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HONOLULU (Jan. 31) — Japan has been an active contributor to the United States’ war on terror. Tokyo has moved far beyond merely opening its pocketbook in support of the U.S. as it did in the first Gulf War, and has been testing the limits of its postwar constitution on the deployment of its troops overseas. But, one Japan expert says to suggest Japan will become the “Britain of Asia” in its support of U.S. policy is off the mark.
Paul Midford, an associate professor and director of the Japan Program at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, says in the wake of post-9/11 events “the Japanese public has evolved away from an uncompromising pacifist opposition to all wars.” But, Midford says the change has not been a complete about face. He sees Japan’s public accepting “a more discriminating defensive realist view that recognizes military power as useful primarily for homeland defense.” That same public believes, however, offensive military power does not “have much utility for destroying terrorist networks or suppressing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, or for ‘offensive liberal’ objectives such as promoting democracy or human rights.”
Midford’s assertions, published as the East-West Center Washington Policy Studies 27 “Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy”, may seem to contradict conventional wisdom, especially in Washington, given the more hawkish stance of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his successor Shintaro Abe. While Abe, and Koizumi before him, talk of rewriting the so-called Peace Constitution to allow Japan to become a “normal military power capable of using military force overseas,” Midford maintains public opinion, something long considered a non-factor in policymaking, will play a significant role in determining how “normal” is defined.
He says policymakers in Tokyo are already divided between the “offensive realist hawks” and “defensive realists who believe the use of military force overseas has little utility and carries significant risks.” Midford says that although Koizumi was able to deploy the country’s Self-Defense Forces (the euphemistic name of Japan’s military) to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, “public opinion empowered the defensive realists, allowing them to successfully delay, curtail, and block altogether military roles and missions desired by the hawks.”
To the chagrin of many in Washington, and hawks in Tokyo, the SDF have been limited to non-combat deployments and have provided no direct support for U.S. combat operations in Iraq. Midford points out the Iraqi mission was initially “conceived of as supporting the American military,” but was “redefined as a humanitarian relief and reconstruction mission.” He adds the operations “consequently ended up having more in common with U.S. Peace Corps operations than with military operations.” And this, according to Midford, was in large part the result of the “defensive realists” riding public opinion to gain influence.
Midford acknowledges that public opinion can change. But, he sees this “defensive realist” awareness being around for awhile. “In the short term,” he notes, “the influence of public opinion will grow stronger as the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party, the ruling conservative party in Japan) tries to gain public acceptance for amending the constitution.” He believes the Japanese government “is especially unlikely to endorse ambitious overseas deployments that might implicate the use of force, since this might provoke a resurgence of antimilitarist distrust” toward government. Already such hoped for ambitious changes such as recognizing the right to collective self-defense, something that would allow the SDF to conduct joint combat operations with U.S. forces overseas, have become “increasingly unlikely,” according to Midford.
Over the longer-term, the defensive realists’ views will have major implications for “Tokyo’s evolving security strategy, as well as its alliance with the Washington and U.S. policymakers.” Midford sees the Japanese strengthening the SDF in order to militarily deter “a North Korean attack or Chinese infringement on Japanese territory.” But, this more robust posture would not signal public acceptance of playing a “military role in joint combat operations with U.S. forces or stand-along security and stabilization mission in theaters such as Iraq that are far from Japan and involve missions not directly linked to (Japanese) territorial defense.”
Midford also sees the defensive buildup of the SDF as gradually decreasing Japan’s military dependence on the United States. Consequently, Washington’s influence over Tokyo would gradually wane, taking out of play a card long used by politicians in Washington as a means of getting Japanese support for less than popular endeavors.
Another factor Midford has identified is what he calls the “Iraq syndrome.” While leaders in Tokyo and Washington hoped Japanese involvement in Iraq would be a precedent for more ambitious SDF deployments overseas, Midford says it “has become a negative example that the Japanese public, and by extension decision-makers, will seek to avoid repeating in the future. He says much as the “Vietnam syndrome” had Americans shying away from committing U.S. forces to combat overseas for years in the wake of the Vietnam War, an “Iraq syndrome” in “Japan will limit enthusiasm for involvement in U.S.-led military operations far from Japanese soil.”
Many American policymakers, analysts, and observers want to believe that Japan’s adoption of, as Midford puts it, “a more realistic grand strategy and its deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq” are indications that Tokyo will soon provide more combat support for U.S. military operations in conflicts far from Japan. But, according to Midford’s findings, “They will be disappointed.”
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Paul Midford is an associate professor in the department of political science and sociology, and director of the Japan Program, at the Norwegian University for Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway. He can be contacted at midfordp@yahoo.co.jp.
The East-West Center Washington Policy Studies 27 “Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy” is available in PDF and print editions. The PDF copies can be accessed through the East-West Center Washington at www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang, Singapore 119614 (website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg).
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