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THE HIGHER EDUCATIONAL NEXUS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE CLASS RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This paper reports the results of an investigation of higher education policy in the People's Republic of China during the decade of the 1970's. The questions of educational stratification and educational correspondence are explored by examining the images of different types of higher education institutions presented in the official press at different times during the 1970's.

The most active phase of the Cultural Revolution was just ending as the 1970's began, and a far-reaching series of educational reforms was implemented in the early 1970's. However, with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the immediate purge of his closest supporters (the "Gang of Four"), most of the Cultural Revolution reforms were abolished or curtailed. The impression given in the Chinese press and in many secondary accounts of the period is that the Cultural Revolution reforms changed everything about higher education, and that the counter-reforms of the late 1970's changed everything back again. The research reported here suggests that there were some fundamental continuities in the social missions or charters of different kinds of schools throughout the 1970's, despite the major political changes which took place.

The 1970's are placed in perspective in a chapter which describes education in imperial China and then traces the institutionalization of a "modern" educational system from the middle of the nineteenth century until the mid 1960's. During and in the immediate aftermath

of the Cultural Revolution, the institutional autonomy of the state supported educational system was greatly curtailed as professional educators lost control over the recruitment of students, the length and content of schooling, and the administration of schools.

Content analysis techniques are utilized to explore the images of different kinds of higher education institutions in the periods before and after the purge of the "Gang of Four." Schools are divided into the traditional ones (state supported, and roughly equivalent to colleges and universities in western countries) and the non-traditional ones (usually locally financed and vocationally oriented). These schools are compared in terms of the kinds of economic and political-ideological goals they are intended to serve, their curricula and major student activities, and (to the extent that these can be determined) the social backgrounds and the occupational placements of their students.

While there was considerable variation in the emphasis given to different economic goals of higher education during the 1970's, a fundamental continuity is evident in the associations of some of the goals with the two types of schools. The concrete, applied goal of increasing production and solving immediate production problems was associated primarily with the non-traditional schools throughout the 1970's, while the more abstract goal of serving the advancement of science and technology was associated only with the traditional schools. In the early and mid 1970's, the non-traditional schools

were seen to be training "qualified manpower," while in the late 1970's, only the traditional schools were seen to contribute to this goal. Clearly, the definition of what constituted qualified manpower had changed.

Political-ideological goals of higher education were mentioned much more often, and with greater variety, in the early and mid 1970's than in 1978. A cluster of such goals having to do with the issue of education as cultural capital and as a means of social advancement were associated almost exclusively with the traditional schools, indicating clearly that they could allocate their graduates to positions in the occupational elite while the non-traditional schools could not.

Rather limited data on student origins are suggestive of a correspondence between social origins and educational attainments--students of worker and of peasant backgrounds being associated primarily with non-traditional schools, and "worker-peasant-soldier" students (a group probably composed largely of children of political cadres) being primarily associated with the traditional schools.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF TABLES (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This paper is a study of higher education policy in the People's Republic of China during the decade of the 1970's. It is particularly concerned with the relationship between education and the structuring of social inequality in contemporary Chinese society.

The first six years of the 1970's, of course, are part of what is often designated the Cultural Revolution Decade (1966-1976) in China. During these years, a segment of the central leadership which Domes has called the Cultural Revoluntionary Left sought to effect a "revolution in education." They charged that China's educational system prior to the Cultural Revolution had been dominated by bourgeois intellectuals and had trained "spiritual aristocrats" who were scornful of China's laboring masses.

China's colleges and universities had been closed in the middle of 1966, and did not begin to reopen in large numbers until 1971. Enrollments were much lower than they had been prior to the Cultural Revolution, and there were major reforms in the structure and the content of higher education, as well as in the recruitment of students. These reforms were intended to create a higher education system appropriate to the Maoist strategy of economic development through mobilization of the energies of ideologically aroused masses. The reforms were also intended to increase the proportion of young people of proletarian backgrounds in higher education institutions.

The nature of these educational reforms is described in greater detail in later chapters of this paper. Suffice it to say here that they entailed a de-emphasis on the contributions of technical experts and other highly educated persons to China's development efforts, and a serious diminution of the chances of children of China's educated elite to attend higher education institutions. Not surprisingly, educational professionals for the most part found the reforms unpalatable, and they did what they could during the early and mid 1970's to undermine and circumvent them. Open opposition to the "revolution in education" was politically very risky, however; and, in any event, the Cultural Revolutionary Left exercised considerable control over the central media and used them as forums for their own views.

It is clear in retrospect that the power of the Cultural Revolutionary Left was based in large part on their close relationship to Mao Zedong. When he died in September 1976, it took less than a month for his widow, Jiang Qing, and other core members of the Cultural Revolutionary Left to be purged. She and Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan were placed under arrest and were dubbed the "Gang of Four." They were vilified incessantly in the Chinese press and were blamed for all of China's ills.

The post-"Gang of Four" regime moved quickly to reverse almost all aspects of the "revolution in education," and launched a campaign to realize the "four modernizations" (of industry, agriculture,

national defense, and science and technology) by the turn of the century. Science and technology were the cornerstones of this developmental strategy, and this of course meant improvements in the positions of scientists, technical experts, and other members of the educated elite in China.

Clearly, commitment to a particular strategy of economic development has implications both for the interests of various groups and classes in Chinese society and for the structure and content of the educational system as it is expected to contribute to development efforts.

A development strategy which emphasizes mobilization of the masses through ideological appeals and organization provides a leading role for political cadres who may themselves possess little in the way of technical knowledge. On the other hand, a development strategy which emphasizes the creation of a modern industrial sector based on high technology provides a leading role for highly educated scientists and technical experts who may show little concern for the social implications of their technical decisions.

Many of the goals to which education is intended by central leaders to contribute are related to economic development. Part of the task of this paper is to examine the economic goals of higher education at different times during the 1970's. But there are also a number of political-ideological goals to which higher education is

intended to contribute. Many of these goals have to do with issues of social equality and inequality, and considerable attention will also be devoted to them in this paper. An increased concern with political-ideological goals of higher education has generally been associated with the mass mobilization strategy of economic development; these kinds of goals have usually received considerably less attention in the Chinese media at times when development led by technical experts has been stressed.

Shifts in the goals to which higher education is intended to contribute have been accompanied by efforts to alter both the structure and the content of higher education. In periods when the Maoist developmental strategy was in the ascendant, the sectors of the higher education system providing the highest levels of knowledge and expertise have been de-emphasized, while those which taught lower and intermediate level technical skills to large numbers of people have been encouraged. These priorities have of course been reversed in periods when expert-led development strategies have been followed.

Access to educational opportunities is another important issue in the structuring of social inequality, in China as elsewhere. This paper devotes considerable attention to the question of which kinds and levels of education are available to young people of differing social backgrounds in contemporary China.

A related issue has to do with the relationship between educational attainment and occupational attainment. To what extent

are high levels of formal education necessary for entry into the occupational elite in China? Certainly the Chinese themselves have believed that higher education leads to higher level occupational placements; there has been intense competition for seats in colleges and universities since the early 1960's.

The study of higher education policy during the 1970's, then, will concentrate on the goals of higher education and the relationship of these goals to the structure and content of higher education. It will also be concerned with the issue of access to educational opportunities, and with the general theme of the relationship between the educated elite and the political elite in contemporary Chinese society. Because less than 1% of the college-age cohort is able to attend colleges and universities in China--and assuming that members of both the political elite and the educated elite are interested in having their own children gain access to higher education institutions--factors which affect the chances of children of the political elite and the educated elite in the competition for scarce college seats can serve as indicators of the relationships between these two elites. Thus, changes in admissions criteria for higher education institutions will be of interest at several points in this paper.

Chapter 2 discusses the development and institutionalization of a "modern" Western-inspired educational system in China from its inception in the nineteenth century. It is argued that the Cultural

Revolution was in part an attempt to de-institutionalize the state-run educational system; the "revolution in education" of the early and mid 1970's sought to sharply reduce the institutional autonomy of the "regular" education system and to subject it to greater political control. The discussion in this chapter draws on impressionistic readings of primary sources, both in Chinese and in translation, and on some of the vast secondary literature on Chinese education.

In Chapter 2 a number of theoretical issues from the sociological literature on the relationship between education and social stratification are also discussed. Particular attention is given to theoretical and empirical studies of these issues in the context of the socialist states of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe.

While most accounts of education in contemporary China are based on impressionistic readings of the Chinese press which seek to cull important factual information from press accounts--or on interviews with emigres from China or educators and administrators within China, the research reported here is based on a systematic investigation of several dimensions of higher education policy which utilized content analysis techniques. The concern of this study is not to cull factual information about the number of students enrolled in Chinese schools, or the range of majors offered at a particular school. Rather, it is to assess the images of the societal roles of different kinds of higher education institutions, as these were expressed in

the central Party newspaper at three different times during the 1970's. It is sometimes the case that implicit understandings about the missions of different schools can be revealed through content analysis when impressionistic readings of the press will fail to uncover them.

Chapter 3 discusses the research design and methodology of content analysis in greater detail.

Chapter 4 elaborates on the distinction between traditional and non-traditional higher education institutions in China, and explores the emphasis placed by central leaders on these two types of schools at different times in the 1970's.

Chapter 5 examines the range of economic goals mentioned in People's Daily articles about higher education during the 1970's, and explores the patterns of association between these goals and the two kinds of schools.

Chapter 6 does the same thing for the political-ideological goals of higher education mentioned in the press during the 1970's.

Chapter 7 deals with the content of education. It examines the relative emphasis placed on different aspects of the curriculum at different times during the 1970's, and explores the patterns of association between various curricular items and the two school types.

Chapters 4-7, then, examine the structure of the higher education system, the missions or charters of different kinds of schools, and the content of education. In Chapter 8, to the extent possible with rather limited data, the issues of the social origins and the occupational placements of students associated with traditional and non-traditional schools are explored.

The final chapter, Chapter 9, summarizes the results of the investigation and suggests how the interests of various groups and classes in China have been affected by the higher education policies of the periods before and after the purge of the "Gang of Four." The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the unresolved issues in the current Chinese educational policies and some of the inherent tensions in the relationship between China's educated elite and political elite.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The focus of this research, as explained in the preceding chapter, is on the decade of the 1970's. However, the events of that decade in China need to be viewed in both historical and theoretical perspective, and it is the goal of this chapter to provide such perspective. The historical materials are organized chronologically, and discussions of relevant theoretical materials are interspersed throughout.

A: Educational Stratification in Historical-Comparative Perspective

The major theoretical concern of this paper is with the connections between education and stratification, especially during periods of large-scale societal transformation. Randall Collins (1977) has elaborated some "comparative principles of educational stratification" which can serve as a useful point of departure.

Collins addresses the question of what accounts for variations in the size, structure, and content of educational systems in different societies or in different historical periods. He writes (p. 1):

> A great deal of research in the sociology of education has taken an existing structure and its content for granted and concentrated on describing the social processes that occur within it. We are left with the question of why a given educational system exists--what conditions or forces produce it, sustain it, change it, or even abolish it.

Collins rejects functionalist explanations of education as contributing to the integration or the produtivity of a society. He

argues instead for a "domination" approach to the evolution and change of educational systems.

He posits the existence of a cultural market in which various sources of demand for education (or cultural capital) interact with sources of supply, and this interaction has a decisive influence on the size, structure, and content of the educational system. Collins identifies three main types of demand for education: (1) demands by individuals for training in practical, economically productive skills; (2) demands to learn the status culture of a dominant group in order to maintain or enhance social standing and qualify for membership in elite groups; and (3) demands of a central political authority which seeks to extend its bureaucratic control over parts or all of the population.

For Collins, education is "part of a multisided struggle among status groups for domination, for economic advantage, and for prestige. This approach...regards social structure as the result of the mobilization of a variety of resources and interest groups within a common arena (p. 3)."

The value of educational certificates can fluctuate, depending on the degree of demand for people with those certificates, relative to the numbers of people actually possessing them. Cultural capital, then, may be subject to periods of inflation or deflation as supply and demand interact within a society's cultural market.

The affinity of Collins' views with those of Max Weber (1968) should be apparent. Weber was quite sensitive to the ways in which social groups sought to acquire or to control education in order to further their ideal or material interests, and to limit competition for economically valuable opportunities. Weber describes the efforts of university graduates in Germany to institute educational requirements for positions in the German bureaucracy, thus providing legal protection for the economic advantages of their education. He suggests that:

> If we hear from all sides demands for the introduction of regulated curricula culminating in specialized examinations, the reason behind this is, of course, not a suddenly awakened "thirst for education," but rather the desire to limit the supply of candidates for these positions and to monopolize them for the holders of educational patents. For such monopolization, the "examination" is today the universal instrument--hence its irresistible advance (1968, p. 1000).

Examinations, of course, played a very important role in the cultural market of traditional China. The next section discusses education in traditional Chinese society, and explores the major sources of demand for and supply of education.

B. Education in Traditional China

The nature of formal education in traditional China remained essentially the same for more than a thousand years prior to the radical transformations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Confucian classics formed the core of the curriculum in virtually all schools, whether public or private. This was true

because formal education had the same goals throughout China: the creation of cultivated men and the preparation of candidates for the series of civil examinations which served as the major avenue of recruitment into imperial service.

Success on the examinations required a detailed knowledge and orthodox interpretation of Confucian classics; thus, education was primarily literary and moral-political in nature. The importance of literacy for an imperial official should not be underestimated. Purcell (p. 8) writes, "The political union of China through the centuries can be attributed to the unifying force of the written language more than to any other factor."

Years of diligent study were required to be successful on the civil examinations, and this was a luxury which only well-to-do families could afford for their children. (Some clan schools did at times take in promising children from among their poorer members.) While the examinations were technically open to almost everyone, the children of the poor were clearly disadvantaged. Among those who could afford to study, only a small proportion ever passed even the lowest level of the examinations; and of these few, only a few were ever awarded official positions. The rest of the educated had to be content to occupy sub-official positions in their localities, or to serve as teachers for younger crops of aspiring officials. Thus, these "failed" or not-yet-successful scholars constituted the primary source of supply of education in traditional China.

The traditional system of education in China took its toll of victims, to be sure. Chinese literature is full of characters living in extreme deprivation because their exposure to some education in Confucian classics precluded their participation in practical, materially-productive manual labor, and yet they had not managed to pass the examinations or to secure official appointment. They were often despised by both the common people and the successful gentry, and they subsisted, if at all, by working as scribes for wealthy families, writing commemorative scrolls for important occasions, and so on. Lu Xun's story, "Kong Yiji," is a moving depiction of this marginal social position.

In the cultural market of traditional China, then, two of Collins' three sources of demand for education were paramount. People wanted to learn, or wanted their children to learn, the status culture of the gentry because membership in this elite stratum brought prestige, economic opportunities, and the possibility of appointment to imperial service. The emperors, on the other hand, controlled the structure and the content of education through the civil examination system. They promoted an ideology, Confucianism, which was perfectly congenial to imperial rule, and channeled the ambitions of the gentry in ways that served imperial interests.

The worth of particular degrees within the examination system fluctuated, of course, depending on the historical period. Quite commonly, when the empire was threatened militarily and needed to

raise capital for military expenditures, it became easier to circumvent the examination system per se by purchasing degrees (and official positions which could be exploited politically and economically). In less pressing times, larger numbers of officials were selected from among those who had attained their degrees legitimately through examinations (Weber, cited in Menzel, p. 59).

Whatever its deficiencies, the traditional educational system worked well enough to persist in roughly the same form for more than a thousand years. However, with the coming of Western powers to China (the first Opium War with Britain in 1842 is a convenient, if shorthand, benchmark for this period in Chinese history), it became apparent to many within China that literary and moral-political education would not, in itself, be adequate to meet the challenge of the West. Before discussing this period, another strand of the theoretical argument is introduced.

C. Education as a System of Legitimation

John Meyer (1977) has argued for a macrosociological view of education as a system of legitimation. In this view, formal education functions both as a societal theory of knowledge, defining certain categories of knowledge as authoritative, and as a societal theory of personnel, defining and certifying particular people as qualified for incumbency of elite positions. Education can act upon the occupational structure by legitimating types of knowledge and possessors of knowledge in this way. By "authoritative," Meyer means

knowledge which must be taken into account by decision makers for them to be considered to be acting rationally.

Meyer suggests that schools have "social charters to define people as graduates and as therefore possessing certain rights and capacities in society (p. 59)." Both the students being processed and people in the wider society recognize this chartering aspect of education; in modern and modernizing societies, employers tend to make hiring decisions at least in part on the basis of educational credentials, and "students tend to adopt personal and social qualities appropriate to the positions to which their schools are chartered to assign them (p. 60)."

Applying Meyer's view to education in traditional China, it would seem that the "external institutional authority" of the schools, per se, to allocate persons to positions was quite limited; rather, this function was performed by the civil examination system.

Meyer is interested in the effects of education as an institution, and he suggests that education not only socializes individuals and allocates them to positions in the occupational structure, but also constructs and alters the network of positions itself. On the mass level, education helps to define and build the nation, and it "allocates persons to citizenship." Meyer writes:

> In expanding the meaning of citizenship and the set of persons who are seen as citizens, education plays a dual role. Certainly it opens up new possibilities for citizens--in particular new claims for equality which can be made on society.

> It also, however, redefines individuals as responsible subordinate members (and agents) of the state organization, and opens them up to new avenues of control and manipulation (p. 70).

This last point, of course, bears a good deal of resemblance to Collins' view of education arising in part because of the needs of central governments for bureaucratic control of their populations.

It seems clear that the kind of mass education with whose effects Meyer is concerned did not exist in traditional China, and that something approximating it does exist in contemporary China. Thus, in the course of the past century there has been a process of institutionalization of education in Chinese society. It is to an understanding of this process of institutionalization that the present chapter is larger devoted.

D. Nineteenth Century China: Internal Weakening, External Challenges

In the nineteenth century, the Qing Dynasty faced a series of challenges, both internal and external, which eventuated in its overthrow and the establishment of a republican form of government in 1911. Rapid population growth had stretched China's resources to the breaking point; she was challenged by the expansionist Western powers; and she was faced with serious internal revolution by the Taipings. Beginning with the first Opium War with Britain in 1842, China suffered a series of military defeats and territorial enchroachments. Her markets began to be flooded with foreign products which were in many cases cheaper and better made than native Chinese products, and this had a devastating effect on China's national economy.

The series of humiliations which the Chinese suffered at the hands of foreigners in the last half of the century made it clear that the traditional educational system, despite the value of its moral training, was inferior to that of the West in the creation of material, and especially, military strength. As the Qing Dynasty declined, numerous calls for reform were made. There was agreement that China had to absorb some of the learning of the West, but there was no agreement about how this synthesis of the traditional and the foreign should be carried out.

Suggestions for reform were quite varied: they can only be summarized here. In general, the Chinese agreed that they needed to incorporate the mathematical and scientific-technical aspects of Western learning into their educational system, and they experimented with many ways of accomplishing this. In the 1860's and 1870's they established new institutions of higher learning which had technical orientations. These included military schools, mining schools, and agricultural schools, and they were often staffed by Europeans as teachers (Purcell, Chapter 2).

Another strategy was to send students to foreign countries to learn those skills in which China was particularly deficient, such as engineering and natural science. The first such students went to the United States in 1872; many others went later to European countries, and between 1896 and 1932 they went in large numbers to Japan (Price, 1970, p. 96).

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were concerted efforts to increase the number of government-supported primary and middle schools, and to reform their curricula somewhat. In 1903 a commission headed by Zhang Zhidong drafted a set of reforms, based on the Japanese school system, which were promulgated as the Imperial Schools Regulations. A related decree in 1906 said that the goal of education was "not only to discover men of talent, but to educate the whole nation and to inculcate loyalty to the throne, respect for Confucius, the awakening of the people to a sense of their national responsibility, the promotion of a military spirit, and the creation of a practical and realistic sense (Purcell, p. 67)."

Early Chinese efforts at educational reform seem to have assumed that China could absorb Western knowledge without acquiring the values which underlie it. This is suggested in the turn of the century slogan, "zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong"; take Chinese learning as the essence, and Western learning for technical efficiency. This phrase, so much neater in Chinese than in English, calls for a very difficult synthesis.

The recognition of a need to incorporate Western learning into China's educational efforts represents an important shift in China's cultural market. Confucianism was no longer the authoritative body of knowledge, and a demand was beginning to develop for people with scientific-technical knowledge, as well as for people with a knowledge

of foreign languages. Foreigners who possessed such knowledge came or were brought to China to teach, and large numbers of Chinese went abroad to study. To use Meyer's terms, a new theory of knowledge and a new theory of personnel (interrelated, of course) had been introduced into Chinese society. The process of institutionalization of a new kind of educational system had begun.

While these various reform efforts represented an important shift in the Chinese definition of the role of education (and of the government's responsibility for education), the most fundamental change came in 1905-06 with the abolition of the civil examination system. This event, perhaps more than any other--except the 1911 revolution--should be seen as the symbol of revolution in Chinese education and, indeed, in Chinese society. The examination system had been the major avenue of mobility into the ruling elite for well over a thousand years and had been largely responsible for the penetration of Confucian ideology throughout Chinese society. But national needs had changed: the empire had to be modernized and militarized as well as administered. A new kind of elite, based on specialized training and technical expertise, was slowly coming into existence, but the examination system was hindering its growth and penetration of the power structure. The abolition of the examinations greatly facilitated the expansion of Western curricula in Chinese schools but, according to McGough (1979, p. 2), it also:

> ...severed the organic link between intellectual pursuits, the possession of an advanced degree, and political office-holding. This meant that intellectuals, as a class, no longer had a direct vested interest in the sociopolitical status quo, since political office was no longer restricted to those with "official" intellectual credentials.

The primary motivation for many Chinese who sought training in the West was the desire to strengthen China technologically, industrially, and militarily. However, it would seem that many Western-trained Chinese lost sight of this goal when they returned to China. Y. C. Wang writes:

> ...there was a steady weakening of the moral sense and an increasing dedication to professional achievement. While the international standing of Chinese scientists rose perceptibly, their attachment to the masses became increasingly more remote. As a number of them recently admitted (under Communist prodding but not necessarily insincerely), they had never even tried to further science or technology in China. Thus, scholars became experts in their own fields but paid almost no attention to national needs (quoted in Price, 1970, p. 100).

To briefly summarize the argument to this point:

In Imperial China formal education and the examination system were central to a cultural market in which members, and aspiring members, of the gentry sought education in Confucian classics as a way to maintain or enhance their prestige within Chinese society, to provide economic opportunities, and to become candidates for official positions in the imperial bureaucracy. The emperors utilized the civil examination system to control the content of education and the structure of degrees, thus channeling the aspirations of the gentry in ways which suited imperial needs. Education in productive techniques

(Collins' other source of demand for education) took place primarily in the form of assistantships to experienced workers.

The internal weakening of China's last dynasty, the Qing, coupled with the forceful arrival of expansionist Western powers in the nineteenth century, caused fundamental re-evaluations of the role of the state and of education in China. New kinds of knowledge were demonstrated to be "authoritative," in that they were held to be responsible for the military and economic strength of the European powers and Japan vis-a-vis China. There was a shift in the kinds of demand for education, and a variety of efforts were made to satisfy these new demands. There was an opening wedge for the new knowledge, but institutional arrangements had to change so that the possessors of the new "currency" in China's cultural market could move into positions of influence within the society. The abolition of the civil examination system demonstrated the extent to which the legitimacy of the traditional educational system had been undermined, and the long-standing link between Confucian scholarship and public office-holding was greatly weakened.

E. Republican China

With the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of a republican government in 1911, a new phase in the educational transformation of Chinese society began. The new government, although its control over the country was never fully consolidated, committed itself to the kind of educational expansion of which Meyer speaks.

Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, the first Minister of Education, sought unsuccessfully to establish a truly national system of education. In spite of the tremendous difficulties it faced in establishing control over the whole of China, the new government made impressive gains in expanding the numbers of students involved in modern primry and secondary schools.

For example, in 1912 there were about 2.8 million primary school students and about 98,000 secondary school students in government supported schools. By 1947 there were almost 23.7 million primary school students and almost 1.9 million secondary school students (Glassman, pp. 53-54).

From 1903 until 1922, the Chinese modeled their education system after the Japanese. After 1922, however, the influence of American styles of education came to predominate. Indeed, John Dewey had spent about two years in China during and after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and he had many followers there.

There were problems in adopting without modification educational methods and forms which had been developed in very different circumstances. A League of Nations team of experts visited China in 1932 and, while they were impressed with the Chinese determination to reform the educational system, they were nonetheless very critical of:

> ...the creation and development in China of schools and educational institutions...not suitable to the needs and conditions of the country. The result is a favoring of schools of higher standard, generally rising far above the condition of the impoverished country, whilst the primary and vocational

> instruction most indispensible for the people is neglected...(Becker, el al, p. 21).

The efforts of the Nationalist government had been successful in greatly increasing the numbers of students enrolled in formal educational programs, but too little attention was being paid to one of the primary sources of demand for education--that for training in practical, productive skills. Conversely, according to the League of Nations team, too much attention was being paid to what Munro (1971) later called "quality" education; young people were being educated to seek more education, to continually move into higher levels of an expert-led educational system. This preference in China for an elitist educational system reflected traditional ideas about the role of education in society and it reflected the practices of the European and North American countries upon which the Chinese were attempting to reform their educational system. Western curricula had been introduced into "modern" schools in China, but education remained quite elitist in orientation and structure.

F. Pre-Liberation Communist Educational Experience

While the Nationalist regime under Chiang Kai-shek was trying to unify China militarily by overcoming the regional warlords, the Chinese Communist Party was growing from infancy in the early 1920's to eventual ascension to power in 1949. In the interim, and especially after the Long March of 1937, when the Communist forces relocated to base areas in the northwest border regions, they experimented with the running of schools at all levels. In the wake

of the Japanese occupation of Chinese coastal areas, intellectuals from the cities fled both to the Nationalist capital at Chongking and to the Communist capital at Yenan. Selden (1971) has argued that, until about 1943, the Communists were trying to create in the border areas an education system much like that in the Nationalist-controlled areas. That is, they favored an academically oriented, expert-led school system. Urban intellectuals, recently arrived in the base areas and many of them no doubt the products of "modern" schools, played an important role in the operations of schools.

These efforts were not very successful, however, for reasons which were reminiscent of the findings of the League of Nations team of experts mentioned above. Lindsay suggests that an educational system modeled on the economically advanced countries could not work in China, where conditions--especially in the rural border areas--were very different. He writes:

> Except for a limited number in government service, society had comparatively little use for the graduates of the ordinary middle school or university. The economy was so poor that the withdrawal of children from productive work into whole-time education was a heavy burden, and the problem of adult illiteracy was so serious...
>
> The development of the Chinese education system could not proceed independently of the development of Chinese society and Chinese economy... It was desirable for everyone to have the elements of education--simple literacy and arithmetic--and these would have to be given as cheaply as possible without too much reduction in labor available for production (p. 35).

In response to these problems, the Communists curtailed their efforts to develop an academically oriented education system controlled by a central educational bureaucracy. Their new approaches

included efforts to make the curriculum as relevant as possible to the interests and needs of the peasants. They established part-work, part-study schools, winter schools, newspaper reading groups, "min ban gong zhu" schools (schools run by the people with government assistance), and so on.

Munro (1977, pp. 121-124) has compared primary school textbooks from Yenan with those from Beijing and other Nationalist controlled areas, and suggests that the Yenan texts are notable for their stress on providing basic level, immediately applicable knowledge and requiring that students put their newly-acquired knowledge into practice for the benefit of others.

In Collins' terms, then, the Communists sought to incorporate economically productive skills and knowledge--the antithesis of teaching the status culture of a dominant group--into the content of formal education for the first time in China. Educational content was completely interlaced with the Communist ideology of class struggle, resistance to Japan, and so on. In the educational practices of Yenan, then, there is a combination of education oriented to the demand to learn practical, productive skills, and the demand by political authorities to extend their control over the population. The structure of this educational system was of course considerably different than that associated with "quality" education; there was little emphasis on preparing students to move into ever-higher rungs of a multi-tiered system.

But while the Communists encouraged the development of community run schools which would operate as flexibly as possible, they decreased the numbers of regular schools under their control. These regular schools had been the backbone of their earlier attempts at running educational institutions; they were located primarily in larger towns, they had been established longer, and they had higher academic standards than the rural areas could maintain. Although the number of these schools decreased, they still provided the only truly literate graduates, who would surely be absorbed by the bureaucracy since their skills were very much in demand. An element of elitism thus emerged from a set of generally egalitarian educational policies (Seybolt, p. 663).

