

SĀMOANA AS *ATUNU‘U*:  
THE SAMOAN NATION BEYOND THE *MĀLŌ* AND STATE-CENTRIC NATIONALISM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF  
THE UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA  
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF ARTS  
IN  
PACIFIC ISLANDS STUDIES

May 2020

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By

John Patu, Jr.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to our beloved *Atunu'u*, the *suli* of Sāmoana,  
past, present, and future.

I specifically dedicate this thesis to my *'āiga*, my grandparents Afioga Leasi Atonio Lei'ataua and Imeleta Vāimoanalētoefeiloa'imolima'ene Taufasau, Afioga Pātū Pila and Lata Moimoi, to my parents Telesia Māria Atonio and John Pātū, Sr., and, and my sisters Carmelita Togi and Frances Suluama Telesia Pātū and the future of our family, Naulea-Imeleta, Vāimoana Paula, and Tava'esina Pātū.

I also especially dedicate this thesis to my mentors Tōfā 'Aumua Mata'itusi Simanu and Afioga Loau Tuiloma Dr. Luafata Simanu-Klutz, my academic mothers, whose *tapua'iga* and *fautuaga* made this entire thesis journey possible.

## A NOTE ABOUT SAMOAN ORTHOGRAPHY

Samoan is a member of the Samoic branch of the Polynesian language family and a member of the larger Austronesian language family. Modern Samoan orthography utilizes the Latin alphabet and consists of five vowels (a, e, i, o, u) and ten indigenous consonants (f, g, l, m, n, p, s, t, v, ‘) and three introduced consonants (h, k, r). The former were later inserted to accommodate the transliteration and creation of new words from other languages, primarily European.

The diacritic markers, the *fa’amamafa*, or macron ( ¯ ), indicates an elongated vowel sound and the *koma liliu* ( ‘ ), or glottal stop is treated in Samoan as an actual consonant sound. They are essential in determining the meanings of homographs or words with the same spelling. The noun “tama” refers to a “boy” or “child of a woman,” however, “tamā” refers to a “father.” The verb “fai” means “to do,” while the noun “fa’i” refers to “bananas.” Thus, these diacritic markers are necessary and, although they are not used consistently by Samoans, they are meticulously used (except in direct quotes) in this thesis to (1) assist the *Atunu’u* in the proper pronunciations and consistent spellings of Samoan words and (2) to promote standardized and conventional use of these diacritics for Samoan in academic writing and other forms of discourse.

Although the contemporary trend among many Pacific and other Indigenous colleagues is to not italicize Indigenous words, I have decided to italicize them in this thesis as a stylistic liberty and to highlight the distinction between Samoan words and the language in which this paper is written. I have, however, kept in line with utilizing Samoan conventions in addressing authors used in this text by using their *matai* titles.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have been possible without the *tapua'iga* (the prayers and well-wishes) of various different people of the *Atunu'u* and all her friends.

I would like to thank my committee, Terence Wesley-Smith, Afioga Fepulea'i Lāsei Dr. John Mayer, and Afioga Loau Tuiloma Dr. Manumaua Luafata Simanu-Klutz. Thank you for your patience, constant encouragement and support, and believing in the value of this project and its contributions to understanding the Samoan *Atunu'u*. I would like to specically offer my endless gratitude to Loau for endless words of encouragement and patiently guiding me through the writing and final editing of this paper. Mālō le 'onosa'i, mālō le tauata'i, mālō le fīnau, fa'afetai le tapua'i!

I am indebted to the Center for Pacific Islands Studies (CPIS), especially Dr. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, Dr. Lola Quan Bautista, Dr. Alexander Mawyer, Dr. James Viernes, and Coco Needham for the constant support. I am particularly indebted to the Na Nei Tou Loloma donors for generously providing for part of my research trip to Sāmoa. To the Samoan Language, Culture, and Literature Program of the Department of Indo-Pacific Languages and Literatures (IPLL) at the University of Hawai'i – Mānoa, I thank you for granting me the support necessary to research about our *Atunu'u*. I would like to express my gratitude to my Samoan faculty colleagues, Tōfā 'Aumua Mata'itusi Simanu, the late Susuga Lei'ataua Vita Tanielu, Afioga Sā'ilimālō Fa'afetai Lesā, Tōfā 'Aumuagaolo Ropeti 'Ale, Susuga Tāfesilafa'i Edward Danielson, and Dr. Grant Muāgututi'a for the conversations about our language and culture. I am also thankful for the support of Dr. Tina Tauasosi Posiulai and Afioga Luamanuvae Dr. Sa'iliemanu Lilomaiava-Doktor for the support during my journey, along with friends and colleagues at the University of Hawai'i–West O'ahu, especially the wisdom of Tiana Malino Henderson. I would like to thank

Elisapeta Tūpō Alaimaleata and the Le Fetūao Samoan Language Center and other community organizations and individuals with whom I have worked for the advancement of our language and culture throughout the diaspora.

I would like to thank His Highness the former Head of State, Afioga Tui Ātua Tupua Tamasese Tā'isi 'Efi for his wisdom and conversations on numerous occasions regarding our *Atunu'u*. I am grateful to have had friendly encounters with Prime Minister Susuga Tuila'epa Dr. Sa'ilele Malielegaoi and to Susuga Lolomatauama Mikaele Mao for introducing me to him.

I am grateful for the conversations with Afioga Leasiolagi Dr. Mālama Meleiseā, Afioga Toeolesulusulu Professor Damon Sālesa, Dr. Fa'anofo Lisa 'Uperesa, Dr. Iati Iati, I'uogafa Tuagalu, Tim Baice, and the many other academic colleagues I have come across the numerous conferences during this thesis journey.

I am also grateful to Ka Haka 'Ula o Ke'elikōlani at the University of Hawai'i – Hilo and the faculty of the Kahuawaiola Indigenous Teacher Education Program, Dr. Makalapua Alencastre, Dr. Noelani Iokepa-Guerrero, and Kumu Kananinohea Māka'imoku and my kahu a'oākumu, Kameha'ililani Waiau and Kalaunuola Domingo for constant support and encouragement during this process. It is through this program that I am learning to best serve the Lāhui and *Atunu'u*.

I would also like to thank the faculty at Ke Kula 'o Samuel M. Kamakau, to Dr. Meahilahila Kelling and Hope Kahu Kameha'ililani Waiau. I am also thankful for the many conversations with Kumu Keane Nakapueo-Garcia about aloha 'āina and aloha lāhui and helping to realize through encouragement what it means to be a part of the Lāhui.

I would like to thank my friends and colleagues, especially Gabrielle Fa'ai'uaso, Harrison Fa'atau Tōgia, Lee Kava, Luseane Raas, Asalemo Fonofī Crawford and others for helping me to

get through these long years and planning for the future of the *atunu* ‘*u* Pasefika. To my Big Island Rave Family (B.I.R.F.), thank you for helping me get by throughout these years.

I would like to thank my family, I am also Tōfā Leaua’i Filipino, Afioga Mulipola Nikolao and all others who contributed to this research. I would like to especially thank my mother Telesia Atonio-Pātū for the constant support and encouragement throughout the many years of schooling and to her siblings Afioga Pātele Falaniko Atonio, Afioga Leasi ‘Ameto, Kilisitina, ‘Ana, ‘Aukusitino, Atonio, Kalameli, and Ioana Malaeogagamoe for both the financial and spiritual support throughout this long and arduous journey. I am thankful to my siblings, especially Carmelita and Frances Pātū, for raising Naulea, Vāimoana, and Tava’esina in the ways of our *Atunu* ‘*u*. *Mālō lava le ‘onosa ‘i, mālō lava le tapua ‘i!*

I would to thank Tōfā ‘Aumua M. Simanu and Afioga Loau Tuiloma Dr. M. Luafata Simanu-Klutz for your constant encouragement throughout the years. It would not have been possible without your support that helped me understand the *Atunu* ‘*u* and why we continue to serve her in all the capacities that we do.

*Soifua!*

## ABSTRACT

Historical and contemporary Western discourse on the concept of the nation are often framed in terms of primordial-modernist debates and the various forms of ethnic and civic nationalisms. The referent of the nation today is the civic-nationalist notion of the nation-state, which narrowly confines the concept of a Samoan nation to the Independent State of Sāmoa (and, thus, this Sāmoa has become the referent for Samoa). This presents an obvious dilemma, despite, 1) the existence of two distinct Samoan polities, Sāmoa and American Sāmoa and 2) the demographic shift in which more Samoans now live in the diaspora (and, thus, outside of this Samoan nation-state).

This thesis deconstructs the nation-state as an inadequate model to describe the current state of the *Atunu'u*, the Samoan conceptualization of nation today, by interrogating its transformation throughout prehistory until now: 1) through its initial conception through Indigenous cosmogonies and Western settlement theories, 2) the creation of the Indigenous sociopolitical structure under the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai, 3) the transformation under initial contact with the West and subsequent colonization, 4) the postcolonial construction of the nation-state, and finally, 5) the transformation of the bounded-state into a more fluid, transnational *Atunu'u*.

Given that these paradoxes confound conventional Western notions of the nation as embodied in the nation-state, can there be alternative conceptions of the nation? This thesis argues that the *Atunu'u* can no longer be defined only in terms of the nation-state but must account for the transnational nature of the nation that is inclusive of the diasporas and Indigenous notions of nation, migration, and *tausi le vā* (maintaining socio-spatial relationships). This thesis then proposes that the *Atunu'u* can be reconceptualized as Sāmoana, the Samoan *Atunu'u* that is



inclusive of all Samoans as a people, whether they are in the ‘homeland’, or the diasporas. These Indigenous conceptualizations of the nation are necessary to describe not only the current phenomena, but to explore the contributions of Indigenous concepts that underlie the transformation of the *Atunu ‘u*.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

C.C.C.A.S	Congregational Christian Church of American Sāmoa
C.C.C.S.	Congregational Christian Church of Sāmoa
D.H.P.G.	Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft
E.F.K.A.S.	Ekālēsia Fa'alāpotopotoga Kerisiano o 'Amerika Sāmoa
E.F.K.S.	Ekālēsia Fa'alāpotopotoga Kerisiano o Sāmoa
L.M.S.	London Missionary Society

## INTRODUCTION

Today is the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of our nation, the Independent State of Samoa. Today, we come together from far and wide, as children and friends of Samoa, to take pause, bear witness, reflect on and share in the maturing of our nation. Today, we are a grateful and proud nation.<sup>1</sup>

– Tui Ātua Tupua Tamasese Ta'isi 'Efi

### Sāmoa mo Sāmoa: A Cup Half Empty or Half Full?

On June 1, 2012, after months of intense and meticulous preparations, the ebullient people of the State of Sāmoa celebrated their fiftieth anniversary of political independence from New Zealand. Delegates from all over the globe, including the neighboring United States Territory of American Sāmoa, were hosted by the government and entertained by a plethora of village and national fanfare. The guests were in attendance to commemorate the end of formal colonization in the first Pacific island nation to join the sovereign “family of nations.” Not only did Samoans in Sāmoa celebrate the independence of their ‘motherland,’ but thousands of expatriates dispersed around the world hosted their own festivities to commemorate the golden jubilee of their Samoan compatriots.

The ostensible congeniality between the parties from the two Samoas during the celebrations successfully masked existing tensions concerning national and political identity and state relations between them. The contradictions of celebrating independence in the context of colonially induced differences between contemporary Samoan political governing entities and Samoans residing in the diaspora were perceptible only to academics who saw the issues surrounding the affair as salient conversation and research topics. Every year, as Samoa celebrates political independence from its former colonies, questions about the nature of Sāmoa as a singular

<sup>1</sup> Meleisea, Malama, et.al. *Samoa's Journey 1962-2012: Aspects of History*. Wellington, N.Z.: Victoria University Press, 2013, 9.



entity ostensibly ‘divided’ and dispersed since western contact were temporarily satiated? In the expression of patriotism by Samoan people all over the world, not as bounded nations but as people understanding independence in the context of their unbounded commitment to a shared ancestry hence worldview which no amount of modernization politically, economically, or culturally, could erase.

But what was the meaning of ‘independence’ for Sāmoa and Samoans, not just in the ‘homeland,’ but elsewhere in American Sāmoa and the diasporas? What assumptions about Sāmoa were taken for granted and what were some of the issues that were masked for the sake of saving face in front of an international audience? What is this Sāmoa that Samoans were celebrating? Did it include Samoans in New Zealand, Australia, Hawai‘i, Texas, or even American Sāmoa, where nearly half of the population reside? The Head of State had proclaimed that June 1, 2012 was the fiftieth anniversary of the ‘birth of our nation,’ but whose nation? What was Sāmoa before the ‘birth’ of this nation? Embedded in this rhetoric prevalent throughout the Independence celebrations were contradictions and ambivalences towards the expressive patriotism and nationalism of Samoans living in both the archipelago and the diaspora.<sup>2</sup> The ambivalence that arises over this so-called ‘Samoan nation’ has taken for granted several ideas of what and who Sāmoa is, an idea that has been complicated by the imposition of foreign concepts of the nation as well as the appropriation and reification of such paradigms by Samoans themselves.

Conventional Western notions conceive of ‘Sāmoa’ as a physical place with delineated boundaries: Contained within the longitudes 171° and 176° west and latitudes 13° and 15° south are

<sup>2</sup> I had the opportunity to visit Sāmoa for its annual Independence Day celebrations in 2012, which marked the fiftieth anniversary since New Zealand lowered its flag from the Samoan capitol building at Tiafau in Mulinu‘u. The commemoration of the momentous occasion was met with much fanfare and patriotic expressions of nationalism. I took part in the celebrations as an observer as well as a participant from the diaspora.

3,135 square kilometers of volcanically formed lands in which the ancient Lapita people settled nearly 3,500 years ago. Within this paradigm of constructing “Sāmoa,” Sāmoa is not only defined geographically and geologically, but politically as well. These colonial boundaries have been ingrained and perpetuated in the ethos of the Samoan people. That Sāmoa was divided according to colonial agendas, with the western portion going to Germany and subsequently New Zealand and the eastern half going to the United States, was taken for granted and not challenged for its fracturing of the nation.




Figure 0.1 Map of the Samoan archipelago including the current political configuration<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Turner, George. 1884. *Samoa, a hundred years ago and long before. Together with notes on the cults and customs of twenty-three other islands in the Pacific.* Available online at Nabu Press (January 4, 2010). [https://openlibrary.org/publishers/Nabu\\_Press](https://openlibrary.org/publishers/Nabu_Press). Gilson lists the longitude as between 163° and 173° West. See also Gilson, Richard Phillip. 1970. *Samoa 1830 to 1900; the politics of a multi-cultural community.* Melbourne/New York: Oxford University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Available from the National Park of American Samoa website at <https://www.nps.gov/npsa/planyourvisit/upload/islands.pdf>

The Samoan archipelago, though, had been previously organized according to its own political philosophy that favored a loose confederacy of traditional districts with no centralized monarchy or ruling government. Manu'a, the eastern-most and most isolated part of the archipelago, was its own separate polity, whereas, the rest of the islands to the West formed confederacies under powerful chiefly titles and families. With the arrival of Europeans, the political balance and power structure were changed dramatically. No longer was the more traditional confederate model in place, the nation-state paradigm was imposed as the sole valid and desired form of government in the postcolonial era. Granted, there were concessions to have Sāmoa's government contextualized within traditional chiefly authority and political organization, a compromise, however, was inevitable, if not necessary. Despite this compromise, the form of government that was ultimately recognized as legitimate, particularly for the sake of appeasing international norms on nationhood, was a Western one. The Independent State of Sāmoa took the form of a modified parliamentary democracy based on the British Westminster model, and American Sāmoa later became an 'unincorporated,' 'unorganized' territory of the United States. Both exist in hegemonic power relations placing traditional politics in check, often disrupting, unsettling, and even undermining traditional sociopolitical structures in the villages and districts.

### Statement of the Problem

The problem of the nation-state as referent for the nation in the current discourse provides some challenges for the framework in which Samoan nationhood is articulated. Aside from the complexities of Independence, this thesis arises from two more problems associated with the current political statuses of the Samoan archipelago.<sup>5</sup> The first deals with addressing some

<sup>5</sup> Originally, the impetus for this thesis had derived from the desire to explicate the rationale for the perpetuation of Samoan language and culture in both the 'homeland' and diaspora. One of the reasons for linguistic and cultural

misunderstandings about Sāmoa as proposed and perpetuated by outsiders observing in the unique Samoan situation. Several observers and commentators have made erroneous speculations, based on their own experiences and assumptions about nationalism, on the nature of the Samoan islands with regards to its differing political statuses. Journalists, academics, political commentators, and media personnel have all contributed to the ‘othering’ of Sāmoa and Samoans. One of the most recent publications was championed by an “honorary member of Oceania,” freelance journalist Andre Vltchek who wrote two condescending articles, “A Tale of Two Samoas”<sup>6</sup> and the chapter “Samoa: One Nation, Two failed States” from his book *Oceania: Neocolonialism, Nukes, and Bones*.<sup>7</sup> Another paper, Matori Yamamoto’s “Nationalism in Microstates,”<sup>8</sup> outlined the ironies of a ‘divided’ nation that lacked the motivation to ‘reunite’ and preferred the status quo because of the ‘realpolitik’ of the current age. Both works were saturated with rhetoric of a “failed state” discourse reminiscent of fatalistic portrayals of Islanders based on Western prescriptions for the nation. The discourse of “reunification” is prevalent among those whose understanding of Samoan sociopolitical organization is overshadowed by the state-centric undertones of contemporary nation-state debates. This reunification discourse is often promoted and perpetuated even among Samoans who have adopted some misconceived notions of political and national prescriptions that

transmission arose from a “responsibility rationale” in which the nation would be expanded to include those living in diaspora as well as those living in the home islands. Part of the idea was derived from Yuko Otsuka’s article, “Making a Case for Tongan as an Endangered Language” (2007). From this idea of an ‘expanded nation’, ‘national’ responsibility would be expanded to those living in the diasporas. The natural step to take then was to examine the debates about the ‘nation’ against Samoa’s unique and complicated situation.

<sup>6</sup> Vltchek, Andre. “A Tale of Two Samoas”, *Oceania: Neocolonialism, Nukes, and Bones*, Auckland: Atuanui Press, 2013. Online <http://atuanuiPress.co.nz/>.

<sup>7</sup> Vltchek’s article is published in his book *Oceania: Neocolonialism, Nukes, and Bones*, Atuanui Press, 2013; this is also available in the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, June 1, Vol. 6, NO. 6, 2008, pp. 1-11.

<sup>8</sup> Yamamoto, Matori. 2011. “Nationalism in Microstates: Realpolitik in the Two Samoas”, *The Hosei University Economic Review*, Vol. 78 No. 3, pp. 283-299.

have been detrimental to articulating and fostering Samoan notions of agency in national discourses.

The second challenge deals with the historic tensions between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa beginning with the name change controversy of 1997.<sup>9</sup> Since the European political partition, both the eastern and western portions of the archipelago had undergone significant changes socially, politically, and economically. The two polities have been in an unofficial rivalry as evidenced by the many political tensions between government officials in both American Sāmoa and Sāmoa and the resultant attempts to reciprocate each other's retributions. Among the political frays is the clash over immigration and the imposition of airport taxes between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, arguments over passport conflicts,<sup>10</sup> questions about Independence,<sup>11</sup> and the opposition to 'foreign' flags flying in American Sāmoa.<sup>12</sup> While these causes of turmoil may seem trivial and frivolous to an outsider, they nonetheless reflect the strains of imposed political identities reified by Samoans themselves as framed around the state. That the existence of two Samoas has contributed to a rivalry that has not resulted in all-out physical violence signifies the complexities of inter-state relations as well the cohesiveness of indigenous Samoan diplomacy in modern political discourse. The challenges to and critiques of these rivalries by political pundits as well as patriotic Samoans from within the polities as well as in the diaspora reflect, furthermore, the complexities of this idea of the 'nation.' Who constitutes the nation of 'Sāmoa'? How can one say that one is from the 'real Sāmoa' as many expatriates of Sāmoa have expressed in jocular

<sup>9</sup> Lopa, Seti. 1997. "American Samoa may vote not to recognize Western Samoa's name change to Samoa". In *The Pacific Islands Report*, August 29<sup>th</sup>, Honolulu: Pacific Islands Report Archive, Pacific Islands Development Plan (PIDP), East West Center.

<sup>10</sup> Tavita, Terry. 2005. "Two Samoas Spar Over Passport Conflicts". In *Samoa Observer*, July 31.

<sup>11</sup> Tavita, Terry. 2005. "Independence noises and the Territory". In *Samoa Observer*, July 3.

<sup>12</sup> Sagapolutele, Fili. "ASNOC voices opposition to foreign flags flying around." In *Samoa News*.

conversations? Despite the homogeneity of language and culture in both Samoas, why have the politically imposed boundaries become so reified as to cause very pronounced political differences?

The problem of colonial boundaries and political entities is further challenged by the presence of a diaspora that is overwhelmingly larger than the numbers of Samoans who reside in the geographical borders of both Samoas. There are numerous diasporas all over the world, yet Sāmoa finds itself in a unique state because of the high expression of patriotism and ethnic nationalism as well by Samoans in diaspora. The fluidity of transnational peoples in the diaspora has made complicated conventional notions about what it means to be a state with closed boundaries. Table 0.1 illustrates the dynamics of the international Samoan population today and how the localized nation centered in the ‘homeland’ has shifted to the diaspora: nearly two-thirds of Samoans today live outside of both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa.

Table 0.1 Number of Samoans all over the globe (including major diasporas)

Location	Population	Percentage
Sāmoa	195,000	
American Sāmoa (2017)	47,690	
Subtotal	240,000	37
United States (2010)	185,000	
New Zealand	144,000	
Australia	75,000	
Subtotal	400,000	63
TOTAL	640,000	100

## Purpose

The purpose, then, of this thesis is to provide critiques of the ways this polity called Sāmoa has been defined and redefined as an *Atunu* ‘u, as a “nation,” by both Samoans and non-Samoans throughout the past two centuries. This paper challenges conventional Western notions of what it means to be a “nation.” It provides a critique of the nation-state model as a referent for the nation in Samoan contexts and contextualizes it within what William Robinson calls “nation-state centrism”<sup>13</sup> that is prevalent in the current discourse on the nation.

## Framework: Traditional and Western Understandings of Nation

To execute this deconstruction of the nation, I utilize the following reference points: 1) the celebration of Independence, as a ‘birth of a modern nation’ and the construction of statehood, 2) the tensions between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa that have arisen over the development of distinct political identities, and 3) the pervasive myth of a politically “unified” Sāmoa before colonization in the media and academic literature. The discourse on the nation has been largely dominated by Western frameworks that privilege a state-centric paradigm that had arisen out of European contexts and extrapolated to Sāmoa after colonization and decolonization schemes. At the time of Euro-American contact and intervention in internal Samoan affairs, the islands to the west of Manu‘a, had been embroiled in wars for titular supremacy. Foreign powers had exploited these local wars in order to centralize power for a rapid colonization of the archipelago.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Robinson, William I. 1998. “Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies.” *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 561–594.

<sup>14</sup> This ‘centering project,’ as Jocelyn Linnekin articulates, facilitated the partition of the islands; these arbitrary boundaries became reified and adopted by Samoans themselves. See Linnekin, Jocelyn. 1997. “Contending Approaches.” In *The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders*, edited by Donald Denoon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-31.

Identities based on the carving of the islands during the height of Western imperialism had been appropriated by Samoans, creating new contexts of nationalism that had been based on state-centric articulations. The separate political entities, Western Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, had arisen out of Euro-American imperialism but reified and taken up by Samoans themselves. What was once derived from indigenous notions of identity based on kinship and historical social and political alliances had been adapted to fit agendas that were designed by foreign nations. The nineteenth century conflicts had focused on the ascendancy of titular primacy in ‘national’ affairs, a constitution of *mālō*. The *mālō* became the word for the new governing structure that was based on the ‘state.’ Western teleological assumptions about the nation had been prescribed for statehood – endowed with sovereignty over a particular geographical area – thus the rise of the Independent State of Sāmoa. The *mālō*, a once dynamic entity that was amenable to changing fractional hierarchies and internal manipulations by the apex of Samoan sociopolitical structure had now become static – reified in the state, a bordered nation defined by Western constructs.

Traditional ideas on the nation could be summarized in the term Atunu'u, which refers to the physical land base and/or to the people itself. It transcends geographical boundaries and reflects the fluidity of identity and community that is formed by shifting demographics, especially in lieu of the dynamics of population movement within the space manipulated by Samoans in various nations and states.

Despite the current transnational nature of the Samoan nation – that is the people who are of Samoan ancestry – in which most people no longer reside within the colonially carved boundaries, the discourse as well as development schemes are based on state-centric paradigms. An indigenous model that creates a pan-Samoan identity, which is Sāmoana, can be a starting point for reconceptualizing the hegemony of the nation-state in the nationhood discourse. It allows for



creative possibilities that not only challenge and unsettle conventional theories and discourse but allows for Samoans to articulate and express their own indigenous imaginations for envisioning their nation.

Even within these colonially imposed boundaries, there must be alternative paradigms to conceptualizing the Samoan nation. At the time of Western Samoan independence, nearly everyone of Samoan descent physically resided in the Samoan islands. The status of the diasporas living outside of the Samoan archipelago has confounded conventional notions of nation and statehood because of the drastic shift in demographics. This shift has transformed modern notions of nationalism that has viewed states, that is Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, as the referent for the term “Sāmoa.” Much of the literature and focus has been on Samoans within the two Samoan polities, but what of Samoans living outside of Sāmoa especially those in the United States where there are as many Samoans from the independent state as there are those from American Samoa? Samoans have been migrating out of the islands for many decades and have settled and established themselves in other communities, such as New Zealand, Australia, Hawai‘i, and the continental United States. Though many of them are citizens of these ‘host’ nations, are they still a part of the Samoan “nation”? The diaspora does not fit quite well in the nation-state paradigm so where, in what ways do they belong? Can all Samoans belong to the same “nation”? And if so, under what kind of theoretical model or alternative explanation?

### Methodology and Approach

This thesis takes overall an approach of *su‘ifefiloi* in which several theories of methodology both from Western and non-Western, particularly indigenous approaches grounded in Samoan and more generally, Pacific, ontologies and epistemologies are intertwined and finely woven together to form a cohesive thesis. *Su‘ifefiloi* is what Simanu-Klutz calls “a medley of

objects and styles stitched together with needle and thread, choreography, or melodies to create a new whole, be it an *'ula* (flower garland), *siva* (dance), or *pese* (song).”<sup>15</sup> In this paper, I utilize this method of stringing together diverse stories, historiographies, and methodologies to articulate the marriage of Indigenous and Western articulations of Samoan nationalism. It is very much similar to Western notions of triangulation in which multiple approaches are utilized to forge comprehensive and cohesive narratives of various complex phenomena. This paper promotes an interdisciplinary approach to deconstructing the nation, weaving together various aspects of history, anthropology, sociology, linguistics, political science, and cultural studies into an *'ula* that is based on indigenous Samoan discourse. It tackles some sociological issues on the nation and migration, critiques anthropological discourse on culture, and utilizes indigenous studies frameworks to deconstruct Western political assumptions about the state and nationhood.

#### Limitations and Inadequacy of Existing Literature

This thesis looks at the deficiency in literature on indigenous conceptions and critiques of the nation, with particular emphasis on Samoan nationalism. Both Samoan and non-Samoan observers on the topic take for granted certain assumptions about the Samoan nation in their discursive practices that have not been widely discussed or framed in discussions about the nation. In attempting to deconstruct notions of the nation and how they are ever more complicated by the nuances of globalism, this paper contributes to the diversity of literature with very specific contexts for Samoa and the Pacific.

In analyzing the current discourse and discursive practices on the nation, this thesis takes into account anecdotal references but does not incorporate interviews and surveys. Instead, it

15 See Simanu-Klutz, Manumaua L. 2011. *'A Malu i Fale, 'E Malu fo'i i Fafo, Samoan Women and Power: Towards an Historiography of Changes and Continuities in Power Relations in Le Nu'u o Teine of Sāolua'fata, 1350 – 1998 C.E.*, Honolulu: Scholarspace, UH Manoa Hamilton Library, p. 30.

encapsulates the *talanoa* methodology<sup>16</sup> in which various aspects of traditional Pacific encounters in everyday conversations (as opposed to western ‘scientific’ quantitative and qualitative analytical frameworks) are explored rather than discounted. Along with archival research with a survey of canonical texts on Samoan history and indigenous devices, much emphasis is granted to written material, in addition to the oral and media components that have become ubiquitous and easily accessible today. Despite the broad scope endeavored by this project, there are improvements that could be made with regard to research design and application of traditional methods through systematic surveying and interviewing of specific interlocutors. Despite these shortcomings, it is perhaps an impetus for future projects that will encourage further study of the changing composition and expressions of the Samoan nation beyond the state.

#### Fa‘asāmoa and the Samoan Indigenous Reference

In order to string together various disciplines, it is important to articulate what this string is in terms of indigenous references and epistemologies. Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese ‘Efi, a prominent Samoan scholar and statesman (and the previous Head of State of [Independent] Samoa), equates the “Samoan Indigenous Reference” with the Fa‘asāmoa<sup>17</sup> itself, which is the basis that much of this paper situates various narratives on the nation. Many definitions are provided for the term Fa‘asāmoa, which functions as a foundational conceptual framework for this thesis. Fa‘asāmoa is not merely “the Samoan way” or “to be in the manner of a Samoan,” but it is the linguistic, cultural, social, political, economic system of Samoan

<sup>16</sup> The *talanoa* methodology is referenced here to Timote Vaoleti's conceptualization of this indigenous Pacific practice. See Vaoleti, T.M. 2006. “Talanoa research methodology: a developing position on Pacific research.” In *Waikato Journal of Education*, Vol. 12, pp. 21-34. For further understanding of the *talanoa* methodology, see Farrelly, Trisia and Nabobo-Baba. 2014. “*Talanoa* as empathic apprenticeship.” In *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, Vol. 55 Issue 3, pp. 319-330.

<sup>17</sup> Tui Ātua, Tupua Tamasese Tupuola Efi. 2009. “Part A Tui Atua and the Samoan Indigenous Reference.” In *Su'esu'e Manogi: In Search of Fragrance and the Samoan Indigenous Reference*, edited by Tamasa'ilau M. Suaali'i-Sauni, et. al., Apia: Center for Samoan Studies, NUS.

ontology. It includes not only national cultural protocols but local customary practices. There are many articulations of the term Fa‘asāmoa, but I summarize it as the ontological, epistemological, ethical, linguistic, and religious values, concepts, structures and paradigms that regulate social, economic, and political organization, interactions and relationships between and among people, the environment, and other entities. It encompasses the “indigenous reference” that Tui Atua constantly alludes to in his writings to articulate the cultural nuances that inform Samoan discourses from politics to spiritual and sociocultural institutions, protocols, values and philosophical worldviews.

#### The *Atunu‘u* as ‘Nation’: Framing the ‘Nation’ around Indigenous Concepts

This thesis is a conceptual analysis of the history and articulation of the Samoan *Atunu‘u* and its transformation since time immemorial, the *vavau*, to the present, *fa‘aonapōnei*. The foundation will be the framework used to mold the discussion of Western notions of the *Atunu‘u*, as well as the transition into the period of the *mālō*, the state.<sup>18</sup>

Traditional ideas on the nation could then be summarized in the term *Atunu‘u*, which refers to the physical land base and/or to the people itself. It transcends geographical boundaries and reflects the fluidity of identity and community that is formed by shifting demographics, especially in lieu of the dynamics of population movement within the space manipulated by Samoans in various nations and states.

I will argue that Samoan nationhood is best articulated by a conceptualization of the indigenous term *Atunu‘u* (nation, country, people) in opposition to *mālō* (the ‘winning party’, government). The current political division of the Samoan archipelago juxtaposes two polities: an

<sup>18</sup> Milner’s dictionary provides similar meanings, though to a lesser extent. See Milner, George Bertram, (Reprint 1993). *Samoan Dictionary: Samoan-English, English-Samoan-English*, Polynesian Press.

independent Sāmoa and an American Sāmoa. With the shift in population demographics, a concept of Samoan “nation” as modeled on the nation-state is insufficient to describe the complexity of interactions among Samoans in the construction, conceptualization, and articulation of their *Atunu ‘u* and expression of their nationalism(s).

### The Contemporary Discussion on the Nation

The current discourse on nationhood is largely dominated by Western paradigms that continually prescribe models that fit within the agendas of those whom they benefit most. In many contemporary circles, discussions on nationhood are framed by Western historical and theoretical debates based on its specific origin and expression in the modern world. Essential to my inquiry is an examination of these debates, particularly on the origin of the nation and how it currently manifests itself in the framework of the nation-state. Various models from the modernist, the perennialist, and primordialist attempt to explain how the nation has come about and how they can be best expressed. The ubiquity of the modernist school of thought has long dominated the current discourse on the nation and contemporary views and attitudes towards the nation. In the development of the modern state and its congruence with the nation, the Samoan nation has been molded and subsumed within this model.

What these models lack, though, is the framing of nationhood within indigenous conceptualizations that incorporate Samoan concepts and values at the forefront, against the backdrop of state-centric hegemony. This thesis investigates these values and applies it to the Samoan situation. The discourse on indigenous criticisms on the nation as well as diaspora and transnationalism studies point to the hegemony of Western concerns in discussing and articulating the nation. It is the hope then of this paper to contribute to the discourse on nation that incorporates and centralizes indigenous perspectives.

## Sāmoana: A Conceptualization of the Samoan Nation

Modern, western notions of the nation are largely state-based, geographical, and constructed along political boundaries constructed primarily by Europe. Samoan notions are also based along geographic terms, to a certain degree, but are not necessarily fixed or static. The fluidity of boundaries in indigenous Samoan worldviews allows for contestations based on evolving claims to land (which is based on a multitude of factors not limited by certain criteria). Discussion on the nation, especially in Sāmoa, have centered on the nation-state, although multiple factors have complicated the nuanced evolution of the nation in modern contexts: the existence of two polities, the demographic shift to diasporas, and the complex patterns of circular migration all contribute to the confounding of traditional Western notions of the nation. When the nation is no longer confined by the state, how does the state still become relevant in modern contexts? How should the nation be expressed in contemporary times?

Epeli Hau'ofa, in his quest for decolonizing Pacific spaces through the articulation of an Pan-Pacific Oceania<sup>19</sup> ignited re-conceptualizations of the Pacific region in the post-colonial contexts that were hitherto dominated by Western prescriptions for nationhood. The era of decolonization and the paradigms that had filtered into the Pacific had reconfigured and reinforced colonially imposed boundaries instead of eliminating them. The creation of new states that had pluralities of different peoples under one country was a common consequence of 'decolonization' policed by the United Nations (e.g. Cook Islands, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea). In the case of the Samoan archipelago, in which the population was linguistically and culturally homogenous, two polities were created supporting the notion that nations should correspond to a homogenous

<sup>19</sup> Hau'ofa, Epeli. 1994. "Our Sea of Islands." *The Contemporary Pacific: The Journal of Contemporary Affairs*, Vol. 6 No. 1, Honolulu: UH Press, pp. 148-61.

political entity. That is, one nation (ethnically) should equal one state. Although there were notable exceptions such as the Congos, the Koreas, the Germanys up until the 1990s, and currently the two Chinas, there is much expectation that nations, regardless of race or other factors, should strive towards statehood. This teleological approach in which nation-states are privileged as the end result of nation-building has become problematic for many nations whose existence are determined and molded by this nation-state centrism, including the Sāmoas.

Although initially imposed with two political entities by the West, Samoans are not merely passive victims of the Machiavellian agendas of Western imperialism. In the formation of two polities, Samoans exercised agency which was manifested in their appropriation of both models of nationhood. Despite this, along with the changing population dynamics, and assuming that Samoans should, or can contribute to the discourse on nationalism? One way is to engage in the creative and imaginative agency of Hau'ofa's reimagination of Oceania. In the same way Polynesians and other Pacific Islanders have traversed the vast oceans to settle new lands and create new identities, Samoans have continued this metaphor through the creation of diasporas and perpetuating the continuity of the Samoan nation. Corresponding to the concept of Oceania, I will argue that the unbounded nation that transcends fixed and clearly demarcated political boundaries can be expressed in the already extant word "Sāmoana." A term of endearment in all things referring to Sāmoa and Samoans, Sāmoana connotes an entity that even transcends the intricacies and complexities of nomenclature. There is no confusion as to what Sāmoa refers (whether independent or American Samoan, rather it is inclusive of both Sāmoas and all Samoans). This is a conceptualization that becomes useful for issues concerning identity but possibilities for articulating social, political, and economic futures for Samoans.

## Organization of the Thesis

The following chapters trace the development of this *Atunu'u* of Sāmoana from the *Vavau*, ancient times, through *aso fa'apāpalagi* and *aso fa'akolone*, post-contact and colonial times, to *aso fa'aonapōnei*, contemporary times.<sup>20</sup> The first chapter is organized around a discussion on nationalism as articulated and debated by the West. This section will trace the evolution and development of the modern nation-state from earlier European notions of sociopolitical organization. It further discusses various Western theories of nationalism and provides background insight into notions of the “nation” and how it applies to “nation” from a Samoan perspective. This section will discuss Samoan nationalism with regards to various theories of nationalism including civil (liberal), cultural, ethnic nationalism and transnationalism. This chapter will frame the nationhood discourse within various theories on the nation discourse.

The second chapter frames the *Atunu'u* along a continuum of the cosmological development of Sāmoa from the *vavau* ‘ancient times.’ The rest of the chapter will focus on the development of the Samoan islands using the indigenous stories intertwined with Western historiography and analysis. It will elucidate on the traditional etiological myths that have characterized the origin of the Samoan nation, including the ethnogenesis of the Samoan people. This section will describe how the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai transformed from the traditional political organization to the modern state-system. Much of the traditional infrastructure was not drastically changed, but rather superimposed into the state-system. Given the history of the Samoan islands and the sociopolitical structures that governed the Samoan polity, this chapter will

<sup>20</sup> Simanu-Klutz's classifications from her unpublished dissertation are also useful: *aso o le vavau* ('days of the beginning'), *faiga fa'apapalagi* (the 'European way'), to *faiga fa'aanaponei* ('the present'). See 'A Malu I Fafo, *E Malu fo'i i Fale*, 2011, page 3.



probe into the issues surrounding the ‘reunification’ of Sāmoa, and how these speculations are based on Western prescriptivist notions that superimposed the reified borders of bounded states.

The third chapter discusses Samoan nationhood in relation to Pacific contexts of colonization and decolonization paradigms. This chapter will discuss the period of foreign intervention and the impetus to colonize the archipelago. From the fracturing of the *Atunu ‘u* and subjugation under alien states, the section will address the challenges Samoans had undergone through the protest and resistance movements of the Mau in both eastern and western Sāmoa. This chapter will discuss migration and transnationalism from the canon of literature on the topic and how it applies to the Samoan and Pacific contexts. This section will evaluate the fiftieth anniversary of Independence and its ties into the theme of state reification and ethnic Samoan nationalism.

The fourth chapter addresses Sāmoana as “nation,” as an alternative paradigm to the nation-state. It will illuminate the problems of the nation-state, as it applies to the Samoan situation. This section will explore the political conflicts between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, with a focus on the name change of 1997 and subsequent immigration policies conflicts. It will also explore the historical tensions between the “homeland” and the diasporas expressed through controversies surrounding cultural authenticity and innovation as well as the tensions surrounding remittances. The chapter will further explore the various populations in the diaspora, including their origins and demographics and historical relationships with their host countries, and interactions with the ‘homeland.’ After discussing the tensions that have arisen over the context of the reification of nations and bounded states, this section will then propose a reconceptualization of the nation not as a bounded state, but as Sāmoana, a ‘nation’, the *Atunu ‘u* that transcends conventional political, historical discourse on nationhood. A model of Sāmoana is proposed that discusses the Samoan

nation in terms of the transnational and globalization forces that have shaped its development and evolution. A unique approach will be considered to highlight a conceptualization of Samoan nationhood in relation to indigenous notions of organization and creative self-expression. Sāmoa will be related to the concepts of *aganu 'u* and *aga 'ifanua* to express the national (universal) aspects and local aspects of the Samoan *Atunu 'u* and how they can combine to paint one cohesive picture of the nation. Epeli Hau'ofa's reconceptualization of the Pacific Islands as "Oceania," will serve as a model for Sāmoana in a more localized context.

The concluding chapter discusses the implications of articulating Sāmoana. As a transnational entity, how does Sāmoana fit into the larger scheme of nationhood? What does this mean for traditional notions of nationalism that are teleological and state-centric in nature? The conclusion will argue that this state-centrism must give way to more localized, indigenous and "islander-centered" expressions of nationhood. This closing section will recap the rationales for articulating Sāmoana and its implications and potential visions for the future. This chapter will discuss the links between nationalism and language and cultural transmission and maintenance as possibilities for diaspora involvement in local nation-state governance as well as the potential for a pan-Samoan cooperative organization. It will also propose the adoption of national symbols of Sāmoana including a flag, an anthem or hymn, a seal with a motto and a *fa'alupega*. Given the limitations of the study, this section will explore how the topic can be enhanced by further study through the use of interviews, surveys, and wider review of the literature.

## CHAPTER I

### CONTEMPORARY THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ON THE “NATION”

This chapter will set the stage for deconstructing the nation by critiquing the theoretical frameworks for discussing the nation and nationalism in the traditional discourse from what is considered canonical and contemporary Western scholarship. It is organized into a discussion of a couple of debates on the current discourse on the nation<sup>1</sup>: (I) definition – what/who constitutes the nation and how nations are defined and expressed through various established criteria and (II) periodization – when the nation occurred, exploring the origin and causes of the nation. The latter debate becomes crucial in the critique of the contemporary discourse of the nation that privileges the state-centric definition of the nation. This chapter will trace the evolution and development of the modern nation-state from earlier European notions of sociopolitical organization. It will also survey various Western theories of nationalism and provide background insight into notions of the “nation” in the traditional discourse and how it applies to “nation” from a Samoan perspective. Several key points of discussion and Samoan applications on notions of nation, of the *Atunu'u*, will be analyzed with regards to various theories on the nation including civil (liberal), cultural, ethnic nationalism. I then survey non-Western ideas of the nation and how indigenous critiques in particular are relevant and crucial to examining the Samoan case of nationalism. Indigenous concepts of the nation will be introduced in the last section before transitioning into the next chapter that traces the origins of the Samoan *Atunu'u*.

<sup>1</sup> The categorization of these debates is adapted from the ‘Nationalism Project’ and I have taken the liberty of replacing one of these debates, ‘how nations are formed’ in order to get into an in-depth discussion on the forms of nationalism. See Nationalism Studies Information Clearinghouse, ‘Nationalism Project’ website: <http://www.nationalismproject.org/what.htm>.

## Defining the “Nation”

We begin our deconstruction of the nation with the debate over definitions and how this has framed Western discourse on the nation. Beginning with the etymology of the English term ‘nation,’ it can be noted that its European genealogy is reflective of the specificity of the contexts out of which it arose: it is borrowed from the French *nacion* – “birth, rank; descendants, relatives; country, homeland,” which itself derives from the Latin, *natio/nationem* – “birth, origin; breed, stock, kind, species; race of people, tribe.”<sup>2</sup> Although the etymological definitions delineate ethnic connotations to the meaning of ‘nation’, the term itself has evolved throughout time. It is now oftentimes used vaguely to refer to various things and is quite often ambiguous as it can be defined along several social, political, and geographical lines. ‘Nation’ has taken various meanings throughout time, but in modern, Western contexts, it has been taken to refer to a ‘state’ a definition that is primarily articulated – whether real or not – along geopolitical concepts. The ambiguity of the ancient term ‘nation’ is further compounded by the conflation of the words “nation” and “state” that is often evoked in commonplace usage as well the debate on defining the nation. Both terms are used synonymously with the modern concept of the state, although in the English language, such terms are used interchangeably so much so that what is meant by “nation” in the global contexts actually refers to a “state.”<sup>3</sup> Contemporary definitions of the broader term nation – that is (not necessarily the nation-state) – are predicated on two debates: (1) the modernist and primordialist camps and (2) the types of nation articulated through nationalisms: in this case, the liberal (civic), cultural, and ethnic nations.

<sup>2</sup> For detailed definitions of ‘nation’, see the *Online Etymology Dictionary*, [http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed\\_in\\_frame=0&search=natio](http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=natio).

<sup>3</sup> See Opello, Walter C. Jr. and Rosow, Stephen. 2004. “Introduction: A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order”. In *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p.3.

## The Nationalism Debates: What/who constitutes a “Nation”?

Nationalism is a broad term that refers to various elements of the nation including national consciousness, national identity, and loyalty to the nation.<sup>4</sup> These notions of the nation and their relationship to nationalism are controversial and diverse, and yet we will explore various ways in which they are articulated throughout this thesis. We begin with Sam Rose, who opines that:

(...) the study of nationalism, particularly its historical development, is invariably also the study of the nation; we speak of nationalism as though we have a solid grasp on and agreement about the concept of the nation itself. While it may be true that there is a phenomenological sense in which we know what a nation is (and, indeed, what nationalism looks like), by no means is this a matter of consensus, nor is it certain that it provides sufficient grounds for explaining the phenomenon of nationalism itself.<sup>5</sup>

We can summarize the debate over nationalism through two philosophical issues in the discourse that deal with (1) the attitudes that members have when they care about their national identity, which informs ideas about what the nation is and (2) the actions that these members have towards becoming or sustaining self-determination, whether it is expressed in terms of statehood or other forms of sovereignty or autonomy.<sup>6</sup> These issues frame the contemporary discussions on the types of ways that nationalism defines the nation. And although there are various forms of nationalism – from the liberal (civic), cultural, ethnic, religious – I focus on a comparison between the ethnic and civic versions of nationalism dominant in the discourse of nationhood. I have included a discussion of cultural nationalism as both a comparison of and bridge between the two as well as to tease out the confounding nature of dichotomizing the two.

<sup>4</sup> Nikolas, Margareta Mary. (1999). *False Opposites in Nationalism: An Examination of the Dichotomy of Civic Nationalism and Ethnic Nationalism in Modern Europe*. Thesis, Monash University

<sup>5</sup> Rose, Sam (2012). “States, Nation, and Reification: Towards Nationalism as Practice.” 2-3.

<sup>6</sup> Miscevic, Nenad. Winter 2014 Edition. "Nationalism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A Developed Dynamic Reference Work*, edited by Colin Allen, Uri Nodelman, and Edward N Zalta, Online publication <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/nationalism>.

