Papers: Jung Chang Young, Han Sang-Jin, and In-Taek Hyun: U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS
Date: 01-09-2003
The Partnership between Korea and the United States, the New Economy - A Korean Perspective
Jan. 8. 2003
JUNG Chang Young
(Yonsei University)
1. Retrospective of the partnership
- During the period of 194561, US aid helped greatly the South korean economy by supplying the necessities of life.
- It peaked in 1957 and amounted to 382.9 million dollars. Its ratio to total imports was 86.6 per cent and aid to GNP was 10.4 per cent in the same year.
- Since then aid amount began to diminish until 1971, when aid was terminated. Total amount of economic aid during 19451971 reached 5.7 billion dollars and military aid during the same period amounted to 6.3 billion dollars.
- The US aid during the liberation and war period was mainly for relief and rehabilitation and it contributed greatly to attaining economic stability. The price level decreased in 1957 for the first time.
- Declining aid prompted efforts to mobilize domestic savings by raising interest rates and tax collection, and also to introduce foreign capital.
- During the period of 195971 public loan of 870 million dollars, commercial loan of 1.7 billion dollars and 170 million dollars of FDI were introduced. American shares were 61.7 per cent, 33.6 per cent and 64.7 per cent respectively.
- Around 1965 export-oriented industrialization policy started and export to US amounted to 137.7 million dollars while US aid to Korea 97 million dollars in 1967. The share of exports to US among total exports reached its peak in 1968 recording 52.0 per cent.
- During the period of 194786 total exports to US amounted 80.5 billion dollars while imports from US 65.5 billion dollars, thus recording the trade surplus of 15 billion dollars during the same period. The US provided South Korea the largest market for her export products.
- In capital transactions during the period of 197285 public loan from US reached 3.75 billion dollars which constituted 26.9 per cent of total public loan of 13.9 billion dollars. Commercial loan from the US was 3.4 billion dollars which comprised 12.8 % of total commercial loan of 26.6 billion dollars. American direct investment reached 500 million dollars which was 31.4 % of total FDI of 1.7 billion dollars. The total capital trnsfer of US to Korea was 7.7 billion dollars which was 25.4 % of total trnsfer of 30.3 billion dollars.
- Meanwhile Korea's FDI during 19681986 reached 500 million dollars and investment in the US 180 million dollars which was 35.1 per cent of total FDI.
- In 2001 Korean exports to US amounted to 31.2 billion dollars and imports from US 22.4 billion dollars. The US is Korea's largest trading partner and biggest export market. The US share among total Korean exports was 20.8 per cent in 2001. Korea is the sixth largest export market for US and the fourth market for US agricultural products.
- American direct investment in Korea increased sharply since 1997 especially in financial sector and service industry. It reached 3.89 billion dollars in 2001 which was 32.8 per cent of total FDI.
- Total US direct investment in Korea reached 25.9 billion dollars as of September 2002 which was 30.9 percent of total FDI 83.9 billion dollars.
- Meanwhile Korea investment abroad reached 39 billion dollars among which 10.9 billion dollars (27.9 percent of total FDI) was toward US. It has increased greatly since the early 1990's.
2. Bilateral trade issues
- In the 1960's and 70's trade issues were confined to textiles, clothing and footwear. The US employed quotas and anti-dumping measures to curb imports. Later color TV and steels were also included.
- Besides increasing protective non-tariff barriers, the US began to ask further Korean market opening in agriculture, banking, insurance, telecommunication and property right(IPR's) around the end of 1970's. Korean exports to US under the various NTB's increased from 20% of total exports in 1978 to 45.9 percent in 1982.
- Korean trade surplus over the US increased sharply during the later part of 1980's and it brought about serious trade disputes. Although trade balance turned into deficit during the '90s trade disputes were intensified.
- Current bilateral trade issues are those on automobiles, pharmaceuticals, IPR's and steel. In 2001 automobile exports reached 1.5 billion units while imports were 16,636 units. For the eight months this year imports of foreign passenger vehicles increased by 109.7% reaching 10,460 units. Hyundai is planning to establish an automobile manufacturing plant in Alabama and GM-Daewoo launched a new company. Aggressive marketing by foreign makers is also needed targeting small and medium-size car market which represents more than 70 percent of Korean car market.
- In pharmaceuticals laws and regulations need to be more transparent and consistent. More dialogue with foreign pharmaceutical companies is necessary for mutual understanding.
- Strengthening of IPR's is also important for Korean industrial development.
It is necessary to improve laws and regulations on IPR's, to increase strong enforcement and to emphasize the importance of IPR's to the public.
- U.S. safeguard measure on imported steal products could be resolved through WTO dispute settlement process. Global overcapacity problem need to be solved through multilateral approach.
3. The New economy
- Trade and investment relationship would increase furthur in the coming decades.
- The Korean economy should continue reform and structural adjustment which started since the foreign exchange crisis in 1997 and thus become more open, accountable, transparent liberal market economy.
- Rules, regulations, policies and institutions are continuously being upgraded to meet global standard.
- These are necessary for Korea being the business hub of Northeast Asia, utilizing its strategic location between Japan and China.
- The Korean government made targets for becoming the logistics hub of NE Asia as well as the region's corporate-financial center. It emphasized attracting multinational corporations and financial institutions to establish their Asian headquarters in Korea.
- Strong financial market which is wholly trusted by foreign investors is necessary to introduce huge amount of foreign capital required when the unification of North and South Korea occurred.
- Strategic alliances with American corporations in various fields are desirable especially in high-tech industries. It would result in mutually beneficial industrial cooperation and also contribute to satisfactory economic relationship between two countries.
- We could also consider free trade agreement between US and Korea. The US is interested in Korea agricultural and service market while fearing the import increase in clothing and steels. Korean could benefit from more freer access to the US market and prepare for the formation of FTAA.
