Iranian American Perceptions of Experienced Prejudice and Discrimination in the Political and Social Context of the United States of America

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

PSYCHOLOGY

MAY 2014

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Keywords: Perception, Iranian, Prejudice, Discrimination
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ABSTRACT

The post 9/11 context created a political and social climate in the United States (U.S.) that promoted prejudice and discrimination against anyone who looked Middle Eastern (e.g., Iranian) or Muslim (Britto, 2008). I was interested in how much and what kinds of prejudice and discrimination Iranian Americans with various religious affiliations perceived. Iranian American perceptions were explored by examining their Social Identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tanti, Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010). The specific dimension of Iranian American social identity examined was religious affiliation and how it related to perceived Ethnic Harassment (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000) and Social Distance (Bogardus, 1947; Rollock & Vrana, 2005) from Euro Americans. Based on the current social and political context and social identity differences between Iranian Americans and Euro Americans, I hypothesized that Iranian American Muslims would report perceiving more experiences of prejudice and discrimination (as assessed by measures of frequency and severity) than would Iranian American Jews or those without religious affiliation. In addition, I hypothesized that Iranian American Muslims, who appeared more prototypically Muslim, would report perceiving a higher rate of prejudice and discrimination (as assessed by measures of frequency and severity), than did Iranian American Muslims who appeared more prototypically Western.

A survey was posted on SurveyMonkey.com and participants were approached in Persian grocery stores. A total of 374 Iranian Americans, ages 18 and older, filled out an online or in-person survey packet that included the following: a consent form, an adaptation of the Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale (EHES) (Schneider, Hitlan, &
Radhakrishnan, 2000), an adaptation of the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959), a brief religiosity scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), and a demographic questionnaire. I discovered that Iranian American Jewish and Muslim participants reported perceiving significantly higher rates of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than did Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation.
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Overview

The post 9/11 context created a political and social climate in the United States (U.S.) that promoted prejudice and discrimination against anyone who looked Middle Eastern (e.g., Iranian) or Muslim (Britto, 2008). Prejudice is defined as an “attitude” or a judgment formed without sufficient information to warrant a negative conclusion (Katz, 1991). Discrimination may be defined as the behavioral action(s) based in prejudicial thoughts or acted out to conform to societal expectations (Allport, 1959; Katz, 1991).

Researchers examined some of the negative consequences of appearing Middle Eastern. Unkelbach, Forgas, and Denson (2008) asked if appearing Middle Eastern or Muslim increased university students’ aggressive behavior. They tested a phenomenon referred to as “the shooter bias effect”—which describes the way individuals utilize racial and ethnic information when deciding whether or not to shoot during a simulated shooting game. “The shooter bias effect” was tested on 66 university students (men, women, conservative, and liberal). The researchers discovered that participants were more likely to shoot at unarmed targets wearing symbols of Muslim/Middle Eastern group membership such as, turbans (a cultural headgear worn by men) or hijabs (a cultural headscarf worn by women) than targets without such markers.

Government agencies have tracked the number of reported hate crimes against Middle Eastern Americans. Human Rights Watch (2002) investigated citizen likelihood of experiencing prejudice and discrimination when wearing turbans or hijabs. They found that Middle Easterners or Muslims who wore culturally symbolic headwear were more likely to be victims of hate crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that anti Middle Eastern/Muslim hate crimes increased seventeen-fold from the years
2000 to 2001 (as cited in HRW, 2002). Hate crimes against Middle Easterners/Muslims declined from the peak of 2001, yet remain substantially above pre-2001 levels. Consequently, as a result of suffering public disapproval, Middle Easterners or Muslims in the U.S. may be at risk of experiencing alienation, isolation, depression, anxiety (Britto, 2008; Clay, 2011), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Clay, 2011). Furthermore, Middle Easterners may potentially experience hate crimes (HRW, 2002), racial profiling (Siggins, 2002), negativity during job interviews (King & Ahmad, 2010), prejudice and discrimination within academia (Omeish, 1999), and face personal identity issues (Bradford, 2009; Zaman, 2010).

**Intersection of Ethnicity and Religion**

As demonstrated in the above section, much of past research has focused on either ethnicity or religion. However, it was at the intersection of ethnicity (Iranian/ Middle Eastern) and religion (Muslim), that a spike in prejudice and discrimination occurred (HRW, 2002). Iranian American Muslims may have become vulnerable to prejudice and discrimination due to both their ethnicity and religion. Thus, in this dissertation, the differences between perceptions of prejudice and discrimination reported by Iranian Americans of various religious affiliations and the extent to which a number of display characteristics influenced the frequency and intensity of such perceived experiences is explored.

The study of Iranian American perceptions of prejudice and discrimination is important for a number of reasons. First, it may alert officials by demonstrating that prejudice and discrimination against Iranian Americans in the U.S. exists. Second, it may influence those involved in policy to create protocols that will protect Iranian Americans.
Third, it may lead to more effective ways of overcoming biases (Soares, 2004). Fourth, with increased knowledge therapists may become better equipped to identify and respond to the unique challenges Middle Eastern patients encounter (Boghosian, 2011). Fifth, such knowledge may assist institutions in developing more effective outreach programs that engage communities at risk (Middle Eastern Center, The University of Utah, 2009). Sixth, it may assist physicians and hospitals in creating protocols that provide opportunities for dialogue and response around potential precursors to physical and psychological health challenges (Carteret, 2011). Seventh, information may help educate emerging pupils and leaders about the potential of misdiagnosis, lack of treatment, and mental breakdowns. Eighth, it may assist political and business leaders in becoming more effective in conducting business with cultures and countries different from the dominant group. Lastly, it may assist in helping businesses advance in a globalizing economy.

**General Questions**

1) Do Iranian American *Muslims* perceive experiencing more prejudice and discrimination from Euro Americans than do their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish or possessing no religious affiliation)?

2) Do Iranian American *Muslims* who appear prototypically Muslim (skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income), report perceiving higher rates of prejudice and discrimination from Euro Americans than do Iranian American Muslims whose appearance is more prototypically Western (or non-Muslim)?
3) Does gender affect frequency and severity of perceived prejudice and discrimination among Iranian Americans?

Outline

In Chapter One, a review of the current social and political depictions of Iranian Americans is presented. In general, researchers describe a negative and homogenous portrayal. I explore how this negative characterization developed and speculate about the possible effects of such depictions. A review of past and current stereotypes of Iranian Americans is also presented. Lastly, the chapter documents a recent increase in hate crimes against people who possess a Muslim appearance or were assumed to be Muslim.

In Chapter Two, a review of psychological theories and concepts employed in formulating my hypotheses is presented. A description of the relevance of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tanti, Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010) and Social Distance Theory (Bogardus, 1947; Rollock, & Vrana, 2005) to the theoretical framework is provided. More specifically, the ways in which the Iranian American social identity affected their perceptions of social distance and prejudice from Euro Americans is explored. Chapter Two concludes with proposed hypotheses and specific research questions.

Chapter Three outlines the methods utilized. Descriptions of the Southern California context, sample demographic characteristics (in terms of frequencies and percentages), recruitment strategies, apparatus/materials, and procedure were reported. The participants were recruited using snowball and purposive sampling (Daniel, 2012; Perez, Nie, Arder, Radhu, & Ritro, 2011). The apparatus/materials included a consent form, an adaptation of the Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale (EHES) (Schneider,
Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000), an adaptation of the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959), a brief religiosity scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), and a demographic questionnaire.

Chapter Four includes the Results section. The Results section describes findings of the statistical analyses. More specifically, the findings that Iranian American Jews and Muslims reported perceiving significantly higher rates of prejudice and discrimination than Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. In addition, Iranian American Jews who displayed symbols of religious affiliation reported significantly higher rates of perceived prejudice and discrimination.

Chapter Five presents the Discussion Section. I provide an interpretation of the statistical findings. The discussion section is organized into three sections: summary of key findings, limitations and strengths, and implications and concluding comments. The Discussion section was written to explore possible reasons for the significant differences between Iranian American Muslim, Jewish, and non-religious perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans.
CHAPTER 1

The Effects of Negative Characterizations of Iranian Americans. Past and Present

Chapter One describes past and current portrayals of Iranian Americans. It also examines a number of psychological concepts. The descriptions and concepts provided in Chapter One are presented below. One factor explored, in the political depiction of Iranian Americans, is the categorization of Iran as one of the three countries that make up the “Axis of Evil” (Bush, 2002) metaphor. Next, the concepts of the “mirror image phenomenon” (Peteraf, & Shanley, 1997; White, 1970) and “the need for cognitive consistency” (Brofenbrenner, 1963; Nail, Bedell, & Little, 2003) describe the effects on the public of such negative political characterizations of Iranian Americans (White, 1970). Negative portrayals may predispose recipients to feeling vulnerable and may produce a hostile social environment.

The Axis of Evil Metaphor and the Mirror Image Effect

The categorization of Iran as part of the Axis of Evil metaphor may have significantly changed the perception of Iranian Americans in the U.S. Former President George W. Bush was the first to categorize Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil.” The concept characterized Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as “terrorist states” (Heradsteveit & Bonham, 2007; Public Broadcasting Service, 2011). Historically, the term “Axis” originally referred to the alliance between Nazi Germany, Italy, and Japan (Heradsteveit & Bonham, 2007). The use of the term Axis may still evoke memories of terror for those affected by World War II. Consequently, American descendants of countries labeled as part of the Axis of Evil (e.g., Iranian Americans) may be stigmatized as wrong and evil.
The stigmatization of Iranian Americans due to the negative political portrayal of Iran may be referred to as the “mirror image” effect (White, 1970).

The mirror image effect is a concept that may explain a psychological phenomenon. The concept suggests that when two countries such as Iran and the U.S. have contentious relations, members of each country will label the opposing country and its people as bad and wrong and justify their own country and people as good and right (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; White, 1970). Governmental endorsement of negative characterizations, such as former President George W. Bush’s Axis of Evil concept, strongly encourages the effect. One of the significant time periods during which the “mirror image” phenomenon occurred was during the month following the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979. Most of the “mirror image” effects related to evaluative constructs (e.g., dangerous/safe, unfriendly/friendly), where 70% of American participants reported a positive image of Americans and a negative image of Iranians (Johnston, Mingst, & Sigelman, 1980). The mirror image effect on individuals was partly shaped by perceptions of cultural similarities and differences.

Individuals typically report less favorable attitudes toward members of countries that are culturally dissimilar than those that are similar (Nincic & Russett, 1979; Rouhana & Fiske, 1995). Important cultural dimensions upon which Iran differs from the U.S. are language, religion, and political characteristics. The increased likelihood of favorable attitudes toward those who are culturally similar is due to categorization of individuals as belonging to the in-group (or in closer relation to the in-group) vs. the out-group. The in-group is comprised of the social, ethnic, or cultural groups one feels a part of; the out-
group is comprised of social groups one competes with and does not associate with themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Categorizing individuals as part of the in-group vs. outgroup has significant psychological implications. Differences between the in-group and out-group are described as the social–cognitive perception of differences between “we and they” (Mclauchlin & Pearlman, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & Pauling 2008). Individuals sympathize and feel similar to members of their in-group and compete with members of the out-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Waldzus, Mummendey, & Wenzel, 2004). The out-group categorization of individuals leads to “a negative evaluation of a social group, or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual’s group memberships” (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 414) in order to maintain a degree of cognitive consistency (Brofenbrenner, 1963; Nail, Bedell, & Little, 2003).

Jane Elliot was an educator who created an exercise on racism using elementary school children that illustrated how quickly an us vs. them dynamic may develop. Once the third graders were placed into blue or brown eye groups, they judged their in-group to be good and superior and the out-group to be wrong and inferior. The blue eyes/brown eyes exercises demonstrates the significant effect in-group/out-group categorization has on one’s perception of out-group members (Infinito, 2003).

The Negative Perception of Iranian Americans, Past and Present

The current section explores past and present political contexts and relations between the U.S. and Iran that contribute to the current negative portrayal and perception of Iran and Iranian Americans. The order of events described are as follows: past
positive relations between the U.S. and Iran, the Iranian Revolution, The Iran Hostage Crisis, The Iran-Iraq war, the tragic events of 9/11, and the current struggle and plight of the Iranian people. This information is important because it provides a context for the current negative portrayal of Iranian Americans and offers an insight into the Iranian American experience.

The relationship between the U.S. and Iran was at one time positive and fruitful. With Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (also known as the Shah) in power (1941), the relationship flourished. In support of the Shah and to protect foreign access to Iranian oil, the U.S. and the British worked together to remove Iran’s Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953. Mossadeq advocated the nationalization of Iranian oil and limitations on foreign ownership. Following Mossadeq’s removal, the Shah instituted the White Revolution in 1963 to work toward Westernizing Iran. However, it is important to note that the monarchy typically punished and imprisoned those who openly criticized the Shah.

The downfall of the Shah was complex. One of the Shah’s greatest critics was religious extremist/fanatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Shah eventually forced Khomeini to leave Iran. During this time, some of the Iranian people opposed the absolute power of a monarchy and protested against the Shah. In 1979, the Iranian revolution occurred, and Khomeini returned to Iran. Khomeini took power and renamed the country the Islamic Republic of Iran. He replaced the Iranian legal system with his interpretation of an Islamic set of laws and regulations called velayat-e faqih. The code also named Khomeini as the supreme leader. As a result, the Shah and his family fled
Iran and the Shah sought cancer treatment in the U.S. Most of the Iranian people who were associated with the Shah were imprisoned and tortured.

Then, one of the most influential and negative events in the relationship between the U.S. and Iran occurred. In October of 1979, a group of Muslim extremists held 52 Americans hostage in the American embassy in Tehran. The hostages were not released for 444 days and the event was referred to as the Iran Hostage Crisis. President Jimmy Carter instituted a prohibition of Iranian oil. After several failed attempts to rescue the hostages, the Ayatollah Khomeini finally released them in 1981 after the U.S. and Iran signed the Algiers Accords in Algeria. After the Iran Hostage Crisis, the relationship between the U.S. and Iran never recovered.

Subsequently, Iran was involved in a lengthy war and lost any positive connection with the Western world. In 1980, the Iran-Iraq war began and was termed the longest conventional war of the 20th century. The use of chemical weapons still affects some Iranians today. After eight years and millions of deaths, the war ended without any gain to either side. Please see Appendix A for more information on the historical relationship between the U.S. and Iran, the current plight of the Iranian people, and the Green Movement. Iran once again became a point of interest following the tragic events of 9/11. The Western world became interested in Iran’s involvement in terrorism and ability to have nuclear weapons.

**Stereotypes about Middle Easterners and Iranian Americans**

Stereotypes about Middle Easterners historically consisted of the idea of the “hook-nosed, savage,” (Shaheen, 2003, p. 171) According to Shaheen (2003), depictions of Middle Easterners in Hollywood movies have been of those who despise Christians
and Jews and are “heartless and brutal” (Shaheen, 2003, p. 171). The American cinema has marginalized the Middle Easterner, who is assumed to be Arab and Muslim, as one who is an outsider (an other). Shaheen’s (2003) analysis of over 900 Hollywood films found that 95% of the movies analyzed depicted Arabs as, “brute murders, sleazy rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women … (that) all look alike” (Shaeen, 2003, p. 172). It comes as no surprise that the tragic events of 9/11 only shed light on the underlying prejudices that existed towards the Middle Eastern community.

Researchers have also described stereotypes that are unique to Iranian Americans. Eagly and Kite (1987) surveyed 303 students at Purdue University. The undergraduate students were enrolled in an Introduction to Psychology class and were asked to rate individuals from 28 countries. Participants stereotyped Iranian American men and women as religious, traditional, and poor (Eagly & Kite, 1987). More recently Ghavami and Peplau (2013) surveyed 627 undergraduates from a Southern California University in regard to ethnic stereotypes in a free response format. They found that Middle Eastern men and women were stereotyped as dark-skinned, Muslim, and religious. However, researchers have also analyzed stereotypes about Iranian Americans and Middle Easterners that were specific to gender.

The differences between what kinds of stereotypes apply to individuals of the same ethnicity but different gender were examined. Eagly and Kite (1987) found that Iranian American men were stereotyped as hostile, aggressive, never giving up, dirty, proud, and arrogant. While Iranian American women were stereotyped as family oriented, conforming, conservative, proud, devoted to others, honest, and emotional. More recently Ghavami and Peplau (2013) found that Middle Eastern men were
stereotyped as anti-West, suspicious, and good at bargaining. While Middle Eastern women were stereotyped as quiet, covered, oppressed, family-oriented, having many children, sexually conservative, and (being) housewives.

In recent years a new stereotype of Iranian Americans may have developed alongside the stereotypes mentioned above. In 2012, the TV network Bravo created a reality show called Shahs of Sunset. The show features six Iranian Americans living in Los Angeles. Many Iranian Americans have disapproved of the show claiming it reinforced negative stereotypes about the community (Perdomo, 2012). Individuals on the show are seen throwing expensive parties with caged tigers. There are many conversations about designer labels, excessive drinking, and trips to Las Vegas. A number of prestigious Iranian Americans have spoken out about the show and the negative image it creates for the community including the former Iranian American mayor of Beverly Hills.