When the Communists established the People's Republic in 1949, they faced a much different set of problems than they had during their guerilla years. In addition to consolidating their control over the whole country and suppressing counterrevolutionary activities, they wanted to move ahead with an ambitious program of economic and social reconstruction and transformation. Before discussing educational policies and practices after 1949, a comparative perspective is offered by discussing the educational experiences of the Soviet Union and the socialist states of eastern Europe, and the relationship between education and stratification in these countries.

G. Education and Stratification in Other Socialist Societies

Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to the relationship between education and stratification in socialist societies. In this section, some of the literature on this topic is explored in order to offer a comparative perspective on the situation in China.

Educational attainment has long been recognized as a major determinant of occupational placement in socialist societies (Inkeles and Bauer, pp. 131-132; Parkin, 1969, p. 359; Jones, p. 522). Since the occupational systems of these countries have remained stratified--in the sense that differing degrees and kinds of material and non-material rewards are consistently attached to differentiated occupational positions (Davis and Moore, pp. 242-249)--access to formal education is a crucial determinant of life chances. Several other factors influence life chances, of course, both directly and indirectly through their effects on educational attainment. These include class background, ethnicity, sex, and residence in urban or rural areas.

Frank Parkin (1969) has offered a two-stage theory of the development of socialist regimes which is relevant to the issues of educational access and of stratification. He argues that, in the early years following the establishment of socialist regimes, the primary goal of the regime is that of political stabilization. There has been a large scale displacement of former elites and hence considerable long-range mobility. Positions of power and authority

tend to be distributed on the basis of political loyalty or ideological purity rather than technical expertise or professional credentials. To build on Collins' argument, the operation of the society's cultural market tends, during this stage, to be subordinated to the operation of its political market. Young socialist regimes have generally been committed to expanding school enrollments and to making educational opportunities more accessible to children of formerly disprivileged classes such as peasants and workers. At the same time, access to higher education has been increased for young people from the working class and the peasantry, and restricted for young people from formerly exploiting classes. The early years of socialist regimes have also often been characterized by efforts to narrow the income differentials accruing to different occupations.

Once political stabilization has been achieved, the regime's concern with consolidating its political power tends to recede, and economic development becomes the dominant concern. Parkin argues that, during this later period, higher education comes to be seen as a means for training highly qualified, specialized manpower needed for modernization, rather than as a reward for revolutionary services rendered or as a mechanism for promoting egalitarian goals. Criteria for recruitment to higher education become more heavily weighted in favor of assessments of academic achievement or ability rather than assessments of political reliability or class background.

When economic development becomes the dominant concern, the trend toward equalizing rewards accruing to different occupations also tends to reverse. The most obvious example of this is Stalin's attacks on "equality-mongering" during the 1930's, but other eastern European socialist states have experienced similar reversals as well. Thus, a concern with having the educational system serve egalitarian ends tends to be supplanted by a concern with having it achieve as close a fit as possible with an increasingly hierarchical occupational structure. This shift in emphasis is due, Parkin concludes, to a:

> ...tension between the system of rewards prescribed by the formal ideology and that associated with economic rationality and technological efficiency. To express it in rather simplified terms, there are inherent contradictions in a stratification order which seeks deliberately to depress the social and economic position of white collar strata while coming increasingly to rely on the type of expertise and knowledge which they possess (1969, pp. 360-361).

When the regime's emphasis is on getting the academically best qualified students into higher education institutions, the children of the manual working classes and the peasantry are at a disadvantage, while those of the intelligentsia and former bourgeiosie, as well as of political functionaries, are at a considerable advantage. Kelley and Klein (1977, p. 86) point out:

> Throughout the world, well-educated, high-status families are much more successful in getting their children educated...; they provide encouragement and role models, teach linguistic skills and academic skills, force their children to work harder, and the like. Schooling is usually expensive, both in direct costs (fees, supplies, clothing, etc.) and indirect costs (income the student could otherwise have earned); prosperous families can better afford these costs.

One might also add that well-educated, high-status families usually live in urban areas because that is where most of the jobs they hold are located, and that the availability and the academic quality of educational opportunities for their children are generally much greater than in the rural areas of these countries (see Dobson, p. 263).

Studies of student body compositions in Soviet schools reveal considerable differences in the amount and quality of education attained by children from different backgrounds. Yanowitz (1977, p. 87) argues that "at successive key junctures on the path to more advanced schooling (the eighth and tenth grades) the selection process--both formal and informal--eliminates larger proportions of workers' and peasants' children than of specialists' children."

Yanowitz points out that shifts in the ratio of secondary school graduates to higher education admissions have been important in stimulating debate among Soviet social scientists and educational policy makers. Between the period of 1950-53 and 1970-73, the number of young people graduating from secondary schools increased much faster than the number of college seats. The result has been that, while in 1950-53 about 65% of secondary school graduates were admitted to full time vuzy (higher education institutions), by 1970-73 only about 19% were being admitted. He continues:

> The failure of vuz admissions to keep up with secondary school graduations, combined with a student selection process based largely on competitive entrance examinations, has threatened to cut into lower-strata graduates' opportunities for

> vuz admissions more sharply than those of typically better prepared youngsters from intelligentsia families (p. 80).

Yanowitz estimates that, in the late 1960's, roughly 40% of the students in higher education institutions in the Soviet Union were from worker or peasant backgrounds. This is of course a considerable underrepresentation of these groups, given their size in the population as a whole. There is a corresponding overrepresentation of young people from intelligentsia families in colleges and universities, and Yanowitz argues that their overrepresentation increases with the increasing prestige of the institutions in which they are enrolled.

Data about the proportional representation of various classes in higher education institutions can be read both ways, of course. Intelligentsia children are overrepresented in higher education, but they do not monopolize it. Parkin points out that "the fact that only a minority of workers' children manage to enter higher education should not obscure the no less significant fact that they are often the preponderant social group in the student population (1971, p. 166)."

In the Soviet Union and the socialist states of eastern Europe, there has been a clear tendency for the intelligentsia (an amorphous category composed of what we would call white collar and professional, technical and administrative positions) to become increasingly self-recruiting; that is, children whose parents are members of the

intelligentsia tend to outstrip children from other backgrounds in academic achievement, and to attain occupations which are similar to those of their parents (Parkin, 1969, p. 367). The relatively rapid expansion of white collar occupations in these countries has meant that some upward mobility into the intelligentsia remains possible by children of worker and peasant backgrounds. Should the expansion of the non-manual sector of the economy slow down, however, the mobility opportunities of children of the manual working classes would, in the absence of affirmative action policies, be considerably reduced (Jones, p. 530).

In countries where a relatively small proportion of the college age cohort is able to attend college, criteria for recruitment to higher education are of great concern. Shifts in the weight given to various criteria can have important consequences for the chances of students from different backgrounds to be admitted to colleges and universities. Below the surface of discussions and debates among Soviet social scientists and educational policy makers about whether the state should intervene in educational recruitment to insure a greater representation of children of worker and peasant backgrounds, there are "the competing claims of distinct social groups to advanced schooling and the privileges associated with it, as well as the problems of a ruling party that must ensure not only the technical competence of its future intelligentsia but also its political and ideological reliability (Yanowitz, p. 96)."

Since members of the political elite and of the educated elite in socialist states are generally interested in having their own children receive advanced educations, and since the numbers of college spaces are small, any attempt to increase the representation of young people from the urban working classes or the peasantry will decrease the number of spaces available for the children of the intelligentsia and of political functionaries. At the same time, and in general terms, children of the intelligentsia tend to do better on measures of academic achievement than do children of political functionaries, while the latter have a more favorable class background than the former. Thus, a shift in the weight assigned to these two criteria in admissions decisions will be an advantage for one of these groups and a disadvantage for the other.

To this point in the discussion of education and stratification in other socialist societies, the primary concern has been with the issue of access to higher education. It has been argued that those who attain high levels of education tend to attain well-rewarded occupations, and that young people from educated families tend to do better on measures of academic achievement or ability and, hence, when this is a heavily weighted criterion in admissions decisions, children of the intelligentsia tend to be overrepresented in higher education institutions. Assigning heavier weight to such criteria as class background and political behavior tends to favor children from political functionary families as well as proletarian children.

The discussion now turns to a second major issue--that of the relationship between the political elite and the educated elite in socialist societies. Part of their relationship is played out in the competition for scarce places in institutions of higher education, and other parts are played out in other institutional spheres of the society.

The political elite in socialist states consists of persons who are full-time Party functionaries, who generally owe their position to a history of political activism and involvement, and who have worked in a series of progressively responsible Party positions. Many of these people may have attained higher education, but this is not, to use Weber's term, the main "causal component" of their life chances.

The educated elite, on the other hand, are persons for whom the possession of higher educational credentials <u>is</u> the major causal component of their life chances--the work that they do and the rewards they can legitimately claim from society depend upon their possession of specialized knowledge acquired in educational institutions. They may also be members of the Party, but this membership does not determine their social position.

There are several different views of the relationships of these elites to each other. Parkin's (1969) two-stage theory of the development of socialist regimes would suggest a domination of the educated elite by the political elite during the earlier stage, and the cultivation of the educated elite by the political elite in the

later stage; this is suggested by shifts in higher education admissions criteria to give greater weight to academic achievement, and in wage policies which provide greater rewards to jobs requiring higher levels of cultural capital.

Djilas (1957), who first popularized the term "new class," offered a scathing critique of the socialist states of eastern Europe, and argued that the true values of the revolution had been subverted. For him, the new class consisted of those "who have special privileges and economic preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold (p. 39)." This definition would seem to single out the full-time Party functionaries as the primary membership of the new class, but Djilas clearly had a broader basis in mind for the class. He stressed that it was the Party's commitment to industrialization which allowed for the growth of the new class, and suggested that, "The Party makes the class, but the class grows as a result and uses the Party as a basis. The class grows stronger while the Party grows weaker p. 40)." In this view, then, administrative, managerial, and technical experts were gaining control of the Party and using it to consolidate their position as a new privileged class in socialist societies.

Djilas' thesis finds some support in evidence from the socialist states of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that the Communist parties have been undergoing a process of "deproletarianization." That is, the proportion of workers and peasants in the Party has been

declining while the proportion of those with higher education employed in white collar occupations has been increasing (Parkin, 1971, pp. 150-152; Giddens, pp. 239-240).

Giddens argues that there are several kinds of elites in socialist societies, but that the Party enjoys paramount status and power and that it constantly balances the claims of the different elites off against each other. In this way, the Party keeps the other elites relatively weak and unable to effectively challenge its authority. He argues that, while higher political leaders may have received technical or other advanced training (as with Brezhnev and others in the Soviet Union), the Party nonetheless controls access to its own higher levels. Thus,

> The use of Party schools as a filter for qualification to leading positions serves to underline the split between elite recruitment to the political and other elites mentioned previously. Those who become the higher Party officials, even if they have received a specialized technical education, tend to undergo a transformation in outlook and attitudes in the course of pursuing a successful bureaucratic career (p. 244).

In Giddens' view, then, the Party may at times cultivate or seek alliances with the educated elite, but the political elite remains functionally differentiated from the educated elite and can, when it wishes, act to curtail the influence of the educated elite.

Gouldner (1978) has offered the most elaborate recent treatment of the concept of the new class. His use of the term "new class" is quite close to my use of the term "educated elite." He is careful to

exclude full-time Party functionaries from his definition of the new class, and argues that the new class and the Party are engaged in a long-term "contest of classes" over control of the economy.

Although the new class is subordinated to the Party, Gouldner argues that socialism nonetheless provides fertile ground for the growth of the new class. Socialist revolutions have created many opportunities for people with specialized training by overthrowing existing elites and by expanding the range of responsibilities of the state and the number of people in its employ. Socialist regimes have also generally been committed to the establishment of a mass education system and this is, according to Gouldner, the institution which is crucial to the mass reproduction of the new class. As young people pass through successive levels of the educational system, they not only acquire higher levels of cultural capital, but they are also inducted into what Gouldner calls the "culture of critical discourse," or CCD. Students become committed to a meritocratic ideology which claims that the possessors of advanced training and specialized expertise have most to offer to societal efforts at economic development and modernization. It is an ideology which tacitly de-legitimizes the authority of the Party, which is based in its Marxist-Leninist structure of democratic centralism and strict discipline. Gouldner elaborates:

> The culture of critical discourse (CCD) is an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, which (1) is concerned to <u>justify</u> its assertions, but (2) whose <u>mode</u> of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3)

> prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of the arguments adduce (p. 176).

It might perhaps be useful to counterpose this description of the new class's culture of critical discourse with Mao Zedong's assertion that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and that the Party controls the gun. A preference for eliciting voluntary consent probably characterizes both the new class and the Party, but control over and willingness to use the coercive apparatus of the state is the province of the Party alone.

Parkin (1971) and others have pointed out that political functionaries and members of the intelligentsia in the socialist states of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union occupy approximately equal positions in the rewards structures of these societies; taken together, they constitute the most privileged stratum of socialist societies. Yet they remain functionally differentiated and they have different bases for their claims to high incomes. There exists between them, then, a basis for alliance (the privileged versus the middle elements and the disprivileged) as well as a basis for conflict as each seeks to extend its control over the economy.

In this "contest of classes" (as Gouldner puts it), the political elite and the educated elite have different, if overlapping, sets of potential allies. The political elite (which is, after all, the guardian of an egalitarian ideology) is more likely to defend the interests of manual and less-skilled workers and peasants while the

educated elite is more likely to align itself with the skilled workers. The assumption here is that those with higher education stand to benefit from wage policies which give greater weight to cultural capital, and that the same meritocratic principle applied to manual labor means that the skilled laborers would benefit as well. On the other hand, less skilled laborers and the peasantry would be disadvantaged by greater weight being given to cultural capital in determining rewards. Thus, they form a potential constituency for the political functionaries who, it is assumed, lack high level cultural capital: they have political but not educational credentials.

An implicit, but perhaps unfounded, assumption of this view is that political functionaries are less capable in terms of economic decision-making than are technical experts. Giddens has pointed out that having access to a wide range of expert advice is more important for economic decision-makers than being masters of some technical specialty themselves (p. 248). This point is similar to Meyer's discussion of education serving as a theory of personnel which designates particular persons as possessors of authoritative knowledge. Rational decision-makers will take into account the advice of these carriers of authoritative knowledge during their policy deliberations. But the more or less institutionalized expectation that experts will be consulted is not the same as the technocratic thesis that the rule of the Party will be supplanted by a rule of technical experts as the economy becomes more complex.

To this point, the political elite has been discussed as though its members were relatively homogeneous. In reality, the Communist parties of the Soviet Union and the eastern European states (and of China) are composed of fairly disparate elements. Among the members of the political elite, the level of education attained by some is quite high, while for others it is quite low. The appeal of the meritocratic ideology of the new class is, in general, probably greatest for those members of the political elite whose educational attainment is high, and least for those whose educational attainment is low. At any rate, some segments of the political elite have promoted policies quite favorable to the interests of the educated elite, while other segments have promoted policies quite hostile to the interests of the educated elite (or new class).

In some instances, then, a conflict model of Party-new class relations seems most appropriate, while in other instances an alliance model of Party-new class relations seems to be in operation. Certainly there have been periods in socialist societies when members of the educated elite have been subjected to rather harsh treatment, and there have been periods when they have been accorded considerable prestige, influence, and material rewards.

The next section considers educational policy and practice in China following the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and pays particular attention to the issues of access to higher education and of the relationships between the political elite and the

educated elite. It is also concerned, following Collins, with the size, the structure, and the content of the education system which developed under the Communists, as well as with the overall process of institutionalization of mass education in China.

H. The Institutionalization of Education in the People's Republic

When the Communists swept to power in 1949, they inherited an educational system which had been undergoing a revolution for more than half a century. Throughout this period Chinese educationalists and political leaders had been trying to develop an educational system which could meet China's changed and changing needs, and to do this under conditions of extreme scarcity of resources and personnel. The numbers of people being given some education had increased a great deal, but educational opportunities were still concentrated in the cities.

> The predominant aims of the system which the Communists inherited were those of the West: a selective system, aiming eventually to be universal, led by experts to train experts at the higher levels. Its ethos was liberal, academic, and scholastic, and its products were in the main isolated from the life of the ordinary people, and had a deep dislike for getting their hands dirty (Price, 1970, p. 27).

An alternative to this kind of education had been developed at Yenan: it was rural oriented, stressing basic level skills and practical knowledge; it was decentralized, relying on localities or industrial enterprises to largely finance, administer, and determine the curriculum of their schools; and it was mass oriented, de-

emphasizing entrance requirements and examinations in favor of teaching greater numbers of students.

All of the major shifts in educational policy which have occurred since 1949 have involved a movement toward greater emphasis on one of these alternatives and less emphasis on the other. The two educational programs are oriented to two different goals: on the one hand to provide a highly trained contingent of technical experts for modernization and, on the other hand, to provide mass education to basic literacy, numeracy, and productive skills. Glassman summarizes the situation thus:

> China's need to train an educated elite and desire to educate the masses of the people are, in some sense, competing goals. Political realities and the obvious importance of both goals leave China's leaders little choice but to emphasize one alternative while laboring steadily to accomplish both (p. 68).

Each time that national policies have shifted the emphasis from one of these educational goals (and its associated model) to the other, the same chorus of complaints recurs from the sector de-emphasized. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958, and again in the educational reforms implemented in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, major elements of the Yenan model have been emphasized. In response, the proponents of "quality" education have complained that academic standards were being eroded to a dangerous degree, that China could not achieve modernization without training and relying on a cadre of technical experts, and that achieving a socialist or Communist society was not possible until the infrastructural, industrial, base had been developed.

During other periods, education has been recentralized, standards have been raised and made more uniform, recruitment of students has become more selective, and technical expertise has been stressed over political activism. In response, the proponents of the Yenan model have argued that education was becoming elitist, that the true needs of the masses were being ignored, and that revisionism was setting in.

In 1949, educated people were very much in short supply; the illiteracy rate was between 70% and 80% (Pepper, p. 847), and most of the literate were concentrated in the cities and larger towns. The Communists needed the assistance of everyone willing to render it in order to keep the education system operating and to try to bring it under Party control. Many teachers and other educational professionals had been educated in modern schools in China, or had in some cases studied abroad. Many looked forward with cautious optimism to the Communist victory in the civil war, and were eager to contribute to national reconstruction.

From 1949 to about 1953, the Party's efforts were concentrated on consolidating their control over the country as a whole, and in establishing Party branches in its various organizations and institutions.

From about 1953 to 1958, the Chinese relied heavily on Soviet aid and the Soviet model of development which stressed the rapid expansion of the heavy industrial sector of the economy. In keeping with this orientation, educational institutions stressed the development of

technical skills which would be needed in the industries that were being built. Less emphasis was placed on primary education than on secondary and tertiary education, and the expansion of educational opportunities in the countryside was deferred.

As the Chinese moved away from the Soviet model of development between 1956 and 1958, they began to place greater emphasis on the expansion of primary and secondary schools. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958, Mao called for the emulation of the Yenan model of education, and stimulated a massive drive to establish new schools of various types in the countryside. The principle of "self reliance" was stressed in the financing of these schools; the central government could not afford to provide financing for school construction nor for the operating budgets for salaries and textbooks. A State Council directive stressed the importance of education being combined with productive labor, and encouraged "schools to set up factories and farms, and for factories and agricultural cooperatives to establish schools (cited in Price, 1975, p. 131)." In this way, students' labor could contribute significantly to the financing of local schools. There was an effort to redirect the curricula of these schools toward the needs of the rural areas and away from training students to pass the entrance examinations of the next higher level of the educational system.

In the economically dismal years of 1960-1962, many of the rural schools so hastily established during the Great Leap were unable to

survive. Many parents needed their children's labor at home, and withdrew them from the schools. Central support flagged and a large proportion of the schools could not support themselves.

In the cities and larger towns, of course, the "regular" schools, run and supported by the state, continued to operate. These schools were much more academically oriented, and sought to train their students to do well on the entrance examinations for the next-higher rung of the educational ladder. But in the early 1960's, demographic trends caught up with the regular school system, and made the futures of their graduates at each level considerably less certain than they had been in the previous decade. The following discussion draws heavily on Unger (1982).

Several factors combined to create a crisis for the urban-oriented "regular" school system in the early 1960's. First, in the preceeding decade there had been fairly rapid expansion of education at the college and university level, and much slower expansion of the lower levels. This meant that, until about 1960, graduates of the state run, academically oriented, and urban-centered secondary school system had a very good chance of continuing on into higher education. However, with the expansion of secondary schooling in the late 1950's, the number of secondary school graduates soon far exceeded the number of higher education admissions, and the situation worsened each year in the first half of the 1960's.

Also contributing to this crisis was a progressive deterioration, from the point of view of job seekers, of the urban job market in the early 1960's. In the previous decade, the state sector and the industrial sector had expanded rapidly and had created many jobs for the graduates of secondary and tertiary educational institutions. However, by the beginning of the 1960's this expansion had slowed considerably, and state agencies and industrial enterprises found themselves fully staffed (and in many cases, overstaffed) with a relatively young workforce.

Thus, precisely at the time when ever-greater numbers of young people were entering the urban job market, urban jobs were becoming less available and the ratio of secondary school graduates to college admissions was becoming less and less favorable with each passing year.

The central government responded to this situation by trying, on the one hand, to curtail the expansion of college preparatory secondary education and to promote vocational education at the secondary level to prepare students for jobs in industry. On the other hand, they placed increasingly great emphasis on the rustication program, in which unemployed urban youths were relocated to rural villages and expected to "put down roots" there. As the competition for entry into academic secondary schools became fiercer in the years between 1960 and 1966, the "class line" came more into play, and children from bad class backgrounds found their chances to get into

these schools (or into the vocational schools) progressively worsening. Bad class background youth were subjected to intense pressures to "volunteer" for rural reassignment. And, despite the glowing rhetoric about rendering glorious service to the revolution by volunteering for the rustication program, it was commonly perceived as a way of dumping urban failures on already overcrowded rural villages.

During the period from 1960 to about 1964 there emerged what Munro (1971) has called the "clearcut institutionalization of elitism" in the form of a two-track educational system consisting of state run schools and lower prestige community run schools. Students in the latter were often young people of bad class background who were kept out of the state run schools. The state run schools were further differentiated into regular and "key" (zhong dian) schools. The academically best qualified students would be channeled into the key schools, which also received greater material support from the state, and to which the best qualified teachers were assigned.

While the state run schools (and especially the key schools) competed to see what proportion of their students would be successful on the entrance examinations for the next-higher levels of education, the chances of students in the community run schools were extremely limited. For many of them, attendance at a community run school was a way to forestall rural transfer. In addition to key schools, there were also special schools for the children of high level cadres and PLA officers.

On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, then, there were serious tensions between students of different class backgrounds in China's educational institutions (Shirk, 1982; Unger, 1982). A central source of tension was access to higher education--the situation was an intensely competitive one in which even minor shifts in the weight attached to various admissions criteria could spell disaster for large numbers of students.

Students of middle class backgrounds (including the children of intellectuals) and of bad backgrounds could hope that a very strong showing on the entrance examinations would compensate for their middling or bad standing on the class background criterion. These students saw their hopes for continuing into higher education largely smashed in mid-1966 when it was announced that entrance examinations were to be abolished in favor of greater emphasis on class background, political behavior and attitude, and work experience.

Students of revolutionary cadre background (among the best of the good class designations) in general did not do as well in terms of standard academic achievement as students from intelligentsia and bad class backgrounds; thus, they welcomed the change in admissions criteria and even, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, put forth a "blood line" theory of revolutionary commitment. In this theory, of course, the children of revolutionary cadres were seen as naturally "red" and thus deserving of elite status comparable to that of their parents. With much greater weight now given to political

activism in determining higher education admissions, middle class youth were motivated to channel their energies into the political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution. The revolutionary cadre students, however, were reluctant to allow these children of the intelligentsia, who had been showing them up academically, to steal their thunder; much of the factionalism of Red Guard groups in the course of the Cultural Revolution is best understood as a response to this situation.

The educational system was, of course, one of the primary institutional targets of the Cultural Revolution. While criticisms of the educational system were numerous, Gardner and Idema (p. 259) have summarized the most important ones under four rubrics. First, not enough poeople were being educated, and those who were receiving education were disproportionately from urban areas and well to do families. Second, the course content of much education was accused of being irrelevant to China's real needs; too much time was given to theoretical knowledge with little consideration of its practical application to Chinese conditions. Third, the system was costly, since courses were long and too many people were being educated to an unnecessarily high level. Fourth, education was seen as failing to produce the correct attitudes in those receiving it. Students, rather than wanting to serve the masses, saw education as a means of improving their own status and salary.

On this last point, Liu Shaoqi is reported to have said: "Generally, those who have graduated from a junior high school despise the peasants; those graduated from a senior high school despise the workers; those graduated from a university despise all of them (quoted in Unger, 1982, p. 39)."

After two years of Cultural Revolution turmoil, PLA Teams and Worker Propaganda Teams moved into the schools to restore order. Junior and senior high school students were abruptly "graduated" and a very large percentage of them were compelled to go to the countryside in the no-longer voluntary rustication program. Unger (1982, p. 134) has suggested that students of revolutionary cadre background fared much better than all others in the ensuing removal of these young people from urban schools and (for the most part) from urban lives. While 96% of the young people of intelligentsia background in Unger's study were shipped off to the countryside, only 58% of the revolutionary cadre students were rusticated.

China's colleges and universities, of course, had been closed in 1966, and most of them did not reopen until 1971. In the interim, Mao's closest supporters, designated here (following Domes) the Cultural Revolutionary Left, had developed a wide ranging set of reforms which they billed the "revolution in education." They wanted to alter the size, the structure, and the content of China's educational system, and this would have profound consequences for students of different class backgrounds.

The Cultural Revolution and the reforms in education implemented in its immediate aftermath were an effort to deinstitutionalize the Western-inspired educational system which had been undergoing a process of institutionalization for the better part of a century. The Cultural Revolutionary Left wanted to disrupt the socially recognized chartering capacity of China's state run educational system, and to institutionalize a unified educational system with a much closer resemblance to the Yenan model.

I. The Cultural Revolution Reforms in Education

The educational reforms instituted in the wake of the Cultural Revolution seriously undermined the institutional autonomy of education. In the conventional sociological meaning of the term, institutions consist of interrelated clusters of statuses and roles, values and norms, organized around some societal need. An institution's statuses are, in many cases, equivalent to positions in organizations. When persons who are full-time, professional occupants of positions within the organization exercise a high degree of control over the operations of these organizations, and over the goals addressed by the organizations, the autonomy of that institution is relatively high. Conversely, when considerable control over the organization's goals and operations is exercised from outside the organization, then institutional autonomy is low.

Gouldner's (1978) discussion of professionalism is relevant to this point. He argues that members of the new class, for whom

knowledge is capital, want to have as much control as possible over the uses to which their knowledge is put and to be acknowledged as the only capable judges of their own performances. One of the main thrusts of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's reforms in education was to reduce the autonomy of professional educators, from the central education ministry--which was reorganized out of existence--to the local classroom, where the authority of teachers was challenged and where control over educational administration, structure and content was assumed by Revolutionary Committees whose memberships consisted of Party representatives, workers, PLA representatives, students, and some educational professionals.

Professional educators lost control over the selection of students at all levels of the system. The use of nationally standardized entrance examinations was abolished, and candidates for higher education were selected on the basis of work experience, local unit and higher level Party recommendations, and class background. Individual colleges and universities retained a limited power to screen candidates, in that they would be presented with a list of candidates with two to three times the number of names as there were seats available. They were able to adminster tests to determine the "cultural level" of candidates, but they were extremely wary of being accused of placing "marks in command."

Professional educators also lost control over the structure of education. The length of schooling was shortened at all levels, and

the Cultural Revolutionary Left proclaimed its intent to create a unified higher education system in which the state run colleges and universities (the apex of China's academically oriented, "regular," school system) would be operated more along the lines of the locally run, vocationally oriented "irregular" schools.

Control over the content of education was also largely removed from the hands of professional educators. Rather, the curriculum of different schools was to be adapted to local conditions. There was great emphasis placed on political-ideological study, and on the participation of students in manual labor. Schools were supposed to be run "in an open door way," meaning that students often went out of the schools and into factories or communes to take part in productive activities and learn about social conditions on the spot. Likewise, experienced workers and peasants were invited into the schools to teach. The length of courses was shortened, and all "unnecessary" theoretical considerations were removed from course materials.

The Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath, then, represented a triple assault on the new class. First, the opportunities of students of intelligentsia backgrounds to continue into higher education were greatly reduced by the abolition of the entrance examinations and by greater emphasis on class background. Second, the legitimacy of China's education system was challenged and the institutional autonomy of the academically oriented system was

sharply reduced. Third, a large number of pro-new class, high level Party cadres were purged and discredited.

When colleges and universities began reopening in sizeable numbers in 1971, students were selected through the recommendation process, and the variation in their level of academic preparation was much greater than it had been prior to the Cultural Revolution. This created special problems for educators, since instruction geared to any one level of student preparedness would not be suitable for many other students. Teaching to the level of the best prepared students was clearly politically unacceptable, while teaching to the level of the worst prepared would have meant, in effect, teaching nothing to most students. Some teachers tried to find a middle ground, while in many schools special "remedial" classes were instituted for the less well prepared students. But this solution, too, was politically dangerous; educators were accused of instituting a two-track system in colleges and universities.

There was considerable resistance to the Cultural Revolution reforms in education, of course. In 1972 there were many references in the Chinese press to the need to raise academic standards at the middle school and university levels, and a report to Current Scene (July, 1972) suggested that, "at both the middle school and university levels, selected institutions appear to have maintained traditional academic curricula and the use of high quality teaching methods and equipment straight through the Cultural Revolution and down to the

present." The article goes on to suggest that there was increasing resistance to the recruitment of workers, peasants, and soldiers as university students, and to the concomitant changes in academic standards, since this was seen as being unable to produce the international level scientists and engineers that China needed.

In October 1972, Guang Ming Ri Bao printed an article by Zhou Peiyuan, an American trained physicist who had been attacked during the Cultural Revolution, but who by then was vice-chairman of the Beijing University Revolutionary Committee and a leading member of the Academy of Sciences. Zhou denounced the "erroneous idea that theory is useless," and pointed out that the major discoveries in natural science are "mainly the result of scientific experimentation, including the observation of natural phenomena," and "not necessarily the result of direct production needs." This was clearly a new class response to the efforts of the Cultural Revolutionary Left to remake the "traditional" (academically oriented) institutions in the image of the "non-traditional" (vocationally oriented) institutions.

In 1973, guidelines for college entrance procedures sought to broaden the base from which students could be chosen by allowing children of non-working class background to apply; these young people's present political stance was to take precedence over their unfavorable class background. This was precisely the position taken by intelligentsia youth during the Cultural Revolution; because they were inferior to revolutionary cadre students in terms of class

background, they much preferred an emphasis on behavior to an emphasis on the ascribed status of class background.

There seems to have been considerably greater use of entrance examinations during 1973 than in earlier years, as educationalists tried to return to pre-Cultural Revolution practices. This effort did not go unanswered by the Cultural Revolutionary Left, however. In July 1973, the Liaoning Daily printed, with favorable editorial commentary, a letter by rusticated youth Zhang Tiesheng. He had turned in a blank answer sheet to the examinations for university entrance, and wrote bitterly that he had been working 18 hours a day as the leader of his production team and had not had time to study for the exams. He expressed his contempt for bookworms who could cram behind closed doors, and he said that at least he could feel satisfied that he had not slowed the work of his production team by taking time out to study. His letter, again with favorable commentary, was reprinted in People's Daily.

In August 1973, an article in the Party's theoretical journal, Hong Qi (Red Flag), argued that politics should return to preeminence in the selection of higher education students. Rather than making an unqualified attack on the use of examinations to assess students' cultural levels, however, the article said that they were an appropriate supplement to the recommendation by the masses on the basis of political stance and class background. This stance clearly represents an improvement for young people of intelligentsia

background, for it includes political behavior along with class background in the selection criteria, and it sees examinations as "appropriate" at some point in the process.

Also during 1973, there was a campaign to emulate Zhong Zhimin, a Nanjing University student who asked to withdraw from school and return to his PLA unit because he felt guilty about having entered "through the back door." His father, a veteran of the Long March and an influential cadre, had gained entrance for his son with a phone call.

Another indication of new class resurgence during 1973 was the rehabilitation of numerous veteran cadres who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. Among them were Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin, who would become the Minister of Education when the Ministry was reestablished in January, 1975.

By 1974, not only the recruitment of students for higher education, but also the policy that graduates should return to their original production units, had been significantly modified. Teiwes reports being told by members of a delegation from the Academica Sinica that "most" of the members of Beijing University's first post-Cultural Revolution graduating class had returned to their original units or their original localities. They further stated that students selected from factories mostly returned to those factories, while students who had been selected from among rusticated urban youths were mostly allocated by the central planning agency to various

bureaucratic departments. This would seem to suggest that the futures to which these graduates were assigned varied according to their social origins.

Also in 1974, both May 7 Agricultural Colleges and July 21 Workers' Universities were given encouragement in the press, and this emphasis on "non-traditional" higher education institutions continued in 1975. These schools offered courses of varying lengths, and their curricula were directly related to production (as well as including considerable political-ideological study).

It seems that both the Cultural Revolutionary Left and the pro-new class elements in the Party leadership viewed these non-traditional schools favorably. The Cultural Revolutionary Left saw them as the prototype of the unified educational system they wanted to create; the traditional, academically oriented institutions were supposed to become more like them, and graduates of the two kinds of schools were supposed to enjoy equal status. Pro-new class elements in the Party saw these schools as part of a differentiated educational system. These schools required little, if any, financing from the central government, and they trained people to enter particular slots in the occupational structure. Allowing industrial enterprises and communes to run these kinds of schools would leave the professional educators free to concentrate on "quality" education in the traditional schools.

Throughout 1975, the Cultural Revolutionary Left faced serious challenges to its educational policies. They were in control of the central media, and criticism of their policies there had to be very carefully phrased. But in other arenas, their policies were roundly attacked.

In January 1975, as the power of Deng Xiaoping was increasing due to the declining health Zhou Enlai, the Fourth National Party Congress carried out an administrative reorganization of the central organs dealing with education. The Scientific and Educational Group of the State Council (which had replaced the Ministry of Education following the Cultural Revolution) was eliminated and the Ministry of Education was reestablished. Zhou Rongxin, staunchly pro-new class in his views on education, became Education Minister. He was an ardent critic of the "revolution in education" and an upholder of academic excellence, management of educational and scientific organs by professionals, and the down-playing of politics.

Throughout 1975, Zhou Rongxin made speeches and wrote articles which critized in blunt terms the innovations of the educational revolution. He suggested that good middle school students made a better pool from which to draw university students than did peasants, workers and soldiers. He attacked open door schooling as emphasizing labor and the immediately applicable too much and causing a neglect of academic work. He also attacked working class leadership of the schools, arguing instead for membership by people with professional

competence (Gardner, 1977). He was arguing, then, for a restoration of the institutional autonomy of the traditional, academically oriented education system.

Several writers (Shirk, 1978; Kent; Unger, 1982) have argued that the recommendation model of student recruitment, whatever its virtues on other grounds, is quite susceptible to subversion by high level cadres who can "go by the back door," using their influence to have their own or their friends' children recommended for higher education. Some reports have indicated that "almost all" of the students in some higher education institutions in the mid 1970's were the children of revolutionary cadre background. Many of them had been assigned to the PLA or to the countryside at the end of the Cultural Revolution, but their connections had enabled them to be recalled to higher education a few years later while their less well connected age mates put down roots in the villages.

This is an issue of considerable interest, and part of the analysis in Chapter 8 is focused on the group of students called "worker-peasant-soldier" students. It seems likely that a large proportion of students so labeled were in reality the children of cadres who had been reclassified, because of their experiences in factories, villages, or the PLA, as "workers," "peasants," or "soldiers." The use of influence to get cadre children recalled from the countryside was the theme of a satirical play, "If I Really Were" (Jiaru Wo Shi Zhende), which was performed in Shanghai in the late

1970's and subsequently banned. In it a rusticated youth very nearly succeeds in getting himself recalled from his miserable village life by pretending to be the son of a Central Committee member. He ends up in a lot of trouble, but questions what the outcome of his efforts would have been "if he really were" what he had pretended to be.

If many of the so-called workers, peasants, and soldiers on university campuses were actually reclassified revolutionary cadre children, then the attacks by Zhou Peiyuan, Zhou Rongxin, and others on the quality of students was really an assault on the less well educated portions of the political elite (the people whose expertise, as Parkin put it, was predominantly of an ideological nature).

The Cultural Revolutionary Left, still in control of the central media in 1975 and the first part of 1976, launched an energetic counter-attack against its critics. Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Rongxin were targets of a campaign against "right deviationists trying to reverse correct verdicts" and undermine the "newborn things" of the Cultural Revolution in educational matters. This campaign succeeded in removing Deng Xiaoping and, along with him, Zhou Rongxin from power, but it must be seen in retrospect as the last stand of the group which soon came to be known as the "Gang of Four."

Mao Zedong died in September 1976, and within a month his widow, Jiang Qing, and other key members of the Cultural Revolutionary Left were purged and placed under arrest. Shortly thereafter, Deng Xiaoping was recalled to power for the third time.

J. Educational Counter-reforms of the Late 1970's

The post-"Gang of Four" regime moved fairly quickly, despite protestations to the contrary (see Pepper, 1977) to implement most of the changes in education policy which had been advocated by Zhou Rongxin in 1975. By 1978, a nationally unified entrance examination for higher education was administered, and the key point system had been reinstituted at all levels. Open door schooling and participation in manual labor were drastically reduced. The length of coursework in colleges and universities was lengthened to four or five years, and greater emphasis was placed on theoretical knowledge and pure research. The authority of teachers was strengthened, and they were assured that they could spend five-sixths of their time on their professional duties. (This is the same formula advanced by Zhou Enlai in his 1956 "Report on the Question of Intellectual Elements.") Administration of educational affairs was recentralized and returned to the control of professional educators and administrators; Revolutionary Committees were abolished and the Workers' Propaganda Teams were withdrawn from schools.

The return to the use of standardized entrance examinations and the lessened importance of class background factors have made the children of intelligentsia families the primary beneficiaries of the post-"Gang of Four" changes. In a definitional sleight of hand, intellectuals were said in 1978 to be "a part of the working class." Further, some 400,000 families, labeled "rightists" for speaking out too much during the Hundred Flowers Movement of 1957, had that label

removed and they rejoined the ranks of the good, or at least the middle, class backgrounds. The vast majority of these families were intellectuals (Unger, 1982, p. 213), and this of course swelled the pool of young people able to sit for the entrance examinations.

Many political cadres felt threatened by the great weight given to examination scores, and they objected--in the name of workers and peasants!--that good background youth were being discriminated against in the new recruitment system. They were powerful enough to bring about a modification of the system in which the cut-off point for eligibility for university entrance was set relatively low. In this way, a substantial number of cadre children would score above the cut-off, and then favoritism on the basis of their class background could be exercised by selection committees. In this way, large numbers of cadre children could still get into colleges and universities along with children from intelligentsia families who often outscored them on the exams (Unger, 1982, pp. 215-216).

As it emerged in the late 1970's, then, the selection process for seats in higher education institutions accommodated both the educated elite and the better-educated segments of the political elite (those whose home environment was conducive to the development of academic skills by the children). One wonders how much room in elite institutions will be left for young people of talent from the urban working classes and the peasantry and whether the less well-educated

segments of the political elite will raise a new round of objections to the current arrangements on egalitarian grounds.

The post-"Gang of Four" regime is committed to creating a diversified educational system which can provide personnel with the requisite training for the various sectors and levels of the economy. Particular industries which run schools for the children of their workers, such as the petroleum and metallurgical industries, are encouraged to stress basic knowledge related to those industries, and agricultural knowledge is to be stressed in rural schools. "These young people will then be trained to work in the same field as their parents on graduation, and specialized higher level institutes can concentrate on enrolling students from these middle schools (Pepper, 1978, p. 878)."

There is a certain amount of inequality inherent in a diversified economy and educational system. Some occupational positions require very little formal training, while others require a great deal. To be most efficient, the system needs to identify at an early age those young people who will be expected to fill the positions which require the most extensive training. These young people must be given qualitatively different kinds of education almost from the beginning, and the development of elitist attitudes on their part (in response to a situation which is clearly elitist, especially when the occupations for which they are being trained carry relatively high levels of material rewards and social prestige with them) will be difficult to

inhibit. Mao's insistence on participation in productive labor for students (and for "mental workers" in general) was in part a response to this problem.

The work of Bowles and of Karabel, although concerned specifically with the United States, is relevant to this issue. Each is concerned with the connections between social origins, educational attainment, and occupational attainment. In this view, educational systems tend to be stratified in a way which corresponds to the overall stratification order of the society. Young people from different class backgrounds are channeled into different tracks or streams of the educational system, and the educational experiences which they have tend to reinforce class subcultures learned in the home. When they leave the school system, young people then tend to be channeled into levels of the stratified occupational structure which corresponds roughly to their social origins.

Karabel writes: "Educational expansion seems to lead to some form of tracking which, in turn, distributes people in a manner which is roughly commensurate with both their class origins and their occupational destinations (pp. 234-235)."

Since the late 1970's, China's leaders have promoted the development of a highly diversified and hierarchical higher education system. This system may be efficient in providing manpower to the occupational system, but it seems likely that challenges to its legitimacy will recur on egalitarian grounds.

In reading the Chinese press of the 1970's and many of the major secondary accounts of education during the decade, one gets the impression that, first, the Cultural Revolution reforms changed everything about higher education and, second, that the counter-reforms of the late 1970's changed everything back again. Implicit in this view are the hypotheses that higher education policy was relatively stable throughout the Cultural Revolution decade (that is, up to late 1976), and that the policies of the current regime have very little in common with those of the Cultural Revolutionary Left.

My own research was designed to carry out a systematic investigation of higher education policy at three different times during the 1970's. Content analysis techniques were utilized to explore the structure of the higher education system, the societal charters or missions associated with different kinds of schools, the content of higher education, and the social origins and occupational placements of students associated with different kinds of schools.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The first two chapters of this paper discussed the institutionalization of a "modern" Western-inspired educational system in China beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, and the challenges to that system which were raised during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution Decade were justified--by their promoters--both in terms of egalitarian goals and in terms of a commitment to a particular strategy of economic development.

At the close of Chapter 2, a number of important issues were raised about the extent to which contemporary China's educational system could be considered to be stratified, and about the extent to which people's educational and occupational attainments were affected by their social origins. A related issue involved the relationship between China's educated elite and political elite, particularly as this relationship was both reflected in and played out in the context of higher education. The present chapter describes the research design and methodology of a content analysis of Chinese press reports, designed to bring systematic data to bear on many of these questions.

A. Content Analysis

Content analysis is a "multipurpose research method developed specifically for investigating any problem in which the content of communication serves as the basis for inference (Holsti, p. 2)."

Content analysis has most often been used to study documentary sources such as newspapers, pamphlets, propaganda leaflets, and so on, but it has also been applied to the interaction between psychiatrists and their patients, and to musical scores.

As a leading practitioner of the method puts it, "content analysis will be useful whenever the problem requires precise and replicable methods for analyzing those attributes of documents which may escape casual scrutiny. In such cases, the analyst will find the objective and systematic methods involved in content analysis advantageous as a supplement to, not as a substitute for, the other intellectual tools he brings to bear on his problem (Holsti, pp. 19-20)."

Content analysis can be particularly useful in studying historical situations and social change, and in studying cross-cultural communications. A potential difficulty here, however, is that the researcher may be unfamiliar with the circumstances under which the communications originated (Riley and Stoll, p. 374).

As Holsti (pp. 4-5) points out, content analysis strives to be objective (in the sense that other analysts, following the same procedures with the same data, would arrive at similar conclusions); to be systematic (in the sense that the inclusion or exclusion of content or categories is done according to consistently applied rules; and to be general (in the sense that the findings must have theoretical relevance).

Content analysis generally involves some form of counting or enumeration of items of interest in the documents being studied. Indeed, the method's detractors often claim that the counting seems to be done for its own sake. This facile point, while no doubt well taken in some cases, can just as easily be applied to any quantitative research.

What is necessary is that the researcher who intends to use content analysis, or other quantitative techniques, have a firm grasp of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature in the field, and expect that content analysis will provide data which can shed light on important questions in the field. Chapters 1 and 2 of the present paper sought to ground the present study in the theoretical and empirical literature about education and stratification, particularly but by no means exclusively in reference to socialist societies.

A grounding in the relevant literature of the field will guide the researcher in general terms to the kinds of things which might profitably be counted or enumerated in the documents (or communications) to be analyzed. Specific items of interest (often called categories of analysis) are often then defined inductively through examination of relevant communications.

It is most often the case in studies utilizing content analysis that the population of communications relevant to the researcher's interests is quite large in relation to the researcher's resources. Thus, decisions must be made about which newspaper editorials, which

campaign speeches, and so on, should be analyzed. This is the issue of sampling: the goal is to select a subset of the relevant communications and to be able to estimate how closely statistics from the sample reflect the parameters of the population. The present study follows a suggestion by Walder (1979) that all relevant newspaper articles from a specified time period be enumerated, and that a random sample be drawn from that list. Sampling for the present study will be discussed in greater detail below.

When the problem of what to count in which communications has been resolved, the analyst proceeds to the coding, or measurement, stage of the analysis. Most often, for each document included in the study, or for each smaller unit such as a sentence or paragraph within the document, the presence or absence of each item of interest is noted. Some content analyses also include information on the intensity of the language used, or on whether references to a particular item are favorable, neutral, or unfavorable.

In general, enumerations may be of the frequency type or the contingency type. For example, in a study of themes in the campaign speeches of presidential candidates in the United States, the analyst might be interested in the relative frequency of the candidates' use of the term "democracy," and might report that Candidate A used the term an average of 16 times per speech while Candidate B used the term only an average of 5 times per speech. Alternatively, or in addition, the analyst might be interested in whether a candidate used the term

"democracy" at all in campaign speeches. This is a case of contingency analysis, and the analyst might report that the term appeared in 30% of Candidate A's speeches, and in only 5% of Candidate B's speeches. In this kind of enumeration, it makes no difference whether a speech contained one or twenty-one references to democracy; the basic distinction is between no references and one or more references.

Both these types of enumeration have the "effect of weighting the category to show how predominant or pervasive that category is within the communication as a whole (Riley and Stoll, p. 375)." No single finding, of course, means very much by itself. Only when findings are compared with other findings and interpreted within a theoretical context are they valuable.

Beyond these kinds of enumeration, the content analyst may also be interested in uncovering the relationships or patterns of associations among two or more items of interest in the study. To continue the example of presidential candidates, the content analyst might be interested in the extent to which each candidate's conception of democracy included concern with civil rights. Categories of analysis would be developed to tap this dimension of the candidates' views, and a variety of procedures could then be used to examine the co-occurrence of the themes of democracy and of civil rights in the candidates' speeches.

Another important dimension in the research designs of many content analyses, including the present one, is time. Both the frequencies of occurrence, and the relationships among two or more categories of analysis, can be compared at two or more times to make inference about social change.

In the effort to discover and describe patterns of association among various categories of analysis, the content analyst often creates models with which to predict what the results of the content analysis would be if the model were true. These model-generated results are then compared with the actual results, and statistical tests are used to assess the goodness of fit of the model data and the actual data. The techniques of loglinear analysis are particularly well-suited for this task and they are used extensively in the following chapters. The use of models in loglinear analysis will be discussed at greater length below.

B. Time--A Fundamental Variable

Time is perhaps the most fundamental of the variables in the present study. The purge of the "Gang of Four" almost immediately following the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, marked a profound shift in the composition and in the policies of the central Chinese leadership, and defined distinctly "before" and "after" periods between which a series of systematic comparisons of major dimensions of higher education policy could be made.

Most analyses of Chinese education written in the period after the purge of the "Gang of Four" have emphasized the policy changes of 1977 and 1978 to such an extent that the policies of the previous period (the Cultural Revolution Decade) seem quite stable in comparison (see for example, Shirk, 1979; Pepper, 1978). In an effort to investigate this implicit hypothesis of stability in educational policy during the Cultural Revolution Decade, two time periods from that period have been incorporated into the design of the present study.

Three one-year periods were selected for inclusion in the analysis. These years are 1971, 1975, and 1978. One year periods were chosen in order to insure that all stages of the educational cycle were represented in the study.

The year 1971 was selected because it was the first year following the Cultural Revolution in which large numbers of colleges and universities reopened after having been closed since 1966. Thus, the Cultural Revolution reforms in education could be expected to receive considerable attention in the official press.

The year 1975 was selected because it was the year prior to the overthrow of the "Gang of Four" and the policies expressed in this year could be considered to represent the preferences of the Cultural Revolutionary Left among the Chinese leadership. While this group exercised considerable control over the central media during 1975, their views on education were being widely attacked in other arenas

(as, for example, in the speeches of Education Minister Zhou Rongxin). This criticism may account for the intensity of the defenses of the Cultural Revolution reforms in education which appeared in People's Daily during 1975.

The year 1978 was selected because it was long enough after the purge of the "Gang of Four" for the new regime to clearly establish its on policies in the sphere of education. The educational changes implemented in 1977 and 1978 were indeed sweeping, as many observers have pointed out and as is reaffirmed in some of the results of the present study. In some ways, however, the policies of 1971 are more similar to those of 1978 than they are to those of 1975. By carefully defining theoretically relevant dimensions of higher education policy, and by using content analysis techniques to systematically investigate those dimensions of policy, continuities and changes in the policies during the 1970's can be clearly traced.

C. People's Daily and the Sampling of Articles

The present study is concerned with higher education policy at the national level in China during the 1970's. With this goal in mind, the central Party newspaper, People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), was chosen as the medium from which articles about higher education would be selected. People's Daily represents the voice of the central Party leadership in China, and it communicates the preferences of the central Party leadership to other parts of the society.

For each of the years under consideration here, a number of articles about higher education published in People's Daily were subjected to content analysis. The particular articles to be analyzed were selected by referring to the yearly topical index of articles in People's Daily, the Renmin Ribao Suo-in. This index lists the headline, and sometimes the subheadline, for all articles under each major topic.

The headlines for all articles appearing under the topic of education were examined to determine whether they dealt with higher education or not. Where this was not clear from the headline, the article itself was consulted. In this way, enumeration of all articles dealing with higher education was obtained for each of the three years under consideration.

TABLE 3.1: Enumeration and Sampling of Articles about Higher Education in People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) during 1971, 1975, and 1978.

Year	Total Number of Articles Published		Percent of Articles Selected for Coding		Number of Sentences* Coded		
	Front Page	Inner Pages	Front Page	Inner Pages	Front Page	Inner Pages	TOTAL
1971	9	39**	100 (9)	51 (20)	1142	556	1698
1975	49	31**	49 (24)	48 (15)	1004	476	1480
1978	13	109	100 (13)	21 (23)	649	711	1360

* Headlines, subheadlines, and internal headings are included as "sentences" throughout this analysis.

** Figures for 1971 and 1975 refer to the total number of articles published in the series "How should Socialist Universities Be Run?" ("Shehui Zhuyi Daxue Yingdang Ruhe Ban?").

The enumeration revealed that there were more than twice as many relevant articles in 1975 as in either 1971 or 1978; this introduced the necessity of sampling from the 1975 articles. A further complication arose from the fact that, in both 1971 and 1975, a series of articles under the general heading of "How Should Socialist Universities Be Run?" ("Shehui Zhuyi Daxue Yingdang Ruhe Ban?") appeared at approximately monthly intervals on the inner pages of People's Daily; this series, however, was no longer being run in 1978.

Table 1 summarizes the enumeration and sampling of articles from 1971, 1975, and 1978. In all cases where less than 100% of the articles were included in the sample, a table of random numbers was use to make the selections. The sample for 1971, then, consists of 29 articles containing 378 paragraphs and 1,698 individual sentences, headlines, and internal headings. The sample for 1975 consists of 39 articles, containing 307 paragraphs and 1,480 individual sentences, headlines, and internal headings. The sample for 1978 consists of 36 articles containing 331 paragraphs and 1,360 individual sentences, headlines, and internal headings.

D. Major Dimensions of Higher Education Policy

For each of the years under consideration here, content anysis techniques were used to gather systematic data about seven major dimensions of higher education policy which are relevant to the issue of stratification. These general policy areas are:

1) the structure of the higher education system;
2) students' background characteristics;
3) the goals of higher education;
4) the process of recruitment to higher education;
5) curricula and major student activities;
6) student-teacher relations in the classroom; and
7) the occupational placement of students

Specific Categories of Analysis

The development of a clearly defined set of items of interest (specific categories of analysis) within these seven major dimensions of higher education policy listed above was a multi-stage, inductive process. First, many articles about higher education from each of the three years were read in the original Chinese. When their specialized vocabularies had been mastered, extensive lists of items related to the various policy areas were compiled. The next stage involved consolidation of the many hundreds of entries in these lists into a meaningful and manageable set of coding categories.

These coding categories were then used in a trial analysis of approximately one-third of the articles selected for each year. On the basis of difficulties and ambiguities encountered during this trial analysis, several categories were modified. This refined set of categories was then used to code the entire sample of articles for each year. The articles subjected to content analysis were read in Chinese, sentence by sentence, and the presence or absence of each

category of analysis was noted for each individual sentence. For the present purposes, headlines and subheadings are included as "sentences."

An allowance was initially made for coding favorable, neutral, and unfavorable references to each category of analysis. However, it was found that virtually all references to items of interest in this study were either favorable or neutral. It seems that aspects of educational policy which are out of favor are simply not mentioned in the press, or are referred to obliquely. For example, key point schools and graduate level training were abolished during the Cultural Revolution, and not a single reference to either was found in the articles coded for 1971 and 1975. The only negative references were to the seeking of higher education for purposes of personal advancement. In the results presented in the following chapters, then, favorable and neutral references have been combined into a "frequency of reference" for each category of analysis.

E. Units of Analysis and the Structure of Comparisons

In the present study, then, the original sampling units are articles about higher education, selected at random where sampling was necessary. For each article, the fundamental coding unit is the sentence; each sentence was coded for the presence or absence of each of the categories of analysis.

Thus, at one level in the presentation of the results of the study, relative frequencies of occurrence of each category of analysis

are used as indicators of the predominance or pervasiveness of those categories in the policy preferences of the central leadership. It is assumed that the greater the sheer volume of references to a particular aspect of higher education policy, the greater is the salience or importance of that aspect of policy for the central leadership. Because these frequencies of reference are based on sentences as the coding unit, and because a different number of sentences was coded for each of the three years under consideration, the frequencies are expressed as the rate of reference per one thousand sentences of text coded for each year.

At another level, the generality of central leaders' concern with particular aspects of higher education policy may be indicated by the proportion of all articles about higher education in each year which include at least one reference to various aspects of policy. This is a form of contingency analysis, in which the concern is with the presence or absence of particular items within the article as a whole. Some tables in the following chapters, then, will present data on the percentage of articles in each year which contain at least one reference to the various categories of analysis.

Both of the above types of analysis (examining the sheer volume of references and examining the proportion of articles referring at least once to particular items) provide useful information about the relative importance of distinct aspects of higher education policy in each of the years under consideration. In general, there is

considerable correspondence between the two kinds of enumerations. But there are also cases where a very large number of references to an item are concentrated in only one or two articles during a year, and a misleading conclusion might be drawn from an examination of only one of these types of enumeration.

Potentially more interesting results may be obtained by moving beyond a consideration of discrete categories of analysis to compare the associations between two or more items across time. For example, a major focus of the analyses which follow is the structure of the higher education system. More specifically, a series of comparisons is made between the images presented in People's Daily of "traditional" and "non-traditional" schools. These comparisons are pursued by examining the associations of references to traditional and non-traditional schools with references to the various goals of higher education, to students of differing social backgrounds, to aspects of the curriculum, and to the occupational placement of graduates.

In general, this kind of analysis looks at the co-occurrence of two or more items of interest within some specified unit of the documents being studied. In the present study, the sentence is considered too small a unit; items which are clearly related in the intent of the writer appear to be unrelated in crosstabulations based on sentences. Conversely, crosstabulations based on full articles as the unit of analysis can easily show connections between items which do not reflect the intent of the writer. Hence, the paragraph is

utilized at the unit of analysis when the co-occurrences of categories of analysis are examined. Paragraphs in Chinese press articles have roughly the same level of conceptual integrity as do paragraphs in written English.

