discover that it is we ourselves who sustain our ownmost potential being, whether we choose to plunge into the abyss or not. The "not" here is important. It points to the fact that such possibilities can be negated; as say by calmly stepping back from the abyss, for example. This clearly reveals to us that such possibilities are not external and not to be feared! Indeed, argues Sartre, as our ownmost potential, each possibility belongs to each of us. Hence it is we ourselves who are the ultimate and the permanent source of their negation. How is this so? Standing there at the face of the abyss we must necessarily negate the fear-producing possibilities by choosing to make one, and only one, possibility actual. But, cautions Sartre, there is nothing causal about this choosing process if by "causal" we mean something like "psychologically determined."

Rather each of us at the face of the abyss is in angoisse

... precisely because any conduct on my part is only possible, and this means that while constituting the totality of motives for pushing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these motives as not sufficiently effective. ... At the very moment when I apprehend my being as horror of the precipice, I am conscious of that horror as not determinant in relation to my possible conduct. In one sense that horror calls for prudent conduct, and it is in itself a pre-outline of that conduct; in another sense, it posits the final developments of that conduct only as possible, precisely because I do
not apprehend it as the cause of these final developments but as need, appeal, etc. (BN., p. 68)

To avoid fear, therefore, we quickly take refuge in reflection. But every form of refuge has its price: reflection offers only an undetermined purely possible future. This means precisely that nothing can compel us to adopt one possibility over another; neither background, nor upbringing, nor education, nor any factor. Rather "... in establishing a certain conduct as a possibility and precisely because it is my possibility, I am aware that nothing can compel me to adopt that conduct" (BN., p. 68). But be that as it may, we are each already in the future since possibilities are by definition potential future actualities. What all this means, then, is that angoisse "... is precisely my consciousness of being my own future, in the mode of not-being" (BN., p. 68). Nothing prevents man from throwing himself headlong into the abyss, just as nothing compels him to save himself. That decision (choice) must be made by a future Self; that is, "the decisive conduct," says Sartre, "will emanate from a self which I am not yet" (BN., p. 69).

With these clues to guide his reader, Sartre adds the following description to the literature of phenomenological descriptions of human being in the face of the abyss:

I approach the precipice, and my security is searching for myself in my very depths. In terms of this moment, I play with my possibilities. My eyes, running over the abyss from top to bottom, imitate the possible fall and realize it symbolically; at the same time suicide, from the fact that it becomes a possibility possible for me, now causes to appear possible motives for adopting it (suicide would cause anguish to cease). Fortunately
these motives in their turn, from the sole fact that they are motives of a possibility, present themselves as ineffective, as non-determinant; they can no more produce the suicide than my horror of the fall can determine me to avoid it. It is this counter-anguish which generally puts an end to anguish by transmitting it into indecision. Indecision in its turn calls for decision. I abruptly put myself at a distance from the edge of the precipice and resume my way (BN., p. 69)

We have attempted to fully detail Sartre's thinking on the first facet, the facet of futural angoisse, because his paradigm is Angst in the face of the abyss: the unifying metaphor that extends throughout this dissertation. Having worked our way through that analysis, description, and interpretation in some detail, however, we may now proceed in a more summary fashion to review the other features of Sartre's full portrait of Angst in this first part of Being and Nothingness; for the full picture is extremely detailed and colored with graphic descriptions—a feature that makes Sartre's account somewhat more readable than Heidegger's discussion of Angst in Being and Time.

Secondly, there is the other Janus face of angoisse, the one that looks toward the past. Here the paradigm used is that of a reformed compulsive gambler, who as he approaches the gambling table experiences profound angoisse as he suddenly sees all of his former resolutions melt away. Angoisse shows our gambler with lucid clarity that the resolutions of yesterday about "no more gambling" mean absolutely nothing. Why? Sartre tells us that it is because what one is now is not what one was when the resolution was first made yesterday. More specifically, a nothingness has slipped in between
our past resolutions (choices) and our present memory of those resolutions. Says Sartre:

It seemed to me that I had established a real barrier between gambling and myself, and now I suddenly perceive that my former understanding of the situation is no more than a memory of an idea, a memory of a feeling. In order for it to come to my aid once more, I must remake it ex nihilo and freely. (BN., p. 70)

Moreover, this need to recreate the memory so that it has relevance to the present moment displays the magical attempt of that resolution to free us from angoisse. Sartre continues:

After having patiently built up barriers and walls, after enclosing myself in a magic circle of resolution, I perceive with anguish (angoisse) that nothing prevents me from gambling. The anguish is me since by the very fact of taking my position in existence as consciousness of being, I make myself not to be the past of good resolutions which I am (BN., p. 70)

Angoisse in the face of the past, therefore, likewise reveals the absolute freedom of human consciousness to réalité humaine from such absolute freedom, and the angoisse in which freedom shows itself, there is no final escape.

Angoisse, then, displays the ultimate freedom of human reality, a freedom that can be defined as "... a constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self which designates a human being" (BN., p. 72). This Self is the essence of being human, an essence that is grounded in the temporal ecstasy of "what-has-been." Thus for Sartre as for Hegel and Heidegger, the essence of man is grounded in his past, his what-has-been. So angoisse appears as an apprehension of this essential Self as it is detached from its "now." We are always one step ahead of our Selves (our essences); we stand-out, we ex-ist, from that
essence, choosing our own existence as a result of the nothingness that stands between our essence and our actualized possibilities. Hence, for Sartre, angeresse "... is the recognition of a possibility as my possibility; that is it is constituted when consciousness sees itself cut off from its essence by nothingness or separated from the future by its very freedom" (BN., p. 73). This means, then, that we are separated by a nihilating nothing from our previous choices as well as those standing before us in the future.

This nothingness that has eluded us now shows itself precisely as our individual, ownmost, ultimate, and absolute freedom, viewed from the standpoint of human reality. But what we authentically apprehend is angeresse in the face of this freedom; for freedom is bounded by nothing: "In anguish (angeresse) freedom is anguished before itself inasmuch as it is instigated and bound by nothing" (BN., p. 73). This means, of course, that such angeresse is precisely a permanent structure of human being. 43 How then so we account for its factual rarity.

First, says Sartre, we must recognize that angeresse is the apprehension of a specific possibility as our ownmost possibility; "that is, it is constituted when consciousness sees itself cut from its essence by nothingness or separated from the future by its very freedom" (BN., p. 73). In other words, we make an intentional appointment with ourselves on the other side of the future possibility—a future that is separated from our essence (our "what-has-been") by a nothingness. From this perspective angeresse shows itself as
"...the fear of not finding myself at the appointment, of no longer wishing to bring myself there" (BN., p. 73).

Secondly, angoisse is rare because we find ourselves engaged in the everyday world; and moreover, engaged in such a way so as to actively prevent our apprehension of possibilities as pure possibilities. "The consciousness of man in action," says Sartre, "is non-reflective consciousness" (BN., p. 74). Hence, angoisse does not reveal itself in the immediacy of experience. But when such non-reflective consciousness becomes reflected upon, as for example, when the writing of this present sentence is seen as part of the yet-to-be-completed project of the present writer's doctoral dissertation, consciousness is directed toward the total project as a finished project. Precisely then does angoisse show itself. For in seeing the work as a completed totality, we recognize that nothing prevents us from giving up the work, of never completing it, and of abandoning it forever. Thus when we fully apprehend the negative possibility of not completing our fundamental projects that are vastly important to us, angoisse reaches out to seize us as from the dark side of a dream; for it is we ourselves who must constantly choose to make actual that which for the moment is merely possible.

Third, angoisse is rare because it does not reveal itself openly in terms of every day morality. Ethical angoisse shows itself when we consider ourselves in relation to our ownmost values which we ourselves create. Hence, values are contingent upon our freedom. And, says Sartre, "my freedom is anguished at being the foundation of
values while itself without foundation" (BN., p. 76). But on the everyday level of morality, we never question our values. The immediacy of experiencing the world as well as the exigency of our dwelling in a value-laden world where we constantly engage ourselves, ", . . . cause values to spring up like partridges" (BN., p. 76). In the world of our everyday concerns, then, we discover ourselves as beings engaged in a situation, in an enterprise, in a project. The meaning of our ultimate project, which in each case is our ownmost existential lives, is determined by each of us alone. We choose ourselves! We project, moreover, this Self choice upon the world so that ", . . . values, appeals, expectations and in general a world . . . " (BN., p. 77) appear to us as the transcendental value horizon of our individual projects, as the referential meaning-totality of our individual enterprises, and as the logical signification and justification of our individual worlds. But as regards the ontic world, the world of mundane life, Sartre says:

For the rest, there exist concretely alarm clocks, signboards, tax forms, policemen, so many guards against anguish (angoisse). But as soon as the enterprise is held at a distance from me, as soon as I am referred to myself because I must await myself in the future, then I discover myself suddenly as the one who gives its meaning to the alarm clock, the one who by a signboard forbids himself to walk on a flower bed or on the lawn, the one who decides the interest of the book which he is writing, the one finally who makes the values exist in order to determine his action by their demands. (BN., p. 77)

And what then is the point of this description in regard to angoisse?

Sartre immediately responds by continuing:
I emerge alone and in anguish (angoisse) confronting the unique and original project which constitutes my being; all the barriers all the guard rails collapse, nihilated by the consciousness of my freedom. I do not have nor can I have recourse to any value against the fact that it it I who sustain values in being. (BN., p. 77)

With these three points concerning the rarity of Angst's self disclosure completed, Sartre concludes his discussion of angoisse with this final definition: "Anguish (angoisse) then is the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself" (BN., p. 78). This is an important addition to the literature on Angst because it defines angoisse as a STATE OF REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS: THAT IS, A STATE CONSCIOUSLY GIVEN TO THE SELF ABOVE THE PREREFLECTIVE LEVEL. Thus Angst, interpreted as angoisse, is here a self-conscious reflection of pre-reflective freedom; a freedom that springs from the nothingness that lies "... coiled in the heart of being--like a worm" (BN., p. 56).

We come then to flight in the face of angoisse. For Sartre angoisse is the reflective apprehension of absolute freedom as indeed we have seen. Thus we are ourselves the alpha point of the world's meaning and so too of the values we create within the referential context called world. Yet we flee from the terrifying responsibility that is entailed in such ultimate freedom. In particular, flight is particularly displayed in the psychological determinism that is guilty of covering over our essential Angst; for determinism denies "... that transcendence of human reality which makes it [i.e., human reality] emerge in anguish (angoisse) beyond its own essence" (BN., p. 79). So psychological determinism emerges as a foil whereby angoisse is easily dealt with and thereby rendered harmless. It is,
therefore, a merely personally satisfying excuse for absolute freedom, one that robs *angoisse* of its primordial sting. As such it leads us into being distracted from the primordial power of *angoisse* in the face of the future. But such flight also applies to *angoisse* in the face of the past. Specifically, to avoid or cover over such *angoisse* we assert (and thereby try to convince ourselves) that we are our essence "... in the mode of being of the in-itself" ([BN.], p. 81). Refusing to consider our essences as being historically constituted, we attempt to flee from our essential transcendence by interpreting freedom as a property inherent in our individual ontic selves as though each of us were little Gods who must possess freedom as a metaphysical virtue. This reassures us, allowing us to bask in the autonomous smugness of a universal order to which we, as ontic Selves, belong. But to do this is a fiction that obscures completely the true nature of our essence as being wholly grounded in what-has-been, that stands out or ex-ists in the present through nothingness, on the way to actualizing future possibilities.

But can such attempts to flee from *angoisse* succeed? Sartre says without reservation on this score: "It is certain that we cannot overcome anguish (*angoisse*), for we are anguish" ([BN.], p. 82). To be sure, we can cover it over and hide it by inauthentic means; but in doing so we must first admit that *angoisse* is there originally a powerful phenomenon to be hidden from ourselves. Thus, *angoisse* shows itself as that very existential truth which each of us must hide from his ontic self. If so, then *angoisse* must be acknowledged as the
condition of the possibility of our hiding or covering-over its profound power over us. It is this which is the origin of psychological determinism.

Sartre concludes this description and interpretation of angoisse by the following observation concerning "bad faith" and our attempt to flee from the power of primordial Angst:

... to flee anguish (angoisse) and to be in anguish cannot be exactly the same thing. If I am my anguish in order to flee it, that presupposes that I can decenter myself in relation to what I am, that I can be anguish in the form of "not-being-it," that I can dispose of a nihilating power at the heart of anguish itself. This nihilating power nihilates anguish in so far as I flee it and nihilates itself in so far as I am anguish in order to flee it. This attitude is what we call bad faith. There is then no question of expelling anguish from consciousness nor of constituting it in an unconscious psychic phenomenon; very simply I can make myself guilty of bad faith while apprehending the anguish which I am, and this bad faith, intended to fill up the nothingness which I am in relation to myself, precisely implies the nothingness which it presupposes. (BN., p. 83)

Thus, Sartre concludes his essential discussion of angoisse by raising the topic of his second chapter of Part One entitled, "Bad Faith." Although this section is a further elaboration of angoisse, inquired into largely from the perspective of disputing the fundamental assumptions of deterministic psychoanalyses, we cannot here further comment on Sartre's analysis; for to do so would take us far afield from hermeneutically displaying the essential role of primordial Angst interpreted as angoisse in Sartre's thought. We are obliged to point out in passing however, that Sartre's own existential psychoanalysis is a moral description that reveals the essential ambiguity between the pour-soi and its fundamental projects (BN., p. 626).
To round out this display, however, it is necessary to examine one further discussion of angoisse in Sartre's thought. For Sartre, as did Heidegger before him, presents his final essential statement on this complex phenomenon in the form of a lecture entitled, "L'existentialisme est un humanisme," which Walter Kaufmann believes is Sartre's "best known work" in the English-speaking world. Therefore to complete our display of the role of Angst in Sartre's thought, we must turn to a cursory discussion of this lecture and the place accorded to angoisse within it.

Primordial Angst as Angoisse in "Existentialism is a Humanism"

The word "Existentialism" does not appear in Being and Nothingness. It first appears within the corpus of Sartre's works in his concise Mise au point (Clarification) in reply to communist attacks against Being and Nothingness in the paper Action, on December 20, 1944. By 1946 these attacks were joined against Sartre by French Catholics who, of course, took exception to the atheism displayed in Sartre's magnum opus. Hence, largely as an answer to both the Catholics and the communists, Sartre delivered an apologia of "existentialism" during 1946 in the form of a public lecture. While he was to later publically state his regret in allowing the lecture to be published, Sartre's impact on the world was profound indeed—the lecture inadvertently became the locus classicus of the philosophy of "existentialism."
Sartre states his atheism unequivocally in the course of the lecture by saying:

Atheistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, declares with great consistency that if God does exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it. That being is man or, as Heidegger has it, the human reality. What do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? We mean that man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards. If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is . . . Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.47

Revealing himself explicitly as an atheistic existentialist, Sartre reaffirms the basic position of Being and Nothingness—Self choice. "Man is responsible for what he is."48 Thus "existentialism" is a humanism, because all values are human values. Now as a humanism it has at the center of its being the belief that man not only chooses himself but in so choosing, he chooses at the same time for all men; since "... of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he will to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man such as he believes he ought to be."49 (Italics added). Hence, our individual choices reflect our values as universal values within the context of our historical epoch. We are in this sense as responsible for all men as we are for choosing ourselves; our "existentialism" is, in short, a humanism and an ethical humanism at that.
But what does *angoisse* have to do with all of this? Sartre responds that we are always in *angoisse* precisely because of the universality of our self-choices as reflections of universal values. Man's responsibility, therefore, is the ground of *angoisse*. Even those persons who never display their *angoisse*, who cover it over or who flee from it, are constantly in *angoisse*. From it there is literally no escape; for our very need to disguise our *angoisse* vividly displays the urgent and primordial power the phenomenon has over us.

Sartre cites Kierkegaard's example of Abraham's *angoisse* at the angel's command to sacrifice Issac, drawing attention to the fact that anyone in Abraham's place would wonder if this angel is really an angel and, more to the point, "... whether I am really Abraham. Where are the proofs?" In a similar fashion, says Sartre, who can prove to us that we are individually the proper persons to impose our individual conceptions of man upon mankind as a whole? There is no proof here either; yet, we must perform at each and every moment exemplary actions as though we were fully convinced of the essential rightness in imposing our own values in a universal way. Sartre observes regarding this matter;

Everything happens to every man as though the whole human race had its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and regulated its conduct accordingly. So every man ought to say, "Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do." If a man does not say that, he is dissembling his anguish (*angoisse*).
Such angoisse, then, is not the kind of phenomenon that leads to quietism or inaction: its very essence is bound to action and the responsibility we each must take for our actions. Using the paradigm case of the military man, Sartre points out that the responsibility of the commander to send his men into battle—where clearly some must die—is a personal choice made in the ultimate alone-ness of responsible decision. But even if he is acting under orders from his superiors the commander must interpret such orders. Upon his and ultimately only his personal interpretation depends the lives of his men. All leaders, claims Sartre, know the angoisse associated with such decisions. Yet angoisse does not prevent such men from making such decisions; indeed it is the precise condition that makes possible their actions; "... for the action presupposes that there is a plurality of possibilities, and in choosing one of these, they realize that it has value only because it is chosen." Such responsibility as our ownmost responsibility that cannot be passed over to another is the radix of the essential Angst that reveals itself in this lecture. Sartre concludes his discussion of it by observing: "Now it is anguish (angoisse) of that kind which existentialism describes, and moreover, as we shall see, makes explicit through direct responsibility towards other men who are concerned. Far from being a screen which could separate us from action, it is a condition of action itself." With this observation Sartre draws to a close the essential discussions of the place and role of angoisse in the lecture. This completes as well our own understanding and
interpretation of the phenomenon in Being and Nothingness and "Existentialism is a Humanism." In the following section we shall attempt to raise several significant issues that require further discussion and clarification in the light of Angst's self revelation within contemporary thought in general.

Preliminary Conclusions Regarding Sartre and Angoisse

We must draw to a close this part of the present chapter by again raising the question of what it is that we have learned here regarding Sartre's understanding and interpretation of Angst as angoisse. Bearing in mind that any answer must remain provisional until the fifth and final chapter, we may suggest as the Vorhabe of that chapter (at least with regard to Sartre), six points require brief mentioning. These are: (1) Sartre's attempt to unify the interpretations of Kierkegaard and Heidegger with regard to Angst result in returning that phenomenon to the province of phenomenological psychology. (2) Sartre's analysis of absolute freedom and the nothingness that is within réalité humaine imply that Angst is wholly immanent in man. (3) Sartre's analysis of Angst as angoisse with regard to values creation clearly goes beyond the purely ontological concerns of Heidegger, returning us to the ethical concerns of Kierkegaard but on a purely atheistic level. (4) Sartre's analysis of Angst is essentially negative in two senses of that word: a) "ontologically" negative, because it is the source of introducing nothingness into being; and b) "psychologically" negative because angoisse
"is the Self already being afraid" (RN., p. 65). (5) Sartre's use of *angoisse* as the anthropological nexus between being and nothingness within man serves likewise as the ontological nexus between the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*. (6) Sartre's interpretation of *angoisse* as that phenomenon from which man seeks to escape in "bad faith" provides a launching point for virtually every other dimension of Sartre's existential analysis of man: *Angst* may be said, therefore, to be a major foundational doctrine of "existentialist" philosophy.

But here again these accomplishments and shifts in the mode of *Angst*'s self-disclosure give rise to several issues and concerns that demand further clarification before the ultimate value of Sartre's contribution can be judged. For as we shall see, these concerns are rooted in the primary assumptions of Sartre's "existentialist" doctrine and so they again go well beyond the discussion of *angoisse* alone.

1. Sartre's account of the psychological phenomenon of *angoisse* is grounded in the ultimate and apodictically certain distinction between the *pour-soi* and the *en-soi*. Hence we must at the outset accept this interpretation as being a more adequate picture of reality that of Heidegger's attempt to get beyond such dualistic interpretations of Being. Indeed, if we cannot accept Sartre's interpretation as being true, then his analysis of *angoisse*, an analysis fully contingent in essence upon that interpretation, likewise cannot be accepted as true.
2. This gives rise to another fundamental question regarding the "existentialist" underpinnings of **angoisse**. By capturing **Angst** in a web of anthropological immanence, Sartre may in fact be guilty of constructing a vast and richly subtle misunderstanding of the goals and aims of a phenomenological ontology—that discipline which he claims as his own in the sub-title of *Being and Nothingness*; for unlike Heidegger, who attempted and failed to come to the question of Being itself, Sartre remains firmly locked within the anthropological purview of man. Sartre's solution to this problem, namely, "... the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-itself itself" (BN., p. 785) is wholly unsatisfactory in our view because it reduces ontology to anthropology.

3. Sartre's analysis of the structures of **réalité humaine** are even more creative than Kierkegaard's or Heidegger's. But we may ask without any internal contradiction whatsoever whether they describe the manifoldness of human experience with regard to the affective side of human existence. It seems to us that Sartre's depictions of this affective side, discussed under such rubrics as love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism, are clearly consistent with the general argument of *Being and Nothingness*, but are not apodictically certain truths about the full nature of being human. On the contrary, such descriptions appear to follow as
constructs that are the antinomies of the negativity inherent in Sartre's interpretation of the pre-reflective *cogito*: therefore, their essential ambiguity. But more important, being locked into consciousness in which there is no content means ultimately to be cut off *solus-ipse* from all other beings (human or otherwise) completely. Sartre's attempt to circumvent the problem of solipsism; namely, "... the Other is the indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I appear to the Other," (BN., p. 302) is fundamentally undermined by the phenomenon of *Angst* which discloses that we are each the source of our own values. Why then should the Other shame us?

It is not necessary to belabor the point here. There are vast numbers of problems and promises in Sartre's work that several excellent books have been devoted to them. The few that we raise here seem to us, however, to be grounded in the ultimate presupposition of a universe without *Telos*, or to use the language of theology, an order of Being without God. This vast display of what absolute freedom means in the face of a Godless universe is necessary, of course, to Sartre's general argument in *Being and Nothingness*; namely, "... to explain man's predicament in human terms without postulating an existent God to guarantee anything."54 The God Sartre denies, it must be remembered, is the theistic God of Christian and Hebraic thought as interpreted by the Scholastics: "a specific all powerful, absolute, existing Creator."55 Now it is manifestly clear, one might
even say "apodictically certain," to even the most plebian thinker that the existence of God can no more be disproven logically than it be proven logically. For this reason the existence of God has rightly been called a matter of faith. But Sartre has a faith as well: that there is no omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator and sustainer of Being, and the argument of *Being and Nothingness* works out the consequences of Sartre's faith. It is, therefore, the apex of the atheistic "existentialist" position. Hence Angst in Sartre fundamentally differs from Angst in Kierkegaard for obvious reasons; but it also differs from that of Heidegger for reasons that are less obvious; for they have to do with the so-called onto-theological status of Being in Heidegger's thought, which in our final chapter will shed much light on Heidegger's notion of Geiassenheit [renunciation] and Angst. This is not possible for Sartre.

If at bottom Sartre's depiction of primordial Angst is unique because of his atheistic "faith," we shall require a theistic approach to primordial Angst apart from which Sartre's may be contrasted. Such is the task of Part II of this chapter to which we now turn; namely the task of showing how primordial Angst reveals itself in the *Systematic Theology* and *The Courage to Be* of Paul Tillich's meta-theology or theonomous philosophy.
Part 2. Tillich on Angst

A Point of Departure

With our attempt to work through the horizons and self-disclosures of Angst in Sartre's atheistic thought behind us, we may now contrast it with Paul Tillich's God beyond God and therefore "meta-theistic" self-disclosure of Angst. We choose Tillich as a contrast to Sartre on three grounds: 1) because of his lifelong enchantment with Angst in the face of the abyss, the unifying metaphor of this dissertation; 2) because of the clear working-out of the full theological implications of Heidegger's conception of Angst and nothingness; and 3) because of the clarity, laser-like precision and power with which he describes and interprets primordial Angst, or what he calls "ontological anxiety" in both his Systematic Theology and The Courage to Be. It is very clear that the role of Angst is as vital to these two works as it is to Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angst, Heidegger's Sein und Zeit and Sartre's L'Être et le néant. Thus Tillich's descriptions and interpretations of the phenomenon are essential to our attempt to discuss the role of Angst in contemporary philosophical thought.