## Periodization: Origins and Causes of the 'Nation'

The complications over defining the nation are actually rooted in the debate pinpointing the exact origin of the nation. This discussion is a complex and contested topic with various theorists pointing to different points of departure on the 'nation'. The American theorist Walter Connor and British sociologist Anthony D. Smith, pose, in opposition to the ubiquitous question 'what is the nation?' the equally challenging inquiry 'when is the nation?'<sup>7</sup> The modernist-primordialist dichotomy<sup>8</sup> will help to frame the causes of the nation from perspectives of the West and comparatively analyze them with Samoan notions of the causes of the nation. Definitions of the nation are framed around the classical debate that pits the 'modernist', who argues that nations are a recent phenomenon, against the 'primordialist', who argues that the nation is an ancient and natural phenomenon preceding the modern state.<sup>9</sup>

### *The Primordialists*

Primordialism, also referred to as perennialism,<sup>10</sup> has roots in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectual movement known as German Romanticism, especially Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder.<sup>11</sup> Herder in particular equated the nation with a language community, for language was learned in the community and encompassed the thought of that particular group and that it would be fixed. Aside from the linguistic aspects, the dominant theme is primordialism's relation to ethnicity and assumes that ethnic ties are also fixed over time,

<sup>7</sup> See Connor, Walker. 1990. "When is a nation?", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13: 92-103 and Smith, Anthony. 2008. "Introduction: The Theoretical Debate" in *Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic*.

<sup>8</sup> Motyl, Alexander, ed. 2001. *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*. Academic Press.

<sup>9</sup> Greenfeld, Liah. 2003. "Etymology, Definitions, Types" In *Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, ed. Motyl and Jack Hayward, [Brian Barry](#), Archie Brown. Also found in *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press, p. 330.

<sup>10</sup> Various sources list primordialists and perennialists as separate camps (see, for example, The Nationalism Project although I have decided to list them here interchangeably.

<sup>11</sup> Jacquin-Berdal, Dominique. 2002. *Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa: A Critique of the Ethnic Interpretation*, Ledwin/New York: Edwin Mellen Press, p. 19.

after being initially constructed.<sup>12</sup> Primordialism's association with evolutionary theory of nationalism – which itself had origins' in Darwinian evolutionary theory – ascribes nation to the evolution of human tendencies to form groups. Anthony Smith, though he may not consider himself a primordialist, falls along this category, though in the ethnonationalist camp, he would articulate his ethnosymbolist theory, which will be enumerated on in the section on ethnic nationalism.<sup>13</sup>

### *The Modernists*

The modernist school conceives the nation as a modern phenomenon, recently constructed within the last couple of centuries as a result of certain variables. It is the dominant paradigm in contemporary discourse on the nation and frames all other debates on the origin and definition of the nation in contemporary times. It is the corollary to the debate between the ethnic and civic forms of the nation and situates the state as a modern construction that arose out of very specific historical and political contexts rooted in Europe. The specificity of the causes of the nation has ranged from a variety of reasons – from the rise of print capitalism to industrialization to the adoption of mass education, among other factors. These factors have contributed greatly to the way the modern state has become conceived of along European genealogies of the nation. I survey Anderson's and Gellner's modernist views as representative of this school and the lack of relevance the historical contexts have for the Samoan *Atunu 'u*.

Benedict Anderson in his seminal work *Imagined Communities* defined the nation as an 'imagined political community' for being 'inherently limited' and sovereign and gives several

<sup>12</sup> Bayar, Murat. 2009. 'Reconsidering Primordialism: an alternative approach to the study of ethnicity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 32 No.9, pp. 1-20.

<sup>13</sup> See Smith, Anthony D. 2009. *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*, New York: Routledge, 1<sup>st</sup> edition.

rationales for it being ‘imagined.’ Anderson argues that the nation is ‘imagined’ because of the sheer size of people involved: even the smallest of nations will have communities in which not everyone will know, hear, see, or meet each other. All communities are potentially imagined, even ones as small as ‘primordial villages of face-to-face contact’. Secondly, the nation is imagined as limited because of the presence of physical boundaries. Even with an infinite amount of people, nations are restricted by borders that give existence to other nations. Thirdly, the nation is limited as sovereign as it originated in the Enlightenment era that had supplanted the “divine right of kings” rationale that had justified political legitimacy. Lastly, the nation is imagined as a community that is characterized by a ‘camaraderie’ and ‘fraternity’ of people who will willingly die for this ‘limited imaginings’.<sup>14</sup> Anderson’s definition is ostensibly modernist and rooted in a Eurocentric focus of the nation that originated in modern times. His criteria are based on a European context grounded in the rise of print media and industrialism. They are very specific to Western historical circumstances and innovations and do not underscore the importance of other factors in articulating the nation. Despite the ‘sheer’ size of the Samoan nation, it can be argued that the geographical mobility of Samoan migration and exchange systems (of which will be elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3) through *malaga* (linear and circular travel), paint a different picture. Samoans relate through genealogy, a mechanism that relates everyone to one another, and thus an avenue is provided through which Samoans can all come to know one another, whether in the past, present or otherwise through future interactions and the recitation of genealogies and social exchanges.

<sup>14</sup> Anderson, Benedict. R. O. G. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, pp. 5-7.



Another modernist, British-Czech philosopher Ernest Gellner, argues that the political and ‘national’ aspects of a nation should be congruent – that the nation coincides with and is equal to the state. Gellner gives two “temporary” definitions of what constitutes a nation:

1. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.
2. Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it. It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non- members.<sup>15</sup>

As a corollary to the political and national congruency of the state, Gellner’s foundations for the assertions of nationalism are rooted in shared culture and mutual recognition of involved persons. For Gellner, specifically, nationalism is “about entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population.”<sup>16</sup> This high culture – which he equates with the nation – is part of “agro-literate” societies in which a tiny elite rule with the privilege of a literate culture over the “low” cultures of the lower stratified classes.<sup>17</sup> Thus, “nationalism is, essentially, the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority and in some cases, the totality of the population.”<sup>18</sup> The absence of literacy in the Samoan archipelago – as the oral literacy was the predominant paradigm through which sociopolitical structures were articulated – certainly makes irrelevant Gellner’s view of the nation to the Samoan polities as they exist today and the

<sup>15</sup> Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 6-7.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>17</sup> Smith, *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 3.

rise of the ethnic components of the Samoan nation. Furthermore, the lack of relative social stratification in the Samoan islands reveals that there was not “high” or “low” culture and the class distinctions between chiefs and commoners were less pronounced as all Samoans had great access to noble lineages.

It is important to note that these technological explanations for nations do not always hold water for all Western theorists. Andreas Wimmer and Yuval Feinstein have put forth the suggestion, that, through quantitative studies, modernist theories, including the aforementioned ones by Gellner and Anderson, among others, are actually *not* due to the effects of “industrialization, the advent of mass literacy, or increasing direct rule.”<sup>19</sup> The modern nation-state, that is, the “independent state with a written constitution, ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens,” is rather dependent on “promixate and contextual political factors” such as through war and the consolidation of power of the imperial elites.<sup>20</sup> Such factors are discussed in detail in the discussion on the rise of the nation-state as the dominant currently political model for nationhood.

#### Ethnic Nationalism: The Ethnic and Ancestral Roots of the Nation

The etymology of the term ‘nation’ that centered on ideas of birth, kinship, and even ‘homeland’ reveals that the ethnic aspects were central to categorizing what actually constituted a nation. Despite the dominance of non-ethnic criteria of modern nations as evidenced by the monopoly of the nation-state in modern discourse, the ethnic elements of the nation cannot be overlooked. Ideas of what the nation is are ancient in the West, stretching as far as Greek historian

<sup>19</sup> Wimmer, Andreas and Feinstein, Yuval. October 2010. “The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001.” In *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 75, Issue 5 pp. 764–790.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 785-786.

Herodotus, who defined ethnicity in terms of the shared kinship, language, and customs.<sup>21</sup> Renowned British sociologist Anthony D. Smith based on his definition of a nation on the *ethnie*, “a named and self-define human population sharing a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and elements of culture (often including a link with territory) and a measure of solidarity.”<sup>22</sup> John Hutchinson defines the nation as “an ethno-cultural community shaped by shared myths of origins, a sense of common history and way of life, and particular ideas of space, that endows its members with identity and purpose.”<sup>23</sup> For ethnonationalists such as Smith and Hutchinson, the nation is characterized not so much by the modernist constructions that do not predate the 18<sup>th</sup> century, or even the nationalist movements for sovereignty. In the primordialist lineage, ethnic nationalism privileges the ethnic aspects as central to an articulation of the nation. As Walker Connor points out:

. . . while from the viewpoint of objective history, today’s nations are modern creatures, in popular perceptions they are, to borrow a word from Gourgours, ‘eternal’, that is to say, ‘beyond time’, ‘timeless’. And it is not facts but perceptions of facts that undergrid attitudes and behavior.”<sup>24</sup>

For the Samoan *Atunu'u*, the central tenet is that Samoans, as people who descend from common ancestors, is linked through kinship and genealogy and that the myths that relay these pedigrees are indispensable to articulating the nation. Thus in Chapter 2, we will explore in depth the indigenous devices that relate the ethnic aspects of the nation to the contemporary Samoan

<sup>21</sup> See Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Robert A *Greek-English Lexicon*, ὁμό-τροπος. *Perseus.tufts.edu.*, and Herodotus, 8.144.2: "The kinship of all Greeks in blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the sacrifices that we have in common, and the likeness of our way of life"; see also Leoussi, Athena S. and Grosby, Steven. 2006. *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*, Edinburgh: University Press, p. 115.

<sup>22</sup> Smith, Anthony D. 1986. "Ethnicity and Nationalism". In *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, p. 172.

<sup>23</sup> Hutchinson, John. 1994. *Modern Nationalism*. London: Fontana Press, p. 7.

<sup>24</sup> Connor, Walker. 2004. "The Timelessness of Nations." In *Nations and Nationalism*. Vol. 10 No. 1-2, pp. 35-47.

situation, both through the birthing of the nation and the territorial space that relates the physical geographical nation to the genealogical aspects.

Table 1.1 A comparison of civic, cultural, and ethnic nationalisms

	Civic	Cultural	Ethnic
<b>Articulation</b>	State	Culture	Ethnie
<b>Membership</b>	Citizenry	Culture, language, religion, geography	Kinship/genealogy; racial/ethnic
	Voluntary	Neither voluntary/hereditary	Hereditary

### Cultural Nationalism: The Cultural Roots of the Nation

As a sort of intermediary between the conventional liberal model based on modernist and ethnic model based on primordialist interpretations of the nation (perhaps even a corollary to ethnic nationalism itself), cultural nationalism presents a case of the nation that both bridges and confounds both. It does not base membership in a nation as part of an ethnic or racial group, nor a political unit as expressed in the state, but is manifested in common cultural connections (devoid of ethnic membership). Kai Nielson uses Quebec as a prime example of cultural nationalism in the Canadian state in which a multicultural state with Anglo-Saxon and French provinces are diverse in language groups and cultural differences.<sup>25</sup> Certainly there are other examples of cultural nationalism, including religious nationalism as encapsulated in the Jewish nation – both in the state of Israel and the diasporic communities, the black communities in North America and the Carribean, and the Latin and Hispanic categories in the United States and the rest of the Americas.

<sup>25</sup> See Nielson, Kai. 1997-1998. "Cultural Nationalism, Neither Ethnic nor Civic." In *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 28 No 1-2, pp. 42-52.

### Civic Nationalism: The Liberal Constituents of the Nation

If a nation, especially in the modern sense, is not completely defined by common ancestry or shared culture, then what does (or should) it constitute? The third type of nationalism we discuss here is civic nationalism, which centers the nation not on an ethnic or cultural basis, but on common membership through political association. Nationhood is not defined by ethnic belongingness or cultural commonalities but rather on political loyalty to the state. The goal of civic nationalism is not a social cohesiveness bounded by shared genetic inheritance but has specifically political goals based loosely on ideas of equality (equal participation and representation) and citizenship. This form of nationalism based on liberal principles of equality, liberty, freedom, inalienable rights is central to the pillars of the nation-state. In order for these ideals to work, membership in the nation cannot be based solely on racial criteria (although historically, this has been in the case in the West). Citizenship becomes the defining feature of the liberal state – a form of membership that grants equal standing in the nation. For much of European civilization, the nation has been predicated on various forms of membership, grounded on ethnic criteria, although empires have been the exceptional norm. How did Western notion of nations transition from ethnic to civic nationalism?

In order to understand the rise of civic nationalism in the West we must look at the historical ideas and transformations from previous forms of sociopolitical organization through various political philosophers of the modernist era. We begin with classical liberal English philosopher John Stuart Mill's articulation of the nation as such:

‘A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others – which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.’<sup>26</sup>

Mill does not clearly define what constitutes “common sympathies” although Jason Tyndal has suggested that it should be read on a causal chain: that these common sympathies are caused by various factors and that they, in turn, cause other factors:

This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. Community of language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these circumstances however are either indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by themselves.<sup>27</sup>

Tyndal expounds on this "feeling of nationality" that is based on Mill's causal schema which produces three "impulses": (1) those who possess these common sympathies will willingly cooperate with each other, (2) they desire to coalesce under one government, and (3) that they

<sup>26</sup> Cited in Howison, Phil. 2006. “The Decline of the Nation-State.” SCRIBD, P. 1. John Stuart Mill. Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Chapter 16.

<sup>27</sup> Representative Government, accessible on [https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john\\_stuart/m645r/chapter16.html](https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/m/mill/john_stuart/m645r/chapter16.html).

desire this government should be exclusively ruled by those who form this entity.<sup>28</sup> In the latter passage, it could be seemingly interpreted that Mill argues for “common sympathies” based on various forms of identity (race, language, religion, etc.), which is inconsistent, as Tyndal argues, with Mill’s beliefs in the nation as a civic entity. Thus, these “common sympathies,” as Tyndal contends, should be read as *political* sympathies (e.g. political goals, expectations, etc.) rather than those based on various criteria based on identities.<sup>29</sup> For Mill, the nation is equated with groups that share these political sympathies and are thus compelled to engage in political participation and cooperation under a shared domain provided by the state. Mill does argue that although identities provide a strong enough cause to unite, they are, nonetheless, insufficient; ethnic or other forms of loyalty must yield to civic loyalties in a society and this is manifested in the civic nation.<sup>30</sup> Thus, Mill’s philosophy can be situated in the corpus of liberal nationalists that base the nation on political rather than ethnic or cultural antecedents. The cultural domains articulated in a “national history” and “community of recollections” must be read in terms of political desires to coalesce as an entity as espoused in a government held in common by the desire to govern themselves exclusively. Thus, the state must be conceived as the *civic* nation, the most ideal of conceptualizations of the nation.

Civic or liberal nationalism has become the basis for much of what the nation represents today in the predominant Western discourse: a community of citizens who share common interests and the desire to coalesce without regard to shared racial or ethnic origin, cultural, or religious affinities. Rather, these political sympathies are manifested in the civic nation as embodied in the

<sup>28</sup> Jason Tyndal contends that the “direct” causes of the common sympathies are these criteria based on identity and only “indirect” feelings of nationality (98-99). See Tyndal, Jason. (2013). Culture and Diversity in John Stuart Mill’s Civic Nation. *Utilitas*, Vol. 25 No. 1, 96-120.

<sup>29</sup> Tyndal, Jason. Culture and Diversity, <https://philarchive.org/archive/TYNCAD>. 97-99

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 101-102.

state. Mill, as Tyndal further argues, postulated that single nationalities (who share the same political sympathies under a public domain) should constitute under a single government: “the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.”<sup>31</sup> Thus, for Mill, the most ideal configuration is that one nation should equal one state, as manifested in the nation-state and that multinational states (a group of various nations – those sharing political sympathies) should be the exception rather than the norm.<sup>32</sup>

How then, do we deal with the problem of having various "nations" under one state? This is the pivotal question in addressing the transition from large empires to smaller units embodied in the nation-state. How can peoples who supposedly share political sympathies coalesce into the idealized civic nation? This has been the challenge and aspirations of modern non-homogenous nation-states. As Michael Hetcher argues:

*State-building nationalism* is the nationalism that is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It is the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogeneous. Thus, beginning in the sixteenth century and continuing into the twentieth, the rulers of England and France attempted fitfully perhaps, and with more or less success - to foster homogeneity in their realms by inducing culturally distinctive populations in each country's Celtic regions to assimilate to their own culture. Since the rationale for state-building nationalism is often geopolitical - to secure borders from real or potential rivals - this kind of nationalism tends to be culturally inclusive. However, much less liberal means of skinning a culturally homogeneous cat have been resorted to in history, as well. Central rulers of a given culture also can unify their country by expelling culturally alien populations (as in the Spanish *Reconquista*), or by exterminating them (often the fate of the indigenous peoples of North America).<sup>33</sup>

This state-building nationalism has resulted in various imperial campaigns that has had several deleterious consequences for those nations who have not succumbed to the colonial imperatives

<sup>31</sup> Tyndal, On Mills, 101.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 102. Mill does acquiesce that federation should be the route for multinational states, but Tyndal contends that this should be the exception and that the nation-state should be the ultimate paradigm for the nation.

<sup>33</sup> Hetcher, Michael. 2000. “Containing Nationalism.” In *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 16, Issue 3, September, 323–325.



for nation-building. In order to have a single “national” state flourish, diversity in cultural and political proclivities must undergo various transformations, either assimilation or elimination. Sam Rose, concurring with the train of thought of Hans Kohn argued that the nation “not only a group held together and animated by common consciousness, but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, the sovereign state.”<sup>34</sup> This state would become the most cohesive political measure to consolidate nonconforming nations and subsumed them into the state so as to promulgate uniformity and foster (often forcefully) shared political sympathies. In order to understand the attempts to privilege and consolidate the state, and thus facilitating the rise of the civic nation-state, we must look how the state transformed from previous forms of organization.

#### Precursors to the Nation-State

If nations are not ancient phenomena as the primordialists argue, then there must have been other forms of community that would have eventually given rise to modern states. Using a historical-constructivist approach Opello and Roslow argue that several forms of politico-military rule existed as ‘rivals’ to the modern rise of the nation-state: city-states, empires, and tribes. City-states, such as those of ancient Greece, the German cities of the middle-ages, and the Renaissance Italy republican cities, were often small urban centers enclosed by agricultural lands and engaged in politico-military conflicts with other city-states. <sup>35</sup>

These often homogenous city-states were contrasted with the heterogeneous populations that lived under empires, including the classical traditional Roman, Chinese, Persian, etc., empires.<sup>36</sup> These empires were often marked by indirect and limited control by relatively small

<sup>34</sup> Kohn, Hans. 2005. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction Press, p.19.

<sup>35</sup> Opello and Roslow. “A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order”, p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 9-10.

ruling elite over often vast and expansive lands and groups of linguistically and culturally diverse peoples. The absence of fixed borders signified the marginality of the limits of territory that was not defined by exclusive national jurisdictions that are evident in modern states, but by the tractability of the margins of the empire and its contact – both military and economic – with those outside its flexible borders.<sup>37</sup> Conventional empires of this time also lacked the monopoly of physical force that Max Weber would later articulate as a prerequisite for the modern nation-state. The various subjects of empire maintained little contact with the ruling elite, with the exception of local intermediaries who acted on their behalf for tax collection season. Empires essentially lacked imperial identity that is characteristic of today's national identity in national states.<sup>38</sup> The multiethnic empires of eighteenth-century Europe – the Austrian Empire, Kingdom of France, Kingdom of Hungary,<sup>39</sup> the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the British Empire – were treated as if they were nation-states. The eventual collapse of these entities as they transitioned into the modern era were in part due to the rise of the nation-state as the globally accepted and legitimate form of 'politico-military' rule. <sup>40</sup>

The tribe, as Opello and Roslow define it, is a “non-territorial social group composed of numerous extended families grouped into clans, which are believed to be related to one another by being the descendants of a common mythical ancestor.” It was not defined by national identity with a defined territory (as is a modern state) but its social ties were defined by kinship and its governance rested in hereditary chiefs. Most people in history, Opello and Roslow postulate, have lived in tribes. <sup>41</sup>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 9-10.

<sup>39</sup> Hobsbawn, Eric. 1990. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press.

<sup>40</sup> “A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order”, 10.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 10.

Of these ‘historical rivals’ to the nation-state, the category of Sāmoa, and most of Polynesia and the rest of the Pacific, fall into the category of the tribe. Although meant to be broad generalizations, Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow’s definition of ‘tribe’ (or rather the use of the word) would not fit well into the Samoan situation. The most contentious and problematic issue with their definition is the absence of a ‘national identity,’ perhaps an othering of non-Western (and even non-Asian) peoples. I will later contend that national identity did exist in the Samoan archipelago even before the rise of the nation-state and its imposition on Sāmoa.

### A Genealogy of the Nation-State

Since primordialists argue that the nation is timeless, then the modernists’ State – the referent for the nation in modern times – requires a ‘birth,’ a beginning, as no state randomly forms itself. But the contested origins of nation-states reveal the complexities of providing a clear-cut transition and transformation to nation-states. Steven Weber, David Woodward, Jeremy Black,<sup>42</sup> among others, argue that the nation-state did not arise randomly but was attributable to the intellectual and technological revolutions that arose out of the fifteenth century, including capitalism, mercantilism and other political economics. What was also particularly important was the development and advancement of geographical technology through cartographies that allowed for the mapping of various new territorial settings.

Many conventional Western genealogies of the nation-state at least from a modernist perspective, pinpoint to the aftermath of the Thirty-Years War and the Westphalia peace treaties that arose out of it. The rise of the nation-state has been attributed to the series of events that transpired in the political and social upheavals of seventeenth century Europe, especially to the

<sup>42</sup> See Jeremy Black Maps and Politics pp.59-98 and Maps and Politics pp.100-147 1998;

religious conflicts between Catholics and Protestants that had originated only a century before. Religious strife over who would control certain provinces, and to which sectarian rule each would subscribe, resulted in great social, political, and economic upheaval. The end of the war would eventually lead to the Westphalian peace treaties which helped to define principles of self-determination, sovereignty, and the creation of sovereign states. This modernist starting point, would though, argue that the creation of the nation-state has Eurocentric beginnings that had arisen out of very specific social, political, cultural, religious, and linguistic contexts. The rise of empires and the collapse of many of them in the modern era have defined not only the precursors to the state but had to bring up contexts for which the concepts of the coexistence of states would bring about peace and stability within territorialized borders. The Westphalian peace treaties were significant in that they outlined the basis for sovereignty and provided for the provision of its citizenry, elements that were not quite fully realized until the political turmoil in Europe and the ‘Age of Discovery’ that led to even more conflicts.

The formation of the nation-state, despite the Westphalian ‘peace treaties’ – which did not effectively bring about peace – has been largely attributable to war: through military conquest and the technological advancements and innovations in warfare techniques and strategies, material development and the increase in capital and numbers of soldiers. In addition, the development of ‘collective identities’ that transcended the diversity in local, class, and tribal commitments contributed to the mobilization of these evolving societies for war.<sup>43</sup> The increasing competition amongst the different principalities, kingdoms, theocracies, empires, and every known form of statist entities, led to outright conflict over who would acquire certain territories, leading to further divisions and formations of different localized and nationalized identities.

<sup>43</sup>Opello and Rosow, 10-11.

Various other dates in the eighteenth century are brought up as to when the first nation-state had appeared, from the French and American revolutions.<sup>44</sup> Hobsbawm argued that the French state created the French nation, not French nationalism, though McLean and McMillan argue that it was the French Revolution that gave rise to the modern principles of nationalism and spread it throughout Europe.<sup>45</sup> Nineteenth century nationalism through the implementation of compulsory education wrought by the state and the spread of mass literacy and mass media is attributed the rise of the nation-state. Wimmer and Feinstein have argued that the rise of the nation-state was not a continual process, as such as a successive genealogy can be unambiguously invoked or constructed. This rather happened in waves and as a result of the collapse and fragmentation of empires.<sup>46</sup> Wimmer and Min (2006) attribute the causes of war to two processes: the expansion of empires in the nineteenth century and the proliferation of nation-states in the twentieth century.<sup>47</sup>

The history of the nation-state, thus, is the history of war and strife for domination and defense, in which bordered territorial spaces, especially the limited, landlocked, and the overcrowded Western European continent, promoted these struggles. For a Pacific nation like Sāmoa, which is surrounded by vast open seas and scattered islands, war for territorial conquest was not the objective, nor was unrestrained imperialism. War was for the most part, a result of various violations of social and political protocols and transgressions and less a mission for conquest and territorial expansion. The Samoan nation was limited by terrestrial boundaries, but extended itself through the migration through the Polynesian trajectory of settling other islands in

<sup>44</sup> Wimmer and Feinstein, 764.

<sup>45</sup> Iain McLean, Alistair McMillan, *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, “**French Revolution**... It produced the modern doctrine of nationalism, and spread it directly throughout Western Europe ...”, Oxford, 2009.

<sup>46</sup> Wimmer and Feinstein, 765.

<sup>47</sup> *From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816-2001*, 868 and 870.

the Pacific. Although there were accounts of Tongan<sup>48</sup> and even “Manu‘an”<sup>49</sup> empires in Western Polynesia, the extent to which such realms exerted control over various peoples did not compare to the social, political, and economic motives behind European and American imperialism. The historical implications of the nation-state, the genealogical roots are not Samoan or Pacific based, but has thus been imposed and appropriated by Samoans themselves.

### Characteristics of the Nation-State

What, then, is a nation, if it is not to emphasize its ethnic and ancestral aspects? The vast majority of the literature as articulated along the constructs of the modernist school posits that the nation is a modern phenomenon. I have included here the criteria given in Table 2.1 by Anthony Smith, Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow.

Table 1.1. The nation, in modern terms can be defined by these categories:<sup>50</sup>

	<b>Smith<sup>51</sup></b>	<b>Opello and Rosow<sup>52</sup></b>
<b>1.</b>	a well-defined territory, with a fixed center and clearly demarcated and monitored borders;	possesses a distinct geographical territory
<b>2.</b>	a unified legal system and common legal institutions within a given territory, creating a legal and political community;	has sovereignty over this territory of which it claims

<sup>48</sup> See for example: <http://www.livescience.com/46954-tonga-was-seafaring-empire.html> and <http://www.cookislandsnews.com/item/47632-study-reveals-pre-historic-tongan-empire/47632-study-reveals-pre-historic-tongan-empire>.

<sup>49</sup> See <http://exploreoceania.weebly.com/the-rise-of-the-tui-tonga-empire.html>.

<sup>50</sup> I have included two categorizations from two sources here for comparative purposes.

<sup>51</sup> Anthony Smith, “The Concepts and its Varieties” in *The Cultural Foundations of Nations: Hierarchy, Covenant, and Republic*, 2004, 12-13.

<sup>52</sup> Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen Rosow. “Introduction: A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order” in *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, 2005, 3.

3.	participation in the social life and politics of the nation by all of the members or “citizens”;	is made up of a government
4.	a mass public culture disseminated by means of a public, standardized, mass education system;	has fixed boundaries
5.	collective autonomy institutionalized in a sovereign territorial state for a given nation;	government claims a monopoly over the use of violence or coercion
6.	membership of the nation in an “international” system of the community of nations;	exhibits national identity
7.	legitimation, if not creation, of the nation by and through the ideology of nationalism.	relies on the obedience and loyalty of its inhabitants

The basic premise of the nation is that it is defined by a distinct geographical territory claimed by a political community, a government, that has sovereignty over this territory and the constituent members, citizens who owe loyalty to this state, and who possesses a national identity, or culture. The geographical and territorial elements, of ‘well-defined’ and ‘fixed’ boundaries (as opposed to the constantly shift frontiers of empires), of the state are salient in both definitions and reveal the importance of governance over physical space as well as a governing entity through the state.

At the very foundation of Western frameworks of nation are principles of sovereignty, independence, and nonintervention. We have broadly discussed these principles, briefly mentioning its origins on Westphalian sovereignty. But what is “sovereignty” from the perspective of the west? Although this thesis will not be exhaustive in defining what sovereignty is, it will survey and summarize its relevant meanings for the conceptualization of the nation. Although multiple and often conflicting definitions exist, we will simplify its multiple meaning to this: Sovereignty, by its political definition, constitutes the principle of having supreme authority, the

right to rule, over a particularly well-defined territory.<sup>53</sup> It has been well defined and debated by various political philosophers including Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau – who will not be discussed in detail here as this is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion on the history of sovereignty.<sup>54</sup>

This idea of sovereignty, as possessed by the agent, the state, is the defining feature of the modern nation-state in that supreme authority is vested within the state. Stephen Krasner provides four aspects of sovereignty that have utility in analyzing state-centric sovereignty. The first, domestic sovereignty, outlines the authority in the state and its organization, whether this is vested in one particular source, or in three separate branches, as in the case of the United States. Interdependence sovereignty involves the ability of the state to regulate and maintain control over various aspects of activities prompted by globalization, whether they be economic or otherwise. International legal sovereignty situates the state within an international body in which it partakes in juridical equality; states are recognized according to whether they had possession of territory and formal jurisdiction and authority over it.<sup>55</sup> Recognition was not necessarily something that all states enjoyed and did not guarantee that domestic and international sovereignty would be respected (as in the case of invasions and external encroachments on domestic territory), especially in the case of Westphalian sovereignty.

Westphalian sovereignty, widely attributed to the end of the Thirty Years War, is often cited as the basis for state sovereignty. Its essential feature is that no external authority should be included in the territory of the state, which should have both *de jure* independence and *de facto*

<sup>53</sup> See Stanford Encyclopedia <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/>.

<sup>54</sup> “Sovereignty” in *Britannica*. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/sovereignty>.

<sup>55</sup> Krasner, Stephen D. *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*. New York: Columbia Press, 6-11.



autonomy.<sup>56</sup> It is inevitable that the sovereign be influenced in some manner, given the more interconnectedness of global affairs. When external control can be exerted on domestic sovereignty, international sovereignty can be compromised. Not all states can exert the same amount of Westphalian sovereignty since the differential of power dynamics and relations between states is not equal. Thus, today, independent Sāmoa exhibits fully, sovereignty across all these realms, while American Sāmoa - which can claim recognized territory and autonomy over its own juridical control, but is still subject to external control exerted by the United States, which possesses not only all forms of sovereignty as articulated by Krasner, but has a more powerful differential over Independent Sāmoa.

Sovereignty, in the Samoan context, has always been vested in the village (*nu'u*) polity rather than in a state or any other entity remotely resembling a centralized, national polity. As we will further explore in Chapter II, the Fa'amatai ('chiefly system'), specifically the *fono a nu'u* ('village council'), is the agent through which supreme and final authority is arbitrated. During the period of European contact and formal colonialism, village sovereignty or *pulega* was compromised and in many ways partially usurped by foreign states under the guise of empires and subsequent decolonization schemes that mandated the creation of the nation-state. Granted we have situated sovereignty not at the village level, but at the state level; the next question to be begged is that if sovereignty is a tenuous proposition that can be mediated by external factors, who then does (or should be) the force that recognizes nations as states?

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 9.

## Who are Nations and who Recognizes them?

If nations are modern political units embodied in the nation-state, who decides whether they are nations? If the nation is not solely defined by cultural, linguistic, or ethnic criteria, who decides which criteria should define the nation and who should be considered nations? This is a focal point of our discussion on the nation along statist terms. The most influential body today is the United Nations, which succeeded the oft cited "less effective" League of Nations, as the authoritative supranational polity. There are currently 206 states recognized under the United Nations, of which 196 are full member states, including Sāmoa. Two 'Observer States,' the Vatican City and the State of Palestine, as well as eleven 'other states' are also recognized.

Table 1.2 List of sovereign nation-states, 2016 and their dates of admission into the United Nations.<sup>57</sup> The Pacific states are highlighted in yellow.

State	Date of Admission	State	Date of Admission
Argentina	24 October 1945	Nigeria	7 October 1960
Belarus*	24 October 1945	Sierra Leone	27 September 1961
Brazil	24 October 1945	Mauritania	27 October 1961
Chile	24 October 1945	Mongolia	27 October 1961
China	24 October 1945	United Republic of Tanzania*	14 December 1961
Cuba	24 October 1945	Burundi	18 September 1962
Denmark	24 October 1945	Jamaica	18 September 1962
Dominican Republic	24 October 1945	Rwanda	18 September 1962
Egypt*	24 October 1945	Trinidad and Tobago	18 September 1962
El Salvador	24 October 1945	Algeria	8 October 1962
France	24 October 1945	Uganda	25 October 1962
Haiti	24 October 1945	Kuwait	14 May 1963
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	24 October 1945	Kenya	16 December 1963
Lebanon	24 October 1945	Malawi	1 December 1964
Luxembourg	24 October 1945	Malta	1 December 1964

<sup>57</sup> Table was compiled from information from <http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml>. Numerous other lists are available, including from the website of the European Union: <http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-5000500.htm>.

New Zealand	24 October 1945	Zambia	1 December 1964
Nicaragua	24 October 1945	Gambia	21 September 1965
Paraguay	24 October 1945	Maldives	21 September 1965
Philippines	24 October 1945	Singapore*	21 September 1965
Poland	24 October 1945	Guyana	20 September 1966
Russian Federation*	24 October 1945	Botswana	17 October 1966
Saudi Arabia	24 October 1945	Lesotho	17 October 1966
Syrian Arab Republic*	24 October 1945	Barbados	9 December 1966
Turkey	24 October 1945	Mauritius	24 April 1968
Ukraine	24 October 1945	Swaziland	24 September 1968
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	24 October 1945	Equatorial Guinea	12 November 1968
United States of America	24 October 1945	Fiji	13 October 1970
Greece	25 October 1945	Bahrain	21 September 1971
India	30 October 1945	Bhutan	21 September 1971
Peru	31 October 1945	Qatar	21 September 1971
Australia	1 November 1945	Oman	7 October 1971
Costa Rica	2 November 1945	United Arab Emirates	9 December 1971
Liberia	2 November 1945	Bahamas	18 September 1973
Colombia	5 November 1945	Germany*	18 September 1973
Mexico	7 November 1945	Bangladesh	17 September 1974
South Africa	7 November 1945	Grenada	17 September 1974
Canada	9 November 1945	Guinea Bissau	17 September 1974
Ethiopia	13 November 1945	Cabo Verde	16 September 1975
Panama	13 November 1945	Mozambique	16 September 1975
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	14 November 1945	Sao Tome and Principe	16 September 1975
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	15 November 1945	Papua New Guinea	10 October 1975
Guatemala	21 November 1945	Comoros	12 November 1975
Norway	27 November 1945	Suriname	4 December 1975
Netherlands	10 December 1945	Seychelles	21 September 1976
Honduras	17 December 1945	Angola	1 December 1976
Uruguay	18 December 1945	Samoa	15 December 1976
Ecuador	21 December 1945	Djibouti	20 September 1977
Iraq	21 December 1945	Viet Nam	20 September 1977
Belgium	27 December 1945	Solomon Islands	19 September 1978
Afghanistan	19 November 1946	Dominica	18 December 1978
Iceland	19 November 1946	Saint Lucia	18 September 1979
Sweden	19 November 1946	Zimbabwe	25 August 1980

Thailand	16 December 1946	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	16 September 1980
Pakistan	30 September 1947	Vanuatu	15 September 1981
Yemen*	30 September 1947	Belize	25 September 1981
Myanmar	19 April 1948	Antigua and Barbuda	11 November 1981
Israel	11 May 1949	Saint Kitts and Nevis	23 September 1983
Indonesia*	28 September 1950	Brunei Darussalam	21 September 1984
Albania	14 December 1955	Namibia	23 April 1990
Austria	14 December 1955	Liechtenstein	18 September 1990
Bulgaria	14 December 1955	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	17 September 1991
Cambodia	14 December 1955	Estonia	17 September 1991
Finland	14 December 1955	Latvia	17 September 1991
Hungary	14 December 1955	Lithuania	17 September 1991
Ireland	14 December 1955	Marshall Islands	17 September 1991
Italy	14 December 1955	Micronesia (Federated States of)	17 September 1991
Jordan	14 December 1955	Republic of Korea	17 September 1991
Lao People's Democratic Republic	14 December 1955	Armenia	2 March 1992
Libya*	14 December 1955	Azerbaijan	2 March 1992
Nepal	14 December 1955	Kazakhstan	2 March 1992
Portugal	14 December 1955	Kyrgyzstan	2 March 1992
Romania	14 December 1955	Republic of Moldova	2 March 1992
Spain	14 December 1955	San Marino	2 March 1992
Sri Lanka	14 December 1955	Tajikistan	2 March 1992
Morocco	12 November 1956	Turkmenistan	2 March 1992
Sudan	12 November 1956	Uzbekistan	2 March 1992
Tunisia	12 November 1956	Bosnia and Herzegovina*	22 May 1992
Japan	18 December 1956	Croatia*	22 May 1992
Ghana	8 March 1957	Slovenia*	22 May 1992
Malaysia*	17 September 1957	Georgia	31 July 1992
Guinea	12 December 1958	Czech Republic*	19 January 1993
Cameroon	20 February 1960	Slovakia*	19 January 1993
Democratic Republic of the Congo *	20 February 1960	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	8 April 1993
Benin	20 September 1960	Eritrea	28 May 1993
Burkina Faso	20 September 1960	Monaco	28 May 1993
Central African Republic	20 September 1960	Andorra	28 July 1993
Chad	20 September 1960	Palau	15 December 1994
Congo	20 September 1960	Kiribati	14 September 1999
Côte D'Ivoire	20 September 1960	Nauru	14 September 1999

Cyprus	20 September 1960	Tonga	14 September 1999
Gabon	20 September 1960	Tuvalu	5 September 2000
Madagascar	20 September 1960	Serbia*	1 November 2000
Niger	20 September 1960	Switzerland	10 September 2002
Somalia	20 September 1960	Timor-Leste	27 September 2002
Togo	20 September 1960	Montenegro*	28 June 2006
Mali	28 September 1960	South Sudan*	14 July 2011
Senegal	28 September 1960		

Table 1.3. List of observer and ‘other’ states, 2016

Observer States (2)	‘Other states’ (11)		
Vatican City	Abkhazia	Niue	South Ossetia
	Cook Islands	Northern Cyprus	Taiwan
Palestine	Kosovo	Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic	Transnistria
	Nagorno-Karabakh	Somaliland	

The creation of the United Nations<sup>58</sup> and its overall purpose needs to be looked at from a critical perspective. The UN is a body of entities that only admits nation-states, which Opello and Rosow postulate have become the “only acceptable form of politico-military rule on the planet.”<sup>59</sup> The Charter of the United Nations provides these stipulations for membership in Articles 3 and 4. Article 3 lists the members (‘states’) that had been part of the United Nations Conference on

<sup>58</sup> Perhaps a more accurate naming would have been the “United States,” though this is not feasible given that there is already a sovereign political entity with the aforementioned name. A “United Nation-States” would be another suggestion, though this is problematic given the nature of nomenclature surrounding the linguistic articulations of the nation in English. Nomenclature here, although seemingly trivial, proves problematic, when the United Nations assumes (or at least purports) to have a monopoly over the recognition of nations.

<sup>59</sup> “Introduction: A Historical Approach to the State and Global Order,” 10 and 12.

International Organization based in San Francisco or who previously signed the Declaration.

Article 4 provided for the requirements for the admission of new states:<sup>60</sup>

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Given the violent history behind the formation of the concepts and actualizations of the nation-state, the irony of the admission of only ‘peace-loving states’ is perhaps lost on the admitters since most of states were never involved in the wars and were never part of the historical circumstances out of which the nation-state or the United Nations arose. Though the formation of the UN arose out of very specific circumstances – that is as a response to the causes and consequences of World War II – it nonetheless had other significant consequences. Aside from maintaining peace and security – premises for its creation, another consequence was that the UN as an institution would set the global standards for what constituted a ‘nation’: that is, the most basic unit of political organization was the nation-state. By asserting itself as the premier international organization for the mediation of conflicts and other governing structures and economic goals, it became a vehicle of nation-building efforts and the bastion of recognition politics with regards to statist affairs. The United Nations role was crucial in the formation and creation of the nation-state of Western Sāmoa and assumed responsibility for the decolonization of American Sāmoa, as we will read in further detail in Chapter III. Though at times American Sāmoa will assert itself as an *Atunu‘u*, a country, a nation, it would not be considered for full membership in the United Nations, as it is not an

<sup>60</sup> United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html>

independent state. Sāmoa, on the other hand, has been accorded the full rights and membership afforded by the United Nations.

### Nationalism: Does Nationalism End with the State?

In contrast to the question that Walker Connor initially posed in his 1989 paper, “When is the nation?” – that is, when did it begin – it is important to discuss the consequences of teleological assumptions towards the nation-state – that is, “when does nationalism end?” In a *talanoa* session<sup>61</sup> with the Prime Minister of Sāmoa, Tuila‘epa Sa‘ilele Malielegaoi, I asked his opinion of “Samoan nationalism.” He responded that “nationalism” was no longer applicable to Sāmoa as it was now an independent State. His position on the matter, though, reflects the nature of his official role as an agent of the State – that is, the Independent State of Sāmoa – as well as the prevalence and pervasiveness of state-centric forms of nationalism, as opposed to the cultural and ethnic forms. His response reflected the modernist overtones of the nation-state that dominates discussion of nation in present day Sāmoa and how Samoans themselves come to reify the state and to equate it with the nation.

My discussion with the Prime Minister raised some important points about the teleological assumptions about statehood that have been taken for granted in the adoption of the nation-state model for Western Sāmoa. As I strolled through the five-story government building in Apia, I noticed the numerous government offices with various departments and realized how statehood had created bureaucracies and all the features of a modern nation-state. The urban scene was a stark contrast to walking through a traditional Samoan village, which reflects the had all the

<sup>61</sup> Personal communication with the Prime Minister, susuga Tuila‘epa Sa‘ilele Malielegaoi, back in September 2012.\* I had the opportunity to discuss with His Excellency the topic of Samoan nationalism, Tuila‘epa was asked about his opinion was of “Samoan nationalism” and he responded that Sāmoa is no longer under the yoke of colonization and is now an independent country, so the question of nationalism was no longer relevant.

sociopolitical features of the traditional Samoan *Atunu'u*. Samoans – including the Prime Minister – very much agree that the nation is embodied in the state, an entity that is necessary in the modern era of globalist politics. For the Prime Minister, nationalism was fulfilled in the achievement of statehood and is a phenomenon that is not relevant to Samoans in the post-independence era. Loyalty to the state (the modernist, liberal nationalism) does not discount the loyalty to the nation (as a people of common ancestry and kinship and defined along the lines of ethnic nationalism). The type of nationalism which I had posed to Tuila'epa, one termed along ethnic lines, was overshadowed by the civic nationalism that is prevalent both in the Western and Samoan discourses on the nation. Nationalism ('loyalty to the nation') as opposed to patriotism ('loyalty to the state')<sup>62</sup> has been a phenomenon in consideration by Samoans. In making his push for Samoans living abroad to acquire economic opportunities in other countries, Tuila'epa's statements implicitly recognized that Samoans could be patriotic (whether in Sāmoa or living in foreign states) or abroad while still maintaining loyalty to the Samoan nation (which is an embodiment of Samoan nationalism). Should nationalism, then in the civic sense with the achievement of statehood, come to an end? Not necessarily, as nationalism in the Samoan sense continued in the ethnic and cultural forms today. The debate between civic and ethnic nationalisms are constantly and seemingly conflicting and in opposition, though, as Margareta Mary Nicholas argues in her thesis, they need not be.<sup>63</sup>

### Can Sāmoa truly be a Liberal State?

<sup>62</sup> Rose, Sam. "States, Nation, and Reification: Toward Nationalism as Practice," 18-19. See also David Kaplan, "Territorial Identities and Geographic Scale," in *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale*, ed. Guntram H. Herb and Dave Kaplan. 1999. Lanham, MD Rowman and Littlefield, 34. Dusan Kecmanovic and Walter Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Band."

<sup>63</sup> Margareta Mary Nickolas, <http://www.nationalismproject.org/articles/nikolas/intro.htm>.



As a critique of the modernist civic nationalist position on the nation, I provide here two examples of ambiguity and contention as challenges to models of the state: the monopoly of violence and citizenship issues. Both issues are meant to challenge the already assumed notions of statehood and the characteristics that defined nation on liberal terms.

### *The ‘Monopoly on Violence’*

One of the biggest assumptions about nations today as articulated in the state – through a politico-military infrastructure – is that the state in itself assumes a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force.” Agreeing with Leon Trotsky in that “every state is founded on force,” Max Weber lays out the foundation for what would later set out debates over the use of coercion and the justification of ‘legitimate violence’ in the articulation of the state. His definition of a nation as a “community of sentiment which would adequately manifest itself in a state of its own; hence a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own”<sup>64</sup> reflects the nature of nation-states along modernist lines of state-centric paradigms.

Testing out this ‘monopoly on violence’ criterion in Sāmoa and American Sāmoa is quintessentially complicated. The existence of two Samoas, one independent state and the other an unincorporated territory of a larger nation-state, complicates not only the issue of whether the state has the actual power to use force, but who has the power to use force. In independent Sāmoa, there is neither a military nor armed police that has the power of effective force.<sup>65</sup> The indigenous institution of the ‘*aumāga*,<sup>66</sup> which was traditionally the enforcer of the village *fono*’s laws and

<sup>64</sup> Quote taken from Roeder 3 “Where Nation-States Come From”, which is quoted from Gerth and Mills, 1958, 176.

<sup>65</sup> There is technically a police force in both Samoas, however, neither are currently armed in a manner comparable to other ‘developing’ states.

<sup>66</sup> The ‘*aumāga*’ is the association of untitled men in a village that acts as the enforcer of village laws and executive orders by the *fono*, the village council. It was essentially the military of the village and district, as Samoans did not have a distinct ‘warrior class’ the ‘*aumāga*’ could be viewed as its equal. It was through the ‘*aumāga*’ that the village council had its monopoly on the use of violence.

executive orders,<sup>67</sup> is still strong in most of rural Sāmoa, despite the encroachment of Western-styled policing and social influences.<sup>68</sup> Samoan historian Asofou So'o recognized this when western Samoans were drafting their constitution:

Though, ideally, the liberal architects of Samoa's constitution would prefer it that way, realistically, the small number of police to enforce law in the country would mean that the state could not survive without the dual existence of village governments and their invaluable contribution to law enforcement, protection, and security within the traditional framework of village sociopolitical structures.<sup>69</sup>

Although Sāmoa does not have a military, its defense is taken care of by New Zealand. The very limited powers of the unarmed police force have come into conflict on many occasions in dealing with power struggles with the State. The numerous challenges and resistance by villages in Sāmoa to the courts established by the State reveals that the use of force, or lack thereof, challenges Weber's definition of the state. If most nation-states of the world today have a military force and the threat of violence is a criterion for the state is this force, how does the absence of a military in Sāmoa challenge not only the power of the state, but the premises for nationhood? Perhaps this problem would be solved if there were a national military who could exert a monopoly of violence or perhaps through contracted military forces hired external of the state or through treaties made with larger states for defense. Either way, defining the state through the doctrine of monopoly of violence proves very problematic for the Samoan situation. It is to be noted that Sāmoa's stability politically and militarily (despite lack of one) is touted in the Pacific as exceeding other nations, even more "developed" states that have gone through several coups and riots in the region. Discontent with the government in Sāmoa has always been protested through nonviolent means in

<sup>67</sup> In recent years, there has arisen an 'Aumāga o Apia, an organization that patrols the streets of the town area enforcing its own *sā* or evening curfews and prohibitions. This institution has been primarily reserved for 'traditional' villages which have been firmly established in Samoan history, yet its creation seems foreign to the only urban center on 'Upolu, which holds no official *fa'alupega* – the mark of legitimacy in traditional Samoan politics.