Korea and U.S. Culture
Cultural Interaction from Korean Perspective
Han Sang-Jin
Chairman, Presidential Commission for Policy Planning
Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University
Introduction
I would like to begin my talk by drawing attention to two recent findings that have struck me as being of some interest and importance. One is the Pew Global Attitude Project whose results were made known publicly in December, 2002. Despite the close military and economic ties between Korea and the United States, says the report, America's image among Koreans has deteriorated to such an extent that, as an overall evaluation, 44% of Koreans have a negative opinion of the America. This figure is higher than that of most of the countries being surveyed except some Islamic countries and Argentina (49%). Furthermore, in Asia, Korea turns out to be the most critical of the American-led war on terrorism, with as many as 72% of Koreans opposing the war. Even globally, this figure ranks Korea second from the top with the exception of only a few countries in the Middle East.
The second point that gathered my attention, is the fact that a surprisingly large number of Koreans joined nationwide protest rallies last December (2002) to mourn the two female Korean teenage students run over by a U.S. armored vehicle, and to demand a rewriting of the agreement governing the legal status of American troops in Korea (SOFA). Triggered by the acquital by a U.S. military court of the two American soldiers charged with the death of these girls, these rallies were initially led by activist young through the internet, but rapidly gained enthusiastic support all over the country from every strata in society cutting across age, gender, class, and religion. These people had become morally upset and angry since American appeared not to accept any responsibility for the deaths. On Saturday night of December, the 14th, for instance, more than three hundred thousand Koreans rallied at no less than 57 locations across the nation, including the Seoul City Hall Plaza, holding votive candles and singing songs. They announced 'the day of restoring of national sovereignty', while demanding a fair and equal partnership between Korea and the U.S. This massive candle lit march turned central Seoul into a "sea of light," ending peacefully in a festive mood, with no reports of violence.
Frankly speaking, while I, as a sociologist, was taking part in the World-cup street cheering in Seoul throughout June, 2002, I became convinced that a fundamental and drastic bottom-up social change is taking place in Korea. I see a definite and unmistakable continuity between the world-cup experience (to which I will get back soon) and the candlelight march referred to above. We should also ask what (if anything) is wrong with the relationship between Korea and the U.S. (particularly on the cultural domain), and also ask ourselves why the political and social reality is changing so rapidly in Korea. The Pew Global Attitude Project 2002 and the massive anti-American rallies in Korea provide us with a sufficient stimulus to undertake this re-examination.
To recap, I would like to propose that the key to understanding the tumultuous realignment underway in the relationship between the United States and Korea, lies in the profound socio-cultural transformation presently under way in Korea. In view of the tremendous impact of September the 11th on the American society and its value orientations, a certain shift may be underway in the United States as well, at least to a certain extent. In what follows, however, I will confine myself to the Korean side of the socio-cultural transformation.
Cultural Interactions between Korea and the West
Firstly, let me provide a brief overview of the cultural interaction between Korea and the West. For a long time, Korea remained almost unknown to the West. Except for a few accounts of Korea made by such Westerners as the Portuguese merchants who sailed near to the Korean coast in the mid-sixteenth century, Father Cespedes who had short personal experiences in Korea during the Imjin waeran (1592-97), and Hamel who left well-known documents, meaningful contact between Korea and the West had to wait until after 1840, when the Paris Foreign Missionary Society began to dispatch its missionaries to Korea. Thereafter, many priests compiled Korean dictionaries and studied Korean customs and culture up until their martyrdom and these documents have been collected by that Society in Paris. After 1880, when treaties began to be made with the Western powers, activity within the field of Korean Studies by European scholars became increasingly frequent.
It is the United States, however, that has wielded an overwhelming influence on the destiny of the Korean people since the end of the Second World War. First of all, the U.S. and the USSR made the decision to divide the Korean peninsula and the American army came to Korea as liberator from Japanese colonialism and, hence, could act as 'big brother.' Yet the U.S. saw Korea largely from their own geopolitical interests and perspective and, with the outburst of the Korean War, Korea became a symbol and a victim of the Cold War, suffering much from territorial division, war, poverty, dictatorial military regimes, ideological confrontation, and so on. There was not much room left after all of that, to discuss questions of culture.
Yet, as Korea showed itself capable of growing fast economically (as one of the four small dragons in East Asia after Japan), and, in addition, as Korea successfully joined the global wave of democratization which finally gave rise to the first peaceful transfer of power from the ruling to the opposition party in 1997, American concern over Korea became increasingly diversified going beyond the typical areas as defense, security, international relations, while addressing attention to such new needs as the comparative political-economic study of Korean development, the role of the government and conglomerates, as well as an interest in student and other social movements, democratic transition, civil society, and culture-specific areas like art, literature, and so on.
Despite these promising changes, however, I feel that an inter-cultural dialogue is badly needed today between Koreans and Americans to advance mutual understanding. In view of the tremendous impact of September 11 upon the American way of thinking and the emergence of a new generation of social actors (or social forces) in Korea who are ready to defy the old legacies of the Cold War and authoritarianism, I suspect that major problems from now on will bear more upon the question of national identity (of cultural aspirations and imaginations) than anything else. It is no longer meaningful (and even dangerous) if we conventionally cling to an old paradigm, losing touch with the shifting reality. Thus, I would argue that it is the time to draw keen attention to the socio-cultural transformation under way in the two countries. What is at stake in Korea today is no longer simply a Weberian question of a functional equivalent for the capitalist spirit, but a cultural awakening which involves cognitive, moral and aesthetic dimensions of national identity.
Korean development would then have to be understood as a combination of such multiple trends as aggressive economic growth, political transition toward democracy, and cultural awakening in two directions: first, increasing sensitivity to the question of national identity and, secondly, a 'post-conventional' tendency toward a discursive critical re-evaluation of taken-for-granted assumptions and world-views. These two tracks seem to be deeply interrelated and the changing reality is thrown sharply into relief when we examine the role of the United States on the Korean Peninsular.
