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<title>Works by East-West Center Authors from Other Publishers</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/1701</link>
<description/>
<pubDate>Thu, 20 Jun 2013 04:59:46 GMT</pubDate>
<dc:date>2013-06-20T04:59:46Z</dc:date>
<item>
<title>Climate change and Pacific islands : indicators and impacts : case studies from the 2012 Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26955</link>
<description>This collection of case studies was developed by the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), and is part of Climate Change and Pacific Islands: Indicators and Impacts, which is being published as one of a series of technical inputs to the National Climate Assessment (NCA) 2013 report. These case studies illustrate current climate impacts and adaptations across the Pacific Islands region. Real-world examples of the implications of climate risks for Pacific Islanders are described in diverse sectors, including agriculture and food security, human health, environmental policy, coastal infrastructure, and native ecosystems. The case studies highlight how information about the changing climate can be used to support decision making. The PIRCA is a collaborative effort engaging federal, state, and local government agencies, non-government organizations, academia, businesses, and community groups to inform and prioritize their activities in the face of a changing climate.
</description>
<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26955</guid>
<dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Climate change and Pacific islands : indicators and impacts : executive summary of the 2012 Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26954</link>
<description>This executive summary has been adapted from the full-length report. Climate Change and Pacific Islands: Indicators and Impacts is being published as one of a series of technical inputs to the National Climate Assessment (NCA) 2013 report. Developed by the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), this report assesses the state of knowledge about climate change indicators, impacts, and adaptive capacity of the Hawaiian archipelago and the US-Affiliated Pacific Islands (USAPI). The PIRCA is a collaborative effort engaging federal, state, and local government agencies, non-government organizations, academia, businesses, and community groups to inform and prioritize their activities in the face of a changing climate.
</description>
<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26954</guid>
<dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Climate change and Pacific islands : indicators and impacts : report for the 2012 Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA)</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26949</link>
<description>Climate Change and Pacific Islands: Indicators and Impacts is being published as one of a series of technical inputs to the National Climate Assessment (NCA) 2013 report. Developed by the Pacific Islands Regional Climate Assessment (PIRCA), this report assesses the state of knowledge about climate change indicators, impacts, and adaptive capacity of the Hawaiian archipelago and the US-Affiliated Pacific Islands (USAPI). The PIRCA is a collaborative effort engaging federal, state, and local government agencies, non-government organizations, academia, businesses, and community groups to inform and prioritize their activities in the face of a changing climate.
</description>
<pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2012 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/26949</guid>
<dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
<item>
<title>Conclusion : capitalism in the dragon's lair</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8742</link>
<description>If we step back and consider China's rapid international ascent within the confines of the world's past 300 years of history, some intriguing parallels emerge. China's rise appears in many ways to be propelled by the same historical forces associated with the climb to international prominence of other great powers. Although each of these industrial powers charted its own course, buffeted by different historical and social currents, they all undertook a form of capitalist development. China today is undoubtedly in the midst of such capitalist development. As noted in Chapter 2, this process is most fundamentally driven by the inherent human tendency to seek gain and accumulate capital. While this tendency&#13;
exposes capitalism's less savory facets, from avarice to crass materialism, it also&#13;
motivates diligence, thrift, and, perhaps most profoundly, human creativity. Of&#13;
course, capitalism is in general distinguished by the rise of market institutions to organize the supply of our basic (and not-so-basic) livelihoods. Ultimately, though, a political vantage point is perhaps the least understood&#13;
and yet the most salient for developing countries. The unique historical process&#13;
of capitalism is characterized by the rise of capital-owning social strata&#13;
to economic, social, and political prominence. At first these social groups&#13;
avoid, then cooperate, engage, and compete with state elites. If a capitalist&#13;
transition proceeds, the increasing power of capital can balance the state's coercive means, establishing constitutional limits that assure the security of property rights and the predictability of economic rules. While China is in the midst of a capitalist transition, the specific processes unfolding are often unmatched in speed and scale. In comparison to earlier instances of capitalist accumulation, China seems to be doing everything simultaneously in a much more condensed time frame.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8742</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>McNally, Christopher A.</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>The institutional contours of China’s emergent capitalism</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8741</link>
<description>This chapter will undertake a more expansive analysis. It will&#13;
map the unique institutional arrangements permeating China's budding&#13;