<sup>68</sup> There have been many instances of clashes between the state police force and traditional village enforcement, which have often ended in stalemates or on ambiguous terms.

<sup>69</sup> So'o. Lau Asofou. "Culture and Governance in a Future Pacific: The case of Samoa" in *Culture and Governance in a Future Pacific*. 43-44.

the post-Independence era. This is perhaps most attributable to Sāmoa's affective connections through kinship and the strength and stability of the Fa'amatai in each *nu'u* and the constraint that they have over their constituents. Rather than the monopoly on violence, the civic nation in Sāmoa must be appropriately defined and analyzed through other means, primarily citizenship.

### *Citizenship in Sāmoa*

Given the criteria of a civic state as one that precludes race as a criterion for citizenship, how do the policies that privilege race and indigeneity inherent in the constitutions of both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa subvert assumptions about the state as nation? American Sāmoa's Constitution provides a policy that protects those of "Samoan ancestry"<sup>70</sup> and the Constitution of Independent Sāmoa also provides mechanisms to protect Samoans from land alienation based on ethnicity (by restricting customary land ownership to Samoans).<sup>71</sup>

Citizenship in Sāmoa, however, reflects the largely liberal state notions. The rights and privileges accorded to citizenship include:<sup>72</sup>

- the ability to purchase land;
- the right to vote in General Elections;
- the right to obtain Samoan travel documentation;
- the ability to represent Samoa in sporting events;
- the right to claim pension;
- easier access to employment opportunities;
- the right to apply for educational scholarships; and
- cheaper health care.

<sup>70</sup> See the *Revised Constitution of American Samoa* [[http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177](http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177)] and the *American Samoa Code Annotated* [[http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&id=113&Itemid=172](http://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=113&Itemid=172)].

<sup>71</sup> See the *Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa* [<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5908.html>].

<sup>72</sup> Samoan Immigration website: Privileges of citizenship <http://www.samoaimmigration.gov.ws/CitizenshipServices/SamoanCitizenship/tabid/6846/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.

Citizenship is attainable through four venues, as articulated on the Immigration website: through birth, descent, permanent residency, and marriage.<sup>73</sup> These categories reflect the largely liberal features of a modern state and yet are antithetical to much of what we will later discuss according to Samoan notions of land tenure and traditional sociopolitical organization. Freehold land, which is available to citizens (but not customary land), is available to citizens here without being tied to ethnic criteria, although what citizenship actually means for non-Samoans, is oftentimes ambiguous. These ambiguities challenge the conventional notions of nation and citizenship in a state that is predominantly indigenous and privileges the indigenous populations with certain rights and privileges that would not be found in settler-colonial nation-states.

### *Citizenship by Investment?*

One of the more recent challenges to Samoan citizenship is the controversial proposal for the Citizenship by Investment Programme (CIP),<sup>74</sup> which would grant citizenship rights, including the right to purchase land, to foreigners who would invest a minimum of WST 4 million in Sāmoa. The economic motives behind this program is a unique challenge to citizenship that confounds civic, cultural, and ethnic criteria for membership in a nation, whether statist or not. The premises for Samoan citizenship have been implicitly articulated along ethnic lines, though the language used in legal governing documents such as constitutions and law codes is legalistically based on civic concepts of the nation.<sup>75</sup> Should citizenship be additionally determined by economic criteria, this would subvert both the ethnic and civic notions by proposing limitations of membership that

<sup>73</sup> Samoan Immigration website:

<http://www.samoaimmigration.gov.ws/CitizenshipServices/SamoanCitizenship/Applyingforcitizenship/tabid/6847/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.

<sup>74</sup> See Bence, Zákonyi “Samoa, the next Citizenship by Investment Program?”, Accessible:

[www.walshww.com/samoa-the-next-citizenship-by-investment-program](http://www.walshww.com/samoa-the-next-citizenship-by-investment-program)

<sup>75</sup> A very recent example is the granting of citizenship to fourteen new candidates allowed under Section 9 of the Citizenship Act of 2004 <http://www.samoagovt.ws/2016/08/new-citizens-sworn-in/>.

violates the liberal principles of equality. The commercialization of citizenship proves repugnant to conventional notions of citizenship in the state and provides another problematic barrier to articulating the nation.

### *Citizenship in American Sāmoa*

Persons born in the American territory do not automatically receive ‘birthright’ citizenship. Rather, people born in American Sāmoa are classified as United States ‘nationals’ and not U.S. citizens. All persons born “within the United States” are considered U.S. citizens; all U.S. citizens are U.S. nationals, but not all U.S. nationals are U.S. citizens. This distinction is unique to the people of American Sāmoa, and nowhere else in the United States – including its incorporated States and other Territories – does it currently exist.<sup>76</sup> This status has highlighted the complexities of citizenship in the United States. If American Samoans are not ‘citizens’ of the American (nation)-state, then where are they citizens of? In Chapter III, this issue will be further explored, especially within the contexts of American imperialism in the early twentieth century and how it produced such an ambiguous and anomalous situation in American Sāmoa.

For American Samoans, its inclusion in the American empire was a contested and contradictory phenomenon: On the one hand it was seen as a colonial subject, an entity that was part of the United States, the civic nation. On the other hand, it was not quite fully part of ‘America’: it was, as articulated by the Insular Cases, part of the “alien races” not quite capable of understanding “Anglo-Saxon principles.” Although the United States was largely assumed to be a liberal state composed of citizens naturally endowed with equal rights, its historical legacy

<sup>76</sup> American Sāmoa is the only Territory in the U.S. in which persons born there are not automatically U.S. citizens. This used to be true for other Territories (including Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands in the Pacific).

certainly did not apply those principles uniformly – particularly on the human and equal rights premises as we understand them today. It was not until the Fourteenth amendment that granted rights to Blacks and not until the Nineteenth amendment that extended voting rights to women.<sup>77</sup> The privileges accorded to White males, of whom the “Anglo-Saxon” race was implied, and the erasure of and denial of Indigenous peoples, African-Americans, women, Asians, Latinos and Hispanics and other “alien races” insinuated that the civic components of the American state were somewhat ethnic-based. It would not be true that the American state, despite its assertions otherwise, was not completely a liberal state, but that the workings of the heteropatriarchal state were inherently part of American national identity. It is within these contexts that American Samoans were denied citizenship in the civic American state: In order for the Anglo-Saxon American State to have been an ethnic nation, and that others were “alien races”, the implication was that these “alien races” were in themselves separate, distinct “ethnic nations.” Thus, they were incompatible with the Anglo-Saxon state. We have thus laid here the grounds for which American Sāmoa was absorbed into the American state and the peculiar and contradictory nature of nationhood dynamics with which it was involved. We will discuss this further in Chapter 3, after the partition of the eastern portion of the *Atunu ‘u*.

Both of the cases in Sāmoa and American Sāmoa demonstrate the complexities of the nation-state framework in the modernist liberal tradition. In both Samoas, citizenship (or nationality) is equated with ethnicity, as implied in the legal documents from which statehood derives its authority in both Samoas. However, the existence of laws protecting the cultural and land rights of the native population complicates the liberal notions of liberty and equality, in which all citizens, regardless of race, share equal rights. The Samoan state has largely assumed that the

<sup>77</sup> See the 14<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> Amendments of the United States Constitution.

indigenous people – of which constitutes the majority of the population – are Samoan citizens, though the statist principles on which it is founded does not discriminate with regard to race or indigeneity.

### Does the Nation Produce the State, or Does the State Produce the Nation?

Given these challenges to the idea of the state, we must ponder on the question, does the nation produce the state or does the state produce the nation? If we are to assume that a nation is one characterized by ethnic ties, how is it there are two Samoan ‘states,’ Sāmoa and American Sāmoa (under the United States)? In Chapter IV, we will discuss the differences between the two, however, it is important to realize now that we have stumbled upon another issue: does the state produce the nation? American Samoans often articulate themselves as an “ *Atunu'u* ” – a country, a ‘nation’ – despite not having an independent state of its own. Have the people of American Sāmoa through these linguistic and social assertions produced a ‘nation’ of their own? Have American Samoans, just as Samoans from the west, reified their own country as a separate nation? Such issues further challenge the congruency of the state and the nation that has been prevalent in the discourse thus far.

### Non-Western Forms and Critiques of the ‘Nation’

It is important to realize that everything regarding the nation that we have discussed is predicated within very specific contexts. The debates on nationalism have largely focused on Western – European and American – frameworks on the nation. This is not only due in large part to the hegemony Western scholars have had in initiating the conversation and transposing theoretical models on non-Western peoples, but that the discursive practices on the nation were

not the subject of inquiry and debate amongst non-Western peoples. Through the process of colonization, which will be part of the focus of the third chapter, we will see how the articulation of nation is a process of power relations between colonizer and colonized in the modern world. Although there are various alternatives to Western norms on the nation, I discriminately focus on a brief survey of indigenous critiques, in particular the Pacific and indigenous Samoan relationships to nation and articulations of it.

### Indigenous Ideas About and Critiques of the Nation and the State

Indigenous critiques of the nation are indispensable to this discourse as Samoan notions of nation, and its lack of representation in the contemporary discussions, do not transpose well into the mold of western nationhood framework. The concept of the nation-state is challenged by many critiques from Asian, African, Latin American, to Indigenous, to feminist and queer theories. This thesis will not delve too deeply into these critiques, however their existence attests to the wealth of available critiques against the vastly heteropatriarchal western nation-state discourse and discursive practices.

We have seen the rootedness of the nation-state on European evolution of political organization, yet we have for the most part largely left out discussions of empire and colonialization with regards to the state. Indigenous discourse critiques the inaccessibility of the nation-state to most indigenous peoples as they are essentially subsumed under settler-colonial states. The modern state system is built on the exclusion of race/ethnicity, which has benefitted settler-majority countries in which non-indigenous peoples dominate the political, social, and economic structures of power within those states. Colonization had wrought upon Indigenous



peoples, the theft of not only their land, but their social, psychological, economic, and ultimately, their political aspirations to nationhood beyond the state.

The United States is the epitome of the success of modernist interpretations of the state under civic nationalism in which, in theory, anyone, regardless of race (or indigeneity) can aspire political inclusion in a supposedly egalitarian state. For Moon Kie-Jung, nation-states are “politically uniform populations of citizens, or state members” within “territories over which nation-states claim sovereignty over politically uniform spaces, symbolized in atlases by evenly colored, neatly bounded blocks.” The United States, he argues, is diametrically opposed to this, and is rather an “empire-state”.<sup>78</sup> The dominant discourse thus far has promoted the transition of empires into nation-states, but Kie-Jung’s work has suggested that empires continue to manifest themselves through various multinational and multicultural empires, manifested as nation-states. It is this multiculturalism, which is entrenched in supposed notions of equality and fairness for all, that ignores the primacy of Indigenous peoples in asserting sovereign rights to nationhood. By privileging a neutral, multicultural state in which everyone, regardless of indigeneity, is treated equally without regard to the goal of political reparations for past wrong-doings, indigenous peoples are relegated to a status which deprives them of their sovereign rights to nationhood.

This could not be truer than in the United States, where Indigenous nations are not only subsumed under a federal government in unequal nation-within-a-nation political scheme, but are denied rights to full, sovereign expression of their nations. The American nation-state's rendering of the nation does not fully grant equal statuses to individual tribes, especially since they fall under the “domestic” control of the Department of the Interior. Furthermore, different Indigenous nations

<sup>78</sup> Jung, Moon-Kie. “Introduction.” *State of White Supremacy: Racism, Governance, and the United States*. Eds. Jung Moon-Kie, Joao Helion Costa and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Stanford University Press, 2011, 3-4.

conceptualize the nation differently, and do not always subscribe to modernist concepts about the nation. As Andrea Smith notes that the assumptions are that “nations can be equated with nation-states and that the end goal of a national liberation struggle must be the attainment of a state or state-like form of governance.”<sup>79</sup> She further elaborates that:

Whereas nation-states are governed through domination and coercion, indigenous sovereignty and nationhood are predicated on interrelatedness and responsibility. In opposition to nation-states, which are also based on control over territory, these visions of indigenous nationhood are based on care and responsibility for land that all can share. These models of sovereignty are not based on a narrow definition that would entail a closely bounded community and ethnic cleansing. So, these articulations pose an alternative to theories that assume that the endpoint to a national struggle is a nation-state and that assume the givenness of the nation-state system.<sup>80</sup>

Smith's critique of the nation-state within the “logic of heteropatriarchy” are applicable to the situation in the Samoan archipelago as we will see how colonialism was premised on white supremacy and that through the United Nations placement of Sāmoa as a ‘trust territory.’

Sandy Grande argues that:

The United States is a nation defined by its original sin: the genocide of American Indians ... American Indian tribes are viewed as an inherent threat to the nation, poised to expose the great lies of U.S. democracy: that we are a nation of laws and not random power; that we are guided by reason and not faith; that we are governed by representation and not executive order; and finally, that we stand as a self-determined citizenry and not a kingdom of blood or aristocracy ... From the perspectives of American Indians, “democracy” has been wielded with impunity as the first and most virulent weapon of mass destruction.<sup>81</sup>

### The Nation-State, White Supremacy, and Settler-Colonialism

An examination of the nation-state in modern contexts in relation to the rise of settler-colonial states in the so-called Age of Imperialism is not only crucial to understanding modernism but its hegemony over ethnic conceptions of the nation. Davis Kazanjian asserts that “colonizing

<sup>79</sup> Smith, Andrea. “American Studies without America: Native Feminisms and the Nation-State.” *American Quarterly* 60:2, 2008, 309-315.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. 312

<sup>81</sup> Original quote from Grande, *Red Pedagogy*, 31-32, cited in Smith, Andrea. “American Studies without America: Native Feminisms and the Nation-State”, 311.

trick”: “the liberal myth that the United States is founded on democratic principles rather than being built on the pillars of capitalism, colonialism, and white supremacy.”<sup>82</sup> The creation of white European settler-states such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand were based on the genocide of their respective indigenous peoples and the slave trade of Black and Brown peoples. Although these countries were founded on certain principles and ideals based on modernist constructions, the implied underlying assumption was that statehood and citizenship could only be fully applied to white males with the necessary economic privileges. This ambivalent, multifaceted view of the state, enveloped in white supremacy and ethnic nationalism, was evidence of the transition between an ethnic conceptualization of the nation and civic notions of the state.

The nation-state is a construct meant to reinforce white supremacy. We know this from the many racialized policies that reinforced racial hierarchies, and the underlying belief in the inherent superiority of whiteness, employed by European colonial powers to subjugated Indigenous and minority peoples around the globe. Sāmoa is, of course, no exception to this and we shall discuss the implications of white supremacy and white privilege in the construction of the Samoan nation-state in Chapter 3. Although Samoans had already viewed themselves as constituting a nation, equipped with an inherent system of government(s) akin to a state, nevertheless, Samoans had to acquiesce to modernist prescriptions for the state. Furthermore, the treatment of Samoans under various successive colonial regimes were rooted in European notions of native inferiority and the inability of Samoans to fully govern themselves. The “half-caste problem,” revealed much about European colonial attitudes towards whiteness, indigeneity, and nationalism, as will be further explored in the discussion on colonization and decolonization.

<sup>82</sup> Cited from Davis Kazanjian, *The Colonizing Trick*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 310-311, in Smith Andrea, *American Studies without America: Native Feminisms and the Nation-State*.

## Indigenous Samoan Notions of Land – Indigenous Frameworks

In customary Samoan contexts in which there is a physical space, a territory, to which people can claim, Samoans connect themselves both physically and symbolically to a particular piece of land through two means: 1) the ritual burying of the child's *pute* (umbilical cord) and the mother's *fanua* (placenta)<sup>83</sup> and 2) the burying of the deceased's body at death on the same family land.<sup>84</sup> These two ritualistic acts contribute to this idea of being *tama o le 'ele'ele*, a 'child of the land'<sup>85</sup> – that is, to be a *suli*, a true, native heir of the land to which one claims genealogical descent through the village *fa'alupega*. The terms *teine o le nu'u* or *tama o le nu'u* connote a sort of 'indigeneity' to a specific place through which Samoans make well known through the village hierarchical order. It is traditional belief that if one does not bury one's afterbirth, he or she will grow up an unstable life.<sup>86</sup> This ancient religious practice has survived Christianity, albeit in a manner that has been relegated to superstition or common secular belief.

How then are these indigenous references complicated by the state-centric modernist theories of the nation? How do liberal nationalism and the civic components of the state complicate and in fact subvert these indigenous concepts and rituals? These cultural phenomena can be addressed by emphasizing the ethnic concepts of the nation, but are ultimately subsumed by the

<sup>83</sup> See Tui Atua, *Su'esu'e Manogi*, 107.

<sup>84</sup> It is customary for Samoans to bury their dead on their own family land, as opposed to communal cemeteries removed from ancestral lands. Normally chiefs are buried in front of the house and others in the back. Certain chiefs' graves are marked by tiers, with the number of tiers signifying rank. The graves of the past, which were composed of rocks, have been replaced by concrete tombstones in most of modern Sāmoa.

<sup>85</sup> The word *tama* can be glossed as either a boy or a child (of a female). '*Tama o le 'ele'ele*' is translated 'child of the land'. Under normal circumstances, the genitive particle *a* ('of') would be used with the word *tama*, because the relationship of a mother to her child is inalienable, e.g., *tama a le fafine*, the child of a woman. But the relationship of a *tama* to '*ele'ele*', in the same manner is inalienable, as one belongs to the land in the way he/she is connected to the *fa'alupega* of the *nu'u*.

<sup>86</sup> These beliefs are tied to pre-Christian rituals that have become obsolete in many areas, though it has still survived in an, albeit, relegated manner of 'superstition' by some.

hegemony of the state and globalizing forces through the processes of colonialism and neocolonization. Consider another complication by the recent proliferation of the diaspora, especially those Samoans who are born outside of the archipelago? Where do they bury their *pute* if they do not have genealogical connections as ‘true heirs’/indigenous people to the land on which they are born? Must they send their afterbirth to Sāmoa to be buried and legitimately part of the land base, the nation? Furthermore, the customary practice of burying one’s deceased relatives on one’s own land adds to the notions of claiming land, something that is either not practiced or forbidden in places outside of the Samoan archipelago. How then do Samoans claim any sort of relationship to land that is not in Sāmoa? Must they send their bodies to be buried in Sāmoa?<sup>87</sup> These important ethical and ontological questions manifest in such ways as has never been raised before in the modern era. Thus, it is important to scrutinize the inadequacies of current theories of nationalism and their practical applications.

### Some Conclusions

The literature on nationalism has largely been dominated by Western assumptions about human organization that has encouraged teleological prescriptions towards statehood. The primordialist-modernist debate has been one that has trivialized and ignored non-Western notions of ‘nation’. The enterprise of defining who and what a nation is, has largely been a project of limiting and confining and excluding others from being a ‘nation.’ Ascribing characteristics of being ‘sovereign’ or having solid geographical definitions are methods of subsuming alternative forms of nation. The modernist view, in particular, places a hierarchy in which Western nations

<sup>87</sup> Samoans have sent bodies of deceased ones to be buried in Sāmoa, though others have also chosen to bury relatives in cemeteries of their host countries. It is becoming more normal for Samoans to cremate relatives, a practice that is relatively new, given the importance of having a physical presence of a body.

are strategically at the top and everyone else must subscribe to that status of being a free and sovereign state in order to be recognized as ‘equal’ among the ‘family of nations’.

Modernist views have been the most antithetical because of their narrowly focused view of the nation that can be pinpointed to a particular time – prompting much discontinuity with the past organizations of peoples into ‘nations.’ Primordialist views, on the other hand, albeit not perfect, are less opposing because of their acknowledgment of the possibilities of having some sort of continuity with the past, in terms of how people organized themselves into nations – before the state. The nation-state, the ultimate agent of the modernist state, does not assume racial homogeneity or ties based on kinship and genealogy, which are some important feats of understanding nationhood in Samoan contexts. The state allows for citizens that are, at least in theory, equal.

Largely universalistic assumptions about nations are taken for granted, without examining the relativistic nature of the nation among different cultures and societies. Thus, it is important to situate the contemporary theoretical discourse within its own historical background and development and be wary of its applications to non-Western nations whose contexts are vastly different. The erroneously perceived diametrically opposed forces behind the modernist-primordialist debate, coupled with the civic and ethnic nationalist distinctions provide for critical starting points for discussion, though it should be informed by non-Western perspectives and their experiences in encountering the Western nation-state. The lack of cultural frameworks for Samoan and Pacific concepts and definitions of the nation as well as a nationalism discourse invokes a need for the topic to be explored and debated. We have thus considered the nation along bordered geopolitical units in which sovereignty is asserted over these units, though in the third chapter of this thesis, we will consider another problem deficiently discussed by the current literature: the

existence of diasporas and the rise of transnationalism and their contributions to the nation discourse.

Despite the shortcomings and inadequacies of Western scholarship of the nation, these concepts and discussions are not irrelevant to, or exclusive of, non-Western views of the nation. In contrast to the dichotomized views of the nation as civic, cultural, or ethnic entities, a more Samoan form of nationalism is a blend of the three aforementioned theories. In having an independent state, Sāmoa, and an (ambiguously) semi-autonomous polity, American Sāmoa, Samoan nationalism can be defined by civic definitions. Furthermore, the inclusion of diasporas has largely described the phenomena of population dynamics and migration shifts of Samoan nationalism.

## CHAPTER II – INDIGENOUS HISTORICAL CONTEXTS: FORMING AND STRUCTURING THE *ATUNU* ‘U

This chapter outlines the beginnings of the *Atunu* ‘u as conceived along Samoan etiological myths that have characterized the origin of the Samoan nation, including the ethno-genesis of the Samoan people and how the current sociopolitical order became manifested through the merging of indigenous institutions and foreign political systems. The rest of the chapter will focus on the development of the Samoan islands using the Indigenous stories intertwined with Western historiography and analysis. This section will describe how the Fa‘asāmoa and the Fa‘amatai transformed and transitioned from the traditional political organization and into the beginnings of colonial partition. Much of the traditional infrastructure was superimposed into the modern state-system. Given the history of the Samoan islands and the sociopolitical structures that governed the Samoan polity, this chapter will delve into the issues surrounding the ‘reunification’ of Sāmoa, and how these erroneous speculations are based on Western normative notions that superimposed the reified borders of bounded states.

### Epistemological Framework

Samoans have accepted both the ontological notions of origin related to their own indigenous etiological myths as well as Western archaeological paradigms that propose migration theories. The seemingly ambivalent nature of accepting both paradigms may not always fare well according to Western standards but are tolerable in Samoan epistemology. This section’s epistemological underpinnings will argue that nation is rooted in genealogical paradigms that include both the etiological myths pertaining to the origins of the [Samoan] universe and the myths that describe the beginnings of the human race. ‘Myths’ in this sense are not treated in the popular sense of the meaning that pejoratively connotes various narratives as false or relegates stories as



‘fairy tales.’ Rather, I articulate it as it is technically defined: they are stories that concern the history of peoples and often explain some natural or social phenomenon, often including ‘supernatural’ entities.<sup>1</sup> Mircea Eliade defines myths are creation stories and often are used to explain behavior and religious experiences.<sup>2</sup>

This section will assume that the nation includes both the geographical and sociopolitical elements and how they are related through genealogical succession. Assuming that the nation involves common ancestry and kinship, as has been articulated by ethnonationalists, I will trace the origin of Sāmoa according to Samoan oral traditions through indigenous methodological concepts, through the concepts of *tāeao*, *tala o le vavau*, and *tala fa’asolopito*.

### Indigenous Historiography: *Tāeao* and *Tala*<sup>3</sup>

Samoan stories and historical references are articulated through (1) *tāeao*, the traditional ‘mornings’ of the nation: significant events to particular chiefly lineages and the nation as a whole become recorded by word of mouth through oratory and other oral methods of transmission and (2) *tala*, indigenous stories that are inclusive of origin stories of various entities (nation, district, village, family, physical geography, customs and protocols, etc.) and stories that are meant to articulate genealogies, morals, and other concepts and ideologies important to Samoan tradition and values. These *tala* are not necessarily rooted in locational spatial concepts in time, but can be relative and cyclical. *Tala o le vavau* explicate stories from Sāmoa’s ancient past irrespective of the precise temporal construction that is characteristic of Western historiography. In contrast *tala*

<sup>1</sup> Oxford English Dictionary, “myth” [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\\_english/myth](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/myth).

<sup>2</sup> See Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, p. 8, 19 and *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* p. 23

<sup>3</sup> Simanu-Klutz in *A Malu i Fale*, prelude.

*fa'asolopito*,<sup>4</sup> as Jocelyn Linneken argues, are 'tales of events told in succession',<sup>5</sup> that are not actually 'Indigenous', but are actually a "rendering of the introduced concept of Western history rather than a native concept that the missionaries translated as 'history.'"

Western historiographies are based on paradigms that are largely linear and privilege correspondence theories of 'truth.' Samoan devices, though, including genealogies, are often circular and perhaps correlate more with coherence paradigms of truth. Thus, Linnekin equates *tala fa'asolopito* with Western historiography, which is linear and sequential. Such *tala* are Samoan correspondences to Western articulations of history that are based on such assumptions.<sup>6</sup> In my analyses of Samoan *tala*, I take into consideration that there are multiple stories, often variants with multiple conflicting narratives. This Samoan epistemic postulation is rooted in the adage "e tala lasi Sāmoa," Samoan is riddled with multiple versions of stories. This is reflective of Samoan notions of history and ontological and epistemological thought that does not utilize citations or precise individualistic referencing of sources as modern academic do today, but leaves fluid the authorship and collective and genealogical creativeness of stories as an endeavor of collective enterprise. It is, therefore, important to read Samoan stories with these concepts in mind, and in particular, when compared with Samoan adoption of Western historiography through *tala fa'asolopito*.

### The Origins of the Samoan *Atunu'u*

This section will cover three main themes: the etiological myths regarding the origin of the islands known to the Samoan archipelago, the origin of the name Sāmoa, and the ethnogenesis of

<sup>4</sup> See "'Morning of the Country': Centering the Nation in Samoan Historical Discourse." In *Narrative of Nation in the South Pacific*. Eds Otto, Ton and Nicholas Thomas. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 199-220.

<sup>5</sup> She quotes this from Pratt 1977[1862]:114. Milner 1966: 233.

<sup>6</sup> See Hanneman 2013 and Linnekin 1997.

the Samoan race, according to Samoan traditions in comparison to Western anthropological theories. Although we have argued that Samoan indigenous references may be rooted in cyclical and fluid narratives, we will endeavor to work in a sort of linear conceptualization by attempting to begin with certain reference points: the beginning of the Samoan nation in time and location and the beginning of Samoan people through their ancestral and genealogical connections.

### Myths and Cosmogony: The ‘Birth of a Nation’

An appropriate history of Samoan nationhood would not be complete without reference to origin stories told through the process of *tu‘ugutu* and *tu‘utaliga*,<sup>7</sup> or passed down through oral tradition and other indigenous methodologies. It has been common for both early and contemporary authors writing about Samoan history to include not only Western [read: ‘objective’] accounts of how Sāmoa came about, but to incorporate Indigenous cosmogonies. There are several cosmogonies that were recorded by early missionaries and government consuls.<sup>8</sup> In the western half of Sāmoa, missionaries George Turner recorded his ethnographic accounts about Sāmoa between 1840 and 1859, John B. Stair did so in the mid-1850s and George Brown between 1860 and 1874. In Manu‘a, Thomas Powell made his collections in 1854, William Churchill wrote in the 1895, and Augustin Kramer collected works for his two-volume work in 1898.<sup>9</sup> John Fraser recorded several *tala o le vavau* as well as the German Oskar Stubel.

Table 2.1. Cosmogonies from the earliest available sources

Recorded by	Year first published	Story	Informant(s)
Powell, Thomas	1886-1887	“A Samoan tradition of creation and the deluge”	Unknown
Pratt, George	1892	“The Samoan story of creation – A ‘Tala’	Unknown

<sup>7</sup> Literally, passed down through the “mouth” and “ears”. The indigenous method of intergenerational storytelling through which genealogies, family stories, histories, and important events are passed through oral transmission.

<sup>8</sup> These are the cosmogonies from English sources. The wealth of information collected from the French Catholic missionaries and other German sources has not yet been surveyed.

<sup>9</sup> Lowell D. Holmes. “Ta‘u: Stability and Change in a Samoan Village”, *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, 301.

<b>Stuebel, Oskar</b>	“O le tala i le tupuga o Samoa”		Unknown
	“O le tupuga o le Eleele o Samoa ma tagata”		
<b>Turner, George</b>	1884	Ten short stories about “Cosmogony and Man”, p. 3-9 in <i>Samoa, A Hundred Years Ago and Beyond</i>	Unknown
<b>Stair, John B.</b>			Unknown
<b>Kramer, Augustin</b>	1902	“O le Solo o le Va o le Fofoaga o le Lalolagi”	Unknown
<b>Fraser, John</b>	1892 (1870)	““O le Solo i le Foa-foaga”	Rapi-sa-Soatoā (from Fitiuta)
	1892	“O le tala i le tupuaga o Samoa atoa fo’i ma Manu’a, a e amata le tala ona fia i Manu’a.”	Tauānu’u (from Manu’a)
	1897	“O le Solo o le Va – ‘A Song about Strife”	Fofō (from Ta’ū)
<b>Tuvale, Te’o</b>	1918	“The ancestors of Samoa – Tumua and pule and their King”	Tuvale
		“Lauati’s version of the ancestors of Samoa”	Lauaki Namulau’ulu
<b>Henry, Fred Br.</b>	1914	“Samoaan Genesis”	Cites Turner

#### Origin Stories and “Creation” Mythologies<sup>10</sup>

Cosmogonies tell us a great deal about what a nation believes about its origins, whether these stories are grounded in paradigms that privilege correspondence theory on truth or are more concerned about constructing and reiterating coherent national myths to explain the cosmic world order. The dominant cosmogonies in the West, whether one relies on the literal or metaphorical religious creation stories set forth by Judeo-Christian scriptures or the scientific corpus of theories on the origins of the universe, provide us clues about how the world is organized (and perhaps why) and how societies explain the current sociopolitical situation. Samoans are no exception to the endeavors which seek to explain the world order, whether by constructing various literary narratives or by trying to synthesize this with their natural observations of the visible world. For

<sup>10</sup> The term “creation” does not necessarily do justice to the actual stories about cosmogony. This paper prefers to use “cosmogony” in its place.

the Samoan, these two paradigms are not mutually exclusive and the dichotomy between these two epistemic methodologies need not be divorced from each other.

In this section, I survey and analyze various cosmogonies that try to explain the order of the Samoan universe and its trajectory towards the Samoan *Atunu 'u*. The diversity of various *tala o le vavau* (stories from the ancient past) and their coexistence in Samoan ontological thought give credence to Samoan notions of pluralism as expressed in the adage, “E tala lasi Sāmoa,” Sāmoa is entrenched with many variations of multiple stories, all of which could be viewed as “correct,” at least to varying degrees and depending on from whom one solicits their opinions. This may oppose Western theories of truth based on empirical and objective data (despite historically Christian theological cosmogonies that are conflicting at times), however, this is not problematic to Samoans. For Samoans, history is relative and historical events are not necessarily linear but are transmitted and recalled as stories engrained in *tala o le vavau* and *tāeao*, which blend both naturally bounded events within the laws of physics, and “supernatural” events that are not constrained by scientific epistemological and ontological limitations. Simanu-Klutz, in citing ‘Aumua Simanu’s and ‘Ai’ono Fanaafi’s recognition of the plurality of perspectives in interpreting historical events, acknowledges that these variations are not to be discarded <sup>11</sup> [66] Samoan ontology permits the coexistence and plurality of various stories, given the vast repertoire of oral histories that are dispersed throughout the numerous villages of the Samoan *Atunu 'u*.

### Vavau as Cosmogony

“Vavau” is a term that refers to a person and a family of people, various physical locations within the natural world, and a marker of time in Sāmoa’s prehistory. Vavau is, according to one

<sup>11</sup> Simanu-Klutz 64.

account from Manu'a, a son of Tagaloasilasila of the Tagaloa clan, who is sent to the earth.<sup>12</sup> As a physical locale there are several places: Malae-o-Vavau (Malae of Vavau) is located in Ta'ū, according to Fraser.<sup>13</sup> The significance of Vavau as a cognate place name recurs through Polynesia: in Tonga, Vava'u is the closest group to Sāmoa; in Sāmoa, Vavau is a village in the south east end of 'Upolu in the district of Lotofaga (facing the Vava'u group in Tonga); in Tahiti, Vava'u is the old name for the island Taha'a. In Hawai'i, 'Upolu and Wawao (Wawau) are referenced in chants and believed to be where Pā'ao is from. The significance of Vavau as the personal name of an individual and a clan (Sā Vavau, the family of Vavau) and place name would eventually manifest into an actual marker of time in history. The tofiga i le Malae o le Vavau (the distribution of roles at the Malae of the Vavau) recalls when Pili, ancestral founder of 'Upolu (Sāmoa's main island), divided the *pāpā* titles of 'Upolu to his children and, thus, established the political order in the Samoan islands west of Manu'a. Thus, *vavau* refers to the ancient past, the time of becoming in which Sāmoa was formulating its social structure and political foundations. As Simanu-Klutz says, it was a time of apportionment and boundary-setting, citing the often-invoked adage, “‘O Sāmoa ‘ua ‘uma ona tofi,” Sāmoa has already been apportioned.<sup>14</sup> It is within this timeframe that Sāmoa's *tala*, oral histories, its cosmogonies, stories, hierarchies, constitutions (*fa'alupega*), social institutions (Fa'asāmoa), and political order (Fa'amatai) were established for all future generations to venerate, transmit, and perpetuate. It is the context of the *vavau* that the *foafoaga*,<sup>15</sup> or the “creation” of the Samoan universe and, thus, the Samoan *Atunu'u* will be contextualized.

<sup>12</sup> John Fraser, “Vavāu and Sā Vavāu”, 34-35.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 35

<sup>14</sup>“ Simanu-Klutz 62-63. Simanu also distinguishes between Vavau (Sāmoa's past before the advent of written history introduced by the West) and vavau (lower case), the manifestations of this past through various objects, stories, etc.

<sup>15</sup> “Foafoaga” is often translated as “creation” and is often used in many cosmogonies. However, in this case I take a more general definition that translates more into cosmogony. There are major paradigms of cosmogony that will be discussed in this section: the genealogical and creational, which differ in various assumptions.

### *Foafoaga: Origination of the Universe and Man*

Several stories tell of the origin of the *Atunu'u* and only a select few will be explored in this thesis. John Charlot argues that there are three major categories of texts on the origins of the universe: the genealogical, the creational model and a combination of the two.<sup>16</sup> The genealogical narratives, according to Charlot, are the oldest type and the genealogy of the rocks, specifically, form the basis for all other variations of traditions of the *foafoaga* are molded. In analyzing these texts, Samoan ontology and thought are revealed in the order in which things appear in the universe. I juxtapose here three of such genealogies of the rock not to reveal varying degrees of thought, but the commonality of the genealogical paradigm. In addition, the genealogical paradigm will be analyzed against the creational narratives that are seen in the Tagaloa literature that Charlot analyzes.

The following cosmogony recorded by German consul Oskar Stuebel provides us with a bare, one-source genealogy of the rocks taking the form A to B to C:<sup>17</sup>

O le alo a Papalevulevu ia Papafofola, o le alo a Papafofola, ia Papasosolo, o le alo a Papasosolo o Papataoto, o le alo a Papataoto, ia Papanofo, o le alo a Papanofo, ia Papa Tu, o le alo a Papa Tu, o Papaele, o le alo a Papaele, ia Papaalā, o le alo a Papaalā, ia Siupapa, o le alo a Siupapa ia le Fee.

The offspring of Papalevulevu (broad rock), it is Papafofola (flat rock). The offspring of Papafofola, it is Papasosolo (spread out rock). The offspring of Papasosolo, Papataoto (lying down rock). The offspring of Papataoto, it is Papanofo (sitting down rock). The offspring of Papanofo, it is Papa Tu (standing rock). The offspring of Papa Tu, Papaele (compact brown or red rock). The offspring of

<sup>16</sup> Charlot, "Aspects of Samoan Literature II," 132-134.

<sup>17</sup> Stuebel 1896/1973: 161/1

Papaele, it is Papaala (a kind of heavy smooth volcanic stone). The offspring of Papaala, it is Siupapa.

Charlot thinks that this one-source genealogical type is the oldest form of rock genealogy and subsequent narrative forms build up on this base. It is, perhaps, the evolution of Samoan intellectual thought in trying to theorize about the origins of the universe that Samoans are trying to make logical and scientific predictions of the origins of matter. In another recorded version, a similar genealogy arises, except with the insertion of fire (*afi* and *mū*) at the head of the genealogy of the rocks:<sup>18</sup>

O le tane ma le fafine o le igoa o le tane, o Afimumasae, o le igoa o le fafine o Mutalali, ua fanau la la tama o Papaele, o Papaele na ia ua ia Papasosolo, fanau le tama o Papanofo, usu Papanofo ia Papatu, fanau le tama o Fatutu, Fatutu na ia usu ia Ma'atāanoa, fanau le tama o Tapufiti, Tapufiti na ia usu ia Mutia, fanau le tama o Mauutoga, Mauutoga, na usu ia Sefa, Sefa na usu ia Vaofali, Vaofali na usu ia Taāta, fanau le tama o Mautofu, Mautofu na usu ia Tavai, fanau o Toi, Toi na ia usu ia Fuafua fanau o Masame, Masame na ia usu ia Mamala, fanau o Mamalava, Mamalava na ia usu ia Malilii, Malilii na ia usu ia Tapuna, fanau o Vaovaololoa.

There male and the female. The name of the male, Afimusaesae (blazing fire). The name of the female, Mutalali (crackling fire). Their son was born, Papaele. He mated with Papasosolo. Bore the son, Papanofo. Papanofo mated with Papatu. Bore the son, Fatutu (standing stone). Fatutu, he mated with Ma'ataanoa (loose stones on path). Bore the son, Tapufiti. Tapufiti, he mated with Mutia (grass). Bore the son, Mauutoga (kind of weed). Mauutoga, he mated with Sefa (kind of grass). Sefa, she mated with Vaofali (kind of grass). Vaofali, he mated with Taata (kind of grass). Bore the son Mautofu (kind of shrub). Mautofu, he mated with Tavai (large tree). Bore Toi (medium-

<sup>18</sup> See analysis by Charlot, *Aspects of Samoan Literature*, I-III.



sized tree). Toi, he mated with Fuafua (guest-tree). Bore Masame (kind of tree). Masame, he mated with Mamala (medium-sized tree). Bore Mamalava (kind of tree). Mamalava, he mated with Malilii (large tree). Malilii, she mated with Tapuna (parasitic shrub). Bore Vaovaololoa (long ‘bush’ tree, or long weeds).

The first genealogy provides a system in which the rocks are already in existence while in the second, fire precedes the mating of the rocks. The models reveal the nature of Samoan thinking in that it coincides with Western scientific notions of evolution: that fire (magma/lava) gives rise to rocks and rocks give rise to plants. We see here the transition from rocks to plants, an obvious scientific observation of the natural world and Samoans have taken note of this. Samoans must have been very observant of their environment in generating such a cosmogony that reflects its ontological roots.

I provide here another genealogy of the rocks in a two-source format (A + B to C, C + D to E, etc.) inclusive of male-female progenitors. One of the earliest Samoans to transcribe stories of the recent ancient past was Te‘o Tuvale, who wrote about the “ancestors of Samoa” in genealogical form:

1. Papatu married Papafoaiga and their child, a girl was named Papaele.
2. Maataanoa married Papaele and begot a boy, Palapala.
3. Palapala married Puleiluga and begot Puleilalonei.
4. Maatogia married Puleilalonei and their son was named Tupufua.
5. Tupufua married Fogataitailua and begot Masinaauele.  
Tagaloalagi married Masinaauele and begot Tagaloaau. Tagaloaau held his chiefly circle at Manu'a and it was at this circle for the first time that children were forbidden to enter.
6. Kava was also used for the first time at this circle. This meeting was the first round table conference of chiefs ever held in Samoa.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>19</sup> In Tuvale, Te‘o. *An Account of the History of Samoa up Until 1918*.

In this genealogy, Tagaloa, the renowned progenitor god of Sāmoa ubiquitous in the minds of Samoans everywhere, is redacted into the genealogy at the end, in which he marries the offspring of the rock. We can see here that the genealogy of the rocks holds a special precedence, probably because it is an older form and, thus, the Tagaloa literature that privileges Tagaloan cosmogonies must attribute its existence as having unavoidable presence in the origin of the universe.

In stark contrast to the cosmogonies defined by cosmic mating and genealogical succession, one legend that grants Tagaloa supreme creative powers (and perhaps this is influenced by missionaries eager to point out similarities between Christian and heathen Samoan tradition or that Samoans blended Samoan tradition with elements and attributes of Christian theology. The story is transmitted as follows:

O Tagaloa le atua e nofo i le vanimonimo; ua na faia mea uma; ua na o ia e leai se Lagi, e leai se Nu'u; ua na ona fealualu mai o ia i le vanimonimo; e leai fo'i le Sami, ma le Lau-'ele'ele; a o le mea na ia tu ai na tupu ai le Papa. O Tagaloa-fa'a-tutupu-nu'u fo'i lona igoa; ina a fai e ia mea uma, aua e le'i faia le lagi, ma mea uma lava; a ua tupu ai le Papa i le mea na ia tu ai.

The god Tagaloa dwelt in the Expanse; he made all things; he alone was [there]; not any sky, not any country; he only went to and fro in the Expanse; there was also no sea, and no earth; but, at the place where he stood there grew a rock. Tangaloa-fa'atutupunu'u was his name; all things were about to be made, by him, for all things were not yet made; the sky was not made nor anything else; but there grew up a Rock on which he stood.<sup>20</sup>

In this story, Tagaloa is granted creational powers: he is granted a creator role by the use of the verb “faia,” to make or create things. In previous accounts of Samoan genesis, no one (or thing)

<sup>20</sup> See Stuebel, C. 1995. “Tala o le Vavau: Myths, legends and customs of Old Samoa.” *Myths, legends and customs of Old Samoa*.

was accorded these generative powers. In later Tagaloa narratives, such as the *Solo o le Va*, Tagaloa merely called out or *fa'amānu* to the islands and they sprung forth. In this case, he lacked creative agency in producing the islands out of nothing, something attributable to the omniscient and omnipotent Judeo-Christian God, characteristics with which Tagaloa was not endowed. These creational paradigms are later introductions as Samoans sought to syncretize Samoan and Christian ontologies to make sense of the foreign influences that came from the West. Regardless of these influences, the principal figurehead in this Samoan theology remains the elusive character of Tagaloa, whose ubiquitous presence in cosmogonies subsequent to the development of the genealogy of the rocks underscores his importance. As Charlot argues, the Tagaloa literature is grounded in the *Solo o le Vā*.<sup>21</sup>

### *Solo o le Vā*

To ask any knowledgeable Samoan about the origins of Sāmoa is to inquire about the creational power that is endowed in Tagaloa, which we investigate in this version of the “Solo o le Vā”<sup>22</sup> collected by John Fraser. A *solo* describes a chant or song in poem (rather than prose) form and in this chant, the world is one full of strife:

Galu lolo, ma galu fātio‘o,  
 Galu tau, ma galu fefatia‘i; –  
 ‘O le auau peau ma le sologa peau,  
 Na ona fa‘afua a e le fati: –  
 Peau ta ‘oto, peau ta ‘alolo,  
 Peau mālie, peau lagatonu,  
 Peau ālilī ‘a, peau la ‘aia,  
 Peau fatia, peau taulia,  
 Peau tautala, peau lagava‘a,  
 Peau tagatā, peau a sifo mai gagae,  
 O lona soa le auau tata‘a.

<sup>21</sup> Charlot, John. 1991. “Aspects of Samoan Literature II. Genealogies, Multigenerational Complexes, and Texts on the Origin of the Universe.” *Anthropos* 86 (1/3): 137.

<sup>22</sup> Fraser, John. “O le Solo o le Va – A Samoan story about strife”, 1897.

Rollers flooding, rollers dashing,  
Rollers struggling, rollers clashing: –  
The sweep of waters, and the extension of waves,  
Surging high but breaking not: –  
Waves reclining, waves dispersing,  
Waves agreeable, waves that cross not,  
Waves frightsome, waves leaping over,  
Waves breaking, waves warring,  
Waves roaring, waves upheaving,  
The peopled waves, waves from east to west,  
Whose companion is the wandering currents.

Contrary to Western cosmogonies that favor paradigms of *creation ex nihilo*, that is creation out of nothing, Samoan cosmogonies do not adhere strictly to this paradigm.<sup>23</sup> In the *Solo*, there are preexisting elements, e.g., the numerous *galu* and *peau* – waves – in the vast ocean. The scene does not start out of *leai*, nothingness, but begins with an ocean full of chaos and strife.

Land appears because the Tuli desires to rest:

“Tagaloa e, taumuli ai,  
Tagaloa fia mālōlō;  
E mapu i le lagi Tuli mai vasa;  
Ta lili‘a i peau a lalō.”

“O Tangaloa, who sittest at the helm [of affairs],  
Tangaloa[’s bird] desires to rest;  
Tuli from the ocean must rest in the heavens;  
Those waves below affright my breast.”

<sup>23</sup> Charlot, John. 1991. “Aspects of Samoan Literature II. Genealogies, Multigenerational Complexes, and Texts on the Origin of the Universe.” *Anthropos* 86 (1/3): 127-150.

The Tulī is significant in that it appears in other stories as the *ata* or shadow or image of Tagaloa; in other stories, she is the daughter of Tagaloa. The association of the Pacific golden plover (*Pluvialis dominica*) with the Tagaloa clan highlights the importance of Tagaloa in creating and settling the Samoan islands. The imagery is that of a bird seeking refuge creates a paradigm in which Sāmoa finds purpose in being created for the Tagaloa people.

The first lands to be brought forth (not ‘created’)

Fea le nu‘u na lua‘i tupu?  
Manu‘a tele na mua‘i tupu.  
Where is the land which first upsprang?  
Great Manu‘a first rose up.

Manu‘a’s prominence in the genealogy is so great that it precedes the creation of water and the seas:

E tupu le vai, tupu le tai, tupu le lagi.  
Ifo Tagaloa e asiasi;  
Tagi i sisifō, tagi i sasa‘ē;  
Na tutulu i le fia tula‘i.