The Question of National Identity
Historically speaking, Korean intellectuals became very sensitive to the issue of national identity during Japanese colonialism while advocating kukhak. This tradition was originated in Japan as an effort to reestablish a national ethos in the face of external challenges. In Japan this movement acted as a spiritual support for their modernization. However, Korea was different, as Chosôn had lost its national will with the onslaught of the Western powers and Japanese imperialism at the end of the nineteenth century. The possibilities of an endogenous development was prevented, while any modernization effort connected to an outside power failed. Naturally, this increased disillusion with, and criticism of, the lack of leadership, internal degradation, factionalism, and a perceived outmoded traditional culture, not to mention the imperialist interests and interference of foreign countries. Furthermore, Japan propagated a colonial mentality which belittled or denied the Korean national character. In such a context, the tradition of Kukhak emerged as an attempt to discover the Chosôn spirit through a study of religion, philosophy, art, folklore, history and literature and so on. Accordingly, this discipline was to possess a strong nationalistic determination from the outset.
Since then, the quest for an independent and legitimate subjectivity manifested itself in various forms depending on historical conjunctures. During Japanese colonial rule, for instance, it provided the underlying force behind the liberation movements of various kinds and, after the Second World War, became embedded in differing efforts in support of One Unified Korea against territorial division. In the age of the Cold War, the quest for national identity became imbued with a severe ideological polarization between North and South Korea over the issue of political legitimacy and orthodoxy.
This long-standing legacy of ideological polarization associated with the Cold War has finally begun to break down in Korea today. Associated with this, a significant socio-cultural transformation has begun to manifest itself. This transformation is critically related to the impact of the World-cup street cheering upon the conventional mentality of Koreans. Cultural sensitivities, ideas, dreams, and aspirations which had been cultivated in the process of democratization and which had accumulated under the surface, began to burst through finally in the form of a massive festival celebrating national pride and dignity. It was through this collective experience of self pride and dignity that Koreans became aware of their new potentialities. It was a great moment of self-awakening, comparable to the June popular democratic uprising of 1987. This new stream manifested itself again in the recent candlelight marches throughout Korea.
From the World-cup Experience to the Candlelight March
In retrospect, as the Korean soccer team defeated their formidable opponents in a series of matches with such European powerhouses as Poland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, before finally advancing to the semifinals, the entire nation was wrapped in an enormous festive mood. People went wild over the feat of the Korean squad and took to the streets to celebrate the great victory. In line with the rising enthusiasm of the soccer lovers, "the Red Devils," Korea's official supporters, prepared for the massive cheering through on-line discussions about the proper way of cheering, costumes, roosters' songs and slogans, and so on. Defying any political motivation or agenda, the Red Devils attempted to invite all the people to the street cheering by forming a loose network of national solidarity. In the match with Spain, consequently, some 5 million people gathered together in the centers of cities across the country and for the match with Germany some 7 million joined the street cheering. Korea's unprecedented success during the tournament amazed the world, moreover, because the massive cheering was never tainted with any violence or trouble. After the game was over, the cheering crowd went so far as to clean the streets, a proof of a highly mature civic consciousness. This self-autonomous management of the street cheering successfully satisfied people's desire for national pride and dignity.
Of particular significance in this regard is the 'Be the Reds' campaign which, in fact, signalled the end of the Cold War mentality. Koreans have been deeply obsessed with the red color which evokes the memories of the Korean War and communism. Against such a backdrop, the conservative media and the elder generations, haunted by the Red complex, were worried about young people who wore red shirts and called themselves 'Red Devils.' For the past several decades, the red color was regarded as a taboo symbolic of Communism or North Korea. Under such circumstance, the 'Be the Reds' campaign reflects the young people's ardent desire to escape from the existing Cold War mentalities as well as to leave behind authoritarian and hierarchical relations and forms of social control. Young people say that they simply like the red color which they believe symbolizes passion, determination, wealth and glory. Not by accident, the majority of the population followed the Red Devils in the World Cup street cheering, in the process subconsciously escaping from the Red Complex.
Here we can sense the profound impact of the World-cup street cheering upon the Korean society beyond its merely athletic implications. On the face of it, the Red Devils was nothing more than a voluntary group of soccer lovers. Upon deeper inspection, however, we can see a strong cultural challenge against the established order and an appeal for a new order embracing humanity and upgrading national pride and dignity. In this way the people projected their dreams through slogans like "Asian Pride" and "Dream Realized." By shouting "Dae-hanminguk," they expressed their willingness and aspirations to make a new Korea, of which could all feel proud. This was a decisive turning point from the self-humiliating legacy originating from Japanese colonial subjection toward a new self-respecting sensitivity. What comes out of this experience was by no means the revival of the old paradigm of nationalism or collectivism. On the contrary, all kinds of liberal experiments such as body painting, fashions with national flag, dances, songs, modes of cheering and greetings, and so on were nicely fused with the communitarian culture emphasizing national solidarity. All these experiments were led by those in their thirties and followed by the succeeding digital generations, who, instead of surrendering themselves to hierarchical and authoritarian relationships, held up to more flexible and pluralistic voluntary organizations and value orientations.
Thanks largely to these communitarian experiences and concurrent socio-cultural transformations, the quest for national identity may be seen now to be decisively liberated from the ideological burden of the past. This has created the room to see the United States not simply as a big brother, but as an equal partner. In the past, it was taken for granted that what the U.S. does is automatically good for Koreans. Only a few with exceptional bravery could wage an anti-American rally, as well documented by the seizure of the USA Information Center in Pusan by students of Seoul National University in 1982. But today ordinary citizens can freely ask whether the relationship between Korea and the United States is fair and equal. In other words, Koreans have begun profoundly to ask whether Americans are respecting Koreans in the terms of a reciprocal relationship.
Yet it must be stressed that the gap between the normative expectation and the reality still remains considerably large, which indicates a source of frustration. It may also be true that the quest for national identity involves ambiguities and uncertainties because Koreans are still far from completely overcoming the legacies of Japanese colonialism, national division, the Korean War, past authoritarian rule, and so on. Nevertheless, with a new President elected last December who has advocated systematic reforms, many attempts will be made to reduce the gap not only between Korea and the USA, but also domestically to reduce divisions within Korean society along many axes. In this respect, Koreans may be expected to become increasingly more capable than in the past of explicitly saying "No" when they feel their sovereignty severely damaged or degraded by external powers.
