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Social control in Chinese work organizations

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University of Hawaii, 1994

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SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

SOCIOLOGY

MAY 1994

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This study examines social control in Chinese work organizations. Social control refers to any mechanism which deals with problematic or deviant situations, secures individual compliance, and maintains collective order and normative consistency. Chinese work organizations, officially called 'work units', *danwei*, are literally workplaces where a group of people are employed to carry out a line of business under socialist state planning.

Research data are primarily from an interview of 100 former and present Chinese work unit members, temporarily sojourned in the U.S. at the time of interview, whose units present a spread of Chinese work organizations in terms of location, rank, line of business, and scale. Secondary data include official documents and scholarly contributions from social control, organizational analysis, and Chinese studies. The investigator's own experience in China is also drawn upon.

The research focus is on various forms of social control in Chinese work units. Included are ideology, residential network, dossier, reward-penalty system, administrative discipline, quasi-justice, para-security, vigilance, and inclusion. Each is described and analyzed with respect to structure, process, nature, change, and comparative perspective.

After all the forms of social control are tackled, communist political economy, Chinese culture, and controllee reactions are examined to contextually explain why and how they are possible, unavoidable, and sustained. China's current reform, modernization, and democratization are also dealt with to project social control reality into the future.

The main theme of this study is: the Chinese work unit is not merely a workplace. It is also a party branch to implement communist policies and a governmental agency to keep social order. The key learning is: the main body of social control is not coercive or therapeutical control of criminals or the insane but non-confrontational control of ordinary citizens who create the mainstream and help realize social goals. The effect of citizen control lies in that it is by the controlled perceived as reasonable, habituated as a natural part of lifestyle, and internalized as a necessary element of social order. Benefits or services may also be delivered along with control to increase its acceptability and effect.

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NOTES FOR INTERVIEW CITATIONS

All interview citations are individually identified with both original respondents and their work units by a uniform codification system. Each code is composed of two parts. The first part identifies an interviewee by four major individual characteristics, including in order age, sex, education, and job. Age is represented by a number, 1 for '25 and under', 2 for '26-35', 3 for '36-45', and 4 for '46 and above'. Sex is marked by a capitalized letter, M for 'male' and F for 'female'. Education is labeled by a capitalized letter, H for 'high school and under', U for 'undergraduate', and G for 'graduate'. Finally, job is indicated by a capitalized letter, O for 'official', R for 'researcher', T for 'teach', M for 'manual', S for 'staff', and P for 'professional'. See Table 1 for reference.

The second part points to the interviewee's work unit features, including in sequence, line of business, location, rank, and size. Line of business is identified by a capitalized letter, C for 'commerce', P for 'production', S for 'service', G for 'government', R for 'research', and U for 'university'. Location is marked by a capital letter followed by a normal sized letter on the right lower side, Ne for 'northeast', Se for 'southeast', Sw for 'southwest', and Nw for 'northwest'. Rank is indicated by a capital letter, M for

'ministry or provincial', P for 'prefectural', C for 'county', and S for 'sectional'. Finally, size is represented by a number, 1 for '10-200', 2 for '201-1000', 3 for '1001-3000', and 4 for '3001-12000'. See Table 2 for reference.

The two parts are connected by a colon mark. One example is: 3MGT:UNeP3. It indicates that the respondent is aged from 36 to 45, male, with graduate level of education, and being a teacher. His work unit is a university, located in northeastern China, ranked at the prefectural level, and with an employee population of between 1001 to 3000.

China is under reform as well as on a long-term developmental trend toward modernization and democratization. Fundamental social change is in the making. Social control system is faced with an indefinite challenge and revolution. Is present social control about to break down, leading to disbelief, loss of community ties, dislocation, chaos, and social disorganization?

To answer this question, it is required that current social control be understood with regard to basic structure, process, nature, history, and comparative perspective. Is it diffusive, community based? If it is, according to Western history, breakdown of community ties may lead to social disorganization and, development of professional control network is the way to pull society out of chaos and build a law-based social order. Is it excessive? By commonsense, when it loosens, excessive control may collapse with a tremendous disruptive force which could send the society into chaos.

This study chooses to examine social control in Chinese work organizations. Officially called 'work units', *danwei*, Chinese work organizations are actually basic building blocks of contemporary Chinese society. Linked to the communist party system as well as anchored to the governmental bureaucracy, the Chinese work unit is not merely a workplace where a group

of people are employed to carry out a line of business under socialist state planning. It is first a local party branch to recruit, discipline, and manage party members among a segment of the general population and to pass on and implement the party policy lines in a territory of the country. It is also a basic governmental agency to ensure that a group of social members are properly fed, employed, and managed, and local order is maintained on the enclave of a social unit. Various social control apparatuses and processes within the confines of Chinese work units, in fact, constitute the backbone of the overall Chinese social control system. Study of those structures and practices, therefore, could provide crucial insights into social control in contemporary China.

Social control, in this study, is theoretically defined as any mechanism or practice which secures individual compliance, maintains collective order and normative consistency, and deals with problematic or deviant situations. The study is not committed to or confined by any particular framework or paradigm. Various social theories and sociological perspectives, including radical social theory, conflict perspective, functionalism, exchange perspective, and interactionalism, while relevant, are referred to for systematic and insightful understandings of various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations and their contextual underpinnings under communist political economy.

Research data are primarily from a comprehensive interview of 100 Chinese who sojourned in the United States at the time of interview. They were selected to obtain a spread of location, rank, line of business, and scale of the last Chinese work units in which they worked for at least six consecutive months within the past ten years. In addition to the interview, official documents and scholarly contributions in social control, organizational analysis, and Chinese studies are reviewed and examined as a secondary data source. The investigator's self-analysis of his own life-long experience and observations in China is also used as a supplement.

The research text consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, formulates a conceptual framework, and addresses methodological issues. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are substantive, detailing all the identifiable forms of social control in Chinese work organizations. Included are ideology, residential network, confidential record, civil reward-penalty system, administrative disciplining, quasi-justice, para-security, mass vigilance, and inclusion. They are each discussed and analyzed with respect to their structure, process, nature, and change over time. Comparisons are made with those in other time periods and in places outside of China.

To further understand all those social control practices, Chapter 5 examines communist political economy and Chinese culture, and attempts to contextually explain why various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations are possible, unavoidable, and sustained. Chapter 6 documents employee reaction to and evaluation of the Chinese work units and compares them with those about American employers in terms of the mode and nature of work control. Chapter 7 turns to China's current system reforms and long-term trends toward modernization and democratization, and ventures to estimate possible future changes on Chinese social control mechanisms.

The study concludes with a review of how the research motivation and a number of pragmatic concerns derived from it have been relieved throughout the study and what theoretical, methodological, and policy implications the study has generated for social and organizational control.

CHAPTER 1

RESEARCH PROBLEM, THEORY, AND METHOD

A. Research Problem:

Social Control in Chinese Work Organizations

As observed by Chinese scholars in the West, China is a
cellular society (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Individuals
are organized into social units which in turn are managed by
the state machinery. From outside or above, the society looks
as if it is orderly, comprised of unitary cells. Under
socialist rule, the basic cell or building block is the work
organization, or as officially called, *danwei*, the work unit.

1. Chinese Work Organizations: the Work Unit[i]

The work unit is an officially-established or registered
organization. It owns property, occupies a plot of land,
undertakes a type of production or enterprise, feeds a group
of people, and builds up a wide range of vertical and
horizontal relationships with the society.

In rural areas, a work unit is a production brigade which
consists of several natural villages. The brigade is
economically self-sufficient and excluded from the state
planning. Politically, it does not have a coherent structure

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[i] Throughout the text, 'work organization' is alternated in
use with 'work unit', although 'work unit' as the official name is
used in a much greater frequency.

or an active procedure and is loosely coordinated by the township government. As such, it is left out of this study.

In cities or state farms, a work unit is organized around a line of production, business, service, profession, or administrative function. For example, it can be a manufacturing or processing factory, a tea farm, a mining field, a travel agency, a department store, a hotel, a restaurant, a hospital, a school, a university, a research institute, a governmental agency, or any other establishment among hundreds-of-thousands of types of business and work in the country. Inside, the work unit has a management network and a party system, each of which has a clear division of labor and a systematic structure and process of administration, discipline, and control. To the outside, it is engaged in various lines of social connection: with its supervising agencies, local governments, local community, its clientele, and the market or profession of its line of enterprise.

The complexity of internal structure and the diversity of external connections for a work unit change by size, rank, and line of business. The general characteristic is that a work unit has its own organization and activity which leave impacts upon both society and individuals. For individuals, it is where they work, live, build up their social network, and realize their hope for career development and personal success. For society, it is a basic unit of action. For the

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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in particular, it is the first and last organizational bastion where its policy lines and programs are executed. From an initial look, it can be definitely said that the Chinese work unit is not merely a workplace.

2. Review of Studies

Despite the importance of the work organization in Chinese social structure and process, there are few systematic studies contributing to understanding it. In the West, Chinese scholars tend to pay attention to either 'macro' social phenomena or 'micro' cases and fail to appropriately address important 'meso' social dynamics. Available academic references for Chinese work units oftentimes are only a dozen lines, several pages, or even a chapter from a book or a paper on contemporary China. For example, Shih Ping's (1973) <u>Life of Workers under Chinese Communist Prosecution</u> includes relevant facts about work units under a heavy political overtone. Butterfield (1990), in a somewhat ethnographic study of Chinese social life under communism, mentions the work unit, *danwei*, in scores of occasions, providing various snapshots on its leverages upon individuals. In Whyte and Parish's (1984) study as well as in a book edited by Troyer, Clark, and Rojek (1989), there are descriptions and preliminary analyses on the work unit's internal organization and its function for law, order, and social control. Monograph studies on the work

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unit's organization and function for production, subsistence, and social stability, in general, have not yet been seriously pursued. One good start is Henderson and Cohen's (1984) observational study of a Chinese hospital. In a medical perspective, the study provides detailed information about the organizational arrangements and operational routines of a standard work unit.

If it is said that the general structure, service task, and external connection of the Chinese work unit have been occasionally studied, its social control mechanism or practice remains basically unaddressed in academic literature.

This study intends to fill the blank. In the following, social control exerted by the Chinese work organization will be examined through its various forms: control in the form of ideology through political study and self-criticism; control of behavior through residency such as family and neighborhood; creation of enduring official identities through confidential records like dossiers; and sanctioning of deviance through a civil reward-punishment system such as transfer, promotion, and demotion, through administrative disciplining, as well as through a quasi-justice or para-security system. For instance, the quasi-justice or para-security system in Chinese work units represents a 'formalized' form of control. It is guided by the police and court to detect, sanction, and control undesirable thoughts and speeches, rule-violating behavior, and minor criminal acts within the work unit's jurisdiction.

In examining all the major forms of social control in Chinese work organizations, attention will be paid to the official justification and sanction for each control practice. That is, why it is applied, how it is concretely executed, what undesirable act is targeted, and what impact is possible upon individuals, social solidarity, and goal attainments of the work unit if the defined undesirable acts are not controlled. It is expected that the study contributes to the understanding of both social control mechanism and organizational process in communist China.

3. Introductory Highlights

As an introduction, some highlights of social control in Chinese work units are presented as follows.

The Chinese work unit has actually incorporated family, neighborhood, spiritual control, and other elements into an effective form of social control. Most urban nuclear families are formed within work units. Their fate and everyday life are built around the household head's position and performance in the work unit. A person holding an important position, or being often praised as a model in the unit, has more means to secure spacious housing and abundant materials to supply household needs. His or her family members are more respected in daily interpersonal dealings. His or her children receive better treatment in schools, especially in the work unit's self-established schools (Goodman 1984).

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Most neighborhood committees are set up in the work unit's residential areas. Although they have to maintain connections with the government's street office, police, and court, their direct supervision comes mostly from the work units where they are located and are supposed to serve. It is understandable that when individual households are so intimately tied to work units, neighborhood committees have to operate under the influence of the work units.

Spiritual control is implemented by the work unit too. Mao urged the work unit to become a 'big school' for people to learn Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. Weekly political study is officially enforced in work units. A work unit has its own propaganda staff and instruments to assume a full responsibility for educating people and keeping them informed of basic party policy lines. For example, Deng's talk after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown was said to be transmitted to every employee and then to every urban resident, in one day, through the work unit network (East-West Center 1991).

In addition, the work unit has a variety of discretionary power inherent in its authority to hold its employees in line. First of all, the work unit holds three 'magic weapons' over its employees: household registration, dossier-keeping, and administrative disciplining. Household registration is a basic survival for urban residents. To live in a place legally, individuals must have permission allowing them to register

their household with local police and food supply departments. The permission for household registration is exclusively issued by the work unit. Without it, individuals are not only denied access to food, medical care, and other basic subsistence needs, but also liable to be evicted by the police.

The dossier is a permanent record created by the government for each individual about his or her political attitudes, job performances, and ordinary behavior. It is like a soul accompanying his or her life all the way from the first day of schooling to death. A work unit is in charge of dossier keeping and writing for its employees during their stay with the unit. A thought or behavioral mistake, if it is written into the dossier, could be a life-time stigma obstructing a person's progress. Obviously, the dossier is a matter everyone has to worry about and therefore, gives the work unit arbitrary power to subdue its employees.

Administrative disciplining ranges from warning, public criticism, recording mistakes into the dossier, deprivation of benefits or honors, and demotion, to removal from the unit. Each work unit has its own detailed definitions of inappropriate or deviant behavior, procedures to handle it, and prescribed penalty. These definitions, procedures, and prescriptions, expressive of its discretionary power, are contextually supported by a series of more general and abstract regulations or rules issued by the state and local

governments. For example, the state allows the work unit to penalize those households which are not in compliance with the state's family planning policy through administrative discipline. It is up to the work unit to figure out a concrete scale of penalties in proportion to all possible rule violations, such as early marriage, early child-bearing, and having more than one child.

Moreover, a work unit is allocated the responsibility of civil dispute mediation and the power for direct or indirect law enforcement. There are many mediation committees and mediators from factories, mines, and enterprises. For law enforcement, as a rule, each medium-sized or large work unit, has a public security department. It is staffed with trained para-police personnel, equipped with law-enforcement instruments, and maintains direct contact with the state police force. In a small-scale work unit, there is at least one person who is formally responsible for public security. The public security department or the person in charge of public security can hold suspects in segregation and custody, interrogate them, and in some case even incarcerate them for a period of time within the work unit. By an unspecified division of labor, the unit security office can take troublemakers, thieves, minor violators, and other malefactors within the unit and settle those cases on its own. Only noted crimes which cause serious outcomes and casualty are passed along to the police and court. This practice has habitually

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been seen as a realization of Mao's mandate that the proletarian dictatorship be carried out by the local work unit.

The organizational structure and process of the Chinese work unit and various forms of social control within it are examined in detail from Chapter Two to Chapter Four.

B. Conceptual Framework and Theoretical Matters

The idea of social control can be traced to Comte, and back further to Plato and Aristotle (Roucek 1978). As associated with order, power, authority, and influence, social control draws the attention of founding sociologists (Marx 1867; Durkheim 1893; Weber 1920; Parsons 1951). As a formal sociological concept, however, it is Ross (1901) who first elaborated it in detail through his pioneer study of law, belief, public opinion, suggestion, education, custom, religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art, enlightenment, illusion, social evaluation, and ethical elements. After Ross, social control has taken on a variety of meanings and interpretations in sociological literature (Janowitz 1975). According to the functionalist conception, social control refers to any social or cultural means which secures individual conformity to social norms or specific role expectations (Roucek 1978). Under this line, Reiss (1951) and Toby (1957) formulate their different personal-social control models which are further expanded by Reckless's (1962)

containment theory. Matza (1964) develops a perspective on social control which explains why some adolescents drift in and out of delinquency. Hirschi (1969), from his measurement of belief, attachment, involvement, and commitment, proposes a bonding theory of social control. Integrated with strain theory by Elliot (1979) and with learning theory by Thornberry (1987), the framework based upon bonds of individuals to society continues to be a dominant paradigm in the social control literature (Adler, Mueller, and Laufer 1991).

Other conceptions which do not center on social bonds and delinquency are also formulated and become recognized with prominent specialists in the field. For example, Gibbs (1981) brings an interactionist perspective to the study and defines social control as an attempt by one or more individuals to manipulate the behavior of another individual or individuals. From this point of view, he classifies social control into referential, allegative, vicarious, modulative, and prelusive types.

Black (1976, 1984) opens a course which urges study of social control as a dependent variable. A number of scholars come under his flag and publish their landmark works such as The Social Control of Mental Illness (Horwitz 1982), The Moral Order of A Suburb (Baumgartner 1988), The Behavior of Law (Black 1976), and The Social Structure of Right and Wrong (Black 1993). The study of social control as a dependent variable views social control as including "all of the

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practices by which people define and respond to deviant behavior" (Black 1984:xi). Drawing upon anthropological and sociological data, it distinguishes among social control's penal, compensatory, therapeutic, and conciliatory styles and inaction, unilateral, bilateral, and trilateral forms, and attempts to examine those styles and forms against gender, relational distance, social status, group ties, hierarchy, and organization. The effectiveness of control with regard to deviance prevention, detection, and treatment is also analyzed (Horwitz 1990).

This study treats social control as any mechanism or practice for securing individual compliance, maintaining collective order and normative consistency, or dealing with problematic or deviant situations. With respect to the research problem, the West vs. the Third World, formal vs. informal, primary vs. secondary group, social vs. organizational, regulative vs. suggestive, and external vs. internal control dichotomies are of particular interest.

1. The West vs. the Third World

The agent applying or securing social control can be a primary group such as a family, an interest club, and a closely-knit community, or a secondary authority like an employment organization, a security or justice system, and the state machinery. Prior to the modern era, countries in the world shared with each other in modes of social control, with

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all heavily relying on primary relations for mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1893).

A characteristic Western form of social control came to the fore after the Industrial Revolution and the Bourgeois Revolution. Its salient feature was the decline of *Gemeinshaft* and its replacement by *Gesellschaft* as a dominant base for human relationship and social control (Tonnies 1887). On the increasing side of formal control, three transformations can be identified: (1) the development of a centralized state apparatus for the control of crime and the care of dependency; (2) the application of scientific knowledge for the differentiation of deviants and dependents into separate types; and (3) the segregation of deviants and dependents into mental hospitals, reformatories, and other closed-institutions for treatment, punishment, and custody (Cohen 1985).

With religious mission, imperialist advance, and colonialist occupation, Western forms of social control gradually entered the Third World countries as a necessary instrument to curb the chaos caused by the collapse of traditional clan- or community-based or patriarchal modes of social control and to maintain the order of internal inequality and external dependency created by Western-style modernization. According to Cohen (1982), three models can be generalized to capture the ideology, process, and consequence of the transfer of Western control to the Third World. At best, benign transfer brings about a progress from barbarity

and prejudice to humanism, rationality, and scientific comprehension. At worst, malignant implantation results in dependency, exploitation, and repression. In between is a paradoxical damage which seems inevitable when the actual relevance of the Western control experience to the Third World is realistically taken into account.

In addition to Cohen's three models, there is another important dimension worthy of notice for the study of Western control in the Third World. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has put Western ideology, value, technology, industrialism, and commercialism into indisputable and unchallengeable dominance in development and redevelopment in the world. Western forms of social control are expected to take the global lead and to be modeled by more and more late industrializers. On the other hand, characteristic Western modes of social control have been under attack in the West since the 1960s. The critiques appeal to those very features which bear heritage to the history of the Third World countries. In other words, control transfers across borders are no longer a one-way traffic. The West and the rest of the world begin to learn from their respective history and each other for new transformations in social control.

2. Formal vs. Informal Contrast

Formal social control refers to an external, secondary group authority enforcing promulgated laws or rules and

delivering sanctions through explicit procedures and complex bureaucracies (Kassebaum 1974). It begins with the emergence of slave systems, feudal lords, or city states in civilized history. Informal social control, on the other hand, applies spiritual and materialistic incentives to engage individuals into collective actions for goal attainment or dispute settlements outside a court for the return of community order (Abel 1982). Based upon primary group relations, it is as old as the human existence.

Since the 1960s, the United States and other capitalist countries have experienced a movement from formal justice to informal process for controlling conduct and handling conflict (Kassebaum 1980). Ideologically, some attribute the shift to "disappointment in the capacity of the state to effect social change, hostility to bureaucrats and professionals, disillusionment with therapy and rehabilitation, and the belief that institutionalization has failed" (Abel 1982:3). Others, such as Marxist criminologists, interpret the movement as an extension of the criminal justice system's control (Selva and Bohm 1987). Practically, informalist programs in the movement appear to effect some basic changes. For instance, alternative dispute resolution programs are said "(1) to relieve congestion in the courts, as well as to reduce costs and delays; (2) to increase the community's involvement in the dispute resolution process; (3) to make justice more

immediate and accessible, and (4) to provide more effective dispute resolution" (Westermann and Burfeind 1991:162-63).

The dialectics of formalism and informalism in social control in capitalist societies drive some scholars to look into socialist states where efforts are made to deformalize the law in search of 'socialist justice'. Lukacs (1972) examined legal transformations under socialism and found a similar paradox between formal justice and informal process. Unger (1976) investigated law and social control in socialist nations and realized that they also exhibit both mass participation and centralism. Despite the parallel between capitalism and socialism in the dialectical experience of unifying the form and substance of social control, Spitzer asserted that there are good examples under socialism to learn about "how deformalization and formalization are related to major structural change" (1982:192).

3. Social vs. Organizational Dichotomy

Social control, by definition, includes all the forms and styles of control existing in society at large. It not only refers to control implemented by a central authority or realized through a dominant ideology, but also covers control applied within and among all localized groups, organizations, or territories under a unified jurisdiction.

Control within a locale, however, is approached often under its own name. For control in organizations, there are a

number of perspectives developed in the name of organizational control. The dominant power and influence perspective interprets organizational control as equal to the power or the sum of interpersonal influence (Etzioni 1965; Tannenbaum 1968). Blau and Scott (1962) and Perrow (1979) draw upon Weber's authority theory and develop an approach which views organizational control as a rule creating and monitoring process through a hierarchical authority structure. The cybernetic perspective treats organizational control as a cybernetic process of testing, measuring, and providing feedback (Thompson 1967; Ouchi 1979). Other perspectives include those of information flows (Galbraith 1973), social power (Storey 1983), rule selection-organizational efficiency (Arrow 1964), resource dependence (Green and Welsh 1988), managerial and autonomous activities (Dermer 1988), and myths of institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

On the basis of appropriate definitions, these various perspectives have attempted to relate organizational control to other variables for both quantitative and qualitative understandings of the control phenomenon. For instance, much discussion is devoted to the mutual relations between patterns of control and important organizational functioning, such as authority structure, power distribution, employee satisfaction, and organizational performance, efficiency, and survival. Tannenbaum (1968) uses the control graph technique to measure the amount of control exercised by hierarchical

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echelons of organizations. Others study the relationship
between turbulent environment or economic decline and
organizational control of highly differentiated tasks
(Czarniawska-Joerges 1989).

4. Control vs. Support

Parsons (1951) distinguishes socialization from social
control. He uses the former to designate a process by which
individuals learn collective values, internalize regulative
rules and suggestive customs, and develop social connections
and networks. Social control is instead a sanctioning
mechanism to deal with situations where socialization fails
and deviance occurs. Later social control studies put their
focus on the effect of various social bonds in controlling
delinquency and other deviant behavior. As such, they blur out
Parsons' conceptual distinction, diversify the meaning and
scope of social control, and even overlap it with social
support. For instance, a number of studies openly argue that
the concept of social support may be incorporated into the
social control theory of deviance (Brownfield and Sorenson
1991).

The underlying connection between control and support is
anchored to the group, institution, or network in which
individuals are engaged. One obvious observation is that when
one joins a club to gain support and resource for his or her
interest development, he or she is automatically under the

control of the club's charter, by-laws, ethics, and other membership obligations. In other words, the club exists as both a source of support and an authority of control, like the inseparable coupling of head and tail sides on a coin.

The logical inseparability of control from support in this sense, however, is often taken for granted, unrecognized by both organizations and individuals, and therefore not worthy of much academic attention. The significant part lies instead in the conspicuous balance between two variables in the involved parties' calculative minds. At this level, support obtained may be calculated by individual members or organizational authorities to judge how much control can be suffered or implemented. Important variables can enter the calculation, such as the attraction of support, the availability of a surrogate, and the degree of unfavorability of control. Perceived imbalance may lead to individual exodus from organizations and therefore a debacle of organizational goals. In other words, the exchange theory can be invoked to explain voluntary acceptance by individuals or application by organizations of support and control.

5. What is Missing from the Existing Studies

Despite serious efforts from different perspectives, there are still some fundamentals missing in control studies. First, control is ironically not always addressed in its own right. While social bonds theory pays attention to those

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mechanisms which keep adolescents in line (Hirschi 1969), the general social control literature treats control mainly as a means to deal with troublesome or rule-breaking behavior. In organizational analysis, control is handled only if it enhances the realization of organizational goals. Emphasis is not duly on control itself but on its functional by-products such as order or goal attainment.

Second, the main thrust of control research is rarely directed at the structure and process of control. The bulk of social control literature takes for granted the existence of a crime-fighting criminal justice system and is oftentimes confined to the passive reaction of control agencies in the West. The structure and operation of various proactive control mechanisms or practices in other cultures are usually left out of attention. Organizational studies assume a standard organization exclusively for making profits and achieving other goals, and fail to grasp the concrete features of control structure and process in their physical layouts.

Third, although there are efforts made to relate the transformation of social control to general political and economic changes (Cohen 1985), political economy and culture are not given proper attention in the study of organizational control. As control is often simplified for organizational goals, the necessity is logically ruled out to study the outside pressure from cultural context and the economic foundation for political control. In one word, present

literature subjects control to social order or organizational goals and fails to approach those cases in which control becomes a substantive goal and is executed through an independent structure and process in parallel to the conventional task-oriented apparatus.

6. The Unique Stand of Chinese Social Control

China is a Third World country, practices socialism, and remains the homeland of East Asian civilization. All these dimensions put China on a unique stand in relation to the West. In fact, China has been a key reference, explicitly or implicitly, for the West and the world in developmental models and all other affairs (Oksenberg 1973). With regard to social control, legal informalism in Chinese socialism undoubtedly contributes to Western debate and argument for diversion, deformalization, and decriminalization through a number of scholarly writings (Lubman 1967; Cohen 1968; Li 1978; Kessler 1982; Troyer, Clark, and Rojek 1989).

China has a long tradition in decentralized, grass-root mediation of social conflicts. Confucianism distinguished between *Li* (moral code) and *Fa* (formal law) and stressed conflict resolution through informal, extralegal conciliation (Lubman 1967; Cohen 1968; Li 1978). Socialist revolution discredited the traditional *Li* and *Fa*. But in attempt to deformalize the law and to generate community-based mass justice, it has reinforced traditional forms of informal

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social control. In the initial years, informalism went so far that many ad hoc people's tribunals were set up to conduct mass trials and sentence 'reactionaries' and 'bad elements' to death (Leng 1967; Leng and Chiu 1985). In his famous speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among People" in 1957, Mao (1975) distinguished the antagonistic contradiction between the 'enemy' and the 'people' from the non-antagonistic contradiction among the people themselves, and designated a large domain for didactic, informal, and rehabilitative methods of control and dispute solution. Leng and Chiu (1985) documented China's legal development under Mao and characterized it as people's justice through mass mobilization campaigns. Li was impressed by this informal people's justice "with so few legal specialists" and found that the Chinese legal system remains "simple in structure, method, and content so that relatively untrained people or even members of the general public can play an active role in the legal process" (1978:10). In general, as Oksenberg (1973) pointed out, Mao was wary of the vulnerability of the State and prefers noninstitutional means to sustain a cause among the populace.

The post-Mao period has seen expanding influences of formal agencies, such as education, law, police, court, and correction systems (The National People's Congress 1984; Gan 1989; The Editorial Board 1990). Formalism takes greater hold. But informalism has not yet lost its ingrained influence. A unified ideology, a strong family, a high degree of community

solidarity, and a close link between citizens and authority still function for socialization and crime prevention (Troyer, Clark, and Rojek 1989). The formal vs. informal tension remains while the modernization process continues.

7. The Nature of Social Control
in Chinese Work Organizations

With respect to the above contrasts, some preliminary assessments can be made as to the nature of social control in Chinese work organizations. First, despite the fact that most work units apply modern technological and materialistic facilities to conduct standard lines of business, they are organized and operated by the East Asian mode of human relations and the socialist political economy. Social control in Chinese work organizations is thus an illustration of the third-world and socialist styles or forms of control.

Second, control in Chinese work organizations is of a both general and local nature. It is general, because many of its practices are universal all over the country. It is local, because it is executed within a specific work unit on the basis of its organizational authority and resources.

Third, control in Chinese work organizations is both formal and informal. The sense of formalism lies in that the work unit is oftentimes an official organization with authority granted directly by the state. In fact, the work unit is a part of the state and acts as a tangible entity

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where the state's power and control reach individuals. On the other hand, work units are different from the governing state machinery and fairly removed from the state's coercive system of the security, the court, and the punishment regime. The control structure and process a work unit institutes within its enclave are based upon work relations and remain in most cases suggestive and regulative. In other words, they are informal.

Fourth, control in Chinese work organizations is patriarchal, inherently associated with provisions of care and support. Like a family head, a clan elder, or a chief of tribe, work unit leaders are supposed not only to keep members in line with correct attitudes and behaviors, but also to support them to do a good job and earn a decent living. Like brothers and sisters, unit members also tend to offer both surveillance over and concern with each other. Beyond this basic interconnection, control and support may even be put on bargain between unit members and the organizational authority for their respective gain and loss.

Fifth, underlying the above characteristics, control in Chinese work organizations is not simply executed by the regular administrative or management network. There is a universally instituted party structure whose primary function is for social and organizational control. Structurally, the party setup parallels the unit administrative system to the basic organizational cell. By functional duty, it oversees the

administration, reinforces all the regular controls normally assumed by the management authority, and makes sure that the entire work unit follows the policy lines set by the party. The party parallel structure and its exclusive control authority, as a 'patent' product from communist political economy, represent a special creation in modern social and organizational control practice.

In all, social control in Chinese work organizations presents a unique case for new theoretical conceptualization and synthesis. This study does not commit to any particular tradition, framework, or paradigm of social control theories. All appropriate theoretical perspectives and tools, while relevant, are drawn upon to develop individual explanations and general theories for the structure, process, nature, change, foundation, and controllee reaction of various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations. Given the extent of criticism associated with functionalism, it is *a prior* pointed out that the research focus of this study on a systematic documentation of various social control structures and processes in their workable form does not mean, either implicitly or explicitly, that functional approach is especially favored and pursued over other sociological perspectives. In fact, an objective and analytic presentation of what a system is and how it works has no effect to prove that functionalism is a viable framework. Also, it should be made clear that inefficiency, failure, resistance, and

rebellion are always present in a functionally working or workable system. Social control practices in Chinese work organizations are no exception in this regard.

C. Research Design and Methodological Issues

This study is an empirical research. A formal research design is adopted and a number of methodological issues are raised for due academic concern.

1. Unit of Analysis and Population Studied

The unit of analysis for this study is the work unit, a collective comprising a group of hierarchically distributed personnel. The referenced population, by definition, consists of all the work units in China, regardless of locations, sizes, professions or businesses engaged, and other organizational features.

There are millions of work units in China. It is obviously impossible to examine the entire population. Sampling procedures have to be used for any implementable method of data collection. For instance, a manageable sample of work units is randomly drawn from the general population according to the main variables in relevance to the study purpose. To the chosen work units, on-site observation and investigation, survey interviews with their leaders and employees, or other strategies may be used to collect the needed research data. This study, because of financial

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constraints and other considerations, chooses to interview former employees of Chinese work units who now live in the United States, as its major mode of data collection.

2. Research Design

The general methodological approach to the research problem is composed of literature search, documentary review, personal recollection, and in-depth interview. Both qualitative and quantitative data are collected.

The major data collection effort, the in-depth questionnaire interview, involved 100 Chinese in the United States. These 100 respondents were selected from five different groups in terms of their U.S. statuses: (1) immigrants; (2) students; (3) visiting scholars or on-work training fellows; (4) conference or workshop participants; and (5) visitors, including students' spouses and parents. The entry requirements were set as: (1) formal affiliation with a Chinese work unit and on-site stay with it for more than half a year; and (2) current leave from the work unit has not been longer than ten years.

A snowballing procedure was adopted to recruit qualified respondents (Bailey 1987). That is, an interviewee was used as an informant or referee for contacts of other eligible persons in the following interviews. The eligibility for actual selection was determined by the primary consideration that respondents' former work units contribute to the maximum

representation of the wide range of the existing Chinese work units in terms of scale, rank, location, line of business, profession, and supervising agency. Also, special attention is paid to those who served as their work unit's leaders, residential committee members, public security officers, dossier staff, mediation committee members, and other civilian activists or persons of authority who engaged in disputes settlement among workmates.

The interview begins with background information about respondents themselves and their work units. It then asks for substantive data about social control practices through family, residential committee, security department, dossier, spiritual control, administrative disciplining, and direct experience. In the end, general questions are included for respondents to evaluate their work and life experience in work units in terms of social control and support.

3. Research Design: Justification

Collecting data from interviews with expatriates is a justifiable practice for Chinese studies in the West. From the communist takeover in 1949 until the middle 1970s when the country was closed from the West, the practice became a dominant mode of study on China. Many Western scholars went to Hong Kong and recruited newly-arrived Chinese Mainlanders for various stories about an inaccessible land (Schurmann 1966; Vogel 1969; Cohen 1970; Lewis 1971). Even relatively recently

in the 1980s when China reaches out to the West for needed technology in its modernization drive, the similar mode of data collection is still used because of financial consideration, political sensitivity, convenience, or other concerns. For example, during 1980-82, Whyte from the University of Michigan and Parish from the University of Chicago interviewed 131 Chinese expatriates in Hong Kong and published a book in 1984 about urban life in China on the basis of that data-collection endeavor.

The advantage this study has over others in interviewing Chinese outside China for substantive data on social control practices in Chinese work organizations is that the investigator himself was raised in China and had ten years of direct experience with two Chinese work units. This fact not only makes questionnaire design more sensitive to the Chinese social reality, but also helps the investigator build up ontological, emotional, and cognitive rapport with his respondents during the interview process for significant qualitative data. Also, unlike the subjects in previous studies who escaped from China for freedom and protection, the respondents in this study had regular work and normal life in China. They came to the United States under no obvious political pressure and do not have to dramatize their experience in front of an investigator of similar status for sympathy or possible benefit.

4. Interview: General Information

The interviews were undertaken in 1993 in a western state. Respondents were cooperative. Most of them, after interview, were willing to introduce the investigator to others of their knowledge. One respondent (2FUS:CSeC1) even had her friend come to the investigator's office after her own interview. The record number of possible interviewees referred to the investigator by one single respondent was eight. Sometimes, an interviewed respondent had only the name of a possible interviewee to give to the investigator. City telephone whitebooks, related institution directories, or office secretaries were then referred to find a telephone number or address for an effective contact.

Three modes of interview were used: 51% face-to-face, 47% telephone, and 2% self-administered. There were no apparent differences among them in terms of substantive data obtained, although the self-administered interviews were a little more difficult to process.

5. Interview: Main Characteristics of Respondents

The interviewed respondents were broken down into five age groups: 3% from '25 and under', 55% from '26 to 35', 32% from '36 to 45', and 10% from '46 and above'. By sex, 61% were male, 39% female. By education, 12% of interviewees went to primary or high school, 48% completed undergraduate education, and 34% received a graduate degree.

By place of birth, there were 13% of respondents from Shanghai, 12% Beijing, 9% Guangdong, 6% Hubei, 5% respectively from Hebei, Hunan, Shandong, and Sichuan, 4% from each of Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Inner-Mongolia, and Zhejiang, 3% from each of Fujian, Henan, and Jilin, 2% from each of Anhui, Guangxi, Helongjiang, Shanxi, and Tianjin, and 1% respectively from Gansu, Hainan, Hong Kong, Liaoning, and Yunnan. Of the thirty provinces, autonomous regions, and direct municipalities under the central government in the country, only Guizhou, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Tibet, and Xinjiang were not on the list.

The length of stay in the United States for all the respondents averaged about thirty months, or two and half years. The shortest, however, was only twelve hours. The longest was eight years. The statuses of respondents in the United States were: 58% students; 23% visitors, mainly students' spouses and parents; 15% visiting scholars, including on-work training fellows and workshop or conference participants; 4% immigrants, including naturalized US citizens, permanent residents, and immigrant visa holders.

Respondents had formally worked on average for two work units. There were two respondents who had been associated with eight Chinese units in their working history. However, a relatively small majority (56%) worked for only one unit. There obviously exists a relationship between the number of work units served by respondents and their age, sex, and education. The general pattern is that older respondents,

Table 1. Characteristics of Respondents

Variable			Percentage
A. Age			
25 and under			3
26-35			55
36-35			32
46 and above			10
B. Sex			
Male			61
Female			39
C. Education			
High School and below			12
Undergraduate			48
Graduate			40
D. Job Information*			
Official	20	24	13
Researcher	7	16	30
Teacher	18	17	35
Manual	27	29	7
Staff	10	8	10
Professional	4	6	5
Housewife	14		
E. Place of Birth**			
Northwest			3
Northeast			37
Southeast			41
Southwest			19
F. Length of Stay in the United States			
under 1 Year			28
2 Years			18
3 Years			19
4 Years and more			35

Shortest: 12 hours
Longest: 8 years
Average 30 months

	Percentage
G. Status in the United States	
US Citizens	4
Visiting Scholars	15
Students	58
Students' Family Members	23

H. Number of Work Units Served
    1 Unit   56
    2-3 Units   32
    More than Three Units   12
        Highest: 8 units
        Lowest: 1 unit
        Average: 1.97 units

I. Length of Stay with the Last Work Unit
    2 Years and under   18
    3-4 Years   22
    5-6 Years   23
    More than 6 Years   37
        Shortest: 7 months
        Longest: 36 years
        Average: 81.33 months

G. Work in the United States
    Yes   57
    No   43

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* Job Information
    First column: mother
    Second column: father
    Last column: interviewer

** Place of Birth
    Northwest: Gansu and Shanxi
    Northeast: Beijing, Tianjin, Inner-Mongolia, Helongjiang,
               Jilin, Liaoning, Hebei, Henan, and Shandong
    Southeast: Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
               Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian
    Southwest: Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Sichuan,
               and Hong Kong

males, and those with lower education tend to have had

experiences with more work units. For example, while about a

half of male respondents worked for two or more than two

units, only one third females had served for more than one

unit.

The average stay with the last work unit was about eighty-one months or more than six years for all the respondents. While the shortest stay was only seven months, the longest went up to thirty-six years. Data analysis showed that the variable is related to respondents' age and education. That is, older respondents and those with lower education are likely to be those who stay long with their work units. In the older age brackets, for instance, 75% of respondents from age 36 to 45 said that they had stayed with their last work units for six or more than six years, and all those respondents aged over 45 had served their last units for more than six years. There are no associations between the length of unit stay and respondents' sex, and units' line of business, location, rank, and size.

The types of job respondents had were diverse, ranging from officials, faculty members, researchers, statisticians, engineers, doctors, nurses, editors, reporters, musicians, school teachers, librarians, office staff, business persons, bank staff, accountants, farm workers, to factory workers. Their fathers and mothers shared all these occupational roles with them. But in addition, there were fathers working as military officer, auditor, diplomat, postman, seaman, fisherman, and peasant, and mothers as diplomat, military officer, salesperson, aviation staff, fisherwoman, peasant, and housewife. Detailed information are presented in Table 1.

6. Interview: Main Characteristics of Work Units

The line of business to which respondents' last work units are engaged ranges from advanced education, research, government, commerce, and service, to production. Under each major line of business, various types and specialties are involved. For example, under advanced education, there are three main types of universities, ie., comprehensive, normal, and specialized. Within the last type, specialization runs from business, finance, labor, management, agriculture, tropical plants and products, forestry, agricultural engineering, transportation, chemical engineering, Chinese medicine, and medical science, to music.

By location, 38% of work units are in Beijing, 12% Guangdong, 9% Shanghai, 5% Jilin, 4% respectively from Hubei, Sichuan, and Zhejiang, 2% from each of Anhui, Fujian, Hainan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Tianjin, and 1% respectively from Gansu, Guangxi, Hebei, Helongjiang, Hunan, Inner-Mongolia, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Xinjiang, and Yunnan. Uncovered provinces and autonomous regions include Henan, Qinhai, Guizhou, Ningxia, and Tibet.

By supervising agencies, 4% of work units are directly under the State Council, 50% under a central Ministry, 23% a provincial government, 15% a municipal government, 5% a county government, 2% under the People's Liberation Army, and 1% as a joint venture under a collective board of foreign and Chinese directors. The ministries included range from

Table 2. Characteristics of Work Units

Variable	Percentage
A. Work Unit: Line of Business	
Commerce	7
Production	15
Service	7
Government	14
Research	27
University	30
B. Work Unit: Location*	
Northwest	4
Northeast	50
Southeast	26
Southwest	20
C. Work Unit: Official Rank	
Ministry/Province	7
Prefecture	62
County	21
Section	10
D. Work Unit: Employee Count	
10-200	20
201-1000	37
1001-3000	29
3001-12000	14
Largest: 12,000	
Smallest: 10	
Average: 1674	
E. Work Unit: Supervising Agency	
Central Government	56
Provincial Government	23
Municipal Government	16
County Government	5

* Location
    Northwest: Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Xinjiang
    Northeast: Beijing, Tianjin, Inner-Mongolia, Helongjiang,
            Jilin, Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong
    Southeast: Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi,
            Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian
    Southwest: Guangdong, Hainan, Guangxi, Yunnan, and
            Sichuan

agriculture, foreign economic relations and trade, health, aerospace industry, mechanics, railway, forestry, post and telecommunications, labor, geology and mineral materials, hydraulic energy, and weaponry, to electronic industry. Also included are state commissions for science and technology, education, and economic planning, state bureaus for pharmacy, and environmental protection, the People's Bank, Bank of China, Chinese academies of science, social science, and medical science, and the CCP Propaganda Department. At the provincial level, the supervising agencies are either the provincial government itself or a functional commission, bureau, or academy under it which involve those of education, science and technology, industry, hydraulics, finance, culture, foreign economic relations and trade, farming, construction bank, and social science. The same is true of the supervisory agencies at the municipal level. The municipal bureaus or commissions involved range from electronics, education, pharmacy, industry, health, statistics, chemicals, industry and commerce, mechanics and electronics, and economic planning, to instruments. At the county-level, supervising agencies include bureaus of education, health, and economic relations and trade.

The scale of a work unit was roughly measured by its total employee count. For all the respondents' last work units, the average employee count was 1,674. The largest unit possessed a total of 12,000 employees. The smallest had only

ten people in its rank and file. The work unit rank runs from high to low, with 7% of work units at the provincial or semi-provincial level, 30% prefectural, 32% semi-prefectural, 21% county, and 10% sectional. Detailed information is presented in Table 2.

7. Interview: General Impressions

Some general impressions were developed in the course of the interview prior to the formal processing and analysis of the interview data. They were: (1) geographically, Beijing, the capital, seems to have more freedom from spiritual control; (2) governmental agencies seem to have better welfare and more freedom from spiritual control; (3) universities and research institutions seem to be a free kingdom in terms of administrative disciplining, work rules, and other regulations; (4) the most stringent control is executed in factories, farms, companies, lower governmental agencies, and places away from Beijing or coastal areas; and (5) most respondents have good feelings about their work units. The good feeling has bearing on their current situation in the United States.

8. Sample Bias

It is apparent, from the general statistics of respondents and their work units, that the sample is biased

and does not perfectly reflect the actual population of work unit employees and the real inventory of Chinese work units.

By individual characteristics, respondents are not ideally distributed in terms of age. People aged from '26 to 35' are over-represented, while selections from those of '25 and under' as well as '46 and above' are less than those in reality. Sex may not seriously deviate from the gender division of the Chinese employee population. But education poses a tremendous representation problem. The sample is obviously upside down: too many highly educated respondents and too little of those with lower education. Occupation exposes a similar fallacy. While the actual work force is mainly composed of manual laborers, frontline workers, service agents, and ordinary staff, the sample drew 78% of its respondents from officials, researchers, and educators. All these over or under representations obviously stems from the research design.

With regard to unit features, work units in commerce, service, and production are clearly under-represented, while too many universities, research institutes, and government agencies make the list. Geographically, there should have been more work units selected from the West, especially from the northwestern provinces of the country. Beijing is over-represented as a single jurisdiction. By rank and supervising agency, the majority of Chinese work units are actually at county, sectional, or an even lower level and mostly under the

supervision of a municipal or county government. But the sample has 69% of its work units on the prefectural level and above. The employee count may also not be a good match to the real situation. Again, the research design is the major cause to blame.

The sample biases would definitely affect the quality of data collected for any inclusive, indicative, documentary research of Chinese work units. For this study, however, existing biases can be tolerated in terms of research purposes or needs and compromised by some intentional corrective measures. First, the major purpose of this study is to generalize basic forms of social control from universally and uniformly instituted organizational practices in all Chinese work units. As most of these forms are known to the Chinese public and their respective structure and process are relatively standardized all over the country, the interview serves mainly as a confirming device rather than an original source of information or a starting point for induction. In other words, a fairly representative variation of control practices in different institutional situations helps but is not indispensable to the research mission of this study.

Second, Chinese society is a society with strong intensity of civil ties and high fluidity of civil information flow. A work unit is usually flanked in all directions by various other units. Any unusual differences among each other surface quickly to public attention. During the interview,

respondents were not only asked to report the situation in their own work units, but also advised to comment on the general nature or any special feature of a social control practice they are able to identify from all possible work units under their observations or in their knowledge.

Third, the major sample bias also proves to be a major advantage for this study. Respondents with high education from governmental agencies, research institutes, and universities displayed clearly an investigative, reflexive, and analytic attitude and approach toward what they have observed and experienced. Some of them mentioned their first-hand experiences with service, commerce, production, and other work units in their early years through the Cultural Revolution when they were sent to factories or farms for re-education through labor. Most importantly, some researchers and university faculty members said they use commerce, service, and production units as their experimental or social survey sites and have thereby, good observation of those work organizations. For all respondents from the governmental agencies especially, contacts with subordinate commerce, service, production, professional, research, or education work units under their respective agencies were reported to be oftentimes a part of their work routines. As they claimed, governmental officials' knowledge about their subordinate work units are usually not only detailed, specific to one unit, but

also overall, comparative among a number of work organizations.

In all, sample biases, though objectively present, do not pose any fundamental danger to this study. The quality of interview data meets the research need and serves the major study mission.

9. Measurement and Analysis

Both qualitative and quantitative measurements were applied to the research problem through the following major variables: control through spirit, through residency, through confidential records, through a civil reward-penalty system, through administrative discipline, and through a quasi-justice or para-security system. Each variable was concretely measured by its various related aspects. For instance, control through spirit was detailed by the following categories: a propaganda department and its various functions, a radio broadcasting system and its percentage contribution to political propaganda, a newspaper or newsletter and its space reserved for political propaganda, the frequency of all-employee meetings for briefing party lines or governmental policies, the content and frequency of weekly political study, the content and frequency of self-report and self-criticism, and the relative importance of various propaganda means of newspapers, radio, television, mass convention, weekly political study, and others. Numerous cases were collected to

describe how a particular policy was pursued, an occasion was handled, and an irregular or deviant incidence was prevented or treated. Questions were also asked to cross-check the validity and reliability of the interview against other effective measuring methods and information sources.

Qualitative data constituted the main body of the interview. They were collected in the form of cases and under each main control types. In each type, cases were sequentially numbered. For instance, there were 14 cases or stories under family, 18 for residential committee, 51 on security department, 14 about dossier, 2 regarding propaganda, and 77 concerning administrative disciplining. Each case was generally a description of an occasion where an irregular, problematic, or rule-breaking act or matter happened and therefore induced a reaction or settlement from the organizational authority for the return of order.

Quantitative data were codified and analyzed through the standard computer programs. Frequency tables, means, and bivariate crosstabulations were obtained to illustrate the basic nature of key variables and their interrelationships.

10. Validity and Reliability

In addition to the sample bias and the problems associated with it, there are a number of obvious other limitations and constraints in this study: references for the proposed study are limited because of little research done on

the Chinese work organization from the perspective of social control; political considerations from interviewees could hamper them from telling the truth; and some respondents' relatively long leave from their work unit and their new experience in the United States could result in memory failure and mistaken recollection or interpretation in their response to the interview.

Even if respondents are free to tell the truth to their best knowledge, there are still underlying cognitive and affective biases which make the validity of their answers questionable. During the interview, it was found that while respondents were good at reporting information about themselves, they were often ignorant of the basic working settings and operations to which they used to be engaged on a daily basis. For instance, a few respondents did not know what rank their work unit is officially granted, by what agencies it is supervised, and how a department is located in the unit hierarchy. The scale of the unit, i.e. the employee count, in most cases, was a rough estimation based upon the respondents' impression.

In general, from respondents themselves, their work units, to control practices in the units, it is a downward slope in terms of the degree of individual access, contact, or involvement. The quality of information they offer about each of them decreases correspondingly. With respect to validity, although it is unlikely that a question designed to measure

one thing is answered for something else, the truth of the answer is likely to change along with the mood of both interviewer and interviewee. In other words, reliability of interview is not completely certain.

CHAPTER 2

THE FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS (I)

A. The General Structure and Process

Social control mechanisms or practices in the Chinese work unit are built upon managerial or administrative leadership and the task-executing activities of the unit organization. Before detailing each form of social control, it is necessary to have an overview of the general structure and process of the work unit.

For this purpose, related references can be drawn from a number of industrial, management, and ethnographic studies of Chinese enterprises and professional organizations. In management studies of Chinese industrial enterprises, organizational layouts and management flow-charts are provided in a generalized form or through some particular cases. The study theme for the Mao era was mainly to demonstrate the participatory nature of socialist economy. Recent researches, in contrast, are focused on managerial reform of factories and its impact on management (Warner 1985), work values (Shenkar and Ronen 1987), business style (Frankenstein 1986), structural arrangement (Schermerhorn and Nyaw 1991), and task performance. The cases supplied are usually sizeable enterprises. Small urban or other local industrial enterprises are often out of attention. For example, in Bettelheim's

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(1974) study of cultural revolution and industrial organization, the case used included the General Knitwear Factory, a sizable production unit of 3,400 employees in Beijing. Jackson (1992) based his research mainly upon a case study of a large-scale manufacturing unit, the Sichuan No. 1 Textile Factory which has about 10,000 employees on its work force.