Middle Easterners and Iranian Americans have faced more than stereotyping and stigma. There has been a recent increase in behavioral actions against Middle Easterners and anyone who is assumed to be Muslim. Below is a discussion of hate crimes toward anyone who is categorized or assumed to be Middle Eastern.

**The Recent Spike in Prejudice and Discrimination Toward Anyone that Appears Middle Eastern or Muslim**

The post 9/11 context created a political and social climate in the U.S. that promotes prejudice and discrimination against anyone who appears to be Middle Eastern or Muslim (Britto, 2008). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports (HRW, 2002), anti-Middle Eastern hate crimes increased seventeen-fold from the year
2000 to 2001 (HRW, 2002). Iranian Americans and Iranian American Muslims contend with prejudice and discrimination that is aimed toward all Middle Easterners in the U.S. This section describes the recent increase in prejudice and spike in hate-crimes against anyone who appears to be Middle Eastern (e.g., Iranian Americans or Iranian American Muslims) or Muslim.

People who appear to be Middle-Eastern or Muslim have been lumped into one social group and discriminated against. For example, members of the Sikh religion were victims of hate crimes and discrimination because they were mistaken for Muslims. Balbir Singh Sodhi was a Sikh Indian man murdered on September 15, 2001, by Frank Roque, who claimed he was seeking revenge for the attacks of 9/11. Sodhi, was ethnically Sikh and wore a turban.

Hate crimes are distinguished by the motivations behind them. In other words, it is not the underlying act committed, (e.g., vandalism, assault, murder) that categorizes a crime as a hate crime; it is the hostility the perpetrator has against the victim, based on “racial, ethnic, religious, gender, or sexual orientation” (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2002). Hate crimes originate from deeply seated anger toward a specific community. The individual committing the hate crime holds the victim, who is a member of the targeted community, responsible for their hatred. While the degree of hate or anger involved in a hate crime is atypical, the sentiment is sometimes reinforced by a larger societal view (e.g., the Axis of Evil concept). Post 9/11 hate crimes were a prime example of an unusual manifestation of hatred that reflected a societal sentiment in the U.S. toward Middle Easterners.
Individuals who are most visibly identified as members of the discriminated group fall vulnerable to higher rates of victimization. Signs of group membership may include a hijab for women and a turban for men in the Middle Eastern or Muslim communities. The hijab is a traditional Muslim article of clothing worn by women in the community to cover their hair. The turban is a traditional Middle Eastern (also African and Far Eastern) headwear worn by men of the community, who may belong to a number of religious groups.

Moreover, members of the Middle Eastern community who held occupations that were more typical for Middle Easterners were more likely to be victims of hate crimes (HRW, 2002). For example, taxi drivers, convenience store owners, and motel owners were more likely to experience hate crimes than were those Middle Easterners who did not occupy stereotypical occupations for their ethnic group. The occupations of murder victims resulting from post 9/11 backlash include two convenience store owners and one gas station owner. There were significant increases measured in the number of hate crimes against Middle Easterners or Muslims in the months following the events of 9/11. Please see Table 1 below.

Table 1. Location and Increase in the Number of Hate Crimes Post 9/11/2001

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Percent or Number increased</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Year 2000 = 4 anti-Muslim hate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 2001 = 51 anti-Muslim hate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Year 2000 = 12 anti-Muslim hate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year 2001 = 188 anti-Muslim hate crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>The attorney general reported an increase in hate crimes of 24.5 percent (HRW, 2002)</td>
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</table>
The extent of hate crimes committed against those who appear to be Muslim in the post 9/11 context remains unknown. One reason for uncertainty is that the rate of hate crimes is based on the number of individuals that choose to report such crimes. A second reason for the unreliable statistics is due to the existence of cases in which a crime has mixed motives. Because the motives behind a crime may be based on a number of factors and not limited to the victim’s religion, race, gender, or sexual orientation, the crime may not be categorized a hate crime.

A fourth problem in hate crime reporting statistics is that in some cases language is a barrier. According to HRW (2002), some victims of the post 9/11 anti-Middle Eastern or anti-Arab backlash had difficulty communicating with government officials in their attempt to report the incidents of hate crimes. Furthermore, the post 9/11 backlash was not limited to hate crimes. Many Middle Eastern Americans filed complaints with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claiming to be illegally fired (HRW, 2002). In 2002, there was a significant increase in claims to the Department of Transportation in the number of persons of Middle Eastern background that were searched without probable cause at airports (HRW, 2002).

Members of the Middle Eastern or Muslim communities, in the post 9/11 context, are left vulnerable to prejudice and discrimination. Iranian American Muslims or Iranian Americans mistaken to be Muslim, face prejudice and discrimination due to both their ethnic and religious group appearance and memberships. Iranian Americans are a diverse group of people and various dimensions of their identity are explored below.
The Diverse Identities of Iranian Americans in U.S. Immigration Patterns

Iranian Americans are a diverse group of people, predominantly made up of immigrants. The Iranian American experience and identity will vary depending on the time period and reasons for which an Iranian immigrated to the U.S. Push factors are reasons that motivate an immigrant to leave his/her place of origin. Pull factors are reasons that motivate an individual to immigrate to a particular country. A brief description of Iranian American immigration patterns is provided below.

Iranian migration to the United States occurred mainly during two phases. The first phase took place in the mid 1950s and consisted of mostly the elite Iranian population. During the first phase of migration, Iranian immigrants included mostly college students. The growing and industrializing economy of Iran created the need for a more educated population. As a result, children of the elite and those politically aligned with the monarchy sought a U.S. college education, with the intention of returning to Iran and contributing to the country’s workforce. Approximately 34,000 Iranians migrated to the U.S. during this first phase of immigration.

The second phase of Iranian migration into the U.S. occurred under significantly different circumstances than the first phase of migration. Beginning with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970s until present day, Iranian immigrants have mainly included refugees. It is estimated that 330,000 Iranians immigrated to the U.S. during this time. The second phase of immigrants consisted of Iranians from diverse backgrounds. Immigrant identities ranged from Iranians who were Jewish, Baha’i, or Christian. The Iran-Iraq War also occurred during the second phase of immigration. Beginning in 1980, migration to the U.S. increased by 74 % (Retrieved June 5, 2011 from
http://www.migrationinformation.org/about.cfm). Many of the immigrants were young Iranians who did not politically agree with the Iran-Iraq War and women and children who escaped warfare in Iran. The Office of Immigration Statistics (1980-2004) estimated “more than one out of every four Iranian immigrants (was) a refugee or asylee.”

Thus far I have described the past and present political and social identities of Iranian Americans. Next I will present current demographic characteristics of the community in the U.S.

The Current Demographic Characteristics of Iranian Americans

The section above described the unique contexts within which Iranians immigrated to the U.S. A description of estimates of current demographic information about Iranian Americans is presented. Many Iranian American groups such as The Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans, the Iranian American Bar Association, and the Iranian Alliances Across Borders, have attempted to increase awareness about the Iranian American community. Below I discuss some of the demographic characteristics and the difficulties involved in accurately identifying the Iranian American community.

There is a discrepancy between the estimated number of Iranians living in the U.S., according to the U.S. Census (2010) and a number of Iranian American associations. The U.S. Census Bureau (2010) reported approximately 463,552 Iranians living in the U.S. The Iranian Studies Group, a non-profit group associated with The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), on the other hand, estimated that there are more than 691,000 (2010) Iranians living in the U.S.

The actual number of Iranian Americans living in the U.S. has become a difficult figure to ascertain. One reason is that Iranian Americans must first identify themselves as
racially “other” (and not White) and then specify (fill in the blank) their identity as Iranian American in order to be publicly recorded as Iranian American. In addition, many Iranian Americans identify themselves as Persian. Thus, Iranian Americans who only identify themselves as White are not counted as Iranian American on public records such as the U.S. census. Iranian American research groups are still working to tabulate the information found on the 2010 census. Therefore, much of the information presented below is either from independent Iranian American research groups or based on the 2000 U.S. census.

Iranian Americans are a diverse group of people, mostly made up of immigrants. Within the Iranian American group are wide variations in cultural identity. The cultural variations are based on the following factors: 1) skin tone/color, 2) foreign accent 3) religious identity 4) Islamic appearance 5) identifying as Jewish 6) identifying as Baha’i, Christian, or Zoroastrian and 7) having no religious affiliation. For a detailed description on the aforementioned dimensions of cultural identity within the Iranian American community please see Appendix B.

Despite the Islamic regime in Iran, not all Iranian Americans identify as Muslims. Religiously, 40% of Iranians in the U.S. identify as Muslim and nearly the same amount identify as non-religious (Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans, PAAIA, 2008). The remaining 20% identified as Jewish, Baha’i, Christian, or Zoroastrian. In addition, 61% of Iranians in the U.S. are naturalized citizens. This is in contrast to the 40% of the “foreign-born population (that) was naturalized.” “Three out of every five Iranian immigrants were naturalized U.S. citizens.” Iranian Americans were also found to be more likely to speak a language other than English within their household. Where 92% of
“foreign born” Iranian Americans spoke a language other than English at home; only 83% of other “foreign born individuals spoke a language other than English” at home.

Iranian Americans are one of the most educated, independent, and economically flourishing immigrant groups in the U.S. According to PAAIA (2008), more than half of Iranian immigrants earned a bachelor’s degree or higher (51%). This was more than double the percentage of total foreign-born individuals (24%). Iranian Americans were twice as likely, compared to other foreign born individuals, to be self-employed. In 2000, 12% of Iranian Americans identified as self-employed, almost double the rate of the 7% of other foreign born individuals. Iranian Americans were also more likely to earn higher incomes than were their foreign born counterparts. The median annual income of male Iranian Americans was $52,333; female Iranian Americans had a median annual income of $36,422. This was significantly higher than their foreign born counterparts: males, $30,288 and females, $25,260.

Recent Research on Iranian Americans and the Current Study

There are a number of ways in which Iranian Americans have been analyzed. The Iranian American identity has been explored via literature reviews (Mostofi, 2003). Cultural retention among Iranian Americans was measured through participant interviews (Darnell, 2002). The political threat of Iran has been analyzed through content analysis of Canadian and U.S. newspapers (Ricard, 2012). Different types of family conflicts were measured through surveys among Iranian Americans (Partiali, 2012).

Researchers have analyzed Iranian and Afghan children’s experiences. They grouped their reports of prejudice and discrimination through interviews, focus groups, journals, and field logs (Khanlou, Koh, & Mill, 2008). In addition, Iranian Americans’
feelings of isolation and depression in Iowa were assessed on the basis of interviews and surveys (Chaichian, 1997). Past research has utilized a mixed methods design in the state of Iowa and most past researchers have studied Iranian Americans as one homogenous group. The current study was interested in intragroup differences in perceptions and experiences with prejudice and discrimination in terms of frequency and severity. Thus, a quantitative approach was utilized, measuring perceptions of experienced prejudice and discrimination among Iranian Americans of various religious affiliations (no religious affiliation, Muslim, Jewish).
CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Frameworks

The theoretical frameworks employed in the current study are Social Identity Theory, Social Distance Theory, and related concepts (e.g., categorization, comparison, identification, and psychological distinctiveness). More specifically, the theories discuss how Iranian Americans and Euro Americans come to accept individuals who make up their in-group(s), while becoming prejudiced and discriminatory toward out-group members. This section describes the significant differences between Euro American and Iranian American social identity that may lead to higher rates of social distance between the two groups. A discussion of significant differences between Iranian and Euro American social identities is also presented.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity is framed by the various social groups to which one belongs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tanti, Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010). For example an Iranian American may belong to several social groups including the Jewish religious group, the Democratic political group, and the White racial group. This section explores the cognitive processes involved in social identity formation. The processes include categorization, comparison, identification, and psychological distinctiveness.

In-group Cognitive Processing. The categorization process involves the cognitive information processing model, whereby the mind organizes information into nomenclatures (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986: Mayer, 2012). In other words people organize stimuli into categories such as man, woman, and/or American. Individuals identify “functionally important aspects” that are common or dissimilar between groups
of people (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p. 128; Mayer, 2012). An important aspect or cue would be a turban or a hijab in categorizing an individual as Middle Eastern or Muslim. An unimportant aspect may be the size of their hands or what kind of shoes they were wearing.

Race is one of the most important social categories in the U.S., despite the non-biological nature and the non-existence of a “pure” race. Racial attributes such as skin color, hair texture, facial structure (Rose, 1997) are used to categorize individuals into racial groups. Iranian Americans are considered White. However, they have diverse skin tones, hair textures, and facial structures that will be further described later on in the dissertation.

Colorism is a concept that explores differences in degree of prejudice and discrimination experienced by individuals of the same racial group who have different skin tones (lighter vs. darker) (Jones, 2000). Skin color may be a proxy for an individual’s type of occupation and the neighborhood in which he/she resides (Rose, 1997). The correlation between non-White skin tone and disproportionate representation within lower status work and neighborhood is a social and not biological phenomenon. Researchers found that Middle Easterners were stereotyped as having darker skin tone (Ghavami & Peplau, 2013).

Skin tone is an ascribed status (Parrillo, 1994) due to one’s inability to choose skin tone and compounded by the cultural significance of skin color in the U. S. (Rose, 1997). In addition to ascribed statuses, socially constructed attributes are also used in the categorization processes (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Mayer, 2012). Characteristics such as religious affiliation and region of origin, are identifiable through other social cues. For
example many Iranian Americans who possess an Euro American appearance may be categorized as Middle Eastern by Euro Americans through the social cue of their ethnic names. There is a relationship between social group categorization and context because of the social and political privileges and powers gained or lost by the particular group within which one is categorized.

A comparison process determines with which group(s) one identifies. However, the comparison process assesses more than actual differences and accounts for the notions of “we and they.” The group comparison process affects the individual’s self-concept. Important attributes of an individual’s self-concept, such as self-esteem, are affected by how society and the individual themselves assess the in-group (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Mayer, 2012). Group assessment is generally assessed via an interval scale whereby the value of one group is only relevant when compared to the value of another group. For example, individuals from California and Texas may perceive one another as culturally significantly different. However, the same two individuals may feel very similar when placed in a different context such as outside of the U.S. They may perceive each other as American and very similar when conversing outside of the U.S.

The positive social identity theory suggests that individuals desire membership within the empowered groups of society (Mayer, 2012; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). The nature of group comparisons creates the motivation for an individual to desire group distinctiveness. Group power may be defined as the ability to control one’s surroundings and the actions of others.

**Out-group Formations.** The out-group, foreigner/immigrant/alien is perceived as strange, unusual, or eccentric (Schrieke, 1971; Semyonov, Rajman, & Gorodzeisky,
This deviation from what is deemed as “normal” is observable through dress, language, and many other social behaviors. That which is considered different is considered wrong (versus right) and causes social hostilities. For example, Iranian Americans who speak Farsi and identify as Muslim may be perceived as significantly different and therefore wrong. The term “alien” is itself dehumanizing and asserts ideas of inferiority. Hence, “the greater the difference in cultural or social heritage, the greater (is) the repugnance” (Schrieke, 1971, p. 71; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006).

Both minority and majority group members solidify their identity when placed in contexts where power differentials are readily observed within a social hierarchy (Porter & Washington, 1993).

Social group members develop a bias against members of the out-group. The bias entails the attribution of out-group successes to external causes, and successes of the in-group to internal causes (Ross, 1977). The bias described above is called the fundamental attribution error. The fundamental attribution error may lead to a form of discrimination against members of the out-group, in order to maintain in-group power. This type of discrimination is referred to as minimal intergroup discrimination (Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is called minimal intergroup discrimination because the effect is based on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The minimal group paradigm describes the minimum number of characteristics necessary to create a sense of in-group solidarity among individuals. Individuals will demonstrate a sense of in-group solidarity based on the most non-significant group designation, which is referred to as the minimal discrimination effect (Stukas, Halloran,
In other words, once an individual has identified with an in-group, a biased comparison is assessed to create a positive social identity marked by group power.

Discrimination includes biased allotments of resources and goods to an individual’s in-group (Katz, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Power, as defined above, is desired to create a higher sense of self-esteem for the in-group while simultaneously widening differences between the in-group and the out-group. The widening of differences and the minimal discrimination effect work together to create and maintain power differentials perceived or real between the in-group and the out-group. Interestingly, participants in a group experiment who displayed discriminatory behaviors also maintained a higher level of self-esteem (Katz, 1991; Oakes & Turner, 1980). The findings that displays of discrimination positively correlate with higher levels of self-esteem, suggests that such discrimination occurs to heighten the status of an individual’s group, and in turn support a positive social identity.

The distinctiveness phase describes the motivations for group categorization (Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Although the processes of categorization, identification, and comparison precede psychological distinctiveness, the motivation for these three processes is to achieve psychological distinctiveness and to enhance positive social identity (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Stukas, Halloran, & Foddy, 2010).

Self-categorization theorists view social category boundaries as flexible. In other words, the “saliency” of particular social identities may change within different contexts among various individuals (Deaux, 1993). Various group identifications will become
more or less salient depending on the status and advantage gained within the immediate context. When aspects of one’s social identity are negatively evaluated by others, individuals may not want to reveal those particular aspects—such as their religious affiliation, political affiliation, or sometimes country of origin. For example, an Iranian American may choose to go by an American nickname in social settings to avoid possible prejudice and discrimination. However, the communication of ascribed status and ascribed group membership is automatic despite social gain or loss.