Three Factors to be Analyzed
Having said so, I would like to suggest that three factors need be taken into consideration in order to adequately understand the socio-cultural transformation under way in Korea. They are: 1) the formation of a new generation of social actors, or social forces, 2) the development of the internet as an alternative public sphere, and 3) nascent post-conventional value orientations. Taking all these factors into consideration, it will become clear that what was at stake in the recent candlelight marches in Korea was not simply a display of anti-American sentiment but the upsurge of a post-conventional moral development supported by other sociological as well as technological conditions. What I am saying here, is that there is a rational and systematic ground for this phenomenon and it is in this sense that this collective voice cannot simply be ignored and is certainly not to be underestimated.
Furthermore, I would argue that, to the extent that the Korean younger generations accept Western liberal and individual value orientations, probably far more actively than in any other Asian countries, there seems to be a far better chance than before for Koreans and Americans to understand and cooperate with each other, if the condition of equality or reciprocity is met. Despite the seeming troubles at hand, we can anticipate better relationships in terms of shared values toward individual freedom, competition and creativity, as well as a belief in fair procedures and justice. Yet problems will arise and become serious insofar as the normative presupposition of equal respect remains damaged. It will be difficult to simply close one's eyes diplomatically if one party treats the other not as an equal partner, but as a second-ranking participant. As a concrete example, if and insofar as the American policy toward Korea continues to be dictated by its own ideological understanding of Korea as a reflection of the Cold War, without fully taking into account the implications of the post-conventional cultural awakening in Korea, the majority of Koreans will probably find it difficult to go along with the American war-drive. What is in fact involved here is not a simple display of Anti-American sentiment, but the presence of a profound conflict of moral judgment. It must be remembered that peace on the Korean peninsula is of fundamental importance and concern for Koreans themselves, whereas American foreign policy too often tends to perceive merely it's own geopolitical security concerns, and Korea as a piece or instrument to be moved in a greater game.
Sociological Conditions
Of the three factors mentioned above, let me first examine the sociological conditions for cultural transformation. In this respect, I would like to pay attention to the characteristics of those who led the way in the nation's democratization movement in the 1980's. Now in their thirties and early forties, those of this generation have become the mainstay of the society, leading the IT-related industries as well as many other areas. With their devotion and struggle, they have upheld the nation's democracy in the 1980's and 1990's and laid a solid foundation for the tradition of civil participation. Many of Korea's largest NGOs (such as People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice), have been formed and led by their leadership. Moreover, they have spearheaded the nation's booming venture industry related to the info-communications revolution by developing various software and other technology. On the other hand, they have been actively involved in the politically significant net-activism.
In-depth analyses about them show a lot of interesting phenomena (Han, 2001). First, as they grew up and reached maturity in the midst of a culture of political protest in the 1980's, they have maintained and shared a collective identity as a reform-oriented social force. Second, they understand themselves as part of the "People" or "Grassroots," rather than as part of the Establishment. Third, they tend to see history and society in their keen attention to the rights and welfare of the common people rather than merely propping up the interests of a handful of power elites. Fourth, they are able to better understand through their broad social vision, the situation facing such social minorities as women, foreign laborers, the handicapped, the poor, prisoners, homosexuals, North Korean defectors and socialists. They try to embrace those minorities instead of excluding them. Fifth, they are able to maintain a sense of their national sovereignty in contrast to adopting subservient attitudes toward powerful states. Sixth, they show their support and respect to leaders who would rather live up to principles than surrender to unjustifiable and unacceptable compromises. Seventh, they are in favor of structural reforms in accordance with global standards, rather than clinging to parochialism and national preoccupation.
An interesting hypothesis in this regard concerns the formation of a distinctive social force which I have named the "middling grassroots" by which I mean those who understand themselves as part of the middle class while identifying themselves as "People" and/or "Grassroots" at the same time. In a sense, we can say that these kinds of people have been formed as a consequence of the particular path of economic development parallel to the development of the student movement since the 1960s (Han, 1997). It is not accidental that the student activists of the 1980s are today most active in defending public interests through NGO activities while running far ahead in developing IT-related venture firms. Because of their disillusionment of politics and the mass media today, they seem to be very enthusiastic in using the Internet as an alternative forum for discussion.
The cultural root of this development may be traced back to the 16th century when private academies began to be formed as moral centers where intellectuals and students studied Confucian teachings. Originally, the separation between scholarship and politics was presupposed. However, as academies increased in number from the 17th century, "procedure evolved and a network developed among private academy students that allowed them to address matters they thought required attention." In the memorials to be sent to the throne, they dealt with not only political issues but also "a wide variety of topics pertaining to local affairs, social issues, and scholarly concerns" (Choe, 1999:44).
Of course, it must be acknowledged that this Confucian participatory tradition was limited to the upper classes and only to men. But this tradition has had a great influence on Korean history, giving rise to a strong civil society and at the same time laying the roots for a contentional middle class. Thus, one can speak of a Confucian participatory tradition historically rooted and yet radically reframed in the age of the post-traditional information society (Han, 2000).
Post-Conventional Value Orientation
However, what I would like to defend is not a Confucian, but a post-Confucian cultural orientation. By post-Confucian I mean, of course, a post-traditional, reflexive kind of attitude, according to which traditions can never be simply taken for granted, but rather persist only "in so far as they are made available to discursive justification and are prepared to enter into open dialogue not only with other traditions but with alternative modes of doing things" (Giddens, 1995:105). In this context Giddens speaks of the "post-traditional society" as "the first global society."
A post-traditional society is not a national society -- we are speaking here of a global cosmopolitan order. Nor is it a society in which traditions cease to exist; in many respects there are impulses, or pressures, towards the sustaining or the recovery of traditions. It is a society, however, in which tradition changes its status. In the context of a globalizing, cosmopolitan order, traditions are constantly brought into contact with one another and forced to 'declare themselves' (Giddens, 1995:83)
In this respect, Confucianism cannot be an exception. I would like instead to argue, that a post-traditional and hence a post-Confucian attitude and world-view has become prevalent among younger generations in Korea.