While cases included in a study providing information about organizational structure and even its change over history, the more valuable reference is the focused research of the work unit structure as a due subject. Schermerhorn and Nyaw (1991), in their special study of managerial leadership in Chinese industrial enterprises, recognized the complex organization of their research subject and identified three simultaneous systems within it which include the life-support system, the business and operation system, and the socio-political support system. The life and socio-political support systems are both ancillary, in relation to the business operation system which is on the core to serve the economic purposes of the enterprise. However, as the former assists employees to fulfill life needs and the latter is designed to advance socialist ideology, they represent a large proportion of an enterprise's day-to-day operating concerns (Ignatius 1989; Redding and Wong 1986). In addition to these three systems, Schermerhorn and Nyaw (1991) also discussed the parallel authority structure of the party in the Chinese

industrial enterprises. Interestingly, they noticed that rule, plan, goal, and role formalization and inflexibility exist as substitutes for direct managerial leadership in the Chinese work situations. Also, the external state and party supervision and control over internal enterprise affairs tend to foster learned helplessness among Chinese administrative cadres and discourage them from taking leadership in the work place.

Unlike the industrial study which carries a sense of scientific analysis, ethnographic materials are generally based upon participatory or non-participatory observations of journalists who are positioned in China or visitors who tour China with an academic intention to understand the country. There are country-wide, bird-view impression descriptions which include general information about the structure and process of work units (Alexander and Alexander 1979). There are also case-specific observations of particular work units (Jackson 1992). American journalist Butterfield's (1990) book about Chinese social life and Henderson and Cohen's (1984) participant study of a Chinese hospital, both of which were mentioned in Chapter One, can be again cited as representative examples respectively for the former and the latter.

While industrial studies and ethnographic descriptions supply information about the structure and process of work units, they are un-focussed, segmented, incomplete, and do not bear directly on social control. This section attempts to

provide a systematic description and analysis of the institutional setup and relational dynamic of Chinese work units.

1. External Connections

Externally, a work unit is interwoven with the overall social system through various horizontal and vertical connections. In terms of control, there are two main sources of authority delivering downward control over the work unit. One is the CCP system which uses the unit as a basic bastion to pass on its will and carry out its policy programs. The other is the government which delivers or collects state planning quotas to or from the work unit, regulates its behavior, and assigns social responsibility to it. Depending upon the situations, these two sources of control can generate many different types of supervision, pressure, and restraint. The following are two illustrative cases.

Case one is a university under the Ministry of Construction where the investigator worked in lectureship for three years. The university is committed to both undergraduate and graduate education with specialization in urban planning, construction, municipal management, civil engineering, and landscape designing. With regard to its outside control, there are three latitude levels and two longitude lines. The three levels are the central, the provincial, and the municipal. The two lines include the party and the governmental

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administration. Beginning with the party line, the university committee is directly under the CCP's Provincial Committee. The central Ministry's leading party group has authority over it. The Municipal Committee can extend its reach over it. For instance, appointment of its deputy and chief party secretaries is done by the Provincial Committee in pre-consultation with the Ministry's party group and with post-notification filed to the Municipal Committee. On the administrative side, the university is a sub-unit of the Ministry through which it receives financial appropriation, administrative monitoring, and professional supervision, and is therefore included in the state planning. As an educational institution, it is subject to the related regulatory rules or practices imposed by the Education Commission system, from the central through the provincial to the municipal. By the same nature, its research activities are under the review of the Commission of Science and Technology at the three levels. On all non-productive matters, control is exclusively from the Municipal Government. The Municipal Government has jurisdiction over the university's household registration, residential organizations, public security, civil or criminal procedures, and supply of basic survival needs such as water, coal, electricity, food, and various services. It exists as both a service agency which determines the quality of campus life and a local authority which allocates social responsibility to the university. Compared to the Ministry and

the Province, however, the Municipality is not a stakeholder or a manipulative authority to the university. The university is a distinguished establishment in the city and has almost the same rank as the Municipal Government granted by the State.

Case two is a pharmaceutical factory under a municipal bureau of medical and pharmaceutical administration (BMPA). The investigator interviewed its chief engineer (4MUR:PSeC4) as one of the sample respondents and conducted several talks with one of its department heads (4FUO:PSeC4) out of the formal interview. Detailed information was obtained about the factory's external connections and internal structure. Regarding control from outside, the factory becomes a part of the state planning through the Municipal Economic Commission which oversees several municipal bureaus of economic production including the BMPA. The municipal BMPA supervises the factory in material supply, production management, product marketing, and other business matters. Scientific development, technological application, production safety, and other areas are respectively under the regulatory purview of the municipal commission of science and technology, and other bureaus of specialty. Because the factory is of a large scale, the provincial, even the central BMPAs are also at stake in allocations of its personnel and market quotas. On the party side, the factory party committee is under the CCP Municipal Committee, directly supervised by the latter's organizational

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Government

Party

State Council/Ministry

Central/Ministry's Committee

Provincial/Bureau

Provincial/Bureau Committee

Municipal/Bureau

Municipal/Bureau Committee

County/Bureau

County/Bureau Committee

The Work Unit

Local Police

Profession

Local Court

Clientele

Street Government

Market

Community

Figure 1. The Chinese Work Unit: External Connections

department. In addition, there is a party committee in the Municipal Economic Commission and a party branch in the municipal BMPA. They both also have direct influence over the factory party system.

The factory was previously administered by the provincial BMPA. The outside control it received then was more crosscutting and complex among the provincial, the municipal, and the central authorities of supervision and regulation.

Figure 1 illustrates the external connections for a standard work unit.

2. Internal Structure

Internally, a work unit has a central structure and a unit-wide system which branches out to all functional sections. First, the party apparatus is a full-blown mechanism with primary function to oversee the administration and to control the entire unit population. The percentage of party members in the unit population varies across different work units and even among those of the same size or rank. As far as the structural setup is concerned, total membership is usually not so important as the size and rank of a work unit. In fact, the party structure always parallels the administrative system with a scale and scope in proportion to the functional division and need of the work unit. At the center, the party system consists of a standing committee, a control committee, an administrative office, a propaganda department, an

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organizational department, a department for united front work, a department for armed forces, and several affiliating organizations such as the youth association, the youth league, the women's federation, and the employees' union. This same structure is further implanted to all functional departments in a scale proportional to their respective size. As a result, each department has a party branch. Each section or production group has a party or youth league sub-branch, with three members respectively in charge of secretary, propaganda, and organization responsibilities.

The party system embraces a full range of control functions. Its control committee operates like an inside-party justice system. It investigates party members' rule-breaking behavior and makes recommendations to the standing committee for a delivery of punishments. The organization department is allocated the power of recruitment, appointment, promotion, and disciplining for all party members and unit officials. The propaganda department reaches out to the entire unit population. It runs moral and ideological control over both party members and non-partisan employees. The department for united front work is responsible to network socially known persons, non-partisan intellectuals, and all those unit members who have relatives and other connections in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macou, and overseas. The department for armed forces is to administer the people's militia and to contribute it to security defence in local community. All affiliated mass

organizations, including the youth association, the youth league, the women's federation, and the employees' union, are required to organize their respective constituents for the party's calls.

Second, the unit administration or management system is built up according to the task or line of business involved. For example, in case one, there are central divisions for instruction, scientific research, technological development, and student affairs, and various departments from urban planning, urban construction, urban management, landscape, to fundamental sciences. In case two, the management divisions include those for planning, designing, research, quality control, equipment and engine, production technology, safety technology, supply and storage, business management, and mechanical power. The production system branches out according to the manufacturing process of pharmaceutical products into various workshops, and further into numerous teams or groups.

Apart from the functional divisions specific to the lines of business involved, all work units share in their structural arrangement several unitary setups. These include a central office and departments for finance, public security, personnel, and general affairs. With regard to social control, they all have a role to play. For instance, the central office holds the unit seal and issues introduction letters and important credentials for all unit employees who need to go outside for business or other purposes. Since an introduction

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letter is a necessary passport for hotel accommodation, travel ticket, and legal entry to other units, all unit people's travel and work opportunities are under the office's control. Control structure and process about the security department, the personnel department with its dossier section, and the general service department with its residential network are all comprehensive and will be detailed later in individual sections.

In general, there is an independent control structure within the Chinese work unit. This structure displays a number of peculiar characteristics which merit attention from control and organizational studies. First, in its physical layout, the control structure parallels the conventional task-oriented structure to its basic unit. In all work units, the party organization follows the track of every functional department down to the smallest cell, such as a class in a university or a production team in a factory. Second, in terms of institutional authority, the party places itself above the administration, and the control structure overrides the conventional task-oriented structure at every level. In all work units, especially before the responsibility reform, all decision-making power is monopolized by the party system and the administration is publicly known as a loyal executor of the party's decisions. Third, with regard to the structure-goal relationship, the primary goal of the party structure is to put the organization and its membership under the CCP's

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                    │The Work Unit│
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┌──────────────┐        │    │                           ┌─────┐
│Administration├────────┤    ├───────────────────────────┤Party│
└──────────────┘        │    │                           └─────┘
                        │    │
┌──────────────┐        │    │                 ┌───────────────────┐
│President      │        │    │                │         Secretary│
│Vice-Presidents├───────┤    ├────────────────┤Deputy Secretaries │
└───────────────┘        │    │                └───────────────────┘
┌─────────────────┐      │    │                  ┌──────────────────┐
│President's Office├──────┤    ├──────────────────┤Committee's Office│
└─────────────────┘      │    │                  └──────────────────┘
┌───────────────────┐    │    │                ┌────────────────────┐
│Personnel Department│    │    │                │Organization Department│
│Dossier Section     ├────┤    ├────────────────┤   Dossier Section  │
└────────────────────┘    │    │                └────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────┐│    │               ┌─────────────────────┐
│General Service Department││    ├───────────────┤Propaganda Department│
│Residential Committee     ├┤    │               └─────────────────────┘
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┌───────────────────┐       │    │              ┌─────────────────┐
│Security Department├───────┤    ├──────────────┤Control Committee│
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│Other Central Divisions├────┤    ├────────────┤United Front Work Department│
└───────────────────────┘    │    │            └──────────────────────────┘
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│Various Business Branches├───┤    ├────────────┤Armed Force Department│
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
Figure 2. The Chinese Work Unit: Internal Structure

control. Control, therefore, is not functional for some other higher goals. It is for itself, i.e., the CCP's rule over a social unit and a segment of population. Fourth, the existence of a control-oriented party structure does not reduce, but virtually reinforces the necessity of inserting conventional control agencies into the conventional task-oriented structure. Public security, dossier, and administrative discipline can be seen as conventional control means because they are used in most scaled organizations for order maintenance and goal attainment. In Chinese work units, because of the CCP's leadership and its concern with order, the security department operates often on an extensive scale. Dossier filing and administrative disciplining are also carried out systematically and intensively. Finally, while the control structure holds a downright grip on the organization, all members are also subject to a kind of total control from residency to work place, and from action to ideology and ethics. In all work units, when unit members are involved in disputes or say something inappropriate, they can be quickly approached by their direct party leaders. Even a bedroom dispute, if frequent or loud enough to be heard by neighbors, can invite visits from the neighborhood committee's mediators.

Figure 2 provides an illustration of the internal structure for a standard Chinese work unit.

3. Control Activities

The existence of a control structure makes control activities a continuous process. There is routine control which comes from the normal functioning of the party machine and control sectors in the administration and residential network. The main goal is to make sure that tasks are conducted within the CCP's policy line, public order is maintained, and all other activities are under control. Added to the routine control are contingency control and problem control. The former is activated for officially launched campaigns such as legal education and the anti-pornography movement, or important events like the CCP's national convention. The latter is a proactive or reactive control of any pre-identified or already-occurred problematic situation. For instance, security guards catch a thief and put him or her under custody, a party official lectures an employee for work negligence, or a residential mediator investigates and mediates a dispute in the neighborhood.

In a structural perspective, processual control activities can be examined through inter- and intra-organizational factors. First, there is organization-to-organization control exerted upon the work unit by its leading agencies. Second is the organization-to-division control which features the control the party holds over the administration, the administration has over functional departments, and a department has over its sections within a work unit. The third

type is organization-to-individual control which designates the control individuals experience from social and organizational authorities.

Means for inside organization-to-division control and outside organization-to-organization control are basically the same. They include exclusive meetings, classified documents, the press, quota appropriation, rank conferment, and personnel appointment. The exclusive meeting is an information briefing, decision-making, and directive delivering occasion. Between a work unit and its supervising organization, unit officials of specific ranks and specialties are regularly called into special or general meetings in which the supervising agency's in-charge figures announce important policies, listen to local reports, and make various assignments. The similar pattern occurs between the central authority and its functional divisions within the work unit. It is a daily operational practice for key unit or departmental figures to meet closed-door for important issues and decisions. In other words, 'meet and decide' is a pervasive control and organizational reality.

Classified documents and the press represent another important means of control. Compared to the meeting, classified documents are more often used. The supervising agency directs a subordinate work unit mainly through directives, which the unit applies to the local situations and sends down to related divisions with changes and in its own name. On the party side, the upper CCP committee passes on

Table 3. The Chinese Work Unit: Social Control Typology

Type	Means or Forms
Organization to Organization	Exclusive Meeting Classified Document Official Media Quota Appropriation Rank Conferment Personnel Appointment
Organization to Division	Exclusive Meeting Classified Document Official Media Quota Appropriation Rank Conferment Personnel Appointment
Organization to Individuals	Control through Ideology Residency Confidential Records Civil Reward or Penalty Administrative Discipline Quasi-Justice Para-Security Vigilance Inclusion

documents from Beijing to the work unit according to the CCP's rules about classified documents. With a similar guideline, the unit distributes received party documents to appropriate ranks or positions. Also important is the party press or

official media. As defined as the CCP's mouthpiece, it provides both policy guides and implementation methods for organizational actions. In almost all formal work units, the CCP Central Committee's People's Daily, the CCP Provincial Committee's daily, the supervising agency's daily, and other related publications are subscribed and delivered to the basic section. A radio station and a unit-wide loudspeaker system are in most cases operated to relay the central and provincial radio stations' prime news programs. In all, 'read, listen, and watch' are fully activated for efficient control and goal attainment.

The more substantive control is executed through quota appropriation, rank conferment, and personnel appointment. For the university in case one, rank, budget, faculty and enrollment size, material and equipment supply, open-up or close-out of departments, and presidency, are all decided by or subject to approval from the central Ministry. The party system is controlled by the Provincial Committee, especially with regard to the appointment of the secretary and deputy secretaries and the access to classified documents. Within the university, between the administration and functional departments, between departments and sections, the former exercises control over the latter in the allocation of personnel, monetary and material quotas, honors, ranks, and positions. Obviously, allocation of resources lends the upper

authority an opportunity for ecological control (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989) over its subordinate units.

The third type, i.e., organizational-to-individual control within the Chinese work unit takes various forms. In the following, control structure, process, nature, and change under each form are documented and analyzed.

B. Control through Ideology

Ideological control is based upon "the controllee's trust and leaders' capacity to offer a convincing interpretation of reality, an attractive vision of the possible future, and a prescription on how to reach that vision" (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989:7). Across all present or former socialist countries, it is a salient feature of individual and social life.

In China, ideological control is publicly known as spiritual control. Coupled with the idea of ruling people by wisdom, spiritual control is a deeply-rooted Chinese tradition. Confucian philosophy taught officials and intelligentsia that those who win people's mind win the earth under heaven (Cohen 1968). Senzi stressed attacking the mind as a better strategy than attacking the castle in his The Art of War. The communist revolution denied Confucianism, sectional doctrines, and various other cultural legacies, but it has not abandoned the idea of spiritual control. Mao said that the key to revolutionary success is to propagandize, persuade, and educate the masses (Mao 1967). In terms of

intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP reign, becoming a basic feature of a common citizen's daily life. In some degree, 'the freedom of silence' cherished by some old-fashioned Chinese scholars (Pepper 1978) is not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP's mass propaganda.

Chinese studies in the West have analyzed the role of ideology and spiritual control in the Chinese political dynamic. Mass media researchers point out that the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for various social programs (Hawkins 1982; Womack 1986). Political analysts find that ideological tension results in mass movements and that spiritual control serves to legitimize political establishments (Barnett 1967; Nathan 1990; Davis and Vogel 1990). Legal scholars notice that political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform, constitute main weapons for the CCP to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behavior, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps (Cohen 1968; Wilson, Greenblatt and Wilson 1977; Brady 1982; Troyer et al. 1989).

The core of Chinese communist spiritual control is Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng's talks, and various party documents. Around the core, there are patriotism, internationalism, worship of communist leaders, reverence for revolutionary history, and other rhetoric of

socialist ideology (Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems 1990). To effectively implement spiritual control, the CCP have in general developed the following strategies. One is to establish an all-inclusive socialist theory, providing a uniform explanation for everything from the past to future, from the Sun to the Earth, and from important state policies to daily life chores. Excerpts from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and official documents, constitute the cornerstone of this theoretical system. Another is to maintain a powerful 'thought and political work' apparatus, sensing people's every word and behavior, and ensuring all citizens have one mind towards the Party and its commitment. Still another is to publicize policies through mass media, bulletins, and street posters, ensuring all sources utter one voice to the common people. Western visitors to China are often impressed by capital slogans and posters across streets and on high-rise buildings (Butterfield 1990). But if they understand Chinese well and spend some time on mass media, they would know better how much spiritual pressure newspapers, radio, and television create on ordinary people. The final method is to mandate weekly political study for all employees in officially-registered work units, requiring village and neighborhood committees to publicize party policies through mass meetings (Barnett 1967; Troyer et al. 1989).

The work unit, in the overall spiritual control, serves as a basic relay station for the party's thoughts and policy lines to reach individuals. Mao called it a school where people learn revolutionary theories and turn them into actions (Mao 1975). In official jargon, it is a propaganda front for the party to convey its will and decisions to the masses (Seeking Truth 1990).

1. Structure

To propagandize and educate the masses about the socialist spirit and current political situations is customarily taken for granted as a sacred task of the work unit, which is inseparable from its business or professional duties. According to the interview, there exists, both implicitly and explicitly, a general perception that every division, department, section, or cell, every leader positioned in the unit system, every party member in the masses, and even every conscientious unit member has responsibility to pass along the party and governmental policies.

But more important is that the work unit has a special propaganda structure to carry out its ideological task. Like the system of political commissars or instructors paralleling each rank to the basic unit in the military, the work unit's propaganda network follows the track of management or administration to the lowest level. Concretely, it begins at

the center with the unit CCP committee's propaganda department, through some middle ranks, to a particular person in charge of propaganda affairs for the smallest group. The person, upon the directive from the unit propaganda department, can call the group together then and there to brief major or minor political news or for general political studies. The interview was fortunate to have recruited three propaganda officials, respectively from a factory in Northeastern China, a southwestern university, and a central governmental commission in Beijing. They all said that they and their propaganda networks can always have the right of way to have their entire work units stay constantly tuned with the party ideology and policy lines.

Across the board, all interview respondents reported that their work units have a special setup for propaganda. The loci of the setup vary depending upon the scale, the line of business, and other characteristics of a work unit. In large and medium-sized work units, it is the department of propaganda under the unit party committee. In small units, it is the office of the unit head, the department of personnel, or the entire unit party branch that takes the lead for ideological control. One respondent (2MGS:PSwS2) from a joint venture said that his unit's propaganda task is included to the duty of its department of public relations.

Around the locus department, there are a number of mass organizations like the union, the youth league, and the

Table 4. The Chinese Work Unit: Means of Propaganda

Variable	Percentage
Newsletters	100%
Wired Radio	54%
Closed-Circuit TV	25%

women's federation which also play an important role in propaganda work. According to the interview reports, the worker's union in commerce, production, and service work units often has more visibility than the party committee in putting propaganda posters and organizing entertainments. On university campuses, the radio station and newsletter are usually run by the youth league and the student association. In most cases, there seems a general pattern that the party pushes mass organizations to the front to deal with people directly for ideological issues, with itself staying in the backstage for ultimate control.

The commonly used means in propaganda work include wired broadcasting system, official documents, study materials, newsletters, wall newspapers, bulletins, blackboard news, entertainment shows, films, and art performances. In recent years, quite a number of work units install a closed-circuit television system and make it a new and more effective form of

propaganda and entertainment within the units' walls. In the interview, 54% of respondents reported that their work units have a radio broadcasting system. Newsletters, blackboard news, bulletin, and wall newspapers are a common practice. All respondents said that their work units use one or more of those forms for propaganda purpose. There were 25% of interview respondents reporting that their work units have a closed-circuit television network in use for news delivery, education of current situation, political propaganda, and entertainment.

The responsibility for putting different propaganda means into effect is distributed among the department of party propaganda, the union, the youth league, the women's federation, and other mass groups, with the party committee as the general director or coordinator. According to the interview responses, the propaganda department is mainly in charge of compiling and distributing official documents and study materials. Shows, performances, or other entertainments with propaganda contents are the responsibility of the union or the youth league, although with help from other departments. Blackboard news is often prepared by all functional departments and displayed where it can be publicly seen and read. In universities, the blackboard news administered by the youth league and the student association at the campus center is often regarded as an exemplar piece on

campus. The youth league and student association are both under direct supervision of the propaganda department.

2. Process

What duties does the work unit's propaganda build-up assume? A variety were reported by the respondents. They include: publicizing the party policy lines and the state rules, informing the work unit population of current situations, mainly political events, delivering unit news and administrative directives, praising good persons and good events within the unit, establishing models and advancing the unit's task performance, organizing shows, performances, excursions, and entertainments which convey communist values and create a sense of collectivity, and others like managing the unit's anniversary celebration activities.

A number of institutionalized or occasional means and actions contribute to these propaganda goals or tasks. First, wired radio broadcasts news, propaganda, and recreational programs regularly. In the work units where most employees live collectively on the unit premises, the radio network usually runs three times a day. The morning broadcast relays the central people's station's popular program of news and newspaper excerpts. The noon broadcast is devoted to unit news reports, including administrative directives, good persons, good events, political study materials, and important notices. The evening begins with the provincial or the central

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station's program of hook-up broadcasting from all people's stations, followed by music and recreational programs.

Availability of radio service is related to the work unit's line of business, location, and employee population. Based upon the interview, university and production units, units in the West, and large units are more likely to have a radio system. For instance, 93% of universities, 80% of production units, 71% of those work units in the West, and 84% of those large work units with over 1,100 employees are reportedly to have a radio network. There are no associations between radio service and the work unit's rank and type of supervising agency.

Second, in those work units where a closed-circuit television network is installed, it serves as a perfect complement to the radio system. The TV broadcast starts about after all unit households finish their dinners and sit down for rest. It begins with unit news, if there is any, and then gets into series broadcasting of films and TV features. Like radio, the television broadcast can be turned to intensive political or educational sessions if special propaganda program is deemed necessary. Both radio and television also serve as an effective means for emergency or important announcements.

Third, wall newspapers and blackboard news are a basic part of unit life. They are prepared daily, weekly, or monthly, focusing on a special event or discussing general

topics, and displayed in front offices, in the hallway, or at a gathering place. The language is simple and easy-to-understand. In most cases, pictures and different colors are applied to catch readers' attention.

Fourth, the weekly political study has become an institutionalized practice. There is no clearly written rule about the practice. But according to the interview, it is well-enforced throughout the country. All the respondents said that their work units have regular political studies. Unit employees are called together once a week in teams, groups, or whatever convenient unit to study official documents, important editorials, or current political events. The time is customarily scheduled in an afternoon, mostly on Thursday or Saturday, taking about two to three hours.

In Mao's era, political study was a sacred occasion. The production or business was closed down, all members were present, and the study was strictly focused on political contents. During the reform, the practice is still continued but with a number of changes. For example, while respondents from governmental and professional units said their work units continue to close doors for political studies, interviewees from factories and businesses reported that political study in their units is now arranged in off-shift time and workers take turn to study important political documents. Production is no longer stopped. Also, most units tend to make more meaningful use of the time for political study. A majority of respondents

The CCP Official Ideology

The CCP Central Propaganda Department

Documents   Newspapers   TV Stations   Radio

The Work Unit

The Unit Propaganda Department

The Employee's Union

Closed-Circuit Television   The Youth League   Wired Radio

The Women's Federation

Propaganda Representative in Each Sub-Unit

All Party Members and Unit Officials

Newsletters   Blackboard News   Wall News

Weekly Political Studies   Mass Meetings

Figure 3. Ideological Control

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said their political study is not solely for hearing or discussing political issues. Important business affairs and local news are also put on the agenda. One interviewee (3FHM:PSeC3) noticed that her unit has a production meeting every Monday morning. That is the only occasion that important political information is passed on among unit members.

Interestingly, there are a number of interviewees saying that their work units' political study is a time for chatting, complaining, boasting, cursing, gossiping, relaxing, and housecleaning. This is somewhat dramatized. By the investigator's own experience, political study is basically a serious occasion mainly for study of political news and documents. One interviewee (2MUO:GSeS1) from a county government commission in Southeast China remembered that they were required to memorize the CCP's Decision on Historical Events. Another (2FUR:RNeP2), recently from Beijing, said that several political sessions in her work unit had been devoted to study Deng's talks during his 1992 tour to the South. After the study of proper matters, non-political business is usually dealt with and casual talking takes place. For instance, some interviewees remembered that they talked about bonus distributions and work assignments. Most of them agreed that political study affords them a good opportunity to know interesting things around them.

Attendance for political study is mandatory. Absence without prior request leads to implicit and explicit

Table 5. Yearly Frequency of Unit-Level Meetings

Times	Percentage
1-3	39
4-5	31
6 and more	30
Highest: 15	

Table 6. Monthly Frequency of Divisional Meetings

Times	Percentage
3 and less	39
4	58
5 and more	3
Highest: 30	

penalties. Penalties reported from the interview range from loss of a chance to know important news, a lower grade on political performance in the annual evaluation, unfavorable impression from the leader, negative impact on future promotion or training opportunity, oral criticism, to loss of a monthly bonus. Although a few said that it does not matter much to go or not, most agreed that it is better to go if you want to stay with the work unit and proceed smoothly.

Finally, division or unit-wide mass meetings are often called for important campaigns, tasks, and political events. Many respondents remembered that their units have all-employee meetings held in divisions or throughout the entire unit after almost every CCP's national congress for a concentrated study of important party decisions and policy changes. Emergency situations also may provoke a mass convention. For instance, one interviewee (1FUP:GNeM2) recalled that an emergency all-employee meeting was called in her work unit immediately after the Soviet coup in 1991. In such a meeting, internal news is delivered, followed by detailed instruction from the unit leaders as how to do their work and how to talk or react to others in the society at large under the shadow of the crisis. Apart from propaganda, mass meetings are also called for routine business affairs, annual opening-up, and summing-up. Across all the work units covered by the interview, all-employee meetings at the unit level average about five times a year, with the highest up to fifty times a year in a small work unit. At the division level, the frequency is three and half times a month, with the highest as one time a day. The scale and the nature of the work unit are two important variables as to the meeting frequency. In a large unit, meetings are usually held at the division level. Unit-wide meeting are seldom called because of the logistical constraints.

What is the effect of those various means of propaganda? A number of interviewees said that they are superficial, dogmatic, and disliked by most unit employees. However, all agreed that they are the main sources of information from which they get to know the party, the society, and the world.

3. Nature

Between the two complementary mechanisms specified by Parsons (1951) to ensure the social system of adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latent pattern maintenance, ideological control leans more to the side of socialization than that of social control. The essence of it is to inculcate desired values, ideas, and world views into the mind of controllees and thereby to keep them in line or have them achieve the goal intended by the controller (Steinhoff 1991). In terms of the way it is addressed to the controlled, ideological control is indirect, implicit, inducive, and suggestive. Brain washing, an extreme form, may sound threatening. But ideological control, in general, is not of a coercive nature.

In the setting of the Chinese work unit, ideological control exists as an organizational process to shape the actions of unit members for the unit's task performance in particular and for the society's collective goal in general. It begins with the general point of view by which unit members see themselves, their organization, their society, and the

entire world, and attempts to present them a critical attitude toward the past or the present and a vision of desired future states of affairs. As anchored in the cultural, psychological, and social reality, it is able to attack any competitive or subversive ideology, and remain responsive to the needs and wishes from the controlled.

The effect of ideological control is primarily epitomized in mass motivation and policy legitimation. By motivation, unit members are enthusiastically aroused to make self-commitment to the unit goals and the social programs. Through legitimation, important policy changes are made theoretically justifiable and practically necessary. Skepticism is thus cleared, opposition is removed, and the entire population is included with total dedication for the new initiative. Because of the pre-programmed effects of motivation and legitimation, direct control through ideology takes a smaller share. It is put in use only when unit members are not motivated and do not consciously act upon the seemingly legitimized official initiatives. For instance, as reported by the interview, when members are not active and stay behind a movement or campaign, they receive thought-and-political work from their leaders. Or they are enrolled in an intensive political lesson given by the unit propaganda officials when they are verbally against a program. The direct ideological control can become more intensive when a distant deviation is identified.

By content, Chinese ideological control is vivid, strategic, and dramatic. It is not merely a heap of empty words cited from the revolutionary leaders. To apply Gibbs' social control typology, all his five modes of referential, prelusive, vicarious, allegative, and modulative control can be found in use even in one single lesson. For instance, one interviewee (3FUO:RNeP2) was a petty official and told a story about a political lecture she received face to face from her leader in a closed-door office. In one episode, the leader said: "What you think is wrong. It is against Mao's instruction that we should believe in the masses. If you do what you think, you would lose the trust from the masses. Look at Jiao Yulu (a model county head) and see what you can learn from him." It is obvious that in this episode, a model is set up (modulative), one allegation is made (allegative), a negative consequence is fabricated (vicarious), and Mao's authority is mobilized (referential). In other words, Gibbs' main modes of control are all on display.

Finally, as it is comparable to that in history and other countries, Chinese spiritual control is politicized, serving more for preventing political dissidence than criminal deviancy (Wilson et al. 1977; Roucek 1978). In the interview, most respondents seemed to understand the CCP's implicitly or explicitly-set rules of the game and agreed that shouting an anti-party slogan or cursing officially-honored revolutionary leaders would be deemed by the CCP standard as more serious

than assaulting a common citizen in the street. For example, one interview (3MGT:USwP4) reminded the investigator that the three persons who spoiled Mao's portrait on the Gate of Heavenly Peace in the 1989 Tiananmen Square event were sentenced to prison terms. He pointed out that the sentence was not merely based on the damage they inflicted on a piece of the state property. It was meted out also in terms of the value of a spiritual symbol. Some old respondents recalled that spiritual control under Mao was often in a high gear. During the Cultural Revolution, an overwhelming sentiment was that non-political violence is correctable, but public opposition against the Party requires a sentence to hell immediately. Spiritual betrayal was extremely intolerable. Some civilians received harsh punishments, simply because they intentionally or inadvertently uttered or wrote words defined as reactionary (Esmein 1973; Butterfield 1990).

4. Change

Spiritual control under Mao, as the CCP itself admits later under Deng, features a blind belief in official ideologies and revolutionary leaders, and a fantasy with one idol, one goal, one mind, and one voice built upon Mao's charisma (Seeking Truth 1990; The Editorial Board 1990). Deng begins his program by advocating a liberation of people's thought. This generates motivation for policy shifts, but also raises suspicion about Mao's thoughts, creating a fundamental

problem to the CCP's spiritual control. As a practical politician, Deng knows that spiritual control is indispensable to his leadership and that a new ideology has to be developed to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of Mao's charisma and idealism (Cui 1990). He advocates legal formalism as a replacement to Mao's continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship. The Constitution is revised, criminal and civil codes and procedures are promulgated, and various laws and rules are put into effect. In 1985, a five-year national legal education campaign was staged to publicize all laws and rules across the country (Gan 1989). In control techniques, Deng often risks his limitations to learn from Mao and the CCP Leftists how to rally a country under one banner (Cui 1990). Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square event, the CCP has reinforced propaganda to counteract the so-perceived 'peace evolution' sabotage from both within and without. Mao and other communist leaders are re-honored through various films and media programs, generating a wave of 'Mao Heat'. Old revolutionary songs are re-sung across the country, creating a mass nostalgia for the past spiritual uniformity (People's Daily 1991 & 1992). The propaganda rhetoric reflects the desperate effort of the current CCP leadership to retain the spiritual control over the population.

The present spiritual control, however, contains manifest and latent problems. First, Mao's charisma and idealism broke down, but Deng's legacy has not built up

strongly enough as an alternative. Second, there is no longer a convincing theory to the people regarding official policies in all possible fields. As pointed out by many interviewees, self-contradictions become commonly known in official justifications for reform and adherence to socialism. Third, with open-up policies, more and more people are cognizant of free speech, free belief, and the coexistence of different ideologies in western democracies, and of the living standard difference between China and developed countries. There are people beginning to blame history and the authority's obsession with socialism. Individual interests are openly claimed and less and less attention is paid to the official ideology. Despite the dominance of the CCP propaganda, current spiritual belief and allegiance are diverse in the population, crosscutting among communism, feudalism, capitalism, and 'everything-ism' (Chu and Ju 1993; Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems 1990).

This public mood has tremendous impact upon ideological control in Chinese work organizations. One interviewee (3MGT:UNeP4) was a deputy departmental party secretary responsible for propaganda. He admitted that people do not like any propaganda in their mind. Officials are wary of saying big words. Strategies and tactics for propaganda work are changed into capturing important chances to talk with people and trying to move their hearts. For himself, he defined his basic strategy as visiting the unit members' home

when they are sick or have special problems. He often arranged
to talk with unit members when they felt bad about promotion
failure. He said:

> We all strive for promotion and know how
> frustrating a person could be from a promotion
> failure. We try to help and move them. I never try
> to say big words. That doesn't work. Another thing
> is that none of we leaders is willing to grab power
> in hands. Collective leadership helps us,
> preventing any single leader from bearing too much
> liabilities.

5. Comparative Perspective

Ideological control is not a phenomenon particular to
contemporary communist China. It occurs in history from the
start of human civilization and around the world crossing the
border between capitalism and communism (Steinhoff 1991). In
China's own history, it is believed that autocratic political
rule combined with ideological control arrested scientific
exploration, led to cultural monotony, and barred China from
developing into a democratic economy (Qian 1982). In the world
system, it is observed that international mass media are
dominated by Western power centers with a characteristic one-
way flow of programs and information from the West to the rest
of the world (Sami 1986). As more and more people are educated
and socialized by Western values, ideas, and knowledge, the
world moves closer to being under a total ideological control
by the West.

At the national level, a high gear to ideological control
is continually reported as an essential part of work and life

in former or present socialist countries. The fact has been so dramatized as if ideological control is a patented invention exclusively from socialism. In capitalist nations, ideological control is also seen in application in both national development and local management. The welfare state in Britain and Germany is recognized to have a primary function for political repression and ideological control (Claus 1982). In Italy, the need for capitalistic development is constantly modified by the wish for ideological control and social-political stability (Paolo 1978). Czarniawska-Joerges (1988) studied ideological control in local governments in Italy and the United States and found it is used as an important strategy to effect change or implement special programs. She also detailed ideological control in a Swedish company. As confessed by the company President, ideological control was put in use immediately after the start of the company and has become the main mode of control at the top levels of management. The ideological control is based upon Goebbels' theory that it finally becomes true if it is repeated often enough.

Compared to other perspectives, Chinese ideological control has obviously a number of unique characteristics: (1) it is based upon communist ideologies; (2) it is implemented by a political-economic machinery controlled by the communist party; (3) it is inclusive and intensive, ie., every citizen is included for a high and constant exposure to it; and (4) it

can be seen as a part of the ideological control imposed by the West upon the world. Communism itself is a product of Western idealogies. It used to be a weapon in resistance to the mainstream Westernism. It now may become a reason for more and more dominant Western values and ideologies.

C. Control Through Residency:
Family and Neighborhood

Control by residence is a country-wide practice constraining individual movement from place to place. It includes mainly household registration with police stations, exclusive supply of food, electricity, and other subsistence needs upon the registration, report of short-term visits, and introduction letters for tickets, accommodations, and visits to other work units (Whyte and Parish 1984; Troyer et al. 1989; Butterfield 1990). The loci of residential control lie in family and neighborhood.

The family, as a traditional form of social relationship, has been a focus of attention from western scholars. For Mao's years, studies concentrate on the commune and its impact on the restructuring of family and kinship networks (Crook and Crook 1959; Strong 1964; Parish and Whyte 1978). In the post-Mao period, studies turn to family planning and aging issues (Davis and Harrell 1990). Research on social control functions of the family, however, is rare for the communist era (Whyte and Parish 1984; Troyer et al. 1989).

The neighborhood is naturally formed by a group of households living together in a town or city. Based upon this grass-root grouping, the CCP has established hundreds of thousands of neighborhood committees across the country. They operate locally under the CCP's supervision and help strengthen its control over society. Chinese neighborhood organizations have interested Western scholars in a number of dimensions. Politically, analysts try to evaluate the importance of those organizations in aiding the CCP to mobilize the masses for political movements and social action programs (Goodman 1984; Selden 1988). In reaction to the Western legal formalism, some scholars hope to learn from the Chinese neighborhood how to solve concrete problems and keep local order (Lubman 1967; Lewis 1971; Oksenberg 1973; Li 1978; Whyte and Parish 1984). In the 1980s, the Eisenhower Foundation sponsored five delegation visits to China in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Public Security. With implicit or explicit intentions to learn from Chinese experience, delegation scholars collected information from fifteen main Chinese cities about the neighborhood networks and their various roles in social control (Troyer et al 1989).

The work unit, with residential control in practice, becomes not only a task-performance organization, but also an all-inclusive community. It grasps a substantive leverage upon

the employees and distinguishes itself from Western-style employment entities.

1. Structure

The basic unit of residential control is individual families, which in turn are networked into neighborhood committees. The latter is connected to the unit party and administrative leadership, the street government, the local police, and the people's courts, functioning like a coordinating body.

In the work unit, a family is usually formed along a major adult who works for the unit. The unit's housing administration section assigns it a room, an apartment, or a house in the unit's living compound with a corresponding housing certificate. The security department gives it a household registration permit. The department of general affairs provides it a proof of subsistence supply. With all these three and other appropriate documents, the family goes to the local police station to register itself as a household and get a household booklet. With the booklet and the unit's proofs, it goes to the district bureau of food supply for staple foods, subsidies for non-staple foods, coals, coal gases, and tickets for rationed groceries. Individual unit members are assigned to live in a dormitory. Their registration with the municipal police and supply bureau is

collectively done by the unit's departments of security and general affairs.

Families living in the unit compound are clustered into groups according to the architectural structure or physical pattern of housing facilities. For example, a typical residential housing in the work unit is a five-storied building with four gates. Each gate has about ten families, with two or three on each floor. They forms a basic unit, called a gate. The gates in the entire building add together, forming a residential group of about forty households. The group joins with others to form a residential committee, which usually covers five hundred or so families.

At each gate, a leader is chosen by the residents, or hand-picked by the residential committee, or even intentionally assigned by the unit leadership. For each building or residential group, the leader is selected similarly or emerges from gate leaders. According to the interview, gate or residential group leaders are often activists, party members, or petty officials. Several respondents reported that unit leaders or party members are assigned housing among ordinary unit members. In case troubles arise in the residential areas during off-work time, they can be available to deal with them.

The residential committee is formalized, with its own staff and office facilities. By the standard setup specified by the Constitution (The National People's Congress 1990), it

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City                                          Work Unit

Street Government            Department of General Service

Police Station                              Housing Section

District Court                           Foods Service Section

Supply Station                            Hospital or Clinic

Health & Immunization Station             Family Planning

Family Planning

                    Residential Committee

Security & Defence    Mediation    Patriotic Health Movement

Residential Group    Residential Group    Residential Group

Gate Gate Gate        Gate Gate Gate        Gate Gate Gate

Family ... Family    Family ... Family    Family ... Family
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
Figure 4. Residential Control

has one chairperson, and one or two deputy chairpersons if necessary. Inside each residential committee, there are three basic committees. One is the mediation committee. Another is the committee for united defense and security. Still another is the committee for patriotic health movement. These three sub-committees can each have an office and formal organizational staff. For example, mediators are elected by residents and certified by the lower level government or court. They are mainly 'solid citizens', including retired or current cadres, petty officials, old persons, people in responsible jobs, and those who represent residents geographically or occupationally. To the outside, the residential committee is under the leadership of the work unit's department of general affairs, like one of the latter's section. It also receives guidance from the street government in the city, which concretely includes directions from the police station, people's courts, the supply station, the public health station, and other branches.

In the interview, 95% of respondents said that there are residential committees in their neighborhoods as officially so called. The other 5% reported that they have similar organizations managing residential matters but called differently. In the factory, it is often the worker's union that acts as a residential committee. In the military, the spouse committee takes care of family and life matters in the living compound. The size of the committee varies according to

the residential population. The largest reported is up to thirty people, which includes employees for convenient stores and other neighborhood services. Usually, it is about three to five persons who are really in charge.

The residential committee members are supposed to be elected by local residents. In fact, however, they are recruited from reliable and warmhearted retirees or volunteers by the committee chairs who are usually appointed by the unit leadership. Prospect candidates can also be directly contacted by the street government. If they agree to do the work, they are given a formal letter of appointment and a badge or an armband which they wear when they are on-duty. According to the interview, most residential committee members are retirees and housewives. But some respondents said that in recent years young people are also hired for residential committees. As it is in or for a work unit, each of the unit's divisions can even arrange regular employees or retired party members to help the residential committee with its various service work. Since either pension or regular salary is offered by the work unit from the state's unitary wage delivery, neither members nor chairs receive additional paychecks through the wage system for their work for the residential committee. But gifts or compensations can be given by both the street government and the work unit. The cash compensation for retiree or non-work housewife members is about ten to twenty Yuan each month. One respondent (4MUO:GNeP1) reported that his wife is a

residential group head. She was reached by the residential committee chair for that job and takes no formal remuneration from it. However, she gets gifts as well as written thanks from the street government and the work unit during important festivals like the Spring Festival. Moreover, her family is sometimes excused from paying those fees they help collect from residents for housing management, electricity, and public health.

2. Process

When a family or an individual is put in place in the residential network, it is automatically subject to various control practices.

<u>Living Pattern</u>   There exist generally four patterns of living for work unit members: in the unit residential areas, in the unit dormitories, with parents, and with spouses. Among the interview respondents, 38% said they live in their own work units' residential compounds. These are usually people who are senior, stay long with the unit, or have established their positions in the unit's rank and file. For instance, among respondents under the age of 36, only 24% said they live in their work units' residential compounds. But among those who are above 35 years old, 57% are assigned to live on the units' residential housing premises. The housing compounds are mostly located on the units' enclaves. Only 9% said their compounds are separated from the workplace.

Table 7. Living Pattern

Variable	Percentage
Dormitory	28
Residential Units	38
With Parents	17
With Spouses	15
Municipal Housing	2

Dormitories are also built within the work units. There are 28% of respondents reporting they live in dormitories. They are generally new comers or young couples waiting for a formal housing assignment to the residential compound. Males are also more likely to live in the dormitory than females, who may prefer to stay with their parents or are able to benefit from their husbands' housing assignment. Among the interview respondents, while 41% of males live in the dormitory, only 13% of females said they do so.

The rest live either with their spouses (15%) or parents (17%) whose housing is also from their respective work units and located within a unit residential compound. As expected, these two groups are overrepresented by females. Among those respondents living with their spouses, 66% are females. And women make up 71% of those living with their parents.

In addition, there are two households living on the municipal housing properties.

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<u>Mutual Help and Surveillance</u> The physical pattern of public housing facilities provides an ideal setting for mutual collective surveillance. No matter whether they are housed in the residential compounds, the dormitories, or their spouses' or parents' work unit premises, they always live collectively in public facilities. Neighbors are either their own colleagues, acquaintances, and leaders or their spouses' or parents'. The fact exists naturally as a pressure for individual families or persons to behave correctly and stick to collective rules. In the interview, various cases are reported to show the interconnectedness of life among neighbors. The nice thing to remember is the help received from neighbors. Two old couples, the wife (4FHP:SNeC2) from one and the husband from another (4MUR:PSeC4) were selected as formal interviewees, said their neighbors take care of their residential matters while they are travelling, like now in the United States. Two student wives thankfully remembered the helps they received from their neighbors when their husbands were abroad. One (3FHM:PSeC3) said that her neighbors helped her move heavy objects. The other (2FGP:RNeP3) was grateful that her neighbors introduced her to good hospitals where she could receive better treatment. Rendering or obtaining help from each other requires that neighbors keep a keen interest in each other. This implies that they build up a kind of collective solidarity and keep associated members together.

Mutual help sometimes takes the form of conflict management. In the interview, cases were collected as to how neighbors help to resolve quarrels and bring peace back to life. For instance, one respondent (2MUT:UNeP1) reported: "We four young staff living in our dormitory played mahjongg. By our rule, the defeated person had to pay fines. But one guy did not want to pay his dues. A quarrel was then started, which led to a fight. Neighbors came out and the event was brought to end by ourselves." Another (3FUO:PNeC4) recalled:

> A couple in our building quarreled. The husband beat the wife and the wife ran out of the door. All neighbors came to help. I took the wife to my home and showed my sympathy to her and persuaded her to forgive her husband. I sent her home and talked with her husband, saying that if he beats her again, his unit leaders would be notified. The husband admitted his wrongdoing and promised not to do it again.

Leaders Intervention   Unit leaders can intervene in a unit member's life at any time. The intervention can touch upon matters of any private nature. In Mao's years, it was not uncommon for unit leaders to help members find wives or husbands and arrange for marriage and family life. Even now, according to the interviewee (3FUR:GNeP2) from the military, the would-be wife or husband of a military officer can be still questioned by his or her upper leaders.

The fact that unit members live with their leaders in the unit's residential compound, offers a better access for leaders to stage an intervention should they deem that necessary. Several interviewees mentioned that their leaders

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are distributed proportionally in unit housing facilities among ordinary members. One (2MGR:RNeP3) said that he lived with a deputy minister right in the same building. Leaders are called or rush to the scene when a need arises. Different from the mutual help offered by neighbors, the settlement they deliver exists as a formal sanction imposed by the unit authority. Also, it means that the event surfaces to the attention of the unit leadership and leaves an impact upon the members involved. One respondent (3FUT:USeP2) told of a case in which she participated as a neighbor:

> One couple lived below our floor. The husband suspected that his wife had an extra-marriage affair. He beat her. She went to his departmental leaders and even the university leaders and asked for divorce. The husband did not want a divorce from her and the dispute lingered for half a year. I myself participated in persuading and mediating them into reconciliation. The couple is now still together. However, because of the negative impact, the husband moved out of our work unit.

Some cases are violent and can be a danger to petty officials. One respondent (3MGT:USeP3) reported an interesting case in which a leader was injured and hospitalized:

> Not long ago, a colleague was out on business travel and had sex with a woman. The woman's brother got the pictures showing them together and mailed them to the colleague's wife and asked for compensation for his sister. A quarrel and fight occurred between the colleague and his wife. Our leader came to solve the problem and he himself was beaten and sent to hospital.

Residential Committee as Watchdog   The residential committee in the work unit can be seen as one of the unit's antennas which forge connections with the lowest end of the

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government. It takes social responsibility and feedback from the local community on behalf of the work unit. To residents, it does both: providing support and implementing rules and control.

In the interview, various functions assumed by the residential committee were reported. Generally, they can be put under five types. Type one is about care for children and elders: immunization for children, child care in the summer, summer entertainments and outdoor activities for schoolers, temporary or emergency care for residents' children when they get into problem with their work, junior delinquents, post-birth care and service, activities for elders, helping elders, and cooking for and sending clothes to those residents under the state's five-protection program[1]. Type two is concerned with life-related community services: milk and newspaper subscription and delivery, telephone or drop-by messages, daily chores, repairs, refuse collection, delivery of coupons and tickets, running convenience stores, helping the postmen locate unclear addresses, receiving gifts and return-items on behalf of residents, welfare, planting trees, running elevators, obtaining coal gas and milk from outside and redistributing them to the unit's residents, running a haircut shop and public bathrooms, introducing and running massage

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[1] A universal welfare program provided by the State for aged, weak, orphaned or widowed, infirm, and disabled. It involves assistance in the form of guaranteed food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and funeral expenses.

Table 8. Social Control: The Residential Committee

Service or Duty	Governmental Connection
Care for Children and Elderly	Family Planning, Public Health, Welfare, Supply Station
Life-related Services	Supply Station
Implementing Rules and Directives	Police, People's Court, Street Government
Residential Hygiene and Local Order	Public Health, Police, People's Court
Local Coordination	Street Government, Work Unit Leadership

andsewing services, making arrangement for holidays, distribution of coal gas, and other life-related services. Type three regards implementing rules and directives from the upper authority: census, family planning, distributing condoms, issuing marriage permit, patriotic health campaigns, passing-on of the upper government's policies, and providing information to officials about residents. Type four concerns residential hygiene and local order: sanitation, security, spiritual civilization, dispute resolution, aiding local police, residential regulations, making schedules for residents to guard their gates or units, killing mice, and preventing households from raising dogs, pets, poultry, and

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animals. Finally, type five is for local coordination: community organizations and activities, charitable affairs, mass organization, making public announcements, and building community coherence.

These various functions can be better understood in terms of the residential committee's links with the government. First, with orders from the police, the residential committee and its special sub-committee for united security and defense pass on and implement city-wide or community-specific rules and regulations concerning residential security and order. One across-the-board rule reported by all respondents is that no pets, poultry, and domestic animals are allowed in public housing facilities. About this, one interviewee (3FUT:USwP2) supplied an interesting story:

> My husband took a dog home and we kept it for several days. Children liked it and played with it, which caused attention from the residential committee. The committee invited the unit security staff together and came to my home when only our maid was at home. They did a search in my home and found nothing, because we sent the dog out in the early morning. I was very angry with them because they did not have our permission to search my home.