The fact that Tillich uses the term "ontological anxiety" in the place of primordial Angst need trouble us no more than Sartre's usage of angoisse for this phenomenon. Yet, we must not make the mistake of thinking that "ontological anxiety," as Tillich views it, is identical to what we ourselves mean by "primordial Angst." As we
shall see, the concepts are homologous but not identical, a fact observed by Rollo May in his brief biographical tribute to Tillich entitled Paulus. May notes that Tillich had a profound sensitivity to the phenomenon of Angst in the face of the abyss, and, moreover, that for Tillich this Angst was close to what Heidegger meant by Angst. Says May:

Living with Angst, as it is called in his [Tillich's] mother tongue, is part of the price of loving the abyss. Tillich believed that anxiety was the subjective side of the tension between being and nonbeing in a sense similar to Heidegger's, and it was therefore inevitable. The Angst could attach itself to almost anything in his existence.56

And, in another passage May says:

Paulus believed that every encounter with a new person is anxiety-creating. Anxiety is present in every authentic encounter, that is, one in which people let themselves genuinely meet. This anxiety is the dread of freedom; in Kierkegaard's words it is the "dizziness of freedom."57

From the standpoint of hermeneutic phenomenology, no matter how interesting and provocative these passages are, they may serve only as a Vorgriff to a hermeneutical interpretation of ontological anxiety in the proper sense of that word. Again, we ourselves must not be guilty of blindly appealing to May's authority to validate any interpretation of Angst in Tillich's thought; all the more so since that is precisely what we accused May of in the Introduction to this work.58 Thus, a hermeneutical inquiry into the role of Angst in Tillich's thought is necessary. We do believe, however, that as with all displays of the Angst phenomenon, Tillich's "ontological anxiety" is likewise a facet of what we have called
primordial Angst. Thus we hope to reveal here how primordial Angst shows itself as that which makes possible even ontological anxiety as discussed by Tillich. Such is the task of this second part of Chapter IV.

To accomplish this task Part 2 will be organized as follows: Upon completion of this introductory material, section 2 will continue the micro-hermeneutical method of inquiry into the conceptual development of Tillich's existential posture, as the broadest horizon of Angst's self-disclosure in his thought. Then in section 3, we shall explore several relevant elements of his Systematic Theology to firmly fix the more immediate horizon of Tillich's depiction of Angst. Such a depiction will then become the focus of section 4. Section 5 will consider Angst's self-disclosure within The Courage to Be, and we shall conclude Part 2 with some provisional issues and questions that require further examination in our fifth and final chapter.

With this guide in mind, we turn now to a brief depiction of the hermeneutical horizons of influence that encompass Tillich's mature existential philosophy; for within such horizons we shall discover the seeds of Angst's self-disclosure. While space limitations preclude a full treatment of such important background material, which incidentally has been undertaken with partial success by David Hopper in his work Tillich: A Theological Portrait, we hope to explore the several major influences on Tillich's thought which made possible the disclosure for which we are searching. It is to this precise task that we now turn.
The Horizons of Influence

Any attempt to grasp the overall horizons of influence upon Tillich's mature thought must begin with at least a passing reference to his intellectual awakening during his Gymnasium years in both Königsberg and Berlin at the turn of the present century. Tillich himself recollects:

In Königsberg as well as in Berlin, I was a pupil in a "humanistic Gymnasium." . . . A humanistic Gymnasium has as its central subjects Greek and Latin. My love of the Greek language was a vehicle for my love of Greek culture and especially the early Greek philosophers. One of my most enthusiastically prepared and best received courses had as its subject matter the pre-Socratic philosophy.60

Another early influence was Tillich's father, Johannes Tillich, who was a minister and administrator in the Prussian Territorial Church during Paul Tillich's early years. He established within the young Tillich a burning desire for personal and intellectual autonomy. This was accomplished by intense philosophical discussions between father and son, which much later Tillich judged to be "... the most happy instances of a positive relation to my father."61 One major positive outcome of this relationship showed itself in the young Tillich's deep attachment to philosophy during his years at Halle as a theology student. But even before these years, specifically with regard to the years between 1900 and 1905, Tillich informs us that:

Long before my matriculation as a student of theology, I studied philosophy privately. When I entered the University, I had a good knowledge of the history of philosophy, and a
basic acquaintance with Kant and Fichte. Schleiermacher, Hegel, and Schelling followed, and Schelling became the special subject of my study. Both my doctoral dissertation and my thesis for the Licentiate in Theology dealt with Schelling's philosophy of religion.62

Thus we find that the first philosophers after the pre-Socratics to strongly influence Tillich were precisely those to whom he remained committed throughout his life, especially Schelling.63 Tillich's doctoral dissertation at the University of Breslau was entitled, Die religionsgeschichtliche Konstruktion in Schellings positiver Philosophie, ihre Voraussetzungen und Prinzipien64 [The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy]. One year after its successful defense in 1911, Tillich wrote a second dissertation for the degree of Licentiate in Theology at the University of Halle. This second work, entitled, Mystik und Schuldewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung65 [Mysticism and Guilt-consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development], appeared to have been of greater philosophical significance for Tillich: he included it in his Gesammlte Werke but excluded his doctoral dissertation.66 What then is the gist of each work? The first work seems to be a straight-forward account of Schelling's positive philosophy and themes relating to the development of his history of religion.67 The second work, on the other hand, appears to be far more sophisticated; attempting with some flair to present Schelling's philosophy from the standpoint of intrinsic principles that are generated from a markedly dialectical framework. Specifically, in this second work Tillich sought to interpret
Schelling's philosophical growth in the light of the antinomy between guilt-consciousness as a function of practical reason on the one hand, and mysticism as the realization of theoretical reason on the other. This basic cleavage drives other antinomies seen ultimately as the distinction between philosophy and religion. Tillich argues that only if the will, as the power of self-contradiction (formal freedom), is made the ultimate metaphysical principle, can these antinomies be overcome. Thus, "... Schelling's philosophical development is represented as a dialectical advance toward the realization of this conclusion."69

What specifically did Tillich appropriate from Schelling's later thought? First, Tillich believed that in his second dissertation he had discovered in Schelling's will principle the roots of a synthesis between the disciplines of philosophy and religion. Secondly, Tillich saw in Schelling's mature period a Christian philosophy of existence which stands in direct contrast to Hegel's humanistic philosophy of essences.70 Third, and most important to the present work, in the later Schelling Tillich was able to detect a marked and utterly decisive break with the Hegel's Idealism, which in turn made possible Soren Kierkegaard's discovery of the roots of existential thought. Regarding this last point, we learn that "Schelling, according to Tillich, had seen the chasm which looms before man but had quickly averted his eyes from the terrifying sight. Kierkegaard looked at it unfilichingly."71
With respect to other significant influences it was likewise at this time that Tillich first became acquainted with Husserl's phenomenology through his reading of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*. Husserl deeply impressed the young Tillich, who was later to say that Husserl's thought became for him his most satisfying confirmation of his knowledge of Kant and Fichte. Be that as it may, Tillich could not attach himself to Husserl's phenomenology because it "lacked the dynamism" necessary to his thought. Tillich enthusiastically approved, however, of Husserl's refutation of positivism and psychologism.

Regarding his teachers at Halle, clearly the most influential was the theologian Martin Kähler from whom Tillich learned "... the all-embracing character of the Pauline-Lutheran idea of justification." This insight led to a keen appreciation of man's finitude, his guilt and despair, and his ultimate estrangement from God as the source of his being. It was therefore Kähler who led Tillich to first see intellectually the meontic Ungrund of the abyss within the God-man relationship, wherein man as a sinner is justified before God's judgment. And it was precisely this insight, Tillich tells us, that led him to accept the existential ideas revealed in the respective philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard and later Martin Heidegger. So regarding Kähler's influence on the young Tillich, Tillich himself tells us that because of Kähler, "... it was easy for me ... to accept the analysis of human existence given by Kierkegaard and Heidegger." It is abundantly clear, however, that Kierkegaard's
influence predated that of Heidegger by at least fourteen years, since Kierkegaard is mentioned in Tillich's second dissertation, written in 1913. Tillich was not aware of Heidegger until 1925. 77

Thus it was during a very early period of his theological and philosophical development that Tillich became acquainted with Kierkegaard's newly rediscovered thought. Let us explore this influence briefly. Tillich says that there were several important shapers of his theological existence during his student years, but outstanding among them was "... our discovery of Kierkegaard and the shattering impact of his dialectical psychology. It was a prelude to what happened in the 1920s when Kierkegaard became the saint of the theologians as well as the philosophers." 78 This profound historical record goes far toward explaining the general climate of intellectual opinion under which both Heidegger and Tillich (who were roughly contemporaries) wrote regarding the phenomenon of Angst. As we have seen Heidegger began Sein und Zeit prior to 1925 and Tillich tells us that he began Volume One of the Systematic Theology, wherein his first treatment of Angst is couched, in 1925. 79 Clearly the spirit of Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angst filled the air of post-first world war Germany.

During his brief stay at Marburg, one which lasted only three semesters, Tillich very likely saw Heidegger (who was in residence there as an ordinarius professor), but according to Tillich's wife, Hannah Tillich, these two intellectual giants never formally met. 80 As she saw it there was a marked tension between her husband
and Heidegger. This story may be well worth repeating for the light it sheds on the rather extraordinary relationship between Tillich and Heidegger. Mrs. Tillich states that her husband's main struggle at Marburg

... was with the philosophy of Heidegger. He met some of Heidegger's doctoral students, and endless debates followed. Oddly enough, the Ordinarius Professor Heidegger and the private dozen Adjunct Professor Tillich never met during our stay in Marburg. The gossip about what Heidegger had said in a lecture about Paulus would be carried by Heidegger's faithful underlings. Paulus would answer in his own lecture, and that would be forwarded again. In time, it resulted in Paulus's growing influence—at the end of his second term, he had a full lecture hall—but when he left for Berlin, having survived the term, he fainted in the corridor of our third-class compartment. The experience in Marburg had been grim.

If we can get beyond the initial pettiness of this lack of encounter, we can see the dark undercurrent of distrust that initially developed between these two thinkers. Yet Tillich himself was to much later say of this period:

In Marburg, in 1925, I began my work on my Systematic Theology, the first volume of which appeared in 1951. At the same time that Heidegger was in Marburg as professor of philosophy, influencing some of the best students, existentialism in its twentieth century form crossed my path. It took years before I became fully aware of the impact of this encounter on my own thinking. I resisted, I tried to learn, I accepted the new way of thinking more than the answers it gave.

In Tillich's On the Boundary he gives the following account of Heidegger's thought: First, he sees Heidegger's philosophy as a doctrine of man; one which although unintentional is at once a doctrine of human freedom and human finitude. Secondly, from Tillich's perspective Heidegger's thought in Being and Time "... is so closely related with the Christian interpretation of human
existence that one is forced to speak of a 'theonomous philosophy,' in spite of Heidegger's emphatic atheism."84 This is, as we shall see, most important in terms of understanding the special "theism" of Tillich.

Thus Tillich was able to summarize his relationship to his own later existential philosophy/theology in terms of the combined influence of Schelling, Kierkegaard, Husserl and Heidegger. In an exceedingly important passage which demands full citation, Tillich talks about his introduction to existential thought. He says,

When existential philosophy was introduced into Germany, I came to a new understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy. Heidegger's lectures at Marburg, the publication of *Sein und Zeit* (Being and Time), and also his interpretation of Kant were significant in this connection. Both to the followers and to the opponents of existential philosophy, Heidegger's work is more important than anything since Husserl's *Logische Untersuchen* (Studies in Logic).85

Coming from the leading spokesman for existential theistic thought, this is a high complement to the apparently atheistic Heidegger indeed! But as far as we are aware, Heidegger, not uncharacteristically, never acknowledged Tillich as a thinker much less returned the complement. In any event, Tillich continues the above passage with an account of how he came to accept existential thought:

Three factors prepared the ground for my acceptance of existential philosophy. The first was my close knowledge of Schelling's final period, in which he outlined his philosophy of existence in response to Hegel's philosophy of essence. The second was my knowledge, however limited, of Kierkegaard, the real founder of existential philosophy. The final factor was my enthusiasm for Nietzsche's "philosophy of life." These three elements are also present in Heidegger. Their fusion into a kind of mysticism tinged with Augustinianism accounts for the fascination of Heidegger's philosophy.86
From this passage we learn that Nietzsche too had a deep influence on Tillich's thought. While Tillich did not read Nietzsche until 1916, when he was thirty years old, his marked influence on Tillich was especially important regarding Tillich's fondness of the abyss metaphor. Tillich says, "Nietzschean vitalism expresses the experience of the abyss more clearly than Neo-Kantianism, value-philosophy, or phenomenology." We shall return to this central concept of the abyss in Tillich's thought in the following sections, but here it is important to recognize that Nietzsche made a profound contribution to Tillich's understanding and interpretation of this root metaphor which is at once the root metaphor of our own work here. We shall reserve further discussion of Nietzsche's influence on Tillich for the concluding sections of this chapter.

Likewise during the time at Marburg, Tillich frequently met with another major shaper of his thought, Rudolf Otto. Tillich had been influenced early by Otto's idea of the *mysterium tremendum*, and the two met often over coffee and cakes. Otto, who in the vision of Hannah Tillich was "... the sky-blue-eyed, whitehaired, slim and youthful-looking man who talked about India, about beauty, about art," touched Tillich at the deepest levels of his theological being. Tillich tells us that Otto's work, *Das Heilige [The Idea of the Holy]*, determined his entire method in the philosophy of Religion. Specifically, Tillich came to see based on Otto's insights, that he could start with the experience of the holy and from it move to the idea of God. But, says Tillich, equally
important to his theological development was Otto's comprehension of the mystical, sacramental, and aesthetic implications that are derivable from the idea of the holy. More specifically, Tillich learned from Otto's work that the "... ethical and logical elements of religion were derived from the experience of the presence of the divine, and not conversely." It was, then, a phenomenology of the Holy that intrigued Tillich.

This is indeed an important nexus between Otto and Tillich, because it shows the origin of a religious phenomenology, a phenomenology derived independently from Husserl and one grounded in the schematization of Kant's categories of the understanding as they were reinterpreted by Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843). We believe it is important to mention this fact as what must have been a profound influence on Tillich, Tillich's friendship with Otto makes it certain that the former was aware of Otto's work of 1909 entitled, Kantische-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie (which in 1932 was translated as The Philosophy of Religion based upon Kant and Fries, but which in our view has been seriously ignored).

Otto's influence, then, clearly left its mark on Tillich. Years later in his work entitled, My Search for Absolutes, Tillich was to recall with obvious warmth:
When I use . . . [the] phrase "the Idea of the holy," I remember wonderful hours in Marburg, Germany, in the mid-twenties, when Rudolf Otto and I walked together through the hills and woods and talked about the problems of Christianity and the Asiatic religions. . . . The first thing he said in his analysis of the meaning of the term "holy" was that "the holy" is a "mystery" and means the Absolute itself, the ground of all the absolutes we have discovered in the different realms of man's encounter with reality. . . . In experiencing this mystery man is driven to ask the question: "Why is there something and not nothing?"91

Here the familiar echo of Heidegger's rephrasing of Leibnitz' question of the essence of ground emerges again in the context of Otto's Das Heilige and the "aweful mystery" of the Holy. But Tillich goes on to describe the phenomenological approach to the mysterium tremendum of Otto:

Otto expresses the relation of our mind to the Ultimate and its mystery in two terms: "tremendum"--that which produces trembling, fear and awe; and fascinosum--that which produces fascination, attraction and desire. . . . The dread of missing one's fulfillment--this is awe. The desire to reach one's fulfillment--this is attraction.92

To this description we must add one other which decisively connects Tillich's own conception of the Holy to that of Otto. In the Systematic Theology, Tillich says of Otto's notion of the Holy:

When he [Otto] describes the mystery of the holy as tremendum and fascinosum, he expresses the experience of "the ultimate" in the double sense of that which is the abyss and that which is the ground of man's being. This is not directly asserted in Otto's merely phenomenological analysis, which, by the way never should be called "psychological." However, it is implicit in his analysis, and it should be made explicit beyond Otto's own intentions.93

From this important passage it becomes clear that Otto's notion of the tremendum, the "numinous dread or awe,"94 struck Tillich as the
key to the abyss dimension of the Ultimate: an extremely important insight for Tillich that is, as we shall see, intimately connected with how it is that primordial Angst, as ontological anxiety, shows itself in Tillich's thought. Such a notion, however, is not obvious in Otto's own thought, and is not mentioned in The Idea of the Holy.

In summary then, we may say that from the later Schelling, Tillich obtained the possibility of a higher synthesis into which philosophy and theology could be merged. From Kühler he gained the central insights necessary to embrace existential thinking. From Kierkegaard, Tillich appropriated an essential grasp of existential theology; from Husserl he derived an appreciation for the method of phenomenology and the refutation of both positivism and psychologism. From Heidegger he derived the radical insight into man as finitude as well as an appreciation for the canons of modern existential thinking. From Nietzsche he secured a deep affinity for the abyss metaphor as it applies to human finitude and Lebensphilosophie. Finally from Otto he acquired the understanding of the abyss as the tremendum experience of the Absolute although Otto may not have seen it as such.

With these influences to guide him, Tillich was able to direct his energies towards a concrete working-out of the phenomenon of primordial Angst, which shows itself in at least two ways in his writings. Angst is: (1) man's awareness of his ownmost finitude; and (2) the essential condition of the possibility of man's
ontological courage, or more precisely, "... the existential aware-

ness of non-being" that man must face courageously.

In the following section we shall begin our approach toward
grasping the immediate horizons wherein Angst can reveal itself in
Tillich's thought. What is required at the outset of this grasp is
an understanding of the cognitive vistas of Angst's self-disclosure.
Thus, before that disclosure becomes a fruitful hermeneutical option
for us, we must first glimpse the structure of Systematic Theology.
It is to this task that we now direct our attention.

Some Relevant Elements of
Systematic Theology

As we have seen in the preceding section, Tillich began his
Systematic Theology in 1925 at Marburg. The finished work of Volume
I was not published, however, until 1951, over a quarter of a century
later. It is beyond dispute that Tillich's depictions of nothingness,
nonbeing, and even Angst itself postdate Heidegger's analyses and
interpretations of them in Sein und Zeit. This must be true because
Tillich himself not only refers to Heidegger's interpretations, but
a fortiori, uses them to explicate and sometimes even support his own
views. This fact is important because it displays concretely
Tillich's profound debt to Heidegger regarding the basis of the
theononimous philosophy, the existential underpinnings of Christian
thought that take their point of departure from the analysis of man's
radical finitude. Let us see how this is so first with regard to the
Systematic Theology and then in regard to The Courage to Be.
The Systematic Theology was, of course, Tillich's life-long work. Its specific purpose, Tillich states, is

... to present the method and structure of a theological system written from an apologetic point of view and carried through in a continuous correlation with philosophy. The subject of all sections of this system is the method of correlation and its systematic consequences illustrated in a discussion of the main theological problems. (ST., "Preface," p. xi)

But Tillich reserved the general purpose of the work for the last powerful line of his preface. There he says, "A help in answering questions: this is exactly the purpose of this theological system" (ST., "Preface," p. xii). The work itself is separated into an Introduction and the following five parts: (1) Reason and Revelation, (2) Being and God, (3) Existence and the Christ, (4) Life and the Spirit, and finally (5) History and the Kingdom of God. Again, broadly speaking we may observe that the first half of each major part raises existential questions which from Tillich's point of view can only be answered with reference to Christian revelation, the subject of the second half of each major part. Our own concern then, again in general, is with the first half or the existential and philosophical portion of each section.

Since Systematic Theology spans over 900 coherently related pages, we cannot possibly explore must less display its full range here. Yet we should point out that at the core of the work Tillich expresses a fundamental distinction between philosophy and theology which necessitates a systematic theology that can answer the existential questions by philosophy. This he calls "theonomous
philosophy." For at root, Tillich argues, philosophy and theology radically differ. This position, of course represents a major shift from the 1911 Halle dissertation that sought to unify these two disciplines. Thus in the Systematic Theology Tillich defines philosophy as "that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object" (ST., I:18). Such a view implies that philosophy must be specifically identified with ontology. Ontology then, is defined as "... an analysis of those structures of being which we encounter in every meeting with reality" (ST., I:20).

Accordingly, ontological analyses are confirmed in philosophy via experimental verification, by which Tillich means "... the way of an intelligent recognition of the basic ontological structures within the encountered reality, including the process of encountering itself."99

Theology is likewise ontologically grounded, says Tillich, but it is not concerned with elaborating the structures of reality in itself; rather theology seeks to display "... the meaning of being for us" (ST., I:20). Thus the theologian, in contrast to the philosopher who "... tries to maintain a detached objectivity toward being and its structures" (ST., I:20), has a markedly different viewpoint towards his discipline. Specifically the theologian

... is involved--with the whole of his existence, with his finitude and his anxiety, with his self-contradictions and his despair, with the healing forces in him and in his social situation. Every theological statement derives its seriousness from these elements of existence. The theologian, in short, is determined by his faith. (ST., I:23)
From this primary difference other important differences follow such as: (1) while the philosopher seeks to discover the structure of reality as a whole, the theologian seeks to discover the meaning of a historical event; namely, the coming of Christ, in which his ultimate concern is manifest; (2) while the philosopher deals wholly with the categories of being, such as physical and psychological causality, or biological and historical time, for example, the theologian relates the same categories and concepts to the quest for a 'new being' (ST., I:24).

Yet, there are confluences of philosophy and theology which go well beyond their respective historically parallel ontological concerns: (1) The philosopher and the theologian both exist as human beings in a world. Hence the former cannot "... jump over the concreteness of his existence and its implicit theology" (ST., I:24) any more (or less) than can the theologian. (2) Moreover, and perhaps even more important, the philosopher, like the theologian "... exists in the power of an ultimate concern, whether or not he admits it to himself and to others" (ST., I:24). In any case, says Tillich, the philosopher as philosopher should admit it, because "... without an ultimate concern his philosophy would be lacking in passion, seriousness, and creativity" (ST., I:25). At rock bottom, says Tillich, "Every creative philosopher is a hidden theologian ..." (ST., I:25). Why? Because the philosopher both as thinker and as human being, must have the existential passions or what Tillich calls
"ultimate concern" (ST., I:27) and the rational power to carry out his philosophical commitment.

But despite their confluences Tillich concludes that a common basis is lacking between philosophy and theology. Philosophy, on the one hand, looks for the hidden structures of being. Theology, on the other hand, deals with the existential passions or man's ultimate concerns in the light of such structures. To understand, therefore, the place of philosophical inquiry in the discipline of systematic theology we must first understand how Tillich conceives of the role of reason in general. For only in understanding how reason functions à la Tillich can we discover the decisive difference between philosophy and theology.

For Tillich "reason" has three distinct functions: First "reason" has the sense of "technical reason," by which is meant the calculative, self-consciously logical, scientific and analytical mode of thinking; the mode commonly associated with positivism and technical linguistic analysis. Secondly, there is "ontological reason," by which Tillich means "... the structure of the mind which enables the mind to grasp and transform reality" (ST., I:22-23). From Tillich's perspective, this second type is the very mode and function of reason associated with the great metaphysical systems of classical Western thought from Parmenides to Hegel. Finally, there is "ecstatic reason" which departs from the strictly philosophical motif. Ecstatic reason is grounded, Tillich tells us, in Christian revelation. As "ecstatic" reason it is "self transcending" power that
enables us to grasp such revelations as manifestations of the meontic mystery of the ground of being itself. The antinomies and outright contradictions to which both technical and ontological reason are subject can be overcome only, says Tillich, in ecstatic reason. It is therefore the source of truth, that is, existential truth with regard to our ultimate concerns.