Let me here compare two surveys I conducted in late 1999, in the process of clarifying further what I mean exactly when I talk of the post-Confucian attitude. One of these was a national survey for the population at large (general public, hereafter) and the other was designed for those who studied at Seoul National University in the 1980's (or the 386 generation). The Confucian culture was divided into two categories, that is, hierarchical and humanistic. The hierarchical mode includes four traditional Confucian values; 1) loyalty to the ruler, 2) respect for the aged, 3) the unity of king, teacher and father, and 4) the favorable treatment of the eldest son. On the other hand, the humanistic mode contains traditional ideas as 5) people-based development, 6) the union of man and heaven 7) humanitarianism, and 8) a sense of proportion or moderation. The surveys were conducted on the basis of a four-level questionnaire system, asking how valuable each of these virtues will be in the nation's future.
The analysis shows that the two groups have remarkably different views on the hierarchical aspect of Confucianism, as
reveals.
[Table-1] Attitudes Toward Hierarchical Culture
Unit: number(%)
Positive Negative Total
386 Generation 268(44.2) 338(55.8) 606(100.0)
General Public 1041(86.7) 160(13.3) 1201(100.0)
As for humanistic culture, on the contrary, the 386 generation of SNU graduates were noticeably more in favour of it than the general public. If we combine these two different modes within Confucian culture, it turns out that 55.8 percent of the SNU graduates responded negatively to hierarchical culture but positively to humanistic culture. On the other hand, some 75.4 percent of the general public positively embraced both cultures.
In this context, the negative evaluation of hierarchical culture on the part of the 386 generation stands for a departure from the longstanding traditional norms and customs and hence indicates, to my way of thinking, a reflexive post-confucian way of thinking. This is so because a post-conventional morality implies the possibility to reject some taken-for-granted yet no longer justifiable conventions on the basis of reasoning and discursive testing, whilst at the same time making possible a reconstruction and renovation of some significant yet marginal traits with normative validity on a new basis. In this respect, we can say that the younger generations in Korea are neither totally against nor merely conventionally accepting of the Confucian cultural heritage as a whole, but are rather very selective in that they tend to evaluate tradition from a global perspective. This means that their way of thinking has already become quite globalized (or individualized) to a certain degree, so that they are most in favor of accepting those traits of tradition which are most compatible with what they consider to be universally acceptable.
The Impact of the Internet
The last condition for socio-cultural transformation concerns the technological infrastructure of communication. What attracts our attention in this regard is the explosive increase in the number of internet subscribers and its widespread use. Together with its technological advancement, the scope and range of the internet has spread far and wide across the nation. Its impact on society at large therefore cannot be under-estimated. In 1999, the number of internet subscribers was merely 3.7 million but this number had soared up to some 4 million by 2000, 7.8 million by 2001 and 10 million by October 2002. At the end of 2001, Korea stood at the world's top in terms of its internet subscription (with a rate of 17.2 per 100 people), followed by Canada (8.4%) and Sweden (5.0%). At present, Korean users spend longer time on the internet than their counterparts in other countries.
Next, we need to carefully examine the social background of these internet users, (or netizens). As table 2 shows, the rate of increase in Internet use from October 1999 to December 2001 is explosive. It has soared up from 33.6 percent to 93.3 percent in the age group between 7 to 19; from 41.9 percent to 84.6 percent among people in their twenties; and from 18.5 percent to 61.6 percent among people in their thirties. As of December 2001, 88.4 percent of elementary pupils, 99.8 percent of middle school students and 99.0 percent of high school students and 99.3 percent of college students are using the Internet.
[Table 3] Increasing Rates of Internet Use by Age Group
years age Rates(%)
Oct. 1999 Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001
7 - 19 33.6 74.1 93.3
Twenties 41.9 74.6 84.6
Thirties 18.5 43.6 61.6
Forties 12.8 22.7 35.6
Over fifties 2.9 5.7 8.7
Source: Korea Internet White Paper, 2002
Who, then, is playing the leading role in net-activism? The largest group of internet users are in their teenage years. Those who are in their twenties may be said to be leading today's net culture. But the leadership in the ongoing online movement and online activism is taken by people in their thirties. In this regard we must closely examine the relationship between those in their thirties who facilitated the nation's democratization and established the powerful tradition of civil participation and the succeeding digital generation. One could define the former as a 'politicized, social-movement generation' and the latter as a 'relatively conservative depoliticized generation.' Another might say that the former experienced "political eruption through the June uprising in 1987" while the latter created "cultural eruption in the 2002 World Cup." Still others may raise the spectre of generational conflict between these two groups.
But we should not overlook the common nature underlying these two groups merely for the sake of emphasizing superficial differences. Despite so many empirical differences, these two generations have one important thing in common, that is the underlying motivation to escape from the constraint of the established order and its norms. In other words, those in their thirties had spearheaded the struggle against the military dictatorship while the succeeding digital generation is in the midst of attempting to verify through a critical stance, a variety of moral and cultural issues in their daily living. On the surface, the former seems to be collectivistic and ideologically-oriented, the latter highly individualized. But both of these two groups share a post-conventional reasoning and, in consequence, are strongly motivated to test the taken-for-granted conventions such as the Cold-War mentality and ideological polarization, and authoritarian and hierarchical value orientations. The World Cup street cheering in June 2002 as well as the recent candlelight marches in Seoul provide us with numerous examples that substantiate such an observation. Relying on the cultural power of the Internet, the digital generation attempts to break up the hierarchy of old authority and experience their new identities in the freedom of cyberspace (Yoon, 2001, 255).
