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AS *ZAINICHI* OR POLITICIAN:

HOW *YOMIURI* WITNESSED THE TRACKS OF ARAI'S POLITICAL HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether/how the representation of *zainichi* Koreans (Koreans living in Japan) in *Yomiuri Shimbun*, one of the national Japanese newspapers, has changed since the end of World War II within postwar *Yomiuri* articles. In order to accomplish this, a case in which a former *zainichi* Korean politician, Shokei Arai, was suspected of receiving payoffs from a securities company, is analyzed and compared with three cases involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans and two cases involving Japanese politicians employing the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis based upon the theory of Cultural Studies. Through the analyses and comparisons, it was found Arai's ethnic background was mentioned only after his death. Arai's case, then, when it broke, tended to be reported as one in which a Japanese politician was involved, though after his suicide it became a case in which a former *zainichi* Korean politician was involved.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to look for a change in the representation of *zainichi* Koreans, or Koreans living in Japan, in one of the Japanese national newspapers, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, between the end of World War II and the present day. In order to accomplish this, it will be determined whether a former *zainichi* Korean politician, Shokei Arai, who committed suicide in the end, was represented in the newspaper as a former *zainichi* Korean or as a Japanese politician after the detection of the scandal. The following is an outline of this paper.

In Chapter 2, a theory thoroughly employed in this paper in order to understand the change especially in Japanese society and analyze each sample case is introduced. It is generally called the theory of Cultural Studies and explains how our daily lives are construed through the media on the basis of the power relationship among powerful/influential organizations/people in society.

In Chapter 3, Arai's background, the history of *zainichi* Koreans, and the change in social position of *zainichi* Koreans in Japan are explored. Contempt for Korea arose among the Japanese in several complicated ways: because of the policy of the then most powerful/influential organization, the Meiji government, and Japan's colonization of Korea in 1910. Due to the latter, many Koreans could/did not return

to Korea, were severely discriminated against by the Japanese or by Japan itself, and could not avoid status as “Others” in Japan even after Japan lost the war. Arai was one of these “Others.” However, Japanese discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans gradually decreased over the years because of changes not only in Japanese society but also in the world situation after the war.

In Chapter 4, Arai’s personal/political history is introduced. It may be noted Arai possessed unique characteristics. Such a personality caused some friction between those around him and himself and seems to have driven him to near constant stress. Partly because of his character, he came to embody a politician determined to die for the nation.

In Chapter 5, Arai’s case, the main subject of this paper, is explained. Arai was suspected of receiving illegal payoffs through stock dealing with one of the major securities companies in Japan, Nikko Securities. Once the scandal was uncovered the mass media released day after day other news stories on him, which can be seen as having strengthened suspicion against him, and on the day he was to be arrested he took his own life. It is necessary, however, for most of the politicians in Japan to raise funds individually, and one of the ways to do so is to engage in stock dealing. It is guessed in this chapter that such a custom partly turned Arai to stock dealing.

In the sixth, seventh and eighth chapters, the two main organizations among the

powerful/influential organizations related to Arai's case, the LDP and the prosecution, and the media are explored in due order. These three chapters taken as a whole provide us a clue for understanding the compositional arrangement of the power relationship surrounding Arai at the time of the detection of his scandal within the theory of Cultural Studies. In addition, it can be taken through these chapters that the structures/characteristics of all three organizations, the LDP, the prosecution and the media, are based on Japanese culture that makes the connections between powerful organizations in Japan very strong once they are united with one another.

In Chapter 9, Arai's social position as one of the "Others" is confirmed. It describes how Arai was treated by the main organizations to which he ever belonged or ever had dealings, such as the LDP and the prosecution. Arai, we learn, could not get used to and did not even try getting used to all the customs of all the organizations to which he belonged. That was one of the causes of the otherness he made for himself. At the same time, his behavior induced much pressure against him, which lasted until his death, from these organizations. Once the matter of his ethnicity/identity due to his background was concerned, however, he tried becoming Japanese at all costs. It may be true it was partly due to Arai's personality that he was finally involved in the swirl of the power relationship among these organizations. This power relationship existed in Japan for a long time without many changes even

after the war, and it may also be true that a foundation tending to encourage people to refuse “Others” existed therefore in Japanese society. That is, Arai’s background was a decisive element in his otherness along with the bigger picture power relationship.

In the beginning of Chapter 10, it is comprehensively proved the theory of Cultural Studies can be applied to Arai’s scandal in order not only to understand the case but also analyze it. Then *Yomiuri* is introduced as provider of sample articles. In addition, five other cases, three involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans and two in which politicians are involved, all of which are used in reaching a conclusion for this paper by comparing them with Arai’s case, are given. Finally, the crucial criterion for conclusion is provided: Whether Arai is represented in newspaper articles as a politician or as a former *zainichi* Korean after the detection of his scandal.

In Chapter 11, each case of the six including Arai’s is analyzed. And in Chapter 12, the final chapter of this paper, a conclusion is given: Arai is represented as a former *zainichi* Korean with reference to his background after his death, although represented as a politician without any reference to his background until his death within the range of analysis of this paper. This chapter notes that method of representation, the former, is not normal in the Japanese media because it has been somewhat taboo to feature *zainichi* Koreans by making their background clear

especially when they are involved in criminal cases/scandals. Either way, however, it was found through the analyses that *Yomiuri* was critical of Arai and did not succeed in staying neutral until his death. This may be a direct result of the power relationship in place at that time.

Lastly, it needs to be mentioned that all of the quotations from references in Japanese, including the *Yomiuri* articles used for analysis, are translated into English by this author.

CHAPTER 2

CULTURAL STUDIES

Cultural Studies: Power, the media and society

First of all, a theory potentially useful to logically understand the change not only in the representation of *zainichi* Koreans in the national Japanese newspaper, *Yomiuri*, but also in Japanese society surrounding *zainichi* Koreans is introduced. It is generally called the theory of Cultural Studies. Cultural Studies established its own foundation by critically succeeding Marxism through the structuralist, Althusser, though Hall (1992/1996a) says later, “There never was a prior moment when cultural studies and marxism represented a perfect theoretical fit” (p. 265). Later Cultural Studies introduced Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which shows how power works in society, imported the concept of articulation, and was influenced by Laclau, who made it possible to analyze society in discourse. As a result, Cultural Studies came to be the area that explores how much our everyday life is connected to the distribution and function of ideological power, how our daily life is constructed, and how that construction is accomplished through the message of the media. The person who brought Cultural Studies to that ambitious extent must be, as Sparks (1996) names him, “the central figure” (p. 71) in the development of Cultural Studies,

Stuart Hall. Therefore, it is his writings that will mainly be explored in the following sections.

A big change in Cultural Studies

Cultural Studies has, as just mentioned, imported some concepts. Actually, a significant change happened in Hall's theory of communication along with the introduction of those concepts. In order to make the change clear, Yamakoshi (2004) offers two of Hall's writings, "Encoding/Decoding" (1973/1980) and "The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Repressed in Media Studies" (1982) and compares them. First of all, those two writings will be looked at in order to understand more deeply not only what sort of change Hall's theory experienced but also the theory of communication of Cultural Studies itself.

Encoding/Decoding

Hall's model of encoding/decoding has a focus on the audience and shows well how the message of the media is actively interpreted by that body. In Hall's encoding/decoding theory, the message, which is sent via the media, is encoded by the author and decoded by the reader comparatively autonomously. Therefore, the social meaning of the message is created and becomes reality through the two processes of encoding and decoding.

It can be seen through encoding and decoding how reality is formed. To begin

with, reality is always “mediated by and through language” (Hall, 1973/1980, p. 131).

Hall (1973/1980) believes the process of the formation of reality consists of “distinctive moments” such as production, circulation, consumption and reproduction (p. 128). Regarding the first moment, production, Hall sees the process of encoding as the production of messages by the media and claims some elements like historically defined technical skills, professional ideologies, institutional knowledge and assumptions about the audience, all of which exist within the media, influence the process. That is, every message is produced under combined pressure and intentions from inside and outside the media.

The message is circulated, but it is not until the audience side decodes that the message becomes meaningful socially. To be exact, the message is meaningful in society if it is appreciated as meaningful by the audience and articulated in practice. Once the message is accepted by the audience side, it produces socially dominant/preferred meanings that have influence on, for instance, the political and ideological values of the audience and are finally institutionalized. That means, in the wording of Hall (1973/1980), “meaning structures” are accomplished in that society as the media side expects.

However, Hall believes not all of the audience decodes every message as per the expectations of the media. The question of misunderstandings is solid proof of

this. According to Hall (1973/1980), this happens because the audience itself produced the meaning of those messages “in a negotiated way” (p. 138).

One message can be read in different ways with the possibility of producing various meanings. That is, the social meaning of the message varies depending on how much the encoder and decoder cooperate or confront each other for the production of meaning. However, the different ways a message is read must be limited because, to borrow the wording of Hall (1973/1980), “we could not speak of an effective communicative exchange at all” (p. 136) if there were no reciprocity between encoding and decoding moments. That is, no decoding exists without the influence of the encoder of the message.

The Rediscovery of “Ideology”: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies

As Yamakoshi (2004) points out, however, Hall later notices there exists limitation in the various ways the audience reads due to the ideological struggle that plays in a different dimension. In “Culture, the media and the ‘ideological effect’,” presented in 1977, Hall introduces Gramsci’s concept of hegemony with the recognition that each culture is formed under definite historical circumstances. In “the Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’,” presented in 1982, he imports Laclau’s concept of discourse and demonstrates that reality is constructed through the ideological struggle, carried out by competing groups for their own interests in the discourse of the media,

or through the struggle over meaning, not through the consumption of messages by the audience. In the wording of Yamakoshi (2004), Hall shows “the conversion of vantage point of his critical theory of communication” (p. 154) in that writing and changes from analysis of the audience to analysis of the discourse.

The idea that language socially mediates meaning does not change, but language is defined as “the medium in which ideology is generated and transformed” (Hall, 1986/1996b, p. 36) if ideology, which is “the mental frameworks—the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works” (Hall, 1986/1996b, p. 26), comes to be involved. That is, the meaning mediated by/through language is deeply connected with ideology; it is produced on the basis of ideology and is actually gained and constructed through the struggle among different classes/social groups with different social interests. This is because the signification is, for classes/social groups, “the means by which collective social understandings are created” (Hall, 1982, p. 70), or “the means by which consent for particular outcomes can be effectively mobilized” (Hall, 1982, p. 70). What is employed to win the struggle is ideological power, which becomes a foundation in signifying and has the power to signify events in a particular way, and then the media, “the dominant means

of social signification in modern societies” (Hall, 1982, p. 83), become a battleground for the ideological struggle. However, some people/groups must first struggle to gain access to the media while some people/groups already have this access due to their social status. Therefore, it depends on the power they have whether they can take part in the ideological struggle. What is most important is to gain access to the media.

In fact, it is the media that support the victory of powerful groups with enough power to attain hegemony, mastery and leadership, in other words, Hall’s (1986/1996b) words, by making “consensus” and producing “consent,” and produce/reproduce dominant ideology. Taking it further, the media make the ideology the norm in that society. It is no wonder the norm accords with the interest of the group that won the struggle and the media represent that interest as “the general interest” and then represent “the general interest” as “ruling.” In this way, the group can continue to dominate its society as long as it keeps winning the ideological struggle. Such a situation can be maintained if other groups continue to “become articulated to and within this particular ideology” (Grossberg, 1986/1996, p. 144). But the connection by articulation is “not necessary, determined, absolute, and essential for all time” (Grossberg, 1986/1996, p. 141), and as Hall (1977) says, “There is no *permanent* hegemony” (p. 333), it is fluid according to the struggle.

However, there is contradiction: The media is articulated with the production/reproduction of dominant ideologies though they are, or must be, independent from any groups. The reason is that the media cannot continue to exist as legitimate unless it gains consensus in society. In order to maintain its existence, the media unconsciously generalizes the interest that gained legitimate power to dominate, as what is consistent with “the national interest” and tries to secure the consent of “the nation.” To be exact, it is just like a quick act of jumping on the bandwagon. Why does “the nation” inclusively become the target? It is because this is that for which nonpartisanship of the media asks.

Then what is signified on the basis of the dominant ideology resulting from the struggle comes to be understood as reality. It is a consequence that a system of equivalence is achieved between language and reality. The system of equivalence is secured through discourse, which has “the effect of sustaining certain ‘closures,’ of establishing certain systems of equivalence between what could be assumed about the world and what could be said to be true” (Hall, 1982, p. 75). The media can change any event into social reality if it has at least the credibility and the discourse to do so, if, in the wording of Hall (1982), it can render the event “naturalized” with “the most skilful and elaborate procedures of coding” (p. 76). This is because discourse has continued to mount, not tightly though, by articulation one with another so far and is

something into which all of the histories that have formed society have been precipitated as well as “a reservoir of themes and premises on which...broadcasters could draw for the work of signifying new and troubling events” (Hall, 1982, p. 73). In discourse, “the ideological frameworks and classifying schemes of a society” (Hall, 1982, p. 72) continue to be re-produced unconsciously and without being noticed. The audience corresponds to the reality constructed through reproduction in discourse and are put “in a complicitous relationship of pragmatic knowledge to the ‘reality’ of the discourse itself” (Hall, 1982, p. 75).

Cultural Studies of today

In that kind of process of change in his theory, Hall turns his attention to the phenomenon that discourse “*situates us* as social actors or as a member of a social group in a particular relation to the process and prescribes certain social identities for us” (Hall, 1986/1996b, p. 40), and starts to take identity as “a ‘production’ which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (Hall, 1990, p.222). He argues identities are produced/reproduced with “difference” that results from the historical/cultural articulation through the ideological struggle, or the struggle over meaning, in discourse. What is produced from the effect of contradiction between identities and difference is discrimination. It appears in various areas such as race, ethnicity, class and gender, and those who are

directed by the side of majority due to the result of the power relation are positioned as “Other,” or the side of Them in an Us-Them relationship. The position of “Other” continues to be fixed/naturalized as long as the power relationship is maintained. Within this theory, Hall concludes, “Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed” (Hall, 1990, p. 225).

The reason “Other” based on “difference” is important is that “Other” is *“fundamental to the constitution of the self”* (Hall, 1997, p. 237) in our daily lives. Stereotyping in representing the “Other” is given as an aspect of the constitution of the self. Through stereotyping, the difference of the “Other” is exaggerated, simplified, fixed and excluded. That difference is ambivalent and can be both positive and negative. It negatively functions if, as aforementioned, it is filled with contradiction and such. As a result, it can be “threatening, a site of danger, of negative feelings, of splitting, hostility, and aggression towards the ‘Other’” (Hall, 1997, p. 238). When the representation of the “Other” based on such a negative differences becomes dominant/preferred in a society, specifically, discrimination against the “Other” occurs in that society.

CHAPTER 3

CONFIRMATION OF ARAI'S POSITION IN JAPANESE SOCIETY

Who is Shokei Arai?

Shokei Arai was born in 1948 in Osaka, Japan, to self-employed parents of South Korean ancestry. He remained in Osaka until moving to Tokyo to prepare for his second chance to take his entrance examinations after he failed the first for the Department of Medicine at the University of Kyoto. In 1967 he was accepted to the Department of Science at the University of Tokyo. This was at the height of student movements in Japan and campus revolts occurred often at the university. He says in his first book, "*Shinwa e no chosen*" (A challenge to the myths) (Arai, 1983), he was somewhat influenced by the movement, gave out handbills publicizing his opinions and started to read the books of such philosophers as Marx. Finally, he became more interested in economics, sociology and anthropology, and transferred to the Department of Economics within the university.

In 1972, as soon as he graduated, he went to work for the iron manufacturing company, *Shin Nippon Seitetsu* (Nippon Steel). He first worked at the Hirohata works in Himeji, Hyogo, but soon wrote an entrance examination to be a government official, received informal assurance of employment from the Ministry of Finance,

and started to work for it the next year, 1973. For two years from 1976, he was sent on loan to the Ministry of Welfare and met Michio Watanabe, then Minister of Welfare. Arai lectured on a tax system for medical doctors to Minister Watanabe and they grew enough close to each other to meet for lunch at the minister's office. In 1978, Arai was appointed superintendent of the tax office at Sakata, Yamagata. In 1980, Watanabe was assigned Minister of Finance and Arai was selected as one of his secretaries.

In 1982, Arai left the Ministry of Finance for which he had worked ten years and prepared to stand as candidate for the House of Representatives in the second constituency of Tokyo. In November, however, a public secretary of one of the candidates of the same constituency put black stickers bearing phrases like "North Korean who has been naturalized in Japan since 1966" on the thousands of Arai's posters around the area. This made Arai's background public. Later, and in addition, copies of the Arai family register were anonymously sent to some leading figures in the electoral district. Arai lost the next year's general election. In 1986, however, he was first elected as member of the House of Representatives with the support of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Before he left the LDP in 1994, he belonged to the faction of Nakasone/Watanabe. (Later this faction came to be called just Watanabe because Arai's old Ministry of Finance connection, Michio Watanabe,

took it over.)

In 1992, Arai appeared on television day after day urging two big-name LDP politicians, Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita, to resign. He was in the limelight as a young standard-bearer of the political world. He severely criticized Kanemaru, former vice-president of the LDP, for receiving five hundred million yen from a parcel delivery company, *Sagawa Kyubin* (Sagawa Express) with links to organized crime. Kanemaru was arrested for tax evasion, related to that “gift,” in 1993. A group called *To no shinrai kaifuku o kangaeru kai* (Group to Think of Restoring Trust in the LDP) formed by younger members of the LDP, including Arai, drove Kanemaru into a corner and was successful in forcing his resignation from his position as a member of the Diet. After that, Arai asked former Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who was indirectly involved in the *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal, to leave the LDP.

In 1993, Arai formed a policy study group called *Jiminto heisei kenkyukai*. In the same year, he organized another group, *Shinsei Jiminto o tsukuru kai*, to renew the LDP with not only younger LDP members but also younger independent Diet members. In 1994, the latter evolved into a group called *Riberaruzu*, which planned to leave the LDP to become an independent political party in support of Watanabe, though Watanabe did not leave the LDP after all. Arai and four other of the LDP members of *Riberaruzu* left the LDP and started the Liberal Party, taking leading

positions within it.

Later, Arai left the Liberal Party for the New Frontier Party. In 1997, he returned to the LDP after winning his fourth election as an independent candidate and left the 21st Century Club to which he had belonged for a while. In December, it became clear he might illegally have received money from a private company, and on February 19, 1998, he, by his own hand, put an end to his life.

Why Arai needed to be naturalized

Arai was not treated as a Japanese citizen until 1966, although he was born and raised in Japan. At eighteen years old he was naturalized as a Japanese citizen along with his parents. In needing to present a reason for seeking the naturalization, Arai expressed in an article by Sasaki (1983) in a magazine called *Shukan Asahi*, “I felt it unreasonable that my parents did not even have the suffrage when I was in the higher grades of elementary school and I started to persuade them to be naturalized claiming that ‘we should bear the responsibility for Japan so long as we live permanently here’ though they opposed it” (p. 162). It is necessary to mention here why Arai did not automatically possess Japanese nationality though he was born in Japan. The Japanese Nationality Law basically (and still) follows a principle of lineage. As mentioned before, Arai’s father and mother had South Korean ancestors. In other words, they were descendants of South Koreans. However, both also were born and

raised in Japan. In addition, and this point is very different from the case of their son, both had automatically been treated as Japanese citizens from their births. In 1952, however, they were divested of their Japanese nationality and formally became aliens in Japan though, according to Lee (1981), all Koreans living in Japan were already classified as aliens with the 1947 Alien Registration Law. That is why Arai, born the year after the Registration Law, saw his parents had no right to vote. There are yet more complicated reasons Arai's parents although born in Japan and treated as Japanese citizens for a while required naturalization later.

They are these: The main cause of the case of Arai's parents could be the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan. In 1910, the Japanese government set about colonizing Korea and forced all Koreans to become Japanese citizens. Then, in 1939, the National Manpower Mobilization Act was ordered because of the protracted war, and hundreds of thousands of Koreans were involuntarily brought to Japan and forced to work in the munitions plants, in coalmines and at other forms of hard labor. In addition, many Korean women were brought to the frontlines as military prostitutes and many died there. According to So (1999), it is also true Koreans voluntarily flocked to Japan around all the time of annexation, not just at the time of the 1939 National Manpower Mobilization Act, to escape their poor lives in Korea. If things had gone well, Korea's independence could have been achieved after Japan lost World

War II; it was promised at the 1943 Cairo Conference. However, Korea was instead divided at 38 degrees north latitude into two countries. The northern part was occupied by the Soviet Union while the southern part was occupied by the United States. In 1948, consequently, a country called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was founded in the northern part and a country called the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was founded in the south. And in 1950, the Korean War erupted.

Some of the Koreans who had been taken/had come to Japan returned to Korea after Japan lost the war. At least as many as 666,000 could or did not, however (Kurihara, 1999). It may have been because only Japan formed the basis of their livelihoods due to its thirty-six-year colonization. They may have felt uneasy about (re)establishing livelihoods in Korea after giving up hard-earned positions in Japan. In addition, they might have hesitated to return to Korea because their homeland was now divided into two countries taking hostile attitudes towards each other because of differences in political ideology. The Soviet Union, which ruled North Korea, was a communist nation at the time while the United States, which ruled South Korea, was/is a democratic nation, so eventually North Korea adopted communism while South Korea adopted democracy. What was worse, it all came to a head and the Korean War made return most unattractive. In Japan, Koreans who did not go back

to their native country and stayed to live in Japan are generally called *zainichi*.

The Japanese government compulsorily granted Japanese national status to all Koreans, forced them to speak Japanese as their native language, and foisted Japanese names on them while colonizing Korea. In spite of this, the Japanese government later stripped its Koreans of their Japanese nationality, taking advantage of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Since that time, the government treated not only them but also their *zainichi* offspring as aliens. Until 1992 they were obliged to be fingerprinted once they turned sixteen. Even now they are required to always have their Certificate of Alien Registration with them. Not all of the *zainichi* Koreans have yet been given suffrage although all are obliged to pay taxes and follow the law. Some organizations, such as *Mindan* (the Korean Residents Union in Japan), which has been on the side of *zainichi* Koreans with South Korean nationality, and *Soren* (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), which has been on the side of *zainichi* Koreans with North Korean nationality, have helped *zainichi* Koreans when dealing with the Japanese government as *zainichi* Koreans are often provided no Japanese government services.

The aforementioned historical facts can effectively explain the reason Arai and his parents became aliens in their own country and needed to be naturalized if they hoped to gain Japanese nationality. It might not be too much to say that all the

trouble the Arai family and other *zainichi* Koreans ever had living in Japan, as well as the Korean War after the division of Korea, stem from the 1910 colonization of Korea by Japan.

From what time have *zainichi* Koreans been considered “Others”?

It is true *zainichi* Koreans suffered severe discrimination at the hands of the Japanese government. It is quite possible this developed from what is known to be the Japanese exclusive culture, but it should be doubted such simple logic really works on this case. There are historical views on Japanese contempt for Korea. According to Yun (as cited in Suzuki, 1997), for example, the unsuccessful Hideyoshi invasions of Korea in the sixteenth century directly induced Japan's contempt for Korea. This was not the end of it. Certainly, in the views of Umezawa (1999), Hasegawa (1999), and Iguchi (1999), Japan's encounter with the West strengthened Japanese contempt for Korea.

Japan established diplomatic relations with a few countries such as the Netherlands, Korea, and China even while it practiced a largely closed-door policy between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, Japan basically held the latter two nations, Korea and China, in contempt, its sense of superiority over them possibly partly because Japan had already adopted a wide range of Western academic disciplines from medicine to astronomy in the Dutch language on which its

neighbors had not yet touched in those days. After the opening of Japan to the world, however, the Japanese identity was little by little dismantled by law-of-the-jungle pressure from the powerful West. As a result, Japan became unsettled. Being practical, the Japanese feared the West might colonize or overtake Japan. The opening of Japan was carried out under unequal treaties with the U.S. and some other Western nations because Japan did not yet have sovereignty and was not yet recognized as a civilized nation in the international society of the time. In order to protect Japan from external pressure and control by those countries, its government officials came up with the idea they would make Japan unified as well as westernized, or modernized/civilized, to catch up with the West. To accomplish this, they decided they must bring the people together as one Japanese people with a slogan, "Rich nation, strong army." The Emperor system, a traditional authority based on the Shinto religion, was employed. Perhaps because Japan was/is basically a vertically-structured society, the sacredness and transcendency of the Emperor worked well once he was placed at the center of power. According to Ito (1988), every Japanese citizen became a member of Japan with the family register system that started later. This made the Japanese people conscious of their nation and determined they became Japanese citizens under the Emperor. Consequently, a plan that Japan would invade Korea and Manchukuo (part of China), the areas most looked

down upon by Japan, would spread the authority of the Emperor of Japan via the family system used to unite the Japanese or Japan itself, in Korea and Manchukuo as well in order to stand against the West was raised within the Japanese government. Korea became the first target, possibly because the theory of conquering Korea, called *Seikan-ron*, already popular all over Japan, supported it, or because the government worried Russia might advance southward and thought Korea geographically would be the best buffer. In 1875, the Japanese government re-established, through use of force, diplomatic relations with Korea under an unfair treaty. That fixed the position of each country: Japan became “the strong” while Korea was “the weak” (Suzuki, 1999, p. 66). Moreover, the ideology of a rigid four-layer caste system, established in the Edo period between 1603 and 1867, was deeply ingrained in the Japanese mind even after it was abolished when Japan was unified, and the Koreans were, in the words of Kajimura (1983/1992a), “forced to physically stand in the very bottom of the stratified ranking that has the Emperor as the top” (p. 153) even though there were even Japanese, *eta* and *hihin*, prohibited from entering the caste system because their occupations were considered taboo in Buddhist and Shintoist belief. Such a societal structure having Koreans at the bottom appears firm grounding for an ideology of contempt for Korea.

Conversely, another theory—that the Japanese are ethnically mixed

people—also appeared perhaps partly because an idea already existed that the Japanese and Koreans share a common ancestry. According to Oguma (1995), the theory further purports the Japanese are people resulted from an assimilation between North and South Asian races. Those then in North and South Asia, who are related by birth to the Japanese, can easily assimilate with the Japanese; it is a return home for the Japanese to advance to those areas. As mentioned, Japan chose to be civilized and modernized, taking the West as its model. Korea at the same time resisted opening itself to the West and tried to keep its door closed to the world resisting pressure to do so. Perhaps because of such an attitude, as also mentioned, Japan considered Korea its inferior and decided it was not good for the Koreans, who after all had the same ancestors as the Japanese, to remain un-westernized. The Japanese came to the decision that Korea should throw in its lot with Japan and they would westernize together. The idea can be viewed from the angle of sympathy and assistance. As Kajimura (1964/1992b) points out, however, it came about while Japan was looking down on Korea and it is needless to say the idea even in a sense strengthened contempt for Korea.

The theories of conquering Korea and of Japanese mixed ethnicity, both of which reinforced contempt for Korea, were spread and infused into Japanese society mainly via newspapers. Therefore the 1910 annexation of Korea by Japan was

justified and taken for granted even among the ordinary Japanese (Suzuki, 1997; Watanabe, 2003). The consistent view of Korea by some intellectuals such as Yukichi Fukuzawa, Shigenobu Okuma, and Shoin Yoshida, must have contributed to it greatly. Contempt for Korea was the very logic shared among the then Japanese intellectuals and even took on an aggressive and insulting shade of meaning.

In Korea, after the annexation, Japanese police and military police worked together carrying out militaristic and despotic rule, and dominating every area in government, economy, ideology, and culture. For instance, they cracked down on every meeting as well as speech activity by Koreans and forced Japanese education upon them. In addition, they appropriated their land. Any activity by Japan, set up to be favorable to Japan, was legalized. According to Iguchi (1999), the assimilation was never one accomplished on the basis of “indiscriminate equality” (p. 57); rather it was an “assimilation with discrimination” (p. 57).

Finally, Koreans formed the March First Independence Movement in 1919. Until then, the Japanese government had completely ignored the existence of Koreans and devoted all its energies to defeating the country. Then, it was its goal to assimilate all Koreans. Notwithstanding, disgruntled Koreans stood up and put together the March First Independence Movement against Japan based on their “otherness” (Watanabe, 2003, p. vi). As Watanabe (2003) puts it, the movement was

the very occurrence that fundamentally shook Japan's framework consisting of the relationship between the Japanese and "Others." After confrontation with the movement, the Japanese government could not help changing its way of governing Korea. Even so, skirmishes and terrorism against Japan continued. In Japan itself, communists as well as anarchists appeared among the Koreans living there. They also launched political movements, but the Japanese government suppressed these more effectively.

In 1923, tragedy took place. A rumor that Koreans (living in Japan) had rioted, set fires, and thrown poison into wells everywhere spread over Japan as soon as the Kanto earthquake occurred. Because of this, as many as 6,500 Koreans living in the Kanto area of Japan were massacred by not only the Japanese army and police but also *jikeidan* (vigilante groups), which were formed by ordinary people. Finally, Japan had come to eliminate the existence of the otherness of the Koreans by means of massacre, no longer assimilation.

At first (centuries ago), "Others" for the Japanese were limited to a small number, including the Koreans, and before Japan's opening to the world they must not have seemed so powerful as to shake Japanese identity. Once Japan met the West, however, the number of "Others" for the Japanese increased and Japan could not help selecting a way to stand up to the all-powerful West in one body. Furthermore, the

theory of conquering Korea and that of Japanese of mixed ethnicity led Japan to justify annexing Korea in order to expand its power base. In order to complete the extension of this power, Japan adopted the Emperor system based on family structure. As Iguchi (1999) says, to put forth the idea assimilation more concretely, Japan emphasized in its policy of assimilation that Korea would fuse with and assimilate into Japan because, after all, Korea and Japan are neighbors and have shared the same kind of culture from of old. Japan at the same time seems to have understood that its colonization policy, which eventually aimed at Korea's assimilation into Japan, was quite different from that of the western nations it attempted to mimic, which went no further than colonization. As Oguma (1995) explains, to be precise there were no clear differences in the area of culture, such as religion, between Korea and Japan as seen between western nations and their colonies, and moreover the Koreans and Japanese racially bear a close resemblance to each other; the difference between the two can be seen only in that produced by national ideological dissimilarity and Japan thought such a difference could be eliminated without difficulty. Consequently, it may be that Japan tried limiting "Others" only to the West by eliminating the eliminate-able differences of the Koreans, namely the unique Korean national characteristics, and then by removing the existence of the Koreans themselves just after the Kanto earthquake.

Japan had tried eliminating the existence of the otherness of the Koreans by all means, by military power especially, but a change occurred in the relationship between the Koreans and the Japanese after Japan lost the war in 1945. As Nomura (1996) says, Japan's defeat brought "liberation" to the Koreans and a *zainichi* Korean expresses her feelings at that time: "I was happy" (p. 249). All Koreans had been obligated to become Japanese until Japan lost the war, but they did not need to do so any longer. Perhaps as a reaction against the oppression they experienced, at Japan's defeat, as Nomura (1996) mentions, some of the *zainichi* Koreans committed outrages against the Japanese, started labor disputes, and made quick money on the black market; such behaviors were considered deviant and out of control. In these ways, the Koreans started to expose their existence as "Others" again. Moreover, their otherness was different from that of before Japan's defeat, marking yet again the everlasting relationship between Korea and Japan, and enough something to inspire dread in Japan and eventually to be deemed dangerous elements. Therefore, the Japanese began to exercise extreme cautiousness toward the *zainichi* Koreans, forcing them to be fingerprinted and to carry their Certificates of Alien Registration, and trying to "hold them down" by making it clear *zainichi* Koreans were different than the Japanese. Furthermore, the Japanese refused to accept any requests of Koreans who were trying to get jobs, to obtain loans from banks, or to rent a flat if they knew

they were Koreans. Japan had at this point lost any power to eliminate Koreans' eliminate-able differences such as ideology and also their very existence as was done at the time of the Kanto earthquake once it turned into a defeated nation. Therefore, Japan tried this time eliminating their existence as "Others" by "enclosing" (Nomura, 1996, p. 251), which how Nomura puts it.

However, the *zainichi* Koreans tried to free themselves from the "enclosure" one after another by making it clear they were Koreans. As Park (1999) points out, the *zainichi* Koreans became an existence that could no longer be ignored. They themselves had already (in 1970) made a strong appeal to the public to abolish any discrimination in various areas such as hiring. In addition, they started a movement to resist the fingerprinting system in 1980. As a result, some national clauses that prevented *zainichi* Koreans from receiving the benefits the Japanese received in such areas as hiring, pensions and social security were eliminated and the fingerprinting system was also abolished perhaps because of Japan's ratification with the International Human Rights Agreement. The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees drew international attention also to those campaigns by the *zainichi* Koreans. That is, *zainichi* Koreans worked to improve not only the relationship between themselves and Japanese but to abolish the discriminating structure in place by inviting criticism from the world for Japan's exclusionism.

In 1988, the Olympic Games were held in Seoul, South Korea. In the rest of the world, the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were of significance. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall collapsed and the next year East Germany and West Germany were united. With this unification, cracks appeared within the eastern bloc. At last, in 1991, the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War came to an end. Some changes occurred in Japan as well around the *zainichi* Koreans once the 1990s began. Some *zainichi* Koreans now played active roles in society with their Korean names, although it had been natural for them before to use their Japanese names in public. Furthermore, a boom of popular songs and TV dramas from South Korea occurred in China at the end of the 90's and the word *hanryu* was coined to mean this boom. Since then, *hanryu* has "broken out" in some nations of East Asia such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and Mongolia, and eventually it also came to Japan. *Hanryu* took effect instantly in Japan too. Among the Japanese, South Korean popular songs have been established as a music genre called K-pop. South Korean films and TV dramas are always in the news. According to Kim (2002), *hanryu* includes a variety of areas from musicals, online games and cooking to fashion, popular novels and food/drink besides TV dramas, films and popular songs and covers all popular culture. It is no exaggeration to say the South Korean culture itself has won popularity all over East Asia including Japan.

According to an article in the Japanese magazine, *Keizaikai* (“Hanryu,” 2004), a news commentator did not hide his/her astonishment, saying, “Our generation cannot understand and believe it” (p. 46), when s/he saw Japanese women gathering around a South Korean popular actor who came to Japan. As a whole, however, the Japanese came to be fond of K-pop and South Korean TV dramas and films, all of which are from the mother country of most of the *zainichi* Koreans, after due recognition of these products’ otherness. The phenomenon must have occurred not only because of changes in the world situation but also since the transformation by *zainichi* Koreans of the social structure within Japan provided the Japanese the groundwork for acceptance of Koreans’ national characteristics. Moreover, those changes in the world as well as in Japan might be said to have greatly contributed to the new Japanese attitude of favorable acceptance of the *zainichi* Koreans, whose existence had once been denied. Japan has not yet established diplomatic relations with North Korea due to some relics of the Cold War such as the kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Koreans. A good relationship with South Korea is enjoyed in Japan, however, especially due to interaction through *hanryu*. Consequently, Japanese feelings for the Koreans are clearly bipolarized on the basis of the border that politically divides Korea in two, and it can be said that not only the South Koreans but also the *zainichi* Koreans are no longer “Others” as based on the contempt

perpetuated since the 1919 March First Independence Movement. The North Koreans can still be presumed to be “Others.”

CHAPTER 4

ARAI'S NATURE: WHAT KIND OF "OTHER" HE WAS

No word "setback" in Arai's dictionary?

Arai was born into one of the discriminated-against classes in Japan, as one of the peculiar "Others." In addition, it can be imagined that the discrimination Arai faced was bad enough to be visible because, according to Kang (1998), Arai revealed, when asked by one of his secretaries, Seiko Ishihara, the crooked ring finger of his left hand was due to the bullying he suffered at junior high school. Nevertheless, Arai's successes in life, such as attending the University of Tokyo and changing from a salaried worker to a government official of the Ministry of Finance, are surprising given his first failure on the university entrance exams as well as his unsuccessful bid in that first election. As well, according to Kubo (1998), one of Arai's friends says Arai failed an entrance examination for a junior high school, and according to Nakagawa (1998), there was a rumor he could not get permission to work for the Ministry of Finance though he had been given an informal assurance of employment at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry just before he graduated from university. In fact, he may have experienced many setbacks. In any event, Arai's advancement was achieved in only about ten years. What sort of person was this

Arai who accomplished such a feat?

A leader of matchless valor, in a sense

Kang (1998) asked some of Arai's high school friends for some stories about Arai after his death: Motoko Michiura relates, "I remember well that Mr. Arai's school record started to go well as soon as he went forward from the 11th grade. One of my friends said that Arai is working hard because he thinks he has no other choices but the one to aim to become a doctor if he tries to live in Japan" (p. 113), Kazuyoshi Kimura states, "He seemed to always have strained himself aspiring to strong power (in the future) since he was at high school" (p. 114), and Akio Suzuki reveals, "Arai always had an eye on the top. He started to say, 'I will be the president!' as soon as he began to work for *Shin Nippon Seitetsu* (Nippon Steel)" (p. 113). In addition, Kang (1998) offers, "He, at any rate, wanted to achieve greatness hastily" (p. 113) as a common theme to everything Arai's friends provided. Here, Arai's strong ambition can be seen. Arai himself in fact admitted he had a strong will to rise in the world (Sasaki, 1983). Moreover, Arai was a babyboomer. Given this fact, Nagao ("Arai Shokei daigishi," 1998) estimates Arai's intense ambition resulted from this social factor saying, "[Babyboomers] have overwhelmingly tons of people who are the same age as they. In the excessive competition [arising due to the large number of the same generation], they are divided into two types: One of the types fights out the

competition and are rapidly promoted while those from the other turn their back on the competition and aim to become specialists. Arai was in the former type” (p. 32). Arai’s wife, Mariko (Arai, 1998), relates after Arai’s death, “[Whenever Arai did anything] from tennis, golf, basketball and judo to roller skating, he worked on it after he studied how to cope with it and equipped himself with a theory on it. He was the sort of person who does not like that he cannot do anything others can do” (p. 33). Also, Oshima (1998) mentions after he revealed Arai directly telephoned to ask he be given a chance to argue against an article by a commentator Susumu Nishibe carried in a magazine called *Seiron*, “I knew later that the more difficult and tricky is the problem Mr. Arai faces, the more increased is his fighting spirit” (p. 189). It can also be inferred that Arai’s ambition worked itself out in all areas on the basis of his powerful hating-to-lose characteristics. In fact, his obstinate nature can be seen in an episode Ito (2001) introduces in which Arai did not listen to Toshihiro Yanagiya, an early member of the B&B Club (the B&B Club will be explained in detail later), saying, “You can win by losing, can’t you?” (p. 152) when Arai criticized Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita. Mariko (Arai, 1998) finds Arai a person who hated flattering people and never changed his attitude according to the person. Also, Arai himself declares in his aforementioned book (Arai, 1983), “I won’t change my attitude according to the person as well as his/her position” (p. 62). According to

Nakagawa (1998), a government official of the Ministry of Finance saw Arai as the sort of person who continues to say, “I think like this. This way is right. Why don’t you think in this way?” (p. 122) Arai might have had it as one of his policies that he persistently remained consistent. Arai, too, moved from party to party after his criticism of Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita. So he was taunted with the label, “stray bird in the political world.” According to Tahara (1998), Arai insisted, “All of my behaviors can be explained” (p. 160), that is, they are reasonable, every time he was criticized in that way. Mariko (Arai, 1998) reveals such actions were due merely to Arai’s faithfulness to the policies he needed to carry out and cites an episode in the same article in which Arai told her he would not appear on TV because he was not confident in his policies of the time.

Probably because of such strength of character, Arai was negatively perceived: In the words of Kang (1998), “[He is] arrogant and proud, and does not listen to others” (p. 114). However, some acquaintances have disclosed episodes that may wipe out such an image. According to Ito (2001), Toshihiro Yanagiya, the previously mentioned ex-member of the B&B Club, claims Arai is not the sort of person who looks down on people, and Ito (2001) himself states as well that Arai tried to associate with both the voters and his supporters on equal terms. Additionally, Arai gave up objecting to the aforementioned Nishibe article in the end despite the

fact that he completed an article against it after re-writing it, though not quite satisfactorily. Oshima (1998) reveals, on the basis of Arai's case in the matter of Nishibe's article, that Arai also had a modest side, giving this example: Arai said the reason he put many citations of famous scholars in the re-written article was, "I do not have either originality or trust in my words" (p. 189).

Warugaki of the Ministry of Finance

"[Arai] goes forward rapidly even if he gets others under his thumb once he decides, 'I will do it,' only because he, kind of, severely feels inferior. It is true that he has a lot of guts and is dependable, really. The other way around, however, he may mercilessly smash the people who defy him that way. So he was not a government official-type person from the beginning." This is the comment of a bureaucrat of the Ministry of Finance carried in an article by Nakagawa (1998, p. 118). What can be taken from it is that Arai's furious ambition might have backfired in the Ministry of Finance where, in the words of Kaimai (1998), "'the order of rank and class' is the most strictly put into practice" (p. 172) and made him ill at ease. This guess is supported in an account by Nakagawa (1998): "Arai's way often came into conflict with a long-running custom, the order, namely, of the Ministry of Finance" (p. 118). In his aforementioned book (Arai, 1983) Arai recalls he himself objected to the methods of the Ministry of Finance and reveals, "I was all-out disliked" (p. 76).

For example, he suggested they introduce a shift work system at the Diet because he got impatient aimlessly standing by while politicians were replying and was told, “You are sassy” (Arai, 1983, p. 77). In addition, Yamada (1998) writes Arai is a rare type of government official because he clearly expressed his ideas. This explanation by Oshima (1998) says it all: “Mr. Arai was an out of the ordinary existence among the 17 colleagues who entered the ministry at the same period” (p. 195). As already mentioned Arai gave lectures on a tax system for medical doctors to the then Minister of Welfare, Michio Watanabe, but furthermore, Arai’s skill in presenting the lectures, according to Oshima (1998), was great enough to make the then president of the Japan Medical Association, Taro Takemi, who was the targeted audience member to win over, dislike Arai, calling him one of the “red government officials” (p. 195). Arai seems to have come to an awareness on his own that he was an extraordinary character because he calls himself *warugaki* (bad boy) in his first book, “*Shinwa e no chosen*” (Arai, 1983).

Because of the constraints, it must have been a good experience for him to get out of the Ministry of Finance as head of the Sakata Tax Office at the age of 28 and be able to work as he liked. In fact, he says in his first book (Arai, 1983), “I had the time of my life at Sakata while I worked for the Ministry of Finance” (p. 74). One of the things he did at Sakata was tax the farm products there; he settled on imposition of

a four-way tax on the farm products though he quarreled with the people of the Agricultural Cooperative Association over it. According to Nakagawa (1998), Arai personally conducted direct negotiations with the leading members of the Agricultural Cooperative Association though it is usual for chiefs of the tax office (“on loan” so to speak) to do nothing that might cause friction. Nakagawa (1998) also relates that the leading members of the Agricultural Cooperative Association, who had direct negotiations with Arai, were impressed by the tax office head because Arai had an enough political ability to win his point and was seen as “dynamic, brave and majestic” (p. 123) in the eyes of Suzuki (a fictitious name), who was an elementary school student there at that time. It might be partly because there was the Ministry of Finance behind Arai that the person was seen so by the boy at that point in time. According to Nakagawa (1998), the reason the Ministry of Finance makes every career bureaucrat like Arai take on the position of head of a tax office is “to make them feel how authoritative the existence of the Ministry of Finance is” (p. 119). Inose (1983) gives another reason: “The Ministry of Finance wants to develop every career bureaucrat’s sense of mission that they are people who are of great service to the nation” (P. 257) and discloses that they are first showed to the top seat in a banquet hall and get used to it while they go on loan as heads of tax offices. Arai seems to have received not-quite-such treatment when he was sent to Sakata. As a

proof, Furutachi (1998) retells a story Arai told his friend as one of his memories at the time of acting as chief of the Sakata Tax Office. The story reads that although Arai sat in the center of a banquet hall because he got to the hall early, he was made move to the corner and the mayor of Sakata and some local politicians took his place. Arai gave Inose (1983) the bureaucratic system as the other reason (the first being “I admire Michio Watanabe”) he left the Ministry of Finance and also expressed to the writer his criticism against the feudalistic order within the Ministry of Finance. However, he might have been sufficiently shocked by the fact there is a “bigger existence” than the Ministry of Finance, which has enough authority to be called the “Ministry of Ministries,” to regale one of his friends with such a reminiscence. The bigger existence might, in no small way, have tickled Arai’s ambition. Later, Arai turned to this bigger existence to obtain a position that allowed him to sit in the center of both banquet halls and meetings.

This might be a digression, but Arai carried out something unheard-of also in his private life while he worked for the Ministry of Finance: It was his wedding with Mariko and the attendance of their first-born son. Mariko and Arai were already going to have the son when Arai started to work for the Ministry of Finance in 1973. Arai entered the ministry keeping it secret from everyone of the ministry, but the couple found they were going to have another baby (their second son) after Mariko

gave birth to their first son in the summer of 1973. Arai realized the dangers of keeping this secret and he and his parents talked about it with the then chief of the Budget Bureau to which Arai belonged at that time. Consequently, it was decided they would have a wedding in April 1974. According to Arai (1983) himself, everyone at the wedding was utterly surprised when the wife of the chief of the Budget Bureau came out holding the first son after one of Arai's colleagues gave her a signal. Oshima (1998) says it was only Arai, even as of 1998, who had a wedding attended by the child of the couple since the beginning of the Ministry of Finance.

Ryoma “*warugaki*” Sakamoto of the Heisei era

The “Ryoma Sakamoto of the Heisei era” was what Arai called himself to compare himself to Ryoma Sakamoto, a patriot who contributed to the Meiji Restoration, brought the unification of Japan to fruition and appealed to the public, with some young Diet members, for political reforms. Arai openly criticized the aforementioned powerful figures, Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita, of the LDP to which he also belonged and succeeded in making Shin Kanemaru resign. Sasaki (1998) takes such an action by Arai and the others as such: “It itself was extremely impressive” (p. 237). He summarizes Arai's general activity as a Diet member: “[Arai's activity] was seen in the situation where he sharply pursues the responsibility of politicians more than in the quiet discussion for reforming various systems” (Sasaki,

1998, p. 237), and thinks highly of his activity in the former because he showed up the problem of “politics and money” and pushed it to a primary task for political reform. In fact, Arai was replaced in his position as a director of the Committee of Foreign Affairs because he appeared on a special television program just after Noboru Takeshita was summoned when he was supposed to attend an informal gathering for discussion by the directors of the committee. Arai was also then a *warugaki* (bad boy) in the political world.

First of all, his *warugaki* behavior can be somewhat understood in light of his view on the *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal. According to his second book “*Heisei no ran o okose*” (Launch the War of Heisei) (Arai, 1993) in which he wrote his various views on the scandal, he and other like-minded Diet members thought remodeling the structure within the LDP was necessary in order to prevent such a scandal from happening in the future. They appealed to the public for structural reforms by criticizing Shin Kanemaru. That is, they took the scandal as a problem of the structure of the LDP, not as the problem of the individual, Shin Kanemaru.

What was the structure of the LDP that produced such a scandal? Arai (1993) calls it in brief the “dual structure of power,” which indicates that some factions that work as “back power,” are immanent in the LDP though the LDP is one political party and even has political influence as “front power.” The “dual structure of power” is

the “dual structure of front power and back power” to be exact. (The internal conditions of the LDP will be explored in more detail later.) In fact, and nevertheless, it was powerful Diet members who individually held back power. Moreover, it depended on how successfully they could raise funds. The originator of making use of back power was Kakuei Tanaka, but Shin Kanemaru succeeded him and was a good example of Diet members who exercised back power. Shin Kanemaru obtained political influence by collecting money, and maintained his political influence by distributing it to members of the faction to which he belonged. As a result, he came to have not only influence on the personal affairs of parties out of power but also enough power to choose a prime minister in the LDP. Such a structure that enables back power to be rampant is sustained by the flow of money. Arai and others made the *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal a starting place for reforms, and even drafted a bill to prohibit Diet members from giving and taking money perhaps because the group felt this kind of scandal would be repeated unless the flow of money was stopped. The group also acted to break down intra-Diet/factorial politics and introducing a voting system under which voters could directly choose a prime minister. As an aside, Diet members who held back power such as Kakuei Tanaka and Shin Kanemaru were called “shadow shoguns,” borrowing the words of Schlesinger (1997).

What the politicians of today need: Their own words

Probably because Arai could not stand the overuse of back power in Japanese politics any longer, he also criticized locked-room or “in camera” politics in which back power is fully exercised, and strongly demanded “openness” in politics in his second book, “*Heisei no ran’ o okose*” (Arai, 1993). He insisted every decision should be open to the public and be confirmed via debate not only among Diet members but also between Diet members and the Japanese citizens, whether or not made on the basis of selfish/factorial interests. And he claims in his third book, “*Erochikku na seiji*” (Erotic Politics) (Arai, 1994) that all political parties should be skilled in debate. That is, Arai appealed to the public for the restoration of words in politics and stated it is essential especially for the politicians who ought to be leading the people by such recovery. Even when Arai criticized Noboru Takeshita, for example, he deplored the situation: The speeches of politicians had come not to be trusted and that every matter had been decided anyway through locked-room groundwork, not through discussion. He expressed his view that the biggest problem in politics was to regain trust in discussion (Arai, 1992). From another aspect, and in addition, he stated in a lecture meeting that words such as “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity” moved the world during the time of the French Revolution and “Marxism, Exploitation, Solidarity and Proletariat” moved it just seventy or so years ago and

offered that politicians were in trouble because nowadays there are no such words which move people (Arai, 1994, pp. 123-125). According to the minutes of the lecture meeting, he concludes it is significant that politicians look for their own expressions as a solution to regaining their own words. Arai thought that much of the words of politicians. Nishibe's article proves it: Arai gave up refuting what was said because he could not trust his own words. Arai at this point was still looking for his own words.

Arai's political ideology

The reason Arai insisted on the importance of words in order to adopt "openness" and "discussion" in politics must have been based on the liberal/democratic political ideology he cherished as his ideal. He understood Japan had maintained its identity with the liberal/democratic ideology, however, merely because the country was part of the western bloc that took the liberal/democratic ideology as its ideal under the Cold War. Furthermore, he also noticed the liberalism/democracy that infiltrated postwar Japan was not the one established by the Japanese themselves, and pointed out that the meaning of liberalism/democracy is taken in Japan as "liberty is 'economic liberty' and democracy implies everyone becomes well off" (Arai, 1994, pp. 19-20). This Japanese selfish interpretation came about in the process of high economic growth, and Arai confessed in his third book

(Arai, 1994) he felt there is a trap inherent in a society that intensifies economic interests. But now the ideological confrontation between conservatism and liberalism had collapsed with the end of the Cold War. Arai (1993) warned that Japan had come to face an identity crisis and needed to re-identify itself and insisted that Japanese traditional values, such as “religious customs, consciousness of the Confucian physical constitution and the Emperor system, human relations, national consciousness, and peasant consciousness” (pp. 128-129), the Japanese originally held with the aim of distinguishing themselves from others in the deepest ways were necessary in coordination with the liberalism/democracy that had been reconstructed in the Japanese way. This would bolster the Japanese original new conservatism, recognize what Japan is, significantly encourage the Japanese to reconsider the family, and make political values not economic outcomes as in the past, but an ideology for the future (Arai, 1993).

One of the reasons Arai came to embrace the Japanese original new conservative ideology that includes the reconsideration of the family might have been his earnestness toward Confucianism. Mariko tells Ito (2001) she was surprised when Arai said, “I want to become a priest” (p. 147), while working as a governmental official. In his second book (Arai, 1993), he actually refers to the problem of succession on the strength of one of the Confucian concepts called *xiao*, and although

he knew he would receive criticism, suggests legalization of the family estate system, which requires the worship of ancestors.

In addition, Arai speaks very highly of the family-ism of Confucianism in a conversation with Nobuyuki Kaji, a leader of Confucian studies in Japan, printed in a magazine called *Seiron* (Arai & Kaji, 1995). Both recognized the individualism that came to postwar Japan had changed into egoism and spoiled the country. In order to control it, the family-ism of Confucianism that originated in East Asia (including Japan) was thought effective. Moreover, they agreed the Japanese could then share a history and promote the rebirth of a Japan of the East by worshipping their ancestors and believing in those ancestors' souls.

At the same time, they put forward a review of the view of death and life together with the reconsideration of Confucian family-ism. Arai denied the values of perennial youth, eternal life, and immortality offering it is more human to say human beings die in course of time. He might have come to espouse such an idea because, though he refers to this in both his second book (Arai, 1993) and this talk with Nobuyuki Kaji for *Seiron* (Arai & Kaji, 1995), he was greatly impressed with a Jorge Luis Borges short story he read in his youth, "El Aleph," which concludes it means a great deal for people to live because people die. For Arai, it is not until ancestors and their descendants are connected with each other, though there is a death

as a premise, that life can exist, as he takes life as, “a link that connects innumerable passed-away ancestors with innumerable future descendants” (p. 130), in his first book (Arai, 1983). Therefore, death, for him, must not have been a phenomenon about which to superficially talk; rather, it must have been a concept to be understood as sacred. In Japan, however, talking about and thinking of death tends to be avoided because there is a notion it is good to live long. In this culture, Arai provided a concrete plan to understanding death, agreeing with Kaji that education on death is necessary in Japan. Arai thought it best to die in one’s house and explains that the rest of the family can feel death really happens when watching a family member die (Arai & Kaji, 1995). Even for the member who is watched to his/her last moment, according to Arai, his/her death is a solemn ceremony to close that life and it is ideal to pass away after leaving last words while the rest of the family members are present at the deathbed, not to die like an animal after admittance to a hospital ICU (Arai & Kaji, 1995).

Arai never said Japan needed to instate Confucianism as a national religion. However, he seemed not to have taken Confucianism independently of politics because he implies it works best to use Confucianism to govern Japan, as the nation happens to be within the sphere of Confucian culture. Arai’s view of politics could not help, it seems, being influenced by Confucianism because he suggested the

reconstruction of the identity of Japan should be done in the Japanese way. He thought it was not until the Japanese learned the preciousness of life in each family and recognized the connection between ancestor and descendant that Japan could realize its unique identity as a nation. He must have expected the reconstruction of Japanese identity would have a positive effect not only in the area of the economy in Japan but also in bringing about the development and continuation of Japan as a nation. He came to think the Japanese might have to be ready for the ultimate: death for Japan's development and ultimate continuation. Also, perhaps because he thought he himself needed to indicate some determination to the Japanese citizens to begin with as one of its politicians who are torchbearers of the future of Japan, he came to impose a task on himself: to die for Japan.

A politician determined to die

As Oshima (1998) says, "I think there are no politicians who like the word 'death' and use it as much as Mr. Arai" (p. 189), and Seiichi Ota, who acted for political reforms with Arai, also gives evidence in an article by Suzuki (1998): "What differentiates Arai from other politicians was that [Arai] always had 'death' as the last choice" (p. 140). Arai was a rare politician who immoderately spoke of "death." And he inevitably had a nation, Japan, following "death."

Arai often cited Max Weber's political concept, "the monopoly on the

legitimate use of physical force,” in his books and his lectures. He interprets the concept as “having the power to kill people legitimately” in one of his lectures for a company called Nemic-Lambda (Arai, 1994). Although he says in his first book (Arai, 1983), “I feel dissatisfied with discussing an individual life connecting with a nation at a bound” (pp. 170-171), and also flatly denied the war saying, “No more war” (p. 171), he started to relate “death” even to politics using the content of an address by former U.S. president George Bush in the time of the Gulf War affirming the use of force in a political context. He (Bush and then Arai) felt the lives lost in such a context can be seen as political death, not as individual deaths, and lead to a regeneration. That is, Arai started to speculate upon the “last way” for Japan’s continuation because he came to think Japanese citizens needed to be resolved to give their lives for Japan’s continuation and what should be protected for it when Japan inevitably found itself in serious straits, such as when urged to choose to/not to continue to exist as a nation in time of war. Arai did say, however, these must be the last words in a political context for any politician to ask the citizens—to give their lives for something—and insisted politicians must also have something to die for (be willing to die themselves) in order to ask this of the Japanese people.

It has already been mentioned that Arai called himself “Ryoma Sakamoto of the Heisei era.” Ryoma Sakamoto was, for Arai, one of the people who accomplished a

political death, though he attained it by being assassinated, and Arai takes that Ryoma's life was given to the nation. Arai must have determined from this not only what a politician should be but also what he could die for. It was a nation, the same as Ryoma's, for which Arai could give his life. Arai came to take a politician as "an occupation of 'death'" on the basis of the recognition that the person who is not determined to give his/her life for the nation is not qualified to become a politician and, according to his second book (Arai, 1993), acknowledges suicide as a politician's self-expression in the aforementioned lecture for Nemic-Lambda. It is no wonder then for Arai with such an image of a politician in mind to be struck that Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita were unsuitable politicians. In a weekly magazine called *Shukan Bunshun* (Arai, 1992), Arai not only criticizes the groundwork politics that caused distrust of politicians among the Japanese citizens but also indirectly points out that Noboru Takeshita was lacking in the attitude a politician required—to be resolved to give his life for the nation—giving the example of Ryoma Sakamoto after his position was changed because he skipped the aforementioned informal gathering of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and appeared on TV. In addition, he persists that the distrust of politicians among Japanese citizens occurred because politicians were not determined to die for the nation and even concludes that it is one of the ways of regaining the trust of citizens for politicians to show by example their

way of living as well as dying.

A politician and *kabuki* player

According to an article in the weekly magazine *Shukan Asahi* (“Taiho kyodaku,” 1998), a person concerned with the LDP compared Arai’s attitude for political reforms to that of a *kabuki* player, not to that of Ryoma Sakamoto. Actually, not a few people called Arai’s political activity a “performance” and set a high valuation upon it. Arai was good at speaking, a necessity for politicians (Park, 1999). Park offers an episode for the article of Kang (1998) as an example: After the aforementioned black sticker case, Arai made speeches to urge Japanese citizens to create a society that gives everyone a chance to do anything s/he wants using the phrase, “discrimination as a spring” (p. 114), incessantly. The audience wept in sympathy with him.

According to Ito (2000), however, there were many lies in Arai’s early speeches but he had a first-class ability to patch up most. Nevertheless, there were some he could not because of the remarks of others, though no one really knows the truth. As mentioned before, for example, Arai made it public he was naturalized as a Japanese citizen by persuading his parents to go through the process with him, and, according to Kang (1998), he also told those around him he himself pressed his parents for this. However, Kang (1998) reveals, on the basis of an article of a national paper, Arai’s

father stated the Arai family had a talk to decide whether all of family members should be naturalized together because they were self-employed and experienced a variety of handicaps due to nationality and Arai agreed with the family decision. Park (1999) thinks as well it was not Arai who began to talk about naturalization and even discloses that the national paper with which Arai's father talked was one called *Mainichi Shimbun*. As for the time of naturalization, moreover, Arai himself said as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee for investigation into the truth about his scandal that he was naturalized at the age of sixteen. Most of the mass media at that time reported this and even Mariko was quoted in the aforementioned article in *Shukan Bunshun* (Arai, 1998) after Arai's death as saying Arai was naturalized when he was sixteen years old. However, in fact, *Shukan Asahi* (Sasaki, 1983), not long after Arai was naturalized, reports, on the basis of Arai's letter of complaint against the person who put the black sticker around Arai's electoral zone, it was in 1966, when he was eighteen, that he was naturalized. Park (1999) concludes as well it would be appropriate after all to take that Arai's naturalization was done when he was eighteen, given not only Arai's past remarks and some evidence from those around him but also an episode revealed in a special program aired on the Fuji Television Network after his death in which Arai asked his class teacher, "Isn't it ethnic discrimination?" (p. 178) when he failed to get permission to

study at the Department of Medicine of the University of Kyoto. In addition, Furutachi (1998) points out that Arai gave a different time of naturalization every time he spoke of it and, like Park (1999), implies it could possibly be true Arai was naturalized at the age of eighteen. As another example of Arai's lies, Arai clearly said in the aforementioned Lower House Budget Committee that he was recommended to run for the election to the House of Representatives by Michio Watanabe, for whom he used to work as a secretary, despite the fact Arai told Itagaki (1987) that he wished to run for it though he was once told by Michio Watanabe to give it up. A former secretary of Michio Watanabe, Toshimichi Tanigawa, told one of the local newspapers, *Nihonkai Shimbun*, that what Arai said in the Lower House Budget Committee was a lie (Sakurai, 1998).

Perhaps because Arai was smart by nature, the aforementioned examples of his lies became his ruin, or because his performance was too skillful, everything he did tended to be taken as targeted or as pre-considered by Arai himself. For instance, Nakagawa (1998) indicates it was a rehearsal to run for election to the House of Representatives for Arai to jump into the agricultural scene at Sakata when sent there, and Arai criticized Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita possibly because he thought it was a good opportunity to sell himself. In addition, Arai actually appealed to the public for Japan's internationalization taking advantage of his being a former *zainichi*

Korean, but Kang (1998) says Arai might not have done so in his right mind; he might have done so as an ultimate strategy to win the election. Also, Park tells Kang (1998) he thought at first it was a clever tactic for Arai to start to talk about his birth and the black sticker case in the aforementioned Lower House Budget Committee. According to Nakagawa (1998), a government official of the Ministry of Finance wondered, “Does he have the intention to die?” (p. 113), when s/he saw Arai wearing a dark blue tie at a press conference held the day before his suicide though s/he thought, “He must show spirit” (p. 113), when s/he saw Arai wearing a red tie in the Lower House Budget Committee and concluded he was the type of person who calculates to that extent. Furthermore, a former secretary of Arai’s saw even Arai’s suicide as his last performance and also looked back on Arai’s life itself as a performance (“Isshuki,” 1999).

Arai’s dearest: Mariko

The existence of Mariko, Arai’s wife, must have been greatly influential on Arai and she would also have been the closest to understanding him. Oshima (1998) asserts that the relationship with Mariko was the greatest thing for Arai in his private encounters with people. Mariko makes an appearance in each of Arai’s three books. According to Yamada (1998), in addition, Arai did not hesitate ever to say, “The dearest person for me is my wife” (p. 34). Arai himself admits in the

aforementioned lecture for Nemic-Lambda that when he had a discussion with a person, the president probably, of Nemic-Lambda over a drink and was asked for what he could die, he answered, “For my wife,” and also gave the same answer to the person even though urged to make another choice after being told that he would be a failure unless he died for the nation (Arai, 1994). For Arai, Mariko must have been as absolute as the nation.

Their relationship looks simple at a glance, but in fact, it is not if studied. It was on November 23rd, 1971, after Arai transferred to the Department of Economics, that the student, Arai, and an eighteen-year-old flight attendant of Japan Airlines, Mariko, happened to meet. In their first encounter Arai accidentally trod upon on Mariko’s toes at a campus festival of the Junior College of the Tokyo Woman’s Christian University. Arai firmly believed Mariko was the partner with whom he would live his whole life when he first met her. Mariko already felt that she might have her toes trod upon by Arai, so to speak, even before he actually did so. In a short time, Arai, in his own words (Arai, 1983), “rolled into” (p.28) Mariko’s apartment and they started to live together. Their cohabitation soon came out to both sets of parents. Both were enraged and Arai’s parents stopped sending him money. So Arai secured enough money to live by working part-time not only as a private tutor but also as a laborer for the construction of subways.

It seems the couple did not have sufficient time for one another because Mariko was a flight attendant for an international air route and Arai left for Hyogo once he entered the iron-manufacturing company *Shin Nippon Seitetsu*. Perhaps in order to cover the time they were not together, they often exchanged letters while they were apart. Furthermore, they even wrote the phrase, "I love you," for each other on a piece of paper in their own blood. Arai reminisces about this in his first book (Arai, 1983): "It is really scary" (p. 29). They had a strong desire to live together again though apart because of Arai's job. In that situation, Mariko suffered bad health because she was preparing for the entrance examination for university while continuing to work and could not help quitting her job. Arai reveals in his third book (Arai, 1994) that, probably around the time, he sent her a letter reading, "I will be back to you" (p. 13), with his signature put down in his own blood and he received a letter from her reading, "I will wait for you, forever" (p. 13), with her signature put down in her blood as well. Then Arai started to study to take the entrance examination to become a government official after it was recommended by one of his friends he do so. As Furutachi (1998) and others say, however, Arai's real intention in taking the exam is not clear because he might have known there were no graduates from the University of Tokyo in that year due to the aforementioned student movements and no students from the university take the examination directly upon

graduation from university, and might have aimed at it for that reason. As Arai confesses in his first book (Arai, 1983), in spite of everything, it must have been true he began preparations for the examination because he wanted to live with Mariko. He says the same thing to Inose (Inose, 1983). Consequently, he obtained a chance to work for the Ministry of Finance. Mariko, later, got permission to study at Sophia University. But in the end she could not help leaving university without completing the course after she had been on the university register for seven years because of the births of her children and Arai's change of workplace.

As mentioned before, they were going to have their first son when Arai started to work for the Ministry of Finance. They needed to talk with the then chief of the Budget Bureau after they knew they were going to have their second son. Arai and his parents sat for that interview. Arai's mother was asked by a government official whether it was satisfactory to have Mariko as Arai's wife, probably because it is unusual for government officials to marry high school (not university) graduates. After the interview, Arai's mother talked about this, laughing carelessly though, in front of Mariko. Mariko started to cry silently with her face down. Nevertheless, Mariko had accomplished success in that entrance examination for Sophia University.

Arai, as seen, changed from a government official to a politician. According to a former secretary of Arai, Mariko was not involved in Arai's political activity and

was totally divorced from politics (“Rieki Kyoyo,” 1998). Although Mariko, after Arai’s funeral, announced her candidacy for the coming election to fill the vacancy caused by her husband’s death, it was only in order to carry out his wishes. She had ruined her health and therefore their first son persuaded her to stop running for the Diet and Mariko ultimately accepted this.

Arai and Mariko were sometimes ridiculed with phrases like, “The strength of this couple’s bonds was out of the ordinary” (Oshima, 1998, p. 190), and “A couple deeply in love with each other” (“Arai Shokei fujin,” 1999, p. 48). But Arai himself describes his relationship with Mariko using a unique expression: “My personality has been mixed with my wife’s personality and it became a kind of mixture which is neither hers nor mine” (Arai, 1983, p. 45), and “Since the day [we first met], her eyes became my eyes and her mouth became my mouth” (Arai, 1994, p. 13). Arai surely felt great affection for Mariko. He cites a remark of Paul Nizan’s, “It is only by war or Eros for men to redo everything,” in both his second book (Arai, 1993) and third book (Arai, 1994) and agrees in his third book (Arai, 1994) with the view of Carl von Clausewitz that war is the extension of politics: “‘Politics’ is ‘Eros’.” In his assumption that “war” and “Eros” ask for self-sacrifice, there is “death” beyond “war” and “Eros” after all, and “war” and “Eros” are connected with “death.” In the beginning of this section, it was noted Arai said he would die for his wife when asked

for what he would die. In his view, however, his answer to the question must be the very ultimate of self-sacrifice in “Eros” as well as in “politics” because he says, “‘Politics’ is ‘Eros’.” That is, Arai might have come to be determined to die for the nation with the idea that the nation is also what he could die for in “politics” while Mariko is what he could die for in “Eros.” Arai reveals in his second book (Arai, 1993) he had a concept of “death” by “Eros,” or by happening to meet Mariko. The encounter with Mariko might also have been a primary factor unifying Arai with the nation, constructing an over-the-top relationship with it, and resolving to die for it.

CHAPTER 5

ARREST OR DEATH: THE ULTIMATE CHOICE

BROUGHT ABOUT BY CONVENTIONAL FUNDRAISING

A scandal causes Arai to choose “death”

Arai was taken as a politician with “an occupation of ‘death’” (or preoccupation of death) and he himself chose “death,” the final choice for politicians, while enmeshed in a scandal. Japan never did face a crisis such as war during his incumbency. What was the scandal that urged Arai, who was tough enough to hate losing and flattering to make this final choice?

This case was discovered in the process of an investigation into four major Japanese securities companies’ payoffs to *sokaiya* (a professional troublemaker at stockholders’ meetings), Ryuichi Koike, and made public by one of the national newspapers, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, on December 22nd, 1997. The suspicion regarding Arai was that he might have received illegal payoffs of about forty million yen from one of these major securities companies, *Nikko Shoken* (Nikko Securities), using an account in the name of a friend. It is prohibited under the internal rules of the Japan Securities Dealers Association to open an account in another person’s name. In addition, it is forbidden by the Securities Exchange Act not only for securities

companies to make good a loss or add profit for their customers but also for customers to demand profit and receive it from securities companies. Regarding customers, however, they are not imposed a criminal penalty unless they are acknowledged to have demanded profit. That is, Arai's arrest depended upon whether he had demanded profit from Nikko Securities. Arai would have been sentenced to less than six months' penal servitude or fined less than five hundred thousand yen if proved guilty.

Arai called a press conference and defended himself on the day the case was reported. He there admitted to an illegal business relationship with Nikko Securities from 1995 to 1997 through an account in another person's name he himself had requested to use. He said he had not known it was prohibited to open an account using another person's name, apologized it was his own mistake to have done so, and gave two reasons for it: his uncommon name and "name value." However, he insisted that he had not demanded profits. He said it was not until he asked Nikko Securities about it after it was uncovered by the mass media that he knew there existed an illegal business relationship with the company. He avoided revealing the details of the dealings and the name of the branch and account through which the dealings were done, saying the person in charge of the dealings from Nikko Securities would be heard as a witness by the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo

District Public Prosecutors Office. He denied, though, receiving discretionary account service saying he made contact with the person in charge for every transaction. Additionally, he claimed the amount of the profit should not have been as much as was reported. Nonetheless, he reported he did not own stocks and securities at the time he needed to open every property including stocks he had on the basis of the Property Disclosure Act applied to all Diet members. Arai did not refer to this point, persistently expressed his recognition that he was involved in an illegal practice with Nikko Securities, and made it clear he would immediately resign as a Diet member if there was even one mistake in his utterances in the press conference. As of this point of time, in addition, Nikko Securities had already admitted it had supplied payoffs to Arai.

The parties out of power asked for Arai be summoned as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee once the scandal was detected, and consequently, the Lower House Budget Committee summoned not only Arai but also the then president of Nikko Securities, Masashi Kaneko, and the former managing director of the company, Hiroyuki Hamahira, who had already been charged in the aforementioned *sokaiya* case, as unsworn witnesses on January 30th, 1998. In the questions and answers there, some facts were made clear: The business relationship with Nikko Securities began when Arai asked the then vice-president of Nikko

Securities, Yumio Hiraishi, who had already been prosecuted in the aforementioned *sokaiya* case in the same way as the then managing director, Hiroyuki Hamahira, for transactions using the account with the name of Arai's friend, the then vice-president, Yumio Hiraishi, left the business in the charge of the then managing director, Hiroyuki Hamahira, after letting him know the account was actually Arai's, funds of one hundred million yen were borrowed by Arai without collateral from the company of a person Arai knew and it was when Arai worked for the then Minister of Finance Michio Watanabe as one of his secretaries and was introduced to an executive of a securities company by him that Arai dabbled in stocks for the first time, and so on. The next day, one of the national newspapers, *Asahi Shimbun* ("Shoten sairoku," 1998), gave the following as some points that arose in the questions and answers of the committee meeting: The suspicion of Nikko Securities adding profit for Arai by buying and selling, the then president Masashi Kaneko admitting the dealings might have been done on the basis of the discretionary account service, noting it would have been unnatural that the company of a person Arai knew would lend funds of as much as a hundred million yen to him without collateral, the disclosure that Arai made a profit of as much as thirty million yen between October 1995 and June 1996, when the dealings were most often done, though stock prices hovered low because of the collapse of the "bubble economy" during the period, and so forth. Not every

suspicion of the case was made clear in the questions and answers in the committee on January 30th, 1998, but Arai did consistently deny demanding profit.