It must be remembered that ecstatic reason, as it is related to revelation, is grounded in the ultimate meontic mystery of being itself. Thus when such reason discloses the meaning of our ultimate concerns, it springs from the abysmal depths of the mystery of Being, the meontic Urgrund. When this occurs, according to Tillich, man undergoes a profound "ontological shock" which we believe to be related to primordial Angst in the face of the abyss. Specifically, in ecstasy, Tillich tells us, the rational mind "... transcends the basic condition of finite relationality, the subject-object structure" (ST., I:112). In such transcendence, then, "Ecstasy occurs only when the mind is grasped by the mystery, by the ground of meaning and being" (ST., I:112). The phenomenon of "ontological shock" thus occurs as a result of the negative side of the ecstatic penetration into the meontic mystery of being. Tillich states that

The threat of nonbeing, grasping the mind, produces the "ontological shock" in which the negative side of the mystery of being--its abysmal element--is experienced. "Shock" points to a state of mind in which the mind is thrown out of normal balance, shaken in its structure. Reason reaches its boundary line, is thrown back upon itself, and then is driven again to its extreme situation. This experience of ontological shock is expressed in the cognitive function by the basic philosophical question, the question of being and non-being. (ST., I:113)
In ecstatic reason the shock is both preserved and overcome. It is
preserved in the annihilating power of the Holy (mysterium tremendum)
and yet preserved in the elevating power of the divine presence
(mysterium fascinosum). Accordingly, Tillich tells us that
"Ecstacy unites the experience of the abyss to which reason in all
its functions is driven with the experience of the ground in which
reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth
of being generally" (ST., I:113). Thus we see that ecstatic reason
is itself grounded in the meontic depths of the abyss as the source
of its power to solve the antinomies of ontological reason on the one
hand and technical reason on the other. As such, the limits placed
upon ecstatic reason by human finitude show themselves through the
phenomenon of profound Angst experienced as the "ontological shock,"
the negative side of the ecstatic penetration into the mysterious
abyss of being.

With this brief outline of the tri-fold functions of reason
as a guide, we are better prepared to understand and interpret
Tillich's methodology in Systematic Theology; for it is this method-
ology that brings man's existential and ultimate concerns into concert
with theology's answers. As we saw in the opening passages of this
section, Tillich calls his method, "the method of correlation."
What, then, is this method and how is it employed in the Systematic
Theology of Paul Tillich?

In the following passage Tillich responds precisely by
describing how the method is used:
In using the method of correlation, systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions. The analysis of the human situation is done in terms which today are called "existential." Such analyses are much older than existentialism; they are, indeed, as old as man's thinking about himself, and they have been expressed in various kinds of conceptualizations since the beginning of philosophy. Whenever man has looked at his world, he has found himself a part of it. But he also has realized that he is a stranger in a world of objects, unable to penetrate it beyond a certain level in scientific analysis. And then he has become aware of the fact that he himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself. (ST., I:62)

The "door to the deeper levels of reality" is, we claim, another way of characterizing the apprehension of the abyss before which Dasein stands in primordial Angst. It is to a hermeneutically deeper analysis and description of man's existential structures that we must now turn so as to display the adequacy of this interpretation. Such an analysis will, we believe, lead us directly to the phenomenon of Angst as it shows itself within Tillich's existential thought. Our point of departure, must be Tillich's conception of ontology and man's role within that ontology. For it is here that we shall discover the final horizon of Angst's self-disclosure.

Part Two of Systematic Theology is the general framework of this horizon. It deals with "Being and the Question of God." Following his established method of "continuous correlation," Tillich begins with the question of Being as a philosophical question. But the very raising of this question is connected with the profound Angst that first arises in "ontological" or "metaphysical" shock.
Tillich specifically states "the ontological question, the question of being itself, arises in something like a 'metaphysical shock'--the shock of possible non-being" (ST., I:163) (Italics added). And, moreover, when this question arises, continues Tillich, "... everything disappears in the abyss of possible non-being; even a god would disappear if he were not being-itself" (ST., I:164).

From Tillich's perspective, then, Ontology as a human inquiry is possible only because some concepts are less universal than Being itself, but still more universal than a third, even lower level set of concepts which describe the realm of ontic, individual beings. These intermediary concepts, says Tillich, have been called "categories," or "principles," or even "ultimate notions" (ST., I:164); but, says Tillich, no agreement has been reached throughout the history of philosophy as to precisely which of these concepts must be included in any full-dress ontology "... although certain concepts reappear in almost every ontology" (ST., I:164).

To aid in understanding the fundamental aegis of ontology, Tillich suggests that there are at least four distinct levels of ontological concepts which can be meaningfully distinguished. These are: (1) the basic ontological structure that is implied in the question of being; (2) the precise elements that constitute that structure; (3) the characteristics of being that are the condition of the possibility of human existence; and finally, (4) the explicit categories of being and knowing. Let us very briefly look at how Tillich fills out this four level structure, because it will later
provide the architectonic horizon from within which primordial Angst makes its appearance.

At the first level, the condition of the possibility of the ontological question itself is, says Tillich, "... an asking subject and an object about which the question is asked; it presupposes the subject-object structure of being, which in turn presupposes the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being" (ST., I:164). Man, in other words, is a "self" which stands over against "world" as the object of ontological inquiry. To this extent self and world, while being cognitively distinguishable, are never ultimately separable. They are for Tillich dialectical polarities of the total ontological structure of being.

The second level addresses the precise polar elements that constitute that structure as the structure of being. Three outstanding dialectical pairs strike Tillich as being absolutely essential to the question of being: a) individuality and universality, b) dynamics and form, and c) freedom and destiny. Recognizing that it is through these three pairs that ontological Angst will later show itself against the finitude of existential man, it is important here to discuss their internal dynamics. Tillich explains: "In these three polarities the first element expresses the self-relatedness of being, its power of being something for itself, while the second element expresses the belongingness of being, its character of being a part of the universe of being" (ST., I:165). We shall, of course, return to these when we discuss Angst in Tillich's view.
The third level speaks to the characteristics of being itself which ultimately provide the conditions of the possibility of human existence. Tillich informs us that these are likewise bound up with concepts that address the difference between essential and existential being. Throughout the history of philosophy from Plato to Sartre, says Tillich, the duality of essence and existence remains a fundamental problem; namely, what is the relationship of essence to existence; and moreover, what is the relationship of these two to being itself? In response to these questions Tillich is explicit:

The answer is prepared by the polarity of freedom and destiny on the second level of ontological analysis. However, freedom as such is not the basis of existence, but rather freedom is unity with finitude. Finite freedom is the turning point from being to existence. Therefore, it is the analysis of finitude in its polarity with infinity as well as its relation to freedom and destiny, to being and nonbeing, to essence and existence, which is the task of ontology in the third level. (ST., I:165) (Italics added.)

Finally, with regard to the fourth level of ontology which deals with the categories of thought and being, Tillich remarks that "... their number and organization is one of the infinite tasks of philosophy" (ST., I:165). But from the standpoint of systematic theology in general and its method of correlation in particular, Tillich is interested in the four major ones: a) Time, b) space, c) causality, and d) substance. Here as well primordial Angst will display itself against the backdrop of human finitude as the human being seeks to encounter the nature of being from the standpoint of these four categories.
Having worked his way through his Introduction as to the scope and nature of Part II, Tillich next asserts his purpose in writing this part:

Since it is the purpose of this section . . . to develop the question of God as the question implied in being the concept of finitude is the center of the following analysis, for it is the finitude of being which drives us to the question of God. (ST., I:166) (Italics added.)

We are now approaching the neighborhood wherein dwells the phenomenon of ontological Angst: the neighborhood of man's finite structures.

In a subsection entitled "A. The Basic Ontological Structure--Self and World" (ST., I:168), Tillich observes: "Every being participates in the structure of being, but man alone is immediately aware of this structure" (ST., I:168). But why man and man alone? Because, says Tillich, man is the only being who can question Being. In this, of course, he agrees with Heidegger's definition of Dasein as well as Sartre's conception of réalité humaine as the human as the only kind of being that questions. Says Tillich, "Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology . . . as that being who asks the ontological question and in whose self-awareness the ontological answer can be found" (ST., I:168). And speaking of Dasein specifically, Tillich notes that Dasein is given to man within himself--man can answer the ontological question only because he experiences being in an immediate and direct manner (ST., I:169-170). Man, therefore, is that being who is decisively aware of the structures of being which makes cognition possible to begin with. In this view as well,
Tillich concurs with Heidegger's conception of Dasein, as we saw in the previous chapter.

But for Tillich, man is not only the "being-there" of Dasein. Rather, man possesses a Self—a self which "has" experiences, which is bound in a relationship of concern to his ontic world. Thus the self is, says Tillich, "... more embracing than the term 'ego.' It includes the subconscious and the unconscious 'basis' of the self-conscious ego as well as self-consciousness (cogitatio in the Cartesian sense) (ST., I:169). In adopting this perspective, Tillich departs from the view of Heidegger's Dasein in a most radical and extremely far reaching way by postulating consciousness, to say nothing of subconsciousness and even the existence of an unconscious element within the self.102

Man, then, is in Tillich's view "... a fully developed and completely centered Self. He 'possesses' himself in the form of self-consciousness. He has an ego-self" (ST., I:170). Thus, man can transcend every possible environment as an ego-self, because he has the concept of world and, at the same time is in the world as his kosmos; the structural unity of the manifoldness of experience. But even so, man is ultimately finite. "World-consciousness," says Tillich, "is possible only on the basis of a fully developed self-consciousness" (ST., I:171). We must, therefore, examine this essential finitude in order to understand how man has any world to begin with. Such an analysis leads us finally to primordial Angst in Tillich's thought, through the doorway, so to speak, of the polar
ontological elements of the second level of ontological analysis as they are manifested in man; namely, (1) individualization and participation, (2) dynamics and form, and (3) freedom and destiny. With this map to guide us, as the Vorsicht of our hermeneutical understanding, we have arrived at last at the self-disclosure of primordial Angst in Tillich's thought.

**Primordial Angst as "Anxiety" in Systematic Theology**

The reader will recall Tillich's repeated insistence that the very question of Being "... is produced by the 'shock of nonbeing'" (ST., I:186). From the standpoint of this precise possibility for man, namely the possibility of his ownmost nonbeing, being itself must remain an ultimate and meontic mystery. But this mystery is itself possible only because man has it within his power to transcend being; "he can," says Tillich, "envisage nothingness" (ST., I:186). The history of man's encounter with nothingness from Tillich's point of view is important in itself, but it need not concern us here. Rather what must concern us here is the very tip of this history: modern existential thinking—the culmination of a long and arduous task of unfolding the meaning of Being from the Archimedian point of man's ability to "envisage nothingness." Thus in an extremely important passage regarding "existentialism" and the problem of nothingness, Tillich observes that

Recent existentialism has "encountered nothingness" (Kuhn) in a profound and radical way. Somehow it has replaced being itself by non-being, giving to nonbeing a positivity and a
power which contradict the immediate meaning of the word. Heidegger's "annihilating nothingness" describes man's situation of being threatened by nonbeing in an ultimately inescapable way, that is, by death. The anticipation of nothingness at death gives human existence its existential character. Sartre includes in nonbeing not only the threat of nothingness but also the threat of meaninglessness (i.e., the destruction of the structure of being). In existentialism there is no way of conquering this threat. (ST., I:189)

Such is Tillich's introduction to the problem of nothingness and Angst in the Systematic Theology. As to how he answers this threat, we shall discuss that momentarily; but our point here is that from Tillich's perspective nonbeing is experienced in man as the "not yet" of being as well as the "no more" of being. Being, which in man is limited by nonbeing, is experienced in the mode of finitude (ST., I:189). Human finitude is, then, temporally "ecstatic."

Now according to Tillich, finitude is precisely what is encountered in awareness as the threat of nonbeing, which reveals itself through the phenomenon of ontological "anxiety." Such Angst has an ontological quality; it cannot be derived from something more primordial. As such, Angst or ontological anxiety must be as omnipresent as man's finitude; for it is dependent only on the threat of nonbeing as a necessary "inward" apprehension of man's "outward" finitude. Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre before him, Tillich agrees that there can be no object of Angst; for only in fear is there such an object. "A danger, a pain, an enemy, may be feared," says Tillich, "but fear can be conquered by action" (ST., I:191). Angst, on the other hand, can never be conquered: for no finite being can ever conquer the inward
apprehension of its own finitude. So Angst, then, "... is always present, although often it is latent. Therefore, it can become manifest at any and every moment, even in situations where nothing is to be feared" (ST., I:191). To this last passage Tillich adds an important footnote regarding psychological versus ontological Angst wherein he specifically states without any ambiguity whatsoever:

"Psychotherapy cannot remove ontological anxiety, because it cannot change the structure of finitude" (ST., I:191, footnote 7). Psychotherapy can, however, put anxiety in its proper place (by removing its compulsive manifestations and thereby reducing the frequency and intensity of ontic fears); but it can never remove ontological Angst.

The distinction between Angst or ontological anxiety and "compulsory forms of anxiety" cannot, from our own perspective, be overemphasized or undervalued. Thus to decisively sharpen this distinction, we draw attention to the following crucial passage in Systematic Theology; for here the ontological dimension of primordial Angst is clearly contrasted with pathological anxiety. Pathological anxiety, in Tillich's view, is simply another manifestation of fear as an ontic phenomenon. Tillich tells us why:

The recovery of the meaning of anxiety through the combined endeavors of existential philosophy, depth psychology, neurology, and the arts is one of the achievements of the twentieth century. It has become clear this fear as related to a definite object and anxiety as awareness of finitude are two radically different concepts. Anxiety is ontological; fear psychological. (ST., I:191)

It is precisely here that Tillich adds the important footnote concerning the terms "Angst" and "anxiety" as distinguished from
Specifically, Tillich observes that the English word "anxiety" has taken on the connotation of the German word Angst only during what was at that time the past decade: the decade of World War II. This is, of course, consistent with our opening section wherein we held that the grand madness of world-war is what accounts for modern existential thinking regarding the phenomenon of Angst. We will return again to this point in the conclusion to this chapter for we recognize that such a view is really the horizon of both Sartre's and Tillich's "existentialist" horizons on Angst.

In the footnote Tillich states that both Angst and anxiety are derived from the Latin "angustiae," which, as we saw in the Introduction to the present dissertation, means "narrowed." And Tillich concludes from this brief etymological exegesis that "Anxiety is experienced in the narrow of threatening nothingness. Therefore, anxiety should not be replaced by the word 'dread,' which points to a sudden reaction to a danger but not to the ontological situation of facing nonbeing" (ST., I:192, footnote 8). This is what we ourselves called strictural Angst in Chapter I,

Thus Angst for Tillich is an ontological phenomenon which expresses man's finitude as "... the self-awareness of the finite self as finite" (ST., I:192). This means, then, that Tillich's conception of Angst, like Sartre's conception of angoisse, is a reflective apprehension of man's finitude in the face of nothingness or nonbeing. This feature, incidentally, should provide a fertile ground for contrasting Sartre and Tillich with regard to their
respective revelations of primordial Angst, a topic reserved for the final chapter of this dissertation.

Angst and the Categorical Forms of Finitude

As was earlier indicated, Tillich's full display of the meaning of primordial Angst can take place only from within the horizon of the fourth level of ontological analysis, the categories "internal to man's being; namely, time, space, causality, and substance."

Specifically, such categories are in Tillich's view "... the forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality" (ST., I:192). But they are decidedly not simply logical forms that determine discourse about reality. Rather they determine our knowledge of the content of reality, because "... the mind cannot experience reality except through the categorical forms" (ST., I:192). Tillich states explicitly that

The categories reveal their ontological character through their double relation to being and nonbeing. They express being, but at the same time they express the nonbeing to which everything that is, is subject. The categories are forms of finitude; as such they unite an affirmative and negative element. ... Each category expresses not only a union of being and nonbeing but also a union of anxiety and courage. (ST., I:192-93)

Of course, for Tillich's method of correlation, the ontological task of raising these categories to reflection merely paves the way for the theological question: the question of God (ST., I:193). But again, the latter question is not our concern here. Our concern is the relation of these categories to the self-revealing character of Angst as the condition of the possibility of human courage.
For Tillich the central category of finitude is time, which throughout the history of Western philosophy has displayed both the positive and negative elements of being and non-being. First, with regard to time's negative elements, philosophy has pointed to the transitoriness of everything temporal as well as to the impossibility of fixing the present "now" within the temporal flux. And then with regard to time's positive elements, philosophy has seen the creative, direct, and irreversible character of time. But at rock bottom, philosophical ontology can only observe the balance between these antipodal views; it can never decide the meaning of time in itself (ST., I:193).

Experienced "inwardly" (i.e., within immediate self-awareness) time is the category which "... unites the anxiety of the transitoriness with the courage of a self-affirming present" (ST., I:193). Tillich points out that the melancholy awareness of our necessity to die, our internal ontological anxiety about having to die, is what precisely reveals the external ontological character of time. "In the anxiety of having to die nonbeing is experienced from 'the inside.' This anxiety is potentially present in every moment. It permeates the whole of man's being; it shapes soul and body and determines spiritual life; it belongs to the created character of being quite apart from estrangement and sin" (ST., I:193-94).

Tillich's theological answer to the Angst associated with transitoriness is a courage which affirms temporality. Without such courage we would succumb to the annihilating character of time.
Man needs such courage because in order to maintain his being he must existentially conquer his deepest ontological anxiety by defending his present against the threat of no future.

Secondly, space is likewise a category which expresses the element of being and nonbeing. Put positively, "To be," says Tillich, "means to have space" (ST., I:194). Obviously, the converse is likewise true: not to have space implies the threat of nonbeing. It is this latter formulation that gives rise to the phenomenon of "insecurity" as a manifestation of ontological Angst arising within the finite category of space. We each need a physical space: ". . . the body, a piece of soil, a home, a city, a country, the world" (ST., I:194). Moreover, man needs social space: ". . . a vocation, a sphere of influence, a group, a historical period, a place in rememberance and anticipation, a place within a structure of values and meanings" (ST., I:194). Such physical and social space, therefore, is an ontological necessity of man. The threat of its nonbeing is the "ultimate insecurity." But to be finite, of course entails being radically insecure (ST., I:194). Thus each of us seeks our own physical and social space with a passion, but our ontological anxiety shows itself when we fully realize that because we are finite we must ultimately and literally lose our space in a final sense of dying.

Again, courage is the theological answer to the Angst that manifests itself in the face of a threatening spacelessness. By affirming the present and the space given to us now, even if it is only for the moment, we are able to endure that which must ultimately be lost.
Third, with regard to causality, it too expresses being and nonbeing. As for being, causality points to that which precedes something else as its source, brought to fruition through being's power. Negatively, however, the cause-effect model displays the inability of the effect to be its own cause. This leads ultimately to the discovery that "things and events have no aseity" (ST., I:196). Angst of course shows itself in connection with this latter determination of causality, for man as a creature has only contingent being. He is, in Tillich's words "... the prey of nonbeing" (ST., I:196). Thus the ontological anxiety man discovers in the category of causality shows itself as Angst in the face of his lack of necessity in being.

The theological solution is, again, courage. Here courage is in the form of an acceptance of contingency and derivedness; for "Without this courage no life would be possible. . . ." (ST., I:197). Specifically, the man who has this courage does not look beyond himself for his source of being; rather he finds it within himself. Such courage, Tillich tells us, ignores the causal dependance of man's finite, contingent, and derived being.

Finally, regarding the category of substance or that which philosophy holds to be what underlies the flux of appearances, Angst shows itself in the nonbeing mode of substance as the internal apprehension by man that ultimately he must lose his substance with virtually every existential modification of his being. All this, of course, is intensified in the threat of ultimate nonbeing: the experience of having to die. Thus, having to die, says Tillich
"... anticipates the complete loss of identity with one's self" (ST., I:198). This loss of identity is likewise bound up in the threatened loss of the power to maintain oneself as a coherent identity in a world of flux.

Again, courage is the theological solution to such ontological anxiety. Specifically, it is the courage to attribute something substantial to what is ultimately accidental; for example a creative work, a dissertation, a loving relationship, a career, a "lasting contribution," and so on. Existentially, man creates values. But theology is the answer here ultimately. Angst, as it shows itself in these four categories, can only be overcome by the fundamental and essential power that lies behind the courage to face such Angst. Says Tillich, "The question of God is the question of the possibility of this courage" (ST., I:198).

**Angst and the Polar Elements of Being**

Tillich concludes his discussion of Angst in Systematic Theology by showing the dynamic tension between the ontological elements that transcend the categories on the second level of ontological analysis; namely, individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. It is precisely the polar character of such elements that opens them up to the threat of nonbeing. Polarity, then, becomes tension under the impact of finitude. And by "tension" Tillich means, "... the tendency of elements within a unity to draw away from one another, to attempt to move in opposite directions" (ST., I:198).
The Angst faced by man vis-à-vis these second level ontological elements is markedly different from the fourth level ontological anxiety discovered in the categories, which as we just saw is ontological anxiety of "... nonbeing simply and directly" (ST., I:199). Here Angst in the face of the dynamic tension of the polar elements is Angst in the face of  

... not being what we essentially are. It is anxiety about disintegrating and falling into nonbeing through existential disruption. It is anxiety about the breaking of the ontological tensions and the consequent destruction of the ontological structure. (ST., I:199) (Italics added.)

We ourselves can think of no circumstances more terrifying than these last few words, "the consequent destruction of the ontological structure;" for such a breaking of the tensions implies a snapping break in the fine thread by which we are each suspended over the bottomless abysses of meaninglessness, death, and moral condemnation. It may be useful therefore, to couch our discussion within the framework of that metaphor.

Thus, ontological Angst is at stake here in the face of "destruction of the ontological structure." In the first polar elements, namely finite individualization and finite participation, man's fragile being hangs over the abyss, stretching between the ultimate loneliness in losing our shared world and its communion (on the one hand) and the robot-like terror of becoming a collectivized entity who has lost both individuality and subjectivity as possibilities (on the other hand). We shudder, hovering in Angst between
these two poles, suspended over the abyss by a thin thread of Self that prevents the ultimate, unredeemable plunge into nonbeing. It is the discovery of this dynamic tension, Tillich says, that belongs essentially to depth-psychology and sociology; for philosophy has often overlooked it. The exception, of course, was Pascal who Tillich regards as the founder of the existential dialogue and the ontological underpinnings of the loneliness-belongingness polarity.

Secondly ontological Angst shows itself through the ontological polarities of dynamics and form. Here again the abyss looms up before man, who again is suspended on the thin thread of Self. On the one side, dynamics drives toward form "... in which being is actual and has the power of resisting nonbeing" (ST., I:199). Yet the dynamic pole of our being is at the same time threatened because we may become lost in rigid forms. If we try to break out of these rigid forms, as indeed we must to attain balance, "... the result may be chaos, which is the loss of both dynamics and form" (ST., I:200). Again the abyss calls to man who on the thin thread between dynamics and form hovers dancing like a tightrope walker that has just lost his balancing bar. And the wind in the depths of the abyss is howling. Thus primordial Angst reveals itself to us before "... the threat of a final form in which vitality will be lost ... the threat of a chaotic formlessness in which both vitality and intentionality will be lost" (ST., I:200).