The story would not be a surprise to another respondent (2FGT:UNeP4) when she understandably described the regulations set by the residential committee: "If you raised chickens or dogs, the committee asked you to do away with them. If you refused to follow its order, it called the police to catch the animals and kill them."

The residential committee and its security subsidiary also provide direct aid to the police for routine update of household registration, registration of visitors residing with a household for a short time, criminal search and investigation, and other security-related matters. Inside, they are responsible for patrolling residential area, arranging households on duty for their gate or building, and reporting significant incidents to the unit security or the police. One episode told by an informant (3MGT:UNwP4) was: "Two youngsters from the residential compound fought each other. The residential committee called the police station. The dispatched officers took them to the station and gave them a lecture."

Second, with connection to the district bureau of public health, local hospitals, and epidemic prevention center, the residential committee helps them deliver free immunization to children, implement family planning programs, arrange pre- and post-birth medical care to women, and enforce other reach-out services to residents. One respondent (4FHP:SNeC2) had worked as a public health doctor for thirty five years. She said: "The residential committee was an indispensable mass organization for health-related campaigns. They helped us a lot in identifying problems, contacting local residents, and organizing activities."

For the family planning program, the committee is in charge of (1) propagandizing among residents about the state

policies and raising their awareness of the advantages from late marriage and late birth; (2) issuing marriage and birth permit. According to the interview, the procedure for child-bearing begins with a quota from the unit leadership. The residential committee takes the quota and forwards it to the street government. Individual couples receive a permit from the committee in the end; and (3) providing birth-related services. Within the residential areas, the committee takes charge of daily sanitation and patriotic health campaigns. Included in this responsibility, it delivers drugs to kill mice, cockroaches, family germs, and other harmful parasites or insects, checks each household unit's outside cleanness and orderliness, and selects the model family for public health.

Third, in contact with supply stations, the residential committee provides residents with all possible life-related services. On its normal duty, it draws from respective supply agencies coupons or tickets for rice, oil, meat, coal, cloth, and other living products, cash subsidies, and rationing stamps for groceries and daily necessities. It then hands out to individual residents or the unit's divisions. Along this line of service, it can set up department stores, grocery stores, supply stands for milk, meat, coal, rice, and coal gas, hair-cut shops, free markets, and other convenient stores, and deliver state-supplied or rationed products as well as sell commercial articles directly to residents. According to the interview, these stores are convenient,

although the price is not necessarily cheap. In addition to various commercial or supply set-ups, the committee can extend their services to all possible areas. For instance, it can go to residents' work divisions or units to collect contributions for a garden, a bike shelter, or whatever facilities for the convenience of residents in the residential compound. One respondent (4FUS:RSwP1) proudly said: "Our residential committee was a model committee. It organizes retired doctors and nurses from our neighborhood to provide medical services for residents, such as electronic therapy, massage, acupuncture, and shot clinic. Little fee is collected."

Fourth, with supervision from the people's court, the people's procuratorate, and the justice administration, the residential committee, through its sub-committee of mediation, is actively involved in conflict management among residents. It watches individual households for latent and manifest conflicts within and among families and family members, and resorts to education, persuasion, assistance, and other strategies for prevention or settlement. Cases for mediation range from marriage, parental support, inheritance, housing and land, debt, production management, juvenile problems with school or work, to minor theft (The Bureau of People's Mediation 1983; Sun 1988). Results from the procedure are written down for some considerable matters. For most cases, they are just put into effect without any formal decrees or documentary records.

In the interview, various stories were supplied by the interviewees about mediation and general conflict management in their neighborhoods. By these stories, a majority of cases are intra-family problems. The residential committee can be called to the scene by residents. For instance, as one respondent (3FUT:SSwP2) said generally: "When a couple falls into a dispute, neighbors usually help find the residential committee or unit leaders to persuade them back to peace."

Sometimes, the residential committee actively intervenes into a situation. One respondent's (2MGS:CNeM3) short story informed of such a case: "a couple quarreled and fought. The residential committee came forward to separate them for individual persuasion." Another respondents (2FUT:SSeS1) described: "In the family below our floor, the son was sent to prison. The husband often quarreled with his wife over their son. When they fought, the residential committee came to calm them down by education and persuasion."

The strategy adopted by the residential committee is variable. Sometimes, it resorts to human relations and even tricks. About this, one respondent (4MUO:GNeP1) told an interesting story:

> Two families got into a dispute because of the storage of household stuff in the doorway. Due to the gossips among women, bad words were passed around, which resulted in an open quarrel between the families. The residential committee learned that the involved families' children played together and often went to each other's home to eat. It thus decided to mediate the case by having children persuade their respective parents. The two families were reconciled by this strategy. They

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celebrated their renewal of cordial relations by
eating together the spring festival dinner.

Sometimes, it alludes to the threat of a possible upper
authority intervention to forcibly persuade disputants back to
peace. This was also illustrated by one respondent's
(3MHM:PNeP4) case story:

> Two neighbors were in a dispute. The residential
> committee came to mediate the case. The two were
> called together for a meeting and told that if they
> did not agree to the mediation, their unit leaders
> would be notified of the dispute. No one wanted the
> dispute to impact their work and followed the
> committee's order.

In general, the residential committee is weak. Its
settlement is informal. Major or delicate disputes may have to
go beyond it for resolution. This is true to 'high-class'
residential compounds, as pointed by one respondent from a
research institution (2MUR:RNeC2): "In a neighborhood where
intellectuals and officials live, the residential committee
composed by poorly-educated housewives does not have much
authority to intervene, unit leaders have more power to deal
with problematic situations." It is also true to 'working
class' neighborhood, as told by another respondent
(4MHM:PSeC3) from a factory: "When the worker's union failed
to mediate a dispute, the case was turned to the unit's
leaders for final resolution."

Finally, the residential committee offers residents the
kind of help which is natural, handy, or of an emergency
nature. For example, it receives for residents messages,
gifts, and returning articles from outside or drop-by

visitors. Any outside agencies which want to cover the residential area for their services or products can use the committee as a bridge or a local stand. In recent years, a number of city evening newspapers rely upon it for residential subscription and distribution. Also, when residents run into an emergency situation, they can turn to the residential committee for direct support. One respondent (2MUO:GNeM2) remembered: "When my wife gave birth to my child, I was not at home. It was the residential committee that called my work unit to send my wife to hospital by a car and took care of my home when both of us were away from home."

3. Nature

Residential control targets the physical side of controllees. It reflects the idea of the panopticon in the prison control of convicted criminals. The fundamental difference is that the idea is put into application in a civil and daily life setting. Because of this, it is non-coercive, integrative, socializable, and can be easily accepted by the controlled as a natural lifestyle.

The essence of the residential control is to attach individuals closely to their families, neighborhoods, and workplaces. Families and neighborhoods are traditional and natural institutions. They socialize their members, resolve various survival problems for them, and pay no significant cost to keep them in line. Apparently, when individuals are

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committed to their primary groups, the possibility is decreased for their movement to other places, access to other choices, and deviation from a stabilized life course. In the setting of the Chinese work unit, the additional and significant part is that family, neighborhood, and workplace are interwoven into a unified network which is further connected to governmental scrutiny, control, and supervision.

As applied in a non-confrontational manner, the direct cost of residential control is minimized. There is no need to deploy a formal control force in the neighborhood. The money which might otherwise be spent on dealing with problematic or rule-breaking incidents caused by the void of primary support is also saved. However, to ensure its effectiveness or to maximize its utility, positive investment has to be made. In other words, jobs are created and provided, subsistence needs are supplied, various services are delivered, and the entire neighborhood is hooked up to the society-wide system of control and support.

To the work unit, an organization designed for production or other business affairs, the practice of residential control may not be cost-effective at all. As complained by the head of the First Automobile Factory where 80% of its 60,000 work force are allegedly employed in non-manufacturing positions like policing and barbering, "Each year, I have to worry about housing for 2,000 couples getting married, nurseries for 2,000 newborn babies, and 2,500 school-

leavers. I am mayor as well as factory head. Of course I have a bigger burden than my counterparts in the U.S." (Leung, 1989: A14).

On the other side of the practice, the work unit secures substantive control over its employees. For instance, the work unit issues permits for household registration and supply of subsistence needs. Although the number of permits is allocated to the unit by a complicated agreement among central, provincial, and municipal governments, it is the work unit that decides how to use the permits among the employees and how to contend for them if the allocated number is used up. As evidenced by the interview, it is not uncommon that unit members wait in line for their separated spouses to be transferred into the city for re-union. They have to continuously plead with their unit leaders, the personnel department, and even upper officials, and are often subject to a series of abuses and humiliations. The investigator personally experienced the procedure when he tried to bring his wife from a remote county to the university clinic. Another illustrative aspect is that the unit controls the issuance of the identification card and introduction letter. The investigator learned from his own experience, affirmed also by the interview, that the once-issued identification card is not accepted alone in most instances and introduction letters have to be secured each time for each business encounter outside. In other words, employees are subject to

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their work units' approval for each outside business travel and even each visit to a unit during the travel (Butterfield 1990).

Can the control a work unit has over its employees be translated into high task performance or productivity? This is hard to measure and judge. The answer is not unilaterally determined by the work unit as long as it is under the state's ownership supervision and the state does not change its belief in the effectiveness of residential control in keeping social order and stability.

4. Change

Residential control featuring household registration is a tradition in the long history of Chinese civilization. In the past, it was based upon the Confucian doctrine of filial duty and served as a mechanism for the government to collect taxes and recruit corvee labor and conscript armies (Dutton 1992).

Family Throughout the history, the family and its extended kinship assumed most socialization functions, existing as a taken-for-granted deterrent to affiliated members from deviant behavior. Continuing a family name in good reputation was perceived as the sacred duty of all male members. Damaging it could lead to expulsion from the family (Ebrey and Watson 1986). In general, family and kinship networks were both a positive force for local order and a

negative source for regional conflict and organized resistance to the authority.

Over the CCP reign, family and kinship networks have undergone tremendous changes. Mao treated the family as a basic revolutionary unit. Within the family, he advocated an equalization of wife with husband, and children with parents, in participating in socialist revolution and construction. Outside it, Mao took various strategies to break the kinship and to organize individual families into a residential network which connects to both the work unit and the people's government (Whyte and Parish 1984). While worship of ancestors, life cycle events, and other activities featuring kinship relations were prohibited, households were organized in a new way for various programs advocated by the CCP, such as the existing security, sanitation, mediation, and political education programs in the neighborhood. During the Cultural Revolution, class struggle was introduced into the kinship, rearranging network members with blood relationship into a simple division of antagonistic fronts fighting against each other. In the extreme, as recalled by older respondents, nuclear family solidarity was even penetrated. The wife was asked to fight her tainted husband, and children were intimidated to draw a class line from their stigmatized parents. The radical movement, while manipulating the family for revolutionary control, caused unprecedented damage to family and kinship relationships (Yue and Wakesman 1985).

Under Deng's pragmatic program, the family becomes basically an economic unit. In rural areas, Deng's production responsibility system allows a family to rent the state land for independent cultivation or collective production with other families within or outside a kinship. Urban reform puts the family into a similar position for private business or contracting of state enterprises (Davis and Harrell 1990; Davis and Vogel 1990). Previously injured family and kinship networks through political movements begin to resume their natural functions in the economic development. The family reclaims its meaningful influence over direct members with blood linkages. The kinship network re-activates itself with mutual visits, gift exchanges, rituals and entertainments among associated members (Seeking Truth 1990; Davis and Vogel 1990).

On the other hand, the CCP and its desired arrangement for the family and kinship networks remain in effect. The kinship, as an organized relationship among families, is apparently not allowed to grow into a challenge to the CCP's policy implementation power, replacing the officially-supported residential and work unit network (Crook and Crook 1959; Ebrey and Watson 1986; Davis and Vogel 1990). The family, with modernization and various other social changes, is gradually on the decline in socializing juniors and constraining deviant behavior. For instance, the State implements voluntary education up to primary or junior high

school level. Children are sent at the age of six to school, or even earlier to child-care centers. They are raised more in a social rather than family environment. By the interview, almost all both parents hold positions in a work unit. They rush children to schools in the early morning and pick them up in the late afternoon. At home, children do school assignments, and parents work on jobs they bring home. The interaction is simplified to an extent that parents only make sure children finish homework, eat well, and dress properly. As noted in a national conference on family and early prevention of juvenile delinquency, social competition and individual development have caused families to drift from social ethics and collective conscience. Spiritual negligence coincides with materialist spoiling, making children more prone to delinquent behavior. Among juvenile delinquents' families, it is found that 27.8% are spoiling and 17% neglecting families (Gan 1989). Neither type takes proper care of children's education due to the parents' preoccupation with their respective work.

In all, the family, as a basic unit either for Mao's continuous revolution or for Deng's economic reform, has been a target for the CCP control and served the CCP's need for control. Through the CCP rule, family structure turns simple, and the nuclear family becomes a majority type in cities. Generation difference is leveled off, male and female members are equalized, and the traditional authority of an

indisputable household head is decentralized among family members (Seeking Truth; Davis and Harrell 1990). Socialization of children and control of members are still a basic family feature. But how the family educates children and deals with problematic situations among members, and how a family networks with other families, is no longer significantly affected by the blood or marriage based kinship, but rather influenced or shaped by the officially-sponsored education system, residential organization, and work unit network.

Neighborhood   An important factor that enables neighborhood committees to accomplish various functions is that many households live in a neighborhood for a long time (Troyer et al. 1989). People know each other well and are able to identify strangers without difficulty in a community. In Mao's years, residents often left their doors open, children played around, and adults entertained themselves in the same courtyard (Lewis 1971; Whyte and Parish 1984). It was taken for granted to keep an eye on each other's children, property, and business, and report noticeable happenings to concerned families. In other words, local residents sought for an interactive social environment, and self-control was habituated as a community life-style. However, this natural cohesion of local residents, despite the CCP's skillful manipulation, often clashed with official requirements of neighborhoods for policy implementation and social control.

The tension was especially salient during Mao's years of class struggles.

In recent years, as the economic reform created a large mobile population, the neighborhood solidarity has declined. By the interview, urban residents become more concerned with their own affairs, showing less and less interest in helping others. Privacy is claimed, and security becomes a primary concern. The majority feel uncomfortable to expose private affairs in the public and insecure to unlock their houses when leaving home.

Generally, although formalized by the CCP into a residential network, the neighborhood's solidarity based upon the residents' mutual trust and loyalty, has been undermined through Mao's class struggle and Deng's modernization drive. In the course of social change, residents' willingness and cooperation will be more important for local matters. Official demands of neighborhood groupings for social control will have to be less mandatory and more interest-related. For example, most respondents reported that mediation of civil disputes is welcome in their neighborhoods. This is also evidenced by the official statistics which show a considerable increase of mediation committees and settlements from 1984 to 1988 (Ministry of Justice 1989). The reason, according to some respondents, is that disputes are generated from the bottom and residents need an authority to stabilize solutions and press for voluntary acceptance. In other words, official

demands for compensatory or conciliatory styles of local control (Horwitz 1990) become effective when they fit and serve residents' needs.

5. Comparative Perspective

Residential control takes place where people live together in village, neighborhood, and community. However, according to the social context in which it occurs, the practice of residential control may take different forms with different contents.

Across all former or present socialist countries, neighborhood networks are usually anchored to the work and governmental authorities and assigned to provide grass-root aid for officially-initiated social support and control programs. In Cuba, community organizations, like the similarly called and positioned residential committee in China, not only act as local vigilance and security organizations safeguarding residents' interests and properties, but also function for the implementation of various governmental programs. These programs are not necessarily of a security or control nature. They can be a supply, a care, or a general social support. For instance, free health care from the national, provincial, municipal, regional, or polyclinic organizations are crucially dependent upon the efforts made by the neighborhood defense committee to reach the targeted patients and medical problems (Boffey 1978).

In Western countries, residential control is epitomized by the widely known neighborhood watch program which focuses on increasing residents' sense of and participation in their community as a means to reduce the fear of crime and criminal activity (Kassebaum 1980). In Ireland, a study reported that strong value orientations, frequent involvement in community organizations, and victimization to non-serious offenses lead to residents' greater willingness to participate in the neighborhood watch program (Hourihan 1987). In England, the 'cocoon' neighborhood watch, along with other measures like target hardening and the removal of the most obvious source of cash, is found to help achieve a 25% reduction of burglary in a public housing estate (Pease 1991). The development of and participation in community crime prevention programs in the United States are generally based upon two theoretical perspectives. One argues that perceived crime problems stimulate collective action. The other stresses that a strong sense of social cohesion and a dedicated involvement in community associations alleviate the fear of crime and motivate residents to participate in the neighborhood watch program. In reality, it is likely that residents join together for neighborhood defense because they are fearful of crimes and have already been involved in their community in other affairs.

Western residential control in general is not systematically organized by and connected to the governmental

agencies for a wide range of social control or support functions. In special projects, however, the form and content of control can be total, all-inclusive, and inseparable from social support. For instance, in public housing facilities designed for the poor, the battered spouses, the abused children, or alcohol and drug addicts, housing is provided free or by a nominal rent (Kassebaum 1974, 1980). Health care, therapy, counseling, child care, headstart program, and other services are made available for the residents. These programs are usually sponsored by the governmental or charity-related grants or funding, and run by professional private agencies. The residents are serviced in the first place but most essentially controlled from committing crimes and ruining social order.

Compared to other forms in the world, Chinese residential control has the following unique features: (1) it is based upon family and neighborhood; (2) it is interwoven with the work organization; (3) it is oriented to serving both governmental policies or programs and local residents' needs; and (4) it is all-inclusive and interlocked with social support.

CHAPTER 3

THE FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS (II)

Following Chapter 2, this chapter examines three forms of social control in Chinese work organizations which are more or less characteristic of modern large-scale production and bureaucratic management. They are: control through confidential records, control through civil rewards and penalties, and control through administrative disciplining.

A. Control through Confidential Records

Control through confidential records is a practice in which basic information and secrets are systematically collected, processed, and stored for individuals as a basis for delivery of rewards, services, therapies, or punishments to them. The controller can be an official authority. For instance, the U.S. Social Security Administration keeps legal records of residents and non-residents in the United States for various civil or criminal purposes. The municipal police or FBI maintain files for important suspects and all offenders having contacts with it. A private credit agency can also make use of specially-collected secrets and manipulate the concerned person or organization for its own benefits.

Acquisition, retention, and use of individual records for control or non-control purposes are as old and widely extended

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as human existence. In the West, personal and organizational information is collected and maintained by both governmental and private agencies in written, auditory, visual, electronic, or other physical form for various purposes. The conflict between the public's right to know and the individual's personal privacy is first recognized in archives access administration (Steward 1974). Legislated, contracted, or limited approaches are thus undertaken to compromise one with the other (Baumann 1986). In social studies, the issue of a developing 'dossier dictatorship' is raised with the recognition that the dossier keeps 'freeze-dried stigma' and helps the state manufacture deviance for a better surveillance of private citizens (Goodwin and Humphreys 1982). Some researchers adopt the social problems discourse and argue that the widely-spread dossier-building phenomenon has become a social problem. It needs to be duly dealt with as a subject by sociology of social problems. For instance, Reichel (1977) raised three questions about the massive dossier-building: (1) what is the nature of the data to be recorded; (2) what are the procedures for insuring data accuracy; and (3) how long are data used. Based upon these questions, he claimed that the dossier-building has a potential for violating such social values as individual liberty and privacy and therefore proposed it be included to social problems studies.

In China, the history of personal files goes back as far as the Eastern Zhou, when intelligence files were produced to

ensure the genealogical appropriateness of court officials (Wang 1984). During the Sui-Tang period, in addition to the family background, examination results were also kept on files for both officials and all scholars who took the imperial examinations. Applying Foucault's (1977) notion of ascending and descending individuality, this exclusive practice of policing the nobles through personal files signifies the ascending individuality (Dutton 1992). On the opposite side, the system of criminal records began in the Han Dynasty along with the emergence of the surveillance and reprieve system. According to Dutton (1992), a disciplined society or a descending mode of subjectification is achieved in its full scale until the contemporary era when the filing system extends from both sides of the nobles and the criminals to include all commoners.

1. Structure

Control through confidential records in contemporary China is a nation-wide practice which is implemented by the work unit. The basic rule is that everyone has a dossier beginning the first grade of school until death. The dossier is kept and annually updated by the unit with which the person is associated through study or job.

With this control in practice, each work unit has special sections or persons in charge of unit members' dossiers. In the interview, all respondents reported that their work units

have special organizational sections or persons to manage unit members' dossiers. Depending upon the size of the unit, a dossier section can be an independent department or have only one person along with other responsibilities. Its location in the work unit hierarchy is a function of the types of dossiers managed which in turn are determined by the status and rank of dossier subjects. Generally, dossiers are broken into three main types: those for party members and on-power officials, those for nominal cadres, and those for ordinary employees. The dossiers for party members and middle-rank officials are kept with the unit party committee's department of organization. Those for lower-rank officials and nominal cadres are kept under the department of personnel. The nominal cadres are those people who do not hold any official position but are classified as cadres. By the state rule, those who are graduated from the polytechnic school and above are automatically treated as cadres. There is a tremendous gap between cadres and ordinary employees. The latter can be converted into the former only by years of services, special rewards, or other extraordinary qualifications. As such, dossiers for ordinary workers are kept separately from cadres. In universities, research institutions, and other professional work units where most employees are cadres, dossiers for a few workers are reportedly managed by the same dossier section but are categorically put on different shelves. In factories,

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Table 9. Type and Deposit of Dossiers

Type	Dossier Subject	Deposit
Party Dossier	Party members Ranked Officials	CCP Organization Department or/and SupervisingAgency
Cadres Dossier	Cadres: Teachers Researchers Low-Rank Officials	Unit Dossier Section Personnel or/and Supervising Agency
Ordinary Dossier	Workers, Staff Service Persons	Unit Dossier Section Labor

state farms, and service units, the work unit management takes care of only workers' dossiers. Dossiers for cadres like technical personnel and management officials are kept in the district or municipal bureaus which supervise the unit. For example, one respondent (2MHO:PSwC2) from a factory reported: "Workers' dossiers are stored in the unit but unit cadres' are kept in the municipal bureau of electronics."

The rule of keeping dossiers for subordinate organizations applies actually to all work units. According to the interview, dossiers for the top leaders of a work unit are not kept in the work unit. They are instead maintained by the upper agency's in-charge division. The purpose is to keep dossiers out of the reach of the concerned persons and to render the upper authority the absolute control of the

confidential record. One respondent (2MGR:GNeM3) from a central Ministry stated: "Dossiers for ordinary officials or cadres are kept in our own Bureau. Officials' of the division level and above are kept in the Ministry's Bureau of Personnel or the Ministry Party Group's Department of Organization."

The dossier sections located differently in the work unit are supervised by the corresponding division in the upper agency which leads the unit. Step by step, it is connected to the central CCP Department of Organization for party members and high-ranking officials, the Ministry of Personnel for cadres, and the Ministry of Labor for workers. The State Bureau of Archives may also have clout as to the supply of appropriate techniques for documentary classification and management. In all, the dossier control has its own network which cuts horizontally across work units and moves vertically through the governmental bureaucracy.

2. Process

The investigator was fortunate to have recruited a respondent (3FUO:PNeC4) who worked in her work unit as a dossier official for an extensive exploration of all the aspects of dossier writing, keeping, and using. Also, there were six interviewees who said they had had a chance to review their dossiers or others, and two party officials who are entitled to access the dossiers of the cadres, party members, and officials under their leadership. The general sample

population, while having no access to a formal, complete dossier in their life, still had some knowledge about its format, the way it is built, and the effect it has over their work.

Format and Content   The format of dossiers is standardized. Based upon the interview reports, a dossier package is assigned to each person with his or her name, sex, age, and affiliating institution on a label affixed to the outside. Included in the package are ten items. Item one is a resume which is comprised of an account of bio data and a chronicle of education and work experience. Something unique about the bio data is that it records the class background of the person's family or parents. The entry is the first thing put on debate in the spiritual relaxation after Mao. It now becomes neutralized as family background for ordinary cadres and employees. But for party members and high-ranking officials, it was reported that the sense of class origin is not yet removed or muted from the dossier. Item two is an autobiography written in the perspective of personal redemption and public recognition. Item three is a depository of evaluations done by school teachers or unit leaders and the self for different periods of time. Item four is a collection of tests or examinations or appraisals survived or failed by the person. Item five is for investigative materials which are obtained for specific reasons like promotion. The content is basically about political attitudes and deeds, lifestyle

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ethics, and day-to-day behavior. Item six is about organizational affiliation, recording when the youth league or the party is joined and what has been achieved for the organization's cause. Item seven records rewards, honors, model or advanced statuses, and ranks. Item eight holds all the negative records a person has over time. There are specific rules as to what punishments or mistakes are entered into the dossier. For instance, a formal warning is required to be kept in the file. The cancellation of, or clearance from, punishments is also put under this category. Item nine keeps assessments, announcements, and approvals for transfer, retiring, promotion, removal, wage adjustment, temporary leave, and special assignment. Finally, Item ten is a memorandum for whatever related materials can be supplied to the organization.

Annual Evaluation By the above description, some dossier items are simply a depository for whatever is eligible to be entered or required to be enclosed. Other items are regularly updated. Still others are generated by special events. Among those regularly updated, Item Three leads directly to an institutionalized practice of annual evaluation in the work unit. The evaluation is conducted at the end of each calendar year. Its content covers almost all aspects but mainly political attitudes, work performance, and ethic quality. The process begins with a meeting informing of the rules or criteria of the evaluation. Then, each person writes up his or

her deeds of the past year, which is called the stage of self-evaluation. Next, self-evaluation is brought together and discussed among workmates and leaders, which generates a mass-evaluation about each person. The self-evaluation may also be modified at this stage. Following the mass-evaluation, unit leaders take their turn to give official comments to each of their subordinates, which are formally written down as evaluation-by-leaders. Unlike self and mass evaluations which are known to the evaluated and evaluators, the evaluation by a leader is usually kept confidential with no access to the person concerned. With this rule in place, it is mandated that division leaders write evaluations for ordinary unit members. Division leaders are appraised by the unit administration. Administrative officials are graded by the work unit's main leaders, whose evaluations are done by the upper supervisory agency. The annual evaluation, with self-, mass-, and leader-appraisals altogether, is entered to the dossier.

Access to Dossier Access to dossiers is restricted. No person is allowed to read his or her own dossier. The rule is well-implemented due to the structural arrangement for dossier management. The respondent (3FUO:PNeC4) who worked as a dossier registrar in her work unit said that she has access to all unit members' dossiers filed with her section, including dossiers for party members and cadres. However, there are two exceptions. One is that her dossier is kept away from her by her direct leader. The other is that her leaders' dossiers are

conserved in the upper agency. The rule is that leaders can read the dossiers of their direct subordinates. Ordinary cadres or employees cannot know anything about their own dossiers and those of others, especially their leaders.

Rule-breaking occurs under situations of negligence or a justifiable reason. In the interview, while 94% of interviewees never read their dossiers, 6% said they did. The situations and reasons under which they were allowed to or had the opportunity to review their own dossiers are variable. In case one, the respondent (2FUT:USwP2) said: "It was right before leaving the country and the person in charge of dossiers was an acquaint of mine. She jokingly said to me: 'serve yourself! It will not mean anything any more.' She implied that I would not go back and my dossier became a history."

Cases two and three presented a situation where the dossier official partially or completely relaxed the rule for dossier management. By the rule, it is the dossier official's responsibility to prepare a requested material from a person's dossier. But as stated by the first interviewee (2MGR:RNwP2), the official may not want to leave an impression to other unit members that he or she is there to serve them:

> I asked the dossier person to give me a copy of my transcripts. He handed me my dossier and let me do it. I took the needed pieces from my dossier, xeroxed them, and returned them back. All these were under his close watch. I realized later that he did not do it for me by himself because he enjoyed to direct me, a youngster, how to do something.

The second's (2MGT:USwP4) story was:

> In applying for U.S. school admissions, I needed to copy my transcripts. The lady in charge gave me my dossier and asked whether I could do it by myself. I said yes and she then went back to her other work. I seized the chance to have a quick look of all other materials included and found nothing significant. Materials supplied by myself, like self-evaluations, took much of my dossier space. I thought she gave me my dossier because she knew that there was nothing in my dossier to hide from me.

Case four was an occasion in which the dossier officials left their working table or the dossier office without properly closing dossier materials and the door. As dossiers are not kept in their due places, they are approached by aggressive employees acting together. The case respondent (3FHT:SSeS2) stated: "One day, I accidently saw several of my colleagues bustling around a table in the unit's dossier office. I went in to see what was interesting. When I saw them looking at the dossiers, I squeezed in and got a look at mine and others."

Cases five and six revealed that there exist holes in a work unit's dossier management. For instance, dossiers are not always properly separated to ensure those managing dossiers have no access to their own. One case respondent (2MUR:RNeC2) reported: "I was a group leader. I was asked to put my workmates' evaluation scores into their dossiers and got a chance to see the dossiers of myself and others." Another (2FGT:USwP4) said: "I saw my dossier when I served as the

departmental secretary. Nothing significant was inside. Most materials were written or supplied by myself."

In general, abuse of power, negligence, and lack of strict classification exist in work units' dossier management.

Use of Dossiers   According to the interview, dossiers are exclusively used by leaders and the work unit or upper authority for making decisions in promotion, recruitment to the party, transfer, or special assignment. For promotion, unit leaders or the upper authority order the dossier officials to present the needed dossier to them. Based upon the review, they can dispatch officials from the unit's organization or personnel department to visit the targeted person's hometown, schools, and former workplaces to verify basic facts recorded in the dossier or collect new information about important points of concern. The new information so obtained is entered into the dossier under Item Five for future consideration.

In transfer, it is the receiving side that sends a formal request for the dossier to the work unit with which the would-be transferred person is currently associated. The decision made by the present work unit as to the release or withholding of the dossier is a focal point to the success or failure of the transfer. If his or her dossier is withheld, the receiving work unit is usually not allowed to make a formal decision of acceptance even it has reasonably enough information about the person. As commonly said, "keeping the dossier, you have the

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person". If the dossier is released, it is usually sent through registered-mail or hand-carried by a reliable third-person under seal. Upon receipt of the dossier, the receiving unit may dispatch its officials to obtain more information about the person.

In special assignment or enrollment to the party, a similar reference to the dossier is also made. However, since the leaders responsible for such a decision have face-to-face contacts with the targeted member, their impression and knowledge based upon routine interactions can play a significant part.

As is seen, dossier officials have the responsibility to entertain the visitors from other work units and the upper authorities. The interviewee (3FUO:PNeC4) who worked as a dossier registrar told that when visitors come to her section for information about a present or former unit member, she talks with them based upon the member's dossier record. It is clearly specified by the related rules that visitors cannot claim direct access to the dossier. However, if they want a formal written statement, she can prepare one in accord with the dossier content and give it to them after the approval of her direct leaders. For the convenience of dealing with outside requests, a brief or a shortened duplicate is usually prepared in each member's dossier. This duplicate can be directly made available to visitors from outside for reference.

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CCP Organization Department
(Party Members and Ranked Officials)


Ministry of Personnel
(Cadres)


Ministry of Labor
(Workers and other non-Cadre Employees)


State Bureau of Archives
(Dossier Management Methods & Techniques)


                                    The Supervising Agency


Unit Leaders
                              The Work Unit

Dossier Officials
                                    Dossier Section(s)

                         CCP    Personnel    Labor

CCP Members          Cadres              Workers
Ranked Officials     Low-Rank Officials  Non-Cadre Employees
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                         ┌──── Resume
                         ├──── Autobiography
                         ├──── Evaluations
                         ├──── Appraisal Records
                         ├──── Investigation Materials
                         │
Standard Dossier Format ─┤
                         │
                         ├──── Organizational Affiliations
                         ├──── Reward Records
                         ├──── Punishment records
                         ├──── Movement and Mobility Records
                         └──── Memorandum
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
Figure 5. Dossier Access, Management, and Format

Finally, dossier officials are not as powerful as might
be imagined. Their due duty is to keep the dossier and to take
care of its transfer when ordered or approved by the unit
leaders. They have no control as to what is written into the
dossier and how those records are used for important personnel
decisions. The time they can leave their influence is when
they orally tell outside visitors or brief unit leaders about
a member's dossier record. Also, if they are corrupt, they can
make use of their key to dossier files for their own benefits.

Individual Attitudes Toward the Dossier   By official
rules, the dossier is an important variable for job placement,
transfer, promotion, and other opportunity. How much do
individuals actually care about their dossiers? In the
interview, 40% of respondents indicated that they are
concerned with their dossiers and worry what might be recorded
into the dossier. There were 29% saying no and 31% feeling
uncertain about or unaware of what would be written into their
dossiers and what impact the dossier record might have upon
them. Among those who did not worry what is recorded into
their dossiers, one respondent's (3MUT:USeP3) direct and
simple reply was a typical explanation: "I have no control
over it, why worry then?"

Data analysis showed that the response was related to
respondents' age, sex, and education. Generally, older
respondents, females, and those of lower education tend to
take their dossiers more seriously than their younger, male,

and highly-educated counterparts. By age, for instance, while only 17% of respondents under age 36 cared about their dossiers, all those older than 45 said they learnt by their experiences that the dossier is important and therefore were very much concerned with what is recorded into it. One respondent (2MUO:GNeM3) from a central governmental agency offered a good explanatory generalization: "Those people who have job transfers, high expectation for promotion, or long years of work, tend to be concerned with their dossiers and acknowledge the importance of dossier control."

Respondents were also asked to comment on the importance of dossier control. Among all respondents, 74% regarded control through dossier as important. Only 26% said it is not too important. None of them outrightly denied its importance. The response was again related to age and education but not sex. About the same percentage from male and female groups realized the importance of dossier control. By age, more younger respondents than their older counterparts displayed a tendency to downplay dossier control. By education, however, highly-educated respondents seemed to show more understanding than those of lower education of the necessity of dossier keeping and writing for a modern work organization. Two interviewee comments were illustrative. While one (2FHM:PNeC3) with primary schooling complained: "I have not done anything wrong in history. The dossier control is an unreasonable practice." Another (2MGO:GSwS1) with a graduate degree said:

"It is a necessary record helping the work unit have better information about its employees."

3. Nature

As one of the civilized forms of social control, control through dossier records has a latent, indirect, non-coercive, and non-confrontational nature.

First, control through dossier records is based upon the spirit of scientism and fits the modern practice of bureaucratism. As applauded by Weber (1906), development of modern records brings about an effective control of people and material flows in bureaucracy and social system and is one of the indispensable factors to the birth of capitalism. Indeed, with justifications provided in the perspective of better treatment and effective management, any information about individuals, organizations, and their activities can be legitimately, conveniently, and systematically collected, processed, custodied, and used in contemporary society.

Second, derived from its effectiveness, control through dossier records can be applied across time and space without the physical presence of both controllers and controllees. On the side of controllers, they can set up a file for any target, investigate related events in the past and at present, and use so-acquired evidences unilaterally to reach a verdict, an evaluation report, or even a fateful decision on the controlled. For controllees, the most scary part of the

control through confidential records lies in that information about them is used without their knowledge for recommended or imposed delivery of reward or punishment to them. The controllees are uncertain as to what information is held about them, against or in favor to them, what consequence the information may have upon them, and how soon. For instance, a person spotted by the police and put under surveillance for criminal acts becomes nervous, oftentimes because he or she does not know what evidence the police has, when, and how the police take action against him or her. A person waiting for promotion is usually kept in the dark as to what evidence their superiors are using for the decision. With no recourse to escape the control, he or she tends to make him- or herself fit for it by being more careful about his or her words and acts. As one respondent (3MGR:RSwP2) commented:

> There is something mysterious about my dossier. I've known its existence since my primary school but known nothing about its contents. Every time I go through an important test or pass and know my dossier is being reviewed by my superiors and upper authorities, I can not help becoming nervous and scared. This experience warns me to be more careful about my speech and behavior in daily routines.

Third, on the opposite side of its effectiveness, control through dossier records looks back into history and tends to lag behind the current development. Also, records are not updated as frequently as they should be. Once an item is entered, it may take a complicated procedure to clear it away. To the detriment of the controlled, freeze-dried stigmas are often kept in record with negative impacts affecting their

choices and fates any time and all the time. The Chinese dossier, as a permanent record created by the government for each individual about his or her political attitudes, job performances, and general behavior, is especially retrospective. According to the interview, there are no clear guides to clear negative records in a personal dossier. A moderate mistake may need an extraordinary effort, such as a formal petition to the work unit leadership, to be cleared away. On the other hand, as long as a mistake is kept in file, it remains a factual stigma obstructing upward mobility.

In all, dossier building and control, while justifiable for basic organizational needs in contemporary social process, may result in unusual fear and damage on the part of the controlled. The practice deserves serious academic scrutiny from both conservative and liberal perspectives.

4. Change

Despite the tradition to police both the nobles and the criminals through confidential records in Chinese history, communist dossier control is developed and operated in a somewhat characteristically new fashion. Dossiers for party members and cadres began in Yanan, with political underpinnings drawn from, and practical concerns addressed by, Lenin's theory of party organization and construction (Seeking Truth 1990; The Editorial Board 1990). Party and cadre dossiers were detailed in content. They were kept

confidential, frequently scrutinized, and oftentimes mysteriously used. In dossier extension to other walks of life, they existed as an exemplar model for the development of worker files in industry, student records in education, and personnel dossiers in professional units (Dutton 1992).

The practice of worker and professional files drew from the Soviet Union's history of worker records. The theoretical justification was set to meet and satisfy existent production and development needs which literally mean the labor discipline and quality control in factory and work unit settings. The initial form of files, resembling the Soviet work book system, included such components as work registration cards, work guarantee books, and other duty or performance-related recording and scrutinizing devices (Wang 1984).

In 1956, a national conference, the first of its kind, was called for cadre personnel file workers. The conference promulgated the Temporary Regulations on Cadre File Management Work which set goals and guidelines for the unification and systematization of cadre files across the country (Wang 1984). The successful standardization of cadre files led to the extension of its experience to other areas. In worker files, the early form was overhauled with an addition of political, ideological, and moral details in its main body of content. As Dutton (1992) pointed out, the practice demonstrates an extension and intensification of the discipline regime.

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Later years of politicization under Mao, epitomized by the Cultural Revolution, sent the political and ideological components of cadre, worker, student, professional, and other personnel files to an even higher latitude of importance. At that time, it was argued that the influence of family as well as community members be detailed in the dossier for a better understanding of individual thoughts and acts. The disciplinary matrix was thus connected to the neighborhood and community policing. Individuals were given no escape from the authority's scrutiny of their daily life and work activities.

The dossier format formed under Mao continues in use under Deng's reform program. The procedure to collect information for each formal item and the exclusive authority of work units in administering the practice of dossier control, remain in effect. The change, however, has also taken place. For instance, class origin of the family is removed from the dossier content, and less political concern is put on the investigation, evaluation, writing, and use of dossier records. More significantly, social context has become challenging. More and more work units and employment organizations, like private and joint business, begin to bypass the government-sponsored dossier in their decisions for personnel or employee enrollment, job placement, promotion, transfer, and other assignment.

Some interviewee reports and comments were illustrative of this change. One respondent (4MHR:RNeP2) reported: "In the

past, withholding your dossier was equal to abducting the person. Now many joint ventures and collective enterprises do not care about the official dossier." Another (2FGT:USwP4) commented: "In recent years, many work units receive people without asking their previous units to release the dossier. The dossier is no longer a key to job transfer." In general, as put concisely by a respondent (2MGR:GNeP1) from a governmental agency, the dossier has "more influence before, much less today."

5. Comparative Perspective

Dossier records are commonly used in contemporary society. Because of its social control implications, legislation and administrative regulations are often made to provide guidelines for its proper application. In the United States, the federal Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts requires federal agencies to permit the individual to (1) determine what records pertaining him are collected or used; (2) prevent the unanticipated use of those records without his consent; (3) have access to those records; (4) assure those records are used for a necessary and lawful purpose; and (5) claim remedies for willful and intentional misuse of those records (Legislative Reference Bureau 1988).

In reality, however, records can be collected, managed, and used with biases and mistakes. The situation, oftentimes, causes undue disposal of control or beneficial treatments.

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For instance, in France, judicial financial aid is allocated to the people by an assumedly objective standard for financial needs. An examination of related dossier records found that the nature of decisions is modified by various factors unrelated to the prescribed governmental standard, such as local considerations, personal characteristics, and even differing conditions relative to the examination of the case files (Valetas 1976). In the Unites States, a study analyzing confidential records on police misconduct reported that court records and citizen complaints against the police, the controllers, are kept and used in a way which delays investigation and biases disciplining decisions toward officers. 'Missing' records are commonplace in all misconduct incidents. Officers with mental, drug, or alcohol problems are often retained on the force (Perry 1987).

In terms of the existence of applicable laws or administrative orders and human manipulations in actual practice, Chinese control through dossier records stands in no difference to that in other countries. However, there are several unique natures for Chinese dossier operation compared to the Western use of transcripts, resumes, curriculum vitae, and reference letters. First, different from the resume or curriculum vitae prepared by individuals themselves for study or job applications in the West, Chinese dossiers are written by teachers or unit leaders and are officially kept and transferred with no or restricted access by individuals.

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Second, different from Western reference letters which are specific in terms of period, subject, or application, Chinese dossiers are a permanent, all-inclusive record of an individual from the first day of schooling to death. Third, Chinese dossiers have a standard format which includes sections for personal data, family background, political attitude, job performance, and others. Finally, the authority to keep and use Chinese dossiers is officially granted to the work unit. The work unit writes comprehensive dossier evaluations for its employees about their political activity, work accomplishment, and other related matters. As everyone is concerned with the dossier and attempts to maintain a clean record throughout the career, the work unit secures from the practice a strong means of control.

B. Control through A Civil Reward and Penalty System

Control through civil reward and penalty is a basic organizational feature of modern bureaucracy (Hall 1991). Reward and the related rhetoric make the goal, the preferred value and ethics, the approved ways and means, and the intended state of affairs explicit and specific to the individuals. They keep individual members in the common course of a collectivity and motivate them to contribute as much as possible to it through their independent or collective actions. The penalty is the other side of this double-edged control. It demonstrates to the individuals what is bad,

wrong, and shameful, deters them from sliding into it, and makes them bear the cost if they happen to jump out of line. The trick of control through reward and penalty is that while only a few are targeted or selected for the treatment, all members of the collectivity feel its pressure and effect.

In China, reward and penalty are systemized with much political rhetoric or symbolism in place. On the reward side, there are model, activist, mass meeting praise, small award, honorary certificate, and various other 'tricks' at different levels for different categories of activity during different intervals. On the penalty side, unfavorable impression, public shame, negative labeling, criticism, unfriendly treatment, no entry to the youth league or the party, and no conversion to the category of cadres are examples of various informally instituted penalizing practices. The formal punishment meted out by the work unit is usually through administrative disciplining, which will be dealt with in a later section.

Reward is constantly used. To ordinary Chinese, it is a significant part of their work and life picture. According to the respondents from universities, for instance, students can be awarded as a 'Three-Good' student, an excellent Youth League member, or a study model. Faculty members can be promoted on the basis of the quality and quantity of their inside and outside awards or honorary titles. They both can become a model or an activist during a campaign, such as an activist during the tree-planting month. As all are highly

motivated by the intensive use of politically-charged rewards, failure to obtain them constitutes a high pressure on an individual. For some, the fact of not being awarded itself amounts to a public denial and an internal punishment. The investigator was awarded as a 'Three-Good' student and an excellent student cadre during his undergraduate years, and knew personally how much extra care an awarded student has to take in front of department officials, professors, and classmates. Before being awarded, a person has to work hard, behave nicely, and avoid any controversy. After receiving a reward, the person is supposed to be a model for others to follow in work, political activity, and daily behavior. Because of public attention and official scrutiny, it is natural that tremendous external and internal pressures build up on the part of awardees.

In one word, expectation for a reward and the reality of being awarded or unawarded make candidates and all those involved more subordinate and obedient, and therefore lend the authority a better control.

1. Structure

According to the interview and official documents, there is no special structural setup exclusively for delivering rewards or meting out a penalty. The task is executed directly by the due organizational authority of the work unit. This fact makes two points worthy of notice. First, it shows that

control through rewards or penalties is routinized and becomes an integrated part of organizational life. Second, it implies that the control is politicized and takes a work unit's due organizational authority to justify its necessity and highlight its importance.

The due organizational authority refers to the core leadership at a functional level. Within the work unit, section leaders decide and deliver sectional awards or penalties to their sectional constituents. The departmental authority controls the allocation of rewards and penalties among eligible members within a department. At the unit level, it is the central administration or management of the work unit that makes the decision as to who are awarded or penalized for what and how. Of course, there are cross-level and cross-function connections. First, for the higher level to make an award or penalty decision, the lower level is first required to supply its representatives and eligible candidates for consideration. Second, a functional department may take directives or criteria from the upper authority of its business or profession, initiate its screening procedure, and directly deliver or ask a due authority to grant its awards or penalties to the selected persons. For example, the residential committee receives from the street government its policies for model or need-to-improve families. It checks each household by the city guidelines, determines which one is selected for what category, and reports its list of candidates

to the work unit leadership and the street government. When awards and honorary certificates for model families, or warning labels for need-to-improve families, are issued from the street government, the committee may choose to send them directly or to have the work unit leaders announce and present them, to the targeted families, in a unit mass meeting if it is deemed necessary to so publicize the event.

In all, establishment, selection, and presentation of awards or penalties reside in the normal organizational structure and process of the work unit. In other words, they are decided and conducted by the unit authority as an integrated part of organizational activity.

2. Process

There are various types of rewards and penalties from within or without a Chinese work unit. They come to a functional division or an individual of the unit in different names but serve in one purpose to motivate various interests to stick to the common ideal and goal of the unit or higher authorities. In the following, major types of rewards generalized from documentary records and interview reports are discussed. Negative labeling and penalties are usually constructed accordingly.

The first type can be called the prototype reward which is established along with vocational roles, selected at each organizational level, and presented to their constituents by

different authorities. It is local and role-specific, because models or rewards can be determined and formalized in the first instance by the lowest authority. It is also cross-sectional and general, because models or awardees at the first, the second, or the third instances may be brought to the next upper level to compete for a higher honorary title or award. Concretely, among students, youth league members, athletes, cadres, mediators, security guards, party members, dossier officials, or unit employees in general, role models or advanced representatives can be selected in a section, a department, a work unit, or through each of these levels until the national system. For example, a youth league member may begin with his or her local branch, becoming an excellent member for a year. He or she may then be elevated through his or her unit, city, province, and finally emerges as one of the nationally known excellent youth league members which are selected and awarded annually by the Youth League Central Committee in Beijing. For other models, because of the role generalization at higher levels, they may merge with each other and end up at the national level with a commonly-applicable title or honor, such as the advanced employees in the country or within a central Ministry. For example, a person from a factory begins with the title of an advanced worker. He or she may join an excellent faculty member from a university, a model researcher from an institute, or a

representative cadre from a local governmental agency, and emerges finally as a model employee in a Ministry.

The second type can be called the campaign-derived reward. It comes with a particular national or local campaign, serving as an energizing mechanism to mobilize and motivate the masses for the designed goals of the campaign. It makes a type because campaigns are frequent and become actually a characteristic feature of contemporary Chinese life. Among those nationally known, there are tree-planting holiday, civic virtue month, legal education campaign, security and safety month, learning from Lei Feng campaign, patriotic health campaign, welcome the national party congress campaign, etc. During a campaign, all the employees of a work unit are mobilized, their thoughts and acts are observed and evaluated with each other or by the leaders in charge, and praises or awards are usually given in the end to reward those who show special dedication and contribution. For instance, during the civic virtue month, unit members are expected to behave nicely and do one or more good things to others or the public. Those who are caught in a typical event which demonstrates the civic virtue as defined by the authority or do good things as many as publicly recognized, may be awarded as a model citizen, an activist, or some other honorary title. The campaign reward, like the vocational type, can go up step by step all the way until the national level of publicity and recognition.

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Level ─────────────────┐                    ┌───────────────── Type
                        │                    │
                        │                    │
Central ────────────┐   │                    │   ┌── Role-Oriented
                    │   │                    │   │   Time-Specific
                    │   │                    │   │
Provincial ──────┐  │   │                    │   │
                 │  │   │                    │   │
                 │  │   │                    │   ├── Campaign-Related
Municipal ────┐  │  │   │      Reward        │   │
              │  │  │   └───────\    /───────┘   ├── Emergency-Derived
County ─────┐ │  │  │           Reward          │
            │ │  │  │              \             │   ┌── Meeting Rhetoric and
Work Unit ──┤ │  │  │               \            └───┤   Governing Trick
            │ │  │  │                \
Unit Division┘ │  │  │                \
                                      \
                                     Content
                        ┌──────────────┼──────────────────┐
                        │              │         \          \
                 Certificate          │          \          Medal
                                      │           \
                          Public Recognition    Disposable Benefit
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Figure 6. Levels, Types, and Contents of Rewards

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The third type is the emergency-derived reward which is made temporally and spatially specific to a fact or an event. The emergency event and the rewarded can be a fire and a person braving it to save life and property, a violence and a person to curb it, a drowning child and a person to save him or her, or a problem and a person to solve it. For instance, one interviewee (2FUR:PNeC3) reported that a party branch secretary for a workshop in her factory rescued a little child when he was swimming in a lake. He sent the child home and didnot leave his name. The parents of the rescued child were very grateful to him and came to the work unit to report his good deeds. The unit propaganda department wrote articles about him and his good deeds to the city newspaper and radio station. The branch secretary was thus publicly praised. Moreover, he was formally awarded by the unit in a mass meeting and elevated as an advanced party secretary by the municipal bureau which supervises the factory.

The last type is the reward or praise given routinely, formally or informally as meeting rhetoric or governing trick by unit leaders for members' good thoughts or acts in daily work and life. There are various meetings in a section, a division, or the entire work unit. Respective leaders habitually single out some individual members for praise and public recognition or as a model for others to follow. Even on a work site, an observational leader can make comments on a particular act and give oral credit to the person who performs

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a good or correct act. For instance, a person can be praised by his or her division leaders for coming to work on time in the past month or coming always early to clean and prepare the office for others. Or a workshop leader can report to an upper leader on the inspection tour to the workshop that a worker has maintained for half a year a record of no under-quality products. All these are routinely done with task-performance activities.