After the questions and answers in the Lower House Budget Committee, many more details on the scandal from the opening of the account in the name of Arai's friend to the contents of the dealings were reported using a Nikko Securities report and evidence from the persons concerned as information sources. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, dated February 6th ("Arai Shokei giin ga," 1998) reported Arai asked for the establishment of the account in the name of his friend even though he was told by Nikko Securities it was illegal to do so. *Asahi Shimbun* dated February 13th ("Kabu baibai," 1998) said Arai's dealings had 108 victories to 33 defeats and 77 percent of the winning average and were "humanly impossible" (p. 39). *Yomiuri Shimbun* dated February 14th ("Arai giin," 1998) reported Nikko Securities added a profit of more than three million yen, which was sold and bought by the company itself, to the account from the first dealing. Suspicion against Arai deepened and then the parties out of power started to ask for Arai's summons as a sworn witness.

The Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office heard from the person who lent his name to Arai for opening the account, besides those around Arai, and from Nikko Securities, as witnesses. On February 17th, at last, the department heard from Arai himself on a charge of violation of

Securities Exchange Act, and against it Arai insisted again he had never asked for profit. At this point in time it was purported the Special Investigation Department had already received testimony from some former executives of Nikko Securities that Arai persistently demanded profit for the dealings. The prosecution seems to have worried Arai might appeal to Nikko Securities to destroy evidence. On February 18th the prosecution started to follow the necessary procedures for being allowed to arrest Arai because the Diet was in session. (According to Article 50 of the Constitution and Article 33 of the Diet Act, Diet members are not to be arrested, unless they commit a crime in the presence of a policeperson, while the Diet is in session.) On the morning of the 18th, the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office asked for an arrest warrant for Arai from the Tokyo District Court. The Tokyo District Court then asked the government to call on the Speaker of the House of Representatives to turn in permission to arrest Arai, and in the afternoon of that day, the government complied with the request from the court. On the evening of the same day, the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives held a committee of the board of directors' secret session and judged the request from the government. Arai attended the secret session and there also denied asking for profit. However, it was decided that the vote for permission to arrest Arai would be conducted in a plenary session of the House of Representatives

on the afternoon of the 19th, and within a day Arai's arrest was to be carried out according to the result of the voting.

In the afternoon on the 18th, thirteen places such as Arai's house and his office were searched by the Special Investigation Department. Arai called a press conference at 6 p.m. after he explained himself at the aforementioned secret session and completely denied the charges against him, saying he had never asked Nikko Securities to add profits. At the press conference, Arai played an audiotape on which a conversation with the then managing director of the company, Hiroyuki Hamahira, and the then vice-president, Yumio Hiraishi, was recorded. In addition, Arai showed two pieces of material evidence, one of which was the transcript of the conversation on the tape, the other being notes that appeared to have been taken by Hamahira on what was asked by the prosecution. He distributed these to the press corps, and explained the contents.

On the 19th, Arai's arrest did not happen as scheduled because he had hung himself. The estimated time of death was around noon that day; staff of the Takanawa Police Station confirmed his death at 3:24 p.m. In the plenary session, which had just opened and was about to make a decision on Arai's arrest, the news of Arai's death was conveyed via a note and by Diet members' whispers. The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office withdrew Arai's arrest warrant soon after they knew

of his death. Arai was the fourth person to commit suicide in the series of investigations by the prosecution.

On March 10th, weeks after Arai's suicide, the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office prosecuted Nikko Securities as a corporation, Hamahira and Hiraishi, both of whom were seen as having taken part in the Arai scandal, for the crime of violation of the Securities Exchange Act. The office decided not to posthumously prosecute Arai. On March 25th, the first trials of the *sokaiya* case and Arai's case were held together. According to the opening statement by the prosecution regarding Arai's case, Nikko Securities had accepted Arai's persistent demands for profits using his career, "a former government official of the Ministry of Finance," because they worried Arai might take actions that would cause trouble in their business. They refused his requests several times, but started transactions with the account in the name of Arai's friend from October 31st, 1995, putting then managing director Hiroyuki Hamahira in charge, and offering profits to Arai until June 18th, 1996, by buying and selling securities without Arai's consent most of the time. Then around in August 1996, Nikko Securities stopped adding illegal profits to Arai's account because it knew the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission might come to investigate the company. Arai complained to Hamahira after he noticed the company had not added profits in some time, but

agreed to what the company had done for him after he understood what might happen. At last, the dealings were cancelled due to the transfer of Hamahira. Arai gained profits of forty million, eight hundred thousand yen through these dealings in the end. Both the accused, former managing director Hiroyuki Hamahira and former vice-president Yumio Hiraishi, pled guilty. On September 21st, the judgment day, both were found guilty and sentenced to one year in prison suspended for three years while Nikko Securities was fined ten million yen. With these judicial decisions, Arai's case was settled and the conclusion was Arai's explanation had been false.

Arai's heart is set on fundraising

Mariko (Arai, 1998) reveals five days after Arai's death that Arai would always say, "I am not attached to money because I have not been surprised for a long time that I do not have it" (p. 33). In the media, however, articles on Arai and money gushed out one after the other once Arai's case had been exposed and they did not stop even after his death. As for one of the detailed episodes, Arai had been eager his small factional group, the 21st Century Club, formed only for a short period of time, would become a political party in order to receive public funding for political parties paid from the national tax ("Konnicchi no shomondai," 1998; "Hikari to kage," 1998). Just after Arai's death, *Shukan Shincho* ("Haji' no ichiji," 1998) expressed the process of such articles coming one after the other: "[Arai's] hidden face, which

might not be able to be imagined from the former neat and clean image of him, was about to be unmasked” (p. 19). The articles were narrowed into two main topics: the actual conditions of Arai’s stock dealings and the company for which Mariko worked as a representative director.

First of all, the actual conditions of Arai’s stock dealings are explored here. Arai’s case was detected because the prosecution found some accounts having a connection to Arai in the materials they seized from some securities companies in the investigation of the aforementioned *sokaiya* case. In addition, Arai seemed to have had accounts in more than one securities company besides Nikko Securities directly as well as indirectly. Regarding the period of Arai’s dealings, it seems he started to play the stock market around the time he was first elected as a Diet member from his answers in the committee as an unsworn witness that he had carried out stock dealings for more than fifteen years.

One of Arai’s accounts was the very one in Nikko Securities that has been mentioned again and again, but some other accounts of his were found in the same company. Between approximately 1984 and 1993, in fact, Arai had two accounts, one of which was not opened in Arai’s name, in Nikko Securities and received illegal profits of about 280 million yen in total. This was made clear by the then chief of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of Justice, Akio Harada, in the secret

session on February 18th, 1998. These illegal dealings could not be prosecuted because, according to the Securities Exchange Act, the three-year statute of limitations had already run out.

Additionally, an account in relation to Arai was found in Nomura Securities. According to Nakagawa (1998), Arai gained illegal profits using Mariko's name. Nomura Securities had already admitted it, but the statute of limitations in this case had also run out.

The company for which Mariko worked as a representative director also had an account in Shin Nihon Securities (now called Shinko Securities after being merged with Wako Securities) using its company name, but only for four months. The company gained profits of as much as seventeen million yen with these dealings that started in April 1996, but it seems it made the profits by leaving the dealings entirely to the chairperson of a precision parts manufacturer. The biggest problem was, however, that the chairperson was known as a speculator. Shin Nihon Securities recognized there were no illegal dealings with the company.

According to *Yomiuri Shimbun* ("Giwaku no seisan," 1998), Arai opened accounts in Daiwa Securities and Yamaichi Securities (now gone bankrupt) as well and had dealings between 1980 and 1990.

It has already been mentioned that Mariko was uninterested in politics. As

Shukan Shincho ("Rieki Kyoyo," 1998) points out, however, it is a fact that Mariko's name appeared in the area of Arai's financing. Mariko was, as mentioned, employed at a company as a representative director and the existence of the company came to the front as another topic in the Arai scandal. The name of the company was Volo. It came out in a scoop by *Shukan Shincho* ("Bakuro," 1998) that the company might operate a "secret club" for buying and selling stocks. According to an article in *Shukan Shincho* ("Bakuro," 1998), the company was the one Mariko used to import and sell groceries and works of art. Once the company moved its office to a building housing a number of independent business concerns in Ginza in the spring of 1997, the office came to be used for meetings of the B&B Club, which consisted mostly of managers of venture companies. Arai participated in meetings of the club as a counselor though he did so as a sponsor in the club's early days. Consequently, the name of the company became Salon de Volo. The purpose of the club was to cultivate mutual friendships among companies with various types of business, but *Shukan Shincho* ("Bakuro," 1998) labeled the club a "secret club for stock trading" (pp. 140-141).

According to a comment of the then chairperson of Century 21 Japan, Toshihiro Yanagiya, in an article by Ito (2001), the B&B Club was a club to support Arai which started around in 1990 mostly made up of managers of companies whose stocks were

listed on the stock exchange as participants. Younger company managers started to occupy the greater part of the club, however, and it became full of life once it started to call itself the B&B Club. Yanagiya himself was, as aforementioned, an early member of the club. Regarding club activities, a former member of the B&B Club and the then president of a company called Nissho Inter Life, Tsugio Amai, reveals in the same article by Ito (2001) that the main activity was to promote mutual friendship through studying and enjoying themselves and no member ever talked about investment. In addition, Ito (2001) explains in detail that the members of the club were divided into six groups, each of which had its own regular meeting: Some of the groups conducted special studies of areas such as real estate and risk control. The club also hosted birthday and golf parties as recreation. Yasumitsu Shigeta of *Hikari Tsushin*, Takao Yasuda of Don Quixote, and Noboru Watanabe of Jac were all not only former members of the B&B Club but also the former/current presidents who, by themselves, made their own venture companies grow. The B&B Club broke up after Arai's death, but was later revived as SK21. (It is said the "S" in SK is the first letter of "Sho," the first part of Shokei Arai's first name while the "K" is that of the end, "kei.") Tsugio Amai was the new chairperson and there were some changes in membership. SK21 changed its name to the Japan Venture Conference in April 2000, and is now a company called Value Creation, though the company retains and runs the

conference. Some companies owned by former members of the B&B Club, such as the aforementioned three companies, *Hikari Tsushin*, Don Quixote, and Jac, grew one after another enough to offer stocks publicly, while other companies owned by former members of the B&B Club went bankrupt.

Ito (2001) says, “‘B&B Club’ consisted mainly of owner-managers. The compositional arrangement of a ‘secret investment club’ in which those with abundant assets gather and exchange insider information could easily be accepted in the situation where the Arai scandal on stocks was reported without any slips of the pen” (pp. 148-149). Nevertheless, the existence of the club itself might have not only promoted the image of a wealthy Arai but also deepened suspicion against Arai. In addition, some members of the club and even non-members might have provoked increase of this suspicion. Two of the lineup were, “a president of a partner company of Shigeki Nakae, who is known as a speculator, and a chairperson of a precision parts manufacturer who is prominent as an investor” (Ito, 2000, p.39). Probably, the latter is the person who took charge of all of the stock dealings of the company for which Mariko worked as a representative director. *Yomiuri Shimbun* (“Arai Shokei giin no shinzoku kigyo,” 1998) reports the chairperson was also a former member of the B&B Club. According to Suda (1998), in addition, a person, who was on good terms with Shigeki Nakae to the extent that they were “identical

twins” (p. 55) and might also have been “a president of a partner company of Shigeki Nakae, who is known as a speculator” (Ito, 2000, p. 39), called Tetsuo Kobayashi, and the holder of the account that became one of the problems in Arai’s scandal, were also former members and central figures of the B&B Club. Regarding the holder, *Asahi Shimbun* (“Namae,” 1998) says he was president of a printing company and in 1992 Arai offered his real estate to the company as security so that company could obtain a loan. Moreover, Ito (2001) makes it clear that a company actually managed by the aforementioned speculator, Shigeki Nakae, as an owner, also belonged to the B&B Club. Ito (2001) reveals on the basis of what a local news reporter said that the building in which the just mentioned company managed by Shigeki Nakae was placed was a base in Tokyo of a fixer in the economic world in the Kansai region, Kyo Eichu, and the company had connections with a group of organized gangsters. Furthermore, it is said that the former managing director of Nikko Securities, Hiroyuki Hamahira, who was in charge of Arai’s dealings, and the former manager of the Maebashi Branch Office, in which the account of Arai’s scandal was opened, also visited the club at times (Suda, 1998). Regarding Hamahira, the aforementioned former member, Tsugio Amai, says he took part in the club just because of his personal relationship with Arai (“Bakuro,” 1998). But *Shukan Shincho* (“Bakuro,” 1998) reports Hamahira was a former member of the B&B Club.

As *Shukan Asahi* (“Taiho kyodaku,” 1998) points out via a comment of a person concerned with the B&B Club, it must have been inevitable for the B&B Club to have been labeled an investment club because it had some professional dealers in stocks among its members. According to Suda (1998), in addition, a person concerned with the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office makes a comment on the composition drawn together by Arai’s stock dealings and the B&B Club: “It is extremely interesting for us that the Diet member Arai invested in stocks as he was building up a close connection with these dangerous fellows” (p. 55).

When he was a government official, besides the stock dealings and the B&B Club, Arai seems to have established a company to manage the tenants of a real estate company, with Mariko as one of its executives, after he became friendly with the president of a company called *Togensha*, Kichinosuke Sasaki. According to Sasaki himself, Arai was introduced him as a government official of the Ministry of Finance who wanted to go into politics before long (Nakagawa, 1998). Sasaki tried supporting Arai financially by giving executive compensation to Mariko, but he cut his connection with Arai because Arai persistently asked for it (“Taiho kyodaku,” 1998). In addition, Ito (2000) writes of an episode in which Arai might have recruited secretaries using informational magazines for job-hunting and made them go around in his electoral zone to collect contributions. Nakagawa (1998) reports an

episode in which Arai paid attention to a new business related to satellite broadcasting after being first elected in 1986 and might have tried making it a source of funds.

Why stocks for fundraising?

Whether legally or not, why did Arai get into stock dealing to that extent? As Arai himself confesses in his first book (Arai, 1983), one of the reasons could have been that he did not have *kaban* (money) when he stood for elections. In addition, the reason he had a hand in stocks for money-making might have been, as Arai testified as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee, that it was an executive of a securities company who the then Minister of Finance Michio Watanabe introduced to Arai for *kaban* when he ran for the Diet without *kaban*.

In a Japanese election, it is said a candidate needs three *ban*: *jiban*, *kanban*, and *kaban*. *Jiban* is a support base or an organization for collecting votes, favorable voting constituency in other words. *Kanban* used to mean name value (the value of a good name), but now also includes the candidate's career and such. The third, *kaban*, indicates funds for the election, money namely. *Kaban* is especially indispensable for a candidacy. As Kawato (1999) says, it has been proved by Hirose, Iwai, Sone and Kanazashi that it takes a large amount of money for politics and elections in Japan.

Therefore, many politicians have not been able to help working diligently on

securing *kaban* by themselves. Actually Michio Watanabe, who gave Arai the chance to start stock dealings, was one of the politicians with the power to collect money in Japan. According to Honzawa (1993), Watanabe had not only at his disposal an incorporated body called *Josukai* consisting of graduates of Hitotsubashi University but also sources of funds from a wide range of areas from agriculture to public welfare for his political funds. Suzuki (1998) also reveals, on the basis of a story of Shintaro Abe, that Watanabe listened to short-wave broadcasting on stocks through an earphone in his first year as a politician during discussion time in the Diet. In the first place, it has become an open secret in Nagatacho (Japan's political center) and Kabutocho (Japan's Wall Street) that many politicians raise funds on the stock market (Nakagawa, 1998). It has also become an open secret in the securities industry that many politicians have VIP accounts and accounts opened in another people's names and have dealings receiving discretionary account services (Chi, 1998). As Kawakami (1998) says, "There are too many Diet members who make money with stock dealings taking advantage of their position to be counted" (p. 27). Ishikawa and Hirose (1989) offer that stock dealing using funds of the faction per faction is one of the ways politicians raise funds, but they explain it has become a tacit understanding that politicians raise funds individually.

Watanabe succeeded to the faction of Nakasone on February 21st, 1990, and

came to have his own faction. Hasegawa and Nemoto (1989) say Watanabe promoted government officials on the basis of their talent and made *kanban* for them while he was a member of the Cabinet, and as an example for it they provide the fact that Watanabe bewilderingly changed his parliamentary secretaries one after another and gave each of them the *kanban* of “former secretary to the minister.” Most of these secretaries to Watanabe were elected as Diet members. Arai might have been one of those sorts of secretaries to him though, according to Itagaki (1987), Watanabe once told Arai to give up running for his first election.

Watanabe aimed at the office of prime minister. Perhaps because he was thinking of using Arai in order to accomplish it, he introduced a sponsor, a securities company namely, to Arai for Arai’s funds for elections. In Arai’s first election in 1983, however, the aforementioned black sticker case occurred. As Arai testified as an unsworn witness in the committee, the securities company Watanabe introduced to Arai began a close connection with Arai, taking it as a task to support Arai’s fundraising until he was elected, once Arai was defeated in his first election after the black sticker case. In addition, Yamada (1998) gives his readers an episode in which Arai answered that no banks would even glance at him while some securities and insurance companies supported him when he lost the first election. This answer came when Yamada asked Arai why he took sides with the securities companies when

the banks and the securities companies were opposed to each other over the business area using the Ministry of Finance as their battlefield though he had been in the Banking Bureau when he was a government official. It was Watanabe who gave Arai a start in stock dealings, but the friendly relationship with the securities company based on the company's "sympathy" toward Arai, which started when he failed to be elected, might have made Arai totally absorbed in stock dealings.

CHAPTER 6

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

LDP: A key to investigating that type of fundraising

As seen, it seems the LDP, to which Arai belonged, maintains a close relationship not only with government officials but also with businesspeople. In the first place, it was when Arai was a government official that he first had a connection with the LDP, with a member of the LDP, Michio Watanabe, to be exact. In addition, it was through Watanabe, a member of the LDP, that Arai had a connection with a securities company for the first time. Arai's scandal came about because Arai allegedly asked Nikko Securities for profits, using his career as a former government official of the Ministry of Finance as leverage. Either way, Arai's scandal shows there seems to be a power relationship among members of the LDP, government officials, and businesspeople. In order to make the relationship clear, it is necessary to look especially closely at the internal situation of the LDP.

The Japanese political system

In order to understand the internal situation of the LDP well, a run-through of the basic structure of Japanese politics mainly through a discussion of Matsuzawa (2003a; 2003b) would be helpful. Modern Japan introduced a parliamentary, not

presidential, system of government. A main characteristic of a parliamentary system of government is that a political party, which occupies the most seats in the Lower House, gains power on the assumption that more than one party, each of which consists of members with a specific political idea, exists. That is, such a characteristic makes it possible that the intention of the people through election is respected to the maximum. The party that obtains power by being elected by the people, comes to be able to secure the government that has all of the administrative power. In Japan, the leader of the party in power is usually nominated as prime minister and appointed to the post by the Emperor. In addition, it is usual that the Diet members, who are leaders of their own factions or top members, of the party of the prime minister are appointed as other ministers by the prime minister and then the government is formed. At least in Japan, therefore, “a parliamentary system of government also becomes a political-party system of government” (Matsuzawa, 2003b, p. 74). And perhaps because of this, the Japanese parliamentary system of government does not enable a prime minister to enjoy concentrated power as Annen (Annen, Tadano, Nakamura, & Yamaguchi, 2001) points out in a discussion with Tadano, Nakamura, and others. In the present circumstances, that is, the parliamentary system of government in Japan does not work well. As one of the common reasons for this, the structure and function of the LDP, cultivated while the

LDP has been the political party in power for a long time, is given in the aforementioned discussion. Matsuzawa (2003b) also admits the corruption of the Japanese parliamentary system of government directly stems from the LDP itself and wonders whether the political system brought about by the LDP is good for the people and the nation. Here, it is confirmed again that knowing the inside workings of the LDP is necessary to understanding Arai's scandal.

The history of the LDP

In this section, first of all, the history of the LDP will be seen mainly on the basis of the view of Ishikawa (1995). Once Japan lost World War II in 1945, it became democratized and capitalist in every area under the guidance of the GHQ (General Headquarters of the Allied Forces). That is, Japan made a fresh start, away from its former militarism and imperialism. In that situation, some conservative parties took turns at power, and in 1955 the LDP was born after the Democratic Party and the Liberal Party merged. For thirty-eight years from the merger to the formation of the Hosokawa administration in 1993, the LDP was the sole party in power having the Japan Socialist Party as its primary opposition and a two-party system with no scrambles for political power, called the 55-year system, was established. The 55-year system is called the Cold War within Japan. However, the LDP felt it needed to maintain power by forming a coalition with other parties once

the Hosokawa administration collapsed.

Under the policy of the LDP from 1955 to the middle of the 1960s, Japan returned to the international stage and attained high economic growth. In 1956, during the Hatoyama administration, Japan established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and became a member of the United Nations. In 1960, the Kishi administration approved a new version of the US-Japan Security Treaty, although forcibly. Then in the same year, the next administration, that of Ikeda, instituted the “Income-Doubling Plan.” Under the plan, much public investment was used for industrial bases and infrastructure such as roads and railroads and much of the state budget was distributed to promote social welfare and to protect agriculture. In 1964, the fastest train in the world at that time, Tokaido Shinkansen, started to run and the Olympic Games were held in Tokyo. The “Income-Doubling Plan” by the Ikeda administration had been accomplished. The Ikeda administration was the only administration whose approval rate never fell below its non-approval rate in all of the administrations under the 55-year system, probably because all of the people welcomed public works as well as the social welfare policies carried out under the plan. The Sato administration, next in line, lasted for the longest time, seven years and eight months, from 1964 to 1972. In 1965, Japan established diplomatic relations with South Korea again, and in 1972, Okinawa was returned to Japan. It

must have been true for the people at that time that it was thanks to the LDP that Japan recovered from the depths of poverty to that extent in such a short time.

From the middle of the 1960s, however, the situation underwent a complete change. Because of the rapid industrialization, the environmental pollution became the most significant problem to be solved. Under the Tanaka administration, in addition, though the administration succeeded in reestablishing diplomatic relations with China, domestic economic policy did not take effect as planned. Rather, it caused inflation. What was worse, two oil crises occurred around the same time. As a result, Japan's financial situation grew critical. In order to help, the Nakasone administration privatized such government-owned companies as Japan Tobacco and Salt Corporation, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, and Japanese National Railways one after the other. Under the Takeshita administration, the three percent consumption tax was introduced in 1989, right in the middle of the "bubble economy" that recorded the highest average stock price.

At last, as mentioned, the 55-year system, the Japan's Cold War, ended in 1993 with the formation of the Hosokawa administration without any LDP members. The collapse was the very self-destruction of the LDP. Scandals that would expose the "money politics" of the LDP and cultivated for a long time, such as the 1988 Recruit scandal and the 1992 *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal had been uncovered and distrust of

politics, distrust of the LDP in particular, among the people consequently peaked. With the 1976 Lockheed scandal, in which the former prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, was arrested, as a start, transparency of the LDP's dependence on the power of money was demanded even within the LDP. However, detection of the Recruit scandal proved a cozy relationship between "money and politics" still remained and rested not only in the LDP but also in the Japanese political world. The Takeshita administration collapsed as a result. In the *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal, after political reforms had been again requested, the then vice-president of the LDP, Shin Kanemaru, was released after paying a fine of only two hundred thousand yen though he received under-the-table cash of as much as five hundred million yen from *Sagawa Kyubin*. The next year, 1993, what is more, he was arrested for evasion of taxes and at last a vote of nonconfidence in the Cabinet passed. As a result of the election of the House of Representatives conducted after these occurrences, the Hosokawa administration was born and the LDP came to be demoted to a party out of power for the first time.

After the breakup of the Hosokawa administration in 1993, the LDP came back to power, but as one of the parties of a coalition government. Since then the LDP has produced from time to time some prime ministers of its own. Due to the recession that has lasted since the collapse of the "bubble economy," each administration has mainly worked on economic recovery. No administration could

see success with this, however. In these circumstances, the Koizumi administration, with a policy of “structural reform without sanctuary,” began. (The Koizumi administration is seen more later.) It was just after the Mori administration, which was unpopular as it had a record of, according to *Asahi Shimbun* (“Mori shusho,” 2001), nine percent approval rate and seventy-nine percent non-approval rate, that the Koizumi administration received a seventy-eight percent approval rate (“Koizumi naikaku,” 2001), the highest in the postwar period, just after it was formed. In November 2004, the approval rate had dropped slightly, but the Koizumi administration continues.

The structure of the LDP

According to Kawato (1999), as aforementioned, it is revealed in studies by Hirose, Iwai, Sone and Kanazashi that politics as well as elections in Japan take large sums of money. That must have been why some corruption scandals such as the 1976 Lockheed scandal, the 1988 Recruit scandal, and the 1992 *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal occurred, and each was a money scandal that stemmed mostly from the inside of the LDP. This fact may represent the degree of the cozy relationship between money and the LDP. And it is also true that Arai, who belonged to the LDP, was ruined with a money-related scandal. In the process of understanding the LDP, it is necessary to bypass the “clean parts” of the surface to look for its true character that

enables such money-related scandals to happen. The relationship between money and the LDP cannot in that case be avoided.

Additionally, it is usually taken that the laxness of the old Political Funds Control Law called a “sieve law” in Japanese spurred the aforementioned scandals. Under the old Political Funds Control Law, it was necessary only for the companies, organizations and individuals that donated more than one million yen to have their names made public and politicians could put in place any number of political organizations as “saucers” for donated money. With the Political Funds Control Law revised in 1994, however, the sum of money that requires official announcement is fifty thousand yen. Companies and organizations can donate money, not more than five hundred thousand yen per year, only to a designated Funds Management Organization established by the politician. In spite of the introduction of the Political Party Subsidy Law in which the nation distributes political funds to political parties and the amendment of the Public Officers Election Law, both of which were carried out as political reforms, the procurement of political funds has not yet become transparent and clean politics and elections have not yet developed fully either. According to a national investigation on political funds in 1998 by Sasaki and others, rather, it was found politicians simply use different “wallets” and still manage to raise political funds actively (Sasaki, Yoshida, Taniguchi, & Yamamoto, 1999). Yoshida

and Yamamoto (Sasaki, Yoshida, Taniguchi, & Yamamoto, 1999) say there are three kinds of “wallets:” One is the aforementioned Funds Management Organization, the second is the branch of each single-member constituency, and the third is the support group of each politician.

A support group for LDP candidates

The third “wallet” support group is indispensable to LDP candidates because, as Ishikawa and Hirose (1989) put it, it can be compared to the machine of the Democratic Party of the U.S.; it gives full play to its overwhelming ability to gather votes. While the machine of the Democratic Party of the U.S. is a lasting organization and works independently, all support groups are basically limited to one generation. In addition, candidates are supposed to organize their own support groups and are also supposed to pay the expenses for the activities of support group and personnel. According to Ishikawa and Hirose (1989), it is taken as usual that it costs between seventy and one hundred million yen per year for one support group. Although some funds are distributed to each support group from the party, basically it is customary in the LDP that each candidate manages to raise funds for his/her own political and electoral activities.

What each candidate first does in order to raise funds through is to network, to make personal relationships within the electoral zone. Ishikawa and Hirose (1989)

say there are two types of these personal relationships: One is “the body” and the other is “the outer gardens.” Regarding “the body,” candidates establish as the core of their support groups schoolmates and colleagues of their former places of work. In order to build upon these personal relationships, furthermore they appear at all ceremonies and such events within their electoral zones and make themselves known to the public. Then they offer their hospitality to support group members by taking them on bus tours, holding *karaoke* parties, and so on. Through such activities done together, the support group members are united and come to be ready to engage in an election campaign as a body. The unity formed in such a process sometimes makes the members bold enough to ask their candidates to help find jobs for their children/other relatives also go so far as to petition for something individually.

The other type of personal relationship is referred to as “the outer gardens.” Here mayors, the executives of agricultural cooperative associations, the presidents of civil engineering and construction businesses, the officials of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and the like within candidates’ electoral zones gather. Now under the aforementioned new law, the role of fundraising by support groups has decreased because support groups cannot receive donations from companies or organizations. But it is the personal relationships of “the outer gardens” besides political organizations that are often used to raise funds. The difference between the personal

relationships of “the body” and those of “the outer gardens” is that the members of “the outer gardens” belong to some organization and join or make an approach to the support groups of candidates following the aims of their organizations (Ishikawa & Hirose, 1989). That is, the members of “the outer gardens” approach candidates in order to further the interests of their organizations. However, it is not until the candidates they support are elected that their petitions are accepted. In order for the candidates they support to be elected, therefore, each organization itself makes efforts to garner votes through a variety of routes such as using subcontracted companies. It then offers “insurance,” funds namely, to the candidate it supports to use in his/her campaign. For candidates, the personal relationships of “the outer gardens” are important because candidates gain not only votes but also funds. The relationships between candidates and members of “the outer gardens” are very give-and-take.

Due to the aforementioned revision of the Political Funds Control Law, nowadays the most significant way to raise funds for support groups is to throw or appear at parties (Tsuchiya, 2000). As seen before, either way, candidates themselves need to cover almost all expenses of their support groups. In order to continue to expand and maintain the personal relationships of “the body,” they never fail to appear at ceremonies and other events within their electoral zones. The number of such events must be high, even judging from the number of voters only.

In addition, candidates need to save funds so they are always ready for elections. It can be deduced from these instances that the outlay of money, even if the expenses of support groups are excluded, occurs at all times in greater or lesser degrees. This is a painful story for candidates who lack the ability to collect funds. For such candidates, funds from the factions to which they belong are most useful.

Why factions were formed

It is factions that make the LDP conspicuously different from other parties. The LDP is undoubtedly one political party, but Honzawa (1990) takes each of the factions as “one corroborative group in political power” (p. 1) and even finishes saying each is “one political party” (p. 1). This may be because a system in which the leader of a faction or a person equal to it is elected as president of the LDP and automatically gains the post of prime minister has already been established.

Why did the faction system come into being in the LDP in the first place? As mentioned, the LDP was formed with the 1955 merger of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party. In 1956, the first election for choosing a president of the LDP was conducted, but from the start the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party included some factions and eight factions, in total, were in place for that event. Of course, numbers are everything in an election. Therefore each faction wanted as many members as possible. Honzawa (1990) sees the first election, with the maneuvering

of the majority, as one of the reasons the faction system was formed in the LDP.

As another reason, not only Honzawa (1990; 1993) but also Tsuchiya (2000) give the medium-sized constituency system for the election of the House of the Representatives in which three to five candidates can be elected from one electoral zone. The medium-sized constituency system was used until 1994, except for a postwar period of time. It seems to have been not only a start for the formation of factions in the LDP but also a medium by which to spread and preserve the power of the factions. In fact, Nagamori (2002) takes the system as a “hotbed of factions” (p. 19). Since the 1956 presidential election in the LDP, five factions have existed mainly through succession and such in the LDP. This was because the number of successful candidates was limited to not more than five in the system and the LDP made its candidates run for the Diet taking that limitation into account (Hoshi, 2001). Even in the election of the House of the Representatives, of course, each faction wanted its candidates to be elected. Numbers are everything, as said. The medium-sized constituency system also brought about hot election campaigns among the factions, in each electoral zone in particular, and deepened confrontations among them. As a former director of the LDP head office, Minaji Sato, says, “We just hope that our factions fight one another under the medium-sized constituency system. That’s the most effective” (Honzawa, 1990, p. 191). The medium-sized constituency

system consequently led to the LDP's overwhelming victories making nothing of the influence of the parties out of power. In order to stop a dictatorship of the LDP, however, a single-member district and its proportional representation system has been adopted for the election of the House of the Representatives since 1994. In the system, voters are supposed to cast two votes, for a candidate and a political party respectively. Three hundred candidates of the fixed number of 480 are elected from 300 electoral zones all over Japan one by one, and the remaining 180 are elected from 11 blocs all over Japan according to the number of votes each party obtains.

Besides these two practical causes, the presidential election in the LDP and the medium-sized constituency system, the formation of factions in the LDP might be explained, too, from the aspect of Japanese culture to some extent. Iyasu (1996) leans toward a view that the political faction in Japan is not a phenomenon peculiar to that country based on the fact that there are no factions in the Clean Government Party nor the Communist Party and the factions of the Social Democratic Party are different in character from those of the LDP. But, the faction is often compared to *mura* (a village). According to Sone and Kanazashi (1989), *mura* is a "community-like society that is tied with the people in the local communities and their relatives on the basis of the spirit of mutual aid contrary to the independent and free individual" (p. 63) and the origin of *mura* in Japan might be the group work

involved in rice farming. It is taken that the time of the beginning of rice farming goes back to the Yayoi era, around the third century B.C., so it can be said that Japanese *mura* culture has been around for a very long time and it is proper to deem *mura* culture the basic foundation of Japanese culture. In the factions in the LDP, in light of such a background, a leader is a village chief and has an *oyabun-kobun* (parent-child) relationship with the people who follow him. Under such a relationship, the followers try to make their chief the prime minister and the chief assists in the distribution of posts as well as fundraising for the followers in return. As Nakane (1978) points out, that is, they have an interest in each other. In addition, such a relationship consists of, in the way Nakane (1978) puts it, an emotional connection, and perhaps consequently makes the faction, in the wording of Sone and Kanazashi (1989), an “exclusive group tied with together using the common fellow feeling as an axis” (p. 63).

The politician who devised the current faction system: Kakuei Tanaka

As pointed out before, factions in the LDP, started due to the practical reason of the election, exist in harmony with the Japanese culture. Perhaps because of it, each faction seems to apply itself more closely to election activities aimed at reinforcing power not only within the LDP but also in the political world in Japan than to political activities themselves. That is why the election of the LDP has been called a

factional election, or, what is worse, a money election. This sort of election might have deepened the relationship between money and politics, but the politician who came up with the model is unmistakably Kakuei Tanaka, famous for the following phrase: "Politics is power, power is numbers, and numbers are money." The Tanaka faction was formed in 1972 and had more than one hundred members at its peak, but it was mainly money Tanaka used in order to gain those members. Tanaka had his family companies and his support group called *Etsuzankai* as main sources of funds and freely gave money not only to the followers in his faction but also to members of other factions and government officials. In return, he expanded the power of his faction, gained votes for the presidential election in the LDP from his followers and won the election. Furthermore, he gained the post of prime minister, won many government officials over to his side, and granted the petitions he received as well as made the policies he held come true one after another. As a result, it could be said that Tanaka completed the so-called "iron triangle" among politicians: big business, bureaucracy and pork barrel politics. Since then the "iron triangle" has been often employed in the LDP, but in Tanaka's case, he gave not only money but also his thoughtfulness to those around him. In that way he succeeded in keeping a tight grasp on their hearts so to speak. When he was the Minister of Finance, for example, he sought any information on his staff: "The official's wife is now sick" and "the

official's child is going to enter elementary school soon.” He said or gave something to each official according to the situation, while for petitioners, in addition, he memorized the name of each with the help of his secretaries and called them by name with knowledge on them such as the present situation not only of their families but also of their relatives (Oshita, 2001). It is no wonder people were deeply moved and took Tanaka's side. Schlesinger (1997) says, “Tanaka's donations were psychological minuets, skillfully drawn-out seductions” (p. 112). What is more, he was friendly and popular while decisive and active. Therefore, the Japanese people adored him, calling him, “*Kaku-san*,” and put their hopes on him. Perhaps because of his nature, one of the former members of Tanaka's faction, Susumu Nikaido, used to say, “My hobby is Kakuei Tanaka.” Also, Gerald Curtis (2002), a scholar familiar with Japanese politics, still introduces Tanaka, even in 2002, with the phrase, “postwar Japan's most popular prime minister” (p. 9).

Three faction points: Money, numbers and personnel

How has the factional/money election created by Tanaka been taken over? It must be true that the introduction of the revised Political Funds Control Law, the single-member district and its proportional representation system, and the Political Party Subsidy Law affected it to some extent. Here, the three points of the faction, money, numbers and personnel, are each explored in detail.

Point #1: Money

It has already been mentioned that the politicians of the LDP individually raise funds, but “follower-level” politicians also receive funds from the faction to which they belong. Regarding the way each faction raised funds before the revision of the Political Funds Control Law, Ishikawa and Hirose (1989) reveal four pipelines. One was connected to companies and organizations. It seems they usually donated money to the faction via the leader of it. The second was the parties each faction held. The third was the influential Diet members of the LDP. They often had their own political organizations aiming at supporting Diet members with funds, so they could also expect donations from them. And the fourth was the financial management of the funds of each faction with stock trading employed as a method for that. Nowadays, after the revision of the Political Funds Control Law, companies are prohibited from donating money to a faction. So it is natural to think that a faction cannot gather as much money as before. Perhaps as a result, though, each faction comes to raise funds by throwing more parties than before (Tsuchiya, 2000). In addition, it is the present situation that each faction receives political party subsidies from the nation, the public purse (Hoshi, 2001). What should be paid attention to, however, is that influential Diet members of each faction donate money to their own factions, the third pipeline listed. Possibly such Diet members who have funds to

spare have strong sources of funds such as companies and organizations. Those sources might have petitioned their Diet members for something, counting on their political power and in turn have given them “insurance.” Then the Diet members who received it might, in return, have directly petitioned government officials and then watched as those convenient-for-the-company/organization bills passed. Diet members with such power are commonly called policy tribes.

According to Iwai (2002), policy tribes are “Diet members of more than middle standing who usually have strong influence on the specific area of policy based on the ministry/agency” (p. 33). Diet members who have been elected a few times only are not yet qualified to be policy tribes. But the system, in which Diet members can be policy tribes in time as they continue to be elected, has existed a long time in the LDP. Policy tribes are born after they gain certain positions in the Diet and the LDP step-by-step as they are elected. The most important positions in the process come in the divisions of the Policy Research Council of the LDP, all of which are established in correspondence to the committees in the Diet and to which government officials come to explain some matters in advance in order to directly obtain agreement from the members of each division. Inoguchi and Iwai (1987) call the divisions with such characters “the arenas where the interests and opinions each Diet member represents are changed into the ones the LDP represents” (p. 99).

According to Kusano (1989), Japanese Diet members depend on government officials because they have insufficient staff in charge of policy, unlike American Congress members. Therefore, Japanese Diet members discuss many of the bills after they are explained by government officials in the aforementioned divisions before they submit them to the Diet. If they can gain approval for a bill they discuss it with every member not only in the division but also in the Policy Deliberation Commission, and also in the General Council, which is the highest decision-making organization in the LDP. The bill must be approved in the Diet and the Diet is occupied mostly by members of the LDP, the party in power. Even for government officials, a system taking advantage of the divisions in the LDP is convenient because the bill, through these divisions, can be approved in the Diet in a single shot. What is more, government officials usually lay the groundwork for the bill not only with the Diet members who are on their side but also with the Diet members who are tough enemies and try to have the bill passed in the Diet in a single shot at any rate. For example, the Health, Labor, and Welfare Division of the LDP, one of the divisions of the Policy Research Council, is established in order to parallel the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. If a Diet member continues to belong to the division from the beginning and to be elected, s/he might, sooner or later, become the chief of the division and be influential in the policy-making in the area of health, labor, and welfare. Then s/he

is directly approached by the government officials of the ministry, and vice versa. In addition, s/he is asked for a close relationship from executives of the companies related to the area and receives “insurance” when the relationship is established. Then finally, s/he is a policy tribe. According to Iwai (2002), being chief of the division is the “gateway” (p. 34) to becoming a policy tribe after being elected three or four times and the division deserves to be called an “incubator” for policy tribes. In the first place, the reason the policy tribe position was instituted is inherent in Tanaka’s political method. Tanaka’s faction educated its members so that it could possess many policy tribes for various areas, so it was called a “general hospital;” it collected a vast sums through its policy tribes, and caused many of its own candidates to be elected. Of course, each faction came to think that it needed as many policy tribes as possible. This idea leads to numbers.

Point #2: Numbers

According to Honzawa (1993), personal relationships mean money and votes in the political world and are primary sources of funds. That is, the wider spread the personal relationships, the more votes as well as donations Diet members get. The factions of the LDP aim at that and gather Diet members who are vote and donation magnets. As mentioned, however, the faction not only gathers Diet members but also trains them so they become policy tribes and collect as many votes and as much

money as possible. As one of the methods for this, the faction needs to make them pass the aforementioned “gateway.” Therefore, there is trouble among factions in every personnel reshuffle as politicians vie for the positions that will bring them money and votes.

Also, the faction never fails to scout for new candidates in order to gather more money and votes. According to Honzawa (1990), factions aim mostly at children of influential Diet members and government officials, both of whom might already possess the personal relationships and sources of funds needed, though they sometimes aim at truly new talent. In the case of the latter, to begin with, they need to do everything from scratch for the election: First of all, they must put in place their own support groups and then they need to establish personal relationships and sources of funds. On the other hand, children of influential Diet members already have *jiban* (a support base or organization) and *kanban* (name value) and government officials already have not only a pipeline to the ministry or agency for which they worked but also special knowledge in the area related to the ministry or agency and might be influential there. Government officials may already have personal relationships and sources of funds to some extent.

Each Diet member aims at becoming a policy tribe as s/he pledges his/her loyalty to the leader of the faction to which s/he belongs. Once this position is

attained, s/he can spread the personal relationships and sources of funds gained and contribute to his/her faction. That results not only in the expansion of power of the faction but also in the expansion of influence on the inside of the LDP and the ministries/agencies. Once s/he becomes a policy tribe, what is more, it can be asserted that his/her future as a politician is promising. That is, there is a good chance s/he will be awarded higher positions not only in the LDP but also in the Diet in his/her coming political life though it depends on the results of struggles among the factions.

Point #3: Personnel

Actually, there are Diet members who do not belong to any factions. If exceptions are removed, however, it is the present situation of the LDP that the non-factional Diet members cannot get “honest” positions. That is, it is not until they belong to a faction that they gain promising positions. Given the fact that it is difficult for candidates to get official recognition, which is necessary when running for the Diet, from the LDP if they do not belong to a faction, Honzawa (1990) takes the faction as a general body for promotion and calls it a “managerial-position-hunting organization” (p. 44) while Tsuchiya (2000) calls it a “managerial-position-distributing organization” (p. 49).

Besides leadership of the divisions of the Policy Research Council, there are

some other positions such as chairperson of the Policy Research Council and ministers for each ministry. But as for the position of ministers, popularity depends on the area of ministry. The areas of “construction,” “agriculture, forestry and fisheries,” and “commerce and industry” used to be called “the big three” because policy tribes of these three areas could expect enormous donations from the related companies and the like. Now the areas of “construction” and “commerce and industry” are still popular, but the areas of “telecommunications” and “finance” are gaining popularity. In fact, it totally depends on the power of the leader or the person equal to the leader of the faction to which Diet members belong, not on the Diet members’ capability, what ministry position they can expect. Therefore, each faction eagerly tries to get for itself the positions of ministers related to these popular areas and there is always trouble among factions at the time of personnel reshuffles. Of course, this kind of trouble happens not only in the reshuffling of the leaders of the aforementioned divisions of the Policy Research Council but also in that of the chairpersons of the standing committees of the House of the Representatives. As Honzawa (1990) points out (rather confusingly), each personnel reshuffle has the characteristic that positions are assigned to each faction according to the power of the faction after the contests for personnel reshuffling among factions.

In addition, there are three positions called “the top three party executives” in

the LDP: the aforementioned chairperson of the Policy Research Council, the chairperson of the General Council and the Secretary General. The chairperson of the Policy Research Council can influence the whole process of policy-making. Therefore, this is the very representative existence of the policy tribe (Honzawa, 1990). The chairperson of the General Council is responsible to re-check each bill passed in the Policy Research Council. Actually, the Secretary General holds the greatest power among the three positions. This is because the role is that of safeguard of the LDP. For instance, it is the Secretary General who is in charge of distributing funds to each candidate for the election as well as letting money flow to the side of the parties out of power when the Diet is in confusion. According to Honzawa (1990), furthermore, it is said in the LDP, “You need to be the Secretary General first if you want to be the president of the LDP” (p. 77) because s/he can openly expand his/her power within the LDP by distributing funds to all LDP candidates when an election is held.

The turning point of the LDP, hopefully

Once the Junichiro Koizumi administration was formed in April 2001, a phenomenon that had never been seen in the LDP occurred. The administration had received the highest approval rate in the history of the LDP, of more than eighty percent, just after it was formed and Japan was hit with a “Koizumi boom.”

Koizumi had been called a “weirdo” by Makiko Tanaka, daughter of the aforementioned politician, Kakuei Tanaka, but what he did now “was” strange. When new Prime Minister Koizumi handed his list of names for the formation of the cabinet to some executives of the LDP saying, “How is it? It’s an earthshaking personnel reshuffle, isn’t it?,” none of the executives could say anything (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2001, p. 212). They were speechless, for on the list were a university professor, some private citizens and some young Diet members. Furthermore, the list was the result of what Koizumi had come up with after shutting himself away in the official residence without meeting anyone. He made the list of the next year’s reformation of the cabinet in almost the same way (Okubo, 2002). He did not follow party conventions for personnel reshuffles, forming each of the cabinets according to the power of each faction. That is, he formed each of the cabinets without sticking to the logic of factions in the LDP.

To begin, Koizumi emphasized “structural reforms” in various areas in his general-policy speech as prime minister. In his speeches made on street corners, he even declared, “I will destroy the LDP!” He is that sort of person who is not a follower of anyone and does not seek followers. In an interview with Keiko Ochiai, he expresses that he feels relieved when he is alone (Sataka, 2001). So he might not like to be with others. He used to belong to the Fukuda faction, but now belongs to

no factions. That kind of person pays attention to the defects in the structures of various areas in the existing economy and administration, and in order to fix them, demolishes some of what exists. One of the Japanese national newspapers, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2001), lists the following as the things he has destroyed: 1) *Keiseikai*, which succeeded to the Tanaka faction and was in the center of power even after prospering in the time of the Takeshita administration (but still exists as the Hashimoto faction), 2) the factions, 3) the methods of decision-making, and 4) the idea that the center of Japan and the provinces of Japan should be equally treated on the basis of the aforementioned “iron triangle” in which politicians, big business and bureaucracy enjoy a cozy relationship with one another. Especially, the second and third items ought to be noted. Regarding the second, Koizumi ignored balancing the personnel reshuffle according to the power of the factions not only for the formation of the cabinet but also for choosing “the top three party executives.” In order to strengthen the power of party, in addition, he decreased the funding (for expenses) distributed to each faction but increased the funding (for expenses) directly given to each Diet member via the Secretary General instead. As for the third item, it was a principle that any bills needed to unanimously pass through the Policy Research Council, the Policy Deliberation Commission, and the General Council in turn and bottom up, but now it is the opposite.

Pre-adjustment is not carried out for examining any bills in these three spots. All bills are approved in the government or by the prime minister and then they are processed from the top down.

The people who turn their backs on Koizumi's new way are commonly called "the forces of resistance" and most of them are policy tribes. Policy tribes have always established their positions as politicians and gathered votes and funds through connection with big business and bureaucracy and exercising their power of influence, but the reforms by Koizumi destroyed the system. Koizumi aims at a system in which the party itself becomes the nucleus in the LDP and has wiped out the "sacred precincts" of factions. In fact, however, not only policy tribes but also factions still exist. This might be because it is too hard to fundamentally sweep away that which was such a large part of the unchanging and stable environment of the 55-year system. The compensation of the 55-year system seems too high.

CHAPTER 7

PROSECUTION

“This is fascism”

It was the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office that was in charge of investigating Arai's scandal, an investigation criticized from various fields. For example, Suzuki (1998) cites a comment of a veteran reporter, “I cannot avoid saying that there are a large number of problems in the investigation because as many as four people died” (p. 142), and also offers the comment of LDP member, Katsuei Hirasawa, who used to work for the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department: “I cannot avoid having a doubt in the way of the prosecution this time” (p. 142). Atsushi Mizoguchi says, “Some people may start pointing out that the prosecution is going too far and becomes fascist” (Futai, 1998, p. 33). A member of the LDP, Shizuka Kamei, who was leader of the faction to which Arai belonged after returning to the LDP and used to work for the National Police Agency, also criticizes the prosecution: “Even the prosecution was wrong” (“Meiyu Kamei Shizuka,” 1998, p. 135). According to Park (1999), Arai's wife Mariko reveals that Arai himself also expressed, “This is fascism” (p. 199). As mentioned in the first quote of this section, as many as four people, including Arai, took their own lives in the process of the series of investigations.

Such comments about the quality of the investigation then might be justified. What is the system of Japanese prosecution that results in four dead in a scandal like Arai's?

The Japanese prosecution system

The current system was established by the 1947 Public Prosecutors Office Law, enacted and promulgated under close observation by the GHQ after Japan lost the war, and also by the 1948 Criminal Procedure Code. The Public Prosecutors Office is one of the administrative organs that belong to the Ministry of Justice and is organized in a pyramidal way: The Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, that corresponds to the Supreme Court, is the top and eight high public prosecutors offices correspond to the eight high courts in major cities. Fifty district public prosecutors offices correspond to the fifty district courts or family courts in almost every prefecture, and 438 local public prosecutors offices correspond to the 438 summary courts all over Japan. The public prosecutors have rights to deal with criminal cases, prove wrong the criminals they prosecute at court, and direct and supervise the execution by the court and so on. As Inose (1983) points out, they have not only administrative power but also judicial power. In addition, it is guaranteed by the Criminal Lawsuit Act and the Public Prosecutors Office Law that public prosecutors can investigate cases in their own right. Therefore, public prosecutors in Japan have a wide range of rights from investigation to dealing with cases and can independently

make use of these rights on the basis of their judgment. However, Japanese prosecution basically carries throughout, in the wording of Nomura (1988; 1991), “the principle of the unification of public prosecutors,” and is, additionally, strongly united because it is hierarchically organized in every corner using the aforementioned pyramidal ranking.

As Nomura (1991) mentions, although the police can investigate general criminal cases such as robbery and murder with the spirit of the fairness and neutrality, they might not be able to deal with the cases in which politicians, the people of the financial world and the like are involved, with that same spirit because they can easily become familiar with these people in the towns in which they work. The pressure to leave behind neutrality may be too much. In addition, Nomura (1991) says the crimes politicians and such carry out are intellectual ones such as bribery and tax evasion and can sometimes be committed on a large scale, so it is necessary for the people who investigate such cases to have special knowledge and all possible systems for investigation. Therefore, the organizations that investigate intellectual cases exist not only in the Second Criminal Investigation Division of the National Police Agency but also among the prosecution that politically maintains its neutrality from the beginning, in the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office and in the Osaka District Public Prosecutors Office as the special investigation department.

Especially the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office is called, in the wording of Uozumi (2001), “the strongest investigation organization in Japan” (p. 44) and is the very department that has exposed various corruption scandals of the political world.

According to Nomura (1991), the public prosecutors of the Special Investigation Department not only hear from witnesses and suspects, put material in order, and deal with the cases sent from the Second Criminal Investigation Division but also read newspapers, magazines and the Diet record carefully in order to “sniff whiffs of foul play” (p. 19) by themselves and investigate cases of corruption tenaciously enough even for those around the suspects to be thoroughly examined. In the process of investigation, according to Nomura (1988), some tenacious public prosecutors of the department break down with ulcers, weight loss, or vitamin deficiencies.

Arrest of Diet members

As mentioned, the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office uncovered the Arai scandal. It had in the past arrested some other incumbent Diet members such as the former prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka. But public prosecutors seem to treat incumbent Diet members differently from general suspects when they arrest them. How so?

Possibly because it is prohibited by the Criminal Lawsuit Act that public

prosecutors damage the honor and human rights of the people concerned in cases, Nomura (1991) notes public prosecutors arrest Diet members only when they are sure they can prosecute them and prove them guilty. A top-level meeting is held when the public prosecutors of the Special Investigation Department are going to investigate or arrest Diet members. In the meeting, the top-level prosecutors discuss the case from various aspects from the career and family background of Diet members to the reaction expected of the citizens. Once they reach consensus on approval for investigating or arresting Diet members on the basis of the aforementioned “principle of the unification of public prosecutors,” the result is soon reported to the Minister of Justice, who can supervise and command all of the public prosecutors under the Public Prosecutors Office Law via the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. The public prosecutors can then arrest or prosecute the Diet members in question unless anyone says in the process, “Wait.” What is important for getting to the stage of arrest or investigation is that the public prosecutors hold such meetings and investigations with utmost secrecy and never leak any information to the press because of the sensation it might cause. If the public prosecutors actually need to arrest Diet members, it is guaranteed by the constitution that Diet members have immunity from arrest when the Diet is in session. If public prosecutors want to arrest Diet members at any time, they need to ask for an arrest warrant from court.

They also need permission to arrest from the cabinet, the Diet, and the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives in due order. According to Nomura (1991), it is especially troublesome for public prosecutors to get permission to arrest Diet members from the Diet and they see mostly bad results such as ultimate guiltlessness or non-prosecution by trial even if they do get permission to arrest from all the institutions. Therefore, prosecutors are taken as wise if they avoid arresting Diet members when the Diet is in session, even if there were such a procedure by which they could arrest them when the Diet was in session. According to a magazine called *Jurisuto* (Jurist) (“Arai Shokei shuin giin,” 1998), however, the prosecutors of today, in principle, seem to try to arrest Diet members even if the Diet is in session as long as Diet members do not admit to that of which they are suspected.

Relationship with the LDP

As mentioned briefly, the prosecution carries out an attitude of neutrality in the area of politics. As Magami (1988) says, however, the top-level public prosecutors are appointed by the cabinet and that point is different from the case of other government offices/agencies. That is, the party in power, the LDP, holds the keys to the personnel reshuffle of the Public Prosecutors Office, and, in more detail, there is a distinct possibility that the influential/main faction has it. Possibly because the Ministry of Justice of the LDP supervises and commands the Public Prosecutors

Office, in addition, Nomura (1991) points out that each Diet member who was suspected in past cases of corruption was from a faction out of power at that time and these scandals were related to money. For instance, factions in power have already established strong pipelines for political funds and information, which arouses others' suspicions, but this is hardly leaked while factions out of power do not have them, are forced to manage to raise funds by any means and consequently accumulate evidence of unfair practices little by little by themselves. As mentioned, there is more than one faction in the LDP, and what is more, these factions are always competing with one another for the acquisition of power. Perhaps because of this, some scandals were uncovered through whistle-blowing from the inside according to the factional relationships within the LDP while some were found through an investigation of the Special Investigation Department. As evidence, Nomura (1991) offers the comment of former Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Seishi Shigemasa of the LDP, who was investigated in the *Kyowa Seito* scandal in which a Diet member of the Japan Socialist Party was suspected of receiving bribes from both *Kyowa Seito* (Kyowa Sugar Company) and *Nihon Budoto Kogyokai* (Japan Glucose Associations): "I think the people who spread the rumor are not from the parties out of power. Rather, I think the rumor spread due to the relationships among the factions within the LDP" (p. 70). Nomura (1991) also provides a comment by former Diet member, Setsuo

Fujiwara of the LDP, who was investigated in the *Nise Shoshi* scandal in which tons of certificate stamps for the posters of a candidate from the LDP for the election of Governor of Tokyo were forged and presented, “There are people who spread the rumor on purpose. Their aim is the only one. They are aiming at making me fall from power” (p. 70). According to Nakanishi (1998), although this is not related to the conflicts among the factions of the LDP, it is based on the information of an LDP Diet member that a Diet member of the LDP and a Diet member of the Japan Socialist Party were arrested in the *Nittsu* case that was also a graft scandal. That is, the prosecution, which fundamentally ought to be a neutral/independent organization, might have made use of information from politicians and the aim of the investigation by the prosecution might have depended on the party in power. In a sense, it is true the prosecution might be quite capable of enjoying a cozy relationship with the LDP.

This might fundamentally be because of the 55-year system in which the LDP retained power and governed Japan for as many as thirty-eight years. As Yamamoto (1999) explains, the LDP had made every law in Japan be approved through discussion within such sectors of the LDP as the Policy Research Council for as many as thirty-eight years. That is, it can be said the LDP might not have made any inconvenient laws for itself and it can also be supposed that it might have been difficult for the prosecution, which deals with any criminal cases on the basis of the

law, to expose LDP corruption. According to Yamamoto (1999), in addition, it was accepted in Japanese prosecution since prewar days that it would be a loss for the nation to exclude those people who are useful to it and it seems avoiding the arrest of big-name politicians was part of this policy. The 55-year system, as mentioned, was called the Cold War in Japan, during which a conservative party, the LDP, and a progressive party, the Japan Socialist Party, took a stand against each other as the party in power and the party out of power (the opposition) respectively. Perhaps in order to avoid the establishment of a socialist administration, Uozumi (2001) implies that public prosecutors kept it in mind they did not need to cause the administration of the LDP to collapse by arresting LDP politicians blindly. It was taboo, as it was, for public prosecutors under the 55-year system to arrest prime ministers (Yamamoto, 1999).

Kakuei Tanaka, however, was arrested, though he was not a prime minister when he was arrested. Even after his arrest, in spite of it, he continued to wield influence within the LDP as leader of the biggest faction and he was popular enough among the people to be re-elected as a Diet member. Possibly because Tanaka was in a position to control administration behind the scenes, the influence of the LDP on the prosecution did not decrease; rather, as Magami (1988) says, the LDP had come to assign powerful people to the position of Minister of Justice after Tanaka's arrest and

the Public Prosecutors Office was completely placed under the Ministry of Justice, and it seems to have increased. What is more, even the 1988 Recruit scandal, which occurred when Noboru Takeshita and Shin Kanemaru started to hold political influence and the Cold War was about to end after Tanaka, who also had political influence on the side of the prosecution even after his arrest, broke down with cerebral infarction and lost his influence on the political world, in the wording of Murobushi (2000), “came to an end without being investigated the core” (p. 269). Regardless of what kind of power relationship existed between the LDP and the prosecution, the prosecution and the LDP “coexisted” (Uozumi, 2001, p. 47) as Uozumi points out. Ono (1992) says all of the LDP executives would have been thrown into jail long ago and the LDP would have collapsed if a truly fair-minded prosecution had existed in Japan.

Nevertheless, a change occurred in the relationship between the LDP and the prosecution. As Uozumi (2001) says, the aforementioned arrest of Shin Kanemaru for tax evasion was the start of it. What happened after Kanemaru’s arrest was that, as Arai actually got out of it, the LDP experienced a split and the Hosokawa administration without any members of the LDP was formed. In other words, the 55-year system, in which only the LDP had power, collapsed. With this occurrence, the prosecution came to gain an advantage not only over the LDP but also over the

political world. As a proof, seventeen Diet members, having a former Diet member of the Democratic Party of Japan, Kanju Sato, as the seventeenth person, were arrested in the eleven years following the 1993 Kanemaru arrest (“Sakai giin,” 2003) while only seven Diet members were arrested in the seventeen years from the Lockheed scandal to Kanemaru’s arrest (Uozumi, 2001). This shows the way in which the relationship between the LDP and the prosecution reversed, and after the reversal, the arrests of Diet members occurred one after another. Arai was going to be one of the seventeen Diet members arrested. Nishibe (1998) expresses how Arai’s arrest was handled: “Even the LDP, a party in power, is about to be unified by the prosecution” (p. 112), and “The Diet Building has entirely been swallowed [by the prosecution]” (p. 113).

Relationship with the Ministry of Finance

The prosecution had another power organization by which to be embarrassed besides the LDP, until only the time of Arai’s scandal though. It was the Ministry of Finance. The position of this ministry is, as mentioned before, high enough it is called “the Ministry of Ministries.” The reason is unmistakably that the Ministry of Finance is in charge of the distribution of budget to each ministry and agency. The Ministry of Justice having the Public Prosecutors Office is one of these ministries, and according to Nakanishi (1998), it used to entertain the executive-class officials of the

Budget Bureau, the Ministry of Finance and lay the groundwork together for setting the budget. Nakanishi (1998) gives another episode: The study meeting to exchange information was often held in an eating house and included the executives of both the Ministry of Finance and the prosecution. Once the executive-class employees of banks came to participate in it, the meeting sometimes “got flamboyant” (Nakanishi, 1998, p. 35). That is, the prosecution might also have had a back-scratching alliance with the Ministry of Finance and banks through entertainment.

Once the prosecution exposed the aforementioned *sokaiya* scandal, however, it detected not only Arai’s scandal but also the cozy relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the financial world through excessive entertainment. Kaimai (1998) says it was spread as a rumor that the prosecution let “great evils [of the Ministry of Finance]” get away under a secret promise with the Ministry of Finance because it could not escape the power structure with the Ministry of the Finance at the center. However, it is true that the prosecution arrested not only the top-level employees of major securities companies and banks but also some government officials of the Ministry of Finance to which the prosecution felt indebted. These arrests could be carried out because the prosecution looked upon the excessive entertainment as bribery for the first time. Perhaps because of the method of investigation, Nakanishi (1998) points out the prosecution “became an existence to give great terror even to the

government officials of the Ministry of Finance” (p. 34) and Uozumi (2001) admits saying both the LDP and the Ministry of Finance “lost the past power” (p. 120) and “Nothing can confront them [of the prosecution] any longer” (p. 120) in that the prosecution came to establish superiority over all other organizations in the power structure.

Relationship with the press

As Uozumi (1998; 2001) and Yamamoto (1999) say, no public offices thoroughly manage information, shut their mouths, and stay silent as much as the prosecution. Uozumi (1998) concludes that public prosecutors do not leak information because they are demoted if it comes out to their bosses they have had contact with reporters, and the leakage of information can be a big obstacle in their investigations. He briefly warns, though, that not every public prosecutor refuses to meet newspaper reporters for information because it is prohibited in the Special Investigation Department only that prosecutors exchange information with each other. Nomura (1991) denies the prosecution formed a united front with the press for the Recruit scandal by leaking information because, he says, that kind of act affects its prestige. On the other hand, Yamamoto (1999) implies that information might be leaked from the Ministry of Justice or in the process of transfer from the Special Investigation Department to the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office, the

Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, and so forth. However, it cannot be asserted that, even if it happens along either of the two routes, the information is leaked by the prosecution on purpose. Rather, it might be more justifiable, even given the aforementioned comments by the former LDP Diet members who were actually brought down because of, they believed, the whistle-blowing from the inside of the LDP or such due to the relationship among the factions as the cause/source for leakage of information. Yamamoto (1999) admits there is a possibility that the truths of scandals are made clear by such “cooperators of the whistle-blowing from the inside” (p. 189).

Nevertheless, it seems the prosecution makes good use of the press, especially newspapers, in order to get the support of public opinion. In fact, Nomura (1991) sees the prosecution as taking an attitude to developing its investigation with public opinion as a strong supporter. Also, even Uozumi (1998), who completely denies leakage of information by the prosecution, says the prosecution expects newspapers, “the gigantic medium,” to become “the following wind” for public opinion (p. 33). On the basis of this, Uozumi (1998) points out that the arrest of Kanemaru for tax evasion was carried out with public opinion critical for him, and as for the aforementioned scandals in the form of entertainment for the Ministry of Finance and the like, “It must have been impossible for the prosecution without the upsurge of

public opinion to go on with the investigation taking the entertainment as bribery” (p. 33).

CHAPTER 8

THE JAPANESE MASS MEDIA

Possible necessity for Arai's arrest: The media

Finally, the media appear. As just mentioned, some type of relationship might have been born and existed between the media and the prosecution especially after Kanemaru's arrest in 1993. As also pointed out, the prosecution may have used the media to gain the support of public opinion to enable its investigation to run smoothly after that arrest. Regarding Arai's scandal, there is also a possibility the media was exclusively employed by the prosecution, which itself aimed at arresting Arai. The media seems to have been a part of the going on that must be explored for a full understanding of Arai's case. In spite of everything, the purpose of this paper, as stated, is to look for a change in representation of *zainichi* Koreans in *Yomiuri*, one of the players in the Japanese media, after the end of World War II and to the present day. Therefore, it is indispensable for a start to see what the Japanese media is like, to explore its characteristics.

The head watchdog in the Japanese media: Newspapers

Media in democratic nations are often compared to "watchdogs," which watch or check power organizations such as the government and prosecution. Probably

because they are so strong themselves, they are sometimes taken as the Fourth Power, after legislation, judicature, and administration, and seen as if they exist on the side of those in power. Either way, it can be said the media play a significant role in democratic nations. The people of all democratic nations tend to depend greatly on the media to keep an eye on national and international power organizations. Because technology allows the Internet to have become one of the main media, as along with newspapers and television, what is more, people have come to select not only media but also “information.” That is, the time people can watch the movement of power in multiple ways has come.

Japan is not an exception. According to a 1991 investigation by the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, however, as many as 80.9% of the sample affirmatively evaluate newspapers as trustworthy while 55.3% affirmatively evaluate television as such (as cited in Sato, 1995). A 2003 investigation by the Advertising Committee of the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association reveals, in one of the questions which allow for multiple answers, that for “I can trust the content of information,” newspapers received 40.5% of “yes” answers among television (including both commercial broadcasting and the NHK, the latter like the BBC in the U.K.), radio, magazines, the Internet, and itself and led commercial television broadcasting by 29.2% although not the NHK, which received 50.1% of

“yes” answers (the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, n.d.a). According to the same survey, in addition, newspapers received 58.2% of “yes” answers for the question, “It is indispensable to me as a source of information,” with a lead of 13.7% on the second-ranking NHK (the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, n.d.a). From this it can be taken that newspapers maintain perceived reliability and are deemed essential despite an increase in the number of media choices. The number 70,340,000, the total circulation of newspapers for 2003 all over Japan revealed by the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (n.d.b), might tell everything. As Wolferen (1998) says, the position of newspapers is in fact higher than that of television in Japan. Additionally, Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) speculates the function of the newspapers as media still enjoys a specific effectiveness in spite of multiplication of media types as well as channels. Finally, Susumu Hayashi (1995) concludes, after taking a look at the impact of television news upon newspapers that the latter will maintain its position as a medium indispensable to society. The Japanese, in the wording of Kase, “worship” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 66) their newspapers and there exists the real possibility this will continue.

To begin, what are the functions of newspapers? Do they possess something different from other media? According to Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) and Hasegawa (1998), one of their functions is to report news because they show their power in

reporting as well as explaining in detail though they are inferior to television in reporting news promptly. Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) thinks highly of newspapers' ability to report and explain news in detail as "the function that gives newspapers an advantage over other media" (p. 78). In addition, Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) and Hasegawa (1998) add to this the function of criticizing, which allows each newspaper publishing company to show its own judgment through editorials and the like, to make public opinion, to give its readers a place in which to exchange their opinions and to present a wide range of reader opinion. Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) recognizes this function as the most significant.

How about the function of newspapers as watchdog? Regarding the Japanese newspapers, Sasaki (1999) points out they "have greatly taken on the characteristic of an apparatus of the government or power to send information" (p. 8) since their inception and characteristics have "wandered" (p. 9) via various changes. It seems Japanese newspapers exist as more a pet of the power organizations than a watchdog. This is because, according to Katsura (1990), the importance of maintaining an opposing relationship between the power and the newspapers has been kept vague and what makes the relationship indistinct is still reproduced in various forms. In this way, it might be difficult to think Japanese newspapers' function to check power organizations is carried out, and that the Japanese people are provided by their

newspapers relevant materials by which to make good judgments.

Regardless, Japan is a newspaper power. Beginning with the next section, we will see what sort of entity is the Japanese newspaper. National papers especially, whose circulation is more than half of those in the whole of Japan, will be paid attention. And finally, even the national newspapers' *modus operandi* as a watchdog will be investigated.

The history of Japanese newspapers

In this section, the history of newspapers in Japan will be looked at mainly from the views of Ariyama (1995) and Uchikawa (1995). To begin: It is taken that the 1854 crisis in the last days of Japan's Tokugawa shogunate brought about by the landing of the "black ships" led by Commodore Matthew Perry was the social condition that sparked the establishment of Japanese newspapers. But not until 1870 was a daily newspaper most similar to the style of the newspapers of today, the *Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun*, published. After it, others were begun one after another. The Meiji administration, soon thereafter, promoted them as a tool for Westernization and enlightenment. In the process of this promotion, the government as well as journalists found the newspapers to have a political function for the formation of public opinion and disputes and each newspaper publishing company created an editorial column in its paper and was reborn a newspaper for political

discussion. Among these newspaper publishing companies, however, some that advanced extreme political discussion on *Seikan-ron* (the theory of conquering Korea) and other such empiricism started to appear. The government then put “speech suppression” into operation with some regulations while it planned to encourage newspapers that spoke for the government. Once the Liberal Party and the Progressive Party were formed in 1881 and in 1882 respectively, each newspaper publishing company kept by the government took either the side of one of the two parties or that of a governmental party called the Imperial Rule Party and developed disputes with one another. The same thing happened among local newspaper publishing companies all over Japan. That is, the situation of, in the wording of Ariyama (1995), “busy quarrel” occurred throughout the country. The government carried out suppression again in order to break the situation and each newspaper publishing company kept by the government could not help avoiding being on the side of any parties for survival. On the other hand, the government eased the situation of “busy quarrel” and brought it to order by making some newspaper publishing companies such as *Asahi Shimbun* neutral on behalf of the aforementioned newspapers which spoke for the government. At last the government succeeded in calming the situation.

Asahi Shimbun was once a newspaper publishing company that had its

stronghold in Osaka, a merchant town. In Osaka, in the late nineteenth century, an oligopolistic state enjoyed by two newspapers, *Asahi Shimbun* and *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, was gradually formed and the two developed commercially by taking commercial enterprise for granted and selling their papers as “commodities” with news and entertainment as key. As a result, *Asahi Shimbun* advanced into Tokyo in 1888, and *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*, by merging with *Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun*, in 1911. The newspaper publishing companies at least in and around Tokyo were also commercialized and took up the attitude of nonpartisanship that suited all tastes. This motto of nonpartisanship was observed even after Japan lost World War II in 1945.

One of the opportunities that allowed *Asahi Shimbun* and *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun* to expand was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Later, in addition, the 1931 Manshu Incident and the 1937 Chinese-Japanese War stirred up competition among the newspaper publishing companies all over Japan enough for further expansion. Perhaps because of this, Suzuki (1997) says, the newspapers were “the first prisoner of war” (p. 111) and “grew rich by being those who are caught” (p. 111). That is, the war promoted the development of newspapers. At the same time, newspapers in place during the war mobilized the people into supporting the war with their cheerleading. The government, which already knew newspapers are equipped

with the political function of forming public opinion, strengthened its control over Japan under the pretext of regulating speech and directed *Ikken issshi* (one paper per prefecture). Consequently, the number of newspapers in Japan decreased to 355 in 1941 though there had been 1422 until 1937 (Katsura, 1990). Then in 1942 there were only 55 newspapers, whose number almost corresponds with the number of prefectures in Japan left in that year under the rules of the Cabinet Information Bureau (Katsura, 1990). In this point in time, the arrangement of Japanese newspapers into the national newspapers, block newspapers, or “regional newspapers” in the wording of Feldman (1993), and local newspapers was basically completed. In the same year, additionally, any reporters’ clubs that separately existed instituted a registration system. According to Katsura (1990), that is, the suppression of freedom of speech was perfectly completed and from the Japanese newspapers in those days “were taken the freedom of speech and [they] were forced to cooperate on propaganda for war unconditionally” (p. 40). What Shibata (1997) indicates when he says, “[The Japanese newspapers] died for journalism even if [they] were held down by power and continued to be published” (p. 18), might exactly be that moment. Then each newspaper publishing company under such control strengthened inside censorship (Kweon, 2002), and in the wording of Freeman (2000), became “the state’s propaganda machine” (p. 171). Meanwhile, the unification of those newspaper

publishing companies under the control of the government quickened their modernization. In terms of the level of production and technology and the scale of capital and facilities, “a condition for the modernization of industrial operation and management at a stroke” (Katsura, 1990, p. 39) in the world of newspapers was brought about. In addition, the registration system of the press clubs became a start to improvement of the level of ability of journalists (Katsura, 1990).