**Social Identity and Iranian Americans**

Iranian Americans may have different experiences in the U.S. depending on how they are categorized, based on ethnic appearance as it pertains to skin tone and hair texture. More specifically, Iranian immigrants to the U.S. come from different regions of Iran that have distinct customs, linguistic dialects, and different skin tones. Iranian Americans vary in appearance from blond hair, blue eyes, small/big pointy noses, and light skin to dark brown/black eyes, black hair, darker/tan/brown or olive skin tones, and wider set noses. Iranian Americans also range from having straight light hair to having dark black curly hair. They may affiliate with Islam, Judaism, or other religious groups and display cultural symbols of belonging to the Iranian American group.

Individuals may categorize Iranian Americans or Iranian American Muslims as part of their in-group/out-group based on similarities and/or dissimilarities between the group member and themselves. Within the comparison process, the Iranian American or the Iranian American Muslim is perceived as a member of the out-group, the other, and as foreigners referred to as “aliens.” Ultimately, these described notions of “we versus they” and “alien” are examples of what is identified as the in-group verses the out-group.
Iranian Americans with more phenotypically Eurocentric features may be socially and politically motivated to socially distance themselves from the Iranian American group. For example, Iranian Americans with Eurocentric appearances may Anglicize their names, wear Westernized attire, and altogether deny being Iranian American if they feel that it is to their social benefit. Whereas Iranian Americans with more ethnic appearances (darker skin tone, darker hair/eyes, ethnic hair texture, ethnic facial structures) do not have control over their ascribed status. Consequently, they become less accepted by the U.S. dominant mainstream group.

**Social Distance Theory**

The section above described Social Identity Theory, application to Iranian Americans, and the biases that develop based on in-group memberships. Below is a description of Social Distance Theory and its effects on prejudice (Bogardus, 1947; Rollock, & Vrana, 2005). The Iranian American community is perceived as the “other” and represents a social identity that is significantly different from the mainstream U.S. identity. This suggests a possible vulnerability to higher rates of social distance between Iranian Americans and Euro Americans.

**Social Nearness.** Social nearness (of social distance theory) describes a high degree of sympathetic understanding (Ahmed, 2007; Bogardus, 1959). Sympathy is defined as an emotional or behavioral response that is positive or in the best interest of another person or group of persons. Sympathetic understanding may occur between individuals, between an individual and a social group, and between social groups. For example, there is a high degree of sympathetic understanding (social nearness) among Iranian American refugees, due to their unique and similar social identities and life
experiences. Williams (as cited in Weaver, 2008) describes social distance as “feelings of unwillingness among members of a group to accept or approve a given degree of intimacy in interaction with a member of an out-group” (Weaver, 2008, p. 780). Interestingly, social distance exists on a personal or group level within every social interaction.

Social distance may exist between person and person, between a person and group, and between social groups (Bogardus, 1959; Rollock, & Vrana, 2005). Social distance is placed on a continuum between degree of social nearness or farness (Bogardus, 1959; Rollock, & Vrana, 2005). Measuring social distance is complicated due to the fact that social distance never ceases to exist. In other words, “social nearness” indicates a high degree of sympathy and understanding between “person and person, or person and group, or group and group.” On the other hand, “social farness” indicates a low degree of sympathy and understanding between individuals, an individual and a group, or social groups. Social distance pertaining to “person and person” is illustrated in seven specific levels (Bogardus, 1959). Please see Table 2 below.

Table 2. Levels of Social Nearness and Distance

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Loved Ones</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Regular Friends</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Speaking Acquaintances</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Non-Speaking Acquaintances</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Strangers in Same Culture</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Strangers in Different Cultures</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>Enemies</td>
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(Bogardus, 1959)

“Social nearness” begins with level one, which includes “loved ones,” and gradually approaches “social farness” with “enemies” at level seven. Social distance
incrementally increases in the following order: “loved ones, regular friends, speaking acquaintances, non-speaking acquaintances, strangers in (the) same culture (e.g. Iranian Americans, Iranian American Muslims), strangers in different cultures, and enemies” (Ahmed, 2007; Bogardus, 1959, p. 8). Levels one and two indicate “social nearness” where level one indicates closer ties than level two. Levels three and four indicate a significant level of “social nearness,” with the possibility of increasing closeness. Level five categorizes “social farness” within the same society. Level six refers to “social farness” that creates no avenues for communication (e.g., individuals living in different countries, Iranians).

Level seven is unique in that it may refer to a range of individuals from within the same household to individuals of different social systems and cultures. Within level seven, social farness is deliberately increased by the two parties involved (e.g., enemies). Level seven is a social farness type that is in a class by itself and may exist between members of different cultures, of the same culture, even of persons within the same household, where each participant discloses the less appealing aspects of his/her personality to the other and where one, or both, engage in deliberately increasing the farness conditions.

Social nearness between person and person may imply that the individuals share many commonalities. It is a careful balance of stimulation that is rooted in similarity without causing boredom. This type of social nearness between person and person is called personal nearness. In the other extreme, personal farness may be due to cultural differences or a feeling of competition (Ahmed, 2007; Bogardus, 1959).
The term personal-group distance refers to the relationship between an individual and the group(s) he/she may be a part of, with which he/she interacts. Personal-group distance refers to the degree of “sympathetic understanding” (Bogardus, 1959, p. 10) between a person and a group. For example, personal-group nearness describes the situation in which an individual has a strong sense of loyalty to a group.

In contrast, an individual may be part of a social group, such as an Iranian American, and if phenotypically able to pass for non-Iranian American, they may deny group membership and engage in personal-group farness. People may not be accepting of a group, and a group may not be accepting or approving of an individual. The term group-personal farness describes a situation wherein the individual’s values, characteristics, or behaviors deviate from what a group deems as normal or acceptable. Therefore, deviating from the “norm” is a strong indication of whether or not a group will accept an individual.

An interesting dynamic exists between isolation and social deviation (Bogardus, 1959; Clinard & Meier, 2010). The relationship describes an individual becoming socially deviant as a cause of isolation (e.g., the Iranian American who is rejected by the group). However the individual may also become socially deviant as a result of his or her isolation from the group (e.g., Iranian Americans who deny group membership). The group may be more or less accepting of an individual depending on the values of the group and whether the individual is deemed a “liability or an asset” (Bogardus, 1959, p. 10; Clinard & Meier, 2010). The term “liability” refers to a person who may lessen or threaten the group’s status or values whereas the term “asset” refers to a person who may further the goals or heighten the status of a group. Personal-group distance may be
conceptualized similarly. That is, the individual is more likely to desire group membership if his/her status or values are heightened—for example, an Iranian American with Eurocentric features may likely desire entrance into the White American group in order to heighten social status or value.

Group distance is measured by the degree of sympathetic understanding (Bogardus, 1959) that exists between two groups in society. Social groups may include, among other categories, religious groups, ethnic groups, or racial groups (e.g., Iranian American, Iranian American Muslim). An example of group distance is described between employers and employees (Bogardus, 1959; Gonzalez, Burke, Santuzzi, & Bradley, 2003). In the case of a workers’ strike, generally there is a high degree of group social distance between that particular group of employees and their employer. Racially motivated riots also illustrate the phenomena of social group distance between racial groups.

Hate crimes and hate rallies may result from a high degree of social group distance. Group nearness is likely to occur when groups have similar backgrounds, cultures, and goals. Group nearness refers to those groups not in direct competition with one another. To further understand types of group social distance you may refer to Appendix C, regarding horizontal and vertical social distance.

**Patterns of Social Distance**

There are basic patterns within which social distance increases or decreases (Bogardus, 1959; Clinard & Meier, 2010). Past research on patterns of social distance allows researchers to understand what particular group memberships are of interest when looking at biases and prejudices. Social distance patterns were observed from 1926 to
1956 (Bogardus, 1959). One of the first social factors explored were patterns regarding race. Race may be conceptualized as a social construct. A social construct is one that is created by the individuals of a society as part of its culture (Lorber, 1994). Social constructs are dynamic. Individuals must unanimously accept the social construct as true and behave accordingly to maintain social parameters and boundaries. Social constructs are created and maintained in this manner. As a result, anticipated behaviors and standards or norms are based on accepted social constructs that are reinforced institutionally, socially, and personally within a society.

Simply stated, race has no biological validity (Lorber, 1994). This theory also addresses the two racial myths: First, that there exists one superior race; and second, that any race is genetically pure. Both of these myths are scientifically inaccurate (Henslin, 2003). Social distance between racial groups in a society is referred to as racial distance (Bogardus, 1959; Clinard & Meier, 2010). Racial distance may be more easily reduced among racial groups that share cultural commonalities (Bogardus, 1959; Clinard & Meier, 2010). For example, although Middle Easterners, Iranian Americans, and Euro Americans are all considered members of the White racial group; there may still be a high rate of group distance due to cultural differences on a number of important cultural dimensions.

Group distance may also be due to differences in power among groups. For example dominant groups in society may fear that their status is threatened by non-dominant groups, and consequently put forth significant effort to lessen the opportunities available to the non-dominant group members for social empowerment. Interestingly, racial distance tends to increase during times of war (Bogardus, 1959).
Three major factors that contribute to decreasing racial distance are described below (Bogardus, 1959; Goff, Davies, & Steele, 2008). First, the dominant group must experience a reduction in fear of the non-dominant group. Second, the non-dominant group must experience a degree of social empowerment through opportunity. Lastly, the level of communication between the two races must increase and facilitate a higher degree of understanding between them.

Social distance between religious groups was explored (Bogardus, 1959; Wark & Galliher, 2007). Social distance in the area of religious group membership is termed religious distance. Religion is considered a cultural phenomenon. Due to the highly exclusive nature of religion, overcoming religious distance is challenging (e.g., social distance with Iranian American Muslims). In other words, each religion conceptualizes itself as the “right” religion, and hence considers other religious groups to be “wrong.” The expertise, power, and control that a religion bears are not to be questioned by its followers.

A lack in religious nearness is evident in the many wars fought in the name of religion. In addition to, between groups religious conflict, the religious group sects that form within a given religious group illustrate internal conflict between religious group members. Religious distance is based on a difference in beliefs and endorsement of leaders. Religious farness is manifested in the prohibition established by a number of religions that do not allow religious group members to marry members of other religious groups. Religious distance may be due to differences between religious groups and the members’ theoretical beliefs (Bogardus, 1959; Wark & Galliher, 2007). It may also be due to a competition to recruit group members and heightened during times of war.
Concepts such as the Axis of Evil may also increase religious distance. As a result, religious distance is difficult to reduce.

**Middle Easterners in the U.S.**

Past researchers have analyzed the relationship between Americans in the U.S. and Iranian Americans and/or Middle Easterners. Below is a description of research that was conducted in the Middle Eastern community. Researchers reported that students from a private southern university did not mind being friends with someone of Middle Eastern descent but would not accept them as a family member (Horsfall & Salih, 2003). Navarre-Jackson (2011) found that knowing someone from Middle Eastern descent decreased social distance between individuals in the U.S. and other Middle Eastern Americans. However, Koleser (2009) found that Middle Easterners were the least likely to be accepted in the U.S. on the Social Distance and Semantic Differentials Scale. Thus, the information is both contradictory and limited to studying Middle Easterners as one homogenous group from an outsider’s perspective.

**Hypotheses and Research Questions**

On the basis of the preceding theoretical framework and research, I explored whether or not Iranian Americans of various religious affiliations (no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim) differed in their perceptions of prejudice and discrimination. Specifically, the hypotheses and research questions were:

**Hypotheses:**

Hypothesis I. Iranian American Muslims will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish or possessing no religious affiliation).
Hypothesis II. Iranian American Muslims who appear prototypically Muslim (displaying scarf/hijab, Allah necklace, a beard, Islamic stone, or a Tasbih), will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than will Iranian American Muslims whose appearance is more prototypically Euro-American (or non-Muslim).

Specific Research Questions:

I. Does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans?

II. Are Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans within the full sample predicted by, Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

III. Are Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans within each religious subsample (Iranian Americans: no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim) predicted by, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

IV. Does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans?
V. Are Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans within the full sample predicted by Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

VI. Are Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans within each religious subsample (Iranian Americans: no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim) predicted by, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

VII. Does religiosity affect perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment and/or perceived social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans?

VIII. Is there an underlying latent construct within the measured variables of: skin tone, accent (Iranian), displays of religious symbols, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, and identification with an ethnicity other than Iranian American?
CHAPTER 3

Southern California Context

Southern California was an excellent location in which to conduct the current study. Most notably because of the significant presence and social/political representation of Iranian Americans in the area. Most of the participants resided in LA or Orange Counties (56%) and a significant number disclosed their residence as California alone (30%). Therefore it is relevant in regard to the participants of the study to describe the Southern California context. Los Angeles is home to the largest number of people of Iranian descent outside of Iran. More specifically, Beverly Hills (Los Angeles County) and Irvine (Orange County) have large populations of Iranian Americans. Iranian Americans gained political visibility in 2007 and 2010 when Beverly Hills, Iranian American, Mayor Jamshid Delshad was voted into office.

Southern California has a unique culture that may be accepting of immigrants and their cultures. *The Los Angeles Times* described Southern California as a center for cultural diffusion, referred to as a “melting pot”- with diverse communities and neighborhoods that represent a number of ethnic and racial groups. More specifically, according to the 2012 Census, Orange County is racially composed of: White (74.5%), Black or African American (2.0%), American Indian and Alaska Native (1.1%), Asian (18.9%), Native ‘an and other Pacific Islander (.4%), two or more races (3.2%), Hispanic or Latino (34.1%), or White not Hispanic or Latino (43.1%). According to the 2012 Census, Los Angeles County is racially composed of: White (71.6%), Black or African American (9.3%), American Indian and Alaska Native (1.5%), Asian (14.5%), Native ‘an and other Pacific Islander (.4%), two or more races (2.8%), Hispanic or Latino (48.2%),
or White not Hispanic or Latino (27.3%). Thus, Iranian Americans may feel more welcomed and comfortable in the Southern California context due to its diverse and inclusive culture.

Los Angeles and Orange counties are financially affluent areas. The median incomes are significantly higher than the nation's average (OC, $Mdn = 75,762$, Century City (West LA), $Mdn = 95,135$, Nation’s Average = 42,979.61). This does not suggest that all individuals living in Los Angeles and Orange Counties are in higher income brackets than individuals in the rest of the nation. However, there are substantial pockets of wealth.

Los Angeles and Orange County are markedly different in regard to political characteristics. According to the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (2008), only one out of every eight Iranian Americans identify as Republican, one out of every two identify as Democrat, and one out of every four as independent. Orange County is politically conservative while Los Angeles County inhabitants have voted democratically for the last four decades.

The Iranian Americans surveyed represented a unique sample predominantly from Southern California. That is to say that many participants did not display symbols of religious affiliation. In addition there were not many visual markers of diversity within the Muslim (e.g., Sunni vs. Shiite) or Jewish (e.g., Hasidic vs. Orthodox) participants in the study.
**Method**

**Demographics of the Sample: Frequencies and Descriptive Statistics**

*Gender.* Participants were asked to identify their gender by choosing either man or woman. The sample size totaled 374 adults (125 men, 249 women). A majority (67%) of the sample identified as women and 33% identified as men. Participant answers were coded as man = 0 and woman = 1.

*Age.* Participants were asked in a free response format to indicate their age. Responses were categorized into the following age brackets: ages 18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57, 58-67, and 67+. Participants ranged from the ages of 18 to 68. Most participants were over 30 years of age ($M = 38$, $Mdn = 35$, $SD = 11.670$). More specifically participant age ranges were as such: ages 18-27(5), 28-37(75), 38-47(137), 48-57(77), 58-67(60), and 67+(20).

*Religious Affiliation.* Participants were asked, “What is your religious affiliation? Please write none if you have no religious affiliation.” Three of the 374 participants did not disclose their religious affiliation. Participants identified as having no religious affiliation (Men =52, Women = 55), Christian (Men =1, Women = 4), Jewish (Men = 24, Women = 58), Muslim (Men = 34, Women = 115), Other (Men = 13, Women = 15), and three individuals did not answer the question (Men = 1, Women = 2). Of the 371 participants, 40% identified as Muslim, 22% identified as Jewish, 1% identified as Christian, 8% identified as other, and 29% reported having no religious affiliation. However, due to the lack of Christian and “other” participants and also no research interest in those groups, Iranian American Christians and those who identified as “other”
were not used in the statistical analyses used to explore the hypotheses and research questions of the study. Answers were coded as 0 = none, 1 = Christian, 2 = Jewish, 3 = Muslim, and 4 = other.

**Level of Education.** Participants were asked to report their highest level of education. Participants reported the following highest level of education completed: No answer (9%), grade school (2%), high school (12%), vocational degree or certification (4%), BA/BS (34%), MS/MA (24%), or PhD/MD (15%). Answers were coded as 1 = Grade school, 2 = High School, 3 = Vocational degree/Certification, 4 = BS/BA, 5 = MS/MA, or 6 = Ph.D./M.D.