Finally, with regard to the polarities of freedom and destiny, the thin thread of Self extending over the abyss is especially tense.
We are threatened on the one hand by a loss of freedom by the finite necessities of our destiny and at the same time threatened by the loss of destiny by the countless contingencies that result from finite freedom. We rush headlong into the notion of absolute freedom to save finite freedom and thereby lose our destiny. Or, we fix ourselves firmly in our self-planned destiny and thereby concede our freedom. In such Angst freedom becomes arbitrariness and both freedom and destiny are lost. To lose our destiny, says Tillich, is to fall into the abyss of despair. Says Tillich:

> To lose one's destiny is to lose the meaning of one's being. . . . Man's essential anxiety about the possible loss of his destiny has been transformed into an existential despair about destiny as such. Accordingly, freedom has been declared an absolute, separate from destiny (Sartre). But absolute freedom in a finite being becomes arbitrariness and falls under biological and psychological necessities. The loss of a meaningful destiny involve the loss of freedom also. (ST., I:201)

We shall return to this refutation of the Sartrean doctrine of freedom again in the concluding chapter of this dissertation. But for now we will close our discussion of Angst's self-revelation in Tillich's Systematic Theology by citing one final passage which we hope will partially confirm why it is that we believe there to be a close correspondance between Tillich's conception of "ontological anxiety" and what we have called "primordial Angst." Specifically, in a footnote to his discussion of Angst and the dynamic polarity between freedom and destiny, Tillich observes:

> The material discussed in this chapter is by no means complete. Poetic, scientific, and religious psychology have made available an almost unmanageable amount of material concerning finitude
not anxiety. The purpose of this analysis is to give only an ontological description of the structures underlying all these facts and to point to some understanding confirmations of the analysis. (ST., I:201) (Italics added.)

This task of providing an ontological description of the primordial structure that undergirds the many faces of Angst is precisely the task we ourselves have undertaken in this dissertation. Our task has been to show how such facets reveal themselves in the works of the thinkers we have considered here, but at root we have tried to allow the phenomenon of primordial Angst to show itself as the final radix which binds together such facets. We would argue then that since this appears to be the case on the ontological level it would also be true of the ontic level, the level to which Tillich points in the passage cited here.

To be sure, other facets of Angst as phenomenon are further discussed and illuminated in Systematic Theology, but at root they are couched in the answers provided by theology to the philosophically existential questions raised here and therefore are not of essential concern to the present work. We remark in passing that such answers are, of course, the outcome of Tillich's "method of correlation."

For example, Tillich observes that man must raise the question of God precisely and ultimately because of nonbeing's threat which gives rise to Angst (ST., I:208). Therefore, somewhat later Tillich announces that "Faith in the almighty God is the answer to the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the anxiety of finitude (ST., I:273). In general, then, it is faith in the almighty God that
Tillich offers as a solution to the problems raised here. Since such answers are theological, they are not of any more than passing interest to a dissertation that concerns itself with a hermeneutic phenomenological investigation of Angst's role in contemporary philosophical thought. We must therefore now address such philosophical concerns as they reveal themselves to us in Tillich's major work on Angst and courage: The Courage to Be.

**Primordial Angst as "Anxiety"**
**In The Courage to Be**

As with Heidegger and Sartre, Tillich's second major statement on Angst and its meaning likewise found expression through the lecture medium. In 1950 Tillich presented a series of lectures at Yale University under the aegis of the Terry foundation that discussed the phenomena of courage and Angst. This series, and the book upon which they were based, was entitled The Courage to Be.

In this second statement the concepts of both Angst and courage are discussed in far greater detail than what was presented in Systematic Theology. In doing so Tillich takes them both through a subtle but important shift in focus. Specifically, these two concepts become more anthropologically polar as opposed to the ontological polarity between them depicted in the four levels of ontolog-
philosophy; although to be sure both dimensions are clearly present.

Tillich tells us that

The title of this book, The Courage to Be, unites both meanings of the concept of courage, the ethical and the ontological. Courage as a human act, as a matter of valuation, is an ethical concept. Courage as the universal and essential self-affirmation of one's being is an ontological concept. The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation. (CB., p. 3) (Italics added.)

Thus while courage still requires absolute faith as its source (CB., pp. 171-78), and is clearly that phenomenon which allows us to carry ontological Angst within us, the courage to be is seen here essentially as a ethical act in which man affirms his own being in-spite-of the threats of non-being. This is where Angst comes in: Angst is precisely the ontological phenomenon whereby these threats to man's being are disclosed. So the subtle shift from discussing Angst ontologically; that is, within the four ontological levels of inquiry as a part of Tillich's theonomous philosophy to this ethical approach; that is, courage as self-affirmation "in-spite-of," Angst, renders the discussion of Angst in The Courage to Be more "existentialistic" in the ethical, Sartrean sense of the term, than phenomenological in either Heidegger's or Otto's sense of that term. We are not claiming that Tillich has abandoned his position of Systematic Theology, of course. We are simply suggesting that the ethical, "existentialist" approach is more pronounced in The Courage to Be than in the approach of phenomenological ontology. But in our view this shift colors the entire interpretation of Angst, at least
one full tone: from a purely descriptive to a partially prescriptive or ethical discussion, making Angst a dark reflector of ethical courage.

What then does this mean in terms of Angst's role in The Courage to Be? In Systematic Theology Tillich defined Angst as our awareness of finitude. And, says Tillich, "like finitude, anxiety is an ontological quality. It cannot be derived; it can only be seen and described. Occasions in which anxiety is aroused must be distinguished from anxiety itself" (ST., I:191) (Italics added).

In The Courage to Be, Tillich's definition of Angst has shifted from man's awareness of finitude to his awareness of possible non-being experienced in his finitude. Says Tillich:

. . . anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing. The same statement, in a shorter form, would read: anxiety is the existential awareness of nonbeing. "Existential" in this sentence means that it is not the abstract knowledge of nonbeing that produces anxiety but the awareness that nonbeing is part of one's own being. It is not the realization of universal transitoriness, not even the experience of the death of others, but the impression of these events on the always latent awareness of our own having to die that produces anxiety. Anxiety is finitude, experienced as finitude. . . . It is the anxiety of nonbeing, the awareness of one's finitude as finitude. (CB., pp. 35-36)

As can be seen from the last sentence in this passage, Tillich does not change his definition of Angst from one work to the other, rather he shifts his emphasis from Angst and the ontological analysis of finitude in Systematic Theology to the "existentialist" analysis of courage as an ethical response to the threat of non-being, experienced through Angst as our awareness of finitude; a subtle but
important shift. But there is one other important observation here to be made at the outset. In *Systematic Theology*, as we saw in the passage cited above, Tillich says that the "occasions in which anxiety is aroused must be distinguished from anxiety itself" (ST., I:191). It is precisely the purpose of *The Courage to Be* to discuss the ontological underpinnings of such occasions, so as to explicitly show how the absolute faith of courage allows man to live his life through "in-spite-of" Angst. In this way as well the second discussion of Angst differs from that provided in Tillich's major work.

Thus Tillich presents in *The Courage to Be* a full dress treatment of Angst and courage as both ontological and ethical issues. But what specifically is different? And, moreover, how does Tillich work out the roles of these two phenomena in such a way so as not to duplicate what was said in his *magnum opus*? To put the matter directly: what is the role of Angst in *The Courage to Be*?

Essentially Tillich presents three new facets of his understanding and interpretation of the Angst phenomenon in *The Courage to Be*. All three are, however, expressions of distinct directions from which nonbeing threatens man; as such they are ontological underpinnings to the specific occasions of Angst discussed above. Specifically these are the expressions of Angst in the face of: (1) fate and death, (2) emptiness and meaninglessness, and (3) guilt and condemnation. What, then, is the relationship between the element first mentioned and the second element in each of these three pairs.
Tillich tells us that the first element of each pair refers to the relative or ontic anxiety we experience in life, and the second of each pair is the underlying ontological dimension being threatened in an absolute sense. As such the second element more closely approaches the ultimate Angst known as despair (CB., p. 41).

The first way that nonbeing threatens man, and by far the most devastating in Tillich's own view, is the threat of the loss of our "ontic self-affirmation" (CB., p. 42). This means, according to Tillich "... the basic self-affirmation of a being in its simple existence." "Ontic," then, comes from the Greek "on" which in English means, of course, "Being" (CB., p. 42). The first and most universal facet of the Angst phenomenon shows itself in the face of this "ontic" threat--"the anxiety of fate and death" (CB., p. 42). This facet is, of course, a dual one. The relative anxiety in the face of the fate is in some sense distinguished from the absolute Angst apprehended in the face of death. How is this so? As we saw above, the initial or the first elements, (in this case "fate") is the ontic and relative (to man) manifestation of the more "permanent horizon" of the second element (in this case "death"). Specifically, Tillich says regarding this first complex facet, "The anxiety of death is the permanent horizon within which the anxiety of fate is at work" (CB., p. 43). The term "fate," then, represents an entire group of specific "ontic" anxieties that share one common property: "their contingent character, their unpredictability, the impossibility of showing their meaning and purpose" (CB., p. 43). The anxiety of fate is therefore grounded
in our full apprehension of our ultimate existential contingency, our utter unnecessariness, our completely accidental occurrence in being.

On the other hand, the ontological Angst which shows itself in the face of death is an absolute threat to man's self-affirmation; for death stands behind contingent being as its end-point and therefore the proof of contingency itself. Death is the ultimate claim against man by nonbeing; it robs us of all final security, sense of belonging to home, of ultimate social and individual existence. It is death, says Tillich, that "... stands behind the attacks on our power of being in body and soul by weakness, disease, and accidents. In all these forms fate actualizes itself, and through them the anxiety of nonbeing takes hold of us" (CB., p. 45).

The second facet of ontological Angst shows itself through the threat of nonbeing to man's spiritual self-affirmation. Such a threat manifests itself relatively as the "anxiety of emptiness" and absolutely as the "anxiety of meaninglessness." Specifically, spiritual self-affirmation occurs, Tillich tells us, at every moment of our creative life within the spheres of meaning that make our existence possible. Man need not be a creative artist to be spiritually creative; rather he must be able to participate in appreciating culture and thereby participate actively in the meanings given to being by such original creations. This is what Tillich means by the spiritual or cultural life in the present context. Hence the ontic form of anxiety as emptiness shows itself when we apprehend a threat
to the special contents of the spiritual life. Tillich describes this ontic anxiety as follows:

A belief breaks down through external events or inner processes: one is cut off from creative participation in a sphere of culture, one feels frustrated about something which one had passionately affirmed, one is driven from devotion to one object to devotion to another and again on to another, because the meaning of each of them vanishes and the creative eros is transformed into indifference or aversion. Everything is tried and nothing satisfies. (CB., pp. 47-48)

The absolute Angst associated with the threatened loss of spiritual self-affirmation is Angst in the face of meaninglessness, or in Tillich's words, "The anxiety of meaninglessness is anxiety about the loss of an ultimate concern, of a meaning which gives meaning to all meanings" (CB., p. 47). When the anxiety of emptiness becomes more pronounced, then, it "... drives us to the abyss of meaninglessness" (CB., p. 48). At the outset of such Angst, we feel at first a grave doubt about our spiritual center, precisely because we are then cognitively separated from that which concerns us existentially: the decisive realm of our spiritual values. The threat to this spiritual realm, says Tillich, is not simply an expanded element of the discriminatory doubt or the doubt necessary for making the aesthetic judgments which are part of spirituality; but rather total doubt—the doubt that leads to despair in the existentially ultimate meaning of that term. To attempt to combat the rapid onrush of such Angst, man may cling to traditions and accept the quiet desperation of resignation. Then, if this does not dispell the despair (as surely it cannot), we next relinquish our spiritual
freedom of asking and doubting. Specifically man "... surrenders himself in order to save his spiritual life. He 'escapes from his freedom (Fromm) in order to escape the anxiety of meaninglessness" (CB., p. 49). In this way meaning is saved, says Tillich, but the self is sacrificed.

Finally, the third facet of primordial Angst is revealed in the threat of nonbeing to man's moral self-affirmation. Relatively, this is apprehended as the anxiety of guilt. But absolutely it is Angst in the face of ultimate existential condemnation that threatens man's moral self-affirmation. Specifically, Tillich states that "man's being, ontic as well as spiritual, is not only given to him but also demanded of him" (CB., p. 51). This means that we are responsible for our being and are required to answer for what we each have made of our lives. It is each of us who asks this question, says Tillich; and likewise each of us that serves as prosecutor and judge in the court of moral self-affirmation.

From the ontic or relative standpoint, this defendant-prosecutor-judge function which each of us must play out is what gives rise to the anxiety of guilt. "Man," says Tillich (in opposition to Sartre), "is essentially 'finite freedom' ... free within the contingencies of his finitude. But within these limits he is asked to make of himself what he is supposed to become, to fulfill his destiny" (CB., p. 52). Now insofar as man is finitude, he cannot, of course, become perfect. Indeed, even his best deed is prevented from being perfect by the radical finitude at his essence.
Hence, as a stern judge at the bar of personal responsibility, each man is asking himself to account for what he has become. He must experience his own radical inability to become perfect. The apprehension of this ontic fact is, says Tillich, the anxiety of guilt.

Behind this ontic anxiety there stands the angst of total condemnation: the possibility of being condemned to the despair of having lost our worth as human beings and our destiny as persons. To compensate for such ultimate angst, we can either defy all negative judgments about our Selves, as well as the moral demands upon which they are based, (the position of anomism); or we can flee into moral rigor with its satisfactions, (the position of legalism). But in either case, moral angst abides, waiting to break into the open "... producing the extreme situation of moral despair" (CB., p. 53).

With this, Tillich completes his discussion of both ontic anxiety and spiritual or ontological angst. In his next chapter, Tillich takes up the nature of pathological anxiety. Here we must mention this discussion very briefly so as to distinguish such purely psychological or neurotic anxiety from ontological angst. Tillich states at the outset of this third chapter that "non-existential anxiety, which is the result of contingent occurrences in human life, has been mentioned only in passing" (CB., p. 64), but it is now time to take up this discussion both explicitly and systematically. This is precisely what Tillich does. Specifically, he observes that the several psychotherapeutic theories of neurotic anxiety have one common denominator: they each see anxiety as "... the awareness of unsolved
conflicts between structural elements of the personality. . ." (CB., p. 64). These are, then, conflicts between unconscious drives and repressive norms, for example, or between imaginary versus real worlds. Yet the basic problem, systemic to psychotherapeutic theory in general, is that its theoreticians, much less its practitioners, cannot agree upon what is basic to the nature of neurotic anxiety as opposed to what is derived in the form of symptoms. The result is utter confusion. Says Tillich:

It is the lack of a clear distinction between existential and pathological anxiety, and between the main forms of existential anxiety. This cannot be made by depth-psychological analysis alone; it is a matter of ontology. Only in the light of an ontological understanding of human nature can the body of material provided by psychology and sociology be organized into a consistent and comprehensive theory of anxiety. (CB., p. 65) (Italics added.)

Thus, pathological anxiety is ontological Angst under special conditions. What these conditions are, are themselves contingent upon the various relationships between self-affirmation, courage, and Angst. Tillich has, of course, outlined the dynamics of these relationships on the ontological and moral level. But it is the moral level that ultimately triumphs: "Courage resists despair by taking anxiety into itself" (CB., p. 66). It is this clue concerning the nature of courage that makes possible an understanding of pathological anxiety. When man becomes incapable of self-affirmation "in-spite-of" despair, he "... can succeed in avoiding the extreme situation of despair by escaping into neurosis" (CB., p. 66). We see, then, that neurosis, defined by Tillich as "... the way of avoiding nonbeing by
avoiding being" (CB., p. 66) is the very epicenter of the ontic phenomenon of pathological or non-existential anxiety. Primordial Angst is, then, short-circuited.

It is with this last observation on the distinction between pathological anxiety and primordial Angst, that we conclude our discussion of our ground phenomenon in Tillich's thought. We shall now turn to some observations and questions concerning the self-disclosure of primordial Angst within this cognitive horizon as propaedeutic to Chapter V of the present work, our next and final chapter.

Preliminary Conclusions Regarding Tillich and Angst

We can now draw to a close our brief outline of how primordial Angst shows itself in Tillich's thought by again raising the question of what it is that we have learned here that furthers Angst's revelation as a self-revelation in contemporary philosophical thought. Keeping in mind that contrasts and comparisons are very close at hand in the following chapter, we shall restrict our comments here to little more than a skeletal sketch of the promises and problems engendered from Tillich's contribution.

First, regarding the obvious promises, we may observe the following six points: (1) Tillich's analysis of the Angst phenomenon is the radical synthesis of both Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's analyses which makes possible an active solution to
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the problem of Angst—namely, courage. (2) Angst in Tillich's view is both an ontological problem and an ethical one. It thus provides a nexus between phenomenological ontology and existential philosophy. (3) Tillich's analysis of Angst, from the standpoint of "theonomous philosophy" in general and the four levels of ontological analysis in particular, makes the description of Angst far less difficult to see than does previous descriptions. (4) Tillich's conception of Angst as a consequence of man's finite freedom displays a positive role for Angst as the condition of the possibility of courage and the ultimate joy of self-affirmation in the face of the abysses of death, meaninglessness, and condemnation. (5) Tillich's analysis of Angst as the "ontological shock" in the face of the abyss provides the basis for a phenomenological linkage between Heidegger's atheism and Otto's theism; thus accounting for the phenomenon of the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum as an element of his Angst analysis. (6) Tillich's analyses of the many facets of what we have ourselves called primordial Angst makes possible a synthetic apperception of that phenomenon as the ultimate ground for Angst in the face of fate and death, Angst in the face of guilt and condemnation, and Angst in the face of emptiness and meaninglessness.

But over against this important series of contributions to Angst's self disclosure, there stands a set of provisional problems that will demand attention in the following chapter. We may roughly sketch these problems as follows.
1. Tillich holds that man is more than Dasein: man has a Self which possesses a conscious, a subconscious, and an unconscious. This assumption may tend in the end to provide the downfall of Tillich's ontological analysis of Angst, because it opens that analysis to the charge that Angst is not an ontological phenomenon after all, but rather one which springs from the wholly immanent abyss of the human unconscious, as is generally argued by the depth-psychologists. For reasons we shall discuss in the next chapter, we cannot accept this view; nor, we suspect, would Tillich. But the admission of man's ego as "possessing" these psychic attributes clearly opens his analysis up to an immanenstist attack.

2. Tillich tells us that Angst is at once the apprehension of our own finitude as a matter "internal" to man, and the apprehension of the threat of non-being, as an "external" matter. While finitude is made wholly clear with respect to the four levels of ontological analysis, the notion of non-being is never made transparent except as that which conditions the threat against man's self-affirmation. Ultimately for Tillich non-being is a mystery, a meontic nothing that stands in dialectical tension over against Being. Thus if Sartre errs on the side of too complete a description of nothingness, Tillich may well err on the side of incompleteness, a charge that renders his position vulnerable to the more drastic accusations of obfuscation and obscurantism regarding the ontological character of Angst as the threat of non-being.
3. Finally, although by no means do we mean that we have tried to exhaust all the possibilities here, there is the problem of the so-called answer to Angst, the phenomenon of courage. If courage is to show itself as a phenomenological phenomenon then we must be able to describe precisely its elements as they show themselves both ontically and ontologically. Tillich, of course, does this ontically throughout both his Systematic Theology and The Courage to Be. But the ontological condition of the possibility of courage is primordial Angst in its various facets of death, meaninglessness, and condemnation. So if courage is to be a genuine answer to the challenge of Angst it must have its ontological ground in something other than Angst. This is, of course, the absolute faith in man's ultimate concern which Tillich calls the God beyond God; and the justification for the term "meta-theology" for his theonomous philosophy. The "answer," even though Tillich tells us that it is a necessary one, is clearly not necessary to Sartre, for example; who would likely argue that Tillich's answer is no answer at all, and in fact is little more than an elaborate cover-up of man's de trop being in a universe without God or the God above God. In other words, Tillich is here open to the charge of confusing his experience of faith with the ultimate justification for faith, a charge against which there can be no sound phenomenological or logical defense.

Again, it is not necessary to further belabor our point here. There are obvious strengths and weaknesses on both sides of Tillich's
display. We do not presume to be wise enough to ultimately determine the issue of the final adequacy of Tillich's portrait of Angst. But we do suggest that it will finally turn upon the "beyond theism" or "meta-theism" that seeks to answer the antinomies raised by existential analysis of the human condition. Such is the whole point, after all, of Tillich's correlative approach to theonomous philosophy. The adequacy of both Tillich's analysis of ontological Angst and ethical courage may be confirmed only if the statement representing the culmination of his analysis is existentially true, even if it is not phenomenologically adequate; namely, "the courage to be is rooted in the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt" (CB., p. 190). If such a statement is false regarding either existential truth or phenomenological adequacy, then the argument regarding the dialectical structures of Angst and courage becomes a purely theological one; not one that carries the force of phenomenological ontology from the standpoint of philosophy, a force for which Tillich strives.

With this in mind as part of the task to which we shall address ourselves in the following chapter, we now bring to a conclusion this outline of the atheistic and "theistic" interpretations of Angst in contemporary philosophical thought, and move on to our final chapter.
1 Alexander Astruc and Michel Contat, Sartre by Himself, translated by Richard Seaver, (New York: Urizon Books Inc., 1978), p. 50. Note: Sartre tells us that during his captivity he had read Heidegger a second time, and "...three times a week I used to explain to my priest friends Heidegger's philosophy." On this same page it is pointed out that according to Simone de Beauvior, Sartre retired from captivity as a fundamentally changed person—one who had become rigid with moral righteousness.

2 Rollo May, Paulus: Reminiscences of a Friendship, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 18. Note: "Paulus" was the name Paul Tillich was known by in his native German, according to May. Cf. p. 1 of the above cited work.


4 It is clear that Sartre's description of angoisse is meant to parallel that of Heidegger's Angst, a fact implied in Sartre's statement that he sees no essential contradiction between Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's "two descriptions of anguish (angoisse). This does not mean however that Sartre's description is point for point analogous to either Kierkegaard's or Heidegger's as we shall soon see. Cf. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York: Pocket Books, 1966), p. 65. (Note: hereafter we will refer to this work as BN., and cite the appropriate page number.)


6 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63), I:191, footnote 8. Here, as we shall later see, Tillich observes: "Both Angst and anxiety are derived from the Latin word angustiae, which means narrows. Anxiety [in Tillich's sense of the term] is experienced in the narrows threatening nothingness. Therefore, anxiety should not be replaced with the word dread, which points to a sudden reaction to a danger but not to the ontological situation of facing nonbeing." We shall, of course, have a great deal more to say about this issue in Part 2 of
this chapter. (Note: Hereafter we shall designate this work as ST, followed by volume and page.)

7 Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1952). (Hereafter we shall designate this work as CB.)

8 Which means, of course, that the present chapter might be somewhat lengthy vis-a-vis the three which precede it. But since this work is concerned with contemporary philosophical thought and the self-disclosure of Angst within it, one long chapter that makes contrasts and comparisons possible between the theistic and atheistic modes of Angst's self disclosure is in our view superior to two chapters in which this flow of contrasts and comparisons is broken up.


10 This is, of course, the proper translation into English of the subtitle of Sartre's work. At the time this work Sartre could not possibly have agreed to the term "Existentialist" in this title. Besides this, the French clearly states that it is an "outline" (Esquisse) of a phenomenological description.


14 Sartre by Himself was originally a film length interview in which many persons participated in posing questions to Sartre. The film was begun in 1972, and after a three year hiatus, was first shown at the Cannes Festival on May 27, 1976.