[25] Tupu Savai‘i ma mauga loa,  
Tupu Fiti ma le atu Toga atoa;  
Tupu Savai‘i a e muli  
Le atu Toga, ma le atu Fiti,  
Atoa ma le atu nu‘u e iti;  
Ma Malae-Alamisi,

Samata-i-uta ma Samata-i-tai:  
Le nofoa a [sic] Tagaloa ma lona ta‘atuga.  
‘O Manu‘a na lua‘i gafoa –  
‘O le mapusaga o Tagaloa –  
A e muli le atu nu‘u atoa.

The waters in their place appear,  
 The sea too occupies its sphere;  
 The heavens ascend, [the sky is clear];  
 To visit [the scene] Tangaloa comes down;  
 To the west, to the east, his wailing cry he sends;  
 A strong desire to have a place whereon to stand  
 Possesses him; [he bids the land arise]  
 [25] Savai'i with its high mountain sprang up  
 And up sprang Fiti and all the Tongan group;  
 Savai'i arose [I say]; and afterwards  
 The Tongan group, and the group of Fiti;  
 [Together with] all the groups of small lands;  
 With the home of Alamisi [the two Samatas arose] –  
 Samata inland and Samata by the sea,  
 The seats of Tangaloa and his footstool.

But great Manu 'a first grew up –  
 The resting place of Tangaloa –  
 After that all other lands.

Several lines later we see the creation of 'Upolu and Tutuila

[40] Le va i nu'u po ua tutusa  
 E levaleva le vasa ma savili  
 E lili'a Tagaloa ia peau alili  
 Tagi i lagi sina 'ili 'ili!

Upolu sina fatu lāitiiti,  
 Tutuila, sina ma 'a lāgisigisi,  
 Nu'u fa'aō e ā sisii:  
 E mapusaga i ai ali'i,  
 Tagaloa e 'ai fa'afēi'i.

[40] Which lies between, from place to place.  
 The ocean between is long and breezy;  
 Terrific waves affright Tagaloa;  
 'Oh for a little coral strand!' thus he cries to heaven;  
 Upolu, a very small bit of rock,  
 And Tutuila, a little stony land,

Are isles that thereupon immediately arise;  
Where chiefs [in aftertimes may] find a place of rest,  
And gods, tho' pinched for room, have many a feast.

### *Analysis of the Solo*

The *Solo* provides us with a critical analysis of how Samoans viewed their universe and the structural order in which the “creation” of the Samoan archipelago. What is interesting is that there is no mention of the word “Sāmoa” in the *Solo*. Both Tonga and Fiji are mentioned, but nowhere is the actual name “Sāmoa” to be found, not even in the title of the *Solo*. What, then, can be inferred about “Sāmoa”? That perhaps it does not merely include ‘Upolu, Savai’i, Tutuila, and Manu’a, but even Tonga and Fiji.<sup>24</sup> If this is the national myth that explains the order of the Samoan universe, what does the inclusion of other ‘nations’ say about the creation of Sāmoa? The conceptual notions of the nation previously talked about are complicated by this conundrum. Samoans were obviously in contact with other peoples (and ‘nations’) at the time this chant was written, though the name ‘Sāmoa’ was perhaps either not in use, did not yet exist, or was not the name accorded to the whole archipelago. What, then, does this have to say about the nation of Sāmoa as it existed in comparison to other nations of which it was aware? This cosmogony says much about Sāmoa’s political relations between Manu’a and ‘Upolu and Tutuila. What problematizes the situation is the inclusion of Tonga and Fiji in the *Solo*. What, then, are Tongans and Fijians in relation to Samoans, since whether they are considered distinct races, and therefore *Atunu’u*, becomes ambiguous? If they have been interacting with Samoans for centuries, how are they placed within the Samoan global order?

### *Extent of the Atunu’u : Connecting Tonga and Fiji*

<sup>24</sup> Though the district ‘Āiga i le Tai, which consists of the small, yet politically significant islands Manono and ‘Apolima, is not mentioned in the solo, it is included under the political sphere of ‘Upolu.

The Samoan nation's relationship with Tonga and Fiji not only provide clues about Samoa's position in the cosmogony but in relation to the settlement and migration patterns in Western Polynesia. Sean Barnes and Terry Hunt, in a non-exhaustive study of Samoan oral traditions, collected numerous stories juxtaposing the shared encounters between Tongan and Fiji.<sup>25</sup> After analyzing more than 200 stories, they came to three compelling conclusions: (1) that Sāmoa has stronger connections with Tonga and Fiji than with other Polynesian and Pacific islands; and (2) Sāmoa and Western Polynesia have fewer similarities in oral traditions and, therefore, weaker connections, with Eastern Polynesia. The last conclusion argues that the Tongan connections are more practical (marriage, politics, war, etc.) and the Fijian connections more "mythical" (which Barnes and Brunt refer to as stories concerning 'ghosts' and 'long time ago'). These findings coincide with the archaeological and linguistic evidence which aligns Fiji, Tonga, and Sāmoa together under a grouping that is more closely related and in which Proto-Polynesian culture developed in its nascent stages. Charlot argues that the inclusion of Tonga and Fiji within the scope of the *Solo* are indicative of a Manu'a's taunting of other islands, including Tutuila and Tonga and Fiji, to prop up the primacy of Manu'a in Samoan cosmogony.<sup>26</sup>

These cosmogonies provide us with insight into how Samoans viewed not only their universe, but gives us clues as to the long duration of settlement in Sāmoa. Samoans believe that they have always been in Sāmoa, rejecting the notion that they sailed from other places or that they originate from elsewhere.<sup>27</sup> Such is the case when Māori ethnologist Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) presented his theory on the origin of Polynesian to a group of Manu'a chiefs, who politely

<sup>25</sup> Barnes, Shawn and Terry L. Hunt. "Sāmoa's Precontact Connection with the West." In *Journal of the Polynesian Society*. Auckland: Polynesian Society: 2005, 227-266.

<sup>26</sup> Charlot, "Aspects of Samoan Literature II" 137-140.

<sup>27</sup> Simanu-Klutz 64, citing Kramer, *The Samoa Islands*, 26.



rejected his explanations.<sup>28</sup> Samoans view themselves as having come from the *'ele'ele*, the earth, as descendants of the *papa* (rocks) and as children of Tagaloa. Although modern Western scholarship has traced Fijian and Tongan settlement earlier than the peopling of the Samoan archipelago, Samoans, have, in the *Solo* asserted primacy of their own cosmogony. Tonga and Fiji, although probably older, are created after Sāmoa, instead of before it. Thus, Sāmoa's, especially Manu'a's, preeminence is asserted, memorialized, and transmitted in chant. Furthermore, this gives support to the assumption that Samoans have probably been in Sāmoa so long that they no longer remember where they came from.<sup>29</sup> Thus, it makes sense for Tonga and Fiji to be taunted and relegated lower ranks in the order of creation. For Samoans, though, as descendants of Tagaloa and Sāmoa itself, we must look closer at how they view themselves as *moa fanua*, native fowl of the land, rather than as *moa folau*, foreign fowl from overseas.

#### Peopling and Settling the Nation: *Moa Fanua* and *Moa Folau*

Early accounts by missionaries, government consuls, and ethnographers not only include the cosmogonies of the natives but also include their own theories about the settlement of Sāmoa. Stair is an exception in that he excludes any cosmogony, though he includes his settlement theories.

Ideas about the subsequent settlement of Sāmoa after its genesis can be dichotomized according to the origin of man through mythological stories or through migration theories. Western epistemological traditions based on “empirical” and “scientific” premises postulate that people come from somewhere else and do not spontaneously originate from their own lands. There seems to be few indigenous migratory stories in the Samoan ontological traditions, other than sporadic

<sup>28</sup> This incident is recalled in Meleisea, “Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa,” 2.

<sup>29</sup> In other more recently settled Polynesian islands such as Hawai'i, there are oral traditions that give clues as to where they come from. Māori, for example, believe they come from Hawaiki and Hawaiians believe they come from Tahiti. Samoans do not have such known traditions, however, there are references to Fiji and Tonga, which could probably suggest that there was interaction with these island groups. Samoans may have “forgotten” that they may have come from here.

references to Fiji (e.g. the origin of the tattoo, and stories about Fijians settling Manono, the presence of a 'Fitiuta' in Ta'ū).<sup>30</sup>

I consider Simanu-Klutz's use of the terms *moa fanua* and *moa folau* in referencing the successive settlements of the Samoan archipelago.<sup>31</sup> The differentiation between *moa fanua* and *moa folau* are analogous to the binary distinctions between those who are indigenous and those who are foreign, either transient or settler, to a particular place, this case being in Sāmoa. Samoans are *moa fanua*, as the aboriginal people of Sāmoa and as children of the *papa* and Tagaloa.

### *Pre-Moa Fanua*

Two important figures in Samoan mythology are those of Ti'iti'iatatalaga and Lata. Both stories relay the importance of Polynesians as voyagers and settlers in the vast Pacific Ocean. Tagaloa, who is not only patron of housebuilding, but is also progenitor of the guild of canoe-builders. As the principal god associated with bringing forth the islands, his domain in Sāmoa spans both land and sea.<sup>32</sup> In terms of the seas, Tagaloa is the god of both sailors and shipbuilders. A relative of Tagaloa, Maui Ti'iti'iatatalaga, becomes a preeminent sailor, so much so that he appears in other Polynesian traditions as having fished up islands from the sea.<sup>33</sup>

Lata, who was the offspring of Samoan parents Fafieloa and Tula, of Tutuila, became one of the finest sailors in Polynesia. The first canoe that he built was an *alia* or *va'atele* – a double-

<sup>30</sup> Though Samoans have relegated the importance of Fiji in its cosmogonies through the subordination of the 'atu Fiti' in the "Solo o le Vā", sporadic references to Fiji are significant as possible indicators that it might have been a place of origin for the Samoans. Ta'ū is widely lauded as the origin place of the ancient Samoans, as attested to by oral tradition and archaeological evidence; the presence of the village Fitiuta ('Fiti inland') in Ta'ū is perhaps a vestige of the origin of the Samoans from Fiji (Since there is no Fiti-tai, perhaps Fiti-tai is a reference to Fiji).

<sup>31</sup> Simanu-Klutz, 'A Malu i Fale, 66.

<sup>32</sup> In other places in Polynesia, Tagaloa's status is relegated to other gods, such as Tāne. He becomes merely god of the sea and is subordinate to greater gods in various places.

<sup>33</sup> Henry, *Samoa: An Early History*, 1980, 21-23. Note that some versions use Tiitiatalaga and Tietieatalaga. The name 'Maui' is not found in earlier sources other than in Henry's historical account.

hulled canoe – named Pualele, after his mother. Lata sailed all over Polynesia, as far as Rarotonga and Aotearoa, establishing dynasties and races of Polynesians. That he was a Samoan figurehead was an important hint for the settling of other lands. Lata is credited with building the first voyaging canoe, a sign of his purpose in the larger scheme of voyaging traditions that bring about the peopling of the Pacific.

*Moa Fanua: The Peopling of Sāmoa and Manu‘a*

The recurrent theme of “e tala lasi Sāmoa” – that there are many versions of a story, each afforded its own veracity – gives us several accounts about the genesis of humankind.<sup>34</sup> Relating back to the *Solo o le Vā*, the first (and therefore indigenous) people to ‘ainā or inhabit the islands did not come about by boat from a foreign land, as in other Polynesian cosmogonies, but were fashioned from the very land that Tagaloa called forth in the *Solo o le Vā* and other important stories.

Na fa‘aifo ai le Fue-Tagata;  
Fa‘atagataina ai Tutuila,  
Ma Upolu, ma Atua, ma A‘ana,  
Atoa ma Le Tuamasaga.  
Ona gaoi fua o tino, e lē a‘ala,  
E leai ni fatu-mānava.  
Logologo Tagaloa i luga,  
Ua isi tama a le Fue-sā,  
Na ona gaoi i le la;  
E lē vaea, e lē lima,  
E lē ulua, e lē fofoga,  
E leai ni fatu-mānava!  
Ifoifo Tagaloa i sisifo,  
I fetalaiga e tu ‘u titino:  
“Fua o le Fue, ni nai ilo;

<sup>34</sup> Another common saying, “‘O Samoa ‘o se i‘a iviivia”, Samoa is a fish with many bones – much that of a tree with many roots and branches – is another appropriate motif for characterizing the diversity and plurality of Samoan stories and perspectives.

E totoni a'u fa'asinosino;  
Outou loto na momoli ifo'  
Ia pouli outou tino;  
Ia malama outou mata,  
E tali a'i Tagaloa,  
A e pe ā maui ifo e savalisavali."

And hither came down [from heaven] the peopling vine,  
Which gave to Tutuila its inhabitants,  
And to Upolu, and Atua, and A'ana,  
Together with Le Tuamasanga.  
The bodies only move, they have no breath,  
Nor heart's pulsation.  
[The godlike Tangaloa] learns [in heaven] above,  
The sacred vine to gender life has now begun,  
But that its offspring only wriggle in the sun;  
No legs, no arms they have,  
No head, no face,  
Nor heart's pulsation.  
Tangaloa then, descending to the west,  
Speaks but the word and it is done:  
"These fruits, the product of the vine are worms,  
But them I fashion into member'd forms;  
To each of you from above I now impart a will;  
Opacity must be the state of your bodies still;  
Your faces, they must shine, [I so ordain]  
That they may Tangaloa entertain,  
When he comes down to walk this earth again."

Mankind, not yet called Samoans, were the product of the "Fue-Tagata," the "peopling vine," the vine that descended from heaven to give rise to human beings. Shapeless and disembodied, these worm-like creatures are given form by Tagaloa.

#### Etymology of the Name Sāmoa

Usually associated with the genesis of Sāmoa, or perhaps any nation, is its nomenclature and how it came into being. Various stories provide explanations for the origin of the name

“Sāmoa”. George Turner suggests about four stories,<sup>35</sup> though there are numerous others. The first story attributes the origin of the name Sāmoa to the child Moa, who is the offspring of rocks (Papa) and the earth (‘Ele’ele).<sup>36</sup> Salevao, whose origins are unknown in this story, is introduced as the god of the rocks and witnesses a motion in the center of the earth, which he calls Moa (which refers to the epigastric region<sup>37</sup> and is thus the center of a body). Salevao orders that everything that grew out of Moa would be *sa ia Moa*, ‘sacred to Moa,’ until he grew and his hair would be cut. Thus, Moa was sacred to the rocks and earth and they would be called Sā ‘iā Moa or Sāmoa.

The other three stories center on the figures of Lū and Moa, who have quite ambiguous origins and are seen in other Samoan cosmogonies, other than to explain the origin of the name Sāmoa. In the second story, Tagaloa of the heavens (Tagaloaalagi) fathers two children, a daughter, Lū, and a son, Moa. Lū is an important figure but has ambiguous origins just as does Moa. Lū marries a brother of Tagaloa and begets a son, who is named after Lū. Tagaloa becomes annoyed from his grandson after placing himself above his father Moa and fetches him to scratch his back. Upon attempting the task, Tagaloa beats his grandson, who later flees to earth and names the land Sāmoa.

The third tale explains that the earth was flooded by the sea except for the existence of pigeons (lupe) and fowls (moa). The pigeons flew off and only the chickens were left and were made sacred by Lū. Thus, the name Sāmoa was derived from this prohibition, the sacred hens of Lū. Lū’s origin in this story is not exactly known, although it can be presumed that he (or she) is related to Moa and Lū of Tagaloa.

<sup>35</sup> Turner 10-15.

<sup>36</sup> The exact corresponding Samoan names are not provided in Turner’s English texts, so I have attempted to name them in parenthesis.

<sup>37</sup> Pratt (1960) 221.

In the final story, Turner recounts Tagaloalagi and his son Lū but introduces several other preexisting characters. As Tagaloa and Lū build a *va'a* (canoe) in what can be inferred are the heavens (*lagi*), they are assisted by Manufili, a carpenter. The canoe was taken down to earth, although there was no sea or land. Lū marries Gaogaoletai ('expanse of the sea') and produces another son named Lū. A succession of characters named Lū follows until the sea and all constitutive elements of the Samoan world are formed. The final product is the marriage between Lū and Lagituavalu, whose child would be named Sāmoa. The cyclical nature of these stories may not make sense as some characters are recurring, and it seems that various elements are redacted into other sections of each story. What is important are the inclusion of *moa*, which seemed to be sacred animals to Tagaloa, something that recurs while recounting the origin of the name Sāmoa. As opposed to other Polynesian groups that are named after a specific island (e.g. Tonga, Tahiti, Hawai'i, etc.), there is no such island named Sāmoa, although the origin is always attributed to Manu'a, to which the Tagaloa traditions privilege the Tui Manu'a dynasty.

Before Sāmoa was known as "Sāmoa," the islands were probably known according to their own specific locales. The only exception was Manu'a, which saw itself as distinct from the islands west of it, being collectively known as a single district independent of the other islands. Tui Ātua suggests that the name Sāmoa is relatively recent because of the absence of the Tui regime in Eastern Polynesia.<sup>38</sup> Before Samoans departed Sāmoa to settle other islands, the islands were not called Sāmoa, but were known individually by their own names: Savai'i, 'Upolu, Tutuila, and Manu'a. Among the great "kings" of Sāmoa, there are the Tui Manu'a, Tui Ā'ana, and Tui Ātua.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Su'esu'e Manogi* 192 and *Archeology Oceania* 42 Supplement (2007) 5-10.

<sup>39</sup> The "Tui" titles are also present among other Polynesian islands: Tu'i Tonga, Tu'i Ha'atakalaua, Tu'i Kanokupolu in Tonga, Tui Tokelau in Tokelau, among others. In Sāmoa, there are numerous other "Tui" titles: Tui Fiti, Tui Sāmau, Tui Olosega, etc., suggesting the importance of the level of "tui" as some sort of ancient vestige referring to a paramount chief of kingly status.

There does not seem to be a “Tui Sāmoa” that precedes the seniority of the other individual Tui.<sup>40</sup> Manu‘a, however, is the only known aggregate of islands collectively as a single group and consists of ‘Ofu, ‘Olosega, and Ta‘ū. Only ‘Olosega had a “Tui” title, signifying a supreme paramount chief, other than the Tui Manu‘a.

### *Moa Folau: Three Successions*

Simanu-Klutz classifies three periods of *moa folau*: those who settled Sāmoa, the Tongans who occupied “Sāmoa” (but not Manu‘a), and the *papālagi*.<sup>41</sup> Overall, this section considers more western forms of recorded history, as opposed to the previous sections that incorporated oral tradition. This is not to say that elements of oral tradition are not considered, but that the emphasis will focus on the ways in which oral traditions and Western scholarship inform and support each other.

### *First Moa Folau: From the Southeast*

Though indigenous Samoan etiological myths suggest that Samoans originated in Sāmoa, there are remnants of well-known stories like the origin of the *tatau*, the tattoo, and references to Pūlotu that hint at Fijian origins – an eastward settlement of the islands. This coincides with what archaeologists and anthropologists have suggested for quite a while: that the Samoans are of the Austronesian branch of the human family, descending from the ancient Lapita people that had settled Western Polynesia from the eastern Lau group of the Fiji Islands. Samoans are believed to

<sup>40</sup> The title “Tui Sāmoa” is a more recent renaming of the chief Tui Fe‘ai by Mālietoa in the seventeenth century [CITATION] and should not be implicated as a title having any authoritative preeminence over all of “Sāmoa”, as one might infer from the name.

<sup>41</sup> Simanu-Klutz. ‘A Malu i Fale, e Malu Fo’i i Fafo. 2011.

have descended from a group of seafaring peoples who developed sophisticated navigational technology to sail through and settle much of the Pacific Ocean.

### *Second Peau: From the South*

Samoans have been interacting with other Pacific islanders since time immemorial, especially with the Tongans and Fijians as evidenced in oral traditions like the *Solo o le Vā*. Both oral tradition and western archaeological evidence support a Tongan occupation of Sāmoa for an approximation of three centuries (between 950 C.E. and 1250 C.E.).<sup>42</sup> For three hundred years Sāmoa had undergone various changes under Tongan regimes, with the exception of Manu‘a, which seemed to maintain its independence. Manu‘a usually considered itself as a separate group<sup>43</sup> as attested to by the nomenclature used in the cosmogonies about ‘Samoa *and* Manu‘a’, as if they were two separate entities. “Tonga” is glossed as “south”<sup>44</sup> in English, and pinpoints the relative position of Sāmoa to Tonga (that it is indeed ‘south’ of Sāmoa).<sup>45</sup>

### *Third Peau: From the “West”*

Initial contact with the Western world was largely due in part to beachcombers, whalers, and missionaries. Dutch explorer Jacob Roggeveen is often cited as the first European to have sighted the Samoan islands in 1722. French navigators Louis A. Bougainville and John F. G. de La Pérouse arrived in 1768 and 1787, respectively.<sup>46</sup> The former is credited for giving the name “Navigator Islands” and the latter is associated with the incident at “Massacre Bay” in Tutuila.

<sup>42</sup> Henry, *Talafaasolopito o Samoa*, 2.

<sup>43</sup> I have even encountered some Samoans who have claimed “Manu’an” as a separate race.

<sup>44</sup> This term, along with “saute”, are belived by Pratt (1862) and Tuvala (1918) as more recent terms; perhaps it is a borrowing from Tongan. The modern term “saute” is a transliteration of the English “south”.

<sup>45</sup> In a class lecture by Lei‘ataua Fepulea‘i Vita Livigisitone Tanielu, I recall the instructor telling one version of the settlement of Sāmoa: when the first settlers populated Polynesia, they went to the north and called the islands “Tokelau”, and to the south they called the islands “Tonga” and in the center they called it “Sāmoa”, the “sacred center” of Polynesia.

<sup>46</sup> Turner, *Samoa: A Hundred Years and Ago and Long Before*, 2-3.



Being the first recorded European party to have actually settled on Samoan soil, La Pérouse and his crew did not fare well. The infamous incident recorded in the mountainous village of A‘asu resulted in twelve Frenchmen and Samoans being killed. Word spread throughout about the incident and this functioned as an inhibitor of European involvement in the islands for a significant period of time.<sup>47</sup>

Missionary entry into Sāmoa, though at a very opportune time, was fraught with many complications of denominational rivalries that had been transplanted from Europe. The conventional year that the missionaries arrived in Sāmoa, as it is engrained in the traditional *tāeao* at Matāniufeagaimaleata,<sup>48</sup> is 1830 with the coming of British former ironmonger turned evangelical preacher John Williams of the London Missionary Society (L.M.S.)<sup>49</sup>. Williams arrived in Sāpapālī‘i, Savai‘i on his vessel the *Messenger of Peace* with six Tahitian and Rarotongan teachers and their families,<sup>50</sup> who later exerted influence in the missionization and education of the Samoan converts. Methodist missionary Peter Turner, however, actually arrived two years earlier in 1828, although the contemporary popular narrative is that John Williams and the LMS arrived first and firmly established their mission. Further complicating missionary rivalries in Sāmoa was the arrival of the Catholics in the late to mid-1840s, more than a decade

<sup>47</sup> Malama Meleisea, *Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa* (Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1987), 203-213.

<sup>48</sup> The arrival of the first missionaries in Sāmoa are engrained in the traditional oratorical historicizing of events called *tāeao*. Three ‘national’ *tāeao* are recognized in relation to the church: ‘o le tāeao i Matāniufeagaimaleata, le tāeao i Faleū ma Utuagiagi, and le tāeao i Malacola ma Gafo‘aga, corresponding to the Congregationalist, Methodist, and Catholic missions, respectively. Only these three churches are unofficially recognized in public speech-making through their *tāeao*, partially due to their initial influence among the paramount chiefs of the time. Mālietoa, who was paramount at the time became Protestant through the London Missionary Society, and Matā‘afa, who was his rival contender, initially became Methodist and later converted to Catholicism. Both became patrons of their respective churches and have become influential even until this day.

<sup>49</sup> The London Missionary Society (LMS) later reorganized and split into the ‘Ekālēsia Fa‘apopotopotoga Kerisiano o Sāmoa (Congregational Christian Church of Samoa [CCCS]) and the ‘Ekālēsia Fa‘apopotopotoga Kerisiano o ‘Amerika Sāmoa (Congregational Church of American Sāmoa [CCCAS]).

<sup>50</sup> Simanu-Klutz, *A Malu i Fale, E Malu fo‘i I Fafo*, 78-79.

after Protestantism reached Samoan shores. Fathers Roudaire and Violette, French priests of the Marist order Society of Mary, arrived initially in Faleālupo, Savai'i but were rejected by the chiefs who had already accepted the Protestant teachers.<sup>51</sup>

The role of the missionaries in forming and restructuring the nation is quite nuanced and complicated. For the most part, they are lauded by Samoans for bringing the nation into the *aso o le mālmalama*<sup>52</sup> by bringing the message of salvation for all through Christ.<sup>53</sup> Visible symbols of the nation like tattooing were banned by the Congregationalists, though they were permitted by the Catholics and to a lesser extent the Methodists.<sup>54</sup> They also sought to do away with *pōula*, night dancing, and undermined the important and foundational institution of the *feagaiga* and the *aualuma*.<sup>55</sup> The role of the missionaries in altering the foundation of Samoan society will not be elucidated here. However, their influence in various spheres cannot be overlooked in shaping Samoan social organization. Missionary influence in developing the nation will not be discussed here, although it is important to situate the intrusion of the West through all its agents.

<sup>51</sup> It is quite interesting that missions would be rejected as it is customary in the *fa'asāmoa* (tradition) to welcome strangers with hospitality. The exclusionary attitudes that missionaries had towards each other were reflective of not only *papālagi* and Christian culture and mannerisms, but seemed to exacerbate already fierce familial and district rivalries. Other missions, especially the newer and less "conventional" denominations faced similar receptions and rejections. The Catholics seemed to be the only ones to rise to prominence in the national arena by acquiring the patronage of a high contender to the throne, Matā'afa Iosefo.

<sup>52</sup> This is common rhetoric in speeches and Samoan ontology in general to distinguish Sāmoa's past into two epochs: the *aso o le pōuliuli*, "the days of darkness" of cannibalism and heathenism, i.e., pre-Christian times, and the *aso o le mālmalama*, "the days of enlightenment".

<sup>53</sup> Christianity's reception by the Samoans is often portrayed as an overnight phenomenon in which the natives fully accepted the tenets and teachings of Christianity. However, their conversion is complex and is motivated and influenced by many factors. Some Samoans saw the religion as politically and economically advantageous and did not wholly commit; some conversions were nominal at best and the early missionaries were initially lax and slow to implement the full-scale package of conservative evangelical Christianity. Some also backslided between the old religion and others were syncretic in accepting some elements of Christianity and retaining elements of the old religion.

<sup>54</sup> See Fofō Sunia, *Measina a Samoa* on the section on the "Tatau."

<sup>55</sup> The missionaries, particularly the Protestant ones, were given the *fa'alupega*, or ceremonial title, of *fa'afeagaiga*, "to be treated in the manner of the *feagaiga*", a status that was accorded to and reserved for the eldest sister of the high chief. In gaining preeminence in the Samoan social order, *fai'ē'au* (male clergy) effectively usurped the status once given to women as they were not only granted that status but worked to undermine the status of the indigenous institution of the *aualuma* in favor of Western styles of female subordination.

“‘O Sāmoa ‘ua ‘uma ona tofi”<sup>56</sup>: Forming and Structuring the Nation

Putting together a cohesive narrative that connects genesis of the *Atunu'u* with the inception of a set political order is a complex endeavor. This requires a reference to the *su'ifefiloi* style of weaving together stories that might not always seem related, or are in fact sometimes conflicting. *Su'ifefiloi* is also a process that fuses traditional oral traditions with western notions of truth construction and articulation of historical events. After the origin of the Samoan cosmos and the production of human beings, it could be said that Samoans were in a chaotic liminal transition into a stable order.

The following story recounts how the political order was set into place by Pili, whom Brother Henry regarded as the progenitor of all Samoans,<sup>57</sup> and the distribution of his *tofiga*, his appointments. There are many accounts of the story of Pili as he is a significant figure in Samoan history.<sup>58</sup> According to Henry, he is described as a demigod who is related to Tuimanu'a and Tuiā'ana.<sup>59</sup> Several versions of Pili's genealogy are recorded by Te'o Tuvala, who traces Pili's ancestry to Tagaloaalagi, the great god who brought forth the islands.<sup>60</sup>

Pili's four children, Tua, 'Ana, Tuamasaga, and Tolufale, are called together by their father to receive their appointments through the māvaega or tofiga na i le Malae o le Vavau: <sup>61</sup>

<sup>56</sup> “Samoan has already been apportioned” refers to the belief that Sāmoa's sociopolitical structure had already been grounded in its unchangeable foundations.

<sup>57</sup> *Samoa: An Early History*, 31.

<sup>58</sup> Pili is also prominent in other places in Polynesia. Pili (e.g. Pilika'aiea) appears in some Hawaiian *mo'olelo* (stories), as coming from “Kahiki”, from “Upolu” and “Wawau” – a place somewhere in Tahiti or Sāmoa. See Kalākau's

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 34. According to one genealogy, Pili marries Sinaaletava'e, who is the daughter of Tuiā'ana. It would seem contradictory for Pili to have married a descendant of a Tuiā'ana, when he is in fact the supposed progenitor and predecessor to 'Ana, who is to be the founding ancestor of the Tuiā'ana title. This highlights the complicated and convoluted nature of Samoan versions of truth and the *su'ifefiloi* method of story-telling: that truth is circular and does not necessarily flow linearly as it does in more Western forms of epistemology.

<sup>60</sup> See Tuvala, Te'o. *An Account of Samoan History Up to 1918*.

<sup>61</sup> Tolufale in some stories is said to be male, though in others she is female. This paper takes the position that Tolufale is female in that it is befitting to the Samoan institution of the *feagaiga* and how it relates to the role of peacemaker and conciliator in this context.

Na vaai Pili ua oo i aso e tatau ai ona fai lelei le malo, ona ia valaauina lea o ona atalii e potopoto mai o le a fai tofiga. O le mavaega la lenei a Pili, o Tua, o le a fai ma pule i Atua – le vaega i Sasae i Upolu. O le faailoga o lona tofi, ua avatu i ai e le toeaina lona oso, e tusa ma lona faamoemoe i le galuega e faasaga i ai.

Ua tofia Ana e pule i Aana, le vaega i sisifo o Upolu. Ia avea Aana ma lona itumalo e fai ma tagata tau ua tuu i ai le tao ma le uatogi – e fai ma faailoga o le toa.

O Tuamasaga e nofo i totonu o Upolu i le va o Tua ma Ana. Ua tuu i ai le tootoo ma le fue, o le faailoga o le failauga.

O Tolufale e le i iloga mai sona tofi mo se galuega fou. A ua tuu i ai le tausiga o Manono ma silasila ma matamata mai i Upolu.

When Pili saw that time had come to provide for a better government, he called his sons together to give them their appointments.

In accordance with the last will of Pili, Tua became the founder of Ātua which is the eastern part of ‘Upolu. As an emblem of his destiny the old man gave him a planting stick (‘oso) as a sign that he was expected to do the farm work.

‘Ana became the founder of Ā‘ana, the western part of ‘Upolu. To indicate that he and his district were to form the war party, he gave him as his emblem a club and spear – the signs of a warrior.

Tuamāsāga was to stay in the center of ‘Upolu, between the Atua and A‘ana. He was given to‘oto‘o (staff) and a fue (fly-wisk) which ever since have become the insignia of a talking chief.

Tolufale did not receive any particular object to indicate his new office. Pili appointed him to take over the direction of Manono and the general supervision of ‘Upolu.

Table 2.2 Tofiga o Pili – the divine appointments of Pili.

	<b>Emblem</b>	<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Paramount Title</b>	<b>District</b>
Tua	‘oso (digging stick)	farmer	Tui Ātua	Ātua (Western ‘Upolu and Tutuila)
‘Ana	uatogi, tao (war club, spear)	warrior	Tui Ā‘ana	Ā‘ana (Eastern Upolu)

Saga	<i>fue, to 'oto 'o</i> (fly whisk, staff)	orator	Gato'aitele <sup>62</sup> Vaetamasoāli'i	Tuamāsaga (Central 'Upolu)
Tolufale		peacekeeper, conciliator <i>feagaiga</i>		'Āiga i le Tai: Manono and 'Apolima




Figure 3.1. The Samoan Islands before political partition.<sup>63</sup>

The old adage '*ua 'uma ona tofi Sāmoa*, or that Sāmoa has already been apportioned its roles and foundations, goes hand-in-hand with the story of Pili and his *tofiga*. It is so accustomed to usage that the problems inherently associated with a static view of the world devoid of change are immediately irrelevant. Samoans perceive culture as sacrosanct and not subject to change, as they willfully follow the traditions of their ancestors, whom they value above all others.

<sup>62</sup> Gato'aitele and Tamasoali'i did not appear until Malietoa line began at the end of the Tongan occupation circa thirteenth century.

<sup>63</sup> Source: George Turner. Retrived online: <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14224/14224-h/14224-h.htm>.

That Pili's *tofiga* are directed at 'Upolu highlights the political importance of the island. This is in contrast to the position of 'Upolu and Savai'i in the "Solo o le Vā", in which 'Upolu is treated as a stepping stone to Savai'i – at least from a Manu'a perspective. Associated with his divisions in his *māvaega* are four paramount titles which give authority to the ruling elite of Sāmoa, save Manu'a: Tui Ātua, Tui Ā'ana, Gato'aitele and Vaetamasoāli'i. These four titles supreme titles were called *pāpā*, and according to Morgan Tuimaleali'ifano, were the highest at the initial point of European contact. When an individual chief held all four titles, he was to be called the *tafa'ifā*.”<sup>64</sup>

Pili's significance in bringing about a *mālō* that would counter the influence of Manu'a is instrumental in the shift of power from the Tui Manu'a to 'Upolu. In surveying and analyzing the Pili traditions, it is noted that Pili is an important historical figure both in human form and in his manifestation as a lizard.<sup>65</sup> He is an accomplished farmer and fisherman and is credited with shifting the primacy of Manu'a to the formal districts and paramount chieftainships to the West of Manu'a.<sup>66</sup> His *tōfiga* (appointments) and *māvaega* (departing will) to his children would become the basis for power struggles in the new quests for supremacy over the western *mālō* after the expulsion of the Tongans, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

### *Fa'asāmoa and Fa'amatai: Establishing National Social and Political Institutions*

Important to discussing a national ethos are the social and political foundations that shape the ways a society, and therefore a nation, organizes itself. Samoan sociopolitical configuration

<sup>64</sup> *O Tama a 'Āiga: The Politics of Succession to Samoa's Paramount Titles*, 4-5.

<sup>65</sup> 'Pili' is also glossed as 'lizard'

<sup>66</sup> Charlot, "Aspects of Samoan Literature III, 44-45.

was based on traditional Samoan social and political philosophy, which are based on two key institutions: the Fa‘asāmoa and the Fa‘amatai. <sup>67</sup> Both are elucidated below using Figure 3.2 and in an analysis of the *nu‘u*, the most basic unit of sociopolitical organization.




Figure 2.3: A schema of the Fa‘asāmoa, outlining different elements/aspects

The Fa‘asāmoa is, at its most basic level, Samoan philosophical system that underpins Samoan worldviews: it is, in summary, the ontological, epistemological, ethical, linguistic, and

<sup>67</sup> See Asofou So‘o “Beyond Governance in Samoa: Understanding Samoan Political Thought.” TCP 17-2 (Fall 2005)

religious values, concepts, structures and paradigms that underpin and regulate social, economic, and political organization, interactions and relationships between and among people, the environment, and other entities, both animate or inanimate. Understanding the Fa‘asāmoa is crucial to explicating the sociopolitical structure of the Samoan polity and certain principles and values outlining the organization of both the *nu‘u* and the Fa‘amatai. The ontological foundations of the *nu‘u* rest on *fa‘alupega*, a compilation of honorifics consisting of hierarchies and genealogies of the founding members of a village. The epistemological workings of the Fa‘amatai are rooted in the *tōfā mamao*<sup>68</sup> and the *fa‘autaga loloto*<sup>69</sup> of the *matai*. The *matai* base their knowledge and decision making on *soālaupule*, or the deliberative process of decision-making in which all parties are consulted before final actions are taken. All of these values define the Fa‘asāmoa in a “sociometric” wheel.<sup>70</sup>

#### The *Nu‘u*: A Microcosm of the *Atunu‘u*

Samoan sociopolitical order is embodied in the *nu‘u*, the most basic unit of organization in society around which families and traditional structures revolved. More than just an aggregation of people situated in a localized space, the *nu‘u* encompasses an area bounded by the central ridges of the mountain to the outer reef.<sup>71</sup> Several definitions of the *nu‘u* are given by different accounts, although, it can be summarized as the aggregate of various *‘āiga* living under a single *fono*, the governing council of the *nu‘u*.

<sup>68</sup> *Tōfā mamao* refers to the wisdom of the *ali‘i* class of *matai* (titled people).

<sup>69</sup> *Fa‘autaga loloto* refers to the wisdom of *tulāfale*, the orators. The wisdom of the *tulāfale* complements the wisdom of the *ali‘i* in a symbiotic relationship.


<sup>70</sup> See Meleisea, *The Making of Modern Samoa* 1987 for more discussion on fa‘asāmoa.

<sup>71</sup> Asofou So‘o, *Democracy and Custom in Samoa* (2008), 17



The *‘āiga* is the most basic unit of the *nu‘u*, to which there were several grouped together under the village council and to a certain extent, *‘āiga* were related to each other either to some degree, since *‘āiga* were not random groups of people under a single community. An *‘āiga* includes both the “nuclear” elements and the extended family, *‘āiga potopto*. *Pui‘āiga* was a group of family members associated with a particular title and parcel of land. But *‘āiga* were not necessarily limited to a particular village but could be dispersed throughout several villages, districts, and even islands.<sup>72</sup>

The *nu‘u* is governed by the *fono a matai*, the council of chiefs, which governs the whole village, functioning effectively as the supreme executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. *Matai*<sup>73</sup> is a general term that is glossed in English as “chief,” though “chief” can be quite ambiguous. In ancient times, the term *ali‘i* referred to the ‘higher’ class of chiefs, who were descended from the gods and thus accorded sacred status. Its counterpart, the class of *tulāfale*, was ordinary men descended from human beings and was thus ‘secular.’ Each *nu‘u* has its own particular structure and hierarchy as defined by their *fa‘alupega*. A typical structure is provided by Table 2.3, which outlines the hierarchy of *matai* in villages in Manu’a.



**Figure 2.4.** A Schematization of the *matai*, *ali‘i-tulāfale* relationship. The *tula* is the foundation of the house. The *taualuga* is the apex of the fale, the roof. The *taualuga* is the dance traditionally reserved for the *ali‘i* or his related representatives of kinsman, the *tāupou* and *mānaia*.

<sup>72</sup> Meleisea, *Making of Modern Samoa*, 6.

<sup>73</sup> Most likely this word is derived from “mata ‘i ai”, meaning one whom is looked upon. See ‘Aumua, ‘*O Si Manu a Ali‘i*.

Table 2.3: Organization of the Nu‘u in Manu‘a<sup>74</sup>

<b>Ali ‘i – “Chiefs”</b>	
<i>Ali ‘i Sili</i>	“high chief”
<i>Ali ‘i</i>	“chief”
<i>Ali ‘i Fa ‘avāipou</i>	“between the posts chiefs”
<b>Tulāfale – “Talking Chiefs”</b>	
<i>To ‘oto ‘o</i>	“high talking chief”
<i>Vae o To ‘oto ‘o</i>	“foot of the talking chief”
<i>Lauti laulelei or Tulāfale Fa ‘avāipou</i>	“common talking chief” or “between the posts talking chief”

### The Fa‘amatai as Foundation of Sociopolitical Organization

Ua tōfia nei e le Atua Sāmoa ia pulea e matai.  
 Auā o lona suafa ua vaelua i ai  
 God has willed that Samoa be controlled by matai  
 Because he has shared his authority with them<sup>75</sup>

The basis for the Fa‘asāmoa – and therefore the nation – is the Fa‘amatai, the chiefly system from which all social and political institutions derive their authority. Although Lau Asofou So‘o has listed five levels at which the Fa‘amatai operates (the *‘āiga*, the *nu‘u*, the sub-district, the district, and national), <sup>76</sup> I have condensed it into three categories: the *nu‘u*, *itūmālō*, and the *mālō*.

The Fa‘amatai originally consisted of three major groupings:

1. Fono a Matai
2. Aualuma (Nu‘u o Tama’ita’i)
3. ‘Aumāga

Contemporary organization of the *nu‘u* can be organized according to several major groups:<sup>77</sup>

<sup>74</sup> See Lowell D. Holmes, “Ta‘u: Stability and Change in a Samoan Village”, 321-323.

<sup>75</sup> Meleisea, *Making of Modern Samoa*, 230

<sup>76</sup> “Culture and Governance in a Future Pacific: The case of Samoa.” In Culture and Governance in a Future Pacific, 36-41.

<sup>77</sup> These are derived from Aiono Fanaafi’s *O le Faasinomaga* (1997), 11-16, and Emma Kruse Va‘ai’s *Producing the Text of Culture* (2011), 25-27.

1. Tama‘ita‘i (‘daughters of the village’)<sup>78</sup>
2. ‘Aumāga/Tāulele‘a (untitled males)
3. Faletua ma Tausi (wives of chiefs)
4. Fānau Lalovaoa (children)
5. ‘Igoa Matai’: Ali‘i ma Tulāfale (chiefly titles, *ali‘i* and *tulāfale*)
6. Faiāvā (husbands who marry into the village) ma Nofotāne (wives of *tāulele‘a*)




Figure 2.5.: A schema of the *nu‘u* along gendered lines.

There are two complementary parts to the Fa‘amatai – the *nu‘u o tama‘ita‘i* which comprises all ‘native daughters’ of the village and the *nu‘u o ali‘i*, the ‘native sons’ of the village,

<sup>78</sup> ‘Daughters of the village’ in this sense refers to those who are natives of the village; that is they are *suli* or ‘true heirs’ by virtue of being born into the village, having genealogical connections to the *fa‘alupega* of the village, as opposed to *fafine nofotāne*, women who marry into the village. These *nofotāne* include both the wives of chiefs and those women who are married to *tāulele‘a*, untitled men. It is customary for Samoans to marry outside of the village so as to preserve the binary relationship of being a *tagata o le nu‘u* (a person of that village). As quasi-brothers and sisters, in theory everyone in a *nu‘u* is technically related to some degree or another. This is part of the reason Samoans will marry outside of their own village, especially the one(s) for whom they claim most affinity. In addition, marriage outside of the village is encouraged to increase the political alliances and connections with other villages.

as opposed to affines. The *nu'u* is inherently exogamous, with marriage within the village discouraged and frowned upon.<sup>79</sup> The complementarity of village structure is embodied in the endemic Samoan institution of the *feagaiga*, the sacrosanct sister-brother relationship marked by avoidance and deference.<sup>80</sup> All '*āiga* within each *nu'u* are expected to abide by the constructs of this relationship. All male sons and female daughters are to treat each other in the same respect as brothers and sisters of the *nu'u*. Any violation of this relationship, especially those sexual in nature, is tantamount to incest and worthy of contempt and the appropriate punishment. Sisters, as *feagaiga*, have the power to bless or curse their brothers, and are to be consulted on all decisions regarding matters concerning the '*āiga*. Women who are daughters of the village have power and prestige over those who are affines, including the *faletua* and *tausi*. When women live in their husband's family, this relationship is reversed; she takes on the role of *nofotāne* and is subject to the authority of her husband's sisters and family.

The *nu'u o tama'ita'i*, or *aualuma*, comprises the native daughters who claim the *nu'u* in which they reside as their natal village. This effectively excludes wives of the chiefs and untitled men from being a "true" member of the village, as they are looked upon as *nofotāne*, in-marrying wives. The group including *faletua* (wives of *ali'i*) and *tausi* (wives of *tulāfale*) are traditionally subject to the authority of the *sa'o tama'ita'i*, or the *tāupou*, who is the *feagaiga* of the village. This role has diminished over the years, particularly due to the influence of Christianity and Westernization,<sup>81</sup> to the point where the *aualuma* has no real effective power in many villages. But

<sup>79</sup> This has changed in recent years as more and more people are marrying within the *nu'u*, villages, or *pitonu'u*, subvillages.

<sup>80</sup> The *feagaiga*, which comes from the verb *feagai*, means to face one another. This special relationship is marked by deference and avoidance. Brothers and sisters are to avoid any semblance of talk sexual in nature; they are to avoid wearing the same clothes. Brothers are expected to protect their sisters and provide support for them whenever necessary. In turn, sisters cheer on their brothers and are consulted by them with the power of veto or the power to curse their brothers if they do not heed their will or disrespect them.

<sup>81</sup> See Simanu-Klutz 2011.

the status of the sister as *feagaiga* is not to be underestimated, as it wields much power and prestige over the *nu'u o ali'i*. It is this particular reason that brothers were expected to take on the role of *matai*, as *ali'io'aiga*, while the sister remained in her dignified position as *feagiaga*.

At the center is the *fono a matai*, which is in theory not necessarily gendered, but in practice it is dominated by the *nu'u o ali'i*. They are not only the trustees and guardians of village lands and titles and oversee all affairs, but they possess authority that spans the executive, judicial, and legislative dimensions of governance. Above the *nu'u* was the *itūmālō*, which were districts organized according to traditional historical alliances. Above the *itūmālō* existed a somewhat looser association of *mālō*, which were amenable to certain times in history. There were the least stable.

The *Atunu'u* comprised these various political entities, which could not be easily simplified to single nations. Before the arrival of the Europeans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Sāmoa did not have a tradition of a permanent 'national' system of government in the sense that the country was administered permanently from a central headquarters. Instead, a system existed where a district under the leadership of its paramount titles, which conquered another district, would establish a kind of 'central' government. This arrangement, however, would last only as the victorious district was able to maintain power. Once successful in the battlefield, the new victors would establish dominance over the island group or a significant section of it until they in turn were defeated.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Asofou So'o in "Culture and Governance in a Future Pacific: The Case of Samoa", 40-41.




Figure 2.6. Structure of the *Atunu'u* and *Fa'amatai* in terms of increasing *mamalu*, prestige, and decreasing political stability prior to contact.

The *nu'u*, the village, was the foundation of 'national' organization having the most political stability. As the most basic unit of social and political organization, the *nu'u* was stable as such because of the foundations of the *fa'asāmoa* and the *fa'amatai*. The *fa'alupega* of the village was more stable and less amenable than national or district *fa'alupega*. *Mamalu*, sanctity, though, moved up the hierarchy to the levels of the *mālō* and *itūmālō*.




Figure 2.7. Structure of the *Atunu'u* with regards to the current *mālō*.

As the state was developed, it – at least in theory – would have a monopoly over the use of force. This is not necessarily the case in Sāmoa, where there is much conflict with the state that has challenged and overruled the rule of the villages.<sup>83</sup>

What colonization had sought to do was to have the state usurp ultimate sovereignty that was inherently exercised and maintained in each *nu'u* and have it invested in the state. The state became an antagonist to village governments who have challenged and often times defied court orders. Sāmoa has neither a military nor armed police, so whether the state has ultimate power over the villages is contested. In American Sāmoa, where there is currently no armed police, protection from the United States military is a potential source of exercise of force, though the military has never been actually needed for such purposes.