F. Loglinear Analysis and the Use of Models

In the chapters which follow, a number of multidimensional tables are presented which display the co-occurrences of references to two or more items of interest in this study. Most often, time is one of the variables included in these tables. Several tables, for example, crosstabulate year (publication in 1971, 1975, or 1978) with one of the goals of higher education (increasing production; promoting the advancement of science and technology), and with traditional schools and with non-traditional schools.

The challenge with multidimensional tables of this kind is to arrive at an understanding of all the patterns which exist in the data, and not only of those which are most obvious. Loglinear analysis provides a way to do this.

Loglinear analysis allows the researcher to construct a variety of models which <u>might</u> explain the patterns in the actual data in multidimensional tables, and to assess the goodness of fit of these various models with the actual data. As Gilbert (1981) points out, the researcher can examine successive models to find the one which best fits the actual data.

These various models can be conceived as imposing particular sets of constraints on a computer program which generates "fitted data." The fitted data are what one would expect to find in the actual data, if the model being tested is indeed an accurate representation of the patterns of association in the data. Where two models of differing complexity fit the actual data just about as well, the simpler of the two models would be selected on the criterion of parsimony.

One possible model which can be suggested at the outset of the analysis is the "equivalency" model alluded to above. In the early 1970's, the Cultural Revolutionary Left proclaimed its intent to create a unified higher education system by raising the status of the non-traditional schools and by "vocationalizing" and politicizing the traditional schools. Now, if these types of schools were actually regarded by writers for People's Daily as equivalent, then there should not be any systematic differences observed in the content analysis data between the two types of schools in terms of the goals they are intended to serve, the students they recruit, and so on. The equivalency model is actually a variation of the null hypothesis, or the hypothesis of no difference.

Of course, it is not likely that the patterns present in the actual content analysis data will match those predicted by the equivalency model for school types. However, the equivalency model serves the important function of providing a common reference point for discussing observed variations in educational policies at

different times. One can then articulate the ways in which the educational policies of one period are a closer approximation of the equivalency model than are the policies of another period.

Another model which can be suggested at the outset of the analysis has to do with the implicit hypothesis of stability in higher education policy during the early and mid-1970's, and of radical change in educational policy following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976. This model would predict that patterns of association would be very similar for 1971 and 1975, and quite different for 1978. The clearest alternatives to this hypothesis of course are, first, that educational policy was not all that stable in the early and mid-1970's and, second, that there was some continuity in policies throughout the period under consideration here, despite the political upheavals.

It is one of the virtues of content analysis that these models can be explored along a number of dimensions of higher education policy. It is quite possible that significant divergences from general trends can be uncovered.

CHAPTER 4

CHINA'S HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS: "TRADITIONAL" AND "NON-TRADITIONAL" SCHOOLS

If, under socialism, control over the economy is to be rationalized, then an important aspect of this rationalization will have to be the achievement of a close fit between the structure of the educational system and the occupational structure. That is, the "output" of the educational system should conform as closely as possible to the "inputs" needed by the economy. The more horizontally and vertically differentiated the occupational system, the more differentiated the educational system will need to be. This represents educational correspondence by explicit design.

The effort to control and direct the development of the economy, of course, means that the state has a vastly expanded role in the demand for education and in its supply. However, there have been rather divergent views among the Chinese leadership about economic development strategies, and different visions of what the occupational structure of the society should be like. There have also been differing views of the role of the educated elite in Chinese society. Clearly, highly trained technical experts have been perceived as an important part of China's overall developmental efforts throughout the history of the People's Republic. But there have been recurring questions about how much control over the economy should be exercised by the educated elite.

These differing approaches to economic development, and societal transformation more generally, have been reflected in varying policies toward higher education. One indication of these variations in policy is the relative emphasis placed in the official press on different kinds of higher education institutions.

The present chapter examines the diverse kinds of schools which comprise contemporary China's higher education system. These range from elite national universities on the one hand to correspondence courses and short term training on the other. Some kinds of educational experiences qualify students for entry into elite occupations in the modernized and state-bureaucratic sectors of the economy, whle others are intended to provide skills and knowledge useful in direct agricultural or industrial production.

While China's higher education institutions are quite diverse, they can be divided into two basic types, which are designated here the "traditional" schools and the "non-traditional" schools. They might also have been called, following Orleans and others, the "regular" and the "irregular" schools.

The traditional institutions are roughly equivalent to colleges and universities in Western countries, after which many of them were modeled. China's traditional higher education institutions also include a number of highly specialized technical institutes and language learning institutes. They are generally financed by the central or provincial governments; they offer a fairly extensive

curriculum (although individual students tend to be very narrowly specialized); they have usually been in existence for many years; they draw their students from large geographical areas; and their graduates, except in times of political upheaval, can generally expect to attain well rewarded positions.

There are differences in the prestige of different traditional institutions, of course. The national universities, such as Beijing University and Qinghua University, draw their students from throughout the country, and are more prestigious than the provincial schools, which recruit from smaller geographical areas. Furthermore, before the Cultural Revolution and again following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, selected schools at all levels have been designated as "key points." Under the key point system, the best students in a given recruitment area are channeled into schools which receive greater state investment and which employ teachers with higher qualifications than in regular schools. These schools take pride in the large proportion of their students who are able to continue into the next higher level of the education system or, in the case of college and university level key schools, in occupational placements.

Students who gain access to key schools are clearly advantaged in educational, and then occupational, attainment. Given its extra investment in their education, the state will be motivated to place graduates of key schools in positions whose "functional importance" is commensurate with their ostensive ability and their training. It is a

system which Munro (1971, p. 278) has described as the "clearcut institutionalization of elitism."

Given the Soviet experience, in which students of intelligentsia and political functionary families are increasingly overrepresented in the more prestigious higher education institutions (Yanowitz), it is reasonable to expect a similar pattern in the Chinese case. Empirical data bearing directly on this hypothesis are quite scarce, of course. Some of the data from the present study will be used to address this issue in a later chapter of this paper.

China's non-traditional institutions are examples of the general guideline of "walking on two legs." In this case, one of the legs is the state supported higher education system, and the other is a "system" of schools and other educational efforts run primarily on a localized basis. Factories, for example, have been encouraged to set up July 21 Workers' Universities for their own workers. These schools teach production skills related to the work of the factory, as well as providing instruction on political-ideological topics. Communes, too, often set up schools called May 7 Agricultural Colleges, in which peasants are provided with knowledge related to direct agricultural production, literacy, water conservancy, and related topics, as well as political study.

Students in these kinds of schools typically return to their original productive units after completing their training. As their

policy of "from the commune or factory, to the commune or factory" indicates, these schools are explicitly opposed to serving as channels of mobility into the occupational elite. They often do, however, provide opportunities for short-range mobility within a particular enterprise. An unskilled laborer, for example, might move to a semi-skilled or skilled position after a period of training. Or a peasant might become the recorder of the production team's work points following some training.

Traditional schools, then, generally provide their graduates with high level cultural capital and with relatively good occupational prospects, while non-traditional schools generally provide people already working at a particular kind of productive activity with greater skills to do that type of work. In both kinds of schools, political study is always part of the curriculum, although it has been emphasized more during some periods than others.

Table 4.1 presents content analysis data on the frequency with which various kinds of higher education institutions were mentioned in People's Daily during 1971, 1975, and 1978. Two kinds of frequencies are presented. In the left three columns, the sheer volume of references to particular kinds of schools is summarized in rates of references per 1000 sentences of text coded. Rates, rather than raw frequencies, are presented because a different number of sentences was coded for each year under consideration here. It is assumed that schools which are mentioned quite often in the official press are more

TABLE 4.1: Types of Higher Education Institutions Mentioned in People's Daily, by Year

	Rate of Reference Per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Type		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Traditional Institutions						
Scientific-technical universities	19	24	49	55	28	53
Medical schools	12	3	16	21	5	22
Comprehensive universities	6	19	9	21	18	25
Teacher Training colleges	2	9	11	7	15	19
Agricultural universities	1	46	4	3	33	8
Total for traditional institutions:	40	101	89	93*	72*	58*
Non-traditional Institutions						
July 21 Workers' Universities	32	112	20	17	33	19
Communist Labor University	31	11	2	3	8	8
Short-term training courses	18	52	12	21	44	14
Spare-time industrial colleges	4	9	4	10	18	11
May 7 Agricultural colleges	0	17	7	0	13	14
Spare-time agricultural schools	0	15	4	0	17	7
Total for non-traditional institutions:	85	216	49	38*	72*	28*
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

* Percentage of articles referring once or more to any of the traditional schools, or to any of the non-traditional schools.

important to central leaders than are schools which are mentioned only seldom.

In the right three columns of Table 4.1 the percentage of articles coded which contained at least one reference to each kind of school is presented. The percentages of articles indicate the generality of central leaders' concern with different kinds of schools. The assumption here is that schools which are mentioned in a high percentage of articles are more important to central leaders than are schools mentioned in a low percentage of articles. The percentages of articles, then, are an indicator of sustained concern with particular kinds of schools.

In this and similar tables presented in subsequent chapters, there is considerable consistency in the patterns of results which are evident in the rates of reference and the percentages of articles. In general, when one of the measures is high, the other is also high, and vice versa. However, this is not always the case; examining both kinds of frequencies makes it possible to assess the question of how salient various items are within the articles where they are mentioned at least once. For example, if the rate of references to a particular item varies considerably across the years under consideration here, but the percentage of articles in which that item is mentioned remains fairly constant, then the item is a more salient aspect of the articles in which it appears in some years than it is in others. In a similar vein, if the rate of references to an item is fairly high,

while the percentage of articles in which references to that item appear is low, one can conclude that the item received considerable attention on relatively few occasions. Interest in that item was intense but short-lived rather than sustained.

As the data in Table 4.1 make clear, among the traditional institutions, the scientific-technical universities were referred to more than other types of schools in both 1971 and 1978, but the rate for 1978 is considerably higher than that for 1971. Since the percentage of articles mentioning scientific-technical universities is nearly the same for 1971 and 1978, these kinds of schools were a more salient part of the articles mentioning them in 1978 than they were in 1971. For 1975, the rate of reference to scientific-technical universities was slightly higher than in 1971, but the percentage of articles mentioning these schools was much lower. This means that, in 1975, scientific-technical universities were mentioned in fewer articles overall, but they were a much more salient part of the articles in which they were mentioned than was the case for 1971. And in 1978, the post-"Gang of Four" regime's emphasis on science and technology as the central element in the drive to achieve the "four modernizations" (of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense) by the turn of the century is reflected in the large proportion of articles about higher education which prominently featured scientific-technical universities.

The rates of reference to medical schools, and the percentage of articles containing references to medical schools, are quite similar in 1971 and 1978. However, in 1975, both kinds of frequency measures are quite low. This was a time when medical practice in China was being criticized by Mao and his allies for being too much oriented to the urban areas, and too much concerned with medical research into relatively rare diseases and conditions while common ailments and medical concerns of the rural population were given scant attention. This represents one part of a more general attack on China's new class which was being carried out in 1975 by the Cultural Revolutionary Left among the Chinese leadership. The social value of high level educational credentials was challenged on this and a number of other fronts.

Comprehensive universities, of which Beijing University is both the preeminent and most often mentioned example, were referred to most often in 1975, and less so in 1971 and 1978.

Both the rates of reference and the percentages of articles with at least one reference to teacher training colleges show a gradual increase during the decade of the 1970's. Teachers, of course, were often the objects of attack during and in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. They, along with other intellectuals, were vilified as members of the "stinking ninth category." In 1978, however, the central leadership was involved in trying to improve the status and material well being of teachers, and to restore much of the

authority over classroom activities which had been stripped from them during the Cultural Revolution Decade.

Perhaps the most striking of all the results in Table 4.1 is the very high frequency with which agricultural universities were mentioned in People's Daily articles about higher education during 1975. While agricultural universities were mentioned less than any other kind of traditional institution during both 1971 and 1978, in 1975 agricultural universities were mentioned most often of any of the other traditional schools. This is true both for the yearly rates of reference and for the percentage of articles mentioning these schools at least once. While inreasing agricultural production and modernizing rural villages has been an important goal of central leaders throughout the period under discussion here, the contribution of higher education to that goal was given a great deal more attention in the official press in 1975 than in other years.

For the rates of reference to traditional higher education institutions, as for the rates of reference to other kinds of items of interest in this study, it is possible to add together all the references made to any of the institutions included in the category, and obtain a yearly rate of reference to the category as a whole. The overall yearly rates of reference to traditional schools are 40, 101, and 89 for 1971, 1975 and 1978, respectively. It should be pointed out that the yearly rate of 101 for 1975 includes the very high number of references to agricultural universities as noted above. If

agricultural universities were excluded from the totals for traditional schools, the yearly rates would be 39, 55 and 85 for 1971, 1975 and 1978, respectively. This pattern would indicate a fairly steady increase in central leaders' concern with traditional higher education institutions as the 1970's progressed.

It is also possible to consider the percentage of articles coded for each year which refer once or more to any one or more of the traditional schools. For 1971, 93% of the articles coded contained at least one reference to at least one of the traditional schools. The corresponding figures for 1975 and 1978 are 72% and 58%, respectively. Thus, traditional schools were mentioned in smaller percentages of articles as the 1970's progressed, but they were more salient aspects of the articles in which they did appear.

Turning now to the non-traditional schools, the very high rate of references to July 21 Workers' Universities during 1975 is notable. These schools were referred to in People's Daily more often than other kinds of non-traditional schools in 1971 and 1978 as well, but the magnitude of the difference is not nearly so great as it is for 1975. To anticipate a discussion in Chapter 6, the Cultural Revolutionary Left appears to have viewed the July 21 Workers' Universities as places where allies could be cultivated in its struggles with "bourgeois experts" in the factories. By providing workers with greater understanding of the technical aspects of their work, and by seeking to mold then ideologically through political study, the

scarcity value of the cultural capital possessed by technical experts in the factories would be lessened.

The importance attached to July 21 Workers' Universities by the Cultural Revolutionary Left in 1975 may be gauged by considering that they were mentioned more than twice as often as agricultural universities, and more than four times as often as scientific-technical universities.

The Communist Labor University was mentioned during 1971 almost as often as Workers' Universities; however, it is clear from the percentage of articles data that all of the references to this school were contained in one long article which was devoted exclusively to this institution. The school received considerably less attention in 1975, and was hardly mentioned at all during 1978.

The last four items among the non-traditional schools (short term training courses, spare-time industrial colleges, May 7 Agricultural Colleges, and spare-time agricultural schools) are similar to July 21 Workers' Universities in that they were mentioned considerably more often in 1975 than in either 1971 or 1978.

The overall yearly rates for the non-traditional schools are 85, 216 and 49 for 1971, 1975 and 1978, respectively. This suggests the great degree of importance attached by central leaders in 1975 to non-traditional educational alternatives. In 1978, non-traditional schools received considerably less attention in the official press

than during 1975 or even 1971. This conclusion is reinforced by the data on percentages of articles containing at least one reference to any of the non-traditional schools; in 1971, 38% of the articles coded referred at least once to some non-traditional school. The corresponding figure for 1975 is 72%, and for 1978, 28%.

If the traditional higher education institutions can be seen as channels of mobility into the occupational elite, while the non-traditional ones provide limited, if any, mobility opportunities, then the relative emphasis placed by central leaders on these two types of schools can serve as an indicator of egalitarian policy preferences. As Table 4.1 shows, in 1971 and 1975 the overall rates of reference to non-traditional schools were approximately double the rates for traditional schools. In 1978, on the other hand, the combined rate for non-traditional institutions was somewhat lower than for traditional institutions.

Thus, in 1971 and especially in 1975 there was much greater emphasis on the kinds of educational experiences which sought to improve applied productive skills (and to impart socialist values and loyalty to the Party), and which were explicit in their rejection of education serving as a channel of mobility into elite occupations. By 1978, however, the post-"Gang of Four" regime had clearly established the traditional schools as the most important part of the higher educational system as a whole. Furthermore, the key point system was

restored and expanded, thus increasing the hierarchical nature of the higher education system.

In the chapters which follow, the distinctions between traditional and non-traditional sectors of China's higher education system will be examined and compared across the three years included in this study. These analyses focus on the extent to which references to each of the school types occur together with references to various economic and political-ideological goals of higher education, to aspects of the curriculum and major student activities and, finally, to the social origins and occupational placements of their students.

Before these analyses are presented, however, it will be useful to consider the extent to which references to traditional schools co-occur with references to non-traditional schools in 1971, 1975 and 1978. Two related questions are important here. First, to what extent do the two kinds of schools tend to be mentioned in the same paragraphs? (The use of the paragraph as the unit of analysis in examining co-occurrences of items of interest is explained in Chapter 3.) If the two kinds of schools are mentioned together a great deal, this would support the view that writers for People's Daily regarded them as equivalent. In this case, it would seem unlikely that significant differences would be found in the associations of these two kinds of schools with other items of interest in the study. On the other hand, if the two kinds of schools tend not to be mentioned in the same paragraphs, this would provide preliminary support for the

view that they were viewed as distinct types by People's Daily writers. In this case, it is more likely that significant differences might be found in the associations of the school types with other items of interest.

The second important question is: to what extent do the associations between traditional and non-traditional schools vary across the years included in the study? Given the Cultural Revolutionary Left's stated preference for a unified higher education system based on the part-work, part-study model, and the current regime's explicit preference for a highly differentiated and stratified educational system, one might expect a greater degree of co-occurrence of references to the two school types in 1971 and 1975, and a lesser degree of co-occurrence in 1978.

Table 4.2 shows the percentage of paragraphs coded during 1971, 1975 and 1978 which contain references to both kinds of schools, to traditional schools only, to non-traditional schools only, and to neither type of school.

The pattern of results is rather different for each of the years under consideration here. In 1971, most of the paragraphs coded (70.9%) did not mention either of the school types, while almost 20% mentioned non-traditional schools only, and 7.1% mentioned traditional schools only. Just 2.1% of the paragraphs coded contained references to both kinds of schools. These results reflect the central leaders'

TABLE 4.2: Traditional Schools by Non-traditional Schools, by Year (Percents)

Year	Both	Traditional Schools Only	Non-traditional Schools Only	Neither	(N)
1971	2.1	7.1	19.8	70.9	(378)
1975	4.2	22.1	36.5	37.1	(307)
1978	0.6	21.1	8.2	70.1	(331)

emphasis on non-traditional schools during 1971 and the depressed standing of the traditional schools.

The pattern of results for 1975 is quite different from 1971. In 1975, only 37.1% of the paragraphs coded did not mention either of the school types, while 36.5% mentioned non-traditional schools only, and 22.1% mentioned traditional schools only. Both types of schools were mentioned in 4.2% of the paragraphs. These results would suggest that the issue of educational differentiation was a great deal more salient in 1975 than it was in 1971. Non-traditional schools were mentioned alone much more often than in 1971, but the same can be said for the traditional schools. The emphasis remained in favor of the non-traditional schools, but there was also a significant increase in the emphasis given to the traditional schools. At the same time, more paragraphs included references to <u>both</u> kinds of schools than was the case in 1971 (4.2% compared with 2.1%).

For 1978, the pattern of results is again rather different from the previous years. Of the paragraphs coded, 70.1% did not mention either kind of school; this is very similar to the 1971 result. However, the results for the paragraphs mentioning only traditional schools and mentioning only non-traditional schools are exactly the <u>reverse</u> of the 1971 pattern. Traditional schools only were mentioned in 21.2% of the paragraphs, while just 8.2% mentioned non-traditional schools only. The balance, then, had shifted decisively in favor of

the traditional schools. Only 0.6% of the paragraphs mentioned both types of schools.

In none of the years under consideration here was there a tendency for references to the two school types to occur in the same paragraphs. In 1975, references to the kinds of schools which have been classified as traditional and non-traditional were a much more salient part of articles in People's Daily than was the case in either 1971 or 1978. In those two years, a substantial majority of the paragraphs coded did not refer to either type of school. In those paragraphs which referred to one or the other type of school, the balance was heavily in favor of non-traditional schools in 1971, and heavily in favor of traditional schools in 1978.

The year 1975 is when the educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution were under assault by educators, administrators, and pro-New Class members of the political elite. While the Cultural Revolutionary Left retained control over the central media, it is perhaps a sign of its general weakness that it was unable to prevent the appointment of Zhou Rongxin--a staunchly pro-New Class advocate of educational quality and an outspoken critic of the Cultural Revolution reforms--as Education Minister in January 1975. It is suggestive that during this period, references to both kinds of higher education institutions increased considerably in People's Daily. The Cultural Revolutionary Left sought both to promote the non-traditional schools (whose students, particularly in the July 21 Workers' universities,

they saw as allies in their struggle with the educated elite and the pro-New Class segments of the Party) and to justify the reforms implemented in the traditional schools (whose current graduates, they claimed, were far more able to serve society than their predecessors).

In the following two chapters, a variety of economic and political-ideological goals of higher education are discussed, and their associations with traditional and non-traditional higher education institutions are examined.

CHAPTER 5

ECONOMIC GOALS OF CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1970's

This chapter examines the various economic goals of higher education which appeared in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978, and explores the extent to which particular goals are associated with particular types of higher education institutions. The societal goals to which schools are intended to contribute are an important part of the schools' charters, and as such they are closely connected with the kinds of futures to which different kinds of schools can allocate their graduates.

Almost all of the goals referred to in the official press are those of the central political leadership. This is to be expected, of course, in the central Party paper. But individuals, too, have reasons for seeking higher education. The desire to improve one's life chances through higher educational attainment is certainly one of the most common of these reasons. Young people often have ideal as well as material interests in seeking higher education, of course. In China until fairly recently, it has been considered completely illegitimate by central leaders to seek higher education to further one's own economic opportunities. Rather, individuals were obliged to express their interest in higher education in terms of their desire to "serve the people" or to "build socialism."

In general, two kinds of goals of higher education have been mentioned in People's Daily: economic goals such as training

qualified manpower, and political-ideological goals such as transforming students' consciousness or promoting class struggle. This chapter examines the economic goals of higher education, and the following chapter deals with the political-ideological goals.

It should be recognized that not all goals expressed in People's Daily fit neatly into one or the other of these categories. For example, the goal of creating people who are "both red and expert" clearly contains both economic and political-ideological dimensions. It should also be recognized that so-called "economic" goals inevitably have political-ideological ramifications, and vice versa.

Table 5.1 displays the frequencies with which various economic goals of higher education were mentioned in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978. Again, both the rates of reference per 1000 sentences of text coded, and the percentages of articles coded which contain at least one reference to particular goals, are noted.

The goal of increasing production and solving immediate production problems was the most frequently mentioned economic goal of higher education in both 1971 and 1975. However, in 1978 this goal was mentioned considerably less often, and references to it appeared in a much smaller percentage of articles than in 1971 and 1975. It is not likely that the post-"Gang of Four" regime was less concerned with increasing production than its predecessors. Rather, other factors than higher education were probably seen as more effective in

TABLE 5.1: Types of Economic Goals of Higher Education Mentioned in People's Daily, by Year

	Rate of Reference Per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Goal		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Economic Goals						
Increase production; solve immediate production problems	91	93	21	62	67	39
Develop qualified manpower	39	53	84	55	62	58
Serve the advancement of science and technology	37	15	60	45	28	56
Economic development; creation of a strong country	16	35	72	48	54	50
Increase agricultural production	12	72	3	21	54	11
Create people who are both "red and expert"	7	6	14	24	15	31
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

promoting increases in production (for example, changes in management practices and incentive structures in factories).

The goal of developing qualified manpower shows a pattern of increasing importance for central leaders as the 1970's progressed. The rates of reference to this goal were 39, 53 and 84 for 1971, 1975 and 1978, respectively. While the yearly rates of reference increased steadily, the percentage of articles containing at least one reference to the goal stayed relatively constant. This means that developing qualified manpower was a much more salient part of the articles in which it was mentioned in 1978 than was the case in 1975, and especially in 1971.

The goal of serving the advancement of science and technology is interesting in that the lowest rate of reference occurs in 1975, while the highest occurs in 1978. This goal is closely connected to the four modernizations campaign. The advancement of science and technology, of course, has something to do with the advancement of scientists and technicians. During 1975, even more so than in 1971, the Cultural Revolutionary Left was involved in an effort to depress the status of "bourgeois experts" with high level educational credentials; hence, they attached little importance to the advancement of science and technology, unless such advances were made by experienced workers inspired by the Thought of Mao Zedong.

The goal of economic development and the creation of a strong country shows a pattern of results very similar to that for developing

qualified manpower; the yearly rates of reference to this goal increase steadily and considerably in the course of the 1970's, while the percentage of articles referring at least once to the goal remains fairly constant. Thus, as the 1970's progressed, the general goal of economic development became an increasingly salient part of the articles in which it was mentioned.

The goal of increasing agricultural production and modernizing rural villages was a much more salient concern in articles about higher education during 1975 than in either 1971 or 1978. This result, of course, parallels the data in Table 4.1 concerning the frequency with which different kinds of higher education institutions were mentioned in the official press.

The goal of creating people who are "both red and expert" was not mentioned a great deal in any of the years under consideration here, but it was more frequently mentioned in 1978 than in the other years. As will become clearer below, 1978 was a year in which central leaders were much more concerned with economic goals than political-ideological ones. The emphasis was overwhelmingly in favor of "expertise," and the increased use of the "both red and expert" phrase probably represents a token recognition of political-ideological concerns.

The patterns described above have to do with the economic goals of higher education in general, and some shifts across time are clearly evident. These include the great stress on increasing

production in 1971 and 1975; the steadily increasing emphasis placed on developing qualified manpower and promoting economic development as the 1970's progressed; and, for 1975, both the great stress placed on agricultural development and the de-emphasis on serving the advancement of science and technology.

But what of the differences between traditional and non-traditional schools? Are some of the goals systematically associated with one or the other of these types of schools? Do the patterns of association change across time? These questions are addressed by examining the co-occurrences within paragraphs of references to the school types and the various economic goals of higher education. For each of these goals, a multidimensional table is constructed which includes the year (1971, 1975 or 1978), the particular goal (whether present or absent from the paragraph), and traditional schools and non-traditional schools (again, whether present or absent).

For each of these tables, loglinear analysis is utilized to test a series of models which might adequately explain the pattern of results in the table. In effect, the researcher presents the loglinear computer program with a guess (educated or otherwise) about what might be going on in the data. This guess about what is going on in the data imposes a set of constraints on the computer program, which it works within to generate a set of internal cell frequencies which represent what the data would look like, if the reseacher's guess were correct. These are called the fitted data, and they can

then be compared to the actual data to assess the accuracy of the researcher's guess. If the fitted data and the actual data are very similar, then the researcher's guess (the model) was quite accurate. If the fitted data and the actual data are very dissimilar, the guess (model) was an inaccurate representation of what was going on in the actual data, and another guess can be made. The computer program then works within the new set of constraints to generate another set of fitted data, and so on.

Chi square is utilized to assess the goodness of fit of the model-generated data and the actual data. The use of chi square in loglinear analysis is the opposite of its usual usage as a test of statistical significance in the social sciences. Chi square is commonly used to assess the likelihood that a statistic from a randomly drawn sample could have come from a population where the true population parameter was substantially different. In this case, the lower the value of chi square, the greater the likelihood that a sample statistic is representative--within specified limits--of the population parameter. However, in loglinear analysis the interest is in whether the fitted data and the actual data are similar enough that the model can be accepted as adequately explaining the patterns present in the data. Here, then, the higher the value of chi square, the better the fit between model and actual data. In assessing the adequacy of particular models, both simplicity and goodness of fit are taken into account.

It is possible to measure the strength of particular associations or interactions by comparing the chi square values of models which are identical except that one includes the association while the other excludes it. If the difference in goodness of fit is minimal, then that association is not a necessary part of an adequate model. If the difference in goodness of fit is substantial, however, then that particular association will need to be included.

In a table which contains four variables, there are fifteen terms which may have an effect on the distribution of cases within the internal cells of the table. At the simplest level, there is the distribution of cases within the subclasses of each individual variable. All of the tables in this chapter include the variables Year (Y), a particular Goal (G), Traditional Schools (T), and Non-traditional Schools (N).