15 Ibid., p. 25.

16 Ibid., p. 29. Note: the text points out that Sartre meant to say "Levinas" rather than "Gurvitch."

Ibid., p. 463. Note: Speigelberg relates that Heidegger did not remember meeting Sartre prior to Sartre's Freiburg lecture of 1953. Yet the following account of Sartre's early meetings with Heidegger is perhaps worth repeating. Speigelberg says: "When asked soon after the war about his early acquaintance with Sartre, Heidegger did not remember him by name; then he identified him as 'the Frenchman who had always confused him with Husserl.' Sartre's primary interest at that time was clearly in Husserl. It was not until the period of L'Etre et le néant that he became more keenly interested in Heidegger's own philosophy. His reaction to Heidegger personally was apparently negative. Thus in commenting on Heidegger's political role, he stated publically: 'Heidegger n'a pas de caractère. Voilà la vérité' (Action, December 27, 1944; Lettres, Genève, I (1945) p. 83). Nevertheless, Sartre was one of the first to intercede for Heidegger after the French occupation of Freiburg to the extent of wanting him to be invited to Paris."

For those who are interested, the translation of Sartre's comment is something like, "Heidegger does not have any character. That is the truth." While this is not the place to discuss Heidegger's Nazi connections, we feel compelled at least to state that in our view there can be no excuse for this event in his life as a philosopher. Some of the documents that have recently come to light have clearly shown that his involvement was more than marginal. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, The Discovery of Mind, II:219-24 for some of the more glaring examples of this involvement.


28 Ibid.

29 Sartre by Himself, p. 25.


31 BN., pp. 45-47.


35 There is a possibility, of course, that Lequier could have been cited in one of any of Sartre's unpublished works such as, for example, the one mentioned in Sartre by Himself entitled "Psyche," which was not completed, Cf., Sartre by Himself, p. 50.

36 Speigelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, II:469.

37 Sartre by Himself, pp. 50-51.


40 Space considerations prevent us for any treatment of "bad faith" beyond its mention on this chapter. We recognize, however, that any full-dress treatment of the phenomenon of Angst in Sartre's thought would require an analysis of "bad faith" to display the means whereby we seek to overcome essential Angst interpreted of course as angoisse.


43 The use of the first person is, or course, the phenomenological "I" which examines what is given to it in consciousness. This is a precedent established by Husserl at the beginning of his own phenomenological investigations.
44. Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevski to Sartre*, p. 45.


46. *Sartre by Himself*, pp. 74-75.

47. Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," in Kaufmann's translation, pp. 290-91.

48. Ibid., p. 291.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p. 293.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., p. 294.

53. Ibid.


55. Ibid.


57. Ibid., p. 29.

58. The reader will recall that in discussing how May uncritically accepted Tillich's insistance that Angst should be translated as "anxiety" rather than as "dread" in Lowrie's translation of *Begröften Angst*, we argued that May had violated a principal canon of hermeneutic phenomenology; namely, the appeal to Tillich as an authorative source, a circumstance which Heidegger saw as an external signification placed over the things themselves which is grounded upon "fancies or popular conceptions" Cf. BT., p. 195.


61. Ibid., p. 8.

Tillich read the complete works of Schelling twice before presuming to write his dissertation(s) on Schelling. Cf. Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 47.

This work has been translated into English by Victor Nuovo as The Construction of the History of Religion in Schelling's Positive Philosophy, (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974).

This work has likewise been translated by Victor Nuovo as Mysticism and Guilt Consciousness in Schelling's Philosophical Development, (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1974).


Ibid.

Other antinomies discussed by Tillich in this connection are those between identity and difference, unity and the manifold, and theoretical and practical reason. Cf. Tillich, Mysticism and Guilt Consciousness, "Translator's introduction," pp. 11-12.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., On the Boundary, p. 53.

Ibid., p. 48.

Ibid., pp. 48-49.

Ibid.

When he met Heidegger, then a young associate Professor at Marburg, Tillich was himself a visiting associate professor of Theology.

Kegley and Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 11.


Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 117.


Tillich, On the Boundary, p. 57.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., pp. 56-57.

Ibid., p. 54.

Hannah Tillich, From Time to Time, p. 117.


Kegley and Bretall, The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 6.

Tillich, My Search for Absolutes, p. 129.

Ibid., p. 130.

ST., I:216.

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, p. 15. Note: it is interesting that Otto employs a full range of possible terms here to describe the subtle nuances of the tremendum experience. He mentions the Hebrew higdlsh (hallow), meaning "keep a thing holy in the heart," for example to mark off a feeling of dread "not to be mistaken for any ordinary dread," but rather one that is exclusively related to the experience of numinous (p. 15). But moreover Otto likens the mysterium feeling of tremendum to te'émah or fear of Yahweh; to the θεός (augustus) of the Greeks, a name given only properly to the numen despite the Roman corruption of it; to several German words such as erschauern (to quiver with emotion), and the baser German concepts of grausen (to have a horror of), grasslich (grisly) and specifically Scheu (dread). Finally in English Otto suggests the words "awe" and "aweful" ". . . in their deeper and most special sense approximate closely our meaning" (p. 14). Needless to say this etymological excursion
of the religious phenomenon of **mysterium tremendum** is likewise close to our own analysis of the self-revelation of primordial Angst as an ontological phenomenon discussed by us in Chapter I of the present work.

95 This capsule summary excludes the important influences of Hegel, Marx, Hursch, Barth, and a host of others that we cannot consider here.

96 ST., I:191.

97 CB., p. 35.

98 The vision of the unification and bifurcation of philosophy and theology was an ever present problem for Tillich. As early as 1923 in his work *Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenständen und Methoden* [The System of Science According to its Objects and Methods (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1923),--], Tillich described and explained his concept of theology as "theonomous philosophy" or "theonomous metaphysics." Philosophy per se, says Tillich, is concerned with the finite and the conditioned, regarding the unconditioned as ground. Theonomous philosophy on the other hand, "turns toward the unconditional for its own sake, using the conditioned forms to grasp the unconditional through them."

(Martin, The Existentialist Philosophy of Paul Tillich, p. 30). Hence although Philosophy and Theology as Theonomous Philosophy differ, the highest **τέλος** of the latter is "to pass beyond its own independence, bringing to expression its unity with autonomous philosophy." (Ibid.)

99 Martin, The Existentialist Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 28.

100 The concept of "ultimate concern" is, of course the phenomenological description associated with God. Tillich says, "God," is the answer to the question implied in man's finitude: he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately" (ST., I:211). It is very important to realize that this phenomenological takes its point of departure from Otto's experience of the Holy. Tillich therefore cements the phenomenological nexus between himself and Otto by asserting without equivocation: "Only that which is holy can give man ultimate concern, and only that which gives man ultimate concern has the quality of holiness" (ST., I:215).

101 The "New Being," refers to "the quest for a new and saving power that will heal the disruptions and estrangements between an old religion and culture and a new one. Christianity's assertion is that the New Being "manifests itself in a unique and dynamic way" in

102 Unlike Heidegger and Sartre, Tillich accepted as relevant to Systematic Theology at least, the insights of depth-psychology. Thus, the unconscious is related to the "dynamics" element of the "dynamics-form" polarity as but one manifestation of this ontological pole to which correspond the "Urgrund" of Boehme, the "will" of Schopenhauer, the "will-to-power" of Nietzsche, the "elan vital" of Bergson, and the "strife" of Jung. But Tillich extends his unconsciousness notion not only to Freud but to Hartmann as well, seeing it as "... mere potentiality" (ST., I:179).

103 It is very likely the contents of this footnote that provided the support for Rollo May's statement in The Meaning of Anxiety where he cites the authority of Tillich in asserting the what Kierkegaard meant by Angst was "anxiety" rather than Walter Lowrie's translation as "dread." Cf. May, The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 36-37, note 39.

CHAPTER V

PRE-REFLECTIVE ANGST AND THE LATER HEIDEGGER

The Question at Hand

In our attempts to depict the phenomenon of Angst and its place in Western philosophical thought, we have employed a somewhat microscopic and almost wholly synoptic approach throughout the three preceding chapters of this dissertation. Thus Chapters II, III, and IV are distinctly different in tone and focus from Chapter I, where we employed a broadly based interpretation of primordial Angst as it revealed itself throughout the Western tradition. We have employed, therefore, two differing approaches to the phenomenon of Angst whose differences we must now try to make wholly explicit.

It is clear that Chapter I takes a broad-based, or what may be called a "macro-hermeneutical," approach to examining the place of Angst in the tradition. On the other hand, Chapters II through IV appropriate a narrow based, or what we may term the "micro-hermeneutical," approach to examining Angst à la its specific self-revelations in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre and Tillich. Our focus upon Angst was, then, considerably narrowed to show greater details of its self-disclosure.
Indeed, our entire attempt here has been to allow Angst to show itself in its own light—to sweep away, as it were, the cobwebs and darkness that obscures Angst's essential role in the very serious business of authentic human being. Only on the basis of this specific or "micro-hermeneutical" analysis, we suggest, can there be a return to a phenomenologically sound macro-hermeneutical interpretation regarding the overall role Angst plays in Western thought. In general we may observe that our conclusions must be based phenomenologically upon the preceding four chapters: our final macro-perspective on Angst grounded in our micro-perspectives.

By way of summary, therefore, we might suggest to the reader that the present dissertation has attempted to employ the hermeneutic phenomenological method to adequately allow Angst to dis-close its essential features—from its first glimmers in pre-mythopoeic man up through its elegant "meta-theological" interpretation in Paul Tillich's thought. To be sure, we have detailed many individual facets of Angst here; but our completeness will allow us now to draw several major conclusions that are decisively grounded in Angst's self-revelation rather than in the "fancies or popular conceptions" which undermine the hermeneutic phenomenological enterprise.

But here in our final chapter we must move from the in-depth analysis or the "micro-hermeneutic" approach of the past three chapters to the "macro-hermeneutic" or general horizontal analysis of
Angst's role in contemporary philosophical thought. Again, if our micro-hermeneutics have been adequate, then the macro-hermeneutical conclusions we draw here should follow naturally from our preceding labors. To accomplish the task the present chapter will be organized as follows in order to bring this dissertation to what we hope will be a useful and fruitful conclusion. In the second section which follows, we hope to very briefly summarize the major facets of primordial Angst that have been discussed here. This should serve to sharpen the contrasts and comparisons of the major treatments of Angst that we have considered at the "micro level." The third section will attempt to contrast and compare at the "macro level" the major roles that Angst plays in the positions of the thinkers we have considered. The section will take as its departure point a consideration of Angst as an "apprehension" which is either reflective in nature or pre-reflective at root. This should provide a brief summary of our work. In the fourth section we will attempt to show that the central nexus to which each self-revelation of Angst points is the self-will of Dasein and its utter craving for the absolute. Thus we hope to show that the abyss metaphor is really a schematization of the fundamental desire of finite Dasein to become one with the infinite, the eternal, the ultimate substance and the ultimate cause as the ground of its Being. Then, the fifth section will explore Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit, which we translate as "renunciation," as the means whereby Angst discloses the abyss of representational thinking itself. With
this task completed we will draw our final conclusion and end our labors in the sixth section, our final section.

**Summary of the Essential Features of Angst**

In Chapter I our task was to display from within the macro-hermeneutical perspective primordial Angst and the four faces of its self-manifestation, from pre-philosophical times up through the nature-mysticism of Jacob Boehme. In this first chapter our ground phenomenon, primordial Angst, was described phenomenologically as a pre-reflective apprehension of an aboriginal abyss of meaninglessness that lies behind the lived-world of experience; an apprehension that is at once both daunting and fascinating. We attempted to show how primordial Angst is generally schematized as the abyss metaphor, a metaphor used consistently throughout the Western tradition. To ground this understanding and interpretation, we explored the manner of primordial Angst's self-disclosure as: (1) "onto-theological Angst," or the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss that separates finite being from infinite Being, and one schematized the disrelationship between Dasein seen as "creature" standing before its "creator"; (2) "strictural Angst," or the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss that separates ontic human freedom from ontological necessity, and one schematized as the binding yoke of Ananke and its restrictions upon the Greek conception of Dasein; (3) "pneumatical Angst," or the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss that separates the divine spark of gnostic Dasein's spirit from the
absolute Godhead of the gnostic God above God: an abyss schematized as the evil archons and their tyrannical Heimarmene over gnostic Dasein; (4) "passional Angst," or the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss that separates the mystical Godhead from those mystical Dasein who seek ultimate union with it, and one schematized as the "dark night of the soul" that each mystical Dasein must face in its quest for union with the absolute. With these displays of primordial Angst and its various facets completed, we drew the "macro-hermeneutical" analysis of Angst to a close.

In Chapter II we considerably narrowed our focus on Angst by taking up a new "micro-hermeneutical" perspective. Here we tried to reveal the horizons of Kierkegaard's thought which made possible the first full-dress treatment of the Angst phenomenon, the 1844 work entitled Begrebnet Angest. Within this microscopic approach we discussed first the influences on Kierkegaard's thought to determine if Angst revealed itself to him as a result of his own personal experience, or as an expansion of the Angst conception implicit in the works of Boehme, Schelling, von Baader and Hamann. We also found it useful to describe the collateral development of Kierkegaard's approach to Angst to show that its final revelation resulted from a bi-polar method of doing philosophy; namely, the "cognitive approach," on the one hand, and the "experimental/psychological approach," on the other. Keeping this dual approach in mind, we showed how Angst first revealed itself in Kierkegaard's reaction to his melancholic father, but that the concept of Angst
was deepened by Kierkegaard's readings of Hamann. Kierkegaard then further deepened the self-revelation of Angst in his thought by employing the model of "anthropological contemplation" with its ground rules of the Socratic "know thyself!" and the unum nous omnes [if you know one you know all]. From this approach we saw how the concept of Angst first emerged as the romantic notion of the "master thief," a notion that was later transformed into a more mature concept of "presentiment." It was in presentiment that Angst finally arose as a theme for philosophical investigation. Thus, in Begrebnet Angst, Kierkegaard provides the first full dress treatment of primordial Angst from the standpoint of hereditary sin and human freedom. We discovered here that at bottom Angst was described by Kierkegaard as a pre-reflective apprehension of "freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility"; a rather obscure way of expressing the utterly daunting and yet fascinating apprehension of freedom as being radically open to any human potentiality we choose to actualize. After examining the substructures of Kierkegaard's pre-phenomenological analysis of Angst with especial regard to the phenomena of "inclosing reserve," we concluded our micro-hermeneutical analysis of Angst's first explicit self-disclosure.

In Chapter III we continued this micro-hermeneutical motif by examining how primordial Angst shows itself in the early mature thought of Martin Heidegger. As with the Kierkegaard chapter, we
first sketched the broad hermeneutical vistas by inquiring into the influences upon Heidegger's philosophical development up until the time that *Sein und Zeit* was written. We discovered that for Heidegger both the alpha and the omega point of philosophical investigation is the question of the meaning of Being: the omnipresent Seinsfrage. Thus, the self-revelation of Angst in Heidegger's thought must naturally take place within the purview of this leading question; a purview that demands an analysis of the ontological structures of the only entity that can raise the question of Being, Dasein. As a more specific vista we saw that there are four basic structures of Dasein's being, the so-called "Existenzials" or ontological properties of Dasein: (1) understanding, (2) disposition (or attunement), (3) speech (or discourse or articulation), and (4) fallenness (or forfeiture). Here we discovered that primordial Angst is the primary mode of Dasein's second Existenzial, disposition (or attunement). Angst is therefore described as a lucid, pre-reflective apprehension of the nothingness that is the ontological "ground" of Being-in-the-world and Dasein's telos, death. As such, primordial Angst discloses to Dasein Dasein's ownmost mode of Being-in-the-world as an entity that is a "thrown-projection:" one which exists toward its ownmost, nonrelational, unsurpassable potentiality for being—death. Yet we saw this was not the final self-disclosure of Angst in Heidegger's thought. In *What is Metaphysics?*, his 1929 Inaugural Lecture, Heidegger offered a new and utterly astonishing facet of Angst's self-revelation: Angst, and the nothingness
revealed in it, is the condition of the possibility of finite transcendence in general, and as such is what makes possible anything like "scientific knowledge." Too, in the postscript to this lecture Heidegger clearly insists that Angst is not anxiety in the pathological sense of that term. Rather in this postscript, which clearly is Heidegger's final specific statement on Angst, we see the phenomenon of Angst in its full primordial spotlight: Angst is the ontological condition of Dasein that makes possible Dasein's experience of Being. So Angst is intimately connected to the Seinsfrage as that phenomenological phenomenon which gives rise to the question of the meaning of Being in the first place. Hence Angst must likewise be the phenomenological wellspring of scientific knowledge in so far as scientific knowledge concerns the entities within Being.

Chapter IV again employed the micro-hermeneutical motif with regard to how primordial Angst discloses itself in both the "atheistic existentialism" of Jean Paul Sartre and the theonomous philosophy or "meta-theology" of Paul Tillich. It was therefore necessary to divide the chapter into two parts so as to juxtapose these two radically differing conceptions of Angst.

In Part One we explored how Angst reveals itself in Sartre's two works: Being and Nothingness and "Existentialism is a Humanism." After discussing the relative influences of Descartes, Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel on Sartre's early mature thought, we showed that the Cartesian dualism that is reflected in the basis distinction between the en-soi and the pour-soi places a radically different color
on how Sartre works out the full existential implications of Angst. So for Sartre, Angst (angoisse) is, generally speaking, reflective rather than pre-reflective; a second level phenomenon that is a self-conscious, self-related apprehension of the ultimate nothingness that stands between human reality and its possibilities. 

Angoisse is a constant mode of consciousness as consciousness of nihilation. It is precisely from angoisse, therefore, that human reality gets its consciousness of freedom as absolute freedom, a freedom to which each of us is condemned.

In the second part of Chapter IV we inquired into how Angst shows itself in the "God-beyond-God" or "meta-theology" of Paul Tillich's two master works: Systematic Theology and The Courage to Be. Again employing the micro-hermeneutical method, we explored the influences of Schelling, Kierkegaard, Kähler, Husserl, Heidegger and Rudolf Otto as predecessors in whom Tillich's self-revelation of Angst as "ontological anxiety" is couched. Next we turned to an overview of Tillich's Systematic Theology discovering that primordial Angst shows itself as the pre-reflective apprehension of human finitude in general, and one's own finitude in particular. As this apprehension becomes more reflective, that is, as it manifests itself to Dasein's self-consciousness, it becomes the daunting experience of ontological anxiety: the threat of non-being to man's being. We discovered that the ontological pole of such ontological Angst is for Tillich grounded in the dialectical polarities of Being that are revealed in the question of Being. For Tillich the dialectical pairs
are: individualism and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny. Man's experience of ontological \textit{Angst}, however, is pre-reflectively apprehended as the "shock of nonbeing"--a threat to man's being. Such a shock is made reflective through the "inward" categories of time, space, substance and causality. Then, in The Courage to \textit{Be}, we found that Tillich draws out the existential and moral consequences of his theonimous analysis of ontological \textit{Angst} presented originally in Systematic Theology. There Tillich shows that ontological \textit{Angst} manifests itself to man as the threat to man's ontological self-affirmation (the \textit{Angst} of fate and death), to man's moral self-affirmation (the \textit{Angst} of guilt and condemnation) and to man's spiritual self-affirmation (the \textit{Angst} of emptiness and meaninglessness). \textit{Angst}, then, was considered to be the phenomenon that made possible human courage as the answer to man's being.

With our discussion of Tillich completed we drew Chapter IV to a close. But at the conclusion of each of these micro-hermeneutic chapters we raised major questions that remained open to further elaboration and discussion in this, the final chapter of our work. Let us once again summarize these questions as well so as to provide a framework for our final contrasts and comparisons of how \textit{Angst} shows itself in the philosophies of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre and Tillich.

\textbf{Problems and Promises for Further Consideration}

First, regarding Kierkegaard's founding and utterly seminal contribution to \textit{Angst}'s self-disclosure, we observed four major contributions of his work: (1) Virtually every ontic feature of
Heidegger's ontic analysis of Dasein is present to some extent in Begrebnet Angst. (2) The iron-like cognitive rigor and careful psychological confirmations equally present in Begrebnet Angst make Kierkegaard's analysis of Angst a masterwork of pre-Husserlian phenomenological analysis. (3) Kierkegaard's insight into Angst as the precondition of the leap between possibility and actuality is actually a major source of Heidegger's conception of Angst in the face of the utterly transcendent nothingness, the outer Bewandtnisganzheit of world, as well as Sartre's conception of Angst in the face of the utterly immanent nothingness, the inner intuition of absolute freedom. Finally, (4) Kierkegaard's analysis of Angst and "inclosing reserve" provide much fruitful grounds for the kind of psycho-therapeutic approaches of Binswanger, May, Angel and Ellenberger; to say nothing of the existential psychoanalysis of Sartre.

Over against this impressive list of accomplishments we also discussed the constraints that prevented the pre-phenomenological Kierkegaard from penetrating further into the ontological foundations of primordial Angst. Specifically, we saw that the following were basically opaque presuppositions of his time: (1) the vision of man as a res cogitans, to whose mode of being belongs the attributes of understanding, feeling, and will; and (2) the vision of positivistic science as the paradigm of certainty regarding the "anthropological contemplation" essential of the Gersteswissenschaften. It was as we saw, precisely against these pre-suppositions that Kierkegaard's mature philosophy took serious exception, culminating in the vision
of the category of the individual as the basis of philosophical inquiry. Having displayed these promises and problems, we closed our second chapter.

Secondly, regarding Heidegger's contribution to Angst's ontico-ontological self-disclosure, we raised another set of promises and problems for further consideration. Specifically, we observed that among his enormous accomplishments are the following:

1. Heidegger's preoccupation with the Seinsräge makes his analysis, understanding, and interpretation of Angst an ontologically visible phenomenon rather than one which is exclusively ontic or psychological.

2. Heidegger's interpretation of Angst ultimately opens up this phenomenon to an even deeper exposition of its implications from the standpoints of Sartre's conception of nothingness and Tillich's conception of courage.

3. Heidegger's vision of Angst, grounded in the ontological truth of Being on the one hand and the ontic truth of historical human being on the other, brings together the Lebensphilosophie of Dilthey and the main thrust of Husserl's early phenomenological epoché: a synthesis which as we shall soon see has had enormous consequences which have not as yet been appreciated.

4. Heidegger's notion of Angst as the primary disposition (Grundbefindlichkeit) of Dasein, equiprimordial with understanding (Verstehen) and speech (Rede), shows Angst to be the rock-bottom condition of the possibility of Dasein's ontic and affective life in general. In particular Angst makes possible phenomena such as fear, boredom, joy, etc., notions often neglected within virtually any other attempt to
discuss ontology in the Western tradition. (5) Heidegger's depiction of Angst, therefore, covers much ontic territory with ample adequacy of interpretation; that is, the ontic phenomena of fear, boredom, and joy in themselves take on a new depth of meaning, a depth which provides a philosophical legitimacy to the effective dimension of human being. Finally, (6) Heidegger's grounding of scientific inquiry in primordial Angst provides this basic phenomenon with a sense of ultimate importance in the realm of epistemology; an importance that requires serious consideration by even the most avid of Heidegger's critics.

Against this list of accomplishments we raised several important questions that require further consideration: (1) Heidegger's conception of Angst may be in the final analysis only an ontological construction that is not capable of being grounded ontically. (2) Heidegger's entire enterprise is likewise subject to question, because of the impossibility of explicitly discussing Sein from the point of view of Dasein. (3) Heidegger's challenging and creative analysis of Dasein's structures may again in the final analysis be an example of what some have called the "far-fetched hypothesis"; that is, a hypothesis concerning man's relation to Being that is (a) not the most economical interpretation, and (b) is possibly nothing other than another Platonic "likely story." (4) Heidegger's use of Gnostic themes and interpretations reveals a hidden dependence on a previously held world-view that in many ways remains wholly obscure and clearly unexamined within his thought of Being. Finally, (5) there remains
open the entire question of the true role Angst plays in Heidegger's thought when viewed from a position outside the purview of either Being and Time or "What is Metaphysics?" Is such a role a) a "phenomenological window" through which the being of Dasein is disclosed to Dasein?; b) a mere zuhanden concept used in the elusive pursuit of the Seinsfrage?; c) Dasein's primordial attunement to the voice of Being? It was with this list of questions that we concluded our third chapter.