The content of each type of reward is different. It may be an oral praise, a mention of good practices or correct acts in a leader's report or speech, a specially-designed certificate, a good point recorded into the dossier, an extra bonus, a pay raise, or an amount of monetary award. In general, a reward may have the following possible components. The first is a formal, well-decorated certificate which provides official proof of the reward. The certificate can be in multiple copies: one for the individual to keep, one to enter his or her dossier, or even one for the section, the division, or the unit to display in a public place. The second is a medal, a sculpture, or a statue with the title and the covering period of the honor and the name of the recipient inscribed on it. The statue can be also put on exhibition in the work unit. The third is a publicity show for public recognition. This can be done through a mass meeting in which the rewarded person is arranged to sit on the stage as a dignitary. But the most effective way is through newspapers,

radio, and television in the official media, or a wired loudspeaker system and blackboard news in a locale. The fourth is a disposable benefit which can be redeemed either politically or economically. For example, a reward may come as an amount of cash or an extra bonus plus a number of good points which can be translated into personal assets for political appointment or professional rank promotion. One respondent (2MGR:RNeC1) reported that he was elected through his work unit as a New Long March shock worker in his city. He received a certificate and a medal, had publicity exposure in the local media, and obtained an extra bonus in the year's end. In addition, the honorary record helped him obtain an early promotion to a higher professional level.

The occasion in which a reward is presented is also variable according to the type of the reward. In most cases, a mass meeting is called for the official presentation of a formal reward. Such an occasion is supposed to be able to generate a maximum amount of positive effect intended for a reward. A head title written in big characters is hanged over the meeting stage to inform the audience of the purpose of the honorary reward meeting. The pre-selected awardees are loudly announced with their names attractively posted on the wall, arranged to sit on the stage, or at least called to the stage when the reward is presented to them. The program begins with the leaders' speeches on the importance of the reward and the procedure of award selection. The awardees are then asked to

report their deeds. After the meeting, they may be approached by reporters for some detailed stories in various mass media. To individual awardees and spectators, the entire process amounts to a political rhetoric which overwhelms them for a total dedication to the collective good desired by the authority.

Criticism and penalty can be meted out similarly. In an opposed parallel to all major types of rewards, the prototype penalty may identify a vocational role as poor or need-to-improve, such as a poor doctor and a need-to-improve worker. In a campaign, some work unit members may be labeled as backward or inactive. An emergency may generate a typical example of apathy to human life and disregard for public property. And all unit members can be targeted for criticism-by-name routinely by the work unit leaders. The content of penalty or the occasion in which a penalty is delivered are also variably comparable to their respective reward counterparts.

3. Nature

Civil reward or penalty comes to the people with a positive or negative face. While a reward glorifies the giver, the receiver, the spectator, the deed it awards, and the site on which it occurs, a penalty serves as a warning to every side concerned. The sense of social control this form of control has lies reflexively in that it can be manipulated by

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an authority to socialize its constituents to a set of preferred values, have them stick to a desired track or state of affairs, and motivate them to contribute as much as possible to an intended goal. With rewards, the controlled are unaware of their being induced, manipulated, or controlled.

First, reward or penalty and the related rhetoric act as a socialization or resocialization mechanism. They teach people what values are preferred or not, what acts are worthwhile or not, what goals are intended or not, and how to make themselves integrated to the collective cause or what means to be drifted from it. The way they teach is simple, easy to understand and follow. For instance, awardees are selected from the people, awarding procedure is conducted in the context, and important points are highlighted by key awarding components. Everybody present can learn the message gradually, contextually, and naturally.

Second, rewards motivate people to do extra, perform extraordinarily, or at least keep pace with the normal progress favored by the work authority. Penalties do about the same thing, but from an opposite direction. Human beings are not only susceptible to tricks, lures, and incentives, but also subjectable by warnings, threats, and penalties. Awarding a person in a collective of similar identities is like giving a stimulating push to the lead horse in a race. A real or perceived penalty exists, on the other hand, as a deterrent to keep any racing member from falling behind the rank. The horse

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in the forefront runs faster, the rest follow it and do not drop out, and the entire race thus becomes more exciting. In other words, rewards or punishment can be used as a pace-setter for the authority to control the process of collective actions.

Third, while penalties give a sense of relief to those not penalized, rewards create a shadow over those who are not awarded but of a similar identity with the awardees. For a very few, the shadow may mean a denial, a punishment, or a reason for doing little, deviating from the course, sabotaging the process, or exiting from the system. But for the majority, it exists as a pressure for more active participation in the collective cause. Generally after a rewarding or penalizing rhetoric, most people are likely to examine their past actions, sort out and highlight what is right and what is wrong, and make efforts to do as good as or better than others for the next round of awards or avoid further penalties.

Fourth, the cost of control through civil rewards is low. When people are made cognizant by rewards and the awarding rhetoric of what is the best, motivated to do the best, or pressured to do as good as others, the authority in charge saves itself automatically from various costly motivating, disciplining, and punishing procedures. It is a commonsense that negligence, derelict, deviance, rule-breaking, and other problematic incidence decrease and the cost for controlling them or correcting their dire consequences declines when

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people are positively socialized and kept in line doing what is right. The cost of control through civil penalties, as it is used in parallel to civil rewards and institutionally integrated to the normal organizational process, is also minimized.

Finally, to the individuals, control through rewards is executed without the controllees' obvious awareness of being controlled. There is no use of force. Everything is done in a positive manner. The rewarded is glorified and made more dedicated. All concerned members observe the procedure, become excited, and are injected with more motivation or at least some positive pressure. Resistance, unhappy feelings, and negative measures are minimized or saved while a more healthy morale, a better work order, a more effective performance, and a higher productivity are rendered to the authority in charge. Also, control through civil penalties, as it is applied mildly in the organizational context, does not generate too much feeling of coercion and alienation to individuals. It serves mainly to advance collective identity and commitment.

4. Change

The system of civil rewards and penalties was instituted early in Chinese history. In the Zhou Dynasty, long before the Christian era, imperial power was shared by several dukes or princes who each ruled over a territory awarded to them by the emperor after tribal wars. In the later feudal dynasties,

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reward of land, wife, concubine, official post, gold or silver, and other valuable articles are seen in both historical records and literature works (Seeking Truth 1990).

The communist reward and penalty system grows out of the peasant uprising and the mass movement in which positive incentives or disincentives are found to be indispensable for a continuous intensity of revolutionary enthusiasm. Critical of material rewards misused in the past, the new awarding practice puts its focus on the fairness of procedure and the spiritual meaningfulness of reward objects. The principle of being clear about reward and penalty is publicly stressed. Propaganda values of reward practice and self- or mass criticism are theoretically explored (Mao 1975). Generally, as justified by the officially established strategy of positive encouragement in combination with negative education, reward or penalty and the related rhetoric constitute an important part of the overall communist mass propaganda program.

Reward and penalty practice under Mao was frequent, politicized, and based upon nominal or spiritual objects. Works units were organized like the military. Political, ideological, and economic programs were intensively executed from time to time. Along with those programs, various study, work, and production competitions, races, or exercises were initiated at each level (Bettelheim 1974). Loudspeakers and blackboard news were instantly active to praise winners or to criticize inactive persons. Mass meetings were regularly

called to glorify those who take the lead in a initiative or rebuke those who lag behind a movement. As those respondents who worked under Mao's era unanimously reported, work units in those years were intensely organized and energized. Individual unit members were in an exciting and inspiring mood, like in a swirl of enthusiasm. Everybody was motivated or pressured to move ahead.

The spiritual effect of reward and penalty is no longer particularly highlighted under Deng. While the civil reward and penalty system keeps some heritage from Mao, mainly with regard to procedural matters and title inventories, the content of rewards and penalties is overhauled with substantive benefits or concrete disincentives which match the new orientation of materialistic and practical effects emphasized by both authority and the individuals (Gao 1991 & 1992; Jackson 1992). The implication of the reward and penalty rhetoric also takes a different perspective. According to the interview, the honor of advanced or the dishonor of backward employees is still in the reward and penalty repertoire of work units. The procedure to select a model or for a need-to-improve employee to emerge from a division or the work unit remains about the same. But the standard by which a person elevates to be an advanced employee or is negatively labeled changes from the past stress on political behavior to the current focus on job performance. Better individual performance is associated with the work unit's higher

productivity and better economic effect. To reflect this relationship, the work unit authority begins to partition a small part of its material gain to the award-worthy persons or its loss to a blameworthy part (Gao 1991 & 1992). In other words, instead of being just praised orally or by media rhetoric, awardees are given bonuses, wage increases, cashes, rank promotions, and other direct benefits. Criticism and educational session also give way to a loss of regular benefits or even a payment of fines to those who deserve a penalty. As a number of respondents reported, their work units' annual summing-up meeting now becomes an occasion for bonuses distribution for extraordinary contributors in particular and good-enough employees in general. A very few backward members, if any, are no longer shamed by open criticism. A smaller general bonus benefit or no bonus serves more than shame. The mentality of unit leaders also changes. They begin to feel embarrassed or powerless if they just make empty praises or rebukes and have nothing substantive to display in front of their employees.

5. Comparative Perspective

Use of rewards or penalties to advance employee morale, to encourage membership commitment to the collective cause, or to prevent individual deviancy is a standard practice in modern business management and governmental administration (Hall 1991). In the West, society-wide rewards come in various

forms like grants, fellowships, awards, special funding, honors, and others. Public criticism, denunciation, or protest are also aired in different forms against various particular individuals or behaviors. Sponsors or judging subjects are not confined to governmental agencies. In fact, private organizations often take a leading role in the arena of civil rewards. They identify local or special needs, provide financial and moral support for development of desired areas or subjects, single out particular deeds for rewards, and help diversify cultural values and substantive interests across the society. The governmental awards, in contrast, are usually more symbolic and less practical. As such, even an ordinary act, if it is judged by the authority as useful to signify a particular value, can be caught as a reward target. For example, a state governor can award youth medals for bravery to teens to advance heroism and the sense of mutual help among public schoolers (The Honolulu Advertiser 1993).

Inside each profession, each line of business, or each work organization, rewards or penalties can be arranged as a part of routine management or annual summing-up rhetoric. In the United States, for example, the teacher, the police officer, the soldier, the volunteer, or even the mother or the family of the year are selected and awarded across the country or within a state. In public schools, students are evaluated once a quarter and selectively awarded for full attendance, good citizenship, or excellent performance. In state

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universities and federal research organizations, rewards are also seen to be given to faculty members, research associates, students, or even staff members for their services, special contributions, or routine job performance.

There are also formal or informal selections of negative models or worst vocational roles in some locales or professions. In the entertainment world, for instance, worst films, books, actors, actresses, or directors are often picked up for negative publicity.

Compared to Western use of civil rewards and penalties in social control, the Chinese version apparently has three contrasting characteristics: (1) all formal rewards and penalties are basically controlled by the government or state-operated agencies. Although there are recent reports that peasants or private businesses make noticeable awards to engineers or technicians trained by the state (China's Scholars Abroad 1993), private organizations do not play a significant role in the process; (2) the procedure to select an awardee or for a backward person to emerge is formal, sometimes top down, and draws intensive attention from both the leaders and the ordinary members concerned. Democracy is in place. Public opinion has its weight. But because of an active leader involvement, judgements from the top naturally have clout on the process; and (3) a significant amount of political rhetoric is created before, during, and after the reward or penalty process. As the effect for positive

encouragement and negative education is officially claimed, various propaganda means are mobilized. The rhetoric from one reward or penalty procedure often lingers until that from another comes in its place.

C. Control through Administrative Disciplining

Disciplining begins with the family and extends through the community to what Foucault (1977) called carceral institutions like prisons, insane asylums, reform schools, reformatories, etc. The target of disciplining can be either the human body or the soul. Disciplining the body involves an exhausting recycling of power and knowledge into and out of the body as if it is a special site of productive and efficient power and knowledge (Foucault 1977; Lalvani 1990). The soul disciplining emerges from an important transformation in modern history. With its ascendence to the dominance, contemporary society becomes characterized by an increasing objectification and disciplining of subjectivity and an intensified ordering of the soul (Van-Kreiken 1990). Social members, while gaining increased individualization, are turned into self-controlled, administered, and depressed beings. Overall, the body and soul disciplining is a key to understanding the impact of the rational, disciplinary, and civilized society on the human psyche. Scholars like Elias (1939) and Foucault (1977) become prominent through their

analyses of social discipline, human nature, civilizing process, and civilizing offensives.

Administrative disciplining in the Chinese work unit consists of rules, regulations, and professional ethics, with prescribed punishments for breaking them. Work unit rules and regulations constitute a complex system. There are formal laws and rules promulgated by central, provincial, and municipal governments, which are applied to individuals by the work unit. For instance, the work unit is empowered to detect and punish early marriage, having more than one child, and other rule-breaking acts specified by the marriage law and family planning program. There are also regulations, measures, and ethics established by the work unit for various categories of activity. To the employees, the work unit has inherent discretionary power to define inappropriate or deviant acts and prescribe corresponding penalties for them. While informal penalties, such as statutory loss of benefits or public shame, are assumedly delivered through the civil reward/penalty practice in a routine basis, formal punishments for organizational rule-breaking are systematically carried out under the name of administrative disciplining. The officially established punishments include public warning, demerit recording into the dossier, deprivation of benefits or honors, demotion, off-duty observation, suspension, transfer, and expulsion from the work unit. Plea-bargaining is not an officially-acknowledged procedure. But according to interview

reports as well as documentary sources, good attitudes, guilty-pleading, and repentance can still earn the concerned person no or reduced punishment (Cohen 1968; Wilson et al. 1977; Troyer et al. 1989). Some respondents sensitively referred to the practice as a reflection or application of Mao's well-known words "leniency to those who confess their crime" in administrative disciplining of a civil work unit.

1. Structure

Like control through civil reward and penalty, the authority of administrative disciplining lies in the overall power apparatus of work units. Laws, rules, regulations, and policy lines, either from the upper governmental agencies or recommended by a functional department about a particular matter within the unit are usually made known to unit members and brought into action by the central administration of the work unit. They are numbered, printed in a uniform format, stamped with the unit seal, and distributed to division or section leaders or directly to unit members. The uniform format features a capitalized, red inked title of the document underlined by thick red lines broken in the middle by red five-pointed stars. The format earns all official documents a special name in the public. That is, 'the red-titled document'. It is interesting that almost all interview respondents used it knowingly to refer to their work units' official circulars.

Division of labor is also in place. According to the interview, it is usually each functional department that receives related laws, rules, or assignments from its corresponding upper agency, drafts by-laws, provisions, or suggestions of its expertise, and submits them to the central authority of the work unit for approval, promulgation, and implementation. During the implementation, the concerned department takes charge to detect problems, under-requirement practices, and rule-breaking acts, and makes recommendations to the unit leaders as to what punishments are appropriate to deliver and how. Within each department or division, rules may be made particularly to its own members and punishments may be meted out locally for specific deviant or troublesome acts. However, most local rules or punishments are cautiously made with a duplicate sent to the central unit for on-file documentation.

One thing unique for administrative disciplining is that the party has an independent organizational setup for investigation and disciplining of party members and officials. The organization is the control committee in each work unit's party committee or a control member at a lower level. As aforementioned, the committee takes complaints from the masses or the party members against individual sections, divisions, leaders, officials, or party members, investigates matters or persons involved, and makes recommendations to the party standing committee for possible punishments. The control

committee usually does not publicize itself in announcing or carrying out a disciplining or penal action. It rather stays behind the party standing committee as its intelligence or investigation agency. In other words, within the party, it is the party standing committee that makes final decisions upon the use of control through disciplining and punishment.

The relatively centralized structure for disciplining and punishment is due to the fact that the lower divisional or sub-unit leaders are wary of the liabilities they have to bear in delivering a penal measure to their subordinates. Also, there are multiple implications involved in a disciplining or penal decision. For example, if the case involves criminal allegations, the authority to deal with it has to be yielded to the criminal justice system, from which a civil work unit usually tends to distance itself. Finally, as the good saying 'easy to praise and hard to punish' tells, disciplining and punishment just need a central, powerful authority to put them on display. The good part of this is that it helps prevent possible abuses at lower levels against the controlled.

2. Process

Rules or regulations are a due part of modern organizational life. Non-compliance, under-compliance, defiance, and rule-breaking bring about disciplining or punishments, making the organizational process full of dramaturgical rhetoric (Goffman 1959).

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In the interview, all the respondents reported that their work units have general and specific rules, by-laws, regulations, or task-related instructions for sub-units and unit members. Different divisions even have their own policies, provisions, and measures within the premises of the general rules made at the work unit level. Rules or measures can come in various names, such as workers' welfare provisions, production safety provisions, document security measures, work responsibility provisions, staff handbooks, student handbooks, faculty handbooks, on-duty rules, etc. Each set of rules can cover a wide range of issues, with each rule made specific to a possible occasion. For instance, in a student or faculty handbook, students may be prohibited from having love affairs with faculty members. Faculty members may be required to set an example for students, including details about how to dress in the class and how to make class preparation and grading in the end of each semester. A staff handbook usually sets basic requirements in work, life, and daily behavior. It also tells what to do and what not to do, including such advice or command as politically following the current situation, financially keeping a clear record, being serious with the work, and having good, harmonious relations with workmates. An on-duty responsibility rule-set may give definitions and prescribe punishments to work attendance, coming late or leaving early, without-application absence, and other possible matters or instances. The interview reports

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                    Leading Party Committees
        Upper Supervising or Professional Agencies
                              |
                              |
                         Work Unit
                  Party and Administration
                              |
                              |
            Functional Divisions or Departments
                              |
                              |
            Making, Implementing, Interpreting

   Rules      Regulations    Professional Ethics      Punishments


        Public Warning
       Demerit Recording
            Demotion
            Transfer
    Off-Duty Observation
           Suspension
           Expulsion
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
Figure 7. Administrative Disciplining

supplied various types or occasions of punishments under the work unit's on-duty responsibility rules. They include loss of half a month's bonuses for three days of absence, public warnings after frequent absences or late coming to and early leaving from the work, deduction of two-day bonuses for one day of absence, loss of one-month bonuses for more than three days of absence, one month of absence leading to expulsion, so on and so forth.

The formation and revision of unit-wide rules and regulations are conducted in a 'democratic' way, as it was put by most respondents. The management or administration puts forth proposals, distributes them to divisions for open discussions, and collects grass-root opinions from the masses as a basic source of inputs. A final draft takes shape after several exchanges. The established rule set may be evaluated after a period of implementation.

Compliance to various rules and regulations by unit members is examined in the annual evaluation in the year's end, which is, as mentioned before, a standard process through self, mass, and leader's evaluations. Together with job performance, individual members are generally graded into three levels: not adequate, adequate, and excellent. The result is recorded in the dossier, with impacts on future promotions. A few advanced employees may emerge from the masses. They are recognized and rewarded in the work unit's summing-up meeting.

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In the interview, various cases of violations and disciplining actions were reported. In the following, they are lumped into several groups to illustrate the variety of rule-breaking acts and corresponding settlements in Chinese work organizations.

Violations by Students There were fifteen interview reports about student violations. Rule-breaking acts or events involved range from fraudulent practices in major examinations, fights, illegal activities, sex affairs, playing officially-forbidden mahjongg or gambling games, prostitution, hooliganism, stealing, and burglarizing, to participation in political protests against the authority. Poor academic performance is also punished formally through the procedure of administrative disciplining.

Disciplining begins with a public warning which, according to the interview, is most frequently used for violations by students. Public warnings can be given at different organizational levels such as class-wide, department-wide, and university-wide, with different degrees of severity such as ordinary, serious, and extraordinarily serious. Among the interview cases reportedly handled through public warnings were cheating on a major examination like a national examination for medical students, fighting with fellow students or university workers, playing mahjongg with junior faculty members or classmates, and engaging in sex

affairs with young faculty members or fellow students. One respondent (2MGT:UNwP3) reported:

> I remember one time I read a public announcement from our University President's Office about three public warning cases. The first one was about a mass fight in one of the dining halls on campus. Two major fighting students were each given a public warning. The rest received lecture and criticism by name. The second involved a female student who was engaged in a love affair with a faculty member. The student was warned to stop the love affair in its "talk" stage. The faculty member was said to be handled by other concerned authorities. The third warning was rendered to a student who was absent from class frequently to hang around with high school drop-outs off campus and failed two of his four courses in one semester.

Disciplining procedures more serious than a public warning but less serious than an expulsion from campus are recording demerit into the dossier, on-campus observation, removal from the youth league, loss of the party membership, and suspension. Cases supplied by the interview reports included: fighting, drinking alcohol, seeking sex outside the campus, cheating in the graduation examination, and participating in a public demonstration. One respondent (2MGT:USeP4) provided information about his university's treatments to those students who had participated in the 1989 Tiananmen-centered Student Protest:

> There were two students formally disciplined on our campus for participating in the 1989 Student Protest. One was removed from the CCP, the other was initially decided for expulsion from the university. However, since the would-be expelled played a major role in a student debate competition with Taiwan and contributed to the victory of the debate, he was reinstalled and put under on-campus

observation, with a direct approval of the then Mayor, Zhu Rongji, now vice-premier.

The most serious disciplining treatment is dismissal. Cases covered by the interview were: stealing, burglarizing, hooliganism, prostitution, marriage during study, unusual sex activity, and poor academic performance. One respondent's (2FGT:UNeP4) account of student sex was unusual: "A female student went to a male student's bedroom shared by five other students and slept with him for a number of nights. Complaints were made by the roommates to the university authority. Both students were removed from the university." Another respondent (2MGT:USeP3) talked about his university's general disciplining policy toward poor academic performance: "Poor academic performances may result in dismissal. According to the student handbook issued by the university authority, students who fail more than three courses in one semester or six courses cumulatively during the four years of study are automatically dropped from the academic program and sent home."

Basic Requirements   There are basic requirements which need to be met by work unit members. Areas covered by the interview reports included: work attendance, work assignment, and avoidance of conflict of interest. For work attendance, some work units, especially production and service units require their employees to sign in and out in an attendance booklet. Regarding work assignment, most work units demand a full on-time completion. Failure is generally not tolerated.

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Some respondents said they must work extra hours to get an assigned work done by the deadline. Others reported that they went to their direct leaders and asked them to help if they felt they could not complete the work in time. On conflict of interest, one interviewee (3MUO:GNeM3) from a central governmental agency stated that the state personnel policy mandates that direct relatives are not allowed to work together in the same governmental agency. His account was affirmed by other interviewees working for the government.

Failure to observe basic rules leads to various disciplining actions. Public warning is first used. Interview cases collected included: workers leaving the work unit without an application for absence, soldiers failing to return when the approved term of absence expired, faculty members reporting late to the class and administering an examination improperly, and so on and so forth. One interviewee (2FGT:UNeP4) recalled:

> An on-duty doctorate faculty member did not go to teach his class twice. Students' evaluations about his overall class performance was also not very good. He was reprimanded by a public announcement from the university's department of instruction. The announcement was broadcast by radio and posted throughout the campus. It would of course have an impact on his future wage raise and rank promotion.

Disciplining procedures more serious than public warning are applicable. For instance, one interviewee (4FUO:PSeC4) cited that a storage attendant in her work unit was given a demerit-recording of dereliction because he did not report a safety-threatening situation when he was on duty. Another

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(2MUR:RSwC1) reported that a colleague in his work unit was put under off-duty observation after he left the unit to work for a private employer without a formal application for absence from the unit.

Loss of employment is even possible. One interviewee (2MHO:PSwC2) from a state farm cited one item of his unit's work responsibility rules as: three months of absence or idleness automatically lead to removal from the farm. Another (2MGS:PSwS2) from a joint venture stated: "there are no criticisms or talks from leaders. If you fail to do your due work, you are fired. One of our staff member was fired because of his incapability."

On the part of individual unit members, some tactics may be used to avoid a formal disciplining action, especially when the matter involved is pardonable. As stated by one senior respondent (4MHR:RNeP2), "leaders show tolerance for minor problems. Self-criticism and admission to incapacity or wrongdoing can help you avoid a formal penalty".

Sex Scandals There were ten cases reported about sex scandals. Five were said to be disciplined through public warning. They were: a faculty member having sex with a staff from a neighboring work unit; a staff having sex with a woman from another work unit who had sex with a number of men; a married teacher having sex with his colleague; a junior researcher sleeping with his girl friend and resulting in her pregnancy before marriage; and an official luring a young

female employee into sex with him. One formal official from a research organization (2MGO:RNeC2) admitted that the CCP members implicated in a sex problem were often handled within the party through an inner party warning. One story told by a respondent (2MUO:GSeS1) was:

> A female staff, from another county and graduated from a secondary school, was assigned to our county. She was lured into sexual relations by her superior, the head of the county bureau of hydraulic engineering. The scandal surfaced when the girl was engaged in love affairs with another young cadre. As a result, the nearly sixty-year old head was given an inner party warning. The county government also issued a public warning to him.

Demotion and transfer are also possible in sex scandals. There were four cases reportedly given such treatments. The first one, reported by a respondent (2MGO:GSwS1) from a governmental agency, involved a section head having sex with a lady under his supervision. He was demoted to an ordinary cadre. The second one was about a young faculty member using a telescope to watch bathing female students. According to the reporting interviewee (2MUT:USwP1), the offending faculty member was transferred to the library and not allowed to teach any more. The third was also about a university faculty member. The respondent (2MGT:USeP3) described:

> One of my colleagues went back to his home in the countryside to prepare his admission examination for graduate study. He slept with a peasant girl who hoped to marry him and moved with him to the big city, the provincial capital. The colleague did not intend to do that. The girl then took the case to the university. As a result, the colleague was transferred from the unit in the big city to his home county seat.

The fourth one occurred in a factory. By the respondent's (3FUO:PNeC4) account, the disciplining treatment was comprehensive:

> A female orphan was arranged to our factory. She was under eighteen and was lured to have sex with eighteen workers and leaders. I participated in the handling of the case. Those involved received differential punishments: workers paying a fine, cadres demoted to become a worker, party members removed from the party or given a serious warning inside the party. The girl was only educated because she was an orphan. The unit gave her concern and support and introduced her to a reliable man for marriage when she was twenty two. I wrote a report to the municipal Daily and China Youth, making the case well-known across the city, the province, and the country.

In some cases, work unit leaders may have the intention to keep the secret for an implicated member. One respondent (3MGT:UNeP4) offered such a case with interesting background information:

> A professor in our department, while on a business travel, had sex with his former girl friend. It was in 1981 when he was just approved as a probationary party member. He was so loyal to the party that he felt he should report the incident to the unit organization. The university party committee decided not to penalize him and keep it as a secret. But not long after, his girlfriend's husband took the case formally to the university. As a result of that formal action, the professor's probationary party membership was terminated. The professor used to be the secretary of the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR. In 1956, he wrote to the CCP Central Committee and suggested that China should not follow the USSR too closely and should develop relations with the USA. The letter classified him as a reactionary. He was sent to prison. In the prison, he worked hard and behaved perfectly and was therefore released early through a general pardon. Out of the prison, he wrote to report the prison condition and agitated for prison reform. He was categorized as a current reactionary again and sent to prison in 1962. He came out in

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1965 and was sent to the countryside for re-
education through labor. He was married to his
peasant wife there. He was redressed in 1979 and
assigned to our university. He was intelligent,
loyal to communism, and has been trying year by
year to join the communist party. His two sons are
now in the United States. The older one told him of
his intention to reside permanently in the United
States and he threatened to cease relation with
him. One of his books is to be published by a US
publishing house.

Power Abuses There were sixteen interview reports about

power abuse cases. One was said to be disciplined by public

warning. The detail supplied by the interviewee (4MUO:GNeP1)

was:

A high ranking official at the deputy prefectural
level used his power to help his daughter be
admitted to a school. He also had bad relations
with other leaders, which left negative impacts
upon the work. He was disciplined by the CCP's
provincial committee's organization department
through a public warning distributed across the
province party bureaucracy.

One was handled by demerit-recording. According to the

reporting interviewee (2FGT:CSeP2), the case involved an

ordinary cadre who embezzled several thousand Yuan from the

work unit.

Six cases led to demotion or transfer. Violations and the

corresponding disciplining treatments for the first three

cases were: an associate professor leaking the question items

prior to a national examination and being demoted to the rank

of lectureship; a unit colleague stealing a software from the

university to the municipal developmental zone for personal

benefit and being transferred to another division; and a

divisional official taking a bribe of one hundred Yuan and

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being transferred to another division. Another three cases were detailed by the interview accounts. One respondent from a university (3FUT:USwP2) stated:

> A lecturer serving as personnel secretary in our department helped a professor to write a false document for his daughter, saying that the girl was a student with the department. After it was uncovered, the professor was demoted to the rank of associate professor and the lecturer was transferred to another division doing ordinary work, not teaching.

Another (2MGR:GNeM3) from a central ministry described:

> One division head was removed from his position because of gift-taking. He was not at home. People from his home town found his home and sent a golden ring to his wife. He did not turn it to the unit. Neither did he give any favorable treatment to the senders' interest. The gift senders became angry and wrote a letter to the unit. He was transferred to another division to become an ordinary cadre.

The last story was told by a respondent (2FHM:PSeS3) from a factory:

> A female divisional official in our unit was a party member from the rural area. When she was in charge of sales, she took bribes and bought under-quality timbers as our factory's packaging materials. She was transferred from the sales department to a workshop with a fine of 1,000 Yuan. In addition, her wage was decreased for one level and prohibited from increase for three years. She was also barred from the competition for excellent employees and other honors.

Removal is applied to serious cases. But sometimes a compromise may be worked out to give the so punished part a way to earn a living for his or her family. One respondent (1FUS:CNeP1) reported such a case: "a petty official from the construction department received a big amount of bribes and

was removed from the work unit. He was later employed as an ordinary staff because he had a family to support."

In recent years, with economic reform and open-up policy, some power abuse cases begin to involve significant economic interests and therefore warrant criminal charges. There were seven cases reported by the interview growing into such a severity. The first four cases involved: a factory head stealing the factory properties worth 100,000 Yuan and being indicted by the people's court; a director for international exchanges receiving multiple bribes and being put into jail; an administrative official using his power over personnel to secretly transfer several persons from outside to the work unit and being sentenced to a two-year prison term; and a class counselor embezzling student fellowships and stealing timbers from the university and being sentenced to three years in prison. The remaining three cases were typical. The reporting interviewees were asked to provide a relatively detailed account. The first respondent (3FUO:CSeP2) described:

> The manager of a sub-company received bribes from foreign business partners. He gave big discounts to them and sent his two children abroad through them. Due to some accidental reasons, foreign business partners in Hong Kong reported the deal to the Chinese authority. The manager was put in custody for investigation. He committed suicide in the course of investigation. There were a number of similar cases in our company which resulted in transfer or imprisonment.

The second (3MGO:GNeM3) reported:

> One deputy bureau head used his power to borrow $15,000 in foreign currency from a subordinate work unit for his son to study abroad. He did not return

it for three years. The subordinate unit was afraid
of asking it back. But it surfaced through a
system-wide audit. The penalty for him was removal
from his position and a prison term of twelve
years. He is now serving his term outside the
prison because of his poor health condition.

The third interviewee (3FUO:CSeP2) provided the following

account:

One official in our bureau was charged for selling
economic information to foreign businessmen. He
leaked our base price to foreign partners in a
business negotiation, which resulted in a
substantial loss on our side. The deal involved
dozens of million US dollars. He was removed and
sentenced to prison for ten years.

Power abuse and corruption are officially acknowledged

and often attacked by national campaigns. The effect,

according to one interviewee (3MGP:GNeM4) from a central

governmental agency, is in general limited:

After the 1989 Tiananmen event, corruption is
checked and punished more harshly. In dealings with
foreign interests, policy lines are better upheld.
But in matters such as housing assignment,
corruption still exists. In those units where
housing is in sufficient supply, there are still
leaders who occupy more than one apartments.

Dereliction   Dereliction oftentimes causes property

damages and business losses. Five cases were reported from the

interview. Two were said to be disciplined through public

warning to let the involved person learn a serious lesson.

Case one interviewee (2MGR:GNeM3) described:

A translator was arranged to accompany the Governor
of the People's Bank to go abroad. They went to the
airport and waited to board the flight. Suddenly,
she found her passport was not with her, which
prevented her from boarding the scheduled flight.
She received a serious public warning.

Case two respondent (2FHS:SSeS2) stated: "A driver in our unit hit and injured a person outside, which incurred a considerable expense to the unit. He was given a public warning and terminated his monthly bonuses for half a year."

As in case two, bonuses and salaries are often deducted or stopped, or fines collected to nominally compensate the loss brought about by the derelict to the work unit. The remaining three dereliction cases were all handled in such a manner. They were: an operator leaving his work post resulting in serious damage of a generator and being demanded to pay a compensation from his wage; a researcher causing fire in the laboratory and being penalized by a deduction of his monthly bonuses; and a laboratory staff forgetting to close the tap water and being fined from her monthly bonuses.

Breaking the Rule There were thirteen reported cases falling under this category. Minor and moderate incidents included: a staff member engaged in fighting; group fighting in a work unit gathering; a young employee driving the work unit's car for fun without securing approval from the authority; a doctor providing false proof for an alleged patient; two workers fighting each other in the workshop with one internally injured; and a worker in the electronic instrument workshop taking home wires when leaving the night shift. Disciplining involved criticism, public warning, demerit-recording, fines, deduction of salaries or bonuses, on-duty observation, or a combination of them, depending on

the degree of severity. For instance, according to one interviewee (2FUR:PNeC3), the worker stealing raw products was not only publicly criticized but also asked to return the wires and missed a chance for wage raise.

Rule-breaking within the work unit may become so serious that administrative disciplining is not enough and the justice system has to be called for criminal charges. When a conviction is made, removal automatically takes effect in administrative disciplining. There were five such cases from the interview. The first three were: an accountant convicted of embezzlement and automatically expelled from the work unit; an employee imprisoned for arson and automatically dismissed; and a soldier stealing weapons jailed for investigation. The other two cases were detailed by the reporting interviewees. One (3MGR:RSwP2) stated: "One colleague used the unit's experimental facility to produce a solvent for opium distillation. He took the solvent to Yunnan and sold it there. He was caught there and sentenced to ten years in prison." Another (2FUS:CSeC1) recalled:

> One bank staff in a subbranch took a large amount
> of cash from the coffer and was caught by a sudden
> overnight auditing. He later said he intended to
> borrow the money for just only one night and would
> bring it back next day. He was sentenced to
> education through labor. After the sentence, he was
> sent to work in the unit's reception room".

There are some rule-breaking acts undetected and escaped from disciplining actions due to management elapses. One respondent (2MGS:CNeM3) reported: "Some of our employees used

the company's telephones to make private international calls."
Another (2FGP:RNeP3) cited a concrete case: "One of my
colleague was absent for one full day. She came to work next
day and provided a false reason to avoid a deduction of her
bonuses."

Political Problems   Some administrative disciplining
actions take a political overtone. One senior respondent
(4FUS:RSwP1) recalled: "During Mao's year, problems in
political thought often took a person to re-education in the
countryside." Another (4MUR:PSeC4) told a concrete story:
"When I worked in the Northeast, our then factory's deputy
head was the former CCP provincial secretary. He was demoted
to the position because of his connection with Gao Gong who
was removed by Mao."

Other Strategies   Disciplining actions are taken when
problematic events take place with a noticeable level of
severity. In daily management, however, if leaders do not feel
something as right as they expect, they may choose to use
other strategies for a correction. One strategy is concession.
As put by one respondent (3MGR:RNeP2), "Leaders often perform
self-criticism and hope to win employees' compliance and
support." Another is use of suggestive hint. In one
respondent's (2FGT:USwP3) words, "Leaders seldom criticize
employees publicly. They often make hints and suggestions that
somebody should improve his or her work or not do something."

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In all, a wide range of problematic or deviant incidents are covered by administrative disciplining in Chinese work organizations. Resolution is not solely determined by the type of violations. Other factors are also at stake, including severity of offence, frequency of violations, and the implicated party's history, public image, guilt-admission attitude, and determination to correct a wrongdoing. There are also obvious variations among work units in different regions and lines of business.

3. Nature

Administrative disciplining is a double-edged control. On the one hand, it teaches, guides, and regulates subjects to follow an assumedly right track for achieving a specifically intended goal. On the other hand, it prevents, punishes, and corrects deviations and deviants through the essential interests an organizational authority has over the subjects through work or other substantive ties. Administrative disciplining in the Chinese work unit, based upon the various disciplining incidents reported, obviously has its unique features.

First, the work unit disciplining is not work-centered in terms of the nature of the incidents covered. Matters falling under jurisdiction are not confined to work attendance, job performance, position abuse, duty negligence, and other employment related non-compliance or rule-breaking. Daily

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behavior, personal ethics, private lifestyle problems, and political acts or thoughts are also under scrutiny and treatment. This feature, in the perspective of division of labor and rationalization, can be characterized as all-inclusive, lack of differentiation, and doomed to low efficiency. From a historical point of view, as pointed out by Dutton (1992), it signifies that the work unit has replaced the traditional family and kinship system as an ethic site for contemporary China.

Second, while the incidents handled are often of a social nature, disciplining measures appeal exclusively to work and work-related interests. Loss of bonuses, wage reduction, and benefit freeze are built around the employment paycheck. Demotion, transfer, and removal center on work assignment and job mobility. Even public warning, announced and circulated within the work unit, is directed at the perception of fellow employees about the blamed. It may be legitimate to generalize that Chinese social disciplining is now based upon work-related practical interests.

Third, administrative disciplining is directed at the soul. It punishes the blameworthy by attacking their valued symbols, desired gains, motivation system, and environmental support. For instance, public warning is most frequently used. Its effect lies in its ability to change individual perceptions of self and others. In other words, it loosens self-motivation by placing the blamed into a degrading

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perspective. It undermines peer support by damaging public opinions and impressions which are decisively important in a closely-knit work unit setting.

Finally, according to interview reports, there exists a subtle distinction between manifest and latent types of administrative disciplining. The manifest disciplining is what is publicly announced and executed, like warning, demerit-recording, transfer, demotion, and removal. The latent type, on the other hand, is not written on the official disciplining list. It refers to unfavorable impression, cold treatment, zero upward mobility, bar from opportunity, no entry to favored groups, and so on and so forth. Compared to its manifest counterpart, the latent disciplining may actually cover an even larger disciplining space. As concurred by most respondents, non-compliance to the rule is not punished immediately. But no trust from and bad impressions among leaders and colleagues pose an even greater concern and threat to their work and career. One respondent (4MUR:RNeP3) explicitly said: "The cruelest penalty to us is not to let us participate in a project, lead a research team, attend a meeting, enter a competition, or be considered for a promotion."

4. Change

Administrative disciplining, with respect to its universal and systematic nature, is a phenomenon after the

emergence of the modern bureaucratic and production system (Weber 1920; Hall 1991). In China, throughout the lengthy history of dynasties, each ruling authority developed its own disciplining procedure which was often directed exclusively to aristocrats and officials, a small number of elites in the population (Liang 1987). From 1840 to 1949, a more than one-hundred-year of half-feudal and half-colonial interregnum, Western-style businesses, factories, and governing bureaucracies were established by fits and starts. Modern disciplining was put into display concomitantly in managing and administrative affairs. But as Western establishments were mostly located in a few urban centers, their disciplining practices remained insignificant to the large majority of ordinary Chinese.

It is under communist reign that modern-style administrative disciplining unfolds its full scale over ordinary citizens across the population. By the first time, a governmental bureaucracy is systematically set up from the center to the lowest level, reaching every individual citizen. State-owned factories, companies, farms, hospitals, schools, research institutions, and other service or production facilities are established in cities and rural regions across the country. An unprecedented large number of people are recruited from various backgrounds to serve the state as officials, professionals, staff members, workers, or ordinary laborers. Work and life disciplining procedures are formally

articulated and implemented in state establishments, leaving influence universally over a significant segment of the population.

Administrative disciplining under Mao leaned to the spiritual side through public labeling, collective shame, and personal humiliation. Practical interests were used, but seldom on monetary matters. Involved mostly were cancellation of honors, denial or removal of statuses, and prohibition from special treatments. For instance, a corrupt official was usually removed from the position or expelled from the party. The disciplining treatment was made publicly known, sometimes through a mass meeting in which the person was forced to kneel on the stage wearing a white and black triangular hat with his face directly to the audience. His family, relatives, and even unit colleagues were thus shamed (Yue and Wakesman 1985). Distance, gap, and obstacle then built up, removing the blamed from the mainstream collective.

Under Deng, spectacle disciplining and punishment are less used. Political shame and other humiliating rhetoric, in general, are no longer intentionally performed. Disciplining procedure becomes simplified. Measures applied focus on practical leverages. Monetary items, such as bonuses, salaries, and other benefits are targeted. Demotion, transfer, mobility freeze, and job assignment inhibition are kept in use and highlighted (Gao 1991 & 1992). For instance, a corrupt official now may not only be taken away from his or her

position, but also asked to pay a fine. The penalty may be just announced in a work unit circular, with no significant public shaming and personal humiliation. But in his or her backyard, the disciplined person is likely to suffer from a hard time of no work income, low wage, or a special saving for payment of fines. In his or her work, he or she may also have to deal with various disadvantaged encounters.

5. Comparative Perspective

Disciplining children in a family has long been a part of human culture. Work disciplining appeared late in history but is now the most wide-spread phenomenon of socialization and social control. In theoretical studies, the link between market power and wage structure is usually construed in terms of disciplining the work force (DiPrete 1990). In practice, disciplining workers comes from both directions: teaching them skills, rules, and regulations, and spanking them if they are out of line.

Western administrative disciplining takes place in both governmental and professional contexts. Police disciplining provides a good illustration for that taking place in governmental agencies. In a large US city, for example, the Police Department releases its disciplinary action reports regularly for the mass media's access. In a recent report, a twenty-day suspension was involved in two disciplinary actions. One was for a civil employee who falsified the police

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arrest record in order to protect his friend, a former state representative, from being reported to the public by the media. The other is for an officer who confronted a group of people in a tourist center with a gun in his hand while being off-duty. The two disciplinary actions were reportedly based upon an investigation made by the Internal Affairs Division of the City Police Department and approved by the Chief. In addition, criminal investigations were also being conducted within the Police Department for both incidents, with results to be handed over to city prosecutors who were about to determine if any criminal charges are warranted (McMurray 1993).

In professional context, doctor disciplining provides a typical instance. A questionnaire survey was recently conducted in the United States in five midwestern states about medical boards which act usually as a disciplining authority over doctors. The survey found that doctor misconduct and malpractice are not responsively handled due to the board's financial inability to hire sufficient investigators and attorneys. When sanctions are ordered, they are often too lenient (Kinkel and Josef 1991). In another study, the career of a US obstetrician who practiced a dangerous method of childbirth was examined. It showed that the medical establishment has difficulty in disciplining its unorthodox members, especially when they have a good eduction, a devoted

clientele, and high social standing (Bullough and Groeger 1982).

It is apparent that an effective implementation of administrative disciplining does not completely lie in a nominal existence of systematic rules to specify rule-breaking incidents, formal divisions to carry out investigations, and explicit procedures to direct disciplining actions to the intended targets. Most importantly, it depends upon whether the disciplining authority holds due leverages upon the disciplined and has enough resources to carry out its decisions. Like the US police department, the Chinese work unit is formally organized with its power based upon the state authority and resources drawn from the state ownership. As such, it is able to formulate meaningful rules and procedures, and effectively execute work and administrative disciplining on its enclave. Moreover, since the work unit stands in the same line with the state and its justice system, when disciplining actions are not enough or criminal allegations are involved, additional investigations and actions can be easily made along with or based upon the unit's disciplining treatments. If it is otherwise like a US professional association which derives its authority only from professional ethics and knowledge, the work unit would suffer the same problem in disciplining its members.

CHAPTER 4

THE FORMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS (III)

This chapter continues the momentum of Chapters 2 and 3 to examine the forms of social control in Chinese work organizations. Included are control through a quasi-justice system, control through a para-security network, and control through mass vigilance and inclusion.

A. Control through A Quasi-Justice System

Control through a quasi-justice system is where all styles, forms, modes, or types of control in the control literature find their applications. The quasi-justice system refers not only to the mediation committee and other conflict management mechanisms, but also to the penetrating, investigative, and cross-checking work routines and life styles in Chinese work organizations. It is labeled 'quasi' in relation to the formal justice system of people's procuratorates and people's courts.

1. Structure

There are specialized functional divisions to administer quasi-justice in Chinese work units. In addition, the centralized unit leadership network exists to mobilize and

coordinate needed resource and authority to reinforce the quasi-justice apparatuses in their operational activities.

Three specialized functional organs are deployed inside the work unit to carry out quasi-justice. One is the aforementioned control committee within the work unit's party machinery. Although under the standing committee of the unit party committee, the control committee receives most guidelines from its direct upper level as to what complaints to take, how to conduct investigations, and what punishments to recommend to the unit standing committee for delivery. The upper level refers to the party control committees in the work unit's supervising agency, in the municipal party committee, and in the provincial party committee. They are further connected, directly or through a higher level, to the CCP central control committee in Beijing. In other words, the party control committee network is a relatively self-sufficient, self-autonomous top-down system. The directives, guidelines, and precedents circulated throughout the system may be different from the promulgated law but remain effective for all party members and position-holding officials. In the jurisdiction of a work unit, the control committee and its by-laws or decisions are often made relevant to cadres and even ordinary employees outside the party and officialdom.

The second is a dispute resolution group or a mediation committee in the employees' union. Physically positioned in the union, it has connections from both within and without.

Within the union system, it may receive policy guides from the upper levels and case references from other similar entities. Employee disputes and resolutions have their characteristic features. Experiences or general rules can be obviously exchanged throughout the union system, topped by All-China Federation of Workers' Unions. Outside the union, the dispute resolution group is officially required to register with the district people's court and government, and receives concrete supervision from judges in the court and judicial assistants in the government. Clients it entertains are all unit members. Cases it takes include all kinds of work-related disputes and problems.

The third is the mediation committee in the residential committee. Since the residential committee is under administrative jurisdiction of the district government, the mediation committee is not only entitled to routine advice and directions from the district people's court and government, but also given access to relevant resources available within the district. For instance, the district or street government may provide appropriate institutional conditions for the mediation committee to network with and learn from other similar entities in the same district or even across the entire city. In terms of clientele and case type, the residential mediation is available to residents who live in the work unit's housing facilities. The cases it covers are

mostly about housing, family, children, and neighborhood matters.

The functional divisions for quasi-justice, while maintaining connections with outside governmental or professional agencies and being specialized in the area of its business, are also under the unified leadership of the work unit's central authority. Their main initiatives need to be approved by it. Implementation is dependent upon what resources and authority it allocates to them.

Moreover, the administrative apparatus, from the center to various branches or sub-units, can take over regular functions which, by definition, ought to be assumed by a specialized quasi-justice division. Leaders at each level, if willing, can take any complaints, disputes, or problems, investigate or mediate them, make a decision about them, and execute their decisions by the resource and authority they hold at hand. On the center, unit leaders can pursue a problem initially by themselves or call upon the control or mediation committee to deal with concrete matters on their behalf. If they put a functional division or committee into such use, they can ask it to report its handling step by step and advise it as to what measures to make and how. For those cases which enter a functional division of quasi-justice first, if the parties involved are not happy with the division's resolution or if the division feels unable to work out a decent deal, the

upper unit leaders are often pleaded as the legitimate authority for a final decision.

In the interview, most respondents reported that multiple-related employee disputes are mainly settled by direct division leaders rather than by the union's mediation committee. They agreed that the mediation committee is usually a basic tool for the unit leaders. Mediators collect first-hand information, handle troublesome scenes, and propose or recommend tentative measures. But oftentimes, it is the unit leaders who make final decisions on complex disputes or problems.

2. Process

With a control committee in the party, a conflict management team in the union, a mediation committee in the residential compound, and a penetrative unit leadership overseeing every episode of unit business operation, nothing problematic can possibly escape without a formal or informal treatment. In fact, as informed by the interview, not only various disputes in work, family, marriage, neighborhood, supply, daily routine, and human relation fall in the domain of unit quasi-justice. A full range of business areas or management issues are also caught for decision and resolution by its mighty power.

Case Variety   Cases under the jurisdiction of the residential and employee union's mediation committees are

variable, depending upon the nature of the matter involved, the character of the person implicated, and relevant environmental factors. There are ordinary civil disputes and minor criminal cases among spouses, family members, neighbors, colleagues, workers, and residents. Issues involved, according to the interview as well as documentary records, may include divorce, domestic quarrel, neighborhood disturbance, juvenile problem with school and work, administrative dispute, property damage, economic squabble, small claim, minor theft, and so on and so forth (The Bureau of People's Mediation 1983; Clark 1989; Barnes 1991). For example, intra-family conflicts may be such trivial instances as: husband is sexually inept or demanding, wife does not do housework or has not been pregnant long after marriage, brother leaves home and takes no responsibility for family affairs, sister fights for her dowry, father is against son's job choice or does not approve daughter's husband-to-be, and mother has conflict with daughter-in-law over housework and grandchild's care.

Disputes over substantive interests such as administrative disciplining, transfer, promotion between and among individual unit members and lower-rank leaders are usually sent to direct unit or division leaders for a hearing and a mediating adjudication. The procedure is usually called administrative mediation. Falling into the domain of administrative mediation conducted by the unit leaders are also economic interests and division of labor conflicts among

functional divisions. As evidenced by the interview, most work units are not willing to let inside disputes be taken to the court for judicial mediation or formal adjudication. As such, administrative mediation takes a considerable weight in the work unit's overall management routine.

In the interview, two disputes between ordinary members and their direct leaders were reportedly resolved by administrative mediation by unit leaders. The first one was told by a respondent (3MGR:RNeP1) about one of his unit colleague:

> One of our colleagues had been working in our unit for ten years. He failed to get a promotion to a senior level as he expected in a unit-wide rank evaluation and promotion. He blamed our division leader for the failure and ran to the leader's office to curse him face to face. The incident was calmed down by present colleagues. But it took the unit leaders' involvement for a formal settlement. The division leader was investigated and cleared from any wrongdoing. The colleague was given a public warning, because of his disturbing behavior against the divisional leadership.