At the next level, there are the associations between each pair of variables, as follows:

(YG): As Table 5.1 made clear, there was often considerable variation across years in the frequency with which different economic goals of higher education were mentioned;

(YT): Chapter 4 pointed out that traditional schools were mentioned more often in some years than in others;

(YN): Non-traditional schools, too, were mentioned more in some years than in others;

(GT): When this term is part of the best fitting model for a particular table, then the association between that goal and traditional schools was relatively stable across the years included in the study;

(GN): When this term is part of the best fitting model for a particular table, then the association between that goal and non-traditional schools was relatively stable across the years included in the study;

(TN): The discussion in Chapter 4 made clear that the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools was rather different for each of the years under consideration here; hence, it can be predicted in advance that this term is unlikely to be part of well fitting models.

At the next level, there are <u>interactions</u> between variables taken <u>three</u> at a time, such that the association between two of them varies across the subclasses of the third. Three variable interactions are much easier to conceptualize when one of the variables can be thought of as an independent variable. This is the case with three of the four interaction terms possible:

(YGT): When Year is part of the interaction term, it is possible to think of it as an independent variable; hence, the researcher can simply ask, "Does the association between the Goal and Traditional Schools vary across the years included in the study?";

(YGN): The same logic can be applied and the same question asked, about the association between the Goal and Non-traditional Schools;

(YTN): It was established in Chapter 4 that the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools does vary across the years included in the study; it will be seen below that this term is a necessary part of well fitting models;

(GTN): The interpretation of this interaction term is less straightforward than the others; perhaps the clearest formulation is this: If central leaders have a particular goal of higher education in mind, are they more likely to connect that goal with traditional schools or with non-traditional schools?

At the most comprehensive level, there is the "second-order" interaction term which includes all four variables at the same time. This is called the "saturated" model, and it has to fit the actual data perfectly since it imposes <u>every</u> possible set of constraints on the computer program. It is designated (YGTN). The basic goal of loglinear analysis, then, is to see which sets of constraints can be <u>removed</u> from the model without destroying the goodness of fit. If a particular term has a substantial impact on the distribution of cases within the internal cells of the actual table, removing that term from the model will destroy the fit of the model data with the actual data.

Conversely, if a term has little impact on the distribution of cases in the actual data, removing that term from the model may actually improve the model's fit with the actual data.

The loglinear program provides a set of additive effects estimates for each model tested. The effects estimates show how much contribution each term included in the model makes to the distribution of cases in the fitted data. Thus, the additive effects estimates from a well fitting model can be used to screen out terms whose effect is minimal.

It should also be pointed out that if a three-way interaction term is included in a model, then the constraints imposed on the program by each of the pairs of these three variables are also included; in other words, the technique is a hierarchical one. For example, if the term (YGT) is included in a model, then the lower order terms (YG), (YT), and (GT) are also included. Conversely, if one decides to exclude a lower order term from the model--(GT) for example--then all higher order terms which contain (GT) must be excluded as well--(YGT) and (GTN).

A. Increasing Production and Solving Immediate Production Problems

It will be recalled that this goal was mentioned considerably less in 1978 than in the earlier years. Hence, the term (YG) is likely to appear in some form--perhaps as part of a three way interaction term--in a well fitting model.

Table 5.2 presents the crosstabulations of the goal of increasing production with the two types of schools, and with year. By defining and testing a variety of models on this data, a number of interesting comparisons can be pursued. For each model tested, the program provides a "likelihood statistic" analogous to chi square, the degrees of freedom of the model, and the probability of that model. The models tested for Table 5.2 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ YTN/ GTN)	3.95	2	.14
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	3.96	3	.27
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	9.74	4	.045
4	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	12.91	4	.012
5	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	4.16	4	.38
6	(GT /YGN /YTN)	4.16	5	.53
7	(YGN /YTN)	4.30	6	.64

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions. Gilbert suggests the .05 level of significance as a conventional criterion to judge the adequacy of fit of a model. By this criterion, the model fits adequately. However, it has the drawback of being quite complex.

Model 1 can be simplified by removing in turn each one of the four interaction terms, thus creating Models 2-5. In Models 2 and 5, the fit improves by removing an interaction term from the model. This suggests that these terms are unnecessary in a final solution. On the other hand, the fit of Models 3 and 4 is considerably worse than that

TABLE 5.2: Year by Increasing Production by School Types

Year	Increasing Production	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	205	55
		YES	23	5
	YES	NO	63	20
		YES	4	3
1975	NO	NO	94	78
		YES	52	11
	YES	NO	21	34
		YES	15	2
1978	NO	NO	219	21
		YES	67	1
	YES	NO	13	6
		YES	3	1

of Model 1, suggesting that the terms which were excluded from these models--(YGN) and (YTN)--make an important contribution to the distribution of cases within Table 5.2.

The two interaction terms which seem not to be required are (GTN) and (YGT). These two terms have the lower order association (GT) in common. Thus, while interactions involving (GT) may not have large effects, the association between traditional schools and the goal of increasing production may have significant effects. Model 6 tests this idea.

Model 6 does indeed represent a substantial improvement in fit over both Models 2 and 5, indicating that the association between traditional schools and the goal of increasing production was relatively constant across the years included in the study (otherwise, of course, Model 2 would have fit better than Model 6). This relationship is mildly negative; references to traditional schools tended not to occur together with references to the goal of increasing production. Thus, despite the major political changes which took place during the 1970's, there seems to have been agreement that this focused, concrete economic objective was not part of the charter of traditional higher education institutions.

Despite this finding, it remains possible that the term (GT) is not a necessary part of the best fitting model for this data. Hence, Model 7 does not include it, and the fit does indeed improve. Model 7

is the simplest and best fitting model tested. It indicates that the largest effects in Table 5.2 are the following:

1) The associations between the goal of increasing production and non-traditional schools were different in 1971, 1975 and 1978. Yule's Q for the appropriate marginal tables is .13 for 1971; .24 for 1975; and .70 for 1978. Thus, there was a movement from a mild positive association in 1971 to a strong positive association in 1978.

2) The interaction between year, traditional schools and non-traditional schools also makes a substantial contribution to the distribution of cases (paragraphs) within Table 5.2. This interaction, discussed in Chapter 4, will be an important term in all subsequent models as well.

B. Developing Qualified Manpower

Table 5.3 presents the cross tabulation of references to the goal of developing qualified manpower with the two types of schools and with year. Because the goal was mentioned with increasing frequency as the 1970's progressed, the year-goal association (YG) will probably need to be part of a well fitting model. Likewise, the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools and its variations across the years included in this study--the term (YTN) will need to be part of an adequately fitting model.

TABLE 5.3: Year by Developing Qualified Manpower by School Types

Year	Qualified Manpower	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	248	55
		YES	22	6
	YES	NO	20	20
		YES	5	2
1975	NO	NO	110	74
		YES	59	9
	YES	NO	5	38
		YES	8	4
1978	NO	NO	184	23
		YES	46	2
	YES	NO	48	4
		YES	24	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

The models tested for Table 5.3 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degree of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.21	2	.90
2	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.62	4	.96
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	20.26	4	.00044
4	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	13.44	3	.33
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.07	4	.59
6	(YGN /YTN)	11.88	6	.065
7	(GT /YGN /YTN)	3.57	5	.61

Again, the model of all three-way interactions is tested first, and it fits very well (P = .90). However, it probably contains many more constraints (terms) than are necessary to achieve a well fitting model; hence Models 2–5 remove in turn each of the four thre-way interaction terms. When the term (YGT) is removed in Model 2, the fit actually improves, suggesting that this term contributes little to distribution of data in Table 5.3.

In Model 3, the term (YGN) is excluded, and the fit is extremely poor. Thus, there must be important changes across time in the relationship between non-traditional schools and the goal of developing qualified manpower.

Model 4, which excludes the term (GTN), fits adequately if not as well as Model 2. However, Model 5, which excludes the term (YTN), fits much less well than Models 2 and 4.

It seems, then, that the interaction terms (YGT) and (GTN) can be safely removed from further models. Model 6 includes only the other two interaction terms, (YGN) and (YTN). However, the probability is only .065, which is much lower than Models 2 and 4. Because the common term in the two three-way interaction terms that were excluded from Model 6 is (GT)--that is, the association between developing qualified manpower and the traditional schools--this term is added to Model 6 to create Model 7.

Model 7 is such a substantial improvement over Model 6 that it is to be preferred, despite its increased complexity. Thus, the most important factors in the distribution of cases within Table 5.3 are:

1) The association between traditional schools and the goal of developing qualified manpower. It should be noted that Models 7 and 4 are identical except that Model 4 includes the interaction term which posits that the relationship between traditional schools and manpower development varies across the years included in the study. Indeed, Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .30 for 1971; -.15 for 1975; and .33 for 1978. Thus, there was some variation across years, and the mild negative association in 1975 can be seen as further evidence of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's mistrust of high level educational credentials.

However, when the interaction term in Model 4 is replaced by the association term in Model 7, the fit improves substantially. Hence, the degree of stability in the relationship between manpower

development and traditional schools has much greater impact on the distribution of cases within Table 5.3 than does the fluctuation of this relationship across time.

2) For the association between the non-traditional schools and manpower development, on the other hand, the fluctuation across time does have a substantial impact on the patterns of data in Table 5.3. There were strong tendencies in 1971 and 1975 for references to manpower development to occur together with reference to non-traditional schools. In 1978, however, there was a moderately strong tendency for them not to occur together. The post-"Gang of Four" regime, it would seem, equated the term "qualified manpower" with the possession of high level training in traditional institutions, while the non-traditional schools were seen to provide what might be called "skills enhancement" training.

3) The variations across time in the associations between traditional and non-traditional schools, discussed in Chapter 4, are also a necessary part of the best fitting model.

C. Serving the Advancement of Science and Technology

Table 5.4 presents the crosstabulations of the goal of serving the advancement of science and technology with the two school types and with year. The models tested against this data are as follows:

TABLE 5.4: Year by Serving the Advancement of Science and Technology by School Types

Year	Science/ Technology	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	234	70
		YES	24	6
	YES	NO	34	5
		YES	3	2
1975	NO	NO	107	107
		YES	63	13
	YES	NO	8	5
		YES	4	.5
1978	NO	NO	193	25
		YES	56	1
	YES	NO	39	2
		YES	14	1

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ YTN/ GTN)	1.32	2	.52
2	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	2.42	4	.66
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	1.33	4	.86
4	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	3.94	3	.27
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.00	4	.061
6	(GTN /YTN)	17.78	8	.023
7	(YGT /YTN)	6.76	6	.34
8	(YGT /GN /YTN)	3.96	5	.55

Models 1-4 all fit rather well, and even Model 5 fits adequately, if the .05 level of significance is accepted as adequate. Because Models 2 and 3 fit so well, it is possible that the interaction terms which they do not include--(YGT) and (YGN)--are not necessary parts of an adequate solution.

Model 6 drops both these terms, retaining only (GTN) and (YTN). However, this model fits poorly. Model 7 tries another combination of two interaction terms, and this time the results are much more positive. It should be ponted out that Model 6 drops one of the interaction terms from Model 3, while Model 7 drops another of them. Hence, it is possible to gauge the relative strengths of the effects of these two terms. When the term (YGT) is dropped, creating Model 6, the probability drops from .86 to .023. Thus (YGT) is an important term in the model. When (GTN) is dropped, creating Model 7, the

probability drops from .86 to .34, indicating that adequate models need not include this term.

Model 7 can also be compared with Model 4. The two models are the same except that Model 4 includes the interaction term (YGN). The fit improves when Model 4 is simplified to become Model 7. This indicates that the most important effects in Table 5.4 are:

1) The variation across time in the associations between traditional schools and the goal of serving the advancement of science and technology. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .13 for 1971; -.08 for 1975; and .17 for 1978. Thus the perception of traditional schools as the appropriate places for advances in science and technology was less apparent during 1975 than in 1971 or 1978. This is another piece of evidence about the Cultural Revolutionary Left's challenge to the value of high level cultural capital.

2) The familiar variation across time in the associations between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

A question remains, however, about the possible effect of the association between non-traditional schools and the goal of serving the advancement of science and technology. A final model, number 8, adds the term (GN) to Model 7. With this term included, the fit of the model improves substantially over the fit of Models 7 and 4.

Thus, the moderately negative association between non-traditional schools and this goal does make an important contribution to the distribution of cases in Table 5.4 Throughout the 1970's, there was a consistent tendency for non-traditional schools not to be perceived as places where science and technology would be advanced.

D. Economic Development and the Creation of a Strong Country

References to this goal increased considerably in the course of the 1970's. Hence, the year-goal association term will probably be an important part of well fitting models. The crosstabulations of the goal of economic development with the two school types and year are presented in Table 5.5. The models which were tested for this table are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ YTN/ GTN)	3.36	2	.19
2	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	7.07	4	.13
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	13.63	4	.0086
4	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	3.75	3	.29
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	10.95	4	.027
6	(YGN /YTN)	8.89	6	.18
7	(YGT /TYN)	16.86	6	.0098

The very poor fit of Model 3 suggests that the interaction term (YGN) should be included in well fitting models. Likewise, the poor fit of Model 5 suggests that, as in each of the preceeding analyses, the term (YTN) must be included.

TABLE 5.5: Year by Promoting Economic Development by School Types

Year	Economic Development	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	255	68
		YES	26	7
	YES	NO	13	7
		YES	1	1
1975	NO	NO	102	103
		YES	49	13
	YES	NO	13	9
		YES	18	.5
1978	NO	NO	182	27
		YES	56	2
	YES	NO	50	.5
		YES	14	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model 4 fits best among the models which include three of the four three-way interaction terms. It includes both of the terms identified as necessary, and the term (YGT). Model 6 drops this last term, and this simplified model fits quite adequately (P = .18), although not as well as Model 4. This model indicates that the most important effects in Table 5.5 are:

1) The variations across time in the associations between non-traditional schools and the goal of economic development. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .26 for 1971; -.45 for 1975; and -1.0 for 1978. Thus, there was a tendency for this goal to become dissociated from non-traditional schools as the 1970's progressed.

2) The variations across time in the associations between traditional and non-traditional schools (see Chapter 4).

It is useful to consider one more model. Recall that Model 4 fit better than Model 6, which suggests that the additional term in Model 4 (YTG) did have some effect on the patterns of the data in Table 5.5. The strength of the effect can be compared with the strength of the term (YGN) by now excluding the latter term to create Model 7. Since the fit of Model 7 is quite poor, it is possible to conclude with confidence that the effect of the term (YGT) on the distribution of cases within Table 5.5 is minimal.

TABLE 5.6: Year by Increasing Agricultural Production by School Types

Year	Serve Agriculture	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	262	67
		YES	27	7
	YES	NO	6	8
		YES	.5	1
1975	NO	NO	96	89
		YES	50	11
	YES	NO	19	23
		YES	17	2
1978	NO	NO	229	27
		YES	69	2
	YES	NO	3	.5
		YES	1	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

E. Increasing Agricultural Production and Modernizing Rural Villages

Table 5.6 presents the crosstabulations of the goal of increasing agricultural production with the school types and with year. It will be recalled that this goal was mentioned a great deal more during 1975 than in either 1971 or 1978. Hence, it can be anticipated that the association between year and this goal (YG) will appear in some form in well-fitting models for this data.

The models which were tested for Table 5.6 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ YTN/ GTN)	1.82	2	.40
2	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	1.89	4	.76
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	8.20	4	.084
4	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	2.16	3	.54
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.60	4	.048
6	(YGN /YTN)	3.57	6	.73
7	(GT /YGN /YTN)	2.34	5	.80
8	(YG /YTN)	124.11	9	.12

As with previous goals, the models which fit badly indicate that necessary terms have been excluded, while models which fit well indicate that unnecessary terms have been excluded.

Models 2 and 4 fit very well, suggesting that the excluded interaction terms--(YGT) and (GTN)--are not needed in well fitting models.

On the other hand, Models 3 and 5 fit much less well, suggesting that the interaction terms (YGN) and (YTN) should be part of an adequate solution.

Model 6, then, includes only these two terms and it fits very well. Indeed, Model 6 fits only slightly less well than Model 2, and it is much simpler. Model 6 can also be compared with Model 4, which contains the additional term (YGT). As suspected, this latter term is not necessary to a well fitting solution.

Model 6, then, indicates that the greatest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 5.6 are:

1) Variations across time in the associations of non-traditional schools with the goal of increasing agricultural production. The Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .71 for 1971; -.04 for 1975; and -1.0 for 1978. It should be recalled that there were extremely few references to this goal in 1978; it is not surprising that this goal failed to occur in the same paragraphs as references to non-traditional schools.

2) Variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools (see Chapter 4).

It is of interest to test two additional models. Model 7 adds the term (GT) to Model 6 to assess the effect of the association between traditional schools and the goal of increasing agricultural production. This model fits only marginally better than Model 6.

However, it is useful to compare Model 7 with Model 4. The only difference in the two models is that Model 4 includes interaction with year in the associations between traditional schools and increasing agricultural production. Model 7 fits considerably better than Model 4, suggesting that there is greater constancy than change in the relationship between traditional schools and this goal during the 1970's.

Finally, Model 8 includes only the year-goal association and the interaction term (YTN). This model fits adequately (P = .12), but the fit of Model 6 is so much better that it is to be preferred.

F. Summary

This chapter has been concerned with the economic goals associated with higher education at different times during the 1970's in the People's Republic of China. Considerable differences in emphasis on a range of economic goals exist.

In 1971, the greatest emphasis by far was placed on the goal of increasing production and solving immediate production problems. Developing qualified manpower and serving the advancement of science and technology both received moderate attention, while the themes of economic development and of agricultural development were mentioned rather seldom.

In 1975, increasing production and solving immediate production problems was again the most salient concern, but a great deal of

emphasis was also given to increasing agricultural production and modernizing rural villages. The emphasis placed on developing qualified manpower and on promoting economic development increased considerably from 1971 to 1975. However, there was a considerable reduction in emphasis on the goal of promoting the advancement of science and technology.

In 1978, when the campaign for the "Four Modernizations" was being stressed, the goals of promoting economic development, of training qualified manpower, and of serving the advancement of science and technology received the greatest emphasis.

These results reflect a rather clear shift in economic development strategy as the 1970's progressed, but the shift occurred in fits and starts. For example, the emphasis on qualified manpower and on economic development increased steadily as the 1970's progressed, but the emphasis on science and technology declined in 1975 (a reflection of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's anti-New Class orientation) before increasing greatly in 1978. Further, the great emphasis on agricultural development in 1975 is anamolous in comparison with 1971 and 1978.

Given these shifting priorities in economic goals, this chapter has also asked whether particular economic goals are associated with one or the other of the school types, or perhaps with both or with neither. It should be recognized that the economic charters of the

traditional schools and the non-traditional schools are defined both by what they are expected to do and what they are expected not to do.

One of the clearest results in this regard is that the very concrete, applied goal of increasing production and solving immediate production problems was seen as the province of the non-traditional schools throughout the 1970's, both before and after the purge of the Gang of Four. Further, this goal was also seen as not being the province of the traditional schools.

Another, complementary result is that the non-traditional schools were not seen in any of the years under consideration here to be the places where the advancement of science and technology would be served. Further, the traditional schools were positively associated with this goal, except in the intensely anti-New Class year of 1975.

This kind of higher educational division of labor is quite similar in general to that which prevails in many countries; one level of the system is responsible for the creation of new knowledge, while another level (lower in prestige) is responsible for the dissemination and practical application of knowledge. It goes without saying that a stratified educational system will be closely connected to the stratified occupational order, and that graduates of different levels of the system will find themselves able to enter different levels of the occupational structure. The Cultural Revolutionary Left are accused by the current leaders of having wreaked havoc with the

educational system and its connections to the occupational order, and those connections have been strengthened in the post-1977 era.

In both 1971 and 1975, the non-traditional schools were strongly identified with the goal of training qualified manpower. However, in 1978 the goal was strongly identified with the traditional shools, and strongly dissociated from the non-traditional schools. The current regime reinterpreted the meaning of the term "qualified manpower," and deprived the non-traditional schools of the claim that they were serving this important societal goal.

The pattern is somewhat similar with the goal of economic development, which was strongly identified with the non-traditional schools in 1971, but which was strongly negatively associated with these schools in 1975 and 1978. In both 1975 and 1978, this goal was clearly and almost exclusively associated with the traditional schools.

Thus, in the post-"Gang of Four" period, the economic charters of the school types have been very clearly and distinctly defined; non-traditional schools are there to provide basic level technical knowledge and "skills enhancement," while traditional schools are to contribute to the achievement of the paramount social goal of modernization through science and technology.

This shift of course represents a tremendous improvement in the status of the educated elite in China, since it makes them the central

players in the drive toward modernization. However, one wonders if it may also open them up to new rounds of attacks if they are granted privileges along the way, but great strides in economic development are not made.

In a sense, the Cultural Revolution reforms in higher education laid the groundwork for the current relatively favored position of the educated elite in China. With the strong emphasis during the Cultural Revolution Decade on narrow, applied economic goals, and on the non-traditional schools, the educational system was oriented to providing manpower at the level of skilled manual labor and low level technical positions. This, coupled with the greatly reduced number of students in the traditional schools (and the vocationalization of the curriculum), resulted in an extreme scarcity of higher level technical personnel. Thus, the effort to depress the status and circumscribe the power of China's higher intellectuals had the ironic side-effect of increasing the value of cultural capital by reducing the supply while failing to reduce the demand for high level skills.

CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL GOALS OF CHINESE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 1970'S

In this article on comparative principles of educational stratification, Collins (1977) argued that the primary interest of central political authorities in education was to have it promote and extend their bureaucratic control over the population in general, or over specific sectors of the population. The case of traditional China fits this argument rather well, since the hierarchical structure of the examinations paralleled that of officialdom, and since Confucian ideology was quite congenial to imperial rule. Through the civil examination system, the ambitions of the gentry were channeled in ways beneficial to the central rulers.

In contemporary China, the interests of the central political authorities are considerably more complicated than in traditional China. To be sure, central Communist Party leaders have been and remain concerned with having education serve the needs of bureaucratic control, but they are also concerned wih the contributions which education can make to the economic and social transformation of the society.

The economic goals associated with higher education in the official press were discussed at length in the preceeding chapter. Here, the discussion turns to the political-ideological goals associated with higher education. It should be recognized that some

of these goals, if realized, would have profound economic consequences for various social groups or classes in Chinese society.

Education has been expected to contribute to a wide range of political-ideological goals in the People's Republic of China, but the salience of these goals has varied considerably from one period to another. Table 6.1 summarizes the frequency with which a number of political-ideological goals of higher education were mentioed in People's Daily in 1971, 1975 and 1978. As with similar tables presented above, both the rate of references to specific items per 1000 sentences of text coded, and the percentage of articles coded which referred at least once to particular items, are presented.

What is immediately apparent in Table 6.1 is that most of the political-ideological concerns of 1971 and 1975 were mentioned very seldom, if at all, in 1978. Only the goals of transforming students' consciousness and of serving the socialist revolution are mentioned with any appreciable frequency in 1978. Both these goals are sufficiently vague as to permit of widely varying interpretations.

Another clear pattern in the data in Table 6.1 is that many of the political-ideological goals appear much more often in 1975 than in 1971. Items related to the general issues of class conflict and class struggle appear with great frequency in 1975, with somewhat lesser frequency in 1971, and virtually not at all in 1978.

TABLE 6.1: Types of Political-Ideological Goals of Higher Education Mentioned in People's Daily by Year

	Rate of Reference per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Goal		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Political-Ideological Goals						
Transform students' consciousness	59	105	25	65	92	25
Restrict the influence of capitalists and their thought	25	33	0	34	44	0
Increase the power of workers	23	27	0	34	23	0
Serve the socialist revolution	21	23	20	31	44	36
Promote class struggle	16	30	0	52	44	0
Consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat	14	62	3	31	67	8
(Criticism of) seeking personal career advancement	9	24	0	38	31	0
Increase the power of the laboring people	12	11	4	31	13	8
Increase the power of peasants	2	8	0	7	13	0
Graduates spread political ideology	2	14	0	10	31	0
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

Mao Zedong was often quoted during the early and mid 1970's as saying that, "All the work of the schools is for the purpose of transforming students' consciousness." This was the most commonly mentioned political-ideological goal of higher education in all three years under consideration here, but the yearly rates of reference are very different. The rate of reference was 59 for 1971; 105 for 1975; and only 25 for 1978. The goal was mentioned in 65% of the articles coded for 1971; in fully 92% in 1975; and in just 25% in 1978.

While the goal of transforming students' consciousness is a multi-dimensional one and is subject to varying interpretations, one of its core meanings involves acceptance of the ultimate authority of the Party--or, perhaps, of proletarian virtue--in all sectors of Chinese society. This goal was clearly of much greater concern to central leaders in 1975 (and, to a lesser extent, in 1971) than it was in 1978. This would seem to reflect an anti-New Class stance on the part of central leaders in 1975, and a pro-New Class stance in 1978. During 1975, the ideological underpinnings of the New Class were being attacked, while in 1978 they were being reinforced.

Several of the remaining political-ideological goals seem to be interrelated and clustered around the general issue of conflict between the "bourgeoisie" and the "proletariat." Schwartz (1968) has argued that these terms are no longer attached to specific social classes defined in terms of relation to the means of production, but rather refer to clusters of values. Schwartz has suggested that the

Maoists among the central leadership have tended to use the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" to designate the dominance of the forces of good over the forces of evil. Proletarian virtues include selflessness and total commitment to the collectivity, austerity, hard work, and so on. Everyone, regardless of class background, can embody these virtues and, conversely, everyone is a potential victim of "bourgeois" vices such as selfishness, individuality, and indolence.

In 1975 there was an intense campaign to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, meaning that persons who embodied the proletarian virtues should monopolize positions of power in the society. This campaign is reflected in the data in Table 6.1, where the patterns of results for several goals are roughly the same as for the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The goal of restricting the influence of capitalists and capitalist thought is mentioned more frequently and in a larger percentage of articles in 1975 than in 1971. This goal was not mentioned at all in 1978, however.

The goal of promoting class struggle is mentioned more often in 1975 than in 1971, but it is mentioned in a somewhat higher percentage of articles in 1971 than in 1975. This means that the goal was a rather less salient part of the articles in which it appeared in 1971 than in 1975.

A related item involves criticisms of seeking higher education for personal career advancement. This item gets to the heart of the issue of education as cultural capital. Young people all over the world seek education because they expect to realize a return on their investment; that is, that their educational attainments will qualify them to occupy well rewarded and perhaps influential positions in their society. Until recently in China, this was considered the wrong kind of motivation for seeking higher education. It was a reflection of "bourgeois" values. If one accepts the premise that culture can be capital, the characterization is not completely inapt.

Criticisms of seeking higher education for reasons for personal advancement were more numerous in 1975 than in 1971. (They were completely absent from the articles coded for 1978). Part of the increase in concern with this issue in 1975 is probably due to the fact that China's colleges and universities were beginning to have substantial numbers of graduates during this period. In 1971, with these schools newly reopened after being closed for several years, there were many newly admitted students, but few if any graduates. However, by 1975 the number of graduates was increasing, and students were finding out just what kinds of futures their schools could allocate them to.

It should be pointed out that college and university students were selected through the recommendation process rather than by competitive examinations during the early and mid 1970's. Thus, their

level of ideological awareness and commitment, their political behavior, and their class background should have played a large part in their selection. It is perhaps a testament to the corrosive nature of higher education that these students had to be reminded in 1975 that seeking self advancement through higher education was illegitimate.

In both 1971 and 1975, People's Daily articles about higher education referred to the goal of increasing the power of factory workers vis-a-vis technicians and technical experts. This is another facet of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's attacks on professional credentials and high level cultural capital. Many articles rather gleefully described how experienced workers, given a modicum of technical training, had solved problems which had baffled "bourgeois experts" with advanced training.

In general, then, articles about higher education in People's Daily contained a much wider range of political-ideological goals in 1971 and 1975 than in 1978. Further, the concern with these issues was considerably more intense in 1975 than in 1971. The increased intensity in 1975 probably reflects the fact that the Cultural Revolution reforms in education were being vigorously criticized in many quarters. For example, Zhou Rongxin had been appointed Education Minister early in the year, and made numerous speeches condemning the Cultural Revolution reforms and calling for their abolition. The Cultural Revolutionary Left then used its control over the central

media to launch a counter-attack against "right deviationist attempts to reverse correct verdicts." Many of the themes of this counter-attack are reflected in Table 6.1

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyses which seek to assess the extent to which several of these political-ideological goals of higher education were associated with traditional and non-traditional schools during 1971, 1975 and, where possible, 1978.

A. Transforming Students' Consciousness

Table 6.2 presents the crosstabulations of references to the goal of transforming students' consciousness with the traditional and non-traditional schools and with year. Recall that this goal was mentioned considerably less in 1978 than in the previous years under consideration here. Thus the term (YG) is likely to appear in some form in well fitting models for this table.