**Annual Income during Childhood.** Participants were asked what their annual household income was during most of their childhood. Participants reported the following incomes: Under $17,000 (4%), $17,000-24,999 (5%), $25,000-49,999 (13%), $50,000-99,999 (37%), and $100,000+ (41%). Answers were coded as 1 = Under $17,000, 2 = $17,000-24,999, 3 = $25,000-49,999, 4 = $50,000-99,999, or 5 = $100,000.

**Predictors**

**Ethnic Identity.** Participants were asked, “Which one group best describes your ethnic identity or the ethnic group with which you most strongly identify?” Participants were given the options (coding used the same numbers): White = 1, White/Iranian = 2, Middle Eastern = 3, Middle Eastern/Iranian = 4, Persian = 5, Iranian = 6, Iranian American = 7, Other Fill in the Blank = 8. In descending order participants identified as Persian (33%), Iranian American (22%), Iranian (17%), White/Iranian (17%), Middle Eastern/ Iranian (5%), White (4%), Middle Eastern and Other (1%).
**Iranian Subgroup Part A.** Participants were asked, “Do you identify with any other ethnic group besides Iranian American? (e.g., Azerbaijani, Afghani, Bahrani, etc.)?” About 50% of the sample also identified with an additional sub-ethnic group other than Iranian American. For example, there are subcultures in Iranian e.g., Turkish Iranian. Although the group is of Iranian descent and primarily identifies as Iranian, they also identify with the Turkish subculture in Iran. Answers were coded as no = 0 or yes = 1.

**Iranian Subgroup Part B.** Participants were asked, “If answered no to question 3b (referenced above), skip to question 4. Do you believe that Iranian Americans from a different region of Iran than yourself are treated significantly different from you in the context of the U.S. by non-Iranian Americans?” Only 3.7% of participants answered “yes.” Participant answers were coded as no = 0 or yes = 1.

**Skin tone.** Participants were asked, “Please select the skin color/tone that best represents your skin color/tone. Indicate your choice by selecting the number associated with the skin color/tone you choose. Write number here___” Skin tone was measured by asking participants to rate their own skin complexion on The Fitzpatrick Scale (Daniel, Heckman, Kloss, & Manne, 2009). The scale was created in 1975 and categorizes skin types by reaction to UV light. The Fitzpatrick Scale (Daniel, Heckman, Kloss, & Manne, 2009) was utilized because it offered a description along with a visual depiction of the skin color. In addition the scale is often used among dermatologists.

The majority of participants (61%) rated their skin tone as a four on the Fitzpatrick Scale, which associates with “dark brown hair and green, hazel, brown eyes” (SD = .85). Only 1% indicated a one rating, 5% indicated a rating of two, 11% indicated a
three, 18% indicated a five, and 4% indicated a six. Skin color/tone was coded the same way the Fitzpatrick Scale denoted it’s categories. Skin color/tone became darker as numbers increased from 1-6.

**Skin Lightening.** Participants were asked, “Have you ever used/undergone a skin lightening product/procedure (for the purposes of lightening your skin color/tone)?” An overwhelming majority of participants (99%) reported never having under-gone a skin lightening procedure. Answers were coded as no = 0 and yes = 1.

**Willingness to Lighten Skin.** Participants were asked, “Would you ever use/undergo a skin lightening product/procedure (for the purposes of lightening your skin color/tone)?” Answers were coded as no=0 and yes=1. A majority, 98% reported they would never undergo a skin lightening procedure. Answers were coded as no = 0 and yes = 1.
**Accent.** Participants were asked, “Do you consider yourself to have an Iranian Accent when speaking English?” Participants reported whether or not they had an Iranian accent on a 7 item scale. In descending order: 32% reported “Not at all,” 17% reported “moderate,” 15% reported “mild,” 13% reported a two (between “Not at all” and “mild”), 12% reported a six (between “moderate” and “acute”), only 6% reported having an “acute” accent, and 5% reported a four (between “mild” and “moderate”) (SD = 2.05). Answers were coded from 1-7 ranging from 1 = Not at all to 7 = Acute.

**Immigration Status.** Participants were asked, “How old were you when you immigrated to the U.S.? Or were you born in the U.S.?” The majority of participants were born outside of the U.S. (82%) while a minority was born in the U.S. (18%). Answers were coded as 0 = Born in the U.S., 1= Born out of the U.S.

**Generational Status.** Participants were asked, “How many generations has your family been in the U.S.?” When asked about generational status in the U.S. participants wrote in the following responses: 81% “born out of the country,” 14% “first generation,” 4% “second generation,” and 1% “third generation”. Answers were coded as 0 = born out of the country, 1 = first generation, 2 = second generation, and 3 = third generation. For many of the analyses answers were coded as 0 = born out of the country and 1 = born in the U.S.

**Symbols of Religious Affiliation.** Participants were asked, “Do you wear symbols of your religious affiliation? (e.g., Cross, Yarmulke, Turban, Scarf, etc.).” Most participants reported “never” displaying religious symbols (70%). While 27% of participants reported “sometimes” displaying religious symbols and only 3% of
participants reported always displaying religious symbols. Answers were coded as Never=1, Sometimes=2, or Always=3. For many of the analyses answers were coded as 0 = never and 1 = sometimes or always.

*Symbols of Religious Affiliation. Open Format.* Participants were asked how often, if ever, they display symbols of religious affiliation. Participants were given a free response format. The majority of participants reported “never” (72%). All other participant responses were placed into eleven categories based on self-reports: seldom, religious event, twice a year, once a year, once a month, twice a month, sometimes, weekly, twice a week, daily, always, or 99. Each category of those displaying a symbol included less than 4% of the sample. Answers were coded as, never=0, seldom=1, religious event=2, twice a year=3, once a year=4, once a month=5, twice a month=6, sometimes=7, weekly=8, twice a week=9, daily=10, or always=11.

What Religious Symbols. Participants were asked what kinds of religious symbols they wear, in a free-response format. The 30% of participants who reported displaying symbols of religious affiliation were asked “what religious symbols” they display. The majority reported wearing a scarf/hijab (15%). Participants also reported displaying the Star of David (3%), a Yarmulke (2%), a Faravahar (symbol of Zoroastrianism) (1%), an Allah necklace (1%), or jewelry (5%). Less than 2% of participants reported displaying: a Kara (steel bangle worn by Sikhs) (.3%), Evil eye jewelry (.3%), a Cross (.3%), a beard (.3%), Islamic Stone (.3%), or a Tasbih (.5%). Answers were coded as: 1=scarf/hijab, 2= Star of David, 3=Yarmulke, 4=Faravahar (symbol of Zoroastrianism), 5=Allah necklace, 6=Jewelry, 7=Kara (steel bangle
traditional worn by Sikhs), 8=Evil eye (non-religious), 9= Christian Cross, 10=Beard, 11=Islamic stone, 12=Tasbih.

**Ethnically Traditional Clothing.** Participants were asked, “Do you wear ethnically traditional clothing? (e.g., clothing worn in non-urban areas of Iran such as Mahali clothing)?” The majority (94%) of participants reported “never” wearing ethnically traditional clothing. A small percentage of participants (6%) reported “sometimes” wearing ethnically traditional clothing. No participants reported “always” wearing ethnically traditional clothing. Answers were coded as Never=1, Sometimes=2, or Always=3. *However, for the purposes of the multiple regression those who displayed ethnically traditional clothing were coded as 1, and those who did not were coded as 0.*

**Ethnically Traditional Clothing. Free Response.** The 6% of participants who reported “sometimes” wearing ethnically traditional clothing were asked an open ended question of how often they did so. Answers were then placed in the following categories: seldom (2%), Halloween (1%), ethnic/cultural event (2%), once a month (1%), or very often (1%). Answers were categorized and coded as, 0= never, 1=seldom, 2=Halloween, 3=ethnic/cultural event, 4=once a month, or 5=very often.

**What Ethnically Traditional Clothing. Free Response.** Participants who reported (6%) wearing ethnically traditional clothing were asked a free response question of what kind of ethnically traditional clothing they wear. Responses were placed in the following categories: thobe/dishdasha (.3%), mahali dress (1.1%), colorful scarf (.8%), scarfs/jewelry (.3%), or bags/scarves/jewelry/skirt (1.6%). Answers were coded as. Responses were placed in the following categories: 1= thobe/dishdasha, 2 = mahali dress, 3 = colorful scarf, 4 = scarfs/jewelry, or 5 = bags/scarves/jewelry/skirt.
Occupation. Participants were asked, in a free response format, to report their occupation. Participants reported their occupation in a free response format. Responses were placed into the following categories: White collar (84%), blue collar (1%), homemaker (10%), or other (5%). Answers were coded as 1=white collar, 2=blue collar, 3=homemaker, or 4=other.

Father’s Occupation. Participants were asked, in a free response format, to report their father’s occupation. Responses were placed in the following categories: White collar (75%), blue collar (3%), army (8%), or other (14%). Responses were coded as 1 = white collar, 2 = blue collar, 3 = army, or 4 = other.

Mother’s Occupation. Participants were asked, in a free response format, to report their mother’s occupation. Participants’ mother’s occupation was placed in the following categories: White collar (36%), blue collar (0%), homemaker (35%), or other (29%). Responses were coded as 1 = white collar, 2 = blue collar, 3 = homemaker, or 4 = other.

Geographic Location. Participants were asked to report their geographic location. Participant responses were placed in the following categories: Los Angeles, CA (28%), Orange County, CA (28%), California (30%), Orange County or Los Angeles (1%), or other (13%). Participant responses were coded as 1 = Los Angeles, 2 = Orange County, 3 = California, 4 = Orange County or Los Angeles, or 5 = Other.

Participants: Recruitment

Participants were recruited using snowball and purposive sampling. Please see Appendix D. I collaborated with the Persian American Society for Health Advancement (PASHA – a non-religious organization which includes Jewish, Muslim, and Iranian
Americans with various religious affiliations) and used media outlets to recruit participants. Surveys were conducted on SurveyMonkey.com and available via Facebook.com and LinkedIn.com. I also recruited participants at Iranian grocery stores on Westwood Blvd. in West Los Angeles (March 9th and March 16th).

Initially an invitation to distribute and complete the survey was emailed to the following Iranian American organizations: University of Maryland Iranian Student Foundation, Persian American Association of Northern California, Iranian-American Women’s Foundation, Persian Student Association at Stanford University, Iranian Student Alliance in America at UC Berkeley, Association of Professors & Scholars of Iranian Heritage, Iranian Students Association at Arizona State University, Pars Times, Iranian-American Cultural Association of Missouri, Iranian American Bar Association, Persian Academic & Cultural Student Association at the University of Southern California, and The Persian American Society for Health Advancement. It is unclear which organizations distributed the survey link. An invitation was sent out to the aforementioned organizations a couple of times. The content of the email is provided below:

“Hello,

My name is Shahrzad Yousefinejad. I am a Ph.D. candidate working under the supervision of Dr. Elaine Hatfield at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa. I am conducting my doctoral study on Iranian American perceptions. I am experiencing a challenge recruiting Iranian Americans (18 years and older) to take my survey online. I was wondering if your organization could help me distribute my survey among the Iranian American community. Below is the link to my survey:

https://www.research.net/s/IranianAmericanPerceptions

Any input or guidance from your organization is greatly appreciated!”
Many many thanks,
Shahrzad”

I also wrote invitations to Synagogues. The following Synagogues were contacted: Chabad of Bel Air, Beth Jacob Congregation, Congregation Magen David of Beverly Hills, Young Israel of North Beverly Hills, LeoBaeck Temple, and University Synagogue. The aforementioned synagogues were emailed because they are located in or around the Beverly Hills area. According to NPR (2006), 20% of individuals living in Beverly Hills are Iranian American and 40% of students who attend schools in the area are Iranian American.

It is unclear which organizations distributed the survey link. The emails were sent on 02/13/2013. The synagogues were emailed the following message:

“Hello,

My name is Shahrzad Yousefinejad. I am a Ph.D Candidate at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa, under the advisement of Dr. Elaine Hatfield. I moved back to Southern California to conduct my doctoral study.

I am contacting you in hopes of gaining your guidance and help. The topic of my dissertation is on the complex identity of Iranian Americans. There is a dearth of research on the social identity of Iranian Americans. I would like to demonstrate the diversity within the Iranian American community, by surveying their perceptions and opinions, in exploration of their experiences with prejudice and discrimination.

It is of great importance that the Iranian American Jewish voice is included in my work. I personally have no religious affiliation and am experiencing a challenge entering any religious community. I am wondering if you would be willing to work with me to distribute and encourage Iranian American Jewish participation. I have provided my survey link below:

https://www.research.net/s/IranianAmericanPerceptions

Please let me know if you would like any further information. I am happy to converse by email, phone (949)280-7648, or in-person. Thank you for your time and consideration.
Warmest regard,
Shahrzad “

Next, I contacted individuals with ethnically Iranian names with an invitation to complete the survey, via LinkedIn.com. Individuals were recruited because the website suggested that I may be acquainted with them. However, I did not know the individuals in any shape or form. The emails were sent between 11/14/2012-12/18/2013. It is unclear which individuals completed or distributed the survey link. The message was as follows:

“Aloha!

Do you identify as Iranian American? Have you ever thought about how you are portrayed or understood in the social sciences? There is a dearth of research out there on your group! My name is Shahrzad Yousefinejad and I am a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa- working under the advisement of Dr. Elaine Hatfield. Please take this opportunity to voice your opinion by completing an online survey. You need not identify yourself and the survey is confidential! The survey link is provided below. Thank you for your time!”

Lastly, participants were approached at two ethnically Persian (Iranian) grocery stores on Westwood Blvd. in West Los Angeles, CA, on March 9th and March 16th. The two grocery stores were Jordan Market and Super Sun. Of the 374 participants, 58% were recruited online and 42% were recruited in person. I approached individuals I perceived to appear Iranian American. I spoke to them in Farsi and asked if they would like to take a survey. Everyone I approached was in fact Iranian American.

Online/In-Person Survey: Procedure

The survey was conducted on Surveymonkey.com and in-person with paper and pen. The researcher recruited participants from grocery stores two weeks prior to Persian New Years because many Iranian Americans shop for groceries prior to the New Year. Participants were asked to agree to the terms of the survey on a consent form and indicate
their understanding of the form by marking an X. I approached participants by introducing myself in Farsi. They were approached outside of the grocery store on public property. Many of the participants asked that I read the questions out loud in English and sometimes translate questions into Farsi.

Participants who were recruited online were provided with a link to the survey on Surveymonkey.com. Initially, participants were required to answer whether or not they consented to taking the survey and understood their rights. Participants who did not agree were directed to a Thank You page. Participants who agreed to the consent form were able to complete the survey online.

**Online/In-Person Survey: Apparatus/Materials**

The materials for the online/in-person survey included a consent form. Please see Appendix E. In addition to a survey packet that included the following scales: 1) An adaptation of the Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale (EHES) (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000), 2) An adaptation of the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959), 3) a brief religiosity scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) and 4) a demographic questionnaire (in which a number of one-item Qs were included- such as: questions designed to assess gender, age, ethnic identity, sub-ethnic identity (if any), treatment of those who affiliate with a sub-ethnic identity, religious affiliation, skin tone/color, whether or not they have or would undergo skin lightening procedures, foreign accent, age of immigration, generational status, displays of religiously symbolic clothing, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, highest level of education, family income during childhood, occupation, father’s occupation, mother’s occupation, and geographic location). The demographic questionnaire one-item questions were described above in the
Demographics and Predictors sections. The order in which the 1) Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale (EHES) (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000), 2) Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959) and, 3) brief religiosity scale (Allport & Ross, 1967) were presented to participants was randomized in the maximum number of ways to control for ordering effects. Please see Appendix F for the survey packet.

1. The Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale (Schneider et al., 2000). The alpha level for The Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale was .80. Please see Appendix G for more information on the statistical reliability and validity of the EHES. The EHES asked participants to rate experiences with ethnic harassment within the last 24 months, on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 3 (almost always).

The questions were as follows: 1) Someone made derogatory comments about your ethnicity. 2) Someone used ethnic slurs to describe you. 3) Someone made racist or prejudiced comments about you or your ethnicity. (For example saying people of your ethnicity aren’t very smart). 4) Someone tells jokes about your ethnic group. And 5) Someone excludes you from social interactions because of your ethnicity. Please see Table 3 below.

Table 3. Adapted EHES Statements

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<td>1) Someone made derogatory comments about your ethnicity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Someone used ethnic slurs to describe you.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Someone made racist or prejudice comments about you or your ethnicity. (For example saying people of your ethnicity aren’t very smart, are terrorists, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Someone tells jokes about your ethnic group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Someone excludes you from social interactions because of your ethnicity. (Schneider, Hitlan, &amp; Radhakrishnan, 2000)</td>
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More specifically, the scale measured frequency of harassment and incidents of marginalization. The researcher in the current study used five items adapted to the Iranian American identity. Participant responses were coded as such: 1 = never, 2 = sometimes, and 3 = always. On average participants reported experiencing ethnic harassment in following ways: Never (81%), Sometimes (18%), Always (1%) (\(M = 1.47, SD = .41\)). Higher numbers indicated higher degrees of perceived ethnic harassment.

2. The Social Distance Scale. The alpha level for The Social Distance Scale was, \(\alpha = .82\) (Angermeyer, Matschinger, & Corrigan, 2003). Please see Appendix H for additional information on the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959). I chose to include the Social Distance Scale in my survey packet to measure the perceived degree of sympathetic understanding between non-Iranian Americans and Iranian Americans (from the Iranian American perspective). In this context, sympathy is defined as an emotional or behavioral response that is positive or in the best interest of another person or group of persons.