capitalism. The focus will rest particularly on how state and capital institutionally&#13;
interact and shape China's political economy. The next section will briefly introduce the conceptual approach taken in&#13;
this chapter - the capitalist institutional lens. I will then elucidate what I&#13;
hold are the three most salient institutional contours of China's emergent&#13;
capitalism: "network capitalism"; the rapid absorption of China into the&#13;
"new global capitalismn; and the distinctive role of state institutions in&#13;
China's capitalist development. In the concluding remarks I will comment&#13;
on China's long historical trajectory and argue that contemporary statecapital&#13;
relations possess certain parallels to those characterizing China's&#13;
imperial political economy over the past 1,000 years. However, due to the&#13;
contemporary international environment this historical trajectory is likely&#13;
to be broken.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8741</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>McNally, Christopher A.</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Reflections on capitalism and China’s emergent political economy</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8740</link>
<description>The purpose of this chapter is to delve deeper into the general nature and&#13;
logic of capitalism and in this manner provide a benchmark for evaluating&#13;
China's emergent political economy. Put differently, this chapter will&#13;
work toward a working defmition of capitalism that is both fundamental&#13;
and precise. This defmition can then serve as a measuring stick to judge&#13;
the progress of China's capitalist transition and elucidate what some of its&#13;
basic properties are. In the conclusion I will further suggest how applying&#13;
the capitalist lens can provide new insights on the present and future of&#13;
China's monumental transformation.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8740</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>McNally, Christopher A.</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Introduction : the China impact</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8739</link>
<description>Of all the competing forecasts for the 21st century, most agree that China's&#13;
international ascent will have a defining impact. Nonetheless, most serious&#13;
forecasts seem at a loss concerning how to capture the exact nature of this&#13;
impact. China's ascent might be the harbinger of international turbulence, or&#13;
portend the rise of a vast consumer market, ushering in a new era of global&#13;
prosperity. Whatever view one might lean toward, China's impact will spring&#13;
from the massive transformations its political economy is experiencing.&#13;
Analyzing these transformations is the purpose of this volume. We will&#13;
explore the domestic origins of China's emergent political economy and its&#13;
global ramifications.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8739</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>McNally, Christopher A.</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Reinforcing national security and regional stability : the implications of nuclear weapons and strategies</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8422</link>
<description>The study advances four other propositions on the implications of nuclear weapons and strategies for security and stability in the Asian security region and for the global nuclear order. First, it argues that nuclear weapons have a modifying effect, but they do not fundamentally alter system structure (distribution of power) or the patterns of amity and enmity. By strengthening weaker powers, nuclear weapons have helped offset imbalances in conventional and nuclear capabilities and mitigated the negative consequences of those imbalances. Second, the impact of nuclear weapons on alliance formation and sustenance is mixed. In the abstract, nuclear weapons should enhance internal balancing and reduce the need for external balancing; this should reduce the significance of alliances. Third, on conflict resolution, the study posits that the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons argues against dispute resolution through the physical use of violence. At the same time, nuclear weapons are not a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution. Finally, the study posits that if it is to continue to be relevant, the nuclear order that emerged during the Cold War must substantially alter to accommodate contemporary strategic realities, including a focus on Asia, which has become a core world region and in which strategic competition is likely to intensify. A "new" nuclear order that is likely to emerge gradually would have to address at least four challenges: (1) sustaining deterrence in a condition of asymmetry and small nuclear forces, (2) accommodating "new" nuclear weapon states, (3) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and to nonstate actors, and (4) facilitating the safe and secure development of nuclear energy to meet the growing demand for this clean fuel.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8422</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Alagappa, Muthiah</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Nuclear weapons and national security : far-reaching influence and deterrence dominance</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8421</link>