Another case was reported by one respondent (3MGR:RSwP2) about how he appealed to a reliable authority within the work unit and was cleared from an improper administrative disciplining imposed against him by his direct leader.

> My direct leader, the section head, demanded employees be punctual coming to and leaving work. I did a very good job but was not able to meet his demand and got criticized. Last year, when I was busy with a project, I failed to attend the political studies four times. As a result, I received an administrative warning publicized throughout the sub-academy. My project head felt angry about the criticism. He and I appealed to the director of our Institute, then to the director of unit personnel, and even to the vice-President for

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research. The disciplining action was found to be proposed and substantiated by our section head. My project head thus provided an anti-proof to the department of personnel, explaining why I was absent. I was vindicated finally. The public criticism was not written into my dossier and did not affect my application to go abroad.

Principle Residential and employee union's mediation in the work unit is usually called people's mediation. Principles by which these two types of mediation are conducted are stipulated by the Civil Procedure Code (The National People's Congress 1991) and the Organizational Regulation on People's Mediation Committees (The State Council 1989). Administrative mediation draws reference from both but is also guided by other administrative directives. In general, there are four principles: (1) mediation is based upon laws, rules, regulations, policies, or socially-acknowledged ethics; (2) mediation is principled and grounded in facts; (3) mediation is non-coercive, with full willingness of disputing parties on an equal basis; and (4) litigation rights of disputants are honored. Mediation does not block formal adjudication at anytime.

In reality, according to the interview reports and the investigator's observations, not all principles are exactly followed. Unit mediators are patient, penetrative, and unyielding. Unit leaders are oftentimes involved. In many disputes, unit or division leaders are first notified. They then call upon the mediation committees and direct mediators to work out concrete measures for a peaceful resolution of the

dispute and a harmonious relationship between the disputants. In one word, once a dispute occurs and catches attention from unit leaders or/and mediators, it is not easy to escape from their assistance until a final settlement is reached.

Inhibition   Both residential and employee union's mediators live in the work unit community and are often implicated in all local interactions and conflicts by themselves. To ensure the dignity and fairness of their mediation, a number of inhibitions have been explicitly set for them. These inhibitions include: (1) favoritism and fraudulence are forbidden; (2) harassment, attack, and retaliation on disputants are forbidden; (3) insult and punishment on disputants are forbidden; (4) disclosure of the secrets of disputants is forbidden; and (5) acceptance of gifts or/and invitation to dinners is forbidden (The State Council 1989).

In the interview, most respondents attested that mediation is eyed by community members and reviewed regularly by the work unit leadership as well as the district people's court and government. As such, rule-breaking is rarely observed.

Strategy and Tactic   In residential, employee union's, and even administrative mediation, the mediators' or even leaders' basic method of response and intervention is talk and persuasion. Official regulations require that mediators resort to investigation of facts, logic of reasoning, and patience of

education and persuasion to overcome misunderstanding and hostility for conciliation (The State Council 1989).

There are several studies trying to generalize major strategies or tactics from numerous contingent mediation tricks and plots. Wall and Blum (1991) reported twenty-seven concrete mediation techniques from their study with ninety-seven community mediators in Nanjing. Using factor analysis, they uncovered four clusters of techniques which they called strategies and tactics. First is an assistance strategy in which mediators, or they have a third party, provide resources or services to the disputants for the return of peace. As assistance is rendered, they often feel it unnecessary to state the other side's point of view or persuade the disputants with logic. Second, a procedural strategy entitles conciliators to set the agenda for each particular hearing or the general course of mediation. As relevant information is gathered and moral principles are cited in a controlled manner, they do not have to educate or argue with the disputants by logic. Third is an education strategy by which mediators advise one or both parties as to how they should behave and let them know each other's position. Mutual forgiveness usually follows. Mediators thus save themselves from resorting to logic argument for specific concessions. Fourth, an external reliance strategy calls for laws or third parties to criticize or educate the disputants. The effect is

that conciliators become less dependent upon their own inputs to win the disputants' cooperation.

While the taxonomy includes major strategies, reports from the interview suggested that concrete techniques used in all mediation occasions in Chinese work units are more diverse and interesting.

<u>Procedure</u>   Approaches to various cases differ. Nevertheless, a standard procedure is generalizable from the mediation conducted by both residential and employee union's mediation committees in the work unit. Commonly, five steps are undertaken. First, disputes are taken for mediation. There are two ways to take a case. One is through a voluntary application for dispute mediation from one or both disputing parties. The other is to have mediators go to the site of disputes and offer mediation, even without a call or an application from any of the parties involved. According to the interview, disputes are often reported to unit leaders who then dispatch mediators to resolve them. The mediation committee is also obligated to watch out for possible targets and catch cases on-spot in the first instance. The approach is officially affirmed as a positive experience to nip a dispute in the bud. But by the principle of voluntariness, uninvited or imposed mediation deprives disputants of their right of self-decision on conflict resolution.

Second, investigation of disputes is undertaken to uncover all related facts. Information is collected through

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┌─────────────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐  ┌──────────────────────┐
│Justice Administration│  │People's Court │  │CCP Control Committee │
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        ┌──────────────┐           ┌──────────────┐
        │Civil Mediation│──────────│Party Control │
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        ┌──────────────────┐      ┌────────────────────────────┐
        │All Civil Disputes│      │Power-Related Abuses & Problems│
        └──────────────────┘      └────────────────────────────┘
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        ┌──────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────┐
        │All Employees │          │Party Members and Officials│
        └──────────────┘          └──────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────┐
│Administrative Mediation   │          │Residential Mediation      │
│By Leaders                 │          │By Mediators               │
└──────────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────┘

                  ┌──────────────────┐
                  │Union Mediation    │
                  │By Mediators       │
                  └──────────────────┘

                  ┌──────────────────────┐
                  │Step One: Case Taking │
                  └──────────────────────┘

            Watch Out For Early Sign
              Catch A Case On-Spot
    Reports From The Concerned Or Assignments From Leaders
       Formal Plea Or Application From Disputants

              ┌──────────────────────────┐
              │Step Two: Investigation   │
              └──────────────────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────────┐
              │Step Three: Education │
              └──────────────────────┘

          ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
          │Step Four: Persuasion and Conciliation│
          └──────────────────────────────────────┘

              ┌──────────────────────┐
              │Step Five: Agreement  │
              └──────────────────────┘

            ┌────────────────────────────┐
            │Step Six: Implementation    │
            └────────────────────────────┘
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Figure 8. Quasi-Justice

various channels which include on-spot observation, interviews of direct disputants, their relatives and friends, and the mass informants around them, fieldwork in disputants' home towns and former work units, and obtainment of documentary proofs from related official agencies.

Third, disputants are made cognizant of related laws, rules, policies, facts, mass opinions, and possible negative consequences through a series of private and public talks, meetings, and hearings. Public hearings are attended by conflicting parties, mediators, neighbors, fellow workers, and sometimes an official or legal advisor from the local government or the people's court. According to the interview as well as documentary sources, patience, persuasion, and education skills are particularly required from mediators in this stage to avoid unprincipled compromise and to overcome any deadlock for conciliation (The Bureau of People's Mediation 1983; Sun 1988).

Fourth, disputants are brought together for formal conciliation. Settlements are various, ranging from self-criticism, offer of apology, assurance of self-correction, return of the disputed objects, and offer of labor services, to monetary compensation. Agreements can be either oral for minor cases or written for major disputes when the parties concerned request a formal documentary record. By the official regulation, registration and written records on the mediation process are required of all cases (The State Council 1989).

The final step is the execution of mediated settlements. By law, mediation settlements do not take any legal effect. They are non-binding. No individuals or agencies can enforce them beyond the willingness of disputants to abide by the agreement (The State Council 1989; The National People's Congress 1991). However, as the work unit and the local people's government is required to support the mediation committee's resolution and the mediation committee itself oversees the process of implementation, pressure exists realistically on disputants to fulfill their promised obligations in a mediation agreement.

3. Nature

Quasi-justice in Chinese work organizations has its unique features in terms of ideological base, political and economical function, and public conception.

Maoism   Quasi-justice in the work unit, or mediation among neighbors and working people, is based upon communist ideology. According to Mao, socialist construction is a mass movement. To increase production, the working masses need to be aroused, educated, and organized. To organize the masses, intra-contradictions among them need to be settled. Viewing the thought as a reflection of internal and external contradictions, Mao argued that people's thought be first changed through criticism, education, and other reform methods for a resolution of their contradictions.

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Applied to mediation, mediators ought to take a dispute as an opportunity to propagandize the masses about the CCP's policies, change their attitudes, and help them adopt correct methods for viewing and approaching various matters in the world. Mao also formulated the well-known principle of 'dividing one into two' and insisted that there are always two sides of an issue. By this principle, mediators need to take into account different perspectives of both disputing parties. It is wrong to simply blame one for the other or to seek a compromise solution by just asking each party to give in half way.

Political and Economic Function Quasi-justice in Chinese work units is not merely a mass mechanism by which unit members apply available resources to settle disputes among each other. It instead assumes important social control functions for the work unit authority. Politically, quasi-justice serves as a surveillance mechanism and strengthens local order within the work unit. As a commonsense, civil disputes exist universally and need to be managed constantly. Quasi-justice deploys politically reliable mediators among unit residents and employees. They propagandize the party policies and watch out for early signs of violation and rule-breaking behavior. They resolve civil disputes timely and locally and prevent them from developing into vicious crimes which may inflict serious property damages and endanger human life. In one word, quasi-justice is key to maintaining

normative order and collective solidarity required by socialist relationship of production in Chinese work organizations.

Economically, quasi-justice avoids or reduces damages and losses, saves expenses, increases the efficiency of human power, and therefore facilitates production and business activity of the work unit. Concretely, it first relieves disputants from conflicts and helps them concentrate on their work. Second, it is free and locally available, saving disputants a lot of time and money. Third, it insulates work unit management from civil conflicts and focuses it on production and substantive affairs. Fourth, some disputes are directly over production and business matters. Settlements prevent reduction of productive activities. Finally, mediation helps keep order and improve morality, and therefore contributes to the overall unity and stability of the work unit which can be also translated into economic productivity and business efficiency.

Public Attitude According to the interview, saving face is still a prevailing psyche among the populace. Unit members tend to have their disputes settled by the nearest support possible. They feel it a convenience that their disputes can be locally resolved through residential, employee union's, and administrative mediation within the work unit. They are also happy that they may freely expose their inner feelings to their mediators or direct leaders.

Among the interview respondents themselves, most saw quasi-justice, particularly mediation, as beneficial to the maintenance and promotion of mutual trust, friendly relations, and reciprocal business interactions. There were also a few raising concerns that mediation may block unit members from executing their legal rights.

4. Change

Local justice is a Chinese tradition. Mediation, as a mode of conflict resolution of civil disputes, can be traced back to the early stage of Chinese civilization. In primitive time, disputes were brought to clan and tribal leaders for settlements. Official mediators were formally installed by the Western Zhou Dynasty (1122-770 B.C.) for "solving disputes among people and harmonizing their relations" (The Bureau of People's Mediation, 1983:2). During the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.- A.D. 220), mediation was standardized as composed of three elders, one farmer, one handicraftsman, and one businessman. The Code of Da Ming elevated mediation, Disputes Handling Pavilions, even to the levels of county and prefecture (Sun 1988). The nationalist years featured an institutionalization of a formal Western-style justice system. But mediation was not abandoned. The Kuomintang (KMT) government promulgated the Code of Civil Disputes and made organizational and procedural regulations on mediation of disputes in neighborhoods,

districts, villages, and townships (The Bureau of People's Mediation, 1983).

Communist quasi-justice in work units and communities, as habitually seen by Western scholars (Cohen 1968; Li 1978), is a continuation of local justice in history. During Mao's era, the main theme of quasi-justice in work units and residential communities was political symbolism. Civil disputes, life or work conflicts, and other daily problems were handled through political persuasion and education. Some were suppressed if they could not be politicized to generate enough mass educational or mobilization value. Political offenses or events, on the other hand, tended to be dramatized and highlighted. Mass tribunals were set up to deliver justice in the first and final instances (Leng and Chiu 1985). Civil rights and legal procedures were often overridden by the political need for mass mobilization and class vigilance against reactionary sabotage (Lubman 1967; Brady 1982).

Deng's program of economic reform and legal construction does not overshadow quasi-justice in work units and communities. In fact, with emphasis shifted to the efficiency of production and the quality of life, civil problems and disputes are frequently generated in interpersonal dealings, families, and work places, involving oftentimes money and practical interests (Gan 1989). Unit members, after spiritual relaxation, are no longer reluctant to expose those problems and disputes to unit leaders or mediating mechanisms for

solution and resolution. Quasi-justice is put into frequent use.

In recent years, new rules and regulations have been publicly promulgated to guide mediation organizations and quasi-justice practices for procedural explicitity and legality. Old measures, however, are also utilized for practical ends and political gains. For instance, persuasion and education are reiterated. Mediators are asked to persuade disputants during mediation by the party lines and governmental policies. Out of mediation, they are also required to educate people with laws, rules, regulations, and various other official measures. As alleged by the authority, persuasion and education in this form help to raise people's legal consciousness and moral standard (Gan 1989).

5. Comparative Perspective

Justice in workplaces draws concerns from both practice and theoretical study. Work justice study began with Stouffer's (1949) classical research of American soldiers. Theoretical concepts, such as frame of reference, relative deprivation, distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice have been articulated to address various aspects of justice in employment organizations (Cropanzano and Randall 1993).

In practice, attention is mainly paid to grievance system, labor disputes forum, and other appropriate mechanisms

to achieve work justice. In the United States, the 1935 Wagner Act provides that "any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employers". The union, on behalf of employees, plays an important role in presentation, negotiation, and resolution of grievances and disputes to and with the management. In 1944, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a verdict. It prompts the articulation of Duty of Fair Representation which obligates the union to provide procedural justice when handling workers' grievances (Gordon and Fryxell 1993). In addition to the union, informal clusters or interest groups may also serve to resolve internal problems among a segment of organizational members. For instance, fraternities used to be popular on U.S. campuses. Interpersonal bonds among fraternal members are often forged and sustained through successful resolution of internal frictions.

Conflicts over division of labor, claim disputes, or general policy debates among different departments within an employment organization usually call for involvement of a board of trustees, management executives, or other rank and file officers for settlement. For instance, board of trustees hearings have to be conducted when an organizational reform proposed by the management is not agreed upon by all main constituencies. Associations and unions, as in collective bargain, may also spearhead an opposition against the management in such policy debates.

While most disputes and problems are handled through normal organizational setup and process, some ad hoc justice bodies can be established permanently or specially for dispute resolution. For instance, in American and Canadian construction contracts, a dispute review board is usually set up from the beginning of the construction. Its task is specifically to mediate claims and disputes between and among contractor, employer, engineers, and field workers (Severn 1991).

A higher authority may be appealed for intervention when differences among various interests are not resolved by justice resources available within an organization. This is especially true in collective bargaining. In the United States, a presidential emergency board may be created to render a justice decision to the two confronting parties in a large corporation whose service has a significant stake to public well-being or convenience. For instance, the 1993 flight attendants strike at the American Airlines was brought to an end at the request of the President (The Honolulu Advertiser 1993).

Compared to Western practice, quasi-justice in Chinese work organizations is generally a little closed from public discussions. It is guided by laws but human relations are often at stake with considerable significance. Also, procedural fairness may be overridden by the need for a quick resolution of substantive issues.

B. Control through A Para-Security System

Like quasi-justice, para-security is named in relation to the formal build-up of the state police, military, and other security forces. In Chinese work organizations, there are not only concrete committees and departments carrying out para-security. The penetrating, cross-checking, and vigilant living-working styles also play an important role in guarding the work unit collective against disruptive incidence.

1. Structure

Para-security involves a division of labor between the party system and the administration. On the side of the party, there is a special department of armed force, which corresponds literally to the CCP's central military committee. In the setting of a civil organization, the department has mainly two tasks to accomplish. First is to give all unit members basic knowledge about national defense and elementary training for military exercises. Second is to organize people's militia, train them regularly, and deploy them strategically to para-military defense positions in the local community. According to the interview, however, these two tasks are not always fully completed. Military training is actually not given to all unit members. People's militia members undergo some training sessions but are not strictly organized and put on constant duty. One exception is on

university campuses where all newly-admitted students are required to receive one month of military training.

On the part of the administration, para-security is carried out by two organizational bodies. The relatively informal one is the united defense and security committee under the residential committee. Its responsibility is to patrol the living compound, guard public housing facilities and private household properties, and report irregular persons or events to the local police station and the unit security department from which it receives advice, policy guides, and task assignments.

The formal organ is the security department in the work unit administration. The department is in charge of both production or other task-related safety and civil or criminal security. To the outside, it has connections with the district, municipal, or even provincial bureaus of safety, public security, secrecy maintenance, or foreign affairs. If the work unit's supervising agency has the same department, it is also subject to that department's advice and direction. Within the work unit, the security department is under the unit's central leadership who may authorize it to formally or informally designate an agent or representative or even establish a station in each division or section of the work unit. Residential united defence and security committees are counted as its stations in the unit's living compounds.

In the interviews, all respondents reported that their work units have a security department or section. Nine said that their work units are so large that the city establishes a police station on the unit's enclave and concedes it to the unit leadership. The station is housed under the same roof with the unit security department, sharing with it the same group of security officers and other staff. In official languages, the coexistence is called 'one batch of people and two pieces of plates'.

The size of the security department is dependent upon the scale of the work unit. The smallest has only one security person with other business to take care of. The largest has reportedly up to thirty persons on staff, including gate-watching guards, office staff, patrolling officers, and policy-makers or leaders. Security leaders are mostly former military officers. Patrolling officers and office staff can be recruited from ex-service men or women or other sources. Guards are usually contracted workers from rural or suburban areas. Several respondents said that their work units are assigned by the upper authorities to help a county or a region. Their unit guards are peasants from those counties or regions under the unit's help.

In addition to the functional security divisions, the work unit's bureaucratic authority is also at stake for para-security. It holds the power to approve all main initiatives from security divisions and controls the allocation of needed

resources for effective implementation of any approved measure. Moreover, unit leaders, from branches or sub-units to the top, can intervene in any security problem and take over regular duties from a specialized para-security division. In fact, unit leaders are often pleaded as the last legitimate authority within the work unit to settle security problems.

2. Process

Para-security covers a wide range of areas or issues. For all security or defense departments or committees, four major types of responsibilities can be identified from various interview reports. The first is to take preventive measures: patrolling the unit compound, watching out for theft and fire, guarding the gate, protecting public properties, checking whether faculty members and students wear the university badge, checking workers when they leave the factory, assigning guards for nightly duties, taking precautions during political movements, installing anti-theft glass, operating the security system such as video equipment installed in the unit's office building, convention security, foreigners' security, holidays and festivals, the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen anniversary, etc.

The second is to pass along the state security policies and process related formalities: security proof for going abroad, proof for household registration, certificate for food and oil supply, passport application, permit to the special

economic zone, briefing new unit members about the rules in dealing with foreigners, giving a lecture on security to those who are about to leave for a foreign country, organizing military training for students and people's militia, etc.

The third is to guard the work unit as a state institution or property and implement production-related safety measures: guarding the governmental agency, protecting production facility, company security, workers' physical safety, protection measures against high-voltage electricity, computer and equipment, security of technology and equipment, transportation security within the unit, fire, potential trouble or danger in workplace, transfer-dispatch-destroy of classified documents, protection of maps, documents, and the state secrets, advising unit members to buy a sleeper if they travel with important maps or documents, and so on and so forth. Respondents from the central ministries said that the state agencies in Beijing are classified into different levels of security protection. Those of second-class security are not guarded by the state armed police but by the para-military guards self-contracted from Beijing municipal security companies.

The fourth is to deal with troublesome situations or problematic incidents: control of fights, injuries after fights or scuffles, catching thieves, lost and found, law-breaking behavior, travel violation and accident, etc. According to those respondents from production units, thefts,

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fights, and scuffles are frequent among workers or farmers. Some fights involving unit members took place even outside the work unit. Because of the unit's preoccupation with the production, minor matters are often put aside. Even for big thefts, since it is hard to find the true culprit and too much money and time have to be spent on investigation, the work unit usually opts to put the case behind it and look forward with more cautious prevention measures.

Cases under the jurisdiction of para-security can be reported directly to a concerned department or committee by the persons involved or by-standers on the scene. Security or defense committees or departments are also obligated to patrol the work unit, approach possible targets, and catch cases in the first instance. Sometimes, unit leaders are first notified of a possible or on-going problem. They may call upon a security division, pick up major in-charge persons with them or dispatch them to the site to bring the situation under control. There were respondents offering particular comments to illustrate this direct connection between para-security and unit leaders. One respondent (3MUR:RSeP3) said: "We turn most problems to the unit leaders who sometimes pass them to the security department." Another explained (4FHM:PSeC2): "The security department is operated under the work unit's leadership. Its duty is to collect information and to contact the municipal police when unit leaders decide to do so."

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Defense ─────────────────────────────── CCP Military Committee

Public Security ─────────────────── National Security

                    Central

                   Provincial

              Municipal or County

                   District

Police Station ───────┬─────── People's Militia

                   Work Unit

Department of Security            Department of Armed Force
   Administration                          Party

        United Security & Defence Committee
              Residential Compound

              Preventive Measures

         Security Policies and Formalities

             Business-Related Safety

          Control of Problematic Incidents

               Military Training

              Community Defence
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Figure 9. Para-Security

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In the interview, a variety of para-security cases, along with handling strategies and steps, were reported from the interviewees. The narrative materials can be lumped into the following types.

Unit Authority Mobilized   There were eight interview cases in which unit leaders were mobilized to handle a problematic incident. Reasons for unit leaders to intervene vary. One factor is the size and working style of the work unit. In work units of a manageable size, unit leaders may have close contacts with all their members. Division of labor is often blurry. One respondent (2FUS:RNeC1) from a small research institute described an incident: "One colleague lost his bike in a public parking lot outside the work unit. One day he accidentally found it was parked within our unit's compound. It was obvious that someone from our unit had stolen the bike. The matter was reported to the unit leaders and was resolved by them."

Another factor is the political sensitivity and implication of the case involved. One respondent (2MUO:GSeS1) told a story in which disappearance of a package of classified documents led to the county government to form a task force in the county bureau of public security for special investigation. Another (2FGR:RNeC2) reported that her unit leaders were shocked by politically-instigated leaflets found in a mail package from abroad and ordered the unit security department to send it to the upper authority for further

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action. Case three was provided by a former university faculty member (2MGT:USeP4):

> One of our students went with a foreign missionary to practice and spread religion across the country. He was caught in Hebei and was put in custody. The local authority called the university to take him back. As his class counselor, I was ordered by the university leaders to go with one officer from the security department to return the student. The student was given a serious demerit-recording and put on-campus observation for one year.

Serious cases with significant economic values at stake or a large number of unit members implicated also invoke involvement of unit leaders. One respondent (2FUS:CSeC1) recalled:

> In our bank, once a large amount of money was not found in balance. Unit leaders were immediately notified of the incidence. Upon their commands, all on-duty employees were kept from leaving by the unit security officers to answer questions. The municipal police were called to the scene. Several suspects were taken away by the police. The case was broken: the person in charge of cash deposit admitted to have taken the money. The treatment was that he was asked to return the money and transferred to another work within the unit.

Sometimes, the persons victimized may feel only unit leaders have the legitimate authority to render them a justice. One respondent (3MGT:UNwP4) reported:

> A young university teaching assistant, just assigned from Beijing to Taiyuan, was assaulted by the children of two university professors. He took his case directly to the President for justice. The President authorized and gave direction to the department head of security to handle the matter. The result was that the professors were criticized for failing to discipline their children and ordered to offer a formal apology to and pay medical expenses for the injured teaching assistant.

When unit leaders are mobilized and make direct decisions, they may apply their discretionary power inherent in the unit authority. One respondent (2MGS:PSwS2) said:

> Our company, a joint venture, was burglarized. Several bolts of cloth worth several thousand Yuan disappeared. The inside investigation by the unit security found that it was done by an old employee from the company. The general manager saw the employee having contributions in the past and decided not to report the case to the police. He was ordered to return the objects and pay a fine.

Regular Duty Twenty-seven cases were reported from the interview about para-security departments or committees carrying out regular security duty in the work unit. For thefts, burglaries, losses, and other similar incidents, the unit security department is usually notified. Security officers run to the scene to collect related information. But oftentimes, they do not prove helpful to recover the losses. There were eight respondents reporting such unbroken cases handled by a para-security division. They included: the next room in our dormitory burglarized; my home burglarized; one of our unit members having money lost in his office; an Apple computer stolen from our laboratory; one unit family's TV set and video recorder disappeared; our unit lost a tape recorder; one of our neighbors' meal tickets stolen from her bedroom in our dormitory; and a TV set in our unit's public entertainment room disappeared.

However, if serious efforts are made, especially in cases when significant economic interests are involved, para-security in the work unit can do a good job. There were five

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interview cases in which lost items were reportedly recovered or the offenders were brought to justice. Three of them were independently done by the para-security of a work unit: one unit family's TV set stolen and found by the security department; one unit member's bike stolen and found with help from the security; and stolen steel from one unit's construction site recovered by the security. The remaining two were broken with help from the municipal police. The first respondent (2MUO:PSwS2) recalled:

> Ten kilograms of our products (700 Yuan/kilogram) were stolen. The unit security investigated the case and reported it formally to the city police. The case was broken in Henan after three months of criminal investigation by the city police. The unit security played an important role in the entire process, especially in uncovering the chief thief's planted agent within the factory.

Another respondent (3FUO:RNeP2) reported:

> One of our employees' motorcycle was stolen. The case was reported to the unit security department. Security officers investigated the incident and determined that the motorcycle was taken out not through the guarded gate but over the unit's wall. As such, they reasoned that it was a case involving more than one person. The case was then reported further to the city police. The theft group was caught by the latter in another case and the motorcycle was found among the group's confiscated properties.

In dealing with fights, disorder, taking or damaging unit properties, and other problematic incidents, unit para-security may take various strategies. For students, a lecture is usually given. Serious cases may be turned over to the university authority for a disciplining action. Reported incidents included: students involved in a bedroom fight

lectured by the security officers; two students fighting in a campus dining hall received a lecture in the security department; campus security officers called to deal with fights and sex scandals among students when violence was identified; and several minority students running into the girls' dormitory in drunkenness caught by the security and expelled by the university.

Among formal employees or their adult family members, reported disruptive incidents include: one unit worker stealing the factory's working clothes and selling them in free markets; workers stealing the factory's products and raw materials; several female farm workers fighting each other with upper clothes stripped off in front of male farm workers, and so on and so forth. To these problems, unit para-security may take both preventive and punitive actions. One respondent (3FUO:PNeC4) reported: "There are workers stealing nutritional medicine produced by our factory. Sometimes, it becomes so serious, body search is conducted by the unit security despite strong protests from workers." Another (3FHM:PSeC3) commented: "Workers often take valuable parts out of the factory. Fighting during work also takes place. The unit security has a lot to deliver. Treatments include: return of stolen items, fines, custody, and expulsion." In serious cases, unit security may call the municipal police for a formal treatment or sanction. One respondent (3MGR:RSwP2) made a general remark: "When a criminal event occurs within the work unit,

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the security department rushes to protect and record the spot while waiting for the municipal police." Another (3MUT:PSeC4) offered a concrete case:

> A son of an old worker worked in our factory as a temporary worker. He went to local restaurants and forced others to pay for his meals. When the people asked refused to pay, he beat them. After several times, the unit security was notified. He was taken to the local police. Because of other offenses, he was finally sent to a two-year labor-through-education program.

Finally, an important regular duty of unit para-security is to guard the work unit and protect the interests of the work unit and unit members in conflicts with the outside. In fact, many preventive measures are directed at the outside. There were three interview reports illustrating this point. The first was told by a former state farm worker (3MHM:PNeP4): "Thefts, burglaries, fights, sex affairs, and disputes with peasants nearby were handled by the farm security. One time, a wolf dog from our farm bit a peasant's female pig to death. It was handled by the security." The second (2FHS:SSeS2) was about a hospital:

> The hospital is walled. All gates are guarded by the security. Whenever problematic matters happen, the security is immediately notified to rush to the scene. The security also pays routine visits to each section and checks whether equipment is in secure conditions and doors are properly locked.

The last one was supplied by a respondent who worked as a university faculty member (3FUT:USwP2):

> The students run a little bar on campus. One day, they ran into a dispute with several workers from outside. The dispute escalated to a fight which led to the injuries of several students. The workers

ran from the scene. The campus security caught them and ordered them to pay medical expenses for the injured students.

Security Education Unit para-security is responsible to inform unit members of related security policies. There were several respondents saying that they were given an official briefing by the unit security department before leaving China to come to the United States. One respondent's (2FUR:RNeP3) description provided a typical illustration of this education session: "Before leaving China, the security gave me a talk and required me to love our country and not to do anything against the motherland."

Additional Prevention Taken After An Incident Preventive measures are often suggested and implemented by unit para-security after an incident. There were three interview reports showing such a tendency. They include: a faculty member's looted home leading to the security department's decision to install an iron door for all unit residents; a burglarized building provoking the residential united defense and security committee to tighten prevention and lobby the unit service department to install an iron gate for each housing unit and an iron door for each family; and a residential burglary causing the security department's reaction to install an iron door for each household and change the door lock into a security one.

An incident may also put the unit security department on alert. One respondent (2MUT:USeP3) told a story:

One night, a girl student went to the toilet and found a man watching her from a corner. She screamed for help and all students came out from their bedrooms. The man ran away. The campus security tightened the patrol. One week later, the girl accidently saw the man and grabbed him on spot. The man was a person living nearby. He confessed he often came to the girls' dormitory to watch and steal girls' belongings such as panties and brassieres.

Disciplining Action Against Security Personnel Security guards or officers may be held accountable for a security failure or disciplined for an improper action. There were three cases reported from the interview about such incidents. The first was told by a respondent (2FGT:USwP4) from a university: "Something from our department's storage was stolen during a holiday. The deputy chairperson designated for security was criticized." The second happened in a governmental agency where the respondent (4MUO:GNeP1) worked as a rank and file official:

> Our unit was looted on a rainy night. The thief entered nine offices, opened all cupboards, cabinets, and drawers, and took away cash and valuable items worth 30,000 Yuan. The burglary was discovered next morning when the staff came to work. The security rushed to protect the spot for the municipal police. The case was broken. The thief was a professional thief from Henan and caught in another theft occurred in Liaoning. The security guard on duty that night was suspended from work for one year. He came back to the unit after one year with his salary dropped one level. The stolen cash and items were not recovered. The unit and individuals took their respective shares of the loss. One staff put money in his office he just borrowed from the unit for a business travel. Since the unit has policy to instruct staff not to put money in office, he was asked to pay the stolen money back to the unit.

The last one was about a dispute between the security guards and a unit employee occurred in a research academy. The respondent (4MUR:RSwP2) reported:

> One of our researchers took his camera and video recorder out of the unit's compound. The guard at the gate asked him to provide a proof. He refused to do so and quarreled with the guard. The patrol guards stopped by the spot and took him away and gave him a beating. The employee took his case to the unit leadership and prevailed finally. The patrol guards' supervisor was removed from his position.

3. Nature

The existence of a para-security system in Chinese work units reflects the nature of employment organizations in socialist context. The Chinese work unit plays a dual role. On the one hand, it is a localized unit where ordinary citizens and working people organize themselves for business affairs, life routines, and associated security and safety. On the other hand, it is a governmental agency which creates, delivers, or imposes the official version of security and order upon commoners.

According to communist ideals, people from working classes are entitled to security and safety in their work places and living communities where they become their own masters (Seeking Truth 1990). The ideal fits into the grass-root point of view that individual citizens empower themselves to protect grass-root interests through the security mechanism within their work units. But in the perspective of controllers and controllees, it is essentially about the design of social

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order and the allocation of social power. If the ruling authority perceives its power as based upon the mass support, it is natural for it to build up social order locally through grass-root efforts. Or, if it perceives its power as omnipresent, it is also natural for it to extend its control to the basic social unit. The end is the same. That is, well-organized and controlled individual social cells or work units secure general order and legitimate the ruling authority.

Theoretically, the para-security system in Chinese work organizations provides a site where major control prototypes can be identified. For instance, the essential mode of intervention of the unit para-security is action control (Czarniawska-Joerges 1989). Incidents are caught by objectively explicit deeds and dealt with by effective counter-acts. Security actions often feature penal or coercive control (Horwitz 1990). Offenders are usually forced to surrender and can be put into custody against their will. Vicarious and referential control (Gibbs 1981) are also seen in action when security officers warn ordinary unit members, lecture trouble- makers, interrogates suspects, and forcibly persuade offenders into admission of wrongdoing and acceptance of self-correction.

Finally, the control executed through any particular para-security department or committee is by nature partial, reactive, and problem-specific. Its effect lies in both environmental and institutional support. According to the

interview, there exists in the work unit an all-inclusive control network over individuals. Contributing to this network is not only the security department or residential united defense and security, but also the entire power hierarchy, daily routine, and life style of the work unit. As admitted by most respondents, work unit members often feel obligated and habituated to expose their own and dig into others' details of personal life in their daily activities with friends, neighbors, and colleague. Everybody tends to keep an eye, an ear, a mouth, an interest, and a concern over other's acts, habits, words, gains, and losses in work and life. As a result, all are subject to pervasive gossip, surveillance, and human relation pressure. In other words, the pervasive surveillance and gossip pressure also work like a para-security system and help hold people in the mainstream of a close-knit community life (Merry 1984).

4. Change

A widely-known saying has persisted over Chinese history: "Heaven is high and the emperor is distant." During the long feudal dynastic period, local officials, landlords, bandits, or mountain masters each held on to their territories and practiced their own versions of law and order like a tyrant in a locale (Yao 1983; Sun 1988). The masses were oftentimes helpless and had to run under one of those umbrellas for basic protection. In relation to the central

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government, various strongholds controlled by local stakeholders existed as if they were a grass-root security mechanism organized by the masses to protect their different interests. Indeed, the pattern had contributed to and perpetuated the tradition of local security in Chinese civilization.

Contemporary para-security in work units and local communities may be seen as an extension of local security in history. But there exists a tremendous difference. The work unit or local group under communism is organized, connected to, and supported by the ruling authority. It is not a force used by defiant local elites to resist the government. Instead, it is a grass-root tool for the communist party to implement its policy lines to every localized corner and keep social order unit by unit across the entire society.

Para-security under Mao featured a mass mobilization and a class vigilance against reactionary sabotage (Lubman 1967; Brady 1982). In work units, priority was given to political purity, on-time completion of official assignments, and collective struggles against class enemies. Violation, failure to follow order, and various disruptive incidents were identified in the perspective of class enemies and their possible intentions of political sabotage. Unit members were made conscious of security and safety needs in terms of class struggle variables. During the night, collective patrolling

was conducted seriously by people's militia within and around the enclave of the work unit.

Under Deng, para-security in work units continues but takes a different orientation. First, the requirement from the authority changes from an sole emphasis on political loyalty to a general call for local order. Needs from unit members change from class consciousness to practical concerns. As political pressure is lifted, unit members are no longer educated to worry about the abstract danger of class enemies. But along with economic reform, most unit members become increasingly concerned with their physical and property safety and security in concrete terms. They begin to demand proper protection not only in workplaces but also in public and residential settings.

Second, the way in which the para-security system is organized is also changed. Generally, inputs of human power are no longer particularly stressed. Installation of security techniques and tools, instead, takes a slope. According to the interview, foot patrolling continues in work units but with less manpower because of the unit's preoccupation with due business affairs. Compensation is seen in efforts to modernize security methods and equipment. For instance, a number of respondents reported that their work units' office buildings are installed and monitored by security devices. An ever more effective control is maintained even without the presence of on-duty guards.

5. Comparative Perspective

Workplace safety and security in capitalist contexts involves both the body and the soul. Employees are concerned with their physical safety in production lines, transportation vehicles, or retail stores. But oftentimes, they are more worried about the security of their jobs as a means to survive and to develop a professional career. In physical security and safety, possible dangers may come not only from the work process itself, but also from increasing robbery attacks on business property and aggravated assaults against a particular type of profession. According to a recent report from the U.S. National Institute of Occupational Health and Safety, murder has been a leading cause of workplace deaths over the 1980s in Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, South Carolina, and Washington D.C. Taxi drivers, police officers, and retailers are the most likely victims of murder on work duty (The Honolulu Advertizer 1993).

Theoretical studies, in correspondence, fall in two major domains. Social sciences researches are focused on the security to maintain a job, psychological perceptions of possible layoffs, and social consequences of job insecurity. Engineering and interdisciplinary efforts, on the other hand, are engaged to invent, install, maintain, and understand various practical procedures and instruments for production-related safety and workplace security (Erikson and Vallas 1990).

To protect employees and properties from possible hazards, dangers, or robbery attacks, Western retail stores, office buildings, and production workshops are usually installed with security systems or safety monitoring devices. As workplace safety and security are featured and dominated by advanced tools and equipment supplied by modern technologies, use of human power is often reduced to a lesser extent. But there are exceptions. On farms, tourist facilities, or any workplace of large open space, human power is still utilized as a significant factor. On major U.S. university campuses, for instance, there is usually a special security force. Guards or officers patrol by small vehicles or on foot. Connected by an advanced communication system among each other and to the central control office, they can be made available to an emergency or incident immediately. On some campuses, automatic dialing telephones are installed in main points, allowing those in need of help to directly access a 24-hour security service by just hanging on the handset. The security service, although aided by material devices, is provided by a group of on-duty officers who stay ready to stop violence and render help in any needed situation.

Job security is basically left to the market force. Although legislative acts provide legal protection for employment contracts and the government responds to those unemployed and laid-off with social benefits, it is the

overall economic situation that sets the tone for social perception and reality of job insecurity.

Chinese work unit employees, in contrast, do not have to worry about losing their jobs, at least until their 'iron rice bowl' is crushed by further economic reform. Workplace security and safety by now mean to them singly a safe, clean, and orderly working and living environment. The institutional mechanism to achieve this state is para-security in work units. Compared to Western practice, Chinese para-security in workplaces has the following unique characteristics: (1) it is universally set up in work organizations and systematically connected to the state security machinery; (2) it involves a significant amount of manpower. Although it moves to more application of modern methods and tools, use of locally available human resources is still a dominant feature; and (3) there are few legislative laws or rules about the para-security system. The operation continues to be a convenient procedure for a localized work unit authority to keep desired order under its wings.

C. Control through Mass Vigilance and Inclusion

Control through collective vigilance and mass inclusion is a landmark heritage of communist mass movement. It signifies how the CCP relates itself and its policy programs to the general populace.

Collective vigilance is aroused by defining a confrontation with either a threat or a task and speculating an imaginative debacle in security or honor if the threat is unchallenged or the task is unfulfilled. Referential and prelusive control (Gibbs 1981) are usually activated in this control. For instance, in a legal education campaign or during the security month, references are made to cases of legal ignorance or security negligence for a formation of consciousness among all participants. Unit activists are encouraged to report feelings and situations which seem to represent the entire population of the work unit and indicate the necessity of a collective action. The purpose is to manipulate the behavior of the unit members and hold them on the track of intended programs or goals.

Control through inclusion is approached in the organizational literature (Allport 1933; Tannenbaum 1968). Its major tactic is a human-relations approach which enhances members' personal commitment to or identification with the organization and hence increases the possibility of a total amount of control (Tannenbaum 1968). In Chinese work units, in addition to the human-relations approach, inclusion is facilitated by contextual elements including the CCP's ideological advocation for people's governance, the unit's public ownership, and the unit population's cosmopolitan composition. It is customary that work units coopt their influential figures as employee representatives into the high

leadership echelon. Noted unit members are also recommended by the work unit to the Municipal or Provincial People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference. At the divisional level, common interests and collective honors are often stressed for assigned tasks. The strategy, along with the ideology of mass governance and obligation, is also intensively used by the whole work unit when it is swept into a movement called by the upper leadership.

1. Structure

Control through collective vigilance and inclusion is ingrained in the communist ideology, policy, and strategy on mass mobilization for formally declared political campaigns and practical programs. In official jargon, it is political-thought work. The institutional structure by which political-thought work is carried out is called political-thought troop or team. In work units, there is actually no definite organizational setup which exists specially to execute political-thought work. Oftentimes, it is the entire unit party and administration network that oversees the use of such control.

The Chinese Communist Party, in a sense, is an exclusive mechanism for control through mass vigilance and inclusion. As defined by the CCP Constitution, the party's mission is to propagandize, educate, inspire, and unite the people with the party policy lines, enabling them to become conscientious

participants in the implementation of the party programs (The Chinese Communist Party 1992). In work units, the CCP system takes a full organizational as well as operational scale in mass mobilization as it does at a level of government. The propaganda department keeps all unit members informed of the party policies. Negative factors are often singled out to arouse mass vigilance against them. The organization department requires all party members to network with ordinary people around them, identify activists and passive elements, and work on them accordingly. Affiliating associations including the youth league, women's federation, and employees' union all reach out to their respective subpopulation and bring their constituents onto the party line. There is usually even a special department for united-front affairs. Its task is to unite all different elements, such as intellectuals, repatriates, national or petty capitalists, and other revolution targets, to the cause of the party (The Chinese Communist Party 1992).

While the task of mass inclusion for political actions and collective vigilance against reactionary subversions are carried out by the party machinery, mobilization of all unit members in vigilant prevention of business-related accidents, fires, thefts, burglaries, or sabotage is a responsibility of the work unit administration. In general, all levels of unit leaders are made responsible for such possible problems under their respective jurisdictions and therefore, become serious

about their duties on the matter. In particular, the residential committee, especially its sub-committee for united defense and security, is in charge of residential areas. The security department, while coordinating all safety and security operations within the work unit, is responsible for vigilant and preventive measures in workshops, offices, and other unit business establishments.

2. Process

Collective vigilance and mass inclusion are first reflected in daily managing or administrative rhetoric. Unit leaders always try to win their subordinates' support, commitment, and dedication to the determined policies and programs, or assigned tasks. Influences or impacts from a failure, possible negatives or causes for a failure, and necessary measures of prevention or vigilance are habitually made explicit to all work unit members for them to stick to the line.

Collective vigilance is highlighted especially during political movements or task-related campaigns. According to the interview, it begins with a flash of propaganda in which the importance of the campaign is stressed, likely sabotages are predictively fabricated, various cases of failures and dishonors are supplied, and all unit members are thus made mindfully serious about the campaign task. During the program implementation, correct attitudes, right methods, and

appropriate operation procedures are emphasized to make all participants conscientiously vigilant against any possible wrongdoing. For instance, during the safe production month, unit bulletins or blackboards are usually filled with drawings, photos, and other highlights about safety operation, safety ignorance and negligence, accidents and their various vicious consequences, and preventive measures. Unit leaders intensify their on-site inspection with a particular emphasis on the safety and security aspect of work. As a result, all unit members are made vigilant against unsafe or insecure possibilities.

Mass inclusion is achieved through both institutional practice and exigent measure. Included in the institutional practice are civil rewards, promotions, co-optation, and recommendations to the upper authority. Rewards and promotions are dealt with in the previous section. They elicit extra dedication from unit members, especially the awarded, to collective actions. Co-optation is to integrate influential unit members into the governing body or process of the work unit. It makes unit members feel their voices are heard and their interests are represented. The recommendation is to send the names and deeds of an extraordinarily outstanding unit member to the upper authority for consideration of a higher award, appointment, or use as a mass representative in a governing body. It gives people a sense of personal accomplishment and social prestige.

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┌─────────┐                              ┌─────────┐
│Inclusion│                              │Vigilance│
└─────────┘                              └─────────┘

┌──────────────┐                    ┌─────────────────────┐
│Included are  │                    │Vigilance signifies  │
│made vigilant │                    │who are excluded from│
│against sabotage│                  │and who are included │
│from excluded │                    │in an official cause │
└──────────────┘                    └─────────────────────┘

┌─────────┐                              ┌─────────┐
│Vigilance│                              │Inclusion│
└─────────┘                              └─────────┘

┌──────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────────┐
│Subject:      │              │      Subject:           │
│              │              │                         │
│Thoughts, Acts,│             │Political Activists &    │
│& Speeches    │             │All Reliable Unit Members │
└──────────────┘              └─────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────┐              ┌─────────────────────────┐
│Objective:    │              │      Objective:         │
│              │              │                         │
│Prevention of │              │                         │
│              │              │    Physical Presence    │
│Reactionary Sabotage│        │   Spiritual Dedication  │
│              │              │                         │
│Criminal Incidents│          │   Isolation of Deserters│
│              │              │                         │
│Accidents     │              │Highlighting Collective Cause│
│              │              │                         │
│Failures      │              │                         │
└──────────────┘              └─────────────────────────┘
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Figure 10. Mass Inclusion and Vigilance

Across all work units, there are generally three official channels for mass participation. One is the employee union where different lines of unit members are proportionally present to push for common welfare interests. Another is the convention of employee representatives where mass inputs are displayed and collected on main policy initiatives of the work unit. Still another is the unit management or administration where mass representatives may be allowed to sit with formal officials to hear or participate in decision-makings. As a part of the CCP's general philosophy of mass governance, each level of government and party also reserves some nominal seats for local representatives. Work units may therefore recommend their members to sit in people's congresses, political consultative conventions, party congresses, and other advisory or mass representative bodies. In the interview, one interviewee (4MUR:PSeC4) admitted that he serves as a standing committee member for a municipal political consultative convention. He said: "as the chief engineer, I ride domestic cars for duty with the unit. But when the Municipal Political Consultative Convention calls me for a meeting or business, an exported car is dispatched to my unit to pick me up. I thus have an extra honor in front of our unit members."

Exigent measures are activated when a special task, a directive, or a command is passed on to the work unit by the upper authorities. The master piece is a mass mobilization convention in which unit leaders or even the upper officials

come to announce the task, explain its importance, articulate the work unit's plan to accomplish it, and make concrete requirements from unit members. In addition to the convention, propaganda is also set into motion. Political-thought officers are designated in each division and dispatched to individual unit members for spiritual arousal. They also help unit or division leaders direct individual actions to the course of task accomplishment. It is apparent that these strategies for mass inclusion and dedication have a similar effect to induce collective vigilance.

3. Nature

Control through vigilance and inclusion is preventive, inductive, and implicit. Its effect or value as a form of control lies in that sabotage, victimization, and other rule-breaking scenes or consequences can be avoided or minimized, if all concerned members are included to the positive pursuits of the collective and made vigilant against any possible mishap.

Inclusion has two layers of meaning in Chinese work organizations. On the first layer, all work unit members are physically brought together with some of their important representatives even co-opted to the leading center. This not only strengthens the positive force, but also reduces the chance for organized resistance and individualized deviance. In other words, the cost for controlling rule-breaking

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incidents is spared. On the second layer, physically included unit members are made spiritually devoted to the collective pursuits. This continues to double the positive force and save the cost for task completion. It also decreases functional failures and unintentional mistakes. As the collective cause builds up successfully with devotion from enthusiastic participants, a few deserters or deviants can become further isolated from the mainstream and overshadowed by the collective atmosphere.

Vigilance makes investment in prevention. Its gains and losses are often speculative. It loses or wastes the invested resources in the sense that the incidence it tries to prevent from occurring is fabricated and non-existent. For instance, class vigilance in the years of class struggle has proven to be more a political mechanism than a practical necessity. The return of vigilance is supposedly savings from the treatments which have to be delivered if a likely disturbing or rule-breaking incident is not prevented and direct losses which have to be suffered in an unstopped criminal victimization. The underlying logic for the benefit and necessity of vigilance is that the more mindful work unit members become in their business operations, the less likely production mishaps take place. Or in public order and property protection, the more preventive work unit members are toward possible or suspicious happenings, the less likely they suffer from a real

explosion of disorderly events or a significant loss of substantive valuables.

Another effect of public vigilance is that it often serves as an energizing mechanism. By commonsense, when people are made vigilant, they not only become mindful, careful, and conscious of all negative possibilities, but also tend to be active, conscientious, and committed to the positive course of perfecting a state of affair or accomplishing a desired goal. Likening this to mass inclusion, it is obvious that collective vigilance and inclusion are actually interconnected to each other. As illustrated by one respondent's (3FUO:RNeP2) thoughtful comments, "the state of spirit is subtle. When I am included in a mass campaign or movement, I always feel that I should be mindful about my acts and speeches and stay vigilant against any harmful idea or lure. But seeing from the opposite side, I find that I am vigilant against internal and external negatives because I stay collectively with the masses included in the movement." From an objective point of view, it can be legitimately said that the CCP has mastered the profound truism of human psychology and can apply it skillfully to mobilize the masses through collective inclusion and vigilance for its various action programs.

4. Change

There are definite differences between the period of Mao and that of Deng in the use of mass inclusion and vigilance.

Under Mao, mass inclusion was used in contrast to exclusion. In work units, members of good class backgrounds were included to the management or administration. Intellectuals, petty capitalists, and traditional elites with class problems were often excluded from main political or economic arenas, even the due area of their expertise. During the Cultural Revolution, a revolutionary committee was set up in each work unit to replace the old-style managing or administrative body. The committee was composed of first-line workers or politically-advanced employees. Regular officials with formal education or experience were mostly excluded from their positions (Bettelheim 1974; Seeking Truth 1990).

Vigilance was aroused in the perspective of class struggle. While civil problems were made trivial, criminal events were often dramatized as reactionary sabotage against national security and socialist production. Class enemies were imagined or created. Their criminal acts, sabotage, and disturbing plots were described by official propaganda as inevitable, imminent, and of terrible consequence. All unit members were taught to be vigilant in both their thoughts and acts. It was as if class enemies were on an epidemic spread. Everybody was vulnerable to them and needed to be armed against their possible plots and treats (Yue and Wakesman 1985).

For both inclusion and vigilance, a salient feature in Mao's era was their exclusive focus on spirit. Inclusion was

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first of all an ideological unity with the party. One mind and one virtue were expected from all social units and individual citizens across the country. One way to reach the unity was to make the masses spiritually vigilant, safeguarding their minds conscientiously against decadent, dissolute bourgeois and revisionist thoughts and lifestyles. As instructed by Mao in a publicized slogan, "fight self-interest and attack revisionism."