As mentioned again and again here and in the world, Japan lost the war in 1945. The GHQ banished executives and people of power in the press in wartime from public office while taking advantage of the existing mass media to bring Japan under occupation smoothly. The GHQ guaranteed freedom of speech in the new 1947 constitution and laid down prohibition of censorship. Actually, however, the GHQ itself carried out press censorship “by reason of the accomplishment of the purpose of occupation and the necessity of the protection of interests of the Allied Powers” (Uchikawa, 1995, pp. 60-61). In addition, the pursuit of responsibility for cooperation in the war as well as in-house democratization occurred in each newspaper publishing company. In that situation, the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union started and the GHQ strove for removal of leftist power from Japan on the basis of its anti-Communist policy. Once the Korean War began in 1950, the GHQ ordered *Akahata* (Red Flag), a daily paper of the Communist Party, to

stop publishing, and in 1951 it also carried out a further “Red purge” in the world of newspapers.

Such newspaper control by the GHQ lasted until occupation ended with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty. While the newspaper world in Japan was limited by the government’s speech suppression, as aforementioned, it had no choice but to develop within the range of that suppression. Ironically, Japanese newspapers experienced significant growth under control by the government during the war. Then the current model of the Japanese newspapers was created under the guidance of the GHQ. As Uchikawa (1995) says exactly, Japanese newspapers obtained “almost-complete modern freedom for the first time” (p. 61) with the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty after they “had trudged along extremely-crooked history under greatly strong control by the government” (p. 56).

What are the national newspapers?

It has already been mentioned that the arrangement of Japanese newspapers into national newspapers, block newspapers, and local newspapers was accomplished under the government. According to the 2003 survey by the World Association of Newspapers, the total circulation of newspapers in Japan for the year 1998 was 72,410,000 copies and came in first in the world if morning and evening editions are taken as two copies (as cited in the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors

Association, n.d.b.). Japan is accurately deemed a newspaper country. Among the kinds of newspapers in Japan, the national newspapers are paid attention in this section. This is because the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association (n.d.b.) reports the 1996 circulation of newspapers in Japan was 53,555,803 copies (morning and evening editions are taken as one copy here), and according to *Joho media hakusho 98* (the 1998 White Paper on the Information Media), the circulation of morning and evening editions of the national newspapers accounted for 53.0% and 62.9%, respectively, or more than half of the entire 1996 circulation of newspapers in Japan (as cited in Hasegawa, 1998).

Why are the national newspapers so very strong? In the first place, the extraordinary circulation numbers indicate that Japanese dependence on newspapers is unusual. But according to Hoshii, the Japanese started to worship newspapers in the Meiji period when newspapers set about to form public opinion and give rise to disputes (Fukuda, 1975). This might have been a reason newspapers were commonly called “guide of the public,” that they began to lead the people in that way. As before mentioned, however, Japanese newspapers developed as “commodities” before the war and became industrialized within the range of government control. Along with that, Japanese newspapers came to embrace nonpartisanship and held it again after World War II though within a militaristic system under the government for

a while in wartime. Regarding the social movement in postwar Japan, the country grew out of militarism under the GHQ, became democratized, and accomplished rapid development, especially in the area of economy, under the LDP administration. It can be supposed that such various internal/external changes and conditions that came about due to those changes contain clues to the enigma of the monopoly of national newspapers. To begin with, it will be seen what sort of entities Japanese national newspapers are before their strength is explored from various aspects.

Today, Japanese national newspapers are the following five: *Asahi Shimbun*, *Mainichi Shimbun*, both of which enjoyed a monopoly on the Tokyo and Osaka newspaper markets as aforementioned, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *Sankei Shimbun*, and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (*Nikkei Shimbun*). This is what can generally be said about Japanese newspapers: They are “between quality and popular newspapers” qualitatively (Amenomori, 1995, p. 222; Hasegawa, 1998, p. 127) but “equal to quality newspapers in the West” (Sazuka, 2000, p. 28). The expression by Oi and Miyajima (1995), that those five newspapers “have circulation which is much the same as or more than that of popular newspapers while they keep their quality the same as the quality newspapers of the West” (pp. 220-221), might directly show the quality of Japanese national newspapers. Besides, Japanese national newspapers are sometimes divided and characterized on the basis of differences in ideology. As Akuto (1996) says, it is

widely believed that *Asahi* and *Mainichi* are anti-government while *Yomiuri*, *Sankei* and *Nikkei* are conservative. Takahashi (1995) further notes that *Asahi* and *Mainichi* take “the bloc of the citizens’ principle” (p. 338) while *Yomiuri* and *Sankei* take “the bloc of conservatism” (p. 338). Tamura (1995) takes *Sankei* as “conservative as well as pro-governmental” (p. 258). Basically, nevertheless, not only all the national newspapers but also the block newspapers and local newspapers embrace nonpartisanship, which resulted from commercialism, as aforementioned, as a motto. Kato points out that a different part from the newspapers of other countries, which do not hold nonpartisanship though the press clubs (to be explored in detail later), must be the biggest cause for this (Fukuda, 1975). In addition, it is another quite obvious characteristic of Japanese newspapers that page layouts are much the same in respect of not only form but also content possibly partly because of nonpartisanship. That is a reason there are those who say that it is Japanese newspapers’ individuality not to have their own individuality (Feldman, 1993). Tsujimura gives an example for this, claiming the only difference in columns among national newspapers are the marks to show stops in sentences: reverse equilateral triangles (▼) in *Asahi*, equilateral triangles (▲) in *Mainichi*, and diamonds (◆) in *Yomiuri* (Fukuda, 1975). He is thus expressing how totally ridiculous and insignificant is the only difference.

However, Fukui (as cited in Maezawa, 2000a) indicates there has been a

tendency toward bipolarization in editorial articles among national newspapers since the 1980s. What is more, Shibata (1997) supports that view, later though, stating the tone of the press has been bipolarized on the basis of the aforementioned ideological confrontation between *Asahi/Mainichi* and *Yomiuri/Sankei*, becoming apparent during the 1991 Gulf War. Here were highlighted problems of international cooperation and the constitution in Japan, though the standardization of national newspapers continues. Possibly because the Japanese constitution has a “no-war” article and there exists the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, international cooperation and the constitution tend to draw much attention to every time a war occurs. Therefore, the bipolarization of the tone of the newspapers must continue or might take a further step forward. Shibata (1997) believes the confrontation between *Asahi/Mainichi* and *Yomiuri/Sankei* stems from the difference in historical view, the very one that “is about to become a key to divide the tone of the Japanese newspapers” (p. 44). Regarding the constitution, for example, *Yomiuri* and *Sankei*, both of which are not active enough to search Japan’s conscience in the matter of the invasion of East Asia including Korea in wartime, promote revision of the constitution while *Asahi* and *Mainichi*, which are active conscience-explorers, oppose it.

It should also be noted that one of the characteristics of the national newspapers is that each of the five owns a television company, which have established stations

over the whole country.

Why have national newspapers accounted for such a large circulation percentage in Japan? In the first place, some conditions and factors that may make the distribution of newspapers easier are in place, in fact were born in Japan. As Oi and Miyajima (1995) point out, first of all, Japan's narrow landmass and the homogeneousness of its people and language are given as conditions and factors. In addition, the people's generally high level of education contributes to the spread of newspapers (Katsura, 1990). As Hoshii says, everyone can come to read newspapers once they are junior high school students (Fukuda, 1975); as well, the quality of the newspapers themselves, as aforementioned, "between quality and popular newspapers" (Amenomori, 1995, p. 222; Hasegawa, 1998, p. 127) cannot be avoided as one of the factors for the widespread circulation of national newspapers in Japan. Therefore, the range of target readers for the newspaper publishing companies is broad enough to be able to say it is, in the wording of Yamada (1997), "from leaders of the nation to ordinary people" (p. 178). As Katsura (1990) indicates, "The door-to-door delivery system under the monopoly system was the biggest cause for the realization of the wide spread of newspapers" (p. 72). According to Amenomori (1995), the door-to-door delivery system is carried out under a condition in which newspaper publishing companies and stores sign monopoly contracts. Amenomori

(1995) also says a company can strengthen unification with all of its stores by strenuously establishing the system all over Japan and this is the foundation for Japan, the newspaper country. Readers can receive newspapers at their doors every day by having in place a contract with a store, but as Sazuka (2000) says, the door-to-door delivery system also produces some advantages on the side of the newspaper publishing companies because these last know how many copies should be made, only enough for their readers, and as a result reduce excess stock. As aforementioned, however, there are also block and local newspapers in Japan and they exist as competitors of national newspapers, also available in local newspaper markets. What method have the national newspaper publishing companies used in order to restrain block and local newspaper publishing companies? It is *kakuzai* (giveaways).

Not only the national newspaper publishing companies but also the block and local newspaper publishing companies have used some means such as *mudaishi* (newspapers offered for free for a certain period of time) and price reductions even when those methods have been prohibited by law. However, the national newspaper companies have used not only those methods but also so-called *kakuzai* such as, according to Katsura (1990), “detergents, towels, bed sheets, digital watches, pockets calculators, electric blankets, small electric fans, necklaces, beer tickets, butter tickets, entertainment, sports, complimentary tickets/invitations for amusement parks” (p. 63).

They have created groups, for the spread of newspapers, which make a specialty of door-to-door sales, not limited to their stores all over Japan, to carry out “persuasion” to read their papers using the aforementioned *kakuzai*. That might be considered a “wicked persuasion act” (Amenomori, 1995, p. 232). In addition, Maezawa (2000a) presents the ultimate example of such an act, that gangsters have joined the sales groups and that has led to violence and even murder. Such over-the-top *kakuzai* as well as those groups have not yet been eliminated, though they have yet to develop to the point of serious concern (Yamada, 1997; Maezawa, 2000a). In the frame of a capitalist economy, as Katsura (1995) notes, even newspaper companies need to fit into the mechanism in order to maintain and develop themselves, and it can easily be their goal to pursue the expansion of circulation. It might have been because of not only the mechanism of a capitalist economy but also commercialism, cultivated in wartime, that each newspaper company tried increasing its circulation. Maezawa (2000a) lists three ways for newspaper publishing companies to compete with one another: “competition with page spaces (such as layouts and content of articles),” “competition with price,” and “competition with giveaways.” Additionally, “competition with page spaces” might not be due to the existence of press clubs and nonpartisanship the Japanese newspapers hold and even “competition with price” might not occur because every newspaper publishing company is granted the privilege

of the resale price maintenance system. That is, “competition with giveaways” was the only method by which to compete left for Japanese newspaper publishing companies of the time. It might have been their real intention to claim they could not help depending on *kakuzai* in order to win the competition war at any rate. Through that kind of development, the current system of national newspapers was accomplished, in the wording of Tamura (1995), “by carrying through the logic of the law of the jungle” (p. 257).

Then, how are the internal industrialized organizations of the national and even the block/local newspapers ran? As in the cases of the internal LDP and prosecution, the cultural background of Japan, and in a macro-aspect the cultural climate of Asia, have much influence. As Yamashita (1996) says, Asians historically often tend to “be stimulated and moved by sympathy and group-oriented harmony” (p. 9). Perhaps because they reflect this, as Gyalpo (as cited in Maezawa, 2000a) puts it, groupism and identificationism with their companies have their roots even inside media organizations. In addition, Maezawa (2000a) argues that feudalism also has roots here. Yamashita (1996) refers to Japanese reporters’ view of ethics: They feel more embarrassed at and guilty for betraying their bosses than for betraying justice and their own ideologies and say this can be an obstacle to true coverage. What is more, exclusivism seems also to work inside media organizations. Although each

section to collect information, such as the political news and the local news sections, coexists with the others exclusively within the same organization and has its own way of gathering information, it, according to Toshitaka Hayashi (1995), sides with the others well in the process of making information into news. Groupism might be said to function in that process.

Perhaps because of the merger of Japanese culture with the system of capitalism, furthermore, reporters at such organizations, using the expression of Hasegawa (1998), “carry out their journalistic tasks as members of their companies” (p. 128), not as individuals. That is to say, they are employees, not journalists. Wolferen (1998) tells us almost all of the reporters on the staffs of newspaper publishing companies in Japan are university graduates, who wrote fiercely competitive university entrance examinations, and members of the elite, and as a result are a “group of people who surpass anybody else in retentive power the same as government officials” (p. 15). In addition, Takeichi (1998) points out that “even the people who had never seriously thought what journalism is can luckily enter a newspaper publishing company” (p. 118) if only they pass an entrance employment examination no matter from which department they graduated. As Tamura (1994) says, they are “closely” employed as a “member of a company” (p. 51). Newspaper publishing companies take it as important to make moderate and reasonable reporters and attach much worth to the

raising of “excellent members of the company,” not “journalists with a great deal of personality and an extraordinary character” (Yamashita, 1996, p. 84). That might be because all newspaper publishing companies hold nonpartisanship in order to be accepted by everyone. Therefore, Japanese reporters, in the wording of Yamashita (1996), tend to become “generalists,” not “specialists.” That point, as Wolferen (1998) indicates, produces a clear result: Japanese reporters cannot have power to think over things themselves unlike the reporters of the West. As Yamashita (1996) specifies, to be exact, reporters of the Japanese newspaper publishing companies can use neither their own words nor attempt individuality: They are “company slaves.”

The press clubs

Here, the already mentioned press clubs, in which that kind of Japanese reporter tries hard to collect information, make an appearance. These are press rooms located in ministries, public organizations and companies, or, in the wording of Haruhara (1995) and Katsura (1990), “frontline bases” for gathering news materials. Press clubs are established throughout the country, but, as Hasegawa (1998) explains, most, such as those set in the prime minister’s official residence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, are located in Tokyo. Haruhara (1995) claims it is not clear when the system of press clubs began in Japan, but guesses currently-style press clubs came into existence in the Taisho era between 1912 and 1926.

According to Komori (1998), any reporter with a reporter's certificate or entry permit can join press rooms in order to collect news material in the U.S., but that kind of easy admittance is not acceptable in Japan. Here, the rules arising from the Japanese cultural background are exercised. Press clubs that already existed separately took on a registration system in 1942, as before mentioned, and it is still in use. Those allowed to collect the information they provide are members only, namely from the organizations listed with the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association or the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan. The press clubs themselves are truly, as Tamura (1994) points out, "exclusive."

Even so they have their merits. Within the clubs, reporters do not miss getting important information (Wolferen, 1998) and can surely obtain what they need to write articles (Hasegawa, 1998). In addition, they ask only relevant questions, which enables press conferences to run smoothly, and unnecessary competition with one another is avoided because all members have the same aims and editorial principles (Haruhara, 1995; Hasegawa, 1998). This must be why Freeman (2000) and Yamashita (1996) call press clubs "information cartels." Even for the information sources, the press club system is convenient, because they can efficiently provide the information they wish disseminated (Haruhara, 1995; Hasegawa, 1998). As for the downside, however, press clubs are, as aforementioned, exclusive and tend to

monopolize information (Haruhara, 1995; Hasegawa, 1998). Also, reporters who break press agreements can expect such punishment as dismissal from membership, which strengthens the monopoly (Haruhara, 1995).

Also, the system of press clubs is a hotbed of limitation, designed to demote reporters to ordinary “employees.” Kayama says reporters lose their critical mindsets and independence by depending upon the sources of information provided and Okuyama treats reporters completely as “employees,” instructing them it is much better they as “employees” not miss any news other media has released than scoop their own (Fukuda, 1975). In addition, Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) indicates reporters, who should compete with those from other media organizations, sometimes show little competitive spirit and impose self-regulation because they get to sympathize with one another beyond a sense of belonging. This is in contrast to the press rooms of the U.S. wherein exists only a vertical relationship between reporters and the subjects of their news material collection. The relationship among reporters in Japan is horizontal (Komori, 1998). Furthermore, reporters receive every benefit from, according to Tamura (1994), parking spaces and methods of communication to, according to Freeman (2000), year-end dinner parties and New Year’s parties, no matter whether related to the activity of gathering information, although it depends on the information source side, or the press clubs themselves. In this way, reporters

might lose their spirit as true journalists, and as a result, produce articles based precisely upon the information they are given without room for doubt. That leads to, using the example of newspapers, the same page layouts in spite of the difference in newspapers. And each page layout, if the view of Wolferen (1998) is to be borrowed, does not have anything the information source side does not want there.

Ban kisha

Besides the press clubs, there is a unique style of collecting news material in Japan: the system of *ban kisha*. *Ban kisha* means “reporters on political affairs who pursue the trend of political power” (Hayashi, T., 1995, p. 89). Of course, those who have the greatest political power are the prime minister and those around him/her, namely the government, so they become a main subject from which to gather news material for *ban kisha*. The government also has a press club in the prime minister’s official residence, but as Takase (1999) says, it is only the Chief Cabinet Secretary who conducts press conferences as a representative of the government. If reporters wish deeper information, it is quickest for them to get comments directly from the prime minister and influential members of the cabinet. The system of *ban kisha* might have been a result of the desire to accomplish this.

How do the *ban kisha* get information? It is very simple. They stay by the politicians of whom they are in charge from morning to evening, imbedded so to

speaking. They head directly for the houses of these politicians in the morning for *asagake* (morning attacks), stand by without leaving while the politicians are at work and follow them in order to get something even after they finish the day's work for *youchi* (night attacks). According to Feldman (1993), some politicians even invite *ban kisha* to their living rooms and drink and enjoy chatting with them after work though Farley (1996) says reporters visiting politicians outside working hours and establishing close relationships with them are taken as invasion of privacy to some extent in the U.S. if the reporters maintain the situation. According to Feldman (1993) and Freeman (2000), perhaps because such relationships must be avoided, *ban kisha* are supposed to "change politicians" every two years, but their biggest aim is, through such relationships, to obtain the stories behind the stories of politicians they cannot get in the press clubs; they shadow politicians as a way of carrying out their duty.

According to Feldman (1993), even news agency and television news reporters once launched *asagake* and *youchi* against influential politicians as *ban kisha*, but now these reporters consist mainly of those of the five national newspaper publishing companies, *Asahi*, *Yomiuri*, *Mainichi*, *Sankei* and *Nikkei*. It is mainly because the reporters of these newspapers, who spend more time with influential politicians compared to those of other media, give not only political information but also good

advice to politicians that those newspapers are read all over Japan and wield significant influence on society (Feldman, 1993). What is more, the reporters of national newspapers are sometimes appointed to members of councils of the government (Westney, 1996; Maezawa, 2000a) and this will be explored in detail later, but Tsuneo Watanabe of *Yomiuri*, who was once a *ban kisha* and therefore connected with many politicians, was one of the brains behind a former prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. As Sone and Kanazashi (1989) say, such reporters are sometimes “players who join the political game” (p. 269) as well.

What resulted from the give-and-take relationship between *ban kisha* and politicians was nothing but a you-scratch-my-back-I’ll-scratch-yours alliance. Katsura (1990) gives the non-arm’s length distance between the Japanese media and politicians as a reason the Japanese media at first did not honestly report the 1989 racially discriminatory remark by the aforementioned Nakasone: “There are many blacks, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans and the like in America and [the intellectual level] is still extremely low if seen from the average” (p. 32). That is, the closer reporters get to politicians, the less they write about them that may be deemed negative. So, it could be guessed that *ban kisha* who always “go along with” politicians can get into such situations more easily. As aforementioned, furthermore, the one-party rule by the LDP, or the 55-year system, lasted as many as thirty-eight years. Yamashita

(1996) hints that the reporters during the 55-year system, especially during the peak period of the LDP, inclined toward the LDP as a high-powered information source. That is, the *ban kisha* in that time might have stuck mainly to the influential LDP Diet members and gathered news material for as many as thirty-eight years. Toshitaka Hayashi (1995) points out that the 55-year system was the very cause of the inability to put in place a more effective system—more effective than the *ban kisha* system. To be precise, it was the 55-year system that preserved that system. In addition, it is no wonder reporters could not help writing articles about the LDP, only because they crowded around only LDP Diet members. Feldman (1993) also sees such LDP-centered coverage by the media as one of the reasons for which the rule of the LDP lasted such a long time.

It has already been mentioned that each national newspaper publishing company has its own related broadcasting company, which spreads closely-knit stations all over Japan. The organization that issues/renews broadcasting licenses for those broadcasting groups of companies is one of the governmental organizations: the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications until 2001). That might mean governmental organization has a destiny for each broadcasting company, and here, as Tamura (1994) says, “political negotiation” may happen. According to Kurashige (1997), the power of politicians

works for issuing such broadcasting licenses. Under such a situation, it should be doubted whether each newspaper publishing company, one of the group of companies for each related broadcasting company as well, can really get critical of politics. There is a great possibility that the issuing/renewing of broadcasting licenses forged another close relationship between the government and those newspaper publishing companies, maintained the 55-year system and helped maintain the long-lived one-party rule by the LDP.

Japanese journalism

The history of Japanese newspapers from approximately the landing of Perry's "black ships" in Japan, through the "busy quarrel," the frequent wars, and Japan's extreme militarization, to its democratization after the war and the systems as well as the phenomena of press clubs and *ban kisha*, which occurred in those historical processes whether before or after the war, have been seen. It is natural to credit Japanese cultural background as well as social situations with influence on that sequence of events, and current media such as newspapers, television, and magazines are the very outcomes of that sequence of events. Yamashita (1996) names those outcomes "Japanese journalism" and categorizes it thus: 1) nonpartisanship/objectivity that makes the political standpoint unclear, 2) the principle of priority-over-management that results from the innate characteristics of

oligopoly and excessive competition in the journalism industry, 3) obedience for power and 4) journalists' strong senses of loyalty and collectivism within the groups to which they belong. Furthermore, it seems those four affect and support one another.

Most of what follows is already mentioned, but as for the first category of the four, the spirit of nonpartisanship, it requires some reiteration for clarity. Nonpartisanship was inherited after the war in Japan and is even now considered positive, though the Japanese newspapers were "non-partisanized" due to government oppression. They stayed neutral in order to be accepted by all people along with the commercialization of the product and once strayed from the narrow path under the system of militarism. That led to the principle of priority-over-management, the second of the categories.

Being accepted by all people means being read by many people. That is, it also means being sold to many people. Nonpartisanship is quite common in Japan and might be thought to be based, in the media, on a sense of justice, but can be traced back along a path of commercialization. Nonpartisanship is also a method of selling papers. In fact, Kahn suggests national newspapers cannot avoid becoming neutral in order to maintain sales and contain only harmless articles for this reason (Fukuda, 1975). Konner (as cited in "Ittai dare ga," 1998) criticizes not only national

newspaper publishing companies but other media entities such as broadcasting companies, saying, “[They] go for the profit pursuit as companies and do not report what makes no profit” (p. 27). Takahashi (1995) asserts it cannot happen that newspaper publishing companies, which are proud of their huge circulation, will give up their motto of nonpartisanship/neutrality; no such risk is worth it. Kahn indicates by saying, “How many things are thrown in and which coupon tickets are freely given” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 53), that giveaways further increase the sales of newspapers.

The third category, obedience, comes next. Reporters might not be able to violate the agreements of their press clubs because they are afraid of being punished, being dismissed from membership for example. Also, it is no doubt hard for reporters to take a critical attitude against the politicians of whom they are in charge once they establish a close relationship with those politicians. This is especially apparent in the case of reporters from the national newspaper companies; they might not be able to help gathering news materials while trying to gauge politicians’ feelings because of the power those politicians wield over issuance of broadcasting licenses. As Tamura (1994) reminds us, this is a position 180 degrees different from that of the U.S. newspaper companies such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, which do not need to stay on anyone’s “good side” in order to be licensed.

The fourth category is related to the third. Reporters within Japanese press

clubs come to have a sense of solidarity with the reporters from other media companies of the same club and might therefore lack a spirit of competition, which brings about a synergistic effect with nonpartisanship. As a result, the page layouts of newspapers get to be similar. Within the companies for which reporters work, in addition, reporters are required not to disobey their bosses and to be seen as good employees who write articles accepted by all people.

Another characteristic of Japanese journalism is seen in the writing. As Feldman (1993) says, the Japanese media are often short of clear information source names, and in that case, such styles as “It looks as if...” and “It is said that...” are adopted. According to Maezawa (2000a), such styles are often seen in the local news pages of newspapers. Maezawa (2000a) gives some reasons sources of information are generally not revealed: Each company hides its sources of information if the information is from other companies and also to protect the privacy of its information sources. Maezawa (2000a) concludes that it is thought even media without apparent information sources can be trusted. Most information with political parties as sources goes down on the page unsourced (Hayashi, T., 1995). As Tonooka says, Japanese journalism is “anonymous journalism” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 177).

From what has been reviewed so far, it can be taken that Japanese journalism

does not take a critical enough attitude in observing those in power, which is an important role of the media. If the expression of Farley (1996) and Freeman (2000) is used, the watchdog in Japan seldom barks. The watchdog in Japan cannot become a “lone wolf” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 30), which is the phrase Hoshii uses for the journalists of the West, if it always tries to judge the state of mind of those in power. As Wolferen (1998) indicates, especially regarding the newspapers, they seem to maintain social order rather than collect and examine accurate truths and report and analyze them. What is more, Takahama (1998) says the maintenance of social order via newspapers is carried out together with the government, not by the newspapers alone. Even though newspapers are often seen as the Fourth Power, in that way it can easily be taken that they adjust their opinions and behavior to please those three greater powers, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, not that they watch those powers. What is worse, the watchdog in Japan may never bark.

Influence on the people

As seen so far, the national newspapers of Japan enjoy widespread circulation rate because of commercialization and are, in terms of content as well as disposition of articles, similar to one another because of their common motto, nonpartisanship, and the same sources of information, such as press clubs. In addition, the national newspapers do not select their readers; anyone who can afford a copy can be a reader.

The national newspapers are still trusted and necessary in Japan even though people can now choose information from a wide range of media from radio to the Internet. What has been brought to the people of Japan by such national newspapers? It is, as Feldman (1993) and Yamashita (1996) say, the standardization of people in Japan.

It might be thought outside Japan that the majority within Japan has come to share much the same way of thinking and common values and world views no matter which national newspapers they read because of their similarity. This proves the theory that the government in wartime succeeded in leading and manipulating public opinion using newspapers. According to Yamashita (1996), such similar newspapers cannot give “various materials to judge (or think over what happens in society) to the people” (p. 82). In addition, Hayashi criticizes the fact that such newspapers lose “the width of the opinions people can select” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 201). Such newspapers cannot avoid being on the side of those in power. With such newspapers, as Hayashi says, it is possible that the people of Japan “cannot help being totalitarian” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 201). Newspapers must be or be close to, in the wording of Freeman (2000) again, “the state’s propaganda machine” (p. 171).

The outside press

As Wolferen (1998) and Tsujimura (Fukuda, 1975) tell us, the media on which the public counts, instead of such newspapers, are the investigative weekly magazines.

It is true that kind of magazine contains gossip as well as sensational articles, and as Wolferen (1998) indicates, have not established as respected a reputation as have many of the newspapers. As one of the reasons such magazines can carry such articles, however, it could be given that they, unlike newspapers and television news, are not encumbered with various restrictions by those in power.

First of all, the reporters of such magazines do not belong to any press clubs. To be exact, they are not permitted to join press clubs. Farley (1996) calls the media, including that kind of magazine employing reporters who do not belong to press clubs, “the outside press.” How do reporters who are not members of press clubs get information and put together articles based on that information? The answer is straightforward: They look for information and investigate it all by themselves. They need neither to worry about any agreements of the press clubs nor to write articles trying to gauging the feelings of the subjects. Also, they do not have a horizontal relationship with those from other magazines that spoils competitive spirit. Under such conditions, the reporters of these magazines can carry out news material collecting activities in a free and easy style. As Kawai (2000) points out, therefore, that kind of magazine can dig into the themes newspapers and television would not touch. In fact, some big scandals have been uncovered by such magazines. It was the outside press that brought to light not only the Lockheed scandal, in the course of

which the aforementioned former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka was arrested, but also the aforementioned *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal.

It is hard, though, for the investigative weekly magazines to secure their readership as can the newspapers. In order to obtain and maintain their readerships, such magazines tend to offer gossip and sensational articles and so are commoditized in a sense. However, the reporters from such magazines neither belong to press clubs nor stick to specific influential politicians as do the *ban kisha*. That is, they are free from power. They might somewhat have restraints imposed upon them by the organizations to which they belong, but they have the option to become “lone wolves,” engaging in collecting news material as well as writing articles, and bark louder than the watchdogs as long as the organizations to which they belong allow them to do so.

CHAPTER 9

CONFIRMATION OF THE “TRANSITION” OF ARAI’S POSITON IN JAPANESE SOCIETY

Collapse of the legend, Arai is matchless

“I was dropped” (Yamada, 1998, p. 34). This is what Arai unhappily said when he was ordered to go on loan to the Export-Import Bank of Japan in his Ministry of Finance days year after he had a wedding in company with his first son. “The bullying among children has become a subject of discussion, but this is also a bullying among adults, right?” (Kubo, 1998, p. 155). This is what Arai said to one of his former secretaries, Junichi Kubo, when asked by the executives of the LDP to leave the party after detection of his scandal. “Everybody is doing it, but why only me?” (Suzuki, 1998, p. 141; Yamada, 1998, p. 35). This is what Arai might have said in the secret session of the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives held to discuss whether it was allowable to arrest him. Arai seems to have been unfortunately enough treated to express the aforementioned words on the various occasions from the personnel reshuffle to the investigation from his days at the Ministry of Finance until his death. In this section, an exploration of the ways in which the four organizations, the Ministry of Finance, the LDP, the prosecution and

Nikko Securities, with which Arai had connections treated him unfolds.

Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance is taken first. It was the Division of General Affairs of the Budget Bureau to which Arai belonged in the Ministry of Finance at his hiring. This section, according to Nakagawa (1998), was a reserved seat for the people who saw excellent results on their entrance exams. As mentioned, Arai was an extraordinary character in the Ministry of Finance partly because he had a wedding in company with his first son after he started to work for the ministry. In fact, the wedding greatly disgusted the people in charge of the personnel reshuffle, and after the event Arai could not get any of the better positions in the ministry (Nakagawa, 1998). He worked for the ministry as a deputy director of the Division of General Affairs of the Bureau of the Bank, which is taken by Oshima (1998) as a “position which makes us feel that s/he is the very government official of the Ministry of Finance that is the center among the ministries” (p. 195), for one year only, then was transferred to the Export-Import Bank of Japan. That made him say, “I was dropped” (Yamada, 1998, p. 34), and he was also made to take the quite lowly position of Assistant Manager there (Oshima, 1998). Perhaps on the basis of the fact that Arai was sent on loan to some other workplaces such as the Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Welfare, Oshima (1998) says it was for only four years

that Arai worked at his ministry though he held up “service at the Ministry of Finance for ten years” as one of his selling points.

LDP

The next organization worth a closer look is the LDP. It is necessary to determine how Arai functioned in the party as a LDP Diet member. Arai criticized money politics to a great extent and left the party once. Did he get used to, close to, the unique customs, such as the support group and faction system, of the LDP, however, while in the party?

Arai seems to have followed the customs without question at first. For his first election, according to one of Arai’s former secretaries, Arai received a distribution of one hundred to two hundred million yen from a bank all at once, mostly because he was a former government official of the Ministry of Finance, and ultimately spent four hundred to five hundred million yen on the campaign (Ha, 1999). Just when first elected, according to Yamada (1998), Arai invited the members of his support group to a free evening of theater, and, according to Ha (1999), he also invited them to tour a hot spring. It must have been true that it cost “tons of money” for various things besides the maintenance of his support group.

Regarding the method of running the support group, however, Ha (1999) explains Arai developed it in his own way without following the customs of the LDP;

it is not clear that he did so from the beginning of the formation of his support group, though. In a word, Arai seems not to have used his support group as a substitute of the aforementioned third “wallet.” Ha (1999) describes the way in which Arai’s support group spread over his electoral zone, divided into smaller groups, each of which had about fifteen members, and also reveals with the evidence of one of Arai’s former secretaries, Makoto Sato, that the number of smaller groups was about seven hundred. It is not obvious either that any members of “the outer gardens” belonged to any of the smaller groups. According to Sato, however, Arai, from the first, did not like to take money from his electoral zone, and after the 1988 Recruit scandal, never accepted petitions that expected rights or interests of himself (Ha, 1999).

Regarding the activity of a faction that requires its members to attach importance to the vertical relationship in which followers need to pledge their loyalty to their leader, Arai, it might be guessed, did not get used to it, as seen not only from his way of behaving at the Ministry of Finance but also from his personal characteristics. In the first place, Arai took such a system as “back power,” and on the basis of that view, he turned on the important figures, Shin Kanemaru and Noboru Takeshita, and criticized money politics. It might be hard to imagine he himself aimed at being a policy tribe in order to sink money into his faction.

Arai could not get back into the faction (the leader of the faction had already

changed at that time, though) to which he used to belong when he returned to the LDP in 1997. This might have had much to do with his not attending the 1995 funeral of Michio Watanabe who, as alluded to many times, was Arai's political mentor. As a reason for staying away, according to Oshima (1998), Arai said, "I had not been under the care of him recently though I used to be so" (p. 196). However, Arai's absence from the funeral was deemed unpleasant to more than just the side of the former faction of Watanabe. Furutachi (1998) says, "Arai's absence might be reflected as a rude and impolite attitude in the political world in which social duty and human feelings have much influence" (p. 61). According to Abe (2000), Arai's absence from the funeral made the executives of the party angry. Then Arai belonged to the faction of Mitsuzuka.

From this, it might be understood that Arai did not deserve to be a member of the LDP. The results of a personnel reshuffle depend on numbers and the faction in which the candidate rests in the LDP, but Arai's I-am-not-a-member-of-the-LDP-like behavior seems to have rebounded on him after his re-entering the party as well as after the detection of his scandal.

Arai says in his second book (Arai, 1993) that he, of his own accord, did not accept an offer of the position of parliamentary undersecretary from Michio Watanabe. According to Ito (2000), however, Arai actually held various posts such as a

vice-chief of the Foreign Affairs Division, Finance Division, Commerce and Industry Division, Telecommunications Division, and Science and Technology Division successively and he might have been allowed to gain a higher position in the system of the LDP when he returned to the party because he had already been elected four times at that time. However, he was not thought so highly of in the LDP when he returned possibly because his previous offence of exposing Noboru Takeshita and Shin Kanemaru had an effect or because he had been absent from the funeral of Watanabe. Kang (1998) concludes that Arai, “finally, could not be even a parliamentary undersecretary though he succeeded in being elected as many as three times as a candidate of the LDP” (p. 118). In Japan, according to Nakane (1967), once one leaves the group to which one belongs, one can never get back to the group. Nakagawa (1998) points out that Arai was an orphan in the political world when he got back to the LDP. He was a member of the task force for urgent financial system stabilization within the LDP, but he left it after his scandal was exposed. However, *Yomiuri Shimbun* (“Nikko shoken,” 1997) reveals that, within the LDP, his resignation was seen as a result of switching with someone else. After the detection of Arai’s scandal, LDP Diet members were strangely unfriendly to Arai, with an “attitude as if they do not want to touch a dirty person” (Tahara, 1998, p. 160). Also, they treated Arai stiffly (Imai, 1998). Later, Arai was advised to leave the LDP by the party itself,

and once February began, the then Secretary General of the LDP, Koichi Kato, met him to advise he leave the party. As Chi (1998) says, Arai, the very person who strongly criticized the corruption of politics, was put in a situation where he pursued dishonest practice and was isolated without any sympathy from his colleagues. Mariko (Arai, 1998) compared Arai, in his isolation in the LDP, to a “lone wolf.” Although Arai belonged to a faction and got some supporters from the LDP, only a few, such as the leader of the faction to which he belonged, Shizuka Kamei, he could not establish a firm basis in the LDP after he returned to the party.

Prosecution

Furthermore, pressure from the prosecution seems to have driven Arai into a corner. As mentioned, Arai’s scandal was detected in the process of an investigation into four major Japanese securities companies’ payoffs to *sokaiya*, Ryuichi Koike. At that time, the prosecution was in the middle of exposing a compositional arrangement that had been found in the *sokaiya* case, in which, in the expression of Ito (2000), “politicians, government officials, people of big business and *sokaiya*’s depend on one another” (p. 36). According to Suda (1998), what is more, the investigation into a series of cases including the *sokaiya* one was extremely carefully conducted by “that go-go Katsuhiko Kumazaki, a chief of the Special Investigation Department” (p. 52), who led the investigation. As a result, Koike was arrested,

some executives of the four major securities companies and of *Daiichi Kangin* (Daiichi Kangyo Bank) were arrested one after another, and some government officials of the Ministry of Finance, an official of a corporation having special status, and others were also arrested. The prosecution gradually and surely exposed the interdependence among them and succeeded in bringing about its collapse. Regarding the rest, although there were many accounts of politicians in the as many as eight thousand “VIP accounts” of Nomura Securities, the prosecution could not indict the politicians because most of their accounts had already been barred by legal prescription and ran out of its limitation of authority (“Konnichi no shomondai,” 1998). According to a magazine, *Shinpo To Kaikau* (“Arai Shokei shi,” 1998), however, Arai became a target to be pursued to full criminal liability due to the unusualness of his case, a situation in which he could make profits even after the collapse of the “bubble economy” (though Nikko Securities had about thirty accounts opened in other people’s names in the same way as Arai). Ito (2000) explains more clearly why Arai was targeted: Arai was chosen as a “handy representative” because he was a returnee, did not have his basis in the LDP, and was a former government official of the Ministry of Finance. That certainly makes his scandal a symbol (of corruption).

As explained earlier, Diet members have the right not to be arrested while the

Diet is in session and also have the right to confidentiality. Nevertheless, the mass media reported Arai's case day after day. Therefore, it might be possible to suspect the prosecution leaked information. According to Nishibe (1998), in fact, some members of the media were leaked information from the prosecution. Suzuki (1998) believes, "[The prosecution] depends on an illegal way to arrest the person who committed an illegal act" (p. 142), with an indication by the then LDP Deputy Secretary General, Hiromu Nonaka, that the prosecution intentionally spread information to the mass media and created an atmosphere in which to arrest a politician. The suspicion against Arai was violation of the Securities Exchange Act. According to the magazine, *Jurisuto* (Jurist) ("Arai Shokei shuin giin," 1998), his charge was lighter than others—he was not accused of crimes such as taking bribes—so it was taken for granted he would be investigated at home. However, the prosecution did not choose to prosecute Arai at home, and in the wording of Nishibe (1998), "It tried arresting [him] in the presence of the mass of the people" (p. 118). The prosecution was taking a firm hand. Arai was heard as a witness and talked to the prosecution for three hours. According to the aforementioned LDP Diet member, Shizuka Kamei, who accepted Arai to his faction, however, Arai sobbed to him on the telephone, "[The prosecution] did not hear me at all" (Kamei, 1998, p. 319). According to the former secretary to Arai Junichi Kubo, in addition, a record was

already completed by the prosecution and all Arai had to do was sign his name to it when Arai met with the prosecution to be heard (Kubo, 1998). Also in the secret session of the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives, no one even received the material Arai brought in order to explain himself (Kubo, 1998; Nishibe, 1998).

Nikko Securities

As explored, of course, it was not only Arai who was heard by the prosecution in the investigation of the scandal. Needless to say, some secretaries to Arai and people concerned were interviewed. Some people concerned in Nikko Securities, especially former managing director Hiroyuki Hamahira, who was in charge of Arai's account, were also heard. As Arai revealed as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee, in fact, Arai and Hamahira were on good terms also in their private lives. According to what Arai said in the committee, all the members of their families were on good terms, and the Hamahira family hurried to Arai's speeches made on street corners and even helped Arai in the election. A magazine, *Shukan Bunshun* ("Arai Shokei fujin ga," 1998), reveals that Arai and Hamahira were on good enough terms with each other to play golf together. As mentioned, Arai distributed copies of the notes Hamahira took to the press in his last press conference, the day before Arai committed suicide. *Shukan Bunshun* ("Igai na shinso," 1998) carries a

“record of indictment,” the source of the copies Arai distributed to the press probably, which consists mostly of the notes Hamahira took when he was heard by the prosecution as well as those his wife took. The “record of indictment” was more than a hundred pages long if some other related material is added. According to it, in *Shukan Bunshun* (“Igai na shinso,” 1998), Hamahira was asked to cooperate with the prosecution, that is, he was asked to admit that Arai demanded profits. His lawyer also advised Hamahira to do so. The then president of Nikko Securities, Masashi Kaneko, told Hamahira, “I do not ask you to tell [the prosecution] that white [innocence] is black [guilt], but I ask you to tell that gray is black” (“Igai na shinso,” 1998, p. 33). Hamahira seems to have been forced into a corner. His wife describes him of that day: “His mental condition is crazy” (“Igai na shinso,” 1998).

Isolated, or isolating

It could be due to his personality that Arai was isolated in the organizations to which he belonged. He became more isolated, enough to give up, after the detection of the scandal. In Japan, according to Nakane (1967), it is difficult for people to become a member of the group to which they belong if they do not have a personality similar to that of other members of the group even if they are in sympathy with the group’s principles and ideology. No doubt Arai had it within him to be isolated from those around him as he was *warugaki* (bad boy) not only in the Ministry of Finance

but also in the LDP. Upon recognition that his “off-the-wall” behavior came from himself, never from his ethnicity, Kurimoto (1998) says Arai could overcome opposition with the firm attitude of a graduate of the University of Tokyo and a former government official of the Ministry of Finance. However, Kurimoto (1998) also notes Arai sometimes made enemies that way. Imai (1998) agrees that Arai’s aggressive character made enemies he should not have made. In addition, Kurimoto (1998) points out that Arai might have lived thinking what he really thought was not understood by those around him due to his character. In addition to being “off-the-wall” Arai came to be looked upon more and more coldly in his latter days by those around him because he was suspected of committing a crime. Chi (1998) says Arai’s isolation stemmed from his own lifestyle and political behavior.

Additionally, Arai’s secession from the LDP might have promoted his isolation. In Japan, according to Nakane (1967; 1978), people usually belong to one group only. What is more, it is fatal for them to leave it (Nakane, 1967). It is, too, the strictest of sanctions for the Japanese, even for the adults, to be left out (Nakane, 1978).

Above all, however, there might be enough room for thinking that the external factors with which the LDP, the prosecution, and such were concerned might have brought Arai more and more isolation as well. Actually, Park (1999) says it can be taken that the arrest of Arai was decided in a political deal among the LDP, the

prosecution, and Nikko Securities. As aforementioned, many of politicians raise funds through stock trading. So it might be guessed the executives of the LDP were afraid the influential Diet members of the party could be suspected as was Arai. Also, the prosecution might have wanted to settle the series of scandals with which it was coping by any means. Nikko Securities might not have wanted to be charged with malfeasance. In order to settle the waters, the LDP might have wanted to put away the nuisance Arai who could not fail in being an obstacle to the discussion on a budget bill being carried out at that time, and the prosecution might have wanted to catch a Diet member who raised his/her political funds by stock dealing. Ito (2000) takes such intentions of the two organizations as finally ridding themselves of certain “politicians” because “government officials, people of big business and *sokaiya*” were as good as settled by an arrest. Nikko Securities might have wanted to put the blame on a politician to divert accusations of wrongdoing from itself or for financial reasons. Consequently, the politician whom the three organizations automatically had in common in order to meet these expectations was Arai, though the disaffected LDP must already have had him in mind. Park (1999) thinks Arai was a “suitable sacrifice” (p. 198). Arai must have been driven to bay little by little by the mutual effects of his own personality and the might-have-been deal behind the scenes among the aforementioned three.

It must have been painful to Arai that Hamahira changed his course to an admission that Arai demanded profits. They had been on good terms, as aforementioned. Arai was let down by the LDP and even Nikko Securities. In the wording of Nishibe (1998), Arai “was placed in the prosecution organization alone” (p. 114).

Finally, it might have promoted Arai’s isolation that he was a former *zainichi* Korean. This is severe, a serious accusation. But it is true some negative feelings toward *zainichi* Koreans lurk(ed) in the Japanese mindset, especially within the Japanese who lived in a period when Japan still discriminated against them in a body and openly. Arai, perhaps for that reason, tried becoming “more Japanese than the Japanese.”

To become more Japanese than the Japanese

Arai wrote three books (three books much quoted in this paper). In addition, he often appeared on TV, granted interviews to magazines and such, and wrote articles for magazines. He was a politician who exposed himself in the media much more than other politicians. A point in common in what Arai gave to the media, as Park tells Kang (1998), is that he did not talk about his own hometown and the like. In the wording of Nakagawa (1998), in more detail, he does not mention his boyhood very often. That is, there is a blank in his stories that covers while he was a *zainichi*

Korean until he was naturalized.

As mentioned, Arai was from Osaka. In his childhood, according to a *zainichi* Korean who lived behind the house of the Arai family, the Arai family tended to avoid socializing with other *zainichi* Koreans (Nakagawa, 1998). Probably because of this, Arai seems to have been strongly conscious of himself as Japanese from his childhood. According to Teruhisa Yamazaki, who was one of Arai's classmates from elementary school to high school, for example, Arai grew angry with a ferocious expression on his face saying, "I am a Japanese," when Yamazaki happened to learn Arai was a *zainichi* Korean and asked him to make sure (Nakagawa, 1998). According to a relative, Arai came to even avoid associating with his relatives (Kang, 1998). Chi (1998) describes his way of breaking off relationships with *zainichi* Koreans as such: "[Arai] turned his back on the *zainichi* Koreans" (p. 51). To be exact, that might have meant Arai chose to live as a Japanese. Mariko (Arai, 1998), who was closest to Arai, said after his death, "[Arai] really tried becoming a Japanese and had the Japanese mind" (p. 32), and "[Arai] was a human being who had a Japanese soul more than the Japanese" (p. 32).

Arai lived more Japanese than the Japanese once he cut his connections with his relatives after he was naturalized (Imai, 1998). This expression "more Japanese than the Japanese" was often used not only by Mariko (Arai, 1998) and Imai (1998) but

also by Chi (1998), Nakagawa (1998), and Oshima (1998) to describe Arai. Even when Arai first ran for the Diet, he did not tell Michio Watanabe of his origins. By the aforementioned black sticker case, Arai's origins were made public and he failed to be elected the next year. According to Kang (1998), Arai shed "tears and tears" (p. 114). Watanabe only came to know Arai's background through the black sticker case. According to one of the former secretaries to Watanabe, Arai told Watanabe, crying, "I could not tell you the truth until now" (Nakagawa, 1998, p. 115), when he came to Watanabe in order to report the results of the election in which he was defeated. Perhaps such a bitter experience strengthened further Arai's will to become more Japanese than the Japanese. According to a like-minded Diet member, Arai "mastered the theory of the Japanese more than us in his mind" (Suzuki, 1998, p. 140).

Even after Arai was first elected as a Diet member, according to a *zainichi* Korean, he refused all requests for participation in events and lectures from *Mindan* (the Korean Residents Union in Japan) (Nakagawa, 1998). In addition, Arai did not take part in even informal gatherings for discussion held by those naturalized among the *zainichi* Koreans (Nakagawa, 1998). On the basis of what a *zainichi* Korean businessperson said, Kang (1998) gives an episode that directly illustrates how Arai got to dislike himself being connected with South Korea as he was elected again and

again: Arai got angry, “[They are] South Koreans!” and cancelled some scheduled lectures and such, when he was in the New Frontier Party, around 1995, when he came to Sapporo, Hokkaido, in order to support a candidate and saw some of the people who came to meet him wearing badges with a motif of the South Korean flag (pp. 115-116). Chi (1998) praises Arai as a “symbol of Korean Dream for the *zainichi* Koreans.” The fact is, however, not a few *zainichi* Koreans saw Arai in another way. Some of them said it was a kind of betrayal that Arai became a Diet member and many who maintained their original citizenship harbored ill feelings toward him (Kurimoto, 1998).

What was the Japanese reaction to Arai? Probably, the black sticker case was the first chance for the Japanese to show their attitude toward Arai in a body. With the black sticker case rendering it undeniable, Arai made it public for the first time he was a former *zainichi* Korean. Sasaki (1983) says it depends on the degree to which the voters are “matured” (p. 162) how Arai’s origin influenced his elections: That is, he must have meant it depends on whether the Japanese were open-minded enough to accept his origins. In that first election Arai was defeated. Perhaps because of the results, Arai decided to challenge the next election without hiding his origins. According to “*Kika daigishi no shinwa*” (the Myths of a Naturalized Diet Member) (as cited in Park, 1999), Arai declared he was a former *zainichi* Korean and appealed

to the public for the realization of an open society in which people with the same origins as Arai would be given a chance to do what they wanted like the Japanese in his speeches in front of the station that lasted five to six hours every day. Consequently, Arai was elected. Arai then appealed to the public for internationalization and often appeared in the mass media. Especially, some remarks Arai made such as, “[I] want to establish a new relationship between Japan and South Korea” (as cited in Park, 1999, p. 187), and “I was not elected as a representative of *zainichi* South Koreans, but there might be things that only I can say to South Korea. [I] would like to be that kind of pipeline [between Japan and South Korea]” (as cited in Park, 1999, pp. 189-190), should be noted. As mentioned, Arai cut relationships with *zainichi* Korean communities and his relatives. Nevertheless, he gave himself up to playing the role of bridge to South Korea, which was his ancestral homeland. Arai might have been somewhat shrewd with this. In the first place, as Kang (1998) points out, it might have been his strategy to win his second election by going on the offensive and saying out front he was a former *zainichi* Korean. According to Park (1999), in addition, Arai vigorously granted interviews in order to put his unique position to the public when he was in the limelight of the mass media just after being first elected. Therefore, it might also have been his strategy to promote himself, taking it upon himself to play the role of pipeline between Japan and South Korea at

the time. According to Kang (1998), in fact, Arai attracted a great deal of exceptional public attention for someone who was thirty-eight years old and fresh in the Diet.

However, the “role of a pipeline between South Korea and Japan” had a negative impact on Arai. According to Park (1999), ethnic discrimination against Arai escalated and he came under intense pressure not only from the right-wing power in the LDP and part of the mass media but also from Diet members who did not like Arai’s origins. In fact, ethnic discrimination against Arai had already started, since his origins only came to light due to the black sticker case. According to Furutachi (1998), a threatening letter having a phrase like, “A spy from the Federation for Victory over Communism” (p. 59), was sent to Arai’s office and his posters were smeared with the graffiti, “There is no right for the Koreans to come forward as a candidate in Japan” (p. 59). Even for the Arai family, the false rumor, “A Korean spy,” started to circulate (Park, 1999). As mentioned, copies of the Arai family register, in which the origins of the Arai family are recorded, were anonymously sent to some leading figures in Arai’s electoral district. In addition, the Diet member who employed the secretary who put the black stickers on Arai’s posters pointed out in a magazine that it is difficult for people with origins like Arai’s to take an active part in the diplomatic stage because such people cannot avoid choosing national interests if

some problem arises between South Korea and Japan.

It must also have been a strain on Arai that he received ethnically discriminatory jeers directly from voters. According to Kang (1998), it was not a few times that Arai was jeered, “Korean, get back to your country!” (p. 115). It has already been mentioned it is a custom for LDP Diet members/candidates to appear in all ceremonies held in their electoral zones and out of the question for them to arrive without anything in hand. Kurimoto (1998) presents a related episode: Although Arai carried out a “reform” not to pay contribution fees for year-end/new-year parties in his electoral zone as a politician, some of the parties in the zone hissed, “Go back, Korean,” when Arai or his secretaries arrived without paying the fee (p. 227).

The disclosure of his origins and his appeal for internationalization caused Arai trouble in the end. He was caught in a dilemma: internationalization by being a bridge between South Korea and Japan or Japan only. Consequently, what arose in him was, in the wording of Park (1999), “an attitude, which ‘takes the traditional nation and history as important’, that is utterly different from ‘the internationalization of Japan’” (p. 192). For an ultimate attitude, as mentioned, he finally came to change to a patriot firmly determined to give his life to Japan. Then he started to utter the word “death” in excess.

Pressure from Japanese society to oust Arai

No politicians utter the word “death” in Japan. Rather, Arai was the only one not only in the past but also in the present to have spoken of it. The reason Arai came to utter “death” was, as just mentioned, Japanese careless behavioral/verbal attacks on him based origins Arai had become accustomed to avoid mentioning. The black sticker case made his origins public, the case of the copies of the Arai family register furthered it, as did the threatening letter, the “Korean spy” attack on the Arai family, the discriminatory jeers from voters, the suggestions of a problem regarding national interests by the then Diet member, and so on. There were then not a few factors trying not to accept Arai in Japan.

Arai experienced a time when he was voiceless. It was in 1962, when he was first required to be fingerprinted and had black ink applied to the forefinger of his left hand in order to register himself as a foreigner. He expresses his state of mind at that time in the magazine, *Esquire*, published in 1987 (as cited in Park, 1999): “I am a Japanese even how I think, but I am pulled down because I have a different nationality. Such a thing fell on a small child like a storm” (p. 174). In addition, he seems to have been accepted not only at the University of Tokyo but also in the medical department of Keio University. The profession of doctor was the one anyone can gain beyond nationality even in those days. According to Kang (1998), however,

one of Arai's classmates in high school, Tomoko Kishida, says Arai's mother sighed again and again at Arai's choice not to go into the medical department even though Arai now had Japanese nationality by being naturalized. "Why don't you go [to Keio University]?" (p. 113), she is reported to have said. According to *Shukan Bunshun* published in 1986 (as cited in Park, 1999), Arai's parents were also opposed to Arai's candidacy: "If you run for the Diet, you will certainly come under intense pressure from the public because we used to have South Korean nationality" (p. 182).

Japanese society had taken Arai's voice at one time. In addition Japanese society caused Arai's parents to worry excessively about the future of their son due to their origins even though Arai had Japanese nationality. Arai erased his past as a *zainichi* Korean and tried gaining entrance into Japanese society though his origins were known to the Japanese. However, Japanese society pressured Arai to choose either Japan or South Korea while it continued to refuse him perhaps because he was a former *zainichi* Korean, or due to his personality. Then Arai selected Japan in order to be accepted by the Japanese society, and consequently became more Japanese than the Japanese and grew resolved to give even his life to Japan. Once his scandal was exposed, Japanese society followed its original course to have Arai removed, this time by arrest. The LDP to which Arai belonged merely asked him to leave the party. The prosecution presented a record, already completed and only requiring Arai's

signature, and had no ear to hear Arai. The secret session, held the day before Arai's death, refused to receive the copies Arai had prepared in his defense. And even Nikko Securities shifted blame onto Arai's shoulders.

Too high a wall to gain sympathy from Japanese society

Arai's scandal came to an end when it was decided in court Arai did demand profits. It is true Arai had dabbled in stocks not only using the suspect account but also some other accounts in securities companies other than Nikko Securities in the past. What should be required here is to wonder why Arai needed to raise funds in this way. The biggest reason is the election conducted in the way of the LDP. The reason Arai chose stock trading for it could, at the very least, be that there was already a system in place in which politicians raised funds by buying/selling stocks in Japanese society though, as Ito (2001) says, it could also be based on Arai's personality: "[Arai] could do [stock trading] at his own discretion without lowering his head" (p. 152). As aforementioned, it is an open secret in the world of securities that politicians raise their political funds by receiving discretionary account service. Perhaps because Arai thought it was due to ethnic discrimination that only he was suspected, he made his origins, which had been sealed once he was troubled by the dilemma on national interests, clear again in a public place, the Diet. He, at last, made a clean breast in the aforementioned secret session: "Why me only?" In fact, a

former secretary to Arai, Seiko Ishihara, reveals it is true Arai thought himself the butt of an attack in his scandal due to ethnic discrimination (Kang, 1998). It was witnessed that Arai drew close to the then Chairperson of the Executive Council of the LDP, Yoshiro Mori, and the then Secretary General of the LDP, Koichi Kato, and complained of ethnic discrimination (Kang, 1998).

In his second book (Arai, 1993), Arai actually discusses political ethics, the politician's way of fulfilling his/her responsibility to be exact. He concludes that it depends on the mutual understanding of "personality" between the doer, or the politician, and the receiver, or the people. For example, Arai gives that the people requested Noboru Takeshita to resign as Diet member. Arai thinks it happened because the people did not feel sympathy for Takeshita's "personality" and they denied his right to existence as a politician. In this way, it could be taken that the people would not deny this existence if they felt sympathy for Takeshita's "personality."

However, Arai came to Takeshita's standpoint in his own scandal. The time when the people would judge the "personality" of Arai and decide whether he could stay on as a politician came at last. As mentioned, Arai called two press conferences and in the second one the day before his suicide he went so far as to play the tape on which the conversation with the then managing director of the company, Hiroyuki

Hamahira, and the then vice-president, Yumio Hiraishi, was recorded as well as to use copies of the notes taken by the then managing director of Nikko Securities, Hiroyuki Hamahira, to insist he was not guilty. In addition, Arai must not have used ambiguous expressions as much as would an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee. Sasaki (1998) sees Arai consumed with such uncommon energy for explaining presumably because he asked for the mutual understanding of “personality” between himself and the people. Seemingly because Arai wanted to feel sympathy from the people as much as possible or upon realization of the limitations of his power to confront pressure from the LDP and the prosecution, while he focused his efforts on such explanations, he seems to have asked for help from somewhere but Japanese society and came back to the *zainichi* society he had avoided since he was granted Japanese nationality.

One of the “Others,” after all

According to one of Arai’s relatives, Arai appeared at a wedding reception for his relative on February 15th, 1998, without notice and explained again and again that he had not demanded profits (Kang, 1998). The relative also says Arai emphasized it was clearly based on ethnic discrimination that he had been denounced and said, as if obsessed with something, that he intended to urge not only *Mindan* (the Korean Residents Union in Japan), but also *Soren* (the General Association of Korean

Residents in Japan) to raise themselves to action (Kang, 1998). According to Kang (1998), the relative was shocked that Arai had been forced into a corner enough not to be able to avoid asking for help even from *Soren*, which has been on the side of *zainichi* Koreans with North Korean nationality. The day before he committed suicide, according to Kang (1998) again, Arai left a message for the chairperson of the headquarters of the South Korean Ladies Society in Japan, Kim Jung-Ja, on her answering machine, "I did not demand profits at all" (p. 109), and he hung up just after saying, "The press conference in the evening today will be my last explanation" (p. 109).

It is doubtful Arai was accepted in the *zainichi* society. What is too obvious, on the other hand, is that Japanese society tried removing Arai after his scandal was detected, as Chi (1998) says, "The Diet member Arai was not accepted from the Japanese society after all" (p. 50). Arai loved Japan more than others and had even been firmly determined to give his life to the country. That must have been the result of Arai's choice between South Korea and Japan forced on him by Japanese society, as aforementioned. According to Higashimatsu (1998), nevertheless, Arai himself also expressed in the press conference the day before his death, "[Japanese society] tries crossing me out in a body" (p. 84). From Arai's mouth, that is, the fact was revealed that what urged him to resign was not only the LDP and the prosecution

but Japanese society itself. With that remark, the credibility of the external factors for Arai's isolation, explored before, might be increased. The day before he committed suicide, furthermore, Arai called one of his old friends and asked, "Are you still in Japan? Think of not only being attached to such a country but also being active in a much bigger one" (as cited in Park, 1999, p. 200), and Mariko intuitively with the remark that Arai tried to give up his attachment to Japan. And after Arai's death, Park (1999) takes not only the Japanese society, which is not so very open-minded to people of different origins and prepared such a "way of coming to an end in life" (p. 201) for Arai, but also the political system in Japan as problems. Kang (1998) goes so far as to say he thinks Japanese society killed Arai and describes it as one "not open-minded to the existence of diverse ethnic identities" (p. 117). Although Arai threw away his homeland, sought Japanese nationality, was resolved to his life to Japan, and loved Japan very much in order to be accepted in Japanese society, he, as Chi (1998) mentions, stayed an "outsider" after all. In other words, he could not go beyond one of the "Others" in spite of everything. He was always a *zainichi* Korean.

Death: As Japanese or *zainichi*?

Mariko (Arai, 1998) says she thought Arai carried out what he planned when she saw the scene of death and insists he positively chose death, and did not die because he was driven into a corner. However, there is a theory that Arai committed suicide

because he was driven to bay by Japanese society: For example, Chi (1998) says the feeling of despair with which Arai was hit by not being accepted in Japanese society drove him to suicide. Additionally, there is a more detailed theory that Arai committed suicide because he was afraid he would lose his political life through pressure from the prosecution. Chi (1998) says Arai would have lost his job as a Diet member and his political life would have come to an end if he were found guilty, while Nakagawa (1998) says Arai was really about to be arrested and his political life was as good as ended at that point in time. Either way, it was persistently a main guess in the mass media that Arai committed suicide because he was driven into a corner.

On the other hand, there was a view that a crisis related to his identity drove Arai to suicide. Kang (1998) says a feeling of fear he would become nothing but a *zainichi* Korean if he took off his Diet member's pin drove Arai to suicide. According to Kang (1998), "Arai had overcome his identity crisis by single-mindedly aiming at the center of power in Japan and also by acquiring the Japanese spiritual world" (p. 116). In addition, Yu (1998) says Arai had supported himself with the self who was a Diet member. That is, being a Diet member might have been a way for Arai to stay Japanese. As Taku Yamamoto says, ultimately Arai's political life was life itself for him (Suzuki, 1998).

As a politician, Arai took his own words as very important, and he had said again and again he was firmly determined to die for the nation. Arai gave a definition of the last words as a politician, or the words the politician says before s/he gives his/her life to the nation, as those that urge the people to also give their lives to the nation and that these should be uttered only when a nation is facing a critical situation. Although Arai defined it as such, what he spoke in the press conference to prove his innocence the day before he committed suicide was ironically “the last words” of him as a politician and the phrase he most frequently uttered there was also “the last words.” According to Ito (2001), Arai began the press conference with, “[What I am going to speak] is the last words done at the risk of my political life, so I would like you to receive them open-mindedly as much as possible” (p. 148). In the middle of the press conference, in addition, he said, “I did not demand [profits]. I say this as the last words” (“Taiho kyodaku,” 1998, p. 36), and “This is the last words done at the risk of my political life” (“Konnichi no shomondai,” 1998, p. 2). Even in the secret session held just before the press conference, in fact, Arai used “the last words” like so: “I would like you to receive [what I say] as the last words” (“Arai Shokei daigishi,” 1998, p. 31). “The last words” as Arai used the phrase can be taken as “the last words” as a Diet member certainly, but as mentioned before, Arai would not have stayed “himself” if he lost that job. Furthermore, he insisted upon criticizing

Noboru Takeshita—that showing the way of living and dying is one way for the politician to regain the trust of the people. That is, it can be taken that Arai had already decided to adopt the way (of living and dying) at this point in time and was firmly resolved to commit suicide. Consequently, what Arai said in the press conference to prove his innocence became “the last words” from him. As Oshima (1998) says, therefore, Arai’s “reason to die” was never made obvious. Probably because of this, there appeared two ways of taking Arai’s death because of Arai’s origins: It was as a Japanese or as a *zainichi* Korean.

It is said that Arai left a Japanese sword under the bed in the hotel room in which he committed suicide. The sword was the one Arai received from Shusuke Nomura, who consoled Arai saying, “Do not forgive the discriminatory structure” (Ito, 2001, p. 152) and “[The black sticker case] is an act to be ashamed of as the Japanese” (Kang, 1998, p. 115), when the black sticker case occurred. He later committed suicide with a pistol at the Asahi Shimbun Head Office in Tokyo. Since the black sticker case, Arai and Nomura seem to have been on friendly terms with each other. A representative of Nomura’s office says Arai deeply admired the ideology and personality of Nomura (Kang, 1998). Presumably because of this, Suzuki (1998) reveals, Arai had hung a picture of Nomura on the wall of his office. After Nomura’s death, nevertheless, Arai told his friends he did not make an

appearance at Nomura's funeral and went into mourning for Nomura alone (Kurimoto, 1998). According to Ito (2001), instead, Arai showed his understanding: "That type of death is good, too" (p. 152). According to an acquaintance of Arai, in addition, Arai said, "It was the creditable last moment of him" ("Kamei Shizuka daigishi," 1998, p. 51). In his third book (Arai, 1994), Arai actually praises Nomura for his strong pride and belief: "[His suicide] showed that he risked his life for the identity of Japan" (p. 87). Arai had already devoted himself to the novelist Yukio Mishima and liked to read one of his works, "*Hagakure nyumon*," in which the aesthetics of death in the code of the samurai are explained. Mishima also performed *hara-kiri* with a sword he brought, committing suicide before being beheaded at the Ichigaya garrison. Chi (1998) guesses the fact that Arai devoted himself unto Mishima and brought a sword to the room indicates Arai might also have thought of performing *hara-kiri* as one of the ways of committing suicide.

In fact, the book, "*Nihonjin no shisei kan*" (the Japanese View of Life and Death) by Toru Sagara, was on the desk in Arai's study in his house. According to LDP Diet member Seiichi Eto who made a call to express his condolences, many parts of the book were underlined, several corners of pages were folded down, and he thought Arai must have read it very deeply ("Kamei Shizuka daigishi," 1998).

It seems true that, too, before his suicide, Arai asked for help from the *zainichi*

society Arai had avoided until then. For that reason, one of the former secretaries to Arai Seiko Ishihara says Arai died as a *zainichi* Korean (Kang, 1998). Before he asked for help from the *zainichi* society, Arai stubbornly tried becoming Japanese. According to *Shukan Asahi* ("Taiho kyodaku," 1998), however, Arai answered, "I am a second-generation *zainichi* Korean and had grown being bullied by those around me since I was a child, so I unintentionally take a stance and a defiant attitude when I am told something" (p. 33), when Arai's acquaintance, who was familiar with Securities and Exchange Law and gave him advice after the detection of his scandal, pointing out the looking-down-on-others attitude of his first related press conference. With the detection of his scandal, therefore, Arai's attachment to Japan might have wavered a little. However, it is true that Arai brought a sword into the hotel room, as mentioned. In addition, there is a great possibility Arai very carefully read the aforementioned book on the Japanese view of life and death before he committed suicide. From his such behaviors, Arai's intention to die as a Japanese can be taken. That is, it is also possible to take that Arai tried carrying out being Japanese until the end like this. Hence, it is not only appropriate but also proper to take that Arai's death was the death of a Japanese and not a *zainichi* Korean. In fact, Taku Yamamoto says, "[Arai] died as a Japanese more Japanese than the Japanese" (Suzuki, 1998, p. 140). Furthermore, Shizuka Kamei calls Arai's death a "death of *mononofu*

(samurai)” (“Meiyu Kamei Shizuka,” 1998).

A person who had hometown in the future

Ito (2000; 2001) often compares Arai’s way of living to that of Masayoshi Son. Son is president of the company, Softbank, qualified to act as representative of Japanese venture companies. Softbank continues to the present after it attained rapid growth since offering stocks publicly. The stage for Arai was the political world while the stage for Son is the business world. These are true opposites. However, both were former *zainichi* Koreans and established their own paths from scratch. Arai started to run for the Diet without a support group, name value, or money while Son set up a business by himself. There is an important difference between the two. That is, as Ito (2000) points out, Arai “tried getting up from the bottom rung inside of order” (p. 37) while Son “shook the existing order from the outside” (p. 37). That is, Arai was in the Japanese system while Son was out of the Japanese system. Both tried breaking the order within the system. As Ito (2000) says, consequently, “The wall of Mr. Arai was all the thicker” (p. 37) because he was within the system. Arai was overawed by his own scandal and could not break the wall after all.

It is aforementioned that a South Korean boom called *hanryu* has occurred in Japan, the dissolution of the old structure within the LDP started once the Koizumi administration was formed and some companies of the former members of the B&B

Club came to offer public stock. That is, it can be said that the Japanese society of today is almost 180 degrees different from that wherein Arai lived. That should mean the Japanese system is about to collapse. Furthermore, it is hard to think that each change resulting in the collapse of the existing Japanese system would have had a negative influence on Arai if he had lived. Rather, Arai would have welcomed the changes in the political/business world in particular. In the area of politics, the part Arai pointed out as needing reform has taken drastic measures to do just that. According to Tsugio Amai, the aforementioned former member of the B&B Club, in fact, Arai told him, "Both politics and the economy need to be reformed soon. I will do it with politics. You change the business world" (Ito, 2001, p. 157). Ito (2001) points out that Arai read the future regarding the point at which to recognize business society from now on and also says Arai was the person who could fill the cracks between the economy and politics in Japan. According to Ito (2000) again, a person concerned in politics says, "[Arai] was the person who could unfailingly be a leader" (p. 37) if the political system collapsed like now.

Zainichi Koreans seem to have often been discriminated against not only by the Japanese but also by Koreans who called *zainichi* Koreans *pan-choppari*. Probably for that reason, or perhaps because Arai avoided the *zainichi* Koreans, Ishikawa (1998) presumes Arai did not have a hometown either in Japan or South Korea or in

the *zainichi* communities. That is, Arai had no hometown anywhere. Instead, Ishikawa (1998) says Arai had his hometown in the future and he needed to realize it himself. Arai appealed for reforms not only in the political world but also in the business world, so he must also have drawn a composition of his hometown very clearly and was in the middle of building it. Arai could have seen the day of the accomplishment of his hometown if he had shaken the Japanese system from the outside as did Son. Arai's death was greatly regrettable because there must now be the hometown Arai wished somewhere in current Japanese society. Although Japanese society forced Arai to construct his own hometown, it stripped him of the day to see. It must be noted Japanese society is filled with contradiction.

CHAPTER 10

SAMPLES AND METHOD

Application of Cultural Studies to Arai's case

Before the introduction of samples and method for this paper, it will be confirmed how the theory of Cultural Studies, which was reviewed in the first chapter, can be applied to Arai's case, a main subject of this paper, and aid accomplishment of its purpose.

The purpose of this paper, as stated, is to look for a change in representation of *zainichi* Koreans in *Yomiuri* after the end of World War II and to the present day. In order to accomplish this, whether Arai was represented in it as a former *zainichi* Korean or as a politician after news broke of his scandal will need to be determined. Until now, most of the details on Arai, from his background, personality, career and activities as a politician to the detection of his case and his death have been revealed. In addition, it might be noticed that the LDP started to appear with Arai in the media after he became a politician, and other socially influential/powerful organizations such as the prosecution started to appear after detection of the scandal. The two organizations, the LDP and the prosecution, are already explained in this paper in detail, even given a section each. Furthermore, it has been guessed that Arai's

scandal was detected as a result of his being dragged into the whirlpool of the power relationship among those two organizations and a third, Nikko Securities. It is presumed Arai reached the point of taking his life because of pressure from Japanese society, strengthened after detection of his scandal, though it is not clear whether he, as he had foreshadowed, gave his life for the nation.