<description>This study advances four propositions on the role of nuclear weapons in national security in the twenty-first century strategic environment. First, the primary role of nuclear weapons now and in the foreseeable future is basic or central deterrence. Nuclear weapons also prevent blackmail, preserve strategic autonomy (freedom to act), and provide insurance to cope with unanticipated developments in a changing strategic environment. Second, although deterrence continues to be the dominant role and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons, the conception and practice of deterrence is different from the mutual assured destruction condition that characterized the Soviet-American nuclear confrontation during the Cold War and varies across countries. Deterrence in the contemporary era is largely asymmetric in nature with weaker powers relying on nuclear weapons to deter stronger adversaries. Third, the absence of severe confrontations and the limited capabilities of the relatively small Asian nuclear arsenals have resulted in general deterrence postures. The United States seeks capabilities to deal with a wide array of threats, but it does not confront an immediate conflict or crisis situation that warrants actor-specific threats that could result in nuclear retaliation. Finally, extended nuclear deterrence continues to be important to the national security of U.S. allied states in East Asia. China and certainly India and Pakistan do not have the capability or the strategic imperative to provide strategic protection to an ally against a threat from another nuclear power. Russia has the capability and plans to extend the deterrence function of its nuclear arsenal to protect Byelorussia and Armenia.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8421</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Alagappa, Muthiah</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Exploring roles, strategies, and implications : historical and conceptual perspectives</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8420</link>
<description>This chapter outlines the transforming logic of nuclear weapons and explores at a conceptual level the roles of nuclear weapons, the strategies for their employment, and their implications for international security to provide a historical and conceptual perspective for the investigation of these issues in the country and concluding chapters that follow.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8420</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Alagappa, Muthiah</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Asia's security environment : from subordinate to region dominant system</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8419</link>
<description>To provide the context for investigating the roles of nuclear weapons and their implications for regional security and stability, this chapter maps Asia's present security environment and likely changes in that environment. It advances four propositions. First, contemporary Asia's security environment is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War period when Asia was a subordinate security region penetrated and dominated by the ideological and strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Asia has become a core world region with distinctive economic, normative, and institutional features. The dynamics of security in Asia are increasingly shaped by the interaction of interests and priorities of states in the Asian security region. Conflict formation, management, and resolution are grounded largely in regional and local dynamics. Extraregional actors are involved but their salience derives from their interaction with Asian state and nonstate actors on issues of mutual concern. Second, Asia's security environment is likely to substantially alter over the next two to three decades. Escalation or resolution of regional conflicts (Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir) and regime change in countries like China, Indonesia, and Pakistan could bring about interaction change at a subregional level. They may also trigger broader changes. More fundamental system-level consequences, however, are likely to result from two ongoing trends. One is the rise of Asian powers, their quests for power, status, and wealth, and differing visions of regional order set in a context of the continuing desire of the United States to remain the preeminent power in Asia. The sustained rise of Asian powers is likely to result in gradual structure change and make relative gain considerations and strategic competition more significant. China's rise would pose the most significant challenge to the U.S.-dominated security order in Asia making Sino-American relations the primary security dynamic with regionwide security implications. The continuing dynamism of Asian economies and their increasing integration into regional and global economies is another important driver of change. It creates a dynamic that reinforces as well as counteracts strategic competition. As their economic power increases, Asian countries would be able to devote greater resources to build military capabilities and other capacities to pursue competing foreign policy objectives. This could intensify strategic competition. Growing economic integration and interdependence could, on the other hand, temper competition and modify adversarial relationships by creating alternative lines of interaction and vested interest in peace and stability. The Asian strategic situation is more akin to that of complex interdependence characterized by cooperation, competition, and conflict. Third, the chapter posits that although it will not be free of tension and will be characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty and hedging, the gradual transition from a U.S.-centered system to an informal balance-of-power system is likely to be relatively peaceful. The primary attention of Asian states in the next decade or more would be internally directed toward economic growth, modernization, state and nation building, and addressing domestic challenges. Maintaining a stable international environment that is conducive to the pursuit of these national goals and preventing international interference in their domestic affairs will be a primary foreign policy objective and determinant of security order. Finally, the chapter argues that military force will remain an important instrument of policy in the interaction of major powers, but largely in defense, deterrence, and assurance roles, not in aggression. States will seek to avoid strategic confrontation and full-scale war but at the same time hedge against uncertainty and unanticipated developments. In strategic matters, the behavior of major powers will approximate more closely to defensive realism than offensive realism.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8419</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Alagappa, Muthiah</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Introduction : investigating nuclear weapons in a New Era</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8416</link>