Third, regarding both Sartre's and Tillich's contribution, we split our fourth chapter's analyses into two parts. In the first part we discussed the promises and problems of Angst's self-disclosure in Sartre's early mature thought. With respect to his obvious accomplishments we observed that: (1) Sartre grounds Angst in phenomenological psychology, thereby allowing us to view our ground phenomenon with the certainty of the pre-reflective cogito. (2) This makes Angst a totally immanent phenomenon which avoids the possibility of ontological obfuscation. (3) Sartre's analysis fills what appears to be a major void in Heidegger's analysis of Angst; namely, the ethical implications of existing in a world alongside others in the face of the immanent nothingness that Angst discloses. (4) Sartre's analysis accounts for the presence of nothingness in human reality in two ways: a) as the ontological negation which lies coiled in the heart of being itself, and b) as the negative dimension or the Négatités of being human and the freedom to say "no!" to our possibilities. (5) Sartre's notion of Angst reveals the vast and unbridgable
abyss between the pour-soi and the en-soi in a lucid and graphic manner. Finally, (6) Sartre's depiction of Angst is the essential point of departure for his analysis and interpretation of human reality as such; it therefore grounds the entire "existentialist" world view of Being and Nothingness and "Existentialism is a Humanism."

Again we raised a series of questions and concerns that require further clarification in the present chapter. Specifically we observed that there remains some difficulties to be discussed with regard to the following points: (1) Sartre's analysis of Angst as being wholly immanent within consciousness may be a subtle misunderstanding of the goal of phenomenological ontology, reducing ontology to an "existentialist" anthropology of human being—a position which leaves open the question of Being itself. (2) Sartre's discussions concerning the structures of consciousness, in particular his discussion of our concrete relationships with others, does not appear to have any compelling force beyond the internal consistency of his fundamental dualism of en-soi and pour-soi. In fact such structures not only run counter to any grounding in ontic experience—they contradict the onto-theological experience of the mysterium tremendum. But even more important, Sartre's doctrine seems to lead to a final solipsism from which there can be no escape, especially if the pour-soi is the ultimate source of its own values, its own world, its own interpretation of
relationships within the nothingness of angoisse. In short, Sartre's depiction leads to ethical nihilism as well as ontological solipsism. With this sketch we drew part one of Chapter IV to a close.

In Part 2 of that chapter, we explored the emergence of Angst in the "meta-theology" of Paul Tillich. We discovered that Tillich's analysis of Angst reveals an array of major accomplishments as well as some curious difficulties. With regard to the accomplishments we observed the following features of Tillich's attempt:

1. Tillich's synthesis of Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's portrayals of Angst make possible an explicit "solution" to the "problem of Angst;" namely, human courage.
2. Tillich's analysis presents Angst as both an ontological and an ethical problem. This provides a specific bridge between both phenomenological ontology and existential ethics on the one hand and Christian theology on the other. Thus Tillich's "theonous philosophy" is the synthesis of Heidegger's atheistic phenomenology and Kierkegaard's theistic existential thought.
3. Tillich's theonomous philosophy with its emphasis on the four levels of ontology and Angst's role within them, makes transparent much of what has remained opaque regarding the phenomenon of Angst from a philosophical perspective.
4. Tillich's analysis of Angst as what reveals finite freedom is the condition which makes possible a positive philosophy of courage and joy, a philosophy in marked contrast to Sartre's negative position and ultimate nihilism.
5. Tillich's analysis of "ontological shock" in the face of the abysmal threat of non-being to man makes possible the further
synthesis of Heidegger's atheism, and Otto's theism in the experience of the mysteriosum with its ontologically daunting yet fascinating elements. (6) Tillich's manifold discussions of the many facets of Angst within the categories of being human, the polar elements of Being itself, and the specific forms of non-being's threat to man's self-affirmation, make it possible to grasp the complex phenomenon of Angst in a synthesis which displays Angst's structures with eloquence and elegance.

Over against Tillich's obvious strengths there is likewise a series of concerns that require our further attention: (1) Tillich's view that man is more than Dasein, that man possesses a Self which has the attributes of consciousness, subconscious and even unconscious, opens his analysis of ontological Angst to the charge of being a misunderstood phenomenon whose true origins lie deeply buried in the unconscious of man. (2) Tillich's discussion of Angst and finitude is not commensurate with his analysis of Angst and the ontological threat of non-being: while the former is very clear the latter notion remains obscure, firmly grounded in the tradition of meontic mystical thought. (3) Tillich's answer to the "problem of Angst" is, of course, a courage that is grounded in the meta-theological position of the God-above-God, a position of faith that Tillich tells us is necessary if we are to survive. But this is by no means necessary for Sartre or Heidegger, for example; and thus Tillich's position is open to the charge of confusing his experience of faith with the ultimate justification for faith in all men. Again, with this list of both the
positive and problematic dimensions of Tillich's thought brought to
the reader's attention, we concluded our micro-hermeneutical analysis
of Angst in the thought of Sartre and Tillich.

The Topos of Angst in the Western Tradition

With this summary in mind, we must now ask: is there a
broader hermeneutical horizon wherein the essence of Angst can be
grasped? More specifically is there a hermeneutical synthesis whereby
the multiplicity of Angst's self-disclosure, its many and various
facets can be brought together? Indeed, is there a broader vista of
Angst which thus far has escaped our attention due to the detailed
micro-hermeneutical approach of the preceding four chapters?

To these questions we respond without equivocation that we
believe there is such a horizon wherein Angst's essence is fully
revealed. It is the task of the present section to reveal the
phenomenological parameters of this horizon and to sketch out its
topography in hermeneutical terms. In this manner we will approach
our final interpretation of Angst's role in Western thought with a
clear dose of measured caution. For to boldly announce such an
interpretation without preparing the ground—or in this case the
broad horizon—we will defeat what has heretofore been a careful and
systematic attempt to allow Angst to show itself, in-itself, and in
its own way.

Thus our first task must be to evaluate the adequacy of our
descriptions of primordial Angst provided in the chapters above.
Only then can we address contrasts and comparisons of Angst at the
macro-hermeneutic level based upon whatever adequacy we discover in our analysis.

**A Point of Departure--the Phenomenon of Apprehension**

The fundamental clue to understanding the broader horizon wherein the many manifestations of primordial Angst come together lies in the linguistic expression we have tried to give in describing the meaning of the expression "primordial Angst"; namely, the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss that separates finite being from infinite Being, the temporal from the eternal, the contingent from the necessary, or the created from the creator. The key terms which require more in-depth analyses now are "apprehension" and "pre-reflective."

The term "apprehension" has been used throughout this dissertation to pin-point, so to speak, the precise feeling that is associated with the Angst phenomenon. It is time now to explore this term in greater depth. "Apprehension" has, of course, several distinct but related meanings. Among those offered in the *Oxford English Dictionary* are the following: "fear as to what might happen; dread." Now throughout this dissertation we have attempted to refine this definition by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of using the terms, "fear" and "dread" to speak of primordial Angst. Each of the thinkers we have discussed here, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre, and Tillich agree that fear is reserved for direct threats to man's being. But "apprehension" specifies that the "fear" of
"apprehension" is one of "what might happen" in the future. Thus the futural direction of apprehension is explicitly recognized. Such a characterization of the futural dimension would meet the descriptions of Angst provided by Kierkegaard and Heidegger, but it falls short of those provided by Sartre and Tillich. Specifically, for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger Angst's primary temporal ekstasis appears to be the future, as we saw in Chapters II and III. But for Sartre and Tillich Angst spans the temporal ekstases with Angst of the future related to Angst of the past coming together in the existential "now." Thus, because in our "existentialist" writers Angst is related to the Self, its primary temporal significance is likewise couched in the "now" of making choices (for Sartre) and the "now" of self-affirmation in spite of the threats of non-being (Tillich). This is not to say that Sartre and Tillich deny the futural dimension of Angst, they simply do not emphasize it to the same degree as did Kierkegaard and Heidegger, who look to man's telos as being futural.

A second meaning of the term "apprehension" is clearly more ontic, relating specifically to everyday experience; namely, "the action of laying hold of or seizing (physically); prehension, grasping." Here, of course, the meaning refers to the capturing of a criminal, for example, so that he or she may be stopped or taken into custody. But as our analysis of primordial Angst has shown, there is a deeper meaning to "apprehension" even in this ontic sense. To "apprehend" in a primordial sense means to recognize at a pre-reflective level that the meaning of Angst must be seized,
grasped, or taken captive in a mythopoeic interpretation of the abyss between beings and Being, between creatures and the gods. And, moreover, what is brought to a stand is grasped pre-reflectively through the daunting power of awe on the one hand and the elating power of fascination on the other. It is Angst itself that arrests the abyss.

It would appear that Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and to a certain extent Tillich have each seen this facet of primordial Angst. And it is implied, although never stated, in Sartre's immanence doctrine of angoisse as a product of reflective consciousness. However in the first three thinkers it is clear that the ontological abyss is itself the true wellspring of Angst. Consequently the apprehension manifests itself as the bipolar daunting and fascinating mystery of Being that beckons to the subjective spirit of Kierkegaard, to the Dasein of Heidegger, and to the Self of Tillich. For Sartre, as we saw earlier, the grasping of the abyss is the grasping of the nothingness wholly within réalité humaine itself—the grasping of the ultimate and absolute freedom, to which human reality is condemned.

All of this should tell us something about how Angst has been differently interpreted within the hermeneutical horizons of the thinkers we have considered here. And so another key is provided for our final understanding and interpretation of Angst: the horizontal differences with regard to how "seizing" or "taking hold of" the abyss between finite and infinite being is reflected in the writers we have considered in the present work.
A third definition of the term "apprehension" has enormous ontological possibilities, as it is precisely in line with Heidegger's insistence that Angst, as Dasein's basic disposition, cannot be separated from Verstehen and Rede as equiprimordial modes of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Specifically, "apprehension" also means: "the apprehensive facility; the ability to understand; understanding."

Now as we have seen, all of the thinkers we have considered in the present work either explicitly or tacitly accept the relationship between Angst and Verstehen. In Kierkegaard, for example, Angst as "sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy," stands in relation to understanding as the condition of its possibility. Angst conditions the subjective individual's transcendence from one mode of existence to another; that is, he cannot grasp a new existence medium until he takes the leap that originates in the Angst of the "dreaming spirit." Heidegger, of course, explicitly recognized the relationship, indeed the necessary relationship between Angst and Verstehen as two dimensions of the phenomenon of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Sartre sees the angoisse of freedom as the necessary condition for understanding as a mode of transcending the en-soi through the medium of nothingness that defines consciousness. And Tillich, of course, also openly recognizes Angst as the explicit understanding or awareness we each have of our own finitude, interpreted by us as the categories of the understanding; namely, time, space, causality, and substance. So this fact should give us yet a third insight into the mode of Angst's self-revelation:
it is a pre-reflective, non-discursive, pre-understanding or dispositional attunement which makes possible discursive understanding in the sense that the term "understanding" is ordinarily used.

Now if our understanding and interpretation of the term "apprehension" is correct; if, moreover, its meaning corresponds closely to what Heidegger means by Angst, then is it not the case that we have merely reduced primordial Angst to "apprehension"? Furthermore, have we not done precisely what we initially said could not be done; namely, to provide an adequate English translation for Angst?

**Apprehension: A Closer Look**

While these questions certainly appear to undercut all that we have attempted here, we fully believe that in no way do they undermine our efforts. This is so because the term "apprehension"—by itself—is wholly inadequate phenomenologically to display the plethora of meaning inherent in what we have called primordial Angst. For along with "apprehension" goes the decisive modifier "pre-reflective"; a term that can show its meaning only through a phenomenological analysis. And, as we shall see, without this modifier primordial Angst cannot be distinguished from the terms "anxiety," pathological "anxiety," "fear," "worry," etc., which we have systematically argued have only a derived significance for ontic Dasein, a significance grounded in primordial Angst.
But to assert either glibly or naively that primordial Angst is a mode of apprehension which is pre-reflective is likewise wholly inadequate without further elaboration of the sense in which the expression "pre-reflective" is used. Clearly, in one sense "pre-reflective" must mean something like "prior to reflection." Hence, it will be useful to grasp the meaning of "reflection" in connection with Angst before attempting to get beneath it to a more primordial level called "pre-reflective."

That to which both the terms "reflective" and "pre-reflective" point must be man's opening to Being or human consciousness: the very essence of both Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Sartre's phenomenological ontology. While there is neither space nor point to fully elaborate the history of the concept of consciousness here, we feel compelled to at least observe that the apodicticity of the Cartesian cogito, when coupled with the notion of a res cogitans or "a subject which thinks," contains the full-dress potentiality for the Husserlian ground of transcendental phenomenology. Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, was very much concerned with the problem of the limits of consciousness, or what we can truly "know" on the basis of our finite understanding. Husserl, of course, sees all consciousness as being intentional; that is, consciousness is an activity distinct from the so-called "mental objects" of consciousness. For phenomenology, as Husserl interprets that discipline, the apodictic cogito must never be confused with the cognitationes. Accordingly, the objects of
consciousness are always intended by consciousness itself. An implied corollary to this intentionalist view of consciousness is that even when consciousness becomes reflexive, that is, when it refers back to itself as being the source of consciousness, self-consciousness can become the theme of a phenomenological investigation precisely because self-consciousness is constituted as an intentional act. But in such an examination it is necessary to bracket out all existential considerations of value, of existence, of history, and circumstance to get to the thing-itself, which in itself must be studied as an intended act of consciousness. This bracketing out, the formal *epoché* of Husserl, is the necessary standpoint from within which "transcendental" or "pure" phenomenological investigations are capable of being successfully carried out.

In the investigation of the phenomenon of consciousness as self-consciousness (a kind of meta-phenomenological inquiry), the question naturally arises as to the existence of an "ego" that stands behind and under the activity of consciousness. Clearly, Husserl affirms this ego as a transcendental ego, an "I" that carries out the activity of consciousness. But this assumption, at least in the view of both Heidegger and Sartre, must ultimately result in the very subject-object dichotomy that Husserl's early phenomenology sought to undercut; for it re-introduces the ego as the medium through which the things themselves must be studied. Thus the "ego" becomes a subject standing over against the objects it studies.
This problem, as well as many others raised by the notion of a transcendental ego, is overcome if we employ the phenomenological razor and cut out the notion or assumption of an ego which stands behind or under the intentionality of consciousness. So the notion of "ego" or "self" becomes in this second view quite simply another object of consciousness that is itself intended by consciousness as among the things of the world, an entity amidst other entities. For Sartre the consequences of this view was that no "thing" or "ego" constitutes the objects of consciousness into intended objects: as we saw in Chapter IV "consciousness is a great emptiness, a wind blowing toward objects." Consciousness is nothingness, but a nothingness that is never isolated from cogitations of pure consciousness. Heidegger, of course, completely rejects the notion of consciousness as standing over against the world of intentional objects, and particularly he discards any notion of a transcendental ego. Rather, Dasein is a being who is already there in a world of circumspect concern; a world where meanings are referential in a context of world. The notion of transcendental consciousness is likewise rejected by Tillich\(^6\) on the grounds that while Husserl's phenomenology is "competent in the realm of logical meanings . . . it is only partially competent in the realm of spiritual realities like religion."\(^7\)

All of this is, of course, post-Husserlian. Thus it is clear that the problems of consciousness, transcendental ego, and intended objects, for reasons we saw in Chapter II, could never have
occurred to Kierkegaard, who of course predated Husserl and who was in the grip of Hegelian metaphysics. Thus, Kierkegaard's cognitive approach to method was, as we have seen, couched in the "know thyself!" principle along with the "unum noris omnes" method of experimental and psychological verification—all in the name of man's absolute telos, the eternity of Christian existence. Yet prior to the Self's emergence in despair, prior to the leap into the abyss that takes its launching point from Angst, the spirit is "dreaming"; that is, it is vividly conscious but not as yet self-conscious of the nothingness surrounding it as it approaches the abyss. Thus, in a sense, consciousness is intentional for Kierkegaard as well.

The Two Approaches to "Apprehension"

This brief description and interpretation is meant to serve as background for our main discussion of "reflective" versus "pre-reflective" with regard to the phenomenon of primordial Angst. In "reflective Angst" the angoisse of Sartre and the "ontological anxiety" of Tillich, a Self is interlarded between spontaneous awareness of the abyss and the daunting and alluring threat of the abyss itself. Thus the basic distinction between pre-reflective Angst and reflective Angst is revealed in the spontaneity of the former and the Self-reflexivity of the latter. In pre-reflective Angst there is no Self and in reflective Angst there is. Pre-reflective Angst is bound by nothing; reflective is bound by Self.
Thus what is threatened is the "Self" in Sartre and Tillich. But in Kierkegaard, there is no self-conscious Self to be threatened at the face of the abyss, rather the Self emerges only after the leap of the "dreaming spirit" is taken into the abyss. Kierkegaard's notion of Angst, then, is originally pre-reflective in the sense of being spontaneous; that is, bound by nothingness. It is only after the self emerges from the abyss as an entity conscious of its own guilt that it becomes infested with the despair and melancholy that will lead it to the ultimate leap—the leap of faith. Too, in Heidegger Angst is first and foremost a pre-reflective phenomenon. As we saw in Chapter III, Angst is a pre-reflective or non-self-conscious fleeing in the face of our ownmost Being-in-the-world. It is only within our spontaneous fleeing that the nothingness of the world's Bewandtnisganzheit shows itself. No Self, then, stands between Angst and the nothingness of world, although a Self is precisely what is chosen from within the existential epoche of Angst once we become suspended in its power to make us solus ipse, the "being free for (Freisein für . . ). Dasein chooses its authentic Self as a mode of being" (SZ., p. 158). So Heidegger's notion of Self as authentic Being-in-the-world, emerges as a result of the pre-reflective apprehension of Angst. Thus, the Self that is chosen is authentic and free to choose its ownmost being. It is therefore wholly transparent to Dasein's as the pre-reflective Self. Likewise in Tillich's thought, Angst is at least initially a pre-reflective apprehension of man's ontological finitude that makes reflective
Angst possible. But like Sartre, Tillich apparently sees the full disclosure of Angst as the reflective awareness of the threat of non-being to human being; specifically again as we saw in Chapter IV Angst is "... the self-awareness of the finite self as finite." 7

Thus there appear to be two modes of Angst's self-disclosure with which we are faced in this dissertation. On the one hand, Angst, as primordial Angst, shows itself in Kierkegaard and Heidegger as the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss between the finite and the infinite. On the other hand, Angst discloses itself in Sartre's and Tillich's positions as being reflective and related to a Self which stands reflectively at the abyss.

This means then that we must distinguish between two approaches to the phenomenon of Angst in Western philosophical thought. Thus reflective Angst, or the Angst of an interlarded Self that sees itself at the abyss, must be distinguished from pre-reflective Angst, or the spontaneous Angst in the face of the abyss itself. The schematization for the former appears to be Angst in the face of human freedom. So then, let us continue our analyses by describing reflective Angst as it is revealed in the "existentialist" writings of Sartre and Tillich.

Reflective Angst and the Self

Angst in the face of the freedom of Self may be characterized as a wholly reflective apprehension of the "self" as an entity that must freely choose its own possibilities during the course of its
being. If such Angst is to be in any way related to primordial Angst, then it must reveal itself as possessing the descriptive characteristics of being both daunting and fascinating. To display such Angst it might be more illuminating were we to choose a description that is not one provided by our four major philosophers. Rather, let us turn to a representative of the Western tradition who historically stands between Boehme and Kierkegaard, the great enemy of Cartesian rationalism, Blaise Pascal. In his *Penseés*, Pascal observes:

> I know not who put me into the world, nor what the world is, not what I myself am. I am in terrible ignorance of everything... I see those frightful spaces of the universe which surround me, and I find myself tied to one corner of this vast expanse, without knowing why I am put in this place rather than another, nor why the short time which is given me to live is assigned to me at this point rather than at another of the whole eternity which was before me or which shall come after me. I see nothing but infinity on all sides, which surround me as an atom, and as a shadow which endures only for an instant and returns no more. All I know is that I must soon die, but what I know least is this very death which I cannot escape. 8

The power and lucidity of Pascal’s depiction by far surpasses many contemporary efforts to achieve a lyrical depiction of reflective Angst. Of course there are parallels in Pascal’s vision to the modern post-"existentialist" interpretations we have presented here. To depict these we suggest that the following basic elements of reflective Angst (in the face of the Self’s absolute freedom) help us to understand this substructure: (1) The apodictic insight that freedom of choice is what characterizes human being displays vividly that to be human is markedly different from any other kind of possible
being. To be human is to choose, and to choose is to transcend the realm of possibilities as that being which can opt for one possibility over another. Thus human being is apodictically given to us as wholly transcendent ekstasis into the world of possibilities, a world into which I as a self stand in order to exercise any choice whatsoever. Thus I alone must choose: I am isolated and condemned to my freedom. 9 (2) The full responsibility for my choices, choices I must make, is wholly upon me. (3) It follows that I must dwell in a value-world of my own creation; a world that is without the support of God or absolute values to guide me; a world wherein the notions of equity, justice and mercy are simply magical fancies I use to comfort me. (4) So the historical forces that I myself am caught up in; the Western tradition of which I see myself participating in, clearly cannot be anything like a written document of how Reason is working toward its absolute telos, as Hegel and the German absolute Idealists believed, rather history is simply the documentation of human failures in our hopeless quest for absolutes. (5) It likewise follows that any attempt to deliver my ultimate responsibility for choice over to some higher authority is an act of fundamental cowardice that may be termed "inauthenticity," "bad-faith," or "superficiality."

(6) Clearly, then, I must fully admit, if I am to be wholly honest with myself, that the world in which I dwell; the world in which I participate, can have no value, no meaning, no sense to it apart from what I myself give to it. (7) This must be true for the others that I clearly know to people the world: they are there but their
value is utterly opaque to me. It is I and I alone who must invest
the other with value, meaning, and even human dignity.

Beyond Pascal's vision, such a view has important conse-
quences for Sartre's depiction of the Angst of the Self in the face
of "existentialist" freedom. Certainly, there are many traces of
Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's everyday, inauthentic structures
in this view. Moreover, Sartre fully admits that this notion of
Angst-filled freedom is taken from Kierkegaard's seminal conception
of Angst. Surely we can see traces of Kierkegaard's scathing attack
on Danish provincialism, entitled The Present Age, in this account,
but the utter bleakness of this vision of Angst, the Self, and
freedom by far transcends anything written by either Kierkegaard or
Heidegger concerning the implications of Angst.

In our description of the Angst of freedom we have left out
an extremely important dimension from the standpoint of Tillich. Of
course, he would agree that what we described is something like his
own depiction of the "ontological anxiety" of a Self which is
threatened by the non-being of the abyss, in this case the abyss
of meaninglessness and death. But for Tillich our description lacks
the ontological polarity of destiny that corresponds to finite freedom
rather than Sartre's absolute freedom. Surely, Tillich might ask,
is it not true that the finite self also participates in Being as well
as being an entity which stands wholly in opposition to Being through
the negativity and the nothingness of human freedom? Moreover, is it
not the case that this description fails to recognize that courage
is the answer to the devastating threat we have describe here: the
courage to affirm my Self even "in-spite-of" non-being's daunting yet fascinating challenge to human being? Tillich might conclude against our description that it is sheer arrogance to see ourselves as the source of values, for man's freedom is finite: that is what it means to be an existent being in a world of values. The world is a historical, value laden realm of ontic concerns; a world already there in a cultural and historical setting. Hence, our world belongs to each of us precisely because we each have a fully developed Self that can transcend every possible environment. Thus the Self participates in the world, and indeed in Being itself, in a delicate dialectical balance between freedom and destiny. To sacrifice our destiny, as would seem to be necessary from our extension of Pascal, means to flee thoughtlessly into a chimera of absolute freedom which in the face of man's utter and absolute finitude is a patent contradiction: to be absolutely free requires infinite and absolute being. Man is that being who by the apodicticity of his own Self-consciousness intuits his finitude. We cannot be both finite and absolutely free.