The questions on the adapted scale ranged from: 1) Do you believe Euro-Americans would marry into the Iranian-American group? 2) Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to work in the same office with Iranian Americans? – to 3) Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to debar Iranian Americans from the U.S.? Please see Table 4 below, for the adapted Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959).
Table 4. Social Distance Scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would marry into the Iranian-American group</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as close friends</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as next door neighbors</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to work in the same office with Iranian-Americans</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as speaking acquaintances only</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as visitors only to the U.S.</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to debar Iranian Americans from the U.S.</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bogardus, 1959)

The Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959) uses a seven-point Likert scale. A Likert scale assumes that the items on the questionnaire are equidistant from one another. In the Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959) agreeing to an item suggests that the participant agrees with prior items. The adapted version of the Social Distance Scale used in the current study examines Iranian American perceptions of prejudice from Euro Americans. Thus the more items, further along the list of questions, an individual agrees with, the more social distance they perceive from Euro Americans. Participants were able to answer each question with either a yes or no. Questions 1-4 were coded as no = 1 and yes = 0. Questions 5-7 were coded as no = 0 and yes = 1. On average participants reported a high level of social distance (14%), medium level of social distance (9%), and
little to no social distance (77%) \((M = .25, SD = .29)\). Higher numbers indicated higher rates of perceived social distance.

3. The Brief Religiosity Scale. The alpha level for the first cluster of the religiosity scale was, \(\alpha = .81\), and \(\alpha = .87\) for the second cluster (Gryczynski & Ward, 2012). The scale determined how important religion was to the individual. Questions ranged from “How would you respond to the statement: ‘Religion provides the individual with an interpretation of his existence which could not be discovered by reason alone.’” And “Faith, meaning putting full confidence in the things we hope for and being certain of things we cannot see, is essential.” To “My religion is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.”

Higher numbers indicate a higher level of religiosity. Participant answers to questions 1-3 were coded as such: Disagree=1, Agree=2, Strongly agree=3. Questions 4-7 were coded the same way but reverse coded to ensure that higher numbers indicated a higher level of religiosity.

Participants completed two parts to the Religiosity Scale. The first religiosity scale revealed the following reports: Very religious (13%), Somewhat religious (38%), or not religious (48%) \((M = 1.87, SD = .70)\). The second religiosity scale revealed the following: Very religious (17%), somewhat religious (47%), or not religious (36%) \((M = 2.07, SD = .73)\). Higher numbers indicated a higher degree of religiosity.
CHAPTER 4

Results

I conducted a number of statistical analyses to explore the findings of the research questions. Below is an outline of the way in which the results are organized. I began with my first research question 1) Does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans? Initially raw averages were presented, organized by gender and religious affiliation. I also reported percentages of individuals by gender and religious affiliation that perceived experiences of ethnic harassment. Percentages are illustrated in Table I5 (please see Appendix I). I also conducted a 2 (gender) x 3 (religion) between groups ANOVA along with associated t-tests to see if there were any significant differences. The results of the ANOVA are illustrated in Figure M1 (please see Appendix M).

I was also interested in testing the predictive ability of a number of variables on perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment. I conducted a multiple linear regression using the following predictors: No religious affiliation, Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income. The results of the multiple linear regression are displayed in Table J6 (see Appendix J). Next, I explored the predictive ability of the aforementioned variables while taking into consideration religious affiliation. I split the file by religion and re-examined the multiple linear regression results.
I conducted statistical analyses on Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans. My research question was, does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans? Initially I presented raw averages organized by gender and religious affiliation. I also reported percentages of individuals by gender and religious affiliation that perceived social distance from Euro Americans. Percentages are illustrated in Table K7 (please see Appendix K). I also conducted a 2 (gender) x 3 (religion) between groups ANOVA along with associated t-tests to explore whether or not there were any significant differences. The results are illustrated in Figure N2 (please see Appendix N).

I was also interested in testing the predictive ability of a number of variables on perceptions of social distance. I conducted a multiple linear regression using the following predictors: Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income. The results of the multiple linear regression are displayed in Table L8 (please see Appendix L). Next, I explored the predictive ability of the aforementioned variables while taking into consideration religious affiliation. I split the file by religion and re-examined the multiple linear regression results.

I analyzed the effect of religiosity on perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans. I initially reported averages by gender and religious affiliation. I also explored statistical issues with the scale and reported results of a factor analysis. I used two approaches in analyzing the religiosity
measure. The first approach justified no further analysis using the measure. The second approach identified two distinct factors, 1) experiential and 2) personal religiosity. An Exact Factor score was calculated for both dimensions of religiosity and multiple regressions were conducted using perceived ethnic harassment and perceptions of social distance as dependent variables. Lastly, I conducted additional analyses taking into account religious affiliation.

I investigated whether or not there was an underlying latent construct within the measured variables of: skin tone, accent (Iranian), displays of religious symbols, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, and identification with an ethnicity other than Iranian American. I conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using a maximum likelihood method and a direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. I go onto explain why one sole latent variable was not revealed.

I. Does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans?

I initially calculated averages and standard deviations to explore the relationship between gender and religious affiliation in regard to perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment. There was a difference between men and women on average scores on the Ethnic Harassment Scale (Men = 1.51, \(SD = .41\); Women = 1.45, \(SD = .41\)). The average scores on the Ethnic Harassment Scale were as follows among participants who had no religious affiliation (\(M = 1.48, SD = .40\)), identified as Jewish (\(M = 1.48, SD = .47\)), or identified as Muslim (\(M = 1.45, SD = .39\)). Please see Table I5 (please see Appendix I)
for percentages of individuals (categorized by gender and religious affiliation) that perceived experiences of ethnic harassment.

I conducted an ANOVA to explore whether or not there was a significant effect of gender and/or religion on perceptions of ethnic harassment. More specifically I conducted a 2 (gender) x 3 (religion) between subjects ANOVA that revealed an interaction between gender and religion \( F(1, 2, 332) = 3.181, p = .043 \), no significant effect of gender \( F(1, 332) = .358, p = .550 \) and no significant effect of religion \( F(2, 332) = .257, p = .774 \). The results are illustrated on Figure M1 (please see Appendix M).

\[ t \] - test revealed a significant difference between the degree of ethnic harassment perceived by Iranian American Muslim men vs. their female counterparts. Iranian American Muslim men were more likely to report perceived experiences of ethnic harassment than Iranian American Muslim women, \( t(332) = 2.60, p = .010 \).

\textit{Gender. Religion.} A \( t \)- test revealed that neither gender nor religion significantly predicted perceived experiences of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims.

\textbf{Hypothesis I.} Iranian American Muslims will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish or possessing no religious affiliation).

\textbf{II.} Are Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans within the full sample predicted by, Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically
traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

I conducted a multiple linear regression to test the predictive strength of the following factors: Islamic identity, Jewish identity, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income – on average reports of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment. Please see Table J6 (please see Appendix J). The results are enumerated below:

**Jewish Identity.** Identifying as Jewish significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans, \( \beta = .159 \), \( t(330) = 2.152 \), \( p = .032 \).

**Muslim Identity. Gender.** Neither identifying as Muslim nor gender significantly predicted perceiving experienced ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans. This fails to support Hypothesis I.

**Skin tone.** Having lighter skin tones significantly predicted perceptions of higher rates of experiences of ethnic harassment, \( \beta = -.045 \) \( t(330) = -2.543 \), \( p = .011 \). This fails to support Hypothesis II.

**Accent.** More acute Iranian accents significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment, \( \beta = .151 \) \( t(330) = 2.377 \), \( p = .018 \).

**Displays of religious affiliation. Ethnically traditional clothing. Generational status.** Whether or not a participant displayed symbols of religious affiliation, displayed ethnically traditional clothing, nor their generational status significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment. This fails to support Hypothesis II.
Sub-Ethnic Group. Identifying with an ethnicity other than Iranian American significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment, \( \beta = .226, t(330) = 3.164, p = .002 \). However, it is important to note that 96% of these participants reported that they did not feel that Euro Americans treated Iranian Americans from other regions any different from how they treated them.

Family income during childhood. Lower family income during childhood significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment, \( \beta = -.209, t(330) = -3.732, p = <.001 \).

Hypothesis II. Iranian American Muslims who appear prototypically Muslim (displaying scarf/hijab, Allah necklace, a beard, Islamic stone, or a Tasbih), will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than will Iranian American Muslims whose appearance is more prototypically Euro-American (or non-Muslim).

III. Are Iranian American perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment from Euro Americans within each religious subsample (Iranian Americans: no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim) predicted by, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

I conducted a multiple linear regression and compared religious affiliation to test the predictive strength of the following factors: skin tone (color), accent (Iranian), displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income – on average
perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment within religious subgroups (no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim). The results are enumerated below:

**Gender.**

*Gender. No Religious Affiliation.* Gender did not significantly predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation.

*Gender. Jewish. Muslim.* Iranian American Jewish women were more likely to rate higher levels of perceived ethnic harassment than Iranian American Jewish men, $\beta = .273, t(330) = 2.852, p = .006$. Iranian American Muslim men reported higher rates of perceived ethnic harassment than Iranian American Muslim women, $\beta = -.219, t(330) = 2.323, p = .022$.

**Skin tone.**

*Skin tone. No Religious Affiliation.* Skin tone did not significantly predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation.

*Skin tone. Jewish. Muslim.* Among both Iranian American Jews, $\beta = -.258, t(330) = -2.618, p = .011$, and Iranian American Muslims, $\beta = -.308, t(330) = -3.654, p < .001$, those who reported having lighter skin tones were more likely to perceive higher rates of experienced ethnic harassment than those with darker skin tones. This fails to support Hypothesis II.

**Accent.**

*Accent. No Religious Affiliation. Muslim.* Accent did not significantly predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation and Muslims. This fails to support Hypothesis II.
**Accent. Jewish.** Iranian American Jews with more acute accents reported higher rates of perceived ethnic harassment than Iranian Americans Jews with little to no accent, \( \beta = .62, t(330) = 4.214, p < .001. \)

**Symbols of Religious Affiliation.**

*Symbols of Religious Affiliation. No Religious Affiliation. Muslim.* Displaying symbols of religious affiliation did not significantly predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation and Muslims. This fails to support Hypothesis II.

*Symbols of Religious Affiliation. Jewish.* Iranian American Jews who displayed symbols of religious affiliation reported perceiving higher rates of ethnic harassment than those who did not, \( \beta = .255, t(330) = 2.570, p = .012. \)

**Ethnically Traditional Clothing.**

*Ethnically Traditional Clothing. No Religious Affiliation. Jewish. Muslim.* Displays of ethnically traditional clothing did not predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims.

**Generational Status.**

*Generational Status. No Religious Affiliation. Jewish. Muslim.* Generational status did not significantly predict perceptions of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims.

**Sub-Ethnic Group.**

*Identifying with a Sub-Ethnic Group. No Religious Affiliation.* Identifying with a sub-ethnic group other than Iranian did not significantly predict reports of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation.
Identifying with a Sub-Ethnic Group. Jewish. Muslim. Identifying with a sub-ethnic group other than Iranian significantly predicted higher rates of perceived ethnic harassment among Iranian American Jews, $\beta = .315$, $t(330) = 3.044$, $p = .003$, and Muslims, $\beta = .193$, $t(330) = 1.992$, $p = .048$. However, it is important to note that 96% of these participants reported that they did not feel that Euro Americans treated Iranian Americans from other regions any different from how they treated them.

Family Income during Childhood.

Family Income during Childhood. No Religious Affiliation. Jewish. Muslim. Family income during childhood significantly predicted reports of ethnic harassment among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation (only), $\beta = -.233$, $t(329) = -2.35$, $p = .022$.

IV. Does gender and/or religious affiliation (no religious affiliation, Jewish, or Muslim) affect Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans?

I initially calculated averages and standard deviations to explore the relationship between gender and religious affiliation in regard to perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans. Scores on the Social Distance Scale for men and women were, Men $= .21$, $SD = .29$; Women $= .25$, $SD = .29$. The average scores on the Social Distance Scale were as follows among participants who had no religious affiliation, $M = .20$, $SD = .27$, Jewish $M = .34$, $SD = .34$, Muslim $M = .23$, $SD = .28$. Please see Table K7 (please see Appendix K) for percentages of individuals (categorized by gender and religious affiliation) that reported perceptions of social distance.
I conducted an ANOVA to explore whether or not there was a significant effect of gender and/or religion on perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans. More specifically I calculated a 2 (gender) x 3 (religion) between subjects ANOVA that revealed a significant main effect of religion, \( F(2, 332) = 3.500, p = .031 \), no significant effect of gender, \( F(1, 332) = .1.148, p = .285 \), and no significant interaction between gender and religion, \( F(1, 2, 332) = 1.268, p = .283 \). The results are illustrated on Figure N2 (please see Appendix N).

*Fisher’s Least Significant Difference, LSD.* A post hoc LSD test revealed that Iranian American Jews reported higher rates of perceived social distance from Euro Americans than Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation and Iranian American Muslims,

(difference in means = .1433, \( SE = .0426, p = .009, dfs = 2, 332 \)):

(difference in means = .1060, \( SE = .0399, p = .008, dfs = 2, 332 \)).

*Fisher’s Least Significant Difference.* Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation reported perceiving significantly less social distance from Euro Americans than Iranian American Jews (Mean differences = -.1433, \( p = .001 \)).

*Gender.* A t-test revealed that gender did not significantly predict perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims.

**Hypothesis I.** Iranian American Muslims will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish or possessing no religious affiliation).
V. Are Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans within the full sample predicted by Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

I conducted a multiple linear regression to test the predictive strength of the following factors: Islamic identity, Jewish identity, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income – on average reports of perceived social distance from Euro American. Please see Table L8 (please see Appendix L). The results are enumerated below:

**Jewish Identity. Muslim Identity. Gender. Skin tone.** Jewish identity, Muslim identity, gender, and skin tone did not significantly predict perceptions of social distance. This fails to support Hypothesis I.

**Accent.** Iranian Americans with more acute accents were more likely to perceive a higher degree of social distance from Euro Americans than those with little to no accents, $\beta = .143, t(330) = 2.281, p = .023$.

**Symbols of Religious Affiliation.** Iranian Americans who displayed symbols of religious affiliation were significantly more likely to perceive a higher degree of social distance from Euro Americans than those who did not, $\beta = .174, t(330) = 2.912, p = .004$.

**Ethnically Traditional Clothing. Generational Status. Sub-Ethnic Group. Income during childhood.** Displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status,
identifying with a sub-ethnic group, and income during childhood did not significantly predict perceptions of social distance.

**Hypothesis II.** Iranian American *Muslims* who appear prototypically Muslim (displaying scarf/hijab, Allah necklace, a beard, Islamic stone, or a Tasbih), will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than will Iranian American Muslims whose appearance is more prototypically Euro-American (or non-Muslim).

VI. Are Iranian American perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans within each religious subsample (Iranian Americans: no religious affiliation, Jewish, Muslim) predicted by, gender, skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income?

I conducted a multiple linear regression comparing religious affiliation to test the predictive strength of the following factors: skin tone (color), Iranian accent, displays of religious affiliation, ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, sub-ethnic identification (other than Iranian American), or family income – on perceived social distance from Euro Americans. The results are enumerated below:

**Gender. Skin tone. No Religious Affiliation. Jewish. Muslim.**

Neither gender nor skin tone significantly predicted perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims. This fails to support Hypothesis II.
Accent. Displays of Religious Affiliation.

Neither accent nor displays of religious affiliation significantly predicted perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation or Muslims. This fails to support Hypothesis II.

However, Iranian American Jews with more acute accents perceived higher degrees of social distance from Euro Americans than those with little to no accent, \( \beta = .501, t(330) = 4.189, p = <.001 \).

In addition, Iranian American Jews who displayed symbols of religious affiliation perceived higher degrees of social distance from Euro Americans than those who did not, \( \beta = .300, t(330) = 2.776, p = .007 \).


None of the following factors: displaying ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, identifying with a sub ethnic group, nor family income during childhood- significantly predicted perceived social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation, Jews, or Muslims.

VII. Does religiosity affect perceptions of experienced ethnic harassment and/or perceived social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans?

Approach I. The Religiosity Scales had good internal reliability with Cronbach’s alphas for the three item Religiosity Scale and four item Religiosity Scale of .81 and .87. The Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of both sets of scores was .52. The average scores on Religiosity Scales One and Two were as follows: Men = 1.92, \( SD = .77 \); Women = 1.84, \( SD = .65 \); Men = 1.86, \( SD = .74 \); Women = 2.19, \( SD = .70 \). The average
scores on Religiosity Scales One and Two were as follows among participants who had no religious affiliation, $M = 2.16, SD = .72; M = 1.43, SD = .55$, Jewish ($M = 1.57, SD = .65; M = 2.58, SD = .36$), Muslim ($M = 1.83, SD = .61; M = 2.25, SD = .66$).