<description>Leaders and governments in nuclear weapon states, their allies, and aspirants to the nuclear club believe that their nuclear forces or those of their allies can advance national security by providing a capability to counter specific threats; to achieve certain policy priorities; to demonstrate national power; to preserve freedom of action; or as insurance against uncertainty and risks in a changing international environment. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and strategic defense have entered or reentered the security thinking of the old, new, and prospective nuclear weapon states and their allies in a fundamentally different strategic environment and in a nuclear era that is substantially different from that of the Cold War. This study investigates the purposes and roles of nuclear weapons in the new security environment, the nature and content of the national nuclear strategies of relevant states, and their implications for international security and stability in the new era with the focus on the Asian security region. The latter is now a core world region and could become the geopolitical center of the world in the twenty-first century.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8416</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Alagappa, Muthiah</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Relating freely : the meaning of educating for equity and diversity.</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8415</link>
<description>According to Buddhist teachings, although it is true that all things arise interdependently, the fruit of interdependence is not predetermined. Interdependence can be directed toward continued and ever more complicated trouble and suffering (samsara), or it can be directed toward meaningfully and sustainably resolving them (nirvana). Put somewhat differently, trouble and suffering are indices of errant interdependence or relationships gone awry; resolving our troubles and suffering means truing, or properly aligning, interdependence. In what follows, I want to make the case that the tragedies of global poverty are intimately related to the global spread and deepening of educational crisis. This will entail telling a complex story relating the structures and direction of twenty-first-century global interdependence; deepening poverty and inequity both within and among societies; and mounting evidence that serious educational shortfalls are emerging at rates and intensities that outstrip any conceivable pace of educational reform. Far from being a story of hopeless capitulation, however, it is a story centered on locating what David Harvey has termed "spaces of hope" within the very pattern of conditions that now serve as engines of inequity. As I hope to make evident, the same realities that globally are driving education into crisis are also opening opportunity spaces for education to serve as a driver for reorienting global interdependence toward a coordinative achievement of ever greater equity and diversity.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8415</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Hershock, Peter</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Energy security in China's capitalist transition : import dependence, oil diplomacy, and security imperatives</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8414</link>
<description>The People's Republic of China (PRC) had been a net energy exporter since the 1960s. In 1993, however, China became a net oil importer. Largely as a result of China's capitalist transition, China's thirst for energy resources has continued to grow massively in recent years. This is deepening the country's energy import dependence, which in turn is changing many aspects of China's energy markets and accelerating China's integration with the rest of the world. However, with higher dependence on energy imports, particularly imports of oil, energy security has emerged as a top issue for the Chinese leadership. Indeed, the exigencies of energy security have come to influence the conduct of China's foreign relations. There are in general four dimensions of energy security. The first is the economic dimension. Energy security means smoothly securing adequate supplies of energy efficiently and at the lowest cost. This requires governments to have an energy policy that is transparent and reduces barriers to the efficient operation of markets. The second is the geopolitical dimension. Promoting energy security means that oil or energy diplomacy plays a key role in a country's foreign policies. The third is the national security and military dimension. Energy security can be an important component in formulating a country's national security and defense policies. The final is the environmental dimension. To manage energy consumption while simultaneously protecting the environment and avoiding ecological degradation, any country, particularly a large and fast growing developing country like China, faces huge challenges. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, we will analyze the nature and seriousness of China's energy vulnerabilities, especially rising dependence on energy imports. Second, we will examine the economic, geopolitical, and, to a lesser extent, military dimensions of the dilemmas shaping China's energy security. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of the environmental issues associated with energy security is beyond the scope of this chapter, though these issues will be touched on.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8414</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Wu, Kang; Storey, Ian</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>China's emerging industrial economy : insights from the IT industry</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8413</link>