Here, one concept comes to mind with the theory of Cultural Studies: If a change occurs in the power relationship among socially influential/powerful organizations, a change is produced also in Japanese society along the same vector. If applied to Arai's scandal, it can be said Japanese society started to make Arai the victim of an attack as a body, once he was suspected, as a result of the change in the power relationship among the aforementioned three organizations. In the compositional arrangement, only two, those organizations and Japanese society, are given on the surface, but in fact a crucial "wirepuller" in that arrangement was the mass media, which is also fully explored in this paper. It was the media that reported Arai was suspected due to his demand for profits. The other way around, it was also the media by which the Japanese public got to know of the scandal.

The following description would prove that the theory of Cultural Studies can fully be applied to Arai's case. As seen, the LDP once maintained vast power for as many as thirty-eight years, but it collapsed under the weight of its own scandals in

1993. When Arai's case was uncovered, the prosecution already possessed enough power not only to control other powerful organizations but also to arrest politicians without delay. That means the prosecution had already come to be dominant through struggle around the time of the detection of Arai's case. Once the case was made public, however, the prosecution might not have needed to continue that struggle because, as guessed, there may have existed a common concern, to the exclusion of Arai, among the LDP, prosecution and Nikko Securities. Therefore, it could be decided the common concern turned into great power through multiplication one with another. Once Arai's scandal was detected, the mass media started to release money-related news stories such as those on the B&B Club and the actual conditions of Arai's past stock dealings one after another as if they were in line with the strong expectations of those three organizations. That is, such discourses in the media were articulated all at once on the basis of the vector of ideological power among those powerful groups. As a result, the media came to report Arai's arrest and appear to have fixed Arai as guilty the day before his death though Arai should still have been deemed only a suspect. Arai was labeled a criminal in Japanese society, and after his death it became reality through the mass media reporting news stories based on the testimony of all people but Arai in court that Arai had demanded profits.

The fact that Arai was a former *zainichi* Korean cannot be missed in these

stories, either. *Zainichi* Koreans, as mentioned before, have been discriminated against because of historic Japanese contempt for Korea. That can also be taken as a result of articulation in discourse, based on the Japanese government's inferior ideology for Korea, of the Japanese mass media being closely watched by government until Japan lost the war. Actually, the Japanese government gained much power, military power to be exact, from the time of discussion on whether Japan should annex Korea and carried it out. It could be taken that the merger of Korea with Japan was a victory of the Japanese government in that ideological struggle among powerful groups. After the annexation, the Japanese government tried positioning the Koreans as Us through assimilation by every possible means, military power above all. Nevertheless, the Koreans kept resisting on the basis of their otherness, avoid being Us even in the discourse of the Japanese media. Instead, then, they were placed as Them, or "Others" and the position continued to be fixed/naturalized. What is more, even their self-defense against Japanese military power was represented as the "wrong thing" since everything Japan did was justified in the press. Therefore, the Japanese came to have only negative feelings regarding Koreans. Postwar, the Japanese government attempted keeping *zainichi* Koreans in the position of "Others" as a dangerous element, though it changed the means to do so into "enclosure" via such requirements as fingerprinting and the Certificate of Alien

Registration. It has already been seen that there appeared a friendly change in the Us-Them relationship between Japan and South Korea after Arai's death, but as also aforementioned, discourse in the media is something into which all of the histories that have formed society are precipitated as well as a "reservoir of themes and premises on which...broadcasters could draw for the work of signifying new and troubling events" (Hall, 1982, p. 73). Consequently, every discourse on Arai's case was produced by being articulated directly/indirectly with all of the discourse produced before the case, which, of course, included the discourse based upon Japanese contempt for Korea. Therefore, it is not impossible that a politician, Arai, who happened to be a former *zainichi* Korean, was represented in a different way from that used to represent other politicians without the Arai's background after the detection of his case taking advantage of the treatment Arai as a criminal. That is why this paper aims at determining whether Arai was represented as a politician or as a former *zainichi* Korean in order to draw a conclusion. In other words, this paper is going to explore whether Arai was treated as one of Us or one of Them/the "Others" in Japan.

The national newspaper, *Yomiuri*, to provide sample articles

To provide samples, a national newspaper is selected. This is because, as seen so far, the Japanese have strong faith in the national newspaper and its circulation,

more than half of the whole, has marked it as the best in the world, as if the Japanese worship of the newspaper is reflected in it. The national newspaper is unquestionably king in the world of the Japanese media. There are no media as close to the government as the national newspaper. Unfortunately, it has also been confirmed that the national newspaper is a watchdog that seldom barks. From such newspapers, it is most reasonable to choose the *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Daily Yomiuri), which has maintained sales at the top of the Japanese newspaper industry since 1977 (Katsura, 1990), as provider of sample articles. *Yomiuri*'s circulation is recorded at 10,220,000 copies in 1999 (Sazuka, 2000) and needless to say that number is the greatest in the world (Maezawa, 2000a). The following section briefly summarizes what kind of newspaper publishing company is *Yomiuri*, which stands at the top in a newspaper nation.

A brief summary of *Yomiuri*

Matsutaro Shoriki, who founded professional baseball and commercial television broadcasting in Japan, and became a politician and was appointed a minister of state although he had been once arrested for a war crime because of his involvement in the media at that time, succeeded to the management of *Yomiuri*, a local paper only for Tokyo, in 1924. Mitsuo Mutai developed that local paper into a national paper in 1964 by winning a sales war under the Shoriki system, made its

circulation the best in Japan, and finally took office as president. The two figures are, in the wording of Ono (1981), the “two big leaders” in *Yomiuri*. According to Kaminogo (1984), regarding Mutai, there is an episode in which he even boasted, “[I] will even sell a (literally) white paper if it has the name of ‘*Yomiuri*’” (p. 11). This episode might show the extent to which *Yomiuri* took selling as primary under these two leaders. Of course the aforementioned methods, like giveaways and discounts, were employed to this end. In addition, the Yomiuri Giants, a professional baseball team indirectly owned by *Yomiuri*, seems to have been used to sell also, because, according to Kaminogo (1984), the circulation of *Yomiuri* changed according to the game records of the Yomiuri Giants. Probably for using such means to reach and stay at the top of the Japanese newspaper market, Westney (1996) calls *Yomiuri* “the master of the aggressive sell” (p. 65).

Tsuneo Watanabe, the aforementioned reporter of political affairs under the system of the aforementioned two leaders, took office as head of the editorial writers in 1979, held the post of editor-in-chief in addition in 1985, and perhaps because of the double posts “took the reins of the right of editing of the company both in name and reality” (Maezawa, 2000b, pp. 161-162), and became president and editor-in-chief in 1991. Strong warnings and objections against *Yomiuri*-style journalism, directly against Watanabe though, immediately were heard. That was

not because of *Yomiuri*'s selling-first principle. In short, it was due to the system in which Watanabe, with his close connection with the world of politics, held not only the right of managing but also the right of editing by staying on as editor-in-chief.

Watanabe's link to the world of politics was forged when he was, as just mentioned, a reporter of political affairs. Actually, Watanabe so established personal relationships in the world of politics that, according to Maezawa (2000b) who referred to one of the books by Watanabe to give the two following episodes: Watanabe had written (a) public statement(s) for the government and was asked who should become cabinet members every time a cabinet was formed. Once Watanabe became head of the editorial writers in 1979, in addition, politicians openly came by to say "hello" to Watanabe just before elections and formations of cabinets. Watanabe seems to have had a deeper connection with former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and actually was, as aforementioned, a member of his think-tank. Katsura (Uchihashi & Katsura, 1994) indicates that, during the time of the Nakasone administration between 1982 and 1987, *Yomiuri* became pro-Nakasone and totally supported his line of administration. The year Watanabe took on chief editorship was 1985, which was in the middle of the Nakasone administration. Therefore, the just-aforementioned indication by Katsura is very persuasive and adequate. In 1994, *Yomiuri* announced a proposal for a major revision of the constitution. That is, according to Asakawa

(1994), recognized as something brought about to realize Watanabe's own idea even within *Yomiuri*. Maezawa (2000b) sees *Yomiuri*'s support for the revision of the constitution as suggestive reporting, with strong agenda-setting elements, and points out that *Yomiuri* includes its own opinions in its reporting in order to lead public opinion forcibly. (In fact, according to Maezawa (2000b), Watanabe said for a bulletin of the Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, "*Yomiuri* is also developing suggestive reporting.") Maezawa (2000b; 2002) criticizes *Yomiuri*'s suggestive reporting as a "clear violation against journalism" and Asakawa (1994) warns about such guidance of public opinion. As seen, there is a worrying tendency that Watanabe not only enjoys a cozy relationship with the world of politics but also promotes suggestive reporting. Probably due to such an attitude, Uozumi (2003) calls Watanabe a "person of the world of politics" (p. 289) and Asakawa (1994), in an easier-to-understand way, calls him a "fixer in the world of politics" (p. 67). Watanabe's ultimate goal, according to Uozumi (2003), is to change *Yomiuri* into a "newspaper which is integrated with the nation" (pp. 428-429). (In this context, the nation seems to indicate the ruling organizations only). Maezawa (2000b) suggests a different-in-kind journalistic environment continues to exist in Japan as long as *Yomiuri* has Watanabe at its head.

Why *Yomiuri* for sample articles

Of course, one of the first reasons for choosing *Yomiuri* for samples is that *Yomiuri* is proud of its number-one circulation spot. It can also be one reason that the characteristic of *Yomiuri* as a company seems, as just seen, out of the ordinary due to having in place a manager/editor who controls the company alone. Besides, *Yomiuri*, as aforementioned, belongs to the side of conservatism based on the understanding of history among the five national newspapers and it should also be interesting to see how *Yomiuri*, a “newspaper which is integrated with the nation” (Uozumi, 2003, pp. 428-429) in the just-mentioned wording of Uozumi, reports news stories in which politicians are involved. As for Arai’s case, in addition, there is not only the problem of his and other (former) *zainichi* Koreans’ origins, which was once hard for the government to deal with, but also the problem his easy-to-target position in the world of politics around the time of the detection of his scandal. Actually, the LDP, which grasped power and had Arai as a member, advised Arai to leave the party. If *Yomiuri* were really a “newspaper which is integrated with the nation,” there might have existed the possibility that *Yomiuri* advised the LDP regarding Arai. And it was, as mentioned previously, *Yomiuri*, not *Asahi* or *Mainichi*, which made Arai’s case public. That might have been a clear signal of *Yomiuri*’s advice to the LDP. It works to allow us finally to determine whether Japanese society at that time wished

the people to see Arai as a politician or as a former *zainichi* Korean. The way in which *Yomiuri*'s support for the LDP was effected, if it is assumed that *Yomiuri* really teamed up with the LDP, will be interesting because, within the theory of Cultural Studies, the government, which has enough power to control whole the nation, has the strongest influence on the formation of Japanese society through the media. Using the view of "newspaper which is integrated with the nation" by Uozumi, it is proved that the choice of *Yomiuri* for sample articles is truly appropriate.

Local news pages to see the ideological struggle

In this paper, the morning editions of *Yomiuri* in Tokyo are basically used; the morning editions of *Yomiuri* in Osaka are used only for the analysis of the Komatsugawa case. Regarding the Recruit case, JDA case, Lucie case and Arai case, articles on each are obtained through a website called YomyClub provided by *Yomiuri*. As well, articles in the first and second local news pages, which "gather materials on how the people live every day, report the truth of it and offer readers material to think" (Fujimori & Nishiyama, 1997, p. 134), are analyzed. The articles written by reporters of political affairs would be more appropriate as samples for this paper in relation to the connection with power, but samples must include not only those on cases involving politicians but also those on cases involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans. Articles on cases involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans are not carried in the

political news pages unless they are politicians or figures in power, while those on cases involving politicians can also be carried in the local news pages. As Nishiyama (Fujimori & Nishiyama, 1997) says, local news pages “...offer readers material to think” (p. 134), so articles in the local news pages are written to be understood more easily. As mentioned before, furthermore, it is very rare that local news pages cite an information source for each article (Maezawa, 2000a). Therefore, there is a great possibility that the vocabulary is limited neither quantitatively nor semantically and meaning is “diversely produced” in the discourse of local news pages. Because of these two points and in order to provide fairer and more valid analysis, the local news pages of *Yomiuri* are chosen as subjects for analysis.

Sample cases

This paper aims to determine the change in representation of *zainichi* Koreans in newspapers from after the end of World War II to today. The Japanese newspapers are proud of their large circulation and distribution all over Japan, and once used that system to spread contempt for Korea throughout the country. In order to complete this paper, it must be concluded whether the aforementioned Arai scandal tended to be taken as one involving a *zainichi* Korean (a former *zainichi* Korean due to naturalization, to be exact) or a politician. Therefore, it is necessary to compare Arai’s case with cases involving *zainichi* Koreans and cases in which Japanese

politicians were involved after the end of the war. Regarding the ranges to be analyzed for each case, articles covering from the beginnings of cases to the arrests/prosecutions will be subjects of the analysis for each case in principle.

Cases involving *zainichi* Koreans

As for cases involving *zainichi* Koreans, the Komatsugawa case (1958), which Watanabe (2003) says made the actual situation of the Japanese perception of Koreans conspicuous and created a chance to fundamentally take it into account again even among Japanese intellectuals, and the Kim Hi-Lo case (1968), which Watanabe (2003) says called forth a greater echo among intellectuals than the Komatsugawa case, are used as samples. The two cases are the biggest involving *zainichi* Koreans in Japanese history. A recent case, the Lucie case (2000), which involves a former *zainichi* Korean after naturalization, also is used. The method of reporting this case is very different from that of the two earlier ones. Unlike the media at the time of the two earlier cases, television and newspaper media did not mention (as much) that the criminal in the Lucie case was a former *zainichi* Korean. However, magazines such as Time Asia (Wright, 2001) and the “outside press” in Japan, like *Shukan Bunshun* (“Obara Joji Ga Keisatsu De,” 2000; “Obara Joji Jitaku De,” 2000; Tomono, 2001a) and *Bungei Shunju* (Tomono, 2001b), clearly and often refer to his past as a *zainichi* Korean.

The Komatsugawa case

Outline: On the morning of August 21st, 1958, the body of a strangled woman, Yoshie Ota, was found on the roof of Komatsugawa High School in Edogawa Ward, Tokyo. After the murder, the criminal continued to be provocative by sending articles left by her, such as a comb and hand mirror, to her house, a police station and the newspaper publisher, *Yomiuri*, and also by calling them. On September 1st, ten days after the detection of the incident, a *zainichi* Korean, Lee Jin-Woo, the victim's classmate, was arrested as a suspect. It was discovered that he might also have murdered a twenty-three-year-old woman Setsuko Tanaka in April of the same year. He was just eighteen years old when arrested for the crimes, but was sentenced to death without the application of the Juveniles Act. Some intellectuals, as well as others, launched a movement to reduce the sentence, but he was found guilty, and in November 1962 was executed.

Range: Between August 22nd and September 7th, 1958

(It was known at the time of the arrest that this incident was committed by a *zainichi* Korean. Therefore, articles for about one week after the arrest will also be analyzed.)

The Kim Hi-Lo case

Outline: On February 20th, 1968, a *zainichi* Korean, Kim Hi-Lo, shot two gangsters at a club in Shimizu, Shizuoka, in a dispute over money and ran away. He ran into a Japanese-style hotel, the *Fujimi*, with a rifle and some dynamite and confined himself to the hotel with thirteen guests as hostages, six hostages finally, for five days. That is, Kim was arrested on February 24th. The true nature of the incident was a murder case, but Kim let members of the press into the front entrance and one room of the hotel and told them he was unhappy with discriminatory treatment. This incident brought up once again the problem of discrimination against *zainichi* Koreans. In 1975, Kim was sentenced to life imprisonment but was released on parole in 1999.

Range: Between February 21st and 25th, 1968

The Lucie case

Outline: Joji Obara, who had already been arrested on suspicion of the rape of women from overseas as well as Japan, was arrested again on April 6th, 2001, on suspicion of kidnapping a British woman, Lucie Blackman, aiming to commit an act of obscenity and taking her life while assaulting her with an anesthetic. He was seen to have taken Lucie to his room in a condominium in Izu, Kanagawa, and to have assaulted her after chloroforming her on July 1st, 2000. Consequently, it was taken that Lucie died of the toxicity of the chloroform. It is suspected Obara cut the dead body into pieces and buried it in a cave in Miura, Kanagawa. However, he denies this and maintains he is innocent.

Range: Between October 13th, 2000, and April 7th, 2001

(It was on October 13th, 2000, that an article which implies Lucie might have been killed by Obara was first carried in *Yomiuri*.)

Cases in which Japanese politicians are involved

As mentioned before, Arai's scandal arose from the case of four major Japanese securities companies' payoffs to a professional troublemaker at stockholders' meetings and was big enough to catch the rapt attention of the Japanese citizens when

it was made public. As for cases in which Japanese politicians are involved, therefore, it is necessary to select money-related corruption scandals that also were reported to such a degree as to garner much public interest so they can be seen to correspond to Arai's case. In addition, it is important to choose ones in which big-name politicians were not arrested, perhaps because of the power relations among organizations such as the LDP and the prosecution as well as within the LDP just as in Arai's case, in order to make the level of the cases equal to Arai's case so each can be fairly compared with the others. As one of the samples, consequently, "the postwar biggest structural/organizational corruption case" (Tamura, n.d.), the Recruit case (1988), in which "The great evils ran away after all" (Yamamoto, 1992, p. 47) and "Two kind-of-quiet-looking politicians were only prosecuted" ("Ri jiken," 1989, p. 30), would be appropriate. As another sample, the Japan Dental Association (JDA) case (2004), in which it was an already-retired and therefore former politician who was prosecuted while some big-name politicians including the one who directly received a donation of one hundred million yen were not, has been selected. In fact, the JDA case brought a discussion of "politics and money" into the Lower House Budget Committee again in spite of the execution of "structural reforms" of the LDP by Prime Minister Koizumi. In addition, the politician who directly received the donation was Prime Minister, or the boss of the LDP, when Arai was about to be

arrested.

The Recruit case

Outline: When a subsidiary of the Recruit Corporation, the Recruit Cosmos, was about to list stocks on the stock market in 1988, unlisted stocks, sure to rise in price, were distributed to politicians, government officials and others who were expected to be of help to the Recruit Corporation. It became clear that family members as well as secretaries of the politicians received the stocks and sold them just after the public offering and the sudden rise of the stock. In the political world, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami and former House of Representatives member Katsuya Ikeda were arrested and found guilty. In fact, other leading LDP members such as a former prime minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone, then Prime Minister Noboru Takesita, later Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and the aforementioned benefactor of Arai, Michio Watanabe, also received company stock.

Range: Between October 30th, 1988, and May 23rd, 1989

(In this scandal, the focus is placed on former Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami, who was one of the arrested from the political world. On October

30th, 1988, an article revealing that he received stocks first ran. On May 23rd, 1989, *Yomiuri* reported he was prosecuted for the crime of accepting a bribe in return for services promised.

The JDA case

Outline: This case was detected in July 2004 in the process of investigation of the bribery scandal in which Sadao Usuda, who was a chairperson for a most-powerful-patron-for-the-LDP political organization, the Japan Dental Association, was arrested. It is suspected that, just before the 2001 House of Councilors election, Usuda handed a check for one hundred million yen to a former prime minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, as political funding for the Hashimoto faction, the biggest in the LDP though it was no longer on the surface because of “structural reforms,” in front of two big name members of the faction, Hiromu Nonaka and Mikio Aoki, at a restaurant. However, the Hashimoto faction did not give a receipt to the JDA and neither the LDP nor the JDA even mentioned anything on the fund in their own political fund reports. In the end, a former treasurer, Toshiyuki Takigawa, and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka, who was not even at the restaurant, were arrested from the

side of the Hashimoto faction. It has been made clear from Takigawa's testimony in court so far that there were other receipts by the Hashimoto faction besides the one hundred-million-yen check which were not mentioned either in those political fund reports. Muraoka still pleads not guilty while Takigawa was found guilty.

Range: Between September 18th and 27th, 2004

(In this scandal, the focus is placed on former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka. It was reported by *Yomiuri* on September 18th that Muraoka was heard as a witness by the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office. On the 27th of the same month, *Yomiuri* reported he was prosecuted at home.)

The Arai case

As for the Arai case, a long-term range of articles about him is studied because he is the main character in this research. On October 9th, 1992, his name first appeared in *Yomiuri* as a young hopeful regarding the *Sagawa Kyubin* case, but on December 22nd, 1997, it appeared as a suspect for receiving payoffs. Even after his death, his name continued to appear because there were other suspects left in the case. In order to determine the range of analysis, the *Yomiuri* on September 21st, 1998,

which reports four suspects including a former vice-president of Nikko Securities were found guilty, will be the final issue to be examined. Finally, the articles between October 9th, 1992, and September 21st, 1998, will be studied. By examining the articles of this timeframe, the years in which Arai was treated as a young standard-bearer of the political world can be compared to other times in which he was treated as a criminal within his case only. Consequently, it can be more easily understood whether he was reported a former *zainichi* Korean or a politician in his scandal by contrasting his scandal with the other five cases. The range is divided into three, as follows.

Between the first appearance as a standard-bearer and the detection of his case:

Between October 9th, 1992, and December 21st, 1997

Between the detection of his case and his death: Between December 22nd, 1997, and February 19th, 1998

Between his death and the judgment day: Between February 20th and September 21st, 1998

Method: Critical Discourse Analysis

For study purposes, the principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will be

employed. As a method of analysis, what van Dijk, whom McKenna (2004) offers as one of the pioneers in the area of CDA, proposes will be consulted. In the first place, van Dijk (1993) takes the role of discourse in the media as “*the (re)production and challenge of dominance*” (p. 249). On this basis, he believes CDA “studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (van Dijk, 1998). To be more exact, CDA explores “what structures, strategies or other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a role in these modes of reproduction” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 250). Van Dijk feels dominance is attained by the most powerful group and assists norms and values based on the ideology of the group, which is produced/reproduced in discourse, to be socially shared. He assumes dominance may cause discrimination and the like. His theory has the same foundation as that of Cultural Studies.

Getting back to the subject of method, there are, in fact, no ready-to-use ways in CDA. Instead, van Dijk introduces several levels of analysis in his works. According to one, “Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis” (1995), each level is as follows: surface structures, syntax, lexicon, local/global semantics, schematic structures, rhetoric, pragmatics and dialogue interaction. In analyzing the aforementioned sample cases, much attention is paid to each level.

However, a concrete criterion for analysis is given to complete an explanation of the method for this paper. In order to accomplish the purpose of this paper, it is required it be made clear whether Arai was represented as a politician or as a former *zainichi* Korean after the detection of his scandal. For disclosure of such representation, it is unsurprising that it is most reasonable to look at every level of analysis for mention of Arai's ethnic background. To each of the other articles on the cases having (former) *zainichi* Koreans as principles, in addition, much attention must be paid to whether or not there is reference to their ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, the most conclusive factor will be whether ethnic background is referred to at each analysis level not only for analysis of the articles on the cases involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans, including Arai's, but also for final comparison with the articles on the cases in which politicians are involved.

In addition to the criterion of the ethnic background, it is important to determine where and how Arai as well as the subjects of each of the other cases are positioned in the aforementioned Us-Them relationship in order to accomplish the purpose of this paper. This is because, even if the ethnic background is not mentioned, each subject of the cases involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans can be placed as "Other." Actually, this matter can be applied to the cases in which politicians are involved. To detect/see whether and how each subject is represented negatively is necessary in

order to discover the distance between each subject and Us.

CHAPTER 11

ANALYSES TO DETERMINE CHANGE

IN REPRESENTATION OF *ZAINICHI* KOREANS

Cases involving *zainichi* Koreans

The Komatsugawa case

The article dated August 22nd reports that a “certain office person at high school M (20),” who had received some postcards from Yoshie Ota, surfaced as a suspect. The one dated the 29th of the same month details that the local news section of *Yomiuri* at Tokyo got calls from two men, who named themselves as the criminal [for this case], and describes their ways of talking as “at a young and brassy tone” and “in a way which can be taken as laughing at” respectively. The personality of the suspect Lee Jin-Woo was analyzed in the local news page on September 2nd; he was arrested the day before. *Yomiuri* spares little space for the analysis, and perhaps because of that, it can be taken at a glance that not only Lee but also all *zainichi* Koreans are greatly looked down upon in the article. In addition, the next article on him does not come out until the 5th of the same month after the one dated the 2nd. Therefore, the article on the 2nd is mainly explored in the following.

At the very start of the article, as the first line of the headline, appears “Lee is

this kind of man,” which might directly indicate by use of his last name that the criminal is not Japanese. Next to that line, there continue two lines of headline: One of the two is a bit larger than the other two lines and reads, “[Lee] seems to have no motive,” while the other reads, with informally emphasized, “[Lee] answers the investigation ‘informally’.” Lee’s personality can already be determined; it is fixed.

As foreshadowed by those headlines, of course, the content of the article on the 2nd explores what kind of person is Lee. Before that, however, the lead sentences are sensational enough not to be missed. In the first, Lee is introduced as “18-year-old Korean student for evening classes Lee Jin-Woo” though any information on him such as name was not to have been made public under the Juveniles Act. And here, the Us-Them relationship between the Japanese and the Koreans is already established by introducing him as a Korean. What is more, stressed is his being in a different position, by introducing him as a “student for evening classes,” not just “student.” On the other hand, there appears a later sentence in which Lee is described as a “young literary enthusiast whose usual attitude is even gentle and calm.” That, in a moment, produces a positive image. But just after it comes a totally opposite description of him within the same sentence: “[Lee] was such a two-faced person who made his friends and teachers think his arrest as impossible.” In this way, it can be concluded Lee is two-faced (so not as literary, gentle or calm as described). By

placing those two opposite phrases next to each other for ease of contrast, the crime in which Lee was suspected is given meaning and any positive aspects of Lee's personality are denied. As a finishing blow, the sentence just after the one including the two opposite phrases reads, "[Lee] should not have committed such an unprecedented crime if he were a Japanese and had grown up in an ordinary family." That is, he committed the crime because he is not Japanese and was not raised in an "ordinary" family.

The article content starts with Lee's manner toward the investigation. To describe it, the following phrases are used: "With calm composure, without being shy, and totally at a tone of an ordinary round-table talk," "[having] an atmosphere that is far from that of a general criminal who feels sorry for killing a person and sheds repentant tears," and "kind of posing as a hero." Especially with the "general criminal" of the second phrase, it is stressed that Lee is not "general." Also, Lee is depicted as regretting he could not make a perfect crime and he laughs slightly saying he did not have a motive. It is concluded that "[Lee] seems not to have a sense of good and evil." In contrast, Lee's anxiety about his mother is recorded, with his words, "Is it going to happen my family are sent home [to South Korea or North Korea] due to what I did?" Nevertheless, it is pointed out that his anxiety about his mother is also because of his "strange and contradicted personality" though it is his

only conscience. Furthermore, it is determined that Lee's "strange and contradicted personality" is a result of "the destiny of a poor 18-year-old Korean student for evening classes." In addition, a second result of Lee's destiny is introduced: "The determination to kill a person without motive." Again, it is indicated that his origin is the cause of his crime.

At the end of the article of the 2nd, it says under a small headline, "Thanks to the cooperation of *Yomiuri Shimbun*," that the Metropolitan Police Department visited "President Shoriki" and expressed its gratitude. (As aforementioned, the criminal called *Yomiuri* several times.) Not only is *Yomiuri*'s great achievement emphasized but also its solidarity with the Metropolitan Police Department. The position of Lee as criminal is made more and more clear.

Finally in the article on the 5th, the whole of a short story written by Lee, his entry in a short story competition held by *Yomiuri*, is carried with an explanation. With the biggest headline, "Short story Lee who killed the high school girl student wrote," it is stressed that it is a very singular short story. Smaller headlines read, "[Lee] writes his experience of killing a cook?," "Vivid description of the murder" and "The name of the title is also a 'bad guy'." With those three headlines, the rough content of the short story can, without reading on, be grasped. In addition, those headlines almost determine that Lee is the "hero" and connect him with the "bad

guy.” In the lead sentences, Lee is introduced again with, “18-year-old high school student for evening classes, Lee Jin-Woo,” and what is more, his Japanese name is also shown just after the phrase. Although the article warns that Lee is still being heard regarding the case in which Setsuko Tanaka was killed, it is stated that the investigation is being done after it has been “determined that it must be Lee’s doing.” In this way it becomes fact that it was Lee who killed Setsuko Tanaka before he killed Yoshie Ota. And by saying, “only the description of the murder has a vividly realistic power in spite of the naïve content [of the short story],” “that point” is ironically set a high value. That is why this short story was named “murder short story” before the evaluation. In the section of explanation by a person identified only with the initial E., it is observed that E. does not attempt to explain the content of the short story itself, but rather tries hard to support that the short story by Lee is about his experience of killing Setsuko Tanaka. E. analyzes beyond explanation of the short story that Lee “got drunk with the excitement resulted from his writing in which it is reproduced he killed Setsuko Tanaka and his gone-mad nerves made him choke Yoshie Ota on a sudden impulse.” In addition, E. even tries “explaining” Lee’s motive for killing Yoshie Ota after determining he killed Setsuko Tanaka though, as aforementioned, it was still being investigated at the time whether Lee also killed Setsuko Tanaka. E. finishes his/her explanation with the sentence, “I am wondering

if a young literary enthusiast Lee did an experiment in murder in order to write a short story.” Here again, Lee is intentionally represented as a two-faced person with a “young literary enthusiast Lee” and an “experiment in murder.” The distance between Lee’s two faces drawn by E. seem likely to implant that Lee possessed uncanny and cruel characteristics in the minds of the readers.

The Kim Hi-Lo case

The rough outline of reporting on this case from the occurrence on February 20th to the arrest on the 24th of the same month is as follows: It is reported on the 21st that Kim shot two people dead at a night club, began confinement of himself and twelve hostages (the actual number of hostages was thirteen) in a Japanese-style hotel, the *Fujimi*, and answered some questions posed by *Yomiuri* over the phone, and it is reported from the 22nd to the 24th that Kim and the police are waiting each other out at the hotel and determining what move he/they will make; it is reported on the 25th that Kim has been arrested. Therefore, the articles between the 22nd and 25th are those to be analyzed, but before that, it is necessary to touch on how Kim is named in the article of the 21st. Therein, Kim is, from beginning to end, called “Kondo,” one of his Japanese names, instead of “Kim.” In addition, he is given the title, “evil spirit with a rifle,” in a headline. There are no phrases/expressions that make clear his ethnic background in the local news pages of the 21st. However, the questions and

answers between Kim and *Yomiuri* show well how Kim has armed himself and is determined to fight the police.

As just mentioned, the articles between the 22nd and 24th depict the progress in which Kim and the police are waiting out and watching each other to decide what move he/they will make. But a fundamental diagram is already completed in the article of the 22nd. The following is an explanation of that diagram. The article on the 22nd basically shows the wait-and-see situation between Kim and the police. According to the story, the situation is maintained as a formation in which “160 police people” are “nailed [to the spot]” by Kim’s “running the whole gamut of violence” and “nothing-to-be-done-with... behaviors which take the police by surprise,” such as firing off his rifle and throwing down ignited dynamite. Furthermore, Kim’s behavior and speech are consistently described as “crazy,” and the implication is that his craziness is due to a stimulant drug because there is the headline, “Drug-injected Kim” in the center of the article. As the people who could not move at all because of Kim’s behavior and speech, in addition, not only the police but also his hostages, 250 residents who could not get out of Sumatakyo although they ran into “the interior,” and the press corps are given. That is, all of the people there or around there but Kim are listed. Some seem to have gone through motions described as accomplishing tasks for Kim and his intentions, as in “[Kim] sent Kazuyuki

Mochizuki [who was a landlord of the hotel] on an errand,” “[Kim] made the children [of the Mochizukis] receive a thousand-yen bill,” and “a camera person Kenichiro Kidokoro (25) was...taken into [the hotel by Kim].” Regarding the situation in which the camera person left the hotel, however, it is described in the active voice with the word “escape,” as in “[He] escaped...after watching for the slightest weakness in Kim.” As for the description of Kim’s hostages, the phrases used are, “It is said that [the hostages] are trembling deeply with quilts over their heads” and “[The people around the hotel] cannot go put out [the old lumber fired by Kim] and just look on the flame from hiding being flustered.” Such phrases make it clear they cannot move at all. As for the hostages, what is more, there is a part of the article in which they are described, very briefly, “in a state of lethargy with tiredness and fear.” In addition, there is one that makes it possible to take that the children of the Mochizukis are also “in a state of lethargy with tiredness and fear...These children whose freedom was taken [by Kim] just smile vacantly.” That indicates Kim’s behavior and speech have influenced even the children. The headline word that shows the condition of the police is “suffering.” “No-light-at-all” Sumatakyo, which resulted from the wait-and-see situation based on Kim’s behavior and speech, is compared to a “ghost town” in not only a headline but also the content of the article; the width and depth of the influence of Kim is here seen. To finish the detailing of

this fundamental diagram, it needs to be mentioned what Kim is called here because there is also the question of his ethnic background. As aforementioned, on the previous day, he was called in the article his Japanese name, “Kondo,” or “evil spirit with a rifle.” But from the 22nd, when the reporting of the hostage-taking by Kim started, he was called his Korean name, “Kim,” and never his Japanese name. Regarding his title or a substitute for his name, “evil spirit with a rifle” is used again as seen in a headline and this is the substitution of choice until the end. In order to complete the analysis of the article on the 22nd, it is important to look at the mention of the television broadcast of the apology to Kim by the chief of the Shizuoka Prefectural Police for which Kim asked. It is reported that the apology is to be broadcast because Kim “has a grudge against the way he was looked down on as a Korean” when he was investigated at the Shimizu Police Station the year before. This tiny paragraph is placed in the very corner of the page’s upper left. Even so, it describes the broadcasting consideration as “exceptional.”

In the article on the 23rd, a change occurs in the situation based on the standoff between Kim and the police. Small acts of communication between Kim and the hostages, such as having meals and snacks together, are described. Nevertheless, it is reported that this is because the hostages have fallen into Kim’s “way of playing as an actor.” Furthermore, the communication between Kim and the hostages is

expressed as “Strange ‘friendly terms through [Kim’s] hypnotism”” in a headline and it is indicated that the communication has never been done at the initiation of the side of the hostages. It is also made clear that Kim lets the people who come to see him from all over Japan into the hotel in order that he may see them. Because of such communication with these people, the uniqueness of the case is emphasized with the phrase, “Probably there have not been any vicious criminals [like Kim] in the history of crime.” On the other hand, the situation between Kim and the police has not yet changed. It is mentioned that Kim did not listen to “the last persuasion” by a former chief of the Kakegawa Police Station who is a “person to whom Kim owes his life.” And a headline reports the strained situation, which makes the police officers wear bulletproof jackets, still continues. It is also revealed that Kim took a bath. The police are criticized because they have not yet arrested Kim, although they might have had a chance to do so when Kim, for instance, was taking that bath. Part of the article on the 23rd refers to the problem, but it seems to persistently take an attitude of defense and justification of the side of the police in such sentences as “The present strict rules on the use of guns for the police prohibits this [shooting Kim dead]” and “If Kim and the police started to shoot each other..., [the place around the hotel] would become a ‘battlefield’.” It can be taken from this that Kim deserves to be shot dead. Actually, Kim gets the new title, “devil,” in this article, and in the lead

sentences there appears the phrase, “[We] wish Kim gets back humanlike feeling.”

Kim is not, then, to be treated as a human being. Is that why Kim could be shot dead if there were no rules on the use of guns?

The article of the 24th reports another three hostages have been released after the wife of Michizuki and their three children were let go on the previous day. The release of the three hostages is described with the words, “return home,” just as if those three were in a battlefield. However, what they say to the press corps is: “[I] did not worry that much,” “[Kim] has a good nature and worried about us much,” and “[I] did not feel frightened that much.” Such comments are not what is imagined from hostages “in a state of lethargy with tiredness and fear,” the phrase given when the press corps could not yet get comments from the hostages directly. In addition, the article reports it is impressive those three refer to Kim with an honorific title (*san*). In the content of the article, there are descriptions of no shivering or hypnotized hostages. Instead, there is “Completely strange mood,” in one of the headlines. However, the residents of Sumatakyo, who complain, “Give back our lives,” appear now. According to part of the article, Sumatakyo has been turned into an “inaccessible land” governed by an “uninvited guest (Kim),” the elementary school there cannot hold classes and a “ration system” has begun. As another topic, it is mentioned, in a small allotment though, that Kim held a “press conference...pressing

his luck” and “having a smell of alcohol” in order to say “with a Korean clergyman as an assistant,” “My request on the racial discrimination has been 70 % accomplished.” And Kim’s title here is “homicidal.” Then just after that, it is also reported briefly that there was a “competing scene” between a group of highly-educated people insisting, “The problem Kim appealed [the ethnic discrimination] is significant for the Japanese,” and the press corps insisting, “Kim is homicidal.”

Finally, the article on the 25th, which informs of the arrest of Kim, comes. Here, the main character is no longer Kim. It is now a “ninja-like ‘special attack corps’” consisted of nine members, which, in fact, disguised themselves, awaited a chance to arrest Kim, held him down and arrested him. The scene of arrest by the corps is expressed as a “tackle at the risk of their lives” in a headline. And as seen from another headline, the tackle was a “surprise attack with all their anger” by the police. It gives a very good impression of the police. Regarding the description of Kim until the arrest, the following phrases are employed: “[Kim] was dragged out,” “[Kim] thrashed his arms and legs about with his last strength” and “Kim’s [facial] expression got tortured unsightly.” A good impression of the suspect this is not. Furthermore, there is this: “[Kim] fell into sleep like mud once he admitted what he did.” Again, Kim is not treated as a human being. He is mud here. With these similes, Kim and the “special attack corps” are as different as chalk and cheese. Kim

completely lost in the wait-and-see situation with the police. As a result, “At last, brightness made a comeback to the village in fear.” The “tackle at the risk of their lives” by the “special attack corps” gets more and more coverage. In addition, it is written up as if to make it due to the “power of ‘hypnotism’” by Kim that the rest of the hostages, who stayed until the end, showed their sympathy for the man with the honorific title and phrases like, “I feel sorry for Kim.” This is the revival of denouncing the communication between Kim and the hostages as “hypnotism.” Then *Yomiuri*, one of the press corps, also starts a “surprise attack with all its anger.” It criticizes Kim because he tried changing the nature of his murder case into an ethnic problem. In the first place, *Yomiuri* does not even openly admit the fact that Kim suffered discrimination based on the ethnic problem, saying, “[It] is probably a fact.”

A thread running through all the articles on this case is this: The suffering of discrimination with which Kim appeals to the nation is treated as small; the condition in which the hostages, the local residents, the police, the press corps and the like are physically stuck due to Kim’s behavior and speech is emphasized, and this case is persistently treated as a murder case in which Kim is a criminal. In the process of reporting, the people who stand on the side of Kim, such as the Korean clergyman and the groups of highly-educated people, are placed on the side of Them, and if the

hostages seem to be trying to stand on the side of Kim by showing their sympathy for his, it is reported that their sympathy for Kim is, from the first, due to “hypnotism,” not due to their true intentions. Nonetheless, there are no ethnic slurs in the words and phrases used to position Kim somewhere socially. Instead, some titles, an “evil spirit with a rifle,” “devil,” and “mud,” are employed, all of which are greatly in contrast to the “special attack corps” that finished Kim off and some of which are not generally used to indicate a human being. Rather, Kim’s ethnic origin has already been made public at the point in time *Yomiuri* calls him “Kim.”

The Lucie case

This is the case of a former *zainichi* Korean, so for analyzing, it should be most important point to see whether there are direct references to his ethnic background or expressions that hint at it. However, there is no such thing in the headlines, lead sentences and content of the articles, so that any subjects of analysis based on his ethnic background can be removed. These articles do not indicate to readers that Obara was a former *zainichi* Korean and merely give them the impression that his is a hard “case of obscenity.” His title, which might directly express his background, starts with “president of an asset management company.” Then “prosecuted for the crime of quasi-rape (indecent assault)” in parentheses comes to be put just after his name with the aforementioned title “president of an asset management company”

from time to time. In addition, “arrested and held-in-custody” is sometimes employed as an alternate title to “president of an asset management company.” That is, Obara is only a president or a criminal. However, there appears a statement that might make someone who knows Obara’s ethic background aware of something by intuition: The statement Obara himself might have recorded into a tape while he was at university seized by the Metropolitan Police Department and the Azabu Police Station, “I will revenge on this world. Become a bad guy.” From this remark, readers would think Obara must have had an unpleasant experience. Those who know his background might read into the statement a chain reaction effect due to his origin.

The flow of the articles during this period is, as briefly aforementioned, this: The existence of the victims came to be known one after another as time passed, and every time, Obara was arrested and prosecuted. The number of arrests and prosecution therefore increased. On April 6th, 2001, when Obara was arrested for the case of Lucie, he had been prosecuted for six crimes of quasi-rape. Before Obara came to be arrested for the case of Lucie, it was reported that a person taken to be Obara called one of Lucie’s friends giving his name as “Akira Takagi” and that a person, also taken to be Obara, called a local firehouse the night Lucie disappeared to say, “A serious matter happened. I would like you to tell me where an emergency

hospital is.” It is included in the story that it became clear Obara actually told the local police officers who visited his room in the condominium complex in Izu the night Lucie disappeared because they received a call from a caretaker of the condominium, “I will bring a suit if you enter the bathroom.” (Obara never showed himself at the condominium at ordinary times and the caretaker did not know him at all. So the caretaker reported to the local police station there was a suspicious person about.) In addition to the aforementioned tape, the story says a person, presumed again to be Obara, sent Lucie’s family a letter saying, “Do not worry.” Regarding other cases (not Lucie’s), some “camouflage attempts” are named by *Yomiuri*, in which Obara “pretended to be a fiancé” of an Australian victim who died, and after her death, gave an “engagement ring” he said he had given to her and such to her parents. Additionally, he is said to have made a Canadian victim hear a tape of a woman’s suffering-like voice and the like and to have said, “I cared for you because you felt ill.” Also, a commonly-employed method, Obara giving a woman drug-spiked alcohol making her lose consciousness, is often mentioned throughout the articles during the period. By the way, the passive voice is invariably used in the articles every time a reference is made to an act of obscenity any victim suffered.

Although these various suspicions and facts against/about Obara are revealed, it is consistently reported that he continues to deny them through his lawyer saying, “I

gave good value to her and did a sexual act after I obtained her agreement,” “I was in love with her” and “It [the sexual act] was done by mutual consent.” Conversely, it is sometimes reported that Obara keeps silent. Either way, there always exists Obara, who insists he is innocent even when cast in every possible condition for guilt.

Cases in which Japanese politicians are involved

The Recruit case

It was found on October 29th, 1988, that a secretary for former Chief Cabinet Secretary Takao Fujinami had been given Recruit Cosmos stocks. And next day, on October 30th, the story was carried on a local news page. As the cozy relationship between Recruit and the political world was made clear, the relationship between Recruit/other organizations and Fujinami was also revealed. That kind of relationship was, after the uncovering of the secretary’s receipt of stocks, reported in the local news pages often. Then at the peak of the coverage, on May 22nd, 1989, Fujinami was prosecuted and the local news pages of the next day, the 23rd, reported the news story as well. That is the rough flow of the report of the parts in which Fujinami was involved. This long range of time, from October 30th, 1988, to May 23rd, 1989, contains four dates of significance: 1) October 30th, 1988, when it was reported that the secretary of Fujinami was given stocks by Recruit Cosmos, 2) March 13th, 1989, when it was reported that Fujinami diverted the profits from the stocks of

Recruit Cosmos privately, 3) April 30th, 1989, when it was reported that the prosecution targeted two Diet members including Fujinami to solve the parts of the Recruit case in which politicians were involved, and 4) May 23rd, 1989, when it was reported that Fujinami had been prosecuted.

From the first to the second date, above, Fujinami seems to be treated just as one of the leading members of the Nakasone faction who happens to have come to the fore in the process of the investigation of the Recruit case perhaps because some big-name Diet members, such as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and then Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, had already appeared due to suspicion of their involvement through their secretaries as well. It was only on November 24th during the first range of time that Fujinami's name appeared in a headline. But on November 8th, a statement made by Hiromasa Ezoe, the president of Recruit who was taken as the ringleader in the case, "It depends on the 'degree of intimacy' with the other party (politician) and on whether s/he [to whom we give stocks] 'will be useful'," is introduced on the basis of a story of the person concerned. That might give readers the impression that Fujinami was one of these politicians. It is reported on November 16th that the summoning of sworn witnesses, which had already become the "last measure not to be resorted to," is going to be carried out after an interval of nine years. This article might have had the effect of making readers re-recognize the

seriousness of the Recruit case.

Once it was reported on March 13th, 1989, that Fujinami privately diverted the profits from the stocks of Recruit Cosmos to “funds to purchase a palatial mansion,” *Yomiuri*’s method of treating Fujinami started to change. In the article of the 13th, to begin with, a “powerful figure among the policy tribes for the area of Labor” is used as Fujinami’s title, instead of “former Chief Cabinet Secretary,” which had been used most of the time until then, though it was, during the second range of time, used only in that article of the 13th that reports the detection of Fujinami’s misappropriation. Either way, however, it is fixed on the 13th that Fujinami is a policy tribe member and politically influential. In addition, it is reported on the same day that Fujinami has a connection not only with Recruit but also with Sundai Education Group, which runs one of the biggest preparatory schools for universities in Japan, through Haruyuki Yamazaki, the chairperson of the board of directors for the group, as if in order to back up Fujinami’s “policy-tribe-ness.” Fujinami offered, says the story, his congratulations in a commemorative publication for the fiftieth anniversary of establishment of the group when he was the Minister of Labor, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at that time and others made an “exceptional inspection” of a school building of the group when Fujinami was the chief cabinet secretary, and in parallel with the inspection, the procedure for the approval of the establishment of

Surugadai University, which was the “dearest wish since its establishment of the group,” was carried out by the Ministry of Education in “just two years.” The quickness of the later approval for establishment of other departments by the university is also described as “exceptional.” All of this is just to say that after all the power of Fujinami counted very much, from the approval of the university to the opening of it. What is more, it is also reported that Fujinami purchased the “mansion” from a real estate company directly affiliated with the group “at half the price,” according to a headline. The “mansion” is seen as collateral for the approval and opening of the university. The circumstances of the purchase are described, “The profits of 26 million yen...arrived at his own residence,” which might give an impression of opulence to readers. It is also reported on the same day, on the 13th, that Fujinami did not need to disclose the existence of the “mansion” in making his property public. Fujinami’s statement made while he was Chief Cabinet Secretary, “In order to gain trust from the people, I hope it can be some help to make our assets public,” is also carried near to the part in the story of Fujinami’s non-disclosing of the “mansion” with “however...” placed just after it. In this way, *Yomiuri* might have succeeded in making Fujinami seem two-faced. According to *Yomiuri*, by the way, the matter concerned with Sundai Education Group was found by “investigation of *Yomiuri*.” After March 13th, the situation in which Fujinami did not talk to the mass

media is described as “where [Fujinami] is unknown” in the article on May 16th and as “[Fujinami is] missing” in the one on April 6th until he “showed up for the first time in half a month” on March 28th. It is reported on April 11th that the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office judged one of the reasons Ezoe gave stocks of Recruit Cosmos to some Diet members was Ezoe wanted to be appointed as a special member of the Government Tax Commission and the Diet member who got involved in this matter was a “politician who can exercise his authority,” namely Fujinami. It is also reported on the same day that there is a possibility that the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office will finally prosecute politicians.

It is reported on April 30th that the targets of the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office have been narrowed down to two, Fujinami and Clean Government Party Diet member Katsuya Ikeda. Regarding Fujinami, it is revealed that another matter, in which the contents of the first report of the Extraordinary Educational Council having then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami as a supervisor seemed advantageous to Recruit, in that it hoped for the continuance of the rules of recruitment, came to the surface in addition to the aforementioned matter of the assignment to a member of the Government Tax Commission. In this phase, there is already a phrase in the content of the article,

“[The Recruit case] has come to the most important last stage.” That is as good as to say in this context that Fujinami will be arrested/prosecuted soon. The article on May 7th reports that Fujinami spent three consecutive holidays in his hometown and contains a headline in which Fujinami is given the ordinary honorific title, “Fujinami-san,” not “Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujinami” or “Diet member Fujinami.” Fujinami’s manner in going home is described as “busily” and it is revealed that his only time out during the three-day stay was to comfort one of his leading supporters who was under medical treatment, mentioned just after his purpose for visiting his hometown, which was to apologize to his neighbors for the previous month’s case in which a storeroom of his office was set on fire. That is, it is indicated that Fujinami did not apologize. In the article on May 11th, reviewed is the way in which the stocks of Recruit Cosmos were given to Fujinami and used by him. But before that, a rough outline of Fujinami’s history, from his youth and going into politics to his activities as a politician, is given. In the history section of the article, there are only ideal words for politicians used, such as “conscientious,” “reliable” and “clean.” In addition, it is mentioned that his political statement is straightforward, although he is moderate, and complimentary words from someone around him, “[Fujinami is] reticent, but [Fujinami is] stubborn enough not to change anything once decided,” are introduced. It is reported as well that Fujinami had been regarded as a “successor to

the faction of Nakasone,” which might give readers the impression again that Fujinami is an influential politician. What is more, it is introduced that Fujinami stopped smoking and drank only in moderation once he entered the political world. It is also revealed that he rejected any requests for jobs from the persons concerned with his support group; rather, he persuaded them not to go this route. These two episodes might show Fujinami also possesses seriousness. “Mr. Fujinami to be heard was seen as ‘clean,’ but...” appears in a headline and the directly-opposed combination of the phrase “to be heard” and the word “clean” indicate the review on the flow of the stocks of Recruit Cosmos starts just after the history of Fujinami. Moreover, the expressions employed for the description of the drift of money in that part have “62 million yen got into the account of Daiwa Securities opened in the name of the secretary,” “The sold stocks mixed with the money that had been pooled in this account,” “26 million yen lost its color after it got mixed with the other money in the account of a major city bank,” and so forth. These are very active metaphors used to show the money was intentionally moved. In addition, the amount of money is described as “outstanding.” In this article of May 11th, Fujinami seems finally to have “two faces” as well, and due to his hypocrisy fell from politician to criminal at one stroke. Such a fall could not have come about (in print) without the introduction placed just before the review on Fujinami’s history. In the article of the 12th,

Fujinami's fall is described as well, but that is consistently written on the basis of an idea that he fell because of the "political maneuvering by Recruit." In that article, Fujinami is given another title—"head clerk of the Cabinet"—because he was Chief Cabinet Secretary when the "political maneuvering" was carried out, which might have readers understanding at a glance why Ezoe approached Fujinami. It is reported on the 16th that then Chief Cabinet Secretary Keizo Obuchi admitted Fujinami made a final decision for appointing Ezoe a special member of the Government Tax Commission. As seen in the headline on the 18th, it is revealed that the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office held an "unprecedented 12-hour hearing" from not only Fujinami but also Ikeda. The article on the 19th reports that each of the two got the second 12-hour hearing, the investigation "seems to be finished on this day" and "the attitude of the Special Investigation Department aiming at settling in an earlier stage peeps" due to such a long hearing. In the article on the 20th, some comments from public prosecutors who attended a top-level meeting to decide whether to prosecute the two are introduced and there are these words in a headline for the article: "Prosecution decided." This although no comments from the prosecutors contain words such as "prosecute," and no prosecutors have said they will prosecute the two. According to that article, Fujinami "kept shutting himself up" in a hotel on the day when the meeting was held

and “seemed as if he kept a very close watch on the whereabouts of the meeting which decides his fate with bated breath.” The article on that day may show how greatly the side of the prosecution, which moved on, and Fujinami are in contrast to each other.

Finally, the article on May 22nd reports both of the Diet members have been prosecuted as predicted in that article of the 20th. In that last article, there are not only words such as “bribe,” used instead of “political donation,” but also a metaphoric expression, “black checks,” used to indicate the checks passed from Recruit to politicians. It is revealed that the “bribe” to Fujinami was twenty million yen in total and it was passed to Fujinami in four installments (five million at a time). According to the article, furthermore, the five-million-yen packets were each given at a point in time related to the Extraordinary Educational Council, such as just before the establishment of the council and the day before submission of a report. It is also mentioned that the third five-million-yen installment was passed in the prime minister’s official residence. The article reports that Fujinami gave a statement, written in his own handwriting, that “shows his firm attitude in his prudence,” through his office meaning he had decided to fight in court to prove his innocence. On the other hand, it reveals Fujinami “kept shutting himself up in a hotel all day” and does not show up in front of the press corps while Ikeda, another Diet member prosecuted,

appears. Therefore, there is possibility that Fujinami is taken to possess a weak disposition, contrary to the “firm attitude” in his statement.

What can be said regarding articles from the detection of Fujinami’s involvement to his prosecution is that, as suspicions about Fujinami are revealed one after another, some things not directly related to the case or that were in place or happened before the detection of the case, such as episodes of his youth and his everyday activities as a politician, are revealed in proportion to the uncovering of the suspicions. The news stories on the suspicions surrounding the case and those not related to the case are in contrast to each other; as a result, they label Fujinami as two-faced and only his negative face based on the case is made conspicuous. That is, Fujinami might be here represented more as a criminal than a politician. At the peak of that representation, the prosecution appears prominently. Finally, Fujinami is prosecuted, and is settled as a criminal not only given the facts, but also via the choice of words/composition of phrases in the news stories, based it would seem on a bill of indictment from the prosecution.

The JDA case

The name of former Chief Cabinet Secretary Kanezo Muraoka first appears in a comparatively small article on September 18th, which reports he was heard by the prosecution on the 15th of the same month due to suspicion of his involvement in the

Japan Dental Association scandal. Furthermore, the news story is not carried on a local news page. It is on September 26th that his name first appears on a local news page in regard this case. The article on the 26th reads that, on the 25th, his house and personal effects were searched by the prosecution and he had a talk with the press at his house after being heard by the prosecution again. The article in the local news pages of the next day, September 27th, already reports he was prosecuted at home on the 26th. That is, he came to be prosecuted about one week after the first coverage and appeared in the local news pages for two days, the 26th and 27th, only. It can be taken from the article on the 27th that his prosecution at home resulted from the system of factions, although he was prosecuted and already considered a criminal in that article.

In the article of September 26th, Muraoka, who flatly denies his involvement, is described with the title a “former chief cabinet secretary.” He is not only heard but also has his house and personal effects searched because of a suspicion that he, who was an acting chairperson for a political organization of the Hashimoto faction at that time, directed that a donation of one hundred million yen from the JDA not be recorded in an Income and Expenditure Report. But it is reported that he “emphatically” answered in front of the press, “I can only think that this is completely unreasonable and a false charge.”

The article on September 27th is the one that reports Muraoka was prosecuted at home. It briefly recounts the following: 1) Muraoka's being prosecuted at home, 2) some young Diet members' recognition that politics based on factions is coming to an end, 3) Muraoka's political history, 4) comments by two intellectuals, and 5) an explanation.

Muraoka's being prosecuted at home: His total denial of involvement when talking with the press again just after he was prosecuted is described as "with his face red," "talked on and on," and such and it is indicated he takes an attitude of fighting against the prosecution in court. In addition, a comment released by the side of the prosecution after it prosecuted Muraoka in justification of Muraoka's being prosecuted, and introduced in the article, is, "It is natural [for us to think] the responsibility rests with a person who organizes the management of the faction." The situation of trial between the opposing sides may easily be imagined from Muraoka's denial and the prosecution's justification, but "[It was] a direction by a leading member of the faction after all," the first sentence of the lead sentences in this part, already fixes Muraoka's involvement although it contains no proper noun like "Muraoka." In the lead sentences, what is more, the reader cannot avoid noting that the position, a "former acting chairperson of the faction," which first cast the suspicion on Muraoka, is added as another title to his existing one, a "former chief

cabinet secretary.”

As seen in a comment by a Diet member, “It might be a result of the long-time observation of the custom in the area of accounting by the factions [that Muraoka was prosecuted],” regarding the recognition of young Diet members, that Diet members think Muraoka was fundamentally prosecuted due to the existence of factions, not due to his personal ideas and behavior.

The third part, Muraoka’s political history, mentions that he came to be opposed to former Secretary General Hiromu Nonaka, who was in the same faction, because Muraoka turned to supporting Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the race for president of the LDP in September 2003, and retired from the political world after he failed to be elected in the House of Representatives election held in November of the same year. Nevertheless, the most significant point is that it is mentioned Muraoka was a policy tribe member with a title, “important figure of ‘the road tribe’.” As if to prove the degree of his importance, it is revealed that he was entertained by the executives of the Japan Highway Public Corporation several times.

As for the fourth item, comments by two intellectuals, one of them, that Muraoka’s being prosecuted without being arrested is unexpected while the pursuit of the prosecution was great, is a statement of a former chief of the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office and current lawyer,

Kazuo Kawakami. The other, indicating a readjustment of the Political Funds Control Law is still needed so true political reforms can be attained, is that of Tomoaki Iwai, professor of Nihon University. It may be remarkable that the intellectuals directed their attacks on the prosecution and the Political Funds Control Law, and neither criticized Muraoka personally.

As for the fifth item, explanation, this is done under the name of Yusuke Yoshino. Yoshino says, “[Muraoka’s being prosecuted] brings the actual conditions in which careless management of funds had been conducted by all the members of the faction into relief” and indicates that the body to criticize is the faction, not Muraoka, the individual, although Yoshino acknowledges the greatness of the existence of Muraoka by giving him the title, “prominent figure of the faction.” It is interesting that Yoshino’s view on Muraoka’s being prosecuted is the same as those of the aforementioned young Diet members. As if in order to support his view, Yoshino cites a comment by a leading member of the prosecution: “[This case] is different from the one in which a politician hides earnings of his/her own organization for fund management and puts the earnings into his/her own pocket.” As Kawakami does, Yoshino also points out that it is “exceptional” that the prosecution finished the part in which Muraoka was involved by prosecuting him at home without arresting him. As his conclusion, Yoshino suggests to politicians they make their political funds

transparent and to the prosecution it firmly copes with politicians as well. Until the end, there is neither criticism of nor attack upon Muraoka by Yoshino.

The Arai case

Between his first appearance as standard-bearer and the detection of his case

For about five years, from the occurrence of the *Sagawa Kyubin* case to the detection of Arai's case, Arai's name rarely appears in *Yomiuri*'s local news pages. Two articles on Arai's scandalous affairs were published, it is true, in the local news pages during that time, one of which reports that Arai's organization has not reported a donation from a political organization and the other that a president of *Togensha* Kichinosuke Sasaki claims Arai called him to ask for a loan once Sasaki's tender for the site of Japan Railway was successful even though Arai had asked him to give up bidding for it a few months previously. But some articles that report Arai's political activities based on his criticism of those in power in the political world in Japan, such as the one telling readers a group called *To no shinrai kaifuku o kangaeru kai* (Group to Think of Restoring Trust in the LDP) was formed to deal with the problem of the *Sagawa Kyubin* case and one that reports Arai criticized the Murayama administration's way of coping with the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, seem especially remarkable among the few articles on Arai during those five years. In addition, an article that predicts Arai will challenge the election of the House of the

Representatives as an independent candidate is noteworthy. During those five years, furthermore, Arai seems to have been positioned very closely to the people in the local news pages, although it may be partly because there is no reference to his origins.

The article of October 9th, 1992, is about the start of a group put together by Arai and other Diet members to think of ways of restoring trust in the LDP. In this article, those who launched the group are described as “young interested Diet members who ask for responsibility” and “seven samurai,” both of which may represent the group as reliable. As for Arai, his remark, “The people know there is more power in the factions (than in the LDP itself), so they are angry that [the *Sagawa Kyubin* case] is not yet settled with the resignation of the LDP vice-president,” is introduced and may give the impression that he understands the feelings of the people and is on their side. In addition, Arai’s wording is described as put “clearly” and the end of the article concludes with, “Mr. Arai told his decision of the self-cleaning of the inside of the LDP, ‘I take the responsibility [for it] so long as I started to talk [about it]’.” Arai’s enthusiasm toward and belief in the internal revolution of the LDP is fully conveyed to the readers.

The article on February 5th, 1995, reports, but not in great detail, the situation of a lecture meeting in which Arai criticizes the Murayama administration’s way of

coping with the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake. Arai belongs to the New Frontier Party at the time and is given the title, “the vice Secretary General of the New Frontier Party,” in the article. According to it, the purpose of the lecture meeting is “to think over the course of Japan such as the reform of the administration and the problem of the constitution,” and in the lecture meeting, Arai “insisted that [we] discuss the political system itself including the [problem of the] constitution, not only the budget for the [post-earthquake] restoration.” This article might be the very one that caused readers to recognize the width of Arai’s range of defense to the extent it thoroughly covered the purpose of the lecture meeting. At the same time, the article may show Arai reduces his distance from the people by thinking of the earthquake sufferers.

In the article of September 21st, 1996, some candidates challenging the election of the House of the Representatives after changing their “doorplates,” or political parties, are introduced and Arai is also introduced as one of them. In the case of Arai, however, it is emphasized with “as ‘independent’” that he is running for the election, independent that is of any party. It is mentioned that Arai urged the necessity of the dissolution of the factions at the time of the *Sagawa Kyubin* case. In addition, it is pointed out that, before the election. (Between 1994 and 1996, Arai moved from party to party because of, if borrowed from the statement of Arai in the article, “the

difference of ideology on policy.”) This article illustrates Arai’s anguish at running as an independent candidate and the limitations in various areas like election broadcasts and numbers of handbills and posters. In this article, what is more, Arai, who conducts himself for the election under such conditions, is described as the candidate who does his best single-mindedly in spite of limits with, “[Arai] rushes from place to place toward the finish line according to his schedule which has everything worked out to the minute.” Such a description fits his action at the time of the *Sagawa Kyubin* case and the fact he moved from party to party due to differences in policy, and, as a result, Arai’s honest and dependable nature, such as his consistent attitude toward his own political ideology and tenaciousness, are shown. Also, it should not be missed that Arai is, as a politician, put in a place nearest the people, namely “independent.”

Regarding the two articles on Arai’s scandalous affairs, the one on the unrecorded donation persistently names eminent politicians such as former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Minister of Finance Ryutaro Hashimoto as its targets and takes Arai as just one of the “six LDP Diet members” who reported “The donation from any political organizations is zero.” (The title of Ryutaro Hashimoto was still former Minister of Finance at that time.) As for the other article on Arai’s calls to Sasaki in order to make him give up bidding and ask him for a loan of money,

it is mentioned that Arai has told *Yomiuri*, “I think President Sasaki has a wrong memory.” Arai’s counterattack against Sasaki is also reported: “[Arai] showed his idea to ask President Sasaki to explain.” Even given the latter article in which Arai himself is targeted, it is difficult to think either of these two articles had much influence on the feelings of the people. From the fact that there is no follow-up of either article, it may be possible to think that neither of Arai’s scandalous affairs, even put together, had enough effect to expand the distance between Arai and the people.

Regarding his ethnic background, there are no expressions, words, or phrases in place to let readers know Arai is a former *zainichi* Korean in any of the articles during this time.

Between the detection of his case and his death

As one of the characteristics of the articles in the local news pages reporting the development of Arai’s case from its detection to his death, it could be given that Arai is, in the end, described as one person alone, forced into a corner by criticizing the prosecution, not by no longer defending himself, though he first insisted upon his innocence. The mess into which Arai has landed is emphasized inversely in relation to the power the side of the prosecution gradually obtains. In addition, Arai’s alone-and-unaided-ness stands out more with the criticism, exclusion, accusation, and such hurled his way by the other political parties, the LDP, and even Nikko Securities,

all of which appears in the articles as if they followed the prosecution. It might have backed up Arai's awkward position and isolation that some of his family's companies are mentioned and a list of Arai's illegal-looking stock dealings is also carried. What is more, it appears as if Arai is fixed as guilty: His case is positioned as the same as the case of former Labor Minister Toshio Yamaguchi, in which the latter made fraudulent loans for financing his family's companies and was found guilty. It could be said Arai's death happened when the distance between Arai and any groups/organizations on the side of the prosecution had widened to the maximum due to the power of the information disadvantageous to Arai, that is, when the Us-Them relationship was established most strongly and Arai was deemed a criminal.

What the article dated December 22nd, 1997, which first reports Arai's case, mainly conveys, as seen in the headline containing the phrase, "the tip of an iceberg," is the fact that many politicians do stock dealings as a method of raising funds, although there is a part in which the suspicion that Arai made illegal profits is mentioned. The article on the 24th reports not only that Arai has resigned his post as a member of the task force for urgent financial system stabilization within the LDP but also that the person concerned with Nikko Securities says Arai demanded profits, however, only Arai is now the focus. Regarding Arai's manner as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee meeting held on January 30th, 1998,

reported on the next day, the 31st, that article (on the 31st) says “a few words of regret escaped” Arai and he “did not have many words of self-examination,” but instead, he “flatly denied every suspicion” and “fluently repeated the claim that he is innocent.”

From that article, only Arai’s manner, in which he desperately protects himself, is made known. In addition, the article of the 31st gives “many points to be doubted” in what Arai has said as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee held January 30th. In this way, the article is worded as if say that Arai desperately explained to that extent in order to defend himself even to the telling of lies.

Furthermore, it makes Arai’s statement as an unsworn witness more doubtful that the existence of Arai’s family’s company, Volo, is revealed on the same day. A statement for *Yomiuri* by a former representative director of Volo, “[I] don’t want to be concerned [in Volo] any longer,” and another statement for *Yomiuri* by a former executive of the same company, “[I] feel cheated,” may further support the doubt against Arai’s statement. (Both resigned their posts as soon as they knew there was suspicion that a speculator helped Volo to make profits.) According to the article dated February 13th, it has been recognized as a result of an in-house investigation by Nikko Securities that Nikko Securities accorded benefits to Arai at Arai’s request.

The article on the 18th reports on the basis of what the person concerned with Nikko Securities said that Arai’s repeated demands for profits led to such stock dealings once

the then vice-president, Yumio Hiraishi, and the then managing director, Hiroyuki Hamahira, “reluctantly accepted [Arai’s requests] because Arai persistently demanded for them” though “[they] were not keen [to do such stock dealings].” In the second of the two local news pages on the 19th, when it is reported on the front page Arai was going to be arrested, it is revealed with the phrase, “an uncertain-if-they-exist group of family companies behind the scenes,” in its headline that there are two Arai family companies having the same company name, “*Mari Nettowaku* (Mari Network),” and one called “*Zerowan* (Zero One)” besides the aforementioned Volo. According to the article, *Zerowan* has no office where it is supposed to be. At the same time, the case of former Labor Minister Toshio Yamaguchi, in which he set up fraudulent loans for the financing of his family’s companies and was found guilty, is also introduced and this article on the second local news page on the 19th concludes with, “The compositional arrangement in which [a politician] holds high the power of his/her position as a Diet member and demands benefits from a financial institution(s) is equal to be repeated by Diet member Arai.” The main part in the two local news page stories of February 19th is this: The first page report that Arai explained himself at a secret session held by the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives and held a press conference to insist he was innocent just after the session. However there is no Arai, as he has previously been described, on that page. Although some

ever-employed phrases such as “[He] insisted on his innocence” and “[He] emphasized his innocence,” are used, Arai’s weak-kneed manners are also depicted: “[He] talked with a fully-exhausted facial expression,” “with his voice shaking,” and “in a tearful voice.” In addition, it is reported that Arai criticized the prosecution: “The prosecution only picks up the things convenient [to itself] and tries to do [this investigation]” and “[The investigation] is a frame-up.” On this page, the person who is in contrast to Arai is Akio Harada, the then Chief of the Criminal Affairs Bureau, who explains in the aforementioned secret session, in order to ask for his arrest, that Arai is guilty. According to the article on the first page, Harada places Arai as a “securities tribe” member, shows various “shocking” grounds for Arai’s guilt and is “full of confidence.” In addition, the degree of shock on the grounds of Arai’s guilt expressed by Harada seems to have been enough to make the members of the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives present “be astonished and lose their voice.” Such an attitude is 180-degrees from the one they showed when Arai was explaining: “[They] put their heads a little to one side because they were not sure if [what Arai was saying] was true.” What is more, a list of what might have been Arai’s illegal stock dealings with Nikko Securities appears just after the content of that article on the first page and *Yomiuri* editorializes, “[The list] indicates [Arai] received exceptional treatment.”

The local news page articles that report Arai's explanation are the following two: That dated January 31st reporting Arai's words as an unsworn witness in the Lower House Budget Committee and the other dated February 19th reporting what he said in his last press conference including his explanation at the secret session held by the Steering Committee of the House of Representatives. (There is no article in the local news pages on Arai's first press conference held just after the detection of his scandal.) In both articles, what Arai says and does seems not to be listened to/paid attention to seriously and directly. Rather, what is impressed upon the reader is that *Yomiuri* takes a thoroughly critical attitude to Arai. It might seem *Yomiuri* is doing an excellent job as a member of the media, but the way and extent of it may go too far. The more Arai insists he is innocent, for example, the more *Yomiuri* tries to find fault with him, noting what Arai says contains some points to be doubted and even going so far as to claim what he says is false. It should be taken into consideration that the prosecution and the other organizations involved, such as the LDP and Nikko Securities, are never criticized at this time. That is, there is a possibility that Arai was fixed as the only ringleader in the case. There exists possible proof: Arai continued to be positioned as guilty from the beginning with such decisive ways of naming him as "Diet member Shokei Arai who gained profits of about 40 million yen from Nikko Securities" and "Due to the problem in which the LDP Diet member

Shokei Arai (50) received the offer of profits of about 41 million yen from Nikko Securities.” Then finally, Arai was, as aforementioned, completely set as a criminal when his family’s companies were revealed and he was connected in print with the aforementioned former Labor minister, Toshio Yamaguchi, who had been found guilty because he set up fraudulent loans for the financing of his own family’s companies, though the nature of Arai’s case was/is fundamentally different from that of Yamaguchi’s case.

And again, his ethnic background is not mentioned here at all.

Between his death and the judgment day

On the next day after Arai’s death, February 20th, 1998, Arai’s ethnic origin is mentioned in the local news pages for the first time in the range of analysis for this paper. But in the local news pages only, the reference is the first as well as the last. To be exact, the reference is one sentence only: “[Arai] is from Osaka and his parents were *zainichi* Koreans,” appears suddenly while his brief career, which is described as “spectacular,” is the focus and some episodes from it are introduced though there is a supplementary explanation just after the sentence that Arai was naturalized in his teens. In the article, however, Arai’s origin is not focused on and mentioned merely to show Arai had neither relatives nor acquaintances in his electoral zone, Ota Ward in Tokyo. Fundamentally, therefore, it is also not necessary that the fact Arai’s parents

were *zainichi* Koreans and that Arai was naturalized be mentioned.

Except for the article with the reference to Arai's ethnic origin, a change in *Yomiuri*'s attitude toward Arai is not seen. *Yomiuri*'s policy of considering Arai guilty does not change even when it reports on September 21st, 1998, that then Vice-President Yumio Hiraishi and then Managing Director Hiroyuki Hamahira, both of whom are of Nikko Securities, have been found guilty after reporting on February 20th of the same year that Arai committed suicide. As if confirming Arai's guilt, it reveals other aspects about Arai, not made clear before Arai died, one after another, especially in its serial related to Arai's scandal. Also, it appears to be establishing credibility for itself, having persistently taken Arai as guilty, in reporting several times that Hamahira admitted Arai demanded profits. After Arai's death, *Yomiuri* criticized some organizations that seem to have tried to repress what Arai said and did, such as the prosecution due to forcible investigation and the possibility of a leak of information. But in the local news pages, each of the organizations is criticized only once. They are not, as Arai, fixed as targets of criticism. Either way, however, it cannot be missed that, in the local news pages during the time from Arai's death to the confirmation of guilt of the two from Nikko Securities, Arai continues to be taken as guilty though he was not prosecuted (because of his death).