Closing Remarks
Can we say clearly where the current cultural transformations in Korea are going to take us in the near future? Though there are some ambiguities involved and of course the path taken will depend upon many factors yet to be determined, it can be said with some certainty that the age of a hierarchical control of civil society is over. With the result of the presidential elections last December, one can predict with confidence that the attempt for dual democratization, namely the democratization of the authoritarian state and that of civil society, will be intensified in many respects.
In this context, I imagine that the linkage effects of the three factors mentioned above will likely be felt stronger as time goes by. Likewise, the conventional image of the United States as a big brother will likely face many more challenges to come. And yet, on the whole there seems to be good prospects and increasingly better opportunities for Koreans and Americans to reconstruct their cultural relationship on the basis of mutually shared universal values, (neither ethnocentric/parochial self-interest nor conventionally given stereotypes). The proven fact that young Koreans with a higher educational background, as a rational core of the middling grassroots, are increasingly leaning toward universally acceptable global values instead of the old style of nationalism clearly point to the possibility of a better inter-cultural dialogue between Koreans and Americans and, hence, between the East and the West. I am very confident that we can develop this dialogue far better in Korea than in any Asian countries.
REFERENCES
Choe, Yong-ho 1999 "Private Academies and the State in Late Choson Korea," J.Kim Haboush & M. Deuchler (eds.), Culture and the State in Late Choson Korea. Harvard Univ. Press, 15-45.
Giddens, Anthony 1995 "Living in a Post-Tradidtional Society," in Reflexive Modernization, ed. by Ulrich Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash, Cambridge: Polity Press, 56-109.
Habermas, Jurgen, 1996. Between Facts and Norms. Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press.
Han, Sang-Jin, 1997. "The Political Economy and Moral Institutions: The Formation of the Middling Grassroots in Korea," Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, 23(1), 71-89.
------- 2000. "Internet Revolution and Asian Values," Journal of American Studies, 32(2), 235-253.
------- 2001. "Modernization and the Rise of Civil Society: The Role of the MIddling Grassroots for Democratization in Korea," Human Studies, 24, 113-132.
National Computerization Agency. 2002. Korea Internet White Paper.
Yoon, Sunny, 2001. "Internet Discourse and the Habitus of Korea's New Generation," Charles Ess & Fay Sudweeks (eds.), Culture, Technology and Communication. State University of New York Press, 241-260.
First Draft (do not quote)
Toward the Next Fifty Years of the ROK-US Alliance
By In-Taek Hyun
Prepared for 2003 Korea Centennial Conference on
Enhancing the Partnership Between Korea and the United States in the 21st Century,
Organized by the East-West Center and University Hawaii, Center for Korean Studies,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 6-8 January 2003
The emerging ROK-US discord over the North Korean nuclear issue and the rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea are posing new and serious challenges to the 50-year-old alliance of South Korea and the United States. Currently, President Kim Dae-Jung has publicly denounced the US plan to put political and economic pressure on North Korea, while the Bush Administration has taken a tougher stance toward North Korea. In Seoul, anti-American sentiment has rapidly spread out as unprecedented anti-American rallies have flared up since two Korean school girls were killed by the American military vehicle.
Meanwhile, President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed that South Korea should take the initiative in inter-Korean talks, and should seek more balanced and autonomous relations with the United States. All of these indicate that unless South Korea and the United States manage the current situation appropriately, the overall US-Korea relations including the status of the USFK (the US Forces in Korea) would eventually face structural change in the near future. The urgent tasks that they have to handle are at least four-fold: (1) the new round of the North Korean nuclear question; (2) the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA); (3) the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK); and (4) other matters including ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).
The new round of the North Korean nuclear question
The first question that we have to ask pertaining to the future of the US-Korea security relations is whether both South Korea and the United States could adjust their different positions on North Korea and make unified voice against it. In fact, it is widely known that since the inauguration of the Bush Administration, the United States and South Korea have shown their differences on how to deal with North Korea. Despite their efforts, the differences have not been narrowed down during the last two years.
In a nutshell, they have had very different perspectives on major aspects: (1) perceptions on North Korea; (2) assessment on Sunshine policy; (3) approaches to North Korea; (4) policy priorities. Table 1 shows major differences among three actors--the Kim Dae-Jung government, the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration. Facing with the current North Korean brinkmanship, both parties have taken different approaches. President Kim has emphasized peaceful resolution and tried to continue dialogue with the North, while President Bush has stressed tougher measures.
-------------------------------------
Table 1
------------------------------------
The last South Korean presidential election is likely to be a major turning point for the North Korean nuclear question. President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun has daunting tasks to handle the North Korean nuclear problem even before his inauguration. Like President Kim Dae-Jung, who was forced to handle the South Korean economic crisis right after the presidential election in 1997, President-elect Roh has been already deeply involved in the North Korean question for the last two weeks. Therefore, how President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun and the next South Korean government will handle the North Korean nuclear issue is the key to the issue itself and to the future relationship between South Korea and the United States.
Overall, in dealing with the North Korean question, the domestic and international environment that President-elect Roh would face are likely to be tougher than ones that President Kim has faced during the last five years. First, in this 2nd round of the North Korean nuclear problem, North Korea has tried directly to deal with the United States. It should be noted that the 1994 Agreed Framework was achieved through the U.S.-North Korea dialogue, not through South-North Korea dialogue. In the process, South Korea was not the major negotiation partner and nearly marginalized in the discussion and deciding the outcome of the 1994 agreement.
Second, the current domestic environment is another obstacle that President-elect Roh has to overcome. It seems that the Korean people become now more split than before especially with regard to the North Korean problem. This presidential election, above all, clearly shows it. The so-called "South-South conflict"-not North-South conflict- prevailed. It is and will be the major stumbling block that President-elect Roh should overcome even in coping with the North Korean issue.
Third, the United States is another factor. President-elect Roh, right after the election, mentioned that he would follow President Kim's Sunshine policy. Given the fact that there have been some basic differences between the Bush Administration and the Kim government over President Kim's Sunshine policy, the President-elect Roh does not seem to have smooth road ahead.