The models which were tested for Table 6.2 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ YTN/ GTN)	4.16	2	.12
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	7.13	3	.068
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	28.20	4	.08444
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	17.86	4	.097
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	13.98	4	.0098
6	(GT /GN /YTN)	79.72	9	18 x 10-12
7	(GN /YGT /YTN)	11.67	5	.04
8	(GT /YGN/ YTN)	9.96	5	.076

TABLE 6.2: Year by Transforming Consciousness by School Types

Year	Transform Consciousness	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	221	58
		YES	23	8
	YES	NO	47	17
		YES	4	.5
1975	NO	NO	71	80
		YES	44	13
	YES	NO	44	32
		YES	23	.5
1978	NO	NO	207	26
		YES	69	2
	YES	NO	25	1
		YES	1	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model 1 is the model for all three-way interactions, and Models 2-5 remove one at a time of these interaction terms. Models 2-4 are all "adequate" if the .05 level of significance is considered adequate, but they provide few clues about which terms are necessary and which unnecessary. Model 5, which removes the term (YTN) fits very poorly, as expected. That term, at least, will need to appear in well fitting models.

Model 6 tests the proposition that the associations of the goal of transforming students' consciousness are relatively stable for both traditional and non-traditional schools. However, this model fits extremely poorly.

Model 7, then, reintroduces interaction with year to the association between traditional schools and consciousness transformation. The fit improves somewhat, but only to the .04 level of significance.

Model 8 reintroduces the interaction with year to the association between non-traditional schools and the goal of consciousness transformation. This model is accepted as the best that can be achieved for the data in Table 6.2. It indicates that the strongest effects on the distribution of cases within the table are:

1) A negative association between traditional schools and the goal of transforming students' consciousness;

2) Variations across time in the associations between non-traditional schools and the goal of consciousness transformation. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .11 for 1971; -.26 for 1975; and -.45 for 1978.

3) Variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

Given that the goal of transforming students' consciousness was negatively associated with the traditional schools during all three years under consideration here, and was negatively associated with non-traditional schools in all three years except 1971, the most appropriate conclusion to draw is that references to transforming students' consciousness occur in other contexts than the ones being examined here. An exploration of what those other contexts might be is beyond the scope of the present effort.

B. Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

It was argued above that the campaign to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat could be seen as an effort by the Cultural Revolutionary Left to attack the ideological underpinnings of New Class authority in China, and to attack pro-New Class elements in the Party.

The Cultural Revolutionary Left argued that those who had received higher education (in traditional schools) in the pre-Liberation period, and even in the period from 1949 until the onset of

the Cultural Revolution, had been permeated by bourgeois thought and values. Among these are the belief in the moral superiority of the highly educated, the belief that the educated are the only competent judges of the kinds of work done by the highly educated (on this point, see Gouldner), and the belief that the highly educated should have influence over economically and socially consequential decisions. Individualism, too, was one of the vices encouraged in the "old" colleges and universities.

The Cultural Revolution reforms in education sought to counteract these bourgeois influences in order to create graduates who would embody the "proletarian" virtues described above. By the middle of the 1970's, many students were graduating from the reformed higher education system, and the Cultural Revolutionary Left was finding itself increasingly on the defensive about the merits of the new graduates. Apparently there were widespread feelings that the graduates of the reformed higher education system were very inadequately prepared to take on the occupational duties to which they were assigned. Indeed, in 1978 when such things could be said in the official media, these graduates were labeled part of a "lost generation" because they had learned so little during their schooling.

In 1975, however, the Cultural Revolutionary Left was still in control of the central media and they utilized the press to criticize the "old" educational system, on the one hand, and to praise the accomplishments of the new, on the other.

One would expect, then, that the campaign to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat would center on the traditional schools, where the political fundamentalism of proletarian virtue directly confronted the cultural capitalist ideologies of the New Class. This is indeed the case, as the following analysis demonstrates. Table 6.3 presents the crosstabulations of references to the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat with traditional and non-traditional schools, and with year. Only 1971 and 1975 are included in the analysis.

The loglinear models which were tested for this table are:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.18	1	.67
2	(YGT /TGN /YTN)	.46	2	.79
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	.18	2	.91
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.26	2	.88
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.95	2	.0069
6	(GT /GN /YTN)	38.71	5	.27 x 10-6
7	(YG /GT /GN /YTN)	.53	4	.97

As usual, the model of all three-way interactions is tested first, and then one of the interaction terms at a time is removed to see whether the fit improves or worsens.

The fit remains very good for Models 2-4, but worsens considerably (as expected) when the term (YTN) is removed in Model 5.

TABLE 6.3: Year by Consolidating the Dictatorship of the Proletariat by School Types

Year	Proletarian Dictatorship	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	252	72
		YES	24	8
	YES	NO	16	3
		YES	3	.5
1975	NO	NO	87	94
		YES	46	9
	YES	NO	28	18
		YES	21	4

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

This indicates that none of the other interaction terms is necessary in a well fitting model.

Model 6 tests the likelihood that the data in Table 6.3 can be explained by positing a stable relationship between each of the school types and the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. As can be seen, the model fits very poorly.

However, it will be recalled that the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat was mentioned a great deal more often in 1975 than in 1971. Therefore, the term (YG) should be important in a well fitting model. This is indeed the case, for when this term is added to Model 6, creating Model 7, the fit improves dramatically. This model indicates that the largest effects on the distribution of cases in Table 6.3 are:

1) The great increase in references to this goal in 1975;

2) The moderately strong positive relationship between traditional schools and the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat;

3) The moderately strong negative association between non-traditional schools and this goal; and

4) Variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

Despite the use of the term "proletariat," which might lead one to think of industrial workers or perhaps agricultural producers, the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat is clearly and almost exclusively associated with traditional schools in 1971 and 1975. By the middle of the 1970's, many students were graduating from the "proletarianized" traditional schools. But for the dictatorship of this "proletariat" to be consolidated, these graduates had to be able to move into positions of power in the larger society. However, there were widespread doubts that the traditional schools during this period had lived up to the economic sides of their charters; graduates were seen by employing enterprises to be inadequately trained for the work they were supposed to be able to do. By 1978, the "revolutionary successors" of this period had become a "lost generation."

C. Restricting the Influence of Capitalists and Capitalist Thought

This item is conceptually related to the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was mentioned relatively often in the official press in both 1971 and 1975, but was not mentioned at all in the articles coded for 1978. The absence of references to this goal in 1978 is another indication of the post-"Gang of Four" regime's desire to downplay the imagery of class struggle in China and, indeed, to tap into the motivational potential of self-interest.

Table 6.4 presents the crosstabulations of this goal with the traditional and non-traditional schools, and with year.

TABLE 6.4: Year by Restricting Capitalism by School Types

Year	Restrict Capitalists	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	247	69
		YES	25	8
	YES	NO	21	6
		YES	2	.5
1975	NO	NO	96	105
		YES	55	13
	YES	NO	19	7
		YES	12	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

The models tested on the data in Table 6.4 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.03	1	.87
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.23	2	.89
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	3.10	2	.21
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.04	2	.98
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.28	2	.0096
6	(YGN /YTN)	.27	4	.99
7	(GN /YTN)	9.79	6	.13

Model 1 is the model for all three-way interactions, while Models 2-5 remove each of these interaction terms in turn. Models 1, 2 and 4 fit very well, suggesting that the interaction terms (GTN) and (YGT) add little to the fit of the models.

Model 3, which excludes the term (YGN), fits much less well than Models 2 and 4. Model 5, as expected, fits very poorly.

Model 6, then, contains the two interaction terms which had a negative effect when removed from Model 1. This model (YGN /YTN) fits extremely well. It indicates that the terms with the largest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 6.4 are:

1) Variations across time in the associations between non-traditional schools and the goal of restricting capitalists and capitalist thought. The Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal

tables are -.04 for 1971 and -.55 for 1975. Thus, in 1975, when this goal was mentioned most, it was strongly dissociated from the non-traditional schools. One can argue that, by implication, central leaders must have seen the issue as more relevant in the context of traditional schools. However, the data in Table 6.4 are not strongly affected by the association of this goal with traditional schools.

2) The variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, described in Chapter 4.

One additional model is tested for this data. Model 7 includes the term for the association between non-traditional schools and the goal of restricting capitalists and their thought (GN), but eliminates the interaction with year. The fit of this model declines to .13, which is in the adequate range, but much lower than the fit of Model 6. Thus, the inclusion of the interaction term seems justified.

D. Seeking Self Advancement Through Higher Education

Criticisms of seeking self advancement through higher education appeared occasionally in the articles coded for 1971, and appeared more often during 1975. However, the articles coded for 1978 did not include a single criticism of this kind.

This item, too, is closely related to the campaign to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, since self seeking is the antithesis of the selfless and collectively oriented "new socialist person" the Cultural Revolutionary Left sought to cultivate.

Table 6.5 presents the crosstabulations of criticisms of seeking self advancement through higher education with the traditional and non-traditional schools, and with year.

The models tested on the data in Table 6.5 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.79	1	.37
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.79	2	.67
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	.79	2	.67
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.84	2	.66
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	10.12	2	.0063
6	(YG /GN /YTN)	1.83	5	.87
7	(GN /YTN)	12.27	6	.056

Model 1 fits quite adequately, and the fit improves with the removal of each of the interaction terms, except for Model 5 where it is clear again that the term (YTN) must be included in well fitting models.

Because removing any one of the other interaction terms from Model 1 has virtually the same effect on the fit, it seems that none of these terms is necessary in a well fitting model. An examination of the additive effects estimates for Models 2-4 indicates that the association terms (YG) and (GN) have the strongest effects.

TABLE 6.5: Year by Seeking Self Advancement by School Types

Year	Self Advancement	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	257	74
		YES	25	8
	YES	NO	11	1
		YES	1	.5
1975	NO	NO	104	107
		YES	57	13
	YES	NO	11	5
		YES	10	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

These two terms are combined with the interaction term (YTN) to create Model 6. This model does indeed fit quite well. Thus, the strongest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 6.5 are:

1) The increase in references to this item from 1971 to 1975;

2) A strong negative association between non-traditional schools and criticisms of seeking self advancement through higher education, regardless of year; and,

3) The variations across time, described in Chpater 4, in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools.

It seems clear that non-traditional schools were <u>not</u> perceived, in 1971 and 1975, to allocate their students to the kinds of futures which could be considered "social advancement." This is an indication that the charters of the traditional and non-traditional schools are quite different in this regard. If such comments are directed at "students," but are clearly dissociated from the students in non-traditional schools, then they must be directed at students in the traditional schools.

E. Increasing the Power of Workers

During the early and mid 1970's, articles in <u>People's Daily</u> referred to the goal of increasing the power of factory workers vis-a-vis technical experts. Most often this goal was phrased in terms of providing workers with greater understanding of the technical aspects of their work. In this way, they would need to rely less upon the

knowledge of "bourgeois experts" in solving production problems or designing new procedures and equipment.

The crosstabulations of references to this goal with the traditional and non-traditional schools and with year are presented in Table 6.6. The year 1978 is excluded from the analysis because no references to this goal appeared in the articles code for 1978.

For the data in Table 6.6, the models tested are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.15	1	.70
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.20	2	.90
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	.15	2	.92
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.23	2	.89
5	(GT /GN /YTN)	.51	5	.99
6	(GN /YTN)	3.89	6	.69
7	(GT /YTN)	7.01	6	.23

Model 1 again is the model for all three-way interactions, while Models 2-4 remove one interaction term at a time. Models 2-4 all fit extremely well, indicating that the interaction terms which were excluded from them are unnecessary in well fitting models.

An examination of the additive effects estimates for these models confirms that this is the case. The two association terms which appear to have strong effects are (GN) and (GT). Thus, these two

TABLE 6.6: Year by Increasing Workers' Power by School Types

Year	Workers' Power	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	251	65
		YES	27	8
	YES	NO	17	10
		YES	.5	.5
1975	NO	NO	109	99
		YES	65	13
	YES	NO	6	13
		YES	2	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

terms are combined with the interaction term (YTN) to create Model 5. Model 5 posits stable associations between traditional schools and the goal of increasing workers' power, and between non-traditional schools and this goal. Model 5 fits extremely well. The relative strengths of the terms (GN) and (GT) can be assessed by creating two new models, one of which includes only the first term along with (YTN), and the other of which includes only the second term along with (YTN).

Models 6 and 7 represent these two options. It can be seen that Model 6, which includes the association between non-traditional schools, fits considerably better than Model 7, which includes the association between traditional schools and the goal of increasing workers' power.

Thus, the largest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 6.6 are:

1) The strong positive association between non-traditional schools and the goal of increasing workers' power. This goal clearly has to do with increasing the power of workers within industrial production rather than within Chinese society as a whole. Through schooling in non-traditional institutions (in this case, July 21 Workers' Universities), workers can increase their technical skills and be less subject to "domination" by "bourgeois experts." But this kind of schooling will not qualify <u>individuals</u> of worker background to move into positions of power and influence in the larger society;

2) The variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4;

3) A lesser effect of the moderately strong negative association between traditional schools and the goal of increasing workers' power.

Summary

This chapter has dealt with the political-ideological goals of higher education, as expressed in People's Daily articles in 1971, 1975 and 1978. A much broader range of political-ideological goals was expressed during 1971 and 1975 than during 1978. Further, the intensity of concern with these goals was greater in 1975 than in 1971.

The political-ideological charters of traditional and non-traditional schools were explored by examining the associations between these goals and the school types. A cluster of goals was centered around the goal of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. Restricting the influence of capitalists and capitalist thought, and criticisms of seeking self advancement through higher education are corrolaries of the dictatorship of the proletariat campaign. It was found that all these goals tended to be associated with the traditional schools or, at least, to be dissociated from the non-traditional schools. This suggests that the greatest controversy, especially during 1975, was focused on the traditional schools. Proponents of the Cultural Revolution reforms in education claimed that the "old" system had neglected the political-ideological charter

of higher education, and had trained generations of spiritual aristocrats who were more interested in serving themselves than in serving the people or the revolution. Opponents of the Cultural Revolution reforms claimed that the "new" educational system was not living up to the economic side of its charter, and that graduates of the reformed traditional schools were not adequately trained to handle the jobs to which they were assigned.

Perhaps as a response to this criticism of the educational reforms, many articles pointed out how experienced workers with a minimal level of instruction in the technical aspects of their work were able to quickly solve production problems which had defied the "bourgeois experts." Thus, the implicit claim was that the July 21 Workers' Universities turned out more useful graduates in a relatively short time than did the "old" colleges and universities after four or five years of study.

These issues are clearly related to the discussions of cultural capital in Chapter 2 of this paper. The traditional schools are where, to use Gouldner's terminology, young people are inducted into the New Class and inculcated with the legitimating ideologies inherent in the culture of critical discourse. Since these ideologies tacitly delegitimize the authority of the Communist Party, Party ideologists have a clear interest in reasserting the primacy of Marxism-Leninism.

The Cultural Revolutionary Left argued strenuously against the view that knowledge could be the property of those "possessing" it.

Rather, knowledge was socially created and had to be used to serve society. If the ideologies of the New Class were so strongly entrenched in the traditional schools, then large doses of political-ideological study and repeated visits to the "front lines of production" would be used to inculcate true proletarian virtues.

In discussing controversies in the eastern European socialist states over economic policy, Parkin (1971) suggests that members of the political elite whose "expertise is primarily of an ideological nature" tend to seek alliances with less skilled workers and with the peasantry. These are the groups which are at a disadvantage when cultural capitalist principles are used in the distribution of rewards in the society; hence, they have a common interest in resisting New Class definitions of reality. This bears a great deal of similiarity to the situation in China in the early and mid 1970's.

CHAPTER 7

CURRICULA AND MAJOR STUDENT ACTIVITIES

This chapter turns from a concern with the goals of higher education to an exploration of the actual content of education. The content analysis included coding categories for a variety of curriculum items and, for lack of a better term, major student activities. This latter term refers to such items as open door schooling, participation in field investigations, and participation in manual labor.

This chapter first examines the frequency with which various curricular items were mentioned in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978, and then explores the question whether some of these items are particularly associated with one or the other of the major school types. The frequency measures--rates of reference per 1000 sentences of text coded, and percentages of articles coded which refer at least once to each item--are presented in Table 7.1.

References to scientific-technical subjects were quite numerous in all three years under consideration here, with the highest yearly rate being in 1971. Such references appear in a high percentage of articles in all three years as well. Because 1971 has both the highest yearly rate, and the lowest percentage of articles mentioning scientific-technical subjects, such subjects were especially salient parts of the articles in 1971.

Political study is an integral part of the curriculum of Chinese schools at all levels. As the yearly rates of reference to this item make clear, however, there is variation over time in the emphasis placed by central leaders on political study. The yearly rates of reference to political-ideological study display the same pattern as many of the political-ideological goals discussed in the previous chapter; the rate is fairly high in 1971, even higher in 1975, and relatively low in 1978. The pattern of results for the percentages of articles referring at least once to political-ideological study is roughly equivalent to the pattern evident in the yearly rates. It is notable that political study is referred to in 42% of the articles coded for 1978. While this is a substantial decline from the previous years, it still indicates considerable generality of concern with political study.

Participation in manual labor by students was seen by the Cultural Revolutionary Left as a mechanism for preventing them from becoming "divorced from the masses." By requiring students, and mental workers in general, to regularly participate in manual labor, it was hoped that the traditional status distinctions between those who labor with their hands and those who labor with their minds could be broken down. Thus, participation in labor was supposed to play a role in the transformation of students' consciousness which was so often called for in 1971 and 1975. But participation in labor was also intended to serve economic goals by introducing students to

practical problems in production, and by having them help to defray some of the costs of their education through productive activities.

The pattern of results for both the rates of references and the percentages of articles referring at least once to students participating in labor is quite similar to that for political-ideological study: fairly high in 1971, even higher in 1975, and fairly low in 1978. References to students participating in manual labor in 1978 often carried with them the admonition that students should be assigned work which related closely to their academic studies. Central leaders in 1978 were concerned almost exclusively with the economic payoffs of student participation in labor.

Both open door activities and field investigations were mentioned regularly during 1971 and 1975, but references to these kinds of activities virtually disappeared in 1978. Open door education involved having sudents regularly leave their schools to participate in productive activities in factories or communes to learn about life on the "front lines of production." The schools' doors were supposed to open in both directions; experienced workers and peasants would be invited into the schools to share their experiences with students. In field investigations, students would go to particular locations in the larger society to study at first hand topics which were part of their studies. These activities represented an effort to bring the schools and the rest of the society into closer contact. As such, they are one part of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's attack on the

TABLE 7.1: Curriculum Items and Student Activities Mentioned in People's Daily, by Year

Curricula and Activities	Rate of Reference Per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Type		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Scientific-technical	151	93	97	69	77	81
Political-ideological	68	104	25	69	79	42
Participation in labor	61	77	15	55	59	17
Open door activities	52	53	1	45	33	3
Medical	29	11	7	21	21	6
Liberal arts	27	44	32	28	49	44
Field investigations	23	23	1	48	44	3
Agricultural	20	46	7	28	39	14
Military	4	3	2	10	3	6
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

institutional autonomy of higher education. The institutional autonomy of higher education was restored in many ways in the post-"Gang of Four" period, and the elimination of open door activities was one of those ways.

The category of liberal arts curricula includes references to such subjects as philosophy, literature, history, and even efforts to promote literacy. This last item was associated primarily with rural, non-traditional schools, and certainly raises the question whether these schools should be considered institutions of higher education. (The post-"Gang of Four" regime decided that they should not.) The yearly rates of reference to liberal arts subjects were highest in 1975, as was the percentage of articles referring at least once to these kinds of subjects. This is consistent with the emphasis on rural areas in 1975, and it also reflects the central leaders' concerns with providing some continuing educational opportunities for educated youth through correspondence courses.

References to agricultural curricula were most numerous in 1975 and least so in 1978.

Several kinds of comparisons can be made to assess the relative weight assigned to different kinds of curriculum. First, the rate of scientific-technical subjects can be compared with that for political-ideological study. In 1971, references to scientific-technical subjects outnumbered those to political study by a margin of more than 2-to-1. However, in 1975 the balance was actually slightly in favor

of political-ideological study. In 1978, the balance was almost 4-to-1 in favor of scientific-technical subjects. This is another indication of the intense concern with political-ideological matters in 1975, and of the downplaying of these concerns during 1978.

A rough indication of the relative emphasis placed on the urban, industrial sector and the rural, agricultural sector is provided by comparing the rates of reference to scientific-technical subjects on the one hand, and to agricultural curricula on the other. For 1971, the ratio is more than 7-to-1 (151 to 20) in favor of scientific-technical subjects. For 1975, the ratio is only 2-to-1 in favor of scientific-technical subjects. For 1978, the ratio is about 13-to-1 in favor of scientific-technical subjects. The post-"Gang of Four" regime was intensely concerned wtih the goal of increasing agricultural production, but saw factors other than higher education as more decisive in this effort.

During 1971 and 1975, then, several curricular items appeared which were either completely eliminated or substantially reduced during 1978; open door schooling and field investigations are in the former category, while political-ideological study and participation in manual labor are in the latter. During 1978 there is an almost single-minded concern with scientific-technical subjects.

The discussion now turns to the question of whether some of these curricular items and student activities were associated primarily with

one or the other of the two major school types. Again, loglinear analysis is utilized to explore the relationships between the curriculum items and the school types in 1971, 1975 and (where possible) 1978.

A. Scientific-Technical Curricula

The crosstabulations of references to scientific-technical subjects with traditional and non-traditional schools and with year are presented in Table 7.2. The models which were tested for the data in Table 7.2 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.73	2	.69
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.82	3	.84
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	24.73	4	.57 x 10-4
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	11.59	4	.021
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	8.67	4	.070
6	(YGN /YTN)	12.14	6	.059
7	(YGT /TYN)	29.19	6	.56 x 10-4

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, and Models 2-5 exclude one of these interaction terms at a time. Model 2 excludes the interaction term (GTN), and the fit improves over Model 1. Thus, this term is probably not necessary to a well fitting model for this data.

TABLE 7.2: Year by Scientific-Technical Curricula by School Types

Year	Scientific-Technical	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	157	56
		YES	21	6
	YES	NO	111	19
		YES	6	2
1975	NO	NO	93	65
		YES	55	8
	YES	NO	22	47
		YES	12	5
1978	NO	NO	193	17
		YES	47	1
	YES	NO	39	10
		YES	23	1

The interaction term (YGN), however, does seem to be a necessary term, since removing it to create Model 3 resulted in a very poorly fitting model. Model 4, which excludes the interaction term (YGT), also fails to achieve an adequate fit.

Model 5 excludes the term (YTN), and it achieves a fit which just exceeds the .05 significance level.

Three interaction terms, then, seem to have an effect on the distribution of cases within Tables 6.2: (YGN), (YTN) and (YGT). Model 6 includes two of these terms, and it just exceeds the .05 significance level.

The effect of the term (YGT), however, is considerably weaker than that of (YGN). This is demonstrated by the very poor fit of Model 7.

The choice of a best fitting model, then, seems to be between Model 2 and Model 6. The fit of Model 2 is so much better than that of Model 6 that Model 2 seems preferable, despite its greater complexity. This model indicates that the largest effects on the distribution of cases in Table 7.2 are:

1) Variations across time in the association of references to scientific-technical curricula with non-traditional schools. The Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are -.29 for 1971; .47 for 1975; and .40 for 1978. Thus, there was a moderate tendency for scientific-technical subjects <u>not</u> to be mentioned together with

non-traditional schools in 1971, and fairly strong tendencies for them to occur together during 1975 and 1978;

2) The variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4; and,

3) Less dramatic variations across time in the associations of scientific-technical subjects with traditional schools. The Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are -.31 for 1971; -.28 for 1975; and .35 for 1978.

The patterns of association with the school types were different only during 1975, when scientific-technical subjects were negatively associated with traditional schools and positively associated with non-traditional schools. Had it been possible at the coding stage of this research to distinguish between references to "pure" and "applied" scientific-technical subjects, it would be possible to offer a rather fuller interpretation of these results.

B. Agricultural Curricula

It should be recalled that agricultural curricula were mentioned a great deal more in People's Daily during 1975 than in either 1971 or 1978. Thus, the term (YG) is likely to be part of a well fitting model. The crosstabulations of references to agricultural curricula with the school types and with year are presented in Table 7.3.

The models which were tested for the data in Table 7.3 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.27	2	.87
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.35	3	.95
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	3.78	4	.44
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.91	4	.92
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.64	4	.047
6	(YGN /YTN)	1.95	6	.92
7	(GN /YTN)	24.28	10	.007
8	(YG /GN /YTN)	4.88	8	.77

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, and Models 2-5 exclude one of these interaction terms at a time. Models 2 and 4 fit quite well, suggesting that the interaction terms which were excluded from them are not necessary to a well fitting model. Model 3 excluded the term (YGN) and, although the fit is still quite good, this model fits much less well than Model 1. Model 5 excludes the term (YTN) and, as expected, it fits quite badly.

Model 6, then, includes the two interaction terms which lowered the fit of Model 1 when they were excluded from it. Model 6 fits quite well.

Model 7 simplifies Model 6 by removing the interaction with year from the relationship between agricultural curricula and the non-

TABLE 7.3: Year by Agricultural Curricula by School Types

Year	Agricultural Subjects	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	259	68
		YES	26	8
	YES	NO	9	7
		YES	1	.5
1975	NO	NO	102	90
		YES	63	11
	YES	NO	13	22
		YES	4	2
1978	NO	NO	229	24
		YES	69	2
	YES	NO	3	3
		YES	1	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

traditional schools. This model, however, fits very badly. Thus Model 8 introduces the association between year and agricultural curricula, and the fit improves dramatically.

Model 8 indicates that the relationships with the largest effect on the distribution of cases within Table 7.3 are:

1) Variations in the frequency with which agricultural curricula were mentioned in different years. The year 1975 had by far the most references;

2) The moderately strong positive association between non-traditional schools and agricultural curricula; and,

3) Variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

D. Liberal Arts Curricula

Table 7.4 presents the crosstabulations of references to liberal arts curricula with traditional and non-traditional schools and with year. Such references occurred somewhat more in 1975 than in 1971 and 1978. Many of these references in 1975 were in the context of efforts to provide educational opportunities, through correspondence courses, for educated youth.

The models which were tested on the data in Table 7.4 are as follows:

TABLE 7.4: Year by Liberal Arts Curricula by School Types

Year	Liberal Arts	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	248	70
		YES	26	8
	YES	NO	20	5
		YES	1	.5
1975	NO	NO	106	88
		YES	64	11
	YES	NO	9	24
		YES	3	2
1978	NO	NO	212	25
		YES	67	2
	YES	NO	20	2
		YES	3	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	.56	2	.75
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	.95	3	.81
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	5.47	4	.24
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	.58	4	.96
5	(GT /YGN /YTN)	.96	5	.97
6	(YGN /YTN)	3.69	6	.72
7	(GN /YTN)	13.59	10	.19

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, and Models 2-4 exclude one of these interaction terms at a time. In Models 2 and 4, the fit improves, suggesting that the excluded interaction terms--(GTN) and (YGT)--are not necessary parts of a well fitting model. It is possible that the term they have in common--(GT)--is, however.

Model 3, which excludes the term (YGN) fits less well than Model 1. Hence, this term is combined with (YTN) to create Model 6. This model fits quite well (P = .72), and indicates that the relationships with the largest effect on the distribution of cases in Table 7.4 are:

1) Variations in the associations between liberal arts curricula and the non-traditional schools. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are -.09 for 1971; .58 for 1975; and -.05 for 1978. Thus, only in 1975 is there a strong tendency for references to liberal arts curricula to occur together with non-traditional schools;

2) The variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

Model 5 adds the term (GT) to Model 6 as a way to assess the effect of the association between traditional schools and liberal arts curricula. The fit does improve somewhat, indicating that the moderate negative association between these two variables does have some impact on the distribution of cases within Table 7.4. This impact, however, is rather minimal.

D. Political-Ideological Curricula

Table 7.5 presents the crosstabulations of referenes to political-ideological study wth traditional and non-traditional schools, and with year. Political study was mentioned considerably less in 1978 than in the previous years; hence, the term (YG) is likely to figure in some way in well fitting models for this data.