After March 11th, 1998, when it was reported Hiraishi and Hamahira were

prosecuted while Arai was not, some stories to support Arai's guilt, as aforementioned, start to appear in the local news pages. In the article on the 11th, such points of difference between Arai and other politicians as Arai's coming to the surface in the aforementioned series of investigations as the "politician who strictly demands to compensate for a loss," and in demanding, Arai himself does so directly are given. In addition, it is pointed out that Arai's stock dealings with Nikko Securities in question are "clearly unnatural for an amateur." These references might have made Arai's claim of innocence less persuasive. Another mention of Hamahira, who was in charge of Arai, admitting Arai demanded profits seems to contribute to Arai's guilt. In spite of everything, what most firmly fixed Arai as guilty would be the aforementioned tape played by Arai at his last press conference. According to the article on the 11th, Arai, between June 1997, and January 1998, "asked the then vice-president Yumio Hiraishi and the then managing director Hiroyuki Hamahira to confirm, 'there was no behavior to demand profits [by Arai],' and recorded such conversations onto a tape without permission." There are no information sources regarding this tape listed in the article. That is, the existence of the tape may mean not only that Arai prepared for the coming investigation but also that he himself recognized the illegality of his stock dealings because he started making the tape even before his scandal was made public. Finally, the article on the 11th reports it was

confirmed without any objections at the top-level meeting of the prosecution on February 18th, the day before Arai's death, that Arai be arrested. According to the article, the reason Arai's arrest was ordered seems to be that "It was taken as pernicious [Arai] gave pressure to Nikko Securities using his position as a politician." The article also reports a leading member who attended the meeting says, "[Arai's stock dealings with Nikko Securities] are remarkably against the principle of self-responsibility in commercial transaction and the people greatly feel it unfair [that Arai was not to be arrested]." That is, Arai's arrest was a result of the settlement by the prosecution taking account of the people's feelings that Arai applied pressure to Nikko Securities. Probably, it was the side of Nikko Securities that told the prosecution, as seen in the aforementioned statement by Hamahira, that Arai demanded profit, that Arai applied pressure to Nikko Securities. It should be noted that the prosecution confirmed Arai's arrest on the basis of the statements of the side of Nikko Securities only and *Yomiuri* reports it without criticism.

The stage on which to fix Arai as guilty is moved to the aforementioned serial, divided into five parts. The serial basically inspects Arai as related to his stock dealings. Local news pages are used for all of the serial except the first part. The fifth part mainly explains the compositional arrangement in which the politicians and securities companies are dependent on each other and does not focus on Arai in

particular. Therefore, it will be seen in the following how Arai continued to be fixed as guilty between the second and fourth parts. The second part on March 17th, 1998, tells not only that, as aforementioned, Arai recorded the conversations onto tape but also that “the voice of the phone urged” a former manager of a branch office at Shinbashi “to agree” there had been no illegal stock dealings and he also called Hamahira as if to ask him to confirm Arai did not demand profits. Such actions are taken on the assumption that Arai is guilty, that “[Arai] was elaborately proceeding with the measures against investigation.” However, it is mentioned here as well that Hamahira admitted Arai demanded profits. Therefore, it is concluded that the measures against investigation by Arai became a “one-man stage play.” And as a reason Nikko Securities bowed to the demands of a Diet member of middle standing to that extent, although it is made clear Arai had never made a “conspicuous ‘demand’” of Nikko Securities, “the power of his Diet member’s pin and his career as a former government official of the Ministry of Finance” is given on the basis of the subjective statement by Hiraishi of Nikko Securities to the prosecution, “[I] recognized [Arai] as a Ministry-of-Finance tribe or securities tribe” member, and that of Hamahira of Nikko Securities to the prosecution as well, “Because [Arai] was a Diet member who was of the Ministry of Finance.” In addition, it is settled that “the power of his Diet member’s pin and his career as a former government official of the

Ministry of Finance” was, for Nikko Securities, the same as the “dark pressure” from the aforementioned professional troublemaker at stockholders’ meetings, Ryuichi Koike. That is to say, Arai is placed on the same level as the troublemaker who had been already arrested. In the third part on the 18th, it is mentioned again that Hamahira admitted Arai demanded profits. Besides that, it is revealed that Hamahira was asked directly by Arai to make sure their stories agreed. It is also reported there were records of self-dealing made by the side of Nikko Securities in the ordering voucher on Arai’s stock dealing with that company as identified by the Special Investigation Department of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office. The fourth part on the 19th seems to try to explore why Arai got into these stock dealings to that extent. First of all, it is revealed Arai’s office was in trouble with financing: Arai’s office failed to pay fees for public services like electricity and water and Arai handed a salary, which was less than it was supposed to be, to each of his three public secretaries. It is also mentioned that Arai personally was three hundred million yen in debt to some banks due to the purchase of a house in an exclusive residential district and of a holiday apartment. It is concluded that, because of his difficult public and private economic conditions, Arai started to depend on his stock dealings and business for financing and “his stock dealings stepped into an ‘illegal’ field” because he demanded profit ignoring the Securities Exchange Act that had been

revised in 1992 although the stock market was reeling after the collapse of the “bubble economy.” In this way, Arai might be taken as having carried out stock dealings for his private financing, not for his political funds.

There are no articles focusing on Arai’s scandal after the last part dated March 20th, 1998, of the aforementioned serial during the period from Arai’s death to the sentencing of Hiraishi and Hamahira. Even in the local news pages on the day after the two Nikko Securities executives were found guilty on September 20th, 1998, there are no mentions of it at all. It is true that Arai’s name sometimes appears after March 20th, like in an article dated March 30th reporting an election to fill a vacancy caused by Arai and in an article dated April 27th exploring whether a retirement allowance should be paid to the prominent figures of companies/ministries who resign and the executives of companies/ministries who are arrested due to scandals such as the case in which the aforementioned Koike was involved. But, again, there are no articles focusing on Arai’s case, or on Arai himself, after the article on the 20th. There is little possibility Arai was/is focused on in any articles after the two from Nikko Securities were sentenced as guilty. Arai disappeared from the world as a criminal and remains so.

CHAPTER 12

CONCLUSION

Regarding whether Arai's case was represented as a case involving a *zainichi* Korean or as a case in which a politician was involved, it would be, within the range of analysis for this paper, more appropriate to say it was represented as a case in which a politician was involved because his origin is mentioned only in the local news page article of February 20th, 1998, without being taken too far in order to show that Ota Ward in Tokyo, his electoral zone, was not his hometown. After his death, however, it is needless to say he was determined a former *zainichi* Korean politician just because of that reference.

The Recruit case and the JDA case were treated as cases in which a politician was involved. Among them, the Recruit case could be used to prove, not completely though, that Arai was represented as a politician in his case. This is because both Arai's and the Recruit cases, to begin with, feature one-on-one relationships between a politician and a company through money in common while the JDA case was one in which a donation was sent to a faction, not one politician. As for the process from the detection of the case to the arrest/prosecution, in addition, there are some common points between Arai's and the Recruit cases: Both Arai and Fujinami of the Recruit

case were positioned as criminals for a comparatively long time in discourse because both were heard by the prosecution long after the detection of their cases, and the arrest of Arai and the prosecution of Fujinami were indicated in advance in the media. What is very different in the JDA case is that the detection of Muraoka's involvement was reported after he was heard by the prosecution. It is especially significant that both Arai and Fujinami were placed so until the announcement of the arrest of Arai and Fujinami's actual prosecution with the snowballing information that had not surfaced until then. As for Arai, it was revealed until he was going to be arrested that he owned family companies, like Volo, a speculator had a connection with Volo, and so on. Also, some facts on Fujinami, that a part of the profits from the Recruit Cosmos stocks he received was allotted to the fund to buy his house and the Sundai Education Group was related to the purchase of his house, were made public until he was prosecuted. Such information must have been the most decisive element to position both of them as guilty before the arrest/prosecution. It was also a result of taking advantage of the negative meaning of the phrase, "policy tribe," for both Arai and Fujinami were taken as policy tribe members by *Yomiuri*. Regarding the way of completing a two-faced criminal portrait before the arrest/prosecution, however, Arai's two-facedness is finished with his political activities before the detection of his case after his death in the morning edition dated February 20th, 1998, while Fujinami's

two-facedness was already finished before he was prosecuted. (In fact, Arai's two-facedness was completed before his death in the evening edition dated February 18th, 1998, by contrasting his standard-bearer status around the time of the *Sagawa Kyubin* scandal and his fixation on money.) This may be because Arai continued to give news materials to the media via press conferences while Fujinami did not. In addition, it might have been judged there was no need to bother to show Arai's political history because he was already known to many people due to his standard-bearer status. In spite of everything, there is a possibility of thinking the delay in finishing Arai's two-facedness as a criminal was his ethnic origin. Actually, it was in the morning edition of *Yomiuri* the day after Arai's death, on February 20th, 1998, when his two-facedness was completed as aforementioned. Simultaneously, his origin is mentioned in the same article. It may seem as if *Yomiuri* was intentionally waiting for the day it could show Arai's political activities alongside his ethnic origin. If pages besides the local news pages of *Yomiuri* are also included, in fact, there are some articles mentioning Arai's ethnic origin: Three in total on February 20th, one on February 21st, one on February 26th, one on March 7th and one on March 26th, 1998. What should be paid attention to here is that the articles mentioning Arai's ethnic origin, in the range of analysis for this paper, first appeared after his death, although such articles were never carried before his death.

As for the cases involving *zainichi* Koreans, three have been seen. One thing to be said is that there are no words, phrases and expressions that reveal the ethnic origin of Obara of the Lucie case while both Lee of the Komatsugawa case and Kim of the Kim Hi-Lo case were clearly revealed as *zainichi* Koreans. This must be because of self-censorship by *Yomiuri*. As seen, Kim of the Kim Hi-Lo case appealed to public opinion against ethnic discrimination in Japan. Perhaps with that appeal by Kim, as Iwabuchi (2000) points out, the Japanese media started to take it as taboo to feature *zainichi* Koreans in order to avoid “possible criticism and denunciation” (p. 57). As mentioned before, in the current Japanese media, such regulations have been loosened to some extent because some *zainichi* Koreans came to be visible in Japan and *hanryu* (the Korean wave) landed in Japan as well. However, it would be an actual situation for the influential media, newspapers especially, not to be able to help being careful when they face any cases/accidents involving (former) *zainichi* Koreans. It can be seen in the analysis of the 2000 Lucie case in this paper that such an attitude must have been taken. In *Yomiuri*, in fact, there are no articles on Obara of the Lucie case coming after the one on the local news page dated October 13th, 2001, reporting that all seven of Obara’s lawyers resigned their posts as his counsel. Therefore, it cannot be learned from *Yomiuri* whether Obara was found guilty in that case after all nor has he been tried.

Although there has been in place such a taboo in the Japanese media, Arai's ethnic origin was, however briefly, mentioned after his death in *Yomiuri*. This might have been because Arai's origin had already been made public or because Arai was a public person. However, it would not have been necessary to refer to Arai's origin when talking about his case. Actually, *Yomiuri* was criticized for its reference to Arai's origin after his death by some of its readers: "You wrote [about Arai's origin] too much though [Arai] already gained Japanese nationality" ("2 gatsu," 1998, p. 17). On March 26th, 1998, nevertheless, *Yomiuri*, again mentioned Arai's origin to explore the "real" Arai and his case and seems to conclude after all that Arai's political action as a reformer was consciously carried out because he thought if he "took an ordinary way" that way would not work due to his origin ("Seijika to kabu," 1998, p. 15). (That article dated March 26th, 1998, was the last one having reference to Arai's origin in *Yomiuri*.) As concluded before, Arai was treated as a politician by *Yomiuri*, but after his death he started to be taken as a former *zainichi* Korean politician.

The theory of Cultural Studies mainly explains how society is constructed through a struggle over meaning by powerful groups. So it would be helpful knowing how that kind of struggle happened and had influence on society in each case in order to explore the six cases in which that kind of struggle is remarkable. All of the cases except the Lucie case and the JDA case would be taken for it on the

basis of the results of the discourse analyses in this paper.

Of the two cases involving *zainichi* Koreans, that kind of struggle over meaning can be seen more clearly in the Kim Hi-Lo case. As Kim says or does something, *Yomiuri* attacks him in discourse. Once a pro-Kim comment comes from the side of hostages who were released, in addition, *Yomiuri* mercilessly attacks him again by pulling out information like the residents around the hotel in which Kim has confined himself have difficulty with their everyday lives and classes at school cannot be held. In that way, *Yomiuri* always put itself in opposition to Kim. That is, it was, all the time, on the side of those in power which/who wanted to repress Kim by any means. In the first place, Kim's direct participation in the struggle must have been the biggest element for *Yomiuri*'s harsh attack on him. However, it must not be missed that it was a way of taking part in the struggle for Kim to start to confine himself in the hotel in order to get attention from the mass media. On the other hand, the attacks not only on Lee of the Komatsugawa case but also on Kim of the Kim Hi-Lo case by *Yomiuri* to such an extent were a result of *Yomiuri*'s catering to the wishes of those in power like the then government, police, and the like. It is also true that the Japanese contempt for Korea continued to be re-produced in *Yomiuri* as long as it kept attacking them. However, it must not be missed that Japanese society at that time took such a way of reporting by *Yomiuri* for granted and accepted it without thought.

As mentioned, that struggle can also be seen in the two cases in which the politicians were involved except the JDA case, the Recruit case and Arai's case that was concluded as such a case. However, the characteristic of the struggle in the case in which the politicians were involved is a little different from that in the cases involving the *zainichi* Koreans. The struggle in the case in which the politicians were involved is exactly a reflection of the struggle among the factions in the LDP and is also one in which each politician deals with the influential/powerful people/organizations around himself/herself. What Arai and Fujinami of the Recruit case have in common in terms of the factions of the LDP was that neither belonged to the faction most influential/powerful when they were going to be arrested/prosecuted. Regarding Arai, in addition, he had to confront the struggle alone. This might have been because he criticized not only the big-name figures of the LDP but also the LDP itself before he left it and he did not have a firm base even in the faction to which he belonged after he returned to the LDP. This could be another reason he could not help being the only target while Fujinami was one of those who received stocks of Recruit Cosmos and were targeted. Arai's struggle against those in power was visible via his press conferences while Fujinami did nothing. While Arai was fighting against those in power by himself, he had before him thrust the word "arrest" by the mass media including *Yomiuri* the day before his death. Ueda (Mihira, 1998)

calls such a way of reporting by the media “the report as if [they] became a cat’s-paw of the prosecution” (p. 20). That may show well the characteristics of the Japanese media, in which the “employees” who easily alter their opinions and behavior to please those in power deal with information without criticizing. It is already mentioned that the prosecution was actually the most influential/powerful among such organizations at the time of Arai’s case. It can also be guessed that the LDP, to which Arai belonged, and Nikko Securities, with which Arai had stock dealings, might have had a hand, with the prosecution, in placing the responsibility for any wrongdoing upon Arai. If this is true, the prosecution won in that struggle beyond doubt. As mentioned, in fact, Arai faced the prosecution alone. It is reasonable that Arai, as aforementioned as well, said in his last press conference that Japanese society would cross him out.

Either way, the responsibility of the Japanese media that formed the Japanese society that made Arai feel discriminated against ethnically and led him to choose death finally by catering to the feelings of the influential/powerful organizations like the prosecution and the LDP, is very heavy. Newspapers were treated especially as representative of the Japanese media in this paper because they are influential enough to make the people, in the wording of Kase, “worship” (Fukuda, 1975, p. 66) them. However, it is shameful that such newspapers were the closest to that kind of

influential/powerful organization and sentenced Arai to “arrest.” It is not too much to say that Arai would not have chosen death if the newspapers of the time had been on the side of the people, not on the side of that kind of influential/powerful organization, and had collected news material with a critical attitude against such organizations and offered their readers material by which to fairly think of and judge both Arai and the prosecution.

It is hoped that the Japanese media including the newspapers will become a true watchdog as soon as possible and correspond regarding the influential/powerful organizations with a critical attitude. In addition, it is necessary for the Japanese media to educate and train professional communicators like journalists and writers who can select the words and phrases that make it possible for various kinds of people to be accepted in Japanese society, and to send messages based on the words and phrases to the public because now the diversity of identities cannot be avoided. The construction of Japanese society that would make everyone including *zainichi* Koreans feel happy surely depends on the Japanese media. In fact, it is urgent our country reform the Japanese media, not Japanese politics or anything else.

Finally, I would like to appreciate herein Arai’s great attachment to Japan in spite of that country’s behaviors of the past. I would also like to tell him in heaven that the political reforms of which he urged the necessity are being realized, albeit

gradually, and that all he did in their regard was not in vain.

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE KOMATSUGAWA CASE

August 22, 1958, p. 9

学校給仕浮ぶ

東京 女高生殺し



東京江戸川の
小松川高
校の給仕
さん、
芳江さん
の太田芳江
さん(左)殺

し事件につき小松川署捜査本部は
怪電話の若い男を洗ったところ二

十一日夜千葉県市川市内居住某高
校給仕M(左)が浮んだ。調べでは
Mは芳江さんが友人のところへ行
くといつて家を出た際残して行つ
たカバンの中から発見された手紙
のあて先になつてゐる男で、いま
までも数回はがきを芳江さんから
もらつてゐる。

Mは犯行のあつた十七日午後四
時ごろ外出、同夜は帰宅せず十
八日朝になつてひよつこり帰つ
て来た。怪電話のあつた二十一
日は同六時すぎ出かけており、
小松川署に電話のあつた午前七
時十五分には十分間にあう時間
であり、Mのアリバイを洗つて
ゐる。

昭和33年8月29日

(金曜日)

信宣

宣

女高生 殺し二人の犯人？と電話問答

名は堀田、二角関係さ

電話はこれが最後、完全犯罪だ

東京小松川高校定時制二年生太田芳江さん(二七)を殺した犯人と名乗る人物から讀賣新聞(東京)社会部あて何回も電話がかかっているが、二十七日夜と二十八日朝早く別人の声でそれぞれ「犯人はおれだ」と二人の男からまた電話がかかってきた。二十七日夜の電話は同夜九時五十九分から十三分間にわたって浅草田原町公衆電話から「オレは堀田四郎という犯人だ。殺した動機は三角関係からだ。自首したいが、十時半に上野駅ホームで親友に会う。そのうえお会いしたい」と凄惨切な態度でいつてきたもので本社記者が上野駅前へかけつけたが、その男はなぜか姿を現わなかった。これに対し二十八日朝の電話は「夏休み前

いまの五回(第一回は讀賣新聞社へ、第二回は小松川署へいずれも犯行を知らせた電話、四回目はクシを送り返した。七回目には「調査一課長あて鑑と写真を送った」という電話)もつづき、新聞社にも警察にも電話しない」と話し出した。

つまったが「そんなことはないえねえよ。ヤバイからな」
「犯人は二人だろう？」
「答」オレ一人だよ。そういえば屋上で死体から証拠物品をとつていたとき三人の話しがすかに聞えていた。(天文観測に同様の男

から計画した殺人で完全犯罪だから絶対にわからない。犯行後も全く健康的な生活を送っているよ」と着々とした態度で現場の死体の状況、クシ、鑑などを送った事実を二十九分間にわたってことまかに告げた。しかも真犯人でなくては知り得ないことを説明しているため、有力容疑者として小松川署捜査本部で追及している電話がかかってきたのは二十八日午前七時三十四分。昨夜の「堀田四郎」と名乗る男よりハリのあつた声だ。「堀田」の打ちしおれたせっぱつまったものと違つて世の中をあき驚かすものもこれのような調子。「昨夜の上野の男はデタラメだ。犯人はおれだ。オレのかけた電話は二、四、七、

生徒が上つていた。オレは死体に三十分ほど腰かけてやりすごしたよ。死体の顔が右斜めに向いていたら。あれは穴に入るとき窮屈なんで無理に押し込んだためさ。(犯行現場は全くこの通りだった)それから顔に血をぬぐうハンカチをかけておいてやったんだがなア、オレのB型の血のついているヤツさ。シメた(絞殺した)ところば屋上の時計台だよ。

「クシや鑑をなぜ送った。」
「答」協力さ。(嘲々クシと二結に彼女のびんせんを破いて左上すみにオレのB型の血をつけてやったのに捜査本部はこうして公表しないんだ。事実これは捜査本部に届いていた。長さ二センチ幅二センチ)

**DOCUMENTS
CAPTURED AS
RECEIVED**

新女學生

座談調で調へに答へ

日米情報交換基本法に署名する者（左）

意 富 集 刊 月
【月報雑誌刊(朝夕刊)330円・郵送一月分(郵料共)360円】

女高生殺人の李が書いた小説

小説『悪く奴の全文』

「悪く奴」は、女高生殺人事件の真相を暴く。事件の中心人物、李の行動と心理を、作者の鋭い観察眼と想像力で描き出す。事件の経緯、人物の背景、そして事件の真実が、読者の前に鮮やかに浮かび上がる。この小説は、事件の真相を追求するだけでなく、人間の心理の深淵を探究する力作である。

事件の中心人物、李の行動と心理を、作者の鋭い観察眼と想像力で描き出す。事件の経緯、人物の背景、そして事件の真実が、読者の前に鮮やかに浮かび上がる。この小説は、事件の真相を追求するだけでなく、人間の心理の深淵を探究する力作である。

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(E)

現場はオレの家から百メートル……」

そっくり現場の



李 珍宇

『も悪い奴』

「鎮宇」について小松川署捜査本部はさる四月二十日、東京

業にまちがいないと断定、本格的な取調べを行っており、李

みられる李の短編小説が三日発売された。讀賣新聞社が公募

話十五枚)で、一日逮捕と同時に李の自宅から押収した日記

ことが判つた。原稿は芳江さんを殺した二日前の先月十九日

生々しい迫真力を持っている。(小説中カッコ内は生なうび

.....

さういふ方し、いふやうな男が目にふれた

息の母を二つに合は

ちの易はさきま
 変は目でみるり
 かつからいどす

にしまひました。ところが、

1871-1872, 1873-1874, 1875-1876, 1877-1878, 1879-1880, 1881-1882, 1883-1884, 1885-1886, 1887-1888, 1889-1890, 1891-1892, 1893-1894, 1895-1896, 1897-1898, 1899-1900, 1901-1902, 1903-1904, 1905-1906, 1907-1908, 1909-1910, 1911-1912, 1913-1914, 1915-1916, 1917-1918, 1919-1920, 1921-1922, 1923-1924, 1925-1926, 1927-1928, 1929-1930, 1931-1932, 1933-1934, 1935-1936, 1937-1938, 1939-1940, 1941-1942, 1943-1944, 1945-1946, 1947-1948, 1949-1950, 1951-1952, 1953-1954, 1955-1956, 1957-1958, 1959-1960, 1961-1962, 1963-1964, 1965-1966, 1967-1968, 1969-1970, 1971-1972, 1973-1974, 1975-1976, 1977-1978, 1979-1980, 1981-1982, 1983-1984, 1985-1986, 1987-1988, 1989-1990, 1991-1992, 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000, 2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 2007-2008, 2009-2010, 2011-2012, 2013-2014, 2015-2016, 2017-2018, 2019-2020, 2021-2022, 2023-2024, 2025-2026, 2027-2028, 2029-2030, 2031-2032, 2033-2034, 2035-2036, 2037-2038, 2039-2040, 2041-2042, 2043-2044, 2045-2046, 2047-2048, 2049-2050, 2051-2052, 2053-2054, 2055-2056, 2057-2058, 2059-2060, 2061-2062, 2063-2064, 2065-2066, 2067-2068, 2069-2070, 2071-2072, 2073-2074, 2075-2076, 2077-2078, 2079-2080, 2081-2082, 2083-2084, 2085-2086, 2087-2088, 2089-2090, 2091-2092, 2093-2094, 2095-2096, 2097-2098, 2099-2100, 2101-2102, 2103-2104, 2105-2106, 2107-2108, 2109-2110, 2111-2112, 2113-2114, 2115-2116, 2117-2118, 2119-2120, 2121-2122, 2123-2124, 2125-2126, 2127-2128, 2129-2130, 2131-2132, 2133-2134, 2135-2136, 2137-2138, 2139-2140, 2141-2142, 2143-2144, 2145-2146, 2147-2148, 2149-2150, 2151-2152, 2153-2154, 2155-2156, 2157-2158, 2159-2160, 2161-2162, 2163-2164, 2165-2166, 2167-2168, 2169-2170, 2171-2172, 2173-2174, 2175-2176, 2177-2178, 2179-2180, 2181-2182, 2183-2184, 2185-2186, 2187-2188, 2189-2190, 2191-2192, 2193-2194, 2195-2196, 2197-2198, 2199-2200, 2201-2202, 2203-2204, 2205-2206, 2207-2208, 2209-2210, 2211-2212, 2213-2214, 2215-2216, 2217-2218, 2219-2220, 2221-2222, 2223-2224, 2225-2226, 2227-2228, 2229-2230, 2231-2232, 2233-2234, 2235-2236, 2237-2238, 2239-2240, 2241-2242, 2243-2244, 2245-2246, 2247-2248, 2249-2250, 2251-2252, 2253-2254, 2255-2256, 2257-2258, 2259-2260, 2261-2262, 2263-2264, 2265-2266, 2267-2268, 2269-2270, 2271-2272, 2273-2274, 2275-2276, 2277-2278, 2279-2280, 2281-2282, 2283-2284, 2285-2286, 2287-2288, 2289-2290, 2291-2292, 2293-2294, 2295-2296, 2297-2298, 2299-2300, 2301-2302, 2303-2304, 2305-2306, 2307-2308, 2309-2310, 2311-2312, 2313-2314, 2315-2316, 2317-2318, 2319-2320, 2321-2322, 2323-2324, 2325-2326, 2327-2328, 2329-2330, 2331-2332, 2333-2334, 2335-2336, 2337-2338, 2339-2340, 2341-2342, 2343-2344, 2345-2346, 2347-2348, 2349-2350, 2351-2352, 2353-2354, 2355-2356, 2357-2358, 2359-2360, 2361-2362, 2363-2364, 2365-2366, 2367-2368, 2369-2370, 2371-2372, 2373-2374, 2375-2376, 2377-2378, 2379-2380, 2381-2382, 2383-2384, 2385-2386, 2387-2388, 2389-2390, 2391-2392, 2393-2394, 2395-2396, 2397-2398, 2399-2400, 2401-2402, 2403-2404, 2405-2406, 2407-2408, 2409-2410, 2411-2412, 2413-2414, 2415-2416, 2417-2418, 2419-2420, 2421-2422, 2423-2424, 2425-2426, 2427-2428, 2429-2430, 2431-2432, 2433-2434, 2435-2436, 2437-2438, 2439-2440, 2441-2442, 2443-2444, 2445-2446, 2447-2448, 2449-2450, 2451-2452, 2453-2454, 2455-2456, 2457-2458, 2459-2460, 2461-2462, 2463-2464, 2465-2466, 2467-2468, 2469-2470, 2471-2472, 2473-2474, 2475-2476, 2477-2478, 2479-2480, 2481-2482, 2483-2484, 2485-2486, 2487-2488, 2489-2490, 2491-2492, 2493-2494, 2495-2496, 2497-2498, 2499-2500, 2501-2502, 2503-2504, 2505-2506, 2507-2508, 2509-2510, 2511-2512, 2513-2514, 2515-2516, 2517-2518, 2519-2520, 2521-2522, 2523-2524, 2525-2526, 2527-2528, 2529-2530, 2531-2532, 2533-2534, 2535-2536, 2537-2538, 2539-2540, 2541-2542, 2543-2544, 2545-2546, 2547-2548, 2549-2550, 2551-2552, 2553-2554, 2555-2556, 2557-2558, 2559-2560, 2561-2562, 2563-2564, 2565-2566, 2567-2568, 2569-2570, 2571-2572, 2573-2574, 2575-2576, 2577-2578, 2579-2580, 2581-2582, 2583-2584, 2585-2586, 2587-2588, 2589-2590, 2591-2592, 2593-2594, 2595-2596, 2597-2598, 2599-2600, 2601-2602, 2603-2604, 2605-2606, 2607-2608, 2609-2610, 2611-2612, 2613-2614, 26

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE KIM HI-LO CASE

February 21, 1968, p. 15

昭和43年2月21日（水曜日）

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ライフル魔と一問一答 本
社記者“自爆”も覚悟のうえ
ダイナマイトもある

【静岡】静岡清水市のクラブでライフル銃を盗取し、二人を射殺して逃走、同県静岡市本川根町千の「なごみ屋旅館」で旅館の家族や宿人十二人をライフルで射殺し、一人をライフルで射殺したとして入獄したライフル射撃魔の近藤安弘（三十二）は二十一日午前二時三十分、焼死新聞静岡支局が同旅館にかけた電話に出て「旅館の客人を人質にして二階に押

し込めている。このうち一人は「ライフル銃を盗取し、二人を射殺して逃走、同県静岡市本川根町千の「なごみ屋旅館」で旅館の家族や宿人十二人をライフルで射殺し、一人をライフルで射殺したとして入獄したライフル射撃魔の近藤安弘（三十二）は二十一日午前二時三十分、焼死新聞静岡支局が同旅館にかけた電話に出て「旅館の客人を人質にして二階に押

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本
社
記
者

傍若無人のライフル魔



金に「ふじみ屋」旅館の中に閉じ込められている人たち

一日、金の要求で旅館にはいった記者が撮影

暗やみにマイト爆発

“ゴースト・タウン”寸又峽

【寸又峽本社特記】「バーバリー」夜更け、暗闇に浮かび上がったライフル魔の弾丸が響き、闇の底をくぐりながらダイナマイトが燃え上がる。ライフル魔の弾丸が、二十一日夜は、暗闇の底をくぐりながらダイナマイトが燃え上がる。ライフル魔の弾丸が、二十一日夜は、暗闇の底をくぐりながらダイナマイトが燃え上がる。

警官百六十人 二晩クギづけ

約百六十人の警官が、二晩クギづけに。約百六十人の警官が、二晩クギづけに。約百六十人の警官が、二晩クギづけに。

覚せい剤うつ「金」

脱出の気配にすぐ銃口




通路検問所で警戒する機動隊員

ライフル魔「金」の動き

11.45	ふじみ屋と隣からライフル魔の動き
12.20	機動隊本部と現場に電話「自由な」やるだけのことやれど、お宝を盗む
12.40	お宝を盗む
12.45	30分ころから、山にダイナマイトを埋め込む
13.28	同じく電話「NHK放送は、準備中」
13.30	同じく電話「ラジオ金大蔵に、お宝を盗む」
15.07	同じく電話「TBS記者会、お宝を盗む」
15.50	同じく電話「文芸春秋、お宝を盗む」
16.15	同じく電話「毎日、お宝を盗む」
16.52	同じく電話「読売、お宝を盗む」
16.57	同じく電話「朝日、お宝を盗む」
17.08	同じく電話「毎日、お宝を盗む」

ライフル魔「金」の動き。ライフル魔「金」の動き。ライフル魔「金」の動き。ライフル魔「金」の動き。ライフル魔「金」の動き。

覚せい剤うつ「金」。覚せい剤うつ「金」。覚せい剤うつ「金」。覚せい剤うつ「金」。覚せい剤うつ「金」。



金に「ふじみ屋」旅館の中に閉じ込められている人たち

—21日、金の要求にはいった記者が



道路検問所で警戒する県警機動隊員

覚せい剤うつ「金」

脱出の気配にすぐ銃口

ざられるような寒さのなかを、民などに変装した警官たちが、ものかけや木立をタテ、動きとも出ず、じっと立ちつくしている。

自首のすめがうまくゆかず、一晩経って徹夜の待機となったわけだが、金が立てこもっている同旅館からは、戸をぬけて、かすかにあかりがこぼれる。

夜にはいても、金の「荒れ方」は、一向におさまらなかつた。

この日午後、報道陣代表として「とによると」。旅館にはいった二人の記者の語ら。

この日午後、報道陣代表として「とによると」。旅館にはいった二人の記者の語ら。

人質の人たちは、旅館一階の金のある六畳と廊下をほきんだ同かい側の十畳の二階にとじこめられ、六畳間には望月さんの長女栄子（二女）と見守る長男和樹（三）の三人と宿泊客数人が一緒にいる。十畳間の人たちは、金のすきを見て、三人が脱出したが、残った人たちはすきをうかがいながら、ふと金を盗みかかっている。

二十一日夕方は、金と人質の人たちの食事は、望月さん夫婦が作り、昼食は二階でみんなが一緒に食べた。前夜からほとんど寝ていない金

づかう 家族たち

【名古屋】ふじみ旅館の宿泊名簿から、加藤末一さん（五）と五人の社員が人質になっているとみられる名古屋市中区今池町四の五四、吉岡電気工業会社では、二十一日夜は、五人の社員が徹夜で事務所を泊まり込み、安否を気にかけて、ひっきりなしにかかってくる家族からの電話の応対などに



「金」が閉じこもるふじみ旅館は、同日午後になって覚せい剤を注射しはじめ、神経を張りつめており、人質になった人々も疲れと恐怖で虚脱状態。部屋の外に出ようとすると、すぐ銃口を向ける金におどかされる。

**DOCUMENTS
CAPTURED AS
RECEIVED**

**DOCUMENTS
CAPTURED AS
RECEIVED**

次第にいらだつ「金」

33時間の恐怖語る主婦

“自爆”の声に胸も凍る

[illegible]

ドーン、ドーンと夜中に表のガラス戸をたたく音がするので、出てみると、金がいきなりライフルを突きつけて「全員集めて二階に上がれ。オレはいま人をたくさん殺してきたんだ」。二十日午後十

「がやつてきた。マイクを使って一頁目しよ」と話しながらがやつてきたのが二人にがやつてきたがまだくもつてしまつた。その刑事さんたちに命がいきなりライフルを撃つ。(このあとと新聞紙やテレビの人がやつてゐる。夫體とさういふ人を結んで撃つた。その銃を聞くとバツ子どもたちは部屋すみにかたまつて閉居合せ合つてゐた。

「いよ」と返事していらした。ライフルをたたくに響くやうになつた。そのうになつて、子どもたちはおひたひた自守するやうになり、甥子は熱出した。ほとんどおぼろけ、食事も少なし。

お客さんたちの中にはいつたい、どうなるのだ。警察を待たしているんだ。という人も、みなが「とにかく子どもだけはかしてやれと急に頼んぐくれ

刑事さんや裁判官の人が、どうもいろいろ連絡が来るので、もうそろそろおれはつてくれのかと思ふたが、はいと待つてゐる。そのうちテレビなどが事件や報道しはじめてく、金は二千万笑ひながら見てゐる。「みんさん、食事を作つてやれといふので、ミツ社長は簡単なものを作つた。王ともしはちにもミツやジュウさんへおれ、おじさん、こいけいかなど」と聞いた。和製不ろこがこいけいかなど、金声が聞けた。

人質の家族

手すゝ、奥裏をたどる音いたる。



和樹ちゃん

えだが、親子（のりこ）（へこ）はま
だミスボウソウがなおっていない
し、この寒さの夜中に、子どもが
け外へ出すのはかえって危険だわ

「おじさん、こわいかい」などと
と聞いた。和蘭天気が「こわくな
金」の音が聞こえた。

286

野田議員は、金の持ちこた旅

を断る。


野田議員は、金の持ちこた旅を断る。野田議員は、金の持ちこた旅を断る。野田議員は、金の持ちこた旅を断る。

人質をえびに入浴

小林さんには半信半疑。小林さんには半信半疑。小林さんには半信半疑。小林さんには半信半疑。小林さんには半信半疑。

旅費の金はいくらだ。

この夜、金持ちの口には。この夜、金持ちの口には。この夜、金持ちの口には。この夜、金持ちの口には。この夜、金持ちの口には。



金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。金持ちの口には。

緊張の警官

防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。防弾チョッキ。

緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。緊張の警官。

三歸つた人“根はいい人”と信頼

「ふじみ屋」の玄關で構る加藤さん(右)と握手する金

本部長も承した。毎日
よく食いつなぐ生活は一体
で続くのか。

信頼

「しなかったし、逮捕できる
なかった。それにしても刑
が何回来てもラチがあかず
度がはつきりしないのに
「した」という。

「すぐ岐阜へ帰るか、別れ
ることが気になっていま
したとか、うれいとか、
「持ちはない」

出てきた加藤一志さんは
「金さんがばくの顔を見

屋ようかん

調子にのってぶつ

金、牧師介添えに、記者会見、

殺人犯金は二十三日午後八時四
十五分から、この目二回目の、記
者会見、を約十五分開行なった。
韓国人牧師を介添えに調子に乗っ
てぶつた。「わたしの主張した朝
鮮人にたいする人種差別の訴えに
同調して、東京から今夜弁護士と
作家、大学教授がくる。先生たち
がくるので部屋がよこれていては
いけないし、食事の世話もあるの
で望月さんの奥さん（二十二日に
帰った英子さんのこと）に二十四
日朝来ってもらう。急のためだが、
これは人質ではないから騒がない
でほしい。人種差別にたいするわ
たしの希望は七割方達せられた」
とアルコールのおいをさせてい
た。

文化人ゲル


ープが会う

「人種偏見をなくするための若い

って意見がちがうので、ここでは
答えられない」「いったい、この
事件をどう思っているんだ」など
やりあう一幕があった。

文化人グループの会」の代表、弁
護士山根二郎（三）同角南俊輔（三）
同斎藤浩二（三）中大助教授伊藤成
彦、作家金達寿の五氏は二十三日
午後十時から約一時間、金に会っ
た。このあとの記者会見で、山根、
角南、岡井護士は「東大日高教授ら
の金に訴える言葉を録音して、持
参、聞かせた。われわれは、自首
を呼びかけたのではない。金が訴
えた問題（人種差別のこと）は日
本人にとって、重要なことだ。金
の主体的な行為を大局にたって考
えたいということです」と語った
が、そこで約百人の報道陣からざ
わめきがおこった。
「金は殺人犯だ。人質を何人も
とっている。この問題は考えない
のか」これに対して角南氏は「そ
の点は……われわれ弁護士の中で
も意見がいろいろあるのだ……」
そばから山根氏も「これは人によ

“ホツとした”人質の六人



もう安心寸又
映に生氣戻る

の金を訪れた。文化人グループの
のアピールの一節。まるで、同
族の英雄扱いだった。

金娘(老)二。小学生のと交束父
が死亡。母が再婚、複雑な家庭
育った。小さいときから民族的
別に苦しめられたというのは、
そらく事実である。しかし、だ
らといって「からだはがん體そ
もの。顔の国もさむめて早い

力ミ」らし、そのあとで死ぬ
 とだった。ところが、人質をタ
 にろう城し、記者団がつかかけ
 と「清水を舞台にしたのは、清
 宮にひとアツ吹かせようと思っ
 からだ」とエスカレートし、や
 て「清水宮の屋上で警官隊に臨
 するつもりだった」と臆じしを
 けた。さらに「それは清水宮の
 衆刑事ののしったからだ」と

「このダイナマイトは、昨年秋季の第一次羽田事件のさい、三派全学連の学生に渡そうとして準備したもの。車で羽田まで行ったんだ」としゃべったという。

ベトナム戦争のことも記者団との館の話題にのせ、自己の正当化に利用したこともあった。その記者会見が、結局、金にトドメを刺す事となったのは、かなり皮肉

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

一人グループプラン、民族公園としてとらえられ、金のもちがたで苦しましめられ、金持は人であるというので、梅蔵は、そのレトリックの面白さで、

民族問題にすり替え

殺人犯が「検事」に化ける

「金、金の責任を多ういた」は、民族の責任を多ういたという行動だ。これは捕虜後、文化に原旅組の金を使った、文化人グループのデビューの一編であって、民族の雄飛だった。

金銀屋。小学生の主妻友が死んだ。母が婿家、親類家庭に殺す。小宮とさかたは民族的差別に告められたいといひは、おそろしき事実であるが、だからといって「かなたはかきく舞のもの。」の題意もつけない

点から見て、甘藷の行状がこの時の初の犯罪行為では、手帳に憑いていふ通り「二匹オオカニ」らしく、そのあと大蛇めぐりなど。ところが、人間多様性への感心、起回りがめづかる「演劇舞台にしたのは、清水麗にひてエスカレーター」想ったからだとか吹かされて、やがて「演劇の歴史七重喜慶に転落したのだ」と同じく小宮つた。さらに「毛は腹にしきつる」。この「毛は腹にしきつる」は、前作の「毛は腹にしきつる」のしたからだと表


とくれば、金のもとなつてと人々が、民族騒動として受け、金のもとなつてと受け、金は文化がないうのの得意裏面。このグルートの対照は、昨年の「ダナトマイヤ」は、昨年第一夜事件の件について、三原孝連の学生生活記事として準備したもの。根田まよ行ったんにと

ベトナム戦争のこと記者とともとの間の話にのせて、自己の正統化に利用したこともあった。の配役を金銀が、結局、金と小全制かなり早いもの。

[illegible]

れたいが、たいしたことはない。
という。

ご家庭と信用金庫で育てる
可愛いお子さまの教育資金
〈信ちゃん〉預金

 **信用金庫**

毎月ムリなく一定額を一定期間積立て

①

ああ、ふがない
相手が強いとシリ込み

金事件で語る
会田京大教授



不正を見過す社会
これは、ぼくらの毎日の西園で
もよくわかる。電車のおかげで
無人にたばこを吸つてゐる無
法人、みんなが並んでゐるとこ
ろへ廻りこんでくるヤツがある。
それやみんな不愉快に思ひなが
らう。注意しないはずですよ。
よ。日本だとそれは無法者と注

四段なんという心身ともに強いインテリがいた。日本流に武士といつてもいいし、欧米流に貴族といつてもいい。それが戦後はどんどん減つていって、武士や貴族が完全に消えてしまった。戦後二十年の教育、戦後二十年の言論、政治、社会の成果が出た。殿殿の續仕上げができたというほかないですわね」

よ、きみのうごこちはあつて、そして、金というくらいにない。だから、日本には金という特別の財産があり、事業がある。ところが、あなたが行きたいようにしないで、相手の人々を教して、なんの関係もない人たちを費にしている。能ですよ。それに因らねて、あなたたの行為をうやにしないで、努力したい」とはいった何事だ。こんな行為が少でないことになったら、こんなことをやってみて

ね。ぼくの在籍のしかた、ことばづかちも願ったかもしれないけれど、君なりの行をも決してしつが、君なないんだ。とかないが事にしてみれば気が持てて事多取拾拍にかならず。もう、いまは勇気あるにやまねわ。自他ともに落ちうとこころで落ちた、まっとうなふがいない日本だといふ証明を、こんなとの事件はやつてくれた。

武士は完全に消えた
旧制、高校教育には真の最期のスポーツがあり、柔道、剣道の三

カラーテレビ
一流メーカー 割引販売



ステレオ
音化装置

死者もどき“特攻班”

‘最前線’で待ちに待つ



【東京24日電】東京近郊、千葉県市川市で、自衛隊の訓練場跡に、ある奇妙な光景が現れた。それは、まるで戦時中の特攻隊の遺跡か、あるいは戦後の特攻隊員の墓場か、といった印象を受ける。そこには、数人の死体らしきものが横たわっており、その周囲には、戦時中の遺物や、戦後の生活の痕跡が散らばっている。この場所は、自衛隊の訓練場跡であるが、なぜこのような光景が現れたのか、その真相は不明である。しかし、この光景は、戦時中の特攻隊の歴史を思い起こさせるものであり、我々が忘れてはいけない歴史の教訓を伝えるものである。

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月・潮

【東京24日電】千葉県市川市で、自衛隊の訓練場跡に、ある奇妙な光景が現れた。それは、まるで戦時中の特攻隊の遺跡か、あるいは戦後の特攻隊員の墓場か、といった印象を受ける。そこには、数人の死体らしきものが横たわっており、その周囲には、戦時中の遺物や、戦後の生活の痕跡が散らばっている。この場所は、自衛隊の訓練場跡であるが、なぜこのような光景が現れたのか、その真相は不明である。しかし、この光景は、戦時中の特攻隊の歴史を思い起こさせるものであり、我々が忘れてはいけない歴史の教訓を伝えるものである。

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口東紅茶

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APPENDIX C

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE LUCIE CASE

わいせつ事件で逮捕の社長
1 2000. 10. 13 被害の訴え、他に5人 大量 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 1034 字 05 段 写真
のビデオ、写真を押収

◆六本木クラブの閉店後に連れ出す

東京・六本木のクラブで働くカナダ人女性が、薬物などを飲まされてわいせつな行為をされた準強制わいせつ事件で、この女性以外に少なくとも五人の外国人女性が、資産運営会社社長の織原誠二容疑者(48)に同様の行為をされたと、警視庁捜査一課などに話していることが、十二日わかった。中には意識がもうろうとする中で写真を撮られたという証言もある。同課は同容疑者が所有するマンションなどの捜索で大量のビデオテープや写真類を押収しており、行方不明になっている英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)の失そうにつながるものがないかについても分析を急いでいる。

被害を証言したのは、東京・六本木にある幾つかのクラブなどで働いていた五人の白人女性で、いずれも店が終わった後に連れ出されたという。

同課などによると、五人は数年前から昨年にかけて、客として来店した織原容疑者から閉店後に同容疑者のマンションなどに誘われ、酒などを飲まされて意識がもうろうとする中でわいせつな行為をされた、と証言した。中には一日以上も眠り続け、気がついた時には全裸でふろ場にいたというケースや、「意識が混濁する中で写真を撮られた」と話し、この時、同容疑者のマンションに大量のビデオテープが積み上げられていたのを目撃したとするケースもあった。

刑事訴訟法では、準強制わいせつ罪など被害者の告訴を必要とする事件は、犯人を知った日から半年以内に告訴しなければならないと定められている。カナダ人女性の場合は最近になって容疑者が特定されたが、五人は当初から同容疑者を認識しており、刑事事件としての立件は難しいとみられているが、同課は同容疑者の行動を示す事実として注目している。

また、その後の調べで、同容疑者は資産運営会社など複数の会社の社長を務める一方で、夜は連日のように、堪能な英語を使って六本木の外国人女性が働くクラブに姿を見せていたことがわかった。

ルーシーさん失そう事件では、失そう後に友人にかかった電話の発信元が、同容疑者が契約していた携帯電話であることが判明、同課では、同容疑者が失そうの何らかの経緯を知っているとみている。海に誘う手口はカナダ人女性を誘い出した手口と酷似しており、同課は同様の手法で頻繁に外国人女性を連れ出していたとみて、同容疑者を追及している。

「セメントまみれ」織原容疑者？ 英
1 2000. 10. 15 女性失そう5日後、マンション管理 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 640 字 04 段
人が目撃

カナダ人女性に対する準強制わいせつ事件で、警視庁捜査一課が十四日に搜索した織原城二容疑者(48)の神奈川県三浦市内のマンションで七月六日夜、同容疑者とみられる男が管理人とトラブルになり、通報で神奈川県警三崎署員が駆け付けていたことが十四日、同課の調べでわかった。英国人ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)失そうから五日後のことで、同課で関連を調べている。

調べによると、七月六日深夜、同市三崎町諸磯のリゾートマンションの管理人から、「不審者がいるので来てほしい」との通報が同署にあった。署員が急行して説明を求めたところ、男はここ何年も来ていない住人と説明した。

同課は十四日、管理人から事情聴取し、〈1〉トラブルの前夜、男が泥のついたスコップを持って浜辺を歩いていた〈2〉男が業者を呼び、同容疑者の部屋の隣室のカギを付け替え、中でセメントにまみれていた——などの目撃証言を得た。管理人は不審に思っていたといい、同課は近隣のカギ取扱店などで聞き込みを進めている。

男が持っていた身分証明書などから、男は同容疑者とみられる。

同課は、何年もマンションを使っていなかったというのに唐突に現れたことや、海岸での不審な行動、ルーシーさん失そうと時期が近いことなどに着目、慎重に捜査を進めている。

同課はまた、十三、十四の二日間にわたってマンションの同容疑者の部屋を搜索、セメント粉や砂片とみられる微粉を浴室から採取した。同課が十四日、同市内の海岸や洞くつなどで行った搜索では、手掛かりは得られなかった。

わいせつ事件 プリペイド式携帯30
1 2000. 10. 16 台以上押収 織原容疑者、女性との 東京朝刊 2社 38 頁 582 字 03 段
連絡に？

◆女性との連絡に使う？

東京・六本木のクラブで働くカナダ人女性への準強制わいせつ事件で、警視庁捜査一課が織原城二容疑者(48)の自宅などから押収したプリペイド式携帯電話は、未使用を含めて三十台を超すことが、十五日わかった。同容疑者の携帯電話は、英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)失そう後に友人にかかった電話の発信元だったことが判明しているが、この電話もプリペイド式だったことがわかり、同課は大量の電話を持っていた目的を追及している。

同課などによると、大量のプリペイド式携帯電話は、東京・赤坂のマンションなどから見つかった。メーカーが出荷する際の箱でまとめ買いしており、未使用のものもあった。

ルーシーさんは七月一日、「客に携帯電話を買ってもらおう」と言って外出、行方不明になった。二日後の七月三日夕、友人の携帯電話に「タカギ・アキラ」を名乗る男から「ルーシーは無事だが、千葉の新興宗教団体に入信したので戻れない」と告げる不審な電話がか

かった。

同課などの調べで、この電話は同容疑者が契約する携帯電話だったことが判明、その後の調べでプリペイド式だったことが新たにわかった。カナダ人女性以外に少なくとも五人の外国人女性が同容疑者からわいせつな行為をされたと証言しており、同課は同容疑者が、女性との連絡用にプリペイド式携帯電話を使っていた可能性があるともみて調べている。

不明のルーシーさん、織原容疑者
1 2000. 10. 17 を接客？ 6月下旬に 元同僚の英 東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 743 字 04 段
人女性証言

今年七月に行方不明になった英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)が働いていた東京・六本木のバーに六月下旬、カナダ人女性への準強制わいせつ事件で逮捕された織原城二容疑者(48)とみられる男が訪れ、ルーシーさんが接客していたことが十六日、同店の英国人女性の証言でわかった。ルーシーさん失そう後、友人にかかった不審な電話は、同容疑者が契約する携帯電話が発信元だったこともわかっており、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部はこの女性から事情聴取して似顔絵を作製、男が同容疑者とみて聞き込みを進めている。

この女性は、ルーシーさんと同じ店で働いていた二十歳代の英国人で、すでに帰国している。

証言によると、男はルーシーさんが行方不明になる九日ほど前の六月下旬、同店に一人で訪れた。ルーシーさんが接客し、高級シャンパンや高級ブランデーを何本か注文した。

店内にいたのは約三時間。ルーシーさんと楽しそうに話し込み、料金は現金払いだった。英語が堪能で、日本語で話しかけないように断っていた。女性にとって、男は初めて見る客だったという。

これまでの調べで、同容疑者は五年以上も前から、外国人女性がいる六本木のクラブに頻繁に出入りしていたことがわかっているが、いずれの店でも偽名を使って名刺も渡さず、身元を隠すような感じだったことが共通していた。

特捜本部では、男の似顔絵と同容疑者が似ていることや、ルーシーさんの友人にかかった電話が同容疑者が契約するプリペイド式携帯電話が発信元だったことから、この男が同容疑者だったとみて調べている。

一方、特捜本部はこの日、東京・銀座の関係先を搜索した。また、これまでに押収された薬品類は数種類の医療用睡眠薬で、外国人女性以外に日本人女性も被害に遭っていたことが新たにわかった。

わいせつ事件 織原容疑者、写真
1 2000. 10. 18 コピー提出を拒否 プレジャーボート購入の際 東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 706 字 04 段

東京・六本木のクラブで働くカナダ人女性への準強制わいせつ事件で、逮捕された織原城二容疑者(48)が今月一日、横浜市内の船舶販売店でプレジャーボートを購入する際に、顔写真付きの船舶免許証のコピー提出を断っていたことが、十七日、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部の調べでわかった。同容疑者は納品時の航行の際、「沖合で一番深いところはどこか」「海上保安庁の船の特徴は」などと業者に尋ねていた。同容疑者はルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)との接点が浮上しており、特捜本部は不可解な言動の真意について調べている。

特捜本部によると、同容疑者は船舶免許を持っており、今月一日、横浜市鶴見区内の船舶販売店で全長約七メートル、約一トンのボートを三百五十万円で購入した。電話で「どういう船を置いていますか」と問い合わせ、一人で来店。展示品のボートにエンジンをつけるよう注文した。ボートの名義は同容疑者が経営する大阪市内の資産運営会社。代金は三日後に振り込まれたという。

契約時、店員がその後の手続きのために顔写真の付いた船舶免許証のコピーの提出を求めたところ、いったんは提出したが、「写真写りが悪いので返してほしい」などとコピーを返却させた。

同容疑者は「早く乗りたいから」と店をせかし、一週間でボートを納入させた。横浜市内から係留先の三浦市内のマリーナへ航行する際には、操縦する業者に「沖合で一番深いところはどこか」「海上保安庁の船はどんな船か」「何をしたら捕まるか」などと質問を繰り返したという。

特捜本部では、同容疑者がボートを購入した意図や、免許証のコピー提出を嫌がったり、海の深さを気にしたりした理由などについて、調べを進めている。

わいせつ事件 別の女性に準暴行容疑、織原容疑者を再逮捕
1 2000. 10. 28 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 427 字 02 段

東京・六本木で働くカナダ人女性に対する準婦女暴行事件を調べている警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は二十七日、資産管理会社社長の織原城二容疑者(48)を別の外国人女性に対する準婦女暴行容疑で再逮捕した。調べによると、織原容疑者は九七年十月、カナダ人女性を暴行したのと同じ神奈川県逗子市内のマンションに二十歳代の外国人女性を連れ込み、薬物入りの酒などを飲ませて乱暴した疑い。

特捜本部は、このほかにも同様の被害を受けた複数の外国人女性を把握しており、連続暴行事件の全容解明を急ぐとともに、英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)の失そうについても、追及している。

一方、織原容疑者はカナダ人女性に対する暴行の際、「フィリピンのハーブ入りのワイン」と偽って、睡眠導入剤入りの酒を飲ませ、意識をもうろうとさせていたこともわかった。酒を飲んだカナダ人女性は、一瞬のうちに意識を失ったという。

東京地検は再逮捕に先立ち、織原容疑者を準婦女暴行の罪で東京地裁に起訴した。

1 2000. 10. 30 わいせつ事件 織原被告を送検 依 東京朝刊 2社 34頁 290字 01段
然として犯行を否認

外国人女性に対する連続わいせつ事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は二十九日、準婦女暴行の疑いで再逮捕した織原城二被告(48)＝別の準婦女暴行罪で起訴＝を東京地検に送検した。

調べによると、織原被告は一九九七年十月、神奈川県逗子市内に所有するリゾートマンションの一室に、二十歳代の外国人女性を連れ込み、薬物が入った酒などを飲ませて意識をもうろうとさせ、わいせつな行為をした疑い。

同被告はこれまでの調べに対し、「複数の外国人女性を部屋に呼び、酒を飲んだりしたが、合意の上だった」「いろいろな外国人女性と交際したが、相手の名前や顔はよく覚えていない」などと、犯行を否認し続けている。

1 2000. 11. 07 外国人わいせつ事件 来月14日に 東京朝刊 2社 38頁 132字 01段
織原被告の初公判

東京地裁(山室恵裁判長)は6日、東京・六本木で働くカナダ人女性に対する準婦女暴行罪に問われた資産管理会社社長・織原城二被告(48)の初公判を来月14日に開くことを決めた。織原被告は先月27日、起訴された後に別の外国人女性への準婦女暴行容疑で再逮捕、拘置されている。

1 2000. 11. 11 外国人わいせつ事件 織原被告が 東京朝刊 社会 35頁 264字 01段
反論文書

外国人女性に対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、織原城二被告(48)(準婦女暴行罪で起訴)が十日、「外国人女性に対価を支払い、了解を得て性行為に及んだ」として、準婦女暴行罪には該当しないなどと主張する文書を、弁護士を通じて報道各社に送付した。その中で、織原被告は、失そう中の英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)について、「一度だけ外国人クラブで接客を受けたことがある」と、面識があることを認めたが、失そうへの関与は否定している。これに対し、事件を捜査している警視庁の特捜本部は、「文書は被害者の名誉を傷つけるものだ」としている。

1 2000. 11. 18 日本人女性も乱暴 織原被告3度 東京朝刊 社会 39頁 674字 03段
目の逮捕／警視庁

外国人女性に対する連続準婦女暴行事件を調べている警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は十七日、資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)(準婦女暴行罪で起訴)が、三十歳代の日本人女性に、薬物を飲ませてわいせつな行為をしたとして、準婦女暴行の疑いで再逮捕した。織原被告の逮捕は三回目。特捜本部は引き続き、事件の全容解明を急ぐ一方、英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)の失そうについても関連を捜査し

ている。

調べによると、織原被告は今年五月、これまでの二件の暴行事件と同じ神奈川県逗子市内のリゾートマンションに、三十歳代半ばの無職の日本人女性を連れ込み、薬物の入った酒を飲ませて意識をもうろうとさせて乱暴した疑い。

日本人女性は、当時、都内の飲食店で働いていて、客の織原被告と知り合い、誘い出されたという。調べに対し、織原被告は「この件については黙秘します」と話している。

これに先立ち、東京地検は同日、織原被告を二件目の英国人女性に対する準婦女暴行罪で追起訴した。

織原被告は英国人女性に対しては「友人とパーティーをやるので来ないか」とだまし、マンションに連れ込んだこともわかった。

調べによると、東京・六本木のクラブでホステスをしていた被害者の二十歳代の英国人女性は、九七年十月十日、織原被告に「風光明媚なところがあるので食事に行こう」と誘われ、車で神奈川県葉山町内のレストランに行き、一緒に食事を取った。パーティーを名目に連れ込まれたマンションの部屋にはだれもおらず、女性は薬物が入ったとみられるカクテル「ジン・トニック」を飲んだ直後に意識を失ったという。

1 2000. 11. 20 日本人女性も乱暴 織原被告を送
検／警視庁 東京朝刊 2社 38頁 167字 01段

警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は十九日、資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)＝二件の準婦女暴行罪で起訴＝を、日本人女性への準婦女暴行の疑いで東京地検へ送検した。調べによると、織原被告は今年五月、二件の暴行事件と同じ神奈川県逗子市内のリゾートマンションに三十歳代の無職の日本人女性を連れ込み、薬物の入った飲み物を飲ませ乱暴した疑い。

外国人わいせつ事件 織原被告、
1 2000. 12. 08 介抱の「状況証拠」偽造 酔って苦 東京朝刊 社会 39頁 534字 05段
しむ声録音

◆テープ聞かせて被害女性だます

外国人女性らに対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、織原城二被告(48)は犯行後、被害者のカナダ人女性に「あなたが気分が悪くなったので、自分が介抱した」と説明し、その「証拠」として、女性の苦しむような声などを録音したテープを聞かせていたことが、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部の調べでわかった。同本部は、犯行の発覚を防ぐための計画的な工作とみている。

同本部はきょう八日、別の日本人女性への準婦女暴行容疑で、織原被告を再逮捕する方針。逮捕は四回目、被害者は外国人二人、日本人二人となる。

調べによると、織原被告は、最初の逮捕容疑となったカナダ人女性(23)に対する一九九六年三月の暴行事件の際、神奈川県逗子市内のマンションで、「フィリピンのハーブで作ったワイン」と偽って睡眠導入剤入りの酒を飲ませ、女性の意識をもうろうとさせた。

女性は約七時間後にふる場でバスローブ姿で目が覚め、着替えた記憶がなかったため問いただすと、織原被告は「あなたは酔って気分が悪くなり寝込んでしまった。自分が介抱してふろに入れてあげた」と説明し、女性が苦しむような声やシャワーの音が入った録音テープを聞かせていた。女性は「言うことを信じるしかないと思った」と話しているという。

1 2000. 12. 09 連続準婦女暴行事件 織原被告を 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 143 字 01 段
4 度目逮捕／警視庁

外国人女性らに対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は八日、資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)を同容疑で再逮捕した。逮捕は四回目。織原被告は今年六月、神奈川県逗子市内のリゾートマンションに、二十歳代の日本人女性を連れ込み、薬物の入った酒を飲ませて乱暴した疑い。

外国人女性暴行事件 織原被告、
1 2000. 12. 29 5 回目逮捕へ 別の日本人女性暴 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 285 字 02 段
行容疑／警視庁

外国人女性らに対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は二十八日までに、織原城二被告(48)を来月四日にも再逮捕する方針を固めた。別の日本人女性にわいせつ行為をした疑いで、女性がけがをしていることから、同本部は準婦女暴行致傷罪適用を検討している。

調べによると女性は、暴行後に体にケロイド状のけがをしていたが、織原被告は「酔った時にけがをした」と話していたという。同本部は何らかの薬品が使われた可能性もあるとみて、傷の鑑定を進めている。

織原被告はこれまでに四回、準婦女暴行容疑で逮捕、起訴されている。うち二件の公判が始まり、同被告は無罪を主張している。

外国人わいせつ事件 織原被告、5
1 2001. 01. 05 度目の逮捕 日本人女性暴行致傷 東京朝刊 2 社 34 頁 223 字 01 段
容疑／警視庁

外国人女性らに対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は4日、日本人女性への準婦女暴行致傷容疑で、資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)(準婦女暴行罪4件で起訴)を再逮捕した。織原被告の逮捕は5回目。

調べによると、織原被告は昨年1月初旬、これまでの4事件と同じ神奈川県逗子市内のマンションに、20歳代の日本人女性を連れ込み、薬物が入った酒を飲ませて意識をもうろうとした状態にして乱暴、体の一部に約1か月のやけどを負わせた疑い。

1 2001.01.26 外国人女性連続暴行事件 織原被 東京朝刊 2社 38頁 156字 01段
告を5回目起訴

外国人女性らへの連続暴行事件で、東京地検は25日、会社社長織原城二被告(48)を準婦女暴行致傷罪で東京地裁に追起訴。起訴は5回目。起訴状によると、織原被告は昨年1月5日ごろ、神奈川県逗子市のマンションで、20歳代の日本人女性に薬物の入った酒を飲ませ、意識を失わせ乱暴。また、ビデオ撮影の際、女性にやけどをさせた。

外国人女性連続婦女暴行事件 織
1 2001.01.27 原被告を「致死」容疑で再逮捕／警 東京朝刊 社会 39頁 948字 05段
視庁・麻布署

◆豪女性 薬飲ませ10日後死亡

外国人女性らに対する連続準婦女暴行事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は二十六日、資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)＝準婦女暴行事件五件で起訴＝を、薬物を飲ませて乱暴した女性を死亡させたとして婦女暴行致死容疑で再逮捕した。織原被告のマンションなどから押収したビデオテープから、約百人の女性が薬物を飲まされ乱暴されたことが判明しているが、被害者が死亡したケースは初めて。織原被告の逮捕は六回目。

調べによると、織原被告は一九九二年二月中旬、都内に住む英会話講師のオーストラリア人女性(当時二十一歳)を神奈川県逗子市内のリゾートマンションに連れ込み、薬物が入った酒を飲ませて意識をもうろうとさせて乱暴した上、死亡させた疑い。

特捜本部は、押収した入院の内金の預かり証から、織原被告がこの女性を、新宿区内の大学病院に連れて行っていたことを突き止めた。織原被告は医師に「女性がカキを食べたら具合が悪くなった」と説明していたという。

女性は約十日後に、肝機能不全で死亡した。同本部で、病院に保存されていた女性の肝臓の一部を改めて鑑定したところ、肝機能不全は薬物によるものであることがわかった。

女性は事件前、同居していた姉に「週末に鎌倉にドライブに行く」と出かけて、行方が分からなくなっていた。その後、「ニシダ・アキラ」と名乗る男から姉に「妹が入院した」と連絡があった。男は、病院にも電話をかけ、女性の容体を聞き出していた。

死亡の翌日、男は来日した女性の両親と羽田空港近くのホテルで会い「シャンパンを飲んだら急に具合が悪くなった」と話していたという。特捜本部はこの男が織原被告とみている。

これに対し、織原被告は弁護士を通じ「女性とは恋愛関係にあった。心配して病院に一緒に行ったのに、(再逮捕には)言いようのない憤りを感じます」とのコメントを出した。

女性は九一年十一月、「日本語を勉強したい」と短期ビザで来日。立川市内の英会話学校で講師をしていた。女性は都内の飲食店でも働いていたという。

一連の準婦女暴行事件は、昨年七月に失跡した元英国航空客室乗務員のルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)の捜査で浮上、織原被告はこれまでに外国人女性二人と日本人女性

三人に対する事件で起訴されている。

外国人女性暴行事件 死亡豪女性

- 1 2001. 01. 28 と婚約装う？ 織原被告、来日両親 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 379 字 02 段
に指輪渡す

英会話講師のオーストラリア人女性(当時二十一歳)に薬物を飲ませ、乱暴して死亡させたとして、新たに婦女暴行致死容疑で再逮捕された織原城二被告(48)＝準婦女暴行事件五件で起訴＝が、女性の婚約者を装って婚約指輪やネックレスまで女性の両親に渡していたことが二十七日、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部の調べでわかった。

調べによると、織原被告は一九九二年二月中旬、薬物を飲ませて乱暴したこの女性を都内の病院に連れていったが、入院の内金を払った直後に姿をくらまし、女性と同居していた姉から面会を求められても、これを拒否していた。

しかし、本国から見舞いに駆け付けた女性の両親が、女性の死亡後に織原被告と羽田空港近くのホテルで面談。同被告から婚約のあかしとして指輪などを渡されていた。

特捜本部では、同被告が女性の不自然な死に疑問を抱かれないように偽装工作を行ったとみている。

- 1 2001. 02. 02 織原被告の連続婦女暴行事件 豪 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 182 字 01 段
女性の遺族が声明

資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)＝準婦女暴行事件五件で起訴＝に薬物を飲まされ乱暴されて死亡したとされるオーストラリア人女性(当時二十一歳)の遺族が一日、在日オーストラリア大使館を通して、事件についての声明を報道各社に発表した。

声明は女性の実名を明記したうえで、「遺族は激怒し、悲嘆に暮れている。公に発言せずにいられない気持ちになっている」と心情を訴えている。

ルーシーさん事件 失跡

- 1 2001. 02. 10 の夜「大変な事が…」 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 2029 字 06 段 写真・表
織原被告？消防に電話

◆逗子のマンションから「救急病院を教えて」

英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(22)が失そうした昨年七月一日夜、一連の準婦女暴行事件で逮捕・拘置中の織原城二被告(48)とみられる男が、暴行事件の現場となった神奈川県逗子市内のマンションから、「大変なことが起きた。救急病院を教えてほしい」と地元の消防署などに問い合わせていたことが、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部の調べでわかった。また、携帯電話の発信記録などから、織原被告がこの日、ルーシーさんと行動をともにしていたことも判明しており、特捜本部は、織原被告の当日の行動につ「て解明を進めている。〈本文記事1面〉

逗子市消防本部に男の声で問い合わせ電話があったのは、昨年七月一日午後九時ごろ。電話を受けた職員は、夜間対応している財団法人「逗葉地域医療センター」を紹介、

男は同センターにも電話をかけた。男は、同センターで紹介された地元の当番医に電話をかけ、診療時間などを問い合わせたが、姿は見せなかったという。

電話に対応した消防本部の職員は「落ち着いているように装っていたが、早口で、どこか慌てた様子だった」と話している。

この日はルーシーさんが失そうした日にあたり、特捜本部で、織原被告が使用していた携帯電話の発信記録などを調べたところ、電話をかけたのは、織原被告の可能性が高いことが判明した。

織原被告は一九九二年二月、英会話講師のオーストラリア人女性(当時二十一歳)を乱暴して死亡させたとして、先月二十六日、婦女暴行致死容疑で逮捕されたが、この時も、逗子のマンションで女性に薬物を飲ませて暴行した後、気分が悪くなったと訴えた女性を自分で、東京都新宿区内の大学病院に連れていったことがわかっている。

織原被告は病院側に、「カキを食べたら具合が悪くなった」と説明。しかし、女性は約十日後に肝機能不全で死亡し、特捜本部が保存されていた肝臓の一部を鑑定したところ、薬物摂取が原因だったことがわかった。織原被告は女性の死亡後に来日した両親に、「シャンパンを飲んだら具合が悪くなった」と話していた。

また、携帯電話の発信記録などから、織原被告は昨年七月一日はルーシーさんと一緒だったことがわかっている。この日、二人は都内から逗子へ移動しており、特捜本部では、消防本部への電話とあわせて、行動の詳細について詰めている。

◆岩陰に花束

九日朝、土中から遺体の手や足が見つかった諸磯(もろいそ)湾沿いの洞くつの搜索は、午前中いったん中断され、裁判所から搜索令状の交付を受けた午後二時過ぎから本格的に再開された。

近くの岩陰には花束が供えられ、捜査員がしゃがみこんで手を合わせる場面も。午後四時半前、水色のシートに包まれた遺体を捜査員が運び出し、搜索は午後五時過ぎに打ち切られた。

◆「遺体はルーシーだろう」英で父親

ルーシー・ブラックマンさんの父親ティム・ブラックマンさん(47)には、ロンドン警視庁から九日早朝(現地時間)、神奈川県内で女性の遺体が見つかったと連絡が入った。ティムさんは読売新聞の国際電話に対し、「今でもルーシーが生存していると思いたいが、現実を直視しなくてはならない。見つかった女性の遺体は、合理的に考えると娘だろう。ある意味ではほっとしている。生きているのか、それとも殺されたのか。それを知らないのが一番つらい」と話した。

一方、英国のマスコミ関係者などによると、遺体の発見はテレビでトップニュース扱いされており、搜索の映像が繰り返し流されているという。ある記者は「国民の関心は高い」と話した。

《ルーシーさん失そう事件と織原被告をめぐる動き》

2000年

5月 4日 ルーシーさんが観光目的で来日
 9日 ルーシーさんと友人が六本木のバーで働き始める
 6月下旬 織原被告を接待するルーシーさんが目撃される
 7月 1日 友人の携帯電話にかかった男の呼び出しでルーシーさん外出。
 午後 発信元は織原被告の携帯電話で、都内から。通信記録では、
 織原被告は都内から神奈川県逗子市に移動
 午後7時ごろ ルーシーさんが友人に「これから帰る」と電話。同じ電話で
 織原被告も知人に電話。逗子市内から
 午後9時ごろ 織原被告とみられる男が携帯電話で同市消防本部に
 「救急病院を紹介して」と電話
 3日タ ルーシーさんの友人の携帯電話に「タカギアキラ」を名乗る
 男から「ルーシーは千葉の新興宗教に入ったので帰れない」
 と電話
 4日 友人が警視庁麻布署に搜索願
 5日夜～ 織原被告が同県三浦市のマンションで管理人とトラブルに。
 6日未明 スコップを持った姿が目撃される
 12日 警視庁が公開捜査に踏み切る
 10月12日 カナダ人への準強制わいせつ容疑で織原被告逮捕
 16日 麻布署に特捜本部設置。捜査員100人態勢に
 2001年
 1月26日 織原被告、6度目の逮捕
 2月 5日 特捜本部が三浦市の海岸線など搜索開始
 9日 海岸線の洞くつから女性の遺体を発見

1	ルーシーさん事件 織原被 告、浴室への立ち入り拒む 失跡直後、地元警察官に	東京朝刊 社会 39頁 745字 04段 写真
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◆駆けつけた三崎所員に