The inverse relationship between social prestige and political stability signifies the tradeoffs associated with trying to acquire a national structure. The structure of the nation in its 'primal' state thus organizes itself according to these indigenous institutions. The introduction of the state system disturbed this traditional hierarchy by stabilizing the political legitimacy and influence of the state. Whereas the *mālō* in ancient times would be easily dissolved at will, the state *mālō* has become a permanent entity with indissolvable stability, a phenomenon that is unique relative to the stability of other Pacific states such as Fiji.

The introduction of the state apparatus has bred conflicts in sovereignty between the national government and individual villages. Numerous conflicts have arisen over the inherent sovereignty of the village polity and the *fono a matai*'s assertion of their sovereignty. Two of the

<sup>83</sup> A lot of conflicts have arisen over the western court system and the individual villages.

most prominent types of conflicts have been religious bans and refusals to obey village decisions and subsequent impositions of *sala*<sup>84</sup> (punishments).<sup>85</sup>

### The Samoan Archipelago

Samoan organization into political districts in the Western archipelago (‘Upolu and Savai’i), comprised eleven districts: Tuamāsaga, Ā‘ana, ‘Āiga-i-le-Tai, Ātua, Va‘a-o-Fonotī, Fa‘asalele‘aga, Gaga‘emauga, Gagaifomauga, Vaisigano, Sātupa‘itea, and Palauli. The modern state system has 41 constituencies under the system of *faipule*, with 265 villages. American Sāmoa became organized into three districts with two “unorganized” atolls, and subdivided into 16 counties and 74 districts.

<sup>84</sup> To *sala* (verb) is to have wronged; to *fa‘asala* is to be punished, and according to Samoan ethics, when one has committed a *sala*, he or she may be subject to a *fa‘asala*, which one must commit to fulfilling, in order to maintain harmony and balance.

<sup>85</sup> Numerous articles have been written about village councils who have banned certain religious denominations in the villages. Villages have also fined entire families for individual actions, and many have been subjected to a *fa‘ate‘a* – banishment from the village. The *fa‘ate‘a*, despite the pejorative value ascribed to it, was a method of *fa‘asala* that was an expression of a violation of *vā fealoa‘i* (socio-spatial relationships) between the ‘*āiga* (family) and the *nu‘u*. Although a *nu‘u* is vested with absolute power, it does not mean that it has rightly done so. ‘*Āiga* have gone to Western courts to settle disputes adjudicated under the guise of human rights. The relationship between the courts – Western democracy – and the *nu‘u* and the *fa‘asāmoa* itself. One could argue that the state acts as a mechanism to check in place the power of the *nu‘u* to overstep its *pule* and its *vā* with its constituencies. The same could be said for the *nu‘u*, which functions as a mechanism to check the power of the *mālō*, the state.






Figure 2.9. The Samoan islands in the modern era, with the Independent State of Samoa, and the United States territory of American Sāmoa.<sup>86</sup>

### *Fa'alupega: National and Local Constitutions of the the Atunu'u*

An oral culture such as Sāmoa's must utilize various devices to articulate its sociopolitical order and this is embodied in national and village *fa'alupega*, a set of honorific salutations that functions as a constitution that elucidate the hierarchies, roles, and privileges accorded to each *'āiga* in a specified polity. In this section, I look at the changes in *fa'alupega* and how they have evolved after the penetration from the West, especially with regards to the reconfiguration of *fa'alupega* to fit the current political arrangements.

<sup>86</sup> By From US National Park Service circa 2002 - US National Park Service Identical image available from: URL: [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australia/samoa\\_islands\\_2002.gif](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/australia/samoa_islands_2002.gif) Source: Samoa Islands U.S. National Park Service circa 2002 [gif format (15K)], Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries. Copyright info from UT: Public domain image - [1], Public Domain, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2721726>

Outlined below is a “national” *fa‘alupega* of “Sāmoa ‘ātoa” (Sāmoa in its entirety) that is currently used to address the *Atunu‘u*, the Samoan nation. These honorifics are ordered in the same order as Sāmoa’s main inhabited islands are geographically arranged, from east to west: Manu‘a, Tutuila, ‘Upolu, Manono, ‘Apolima, and Savai‘i.

Manu‘a:<sup>87</sup>

Tulouna Tama a le Manu‘atele  
Le afioga a le Lā‘au na Amotasi  
Afioga a Ali‘i Fa‘atui  
Mamalu mai To‘oto‘o o le Fale‘ula  
Ma ‘upu o le Manu‘atele

Greetings to the Tama of Manu‘atele  
His Excellency the Tui Manu‘a  
The royal Chiefs  
To the orators of Fale‘ula  
And to the Word of Manu‘atel

Tutuila:

Tulouna afioga a Ma‘opū  
Le susū o Sua ma le Vāifanua  
Fofō ma Aitulagi  
Sā‘ole ma le Launiusāelua  
Itū‘au ma Alātaua

Greetings to the Chiefly lineages  
of Sua and Vāifanua  
Fofō and Aitulagi  
Sā‘ole and Launiusāelua  
Itū‘au and Alātau

Sāmoa (‘Upolu, Savai‘i, Manono, ‘Apolima):

Tulouna ‘Āiga ma a lātou Tama

<sup>87</sup> Though there are numerous variations of the *fa‘alupega* of Sāmoa, I have taken this set from ‘Aumua Simanu Papāli‘i’s *‘O si Manu a Ali‘i*. For other sources, see Kramer’s versions of the *Tusi Fa‘alupega* of the LMS and Methodist churches.

Tama ma o lātou ‘Āiga  
Susū Pule ma Tūmua  
Itū‘au ma Alātaua  
‘Āiga i le Tai ma le Va‘a o Fonotī

Greetings to Families and their Sons  
Sons and their Families  
Greetings Pule ma Tūmua  
Itū‘au and Alātaua  
‘Āiga i le Tai and Va‘a o Fonotī

Traditional political organization would have included Tutuila under the *itūmālō* of Ātua, which is part of the island of ‘Upolu. Known as the “Motu o Salaia”, Tutuila was used as a place to exile banished chiefs.<sup>88</sup> The rise of Tutuila’s status in the traditional national *fa’alupega* was due in great part to colonial reconfiguration of the traditional political order. As an American territory, Tutuila gained primacy in the newly established polity as the traditional sociopolitical prestige of Manu‘a became subjugated not only to American sovereignty but to Tutuilan hegemony. As Pago Pago became the *laumua* (literally, that ‘which is called out first’), or the capital, of the new *mālō*, Manu‘a diminished in both authority and prestige. The incorporation of a group of islands that prided itself as a separate, sovereign ‘kingdom’ (even a separate ‘race’ by some accounts) since time immemorial, under the Tutuilan government would have seemingly diminished the Manu‘an primacy that had been hitherto unmatched. In both formal and informal gatherings (such as when speeches are delivered or when songs or dances are performed), American Sāmoa, is called out as “Tutuila and Manu‘a,” with Tutuila almost always being called first. Traditionally, however, whomever is called first holds greater rank and prestige, or is at least afford the deference in various contexts. To be called after Tutuila would have diminished the *pa‘ia* (sanctity) and *mamalu* (dignity) of a people that had asserted and maintained its hierarchy and rank from the *Vavau*. That

<sup>88</sup> Unasa Va‘a. <http://journal.samoanudies.ws/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Aspects-of-Western-Samoa-Migration-to-American-Samoa.pdf>

Tutuila and Manu'a have separate *fa'alupega*, as opposed to ('western') Sāmoa is representative of the difficulties in the reordering of the traditional political order.

The advent of the nation-state paradigm in the Samoan islands has also served to disturb the traditional order of rank and hierarchy on many levels. Traditional *mālō* placed various paramount titles at the apex of traditional greetings with various orator groups receiving their fair share of acknowledgement in the *fa'alupega*. The *fa'alupega* used for the *mālō* of the twentieth century recognizes the newly created positions formulated by the state and its various bureaucracies.

#### American Sāmoa<sup>89</sup>

1. Kōvana Sili (Governor)
2. Sui Kōvana (Lieutenant Governor)
3. Peresitene ma le Senate (Senate President and Senate)
4. Ta'ita'ifono ma le Maota o Sui (Speaker of House of the Representatives)
5. Fa'amasino Sili ma Ali'i Fautua (Chief Justice and the Attorney General)

#### Sāmoa

1. Ao o le Mālō (Head of State)
2. Sui Ao (Deputy Head of State)
3. Pālemia (Prime Minister)
4. Fofoga o le Fono (Speaker of the Assembly)
5. Minisitā o le Kāpeneta (Cabinet Ministers)
6. Sui o le Pālemene (Ministers of Parliament)

#### Concluding Reflections

The indigenous stories, legends, and mythologies and the ontologies and epistemologies they articulate are critical frameworks for conceptualizing the nation from a Samoan perspective. Rooted in the *Fa'asāmoa*, the ultimate philosophical and theoretical model for framing the Samoan *Atunu'u*, the Samoan nation is fully articulated as ethnically based, both on kinship and genealogy

<sup>89</sup> Currently, American Sāmoa does not have a widespread *fa'alupega* for its national government, the Mālō Tele, the United States proper. Though the Kaisalaka and German had restructured the 'national' *fa'alupega* of western Sāmoa, the Americans did not do the same for American Sāmoa.

as well as sociocultural and political foundations. The *Atunu'u* is, from a primordialist stance, a timeless and eternal phenomenon constructed out of kinship and genealogy laying out the foundations of common ancestry for anyone whose *gafa* (genealogy) extends to the primordial ancestors originating from the Samoan archipelago.

The *Atunu'u* is further defined by the state which Samoans have reified and will be discussed in the next chapter, which outlines the transition of the *Atunu'u* from a confederation of *nu'u* and *itūmālō* to the colonial schemes wrought on by Europe that ultimately resulted in the creation of the Samoan nation-state. While western Sāmoa becomes ingrained in the struggle to determine its own political aspirations, we are left with the political status of American Sāmoa, which is left to contend with itself, to whose nation does it belong? To the American family, of whom it is a part of the political being as a subject of the American civic nation-state, or to the Samoan *Atunu'u*, the primordial ethnic nation with whom it shares its genealogical history? If American Sāmoa's political status were to change, would it continue to be part of the Samoan *Atunu'u* or aspire to be its own civic nation? Such are the pertinent questions that continue to confound the conventional notions of the nation and will be entertained in the next chapter.

### CHAPTER III – GLOBAL FORCES TRANSFORM THE ATUNU'U: COLONIZATION, DECOLONIZATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SAMOAN STATE

Can 137,000 people stand alone as a viable State in this world of tensions? Samoans would answer simply, 'God willing, we can do it'<sup>1</sup>

The organization and expression of the 'nation' in the previous chapter has focused along traditional contexts from "time immemorial" to the time of European penetration into the Pacific and intervention into Sāmoa. This chapter transitions into how colonization and decolonization paradigms have influenced the structure of the Samoan nation from the period of European intervention to the fracturing of the *Atunu'u* and subjugation under alien nations and states. This chapter addresses the challenges Samoans had undergone through the protest and resistance movements of the Mau in both eastern and western Sāmoa. The *Atunu'u* had been complicated both linguistically and socio-politically as it no longer held the connotations of having a geographical land base, but one that had spread out to other nations and states.

#### Initial Contact with the West

It is often said that victors are those who write history and much of what is written about the early contact period with the West is framed through the records of those who traveled through Oceania for various reasons. Although it is impossible to say with absolute certainty when Samoans first encountered *papālagi*, Europeans, extant written accounts provided by those who indicate various encounters provide a complex picture of exchanges between the Samoan and Western world. Samoans were in constant contact with Tonga and Sāmoa since time immemorial, as indicated in the cosmological texts of the *Solo o le Vā*, they were very much a part of the Samoan

<sup>1</sup> McKay, C.G.R. *Samoa: A Personal Story of the Samoan Islands*. 1968 Reed: Wellington, 165.

universe. When the *papālagi* made contact with Samoans, the paradigms shifted from contact with foreign peoples with whom there was no genealogical, cosmological, or historical connections either in *tala o le vavau* or historical exchange routes, marriages, and political alliances. The incursion of the *papālagi* heralded a new era in which initially saw little growth of settler-colonialism, as was initiating in other parts of Oceania, into a time that would further necessitate the creation of a centralized government with whom the foreign settlers could deal. This would be the context for Samoan quests for a singular titular-head and the motive for European intrusion into the *Atunu'u* and subsequent formal intervention and colonization by Western agendas for empire.

#### The Quest for a “Unified” Nation under a “Kingship”

Given Samoans’ inclination towards dispersed and decentralized authority, a proclivity soundly based on Samoan philosophical notions of shared governance, the major events of the nineteenth century had revolved around a series of wars to dominate the Samoan political landscape through the establishment of a centralized, “unified” nation with a *mālō* under a singular paramount ruler or “king.” This was a struggle that went on for centuries and, as outlined in Chapter 2, never subsided partially because of the instability of a national polity and the stability of the *nu’u* (village) and *‘āiga* (network of kin). *‘Āiga* would vie for paramount titles to elevate the prestige of their own districts, *nu’u*, and maximal descent lineages. The struggle for kingship was a centuries-old endeavor that would also be assumed and appropriated by foreign settlers and Western colonial powers to protect their economic and political stakes in Sāmoa and to further their own imperialist agendas for the Pacific region.

The nineteenth century was a time of radical transformation with the advent of ‘formal’ Christian missionaries in the 1830s and subsequent entrance of European colonial powers into the

complex dynamics of Sāmoa's political arena in the pivotal 19th century.<sup>2</sup> Rival chiefs were engaged in onerous battles to vie for 'supreme' recognition as titular head over all of 'Sāmoa,' although, in line with traditional Samoan ideas of shared and dispersed power, this would not necessarily equate to absolute control and 'sovereignty' vested in an individual or a government. The instability of a national polity as articulated in the *mālō* was counterintuitive to the stability of the *nu'u* polity, yet the goal of a singular head as envisioned in a "tupu" would nonetheless be the cause for the wars for attempts at titular supremacy over the majority of Sāmoa.

### Samoan Wars for Paramountcy

Samoan quests for a 'kingship' must be framed with the struggles to attain paramount chieftainship over the whole archipelago, excluding Manu'a.<sup>3</sup> Some of these titles are outlined in Table 4.1 and reflect the complex nature of kinship in Samoan society. The convoluted web of relations is reflective of the multitude of generations of *usuga* (marriages) through the process of *malaga* that produced many offspring throughout the archipelago. At various periods in time, certain paramount titles came into dominance, but the point of reference we consider is the first "tupu" of Sāmoa, the Tafa'ifā Salamāsina who lived in the sixteenth century (approximately 1540 C.E.).<sup>4</sup> After Salamāsina and before the reign of Mālietoa as Tafa'ifā in 1830, there were only three more Tafa'ifā within these three centuries. When the European *moa folau* brought Christianity and the new *mālō*, Samoans continued the wars for title succession, and the arrival of John Williams coincided fortuitously, for him, with the end of the War of Ā'ana. Although

<sup>2</sup> The dominant narrative among Samoans is that Christianity arrived in Sāmoa in 1830 as memorialized by *tāeao* (mornings) of the nation. However, there were already 'beachcombers' who were agents of spreading Christianity in Sāmoa noted by John Williams' distaste for them. See Meleisea 157-158. See also Serge Tcherkézoff. *First Contacts in Polynesia: The Samoan Case (1722-1848) Western Misunderstandings about Sexuality and Divinity*. 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Manu'a was excluded from the western polities, as discussed in Chapter 2, as was its own polity ruled ultimately by the Tuimanu'a.

<sup>4</sup> Simanu-Klutz, *A Malu i Fale, E Malu fo'i i Fafo*, 84. I use here Loau Luafata Simanu's approximation of dates.



Samoans were in contact with *papālagi* before this point in time, the arrival of missionary John Wiliams and the bestowal of the four highest paramount titles of the time on Mālietoa Vāinu‘upō will be the focal point of discussion as it would be the major turning point in the centralization of political authority under a singular polity.

Table 4.1 Major Paramount Titles of Sāmoa; Sā Tui Manu‘a (Manu‘a) and Sā Tupuā (colored in blue) and Sā Mālietōā (colored in pink) of ‘Upolu and Savai‘i, ‘Āiga i le Tais

Manu‘a	Ao (Savai‘i)	Pāpā (‘Upolu)	Tamaa‘āiga (‘Upolu)
Tui Manu‘a (Ta‘ū)	Le Tagaloa	Tui Ātua	Tupua (Tamasese)
Tufele (Fitiuta)	Tonumaipē‘a	Tui Ā‘ana	Matā‘afa
Tui ‘Olosega	Lilomaiaava		Tuimaleali‘ifano
Misa (‘Ofu)		Vaetamasoali‘i	Mālietoa
		Gato‘aitele	

To fully understand the quests for titular supremacy in the islands west of Manu‘a, we must comprehend the nuances of the office of the *Tafa‘ifā*,<sup>6</sup> which comprises the four paramount titles known as *pāpā*: Tui Ātua, Tui Ā‘ana, Vaetamasoali‘i, and Gato‘aitele.<sup>7</sup> They are so named because of the four *tafa‘i*, the pairs of orators that sit on their side during their installation ceremonies, and are stipulated in Table 3.2.<sup>8</sup> Although there are several important paramount titles that gained prominence throughout various epochs in Samoan history, these four, combined as the *Tafa‘ifā*,

<sup>5</sup> This table is adapted from So‘o (208-210); Refiti 137 (whose schema is adapted from Keesing and Keesing 21-22).

<sup>6</sup> So‘o, *Democracy and Custom in Sāmoa*, 9-10. “The relationship between the *Tafa‘ifā* and the people, associated with the holder, differs from that between a king and his subjects as in pre-constitutional European monarchies, where all authority is derived from the power residing in the monarch. As with the holders of individual *pāpā*, the *Tafa‘ifā* has no independent power: He or she had supernatural powers attributed to these titles in pre-Christian times (Meleiseā 1995) but the political authority of the title was and still is collectively shared with the *fale‘upolu* (orator-chiefs) who confer the *pāpā*. A *Tafa‘ifā* holder, and the institution of the *Tafa‘ifā* in general, become the central point around which all the people associated with the papa titles unite. The congregation of interests and alliance of polities around this central point is the closest political framework Sāmoa had to that of a central government as it is understood in the modern sense.”

<sup>7</sup> Tui Ātua and Tui Ā‘ana are the more ancient titles that existed before the expulsion of the Tongans and are the paramount titles of the Ātua and Ā‘ana districts, respectively. Their origins are outlined in Chapter 2 and can be researched further in So‘o (2008) 10 and others.

<sup>8</sup> So‘o 8-9.

were at the apex of quests for titular supremacy during the nineteenth century and were the subject of contestation in the wars for a “kingship.” It is important to note that genealogies in Samoan epistemology may not necessarily reflect pedigrees but can be reflections of the political maneuverings of orator groups known as Tūmua and Pule, whose prerogative it is to bestow these ‘divine’ titles.<sup>9</sup>

Table 3.2 The *Pāpā* titles of the *Tafa’ifā* and their respective *Tafa’i* and Seats

<b>Pāpā</b>	<b>Tafa’i</b>	<b>Seat</b>	<b>‘Āiga</b>
Tui Ātua	Tupa’i and Ta’inau	Lufilufi	Sā Tupuā
Tui Ā’ana	‘Umaga and Pāsēsē	Leulumoega	Sā Tupuā
Vaetamasoāli’i	Fuga and Mau’ava	Sāfata	Sā Mālietoā
Gato’aitele	Fata and Maulolo	Afega	Sā Mālietoā

Although there are many maximal lineages in Sāmoa, the two major family clans at play in the 19th-century quest for a unified kingship were the Sā Tupuā, whose *pāpā* titles were Tui Ātua and Tui Ā’ana, and Sā Mālietoā, to whom belonged the *pāpā* titles of Vaetamasoāli’i and Gato’aitele.<sup>10</sup> In ancient times, these paramount titles were vested to their *tama* (chiefs)<sup>11</sup> by their respective ‘āiga, but over the centuries, *tulāfale* groups became dominant and acquired the prerogative to bestow these titles on their candidates of choice. The evolution of the *fa’amatai* concerning these most senior titles reflects an upheaval from the traditional notion of familial origins of *suafa matai* (chiefly titles) that emanate from ‘āiga rather than orator groups. When title disputes cannot be resolved within peaceful means, the parameters that determine the winners become extended to warfare, and the victorious party becomes the *mālō*, and the losing side

<sup>9</sup> Tūmua is the orator group based in ‘Upolu and Pule includes the principal orator groups of Savai’i.

<sup>10</sup> The Sā Tupuā are not, according to Davidson as ancient as other titles, including Tui Ātua and Tui Ā’ana, but have nonetheless become important in Samoan history.

<sup>11</sup> “Tama” is glossed as “child” or “young male” but it also refers to the Tama or paramount chiefs of the leading families in Sāmoa, as recited in the traditional fa’alupega of ‘Upolu (Tama ma o lātou ‘Āiga and ‘Āiga ma a lātou Tama) as well as in the institution of the Tamaa’āiga.

becomes the *vāivai*. The outcomes of war in traditional Samoan protocols always delineated between this *mālō-vāivai* binary. The *mālō*, as the victors become the ruling ‘government’ as long as they can hold a grip on their titles and as soon as opposing parties can build up enough resources and manpower to wage another war.

There were various wars in the nineteenth century and too many to count. Major wars and battles from 1828-1899 are outlined in Table 4.3 and begin with the War of Ā’ana, in which Mālietoa Vāinu’upō waged against the district of Ā’ana for the killing of his kinsmen Lei’ataualesā Tonumaie’a Tamafaigā. Sā Mālietoa comes out victorious and inherits the Sā Tupuā titles of Tui Ātua and Tui Ā’ana, making him only the fourth Tupu Tafa’ifā since Salamāsina acquired all four *pāpā* only three centuries earlier. Before the war, Mālietoa had already acquired the Gato’aitele and Vaetamasoāli’i titles that were already associated with his ‘āiga, and thus the defeat of Sā Tupuā signalled a new era in which the Sā Mālietoa would gain new prominence under the auspices of the Christian mission. The death of Mālietoa Vāinu’upō in 1841, however, would bring instability to the ‘āiga due to Vāinu’upō’s *māvaega*<sup>12</sup> (departing wishes) that the *pāpā* titles would be split up and returned to their respective districts. The Tui Ātua would be handed over to Matā’afa Tāfagamanu, the Tui Ā’ana would be given to To’oā Sualauvī, and the Gato’aitele and Vaetamasoāli’i *pāpā* would be bestowed on Natuitasina Taimalelagi, half-brother of Vāinu’upō and the Mālietoa be given to his son Mōlī.<sup>13</sup> Mālietoa Mōlī’s tenure would be short, only lasting two years after Taimalelagi passed away in 1858. Mōlī’s passing in 1860 left two contenders to the title, Tonumaie’a Talavou, the half-brother of Mālietoa Mōlī, and Laupepa, son of Mōlī.

<sup>12</sup> Māvaega are departing wishes delivered before the death of a titleholder. Whether they are actually carried out depends on the wishes of the ‘āiga or orator groups that have ultimate control over who will name the successors.

<sup>13</sup> Meleisea says that the Gato’aitele and Vaetamasoāli’i went to Taimalelagi, although Tu’u’u (1999) and Tuimaleali’ifano (2008) say they went to To’oā Sualauvī, son of Vāinu’upō’s sister and *feagaiga* to Vāinu’upō.

Vāinu'upō's *māvaega* left the Sā Mālietoā a house divided and became even more vulnerable when Mōlī's death pitted Tuamāsaga district, which supported Laupepa, against Manono and Savai'i, which favored Talavou.<sup>14</sup> The War of the Faitasiga (confederation) of 1869-1873 would be fought over who would be the titular head of the *mālō* based in Tuamāsaga, which was the traditionally the prerogative of the Sā Mālietoā. The split between the much older Talavou and more youthful Laupepa and their respective supporting factions reflected various divisions over who should be poised to succeed Mōlī. Talavou was originally part of the Christianizing mission with his father's brother Taimalelagi, until the death of Taimalelagi's son caused him to abandon the London Missionary Society.<sup>15</sup> Talavou was not a supporter of the L.M.S. and was often characterized as a fierce leader, in stark contrast to the Mālua seminary student Laupepa, who had the backing of the missionaries. The split in support between the two camps also reflected geographic differences and political loyalties. The traditional seat of the Sā Mālietoā was in Malie, in the Tuamāsaga district, and is where Mōlī was buried and where Laupepa was raised. The famous Sāpapāli'i site where Vāinu'upō accepted the L.M.S. mission at Matāniufeagaimaleata was relatively of recent origin for a Mālietoa base, as it was where Mālietoa Muāgututi'a established residency through marriage into that village in the 1770s.<sup>16</sup>

Like the other leading paramount clans, the Sā Mālietoā was split into two warring camps and because of the parting of the titles by Vāinu'upō between Sā Tupuā and Sā Mālietoā, neither Laupepa nor Talavou had any of the *pāpā* necessary for attaining the status of *tafa'ifā*.<sup>17</sup> Despite this, the Laupepa faction devised a plan to create a *faitasiga* (confederation) not based in any of

<sup>14</sup> Meleisea 32-33. Talavou held the Tonumaipē'a from Savai'i and was also married to a wife from Manono (So'o 32).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid Meleisea 28-29.

<sup>16</sup> So'o 32-33.

<sup>17</sup> Meleisea Lagaga 78.

the traditional political centers, but at Matā'utu in Āpia. The plans to build a legislature drew the attention of the Talavou camp, who took it upon themselves to create a rival base at Mulinu'u, facing Āpia, the center of foreign settlement.<sup>18</sup> This would be the impetus for the War of the Faitasiga and would draw new political loyalties for each of the Mālietoa factions in addition to the Sā Tupuā, which had been mounting political alliances with different parties.

In addition to the Manono and Savai'i clans, Lufilufi and Leulumoega, the Tūmua centers of Ā'ana and Ātua, respectively, (and former rivals to Talavou in previous wars), and who were more neutral and not as pronounced in the national polity as the Sā Mālietoā, lent their support to Talavou despite most of the district remaining neutral and later siding with the Laupepa alliance.<sup>19</sup> Their entrance into the war was due to numerous complex factors, but was, as Lau Asofou So'o argues, a way of asserting their traditional roles in Samoan politics as *the* traditional center of the *mālō*. By remaining engaged in the national scene, even to the point of siding against their own districts, they sought to check the prestige of Tuamāsaga and the Sā Mālietoa as the center of a would-be national government. Tūmua viewed itself, Ma'auga in Leulumoega in particular, as the traditional center of all political districts in Sāmoa, save Manu'a. Tuamāsaga's establishment of a new seat of government in Āpia, which was to forshadow a future capital there, was seen as a threat to the prestige, influence, and primacy of Ātua and Ā'ana and, therefore, Leulumoega and Lufilufi and Sā Tupuā. New political alliances were forged and war would rage on from March 1869 to May 1873.<sup>20</sup> From this time period, Talavou and Laupepa forces would battle each out, vying for control of Āpia and the new government in Tuamāsaga, oftening drawing one side out

<sup>18</sup> Ibid 77-78.

<sup>19</sup> Although Tūmua and Pule are the powerful leading orator groups representing their districts (itūmālō), this did not necessarily mean that all their individual constituent villages necessarily agreed with what they planned. This seemingly rebellion against Tūmua by their own district reflects traditional Samoans notions of dispersed power and shared governance. Absolute authority did not necessarily extend beyond the polity of the *nu'u* (or even the *'āiga*), as it is each individual *fono* that props up the power and effectiveness of higher political collectives.

<sup>20</sup> So'o 33-34.

of town. By 1870, the political alliances would become more clear: Ā'ana and Ātua districts as a majority, divorced from Tūmua, allied with Laupepa under the leadership of Tui Ā'ana Tuimaleali'ifano To'oā Sualauvī, who was the most prospective candidate for Tafa'ifā had he not passed away early.<sup>21</sup> War commenced again in 1872 until a truce was negotiated by foreign European consuls and missionaries on May 1, 1873.<sup>22</sup>

### Early Centralized Western-Styled Government

The end result of the Faitasiga war left complicated results: Talavou's *itū* (side) seemed initially victorious, although the peace terms negotiated allowed Laupepa to remain in Malie, Tuamāsaga and Talavou to return to Sāpapāli'i in Fa'asālele'aga, Savai'i. As to why Talavou, being the victor left Laupepa as king with another member of Sā Tupuā to become co-king evades outsiders. While Sā Mālietoā decided on Laupepa as its king, Sā Tupuā had contested who had the right to be their *sui* (representative). Although Matā'afa Tāfagamanu was to be granted the Tui Ātua *pāpā*, Tupua Pulepule was instead picked and while this took quite some time to decide, it was agreed later that Mālietoa Laupepa would be king and alternate with the Sā Tupuā.<sup>23</sup>

The major result would be the establishment of a centralized government in cooperation with the Europeans based on European parliamentary models. In addition to a kingship, a bicameral legislature was created: Ta'imua, the upper house was to be made of the leading *ali'i* of the seven major districts of Sāmoa,<sup>24</sup> and Faipule was to comprise *matai* from the sub-district level,

<sup>21</sup> Tuimaleali'ifano in *O Tama a 'Āiga* 51-55 argues that Sualauvī did become Tafa'ifā, claiming that the Tui Ātua was bestowed upon him (and also having the other requisite *pāpā* titles) by Fuataga and Tafua, the 'kingmakers' of Aleipata.

<sup>22</sup> So'o 35.

<sup>23</sup> The complex dealings of whom should be chosen as the king for Sā Tupuā are elucidated in So'o 38-39.

<sup>24</sup> The seven districts included three from 'Upolu (Ā'ana, Ātua, Tuamāsaga), three from Savai'i (Itūotane, Itūoteine, Fa'asālele'aga) and 'Āiga i le Tai (Manono, 'Apolima). So'o 35. The creation of the Ta'imua-Faipule houses not only reflected an extrapolation of European parliaments that dichotomized between a house of nobles and commoners, but were possibly an appropriation of the *ali'i-tulāfale* binary in Samoan political thought. Ta'imua, consisting primarily of the major paramount *ali'i* chosen by Faipule reflected the current trend of *pāpā* being chosen by leading principal orator groups.

who would elect those in the upper house.<sup>25</sup> This new government was realized in the adoption of the first Samoan constitution in 1873.<sup>26</sup> The entrance of a peculiar American, Albert Steinberger, into the scene complicated affairs in the new *mālō*. A U.S. colonel claiming to be an agent of President Grant, Steinberger<sup>27</sup> convinced the Samoans that American protection would be eventually extended over Sāmoa and he would providently come to be established as the premier of new central government. Settlers in Āpia found out that he was not officially there on behalf of the United States and the American and British consuls in town would come to arrest him. Mālietoa Laupepa eventually acquiesced to the foreign governments, however, to the dismay of Ta'imua and Faipule, whom Laupepa had acted against, Steinberger was still thought to have been useful. As a result of this power struggle, Mālietoa was deposed by the Samoan government in 1876. The foreign consuls tried to have Mālietoa reinstated, but were ultimately unsuccessful.<sup>28</sup> This victory for the recently formed Samoan legislature marked a significant paradigm shift for the Atunu'u Brian Alofaituli brings up the important point that this was the first time an entity other than *'āiga* led by a paramount chief or orator groups had exercised its authority as the *mālō*.<sup>29</sup> Ta'imua and Faipule, modeled after a Western-style parliament and which stood in place of, but nonetheless came to greatly resemble traditional authorities such as Tūmua and Pule, would come to subvert traditional notions of *mālō*.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Although Manu'a remained relatively isolated politically from the wars for confederation to the west of it, participation in the new *mālō* was extended to it by inclusion of representatives.

<sup>26</sup> So'o 35-36.

<sup>27</sup> So'o 38-39. It is possible that Ta'imua and Faipule saw Mālietoa Laupepa's assentment as a reprise to their traditional authority and that the removal of a premier installed by Samoans was an affront to Samoan notions of *pule*, both in their customary powers and in the national sovereignty that they had established as a new *mālō*.

<sup>28</sup> Meleisea 37.

<sup>29</sup> Alofaituli 77-78.

<sup>30</sup> Among the many ironies behind the creation of the Faitasiga government of Ta'imua and Faipule was that it was first theorized by those who did not possess *pāpā* titles and sought to center its seat in a new capital that had no significance to traditional Samoan politics or history: it was neither in the two rivaling seats of the Sā Mālietoa (Malie and Sāpapāli'i) nor the orator groups of Pule (in Sāfotulāfai and Sāle'ula) or Tūmua. Furthermore, the many villages that comprised the growing municipality of Āpia had a paramount chief who was part of Sā Tupuā, although the proposed site of the centralized government was put forth by the Sā Mālietoa.

Mālietoa Laupepa retreated to his base in Malie to recuperate and establish the Puletua, a rival government to Ta'imua and Faipule,<sup>31</sup> but with the support of Ā'ana, Tuamāsaga, and Fa'asālele'aga.<sup>32</sup> After clashing with this government led by Tupua Tamasese Titimaea, Puletua was crushed at Fale'ula and became the *itū vāivai* in 1877. Ta'imua and Faipule would continue to govern, however, with much frustration in dealing with the British, American, and German consuls, especially in particular to land claims and their steadfastness in alienating further land.<sup>33</sup> They would not appoint another king because Sā Tupuā was now divided over three viable candidates instead of Sā Mālietoā's two: Tui Ātua Matā'afa, Tupua Pulepule, and now Tupua Tamasese Titimaea.<sup>34</sup> The government would continue to engage in various with the European settler interests, to the point of signing a treaty giving the United States exclusive use of the massive harbor at Pago Pago in 1878 and gave trade rights to the Germans in 1879.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to lack of leadership with the absence of an executive chief, Ta'imua and Faipule's problems were further compounded by a myriad of competing foreign interests and conspiring rival native factions. Samoan support for the government seemed to diminish as a result of the increasing land alienation and the lack of a king.<sup>36</sup> A recess seemed to be the most provident solution and in May 1879 the *mālō* returned to their districts. Sā Mālietoā, previously divided, later brings together the Talavou and Laupepa factions during the absence of the *mālō* in Mulinu'u and establishes the Pulefou as their new *mālō*. Talavou assumes the kingship while Laupepa becomes *Sui Tupu*, "vice-king," effectively leaving out Sā Tupuā from any executive position in the government and Ta'imua and Faipule would retreat to Ā'ana to await the regaining of

<sup>31</sup> So'o 39-40 argues that Mālietoa and his supporters moved to Leulumoega (the capital of Ā'ana), rather than in Malie (the traditional seat of the Sā Mālietoā) to establish the Puletua.

<sup>32</sup> Meleisea, *Lagaga* 85

<sup>33</sup> Meleisea 37-38, So'o 39-40

<sup>34</sup> Meleisea *Lagaga* 85

<sup>35</sup> So'o 40

<sup>36</sup> Meleisea 38



Mulinu‘u. An intervening German warship, the *Bismark*, would force peace terms to stop the war that broke between the two parties, and the end result would be the recognition of the Mālietoa *mālō* by the United States, Britain, and Germany on March 1880.<sup>37</sup> On July 1880, the Mālietoa and Tupua camps would meet on another German warship, this time the *Nautilus* at Sāolua fata to discuss the terms. It was agreed that the next king after Talavou would come from the Sā Tupuā and Matā‘afa joined the government as premier.<sup>38</sup>

Talavou would come to pass away on November 1880 and, instead of passing the kingship to Sā Tupuā, Laupepa would succeed as the sole Mālietoa in 1881 and king, being again recognized by the foreign consuls. Matā‘afa was rejected as *Tupu* – although he was genealogically connected to both Sā Tupuā and Sa Mālietoa and would have been a popular candidate for king – and thus withdrew his support from the Mālietoa government.<sup>39</sup> Subsequently, Sā Tupuā would leave the *mālō* at Mulinu‘u and form their own *mālō* at Leulumoega, where Tupua Tamasese Titimaea would be given the Tui Ā‘ana *pāpā* and declared king with the backing of the Germans in April 1881.<sup>40</sup> War was again waged between the two families and ceased when the foreign consuls again came up with the Lackwanna compromise, leaving Mālietoa as king and Tamasese as vice king. Matā‘afa again was passed over as king and withdrew from the newly recognized *mālō* to his own base in Ātua.<sup>41</sup> The government would not gain much support among the people for its heavy taxes, whom the Samoans saw as suspicious as to why taxes should be paid.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, the national government, though centralized, did not have effective control over the individual villages, which still did not completely buy into a *mālō* that held full sovereignty over village affairs. An incursion

<sup>37</sup> So‘o 40.

<sup>38</sup> So‘o 41.

<sup>39</sup> So‘o 40.

<sup>40</sup> So‘o 41.

<sup>41</sup> Meleisea 38-39, So‘o 40-41.

<sup>42</sup> Meleisea, *Lagaga* 90-91

on village autonomy was antithetical to proper notions of Samoan governance which vested political sovereignty in the *fono a le nu'u* (village councils).

The Germans were resented by the Samoans for their lack of respect for the *mālō* and a general fear of a German annexation of Sāmoa prompted two petitions in 1884 to be delivered to the British asking to be a protectorate. The resident German consul, Theodore Weber, took umbrage after hearing of this and proceeded to expel the government of Laupepa at Mulinu'u. Tamasese would withdraw from the Pulefou and form and draw support for another opposition government in Leulumoea in 1885.<sup>43</sup> Weber had sent an agent of one the local German firms, Eugen Brandeis to act as premier in Tamasese's new *mālō* in exchange of Germany's recognition of his status as king.<sup>44</sup>

#### Expanding the Pacific *Atunu'u*: Laupepa's "Polynesian Confederacy" with Kalākaua

As Samoans engaged simultaneously amongst themselves for 'national' supremacy while attempting to curtail the spread of Euro-American imperialism, colonial projects in the Pacific continued to expand. In 1887, King David Kalākaua of Hawai'i sought to build a "Polynesian confederacy" that had, according to Kealani Cook, had furthered the expansion of Hawaiian influence in the region while attempting to forge a united Pan-Pacific front to protect fellow Polynesian nations from expanding colonial aggression.<sup>45</sup> Kalākaua, who was influenced by his diverse cabinet of missionary-descended and part-Hawaiian, part-European advisors, sent a legation to Sāmoa in 1887 aboard the H.H.M.S. *Ka'imiloa* with the aim of negotiating a treaty

<sup>43</sup> So'o 41

<sup>44</sup> Meleisea 38-39.

<sup>45</sup> Cook, Kealani. *Return to Kahiki: Native Hawaiians in Oceania*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

with Mālietoa Laupepa. The goal of such Hawaiian diplomatic relations was noble, yet ambitious. Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Walter Murry Gibson and Kalākaua would prepare for their convoys to Sāmoa and Tonga and if successful, to the Cook Islands and others, although the *Ka'imiloa* would only reach Sāmoa. The mission's aim would garner great prestige for the Kingdom while attempting to fulfill the king's goals of forming a confederation of Polynesian states under his leadership. Envoys John E. Bush and Henry F. Poor, both *hapa Haole* (part Hawaiian, part European), were instrumental in drafting and ratifying a treaty in Āpia on February 17, 1887. Samoans were to share their *pule* with fellow Hawaiian kinsman, in exchange for their enlightenment (as the Hawaiian legation saw it) through their sophisticated diplomatic relations with and recognition by their powerful world colleagues.

The Hawaiian diplomatic mission, as Lorenz Gonschor argues, had a profound influence on the Samoans through its generous assistance in various capacities. The Hawaiians sought to help negotiate more equitable treaties with world powers, given the Kingdom of Hawai'i's own international recognition as an independent *mālō* (nation-state). Bush and Poor sought to leverage the King's power to negotiate with Mālietoa Laupepa's rivals, Matā'afa Iosefo and Tupua Tamasese in a compromise to join Laupepa's government in exchange for compensation and the protection by the Hawaiian Kingdom. The presence of a military vessel sent by the Kingdom, the *Ka'imiloa*, further provided the Hawaiians greater clout in convincing the Samoans that fellow Polynesians could possess such advanced technological commodities if they too engaged with the Hawaiians.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the fact that the Kingdom of Hawai'i was an independent *Atunu'u*, with an internationally recognized *mālō*, was to provide more incentive to Samoans that aspirations to nationhood could be reached if they had followed the path of the Hawaiians. Such benevolent

<sup>46</sup> Gonschor, Lorenz. *A Power in the World: the Hawaiian Kingdom in Oceania*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019, 96-101.

ambitions among kindred peoples, however, were not to go unnoticed by the Germans who had great stakes in the Samoan archipelago.

#### American and German Backlash Against the Pacific *Atunu'u*

Despite Polynesian attempts to assert their own independence and engage in diplomatic relations, American businessmen in Hawai'i would come to force Kalākaua into signing the “Bayonet Constitution” and the Germans would later remove Laupepa as king and have him deported to the Marshall Islands. Although the treaty of confederation was not to last, it revealed much about the dynamics of Samoan political engagement with fellow Pacific Islanders, in this case, with Hawaiian brethren.<sup>47</sup> Unlike other attempts to seek refuge in unequal dynamics of annexation to European and American powers, the treaty with the Kingdom of Hawai'i was an engagement with *'āiga*, that is with *tagata Hawai'i* (Hawaiian people), with whom Samoans were connected through ancient genealogical ties. A confederacy would have certainly expanded the *Atunu'u*, had it not been for the interference of American and European imperialism and had Hawai'i been able to forge and effectively maintain a protectorate over Sāmoa.<sup>48</sup>

Although Kalākaua's Polynesian confederacy did not come into fruition, the existence of mixed Hawaiian-Samoan families in modern-day Hawai'i has resulted in a microsm of Pan-Pacific communities dispersed throughout Hawai'i, including in the Lā'ie and Kahuku communities to where one of the first post-Kalākaua era Samoan waves migrated. The goals of a confederacy were later to be realized in the migrations of Samoans to Hawai'i (which will be discussed in the next chapter), and their subsequent intermarriages with Hawaiians. The *Atunu'u* had manifested in other

<sup>47</sup> Gonshor, citing Kalākaua's reference to Pili and Pa'ao, likens the relationship between Sāmoa in terms of Hawaiian kinship terms: Sāmoa as kua'ana, as elder sibling, and Hawai'i as kaina, younger sibling. See pages 96-97.

<sup>48</sup> The first Hawaiian LDS missionaries to Sāmoa came from these communities, Mānoa and Pelio. The first major wave of Samoan migrants to Hawai'i came to build the temple in Lā'ie.

ways that Kalākaua probably would not have imagined today.<sup>49</sup> Had it been successful, the outcome of a Pan-Polynesian confederacy would have redefined notions of the nation in postcolonial contexts.

### Rebounding the Samoan *Atunu'u* and the Quest for Kingship

Despite the brief attempts at Polynesian unity, political unrest continued and the wars for titular supremacy continued. The army of Tupua Tamasese would attack Laupepa and retake Mulinu'u with German backing, and he was to finally to be declared king on August 25, 1887.<sup>50</sup> Mālietoa Laupepa was to be exiled to the Marshall Islands.<sup>51</sup> Although Tamasese was declared king by the Germans, he was not necessarily so by Samoan custom dictated by the times. Having only possessed only one *pāpā*, the Tui Ā'ana, Tamasese could not properly call himself Tupu, much less Tafa'ifā. Now that a vacuum was created with the absence of a Mālietoa, support finally garnered around Matā'afa Iosefo, who had already possessed the Tui Ātua *pāpā* by June 1887. Subsequently, however, another faction of the Tui Ātua placed the title on Tamasese, followed by the bestowal of the Vaetamasoāli'i *pāpā* by Su'atele of Sāfata.<sup>52</sup> Various factions of the Sā Mālietoa bestowed the Mālietoa title on Matā'afa in September 1888. War was to commence and ultimately Tui Ātua Mālietoa Matā'afa came out victorious as the new *mālō* in October 1888.<sup>53</sup>

The 1888 war was disastrous for all parties involved, however, it prompted the Germans, Americans, and British to meet in Germany and pass the Treaty of Berlin in 1889. This essentially

<sup>49</sup> Chappell, David A. Chappell. *Double Ghosts: Oceanian Voyagers on Euroamerican Ships*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, 85.

<sup>50</sup> So'o 41.

<sup>51</sup> Various circumstances contributed to the irration of the foreign imperialists. In 1887 King Kalākaua sent a delegation to negotiate a Polynesian Confederation with Mālietoa Laupepa in an attempt to promote Oceanic camaraderie and to extend Hawaiian influence in Polynesia. The Hawaiian legation was able to secure a treaty with Laupepa's government, although this drew the attention of the foreign governments and contributed to the deposition of Mālietoa. For more detailed accounts of this exchange, see Cook, Kealani. *Return to Kahiki: Native Hawaiians in Oceania*. 2018.

<sup>52</sup> So'o 41-42

<sup>53</sup> Meleisea 39-40

created a supreme court in the settler area in Āpia and permitted the Samoans to elect their own king. Despite this, neither Matā'afa nor Tamasese were suitable candidates to the Germans, British, and for this reason, they conspired to bring back Mālietoa Laupepa from exile to be declared king. This caused further division among the Sā Mālietoā, which ultimately declared Matā'afa king when he was taken to Malie, which was the seat of the Mālietoa title. Laupepa would be bestowed the Tui Ā'ana title and war broke out in 1893. Ultimately Matā'afa surrendered to the Germans and it was he who ended up being exiled to the Marshall islands this time. Another war broke out between Sā Tupuā and Sā Mālietoā in 1894, however, Laupepa was becoming old and was poised to have Matā'afa brought back to Sāmoa in 1897 and Matā'afa was declared the king by Tumua and Pule on November 12, 1898.

Matā'afa's proclamation as king was challenged by both Mālietoa Tanumāfili I and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi I, the successors to Laupepa and Titimaea, respectively. The issue was brought up to the Supreme Court established by the Berlin Treaty, and the American Chief Justice ruled in favor of Tanumāfili I. Matā'afa's forces did not accept this and overtook both Tanumāfili's and Tamasese Lealofi I's armies combined. Matā'afa and his 13 Ta'imua were then recognized as the *mālō* in January 1899 by the foreign consuls. However, an international commission would later arrive in Āpia to proclaim a provisional government, until the Tripartite convention of 1899 partitioned Sāmoa into two polities: German Sāmoa and the United States Naval Station Tutuila.

A centralized government was imperative to the Euro-American settlers whose vested interests required the protection of their assets under a stable governing entity that did not solely rely on their respective consuls. The need for a central governing body was further necessitated by what was perceived as the instability of Samoan rule, which fluctuated according to the politics of Samoan war and the dynamics wrought on by the *mālō-vāivai* schema. As Meleisea and So'o both

note, the greatest motivation for a Samoan centralized government for the European was the need for recognition of land claims.