The Religiosity Scales also had good construct validity with Iranian American Jews and Iranian American Muslims (Jews $= 2.43$, Muslims $= 2.17$) having higher mean scores than Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation ($M = 1.84$).

Religiosity items 1-3 and items 4-7 clustered together in a factor analysis. However, I discovered an unusually significantly high negative correlation among Iranian American Jews and averages on Religiosity Scale one and Religiosity Scale two ($r = -.341$). Iranian American Muslims and Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation had positive correlations between Religiosity Scale One and Religiosity Scale Two (Muslims $r = .10$ No religion $r = .479$). The two scales should measure the same construct.

The finding that Iranian American Jews were the only group in the study to have a highly negative correlation between Religiosity Scale One and Religiosity Scale Two suggests an error in how this particular construct was understood by the participant group. As a result, further statistical analysis using the Religiosity Scales was not possible.

**Approach II.** The second approach to analyzing the religiosity measure was to treat questions 1-3 and 4-7 as separate measures of unique dimensions of religiosity. Exact Factor scores were calculated for both series of questions using the factor loadings as weights. Once Exact Factor scores were calculated a multiple regression was
conducted using perceptions of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans as dependent variables.

The factor analysis (direct oblimin) revealed that I have two distinct factors, experiential (questions 1-3) and personal religiosity measures (questions 4-7). Please see the scree plots in Figure O3 (please see Appendix O).

The experiential scale was designed to assess the importance or role religion plays in the individual’s conceptualization of reality (Glock & Stark, 1965). The personal scale was designed to measure how religion affects the individual’s concept of self (Allport & Ross, 1967).

Separate factor analyses were conducted to calculate Exact Factor scores for questions 1-3 and 4-7. Exact Factor scores, weight each person’s score on each item by the factor loadings, and then an average is calculated on the weighted scores. Questions 1-3 and 4-7 produced two Exact factor scores.

I conducted a multiple linear regression and compared religious affiliation to test the predictive strength of experiential and personal religiosity (using Exact Factor scores) on average reports of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment.

**Experiential Religiosity**

**Experiential Religiosity. Jewish.** Experiential Religiosity significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment among Iranian American Jews, \( \beta = .473, t(2, 78)= 5.453, p = .001 \).

**Personal Religiosity**

**Personal Religiosity. Jewish.** Personal Religiosity significantly predicted higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment among Iranian American Jews,
\[ \beta = .371, t(2, 78) = 4.277, p = .001. \]

I conducted a multiple linear regression and compared religious affiliation to test the predictive strength of experiential and personal religiosity (using Exact Factor scores) on average reports of perceived social distance from Euro Americans.

**Experiential Religiosity**

**Experiential Religiosity. Jewish.** Experiential Religiosity significantly predicted higher rates of perceived social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian American Jews, \[ \beta = .510, t(2, 78) = 5.798, p = .001. \]

**Personal Religiosity**

**Personal Religiosity. Jewish. Muslim.** Personal Religiosity significantly predicted higher rates of perceived social distance from Euro Americans among Iranian American Jews, \[ \beta = .311, t(2, 78) = 3.539, p = .001, \] and Muslims, \[ \beta = .285, t(2, 146) = 3.566, p = .001. \]

**Additional Analyses.** I compared religious affiliation by conducting direct oblimin factor analyses (principle axis factoring). I found that Iranian American Muslims reported rates of religiosity as expected by the two distinct factors described above (Experiential and Personal). The factor analyses revealed two significant factors as demonstrated by Figure P4 (Appendix P). Factor One included questions R4-R7 (Personal religiosity) and Factor Two included R1-R3 (Experiential religiosity). However, the factor analyses revealed that three factors were extracted within the Iranian American Jewish ratings as demonstrated by Figure Q5 (Appendix Q). The first factor included items R1-3 (Experiential religiosity). However, Iranian American Jews rated Personal religiosity items in an unexpected way. Factor two included R4 and R6. Factor three included R5
and R7. According to the scale questions R4-R7 should all measure personal religiosity. It is unexpected and unusual that Iranian American Jews answered the personal religiosity questions in significantly different ways. Consequently, treating the Brief Religiosity Survey (Allport & Ross, 1967) as demonstrating two distinct types of religiosity may not be appropriate among Iranian American Jews.

VIII. Is there an underlying latent construct within the measured variables of: skin tone, accent (Iranian), displays of religious symbols, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, and identification with an ethnicity other than Iranian American?

I conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) using the factors as weights. I investigated a number of variables to see if there was an underlying variable that affected all other variables included. The factors consisted of: Skin tone, accent (Iranian), displays of religious symbols, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, and identification with an ethnicity other than Iranian American. Skin tone scores, accent (Iranian), displays of religious symbols, displays of ethnically traditional clothing, generational status, and identifying with an ethnicity other than Iranian American – were Z scored for the purposes of the EFA.

The items listed above were analyzed to reveal no latent variable through an EFA. The factors did not load onto one factor. One requirement was that items were not conceptually related. I used a Maximum Likelihood method as it is may be the best estimation procedure. I also used a Direct Oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization to reveal the correlational relationship between factors. I found no statistical evidence for items to load onto one factor.
Two factors were extracted. The factors were skin tone and accent. Skin tone accounted for 23% of the variance and accent accounted for 5% of the variance. However, when reviewing the factor matrix I found that skin tone was correlated with accent (.78). There is no conceptually valid reason why darker complected individuals would have an accent. Nor does there seem to be a logical reason for skin tone correlation and displays of symbols of religious affiliation (.41), ethnically traditional clothing (-.12), generational status (.48), or identifying with an identity other than Iranian American (-.57). The same illogical weak correlations were found with accent. Accent correlated with skin tone (.35), displays of religious symbols (-.25), ethnically traditional clothing (-.03), generational status (.20), or identifying with an ethnicity other than Iranian American (.25). Thus there is no latent factor that explains the measured variables.
CHAPTER 5
Discussion

Summary of Key Findings

The primary hypothesis was, Iranian American Muslims will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than will their non-Muslim peers (be they Jewish or possess no religious affiliation). The primary hypothesis was only partially supported. My findings indicated that Iranian American Muslims perceived higher rates of experienced ethnic harassment than Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. However, Iranian American Muslims did not perceive significantly higher rates of social distance than Iranian American Jews. In fact Iranian American Jews reported higher rates of social distance than Iranian American Muslims. Although Iranian American Muslim men perceived (insignificantly higher) the highest rates of ethnic harassment on average- there was no significant difference between Iranian American Muslim men and Iranian American Jewish women.

The secondary hypothesis was, Iranian American Muslims who appear prototypically Muslim (displaying scarf/hijab, Allah necklace, a beard, Islamic stone, or a Tasbih), will report higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than will Iranian American Muslims whose appearance is more prototypically Euro-American (or non-Muslim). The data analysis failed to support the secondary hypothesis. This is unusual given the higher likelihood of these individuals falling victim to hate crimes (HRW, 2002). However, Iranian American Jews who displayed symbols of religious affiliation were significantly more likely to perceive higher rates of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans than those
who did not. This is supported by the fact that most hate crimes motivated by religion in the United States are against Jewish Americans (FBI reports, 2009). However, there is a significantly higher number of Jews than Muslims in the U.S. which may affect hate crime rates. Thus these findings warrant additional research.

There are a number of interesting and significant findings in the current study. One finding was that Iranian American Muslim men reported higher rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment than Iranian American Muslim women. This finding negates reports on hate crime rates by the Human Rights Watch (2002) organization. The reasoning behind it may be: 1) Iranian American women may seem less threatening due to their double minority status as women and Iranian 2) Iranian American men may seem more threatening due to their appearance, size, and social power as men 3) Iranian American Muslim women may be more likely to alter their appearance to appear Euro American.

Social Dominance Theory (SDT) (Sidanius & Pratto, 2012) may be used to explain why Iranian American Muslim men reported higher rates of ethnic harassment than Iranian American Muslim women. SDT suggests that society is made up of social hierarchies. One social hierarchy in the U.S., as it pertains to the current study, is comprised of Euro American men as the dominant group and in descending order, Iranian American men and Iranian American women. According to SDT, Iranian American men may experience higher rates of ethnic harassment as an attempt by the dominant group to maintain the social hierarchy and power differentials within society. Iranian American women are viewed as non-threatening and unimportant to maintaining the social power and hierarchy of Euro American men.
In addition, Iranian American Muslim women may be more likely to alter their appearance to appear Euro American than Iranian American Muslim men (e.g. hair texture/color, skin tone, plastic surgery, etc.). Consequently, Iranian American Muslim women may appear more Euro American than their male counterparts.

I also found that religion had a significant effect on perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans. In contrast to my hypothesis Iranian American Jews reported significantly higher rates of social distance from Euro Americans than Iranian American Muslims and Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. One explanation is that the Iranian American Muslims in this study may be socially insulated and do not interact with the larger public as much as Iranian American Jews.

Another explanation may have to do with gender roles and Iranian American Jewish women’s identity. One of the many components of what has traditionally been “women’s work” is to maintain the emotional and personal well being of her family (Hochschild, 2012). I suggest that Iranian American Jewish women feel it is their responsibility to transmit their culture intergenerationally as a way of maintaining the community’s health, well being, and overall existence. Thus, they may feel compelled to marry and maintain strong relationships with other Iranian American Jews- resulting in a higher degree of social distance from Euro Americans. Another factor is that Iranian American Jews are a numerical minority and preserving their culture may be a priority that increases perceptions of social distance from Euro Americans.

Lighter skin tone preference and more favorable treatment of individuals with lighter skin complexion have been widely researched in the past (Jones, 2000). However, the analysis revealed that lighter skin tone preference was only relevant to Iranian
American Jews and Muslims and did not affect Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. Iranian American Jews and Muslims with lighter skin tones reported perceiving higher rates of ethnic harassment. This may be because Iranian Americans with lighter skin tones may appear European and many Euro Americans may not immediately realize their Iranian American ethnicity. Thus, Iranian Americans with lighter skin tones may witness Euro Americans express prejudices toward Iranian Americans more often than Iranian Americans who phenotypically appear Middle Eastern (e.g. skin tone, hair texture). This additional exposure to prejudicial attitudes of Euro Americans may lead to higher rates of perceived ethnic harassment. A second argument is that lighter skinned Iranian American Muslims and/or Jews feel unaccepted from both the mainstream Euro American group and from their own in-group. The idea is that if they appear more European then in-group members may feel that they do not experience the same level of prejudice and discrimination they do- resulting in prejudice toward them for their alleged privilege. However, these results must be replicated as there were not enough participants recruited within every skin tone category. The majority of participants identified with the skin color corresponding with numbers four or five on the Fitzpatrick Scale (Daniel, Heckman, Kloss, & Manne, 2009) (distribution was generally normal).

Past researchers have demonstrated higher rates of prejudice and discrimination toward individuals with foreign accents (Lippi-Green, 1994). Iranian American Jews reported the highest rates of perceived experiences of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans based on acuteness of foreign accent more so than Iranian American Muslims or Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. This may be
because Iranian American Jews contend with layers of prejudice and discrimination based on their ethnicity, religion, and accent. Also, there are numerically less Iranian American Jews in the world than Iranian American Muslims or those without religious affiliation. This may amplify Iranian American Jewish perceptions of perceived ethnic harassment and/or social distance.

Lastly, I found that Iranian Americans who were born outside of the U.S. perceived higher rates of social distance than those who were born in the U.S. One may suggest that Iranian Americans born in the U.S. may be more assimilated into U.S. society. It may be the case that cultural assimilation shields some Iranian Americans from experiencing higher rates of perceived ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans.

**Limitations and Strengths**

One limitation is that I did not take into account degree of assimilation into the U.S. culture and society. This raises the question of how religious affiliation may affect intra and inter group perceptions of assimilation. Considering the JudeoChristian roots of the United States, the dynamic of what traits define American identity (in the context of assimilation) could be studied on a continuum. It would be interesting for future researchers to explore what if any social, political, or economic benefits or privileges Iranian Americans gain through assimilation, taking into account religious affiliation.

Another limitation was that I was required to reveal my intention of researching perceived experiences of prejudice and discrimination on the consent form. Thus, by directly revealing what I aimed to measure, on the consent form, I may have attracted individuals who were 1) emotionally ready to talk about such experiences and/or 2)
individuals who had such experiences. Researchers face challenges in measuring prejudice or perceived prejudice due to social desirability pressures and challenges of deciphering between participant opinion and fact.

While conducting the study in Southern California afforded access to a large number of Iranian Americans, I still faced a number of limitations. Recruiting from the Southern California region came with some drawbacks. First off, an overwhelming majority of the Iranian American Muslim and Jewish participants were recruited from either Orange County or West Los Angeles. Both of these Southern California regions are affluent and median incomes far exceed national averages (OC, $Mdn = 75,762$, Century City (West LA), $Mdn = 95,135$, Nation Average = $42,979.61$). Thus, the results of the study are limited to representing Iranian Americans from those regions.

The Southern California region is also limited to representing Iranian Americans living in a state that predominantly votes for the Democratic Party in elections. The LA Times described Southern California as a “melting pot” (meaning a place with a high degree of cultural diffusion) with diverse communities and neighborhoods that represent a number of racial ethnic groups. Despite the general political and cultural characteristics of California, Orange County is heavily populated with a majority of Republicans. It is unclear how the political nature of the regions affects the experiences of Iranian Americans. Nevertheless, the state is heavily populated with immigrants and is inclusive of cultures from many parts of the world.

Some of the unique challenges I faced surveying Iranian Americans was cultural mistrust, refusal to denote religious affiliation, and the fact that most participants were immigrants or refugees. While conducting the current study I found that many Iranian
Americans were extremely suspicious of how the information would be utilized. Many asked if there would be governmental tracking. Upon further conversation many participants voiced a concern. They described how in Iran government officials would ask about political attitudes in a seemingly safe environment, only to persecute individuals who had opinions against the regime. As a result, many participants felt that a similar strategy could be employed in the U.S. Thus, a large number of individuals refused to take the survey and many were very hesitant in answering questions about ethnic harassment or social distance from Euro Americans. I assured participants, who did complete the survey that it was confidential and that the only information that could be derived was general demographic traits.

A number of Iranian Americans found the options offered as answers to the questions in the EHES were challenging. In other words they found it difficult to report their perceptions or experiences of ethnic harassment with the options of 1) never 2) sometimes or 3) always. Perhaps the scale may be revised by the original authors after gathering input from participants.

Another interesting finding was that many Iranian Americans did not want to disclose their religious affiliation. Perhaps this refusal was due to fear of social marginalization or discrimination. This was evident by a few participants who reported not having any religious affiliation but “sometimes” (6%) or “always” (2%) displaying symbols of religious affiliation. It also may have occurred because these individuals perceived religion as part of their ethnic identity and did not make a religious distinction within their personal identity. They may not follow the tenets of the religion but merely respect their hereditary connection to the religion. Hence some participants verbally
identified as Iranian American Jewish without being asked about religious affiliation. This area requires additional research.

Another challenge was that most Iranian Americans surveyed were born outside the U.S. I failed to ask if they were immigrants or refugees. The psyche, mentality, and culture of a refugee are significantly different from that of an immigrant (Tribe, 2002). Thus, the question should have been added to the survey.

One of the advantages of conducting the study in Southern California is that there is a significantly large population of Iranian Americans. Large populations of Iranian Americans reside in the areas of Orange County (the city of Irvine) and Los Angeles. In fact Los Angeles has the largest number of Iranians outside of Iran. The majority of Iranian American Jews in the study were recruited from West Los Angeles. The majority of Iranian American Muslims were recruited from Orange County. It is unclear if there are fewer Iranian American Muslims in Orange County versus Los Angeles, since the majority of past researchers have only asked about ethnicity.

Lastly, it was advantageous that I speak Farsi with Native fluency. This aided with translation and cultural mistrust issues. It also helped me get endorsements and collaborative efforts from Iranian American organizations.

**Implications and Concluding Comments**

The findings in the current study inspired the following question: is there a social hierarchy based on cultural similarity to Euro Americans that is explicitly related to religious affiliation (in relation to the degree of perceived prejudice and discrimination)? Perhaps Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation (although very different) were more similar to Euro American Christians (the dominant group) than
Iranian American Jews or Muslims. I ask the question does religious assimilation (religious conversion) shield one from a higher degree of prejudice and discrimination among Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation? More importantly what religion most closely resembles American identity (on the continuum of social identity) and must Iranian American Jews and Muslims change their religious affiliation in order to assimilate? These are all questions I hope to explore in future studies.

In contrast to my hypothesis I found that Iranian American Jews reported significantly higher degrees of social distance from Euro Americans than Iranian American Muslims and Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. One may infer that Iranian American Jews may be a population that feels particularly vulnerable in the current social and political context.

One speculation is that, because there are numerically fewer Iranian American Jews, they may feel the need to preserve their group’s existence and future. Cultural preservation may seemingly require a higher degree of intragroup cohesion. This may result in less intermarriage and perhaps explains in part why Iranian American Jews reported higher rates of perceived social distance from Euro Americans. Future research may explore Iranian American Jewish identity and consider qualitative interviews to ask the community how and why they think these phenomena occurred.