遺体は、やはりルーシーさんだった――。英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(当時二十一歳)の失そう事件は、遺体の身元が確認されたことで、婦女暴行致死容疑で逮捕・拘置中の織原城二被告(48)の関与が、捜査の焦点となった。これまでの調べで、失そう四日後の昨年七月五日夜には、遺体発見場所近くのマンションで、織原被告が、訪れた地元警察官に「浴室に入ったら告訴する」と話していたことが新たに判明。失そう前後のルーシーさんとの接点も次々に浮上しており、捜査は大詰めを迎えた。(本文記事1面)

問題のマンションは、ルーシーさんの遺体が見つかった海岸沿いの洞くつから約二百メートルしか離れていない。警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部によると、織原被告は、それまで数年間にわたってこのマンションに所有する自分の部屋を使っていなかったが、昨年七月五日夜になって突然訪れた。その時、カギを持っておらず、カギ業者を呼んで玄関

を開けさせたため、織原被告の顔を知らない管理人が不審に思い、110番通報した。

神奈川県警三崎署員が部屋に入って異常の有無を確かめた際、織原被告の手がセメントにまみれていた。署員が浴室をのぞこうとしたところ、「入ったら告訴するぞ」と強く拒否された。署員はほかの部屋はすべて見て回ったが、織原被告が所有者であることが確認されたため、浴室だけは入らないままにして立ち去ったという。

特捜本部は昨年十月、カナダ人女性に対する準強制わいせつ容疑で織原被告を逮捕した後、この部屋を捜索、浴室からは微量のセメントの粉が検出されていた。ルーシーさんの遺体の頭部はセメントで塗り固められていた。

外国人女性連続暴行事件			
1	2001. 02. 17	織原被告が暴行計画日記 警視庁などが押収	東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 1103 字 05 段 写真

◆大学時代のテープ「世の中に復讐」「女性を眠らせ無抵抗に」「そのために睡眠薬購入」

連続婦女暴行事件で起訴されている織原城二被告(48)が、睡眠薬を使って女性を暴行する計画を記したとみられる日記や録音テープを、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部が押収していたことがわかった。日記は、遺体で見つかった英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(当時二十一歳)が失そうする直前の昨年六月ごろで突然途絶えている。特捜本部は、外国人女性らに対する一連の暴行事件の動機や計画性を解き明かす証拠として内容の分析を進めるとともに、ルーシーさんの事件との関連を調べている。

調べによると織原被告の関係先から押収された証拠品の中から、織原被告が二十数年前の大学在学当時から昨年六月ごろまで書き続けていた日記や、自ら録音したテープが見つかった。

日記はノートにほぼ毎日付けられ、複数の日本人や外国人の女性との交際の記録が記載されていた。さらに、「女性を眠らせて完全に抵抗できない状態にするしかない。そのために睡眠薬を購入する」などと暴行事件の犯行計画ととれる内容が書かれ、所有する神奈川県逗子市内のリゾートマンションの部屋に誘い込むことや、犯行状況をビデオで撮影することなども具体的に記されていた、という。

織原被告は、これまでに外国人女性三人と日本人女性三人の計六人に対する準婦女暴行罪などで起訴されている。いずれも、女性を言葉巧みに逗子市内のリゾートマンションに連れ込み、催眠導入剤が入った酒を飲ませて、意識がもうろうとなった状態で乱暴する手口が共通していた。

その様子を室内に備え付けのビデオカメラで撮影しており、織原被告の関係先からは、立件された被害者六人を含む約百人の女性の暴行シーンが撮影されたビデオが押収されている。ビデオのラベル部分には、犯行の日付や女性の名前がきちんと書き込まれていた。

これまでの調べで、織原被告は、父親の遺産を相続し、逗子市内の九階建てリゾートマンションの三階に部屋を購入した翌年の一九八二年ごろから、女性に対する暴行を重ねていたことが明らかになっているが、日記には当初、相手に発覚してトラブルになり、金銭を支払って解決したことも書かれていたという。

一方、大学在学中に録音されたテープにも、織原被告の声で「睡眠薬を手に入れる」「ビデオのカメラで映す」「うそをつきまくる」などという内容が吹き込まれていた。「この世の中に復讐(ふくしゅう)してやるんだ。悪い奴(やつ)になれ」という発言も録音されていた、という。

1 2001. 02. 17 外国人女性連続暴行事件 織原被告を致死罪で追起訴／東京地検 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 183 字 01 段

東京地検は十六日、会社社長織原城二被告(48)を準婦女暴行致死罪で東京地裁に追起訴した。起訴は六回目だが、被害者が死亡したケースは初めて。

起訴状によると、織原被告は一九九二年二月十五日、神奈川県逗子市に所有するマンションに、都内在住の英会話講師のオーストラリア人女性(当時二十一歳)を連れ込み乱暴、クロロホルムの作用で女性に劇症肝炎を起こさせ、二週間後に死亡させた。

1 2001. 02. 20 外国人女性暴行事件 織原被告の東京・世田谷の元自宅を検証 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 167 字 01 段

英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(当時二十一歳)の死体遺棄事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は十九日、連続準婦女暴行事件で起訴されている織原城二被告(48)が所有する東京都世田谷区玉川田園調布の元自宅を、被疑者不詳のまま死体遺棄容疑で検証した。元自宅は敷地面積約一千平方メートルの豪邸で、織原被告が約三十年前から住んでいた。

ルーシーさん事件 織原被告を準
1 2001. 04. 06 婦女暴行致死容疑で再逮捕へ／警 東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 743 字 04 段
視庁・麻布署

英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(当時二十一歳)の死体遺棄事件で、警視庁捜査一課と麻布署の特捜本部は五日、連続準婦女暴行事件で起訴された資産管理会社社長の織原城二被告(48)を、近く準婦女暴行致死と死体遺棄などの容疑で再逮捕する方針を固めた。

調べによると、織原被告は昨年七月一日、神奈川県逗子市のマンションにルーシーさんを誘い込み、薬物入りの飲み物を飲ませて暴行、死亡させたうえ、遺体を切断して同県三浦市のマンション近くの海岸に埋めた疑いなどが持たれている。

ルーシーさんは同日、「勤め先の客から携帯電話を買ってもらう」と知人の外国人女性に言い残して失そうした。

関係先の搜索や携帯電話の捜査などから、織原被告がルーシーさんの失そう当日、ル

ルーシーさんと一緒に都内から逗子市内まで行動したことが判明。マンションのある逗子マリーナで織原被告が撮影したとみられるルーシーさんの写真のネガも押収した。

今年二月九日には、織原被告が所有する同県三浦市内のマンション近くの洞くつで、セメントで頭部を固められ、電動のこぎりで切断されたルーシーさんの遺体を発見。織原被告は、ルーシーさんの失そう直後の昨年七月上旬、都内で電動のこぎりやセメント、スコップなどを購入したところなどが目撃されている。

織原被告は、昨年十月以降、逮捕、起訴された六件の婦女暴行事件で、いずれも逗子市内のマンションで、催眠導入剤入りの酒を女性に飲ませ、意識がもうろうとした状態で乱暴したとされ、手口が共通していた。

こうしたことから、特捜本部は、織原被告が乱暴目的でルーシーさんをマンションに連れ込み、薬物入りの酒を飲ませたものの、ルーシーさんが死亡したため、遺体を捨てたとの見方を強め、準婦女暴行致死容疑などでの立件が可能と判断した。

	ルーシーさん名乗る手紙 翻訳ソフトで作成 織原被告、同種を購入／東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 635 字 04 段
1 2001.04.07	警視庁

英国人女性ルーシー・ブラックマンさん(当時二十一歳)に対する準婦女暴行致死事件で、ルーシーさんの名前をかたって失そう後に郵送された手紙は、同事件で六日に再逮捕された織原城二被告(48)が購入していたパソコン用自動翻訳ソフトと同種のもので書かれていたことが、警視庁麻布署特捜本部の調べでわかった。特捜本部は、織原被告が捜査を混乱させようと、手紙を書いていた疑いが強いとみて追及している。

手紙はルーシーさんの失そうが表面化して間もない昨年七月二十日、千葉中央郵便局の消印で、麻布署長あてに届いたもので、「(姿を消したのは)自分の意思なので心配しないでほしい」という内容の英語の文章が印刷されていた。

また、同じ手紙の中で、当時行方を捜すために来日していた父親のティムさんや妹に向けては、「心配しないでイギリスに帰国してほしい」とも書かれていた。

手書きで文末に記されていたルーシーさんのサインは、筆跡が異なっていたため、特捜本部は自らの意思で失そうしたように見せ掛けるための工作とみて調べていた。

日本語から英語に自動翻訳するパソコンソフトは多くの種類が販売されているが、特捜本部でこの手紙を分析したところ、英語の文面の言い回しが、国内のあるメーカーが販売している翻訳ソフトに固有のものであることが判明。専門家による鑑定でも裏付けられた。

一方、織原被告の関係先の搜索などで押収したレシート類から、織原被告はこの翻訳ソフトや、このソフトが使えるパソコンを購入していたことがわかった。

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE RECRUIT CASE

リクルート61年9月 ダブル選
1 1988. 10. 30 直後・総裁争い活発化 “あう 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1340 字 06 段 表
ん”の株バラまき

◆政界資金膨らむ時期 主要派閥へ均等に“保険”◆

リクルートコスモス社の第三者割当増資株の譲渡疑惑は二十九日、新たに中曽根派幹部の藤波孝生、渡辺秀央両代議士の秘書に波及。これまで判明した政治家への譲渡ぶりと合わせ、当時の総裁派閥の中曽根派を中心に、竹下、宮沢、安倍派など次期政権を担う勢力も含め自民党主要派閥に横断的にばらまかれていた実態が浮かび上がってきた。すべての派閥に保険をかける形で、巧妙に政治家に接近したとの見方も強いが、これと並行して土地、税、教育などリクルートグループの仕事に関係する政府審議会などのポストを次々に手に入れていった総帥の江副浩正氏。個々の政治家や秘書に株を渡した目的は何なのかは今後、大きく問題化しそうだ。

リクルート社による政治家への株のバラまきが集中した六十一年九月は、リクルートコスモスの店頭登録を一か月余り後にひかえ、確実に値上がりが見込まれる時期だったうえ、政界の資金需要も膨らんだ時期で、リクルートの“献金”は、絶妙のタイミングとなった。

同年七月六日には衆参ダブル選が終わり、自民党が圧勝したが、巨額の選挙資金を費やした後に、同党では総裁選に向けた派閥間のかけ引きが活発化し始めた。同十四日には福田派に代わって安倍派が旗揚げ、九月四日には、宏池会会長に宮沢喜一氏が就任している。田中派の中でも竹下色が進んでいた。九月十一日には中曽根首相の一年間の続投が決まり、総裁選も六十二年秋にのびている。

また、翌年春には統一地方選をひかえ、野党にとっても事情は同じだった。

このような政治状況の中で行われたリクルートの株譲渡で名前が出た政治家(秘書を含む)は、これで自民党十人、民社党二人の計十二人に達したが、自民党内の派閥別の内訳は、中曽根派四人、安倍派三人、宮沢派二人、竹下派一人。いずれも中曽根政権の中枢にいた政治家ばかりで、しかも、各派閥の領袖(りょうしゅう)と幹部が顔をそろえている。

リクルートはこの時期をはさんで、創業以来の就職情報事業をさらに拡大させていた。また、六十年七月からは、NTTの支援を受けて、高速デジタル回線のリセール(再販)事業に乗り出し、六十一年と六十二年には、NTTの調達で、米・クレイ社のスーパーコンピューター二台を導入している。リクルートコスモスも、首都圏を中心に盛んに土地を買っていた。

こうした事業の背後で、回線リセールの分野では、リクルートがNTTの局舎を借りて通信施設を置いたり、回線リセールのシェア確保を優先させたダンピング商法が業界の批

判を招いたりした。さらに不動産事業でも、建設省が六十一年二月、地上げにからむ宅建法違反の疑いで、リクルートコスモスの社長から聴取を行うなど、急成長会社の強引ともいえる商法が、各界に波紋を投げかけ始めていた。

衆参両院選挙と統一地方選の谷間で資金作りに追われる政界。リクルート商法に対する苦情の高まり。その最中に店頭登録されたコスモス株は急騰し、登録前に再譲渡を受けていた政治家、秘書グループは多額の売却益をあげた。江副氏がバラまいた株は、いま浮上している政権中枢部だけなのか。東京地検特捜部は、新たに還流ルート解明のための専従班を設置し“ナゾ解き”に本格的態勢をととのえた。

1 1988. 11. 05 リクルート疑惑 社会党上田氏辞職に政界の声 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 1248 字 06 段

「上田ショック」は四日夜まで永田町を揺さぶった。コスモス株譲渡で名前のあがった政治家に、上田氏の議員辞職に関するコメントを求めた。

竹下登首相「あれはご本人が決断なさったことだ。行政府の長としては国会のことは言えない。国会のことは国会でお決めになることだ」(国会内で)

宮沢喜一蔵相「事情がわかりませんので何とも申せません。(リクルート疑惑解明については)国会でご判断いただく問題だと思います」

安倍晋太郎自民党幹事長「他党のことだから論評は差し控えたい。私も世間を騒がせた道義的責任を感じている。辞職という責任のとり方もあるが、むしろこれからの政治を進めていくうえでの反省として生かしていかなければならない」(国会内の記者会見) ◆解明きちんと私の責任◆

塚本三郎民社党委員長「その方はその方の立場があり、ご見識がおありですから、上田先生のご見識と受けとめております。(リクルート)問題の解明をきちんとして期待にこたえるのが私の責任だと思っている。進退は考えていない」(民社党福井県連の政経パーティー後の記者会見)

◆カッコいいな オレは辞めないよ◆

渡辺美智雄代議士「ほー、カッコいいな。オレは辞めないよ。(自分の場合は)長男が自分の判断でやったことだ」。このあと秘書を通じて「本人がまったく関係ないと言っていたのに辞職したというのは、いかなる動機によるものやらわからない。理解できない。(私は)悪いことはやっていないので辞めません」。

藤波孝生代議士「詳しく聞いていないから分からん。上田さんには上田さんの考え方があるんでしょ」

加藤六月代議士「(上田辞職は)聞いていない」のあと、「税特委の間に(辞職を知らせる)紙が回っていたではないか」と記者団に突っ込まれてだんまり。

◆株売りもうけたわけなし…◆

田中慶秋代議士「けじめのつけ方は個人によって違う。うちの場合は株を売ってもうけたわけでもないし、やめる気はない。国会での疑惑解明は党と足並みをそろえ徹底的に行う。国民の経済的、政治的不信を呼び起こしただけに、ぜひはっきりさせる必要がある」

(秘書を通じて)

伊吹文明代議士「リクルート関連株については、悪いことをしたとは思っていないが、庶民の気持ちを考慮すべき政治家として誠にうかつで申し訳なかった。上田氏については、微妙な時期の微妙な問題なのでコメントは差し控えたい」(秘書を通じて)

渡辺秀央代議士「代議士は東京都内にいるが、連絡はとれない。事務所としては『コメントはない』ということをお願いしたい」

中曽根康弘前首相「何ともいいかねる話。先生に聞く性質のものではない」(秘書)

加藤紘一代議士「何と申し上げていいか。本人はきょうは戻る予定はありませんし、私の立場では、言える問題ではありません」(秘書)

浜田卓二郎代議士「本人も、秘書もきょうは不在です」(留守番の女性職員)

森喜朗代議士「昼過ぎから公務で沖縄へ出張しており、連絡がとれません」(秘書)

公明党の池田克也代議士は自宅、事務所とも不在で連絡がとれなかった。

	株の政官財界ばらまき 江副氏が	
1 1988. 11. 08	親密度と将来性で査定／リクルー	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1389 字 06 段
	ト疑惑	

◆3000—3万株、社員のコネをフル動員◆

リクルートコスモス社の一連の非公開株譲渡疑惑で、六十一年九月に政官財界にばらまかれた株数は、江副浩正リクルート前会長・コスモス社側が、リクルートグループに対する親密度を基準として一人三千—三万株としていたことが、七日、関係者の証言で明らかになった。また、ばらまき方は江副前会長を“作戦本部”とし、グループ中枢幹部や地方組織幹部の中から、政官界とつながりのある者を動員して、株の譲渡を任せ、その一方で、こうした“作戦”が完了したかどうか報告させていた。非公開株の一部は、実質現金贈与だった疑いが濃くなっており、「親密度が基準」とする証言は、東京地検特捜部も重視するとみられる。

関W者によると、六十一年九月に官界にばらまかれた非公開株は、元熊本国税局長で先月十三日までリクルート顧問税理士だった多賀谷恒八氏の三万株が最高で、加藤孝・前労働省事務次官の三千株が最も少ない。

また、同じ前文部事務次官だった高石邦男氏の夫人が譲渡された株は一万株とばらつきが目立つ。政界でも、中曽根前首相秘書の筑比地康夫氏が二万三千株で最高。最少は竹下現首相元秘書の青木伊平氏の二千株。安倍自民党幹事長の清水二三夫秘書は一万七千株、藤波孝生元官房長官の徳田英治秘書は一万二千株。渡辺秀央元官房副長官(本人名義)も、一万株とそれぞればらつきがある。

関係者によると、こうした一連のばらまき工作は、江副氏が、相手との“親密度”や将来「役に立つかどうか」で判断、譲渡先や株数を最終決定した、という。その際、リストアップされた政官界とリクルートグループ内のコネの濃淡を点検したうえで、一番関係の深い社員や幹部を動員、株の譲渡が終えたあとは、すべてその結果までを報告させた、という。この関係者の話から、江副氏をピラミッドの頂点として株が、整然と流れた実態がうかが

える。

こうした社内人脈のフル動員を裏付けるように、これまで明らかになったばらまき方も、多賀谷恒八氏、式場英NTT取締役の場合、江副氏自ら「迷惑をかけないから、コスモス株を持って下さいよ」などと働きかけた。公明党の池田克也代議士の弟、謙氏は、早大の同窓の小野秘書室長から「友情ですから」と持ちかけられた。

また、民社党の田中慶秋代議士はコスモス社横浜支社の営業課長から「選挙も近づいていて、資金も大変でしょう」などと持ちかけられ、加藤氏の場合、仲介者は「かつてのリクルート幹部で釣り仲間」だった。

さらに、江副氏が株のばらまき状況を報告させていたことを裏付けるものとして、「ドウ・ベスト」社から株を譲渡された江副氏の知人のケースがある。この知人は、リクルートグループ以外の第三者から株の譲渡を受けたのに、リクルート疑惑が表面化した直後、江副氏本人から「あなたが取得したコスモス株については、こんご問題になるようなことはない」と電話を受けた、という。

証言では、譲渡した最低株数を三千株としながら、竹下首相の元秘書・青木氏には実際には、二千株しか渡っていないなど、一部に実態と食い違う面もあるが、この証言は、東京地検に対する複数のリクルート幹部の供述とも一致、株ばらまきが、江副氏の主導で行われたことを動かないものとしている。江副氏の初聴取に踏み切った東京地検が、今後株ばらまきの実態、目的をどう解明するか注目される。

「政治家にだまされた」病室

1 1988. 11. 16 の江副リクルート前会長、知 東京朝刊 2社 30 頁 1984 字 05 段 写真
人に電話で語る

◆「死んでも沈黙」から心境変化?! ◆

リクルートコスモス社の大量の還流株の政、官、財界へのばらまきのねらいはなんだったのか――。十五日決まった渦中の人、江副浩正・リクルート社前会長、高石邦男・前文部事務次官、加藤孝・前労働事務次官の三人の証人喚問とリクルート特別委のスタート。衆院税制特別委での強行採決から生まれた与野党の妥協で、疑惑解明は国会を舞台に新たな局面を迎える。一方、東京・麹町の半蔵門病院に「心因反応」で入院中の江副氏が、最近になってごく親しい複数の知人に電話で「政治家にだまされた」と語っていたことがわかった。東京地検特捜部の株疑惑捜査が本格化する・ナ、江副氏が、政官界工作の一端について心境をもらしたのは初めて。「(譲渡先を)発表するなら自滅し、死んだ方がいい」として沈黙を守ってきた江副氏だが、この日深夜、皮肉にもリクルート社側から「政官界リストの全容」が公表された。

江副氏のこの発言は数日前、病室から知人に対して、電話でされたもの。「不眠、食欲不振、全身けん怠感、集中力減退などの抑うつ状態にある」との診断どおり、強気になったり、ふさぎこんだりなどする“落差”が非常に大きいとされる。

江副氏の周辺筋によると、コスモス社の松原弘前社長室長(47)の取り調べ期間中に、同氏は、「松原前室長の処分が決まれば、世間の騒ぎが収束に向かう」との期待感を持つ

ていたが、十日に東京地検特捜部が松原を贈賄罪で起訴するとともに、非公開株譲渡疑惑の全容解明へ向けて“捜査開始宣言”をするなど、火の手は広がる一方。これを境に江副氏は特にふさぎこむ時間が長くなっているという。この知人への「政治家にだまされた」との発言は自らも“被害者”であることを強調したものと受け止められている。

この知人によると、「政治家」が特定の個人を指すのか、もっと幅広い意味を持っているのか江副氏は明らかにしなかったというが、「コスモス株バラまきに、政治家が何らかの形で積極的に関与していたのではないかと“解説”している。

コスモス株譲渡問題では、十六人の政界関係者の関与が明らかになっている。疑惑の核心とされるコスモス株公開直前の六十一年九月の再譲渡では、竹下、中曽根氏のほか、宮沢蔵相、自民党の安倍幹事長、渡辺美智雄政調会長、加藤六月前農相（税特委理事）、藤波孝生元官房長官（同）や塚本民社党委員長らの関係者の名前が上がった。

◆新証言法の威力は？ 告発に足かせ、強まった「証人保護」

長い間、「抜かずの宝刀」のままになっていた証人喚問が、リクルート疑惑解明のため、九年ぶりに実施される見通しになった。現行の議院証言法を「証人保護」の観点から改正して行う初の証人喚問。現行法に比べて、偽証に対する告発というペナルティーの要件も緩和されそうな新しい装いの喚問が、疑惑解明にどこまで切りこめるか。

小佐野賢治・元国際興業社主や丸紅、全日空の当時の会長らが、五十一年から五十二年にかけて次々に登場したロッキード事件の証人喚問は、喚問史上でも最も華々しい舞台となり、国民に、証人喚問の存在を強く印象づけた。

不出頭、偽証、証言拒否などの告発もできる証人喚問は、昭和二十二年に定められた議院証言法に基づいて制度化された。もともとは、同年の第一回国会で大きな問題になった隠退蔵物資の審議で、関係者の供述が大きく食い違ったことなどがきっかけでスタートしただけに、二十年代は喚問例が多く、二十三年の石炭国家管理事件では川崎秀二、倉石忠雄各代議士らが、二十九年の開発銀行造船融資事件では吉田茂首相（当時）らが喚問されている。

その後、四十年の九頭竜川ダム入札疑惑以来、途絶えていた証人喚問が復活したのがロッキード事件。小佐野氏らの「記憶にありません」「知りません」などの発言に阻まれ、国会その場での疑惑解明は難航したものの、偽証罪などによる告発が、東京地検特捜部による一連の捜査の糸口となり、その威力を十分発揮する結果となった。

その反面、「厳しく追及される証人が十分に保護されていない」「人民裁判のようだ」という声も出たため、五十二年から同法改正の動きがスタート。自民党が「改正までは喚問に応じられない」との姿勢を打ち出したことなどから、五十四年のダグラス・グラマン事件以後、喚問は実現せず、与野党の国会審議かけひきの道具に使われる事態も再三、起きた。

とはいえ、これまで、計八十七回の証人喚問に出頭した証人は国会議員八十八人を含む計千六十六人。うち十六人が偽証罪で告発され、十一人が起訴されている（いずれも衆議院調査課調べ）。

これに対し、リクルート疑惑の追及から適用される改正議院証言法による初の証人喚問

では、証人は補佐人を選任でき、証人威迫に対する処罰規定を設けるなど、証人保護の色彩が強められることが確実視されている。

Fファイナンスの第三者割当増資
1 1988. 11. 24 藤波・加藤六氏ら役員2社の各4 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 511 字 04 段
0万株

リクルート系金融会社「ファーストファイナンス」が昨年、第三者割当増資した四千万株の一部が、加藤六月前農水相、藤波孝生元官房長官（いずれも自民）と小川泰・前民社党代議士（離党済み）の現役秘書や元秘書が役員を務めている二企業に、それぞれ四十万株を割り当て譲渡していたことが、二十三日明らかになった。

この会社は中央区銀座に本社がある不動産関連会社「ノヴァ企画」（杉山和弥社長）と港区六本木の同「オー・エヌ・ケー」（大西克教社長）。関係者によると、加藤前農水相の奥水（こしみず）茂三秘書が昨年八月からノヴァ企画の取締役役に、藤波元官房長官の横山哲也秘書が同四月、オー・エヌ・ケーの取締役に、それぞれ就任。小川前代議士の伊藤克幸元秘書もノヴァ企画の設立発起人に名を連ねている。

この件について横山秘書は「役員として名前を貸してほしいと頼まれ、深く考えずに応じた。いま考えるとつかつだった」と話している。

また、伊藤元秘書は「妻の弟から発起人になってほしいと頼まれ、了承した。名前を貸したのは妻の身内だからで、小川前代議士の秘書としてではなく、ファーストファイナンスの第三者割り当て引き受けについても相談を受けたことはなかった」としている。

リクルートコスモス社の社内還流は
1 1988. 12. 03 31万株19人 株数をごまかし記載 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 807 字 04 段

リクルートコスモス社と関連会社役職員による第二次第三者割当株の買い戻しは、還流ルートから合計三十万八千株、十九人にのぼることが二日、明らかになった。この買い戻しは、日本証券業協会の内規に違反するため、有価証券報告書に、同社は株数をごまかして記載していた。

買い戻しルート別では「エターナルフォーチュン」社ルートの再譲渡先十四人のうち、藤波孝生元官房長官の徳田英治秘書と文化人を除く十二人がコスモス社の役職員で、譲渡株数は合計十八万株に上った。榎崎弥之助代議士（社民連）への贈賄申し込みで起訴されたコスモス社前社長室長、松原弘被告（47）もこのルートで三万五千株を取得していた。

このほか、加藤六月前農水相の片山紀久郎秘書ら二十四人に譲渡された「ワールドサーピス」ルートで、三人の役員がそれぞれ五万五千―二万株、計十万株を購入。

さらに、中曽根前首相の上和田義彦秘書ら二十二人に渡った「三起」ルートでも、社員二人が一万株ずつ、計二万株を取得した。また、関連会社の役員二人も、五千株と三千株を購入していた。

この結果、松原被告ら役員九人、社員十人の計十九人が三十万八千株を譲り受けてお

り、還流株七十六万株のうち、四割近くがコスモス社関係者に渡っていたことになる。

還流株とは別に、一万株を取得した元警視庁幹部でコスモス社常勤監査役の麻野忠雄氏のように、コスモス株をリクルート本社役員から直接、買い取ったケースもある。

こうした買い戻しの理由について関係者は、六十一年七月一日、リクルート本社からコスモス社へ役員が転籍する大幅な人事異動があり、新幹部らにコスモス株を持たせようとしたことを挙げている。

これらの買い戻しは、日本証券業協会の内規に違反、この事実が発覚すると、同協会に登録申請を受理されない事態に発展するため、有価証券報告書の役員欄には、麻野氏は所有株なし、松原被告は二千株など持ち株数を意図的に虚偽記載していたという。

1	1988. 12. 11	コスモス株再譲渡先 不明、残るは7人 江副氏防戦のカイなく民間人の名判明	東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 3761 字 07 段 写真・表
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リクルートコスモス株の譲渡先リスト十七人が十日、社会党によってまた明らかにされたが、公表された十七人のうち新たに登場した氏名は信託銀行役員など十三人。延べ八十三人、七十六万株の還流株のうち譲渡先が全く不明なのは、これで七人、五万三千株分を残すのみとなった。「ご容赦願いたい」と、民間人の氏名についてはかたくなに公表を拒んできた江副浩正・リクルート社前会長だが、公党によって純粋な経済行為までがあばかれていく。また、公表リストではコスモス社の役員三人が計十万株を譲渡されていたことも判明したが、同社の有価証券報告書には記載がなく社会党では、政官界に流れた可能性を指摘、新たな疑惑も浮上してきた。

◆コスモスミ役員の10万株 政官界還流疑惑も◆

「何とかご容赦を」「これ以上名を挙げると私は生きていけない気持ち」「お許し願いたい」……。衆参両院で行われた証人喚問や衆院税特委の病床質問で、江副前会長は、ひたすら未公開リストの提出を渋ってきた。たとえば、「名前が出たことで職を辞めたり、バツの悪い思いをさせたこともあるので、これ以上、名前を出すことは……」(衆院リクルート特別委)「私どものお願いでありまして。民間の方について、いちいちお名前を挙げるのは大変な問題」(参院税特委)ーなどだ。

リクルート関係者の中には「(江副氏が)証言拒否罪に問われないための精一杯の表現が『ご容赦』だった」という見方もあるが、金融関係者など、公的地位にある者を含めて純粋の民間人名が公党によって容赦なく公表され続けている。

そのうちの一人、ユニ・チャームの高原慶一郎社長によると、コスモス株三千株の譲渡を持ちかけられたのは、六十一年秋ごろ。リクルート社の秘書から、高原社長の秘書を通じて依頼された、という。高原社長は、江副前会長とは十数年来の付き合い。財界のパーティーなどを通じ親交が深まったという。

高原社長は、一株三千円で引き受けた。購入額九百万円は自分の銀行預金を取り崩して充てた。株は現在も保有しているという。

また、東洋信託銀行取締役(現名古屋支店長)の入江健介氏も同社広報担当者を通じて、コスモス株譲渡の事実を認めた。入江氏は同社取締役で不動産部長だった六十一年九月三十日、コスモス社の役員からの依頼で一株三千円で三千株を購入、同年十一月に売却したという。売却は自分の判断という。

広告代理店「創芸」の田中安夫専務の場合は、コスモス社の取締役から「近く公開するが、五千株を持って欲しい」と六十一年九月に依頼された。創芸にとってコスモス社はメインのお得意先でもあったことから、田中専務は「うちの仕事ぶりを評価してくれた。ありがたかった」という。

一株三千円の購入資金千五百万円は、ファーストファイナンスの融資を受けた。株は現在でも保有しており、「ふつうの商行為」と話している。

一方、コスモス社役員で名前が出た三人は、高島正明常務、館岡精一取締役、重田里志常務で、それぞれ購入株数は五万五千株、二万五千株、二万株と、ワールドサービスルートの他の政界や財界人より極端に多いのが特徴だ。

しかも、コスモス社の有価証券報告書で各役員の六十二年四月と六十一年四月の保有株数をみると、高島常務はこの一年で三千株、館岡取締役は千株、重田常務も五千株しか増えていない。六十一年九月に取得したこれらの株がどこに消えたかはわかっておらず、社会党は「重大な疑問だ」としている。

コスモス社役員らへの株譲渡について江副氏は証人喚問で、「二十人近くいると思う」と証言、高島、館岡の二氏のほか、橋爪年幸常務、高田直澄取締役、米津宏取締役、松原弘前社長室長、花田幸弘北関東支社長、の名前を挙げたが、具体的な株数については、松原前室長がエターナルフォーチュン分の三万五千株であることを認めたただけだった。しかし、読売新聞社の調べでも、計十九人に三十万八千株が流れたことがわかっている。

また、松原前室長のこの時期の株取得が、有価証券報告書に記載がないことについて「報告書作成担当者のミス」と、意図的なものではないことを強調していた。しかし、このような単純なミスは考えにくく、政官界などに形を変えて流れた疑いがあり、残る七人の解明とともに、今後の追及の焦点となりそうだ。

◇リクルートコスモス株再譲渡先

(敬称略)

氏 名	役職	株 数
◇ワールドサービス		
片山 紀久郎(加藤六月秘書)		5,000
加藤 紘一(自民党代議士)		5,000
加藤 周子(加藤六月二女)		5,000
田中 慶秋(民社党代議士)		5,000
徳田 英治(藤波孝生秘書)		2,000
高島 正明(コスモス社常務)		55,000
館岡 精一(コスモス社取締役)		25,000
重田 里志(コスモス社常務)		20,000

飯島	清(税調特別委員)	10,000
志立	託爾(三菱信託社長)	10,000
帆足	興之(浦和市議)	5,000
松村	千賀雄(前横浜市議)	5,000
菊山	寿夫(大和土地建物専務)	5,000
神長	安彦(住宅流通センター専務)	5,000
後藤	秀憲(第一不動産取締役)	5,000
小玉	勝利(創芸取締役)	5,000
田中	安夫(創芸専務)	5,000
大橋	貞彦(三井信託元取締役)	3,000
蒔田	正雄(中央信託取締役)	3,000
入江	健介(東洋信託取締役)	3,000
高原	慶一郎(ユニ・チャーム社長)	3,000
乾	宏年	
= 故人	= (イヌイ建物元社長)	3,000
?	(会社役員)	5,000
?	(文化人)	3,000
(24人)		200,000

◇三起

太田	英子(中曽根康弘政治資金 団体事務責任者)	3,000
上和田	義彦(中曽根康弘秘書)	3,000
高石	邦男(前文部事務次官)	10,000
筑比地	康夫(中曽根康弘秘書)	13,000
塚本	三郎(民社党委員長)	5,000
吉田	勝次(上田卓三元秘書)	5,000
渡辺	喜美(渡辺美智雄長男)	5,000
コスモス社員		10,000
コスモス社員		10,000
大沼	淳(専修学校理事長)	10,000
村田	幸蔵(NTT会長元秘書)	10,000
社会工学研究所		10,000
諸井	虔(大学審議会副会長)	5,000
丸山	巖(読売新聞前副社長)	5,000
リ社関連会社役員		5,000
リ社関連会社役員		3,000
歌川	令三(毎日新聞元編集局長)	3,000
金子	俊明(前浦和市秘書課長)	10,000

?	(会社役員)	10,000
?	(会社役員)	10,000
?	(会社員)	10,000
?	(会社員)	5,000
(22人)		160,000

◇ドウ・ベスト

青木	伊平(竹下登元秘書)	2,000
加藤	孝(前労働事務次官)	1,000
清水	二三夫(安倍晋太郎秘書)	2,000
筑比地	康夫(中曽根康弘秘書)	10,000
宮沢	喜一(前蔵相)	10,000
多賀谷	恒八(元熊本国税局長)	30,000
公文	俊平(税調特別委員)	10,000
長谷川	寿彦(元NTT取締役)	10,000
式場	英(NTT取締役)	5,000
(9人)		80,000

◇ビッグウェイ

池田	謙(池田克也実弟)	5,000
片山	紀久郎(加藤六月秘書)	2,000
加藤	孝(前労働事務次官)	2,000
渡辺	秀央(自民党代議士)	10,000
福田	勝之(竹下登緑せき)	10,000
古河	久純(古河林業社長)	60,000
阿部	喜夫(オリエントファイナ ンス社長)	10,000
井上	健治(東大教授)	5,000
田中	最代治(オリエントファイナン ス専務)	3,000
丸山	雅隆(財界主幹)	3,000
大牟田	育宏(元甲南学園乗務理事)	3,000
馬場	彰(オンワード樫山社長)	3,000
村田	博文(財界編集長)	2,000
浜野	照美(東京アドクリエイティ ブ社長)	2,000
(14人)		120,000

◇エターナルフォーチュン

徳田	英治(藤波孝生秘書)	10,000
松原	弘(コスモス社前社長室長)	35,000

コスモス社員	30, 000
コスモス社員	28, 000
コスモス社員	17, 000
コスモス社役員	15, 000
コスモス社役員	15, 000
コスモス社員	10, 000
コスモス社員	10, 000
コスモス社員	5, 000
コスモス社員	5, 000
コスモス社員	5, 000
コスモス社役員	5, 000
？ (文化人)	10, 000
(14人)	200, 000
83人 計	760, 000

※ワールドサービス関連の株再譲渡先のうち、高島氏から乾氏までの十七人は社会党が10日、公表した氏名

◆公表分を加え 本社独自作成◆

コスモス株再譲渡先一覧表は十日までに公表された共産党の「ドウ・ベスト」リスト(十月十一日)、社会党の「ビッグウェイ」(十一月九日)と十日の「ワールドサービス」の各リスト、リクルート社が国会に提出した政官界リスト(十一月十五日)に加え、読売新聞社が独自に確認した分を含めて作成した。

社会党が新たに公表した十七人のうち、飯島氏、志立氏、帆足氏、松村氏の四人は、すでに本社調べで氏名が公になっており、高島氏、館岡氏は、江副前会長が、参院税特委の証人喚問で、再譲渡をうけたコスモス社役員として明らかにしている。また高原、入江、田中の三氏は本社の取材に、同日夜、株譲渡の事実関係を認めた。残る譲渡先については、本人に確認はとれないが、関係者の証言などから、全員、譲渡が裏付けられた。

公党によるリスト公表はこれで三回目。これまでは、内部資料に基づく公表で、譲渡先が第三者割当先ごとに全員判明したが、今回は会社役員五千株と文化人三千株の二人が不明のまま。

リクルート疑惑 松原被告購入分の
1 1988. 12. 13 1万株 加藤代議士(自民)の兄夫婦 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 319 字 03 段
妻名義に

リクルートコスモスの非公開株譲渡疑惑で、同社前社長室長、松原弘被告(47)(贈賄罪で起訴)に譲渡された三万五千株のうち一万株が、加藤紘一・自民党代議士(元防衛庁長官、山形二区)の兄夫妻名義になっていることが、十二日、明らかになった。加藤代議士も別ルートで五千株の譲渡を受けている。

松原被告の三万五千株は、六十一年九月、エターナルフォーチュンから還流した。同ル

ートでは藤波孝生・元官房長官秘書の徳田英治氏ら十四人に計二十万株が流れたが、松原被告分がもっとも多いうえ、コスモス社の有価証券報告書によると、松原被告の保有株は、譲渡前の六十一年四月も、譲渡後の六十二年四月も、ともに二千株と変動はなく、三万五千株は書面上は消えた存在となっていた。

「秘書がやった」の流行論法

1 1988. 12. 15 破たん リクルート疑惑の真 東京朝刊 2社 26頁 1702字 05段 写真
藤NTT会長、自ら責任

「信用を著しく傷つけた。責任をとりたい」。電電公社から新生NTTへと、八年間にわたって君臨した真藤恒会長の辞任は、自らの一言で決まった。国民が注視した村田幸蔵・前秘書名義の株疑惑を「秘書がやったこと」で押し通した真藤氏は、金の流れが判明したこの日も、ほかの政治家と同様に「秘書が管理している口座なので詳しいことは分からない」とだけ説明した。山口開生社長を委員長とする調査委員会も、村田氏と連絡が取れない限り、真相の解明は難しいと語り、真藤会長に対する遠慮だけが際立った。「老醜をさらしたくない」と弱音もみせたが、役員を子供のように扱ってきたワンマンぶりは最後まで変わらなかった。

NTT四階の役員室フロア。藤会長、山口社長、児島仁副社長の三人が顔をそろえたのは、十四日午前八時半すぎ。NTTの三本柱として、常に経営を担ってきた三人が、この日は報道陣を避けて、こっそりと本社ビルに入り、役員室は重苦しい雰囲気包まれた。三人の顔には、「売却益九百万円、真藤会長の口座に」の衝撃のニュースが伝わった前夜からの心労がありありとうかがえたという。

関係者によると、山口社長は、社長としてではなく、リクルート疑惑を解明する社内調査委員会の責任者として、重い口を開いた。「会長。九百万円が振り込まれたという報道は事実でしょうか」

公社時代から通算して、NTTに君臨すること八年。初めて、部下に調べられる側に立った真藤会長は、「村田にまかせた金。申し訳ないが、あまりよくわからん」。

「村田の株譲渡や、私が社長時代に取締役にした式場君や長谷川君のことで、NTTの信用を著しく傷つけた。責任をとりたい」と辞任の弁を語るその表情には、他を寄せつけない覚悟がうかがえたという。傍らの児島副社長も、息をのんで、トップの決断を見守った。

この間、約三十分。最後に真藤会長は「君たちでNTTの信用を回復してくれ」と、後事を託したという。

会長の辞任劇を経て、山口社長は午後六時三十五分から記者会見した。田島広報部長を伴って六階会見場に現れた山口社長は、口をへの字に結び、硬い表情でマイクの前に。

「NTTの信用を著しく傷つけたことに対して責任をとりたいということだった」と手元のメモを見ながら、山口社長は一気に説明した。

報道陣からの質問に、あっさり過ぎるほど淡々とした調子で答える山口社長。今後の社内調査については、「話を聞くことによって進めていく」方針を明らかにしたが、「関係者の

話はこれまで二転三転しており、それだけでは不十分では」との質問には、少し口ごもりながら「聞く内容によっては解明できると思う」。しかしその消極的な姿勢からは、真藤会長の疑惑をかばい通そうという気持ちがありありとうかがえた。

ところで、今回の真藤辞任劇は、「秘書がやった」というリクルートコスモス株疑惑で決まり文句になった言葉に、初めて一部でほころびが出たことを示している。しかし、政界は、今も秘書のせいにし、その秘書は口をつぐんだり、姿を消したりで、真相は相変わらずヤブの中だ。

たとえば、藤波孝生・元官房長官の秘書、徳田英治氏が一万二千株を取得したケース。藤波氏は「朝、電話で問い合わせ初めて知った。リクルート関係者から話があつて譲り受けた、と聞いた。江副氏本人ではないと思う」と、「間接話法」に終始した。その徳田氏の弁明はいまだにない。

清水二三夫秘書名義の株売買が発覚した安倍晋太郎・自民党幹事長は「私は全く知らない。秘書に聞いてみる」、片山紀久郎秘書の名前が出た加藤六月・前農相も「秘書がやったことだ」とした。政治家と秘書は一体とされながら、こと資金集めに関しては、秘書が独自に判断するという不可思議な関係がうかがえる。

この日、「金の流れはあつたように思う」と中山郵政大臣に半ば認めながら、「村田がハンコ、通帳を預かっており、わからない」とまたもや秘書のせいにする論理を展開した真藤氏。その真藤氏は、午後六時三十七分、東京・NTT本社を出た。カメラのフラッシュを浴びた車は猛スピードで裏口から新橋方向へ走り去り、十五日午前零時を過ぎても自宅へ戻らなかった。

リクルート社 ビジネスに不
1 1989. 01. 28 可欠? 政官界の“攻略本” 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 1178 字 05 段 写真
「役所とうまく」と強調

◆職安法改正のさ中 まず、労働省を狙う◆

リクルート社が、昭和五十九年夏に企業の危機管理について小冊子をまとめ、「(労働省は)職業安定法の改正で就職情報誌を規制しようとしている」などと行政官庁への接近の必要性を社員に説いていたことが二十七日、明らかになった。リ社は歴代労相や同省出身の国会議員に幅広く政治献金、さらに同法改正をめぐる対策チームを社内に発足させており、リ社が広範な政官界工作を進めた背景を示す内部資料として、捜査当局も関心を寄せている。

◆OBの影響力期待 接近忘れず◆

この小冊子は「PCマネジャーのためのリクルート危機管理プログラム」。全文約二十ページで、五十九年夏、社内各事業部(PC)の部長クラス向けに、トラブル対応法をまとめ、発行された。

職安法の改正については、「行政・官公庁への対応」の項で触れている。「(官庁は)、場合によっては法律の改正や、新たに法律をつくり、その省の権域の拡大を計ることを常に考えている」としたうえで、労働省を例に「職業安定機能の低下の回復と雇用の需給調整

という名目で職安法を改正し、就職情報誌を規制しようという動きは、まさにこのケースである」と、五十八年秋ごろから始まった職安法の規制強化の動きに、強い警戒心をみせていた。

また、「現在は、役所を抜きにビジネスは不可」「役所への影響力をどうもつか。役所との関係をうまくやるかどうかは事業盛衰の要(かなめ)」とまで書いていた。

職安法改正の動きは、当初、就職情報誌の規制強化の方向でスタートしたが、リ社など業界の強い反発で五十九年秋「自主規制」へと緩和された。危機管理プログラムはこの直前にまとめられた。

法改正の軌道修正をめぐっては、当時職安局長の加藤孝・前労働事務次官が六十一年九月、リ社側から非公開株三千株の譲渡を受けていたほか、省幹部が飲食やゴルフなどの接待をうけていた疑惑もあり、危機管理プログラムが実践された形になっている。

並行して行われた政界工作も労働省筋が中心。歴代労相の長谷川峻、栗原祐幸、藤波孝生、大野明、坂本三十次、山口敏夫の各氏のほか、労働省OBの有馬元治、大坪健一郎、遠藤政夫各氏、浜田卓二郎、伊吹文明両氏から衆院社会労働委員会の委員など“族議員”に非公開株を譲渡したり、政治献金、パーティー券購入を引き受けたりしており、小冊子にある「役所への影響力」を持とうとしていた狙いが浮き彫りになっている。

プログラムの中では、さらに「役所は上意下達が原則」、「人事は官僚の最大関心事」などと、付き合い方の心得もまとめていた。また、リ社の各事業部が、どういう法律を根拠にして、どの官庁と関係があるのかを、一覧表にまとめ、官界工作の対象が一目でわかるようにしていた。この中には、労働省はじめ、公正取引委員会、運輸省、建設省、国土庁など九省庁が取り上げられている。

1 1989. 02. 17 日本アメフト議員連盟発足 名誉会長 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 78字 01段
に安倍晋太郎氏

日本アメリカンフットボール議員連盟は十六日、自民党本部で設立総会を開き、名誉会長に安倍晋太郎氏(幹事長)、会長に藤波孝生氏、事務局長に山岡賢次氏を選任した。

[深層リクルート事件](4)リ社・駿
1 1989. 03. 13 台学園、利益目当ての手この手 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 1318字 05段
(連載)

NTT前会長・真藤恒(78)、元労働事務次官・加藤孝(58)という財官界トップの収賄に続き、こんどはかつて政界中枢にいた文教、労働族の実力者、藤波孝生・自民党代議士のコスモス株売却益の私的流用が発覚した。民活をバネにしたニューメディア、雇用の先進国化、今や産業といえる教育、受験業界一リクルートを筆頭に、急成長産業は「新利権」にあらゆる策を講じて接近する。

◆リクルート、労働官僚に退職後のイス 駿河台学園、邸宅を格安で賃貸、売却◆

藤波氏に“破格の好条件”で邸宅を売却した駿河台学園(山崎春之理事長)は、一流大学教授三百人を抱え、その年間売り上げは、百七十億円。予備校最大手の駿台予備校

を経営するほか、幼稚園(五十二年)、甲府高校(五十六年)、駿河台大学(六十二年)を次々と創設、さらに英語学院(五十三年)、外語専門学校(五十五年)、トラベル専門学校(同)、自動車整備工業専門学校(五十八年)など専門教育分野にも事業を急拡大、今や、“教育コンツェルン”の観を呈する。大型コンピューターをそろえ、リクルートのスーパーコンピューターの時間貸し業務(RCS)にも似た委託業務を展開するなどニューメディアにも接近中だ。

駿台関係者によれば、藤波氏と山崎理事長は二十年来の友人。さる五十五年、創立五十周年記念誌を発刊した際、労働大臣だった藤波氏が祝辞を寄せている。六十一年には、藤波氏や森喜朗代議士などが発起人代表となり、山崎理事長の藍綬褒章受章記念パーティーが開かれている。また藤波氏が官房長官だった五十九年二月二十四日には、当時の中曽根首相、森文相らが駿台本部校舎を異例の視察、約二時間三十分 にわたり、授業見学、山崎理事長らとの懇談を行っている。そして、五十九年末―六一年末の二年間に、藤波氏への邸宅賃貸、売却も“同時進行”していた。

こうした動きと並行して「学園創設以来の念願」という駿河台大学の認可、開校が進む。六十二年四月、埼玉県飯能市の敷地三十万平方メートルに数百億円を投下して同大学が法学部だけの単一学部校として開校するが、設立準備室設置(五十九年)から文部省の認可までわずか二年、ことし暮れまでに異例の別学部増設認可の見通しだ。

一方のリクルート。五十七年初め、江副浩正は労働省幹部にもちかける。「当社も社会的認知を受けたいので、大物幹部の天下りポストを用意したい」

が、この時は江副はたしなめられる。ところが、この年、全国の職業安定所でまとめた就職件数は十年前より約五十万件も減って約百三十八万件にまで落ち、労働省は「二割官庁」と呼ばれ始める。リ社など就職情報産業が急成長したためだ。リ社の“天下りポスト”作戦が奏功するきっかけは、職安と民間就職情報業界を結びつける財団法人「雇用情報センター」のオープン(五十九年三月)で、リクルート主導のセンター設立に反対する業界を「ツルの一声」でおさえたのが、当時の職業安定局長の加藤だった。現在、同センター入りしている労働省OBは全職員十六人中八人。このほかり社絡みで作られた三法人に計十三人が天下っている。「高い給料を出せば文句を言わなくなる」―したたかで、人の足元をみる江副の述懐の言葉だ。

リクルート売却益私用の藤
1 1989. 03. 13 波氏 狂騰下、駿台会館か 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1741 字 06 段 写真
ら実勢の半額で豪邸を購入

◆「秘書が…」の釈明ほころび 土地取得も不透明◆

中曽根内閣の官房長官当時から住む東京・杉並の豪邸は文字通りリクルート汚染されていた―藤波孝生自民党代議士の一億三千二百万円という豪邸購入資金とコスモス株の関係が十二日、読売新聞社の調べで判明したが、この事実は、昨年十月の譲渡疑惑発覚時、「秘書に問いただして初めて知り、軽率さを注意した」と弁明した自民党ネオニューリーダーの発言を打ちくだし、リクルートが狙った文教、労働族のなかの有力代議士

周辺の水面下の癒着を浮かび上がらせた。一連の非公開株疑惑で「秘書がやった株取引」との弁明はNTT前会長、真藤恒(78)のケースで一角が崩れていたが、政界関係者では初めて。特捜部の政治家秘書の事情聴取で今後さらに同様のケースが発覚する可能性も出てきた。

株譲渡疑惑が明るみに出た昨年十月二十九日朝、藤波氏は、「けさ、電話で彼(徳田英治秘書)に問い合わせ初めて知った。軽率なことだと注意した。(売却益は)秘書が自分で確保していると思う」など秘書を“強調”する一方で、「秘書のしたことは、代議士のやったことと一体。私自身の責任」とかばう姿勢もみせていた。だが、その売却益二千六百万円は、徳田秘書名義など銀行口座を複雑に経由しながら、自らの邸宅へ行き着いていた――。

問題の藤波邸はモダンな鉄筋二階建て、敷地百九十五平方メートル、京王井の頭線永福町駅から徒歩六分の閑静な高級住宅街にある。

関係者によると、この土地、家屋を駿河台学園直系の不動産管理会社「駿台会館」が一億三千万円で取得、すぐに藤波氏に月家賃四十万円などで賃貸しているうち、藤波氏側から「住み心地がいいので売ってほしい」と希望があり、取得からちょうど二年後の六十一年十二月十九日、藤波氏側から売買代金一億三千二百万円の現金決済をうけ、権利証などを渡した。しかし、その売買価格は、駿台会館の取得価格に、二百万円上積みしただけ。

土地狂騰時だっただけに、この間に周辺の公示地価は一平方メートル当たり三十八万五千円から百八万円と、一挙に二・八倍アップ。しかも、売買代金支払い時で、藤波邸を公示地価で換算すると約二億一千万円。さらに近くの不動産業者によれば、当時の実際の取引価格ベースだと三億円弱にもなるという豪邸だった。ところが、駿河台学園の山口広報情報部次長は「正当な取引、売却額は相手のあることで言えないが適正価格だった」と繰り返す。

しかし、読売新聞社で調べたところ、駿台会館が最初に、この土地を取得した際、藤波氏の夫人が立ち会っていることが確認された。また、藤波氏への土地の移転登記は現在までされず、所有者は同会館になっており、固定資産税の納付請求は同会館に回るが、実際には藤波氏側が払っている。こうしたことから、藤波氏側が同会館をダミー役にして取得してもらい、後になって売買代金を決済した可能性もある。いずれにしても当時官房長官だった藤波氏は、六十年四月から事実上自宅としながら二年近くの間、閣僚の資産公開のケースが起きた際に、この邸宅を明らかにしなくて済んだ格好だ。発覚したり社株売却益を自宅購入資金にする完全な私的流用、不明朗な土地取引。本人が官房長官就任時、「公職につく者の倫理感というか、国民から信頼を得るうえで資産公開が一助になればと思っている」と語っていたのだが……。

ところで、コスモス株を譲り受けた政界関係者二十一人(政治家名十七人)は、大半が「秘書がやった」と弁明している。

秘書ら三人へ計二万九千株が譲渡されていた中曽根前首相は、先月二十七日の記者会見で「首相を辞めた後、秘書から聞いた。私の監督不十分」と釈明したが、自分自身と

の関係については「全く関知していない」と主張。

また、秘書と親類が計一万二千株を取得していた竹下首相も「(取引は)いいことではない」としながらも「秘書から聞いた」と本人関与を否定している。本人名義での株取引が発覚した宮沢前蔵相や渡辺秀央・元官房副長官側も秘書の行為だったとしている。

しかし、リクルート社前会長、江副浩正(52)は「秘書名義で売った株は政治家本人に譲渡するつもりだった」と供述しており、藤波代議士のケースは初めてそれを裏付ける形になった。

1 1989. 03. 14 [深層リクルート事件](5)常識超える政官界工作(連載) 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 1172字 03段

「(藤波孝生)代議士ほどの方の日程をつかめないはずはないでしょう」「先生の行き先も日程も分からない」非公開株の売却益を自宅購入費の一部に充てたと報道された十三日朝、藤波氏の事務所では問い合わせに対し、秘書が「分からない」を連発、藤波氏をかばった。同じ日、リ社が疑惑発覚後も、自民党国会議員に献金を続けるという常識を超えた政界工作もまた顔をのぞかせた。

◆陰のパイプに地検の手◆

労働省のある幹部は、十年前の電話を思い出した。「リクルートのA君はフレッシュマンだからよろしく」。相手は同省と縁が深い労働族議員の秘書。思い当たるふしがあった。

その数日前、担当交代のあいさつにきたA社員が、なれなれしいので突き放していたのだ。「そんなことにまで」。幹部は、あまりに綿密な政治家工作にあ然とした。

民間企業による職業紹介を禁止したILO条約九六条をわが国が批准したのは三十二年。一方、リ社など民間の就職情報誌は五十年前後に急成長、職業紹介手段として目立ち始める。

当時のリ社は、まだ小規模で、同省では「違反企業を放置するな」という声が大勢。職安局長だった遠藤政夫氏(現在参院議員)もその一人だったが……。

「(五十年六月十二日)シンポジウムの講師へのお礼の件で位田(尚隆・現リ社社長)君らが労働大臣らへ。小生(江副浩正)らは労働省遠藤局長を訪問」。リ社社内報も取り上げた活発な政官界工作に、遠藤氏も巻き込まれて行く。

遠藤氏が参院選出馬のため退官した五十二年、リ社は二万円のパーティー券二百枚を購入。社員扱いにした妻に三十万円の「月給」を払い始める。「リ社をつぶせ」の声は既に同省内では消えていた。

政官界工作の陣頭に立ってきた江副は一昨年四月、当時のNTT社長、真藤恒や、郵政族の大物、金丸信代議士と、ビルの完工式で同席した。

ビルの持ち主は、金丸氏の有力後援者が経営する丸金商事。リクルートコスモスなどが埼玉県大宮市内で地上げた土地を買い取ったこともある。

同ビルの四フロアに入居しているのは、NTTの国際部など。NTT幹部は「うちが入っているだけで信頼性が高まる」と指摘、実際に賃貸料も周辺より三・三平方メートル当たり八千—三千円程度高い。

真藤と金丸氏の付き合いは、関係者によると、真藤が電電公社入りして以来。六十年三月のNTT役員人事で「社長・真藤」が決まった裏では、金丸氏の影響力が発揮されたといわれる。真藤が政界に深入りしたのは、NTTになってからも、役員人事権と経営監督権を政府が握り、政治家の影響力が大きいためだった。

真藤はせっかく、いったんは「癒着」の根を断ち切ろうとしながら、再び、政界工作用の資金パイプを作り始める。

その陰のパイプに流れ込んだ株売却益。江副と真藤が編み上げた政界工作網の糸を東京地検特捜部が、いま解きほぐそうとしている。(おわり)

1 1989. 03. 14 リクルート社からの巨額の政治献金判明の藤波孝生氏は雲隠れ? 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 240 字 01 段

自宅購入資金へのコスモス株売却益の充当、リクルート社からの巨額の献金などが明らかになった藤波孝生代議士は、十三日深夜になっても自宅や事務所に姿を見せなかった。

藤波氏への二千数百万円の献金が明らかになった十三日夕、国会記者クラブでは、東京・永田町の藤波事務所に対し、正式に取材を申し入れた。

これに対し、藤波事務所の水谷太秘書は同日夕、「代議士はつかまらない。探しているので、会見などを開くようなら連絡します」と国会クラブに電話で伝えて来たが、その後深夜になっても一切連絡はなかった。

1 1989. 03. 16 リクルート疑惑の藤波代議士、取材断る 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 226 字 01 段

自宅購入資金へのコスモス株売却益の充当、リクルート社からの巨額の献金などが明らかになった藤波孝生・自民党代議士は十五日夜、東京・永田町の藤波事務所を通し、平河クラブ、国会クラブに対し、「今のところお話しすることはない」と、当面取材に応じる考えのないことを伝えてきた。

藤波氏は、株売却益が自宅購入資金に充てられたとの報道に対し、「事実と違う」と秘書に言い残したまま所在不明となり、記者クラブが「事実関係を明らかにして欲しい」と正式に取材を申し入れていた。

1 1989. 03. 24 リクルート株譲渡「秘書がやった」に検察メス「政治家本人へ譲渡」と江副も認める 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1081 字 06 段

リクルートコスモスの非公開株を譲り受けながら、「秘書がやった」と弁明した大半の政治家たち。秘書名義の取引を装って自らは安全地帯にいたかにみえたNTT前会長、真藤恒(78)も、特捜部の追及を逃れられなかっただけに、東京地検特捜部による極秘の政

政治家秘書聴取は、関係者に衝撃を与えた。

今月六日の真藤の逮捕は、政治家に大きな衝撃を与えた。取引の名義人が元秘書の村田幸蔵(63)でありながら、表面に出ていなかった真藤を逮捕したことは、そのまま「秘書が」「秘書が」と弁明を繰り返す政治家を実質的な利益の譲り受け人と見たてることに通じるからだ。

実際、特捜部は、捜査の過程でカネの流れを克明につかんでいた。売却益約二千二百万円は、いったんは村田名義の口座に入った。真藤の用意周到ぶりがうかがえる。だが、そのうちの約九百万円は、すぐ真藤名義の口座に流れた。さらに村田名義の口座は、この取引の直前に開設され、役目を果たした後に消滅していることもわかった。

コスモス株の引き受けに当たっては、真藤、村田間で細かな事前謀議が行われていたことも判明、他人名義の壁は、あっさりと崩された。

真藤に対する容疑事実の中で特捜部は、コスモス株について〈1〉取引直後の昭和六十一年十月三十日に店頭登録が予定され、登録後に確実に値上がりが見込まれた〈2〉リクルート社前会長、江副浩正(52)らと特別な関係にある者以外の一般人が入手することは極めて困難だった〈3〉登録後に見込まれる価格より明らかに低い価格で譲り受けた一と指摘、実質的な現金贈与であると決めつけた。

政治家の場合も、名前の出た十七人の名義人のうち、秘書や元秘書らが十二人、本人名義が五人となっているが、秘書や家人のケースでは、すべての政治家が「自分は無関係」と主張している。

しかし、特捜部が真藤の容疑事実で指摘した点は、そっくり政治家の場合にあてはまる可能性がある。リクルート社がすでにコスモス株の売り出し価格を最低で一株四千六十円と内定していた六十一年九月末に、一株三千円という安値で取引された。さらに政治家のほとんどは、購入資金をリクルート社に立て替え払いをしてもらい、売却益だけが口座に残る仕組みになっていた。

特捜部の調べに対し、江副はすでに、中曽根康弘前首相、竹下登首相、安倍晋太郎幹事長、藤波孝生元官房長官ら、名前の出た九人の自民党政治家の大部分と、民社党の塚本三郎委員長は自ら選び、しかも政治家本人に対する譲渡と考えていたことを認めている。政治家の「秘書がやった」という弁明の信ぴょう性が、こんご検察当局の調べで明らかにされる。

政界工作、主眼は“獵官”「名誉」

1 1989. 03. 28 求めた真藤 郵政・NTT関係者が証 東京朝刊 2社 30 頁 913 字 04 段 言

二十七日起訴されたNTT前会長真藤恒(78)は、昭和六十年四月に就任した民営NTTの初代社長のイスや、六十三年六月の代表取締役会長職を手に入れるために、政界への働きかけを盛んに行った疑惑が、関係者の証言で浮かび上がっている。政府主導のNTTトップ人事。東京地検特捜部も真藤の政界工作に強い関心を寄せている模様だ。

電電公社時代の総裁、副総裁人事は内閣が任命した。民営化後の取締役、監査役の

選任、解任については郵政大臣に認可権があるほか、政府も深く関与してきた。真藤が昭和五十六年一月に公社総裁に就任した人事は、当時の鈴木善幸首相、宮沢喜一官房長官のラインで決まった。

民営化後の初代社長人事では、真藤と北原安定副総裁（現・顧問）の間で激しい争いが演じられた。

真藤は五十九年九月、記者会見で「これまで改革を進めてきた。軌道に乗るまでやる」と語り、民営化後の続投に強い意欲を示した。

北原氏は田中角栄元首相に近いとされ、真藤は、当時の中曽根康弘前首相の臨調路線に沿う立場にあり、財界もバックについた。が、田中元首相が六十年二月末に病気で倒れ、情勢は真藤に有利に傾いた。

中曽根氏はNTT設立委員長の今里広記氏（故人）や当時の稲山嘉寛経団連会長（故人）らと会談を持った。大詰めを迎えた三月十五日には、中曽根氏と当時の金丸信・自民党幹事長、左藤恵郵政相、藤波孝生官房長官が協議している。

六十三年六月、代表取締役会長に就任した真藤。それ以前の会見では「会長になれといわれれば会長になる」などと語りながら、その裏では代表権つきの会長になるために動いていた。

結局、当時の中山正暉郵政相は「一期二年だけ」という条件をつけて、真藤の代表権つき会長への就任を認めたが、これについても「真藤が官邸工作をしたんだろう」（自民党代議士）などといわれてきた。

真藤の政界工作の最大の狙いは、自らの人事にあったといわれる。リクルートコスモス株の売却益について、郵政省やNTT関係者は「人並み以上の財産のある真藤には地位と名誉がすべて。株の売却益も、NTTの管理職がカンパしたボランティア基金も、そのために使った可能性もあり、私腹を肥やしたに等しい」と決めつけている。

1 1989. 03. 29 リクルート疑惑の藤波孝生氏、半月ぶりに姿見せる 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 418字 02段 写真

徳田英治秘書名義で譲渡された一万二千株の売却益を自宅購入費用に充てたことが発覚した藤波孝生元官房長官が、二十八日午後、問題が明るみに出て以来約半月ぶりにマスコミの前に姿を現した。

午後三時五十分ごろ、中曽根派事務所のある東京・平河町の砂防会館に車で乗りつけた藤波氏。入り口で待ち構えたカメラマンのフラッシュに一瞬緊張した表情を浮かべたが、すぐに背筋をピンと伸ばしゆったりとした足取りで階段に。記者団に取り囲まれ、「事情聴取は受けましたか」と聞かれ、はっきりと「ありません」。前をふさぐカメラマンに「前へ進みましょうや」と声をかける余裕も。

午後五時すぎ、会議室から出てきた藤波氏は、うつむきかげんでA「今、お話しすることはありません」とひと言。

関係者によると、この日の会合には、渡辺政調会長、山口議運委員長ら同派幹部が出席。藤波氏は、久しぶりの出席とあって、同僚議員に励ましの言葉をかけられ、「ご心配か

けてすみません」と頭を下げた、という。

仮名口座は“秘書名合体” 藤波
1 1989. 04. 06 氏への江副献金「表にしたくない 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1532 字 05 段
事情」

◆徳田英治氏と水谷太氏で徳田太名義◆

リ疑惑発覚五日後(昭和六十三年六月二十三日)に、リクルート前会長・江副浩正(52)が個人でひそかに振り込んだ一千五百万円。その入金先は、元官房長官・藤波孝生自民党代議士の秘書、徳田英治氏と水谷太氏を合わせた「徳田太」名義の仮名口座だった。藤波代議士へのリ社非公開株一万二千株の譲渡名義人と判明してから現在まで、姿を消している徳田氏。株売却益を邸宅購入資金に充当したことが明るみに出たあと表面に現れなくなった主にかわり、報道陣との対応に追われていた水谷氏。入金直前に急きよ都銀に設けられた二人の“合作仮名口座”は、リ社と政界の深部をのぞかせている。

神奈川県警捜査二課は、小松秀熙(ひでき)前川崎市助役へのリクルートコスモス非公開株三万株(一株額面五十円換算)譲渡疑惑について、六十二年暮れ、内偵を開始。そして関係者の事情聴取、リ社や関連会社に関係資料の任意提出など水面下の捜査が翌年から本格化する。

金融筋などによると「徳田太」なる実在しない人物の仮名口座は、この捜査本格化の時期に某都銀に設けられていた。

リ社関係者の証言によると、神奈川県警の捜査を察知したり社内部には江副をトップにした対策委員会が作られ、活発に動いていた。このころ、県警の事情聴取に供述を急にひるがえすリ社幹部も目立った、という。

さらにリ社側は県警に「弁明書」も提出、株を譲渡した相手は小松前助役だけではない――と主張し、譲渡先を増やすことで贈る側の趣旨をぼかすという“背水の陣”まで敷いていた。そのなかでリ疑惑に火がついた。

この間の事実を検察側は、リクルートコスモス社前社長室長、松原弘被告(48)の贈賄申し込み事件(懲役一年六月、執行猶予四年の有罪判決)の冒頭陳述で「小松前助役への報道後、リ社では各新聞報道の写しをただちにリ社、コ社幹部に配布したほか、国会の動向の把握に努めていた。さらに、江副、位田尚隆リ社社長、池田友之コ社社長ら主要幹部をメンバーとする対策会議を設置、コスモス株の譲渡先については個人のプライバシーとして一切公表を拒否することになった」と明らかにしている。

問題の仮名口座に江副本人から直接、一千五百万円が振り込まれ、同時に三百万円もコスモス社から入金したのはリ疑惑が大きく広がろうとする直前だった。このあと、つぎつぎ自民党首脳の秘書名義での株譲渡が発覚、同七月六日、江副はリ社会長辞任に追い込まれた。

一方、六十一年六月から六十二年十二月にかけ、リ社から振り込まれた計二千三百万円は、某都銀の「徳田英治秘書」口座に入金している。

なぜ、別の、しかも仮名口座が今回に限って使われたかは不明だが、銀行関係者は匿

名を条件に「内規に触れるので通常、仮名口座は設けられない。相当の顧客の場合、暗黙の了解で作ることもあるが、銀行側にすれば相手が信用できるからこそ。仮名口座への入金には表にしたい事情があるのだろう」と推測する。

「徳田太」と合作された徳田、水谷の両氏は、藤波氏が抱える秘書の中でも中心的な存在。徳田氏はすでに、東京地検特捜部の事情聴取を受けているが、昨秋、同氏名義でのリ社株譲渡が報道されて以来、ホテルや知人宅を泊まり歩く毎日といい、表面からは姿を一切消している。当時、藤波氏は「秘書のしたことは私のしたこと」としていたが、先月十三日、株売却益二千六百万円を東京・杉並の邸宅購入資金に充当したことが発覚すると、半月余も“行方不明”になった。

ようやく、同二十九日に中曽根派の幹事会に顔を出したが「今は申し上げることはない」と語っただけ。この間、水谷秘書は詰めかける報道陣に「ノーコメント」「先生と連絡がとれない」などと繰り返していた。

リ事件・政界ルート 税調委員起
1 1989. 04. 11 用 就職協定 安比開発 職務権 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1065 字 05 段
限3つに絞る

リクルート事件・政界ルートについて、東京地検特捜部は十日までに、リクルートコスモス株譲渡工作で国会議員の職務権限が絡むテーマは〈1〉リ社前会長・江副浩正(52)の政府税調委員起用〈2〉就職協定〈3〉岩手・安比高原開発一の三つと判断。また株譲渡とは別の求人誌規制をめぐるリ社からの工作を受けた社労族議員を含め、権限を行使し得る政治家として藤波孝生・元官房長官、池田克也・公明党代議士ら五人前後をリストアップした模様だ。特捜部ではこれら政治家秘書の再聴取を徹底的に行ったうえ最終的には政治家聴取に踏み切り、刑事立件の可能性を探るとみられる。

検察当局は、店頭登録直前の昭和六十一年九月末に行われた十三人の政治家(名義人数は十七人)へのコスモス株譲渡でも譲り受け側の職務権限が伴えば、わいろになり得るとして、リ社側が政治家を選定した個別的な動機の特定を進めてきた。その結果、江副の税調委員選任など三つのテーマが、政治家の職務権限に関連する問題として浮かび上がってきた。

このうち、政府税調問題に関与した可能性があるのは、藤波元官房長官ら。中曽根前首相は六十年七月、「税調に“暴れ馬”も入れた方がいい」と発言、これがきっかけとなって民間人の登用が決まり、同年九月、江副が特別委員に就任した。このため、藤波氏が具体的人選にどれほど関与したかが焦点となっている。

また、就職協定問題は六十年六月の臨教審答申の後、見直し論議が起きたが、池田氏は同年十一月十五日、衆院文教委で「就職協定についてその後何らかの進展はみられているか」と質問、当時の松永文相から「遅くとも一月早々ぐらいには何らかのルールづくりができれば望ましい」との答弁を引き出した。当時は、就職情報誌業界が編集の都

合などから、新協定の行方に関心を寄せていた時期だった。

さらに、リ社系の「安比高原スキー場」をめぐるでは、加藤六月農相(当時)が六十二年二月、林野庁幹部とともに、大部分がリ社負担のヘリコプターで現地を視察。その直後、地元営林局が難色を示していたスキー場拡張計画が一転、許可が下りたことなどが明らかになっている。

政界関係者の場合は、一般的な政治献金とわいろの見分けがつきにくいえ、株譲渡の際、政治家本人がその事実を承知していたかどうか、という問題もある。このため、特捜部では、これら職務権限との関連が問題になり得る政治家の秘書らから再聴取、株譲渡の事実関係の徹底解明を進めているが、秘書らは、当局の調べに対し、徹底的に抵抗しているともいわれ、解明には、時間がかかりそう。

1 1989. 04. 14 藤波元官房長官事務所物置で火事 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 114 字 01 段
／三重・伊勢

十三日午後九時五分ごろ、三重県伊勢市八日市場町にある元内閣官房長官藤波孝生代議士(56)の事務所裏の物置から出火、プレハブ造りの同物置二十六平方メートルを全焼、中にあったイスやテーブルも焼けた。

伊勢署では不審火とみて調べている。

突然の竹下首相“降板”にリクルート
1 1989. 04. 26 株取得政治家は… 渡辺・藤波・塚本氏ほか 東京朝刊 2社 30 頁 449 字 03 段

首相の突然の退陣表明をどう受け止めたか。二十五日正午から開会した衆院本会議場で、リクルートコスモス株譲渡を受けた政治家にその胸中をたずねた。

後ろ手を組んで足早に本会議場に入った藤波孝生元官房長官。感想を求められても「ウーム」と一言いったきり。本会議後も、質問に一切答えず、秘書にガードされて車で駆け去った。