On countless occasions, Ta'imua and Faipule sought the assistance of foreign protectures to deal with the competing settler interactions that was centered in Āpia. The request of an American protectorate that was supposed to be mediated by Steinberger was did not materialize and the two failed attempts for a British protectorate against the Germans also failed to follow through. The Germans, who had the most vested interest in Samoan plantation economies, ultimately was the “protectorate” that the Samoans did not ask for, but got so anyway. The Samoan *Atunu'u*, which had its attempt to create a modernist form of government, had to be subsumed under the hegemony of a foreign *Atunu'u* and *mālō*.

Table 3.3 Major Post-contact Civil Wars, 1828-1899<sup>54</sup>

War	Outcome	Mālō	Vāivai
1828-1832 War of Ā'ana	Mālietua declares war on Ā'ana; over the slaying of Tamafaigā and becomes victorious; acquires Tui Ātua and Tui Ā'ana <i>pāpā</i> and becomes <i>Tupu Tafa'ifā</i>	Mālietua Vāinu'upō (Vaiinupō)	Ā'ana
1841-1843 (1842)	Mālietua Taimalelagi rejects the lotu/LMS mission and engages with Fa'asālele'aga in war against Sātupa'itea and Palauli	Mālietua Taimalelagi and Tonumaipē'a Talavou Fa'asālele'aga	Sātupa'itea and Palauli
1848-1851 1847-1857	1848: War of Taumua Fā (Vaimoso, Tufulele); 1851: Taua (war) o Fua (Ā'ana-Ātua, Savai'i-Manono) <sup>55</sup> Truce declared (no clear winner) in 1851; last war fought without foreign intervention, although first to use foreign gunboats and weapons	--	--
1869-1873 War of the Faitasiga	Talavou becomes <i>mālō</i> but returns to Savai'i leaving Tuamāsaga to Laupepa; establishment of Ta'imua and Faipule; creation of 1873	Mālietua Talavou	Mālietua Laupepa British Consul

<sup>54</sup> Information from this table was compiled from events described by Meleiseā (1987), Meleiseā et al (1987), and So'o (2008).

<sup>55</sup> Meleisea et. al, 205.

	constitution and centralized government; Laupepa declared joint king along with Tupua Pulepule		
1877	Ta'imua and Faipule clash defeats Puletua (Laupepa) under leadership of Tupua Tamasese Titimaea	Tupua Tamasese Titimaea/ Ta'imua and Faipule	Mālietua Laupepa/Puletua
1879	Mālietua Talavou and Laupepa join forces to establish Pulefou at Mulinu'u	Mālietua Talavou and Mālietua Laupepa	Tupua Tamasese Titimaea, Ta'imua and Faipule
1881	Pulefou/Mālietua Laupepa and Leulumoega (Tupua Tamasese Titimaea) go to war but a truce is declared; Laupepa declared King and Tamasese Vice King, Matā'afa Iosefo becomes Premier	Mālietua Laupepa (King); Tupua Tamasese Titimaea (Vice King)	--
1887	Tamasese and Germans capture Mālietua and exiles him to the Marshall Islands	Tupua Tamasese Titimaea	Mālietua Laupepa
1888	Matā'afa declared winner by Samoans; foreign consuls declare Mālietua Laupepa King by the Berlin Act of 1889	Matā'afa Iosefo	Mālietua Laupepa
1893	Mālietua defeats Matā'afa, who is later exiled to the Marshall Islands	Mālietua Laupepa	Matā'afa Iosefo
1899	Matā'afa returns and Samoans rally behind him to become king; court declares Tanumāfili king, but is forced to abdicate when partition is declared	Matā'afa Iosefo	Mālietua Tanumāfili I

The centuries-old struggle for a “kingship” had been effectively curtailed with the partition of the *Atunu'u* by the three colonial interlopers in Samoan affairs. After decades of internal strife, partly fueled by these external foreign *Atunu'u*, Samoans would later be subsumed under their rule. Ironically, as Davidson points out, it was a period in which Samoans were eager for peace after decades of warring amongst themselves.<sup>56</sup> A halt to years of war and factionalism, although not a new phenomenon, brought upon by formal colonialism would bring about a semblance of relief and, at least temporary, stability to the *Atunu'u*.

<sup>56</sup> Davidson, “Lauaki Namulau'ulu Mamoe,” 291.



Table 3.4 The “Kings” of Sāmoa, 1830-1900

Title	Addittional Titles Held	Reign
<b>Mālietoa (Sā Mālietoa)</b>		
Vāinu’upō (d. 1841)	Tui Ātua, Tui Ā’ana, Vaetamasoāli’i, Gato’aitele	Tupu Tafa’ifā, 1832-1841
Taimalelagi [Natuitasina]	Gato’aitele, Vaetamasoāli’i, Tupu o Sālāfai	1841-1858
Mōlī	Tupu (King); Gato’aitele, Vaetamasoāli’i, Tui Ātua	1858-1860
Talavou	Tonumaife’a	1869-1880
Laupepa	Tui Ā’ana, Gato’aitele, Vaetamasoāli’i	1880-1898
Tanumāfili I (1898-1939)	--	1898-1899
<b>Tupua (Sā Tupuā)</b>		
Pulepule	--	Joint King
Tamasese Titimaea	Tui Ā’ana, Tui Ātua, Vaetamasoāli’i	Tupu Sui Tupu (Vice King)
Tamasese Lealofi I	--	--
<b>Matā’afa (Sā Tupuā)</b>		
Tāfagamanu	Tui Ātua	--
Iosefo (d. 1912)	Tui Ātua, Tupua, Mālietoa, To’oā	Tupu Tafa’ifā (King)
<b>Tuimaleali’ifano (Sā Tupuā)</b>		
To’oā Sualauvī (d. 1870)	[Tui Ātua,] Tui Ā’ana, Gato’aitele, Vaetamasoāli’i	Tafa’ifā (1869-1870) <sup>57</sup>

#### Fracturing the *Atunu’u*: the Split between East and West

Up until the late nineteenth century, the Samoan archipelago was “united” through common linguistic, cultural, and kinship connections. Samoans had been the major agents in constructing and molding their own *Atunu’u*. At the turn of the century, however, without much indigenous input into the future of the *Atunu’u*, Sāmoa was carved out by foreign Euro-American regimes. In 1899, the Treaty of Berlin was signed by the United States, Great Britain, and Germany prescribing the transfer of the western islands of the *Atunu’u* to Germany and the eastern ones to the United States.

<sup>57</sup> Tuimaleali’ifano, 54-55. There is debate as to whether To’oā Sualauvī attained the status of Tafa’ifā, as Tuimaleali’ifano (2008) argues, citing missionary George Pratt’s (1890: 663) “unambiguous” assertion in addition to Samuel J. Whitmee (1870).

For Samoans on both ends of the archipelago, annexation by a foreign *Atunu'u* – the German empire, the United States or New Zealand – was an option in which they would ultimately retain and maintain *pule* through the backing of these foreign powers. This *feagaiga*, a covenant or treaty relationship, was how the Samoans naively viewed their relationship with their colonizers. It was becoming more clear, though, at the turn of the twentieth century that the foreign *mālō*, did not see the Samoans as equals in a *feagaiga* relationship.<sup>58</sup>

### The *Atunu'u* Fights Back: Seeds of Discontent and Colonial Resistance Through the *Mau* Movements

*E lē faia e se faiāvā se tonu*<sup>59</sup>  
– Traditional Samoan belief

Samoan resistance to colonial *pule* (authority, rule) was a reflection of traditional views of power dynamics and a reaction to a violation of these core beliefs as encapsulated in the Fa'asāmoa and Fa'amatai. Samoans viewed themselves as *tagatanu'u*, as “true citizens” belonging to the *Atunu'u*, and had inherent rights to govern their own land. Outsiders, including Europeans, Americans, and other foreigners were accorded the status analogous to *faiāvā* or *nofotāne*, husbands or wives, respectively, from the outside who married into the *nu'u*: they had no inherent authority to govern or dictate their will to the *suli* (inherent heirs) of the land. It is within this framework that I contextualize Samoan indignation towards colonial rule. Whereas Europeans

<sup>58</sup> It could also be argued that the Samoans viewed themselves as the *feagaiga*, the sisters, in this covenant relationship. As sisters often deferred *matai* titles to their brothers, as it could be argued metaphorically, so did the Samoans rely on foreign protectorates.

<sup>59</sup> “A husband who marries into a family has no right to make decisions for the family of his spouse.” Another belief, “e leai se aiā a se fafine nofotāne i mea a le ‘āiga” (a wife who is married into a family has no rights to the inheritance of her spouse’s family), also reflects traditional views about outsiders obtaining power and authority in one’s own (blood) family and native land. Spousal dynamics in Samoan culture makes stark distinctions between *suli* – “tagata o le ‘āiga” – those belonging to the family by ancestry (genelogy) versus those who are *paolo* (inlaws). I use this analogy to articulate the ways in which Samoans viewed outsiders as *faiāvā* and *nofotāne*, spouses who marry into a family and have no traditional rights to their spouses’ family inheritance and or a voice in village affairs. When a spouse returns to his or her natal village, he or she is no longer a *faiāvā* or *nofotāne*, but is a *suli* of that village, and thus maintains his or her traditional rights. This traditional belief reflects the ways in which Samoans viewed their relationship with outsiders and is an assertion of their Indigenous rights as *suli moni*, as the “true descendants” of Sāmoa, with all the rights and privileges of such a status.

sought to impose their own economic prerogatives and political institutions on Samoans, Samoans actively sought to assert their own inherent rights, *āiā tatau*, and *pule* over the *Atunu'u* by fighting to maintain the dignity of the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai for their own *suli*.

In the succeeding sections, I explore the three *Mau*<sup>60</sup> movements and interrogate the history of colonization and situate Samoan indignation and resistance to foreign rule: the *Mau a Pule* during German occupation, the *Mau* during New Zealand takeover of the western half of the *Atunu'u*, and the American Sāmoa *Mau* under American colonialism.

### The German Empire Strikes Back: Colonial Administration of the Western *Atunu'u*

German interest in the Samoan archipelago was its plantations (copra, rubber, cocoa, cotton, and other crops) on 'Upolu and Savai'i's larger and more arable land mass. Largely influenced by the plantation company, Deutsche Handels-und Plantagen-Gesellschaft der Südsee Inseln zu Hamburg (D.H.P.G),<sup>61</sup> the German colonial administration's promotion and protection of its commercial interests in the Pacific region would guide its policies in the Samoan archipelago.

The first German colonial governor, Wilhelm Solf, was more cognizant and knowledgeable of Samoan custom and tradition than most other Europeans. His prerogative, first and foremost, was the administration of the new colonial acquisition for the German empire and its political and economic interests.<sup>62</sup> Despite praises of his benevolent paternalism towards Samoans, Solf's ulterior motives were not so altruistic to Samoans. He ultimately sought the replacement of Samoan custom with Western principles and institutions in order to facilitate colonization.<sup>63</sup> Solf's policies would ultimately serve to progressively undermine both the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai.

<sup>60</sup> "Mau," according to Milner (1966) refers to a movement; it also refers to an "opinion" or "testimony."

<sup>61</sup> Meleisea, Malama. *The Making of Modern Samoa*, 46-47.

<sup>62</sup> Meleisea.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid 49-50

Elements of both these endemic Samoan institutions were only permissible to the extent that it did not counter German political or economic interests.

The degradation of the Fa'amatai was, among other things, to be realized in the abandonment of the already relegated position of Ali'i Sili to Fautua<sup>64</sup>. The passing of Matā'afa Iosefo (the first and only to hold the position) and the subsequent vacancy was an opportune moment for Solf to abolish the office all together and gradually erode Samoan chiefly authority. The two heads of the Sā Tupuā and Sā Mālietoā were to be joint Fautua, or advisors to the Kaiser's representative in Sāmoa, who held actual executive authority over the colonial government.

The German period under Solf's administration was to mark stark changes in the dynamics of political authority, which would later give rise to the protest movements by leading traditional Samoan powerbrokers. Firstly, it was the first time that Samoan authority had been formally subsumed under the rule of a foreign nation – both an *Atunu'u* and the *mālō* that accompanied it. Not only was Sāmoa to be ruled by proxy, but the origin of *pule* from which governance was derived was to be shifted to a locus outside of the *'a'ai*, the urban center.

Secondly, the administration, typical of foreign colonial arrogance, sought to undermine Samoan sovereignty, the ultimate form of *pule*. Under the previous centralized governments of the nineteenth century, the numerous *mālō* were, at least superficially, headed by Samoans – with the occasional foreign premier and appointments – at both the executive and legislative levels, whether nominally or not. The German Kaiser now had formally usurped *pule* from Samoans both physically through the occupation of Samoan territory and ideologically by changing the

<sup>64</sup> After the passing of Matā'afa Iosefo as the Ali'i Sili, the office was to be disbanded and replaced with that of Fautua (Chief Advisor) to the German Governor.

*fa'alupega* of the Atunu'u Under the new colonial regime, the *fa'alupega* of Sāmoa was manipulated to give precedence to the head of state of the German empire:<sup>65</sup>

Tulouna a Lana Maiesetete le Kaisa, o le tupu mamalu o lo tātou Mālō Kaisalika aoao  
 Tulouna a Lana Afioa le Kovana Kaisalika o le sui o le Kaisa i Sāmoa nei.  
 Sūsū mai Mālietua. Afio mai Tupua, ua fa'amanatuaina 'āiga e lua; i lo oulua tofiga Kaisalika o le Fautua.  
 Tulouna a le vasega o tofiga Kaisalika 'o ē 'ua fitā i le tautua 'i le Mālō.

Respect to his Majesty the Kaiser, the most dignified King of our Imperial Government.  
 Respect to his honour the Imperial Governor, the Kaiser's representation in Sāmoa.  
 Welcome to Mālietua and Tupua, who represent the two families in your positions as advisers to the Imperial government.  
 Welcome to the various officials who have served the Imperial government faithfully

The restructuring of *fa'alupega* was contrary to the commonly evoked *alagā'upu* (proverb), 'o Sāmoa 'ua 'uma ona tofi, Sāmoa's foundations have already been set (and thus cannot be changed, at least in theory).<sup>66</sup> In changing the national *fa'alupega*, the Germans directly challenged the inherent *pule* of the *matai* by seeking to alter the foundations of the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai. Given the importance of *fa'alupega* to Samoan ontological and epistemological beliefs about *pule* (authority), the German manipulation of a core part of Samoan political foundations from the Vavau was a direct assault to the *pa'ia* (*sanctity*) and *mamalu* (dignity) of both the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai as divine institutions inherited as inalienable *tofi* (appointment) passed down from *mātua* (parents) and *tua'ā* (ancestors). The German administrator utilized indigenous institutions to legitimize his own authority and superiority by placing the Kaiser at the beginning of the *fa'alupega*. Given the hierarchical nature of Samoan society – as it is embedded in the structural composition of the *fa'alupega* itself – the Germans had made bold and arrogant assertions about their status. Not only did they usurp the traditional *fa'alupega* of Samoa, but they relegated those chiefs whom Samoans had accorded with the highest *pa'ia* (sacredness) and *mamalu* (prestige)

<sup>65</sup> Meleisea, Malama, et.al. *Lagaga: A Short History of Western Samoa*, 114-115.

<sup>66</sup> Although Samoans will often evoke this proverb, various aspects of the Fa'asāmoa and Samoan history are often changed and manipulated by Samoans themselves.

and worshiped as dieties in the ancient past to mere subjects of a foreign monarch. The Germanized *fa'alupega* was framed around the 'Kaisalika' who became the ultimate source from which Samoan *pule* (authority) was derived. Samoan authority to govern in Samoa was only legitimized by the German empire's representative.<sup>67</sup> The exclusion of Tūmua and Pule as well as the other representative parts of Sāmoa went against traditional epistemological assumptions about Tama and how they were connected to their 'Āiga. Certainly, these moves were an affront to Samoan notions of propriety, and were more cause for protest and resistance against violations of Samoan claims to their *pule*.<sup>68</sup>

#### Mau a Pule: Protest Against German Paternalism

The movement known as the *Mau a Pule*, the "Opinion of Pule," Pule being the principal orator groups of Savai'i, struck a chord with Samoans because of the arrogance of colonial paternalism and its affront to the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai, the cornerstones of Samoan political life. Namulau'ulu Lauaki Māmoē, who was the leading orator of Sāfotulāfai, the capital of Fa'asālele'aga district in Savai'i, was the most vocal in his opposition to Solf's administration.<sup>69</sup> As a nationalist, Lauaki challenged Solf's efforts to ban the display of finemats, Samoa's manifestation of wealth and prestige for the chiefs, while also removing certain titles from prominent *matai*. According to Samoan custom, *matai* titles can only be removed by those who bestowed them, by 'āiga, or through conquest in war. That a foreigner violated crucial aspects of the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai, including the changing of the national *fa'alupega*, was cause for

<sup>67</sup> Meleisea, Mālama. *The Making of Modern Samoa: Traditional Authority and Colonial Administration in the Modern History of Western Samoa*. Suva: University of the South Pacific Press, 1987, 86-87.

<sup>68</sup> The German regime in Sāmoa also sought to ban the ancient *pāpā* titles and the ancient quest for titular supremacy as the Kaiser had now been proclaimed the actual "king" of (western) Sāmoa.

<sup>69</sup> Lauaki is a Tongan *matapule* title that was bestowed on Namulau'ulu's father, Namulau'ulu Faleseu (Atamu) by the Tongans. Namulau'ulu Māmoē is more popularly known as Lauaki, although Namulau'ulu is his Samoan title, bestowed on him by his 'āiga in Savai'i.

dissent and protest.<sup>70</sup> Lauaki launched a formal petition to the Kaiser raising complaints about Governor Solf and his policies in the colony and antagonized the government set up by asserting Tūmua and Pule's traditional *pule* as the “rulers” of Sāmoa. <sup>71</sup> Lauki's prowess as a skilled orator even earned the amazement of Solf and his shrewdness would provide a formidable antagonist in Solf's colonial ambitions. This ultimately led Solf to exile Lauaki to the Northern Marianas along with several of his loyal entourage.<sup>72</sup>

For decades, the Germans resisted and dodged attempts by Samoans to successfully solicit annexation to other competing foreign governments.<sup>73</sup> For the Samoans, the Germans presented a problem primarily for their lack of respect for Samoan authority and their economic interests that came to exacerbate the land alienation problems that had ravaged the archipelago in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

**Table 3.5** Colonial Governors and Administrators of German and Western Sāmoa

<b>Position</b>	<b>Occupant</b>	<b>Tenure</b>	<b>Reigning Head of State</b>
Governor of German Sāmoa (1900-1914)	Solf, Wilhelm Heinrich	1900-1911	Wilhelm II
	Schultz-Ewerth, Erich	1911-1914	
Administrators of Western Sāmoa (1914-1948)	Logan, Colonel Robert	1914-1919	George V
	Tate, Robert Ward	1919-1923	
	Richardson, George Spafford	1923-1928	
	Allen, Stephen Shepherd	1928-1931	
	Hart, Herbert Ernest	1931-1935	
	Turnbull, Alfred Clarke	1935-1946	Edward VIII
	Voelcker, Francis William	1946-1948	
	Voelcker, Francis William	1948-1949	Elizabeth II
	Powles, Guy Richardson	1949-1960	

<sup>70</sup> In addition to the protests against the political takeover of Sāmoa, the *Mau* also manifested itself as an economic protest against the German monopoly of the cash crops, especially copra.

<sup>71</sup> Davidson, J.W. “Lauaki Namulau’ulu Mamoe: A Traditionalist in Samoan Politics,” in *Pacific Self Portraits*. 295-299.

<sup>72</sup> When Namulau’ulu heard that New Zealand had taken over Western Samoa at the start of World War I in 1914, he made passage back to Samoa. Sadly, he perished from dysentery on the way back and was buried in Tarawa, Kiribati. For more details, see *The Pacific Islands : an encyclopedia* by Brij V. Lal and Kate Fortune, UH Press 2000, page 145

<sup>73</sup> Ripine, Muliaumaseali’i A. (2008). *A History of Amerika Samoa: A Historical Timeline*, 229-234. Gray, J.A.C. *Amerika and its Naval Administration*, 58-60. Commander Richard Meade had negotiated a “treaty” with Mauga, the leading chief of Pago Pago, to procure land for a naval station in exchange for the military protection of the United States in 1872, although this agreement was not formalized by the United States Senate.

High Commissioners of Western Sāmoa (1948-1961)	Wright, John Bird	1960-1961	
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The transition from German to British colonization at the outset of WWI was relatively peaceful. Lieutenant Colonel Logan of the New Zealand Navy waded ashore with a white flag at the end of a broomstick and took over from the Germans in August 1914. German military influence in the Pacific was insignificant but an apparent thorn on the sides of Australia and New Zealand who were determined to make the Pacific a “subcolonial” empire with diminishing influence from the British.<sup>74</sup>

#### The *Mau a Sāmoa*: Protest Against British Negligence and Arrogance

New Zealand’s intrusion into and tenure in the *Atunu’u* can be divided into three periods:<sup>75</sup> military rule from 1914-1919, the Mandate of Western Sāmoa, 1920-1945, and the Trusteeship of Western Sāmoa, 1945-1961. German occupation of ‘Upolu, Savai’i, and ‘Āiga i le Tai ended on August 29, 1914 when New Zealand forces headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Logan landed in Āpia and took control of administration of the territory. Little resistance was attempted by the Germans, especially given the unequal dynamics of their position as colonial administration, they were to expect little loyalty from the Samoans, yet also could not mount an adequate resistance against an invading power.<sup>76</sup>

One of the biggest failures of the Logan administration was the mismanagement of the Spanish influenza pandemic that reached Sāmoa in 1918. Logan’s failure to adequately protect Samoan lives from the deadly flu, despite warnings from the American administration governing eastern Sāmoa, resulted in the death of about 7,500 to 8000 Samoans, or about a fifth of the

<sup>74</sup> See Hermann Joseph Hiery, *The Neglected War*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995, 31.

<sup>75</sup> So’o, 45.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 45.



population. Many of Samoa's leaders died as well, thus leaving the western islands of the *Atunu'u* with a weakened traditional leaders. This led to great resentment by the Samoans and many even argued that western Sāmoa would be better off if it were administered by the United States.

Mālama Meleiseā asserts that

. . . [c]ontrary to Keesing's view (1934:1952-3) that the Mau was comparable to a number of movements which were regarded as millennial and nativistic and that it "took a more mystical form after being suppressed in 1930", the movement led to unprecedented unity among the Samoans by providing a focus for political activity centered on the struggle for government based on Samoan traditional institutions.<sup>77</sup>

The American Sāmoa Mau: The Creation of 'American Sāmoa'

We have already explored the traditional place of Tutuila and Manu'a in the ancient social and political order of the *Atunu'u*. American entrance into Sāmoa, however, did not begin at the Condominium nor at the signing of the Treaty of Berlin. Instead, American influence was initially exerted in the archipelago during Captain Tilley's expedition and Steinberger's political influences on the entire Samoan archipelago. When the United States formally occupied eastern Sāmoa, its interests did not center around the acquisition of land per se, as was the case with German Sāmoa. Both Tutuila and Manu'a made up less land for cultivation than in 'Upolu and Savai'i. However, the massive, deep harbor of Pago Pago suited strategic U.S. military interests, thus the territory was known as the United States Naval Station Tutuila and it was not until July 17, 1911 that the station would be renamed "American Sāmoa."<sup>78</sup>

The eastern half of Sāmoa, including Manu'a, had its own *Mau* movement, which David Chappell argues was essentially . . .

. . . a protest against arbitrary U.S. Navy rule, not a demand for independence, and it led to changes that eventually gave American Samoans a significant degree of local authority over decision making, as will be seen. This outcome suggests that ending colonialism may

<sup>77</sup> See *The Making of Modern Samoa*, 154

<sup>78</sup> "Manu'a celebrates 105 years under the U.S. Flag" Accessed:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20110927012532/http://www.samoanews.com/viewstory.php?storyid=7779>. See also Joseph Kennedy's *Tropical Frontier: America's South Seas Colony* (2009).

not mean separation, but rather improved relations between outsider and insider, based on equitable rights and local agency.<sup>79</sup>

Gaining an Organic Act for Samoans would be disastrous as it would have generated a double-edged sword. Chappel confirms this by claiming that “[w]hile bestowing citizenship rights, it might also threaten their communal land tenure and chiefly system; hence the need for cautious reform rather than U.S. citizenship.”<sup>80</sup>

The outcome of the Mau movement in American Sāmoa was representative of the relationship that the Samoans wanted with the United States. As opposed to the Mau in the Western islands which would eventually lead to independence, the Tutuilans were content with their continued form of “attenuated sovereignty.”<sup>81</sup> Their so-called protection under the American flag however masks the weakened position of the Fa’amatai and Fa’asamoa which could very well be upended should attempts to alter the nature of the deeds of cession signed in 1900 and 1904 for Tutuila and Manu’a respectively by certain groups on the US Mainland result in changing the citizen status of American Samoans who are the remaining “nationals” under the US constitution.<sup>82</sup>

Table 3.6 Colonial Commandants and Governors of Eastern (American) Sāmoa

Position	Occupant	Tenure	President
Commandant Governors (1900-1905)	Tilley, Benjamin Franklin	1900-1901	McKinley, William
	Sebree, Uriel	1901-1902	Roosevelt, Theodore (14 Sept. 1901 – 4 March 1909)
	Minett, Henry	1902-1903	
	Underwood, Edmund Beardsley	1903-1905	
	Moore, Charles Brainard Taylor	1905-1908	

<sup>79</sup> “The Forgotten Mau: Anti-Navy Protest in American Samoa, 1920-1935,” *Pacific Historical Review*, 69:2, 2000, 218.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, 256.

<sup>81</sup> This term “attenuated sovereignty” is borrowed from a presentation that was given by Lisa Uperesa entitled “Attenuated Sovereignities” See Fa’anofo Lisaclaire Uperesa and Adrianna Maria Garriga-Lopez, “Contesting Sovereignities: Puerto Rico and American Samoa”, in *Sovereign Acts: Contesting Colonialism Across Indigenous and Latinx America*, edited by France Negrón-Muntaner, Phoenix: University of Arizona Press, 2017, 39-81.

<sup>82</sup> For an explication of the two deeds of cession, see Faleomavaega Eni Hunkin, “Navigating the Future: A Samoan Perspective on US-Pacific Relations, Suva: Institute of Pacific Islands Studies, USP, 1995, 34-36.

Naval Governors (1905-1951)	Parker, John Frederick	1908-1910	Taft, William Howard (4 March 1909-1913)
	Croze, William Michael	1910-1913	
	Post, Nathan Woodworth	1913-1913	
	Stearns, Clark Daniel	1913-1914	Wilson, Woodrow (4 March 1913 -1921)
	Post, Nathan Woodworth	1914-1914	
	Woodruff, Charles Armijo	1914-1915	
	Poyer, John Martin	1915-1919	
	Terhune, Warren Jay	1919-1920	
	Evans, Waldo A.	1920-1922	Harding, Warren G. (4 March 1921 – 2 Aug. 1923)
	Pollock, Edwin Taylor	1922-1923	Coolidg, Calvin (2 Aug. 1923 – 4 March 1929)
	Kellogg, Edward Stanley	1923-1925	
	Bryan, Henry Francis	1925-1927	
	Graham, Stephen Victor	1927-1929	Hoover, Herbert (4 March 1929 – 1933)
	Lincoln, Gatewood Sanders (First term)	1929-1931	
	Spore, James Sutherland	1931-1931	
	Emerson, Auther Tenney	1931-1931	
	Lincoln, Gatewood Sanders (Second term)	1931-1932	
	Landenberger, George Betram	1932-1934	Roosevelt, Franklin D. (4 March 1933 – 12 April 1945)
	Latimore, Thomas C.	1934-1934	
	Dowling, Otto Carl	1934-1936	
	Fitzpatrick, Thomas B.	1936-1936	
	Milne, MacGillivray	1936-1938	
	Hanson, Edward William	1938-1940	
	Wallace, Jesse R.	1940-1940	
	Wild, Laurence	1940-1942	
	Larsen, Henry Louis	1942-1942	
	Moyer, John Gould	1942-1944	
	Hobbs, Allen	1944-1945	
	Hungerford, Ralph Waldo	1945-1945	
	Canan, Samuel	1945-1945	Truman, Harry S. (12 April 1945 – 20 January 1953)
	Houser, Harold	1945-1947	
	Huber, Vernon	1947-1949	
	Darden, Jr, Thomas Francis	1949-1951	
Appointed Governors	Phelps, Phelps	1951-1952	
	Elliott, John C.	1952-1952	

	Ewing, James Authur	1952-1953	Eisenhower, Dwight D. (20 January 1953 – 1961)
	Judd, Lawrence M.	1953-1953	
	Lowe, Richard Barrett	1953-1956	
	Coleman, Peter Tali	1956-1961	Kennedy, John F. (20 January 1961 – 22 November 1963)
	Lee, Hyrum Rex (First term)	1961-1967	Johnson, Lyndon B. (22 November 1963 – 20 January 1969)
	Apsinall, Owen Stuart	1967-1969	Nixon, Richard (20 January 1969 – 9 August 1974)
	Haydon, John Morse	1969-1974	Ford, Gerald (9 August 1974 – 20 January 1977)
	Mockler, Frank C.	1974-1975	
	Ruth, Earl B.	1975-1976	
	Barnett, Frank	1976-1977	Carter, Jimmy (20 January 1977 – 1981)
	Lee, Hyrum Rex (Second term)	1977-1978	

### Framing Decolonization Schemes

The differences in values and underlying principles were evident in the decolonization schemes. The post-World War II period was a particularly vulnerable time for Europe and an opportune time for American political and strategic military dominance. In the Pacific and in the larger world scene, decolonization was inevitable, especially from those colonial powers that were devastated by the impacts of the war.

The Samoan case for independence was gaining momentum after years of attempts to overcome successive waves of foreign dominance. Although the United Nations declaration on decolonization the declares that:

. . . [a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,<sup>83</sup>

It was implicit that independence would be the referent for decolonization, the teleological outcome of this paradigm to “undo” colonialism.

### Pacific Paradigms for Decolonization

It is important to situate the Samoan case for decolonization by framing it within the broader paradigms that were being prescribed for emerging Pacific states – and nation-states in general. The largely teleological assumptions about nation-states privileged independence as the end goal of ‘decolonization’ processes that were largely regulated by the colonial powers. Within the Pacific, many problems were ostensible in the modern construction of nation-states. Some states range from linguistically and culturally homogenous peoples (e.g. Tonga, Sāmoa, Tuvalu, Fiji) to divergent heterogeneous communities (e.g. Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia). Within Oceania, decolonization paradigms were prescribed by primarily three routes: independence (Sāmoa, Tonga, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu), free-association (Federated States of Micronesia, Niue, Cook Islands), and (forced) integration (Hawai‘i, Aotearoa/NZ, American Sāmoa) into the colonial administering state.

**Table 3.7** Decolonization paradigms in the Pacific

General Political Status	Date	Country	Former/Current Colonial/ Administering Power	Specific Political Status	Percentage of Indigenous People
Independence	1 January 1962	[Western] Sāmoa	New Zealand		93
	31 January 1968	Nauru	Australia		94
	4 June 1970	Tonga	United Kingdom		98
	10 October 1970	Fiji	United Kingdom		57

<sup>83</sup> Accessible here: <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml>.

Integration/ Contested	1888	Rapa Nui (Easter Island)	Chile	Province	30-60 (minority)
	1898	Guam*	United States	Territory, Unincorporated , Organized	37 (minority)
	1900/1904	American Sāmoa	United States	Territory, Unincorporated , Unorganized	89
	21 August 1959	Hawai‘i*	United States	State	21 (minority)
	1969	West Papua	Indonesia	Province	51
	1978	Northern Marianas Islands	United States	Territory, Unincorporated , Organized Commonwealth	35 (minority)
	1999	New Caledonia*	France	Special Collectivity (S uis generis)	40 (minority)
	2003	French Polynesia	France	Overseas Collectivity	66
	2003	‘Uvea (Wallis) and Futuna	France	Overseas Collectivity	>90
Free Association	16 September 1975	Papua New Guinea	Australia		>90
	7 July 1978	Solomon Islands	United Kingdom		96
	1 October 1978	Tuvalu	United Kingdom		94
	12 July 1979	Kiribati	United Kingdom		99
	30 July 1980	Vanuatu	United Kingdom/ France		99
	21 October 1986	Marshall Islands	United States		98
	3 November 1986	Micronesia, F ederated States	United States		90
	1992	Cook Islands	New Zealand		88
	1 October 1994	Palau	United States		73
	1994	Niue	New Zealand		80

The direct relationship between the size of the indigenous population and their inclination towards independence reveals the general trend of which political status indigenous Pacific Islanders preferred. In Pacific countries in which settler populations are the majority, the trend

towards greater integration with the colonial administrative power was more prominent. For other island territories, there were mixed reactions to independence, thus alternative models for decolonization were sought.

The anomaly of American Sāmoa highlights one of the ostensible paradoxes of decolonization in the Pacific. Although many other Pacific nations fell in line with the prescribed Western trajectory for political independence, American Samoans preferred greater autonomy rather than full-fledged independence. Economic rather than political independence was a factor that made many American Samoans content with the status quo. In addition, the political configuration allowed for two major exceptions to the general trend of deleterious affects against indigenous peoples in the United States: not only were the Fa‘asāmoa and Fa‘amatai preserved, Samoans, still retaining a majority of their population, benefit directly from maintaining its status with its administering power.

Table 3.8. List of Non-Self-Governing Territories in the Pacific region<sup>84</sup>

<b>Territory</b>	<b>Listed since</b>	<b>Administering State</b>	<b>Domestic legal status</b>
American Sāmoa	1946	United States	Unincorporated, unorganized territory
French Polynesia	1946-1947 and since 2013	France	Overseas collectivity
Guam	1946	United States	Unincorporated, organized territory
New Caledonia	1946-1947 and since 1986		Special Collectivity
Pitcairn	1946	United Kingdom	Overseas territory
Tokelau	1946	New Zealand	Territory

<sup>84</sup> This table was compiled from information accessible at <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselvgovterritories.shtml>.

Of the seventeen ‘territories’ deemed by the UN not to be ‘self-governing,’ six of them are in the Pacific, including American Sāmoa. It is interesting to note that the former New Zealand Cook Islands is listed as an ‘other state’, while Tokelau is still currently under this list.

For Western Sāmoa, then, January 1, 1962 witnessed the creation of the state as promulgated by a document with which the Samoans would later have an ambivalent relationship. The *Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa* came to formally establish a country that would “comprise the islands of Upolu, Savaii, Manono and Apolima in the South Pacific Ocean, together with all other islands adjacent thereto and lying between the 13th and 15th degrees of south latitude and the 171st and 173rd degrees of longitude west of Greenwich.”<sup>85</sup> Questions about the legitimacy of the state and the source of its authority were assumed into the statehood package, though Samoans have not left it unchallenged.

The creation of the state had drastically transformed power relations, particularly at the executive branch of government in which ‘supreme authority’ was vested in a constitutional document.<sup>86</sup> The transition from oral constitutions, i.e. *fa’alupega*, to a codified written constitution signaled transformations in the balance power and the legitimacy of authority and its exercise thereof. While the conflict between the national government and local village government was mitigated with the establishment of first a mayor or *pulenu’u* (during the German period) and second a woman’s representative to be chosen from among all women in a village, the *sui tama’ita’i*.

Samoans, though, as relational people sought statehood as a form of relating to the outside world – the “family of nations” at the international level for two main reasons (1) that relationship

<sup>85</sup> See *Constitution of the Independent State of Western Samoa*, cited in Iati 222-223.

<sup>86</sup> Meti, Lauofo. *Samoa: The Making of the Constitution*, 2002.



that had started with the encounters with the *papālagi* outside world was inevitable and (2) that the creation of a state was desirable amongst the Samoans themselves. The appropriation of the state was essentially a compromise between the unequal powers between the new nation-state or *malo*, and local village councils, of *fono a matai*. At the international level, the state or the *mālō* is the mediator – the *tulāfale* <sup>87</sup> – who acts on behalf of his *ali'i*, that is the *Atunu'u* comprising individual *nu'u* and all those who subscribe loyalty to the *mālō*.

### The Road to Independence

Gaining independence was a long and arduous process that involved years of protests, some resulting in death in December 1929. Under the New Zealand administration, progress or the lack thereof towards reclaiming power depended on which government was in power in New Zealand, either Labour or National party. The Labour Party was certainly supportive of independence, thus once in power after WWII, they moved towards preparing the people to take over once New Zealand retreated. The administration launched a massive scholarship program which transplanted many of Samoa's youth, as young as thirteen years old to live and study in New Zealand until they were ready to return and take the reins of running the new independent nation. This was quite successful although it also contributed to a brain drain since quite a few scholars decided to stay build a new life abroad. Nonetheless, those who returned mapped themselves into leadership and management positions. A decade after Independence, many of the government functions and responsibilities were in the hands of a Samoan professional workforce.<sup>88</sup>

### *Constitutional Convention*

<sup>87</sup> Here, I liken the *tulāfale* to that of the *mālō* and the *Atunu'u* to that of the *ali'i*. Similar metaphors can be applied, including that of the *tuagane* or the *ali'io'āiga* and the *tuafafine* or the *feagaiga*.

<sup>88</sup> Personal conversation with Dr. Fata Simanu-Klutz, April 2020. She was raised in Western Samoa and remembered busloads of adults going to Apia to vote in the plebescite in 1961. She was 11 years old.

It seems that the *matai* were cognizant of the organization of the government and the expectations of the United Nations. Tēvaga Paletāsala had noted:

I would like to say that there are a lot of big brains over there in the UN and they might be suspicious of our set-up and they might say, you want the matai system, but what is this discrimination which appears here?<sup>89</sup>

Such a statement illustrates well the issue of universal suffrage floated by the UN General Assembly which could not understand and therefore suspicious that Western Sāmoa would be in violation of individual adult voting rights by letting only *matai* vote. Confident of their leadership and representative type of government—Fa‘amatai, the chiefs managed to convince the UN representatives that their chiefly system was consistent in many ways with certain democratic principles, and that their families had chosen them to speak on their behalf. The Samoans even went further and accepted the UN recommendation that there should be representation for the non-citizens of Western Sāmoa. Many in this group were ‘*afakasi* (part Samoan, part European) and were granted two seats in the Legislature. Still the UN insisted on removing all doubts that the Samoans would be supportive of their chiefs’ position and agreed to holding a plebiscite.

### *The Plebiscite*

Independence was a goal that mobilized the Western Samoans into spreading the news throughout the country, from Upolu to Savai’i in 1961; however, the leading paramount chiefs who represented Sā Mālietoā and Sā Tupuā, Mālietoa Tanumāfili II and Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, initially objected to the use of a plebiscite, because it was not only irrelevant, but unnecessary. According to Samoan custom, the *matai*, whom are elected by their ‘*āiga*, were direct representatives of the people and have the right to decision-making powers inherently granted to them by their families. The Honorable Tupua Tamasese made his broadcast and said, ‘A plebiscite

<sup>89</sup> Cited from So‘o, Asofou Democracy and Custom in Sāmoa, 60. (CCD, Vol. II, p. 498)

is an innovation, and foreign to Samoa. Isn't this what is called outside interference? Vote "Yes" and never again will there be interference with us from abroad.<sup>90</sup>

Despite the seeming doublespeak, the *Tamā'aiga* acquiesced to United Nations stipulations in order to proceed with an imposed decolonization agenda. In retrospect, not only were Samoans subjected to the hegemonic worldviews on governance but were denied the legitimacy of its own indigenous institutions as having intrinsic value and equal standing within the global sphere of nation recognition. Samoan customs and traditions, even in their limitations, were not sufficient by their own merits. The UN did not recognize Samoan notions of *soālaupule*<sup>91</sup> (deliberative consultation) in determining whether the people wanted independence but instead relied on its own Western political mechanisms to legitimize what Samoans already had declared for themselves on their own terms. This acquiescence can be viewed as a form of protest against the ever-intruding colonialism of their paternalist colonizers. The results of the plebiscite are displayed in tables 3.9 and 3.10.<sup>92</sup> There were two questions on the ballot: whether to adopt the Constitution and whether they wanted independence. By overwhelming majorities, the Samoans voted "Yes" to both.

**Table 3.9.** Do you agree that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent State on the basis of that Constitution?<sup>93</sup>

Option	Votes	%
For	29,882	85.40
Against	5,108	14.60
Invalid/blank votes	2,907	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,897</b>	<b>100</b>

<sup>90</sup> McKay, C.G.R. *Samoa: A Personal Story of the Samoan Islands*. 1968 Reed: Wellington, 160.

<sup>91</sup> 'Aiono, "The Samoan Culture and Government", in R. L. Crocombe, et. al, *Culture and Democracy in the South Pacific*, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 1992, 117-138;

<sup>92</sup> For a detailed look at the preparation for Independence, see the United Nations General Assembly, Agenda Item 48 Annexes, Sixteenth Session, New York, 1961-62. Available on line: <file:///C:/Users/Fata/Desktop/SAMOAS%20POLITICS/WESTERN%20SAMOA%20ROAD%20TO%20INDEPENDENCE%20PLEBISCITE%20ON%20CONSTITUTION%20AND%20INDEPENDENCE.pdf>

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

Table 3.10. Do you agree with the Constitution, adopted by the Constitutional Convention on 28 October 1960?

Option	Votes	%
For	31,426	86.49
Against	4,909	13.51
Invalid/blank votes	1,562	--
<b>Total</b>	<b>37,897</b>	<b>100</b>

### The Current Politics

The Independent State of Sāmoa is currently divided into its eleven political districts, which had been established well before European contact. Instead of eliminating or fabricating new districts, the new state had absorbed these *itūmālō* and created electoral districts to account for representational infrastructure in the new *mālō*, or nation-state.

Table 3.11. The political districts of Sāmoa include the eleven traditional *itūmālō*.

No.	District	Capital	No.	District	Capital
<b>‘Upolu</b>			<b>Savai’i</b>		
1	Tuamāsaga	Afega	6	Fa’asālele’aga	Sāfotulāfai
2	Ā’ana	Leulumoega	7	Gaga’emauga	Sāle’aula
3	‘Āiga i le Tai	Mulifanua	8	Gagaifomauga	Āopo
4	Ātua	Lufilufi	9	Vaisigano	Ā’asu
5	Va’a-o-Fonotī	Sāmāmea	10	Sātupa’itea	Sātupa’itea
			11	Palauli	Vailoa

### Greater Autonomy for American Sāmoa

Decolonization, in American Sāmoa, did not follow Independent Sāmoa’s trajectory. Tutuila and Manu’a have been used as metonyms for “American Sāmoa” though the complications have already been discussed in the previous chapter. The center of migration to American Sāmoa is the island of Tutuila, which itself houses an overwhelming majority of the population of the territory. It has been reported that there has been a history of requests to remove American Sāmoa from the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories, however, the most recent move has been to

leave American Sāmoa on the list.<sup>94</sup> There were such considerations when decolonization was occurring in Sāmoa. American Samoans, however, expressed various concerns about “uniting” with Western Sāmoa. Many of these issues were expressed in the political status study commission reports. Included among some of the concerns was the unequal relationship American Samoans would have as a “junior” partner in a united polity. Given that American Sāmoa had less land and fewer people, this would subsequently result in less representation, among other things. In addition, the federal funding from the U.S. already puts A.S. in an economically advantageous position. It had already been proven by the schism in the Congregational Christian Church of Sāmoa (CCCS) in the second half of the twentieth century that unequal monetary contributions between the two Sāmoas whereby the American Samoa claimed to have given too much financial support to the headquarters in Āpia for very little return. Many of the church leaders from American Sāmoa at the time were themselves public leaders as well. It would not have taken much to see a similar vision from a reunification.<sup>95</sup>

Table3.12. District and Counties of American Sāmoa

Eastern District	Western District	Manu‘a District
Itū‘au County	Ālatau County	Faleasao County
Ma‘opūtasi County	Fofō County	Fitiuta County
Sā‘ole County	Leasina County	‘Ofu County
Sua County	Tualatai County	Olosega County
Vāifanua County	Tuālāuta County	Ta‘ū County

### Decolonization Critiques

Decolonization was not always a clear conceptualization for returning sovereignty to the former colonies. In name only, it would not take long before decolonization would become new

<sup>94</sup> See articles: <http://www.talane.com/pages/21542401.php>.

<sup>95</sup> Personal conversation with ‘Aumua Mata‘itusi Simanu, a member of the CCCS in Waimānalo. She was apparently still in Sāmoa when the split happened. The American Sāmoa sect is now called the Congregational Christian Church of American Samoa (CCCAS) with headquarters at Kanana Fou, Tāfuna.

colonization or neocolonization by the nation-state agenda. It could be said that European involvement in Samoan affairs in the nineteenth century struggles for centralization, was a form of imperialism that was only transformed into neocolonial agendas of globalization into nation-states. In other words, the colonizers physically left and left behind their colonizing institutions. The color of the guard may have changed, but not western methods and approaches, tactics and strategies which the local substitutes or replacements were more comfortable to continue than having to reinvent or land in a zero-sum game of paradigm shifts.

Jean-Paul Sartre's treatise, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*,<sup>96</sup> claims that the state-imposed paradigm (the current ideological framework for the nation) has proven that the state is a postcolonial/neocolonial institution that continues the colonial legacy of the previous colonizers. By setting up political and economic institutions in the postcolonial era, the State had consolidated its power in a way that the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century centralization schemes had failed to do. Traditional institutions were transformed and the power and social dynamics between customary binary relationships and structures were disrupted and ultimately subverted by the neoliberal hegemony of the state.

#### *Critiques from Indigenous Studies*

The nation-state though is not premised on any notion of affective ties or other dimensions related to racial categories. Sāmoa's case, however, was not like that of most other indigenous nations. Sāmoa comprised more than 90 percent of its indigenous people, all of whom are represented by their customary institutions. The state's initial rejection of the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* was an indication that the state and indigenous

<sup>96</sup> Sartre, Jean-Paul. 2001. *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*: Routledge.

peoples were two separate entities. Both claim separate agencies in relating to the nation, but only states are recognized internationally under the rhetoric of sovereignty and political legitimacy.

### *Gender Critiques of Decolonization*

In addition to mainstream Western and Indigenous critiques, the gendered disparities in decolonization were often overlooked. As Tracey Banivanua Mar argues, decolonization, within the larger Pacific contexts was largely “men’s business:”

It involved the handing over of a male-dominated form of colonial rule to a male-dominated form of a nation-state. It was men that colonial administrators negotiated with over land and resources. It was mostly men who were educated by colonial administrations in preparation for independence. It was men who traveled to conferences, joined constitutional committees and petitioned other men in the United Nations.<sup>97</sup> This important point was noticeable in the constitutional conventions that included

privileged male Tama’āiga and their European advisors.<sup>98</sup>

Simanu-Klutz echoes this critique in her analysis of female power and the exclusion of *feagaiga* or sisters from nation-building.<sup>99</sup> In her analysis of the political dynamics of the Nu’u o Teine of Saoluaafata, the village council of daughters and sisters, Simanu-Klutz argues that the infringement of state and church policies and practices on the primordial power of her village women’s council has left them powerless when it comes to managing the political and economic responsibilities of the village.