The models tested for the data in Table 7.5 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	3.90	2	.14
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	4.57	3	.21
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	8.49	4	.075
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	15.29	4	.0041
5	(YGT /YTN)	9.16	6	.16
6	(YG /YTN)	20.78	9	.014

TABLE 7.5: Year by Political-Ideological Curricula by School Types

Year	Political Study	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	215	62
		YES	15	7
	YES	NO	53	13
		YES	12	1
1975	NO	NO	83	69
		YES	50	9
	YES	NO	32	43
		YES	17	4
1978	NO	NO	210	26
		YES	69	2
	YES	NO	22	1
		YES	1	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, and Models 2-4 exclude one of the interaction terms at a time. The fit of Model 2 improves, suggesting that the term it excludes--(GTN)--is not a necessary one. The fit of Model 3 (P = .075) is within the adequate range, while the fit of Model 4, which excludes the term (YGT), is quite poor.

Model 5, then, includes the terms which had the largest negative impact on the fit of Model 1 when they were removed. This model (YGT /YTN) fits better than Model 1, and not as well as Model 2. It is, however, simpler than Model 2. Model 5 indicates that the largest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 7.5 are:

1) Variations across time in the associations between traditional schools and references to political-ideological curricula. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are .43 for 1971; .17 for 1975; and -.75 for 1978. Thus, in the period when colleges and universities were just reopening after having been closed for several years, political study was mentioned quite often as part of their curricula. In 1975 there was a mild tendency for references to political study not to occur in the same paragraphs with references to traditional schools, and in 1978 this tendency was quite strong;

2) The variations across time, described in Chapter 4, in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools.

One additional model is tested. Model 6 asks, in effect, whether it is necessary to refer at all to the associations between traditional schools and political study in achieving a well fitting model. Model 6 includes only the term (YG), reflecting the differences across years in the frequency with which political study was mentioned, and the ubiquitous term (YTN). However, Model 6 fits badly, thus lending support to the conclusion that Model 5 includes only necessary terms.

That the term (YGN) has a small impact on the distribution of cases within Table 7.5 can be seen by comparing the fits of Models 2 and 5. The association of non-traditional schools with political study is moderately negative in both 1971 and 1978. But in 1975, it is moderately positive. This was a year when the Cultural Revolutionary Left placed great emphasis on July 21 Workers' Universities, perhaps, as suggested above, in response to widespread criticism of the quality of graduates of traditional schools. The stress on political study in these schools in 1975 may reflect the desire of the Cultural Revolutionary Left to cultivate allies among industrial workers in its conflicts with pro-New Class elements in the Party.

E. Student Participation in Manual Labor

Table 7.6 presents the crosstabulations of references to students participating in manual labor with the school types and with year. It will be recalled that references to labor participation were common in

TABLE 7.6: Year by Participation in Manual Labor by School Types

Year	Manual Labor	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	221	59
		YES	24	7
	YES	NO	47	16
		YES	3	1
1975	NO	NO	91	85
		YES	61	11
	YES	NO	24	27
		YES	6	2
1978	NO	NO	222	27
		YES	67	2
	YES	NO	10	.5
		YES	3	.5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

1971 and 1975, but relatively infrequent in 1978. Thus, the term (YG) will need to be part of well fitting models for this data.

The models tested on the data in Table 7.6 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	1.06	2	.59
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	1.41	3	.70
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	1.29	4	.86
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	3.06	4	.55
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	9.63	4	.047
6	(YG /YTN)	10.43	9	.32
7	(YGT /YTN)	2.60	6	.86

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, while Models 2 through 5 exclude one of these interaction terms at a time. Of these, only Model 5, as expected, fits badly. Thus the other interaction terms may not be necessary to a well fitting model. Model 6 tests this idea by including only the association between year and references to manual labor, and the term for the interaction between traditional and non-traditional schools by year (YTN). Model 6 fits quite adequately, indicating that references to manual labor were not strongly enough associated with either of the school types that such associations were necessary parts of well fitting models.

However, one additional model is tested. Model 7, which includes the terms (YGT) and (YTN) fits quite well (P = .86), suggesting that the distribution of cases in Table 7.6 is affected by variations across time in the association of traditional schools and manual labor. Yule's Q values for the appropriate marginal tables are -.27 for 1971; -.44 for 1975; and .04 for 1978. Thus, there was a relatively strong tendency in 1975 for references to participation in manual labor not to be mentioned in the same paragraphs as traditional schools.

The overall impression given by this data, however, is that participation in manual labor by students tended to be referred to in contexts other than those where the school types were salient topics. Earlier work (Broaded, 1983) has suggested that references to manual labor were associated, in all three years under discussion here, with the economic goals of increasing production and solving immediate production problems and developing qualified manpower, and in 1971 and 1975, with the political-ideological goal of transforming students' consciousness.

F. Open Door Activities

It was argued above that the admonition during the early and mid 1970's to "run schools in an open door way" was one part of a general assault on the institutional autonomy of education. Students spent a great deal of time outside the schools, learning about the realities of productive activities, and laymen were regularly invited into the

schools to share their perspectives with students. Thus, the amount of time which students spent attending to the messages of professional educators was reduced considerably during this period. However, references to open door schooling virtually disappeared from People's Daily during 1978. The post-"Gang of Four" regime wanted students back into the classroom, receiving instruction from people who had been specifically trained to give it.

Table 7.7 presents the crosstabulations of references to open door schooling with the traditional and non-traditional schools, and with year. Only 1971 and 1975 are included in the analysis.

The models which were tested on the data in Table 7.7 are as follows:

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN/ GTN/ YTN)	9.47	1	.034
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	6.17	2	.046
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	4.48	2	.11
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	5.72	2	.057
5	(GT / GN /YTN)	7.54	5	.18
6	(GTN /YTN)	5.81	4	.21

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, while Models 2-4 exclude one of these interaction terms at a time. Of these, Model 3 fits the best, while Model 4 is just above the .05 level of significance. An examination of the additive effects estimates for

TABLE 7.7: Year by Open Door Activities by School Types

Year	Open Door Activities	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NO	NO	226	73
		YES	25	6
	YES	NO	42	2
		YES	2	2
1975	NO	NO	100	106
		YES	52	12
	YES	NO	15	6
		YES	15	1

Model 3 suggests that the association terms (GT) and (GN) have the largest effects.

Model 5 then incorporates these two terms as well as the usual (YTN). This model fits extremely well and indicates that the relationships with the largest effects on the distribution of cases within Table 7.7 are:

1) A mild positive association between traditional schools and references to open door activities;

2) A strong negative association between non-traditional schools and references to open door activities; and,

3) The variations across time in the relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools, as described in Chapter 4.

Open door activities, then, were clearly phenomena of the traditional schools. This makes sense, given that the students of non-traditional schools have interrupted full-time productive activity in factories or in agriculture to receive training relevant to their work. Thus, they are less likely to need to learn about the realities of production; they will be returning to full-time agricultural or industrial labor soon enough.

G. Summary

This chapter has examined the frequency with which various aspects of the curriculum of Chinese higher education were mentioned

in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978, and has explored the extent to which some of these curricular items were associated with one or the other of the school types.

The fundamental changes in educational policy which occurred following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in late 1976 are quite evident in the patterns of results. A number of items which were considered "new born things" of the Cultural Revolution were mentioned a great deal in 1971 and 1975, only to disappear completely (open door activities, field investigations) or to appear only in muted form (political study, participation in manual labor) during 1978.

During 1978, references to scientific-technical subjects far outnumbered references to other kinds of subject matter, indicating the central leadership's almost single-minded concern with science education and the contribution it was expected to make to the "four modernizations." In 1978, references to scientific-technical subjects were positively associated with both types of schools. Had it been possible at the coding stage of the research to distinguish between "pure" and "applied" subject matter, the former would undoubtedly have been associated primarily with the traditional schools, and the latter with the non-traditional schools.

Agricultural curricula tended to be associated primarily with the non-traditional schools throughout the 1970's.

Political study was mentioned fairly often in the context of traditional schools in 1971, when these schools were just reopening after being closed for several years as a result of the Cultural Revolution. In 1978, however, references to political study were strongly dissociated from references to traditional schools. "The main task of students," said the official press, "is to study." In this case, studying refers to scientific-technical curricula; time was not to be wasted on political-ideological study.

The participation of students in manual labor did not seem to be strongly associated with either of the school types; earlier work suggests that it was associated with the goal of transforming students' consciousness during 1971 and 1975, and with economic goals of increasing production and developing qualified manpower in all three years under consideration here.

Running schools "in an open door way" was one of the most distinctive aspects of the Cultural Revolution reforms in education, and it represented an effort to reduce the institutional autonomy of the traditional schools. The post-"Gang of Four" regime clearly felt that the results of this effort were disastrous for the quality of preparation of graduates of traditional schools, and such activities were eliminated after the purge of the "Gang of Four."

CHAPTER 8

STUDENT BACKGROUNDS, OCCUPATIONAL PLACEMENTS, AND THE SCHOOLS

The previous chapters have established that China's traditional and non-traditional higher education institutions are viewed in rather different terms in regard to their economic and political-ideological charters, and in regard to their content. It seems fair to conclude that the higher education system is stratified, with the non-traditional schools representing the lower level and the traditional schools representing the upper level. The traditional schools themselves are stratified, with national universities enjoying greater prestige than provincial schools. The key point system adds further to the hierarchical nature of the system since the late 1970's.

Substantial differences in the perceptions of traditional and non-traditional schools have been noted for different times during the 1970's. The Cultural Revolution reforms in education sought to narrow the gap between the traditional and non-traditional schools by vocationalizing and politicizing the former. During the early and mid 1970's, much greater emphasis was placed on political-ideological goals of higher education than was the case in 1978. It was argued above that much of the concern about traditional schools centered around the fact that they were providing their students with high level cultural capital, and imbuing them with an ideology (Gouldner's culture of critical discourse) that the possessors of high level educational credentials had a legitimate claim on the exercise of

authority in Chinese society. The Cultural Revolutionary Left, characterized here as "political fundamentalists," sought to discredit this technocratic ideology and to place "politics in command" of all socially consequential decisions. Despite their extreme rhetoric, however, even the Cultural Revolutionary Left seems to have been operating with the assumption that China's traditional and non-traditional schools had different parts to play in the educational division of labor. This was reflected in the stability with which the narrow goal of increasing production and solving immediate production problems was associated--throughout the 1970's--with the non-traditional schools, while the more abstract and general goal of serving the advancement of science and technology was associated with the traditional ones.

In this chapter, admittedly limited data are brought to bear on two crucial links in the correspondence theory of educational stratification. The chapter looks first at the social backgrounds of students entering the stratified educational system and second at the occupational placements of students leaving the system.

It should be stressed that it has not been possible to gather systematic data within China about the possible connections between social origins and educational opportunities, nor between educational and occupational attainments (on the latter, see White). The data presented here represent, not the results of studies of actual student body composition nor actual job assignments, but rather the frequency

with which, and the contexts within which, various student backgrounds and various occupational placements were mentioned in People's Daily during the 1970's. The data can tell us only what kinds of backgrounds central leaders tended to associate with the traditional and non-traditional schools, and what kinds of occupational placements they saw as appropriate for the graduates of different kinds of schools.

A. Student Backgrounds and the Schools

In this section, the question of whether students are distributed within the stratified educational system according to their social origins is taken up.

Data on the background characteristics of students are not very precise; People's Daily usually speaks only in very general terms about students' backgrounds. Table 8.1 summarizes the frequencies with which students identified as workers, as peasants, as "worker-peasant-soldier" students (gong-nong-bing-xueyuan), and as "educated youth" (zhishi qingnian) were mentioned in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978.

In addition to the categories shown in Table 8.1, the sampled articles included scattered references to technicians, cadres, and members of the People's Liberation Army being recruited to higher education. The numbers of such references were so small, however, that the categories have been eliminated from further consideration.

TABLE 8.1: Types of Student Backgrounds Mentioned in People's Daily, by Year

Student Type	Rate of Reference Per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Type		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Worker	52	59	4	38	46	11
"Worker-Peasant-Soldier"	41	20	2	48	23	6
Peasant	11	31	2	24	51	8
Educated Youth	1	21	6	3	21	14
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

The categories "worker" and "peasant" seem fairly straightforward. Workers are those who have been employed in a variety of primarily manual laboring occupations in factories, service industries, construction, transportation, and so on. Peasants are those whose main economic activity has been direct agricultural production. But the interpretation of these designations is made problematic because of the practice of reclassifying as workers or peasants young people from urban areas (regardless of their class background) who had worked in factories or who had gone to the countryside for two or more years as part of the rustication program. Thus, many of the "workers" and "peasants" on university campuses in the early and mid 1970's may have been reclassified urban youths.

The interpretation of the category of worker-peasant-soldier students is even more problematic. It is clearly a normative appelation which reflects the regime's policy of compensatory favoritism for persons from proletarian backgrounds. But a catch-all category like this can be used to hide a multitude of divergences from official prescriptions. In a time when a significant portion of the Chinese leadership felt the need to utilize higher education to the best possible advantage in promoting economic development, while another significant, and perhaps overlapping, portion of the leadership felt that higher education should be used as a mechanism for the redistribution of social opportunities, the appeal of such a category should not be underestimated. One of the most likely

divergences from official prescriptions in student recruitment is the large scale use of influence by cadres in order to have their own or their friends' children recalled from the countryside and assigned to colleges and universities. Kent estimates that "almost all" of the students in one teachers' college in 1975 were the children of cadres, and the Chinese press was full of accounts in the mid 1970's of cadres "going by the back door." Several writers have suggested that while the recommendation model of student recruitment was intended to benefit children of workers and peasants, it operated primarily to the advantage of cadres and their families (see, for example, Bratton; Shirk).

This phenomenon was the topic of a satirical play, "If I Really Were" (Jiaru Wo Shi Zhende), performed in Shanghai in the late 1970's, and subsequently banned. In it, a rusticated youth almost succeeds in having himself recalled from his miserable village life by pretending to be the son of a Central Committee member. His deception is discovered and he winds up in a lot of trouble, but he questions what the outcome would have been "if he really were" what he had pretended to be.

Li Xiaozhang, the protagonist of the play, would be considered an educated youth; that is, an urban youth who had been rusticated upon graduation from lower or higher middle school. By the middle of the 1970's, well over ten million urban young people had been transferred to rural villages or state farms (see, for example, Bernstein), and

only a small proportion of them had any chance of returning legally to the cities for employment or further education. Large numbers of educated youth returned to the cities illegally, however, and created serious problems of delinquency and unemployment. There were numerous problems with the program in the rural areas, as well.

As the data in Table 8.1 indicate, workers were mentioned a great deal in People's Daily in both 1971 and 1975, but there were very few references to workers during 1978.

Worker-peasant-soldier students were mentioned a great deal in 1971, perhaps because colleges and universities had newly reopened, and students were being selected through the recommendation process. Thus, emphasis was being given to the fact that greater numbers of young people from proletarian backgrounds were being enrolled in higher education institutions than had been the case in the past.

In 1975, references to worker-peasant-soldier students were less common and appeared in a smaller proportion of articles than in 1971. And in 1978, there were only a handful of references to such students.

Peasants were referred to considerably more in 1975 than in 1971. This is consistent with data presented above about the frequency of references to agricultural universities, to the goal of increasing agricultural production, and to agricultural curricula during 1975. As with the other student types, references to peasants were very infrequent during 1978.

Educated youth were hardly referred to at all during 1971, but they were mentioned relatively often in 1975. This reflects the difficulties with the rustication program and central leaders' attempts to provide some continuing educational opportunities for young people who had been sent to the countryside.

The discussion now turns to the question whether these student types are associated with one or the other of the school types. The underlying concern is whether students are distributed within the stratified educational system in a way which corresponds to their social origins. This analysis begins by considering the extent to which references to the different student types tend to occur together.

Table 8.2 shows, for 1971, the percentage of paragraphs containing at least one reference to a particular student type which also contain at least one reference to another student type. Thus, of the 55 paragraphs which contain a reference to workers, 20% contain a reference to peasants as well, and 5.4% contain a reference to worker-peasant-soldier students.

However, of the 13 paragraphs containing a reference to peasants, fully 86% also referred to workers and only 15.4% referred to worker-peasant-soldier students. And of 44 paragraphs referring at least once to worker-peasant-soldier students, only 6.8% referred to workers and only 4.5% also referred to peasants.

TABLE 8.2: Of Paragraphs with One or More References to a Particular Student Background, Percent Containing One or More References to Another Student Background - 1971

Student Types	Worker	Peasant	Worker-Peasant-Soldier	(n)
Worker	--	20.0	5.4	(55)
Peasant	86.4	--	15.4	(13)
Worker-Peasant-Soldier	6.8	4.5	--	(44)

It would seem, then, that peasants tended only to be mentioned in conjunction with workers, in phrases referring to "workers and peasants," while workers were mentioned quite frequently in isolation from other student types. Worker-peasant-soldier students were referred to in conjunction with other student types least of all. This suggests that they were perceived as somehow distinct by People's Daily writers during 1971.

For 1975, the intercorrelations of student types are more complicated, partly because references to educated youth are included in the analysis. Table 8.3 shows, for 1975, the percentage of paragraphs containing at least one reference to a particular student type which also contain at least one reference to another type.

In 1975, peasants seem to have considerably more in the way of an independent status; of the 32 paragraphs with references to peasants, only 43.7% also refer to workers. The corresponding figure for 1971 was 86.4%.

Of the 49 paragraphs referring to workers in 1975, 28.5% refer also to peasants while only 4.1% refer to worker-peasant-soldier students and 4.1% refer to educated youth. Workers and peasants, then, are the two student types most often mentioned together by People's Daily writers.

Of 25 paragraphs mentioning worker-peasant-soldier students, only 8% mention workers also, and 12% mention peasants also. No references to educated youth occur together with references to worker-peasant-soldier students. This suggests that worker-peasant-soldier students and educated youth were perceived by People's Daily writers to be the least similar of the student types.

Finally, of 18 paragraphs referring to educated youth, 11.1% referred also to workers and 22.2% referred also to peasants; as stated above, none also referred to worker-peasant-soldier students. Thus, educated youth were most commonly identified with peasants by People's Daily writers. This result is not surprising, given the characterization of educated youth as urban young people who had gone or been sent to the countryside and expected to "put down roots" in the rural villages.

TABLE 8.3: Of Paragraphs with One or More References to a Particular Student Background, Percent Containing One or More References to Another Student Background - 1975

Student Type Mentioned	Student Type Also Mentioned				
	Worker	Peasant	Worker-Peasant-Soldier	Educated Youth	(n)
Worker	--	28.5	4.1	4.1	(49)
Peasant	43.7	--	9.4	12.5	(32)
Worker-Peasant Soldier	8.0	12.0	--	0.0	(25)
Educated Youth	11.1	22.2	0.0	--	(18)

It will be argued below that if the worker-peasant-soldier students represent the "chosen" in the competition for the scarce places in China's traditional higher education institutions, the educated youth represent the "banished," those who were shipped to the countryside, whose chances for reassignment to city jobs or further education were very slim, and whose disaffection from the system posed serious problems for the authorities during the mid 1970's. This depiction depends, however, on a consideration of the associations of these student types with traditional and non-traditional higher education institutions. The discussion now turns to this issue.

Table 8.4 presents the crosstabulations of references to these types of student backgrounds with traditional and non-traditional schools during 1971 and 1975. Loglinear analysis is utilized to explore the patterns of relationships within Table 8.4. The models tested on these data are as follows:

TABLE 8.4: Year by Student Types by School Types

Year	Student Types	Traditional Schools	Non-Traditional Schools	
			NO	YES
1971	NONE	NO	212	50
		YES	14	4
	GNBING	NO	28	4
		YES	10	1
	PEASANT	NO	3	8
		YES	2	.5
	WORKER	NO	28	21
		YES	3	3
	EDYOUTH	NO	.5	1
		YES	1	.5
1975	NONE	NO	97	57
		YES	45	6
	GNBING	NO	15	3
		YES	7	.5
	PEASANT	NO	3	11
		YES	14	3
	WORKER	NO	2	38
		YES	7	3
	EDYOUTH	NO	1	11
		YES	1	5

NOTE: Sampling zeros are replaced by the value .5.

Model	Terms Included	Likelihood Statistic	Degrees of Freedom	P
1	(YGT /YGN /GTN /YTN)	4.67	4	.32
2	(YGT /YGN /YTN)	9.69	8	.29
3	(YGT /GTN /YTN)	16.05	8	.042
4	(YGN /GTN /YTN)	13.22	8	.10
5	(YGT /YGN /GTN)	14.65	5	.012
6	(GT/ GN /YTN)	42.79	20	.0022

Model 1 is the model of all three-way interactions, while Models 2-5 exclude one of the interaction terms at a time. The largest declines in the fit of Model 1 result from dropping the terms (YGN) and (YTN) from Models 3 and 5, respectively.

Model 6 tests the idea that the student types are associated with traditional schools and with non-traditional schools in ways which do not vary substantially across time. This model fits very badly, and an adequate solution for the data in Table 8.4 seems to require three of the four interaction terms. Model 2 is the best fitting of these models, and it indicates that:

1) The relationship of the student types to traditional schools is different in 1971 than it is in 1975;

2) The relationship of the student types to the non-traditional schools is different in 1971 than it is in 1975; and,

3) The relationship between traditional and non-traditional schools varies across time, as described in Chapter 4.

In order to fill out this characterization of the associations between students' backgrounds and the schools they attend, it is necessary to look at each student type in turn.

In both 1971 and 1975, worker-peasant-soldier students tend to be positively associated with the traditional schools and to be strongly negatively associated with the non-traditional schools. If one takes the official Chinese media at face value, then young people from actual worker backgrounds, peasant backgrounds, and PLA backgrounds make up this category of students. However, a great deal of evidence, both direct and indirect and from a variety of sources, indicates that the recommendation process of student recruitment utilized during the early and mid 1970's was abused on a vast scale by political cadres for the benefit of their own and their friends' children. It is likely, then, that a very substantial proportion of students referred to as worker-peasant-soldier students during this period were the children of China's political elite. If this argument is accepted, then there was considerable correspondence between these young people's social origins and their distribution within the stratified higher education system. It should be pointed out, also, that many real workers and peasants were probably included in the worker-peasant-soldier classification, and that the proportions of young people of truly proletarian origins may well have been higher during the early

and mid 1970's than prior to the Cultural Revolution. The real losers in the intense competition for spaces in traditional institutions were the children of China's educated elite who could no longer use high scores on standardized entrance examinations to overcome the deficiencies of their class backgrounds.

References to workers were strongly positively associated with non-traditional schools (particularly with the July 21 Workers' Universities) during both 1971 and 1975. This designation, of course, generally refers to the current occupational status of these students, and does not have any necessary connection with the class labels of the families in which they grew up. It is clear, though, that this kind of education was not considered a qualification for entry into the occupational elite.

The association of workers with traditional schools is very weak and does not contribute much to the pattern of data in Table 8.4.

References to peasants were strongly associated with non-traditional schools during 1971, but in 1975 they were strongly associated with the traditional schools. This association with traditional schools in 1975 is due primarily to the large number of articles dealing with agricultural universities in that year. Of the 18 references to peasants which co-occur with references to traditional schools, 12 are with agricultural universities.

Educated youth, hardly mentioned in 1971, received considerable attention in 1975. The association of references to them with traditional schools is near zero, but they are strongly positively associated with the non-traditional schools. Shirk (1979) suggested that the millions of rusticated youth still in the countryside in the late 1970's constituted a potential interest group in the competition for China's scarce resources. But interest groups need organization and adequate communication with each other in order to make effective demands on the system. Educated youth lacked these things, and in the mid-1970's the response of central authorities to the manifest problems with the rustication program and the alienation of many rusticated youth was to offer them--not the urban jobs and university places they wanted--but correspondence courses in Mao thought, rural electrification, and so on.

In 1978, as noted above, there were very few references to any of these student types. The return to the use of nationally standardized entrance examinations imposed severe limitations on the compensatory favoritism which had been accorded to experienced workers and peasants, and age limits for applicants further reduced the chances of college admission for people already in the workforce. Among children of cadre families, many of the least academically able were probably screened out by the examinations; thus, the proportion of cadre children in higher education institutions probably fell somewhat as a result of the changes in admissions procedures and criteria. (See the discussion of this issue in Chapter 2.) The return to standardized

examinations was clearly of benefit to children of the intelligentsia, who were most likely to score well on them; the examinations were a symbol of victory, and at the same time, one of the fruits of victory, for the pro-New Class segments of the Chinese leadership. Several articles during 1978 pointed out that the importance of home education had increased because of the "Gang of Four's" disruption of the schools during the Cultural Revolution Decade. Thus the high proportion of college students coming from well-educated (i.e., non-proletatian) households was an understandable but temporary phenomenon. As order was restored to the schools, it was argued, the preparation of students from proletarian backgrounds would improve, and their representation in colleges and universities would increase.

In a definitional sleight of hand, however, the current regime has included intellectuals as "part of the working class." Thus they can cite very high percentages of students who come from proletarian backgrounds, but a breakdown by whether students' parents worked in manual or non-manual occupations would probably look rather different.

B. Occupational Placements and the Schools

This section is concerned with the occupational placements of graduates of traditional and non-traditional schools. It was clear from the patterns of economic and political-ideological goals associated with traditional and non-traditional schools that only the traditional higher education institutions could allocate their graduates to occupational positions which could be regarded as social

advancement. It is of course one of the central links in theories of educational correspondence that the graduates of different kinds of schools enter the occupational structure at levels roughly equivalent to the kinds of training they have received.

The present research included occupational placement of graduates as one of the dimensions of higher education to be analyzed. Unfortunately, the data gathered for this dimension are much poorer than for the goals of higher education and the content of higher education. People's Daily has very little of a specific nature to say about the kinds of jobs to which graduates of higher education institutions are assigned. Rather, only the most general of terms are used.

Table 8.5 summarizes the frequencies with which various occupational placements were mentioned in People's Daily during 1971, 1975 and 1978. As with previous tables of this type, both the rate of reference per 1000 sentences of text coded, and the percentage of articles coded which referred at least once to each placement item, are presented.

What is immediately apparent from Table 8.5 is that there were very few references to any kinds of occupational placements of graduates in either 1971 or 1978. Only in 1975 are there sufficient references to carry out any further statistical analysis.

TABLE 8.5: Types of Occupational Placements Mentioned in People's Daily, by Year

Occupational Placements	Rate of Reference Per 1000 Sentences of Text Coded			Percentage of Articles Referring Once or More to Each Type		
	1971	1975	1978	1971	1975	1978
Production	3	15	2	10	31	3
Commune	3	38	0	7	44	0
Factory	2	11	1	10	18	3
Border Regions	0	11	10	0	5	3
Graduate Study	0	0	18	0	0	17
N of sentences coded	1698	1480	1360			
N of articles coded				29	39	36

In 1971, colleges and universities were just reopening after the tumult of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, they had many entering students but few if any graduates. Under these circumstances, occupational placement was not a particularly salient concern. The few references which were made to assignments to production, to communes, and to factories were almost exclusively associated with non-traditional schools.

By 1975, a substantial number of students were completing their studies in the reformed educational system, and job allocations were of greater concern. References to placement in production and in factories tended to be associated with the non-traditional schools, while references to placement in communes and to border regions tended to occur together with references to traditional schools.

The connection of assignment to communes with traditional schools is due primarily to the large number of references to agricultural universities during 1975; of the 17 paragraphs containing references to both traditional schools and placement in communes, fully 13 involved references to agricultural universities. Thus, there was actually a fairly strong tendency for references to placement in communes not to occur together with references to other kinds of traditional schools.

Assignment to work in border regions was mentioned in two articles late in 1975. People's Daily praised worker-peasant-soldier

students who volunteered for assignment to the physically harsh and culturally different border regions.

Despite claims in the early 1970's that students for traditional schools were to be recruited from productive units and were, upon graduation, to return to those productive units, these data do not lend themselves to the interpretation that graduates of traditional universities and colleges were indeed being assigned to units involved in direct production. It is noteworthy that in no year was there a single reference to graduates entering the administrative apparatus of the state, despite the fact that placement in the bureaucracy must have been a very commonplace occurrence (on this point, see Teiwes).

During 1978, there were very few references to the occupational placement of students. One article described at length how over 200 graduates of colleges and universities in Sichuan had volunteered to take up jobs in Tibet to help build Communism there. Several others referred to the need to carry out ideological work with graduates of higher education institutions so that they would commit their energies to the building of socialism (and accept with enthusiasm their work assignments). This suggests that there may have been considerable discontent about these assignments.