Future studies may aim to mitigate the above listed challenges. One remedy is to attempt to collect nationally representative data. Recruitment should ensure the inclusion of Iranian American Jews and Muslims who display a higher degree of symbols of religious affiliation and participants from a wide range of income brackets. Lastly, future researchers may also include a higher number of men.
As noted above, all of the analyses revealed that Iranian American Jews and Muslims perceived significantly higher rates of ethnic harassment and/or social distance than Iranian Americans with no religious affiliation. Social distance may generally be defined as a “lack of intimacy” (Weaver, 2008). It may be stated that intimacy (social nearness) must be validated (reciprocated) by both parties for it to exist. Hence Iranian Americans’ perceptions of social distance may be indicative of actual social distance.

The current study demonstrated the complex social identities of Iranian Americans. As is evident by the results enumerated above, Iranian American perceptions are significantly influenced by religious affiliation. I hope that researchers will begin to examine Iranian American identity in a more multidimensional manner that takes into account the intersectionality of ethnicity and religion. The study also demonstrated that Iranian American Jews and Muslims are vulnerable and perceive higher rates of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans. Thus, this is an issue (once replicated) that should be taken into account when developing policy and standards of practice both in public and private organizations.
APPENDIX A – RECENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN

The current section is a description of the recent social and political context and past relationship between the U.S. and Iran. In 1990-1991, Iran remained neutral during the Persian Gulf War between several countries led by the U.S. against Iraq. In 1993, under the leadership of President William Clinton, the U.S. instituted a policy of “dual containment,” designed to isolate Iran and Iraq in retaliation for their involvement in supporting terrorists and terrorist causes. In 1995, President Clinton signed an executive order that prohibited any U.S. trade with Iran. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act that instituted economic repercussions against entities that invested in Iran or Libya.

The events of 9/11 occurred in the U.S. in 2001, causing hundreds of mostly civilian deaths, billions of dollars in damages, and resulted in the Axis of Evil conception. Al-Qaeda terrorists crashed two aircrafts into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, another aircraft crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth airplane was intended to crash into the White House or the Capitol Building. However, the fourth plane crashed in a rural area of Pennsylvania due to passenger intervention. Consequently, the U.S. began the War on Terror (also known as the Overseas Contingency Operation) and invaded Afghanistan. Soon thereafter, on March 20, 2003, the war in Iraq began. As previously mentioned, in 2002, President George W. Bush, labeled the countries of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, as part of the “Axis of Evil.” President Bush remarked that the countries of the Axis of Evil harbored weapons of mass destruction and were a threat to the safety of the U.S. and the world. The concept of the Axis of Evil changed the way in which Americans perceived Iran (Heradstveit &
Bonham, 2007). Iranians used the renewed interest in Middle Eastern politics to fight for change via the Green Movement.

Since the Iranian revolution and the events of 9/11, Iranians in Iran have suffered and fought against the despotic rule of the Islamic Regime in a political movement called the Iranian Green Movement. Years of protesting, false imprisonment, public hangings, the stoning of women, and civilian torture were brought to light in 2009. The unprovoked public murder of Neda Agha-Soltan during a protest against the Islamic Regime was captured on tape and viewed widely among the international community. The book and movie of *The Stoning of Soraya M.* also tells the far too common story of a young woman stoned in a village in Iran. The Green Movement began as a political movement demanding the removal of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from power, but has since become a movement encouraging hope for freedom and human rights in Iran. Despite the vulnerable and desperate situation of Iranians in Iran, Iranian Americans are overshadowed by the terroristic stereotypes encouraged by the Axis of Evil concept.
APPENDIX B – THE IMPACT OF SKIN COLOR, ACCENT, RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, AND A LACK OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION ON PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Skin Color Prejudice and Discrimination

The following paragraphs explore the effects of skin tone in the United States. Skin tone is often used as a proxy for racial or ethnic group membership (Jones, 2000). There is a wide range of skin tones and other markers of racial and ethnic identity among Iranian Americans. A description of the phenotypic makeup of Iranian Americans and possibly experienced skin tone prejudice and discrimination is provided below.

Iranians are a culturally and phenotypically diverse group of people. More specifically, different regions of Iran are inhabited by groups of Iranians with distinct customs, linguistic dialects, and different skin tones. Iranians vary in appearance from blond hair, blue eyes, and light skin to dark brown eyes, black hair, and darker skin tones. In addition, Iranian Americans range from having straight light hair to having dark black curly hair. Hence, Iranians living in the U.S. may have different experiences depending on their ethnic appearance as it pertains to skin tone and hair texture. Differences in the degree of prejudice and discrimination toward individuals specifically skin tone may be referred to as, “colorism” (Jones, 2000). In other words, a distinction between skin color and race can be made. Skin color and hair texture often vary among individuals within the same racial group. As a result, individuals of the same racial group, may experience prejudice to different degrees.

Colorism uses skin color as a proxy for social status, whereas racism uses racial identification as a proxy for social status. Colorism occurs both between and within social (racial/ethnic) groups. Researchers have found that lightness has been associated
with “intelligence, refinement, prosperity, and femininity. Darkness [has been found to be] associated with toughness, meanness, indigence, criminality, and masculinity” (Jones, 2000, p. 1527). Thus, Iranian Americans may perceive and experience prejudice and discrimination differently in the U.S. based on their skin color and other ethnic markers of group membership.

**Foreign Accent**

Many Iranian Americans who have immigrated to the U.S. possess an accent when speaking English. Iranian Americans who possess a foreign accent face different forms of prejudice and discrimination than those without such an accent (Lee, 2007). The following paragraph describes the negative effects a foreign accent may have on one’s experiences in the U.S.

Foreign students, particularly from the Middle East, face institutional discrimination (Lee, 2007). Lee (2007) notes: “One of the factors that potentiated prejudice and discrimination toward Middle Eastern students are stereotypes surrounding students’ accents. In addition, many participants associated an accent with a lack of comprehension and a lack of intelligence” (Lee, 2007, p. 29). Not all accents are perceived as negative. Some accents, such as a British accent, are perceived as prestigious and indicative of high-class (Wang, Arndt, Singh, & Biernat, 2007). Hence, Iranians in the US who possess foreign accents may face a higher degree of prejudice and discrimination than their counterparts who do not have such an accent.

**Religious Identity**

Religion is an important aspect of identity. We have noted that Iranian Americans are affiliated with a variety of religions—Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Baha’i, and
Zoroastrian, or they may be agnostic or atheist. The following section describes the importance of religion and its influences on inter-group interactions. This section describes the concept of religion in general and how it may influence experiences of prejudice and discrimination.

Religion has historically had complex effects on rates of prejudice (Allport, Clark, & Pettigrew, 1979; Katz, 1991). Individuals who attend church services on a regular basis have been found to be either more or less prejudiced than the typical person. Prejudice in such cases may stem from a “realistic conflict” between religious groups (Allport et. al., 1979; Katz, 1991). Many of the major religions of the world claim to have access to the “Truth,” and in so doing suggest that other religions are flawed. There are differences of ideas that lead to conflict between the major religions of the world.

The impact of religion is found in the construct of culture. For example, Christianity had had a significant impact on Western culture. The same is true in regard to Islam and its effects on the Middle East. Judaism is also looked upon as a cultural group with an associated language, type of food, etc. The tendency to over-generalize about out-group members is not specific to one particular religion. Prejudice is not predicted by type of religion, but by the degree of religiosity (Allport, et. al., 1979; Katz, 1991). Highly religious individuals tend to have both higher and lower rates of prejudice than average. It is important to note the contradictory effects of religion on individuals.

**Muslim Attire**

The following section describes significant effects of wearing Muslim attire and appearing Muslim in the post 9/11 context (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). As previously mentioned, the hijab and turban signify group membership in the Muslim
Many Muslim women wear hijabs due to religious requirements to cover their hair. The turban is a widely worn headgear by men in Africa, India, and the Middle East. Despite the non-specific religious or ethnic nature of the turban, it is now a symbol of Muslim group membership. The paragraphs below analyze prejudice and discrimination that may result from wearing Muslim attire. This section is relevant because 40% of Iranian Americans identify themselves as Muslim (PAAIA, 2008).

The current paragraph explores the negative effects of wearing Muslim attire and appearing Muslim in the post 9/11 context (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). More specifically, their study looked at participant reactions to Muslim headgear. Muslim headgear includes men wearing turbans and women wearing hijabs. In a computer-simulated game, participants were asked to shoot at individuals who were armed. The photos of Muslim targets were categorized as “non-Black” and “non-Asian.” The targets were outfitted with either a white turban or a white hijab. Participants were more likely to shoot at unarmed targets wearing turbans or hijabs than at those not so clothed and sometimes armed (Unkelbach, Forgas, & Denson, 2008). The researchers suggest that these findings demonstrate the negative stereotypes and perceptions linked to the Muslim appearance. The “shooter bias” effect was found across men, women, conservative, and liberal participants. Surprisingly, the likelihood of shooting Muslim targets increased when participants were in a positive mood.

Public reactions to the Islamic headscarf, called the hijab, worn by Muslim women, have been controversial. In 2004, a law passed in France prohibiting women from wearing hijabs in public schools (Thomas, 2008). More recently, Iran’s female soccer team was banned from the 2012 London Olympics due to their religious headgear.
In reaction, the Iranian women’s soccer team created headgear that covered their hair and neck that would not interfere with their participation in the sport. Ultimately, FIFA banned the team stating safety issues with the headgear.

**The Iranian American Jewish Community**

The Iranian and Jewish communities are unique groups in the U.S. that face different kinds of prejudices and discrimination. The current section describes the Jewish past and current experiences in the U.S. This section attempts to demonstrate the complex identities of Iranian Americans Jews, as a group that encounters both the prejudices and discrimination associated with being Iranian and with being Jewish in the U.S.

The stereotype and stigmatization of Jews has a long history in the U.S. A brief summary is provided below. It was not until the 1840’s that a large influx of German Jews migrated to the U.S. A notable number of the Jewish communities formed in New York and thereafter a stereotype of a “dishonest peddler” formed (Higham, 1984, p. 121; Wilson, 1996). During and around the time of the American Civil War (1861-1865), a stronger anti-Semitic ideology grew. Jewish Americans were perceived as an outsider and a threat to the Christian American way of life (Higham, 1984; Wilson, 1996). The German and Polish Jewish American communities had established themselves as merchants all across the United States and heavily in New York City (Higham, 1984; Wilson, 1996). No other immigrant group had acquired the success and social mobility of the Jewish American community.

A new stereotype of the Jewish American formed following the American Civil War. The Jewish American was now perceived as someone who had recently acquired
wealth but was lacking “manners” (Higham, 1984, p. 125; Wilson, 1996). In reaction, the American elite of the time attempted to exclude Jewish Americans from staying in certain hotels, resorts, and created “educational quotas, restrictive housing covenants …” (Sundquist, 2005, p. 20) and viciously stereotyped the Jewish American community. Famously, the prominent banker, Jewish American Joseph Seligman, was not permitted to stay at the Grand Union Hotel in Saratoga in 1877. Some of the signs at the hotel read, “no Jews or Dogs Admitted Here” (Higham, 1984, p. 128; Sundquist, 2005). It was common practice in 1881 for many private eastern schools to refuse to accept Jewish students.

The success of the Jewish community seemed to translate as a threat to the Christian majority. This caused more private schools, ivy-league schools, resorts, and hotels to either form quotas for how many Jews they accepted or to out-right not allow Jews to attend at all. However, by the early 1920s, the distance between German American and Eastern European Jews decreased. The Jewish American communities fought against housing covenants, student quotas, and quotas put in place in medical schools nationwide (Higham, 1984; Wilson, 1996). It was during the second establishment of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s that the anti-Semitic ideology of Jews as “Christ killers” was re-established in the United States (Higham, 1984, p. 149). The stereotype of Jewish Americans was cemented in the idea of the “banker” who was a threat to those in power.

The life sentencing of a pencil factory manager, Leo Frank, in 1913, and the later kidnapping and public lynching of Frank, are evidence of the hate ideology towards Jewish Americans. One may claim that it was this anti-Semitic ideology that contributed
to the decision the United States made in the late 1930s not to increase limited quotas of allowed Jewish immigrants during World War II (Sundquist, 2005). Iranian American Jews face prejudice and discrimination due to their ethnic identity as Iranian and also due to their religious identity as Jewish. Thus in addition to the stereotypes and stigmas faced by all Iranians, Iranian American Jews also experience prejudices unique to the Jewish identity in the U.S.

**The Iranian American Baha’i, Christian, and Zoroastrian Communities**

Baha’i, Christian, and Zoroastrian Iranians represent a numerical minority within the Iranian American group. It is important to understand the diversity of the Iranian American community and the unique needs of the various religious groups within the community.

These groups are a part of the Iranian American voice and their identities are described below.

The Baha’i community is the second most ethnically diverse religious group with North Korea and the Vatican City as the only two countries in the world to not have any documented Baha’is (Smith, 2008). According to The National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States (2011) there are 169,578 Baha’is in the U.S not including Hawai‘i or Alaska, making Baha’is a religious minority in the United States. According to the International Federation for Human Rights (2003), despite the fact that the Baha’i faith was founded in Iran, Baha’is living in Iran after the Iranian revolution of 1979 face religious persecution. Many Baha’is in Iran are arrested, imprisoned, tortured, and even killed for actively practicing their religion. Furthermore, Baha’is in Iran face prejudice and discrimination at their place of employment and within the Iranian education system.
Many Baha’i’s fled Iran since the 1979 revolution and now reside in countries throughout the world.

A very small minority of Iranians are Christian. However, Christianity has had a presence in Iran since the birth of the religion. In 2009, The United States Department of State estimated there were 300,000 Iranian Christians living in Iran. The Iranian government claims to afford Christians representation within the establishment and to guarantee other government rights. However, similar to the experience of most religious minorities in Iran and Iranians in general, Christians have experienced prejudice and discrimination. Post the Revolution of 1979, Iranian Christians were imprisonment and sometimes killed by the Iranian government.

According to *The New York Times* (2006), there are approximately 11,000 Zoroastrians living in the U.S. today. Currently, the Zoroastrian community faces the challenge of keeping the community alive and active. Zoroastrianism is a monotheistic religion founded in Iran before the establishment of Christianity and Islam. Following the Islamatization of Iran in the seventh century A.D., Zoroastrians were slaughtered and exiled. Many relocated to India. According to The Federation of Zoroastrian Associations of North America (2004), worldwide there are only 190,000 Zoroastrians. This may also be due the debated issue of not accepting converts into the Zoroastrian community. Despite the minority status, oppression, discrimination, and prejudice faced by Zoroastrians, many of the Zoroastrian practices are still adopted in Iran today. For example, Persian New Year, or Nowruz, is said to have its origins in Zoroastrianism, and is still widely celebrated by most Iranians of all religious affiliations today.
Iranian Americans Without Religious Affiliation

As discussed in the prior sections of this paper, Iranian Americans without any religious affiliation may face discrimination due to their ethnic identities. This section is written with the caveat that many Iranian Americans are assumed or mistaken to be Muslim, due to the “Axis of Evil” analogy (as described in previous sections). If Iranian Americans without religious affiliation are able to overcome the assumption that they are Muslim, then they will contend with the issues surrounding a social identity without religious affiliation and/or belief in God. For example, one Gallup poll (2011) found that atheists were the least likely to be trusted with a political position in the U.S. Thus, Iranian Americans who are classified as being atheists due to their lack of a religious affiliation, experience prejudice and discrimination due to both their ethnicity and their lack of religious affiliation.
APPENDIX C – HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL SOCIAL DISTANCE

To further understand the concept of social distance as a type of prejudice, a description of horizontal and vertical social distance is provided below.

Horizontal and vertical social distance may occur between persons, between person and social group, and between social groups. Horizontal versus vertical social distance is founded in the notion that society is stratified into social groups that belong to different social statuses. In other words, some social groups in society have social advantages that other social groups do not.

The concept of horizontal social distance describes a type of social distance that occurs between individuals or social groups that have the same social status. In other words, horizontal social distance functions between equals, or groups that share a similar status within society. For example the social distance between two Iranian Americans who both have Eurocentric appearances.

The concept of vertical distance describes a type of social distance that occurs between individuals or social groups that have different levels of social status. For example the social distance between an Iranian American with eurocentric features and an Iranian American with ethnic features. It is important to emphasize that social status in this context refers to the social stratifications of a society based on ascribed status, but social status may also refer to the achievements an individual has attained. Individuals may feel superior based on their income or education, but not necessarily in their ascribed status. Hence, vertical distance is based on a number of social factors and is quite complex. Vertical distance is a form of social farness with no intention by either party to decrease the level of distance.
APPENDIX D- SNOWBALL & PURPOSIVE SAMPLING

Snowball Sampling. The participant recruitment methods are described below.

The current study employs snowball and purposive sampling. Snowball sampling may be an effective way of recruiting from populations that may not frequently take part in research projects (Perez, Nie, Ardern, Radhu, & Ritvo, 2011). Some of the challenges may be that the population mistrusts authority figures, has a disinterest in the area of study, or faces linguistic issues. However, researchers may work to overcome such challenges by “building trust with individuals and the community by prioritizing participants’ concerns and convenience, and effectively conveying study purpose, task, and potential benefits to individuals and the community” (Perez et al., 2011, p. 2). In return, the individuals with whom the researcher has built a relationship with are asked to refer other individuals of that population.