The exclusion of *tama’ita’i*, women, as equal participants in the creation of the State reflects some of the inherent pitfalls of the nation-state in providing for adequate representation of women. Government schemes that advocate for women quotas, which were advocated by outside

<sup>97</sup> *Decolonisation in the Pacific*, 217.

<sup>98</sup> See Meti, Lauofo. *Samoa: The Making of the Constitution*. National University of Samoa, 2002.

<sup>99</sup> See her dissertation.

countries who themselves have unequal and underrepresentation of women in government positions, seem noble but the practical realities show that there is still much to do in terms of providing greater gender representation in government.<sup>100</sup>

Queer theory has important critiques in terms of the nation-state and where *fa'afāfine*,<sup>101</sup> *fa'afātama*,<sup>102</sup> and other nonbinary conforming genders and gender roles fit into the traditional sphere of the *nu'u*. There is no doubt that *fa'afāfine* and others have been a part of the *Atunu'u* As any other *suli moni o 'āiga*, 'true' descents of families, they have equal rights to *suafa matai* (chiefly titles) and participation in the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai. To which groups they claim, whether the Nu'u o Tama'ita'i or Nu'u o Teine, has not been adequately addressed, and will perhaps be shaped by the tides of change that are sweeping across the diasporas. Debates on the issue of same-sex marriage have caused great debates within the *Atunu'u* as to what rights certain members have in the Fa'asāmoa and the Fa'amatai. While the conservative atmosphere, largely influenced by the Christianization of the *Atunu'u*, has restricted in Independent Sāmoa, challenges to constitutional rights and Samoan autonomy have been debated and lodged in American Sāmoa.<sup>103</sup> Although Independent Sāmoa has asserted its sovereignty in its prohibition of same-sex marriage by citing ambiguous and undefined aspects of the Fa'asāmoa, this still does not resolve the debates as to the rights of *fa'afāfine* and others in full participation in the nation-state. In theory, all descendants of 'āiga and *nu'u* have rights to *tofi* (roles, positions) in the Fa'asāmoa. Rights as

<sup>100</sup> See Baker, Kerry. *Pacific Women in Politics: Gender Quota Campaigns in the Pacific*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2019.

<sup>101</sup> Although there is no native Samoan word designated specifically for 'gay' or 'homosexual,' the umbrella term *fa'afāfine* has come to be inclusive of those who claim to be a part of the Samoan lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQI+) communities. For more in depth analyses of these terms, see McMullin and Kihara, *Samoan Queer Lives*, Auckland, Little Island Press, 2018.

<sup>102</sup> *Fa'atama* is now used by some as a variant of *fa'afātama*, a word that is, perhaps, an analogy - borrowing from the term *fa'afāfine*. *Fa'atama*, however, is an indigenous Samoan term for a girl looking for male 'companionship.'

<sup>103</sup> See "American Samoa holds out against same-sex marriage ruling." Accessible at <https://www.khon2.com/news/american-samoa-holds-out-against-same-sex-marriage-ruling/>.



enshrined in Western institutions, which may often come into conflict with Samoan institutions, become more ambiguous for LGBTQI+ individuals in both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa.<sup>104</sup>

In American Sāmoa, attempts to curtail the legalization of same-sex marriage were grounded on appeals to two authorities: the Fa'asāmoa itself, and Christian principles. Although appeals to the latter may not hold in court, American Sāmoa's Constitution proclaims to protect the former.<sup>105</sup> Whatever the Fa'asāmoa is, however, is ambiguous and not clearly defined as it is not codified in the Constitution (yet some of its interpretations are spelled out in its annotations).

### Concluding Reflections

Colonization, a complex and nuanced process in the case of Sāmoa, was central to the transformation of the *Atunu'u*, especially as other *atunu'u* and *mālō* sought to engage with, exploit, and alter the social, political, and economic foundations of Sāmoana. The United States, Britain, and Germany exploited the preexisting conflicts of the various factional parties that were fighting to assert their supremacy as the *mālō* of all of Sāmoa. The unequal power differential between the colonizers and Sāmoa further placed Samoans in a less than equal position to fully determine their political destinies without foreign intervention. Samoans were not naive in letting Europeans and Americans colonize; however, the power dynamics and political circumstances under which the treaties to carve up Samoa were negotiated cannot be ignored. Samoans, nonetheless, still exercised their agency in trying to navigate and negotiate their political circumstances within the confines of the parameters to which they were limited.

<sup>104</sup> As most Samoans in the diaspora reside in nation-states that legalize same-sex marriage, challenges still exist within conservative Samoan communities with regard to this issue.

<sup>105</sup> See the *Revised Constitution of American Samoa*:

[http://asbar.org/2019/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177](http://asbar.org/2019/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1961&Itemid=177).

The *Atunu'u*, as a nation founded on genealogical and kinship ties, had been transformed through the period of European contact and after Sāmoana became divided and molded into the nation-state model of nationhood. A new nation – that is, defined in terms of the state, was created in 1962: the independent state of Western Sāmoa. American Sāmoa had still been part of the American nation-state, subsumed under its hegemony, with an ambiguous, but an amicable relationship with the United States. The global forces that transformed the nation from *Atunu'u* to *mālō* had not only defined Sāmoa in terms of bordered political entities but had also provided opportunities for the nation-state to outmaneuver itself through the expanded networks of Samoans living outside of Sāmoa, which will be a focal point of discussion of the nation in Chapter 4.

## CHAPTER IV – BEYOND THE STATE-CENTRIC *MĀLŌ*: ARTICULATING SĀMOANA AS *ATUNU'U* (AS NATION)

“O Samoa e lē o se malo; o Samoa o le uso ma le 'aiga.”

[‘Samoa is not government; Samoa is brotherhood and family’]<sup>1</sup>

– Tui Ātua Tupua Tamasese ‘Efi, Head of State of Sāmoa, 2007-2017

Despite the jubilant overtone of the celebrations of political independence, the Head of State’s sentiment about Sāmoa being more than just government is a reflection of the ambivalence of Western definitions of nation and traditional, indigenous notions of nation related to kinship, *uso* and *‘āiga*. In the context of the speech, when Tui Ātua referred to Samoan concepts of the nation that are based on genealogy, on kinship, he simultaneously praised the ‘birth’ of a nation, the state, that had been created only fifty years earlier. The previous chapters have deconstructed notions of the nation in relation to the state, especially in the post-colonial, decolonization era. A discussion about the transnationalism that had resulted from globalization imperatives which are compounded by indigenous notions of *malaga* and movement reinforces the fluid nature of the primordial Atunu'u. In this final section, I argue that the Samoan nation is best articulated by a reconceptualization of the indigenous term *Atunu'ū*, nation, country, in opposition to *mālō* (the ‘winning party’), government or state. After tracing the origins of the nation-state from its pre-Western forms, I have examined how this conceptualization of the nation has been imposed on and appropriated by Samoans. This section will evaluate the fiftieth anniversary of Independence and its ties into the theme of state reification and ethnic Samoan nationalism. The political and social divergence resulting from the partition of 1899 has produced various attitudes and rivalries that will be examined in depth through anecdotal experiences and evidence from contemporary sources.

<sup>1</sup>Exact quote and translation is taken from p. 12 of the Preface to *Samoa's Journey: 1962-2012*, edited by Malama Meleisea, et al.

## Post-Independence Tensions between the Two Samoan Polities<sup>2</sup>

Before delving into a reconceptualization of a nation that operates on ancestral notions of Samoanness—one that reflects beliefs and values of the collective while sanctioning individual contributions, I would like to revisit one of the original purposes for this thesis, which was to interrogate the discourse about the tensions between Independent Sāmoa and American Sāmoa. Fairly documented primarily through newspaper writings, the relations between the two polities have been both amicable and contentious. An unofficial rivalry between the two polities exists in the rhetoric that is sometimes exhorted by both sides. The relationship between the two Samoas has at times been less cordial particularly when modern systems of governance highlighting differences in rules and policies concerning geographic or economic border crossings are involved. The conflicts between these two *mālō* are expressed through the reification of two separate modern nations, *Atunu‘u*, through two *faigāmālō*. The tensions that arise out of these differences have translated into popular discursive practices. We first explore the complications over nomenclature and how this has contributed to the conflict today.

### *The Nomenclature Dispute*

We have explored in Chapter 2 the irony of the name ‘Sāmoa’ since one cosmogony credits the name Sāmoa to the Moa family from Manu‘a. The irony is that Sāmoa became the name for all islands in the archipelago west of Manu‘a, subsuming Tutuila under the ‘Upolu districts.

On July 4, 1997, the Parliament of Western Sāmoa amended the Constitution to formally remove the qualifier, “Western”, from all references to the state, so that in effect it would return to being called just ‘Sāmoa.’<sup>3</sup> Although the change was allegedly undertaken under

<sup>2</sup> Hermann Mückler talks a great deal about these tensions in his article, “Unwanted Neighbours: Implications, Burdens, and the Instrumentalization of Migration: relations between American Samoa and the Republic of Samoa.”

<sup>3</sup> See constitutional amendment: [http://www.palemene.ws/new/wp-content/uploads/01.Acts/Acts%201997/Constitution\\_Amendment\\_Act\\_No.2\\_1997\\_-\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.palemene.ws/new/wp-content/uploads/01.Acts/Acts%201997/Constitution_Amendment_Act_No.2_1997_-_Eng.pdf).

recommendations by the United Nations, legislators in American Sāmoa took umbrage at the change. In August of the same year, Representative Seti Lopa of the territorial government proposed an amendment to not recognize the name change, going so far as to suggest a rejection of passports bearing the seal of the “Independent State of Samoa.”<sup>4</sup> House Speaker Ma‘ilo Sao Nua supported the proposal, while Governor Tau‘ese Sunia threatened to veto it. The proposal was ultimately passed in the House on March 10, 1998, effectively nullifying recognition of the name change by Western Sāmoa.<sup>5</sup> This protest did not stop with internal measures. A delegation from the American Sāmoa Fono (legislature) was sent to meet with then Head of State of Sāmoa, Mālietoa Tanumafili II, to discuss the withdrawal of the name change. A petition was even considered to be delivered to the United Nations to formally ban Western Sāmoa from exclusively using the name Sāmoa.

Ultimately, this dispute revealed the assumptions behind modern principles and paradigms of statehood of the right to exercise sovereignty therefore superiority over the absence of such for American Samoa. The territory’s protest against Western Sāmoa’s change in nomenclature was not a futile exercise of political discourtesy. The Samoans in American Samoa, through their leaders, found such a move audacious and threatening; the politicization of the Samoan identity had become a point of contention between the two political entities. The conflict raised questions over the politics of identity and its relationship to statehood. It begged the question of whether this meant American Sāmoa had less of a claim to “Samoanness” because it was not a nation-state, since it was and still is subsumed under the hegemony of another nation-state. Furthermore, is “independence” and the ‘achievement’ of full political sovereignty the terminal goal of

<sup>4</sup> Lopa, Seti (1997). “American Samoa may vote not to recognize Western Samoa’s name change to Samoa”. In Pacific News, August 8th, 1997 (Pacific Islands Report Archive). Accessible on <http://pidp.org/pireport/1997/August/08-29-06.html>.

<sup>5</sup> *Political Handbook of the World*, 994.

nationhood, hence, exclusive ownership of Samoanness? What if American Sāmoa were to become independent? Who would be the ‘real’ Sāmoa? Certainly, this would evoke more problems that had not been fully anticipated with the initial name change. Could we have a phenomenon in which two independent Sāmoas emerge with a nomenclature conundrum, similar to the two Congos, the two Koreas, and the two Chinas (‘mainland’ China and Taiwan China)? This certainly needs to be explored, especially as American Sāmoa may look to reexamine its political status in the future.

### *Immigration Policies Disputes*

Despite the popular assumptions about Sāmoa being one national unit, the statist disputes that arise out of reified borders become salient. Imagined as an ethnic nation with a linguistically, culturally and socially homogenous people with two distinct polities, the two Sāmoas have become entangled in the nuances and complexities of modern statist affairs. I will refer again to two examples that entail the banal nationalism of everyday habits and encounters that normalize such seemingly mundane expressions of patriotism, including flags, anthems, passports, and other symbols and policies – both physical and imagined.<sup>6</sup> The first example entails the disputes over immigration laws and policies that have further exacerbated relations between the two countries. The imposition of airport taxes between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa is a manifestation of the reification of bordered states and polities. After witnessing the enactment of immigration restrictions and fees by the American Sāmoa government, the Samoan state-imposed taxes into American Sāmoa. There had been an apparent incident in which a group from Sāmoa tried to enter into the port in Pago but was denied entry by the Attorney General. Taxes were imposed by the Independent State of Sāmoa as a form of reciprocation and retaliation. The irony is that those who

<sup>6</sup> Michael Billeg, *Banal Nationalism* 1995, 6-7.

possess American passports as U.S. citizens traveling to Sāmoa are exempt from the tax. “U.S. nationals,” on the other hand, must pay the entry tax – a move that was directly intended to target those visiting from American Sāmoa, who are not technically U.S. citizens, but are referred to as “U.S. nationals,” a status that is conspicuously identified on the last page of the U.S. passport. These barriers, which did not exist in pre-contact Sāmoa, had all of a sudden appeared in less than a century.

One of the most recent cases involved the denial of entrance to Americans with military identification documents upon arrival in Samoa.<sup>[7]</sup> As another measure of response to the situation in American Samoa, the government of Sāmoa decided not to accept military identification cards for international travel, as Samoans frequently travel between the Samoas.<sup>[8]</sup> There is often a laidback attitude among Samoans with regard to such policies as Samoans often invoke the affective dimensions of relating to and interacting with people. But the perceived bitterness and seemingly trivial reactionary measures enacted by both Samoas reveal that tensions manifest wherever perceived violations of *vā fealoa’i* (the maintenance of sociospatial relationships) prevent the mitigation of disputes.

### *The Relativity of ‘Foreignness’*

This violation of *vā* is reflected in these banal, albeit very foreign, notions of nationalism that have arisen out of a relativity of “foreignness”, a consequence of the reification of the state and the bordered boundaries imposed by the West and appropriated by Samoans. This relativity is based on an idea of immigration that is centered around concepts of national identity and national consciousness that have been forged in both Sāmoas. The fact that “immigration” – a term usually

<sup>7</sup> Tavita, Terry. “Independence noises and the Territory”. In *Samoa Observer*, July 3, 2005.

reserved for moving to settle different countries has manifested in the two Samoas further adding to the reification of colonially-imposed models of the nation-state. The invoking of the ‘foreign’ in encounters between the two polities reveal at least at a surface level, that Samoans were using statist concepts of the ‘foreign’ to polarize and assert modern geopolitical constructs. The two examples I use here are the adoption of the ‘overstayer’ rhetoric used in settler-states such as New Zealand. Movement between islands in the *Atunu‘u* before contact was more fluid. It was freely undertaken between and about different *nu‘u* and *itūmālō* without the limiting constraints of passports and travel visas and the existence of immigration departments and policies. Now, under a state system, the products of civic nationalism become more salient: western concepts of citizenship based on the state, rather than indigenous Samoan notions of kinship and genealogy have overtaken the sense of Samoanness. For Samoans, “foreigner” (*tagata ‘ese*) did not mean someone who belonged to a different state, but to a different *atunu‘u*.<sup>8</sup> The classification of Samoans from the independent state as ‘overstayers’ by their American Samoan brethren has complicated ideas of what it means to be Samoan. Samoans have continually moved about the *Atunu‘u*, but the postcolonial economic paradigms have shifted migration patterns unilaterally from independent Sāmoa to American Sāmoa – to point to where over half of the population of Tutuila comprises those originating from Sāmoa.<sup>9</sup>

Despite these colonial distinctions, the banal nationalism articulated in the recent phenomena of sports nationalism has also dominated (and complicated) Pacific concepts of identity. The *Manu Sāmoa*, the national rugby team of the independent state of Sāmoa is a symbol

<sup>8</sup> It is difficult to actually gloss the term ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ in Samoan as the conceptual categorization of race seems to be foreign to Samoans. The term *tagatānu‘u*, literally a person of a village or nation, has been translated as a ‘citizen’ of a country. The problem is that Samoans have associated ‘citizenship’ along ethnic terms rather than how Western states define it through civic means. Does *tagatānu‘u* refer to race or to citizenship?

<sup>9</sup> Contemporary migration from American Sāmoa to Sāmoa reflects access to economic benefits because of the greater wealth provided by access to the United States.



not only of patriotism to the Samoan state but to the *Atunu'u* as a whole. Despite its formal association with the nation-state of Sāmoa, the Manu Samoa yields many loyal fans and patrons across borders and states. During the 2011 Rugby World Cup, a minor controversy erupted after American Sāmoa Senator Fuamatu Fuamatu complained about the flying of “foreign flags” in American Sāmoa. Claims were made that the Samoan flag was “trumping” the flags of the United States and American Sāmoa in the territory.<sup>10</sup> For Fuamatu and others who supported a bill to ban the flying of “foreign flags”, an indirect reference to the Samoan flag reveals the latent animosity held between the two Samoan polities. For Fuamatu, who himself was an American soldier, the flying of the Samoan flag was an affront to the sacrifice of Samoans for the American flag.<sup>11</sup> These assertions by the leadership in American Sāmoa and the seemingly salient disregard or negligence towards the flying of the Samoan flag in the territory reveals the complex politics of patriotism and national identity evident in American Sāmoa.

Although a majority of Tutuilans have genealogical roots in 'Upolu, the majority of the territorial legislature are native Tutuilans who are protective of its relationship with the United States. As opposed to Samoans in the west who have allegiance to one state, American Samoans pledge allegiance to its parent state, the United States and the territorial *mālō* (government). Both Samoas celebrate the *Fu'a* – a colloquial term used to reference the Flag Days of each respective Samoan polity. But they are diametrically opposed in substance: Samoan Independence Day, observed on June 1<sup>st</sup> of every year commemorates the ‘achievement’ of independence and the formation of the nation-state. The American Samoan Flag Day held annually on April 17 commemorates the raising of the American flag in eastern Sāmoa and valorizes its relationship

<sup>10</sup> See Sagapolutele, Fili. “ASNOC voices opposition to foreign flags flying around” and

<sup>11</sup> “Samoa flags everyone as Am Samoa cheers team” <http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2011/September/09-28-10.htm>

with the United States. At the level of the *mālō*, the interests of the state become paramount, as the expressions of patriotism become transcended by loyalties to the *Atunu‘u*. In the first case with the flag controversy, we saw challenges in expressions of patriotism. Samoans, not just in the independent state, but the global *Atunu‘u*, including American Sāmoa, who celebrated the achievements of the Manu Sāmoa, actually transcended the static-centric and state-limiting patriotism that centralizes itself (the state) as the focus of “loyalty.” This banal nationalism – rooted in ethnic nationalism – not only challenged the statism in American Samoan objections to flag-raising but revealed the transcendent nature of nationalism against the assertion of Western, colonially-imposed borders and territoriality.

Ultimately the diplomatic disputes involving controversial immigration policies and the banal expressions of nationalism embodied in the flag controversy challenge ethnic components of nationalism, in favor of more civic/liberal notions of nationalism. But these ostensible surface elements of tension are also rooted in the latent attitudes of disparagement that are not necessarily articulated in mainstream mediums. The tensions between Sāmoa and American Sāmoa were highlighted in the famous song by Penina o le Tiafau, “Tau‘alaga a Solomona,” which highlights not so much the political discrimination in which both states exhibit towards one another, but rather the economic and social belittlement of Samoans. The song “Tau‘alaga a Solomona” became a classic song of nostalgia and critique of the tense relations between Western and American Samoans:

Le tau‘alaga a Solomona, e fa‘atatau i le alofa  
 E lē mafaia e vai e tele ona tineia ese  
 ‘O le uō i aso ‘uma ‘a ‘o le uso i aso vale  
 Na‘o le Sāmoa e tua ‘i le Sāmoa i fa‘alavelave

#### **Tali**

‘Ae fa‘anoanoa ai ‘o lo‘u agāga  
 ‘A ‘e ita uso e Tutuila ‘ua ‘e lau ‘ita  
 Fai mai ‘o Sāmoa i Sisifo e mativa  
 ‘Ae galo ‘iā ‘oe ‘o ‘oe lava ‘ua ‘e fa‘alumaina

Faimai e tele a'a o le tagata  
Nai lō a'a o lā'au 'uma lava  
'Ae sē pagā 'o le ipu vai lea 'ua masa'a  
'Ae ui i lea 'ou te talia ma lo'u loto fiafia  
Pule 'oe, sē, 'ou te lē 'āmana'ia

Lo ta uso Sāmoa se'i tautuanā si o tā igoa  
Va'ai 'i mata e afe lele e māimoa  
Le mālosi mai i le Atua  
'O le tama poto e fuafua  
'Ae 'ā leaga e ta'uvalea ai ou mātua

Sāmoa ma si ona olaga  
Na 'o se 'ie'ie e lāvalava  
E palapalā fo'i mea e fai ai ana mea taumafa  
Leai ni mea'ai tu'u'apa,  
E susu le tina si ana tama  
Tolu māsina fafāga loa 'i le mama

'Aiseā e 'ua ala i uso e lou tau fa'aleaga mai  
Le tama'i moa lale e 'io'io mai  
'Aua ne'i 'e ta'u atua 'i tagata si o tā olaga  
Manatua, 'o Sāmoa 'o le penina o le vasa

Solomon's exhortation regarding compassion  
That cannot be decimated by strong currents  
A comrade in fine times, yet a brother through the bad  
Only a Samoan helps a Samoan in times of trouble

**Chorus**  
My soul despairs in  
You brother Tutuila have shamed me  
Say [you] that Western Sāmoa is impoverished  
But lest ye forget, you only bring shame upon yourself

It is said that man has more roots  
Than the roots of all plants  
But how sad that the cup spills  
But nonetheless I accommodate you joyfully  
But do as you will, as I will not recognize

My dear Samoan brother, be considerate of our name  
Look at the faces of the multitudes who observe us  
The strength that comes from God  
Which is imparted onto the cautious child  
Lest he stumbles, he disgraces his parents

Sāmoa and its dear lifestyle  
Only with an 'ie lavalava to wear  
Who sweats to prepare its food  
With no canned food

Whose mother breastfeeds her child  
And after three months masticates its food

Why is it that you must sabotage me  
The small chick exposes its parenthood  
Tell not to others of our life  
And remember that Sāmoa is the pearl of the sea

This song highlights the bonds that both Samoas share through their kinship with the use of the *uso* (sibling of the same sex).<sup>12</sup> Sāmoa, despite its modern political divisions, maintains its relationship through traditional relational encounters through the invoking of genealogical connections rather than the state-centric bonds. As a protest song, “Taulaga a Solomona” has been used to critique the belittling attitudes by those from American Sāmoa towards Samoans from the west. The lyrics above express discontent with the ways in which American Samoa “looked down” upon Western Samoans for their poverty, an attitude that was evident in the casual, everyday life and encounters among Samoans. Although I do not explore these attitudes in depth, they are worth mentioning as evidence to the latent tensions revealed between the two polities. But these attitudes were not unilaterally provoked.

Anecdotally, Samoans from ‘Upolu have “looked down” upon “Tutuila people” as being ‘more distanced from traditional culture’ and uninspiring in comparison to Samoans from ‘Upolu. Claiming to be from the “real” Sāmoa, Upoluan have patronized Tutuilans as less Samoan because of their “American ways,” depending on “Uncle Sam” for aid and government benefits, while people from ‘Upolu have to work their way up and attain good educational and career opportunities. This was evident in the objections raised by the American Sāmoa delegation that attempted to reverse the name-change in 1997. Often citing Tutuila’s history of being a “penal colony,” American Sāmoa has garnered such a reputation from its ‘Upolu neighbors. Furthermore,

<sup>12</sup> It is said that this song was banned in American Sāmoa for its controversial nature. <http://www.samoan-sensation.com/q-and-a/4668.html>

recent comments by Prime Minister Tuila'epa on the status of American Sāmoa, calling it 'disorganized' rather than 'unorganized,' had much backlash from the American Sāmoa legislature and the general public.<sup>13</sup> Tuila'epa, despite his disparaging attitude towards his government's sister *mālō*, recounted on economic and political terms, the lack of political clout American Sāmoa currently has in terms of its dynamics with the United States:

This is similar to village council meetings, when the chiefs meet, the chief's son always sits at the back behind his father. This is what's happening here, when the world meets, the chiefs meet and American Samoa sits behind and waits for the US. That's what American Samoa should really think about, if they should continue to be sitting behind the US.<sup>14</sup>

Tuila'epa's comments did not only reflect numerous issues about American Sāmoa's political status, but exacerbated the politics of maintaining the *vā* (social relationships, *teu le vā*). Feelings of resentment and offense reveal that the latent condescension between the two were very strong, after years of back-and-forth political retributions.

#### Tensions between Samoans in the Homeland and the Diasporas

The tensions between Samoans in the 'homeland' and that in the diasporas have also become more salient. Criticism has been exchanged between the two in anecdotal experiences as well as in the literature. Criticisms from the Sāmoas range from the modification and commodification of culture to the lack of respect amongst the communities in the diaspora. Such discourse is particularly salient through the rise of social media in promoting transnational discussion through mediums such as blogs, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and other related platforms. Recent posts on Facebook and comments on online newspaper articles reveal the

<sup>13</sup> See an article in the, "Samoa's PM calls on Am Samoa to change status." *Samoa News* 08 Sept 2014. Accessible on <http://www.samoanews.com/content/en/samoa%E2%80%99s-pm-calls-am-samoa-change-status>. American Sāmoa's status as an "unorganized" territory of the United States is a reference to the lack of an Organic Act, which would have had Congress establish a formal government.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.samoanews.com/content/en/samoa%E2%80%99s-pm-calls-am-samoa-change-status>

complex relationships between those who live *i fafo* (outside) to those who live *i 'inei* (here). There are always conversations on related group pages that discuss various issues.<sup>15</sup>

From the diaspora, the main contentions lie within various diverse topics. One of the most prevalent concerns regards contributing to *fa'alavelave* – family, village, and church obligations – and critiques of the politics and governance, especially corruption in both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa.<sup>16</sup> Studies have shown the conflicts caused by the stresses of remittances and *saogatupe*, collection of money for *fa'alavelave*, has placed undue burdens on Samoan families struggling to live the capital-rich metropolitan areas of the diasporas. While the romanticization and valorization of the 'homeland' Sāmoa is often expressed by those in the outskirts of this *Atunu'u*, they have not also been uncritical of the pressures and contradictions of struggling to survive in the modern economy while trying to maintain cultural identities. For the discussion of nationalism, we have not addressed how questions of identity have influenced the nationalism for Samoans who do not reside in Independent, or American Sāmoa.

### The Failed-States Discourse

Given the centrality of the state as the referent for the nation and that nationhood is widely taken for granted as the primary legitimate politico-military force by the West, it is not surprising that there is confusion about the state. The descriptions of nationalism towards the state as applied to the *Atunu'u* in academic and popular discourse has been predicated on contentious assumptions. The framework for these discussions, rooted in the "reunification discourse" that in itself is rooted in the state-centrism of the nation, have ultimately contributed to the 'othering' and belittling of contemporary Samoan indigenous political institutions. I

<sup>15</sup> Some of the older common forums on which these issues can be discussed are found on [www.topix.com](http://www.topix.com) and [www.activeboard.com](http://www.activeboard.com). Currently, social media has become more popular to discuss issues including pages on Facebook like "Samoa mo Samoa" "Café Coco Samoa" and "Palemene o Samoa."

<sup>16</sup> See studies on MIRAB economies and the stresses of remittances and family obligations on the diasporas.

discuss here specifically three texts in which this is manifested: 1) the failed-state discourse of Andre Vltchek, 2) the real-politick analysis of Mattori Yamamoto, and 3) the analysis of the fa'amatai by Stephanie Lawson.<sup>17</sup>

In compiling his work, *Oceania: Neocolonialism, Nukes, and Bones*,<sup>18</sup> Andre Vltchek recycles the doom and gloom tone of his article, "Samoa: One Nation, Two Failed States" and perpetuates a black and white scenario that relegates Samoa as a sunken state controlled by authoritarian matai using culture to exploit their people. Typical of modernization critique, the "other" is viewed with Western individualistic and capitalist lens, the only way Vltchek can see the world. Had he lived longer in the Pacific and to a Samoan spouse, he might have had the chance to see the bias of his journalism and the choice to be condescending of his subjects in a manner consistent with another doom and gloom travel writer, Paul Theroux. Given this positionality, Vltchek will never experience the complexities of Samoanness, the way Serge Tcherzekoff has with his feet in the discursive nature of daily life in both Western and Samoan contexts.<sup>19</sup>

In her book *Tradition versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa*, Stephanie Lawson points to the incompatibility of Western democracy with the Fa'asāmoa, inferring that there is a tendency to associate democratic ideals with the West. That is, democracy is an explicit invention of the West and its genealogy precludes others from espousing legitimate likewise polities. In the case of Samoa, Lawson argues that the Fa'asāmoa, an authoritarian institution meant to preserve the power of the elite, inherently privileges the elite. Her application of Marxist theories assumes a congruence of class structure and social strife in the

<sup>17</sup> Stephanie, Lawson, "Tradition versus Democracy in the South Pacific: Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996

<sup>18</sup> *Oceania: Neocolonialism, Nukes & Bones*, Badak Merah Semesta, 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Serge Tchezekoff has written extensively about various aspects of Fa'asāmoa and its encounters with the West. He has challenged the Fa'amatai as well, but with much input from his Samoan wife and Samoan scholars.

West with the Samoan situation. Iati provides a sound critique of Lawson's premises; however I will argue that from a nationalism perspective, there are serious and erroneous assumptions. The Fa'amatai, is an ethnic-based political system in which all of its constituents are related through kinship and genealogy. Western democracy, as fulfilled in the state, is predicated on civic notions of statehood and citizenship, which does not necessarily preclude ethnic requirements for membership. The *matai* do not operate as an elitist bourgeois class that has stringent control over a rigidly-defined proletariat. Rather the Fa'amatai is, at least in theory, an egalitarian institution with inherent principles of democracy that is localized within the *'āiga* and the *nu'u*. Class stratification is not a phenomenon that characterizes the Samoan situation as matai are not elitist politicians who are devoid of contact and connections with their constituencies. Rather, the matai are genealogically related to their *'āiga* and thus only family members – not affine – have traditional rights to select their matai. To divorce the ethnic and racial foundations for the Fa'amatai and the Fa'asāmoa as defined along cosmological and racial lines renders outsider perspectives defunct.

Lawson's feigned critique of the Fa'amatai as inherently authoritarian and elitist is contrary to the sociopolitical dynamics and philosophical underpinnings of the Fa'asāmoa. The corruption ascribed to the Fa'amatai, is ironically meager in comparison to the corruption wrought by the introduction of the state and its bureaucratic agencies and problematic infrastructure. Government audits in Sāmoa reveal that corruption has been and is currently rampant on various levels.

American Sāmoa, despite the belittling views of its dependence on American capital and economic and political infrastructures, has exercised its own agency in resisting against the prescribed trajectory towards (nation-)statehood. The tables below are of development indexes that reinforce underlying racial hierarchies of the colonial era in contemporary neocolonial contexts.



The most stable of states are the Northern European countries and the British-descended settler-colonial states (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States). The least stable are the African and Middle-Eastern states ravished by Western military-industrial campaigns in the region. These rankings reinforce the world order that was already in place during colonization and the neocolonial schemes after decolonization.

Table 5.1 Fragile (formerly ‘failed’) States Index, Sāmoa 2007-2018

<b>Year</b>	<b>Rank</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>SA</b>	<b>FE</b>	<b>GG</b>	<b>EC</b>	<b>UD</b>	<b>HF</b>	<b>SL</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>HR</b>	<b>DP</b>	<b>RD</b>	<b>EX</b>
<b>2018</b>	111		4.4	5.1	4.2	6.6	4.6	9.4	5.2	4.6	4.0	5.4	2.6	9.5
<b>2017</b>	111	67.1	4.7	5.1	4.5	6.3	4.9	9.5	5.5	4.9	4.1	5.7	2.7	9.2
<b>2016</b>	110	67.9	4.9	5.1	4.5	6.5	5.1	9.2	5.7	5.1	4.3	5.9	2.4	8.9
<b>2015</b>	111	68.2	5.2	5.1	4.5	6.5	5.4	8.9	6.2	5.0	4.5	6.2	2.1	8.6
<b>2014</b>	110	69.3	5.5	5.1	4.8	6.2	5.7	8.9	6.0	5.1	4.8	6.5	2.4	8.3
<b>2013</b>	111	68.7	5.5	5.1	4.8	5.9	6.0	8.8	6.0	4.8	4.5	6.8	2.5	8.0
<b>2012</b>	110	68.5	5.5	5.1	4.8	5.4	6.3	8.6	6.0	4.8	4.4	6.7	2.6	8.3
<b>2011</b>	109	69.5	5.5	5.1	4.8	5.9	6.6	8.3	6.2	4.7	4.2	7.0	2.7	8.6
<b>2010</b>	107	71.1	5.8	5.3	5.1	6.2	6.6	8.0	6.4	5.1	4.5	6.9	3.1	8.1
<b>2009</b>	108	71.4	6.0	5.5	5.2	5.8	6.8	8.2	6.6	5.0	4.7	6.5	3.0	8.1
<b>2008</b>	101	72.2	6.3	5.4	5.0	6.1	6.9	8.2	6.7	4.8	4.6	6.8	3.2	8.4
<b>2007</b>	96	73.8	6.7	5.4	5.0	6.3	7.2	7.9	6.7	4.7	4.9	6.8	3.8	8.4

Table 5.2 Fragile Index Indicators

<b>Cohesion</b>	<b>Economic</b>	<b>Political</b>	<b>Social</b>
C1: Security Apparatus (SA)	E1: Economic Decline (ED)	P1: State Legitimacy (SL)	S1: Demographic Pressures (DP)
C2: Factionalized Elites (FE)	E2: Uneven Economic Development (UD)	P2: Public Services (PS)	S2: Refugees and IDPs (RD)
C3: Group Grievance (GG)	E3: Human Flight and Brain Drain (HF)	P3: Human Rights and Rule of Law (HR)	S3: External Intervention (EX)

Table 5.3 Fragile Index 2018, Samoa in relation to other Pacific and world states

<b>Rank</b>	<b>State</b>	<b>Index</b>	<b>Status</b>
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<b>1</b>	South Sudan	113.4	
<b>4</b>	Syria	111.4	
<b>6</b>	Congo, Democratic Republic	110.7	
<b>9</b>	Afghanistan	106.6	
<b>11</b>	Iraq	102.2	
<b>12</b>	Haiti	102.2	Alert
<b>14</b>	Ethiopia	99.6	
<b>17</b>	Kenya	97.4	
<b>24</b>	Uganda	95.1	
<b>28</b>	North Korea	93.2	
<b>51</b>	<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	<b>84.8</b>	
<b>56</b>	Solomon Islands	83.1	
<b>79</b>	Fiji	74.5	
<b>80</b>	Micronesia, Federated States	74.4	
<b>91</b>	Indonesia	72.3	Warning
<b>111</b>	Samoa	65.5	
<b>149</b>	Spain	41.1	
<b>150</b>	Chile	40.7	Stable
<b>154</b>	United States	37.7	
<b>158</b>	Japan	34.5	
<b>159</b>	United Kingdom	34.3	
<b>160</b>	France	32.2	
<b>167</b>	Germany	25.8	
<b>169</b>	New Zealand	20.9	
<b>170</b>	Australia	20.8	
<b>178</b>	Finland	17.9	Sustainable

### Decolonizing Nationalism: Unsettling the Nation-State

Western discourse on the nation has revealed much about the limitations and false assumptions about the colonized societies even for those like Samoa who have achieved independence albeit perpetually using colonial constructions in postcolonial practices. In sum, the nation-states are limited within colonially-recognized boundaries (the fluidity of national boundaries is now made rigid and “official;” borders are drawn and reified). They often assume linguistic, social, cultural homogeneity, which is at times problematic for various reasons; where some states comprise many different ethnic groups, violence against each other due to racism and religious dogmatism, to name a few, often disrupts peace and stability.

The process of nation-building is premised on certain assumptions: that the nation-state is the most ideal model of political organization, especially if nations want to be internationally recognized by peer states with diverse populations, regardless of linguistic and cultural identities

Furthermore, nation-states operate with various goals in mind: centralization (versus localization), expansion of national and economic interests. Yet the problems of bordered nations are perpetuated since those in power choose to ignore kinship connections across the islands as in the case of Samoa--connections between/among families operating from afar and near, sharing resources with the ultimate obligation to help all relatives close or distant. Bordered nation-states are superficial and made arbitrary by kinship connections which are enhanced by cyber technologies hence realtime virtual interactions. Nation-states try to transcend the territoriality of ethnicity, race, allegiances, and assume an objectivity therefore supreme and superior authority recognized as sovereignty with itself the final arbitrator in matters of jurisprudence

Now that we have explored the problems and challenges of nationalism and the nation-state, we must ask ourselves, how do we move forward given these issues? We have seen the very problematic nature of decolonization paradigms and the directions in which they are heading. How do we move past the trajectory of the nation-state, if it is so desirable? Can there be a movement away from the state or is a necessity in the modern age? We have faintly explored the problems with colonization and neocolonization in the era of modernity and postmodernism, but there are many possible solutions.

#### The Samoan Diaspora, Samoan Transnationalism

Before Western Sāmoa became an independent state, most of the indigenous Samoan population had resided in the islands. Today, most Samoans live outside of Sāmoa and American Sāmoa as indicated in the list below. In this picture, Samoans appear to have unsettled traditional

notions of nationhood through the expansion of the nation beyond the state. This is not specifically a Samoan phenomenon; it is commonplace throughout the Pacific, especially in Polynesia.

#### The Samoan Population as a Whole

- Samoa 190,000
- American Sāmoa 57,000
- United States 185,000
- New Zealand 144,000
- Australia 75,000

Total 650,000

Transnationalism between states can be viewed as an extension of the voyager paradigm that is prevalent in Pacific societies. Even between the two state polities, migration from independent Sāmoa to American Sāmoa is an ostensibly evident phenomenon between Samoans. The trend is disproportionately unequal, with Samoans from ‘Upolu and Savai‘i crossing “international” borders to move to American Sāmoa and, ultimately to Hawai‘i and the United States continent. The reasons are pragmatic, primarily economic.

I have decided to include American Sāmoa as part of the [‘Western’] “Samoan” diaspora because of the complications that statehood has meant for indigenous relations based on *malaga* among Samoans. Estimates have placed up to 30 to 50 percent of the population of American Sāmoa as having origins from its western neighbor. Statehood has complicated this idea of immigration by privileging a Western framework in what was once dominated by Samoan mobility based on kinship ties and linkages. Definitions of “immigrants” and the immigration discourse in American Sāmoa largely reflect American notions of bordered states – to which Samoans in Tutuila and Manu‘a have subscribed.

#### *Aotearoa/New Zealand*

To prove how transnationalism for the Samoans as an ethnic diaspora transcend nation-state boundaries, the relationship between [Western] Sāmoa and New Zealand is a case in point. It

was not always as amicable relationship as idealized in the “Treaty of Friendship” signed at the start of the former’s independence. Samoans were already in Aotearoa before independence. From the 2013 census, 144,138 Samoans now live in Aotearoa/New Zealand and they make up 3.6 percent of the general population and half of the Pacific Islander population. 50,661 (35 percent) were born in Sāmoa. Between 2006 and 2013, the population increased by 9.9 percent, however, it is obviously at a lower rate when compared with an increase of 14.0 percent between 2001 and 2006. The explanation for this decline may be found in New Zealand’s neighbor, Australia.

The first known Samoans to enter Australia were missionaries who entered the smallest continent in the 1860s. Catholic missions sent Samoans to study for the priesthood in Australia; 14 Samoans were recorded in Richmond, New South Wales in 1863.<sup>20</sup> Once the white policy of the Australian government was lifted, a steady flow of Samoans was possible in the latter half of the previous century. Modern Samoan entry into the continent in contemporary times is largely a result of trending migrations from New Zealand for better paying jobs. Today there are approximately 75,000 Samoans living in Australia, an increase from 55,000 just a couple of years ago.

In the mythological narratives, the first known people who are believed to have arrived in Hawai‘i from Sāmoa are recorded by Hawaiians to have been Pa‘ao and Pili, in the *Vavau* (Samoan antiquity).<sup>21</sup> In the modern era, however, the Samoan migration into Hawai‘i initially began through missionary and military initiatives. The Mormon mission sent out by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints produced nearly 33 Samoans living in Lā‘ie, on the North Shore of

<sup>20</sup> Va’a, Unasa L. F. 2005. "Searching for the Good Life: Samoan International Migration."

A. Deacon (1988), “Samoans in Australia” Anthropology Colloquium Series Spring: University of Hawai‘i-Manoa.

<sup>21</sup> See Kalakaua’s *Myths and Legends of Hawaii*.

O‘ahu in 1925.<sup>22</sup> As of 2010, there were 37, 463 Samoans living in Hawai‘i and this number continues to grow a decade later.<sup>23</sup>

The 2010 US Census documented the population of Samoans at 184,440 in the United States. One of the earliest migrations to the continental US was to what is now understood as the Polynesian Mormon settlement in Utah. In “Voice of Social Justice and Diversity in a Hawaii Context,” Simanu-Klutz reveals that the Samoans make up the largest Pacific Islander group in the US; the first and second largest groups live in California and Hawai‘i, respectively. In fact, most Samoans live along the Mainland West Coast with bigger increases since 2010 in Washington State.<sup>24</sup>

#### Sāmoana as a Transnational Entity

The demographics for the Samoan population across all the islands have shifted significantly over the past couple of centuries. At the point of initial European missionary contact – around the early mid-nineteenth century – the estimated population was at 35,000<sup>25</sup> to 40,000 and not more than 45,000.<sup>26</sup> Strife and warfare were reasons that the population relatively small. However, Sāmoa's birthrate became much higher in the modern era despite the introduction of birth control such as the pill but also experienced better prenatal and postnatal care for mothers and babies. The pill was largely prohibited by the Christian denomination for its families; nonetheless, the overall family unit in Sāmoa significantly increased as the number of live births improved. The independent nation-state has one of the highest birthrates in the world, thus migration is a mitigating factor for potential overcrowding.

<sup>22</sup> See Sia Achica, *Se Tala mai Hawai‘i*, who claims that the first arrival of Samoans was in 1919.

<sup>23</sup> “Samoan Population by County, Island and Census Tract in the State of Hawaii: 2010.”

[http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/census/Census\\_2010/SF1/HSDC2010-9\\_Samoan.pdf](http://files.hawaii.gov/dbedt/census/Census_2010/SF1/HSDC2010-9_Samoan.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> See Simanu-Klutz, “Voices of Social Justice and Diversity a Hawai‘i Context, Linden/Boston: Brill|Sense, 2019, 149.

<sup>25</sup> George Turner, *Samoa: A Hundred Years Ago and Long Before*, 3.

<sup>26</sup> John B. Stair, *Old Samoa*, 57-58.

## Moving Beyond Artificial Boundaries

Epeli Hau'ofa, in his seminal essay "Our Sea of Islands" re-conceptualized the Pacific Islands not as small remote, isolated islands, but

Nineteenth-century imperialism erected boundaries that led to the contraction of Oceania, transforming a once boundless world into the Pacific Island states and territories that we know today. People were confined their tiny spaces, isolated from the other. No longer could they travel freely to do what they had done for centuries. They were cut off from their relatives abroad, from their far-flung sources of wealth and cultural enrichment. This is the historical basis of the view that our countries are small, poor, and isolated. It is true only insofar as people are still fenced in and quarantined.<sup>27</sup>

Hau'ofa sought to redefine the Pacific Islands as our "Sea of Islands", propounding an "Oceania" model that sought to curb belittlement of Islanders and empower them into collective cooperation. His proposal for a regional identity did in a way seek to organize Oceania. The fluidity of his model is emulated by my model of reconceptualizing the Samoan nation. In a sense, it is an attempt like Hau'ofa's to define Samoan community organization with regards to human capital as well as social and physical space.

Hau'ofa's articulation of Oceania is that of a sea of islands connected by waves into a large socio-economic space that sustained islanders throughout time immemorial just as it once was, as noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The psychological effects of Hau'ofa's revelatory scholarship cannot be underestimated; it is fair to say the release of his seminal work at the turn of the twenty-first century speaks to an improvement in self-esteem and access to mainstream resources for many Pacific islanders in diaspora. Today, the diasporic islander including Samoans try to emulate his urging for us to define who and how we are and how we should behave politically, socially, and culturally. Size does not matter in the Pacific and despite the rigid ideas of "nation" as limiting other expressions of nationhood through marginalizing and exclusion, Pacific island notions of

<sup>27</sup> Hau'ofa, Epeli. "Our Sea of Islands." In *We Are the Ocean: Selected Works*, 34.

nationhood comes through protest and resistance as in the historic Mau movements during the colonial period. For those in the diaspora, articulating and asserting alternative forms of nation (as opposed to the state) is in itself a form of protest against assimilation into the mainstream settler-colonial societies that articulate a state-brand that simultaneously suppresses indigenous peoples and promotes a neutral/objective state that serves “justice for all” regardless of race, creed, religion (despite the issues concerning Native peoples and their struggles).

#### Sāmoana: A Sea People, A Sea Clan? A Nation from the Sea?

Sāmoana has many meanings, references, and varied nuances. Renowned Tongan scholar Futa Helu defines Sāmoana as “sea people”<sup>28</sup> Sia Figel also mentions Samoana as a “sea clan.” Sāmoana, according to C.G.R. McCay, is “a lyricized version of the islands in mid-Pacific that are called Sāmoa. It is used in oratory, in traditional songs and other expression, and in Church hymns. It connotes also any lore of the Islands, with a meaning corresponding to that of ‘Americana’.”<sup>29</sup> According to Muli‘aumaseali‘i Aleni Ripine,<sup>30</sup>

Rev. J.B. Stair boldly suggested that the name Samoa may have originated from the word “Samoana”, implying that the Samoans might have known but long forgotten that their islands had “sprung up from the ocean floor” (via volcanic eruption) as the scientists believe. The name is often used by the Samoans when referring to their islands as “beloved Samoa” (Stair 1897).

According to Joseph Finney, Sāmoa is glossed as “people of the ocean or deep sea”.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps, then, Sāmoa is a rendering of archaic notions of being attached to or associated with the ocean from which Tagaloa calls forth. Whether Sāmoa is actually derived from Sāmoana should not be

<sup>28</sup> Ka‘ili, Tevita. “Tauhi Vā: Nurturing Tongan Sociospatial Ties in Maui and Beyond” *The Contemporary Pacific*.17:1, 83-117 (2005).

<sup>29</sup> *Samoana: A Personal Story of the Samoan Islands*.

<sup>30</sup> *A History of Amerika Samoa*, 16. It was difficult retrieving just where Muli‘aumaseali‘i found Stair’s assertion about “Samoana”.