疑惑発覚当初、「単なる商取引」と言い張っていた渡辺美智雄自民党政調会長は「なに？ 感想。いいよ、感想終わり」。ムツとした様子。

浜田卓二郎代議士は「いいです。いいです」と振り切るように議場から外へ。

この問題で委員長を引責辞任した塚本三郎前民社党委員長は「(自分が永年勤続の表彰を受けた)この日に辞める発表をしたのは皮肉なことですね」とあまり表情も変えず言葉少な。

渡辺秀央代議士は、「政治家として出处進退を示し責任を明らかにしたということだろう。(今後のことは)わからん」とぶっきらぼうに答えた。

加藤紘一代議士も「突然で驚きました。(感想は、の質問に対し)話はない」といったきり、くちびるを結んだ。

リクルート・政界ルート 刑事立件、
1 1989. 04. 30 5月末メドに結論 藤波、池田氏周 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 927 字 06 段
辺重点に

リクルート事件・政界ルートについて検察当局は二十九日までに、政治家関与の刑事処分メドを五月下旬におくとの方針を固めた模様である。とくに公明党の池田克也代議士と藤波孝生元官房長官の二人の周辺を重点捜査した結果、池田氏は、就職協定の国会質問に関してリ社から要請を受けていた。藤波氏については、政府税制調査会特別委員選任のほか、新たに臨時教育審議会での就職協定問題の疑惑が浮上した。東京地検特捜部では、両氏周辺の捜査をさらに強化、刑事立件が可能かどうかの最終判断をすると思われる。捜査は両氏の事情聴取の可否も含め最後のヤマ場にさしかかった。

池田氏は五十九年六月から六十年十一月、衆院文教委員会や予算委員会で五回にわたり、就職協定に関し質問した。「協定の必要性を指摘、青田買いの是正を唱える」内容で、六十年十月三十日の衆院予算委員会では青田買いについて「できるだけ早期に手を打つ」とした当時の中曽根首相の答弁を引き出している。

ところが、質問の中には、リ社元社長室長・辰巳雅朗(46)(贈賄罪で起訴)らが質問原稿の作成に協力したのもあったとされ、リ社側の質問依頼の事実を裏付ける関係者の供述や資料もある模様。

一方、六十年六月の臨教審第一次答申は、学歴社会の是正策として「有名校重視につながる就職協定違反を改める」と指摘したが、これは協定の存続を望むリ社に有利に働く内容だった。藤波氏は当時官房長官として、臨教審を監督する立場にあった。

就職協定問題は、五十九年一月に協定廃止論議が活発化した。リ社は、協定がなくなると、主力商品の大学生向け求人誌「リクルートブック」の存在価値が失われかねないと判断、政界関係者への働きかけを計画したとされる。

特捜部は、これと並行して岩手県・安比高原開発に絡む問題の解明も進めているほか、コスモス株を譲渡された十三人の政治家について、株だけでなくその他の政治献金も含めて、政治資金規正法に抵触する可能性があるかどうか検討を進めている。

検察当局では、リ事件の捜査がすでに八か月を過ぎ長期化していること、政界ルートのターゲットもしぼられたことから早期決着を目指すことで意見統一がはかられ、五月下旬を一応のメドに捜査を進めることになった。

1 1989. 04. 30 藤波孝生氏留守宅でも放火被害 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 177 字 01 段

元内閣官房長官、藤波孝生代議士(三重二区)の三重県伊勢市にある留守宅の外壁に、放火されていたことが二十九日、明らかになった。さる十三日夜には、同市内の同代議士事務所の物置が放火とみられる火事で全焼しており、伊勢署は関連を調べている。

留守宅(伊勢市曾ネーの三の一四)の放火跡は二十五日午後六時ごろ、東京から帰宅した藤波代議士の妻邦江さん(56)が発見した。

政治家を4ランクに分け50

1 1989. 05. 07 00株未満は秘書用に 江 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1092 字 06 段 写真
副が直接勧誘も／リ事件

リクルート社前会長・江副浩正(52)(五件の贈賄罪で起訴、拘置中)が、東京地検特捜部の調べに対し、〈1〉政界関係者へのリクルートコスモス株譲渡は、部下が契約手続きに行く前に、江副が政治家本人か秘書に直接持ちかけた〈2〉五千株未満の端数はいずれも、政治家本人分とは別に、秘書の分として用意したつもりだったーなどと供述を始めたことが、六日までの関係者の証言で明らかになった。特捜部は株譲渡に関係した池田克也・公明党代議士の事情聴取に着手、藤波孝生・元官房長官からも近く聴取する見通したが、江副の新たな供述は、大詰めの政界ルート捜査の行方にも大きな影響を与えそうだ。

関係者によると、特捜部の追及に対し江副は、政界関係者の譲渡株数の決定パターンには、大きく分け、政治家本人の分だけを考えたものと、本人と秘書の両方の分を合計した場合の二つがあった、と説明した。大物秘書や日ごろの交流が親密な秘書に対しては、別個に利益を与えようと考えたため、その株数は、政治家本人分が最低五千株だったのに対し、秘書分は二千―三千株とそれより少な目に計算したという。

焦点の昭和六十一年九月のコスモス株譲渡に登場する国会議員十三人のうち、江副側で秘書分を織り込んでいたとみられるのは、中曽根前首相周辺の二万九千株、竹下首相、藤波元官房長官、加藤六月元農相各周辺の各一万二千株、それに、森喜朗元文相から渡った分を含め一万七千株を譲り受けた安倍晋太郎自民党幹事長周辺の五つのケース。江副側では、中曽根氏の三人の秘書ら周辺人物に三千株ずつ、他のケースはいずれも、一人の秘書に各二千株と計算していた模様で、こうした秘書分を除くと、江副らによる政界譲渡の株数は〈1〉二万株〈2〉一万五千株〈3〉一万株〈4〉五千株ーの四ランクに分けられていたことになる。

さらに江副は、「自分から政治家本人に直接話をしたケースもある」と供述したという。

政界関係者への譲渡手続きは、リ社経営企画室部長・小野敏広(39)(起訴、拘置中)らが担当、秘書と面会して契約を交わしていたことがすでに判明しているが、今回新たにわかった江副の供述は、小野らの訪問の以前に江副自身が直接、勧誘行為に乗り出していたことを認めるものだ。

しかし、その一方で、秘書分を含めたケースに関しては、「本人に直接伝えると、秘書の人が自分の分を取りにくいと思い、秘書の人に持ちかけた」と述べているといわれ、なお不明な点も残されている。

特捜部はこれら江副の供述を踏まえ、池田氏ら政治家本人からの聴取結果などを総合的に分析、政界ルート刑事立件の可否の最終判断を下すとみられている。

地元で3連休を過ごした藤波

1 1989. 05. 07 さん帰京 リクルート事件捜査 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 374 字 02 段 写真
査焦点に

公明党の池田克也代議士とともに、捜査の焦点となっている藤波孝生・元官房長官は、三連休を地元・三重県伊勢市の自宅で過ごし、六日午前、四日ぶりに帰京した。

藤波氏はこの日午前八時前、伊勢市の自宅玄関前に姿を見せた。周囲を約二十人の記者団に取り囲まれ、「東京地検から何らかの連絡があったのか」との質問に対し、「何もありません。疑惑に関することは今は申し上げる時期ではない」と述べるとともに、今後、釈明の会見などについても、「予定はない」と答えた。

藤波氏はこのあと帰京、都内のホテルで開かれた友人の子息の結婚披露宴に出席、杉並の私邸に帰宅した。

藤波氏はさる二日夕、あわただしく伊勢市の自宅に帰った。「先月起きた自宅放火事件を近所にわびるのが目的」だったが、ほとんど外出することなく、外出したのは三日午後、病氣療養中の地元有力支持者を見舞いに行っただけだった。

リクルート事件捜査、政界中枢へ

1 1989. 05. 11 聴取の藤波氏は「清潔」と言われ 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 2134 字 06 段
たが…

リクルート事件政界ルートの捜査が正念場をむかえた。十日明らかになった元内閣官房長官、藤波孝生代議士(56)に対する東京地検特捜部の事情聴取。クリーンイメージで政界の階段を駆け上がり、中曽根内閣の舞台裏を知り尽くした藤波代議士。同代議士やその周辺へ株譲渡や小切手献金で流れた巨額のり社資金の理由は何か。ついに政権中枢に切り込んだ捜査に、永田町の緊張感は一層強まりそうだ。

藤波代議士は伊勢神宮近くの老舗(しにせ)まんじゅう店の長男。父親は伊勢市議でもあった。

早大卒業後、青年会議所、青年団活動を通じて人望を集め、三十八年四月、青年会議所から推されるかたちで三重県議選に出馬、当選。さらに四十二年一月、故浜地文平・元代議士の後継者に指名され、三十四歳で国会に躍り出た。

中、高校時代は野球部の補欠捕手。代議士になってからの講演では、この補欠時代の経験を度々引用、「政治家は、いわば補欠選手のようなもの。国民の皆さんが第一線でホームランを打ったり、あるいは名投手で、いいボールを投げたりするのをしっかり受け止めて、その人たちがより活動できるような環境をつくるのが政治家の役割。補欠時代は一番いい勉強になった」と語っている。中曽根内閣の官房長官時代には、「有能な人を支えるのが私の楽しみ」とも語っている。

衆院当選後、地元の青年会議所の会合に出席した際、「今日は会議所のメンバーとして出てきた」と机の後片付けを手伝う律義さも持ち味。「オレがオレが」の政界にあって、控え目な姿勢に徹している。

しかし政治的言動は明確に打ち出し、早くから若手のリーダーとして注目を集めた。田

中金脈問題が噴き出したさる四十九年、河野洋平代議士を総裁候補にかつぎだし、ガラス張りの党運営を訴える。さらに河野代議士が新自由クラブを結成した五十一年には、猛烈な入党勧誘を振り切って、「党内改革」を主張、自民党にとどまる。周辺は「寡黙だが、一度決めたことは絶対に変えない頑固さがある」と語る。

孝堂の号をもつ俳人でもあり、句集「神路山」も出版されている。文教族として地歩を固めたが、大平内閣では労働大臣として初入閣。中曽根氏の信任も厚く、中曽根派の後継者とも目されていた。

中曽根氏に対しては、政界入りするころから尊敬の念を抱いていた、という。河野一郎氏の死去で、河野派が分裂、中曽根派が結成されると、中曽根氏のもとへ駆けつけている。

国会進出後、禁煙し、アルコールも控えるようになった。選挙の時も、事務所では一切酒を出さない。

また後援会関係者が就職などの依頼をしても、「実力が伴っていないと、本人が苦勞するだけだ」といさめることも。派手な地元対策もせず、「誠実で清潔」との信頼を受けていた。このため疑惑発覚後、地元では「裏切られた」と反発する声ができる一方、「悪いことをしたとは信じられない」との困惑が広がっていた。

◆リ社から利益供与 2年間に6700万円◆

藤波代議士やその周辺が昭和六十一年から昨年までの二年間にリ社から受けていた利益供与は、計六千七百万円。竹下首相、中曽根前首相、安倍幹事長、宮沢前蔵相という派閥の領袖(りょうしゅう)を除くと突出した金額だ。

リ社が藤波氏の徳田英治秘書名義でコスモス株一万二千株を譲渡したのは、党国対委員長当時の六十一年九月末。一株三千円で、購入資金三千六百万円はファーストフィナンس社が融資した。

株は同年十月三十一日に一株五千二百七十円で売却され、売却益二千六百万円を含む代金六千二百万円は大和証券の同秘書名義の口座に入った。数日後の十一月初め、この金はそっくり都内の大手都銀の徳田口座に移動、ここで、売却代金は、この口座にプールされた金と混合した。次いで同月中旬、ここからほぼ同額が遠隔地の都銀支店に送金された。

さらに十二月十九日、一千万円を引いた残りの五千二百万円が同支店から「駿台会館」の銀行口座に振り込まれた。この日は、藤波氏が同会館から東京・杉並の豪邸を一億三千二百万円で買い取った日。五千二百万円はこの購入代金の一部で、残り八千万円も別ルートで同日、会館の口座に振り込まれ、売買が完了している。

この間、藤波氏側は、株購入資金三千六百万円を別口座からファ社に返済、結果的に売却益二千六百万円は大手都銀口座で他の金と入り混じって色を消したあと自宅購入資金の一部に充当されたことになる。

一方、藤波氏側へは株売却益とは別にリ社側から直接の資金供与も明らかになっている。使われたのは、やはり都銀の徳田名義口座で、六十一年六月、六十二年七月、同年十二月の三回にわたり、それぞれ一千万円、三百万円、一千万円の計二千三百万円がリ

社から小切手で振り込まれた。

また、リクルート疑惑が発覚して五日後の昨年六月二十三日には、徳田秘書と水谷太秘書の名前を合作した「徳田太」名義の都銀の仮名口座に、江副個人名で千五百万円、コスモス社が三百万円の計千八百万円を小切手で振り込んでいた。

株売却益が、事実上藤波氏の自宅購入という私的な目的に使われたことは、「秘書がやった株取引」との弁明を覆す事実。直接の資金供与は、政治資金として届け出がないうえ、昨年の仮名口座入金は秘匿性が強い点などが注目されている。

[深層リクルート事件]政界						
1	1989. 05. 12	工作(1)狙われた大番頭、 藤波元官房長官(連載)	東京朝刊	社会	31 頁	1415 字 05 段 写真

◆税調でも選任疑惑 江副の“先行投資”的中◆

近い将来の政権の座も射程に入れていたネオニューリーダー、藤波孝生代議士に、ついに、東京地検特捜部の事情聴取の手が伸びた。クリーンなイメージに包まれていた藤波代議士をも標的にしたリクルート社の政界工作。その工作を進める際、金に糸目をつけずに繰り上げた多彩な手口は、わが国の政界が抱え続けてきた業界との結びつきの暗部を浮かび上がらせた。

「新自由クラブ結成に参加していれば、こんなことはなかっただろうに」

ロッキード事件さなかの五十一年六月、自民党に失望して新自クを結成した一人、田川誠一代議士(進歩党代表)は、藤波代議士の行動に思いをはせた。

藤波代議士が「党の現状を考えると、いったん解党したほうがいいな」と言い切ったのは結党二か月前のことだった。

だが、決行の時が近付くと「離党は国会延長後の会期末」と主張したかと思えば、その十数分後には新党結成の是非を持ち出す。

脱党の決意を迫る河野洋平代議士に対し、「当たり券があるかどうか、よく確かめてから(宝くじを)買うことにする」と後退した藤波代議士は結局、新党に加わらなかった。

五十六年春、リ社の銀座本社ビル落成披露パーティーが開かれた東京都内の一流ホテル。藤波労相(当時)は江副浩正を横に見ながらあいさつした。「親しくしている江副さんは立派な経営者。今後に期待している」

藤波代議士は、このしばらく前、本社ビルで開かれた落成式にも出席した。

「政官界に接近する有力な方法だった」(リ社幹部)高額謝礼つきのシンポジウムに藤波代議士が招かれたのはその前年一月だった。

藤波代議士への接近工作は、五十七年、所属派閥の中曽根派が政権を握ったことで、的中した形になる。

“内閣の大番頭”の官房長官に藤波代議士が就任したことで、リ社は政権中枢への大きなパイプをつかんだ。「やろうと思えばなんでもできる」(元秘書官)官房長官の幅広い権限を、藤波代議士がリ社との関係でどう行使したか、まだ明確ではないが、江副が税調特別委員に就任したのは藤波官房長官の時である。

「経理は心配ない。ソツがない江副さんは大蔵筋には手を打っている」。五十年代半ば、リ社の中堅幹部の間でこんな会話が交わされた。テーマは決算上の前倒し処理である。

借金で急成長を続けたリ社は「金融機関の信用を失わないため、減収、減益は避ける必要があった」。

そのため、貸し倒れ分を隠したり、決算日より先の売り上げを前倒しで計上したくなる。「そのかわり、当局の経理チェックが気になる。だから大蔵筋の抑えが必要だった」という。

中央省庁が、政治家に準じる存在として扱ってくれるといわれる政府機関委員。リ社の中心事業に大きな影響を与える土地問題を審議する土地臨調参与とともに、税調特別委員にも江副が選ばれたことは、大蔵省を通じて金融機関にも影響力が増すメリットがあったといえる。

◆リクルート社の交際費急上昇、9億9000万円◆

「わが社は交際費といわれるものは、ほとんど使っていない」。リ社の急成長が目立ち始めた四十七年、江副は新聞とのインタビューで胸を張って語った。

それから十二年後。五十九年四月の社内報によるとリ社の交際費はなんと九億九千万円。部長級で年間千五百万円もの交際費を使ったという。他企業を圧する勢いだった成長ぶりと軌を一にして膨れ上がった交際費。それとともに、藤波代議士を含む政界工作が大きな広がりを見せていった。

1	1989. 05. 16	江副の税調委員任命 が最終決裁	藤波孝生氏	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 141 字 01 段
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小淵官房長官は十五日の参院予算委員会で、江副浩正リクルート前会長の政府税調特別委員任命問題について、「税制調査会の特別委員の任命は、官房長官が専決処理することになっている」と、当時の藤波孝生官房長官が最終的な決裁印を押したことを初めて認めた。和田教美委員（公明）の質問に答えたもの。

リクルート事件政界ルート				
1	1989. 05. 17	身辺捜査ほぼ終了 実弟から深夜まで聴取	池田氏	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 670 字 05 段 写真

リクルート事件・政界ルートを追及している東京地検特捜部は十六日までに、身辺捜査をほぼ終了、政界汚職立件は緊迫した最終局面を迎えた。特捜部が収賄容疑を固めている元官房長官・藤波孝生自民党代議士（56）、池田克也公明党代議士に対する捜査は被疑者としての取り調べを含む段階へ進むことは必至の情勢となった。

◆声震わせ「全否定」池田氏辞職会見◆

この日公明党からの離党と議員辞職を発表した池田代議士は、目に涙を浮かべ、声を震わせて、疑惑を否定した。が、株譲渡を受けた実弟の謙（ゆずる）氏は、この日も深夜まで、特捜部の事情聴取を受け、池田代議士への包囲網は、着々と絞り込まれている。

二月中旬、国会に顔を見せて以来、三か月も“雲隠れ”してきた池田氏が、約十人の衛

視にがつちり守られ、硬い表情で姿をみせた。心労からかひと回りやせて見える。

背広の内ポケットから、声明文を取り出し、一気に読み始めた。「本日、大久保書記長に離党届を提出、ただいま衆院議長に辞職願を提出してまいりました」。手が、小刻みに震え、みるみる目がうるんだ。収賄事件の立件必至との報道には、「日々、誠に断腸の思い」とし、「党と同志に対し、衷心よりおわび申し上げます」と頭を下げた。

しかし、この後は、指摘される疑惑のすべてを否定した。リクルート社からの千四百万円の献金も「一切受けていません」。国会質問についても「リ社を利するために行ったものではない」。時に唇をかみ、声を強める。が、身の潔白の証明については「残念ながら、相当の期間が必要」と語り、地検の追及が続くのを覚悟した様子もうかがえた。

無言・困惑・雲隠れ？ コスモス株取	
1 1989. 05. 18	得議員は反応さまざま／リ事件政界 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 751字 06段 捜査

◆はなはだ残念／中曽根氏◆

藤波孝生、池田克也両代議士の受託収賄罪立件に向けて急進展したリクルート事件政界ルートの捜査は、やはりコスモス未公開株売買で名前の上がった他の国会議員十五人にも強い衝撃を与えた。反応は、様々だったが、これをきっかけに政治家のけじめ論議はさらに広がりそうだ。

竹下首相は、塚本前民社党委員長が辞任、自分自身に続き矢野公明党委員長が辞意を表明し三党首が株疑惑で辞任することにつき、「私を除いて、立派な方々が判断されたことですから」と言葉少な。中曽根前首相は「こういう事態に至ったことは、はなはだ残念で遺憾に思う」と述べたが、自分については口を閉ざした。

◆マスコミ過剰反応／渡辺氏◆

一方、渡辺美智雄政調会長は、「(取り調べを受けたことは)非常に残念。しかし、マスコミは過剰反応だ」としながらも「嫌疑があれば、取り調べは当たり前。事実関係がわからないので評価しようがない」と当惑気味だった。

◆けじめは昨年つけた／宮沢氏◆

対照的なのが宮沢喜一・前蔵相。「私のけじめは(蔵相辞任で)昨年つけた。党のけじめは、政治改革の一つとして党議決定される」と冷静。しかし、「藤波さんのことは、内容がよくわからないので」と明言を避けた。

塚本前委員長は「(株譲渡を受けた)三年前、今回のようなことが問題になるとわかっていれば、譲渡は受けなかった。検察の警鐘も遅きに失した」と語った。

浜田卓二郎代議士(自民)も、「リ事件終了まで、一切差し控えたい」。渡辺秀央代議士(同)は、地元の新潟県で知事選の応援中だが、事件については一切無言を通し、田中慶秋代議士(民社)は「コメントしない」とのこと。

加藤紘一代議士(自民)や加藤六月・元農水相、伊吹文明(同)の各代議士、上田卓三前代議士(社会)は連絡不能とのことだった。

リクルート事件 異例の12時
1 1989. 05. 18 間聴取 無言藤波代議士 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 867 字 06 段 写真
「闘い抜く」池田代議士

十七日朝から、東京地検特捜部の取り調べを受けていた元官房長官の藤波孝生代議士と、池田克也代議士の二人が再び姿を現したのは、まる半日も後の午後九時前後になってからだった。東京地検の立件に向けての強い意欲を示すかのように、任意捜査にしては異例の長時間聴取。二人とも取り調べ内容をさとられまいとするかのように、表情を変えず、足早に乗用車で検察庁舎を後にしたが、特捜部対両代議士の“対決”は、今後もさらに続くことが予想されている。

藤波代議士は午後八時五十五分、東京・中野区の中野区検の玄関前に、秘書一人を伴って出てきた。長時間の取り調べにもかかわらず、表情に疲れは見えない。むしろ、何かが吹っ切れたかのように、さばさばしたようにもみえる。

待ち構えた約百人の大報道陣に静かに目をやり、玄関に横づけされた乗用車に乗り込んだ。車が走り出す時、あいさつをするかのように上体を一瞬、前へ傾けたが、やはり表情は変わらなかった。

この後、藤波代議士の車は前夜から宿泊している東京・永田町のキャピトル東急ホテルに一直線。入り口で待ちかまえた二十人余りのカメラマンにもみくちやにされそうになり、一瞬、足を止めた。渋い表情をみせたが、ホテル従業員の先導で報道陣を振り切るように、エレベーターで自分の部屋に向かい、この時には、いつもの能面のような表情に戻っていた。

池田克也代議士は午後九時二十分、東京・霞が関の東京地検の正面玄関に姿をみせた。朝と同様、まっすぐ前をみつめ、唇を真一文字に結びながら、急ぎ足で車の中へすべり込む。約百人の報道陣から一斉にカメラのフラッシュを浴びせられても、まゆひとつ動かさなかった。

池田代議士の車は、午後九時五十分、東京・玉川の自宅に着いた。三か月ぶりの帰宅。報道陣に「取り調べは」と聞かれたが、「内容については何もいえません」。さらに「容疑は認めましたか」との問いに、立ち止まって「いえ」と、はっきり否定した。久しぶりの帰宅の心境も聞かれたが、それには答えず「力一杯これから闘い抜いていきたいと思います」と、少し声をふるわせて語った。

1 1989. 05. 18 臨教審委員に江副を推す 官邸サイド、強硬に 文部省渋り実現せず 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 915 字 04 段

東京地検特捜部から受託収賄容疑で取り調べを受けた藤波孝生代議士(56)は、臨時教育審議会(臨教審)の就職協定論議で社に便宜を図った疑いが持たれているが、臨教審の委員選任に際して、当時、首相官邸サイドから、江副浩正(52)を委員に就任させるよう、強い要請があったことが、十七日、関係者の証言で明らかになった。江副は結局、委員にはなれなかったものの、藤波代議士は、官房長官として委員人選に深く関与しており、特捜部では江副が委員就任についても、働きかけをしていた可能性もあるとして、重

大な関心を寄せている模様だ。

臨教審は中曽根首相の提唱で五十九年二月に設置の方向が固まり、同年八月二十一日に発足、九月から教育改革の審議に入った。

発足時の委員は、二十五人。関係者によると、委員の人選は、同年三月ごろから始まったが、この過程で、首相官邸サイドから、江副のほか、香山健一氏(学習院大教授)、公文俊平氏(元東大教授)、山本七平氏(山本書店店主)の四人について、「委員としてメンバーに加えて欲しい」と、要請があった。

しかし、要請をうけた文部省首脳は、「指名された四人は中曽根首相に近い人たちで、審議会の答申が、中曽根寄りと先入観を持たれる」と判断。要請を事務局サイドには伝えず、独自に人選が進められた。

結果的には、香山氏だけが、教育学者として、委員に選任され、公文氏と山本氏については、同年十二月、臨教審専門委員に選ばれたが、江副は、結局、委員にはなれなかった。

臨教審設置法によると、委員の選任は「人格、識見共に優れた者のうちから、文部大臣の意見を聞いて、内閣総理大臣が任命する」とされ、実際には、臨教審事務局となった文部省が、候補をリストアップ、首相が任命した。

人選をめぐるのは、首相主導の教育改革に不安感が強かった文部省と、官邸との間で、確執があったとされ、官邸サイドの中心が、当時、官房長官の藤波代議士だった。

臨教審審議のなかでは、学歴社会を生む要因として、就職協定を無視した企業、官庁の青田買いが論議された。経済界には、臨教審設置以前から、協定廃止論があり、リ社は「協定廃止は就職情報誌に不利」と判断、臨教審審議に強い関心を抱いていた。

リクルート事件 起訴へ今日					
1	1989. 05. 19	にも検察首脳協議 藤波・池田両代議士の調べ終了	東京朝刊	社会	31 頁 1368 字 05 段 写真

リクルート事件・政界ルートで、元官房長官・藤波孝生代議士(56)(自民)と池田克也代議士(52)(公明離党)の二人に対する受託収賄容疑での東京地検特捜部の二度目の取り調べは、十八日も夜まで行われ、聴取時間はこの日も十二時間、関係二十か所の搜索も九時間に及んだ。検察当局は、二代議士の取り調べを一部の補充捜査を残し、事実上この日で終了した模様で、きょう十九日にも最高検、東京高検、東京地検の首脳が、来週に予想される両代議士の同時起訴へ向けて協議するものとみられる。

この日、午前九時すぎから始まった二人に対する取り調べは、藤波代議士が午後九時前まで十二時間近く、池田代議士は、同九時半すぎまで十二時間以上に及んだ。

午後八時五十八分、中野区検を出た藤波代議士は、疲労は隠せず、顔色は青白い。約五十人の報道陣のライトの中、無言で前方を見つめたまま車に乗り込み、同九時十八分、宿泊先の東京・永田町のキャピトル東急ホテルに入った。

同三十六分、東京地検本庁舎を出た池田代議士は報道陣から「調べは今日で終わりか」と質問を向けられると「ええ」と答えたが、すぐに「わかりませんが」と弱々しく付け加えた。

取り調べについては、「全面否定です」とキツパリ。献金についても、「一切受け取っておりません」。が、疲れと緊張からか、体は小刻みにふるえ、秘書が「ええ、もうこのへんで」と助け舟を出した。

一方、特捜部の一斉捜索の対象に、池田代議士の家族が役員をつとめ、リ社から一千万円を超えるヤミ献金を受け入れていた「清雅」(東京都渋谷区)も含まれていた。特捜部は献金についてもわいろとして立証を急ぐものとみられる。

東京・永田町のTBRビルにある藤波代議士主宰の政策集団「新生クラブ」の捜索は、午後八時半すぎまで九時間以上。同代議士の受託収賄罪立件に向けた検察の強気の姿勢がありあり。

こうした検察の空気を察してか、事務所では、神経をとがらせ、報道陣に「ここは立ち入り禁止」と食ってかかる一幕もあった。

また、衆院第二議員会館の藤波代議士事務所の捜索は、開始から約七時間後の午後五時すぎに終了、ダンボール箱二十七個と紙袋三個が運び出された。池田代議士事務所は、午後四時三十九分に終わり、同代議士の発言集、名刺、企業リストなど段ボール十個分の資料が押収された。

政治家追及に在宅捜査で臨む検察の手法は、燃系(ねんし)汚職、砂利船汚職を通じて定着してきたが、今回の特捜部の捜査手順は、過去の二件とは異なる。

燃系汚職は、東京地検が横手文雄・元民社党代議士を三回、稲村佐近四郎・元自民党代議士を二回聴取し、着手十五日後に同時起訴した。

大阪地検特捜部の砂利船汚職も田代富士男・元公明党参院議員の三回の聴取後、起訴となった。聴取時間も、燃系汚職では二一八時間、砂利船汚職は六時間前後だったとされる。いずれも自宅捜索は一回目の聴取と同じ日だった。

藤波、池田代議士の場合は事情聴取を行ったうえで、十七日に受託収賄の被疑者として取り調べ、捜索はその翌日だった。

リ事件は収賄に当たるケースと通常の政治献金にとどまるケースが混在するため、検察当局が慎重を期した結果とみられるが、取り調べ着手後、一転して、まるで逮捕と同じような長時間聴取を行っているところに、特捜部の早期決着をめざす姿勢がのぞいている。

	リクルート事件 検察首脳、
1	1989. 05. 20 起訴決定で自信の笑み 藤 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1125 字 05 段 写真
	波・池田氏は“音なし”

政治家起訴を正式決定した十九日午後の検察首脳会議。最終ゴールを目前に、約一時間半の協議を終えた検察首脳らは報道陣の質問に「ノーコメント」を貫いたが、その表情には困難な長期捜査のヤマ場をようやく越した安ど感が感じられた。一方、連日の厳しい取り調べを受けた藤波孝生、池田克也両代議士は、この日は、ホテル、自宅に閉じこもっ

たまま。命運を決める会議の行方を、息をこらして見守るかのようだった。

注目の首脳会議は午後三時十五分から始まったが、これに先立って、まず同一時二十九分、東京地検の吉永祐介検事正が最高検のある八階に上り、前田宏検事総長、根岸重治次長検事らと約一時間半にわたって、事前協議。途中でこれに東京高検の笈栄一検事長が加わり、この話し合いが終わったあと、他の幹部が次々に集まってようやく首脳会議が始まった。

首脳会議終了後、会見した地検の山口悠介次席検事は、「出席者は検事総長以下十一人。特捜部から、これまでの捜査の報告を受けた」と出席者の数だけを明かしただけで、記者からの「藤波、池田両代議士の処分を正式決定したのか」「二人の最終処分の日程は」などの質問には、「ほかのことは一切話せない」。しかし、そう言いながらも「(あとは)そう長くない」と笑みを浮かべ、捜査の終結間近を強く感じさせていた。

報道陣の前に最初に姿を見せた増井清彦・東京高検次席検事は、「終わりましたよ」と一言。「起訴ですか」と、質問され、おだやかな表情で「ご想像にお任せします」。主任検事の宗像紀夫特捜部副部長は、「事件もようやく終わりだな」とポツリ。昨年十一月の捜査開始宣言以来半年余りにおよんだ“闘い”の疲れが色濃くにじんでいた。

前田検事総長は、午後六時十六分、検察合同庁舎を出た。会議の成り行きに対する問いかけには無言だったが、左手を記者団に軽く上げ、自信の笑みを浮かべる余裕をみせた。

一方、二日間とも十二時間という異例の取り調べから解放された藤波代議士は、十九日は一日中宿泊先の永田町のキャピトル東急ホテルにこもった。しかし、早朝にはホテルの中庭を散歩、もの思いにふけていたという。夕方には藤波氏の秘書の一人がホテルに入ったが、それ以外は訪問客も見られなかった。

また、池田代議士もこの日は、世田谷の自宅マンションにひきこもり、一日をすごした。すべての部屋にカーテンがひかれ、明かりがついたが、他の部屋にくらべると異様なまでに静まりかえていた。

池田代議士の実弟謙氏は、この日も十二時間以上にわたり、東京地検で聴取を受けた。同日午後十時半すぎ、正面玄関を出た謙氏は、「今日で調べは終わりか」などの問いかけに「わかりません」「失礼します」と小声で答え、地下鉄のホームへ降りた。

【深層リクルート事件】傷あと

1 1989. 05. 23 深く(1)宮沢氏、人前で初め 東京朝刊 2社 30頁 1443字 04段 写真
て弱音(連載)

ひとつの事件、疑惑に関連してこれほど多くの固有名詞が登場したことは、例がない。政治家、高級官僚、民間人まで、四十人以上もが、職を投げ出し、将来の夢を絶たれた。十一か月にわたって社会を震わせ続けた男、江副浩正は、いまま東京拘置所の厚い壁の中にいる。ついに政治家の起訴にまで上りつめたリクルート事件。それぞれの主役たちに残る、深いつめ跡を追った。

◆「つらかったよ信じてくれ…」 エリート宮沢氏、泥まみれの再起◆

藤波孝生代議士が株の売却益を東京の自宅購入資金に充てていたことが発覚した今年三月、三重県伊勢市にある藤波後援会会長、乾英夫氏は、十数年前の藤波代議士とのやり取りを思い出した。「立派な政治家になるのなら東京に家を持て。金がないなら地元で都合しよう」と勧める乾氏に、代議士は「そこまでしてもらうわけにはいかない」と受け流した。笑い話だったが、「その時のことが頭に残っていたのだろうか」と乾氏はふと思ったという。

清貧な政治家といわれていた。「地元でカネを出しているのは百人ぐらい。それも月一、二万円程度」だったが、起訴状は公邸での請託、官邸でのわいろ収受など中央の汚れた顔をあばいた。

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昨年十二月九日朝、広島県福山市の市議会議長室の電話が鳴った。受話器をあげた三好章議長の耳に、宮沢喜一代議士の重苦しい声が響いた。「国会での答弁が二転、三転するはめになり、地元の人たちが何と思うか、耐え難い気持ちだ。心配かけてすまない」。この直後、宮沢氏は大蔵省での辞任会見に臨んだ。

辞任から四日後、励ましをかねて、熊谷忠氏ら宮沢派の県議五人が上京した。「疲れた。つらかったよ。私は本当に何も知らなかったんだ。信じてほしい」と宮沢氏。人前で初めてみせた弱音が、五人を驚かせた。

昭和二十八年、三十三歳の若さで国政に参加した当初から、地元では期待の総理大臣候補だった。大物ぶりと、藤波代議士同様の清潔イメージに支えられて、苦労知らずで当選を重ねた。地元に戻るのも年に一回あるかないか。自分の選挙中でさえ留守にした。

冠婚葬祭にも淡泊で、花輪や香典もほとんど出さない。「先生がいうには、それはだめだよ、寄付行為に当たるから、ということなんです」(後援会幹部)で通っていた。

その宮沢氏が今年に入って、ふつうの政治家に変身する。四月中旬までは毎週末、欠かさず新幹線で地元に戻った。「一から出直します」「あの件は不徳のいたすところ。今後とも頼みます」。小さな会合の場でこう頭を下げ続ける姿が、福山市を除く選挙区の全市町村でみられた。

「宏池会会長になって、盆暮れには派閥議員に二百万、三百万円と配らなければならぬ立場になった。泥水を飲まなきゃいけないこともあったんじゃないか」と、側近らはみる。

しかし、それでも離れていく支持者がいるのが現実だ。中津信義秘書も「先生の名前だけしっかり出てしまった。説明には時間もかかるし骨も折れる」と率直に認める。

地元では数年前から、「宮沢さんを総理にする会」「宮沢喜一を総理にする広島県決起大会」などが開かれ、夢は膨らんでいた。

政界の激震が続き、いまは再び足が遠のいた。が、落ち着いたら、宮沢氏はまた地元帰りを始める計画だという。「政治の世界は一寸先がやみ。また総理の座が近づいてくると思ってるしかない」。後援団体会長、北川実夫氏は、自らを元気づけている。

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起訴された藤波代議士、キズあとを今後も引きずる宮沢代議士。事件の前と後と、二人

1 1989. 05. 23 リクルート社、臨教審節目に小切手 藤波代議士へ4回 首 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1295 字 06 段 表
相官邸でも500万円

リクルート社から藤波孝生代議士の元に流れ込んだ多額の献金。東京地検特捜部は二十二日の起訴で、このうち二千万円について、政治献金のかくれみのをひきはがし、わいろと断定した。官房長官公邸での請託や、日本の政治の中枢、首相官邸などで次々に手渡された十七通の黒い小切手。その多くは、就職協定を論議した臨時教育審議会審議の節目に、巧みに打ち込まれていた。最大の効果を狙った周到な工作は、逆に藤波代議士と江副浩正(52)の命取りとなった。

当時、民間企業では協定破りの青田買いが横行、同年一月には日経連幹部が協定廃止を唱えた。協定の動向に神経をとがらせていたり社は、臨教審審議の動向にも関心を抱かざるを得なかった。

臨教審は九月から審議入り、同年十一月に発表された審議経過(その1)の中には、リ社の予想通り、今後の検討事項として、「有名校重視・企業の採用方式などの見直しによる学歴偏重の是正について」が盛り込まれた。二回目の五百万円が渡されたのは、同年十二月十九日。翌二十日には臨教審専門委員が任命され、本格審議がスタートを切った。

一方、臨教審審議では、リ社の懸念通り、就職協定問題が、姐(そ)上にのぼり、「守れぬ協定なら、いっそのこと自由競争にしてみたらいい」と、廃止論も出された。が、六十年六月二十六日に提出された第一次答申では、学歴社会の是正策として、協定無視の青田買いを改めることが盛り込まれ、結果的に協定存続となった。

政府は、臨教審答申を受けて、六十年七月、内閣に教育改革推進閣僚会議を設置。八

月には、総理府が各省庁の人事担当者を集めて、できるだけ多様な学校から採用することなどを申し合わせ、実質的に青田買いを禁止。その後、民間の就職協定についても、文部省、労働省、経済四団体で構成する協議機関を発足させ、最終的に協定存続が決まる。

見直し作業は同年九月に始まり、池田代議士の国会質問という援護射撃もあって、政府は協定存続を確約する。十二月五日、藤波代議士に渡った五百万円、同十七日の池田代議士への二百万円の振り込み送金は、協定存続の成功報酬の意味が込められていた。

1	1989. 05. 23	リクルート事件起訴の藤波、池田両代議士がコメント「法廷で戦う」	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 454 字 03 段
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藤波孝生・元官房長官は二十二日夕、受託収賄罪で起訴されたことを受け、「一連のリクルート社に関する話が中曽根内閣の時代に起こっていたことについては、遺憾に思っていた。私は今日まで、誠実に政治活動を進め、職務を遂行してきた。起訴が決定したことはまことに残念だ。この上は弁護士と相談して、身の潔白を明かすべく法廷でたたかっていく決意だ」とのコメントを事務所を通じて発表した。

代議士直筆でしたためられた便せん一枚、約二百十字の声明文。用意周到ぶりの中に強気の姿勢がうかがえる。しかし、藤波代議士は、終日ホテルにこもりきりで、ついに報道陣の前に姿を見せなかった。

一方、池田克也代議士は二十二日夕、自宅前につめかけた報道陣に「リクルートから請託を受けて、その謝礼として株を譲り受けたとか献金を受けたなどというものであれば、それは真実ではなく、事実をねつ造したものであると言わざるをえない。今後、裁判を通じて、この不当な起訴に対して断固戦い抜くことを言明する」と用意した原稿を一気に読みあげた。

唇がふるえ、涙が光っていた。

APPENDIX E

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE JDA CASE

	村岡元官房長官 ヤミ献金処理関					
1	2004. 09. 26	与否定「収支報告書や帳簿見てない」	東京朝刊	社会	39 頁 495 字	04 段

◆村岡元長官 ヤミ献金処理関与否定「収支報告書や帳簿見てない」

日本歯科医師会側から自民党旧橋本派への1億円ヤミ献金事件に絡み、政治資金規正法違反容疑で二十五日、自宅などの捜索を受けた村岡兼造元官房長官(73)は、東京地検特捜部からの事情聴取を終えた同日午後十一時過ぎから、東京都目黒区の自宅で会見に応じた。〈本文記事1面〉

「(政治資金規正法違反の罪で起訴された)滝川俊行被告とは一年近く話したこともない」「政治資金収支報告書や会計帳簿を見せてもらったこともない」と、ヤミ献金処理への関与を否定。その上で、この日の捜索などについて、「全く不当で冤罪(えんざい)とは思えない。(刑事責任を問われるとすれば)作られたものだと思いますよ」と語気を強めた。

特捜部からは「(二〇〇二年)三月十三日の旧橋本派の幹部会で(滝川被告と)重要な話をしていますか」など、1億円の献金を収支報告書に記載しないように滝川被告に指示したかどうかを聞かれたが、「記憶がなく、指示もしていない」と答えたという。

村岡元長官によると特捜部は政治資金規正法違反容疑の捜索令状を示し、最近撮影された写真など数点を押収したという。

	1億円ヤミ献金 村岡元長官起訴					
1	2004. 09. 27	政治資金ずさん管理 逮捕せずは異例(解説)	東京朝刊	2社	38 頁 800 字	04 段

◆日歯側と不公平感

自民党旧橋本派への1億円ヤミ献金事件で、東京地検特捜部は、会計責任者の滝川俊行被告が政治資金収支報告書に1億円を記載しなかった背後に、派閥の重鎮だった村岡兼造元官房長官らの関与があったことを突き止め、ずさんな資金管理が派閥ぐるみで行われていた実態を浮き彫りにした。

政治資金規正法は、会計責任者に収支報告書の記載、提出義務を負わせているため、「不記載」に対し、政治家の責任を問うことは困難な側面がある。滝川被告も当初、「自分の判断でやった」などと供述。捜査は一時、同被告の起訴で終結するかに見えた。

しかし、特捜部は「1億円は大きい。(収支報告書に)書く、書かないということを、会計責任者が一人で決めるのは無理」とみて、滝川被告を追及。同被告の供述などから、派閥の会長代理だった村岡元長官がヤミ献金処理を指示し、事務総長だった野中広務・元自民党幹事長も不記載を認識していた事実を明らかにした。

一方、関与を全面否定している村岡元長官を在宅起訴で済ませたことは、最近の特捜部の捜査手法では異例だった。一九九二年の共和汚職事件以降、容疑を否認している国会議員は逮捕して取り調べる手法が定着していたからだ。

今回のケースでは、派閥資金の管理が問題になっており、「政治家個人の資金管理団体の収入を隠し、自分の利得にしたケースとは違う」(検察幹部)という面があった。しかし、1億円の支出を記載しなかった日本歯科医師会側では、前会長の臼田貞夫被告ら二人が再逮捕されており、不公平感はぬぐえない。

ただ、村岡元長官の在宅起訴により、政治資金の流れの開示を、政治家自らがいかに軽んじているかを示した意義は大きい。政治家には、国会で政治資金の透明化に向けた議論を尽くすことが求められる。また、検察は今後、企業だけでなく、政治家の情報開示義務違反に対しても、毅然(きぜん)と対処することが期待される。(吉野裕介)

1		2004. 09. 27	1億円やミ献金起訴 派閥幹部の指示断定 村岡元長官「陰謀だ」、争う構え	東京朝刊	社会	39 頁	2289 字	07 段	写真・図
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やはり派閥幹部の指示だった——。日本歯科医師会(日歯)側から自民党旧橋本派への1億円やミ献金事件で、東京地検特捜部は二十六日、同派元会長代理の村岡兼造元官房長官(73)が政治資金収支報告書への不記載を主導したとし、在宅起訴した。さらに、不起訴(起訴猶予)ながら、野中広務・元自民党幹事長(78)の関与も認定した。「政治とカネ」を巡り、またも明らかになった政治家の不正。しかし、村岡元長官は事件への関与を全面否定し、法廷に舞台を移して検察側と争う構えだ。(本文記事1面)

村岡元長官は起訴直後の二十六日午後一時四十分から、東京都目黒区の自宅で会見した。前日とこの日の朝に続いて三度目で、「非常に心外だ。裁判で闘う」と切り出した。

村岡元長官によると、特捜部の事情聴取では、二〇〇二年三月十三日に開かれた旧橋本派幹部会のことを追及された。同派政治団体「平成研究会」の会計責任者・滝川俊行被告(55)が、日歯側からの1億円について「領収書を出していいか」と相談したところ、幹部の一人が「選挙の金だから出さない方がいいんじゃないか」と応じ、村岡元長官が会長代理として収支報告書に記載しないよう指示した疑いがある——という指摘だった。

これに対し、村岡元長官は「そもそも1億円の献金を知らず、指示できるわけがない。報告、相談も一切なかった」「五年ぐらい、派閥の収支報告書を見たこともない」と反論。顔を真っ赤にして、「起訴は誰かの陰謀だ。罪をかぶせられた」とまくし立てた。

また、起訴猶予となった野中元幹事長は読売新聞の取材に対し、「何をもって関与したと言われたのか分からないが、日歯側からの献金については一切知らない。政治不信を招いたのは申し訳なく思うが、裁判の経過を見守りたい」と話した。不起訴となった青木幹雄・自民党参院議員会長は「捜査のことなので、コメントを差し控えたい」と記者団に語った。

一方、東京地検の笠間治雄次席検事は、村岡元長官を在宅起訴した後、午後零時半か

ら会見し、起訴の理由について、「滝川被告が独断で判断するのは無理で、派閥運営を統括していた人に責任が行くのは当然」と語った。滝川被告の供述以外にも証拠があるとしたが、元長官の指示については、「会計責任者の滝川被告を指揮して、不記載の犯行に主導的に関与していた。あとは公判で明らかにする」と述べるにとどまった。

また、野中元幹事長についても、「本件犯行に関与は認められるが、積極的に関与したとは認めがたい」とだけ説明した。

◆旧橋本派若手「派閥政治の終わり」

村岡元長官が在宅起訴されたことに、旧橋本派に所属する若手議員からは「もう、派閥政治は終わりだ」などの声が上がった。

ある若手衆院議員は、「旧橋本派というだけで、『不明朗な金を受けているのでは』と思われる」と嘆き、「献金を隠して使えるような時代ではない。派閥政治は終えんを迎えている。もう（派閥）事務所を持つのもやめた方がいい」と語った。

別の衆院議員も「派閥の長年の会計慣行の結果なのだろう。経理処理の透明性を確保し、国民に信頼される仕組みにしなければならない」と話した。

これに対し、同派事務総長の津島雄二元厚相は「（事件について）私は知らないからコメントしようがないし、コメントの用意もない」と言うだけだった。

◆粘り腰・道路族の大物・毒まんじゅう批判…

村岡元長官は一九七二年、秋田県議から衆院選に初当選。郵政相、運輸相などを歴任し、自民党の実力者へと上り詰めた。

東北人らしい粘り腰の交渉が身上とされ、旧住宅金融専門会社（住専）の処理を巡って空転した九六年国会では、同党国対委員長として混乱を收拾した。

また、与党の高速道路建設推進議員連盟会長を務めるなど“道路族”の大物として知られ、道路四公団の民営化に反発。日本道路公団の幹部から数回、酒食のもてなしを受けていたことも発覚した。

九九年十月、小渕派（当時）の会長代理に就任。翌年、橋本派に衣替えしてからは、橋本元首相や野中元幹事長らによる集団指導体制の一角を担った。

しかし、昨年九月の自民党総裁選で小泉首相の支持を決めたことから、同派の藤井孝男元運輸相を推す野中元幹事長と対立。元幹事長から「毒まんじゅうを食ったのではないか」と批判された。同十一月の衆院選で、秋田三区から十期目を目指したが落選。その後、「年齢なのでやる気はない」と政界から身を引いた。

◆追及検察の成果

元東京地検特捜部長の河上和雄弁護士の話「会計責任者の起訴だけで捜査が終わるのはおかしいと国民が思っただけに、政治家の刑事責任まで追及できたのは検察の成果だろう。ただ、同様の政治資金規正法違反事件では最近、容疑者を逮捕する傾向にある。村岡元官房長官が、報道陣に事件の関与を否定しているように調べにも否認しているのなら、逮捕せず在宅で処理したのは意外だ」

◆真の政治改革を

岩井奉信・日大教授（政治学）の話「村岡元官房長官の起訴は、検察が政治資金規正

法を積極的に適用した結果だろう。最近の政治とカネを巡る事件には、政治家が改善を怠ってきた派閥や党組織による不透明な資金集めの実態を、司法当局が突いたものが多い。政界は今回の事件を問題提起と受け止め、上限のない政治団体間の献金額に規制を設けるなど、真の政治改革を果たす義務がある」

APPENDIX F

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE ARAI CASE:

BETWEEN THE FIRST APPEARANCE AS A STANDARD-BEARER

AND THE DETECTION OF HIS CASE

1	1992. 10. 09	自民、遅まきながら“重い腰”「考 える会」若手が旗揚げ「金丸批判」	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 591 字 04 段 噴出
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「副総裁辞任ではケジメがついてない」「国民に対してケジメをつけていただきたい」。金丸信・前党副総裁の出处進退をめぐり、議員辞職を迫る声も出始めた自民党内で八日、ケジメを求める若手有志議員の「自民党の信頼回復を考える会」が旗揚げした。党本部で午後一時から開かれたこの日の会合に集まった三塚、渡辺、宮沢各派の“七人のサムライ”たちは、口々に「党と政治の危機」を訴えた。

「スタンドプレーなんかじゃない」と訴える新井将敬氏(渡辺派)は「国民は(党より)派閥にこそ力があると知っているから、副総裁辞任ではケリがついていないと怒っている」と中途半端な状況を批判し、「離党と(竹下派の)会長辞任を願っている」ときっぱり。

「政治改革の論議に入る前に、国民から、いかがわしいと思われているわれわれの党が、政治改革を言っても信用してもらえないでしょ」という太田誠一氏(宮沢派)は、「金丸氏は離党すべきだ」と熱っぽく訴えた。

小林興起氏(三塚派)は「国民の厳しい批判がある中で、党内で意見を言わないと、これでよになってしまう」と、「永田町の論理」と国民の意識のズレに危機感を示す。

同会によると、他に六人が加入の予定だという。午後一時からの会合前、集まらないメンバーを心配して「(派閥の)締めつけかな」と冗談ともつかないつぶやきもれたが、新井氏は「言い出した以上、責任は持つ」と党内自浄への決意を語った。

1	1992. 12. 23	金丸献金問題 5億円“追及 便”は届かず「佐川」の核 心、見えぬ幕引き	東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1889 字 06 段 写真
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◆「形式捜査」検察は否定 配分先不起訴「情ない…」不満渦巻く

「佐川マネー」を受け取った議員は不問——前自民党副総裁、金丸信氏の五億円違法献金をめぐり、東京地検は二十二日、その配分先とされる六十数人の国会議員を「事実関係を特定できず」と不起訴処分にした。多くの告発に後押しされた形で、金丸氏や国会議員らを聴取した二か月余の曲折再捜査だったが、検察側は「形だけの捜査ではない」と強調した。この日はまた、竹下元首相が身内の“みそぎ聴取”に「潔白」を改めて釈明。野党や市民グループからは「佐川追及の一件落着は許さない」との声が上がった。

不起訴処分について、東京地検の高橋武生次席検事はこの日午後三時から約一時間にわたり不起訴処分の発表としては異例の長時間の会見。高橋次席はまず、「多数の告発が行われたので、改めて事実の有無の捜査を行った。金丸氏の処分の際に確認したことが、今回の処分でも確認された」と前回の捜査に誤りがなかったことを強調した。

「再捜査の結果は見えていたのでは」との質問には、「そうではない。告発という新たな事実が出てきたから行った。今回はもう一度、確認するための捜査をやろう、ということで全力をあげてやった。形だけの捜査ではない」。

今回金丸氏や国会議員らの事情聴取を行ったことについても、「情勢しだいで捜査は変わる。今回の金丸さんの取り調べは、念のため。あの時は調べができない状況だったが、今の段階では取り除かれている」と説明。しかし、「法律上の処理と国民感情にズレがあったのでは」との質問には、「法律上の処理では、そういうことが多い」と複雑な表情をみせた。

こうした処分に対し、金丸氏と氏名不詳の国会議員六十数人を告発した市川房枝政治資金調査室の近藤千浪・室長は「五億円が政治団体に入ったかどうか認定できないなんて考えられない」と厳しく批判。「検察審査会への申し立てを検討する」と不満を語った。

全国の弁護士に呼びかけた結果、千通以上の告発状が提出されたという松井康浩・弁護士は「五億円は氷山の一角。それすら解明できない検察は、同じ法曹人として情けない」と落胆を隠さない。時効が間近に迫っていることから、「検察審査会に十分審査をする余裕を与えなかったのも怠慢」と批判した。

この日の政治資金規正法関係の処分とは別に、今後も捜査が続く所得税法違反で告発した「無所属議員の会」代表の石田千秋・葛飾区議(税理 m)は、「東京国税局にも税務調査を申し入れたが、不公平感が残らないよう、脱税の捜査は十分尽くしてほしい」と訴えた。

◆旧竹下派はホッ

「五億円」の不起訴で、旧竹下派の議員は「疑惑はなかった」と強気ながらも、安どの表情。小淵派の額賀福志郎代議員は「(地検の)事情聴取を受けたこともないし、少しも心配していなかった。不起訴について、私自身まったく感想も何もない」と、淡々と話していた。羽田・小沢派の金子徳之介代議員は「捜査終結は徹底的にやった結果。国民が納得するかは政治改革の姿勢にかかるとしながら、私はもらっていない」とピシャリ。

所属議員が金丸氏らを告発した社会党。同党佐川追及チームの高沢寅男代議員は「地検の責任放棄で、誠に遺憾。強制捜査をしないなど、当初からの消極姿勢が証拠収集を困難にした」と語気を強めた。

一方、竹下氏の釈明について、同氏の離党を求めた「自民党の信頼回復を考える会」の新井将敬代議員は「通常国会までに出处進退を明らかにすると信じる」と話した。

◆「憶測」「中傷」強気の竹下氏

自民党本部四階にある総裁応接室。この日午後一時、二十人を超える党役員らが、竹下氏からの事情聴取のためにテーブルを囲んだ。竹下氏は冒頭の写真撮影の際には、緊張からか、時折唇をなめたりして落ちつかない様子。しかし、報道陣をシャットアウトして

身内だけの聴取が始まると、慎重に言葉を選びながらも、時に能弁に語った。

「品性のイメージダウンを受けた自分も(ほめ殺しの)被害者」「暴力団の介在で政権が成立するものではないことを証明するため、忍耐強く努力しなければならない」

国会での証人喚問と同様、皇民党や暴力団とのかかわりを次々に否定した一時間。最後には、「憶測や誤解にもとづく報道や中傷に対し、自分だけが我慢すれば良いとの体質があった。その都度、適切に対応して行くことが必要」と、開き直りとも言える強気の発言さえみせた。

梶山静六幹事長は、終了後の会見で「これでケジメがついた」と自民党流の幕引き宣言。役員の一人、島村宜伸・国民運動本部長も「釈明の中身は極めて厳肅で、なれ合いではない」と話した。

[乱世に生きる若者たち](1)									
1	1993. 01. 13	1) 全共闘世代 政界で強い 自己主張(連載)	西部朝刊	2社	18頁	1172字	05段	写真	

「政治家の究極の選択は、国民に『死ね』と言えるかどうかです。アメリカの大統領は(戦争のたびに)それをやっているじゃないですか」

衆議院議員会館の自室で、自民党の新井将敬さん(45)(東京二区)は、さらりと言うった。テレビなどを通しての激しい党批判発言でおなじみの若手議員である。

前回総選挙では、自殺行為だと言われながら、「消費税賛成」を貫いた。佐川急便事件の金丸信氏に、自民党の国会議員では最初に、名指しで「けじめ」を迫ったのも、この人だった。

学生時代に、東大闘争を闘い、三島由紀夫事件に衝撃を受けた。

「政治をやっているのは、自分が何者であるかを確かめるため。西郷や竜馬のように、『公』のために死ねるか、(私が)問われているんですよ」

◇ ◇

あつと驚く光景だった。「九増十減」案の採決のあった昨年十二月三日の衆院本会議場。全員着席(反対)のはずの社会党席に、一人だけ立っている議員がいたのだ。

当選一回の渋谷修さん(42)(東京九区)。「党の方針通りに立ったり、座ったりするだけでいいのか。ロー・メーカー(立法者)としての自覚を取り戻すべきではないか」と、採決の寸前まで、迷った末の決断だったという。

新井さんも渋谷さんも、一九六〇年代後半の、世界的な若者の異議申し立ての時代に青春を過ごした、いわゆる全共闘世代だ。あのころはやった言葉がある。

「連帯を求めて、孤立を恐れず」

◇ ◇

かつての全学連委員長、藤本敏夫さん(48)は、昨夏の参院選比例代表区に「希望」から立候補した。歌手の加藤登紀子さんとの獄中結婚で話題になった人だが、この二十年間は無農薬農業や自然保護運動に取り組んできた。

学園紛争当時の活動家の中には、その後も反原発運動などを続けている人がいる。若

い時の気持ちだけは忘れまいと努めている人も少なくないはずだ。藤本さんが立候補したのも、そういう同世代の心に呼びかけるためだった。

結果は、十五万票弱で当選者はゼロ。「数字はともかく、あのころ、ああいうことをしたなあ、という思いは残せたかもしれない。それで十分だという気もするんですよ」

◇ ◇

全共闘世代は、団塊の世代でもある。自民党代議士の坂井隆憲さん(45)(佐賀全県区)は「優しさやナイーブさ、権力を嫌う気持ちなど、ぼくらの世代は同じフィーリングを共有している。野党の若手ともこたわりなく話し合えるのは、そのためでしょう。世代人口が多い分、社会への影響力も大きいかもしれない」。

政治が再生できるかどうか。この世代の政治家たちの働きにもかかっている。

◆団塊の世代 衆・参で各一割

いわゆる団塊の世代の代議士は、昭和21年生まれが10人、22年生まれ15人、23年生まれ9人、24年生まれ6人、25年生まれ4人の計44人。21—25年生まれの参院議員は、23人で、衆、参院とも、全体のほぼ1割を占める。

	政治資金 出も入りも不可解至極								
1	1993. 09. 10	献金受け収入ゼロ 手違い、記載漏れと釈明	東京朝刊	2社	30頁	1783字	06段		

巨額の寄付を受けながらその出所の記入がなかったり、不審な記載漏れ、記載ミスも相変わらず。実体のない「ペーパー政治団体」も多く、あまりのお粗末ぶりに、政治家への公的助成などが論議を呼んでいる政治改革関連法案の行方にも厳しい目が注がれそうだ。

中島衛元科学技術庁長官の政治団体「中央政経開発研究会」の報告書には、地元の政治団体「審政クラブ」に対し、総額四千六百六十万円の寄付の支出が報告されている。ところが、審政クラブの報告書にはこの寄付の記載は全くなく、政治団体からの収入はゼロ。しかも、同クラブの総収入は二千二百万円で寄付額を大きく下回っている。会計責任者は記載漏れのミスを認め、修正の手続きを始めた。

山口敏夫元労相の政治団体「山口敏夫と21世紀の日本を創る会」も、他の代議士数人や日本医師連盟などから百二十万円の収入があったが収支自体「ゼロ」と報告していた。事務所では、「このほかにもパーティー会費など八千万円の収入があったが、手違いで別団体の雑収入に計上していた」と釈明している。

また、日本医師連盟から百—二百万円の献金を受けた新井将敬氏ら自民の六代議員の団体がすべて「政治団体からの収入はゼロ」と報告していた。

西田司・元国土庁長官の政治団体「拓友会」は、地元愛媛三区の支部会員七十五人に、昨年一月と七月の二回、十万円ずつ計千五百万円を支払ったことになっているが、会員は受け取りを否定している。

報告書を作成した秘書は「七十五人はいずれも各支部の代表者で、個人向けではなく、冠婚葬祭費など支部の活動費として支払った」と説明。「個人名で記載すると説明してないので、誤解を招いているのかも知れない」と釈明している。これに対し、ある支部会長は

「個人としても支部としても、会から二十万円もの金を受け取ったことなどない」と話している。

◆出所不透明ズラリ

宮沢前首相の四つの政治団体には、法人から計約五億七千万円もの寄付の記載があるが、企業名は書かれていない。竹下元首相は六団体で約三億八千万、森自民党幹事長も五団体で三億五千万円の法人寄付があるが、同様に所は不明。

政治資金規正法では、百万円以下の企業献金の場合企業名の記載の必要がないとはいえ“資金の透明さ”にはほど遠いのが現状だ。自分の団体に、出所不明の企業献金の記載が一億円以上ある政治家は自民、新生党など二十八人にのぼる。

連立政権を組む民社党委員長、大内厚相も二千二百万円、社会党委員長、山花政治改革担当相も五百四十万円の所が不明。

◆政治団体 ゴルフ代も“丸抱え”

瓦力元防衛庁長官の政治団体「中央政治経済研究会」は昨年、関東各地のゴルフ場で計三十九回のコンペを主催したが、会費は一切取っていない。プレー代などの支払いは総額五百万円に上った。事務所では「選挙区内の有権者は公職選挙法上まずいので参加しておらず、問題はないはず」と強調している。

橋本竜太郎元蔵相の団体も、かつて大臣を務めた運輸省、厚生省の職員を対象にしたゴルフ大会をそれぞれ一回ずつ開いている。会費は一人一万円で計百二十万の収入があったが、出費はそれを大幅に超える約六百五十万円。プレー代の一部に加え東京から藤沢、静岡までの交通費、写真代まで負担しているためだ。

これらのゴルフ大会は、一昨年までの二年間は証券不祥事による蔵相辞任などで「自粛」していたが、昨年からは復活。事務所では、「お世話になっている若手官僚を対象に以前から行っているもの」と話している。

江藤隆美元運輸相は「組織対策費」として日本相撲協会に二百五十万円の支出。これは、年間四十五日ある東京場所中の四人分のマス席確保にあてた代金。地元の後援者が上京した際や企業関係者を招いている。「わざわざそのためにバスで後援者を連れてきているわけではないし、料亭などで接待するよりよほど健全ではないか」と事務所。

◆マンションのローン支払い

原田昇左右・元建設相の政治団体「たちばな会」「富士ばら会」は、東京・千代田区永田町二丁目にある同議員名義のマンションの一室を事務所の所在地として登録、このマンションのローン返済の一部を事務所費として計上、政治資金の中から支払っていた。

両団体の事務所費は合計約千六十六万円。

これについて、細谷秀雄秘書は「今後は議員と政治団体の間でちゃんと賃貸契約を結びたい」と話している。

大混戦の“再編第2幕”

1 1994. 04. 12 「数」求め走る与野党 「割る」? 「結ぶ」? きな臭く 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 1607 字 06 段 写真

後継選びをめぐる政界再編の第二幕は、与野党が入り乱れての大混戦となってきた。空中分解寸前の連立与党。かたや野党・自民党も分裂の動きが表面化し、混迷は深まるばかり。水面下での多数派工作も目立ち始め、はっきりした政策が見えてこないまま、永田町では相も変わらず「数の論理」だけが横行する。これが日本の政治の現実——。

「ミッチーが五十人ぐらいを引き連れ、党を出るようだ」。十一日午後四時過ぎ、複数の渡辺派所属議員の議員会館事務所に、そんな情報が飛び交った。

事務所で報道陣の取材を受けていた若手議員は「今後、何人離党するか分からないよ」と声をひそめる。

同派所属議員の事務所にはこの日、渡辺美智雄氏の出方をうかがうマスコミや支持者からの電話が殺到。代議士本人不在の事務所では秘書が、「うちの先生の情報だと〇〇人。そっちはどう？」など、情報収集に奔走していた。

ミッチー擁立に走る自民党の新井将敬衆院議員は、「それぞれ個人で動いている。かなり反応はいいよ」と笑みをみせる。新井氏が幹事長を務める同党超派閥の政策勉強会「リベラルズ」(太田誠一代表)は午後二時、党本部八階で約二十人が出席して総会を開いたが「渡辺氏を推す声が多くを占めた」(新井氏)という。

一方、連立与党の亀裂も深まるばかり。

後継選びをめぐり、大内啓伍委員長と米沢隆書記長の確執が取りざたされる民社党。分刻みのスケジュールでマスコミの取材や関係者の面会に追われた伊藤英成副書記長は「党内で意見が分かれてはいるが、(大内氏か米沢氏かの)どっちにつくという話ではない」と、二人の対立を打ち消す。

だが、日本新党と新生、公明両党が参加する院内新党派「改革」について、公明党幹部は「民社からは二けた(の議員)が来るっていう話だ。よその党のことだから手を突っ込むわけにはいかないが、うちの市川(雄一書記長)さんに近い米沢さんを支持する人の方が多いよ」とあおる。

また、ある民社党幹部の事務所では、午後五時過ぎから取材陣を排除して同僚議員らと“秘密会議”を開くなど、きな臭い動き。

分裂の危機にさらされる日本新党は、午後六時から党本部で非公開の緊急議員懇談会を開いた。会見した議員総会会長の山崎広太郎氏は「一致団結を確認した。後継についてはなかった」。

しかし、懇談会には「改革」に反対する中島章夫氏ら五人が欠席。懇談会で反対を表明した五十嵐ふみひこ氏も「統一会派は成算があるのか疑問のため、反対と申し上げた。このまま凍結して、新生、公明との合併を急ぐべきではない」と紅潮した顔で語るなど、不協和音が広がっていた。

◆ヤミ取引やめて選挙管理内閣を

岡野加穂留・明大学長(比較政治学)の話「連立内閣の初期はヨーロッパの例を見ても、

「先に党を出て、弾みをつけようと思ったのに」というのは佐藤静雄議員。「家庭の中で何かやろうという時、奥さんや子供が反対しては何も出来なくなる。側近が引き留めにかかったのがいけないよ」と残念そう。しかし、「自民党に戻るつもりはない」と言い切った。

1	1995. 02. 05	「これでいいのか日本」新潟・加茂 で日本の進路考える講演会	東京朝刊	2社	26 頁	244 字	01 段
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「これでいいのか日本」と題した講演・討論会（日本青年会議所・新潟ブロック協議会主催）が四日、新潟県加茂市の文化会館で開かれ、新井将敬・新進党副幹事長は、阪神大震災での村山内閣の対応を批判。「戦後の日本は非常事態を考えてこなかった」として、復興のための予算論議だけでなく、憲法を含めた政治システム自体を議論するべきだと主張した。

今回の講演会は行政改革や憲法問題など日本の進路を考えようという各地のJCでは初の試みで、政治評論家の屋山太郎氏、飯沼健真・読売新聞調査研究本部長の二氏も講演した。

1	1995. 04. 10	東京・大阪知事選「やあやあ驚いた」新進・渡部さん	東京朝刊	2社	18 頁	145 字	01 段
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東京・虎ノ門の新進党本部では、東京都知事選で青島さんの当確が伝えられると、渡部恒三幹事長代理は「やあやあ驚いた。まいったなあ」。その後、大阪府知事選でノックさんの当確が伝わり、新井将敬副幹事長は「おい、おい、おい」と信じられないといった表情を見せ、「無党派党か」と言うのが精いっぱいだった。

1	1996. 03. 22	入札下りた方がいい、「国会議員から電話」桃源社社長証言／東京・大田区議会	東京朝刊	社会	39 頁	361 字	01 段
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住宅金融専門会社（住専）の大口融資先である不動産会社「桃源社」の佐佐木吉之助社長が二十一日、東京・大田区議会の予算特別委員会に参考人として出席した。佐佐木社長は、同社が一九八七年三月に六百五十六億円で落札したJR蒲田駅東口前の貨物ヤード跡地の入札前日に、「国会議員から『入札を下りた方がいい。大金を捨てることになる』と、約三十分にわたって電話を受けた」と発言した。

佐佐木社長は同委出席後、報道陣の質問に「新井将敬代議士（新進党）だった」と議員名を述べ、「入札後二、三か月して、新井代議士本人から借金の申し込みの電話があった。その一週間後に新井代議士の奥さんが来社したようだが断った」と語った。

新井氏は読売新聞社の取材に、「佐佐木社長の記憶違いではないのか」と、事実関係を全面的に否定、佐佐木社長に説明を求める考えを示した。

		新選挙列島 看板変えて 自由→							
1	1996. 09. 21	自民、社会→自民…「再編の潮流」読みながら	東京朝刊	2社	34 頁	1018 字	05 段		

永田町にうねる再編の波をどう乗り切るか。それぞれの思いを秘めて、議員の所属政党は、目まぐるしく変わった。中には、かつて激しくぶつかり合った社会党（現社民）から自民へと看板を変えた議員もいる。

「中央とのパイプがない野党や新人が当選して、はたして物事が成就できるだろうか」

東京・江東区の区民会館で今月中旬に開かれた小集会で、東京十五区の自民、柿沢弘治氏は、与党の優位性をアピールした。

一昨年に自民を離党、故渡辺美智雄氏を首相に担ぎ出そうとしたが果たせず、自由党を結成。昨年一転して、自民に復党した。

「批判があったことは確かだが、信念に従った私の勇気を理解してもらっていると思う」と柿沢氏。

が、選挙へ影響については、「やってみないとわからない」と率直に語る。

「今回は銀メダルでは駄目。ヤワラちゃんや有森さんでは駄目なんです」

声を張り上げた集会の後、個人宅の上棟式や団体の定期大会、パーティーにも出席。

「選挙カーも小さくして、路地を回る。百人以下の集会もやらなくては」。元外務大臣、当選五回のベテランは、徹底した「どぶ板」に活路を求める。

やはり自由党だった東京四区の新井将敬氏は、「無所属」で挑む。

東京佐川急便事件では、故金丸信・元自民党副総裁に離党を迫り、派閥解消を求めて“決起”。九四年四月に細川首相の後継問題をめぐって離党し自由党に。その後、新進党に参加したが、住専処理法案の採決で党議に反して賛成し今年六月、党を出た。

「政策上の思想の違いということですね。責任ある野党の立場とか、大きな哲学でいろいろあった」と、

歩んだ道を振り返る。

「もう一回原点に戻ってやりたい、と言えば支持者は納得してくれます」。とはいえ、いざ選挙になると「無所属で戦うのは不利。政見放送、ビラやポスターの枚数、すべて制限されて、事実上選挙ができないような状態」だ。新井氏もまた、ゴールを目指して、分刻みのスケジュールで飛び回る。

大阪十四区から立つ元社会党参院議員の谷畑孝氏は「自民」に看板を変えた。

一時は自、社、さの連立候補としての出馬も模索。が、塩川正十郎・自民党総務会長が示した「過去の組織や党籍を辞任し、素っ裸の一個人として入党するなら」という条件のみ、今年一月、社会党を離党した。

地元には「生粋の党员ではない」との反発もある。くら替え批判に谷畑氏はこう答えた。「もうイデオロギーをうんぬんする時代じゃない。連立政権で自、社、さは派閥としての違いしかない」

APPENDIX G

SAMPLE ARTICLES ON THE ARAI CASE:

BETWEEN THE DETECTION OF HIS CASE AND HIS DEATH

新井議員への日興利益供与 政
1 1997. 12. 22 界癒着、氷山の一角 バブル崩壊 東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 1441 字 06 段
後、補てん要求

長い間さやかれてきた政治家と証券会社の癒着が、初めて明るみに出た。違法な一任勘定取引で、日興証券から約四千万円の利益を得ていた新井将敬衆院議員。しかし、それも、政界と証券界の不透明な関係の一片に過ぎない。「国会議員をもうけさせるための取引は頻繁にある」「バブル崩壊後は、政治家側から損失補てんの激しい要求が相次いでいた」——大手証券の元幹部らは読売新聞社の取材に対し、政治家優遇の実態を次々に証言した。(本文記事1面)