Finally, Tillich would argue that in order to exist we must either affirm our Selves or else give in to the despair of non-being. The only way finite man can "carry-on" once the Angst of freedom has been disclosed, is through ontological courage: the courage to say "yes!" to being "in-spite-of" the Angst which reveals non-being's threat to our ontic, spiritual, and moral affirmations of Self. The issue is resolved for man in faith: faith in the
"God above God" that emerges when Angst has stripped our traditional notions of God from us. For Tillich, then, Sartre has failed to grasp the essence of reflective Angst, because he fails to grasp the ontological dialectic of both freedom and destiny in Being. But in man this polarity shows itself as finite freedom in tension with finite destiny. To ignore one or the other side of this polarity, as Sartre clearly does with regard to the Self's finite destiny, is to snap the thin thread that extends over the abysses of fate and death, emptiness and meaninglessness, and finally guilt and condemnation.

Thus while Sartre and Tillich agree on the reflective aspect of Angst as the threat of non-being or the nothingness of the Self, they clearly disagree on the implications of the Self. Specifically:

1. For Sartre the Self is absolutely free; for Tillich it is free only up to the limits of its finitude.
2. For Sartre the Self is the source of all values; for Tillich the Self participates in a value laden realm of being.
3. For Sartre the Self is isolated in a wholly de trop realm of being and is an object of consciousness, i.e., pure freedom, pure nothingness; for Tillich the Self participates as an ontological entity suspended between freedom and destiny.

But despite these differences there is at least one major point upon which Sartre and Tillich agree. The ontological entity that is the condition of the possibility of any Self to begin with is precisely Dasein: the entity whose mode of being is to question Being. To show that this is indeed the case, let us compare Sartre's
and Tillich's views on this decisively synthetic matter. First, with regard to Sartre, in *Being and Nothingness* he observes that the:

... appearance of the self beyond the world—that is, beyond the totality of what is real—is an emergence of "human reality" [Heidegger's *Dasein*] in nothingness. It is in nothingness alone that being can be surpassed. At the same time it is from the point of view of beyond the world that being is organized into the world, which means on the one hand that human reality rises up as an emergence of being in non-being and on the other hand that the world is suspended in nothingness. Anguish (angoisse) is the discovery of this double, perpetual nihilation. It is in terms of this surpassing of the world that Dasein manages to realize the contingency of the world; that is to raise the question, "How does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?" *(BN., p. 51)*

Secondly, Tillich likewise acknowledges the ontological and even the logical priority of pre-reflective *Dasein* to Self, where in *Systematic Theology* he states:

Man occupies a pre-eminent position in ontology, not as an outstanding object among other objects; but as that being who asks the ontological question and in whose self awareness the ontological answer can be found. . . . "Philosophers of life" and "Existentialists" have reminded us in our time of this truth on which ontology depends. Characteristic in this respect is Heidegger's method in *Sein und Zeit*. He calls "Dasein" ("being there") the place where the structure of being is manifest. But "Dasein" is given to man within himself. Man is able to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements. *(ST., I:169)* (Italics added.)

In other words, while the self is a reflective phenomenon that stands within a world and in this sense "creates" or "has" a world, at the pre-reflective level man is Dasein for both Sartre and Tillich; that is, the being that can ask the ontological question of Leibnitz:

"Why is there something rather than nothing?"
The importance of this joint agreement, we submit, is that it reveals a clear dependence upon the pre-reflective level of man's being as the more primordial realm which is at once both ontologically and logically prior to man as a Self. So too, the Angst experienced at this level must be the more primordial. Therefore, pre-reflective Angst is that which must undergird in the final analysis both the angoisse of Sartre and the "ontological anxiety" of Tillich.

Pre-Reflective Angst and the Abyss

We come then to the second type of Angst suggested above that must be distinguished from the reflective Angst of the self's freedom; namely, what we termed pre-reflective Angst in the face of the abyss itself. Here again the two polar characteristics of the daunting element and the alluring element must be present. This is to say that they must show themselves concretely if our description is to be adequate. As with our discussion of reflective Angst we will here call upon thinkers who have not been previously cited to display the daunting dimension of pre-reflective Angst on the one hand and the fascinating dimension on the other. For both elements need to show themselves in order for Angst to reveal its full ontological power. First, regarding the daunting power, let us see Angst's profound pre-reflective power at the very edge of the abyss as seen by Miguel de Unamuno, who in The Tragic Sense of Life cites the Italian poet Leopardi's last lines of the Song of the Wild Cock:

A time will come when this Universe and Nature itself will be extinguished. And just as of the grandest kingdoms and empires of mankind and the marvellous things achieved therein, very famous in their own time, no vestage or memory remains to-day.
So, in like manner, of the entire world and of the vicissitudes and calamities of all created things there will remain not a single trace, but a naked silence and a most profound stillness will fill the immensity of space. And so before ever it has been uttered or understood, this admirable and fearful secret of universal existence will be obliterated and lost.

But the daunting and indeed haunting power of Leopardi's entropic view of "universal existence" is counterbalanced by the fascination which such entropy holds for pre-reflective Dasein: namely that if life and joy are to exist, they must exist now—right here and now—in the spontaneous affirmation of "universal existence," the only Being we can know. The stillness that Leopardi sees which "will fill the immensity of space" calls in its still voice to Dasein to provide the universe with meaning now before the certainty of entropy sets in. As though in direct response to Leopardi's dark vision, Nietzsche, that intrepid affirmer of life, states with equal eloquence:

All the beauty and sublimity which we have attributed to real or imaginary objects I claim as the property and creation of man. They are his most beautiful justification. Man the poet and the thinker! Man as God, as love, as power! With what royal generosity has he impoverished himself and made himself feel miserable in order to worship things. Up to now his greatest baseness has been that he admired and venerated things, forgetting that it was he who had created what he admired. Reject the humble expression "Everything is subjective." Say rather: "It is our work! Let us be proud of it."

Note here that Nietzsche does not refer to the Self as being the source of this alluring apprehension of mankind's creative role in the universe of meaning. Indeed it is man as an ontological being who creates meaning and values in a kind of pre-reflective spontaneity. Man as Dasein stands at the abyss of death, meaninglessness, and
condemnation; and spontaneously builds a bridge across the chasm. It is man who in a similar way saturates Being with human meaning. If there is any craveness in man, therefore, it is either in his failure to take responsibility for being the source of the values he creates or in his forgetting that such values are created by man. Ontological man, in this forgetfulness, then concedes to the gods a universal order of value that takes on a status of being independent from man. In this view, then, it was man who was originally the creator of the gods and the transcendental values for which they stand.

The Self as it is seen by Sartre and Tillich is of course excluded from this picture. Rather, what has been depicted here is pre-reflective Dasein, the Dasein of which Heidegger directly speaks, as well as the "dreaming spirit" of Kierkegaard, who in Angst has yet to leap. Thus Heidegger, who sees Dasein as that entity which questions Being, recognizes that the question itself depends on primordial Angst as an existential epoché which can be the only Archimedean point from whence Being can be questioned. Without the pre-reflective lucidity of such Angst no such question is or can be possible. Certainly the question of Leibnitz, "why is there anything at all rather than nothing?", is similar to Job's question to Elohim: it is decidedly not a mere request for information. Rather it is an explicit display of Dasein's recognition of the abyss between Being and Non-being that gives rise to the question of Being. Likewise, Kierkegaard's "dreaming spirit," who pre-exists in a state of moral innocence and ontological ignorance, leaps into
the abyss to emerge into guilty existence only because of the primordial pre-reflective *Angst* that ". . . is a qualification of dreaming spirit" (CA., p. 41). The dreaming spirit becomes a Self only in a qualitative leap; a leap made possible by pre-reflective primordial *Angst*.

For both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, therefore, it is the pre-reflective rather than the reflective dimension of being human that characterizes primordial *Angst*. Concerning Kierkegaard, such *Angst* is a theological category which arises from God's prohibition concerning not eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, a prohibition which ultimately brought Adam to *Angst*: "The prohibition induces in him anxiety [Angst], for the prohibition awakens in him freedom's possibility."14 Moreover, as we have repeatedly seen in Kierkegaard's thought, *Angst* is freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility. Our point in regarding Kierkegaard's pre-reflective *Angst* is that Adam is not a Self who sees himself being affected by *Angst* in any reflective way. Rather Adam is primordial man, (i.e., he who is at once the human race and the creature of God, who stands prior to the human race). Adam is a schematized metaphor, therefore, for pre-reflective man, the same concept schematized by Heidegger as pure Da-sein. This, we submit, is the secret nexus between Kierkegaard and Heidegger; a nexus that clearly shows itself in their respective treatments of primordial *Angst*. For as we have seen, Heidegger says that man becomes Dasein through primordial *Angst*. Likewise for Kierkegaard the "dreaming spirit" emerges into existence
through primordial Angst. In each case such Angst is pre-reflective rather than reflective, and is related to Being rather than to the Self as that concept is conceived by Sartre and Tillich.

What we have tried to show here is decidedly not that the notion of Self is absent from Kierkegaard and Heidegger. To be sure, the Self plays an important role in the viewpoints of both thinkers. For Kierkegaard the entire sequel to Begrebnet Angest; namely, The Sickness unto Death, deals precisely with the problem of the Self and despair. And for Heidegger the Self is clearly an authentic mode of Dasein's being, the answer to the "who?" of Dasein, and a question to which Heidegger devotes the whole of Part I, Chapter IV of Sein und Zeit. But what we are claiming is that primordial Angst, and the pre-reflective apprehension which describes it, both ontologically and logically precedes any notion of Self in Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's thought. This macro-hermeneutical interpretation is, we submit, one that is grounded in the micro-hermeneutical analysis of both Chapters II and III above. Consequently it reveals the deep but clearly not obvious sub rosa relationship between Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's revelations of primordial Angst; namely, the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss between finite and infinite Being in Heidegger's case, and between "dreaming spirit" and existential man in Kierkegaard's case.

Consequences of the Foregoing Descriptions

We may now ask with propriety what consequences can be drawn from our somewhat detailed description of the phenomenological and
hermeneutical difference between reflective and pre-reflective Angst, between the Angst of Self and the Angst of Nothingness? Generally five major consequences immediately suggest themselves. Let us simply mention these here as topics which require at least another volume to work out their full implications.

First, as we have seen, reflective apprehension of the Self in Angst, as disclosed by Sartre and Tillich, is possible only because of the pre-reflective Dasein that undergirds any notion of Self. Thus reflective Angst discloses itself as a constituted or second order phenomenon, a kind of "epiphenomenon" which gives significance to an ethical or praxis oriented "existentialism." From this we may conclude that pre-reflective Angst is indeed the very self-same primordial Angst we seek, the primordial Angst that shows itself ontologically in the face of the abyss between finite being and infinite Being.

Secondly, if this is so then the notion of the Angst of the Self and freedom is phenomenologically speaking a vacuous concept. This is to suggest that the notion of reflective Angst as a phenomenon independent from pre-reflective Angst is simply not possible on the basis of phenomenological analysis. As we have tried to show repeatedly, the self-revelation of primordial Angst throughout the tradition of Western thought from pre-historical Dasein to the present, renders this possibility decidedly empty and one which cannot account phenomenologically for the ontological dimension of Angst. Thus the psychoanalytic school that tends to reduce Angst to a wholly immanent human phenomenon wholly grounded in the ego-id-superego
manifestations of Self, can never decide what is a symptom of Angst and what is Angst itself. Further, the postulation of a sub-conscious mind, much less an unconscious-mind (concepts of which we can have very little direct intuition by definition) tends to start the process of an infinite regress into progressively more abstract notions of consciousness as the ground of primordial Angst. Finally, the notion of an immanence doctrine of Angst presupposes that there is a causal inference between origin of Angst and its symptoms; which in some sense can be predicted and controlled is a perspective grounded in scientism's positivistic presuppositions, which as we have seen here cannot in themselves account adequately for purely human phenomena such as love, concern, care, boredom, and, yes, the ontological experience of Angst itself as it has been described (not explained) throughout this dissertation.

The third consequence that suggests itself is that Angst's role in Western philosophical thought, while being grounded in phenomenological ontology, has ontic significance in the "existentialist" doctrines of Sartre and Tillich; the doctrines regarding finite choice, responsibility for such choices, and ultimately the universalization of such choices. Clearly, as we have seen here, existential choices are based upon the reflective Angst of which Sartre and Tillich speak specifically and of which Kierkegaard and Heidegger speak indirectly. The ontic consequence of primordial Angst turns out to be an ethical order of resolute Daseins who are responsible for their actions to one another in a shared world of
human meaning. All this is, of course, grounded in an ontological conception of pre-reflective Angst.

The fourth consequence of our analysis is related directly to the methodological basis of Heidegger's phenomenological ontology—the self same hermeneutical approach that we have employed throughout this dissertation. Primordial Angst may be phenomenologically interpreted in the light of all four thinkers we have here discussed to be a methodological or zuhanden concept whereby the being of Dasein, by whatever name it is called, is revealed to itself. Specifically, to use a visual metaphor, primordial Angst appears to act as a "phenomenological window" through which Dasein's mode of Being-in-the-world is revealed to it. If Heidegger is right when he says that Dasein is possible only on the grounds of primordial Angst, and, moreover, if this means that Angst is the condition of the possibility of understanding and interpreting our ownmost Being-in-the-world, then this metaphor of the "phenomenological window" must at least by implication be extended to cover the "existentialist" interpretations of Angst offered by Sartre and Tillich. For these latter two thinkers, again as we have seen, agree that Dasein is man's fundamental mode of being in a world. Likewise, Kierkegaard's ontico-psychological-theological description of Angst cannot escape this interpretation in its broadest sense, for the primordial Angst of which he spoke in Begrebnet Angest allows the "dreaming spirit" to awaken to see the possibilities, that as its ownmost possibilities, are laid out before it. Thus, for Kierkegaard too,
Angst is a window through which the dreaming spirit's being is revealed to it, even though it cannot be a phenomenological window, of course.

Finally, a fifth consequence of our description emerges, which as far as we know has not been specifically seen before: primordial Angst is what makes possible an understanding and interpretation of human existence from with the purview of Aletheia, the truth of Being. Heidegger observes that only in Angst can we become Dasein, and Dasein is that entity which stands in the truth of Being (SZ., pp. 221-23). Thus it seems to us that Angst serves as the hermeneutic phenomenological counterpart to Husserl's "pure" phenomenological epoché: the Archimedian point, so to speak, from which Dasein can discover the truth of Being. We believe further that this interpretation is confirmed in "What is Metaphysics?" and especially in the Postscript to that work where Heidegger insists that Angst reveals the nothingness that is the condition of the possibility of the finite transcendence. Primordial Angst, therefore, is precisely the hermeneutic existential epoché.

While this methodological role cannot be extended to Kierkegaard, Sartre, or Tillich without some fancy hermeneutical footwork that can only be spurious at best, it is important to recognize that both Sartre and Tillich base much of their own descriptions and interpretations of Angst on Heidegger's analysis. Hence in a manner of speaking there may be some carry-over of the existential epoché notion to Sartre's depiction of the en-soi and Tillich's depiction of
human being in the face of non-being's threat. We decline, however, to stretch the point beyond what we have said here for the sake of completeness.

**Primordial Angst: A Broader Horizon**

With these five suggestions for further consideration now mentioned and outlined, we come finally to the last concern to be addressed in the present dissertation: the question of the overall horizon from which primordial Angst reveals the central core of Dasein that unifies and makes whole Dasein's existential structures. But before turning to this horizon in the following section it might be of some use to the reader to summarize what has transpired thus far in this somewhat detailed section.

**Summary**

So far we have attempted to show that Angst, as it has been described, analyzed, understood, and interpreted in this dissertation, may be seen to display two primary roles in Western philosophical thought: (1) Angst as a reflective apprehension of the Self in freedom has given rise to what has become known as "existentialism," as has been represented here by Jean Paul Sartre and Paul Tillich; and (2) Angst as a pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss metaphor, that schematizes the phenomenological-ontological recognition of the disrelationship between finite and infinite Being, has given rise to a new phenomenological conception of man as an ontological being whose ek-sistence into the world undercuts the subject-object dichotomy of
traditional metaphysics in general and philosophical anthropology in particular.

In our analysis we began with showing how ordinary language gives us a clue to Angst by inquiring into the definition of "apprehension," as it has been used to describe primordial Angst throughout this dissertation. We then showed that even while "apprehension" appears to correspond to what has been described here as primordial Angst, it is inadequate in and of itself, requiring the essential modifier of "pre-reflective" to adequately convey a full phenomenological description of primordial Angst. Thus we distinguished between the "reflective" apprehension of "existentialist" thought, showing how it results in the postulation of a Self which stands between Angst and the abyss, and the "pre-reflective" apprehension of both Kierkegaardian and Heideggerian thought, wherein the "dreaming spirit" and pure Dasein confront nothingness at a level that is beneath and behind any conception of a Self. Finally we showed that at root, reflective Angst is itself grounded in pre-reflective Angst, since both Sartre and Tillich agree that Dasein is our fundamental mode of Being-in-the-world, prior to any conception of Self.

From this we sketched five consequences of this phenomenological description: (1) reflective Angst and the Self it discloses is a second order, some might say "epiphenomenal" phenomenon that grounds the ethical philosophy vulgarly known as "existentialism." (2) This means that psychoanalysis, as that term has been generally understood, is entirely beside the point when it attempts to deal
with primordial Angst. (3) While Angst's principle role is germane to the phenomenological ontology of Dasein, it clearly has fundamentally important implications ontically; that is, the ethical order of resolute Dasein in a world of shared authentic concern. (4) Primordial Angst and its profound impact on man as Dasein, shows to Dasein its ownmost Being-in-the-world; a revelation that is clearly not possible in the absence of primordial Angst. Thus Angst serves as a kind of "phenomenological window" through which the being of Dasein is disclosed to itself. (5) Finally, Angst may be seen as Heidegger's existential attempt to overcome the difficulties of Husserl's phenomenological epoché by placing Dasein directly into the truth of Being (Aletheia) in the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst. Primordial Angst, then, is the existential epoché of hermeneutic phenomenology.

Thus in the following sub-section we will propose the final horizon for understanding and interpreting the phenomenon of primordial Angst, a horizon into which all of the various descriptions and interpretations can be gathered. It is to this horizon that we now turn.

Angst and the Urwille

We come now to the question toward which all of our labors here have been ultimately directed. To put the question simply, we may now ask: what is the ultimate condition inherent within the Dasein itself that expresses Dasein's essential unity of understanding, disposition, speech and fallenness and which manifests itself in the phenomenon of primordial Angst? Indeed, we must not shrink back
from this haunting question, even in the face of the profound awe and terror it may engender regarding the dark roots of human existence. For to inquire into this matter is to leave behind the guidelines of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology and set sail at once upon uncharted seas into the deepest levels of Dasein. Yet if we are to plumb the abysmal bathos of Angst's murky and fathomless depths, set sail we must without further ado.

All of our analyses of Angst's many facets, of primordial Angst's manifestations as onto-theological Angst, strictural Angst, pneumatical Angst, passional Angst, "existentialist" Angst back around the hermeneutical circle to the complex phenomenological analyses and descriptions of primordial Angst have shown that at the very epicenter of all our depictions there rests a fundamental assumption that heretofore has remained unexamined. This assumption is that Dasein is a being for whom its finitude is regarded as a fundamental privation of some ontological wholeness. Dasein pre-reflectively apprehends in the Grundbefindlichkeit of Angst that its incommensurability with infinite Being is not only mere privation, but an axiological or value-laden privation, schematized in the tradition of theology as the Fall of primal man from an original state of grace to the existential state of sin and disgrace. Job and Prometheus, as we saw in our first chapter, are decidedly not interested in merely passively acquiescing their finitude and impotence without fundamental ontological protest. Indeed it is their purpose to seize Being itself and to demand an account of it, and in this
attempt to possess it and make it their own: Job demands that Elohim speak, Prometheus knows the yoke of Ananke and in this knowledge becomes her true master.

Thus at the origins of the modern Western tradition, at the very confluence of the Hebrew and Greek traditions, we see a more basic element of Dasein's being emerging out of the abyss of Angst: Dasein is a being whose primary mode of being is ontological assertiveness—the burning desire to express its transcendence from a position of finitude, the burning desire to stand out into the infinite by transcending the world of objects, the burning desire to master Being itself. This, we submit, is the primal Urwille behind Job's demands upon Elohim; but more to the point, it is also the subtle power that motivates Dasein to even pose the question: "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Like Job's demands, the question of Being is no mere request for information. Its fundamental power and purpose is revealed within the question itself—the explicit demonstration that Dasein not only can ask the question, but that the "quest" for its answer is in fact the history of metaphysics in the Western tradition.

Dasein, therefore, is a "questing" as well as a "questioning" being. The tools whereby the quest is carried out are its primordial Existenzials: understanding, disposition and speech. But the concept of fallenness or forfeiture, the fourth of Dasein's Existenzials, is what delimits the power of the quest. The question, which is the articulation (Rede) of the quest's power, goes well beyond Dasein's
fallenness or finitude, extending into the ontological realm itself. But primordial Angst is the pre-reflective apprehension of the impossibility of any answer to the question and indeed the ultimate quest that stands behind it.

But the condition of the possibility of the quest itself, indeed, the condition of the possibility of Dasein, is the primordial Urwille of wonder that is the impetus to finite transcendence. Without such a will, Dasein's being would be just another entity in a world of entities, the totality of which would only be comprehended by God. Thus Angst, as we have described it here, is an apprehension on the pre-reflective level, the level that penetrates behind even the Vorsicht, Vorhabe, and the Vorgriff of the understanding to the abyss that lies between the question of Being. Primordial Angst discloses the Urwille which expresses apophatically the quest for Being, and the answer that can never come because of Dasein's inherent finitude.

This concept of finite Urwille is, of course, not a notion that is new to the Western tradition. The term is of course Boehme's. But likewise Arthur Schopenhauer saw its power, and Nietzsche's conception of the will to power is clearly in the tradition that we are suggesting here as well. It would appear, therefore, that the Urwille is a kind of pre-ontological hunger, passion, or even craving for ontological fullness. Recognizing the pre-mythopoeic, pre-ontological, and pre-reflective power of such Urwille as "metaphysical craving" establishes an essential element
to the phenomenon; namely its passionate and urgent nature. Thus we are not suggesting here the notion of will as discussed dispassionately throughout the Western tradition is "the problem of free will," but rather a pre-reflective and passionately non-rational craving for ontological fullness which philosophy has sought to cover-over, bury, and hide in the bone-yard of dubious passions. But what the reflective, contemplative, and rationalistic philosophy of Western metaphysics fails to grasp is that if, as Plato suggests, Philosophy begins in wonder, then the "quest" of the question of Being owes its origins to the pre-mythopoeic Urwille of which we speak, as well as to the Angst which shows that because of Dasein's inherent finitude the quest is doomed to failure.

We need not look far to hermeneutically ground this interpretation in the Western tradition. In fact, we need not look beyond what has been shown in Chapter I of the present work. Behind the power of primordial Angst lies its precondition: the pre-ontological craving for Kosmos in the face of the abyss. This is further borne out in the four facets of primordial Angst discussed in our first chapter.

Onto-theological Angst, for example, the Angst that stands behind mythopoeic thought, finds its sources in the wellspring of the Urwille's craving for ontological wholeness. Such Angst is the pre-reflective apprehension, therefore, of the Urwille's inability to complete the synthesis of creatures and Creator. Hence, mythopoeic
thought seeks to complete the synthesis, the bridge across the abyss of onto-theological Angst.