<sup>31</sup> “The Meaning of the Name Sāmoa”, 301-303. Finney argues that Sāmoa can be the equivalent to sā moana and provides evidence to suggest that “moa” is a reflex of “moana”



the focal point of discussion, but a point from which discussions about Sāmoana can be generated in creative and pragmatic contexts for articulations of nationhood. What is more practical and desirable is an envisioning of Sāmoana that is useful for Samoans paddling their canoes forward into the future. If indeed Samoans have forgotten that their lands “sprung up from the ocean floor”, not only by volcanic eruption, but by the decree of Tagaloa, then Sāmoana needs to be reawakened. Colonialism, neocolonialism, globalism, neoliberalism, to name a few, have all contributed to this form of national historicized forgetting of the native traditions that have been sacrificed in favor of foreign economic and religious imperatives.

A reconceptualization of Samoan nationhood and nationalism is imperative to the situation in which Sāmoa finds itself. I am suggesting here a graphic model to articulate a Sāmoana that is reflective of the *Atunu’u* as it manifests itself today. It is only one model, though it attempts to, in the manner of *su’ifefiloi*, incorporate many different facets of the Samoan experience in different contexts. I utilize both traditional aspects of Fa‘asāmoa that are relevant in expressing this nationhood, and shaping a paradigm that incorporates the ways Samoans spatialize themselves. I expand a *fa’alupega* that encompasses all of Sāmoana – it is a “national” *fa’alupega* that is more than just the honorifics of Pule and Tūmua and Tutuila and Manu‘a.

Within the context of decolonization, I nudge a reconsideration of Samoan “nationhood” that transcends political and even geographical boundaries, which are often arbitrarily constructed. I would like to think of the Samoan ‘nation’ beyond the nation-state. Current models of nationhood have been evaluated and scrutinized and alternative conceptualizations were sought to reframe the conversation of nationalism among Samoan people from Samoan perspectives. One of the main goals of this thesis has been to understand where different perspectives of nationhood came from, and how they can function to empower people to represent them. Overall this endeavor explores

the multifaceted nature of the Samoan community and how people organize for power and to combine that with a more empowering sense of nationalism. These outcomes are valuable tools for other facets of Samoan identity, including language and cultural maintenance and innovation.

### 'O le Atunu'u: The Samoan Nation

The term *Atunu'u* is defined by Pratt's dictionary as "a chain or group of islands" and "also generally used for country".<sup>32</sup> It is a combination of the words *atu*, which is a "row, line, or chain of things; as houses, mountains, islands, etc." and *nu'u*, which has several meanings: 1) a district, a town; 2) a country, an island; and 3) people.<sup>33</sup> "Nation" and "country" are both glossed as "nu'u, *Atunu'u*"<sup>34</sup> Milner's dictionary provides similar meanings, though to lesser extent.

When a Samoan, speaking of this State of Western Samoa, says it is his country, or when, as an emigrant in a distant land, he sings of his nostalgia for his 'dear country' (*o lou atunuu pele*), he always uses the word *atunuu*, which signifies literally a 'deployment of social groups' — and observation shows that these groups are ordered by the logic of the *matai* system. *Atu* is a term indicating a direction considered from the standpoint of the speaker and moving away from him. Dictionaries usually translate *Nuu* as 'village', and Samoa is effectively a 'country of villages'; there are some 350 of them.<sup>35</sup>

The *mālō*, deriving from the verbal form, "to be victors in war or games," the nominative *mālō* refers to a "conquering party" or simply to "the government."<sup>36</sup>

This country has a 'government', it is a country, a 'State'; that is the content of the term ***Malo***, which designates the established power, the oneness of authority (a district is ***itumalo***, 'one face or one side of power'). In the ordinary sense, the term also designates 'victory' or the 'victor, winner' (in war, in rhetorical competitions). It also means 'guest', which says much about the Samoan duty of hospitality and the welcome extended to the outsider who is the guest of a Samoan family.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Pratt's *Grammar and Dictionary of the Samoan Language* (1911), 39.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 236-237.

<sup>34</sup> George Milner (1966). *Samoa Dictionary*,

<sup>35</sup> Tchekozeff, *Culture, Nation, and Society* 254-255.

<sup>36</sup> Pratt, 201.

<sup>37</sup> Tchekozeff, 254. 'Atu' refers to 'a row, line, or chain of things' as stated in Pratt 38. However, Tchekozeff uses the adverbial directional particle 'atu' instead.

Before the advent of the state, sovereignty was exercised at the level of the *nu 'u*, for which it was most stable. The imposition of the state with a national government, however, served to unsettle, and ultimately disrupt and usurp village sovereignty. Numerous case studies provide examples in which villages and the national government in Sāmoa speak of the infringing nature of the latter on local people.

#### Sāmoana: The Nation Beyond the Sea

The cohesive unit that defines the Samoan nation is the *Atunu 'u*, the highest level that encompasses all aspects of the Samoan people, including space in time and place. Scattered around the global ocean of Sāmoana are the *atumotu* or diasporic centers defined by their established respective host countries/communities. Localized within these centers are the *motu*, communities of Samoans organized according to specific locations or organizing institutions, including villages, churches, sports teams, and clubs and organizations. This model is fluid in its outlook and tries not to confine movement patterns to closed, physical boundaries, but rather contextualizes them according to their respective (colonized) spaces. Samoans and Pacific Islanders transcend these boundaries, making connections with others and expanding the “nation” space. *Va 'a* as symbols of mobile/transitory/migratory communities (water), *motu* as symbols of settled, permanent communities (land).





Figure 1. Sāmoana positioned within the context of Hau'ofa's vision of "Oceania"

Figure 5.2 A Theoretical Model of Sāmoan



The above model is an articulation of Sāmoana juxtaposed with the concepts of *aganu'u* and *aga'ifanua*, indigenous articulations of universal culture and local customs, respectively. At the most basic levels are the *motu*, islands, which are local village communities. The term applies mainly to diasporic communities at the periphery, whereas domestic communities are organized into their traditional units (villages, districts, etc.).

In much of the literature, Sāmoa (the ancestral counterparts) are focalized at the

center, whereas the domestic ‘satellites’ are placed (even marginalized at the periphery). But all of the “satellites” contribute to cultural continuity and conversations concerning matters of preservation and cultural innovation. Perhaps each locality will be centered with regards to their respective communities and others will be placed on the periphery—a kind of shifting core-periphery with the ancestral islands as core and the diasporic conclaves as periphery.

#### Relating the *Atunu‘u* through *Aganu‘u* and *Aga‘ifanua*

*Aganu‘u* can be translated as “universal Samoan culture”; *aga‘ifanua* are the “local customs.” *Aganu‘u* in the sense of Sāmoana can refer to the national cultural practices of Sāmoa that define “Samoanness.” Throughout the various Samoan communities in the homeland and in diasporic spheres, *aganu‘u* remains practically homogeneous; these are the practices that constitute being Samoan. What makes Sāmoana heterogeneous is its diversity represented in the various local customs expressed in the various communities. For homeland Samoans, the village is the smallest unit through which local custom is expressed. For many Samoan communities abroad, it is the church. As unique and separate Samoan entities, each are entitled to their own practices influenced by their host cultures and communities. All communities are tied to each other, to Sāmoana, through *aganu‘u*, manifested in obligatory events such as weddings, funerals, title investitures, or births.

According to ‘Aumua Mata’itusi Simanu, the differences between *aganu‘u* and *aga‘ifanua* are quite small and therefore nuanced.<sup>38</sup> Although there are differences in *aganu‘u* and *aga‘ifanua*, both culture and customs, along with *gagana* (‘language’) are what makes Samoans Samoan,

<sup>38</sup> Simanu, ‘Aumua M. ‘*O Si Manu Ali‘i*: A Text for the Advanced Study of Samoan. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 2002.

ethnically speaking. Both concepts will attempt to explain how different parts of the whole can cohesively fit together in this nationalistic scheme of expanding Sāmoana.

What I have attempted to describe here is the phenomenon in dynamic progression of the Samoan community in the modern world. The new realities are being faced every day as Samoans expand their nation and ancestral genealogies beyond borders to the outside world forging new relationships and identities. Samoans will continue to be a part of a bigger community beyond the geographical and political lines drawn by others. We as a people are active agents in building and defining our nation, our identities, our destinies and futures and I hope that Sāmoana is a worthwhile attempt for this venture.

#### Whats in a Name?

With regards to nomenclature: The term “Sāmoa” has evolved over time with regards to what it refers. I sometimes use the term Sāmoa interchangeably to include Sāmoa in general (as a whole), though I will distinguish between Sāmoa – the independent nation-state – and Sāmoana – the amalgamation of Samoan people all over the world – the Samoan nation, *Atunu'u*. This thesis once and for all lays to rest the labels imposed by others and include the Manu'a islands as part of Samoa. From 1900 to 1914 the *Atunu'u* was split as German Sāmoa, American Sāmoa (including Manu'a); from 1962-1997, as Western Sāmoa, American Sāmoa, from 1997-Present, the [Independent State of] Sāmoa, American Sāmoa.

#### Sāmoanalua

Given the complexities of the nomenclature associated with dual states, confusion is bound to occur. How does one refer to “Sāmoa” without conflating it with the nation-state versus the pan-Samoan polity? In both formal and informal speech, Sāmoa and American Sāmoa are reified terms most undoubtedly accepted. So how do Samoans refer to the nation as a whole? One strategy is to

address the two Samoas together as “Sāmoanalua,” that is, “the two Sāmoas.” The conventional assumption or belief that the ancestral name *Atunu‘u* may not be enough to convince Samoans as citizens of their host nations that they are still one people. One could extend this term to Sāmoa as a whole, as a nation, but it would not suffice to explain the complexity of the Samoan population and the national conglomerate as a whole.<sup>39</sup>

### Concluding Reflections

So what then is the Samoan nation?

It is the *Atunu‘u* comprising all Samoans including those from Manu’a, and in its modern honorific of Samoanalua: it manifests as Iati’s affective ties, *uso* and *‘āiga*, a connection that has been confirmed by Tui Ātua. The *Atunu‘u* is grounded on both the genealogical dimension, *‘āiga* – the ethnic and the cultural Fa‘asāmoa, and is reified in the hybridized modern nation-state system that incorporates (subordinates) the Fa‘amatai and the Fa‘asāmoa. The current Samoan *Atunu‘u* exists along a spectrum of multifaceted levels, incorporating both civic and ultimately ethnic aspects of nationalism that tie together indigenous notions of belonging that transcend the nation-state—one operating on principles of loyalty to the people, not necessarily the office, and generous sharing of livelihoods.

Given the highly state-centric and inadequate articulations of the nation-state or territorial state that are neocolonialist in prescription, how do we generally move towards genuine (or at least a more indigenous-mediated) forms of decolonization? Taking Hau‘ofa’s critique and assertions of Oceania, we can model this through a reconceptualization of the Samoan nation as Sāmoana. Why is it important to articulate Samoan notions of nation? As Andrea Smith states, “we have

<sup>39</sup> Other terms associated with Sāmoa include: Sāmoana, Samoanalua, ‘Amerika Sāmoa (American Sāmoa), Sāmoa i sisifo (western Sāmoa), Sāmoa i sasa’e (eastern Sāmoa).



deeply internalized the notion that social hierarchy is natural and inevitable, thus undermining our ability to create movements for social change that do not replicate the structures of domination that we seek to eradicate.”<sup>40</sup>

We have tried to be creative in our quest to find solutions to the problem of the nation-state by advocating that indigenous peoples should be empowered with the tools to decolonize the systems that try to restrict their autonomy. It is important to be both critical of the West and its colonial legacies while also living in the same society and working to dismantle the structures that promote oppression and inequality. The Samoan nation transcends multiple states, even the Samoan nation-state itself – the Samoan homeland and land base. Despite the dominant discourse that privileges the nation-state as one which possesses sovereignty over a particular territorial domain, the nation transcends these limited borders, especially the Samoan *Atunu‘u*.

<sup>40</sup> Andrea Smith, “American Studies without America”, 312.

## CHAPTER V – RECLAIMING THE *ATUNU ‘U*: IMPLICATIONS FOR SĀMOANA AND CONCLUSIONS

*‘Ua sau le va ‘a na tiu, tau mai ‘i le va ‘a na tau, ‘olo ‘o mau pea lago o le va ‘a faō afolau.*

– Traditional proverb and official motto of the 50<sup>th</sup> Independence Day celebrations

Keeping in mind the celebratory nature of maintaining statehood in the twenty-first century, the committee who organized the Independence Day festivities chose a fishing proverb to express the momentous occasion, with the following explanation:

It literally refers to three canoes. The first canoe – which was out fishing – is returning from the deep sea. The second canoe is at berth on the lagoon. And the third canoe lies in the boat shelter on the beach.

In a humanistic context, it refers to the fisherman heading home from a deep-sea expedition, the fish-carriers (*au taliva ‘a*) in the shallow lagoon and the village elders – in the shelter – praying for the seafarers’ success and safe passage home (*tapuaiga*).

In reference to next year’s celebrations, it can be interpreted as Samoa’s travels in the last 50 years. The daring fisherman – conqueror of the oceans, those who await his return and the prayers of those who keep vigil of Samoa’s journey, keeping the home fires burning.

Samoa’s voyage in the last 50 years has not been smooth sailing. It had to master the high winds and rough seas. Many times it had to rely on strong leadership and visionary stewardship as well as its dedicated crew to conquer what challenges the oceans conjured up.

Samoa is about to celebrate 50 years of this continuing journey.<sup>1</sup>

In light of articulating Sāmoana as an expression of the Samoan *Atunu ‘u*, this proverb is particularly relevant to the fluidity of the voyaging metaphor. The convergence of both the permanent residents and diaspora who made their pilgrimage to Sāmoa was an indication of the fluidity of the ocean space through which the Samoan nation encompasses those who are *i fafo*, in the ‘reach’, in the *va ‘a na tiu*, the canoe that went out fishing and venturing for new lands, have returned and are joined together by the residents of those *i ‘inei*, those who have prayed patiently at home.

<sup>1</sup> This explanation was taken from the website [www.samoa50years.ws/](http://www.samoa50years.ws/). [This website is now defunct.]

In keeping with this model of Sāmoana, this concluding chapter highlights the implications of articulating Sāmoana from creative and constructive contexts. If anything, it reveals that there are more questions than answers which hopefully will motivate further research. As a transnational entity, how does Sāmoana fit into the larger scheme of nationhood? What does this mean for traditional notions of nationalism that are teleological and state-centric in nature? I conclude that this state-centrism must give way to more localized, indigenous and “islander-centered” expressions of nationhood.

To recap the rationales for articulating Sāmoana and its implications and potential visions for the future this thesis has hopefully provided links between nationalism and language, and cultural transmission and maintenance as possibilities for diaspora involvement in local nation-state governance; a pan-Samoan cooperative organization as proposed is imperative for achieving and sustaining a way of life that balances both the hybridity of Samoan identity and the western lifestyles that Samoans have been adopted today. It proposes the adoption of national symbols of Sāmoana a flag, an anthem or hymn, a *tagavai* or seal with a motto and a *fa’alupega*. Given the limitations of the study, this conclusion recommends further study through the use of interviews, surveys, and wider review of the literature, as well as the analysis of indigenous literary and historical devices. In other words, in the diaspora, Samoa must incorporate non-Samoan ways of knowing. It is the normal thing to do for cultures and peoples to survive in various contexts.

### Implications for Sāmoana

Contemporary understandings of the nation have been dominated by hegemonic focus on the state, which is how Samoans manifest their understandings of the nation and reify their existence. This state-centric model cannot adequately explain the contemporary Samoan nation for these various reasons: 1) the existence of two political entities claiming legitimate claims to being

“Sāmoa”: Sāmoa and American Sāmoa; 2) major demographic transnational shifts, as explained by the existence of diasporic communities that collectively outnumber Samoans living in both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa. When the Samoan people, who constitute the *Atunu ‘u*, the “nation,” no longer fully reside in the physical locale to which they claim ancestral ties, what or perhaps where, then, is the nation?

Samoans still view that they are largely part of a “nation,” both politically as a nation-state and as an ethnic nation connected by genealogy and kinship and maintaining spatial relations (*vā*). Nationhood can thus be viewed under these concepts and expanded upon under various contexts. Samoans have already transcended national boundaries, and this creates new opportunities to redefine and renegotiate the parameters of what should constitute a nation. Flowing from this idea, what, then, are some of the implications for Sāmoana? If the nation is rooted not only in its land base, but its people, what else contributes to the collective identity of the Samoan nation?

#### Maintenance of the Fa‘asāmoa: Linguistic and Cultural Transmission and Maintenance

Before the outset of this paper, I had originally planned to propose that Samoans should view the *Atunu ‘u*, the nation, as beyond historically and colonially imposed borders, for the sake of maintaining Samoan language and culture. The premise was that the burden of cultural and linguistic maintenance should not fall alone on the residents of Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, but that it is a shared, collective responsibility of the entire *Atunu ‘u*, including those who live in the diaspora. If more Samoans were living in the United States than the entire population of Sāmoa, whose responsibility, then would it be to preserve and perpetuate the Fa‘asāmoa?

Thus, this thesis is an expanded reconceptualization of the Samoan nation under the Sāmoana model with implications for the maintenance of language and culture outside of the

‘homeland.’ Because of the association of identity, language and culture with nationhood and nationality, more needs to be done to maintain it, especially in the face of cultural and linguistic loss to assimilation into more dominant settler societies in which the majority of diasporic Samoans currently reside. These are not either-or choices, but a syncretism of both.

Linguist Yuko Otsuka has made a case for Tongan, a largely homogenous and relatively widely-spoken language, as endangered because of the globalization forces that have made the language more obsolete in professional and general use in Tonga among Tongans.<sup>2</sup> The Tongan situation can be extrapolated to the Samoan one because of the similarities in strength of numbers or speakers, compared with other indigenous languages in Polynesia and Oceania as a whole. Samoan, which is not the primary language of instruction in the majority of pedagogical contexts in the public education system in both Sāmoas, becomes at risk for language decline and/or loss when students do not become proficient in their heritage language. The status of the language and culture is an expression of the *Atunu’u*, the *mālō* in both Samoas have had mixed reactions to the instruction of Samoan in the classrooms.<sup>3</sup> However, despite the widespread use of Samoan in the home and in various public capacities (in church services, cultural obligations, such as *fa’alavelave*, and village and government cultural festivities), Samoan still is in danger of decline if it is not a medium of public instruction, especially since English is a hegemonic language even in American Sāmoa.

Despite confidence in the resiliency of the Samoan language in the “homeland,” there is still room to promote greater survival of Samoan language and culture outside of the nation-state. One of Otsuka’s key arguments is that the diaspora has a large role in contributing to language

<sup>2</sup> Otsuka, Yuko. “Making the Case for Tongan as an Endangered Language.”

<sup>3</sup> American Samoan senators, reflecting some general opinion, have objected to the use of Samoan as a medium of instruction.

maintenance.<sup>4</sup> This, I argue, is relevant to the Samoan situation precisely because of the significant demographic shift from those living in the Sāmoas to the diasporas. Since more Samoans are living abroad, Samoans in the diaspora are key to language maintenance. As an extension of the *Atunu'u*, Samoans in the diaspora have a responsibility to perpetuate gagana Sāmoa (Samoan language) and *aganu'u fa'asāmoa*. This is already evident with the numerous school programs such as Le Fetuao ā'oga āmata language nests, PolyFest competitions, Samoan language programs at the secondary and tertiary levels, and other initiatives intended to promote the use and perpetuation of Samoan language and culture.

#### Reflections on the 'Divided Nation': One Nation, Many States

At the outset of this thesis, we sought to critically reexamine some of the assumptions behind ideas of nation in Sāmoa, one of them being the idea of a "unified" Samoan polity. Through various epochs in ancient and modern Samoan history, we found it difficult to give credence to this assumption based on the multiple evidence to provide to the contrary. The Samoan archipelago was hardly "unified" in the first place, so how can we assume today that both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa be "reunified"? The late former American Sāmoa Delegate to Congress Faleomavega 'Eni Hunkin summarizes this sentiment:

We are the same people, we share the same culture, the same language, the same extended families. The bond between us is very close despite our political differences. What I advocate is greater communication in trade, commerce, and cultural activities. When we talk of re-unification we should talk of the economic situation. As I have advocated over the years, our situation is unique in that Western Samoa should be a gateway in to the world because of its sovereign status and its participation in world and regional organizations. In contrast, American Samoa is a gateway to the largest consumer market in the world. This places us in a unique position, not only with Western Samoa, but the region as a whole. The whole South Pacific region can benefit from this relationship, but a current challenge

<sup>4</sup> Otsuka, Yuko. 2007. "Making a Case for Tongan as an Endangered Language." *The Contemporary Pacific* 19 (2):444-446.

for the Pacific region is to lift the false stereotypes the island nations have towards America and American Samoa.<sup>5</sup> Faleomavaega's views reveal the pragmatic rationale through which Samoans view the current order of their nation. Despite being the "same people" with the "same people," the Samoan archipelago diverged into two distinct political entities with differing practical realities and, perhaps, different aspirations both politically and economically.

From an evolutionary perspective, the existence of two states is mutually beneficial not just for Samoans living in Sāmoa and American Sāmoa, but for Samoans living everywhere, including the diaspora. The economic incentives provided through remittances and the exchanges fostered by these political configurations supports a cyclical network that mutually benefits everyone. Given that the flow of people is disproportionately unilateral, migrating outside of the Samoan archipelago, educational and other economic opportunities for Samoans have expanded exponentially. Furthermore, the economic realities for a "reunified" Sāmoa are not sustainable under the current trend towards globalization and transnationalism. The current Prime Minister of Sāmoa, Tuila'epa Sa'ilele Malielegaoi, lends support to Faleomavaega's sentiments by lauding the advantages of having two Samoan polities:

"There is no benefit whatsoever for us if we unify," he said this week.

The PM's views follow a day of meeting last Friday with a delegation from American Samoa, led by Lieutenant Governor Lemanu Peleti Moliga in Apia.

"It's better to have two independent Samoas. Independent Samoa to the west and our ties with the international community and an independent Eastern Samoa which maintains its close ties with the United States. That way we have the best of both worlds. We go to international forums and we get two voices and two votes and have a lot of say and manoeuvrability on issues that affect us."

<sup>5</sup> Faleomavaega, Eni. "American Samoa: A unique Entity in the South Pacific" in *New Politics in the South Pacific*. Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1994, 118-119.

“I know there are some people who would like to see the two Samoas reunified but I don’t support it.”<sup>6</sup>

Tuila’epa’s focus on the benefits of having two countries highlights the practical realities of the two-polity system. It is a sound economic advantage, as both Samoas engage in multiple world economic venues and in regional cooperative endeavors. Both American Sāmoa and Sāmoa are currently engaged in the annual Two Samoas Economic Integration Task Force, which is an economic venture meant to foster mutual dialogue in terms of trade and investment opportunities. Such initiatives provide evidence of the various ways in which Samoans have taken advantage of development schemes beyond the state-centric paradigms, which often limit small nation-states in both political and economic leverage in the grand scheme of realpolitik in the Western-dominated world.

Faleomavaega is correct in that the ties American Sāmoa has to the United States, have been beneficial not just to Samoans, but to others in the Pacific. Tongans and other Pacific Islanders have made their way to the United States in larger numbers and have established themselves in enclaves such as Hawai’i, California, Utah and elsewhere in the States. This exchange between borders adds to Epeli Hau’ofa’s notion of an interconnected Oceania. Through Sāmoana, other Pacific Islanders have continued to expand the boundaries of Oceanic exchange and the fostering of new socio-spatial relationships.

Tui Ātua, in his speech opening the Golden Jubilee celebrations, recounted the indigenous, multifaceted Samoan approach to dealing with the colonial administration in the Mau resistance movements:

<sup>6</sup> Tavita, Tupuola Terry. “I don’t support unification, say PM”. *Savali News*. Accessed <http://www.savalinews.com/2014/07/13/i-dont-support-unification-says-pm/>. See also: <http://www.savalinews.com/2012/04/30/pm-independent-pago-a-boon-for-washington/>.



When Aleipata deliberated over who to support and how, they decided that Tafua and the *itūpā-i-lalo* would support the Malo and that Fuataga and *the itūpā-i-luga* would support the Mau. Tafua and Fuataga are the two leading chiefly families of Aleipata. Aleipata believed that this approach would ensure that either way their district would gain wherever the spoils went: if Fuataga's faction won then they would give to and enhance Aleipata; if Tafua's faction won they would do the same. In the end Fuataga and Tafua would do what was best for Aleipata.<sup>7</sup>

In this story, the case of Aleipata can be extrapolated to the political situation in which Sāmoana is divided. Despite being colonially carved out by Europeans, having two political entities, as well as a growing and thriving diasporas, Samoans have largely benefitted economically from the situation. In American Sāmoa, the election of a Republican woman in a largely conservative Democratic-leaning territory as a Delegate to the Congressional House of Representatives has further attested to this dual strategy on the part of American Samoans. Transcending these colonial and neocolonial prescriptions for the nation, Samoans are reaping the benefits of the modern global order.

Despite itself not having full membership as a state in the United Nations, American Samoa has been represented in other regional organizations.<sup>8</sup> In the Olympics, the South Pacific Games, and the Commonwealth Games, Samoans have two teams: Samoa and American Samoa. In 2008, American Samoa had hosted the Festival of Pacific Arts which Sāmoa hosted in 1996. The chances of Samoans hosting regional events and having representation in regional organizations has increased and given Samoans greater exposure, participation, and influence in the Pacific, despite having relatively smaller populations than other comparatively larger Melanesian states, who make up the overwhelming majority of the Pacific population.

### A New Nationalism?

<sup>7</sup> Tui Ātua in Meleisea, *Samoa's Journey, 1962-2012*, 9.

<sup>8</sup> Some examples include the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG), the United Nations Pacific Community (SPC) and others, of which both Sāmoa and American Sāmoa take various memberships.

Now that we have articulated a reconceptualization of the Samoan *Atunu 'u* as Sāmoana, there are numerous possibilities to expand upon the creative dimensions of expressing the nation. If the goal is decolonizing and deconstructing the nation beyond the state-centric boundaries imposed by foreign powers, can Samoans construct for themselves new symbols of the nation that incorporates these new realities? Can there be a pan-Samoan nationalism beyond the two polities, especially since the majority of the Samoan people, whom we have concluded to be the Samoan nation, live outside of these statist boundaries? I will argue that, yes, we can and should be able to. This will draw much backlash, but it certain is worth it to push the boundaries of what it means to decolonize, even if it invokes the ire of traditionalists who may invoke the adage “‘o Sāmoa ‘ua ‘uma ona tofi” (Sāmoa’s foundations have already been established). But deconstructing nationalism means that we must not be afraid to push the boundaries of postcolonial discursive practices and the established norms prescribed even by native agents. Society and its cultural, political, and social institutions are rarely static, and we must constantly reevaluate and dialogue with the predominant structures to assess their suitability for current situations. It is under this premise that this thesis endeavors to navigate new directions for deconstructing the nation in modern contexts and takes liberty in constructing new perspectives around the Samoan *Atunu 'u*.

#### Symbols of Sāmoana: Banal Nationalism

If then, we can move past the colonially imposed and indigenous-appropriated constructs of the nation-state and articulate a “Sāmoana,” how can this reconceptualization of the *Atunu 'u* be realized? I will revisit here the concept of banal nationalism in order to construct new visible symbols of the nation by proposing a new flag, a joint national anthem, *fa'alupega*, articulation of *tāeao* and other forms of pan-Samoan identity. Such ostensible displays of nationalism warrant

new creative avenues to reflect the ways in which nationhood has evolved beyond the state and incorporate the transnational nature of the Samoan *Atunu'u* as it exists today.

*Fa'alupega*, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 are traditional honorifics that constitute the hierarchies and dignities within a family, village, district, and country. When in a formal or ceremonial gathering of any sort, it is customary to *fa'alagi* or to call out *fa'alupega* of the host village and then proceeding to recite the *fa'alupega* of everyone else in attendance. Outlined below are Sāmoa's traditional 'national' *fa'alupega*. Since *fa'alupega*, are a device endemic to the *Fa'asāmoa*, I have essentially fabricated the honorifics of different communities according to the traditional constructions of the device. The honorifics of communities outside of Sāmoa recognize the indigenous *Atunu'u* and people of the land (*tama o le 'ele'ele/tagatānu'u*) first, the ruling *mālō* (state, government), and then the Samoan communities. The following order proceeds from east to west and then with the diasporic communities. It is necessary to employ the usage of this indigenous device, the *fa'alupega*, to effectively articulate Sāmoana as an indigenous national construct.

Table 6. 2 Proposal for a *Fa'alupega* of Sāmoana

Pito <i>Atunu'u</i> (Segment of the Nation)	Gagana Sāmoa (Samoan)	Rough Translation
	Tulouna le 'āiga Sāmoana E 'āmata mai Saua se'i pā'ia le Fafāosauali'i	Greetings to the great family, Sāmoana From Saua (the eastern most part of American Sāmoa) to the Fafāosauali'i (the western most part of Sāmoa)
Manu'a	Tulouna Tama a le Manu'atele	Greetings to the Sons of Great Manu'a His Majesty, the Lā'au na Amotasi Their Highnesses, the Ali'i Fa'atui

	<p>Le afioga a le Lā‘au na Amotasi  Afioga a Ali‘i Fa‘atui  Le Mamalu o To‘oto‘o o le Fale‘ula  Ma ‘Upu i le Manu‘atele</p>	<p>To the dignities of the orators of the Fale‘ula  And to the speechmakers of great Manu‘a</p>
	<p>Tulouna Afioga a Ma‘opū  Susū Sua ma le Vāifanua  Fofō ma Aitulagi  Itū‘au ma Alātaua  Sā‘ole ma le Launiusāelua</p>	<p>Greetings to the venerable nobles  To the districts of Sua and Vāifanua  Fofō and Aitulagi  Itū‘au and Alātaua  Sā‘ole and Launiusāelua</p>
<p>Sāmoa Tūto‘atasi  (Savai‘i, ‘Upolu, Manono, ‘Apolima)</p>	<p>Tulouna Tama ma o lātou  ‘Āiga  ‘Āiga ma a lātou Tama  Susū Pule ma Tūmua  Itū‘au ma Alataua  ‘Āiga i le Tai ma le Va‘a o Fonotī</p>	<p>Greetings to the Sons and their Families  Families and their Sons  Greetings to [the orator groups] Pule and Tūmua and to the districts Itū‘au and Alātaua, ‘Āiga i le Tai ma le Va‘a o Fonotī</p>
<p>Aotearoa/New Zealand</p>	<p>Tulouna afioga a Tagata Fenua, le Mamalu o Aotearoa ma le faigamālō a Niu Sila</p>	<p>Greetings to the Native Sons and the dignity of Aotearoa and the ruling government</p>
<p>Hawai‘i</p>	<p>Tulouna Hawai‘inuiākea mai le Moku o Keawe se‘i o‘o atu i le motu tapu o Kahelelani  [Hawai‘i o Keawe, Maui o Kama, Moloka‘i nui a Hina, O‘ahu o Kākuhihewa, Kaua‘i o Manokalanipō, me Ni‘ihau o Kahelelani]  Tulouna le faigāmālō a le Setete ‘o Hawai‘i fa‘apea fo‘i Tama fānau a le <i>Atunu‘u</i></p>	<p>Greetings to great Hawai‘inuiākea from Moku o Keawe (Hawai‘i Island) to the forbidden isle of Kahelelani [Hawai‘i of Keawe, Maui of Kamalalawalu, Great Moloka‘i of Hina, O‘ahu of Kākuhihewa, Kaua‘i o Manokalanipō, and Ni‘ihau o Kahelelani]  Greetings to the State of Hawai‘i and to the sons of the Nation</p>

United States continent	Tulouna le pa'ia o tama o 'ele'ele o Meleke, fa'apea fo'i le faigamālō Tulouna le mamalu o tama fānau a le <i>Atunu'u</i>	Greetings to the natives of America and to the ruling party
Australia	Tulouna 'Ausetālia ma ou sā ma faigā, le pa'ia o tama o le 'ele'ele ma fānau a le <i>Atunu'u</i>	Greetings to Australia and your sacredness, to the Aboriginals and compatriots of the Nation
Isi Atumotu (Other locales)	Tulouna tama i nu'u lasilasi o le lalolagi e alaala ai Tama ma 'Āiga	Greetings to the numerous lands in which Tama dwell
Sāmoana 'ātoa (Sāmoana as a whole)	Tulouna le pa'ia o Sāmoana 'ua 'ato'atoa mai nei	Greetings to the great Sāmoana gathered

#### Some Tāeao of the *Atunu'u*?

Given the importance of *tāeao* in Samoan epistemological frameworks, especially that of articulation of 'historical' events, can this be extrapolated to the entity of Sāmoana? Can each diaspora have its own *tāeao*? How can these be publicly acknowledge in *fa'alupega* and *lāuga*? I will thus argue that the expansion of the Samoan nation as Sāmoana allows greater flexibility for extending customary relational devices for those who live outside of the Samoan archipelago. Each diasporic community is entailed to its own *tāeao* as Samoans create 'new dawns' is more broadly accepted as 'new beginnings' and establish new communities abroad. This thesis does not claim to cite all of the historical instances of Samoan settlement in the diaspora, but this is perhaps a goal for future studies to research and create and memorialize *tāeao* abroad for posterity.

#### Shared Involvement in Governance: A Pan-Samoan Congress?

Given the great influence of the diaspora in their contributions to the *mālō* in Sāmoa and American Sāmoa and the *Atunu'u* as a whole, can Sāmoa and American Sāmoa incorporate

diasporas in their governance schemes? I will argue for two possibilities with regard to Sāmoana. The first entails giving all members of Sāmoana, including the diaspora, either direct or observatory participation in governance. This involves two options 1) direct representation in the local legislatures of Sāmoa and American Sāmoa or 2) giving diasporas delegates with non-voting ‘observer status’ in the respective legislatures, much in the same manner that American Sāmoa has a non-voting delegate to the United States Congress.

The second possibility involves creating a pan-Samoan organization that incorporates representation from Samoans in the Sāmoas and the diaspora, much in the same way as their regional cooperative organizations in the Pacific. This would entail setting up a legislature-like structure, with a committee representing delegates from the different parts of Sāmoana. Similar structures have been attempted to like the Fale‘ula organization as a Samoan Language Commission.<sup>9</sup> This cooperative organization has the potential for fostering collaborative projects and engaging in dialogues on social, cultural, political and economic issues. Its creation could function as a forum through which Samoans can voice their concerns and participate directly in this nationalism. These ideas face many challenges and will likely be controversial, but they are nonetheless possibilities for a constantly changing nation in the modern era.

### Limitations and Recommendations

Despite being a largely theoretical text, this study could utilize a stronger methodology that incorporates the voices of Samoan through ethnographic study. Even the methodology of *talanoa*, a uniquely Pacific of engaging in research, would be recommended.<sup>10</sup> The variety of anecdotal

<sup>9</sup> The Faleula o Fatuailupu o le Gagana Samoa (International Samoan Language Commission), which was in existence from 2000-2009, was similar to the Mamaka Kaiāo Hawaiian language commission project as well as other language revitalization efforts in the Pacific and other Indigenous communities.

<sup>10</sup> Vaiioleti, Timote M. “Talanoa Research Methodology: A Developing Position on Pacific Research.” *Waikato Journal of Education* 12 (2006): 21-34.

knowledge and insight gained from community input would greatly add to the repertoire of lived experiences in nationalist discursive practices. How do Samoans view, experience, and take part in the Samoan nation? At what levels do both ethnic and civic nationalism manifest in Samoan communities at the village, district, national, and diasporic levels? Further methodologies that can be used include interviews, surveys, participant-observer focus-groups that would supplement and augment the diversity of perspectives that were not solicited.

In keeping in line with the focus on indigenous methodologies, it would appropriate to craft analyses based on traditional forms of discourse including *lāuga* (ceremonial speeches) and *solo* (chants, poems). The primary utilization focused on indigenous stories, *tala*, as strung into Western discursive practices, but there is yet to be tapped a vast repertoire of speeches, songs, poems, dances, and other performative devices in which nationalism are both explicitly and implicitly expressed. Another important device that does not receive much attention is the *lāuga*, oratory and traditional speeches. Its inclusion in historiography is neglected, though it often posits important historical references for certain events. There are significant bodies of *lāuga* that are unwritten but are, nonetheless, documented through various cultural exchanges recorded by numerous forms of media (television stations, newspapers, radio stations) produced by both government and private sources both in Sāmoa and abroad.

Among other indigenous forms not widely analyzed are *fāgogo*, ‘fabled’ stories – indigenous folklore, *pese*, song, *siva*, dance, and, *faleaitu* (comical skits). The numerous expressions of the nation embodied in these art forms and bodies of indigenous literature offer numerous perspectives on the nation that are not found in conventional Western discursive practices. A closer in-depth review of the Independence Day celebrations from the initial Independence Day in 1962 until the present-day celebrations would also enhance the repertoire of

documented experiences of the nation and views of nationhood among Samoans. One might get a better picture of how Samoans situate themselves in various locational spaces by soliciting their experiences of patriotism and involvement in Samoan lived national discourse.

## Conclusion

“O Samoa o le aiga e tasi ae lua faigamalo”<sup>11</sup>

At the outset of this thesis, we sought to reexamine the idea of the nation from various Samoan contexts and we sought to analyze the numerous factors that confound contemporary conceptualization of the nation, particularly the modernist orientation. We saw that this idea of a primordial Sāmoa that existed from time immemorial underwent various transformations after contact with the West and after a long nationalization process, culminated in the construction of the modern nation-state. But did this nation-state define Sāmoa as a whole? It did not, after realizing that there were two modern competing political entities claiming to be Sāmoa. Further compounding this conundrum was the fact that the majority of the population of Samoans no longer reside in the physical Samoan polities, as the shift from “homeland” to diasporas has redefined population demographics for those claiming Samoan ancestry. If the Samoan nation is no longer traditionally defined along geopolitical lines, can there be a shift toward an ethnic-centered idea of nation?

Today, we have not only have competing political notions of the nation, but also social and ethnic definitions of the nation which can be supported by indigenous notions of nation based on kinship and genealogy in their various forms. This brings us to the general lack of recognition of indigenous conceptualization of the nation beyond the state-centric definitions. The discourse on nationalism has largely been dominated by Western hegemonic, hetero-patriarchal assumptions

<sup>11</sup> “Samoa is one family, but two governments.” Tui Atua Tupua Tamasese ‘Efi



about the nation with teleological prescriptions about the development towards statehood. This is evidenced not only in the binary polarization and simplification of nationalism into primordialist and modernist camps. This state-centric idea of the nation can longer be a viable description of the ways nationalism has manifested in the Pacific, where many diasporas have become larger than the “homeland” and the existence of multiple political entities confound Western concepts of the nation.

There is a great gap in the literature on Samoan – and Pacific, in general – nationalism that focuses on island-centered, indigenous debates on the nation. Much of the focus of Samoan nationalism has been on transnational discourse that is itself framed within state-centric models of the nation. Globalization and other economic motives driven by outside organizations – both national and supranational groups such as aid-donors – have contributed to this. Analysis of these factors, is not, however, the central goal of this thesis. This paper deconstructs traditional state-centric discourse on the Samoan nation and proposes more adequate critiques that conceptualizes the nation from indigenous perspectives.

Thus, the idea of Sāmoana as *Atunu‘u*, as nation – in opposition to the *mālō* – has become the central goal and outcome of this thesis. Although the focus of political power is vested in a centralized nation-state (*mālō*), this locale is very limited in that it does not represent the entirety of the Samoan people as the *Atunu‘u*. The existence of American Sāmoa as a separate political entity excludes this significant portion of the Samoan population from the dominant notions of the nation as a state. The existence of large diasporas also excludes Samoans outside of both polities from this same notion of nation. What then, can bind Samoans together as a single nation? If not in the political realms, we as Samoans must construct our own understanding and concepts of the

nation. It is for this reason that I reiterate the conceptualization of Sāmoana as the *Atunu‘u*. As ‘Epeli Hau’ofa has said,

Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us. We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny spaces which have resisted accepting as our sole appointed place, and from which we have liberated ourselves. We must not allow anyone to belittle us again, and take away our freedom.<sup>12</sup>

In the same way, we can say this about Sāmoana: Sāmoana is vast; Sāmoana is expanding, Sāmoana is *Atunu‘u*, is nation, is people. We as Samoan people are the descendants of seafaring peoples who have transcended oceanic *vā*, the boundaries and space that not only separate us, but bind and connect us together. In articulating Sāmoana not only as a physical place, which has defined and restricted our notion of nation for so long, compounded and confounded by the modernist and neocolonialist narratives of the state, we revive and construct new understandings of our ancestral and genealogical connections to each other as Samoans. We engage in decolonial theorizing and praxis and we deconstruct the hegemonic national discourse and create and build upon, with our native agency, our uncaded nation forged by genealogy and kinship with each other as Samoans. As Tui Ātua has state in the quote above, Sāmoa is two governments, but one nation, one *‘āiga*, family. This can be rephrased as such, ‘o Sāmoa e lua ana faigāmālō, ‘a ‘o Sāmoana ‘o le *Atunu‘u* e tasi: Sāmoa may be two states, but Sāmoana is one family, one nation.

## A GLOSSARY OF SAMOAN WORDS

<i>āiā</i>	to have authority over	<i>fa‘alupega</i>	honorifics of the
<i>āiā tatau</i>	human rights		Atunu'u , a particular
<i>‘āiga</i>	the general term for		<i>itūmālō</i> , <i>nu ‘u</i> , <i>‘āiga</i> ,
	family, kin		or <i>suafa matai</i>
<i>ali ‘i</i>	the higher class of	<i>faiāvā</i>	a husband who lives
	<i>matai</i> , chiefly titles		with and serves his
Ali‘i Sili	‘paramount chief’ –		wife’s family
	the office created		
	during the German	Fa‘amatai	the social, political,
	period for Matā’afa		and cultural system
	Iosefo as advisor to		that governs the nu‘u,
	the governor		originally the <i>fono a</i>
<i>aga ‘ifanua</i>	customs particular to		<i>matai</i> , the <i>auvaluma</i> ,
	a village		and the <i>‘aumāga</i>
<i>aganu ‘u</i>	‘national’ customs		
	and traditions	Fa‘asāmoa	the social, cultural,
	common throughout		political customs and
	the <i>Atunu'u</i>		traditions of Sāmoa
<i>Ao</i>	one of the paramount	<i>faipule</i>	an elected
	titles of Savai’i		representative in the
<i>atunu ‘u</i>	a nation, a country, a		Fono
	people		
(le) <i>Atunu ‘u</i>	the Samoan nation, its	Faipule	representatives of the
	people in the		lower house of the
	‘homeland’ and		American Sāmoa
	diaspora		legislature
<i>auvaluma</i>	association of the	Fautua	office of advisory role
	sisters and daughters		to the German
	of a village		governors in colonial
			Sāmoa that replaced
<i>‘aumāga</i>	association of untitled		the office of Ali‘i Sili
	males in a <i>nu ‘u</i>		
<i>itūmālō</i>	a district	<i>feagaiga</i>	the traditional
			brother-sister
<i>fa‘alavelave</i>	a cultural obligation		relationship, in which
	to which tōga (fine		the sister, the
	mats) and other		<i>feagaiga</i> , was
	contributions (e.g.		accorded sacred status
	funeral, marriage, title		and certain privileges;
	investiture, church		also refers to a
	blessing, etc.)	<i>fono</i>	covenant or treaty
			a meeting

<i>fono a matai</i>	the village council	<i>pāpā</i>	one of the four ancient paramount titles from the <i>Vavau</i> : Tuiātua, Tuiā‘ana, Gato‘aitele, Vaetamasoāli‘i
Fono a Faipule	the legislative assembly during the colonial era		
Fono	the current legislative assembly of Independent Sāmoa; the territorial legislature of American Sāmoa	<i>pule</i>	power, authority, control
<i>lāuga</i>	ceremonial speeches delivered (primarily by <i>tulāfale</i> )	Pule	the principal orators of Savai‘i based in Sāfotulāfai, Sāle‘aula, Sāfotu, ‘Āsau, Sātupa‘itea, and Palauli
<i>mālō</i>	the winning party in a war; a government; the nation-state		
<i>matai</i>	a “titled” person; general word for a “chief,” of which there are two classes: <i>ali‘i</i> and <i>tulāfale</i>	<i>Pulenu‘u</i>	village ‘mayor’; liaisons between the village councils and central government
<i>mau</i>	an opinion; a movement, a rebellion, revolution	<i>soālaupule</i>	deliberative consultation and decision-making; consensus
Mau a Pule	protest movement against German colonial administration	<i>sui tama‘ita‘i</i>	a female representative from each village in Independent Sāmoa
Mau a Sāmoa	resistance movement against the New Zealand colonial administration	<i>suli</i>	heir of an <i>‘āiga</i>
		<i>suli moni</i>	“true heir” related by blood
		<i>suli tama fai</i>	an heir adopted into a family
<i>nofotāne</i>	a wife who lives with her and serves her husband’s family	<i>tāeao</i>	major historical “mornings” (events) commemorated in <i>lāuga</i>
<i>nu‘u</i>	village polity	<i>tagatānu‘u</i>	a native person of a country, a citizen

Ta'imua ma Faipule	the upper (Ta'imua) and lower (Faipule) houses of the Samoan legislative body representing the major districts and subdistricts, respectively, of Sāmoa during the 19th century	<i>teine</i>	general word for a girl or young, unmarried woman; a girl/woman belonging by blood to an 'āiga or nu'u, as opposed to an inlaw
<i>tala</i>	stories, legends	<i>Teine</i>	the native sisters and daughters of the nu'u of Sāoluaafata, which was founded by women
<i>tala fa'asolopito</i>	“history” in the Western sense of events occurring in a particular sequence	<i>tulāfale</i>	the orator class of chiefs tasked with conducting <i>lāuga</i> and other political tasks on behalf of the <i>ali'i</i>
<i>Tamaa'āiga</i>	one of the four paramount titles, Mālietoa, Tupua Tamasese, Matā'afa, Tuimaleali'ifano, created by the colonial government that replaced the prominence of the <i>pāpā</i> titles	Tūmua	the principal orator group of 'Upolu based in Leulumoega ('Ā'ana), Lufilufi (Ātua), and Afega and Malie (Tuamāsaga); along with Pule, these groups were the powerbrokers and “king-makers” of Sāmoa, west of Manu'a
<i>tama'ita'i</i>	originally, the sisters and daughters of a village; now refers to all women (including inlaws) of a village	<i>tupu</i>	“king”
<i>tāulele'a</i> (plural)	the untitled men of the village; taule'ale'a (singular)	<i>Tafa'ifā</i>	the title given to the one who acquires all four pāpā: Tui Ātua, Tui Ā'ana, Gato'aitele and Vaetamasoāli'i
<i>tautua</i>	to render service (to a <i>matai</i> , 'āiga, nu'u)	Vavau	Sāmoa's ancient past

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