<description>Since the turn of the 21st century, a distinctive Chinese variety of industrial capitalism has taken shape. In this chapter, we trace the contours of China's emergent industrial economy, giving special attention to the role of the information technology (IT) industry. Throughout China's reform era, the IT industry has often been a forerunner of broader trends in the industrial economy, and this continues to be true today. For most of the socialist period, development was equated with large, heavy industrial plants. Even under market transition, the Chinese government at first maintained its faith in guided development and invested resources in large, state-owned firms in the hope of creating "national champions." However, over the past decade planners have moved away from the "big-is-better" model of industrialization, and instead placed their hopes in science and technology-intensive industry.  The first section of this chapter describes how China's contemporary industrial economy emerged from the state-run economy and introduces our first illustrative case of a Chinese IT company, the computer firm Legend Lenovo. The next section describes the emergence of a broader three-tiered industrial system, and indicates where Chinese IT companies fit in. The third section highlights new opportunities and challenges for Chinese IT firms that result from their progressive integration into global production and innovation networks. The fourth section introduces Huawei, China's largest telecommunications and networking equipment manufacturer, our second illustrative case. We examine Huawei's business model and show how the company is seeking to exploit the new international division of labor to foster managerial and innovative capabilities.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/8413</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Ernst, Dieter; Naughton, Barry</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Mapping boundaries, shifting power : the social-ethical dimensions of participatory mapping</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/5478</link>
<description>This chapter and the research project on which it is based emerged out of common and yet distinct concerns among the authors that spatial information technologies – at least in certain contexts and at certain scales – can lead to consequences that raise important ethical questions. We identified three inter-related dimensions in which these consequences have manifested: in conflicts correlated with changing patterns of spatial perceptions and values; in competition related to knowledge and claims of resources; and in relation to structural or organization stresses at the institutional level. Our observation began with discussions in relation to one author (Fox)’s experiences with participatory mapping activities in Southeast Asia, where he has been working since 1983.
Chapter 12 in Contentious geographies : environmental knowledge, meaning, scale / edited by Michael K. Goodman, Maxwell T. Boykoff, Kyle T. Evered.
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/5478</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Fox, Jefferson; Suryanata, Krisnawati; Hershock, Peter; Pramono, Albertus Hadi</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Land for my grandchildren : land use and tenure change in Ratanakiri: 1989-2007</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/5477</link>
<description>Like many nations in Southeast Asia, Cambodia faces challenges respecting the rights and culture of its upland dwelling ethnic minorities while pursing national development strategies. Centrally designed planning and economic goals have been prescribed for these remote areas often without recognizing the extraordinary knowledge indigenous communities have of their environment and the special resources they can bring to its further development. As a consequence, public and private sector initiatives for development may fit poorly, or conflict with local needs and management systems, resulting in destabilizing shifts in land-use and tenure systems as well as social systems. Ratanakiri has approximately 250 villages with 100,000 people who live either within forests or within 5 kilometers of them2. Annual population growth of 4 to 5 percent from natural increase and migration, combined with rapidly expanding market penetration, is putting immense pressure on land and forests and fueling a large and illegal land market. As indigenous communities lose control of their lands they are forced to retreat further into the forest, clearing those areas in turn. At the current rate of forest loss it appears much of the forest in Ratanakiri will be cleared in the next decade. During the same period it is likely that half of all indigenous lands in the province will be transferred to outside investors, concessionaires, or Khmer migrants from lowland areas. The alienation of indigenous community lands is and will result in growing social and economic marginalization, while the clearing of natural forests will likely destabilize&#13;
micro-climatic patterns, affect watershed hydrology, and erode biodiversity. These&#13;
changes, in turn, may limit the sustainability of any new economic production systems that replace existing land-use patterns (i.e., forests and swiddens). This paper draws on case studies from three communities in Ratanakiri to illustrate both the forces driving land-use and tenure change as well as how effective community stewardship can guide agricultural transitions. The study combines a time  series of remotely sensed data from 1989 to 2006 to evaluate changes in land use, and relates this data to in-depth ground truth observations and social research from the three villages. The methodology was designed to evaluate how indigenous communities who had historically managed forest lands as communal resources, are responding to market forces and pressures from land speculators. Krala Village received support from local NGOs to strengthen community, map its land, demarcate boundaries, strengthen resource use&#13;
