Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Potential Prison Time and Earnings Management
There are no files associated with this item.
|Title:||Potential Prison Time and Earnings Management|
court system confidence
|Issue Date:||01 Sep 2017|
|Abstract:||We examine the association between earnings management and the maximum potential prison time a director may receive resulting from a self-serving transaction that is neither disclosed nor approved. Executives face incentives and disincentives to manage earnings. We hypothesize and find a negative relation between potential prison time and earnings management. Further, we show that the negative relation between potential prison time and earnings management is stronger in countries where the population has more confidence in the court system. These findings suggest that potential prison time serves as a powerful disincentive to manage earnings.|
|Description:||Inquiries about this document can be made to HARC@hawaii.edu|
|Appears in Collections:||11 Financial: Financial Reporting Quality / Credit Ratings / Earnings Smoothing / Earnings Comparability (FAR3)|
Please contact firstname.lastname@example.org if you need this content in an alternative format.
Items in ScholarSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.