Deng's period continues to see the practice of collective inclusion and vigilance for social control. The practice's meaning and approach, however, are changing. Inclusion becomes differential and discriminatory. Social elites are coopted into the governing echelon. The general masses are included to the process only as instrumental agents for goal attainments. Vigilance is still grass-rooted but no longer prompted by class struggle. Instead, it is guided by practical needs or substantive interests. For instance, increasing crimes against persons and properties raise the level of civil vigilance against possible attacks or robberies among unit members in their residential compounds. In work places, as the link of their personal gains to the work unit's overall economic efficiency is made direct and clear through responsibility reform, unit members also become mindful about various safety operation procedures. Vigilance against job negligence or dereliction is increased as well. As one respondent (3MHM:PSeC3) put, "we are very careful to avoid accidents and

defective or under-quality products, because we all recognize that they will make us suffer in the end. On the other hand, if we are just a little more careful, we can soon see the pay-off."

5. Comparative Perspective

Western vigilantism, in its classic sense, refers to organized, extralegal movements, the members of which take the law into their own hands. In the United States, vigilantism arose in the 18th century as a response to the absence of effective law and order in the frontier region. According to Brown (1975), vigilante groups were variably named as 'regulators', 'vigilance committee', 'committee of safety', or 'mobs'. They had two main characteristics: (1) regular organization and (2) existence for a definite period of time. In modern times, although the legal system has extended to every possible jurisdiction, vigilance is still seen in practice in its traditional or modified versions. For instance, the Watergate event exemplifies the vigilante mentality in its old sense, i.e., burglary and other felonies being justified in the interest of national security or taking the law into one's own hands for the public good (Brown 1975). The neighborhood watch or vigilance committee, on the other hand, represents a modified version of vigilance which contributes to local order and complements the formal justice system. Lack of adequate legal protection, of course, also

remains a reason for local vigilance. For example, a group of local residents in Hawaii were reportedly planning to form some kind of vigilant watch effort after the police failed to remove an alleged drug operation from their neighborhood (KHON 1993).

Inclusion is theoretically connected to control first through micro study of group development when Schutz (1958) found that group process follows a staged cycle of inclusion, control, and affection. In macro social dynamics, the dilemma of inclusion and exclusion has long been one of the central issues for national integration and control. The United States provides an exemplary case with its history of slavery, the liberation of slaves, residential and school segregation and desegregation, and civil rights movements, and its current debates of racism, abortion, and gay and lesbian recruits in the military. As put by Shklar (1991) in a lecture title, the American citizenship is a quest for inclusion.

In a comparative perspective, the uniqueness of Chinese mass vigilance and inclusion is: (1) vigilance is oftentimes officially aroused from the top against socially-identified targets such as class enemies or criminals, or for socially-pursued programs like political campaigns or special assignments; and (2) inclusion is not based upon on ethnic line, personal identity, and social wealth. It is rather a matter of political participation in active social agendas. Mass inclusion is set to show both an agenda's popularity and

the populace's dedication to its fulfillment and loyalty to its sponsor. A few are excluded mainly to signify the sacred nature of the program.

D. Interconnections

It is apparent that the various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations are interconnected. Also, some general features or patterns become recognizable when all those major forms are examined altogether.

1. General Feature

As a whole, several contrasts can be identified from among the various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations. These contrasts denote general social control features in the theoretical context.

Regional vs. Overall Regional control is confined to a specific issue, area, or segment of population in the work unit. Overall control, in contrast, is applicable to all occasions and all unit members. Among the various forms of social control discussed, residential control is regional because it is exercised among unit residents living in unit housing facilities. Ideological control, control through confidential records, and control through mass vigilance and inclusion are overall because they are applied to all unit members. Control through a civil reward and penalty system, administrative disciplining, control through quasi-justice,

and control through para-security can be seen as regional when they target particular unit members and handle specific incidents. But in the meantime, as they are universally installed, responsible for and affecting all unit members, they are overall.

Community-Based vs. Bureaucracy-Based Community-based control depends upon the reality that people live and work together and have close ties among each other. Bureaucracy-based control, on the other hand, is based upon a bureaucratic organization where people are disciplined to perform a specific task. By this distinction, residential control is obviously community-based, while control through confidential records, control through civil reward or penalty, and administrative disciplining are bureaucracy-based. Ideological control, control through mass vigilance and inclusion, control through quasi-justice, and control through para-security are mixed, because they not only draw from community-based resources but also rely upon the work unit bureaucracy for support and coordination.

Soul-Oriented vs. Body-Oriented Soul-oriented control is directed at spirit, thought, and speech. Body-oriented is instead focused on an objectively-observable act or behavior. Ideological control is obviously a clear-cut type of soul-oriented control. Control through confidential records and control through mass vigilance and inclusion appeal to the human spirit but what are recorded in dossiers, prevented by

vigilance, or intended through inclusion are oftentimes respectively objective deeds, disruptive incidents, or collective actions. In other words, they are mixed. Residential control, control through civil reward or penalty, administrative disciplining, control through quasi-justice, and control through para-security all begin and deal with objective behavior or event. They are body-oriented but not of such a clear-cut type because they also stress the importance of attitude and education.

Positive vs. Negative Positive control refers to the use of inclusive, indicative, stimulative, and integrative measures to make people physically and spiritually committed to the collective cause of an organization. Negative control, on the opposite side, mobilizes preventive, corrective, punitive, or coercive tools to deter, contain, and control rule-breaking tendencies or behaviors and to deliver punishments to corresponding offenders. Applying this contrast to the various forms of social control in Chinese work units, it is apparent that ideological control, control through civil rewards, and control through mass inclusion are positive. Control through punishments, administrative disciplining, and control through para-security are negative. Residential control, control through collective vigilance, control through quasi-justice, and control through confidential records are not clear-cut. They all involve both positive and negative elements. For instance, control through quasi-justice hands

out punitive or corrective treatments in a settlement but also features an essence of conciliation and integration in its effort to bring disputants into a peaceful agreement. Likewise, control through confidential records keeps positive deeds, giving people a sense of pride and accomplishment. It also records negative behaviors, making people scared and regretful.

In addition to these four contrasts, other perspectives or criteria also can be used to distinguish the various forms of social control in Chinese work organizations. For example, ideological control and control through mass vigilance and inclusion can be said to be communism-specific. Others are instead non-communism specific.

2. Mutual Connections

Specifically, each form of social control is linked to others in the overall organizational and control dynamic in Chinese work units.

Ideological Control Ideological control is overall and diffusive. In residential control, one task of a neighborhood committee is to distribute party and governmental policies among residents no matter whether or not they are already briefed in their work places. Dossier records cover political thoughts, speeches, and attitudes in first place. Control through civil reward or penalty stresses the propaganda rhetoric of a reward or penalty. Administrative disciplining

begins with educational propaganda of basic principles and rules. Self-criticism, lecture from leaders, and pubic warning are no different than an ideological session. The basic method for quasi-justice is persuasion or talk, which means a resort to the official ideology. In para-security, the meaning of an incident is often understood in terms of its ideological value. The response is worked out accordingly. Mass vigilance and collective inclusion are entirely buttressed by ideology. Spiritual instigation is present from beginning to end as a tool, a stimulant, or a magic wand. In one word, ideological control penetrates all other forms.

Residential Control   Although residential control is regional, its site, target incident, or handling result can be used for or, transferred to, that of other forms of social control throughout the work unit. For instance, ideological control and control through mass vigilance and inclusion see residential compounds as an important front and often add their forces to residential control. Good deeds or serious violations in residential compounds may either surface to the civil reward and penalty system, or catch the muscle of administrative disciplining, and be entered into personal dossiers in the end. Most saliently, residential control overlaps with quasi-justice through mediation and para-security through united defense and security.

Control through Confidential Records   Dossier record is a depository of any eligible deed and treatment from all

control areas. Civil rewards can be written down. Civil penalties and administrative disciplining decisions are required to be entered. Good or bad performances in all action programs of ideological and residential control as well as of control through quasi-justice, para-security, mass vigilance, and collective inclusion can be crystallized in annual evaluations and reflected in dossiers. For instance, 'closely follow the current situation' in an evaluation-by-leader may indicate that the person concerned does well in political studies and other ideological control areas.

Control through Civil Reward or Penalty The relationship control through civil reward or penalty has with administrative disciplining is: the former is to praise, award, and encourage good behavior and excellent performance. Its penalty sector is role-oriented, confined to self-shame and public embarrassment. Administrative disciplining, in contrast, is formal, with resort to the administrative stake the organization has over its members' substantive interests. With all other forms, the relationship is dual. On the one hand, control through civil reward or penalty can be applied to the area covered by each other form of control. For instance, an activist may be praised for political study in ideological control. A model may be awarded in the patriotic health movement through residential control. Their respective action programs can be thus reinforced. On the other hand, each form of other controls may supply a candidate in its

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perspective to the civil reward or penalty system for unit-wide or upper level contests. For example, model mediator, dossier staff, security officer, safety-minded employee, or program activist may enter into a unit-wide contest for advanced employees.

Control through Administrative Discipline Administrative disciplining is one of the highest control procedures and can be applied to any area within a work unit. Targets or a malpractitioner from ideological and residential control as well as from control through confidential records, civil rewards or penalties, quasi-justice, para-security, mass vigilance, and collective inclusion can be treated by administrative disciplining. For instance, a habitual absentee from political studies or an ideological official who abuses power for personal revenge may be similarly disciplined through administrative procedure.

Administrative disciplining refers to dossier records. Civil rewards may be redeemed for lesser disciplining actions. Quasi-justice and para-security treatments are also taken into consideration. In fact, when quasi-justice goes to the court and para-security leads to criminal investigation by the police, unit administrative disciplining may be overturned or at least has to be modified. For instance, dismissal is automatic to any unit member who becomes a convicted prisoner.

Control through Quasi-Justice Problems and disputes which happened in an area covered by a form of social control

can be resolved either by in-charge leaders within that form of control or turned to a standard quasi-justice forum or unit leaders for settlement. In other woads, control through quasi-justice is both diffusive across each other form of social control and autonomous as a self-claim entity. For example, the security department shall be able to settle a dispute among its guards or between one of its guards and a unit member in a security scene. But sometimes, a security measure or treatment may cause so much displeasure or dissatisfaction among unit members that unit leaders may have to designate the union or residential mediation committee to resolve the problem or do it by themselves.

Control through quasi-justice crosscuts with residential control due to the residential mediation committee and with control through para-security because of the shared goal to bring an incident under control. When unit leaders are engaged to hammer out justice through administrative mediation, disputes from administrative disciplining as well as from the division of labor can be also dealt with.

Control through Para-Security   Unless minor problems, security incidents occurred in a jurisdiction of a form of social control are generally turned to a para-security department or committee for treatment. Except for major unit leaders, lower level leaders tend to distance themselves from a security scene. For instance, dossier officials may be able to fix misplacement of documents by themselves. But loss of

confidential records definitely warrants a call for intervention from para-security.

In fact, all other forms of social control count more or less on para-security protection for orderly execution of control within their respective areas. In ideological control, important studies or conventions are usually guarded by the para-security force. In residential control, the united defense and security committee is a formal para-security station in neighborhoods. Protection of confidential records is a para-security concern. Large awarding ceremony or disciplining occasions have the presence of para-security guards. Highly-publicized awardees or disciplined persons may even have to be carefully watched by para-security for possible incidence. In quasi-justice, para-security may act as an enforcement authority of an agreement. Para-security often leads the charge in mass vigilance and inclusion.

Control through Mass Vigilance and Inclusion First of all, mass vigilance is internally connected to collective inclusion. Vigilance signifies who are included and who are excluded from a program. Inclusion draws the line by which those included are made vigilant against sabotage from those excluded. With other forms of social control, vigilance and inclusion are obviously present in ideological and residential control. For instance, working class people are officially ideologized as the master of their society. Residents are often made vigilant against neighborhood thefts and crimes. In

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control through confidential records, people are warned of their acts and thoughts. Control through rewards induces mass inclusion and commitment, while penalty and disciplining distance those excluded and educate those included not to do so. Vigilance is used as a conventional instrument for prevention of disputes and security problems. The essence of quasi-justice and para-security is mass inclusion through conciliatory and corrective return of community order and solidarity.

All in all, the various forms of social control in Chinese work units are connected with each other. They altogether form a literal network of social control which gives a maximum possible prevention and treatment to all probable problems, obstacles, resistances, deviations, disruptions, or failures in a work organization. For individual unit members, from work places to residential compounds, from the soul to the body, every possible chain of thoughts and acts are guarded, guided, and taken care of in the normal course of collective actions.

It ought to be pointed out, however, such a seemingly inescapable network of social control is still not a perfect system which solves or even uproots all problems and imposes a stable order permanently. There are system loopholes, elapses, mistakes, and failures, as well as human conflicts, complaints, avoidances, and resistances. In fact, the very existence of the network signifies that problems are

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constantly produced and reproduced and incessant responses and treatments are needed to deal with them effectively.

3. The Nature of Chinese Work Organizations

Along with and beyond the general feature and mutual connection, a fundamental theme or question which emerged from the forgoing descriptions and analyses of various forms of social control instituted in Chinese work organizations is: what is the nature of the Chinese work organization?

It is obvious that none of the various forms of social control examined is specific, limited, or confined to any particular locale, time, and work unit. They all are universally instituted and standardized in all work organizations and, uniformly hooked up to and coordinated stably by the entire communist party system and the state governmental bureaucracy across the country. First, ideological control is based upon communist ideologies and implemented by a political-economic machinery controlled by the communist party. Political studies of party policy lines and state laws are openly claimed as an unshirkable obligation of all work units and individual citizens.

Second, residential control is a country-wide practice constraining individual movement from place to place. The basic organization of residential control, i.e., the neighborhood committee and its subcommittees for mediation and united defense and security, is categorically required for

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establishment and operation in urban communities by the State Constitution. The accompanied living service and subsistence supply are an essential feature of socialist state planning and rationing.

Third, control through confidential records is applicable to all state employees. Format, content, annual evaluation, access, management, and use of dossiers are standardized nationally. No matter where an individual works and lives, his or her dossier always accompanies with him or her, from the first day of schooling to death. His or her different work units write and keep the dossier. He or she is never allowed access to it.

Fourth, control through civil reward or penalty is a standard organizational exercise for all work unit managements. Formal rewards and penalties are oftentimes selected and delivered by the government beyond individual work organizations. The procedure to select an awardee or for a backward person to emerge is usually formalized at a level of government or across a region or a line of business.

Fifth, administrative disciplining is guided by the state law and connected to the state-party system. A standard disciplining package consists invariably of state rules, organizational by-laws, work requirements, professional ethics, and punishments for rule-breaking. Formal actions are publicly known as composed of public warning, demerit-

recording, demotion, transfer, off-duty observation, suspension, and expulsion.

Sixth, quasi-justice is a uniform operation across all Chinese work organizations. Intervention of leaders into employee disputes is a standard management routine. Conflict resolution forum is required by the State law in all employee unions and residential compounds. Mediation cases, approaches to them, principles, inhibitions, and procedures are specifically stipulated by law or governmental directives.

Seventh, control through para-security is universally set up in all work organizations and systematically connected to the state security machinery. Main security and safety responsibilities are common across the board, including preventive measures, security policies and formalities, business-related safety, control of problematic incidents, military training, and community defence. Also, use of manpower is a salient feature in all local para-security operations to keep work and community order.

Eighth, control through mass vigilance and collective inclusion is a characteristic communist strategy in mass movements. Inclusion induces individual commitment and dedication, both physically and spiritually, for social action programs. Vigilance guards against reactionary sabotage, criminal incidence, accidents, or work failures. They both are widely employed across the party system, the government, and all kinds of work organizations.

Linking this universal, uniform, and stable nature of social control practices to the general structure and process of Chinese work organizations, it is clear that the Chinese work unit is not merely a workplace where a group of people are employed to carry out a line of business under socialist state planning. It is first a local party branch to recruit, discipline, and manage party members among a segment of the general population and to pass on and implement the party policy lines in a territory of the country. It is also a basic governmental agency to ensure that a group of social members are properly fed, employed, and managed, and local order is maintained on the enclave of a social unit.

Such an essential nature of the Chinese work organization sets generally, a basic theme for this study and particularly, a stage for the following discussions of the political, economic, and cultural underpinnings of the work unit's various forms of social control.

CHAPTER 5

THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL CONTROL

IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS

The foundation of control is a subject which has not been properly and sufficiently dealt with in academic studies. Assuming that the criminal justice system is set for crime-fighting and order-keeping, and organization is geared to task performance and goal attainment, control literature focuses mainly on what types of control are put in place and how they are practiced. Although some Marxist or neo-Marxist criminologists try to relate punishment to social structure and modes of production (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939; Garland 1990), control study in general fails to examine the political, economic, and cultural context of various control structures and processes in a society or an organization.

The study of control foundations, evidently, is an area where the main varieties of sociological theory can be applied to generate substantive interests. Radical social theory and conflict perspective feature the confrontation between ruling and ruled classes in an imperatively-coordinated association or society (Dahrendorf 1959), and can be utilized to highlight political legitimization by the authority for its implementation of control practices or by the controllees for their organized or individualized resistance to those practices. Functionalism specifies social structure and

institution in terms of their functions for the maintenance of a larger social system (Parsons 1951), and may help to explain why a form of control contributes to organizational order and how organizational order contributes to the overall social stability. The exchange perspective points to the importance of reciprocity or compensation (Homans 1961), and should be able to provide a plausible interpretation of the underpinnings of the welfare system for social control. It may also throw light on the applicability of paternalism and patriarchism. For instance, the underlying moral justification for Chinese leaders to lecture their subordinates is that they also take care of them. Finally, the interactionalist theorizing draws interests to symbolic role-taking process (Blumer 1969), and may help understand why associated leaders or members volunteer to pay keen attention to each other in a closely-knit community or organization.

In this study, it is obviously not enough to just describe that there is a party system and a managing or administrative apparatus in the Chinese work unit and that they are connected to various governmental agencies and are able to put different means of control into action. To understand, it is necessary to draw upon theoretical contributions in the sociological literature, to dig into the political, economic, and cultural reality of socialist China, and to combine both to generate substantive insight on social control in the Chinese work organization.

A. Political Legitimization

China's power system carries the CCP's military heritage of setting up the CCP organization to the very basic unit. Although the new Constitution under Deng subjects the CCP members to law and denies any political organization the privilege of transcending or parallelling the government (The National People's Congress 1990), the CCP still maintains its level by level, unit by unit leadership throughout the governing bureaucracy and across the society (Seeking Truth 1990; The Editorial Board 1990). The CCP committees or branches are established correspondingly to all levels of government and social units. They control who is to do what, and how, by passing on the CCP policy lines, setting local priorities, appointing officials for administration or management, and making important decisions on all major matters under a jurisdiction (The Chinese Communist Party 1992).

In work units, such an insertion of the party system makes business affairs politically charged, fluctuating with different political swings. To individual members, the unit is not purely a place for employment. It is both a forum to participate in and contribute to and an institution to be anchored, disciplined, and controlled, for whatever political state and social order desired by an omnipresent central authority.

1. Ruling and Ruled

The CCP's state power theory is based upon the Marxist and Leninist visions of proletarian dictatorship. Its central idea is that the state machinery is a tool for one class to rule another (Lenin 1966). The goal of proletarian revolution in China is thus to overthrow the feudal, imperialist, and capitalist power apparatuses through armed struggles and to build a new people's democratic dictatorship. In the people's democratic dictatorship, the CCP takes leadership to unite all laboring class people, the majority, to apply dictatorship against all exploiting class enemies, the minority, in the old society (Mao 1975).

Ruling has long been an exclusive privilege for a small number of power holders. According to the CCP theory, socialist or communist ruling becomes the people's business, or a matter of the majority over the minority (Mao 1975). In actuality, however, since the ruled minority is annihilated or significantly weakened during the revolution, ruling shifts its focus from the confrontation between rulers and the ruled to the power distribution among the ruling majority. The CCP claims to be the people's representatives, but holds the national power in its hand, and is therefore the real ruling segment. The masses, nominally in the ruling majority, are virtually left with no executive power. They are instead organized by the CCP for the demonstration of its ruling strength and the maintenance of social order. In other words,

ruling under socialism is, essentially, still a minority prerogative for the CCP.

It is thus apparent that there are two basic distinctions. One is between the ruled minority and the ruling majority. The other is between those who hold power and those who are united around the power as a part of the ruling majority. The interests of the three groups are obviously different, and basically in conflict. As the power holder, the CCP needs to suppress its identified class enemies and minimize their resistance. More importantly, it needs to mobilize, organize, and energize ordinary people in the ruling class for its desired social programs, goals, and order. The ruled minority is weak but struggles to survive physically and even to preserve and advance its values, ideas, and ethics. Laboring people are diverse in terms of needs and wants. They distinguish themselves from the ruled minority and hope to meet their needs by following the CCP's policy lines. On the other hand, as they recognize that they provide legitimacy for the CCP's rule and remain to be a de facto force indispensable to the CCP's success, they also dare to stay inactive or even stage protests to voice their resistance, demonstrate their strength, and win their own cause (Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems 1990).

Where are the three groups positioned? The power holder CCP has its own party system and occupies the governmental bureaucracy, both of which constitute its institutional

network and tool to display and execute the ruling power. The ruled minority is put under the state dictatorship or sent to the laboring people for re-education and supervision. Laboring people in the ruling class are distributed across work units where they are organized to self-rule themselves, answer the CCP's call, and apply the people's democratic dictatorship to a few reactionary elements. The work unit is thus an extension of the governing machinery to and among the masses. It bears three responsibilities. For the CCP and its state, the work unit is a basic organization to put people in place and make good use of them. To laboring people, it is where they act like a master of their own and feel the sense that they belong to the ruling class. To the ruled, it is a place to be monitored, supervised, and re-socialized.

In such a political context, it is understandable why various social control practices are institutionalized in the work unit. In fact, if the state is called a coercive, formal machinery of class rule, the work unit can be seen as a civilized, informalized form of people's governance. The essence is that the work unit is a governing mechanism. For instance, the unit security department, as an extension of the armed force and the police, acts like a police station and has the responsibility to pass on and execute all security-related directives and tasks from the government. In the unit, it is a tool for unit members, laboring people, to safeguard their public and private properties and assume their democratic

dictatorship against reactionary elements. The mediation mechanism, as an extension of the formal state justice system, also provides laboring people self-rule and a procedure to resolve problems among themselves for local peace.

2. Mao: Work Units as A Basic Tool
for Proletarian Dictatorship

As a governing mechanism, work units have all elementary control setups and practices as instituted in a local government. The control system, while staying structurally stable with regard to its outside connection and inside layout, fluctuates and swings processually, up and down, left and right, along with the change of national political climates.

Mao saw the work unit as a basic tool for proletarian dictatorship. In his vision, there are three dimensions along which to evaluate a work unit in terms of its control effectiveness. One is the degree to which the unit is connected to the center of the proletarian dictatorship and the quickness by which it responds to his calls. Another is the scale and depth of proletarian participation in the management of business affairs in the work unit. If laboring people are kept out by a few elites from the unit administration, what is the point of the proletarian dictatorship? The third is whether reactionary elements are suppressed, controlled, and disabled from staging resistance

and sabotage against the order of the proletarian dictatorship (Mao 1975).

One practice which illustrates Mao's use of work units as a tool for proletarian dictatorship is the organization of people's militia. There is a formal armed force under the CCP leadership as the sacred protector of its power (The Editorial Board 1990). This force is somehow exclusive. For laboring people to engage in the protection of the motherland and the general social order, people's militia need to be organized in work places and local communities. They exist locally as a safeguard against any sabotage from class enemies. For the upper authorities, they can be easily mobilized and used against imperialist aggression and other defined enemy targets. People's militia are thus not only an extension of the armed force to the civil areas but also an opportunity for laboring people to take part in the proletarian dictatorship.

Another aspect worthy of notice is Mao's frequent use of class struggle strategy. It provides a classical case for the functional perspective of social conflicts (Coser 1956). Mao's conflict approach features a selective struggle against a handful of class enemies. Its salient point is to serve Mao's political goal. In work units, for instance, it first puts the unit control system on constant alert, making it ready to answer the call from the center. Second, it creates a sense of participation, control, and governance among laboring people and therefore motivates them to make devoted contributions to

the CCP's course of socialist revolution and construction. Third, it directs people's attention from their living well-being and saves the controlling authority from the economic cost of social control. Finally, as conflict functionalism theory points out (Coser 1956), it unites people, clarifies group identity, and strengthens collective solidarity. In the interview, those interviewees who worked under Mao's era unanimously admitted that they had a deeper feeling of being a part of their work units in those days than after Deng's economic reform.

3. Deng: Work Units as A Basic Unit
for Socialist Production

Like Mao, Deng claims to be a revolutionary. But his approach proves actually the reverse, i.e., he is a pragmatist with even a sense of elitism. The point is that he does not see the revolution as a matter of mass mobilization and participation. Instead, he stresses that proper institutions are set up, capable people are put in charge of affairs, and mass actions are managed for productive outcomes (Deng 1984). For work units, he does not think it is wise to create a revolutionary focus other than the due business. In other words, the best way to incorporate a work unit into the CCP cause is not to revolutionize it through political campaigns but to have it concentrated on its business and production. The logic is practically clear: if each work unit keeps its

compound in good order, puts its population under control, and turns out products or performs tasks efficiently, the overall social stability and prosperity will increase and be ensured.

The approach is obviously functional. To pursue it, Deng stages his economic responsibility reform. The main initiatives of the reform include: (1) use of division of labor to partition work responsibility among groups and individual workers; (2) application of economic incentives to encourage individual commitment; (3) co-optation of technocrats into the party and state system by putting them in charge of professional and production affairs in work units; and (4) relative separation of the party from the administration with the latter granted a degree of autonomy in running business affairs in work units (Deng 1984). The goal of all these measures is to increase work efficiency and to raise productivity. In fact, when work units are seen as basic units for socialist construction, the primary concern is naturally on whether they are organized effectively to turn out products, deliver services, and handle various business matters as specified in their missions or tasks.

Does Deng's focus on work outcomes enfeeble the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and loosen the party's control? This is exactly what Mao hypothetically worried about. The point is that if the masses need to be led, is it less effective to be led by technocrats than their own activists? If the masses' revolutionary enthusiasm needs to be

channelled, is it less productive to be channelled to socialist construction than to class struggle? On the surface, when the masses are made to concentrate on task-related activities, they are less hyperactive in revolutionary drives. But in essence, when people are put in place to make substantial contributions to the socialist construction, which in turn helps increase the real strength of the center, the party indeed achieves a better control over the population.

4. Extra Stability:

All the Good Parts Make an even Better System

The central proposition of general systems theory is that the total of a system is greater than the sum of its parts (Miller 1978). From an institutional point of view, it means that it takes organizational efforts to coordinate various organic parts and integrate them well into a functionable system. By the philosophy of Chinese leadership, however, when the coordination mechanism is taken for granted, what seems important is that each individual part be made good, strong, and suitable for integration. In other words, the general systems theory proposition is reversed as: all good parts are expected to make an even better system.

The logic is applicable to both Mao and Deng. For Mao, a revolutionary state dictates that each cell, unit, or individual is made spiritually conscious of revolutionary needs and demands, and physically committed to revolutionary

causes. The other way around, if each social unit or member is revolutionized, the entire society will be under the same condition. Mao believed in the power of the masses (Mao 1975). Despite the fact that he stayed on the top, he always stressed the importance of grass-root elements and groups for revolutionary cause. The approach, officially called the mass line, worked well for him: under his reign, Chinese people were made active on, work units stayed tuned with, his revolutionary programs, and the entire society was like a wonderland of communist idealism.

Deng's expectation for social prosperity and personal wealth follows the same line of reasoning. He believes that social prosperity is built upon personal wealth. In other words, if each individual, family, and work unit is made self-sufficient, productive, and wealthy, the entire society will automatically become stable, strong, and prosperous. As a pragmatist, Deng recognizes that the road toward wealth is uneven and concedes that a portion of the Chinese population will benefit from his reform first and become rich ahead of the rest (Deng 1984). The concession serves Deng as a double excuse. Theoretically, he clears himself from Mao's concern of social egalitarianism. In action, he does not have to stage system-wide mobilization campaigns to push each social element into his reform program. In fact, he needs only to grant possibilities. It is up to each social unit to open the granted possibilities for its own fortunes. One caution is

that while a minority going ahead in wealth accumulation may be strategically workable in the beginning, Deng's envisioned social prosperity will not come until at least the majority of social units become wealthy and maintain some degree of balance among themselves.

In all, by the philosophy of Chinese leadership, social order, revolutionary states, productivity, or wealth are all rooted in basic social units. This explains why work units are able to function as building blocks to begin with, means to use, or goals to achieve in various social programs under even different political orientations.

B. Economic Foundation

Economically, public ownership arms the State with the power of allocation over all resources and means of production (Seeking Truth 1990). Lower levels of government need higher levels of government for approvals, appropriations, and policy lines concerning all important aspects of economic activities. Enterprises, work units, and all other organizations depend upon their respective governing agencies for inputs, through-puts, and outputs regarding their tasks and functions. Individuals have to turn to work units for housing, medical care, and supply of all survival needs, and rely upon them for a legal status of citizenship, an opportunity for employment and career development, and a proof of capacity to support their family (Whyte and Parish 1984). In a university, for

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example, faculty members need the unit's introduction letter and documentary proof to register with the local police and receive food, oil, gas, and tickets for groceries and other subsistence materials. They also depend upon the university's stimulating environment and legitimacy proof for a sense of dignity and a hope of self-realization. The university as a whole, is dependent upon central, provincial, and municipal governments for allocation of monetary and material resources. Without securing appropriate quotas, it would not be able to keep its scale, open new programs, and provide proper levels of housing, medical care, books and equipment, and other services for students and faculty. The authority it has over its divisions and even individual employees would be in serious question.

In all, the economic system of resource allocation grants differential stakes to the original and relay authorities over lower relay stations and ultimate recipients. As far as the work unit is concerned, it is first subject to differential control from central, provincial, and municipal governments in proportion to its differential dependence upon them for needed resources. The control it has over the unit components is also shaped by the substantive stake it holds in their economic life or interest-related matters.

i. A New Version of Exchange Theory

While stressing the economic dependence of work units upon the State and of individuals upon work units as an underpinning for substantive social control, it is irrefutable that there is a sense of exchange between the State and work units and between work units and individuals as commitment and subordination are concerned. Put directly, economic resources from the State stand as a 'mortgage' for work units to be an agent of social control for the authorities. The all-inclusive support provided by the work unit exists as a 'loan guarantee' for its employees to stick to its imposed order and discipline. As said by a welfare scholar, by providing tangible welfare support, "the CCP has not only consolidated its 'proletarian dictatorship' but also facilitated its control over deviant social and political behavior" (Dixon 1981:7)

Caution needs to be made, however, in drawing upon exchange theory. As is known, the central theme of exchange theory is that human interactions are guided by the exchangeable values the interacting subjects are able to offer each other (Homans 1961; Blau 1964). Its validity lies assumedly in that the two sides in an exchange stand on an equal footing and the values of the objects they offer for exchange are comparable and convertible. More restrictively, it is assumed that exchanging sides be independent from each other and have their own legally justifiable statuses.

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The Chinese case poses a challenge to the exchange theory in its original or orthodox form. On the one hand, there is an obvious, sufficient sense of exchange, mainly in the conscious calculations of the two sides involved in social control. The controllers, either the State or the work unit leadership, know clearly that an orderly, stable political situation is warranted by the tangible benefits they can offer to their subordinates. They first have to provide a basic level of support to which recipients become so habituated that it is taken for granted by them. Below the basic level, they can see how complaints rise rectilinearly and thus undermine their leading legitimacy. Above it, they may also experience how mass satisfaction and public support grow proportionally and therefore stabilize their leadership. Several respondents in leadership positions sighed that the real leverage their work units have over the employees is derived from interest-related matters even though the work units literally 'own' those people and try hard to propagandize the 'proletarian conscientiousness'. Especially after economic reform, material incentives seem to be the only thing effective to keep people on the move in workplaces. Unit members, from the perspective of controllees, recognize what they want, how to make demands on what they want, what to pay back for what they get, and how to keep their needs and their controllers' demands in balance through institutional order. As a number of interviewees directly said, their relationship with their work units is

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that of exchange in the final analysis. People do not like being lectured, monitored, restricted, and controlled. They live with it, because the work unit is the only place from where they can obtain what is needed to support their family and to develop their career.

On the other hand, underlying the aforementioned sense of exchange between the State and work units and between work units and their members is not a standard pair of partners who are on equal footing and possess clearly value-convertible objects for exchange. The State legally owns work units. Work units are not independent entities. Individual working people are not free laborers for sale in the market either. They are assigned to the work units because they as the masters of their country have the right to work rather than as the possessors of their labor force have the capacity to create values. The sense of exchange relationships among them is thus originally non-conventional in terms of their respective statuses. Moreover, a work unit is designed to perform a particular task for the State which is in turn obligated to provide with it infrastructure, resource, and other environmental services. Individuals are assigned to a work unit where they can display their potentials and have their working and living needs systematically met. By design or definition, all these relational flows of inputs or outputs are not a matter of exchange but a new pattern of social relationships out of the socialist revolution. In fact, the

substances in the relational flows among the State, work units, and unit members are in principal non-quantifiable, non-exchangeable, and even non-comparable. From individual units and members, what the State and work units need are devotion, loyalty, and commitment. From the State and work units, what individual units and members want are caring, nurturing, and concerning. Between caring and devotion, nurturing and loyalty, and concerning and commitment, there seems a loose causal relationship. But how much former results in a detectable or measurable latter? It is obviously not a matter of mathematical calculation between barterers and traders in an exchange. The sense of exchange is a misplaced mentality emerged from people's minds after a nobly-intended design is put into realistic operation and becomes contaminated by reality.

In all, the sense of exchange raised by respondents in their dealings with their work units can be approached by the exchange perspective. But it is a new version of the exchange theory, because the exchange partners are not relatively independent and the objects they have for or expect from exchange are not exactly convertible in values. In the following, the main economic resources the State provide for work units and the major benefits work units have for their working members, are concretely examined. The point to be made is that these resources and benefits justify and legitimize

explicitly or implicitly various normative values and control practices the benefactors impose upon their beneficiaries.

2. Between the State and Work Units

The essential economic interests the State exercises over work units, in terms of its relevance to the nature of social control, are rank, size, and business area.

First, rank is the political, legal, and economic status the State grants for a work unit. It determines what level of governmental agencies the work unit can reach for direction and supervision, how much power it has over the working people assigned to it, and to what extent a control apparatus can be installed in its governing body. On the one pole, the work unit may be granted no rank. As a result, the unit serves only as a plain work place for several people to earn a living, without cross-cutting inside and outside connections to hold its members in line. The exemplary case is a small workshop or factory under a street government. It is a work place to provide employment for local residents. Since the street government and the residential committee are readily available, it naturally leaves to them otherwise its own political assignments and social control responsibilities. On the other pole, the work unit may be elevated to a rank which is higher than several levels of government. Like some of the work units served by our respondents, rank can be as high as that of a prefectural, even a provincial government. In this

case, work units possess the full power to hear policy lines from the center, design their own governing and control mechanism, and implement commands, orders, and programs on their own. Sometimes, the effect of its control can even go beyond its confines to influence a segment of the general population. As one respondent (1FUP:GNeM2) said of its work unit, a leading media agency in the country, "what control ideologically befalls us unit members is what our unit is in charge to deliver to all other country fellows."

Second, size is not merely a matter of how many people are assigned to a work unit. It brings about different positions, titles, and professions, and exists as a basis for exact calculation of how much wage, resource, and supply is allocated to the unit. In relation to social control, size is a key factor because it obviously determines how many people are put under the unit control, how the unit's control system is differentiated, and whether the quality of control is affected by the quantity of those under control. Some dilemmas or paradoxes may emerge from size. For instance, larger size brings about more resource allocation from the State, which may result in more effective control a work unit has over its members. Also possible is that larger size creates management difficulty, which leads to the loosening of social control within the confines of the work unit. In the interview, quite a number of respondents from large work units concurred that their large units receive more attention, monitoring and

Table 10. The State's Stake:
Social Control in Chinese Work Units

State to Work Unit	Unit Variable	Control Variable
Conferment	Rank	Control Authority
Authorization	Size	Control Quantity ControlQuality
Designation	Area of Business	Control Target Means of Control

auditing, from the State. But inside the unit, individuals seem to have much more room to escape from the eyes of their leaders who are often beleaguered by different lines of troublesome business duties.

Third, work units are established to do business in an area. There are three types of business areas at the most general level. Production units consist of farms, factories, and other enterprises which consume the State-rationed resources to turn out quota products for the State. Service units include hotels, department stores, restaurants, and other facilities which provide services or sell merchandise directly to customers. Institutional units refer to governmental agencies, educational, medical, and research organizations, and other institutional establishments which

administer governing or professional activities, deliver related outcomes to, or collect necessary feedbacks from the population (The Editorial Board 1990; The Editorial Board 1991 &1992). Business areas apparently raise the issue of applying what modes of social control to what kinds of people. In institutional units, ideologies, ethics, party commands, organizational rules, career-related interests, or psychological or conscious rewards or penalties are usually the main modes of control in use for control of employees. In production or service units, in contrast, control is more likely to involve the use of physical or material means such as fines, losses of bonuses, and even some forms of physical sufferings like a short term of custody.

In sum, rank, size, and business area are altogether decided by the upper State authorities for a work unit. It affects almost all aspects of social control a work unit applies to its employees. Since these three key factors signify the inseparable relationship between the State and work units, they virtually provide original assurance and logic warranty for both the State's control over work units and the work unit's control over a segment of the population on behalf of the State. In fact, in terms of the extent to which the work unit is politically, economically, and socially dependent upon and inseparable from the State, it is fair to say that the State owns the work unit and the work unit is a part of the State machinery. Furthermore, in so far as the

work unit administers the State control to its employee population, it can be legitimately called a State agent for social control.

3. Between Work Units and their Employees

As the owner relationship of the State to work units extends to working employees, it generates two new owner relationships. That is, individual working people are owned by both the State and their direct work units.

In the interview, concrete benefits working people have from their work units were specially explored. There are generally few benefits which are directly associated with or specific to a particular work unit. Almost all the benefits reported are State-mandated or approved. The variabilities among work units are confined to the scale or physical amount of the benefits delivered. For example, housing is delivered by most work units but some work units have the capacity to provide better housing to their employees. Among the basic employee welfare benefits regularized by the State across all work units, detailed information was collected from respondents for the following categories.

Disposable Income   Disposable income includes regular salary, monthly, seasonal, and yearly bonuses, subsidies, allowances, and other fringe benefits. Salary is determined by the State for different lines of businesses, regions, ranks, and positions, and delivered from the State treasure though

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work units directly to individual working people. There are basically two main wage systems. One is for workers. The other is for cadres which are composed of officials and professionals. Salary, in general, is the same for any given category of wage earners across the country. Only a few floating increases or decreases are granted by the State for special units and districts. For example, a respondent (3MGT:UNeP4) from one of the State's leading universities reported that the State Education Commission awards his unit, along with another leading state university in Beijing, two levels of salary up the regular wage scale.

Bonuses are State approved items which may be delivered by the work unit to its employees. In the early stage, the State set a ceiling for the maximum amount a unit could distribute among its employees. But along with the deepening reform, the State gradually leaves its hands off the matter. It is now up to the work unit to decide how much and how frequently it gives its employees monthly, seasonal, and yearly bonuses (Gao 1990, 1991, & 1992). In the interview, respondents from production and service units reported that bonuses are directly associated with the volume of sales or production and determined through independent accounting within each sub-unit or division. The base amount of bonuses for cadres in factories is determined by bonuses which have been received by workers. Usually, cadres take the average amount of bonuses received by workers across different

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workshops. Respondent reports also provided information on bonuses for other work units. For instance, bonuses for faculty members in universities are sometimes calculated quantitatively by such measures as the number of test sheets graded. In research organizations, bonuses are used to compensate for sea explorations and other expeditions. In press units, correspondents are encouraged to write and report by a bonus for each broadcast item or a set of columns accepted for formal publication.

Other disposable income consists of small allowances or subsidies for housing, haircut, non-staple food, transportation, heating, cooling, and other State-approved items, and fringe benefits for people taking special positions or working under hazard environments. In reality, cash payments delivered to unit members can be put under different names. According to the interview, various cash deliveries may include compensation for newspaper subscriptions, courses taught, student exercises graded, and research done, or payments for having only one child, for a record of full attendance, and for milk subscriptions for children. Universities and research institutions can hold a part of research project funding as extra benefits or awards for their participating members. Production and service units may also deduct their wanted benefits from the profit scheduled for the State.

Material Benefits   The main item of material benefit is housing. Depending upon the type and nature of the work units, housing may be provided for unit employees spaciously, in a tight situation, or no housing at all. The variation is evident among the interview reports. According to them, there are situations where no housing is provided for ordinary workers or only temporary sleeping beds are shared by workers on nightly shift. Entering employees are usually crowded in dormitories or guest houses with two, three, or up to five persons sharing a room. A few seniors may live comfortably in a three-bedroom or larger apartment. In between, there are studio, one-bedroom, two bedroom, one room and a half, and other housing arrangement for a married couple, nuclear family, and even extended family. Along with economic reform, some work units start to encourage their employees, through substantial financial support, to buy unit housing or other public housing for owner occupancy (Chen 1992).

In addition to housing, material benefits include fruits, vegetables, meats, eggs, coal, coal gas, non-staple food, and other living needs articles. They are bought from special sources at a low price and distributed among unit employees either free or for a nominal fee. The giveaway spree occurs mostly in holidays.

Transportation   Most work units have their own transportation team. As far as the employee welfare is concerned, the team provides such transportation services as

picking-up employees for work and sending them home, taking patients to the hospital and bringing them home, transportation of business travelers to and from the airport, train or bus stations, and the water port, holiday and weekend shopping transports to and from the city center, household moving, and other transportation needs from unit members. For those members who choose or have to ride bikes, take public bus, or even walk to and from work, a transportation subsidy or a monthly pass is provided by the work unit as compensation. Transportation subsidy can be also granted specially by the government for those work units located some distance from the city center to directly deliver to their inconvenienced employees or develop a better transportation team to meet the concrete needs. For instance, the investigator's work unit is about fifteen kilometers away from the city center. To the unit members' paycheck is thus added a new item, transportation subsidy, which was two Yuan a month in 1989. The unit also has a good transportation team. When the investigator was there, it had a van specially for the unit clinic and three buses for transporting employees living outside to and from work and for holiday or weekend shopping. The investigator remembered that the unit had dispatched cars or vans five times in total for his family: first for moving him into the unit, second for bringing his newly born child from hospital to home, third for picking up his wife from hospital to home, fourth for sending him to the train station

when he left it for the United States, and finally for his wife to leave from for reunion with him in the United States.

Medical Care The key features of the medical care include free doctor visits, free medicine, free surgery, free hospital stay, free immunization for children, inside-work-unit clinic or hospital service, job accident compensation, and special sickness-related treatment. In recent years, attention has been drawn to the waste and inefficiency of such a public medical care system. Various reform measures are developed and experimented with across the country (Gao 1990, 1991, & 1992). According to the interview, a number of reform measures were underway in work units. For instance, some work units pay medical expenses for their employees after a deductible of 10% across the board, 10-20% depending upon years of service, 20% if incurred outside the work unit's medical facility, or 20% if for children. Others give an amount of money monthly or yearly to their employees and let them take care of basic medical care expenses by themselves. However, the large medical bill is still left for the unit. There were several such methods reported by the respondents. One method was: 10 Yuan is given to each employee for one month, 120 Yuan for one year, and 90% of expense is reimbursed yearly for the amount above 120 Yuan.

Child-bearing Benefits and Day-Care or School for Children Mothers are given paid leave prior to and after the birth of the child. The officially allowed paid leave ranges

from two to three months. But there were several respondents telling that they stayed home even longer with fully or partially paid salary. Two cases were noticeable. One (2FHS:SSeS2) was paid the full salary for a 10-month stay with her baby. The other (2FGT:CSeP2) received 60% of her salary for more than three years with no influence on her promotion.

In connection with the paid childbearing leave, most work units have adequately-equipped day care facilities for children. Some unit facilities are staffed with graduates from formal early-education schools and are able to take newborns at the end of their mothers' paid leave and provide full care for older children from Monday morning all the way to Saturday afternoon. One respondent (2FGT:USwP4) reported that her unit's child care is a UN-assisted pre-school education center.

After the day care, many unit employees can send their children to their units' primary school, junior or senior high school, and even the unit itself for advanced education. A general pattern informed of by the interview is: most medium-sized work units have day care and primary school and large-sized ones have high school, secondary school, vocational training center, TV university, and other educational facilities for employees and their children. In universities, child care, education, and training opportunities for employees and their children stretch even further to the advanced education.

<u>Vacations and Entertainments</u>   Vacations and entertainments are a part of the State approved welfare benefit for the working people. It is literally required that work units have necessary recreational facilities such as reading rooms, libraries, sport fields or tools, amateur performance teams, regular troupes, gardens, play grounds, and so on and so forth (Yan 1987). According to the interview, resting and relaxing amenities are almost universally established across work units. Activities, ranging from amateur art performance, sport contest, chess contest, and excursion, to calligraphy exhibition, are routinely organized for unit members by the union, the youth league, the women's federation, the CCP propaganda department, or other divisions. They not only create a situation for work relaxation but also an atmosphere of organizational cohesion and collective solidarity.

Vacations are originally designed for those employees who work in hazard duties, make special contributions, or have a long time of service. Places are in most cases nationally or locally well-known resorts or tourist destinations. Time can be two weeks or as long as some special treatment or recuperation requires. Cost is all paid by the work unit. Besides, vacationers continue to receive their regular paychecks. It ought to be pointed out that the original benefit line blurs out over years of practice. Nowadays, more and more work units send their ordinary members for vacations

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Table 11. Economic Stake:
Social Control in Chinese Work Units

Benefit   Content

Disposable Income   Salary, Bonus, Allowance
                                                                Subsidy

Material Benefit   Housing, Foods, Fruits
                                                      Coal, Coal Gas
                                        other Living Needs Articles

Transportation   Pick-up, Drop-off
                                                    Bus Pass, Subsidy

Medical Care   Doctor Visit, Medicine
                                             Surgery, Hospital Stay
                                   Vaccine, Special Treatment

Child-Bearing
Day-Care & School   Paid Leave for Child-Bearing
                                                             DayCare
                              Primary, High, & Secondary Schools

Vacation
Entertainment   Recreation Facility, Library
                                               Garden, and Sports
                              Paid Vacation and Recuperation

Services
Special Assistance   Store, Supply Stand
                                                       Welfare for
                                  the Old, Sick, and Disabled

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when they can afford to do it. The trend becomes evident even

in the interview. Among all the respondents, 56% said they had

at least one paid vacation from their work units. The

investigator himself remembered that he and his wife took a

summer vacation for two weeks in a mountain resort built by Germans in the early 20th century. It was not long after they both entered the work unit.

Special Assistance and Other Services   Other welfare-style services include convenience stores, postal office, supply stands, labor service companies, hot water, dining facilities, guest houses, etc. They provide services to employees at a non-profit price. To meet the employee's satisfaction, subsidies are given by the work units in most cases to ensure the quality and low price of their services.

Welfare assistance in the form of materials and cash is also delivered through work units to unit members and their families. It comes from the State welfare agencies for those individuals and families who need special treatments because of fire, accidents, thefts, crime victimization, sickness, childbearing, old age, handicap, unemployment, and other various causes. For widowed, childless senior citizens, there is a publicly known five-protection welfare program (Yan 1987). For newly married, low-salaried entering employees, assistance may also be rendered to them due to direct leaders' concern and colleagues' proposals. For instance, the investigator remembered that in the end of his first year with the work unit, his divisional leader approached him and asked him whether his new family needed any help. He said he was fine. But the leader still gave him fifty Yuan, saying: "we all know you have difficulty in organizing your new family and

the divisional leadership have applied from the State this amount of welfare assistance for you to have a happy spring festival."

It is obvious that Chinese work units practically embrace all aspects of their employees' working and living needs. In fact, they are ideologically designed to provide a systematic, complete, attentive, and satisfactory care which helps create a sense among the working people that they are masters of their work units and societies, and shall feel no alienation when they work devotedly for the common cause of their units and the State. In an exchange perspective, however, such a designer arrangement breeds, originally and continually, both economic and institutional dependence of individual employees upon their work units. The dependence predisposes them to work loyally, live comfortably, and behave docilely under their work unit's political, normative, and economic order. In other words, economic benefits justify unit employees' conscious acceptance of the work unit order. As they see various forms of social control under that order as reasonable, flexible, non-repressive, and having room for personal development and possible change, the direct cost of social control becomes automatically insignificant.

C. Cultural Underpinnings

Culturally, core values provide explanations as to what types and how much control and order are favored and even what

political institutions and economic practices are sustained in a particular society. In reference to the Chinese culture, both scholarly and commonsense speculations have been raised on how it is internally connected to the emergence of a communist party state, a planned economy, and a totalitarian control in contemporary China (Nathan 1990; Pye 1992). For control in particular, there are various cultural elements which may seem explicitly or implicitly to legitimate or render direct support to hierarchical and organizational control in the Chinese society. In the following, the general nature of contemporary Chinese culture is first examined. Three cultural elements are then sorted out as principal explaining variables for social control practices in the Chinese work units.

1. What is the Chinese Culture
in Contemporary China?

It is hard to present a full picture of the Chinese culture in contemporary China. Obviously, the current Chinese culture is not equal to the official ideology. Nor is it an equivalent of what is underway in the civil mentality. In scholarly discussions, confusion is continually created as if Confucianism is a legitimate representative of the Chinese culture, being able to provide explanations for political and economic behaviors in the Communist era. A recent article by a Harvard scholar goes even further in speculating that

Confucianism unites with Islam to undermine the dominant Western civilization in the world (Huntington 1993). The fact is that Confucianism has never been hostile to the Western civilization. It instead has Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries to cite as its successful examples to incorporate Western culture into its mainstay thinking (Deyo 1987; Tai 1989). Ironically, Confucianism is not dominant in its original homeland, China. The official culture in China is a derivative of Western civilization, i.e., communism. It is thus pointless to mystify China with Confucianism and present China in the name of Confucianism as a threat, like the Islamic League, to the advanced capitalist economies.