regulations, and develop land-use plans. The two other villages, Leu Keun and Tuy, each received successively less support from outside organizations for purposes of resource mapping and virtually no support for institutional strengthening. The remote sensing data indicates that in Krala, over the sixteen year study period, protected forest areas remained virtually intact, while total forest cover declined at a rate of only 0.86 per year. While under mounting pressure, the study finds that some indigenous resource management systems operating in Ratanakiri, like those in Krala Village, have demonstrated a capacity to achieve national goals for sustainable use and forest conservation. These systems respond well to support that is directed towards building local forest management initiatives and supporting traditional communal tenure. The study also indicates that indigenous families are under tremendous pressure to illegally sell community forests and are often manipulated by local officials. Indigenous community forestry presents an opportunity for the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to retain&#13;
high value natural forests in Ratanakiri, if government, NGOs and donors can find ways&#13;
to effectively support traditional forest stewardship systems. Such a strategy would&#13;
support the RGC’s achievement of national forest cover goals while responding to social needs of the province’s predominantly rural population. (Executive summary)
</description>
<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jan 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/5477</guid>
<dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Fox, Jefferson; McMahon, Dennis; Poffenberger, Mark; Vogler, John</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>East Asian economic development : two demographic dividends</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/3647</link>
<description>The importance of the demographic dividend to East Asian economic growth is now widely recognized. During the last four decades of the 20th Century the working age populations grew much more rapidly than the dependent populations fueling growth in per capita income. Over the coming decades, however, demographic change is seemingly unfavorable. In the coming decades the working-age populations of many countries will grow more slowly than dependent populations because of rapid growth of the elderly. Thus, the demographic dividend will be undone. The thesis advanced in this presentation, however, is that appropriate economic policy could produce a second demographic dividend one that is as great or greater than the first dividend and one that may last indefinitely. Contrary to popular wisdom, population aging may prove to be the source of stronger economic growth and greater prosperity in East Asia.
For more about the East-West Center, see &lt;a href="http://www.eastwestcenter.org/"&gt;http://www.eastwestcenter.org/&lt;/a&gt;
</description>
<pubDate>Sat, 01 Jan 2005 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/3647</guid>
<dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Mason, Andrew; Kinugasa, Tomoko</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>Saving, wealth, and the demographic transition in East Asia</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/3633</link>
<description>This paper assesses the extent to which demographic forces can explain the substantial increases in national saving rates in East Asia over the last few decades, under the strong assumption that saving is motivated by a desire to provide for consumption in retirement. Comparative, steady-state analysis shows that relatively low rates of saving should characterize either pre- or post-transition societies, but that post-transition societies have a much higher demand for wealth than do societies yet to have begun their demographic transition. A dynamic simulation model is used to analyze saving rates during the transition. Using detailed demographic and economic data based on the experience of Taiwan, we show that demographic factors may underlie a substantial portion of the rise in net national saving experienced in the region. Further, our model anticipates a rapid decline in saving as countries approach the end of their demographic transitions and achieve high levels of wealth.
For more about the East-West Center, see &lt;a href="http://www.eastwestcenter.org/"&gt;http://www.eastwestcenter.org/&lt;/a&gt;
</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 1997 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<dc:date>1997-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Lee, Ronald Demos; Mason, Andrew; Miller, Timothy</dc:creator>
</item>
<item>
<title>China's overseas oil and gas investment : motivations, strategies, and global impact</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/10125/3336</link>
<description>In the mid and late 1990s, China embarked on a path of investing in overseas upstream oil and gas assets and intensified its efforts in the latter part of the decade. Since the beginning of this decade, Chinese state oil companies have made a bigger push to expand overseas, an effort strongly favored and encouraged by the Chinese government. The Chinese state oil companies have thus been taking advantage of the central government’s&#13;
growing concern over potential disruptions to their energy supplies to realize their desires of having larger business operations around the world. “Going out” has become part of the overall investment strategy for every state oil company in China.&#13;
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) leads the charge in overseas upstream petroleum investment. CNPC was later joined by its publicly-listed subsidiary PetroChina. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), through its publicly listed subsidiary CNOOC Limited, has followed CNPC’s lead in the pursuit of overseas ventures. China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), together with its own publicly listed subsidiary Sinopec Corp, comes in third in its overseas energy investment activities. In addition to these three, state oil trading company Sinochem Corporation and two non-oil state companies, China International Trust &amp; Investment Company (CITIC) and ZhenHua Oil Company, have also begun investing in oil and gas overseas.
</description>
<pubDate>Sat, 01 Mar 2008 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
<guid isPermaLink="false">http://hdl.handle.net/10125/3336</guid>
<dc:date>2008-03-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Wu, Kang</dc:creator>
</item>
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