証券関係者によると、株価が右肩上がりだったバブル期には、数多くの国会議員本人や秘書から「証券取引で資金を増やしたい」との依頼が証券各社に殺到し、株などの取引が、政治家の大きな資金調達手段となっていた。

こうした政治家口座は、証券会社の判断で売買する一任勘定取引で運用され、証券取引法の改正で一任勘定が禁止された九二年以降も続いていた。

日興証券ばかりでなく、多くの証券会社では、政治家から取引依頼があった場合、秘書室の幹部らが窓口役を務めていた。そうした経営トップの直属部署は、日ごろから政治家への陳情活動を行う一方で、政治献金やパーティー券の購入を引き受けるなど、政治家対策の中心を担っている。また、議員と個人的に親しい役員の口利きで口座が開設される例も多かった。

日興証券と野村証券の元幹部は「政治家のむちゃくちゃな要求に、会社はずいぶん悩まされた」と、それぞれの経験を証言する。

日興証券では一九八〇年代前半に、保守系の国会議員が、同証券の口座で損失を出した顧客に頼まれて、本社に乗り込んできたことがあった。その国会議員は「顧客は『日興が絶対もうかると言ったから取引をした』と言っている。すぐに損失を補てんしろ」と強硬に迫ったという。議員は後日再び現れ、今度は「私の口座も開いて、もうかるCB(転換社債)を割り当ててくれ」と要求、同証券は値上がりが見込まれる新規発行のCBを割り当てた。

日興証券元幹部は、「当時は、CBが確実に値上がりする時代で、多くの政治家が割り当てを要求してきた」と語る。

また、別の元幹部によると、同郷の政治家に頼まれた役員の口利きで、優遇口座が開設される、というケースがしばしばあったという。元幹部は「役員の一人は、親しい政治家のために、自ら口座運用の陣頭指揮をしていた。日興にとって、こうした口座は暗部という

より恥部だ。新井議員のようなケースは珍しくもなにもない」と話している。

一方、野村証券の元幹部は「国会議員関連の口座は、損をさせてはならない、というのが、うちの暗黙のルールだった」と言う。

複数の野村証券幹部によると、政治家関連の口座は、秘書室などが窓口となって主に公共法人部に開設された。野村証券では、一万近い「VIP口座」の存在が明らかになっているが、政治家関連のものは、それと別格の特別口座だった。野村はこれらの口座について、一任勘定でもうけが出るように注意を払って運用したが、バブル崩壊後は利益を出すのが難しくなった。

この時期の政治家取引に関与した元幹部は「九一、九二年ごろから相場は悪化するばかりで、損失に激しいクレームをつけてくる議員や秘書がやたらと増えた。丁重に謝っても『何とかしてくれ』と譲らなかった。そうした政治家は今もいる」と嘆いた。

大がかりな株の買い占めなどで知られる元衆院議員の糸山英太郎氏も今年五月に記者会見した際、「複数の国会議員が証券会社に要求し、株取引などを通じて利益供与を受けている」と証言していた。

日興証券利益提供の新井議員、自
1 1997. 12. 24 民の金融安定化対策本部の委員を 東京朝刊 社会 31 頁 688 字 04 段
辞任

日興証券から約四千万円の利益提供を受けていた自民党の新井将敬衆院議員(49)が二十三日までに、同党の緊急金融システム安定化対策本部(本部長・宮沢元首相)と金融システム安定化対策小委員会(保岡興治委員長)の各委員を辞任した。党内には事実上の更迭との声もある。

同対策本部は、自民党が金融不安対策を協議するために設置し、元大蔵官僚の新井氏は幹事を務めるなど中心的な役割を果たしていた。しかし、二十二日に利益提供問題が明るみに出て、新井氏自身も会見で不正な借名取引を行っていたことを認めた。一方、同証券関係者は新井氏から利益を上げるよう要求されたと証言している。

自民党内からは、「党の金融安定化対策に対し、国民から疑惑があるように見られかねない」(閣僚経験者)との懸念も出ており、党執行部は、新井氏が所属する旧三塚派に対応を求め、宮下創平事務総長が新井氏から事情を聞くなど、ダメージ回避に懸命となっている。

こうした状況を受けて、新井氏は二十二日夜、同党執行部に辞意を伝えた。

来年夏に参院選を控えた参院側は「選挙が戦えない」と、新井氏への離党勧告を求める意見も出ている。その一方、「新井氏の件は氷山の一角」として、複雑な反応を示す若手議員もいる。

新井氏は、衆院で証券・金融問題を審議する大蔵委員会のメンバーでもある。このため野党委員からは、「四大証券の不正がここまではびこり、政治家との癒着は予想されていた。徹底的に解明する」(共産党・佐々木陸海氏)、「借名取引を行っていたことだけでも問題だ」(民主党・海江田万里氏)などとして、来年一月からの通常国会で追及する方針を明

らかにしている。

1	1997. 12. 25	日興証券利益提供問題 新井議員 へ都選出3議員が離党勧告	東京朝刊 社会 27 頁 707 字 04 段
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自民党の新井将敬衆院議員(49)(東京四区)が日興証券から約四千万円の利益提供を受けていた問題で、同じ東京選出の同党国会議員が二十四日、党執行部に対し、新井議員への離党勧告を求める文書を提出した。同日の総務会でも「党として事実関係を明らかにすべきだ」との声が上がった。

新井議員の離党を求めたのは、衆院の石川要三(東京二十五区)、下村博文(東京十一区)、参院の保坂三蔵(東京)の三議員。新井議員は自民党の「緊急金融システム安定化対策本部」の委員を辞任したが、同じ東京を選挙区とする議員たちは、それでは不十分だとして、加藤幹事長あてに「本人自らが徹底した真相究明を明らかにするとともに、国民の信にこたえるために、自民党としてすみやかな離党を要請する」との文書を出した。

また、同日午後の総務会では、粕谷茂・東京都連最高顧問が「党として、事実をもう少し明確にしてほしい」と要求。他の議員からも、「本人の記者会見と、日興証券関係者の言い分が食い違っている。事実関係をはっきりさせろ」との声が上がった。

新井議員の利益供与問題に対しては、この日の閣議後会見でも、閣僚の間から批判が相次いだ。

伊吹労働相は、「法律でやっちゃいかんということを、国民に選ばれた者がやっちゃいかんでしょ」と批判し、「証券市場について、(悪い)印象を与えることは残念だし、避けるべきことだと思う」とも述べた。藤井運輸相は、新井議員が借名口座で運用された株を国会議員の資産公開で開示していなかった点を批判、「非常に残念。立場、立場におけるモラルが当然ある」と語った。

また、民主党の菅代表も記者会見で、「報道の通りであれば国会議員を辞すのが適当だ」と述べた。

1	1998. 01. 31	新井議員招致 釈明で新たな疑惑 窓口の日興元常務 へなぜ弁護士紹介	東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 1608 字 06 段 写真
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◆「日興証券が不正取引、勝手に利益供与」

「自分自身、少しマヒした倫理感覚を持っていたと思う」。強気の新井将敬衆院議員(50)の口から、わずかに後悔の言葉が漏れた。約四千百万円の利益提供問題で、三十日開かれた衆院予算委の参考人質疑。日興側に利益を要求した疑惑を持たれている新井議員は、反省の弁を交えながらも、疑惑のすべてを真っ向から否定した。しかし、質疑の中で、不自然な株取引の実態や、一億円もの資金を無担保で借り入れていた新たな事実も判明。なぜ日興は新井議員に利益提供したのか——三時間にわたる新井議員とのやり取りの中から、いくつかの疑問点が浮かび上がった。(本文記事1面)

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「(口座開設を依頼した)平石弓夫元副社長から(浜平裕行)元常務に『新井先生の口座だからよろしく』と話があったと聞いている」

日興証券は、新井議員の借名口座に約四千万円の利益を供与していた。しかし、新井議員は「こちらから利益を要求したことはない」と主張し、株取引を統括する立場にあった浜平元常務(48)が、勝手に不正取引をしていた、と指摘する。

「昨年一月末から二月ごろ、私の取引にかすかな疑念を抱いた。浜平元常務から一括してある銘柄を買い、私の口座に替えたと言われた。浜平さんから『違法取引でない。一種のサービスだ』という説明を受けた」

「『そんなことをしなくてもいい』と言った」という同議員に、日興はなぜそのような特別な利益供与と工作を行わなければならないのか。疑問は解けなかった。

新井議員はまた、各証券会社と株取引を始めた理由について、大蔵官僚から国会議員に出馬する際、故・渡辺美智雄元副総理から、応援してくれる人を探すといわれ、「ある証券会社の大幹部を紹介された」ことがきっかけだったことを初めて明かした。

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「口座には一億円が振り込まれた」(金子昌資社長)

「運用原資は一億円の借入金と二千万円の自己資金」(新井議員)

最も基本的な元手の金額で答弁は食い違った。そして一億円の調達先も新井議員は明かさなかった。

「支援者がオーナーになっている会社から、無担保で借りた」——新井議員の説明だ。

「絶対に損失は出ないという(日興証券との)約束があったから、無担保で貸してくれたのではないか」「一億円は大金だ。『もうけさせてくれ』という要求をしたのではないか」と追及する委員たち。しかし新井議員は、「きちっと返済した」という以上のことは語らなかった。

□□■□

不可解な「弁護士疑惑」も浮上した。

浜平元常務が、昨年十月に総会屋への利益供与事件で逮捕された際、弁護士を紹介していたのは、新井議員だった。

「利益供与した側とされた側に対し、同じ弁護士が相談に乗るのはあまりにも不自然。自分の顧問的な弁護士を、浜平元常務に紹介し、口封じをしようとした疑いもでてくる」と富田茂之委員(平和・改革)が追及。これに対し、新井議員は紹介の事実を認めたものの、「私はまったく関係ない」。

法曹関係者は、利害が対立する刑事事件の複数の関係者を、同じ弁護士が担当するのは問題が多い、と指摘している。

疑惑の弁護士は、三十日までの読売新聞社の取材に対し、「新井議員の法律相談に乗っている」と関係を認めたが、「引き受けたのは、総会屋への利益供与事件に関する弁護だから、問題はない」。しかし今月になってなぜか、浜平元常務の弁護人を辞任している。

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「あなたの言うことは信用できない」。そんな言葉で委員から批判されながらも、新井議

員の反省の言葉は少なかった。

自民党の古屋圭司委員の質問を受けてようやく、「あとになって(借名取引が)ルール違反であることを知りました。(借名にしたのは)特権意識があったから。皆さまからしつ責を受けるのは当然」。しかし、その後は再び、よどみなく潔白の主張を繰り返した。

新井将敬議員の親族企業、「株」で	
1 1998. 01. 31	1800万円利益 共同代表に無断 東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 772 字 04 段 で取引

新井将敬衆議院議員の親族企業が、仕手筋として知られる精密部品メーカー会長(73)に証券取引を一任し、約一千八百万円の利益を上げていた問題で、この取引は親族企業の共同代表取締役が無断で行われていたことが三十日、明らかになった。この共同代表ら役員二人は、取引には問題が多いとして同日までに辞任届を出した。親族企業側は「会社としての取引」と主張しているが、実際には新井議員周辺による私的な資金運用の性格が強いことが改めて浮き彫りになった。

親族企業は東京・銀座の雑居ビルに事務所を構える「ヴォーロ」。一九九四年三月の設立時は、新井議員の自宅が会社所在地となっていた。同社は、同議員の妻と新井議員と旧知の会社社長が共同で代表取締役になっており、取締役は長男と別の知人が、監査役は妻の父が務めていた。

会社社長は九五年九月、同議員本人と妻から「手を貸してほしい」と頼まれて代表取締役に就任したが、問題の証券取引は一切知らされていなかった。この代表取締役は読売新聞社の取材に、「知っていれば反対した。これ以上、かかわりたくない」と語った。また、役員に就任していた別の知人も「裏切られた思いだ」と話している。

複数の関係者によると、ヴォーロは当初、健康食品などの輸入・販売を手がけたが、あまり利益があがらなかった。銀座に事務所を移した昨年四月ごろからは、若手経営者による異業種交流会「B&B(ベスト・アンド・ブライテスト)」(約六十人)に会場を提供し、交流会の事務局として機能していた。

この会は約三年前、若手経営者らが新井議員を囲む形で結成された。ベンチャーキャピタルやM&Aなどをテーマに月八回の会合を行い、現在も新井議員が顧問となっている。利益提供していた精密部品メーカー会長も以前は会員で、同会長が勧めた銘柄の株式を、他のメンバーが購入したこともあった。

「新井議員に便宜」認める 日興証券が調査報告書	
1 1998. 02. 13	東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 432 字 02 段

自民党の新井将敬衆議院議員(50)が日興証券から約四千百万円の利益提供を受けていた問題で、同議員と日興証券は十二日、借名口座の取引記録を衆院予算委員会に提出した。それによると、新井議員は買った株をその日に売り抜ける即日売買で、一日のうちに約三百二十六万円の利益を上げるなどしていた。日興証券は、こうした新井議員の即日売買取引について、一月三十日の衆院予算委の参考人質疑では「十二銘柄十二回

また、同証券は株取引で新井議員に便宜を図ったことを認める内部調査結果も提出した。報告書によると、新井議員との接触は、日興証券の元役員が一九九四年末、同議員から申し出を受けたことで、元役員は平石弓夫元副社長（総会屋への利益供与事件で起訴）らを呼び、議員と会合を開いていた。その平石元副社長は翌年十月ごろ、浜平裕行元常務（同）に議員の口座開設を指示、取引場所は新橋支店と決まったという。

◆「あまりにしつこく…」

複数の日興証券関係者によると、新井議員は一九九五年十月、平石元副社長（当時は専務）に対し「（他の証券会社での取引で）うまく利益があがらないので、日興に頼むしかない。何とかもうけさせてほしい」などと口座開設を要求。さらに、日興新橋支店に借名口座を開設する際には、浜平裕行・元常務（48）（同）らに「必ず利益をあげてほしい」などと頼んでいた。このため、浜平元常務らは一億円に上る新井議員の運用資金が入金された同月三十一日の初回取引から、同証券の株の自己売買益を、同議員の借名口座に付け替える操作を行っていた。

新井議員の取引について社内調査にかかわった同証券関係者の一人は「平石元副社長や浜平元常務は取引に乗り気ではなかった。だが、政治家を損させるとまずいし、あまりに要求がしつこいので仕方なく応じ、利益の付け替えをせざるを得なかった」と証言している。新井議員は先月三十日に行われた衆院予算委の参考人質疑や記者会見で「私は『もうけさせろ』と強要するような人間ではない」などと要求行為を強く否定していた。

この取引停止の理由について、同議員は衆院予算委の参考人質疑で、「昨年一月末から二月の間に、取引にかすかな疑念を抱いた。浜平元常務から、ある銘柄を本店で繋No.

オて買い、私の口座に替えていたという話があり、自分が思っていた取引と違うという認識だったので口座を閉じた」と説明していた。

ところが実際には、新井議員の借名口座で一任勘定取引を担当していた浜平裕行・元常務が、昨年二月の定期異動で取締役エクイティ本部長兼株式部長から常務に栄転し、同時に株取引の結果を同議員に報告していた新橋支店長も他県の支店長に異動。担当者二人が変わったことで、不正工作を続けることが難しくなっていたためだったことがわかり、新たな虚偽答弁の疑いが浮上した。

さらに、取引開始当初に比べ株価が下落し始め、付け替えなどの利益供与がしにくくなっていたことも重なって、新井議員と浜平元常務らは取引の継続を断念したという。このため、電子機器メーカー株など十五万四千株を昨年二月から約一か月間に一斉に売却し、四月一日、原資の一億円とそれまでの売却益を含めた約一億四千百万円を引き出して口座を閉じていた。東京地検特捜部もこの特異な取引停止の経緯について把握、付け替えの不正をうかがわせる事実として注目している模様だ。

一方、新井議員は参考人質疑で、借名口座が不正行為であることを知らなかったと釈明していたが、日興で口座を開いた際、担当者から「借名口座は大蔵通達で禁止されている」と説明を受けていたことも明らかになっており、虚偽答弁の疑いが指摘されていた。

新井議員の利益要求 陰に実態不
1 1998. 02. 19 明の親族企業群 蓄財構図、検察 東京朝刊 2社 38 頁 1097 字 04 段
追及へ

新井将敬衆院議員(50)の利益供与事件の陰に、同議員のファミリー企業群の存在が浮かび上がった。強制捜査に着手した東京地検特捜部は十八日、こうした親族企業も捜索の対象とした。一九九五年に旧東京協和・安全信組事件で背任罪などに問われた元労相・山口敏夫被告も、不正融資にかかわった理由は資金繰りに窮した親族企業を救うためだった。ファミリー企業を利用した政治家の不透明な蓄財の構図が、また明るみに出ようとしている。

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この日、捜索を受けたのは、新井議員の妻が代表取締役を務める「ヴォーロ」(東京都中央区)。同社名義の証券取引口座が新日本証券本店にあり、仕手筋として有名な精密部品メーカー会長が運用を一任され、千八百万円の利益を上げていた。関係者は同会長が、新井議員の株の指南役だった、と証言している。

法務省側は、「ヴォ社は秘密投資クラブとして、重大な関心を持っている」と逮捕許諾請求手続きの中で指摘した。

新井議員の妻と共同で代表取締役になっていた会社社長は「名前を貸していただけ、株取引について何も知らされていなかった」として、先月二十日に辞任している。

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新井議員の周辺には親族や秘書、後援者が役員に名を連ねている実態不明の企業がまだある。

ヴォ社の所在地に昨年十月、有限会社「マリ・ネットワーク」が設立された。登記簿の役員欄には、ただ一人、同議員の妻の名前が記されている。だが、もう一社、名前も目的も同じ株式会社「マリ・ネットワーク」が存在する。こちらは九四年三月に新井議員の自宅住所に設立された。このマリ社は、九六年に練馬区内のマンションに所在地を移すと同時に、役員が全員交代している。

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元秘書が代表となっている「ゼロワン」(東京・南青山)という会社もある。役員には元秘書二人のほか、日興証券の借名口座で新井議員が名義を借りた印刷会社社長の名も登場する。所在地とされる場所に事務所はない。代表を務める元秘書は、「事務所を辞めた後の秘書の受け皿として設立したと聞いているが、実態は知らない。名前を貸しただけ」と話す。政治資金収支報告書によると、九〇年に新井議員の三つの政治団体からコピー代、封筒代として計約百万円が同社に支払われている。

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こうした不透明な親族企業がいくつも存在する様子は、元労相の山口敏夫被告と共通している。山口被告は九五年十二月、バブル崩壊によるファミリー企業の株取引の失敗を処理するため、旧東京協和信組に強引に融資を要求したとして、背任罪などで起訴された。

国会議員の威光をかざして、金融機関に便宜を要求する構図もまた、新井議員によって繰り返されたことになる。

1	1998. 02. 19	新井議員が露骨な要求 口座を浜平に頼む、利 益確実にね 議運委で 刑事局長説明	東京朝刊	社会	39 頁	2453 字	06 段	写真・表
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◆議運委の出席者、声もなく

「何百人も私と同じことをやっている。はめられた」。潔白の主張を貫く新井将敬衆院議員。「新井議員ほど高額の利益を上げたケースはない」。自信たっぷりに逮捕許諾を求める法務省の原田明夫刑事局長。十八日夜、逮捕許諾請求を審査する衆院の議院運営委員会。法務・検察側が、新井議員は十四年前から不正取引をしていたことなど新事実を突き付けたのに対し、涙声で訴える同議員。しかし議運委のメンバーは、「本当かどうか疑わしい」と首をかしげていた。

秘密会形式で行われた議運委。複数の出ネ者によると、許諾理由の説明をするため出席した法務省の原田刑事局長はまず、日興証券関係者のショッキングな供述調書を次々と読み上げた。

「新井議員から、日興本社で『浜平(裕行・元常務)の立場なら、いろいろな方法で確実に利益を出せる。(口座の担当は)浜平にお願いしたい』と頼まれた」

「(新井議員は)通常でない方法で利益要求していると思った。断れば(新井議員が)いろいろな行動に出ると思った」

「浜平に確実に利益が出るよう指示した」

原田刑事局長は、最初に平石弓夫元副社長の供述を披露した後、浜平元常務の調書に移った。

「新井議員は証券族で、要求にこたえなければ、日興の業務に支障が出ると判断した」

「新井議員から『あなたは自己売買を担当しているのだから、確実に利益を出してもらいたい』という電話があった」

約三十分にわたって、新井議員を逮捕する根拠を示す原田刑事局長。さらに、「新井議員は八四年から、日興証券と不正の疑いが強い取引を行っており、その利益が二億八千万円に上る」という新事実を突き付けられると、議運委のメンバーたちは驚き、声もなかった。

原田局長が退席し、入れ替わりに新井議員が部屋に入った。過去の逮捕許諾請求の際には、議員の弁明時間は十五分程度が慣例。ところが、新井議員は約二十五分間にわたり、潔白を主張。「あと五分、もうしばらく話をさせてほしい」という発言も飛び出した。

関係者によると、新井議員は委員会の冒頭、「立ってやるんですか」と、疲れた表情で語った。

亀井委員長が、立ったまま弁明するように求めると、「どうせ色眼鏡でご覧になって、なにを言っても取り合ってくれないでしょう」と話したあと、自説を曲げずに処罰された天文学者ガリレオに自らを見立て、「それでも地球は回る」。その後、「検察は都合のいいところを取り上げて、やろうとしている」「おれだけ集中砲火をなぜ、浴びなければいけないのか」と検察当局を批判。最後には、「新井の最後の言葉と思ってうけとってほしい。新井はウソなど言わない男だ」と無実を強調した。

◆「日興はうそつきだ」 新井議員が涙声の会見 幹部との電話録音テープ持ち出す

議運委での弁明を終えた新井議員はその足で衆議院第二議員会館に向かい、午後六時から記者会見に臨んだ。新井議員は「政治生命すべてをかけた最後の言葉でございすから、できるだけ虚心に受け止めてほしい」と切り出したあと、日興証券の浜平裕行元常務と同証券幹部との会話を録音した記録などを公開。「(捜査は)でっちあげ」などと検察当局を批判した。

新井議員が公開した資料は、〈1〉昨年六月から今年一月の間、浜平元常務と平石弓夫元副社長と電話などで連絡を取り合った際に会話を録音したテープの記録文〈2〉浜平元常務が東京地検で事情聴取を受けた際の内容とされるメモ——の二種類。新井議員は報道陣にテープの一部を聞かせ、「利益提供の要求は一切ない」と改めて主張した。日興証券の幹部が容疑を認める供述をしていることに対しては、「会社を守るために、あそこまでウソをつくとは思わなかった」と声を震わせ、「私の最後の言葉にウソはない」と涙声で訴えた。

◆利益付け替え「アンコ取引」7銘柄

日興証券から新井議員に提供された利益のうち、「アンコ」と呼ばれる悪質な不正取引の疑いが強いものが計七銘柄、四十八万六千株あり、利益総額は九百三十七万円にのぼっていたことが、十八日、逮捕許諾要求書の添付資料から明らかになった。「アンコ取

引」は、証券会社が自己売買の利益が確定してから特定顧客にその利益を付け替えてやる不正取引。一銘柄を除き、同じ日に株を買って売却する「即日売買」によるもので、容疑事実となった利益供与総額約二千九百万円のうちの三割以上に達しており、新井議員に対する破格の待遇ぶりを示している。

《内閣に提出された新井議員の容疑事実一覧(利益供与)》

犯行年月日	新井議員の取引株	株数(千株)	利益供与額(千円)
○95. 10. 31	ニコン	150	4, 083
95. 11. 1	ミツミ電機	10	905
		30	
95. 11. 6	ナムコ	10	192
		10	
95. 11. 7	大平洋金属	100	2, 279
95. 11. 22	大平洋金属	28	90
95. 11. 24	不動建設	100	584
○95. 11. 30	日新電機	26	295
○95. 12. 1	シーエスケイ	10	671
95. 12. 11	大平洋金属	100	1, 280
○96. 3. 8	大平洋金属	25	57
		17	
		8	
96. 1. 25	極洋	50	242
○96. 1. 26	宝酒造	100	2, 551
96. 2. 1	神鋼電機	67	347
		2	
		31	
96. 2. 8	ニコン	100	2, 516
96. 2. 14	神鋼電機	50	333
96. 2. 29	神鋼電機	7	2, 866
		93	
96. 3. 1	高圧ガス工業	24	645
		2	
		20	
96. 3. 6	大平洋金属	30	2, 815
		5	
		45	
96. 4. 5	東食	77	193
		23	

96.	4.	9	東京特殊電線	50	706
96.	4.	15	呉羽化学工業	100	1,686
○96.	4.	24	呉羽化学工業	100	1,321
96.	6.	10	クラリオン	50	1,858
○96.	6.	12	クラリオン	50	387
96.	6.	18	クラリオン	16	240
合 計				1,716	29,157

(千円未満は切り捨てのため、合計額は一致しない)

(○印は「アンコ取引」の疑いが強いもの)

BETWEEN HIS DEATH AND THE JUDGMENT DAY

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約三十分後、新井議員の家族が車で外出したが、すぐに近くの民家の塀に接触した。動転している。午後四時十分過ぎには、新井議員の両親と見られる年配の男女が、押し寄せた報道陣に「本人は死んで、(ここには)いないんだ」と残して外出。

船田元・衆院議員(自民)が訪れたのは午後七時ごろ。「死をもって正しさを証明しようとしたのかも知れないが、それは違うと思う。正しければ、本人が一生かけて証明すればいい。そういう強さを持っていたはずなのに、折れてしまったのが残念。非常にプライドのある男だったから、今回のことで相当傷つけられたのだでしょう」と話した。

午後八時二十分、遺体を乗せたワゴン車が到着。白いシーツに包まれた遺体は真理子さんが付き添って玄関へ。船田氏ら集まった同僚議員約十五人が遺体に手を合わせた。

午後九時二十分に弔問を終え、新井議員の自宅を出た亀井静香前建設相は、報道陣に囲まれて歩きながら、「もっと事情を聞いてほしかった。たった三時間の事情聴取で強制捜査をするとは。本人は何でわかってくれないんだろうと話していた」と途切れ途切れに語った。

◆メモ回りヤジ止まる

■国 会■

新井議員自殺の情報は、午後三時過ぎ、逮捕許諾の議決が行われようとしていた衆院本会議場で、さざ波のように伝わった。

ヒナ壇の大臣席に額賀福志郎官房副長官からのメモが回った。野党の代表質問に対する答弁から戻った橋本首相は、いちべつして顔をこわばらせ、議員席からは、自民党の加藤幹事長や野中広務幹事長代理ら三人が血相を変えて議場出口に向かった。議員のヤジもびたりと止まった。

その二時間前、新井議員が所属していた三塚派幹部らは、すでに異変に気づいていた。森総務会長によると、新井議員は少し前から携帯電話の電源を切り、亀井静香・前建設相ら特に親しかった数人以外は一切連絡がとれなくなっていた。午後一時前、新井議員の家族から「(新井議員と)連絡が取れなくなった」と、切羽詰まった声で亀井前建設相に電話があった。その直後、新井議員が宿泊していた「ホテルパシフィックメリディアン東京」に関係者が向かっていた。

◆一連の疑惑 自殺4人、検察困惑

■法務・検察■

新井議員の逮捕許諾請求の手続きを進めてきた法務省と検察庁は、困惑の空気に包まれた。午後五時、詰めかけた五十人近い報道陣を前に会見に臨んだ東京地検の松尾邦弘・次席検事は冒頭、「訃報(ふほう)に接し、驚きとともに極めて遺憾。ご遺族に対し、哀悼の意を表します」。

同次席検事によると、新井議員の所在については、十八日夜、本人が宿泊先の東京・JR品川駅前のホテルに入ったところまでは確認したが、その後は、衆院本会議で逮捕許諾が議決された段階で、特捜部が新井議員の弁護人と連絡を取り、出頭などの段取りについて話し合う予定にしていた。

特捜部では衆院本会議で逮捕許諾の議決が迫った午後三時ごろ、新井議員の所在を

最終的に確認しようとしていた矢先に、新井議員が自殺を図ったとの一報が警視庁など複数のルートから入ってきたという。

一連の証券・銀行業界をめぐる事件では、新井議員の前にも第一勧業銀行の宮崎邦次・元会長(当時六十七歳)ら三人が首つり自殺している。松尾次席検事は、捜査手法に問題がなかったかどうかに関心が及ぶと、「いろんな見方もあるだろうが、地検としては、必要な捜査を必要な手続きでやってきたとしか言えない」と答え、やや表情を硬くした。

また、法務省の原田明夫・刑事局長も同日夜、記者会見し、「(新井議員には)司法の場で主張を訴えて頂きたかった」。

記者団から、逮捕許諾請求に踏み切ったことは適切だったのかと問われると、「検察当局としても熟慮の末、事件の真相に迫れない状況下で逮捕の必要性を考えるに至った」と話し、一連の証券・金融事件について、「できるだけ捜査を続けてきている。それが検察が国民から負託された責務である」と語った。

1 1998. 02. 21 故新井将敬衆院議員の告別式 東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 59 字 01 段

24日正午から東京都大田区池上1の1の1の池上本門寺で。自宅は同区久が原6の4の15。喪主は妻、真理子(まりこ)さん。

証券「借名口座」摘発80件 92年					
1	1998. 02. 24	の監視委発足以来	なお氷山の	東京朝刊 社会 35 頁	1233 字 05 段
一角					

自民党の故・新井将敬衆院議員への利益供与事件をきっかけに、不正な証券取引である借名口座の横行が指摘されているが、証券取引等監視委員会が一九九二年の発足以来、摘発した借名口座は約八十件に上ることが二十三日、関係者の話などから分かった。これを受けて日本証券業協会では関与した外務員の資格取り消しなどの処分をしているが、証券会社が処分されたケースは一件もない。関係者からは「摘発された借名口座は氷山の一角。日証協は身内の証券会社に甘い」との指摘も出ている。

◆日証協 “身内”の証券、処分ゼロ

九二年に設立された証券監視委はこれまで、国内の全証券会社二百八十九社を対象に、延べ四百二十五回検査を行っている。監視委は、取引記録が名義人以外の人物に郵送されているケースや、名義人の住所が口座のある店舗から遠過ぎるなど、不自然な取引を重点的に調べたところ、証券会社側が借名であると知りながら、口座の開設に応じたケースが約八十件判明した。

これらの中には、株取引に資金をつぎ込んでいたことを税務署などに知られたくないという顧客の意図を承知で借名口座の開設に応じたケースや、顧客が新規公開株の売り出し抽選に多数の知人名義の口座を通じて申し込んでいることを知りながら、証券会社の営業員が受託していた例などがあつた。

しかし、証券関係者の多くは「監視委の調査で摘発された八十件は、実際に存在する借名口座のごく一部」と指摘している。監視委幹部も「口座名義などが一見しておかしくない

限り、証券会社側も隠そうとするので、検査で発見するのは極めて困難だ」と打ち明ける。借名口座をめぐっては、新井議員との取引が問題化した日興証券が国会の要請で社内調査を行い、今年十七日、「借名の疑いのある口座がさらに三十二件見つかった」と報告。監視委の検査でも発覚していない借名口座が証券界に多数存在することが裏付けられた。また、ある大手証券の社員は数年前、顧客だった右翼団体の人物が家族四人の名義をすべて使った上に「新たな名義の口座が欲しい」と要望してきたため、知人名義での開設に応じたという。この社員は「税金対策だと思ったが、何も言えず応じた。今でもこの口座は摘発されずにそのまま存在している」と証言している。

監視委は借名口座の存在がわかった証券会社に対し、検査終了とともに改善を指導、これを受けて日証協が年に二十件程度のペースで処分を行っている。しかし、処分はすべて外務員個人に対するもので、これまで「組織的な借名取引と断定できるケースはなかった」(日証協会員部)として、証券会社に対する処分は一件も行われていない。

これについて、元東京証券取引所幹部の大武泰南・摂南大学教授(証券取引法)は、「日証協の会長は証券会社のトップが務めているため、業界に対する遠慮があり過ぎる。借名口座は不正取引の温床なのに、外務員個人に対する処分だけでは甘い。証券会社にも監督責任があるのだから、厳正に処分するべきだ」と話している。

1	1998. 02. 24	自殺した新井将敬議員の通夜に1000人／東京・池上本門寺	東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 242 字 01 段
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日興証券からの利益供与事件で、逮捕許諾請求された直後に自殺した新井将敬衆院議員の通夜が、二十三日午後六時から、東京都大田区の池上本門寺で行われた。

通夜には、橋本首相をはじめ、加藤幹事長ら自民党三役、新井議員が所属していた旧三塚派の亀井静香・前建設相ら多数の国会議員が姿を見せた。境内には、本堂に入り切れない人たちを合わせ、千人以上が焼香の列を作った。焼香に立った新井議員の妻、真理子さん(45)は、遺影を前に、合掌したまま一分近くも動かず、突然の死に対する悲しみの深さをうかがわせた。

1	1998. 03. 10	新井議員への利益供与 証券監視委、日興と元役員告発	東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 246 字 02 段
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日興証券が新井将敬衆院議員(先月十九日自殺)に利益供与をしていた事件で、証券取引等監視委員会は九日、法人としての同証券と元役員二人を、証券取引法違反(利益追加)の疑いで東京地検に告発した。同地検が起訴した後に、大蔵大臣に対して日興証券に行政処分を下すよう勧告する方針で、総会屋への利益供与事件で、今年四日に業務停止が解けたばかりの同証券が、再び厳しい処分を受けるのは必至となった。

告発された元役員は、平石弓夫・元副社長(61)(総会屋への利益供与事件で起訴)、浜平裕行・元常務(48)(同)。

		故新井議員に2900万円供 与 日興元副社長ら起訴／ 東京地検		東京朝刊	社会	39	頁	2332	字	05	段	写真		
1	1998. 03. 11													

自民党の故・新井将敬衆院議員（先月十九日に自殺）が日興証券から利益供与を受けた事件で、東京地検特捜部は十日、法人としての同証券と、平石弓夫・元副社長（61）（総会屋への利益供与事件で起訴）、浜平裕行・元常務（49）（同）を、証券取引法違反（利益追加）の罪で東京地裁に起訴した。同法違反（利益要求）の疑いが持たれていた新井議員については、死亡のため不起訴とした。同地検は、二十五日に開かれる平石元副社長らの利益供与事件の初公判の冒頭陳述で、新井議員の要求行為や日興側の利益提供の経緯についても明らかとする。

起訴状によると、日興証券は一九九五年十月から九六年六月の間、二十五回にわたり、同証券が行った株の自己売買を、新井議員から注文を受けたかのように装って、同議員の知人の会社社長名義の借名口座に付け替え、約二千九百十六万円の利益を提供した。

調べによると、新井議員は九五年十月、数回にわたって平石元副社長らに利益提供を要求した疑いを持たれていた。特捜部は先月十八日、新井議員の逮捕許諾請求の手続きを取り、衆院で翌十九日夕、逮捕許諾を議決する運びとなっていたが、その直前、新井議員が都内のホテルで自殺。逮捕状請求を取り下げた。

新井議員への利益提供事件で、東京地検が法人としての日興証券と、平石弓夫元副社長らを起訴したことを受けて、同証券は「当社の社会的責任を痛感しております」とのコメントを出した。しかし、その中で「元役員の安易な顧客対応によって当社の信用が失墜されたということは大変遺憾」として、平石元副社長らの責任を強調。「元役員に対し、損害賠償を請求する」との方針を示した。

◆「利益要求厳しい政治家」「野村」捜査中に名前が浮上 昨年6月から内偵

「利益要求が厳しい政治家」。新井将敬衆院議員の名前は昨年六月ごろ、野村証券に対する捜査の中で浮上した。東京地検特捜部は野村証券関係者の証言などを端緒に、同議員関連の銀行口座を洗い出し、その資金の一部が日興証券に開設された借名口座に流れ込んでいたことを突き止めていく。昨年九月末、総会屋への利益供与事件で、日興証券本社を捜索した際には、「新井議員の借名取引の解明も大きな焦点だった」（検察幹部）。特捜部は先月、新井議員を利益要求容疑で三時間にわたって聴取したが議員は調書にサインすることを拒み、命を絶った。金融界が不祥事で揺れるなか、検察と議員は約八か月間に及ぶ攻防を繰り広げていた。

■疑惑浮上

特捜部は昨年三月二十五日、総会屋に対する利益供与容疑で野村証券を捜索し、同時に政官界疑惑についても内偵捜査を始めた。

新井議員関連の口座は、全国で約一万件にのぼる「VIP口座」の中に埋もれていたが、六月ごろ、野村関係者の供述から、「厳しく損失補てんの要求をしってくる政治家」の一人として新井議員の名が浮上した。

「要求型」には大物議員の秘書もいた。ただ、側近を持たない新井議員の場合、本人が直接クレームをつけてくる点で際立っていた。

同議員は一九八八年から妻や本人名義の口座を野村に設け、取引をしていた。本店営業部に設けていた妻名義の口座では、九五年夏ごろ、約五千万円の損失が出ていた。同議員は当時取引をしていた日興証券関係者に「野村はサービスが悪い」と不平をもらし、九五年いっぱい口座を閉鎖した。

■借名口座

特捜部は新井議員の株取引資金の流れに注目し、銀行口座を調査した。その結果、資金の一部が複雑な経緯をたどり、銀行から日興証券新橋支店に設けられた新井議員の知人名義の口座に流れていたことを突き止める。九月二十五日、総会屋事件で行った日興本社の搜索の目的の一つは、新井議員の借名取引を解明することだった。

これに対し新井議員は、昨年六月から今年一月にかけ、浜平裕行元常務や平石弓夫元副社長らに、「利益要求行為がなかった」と確認を求め、会話を無断で録音テープに取っていた。新井議員はそれを「真実の響きがある」として記者会見で公表し、無罪の証明と主張した。

■供述

録音テープの中で浜平元常務らは、新井議員から「要求はしていませんでしたよね」と同意を求められ、「そうですね」と相づちを打っていた。特捜部の調べにも当初抵抗するが、議員の取引は、付け替えの疑いが強い即日、翌日売買が全体の半数を占め、それだけで四千万円を超える利益が出ていた。素人にしては明らかに不自然な取引だった。取引記録に残る明白な利益供与の痕跡を突き付けられ、浜平元常務は同議員からの要求で利益を提供していた、と認めた。

「新井さんから『あなたが自己売買を担当しているので、確実に利益を出してほしい』と電話がありました」。昨年十一月から今年一月にかけての最終攻防だった。

■サインせず

特捜部は新井議員に対し最初、先月十四日に事情聴取を求めたが、議員側の都合がつかず、十七日午後、都内のホテルで約三時間、担当検事が聴取した。新井議員は容疑を否認したが、言い分を記した供述調書にはサインしなかった。新井議員は自殺前日の記者会見で「検事さんは(聴取を)形だけで済ませようという感じだった」と訴えた。これに対し検察当局は「記者会見や国会質疑での主張を繰り返しており、聴取は一回で十分と判断した」。

翌十八日の検察首脳会議では、政治家としての立場を利用して日興証券に圧力をかけた点が悪質とされ、逮捕許諾請求の方針が、異論なく確認された。出席した幹部からは「商取引の自己責任原則に著しく反し、国民の不公平感も大きい」との声が出た。

二十五日から始まる日興証券側の裁判では、新井議員の調書なしで審理が進められる。

大蔵省の接待汚職など政官界の腐敗を巡り、捜査が進展するにつれて、国会議員や大蔵官僚の間から検察当局を批判する声が強まっている。「捜査が強引」「情報をリークしている」というものだが、こうした“検察バッシング”に対して、東京地検の松尾邦弘次席検事は十三日夕、緊急会見を開き、「いわれなき非難」と反論するとともに、リーク説が出るのは報道側にも責任があるとして、同地検への取材制限を通告した。

検察に対する批判は、特に利益供与事件にからんで、新井将敬衆院議員が自殺した先月十九日から強まり、「検察はこそこそリークしている。やり方は法治国家として問題だ」（橋本太郎衆院議員＝自民）、「東京地検特捜部は、接待を強引に贈収賄事件に結び付けようとしている」（大蔵省幹部）などという声が出ていた。

こうした情勢の中、松尾次席は司法記者クラブ（東京）加盟各社の取材責任者を集め、「検察がリークによって世論作りをしているとか、その結果、関係者が追い込まれて自殺しているとか、いわれなき非難を受けて捜査に甚大な影響が出ている」と現状を説明。「新聞やテレビが『特捜部の調べでわかった』といった表現を安易に使ったりすることも、リーク説が流れる大きな原因だと思う」と批判した。その上で、〈1〉当面、東京地検の取材の窓口を次席に一本化する〈2〉特捜部を含め各部の幹部への取材には一切応じない——と通告した。

こうした取材規制は、極めて異例。松尾次席は、「過剰規制」との批判を懸念してか、「必要な情報は今後も公開する。広報官を置くことも検討する時期に来ている」などと述べた。

これに対し、司法記者クラブは「取材対象を一方的に狭めようとするもので、応じられない」として、通告の撤回を申し入れる。

◆日興から640万円 証券族…威圧の証明

日興証券が一九八四年以来、新井将敬衆院議員に提供した利益は総額三億二千万円にも上っていた。政治家としては中堅に過ぎなかった同氏を、日興はなぜ優遇し続けたのだろうか。

◇

昨年九月ごろ、日興証券の元新橋支店長に、新井衆院議員から電話がかかってきた。東京地検特捜部が新橋支店にあった新井氏の借名口座に注目し始めたころだった。

「私はあなたに直接、売買注文を出していましたよね」

新井氏は九五年十月から一年半の間に、日興証券に売買の一切を託す一任勘定取引で約四千百万円の利益を上げてきた。ところが、電話の声は、問題の取引はすべて新井氏の身が注文を出したもので、違法な一任勘定取引などなかった——と同意するよう迫っていた。

売買結果を新井氏に伝えるだけの連絡役だった元支店長は、「それは違いますよ」とはねつけた。

新井氏は、野村証券から総会屋への利益供与事件が他の三大証券に広がる様相を見せ始めた昨年六月ごろから、一任取引を依頼した日興の浜平裕行元常務や平石弓夫元副社長との会話を無断で録音するなど、入念に捜査対策を進めていた。浜平元常務にはこんな電話を入れている。

「何か(利益供与を)要求したようにねじ曲げられても困ると思ってね」

「そうですよ」

しかし、相づちを打っていた浜平元常務は昨年末から今年初めにかけて、特捜部の調べに利益要求を受けていたことを認める。「一蓮托生(いちれんたくしょう)」だったはずの日興側はたもとを分かち、新井議員の抵抗は「ひとり芝居」となっていた。

◎ ◎

日興は新井氏の重要な資金提供源だった。約四千百万円の利益供与(起訴対象は約二千九百万円)のほか、八四年から九三年までの間、利益の付け替えなどによって約二億八千万円を提供していた。

「中堅クラスの国会議員になぜ、そこまで……」。日興内部からも驚きの声が漏れる。

九五年十月三十一日、衆院大蔵委員会に、景気対策として有価証券取引税(有取税)の三年間非課税化を求める議員提出法案が出された。賛成者五十八人の中には同委員会理事でもある新井氏の名があった。この日、新井氏は借名口座に一億円を振り込み、初回取引で約四百万円の付け替えを受ける。

中堅の証券会社社長は、「証券業界と政治との関係はもっぱら税制(改正)に行き着く」と言う。中でも有取税の撤廃は、証券取引を活性化させ、手数料収入に直結するため、日本証券業協会など業界団体が長年、要望し続けてきた懸案だった。

一方の新井氏は大蔵省出身で金融に明るく、自民党税制調査会に八年も籍を置いた税制通だ。借名口座開設の際、浜平元常務に「要望があるのなら相談に乗る」と持ちかけており、平石元副社長は特捜部の調べに対し、「大蔵族というか、証券族議員と認識していた」と供述している。

ところが、この法案が日興幹部との間で話題にされた形跡はなく、その年のうちに審議未了で廃案となっていた。

この件に限らず、日興側が新井氏に四千百万円の利益提供に見合うような陳情をした形跡はない。浜平元常務も「なぜ、もうけさせたか」という特捜部の追及に、「大蔵出身の議員だったから」と答えている。新井氏のパーティー券を購入していた同証券秘書室の元幹部は、「パーティー券でも他の議員より彼を優遇してきた。それは、いずれ証券関係の委員会で力を持つようになる期待があったからだ」と証言する。

日興側は、露骨な「強要」を受けたわけではなかった。浜平元常務の供述調査には「新井さんから『あなたが自己売買を担当しているので、確実に利益を出してほしい』と電話があった」とあるだけだ。

新井氏にとっては、議員バッジの威光と大蔵OBの経歴をちらつかせればよかった。

◎ ◎

日興が国会に提出した新井氏の顧客口座元帳には、九五年十二月六日から七日にかけ、電気機器メーカーのワラント取引で、約六百四十万円の売買益を出したことが記されている。日興は同じ日の同一銘柄で、総会屋の小池隆一被告にも同じ金額の利益を提供していた。二つの利益供与は偶然のものではない。総会屋の「やみの圧力」と、証券族議員の「威圧」が、日興証券にとっては、同質のものであったことを物語っている。

		【疑惑の清算 検証・新井							
1	1998. 03. 18	議員の死】(3)動かぬ証	東京朝刊	2社	38頁	1499字	04段	写真・図	
		拠 取引伝票(連載)							

◆自己売買記録に崩れた工作

自殺する前日の二月十八日、新井将敬衆院議員は記者会見で、二枚の切り札を切った。

衆院で逮捕許諾請求の手続きが進み、逮捕は秒読みに入っていた。それに対抗する「無罪の物証」のつもりだった。

切り札の一枚は、新井氏が日興証券の浜平裕行・元常務らに違法取引でなかったとの確認を求め、その会話を無断で録音したテープ。そして、もう一枚は、浜平元常務が東京地検特捜部で受けた取り調べの内容を詳細に記した二通の手書きメモのコピーだった。

◎

浜平元常務は昨年十月下旬、総会屋への利益供与事件で逮捕されると、新井氏から、元検事で同氏の顧問役だった弁護士を紹介されていた。

弁護士は浜平元常務に「(検察当局には)総会屋への利益供与を認めると、別の口座のことも追及されるでしょう」とアドバイスした。昨年六月中旬以来、新井氏から直接、口裏合わせを求められていた浜平元常務にとって、「別の口座」とは、新井氏の借名口座を意味していた。

弁護士はさらに、「あなたの身を守るためにもなるから(調べの内容を)メモに残しておくように。公にはしないから」などと、検事とのやり取りなどをメモにして渡すよう指示した。

新井氏が手にしていたのはこのメモのコピーだった。二通のうち一通は「十二月三日検察庁取り調べ1:30~6:00」の書き出しで始まり、借名口座が日興新橋支店に設けられた経緯などについて、浜平元常務の供述内容が書かれている。

〈新井先生からの具体的な目標はなかった。損益についてのクレームはなし。クールな対応であった〉

〈(借名口座を開設する直前の)平成七年十月、新井代議士を接待した。政治経済の一般的な話だった〉

新井氏は、自らの利益要求行為を薄める供述部分や、日興側からの接待の際にも、株取引の話はなかったとする部分を取り上げ、「無実」を強調した。

◎

ところが、浜平元常務は総会屋事件で起訴される十一月十一日の数日前、東京拘置所

の調べ室で「新井さんの申し入れで借名口座を開き、自己売買益を付け替えました」と認めていた。

元常務は昨年十二月から今年二月にかけ、新井氏からの要求についても供述。同氏が日興の株取引全般を統括していた浜平元常務に、「相場の中ではできないことをやってくれ」と、具体的に自己売買益の付け替えを求めてきたことまで明らかにした。

さらに、特捜部は昨年九月ごろ、銀行口座の調査から新井氏の資金の一部が日興の借名口座に流れていることを突き止めていた。通常取引ならば、日興が証券取引所に出す顧客の注文伝票には、「委託」のコード番号が打ち込まれる。しかし、新井氏の借名口座については、「委託」であるべきコード番号が、日興が行う「自己売買」のものになっていた。

利益の付け替えをはっきりと示す取引の足跡は、日興側の言い逃れを許さなかった。

◎

疑惑発覚を受けた昨年十二月二十二日の釈明会見で、新井氏は借名口座を認め、「違法な一任勘定や利益要求は行っていない」と主張。借名口座の開設理由を「売れている名なので友人の名を借りた」と説明したが、昨年九月には準大手の新日本証券で本人名義の口座を開設していた。一貫しない対応に、説得力は乏しかった。

衆院予算委の参考人質疑の後には、国会に取引資料を提出している。しかし、約百四十回に及ぶ取引の半数は、付け替えの疑いが強い即日、翌日売買で疑惑をさらに深める結果となった。

株取引の記録を始めとする客観証拠は、思惑に反して新井氏の「物証」を退け、外堀を埋めていった。

[疑惑の清算 検証・新井議									
1	1998. 03. 19	員の死](4)株で回した“火	東京朝刊	2社	38 頁	1644 字	04 段	写真	
の車”(連載)									

◆補てん、罰則化後も要求

数年前、新井将敬衆院議員の地元事務所は、電気やガス代などの公共料金を半年間も滞納していた。私設秘書の給料遅配も珍しくなかった。事務所はいつも資金に困っていた。

新井氏の公設秘書を十一年も務めた男性は「新井事務所から給料を差し引かれていた」と打ち明ける。「きちんと払ってほしい」と議員に詰め寄ったこともあるが、「まあ、考えとく」と笑顔であしらわれた。「改革派の旗手」としてテレビ出演し、鮮やかな弁舌を振るう新井氏。その姿に、秘書は「いつか日本一の政治家になれる」と納得せざるを得なかったという。

議員秘書は三人に限り「公設」として国から給料が支給される。この秘書の支給額へ年間八百万円以上だったが、実際に手元にきたのは約五百万円に過ぎなかった。公設秘書の九割は銀行振り込みの手続きを取っていたが、新井事務所は女性秘書が衆議院に三人分の給料を受け取りに行き、新井氏がそれを茶封筒に入れ分配していた。

◎

生まれ育った大阪でなく、学生時代から住んでいた東京で出馬した新井氏は、有力な支持母体を持たなかった。足掛かりもない。旧東京二区(大田、品川区)で支持者を掘り起こすため、多いときで地元回りの秘書を十五人も抱え、人件費もかさんだ。選挙用はがきの切手代を節約するため、秘書たちは自転車で回った。事務所の“給料ピンはね”はこうした中で起きた。

新井氏個人も、高級住宅地の自宅やリゾートマンションなどの購入のため、複数の銀行から三億円を超える借金をしていた。元本返済はストップし、利息分を返すのが精一杯だった。

新井氏は資金繰りを、株取引やビジネスに頼った。

◎

「合法的にもうけたいなら株式市場しかない。株取引で利益を上げるのはまっとうなことだ」

大蔵官僚だった新井氏がこう話すのを、元同僚は覚えている。企業からのヤミ献金でなく、だれからも非難されることのない金。そして自由な立場で活動する。新井氏はこうしたシナリオを描いていたのではないかと元同僚は指摘する。

新井氏によると、一九八三年の初出馬にあたって、まず、渡辺美智雄元蔵相(故人)に大手証券会社幹部を紹介してもらう。翌八四年から日興証券で株取引を始め、九三年までの間、付け替えなどによって約二億八千万円の利益提供を受けていた。八六年の初当選後は、「事務所経費に月五百万円かかる」と、日興側に利益上乗せを要求するようになった。野村、大和、山一の各証券会社でも、八〇年から九〇年にかけて、運用を続けた。議員バッジの威光がシナリオを現実のものとした。

◎

ところが、証券不祥事をきっかけにして、九二年に証券取引法が改正され、損失補てんや顧客の要求行為に罰則が設けられる。しかもバブルがはじけ、株式市場は低迷期を迎えた。

新井氏は日興証券で取引を再開した九五年十月当時、野村証券本店営業部にあった妻名義口座で約五千万円の損失を抱えていた。新井氏は補てんを迫るが、野村は聞き入れなかった。

日興側も新井氏からの口座再開要求をいったん断っている。株価低迷で「開設を引き受ければ、補てんまでしなくてはならなくなる」と恐れたのだ。それを無視して要求を通した時、取引は、「違法」の領域に踏み込んでいた。

◎

先月二十四日、新井氏の告別式が、地元・大田区の池上本門寺で営まれた。弔問客の傘を冷たい雨がまとわりつくように打つ中、霊きゅう車を先導する選挙カーから、涙声の「ショーケイ」コールが響いた。車上に特大の顔写真が一枚。その笑顔は滑るように走り去っていった。

新井氏はしばしば親しい仲間に、こう語っていた。

る。

「うちの割り当てリストには、著名な政治家の秘書の名前がずらりと並んでいた。みんな陳情で知り合った人だった」

日興証券関係者によると、衆院選に初当選したばかりの新井議員にも三菱重工の一千万円分のCBを割り当て、二千万円で売り抜けさせたという。政治家取引を担当していた同証券の元幹部は「政治家のランクを考慮して、複数の政治家に割り当てた。首相経験者の周辺は三億円だった」と語っている。

◎

一連の証券疑惑で、東京地検特捜部は当初、職務権限の明確な大臣クラスの関連口座に注目していた。証券会社が株取引を通じて政治家にわいろを提供する——そんな贈収賄事件の構図を描いていた。

大手証券では、保守系の大物議員の秘書名義の口座で億単位の損失が出ているのが見つかった。「政治家に損はさせない」(大手証券幹部)という業界の“常識”に反した取引だ。特捜部は、別口座を通じて損失補てんされた疑いもあるとして追跡したが、該当する口座は見つからなかった。

日興証券に開設された新井氏の借名口座は、複雑な資金の流れを追及して突き止めることができたが、本来、「借名口座の把握は至難のワザ」(検察幹部)だ。

◎

「何百人と、私と同じことをやっている人がいる」

新井氏は、衆院の議運委理事ら議員たちに、こう主張して自ら命を絶った。

(おわり)

(この連載は松井敏宏、加藤隆則、市田隆、小坂剛、川辺隆司が担当しました)

政治には誘われません 衆院東京									
1	1998. 03. 30	4区補選の投票率37. 65%	国	東京朝刊	2社	38頁	1260字	04段	
政で都内最低									

出口が見えない不況感、そして政治不信に、小さな町工場がひしめく東京都大田区の有権者の六割以上が棄権を選択した。証券疑惑の渦中に自殺した新井将敬氏の後を受け、二十九日に投開票された衆院東京四区の補欠選挙。お花見日和も手伝ってか、投票率は37・65%と、東京都内での国政選挙としては過去最低となった。同補選は、自民党公認の森田健作さん(48)が勝利を手にしたが、有権者の間には「政治には期待できない」「投票しても何も変わらない」などの冷めた声が渦巻いた。(本文記事1面)

「あえて棄権を選択したんだ」と話すのは西蒲田で履物店を経営する鈴木昭夫さん(50)。「投票したとしても何も変わらんでしょう」と、店番のいすに座りながら苦笑いを浮かべた。

東糞谷の金属加工業、伊井義久さん(62)は「今の政治では投票に行く気にならない」という。特注品があって、仕事はなくなることはないが、「ここ数年は経営的には成り立たない」とこぼす。だから、赤字分は工場の一部を賃貸する形で家計を支えている。「結局、

政府は大企業ばかり。ここも、年金生活の二人の従業員が続けてほしいというのでやっているようなものです」と力なく笑った。

南六郷の機械加工場に組み込んでいる鋳持(けんもち)公明さん(31)は、一九九六年十月の前回衆院選では新井氏に一票を投じたが、今回は棄権した。

この日も仕事に追われ、「年度末で忙しいし、政治に期待なんかない」。給料は一昨年まで五年続けて据え置かれ、四月からの仕事量も不透明のまま。「自分はまだいい方。日給で働いている人は仕事がなくて収入も大幅に減っている。国はずっと何もしてくれなかった」

二年前に夫を亡くし、女手一つで青果店を切り盛りする西糺谷の女性店主(70)は「義務として投票はしたけれど、何の期待もしていない」と客足が減った店に目を落とし、「もうあすにも店を閉めようかと思っています」と話していた。

「貸し渋りをやめさせよう」「大田の中小企業を守ろう」——。選挙戦ではどの候補者も、選挙区事情を意識して同じ言葉を繰り返した。しかし、その結果は最低の投票率。“追い詰められた”人々の思いをどう受け止めているだろうか。

◆教育問題に熱血 投票率には神妙 当選の森田さん

JR蒲田駅西口の雑居ビルにある森田さんの選対事務所では、午後七時四十八分に森田さんの「当確」を知らせるテレビ速報のテロップが流れると、集まった支持者から大きな拍手と歓声がわき上がった。

森田さんは、間もなく美子夫人(36)を伴って事務所に姿を現し、涙を浮かべながら深谷隆司・自民党都連会長とがっちり握手。「教育は国の根幹です」と切り出し、「すぐに結果は出せないが、学校でのいじめを少なくするために全力を尽くしたい。覚せい剤の問題などについても、子供たちに悪いことは悪いと教えることができる社会にしたい」と、すっきりかれた声で抱負を語った。

投票率の低さには「政治家が真剣に考えなければならない。ただ、誠意を持って訴えれば、有権者には必ず伝わると思う」と神妙な表情だった。

1	1998. 04. 27	引責役員に巨額退職金？ 社内規定通りなら30億円の前身	東京朝刊 社会 35 頁 2402 字 06 段 表
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◆「株主訴訟」が怖い企業側

引責辞任したトップや逮捕された役員に多額の退職金を支払うべきか——総会屋への利益供与事件や接待汚職で摘発された大手証券や第一勧業銀行の経営陣たちが頭を痛めている。一連の事件で辞任した役員は山一証券を含むと計七十八人(うち略式を含めた起訴者は二十人)。今年度中に彼らに退職金を支払うためには、役員会で決定後、六月の株主総会で承認を得なければならないが、判断を誤れば社会の批判を浴びて株主代表訴訟という事態にも発展しかねない。過去の貢献だけを考慮すると、退職金は数億—数十億円という役員もあり、野村証券や第一勧銀などでは、社員の間でも大きな論議になっている。

◆証券、銀行の利益供与・接待汚職 辞任は計78人

大和証券では、総会屋の小池隆一被告(54)に対する利益供与事件で、土井定包(さだかね)・前会長ら七人の役員が引責辞任した昨年九月ごろから、社内にウワサ話が広がっている。

「土井前会長に、過去に例がないほど巨額の退職金が支払われる」というもの。同氏は一九六七年に取締役昇進以来、副社長や社長、副会長など三十年間にわたって取締役を務めた。「ドン」とも呼ばれ、事件で起訴された十亀博光・前副社長らもその直系と言われていた。

本店に勤務する同証券幹部は「社内規定を調べて試算したら二十億から三十億円になった。事件の責任を取った人に、なぜそんな巨額の金を支払う必要があるのか。社員の多くは憤っている」と語る。

また、「土井前会長にも事件を招き大和の信頼を失墜させた責任がある。巨額退職金が本当なら許せない」という社員もいる。

大和では昨年十月にも、この事件で逮捕された島村猛専務と常務も辞任したが、これらの役員に退職金を支払う場合、六月の株主総会で、役員退職金の支払いを取締役会に一任することなどを議題として上程したうえ、株主の承認を得なければならない。

それには、五月中旬までに取締役会で正式決定しなければならないが、経営陣の一部からも「事件は、起訴された三人の役員だけが起こしたわけではない」「今年は、この問題の決定を保留すべきだ」との指摘が出ているという。これについて大和広報部では「経営陣と株主との間で決める問題」と答えるばかりで、困惑を隠せずにいる。

野村証券と第一勧銀は、昨年の株主総会で、辞任役員への退職金の支払いについて議題として上程せず、結論を先送りしていたが、今年も、二年連続で上程しないという異例の対応を検討している。

野村は、小池被告への利益供与事件に絡んで、昨年三月から四月に酒巻英雄元社長ら二十人の役員が辞任。今年二月にも、日本道路公団理事への接待汚職に絡んで、略式起訴された常務一人が辞任している。

八一年から十六年間も取締役就いていた酒巻元社長に退職金が支払われた場合、金額は「内規通りなら少なくとも五億円にのぼるはず」(野村幹部)という。野村広報部も「裁判が終わるまで、退職金問題を保留する可能性もある。事件への関与が薄い人に限って退職金を支払うという選択肢もあるが、大変難しい判断で悩んでいる」と話している。

奥田正司・前会長ら二十一人が辞めた第一勧銀では、藤田一郎前副頭取ら元役員四人が無罪を主張して争っている。

同行関係者は「無罪を主張する被告が出てさらに判断が難しくなった。事件は会社や社会に大きな影響を与えており、起訴や不起訴、有罪や無罪の区別だけで退職金を出せば社内外から再び批判を受ける」と言う。

日興証券は、小池被告への利益供与や接待汚職のほか、新井将敬衆院議員(故人)に対する利益供与事件でも摘発された。ある幹部は「引責辞任した役員は事件に関与していなかったのか。逮捕された役員と区別するのは難しい」と指摘している。

一連の事件では、山一証券も含め二十人の役員が起訴されたほか、かつての役員八人も起訴されたが、この八人は事件の一年以上も前に辞めて退職金をもらっていた。

◆分かれる対応 “岡田淵”氏前回は承認

不祥事で辞任した役員に退職金を支払うかどうか。過去のケースは、企業によって対応が分かれている。

一昨年、総会屋への利益供与事件で摘発されたデパート大手の高島屋では昨年五月の株主総会で、事件の責任を取って辞任した日高啓・前社長に退職金を支払う議案を上程し、承認された。野村証券でも、九一年の証券不祥事をきっかけに、田淵義久社長や田淵節也会長が取締役をいったん退いたが(九五年に復帰)、九二年の総会では、退職金の支払いが認められている。

高島屋の場合、日高前社長の申し出で、支払われる退職金は内規より減額されたが、両社とも、支払いを決めた理由は、事件や不祥事に直接、関与していないというものだった。

一方、九三年のゼネコン汚職で摘発された建設会社では、大林組と大成建設が九五年の総会で、「長年の功労に報いるため」として逮捕・起訴された副社長への退職金を上程し、承認された。しかし、鹿島と清水建設では、逮捕・起訴された会長や副社長などへの退職金の支払いについて見送りを続けている。その理由については、「違法行為をした役員への退職金の支払いは、株主代表訴訟になる可能性が高いから」(清水建設)としている。

中堅商社イトマンの乱脈経理事件に絡んで、九一年二月に辞任した住友銀行の磯田一郎元会長(九三年十二月に死去)の場合は退職金が払われていない。

◆原則、金額の明示必要

多摩大経営情報学部の松浦敬紀・学部長(経営学)の話「引責辞任した役員に退職金を払うのであれば、原則やルールを明示し、金額や理由もきちんと公開しなければ、社会の批判に耐えることはできないはずだ。退職金を支払うのは『法的・道義的に問題ある行為をした役員にも会社は報いる』という意味であり、会社ぐるみの不祥事を裏付ける結果になるのではないか」

1 1998. 06. 24 [山一背信](8)政官界疑惑「入り口」封印(連載) 東京朝刊 2社 34頁 1353字 06段

◆消えた転換社債…「亡くなってくれて助かった」

山一証券では昨春秋、総会屋の小池隆一に利益を供与した疑いで前社長・三木淳夫ら八人が東京地検特捜部に逮捕されている。十二年前、これとよく似た総会屋疑惑があった。違っていたのは、一九八六年の疑惑は、すべてを知る山一証券筆頭副社長・成田芳穂(よしお)が翌年一月に自殺して封印され、何の教訓も残されなかったことである。

「あの自殺で捜査の道が断たれた。成田さんから聴取できていれば大疑獄事件に発展したはずだ。あるいは、今回の総会屋事件もなかったかもしれない」

当時、東京地検特捜部検事として、三菱重工の転換社債(CB)疑惑を捜査した田中

森一（もりかず）（現弁護士）が言う。田中は、三菱重工が山一に依頼して総会屋などにCBを提供したとみていた。

バブル期に新規発行されたCBは短期間に利益を得られる商品だった。総会屋対策や損失補てんに利用され、特に三菱重工が八六年八月に新規発行した総額一千億円のCBは買値の二倍の売り抜けが可能だった。

問題のCBを手にした総会屋を追及するうちに、田中はこの事件に都銀も関与していたことを知る。山一からCBを割り当てられた総会屋は、その購入資金を大手都銀から無担保で調達していた。そのうえで高値で売り抜け、五百万から一千万円の利益を手に入れたのである。まさにぬれ手にあわ。リクルート事件と同じ構図がここにあった。

もっと大きな疑惑もあった。三菱重工はCBの売り出しを四大証券に任せていた。当時は、証券業界の自主ルールで発行額の一割までは発行会社が割り当てる先を自由に指定できることになっていた。

「つまり、CB百億円分までは三菱重工がばらまけるということだ。ところが、山一から総会屋に割り当てられたCBは十五億円に過ぎない。残りの八十五億円分はどこへ消えたのか」

大和証券の元幹部は、その一部が政界に流れたと証言する。日興証券で政治家との取引を担当した元幹部や関係者はこう言う。

「そのランクを考慮して複数の政治家にCBを割り当てた。首相経験者の周辺は三億円」「代議士に当選したばかりの新井将敬議員にも一千万円分を提供した」

ヤミに消えたCBは三菱重工の“顧客”に渡ったものと、四大証券の得意先に回ったものと二種類あったが、田中は軍需品の受注に絡んでCBが政官界に流れていれば大変なことだと考えた。

「総会屋と山一証券の癒着は単なる商法違反。CB配分の統括責任者だった成田さんの供述を手繰って、その裏に潜んでいたであろう疑惑を暴きたかった」

昨年の利益供与事件で、東京地検特捜部は小池と四大証券幹部の逮捕から、大蔵省、日銀、そして政界疑惑の摘発へと駆け上がっていった。一方、十二年前の特捜部も、成田の聴取を政官界疑惑への入り口にしようと目指していた。

成田の自殺から半年後。山一の首脳が漏らした言葉を側近の部長は忘れられないという。「成田には申し訳ないが、亡くなってくれて会社は助かった」

成田の自殺が封じ込んだ総会屋疑惑。それは新たな形で、しかも最悪のタイミングで山一を襲うことになる。九七年三月期決算で約千五百六十億円の赤字を出し、経営危機に直面したところで、首脳陣が一斉逮捕され、機関投資家や金融機関に見放されてしまった。

（敬称略、肩書は当時のまま）

1	1998. 08. 27	日本ハイカ旧経営陣、引責なのに退職金「内規通り、不正ない」4220万円	東京朝刊 社会 39 頁 2076 字 05 段 写真・表
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◆96年夏、4人に

特殊法人「日本道路公団」の関連会社で約二十七億円の焦げ付きを出した日本ハイカ（東京・九段北）の旧経営陣四人が、引責辞任した際に総額四千二百二十万円の退職金を受け取っていたことが二十六日、公団の内部資料でわかった。日本ハイカは「内規に従って支払われたもので問題はない」と主張している。一方、この四人はいずれも運輸省や公団OBで、引責辞任後、別の公団関連企業に再び天下りしていたが、これが発覚して国会などで厳しい批判を受けたため、同日までに前社長ら二人が辞職し、残る二人も辞任を申し出た。

◆国会などの批判受け 再天下り先も辞任

旧経営陣の四人は、日本ハイカが高速道路料金のプリペイドカード販売を巡って約二十七億円の焦げ付きを出した一昨年夏に引責辞任していた。

公団の内部資料によると、退職金の内訳は▽運輸省観光部長から道路公団理事を経て、日本ハイカに天下っていた大久保一男前社長が二千四十万円（在職期間六年十一月）▽道路施設協会常任参与や中央ハイウェイサービス専務を経た加藤年久前専務（元日本道路公団東京第一管理局八王子支局長）が七百五十万円（同三年）▽公団から天下りした進（しん）哲美前専務（同東京第一建設局次長）と小淵雅裕前取締役営業部長（同東京第二管理局業務部長）がそれぞれ九百四十万円（同五年）、四百九十万円（同三年十一月）。

これについて、日本ハイカでは「当時の経営陣が支払いを決めたため、詳しい経緯はわからないが、内規に従って支払われており、不正はない」とした上で、「日本ハイカでは焦げ付いた販売代金の支払いを巡って契約先と裁判を行っているところで、その結果を見てから（返還を求めるかどうかなど）対応を決めたい」と話している。

四人はいずれも引責辞任直後に別の公団関連会社に再就職しており、これが発覚した後、大久保前社長が再就職先の東日本ハイウェイ・パトロール顧問を辞職した。さらに新日本道路サービス顧問に天下った加藤前専務も「一身上の都合」を理由に辞表を提出、二十六日に受理された。同サービスの内規で顧問には退職金は支払われないという。

また、進前専務が東日本道路サービス常務取締役総務部長に、小淵前取締役が関越道路サービス営業部長に再就職していたが、二人とも「一連の報道で会社に迷惑をかけた」などとして、同日までに辞任を申し出たという。これに対して東日本道路サービスなどは「本人の意向を尊重する。退職金を支払うかどうかは未定」としている。

旧経営陣の再天下りについては、関谷建設相が二十一日の参院予算委員会で「退任しないならその指示を出したい」と答弁、辞任しない場合は退任するよう指示を出す方針を

表明していた。

旧経営陣のうちの一人は読売新聞社の取材に対し、「間違ったことをしたとは思っていない。それぞれの持ち場できちんと仕事はしてきたつもりだ」と話している。

◆民間も右へならえ 野村21人中16人 大和9人中6人 日興8人全員に

日本ハイカの旧経営陣四人はキャリア官僚やみなし公務員だったが、民間会社でも役員が引責辞任した後に、多額の退職金を受け取っているケースが少なくない。

典型的な例が、総会屋への利益供与事件などで役員が引責辞任した三大証券会社。

まず、野村証券は利益供与事件と日本道路公団理事への贈収賄事件で計二十一人の役員が引責辞任した。ところが、このうち十六人に退職金を支払うことが今年六月の株主総会で承認された。残り五人のうち、酒巻英雄元社長ら公判中の三人は支払いを留保中。田淵節也元会長、田淵義久元社長の二人は本人が受け取りを辞退した。

大和証券も引責辞任した元役員九人のうち、十亀博光元副社長ら公判中の三人を除く六人に、退職金を支払う方針を決めている。総会屋や故新井将敬衆院議員への利益供与事件で八人の役員が辞任した日興証券も、規定額より減額したものの、全員に退職金が支払われた。

これに対して、第一勧銀は、近藤克彦前頭取ら九人が利益供与事件の責任を取って辞めたが、株主総会への議案上程が見送られ、退職金は支払われていない。

これについて、埼玉大名誉教授(生活経済論)の暉峻淑子(てるおかいつこ)さんは「会社に損失が出れば責任者は退職金の返上はもちろん、私財を投げうってでも穴埋めするのが世界の資本主義の常識だ。高額な退職金支払いがまかり通る日本の現状に驚くばかり。日本ハイカは旧経営陣に直ちに退職金の返還を求めるべきだ。自分たちの保身しか考えない日本ハイカの旧役員のような人がいる限り、日本経済は決してよくなるまい」と指摘している。

◇日本ハイカを引責辞任した4人の退職金

在職期間 退職金 再就職先と役職

大久保一男社長 6年11か月 2040 東日本ハイウェイ・パトロール顧問

加藤 年久専務 3年 750 新日本道路サービス顧問

進 哲美専務 5年 940 東日本道路サービス常務

小淵 雅裕取締役 3年 1か月 490 関越道路サービス営業部長

※肩書は引責辞任当時。退職金の単位は万円

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