Purposive Sampling. Purposive sampling is a type of sampling or recruiting of participants that selects individuals based on a number of chosen criteria (Daniel, 2012). In other words, researchers define a set of desired traits and a set of undesired traits; individuals that meet all of the desired requirements are selected to participate in the study. According to Daniel (2012), purposive sampling develops through five steps.

Please see Table 9 below.

Table 9. Steps for Purposive Sampling

| 1) Define the target population |
| 2) Identify inclusion and exclusion criteria |
| 3) Create a plan to recruit and select population elements that satisfy the inclusion and exclusion criteria |
| 4) Determine the sample size |
| 5) Select the targeted number of population elements |

(Daniel, 2012, p. 89)
The five steps described above are implemented in the current study below. Please see Table 10 below.

**Table 10. Implemented Steps for Purposive Sampling**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Define the target population: Iranian Americans, Jewish, Muslim, &amp; Baha’i Iranian Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Identify inclusion and exclusion criteria: 3 men: 3 women: must identify as ethnically full Iranian: Must permanently reside in the U.S. Must be either, Muslim/ Jewish/ or Baha’i, &amp; must be 18 years or older.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Create a plan to recruit and select population elements that satisfy the inclusion and exclusion criteria: Snowball sampling. Participants are recruited through other participants’ acquaintances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Determine the sample size: The sample size will be 6 individuals (3 men, 3 women).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Select the targeted number of population elements: Two: 1) Gender (men, women), 2) Religion (Muslim, Jewish, Baha’i) (Daniel, 2012, p. 89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that research conducted using purposive sampling is not generalizable and is not meant to be generalizable. Such research is exploratory and is only reliable and valid for the individuals used in the study. The purpose of exploratory qualitative work is that it represents the experiences and thoughts of a selected few. By representing these individuals, researchers are able to give voice to a segment of the population that is relatively unknown to the mainstream. There is a dearth of research voicing the thoughts and experiences of Iranian Americans in the current U.S. context. Thus, the study encourages other researchers to replicate the findings of the study.

The current study employs snowball sampling. According to Perez, Nie, Ardern, Radhu, and Ritvo (2011), snowball sampling may be an effective way of recruiting from populations that may not frequently take part in research projects. Some of the challenges may be that the population mistrusts authority figures, has a disinterest in the area of study, or faces linguistic issues. However, researchers may work to overcome such
challenges by “building trust with individuals and the community by prioritizing participants’ concerns and convenience, and effectively conveying study purpose, task, and potential benefits to individuals and the community” (Perez et al., 2011, p. 2). In return, the individuals with whom the researcher has built a relationship with are asked to refer other individuals of that population.
APPENDIX E- CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Iranian American Perceptions

A Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Hawai‘i, Mānoa is conducting a study on the social attitudes of Iranian Americans. We are interested in perceptions of Iranian Americans on the extent to which prejudice and/or discrimination against Iranian Americans exists in the U.S. You are being asked to participate because you are an adult over the age of 18 who identifies as Iranian American.

Activities and Time Commitment: You are being asked to participate in a 40-45 minute online survey or paper/pencil survey (whichever you prefer). The survey is primarily composed of multiple choice questions with several opportunities for short fill-in the blank responses. Approximately 240 Iranian Americans will participate in the study.

Benefits and Risks: Participation in this research may be of no direct benefit to you. Participants may find the subject matter of prejudice and discrimination upsetting and as a result there may be the potential for psychological pain. If you experience psychological pain, you may call a nationwide crisis hotline for help, at 1(800)448-3000 or 1(800)273-8255. It is believed that the results of this project will help social scientists better understand perceptions of Iranian Americans on prejudice and/or discrimination within the U.S.

You will also be asked to fill out the Ethnic Harassment Experiences (EHES) scale (Schneider et al., 2000), a Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1959), a brief religiosity scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), and a demographic sheet.

Confidentiality and Privacy: All data collected will be summarized into broad categories. Although, we will not ask for your name the demographic questionnaire (what part of the country you live in, your age, etc.) may potentially cause a loss of privacy.

Voluntary Participation: At any time, you are free to discontinue participation for any reason, without loss. Research data will be confidential to the extent allowed by law. Agencies with research oversight, such as the University of Hawai‘i’s, Human Studies Program, have the authority to review research data. All research records will be stored in a locked file in the primary investigators’ office for the duration of the research project. All research records will be destroyed three years after the completion of the project.

Questions: If you have any questions, please contact the researcher, Shahrzad Yousefinejad at shariyousefi@gmail.com. You may also contact the faculty advisor Dr. Elaine Hatfield, at elainehatfield582@gmail.com. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please contact the University of Hawai‘i’s, Human Studies Program at (808) 956-5007, or uhirb@hawaii.edu. If you choose to participate, please print the letter X on the line provided below and the date, to indicate your consent and comprehension of the nature of this study. ____________________
APPENDIX F- SURVEY PACKET

INSTRUCTIONS: Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale. Please indicate whether you have experienced the following within the last 24 months, by marking an X on the often, sometimes, or never space.

1) Someone made derogatory comments about your ethnicity.
   ______ Never       ______ Sometimes      ______ Always

2) Someone used ethnic slurs to describe you.
   ______ Never       ______ Sometimes      ______ Always

3) Someone made racist or prejudice comments about you or your ethnicity. (For example saying people of your ethnicity aren’t very smart).
   ______ Never       ______ Sometimes      ______ Always

4) Someone tells jokes about your ethnic group.
   ______ Never       ______ Sometimes      ______ Always

5) Someone excludes you from social interactions because of your ethnicity.
   ______ Never       ______ Sometimes      ______ Always
INSTRUCTIONS: We are interested in Iranian American perceptions in the U.S. Particularly perceptions regarding Iranian American feeling toward how they are looked at by Euro-Americans (Americans of European descent). Please answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Do you believe Euro-Americans would marry into the Iranian-American</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as close</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as next</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>door neighbors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to work in the same office</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Iranian-Americans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>speaking acquaintances only</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like Iranian-Americans as</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visitors only to the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do you believe Euro-Americans would like to debar Iranian Americans</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INSTRUCTIONS: Religiosity Scale. Please answer the following questions.

1. How would you respond to the statement: “Religion provides the individual with an interpretation of his existence which could not be discovered by reason alone.”
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree

2. Would you say that one’s religious commitment gives life a certain purpose which it could not otherwise have?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree

3. Faith, meaning putting full confidence in the things we hope for and being certain of things we cannot see, is essential.
   1. Strongly Agree
   2. Agree
   3. Disagree
INSTRUCTIONS: Religiosity Scale. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.

4. Overall, my religion has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
   A  B  C  D
   Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

5. My religion is an important reflection of who I am.
   A  B  C  D
   Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

6. My religion is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am.
   A  B  C  D
   Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

7. In general, my religion is an important part of my self-image.
   A  B  C  D
   Strongly Mildly Mildly Strongly
   Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill out the following demographic questionnaire.

1) Please choose your gender identity (sex). _______Man _______Woman

2) Age _______

3) a) _______. Which one group best describes your ethnic identity, or the ethnic group with which you most strongly identify?

1. White
2. White /Iranian
3. Middle Eastern
4. Middle Eastern /Iranian
5. Persian
6. Iranian
7. Iranian American
6. If other, please specify: ________________________________

3) b) Do you identify with any other ethnic group besides Iranian American? (e.g., Azerbaijani, Afghani, Bahrani, etc.) _______Yes _______No

3) c) If answered no to question 3b, skip to question 4.
 Do you believe that Iranian Americans from a different region of Iran than yourself are treated significantly different from you in the context of the U.S. by non-Iranian Americans? _______Yes _______No

4) What is your religious affiliation? Please write none if you have no religious affiliation.

______________________________

5) Please select the skin color/tone that best represents your skin color/tone. Indicate your choice by selecting the number associated with the skin color/tone you choose. Write number here ____________
6) a) Have you ever used/undergone a skin lightening product/procedure (for the purposes of lightening your skin color/tone)? ______Yes ______No

6) b) Would you ever use/undergo a skin lightening product/procedure (for the purposes of lightening your skin color/tone)? ______Yes ______No

7) Do you consider yourself to have an Iranian accent when speaking English?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acute</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Mild</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8) How old were you when you immigrated to the U.S.? Or were you born in the U.S.?

_____________________________

9) How many generations has your family been in the U.S.?

_____________________________

10a) Do you wear symbols of your religious affiliation? (e.g., Cross, Yarmulke, Turban, Scarf, etc.)

_______ Never _______ Sometimes _______ Always
10b) How often? ________________________________

10c) If so what do you wear?
_________________________________________________

11a) Do you wear ethnically traditional clothing? (e.g., clothing worn in non-urban areas of Iran such as Mahali’ clothing)

________ Never ________ Sometimes ________Always

11b) How often? ________________________________

11c) If so what do you wear?
_________________________________________________

12) Highest level of education you have completed. Please circle one.

Grade School

High School

Vocational Degree or Certification

BS / BA

MS / MA

Ph. D. / M.D.

13) What was the annual family household income during most of your childhood?

Under $17,000

$17,000-24,999

$25,000-49,999

$50,000 – 99,999

$100,000 +

14) What is your occupation? _________________________

15) What is your father’s occupation? _________________

16) What is your mother’s occupation? _________________
17) What state and county do you reside in? ____________________
APPENDIX G – ADDITIONAL STATISTICS ON THE ETHNIC HARASSMENT EXPERIENCES SCALE

The Ethnic Harassment Experiences Scale was built and organized based on the Sexual Experiences Questionnaire (Fitzgerald et al., 1988). The statistical information provided below is taken from Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan’s (2000) study on ethnic harassment involving Anglo and Hispanic participants.

“Combining all of the data from Hispanic and Anglo participants in our four samples resulted in 556 cases with complete data on all seven items (α should be an alpha = .79). A confirmatory factor analysis conducted on the combined data suggested that the fit indexes for the two-factor model were reasonable. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) was .95, the adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI) was .90, the comparative fit index (CFI) was .93, the normed fit index (NFI) was .92, the non-normed fit index (NNFI) was .89, and the root mean square residual (RMSR) was .05. The chi-square value (df = 13) was 103.60 (χ²/df ratio: 7.97).

The parameter loading for each item were positive and significant (all ts > 12.9), and the correlation between the two factors was .54. We compared the two-factor model with a one-factor model. The one-factor model did not fit the data as well. GFI, AGFI, NFI, NNFI, and CFI values were .87, .72, .80, .69, and .81, respectively; the RMSR was .07. The χ²/df ratio was 19.30, and the chi-square value (df = 14) was 270.22. The alpha reliability indexes for the two-factor EHES in all four samples were acceptable given the heterogeneous nature of some of the behaviors included in the scale and the relative sizes of the samples that completed all seven items. The reliabilities for the verbal ethnic harassment and
exclusion factors, respectively, were .85 and .47 in Sample 1 (n = 117), .74 and .49 in Sample 2 (n = 43), .77 and .88 in Sample 3 (n = 97), and .82 and .63 in Sample 4 (n = 286)” (Schneider, Hitlan, & Radhakrishnan, 2000, pg 7-8).”
APPENDIX H – THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

Social nearness (social distance theory) may be quite complex because it attempts to measure a feeling: a feeling of “sympathetic understanding.” Scales were developed as early as 1924 to measure the degree of social distance between social groups. Please see Table 11 below.

Table 11. Social Distance Scale

| 1. Would marry into group         | Yes, no         |
| 2. Would have as close friends    | Yes, no         |
| 3. Would have as next door neighbors | Yes, no       |
| 4. Would work in same office      | Yes, no         |
| 5. Have as speaking acquaintances only | Yes, no    |
| 6. Have as visitors only to my nation | Yes, no  |
| 7. Would debar from my nation     | Yes, no         |

(Bogardus, 1959)

The Social Distance Scale uses the Guttman Scale to measure social farness or nearness. On a Guttman Scale items are ranked in a particular order so that when a “typical” respondent answers with a yes to an item, they also agree with items ranked lower on the scale. For example, if a participant is willing to accept a particular social group member as a “speaking acquaintance,” then it is very likely that they also would accept a member of that social group in their nation.

Ideally, a Guttman Scale is ordered from least extreme to most extreme, as is the case with the Bogardus Social Distance Scale. As a result, debarring a social group from your country is the most extreme and last item on the scale. The scale also uses intervals of equal proportions where questions are ranked in such a way that the difference
between each interval is equal. This makes the sum score of the scale useful for statistical analysis.

The theory of social distance (whether it is social farness or social nearness) may be conceptualized on a continuum from a high degree of social distance (social farness) to a low degree (social nearness). There is never a relationship where there is no social distance. Hence, social distance may be represented on a linear model. A linear model may be simply represented on a line. As a result, an individual may be represented by a point on a graph. For example, a graph may be used to illustrate race and gender.

In the graph below, race is represented on the X-axis and gender is represented on the Y-axis. On one polar end of the X-race-axis is the social construct of Whiteness. On the opposite polar end of the X-race-axis is the social construct of Blackness. On one polar end of the Y-gender-axis is the social construct of women. On the opposite polar end of the Y-gender-axis is the social construct of men. When constructing the graph, the numerical value given for the social construct of race or gender is not important because social distance is calculated using absolute values. This means that the distance formula used in algebra may be applied, which uses only absolute values. Hence, the directionality, or whether the number is positive or negative, is not important. The distance formula is

\[ d = \sqrt{(x_2 - x_1)^2 + (y_2 - y_1)^2}. \]

Located on the graph below are two points, A and B. Point A is found at the coordinates (-5, 11) and represents the social identity of a Black man. Point B is found at the coordinates (-11, 5) and represents the social identity of a White woman. By creating an algebraic representation of social distance we are able to calculate the social distance. The coordinates that define an individual’s social identity are called one’s social location.
Social location refers to the location of an entity on a graphical representation of an individual’s identity. Below is the figurative calculation of social distance between the social identity of a Black man and the social identity of a White woman.

\[ d = \sqrt{(x_2 - x_1)^2 + (y_2 - y_1)^2} \]

social distance = the square root of \((-5 - 5)^2 + (11 - (-11))^2\)

social distance = the square root of \((-10)^2 + (22)^2\)

social distance = the square root of \((100 + 484)\)

social distance (almost equals) = 24.17

Racial and Gender (sex) Distance
**APPENDIX I**

Table I5

*Percentage of Men and Women Perceiving Ethnic Harassment. Never, Sometimes, Always*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Groups</th>
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<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Always</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0 80</td>
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<td>0 20</td>
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<td>28-37</td>
<td>10 16</td>
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<td>5 6</td>
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<td>38-47</td>
<td>14 15</td>
<td>81 80</td>
<td>5 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-57</td>
<td>25 22</td>
<td>71 76</td>
<td>4 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58-67</td>
<td>21 24</td>
<td>70 57</td>
<td>9 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68+</td>
<td>42 37</td>
<td>50 50</td>
<td>8 13</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Always</th>
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<td>0 7</td>
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<td>8 11</td>
<td>84 81</td>
<td>8 8</td>
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<td>57 63</td>
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<td>69 82</td>
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<th>Always</th>
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<td>88 71</td>
<td>4 16</td>
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<td>20 18</td>
<td>71 78</td>
<td>9 4</td>
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### Appendix J

#### Table J6

*Predictors of Perceiving Ethnic Harassment among Iranian American Men and Women.*

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<td>.15*</td>
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<td>.23**</td>
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<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.21***</td>
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</table>

* * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
### Appendix K

**Table K7**

*Percentages of Perceptions of Social Distance among Iranian American Men and Women.*

<table>
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<td></td>
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<td>Women %</td>
<td>Men %</td>
<td>Women %</td>
<td>Men %</td>
<td>Women %</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>Income during Childhood</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
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<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>51</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
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Appendix L

Table L8
Predictors of Perceptions of Social Distance from Euro Americans among Iranian Americans.

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<td>-</td>
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<td>.20*</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skin tone</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.14*</td>
</tr>
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<td>.30**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnically Traditional Clothing</td>
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<td>.02</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generational Status</td>
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<td>-.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>Sub-Ethnic Group</td>
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<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
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<td>-.08</td>
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<td>-.17**</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
Appendix M

Figure M1
Average Rates of Perceived Ethnic Harassment. Gender and Religion.
Appendix N

Figure N2
Average rates of Perceived Social Distance among Iranian American Men and Women.
Appendix O

Figure O3
*Factor Analysis. Religiosity Scale One and Religiosity Scale Two.*
Appendix P

Figure P4
Factor Analysis. Religiosity Scale One and Religiosity Scale Two. Iranian American Muslim.
Appendix Q

Figure Q5
*Factor Analysis. Religiosity Scale One and Religiosity Scale Two. Iranian American Jewish.*
APPENDIX R – ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

I conducted additional analyses to analyze differences in perceived averages of ethnic harassment and social distance from Euro Americans among participants who were recruited online versus those recruited in person. Participants recruited online had similar means and standard deviations to those recruited in person in regard to ethnic harassment (online: $M = 1.482$, $SD = .397$: in-person: $M = 1.457$, $SD = .415$). Participants recruited online had similar means and standard deviations to those recruited in person in regard to social distance (online: $M = .197$, $SD = .267$: in-person: $M = .272$, $SD = .304$).
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