Nevertheless, the situation is not all negative. Within the limited leverage, what the new Korean government should do first is to reconfirm the ROK-U.S. policy coordination to cope with the North Korean issue. Close consultation is an immediate task. A special envoy, if necessary, should be sent to the U.S. first. On the base of this, the Roh government could take more practical and realistic stance toward the issue.
Second, it should be noted that South Korea is not a third party in this matter. When South Korea tries to give some suggestions or policy alternatives to solve the issue, it needs to see whether they are acceptable to itself, but not of whether they are acceptable to other two parties. The North Korean nuclear issue poses a problem to South Korea let alone its ally, or the United States, and South Korea should thus try to handle the issue that way. South Korea cannot and should not be a "neutral mediator."
Third, among the various policy choices, it is not an appropriate approach to propose an early summit meeting between South Korea's Roh Moo-Hyun and North Korea's Kim Jong-Il as a short-term solution to the current nuclear issue, simply because North Korea now would like to have a dialogue with the United States. It is not a right timing for such a proposal.
The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
The inequity of the SOFA appears to be one of the reasons for the recent anti-American demonstrations in South Korea. During the presidential campaign, both candidates from the ruling and opposition party have promised to change US-ROK SOFA so that the Korean authorities will have a bigger role in dealing with criminal cases. Accordingly, Korean and American staff members of the Criminal Jurisdiction Subcommittee met and discussed about the possibility of the improvement of the SOFA on December 16, 2002.
It is known that the Korean authorities wanted to have guaranteed access to suspects being held by the U.S. military authorities in the initial stages of investigations. They also asked new procedures for the questioning of GI suspects in Korean custody. The SOFA says an American government representative must be present during any questioning of those suspects; the Korean sides wanted a U.S. commitment to send that observer within an hour of a request from police or prosecutors. The Korean authorities also wanted that suspects in U.S. custody should be made available immediately for questioning by the Korean authorities. It is known that the American side was likely to agree to all of these requests by the Korean authorities. If both sides agree on these, the SOFA's binding "agreed views" will be made in the near future.
US-ROK SOFA was signed at Seoul July, 1966. It was revised twice in 1991 and 2001. The Korean government believes that the current SOFA is not quite unequal in comparison with US-Germany SOFA and US-Japan SOFA. Above all, paragraphs on criminal jurisdiction have been revised and US-ROK SOFA has articles on environmental protection, which US-Japan SOFA does not have.
Regarding the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, the most important difference between US-ROK SOFA and US-Japan SOFA is related to the clause on "custody." Article XXII paragraph 5 of US-ROK SOFA says that "the custody of an accused member of the United States armed forces or civilian component, or of a dependent, over whom the Republic of Korea is to exercise jurisdiction shall remain with the military authorities of the United States until he is indicted by the Republic of Korea." The article regulates that the US authorities may transfer custody to the Korean authorities at any time. It, however, says that the US authorities shall give sympathetic consideration to any request for transfer of custody which may be made by the ROK authorities in specific cases. In other words, custody of an accused can be transferred to the Korean authorities only by sympathetic consideration of the US authorities. In comparison with this, the US-Japan SOFA (Article XVIII paragraph 4) regulates that custody can be transferred after the indictment of an accused.
Despite the fact, however, the Korean government explains that overall, there are not much differences between the US-ROK SOFA and the US-Japan SOFA and even the US-Germany SOFA. As Table 1 indicates, three SOFAs are nearly identical in terms of the clauses of criminal jurisdiction, environment, and labor.
------------------
Table 2
----------------------
The problem, however, is that it is doubtful whether such explanation by the Korean government can meet the expectation of the Korean people, who strongly want the revision of the SOFA itself, but not simply the improvement of it. Due largely to the current massive rallies, anti-American movement has been already very organized and massively mobilized. It is believed that ideological NGOs, radical student groups and labor unions are behind it. Anti-American sentiment, therefore, is likely to spread out quickly in the Korean society in the near future.
Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether there is "any bad clause," which has to be revised immediately, compared to other SOFAs. As we discussed, both the Korean and American authorities seem to believe that US-ROK SOFA is relatively a reasonable one compared to other ones. They also believe that the current revision was only made in 2001, just two years ago. However, we should closely check the practices in the operational dimension and if there is any wrong doing, they should be corrected.
Whether and how the next Korean government led by President-elect Roh Moo-Hyun can handle this issue is another question to us. The Roh Moo-Hyun government, in this sense, has both difficulties and merits in handling this issue. It might be easy to persuade the anti-American movement groups, because they were mostly supporters of President-elect himself during the campaign. However, it must be a heavy political burden for him, because in doing this, he will have to say what they would not like to listen. If he fails, it could be an enormous political fiasco for him. Thus, the way ahead to him is not an easy one.
The Future of USFK
The most crucial question for the policy planners and key decision-makers of both South Korea and the United States for the last ten years has been whether and how both countries would maintain their alliance relationship if North Korea ceases to exist or if North Korea no longer poses a major threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. With regard to this, the conclusion thus far is that both countries should maintain their alliance relationship even after the unification of the Korean peninsula. President Kim Dae-Jung himself has kept saying the necessity of the US forces in Korea even after the Korean unification. This is right position. In fact, there are some Koreans who think differently from this. However, the majority of the Korean people including young generations support the USFK despite the current anti-American sentiment.
In this regard, I believe that the assumption of the "Nye Report" is still valid. In February 1995, the United States highlighted a new strategy for the East-Asian Pacific region, reaffirming U.S. commitment to maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 for the foreseeable future. The report, the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, known as the "Nye Report," reaffirmed U.S. commitment to South Korea, emphasizing five major security objectives. They are: (1) to deter any North Korean aggression; (2) to maintain approximately 37,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea; (3) to continue to assume more South Korea's leading role in its own defense; (4) to increase steadily South Korea's cost-sharing contributions as its economy grows; and (5) to pursue a robust security relationship between the United States and South Korea, even if the threat from North Korea were to diminish. Even after seven years that the Nye Report has made, the basic condition of the Korean peninsula has not been greatly changed. The North Korean intransigence remains high. The Gordian knot of the North Korean nuclear program is not likely to be untied easily in the near future.