The year 1978 was still a transitional one in terms of college graduates, of course. The post-"Gang of Four" regime had only begun its counter-reform program the year before, and students graduating in

1978 had had a large part of their education during the Cultural Revolution Decade. Students educated (or not educated, as the case may be) during the early and mid 1970's were dubbed a "lost generation" by central leaders in 1978. Under these circumstances, many graduates probably did not receive the kinds of job assignments that they had come to expect.

During the late 1970's a system of occupational inheritance, the ding ti system, was revived and given new official support. Under this system, older workers in a variety of industries were encouraged to retire and were allowed to "leave" a job in the same enterprise to one of their children. This was a way of providing greater opportunities for young people in the urban job market. Industrial jobs are sought after, not only because of their relatively high wages, benefits and security, but also because rural transfer remains a real possibility for the urban unemployed. The current regime is allowing considerably greater latitude for individual entrepreneurial activity in the cities (Schell), thus reducing unemployment and lessening somewhat the need for the rustication program. Fertility declines in urban areas will also help to ease this problem. But industrial jobs in state-run enterprises remain an attractive option for many youth.

In an article about stratification in China, Whyte (1975) suggested that the children of industrial workers stood to gain from the educational reforms of the Cultural Revolution decade; their class

background was good and they had grown up in urban areas where they could take advantage of greater educational oportunities available there. However, one of the effects of the ding ti system would seem to be to encourage children of industrial workers to opt out of the competition for spaces in traditional higher education institutions. This of course would tend to leave the field somewhat more open for the children of China's political elite and educated elite.

While most of the evidence is inferential, it does seem that the traditional schools serve as channels of mobility into the occupational elite, while the non-traditional schools do not. The credibility of the traditional schools was greatly undermined during the early and mid 1970's when employing enterprises found that graduates were ill prepared for their work assignments. The post-"Gang of Four" regime moved quickly to return to pre-Cultural Revolution educational practices, and it openly espoused many aspects of the technocratic ideology against which the Cultural Revolutionary Left had so vigorously struggled.

C. Summary

Having established in earlier chapters the elements of stability and of change in the stratification of China's higher education institutions during the 1970's, this chapter has examined the connections, first, between students' social origins, to the extent that these could be determined, and their educational opportunities

and, second, between students' educational attainments and their occupational placements.

Because People's Daily says very little of a specific nature about either student backgrounds or occupational placements, the data for this chapter are rather limited. Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made.

During 1971, students labeled as workers and as peasants were strongly associated with the non-traditional schools, while students labeled as "worker-peasant-soldier" students were strongly associated with the traditional schools. The results for 1975 were similar, except that references to peasants tended to be associated with agricultural universities.

Worker-peasant-soldier students consisted of young people who had been assigned to work in communes, factories, or the PLA in the late 1960's, and who had then been recalled to higher education through the recommendation process of student recruitment. The recommendation process was quite vulnerable to abuse by high level political cadres, and it seems very likely that a large proportion of worker-peasant-soldier students in the early and mid 1970's were the children of China's political elite.

On the other end of the spectrum were the "educated youth" who had also been sent down to communes and (if they were lucky) factories in the late 1960's and expected to put down roots there. These

students included children of bad class backgrounds and of China's educated (but not politically well-connected) elite. The latter, of course, were those whose chances for higher education were most powerfully affected by the elimination of standardized entrance examinations. Educated youth tended to be almost exclusively associated with non-traditional schools. Central authorities sought to alleviate some of their dissatisfactions with village life in the mid 1970's by providing opportunities for continuing education, but this kind of education was a pale reflection of the university level training and subsequent occupational opportunities they really desired.

It seems almost axiomatic that a paramount elite in any society (such as the Communist Party elite in China during the 1970's) will seek to provide its offspring with the good things that the society can provide, and that they will generally be successful in this effort. With regard to scarce spaces in China's traditional higher education institutions, then, the question would seem to be: Who else, besides the children of the political elite, will have some access to college and university education?

It would seem that, in the early and mid 1970's, greater numbers of young people of truly proletarian origin had access to traditional schools than was the case prior to the Cultural Revolution. This came at the expense of children of China's educated elite, a large proportion of whom were banished to the countryside. In 1978, on the

other hand, children of the educated elite probably regained their prior advantages in access to traditional schools. The reinstitution of standardized entrance examinations, coupled with years of disarray in the primary and secondary school system, meant that home education and environment took on additional importance. Children from already educated families, or from those which could afford private tutoring, were much better prepared for the examinations than others.

People's Daily and Beijing Review asserted in 1978 that these advantages would soon be minimized as order and discipline were restored to lower schools and teaching was strengthened. However, the strengthening of the key point system, and the concentration of resources there, will make it more difficult for the rest of the lower schools to carry out their mission. The key school system is likely to supply the bulk of recruits to China's traditional higher education institutions; hence, the issue of access to the lower key schools must loom very large for Chinese parents. This is a social location in which strong competition and perhaps conflict between the political elite and the educated elite seems almost inevitable.

It has been established in previous chapters that the traditional higher education institutions in China were perceived by writers for People's Daily as the ones which could allocate graduates to positions in, or with career ladders to, the occupational elite. The non-traditional schools provided skills enhancement for manual and low level technical positions in the occupational structure.

Thus, there does seem to be some support, although of a largely inferential nature, for the conclusion that people's educational opportunities do depend, in a general way, on their social origins and that occupational attainments do depend, again in a very general way, on one's educational attainments.

CHAPTER 9

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the course of approximately the last century, a "modern," Western-inspired educational system has become institutionalized in China. The process was begun by the forceful arrival of expansionist Western powers in the middle of the nineteenth century and the Chinese realization that the traditional education system, revolving around the civil examination system, was not adequate to meet the challenges of the West.

An ideology of national strength and material progress through science and technology gained increasing numbers of adherents during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A number of modern schools were established which included such subjects as mathematics and natural science in their curricula, and educational transformation gained momentum with the abolition of the civil examination system in 1905-06.

Another step in the institutionalization of a modern education system came with the establishment of a Ministry of Education in the Nationalist government and the strong commitment of the Ministry, under Ts'ai Yuanp'ei, to the expansion of the schools system at all levels.

Many Chinese went abroad to study, and returned with firsthand knowledge of educational practices in Western countries and in Japan.

These returned students were often accorded great prestige in China, and found numerous occupational avenues open to them. Many of them entered government service, and large numbers became educational professionals.

The expansion of this new educational system continued throughout the Nationalist period and, indeed, under the communists after 1949. But the system remained elitist and urban centered. Most schools above the primary level were located in cities and larger towns and maintained a standard which, as the League of Nations report cited in Chapter 2 pointed out, was far above the "level of the impoverished countryside," and which neglected training in basic literacy and productive skills. In this system, the central government was able to promote its interests in political socialization and bureaucratic control, and the children of relatively well-to-do urban families were able to get a "modern" education which included the study of mathematics, science and foreign languages. But the needs of the rural population and of the urban poor were neglected.

After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the communists faced a fundamental educational dilemma: on the one hand, they had come to power on the basis of an egalitarian ideology and with the large scale support of the peasantry and, to a lesser extent, of the urban proletariat. On the other hand, they were committed to an ambitious program of national reconstruction and industrial expansion. Their egalitarian commitments called for

increasing the educational opportunities of the rural population and the urban poor, while their commitments to modernization called for concentrating scarce resources in the system of modern schools they inherited from the earlier period. Their general solution has been to concentrate central energies on the state-run schools at all levels, and to encourage localities and neighborhoods to operate under the principle of "self-reliance" by establishing and running schools of their own.

Because these various alternatives to the state-run schools did not prepare their students as well for entry into what are called here the traditional higher education institutions, the question of equality of opportunity has inevitably arisen. The Party, after all, is supposed to be the representative of the interests of the proletariat (including the peasantry) and this would seem to call for insuring proletarian access to educational institutions which serve as conduits into the occupational elite. The ways in which a modern educational system had been institutionalized in China served to restrict the access to higher education and to modern sector jobs of children of proletarian backgrounds.

It was argued above that the Cultural Revolution was, in part, an effort to de-institutionalize the modern, state-run educational system and to remake it along the lines of the Yenan model. This involved sharply reducing the institutional autonomy of education: central educational authorities and educational professionals lost control

over the structure of education, the selection of students, the curriculum, and the administration of schools. The Cultural Revolutionary Left sought to shatter the link between different levels of the school system; one's chances of getting into higher education during the early and mid 1970's did not seem to depend on how well one did academically in the lower levels. This was in part an effort to counteract the effects of entrance examinations; lower level schools were concerned to have as high a proportion as possible of their students continue into the next higher rung of the educational ladder, and they tended to gear their curricula to what was tested on the entrance examinations. By doing away with the examinations and severing the links between secondary and tertiary schooling, curricular reform would be easier to implement.

The goals of the Cultural Revolution reforms in education were to make education more relevant to the Maoist model of economic development, and to increase the opportunities of formerly disprivileged classes for higher education. In a sense, the Cultural Revolutionary Left sought to redefine the social charters of the schools. One result of the educational reforms, however, seems to have been that societal confidence in the ability of the traditional schools to live up to the economic side of their charter was seriously undermined when the products of the new system took up job assignments for which they were ill-prepared.

Many of the issues of concern in this paper can be discussed within the context of a general correspondence theory of educational stratification. The correspondence thesis is that a society's educational institutions tend to be stratified in a way which corresponds to the overall stratification order of the society. Young people receive differing kinds and degrees of education, depending on their social origins, and their educational experiences reinforce class subcultures learned in the home. Finally, young people move into the stratified occupational order at levels which correspond roughly to their social origins and their educational attainments.

The correspondence thesis, as propounded by Bowles (1971), Karabel (1972), and other neo-Marxists, has been applied primarily to so-called capitalist societies and is closely related to the class reproduction arguments of Bourdieu (1973). The general thesis is clearly applicable to socialist societies as well. It is not the burden of this paper to provide a test of this theory; rather, the correspondence thesis points to a series of questions around which a summary of the results of this investigation of Chinese higher educational policy can be organized. The key propositions of the correspondence thesis can be rephrased as five questions:

1) In what ways can the society under investigation be considered to be stratified?

2) In what ways is its educational system stratified?

3) To what extent is there a connection between young people's social origins and their access to educational opportunities?

4) To what extent do the schools reinforce class subcultures learned in the home?

5) To what extent do occupational attainments depend on educational attainments?

The results of the present research through content analysis as well as other primary and secondary data will be utilized to address each of these questions in turn.

1) Stratification in Chinese Society

The term stratification, of course, is used in a variety of ways in the sociological literature; it generally refers to the structuring of social inequality in a given society or between societies. In terms of its occupational order, China is clearly a stratified society (see, for example, the work of Howe [1973], Whyte [1975], and Korzec and Whyte [1981] on wage patterns). Differing levels of material and non-material rewards are consistently attached to different occupational positions.

China is politically stratified as well, with Party leaders at the top and counterrevolutionaries and other bad elements at the bottom. Not all positions are fixed in this system, of course; intellectuals were vilified as the "stinking ninth category" during

the Cultural Revolution, and praised as some of China's most valuable resources in the post-"Gang of Four" period.

Stratification often also refers to the intergenerational transmission of status. Considerable status inheritance is built into Chinese society. In the first place, 80% of the population lives in rural villages. Migration restrictions prevent much movement of the rural population into the cities, and the vast majority of children born to peasant families will themselves be peasants. In the cities, industrial enterprises often give preference in hiring to children of their own workers, and the revival of the ding ti system has strengthened this practice. This, too, contributes to status inheritance.

In contemporary China, certain groups find themselves with privileged access to the good things the society has to offer, while others are disprivileged in this regard. There are a number of ways, then, in which social inequality is structured into contemporary Chinese society.

2) Educational Stratification

It was argued above that the Cultural Revolutionary Left sought during the early and mid 1970's to create a unified educational system based on the Yenan model of part-work, part-study schools. However, even during this period of radical assault on the elitism of the state-run educational system, articles about higher education in People's

Daily presented considerably different images of the traditional and non-traditional schools.

The non-traditional schools were perceived primarily as places where skills directly applicable to productive activities were taught, and where political-ideological study could be promoted. In traditional schools, on the other hand, there was much greater concern with the more abstract economic goals, such as promoting advances in science and technology.

In the post-"Gang of Four" period, there has been a strong commitment to educational diversification. Traditional schools are to concentrate on science and technology at their higher levels and create a large pool of highly trained experts. Non-traditional schools are to concentrate on skills directly applicable to production, and no pretense is made that these schools are in any way equivalent to the traditional ones.

The reinstitution of key point schools also increases the hierarchical nature of the current educational system. These schools are seen as superior to the regular state-run schools; they get extra state funding, hire the best qualified teachers and staff, and recruit the academically best prepared students. Part-work, part-study schools continue to exist outside the state-run system, since the state-run schools cannot accommodate all the young people in the age cohort. Private tutors are increasingly common for those who can afford their services.

Rural schools receive little, if any, financial support from the central government, and their graduates for the most part are ill-prepared to compete with young people from state-run urban schools for places in traditional higher education institutions.

During the Cultural Revolution Decade, then, there were efforts to reduce the hierarchical nature of China's education system, but even in this period the traditional and non-traditional schools continued to be perceived in different terms. In the period since the overthrow of the "Gang of Four," the Chinese leadership has returned explicitly to a diversified and hierarchical educational system.

3) Social Origins and Educational Opportunities

If contemporary Chinese society can be considered stratified in some senses, and if the educational system too is stratified, what then of the connection between young people's social origins and their access to educational opportunities? In a situation of completely equal educational opportunity, the proportions of young people of different social backgrounds in educational institutions would be about the same as the proportions of these different backgrounds in the population as a whole.

However, educational opportunities have never been equally available to all of China's young people. The discrepancies between rural and urban areas are the most obvious in this regard, since "regular" schools have been concentrated in urban areas. Rural areas

have generally been expected to operate schools with resources generated locally, and have been encouraged to orient their curricula to locally needed production skills. This kind of educational experience may well be of use to them in their lives as peasants, but it also assures that rural young people will not be able to compete for places in schools which could allocate them to elite positions in the modern industrial and state-bureaucratic sectors of the occupational structure.

In the urban areas, too, educational opportunities have been differentially available. Community-run schools have continued to exist alongside state-run schools, since the latter could not accommodate everyone seeking an education. But the community-run schools have been quite inferior to the state-run schools in terms of facilities, resources and teachers. Many young people blocked from attending state-run schools because of their class backgrounds attended community-run schools, but their chances of returning to the regular school system at a higher level were quite limited. However, in the entrepreneurial 1980's, the establishment of private "prep" schools of high quality for the children of the well-to-do does not seem out of the question.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, entrance examinations were an important criterion in deciding which students would continue on from primary school into secondary school, and from lower into higher secondary schools. China is no exception to the world-wide tendency

for children from well educated households to do better on academically oriented examinations than children from other backgrounds; children of the educated elite had a decided advantage in the competition to move into the higher levels of China's state-run school system. But class background was also an important selection criterion, and children of the intelligentsia were generally lower on this measure than the children of cadres or proletarian children.

During the Cultural Revolution, and in its aftermath, entrance examinations were abolished and greater weight was given to the class background criterion in student selection. This worked to the disadvantage of intelligentsia youth, while it favored the children of political cadres and of proletarian backgrounds.

In the years immediately preceeding the Cultural Revolution, the competition for seats in traditional higher education institutions became very intense because the number of secondary school graduates increased much more rapidly than the number of college admissions. The abolition of entrance examinations at this level dealt a serious blow to the opportunities of children of the educated elite, and many of them were summarily shipped off to the countryside in 1969 and 1970.

The adoption of the recommendation model of recruitment for college and university students was supposed to increase the representation of young people from worker and peasant backgrounds in traditional higher education institutions. But considerable evidence

points to the conclusion that it worked primarily to the benefit of children of political cadres. Content analysis data reported here indicated that students identified as workers and peasants were mentioned much more often in the context of non-traditional schools than in the context of traditional ones. At the same time, worker-peasant-soldier students, whom it has been argued were probably largely from cadre families, were most often associated with the traditional higher education institutions.

One of the primary effects of the reforms in education, then, would seem to have been to increase the opportunities for vocational training (and, along with it, for ideological study) for young people of proletarian backgrounds, and to increase the proportion of children of the political elite in traditional higher education institutions at the expense of the children of the educated elite.

The pro-New Class policies of the post-"Gang of Four" period encourage an even greater correspondence between social origins and educational opportunities. Rural schools are supposed to concentrate on teaching agricultural knowledge, and industries are encouraged to run schools for the children of their own workers; these schools will gear their curricula toward knowledge needed in their particular industries and will recruit workers from among their graduates. The state-run, college preparatory schools are again divided into regular and key schools, and academic achievement is the primary criterion for advancement. Criteria for higher education admissions are geared so

that both the children of the educated elite and the academically more able children of the political elite will be represented.

4) Class Subcultures and the Schools

The question of the extent to which schools reinforce class subcultures can be addressed only briefly here.

When an industrial enterprise operates a school for the children of its own workers, the connection between home life and school experiences would seem to be rather direct. The same could be said for a school run by an agricultural production brigade. In both cases, the student body is quite homogeneous, and the social background of the teachers is probably fairly close to that of the students. At the other end of the scale, in urban key schools the student body is again probably fairly homogeneous; most students will come from well educated families. Likewise, the teachers and administrators at these schools will be better qualified than those in regular schools, and will be well aware of their elite status. Their educational background may well be similar to that of the parents of their students, and everyone involved is likely to embrace the meritocratic ideology that being educated makes one more valuable to society.

During the early and mid 1970's, there was considerable emphasis on open door schooling at the college and university level. Having students spend time in production units in industrial enterprises, or participate in agricultural production, would tend to decrease the

amount of time they spent attending to lessons by professional educators. Open door schooling, then, probably had the effect of reducing the extent of reinforcement of class subcultures in traditional schools during this period. The elimination of these kinds of activities in the post-"Gang of Four" period, and the return to standard classroom learning with professional teachers probably means that students encounter a more homogeneous environment than when open door activities were stressed.

5) Educational Attainment and Occupational Attainment

The question of the connection between educational attainments and occupational attainments is difficult to answer. The content analysis data on occupational placements presented in Chapter 8 are quite limited. People's Daily has little of a specific nature to say about the occupational placements of graduates. Still, the general outlines of an answer can be suggested.

Certainly the majority of students in rural primary and secondary schools will remain peasants, but this has more to do with their having been born in rural China than with their educational attainments. It is, however, fair to say that the education they receive in rural schools does not equip them very well to compete with urban youngsters for educational experiences leading to modern sector jobs.

The operation of schools by industrial enterprises is an effort to tie educational attainment directly to occupational attainment.

The curricula of these schools are oriented directly to applicability in those industries, and the schools recruit primarily from the children of workers in the enterprises themselves. This tendency toward direct status inheritance is further strengthened by the operation of the ding ti system.

The content analysis data for 1975 indicated that students labeled as workers and as peasants were associated with job assignments in factories and in "production." Worker-peasant-soldier students, however, tended to be dissociated from such assignments. The implication is that they were assigned to higher status, non-manual occupations. In a similar vein, criticisms of seeking self advancement through higher education tended to occur in the context of references to traditional higher education institutions, and tended not to occur in the context of references to non-traditional schools. The implication seems clear; the traditional schools were chartered to assign graduates to occupations which could be considered social advancement, while the non-traditional schools were not.

It seems clear that opposition to the Cultural Revolution reforms in education was growing in the mid-1970's. This growing opposition was probably related to the fact that a stream of graduates was beginning to flow from the reformed colleges and universities, and these young people were taking up job assignments. In general, the graduates of the "new" educational system had a much lower level of specialized training than their predecessors, and they were often ill-

prepared to take up the economic tasks they were assigned. In 1978, the graduates of this period were characterized as a "lost generation." Thus, in the mid-1970's, societal confidence in the ability of the reformed traditional higher education institutions to live up to the economic side of their charters was seriously eroded.

The dictatorship of the proletariat campaign may well have been related to this widespread criticism of the quality of graduates of the new educational system. Consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat meant insuring that the possessors of proletarian virtue (e.g. graduates of the reformed educational system), rather than the possessors of high level cultural capital (e.g. the graduates of the pre-Cultural Revolution education system and other professionals), occupy positions of power in the society.

Many of the reforms in education implemented in the wake of the Cultural Revolution were intended to lessen the correspondence between social origins, educational experiences, and occupational attainments. A large part of this effort centered around restricting the opportunities of children of the educated elite to reproduce their parents' status, and providing greater opportunity for children from proletarian backgrounds to attend colleges and universities. While the numbers of workers and peasants on college campuses probably did increase somewhat, it appears that the major beneficiaries were the children of political cadres. But even while the Cultural Revolutionary Left was pushing for the creation of a unified

educational system based on the part-work, part-study model, articles in People's Daily continued to reflect the perception that traditional and non-traditional schools really were different in the students they recruited, in the content of their curricula, and in the futures to which they could allocate their graduates.

In addition to these issues of educational correspondence, this paper has also been concerned with the issue of the relationship between the educated elite and the political elite in contemporary Chinese society. Taken together, these two elites constitute the most privileged stratum in Chinese society (with the exception of some former capitalists who continue to enjoy very high incomes and whose managerial and entrepreneurial skills are being drawn upon by the current regime), and this is a factor favorable to the formation of alliances between the two. Further, there are important similarities in some of the dimensions of the ideologies with which each elite justifies its claims to authority in Chinese society. Both the political elite and the educated elite define themselves as contributing in crucial ways to the economic modernization of the country, and the authority claims of each are bound up with what Bauman (1974) has called "futuristic legitimation."

On the other hand, the political elite and the educated elite remain in competition for some of China's resources, including educational opportunities for their children. Also, the bases of their authority differ in important ways. For members of the

political elite, their relationship to the Communist Party is decisive, while for members of the educated elite, their possession of cultural capital--of knowledge socially recognized as authoritative--is most important.

Because the Communist Party maintains branches within all organizations in China, and the branch secretaries enjoy considerable power within those organizations, there are many spheres of activity in which the authority of the Party is continuously counterposed to the authority of specialized expertise.

The "red-expert" issue is a longstanding one in Chinese society (see, for example, Schurmann): how much control over decision-making will the experts have, and how much will the Party representatives have? Technical experts tend to resent interference in what they see as basically "technical" decisions within their areas of expertise, while political cadres take into account a range of concerns which the technical experts can exclude from their deliberations.

In industrial enterprises, the red-expert conflict can be especially acute. This is an area in which the importance of technical expertise is widely acknowledged. At the same time, factories are the quintessential home of the proletariat, in whose name the Party acts. While the research reported here has not been focused on Party-New Class relations in industry, some of the data can be addressed to this issue.

In the early and mid 1970's, many articles about higher education placed great emphasis on the goal of solving immediate production problems in various industrial settings. Efforts to make the curricula of higher education more directly applicable to production were praised, and a large number of disparaging comments were made about "experts" (or even "bourgeois experts") in the factories whose knowledge was too theoretical to be very useful. Far superior to these bourgeois experts, the articles claimed, were experienced workers given some technical training in the reformed educational system. The Maoist goal of training technicians from among experienced workers was billed as a way to counter the domination of bourgeois experts in the factories.

July 21 Workers' Universities played a big part in this effort. Their curricula included not only technical training but also large doses of political-ideological study. This represents one part of the Cultural Revolutionary Left's assault on the New Class in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. The scarcity value of the knowledge possessed by the technical experts would be reduced and the political reliability of portions of the workforce could be increased at the same time. In its conflict with the New Class and with pro-New Class segments of the Party, the Cultural Revolutionary Left sought an alliance with the industrial workforce during the early and mid 1970's.

The red-expert conflict is also played out in the educational sphere. The idea of institutional autonomy is relevant here; those who are full-time professionals in a particular field want to have as much control as possible over the everyday operations of the organizations within which they work, and over the evaluations of their efficacy in pursuing their goals. The greater the control of insiders over these things, the greater is their institutional autonomy. Conversely, the greater the control of outsiders over these things, the less is their institutional autonomy. Since institutions, in this sense of the term, are organized around basic societal needs, there are inherent limitations on institutional autonomy. Education, for example, is commonly not a self-supporting institution; its activities must often be funded from outside, and the funding sources often demand some control over goals and evaluations if not over everyday operations.

In the Chinese case, the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath represented an effort to sharply reduce the institutional autonomy of the modern, state-run educational system and to subject it to greater political control. The scope of authority of professional educators--core members of the New Class--was reduced a great deal during the early 1970's, and the results of their efforts in earlier years, when they enjoyed more autonomy, were harshly criticized.

But while the autonomy of professional educators and administrators was reduced, the educational system, even in its

reformed state in the early 1970's, could not be operated without their participation. And as the 1970's wore on, they did what they could to help the reforms fail, on the one hand, and to restore the situation prior to the Cultural Revolution, on the other. There was pressure throughout the early and mid 1970's to find a politically acceptable way to utilize examinations to screen candidates for higher education. Professional educators continued to stress the importance of academic standards even while the length of schooling was shortened and the curriculum was infused with large doses of political-ideological study, participation in labor, and open door activities.

Following the death of Mao Zedong and the purge of the "Gang of Four" in 1976, of course, the new regime adopted a very pro-New Class stance. A campaign to achieve the "four modernizations" by the end of the century was launched and the educated elite was called upon to play a central role in this effort. Intellectuals were officially redefined to be "a part of the working class," and the Party promised to recruit more intellectuals into its ranks.

The control of professional educators over educational affairs was also greatly increased. Revolutionary Committees and Worker Propaganda Teams were withdrawn from the schools and teachers were encouraged to restore "revolutionary order and discipline" in the classroom.

The current situation, then, is characterized by an alliance between pro-New Class segments of the political elite and the educated

elite. The post-"Gang of Four" regime has tried to appeal to virtually all segments of the population, promising improvements in living standards, educational opportunities, and so on. But they still must operate within the constraints of scarcity of important resources, and it is difficult to see how they will be able to satisfy what seem to be competing claims for those resources.

In education, the reinstitution of the key point system has meant the concentration of state resources--both material and human--in the key schools to the detriment of non-key schools. Entrance examinations are being used at all levels of the system, and special schools for the children of cadres are being run. Under these circumstances, the children of the educated elite and of the political elite will be the preponderant groups in the traditional higher education institutions, and children from less privileged backgrounds (including children from less well educated cadre families) will find access to educational experiences leading into the occupational elite very restricted.

Even for the children of elite families, however, the competition to enter colleges and universities is going to be intense, given the proportionately small number of college seats available. Some downward mobility would seem to be inevitable under these circumstances, and the relative weight assigned to different admissions criteria will have a lot to do with who is forced out and down.

Two factors could help to alleviate the pressure for downward mobility for children of the educated and the political elite. First, a gradual expansion of elite positions in the society as a whole could provide some opportunities for children of current elites to reproduce their parents' status, or for upward mobility for young people from less privileged backgrounds. Second, current elites can restrict their own fertility; there is some evidence that this is happening in urban areas and among better educated groups in China.

From the mid 1960's until the late 1970's, the rustication program was the primary way in which the central authorities dealt with the large numbers of urban youths for whom neither further educational opportunities nor urban jobs could be provided. The post-"Gang of Four" regime has allowed for considerably greater individual and familial initiative in the creation of urban jobs, primarily in the service sector. This is one way of expanding the economic options of the urban populace and allowing many young people to avoid rural transfer. If current population planning efforts are fairly successful in urban areas, there will be less need for the rustication program than in the past.

Many Western scholars and journalists like to believe that the "moderates" have finally won a decisive victory over the "radicals" in the Chinese leadership, and that the current alliance between the educated elite and the pro-New Class segments of the Party (the "moderates") will be an enduring one. Certainly, they have enough

interests in common that this alliance will be a recurring, if not an enduring, one.

However, there are also inherent structural cleavages between the political and educated elites which make recurring periods of latent and manifest conflict between them likely as well. Their claims to authority are overlapping but not identical, and they have differing sets of potential allies among the other important groups and classes in Chinese society. Further, ascent into the political elite from the peasantry or the urban working class remains fairly common. Thus, if the educated elite comes to be made up primarily of children from privileged backgrounds, the political elite will probably remain more open to infusions from less privileged strata. Certain segments of the political elite, then, are likely to continue to identify their interests with those of the peasantry and the industrial proletariat, or at least to speak in the name of these groups when they find their own interests jeopardized by those possessing high levels of cultural capital.

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