Returning to the subject, the present Chinese culture is composed of at least three elements: the officially-imposed communist ideology, intellectually-honored and -popularized Western thoughts, and civilly-transmitted Chinese mentality mixed with Confucianism, Buddhism, and feudalism. The communist ideology is imported from the West. It is developed out of a rational critique of Western capitalism (Marx 1867). But by agitating a radical countermeasure to the bourgeois establishment, it becomes a never-successful counterculture in the mainstream Western civilization. Ironically, while it is suppressed by the dominant capitalist culture in the West, it is helped by the same or at least similar force, Western imperialism, for diffusion into the Third World countries.

China, after the first failed combative confrontation with the West in 1840, began to turn to the West for answers to salvage its age old civilization. Through years of painful exploration, reflection, and hesitation, more and more Chinese intellectuals came to the recognition that the Chinese tradition had to be thrown away or at least revolutionized, giving or creating way to new thoughts, new methods, and new culture (Seeking Truth 1990). This was the slogan of the well-known May 4th Movement, after which the development of the Chinese culture headed in basically two directions. In the one direction, the KMT and its later government tried to unite the country and modernize it by the Western mainstream political, economic, and cultural means and institutions (Pye 1991). In the other direction, the CCP learned from Marxist communism, a Western counterculture, and hoped to use it to revolutionize the Chinese masses and bring about a universal liberation to them (Pye 1991). In 1949, the prevailing CCP established its government in the Mainland. Communism and its various derivatives have since then become an important element of the Chinese culture.

The spiritual inspirations provided by the mainstream Western culture among intellectuals, however, never died out under the communist reign. Even during the years of high revolutionary tide and total isolation from the West, there were still intellectuals standing up to speak against the country's dominant policy lines and propose a new alliance

with the West. This was even evidenced by the story supplied by one respondent (3MGT:UNeP4) in the interview about his colleague in a sex scandal[1]. Entering the United Nations and establishing diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States in the early 70s, China began to open its window for Western technology and its associated material achievements. Among intellectuals and the youth, interests in Western mainstream arts, philosophy, and culture seized a chance to grow (Stavis 1988; Burton 1990). Toward and through Deng's reform, Western thoughts and culture have actually become the most popular ideology among well-informed young people and liberal intellectuals.

Of course, the traditional Chinese culture featuring Confucianism, Buddhism, and even feudalism also does not lose ground in its homeland. Across the general population, if the CCP members, government officials, and mass activists are counted as apostles and disciples of the communist ideology, and the youth and intellectuals as under the influence of Western culture, there are still ordinary peasants, workers, merchants, and other civilians being possible constituents of the deeply rooted Chinese culture. This is the largest segment of the population, overshadowing the other two in pure size. Also, it ought to be pointed out that the other two groups, while being legitimately put in the camp of either the

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[1] See interview citation under administrative disciplining in Chapter Three.

communist ideology or Western mainstream culture, are never free from the influence of the Chinese culture in its original sense (Pye 1992). For instance, Mao claimed to be a communist revolutionary. But as it is widely agreed, he read more books about Chinese culture than those on communism. He thought and behaved basically as a Chinese. The same is true to all those who claim to be liberal intellectuals and have worked abroad to advance democracy in China. Chinese are always Chinese. Although their thoughts are overhauled with some totally alien elements, they still think and behave in a manner which signifies the ingrained influence of the Chinese blood, habit, and culture.

On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to sort out some common cultural elements which are shared by Chinese no matter what categories of cultural influences to which they openly admit being exposed or are literally exposed. In relevance to the subject of this study, the following three cultural elements are believed to bear direct causal relations to the modal control practices in the Chinese work units.

2. Peace and Order

Order and peace are core cultural values highly honored by Chinese as their ideal state of the world. They are used as a primary stick to judge whether a reign has achieved its goal and therefore retains the legitimacy to continue its rule (Confucius 1971). For individual citizens, if peace and order

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are in place, it is morally worthwhile to bear any other inconvenience, even some degree of suffering (Confucius 1971; Liang 1987). In other words, for peace and order, they are willing to put themselves under control of authority, tradition, and seniority.

Order and peace have understandably different meanings with Confucianism, Communism, and liberal intellectuals inspired by Western ideology. In Confucianism, order represents a hierarchal relationship between the emperor and court officials, father and son, and husband and wife. Peace is ensured by the former's forbearance to the latter and the latter's subordination to the former (Confucius 1971; Seeking Truth 1990). With Communism, absolute peace is not possible until all forms of exploitative relationship are abolished on the earth. However, relative peace is retainable in a new social order which features public ownership, social egalitarianism, mass participation, and proletarian dictatorship under the CCP leadership (The Chinese Communist Party 1992). Mao launched the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution, and other turbulent campaigns. His ultimate goal was "to achieve great order through great chaos on the land under heaven" (Pye 1991; Seeking Truth 1990). The great order so obtained, in his vision, warrants a lasting peace which might be next to the utopia, the absolute peace, speculated by the communist theory. Deng begins his new program by appealing to 'stability and unity' (Deng 1984; Seeking Truth 1990).

Order and control have become his justification for a number of unpopular measures, such as resistance to democratic reform, and even the Tiananmen Square crackdown (Cui 1990).

To liberal intellectuals who look up to Western freedom and democracy, order and peace are a kind of political, economic, and social arrangement which accommodates individual free will for personal innovation, creativity, and development. Since most of them have learned the lessons from their own experiences or contemporary history, they no longer believe that such arrangement can be brought about through disruptive revolutionary measures. Instead, they think that only institutional reform and reasonable political pressure can push the reality into a gradual good-for-better change. As such, they, like ordinary Chinese, see order as a reconciliation of personal needs with social constraints. Especially when coming back to their own life, they tend to let peace of mind override their ego-driven ambitions. Respect for tradition, seniority, and authority, from this individual point of vantage, becomes oftentimes indispensable to a self-sufficient and self-satisfying life style (Cohen 1968; Wilson et al. 1977; Troyer et al. 1989).

In all, despite their different understandings, peace and order are stressed by all three main philosophical, ideological, cultural themes which cross-shape modern Chinese mentality. They are actually a focal point for various modes of Chinese thinking, reasoning, and acting. In recent years,

as basic living needs are better served, more and more people tend to be in favor of maintaining the current order (Seeking Truth 1990; The Editorial Board 1990). This is even true to the cultural employees or intellectual community on university campuses and in research institutions. As admitted and pointed out by most respondents, while they are inspired with democratic changes and make complaints and protests, the majority intellectuals basically follow the current order and favor a kind of evolutionary progress. When chaotic episodes arrive on the scene, they can be easily convinced for control and order (Davis and Vogel 1992).

3. Interpersonal Harmony

Interpersonal harmony is highly regarded by Chinese in their collectives and shall be included as another key Chinese cultural value. Harmony does not mean a static, non-problematic weak tie among individuals. It refers to a rapport among a group of people through intensive, reciprocal interactions. In this interpersonal rapport, it is required that concerned participants understand their roles, assume them appropriately, and pay special attention to their cooperations with others.

Confucianism is known for its doctrine of the mean which advises people to yield, compromise, and give up their rights for harmony among each other (Confucius 1971). The communist revolution is customarily seen to be a damaging factor for

interpersonal harmony. But in terms of its advocacy for mass participation and group activity, it indeed helps increase the level of interpersonal interaction which in turn makes harmony virtually an ever more salient concern among the people involved. Western-minded intellectuals often criticize the doctrine of the mean for suppressing free will and obstructing personal creativity. But when coming back to their community life, nobody other than a handful of idealist radicals dares to disregard interpersonal harmony.

In the setting of a work unit, intensive interpersonal interaction is a basic feature. Because of the primary concern for a positive 'face' among friends, colleagues, and neighbors, individuals have to show interests in each other's work, life, and even daily chores and thus be able to deliver concern, support, or gossip when necessary. This interactional pattern, on the one hand, leads directly to high frequency and intensity of human contacts which in turn gives rise to more interpersonal conflicts. Interestingly, it is not easy to avoid the so-inflicted conflicts by simple withdrawal. Instead, the parties involved have to resort to more careful and patient interactions and communication to resolve the past conflicts. In other words, conflicts and interactions are reciprocally reinforced when interpersonal harmony is highlighted as a primary individual concern. On the other hand, the above-mentioned interactional pattern results in the formation of an informal network which subjects individual

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members to mutual surveillance and gives them no escape from it. Even more significantly, the so formed informal network provides a fertile soil for residential control and exists as an environmental underpinning for unit leaders to probe into subordinates' private affairs.

In the interview, most work units were reported to have a concentrated residential area for their unit members to live together. In the residential area, unit members use the same free market, grain shop, grocery store, post office, mess hall, and other services. They even observe the same daily routines such as going to free market in the early morning and taking a walk around in the evening. Leaders live among unit members. They feel free to ask their subordinates questions on personal issues in an aggressive manner. Some respondents also noticed that the involving parties' concern for interpersonal harmony can make interaction an endless process. For instance, they recalled that many minor problems in their daily routines, which could be naturally gone if left alone, took a long series of back and forth interactions because nobody wanted to hurt the faces of him- or herself and his or her counterpart.

In one word, harmony and interaction reinforce each other, making the involved individuals susceptible to mutual and top-down surveillance and control.

4. Moralism

Moralism is the third key Chinese cultural element with which all Chinese are deeply concerned. It therefore has an extraordinary impact on their social life. In its essence, moralism consists of a set of central moral values which dictate the fundamental attitude toward and the daily dealings with the world. More concretely, it is a mental tendency or process to moralize all existing beings or occurring acts, simplify their interconnections by the seemingly sound law of causality, and spell out what and how to think and act toward them. For instance, the Buddhist karma is widely held true among Chinese. It speculates that if a person obtains what does not belong to him, he will lose it someday in some form. If he obtains it forcibly at the expense of others, he will be duly punished by an assumedly existing universal justice.

Like the regard for peace, order, and interpersonal harmony, moralism is a shared cultural feature among all Chinese who may otherwise claim to be in different main camps of the Chinese culture. Confucians believe in moral redemption through self-examination (Confucius 1971). Communists, especially Mao, appeal often to norms to regulate society and maintain a faith in the capacity of exemplary revolutionary virtue to educate deviants and criminals (Cohen 1968; Wakeman 1973; Mao 1975)). For ordinary Chinese, good and bad, right and wrong represent a fundamental contrast among things and persons in social life. Children are taught what is good, bad,

right, or wrong in their mother's embrace and learn to frame the world accordingly. Through schools and in work units, the similar moral theme is repeatedly intensified by a series of oral advice and factual events (Pye 1992). For instance, in the years of class struggle, the pet phrase from teachers and leaders was always the same: "you must distinguish true from false, right from wrong, and friends from enemies."

In the interview, some respondents pointed out that they are made cognizant of their tendency to characterize the world by a simple moral contrast of good and bad when interacting with other people in an international community. It seems that the strong moral sense of right and wrong reflected in their world view is a cultural landmark to distinguish Chinese people from those of other cultures. However, the best place to test the Chinese cultural characteristic of moralism shall be in China. For instance, as the investigator experienced, creeping into a crowd of movie-viewers just out of the cinema would likely afford an observer a simple quasi-experimental condition for testing: Chinese movie-viewers focus most of their post-movie talks on identifying a good and a bad guy in the feature film and become often emotionally frustrated if the story is ambiguous about the contrast.

The tendency to moralize social life and dramatize complex situations into right-wrong confrontations has multiple implications for Chinese. As far as control is concerned, it helps to justify authority, tradition, and

dominant order, because they are often referred to as a base or last resort to judge what is right and wrong. It also helps to sort out deviant individuals from contexts and perpetuate their wrongness with hard-to-clear stigmas. Finally, it negates wrongdoers in their entirety and aids the dominant control to fight against them. As reported by those respondents who arrived recently, the CCP political-thought work after the 1989 Tiananmen Square event tried to convince the population about the necessity of the crackdown by a right-wrong perspective. In work units, since some unit members were morally sided with the students during the demonstration, the unit authorities had to re-direct the moral focus from political democracy vs. resistance to reform to order vs. unrest. Through various study sessions, the moral focus was placed on the right to keep order and the wrong to engage in unrest. Student demonstration was then gradually negated, entirely with its right cry for democratic change. Obviously, the right-wrong mentality in the Chinese moralism gives the authority an easy hand to manipulate the masses and to mobilize control.

In all, Chinese culture and communist political economy constitute a foundation for social control set-ups and practices in contemporary Chinese work organizations.

CHAPTER 6

CONTROLLEE REACTION AND EVALUATION

UPON SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINESE WORK ORGANIZATIONS

The study of social control is confronted basically with two sides of a control practice. The first is about who is the controller, what forms of control are put into action, and how. The second is about who is controlled, what aspects of their life are directly influenced, and how they react toward the control.

In the foregoing chapters, the Chinese work unit, the controller, and its various forms of social control have been discussed and analyzed along with political legitimization, economic foundation, and cultural underpinning. The next question to consider is how unit members, the controllees, react to and think of those control practices.

Reactions and evaluations of controllees are theoretically variable. There can be public, collective protest, denunciation, and resistance on the one extreme, submission, obedience, and ingratiation on the other. In between, there may be passive resistance, quiet disregard, intentional negligence, complaint, apathetic order-taking, ritualistic duty-performing, drifting with the tide, or aimless following-up (Kassebaum 1974; Liska 1987).

In the setting of a Chinese work unit, reactions and evaluations of unit members as controllees toward their unit

and its controlling practices are obviously not clear-cut. According to communist ideology, unit members are the masters of their work unit. Various forms of social control in place are civilized, non-confrontational, and out of rational requirements of work. As such, the sense of being controlled among unit members may be faint or even totally unrecognized. On the other hand, unit members are confined to their unit and have to abide by a multitude of rules, restrictions, and inhibitions to be just a good member. It is natural if there are complaints and critiques from unit members about excessive control in their working organizations.

A. Reaction and Evaluation

In the last part of the interview, respondents were asked to objectively evaluate their work unit: how important it is to their life and career development, what positive memories or negative feelings they have about it, and how it relates to them, as an authority of control or a source of support.

1. The Weight of the Work Unit

The weight of the work unit to unit members was measured in terms of two variables: personal life and career development.

In response to the question of how significant their work unit is to influence their personal life, 29% of respondents from the interview said their work unit is very important, 49%

fairly important, 22% not too important, and none thought it not at all important. The result is not related to individual characteristics like age, sex, and education. Nor is it associated with most unit features such as line of business, location, supervising agency, and size. The only correlation found is with the rank of work units. That is, respondents from work units of higher rank tended to acknowledge the higher importance of their units on their personal life. For instance, while 71% of respondents from provincial or ministry units indicated that their work units are very important to their life, only 10% of those from work units of sectional rank said so. In fact, 40% of them viewed their sectional work units as not too important to their life.

Perception might be a disturbing factor. For instance, some respondents might perceive their spouse, children, and family as primarily important to their personal life even though they need the work unit to support a family. But overall, the majority, more than three fourths, of respondents acknowledging their unit's importance for their life exists as a legitimate proof of the work unit's substantive weight in this area.

In evaluating the work unit's impact on career development, 44% of respondents said their work unit is very important to their career development, 46% fairly important, and 10% not too important. Nobody said it is not important at all. There were no variations between younger and older, male

Table 12. The Weight of Chinese Work Units

Degree of Importance	Personal Life	Career Development
Very Important	29%	44%
Fairly Important	49%	46%
Not too Important	22%	10%

and female, or higher and lower educated respondents in their answers. The line of business, location, size, and supervising agency of their work units did not make a difference either. The only relationship found was with the work unit's rank. As on the unit's importance for personal life, respondents from higher-ranked units see higher importance of their work units in shaping their career development. The correlation is obviously reasonable, because work units of higher rank offer to their employees not only a larger forum to play their roles but also a closer link to the socio-economic hierarchy to feel a sense of career achievements in the Chinese society.

Combining the first two response categories, there were almost an absolute majority (90%) regarding the work unit as important. This gives evidence to the work unit's overwhelming position in its employees' career development. Moreover, as admitted by most respondents, they represented actually those unit members in their work units who work wholeheartedly on a foreign language and put all their hope on studying abroad,

and therefore, tend to overlook their work units' importance to their career design and development. In other words, the core unit members who are supported by unit funding, working, and living conditions for all their tasks may have a higher view of their work units' role in their career pursuits.

An obvious comparison of the two evaluation outcomes indicated that the Chinese work unit weighs differently to its employees between their personal life and career development. It is true that the work unit, as a place to work, involves its employees more in work-related than life-concerned matters. As a result, more weight is given to it for shaping career development than in influencing personal life.

2. Positive Memories

Positive memories or negative feelings from respondents about their work unit were evoked by an introductory question: whether they miss it, or feel glad to have left it, or feel mixed about it after having been away from it.

Among all respondents, 59% affirmed that they miss their work unit and have many positive memories about it. One fifth (20%) admitted that they are glad to have left their unit, and 21% indicated that it is difficult to clearly say missing it or being glad to have left it. The response is not related to any individual or unit characteristics, including age, sex, and education, as well as line of business, location, rank,

supervising agency, and size of work units. The length of leave from the work unit is not relevant either.

Among those respondents who admitted they are happy to have left their work units, reservations were immediately made after such admission in a number of cases. Some respondents added that there are still something memorable about their work unit. Others explained that they feel glad to have left their work unit because their choice of leaving has proved to be good for their personal development. It has nothing to do with their past work unit or their feelings about it. Of course, there were still respondents who chose the answer because it expressed their feelings about the past work unit. For example, one respondent (2MGR:RNwP2) cited his unhappy bickering with the work unit as a proof of his dissatisfaction. He stated that his unit leaders required him to pay back 4,000 Yuan to the unit before letting him leave for the United States. The reason was that his graduate study was paid directly by the unit and he was supposed by that arrangement to serve the unit for at least five years. The unit's requirement was legally reasonable but it made him emotionally alienated from his unit and unit leadership.

To find out how they think about their past work unit concretely, respondents were further probed in the interview with regard to the positive memories or negative feelings they might have about their work unit on major variables.

On the positive side, variables included for such a probe were working environment, life style, colleague, leader, and welfare. Among all respondents, 63% agreed that the working environment in their work unit is good or even excellent. The response is variable in terms of respondents' age and sex. While more younger and female respondents were critical of their unit's working condition, most seniors and males seemed to have entered the core of their work unit and become happy about its working environment. The rank of work units also makes a difference, with higher satisfaction in correspondence to higher rank. It is understandable that work units of higher rank stay closer to the allocative authority for needed resources and are therefore, able to make their members more satisfied with working environment. There are no obvious associations between satisfaction of working environment and respondents' education, or their unit's line of business, location, size, and supervising agency.

As far as the physical facility is concerned, a number of respondents from leading research institutes and universities proudly mentioned that their work unit is well-equipped or even designated as the State's important laboratory or production site. There were three interviewees comparing their work units with the American universities in which they stayed and saying that their respective work unit has better computing and experimenting facilities than the latter.

For lifestyle, 43% of respondents thought the way of living in their work unit is leisurely, comfortable, and full of human interest. The variable is not significantly correlated with respondents' sex and education, or their unit's line of business, location, supervising agency, or size. But it is related to the age of respondents: the older they are, the more adapted they are to the lifestyle of their work unit. For instance, while only 20% of respondents under age of 36 endorsed their unit lifestyle, 52% of those above 35 said they are satisfied with the style they live in their unit. In fact, all respondents under 26 rejected the lifestyle in their work unit.

It ought to be pointed out that those who rejected, criticized, or did not praise the lifestyle in their work unit did not deny the comfort of their unit lifestyle. They backed away from it, because they thought it encouraged idleness and low work efficiency in their work unit.

Toward their unit colleagues, 92% of respondents displayed a positive feeling. The overwhelming response to the variable leaves little variations to examine whether it is meaningfully associated with all major individual and unit variables. The only identifiable pattern is with respondents' education. The few 'no' responses were im-proportionally concentrated in higher education brackets, which may signify that respondents of higher education stay relatively more independent from human interactions in their work units. Among

the majority respondents who feel good about and miss their unit colleagues, many stated that they still maintain contacts with their close colleagues in the work unit. Overall, it is quite apparent that inter-employee relationship in Chinese work units is friendly and affectionate.

About the unit leaders, 45% of respondents said that their leaders are good, working conscientiously for the well-being of the work unit and the unit employees. The age, sex, and education of respondents have seemingly no effect on the response. Unit characteristics like line of business, location, and supervising agency are also found irrelevant. There are, however, some moderate influences from the rank and size of work units. That is, people from work units of higher rank and smaller size tend to feel more favorable toward their leaders.

A number of respondents said good things specifically about their leaders and showed understanding for their leadership. For instance, one respondent (3MGT:USeP3) admitted: "They try every possibility to bring about more benefits for employees." Another (3FUS:RNeP2) sympathized: "They have to set an example in every aspect for employees." Still another (2FUS:SSwC2) sighed as if she herself was a leader: "it is not easy to be a leader." There was only one respondent (2FHM:PSeS3) from a production unit venting anger toward her unit leaders. She accused her unit leaders of

Table 13. The Chinese Work Unit: Positive Memory

Variable	Satisfied	No Comment and Dissatisfied
Working Environment	63%	37%
Lifestyle	43%	57%
Colleague	92%	8%
Leader	45%	55%
Welfare	42%	58%

taking bribes, giving no say to workers, and being unreasonable in policy-decisions.

Finally, about welfare, 42% of respondents openly praised that their work units take good care of unit employees. The variable is related to the sex and education of respondents and the line of business of their work units. By sex, females are more satisfied than males with the unit welfare. Education leaves a negative impact. People of higher education tend to be more critical of the welfare situation in their work units. Across different lines of unit business, commerce organizations, governmental agencies, and production units seem to have better welfare benefits than service units, research institutes, and universities. There are no obvious relationships between the response and other individual or unit variables such as respondent's age, unit location, supervising agency, rank, and size.

It ought to be clarified that when Chinese talk about the work unit welfare, their concern is with the quality and quantity of all State-designated employee benefits such as housing, bonuses, material deliveries, and so on and so forth. In general, they take for granted that they deserve all State-approved benefit items and feel satisfied only when most of those items are delivered to them above a publicly-perceived basic level in both quality and quantity.

3. Negative Feelings

On the negative side, mutual surveillance, control, human relations, and upward opportunity were listed as possible areas or sources of employee dissatisfaction with the work unit.

Regarding surveillance, 58% of respondents complained that there is too much mutual surveillance in their work units. The response is seemingly not affected by age, sex, and education of respondents, as well as the location, rank, and supervising agency of their work units. But the unit line of business and size make differences. Across the main lines of unit business, production, commerce, and service units tend to have more mutual surveillance than governmental agencies, research organizations, and universities. Smaller work units are also likely to breed higher mutual surveillance among their employees.

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Surveillance is associated with the work-life arrangement, architectural design, and lifestyle in Chinese work organizations. According to some narrative accounts followed, it is common in a work unit compound that unit employees' doors are next to their colleagues' or windows against their leaders'. Working partners or supervisors are at the same time neighbors. They go over similar routines like taking a walk after dinner, and oftentimes open house for casual chatting or gossiping with each other. Interests are naturally developed among them in each other's work and life details. Mutual surveillance, therefore, becomes prevalent. As it is natural and prevalent, some are even unaware of it. Others may feel it is not necessary at all to keep a privacy from others. This is especially true to females. Although they do not sense higher mutual surveillance among themselves than males, some male respondents pointedly mentioned that surveillance is serious among female employees who like going to each other's house chatting and gossiping.

On control, 55% of respondents thought that unit members bear too much control from the institutional establishment in their work units. Variations are not existent among the three respondent characteristics but found across all main unit variables except supervising agency. By line of business, production, service, and commerce units seem to exert a higher level of control upon their employees than those of government, research, and advanced education. Across

geographical areas, work units in the East have less control than those in the West. Between the South and North, control is more salient in the former than in the latter. By rank and size, the general pattern is that work units of lower rank and smaller size are likely to put more control on display.

Among those respondents who remained uncritical of the level or intensity of control in their work units, some admitted that unit members may be used to the control environment of their work units and therefore, become unconscious of it over time. Others argued that unit control is mostly immersed in regular work, life, and organizational requirements and is, by their judgement, reasonable and acceptable. One respondent (2MGT:UNeP3) said: "yes, there is control in the work unit. But there is also a lack of control, sometimes even an anarchy."

With respect to human relations, 88% of respondents complained that human relations in their work unit are too complicated, taking an undue amount of time and energy from them and the unit leadership. Variations are found among respondents of different age and education and work units of different size and in different locations. Respondents' sex and their units' line of business, rank, and supervising agency do not make an obvious difference. By age, younger people seem to be more sensitive than older ones to the complicatedness of human relations in their work units. The effect of education is negative. People with higher education

sense a lower degree of human relation pressure than those from lower education group. Geographically, work units in the West have more complicated human relations than those in the East. Between northern and southern work units, human relations seem more significant in the former than in the latter. The size of work units makes negative relevance. That is, the smaller the work unit, the higher is its intensity of human relations.

Human relation is indeed an important aspect of Chinese life. Western scholars and visitors are often impressed that Chinese people are so willing and patient to take care of relationships among each other (Troyer et al. 1989; Butterfield 1990). In addition to the general response, some accompanied interview accounts suggest that there exists a positive reaction between the complexity of human relation and the motivation of moving up or to the center. As generalized by several respondents, if unit members want to get official positions, move up quickly and smoothly, they have to pay special attention to the human relations around them. On the other hand, if they just want to follow the trend doing the routine, they may still feel fine even if they do not care enough to deal with the often-perceived-as-complicated human relations.

Finally, on upward opportunity, 40% of respondents were critical that their work units offer too little upward opportunity to unit employees. The variable does not correlate

significantly with respondent's age and education, as well as their units' supervising agency, rank, and size. But by sex, males tend to see more upward mobility than females. Across different lines of business, people from commerce, production, and service units are seemingly less likely to complain about upward opportunity than those from governmental agencies, research institutes, and universities. In terms of location, more upward mobility seems to exist in northern work units than in southern ones. Between the East and West, work units in the former appear to render a little more upward opportunity to their employees than those in the latter.

In Chinese public media and reform debate, lack of proper incentive, mainly upward mobility, is often criticized as a problem in the work unit (Gao 1990, 1991, & 1992). By the interview result, however, more than a half did not actually admit that upward mobility is a problem either personally to themselves or generally to all unit employees. There were even respondents commenting on it approvingly. They said that the system is basically equitable. Good work and behavior earn them real credit.

Overall, among all possible areas or sources of employee negative feelings toward the unit, human relation was affirmed as too complicated by a majority of respondents. Mutual surveillance came in the second place, a little more than the half. Noticeably, these two factors are more connected to Chinese culture or civil lifestyle than political or

Table 14. The Chinese Work Unit: Negative Feeling

Variable	Dissatisfied	No Comment or Satisfied
Mutual Surveillance	58%	42%
Control	55%	45%
Human Relations	88%	12%
Upward Opportunity	40%	60%

organizational arrangement in Chinese work units. On the other hand, control and upward mobility which are assumedly associated with the institutional establishment, do not seem to be a serious problem in the eyes of a half and more of respondents. The reaction obviously awaits further explanations.

4. An Authority of Control vs. A Source of Support

In the end, respondents were asked to make a critical distinction on their work unit: is it an authority of control or a source of support? The open-ended interview format left ample space for any supporting evidences, comments, or personal opinions each respondent might have for his or her particular judgement.

Among all respondents, 55% claimed that their work unit is a source of support. Another smaller half, however, did not totally commit to the opposite judgement. Instead, 23% of all

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respondents said that it is hard to make such a distinction about their work unit. Only 22% agreed that their work unit exists as an authority of control. The response was related to respondents' sex. That is, females are more likely than males to see their work unit as a source of support, while males are more likely than females to regard their work unit as an authority of control. Other individual characteristics like age and education, as well as all unit variables do not seemingly make any significant difference.

Evidence supplied to demonstrate the work unit as a source of support is ample and various. In general, it involves the following aspects.

Good Leaders There were ten respondents who cited their good leaders as a proof of support they have from their work units. Leaders mentioned are mostly direct leaders who supervise the work of unit employees through face-to-face contact, including: project head, divisional director, departmental officials, section head, laboratory director, manager, and unit leaders in general. The good leadership deeds cited are generally of unit employees' direct concern or in a concrete form. They range from being wise and open-minded, being supportive, being always ready to help employees to solve problems, training all newly-come young employees for formal entrance to work, being clear on reward and punishment, and providing reagents and materials as needed for laboratory

work, to supporting employees to seek outside training and foreign study opportunities.

Several interviewees' accounts were illustrative. The first (2FGT:USwP3) was from a university. She said gratefully: "We can directly ask our departmental officials for funding and condition. They try to meet our need if it is reasonable. For myself, because of support from my leaders and colleagues, I received in 1991 an award of 500 Yuan as one of the ten excellent faculty members on our campus." The second (3MGR:RNeP1) was from a research institute. He admitted: "We feel free to report needs in academic research to our leaders who are always ready to help us solve problems." The third (2FUS:CSeC1) was from a commerce unit. She proudly claimed: "Our general manager gives us clear and direct rewards and punishments. Every word of his counts." Finally, one respondent (3MHM:PNeC2) pointed out: "Our leaders want to help us but they are often not able to help because of poor physical and financial conditions of the unit."

Justice Procedure   Four respondents referred to the existence of justice or a justice procedure as a reason for their sense of support from their work units. Justice is first reflected in whether work assignment is fair and whether rewards and promotions are based upon individual capacity and accomplishment. As stressed by two respondents, they see their work units dependable as a source of support because they feel what they are assigned to do is fair and what they have done

is recognized. The second part of justice is determined by whether a dispute can be justly resolved or a reasonable claim can be duly addressed. The existence of a procedure for such justice also gives a sense of support to unit members. One respondent (3MGT:UNwP3) affirmed: "If you have problems with your direct leaders, you can always take your case to an upper leader and get help from there." Another (3MUR:RSeP3) seemed more confident about his work unit: "If you are right, you can always get help and prevail eventually."

Opportunities Availability of opportunities within the work unit and go-ahead approval by the unit authority of individually-sought opportunities are obviously a direct measure of how much support unit members may have from their work units. Two respondents said their respective work unit is able to either provide unit members with various research opportunities or to make praises, awards, and other honors available for their good work. Another two mentioned the support their unit members have from their respective unit authority in seeking outside studying, training, and research opportunities. Generally as one respondent (3MGR:RNeP2) said: "There are numerous research opportunities available through the work unit. Grants and awards are open to all eligible unit members. Junior researchers are often encouraged and provided with necessary proofs and recommendation letters to seek additional training outside."

Upward Mobility Upward mobility conveys directly to unit members how much support they have from their work units. One respondent (3MGT:UNeP4) from one of the leading state universities reported a newly-instituted promotion procedure on his campus:

> In our university, if you feel you are qualified for promotion to a higher rank, you can submit a petition to the university promotion committee. The committee will organize related experts into a hearing which is publicized on campus and open to all faculty members. You present your case in the hearing and answer questions from experts and the audience. Experts cast their votes right in the end of the hearing. The promotion is solely based upon their votes. In 1992, forty associate professors and thirty professors were promoted by this procedure. The youngest professor so promoted was only twenty-seven years old.

Work Autonomy and Freedom Twelve respondents pointed to work autonomy and freedom to evidence that their work units are a source of support to unit members. Work autonomy listed among ordinary unit members are: choosing own research subjects, opening new courses by themselves, being trusted to perform important tasks, having full autonomy in assigned work, being independent in teaching, no unreasonable restrictions on teaching, not much control over work, and so on and so forth. One respondent (1FUP:GNeM2) worked for a leading state newspaper. She said: "I was allowed to do reporting, writing, editing, and organizing news and submissions not long after I entered the unit from the university." Another (2MUR:RSeC3) was a researcher. He stated: "You do your own research. They generally do not

bother to question you, except to provide you with necessary support."

Two respondents served their respective work unit as a divisional leader. They also claimed that they have power to manage the matters in their domain such as dealing with the outside in public relations.

Another two respondents went beyond work autonomy to comment on general freedom in their work units. One ((2FGT:UNeP3) said: "Our unit gives us trust to do work. To be honest, there is a lot of non-political freedom to all unit members." Another (3MGR:RSwP2) stated: "It seems to me that there is no control at all in our work unit. In fact, you have full support from the unit if you work hard and do not think of transferring to other places or going abroad."

Gain from Work and Gratitude for Special Support Eight respondents acknowledged that they have learned a lot from work and feel grateful to their work units for provision of a favorable working and living environment. Areas of gratitude mentioned included: taking good care of unit members' life; supporting unit employees' life from themselves to their children in all aspects; paying undergraduate tuition and giving full salary while studying; funding for outside training and meeting three times during a three-year stay with the unit; and so on and so forth. One respondent (2MUT:USwP1) stated: "I was born into a peasant family. I was able to come abroad due to the state's two-year full funding granted to me

through my work unit. Last year, I revisited my unit and got a warm welcome." Another (3FUO:PNeC4) commented generally: "I received support, nurturing, encouragement from the masses and leaders in work, life, and other aspects, and felt like living in a big family in my work unit."

Supporting proofs were also presented by those respondents who regarded their work units as an authority of control. In general, sense of control or dissatisfaction falls in five areas. The first area is on job transfer and seeking outside training or studying opportunities. There were five respondents reporting this control. One (2FUO:CNeP2) complained of his work unit "not allowing me to go out for job training and business travel". Another (3MGR:RSwP2) was more critical, saying even with some anger: "working environment is not good, service is poor, and there is no way to transfer to another job and unit." There were, however, two other respondents who mentioned their work units' control over employee movement but added that unit members can still struggle for their choice. For example, the first (2FUR:RNeP3) reported that her work unit did not let her take the TOEFL test but admitted later that her unit did not make any trouble for her when she was ready to leave it for the United States. The other interviewee (2MUT:USeP3), after some criticism on the issue, conceded: "They have control over job transfer but if you really want to go, they let you go in the end." Finally, the last respondent (3MUT:PSeC4), while being unhappy

with the practice of movement control in his work unit, pointed to the other side of the coin. He said: "There is no control at all if you do not think of transferring or going abroad."

The second area is work. There were two respondents who directly blamed excessive control in their work units for having unit employees either denied work autonomy or unfairly neglected. One of them (2MGT:USeP3) said that it is hard to get approval from his university authority for teaching class in English and adding new content to the course. Another two respondents reported various work restrictions in their work units but identified the cause of restriction with other sources than control. For instance, poor living conditions and inadequate service systems were both cited as obstructing normal work progress. One interviewee (2MGR:RNwP2) complained: "Service support in our work unit is inadequate. We waste a lot of time in xeroxing and other non-academic chores." The other (4MUR:RSwP2) presented an even more serious case, saying: "In the past five years or so, poor living and working situations have rendered me no condition to conduct my research work."

The third area is political life and upward mobility. There were six respondents criticizing that their work units maintain a full control over unit members' political life. Concrete aspects or instances mentioned included: requiring all unit members to attend political study, demanding employee

support for public campaigns, monopoly over entry to the communist party, limited access to important policy information, and control of employee participation in the unit's decision-making. Interestingly, one respondent (2MGT:USeP4) complained that his university required him to go with his students for military training.

Fourth, factory and military work units were reported to have a global control over unit members. Such a control within their confines is sometimes abused. One respondent (4FUR:GNeP2) was from a military unit. She testified: "In the military, everything is under the leadership's control and scrutiny: how you dress, what kinds of friends you make, and whom you are married with, and so on." Another three were all from factory. One (4FHM:PSeC3) said: "It is okay to be criticized and controlled. But we workers hate the leaders to execute rules unfairly. We are especially angry that they arrange their children in management offices and introduce their untrained peasant relatives to workshops." Another (3FHM:PSeC2) complained: "My workshop head manages us like a household master. He likes going to workers' home for dinner. We all have to invite him. He is greedy and exploitative." The last one (3MHM:PNeC2) reported: "Leaders have no trust in workers. Although control is tight and everywhere, workers still try every chance to slow down." The third comment exposed a fundamental problem for social control in Chinese production work units.

Fifth, control may be directed at a particular individual or a group of people. One respondent (2MGT:USeP3) said that he was not allowed by his work unit to participate in the unit competition for excellent employees because of his involvement in the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstration. Another (3MUR:GNeP1) reported that newly-arrived employees are often discriminated against by the children of high-ranking officials in his work unit. There were also respondents who were able to recognize the nature of control or the source of dissatisfaction in their work units after their experience. For instance, one respondent (2MGT:USeP4) said that he is confined by various unit rules but feels supported by his departmental and sectional leaders. Based upon his experience, he held: "Control is from the system not from individual leaders."

Finally, resistance is a logical mate to control. During the interview, few respondents reported whether or how unit members attempt to resist control imposed upon them in their work units. But one respondent (2MGT:UNeP3) made a typical comment on his general attitude toward his work unit and its control: "It is supposed to be an authority of control. But still I manage to disregard or defer that authority."

B. A Comparison with the United States

Among all respondents, 57% said they have work experiences in the United States. These respondents were thus

asked to draw upon their cross-national work experiences and make a comparison between China and the United States in terms of work and social control variables.

Based upon their response, similarity is limited. There were respondents saying that human relations are equally important in both Chinese work units and American employment organizations. There were also others reporting that Chinese leaders and American bosses are both accessible when work problems arise. Two respondents even claimed a seemingly total match between their Chinese work units and American employers. One (3MUR:RSeP3) said: "I am pretty surprised that employer here in the United States is almost the same to my research unit in China. I think, it indicates that modern production and research are standardized across the globe. The way of doing scientific research becomes comparable among different nations."

The main part of comparison, however, is taken by difference. Based upon various differences reported, three contrasts can be identified with the nature or mode of work and social control between China and the United States.

1. Diffusive vs. Concentrated Control

One clearly sensed difference between Chinese and American work establishments is on the mode of control. According to the interviewee evaluations, Chinese work units are not merely a place to work. Control is not limited to

work. It extends to behavior, thought, and all other aspects of human life. On the other hand, American employers pay attention only to their employees' capacity to do a job. They are generally not concerned with what their employees do outside or in their homes as long as they perform their duties well, efficiently, and up to the job requirement. In sociological words, Chinese work units are community-based, less differentiated along with its work-task mission. American work organizations are instead a product of modern division of labor. It meets the differentiation standard needed for modern production society.

The mode of control is related to the efficiency of control. As affirmed by several interview accounts, the diffusive control in Chinese work units often leads to loosened control on work or even poor implementation of work disciplines. The first two respondents pointed directly to the connection. One (3MGT:USwP4) said: "Chinese control is diffusive. As a result, work discipline is poorly implemented." The other (3FUS:RNeC1) stated: "Control in our Chinese work unit is put on daily behavior. Less control is actually put on work." Another two referred to the reality of lack of control in Chinese work units. One (2FHM:PNeC3) admitted: "It is easy to muddle along in our Chinese work unit." The other (2MUO:PSwS2) claimed: "In China, you can even avoid to do what your work required."

In the United States, as work is singly focused and work control is directed only at the job, the efficiency of both is warranted. As put by one respondent (2MUO:GSeS1), "Unlike all-inclusive control in China, only concentrated control of work is put in place in American work organizations. The control of work is tighter and more effective in the United States." Another two respondents had the same feelings. One (2FGT:CSeP2) reported: "Bad and good work is directly monitored and judged by the boss." The other (4MUO:GNeP1) held: "In the United States, people receive higher salaries but experience more control from work."

In a similar line, a number of respondents reported that the intensity of work or the pace of work activity is high in the United States. Some pointed to the inflexibility of meeting job requirements. Others cited heavy workload and high job pressure. One respondent lamented: "We earn more money here but we sacrifice tremendously in all other aspects. We bear too much for the money we make here."

2. Fatherly vs. Mechanical Control

Another significant difference reported between China and United States is on the nature of control. The nature of control refers to an essential dimension of social control which bears heritage from Durkheim's (1893) distinction between organic and mechanical solidarities. It basically asks such a question as whether a particular control comes from

blood, kinship, closely-knit community, and other forms of primary relations, or instead from division of labor, bureaucratic mandates, and other secondary cooperational needs. Because of the difference in origin and operating environment, control may take different outlooks and have different natures. For example, one may be close, flexible, imprecise, associated with care, and immersed in human relations. The other may be distant, mechanical, exact, connected to law, and in response to division of labor demands.

In the interview, when commenting on work control in American employment organizations, respondents used such words or phrases as 'rule by law', 'money dominating human relations', 'distant from the boss', and 'men as machine'. On control in Chinese work units, respondents put forth opposite phrases like 'rule by men', 'leaders acting as your parents', and 'men as men'. The clear contrast prompts a general impression that Chinese work control is organic, appealing to human relations. American work control, on the other hand, is mechanical, based upon the precise requirement of work. It thus may be legitimate to characterize the difference in the nature of work control between China and the United States as fatherly vs. mechanical.

Along with this characteristic is the caring aspect of Chinese control and the lack of caring elements of American control. For instance, respondents described their relations

with American employers as 'self-reliance', 'self-independence', 'self-centered', 'no work, no pay, and no relief', 'no job security', and 'no support for the family'. The descriptions are reverse to what they said about their relations with the Chinese work unit: 'caring', 'sharing', 'comfortable', and 'secure'. One respondent (4MUO:GNeP1) put humorously: "It is a big iron rice bowl. Once you are fed, you feed permanently. Your entire family is fed along with you as well."

Also relevant is the distance and orientation of controllers from and toward controllees. Chinese leaders are not concerned with legal avoidance. They tend to resort to public and personal sentiments and may criticize their subordinates to such an extent that they burst into tears. As reported by one respondent (1FUS:CNeC1), "Our leaders can lecture us very intensively and make us cry like their babies." The intention behind, however, is oftentimes good, fatherly, or at least non-threatening. American bosses, as presented by respondents, seem the opposite. They keep a distance from the employees and manipulate the distance as the most effective way to demonstrate their authority of control over the subordinates. American bosses are also smart about what is legally appropriate or viable. When they need to use control, they direct it to where the employees' fundamental interests lie. For example, one respondent (2FUR:RNeP2)

reported sadly: "We have no right to say anything as foreigners. My boss even threatened to send me home if ..."

3. Organizational vs. Constitutional Democracy

The open-ended discussions during the interview also provided materials for a comparison about individual right, freedom, and democracy between China and the United States.

First of all, if individual right is understood as what a person may be entitled to, freedom as free from undue restrictions on individual choice, and democracy as the opportunity to participate in policy-making, as perceived by respondents from their individual point of view, they all exist and do not lack at all in both China and the United States.

In the United States, individual right and freedom are specified and assured by the Constitution. Democracy is also mandated by the federal and local constitutions through the individual voting right in the direct election of representatives, senators, mayors, governors, and the President. An individual, if he or she likes, may openly criticize government policies or leaders, vote against them, or even declare his or her own candidacy to replace them. This is by definition what American people as independently acting citizens may do in the American political system. Or in other words, it is what is guaranteed by the constitutional democracy.

In reality, to practice their rights, most individual citizens must first work to meet their basic living needs. In work organizations, if they do not own company stocks, the only capital they have is their labor. This then leads to the question of how much organizational right, freedom, or democracy they possibly have in a privately-owned or an even publicly-owned work establishment. According to the interview, it appears that right, freedom, or democracy is very limited in American work organizations. Several interviewee comments were illustrative. One respondent (2MGR:RNeP1) said: "The American boss is right all the time." Another (2FUR:PSeS2) stated: "In the U.S. employment unit, it is unconditional to obey the order." Still another (2MGT:UNeP2) realized: "Support may be expected from the U.S. boss only if the proposed initiative is not in conflict with his or her interest."

Of course, lack of organizational democracy can be compensated through constitutional democracy which grants individuals the right to change and choose according to their will. As put by one respondent (2MGT:UNeP2), "You can go if you feel uncomfortable." Another two also recognized this fact. One (4MUR:GSwP2) admitted: "The freedom to choose jobs can rescue you from undue treatments by one particular employer." Another (2MUT:UNeP3) advised: "It is not necessary to care or say too much about it if you do not feel good about it. Just wrap up and go."

China proves to be the opposite. The Constitution presents a list of individual rights. But the actual political framework does not give citizens the right to choose local and national leaders and policies. Freedom to speak, criticize, or protest is not practically applicable to all subjects. Individuals may speak and protest against a local leader or policy, but it is often deemed as reactionary if the criticism and protest are openly directed at officially-recognized revolutionary leaders, the central government, the communist ideology, and the communist party. The opportunity to participate in the political process for individual citizens is available only when they go along with the mainstream. In fact, as long as they do not openly oppose the communist party and socialist system, they can find quite a spread of leeway to meaningfully advance their practical interests. For example, they may even take their case to the top national leaders and insist on them for a positive response.

Obviously, constitutional democracy in China is limited by definition. In practice, it is directional, available to individual citizens only when they remain in the mainstream politics. But how about organizational democracy in places where people work and live? As is known, Chinese people, especially working people, are all defined as masters of their society. There is literally no private ownership, no employee-employer relationship, and no labor-wage exchange. All resources and properties are owned by the State, which in the

end belongs to all working people. In work units, working people are supposed to take their initiatives in management, production, and other affairs. Reality is certainly somewhat short of the ideological design. But as concurred by most respondents, organizational right, freedom, and democracy are indeed lavishly enjoyed by Chinese working people. There are both institutional and non-institutional channels and frameworks which demonstrate and ensure those privileges. For example, there are the congress of employee representatives, the workers' union, the youth league, the women's federation, the retirees' association, and various other institutional arrangements which help address different interests and take their inputs to the work unit management. In routine dealings, unit leaders can be called, stopped anywhere anytime by any unit members for any matters. Some respondents in the interview might have been spoiled by the freedom in their work unit. Their comments were apparently a little dramatized. One respondent (3MGT:UNeP3) said: "There is no clear distinction between superiors or leaders and ordinary employees. Everyone can feel free to make trouble with the superior." Another boasted (4FUO:PSeP4): "Leaders beg you to do your work. You are actually the boss. There is no pressure at all."

If it is true that Chinese have more organizational democracy and less constitutional democracy in comparison with American people, how about the total amount of democracy enjoyed between them? The interview response was un-focussed.

Some held there is a greater democracy in the United States. Others thought the Chinese enjoy more freedom. There were also respondents who said it is hard to make a clear-cut judgement. However, a majority of respondents agreed that the freedom and democracy they have in China are more real, within their touch, and beneficial to their practical interests.

C. A New Theory of Social Control

In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, various forms of social control practices in Chinese work units are detailed on the basis of interview reports and related documentary records. These various control practices, along with other material backwardness or disadvantage, however, do not appear to cause significant negative reactions and evaluations from unit members. In fact, a significant number of respondents clearly revealed that they miss, have pride in, and embrace gratitude toward their work units and unit leaders. This fact invites more theoretical discussions and explanations.

On the surface, there is apparently an instrumental or research-design error. Using former work unit employees in the United States as informants is methodologically legitimate but does not warrant a precise and exact measurement of social control in the Chinese work units. There are several error factors involved. Psychologically, for instance, people tend to be more critical of the present than the past. Especially when their new experiences are short of their expectations or

unfavorable, they may even beautify their past as a way to react against the reality. It is admitted that most respondents had high expectations of the United States before they arrived. They are now in the United States facing language barriers and many other surviving difficulties. The psychological effect is likely to be a factor to influence the validity of their response.

But essentially in the subjective matter, there are indeed peculiar points about social control in the Chinese work units, which may account for its controllees' non-negative reactions or contribute to its acceptability and enfeeble its original sense of control among the unit populace. First, the Chinese unit control is instituted along with the basic requirements of work and life. Practices are perceived as necessary, reasonable, and beneficiary by those under or protected by control. For example, administrative disciplining and even dossier come from regular labor management. Neighborhood mediation and security are based upon residents' needs to resolve conflicts and guard properties. No obvious resistance can be leveled against them logically and even legally.

Second, control in the Chinese work unit is accompanied by delivery of services and well-intended advice. The sense of control is often shadowed by the benefits coming through the control system. Specifically, the residential committee provides all life-related services to residents. Mediators,

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security guards, and officials are required by work guidelines to do good things to the people and set an example for them. As miniaturized by Mao's words, they should serve the people wholeheartedly. Services, benefits, and doing good all exist not only as a moral underpinning for intervention but also as a cooling mechanism for the hostility arisen along with an intervention.

Third, the Chinese unit control is non-confrontational, non-alienative, and non-exclusive. Since positive education is an officially established theme (Seeking Truth 1990), most practices appeal to the good side and aim at advancing individual identification with the group and the group's solidarity with the central authority. For instance, rewards, positive education, and various measures designed in ideology, inclusion, and even vigilance draw controllees' attention on how to closely stick to the main course of the work unit and arouse them to do more and better.

Fourth, as associated with normal work-life requirements and needs and being non-repressive, the Chinese control practices are often habituated and even internalized by controllees. Unit members take them as a normal element of life and work and therefore feel minimal or no pressure and inconvenience from them. Like in the West, when church-goers are made to believe that it is God's call to attend all their congregation services, they feel no problem at all to drive in

the dark on Wednesday night or in the rain on Sunday morning to the church.

Fifth, the Chinese control is universal and inclusive across the work unit. All are a part of it. Nobody thus feels special about it. Moreover, it is not based upon law or logic. Instead, it is immersed in human relations and therefore flexible and negotiable. Within the unit confine, controllers, when they feel a control practice unreasonably stringent, may take initiatives to fine-tune it. Controllees, when they feel unhappy about a practice or deem a particular case as unfairly handled, can take it to the unit leadership for a revision or re-treatment. Concerning those control practices imposed by the State, controllers and controllees can sometimes work together to spell out a measure which shields both of them from related responsibilities or liabilities. For instance, in some work units, as reported by a few respondents, both unit leaders and employees do not like the weekly political study. They often act together to reduce its frequency, change its content, and make up a story for the upper authority.