Likewise in the Greek tradition of Ananke and strictural Angst, primordial Angst is interpreted as the restrictions placed on Greek Dasein's Urwille to grasp the whole of Being as Kosmos. Ananke, as we saw in our first chapter, binds more than the intellect; it binds closely the will and desires of Greek Dasein. Thus the schematizing concepts of Ananke as ontological necessity, binding, choking, strangling, etc., are mute hermeneutical testimony to the craving in Dasein's primordial Urwille for ontological wholeness. Indeed the entire notion of binding necessity makes little sense unless there is something to bind. We suggest that it is the Urwille of Greek Dasein who through primordial Angst understands and interprets these restrictions as those of ontological necessity.

In the pneumatical Angst of the Hellenistic period, gnostic Dasein enumerated the precise number of barriers, the 365 spheres of the evil Archons, that stood between the pneuma and ontological wholeness: the original home beyond the cosmos. This deep desire, this open craving to transcend homelessness, can only be grounded in a pre-ontological Urwille to grasp and cling to the fullness of Being. Gnostic Dasein, therefore, saw the doom of finitude through the pneumatical Angst of which we spoke in Chapter I—the clear pre-reflective apprehension of the literal abyss (Hell) into which the pneuma is cast—yearning, craving, hungering for spiritual comfort and relief from the tyrannical Heimarmene of the Archons.
While such craving of the Urwille becomes less obvious in the passional Angst of mystical Dasein, it is certainly no less intense an experience as the accounts of Paul, Augustine, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Eckhart, and Boehme clearly indicate. But the passionate mysticism of St. John of the Cross, the Ascent of Mount Carmel and the Dark Night of the Soul are resounding metaphorical tributes to an Urwille to abandonment that characterizes passional Angst. This is no patent contradiction, the will to abandon will; for the first will mentioned is grounded in primordial Urwille while the second is the ontic will that corresponds to reflective intellect. Thus the Dark Night of the Soul as metaphor reflects the deep passional Angst which pre-reflectively apprehends the abyss between the soul as mystical Dasein and the ultimate Godhead as Being. The dark night metaphor displays that behind Abgeschiedenheit (Abandonment) lies the primal will or Urwille to unite with infinite Being. It must therefore be the full impetus running behind and beneath mystical Dasein's quest to unite with the source of its Being.

Finally and at long last, the craving of the Urwille is fully identified and articulated by the humble shoemaker, Jacob Boehme. As we have seen, in Boehme's thought the dark forces of the Ungrund (the abyss), the Urwille (conceived by Boehme as God's primordial will), and the Urmensch (primal man both before and after the Fall) are all brought together into a doctrine of ontological craving or desire in Being itself. The Urwille for
Boehme is the ontological craving of the Godhead for meontic self-knowledge.

Even in Kierkegaard's analysis of Angst it becomes clear that the sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy which characterizes his notion of Angst is dependent upon the hidden presupposition of a craving for what one is apprehensive about, an expression that is made wholly explicit in the 1842 Journal entry where he observes: "... anxiety [Angst] is an alien power that grips the individual, and yet one cannot tear himself free from it and does not want to, for one fears, but what he fears he desires." (Italics added.)

Sartre makes absolutely no secret concerning this craving. As we have seen his entire analysis of the "existentialist" structures of the en-soi turn around the en-soi's desire, its vast craving, to become one with the pour-soi, Being itself. And as regards Tillich, the entire raison d'être for ontological courage is, as we have seen, grounded in "... the God who appears when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt" (CB., p. 190). Seemingly, then, the "existentialist" literature on Angst, whether it be theistic or atheistic, gives full ascent to the craving for the wholeness of Being and truth that characterizes the "wonder" of philosophical Dasein's mode of Being, but the notion of spontaneous Urwille, of course, becomes obscured by the insistence of both Sartre and Tillich upon a reflective Self that is affected by angoisse in Sartre's case and ontological anxiety in Tillich's.
But what about Heidegger? Have we not simply eliminated him from our analysis? To this we answer that the specter of *Being and Time* hovers like the silent call of conscience behind every word we have written here. But it is time now to make what we have implied here explicit with regard to Heidegger, for it is from his analysis that we discover how the Urwille of Dasein can crave the ontological fullness and how Angst reveals the limits of such craving.

Dasein is the only entity, says Heidegger, that can even pose the question of Being, much less attempt to answer it. This is because Dasein is a thrown-projection, a temporal entity whose authentic mode of Being is anticipatory resoluteness toward its final telos, death. As we have seen it is in the existential epoche of primordial Angst that inauthentic Being-in-the-world is grasped as the nothingness of the world's Bewandtnisganzheit, a grasp that makes possible the freedom to transcend inauthenticity and become a full partner with Being as authentic Dasein.

Authentic Dasein is, we suggest, the closest man can come to the union with ultimate Being and truth. For in such authenticity, man for the first time renounces fully his craving for an impossible ultimate equality with Being itself. Man finally accepts his finitude in the spirit of full resoluteness toward the end of his finitude—death. BUT ONLY THROUGH PRIMORDIAL ANGST CAN DASEIN BECOME AUTHENTIC.

Here the spirit of gnosticism drifts through Heidegger's thought—urging it, compelling it to a fullness and wholeness that
has heretofore not been possible in the Western tradition; for even Hegel's grand final synthesis of thought and Being—Absolute Reason's full teleological fruition—must exclude, as Kierkegaard clearly saw, Dasein as an individualized and fully finite Being-in-the-world. It is man's finitude that prevents the full fruition of the synthesis; man's existential condition as a finite subject. The gnostic notion of the call, Dasein's alienness in the everyday world, the metaphysical homesickness discovered in Angst's ontic "uncanniness," the vision of man as a thrown being, indeed, even the notion of the Angst engendered by man's separation from Being—each of these themes move in and through Heidegger's Being and Time and "What is Metaphysics?" with the same covert power that the Bible has in and throughout Kierkegaard's Begrebnet Angest. Gnosticism, it seems to us, is one of the most overt recognitions of man's essential craving for Being and truth—a fact that Heidegger clearly recognized but only covertly.

The mysticism of Heidegger, of which Caputo has so elegantly written, likewise reveals itself in the existential epoché of primordial Angst. But that is a topic that we shall consider in the next section of this chapter. For the moment we wish to conclude our discussion here by observing that we are coming around again to another completed sweep of the hermeneutic circle, for we believe that it is in Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit that the full and final significance of the Urwille and Angst displays itself. And so we return to Heidegger, but now the later Heidegger for our
final display of the role of Angst in contemporary philosophical thought.

We conclude this present section, then, with the suggestion that primordial Angst contains within itself the full ontological meaning of human finitude; for the notion of a pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss between finite and infinite Being describes the grounds for the apprehension in the first place—the Urwille's craving for the fullness of Being and truth that announces itself mutely in Dasein's Angst-filled recognition that such fullness can never come to pass for man as a finite being.

If we have adequately worked through the daunting dimension of primordial Angst's basic conditions; namely the vision of Dasein's ultimate and essential craving for absolute Being and truth which primordial Angst delimits, then we must also display Angst's alluring dimension wherein craving is itself transcended and becomes meditative thinking—a final horizon wherein Being and truth meet Dasein's Urwille to Being.

**Angst and Gelassenheit**

As we have consistently attempted to show, there is no "solution" to the "problem" of primordial Angst, any more than there can be a "solution" to the "problem" of human finitude. To describe primordial Angst phenomenologically does not mean, therefore, that we must necessarily charge it with negative value. Indeed there is no problem of Angst; there is only the daunting
and alluring intensity with which it overtakes us first through ontic "uncanniness" and then from within primordial Angst itself as the condition of the possibility of an existential epoché.

In the preceding section we have focused upon the daunting power of primordial Angst to see that at the center of Dasein's Existenzial's Angst discloses man as a finite being who as Urwille craves the fullness and wholeness of Being and truth, who desires intensely to bridge the abyss between finite being and infinite Being. In the present section we seek to not to repress, cover-over, and bury this daunting essence of Dasein, but rather to show how it can be transformed into a creative and dynamic approach to the fullness it craves by wholly and utterly renouncing this craving as an intentional act. Urwille appropriates in ontic craving's place an ability to allow Being to reveal itself to us through the difficult task of "mediative thinking," as Heidegger understands that term.

So as we began, so shall we return to the thinking of Martin Heidegger for one final sweep around the hermeneutical circle. We are afforded in Heidegger's later thought, we suggest, an opportunity to bring to a close our discussion of the role of Angst in Western thought by showing how Angst points ahead to the philosophical and meta-philosophical horizons that transcend the representational thinking which characterizes much of the Western philosophical tradition. Such a "pointing ahead" is meant to indicate that there can be no exhausting of the question of
primordial Angst and its relationship to Being, there can only be the opening up of even vaster horizons whereby the meaning of Being and man's place within it may be further understood and interpreted. This having been stated, let us examine as our final horizon Heidegger's notion of Gelassenheit in relation to primordial Angst.

In 1959, two and one half decades after "What is Metaphysics?" was presented, Heidegger published Gelassenheit, translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund as Discourse on Thinking. The work consists of two parts: a Memorial Address in honor of the German composer Conradin Kreutzer, and a dialogue entitled "Conversations on a Country Path," between a scholar, a scientist, and a teacher.

The term "Gelassenheit" is another German expression that is extremely difficult to translate into English. Nonetheless, according to Hoffmeister's Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe [Dictionary of Philosophical Concepts], Gelassenheit comes from the Middle High German word "Geläzen" which means: "to settle down" or "to take up one's abode." Specifically Hoffmeister defines "Gelassenheit" as follows:

... an expression from mysticism and Pietism meaning the serenity [Ruhe] in God that is acquired by the full renunciation of earthly affairs. Today it generally means: firmly grounded in authentic [or essential] Being (eigenden Wesen).

Thus while Anderson and Freund translate Gelassenheit as "releasement," we suspect that "renunciation" (in the sense of a serene renouncing the world of ontic concerns) is closer to what Heidegger means by Gelassenheit. What this means is that the
position that is worked-out in this later work is in a sense a
continuation of Being and Time: namely a working out of the ques-
tion of Being from within the standpoint of authentic or resolute
Dasein, the Dasein which through the existential epoché of
primordial Angst can relinquish the ontic concerns of everyday
being in the world, and can now appreciate the question of Being
from with Being's ownmost disclosed horizons.

The argument of Gelassenheit appears deceptively simple.
Heidegger shows that the history of the Western intellectual
tradition generally has been conveyed through a kind of restless
calculative thinking which seeks to mold entities to its canons
of reason, a fact we ourselves have attempted to display here in
our notion of the Urwille. But, says Heidegger, there is another
possibility of thought, another kind of thinking that does not seek
to manipulate or "re-present" the entities. This second mode,
called "meditative thinking" (besinnliches Denken), may be charac-
terized as a "hearkening to the voice of Being" which allows Being
to show itself through Dasein's participation in meditative thinking.
Moreover, such meditative thinking is inherent in the nature of man,
says Heidegger.

But what is it that must be renounced in meditative think-
ing? In the "Memorial Address," it is the thoughtless glorifi-
cation of the calculative thinking that permeates our contemporary
technological civilization, so that we may see technology in its
true light. "I call the comportment which enables us to keep open
"to the meaning hidden in technology," says Heidegger, "openness to the mystery." Behind calculative thinking, the technological thinking that focuses upon entities, stands the mystery that technology seeks to overcome. In the "Conversation on a Country Path," however, what is renounced is the kind of representational (calculative) thinking that at its essence the kind of willing, a willing to represent entities to us in terms of human reason; in other words, to force the things-themselves to disclose themselves to us on our own terms; namely through the categories of reason, rather than in themselves and on their own terms.

To renounce this kind of thinking is to renounce the source of all representational thinking, Dasein's will to grasp, transform, and understand entities on his own terms. Thus renunciation involves not only representational thinking, but the kind of second order calculative intentions to which it leads. This does not mean that calculative thinking must be wholly abandoned: rather what must be relinquished as the all-embracing hold it has over us in contemporary thought. To get, therefore, from calculative to meditative thinking, says Heidegger, we must will not to will, so that Gelassenheit "... awakens when our nature is let-in so as to have dealings with that which is not a willing." Only on the basis of such renunciation, such willing not to will, can meditative thinking take place in Dasein on a purely spontaneous or pre-reflective level of awareness.
Thus some of the important characteristics of meditative thinking are as follows: (1) It is not representational; that is, it does not reconstruct a world of objects. (2) It begins with an awareness of the horizon wherein the things reveal themselves. (3) It is open to content within the horizon and does not force concepts upon that which shows itself to us within the horizon. (4) It is no act of self-will to grasp the wholeness of Being, rather it renounces self-will completely in a higher act of will described by us as the Urwille that is openness to Being (seen here as what is revealed in the expression "that-which-regions"). (5) It is not passive but rather requires the courage of constant effort to maintain its pristine clarity. (6) It is a higher type of activity than the willing of representational thought. (7) It is the manner in which Dasein approaches Being itself and Being approaches Dasein by revealing its horizons to Dasein. (8) It is dwelling in the realm of Being, a kind of serving of Being that authentically lights up the horizons of Being. (9) Its openness to Being discloses that which is hidden or veiled in Being. And finally, (10) it is a resolve for truth that makes possible such disclosure.

Perhaps most important of all, especially from the standpoint of the present dissertation, Heidegger insists that meditative thinking is spontaneous pre-reflective thought which apprehends that the willing which characterizes representational or calculative thought will never lead Dasein to the wholeness and
fullness of Being and truth. In other words, meditative thought is the true direction of the Urwille.

We believe that the meaning of representational thinking, the kind of calculative thinking that "... computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities ...," that "... races from one prospect to the next ...," that "never stops, never collects itself,"\(^{24}\) is grounded in the craving of the Urwille that we discussed in our preceding section and to which Heidegger gives the more philosophically acceptable word "will."

Meditative thinking, however, gets to Dasein's roots, Dasein's true autochthony in Being itself. Only by primordial act of renouncing craving for Being and truth can Dasein get beyond the representational thought. For here at least we come to see: IT IS REPRESENTATIONAL THOUGHT, THE PRIMARY THOUGHT MODE OF TRADITIONAL WESTERN METAPHYSICS, THAT IS THE ABYSS ITSELF. Consequently, the deeper we penetrate into the secrets of beings, the further Being is separated from us. The harder we will Being to show itself, the more quickly Being flees from us. Clearly the Urwille must reverse its ground in thinking of Being.

As we saw in Chapter I, at the very dawn of mythopoeic Dasein in the first primitive stirrings of primordial Angst before man could even think or "reason" as we know these expressions today, there emerged, in our own words, "... a kind of 'gut-level"
apprehension of an absolute groundlessness of Being expressed as an abyss; a feeling that there may be no meaning to existence in the lived-world of experience..."25 There we argued that the onto-theological Angst that arose from this primordial Angst can occur only when a transcendental totality of beings is interpreted as a Supreme Being "...which then becomes schematized as a pantheon of deities or a monotheistic God."26 When this schematization first takes place is the alpha point of ontologically representational thought: for Dasein does not worship, question, or defy the transcendental totality of beings—Being itself; rather Dasein worships, questions or defies the schematized icons that stands in the ontic place of such a lofty ontological conception.

Thus the abyss grows vaster with the layers and encrustations of dogma and ritual that surround philosophical metaphysics and theological speculation. With this in mind it is little wonder that the gnostics sought their original home beyond this hell called Earth—the transcendental totality has slipped away in the 365 spheres between Dasein and the high God.

It was Eckhart who saw that the only way out of the labyrinth of beings and Being was utter and total "detachment" (Abgescheidenheit) as it manifests itself in man. To quote ourselves again we described this phenomenon as being related to Eckhart's concept of the "inner man" who "... has in his essence the inner strength to completely detach himself from the world..." Such detachment takes the form of
a self-renouncing abandonment of worldly concerns attained in a destruction of self-will."²⁷

Yet Heidegger's conception of Gelassenheit goes beyond that of Eckert's Abgescheidenheit. Says Heidegger:

Scientist: The transition from willing into . . . [Gelassenheit] is what seems difficult to me.
Teacher: And all the more, since the nature of . . . [Gelassenheit] is still hidden.
Scholar: Especially so because even . . . [Gelassenheit] be thought of as within the domain of will, as is the case with old masters of thought such as Meister Eckhart.
Teacher: From whom, all the same, much can be learned.
Scholar: Certainly; but what we have called . . . [Gelassenheit] evidently does not mean casting off sinful selfishness and letting self-will go in favor of divine will.
Teacher: No, not that.²⁸

Rather in Heidegger's account the renunciation that is Gelassenheit goes even beyond any conception of divine will itself. It is a renunciation of the representational thought and the abyss of reason that is its source. It is a direct or pre-reflective intuition into the ground and abode of Being itself that undercuts all dichotomies of finite-infinite, temporal-eternal, creature-creator. Heidegger's Gelassenheit abandons not only these terms and the representational concepts to which they point, but far more important, Gelassenheit means to abandon the small hyphen between these concepts: a wholly uncomplicated symbol used in ordinary language which contains within its purview the final abyss before which primordial Angst stands.

To renounce representational thinking in no way implies that we have "overcome" primordial Angst. As we have attempted to show
throughout this chapter, the existential *epoché* of primordial *Angst*, as the condition of authentic existence, means that **THE ULTIMATE AUTHENTICITY OF GELASSENHEIT CAN TAKE PLACE ONLY FROM WITHIN PRIMORDIAL ANGST.** *Angst* must again be affirmed as Dasein's *Grundbefindlichkeit*, the primary disposition or attunement to Being that makes possible even meditative thinking. Indeed *Angst is Dasein*, authentic Dasein as meditative thinker. As such we must seek not to overcome primordial *Angst*, but to live authentically and meditatively within its purview.

But it seems to us clear that since meditative thinking requires the will to renounce the will to representational thinking, the notion of the *Urwille* of Dasein cannot be abandoned. But in the *Urwille's* renunciation of will, the primordial *Angst* which we have sought here becomes at least wholly pure openness to Being, wholly translucent authenticity, and wholly pure pre-reflective understanding of what is given in Being to Dasein. From all of this there emerges the vision of pure da-sein who spontaneously interacts with Being in the "region of all regions." Spontaneous, pre-reflective apprehension is apprehension not in the first sense described above, "fear as to what might happen; dread." Rather, in Dasein's delivery over into the region of Being, apprehension becomes "the ability to understand, understanding." In *Gelassenheit* the *Urwille* has finally found rest; for it has at least transcended the realm of entities and dwells in the house of Being.
Let us therefore conclude our labors by turning to some final thoughts that will end this dissertation's attempt to capture the spirit of primordial Angst and its role in Western philosophical thought. For this we shall turn to our final section of this chapter.

**A New Beginning--The Final Sweep of the Hermeneutic Circle**

In this dissertation we have not attempted to argue that philosophy and the representational thinking which is its primary articulation should be overthrown by some kind of ontological and meditative revolution in thought. On the contrary, representational thinking as Heidegger himself has observed has its lasting place in the being of man. Neither are we advocating that the Urwille, primordial Angst, and Dasein have been transcended in what we have attempted here. Moreover, we are not advocating a "philosophy of feeling," a doctrine of the irrational, or any other attempt to undercut the philosophical enterprise from its deep and substantial roots.

To be sure, representational thinking and the technological advances it has brought us in virtually every field of human endeavor, from the dawn of Greek hylozoism to beyond the contributions of Wittgenstein, the traditional philosophical modes of thought remain a continual boon to mankind's being. We are not so arrogant as to deny these enormous accomplishments or their intrinsic philosophical, spiritual, and even ethical value. Representational thinking and the technological mode of its current manifestation in contemporary thought has indeed assured itself a lasting place in
the record of mankind, for it is clearly the major mode of man's access to every field of human endeavor, from sports activities to contemporary theology and philosophy. Its voice rings clearly in the logoi of Being.

We are saying, however, that in the clear night of primordial Angst we discover that representational thinking and the technology, science, and philosophy it serves is decidedly insufficient to satisfy Dasein's Urwille to grasp Being; to ask the ontological question. For nowhere in representational thinking can there be an answer to the question of Leibnitz: "Why is there something, rather than nothing?" The canons of reason do not admit of a satisfactory answer.

And so we have attempted here to show that a major role that Angst plays in Western philosophical thought is to provide access to a second mode of thinking, the meditative thinking to which we can come only after the long path along which we have trekked here from mythopoeic thought through hermeneutic phenomenology to meditative thinking. It is Angst as the pre-reflective apprehension of the abyss of representational thought that shows the way to Gelassenheit, becoming finally the medium of Gelassenheit itself.

Thus we have not advocated a "philosophy of feeling" (although we see nothing inherently wrong in such a view) nor a doctrine of the irrational that seeks to overthrow logic, reason, science, or even technology itself. Rather what we have advocated here is a clear call to accept into the pristine towers of academic philosophy the visions and intuitions that are revealed in primordial
Angst. Again our cry is not to banish representational thought but to enrich and supplement thought itself by recognizing that the dark forces of primordial Angst are not so dark after all—in fact, they light up a realm of human being that is simply not possible if we cling to the canons of reason as the only mode of philosophical inquiry. As we have tried to show, such clinging is a form of ontic will that when clutched to the breast in a desperate embrace can only prevent us from hearkening to the truth of Being—the truth that rushes in upon us when in Gelassenheit WE LET GO.

Surely he who confuses techne with sophia has little claim to philo-sophia; for wisdom is far more than technique or technology. The quest for wisdom may require many paths through the forest of thought. Our small effort here has been simply an attempt to point out another way—the way from mythopoeic to meditative thought through the opening in the woodlands that separate them, the opening of hermeneutic phenomenology, a path on the way to meditative thinking.

So finally we do not claim to have transcended primordial Angst, the Urwille, or Dasein; for we suspect that beyond these primordial manifestations of human being, none but a god dare go. We have no desire to philosophize with a hammer or with an axe, but to point beyond our simple efforts here to the authentic freedom that primordial Angst discloses as Dasein's existential epoché. We seek only the serenity of Gelassenheit—to dwell in the voice and
presence of Being that is possible only within the phenomenon of
primordial Angst itself.

And thus we come around the arc of the hermeneutic circle
for the final time in the present dissertation, allowing our primary
guide, Martin Heidegger, the occasion of our final conclusion.

The clear courage of primordial Angst vouches for the most
mysterious of all possibilities: the experience of Being.
For close to primordial Angst—as the terror of the abyss—
abides awe. Such awe, illuminates and covers—over each
dwelling place of mankind, within which he comfortably abides
in the abiding.29
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V

1 For example, Monroe Beardsley defines the "far-fetched hypothesis" as: "A hypothesis accepted on the support of a particular body of evidence when that evidence can be explained by an alternative hypothesis that is simpler or more frequent . . ." Cf. Monroe Beardsley, Thinking Straight: Principles of Reasoning for Readers and Writers, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1975), p. 248.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

5 Supra., p. 264.

6 ST., I:107.

7 ST., I:170.


9 We are using here the phenomenological "I," rather than the first person singular of the present author.


11 For Tillich, as we saw in Chapter IV, Heidegger is an "existentialist" in spite of himself. But then, so too is Tillich.


14 CA., p. 44.

15 CB., p. 65.
16. We are thinking here primarily, although certainly not exclusively, of Arthur Schopenhauer's notion of the will as endless striving which in Copleston's words is "... a blind urge or impulse which knows no cessation, it cannot find satisfaction or reach a state of tranquility." Cf. Frederick Copleston, S. J., *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. 7, Part II (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1963), p. 38. But this tradition clearly goes back as far as Boehme.


20. Ibid., p. 253. Note: the present author is wholly responsible for this translation.


22. Ibid., p. 55.

23. Ibid., p. 61.

24. Ibid., p. 46.


______. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 2nd ed. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951.


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