The current rift between the United States and South Korea as to the North Korean issue and anti-American sentiment in Seoul is in some sense natural. We should not be too emotional in dealing with this matter. In theory, one of the main assumptions of an alliance is that there is a perception on the part of the member states that they have "common interests and common enemies." In reality, however, member states have often different priorities with regard to their perceived enemies. The extent of perceived threat also varies over time. Thus we should not expect that allies always share the same degree of common interest and common threat perception.
In the case of the US-Korea alliance, South Korea tends to regard U.S. forces as a deterrent power against the North Korean military threat, while the United States sees it in a broader context. During the last five years, due largely to President Kim's Sunshine policy, many Koreans have gradually tended to think, rightly or not, that the North Korean military threat has been diminished. But the majority of the people still believe that the North Korean threat exists as it was. In reality, the North Korean nuclear problem is still unresolved and even severer than before. Moreover, the future of the North Korea regime is not likely to be bright, mainly because even if the nuclear issue will be resolved peacefully, the North Korean dilemma, which is related to the openness of its regime and therefore the fate of its regime, will not disappear. It signifies that the future of the Korean peninsula will be uncertain and unstable.
On balance, any attempt to change U.S troops, in terms of scale, size, and structure, is premature at this moment. Moreover, it should not be pursued unilaterally by anyone party of the alliance. If it happens in that manner, it would be an enormous political, military, strategic, economic, and societal burden for South Korea. For the United States, those changes would demand fundamental readjustments of its East Asian strategy.
Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula and USFK
Inter-Korean arms control is also closely related to the issue of USFK. At present, it seems that the probability of successful inter-Korean arms control is not high. First, there is a clear conceptual gap between the two Koreas regarding the threat: that is, while South Korea is primarily concerned with North Korea's military threat, North Korea is mainly concerned with the threat from the United States.
Second, there is a big difference between the two Koreas in terms of military capabilities. While South Korea's military capability is primarily conventional, North Korea is believed to pass the breakpoint by acquiring WMD capabilities. In this regard, inter-Korean arms control is not easy. This asymmetrical weapons structure between the South and North makes inter-Korean arms control harder.
Third, inter-Korean arms control, as mentioned above, is inevitably connected with the issue of USFK and combined defense system.
Fourth, inter-Korean arms control will be greatly affected by regional strategic landscape.
Fifth, political utility of armed forces and military assets is one of the major impediments of the progress in tension reduction and arms control due to the regime characteristics and related internal constraints. However, on the contrary, domestic political climate could be a major triggering factor for it.
Over the years, North Korean proposals on inter-Korean arms control have been somewhat changed, but their main arguments are four-fold: (1) the withdrawal of the USFK; (2) the conclusion of peace treaty between the US and North Korea; (3) ban on the combined military exercises with foreign troops; and (4) ban on the introduction of new weapons.
In contrast, South Korea has adopted three-stage approach: CBMs ® arms limits ® arms reduction. The first stage is related to tension reduction and confidence-building measures. In this stage, there will be the resolution of WMD issues and major CSBMs including transparency and communication measures. The second stage is one for coexistence and cooperation for peace on the Korean peninsula. It includes arms limitations, budget freeze, security of capital area, compliance to international regimes, and more intrusive CBMs and transparency measures. The third stage is related to arms reduction. The reduction of offensive weapons will be made.
In doing this, South Korea and the Unite States want to separate the issue related to the status of the USFK from inter-Korean arms control. The status of the USFK is clearly not the object of negotiation between South and North Korea. It is the issue between the United States and South Korea.
The Structure of CFC
The structure of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) has been the focal point of the discussion of the U.S.-Korea alliance during the last fifteen years. The change of the USFK is not only related to its size and deployment, but also the structure of the CFC.
Until the early 1990s, the commander of the CFC, an American general, had exercised operational control over the most of the South Korean forces over a long period of time. In October 1992, the United States and South Korea agreed that South Korea would take over the peacetime operational control of the South Korean forces from the United States. Under the new agreement, the chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises operational control over Korean combat forces in peacetime, while the commander of the CFC exercises it in time of war. The transfer of peacetime operational control was effectuated on December 1, 1994.
The chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff now has the authority and responsibility over the whole of operations exercised by the South Korean forces in peacetime without U.S. consent. They include: exercises for combat readiness, military exercises including field maneuver and tactical exercises at different echelons, combined tactical exercises, and ground, sea and air surveillance activities by the Air Force and the Navy. But the commander of the CFC still has the authority to command the combined forces, even though the peacetime operational control has been transferred to the chairman of ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The major role of the commander of the CFC is to deter aggression from North Korea in peacetime and to win a war if it breaks out. Therefore, it is practically difficult to differentiate a role in peacetime from that in wartime. In order to facilitate smooth linkage of the operational control between peacetime and wartime, he has the authority to establish operational planning, to manage intelligence for early warning, and to plan and implement combined exercises such as Ulchi Focus.
In fact, operational control cannot be clearly divided into two parts, that is, peacetime and wartime control. However, we did it artificially. In doing this, there was a political decision. The return of peacetime operational control once had a symbolic meaning for South Korea. Since mid-1980s, operational control had been the thorny domestic political issue, because it was closely related to the very sensitive issue at that time, that is, the involvement of the military over politics under the authoritarian regime, which was allegedly supported by the United States. Accordingly, South Koreans tended to think that the U.S. operational control over the combined forces was the symbol of South Korea's dependence on the United States. As the issue of operational control became a political one and a source of anti-American sentiment, the ruling party led by then the presidential candidate Roh Tae-Woo had proposed the return of the operational control in the 1987 presidential election as a political bargain.
The issue of operational control should not be politicized. It should be discussed solely on the base of strategic necessity. Thus far, the return of wartime operational control did not become a serious domestic security issue in Korea and there have not been serious discussions between the United States and South Korea on it. However, the issuThis is an East-West Wire, copyright East-West Center