The above explanations about the Chinese control in work organizations lead naturally to a new theory of social control. That is, coercive control of criminals and therapeutical control of the insane constitute only a small part of the social control landscape. The vast domain of social control is non-dramatized, non-escalated, and non-confrontational control of ordinary citizens. Ordinary

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citizens need to be controlled not only because they may otherwise probably deviate from the course of mainstream but also due to the fact that they are the material forces indispensable to the success of group or social programs and goals.

The control instituted to the general populace can be literally called civil control. By origin, it begins with commonsense rules in families, guilds, clubs, and other groups or comes from normal requirements in game, work, life, and other sectors of human activities. For instance, rules in a game help to frame game activities and bring game players into orderly action. They are voluntarily observed by players and can be regarded as an example of civil control. By nature, civil control is non-confrontational, non-repressive, and oftentimes has a positive aim at collective cohesion, solidarity, and commitment. In other words, control is not for correcting something wrong or removing something malignant but instead leading to or amplifying a desired state of affairs. By form, civil control is diversely variable. It may be spiritual or ideological when directed at the soul. Acting upon the human body, it may be distant or close, abstract or concrete, complicated or simple, and unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral. For instance, commands for soldiers on the battlefield are given closely, in simple words, and with concrete situational reference. In modern bureaucracies, rules are instead written in abstract, complex terms or languages.

Bureaucrats learn rules distantly and unilaterally, although they may communicate the rules with each other through close or multilateral oral or written contacts.

Apart from that which is specified by the state constitution, civil codes, or organizational by-laws, civil control can be a matter of order or a deal negotiated between controllers and controllees. In some cases, controllees may be legally or, in terms of some standards, on an equal standing with controllers. For instance, Chinese work unit employees are by the communist ideology equal to their unit leaders. In academic settings, university presidents, college deans, and department chairs are often measured with ordinary professors by a universal academic rank.

The effectiveness of civil control lies in that it is perceived by controllees as reasonable, habituated by them as a natural part of their work or life style, or even internalized by them as a necessary element of social order. Also contributing to its effectiveness is the amount of benefits or services which may be delivered along with it.

Studies of civil, non-confrontational control, the vast landscape of social control, can generate tremendous insights for the sociological understanding of groups, social institutions, and social changes. They also provide an ample opportunity for the application of various sociological perspectives. The Chinese work unit has been an initiating and illustrating case for this new orientation of social control

study. For another typical site, one may try a military establishment.

CHAPTER 7

CHALLENGE AND CHANGE FOR CHINESE SOCIAL CONTROL

Interview data, as based upon respondents' memories of
past events or experiences, are always behind time. This is
also true for this study. There were a number of respondents
whose work unit experiences were as recent as 1993. But as
showed by the average stay for all the respondents in the
United States which was thirty months, what was documented by
the bulk of interview data were actually the situations two
and half years ago. That was the year of 1990 when China was
under the shadow of the 1989 Tiananmen Square event. In the
past two years, as witnessed by the world, China has undergone
tremendous change which leaves direct impact upon the subject
of this study, the work unit. Despite the fact that the
concrete result of the impact is not yet clear even to the
work unit members who just recently left their work units and
arrived in the United States, as the open-policy and economic
reform continue, the impact will gradually unfold itself to
those who are to be affected. This study would be incomplete
if no effort was made to examine the ongoing change and to
project reality into the future.

Throughout the previous descriptions and analyses, it is
clear that various social control structures and processes in
the Chinese work unit are premised on the CCP's grip on and
its organization of national power, the State's ownership of

and responsibility for work units, the work unit's same relation to the working people under its wings, and the community style or the combinational arrangement of work and life within the wall of the work unit. In the following, several main reform initiatives which are either under debate or implementation are examined along with their possible impacts upon social control practices in Chinese work organizations. General thoughts on Chinese modernization and democratization and their demands on social control are also offered afterwards.

A. Main Reform Initiatives

China's reform began as early as the late 1970s after the third plenary of the CCP's eleventh Congress (Seeking Truth 1990). Various initiatives have been put into debate, experimentation, and implementation over the course of reform (Gao 1991 & 1992). They are mainly directed at economic issues. But as determined by the Chinese system, all of them are political.

1. Separation of the Party from the Government

Separation of the party from the government emerged initially from the introduction of the responsibility system into production units. To increase efficiency and productivity, the responsibility reform proposed that production quotas or tasks be assigned to work units and

governmental agencies be withdrawn from direct management or administration of work units (Seeking Truth, 1990). The initiative raised an immediate question: who is to be put in charge of assigned quotas or tasks at the unit or sub-unit level?

As is known, there are two control systems in each work unit. One is the party which leads the unit and controls all its decision-making power. The other is the management which literally takes orders from the party and executes them. In practice, however, division of labor between the two is by no means clear-cut. Struggling for power and shirking responsibility are always at issue.

By the responsibility system, if the unit management is the legitimate authority to be entrusted with production quotas or business tasks, what role is left to the party? The response prepared by reformers was to have the party concentrate on the construction of the unit party system and the political-thought work of unit employees (Seeking Truth, 1990; Gao 1991 & 1992). But when the unit and its employees are committed to completion of production quotas, less interest and time can be actually partitioned to the focus of the party. The party is thus confronted with losing public attention on the one hand and shrinking its apparatus on the other.

Practically, at the unit level, the solution is in most cases a measure which runs against the face of the party-

management separation reform. That is, the party is combined with the management, which is altogether headed by one person. In relation to the upper party and government authorities, the person takes responsibility of both production and political-thought work. Within the unit, his or her focus of work is partitioned between the 'soft' need to catch up with political rhetoric and the 'hard' requirement to accomplish production assignment. The division, in practice, leans mostly to the management side. Along with this major pattern of combination, there are also separation, no change, and other possible reactions. In all, the party at the unit level is made more compact in size and less spectacular in activity.

Separation of the party from the government surfaced soon from the responsibility reform and became an official ideology of the overall reform (Seeking Truth 1990). At the national level, it has created identifiable leadership vicissitudes in the political landscape. In the middle 1980s, separation began to take shape when Hu Yaobang was the CCP Secretary General and Zhao Ziyang was the Premier. They each had a relatively clear division of labor, with the former focusing on the party construction and the general political-thought work and the latter concentrating on economic reform. Zhao's switch to the Secretary General in 1988 was a setback (Stavis 1988). With a keen interest in economic matters, he left the newly-positioned Premier Li Peng in his shadow. The 1989 reshuffle brought Jiang Zeming into the position of the Secretary

General. Li's position was relatively enhanced, which in turn helped restore the balance between the party and the government. But now, Jiang also assumes the State Presidency, which signifies that separation slides to its opposite. That is, the party is combined with the government, as it happens at the work unit level.

Separation or combination takes personal flavor when it occurs either at the center or locally. What at issue is a fundamental political dilemma. Separation comes from the idea that the party has its unique focus which is logically separable from that of the government. Combination arises from the practice that separation of the party from policy-making and governing is equal to making it a mere figurehead. If the party leadership is not sacrificed and the goal of separation is saved in terms of reducing decision-making bickering and increasing work efficiency, the practical compromise is to combine the party with the government and make them into one governing body.

The debate continues (Gao 1991 & 1992). The practice is all tentative. What is the end outcome? What does it mean to social control practices in the Chinese work unit? There are no exact answers except some speculative comments. First of all, between the party and the work unit, the party may pull out of the unit entirely, remain with it but stay away from management process, become incorporated with the management, or take other choices. References for all these possible

changes can be drawn from present reality (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992). For instance, in rural enterprises, party affairs are managed by the party committee in the local government. In joint ventures, party groups or committees are formed but in general kept out of the business decision-making process. In many state-owned work units, the party secretary position is assumed by the management or administration head, who decides priorities in the overall framework of the unit.

All these changes tend to reduce the party's presence in the work unit. One immediate reaction in social control should be from the unit propaganda, including ideology, political study, campaign rhetoric, and other thought work. If one or all of those control practices are cleared away, what takes their space? Mass media will obviously expand in the first place. The media have grown tremendously along with the development of technology. They spread the dominant ideology often without direct mass hostility (Xu 1993). Compared to face-to-face thought work in the unit setting, this remote control can be more effective. In other aspects, work disciplines may be tightened. Also, by the experiences in the past ten years of reform, the form and total amount of some control practices may not change at all. The change takes place only in content. For instance, work unit leaders may still feel thought work is a good form to motivate workers and keep them in line with proper work disciplines. They continue

to use it but inject it with new contents which fit their new needs.

2. Ownership Reform:

Privatization, Stock, and Foreign Venture

While separation of the party from the government could reduce the party's presence in the work unit, ownership reform might go even further to keep the government's hand out of a large number of production, business, and professional work units and therefore fundamentally change the Chinese employment landscape.

The officially-acknowledged ownership pattern of socialist work units was established after socialist transformation and has remained stable throughout the communist year since 1949. It is composed of three elements: all-people or state ownership, collective ownership, and private ownership (Seeking Truth 1990). The state-owned work units take the lead in the entire economy, with collective and private units existing as a necessary support or supplement.

By the orthodox ideology, one task of socialist revolution and construction is to transform collective work units into the state-owned ones and remove all private elements from the economy (Mao 1975; Seeking Truth 1990). But economic reform under Deng has taken the opposite direction. Over more than ten years in the past, some all-people-owned enterprises were closed, stopped, merged, transformed, or even

declared bankrupt. Others were sold or contracted out to private hands for profitable operation, or privatized through stock shares. Foreign ventures were established along the coast and in the hinterland. Numerous private businesses came into being in cities and rural areas. Across the country, the private sector has grown tremendously and begun to take a significant share (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992).

In 1991, for instance, 1,097 state enterprises were closed, stopped, merged, or even dissolved because of heavy losses in twenty-six provinces and cities. Private contracts for about 33,000 service or production units were renewed across the country. In thirty-four provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly administered or independently planned under the central government, there were 2,751 enterprises privatized through stock sharing among employees, and 380 through stock taking by other companies. In Shanghai and Shenzhen, company stocks began to be sold out to the public, even to overseas holders (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992).

At present, among the state, collective, and private economies, state ownership is still the biggest. However, the trend of reform indicates that the state sector shrinks and private business, joint venture, and even wholly-owned foreign company move to take a greater share in the ownership pie and economic activity. This change has great relevance to social

control practices in work places. In private businesses, either Chinese or foreigner owned, control obviously will no longer be in the service of implementing the will of the party or governmental policies. It instead will primarily serve the unit's business need for work efficiency and productivity. Control will automatically take a different form. It will be up to the owner or board of owners to decide what style of control is effective or facilitative to work accomplishments and unit profitability. In the state-owned work units where the right of operation is contracted out to private hands, the autonomy to run business claimed by contractors will leave minimal leverage to the state. Even in the state-owned and - run work organizations, because the focus is primarily put on productivity, the content and form of control also have to be fine-tuned to meet the newly-defined needs. Most interestingly, when employees hold company stocks, the nature of work control over them by the unit authority will have to take a new shape. The legitimacy of control and the relationship between controllers and controllees will all need new explanations.

3. Dismantling the Rationing System

The Chinese rationing system is a key element of the socialist planned economy (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992). It is operated this way: the State buys, collects in the form of tax, foods, oil, textiles, and other

agricultural or non-agricultural products from peasants or other producers, and provides them by a uniform price to all urban residents and work unit employees. Working side by side with the household registration system, the rationing practice keeps people staying where they are born, raised, and assigned. It is obviously a key to the formation of neighborhood committees, the stabilization of community lifestyles, and the effectiveness of social control in living and working places.

The call to reform the rationing system comes from two sources. One is from the State itself. By running the system, the State has to hand out a tremendous amount of subsidies. The other is from recipients. They feel more and more unsatisfied with delay, low quality, and limited varieties of the State rationing supplies when reform affords them the availability of free markets and the capacity to buy supplies from the market. Formal reform or change goes step by step. The first sign of change appeared in the early 1980s when sufficient supplies of meats and non-staple foods in free markets made the State-printed rationing coupons ridiculous. In the middle 1980s, a significant measure took place. The rationing tickets for textiles and clothes were officially stopped. Toward the end of the 1980s, as staple foods and other products or consumer goods were readily available in the market, changing the entire rationing system became a formal topic in reform debates (The State Commission for Systems

Reform 1992). At present, the State supplies continue, but more and more people find they live well and even better without relying upon the rationing system.

It is a matter of time for a basic change of the State supply system. A total dismantling is one possible change. In that scenario, work unit employees would buy their foods, consumer goods, and all other living needs on the open market. They will no longer depend upon their work unit for registration with local government supply agencies. As implied by the previous analysis, the unit will thus lose a substantive reason or measure to keep its employees in line. Most noticeably, people will feel no worry to move from one place to another as long as they can make money to buy their sustenance needs from markets. The neighborhood will be destabilized by the frequent in or out flow of residents. The community lifestyle and various control practices based upon it like mutual surveillance and neighborhood guard will lose the ground to play their roles properly. The entire society will be inundated with thousands of migrants, posing a challenging problem for social control authorities. As observed by those respondents who just came from China, train and bus stations are now crowded with passengers who leave their homes or work units and set out to seek better fortunes in other places, especially in the southern and coastal regions. Thefts, cheating, fights, and rapes become a worry for both passengers and transportation guards.

4. Crushing the Iron Wage System

The official wage system is formed over years of ideological debates and revolutionary campaigns. Its main theme is to have the State control the total, scale, and change of the wage, prevent significant differences of income distributions across professions, ranks, and regions, and keep the uniformity of the wage system (Seeking Truth, 1990).

The advantages of this system are that salary change and income disparity are minimized, a sense of status equity is maintained among all working people, and a universal allegiance to social policies or control practices can be legitimately required from upper authorities. The disadvantages include: providing little incentive for those who are competent and able to accomplish more in work; being rigid, like iron, not suited for changing needs; and nourishing idleness, incompetency, and inefficiency (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992).

Reform begins with delivery of bonuses which are determined by the profits or work effects of the work unit. It is followed by an initiative which allows a unit to float its employee wage up or down one, two, or more levels along the standard State wage scale. In production units, a total monthly or yearly wage may be negotiated from the State. The unit itself then decides on how to distribute the wage among its employees, either by time or by piecework. Currently, coastal areas, economic zones, and some enterprises have

basically escaped the iron wage system and started their own new ones. The State wage system remains in effect in governmental agencies, professional organizations, and some production units (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992). Also, it exists as a basic reference for all different work units across the country.

Continuing reform may drive all work units out of the State wage planning and delivering, leaving the State with only the regulatory power to make wage-related laws, references, or rules. If that happens in the end, the work unit will gain a substantive power at its own disposal. Unlike in the past, employees will receive a paycheck which is determined solely by the unit. There will be no longer the sense that they work for the State, support the party, and are therefore cared for by them through work units. Instead, they will feel that every thing draws closer. That is, they work directly for the unit's well-being, which leaves immediate impact upon their paychecks. For instance, if they work harder and accomplish more, as these will be closely monitored and quickly translated into economic gains by their leaders without outside restrictions, they may receive a larger paycheck right after.

As social control is concerned, following the party line, answering the State's call, or in one word the official politics may have to give way to the unit's practical needs. Employees will be tied to their work requirements. Wage will

act as an effective way to award or punish them for satisfactorily meeting or failing to catch up with those requirements. Also, as the sense of egalitarianism disappears, the unit authority may feel unnecessary to require a universally equal allegiance, devotion, or commitment from the general employee population. They will only ask for what they need and pay what they obtain. In other words, unit employees will be differentially controlled or motivated in terms of the nature of duties they perform for the unit.

5. Housing Reform

Housing is a major benefit the State offers to the employees through work units. In the State economic planning, it is included in the investment for basic construction and depreciation of work unit assets (Chen 1992; Xu 1993). In other words, it is built along with the opening and expanding construction of the work unit and maintained by the unit's depreciation fund which is a standard item of unit operation cost.

Unit housing, as described in the preceding chapters, provides a physical arrangement upon which various social control practices are built. Neighborhood organizations, close connections between and among unit employees and leaders, continuous monitoring from work to life, and effective coordination of work and life security and other matters are all owing to the fact that unit employees live together in

standard housing cells and are easy to be managed and monitored physically.

Housing reform has been debated, experimented, and partially implemented with various proposals or measures for more than a decade (Xu 1993). Recently, it has been put under social distribution reform. According to the official argument, the main thrust of housing reform is to change the form of distribution from object to cash (Chen 1992). Translated into action, it asks to increase wage to a level at which employees can afford to rent or buy housing without the State's subsidy or preferable treatment. In other words, the State no longer provides free housing to employees. Instead, it gives them the salary their work actually earns and lets them buy or rent housing on their own.

Like other reforms, the end of housing reform is still in the future. But some impacts of private housing ownership or rental on social control may be estimated. First, termination of housing benefits from the State through work units, from a utilitarian point of view, will weaken the State's position in requiring unit employees to follow its policy lines or support its social programs. Some work units may pitch in and take the State's role as a close benefactor. If that is the case, it will afford the unit a reason to motivate or control the employees for its own goal. Second, private housing makes continuous monitoring of unit employees from work to life difficult and even impossible. The previously-built unit

housing facilities may be owned by present unit members who may continue to stay with the unit or leave. Newly-arrived unit members may rent or own housing outside the unit anywhere they prefer. The living situation of unit employees in general will be more cross-cutting, more complicated, and harder to manage and control. For instance, it may be no longer practical to organize a residential committee by the unit boundary and count on it to reach employees when they are out of work. The previous method to control people's work through their life, or life through their work, will also lose its effect.

Of course, not all reform effects are negative to social control. One positive effect which may contribute to the group-community stability is also possible. That is, housing ownership in the unit's residential compound may help keep unit members from leaving their unit. Old neighbors and colleagues are so used to each other that they may make an effort to maintain their co-work and co-living pattern. Mutual connections among them and their bonds with the unit may thus be strengthened.

6. Replacing Life Employment with Social Security

Job security and life employment have long been praised as one of the main socialist advantages by the official ideology. The central point of the advantage is directed to the individual. That is, once an individual is employed by a

work unit, he or she is included in the State planning and therefore insured continuous work until retirement and permanent protection until death (Seeking Truth 1990). The work space left after retirement can be even taken by one of his or her children.

Obviously, life employment is a base for unit employees to willingly stick to each other and build their community lifestyle within the confine of the work unit. For the unit authority, it provides a stable work and life situation which makes less challenging its management, intervention, and control decisions and actions. In recent years of enterprise reform, however, it is also recognized that life employment nourishes idleness and remains as a major source for business inefficiency (Deng 1984; The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992).

Present reform debate tackles life employment from two sides. On the one side, work unit labor and personnel mechanism reform proposes that cadres move up and down, employees get on and off, and salary be raised and lowered, all upon the unit business needs (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992). This, in other words, asks for a dismantling of the life employment system. On the other hand, social security reform begins to design social protection programs for those who wait for first employment and those who are driven out of employment because of unit closure, reorganization, transformation, bankruptcy, or personal

incompetency (The State Commission for Systems Reform 1992). This actually prepares a solution for problems brought about by termination of life employment. Putting the two fronts of reform together, the common goal or end outcome is obviously to replace life employment with social security.

How is social control affected when social security replaces life employment? First, it means that the previous unit problem to care for and control permanent employees is transferred to society. The relationship between the work unit and employees may be shortened in time and simplified in dimension. For example, the work unit may take responsibility for employees only when they are associated with it and only when a work-related matter is involved. Second, when the unit-employee relationship is refocused exclusively on work, many of the previous social control practices within the work unit may be deemed irrelevant and therefore be removed from the scene. In the meantime, those control measures regarded as essential to work accomplishment may be tightened. For instance, when employees are not treated as a permanent 'belonging' to the unit, their thought and behavior may no longer be included as an attention of control. On the other hand, as paid 'employees', whether they follow work schedule and procedure can be legitimately questioned and controlled. Third, the relationship between controllers and controllees will become blurry if cadres are made on and off, up and down, on the basis of their performance. In the past, leaders were

always leaders. As their authority is established and unchangeable, they are often assertive in dealing with their subordinates. Now, if they are aware of their liability to step down, they are likely to take a new attitude and manner to implement any control-related measure. Finally, the end of life time employment and protection from the work unit also reduces employees' dependence, gratitude, and subordination. They may be more self-assertive and more likely to take initiative and courage to resist any unreasonable control from the authority.

All in all, the main thrust of reform, as demonstrated by the above major initiatives, is to liberate the work unit from its all-inclusive responsibilities for the employees, the party, the government, and the society. The so-liberated work unit is then able to focus on work and business affairs, implement task-related programs, goals, and disciplines, and achieve its desired work efficiency, productivity, and profitability. As many social control functions assumed by the Chinese work unit are actually social responsibilities of the government, current reform has direct impacts upon them. Although it is still early to precisely estimate the impacts, it is definite that some control practices will be cleared away from the work unit and thrown back to the hands of governmental agencies. Those kept in the work unit will be only those which have direct relevance to work disciplines. As the unit is left exclusively with work-related control tasks,

it may feel at ease with more time and energy to come up with better strategies and tactics to deal with them.

B. Modernization and Democratization

The present reform is an episode of a large developmental theme or trend. China is a developing country. Over the past 150 years after the Opium War, various schemes, plans, and policy lines have been explored, debated, and even seriously pursued to vitalize the nation. Despite the fact that they are often mutually contradictory and let the country suffer from twists and setbacks, they converge into a main theme: driving China toward modernization and democratization (Seeking Truth 1990; Pye 1991).

In an absolute sense, there is no model or end state in the world about modernization and democratization. Relatively, over the past 200 years of world history, the development of Western societies has left a track of and presented a dominant image of modernization and democracy on the earth. China, despite its effort to maintain an independent character and its apparent confrontation with the Western mainstream democratic economies due to its alleged adherence to a Western counterculture, Marxism, follows basically the standard version of Western development in its drive toward modernization and democratization. Some inevitable consequences from Western development may therefore be cited

to project China's future social configuration and its relevance to work organizations and social control practices.

1. Division of Labor and Differentiation

According to orthodox Marxism, socialism is a social scheme to cure problems created by capitalism (Marx 1867; Lenin 1966). For Marx, capitalist enterprises employ workers from free labor markets and exploit their labor force without any mercy. They produce irresponsibly, pour out products continuously to consumer markets, and create cyclical production surpluses and economic crises. When the crisis arrives, they lay off workers and drive them to the streets without taking any social responsibility (Marx 1867; Mao 1975).

To react upon this fundamental capitalist problem, socialism proposes a planned economy. Work units are designed not only as a place to work but also a community where all human ties can be built and needs can be met. But the reality proves that it does not suit the need of modern, large-scale production. Current reform in China is actually reversing the grandiose reform of socialism and driving back to the market mechanism of capitalism.

Putting aside socialism and capitalism, what is the nature of modern production? Does it logically require that division of labor is clearly laid out, social organizations are functionally differentiated, and human sentiments, ties,

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or needs are enfeebled or sacrificed? As discovered and analyzed by great sociologists along the changing historical course, the past century of the world has indeed proven that continuing division of labor is a social fact and deepening differentiation is a developmental trend (Marx 1867; Durkheim 1893; Weber 1920).

Reform puts China on this trend. By division of labor, each social unit or group is assigned into a manageable task. Time and energy can be concentrated to tackle the task effectively in its entirety. Specialization can be developed to generate high work speed and competitive product or outcome. Chinese work units, likewise, if they give up all of their irrelevant social responsibilities and become exclusively anchored to the work and task they are designed for, may produce products and accomplish business goals more effectively. What are irrelevant and need to be phased out? Obviously, they cannot continue to be a party station, involving in ideological propaganda and party politics. They cannot continue to be a governmental agency, engaging in welfare delivery, security, and social control practices. They cannot even continue to take care of all aspects of their employees. In one word, all these make the labor of the work unit too general, too all-inclusive, and too diffusive. Division of labor needs to be exercised to partition them to proper social service, charity, or governmental agencies.

Division of labor calls for functional differentiation of both the labor-performing agency and the content of labor being performed, which together lead to increased efficiency. For instance, when social responsibilities of the Chinese work unit are turned back to the government, it is required that the government be differentiated institutionally and functionally along with all the ramifications of a modern governing bureaucracy. In other words, it can no longer be only an authority to play power. It must provide all necessary rule, order, service, and environment to its constituents, which means that proper branches or systems are developed to accomplish all governing tasks.

Once a system is established, the content of its task, either service or control, can be also further divided into smaller parts, differentiating the system into an even more sophisticated organizational complex. The process continues until work efficiency is maximized. For example, social control tasks, once concentrated into the government's hands from various work units or local communities, may be divided within a unified but highly differentiated agency. Such an agency, being specialized in nothing else than social control, may easily follow the natural logic of its specialty, productively organize its force, and effectively perform its job. Likewise, when a work unit is left only with its due business interest, it can amplify that interest, divide it into manageable parts, and tackle it with full efficiency.

2. A Standard Employment Organization

As pointed out above, the essence of division of labor is that the task is broken down into various parts so that each part can be duly handled. Likewise, differentiation requires that society is differentiated into different sub-systems in a way that each sub-system can be specialized to effectively perform a particular job.

By this criterion, a standard employment organization should be one that can focus on its chosen business affair and rely upon other social agencies or work units for its needed supporting services. Obviously, the existence of various other organizations which are suited to provide different services is a precondition for the independence of a business establishment. In other words, society needs to be developed to a degree that all necessary social needs are recognized and are properly dealt with by corresponding agencies. In China, why do work units have to function like a small self-sufficient city? It is because the society is not differentiated enough to provide necessary supporting services universally to all different units. But if the situation is changed, the Chinese work unit can move closer to a standard employment organization which fits the image of efficient modern production.

Returning to Marx's critique of early capitalists' irresponsibility for social problems, the blame should be fairly directed to the society itself for lagging behind in

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differentiation or not developing proper social institutions to take care of the problems created by rapid industrialization and capitalist development. Enterprises do not commit any crime when they produce effectively. In fact, they provide a driving force for social reform and historical change. It is until the era of advanced capitalism the society is able to stand up to its responsibility and keep pace with the changing needs created by grass-root interests and capitalist development.

Is a standard capitalist employment organization likely in the Chinese context? A Chinese work unit can surely focus on its business affair and become specialized in it. It also can develop a complicated and effective work discipline system to motivate or control employees to realize business goals. However, given the fact that many Chinese work units have adequate or near adequate self-services for their employees, it is unlikely that they throw out those self-services altogether. Moreover, reform brings different perspectives into recognition. While people know that a work unit cannot be productive if it tries to meet every need of their employees, they also recognize that some employee services help induce employee commitment and therefore bring about high productivity. For instance, it is well-known that Japanese employers capture employee loyalty by their willingness to run some important employee services (Deyo 1987; Gao 1990, 1991, & 1992).

In one word, a business-oriented work unit can no longer be a social control or service agency. Social control or service needs to be bestowed to proper governmental or social organizations which are suited or specialized to do the job. Such division of labor and standardization can not only make work units more productive but also have social control or service be provided or implemented more effectively. Within a so-standardized employment unit, work discipline can be made closer to the needs of business goals when business is primarily emphasized. However, while focus on business rules out irrelevant services, retention of some employee benefits can make business goals easier to be accomplished and work control practices more legitimate to be implemented.

3. Freedom of Belief, Speech, and Choice

Democratization is another trend in China's development. Despite the fact that Mao's mass democracy is not institutionally constructive and Deng's economic reform does not explicitly include democratic reform of the one-party political system, the idea, mentality, and practice of democracy have indeed begun to spread widely across the population. At the center of national power, individual right, freedom of belief, speech, and choice are clearly written into the Constitution (The National People's Congress 1990). Ethnic minorities, democratic parties, overseas Chinese, and other local or special interests are included through the People's

Political Consultative Conference and the People's Congress into serious political debates or even national decision-makings (The Editorial Board 1990). In local politics, direct election of people's representatives or low-rank positions is instituted, giving people a sense of participation in the governing process and a lesson on how to advance their own interests through institutional means (Seeking Truth 1990; The Editorial Board 1990). In general, political atmosphere moves in the direction of more relaxation and greater democracy.

The most important in this trend, however, is not what is allowed or granted from the top. It is instead what is wanted, created, or realized at the grass root level. For example, freedom of belief is guaranteed by the 1982 Constitution. But it is not until the arrival of different religions, ideologies, and thoughts through years of open policy that people are able to make free choices of their own beliefs. On the other hand, although freedom of speech does not allow people to speak publicly against the party, complaining, criticizing, and even cursing the party do not lack in private or small group settings. This limited freedom is due to a relaxed public sentiment and would not be possible if the public stayed tuned exclusively to the party ideology. Likewise, freedom of choice is still restricted by the old system. But through reform, more and more people begin to cross lines and locate their fortunes in a new landscape. In one word, either granted, or restricted, by or from the

system, it is up to the people who actually apply their freedom to realize specific goals.

What is the consequence on social control when people begin to exercise their basic freedom? At present, Western thoughts are readily available in the Chinese culture market. World events and changes are instantly viewed by more and more ordinary Chinese through mass media (Xu 1993). If the grass-root hobby to criticize the party-government and the mass movement across walks of life to seek better individual fortunes are elevated into a full claim for freedom of belief, speech, and choice, a new dimension of national ideology, order, and politics is the only way to save the Chinese society from collapsing into pieces. In this new dimension, ideology takes its effect as a means of control not because it is declared as dominant but because people consciously believe it. Order is no longer based upon one party's interests. It is instead judged by the legal needs for protection of individual freedom and national security. Social control to maintain the order is thus legitimated by legal soundness rather than a biased effectiveness to protect the rule of one party.

4. Civil Liberty and Privacy

If it is said that Confucianism places order above human rights and subjects people to social hierarchy, the communist revolution contributes tremendously in publicizing the idea of equality, equity, and fairness across old and new lines of

social stratification among all Chinese people. For the first time in Chinese history, women recognize that they hold up half the sky, peasants know that they are not inferior to urbanites, and ordinary citizens are made aware that they are the masters of their society rather than the tools of their leaders (Mao 1975; Seeking Truth 1990). The communist version of civil liberties is somewhat different from that of the Western mainstream. It is group-oriented rather than individually-asserted. Instead of stressing the right of privacy, it points emphatically to the right of participation. From a developmental point of view, however, the communist idea of civil liberties is as modern as that of the Western mainstream.

China's movement or future evolution in the direction of democracy and civil liberties is thus likely to be a fine-tuning of what is currently achieved. The trend is made relatively apparent by recent reform. That is, civil liberties are to be conceived and claimed more in terms of individual human rights as defined by the world standard. Group pressure gives way to privacy. Individuals take first priority to look at and take care of their individual needs legally permitted by their constitutional rights. Group goals come next on a voluntary basis and cannot press individuals to reveal what they are willing to keep for themselves only. For example, the past idea of equality can question whether everyone is equally committed to the party cause. A fine-tuned version will

instead ask whether a pursuit is based upon individual voluntarism and then examine whether each reasonable pursuit is given equal social opportunity.

The social consequence of such an orientation of civil liberty or justice can be profound. In relevance to social control, a justified claim for individual space or privacy may prevent control agents from accessing sensitive areas to obtain crucial information needed to uncover a crime. Or evidence collected may be judged as legally unsound or unusable due to a violation of individual procedural rights by control agents. Within an organization like the work unit, allegiance may no longer be indiscriminately presumed when people come to it for work or a line of activity. Or membership allegiance may not provide any warranty that a part of members' constitutional right be forfeited for a desired collective cohesion, solidarity, or goal. Even work discipline procedures may have to pass through the test that they do not constitute any violation of basic human dignity and right.

In all, China is undergoing a conscious reform as well as on a developmental trend toward modernization and democratization. Various reform measures instituted and new changes to be faced have direct or indirect impacts on social control in Chinese work units. For the communist party who has been relying upon the work unit as a basic tool for proletarian dictatorship and socialist construction, all ongoing and likely changes pose a serious challenge to its

power base. There are different possible outcomes. At one extreme, the CCP may lose power eventually because of its gradually loosening grip on work organizations, the basic social building block. On another extreme, fear of losing control may drive the CCP back to its old fashion of organizing and controlling all social units and individual members. In between are various possible options or developments. One realistic development is that the CCP backs off from private space while continuing to hold onto national power. The key is that the CCP follows the basic trend of social change and shifts its style of social control from all-inclusive, motivational, and spirit-oriented to legal, regulatory, and behavioral control. In this development, it is natural that China becomes more open, more integrated to the world system, and adopts more world standards in all possible areas.

C. Possible Outlooks of Future Chinese Social Control

In the above, speculative comments as to what consequences long-term trend and current reform will create for social control in China, especially in the setting of work units, are provided in various segments. Now, it is time to develop an overall view of possible outlooks of future Chinese social control in its totality.

1. Social Control Being Social

A strikingly new feature of future social control in China will be a clear distinction between social and local or organizational responsibilities. Reform calls for enterprise autonomy. Modernization requires division of labor. Work units can no longer bear all social responsibilities to control employees for the party and government. The government must take back its part and develop an adequate social control to provide a necessary social environment or support for work units.

The consequence is that social control becomes social, i.e., universally executed by the government for all citizens or legal entities. This first demands that the police network is modernized, standardized, and strengthened to take the lead in control activities. It is also required that various control measures are designed and implemented in relative independence from local interests.

Ideological Control While it is no longer practical to develop a national ideology and impose it through weekly political studies in all social units, use of governmental networks and mass media to pass on official policies, social programs, non-ideological ideas, and commonsense control advice to the populace will be a new form of dragging people spiritually to the mainstream.

Neighborhood Control Local police stations are currently in direct connection with residential committees. As housing

reform and non-life-employment blur out the boundaries of work units, change residents composition, and reshape residential order, the government may become the only legitimate authority to maintain and claim full control over residential organizations. In other words, residential committee may become independent from the work unit. Its role in keeping community order may no longer be mixed with the production or business functions of any particular work organization.

Confidential Records It is burdensome and makes no point to keep a long evaluational record for each citizen. Also, the current dossier system put its focus on the political aspect and proves no significant help for crime control. A new development, as signified by the introduction of identification in recent years, may be to develop a record system which collects and stores information to identify each individual precisely, such as basic biological data and finger prints. More importantly, a computerized document system is established to monitor criminals across the country.

Reward and Penalty Social rewards can be made publicly to all citizens and determined by various levels of government for people under their respective jurisdiction. Model family, model work unit, excellent entrepreneur, or whatever titles or categories may be, can be included to motivate people and keep them in line.

Penalty and punishment may be meted out from different perspectives. Social order is maintained or reinforced only

when punishment is decided and delivered justly. Removing irregular, informal forms of penalty and letting the justice system be in charge may be the way toward such a goal.

Administrative Disciplining The government may be able to act against violations from ordinary citizens by administrative means. For example, tax eviction is handled by revocation of licenses. But proper use of administrative disciplining must be accompanied by systematic, well-publicized rules and subject to the court review for its legality or constitutionality.

Justice A formal court system applies law professionally, independently, and procedurally. Justice is delivered universally to all social interests and individual citizens. Informal grass-root justice is encouraged for quick solution of local disputes. But full legal guidance is rendered to ensure that no law is transgressed and individual legal rights are not violated.

Public Security Social order is maintained by a relatively stable, independent, and professionalized security force. Formal police officers act as the primary agents of social control and carry out all proactive and reactive control activities. Local security is supervised and coordinated. But no formal social control will be left to the hands of local interests, including a work unit. Also important is that public security itself is put under the premise of the law.

<u>Vigilance and Inclusion</u> Vigilance, inclusion, exclusion, or mobilization is a part of the social phenomenon. No matter it is locally used as an organizational strategy or nationally applied as an instrument for social programs, it must be based upon individual voluntarism and does not transgress the law. It is up to the justice system to judge the legality of any mass vigilance or inclusion measure.

In all, across all the forms of social control dealt with in this study, the government or society may no longer count on individual social units for implementation and collect the gains in the end without actual labor. Instead, there is an ample space or a tremendous task of social control left to the government to ensure all social units are run orderly, legally, and with their own characters in a socially secure environment.

2. Social Control Being Local and Organizational

While the main domain of social control becomes social, standardized, and a professional operation of a special governmental agency, it does not rule out that individual social units continue to maintain a control apparatus and operation within their confine to advance their local or organizational goals. In fact, a highly differentiated social unit is indispensable in some degree to an effective control system for its success.

<u>Ideological Control</u> A work unit, even if it is free from the party politics, may still have its own motto, charter, flag, song, or unique spirit. This spirit may be translated into action, reflected in all aspects of membership life, or propagandized through all effective channels like mass meetings, broadcasts, posters, and membership handbooks. The effect is apparent: creating a sense of collectivity and inducing allegiance and commitment.

<u>Residential Control</u> Reform is designed to clear the work unit from undue social responsibility. But the work unit can still keep running all previous services for its employees if it is willing to do so or if it feels it may benefit from doing so. It may continue to claim its leading role in residential organizations within its living compound and use them to provide protection for and execute some forms of control over its employees. In fact, as housing reform lets housing units owned by individual employees who may later cut off their work relations from but continue to live in a work unit, it is especially necessary for the work unit to keep its hands on the residential area to prevent disruptive occurrence which may negatively impact its business affair.

<u>Confidential Records</u> Instead of keeping employee dossiers for the party and state, a work unit may feel it must establish a unit-wide employee record system based upon its business need. The record system may provide basic information for the management to implement appropriate training,

educational programs and make correct decisions in appointment, award, and promotion. It certainly lends the unit authority a scientific means of control over employees' transfer and upper mobility.

Reward and Penalty   Reward and penalty may also be made more suitable to work needs and organizational goals. Removal of political rhetoric and irrelevant events can make reward and penalty activities internally oriented, differentiated along with various specialties of business affairs. In other words, every line of specialty within the work unit may come into public notice by reward and penalty and therefore receive a boost in perfecting its workmanship.

Administrative Disciplining   As it is directed solely to work, administrative disciplining can be tightened in its intensity. Also administrative rules may be made more specific and precise in terms of the internal ramifications of work or duty requirements. The most salient feature, however, may be that as everyone is aware of the primary importance of task performance and work efficiency, both controllers and controllees will become serious about regular work procedures. As a result, most would stick to the normal administrative requirement. Disciplining muscle can then be saved and focused to handle a handful who go beyond the line. In other words, the effect of control is automatically achieved.

Quasi-Justice   Work-related disputes and interest conflicts may increase when focus is put on work performance

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and business accomplishment. Practical needs are likely to justify the practice of conflict resolution and the retention of a formal forum within the work unit to perform it. Moreover, resolving disputes, dealing with conflicts, and delivering civil justice may become an even salient part in the work unit's management activities. In one word, quasi-justice is likely to be kept as a labeling legacy for the Chinese work unit.

Para-Security It may continue to operate in the form of a formal unit division, especially when the unit is large or the public security system is unable to provide a socially secure environment for individual organizations. The task orientation of unit para-security, however, is likely to become more inward, not only confined to the work unit compound but also focused on business-related safety procedures. Operation may feature more installation of safety and security instruments and less use of human power. In all, para-security will be made to suit the practical needs of a work unit.

Vigilance and Inclusion Organizational membership may imply that some individual rights be surrendered to the collective morality or goal. Within the work unit, discretionary power may allow the unit authority to take the law, at least the organizational by-law, in its hands. Various mass self-guard and motivation measures may be practiced for order-keeping or goal attainment. However, all these have to

pass through the legal or constitutional test that law and human right are not violated forcibly.

In all, individual work organizations in society provide an occasion where social control can develop both its depth and width. In the dimension of depth, control within a work unit is tailored to local or organizational needs and may be differentiated as far as work or task division goes. Old forms of inside-unit control may continue and gain new contents. New forms may also emerge. Horizontally, organizational control in various work units or social settings presents a task for social control at large. Society-wide patrol or monitoring may be needed to attack clandestine control activities of illegal cliques and to intervene in the routine control operation of legal work units or social organizations when the legality of control is in question.

3. Control Less for Effect

Along with the differentiation of social control into social and organizational dimensions, an important effect is that each dimension is left with a focused area to deal with. The width of its task is reduced, affording it an opportunity to develop professional specialty and therefore increase work efficiency. A catch word for this trend of change is 'control less for effect'.

For social control in work units, 'control less for effect' is obvious when control is focused only on work or

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business related areas. The scope is narrowed: the party's or government's control requirement is returned to its due sponsor or the overall society, employees' thought is left out, and their behavior is observed only on work time. Also, the entire control apparatus is no longer put on constant alert to just prevent anything that might happen. The system can thus be relaxed. Saved energy can be focused on work-related control activities, making them more suitable to the needs of modern management and work productivity. In other words, the depth of control can be increased in the direction of a work unit's business task. The effect can be made more direct and salient in terms of goal attainment.

For social control in the level of society, 'control less for effect' is reflected in two fronts. In relation to organizational or local control, if work-related problems are well-handled and local order is effectively kept within the confine of various social units, governmental control authorities may not have to teach, advise, direct, organize, or coordinate them for their respective control tasks or activities. Energy can be saved for effective control actions in society at large. On the other hand, effect may come from a reduction of unnecessary control activities and a concentration on due control targets. For instance, the scope of control can be tremendously focused when social control shifts its basis from the party ideology to the state law. Generally, the party ideology asks to censor people's thoughts

and words. It also tends to create a hyperchondrium that something might happen if control is put at ease for just a moment. The hyperchondrium overstretches the control system, making it actually less ready to react effectively to virtual problems. In contrast, a sound state law is made with clear definitions of objectively existing acts or deeds. As social control is concerned, crimes and deviances should be specified with clear prescriptions of punishments. A professional and effective social control just follows the law to carry out its duty in designated areas on designated targets. Hand is off when law is out.

In a philosophical sense, the idea of 'control less for effect' requires a fundamental change in attitude, thinking, and decision-making. The Chinese mind is habitually suited to a consummate mode of thinking. Translated into social control actions, they tend to stretch out all their control muscles to prevent from happening something whose occurrence probability is just a little more than zero. 'Control less for effect' is instead instrumental. It is based upon an assumption that ends are specified and means are selectively applied only if they help to realize the ends. In other words, control is treated as a means. It is used only when it is necessary to advance a specific goal or to cope with an obvious problem.

In sum, current reforms and long-term trends toward modernization and democratization have various impacts on social control in China. Changes are possible in all aspects.

Some may be implicit, indirect, remote, and general to the society. Others are instead explicit, direct, immediate, and particular to individual social units, especially the work unit. As far as the subject matter this study is concerned, various forms of social control may still continue in the work units. But their contents may be overhauled in a way that party politics, governmental requirements, and business-irrelevant control activities are cleared away and work, business affairs, and organizational goals become a primary focus of control practices. The work unit is thus better served in its own rights. Control itself becomes less diffusive in scope but more effective in essence.

D. Conclusion

The underlying motivation of this study is to understand the current Chinese social control system and be prepared, both theoretically and psychologically, for its transformation under China's changing social condition of reform, modernization, and democratization. Throughout the study, a number of pragmatic concerns raised by the research motivation have been relieved. First, it is discovered that current Chinese social control is not exclusively community-based. It is a mixture. On the one hand, it has a bureaucratic structure which is modern, rational, and suitable for various functional needs. Rules, by-laws, and ethics are systematically established. Implementations follow sophisticated

organizational procedures. On the other hand, traditional ties, customary codes, and mutual surveillance are well incorporated into the bureaucratic control system, rendering human relations or organic solidarities a salient role to play in control operations. This mixed feature determines that transition of Chinese social control is not likely to be as drastic as that occurred in Western history when community-based control switched suddenly into a new mechanical mode of law- or bureaucracy-based control. Social disorganization may be prevented, because the new mechanical mode is already partially in place and its ascendence can be balanced by a proportional descendence of organic control elements.

Second, it is identified that current social control is not total, repressive, and excessive, although it is diffusive, inclusive, and demanding. In Chinese work units, employees may be questioned or controlled from their beliefs, personal life, to work performance. But they also have the freedom and right to turn around a line of control or even question its legality. Basically, across the current control system, there is no significant accumulation of anger, resistance, and explosive force. As such, it is not likely that a relaxation or change on one time or place causes the collapse of the entire system.

Third, it is clear that reform in the past ten years and its continuation have de-dramatized any change on Chinese social control system. Debates and theoretical explorations of

various managing or control initiatives in work settings gives the public a sense of preparedness in their minds. Actual implementation of reform measures makes those impacted even suited to new control situations. In one word, transformation of Chinese social control, as expected and tried through reform, can be made an additive and smooth progression with possible destructive impacts minimized at a manageable level.

In addition to relieving these practical concerns, the study has also generated various theoretical, methodological, and policy implications for social and organizational control. Theoretically, the study proposes that social control be treated as a variable which can be approached in its own right. Social control in Chinese work organizations has been systematically examined in terms of its logic components, from structure, process, nature, and change, to context. Second, the study suggests that various applicable sociological perspectives be utilized to develop meaningful and sensitizing explanations for social control and organizational phenomena. Weber, Durkheim, and Marx have been drawn upon and conflict, functional, exchange, and interactional perspectives have been mobilized to analyze the general mechanism and particular occasions of social control practices in Chinese work settings. It ought to be admitted, however, that because of its preoccupation with description and analysis of social control practice in Chinese work units in its presently workable form, this study has not yet carried out its

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application of conflict, exchange, and interactional approaches to a systematic and in-depth level. More effort is needed in future researches to realize the theoretical potential of conflict, exchange, and interactional theories in explaining the dynamics of complex social control reality. Finally, sticking to the philosophy of free-lance thinking and theorizing, the study has formulated a new theory of social control on the basis of this exclusive research on Chinese experience. The theory defines social control in Chinese work organizations as non-confrontational citizen control. Recognizing that such civil control constitutes the main domain of social control landscape, the theory has pinpointed the newly-identified control's scope, origin, goal, necessity, nature, form, and effect. It could be an important contribution to social control studies.

In methodology, the study adopted a method of interviewing former participants who have physically left their participating situations. It raises questions and leaves hints which point to better methodological options in future studies. For example, participant or non-participant observational studies in selected Chinese work units can supply materials about control setups and operations directly on site. Survey or in-depth interview of current unit employees can provide data about individual experience, reaction, or evaluation on control practices immediately in front of controllees' eyes. Time lag, memory loss, and new

cultural or situational effect can be thus removed. There are also other methodological lessons which can be learned from this study.

With relevance to social control policies, the study offers the following major suggestions. First, effective control begins with identifying what needs to be controlled and what may be left out of control. It is pointless to control everything, because an all-inclusive control overstretches the muscle of controllers, causes unnecessary resistance from controllees, de-focuses the due attention on real control targets, and increases the cost of control. Second, when control is directed to where is needed, energy can be concentrated. Strategies and tactics can be better developed and administered to ensure that control is duly in place. Third, for control to be convincing, stable, and lasting, it is required that it be instituted along with universally-recognized life and work needs or demands. Concretely, it is internalized by the controlled and deemed by them as necessary, reasonable, and legitimate. It is habituated by controllees and treated by them as inseparable from their lifestyles, work routines, or even natural rhythms.

All in all, as observed, analyzed, and foreseen by the study, Chinese society is evolving. Social control is being differentiated into work-related discipline and government-administered control. Focus is strengthened respectively on each line of differentiated control. Legitimization process is

also depoliticized, becoming more relevant to pragmatic needs in life, work, and social process. In other words, China is realistically taking the policy advice obtained from this study. This fact gives the study the content and comfort to bring itself into a conclusion.

APPENDIX

A. Interview: Some Anecdotes

The interview was an interesting experience. The investigator felt like going back to China. Chinese ways of doing business and basic social relation tactics in the Chinese community were invoked to effectively deal with various occasions. A number of anecdotes were recorded on the field:

(1) three respondents teased the investigator to offer them a lunch for having been interviewed. Two of them were escaped with smiles and teasing comments. The third (2MGT:UNeP2) was given a lunch. He offered four names of possible interviewees.

(2) The investigator was asked to go to her home by one respondent (3FUT:USwP3). In a courtesy, a pack of Hawaii-made chocolate-coated macadamia nuts was brought as a gift for her.

(3) In exchange for one interview and five referred interviewees, the investigator offered a service of tour-guiding a party of two to the Diamond Head Crater and the Waikiki Beach for three hours and taking them to the Honolulu International Airport in an early morning.

(4) To help an interviewee (2FUO:CNeP2) concentrate on the interview at her home, the investigator carried her one-year old son in his brace, and teased the baby occasionally in order to keep him quiet throughout the meeting.

(5) One respondent (2MGT:UNeP2) took his parents, wife, and little son to the investigator's home for the interview. Fruits, drinks, chocolates, and cookies were then prepared to entertain them. The visit took an entire afternoon.

(6) One respondent (4MUR:RSwP2) was so opinionated that he kept making impolite and even degrading comments during the interview. For instance, he said one time, in a domineering manner, to the investigator: "You simply did not work in China. I worked in several places, the system is the same everywhere!" Another time, he asked a question in reply: "Is there a security department in my unit? What a nonsense! Was there a unit with no security department?" Still another time, he refuted: "You simply do not know anything about China. The Chinese dossier is a secret system operated by the state. How can you read your own dossier?" As a reaction, the investigator had to keep ingratiating himself with him. In the end, the investigator said to him: "You are very experienced. I learned a lot from you and hope to meet you face to face somewhere sometime."

B. Original Information for Line of Business

Original information for the line of business among all the work units covered in the interview is as follow:

Commerce: banks and companies in export and import, textile and printing, mechanics, and foreign trade.

Production: farms and factories in wireless radio equipment, bicycles, pharmacies, chemicals, measuring and cutting tools, kinescope and glass, internal-combustion engines, machine tools, rubbers, and loudspeakers.

Service: museum, library, hospitals, kindergarten, and schools.

Government: commissions, ministries, or bureaus for science and technology, economic planning, culture, statistics, and economic relation and trade; military unit, newspapers, and news agency.

Research: hydraulics, energy, resource, agriculture, information, natural sciences, aerospace industry, social sciences, mechanical technology, statistics, agricultural engineering, post and telecommunication, pharmacy, oceanography, medical science, electronic engineering, meteorology,

environmental science, scientific documents, organic chemistry

University: comprehensive, normal, and those specialized in business, finance, management, labor, agriculture, music, tropical plants and products, transportation, forestry, agricultural engineering, Chinese medicine, medical science, and chemical engineering.

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